[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 199 (Monday, October 15, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 62624-63200]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-21972]
[[Page 62623]]
Vol. 77
Monday,
No. 199
October 15, 2012
Part II
Environmental Protection Agency
40 CFR Parts 85, 86, and 600
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Department of Transportation
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 523, 531, 533, et al.
2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 199 / Monday, October 15, 2012 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 62624]]
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
40 CFR Parts 85, 86, and 600
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 523, 531, 533, 536, and 537
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799; FRL-9706-5; NHTSA-2010-0131]
RIN 2060-AQ54; RIN 2127-AK79
2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards
AGENCIES: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: EPA and NHTSA, on behalf of the Department of Transportation,
are issuing final rules to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
improve fuel economy for light-duty vehicles for model years 2017 and
beyond. On May 21, 2010, President Obama issued a Presidential
Memorandum requesting that NHTSA and EPA develop through notice and
comment rulemaking a coordinated National Program to improve fuel
economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions of light-duty vehicles for
model years 2017-2025, building on the success of the first phase of
the National Program for these vehicles for model years 2012-2016. This
final rule, consistent with the President's request, responds to the
country's critical need to address global climate change and to reduce
oil consumption. NHTSA is finalizing Corporate Average Fuel Economy
standards for model years 2017-2021 and issuing augural standards for
model years 2022-2025 under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as
amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act. NHTSA will set
final standards for model years 2022-2025 in a future rulemaking. EPA
is finalizing greenhouse gas emissions standards for model years 2017-
2025 under the Clean Air Act. These standards apply to passenger cars,
light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles, and represent
the continuation of a harmonized and consistent National Program. Under
the National Program automobile manufacturers will be able to continue
building a single light-duty national fleet that satisfies all
requirements under both programs while ensuring that consumers still
have a full range of vehicle choices that are available today. EPA is
also finalizing minor changes to the regulations applicable to model
years 2012-2016, with respect to air conditioner performance, nitrous
oxides measurement, off-cycle technology credits, and police and
emergency vehicles.
DATES: This final rule is effective on December 14, 2012, sixty days
after date of publication in the Federal Register. The incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this regulation is approved
by the Director of the Federal Register as of December 14, 2012.
ADDRESSES: EPA and NHTSA have established dockets for this action under
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799 and NHTSA 2010-0131, respectively.
All documents in the docket are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov index. Although listed in the index, some
information is not publicly available, e.g., confidential business
information (CBI) or other information whose disclosure is restricted
by statute. Certain other material, such as copyrighted material, will
be publicly available in hard copy in EPA's docket, and electronically
in NHTSA's online docket. Publicly available docket materials can be
found either electronically in www.regulations.gov by searching for the
dockets using the Docket ID numbers above, or in hard copy at the
following locations: EPA: EPA Docket Center, EPA/DC, EPA West, Room
3334, 1301 Constitution Ave. NW., Washington, DC. The Public Reading
Room is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday,
excluding legal holidays. The telephone number for the Public Reading
Room is (202) 566-1744. NHTSA: Docket Management Facility, M-30, U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), West Building, Ground Floor, Rm.
W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. The DOT
Docket Management Facility is open between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern
Time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: EPA: Christopher Lieske, Office of
Transportation and Air Quality, Assessment and Standards Division,
Environmental Protection Agency, 2000 Traverwood Drive, Ann Arbor MI
48105; telephone number: 734-214-4584; fax number: 734-214-4816; email
address: [email protected], or contact the Assessment and
Standards Division; email address: [email protected]. NHTSA:
Rebecca Yoon, Office of the Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
20590. Telephone: (202) 366-2992.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Does this action apply to me?
This action affects companies that manufacture or sell new light-
duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles,
as defined under EPA's CAA regulations,\1\ and passenger automobiles
(passenger cars) and non-passenger automobiles (light trucks) as
defined under NHTSA's CAFE regulations.\2\ Regulated categories and
entities include:
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\1\ ``Light-duty vehicle,'' ``light-duty truck,'' and ``medium-
duty passenger vehicle'' are defined in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.
Generally, the term ``light-duty vehicle'' means a passenger car,
the term ``light-duty truck'' means a pick-up truck, sport-utility
vehicle, or minivan of up to 8,500 lbs gross vehicle weight rating,
and ``medium-duty passenger vehicle'' means a sport-utility vehicle
or passenger van from 8,500 to 10,000 lbs gross vehicle weight
rating. Medium-duty passenger vehicles do not include pick-up
trucks.
\2\ ``Passenger car'' and ``light truck'' are defined in 49 CFR
Part 523.
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NAICS Codes
Category \A\ Examples of potentially regulated entities
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Industry...................................... 336111 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers.
336112
Industry...................................... 811111 Commercial Importers of Vehicles and Vehicle
Components.
811112
811198
423110
Industry...................................... 335312 Alternative Fuel Vehicle Converters.
336312
[[Page 62625]]
336399
811198
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\A\ North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather provides a
guide regarding entities likely to be regulated by this action. To
determine whether particular activities may be regulated by this
action, you should carefully examine the regulations. You may direct
questions regarding the applicability of this action to the person
listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
Table of Contents
I. Overview of Joint EPA/NHTSA Final 2017-2025 National Program
A. Executive Summary
1. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
2. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Final Rule
3. Costs and Benefits of National Program
B. Introduction
1. Continuation of the National Program
2. Additional Background on the National Program and Stakeholder
Engagement Prior to the NPRM
3. Public Participation and Stakeholder Engagement Since the
NPRM Was Issued
4. California's Greenhouse Gas Program
C. Summary of the Final 2017-2025 National Program
1. Joint Analytical Approach
2. Level of the Standards
3. Form of the Standards
4. Program Flexibilities for Achieving Compliance
5. Mid-Term Evaluation
6. Coordinated Compliance
7. Additional Program Elements
D. Summary of Costs and Benefits for the National Program
1. Summary of Costs and Benefits for the NHTSA CAFE Standards
2. Summary of Costs and Benefits for the EPA's GHG Standards
3. Why are the EPA and NHTSA MY 2025 estimated per-vehicle costs
different?
E. Background and Comparison of NHTSA and EPA Statutory
Authority
1. NHTSA Statutory Authority
2. EPA Statutory Authority
3. Comparing the Agencies' Authority
II. Joint Technical Work Completed for This Final Rule
A. Introduction
B. Developing the Future Fleet for Assessing Costs, Benefits,
and Effects
1. Why did the agencies establish baseline and reference vehicle
fleets?
2. What comments did the agencies receive regarding fleet
projections for the NPRM?
3. Why were two fleet projections created for the FRM?
4. How did the agencies develop the MY 2008 baseline vehicle
fleet?
5. How did the agencies develop the projected MY 2017-2025
vehicle reference fleet for the 2008 model year based fleet?
6. How did the agencies develop the model year 2010 baseline
vehicle fleet as part of the 2010 based fleet projection?
7. How did the agencies develop the projected my 2017-2025
vehicle reference fleet for the 2010 model year based fleet?
8. What are the differences in the sales volumes and
characteristics of the MY 2008 based and the MY 2010 based fleets
projections?
C. Development of Attribute-Based Curve Shapes
1. Why are standards attribute-based and defined by a
mathematical function?
2. What attribute are the agencies adopting, and why?
3. How have the agencies changed the mathematical functions for
the MYs 2017-2025 standards, and why?
4. What curves are the agencies promulgating for MYs 2017-2025?
5. Once the agencies determined the slope, how did the agencies
determine the rest of the mathematical function?
6. Once the agencies determined the complete mathematical
function shape, how did the agencies adjust the curves to develop
the proposed standards and regulatory alternatives?
D. Joint Vehicle Technology Assumptions
1. What technologies did the agencies consider?
2. How did the agencies determine the costs of each of these
technologies?
3. How did the agencies determine the effectiveness of each of
these technologies?
4. How did the agencies consider real-world limits when defining
the rate at which technologies can be deployed?
5. Maintenance and Repair Costs Associated With New Technologies
E. Joint Economic and Other Assumptions
F. CO2 Credits and Fuel Consumption Improvement
Values for Air Conditioning Efficiency, Off-cycle Reductions, and
Full-size Pickup Trucks
1. Air Conditioning Efficiency Credits and Fuel Consumption
Improvement Values
2. Off-Cycle CO2 Credits
3. Advanced Technology Incentives for Full-Size Pickup Trucks
G. Safety Considerations in Establishing CAFE/GHG Standards
1. Why do the agencies consider safety?
2. How do the agencies consider safety?
3. What is the current state of the research on statistical
analysis of historical crash data?
4. How do the agencies think technological solutions might
affect the safety estimates indicated by the statistical analysis?
5. How have the agencies estimated safety effects for the final
rule?
III. EPA MYs 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards
A. Overview of EPA Rule
1. Introduction
2. Why is EPA establishing MYs 2017-2025 standards for light-
duty vehicles?
3. What is EPA finalizing?
4. Basis for the GHG Standards Under Section 202(a)
5. Other Related EPA Motor Vehicle Regulations
B. Model Year 2017-2025 GHG Standards for Light-duty Vehicles,
Light-duty Trucks, and Medium Duty Passenger Vehicles
1. What fleet-wide emissions levels correspond to the
CO2 standards?
2. What are the CO2 attribute-based standards?
3. Mid-Term Evaluation
4. Averaging, Banking, and Trading Provisions for CO2
Standards
5. Small Volume Manufacturer Standards
6. Additional Lead Time for Intermediate Volume Manufacturers
7. Small Business Exemption
8. Police and Emergency Vehicle Exemption From GHG Standards
9. Nitrous Oxide, Methane, and CO2-equivalent
Approaches
10. Test Procedures
C. Additional Manufacturer Compliance Flexibilities
1. Air Conditioning Related Credits
2. Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrid Electric
Vehicles, Fuel Cell Vehicles, and Dedicated and Dual Fuel Compressed
Natural Gas Vehicles
3. Incentives for Using Advanced ``Game-Changing'' Technologies
in Full-Size Pickup Trucks
4. Treatment of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles, Dual Fuel
Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles, and Ethanol Flexible Fuel Vehicles
for GHG Emissions Compliance
5. Off-cycle Technology Credits
D. Technical Assessment of the CO2 Standards
1. How did EPA develop reference and control fleets for
evaluating standards?
2. What are the effectiveness and costs of CO2-
reducing technologies?
3. How were technologies combined into ``Packages'' and what is
the cost and effectiveness of packages?
4. How does EPA project how a manufacturer would decide between
options to improve CO2 performance to meet a fleet
average standard?
5. Projected Compliance Costs and Technology Penetrations
6. How does the technical assessment support the final
CO2 standards as compared to the alternatives has EPA
considered?
7. Comments Received on the Analysis of Technical Feasibility
and Appropriateness of the Standards
[[Page 62626]]
8. To what extent do any of today's vehicles meet or surpass the
final MY 2017-2025 CO2 footprint-based targets with
current powertrain designs?
E. Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement
1. Compliance Program Overview
2. Compliance With Fleet-Average CO2 Standards
3. Vehicle Certification
4. Useful Life Compliance
5. Credit Program Implementation
6. Enforcement
7. Other Certification Issues
8. Warranty, Defect Reporting, and Other Emission-related
Components Provisions
9. Miscellaneous Technical Amendments and Corrections
10. Base Tire Definition
11. Treatment of Driver-Selectable Modes and Conditions
12. Publication of GHG Compliance Information
F. How will this rule reduce GHG emissions and their associated
effects?
1. Impact on GHG Emissions
2. Climate Change Impacts From GHG Emissions
3. Changes in Global Climate Indicators Associated With This
Rule's GHG Emissions Reductions
G. How will the rule impact Non-GHG emissions and their
associated effects?
1. Inventory
2. Health Effects of Non-GHG Pollutants
3. Environmental Effects of Non-GHG Pollutants
4. Air Quality Impacts of Non-GHG Pollutants
5. Other Unquantified Health and Environmental Effects
H. What are the estimated cost, economic, and other impacts of
the rule?
1. Conceptual Framework for Evaluating Consumer Impacts
2. Costs Associated With the Vehicle Standards
3. Cost per Ton of Emissions Reduced
4. Reduction in Fuel Consumption and its Impacts
5. Cost of Ownership, Payback Period and Lifetime Savings on New
Vehicle Purchases
6. CO2 Emission Reduction Benefits
7. Non-Greenhouse Gas Health and Environmental Impacts
8. Energy Security Impacts
9. Additional Impacts
10. Summary of Costs and Benefits
11. U.S. Vehicle Sales Impacts and Affordability of New Vehicles
12. Employment Impacts
I. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
J. Statutory Provisions and Legal Authority
IV. NHTSA Final Rule for Passenger Car and Light Truck CAFE
Standards for Model Years 2017 and Beyond
A. Executive Overview of NHTSA Final Rule
1. Introduction
2. Why does NHTSA set CAFE standards for passenger cars and
light trucks?
3. Why is NHTSA presenting CAFE standards for MYs 2017-2025 now?
B. Background
1. Chronology of Events Since the MY 2012-2016 Final Rule was
Issued
2. How has NHTSA developed the CAFE standards since the
President's announcement, and what has changed between the proposal
and the final rule?
C. Development and Feasibility of the Proposed Standards
1. How was the baseline vehicle fleet developed?
2. How were the technology inputs developed?
3. How did NHTSA develop its economic assumptions?
4. How does NHTSA use the assumptions in its modeling analysis?
D. Statutory Requirements
1. EPCA, as Amended by EISA
2. Administrative Procedure Act
3. National Environmental Policy Act
E. What are the CAFE standards?
1. Form of the Standards
2. Passenger Car Standards for MYs 2017-2025
3. Minimum Domestic Passenger Car Standards
4. Light Truck Standards
F. How do the final standards fulfill NHTSA's statutory
obligations?
1. Overview
2. What are NHTSA's statutory obligations?
3. How did the agency balance the factors for the NPRM?
4. What comments did the agency receive regarding the proposed
maximum feasible levels?
5. How has the agency balanced the factors for this final rule?
G. Impacts of the Final CAFE Standards
1. How will these standards improve fuel economy and reduce GHG
emissions for MY 2017-2025 vehicles?
2. How will these standards improve fleet-wide fuel economy and
reduce GHG emissions beyond MY 2025?
3. How will these standards impact non-GHG emissions and their
associated effects?
4. What are the estimated costs and benefits of these standards?
5. How would these final standards impact vehicle sales and
employment?
6. Social Benefits, Private Benefits, and Potential Unquantified
Consumer Welfare Impacts of the Standards
7. What other impacts (quantitative and unquantifiable) will
these standards have?
H. Vehicle Classification
I. Compliance and Enforcement
1. Overview
2. How does NHTSA determine compliance?
3. What compliance flexibilities are available under the CAFE
program and how do manufacturers use them?
4. What new incentives are being added to the CAFE program for
MYs 2017-2025?
5. Other CAFE Enforcement Issues
J. Record of Decision
1. The Agency's Decision
2. Alternatives NHTSA Considered in Reaching its Decision
3. NHTSA's Environmental Analysis, Including Consideration of
the Environmentally Preferable Alternative
4. Factors Balanced by NHTSA in Making its Decision
5. How the Factors and Considerations Balanced by NHTSA Entered
Into its Decision
6. The Agency's Preferences Among Alternatives Based on Relevant
Factors, Including Economic and Technical Considerations and Agency
Statutory Missions
7. Mitigation
K. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
1. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
2. National Environmental Policy Act
3. Clean Air Act (CAA) as Applied to NHTSA's Action
4. National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
5. Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act (FWCA)
6. Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
7. Endangered Species Act (ESA)
8. Floodplain Management (Executive Order 11988 and DOT Order
5650.2)
9. Preservation of the Nation's Wetlands (Executive Order 11990
and DOT Order 5660.1a)
10. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act (BGEPA), Executive Order 13186
11. Department of Transportation Act (Section 4(f))
12. Regulatory Flexibility Act
13. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
14. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
15. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
16. Regulation Identifier Number
17. Executive Order 13045
18. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
19. Executive Order 13211
20. Department of Energy Review
21. Privacy Act
I. Overview of Joint EPA/NHTSA Final 2017-2025 National Program
A. Executive Summary
1. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
a. The Need for the Action and How the Action Addresses the Need
NHTSA, on behalf of the Department of Transportation, and EPA are
issuing final rules to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
improve fuel economy for light-duty vehicles for model years 2017 and
beyond. On May 21, 2010, President Obama issued a Presidential
Memorandum requesting that EPA and NHTSA develop through notice and
comment rulemaking a coordinated National Program to improve fuel
economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions of light-duty vehicles for
model years 2017-2025, building on the success of the first phase of
the National Program for these vehicles for model years 2012-2016.
These final rules are consistent with the President's request and
respond to the country's critical need to address global
[[Page 62627]]
climate change and to reduce oil consumption.
These standards apply to passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and
medium-duty passenger vehicles (i.e. sport utility vehicles, cross-over
utility vehicles, and light trucks), and represent the continuation of
a harmonized and consistent National Program for these vehicles. Under
the National Program automobile manufacturers will be able to continue
building a single light-duty national fleet that satisfies all
requirements under both programs.
The National Program is estimated to save approximately 4 billion
barrels of oil and to reduce GHG emissions by the equivalent of
approximately 2 billion metric tons over the lifetimes of those light
duty vehicles produced in MYs 2017-2025. The agencies project that fuel
savings will far outweigh higher vehicle costs, and that the net
benefits to society of the MYs 2017-2025 National Program will be in
the range of $326 billion to $451 billion (7 and 3 percent discount
rates, respectively) over the lifetimes of those light duty vehicles
sold in MYs 2017-2025.
The National Program is projected to provide significant savings
for consumers due to reduced fuel use. Although the agencies estimate
that technologies used to meet the standards will add, on average,
about $1,800 to the cost of a new light duty vehicle in MY 2025,
consumers who drive their MY 2025 vehicle for its entire lifetime will
save, on average, $5,700 to $7,400 (7 and 3 percent discount rates,
respectively) in fuel, for a net lifetime savings of $3,400 to $5,000.
This estimate assumes gasoline prices of $3.87 per gallon in 2025 with
small increases most years throughout the vehicle's lifetime.
b. Legal Authority
EPA and NHTSA are finalizing separate sets of standards for
passenger cars and for light trucks, under their respective statutory
authority. EPA is setting national CO2 emissions standards
for passenger cars and light-trucks under section 202 (a) of the Clean
Air Act (CAA) ((42 U.S.C. 7521 (a)), and under its authority to measure
passenger car and passenger car fleet fuel economy pursuant to the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) 49 U.S.C. 32904 (c). NHTSA is
setting national corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards under
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), as amended by the Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 (49 U.S.C. 32902).
Section 202 (a) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to establish
standards for emissions of pollutants from new motor vehicles which
emissions cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. See Coalition for
Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012)
slip op. p. 41 (``'[i]f EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean
Air Act requires the [a]gency to regulate emissions of the deleterious
pollutant from new motor vehicles. `* * * Given the non-discretionary
duty in Section 202 (a)(1) and the limited flexibility available under
Section 202 (a)(2), which this court has held relates only to the
motor-vehicle industry,* * * EPA had no statutory basis on which it
could `ground [any] reasons for further inaction'' (quoting State of
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533, 535 (2007). In establishing
such standards, EPA must consider issues of technical feasibility,
cost, and available lead time. Standards under section 202 (a) thus
take effect only ``after providing such period as the Administrator
finds necessary to permit the development and application of the
requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of
compliance within such period'' (CAA section 202 (a)(2) (42 U.S.C. 7512
(a)(2)).
EPCA, as amended by EISA, contains a number of provisions regarding
how NHTSA must set CAFE standards. EPCA requires that NHTSA establish
separate passenger car and light truck standards (49 U.S.C.
32902(b)(1)) at ``the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that
it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year (49 U.S.C.
32902(a)),'' based on the agency's consideration of four statutory
factors: Technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect
of other standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of
the nation to conserve energy (49 U.S.C. 32902(f)). EPCA does not
define these terms or specify what weight to give each concern in
balancing them; thus, NHTSA defines them and determines the appropriate
weighting that leads to the maximum feasible standards given the
circumstances in each CAFE standard rulemaking. For MYs 2011-2020, EPCA
further requires that separate standards for passenger cars and for
light trucks be set at levels high enough to ensure that the CAFE of
the industry-wide combined fleet of new passenger cars and light trucks
reaches at least 35 mpg not later than MY 2020 (49 U.S.C.
32902(b)(2)(A))]. For model years 2021-2030, standards need simply be
set at the maximum feasible level (49 U.S.C.32903(b)(2)(B).
Section I.E of the preamble contains a detailed discussion of both
agencies' statutory authority.
2. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Final Rule
NHTSA and EPA are finalizing rules for light-duty vehicles that the
agencies believe represent the appropriate levels of fuel economy and
GHG emissions standards for model years 2017 and beyond pursuant to
their respective statutory authorities.
a. Standards
EPA is establishing standards that are projected to require, on an
average industry fleet wide basis, 163 grams/mile of carbon dioxide
(CO2) in model year 2025, which is equivalent to 54.5 mpg if
this level were achieved solely through improvements in fuel
efficiency.\3\ Consistent with its statutory authority, NHTSA has
developed two phases of passenger car and light truck standards in this
rulemaking action. The first phase, from MYs 2017-2021, includes final
standards that are projected to require, on an average industry fleet
wide basis, a range from 40.3-41.0 mpg in MY 2021. The second phase of
the CAFE program, from MYs 2022-2025, includes standards that are not
final, due to the statutory requirement that NHTSA set average fuel
economy standards not more than 5 model years at a time. Rather, those
standards are augural, meaning that they represent NHTSA's current best
estimate, based on the information available to the agency today, of
what levels of stringency might be maximum feasible in those model
years. NHTSA projects that those standards could require, on an average
industry fleet wide basis, a range from 48.7-49.7 mpg in model year
2025.
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\3\ Real-world CO2 is typically 25 percent higher and
real-world fuel economy is typically 20 percent lower than the
CO2 and CAFE compliance values discussed here. 163g/mi
would be equivalent to 54.5 mpg, if the entire fleet were to meet
this CO2 level through tailpipe CO2 and fuel
economy improvements. The agencies expect, however, that a portion
of these improvements will be made through improvements in air
conditioning leakage and through use of alternative refrigerants,
which would not contribute to fuel economy.
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Both the CO2 and CAFE standards are footprint-based, as
are the standards currently in effect for these vehicles through model
year 2016. The standards will become more stringent on average in each
model year from 2017 through 2025. Generally, the larger the vehicle
footprint, the less numerically stringent the corresponding vehicle
CO2 emissions and MPG targets. As a result of the footprint-
based standards, the burden of compliance is distributed
[[Page 62628]]
across all vehicle footprints and across all manufacturers.
Manufacturers are not compelled to build vehicles of any particular
size or type (nor do the rules create an incentive to do so), and each
manufacturer will have its own fleet-wide standard that reflects the
light duty vehicles it chooses to produce.
b. Mid-Term Evaluation
The agencies will conduct a comprehensive mid-term evaluation and
agency decision-making process for the MYs 2022-2025 standards as
described in the proposal. The mid-term evaluation reflects the rules'
long time frame and, for NHTSA, the agency's statutory obligation to
conduct a de novo rulemaking in order to establish final standards for
MYs 2022-2025. In order to align the agencies' proceedings for MYs
2022-2025 and to maintain a joint national program, EPA and NHTSA will
finalize their actions related to MYs 2022-2025 standards concurrently.
If the EPA determination is that standards may change, the agencies
will issue a joint NPRM and joint final rules. NHTSA and EPA fully
expect to conduct this mid-term evaluation in coordination with the
California Air Resources Board, given our interest in maintaining a
National Program to address GHG emissions and fuel economy. Further
discussion of the mid-term evaluation is found in Sections III.B.3 and
IV.A.3.b.
c. Compliance Flexibilities
As proposed, the agencies are finalizing several provisions which
provide compliance flexibility to manufacturers to meet the standards
without compromising the program's overall environmental and energy
security objectives. Further discussion of compliance flexibilities is
in Section C.4, II.F, III.B, III.C, IV.I.
Credit Averaging, Banking and Trading
The agencies are continuing to allow manufacturers to generate
credits for over-compliance with the CO2 and CAFE
standards.\4\ A manufacturer will generate credits if its car and/or
truck fleet achieves a fleet average CO2/CAFE level better
than its car and/or truck standards. Conversely, a manufacturer will
incur a debit/shortfall if its fleet average CO2/CAFE level
does not meet the standard when all credits are taken into account. As
in the prior CAFE and GHG programs, a manufacturer whose fleet
generates credits in a given model year would have several options for
using those credits, including credit carry-back, credit carry-forward,
credit transfers, and credit trading.
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\4\ This credit flexibility is required by EPCA/EISA, see 49
U.S.C. 32903, and is well within EPA's discretion under section 202
(a) of the CAA.
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Air Conditioning Improvement Credits
As proposed, EPA is establishing that the maximum total A/C credits
available for cars will be 18.8 grams/mile CO2-equivalent
and 24.4 grams/mile for trucks CO2-equivalent.\5\ The
approaches used to calculate these credits for direct and indirect A/C
improvement (i.e., improvements to A/C leakage (including substitution
of low GHG refrigerant) and A/C efficiency) are generally consistent
with those of the MYs 2012-2016 program, although there are several
revisions. Most notably, a new test for A/C efficiency, optional under
the GHG program starting in MY 2014, will be used exclusively in MY
2017 and beyond. Under its EPCA authority, EPA proposed and is
finalizing provisions to allow manufacturers to generate fuel
consumption improvement values for purposes of CAFE compliance based on
these same improvements in air conditioner efficiency.
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\5\ This is further broken down by 5.0 and 7.2 g/mi respectively
for car and truck A/C efficiency credits, and 13.8 and 17.2 g/mi
respectively for car and truck alternative refrigerant credits.
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Off-Cycle Credits
EPA proposed and is finalizing provisions allowing manufacturers to
continue to generate and use off-cycle credits to demonstrate
compliance with the GHG standards. These credits are for measureable
GHG emissions and fuel economy improvements attributable to use of
technologies whose benefits are not measured by the two-cycle test
mandated by EPCA. Under its EPCA authority, EPA proposed and is
finalizing provisions to allow manufacturers to generate fuel
consumption improvement values for purposes of CAFE compliance based on
the use of off-cycle technologies.
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles,
Fuel Cell Vehicles and Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles
In order to provide temporary regulatory incentives to promote the
penetration of certain ``game changing'' advanced vehicle technologies
into the light duty vehicle fleet, EPA is finalizing, as proposed, an
incentive multiplier for CO2 emissions compliance purposes
for all electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
(PHEVs), and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) sold in MYs 2017 through 2021.
The incentives are expected to promote increased application of these
advanced technologies in the program's early model years, which could
achieve economies of scale that will support the wider application of
these technologies to help achieve the more stringent standards in MYs
2022-2025. In addition, in response to public comments persuasively
explaining how infrastructure for compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles
could serve as a bridge to use of advanced technologies such as
hydrogen fuel cells, EPA is finalizing an incentive multiplier for CNG
vehicles sold in MYs 2017 through 2021.
NHTSA currently interprets EPCA and EISA as precluding it from
offering incentives for the alternative fuel operation of EVs, PHEVs,
FCVs, and NGVs, except as specified by statute, and thus did not
propose and is not including incentive multipliers comparable to the
EPA incentive multipliers described above.
Incentives for Use of Advanced Technologies Including Hybridization for
full-Size Pick-up Trucks
The agencies recognize that the standards presented in this final
rule for MYs 2017-2025 will be challenging for large vehicles,
including full-size pickup trucks. To help address this challenge, the
program will, as proposed, contain incentives for the use of hybrid
electric and other advanced technologies in full-size pickup trucks.
3. Costs and Benefits of National Program
It is important to note that NHTSA's CAFE standards and EPA's GHG
standards will both be in effect, and both will lead to increases in
average fuel economy and reductions in GHGs. The two agencies'
standards together comprise the National Program, and the following
discussions of the respective costs and benefits of NHTSA's CAFE
standards and EPA's GHG standards does not change the fact that both
the CAFE and GHG standards, jointly, are the source of the benefits and
costs of the National Program.
The costs and benefits projected by NHTSA to result from the CAFE
standards are presented first, followed by those projected by EPA to
result from the GHG emissions standards. For several reasons, the
estimates for costs and benefits presented by NHTSA and EPA for their
respective rules, while consistent, are not directly comparable, and
thus should not be expected to be identical. See Section I.D of the
preamble for further details and discussion.
NHTSA has analyzed in detail the projected costs and benefits for
the 2017-2025 CAFE standards for light-
[[Page 62629]]
duty vehicles. NHTSA estimates that the fuel economy increases would
lead to fuel savings totaling about 170 billion gallons throughout the
lives of light duty vehicles sold in MYs 2017-2025. At a 3 percent
discount rate, the present value of the economic benefits resulting
from those fuel savings is between $481 billion and $488 billion; at a
7 percent private discount rate, the present value of the economic
benefits resulting from those fuel savings is between $375 billion and
$380 billion. The agency further estimates that these new CAFE
standards will lead to corresponding reductions in CO2
emissions totaling 1.8 billion metric tons during the lives of light
duty vehicles sold in MYs 2017-2025. The present value of the economic
benefits from avoiding those emissions is approximately $49 billion,
based on a global social cost of carbon value of about $26 per metric
ton (in 2017, and growing thereafter).
The Table below shows NHTSA's estimated overall lifetime discounted
costs and benefits, and net benefits for the model years 2017-2025 CAFE
standards.
NHTSA's Estimated MYs 2017-2021 and MYs 2017-2025 Costs, Benefits, and Net Benefits (Billions of 2010 dollars)) under the CAFE Standards \6\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals Annualized
Baseline fleet ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% Discount rate 7% Discount rate 3% Discount rate 7% Discount rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative for MYs 2017-2021 Final Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs............................. 2010.................. ($61)-................ ($58)-................ ($2.4)-.............. ($3.6)-
2008.................. ($57)................. ($54)................. ($2.2)............... ($3.3)
Benefits.......................... 2010.................. $243-................. $195-................. $9.2-................ $11.3-
2008.................. $240.................. $194.................. $9.0................. $11.0
Net Benefits...................... 2010.................. $183-................. $137-................. $6.8-................ $7.7-
2008.................. $184.................. $141.................. $6.8................. $7.8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative for MYs 2017--2025 (Includes MYs 2022-2025 Augural Standards)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs............................. 2010.................. ($154)-............... ($147)-............... ($5.4)-.............. ($7.6)-
2008.................. ($156)................ ($148)................ ($5.4)............... ($7.5)
Benefits.......................... 2010.................. $629-................. $502-................. $21.0-............... $24.2-
2008.................. $639.................. $510.................. $21.3................ $24.4
Net Benefits...................... 2010.................. $476-................. $356-................. $15.7-............... $16.7-
2008.................. $483.................. $362.................. $15.9................ $16.9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``The ``Estimated Achieved'' analysis includes accounting
for compliance flexibilities and advanced technologies that
manufacturers may voluntarily use for compliance, but that NHTSA is
prohibited from considering when determining the maximum feasible
level of new CAFE standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA has analyzed in detail the projected costs and benefits of the
2017-2025 GHG standards for light-duty vehicles. The Table below shows
EPA's estimated lifetime discounted cost, fuel savings, and benefits
for all such vehicles projected to be sold in model years 2017-2025.
The benefits include impacts such as climate-related economic benefits
from reducing emissions of CO2 (but not other GHGs),
reductions in energy security externalities caused by U.S. petroleum
consumption and imports, the value of certain particulate matter-
related health benefits (including premature mortality), the value of
additional driving attributed to the VMT rebound effect, the value of
reduced refueling time needed to fill up a more fuel efficient vehicle.
The analysis also includes estimates of economic impacts stemming from
additional vehicle use, such as the economic damages caused by
accidents, congestion and noise (from increased VMT rebound driving).
EPA's Estimated 2017-2025 Model Year Lifetime Discounted Costs,
Benefits, and Net Benefits Assuming the 3% Discount Rate SCC Value \7\
(Billions of 2010 dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Present Value \d\--3% Discount Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Costs........................................... $150
Fuel Savings............................................ 475
Benefits................................................ 126
Net Benefits \d\........................................ 451
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Value \f\--3% Discount Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized costs........................................ 6.49
Annualized fuel savings................................. 20.5
Annualized benefits..................................... 5.46
Net benefits............................................ 19.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Present Value \d\--7% Discount Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Costs........................................... 144
Fuel Savings............................................ 364
Benefits................................................ 106
Net Benefits \e\........................................ 326
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Value \f\--7% Discount Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized costs........................................ 10.8
Annualized fuel savings................................. 27.3
Annualized benefits..................................... 7.96
Net benefits............................................ 24.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Introduction
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Further notes and details concerning these SCC. Value are
found in Section I.D.2. Table I-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA is announcing final greenhouse gas emissions standards for
model years 2017-2025 and NHTSA is announcing final Corporate Average
Fuel Economy standards for model years 2017-2021 and issuing augural
\8\ standards for
[[Page 62630]]
model years (MYs) 2022-2025. These rules establish strong and
coordinated Federal greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for
passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles
(hereafter light-duty vehicles or LDVs). Together, these vehicle
categories, which include passenger cars, sport utility vehicles,
crossover utility vehicles, minivans, and pickup trucks, among others,
are presently responsible for approximately 60 percent of all U.S.
transportation-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fuel
consumption. These final rules extend the MYs 2012-2016 National
Program by establishing more stringent Federal light-duty vehicle GHG
emissions and corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards in MYs
2017 and beyond. This coordinated program will achieve important
reductions in GHG emissions and fuel consumption from the light-duty
vehicle part of the transportation sector, based on technologies that
either are commercially available or that the agencies project will be
commercially available in the rulemaking timeframe and that can be
incorporated at a reasonable cost. Higher initial vehicle costs will be
more than offset by significant fuel savings for consumers over the
lives of the vehicles covered by this rulemaking. NHTSA's final rule
also constitutes the agency's Record of Decision for purposes of its
NEPA analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ For the NPRM/PRIA/Draft EIS, NHTSA described the proposed
standards for MYs 2022-2025 as ``conditional.'' ``Conditional'' was
understood and objected to by some readers as implying that the
future proceeding would consist merely of a confirmation of the
conclusions and analysis of the current rulemaking, which would be
incorrect and inconsistent with the agency's obligations under both
EPCA/EISA and the Administrative Procedure Act. The agency must
conduct a de novo rulemaking for MYs 2022-2025. To avoid creating an
incorrect impression, the agency is changing the descriptor for the
MY 2022-2025 standards that are presented and discussed in these
documents. The descriptor must convey that the standards we are now
presenting for MYs 2022-2025 reflect the agency's current best
judgment of what we would have set at this time had we the authority
to do so, but also avoid suggesting that the future process for
establishing final standards for MYs 2022-2025 would be anything
other than a new and separate rulemaking based on the freshly
gathered and solicited information before the agency at that future
time and on a fresh assessing and balancing of all statutorily
relevant factors, in light of the considerations existing at the
time of that rulemaking. The agency deliberated extensively,
considering many alternative descriptors, and concluded that the
best descriptor was ``augural,'' from the verb ``to augur,'' meaning
to foretell future events based on current information (as in,
``these standards may augur well for what the agency might establish
in the future''). This is precisely what the MYs 2022-2025 standards
presented in these documents are--our effort to help interested
parties anticipate the future by providing our current best judgment
as to what standards we would now set, based on the information
before us today, recognizing that our future decision as to what
standards we will actually set will be based on the information then
before us.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This joint rulemaking builds on the success of the first phase of
the National Program to regulate fuel economy and GHG emissions from
U.S. light-duty vehicles, which established strong and coordinated
standards for MYs 2012-2016. As with the MY 2012-2016 final rules, a
key element in developing this rulemaking was the agencies' discussions
with automobile manufacturers, the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) and many other stakeholders. During the extended public comment
period, the agencies received nearly 300,000 written comments (and
nearly 400 oral comments through testimony at three public hearings
held in Detroit, Philadelphia and San Francisco) on this rule and
received strong support from most auto manufacturers, the United Auto
Workers (UAW), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), consumer groups,
national security experts and veterans, State/local government and auto
suppliers.
Continuing the National Program in coordination with California
will help to ensure that all manufacturers can build a single fleet of
vehicles that satisfy all requirements under both federal programs as
well as under California's program,\9\ which will in turn help to
reduce costs and regulatory complexity while providing significant
energy security, consumer savings, and environmental benefits.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Section I.B.4 provides a explanation of California's
authority to set air pollution standards for vehicles.
\10\ The California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted
California MYs 2017-2025 GHG emissions standards on January 26,
2012. At its March 22, 2012 meeting the Board gave final approval to
the California standards. The Board directed CARB's Executive
Officer to ``continue collaborating with EPA and NHTSA as their
standards are finalized and in the mid-term review * * *'' and the
Board also reconfirmed its commitment to propose to revise its GHG
emissions standards for MYs 2017 to 2025 ``to accept compliance with
the 2017 through 2025 MY National Program as compliance with
California's greenhouse gas emission standards in the 2017 through
2025 model years if the Executive Officer determines that U.S. EPA
has adopted a final rule that at a minimum preserve greenhouse
reductions benefits set forth'' in the NPRM issued by EPA on
December 1, 2011. State of California Air Resources Board,
Resolution 12-11, January 26, 2012, at 20. Available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/cfo2012/res12-11.pdf (last accessed July
9, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined with the standards already in effect for MYs 2012-2016, as
well as the MY 2011 CAFE standards, the final standards will result in
MY 2025 light-duty vehicles with nearly double the fuel economy, and
approximately one-half of the GHG emissions compared to MY 2010
vehicles--representing the most significant federal actions ever taken
to reduce GHG emissions and improve fuel economy in the U.S.
EPA is establishing standards that are projected to require, on an
average industry fleet wide basis, 163 grams/mile of carbon dioxide
(CO2) in model year 2025, which is equivalent to 54.5 mpg if
this level were achieved solely through improvements in fuel
efficiency.\11\ Consistent with its statutory authority,\12\ NHTSA has
developed two phases of passenger car and light truck standards in this
rulemaking action. The first phase, from MYs 2017-2021, includes final
standards that are projected to require, on an average industry fleet
wide basis, a range from 40.3-41.0 mpg in MY 2021.\13\ The second phase
of the CAFE program, from MYs 2022-2025, includes standards that are
not final due to the statutory provision that NHTSA shall issue
regulations prescribing average fuel economy standards for at least 1
but not more than 5 model years at a time.\14\ The MYs 2022-2025 CAFE
standards, then, are not final based on this rulemaking, but rather
augural, meaning that they represent the agency's current judgment,
based on the information available to the agency today, of what levels
of stringency would be maximum feasible in those model years. NHTSA
projects that those standards could require, on an average industry
fleet wide basis, a range from 48.7-49.7 mpg in model year 2025. The
agencies note that these estimated combined fleet average mpg levels
are projections and, in fact the agencies are establishing separate
standards for passenger cars and trucks, based on a vehicle's size or
``footprint,'' and the actual average achieved fuel economy and GHG
emissions levels will be determined by the actual footprints and
production volumes of the vehicle models that are produced. NHTSA will
undertake a de novo rulemaking at a later date to set legally binding
CAFE standards for MYs 2022-2025. See
[[Page 62631]]
Section IV for more information. The agencies will conduct a
comprehensive mid-term evaluation and agency decision-making process
for the MYs 2022-2025 standards as described in the proposal. The mid-
term evaluation reflects the rules' long time frame and, for NHTSA, the
agency's statutory obligation to conduct de novo rulemaking in order to
establish final standards for vehicles for those model years. In order
to align the agencies' proceedings for MYs 2022-2025 and to maintain a
joint national program, EPA and NHTSA will finalize their actions
related to MYs 2022-2025 standards concurrently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Real-world CO2 is typically 25 percent higher
and real-world fuel economy is typically 20 percent lower than the
CO2 and CAFE compliance values discussed here. 163g/mi
would be equivalent to 54.5 mpg, if the entire fleet were to meet
this CO2 level through tailpipe CO2 and fuel
economy improvements. The agencies expect, however, that a portion
of these improvements will be made through improvements in air
conditioning leakage and use of alternative refrigerants, which
would not contribute to fuel economy.
\12\ 49 U.S.C. 32902.
\13\ The range of values here and through this rulemaking
document reflect the results of co-analyses conducted by NHTSA using
two different light-duty vehicle market forecasts through model year
2025. To evaluate the effects of the standards, the agencies must
project what vehicles and technologies will exist in future model
years and then evaluate what technologies can feasibly be applied to
those vehicles to raise their fuel economy and reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions. To project the future fleet, the agencies
must develop a baseline vehicle fleet. For this final rule, the
agencies have analyzed the impacts of the standards using two
different forecasts of the light-duty vehicle fleet through MY 2025.
The baseline fleets are discussed in detail in Section II.B of this
preamble, and in Chapter 2 of the Technical Support Document. EPA's
sensitivity analysis of the alternative fleet is included in Chapter
10 of its RIA.
\14\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies project that manufacturers will comply with the final
rules by using a range of technologies, including improvements in air
conditioning efficiency, which reduce both GHG emissions and fuel
consumption. Compliance with EPA's GHG standards is also likely to be
achieved through improvements in air conditioning system leakage and
through the use of alternative air conditioning refrigerants with a
lower global warming potential (GWP), which reduce GHGs (i.e.,
hydrofluorocarbons) but which do not generally improve fuel economy.
The agencies believe there is a wide range of technologies already
available to reduce GHG emissions and improve fuel economy from both
passenger cars and trucks. The final rules facilitate long-term
planning by manufacturers and suppliers for the continued development
and deployment across their fleets of fuel saving and GHG emissions-
reducing technologies. The agencies believe that advances in gasoline
engines and transmissions will continue for the foreseeable future, and
that there will be continual improvement in other technologies,
including vehicle weight reduction, lower tire rolling resistance,
improvements in vehicle aerodynamics, diesel engines, and more
efficient vehicle accessories. The agencies also expect to see
increased electrification of the fleet through the expanded production
of stop/start, hybrid, plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles. Finally,
the agencies expect that vehicle air conditioners will continue to
improve by becoming more efficient and by increasing the use of
alternative refrigerants and lower leakage air conditioning systems.
Many of these technologies are already available today, some on a
limited number of vehicles while others are more widespread in the
fleet, and manufacturers will be able to meet the standards through
significant efficiency improvements in these technologies, as well as
through a significant penetration of these and other technologies
across the fleet. Auto manufacturers may also introduce new
technologies that we have not considered for this rulemaking analysis,
which could result in possible alternative, more cost-effective paths
to compliance.
From a societal standpoint, this second phase of the National
Program is estimated to save approximately 4 billion barrels of oil and
to reduce GHG emissions by the equivalent of approximately 2 billion
metric tons over the lifetimes of those light duty vehicles produced in
MYs 2017-2025. These savings and reductions come on top of those that
are being achieved through the MYs 2012-2016 standards.\15\ The
agencies project that fuel savings will far outweigh higher vehicle
costs, and that the net benefits to society of the MYs 2017-2025
National Program will be in the range of $326 billion to $451 billion
(7 and 3 percent discount rates, respectively) over the lifetimes of
those light duty vehicles sold in MY 2017-2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ The cost and benefit estimates provided in this final rule
are only for the MYs 2017-2025 rulemaking. EPA and DOT's rulemaking
establishing standards for MYs 2012-2016 are already part of the
baseline for this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These final standards are projected to provide significant savings
for consumers due to reduced fuel use. Although the agencies estimate
that technologies used to meet the standards will add, on average,
about $1,800 to the cost of a new light duty vehicle in MY 2025,
consumers who drive their MY 2025 vehicle for its entire lifetime will
save, on average, $5,700 to $7,400 (7 and 3 percent discount rates,
respectively) in fuel, for a net lifetime savings of $3,400 to $5,000.
This estimate assumes gasoline prices of $3.87 per gallon in 2025 with
small increases most years throughout the vehicle's lifetime.\16\ For
those consumers who purchase their new MY 2025 vehicle with cash, the
discounted fuel savings will offset the higher vehicle cost in roughly
3.3 years, and fuel savings will continue for as long as the consumer
owns the vehicle. Those consumers that buy a new vehicle with a typical
5-year loan will immediately benefit from an average monthly cash flow
savings of about $12 during the loan period, or about $140 per year, on
average. So this type of consumer would benefit immediately from the
time of purchase: the increased monthly fuel savings would more than
offset the higher monthly payment. Section I.D provides a detailed
discussion of the projected costs and benefits of the MYs 2017-2025 for
CAFE and GHG emissions standards for light-duty vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Chapter 4.2.2 of the Joint TSD for full discussion of
fuel price projections over the vehicle's lifetime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to saving consumers money at the pump, the agencies
have designed their final standards to preserve consumer choice--that
is, the standards should not affect consumers' opportunity to purchase
the size of vehicle with the performance, utility and safety features
that meets their needs. The standards are based on a vehicle's size
(technically they are based on vehicle footprint, which is the area
defined by the points where the tires contact the ground), and larger
vehicles have numerically less stringent fuel economy/GHG emissions
targets and smaller vehicles have numerically more stringent fuel
economy/GHG emissions targets. Footprint based standards promote fuel
economy and GHG emissions improvements in vehicles of all sizes, and
are not expected to create incentives for manufacturers to change the
size of their vehicles in order to comply with the standards. Moreover,
since the standards are fleet average standards for each manufacturer,
no specific vehicle must meet a target.\17\ Thus, nothing in these
rules prevents consumers in the 2017 to 2025 timeframe from choosing
from the same mix of vehicles that are currently in the marketplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ A specific vehicle would only have to meet a fuel economy
or GHG target value on the target curve standards being finalized
today in the rare event that a manufacturer produces a single
vehicle model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Continuation of the National Program
EPA is adopting final greenhouse gas emissions standards for model
years 2017-2025 and NHTSA is adopting final Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standards for model years 2017-2021 and presenting augural
standards for model years 2022-2025. These rules will implement strong
and coordinated Federal greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for
passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles.
Together, these vehicle categories, which include passenger cars, sport
utility vehicles, crossover utility vehicles, minivans, and pickup
trucks, are presently responsible for approximately 60 percent of all
U.S. transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions and fuel
consumption. The final rules continue the National Program by setting
more stringent standards for MY 2017 and beyond light duty vehicles.
This coordinated program will achieve important reductions of
[[Page 62632]]
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fuel consumption from the light-duty
vehicle part of the transportation sector, based on technologies that
either are commercially available or that the agencies project will be
commercially available in the rulemaking timeframe and that can be
incorporated at a reasonable cost.
In working together to finalize these standards, NHTSA and EPA are
building on the success of the first phase of the National Program to
regulate fuel economy and GHG emissions from U.S. light-duty vehicles,
which established the strong and coordinated light duty vehicle
standards for model years (MY) 2012-2016. As with the MY 2012-2016
final rules, a key element in developing the final rules was the
agencies' collaboration with the California Air Resources Board (CARB)
and discussions with automobile manufacturers and many other
stakeholders. Continuing the National Program will help to ensure that
all manufacturers can build a single fleet of U.S. light duty vehicles
that satisfy all requirements under both federal programs as well as
under California's program, helping to reduce costs and regulatory
complexity while providing significant energy security, consumer
savings and environmental benefits.
The agencies have been developing the basis for these final
standards almost since the conclusion of the rulemaking establishing
the first phase of the National Program. Consistent with Executive
Order 13563, this rule was developed with early consultation with
stakeholders, employs flexible regulatory approaches to reduce burdens,
maintains freedom of choice for the public, and helps to harmonize
federal and state regulations. After much research and deliberation by
the agencies, along with CARB and other stakeholders, on July 29, 2011
President Obama announced plans for extending the National Program to
MY 2017-2025 light duty vehicles and NHTSA and EPA issued a
Supplemental Notice of Intent (NOI) outlining the agencies' plans for
proposing the MY 2017-2025 standards and program.\18\ This July NOI
built upon the extensive analysis conducted by the agencies during 2010
and 2011, including an initial technical assessment report and NOI
issued in September 2010, and a supplemental NOI issued in December
2010. The State of California and thirteen auto manufacturers
representing over 90 percent of U.S. vehicle sales provided letters of
support for the program concurrent with the Supplemental NOI.\19\ The
United Auto Workers (UAW) also supported the announcement,\20\ as did
many consumer and environmental groups. As envisioned in the
Presidential announcement, Supplemental NOI, and the December 2011
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), these final rules establish
standards for MYs 2017- and beyond light duty vehicles. These standards
take into consideration significant public input that was received in
response to the NPRM from the regulated industry, consumer groups,
labor unions, states, environmental organizations, national security
experts and veterans, industry suppliers and dealers, as well as other
organizations and by thousands of U.S. citizens. The agencies
anticipate that these final standards will spur the development of a
new generation of clean and more fuel efficient cars and trucks through
innovative technologies and manufacturing that will, in turn, spur
economic growth and create high-quality domestic jobs, enhance our
energy security, and improve our environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ 76 FR 48758 (August 9, 2011).
\19\ Letters of support are available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations.htm and at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy (last accessed June 12, 2012).
\20\ The UAW's support was expressed in a statement on July 29,
2011, which can be found at http://www.uaw.org/articles/uaw-supports-administration-proposal-light-duty-vehicle-cafe-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions-r (last accessed June 12, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described below, NHTSA and EPA are finalizing a continuation of
the National Program for light-duty vehicles that the agencies believe
represents the appropriate levels of fuel economy and GHG emissions
standards for model years 2017 and beyond, given the technologies that
the agencies project will be available for use on these vehicles and
the agencies' understanding of the cost and manufacturers' ability to
apply these technologies during that time frame, and consideration of
other relevant factors. Under this joint rulemaking, EPA is
establishing GHG emissions standards under the Clean Air Act (CAA), and
NHTSA is establishing CAFE standards under EPCA, as amended by the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). This joint final
rulemaking reflects a carefully coordinated and harmonized approach to
implementing these two statutes, in accordance with all substantive and
procedural requirements imposed by law.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ For NHTSA, this includes the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These final rules allow for long-term planning by manufacturers and
suppliers for the continued development and deployment across their
fleets of fuel saving and emissions-reducing technologies. NHTSA's and
EPA's technology assessment indicates there is a wide range of
technologies available for manufacturers to consider utilizing to
reduce GHG emissions and improve fuel economy. The agencies believe
that advances in gasoline engines and transmissions will continue
during these model years and that these technologies are likely to play
a key role in compliance strategies for the MYs 2017-2025 standards,
which is a view that is supported in the literature, among the vehicle
manufacturers, suppliers, and by public comments.\22\ The agencies also
believe that there will be continued improvement in diesel engines,
vehicle aerodynamics, and tires as well as the use of lighter weight
materials and optimized designs that will reduce vehicle mass. The
agencies also expect to see increased electrification of the fleet
through the expanded production of stop/start, hybrid, plug-in hybrid
and electric vehicles.\23\ Finally, the agencies expect that vehicle
air conditioners will continue to become more efficient, thereby
improving fuel efficiency. The agencies also expect that air
conditioning leakage will be reduced and that manufacturers will use
reduced global warming refrigerants. Both of these improvements will
reduce GHG emissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ There are a number of competing gasoline engine
technologies, with one in particular that the agencies project will
increase beyond MY 2016. This is the downsized gasoline direct
injection engine equipped with a turbocharger and cooled exhaust gas
recirculation, which has better fuel efficiency than a larger engine
and similar steady-state power performance. Paired with these
engines, the agencies project that advanced transmissions (such as
automatic and dual clutch transmissions with eight forward speeds)
and higher efficiency gearboxes will contribute to providing fuel
efficiency improvements. Transmissions with eight or more speeds can
be found in the fleet today in very limited production, and while
they are expected to penetrate further by MY 2016, we anticipate
that by MY 2025 these will be common in new light duty vehicles.
\23\ For example, while today less than three percent of annual
vehicle sales are strong hybrids, plug-in hybrids and all electric
vehicles, by MY 2025 we estimate in our analyses for this final rule
that these technologies could represent 3-7%, while ``mild'' hybrids
may be as high as 17- 27% of new sales and vehicles with stop/start
systems only may be as high as 6-15% of new sales. Thus by MY 2025,
26-49% of the fleet may have some level of electrification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although a number of these technologies are available today, the
agencies' assessments support that there will be continuing
improvements in the efficiency of some of the technologies and that the
cost of many of the technologies will be lower in the future.
[[Page 62633]]
We anticipate that the standards will require most manufacturers to
considerably increase the application of these technologies across
their light duty vehicle fleets in order to comply with the standards.
Manufacturers may also develop and introduce other technologies that we
have not considered for this rulemaking analysis, which could play
important roles in compliance with the standards and potentially offer
more cost effective alternatives. Due to the relatively long lead time
for the later model years in this rule, it is quite possible that
innovations may arise that the agencies (and the automobile
manufacturers) are not considering today, which may even become
commonplace by MY 2025.
As discussed further below, and as with the standards for MYs 2012-
2016, the agencies believe that the final standards help to preserve
consumer choice, that is, the standards should not affect consumers'
opportunity to purchase the size and type of vehicle that meets their
needs, and should not otherwise affect vehicles' performance
attributes. NHTSA and EPA are finalizing standards based on vehicle
footprint, which is the area defined by the points where the tires
contact the ground, where smaller vehicles have relatively more
stringent targets, and larger vehicles have less stringent targets.
Footprint based standards promote fuel economy and GHG emissions
improvements in vehicles of all sizes, and are not expected to create
incentives for manufacturers to change the size of their vehicles in
order to comply with the standards. Consequently, these rules should
not have a significant effect on the relative availability of different
size vehicles in the fleet. The agencies' analyses used a constraint of
preserving all other aspects of vehicles' functionality and
performance, and the technology cost and effectiveness estimates
developed in the analyses reflect this constraint.\24\ In addition, as
with the standards for MYs 2012-2016, the agencies believe that the
standards should not have a negative effect on vehicle safety, as it
relates to vehicle size and mass as described in Section II.C and II.G
below, respectively. Because the standards are fleet average standards
for each manufacturer, no specific vehicle must meet a target.\25\
Thus, nothing in these rules prevents consumers in the 2017 to 2025
timeframe from choosing from the same mix of vehicles that are
currently in the marketplace.
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\24\ One commenter asserted that the standards ``value purported
consumer choice and the continued production of every vehicle in its
current form over the need to conserve energy: as soon as increased
fuel efficiency begins to affect any attribute of any existing
vehicle, stringency increases cease.'' CBD Comments p. 4. This
assertion is incorrect. As explained in the text above, the
agencies' cost estimates include costs of preserving existing
attributes, such as vehicle performance. These costs are reflected
in the agencies' analyses of reasonableness of the costs of the
rule, but do not by themselves dictate any particular level of
standard stringency much less cause stringency to ``cease'' as the
commenter would have it.
\25\ A specific vehicle would only have to meet a fuel economy
or GHG target value on the target curve standards being finalized
today in the rare event that a manufacturer produces a single
vehicle model.
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Given the long time frame at issue in setting standards for MYs
2022-2025 light-duty vehicles, and given NHTSA's statutory obligation
to conduct a de novo rulemaking in order to establish final standards
for vehicles for the 2022-2025 model years, the agencies will conduct a
comprehensive mid-term evaluation and agency decision-making process
for the MYs 2022-2025 standards, as described in the proposal. As
stated in the proposal, both NHTSA and EPA will develop and compile up-
to-date information for the mid-term evaluation, through a
collaborative, robust and transparent process, including public notice
and comment. The mid-term evaluation will assess the appropriateness of
the MYs 2022-2025 standards, based on information available at the time
of the mid-term evaluation and an updated assessment of all the factors
considered in setting the standards and the impacts of those factors on
the manufacturers' ability to comply. NHTSA and EPA fully expect to
conduct this mid-term evaluation in coordination with the California
Air Resources Board, given our interest in maintaining a National
Program to address GHG emissions and fuel economy. NHTSA's rulemaking,
which will incorporate findings from the mid-term evaluation, will be a
totally fresh consideration of all relevant information and fresh
balancing of statutory and other relevant factors in order to determine
the maximum feasible CAFE standards for MYs 2022-2025. In order to
align the agencies proceedings for MYs 2022-2025 and to maintain a
joint national program, if the EPA determination is that its standards
will not change, NHTSA will issue its final rule concurrently with the
EPA determination. If the EPA determination is that standards may
change, the agencies will issue a joint NPRM and joint final rule.
Further discussion of the mid-term evaluation is found later in this
section, as well as in Sections III.B.3 and IV.A.3.b.
The 2017-2025 National Program is estimated to reduce GHGs by
approximately 2 billion metric tons and to save 4 billion barrels of
oil over the lifetime of MYs 2017-2025 vehicles relative to the MY 2016
standard curves already in place.\26\ The average cost for a MY 2025
vehicle to meet the standards is estimated to be about $1800 compared
to a vehicle that meets the level of the MY 2016 standards in MY 2025.
Fuel savings for consumers are expected to more than offset the higher
vehicle costs. The typical driver will save a total of $5,700 to $7,400
(7 percent and 3 percent discount rate, respectively) in fuel costs
over the lifetime of a MY 2025 vehicle and, even after accounting for
the higher vehicle cost, consumers will save a net $3,400 to $5,000 (7
percent and 3 percent discount rate, respectively) over the vehicle's
lifetime. This estimate assumes a gasoline price of $3.87 per gallon in
2025 with small increases most years over the vehicle's lifetime.\27\
Further, the payback period for a consumer purchasing a 2025 light-duty
vehicle with cash would be, on average, 3.4 years at a 7 percent
discount rate or 3.2 years at a 3 percent discount rate, while
consumers who buy with a 5-year loan would save more each month on fuel
than the increased amount they will spend on the higher monthly loan
payment, beginning in the first month of ownership.
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\26\ The cost and benefit estimates provided here are only for
the MY 2017-2025 rulemaking. The CAFE and GHG emissions standards
for MYs 2012-2016 and CAFE standards for MY 2011 are already part of
the baseline for this analysis.
\27\ See Chapter 4.2.2 of the Joint TSD for full discussion of
fuel price projections of the vehicle lifetimes.
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Continuing the National Program has both energy security and
climate change benefits. Climate change is a significant long-term
threat to the global environment. EPA has found that elevated
atmospheric concentrations of six greenhouse gases--carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and
sulfur hexafluoride--taken in combination endanger both the public
health and the public welfare of current and future generations. EPA
further found that the combined emissions of these greenhouse gases
from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines contribute to the
greenhouse gas air pollution that endangers public health and welfare.
74 FR 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009). As summarized in EPA's Endangerment and
Cause or Contribute Findings under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,
anthropogenic emissions of GHGs are very likely (90 to 99 percent
probability) the cause of most of the observed global warming over the
last
[[Page 62634]]
50 years.\28\ Mobile sources emitted 30 percent of all U.S. GHGs in
2010 (transportation sources, which do not include certain off-highway
sources, account for 27 percent) and have been the source of the
largest absolute increases in U.S. GHGs since 1990.\29\ Mobile sources
addressed in the endangerment and contribution findings under CAA
section 202(a)--light-duty vehicles, heavy-duty trucks, buses, and
motorcycles--accounted for 23 percent of all U.S. GHG emissions in
2010.\30\ Light-duty vehicles emit CO2, methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons and were responsible for nearly 60
percent of all mobile source GHGs and over 70 percent of Section 202(a)
mobile source GHGs in 2010.\31\ For light-duty vehicles in 2010,
CO2 emissions represented about 94 percent of all greenhouse
emissions (including HFCs), and similarly, the CO2 emissions
measured over the EPA tests used for fuel economy compliance represent
about 90 percent of total light-duty vehicle GHG
emissions.32,33
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\28\ 74 FR 66,496, 66,518, December 18, 2009; ``Technical
Support Document for Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings
for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act''
Docket: EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472-11292, http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/index.html (last accessed August 9. 2012)
\29\ Memorandum: Mobile Source Contribution to U.S. GHGs in 2010
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). See generally, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. 2012. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2010. EPA 430-R-12-001. Available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads12/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf (last accessed June 12, 2012).
\30\ Section 202(a) sources include passenger cars, light-duty
trucks, motorcycles, buses, and medium- and heavy-duty trucks. EPA's
GHG Inventory groups these modes into on-road totals. However, the
on-road totals in the Inventory include refrigerated transport for
medium- and heavy-duty trucks, which is not considered a source for
Section 202(a). In order to determine the Section 202(a) total, we
took the on-road GHG total of 1556.8 Tg and subtracted the 11.6 Tg
of refrigerated transport to yield a value of 1545.2 Tg.
\31\ Memorandum: Mobile Source Contribution to U.S. GHGs in 2010
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). See generally, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. 2012. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2010. EPA 430-R-12-001. Available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads12/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf (last accessed June 12, 2012)
\32\ Memorandum: Mobile Source Contribution to U.S. GHGs in 2010
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). See generally, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. 2009. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2007. EPA 430-R-09-004. Available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads09/GHG2007entire_report-508.pdf.
\33\ Memorandum: Mobile Source Contribution to U.S. GHGs in 2010
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). See generally, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. 2012. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2010. EPA 430-R-12-001. Available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads12/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf
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Improving our energy and national security by reducing our
dependence on foreign oil has been a national objective since the first
oil price shocks in the 1970s. Although our dependence on foreign
petroleum has declined since peaking in 2005, net petroleum imports
accounted for approximately 45 percent of U.S. petroleum consumption in
2011.\34\ World crude oil production is highly concentrated,
exacerbating the risks of supply disruptions and price shocks as the
recent unrest in North Africa and the Persian Gulf highlights. Recent
tight global oil markets led to prices over $100 per barrel, with
gasoline reaching over $4 per gallon in many parts of the U.S., causing
financial hardship for many families and businesses. The export of U.S.
assets for oil imports continues to be an important component of the
historically unprecedented U.S. trade deficits. Transportation
accounted for about 72 percent of U.S. petroleum consumption in
2010.\35\ Light-duty vehicles account for about 60 percent of
transportation oil use, which means that they alone account for about
40 percent of all U.S. oil consumption.\36\
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\34\ Energy Information Administration, ``How dependent are we
on foreign oil?'' Available at http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm (last accessed June12, 2012).
\35\ Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook
2011, ``Oil/Liquids.'' Available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_liquidfuels.cfm (last accessed June 12, 2012).
\36\ Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook
2012 Early Release Overview. Available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/early_fuel.cfm (last accessed Jun. 14, 2012).
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2. Additional Background on the National Program and Stakeholder
Engagement Prior to the NPRM
Following the successful adoption of a National Program for model
years (MY) 2012-2016 light duty vehicles, President Obama issued a
Memorandum on May 21, 2010 requesting that the NHTSA, on behalf of the
Department of Transportation, and the U.S. EPA develop ``* * * a
coordinated national program under the CAA [Clean Air Act] and the EISA
[Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007] to improve fuel
efficiency and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of passenger cars and
light-duty trucks for model years 2017-2025.'' \37\ Among other things,
the agencies were tasked with researching and then developing standards
for MYs 2017 through 2025 that would be appropriate and consistent with
EPA's and NHTSA's respective statutory authorities. Several major
automobile manufacturers and CARB sent letters to EPA and NHTSA in
support of a MYs 2017 to 2025 rulemaking initiative as outlined in the
President's announcement.\38\
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\37\ The Presidential Memorandum is found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-fuel-efficiency-standards. For the reader's reference, the
President also requested the Administrators of EPA and NHTSA to
issue joint rules under the CAA and EISA to establish fuel
efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions standards for commercial
medium-and heavy-duty on-highway vehicles and work trucks beginning
with the 2014 model year. The agencies recently promulgated final
GHG and fuel efficiency standards for heavy duty vehicles and
engines for MYs 2014-2018. 76 FR 57106 (September 15, 2011).
\38\ These letters of support in response to the May 21, 2010
Presidential Memorandum are available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/letters.htm (last accessed August 9, 2012).
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The President's memorandum requested that the agencies, ``work with
the State of California to develop by September 1, 2010, a technical
assessment to inform the rulemaking process * * *''. Together, NHTSA,
EPA, and CARB issued the joint Technical Assessment Report (TAR)
consistent with Section 2(a) of the Presidential Memorandum.\39\ In
developing this assessment, the agencies and CARB held numerous
meetings with a wide variety of stakeholders including the automobile
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), automotive suppliers, non-
governmental organizations, states and local governments,
infrastructure providers, and labor unions. Concurrent with issuing the
TAR, NHTSA and EPA also issued a joint Notice of Intent to Issue a
Proposed Rulemaking (NOI) \40\ which highlighted the results of the TAR
analyses, provided an overview of key program design elements, and
announced plans for initiating the joint rulemaking to improve the fuel
efficiency and reduce the GHG emissions of passenger cars and light-
duty trucks built in MYs 2017-2025.
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\39\ This Interim Joint Technical Assessment Report (TAR) is
available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/ldv-ghg-tar.pdf (last accessed August 9, 2012) and http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/2017+CAFE-GHG_Interim_TAR2.pdf.
Section 2(a) of the Presidential Memorandum requested that EPA and
NHTSA ``Work with the State of California to develop by September 1,
2010, a technical assessment to inform the rulemaking process,
reflecting input from an array of stakeholders on relevant factors,
including viable technologies, costs, benefits, lead time to develop
and deploy new and emerging technologies, incentives and other
flexibilities to encourage development and deployment of new and
emerging technologies, impacts on jobs and the automotive
manufacturing base in the United States, and infrastructure for
advanced vehicle technologies.''
\40\ 75 FR 62739, October 13, 2010.
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The TAR evaluated a range of potential stringency scenarios through
model year 2025, representing a 3, 4, 5, and 6 percent per year
estimated decrease in GHG levels from a model
[[Page 62635]]
year 2016 fleet-wide average of 250 gram/mile (g/mi), which was
intended to represent a reasonably broad range of stringency increases
for potential future GHG emissions standards, and was also consistent
with the increases suggested by CARB in its letter of commitment in
response to the President's memorandum.41,42 For each of
these scenarios, the TAR also evaluated four illustrative
``technological pathways'' by which these levels could be attained,
each pathway offering a different mix of advanced technologies and
assuming various degrees of penetration of advanced gasoline
technologies, mass reduction, hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), plug-in
hybrids (PHEVs), and electric vehicles (EVs). These pathways were meant
to represent ways that the industry as a whole could increase fuel
economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and did not represent ways
that individual manufacturers would be required to or necessarily would
employ in responding to future standards.
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\41\ 75 FR 62744-45.
\42\ Statement of the California Air Resources Board Regarding
Future Passenger Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards,
California Air Resources Board, May 21, 2010. Available at: http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/letters.htm (last accessed August 9, 2012).
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Manufacturers and others commented extensively on a variety of
topics in the TAR, including the stringency of the standards, program
design elements, the effect of potential standards on vehicle safety,
and the TAR's discussion of technology costs, effectiveness, and
feasibility. In response, the agencies and CARB spent the next several
months continuing to gather information from the industry and others in
response to the agencies' initial analytical efforts. EPA and NHTSA
issued a follow-on Supplemental NOI in November 2010,\43\ highlighting
many of the key comments the agencies received in response to the
September NOI and TAR, and summarized some of the key themes from the
comments and the additional stakeholder meetings.
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\43\ 75 FR 76337, December 8, 2010.
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The agencies' stakeholder engagement between December 2010 and July
29, 2011 focused on ensuring that the agencies possessed the most
complete and comprehensive set of information to inform the proposed
rulemaking. Information that the agencies presented to stakeholders is
posted in the NPRM docket and referenced in multiple places in the
NPRM. Throughout this period, the stakeholders repeated many of the
broad concerns and suggestions described in the TAR, NOI, and November
2010 SNOI. For example, stakeholders uniformly expressed interest in
maintaining a harmonized and coordinated national program that would be
supported by CARB and allow auto makers to build one fleet and preserve
consumer choice. The stakeholders also raised concerns about potential
stringency levels, consumer acceptance of some advanced technologies
and the potential structure of compliance flexibilities available under
EPCA (as amended by EISA) and the CAA. In addition, most of the
stakeholders wanted to discuss issues concerning technology
availability, cost and effectiveness and economic practicability. The
auto manufacturers, in particular, sought to provide the agencies with
a better understanding of their respective strategies (and associated
costs) for improving fuel economy while satisfying consumer demand in
the coming years. Additionally, some stakeholders expressed concern
about potential safety impacts associated with the standards, consumer
costs and consumer acceptance, and potential disparate treatment of
cars and trucks. Some stakeholders also stressed the importance of
investing in infrastructure to support more widespread deployment of
alternative vehicles and fuels. Many stakeholders also asked the
agencies to acknowledge prevailing economic uncertainties in developing
proposed standards. In addition, many stakeholders discussed the number
of years to be covered by the program and what they considered to be
important features of a mid-term review of any standards set or
proposed for MY 2022-2025. In all of these meetings, NHTSA and EPA
sought additional data and information from the stakeholders that would
allow them to refine their initial analyses and determine proposed
standards that are consistent with the agencies' respective statutory
and regulatory requirements. The general issues raised by those
stakeholders are addressed in the sections of this final rule
discussing the topics to which the issues pertain (e.g., the form of
the standards, technology cost and effectiveness, safety impacts,
impact on U.S. vehicle sales and other economic considerations, costs
and benefits).
The first stage of the meetings occurred between December 2010 and
June 20, 2011. These meetings covered topics that were generally
similar to the meetings that were held prior to the publication of the
November 2010 Supplemental NOI and that were summarized in that
document. Manufacturers provided the agencies more detailed information
related to their product plans for vehicle models and fuel efficiency
improving technologies and associated cost estimates, as well as more
detailed feedback regarding the potential program design elements to be
included in the program. The second stage of meetings occurred between
June 21, 2011 and July 14, 2011, during which EPA, NHTSA, CARB and
several components of the Executive Office of the President kicked-off
an intensive series of meetings, primarily with manufacturers, to share
tentative regulatory concepts including concept stringency curves and
program flexibilities based on the analyses completed by the agencies
as of June 21, 2011 \44\ and requested manufacturer feedback;
specifically \45\ detailed and reliable information on how they might
comply with the concepts, potential changes to the concept stringency
levels and program flexibilities available under EPA's and NHTSA's
respective authority that might facilitate compliance, and if they
projected they could not comply, information supporting that belief. In
these second stage meetings, the agencies received considerable input
from the manufacturers related to the questions asked by the agencies
and also related to consumer acceptance and adoption of some advanced
technologies and program costs based on their independent assessment or
information previously submitted to the agencies. The third stage of
meetings occurred between July 15, 2011 and July 28, 2011 during which
the agencies continued to refine concept stringencies and compliance
flexibilities based on further consideration of the information
available to them as well as meeting with manufacturers who expressed
ongoing interest in engaging with the agencies.\46\
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\44\ The agencies consider a range of standards that may satisfy
applicable legal criteria, taking into account the complete record
before them. The initial concepts shared with stakeholders were
within the range the agencies were considering, based on the
information then available to the agencies.
\45\ ``Agency Materials Provided to Manufacturers'' Memo to
docket NHTSA-2010-0131.
\46\ ``Agency Materials Provided to Manufacturers'' Memo to
docket NHTSA-2010-0131.
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Throughout all three stages, EPA and NHTSA continued to engage
other stakeholders to ensure that the agencies were obtaining the most
comprehensive and reliable information possible to guide the agencies
in developing proposed standards for MY 2017-2025. Environmental
organizations consistently stated that stringent standards are
technically achievable and critical to important national interests.
Labor interests stressed the need to
[[Page 62636]]
carefully consider economic impacts and the opportunity to create and
support new jobs, and consumer advocates emphasized the economic and
practical benefits to consumers of improved fuel economy and the need
to preserve consumer choice.
On July 29, 2011, President Obama with the support of thirteen
major automakers, announced plans to pursue the next phase in the
Administration's national vehicle program, increasing fuel economy and
reducing GHG emissions for passenger cars and light trucks built in MYs
2017-2025.\47\ The President was joined by Ford, GM, Chrysler, BMW,
Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar/Land Rover, Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Toyota and Volvo, which together account for over 90 percent of all
vehicles sold in the United States. The California Air Resources Board
(CARB), the United Auto Workers (UAW) and a number of environmental and
consumer groups, also announced their support.
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\47\ The President's remarks are available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/29/remarks-president-fuel-efficiency-standards (last accessed August 9, 2012); see also
http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy for more information from the
agency about the announcement.
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On the same day as the President's announcement, EPA and NHTSA
released a second SNOI (published in the Federal Register on August 9,
2011) describing the joint proposal that the agencies expected to issue
to establish the National Program for model years 2017-2025. The
agencies received letters of support for the concepts laid out in the
SNOI from BMW, Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Global Automakers,
Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar/Land Rover, Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Toyota, Volvo and CARB. The input of stakeholders, which is encouraged
by Executive Order 13563, was invaluable to the agencies in developing
the NPRM. A more detailed summary of the process leading to the
proposed rulemaking is found at 76 FR 74862-865.
3. Public Participation and Stakeholder Engagement Since the NPRM Was
Issued
The agencies signed their respective proposed rules on November 16,
2011 (76 FR 74854 (December 1, 2011)), and subsequently received a
large number of comments representing many perspectives. Between
January 17 and 24, 2012 the EPA and NHTSA held three public hearings in
Detroit, Philadelphia and San Francisco. Nearly 400 people testified
and many more attended the hearings. In response to requests, the
written comment period was extended by two weeks for a total of 74 days
from Federal Register publication, closing on February 13, 2012. The
agencies received extensive written comments from more than 140
organizations, including auto manufacturers and suppliers, State and
local governments and their associations, consumer groups, labor
unions, fuels and energy providers, auto dealers, academics, national
security experts and veterans, environmental and other non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and nearly 300,000 comments from private
individuals. In addition to comments received on the proposal, the
agencies met with many different stakeholder groups between issuance of
the NPRM and this final rule. Generally, the agencies met with nearly
all automakers individually to discuss flexibilities such as the A/C,
off-cycle, and pickup truck incentives, as well as different ways to
meet the standards; with suppliers to discuss the same flexibilities;
with environmental groups to discuss flexibilities and that the
agencies maintain strong standards for the final rule; and with the
natural gas interests to discuss incentives for natural gas in the
final rule. Memoranda summarizing these meetings can be found in the
EPA and NHTSA dockets for this rulemaking. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799 and
NHTSA-2010-0131.\48\
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\48\ NHTSA is required to provide information on these meetings
per DOT Order 2100.2, available at http://www.reg-group.com/library/DOT2100-2.PDF (last accessed Jun. 12, 2012). The agencies have
placed memos summarizing these meetings in their respective dockets.
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An overwhelming majority of commenters supported the proposed 2017-
2025 CAFE and GHG standards with most organizations and nearly all of
the private individuals expressing broad support for the program and
for the continuation of the National Program to model years (MY) 2017-
2025 light-duty vehicles, and the Program's projected achievement of an
emissions level of 163 gram/mile fleet average CO2, which
would be equivalent to 54.5 miles per gallon if the automakers were to
meet this CO2 level solely through fuel economy
improvements.\49\
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\49\ Real-world CO2 is typically 25 percent higher
and real-world fuel economy is typically 20 percent lower than the
CO2 and CAFE compliance values discussed here. 163 g/mi
would be equivalent to 54.5 mpg, if the entire fleet were to meet
this CO2 level through tailpipe CO2 and fuel
economy improvements, and assumes gasoline fueled vehicles
(significant diesel fuel penetration would have a different mpg
equivalent). The agencies expect, however, that a portion of these
improvements will be made through improvements in air conditioning
leakage and alternative refrigerants, which would not contribute to
fuel economy.
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In general, more than a dozen automobile manufacturers supported
the proposed standards as well as the credit opportunities and other
provisions that provide compliance flexibility, while also recommending
some changes to the credit and flexibility provisions--in fact, a
significant majority of comments from industry focused on the credit
and flexibility provisions. Nearly all automakers stressed the
importance of the mid-term evaluation to assess the progress of
technology development and cost, and the accuracy of the agencies'
assumptions due to the long time-frame of the rule. Many industry
commenters expressly predicated their support of the 2017-2025 National
Program on the existence of this evaluation. Environmental and public
interest non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as States that
commented were also very supportive of extending the National Program
to MYs 2017-2025 passenger vehicles and light trucks. Many of these
organizations expressed concern that the mid-term evaluation might be
used as an opportunity to weaken standards or to delay the
environmental benefits of the National Program.
The agencies also received comments that either opposed the
issuance of the standards, or that argued that they should be modified
in various ways. The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) commented
that the proposed standards were not sufficiently stringent,
recommending that the agencies increase the standards to 60-70 mpg in
2025. CBD, as well as several other organizations,\50\ also argued that
minimum standards (``backstops'') were necessary for all fleets in
order to ensure anticipated fuel economy gains. Several environmental
groups expressed concern that flexibilities, such as off-cycle credits,
could result in significantly lower gains through double-counting and
allowing manufacturers to avoid making fuel economy improvements.
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\50\ The Natural Resources Defense Council, the Union of
Concerned Scientists, the Sierra Club, and the Consumer's Union.
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Some car-focused manufacturers objected to the truck curves, which
they considered lenient while some small truck manufacturers objected
to the large truck targets, which they considered lenient; and some
intermediate and small volume manufacturers with limited product lines
requested additional lead time, as well as less stringent standards for
their vehicles. Manufacturers in general argued that backstops were not
[[Page 62637]]
necessary for fuel economy gains and would be outside NHTSA's
authority. Manufacturers also commented extensively on the programs'
flexibilities, such as off-cycle credits, generally requesting more
permissive applications and requirements.
The National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) opposed the MYs
2017-2025 proposed standards, arguing that the agencies should delay
rulemaking since they believe there was no need to set standards so far
in advance, that the costs of the proposed program are higher than
agencies have projected, and that some (mostly low income) consumers
will not be able to acquire financing for new cars meeting these more
stringent standards.
Many environmental and consumer groups commented that the benefits
of the rule were understated and the costs overstated, arguing that
several potential benefits had not been included and the technology
effectiveness estimates were overly conservative. Some environmental
groups also expressed concern that the benefits of the rule could be
eroded if the agencies' assumptions about the market do not come to
pass or if manufacturers build larger vehicles. Other groups, such as
NADA, Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Institute for Energy
Research, argued that the benefits of the rule were overstated and the
costs understated, asserting that manufacturers would have already made
improvements if the agencies' calculations were correct.
Many commenters discussed potential environmental and health
aspects of the rule. Producers of specific materials, such as aluminum,
steel, or plastic, commented that standards should ultimately reflect a
life cycle analysis that accounts for the greenhouse gas emissions
attributable to the materials from which vehicles are manufactured.
Some environmental groups requested that standards for electrified
vehicles reflect emissions attributable to upstream electricity
generation. Many commenters expressed support for the rule and its
health benefits, while other commenters were concerned about possible
negative health impacts due to assumptions about future fuel
properties.
Many commenters also addressed issues relating to safety, with most
generally supporting the agencies' efforts to continue to improve their
understanding of the relationship between mass reduction and safety.
Consistent with their comments in prior rulemakings, several
environmental and consumer organizations commented that data exist that
mass reduction does not have adverse safety impacts, and stated that
the use of better designs and materials can improve both fuel economy
and safety. Dynamic Research Institute (DRI) submitted a study, and
other commenters pointed to DRI's work and additional studies for the
agencies' consideration, as discussed in more detail in Section II.G
below. Materials producers (aluminum, steel, composite, etc.) commented
that their respective materials can be used to improve safety. The
Alliance commented that while some recent mass reduction vehicle design
concept studies have created designs that perform well in simulation
modeling of safety standard and voluntary safety guideline tests, the
design concepts yield aggressively stiffer crash pulses may be
detrimental to rear seat occupants, vulnerable occupants and potential
crash partners. The Alliance also commented that there are simulation
model uncertainties with respect to advanced materials, and the real-
world crash behavior of these concepts may not match that predicted in
those studies. The Alliance and Volvo commented that it is important to
monitor safety trends, and the Alliance urged that the agencies revisit
this topic during the mid-term evaluation.
Additional comments touched on the use of ``miles per gallon'' to
describe the standards, the agencies' baseline market forecast,
consumer welfare and trends in consumer preferences for fuel economy,
and a wide range of other topics.
Throughout this notice, the agencies discuss key issues arising
from the public comments and the agencies' responses to those comments.
The agencies also respond to comments in the Joint TSD and in their
respective RIAs. In addition, EPA has addressed all of the public
comments specific to the GHG program in a Response to Comments
document.\51\
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\51\ EPA Response to Comments document. (EPA-420-F-12-017)
Available in the docket and at: http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regs-light-duty.htm (last accessed August 8, 2012).
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4. California's Greenhouse Gas Program
In 2004, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) approved
standards for new light-duty vehicles, regulating the emission of
CO2 and other GHGs.\52\ On June 30, 2009, EPA granted
California's request for a waiver of preemption under the CAA with
respect to these standards.\53\ Thirteen states and the District of
Columbia, comprising approximately 40 percent of the light-duty vehicle
market, adopted California's standards.\54\ The granting of the waiver
permits California and the other states to proceed with implementing
the California emission standards for MYs 2009 and later. After EPA and
NHTSA issued their MYs 2012-2016 standards, CARB revised its program
such that compliance with the EPA greenhouse gas standards will be
deemed to be compliance with California's GHG standards.\55\ This
facilitates the National Program by allowing manufacturers to meet all
of the standards with a single national fleet.
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\52\ Through operation of section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act,
California is able to seek and receive a waiver of section 209(a)'s
preemptions to enforce such standards. Section 209(b)(1) requires a
waiver to be granted for any State that had adopted standards (other
than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicles' engines prior to March 30,
1966. California is the only state to have adopted standards prior
to 1966 and is therefore the only state qualified to seek and
receive a waiver. EPA evaluates California's request under the three
waiver criteria set forth in section 209(b)(1)(A)-(C) and must grant
a waiver under section 209(e)(2) if these criteria are met.
\53\ 74 FR 32744 (July 8, 2009). See also Chamber of Commerce v.
EPA, 642 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing petitions for review
challenging EPA's grant of the waiver).
\54\ The Clean Air Act allows other states to adopt California's
motor vehicle emissions standards under section 177 if such
standards are identical to the California standards for which a
waiver has been granted. States are not required to seek EPA
approval under the terms of section 177.
\55\ See ``California Exhaust Emission Standards and Test
Procedures for 2001 and Subsequent Model Passenger Cars, Light-Duty
Trucks, and Medium-Duty Vehicles as approved by OAL,'' March 29,
2010 at 7. Available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/ghgpv10/oaltp.pdf (last accessed June 12, 2012).
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As requested by the President and in the interest of maximizing
regulatory harmonization, NHTSA and EPA worked closely with CARB
throughout the development of the proposed rules. CARB staff released
its proposal for MYs 2017-2025 GHG emissions standards consistent with
the standards proposed by EPA on December 9, 2011 and the California
Air Resources Board adopted these standards at its January 26, 2012
Board meeting, with final approval at its March 22, 2012 Board
meeting.\56\ In adopting their GHG standards the California Air
Resources Board directed the Executive Officer to ``continue
collaborating with EPA and NHTSA as their standards are finalized and
in the mid-term review to minimize potential lost benefits from federal
treatment of upstream emissions of electricity and hydrogen fueled
vehicles,'' and also, ``to participate in U.S. EPA's review of the 2022
through 2025 model year
[[Page 62638]]
passenger vehicle greenhouse gas standards being proposed under the
2017 through 2025 MY National Program.'' \57\ CARB also reconfirmed its
commitment, previously made in July 2011 in conjunction with release of
the Supplemental NOI,\58\ to propose to revise its GHG emissions
standards for MYs 2017-2025 such that compliance with EPA GHG emissions
standards shall be deemed compliance with the California GHG emissions
standards. The Board directed CARB's Executive Officer that, ``it is
appropriate to accept compliance with the 2017 through 2025 model year
National Program as compliance with California's greenhouse gas
emission standards in the 2017 through 2025 model years, once United
States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) issues their final
rule on or after its current July 2012 planned release, provided that
the greenhouse gas reductions set forth in U.S. EPA's December 1, 2011
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for 2017 through 2025 model year
passenger vehicles are maintained, except that California shall
maintain its own reporting requirements.'' \59\
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\56\ See California Low-Emission Vehicles (LEV) & GHG 2012
regulations adopted by State of California Air Resources Board,
March 22, 2012, Resolution 12-21 incorporating by reference
Resolution 12-11 (see especially Resolution 12-11 at 20) which was
adopted January 26, 2012. Available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/leviiighg2012/leviiighg2012.htm (last accessed July 9, 2012).
\57\ Id.
\58\ See State of California July 28, 2011 letter available at:
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/letters.htm (last accessed August 9,
2012).
\59\ Id., CARB Resolution 12-21 (March 22, 2012) (last accessed
June 6, 2012).
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C. Summary of the Final 2017-2025 National Program
1. Joint Analytical Approach
These final rules continue the collaborative analytical effort
between NHTSA and EPA, which began with the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking
for light-duty vehicles. NHTSA and EPA have worked together on nearly
every aspect of the technical analysis supporting these joint rules.
The results of this collaboration are reflected in key elements of the
respective NHTSA and EPA rules, as well as in the analytical work
contained in the Joint Technical Support Document (Joint TSD). The
agencies have continued to develop and refine the supporting analyses
since issuing the proposed rule last December. The Joint TSD, in
particular, describes important details of the analytical work that are
common to both agencies' rules, and also explains any key differences
in approach. The joint analyses addressed in the TSD include the build-
up of the baseline and reference fleets, the derivation of the shape of
the footprint-based attribute curves that define the agencies'
respective standards, a detailed description of the estimated costs and
effectiveness of the technologies that are available to vehicle
manufacturers, the economic inputs used to calculate the costs and
benefits of the final rules, a description of air conditioner and other
off-cycle technologies, and the agencies' assessment of the impacts of
hybrid technology incentive provisions for full-size pick-up trucks.
This comprehensive joint analytical approach has provided a sound and
consistent technical basis for both agencies in developing their final
standards, which are summarized in the sections below.
2. Level of the Standards
EPA and NHTSA are finalizing separate sets of standards for
passenger cars and for light trucks, each under its respective
statutory authority. EPA is setting national CO2 emissions
standards for passenger cars and light-trucks under section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act (CAA), while NHTSA is setting national corporate
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA), as amended by the Energy Independence and
Security Act (EISA) of 2007 (49 U.S.C. 32902). Both the CO2
and CAFE standards for passenger cars and standards for light trucks
are footprint-based, similar to the standards currently in effect for
these vehicles through model year 2016, and will become more stringent
on average in each model year from 2017 through 2025. The basis for
measuring performance relative to standards continues to be based
predominantly on the EPA city and highway test cycles (2-cycle test).
However, EPA is finalizing optional air conditioning and off-cycle
credits for the GHG program and adjustments to calculated fuel economy
for the CAFE program that are based on test procedures other than the
2-cycle tests.
As proposed, EPA is finalizing standards that are projected to
require, on an average industry fleet wide basis, 163 grams/mile of
CO2 in model year 2025. This is projected to be achieved
through improvements in fuel efficiency and improvements in non-
CO2 GHG emissions from reduced air conditioning (A/C) system
leakage and use of lower global warming potential (GWP) refrigerants.
The level of 163 grams/mile CO2 is equivalent on a mpg basis
to 54.5 mpg, if this level was achieved solely through improvements in
fuel efficiency.\60\
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\60\ Real-world CO2 is typically 25 percent higher
and real-world fuel economy is typically 20 percent lower than the
CO2 and CAFE values discussed here. The reference to
CO2 here refers to CO2 equivalent reductions,
as this included some degree of reductions in greenhouse gases other
than CO2, as one part of the A/C-related reductions. In
addition, greater penetration of diesel fuel (as opposed to
gasoline) will change the fuel economy equivalent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the proposal, for passenger cars, the
CO2 compliance values associated with the footprint curves
will be reduced on average by 5 percent per year from the model year
2016 projected passenger car industry-wide compliance level through
model year 2025. In recognition of manufacturers' unique challenges in
improving the fuel economy and GHG emissions of full-size pickup trucks
as the fleet transitions from the MY 2016 standards to MY 2017 and
later, while preserving the utility (e.g., towing and payload
capabilities) of those vehicles, EPA is finalizing standards reflecting
an annual rate of improvement for light-duty trucks which is lower than
that for passenger cars in the early years of the program. For light-
duty trucks, the average annual rate of CO2 emissions
reduction in model years 2017 through 2021 is 3.5 percent per year. As
proposed, EPA is also changing the slopes of the CO2-
footprint curves for light-duty trucks from those in the 2012-2016
rule, in a manner that effectively means that the annual rate of
improvement for smaller light-duty trucks in model years 2017 through
2021 will be higher than 3.5 percent, and the annual rate of
improvement for larger light-duty trucks over the same time period will
be lower than 3.5 percent. For model years 2022 through 2025, EPA is
finalizing an average annual rate of CO2 emissions reduction
for light-duty trucks of 5 percent per year.
Consistent with its statutory authority,\61\ NHTSA has developed
two phases of passenger car and light truck standards in this
rulemaking action. The first phase, from MYs 2017-2021, includes final
standards that are projected to require, on an average industry fleet
wide basis, a range from 40.3 to 41 mpg in MY 2021.\62\ For passenger
cars, the annual increase in
[[Page 62639]]
the stringency of the target curves between model years 2017 to 2021 is
expected to average 3.8 to 3.9 percent. In recognition of
manufacturers' unique challenges in improving the fuel economy and GHG
emissions of full-size pickup trucks as the fleet transitions from the
MY 2016 standards to MY 2017 and later, while preserving the utility
(e.g., towing and payload capabilities) of those vehicles, NHTSA is
also finalizing a lower annual rate of improvement for light trucks in
the first phase of the program. For light trucks, the annual increase
in the stringency of the target curves in model years 2017 through 2021
is 2.5 to 2.7 percent per year on average. NHTSA is changing the slopes
of the fuel economy footprint curves for light trucks from those in the
MYs 2012-2016 final rule, which effectively make the annual rate of
improvement for smaller light trucks in MYs 2017-2021 higher than 2.5
or 2.7 percent per year, and the annual rate of improvement for larger
light trucks over that time period lower than 2.5 or 2.7 percent per
year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ 49 U.S.C. 32902.
\62\ The range of values here and through this rulemaking
document reflect the results of co-analyses conducted by NHTSA using
two different light-duty vehicle market forecasts through model year
2025. To evaluate the effects of the standards, the agencies must
project what vehicles and technologies will exist in future model
years and then evaluate what technologies can feasibly be applied to
those vehicles to raise their fuel economy and reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions. To project the future fleet, the agencies
must develop a baseline vehicle fleet. For this final rule, the
agencies have analyzed the impacts of the standards using two
different forecasts of the light[hyphen]duty vehicle fleet through
MY 2025. The baseline fleets are discussed in detail in Section II.B
of this preamble, and in Chapter 1 of the Technical Support
Document. EPA's sensitivity analysis of the alternative fleet is
included in Chapter 10 of its RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second phase of the CAFE program, from MYs 2022-2025, includes
standards that are not final due to the statutory provision that NHTSA
shall issue regulations prescribing average fuel economy standards for
at least 1 but not more than 5 model years at a time.\63\ The MYs 2022-
2025 standards, then, are not final as part of this rulemaking, but
rather augural, meaning that they represent the agency's current
judgment, based on the information available to the agency today, of
what levels of stringency would be maximum feasible in those model
years. NHTSA projects that those standards would require, on an average
industry fleet wide basis, a range from 48.7 to 49.7 mpg in model year
2025. NHTSA will undertake a de novo rulemaking at a later date to set
legally binding standards for MYs 2022-2025. See Section IV for more
information. For passenger cars, the annual increase in the stringency
of the target curves between model years 2022 and 2025 is expected to
average 4.7 \64\ percent, and for light trucks, the annual increase
during those model years is expected to average 4.8 to 4.9 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3)(B).
\64\ The rate of increase is rounded at 4.7 percent per year
using 2010 and 2008 baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA notes that for the first time in this rulemaking, EPA is
finalizing, under its EPCA authority, rules allowing the impact of air
conditioning system efficiency improvements to be included in the
calculation of fuel economy for CAFE compliance. Given that these real-
world improvements will be available to manufacturers for compliance,
NHTSA has accounted for this by determining the amount that industry is
expected to improve air conditioning system efficiency in each model
year from 2017-2025, and setting the CAFE standards to reflect these
improvements, in a manner consistent with EPA's GHG standards. See
Sections III.B.10 and IV.I.4.b of this final rule preamble for more
information.
NHTSA also notes that the rates of increase in stringency for CAFE
standards are lower than EPA's rates of increase in stringency for GHG
standards. As in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, this is for purposes of
harmonization and in reflection of several statutory constraints in
EPCA/EISA. As a primary example, NHTSA's standards, unlike EPA's, do
not reflect the inclusion of air conditioning system refrigerant and
leakage improvements, but EPA's standards allows consideration of such
A/C refrigerant improvements which reduce GHGs but do not affect fuel
economy. As another example, the Clean Air Act allows various
compliance flexibilities (among them certain credit generating
mechanisms) not present in EPCA.
As with the MYs 2012-2016 standards, NHTSA and EPA's final MYs
2017-2025 passenger car and light truck standards are expressed as
mathematical functions depending on the vehicle footprint
attribute.\65\ Footprint is one measure of vehicle size, and is
determined by multiplying the vehicle's wheelbase by the vehicle's
average track width. The standards that must be met by each
manufacturer's fleet will be determined by computing the production-
weighted average of the targets applicable to each of the
manufacturer's fleet of passenger cars and light trucks.\66\ Under
these footprint-based standards, the average levels required of
individual manufacturers will depend, as noted above, on the mix and
volume of vehicles the manufacturer produces in any given model year.
The values in the tables below reflect the agencies' projection of the
range of the corresponding average fleet levels that will result from
these attribute-based curves given the agencies' current assumptions
about the mix of vehicles that will be sold in the model years covered
by these standards. EPA and NHTSA have each finalized the attribute-
based curves, as proposed, for the model years covered by these final
rules, as discussed in detail in Section II.B of this preamble and
Chapter 2 of the Joint TSD. The agencies have updated their projections
of the impacts of the final rule standards since the proposal, as
discussed in Sections III and IV of this preamble and in the agencies'
respective RIAs.
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\65\ NHTSA is required to set attribute-based CAFE standards for
passenger cars and light trucks. 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3).
\66\ For CAFE calculations, a harmonic average is used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in Table I-1 NHTSA's fleet-wide estimated required CAFE
levels for passenger cars would increase from between 40.1 and 39.6 mpg
in MY 2017 to between 55.3 and 56.2 mpg in MY 2025. Fleet-wide required
CAFE levels for light trucks, in turn, are estimated to increase from
between 29.1 and 29.4 mpg in MY 2017 and between 39.3 and 40.3 mpg in
MY 2025. For the reader's reference, Table I-1 also provides the
estimated average fleet-wide required levels for the combined car and
truck fleets, culminating in an estimated overall fleet average
required CAFE level of a range from 48.7 to 49.7 mpg in MY 2025.
Considering these combined car and truck increases, the standards
together represent approximately a 4.0 percent annual rate of
increase,\67\ on average, relative to the MY 2016 required CAFE levels.
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\67\ This estimated average percentage increase includes the
effect of changes in standard stringency and changes in the forecast
fleet sales mix.
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[[Page 62640]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.000
The estimated average required mpg levels for passenger cars and
trucks under the standards shown in Table I-1 above include the use of
A/C efficiency improvements, as discussed above, but do not reflect a
number of flexibilities and credits that manufacturers may use for
compliance that NHTSA cannot consider in establishing standards based
on EPCA/EISA constraints. These flexibilities cause the actual achieved
fuel economy to be lower than the required levels in the table above.
The flexibilities and credits that NHTSA cannot consider include the
ability of manufacturers to pay civil penalties rather than achieving
required CAFE levels, the ability to use Flexible Fuel Vehicle (FFV)
credits, the ability to count electric vehicles for compliance, the
operation of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles on electricity for
compliance prior to MY 2020, and the ability to transfer and carry-
forward credits. When accounting for these flexibilities and credits,
NHTSA estimates that the CAFE standards will lead to the following
average achieved fuel economy levels, based on the agencies'
projections of what each manufacturer's fleet will comprise in each
year of the program: \68\
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\68\ The CAFE program includes incentives for full size pick-up
trucks that have mild HEV or strong HEV systems, and for full size
pick-up trucks that have fuel economy performance that is better
than the target curve by more than final levels. To receive these
incentives, manufacturers must produce vehicles with these
technologies or performance levels at volumes that meet or exceed
final penetration levels (percentage of full size pick-up truck
volume). This incentive is described in detail in Section IV.I.3.a..
The NHTSA estimates in Table I-2 do not account for the reduction in
estimated average achieved fleet-wide CAFE fuel economy that will
occur if manufacturers use this incentive. NHTSA has conducted a
sensitivity study that estimates the effects for manufacturers'
potential use of this flexibility in Chapter X of the RIA.
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[[Page 62641]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.001
NHTSA is also required by EISA to set a minimum fuel economy
standard for domestically manufactured passenger cars in addition to
the attribute-based passenger car standard. The minimum standard
``shall be the greater of (A) 27.5 miles per gallon; or (B) 92 percent
of the average fuel economy projected by the Secretary for the combined
domestic and non-domestic passenger automobile fleets manufactured for
sale in the United States by all manufacturers in the model year * *
*,'' and applies to each manufacturer's fleet of domestically
manufactured passenger cars (i.e., like the other CAFE standards, it
represents a fleet average requirement, not a requirement for each
individual vehicle within the fleet).
Based on NHTSA's current market forecast, the agency is finalizing
minimum standards for domestic passenger cars for MYs 2017-2021 and
providing augural standards for MYs 2022-2025 as presented below in
Table I-3.
Table I-3--Minimum Standard for Domestically Manufactured Passenger Cars (mpg)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
36.7 38.0 39.4 40.9 42.7 44.7 46.8 49.0 51.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA is finalizing GHG emissions standards, and Table I-4 provides
estimates of the projected overall fleet-wide CO2 emission
compliance target levels. The values reflected in Table I-4 are those
that correspond to the manufacturers' projected CO2
compliance target levels from the passenger car and truck footprint
curves, but do not account for EPA's projection of how manufacturers
will implement two of the incentive programs being finalized in today's
rulemaking (advanced technology vehicle multipliers, and hybrid and
performance-based incentives for full-size pickup trucks). Table I-4
also does not account for the intermediate volume manufacturer lead-
time provisions that EPA is adopting. EPA's projection of fleet-wide
emissions levels that do reflect these provisions is shown in Table I-5
below.
Table I-4--Projected Fleet-Wide CO2 Compliance Targets Under the Footprint-Based CO2 Standards (g/mi) (Primary Analysis) a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016
base 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars................................................ 225 212 202 191 182 172 164 157 150 143
Light Trucks.................................................. 298 295 285 277 269 249 237 225 214 203
Combined Cars and Trucks...................................... \69\ 243 232 222 213 199 190 180 171 163
250
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Projected results using MY 2008 based fleet projection analysis. These values differ slightly from those shown in the proposal because of revisions
to the MY 2008 based fleet.
[[Page 62642]]
As shown in Table I-4, projected fleet-wide CO2 emission
compliance targets for cars increase in stringency from 212 to 143 g/mi
between MY 2017 and MY 2025. Similarly, projected fleet-wide
CO2 equivalent emission compliance targets for trucks
increase in stringency from 295 to 203 g/mi. As shown, the overall
fleet average CO2 level targets are projected to increase in
stringency from 243 g/mi in MY 2017 to 163 g/mi in MY 2025, which is
equivalent to 54.5 mpg if all reductions are made with fuel economy
improvements.
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\69\ As noted at proposal, the projected fleet compliance levels
for 2016 are different for trucks and the fleet than were projected
in the 2012-2016 rule. See 76 FR 74868 n. 44. Our assessment for
this final rule is based on a predicted 2016 car value of 224, a
2016 truck value of 297 and a projected combined car and truck value
of 252 g/mi. That is because the standards are footprint based and
the fleet projections, hence the footprint distributions, change
slightly with each update of our projections, as described below. In
addition, the actual fleet compliance levels for any model year will
not be known until the end of that model year based on actual
vehicle sales.
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EPA anticipates that manufacturers will take advantage of program
flexibilities, credits and incentives, such as car/truck credit
transfers, air conditioning credits, off-cycle credits, advanced
technology vehicle multipliers, intermediate volume manufacturer lead-
time provisions, and hybrid and performance-based incentives for full
size pick-up trucks. Three of these flexibility provisions--advanced
technology vehicle multipliers, intermediate volume manufacturer lead-
time provisions, and the full size pick-up hybrid/performance
incentives--are expected to have an impact on the fleet-wide emissions
levels that manufacturers will actually achieve.\70\ Therefore, Table
I-5 shows EPA's projection of the achieved emission levels of the fleet
for MY 2017 through 2025. The differences between the emissions levels
shown in Tables I-4 and I-5 reflect the impact on stringency due EPA's
projection of manufacturers' use of the advanced technology vehicle
multipliers, and the full size pick-up hybrid/performance incentives,
but does not reflect car-truck trading, air conditioning credits, or
off-cycle credits, because, while the latter credit provisions help
reduce manufacturers' costs of the program, EPA believes that they will
result in real-world emission reductions that will not affect the
achieved level of emission reductions. These estimates are more fully
discussed in III.B.
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\70\ There are extremely small (and unquantified) impacts on the
achieved values from other flexibilities such as small volume
manufacturer specific standards and emergency vehicle exemptions.
Table I-5--Projected Fleet-Wide Achieved CO2-Equivalent Emission Levels Under the Footprint-Based CO2 Standards (g/mi) \71\ (Primary Analysis) a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016
base 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars................................................... 225 213 203 193 183 173 164 157 150 143
Light Trucks..................................................... 298 295 287 278 270 250 238 226 214 204
Combined Cars and Trucks......................................... \72\ 243 234 223 214 200 190 181 172 163
250
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Projected results using 2008 based fleet projection analysis. These values differ slightly from those shown in the proposal because of revisions to
the MY 2008 based fleet and updates to the analysis.
A more detailed description of how the agency arrived at the year
by year progression of both the projected compliance targets and the
achieved CO2 emission levels can be found in Sections III of
this preamble.
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\71\ Electric vehicles are assumed at 0 gram/mile in this
analysis.
\72\ The projected fleet achieved levels for 2016 are different
for the fleet than were projected in the 2012-2016 rule. Our
assessment is based on a predicted 2016 car value of 224, and a 2016
truck value of 297 and a projected combined car and truck value of
252 g/mi. That is because the standards are footprint based and the
fleet projections, hence the footprint distributions, change
slightly with each update of our projections, as described below. In
addition, the actual fleet achieved levels for any model year will
not be known until the end of that model year based on actual
vehicle sales.
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As previously stated, there was broad support for the proposed
standards by auto manufacturers including BMW, Chrysler, Ford, GM,
Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Jaguar/Land Rover, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Tesla, Toyota, Volvo, as well as the Global Automakers. Of the larger
manufacturers, Volkswagen and Mercedes commented that the proposed
passenger car standards were relatively too stringent while light truck
standards were relatively too lenient and suggested several
alternatives to the proposed standards. Toyota also commented that
lower truck stringency puts more burdens on small cars. Honda was
concerned that small light trucks face disproportionate stringency
compared to larger footprint trucks under the proposed standards. The
agencies' consideration of these and other comments and of the updated
technical analyses did not lead to changes to the stringency of the
standards nor in the shapes of the curves discussed above. These issues
are discussed in more detail in Sections II, III and IV.
NHTSA and EPA reviewed the technology assessment employed in the
proposal in developing this final rule, and concluded that there is a
wide range of technologies available in the MY 2017-2025 timeframe for
manufacturers to consider in upgrading light-duty vehicles to reduce
GHG emissions and improve fuel economy. Commenters generally agreed
with this assessment and conclusion.\73\ The final technology
assessment relied on our joint analyses for the proposed rule, as well
as some new information and analyses, including information we received
during the public comment period, as discussed in Section II.D below.
The analyses performed for this final rule included an updated
assessment of the cost, effectiveness and availability of several
technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ For more detail on comments regarding the agencies'
technology assessment, see Section II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted further in Section II.D, for this final rule, the agencies
considered over 40 current and evolving vehicle and engine technologies
that manufacturers could use to improve the fuel economy and reduce
CO2 emissions of their vehicles during the MYs 2017-2025
timeframe. Many of the technologies we considered are available today,
some on a limited number of vehicles and others more widespread
throughout the fleet, and the agencies believe they could be
incorporated into vehicles as manufacturers make their product
development decisions. These ``near-term'' technologies are identical
or very similar to those anticipated in the agencies' analyses of
compliance strategies for the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, but we believe
they can achieve wider penetration throughout the
[[Page 62643]]
vehicle fleet during the MYs 2017-2025 timeframe. For this rulemaking,
given its timeframe, we also considered other technologies that are not
currently in production, but that are beyond the initial research
phase, and are under development and expected to be in production in
the next 5-10 years. Examples of these technologies are downsized and
turbocharged engines operating at combustion pressures even higher than
today's turbocharged engines, and emerging hybrid architecture combined
with an 8-speed dual clutch transmission, a combination that is not
available today. These are technologies that the agencies believe that
manufacturers can, for the most part, apply both to cars and trucks,
and that we expect will achieve significant improvements in fuel
economy and reductions in CO2 emissions at reasonable cost
in the MYs 2017-2025 timeframe. Chapter 3 of the joint TSD provides the
full assessment of these technologies. Due to the relatively long lead
time before MY 2017, the agencies expect that manufacturers will be
able to employ combinations of these and potentially other technologies
and that manufacturers and the supply industry will be able to produce
them in sufficient volumes to comply with the final standards.
A number of commenters suggested that the proposed standards were
either too stringent or not stringent enough (either in some model
years or in all model years, depending on the commenter), and nearly
all auto manufacturers and their associations stressed the importance
of the mid-term evaluation of the MYs 2022-2025 standards in their
comments due to the long timeframe of the rule and uncertainty in
assumptions given this timeframe. Our consideration of these comments
as well as our revised analyses, leads us to conclude that the general
rate of increase in the stringency of the standards as proposed remains
appropriate. The comprehensive mid-term evaluation process being
finalized and our evaluation of the stringency of the standards is
discussed further in Sections III and IV.
Both agencies also considered other alternative standards as part
of their respective Regulatory Impact Analyses that span a reasonable
range of alternative stringencies both more and less stringent than the
final standards. EPA's and NHTSA's analyses of these regulatory
alternatives (and explanation of why we are finalizing the standards)
are contained in Sections III and IV of this preamble, respectively, as
well as in the agencies' respective Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs).
3. Form of the Standards
NHTSA and EPA are finalizing attribute-based standards for
passenger cars and light trucks, as required by EISA and as allowed by
the CAA, and will continue to use vehicle footprint as the
attribute.\74\ Footprint is defined as a vehicle's wheelbase multiplied
by its average track width--in other words, the area enclosed by the
points at which the wheels meet the ground. NHTSA and EPA adopted an
attribute-based approach based on vehicle footprint for MYs 2012-2016
light-duty vehicle standards.\75\ The agencies continue to believe that
footprint is the most appropriate attribute on which to base the
proposed standards, as discussed in Section II.C and in Chapter 2 of
the Joint TSD. The majority of commenters supported the continued use
of footprint as the vehicle attribute; those comments and the agencies'
response are discussed in Section II.C below.
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\74\ NHTSA and EPA use the same vehicle category definitions for
determining which vehicles are subject to the car curve standards
versus the truck curve standards as were used for MYs 2012-2016
standards. As in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, a vehicle classified
as a car under the NHTSA CAFE program will also be classified as a
car under the EPA GHG program, and likewise for trucks. This
approach of using common definitions allows the CO2
standards and the CAFE standards to continue to be harmonized across
all vehicles for the National Program.
\75\ NHTSA also used the footprint attribute in its Reformed
CAFE program for light trucks for model years 2008-2011 and
passenger car CAFE standards for MY 2011.
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Under the footprint-based standards, the curve defines a GHG or
fuel economy performance target for each separate car or truck
footprint. Using the curves, each manufacturer thus will have a GHG and
CAFE average standard that is unique to each of its fleets, depending
on the footprints and production volumes of the vehicle models produced
by that manufacturer. A manufacturer will have separate footprint-based
standards for cars and for trucks. The curves are mostly sloped, so
that generally, larger vehicles (i.e., vehicles with larger footprints)
will be subject to higher CO2 grams/mile targets and lower
CAFE mpg targets than smaller vehicles. This is because, generally
speaking, smaller vehicles are more capable of achieving lower levels
of CO2 and higher levels of fuel economy than larger
vehicles. Although a manufacturer's fleet average standards could be
estimated throughout the model year based on the projected production
volume of its vehicle fleet (and are estimated as part of the EPA
certification process), the standards to which the manufacturer must
comply will be determined by its final model year production figures. A
manufacturer's calculation of its fleet average standards as well as
its fleets' average performance at the end of the model year will thus
be based on the production-weighted average target and performance of
each model in its fleet.\76\
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\76\ As in the MYs 2012-2016 rule, a manufacturer may have some
models that exceed their target, and some that are below their
target. Compliance with a fleet average standard is determined by
comparing the fleet average standard (based on the production
weighted average of the target levels for each model) with fleet
average performance (based on the production weighted average of the
performance for each model).
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The final footprint-based standards are identical to those
proposed. The passenger car curves are also similar in shape to the car
curves for MYs 2012-2016. However, as proposed, the final light truck
curves for MYs 2017-2025 reflect more significant changes compared to
the light truck curves for MYs 2012-2016; specifically, the agencies
have increased the slope and extended the large-footprint cutpoint for
the light truck curves over time to larger footprints. We continue to
believe that these changes from the MYs 2012-2016 curves represent an
appropriate balance of both technical and policy issues, as discussed
in Section II.C below and Chapter 2 of the Joint TSD.
NHTSA is adopting the attribute curves below for model years 2017
through 2021 and presenting the augural attribute curves below for
model years 2022-2025. As just explained, these targets, expressed as
mpg values, will be production-weighted to determine each
manufacturer's fleet average standard for cars and trucks. Although the
general model of the target curve equation is the same for each vehicle
category and each year, the parameters of the curve equation differ for
cars and trucks. Each parameter also changes on a model year basis,
resulting in the yearly increases in stringency. Figure I-1 below
illustrates the passenger car CAFE curves for model years 2017 through
2025 while Figure I-2 below illustrates the light truck CAFE curves for
model years 2017 through 2025.
EPA is finalizing the attribute curves shown in Figure I-3 and
Figure I-4 below, for model years 2017 through 2025. As with the CAFE
curves, the general form of the equation is the same for each vehicle
category and each year, but the parameters of the equation differ for
cars and trucks. Again, each parameter also changes on a model year
basis, resulting in the yearly increases in stringency. Figure I-3
below illustrates the CO2 car standard curves for model
years 2017 through 2025 while Figure I-
[[Page 62644]]
4 shows the CO2 truck standard curves for model years 2017-
2025.
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EPA and NHTSA received a number of comments about the shape of the
car and truck curves. Some commenters, including Honda, Toyota and
Volkswagen, stated that the light truck curve was too lenient for large
trucks, while Nissan and Honda stated the light truck curve was too
stringent for small trucks; Porsche and Volkswagen stated the car curve
was too stringent generally, and Toyota stated it was too stringent for
small cars. A number of NGOs (Center for Biological Diversity,
International Council on Clean Transportation, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists) also
commented on the truck curves as well as the relationship between the
car and truck curves. We address all these comments further in Section
II.C as well as in Sections III and IV.
Generally speaking, a smaller footprint vehicle will tend to have
higher fuel economy and lower CO2 emissions relative to a
larger footprint vehicle when both have a comparable level of fuel
efficiency improvement technology. Since the finalized standards apply
to a manufacturer's overall passenger car fleet and overall light truck
fleet, not to an individual vehicle, if one of a manufacturer's fleets
is dominated by small footprint vehicles, then that fleet will have a
higher fuel economy requirement and a lower CO2 requirement
than a manufacturer whose fleet is dominated by large footprint
vehicles. Compared to the non-attribute based CAFE standards in place
prior to MY 2011, the final standards more evenly distribute the
compliance burdens of the standards among different manufacturers,
based on their respective product offerings. With this footprint-based
standard approach, EPA and NHTSA continue to believe that the rules
will not create significant incentives to produce vehicles of
particular sizes, and thus there should be no significant effect on the
relative availability of different vehicle sizes in the fleet due to
these standards, which will help to maintain consumer choice during the
MY 2017 to MY 2025 rulemaking timeframe. Consumers should still be able
to purchase the size of vehicle that meets their needs. Table I-6 helps
to illustrate the varying CO2 emissions and fuel economy
targets under the final standards that different vehicle sizes will
have, although we emphasize again that these targets are not actual
standards--the standards are manufacturer-specific, rather than
vehicle-specific.
[[Page 62648]]
Table I-6--Model Year 2025 CO2 and Fuel Economy Targets for Various MY 2012 Vehicle Types
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example model CO2 Emissions Fuel economy
Vehicle type Example models footprint (sq. target (g/mi) target (mpg)
ft.) \a\ \b\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compact car.......................... Honda Fit................ 40 131 61.1
Midsize car.......................... Ford Fusion.............. 46 147 54.9
Full size car........................ Chrysler 300............. 53 170 48.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example Light-duty Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small SUV............................ 4WD Ford Escape.......... 43 170 47.5
Midsize crossover.................... Nissan Murano............ 49 188 43.4
Minivan.............................. Toyota Sienna............ 56 209 39.2
Large pickup truck................... Chevy Silverado (extended 67 252 33.0
cab, 6.5 foot bed).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a,b Real-world CO2 is typically 25 percent higher and real-world fuel economy is typically 20 percent lower than
the CO2 and fuel economy target values presented here.
4. Program Flexibilities for Achieving Compliance
a. CO2/CAFE Credits Generated Based on Fleet Average Over-
Compliance
As proposed, the agencies are finalizing several provisions which
provide compliance flexibility to manufacturers to meet the standards.
Many of the provisions are also found in the MYs 2012-2016 rules. For
example, the agencies are continuing to allow manufacturers to generate
credits for over-compliance with the CO2 and CAFE
standards.\77\ As noted above, under the footprint-based standards, a
manufacturer's ultimate compliance obligations are determined at the
end of each model year, when production of vehicles for that model year
is complete. Since the fleet average standards that apply to a
manufacturer's car and truck fleets are based on the applicable
footprint-based curves, a production volume-weighted fleet average
requirement will be calculated for each averaging set (cars and trucks)
based on the mix and volumes of the models manufactured for sale by the
manufacturer. If a manufacturer's car and/or truck fleet achieves a
fleet average CO2/CAFE level better than its car and/or
truck standards, then the manufacturer generates credits. Conversely,
if the fleet average CO2/CAFE level does not meet the
standard, the fleet would incur debits (also referred to as a
shortfall). As in the MY 2011 CAFE program under EPCA/EISA, and also in
MYs 2012-2016 for the light-duty vehicle GHG and CAFE program, a
manufacturer whose fleet generates credits in a given model year would
have several options for using those credits, including credit carry-
back, credit carry-forward, credit transfers, and credit trading.
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\77\ This credit flexibility is required by EPCA/EISA, see 49
U.S.C. 32903, and is well within EPA's discretion under section
202(a) of the CAA.
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Credit ``carry-back'' means that manufacturers are able to use
credits to offset a deficit that had accrued in a prior model year,
while credit ``carry-forward'' means that manufacturers can bank
credits and use them toward compliance in future model years. EPCA, as
amended by EISA, requires NHTSA to allow manufacturers to carry back
credits for up to three model years, and to carry forward credits for
up to five model years. EPA's MYs 2012-2016 light duty vehicle GHG
program includes the same limitations and, as proposed, EPA is
continuing this limitation in the MY 2017-2025 program. In its
comments, Volkswagen requested that credits under the GHG rules be
allowed to be carried back for five model years rather than three as
proposed. A five year carry back could create a perverse incentive for
shortfalls to accumulate past the point where they can be rectified by
later model year performance. EPA is therefore adopting the three year
carry back period in its rule. NHTSA is required to allow a three year
carry-back period by statute.
However, to facilitate the transition to the increasingly more
stringent standards, EPA proposed, and is finalizing under its CAA
authority a one-time CO2 carry-forward beyond 5 years, such
that any credits generated from MYs 2010 through 2016 will be able to
be used to comply with light duty vehicle GHG standards at any time
through MY 2021. This provision does not apply to early credits
generated in MY 2009. EPA received comments from the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers and several individual manufacturers
supporting the proposed additional credit carry-forward flexibility and
also comments from the Center for Biological Diversity opposing the
additional credit carry-forward provisions which are addressed in
section III.B.4. NHTSA's program will continue the 5-year carry-forward
and 3-year carry-back, as required by statute.
Credit ``transfer'' means the ability of manufacturers to move
credits from their passenger car fleet to their light truck fleet, or
vice versa. As part of the EISA amendments to EPCA, NHTSA was required
to establish by regulation a CAFE credit transferring program, now
codified at 49 CFR Part 536, to allow a manufacturer to transfer
credits between its car and truck fleets to achieve compliance with the
standards. For example, credits earned by over-compliance with a
manufacturer's car fleet average standard could be used to offset
debits incurred due to that manufacturer's not meeting the truck fleet
average standard in a given year. However, EISA imposed a cap on the
amount by which a manufacturer could raise its CAFE standards through
transferred credits: 1 mpg for MYs 2011-2013; 1.5 mpg for MYs 2014-
2017; and 2 mpg for MYs 2018 and beyond.\78\ These statutory limits
will continue to apply to the determination of compliance with the CAFE
standards. EISA also prohibits the use of transferred credits to meet
the minimum domestic passenger car fleet CAFE standard.\79\
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\78\ 49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(3).
\79\ 49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(4).
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Under section 202 (a) of the CAA there is no statutory limitation
on car-truck credit transfers, and EPA's GHG program allows unlimited
credit transfers across a manufacturer's car-light truck fleet to meet
the GHG
[[Page 62649]]
standard. This is based on the expectation that this flexibility will
facilitate setting appropriate GHG standards that manufacturers can
comply with in the lead time provided, and will allow the required GHG
emissions reductions to be achieved in the most cost effective way.
Therefore, EPA did not constrain the magnitude of allowable car-truck
credit transfers in the MY 2012-2016 rule,\80\ as doing so would reduce
the flexibility to achieve the standards in the lead time provided, and
would increase costs with no corresponding environmental benefit. EPA
did not propose and is not finalizing any constraints on credit
transfers for MY 2017 and later, consistent with the MY 2012-2016
program. As discussed in Section III.B.4, EPA received one comment from
Center for Biological Diversity that it should be consistent with EISA
and establish limitations on credit transfers. EPA disagrees with the
commenter and continues to believe that limiting transfers and trading
would unnecessarily constrain program flexibility as discussed in
section III.B.4 below.
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\80\ EPA's GHG program will continue to adjust car and truck
credits by vehicle miles traveled (VMT), as in the MY2012-2016
program.
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Credit ``trading'' means the ability of manufacturers to sell
credits to, or purchase credits from, one another. EISA allowed NHTSA
to establish by regulation a CAFE credit trading program, also now
codified at 49 CFR Part 536, to allow credits to be traded between
vehicle manufacturers. EPA also allows credit trading in the light-duty
vehicle GHG program. These sorts of exchanges between averaging sets
are typically allowed under EPA's current mobile source emission credit
programs. EISA also prohibits manufacturers from using traded credits
to meet the minimum domestic passenger car CAFE standard.\81\
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\81\ 49 U.S.C. 32903(f)(2).
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b. Air Conditioning Improvement Credits/Fuel Economy Value Increases
Air conditioning (A/C) systems contribute to GHG emissions in two
ways. The primary refrigerant used in automotive air conditioning
systems today--a hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) refrigerant and potent GHG
called HFC-134a--can leak directly from the A/C system (direct A/C
emissions). In addition, operation of the A/C system places an
additional load on the engine that increases fuel consumption and thus
results in additional CO2 tailpipe emissions (indirect A/C
emissions). In the MY 2012-2016 program, EPA allows manufacturers to
generate credits by reducing either or both types of GHG emissions
related to A/C systems. For those model years, EPA anticipated that
manufacturers would pursue these relatively inexpensive reductions in
GHGs due to improvements in A/C systems and accounted for generation
and use of both of these credits in setting the levels of the
CO2 standards.
For this rule, as with the MYs 2012-2016 program, EPA is finalizing
its proposal to allow manufacturers to generate CO2-
equivalent\82\ credits to use in complying with the CO2
standards by reducing direct and/or indirect A/C emissions. These
reductions can be achieved by improving A/C system efficiency (and thus
reducing tailpipe CO2 and improving fuel consumption), by
reducing refrigerant leakage, and by using refrigerants with lower
global warming potentials (GWPs) than HFC-134a. As proposed, EPA is
establishing that the maximum total A/C credits available for cars will
be 18.8 grams/mile CO2-equivalent and for trucks will be
24.4 grams/mile CO2-equivalent.\83\ The approaches to be
used to calculate these direct and indirect A/C credits are generally
consistent with those of the MYs 2012-2016 program, although there are
several revisions, including as proposed the introduction of a new A/C
efficiency test procedure that will be applicable starting in MY 2014
for compliance with EPA's GHG standards.
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\82\ CO2 equivalence (CO2e) expresses the
global warming potential of a greenhouse gas (for A/C,
hydrofluorocarbons) by normalizing that potency to CO2's.
Thus, the maximum A/C credit for direct emissions is the equivalent
of 18.8 grams/mile of CO2 for cars.
\83\ This is further broken down by 5.0 and 7.2 g/mi
respectively for car and truck AC efficiency credits, and 13.8 and
17.2 g/mi respectively for car and truck alternative refrigerant
credits.
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In addition to the grams-per-mile CO2-equivalent
credits, for the first time the agencies are establishing provisions in
the CAFE program that would account for improvements in air conditioner
efficiency. Improving A/C efficiency leads to real-world fuel economy
benefits, because as explained above, A/C operation represents an
additional load on the engine. Thus, more efficient A/C operation
imposes less of a load and allows the vehicle to go farther on a gallon
of gas. Under EPCA, EPA has authority to adopt procedures to measure
fuel economy and to calculate CAFE compliance values.\84\ Under this
authority, EPA is establishing that manufacturers can generate fuel
consumption improvement values for purposes of CAFE compliance based on
air conditioning system efficiency improvements for cars and trucks. An
increase in a vehicle's CAFE grams-per-mile value would be allowed up
to a maximum based on 0.000563 gallon/mile for cars and on 0.000810
gallon/mile for trucks. This is equivalent to the A/C efficiency
CO2 credit allowed by EPA under the GHG program. For the
CAFE program, EPA would use the same methods to calculate the values
for air conditioning efficiency improvements for cars and trucks as are
used in EPA's GHG program. Additionally, given that these real-world
improvements will be available to manufacturers for compliance, NHTSA
has accounted for this by determining the amount that industry is
expected to improve air conditioning system efficiency in each model
year from 2017-2025, and setting the CAFE standards to reflect these
improvements, in a manner consistent with EPA's GHG standards. EPA is
not allowing generation of fuel consumption improvement values for CAFE
purposes, nor is NHTSA increasing stringency of the CAFE standard, for
the use of A/C systems that reduce leakage or employ alternative, lower
GWP refrigerant. This is because those changes do not generally affect
fuel economy. Most industry commenters supported this proposal, while
one NGO noted that the inclusion of air conditioning improvements for
purposes of CAFE car compliance was a change from prior
interpretations.
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\84\ See 49 U.S.C. 32904(c).
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c. Off-cycle Credits/Fuel Economy Value Increases
For MYs 2012-2016, EPA provided an option for manufacturers to
generate credits for utilizing new and innovative technologies that
achieve CO2 reductions that are not reflected on current
test procedures. EPA noted in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking that
examples of such ``off-cycle'' technologies might include solar panels
on hybrids and active aerodynamics, among other technologies. See
generally 75 FR 25438-39. EPA's current program allows off-cycle
credits to be generated through MY 2016.
EPA proposed and is finalizing provisions allowing manufacturers to
continue to generate and use off-cycle credits for MY 2017 and later to
demonstrate compliance with the light-duty vehicle GHG standards. In
addition, as with A/C efficiency, improving efficiency through the use
of off-cycle technologies leads to real-world fuel economy benefits and
allows the vehicle to go farther on a gallon of gas. Thus, under its
EPCA authority EPA proposed and is finalizing provisions to allow
manufacturers to generate fuel consumption improvement
[[Page 62650]]
values for purposes of CAFE compliance based on the use of off-cycle
technologies. Increases in fuel economy under the CAFE program based on
off-cycle technology will be equivalent to the off-cycle credit allowed
by EPA under the GHG program, and these amounts will be determined
using the same procedures and test methods as are used in EPA's GHG
program. For the reasons discussed in Sections III.D and IV.I of this
final rule preamble, the ability to generate off-cycle credits and
increases in fuel economy for use in compliance will not affect or
change the stringency of the GHG or CAFE standards established by each
agency.\85\
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\85\ The agencies have developed estimates for the cost and
effectiveness of various off-cycle technologies, including active
aerodynamics and stop-start. For the final rule analysis, NHTSA
assumed that these two technologies are available to manufacturers
for compliance with the standards, similar to all of the other fuel
economy improving technologies that the analysis assumes are
available. The costs and benefits of these technologies are included
in the analysis, similar to all other available technologies and
therefore, NHTSA has included the assessment of off-cycle credits in
the assessment of maximum feasible standards. EPA has included the
2-cycle benefit of stop-start and active aerodynamics in the
standards setting analysis because these technologies have 2-cycle,
in addition to off-cycle, effectiveness. As with all the
technologies considered in TSD Chapter 3 which are modeled as part
of potential compliance paths, EPA considers the 2-cycle
effectiveness when setting the standard. The only exception where
off-cycle effectiveness is reflected in the standard is for
improvements to air conditioning leakage and efficiency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many automakers indicated that they had a strong interest in
pursuing off-cycle technologies, and encouraged the agencies to refine
and simplify the evaluation process to provide more certainty as to the
types of technologies the agencies would approve for credit generation.
Other commenters, such as suppliers and some NGOs, also provided
technical input on various aspects of the off-cycle credit program.
Some environmental groups expressed concerns about the uncertainties in
calculating off-cycle credits and that the ability for manufacturer's
to earn credits from off-cycle technologies should not be a
disincentive for implementing other (2-cycle) technologies. For MY 2017
and later, EPA is finalizing several proposed provisions to expand and
streamline the MYs 2012-2016 off-cycle credit provisions, including an
approach by which the agencies will provide default values, which will
eliminate the need for case-by-case-testing, for a subset of off-cycle
technologies whose benefits are reliably and conservatively quantified.
EPA is finalizing a list of technologies and default credit values for
these technologies, as well as capping the maximum amount of these
credits which can be utilized unless a manufacturer demonstrates
through testing that greater amounts are justified. The agencies
believe that our assessment of off-cycle technologies and associated
credit values on this list is conservative, and emphasize that
automakers may apply for additional off-cycle credits beyond the
minimum credit value and cap if they present sufficient supporting
data. Manufacturers may also apply to receive credit for off-cycle
technologies besides those listed, again, if they have sufficient data.
EPA received several comments regarding the list of technologies and
associated credit values and has modified the list somewhat in response
to these comments, as discussed in Section II.F.2. EPA was also
persuaded by the public comments that the default credit values should
not be contingent upon a minimum penetration of the technology into a
manufacturer's fleet, and so is not adopting this aspect of the
proposal. Manufacturers often apply new technologies on a limited basis
to gain experience, gauge consumer acceptance, allow refinement of the
manufacturing and production processes for quality and cost, and other
legitimate reasons. The proposed minimum penetration requirement might
have discouraged introduction of off-cycle technologies in these
legitimate circumstances.
In addition, as requested by commenters, EPA is providing
additional detail on the process and timing for the credit/fuel
consumption improvement values application and approval process for
those instances where manufacturers seek off-cycle credits rather than
using the default values from the list provided, or seek credits for
technologies other than those provided through the list. EPA is
finalizing a timeline for the approval process, including a 60-day EPA
decision process from the time a manufacturer submits a complete
application for credits based on 5-cycle testing. As proposed, EPA is
also finalizing a detailed, step-by-step process, including a
specification of the data that manufacturers must submit. EPA will also
consult with NHTSA during the review process. For off-cycle
technologies that are both not covered by the pre-approved off-cycle
credit/fuel consumption improvement values list and that are not
quantifiable based on the 5-cycle test cycle option provided in the
2012-2016 rulemaking, EPA is retaining the public comment process from
the MYs 2012-2016 rule, and will consult with NHTSA during the review
process.
Finally, in response to many OEM and supplier comments encouraging
EPA to allow access to the pre-defined credit menu earlier than MY
2017, EPA is allowing use of the credit menu for the GHG program
beginning in MY 2014 to facilitate compliance with the GHG standards
for MYs 2014-2016. This provision is for the GHG rules only, and does
not apply to the 2012-2016 CAFE standards; the off-cycle credit program
will not begin until MY 2017 for the CAFE program, as discussed in
Section IV.I.4.c. A full description of the program, including an
overview of key comments and responses, is provided in Section III.C.5.
A number of technical comments were also submitted by a variety of
stakeholders, which are addressed in Chapter 5 of the joint TSD.
d. Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles,
Fuel Cell Vehicles, and Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles
In order to provide temporary regulatory incentives to promote
advanced vehicle technologies, EPA is finalizing, as proposed, an
incentive multiplier for CO2 emissions compliance purposes
for all electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
(PHEVs), and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) sold in MYs 2017 through 2021.
In addition, in response to public comments explaining how
infrastructure and technologies for compressed natural gas (CNG)
vehicles could serve as a bridge to use of advanced technologies such
as hydrogen fuel cells, EPA is finalizing an incentive multiplier for
CNG vehicles sold in MYs 2017 through 2021. This multiplier approach
means that each EV/PHEV/FCV/CNG vehicle would count as more than one
vehicle in the manufacturer's compliance calculation. EPA is
finalizing, as proposed, that EVs and FCVs start with a multiplier
value of 2.0 in MY 2017 and phase down to a value of 1.5 in MY 2021,
and that PHEVs would start at a multiplier value of 1.6 in MY 2017 and
phase down to a value of 1.3 in MY 2021.\86\ EPA is finalizing
multiplier values for both dedicated and dual fuel CNG vehicles for MYs
2017-2021 that are equivalent to the multipliers for PHEVs. All
incentive multipliers in EPA's program expire at the end of MY 2021.
See Section III.C.2 for more discussion of these incentive multipliers.
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\86\ The multipliers are for EV/FCVs: 2017-2019--2.0, 2020--
1.75, 2021--1.5; for PHEVs and dedicated and dual fuel CNG vehicles:
2017-2019--1.6, 2020--1.45, 2021--1.3.
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[[Page 62651]]
NHTSA currently interprets EPCA and EISA as precluding it from
offering additional incentives for the alternative fuel operation of
EVs, PHEVs, FCVs, and NGVs, except as specified by statute,\87\ and
thus did not propose and is not including incentive multipliers
comparable to the EPA incentive multipliers described above.
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\87\ Because 49 U.S.C. 32904(a)(2)(B) expressly requires EPA to
calculate the fuel economy of electric vehicles using the Petroleum
Equivalency Factor developed by DOE, which contains an incentive for
electric operation already, 49 U.S.C. 32905(a) expressly requires
EPA to calculate the fuel economy of FCVs using a specified
incentive, and 49 U.S.C. 32905(c) expressly requires EPA to
calculate the fuel economy of natural gas vehicles using a specified
incentive, NHTSA believes that Congress' having provided clear
incentives for these technologies in the CAFE program suggests that
additional incentives beyond those would not be consistent with
Congress' intent. Similarly, because the fuel economy of PHEVs'
electric operation must also be calculated using DOE's PEF, the
incentive for electric operation appears to already be inherent in
the statutory structure.
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For EVs, PHEVs and FCVs, EPA is also finalizing, as proposed, to
set a value of 0 g/mile for the tailpipe CO2 emissions
compliance value for EVs, PHEVs (electricity usage) and FCVs for MY
2017-2021, with no limit on the quantity of vehicles eligible for 0 g/
mi tailpipe emissions accounting. For MY 2022-2025, EPA is finalizing,
as proposed, that 0 g/mi only be allowed up to a per-company cumulative
sales cap, tiered as follows: 1) 600,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs for companies
that sell 300,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs in MYs 2019-2021; or 2) 200,000 EV/PHEV/
FCVs for all other manufacturers. Starting with MY 2022, the compliance
value for EVs, FCVs, and the electric portion of PHEVs in excess of
individual automaker cumulative production caps must be based on net
upstream accounting. These provisions are discussed in detail in
Section III.C.2.
As proposed and as discussed above, for EVs and other dedicated
alternative fuel vehicles, EPA will calculate fuel economy for the CAFE
program (under its EPCA statutory authority, as further described in
Section I.E.2.a) using the same methodology as in the MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking.\88\ For liquid alternative fuels, this methodology
generally counts 15 percent of the volume of fuel used in determining
the mpg-equivalent fuel economy. For gaseous alternative fuels (such as
natural gas), the methodology generally determines a gasoline
equivalent mpg based on the energy content of the gaseous fuel
consumed, and then adjusts the fuel consumption by effectively only
counting 15 percent of the actual energy consumed. For electricity, the
methodology generally determines a gasoline equivalent mpg by measuring
the electrical energy consumed, and then uses a petroleum equivalency
factor to convert to a mpg-equivalent value. The petroleum equivalency
factor for electricity includes an adjustment that effectively only
counts 15 percent of the actual energy consumed. Counting 15 percent of
the fuel volume or energy provides an incentive for alternative fuels
in the CAFE program.
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\88\ See 49 U.S.C. 32904 and 32905.
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The methodology that EPA is finalizing for dual fueled vehicles
under the GHG program and to calculate fuel economy for the CAFE
program is discussed below in subsection I.C.7.a.
e. Incentives for Using Advanced, ``Game-Changing'' Technologies in
Full-Size Pickup Trucks
The agencies recognize that the standards presented in this final
rule for MYs 2017-2025 will be challenging for large vehicles,
including full-size pickup trucks often used in commercial
applications. To help address this challenge, the program will, as
proposed, adopt incentives for the use of hybrid electric and non-
hybrid electric ``game changing'' technologies in full-size pickup
trucks.
EPA is providing the incentive for the GHG program under EPA's CAA
authority, and for the CAFE program under EPA's EPCA authority. EPA's
GHG and NHTSA's CAFE standards are set at levels that take into account
this flexibility as an incentive for the introduction of advanced
technology. This provides the opportunity in the program's early model
years to begin penetration of advanced technologies into this category
of vehicles, and in turn creates more opportunities for achieving the
more stringent MYs 2022-2025 truck standards.
EPA is providing a per-vehicle CO2 credit in the GHG
program and an equivalent fuel consumption improvement value in the
CAFE program for manufacturers that sell significant numbers of large
pickup trucks that are mild or strong hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs).
To qualify for these incentives, a truck must meet minimum criteria for
bed size, and for towing or payload capability. In order to encourage
rapid penetration of these technologies in this vehicle segment, the
final rules also establish minimum HEV sales thresholds, in terms of a
percentage of a manufacturer's full-size pickup truck fleet, which a
manufacturer must satisfy in order to qualify for the incentives.
The program requirements and incentive amounts differ somewhat for
mild and strong HEV pickup trucks. As proposed, mild HEVs will be
eligible for a per-vehicle CO2 credit of 10 g/mi (equivalent
to 0.0011 gallon/mile for a gasoline-fueled truck) during MYs 2017-
2021. To be eligible a manufacturer would have to show that the mild
hybrid technology is utilized in a specified portion of its truck fleet
beginning with at least 20% of a company's full-size pickup production
in MY 2017 and ramping up to at least 80% in MY 2021. The final rule
specifies a lower level of technology penetration for MYs 2017 and 2018
than the 30% and 40% penetration rates proposed, based on our
consideration of industry comments that too high a penetration
requirement could discourage introduction of the technology. The lower
required rates will help factor in the early experience gained with
this technology and allow for a more efficient ramp up in manufacturing
capacity. As proposed, strong HEV pickup trucks will be eligible for a
20 g/mi credit (0.0023 gallon/mile) during MYs 2017-2025 if the
technology is used on at least 10% of a company's full-size pickups in
that model year. EPA and NHTSA are adopting specific definitions for
mild and strong HEV pickup trucks, based on energy flow to the high-
voltage battery during testing. These definitions are slightly
different from those proposed--reflecting the agencies' consideration
of public comments and additional pertinent data. The details of this
program are described in Sections II.F.3 and III.C.3, as well as in
Chapter 5.3 of the joint TSD.
Because there are other promising technologies besides
hybridization that can provide significant reductions in GHG emissions
and fuel consumption from full size pickup trucks, EPA is also
adopting, as proposed, a performance-based CO2 emissions
credit and equivalent fuel consumption improvement value for full-size
pickup trucks. Eligible pickup trucks certified as performing 15
percent better than their applicable CO2 target will receive
a 10 g/mi credit (0.0011 gallon/mile), and those certified as
performing 20 percent better than their target will receive a 20 g/mi
credit (0.0023 gallon/mile). The 10 g/mi performance-based credit will
be available for MYs 2017 to 2021 and, once qualifying; a vehicle model
will continue to receive the credit through MY 2021, provided its
CO2 emissions level does not increase. The 20 g/mi
performance-based credit will be provided to a vehicle model for a
maximum of 5 years within the 2017 to 2025 model year period provided
its
[[Page 62652]]
CO2 emissions level does not increase. Minimum sales
penetration thresholds apply for the performance-based credits, similar
to those adopted for HEV credits.
To avoid double-counting, no truck will receive credit under both
the HEV and the performance-based approaches. Further details on the
full-size truck technology credit program are provided in sections
II.F.3 and III.C.3, as well as in Chapter 5.3 of the joint TSD.
The agencies received a variety of comments on the proposal for
this technology incentive program for full size pickup trucks. Some
environmental groups and manufacturers questioned the need for it,
arguing that this vehicle segment is not especially challenged by the
standards, that hybrid systems would readily transfer to it from other
vehicle classes, and that the credit essentially amounts to an economic
advantage for manufacturers of these trucks. Other industry commenters
requested that it be made available to a broader class of vehicles, or
that the minimum penetration thresholds be removed or relaxed. There
were also a number of comments on the technical requirements defining
eligibility and mild/strong HEV performance. In response to the
comments, the agencies made some changes to the proposed program,
including adjustments to the penetration thresholds for mild HEVs,
clarification that non-gasoline HEVs can qualify, and improvements to
the technical criteria for mild and strong hybrids. The comments and
changes are discussed in detail in sections II.F.3, and III.C.3, and in
Chapter 5 of the TSD.
5. Mid-Term Evaluation
Given the long time frame at issue in setting standards for MYs
2022-2025, and given NHTSA's obligation to conduct a de novo rulemaking
in order to establish final standards for vehicles for those model
years, the agencies will conduct a comprehensive mid-term evaluation
and agency decision-making process for the MYs 2022-2025 standards, as
described in the proposal.
The agencies received many comments about the importance of the
proposed mid-term evaluation due to the long time-frame of the rule and
the uncertainty in assumptions due to this long timeframe. Nearly all
auto manufacturers and associations predicated their support of the MY
2017-2025 National Program on the agencies conducting this evaluation
and decision-making process. In addition, a number of auto
manufacturers suggested additional factors that the agencies should
consider during the evaluation process and also stressed the importance
of completing the evaluation no later than April 1, 2018, the timeframe
proposed by the agencies. Several associations also asked for more
detail to be codified regarding the timeline, content and procedures of
the review process. Several automakers and organizations suggested that
the agencies also conduct a series of smaller, focused evaluations or
``check-ins'' on key issues and technological and market trends.
Several organizations and associations stressed the importance of
involving CARB and broad public participation in the review process.
The agencies also received a number of comments from environmental
and consumer organizations expressing concerns about the mid-term
evaluation--that it could occur too early, before reliable data on the
new standards is available, be disruptive to auto manufacturers'
product planning and add uncertainty, and that it should not be used as
an opportunity to delay benefits or weaken the overall National Program
for MY 2022-2025. Those organizations commented that if the agencies
determined that a mid-term evaluation was necessary, it should be used
as an opportunity to increase the stringency of the 2022-2025
standards. Some environmental groups opposed the concept of the
agencies performing additional interim reviews. Finally, several
environmental organizations urged transparency and recommended that the
agencies provide periodic updates on technology progress and compliance
trends. One commenter, NADA, stated that the rule should not be
organized in a way that would require a mid-term evaluation and that
the agencies should wait to set standards for MYs 2017-2021 until more
information is available. The mid-term evaluation comments are
discussed in detail in sections III.B.3 and IV.A.3.b.
The agencies are finalizing the mid-term evaluation and agency
decision-making process as proposed. As stated in the proposal, both
NHTSA and EPA will develop and compile up-to-date information for the
mid-term evaluation, through a collaborative, robust and transparent
process, including public notice and comment. The evaluation will be
based on (1) a holistic assessment of all of the factors considered by
the agencies in setting standards, including those set forth in this
final rule and other relevant factors, and (2) the expected impact of
those factors on the manufacturers' ability to comply, without placing
decisive weight on any particular factor or projection. In order to
align the agencies' rulemaking for MYs 2022-2025 and to maintain a
joint national program, if the EPA determination is that standards will
not change, NHTSA will issue its final rule concurrently with the EPA
determination. If the EPA determination is that standards may change,
the agencies will issue a joint NPRM and joint final rule. The
comprehensive evaluation process will lead to final agency action by
both agencies, as described in sections III.B.3 and IV.A.3 of this
Notice.
NHTSA's final action will be a de novo rulemaking conducted, as
explained, with fresh inputs and a fresh consideration and balancing of
all relevant factors, based on the best and most current information
before the agency at that time. EPA will conduct a mid-term evaluation
of the later model year light-duty GHG standards (MY2022-2025). The
evaluation will determine what standards are appropriate for those
model years.
Consistent with the agencies' commitment to maintaining a single
national framework for regulation of vehicle GHG emissions and fuel
economy, the agencies fully expect to conduct the mid-term evaluation
in close coordination with the California Air Resources Board (CARB).
In adopting their GHG standards on March 22, 2012, the California Air
Resources Board directed the Executive Officer to continue
collaborating with EPA and NHTSA as the Federal GHG standards were
finalized and also ``to participate in U.S. EPA's mid-term review of
the 2022 through 2025 model year passenger vehicle greenhouse gas
standards being proposed under the 2017 through 2025 MY National
Program''.\89\ In addition, in order to align the agencies' proceedings
for MYs 2022-2025 and to maintain a joint national program, if the EPA
determination is that standards will not change, NHTSA will issue its
final rule concurrently with the EPA determination. If the EPA
determination is that standards may change, the agencies will issue a
joint NPRM and joint final rule.
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\89\ See California Low-Emission Vehicles (LEV) & GHG 2012
regulations approved by State of California Air Resources Board,
Resolution 12-11. Available at: http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/cfo2012/res12-11.pdf (last accessed August 9, 2012).
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Further discussion of the mid-term evaluation can be found in
Sections III.B.3 and IV.A.3.b of this final rule preamble.
6. Coordinated Compliance
The MYs 2012-2016 final rules established detailed and
comprehensive regulatory provisions for compliance and enforcement
under the GHG and
[[Page 62653]]
CAFE programs. These provisions remain in place for model years beyond
MY 2016 without additional action by the agencies and EPA and NHTSA are
not finalizing any significant modifications to them. In the MYs 2012-
2016 final rule, NHTSA and EPA established a program that recognizes,
and replicates as closely as possible, the compliance protocols
associated with the existing CAA Tier 2 vehicle emission standards, and
with earlier model year CAFE standards. The certification, testing,
reporting, and associated compliance activities established for the GHG
program closely track those in previously existing programs and are
thus familiar to manufacturers. EPA already oversees testing, collects
and processes test data, and performs calculations to determine
compliance with both CAFE and CAA standards. Under this coordinated
approach, the compliance mechanisms for both programs are consistent
and non-duplicative. EPA is also continuing the provisions adopted in
the MYs 2012-2016 GHG rule for in-use compliance with the GHG emissions
standards.
This compliance approach allows manufacturers to satisfy the GHG
program requirements in the same general way they comply with
previously existing applicable CAA and CAFE requirements. Manufacturers
will demonstrate compliance on a fleet-average basis at the end of each
model year, allowing model-level testing to continue throughout the
year as is the current practice for CAFE determinations. The compliance
program design includes a single set of manufacturer reporting
requirements and relies on a single set of underlying data. This
approach still allows each agency to assess compliance with its
respective program under its respective statutory authority. The
program also addresses EPA enforcement in instances of noncompliance.
7. Additional Program Elements
a. Compliance Treatment of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs),
Dual Fuel Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) Vehicles, and Flexible Fuel
Vehicles (FFVs)
As proposed, EPA is finalizing provisions which state that
CO2 emissions compliance values for plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEVs) and dual fuel compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles
will be based on estimated use of the alternative fuels, recognizing
that if a consumer incurs significant cost for a dual fuel vehicle and
can use an alternative fuel that has significantly lower cost than
gasoline, it is very likely that the consumer will seek to use the
lower cost alternative fuel whenever possible. Accordingly, for
CO2 emissions compliance, EPA is using the Society of
Automotive Engineers ``utility factor'' methodology (based on vehicle
range on the alternative fuel and typical daily travel mileage) to
determine the assumed percentage of operation on gasoline and
percentage of operation on the alternative fuel for both PHEVs and dual
fuel CNG vehicles, along with the CO2 emissions test values
on the alternative fuel and gasoline. Dual fuel CNG vehicles must have
a minimum natural gas range-to-gasoline range of 2.0 in order to use
this utility factor approach. Any dual fuel CNG vehicles that do not
meet this requirement would use a utility factor of 0.50, the value
that has been used in the past for dual fuel vehicles under the CAFE
program. EPA is also finalizing, as proposed, an option allowing the
manufacturer to use this utility factor methodology for CO2
emissions compliance for dual fuel CNG vehicles for MY 2012 and later
model years.
As proposed, EPA is accounting for E85 use by flexible fueled
vehicles (FFVs) as in the existing MY 2016 and later program, based on
actual usage of E85 which represents a real-world tailpipe emissions
reduction attributed to alternative fuels. Unlike PHEV and dual fuel
CNG vehicles, there is not a significant cost differential between an
FFV and a conventional gasoline vehicle and historically consumers have
fueled these vehicles with E85 a very small percentage of the time. But
E85 use in FFVs is expected to rise in the future due to Renewable Fuel
Standard program requirements. GHG emissions compliance issues for dual
fuel vehicles are discussed further in Section III.C.4.a.
In the CAFE program for MYs 2017-2019, the fuel economy of dual
fuel vehicles will be determined in the same manner as specified in the
MY 2012-2016 rule, and as defined by EISA. Beginning in MY 2020, EISA
does not specify how to measure the fuel economy of dual fuel vehicles,
and EPA is finalizing its proposal, under its EPCA authority, to use
the ``utility factor'' methodology for PHEV and CNG vehicles described
above to determine how to apportion the fuel economy when operating on
gasoline or diesel fuel and the fuel economy when operating on the
alternative fuel. For FFVs under the CAFE program, EPA is using the
same methodology it uses for the GHG program to apportion the fuel
economy, namely based on actual usage of E85. As proposed, EPA is
continuing to use Petroleum Equivalency Factors and the 0.15 divisor
used in the MY 2012-2016 rule for the alternative fuels, however with
no cap on the amount of fuel economy increase allowed. This issue is
discussed further in Section III.C.4.b and in Section IV.I.3.a.
b. Exclusion of Emergency and Police Vehicles
Under EPCA, manufacturers are allowed to exclude emergency vehicles
from their CAFE fleet \90\ and all manufacturers that produce emergency
vehicles have historically done so. In the MYs 2012-2016 program, EPA's
GHG program applies to these vehicles. However, after further
consideration of this issue, EPA proposed and is finalizing the same
type of exclusion provision for these vehicles for MY 2012 and later
because of their unique features. Law enforcement and emergency
vehicles are necessarily equipped with features which reduce the
ability of manufacturers to sufficiently improve the emissions control
without compromising necessary vehicle utility. Manufacturers commented
in support of this provision and EPA received only one comment against
exempting emergency vehicles. These comments are addressed in Section
III.B.8.
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\90\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(e).
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c. Small Businesses, Small Volume Manufacturers, and Intermediate
Volume Manufacturers
As proposed, EPA is finalizing provisions to address two categories
of smaller manufacturers. The first category is small businesses as
defined by the Small Business Administration (SBA). For vehicle
manufacturers, SBA's definition of small business is any firm with less
than 1,000 employees. As with the MYs 2012-2016 program, EPA is
exempting small businesses--that is, any company that meets the SBA's
definition of a small business--from the MY 2017 and later GHG
standards. EPA believes this exemption is appropriate given the unique
challenges small businesses would face in meeting the GHG standards,
and since these businesses make up less than 0.1% of total U.S. vehicle
sales, there is no significant impact on emission reductions. As
proposed, EPA is also finalizing an opt-in provision that will allow
small businesses wishing to waive their exemption and comply with the
GHG standards to do so. EPA received no adverse comments on its
proposed approach for small businesses.
EPA's final rule also addresses small volume manufacturers, those
with U.S. annual sales of less than 5,000 vehicles.
[[Page 62654]]
Under the MYs 2012-2016 program, these small volume manufacturers are
eligible for an exemption from the CO2 standards. As
proposed, EPA will bring small volume manufacturers into the
CO2 program for the first time starting in MY 2017, and
allow them to petition EPA for alternative standards to be developed
manufacturer-by-manufacturer in a public process. EPCA provides NHTSA
with the authority to exempt from the generally applicable CAFE
standards manufacturers that produce fewer than 10,000 passenger cars
worldwide in the model year each of the two years prior to the year in
which they seek an exemption.\91\ If NHTSA exempts a manufacturer, it
must establish an alternate standard for that manufacturer for that
model year, at the level that the agency decides is maximum feasible
for that manufacturer.\92\ The exemption and alternative standard apply
only if the exempted manufacturer also produces fewer than 10,000
passenger cars worldwide in the year for which the exemption was
granted. NHTSA is not changing its regulations pertaining to exemptions
and alternative standards (49 CFR Part 525) as part of this rulemaking.
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\91\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(d). Implementing regulations may be found
in 49 CFR Part 525.
\92\ NHTSA may also apply an alternative average fuel economy
standard to all automobiles manufactured by small volume
manufacturers, or to classes of automobiles manufactured by small
manufacturers, per EPCA, although this particular provision has not
yet been exercised. See 49 U.S.C. 32902(d)(2).
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Also, EPA requested comment on allowing manufacturers able to
demonstrate that they are operationally independent from a parent
company (defined as 10% or greater ownership), to also be eligible for
small volume manufacturer alternative standards and treatment under the
GHG program. Under the current program, the vehicle sales of such
companies must be aggregated with the parent company in determining
eligibility for small volume manufacturer provisions. The only comments
addressing this issue supported including a provision recognizing
operational independence in the rules. EPA has continued to evaluate
the issue and the final GHG rule includes provisions allowing
manufacturers to demonstrate to EPA that they are operationally
independent. This is different from the CAFE program, which aggregates
manufacturers for compliance purposes if a control relationship exists,
either in terms of stock ownership or design control, or both.\93\
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\93\ See 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(4) and 49 CFR Part 534.
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EPA sought comment on whether additional lead-time is needed for
niche intermediate sized manufacturers. Under the Temporary Lead-time
Allowance Alternative Standards (TLAAS) provisions in the MYs 2012-2016
GHG rules (see 75 FR 25414-417), manufacturers with sales of less than
50,000 vehicles were provided additional flexibility through MY 2016.
EPA invited comment on whether this or some other form of flexibility
is warranted for niche intermediate volume, limited line manufacturers
(see section III.B.7).
NRDC commented in support of EPA's proposal not to extend the TLAAS
program. EPA received comments from Jaguar Land Rover, Porsche and
Suzuki that the standards will raise significant feasibility concerns
for some intermediate volume manufacturers that will be part of the
expanded TLAAS program in MY 2016, especially in the early transition
years of the program. Porsche commented that they would need to meet
standards up to 25 percent more stringent in MY 2017 compared to MY
2016, requiring utilization of advanced technologies at rates wholly
disproportionate to rates expected for larger manufacturers with more
diverse product lines. EPA is persuaded that these manufacturers
require additional lead-time to make the transition from the TLAAS
regime to the more stringent standards. To provide this needed lead-
time, EPA is finalizing provisions for manufacturers with sales below
50,000 vehicles per year that are part of the TLAAS program through MY
2016, which will allow eligible manufacturers to remain at their MY
2016 standards through MY 2018 and then begin making the transition to
more stringent standards. The manufacturers that utilize this added
lead time will be required to meet the primary program standards in MY
2021 and later. The intermediate volume manufacturer lead-time
provisions are discussed in detail in Section III.B.8.
d. Nitrous Oxide and Methane Standards
As proposed, EPA is extending to MY 2017 and later the flexibility
for manufacturers to use CO2 credits on a CO2-
equivalent basis to comply with the nitrous oxides (N2O) and
methane (CH4) cap standards. These cap standards,
established in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking were intended to prevent
future emissions increases and were generally not expected to result in
the application of new technologies or significant costs for
manufacturers using current vehicle designs. EPA is also finalizing
additional lead time for manufacturers to use compliance statements in
lieu of N2O testing through MY 2016, as proposed. In
addition, in response to comments, EPA is allowing the continued use of
compliance statements in MYs 2017-2018 in cases where manufacturers are
not conducting new emissions testing for a test group, but rather
carrying over certification data from a previous year. EPA is also
clarifying that manufacturers will not be required to conduct in-use
testing for N2O in cases where a compliance statement has
been used for certification. All of these provisions are discussed in
detail below in section III.B.9.
D. Summary of Costs and Benefits for the National Program
This section summarizes the projected costs and benefits of the MYs
2017-2025 CAFE and GHG emissions standards for light-duty vehicles.
These projections helped inform the agencies' choices among the
alternatives considered and provide further confirmation that the final
standards are appropriate under the agencies' respective statutory
authorities. The costs and benefits projected by NHTSA to result from
the CAFE standards are presented first, followed by those projected by
EPA to result from the GHG emissions standards.
For several reasons, the estimates for costs and benefits presented
by NHTSA and EPA, while consistent, are not directly comparable, and
thus should not be expected to be identical. NHTSA and EPA's standards
are projected to result in slightly different fuel efficiency
improvements. EPA's GHG standard is more stringent in part due to its
assumptions about manufacturers' use of air conditioning leakage/
refrigerant replacement credits, which will result in reduced emissions
of HFCs. NHTSA's final standards are at levels of stringency that
assume improvements in the efficiency of air conditioning systems, but
these standards do not require reductions in HFC emissions, which are
generally not related to fuel economy or energy conservation. In
addition, as noted above, the CAFE and GHG standards offer somewhat
different program flexibilities and provisions, and the agencies'
analyses differ in their accounting for these flexibilities, primarily
because NHTSA is statutorily prohibited from considering some
flexibilities when establishing CAFE standards,\94\ while EPA is not.
These differences contribute to differences in the agencies' respective
estimates of
[[Page 62655]]
costs and benefits resulting from the new standards.
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\94\ See 49 U.S.C. 32902(h).
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Specifically, the projected costs and benefits presented by NHTSA
and EPA are not directly comparable because EPA's standards include air
conditioning-related improvements in HFC reductions, and reflect
compliance with the GHG standards, whereas NHTSA projects some
manufacturers will pay civil penalties as part of their compliance
strategy, as allowed by EPCA. EPCA also prohibits NHTSA from
considering manufacturers' ability to earn, transfer or trade credits
earned for over-compliance when setting standards. The Clean Air Act
imposes no such limitations. The Clean Air Act also allows EPA to
provide incentives for particular technologies, such as for electric
vehicles and dual fueled vehicles. For these reasons, EPA's estimates
of GHG reductions and fuel savings achieved by the GHG standards are
higher than those projected by NHTSA for the CAFE standards. For these
same reasons, EPA's estimates of manufacturers' costs for complying
with the passenger car and light truck GHG standards are slightly
higher than NHTSA's estimates for complying with the CAFE standards.
It also bears discussion here that, for this final rulemaking, the
agencies have analyzed the costs and benefits of the standards using
two different forecasts of the light vehicle fleet through MY 2025. The
agencies have concluded that the significant uncertainty associated
with forecasting sales volumes, vehicle technologies, fuel prices,
consumer demand, and so forth out to MY 2025, make it reasonable and
appropriate to evaluate the impacts of the final CAFE and GHG standards
using two baselines.\95\ One market forecast (or fleet projection),
very similar to the one used for the NPRM, uses (corrected) MY 2008
CAFE certification data, information from AEO 2011, and information
purchased from CSM in December of 2009. The agencies received comments
regarding the market forecast used in the NPRM suggesting that updates
in several respects could be helpful to the agencies' analysis of final
standards; given those comments and since the agencies were already
considering producing an updated fleet projection, the final
rulemakings also utilize a second market forecast using MY 2010 CAFE
certification data, information from AEO 2012, and information
purchased from LMC Automotive (formerly J.D. Power Forecasting).
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\95\ We refer to these baselines as ``fleet projections'' or
``market forecasts'' in Section II.B of the preamble and Chapter 1
of the TSD and elsewhere in the administrative record. The term
``baseline'' has a specific definition and is described in Chapter 1
of the TSD.
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These two market forecasts contain certain differences, although as
will be discussed below, the differences are not significant enough to
change the agencies' decision as to the structure and stringency of the
final standards, and indeed corroborate the reasonableness of the EPA
final GHG standards and that the NHTSA standards are the maximum
feasible. For example, the 2008 based fleet forecast uses the MY 2008
``baseline'' fleet, which represents the most recent model year for
which the industry had sales data that was not affected by the
subsequent economic recession. On the other hand, the 2010 based fleet
projection employs a market forecast (provided by LMC Automotive) which
is more current than the projection provided by CSM (utilized for the
MY 2008 based fleet projection). The CSM forecast appears to have been
particularly influenced by the recession, showing major declines in
market share for some manufacturers (e.g., Chrysler) which the agencies
do not believe are reasonably reflective of future trends.
However, the MY 2010 based fleet projection also is highly
influenced by the economic recession. The MY 2010 CAFE certification
data has become available since the proposal (see section 1.2.1 of the
Joint TSD for the proposed rule, which noted the possibility of these
data becoming available), and is used in EPA's alternative analysis,
and continues to show the effects of the recession. For example,
industry-wide sales were skewed down 20% \96\ compared to pre-recession
MY 2008 levels. For some companies like Chrysler, Mitsubishi, and
Subaru, sales were down 30-40% \97\ from MY 2008 levels. For BMW,
General Motors, Jaguar/Land Rover, Porsche, and Suzuki, sales were down
more than 40% \98\ from 2008 levels. Using the MY 2008 vehicle data
avoids projecting these abnormalities in predicting the future fleet,
although it also perpetuates vehicle brands and models (and thus, their
outdated fuel economy levels and engineering characteristics) that have
since been discontinued. The MY 2010 CAFE certification data accounts
for the phase-out of some brands (e.g., Saab) and the introduction of
some technologies (e.g., Ford's Ecoboost engine), which may be more
reflective of the future fleet in this respect.
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\96\ These figures are derived from the manufacturer and fleet
volume tables in Chapter 1 of the TSD.
\97\ These figures are derived from the manufacturer and fleet
volume tables in Chapter 1 of the TSD.
\98\ These figures are derived from the manufacturer and fleet
volume tables in Chapter 1 of the TSD.
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Thus, given the volume of information that goes into creating a
baseline forecast and given the significant uncertainty in any
projection out to MY 2025, the agencies think that the best way to
illustrate the possible impacts of that uncertainty for purposes of
this rulemaking is the approach taken here of analyzing the effects of
the final standards under both the MY 2008-based and the MY 2010-based
fleet projections. EPA is presenting its primary analysis of the
standards using the same baseline/future fleet projection that was used
in the NPRM (i.e., corrected MY 2008 CAFE certification data,
information from AEO 2011, and a future fleet forecast purchased from
CSM). EPA also conducted an alternative analysis of the standards based
on MY 2010 CAFE certification data, updated AEO 2012 (early release)
projections of the future fleet sales volumes, and a forecast of the
future fleet mix projections to MY 2025 purchased from LMC Automotive.
At the same time, given that EPA believes neither projection is
strongly superior to the other, EPA has performed a detailed analysis
of the final standards using the MY 2010 baseline, and we have
concluded that the final standards are likewise appropriate using this
alternative baseline/fleet projection. EPA's analysis of the
alternative baseline/future fleet (based on MY 2010) is presented in
EPA's Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), Chapter 10. NHTSA's
primary analysis uses both market forecasts, and accordingly presents
values from both in tables throughout this preamble and in NHTSA's
FRIA. Joint TSD Chapter 1 includes a full description of the two market
projections and their derivation.
As with the MYs 2012-2016 standards, and the MYs 2014-2018
standards for heavy duty vehicles and engines, NHTSA and EPA have
harmonized the programs as much as possible, and continuing the
National Program to MYs 2017-2025 will result in significant cost
savings and other advantages for the automobile industry by allowing
them to manufacture and sell one fleet of vehicles across the U.S.,
rather than potentially having to comply with multiple state standards
that may occur in the absence of the National Program. It is also
important to note that NHTSA's CAFE standards and EPA's GHG standards
will both be in effect, and each will lead to increases in average fuel
economy and reductions in GHGs. The two agencies' standards together
comprise the National Program,
[[Page 62656]]
and the following discussions of the respective costs and benefits of
NHTSA's CAFE standards and EPA's GHG standards do not change the fact
that both the CAFE and GHG standards, jointly, are the source of the
benefits and costs of the National Program.
1. Summary of Costs and Benefits for the NHTSA CAFE Standards
In reading the following section, we note that tables are
identified as reflecting ``estimated required'' values and ``estimated
achieved'' values. When establishing standards, EPCA allows NHTSA to
only consider the fuel economy of dual-fuel vehicles (for example, FFVs
and PHEVs) when operating on gasoline, and prohibits NHTSA from
considering the use of dedicated alternative fuel vehicle credits
(including for example EVs), credit carry-forward and carry-back, and
credit transfer and trading. NHTSA's primary analysis of costs, fuel
savings, and related benefits from imposing higher CAFE standards does
not include them. However, EPCA does not prohibit NHTSA from
considering the fact that manufacturers may pay civil penalties rather
than comply with CAFE standards, and NHTSA's primary analysis accounts
for some manufacturers' tendency to do so. The primary analysis is
generally identified in tables throughout this document by the term
``estimated required CAFE levels.''
To illustrate the effects of the flexibilities and technologies
that NHTSA is prohibited from including in its primary analysis, NHTSA
performed a supplemental analysis of these effects on benefits and
costs of the CAFE standards that helps to illustrate their real-world
impacts. As an example of one of the effects, including the use of FFV
credits reduces estimated per-vehicle compliance costs of the program,
but does not significantly change the projected fuel savings and
CO2 reductions, because FFV credits reduce the fuel economy
levels that manufacturers achieve not only under the standards, but
also under the baseline MY 2016 CAFE standards. As another example,
including the operation of PHEV vehicles on both electricity and
gasoline, and the expected use of EVs for compliance may raise the fuel
economy levels that manufacturers achieve under the proposed standards.
The supplemental analysis is generally identified in tables throughout
this document by the term ``estimated achieved CAFE levels.''
Thus, NHTSA's primary analysis shows the estimates the agency
considered for purposes of establishing new CAFE standards, and its
supplemental analysis including manufacturer use of flexibilities and
advanced technologies currently reflects the agency's best estimate of
the potential real-world effects of the CAFE standards.
Without accounting for the compliance flexibilities and advanced
technologies that NHTSA is prohibited from considering when determining
the maximum feasible level of new CAFE standards, since manufacturers'
decisions to use those flexibilities and technologies are voluntary,
NHTSA estimates that the required fuel economy increases would lead to
fuel savings totaling a range from 180 billion to 184 billion gallons
throughout the lives of light duty vehicles sold in MYs 2017-2025. At a
3 percent discount rate, the present value of the economic benefits
resulting from those fuel savings is between $513 billion and $525
billion; at a 7 percent private discount rate, the present value of the
economic benefits resulting from those fuel savings is between $400
billion and $409 billion.
The agency further estimates that these new CAFE standards will
lead to corresponding reductions in CO2 emissions totaling
1.9 billion metric tons during the lives of light duty vehicles sold in
MYs 2017-2025. The present value of the economic benefits from avoiding
those emissions is approximately $53 billion, based on a global social
cost of carbon value of about $26 per metric ton (in 2017, and growing
thereafter).\99\ All costs are in 2010 dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ NHTSA also estimated the benefits associated with three
more estimates of a one ton GHG reduction in 2017 ($6, $41, and
$79), which will likewise grow thereafter. See Section II.E for a
more detailed discussion of the social cost of carbon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accounting for compliance flexibilities reduces the fuel savings
achieved by the standards, as manufacturers are able to comply through
credit mechanisms that reduce the amount of fuel economy technology
that must be added to new vehicles in order to meet the targets set by
the standards. NHTSA estimates that the fuel economy increases would
lead to fuel savings totaling about 170 billion gallons throughout the
lives of light duty vehicles sold in MYs 2017-2025, when compliance
flexibilities are considered. At a 3 percent discount rate, the present
value of the economic benefits resulting from those fuel savings is
between $481 billion and $488 billion; at a 7 percent private discount
rate, the present value of the economic benefits resulting from those
fuel savings is between $375 billion and $380 billion. The agency
further estimates that these new CAFE standards will lead to
corresponding reductions in CO2 emissions totaling 1.8
billion metric tons during the lives of light duty vehicles sold in MYs
2017-2025. The present value of the economic benefits from avoiding
those emissions is approximately $49 billion, based on a global social
cost of carbon value of about $26 per metric ton (in 2017, and growing
thereafter).
Table I-7--NHTSA's Estimated MYs 2017-2025 Costs, Benefits, and Net Benefits ($Billion) Under the CAFE Standards
(Estimated Achieved)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals Annualized
---------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline Fleet 3% Discount 7% Discount 3% Discount 7% Discount
rate rate rate rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative for MYs 2017-2021 Final Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs........................... 2010 ($61)- ($58)- ($2.4)- ($3.6)-
2008 ($57) ($54) ($2.2) ($3.3)
Benefits........................ 2010 $243- $195- $9.2- $11.3-
2008 $240 $194 $9.0 $11.0
Net Benefits.................... 2010 $183- $137- $6.8- $7.7-
2008 $184 $141 $6.8 $7.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62657]]
Cumulative for MYs 2017-2025 (Includes MYs 2022-2025 Augural Standards)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs........................... 2010 ($154)- ($147)- ($5.4)- ($7.6)-
2008 ($156) ($148) ($5.4) ($7.5)
Benefits........................ 2010 $629- $502- $21.0- $24.2-
2008 $639 $510 $21.3 $24.4
Net Benefits.................... 2010 $476- $356- $15.7- $16.7-
2008 $483 $362 $15.9 $16.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table I-8--NHTSA's Estimated Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons and Barrels) and CO2 Emissions Avoided (mmt) Under the CAFE Standards (Estimated Required)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Total
MY Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 through 2022 2023 2024 2025 through
baseline 2021 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars:
Fuel (b. gallons)........... 2008 5.3- 2.8- 5.3- 7.7- 10.9- 13.0- 45.0- 14.4- 15.8- 18.0- 19.7- 112.9-
2010 7.7 3.6 5.3 8.3 10.8 13.0 48.7 14.3 16.2 18.3 20.0 117.4
Fuel (b. barrels)........... 2008 0.1- 0.1- 0.1- 0.2- 0.3- 0.3- 1.1- 0.3- 0.4- 0.4- 0.5- 2.7-
2010 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 2.8
CO2 (mmt)................... 2008 58.1- 31.0- 58.1- 84.0- 116.9- 139.9- 488.0- 155.5- 171.0- 192.7- 210.9- 1,218.2-
2010 83.9 39.5 57.2 90.1 117.4 140.9 529.0 155.8 176.3 198.5 216.4 1,275.9
Light Trucks:
Fuel (b. gallons)........... 2008 0.5- 1.0- 2.5- 4.8- 6.8- 9.4- 25.0- 10.3- 10.9- 11.8- 12.7- 70.7-
2010 0.9 0.8 1.5 3.7 5.6 8.2 20.7 8.9 10.0 11.1 12.1 62.9
Fuel (b. barrels)........... 2008 0.0- 0.0- 0.1- 0.1- 0.2- 0.2- 0.6- 0.2- 0.3- 0.3- 0.3- 1.7-
2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.5
CO2 (mmt)................... 2008 5.8- 11.1- 26.8- 52.1- 74.0- 102.1- 271.9- 112.1- 118.6- 128.5- 138.0- 769.1-
2010 10.1 8.6 16.1 39.9 60.1 87.8 222.6 95.8 107.5 119.9 130.8 676.6
Combined
Fuel (b. gallons)........... 2008 5.9- 3.9- 7.8- 12.5- 17.7- 22.3- 70.1- 24.7- 26.7- 29.8- 32.4- 183.5-
2010 8.6 4.4 6.7 12.0 16.4 21.1 69.2 23.2 26.2 29.5 32.1 180.3
Fuel (b. barrels)........... 2008 0.1- 0.1- 0.2- 0.3- 0.4- 0.5- 1.6- 0.6- 0.6- 0.7- 0.8- 4.4-
2010 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 4.3
CO2 (mmt)................... 2008 63.9- 42.1- 84.9- 136.1- 191.0- 242.0- 760.0- 267.7- 289.6- 321.2- 348.9- 1,987.3-
2010 93.9 48.1 73.3 130.0 177.5 228.6 751.4 251.6 283.9 318.4 347.2 1,952.5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considering manufacturers' ability to employ compliance
flexibilities and advanced technologies for meeting the standards,
NHTSA estimates the following for fuel savings and avoided
CO2 emissions, assuming FFV credits will be used toward both
the baseline and final standards:
Table I-9--NHTSA's Estimated Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons and Barrels) and CO2 Emissions Avoided (mmt) Under the CAFE Standards (Estimated Achieved)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Total
MY Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 through 2022 2023 2024 2025 through
baseline 2021 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars:
Fuel (b. gallons)........... 2008 5.5- 2.9- 5.1- 7.5- 10.3- 12.0- 43.3- 13.7- 14.9- 16.8- 18.5- 107.3-
2010 6.1 3.5 5.1 7.8 9.7 12.0 44.2 13.2 15.0 17.1 18.2 107.7
Fuel (b. barrels)........... 2008 0.1- 0.1- 0.1- 0.2- 0.2- 0.3- 1.0- 0.3- 0.4- 0.4- 0.4- 2.6-
2010 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.6
CO2 (mmt)................... 2008 59.9- 32.2- 55.1- 81.5- 111.7- 130.6- 471.0- 148.8- 161.2- 180.8- 196.6- 1,158.3-
2010 66.5 38.7 55.6 85.3 105.4 130.4 481.9 143.7 162.9 185.4 196.9 1,170.7
Light Trucks:
Fuel (b. gallons)........... 2008 0.8- 1.0- 2.2- 4.1- 5.9- 7.9- 21.9- 9.0- 9.6- 10.7- 11.8- 62.8-
2010 2.0 1.2 1.6 4.2 5.6 7.7 22.3 8.4 9.5 10.4 10.7 61.5
Fuel (b. barrels)........... 2008 0.0- 0.0- 0.1- 0.1- 0.1- 0.2- 0.5- 0.2- 0.2- 0.3- 0.3- 1.5-
2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.5
CO2 (mmt)................... 2008 8.1- 10.4- 24.1- 44.5- 63.9- 86.4- 237.4- 97.9- 104.7- 116.2- 128.3- 684.5-
2010 22.2 13.3 17.8 45.6 60.2 82.4 241.5 90.5 101.8 112.3 115.5 661.5
Combined
Fuel (b. gallons)........... 2008 6.3- 3.9- 7.3- 11.6- 16.2- 20.0- 65.3- 22.7- 24.5- 27.4- 30.3- 170.1-
2010 8.1 4.8 6.7 12.0 15.2 19.7 66.5 21.6 24.5 27.5 28.9 169.2
Fuel (b. barrels)........... 2008 0.1- 0.1- 0.2- 0.3- 0.4- 0.5- 1.6- 0.5- 0.6- 0.7- 0.7- 4.0-
2010 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 4.0
CO2 (mmt)................... 2008 68.0- 42.6- 79.2- 126.0- 175.5- 216.9- 708.2- 246.6- 265.9- 296.9- 324.9- 1,842.7-
2010 88.7 51.9 73.5 130.9 165.5 212.8 723.3 234.2 264.7 297.6 312.4 1,832.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62658]]
NHTSA estimates that the fuel economy increases resulting from the
standards will produce other benefits both to drivers (e.g., reduced
time spent refueling) and to the U.S. as a whole (e.g., reductions in
the costs of petroleum imports beyond the direct savings from reduced
oil purchases),\100\ as well as some disbenefits (e.g., increased
traffic congestion) caused by drivers' tendency to travel more when the
cost of driving declines (as it does when fuel economy increases).
NHTSA has estimated the total monetary value to society of these
benefits and disbenefits, and estimates that the standards will produce
significant net benefits to society. Using a 3 percent discount rate,
NHTSA estimates that the present value of these net benefits will range
from $498 billion to $507 billion over the lives of the vehicles sold
during MYs 2017-2025; using a 7 percent discount rate a narrower range
from $372 billion to $377 billion. More discussion regarding monetized
benefits can be found in Section IV of this preamble and in NHTSA's
FRIA. Note that the benefit calculation in the following tables
includes the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions,\101\ but
not the benefits of reducing other GHG emissions (those have been
addressed in a sensitivity analysis discussed in Section IV of this
preamble and in NHTSA's FRIA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ We note, of course, that reducing the amount of fuel
purchased also reduces tax revenue for the Federal and state/local
governments. NHTSA discusses this issue in more detail in Chapter
VIII of its RIA.
\101\ CO2 benefits for purposes of these tables are
calculated using the $26/ton SCC value. Note that the net present
value of reduced GHG emissions is calculated differently from other
benefits. The same discount rate used to discount the value of
damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, and 2.5 percent) is used
to calculate net present value of SCC for internal consistency.
Table I-10 NHTSA's Discounted Benefits ($Billion) Under the CAFE Standards Using a 3 and 7 Percent Discount Rate (Estimated Required)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Total
MY baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 through 2022 2023 2024 2025 through
2021 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% discount rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger 2008.............................................................. 19.2- 10.4- 19.6- 28.6- 40.2- 48.4- 166.4-1 54.2- 60.1- 68.6- 75.9- 425.3-
cars 2010.............................................................. 27.5 13.2 19.3 30.5 40.1 48.5 79.1 54.0 61.6 70.1 77.0 441.9
Light 2008 2010......................................................... 1.9- 3.7- 8.9- 17.3- 24.8- 34.4- 91.0-73 38.1- 40.7- 44.5- 48.3- 262.6-
trucks 3.3 2.8 5.3 13.1 19.9 29.4 .8 32.4 36.7 41.3 45.6 229.9
Combined 2008 2010......................................................... 21.1- 14.1- 28.5- 45.9- 65.0- 82.8- 257.4-2 92.3- 100.7- 113.1- 124.2- 687.5-
30.8 16.0 24.5 43.6 60.0 77.9 52.8 86.4 98.3 111.3 122.5 671.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7% discount rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger 2008.............................................................. 15.3- 8.3- 15.7- 22.9- 32.2- 38.8- 133.2-1 43.4- 48.2- 55.0- 60.8- 340.7-
cars 2010.............................................................. 22.0 10.6 15.5 24.5 32.1 38.9 43.6 43.3 49.4 56.2 61.7 354.1
Light 2008 2010......................................................... 1.5- 2.9- 7.0- 13.7- 19.7- 27.3- 72.1-58 30.2- 32.3- 35.3- 38.3- 208.2-
trucks 2.6 2.2 4.2 10.4 15.8 23.4 .6 25.7 29.1 32.8 36.1 182.3
Combined 2008 2010......................................................... 16.8- 11.2- 22.7- 36.6- 51.9- 66.0- 205.2-2 73.6- 80.4- 90.3- 99.1- 548.6-
24.7 12.8 19.6 34.8 47.9 62.2 02.0 69.0 78.4 88.8 97.8 536.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considering manufacturers' ability to employ compliance
flexibilities and advanced technologies for meeting the standards,
NHTSA estimates the present value of these benefits will be reduced as
follows:
Table I-11 NHTSA's Discounted Benefits ($Billion) under the CAFE Standards Using a 3 and 7 Percent Discount Rate (Estimated Achieved)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Total
MY baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 through 2022 2023 2024 2025 through
2021 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% discount rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008....... 19.7-...... 10.8-...... 18.7-...... 27.8-...... 38.4-..... 45.2-..... 160.6-163. 51.9-..... 56.8-..... 64.4-..... 71.1-..... 404.8-
2010....... 21.8....... 12.9....... 18.7....... 28.9....... 36.0...... 44.9...... 2. 49.9...... 57.0...... 65.4...... 70.2...... 405.6
Light trucks................... 2008....... 2.7-....... 3.4-....... 8.0-....... 14.8-...... 21.5-..... 29.2-..... 79.6-80.0. 33.4-..... 36.0-..... 40.3-..... 44.8-..... 234.2-
2010....... 7.2........ 4.4........ 5.9........ 15.0....... 19.9...... 27.6...... 30.6...... 34.7...... 38.7...... 40.2...... 224.1
Combined....................... 2008....... 22.4-...... 14.2-...... 26.6-...... 42.5-...... 59.8-..... 74.4-..... 239.9-242. 85.2-..... 92.7-..... 104.6-.... 115.9-.... 638.5-
2010....... 29.0....... 17.3....... 24.6....... 43.8....... 55.8...... 72.4...... 9. 80.3...... 91.6...... 104.0..... 110.2..... 629.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7% discount rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008....... 15.8-...... 8.7-....... 15.0-...... 22.3-...... 30.8-..... 36.2-..... 128.8-130. 41.6-..... 45.5-..... 51.6-..... 57.0-..... 324.3-
2010....... 17.4....... 10.3....... 15.0....... 23.1....... 28.8...... 36.0...... 6. 40.0...... 45.7...... 52.5...... 56.2...... 325.0
Light trucks................... 2008....... 2.1-....... 2.7-....... 6.3-....... 11.8-...... 17.1-..... 23.2-..... 63.2-63.5. 26.5-..... 28.6-..... 32.0-..... 35.5-..... 185.7-
2010....... 5.7........ 3.5........ 4.7........ 11.9....... 15.8...... 21.9...... 24.3...... 27.5...... 30.7...... 31.8...... 177.7
Combined....................... 2008....... 17.9-...... 11.4-...... 21.3-...... 34.0-...... 47.8-..... 59.4-..... 191.8-194. 68.0-..... 74.0-..... 83.5-..... 92.5-..... 509.7-
2010....... 23.2....... 13.8....... 19.6....... 35.0....... 44.6...... 57.8...... 0. 64.1...... 73.1...... 83.0...... 88.0...... 502.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA attributes most of these benefits (between $513 billion and
$525 billion at a 3 percent discount rate, or between $400 billion and
$409 billion at a 7 percent discount rate, excluding consideration of
compliance flexibilities and advanced technologies for meeting the
standards) to reductions in fuel consumption, valuing fuel (for
societal purposes) at the future pre-tax prices projected in the Energy
Information Administration's (EIA) reference case
[[Page 62659]]
forecast from the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2012. NHTSA's RIA
accompanying this rulemaking presents a detailed analysis of specific
benefits of the rule.
Table I-12--Summary of NHTSA's Fuel Savings and CO2 Emissions Reduction Under the CAFE Standards (Estimated
Required)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% discount 7% discount
MY baseline Amount rate rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-2021 standards:
Fuel savings (billion gallons).............. 2008 70.1 - $196 - $153 -
2010 69.2 $193 $151
CO2 emissions reductions (million metric 2008 760 - $19.3 - $19.3 -
tons)......................................
2010 751.40 $19 $19
2017-2025 standards:
Fuel savings (billion gallons).............. 2008 183.5 - $525 - $409 -
2010 180.3 $513 $400
CO2 emissions reductions (million metric 2008 1,987 - $53 - $53 -
tons)......................................
2010 1,953 $52 $52
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA estimates that the increases in technology application
necessary to achieve the projected improvements in fuel economy will
entail considerable monetary outlays. The agency estimates that the
incremental costs for achieving the CAFE standards--that is, outlays by
vehicle manufacturers over and above those required to comply with the
MY 2016 CAFE standards--will total between about $134 billion and $140
billion.
Table I-13--NHTSA's Incremental Technology Outlays ($Billion) Under the CAFE Standards (Estimated Required)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
MY baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 through 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
2021 through 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................ 2008........ 3.9 -..... 2.3 -..... 4.3 -..... 6.1 -..... 9.4 -..... 11.7 -.... 37.7 -.... 13.1 -...... 14.6 -.... 18.8 -.... 20.2 -.... 104.4 -
2010........ 7.7....... 3.6....... 4.8....... 6.5....... 8.5....... 9.9....... 41.0...... 11.0........ 12.4...... 15.5...... 16.7...... 96.6
Light trucks.................. 2008........ 0.1 -..... 0.4 -..... 1.1 -..... 2.3 -..... 3.4 -..... 4.8 -..... 12.1 -.... 5.4 -....... 5.6 -..... 6.1 -..... 6.6 -..... 35.9 -
2010........ 1.1....... 0.8....... 1.1....... 2.2....... 3.4....... 4.9....... 13.5...... 5.1......... 5.7....... 6.2....... 6.6....... 37.1
Combined...................... 2008........ 4.0 -..... 2.8 -..... 5.4 -..... 8.4 -..... 12.8 -.... 16.5 -.... 49.9 -.... 18.5 -...... 20.2 -.... 24.9 -.... 26.8 -.... 140.3 -
2010........ 8.7....... 4.4....... 5.8....... 8.7....... 11.9...... 14.9...... 54.4...... 16.1........ 18.1...... 21.7...... 23.3...... 133.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, NHTSA estimates that manufacturers employing compliance
flexibilities and advanced technologies to meet the standards can
significantly reduce these outlays:
Table I-14--NHTSA's Incremental Technology Outlays ($Billion) Under the CAFE Standards (Estimated Achieved)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
MY baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 through 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
2021 through 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................ 2008........ 3.3 -..... 2.0 -..... 3.6 -..... 5.5 -..... 8.5 -..... 10.6 -.... 33.5 -.... 12.2 -...... 13.2 -.... 15.6 -.... 17.5 -.... 91.9 -
2010........ 4.6....... 2.8....... 4.2....... 6.0....... 7.6....... 9.4....... 34.6...... 10.3........ 11.5...... 13.9...... 14.4...... 84.6
Light trucks.................. 2008........ 0.4 -..... 0.5 -..... 1.0 -..... 1.8 -..... 2.6 -..... 3.6 -..... 9.9 -..... 4.2 -....... 4.5 -..... 5.0 -..... 5.8 -..... 29.5 -
2010........ 1.6....... 0.9....... 1.0....... 2.3....... 3.2....... 4.7....... 13.7...... 4.9......... 5.4....... 5.8....... 5.7....... 35.5
Combined...................... 2008........ 3.7 -..... 2.5 -..... 4.6 -..... 7.3 -..... 11.1 -.... 14.2 -.... 43.4 -.... 16.4 -...... 17.8 -.... 20.6 -.... 23.3 -.... 121.4 -
2010........ 6.2....... 3.7....... 5.2....... 8.3....... 10.8...... 14.0...... 48.2...... 15.3........ 16.9...... 19.7...... 20.0...... 120.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA projects that manufacturers will recover most or all of these
additional costs through higher selling prices for new cars and light
trucks. To allow manufacturers to recover these increased outlays (and,
to a much less extent, the civil penalties that some manufacturers are
expected to pay for non-compliance), the agency estimates that the
standards will lead to increase in average new vehicle prices ranging
from $183 to $287 per vehicle in MY 2017 to between $1,461 and $1,616
per vehicle in MY 2025:
Table I-15--NHTSA's Incremental Increases in Average New Vehicle Costs ($) Under the CAFE Standards (Estimated Required)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................ 2008........ 244 -..... 455 -..... 631 -..... 930 -..... 1,143 -... 1,272 -... 1,394 -... 1,751 -... 1,827 -
[[Page 62660]]
2010........ 364....... 484....... 659....... 858....... 994....... 1,091..... 1,221..... 1,482..... 1,578
Light trucks.................. 2008........ 78 -...... 192 -..... 423 -..... 622 -..... 854 -..... 951 -..... 997 -..... 1,081 -... 1,183 -
2010........ 147....... 196....... 397....... 629....... 908....... 948....... 1,056..... 1,148..... 1,226
Combined...................... 2008........ 183 -..... 360 -..... 557 -..... 823 -..... 1,043 -... 1,162 -... 1,259 -... 1,528 -... 1,616 -
2010........ 287....... 382....... 567....... 779....... 964....... 1,042..... 1,165..... 1,370..... 1,461
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And as before, NHTSA estimates that manufacturers employing
compliance flexibilities and advance technologies to meet the standards
will significantly reduce these increases.
Table I-16--NHTSA's Incremental Increases in Average New Vehicle Costs ($) Under the CAFE Standards (Estimated Achieved)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................ 2008........ 208-...... 377-...... 571-...... 837-...... 1,034-.... 1,168-.... 1,255-.... 1,440-.... 1,577-
2010........ 284....... 424....... 603....... 762....... 934....... 1,024..... 1,129..... 1,328..... 1,361
Light trucks.................. 2008........ 87-....... 179-...... 331-...... 470-...... 648-...... 752-...... 808-...... 888-...... 1,040-
2010........ 158....... 187....... 416....... 596....... 863....... 911....... 1,000..... 1,081..... 1,047
Combined...................... 2008........ 164-...... 306-...... 486-...... 709-...... 900-...... 1,025-.... 1,104-.... 1,256-.... 1,400-
2010........ 239....... 340....... 537....... 704....... 909....... 985....... 1,085..... 1,245..... 1,257
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite estimated increases in average vehicle prices of between
$183 to $287 per vehicle in MY 2017 to between $1,461 and $1,616 per
vehicle in MY 2025, NHTSA estimates that discounted fuel savings over
the vehicles' lifetimes will be sufficient to offset initial costs.
Even discounted at 7%, lifetime fuel savings are estimated to be more
than 2.5 times the incremental price increase induced by manufacturers'
compliance with the standards. Although NHTSA estimates lifetime fuel
cost savings using 3% and 7% discount rates based on OMB guidance, it
is possible that consumers use different discount rates when valuing
fuel savings, or value savings over a period of time shorter than the
vehicle's full useful life. A more nuanced discussion of consumer
valuation of fuel savings appears in Section IV.G.6.
[[Page 62661]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.006
As is the case with technology costs, accounting for the program's
compliance flexibilities reduces savings in lifetime fuel expenditures
due to lower levels of achieved fuel economy than are required under
the standards.
[[Page 62662]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.007
The CAFE standards are projected to produce net benefits in a range
from $498 billion to $507 billion at a 3 percent discount rate (a range
of $476 billion to $483 billion, with compliance flexibilities), or
between $372 billion and $377 billion at a 7 percent discount rate (a
range of $356 billion to $362 billion, with compliance flexibilities),
over the useful lives of the light duty vehicles sold during MYs 2017-
2025.
While the estimated incremental technology outlays and incremental
increases in average vehicle costs for the final MYs 2017-2021
standards in today's analysis are similar to the estimates in the
proposal, we note for the reader's reference that the incremental cost
estimates for the augural standards in MYs 2022-2025 are lower than in
the proposal. The lower costs in those later model years result from
the updated analysis used in this final rule. In MY 2021, the estimated
incremental technology outlays for the combined fleet range from $14.9
billion to $16.5 billion as compared to $17 billion in the proposal,
while the estimated incremental increases in average vehicle costs
range from $964 to $1,043, as compared to $1,104 in the proposal. In MY
2025, the estimated incremental technology outlays for the combined
fleet range from $23.3 billion to $26.8 billion, as compared to $32.4
billion in the proposal, while the estimated incremental increases in
average vehicle costs range from $1,461 to $1,616, as compared to
$1,988 in the proposal. The changes in the MY 2025 incremental costs
reflect the combined result of a number of changes and corrections to
the CAFE model and inputs, including (but not limited to) the following
items:
Focused corrections were made to the MY2008-based market
forecast;
A new MY2010-based market forecast was introduced;
Mild HEV technology and off-cycle technologies are now
available in the analysis;
The amount of mass reduction applied in the analysis \102\
has changed;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ The agencies limited the maximum amount of mass reduction
technology that was applied to lighter vehicles in order that the
analysis would show a way manufacturers could comply with the
standards while maintaining overall societal safety. to demonstrate
a path that industry could use to meet standards while maintaining
societal safety
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effectiveness of advanced transmissions when applied
to conventional naturally aspirated engines has been revised based on a
study completed by Argonne National Laboratory for NHTSA;
Estimates of future fuel prices were updated;
The model was corrected to ensure that post-purchase fuel
prices are
[[Page 62663]]
applied when calculating the effective cost of available options to add
technologies to specific vehicle models; and
The model was corrected to ensure that the incremental
costs and fuel savings are fully accounted for when applying diesel
engines.
These changes to the model and inputs are discussed in detail in
Sections II.G, IV.C.2, and IV.C.4 of the preamble; Chapter V of NHTSA's
FRIA, and Chapters 3 and 4 of the joint TSD.
Acting together, these changes and corrections caused technology
costs attributable to the baseline MYs 2009-2016 CAFE standards to
increase for both fleets in most model years. In addition, the changes
and corrections had the combined effect of reducing the total
technology costs (i.e., including technology attributable to the
baseline standards) in MYs 2022-2025, when greater levels of fuel
economy-improving technologies would be required to comply with the
augural standards. Because today's analysis applies these changes
simultaneously, and because they likely interact in ways that would
complicate attribution of impact, the agency has not attempted to
quantify the extent to which each change impacted results. The combined
effect of the increase in the baseline technology costs and reduction
in the total technology costs in MYs 2022-2025 led to a reduction in
the estimated incremental technology cost in MYs 2022-2025 in NHTSA's
analysis, although estimated incremental technology costs were higher
than or very similar to those reported in the NPRM for model years
prior to MY 2022.
While the incremental costs for MYs 2022-2025 are lower than in the
NPRM, the total estimated costs for compliance (inclusive of baseline
costs) were reduced to a lesser extent. In assessing the appropriate
level for maximum feasible standards, NHTSA takes into consideration a
number of factors, including technological feasibility, economic
practicability (which includes the consideration of cost as well as
many other factors), the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy, the need of the United States to conserve
energy, and safety, as well as other factors. Considering all of these
factors, NHTSA continues to believe that the final standards are
maximum feasible, as discussed below in Section IV.F.
2. Summary of Costs and Benefits for the EPA's GHG Standards
EPA has analyzed in detail the projected costs and benefits of the
2017-2025 GHG standards for light-duty vehicles. Table I-19 shows EPA's
estimated lifetime discounted cost, fuel savings, and benefits for all
such vehicles projected to be sold in model years 2017-2025. The
benefits include impacts such as climate-related economic benefits from
reducing emissions of CO2 (but not other GHGs), reductions
in energy security externalities caused by U.S. petroleum consumption
and imports, the value of certain particulate matter-related health
benefits (including premature mortality), the value of additional
driving attributed to the VMT rebound effect, the value of reduced
refueling time needed to fill up a more fuel efficient vehicle. The
analysis also includes estimates of economic impacts stemming from
additional vehicle use, such as the economic damages caused by
accidents, congestion and noise (from increased VMT rebound driving).
Table I-19--EPA's Estimated 2017-2025 Model Year Lifetime Discounted
Costs, Benefits, and Net Benefits Assuming the 3% Discount Rate SCC
Value a b c
[Billions of 2010 dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Present Value d--3% Discount Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Costs........................................... -$150
Fuel Savings............................................ 475
Benefits................................................ 126
Net Benefits\d\......................................... 451
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Value f--3% Discount Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized costs........................................ -6.49
Annualized fuel savings................................. 20.5
Annualized benefits..................................... 5.46
Net benefits............................................ 19.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Present Value d--7% Discount Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Costs........................................... -144
Fuel Savings............................................ 364
Benefits................................................ 106
Net Benefits \e\........................................ 326
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Value f--7% Discount Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized costs........................................ -10.8
Annualized fuel savings................................. 27.3
Annualized benefits..................................... 7.96
Net benefits............................................ 24.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
a The agencies estimated the benefits associated with four different
values of a one ton CO2 reduction (model average at 2.5% discount
rate, 3%, and 5%; 95th percentile at 3%), which each increase over
time. For the purposes of this overview presentation of estimated
costs and benefits, however, we are showing the benefits associated
with the marginal value deemed to be central by the interagency
working group on this topic: the model average at 3% discount rate, in
2010 dollars. Section III.H provides a complete list of values for the
4 estimates.
b Note that net present value of reduced GHG emissions is calculated
differently than other benefits. The same discount rate used to
discount the value of damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, and
2.5 percent) is used to calculate net present value of SCC for
internal consistency. Refer to Section III.H for more detail.
c Projected results using 2008 based fleet projection analysis.
d Present value is the total, aggregated amount that a series of
monetized costs or benefits that occur over time is worth in a given
year. For this analysis, lifetime present values are calculated for
the first year of each model year for MYs 2017-2025 (in year 2010
dollar terms). The lifetime present values shown here are the present
values of each MY in its first year summed across MYs.
e Net benefits reflect the fuel savings plus benefits minus costs.
f The annualized value is the constant annual value through a given time
period (the lifetime of each MY in this analysis) whose summed present
value equals the present value from which it was derived. Annualized
SCC values are calculated using the same rate as that used to
determine the SCC value, while all other costs and benefits are
annualized at either 3% or 7%.
Table I-20 shows EPA's estimated lifetime fuel savings and
CO2 equivalent emission reductions for all light-duty
vehicles sold in the model years 2017-2025. The values in Table I-20
are projected lifetime totals for each model year and are not
discounted. As documented in EPA's RIA, the potential credit transfer
between cars and trucks may change the distribution of the fuel savings
and GHG emission impacts between cars and trucks.
[[Page 62664]]
Table I-20--EPA's Estimated 2017-2025 Model Year Lifetime Fuel Saved and GHG Emissions Avoided (Primary Analysis) a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
MY MY MY MY MY MY MY MY MY Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars:
Fuel (billion gallons)........................... 2.4 4.5 6.8 9.3 11.9 14.8 17.4 20.2 23.0 110.3
Fuel (billion barrels)........................... 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.41 0.48 0.55 2.63
CO2 EQ (mmt)..................................... 29.7 55.7 83.0 113 146 178 207 238 269 1,319
Light Trucks:
Fuel (billion gallons)........................... 0.1 1.0 1.7 2.6 5.5 7.5 9.4 11.3 13.1 52.2
Fuel (billion barrels)........................... 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.31 1.24
CO2 EQ (mmt)..................................... 0.8 13.9 24.6 36 70 92 113 134 154 638
Combined:
Fuel (billion gallons)........................... 2.5 5.5 8.5 11.9 17.4 22.3 26.8 31.5 36.2 162.5
Fuel (billion barrels)........................... 0.06 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.41 0.53 0.64 0.75 0.86 3.87
CO2 EQ (mmt)..................................... 30.5 69.6 108 149 216 270 320 371 423 1,956
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Projected results using 2008 based fleet projection analysis.
Table I-21 shows EPA's estimated lifetime discounted benefits for
all light-duty vehicles sold in model years 2017-2025. Although EPA
estimated the benefits associated with four different values of a one
ton CO2 reduction ($6, $26, $41, $79 in CY 2017 and in 2010
dollars, see Section III.H), for the purposes of this overview
presentation of estimated benefits EPA is showing the benefits
associated with one of these marginal values, $26 per ton of
CO2, in 2010 dollars and 2017 emissions. The values in Table
I-21 are discounted values for each model year of vehicles throughout
their projected lifetimes. The estimated benefits include GHG
reductions, particulate matter-related health impacts (including
premature mortality), energy security, reduced refueling time and
additional driving as well as the impacts of accidents, congestion and
noise from VMT rebound driving. The values in Table I-21 do not include
costs associated with new technology projected to be needed to meet the
GHG standards and they do not include the fuel savings expected from
that technology.
Table I-21--EPA's Estimated 2017-2025 Model Year Lifetime Discounted Benefits Assuming the $26/ton SCC Value a b c d
[Billions of 2010 dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discount rate Sum of
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Present
Values
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3%........................................ $1.81 $4.05 $6.37 $9.0 $13.4 $17.3 $20.9 $24.7 $28.6 $126
7%........................................ $1.52 $3.41 $5.35 $7.6 $11.3 $14.6 $17.6 $20.8 $24.1 $106
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Note that net present value of reduced CO2 emissions is calculated differently than other benefits. The same discount rate used to discount the
value of damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, and 2.5 percent) is used to calculate net present value of SCC for internal consistency. The
estimates in this table are based on the average SCC at a 3 percent discount rate. Refer to Section III.H.6 for more detail.
\b\ As noted in Section III.H.6, the $26/ton (2010$) value applies to 2017 emissions and grows larger over time. The estimates in this table include
monetized benefits for CO2 impacts but exclude the monetized benefits of impacts on non-CO2 GHG emissions (HFC, CH4, N2O). EPA has instead conducted a
sensitivity analysis of the final rule's monetized non-CO2 GHG impacts in section III.H.6.
\c\ Model year values are discounted to the first year of each model year; the ``Sum'' represents those discounted values summed across model years.
\d\ Projected results using 2008 based fleet projection analysis.
Table I-22 shows EPA's estimated lifetime fuel savings, lifetime
CO2 emission reductions, and the monetized net present
values of those fuel savings and CO2 emission reductions.
The fuel savings and CO2 emission reductions are projected
lifetime values for all light-duty vehicles sold in the model years
2017-2025. The estimated fuel savings in billions of gallons and the
GHG reductions in million metric tons of CO2 shown in Table
I-22 are totals for the nine model years throughout these vehicles'
projected lifetime and are not discounted. The monetized values shown
in Table I-22 are the summed values of the discounted monetized fuel
savings and monetized CO2 reductions for the model years
2017-2025 vehicles throughout their lifetimes. The monetized values in
Table I-22 reflect both a 3 percent and a 7 percent discount rate as
noted.
[[Page 62665]]
Table I-22--EPA's Estimated 2017-2025 Model Year Lifetime Fuel Savings,
CO2 Emission Reductions, and Discounted Monetized SCC Benefits Using the
$26/ton SCC Value a,b,c
[Monetized values in 2010 dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ value
Amount (billions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel savings (3% discount rate) 163 billion gallons.... $475
(3.9 billion barrels)..
Fuel savings (7% discount rate) 163 billion gallons.... $364
(3.9 billion barrels)..
CO2e emission reductions
(CO2 portion valued assuming 1,956 MMT CO2e......... a, b $46.6
$22/ton CO2 in 2010).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ $46.6 billion for 1,747 MMT of reduced CO2 emissions. As noted in
Section III.H.6, the $26/ton (2010$) value applies to 2017 emissions
and grows larger over time. The estimates in this table include
monetized benefits for CO2 impacts but exclude the monetized benefits
of impacts on non-CO2 GHG emissions (HFC, CH4, N2O). EPA has instead
conducted a sensitivity analysis of the final rule's monetized non-CO2
GHG impacts in section III.H.6.
\b\ Note that net present value of reduced CO2 emissions is calculated
differently than other benefits. The same discount rate used to
discount the value of damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, and
2.5 percent) is used to calculate net present value of SCC for
internal consistency. The estimates in this table are based on one of
four SCC estimates (average SCC at a 3 percent discount rate). Refer
to Section III.H.6 for more detail.
\c\ Projected results using 2008 based fleet projection analysis.
Table I-23 shows EPA's estimated incremental and total technology
outlays for cars and trucks for each of the model years 2017-2025. The
technology outlays shown in Table I-21 are for the industry as a whole
and do not account for fuel savings associated with the program. Also,
the technology outlays shown in Table I-21 do not include the estimated
maintenance costs which are included in the program costs presented in
Table I-19. Table I-24 shows EPA's estimated incremental cost increase
of the average new vehicle for each model year 2017-2025. The values
shown are incremental to a baseline vehicle and are not cumulative. In
other words, the estimated increase for 2017 model year cars is $206
relative to a 2017 model year car meeting the MY 2016 standards. The
estimated increase for a 2018 model year car is $374 relative to a 2018
model year car meeting the MY 2016 standards (not $206 plus $374).
Table I-23--EPA's Estimated Incremental Technology Outlays Associated With the Standards a b
[Billions of 2010 dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sum of
2017 MY 2018 MY 2019 MY 2020 MY 2021 MY 2022 MY 2023 MY 2024 MY 2025 MY present
values
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% discount rate:
Cars.................................................... $2.03 $3.65 $5.02 $6.43 $7.94 $11.4 $14.7 $18.0 $19.6 $88.8
Trucks.................................................. 0.33 1.10 1.67 2.29 4.28 6.67 8.75 10.70 11.6 47.4
Combined................................................ 2.40 4.78 6.72 8.73 12.2 18.1 23.4 28.7 31.2 136
7% discount rate:
Cars.................................................... 1.99 3.58 4.93 6.32 7.80 11.2 14.4 17.7 19.3 87.2
Trucks.................................................. 0.32 1.08 1.64 2.25 4.20 6.54 8.59 10.51 11.4 46.5
Combined................................................ 2.36 4.69 6.59 8.57 12.0 17.7 23.0 28.1 30.6 134
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Model year values are discounted to the first year of each model year; the ``Sum'' represents those discounted values summed across model years.
\b\ Projected results from using 2008 based fleet projection analysis.
Table I-24--EPA's Estimated Incremental Increase in Average New Vehicle Cost Relative to the Reference Case a b
[2010 dollars per unit]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 MY 2018 MY 2019 MY 2020 MY 2021 MY 2022 MY 2023 MY 2024 MY 2025 MY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars.......................................................... $206 $374 $510 $634 $767 $1,079 $1,357 $1,622 $1,726
Trucks........................................................ 57 196 304 415 763 1,186 1,562 1,914 2,059
Combined...................................................... 154 311 438 557 766 1,115 1,425 1,718 1,836
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ The reference case assumes the 2016MY standards continue indefinitely.
\b\ Projected results from using 2008 based fleet projection analysis.
[[Page 62666]]
3. Why are the EPA and NHTSA MY 2025 Estimated Per-Vehicle Costs
Different?
In Section I.C.1 and I.C.2 NHTSA and EPA present the agencies'
estimates of the incremental costs and benefits of the final CAFE and
GHG standards, relative to costs and benefits estimated to occur absent
the new standards. Taken as a whole, these represent the incremental
costs and benefits of the National Program for Model Years 2017-2025.
On a year-by-year comparison for model years 2017-2025, the two
agencies' per-vehicle cost estimates are similar for the beginning
years of the program, but in the last few model years, EPA's cost
estimates are significantly higher than the NHTSA cost estimates. When
comparing the CAFE required new vehicle cost estimate in Table I-15
with the GHG standard new vehicle cost estimate in Table I-24, we see
that the model year 2025 CAFE incremental new vehicle cost estimate is
$1,461-$1,616 per vehicle (when, as required by EISA/EPCA, NHTSA sets
aside EVs, pre-MY2019 PHEVs, and credit-based CAFE flexibilities), and
the GHG standard incremental cost estimate is $1,836 per vehicle--a
difference of $220-$375. The agencies have examined these cost estimate
differentials, and as discussed below, it is principally explained by
how the two agencies modeled future compliance with their respective
standards, and by the application of low-GWP refrigerants attributable
only to EPA's standards. As also described below, in reality auto
companies will build a single fleet of vehicles to comply with both the
CAFE and GHG standards, and the only significant real-world difference
in the program costs are is limited to the hydrofluorocarbon (HFC)
reductions expected under the GHG standards, which EPA estimates at
$68/vehicle cost.
As documented below in Section IV, although NHTSA is precluded by
EISA/EPCA from considering CAFE credits, EVs, and pre-MY2019 PHEVs when
determining the maximum feasible stringency of new CAFE standards,
NHTSA has conducted additional analysis that accounts for EISA/EPCA's
provisions regarding CAFE credits, EVs, and PHEVs. Under that analysis,
as shown in Table I-16, NHTSA's estimate of the incremental new vehicle
costs attributable to the new CAFE standards ranges from $1,257 to
$1,400. Insofar as EPA's analysis focuses on the agencies' MY 2008-
based market forecast and attempts to account for some CAA-based
flexibilities (most notably, unlimited credit transfers between the PC
and LT fleets), NHTSA's $1,400 result is based on methods conceptually
more similar to those applied by EPA. Therefore, although the
difference in MY 2025 is considerably greater than differences in
earlier model years, the agencies have focused on understanding the
$436 difference between NHTSA's $1,400 result and EPA's $1,836 result,
both for the MY 2008-based market forecast.
Of this $436 difference, $247 is explained by NHTSA's simulation of
EISA/EPCA's credit carry-forward provisions. EISA/EPCA allows
manufacturers to ``carry forward'' credits up to five model years,
applying those credits to offset compliance shortfalls and thereby
avoid civil penalties.\103\ In meetings with the agency, some
manufacturers have indicated that, even under the preexisting MY 2012-
2016 standards, they would make full use of these provisions,
effectively entering MY 2017 with little, if any, credit ``in
reserve.'' \104\ As in the NPRM, NHTSA's analysis exercises its CAFE
model in a manner that simulates manufacturers' carrying-forward and
use of CAFE credits. This simulation of credit carry-forward acts in
combination with the model's explicit simulation of multiyear
planning--that is, the tendency of manufacturers to apply ``extra''
technology in earlier model years if doing so would economically
facilitate compliance in later model years, considering estimated
product cadence (i.e., estimated timing of vehicle redesigns)
facilitate. When the potential to carry forward CAFE credits is also
simulated, multiyear planning simulation estimates the extent to which
manufacturers could generate CAFE credits in earlier model years and
use those credits in later model years. In meetings with the agency,
manufacturers have often provided forward-looking plans exhibiting this
type of strategic timing of investment in technology. For the NPRM,
NHTSA estimated that in MY 2025, accounting for credit carry-forward
(and other flexibilities offered under EISA/EPCA), manufacturers could,
on average, achieve 47.0 mpg, 2.6 mpg less than the agency's 49.6 mpg
estimate of the average of manufacturers' fuel economy requirements in
that model year. Using the corrected MY 2008-based market forecast,
NHTSA today estimates that in MY 2025, manufacturers could achieve 47.4
mpg, 2.3 mpg less than the agency's current 49.7 mpg estimate (also
under the corrected MY 2008-based market forecast) of the average of
the manufacturers' fuel economy requirements in MY 2025. This 47.4 mpg
estimate corresponds to the incremental cost estimate of $1,400 cited
above. When credit carry-forward is excluded from this analysis,
NHTSA's estimate of manufacturers' average achieved fuel economy in MY
2025 increases to 49.0 mpg, and NHTSA's estimate of the average
incremental cost in MY 2025 increases to $1,647, an increase of $247.
Although EPA's GHG standards allow manufacturers to bank (i.e., carry
forward) GHG-based credits up to five years, EPA's OMEGA model was
designed to estimate the costs of a specific standard in a specific
year and EPA for this action did not estimate the potential credit bank
companies could have on a year-by-year basis. As explained, this
difference in simulation capabilities explains $247 of the $436
difference mentioned above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ 49 U.S.C. 32903.
\104\ On the other hand, although EISA/EPCA also allows
manufacturers to carry back CAFE credits, most manufacturers have
indicated extreme reluctance to make use of these provisions,
insofar as doing so would constitute ``borrowing against the
future'' and incurring risk of paying civil penalties in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As it has in past rulemakings and in the NPRM preceding today's
final rule, NHTSA has also applied its CAFE model in a manner that
simulates the potential that, as allowed under EISA/EPCA and as
suggested by their past CAFE levels, some manufacturers could elect to
pay civil penalties rather than achieving compliance with future CAFE
standards.\105\ EISA/EPCA allows NHTSA to take this flexibility into
account when determining the maximum feasible stringency of future CAFE
standards. As in the NPRM, simulating this flexibility leads NHTSA to
estimate that, under EISA/EPCA, some manufacturers (e.g., BMW,
Mercedes, Porsche, and Volkswagen) could achieve fuel economy levels 6
to 9 mpg or more short of their respective required CAFE levels in MY
2025. Having set aside the potential to carry forward CAFE credits,
when NHTSA also sets aside the potential to pay civil penalties, NHTSA
estimates that manufacturers could achieve a fuel economy average of
49.7 mpg in MY 2025, reflecting, on average, manufacturers' achievement
of their respective required CAFE levels. For MY 2025, this analysis
shows this 0.7 mpg increase in average achieved fuel economy
accompanied by a $119 increase in average incremental cost, increasing
the average incremental cost to $1,766. Because the Clean Air Act,
unlike EISA/EPCA, does not allow manufacturers to pay civil penalties
rather than achieving compliance with GHG standards, EPA's OMEGA model
[[Page 62667]]
does not simulate this type of flexibility.\106\ Therefore, this
further difference in simulation capabilities explains $119 of the $436
difference mentioned above, and results in an estimated average
incremental cost of $1,766 in MY 2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ 49 U.S.C. 32912.
\106\ See 75 FR 25341.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to these differences in modeling of programmatic
features, EPA projects that manufacturers will achieve significant GHG
emissions reductions through the use of different air conditioning
refrigerants (the HFC refrigerant in today's vehicles is a powerful
greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential 1,430 times that of
CO2).\107\ EPA estimates that in 2025, the incremental cost of the
substitute is $68/vehicle. While all other technologies in the
agencies' analyses are equally relevant to compliance with both CAFE
and GHG standards, CAFE standards do not address HFC emissions, and
NHTSA's analysis therefore does not include the costs of this HFC
substitution. This factor results in the EPA 2025 cost estimate being
$68/vehicle higher than the NHTSA MY 2025 per-vehicle cost estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ As with the MY 2012-2016 Light Duty rule and the MY 2014-
2018 Medium and Heavy Duty rule, the GWPs used in this rule are
consistent with 100-year time frame values in the 2007
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment
Report (AR4). At this time, the 100-year GWP values from the 1995
IPCC Second Assessment Report are used in the official U.S. GHG
inventory submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) per the reporting requirements under that
international convention. The UNFCCC recently agreed on revisions to
the national GHG inventory reporting requirements, and will begin
using the 100-year GWP values from AR4 for inventory submissions in
the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taken together, as shown in Table I-25, these three factors suggest
a difference of $434, based on $247 and $119 for NHTSA's simulation of
EISA/EPCA's credit carry-forward and civil penalty provisions,
respectively, and $68 for EPA's estimate of HFC costs. While $2 lower
than the $436 difference mentioned above, the agencies consider this
remaining difference to be small (about 0.1% of average incremental
cost) and well within the range of differences to be anticipated given
other structural differences between the agencies analyses and modeling
systems.
Table I--25--Major Factors Contributing to Difference in EPA and NHTSA
Achieved MY2025 Per-Vehicle Cost Estimates (2010 dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average per-
Factor contributing to epa and nhtsa my2025 per-vehicle vehicle cost
cost estimate difference impact in MY
2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air conditioning refrigerant substitution............... $68
CAFE program provisions for civil penalties............. 119
CAFE program credit carry-forward value................. 247
---------------
Total impact on the difference between EPAs 2025 434
estimate and NHTSA's 2025 achieved estimate (sum of
individual factors)................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies' estimates are based on each agency's different
modeling tools for forecasting costs and benefits between now and MY
2025. As described in detail in the Joint Technical Support Document,
the agencies harmonized inputs for our modeling tools. However, our
modeling tools (the NHTSA-developed CAFE model and the EPA-developed
OMEGA model), while similar in core function, were developed to
estimate the program costs based on each agencies' respective statutory
authorities, which in some cases include specific constraints. It is
important to note that these are modeling tool differences, but that,
while the models result in different estimates of the costs of
compliance, manufacturers will ultimately produce a single fleet of
vehicles to be sold in the United States that considers both EPA
greenhouse gas emissions standards and NHTSA CAFE standards.
Manufacturers are currently selling MY2012 and MY2013 vehicles based on
considering these standards. Every technology an automotive company
applies to its vehicles that improves fuel economy will also lower
CO2 emissions--thus each dollar of technology investment
will count towards the company's overall compliance with the CAFE
standard as well as the CO2 standard. The agencies' final
footprint curve standards for passenger cars and for light trucks have
been closely coordinated, with the principle difference being EPA's
estimate of the application of HFC air conditioning refrigerant
technology across a company's fleet of vehicles. Thus, within the
entire fleet of vehicle models ultimately produced for sale in the
United States, the agencies expect the only technology attributable
solely to EPA's standards will be the low-GWP refrigerants, which EPA
estimates at an average incremental unit cost of $68 in 2025.
E. Background and Comparison of NHTSA and EPA Statutory Authority
Section I.E of the preamble contains a detailed overview discussion
of the NHTSA and EPA respective statutory authorities. In addition,
each agency discusses comments pertaining to its statutory authority
and the agencies' responses in Sections III and IV, respectively and
EPA responds as well in its response to comment documents.
1. NHTSA Statutory Authority
NHTSA establishes CAFE standards for passenger cars and light
trucks for each model year under EPCA, as amended by EISA. EPCA
mandates a motor vehicle fuel economy regulatory program to meet the
various facets of the need to conserve energy, including the
environmental and foreign policy implications of petroleum use by motor
vehicles. EPCA allocates the responsibility for implementing the
program between NHTSA and EPA as follows: NHTSA sets CAFE standards for
passenger cars and light trucks; EPA establishes the procedures for
testing, tests vehicles, collects and analyzes manufacturers' data, and
calculates the individual and average fuel economy of each
manufacturer's passenger cars and light trucks; and NHTSA enforces the
standards based on EPA's calculations.
a. Standard Setting
We have summarized below the most important aspects of standard
setting under EPCA, as amended by EISA. For each future model year,
EPCA requires that NHTSA establish separate passenger car and light
truck standards at ``the maximum feasible average fuel
[[Page 62668]]
economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that
model year,'' based on the agency's consideration of four statutory
factors: technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect
of other standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of
the nation to conserve energy. EPCA does not define these terms or
specify what weight to give each concern in balancing them; thus, NHTSA
defines them and determines the appropriate weighting that leads to the
maximum feasible standards given the circumstances in each CAFE
standard rulemaking.\108\ For MYs 2011-2020, EPCA further requires that
separate standards for passenger cars and for light trucks be set at
levels high enough to ensure that the CAFE of the industry-wide
combined fleet of new passenger cars and light trucks reaches at least
35 mpg not later than MY 2020. For model years after 2020, standards
need simply be set at the maximum feasible level.
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\108\ See Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d.
1172, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008) (``The EPCA clearly requires the agency
to consider these four factors, but it gives NHTSA discretion to
decide how to balance the statutory factors--as long as NHTSA's
balancing does not undermine the fundamental purpose of the EPCA:
energy conservation.'').
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Because EPCA states that standards must be set for ``* * *
automobiles manufactured by manufacturers,'' and because Congress
provided specific direction on how small-volume manufacturers could
obtain exemptions from the passenger car standards, NHTSA has long
interpreted its authority as pertaining to setting standards for the
industry as a whole. Prior to this NPRM, some manufacturers raised with
NHTSA the possibility of NHTSA and EPA setting alternate standards for
part of the industry that met certain (relatively low) sales volume
criteria--specifically, that separate standards be set so that
``intermediate-size,'' limited-line manufacturers do not have to meet
the same levels of stringency that larger manufacturers have to meet
until several years later. NHTSA sought comment in the NPRM on whether
or how EPCA, as amended by EISA, could be interpreted to allow such
alternate standards for certain parts of the industry. Suzuki requested
that NHTSA and EPA both adopt an approach similar to California's of
providing more lead time to manufacturers with national average sales
below 50,000 units, by allowing those ``limited line manufacturers'' to
meet the MY 2017 standards in MY 2020, the MY 2018 standards in MY
2021, and so on, with a 3-year time lag in complying with the standards
generally applicable for a compliance category. Suzuki stated simply
that the standards are harder for small manufacturers to meet than for
larger manufacturers, because the per-vehicle cost of developing or
purchasing the necessary technology is higher, and that since the GHG
emissions attributable to vehicles built by manufacturers who would be
eligible for this option represent a very small portion of overall
emissions, the impact should be minimal.\109\
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\109\ Suzuki comments, at 2-3. Available at http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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Although EPA is adopting such an approach as part of its final rule
(see Section I.C.7.c above and III.X), no commenter provided legal
analysis that might lead NHTSA to change its current interpretation of
EPCA/EISA. Thus, NHTSA is not finalizing such an option for purposes of
this rulemaking.
i. Factors That Must Be Considered in Deciding the Appropriate
Stringency of CAFE Standards
(1) Technological Feasibility
``Technological feasibility'' refers to whether a particular method
of improving fuel economy can be available for commercial application
in the model year for which a standard is being established. Thus, the
agency is not limited in determining the level of new standards to
technology that is already being commercially applied at the time of
the rulemaking, a consideration which is particularly relevant for a
rulemaking with a timeframe as long as the present one. For this
rulemaking, NHTSA has considered all types of technologies that improve
real-world fuel economy, including air-conditioner efficiency, due to
EPA's decision to allow generation of fuel consumption improvement
values for CAFE purposes based on improvements to air-conditioner
efficiency that improves fuel efficiency.
(2) Economic Practicability
``Economic practicability'' refers to whether a standard is one
``within the financial capability of the industry, but not so stringent
as to'' lead to ``adverse economic consequences, such as a significant
loss of jobs or the unreasonable elimination of consumer choice.''
\110\ The agency has explained in the past that this factor can be
especially important during rulemakings in which the automobile
industry is facing significantly adverse economic conditions (with
corresponding risks to jobs). Consumer acceptability is also an element
of economic practicability, one which is particularly difficult to
gauge during times of uncertain fuel prices.\111\ In a rulemaking such
as the present one, looking out into the more distant future, economic
practicability is a way to consider the uncertainty surrounding future
market conditions and consumer demand for fuel economy in addition to
other vehicle attributes. In an attempt to ensure the economic
practicability of attribute-based standards, NHTSA considers a variety
of factors, including the annual rate at which manufacturers can
increase the percentage of their fleet that employ a particular type of
fuel-saving technology, the specific fleet mixes of different
manufacturers, and assumptions about the cost of the standards to
consumers and consumers' valuation of fuel economy, among other things.
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\110\ 67 FR 77015, 77021 (Dec. 16, 2002).
\111\ See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA (CAS), 793 F.2d
1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Administrator's consideration of market
demand as component of economic practicability found to be
reasonable); Public Citizen v. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256 (Congress
established broad guidelines in the fuel economy statute; agency's
decision to set lower standard was a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies).
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It is important to note, however, that the law does not preclude a
CAFE standard that poses considerable challenges to any individual
manufacturer. The Conference Report for EPCA, as enacted in 1975, makes
clear, and the case law affirms, ``a determination of maximum feasible
average fuel economy should not be keyed to the single manufacturer
which might have the most difficulty achieving a given level of average
fuel economy.'' \112\ Instead, NHTSA is compelled ``to weigh the
benefits to the nation of a higher fuel economy standard against the
difficulties of individual automobile manufacturers.'' \113\ The law
permits CAFE standards exceeding the projected capability of any
particular manufacturer as long as the standard is economically
practicable for the industry as a whole. Thus, while a particular CAFE
standard may pose difficulties for one manufacturer, it may also
present opportunities for another. NHTSA has long held that the CAFE
program is not necessarily intended to maintain the competitive
positioning of each particular company. Rather, it is intended to
enhance the fuel economy of the vehicle fleet on American roads, while
protecting motor vehicle safety and being mindful of the risk to the
overall United States economy.
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\112\ CEI-I, 793 F.2d 1322, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
\113\ Id.
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[[Page 62669]]
(3) The Effect of Other Motor Vehicle Standards of the Government on
Fuel Economy
``The effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on
fuel economy,'' involves an analysis of the effects of compliance with
emission, safety, noise, or damageability standards on fuel economy
capability and thus on average fuel economy. In previous CAFE
rulemakings, the agency has said that pursuant to this provision, it
considers the adverse effects of other motor vehicle standards on fuel
economy. It said so because, from the CAFE program's earliest years
\114\ until present, the effects of such compliance on fuel economy
capability over the history of the CAFE program have been negative
ones. For example, safety standards that have the effect of increasing
vehicle weight lower vehicle fuel economy capability and thus decrease
the level of average fuel economy that the agency can determine to be
feasible.
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\114\ 42 FR 63184, 63188 (Dec. 15,1977). See also 42 FR 33534,
33537 (Jun. 30, 1977).
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In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), and of
EPA's endangerment finding, granting of a waiver to California for its
motor vehicle GHG standards, and its own establishment of GHG
standards, NHTSA is confronted with the issue of how to treat those
standards under EPCA/EISA, such as in the context of the ``other motor
vehicle standards'' provision. To the extent the GHG standards result
in increases in fuel economy, they would do so almost exclusively as a
result of inducing manufacturers to install the same types of
technologies used by manufacturers in complying with the CAFE
standards.
In the NPRM, NHTSA sought comment on whether and in what way the
effects of the California and EPA standards should be considered under
EPCA/EISA, e.g., under the ``other motor vehicle standards'' provision,
consistent with NHTSA's independent obligation under EPCA/EISA to issue
CAFE standards. NHTSA explained that the agency had already considered
EPA's proposal and the harmonization benefits of the National Program
in developing its own proposal. The only comment received was from the
Sierra Club, noting that the structure of the National Program accounts
for both NHTSA's and EPA's authority and requires no separate
action.\115\ NHTSA agrees that no further action is required as part of
this rulemaking.
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\115\ Sierra Club et al. comments, at 10. Available at http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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(4) The Need of the United States To Conserve Energy
``The need of the United States to conserve energy'' means ``the
consumer cost, national balance of payments, environmental, and foreign
policy implications of our need for large quantities of petroleum,
especially imported petroleum.'' \116\ Environmental implications
principally include reductions in emissions of carbon dioxide and
criteria pollutants and air toxics. Prime examples of foreign policy
implications are energy independence and security concerns.
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\116\ 42 FR 63184, 63188 (1977).
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(5) Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving Fuel
Projected future fuel prices are a critical input into the economic
analysis of alternative CAFE standards, because they determine the
value of fuel savings both to new vehicle buyers and to society, which
is related to the consumer cost (or rather, benefit) of our need for
large quantities of petroleum. In this rule, NHTSA relies on fuel price
projections from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA)
most recent Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) for this analysis. Federal
government agencies generally use EIA's projections in their
assessments of future energy-related policies.
(6) Petroleum Consumption and Import Externalities
U.S. consumption and imports of petroleum products impose costs on
the domestic economy that are not reflected in the market price for
crude petroleum, or in the prices paid by consumers of petroleum
products such as gasoline. These costs include (1) higher prices for
petroleum products resulting from the effect of U.S. oil import demand
on the world oil price; (2) the risk of disruptions to the U.S. economy
caused by sudden reductions in the supply of imported oil to the U.S.;
and (3) expenses for maintaining a U.S. military presence to secure
imported oil supplies from unstable regions, and for maintaining the
strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) to provide a response option should a
disruption in commercial oil supplies threaten the U.S. economy, to
allow the United States to meet part of its International Energy Agency
obligation to maintain emergency oil stocks, and to provide a national
defense fuel reserve. Higher U.S. imports of crude oil or refined
petroleum products increase the magnitude of these external economic
costs, thus increasing the true economic cost of supplying
transportation fuels above the resource costs of producing them.
Conversely, reducing U.S. imports of crude petroleum or refined fuels
or reducing fuel consumption can reduce these external costs.
(7) Air Pollutant Emissions
While reductions in domestic fuel refining and distribution that
result from lower fuel consumption will reduce U.S. emissions of
various pollutants, additional vehicle use associated with the rebound
effect \117\ from higher fuel economy will increase emissions of these
pollutants. Thus, the net effect of stricter CAFE standards on
emissions of each pollutant depends on the relative magnitudes of its
reduced emissions in fuel refining and distribution, and increases in
its emissions from vehicle use. Fuel savings from stricter CAFE
standards also result in lower emissions of CO2, the main
greenhouse gas emitted as a result of refining, distribution, and use
of transportation fuels. Reducing fuel consumption reduces carbon
dioxide emissions directly, because the primary source of
transportation-related CO2 emissions is fuel combustion in
internal combustion engines.
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\117\ The ``rebound effect'' refers to the tendency of drivers
to drive their vehicles more as the cost of doing so goes down, as
when fuel economy improves.
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NHTSA has considered environmental issues, both within the context
of EPCA and the National Environmental Policy Act, in making decisions
about the setting of standards from the earliest days of the CAFE
program. As courts of appeal have noted in three decisions stretching
over the last 20 years,\118\ NHTSA defined the ``need of the Nation to
conserve energy'' in the late 1970s as including ``the consumer cost,
national balance of payments, environmental, and foreign policy
implications of our need for large quantities of petroleum, especially
imported petroleum.'' \119\ In 1988, NHTSA included climate change
concepts in its CAFE notices and prepared its first environmental
assessment addressing that subject.\120\ It cited concerns about
climate change as
[[Page 62670]]
one of its reasons for limiting the extent of its reduction of the CAFE
standard for MY 1989 passenger cars.\121\ Since then, NHTSA has
considered the benefits of reducing tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions
in its fuel economy rulemakings pursuant to the statutory requirement
to consider the nation's need to conserve energy by reducing fuel
consumption.
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\118\ Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1325 n. 12
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Public Citizen v. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256, 262-3 n. 27
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that ``NHTSA itself has interpreted the
factors it must consider in setting CAFE standards as including
environmental effects''); and Center for Biological Diversity v.
NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007).
\119\ 42 FR 63184, 63188 (Dec. 15, 1977) (emphasis added).
\120\ 53 FR 33080, 33096 (Aug. 29, 1988).
\121\ 53 FR 39275, 39302 (Oct. 6, 1988).
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ii. Other Factors Considered by NHTSA
NHTSA considers the potential for adverse safety consequences when
establishing CAFE standards. This practice is recognized approvingly in
case law.\122\ Under the universal or ``flat'' CAFE standards that
NHTSA was previously authorized to establish, the primary risk to
safety came from the possibility that manufacturers would respond to
higher standards by building smaller, less safe vehicles in order to
``balance out'' the larger, safer vehicles that the public generally
preferred to buy. Under the attribute-based standards being presented
in this final rule, that risk is reduced because building smaller
vehicles tends to raise a manufacturer's overall CAFE obligation,
rather than only raising its fleet average CAFE. However, even under
attribute-based standards, there is still risk that manufacturers will
rely on down-weighting to improve their fuel economy (for a given
vehicle at a given footprint target) in ways that may reduce
safety.\123\
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\122\ As the United States Court of Appeals pointed out in
upholding NHTSA's exercise of judgment in setting the 1987-1989
passenger car standards, ``NHTSA has always examined the safety
consequences of the CAFE standards in its overall consideration of
relevant factors since its earliest rulemaking under the CAFE
program.'' Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA (CEI I), 901
F.2d 107, 120 at n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
\123\ For example, by reducing the mass of the smallest vehicles
rather than the largest, or by reducing vehicle overhang outside the
space measured as ``footprint,'' which results in less crush space.
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iii. Factors That NHTSA Is Statutorily Prohibited From Considering in
Setting Standards
EPCA provides that in determining the level at which it should set
CAFE standards for a particular model year, NHTSA may not consider the
ability of manufacturers to take advantage of several EPCA provisions
that facilitate compliance with the CAFE standards and thereby reduce
the costs of compliance. Specifically, in determining the maximum
feasible level of fuel economy for passenger cars and light trucks,
NHTSA cannot consider the fuel economy benefits of ``dedicated''
alternative fuel vehicles (like battery electric vehicles or natural
gas vehicles), must consider dual-fueled automobiles to be operated
only on gasoline or diesel fuel, and may not consider the ability of
manufacturers to use, trade, or transfer credits.\124\ This provision
limits, to some extent, the fuel economy levels that NHTSA can find to
be ``maximum feasible''--if NHTSA cannot consider the fuel economy of
electric vehicles, for example, NHTSA cannot set a standards predicated
on manufacturers' usage of electric vehicles to meet the standards.
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\124\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(h). We note, as discussed in greater
detail in Section IV, that NHTSA interprets 32902(h) as reflecting
Congress' intent that statutorily-mandated compliance flexibilities
remain flexibilities. When a compliance flexibility is not
statutorily mandated, therefore, or when it ceases to be available
under the statute, we interpret 32902(h) as no longer binding the
agency's determination of the maximum feasible levels of fuel
economy. For example, when the manufacturing incentive for dual-
fueled automobiles under 49 U.S.C. 32905 and 32906 expires in MY
2019, there is no longer a flexibility left to protect per 32902(h),
so NHTSA considers the calculated fuel economy of plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles for purposes of determining the maximum feasible
standards in MYs 2020 and beyond.
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iv. Weighing and Balancing of Factors
NHTSA has broad discretion in balancing the above factors in
determining the average fuel economy level that the manufacturers can
achieve. Congress ``specifically delegated the process of setting * * *
fuel economy standards with broad guidelines concerning the factors
that the agency must consider.'' \125\ The breadth of those guidelines,
the absence of any statutorily prescribed formula for balancing the
factors, the fact that the relative weight to be given to the various
factors may change from rulemaking to rulemaking as the underlying
facts change, and the fact that the factors may often be conflicting
with respect to whether they militate toward higher or lower standards
give NHTSA discretion to decide what weight to give each of the
competing policies and concerns and then determine how to balance
them--``as long as NHTSA's balancing does not undermine the fundamental
purpose of the EPCA: Energy conservation,'' \126\ and as long as that
balancing reasonably accommodates ``conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute.'' \127\ Thus, EPCA does
not mandate that any particular number be adopted when NHTSA determines
the level of CAFE standards.
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\125\ Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, at 1341
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
\126\ CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1195 (9th Cir. 2008).
\127\ Id.
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v. Other Requirements Related to Standard Setting
The standards for passenger cars and for light trucks must increase
ratably each year through MY 2020.\128\ This statutory requirement is
interpreted, in combination with the requirement to set the standards
for each model year at the level determined to be the maximum feasible
level that manufacturers can achieve for that model year, to mean that
the annual increases should not be disproportionately large or small in
relation to each other.\129\ Standards after 2020 must simply be set at
the maximum feasible level.\130\
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\128\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(C).
\129\ See 74 FR 14196, 14375-76 (Mar. 30, 2009).
\130\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(B).
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The standards for passenger cars and light trucks must also be
based on one or more vehicle attributes, like size or weight, which
correlate with fuel economy and must be expressed in terms of a
mathematical function.\131\ Fuel economy targets are set for individual
vehicles and increase as the attribute decreases and vice versa. For
example, footprint-based standards assign higher fuel economy targets
to smaller-footprint vehicles and lower ones to larger footprint-
vehicles. The fleetwide average fuel economy that a particular
manufacturer is required to achieve depends on the footprint mix of its
fleet, i.e., the proportion of the fleet that is small-, medium- or
large-footprint.
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\131\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3).
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This approach can be used to require virtually all manufacturers to
increase significantly the fuel economy of a broad range of both
passenger cars and light trucks, i.e., the manufacturer must improve
the fuel economy of all the vehicles in its fleet. Further, this
approach can do so without creating an incentive for manufacturers to
make small vehicles smaller or large vehicles larger, with attendant
implications for safety.
b. Test Procedures for Measuring Fuel Economy
EPCA provides EPA with the responsibility for establishing
procedures to measure fuel economy and to calculate CAFE. Current test
procedures measure the effects of nearly all fuel saving technologies.
EPA is revising the procedures for measuring fuel economy and
calculating average fuel economy for the CAFE program, however, to
account for certain impacts on fuel economy not currently included
[[Page 62671]]
in these procedures, specifically increases in fuel economy because of
increases in efficiency of the air conditioning system; increases in
fuel economy because of technology improvements that achieve ``off-
cycle'' benefits; incentives for use of certain hybrid technologies in
a significant percentage of pick-up trucks; and incentives for
achieving fuel economy levels in a significant percentage pick-up
trucks that exceeds the target curve by specified amounts, in the form
of increased values assigned for fuel economy. NHTSA has considered
manufacturers' ability to comply with the CAFE standards using these
efficiency improvements in determining the stringency of the fuel
economy standards presented in this final rule. These changes would be
the same as program elements that are part of EPA's greenhouse gas
performance standards, discussed in Section III.B.10. As discussed
below, these three elements will be implemented in the same manner as
in the EPA's greenhouse gas program--a vehicle manufacturer would have
the option to generate these fuel economy values for vehicle models
that meet the criteria for these elements and to use these values in
calculating their fleet average fuel economy. This revision to the CAFE
calculations is discussed in more detail in Sections III.B.10 and III.C
and IV.I.4 below.
c. Enforcement and Compliance Flexibility
NHTSA determines compliance with the CAFE standards based on
measurements of automobile manufacturers' CAFE from EPA. If a
manufacturer's passenger car or light truck CAFE level exceeds the
applicable standard for that model year, the manufacturer earns credits
for over-compliance. The amount of credit earned is determined by
multiplying the number of tenths of a mpg by which a manufacturer
exceeds a standard for a particular category of automobiles by the
total volume of automobiles of that category manufactured by the
manufacturer for a given model year. As discussed in more detail in
Section IV.I, credits can be carried forward for 5 model years or back
for 3, and can also be transferred between a manufacturer's fleets or
traded to another manufacturer.
If a manufacturer's passenger car or light truck CAFE level does
not meet the applicable standard for that model year, NHTSA notifies
the manufacturer. The manufacturer may use ``banked'' credits to make
up the shortfall, but if there are no (or not enough) credits
available, then the manufacturer has the option to submit a ``carry
back plan'' to NHTSA. A carry back plan describes what the manufacturer
plans to do in the following three model years to earn enough credits
to make up for the shortfall through future over-compliance. NHTSA must
examine and determine whether to approve the plan.
In the event that a manufacturer does not comply with a CAFE
standard, even after the consideration of credits, EPCA provides for
the assessing of civil penalties.\132\ The Act specifies a precise
formula for determining the amount of civil penalties for such a
noncompliance. The penalty, as adjusted for inflation by law, is $5.50
for each tenth of a mpg that a manufacturer's average fuel economy
falls short of the standard for a given model year multiplied by the
total volume of those vehicles in the affected fleet (i.e., import or
domestic passenger car, or light truck), manufactured for that model
year.\133\ The amount of the penalty may not be reduced except under
the unusual or extreme circumstances specified in the statute, which
have never been exercised by NHTSA in the history of the CAFE program.
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\132\ EPCA does not provide authority for seeking to enjoin
violations of the CAFE standards.
\133\ 49 U.S.C. 32912(b), 49 CFR 578.6(h)(2).
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Unlike the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, EPCA does
not provide for recall and remedy in the event of a noncompliance. The
presence of recall and remedy provisions \134\ in the Safety Act and
their absence in EPCA is believed to arise from the difference in the
application of the safety standards and CAFE standards. A safety
standard applies to individual vehicles; that is, each vehicle must
possess the requisite equipment or feature that must provide the
requisite type and level of performance. If a vehicle does not, it is
noncompliant. Typically, a vehicle does not entirely lack an item or
equipment or feature. Instead, the equipment or features fails to
perform adequately. Recalling the vehicle to repair or replace the
noncompliant equipment or feature can usually be readily accomplished.
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\134\ 49 U.S.C. 30120, Remedies for defects and noncompliance.
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In contrast, a CAFE standard applies to a manufacturer's entire
fleet for a model year. It does not require that a particular
individual vehicle be equipped with any particular equipment or feature
or meet a particular level of fuel economy. It does require that the
manufacturer's fleet, as a whole, comply. Further, although under the
attribute-based approach to setting CAFE standards fuel economy targets
are established for individual vehicles based on their footprints, the
individual vehicles are not required to meet or exceed those targets.
However, as a practical matter, if a manufacturer chooses to design
some vehicles that fall below their target levels of fuel economy, it
will need to design other vehicles that exceed their targets if the
manufacturer's overall fleet average is to meet the applicable
standard.
Thus, under EPCA, there is no such thing as a noncompliant vehicle,
only a noncompliant fleet. No particular vehicle in a noncompliant
fleet is any more, or less, noncompliant than any other vehicle in the
fleet.
2. EPA Statutory Authority
Title II of the Clean Air Act (CAA) provides for comprehensive
regulation of mobile sources, authorizing EPA to regulate emissions of
air pollutants from all mobile source categories. Pursuant to these
sweeping grants of authority, EPA considers such issues as technology
effectiveness, its cost (both per vehicle, per manufacturer, and per
consumer), the lead time necessary to implement the technology, and
based on this the feasibility and practicability of potential
standards; the impacts of potential standards on emissions reductions
of both GHGs and non-GHGs; the impacts of standards on oil conservation
and energy security; the impacts of standards on fuel savings by
consumers; the impacts of standards on the auto industry; other energy
impacts; as well as other relevant factors such as impacts on safety
Pursuant to Title II of the Clean Air Act, EPA has taken a
comprehensive, integrated approach to mobile source emission control
that has produced benefits well in excess of the costs of regulation.
In developing the Title II program, the Agency's historic, initial
focus was on personal vehicles since that category represented the
largest source of mobile source emissions. Over time, EPA has
established stringent emissions standards for large truck and other
heavy-duty engines, nonroad engines, and marine and locomotive engines,
as well. The Agency's initial focus on personal vehicles has resulted
in significant control of emissions from these vehicles, and also led
to technology transfer to the other mobile source categories that made
possible the stringent standards for these other categories.
As a result of Title II requirements, new cars and SUVs sold today
have emissions levels of hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon
monoxide that are 98-99% lower than new vehicles sold in the 1960s, on
a per
[[Page 62672]]
mile basis. Similarly, standards established for heavy-duty highway and
nonroad sources require emissions rate reductions on the order of 90%
or more for particulate matter and oxides of nitrogen. Overall ambient
levels of automotive-related pollutants are lower now than in 1970,
even as economic growth and vehicle miles traveled have nearly tripled.
These programs have resulted in millions of tons of pollution reduction
and major reductions in pollution-related deaths (estimated in the tens
of thousands per year) and illnesses. The net societal benefits of the
mobile source programs are large. In its annual reports on federal
regulations, the Office of Management and Budget reports that many of
EPA's mobile source emissions standards typically have projected
benefit-to-cost ratios of 5:1 to 10:1 or more. Follow-up studies show
that long-term compliance costs to the industry are typically lower
than the cost projected by EPA at the time of regulation, which result
in even more favorable real world benefit-to-cost ratios.\135\
Pollution reductions attributable to Title II mobile source controls
are critical components to attainment of primary National Ambient Air
Quality Standards, significantly reducing the national inventory and
ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants, especially
PM2.5 and ozone. See e.g. 69 FR 38958, 38967-68 (June 29,
2004) (controls on non-road diesel engines expected to reduce entire
national inventory of PM2.5 by 3.3% (86,000 tons) by 2020).
Title II controls have also made enormous reductions in air toxics
emitted by mobile sources. For example, as a result of EPA's 2007
mobile source air toxics standards, the cancer risk attributable to
total mobile source air toxics will be reduced by 30% in 2030 and the
risk from mobile source benzene (a leukemogen) will be reduced by 37%
in 2030. (reflecting reductions of over three hundred thousand tons of
mobile source air toxic emissions) 72 FR 8428, 8430 (Feb. 26, 2007).
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\135\ OMB, 2011. 2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits and
Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local,
and Tribal Entities. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
June, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_regpol_reports_congress/ (Last accessed on August 12, 2012). Several commenters
asserted that EPA had underestimated costs of rules controlling
emissions of criteria pollutants from heavy duty diesel engines.
These comments, which are incorrect and misplaced, are addressed in
EPA's Response to Comments Section 18.2.
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Title II emission standards have also stimulated the development of
a much broader set of advanced automotive technologies, such as on-
board computers and fuel injection systems, which are the building
blocks of today's automotive designs and have yielded not only lower
pollutant emissions, but improved vehicle performance, reliability, and
durability.
This final rule implements a specific provision from Title II,
section 202(a).\136\ Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA)
states that ``the Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from
time to time revise) * * * standards applicable to the emission of any
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles * * *
which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.'' If
EPA makes the appropriate endangerment and cause or contribute
findings, then section 202(a) authorizes EPA to issue standards
applicable to emissions of those pollutants. Indeed, EPA's obligation
to do so is mandatory: ``Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA,
No. 09-1322, slip op. at pp. 40-1 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533. Moreover, EPA's mandatory legal
duty to promulgate these emission standards derives from ``a statutory
obligation wholly independent of DOT's mandate to promote energy
efficiency.'' Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. Consequently, EPA has no
discretion to decline to issue greenhouse standards under section
202(a), or to defer issuing such standards due to NHTSA's regulatory
authority to establish fuel economy standards. Rather, ``[j]ust as EPA
lacks authority to refuse to regulate on the grounds of NHTSA's
regulatory authority, EPA cannot defer regulation on that basis.''
Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, slip op. at p. 41.
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\136\ 42 U.S.C. 7521 (a)
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Any standards under CAA section 202(a)(1) ``shall be applicable to
such vehicles * * * for their useful life.'' Emission standards set by
the EPA under CAA section 202(a)(1) are technology-based, as the levels
chosen must be premised on a finding of technological feasibility.
Thus, standards promulgated under CAA section 202(a) are to take effect
only ``after providing such period as the Administrator finds necessary
to permit the development and application of the requisite technology,
giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such
period'' (section 202 (a)(2); see also NRDC v. EPA, 655 F. 2d 318, 322
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). EPA must consider costs to those entities which are
directly subject to the standards. Motor & Equipment Mfrs. Ass'n Inc.
v. EPA, 627 F. 2d 1095, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Thus, ``the [s]ection
202 (a)(2) reference to compliance costs encompasses only the cost to
the motor-vehicle industry to come into compliance with the new
emission standards.'' Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, slip
op. p. 44; see also id. at pp. 43-44 rejecting arguments that EPA was
required to, or should have considered costs to other entities, such as
stationary sources, which are not directly subject to the emission
standards. EPA is afforded considerable discretion under section 202(a)
when assessing issues of technical feasibility and availability of lead
time to implement new technology. Such determinations are ``subject to
the restraints of reasonableness'', which ``does not open the door to
`crystal ball' inquiry.'' NRDC, 655 F. 2d at 328, quoting International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F. 2d 615, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
However, ``EPA is not obliged to provide detailed solutions to every
engineering problem posed in the perfection of the trap-oxidizer. In
the absence of theoretical objections to the technology, the agency
need only identify the major steps necessary for development of the
device, and give plausible reasons for its belief that the industry
will be able to solve those problems in the time remaining. The EPA is
not required to rebut all speculation that unspecified factors may
hinder `real world' emission control.'' NRDC, 655 F. 2d at 333-34. In
developing such technology-based standards, EPA has the discretion to
consider different standards for appropriate groupings of vehicles
(``class or classes of new motor vehicles''), or a single standard for
a larger grouping of motor vehicles (NRDC, 655 F. 2d at 338). Finally,
with respect to regulation of vehicular greenhouse gas emissions, EPA
is not ``required to treat NHTSA's * * * regulations as establishing
the baseline for the [section 202 (a) standards].'' Coalition for
Responsible Regulation v. EPA, slip op. at p. 42 (noting further that
``the [section 202 (a) standards] provid[e] benefits above and beyond
those resulting from NHTSA's fuel-economy standards''.)
Although standards under CAA section 202(a)(1) are technology-
based, they are not based exclusively on technological capability. EPA
has the discretion to consider and weigh various factors along with
technological feasibility, such as the cost of compliance (see section
202(a) (2)), lead time necessary for compliance (section 202(a)(2)),
safety (see NRDC, 655 F. 2d at 336 n. 31) and other impacts on
[[Page 62673]]
consumers,\137\ and energy impacts associated with use of the
technology. See George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623-624
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (ordinarily permissible for EPA to consider factors
not specifically enumerated in the Act).
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\137\ Since its earliest Title II regulations, EPA has
considered the safety of pollution control technologies. See 45
Fed.Reg. 14,496, 14,503 (1980). (``EPA would not require a
particulate control technology that was known to involve serious
safety problems. If during the development of the trap-oxidizer
safety problems are discovered, EPA would reconsider the control
requirements implemented by this rulemaking'').
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In addition, EPA has clear authority to set standards under CAA
section 202(a) that are technology forcing when EPA considers that to
be appropriate, but is not required to do so (as compared to standards
set under provisions such as section 202(a)(3) and section 213(a)(3)).
EPA has interpreted a similar statutory provision, CAA section 231, as
follows:
While the statutory language of section 231 is not identical to
other provisions in title II of the CAA that direct EPA to establish
technology-based standards for various types of engines, EPA
interprets its authority under section 231 to be somewhat similar to
those provisions that require us to identify a reasonable balance of
specified emissions reduction, cost, safety, noise, and other
factors. See, e.g., Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (upholding EPA's promulgation of technology-based standards
for small non-road engines under section 213(a)(3) of the CAA).
However, EPA is not compelled under section 231 to obtain the
``greatest degree of emission reduction achievable'' as per sections
213 and 202 of the CAA, and so EPA does not interpret the Act as
requiring the agency to give subordinate status to factors such as
cost, safety, and noise in determining what standards are reasonable
for aircraft engines. Rather, EPA has greater flexibility under
section 231 in determining what standard is most reasonable for
aircraft engines, and is not required to achieve a ``technology
forcing'' result.\138\
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\138\ 70 FR 69664, 69676, November 17, 2005.
This interpretation was upheld as reasonable in NACAA v. EPA, (489
F.3d 1221, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). CAA section 202(a) does not specify
the degree of weight to apply to each factor, and EPA accordingly has
discretion in choosing an appropriate balance among factors. See Sierra
Club v. EPA, 325 F.3d 374, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (even where a provision
is technology-forcing, the provision ``does not resolve how the
Administrator should weigh all [the statutory] factors in the process
of finding the `greatest emission reduction achievable' ''). Also see
Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F. 3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (great
discretion to balance statutory factors in considering level of
technology-based standard, and statutory requirement ``to [give
appropriate] consideration to the cost of applying * * * technology''
does not mandate a specific method of cost analysis); see also Hercules
Inc. v. EPA, 598 F. 2d 91, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (``In reviewing a
numerical standard we must ask whether the agency's numbers are within
a zone of reasonableness, not whether its numbers are precisely
right''); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 797 (1968)
(same); Federal Power Commission v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 278
(1976) (same); Exxon Mobil Gas Marketing Co. v. FERC, 297 F. 3d 1071,
1084 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same).
One commenter mistakenly characterized section 202(a) as a
``technology-forcing'' provision. Comments of CBD p. 5. As just
explained, it is not, but even if it were, EPA retains considerable
discretion to balance the various relevant statutory factors, again as
just explained. The same commenter maintained that the GHG standards
should ``protect the public health and welfare with an adequate margin
of safety.'' Id. p. 2. The commenter paraphrases the statutory standard
for issuing health-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards under
section 109(b) of the CAA.\139\ Section 202(a) is a technology-based
provision with an entirely different legal standard. Moreover, the
commenter's assertion that the standards must reduce the amount of
greenhouse gases emitted by light duty motor vehicles (id. pp. 2-3) has
no statutory basis. Section 202(a)(2) does not spell out any minimum
level of effectiveness for standards, but instead directs EPA to set
the standards at a level that is reasonable in light of applicable
compliance costs and technology considerations. Nor is there any
requirement that the GHG standards result in some specific quantum of
amelioration of the endangerment to which light-duty vehicle emissions
contribute. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, slip op.
pp. 42-43. In addition, substantial GHG emission reductions required by
section 202(a) standards in and of themselves constitute ``meaningful
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions'' without regard to the extent
to which these reductions ameliorate the endangerment to public health
and welfare caused by greenhouse gas emissions. Coalition for
Responsible Regulation v. EPA, slip op. p. 43.
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\139\ 42 U.S.C. 7409(b).
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a. EPA's Testing Authority
Under section 203 of the CAA, sales of vehicles are prohibited
unless the vehicle is covered by a certificate of conformity. EPA
issues certificates of conformity pursuant to section 206 of the Act,
based on (necessarily) pre-sale testing conducted either by EPA or by
the manufacturer. The Federal Test Procedure (FTP or ``city'' test) and
the Highway Fuel Economy Test (HFET or ``highway'' test) are used for
this purpose. Compliance with standards is required not only at
certification but throughout a vehicle's useful life, so that testing
requirements may continue post-certification. Useful life standards may
apply an adjustment factor to account for vehicle emission control
deterioration or variability in use (section 206(a)).
Pursuant to EPCA, EPA is required to measure fuel economy for each
model and to calculate each manufacturer's average fuel economy.\140\
EPA uses the same tests--the FTP and HFET--for fuel economy testing.
EPA established the FTP for emissions measurement in the early 1970s.
In 1976, in response to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA)
statute, EPA extended the use of the FTP to fuel economy measurement
and added the HFET.\141\ The provisions in the 1976 regulation,
effective with the 1977 model year, established procedures to calculate
fuel economy values both for labeling and for CAFE purposes. Under
EPCA, EPA is required to use these procedures (or procedures which
yield comparable results) for measuring fuel economy for cars for CAFE
purposes, but not for labeling purposes.\142\ EPCA does not pose this
restriction on CAFE test procedures for light trucks, but EPA does use
the FTP and HFET for this purpose. EPA determines fuel economy by
measuring the amount of CO2 and all other carbon compounds
(e.g. total hydrocarbons (THC) and carbon monoxide (CO)), and then, by
mass balance, calculating the amount of fuel consumed. EPA's final
changes to the procedures for measuring fuel economy and calculating
average fuel economy are discussed in section III.B.10.
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\140\ See 49 U.S.C. 32904(c).
\141\ See 41 FR 38674 (Sept. 10, 1976), which is codified at 40
CFR Part 600.
\142\ See 49 U.S.C. 32904(c).
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b. EPA Enforcement Authority
Section 207 of the CAA grants EPA broad authority to require
manufacturers to remedy vehicles if EPA determines there are a
substantial number of noncomplying vehicles. In addition, section 205
of the CAA
[[Page 62674]]
authorizes EPA to assess penalties of up to $37,500 per vehicle for
violations of various prohibited acts specified in the CAA. In
determining the appropriate penalty, EPA must consider a variety of
factors such as the gravity of the violation, the economic impact of
the violation, the violator's history of compliance, and ``such other
matters as justice may require.'' Unlike EPCA, the CAA does not
authorize vehicle manufacturers to pay fines in lieu of meeting
emission standards.
c. Compliance
EPA oversees testing, collects and processes test data, and
performs calculations to determine compliance with both CAA and CAFE
standards. CAA standards apply not only at the time of certification
but also throughout the vehicle's useful life, and EPA is accordingly
finalizing in-use standards as well as standards based on testing
performed at time of production. See section III.E. Both the CAA and
EPCA provide for penalties should manufacturers fail to comply with
their fleet average standards, but, unlike EPCA, there is no option for
manufacturers to pay fines in lieu of compliance with the standards.
Under the CAA, penalties are typically determined on a vehicle-specific
basis by determining the number of a manufacturer's highest emitting
vehicles that cause the fleet average standard violation. Penalties
under Title II of the CAA are capped at $25,000 per day of violation
and apply on a per vehicle basis. See CAA section 205(a).
d. Test Procedures
EPA establishes the test procedures under which compliance with
both the CAA GHG standards and the EPCA fuel economy standards are
measured. EPA's testing authority under the CAA is flexible, but
testing for fuel economy for passenger cars is by statute is limited to
the Federal Test procedure (FTP) or test procedures which provide
results which are equivalent to the FTP. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 32904 and
section III.B, below. EPA developed and established the FTP in the
early 1970s and, after enactment of EPCA in 1976, added the Highway
Fuel Economy Test (HFET) to be used in conjunction with the FTP for
fuel economy testing. EPA has also developed tests with additional
cycles (the so-called 5-cycle test) which test is used for purposes of
fuel economy labeling and is also used in the EPA program for extending
off-cycle credits under both the light-duty and (along with NHTSA)
heavy-duty vehicle GHG programs. See 75 FR 25439; 76 FR 57252. In this
rule, EPA is retaining the FTP and HFET for purposes of testing the
fleetwide average standards, and is further modifying the N2O
measurement test procedures and the A/C CO2 efficiency test
procedures EPA initially adopted in the 2012-2016 rule.
3. Comparing the Agencies' Authority
As the above discussion makes clear, there are both important
differences between the statutes under which each agency is acting as
well as several important areas of similarity. One important difference
is that EPA's authority addresses various GHGs, while NHTSA's authority
addresses fuel economy as measured under specified test procedures and
calculated by EPA. This difference is reflected in this rulemaking in
the scope of the two standards: EPA's rule takes into account
reductions of direct air conditioning emissions, and establishes
standards for methane and N2O, but NHTSA's do not, because
these emissions generally do not relate to fuel economy. A second
important difference is that EPA is adopting certain compliance
flexibilities, such as the multiplier for advanced technology vehicles,
and has taken those flexibilities into account in its technical
analysis and modeling supporting the GHG standards. EPCA specifies a
number of particular compliance flexibilities for CAFE, and expressly
prohibits NHTSA from considering the impacts of those statutory
compliance flexibilities in setting the CAFE standard so that the
manufacturers' election to avail themselves of the permitted
flexibilities remains strictly voluntary.\143\ The Clean Air Act, on
the other hand, contains no such prohibition. As explained earlier,
these considerations result in some differences in the technical
analysis and modeling used to support the agencies' respective
standards.
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\143\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another important area where the two agencies' authorities are
similar but not identical involves the transfer of credits between a
single firm's car and truck fleets. EISA revised EPCA to allow for such
credit transfers, but placed a cap on the amount of CAFE credits which
can be transferred between the car and truck fleets. 49 U.S.C.
32903(g)(3). Under CAA section 202(a), EPA is continuing to allow
CO2 credit transfers between a single manufacturer's car and
truck fleets, with no corresponding limits on such transfers. In
general, the EISA limit on CAFE credit transfers is not expected to
have the practical effect of limiting the amount of CO2
emission credits manufacturers may be able to transfer under the CAA
program, recognizing that manufacturers must comply with both the CAFE
standards and the GHG standards. However, it is possible that in some
specific circumstances the EPCA limit on CAFE credit transfers could
constrain the ability of a manufacturer to achieve cost savings through
unlimited use of GHG emissions credit transfers under the CAA program.
These differences, however, do not change the fact that in many
critical ways the two agencies are charged with addressing the same
basic issue of reducing GHG emissions and improving fuel economy. The
agencies are looking at the same set of control technologies (with the
exception of the air conditioning leakage-related technologies). The
standards set by each agency will drive the kind and degree of
penetration of this set of technologies across the vehicle fleet. As a
result, each agency is trying to answer the same basic question--what
kind and degree of technology penetration is necessary to achieve the
agencies' objectives in the rulemaking time frame, given the agencies'
respective statutory authorities?
In making the determination of what standards are appropriate under
the CAA and EPCA, each agency is to exercise its judgment and balance
many similar factors. NHTSA's factors are provided by EPCA:
Technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other
motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need
of the United States to conserve energy. EPA has the discretion under
the CAA to consider many related factors, such as the availability of
technologies, the appropriate lead time for introduction of technology,
and based on this the feasibility and practicability of their
standards; the impacts of their standards on emissions reductions (of
both GHGs and non-GHGs); the impacts of their standards on oil
conservation; the impacts of their standards on fuel savings by
consumers; the impacts of their standards on the auto industry; as well
as other relevant factors such as impacts on safety. Conceptually,
therefore, each agency is considering and balancing many of the same
concerns, and each agency is making a decision that at its core is
answering the same basic question of what kind and degree of technology
penetration is it appropriate to call for in light of all of the
relevant factors in a given rulemaking, for the model years concerned.
Finally, each agency has the authority to take into consideration
impacts of the standards of the other agency. Among the other factors
that is considers in determining maximum
[[Page 62675]]
feasible standards, EPCA calls for NHTSA to take into consideration the
effects of EPA's emissions standards on fuel economy capability (see 49
U.S.C. 32902(f)), and EPA has the discretion to take into consideration
NHTSA's CAFE standards in determining appropriate action under section
202(a).\144\ This is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement that
EPA's mandate to protect public health and welfare is wholly
independent from NHTSA's mandate to promote energy efficiency, but
there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer
their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency. Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
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\144\ It should be noted, however, that the D.C. Circuit noted
the absence of an explicit obligation for EPA to consider NHTSA fuel
economy standards as one basis for holding that the existence of
NHTSA's fuel economy regulatory program provides no basis for EPA
deferring regulation of vehicular greenhouse gas emissions.
Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, slip op. pp. 41-42.
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In this context, it is in the Nation's interest for the two
agencies to continue to work together in developing these standards,
and they have done so. For example, the agencies have committed
considerable effort to develop a joint Technical Support Document that
provides a technical basis underlying each agency's analyses. The
agencies also have worked closely together in developing and reviewing
their respective modeling, to develop the best analysis and to promote
technical consistency. The agencies have developed a common set of
attribute-based curves that each agency supports as appropriate both
technically and from a policy perspective. The agencies have also
worked closely to ensure that their respective programs will work in a
coordinated fashion, and will provide regulatory compatibility that
allows auto manufacturers to build a single national light-duty fleet
that would comply with both the GHG and the CAFE standards. The
resulting overall close coordination of the GHG and CAFE standards
should not be surprising, however, as each agency is using a jointly
developed technical basis to address the closely intertwined challenges
of energy security and climate change.
As set out in detail in Sections III and IV of this notice, both
EPA and NHTSA believe the agencies' standards are fully justified under
their respective statutory criteria. The standards are feasible in each
model year within the lead time provided, based on the agencies'
projected increased use of various technologies which in most cases are
already in commercial application in the fleet to varying degrees.
Detailed assessment of the technologies that could be employed by each
manufacturer supports this conclusion. The agencies also carefully
assessed the costs of the rules, both for the industry as a whole and
per manufacturer, as well as the costs per vehicle, and consider these
costs to be reasonable during the rulemaking time frame and recoverable
(from fuel savings). The agencies recognize the significant increase in
the application of technology that the standards would require across a
high percentage of vehicles, which will require the manufacturers to
devote considerable engineering and development resources before 2017
laying the critical foundation for the widespread deployment of
upgraded technology across a high percentage of the 2017-2025 fleet.
This clearly will be challenging for automotive manufacturers and their
suppliers, especially in the current economic climate, and given the
stringency of the recently-established MYs 2012-2016 standards.
However, based on all of the analyses performed by the agencies, our
judgment is that it is a challenge that can reasonably be met.
The agencies also evaluated the impacts of these standards with
respect to the expected reductions in GHGs and oil consumption and,
found them to be very significant in magnitude. The agencies considered
other factors such as the impacts on noise, energy, and vehicular
congestion. The impact on safety was also given careful consideration.
Moreover, the agencies quantified the various costs and benefits of the
standards, to the extent practicable. The agencies' analyses to date
indicate that the overall quantified benefits of the standards far
outweigh the projected costs. All of these factors support the
reasonableness of the standards. See Section III (GHG standards) and
Section IV (CAFE standards) for a detailed discussion of each agency's
basis for its selection of its standards.
The fact that the benefits are estimated to considerably exceed
their costs supports the view that the standards represent an
appropriate balance of the relevant statutory factors.\145\ In drawing
this conclusion, the agencies acknowledge the uncertainties and
limitations of the analyses. For example, the analysis of the benefits
is highly dependent on the estimated price of fuel projected out many
years into the future. There is also significant uncertainty in the
potential range of values that could be assigned to the social cost of
carbon. There are a variety of impacts that the agencies are unable to
quantify, such as non-market damages, extreme weather, socially
contingent effects, or the potential for longer-term catastrophic
events, or the impact on consumer choice. The cost-benefit analyses are
one of the important things the agencies consider in making a judgment
as to the appropriate standards to propose under their respective
statutes. Consideration of the results of the cost-benefit analyses by
the agencies, however, includes careful consideration of the
limitations discussed above.
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\145\ The comment that the standards are insufficiently
stringent because estimated benefits of the standards substantially
exceed the estimated costs shows (Comment of CBD p.8) is misplaced.
Neither EPCA/EISA nor the CAA dictates a particular weighing of
costs and benefits, so the commenter's insistence that the
respective statutes require ``maximized societal benefits, where the
benefits most optimally compare to the anticipated costs'' (id. p.
23) is not correct.
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II. Joint Technical Work Completed for This Final Rule
A. Introduction
In this section, NHTSA and EPA discuss several aspects of our joint
technical analyses. These analyses are common to the development of
each agency's standards. Specifically we discuss: The development of
the vehicle market forecasts used by each agency for assessing costs,
benefits, and effects; the development of the attribute-based standard
curve shapes; the technologies the agencies evaluated and their costs
and effectiveness; the economic assumptions the agencies included in
their analyses; a description of the credit programs for air
conditioning; off-cycle technology, and full-sized pickup trucks; as
well as the effects of the standards on vehicle safety. The Joint
Technical Support Document (TSD) discusses the agencies' joint
technical work in more detail.
The agencies have based this final rule on a very significant body
of data and analysis that we believe is the best information currently
available on the full range of technical and other inputs utilized in
our respective analyses. As noted in various places throughout this
preamble, the Joint TSD, the NHTSA RIA, and the EPA RIA, new
information has become available since the proposal from a range of
sources. These include work the agencies have completed (e.g., work on
technology costs and effectiveness and creating a second future fleet
forecast based on model year 2010 baseline data). In addition,
information from other sources is now incorporated into our analyses,
including the Energy Information
[[Page 62676]]
Agency's Annual Energy Outlook 2012 Early Release, as well as other
information from the public comment process. Wherever appropriate, and
as summarized throughout this preamble, we have used inputs for the
final rule based on information from the proposal as well as new data
and information that has become available since the proposal (either
through the comments or through the agencies' analyses).
B. Developing the Future Fleet for Assessing Costs, Benefits, and
Effects
1. Why did the agencies establish baseline and reference vehicle
fleets?
In order to calculate the impacts of the EPA and NHTSA regulations,
it is necessary to estimate the composition of the future vehicle fleet
absent regulatory action, to provide a reference point relative to
which costs, benefits, and effects of the regulations are assessed. As
in the NPRM, EPA and NHTSA have developed comparison fleets in two
parts. The first step was to develop baseline estimates of the fleets
of new vehicles to be produced for sale in the U.S. through MY2025, one
starting with the actual MY 2008 fleet, and one starting with the
actual MY 2010 fleet. These baselines include vehicle sales volumes,
GHG/fuel economy performance levels, and contain listings of the base
technologies on every MY 2008 or MY 2010 vehicle sold. This information
comes from CAFE certification data submitted by manufacturers to EPA,
and for purposes of rulemaking analysis, was supplemented with publicly
and commercially available information regarding some vehicle
characteristics (e.g., footprint). The second step was to project the
baseline fleet volumes into model years 2017-2025. The vehicle volumes
projected out to MY 2025 are referred to as the reference fleet
volumes. The third step was to modify those MY 2017-2025 reference
fleets such that they reflect the technology that manufacturers could
apply if the MY 2016 standards were extended without change through MY
2025.\146\ Each agency used its modeling system to develop modified or
final reference fleets, or adjusted baselines, for use in its analysis
of regulatory alternatives, as discussed below and in each agency's
RIA. All of the agencies' estimates of emission reductions, fuel
economy improvements, costs, and societal impacts are developed in
relation to the respective reference fleets. This section discusses the
first two steps, development of the baseline fleets and the reference
fleets.
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\146\ EPA's MY 2016 GHG standards under the CAA would continue
into the future absent this final rule. While NHTSA must actively
promulgate standards in order for CAFE standards to extend past MY
2016, the agency has, as in all recent CAFE rulemakings, defined a
no-action (i.e., baseline) regulatory alternative as an indefinite
extension of the last-promulgated CAFE standards for purposes of the
main analysis of the standards in this preamble.
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EPA and NHTSA used a transparent approach to developing the
baseline and reference fleets, largely working from publicly available
data. Because both input and output sheets from our modeling are
public, stakeholders can verify and check EPA's and NHTSA's modeling,
and perform their own analyses with these datasets.\147\
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\147\ EPA's Omega Model and input sheets are available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/models.htm; DOT/NHTSA's CAFE Compliance and
Effects Modeling System (commonly known as the ``Volpe Model'') and
input and output sheets are available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
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2. What comments did the agencies receive regarding fleet projections
for the NPRM?
During the comment period, the agencies also received formal
comments regarding the NPRM baseline and reference fleets. Chrysler
questioned the agencies' assumption that the company's sales would
decline by 53% over 17 years, and stated that the forecast had
implications not just for the agencies' analysis, but also, indirectly,
for Chrysler's competitiveness, because suppliers and customers who
``see [such] projections supported by Federal agencies * * * are
potentially given a highly negative view of the viability of the
company * * * [which] may result in less favorable contracts with
suppliers and lower sales to customers.'' Chrysler requested that the
agencies update their volume projections for the final rule.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ Chrysler, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0241, at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies' projection that Chrysler's sales would steadily
decline was primarily attributable to the manufacturer- and segment-
level forecasts provided in December 2009 by CSM. The agencies thought
that forecast to have been credible at the time considering economic
and industry conditions during the months before CSM provided the
agencies with a long-range forecast, when the overall light vehicle
market was severely depressed and Chrysler and GM were--with nascent
federal assistance--in the process of reorganizing. We recognize that
Chrysler's production has since recovered to levels suggesting much
better long-term prospects than forecast by CSM in 2009. While the
agencies are continuing to use the market forecast developed for the
NPRM (after minor corrections unrelated to Chrysler's comments), we are
also using a second market forecast we have developed for today's final
rule, making use of a newer forecast (in this case, from LMC) of
manufacturer- and segment-level shares, a forecast that shows
significantly higher sales (more than double that of the earlier
forecast) for Chrysler in 2025.
Environmental Consultants of Michigan commented that use of 4-year-
old certification data was ``unconscionable'' and unreflective of
technology improvements already made to vehicles since then, requesting
that the agencies delay the final rule until the market forecast can be
updated with appropriate data.\149\ As described in this chapter, even
though the year of publication of this rule is 2012, model year 2010
was the most recent baseline dataset available due to the lag between
the actual conclusion of a given model year and the submission (for
CAFE compliance purposes) of production volumes for that model year.
Moreover, as explained below in the joint TSD and in our respective
RIAs, EPA and NHTSA measure the costs and benefits of new standards as
incremental levels beyond those that would result from the application
of technology given continuation of baseline standards (i.e.,
continuation of the standards that will be in place in MY 2016).
Therefore, our analysis of manufacturers' capabilities is informed by
analysis of technology that could be applied in the future even absent
the new standards, not just technology that had been applied in 2008 or
2010. We further note that, while NHTSA has, in the past, made use of
confidential product planning information provided to the agency by
many manufacturers--information that typically extended roughly five
years into the future--other stakeholders previously commented
negatively regarding the agency's resultant inability to publish some
of the detailed inputs to and outputs of its analysis. As during the
rulemaking establishing the MYs 2012-2016 standards, EPA and NHTSA have
determined that the benefits of a fully transparent market forecast
outweigh the disbenefits of a market forecast that may not fully
reflect likely forthcoming changes in manufacturers' products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Environmental Consultants of Michigan, Docket No. NHTSA-
2010-0131-0166, at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies also received a comment from Volkswagen, stating that
``Volkswagen sees no evidence that would suggest a near 30% decline in
truck market share from domestic OEMs
[[Page 62677]]
[original emphasis].'' \150\ Volkswagen further suggested that the
agencies' forecast was based on confidential ``strategic plans by
[Volkswagen's] competitors''. On the contrary, the agencies' forecast
was based on public and commercial information made fully available to
all stakeholders, including Volkswagen. Also, while the agencies' 2008
based fleet projection showed a decline in the share of light trucks
expected to be produced by the aggregate of Chrysler, Ford, and General
Motors, Volkswagen's statement mischaracterized the magnitude and
nature of the decline. Between MY2008 and MY2025, the agencies'
forecast showed declines from 17.8% to 5.8% for Chrysler, from 14.5% to
12.0% for Ford, from 26.8% to 27.8% from General Motors, and from 58.3%
to 44.5% for the aggregate of these three manufacturers. The latter
represents a 22.5% reduction, not the 30% reduction cited by
Volkswagen, and is dominated by the underlying forecast regarding
Chrysler's overall position in the market; for General Motors, the
agencies' forecast showed virtually no loss of share in the light truck
market. As discussed above, the agencies' market forecast for the NPRM
was informed by CSM's forecast of manufacturer- and segment-level
shares, and by EIA's forecast of overall volumes of the passenger car
and light truck markets, and CSM's forecast, in particular, was
provided at a time when market conditions were economically severe.
While the agencies are continuing to use this forecast, this agency is
also using a second forecast, informed by MY 2010 certification data,
an updated AEO-based forecast of overall volumes of passenger cars and
light trucks, and an updated manufacturer- and segment-level market
forecast from LMC Automotive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Volkswagen, NHTSA-2010-0131-0247, at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) expressed concern that if
the light vehicle market does not shift toward passenger cars as
indicated in the agencies' market forecast, energy and environmental
benefits of the new standards could be less than projected.\151\ As
discussed below, our MY 2008-based and MY 2010-based market forecasts,
while both subject to uncertainty, reflect passenger car market shares
estimated using EIA's National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). For both
market forecasts, we re-ran NEMS by holding standards constant after MY
2016 and also preventing the model from increasing the passenger car
market share to achieve increases in fleetwide average fuel economy
levels. Having done so, we obtained a somewhat lower passenger car
market share than EIA obtained for AEO 2011 and AEO 2012, respectively.
In our judgment, this approach provides a reasonable basis for
developing a forecast of the overall sales of passenger cars and light
trucks, while remaining consistent with our use of EIA's reference case
estimates of future fuel prices. In any event, we note that EPCA/EISA
requires NHTSA to ensure that the overall new vehicle fleet achieves
average fuel economy of at least 35 mpg by MY 2020. Our analysis,
discussed below, indicates based on the information currently before us
that the fleet could achieve 39.9-40.8 mpg by MY 2020 (accounting for
flexibilities available under EPCA)--well above the 35 mpg statutory
requirement. However, NHTSA will monitor the fleet's progress and, if
necessary, adjust standards to ensure that EPCA/EISA's ``35-by-2020''
requirement is met, even if this requires issuing revised fuel economy
standards before the planned joint mid-term evaluation process has been
completed. However, insofar as NHTSA's current analysis indicates the
fleet could achieve 40-41 mpg by MY 2020, NHTSA currently expects the
need for such a rulemaking to be unlikely. Beyond MY 2020, EPCA/EISA
does not provide a minimum requirement for the overall fleet, but
requires NHTSA to continue setting separate standards for passenger
cars and light trucks, such that each standard is at the maximum
feasible level in each model year. In other words, as long as the ``35-
by-2020'' requirement is achieved, NHTSA is required to consider
stringency for passenger cars and light trucks separately, not to set
those standards at levels achieving any particular level of average
performance for the overall fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ UCS, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, the agencies recognize that overall fuel consumption
and GHG emissions by the light vehicle fleet will depend on, among many
other things, the relative market shares of passenger cars and light
trucks. In its probabilistic uncertainty analysis, presented in NHTSA's
RIA accompanying today's notice as required by OMB for significant
rulemakings, NHTSA has varied the passenger car share (as a function of
fuel price), such that the resultant distributions of estimated model
results--including fuel savings and CO2 emission
reductions--reflect uncertainty regarding the relative market shares of
passenger cars and light trucks. The results of the probabilistic
uncertainty analysis along with the other analysis in this rulemaking
support that the NHTSA standards are maximum feasible standards. The
probabilistic uncertainty analysis is discussed in NHTSA's RIA Chapter
XII. Like all other aspects of the outlook for the future light vehicle
market, the agencies will closely monitor the relative market shares of
passenger cars and light trucks in preparation for the planned midterm
review.
3. Why were two fleet projections created for the FRM?
Although much of the discussion in this and following sections
describes the methodology for creating a single baseline and reference
fleet, for this final rule the agencies actually developed two baseline
and reference fleets. In the NPRM, the agencies used MY 2008 CAFE
certification data to establish the ``2008-based fleet projection.''
\152\ The agencies noted that MY 2009 CAFE certification data was not
likely to be representative of future conditions since it was so
dramatically influenced by the economic recession (Joint Draft TSD
section 1.2.1). The agencies further noted that MY 2010 CAFE
certification data might be available for use in the final rulemaking
for purposes of developing a baseline fleet. The agencies stated that a
copy of the MY 2010 CAFE certification data would be put in the public
docket if it became available during the comment period. The MY 2010
data was reported by the manufacturers throughout calendar year 2011 as
the final sales figures were compiled and submitted to the EPA
database. Due to the lateness of the CAFE data submissions,\153\
however, it was not possible to submit the new 2010 data into the
docket during the public comment period. As explained below, however,
consistent with the agencies' expectations at proposal, and with the
agencies' standard practice of updating relevant information as
practicable between proposals and final rules, the agencies are using
these data in one of the two fleet-based projections we are using to
estimate the impacts of the final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ ``2008 based fleet projection'' is a new term that is the
same as the reference fleet. The term is added to clarify when we
are using the 2008 baseline and reference fleet vs. the 2010
baseline and reference fleet.
\153\ Partly due to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the
significant impact this had on their facilities, some manufacturers
requested and were granted an extension on the deadline to submit
their CAFE data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For analysis supporting the NPRM, the agencies developed a forecast
of the light vehicle market through MY 2025
[[Page 62678]]
based on (a) the vehicle models in the MY 2008 CAFE certification data,
(b) the AEO 2011 interim projection of future fleet sales volumes, and
(c) the future fleet forecast conducted by CSM in 2009. In the
proposal, the agencies stated we would consider using MY 2010 CAFE
certification data, if available, for analysis supporting the final
rule (Joint Draft TSD, p. 1-2). Shortly after the NPRM was issued, the
agencies reiterated this intention in statements to Automotive News in
response to a pending article by that publication.\154\ The agencies
also indicated our intention to, for analysis supporting the final
rule, use the most recent version of EIA's AEO available, and a market
forecast updated relative to that purchased from CSM (Joint Draft TSD
section 1.3.5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ ``For CAFE rules, feds look at aging sales data'',
Automotive News, December 22, 2011. Available at http://www.autonews.com/article/20111222/OEM11/111229956 (last accessed
Jun. 27, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this final rulemaking, the agencies have analyzed the costs and
benefits of the standards using two different forecasts of the light
vehicle fleet through MY 2025. The agencies have concluded that the
significant uncertainty associated with forecasting sales volumes,
vehicle technologies, fuel prices, consumer demand, and so forth out to
MY 2025 makes it reasonable and appropriate to evaluate the impacts of
the final CAFE and GHG standards using two baselines. One market
forecast, similar to the one used for the NPRM, uses corrected data
regarding the MY 2008 fleet, information from AEO 2011, and information
purchased from CSM. As noted above, the agencies received comments
regarding the market forecast used in the NPRM suggesting that updates
in several respects could be helpful to the agencies' analysis of final
standards; given those comments and since the agencies were already
planning to produce an updated market forecast, the final rule also
contains another market forecast using MY 2010 CAFE certification data,
information from AEO 2012, and information purchased from LMC
Automotive (formerly JD Powers Automotive).
The two market forecasts contain certain differences, although as
will be discussed below, the differences are not significant enough to
change the agencies' decision as to the structure and stringency of the
final standards. For example, MY 2008 certification data represents the
most recent model year for which the industry's offerings were not
strongly affected by the subsequent economic recession, which may make
it reasonable to use if we believe that the future vehicle mix of
models are more likely to be reflective of the pre-recession mix than
mix of models produced after MY 2008 (e.g., in MY 2010). Also, the MY
2010-based fleet projection employs a future fleet forecast provided by
LMC Automotive, which is more current than the projection provided by
CSM in 2009. The CSM forecast, utilized for the MY 2008-based fleet
projection, appears to have been influenced by the recession, in
particular in predicting major declines in market share for some
manufacturers (e.g., Chrysler) which the agencies do not believe are
reasonably reflective of future trends.
The MY 2010 based fleet projection, which is used in EPA's
alternative analysis and in NHTSA's co-analysis, employs a future fleet
forecast provided by LMC Automotive, which is more current than the
projection provided by CSM in 2009, and which reflects the post-
proposal MY 2010 CAFE certification data. However, this MY 2010 CAFE
data also shows effects of the economic recession. For example,
industry-wide sales were skewed down 20% compared to MY 2008 levels.
For some companies like Chrysler, Mitsubishi, and Subaru, sales were
down by 30-40% from MY 2008 levels, as documented in today's joint TSD.
For BMW, General Motors, Jaguar/Land Rover, Porsche, and Suzuki, sales
were down by more than 40%. Employing the MY 2008 vehicle data avoids
using these baseline market shifts when projecting the future fleet. On
the other hand, it also perpetuates vehicle brands and models (and
thus, their outdated fuel economy levels and engineering
characteristics) that have since been discontinued. The MY 2010 CAFE
certification data accounts for the phase-out of some brands (e.g.,
Saab, Pontiac, Hummer) \155\ and the introduction of some technologies
(e.g., Ford's Ecoboost engine), which may be more reflective of the
future fleet in this respect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ Based on our review of the CAFE certification, the MY
2010-based fleet contains no Saabs, and compared to the MY 2008-
based fleet, about 90% fewer Hummers and about 75% fewer Pontiacs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, given the volume of information that goes into creating a
baseline forecast and given the significant uncertainty in any
projection out to MY 2025, the agencies think that a reasonable way to
illustrate the possible impacts of that uncertainty for purposes of
this rulemaking is the approach taken here of analyzing the effects of
the final standards under both the MY 2008-based baseline and the MY
2010-based baseline. The agencies' analyses are presented in our
respective RIAs and preamble sections.
4. How did the Agencies develop the MY 2008 baseline vehicle fleet?
NHTSA and EPA developed a baseline fleet comprised of model year
2008 data gathered from EPA's emission and fuel economy database. This
baseline fleet was used for the NPRM and was updated for this FRM.
There was only one change since the NPRM. A contractor working on a
market share model noted some problems with some of the 2008 MY vehicle
wheelbase data. Each of the affected vehicle's wheelbase and footprint
were corrected for the MY 2008-based fleet used for this final rule. A
more complete discussion of these changes is available in Chapter 1.3.1
of the TSD.
The 2008 baseline fleet reflects all fuel economy technologies in
use on MY 2008 light duty vehicles as reported by manufacturers in
their CAFE certification data. The 2008 emission and fuel economy
database included data on vehicle production volume, fuel economy,
engine size, number of engine cylinders, transmission type, fuel type,
etc.; however it did not contain complete information on technologies.
Thus, the agencies relied on publicly available data like the more
complete technology descriptions from Ward's Automotive Group.\156\ In
a few instances when required vehicle information (such as vehicle
footprint) was not available from these two sources, the agencies
obtained this information from publicly accessible internet sites such
as Motortrend.com and Edmunds.com.\157\ A description of all of the
technologies used in modeling the 2008 vehicle fleet and how it was
constructed are available in Chapter 1 of the Joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Note that WardsAuto.com is a fee-based service, but all
information is public to subscribers.
\157\ Motortrend.com and Edmunds.com are free, no-fee internet
sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. How did the Agencies develop the projected MY 2017-2025 vehicle
reference fleet for the 2008 model year based fleet?
As in the NPRM, EPA and NHTSA have based the projection of total
car and total light truck sales for MYs 2017-2025 on projections made
by the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIAEIA
publishes a mid-term projection of national energy use called the
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO). This projection utilizes a number of
technical and econometric models which are designed to reflect both
economic and regulatory
[[Page 62679]]
conditions expected to exist in the future. In support of its
projection of fuel use by light-duty vehicles, EIA projects sales of
new cars and light trucks. EIA published its Early Annual Energy
Outlook for 2011 in December 2010. EIA released updated data to NHTSA
in February (Interim AEO). The final release of AEO for 2011 came out
in May 2011 and early release AEO came out in December of 2011, but for
consistency with the NPRM, EPA and NHTSA chose to use the data from
February 2011.
The agencies used the Energy Information Administration's (EIA's)
National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) to estimate the future relative
market shares of passenger cars and light trucks. However, NEMS
methodology includes shifting vehicle sales volume, starting after
2007, away from fleets with lower fuel economy (the light truck fleet)
towards vehicles with higher fuel economies (the passenger car fleet)
in order to facilitate projected compliance with CAFE and GHG
standards. Because we use our market projection as a baseline relative
to which we measure the effects of new standards, and we attempt to
estimate the industry's ability to comply with new standards without
changing product mix (i.e., we analyze the effects of the rules
assuming manufacturers will not change fleet composition as a
compliance strategy, as opposed to changes that might happen due to
market forces), the Interim AEO 2011-projected shift in passenger car
market share as a result of required fuel economy improvements creates
a circularity. Therefore, for the NPRM analysis, the agencies developed
a new projection of passenger car and lighttruck sales shares by
running scenarios from the Interim AEO 2011 reference case that first
deactivate the above-mentioned sales-volume shifting methodology and
then hold post-2017 CAFE standards constant at MY 2016 levels. As
discussed in Chapter 1 of the agencies' joint Technical Support
Document, incorporating these changes reduced the NEMS-projected
passenger car share of the light vehicle market by an average of about
5% during 2017-2025.
In the AEO 2011 Interim data, EIA projects that total light-duty
vehicle sales will gradually recover from their currently depressed
levels by around 2013. In 2017, car sales are projected to be 8.4
million (53 percent) and truck sales are projected to be 7.3 million
(47 percent). Although the total level of sales of 15.8 million units
is similar to pre-2008 levels, the fraction of car sales is projected
to be higher than that existing in the 2000-2007 timeframe. This
projection reflects the impact of assumed higher fuel prices. Sales
projections of cars and trucks for future model years can be found in
Chapter 1 of the joint TSD.
In addition to a shift towards more car sales, sales of segments
within both the car and truck markets have been changing and are
expected to continue to change. Manufacturers are introducing more
crossover utility vehicles (CUVs), which offer much of the utility of
sport utility vehicles (SUVs) but use more car-like designs. The AEO
2011 report does not, however, distinguish such changes within the car
and truck classes. In order to reflect these changes in fleet makeup,
EPA and NHTSA used a long range forecast\158\ from CSM Worldwide (CSM)
the firm which, at the time of proposal development, offered the most
detailed forecasting for the model years in question. The long range
forecast from CSM Worldwide is a custom forecast covering the years
2017-2025 which the agencies purchased from CSM in December of 2009.
Since proposal, the agencies have worked with LMC Automotive (formerly
J.D. Powers Forecasting) and found them to be capable of doing
forecasting of equivalent detail and are using the LMC forecast for the
2010 baseline fleet projection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ The CSM Sales Forecast Excel file (``CSM North America
Sales Forecasts 2017-2025 for the Docket'') is available in the
docket (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The next step was to project the CSM forecasts for relative sales
of cars and trucks by manufacturer and by market segment onto the total
sales estimates of AEO 2011. Table II-1 and Table II-2 show the
resulting projections for the reference 2025 model year and compare
these to actual sales that occurred in the baseline 2008 model year.
Both tables show sales using the traditional definition of cars and
light trucks.
Table II-1--Annual Sales of Light-Duty Vehicles by Manufacturer in 2008 and Estimated for 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Light trucks Total
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 MY 2025 MY 2008 MY 2025 MY 2008 MY 2025 MY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin............................................ 1,370 1,182 0 0 1,370 1,182
BMW..................................................... 291,796 405,256 61,324 145,409 353,120 550,665
Chrysler/Fiat........................................... 703,158 436,479 956,792 331,762 1,659,950 768,241
Daimler................................................. 208,195 340,719 79,135 101,067 287,330 441,786
Ferrari................................................. 1,450 7,658 0 0 1,450 7,658
Ford.................................................... 956,699 1,540,109 814,194 684,476 1,770,893 2,224,586
Geely/Volvo............................................. 65,649 101,107 32,748 42,588 98,397 143,696
GM...................................................... 1,587,391 1,673,936 1,507,797 1,524,008 3,095,188 3,197,943
Honda................................................... 1,006,639 1,340,321 505,140 557,697 1,511,779 1,898,018
Hyundai................................................. 337,869 677,250 53,158 168,136 391,027 845,386
Kia..................................................... 221,980 362,783 59,472 97,653 281,452 460,436
Lotus................................................... 252 316 0 0 252 316
Mazda................................................... 246,661 306,804 55,885 61,368 302,546 368,172
Mitsubishi.............................................. 85,358 73,305 15,371 36,387 100,729 109,692
Nissan.................................................. 717,869 1,014,775 305,546 426,454 1,023,415 1,441,229
Porsche................................................. 18,909 40,696 18,797 11,219 37,706 51,915
Spyker/Saab............................................. 21,706 23,130 4,250 3,475 25,956 26,605
Subaru.................................................. 116,035 256,970 82,546 74,722 198,581 331,692
Suzuki.................................................. 79,339 103,154 35,319 21,374 114,658 124,528
Tata/JLR................................................ 9,596 65,418 55,584 56,805 65,180 122,223
Tesla................................................... 800 31,974 0 0 800 31,974
Toyota.................................................. 1,260,364 2,108,053 951,136 1,210,016 2,211,500 3,318,069
[[Page 62680]]
Volkswagen.............................................. 291,483 630,163 26,999 154,284 318,482 784,447
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................... 8,230,568 11,541,560 5,621,193 5,708,899 13,851,761 17,250,459
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II-2--Annual Sales of Light-Duty Vehicles by Market Segment in 2008 and Estimated for 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Light trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 MY 2025 MY 2008 MY 2025 MY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full-Size Car................. 829,896 245,355 Full-Size Pickup 1,332,335 1,002,806
Luxury Car.................... 1,048,341 1,637,410 Mid-Size Pickup. 452,013 431,272
Mid-Size Car.................. 2,103,108 2,713,078 Full-Size Van... 33,384 88,572
Mini Car...................... 617,902 1,606,114 Mid-Size Van.... 719,529 839,452
Small Car..................... 1,912,736 2,826,190 Mid-Size MAV*... 110,353 548,457
Specialty Car................. 469,324 808,183 Small MAV....... 231,265 239,065
.............. .............. Full-Size SUV*.. 559,160 46,978
.............. .............. Mid-Size SUV.... 436,080 338,849
.............. .............. Small SUV....... 196,424 71,827
.............. .............. Full-Size CUV*.. 264,717 671,665
.............. .............. Mid-Size CUV.... 923,165 1,259,483
.............. .............. Small CUV....... 1,612,029 1,875,703
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sales**............. 6,981,307 9,836,330 ................ 6,870,454 7,414,129
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* MAV--Multi-Activity Vehicle, or a vehicle with a tall roof and elevated seating positions such as a Mazda5.
SUV--Sport Utility Vehicle, CUV--Crossover Utility Vehicle.
**Total Sales are based on the classic Car/Truck definition.
NHTSA has changed the definition of a truck for 2011 model year and
beyond. The new definition has moved some 2 wheel drive SUVs and CUVs
to the car category. Table II-3 shows the different volumes for car and
trucks based on the new and old NHTSA definition. The table shows the
difference in 2008, 2021, and 2025 to give a feel for how the change in
definition changes the car/truck split.
Table II-3--New and Old Car and Truck Definition in 2008, 2016, 2021, and 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle type 2008 2016 \159\ 2021 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Old Cars Definition............................. 6,981,307 8,576,717 8,911,173 9,836,330
New Cars Definition............................. 8,230,568 10,140,463 10,505,165 11,541,560
Old Truck Definition............................ 6,870,454 7,618,459 7,277,894 7,414,129
New Truck Definition............................ 5,621,193 6,054,713 5,683,902 5,708,899
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CSM forecast provides estimates of car and truck sales by
segment and by manufacturer separately. The forecast was broken up into
two tables: one table with manufacturer volumes by year and the other
with vehicle segments percentages by year. Table II-4 and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ In the NPRM, MY 2016 values reported for the New Cars
Definition and Old Truck Definition were erroneously reversed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II--5 are examples of the data received from CSM. The task of
estimating future sales using these tables is complex. We used the same
methodology as in the previous rulemaking. A detailed description of
how the projection process was done is found in Chapter 1.3.2 of the
TSD.
Table II-4--CSM Manufacturer Volumes in 2016, 2021, and 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2021 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW............................................................. 328,220 325,231 317,178
Chrysler/Fiat................................................... 391,165 346,960 316,043
Daimler......................................................... 298,676 272,049 271,539
Ford*........................................................... 971,617 893,528 858,215
Subaru.......................................................... 205,486 185,281 181,062
General Motors.................................................. 1,309,246 1,192,641 1,135,305
Honda........................................................... 1,088,449 993,318 984,401
Hyundai......................................................... 429,926 389,368 377,500
[[Page 62681]]
Kia............................................................. 234,246 213,252 205,473
Mazda........................................................... 215,117 200,003 199,193
Mitsubishi...................................................... 47,414 42,693 42,227
Spyker/Saab..................................................... 6 6 6
Tesla........................................................... 800 800 800
Aston Martin.................................................... 1,370 1,370 1,370
Lotus........................................................... 252 252 252
Porsche......................................................... 12 12 12
Nissan.......................................................... 803,177 729,723 707,361
Suzuki.......................................................... 88,142 81,042 76,873
Tata/JLR........................................................ 58,594 53,143 52,069
Toyota.......................................................... 1,751,661 1,576,499 1,564,975
Volkswagen...................................................... 578,420 530,378 494,596
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Ford volumes include Volvo in this table.
Table II-5--CSM Segment Percentages in 2016, 2021, and 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2021 2025
(percent) (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full-Size CUV................................................... 3.66 8.34 9.06
Full-Size Pickup................................................ 19.39 15.42 13.53
Full-Size SUV................................................... 3.27 0.90 0.63
Full-Size Van................................................... 0.92 1.29 1.19
Mid-Size CUV.................................................... 19.29 16.88 16.99
Mid-Size MAV.................................................... 1.63 5.93 7.40
Mid-Size Pickup................................................. 4.67 5.74 5.82
Mid-Size SUV.................................................... 2.28 4.73 4.57
Mid-Size Van.................................................... 11.80 11.63 11.32
Small CUV....................................................... 30.67 25.06 25.30
Small MAV....................................................... 0.88 2.98 3.22
Small Pickup.................................................... 0.00 0.00 0.00
Small SUV....................................................... 1.53 1.12 0.97
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The overall result was a projection of car and truck sales for
model years 2017-2025--the reference fleet--which matched the total
sales projections of the AEO forecast and the manufacturer and segment
splits of the CSM forecast. These sales splits are shown in Table II-6
below.
Table II-6--Car and Truck Volumes and Split Based on NHTSA New Truck Definition
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car Volume*................................................... 10,140 9,988 9,905 9,996 10,292 10,505 10,736 10,968 11,258 11,542
Truck Volume*................................................. 6,054 5,819 5,671 5,583 5,604 5,684 5,704 5,687 5,676 5,709
Car Split..................................................... 62.6% 63.2% 63.6% 64.2% 64.7% 64.9% 65.3% 65.9% 66.5% 66.9%
Truck Split................................................... 37.4% 36.8% 36.4% 35.8% 35.3% 35.1% 34.7% 34.1% 33.5% 33.1%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*In thousands
Given publicly- and commercially-available sources that can be made
equally transparent to all reviewers, the forecast described above
represented the agencies' best forecast available at the time of its
publishing regarding the likely composition direction of the fleet. EPA
and NHTSA recognize that it is impossible to predict with certainty how
manufacturers' product offerings and sales volumes will evolve through
MY 2025 under baseline conditions--that is, without further changes in
standards after MY 2016. While the agencies have not included
variations in the market forecast as aspects of our respective
sensitivity analyses, we have conducted our central analyses twice--
once each for the MY 2008- and MY 2010-based market forecasts that
reflect differences in available vehicle models, differences in
manufacturer- and segment-level market shares, and differences in the
overall volumes of passenger cars and light trucks. In addition, as
discussed above, NHTSA's probabilistic uncertainty analysis accounts
for uncertainty regarding the relative market shares of passenger cars
and light trucks.
The final step in the construction of the 2008 based fleet
projection involves applying additional technology to individual
vehicle models--that is, technology beyond that already present in MY
2008--reflecting already-promulgated standards through MY 2016, and
reflecting the assumption that MY 2016 standards would apply through MY
2025. A description of the agencies' modeling work to develop their
respective final reference (or adjusted baseline) fleets appear in the
agencies' respective RIAs.
6. How did the agencies develop the model year 2010 baseline vehicle
fleet as part of the 2010 based fleet projection?
NHTSA and EPA also developed a baseline fleet comprised of model
year
[[Page 62682]]
2010 data gathered from EPA's emission and fuel economy database. This
alternative baseline fleet has the model year 2010 vehicle volumes and
attributes. The 2010 baseline fleet reflects all fuel economy
technologies in use on MY 2010 light duty vehicles as reported by
manufacturers in their CAFE certification data. The 2010 emission and
fuel economy database included data on vehicle production volume, fuel
economy, engine size, number of engine cylinders, transmission type,
fuel type, etc.; however it did not contain complete information on
technologies. Thus, as with the 2008 baseline fleet, the agencies
relied on publicly available data like the more complete technology
descriptions from Ward's Automotive Group. In a few instances when
required vehicle information (such as vehicle footprint) was not
available from these two sources, the agencies obtained this
information from publicly accessible internet sites such as
Motortrend.com and Edmunds.com. A description of all of the
technologies used in modeling the 2010 vehicle fleet and how it was
constructed are available in Chapter 1.4 of the Joint TSD.
7. How did the Agencies develop the projected my 2017-2025 vehicle
reference fleet for the 2010 model year based fleet?
EPA and NHTSA have based the projection of total car and total
light truck sales for MYs 2017-2025 on projections made by the
Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA). EIA
published its Early Annual Energy Outlook for 2012 in December 2011.
EIA released updated data to NHTSA in February (AEO Early Release). The
final version of AEO 2012 was released June 25, 2012, after the
agencies had already completed our analyses using the early release
results.
As the we did with the Interim 2011 AEO data, the agencies
developed a new projection of passenger car and light truck sales
shares by running scenarios from the Early Release AEO 2012 reference
case that first deactivate the above-mentioned sales-volume shifting
methodology and then hold post-2017 CAFE standards constant at MY 2016
levels. As discussed in Chapter 1 of the agencies' joint Technical
Support Document, incorporating these changes reduced the NEMS-
projected passenger car share of the light vehicle market by an average
of about 5% during 2017-2025.
In the AEO 2012 Early Release data, EIA projects that total light-
duty vehicle sales will gradually recover from their currently
depressed levels by around 2013. In 2017, car sales are projected to be
8.7 million (55 percent) and truck sales are projected to be 7.1
million (45 percent). Although the total level of sales of 15.8 million
units is similar to pre-2008 levels, the fraction of car sales is
projected to be higher than that existing in the 2000-2007 timeframe.
This projection reflects the impact of assumed higher fuel prices.
Sales projections of cars and trucks for future model years can be
found in Chapter 1.4.3 of the joint TSD.
In addition to a shift towards more car sales, sales of segments
within both the car and truck markets have been changing and are
expected to continue to change. Manufacturers are introducing more
crossover utility vehicles (CUVs), which offer much of the utility of
sport utility vehicles (SUVs) but use more car-like designs. The AEO
2012 report does not, however, distinguish such changes within the car
and truck classes. In order to reflect these changes in fleet makeup,
EPA and NHTSA used a custom long range forecast purchased from LMC
Automotive (formerly J.D. Powers Forecasting). NHTSA and EPA decided to
use the forecast from LMC for the 2010 model year based fleet for
several reasons discussed in Chapter 1 of the Joint TSD, and believe
the projection provides a useful cross-check for the forecast used for
the projections reflected in the 2008 model year based fleet. For the
public's reference, a copy of LMC's long range forecast has been placed
in the docket for this rulemaking.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ The LMC Automotive's Sales Forecast Excel file (``LMC
North America Sales Forecasts 2017-2025 for the Docket'') is
available in the docket (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The next step was to project the LMC forecasts for relative sales
of cars and trucks by manufacturer and by market segment onto the total
sales estimates of AEO 2012. Table II-7 and Table II-8 show the
resulting projections for the reference 2025 model year and compare
these to actual sales that occurred in the baseline 2010 model year.
Both tables show sales using the traditional definition of cars and
light trucks. As discussed above, the new forecast from LMC shown in
Table II-7 shows a significant increase in Chrysler/Fiat's sales (1.6
million) from those projected by CSM (768 thousand).
Table II-7--Annual Sales of Light-Duty Vehicles by Manufacturer in 2010 and Estimated for 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Light trucks Total
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 MY 2025 MY 2010 MY 2025 MY 2010 MY 2025 MY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin............................................ 601 639 0 0 601 639
BMW..................................................... 143,638 363,380 26,788 101,013 170,426 464,394
Chrysler/Fiat........................................... 496,998 899,843 665,806 726,403 1,162,804 1,626,246
Daimler................................................. 157,453 261,242 72,393 119,090 229,846 380,332
Ferrari................................................. 1,780 1,894 0 0 1,780 1,894
Ford.................................................... 940,241 1,441,350 858,798 997,694 1,799,039 2,439,045
Geely................................................... 28,223 65,883 29,719 31,528 57,942 97,411
GM...................................................... 1,010,524 1,696,474 735,367 1,261,546 1,745,891 2,958,020
Honda................................................... 845,318 1,295,234 390,028 504,020 1,235,346 1,799,254
Hyundai................................................. 375,656 935,619 35,360 117,662 411,016 1,053,281
Kia..................................................... 226,157 350,765 21,721 37,957 247,878 388,723
Lotus................................................... 354 377 0 0 354 377
Mazda................................................... 249,489 262,732 61,451 53,183 310,940 315,916
Mitsubishi.............................................. 54,263 67,925 9,146 15,464 63,409 83,389
Nissan.................................................. 619,918 919,920 255,566 312,005 875,484 1,231,925
Porsche................................................. 11,937 17,609 3,978 19,091 15,915 36,701
Spyker.................................................. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subaru.................................................. 184,587 218,870 73,665 96,326 258,252 315,196
Suzuki.................................................. 25,002 48,710 3,938 4,173 28,940 52,883
[[Page 62683]]
Tata/JLR................................................ 11,279 30,949 37,475 50,369 48,754 81,319
Tesla................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0
Toyota.................................................. 1,508,866 1,622,242 696,324 921,183 2,205,190 2,543,426
Volkswagen.............................................. 284,046 479,423 36,327 105,009 320,373 584,432
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................... 7,176,330 10,981,082 4,013,850 5,473,718 11,190,180 16,454,800
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II-8--Annual Sales of Light-Duty Vehicles by Market Segment in 2010 and Estimated for 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Light Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 MY 2025 MY 2010 MY 2025 MY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compact Conventional.......... 2,107,568 2,380,540 Compact CUV..... 1,201,018 1,172,645
Compact Premium Conventional.. 498,107 868,582 Compact MPV..... 250,816 409,034
Compact Premium Sporty........ 45,373 59,523 Compact Premium 154,808 204,204
CUV.
Compact Sporty................ 136,464 170,121 Compact Utility. 216,634 234,737
Large Conventional............ 485,656 832,113 Large Pickup.... 992,473 1,426,193
Large Premium Conventional.... 61,291 187,898 Large Premium 72,411 139,719
Utility.
Large Premium Sporty.......... 8,551 21,346 Large Utility... 164,416 323,992
Midsize Conventional.......... 1,742,494 3,353,080 Large Van....... 17,516 31,198
Midsize Premium Conventional.. 176,193 412,950 Midsize CUV..... 825,743 1,351,888
Midsize Premium Sporty........ 27,023 67,005 Midsize Pickup.. 288,508 443,502
Midsize Sporty................ 244,895 257,865 Midsize Premium 333,790 493,977
CUV.
Sub-Compact Conventional...... 336,971 748,210 Midsize Premium 18,584 33,087
Utility.
Unity Class *................. 7,351 7,820 Midsize Utility. 267,035 331,291
.............. .............. Midsize Van..... 508,491 492,280
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sales * *........... 5,877,937 9,367,054 ................ 5,312,243 7,087,746
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Unity Class--Is a special class created by the EPA for luxury brands that were not covered by the forecast.
* * Total Sales are based on the classic Car/Truck definition.
NHTSA has changed the definition of a truck for 2011 model year and
beyond. The new definition has moved some 2 wheel drive SUVs and CUVs
to the car category. Table II-9 shows the different volumes for car and
trucks based on the new and old NHTSA definition. The table shows the
difference in 2010, 2021, and 2025 to give a feel for how the change in
definition changes the car/truck split.
Table II-9--New and Old Car and Truck definition in 2010, 2016, 2021, and 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle type 2010 2016 2021 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Old Cars Definition............................. 6,016,063 8,725,700 8,898,400 9,525,700
New Cars Definition............................. 7,176,330 10,227,185 10,310,594 10,981,082
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Old Truck Definition............................ 5,174,117 7,136,500 6,831,700 6,929,100
New Truck Definition............................ 4,013,850 5,635,015 5,419,506 5,473,718
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The LMC forecast provides estimates of car and truck sales by
manufacturer segment and by manufacturer separately. The forecast was
broken up into two tables: one table with manufacturer volumes by year
and the other with vehicle segments percentages by year. Table II-10 is
an example of the data received from LMC. The task of estimating future
sales using these tables is complex. Table II-11 is the LMC projected
volumes for each manufacturer.
Table II-12 has the LMC segment percentages for 2016, 2021, and
2025. We used a new methodology that is different than we used for the
2008 fleet projection. A detailed description of how the projection
process was done is found in Chapter 1 of the TSD.
Table II-10--Example of the LMC Segmented Chrysler Volumes in 2016, 2021, and 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer LMC segment 2016 2021 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Compact Basic.............. 0 0 0
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Compact Conventional....... 66,300 80,131 90,032
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Compact CUV................ 66,861 73,867 79,812
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Compact MPV................ 42,609 73,673 108,134
[[Page 62684]]
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Compact Premium 32,080 36,654 40,287
Conventional.
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Compact Premium CUV........ 10,780 11,229 11,811
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Compact Premium Sporty..... 164 151 140
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Compact Utility............ 227,901 249,383 274,171
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Large Conventional......... 182,468 231,692 251,766
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Large Pickup............... 334,980 366,592 382,492
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Large Van.................. 19,981 20,639 21,569
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize Conventional....... 106,105 108,965 112,637
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize CUV................ 82,615 90,608 95,281
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize Pickup............. 31,246 42,374 48,862
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize Premium 9,078 13,074 15,891
Conventional.
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize Premium CUV........ 10,983 19,432 24,749
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize Premium Sporty..... 4,132 3,753 3,728
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize Sporty............. 0 0 0
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize Utility............ 219,206 185,386 162,149
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Midsize Van................ 181,402 155,543 145,019
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Sub-Compact Conventional... 77,361 75,478 79,533
Chrysler/Fiat...................... Unity Class*............... 3,163 3,163 3,163
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Note: Unity Class is created by EPA to account for luxury brands.
Table II-11 LMC Manufacturer Volumes in 2016, 2021, and 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2016 2021 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin.................................................... 601 601 601
BMW............................................................. 411,137 441,500 461,752
Daimler......................................................... 354,175 385,197 404,899
Chrysler/Fiat................................................... 1,709,415 1,841,787 1,951,226
Ford............................................................ 2,692,193 2,818,737 2,935,409
Geely........................................................... 91,711 97,548 100,912
GM.............................................................. 3,382,343 3,532,217 3,676,282
Honda........................................................... 1,635,473 1,758,092 1,838,444
Hyundai......................................................... 1,325,712 1,378,186 1,438,427
Lotus........................................................... 354 354 354
Mazda........................................................... 309,864 308,298 318,450
Mitsubishi...................................................... 69,397 80,028 87,468
Nissan.......................................................... 1,221,374 1,247,279 1,288,609
Subaru.......................................................... 313,619 321,934 339,206
Spyker.......................................................... .............. .............. ..............
Suzuki.......................................................... 44,935 48,861 52,594
Tata/JLR........................................................ 83,824 87,169 89,011
Toyota.......................................................... 2,492,707 2,582,404 2,658,145
Volkswagen...................................................... 608,484 604,255 619,274
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II-12--LMC Segment Percentages in 2016, 2021, and 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2021 2025
LMC segment (percent) (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unity Class*.................................................... 0.04 0.04 0.04
Compact Basic................................................... 0.00 0.00 0.00
Compact Conventional............................................ 12.44 12.07 12.03
Compact CUV..................................................... 7.74 7.38 7.30
Compact MPV..................................................... 2.61 2.47 2.56
Compact Premium Conventional.................................... 4.59 4.68 4.69
Compact Premium CUV............................................. 1.49 1.54 1.55
Compact Premium Sporty.......................................... 0.41 0.34 0.31
Compact Sporty.................................................. 0.95 0.91 0.88
Compact Utility................................................. 1.37 1.45 1.53
Large Conventional.............................................. 3.95 4.27 4.27
Large Pickup.................................................... 12.62 12.95 12.92
Large Premium Conventional...................................... 0.88 0.95 0.98
Large Premium Pickup............................................ 0.00 0.00 0.00
Large Premium Sporty............................................ 0.09 0.11 0.11
Large Premium Utility........................................... 0.91 0.91 0.91
Large Utility................................................... 2.32 2.21 2.11
Large Van....................................................... 2.24 2.34 2.40
Midsize Conventional............................................ 16.49 17.04 17.17
Midsize CUV..................................................... 9.28 8.84 8.92
Midsize Pickup.................................................. 2.56 2.79 2.89
[[Page 62685]]
Midsize Premium Conventional.................................... 2.06 2.18 2.21
Midsize Premium CUV............................................. 2.87 3.08 3.11
Midsize Premium Sporty.......................................... 0.40 0.36 0.34
Midsize Premium Utility......................................... 0.23 0.22 0.22
Midsize Sporty.................................................. 1.59 1.41 1.33
Midsize Utility................................................. 2.57 2.42 2.16
Midsize Van..................................................... 3.53 3.32 3.21
Sub-Compact Conventional........................................ 3.77 3.72 3.85
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Note: Unity Class is created by EPA to account for luxury brands.
The overall result was a projection of car and truck sales for
model years 2017-2025--the reference fleet--which matched the total
sales projections of the AEO forecast and the manufacturer and segment
splits of the LMC forecast. These sales splits are shown in Table II-13
below.
Table II-13--Car and Truck Volumes and Split Based on NHTSA New Truck Definition
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car Volume*......................................... 10,227 10,213 10,089 10,140 10,194 10,311 10,455 10,594 10,812 10,981
Truck Volume*....................................... 5,635 5,599 5,516 5,522 5,436 5,420 5,432 5,413 5,435 5,474
Car Split........................................... 64.5% 64.6% 64.7% 64.7% 65.2% 65.5% 65.8% 66.2% 66.5% 66.7%
Truck Split......................................... 35.5% 35.4% 35.3% 35.3% 34.8% 34.5% 34.2% 33.8% 33.5% 33.3%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ In thousands.
The final step in the construction of the 2010 model year based
fleet involves applying additional technology to individual vehicle
models--that is, technology beyond that already present in MY 2010----
reflecting already-promulgated standards through MY 2016, and
reflecting the assumption that MY 2016 standards would continue to
apply in each model year through MY 2025. A description of the
agencies' modeling work to develop their respective final reference (or
adjusted baseline) fleets appear in the agencies' respective RIAs.
8. What are the Differences in the Sales Volumes and Characteristics of
the MY 2008 Based and the MY 2010 Based Fleets Projections?
Table II-14 is the difference in actual and projected sales volumes
between the 2010 based and the 2008 based fleet forecast. This summary
table is the most convenient way to compare the projections from CSM
and LMC, since the forecasting companies use different segmentations of
vehicles. It also provides a comparison of the two AEO forecasts since
the projections are normalized to AEO's total volume of cars and trucks
in each year of the projection. The table shows a total projected
reduction from the 2008 fleet to the 2010 fleet in 2025 of .5 million
cars and .8 million trucks. The largest manufacturer changes in the
2025 model projections are for Chrysler and Toyota. The newer
projection increases Chrysler's total vehicles by .9 million vehicles,
while it decreases Toyota's total vehicles by .8 million.
The table also shows that the total actual reduction in cars from
2008 MY to 2010 MY is 1.0 million vehicles, and the reduction in trucks
is 1.6 million vehicles.
Table II-14--Differences in Annual Sales of Light-Duty Vehicles by Manufacturer
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Light trucks Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010-2008 MY 2025 MY 2010-2008 MY 2025 MY 2010-2008 MY 2025 MY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin............................................ -769 -543 0 0 -769 -543
BMW..................................................... -148,158 -41,876 -34,536 -44,396 -182,694 -86,271
Chrysler/Fiat........................................... -206,160 463,364 -290,986 394,641 -497,146 858,005
Daimler................................................. -50,742 -79,477 -6,742 18,023 -57,484 -61,454
Ferrari................................................. 330 -5,764 0 0 330 -5,764
Ford.................................................... -16,458 -98,759 44,604 313,218 28,146 214,459
Geely................................................... -37,426 -35,224 -3,029 -11,060 -40,455 -46,285
GM...................................................... -576,867 22,538 -772,430 -262,462 -1,349,297 -239,923
Honda................................................... -161,321 -45,087 -115,112 -53,677 -276,433 -98,764
Hyundai................................................. 37,787 258,369 -17,798 -50,474 19,989 207,895
Kia..................................................... 4,177 -12,018 -37,751 -59,696 -33,574 -71,713
Lotus................................................... 102 61 0 0 102 61
Mazda................................................... 2,828 -44,072 5,566 -8,185 8,394 -52,256
Mitsubishi.............................................. -31,095 -5,380 -6,225 -20,923 -37,320 -26,303
Nissan.................................................. -97,951 -94,855 -49,980 -114,449 -147,931 -209,304
Porsche................................................. -6,972 -23,087 -14,819 7,872 -21,791 -15,214
Spyker.................................................. -21706 -23130 -4250 -3475 -25956 -26605
Subaru.................................................. 68,552 -38,100 -8,881 21,604 59,671 -16,496
[[Page 62686]]
Suzuki.................................................. -54,337 -54,444 -31,381 -17,201 -85,718 -71,645
Tata/JLR................................................ 1,683 -34,469 -18,109 -6,436 -16,426 -40,904
Tesla................................................... -800 -31974 0 0 -800 -31974
Toyota.................................................. 248,502 -485,811 -254,812 -288,833 -6,310 -774,643
Volkswagen.............................................. -7,437 -150,740 9,328 -49,275 1,891 -200,015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................... -1,054,238 -560,478 -1,607,343 -235,181 -2,661,581 -795,659
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II-15 shows the change in volumes between the two forecasts
for cars and trucks based on the new and old NHTSA definition. The
table shows the change to give a feel for how the change in definition
impacts the car/truck split. Many factors impact the changes shown here
including differences in AEO, differences in the number of SUV and CUV
vehicles becoming cars, and the future volume projected by CSM and LMC.
Table II-15--Differences in New and Old Car and Truck definition in 2008, 2016, 2021, and 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle type 2010-2008 2016 2021 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Old Cars Definition............................. -965,244 148,983 -12,773 -310,630
New Cars Definition............................. -1,054,238 86,722 -194,571 -560,478
Old Truck Definition............................ -1,696,337 -481,959 -446,194 -485,029
New Truck Definition............................ -1,607,343 -419,698 -264,396 -235,181
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II-16 is the changes in car and truck split due to the
difference between the 2010 and 2008 forecast. The table shows that the
different AEO forecasts, CSM and LMC projections have an insignificant
impact on the car and truck split.
Table II-16--Differences in Car and Truck Volumes and Split Based on NHTSA New Truck Definition
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car Volume \*\............................ 87 225 184 144 -98 -194 -281 -374 -446 -561
Truck Volume \*\.......................... -419 -220 -155 -61 -168 -264 -272 -274 -241 -235
Car Split................................. 1.9% 1.4% 1.1% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 0.0% -0.2%
Truck Split............................... -1.9% -1.4% -1.1% -0.5% -0.5% -0.6% -0.5% -0.3% 0.0% 0.2%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ in thousands.
The joint TSD contains further comparisons of the two projections
at the end of Chapter 1.
So, given all of the discussion above, the agencies have created
these two baselines to illustrate possible uncertainty in the future
market forecast. The industry-wide differences between the forecasts
are relatively minor, even if there are some fairly significant
differences for individual manufacturers. Analysis under both baselines
supports the agencies' respective decisions as to the stringency of the
final standards, as discussed further in Sections III and IV below.
C. Development of Attribute-Based Curve Shapes
1. Why are standards attribute-based and defined by a mathematical
function?
As in the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE/GHG rules, and as NHTSA did in the MY
2011 CAFE rule, NHTSA and EPA are promulgating attribute-based CAFE and
CO2 standards that are defined by a mathematical function.
EPCA, as amended by EISA, expressly requires that CAFE standards for
passenger cars and light trucks be based on one or more vehicle
attributes related to fuel economy, and be expressed in the form of a
mathematical function.\161\ The CAA has no such requirement, although
such an approach is permissible under section 202 (a) and EPA has used
the attribute-based approach in issuing standards under analogous
provisions of the CAA (e.g., criteria pollutant standards for non-road
diesel engines using engine size as the attribute,\162\ in the recent
GHG standards for heavy duty pickups and vans using a work factor
attribute,\163\ and in the MYs 2012-2016 GHG rule itself which used
vehicle footprint as the attribute). As for the MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking, public comments on the MYs 2017-2025 proposal widely
supported attribute-based standards for both agencies' standards as
further discussed in section II.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(a)(3)(A).
\162\ 69 FR 38958 (June 29, 2004).
\163\ 76 FR 57106, 57162-64, (Sept. 15, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under an attribute-based standard, every vehicle model has a
performance target (fuel economy and CO2 emissions for CAFE
and CO2 emissions standards, respectively), the level of
which depends on the vehicle's attribute (for this final rule,
footprint, as discussed below). Each manufacturers' fleet average
standard is determined by the production-weighted \164\ average (for
CAFE, harmonic average) of those targets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ Production for sale in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies believe that an attribute-based standard is preferable
to a single-industry-wide average standard in the
[[Page 62687]]
context of CAFE and CO2 standards for several reasons.
First, if the shape is chosen properly, every manufacturer is more
likely to be required to continue adding more fuel efficient technology
each year across their fleet, because the stringency of the compliance
obligation will depend on the particular product mix of each
manufacturer. Therefore a maximum feasible attribute-based standard
will tend to require greater fuel savings and CO2 emissions
reductions overall than would a maximum feasible flat standard (that
is, a single mpg or CO2 level applicable to every
manufacturer).
Second, depending on the attribute, attribute-based standards
reduce the incentive for manufacturers to respond to CAFE and
CO2 standards in ways harmful to safety.\165\ Because each
vehicle model has its own target (based on the attribute chosen),
properly fitted attribute-based standards provide little, if any,
incentive to build smaller vehicles simply to meet a fleet-wide
average, because the smaller vehicles will be subject to more stringent
compliance targets.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ The 2002 NAS Report described at length and quantified the
potential safety problem with average fuel economy standards that
specify a single numerical requirement for the entire industry. See
2002 NAS Report at 5, finding 12. Ensuing analyses, including by
NHTSA, support the fundamental conclusion that standards structured
to minimize incentives to downsize all but the largest vehicles will
tend to produce better safety outcomes than flat standards.
\166\ Assuming that the attribute is related to vehicle size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, attribute-based standards provide a more equitable
regulatory framework for different vehicle manufacturers.\167\ A single
industry-wide average standard imposes disproportionate cost burdens
and compliance difficulties on the manufacturers that need to change
their product plans to meet the standards, and puts no obligation on
those manufacturers that have no need to change their plans. As
discussed above, attribute-based standards help to spread the
regulatory cost burden for fuel economy more broadly across all of the
vehicle manufacturers within the industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ 2002 NAS Report at 4-5, finding 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, attribute-based standards better respect economic
conditions and consumer choice as compared to single-value standards. A
flat, or single value, standard encourages a certain vehicle size fleet
mix by creating incentives for manufacturers to use vehicle downsizing
as a compliance strategy. Under a footprint-based standard,
manufacturers have the incentive to invest in technologies that improve
the fuel economy of the vehicles they sell rather than shifting their
product mix, because reducing the size of the vehicle is generally a
less viable compliance strategy given that smaller vehicles have more
stringent regulatory targets.
2. What attribute are the agencies adopting, and why?
As in the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE/GHG rules, and as NHTSA did in the MY
2011 CAFE rule, NHTSA and EPA are promulgating CAFE and CO2
standard curves that are based on vehicle footprint, which has an
observable correlation to fuel economy and emissions. There are several
policy and technical reasons why NHTSA and EPA believe that footprint
is the most appropriate attribute on which to base the standards for
the vehicles covered by this rulemaking, even though some other vehicle
attributes (notably curb weight) are better correlated to fuel economy
and emissions.
First, in the agencies' judgment, from the standpoint of vehicle
safety, it is important that the CAFE and CO2 standards be
set in a way that does not encourage manufacturers to respond by
selling vehicles that are less safe. While NHTSA's research of
historical crash data also indicates that reductions in vehicle mass
tend to compromise overall highway safety, reductions in vehicle
footprint do so to a much greater extent. If footprint-based standards
are defined in a way that creates a relatively uniform burden for
compliance for vehicles of all sizes, then footprint-based standards
should not create incentives for manufacturers to downsize their fleets
as a strategy for compliance which could compromise societal safety, or
to upsize their fleets which might reduce the program's fuel savings
and GHG emission reduction benefits. Footprint-based standards also
enable manufacturers to apply weight-efficient materials and designs to
their vehicles while maintaining footprint, as an effective means to
improve fuel economy and reduce GHG emissions. On the other hand,
depending on their design, weight-based standards can create
disincentives for manufacturers to apply weight-efficient materials and
designs. This is because weight-based standards would become more
stringent as vehicle mass is reduced. The agencies discuss mass
reduction and its relation to safety in more detail in Preamble section
II.G.
Further, although we recognize that weight is better correlated
with fuel economy and CO2 emissions than is footprint, we
continue to believe that there is less risk of ``gaming'' (changing the
attribute(s) to achieve a more favorable target) by increasing
footprint under footprint-based standards than by increasing vehicle
mass under weight-based standards--it is relatively easy for a
manufacturer to add enough weight to a vehicle to decrease its
applicable fuel economy target a significant amount, as compared to
increasing vehicle footprint. We also continue to agree with concerns
raised in 2008 by some commenters to the MY 2011 CAFE rulemaking that
there would be greater potential for gaming under multi-attribute
standards, such as those that also depend on weight, torque, power,
towing capability, and/or off-road capability. The agencies agree with
the assessment first presented in NHTSA's MY 2011 CAFE final rule \168\
that the possibility of gaming an attribute-based standard is lowest
with footprint-based standards, as opposed to weight-based or multi-
attribute-based standards. Specifically, standards that incorporate
weight, torque, power, towing capability, and/or off-road capability in
addition to footprint would not only be more complex, but by providing
degrees of freedom with respect to more easily-adjusted attributes,
they could make it less certain that the future fleet would actually
achieve the average fuel economy and CO2 reduction levels
projected by the agencies.\169\ This is not to say that a footprint-
based system will eliminate gaming, or that a footprint-based system
eliminates the possibility that manufacturers will change vehicles in
ways that compromise occupant protection. Such risks cannot be
completely avoided, and in the agencies' judgment, footprint-based
standards achieved the best balance among affected considerations.
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\168\ See 74 FR 14359 (Mar. 30, 2009).
\169\ However, for heavy-duty pickups and vans not covered by
today's standards, the agencies determined that use of footprint and
work factor as attributes for heavy duty pickup and van GHG and fuel
consumption standards could reasonably avoid excessive risk of
gaming. See 76 FR 57106, 57161-62 (Sept. 15, 2011).
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The agencies recognize that based on economic and consumer demand
factors that are external to this rule, the distribution of footprints
in the future may be different (either smaller or larger) than what is
projected in this rule. The agencies recognize that a recent
independent analysis, discussed below, suggests that the NPRM form of
the MY 2014 standards could, under some circumstances posited by the
authors, induce some increases in vehicle footprint. Underlining the
potential uncertainty, considering a range of scenarios, the authors
obtained a wide range of results in their analyses. As discussed in
later in this section,
[[Page 62688]]
slopes of the linear relationships underlying today's standards are
within the range of technically reasonable analyses of the
relationships between fuel consumption and footprint, and the agencies
continue to expect that there will not be significant shifts in the
distribution of footprints as a direct consequence of this final rule.
The agencies also recognize that some attribute-based standards in
other countries/regions use attributes other than footprint and that
there could be benefits for some manufacturers if there was greater
international harmonization of fuel economy and GHG standards for
light-duty vehicles, but this is largely a question of how stringent
standards are and how they are tested and enforced. It is entirely
possible that footprint-based and weight-based systems can coexist
internationally and not present an undue burden for manufacturers if
they are carefully crafted. Different countries or regions may find
different attributes appropriate for basing standards, depending on the
particular challenges they face--from fuel prices, to family size and
land use, to safety concerns, to fleet composition and consumer
preference, to other environmental challenges besides climate change.
The agencies anticipate working more closely with other countries and
regions in the future to consider how fuel economy and related GHG
emissions test procedures and standards might be approached in ways
that least burden manufacturers while respecting each country's need to
meet its own particular challenges.
In the NPRM, the agencies stated that we continue to find that
footprint is the most appropriate attribute upon which to base the
proposed standards, but recognizing strong public interest in this
issue, we sought comment on whether the agencies should consider
setting standards for the final rule based on another attribute or
another combination of attributes. The agencies also specifically
requested that the commenters address the concerns raised in the
paragraphs above regarding the use of other attributes, and explain how
standards should be developed using the other attribute(s) in a way
that contributes more to fuel savings and CO2 reductions
than the footprint-based standards, without compromising safety.
The agencies received several comments regarding the attribute(s)
upon which post-MY 2016 CAFE and GHG standards should be based. The
National Auto Dealers Association (NADA) \170\ and the Consumer
Federation of America (CFA) \171\ expressed support for attribute-based
standards, generally, indicating that such standards accommodate
consumer preferences, level the playing field between manufacturers,
and remove the incentive to push consumers into smaller vehicles. Many
commenters, including automobile manufacturers, NGOs, trade
associations and parts suppliers (e.g., General Motors,\172\ Ford,\173\
American Chemistry Council,\174\ Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers,\175\ International Council on Clean Transportation,\176\
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,\177\ Society of the Plastics
Industry,\178\ Aluminum Association,\179\ Motor and Equipment
Manufacturers Association,\180\ and others) expressed support for the
continued use of vehicle footprint as the attribute upon which to base
CAFE and CO2 standards, citing advantages similar to those
mentioned by NADA and CFA. Conversely, the Institute for Policy
Integrity (IPI) at the New York University School of Law questioned
whether non-attribute-based (flat) or an alternative attribute basis
would be preferable to footprint-based standards as a means to increase
benefits, improve safety, reduce ``gaming,'' and/or equitably
distribute compliance obligations.\181\ IPI argued that, even under
flat standards, credit trading provisions would serve to level the
playing field between manufacturers. IPI acknowledged that NHTSA,
unlike EPA, is required to promulgate attribute-based standards, and
agreed that a footprint-based system could be at much less risk of
gaming than a weight-based system. IPI suggested that the agencies
consider a range of options, including a fuel-based system, and select
the approach that maximizes net benefits. Ferrari and BMW suggested
that the agencies consider weight-based standards, citing the closer
correlation between fuel economy and footprint, and BMW further
suggested that weight-based standards might facilitate international
harmonization (i.e., between U.S. standards and related standards in
other countries).\182\ Porsche commented that the footprint attribute
is not well suited for manufacturers of high performance vehicles with
a small footprint.\183\
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\170\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 11.
\171\ CFA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419 at 810, 44.
\172\ GM, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0236, at 2.
\173\ Ford, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0235, at 8.
\174\ ACC, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517 at 2.
\175\ Alliance, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, at 85.
\176\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 48.
\177\ IIHS, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0222, at 1.
\178\ SPI, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492 at 4.
\179\ Aluminum Association, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0226, at
1.
\180\ MEMA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478 at 1.
\181\ IPI, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11485 at 13-15.
\182\ BMW, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0250, at 3.
\183\ Porsche, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264.
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Regarding the comments from IPI, as IPI appears to acknowledge,
EPCA/EISA expressly requires that CAFE standards be attribute-based and
defined in terms of mathematical functions. Also, NHTSA has, in fact,
considered and reconsidered options other than footprint, over the
course of multiple CAFE rulemakings conducted throughout the past
decade. When first contemplating attribute-based systems, NHTSA
considered attributes such as weight, ``shadow'' (overall area),
footprint, power, torque, and towing capacity. NHTSA also considered
approaches that would combine two or potentially more than two such
attributes. To date, every time NHTSA (more recently, with EPA) has
considered options for light-duty vehicles, the agency has concluded
that a properly designed footprint-based approach provides the best
means of achieving the basic policy goals (i.e., by reducing
disparities between manufacturers' compliance burdens, increasing the
likelihood of improved fuel economy and reduced GHG emissions across
the entire spectrum of footprint targets; and by reducing incentives
for manufacturers to respond to standards by reducing vehicle size in
ways that could compromise overall highway safety) involved in applying
an attribute-based standards, and at the same time structuring
footprint-based standards in a way that furthers the energy and
environmental policy goals of EPCA and the CAA by not creating
inappropriate incentives to increase vehicle size in ways that could
increase fuel consumption and GHG emissions. As to IPI's suggestion to
use fuel type as an attribute, although neither NHTSA nor EPA have
presented quantitative analysis of standards that differentiate between
fuel type, such standards would effectively use fuel type to identify
different subclasses of vehicles, thus requiring mathematical
functions--not addressed by IPI's comments--to
[[Page 62689]]
recombine these fuel types into regulated classes. Insofar as EPCA/EISA
already specifies how different fuel types are to be treated for
purposes of calculating fuel economy and CAFE levels, and moreover,
insofar as the EISA revisions to EPCA removed NHTSA's previously-clear
authority to set separate CAFE standards for different classes of light
trucks, using fuel type to further differentiate subclasses of vehicles
could conflict with the intent, and possibly the letter, of NHTSA's
governing statute. Finally, in the agencies' judgment, while regarding
IPI's suggestion that the agencies select the attribute-based approach
that maximizes net benefits may have merit, net benefits are but one of
many considerations which lead to the setting of the standard. Also,
such an undertaking would be impracticable at this time, considering
that the mathematical forms applied under each attribute-based approach
would also need to be specified, and that the agencies lack methods to
reliably quantify the relative potential for induced changes in vehicle
attributes.
Regarding Ferrari's and BMW's comments, as stated previously, in
the agencies' judgment, footprint-based standards (a) discourage
vehicle downsizing that might compromise occupant protection, (b)
encourage the application of technology, including weight-efficient
materials (e.g., high-strength steel, aluminum, magnesium, composites,
etc.), and (c) are less susceptible than standards based on other
attributes to ``gaming'' that could lead to less-than-projected energy
and environmental benefits. It is also important to note that there are
many differences between both the standards and the on-road light-duty
vehicle fleets in Europe and the United States. The stringency of
standards, independent of the attribute used, is another factor that
influences harmonization. While the agencies agree that international
harmonization of test procedures, calculation methods, and/or standards
could be a laudable goal, again, harmonization is not simply a function
of the attribute upon which the standards are based. Given the
differences in the on-road fleet, in fuel composition and availability,
in regional consumer preferences for different vehicle characteristics,
in other vehicle regulations besides for fuel economy/CO2
emissions, and in the balance of program goals given all of these
factors in the model years affected, among other things, it would not
necessarily be expected that the CAFE and GHG emission standards would
align with standards of other countries. Thus, the agencies continue to
judge vehicle footprint to be a preferable attribute for the same
reasons enumerated in the proposal and reiterated above.
Finally, as explained in section III.B.6 and documented in section
III.D.6 below, EPA agrees with Porsche that the MY2017 GHG standards,
and the GHG standards for the immediately succeeding model years, pose
special challenges of feasibility and (especially) lead time for
intermediate volume manufacturers, in particular for limited-line
manufacturers of smaller footprint, high performance passenger cars. It
is for this reason that EPA has provided additional lead time to these
manufacturers. NHTSA, however, is providing no such additional lead
time. As required under EISA/EPCA, manufacturers continue--as since the
1970s--to have the option of paying civil penalties in lieu of
achieving compliance with the standards, and NHTSA is uncertain as to
what authority would allow it to promulgate separate standards for
different classes of manufacturers, having raised this issue in the
proposal and having received no legal analysis with suggestions from
Porsche or other commenters.
3. How have the agencies changed the mathematical functions for the MYs
2017-2025 standards, and why?
By requiring NHTSA to set CAFE standards that are attribute-based
and defined by a mathematical function, NHTSA interprets Congress as
intending that the post-EISA standards to be data-driven--a
mathematical function defining the standards, in order to be
``attribute-based,'' should reflect the observed relationship in the
data between the attribute chosen and fuel economy.\184\ EPA is also
setting attribute-based CO2 standards defined by similar
mathematical functions, for the reasonable technical and policy grounds
discussed below and in Section II of the preamble to the proposed
rule,\185\ and which supports a harmonization with the CAFE standards.
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\184\ A mathematical function can be defined, of course, that
has nothing to do with the relationship between fuel economy and the
chosen attribute--the most basic example is an industry-wide
standard defined as the mathematical function average required fuel
economy = X, where X is the single mpg level set by the agency. Yet
a standard that is simply defined as a mathematical function that is
not tied to the attribute(s) would not meet the requirement of EISA.
\185\ See 76 FR 74913 et seq. (Dec. 1, 2011).
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The relationship between fuel economy (and GHG emissions) and
footprint, though directionally clear (i.e., fuel economy tends to
decrease and CO2 emissions tend to increase with increasing
footprint), is theoretically vague and quantitatively uncertain; in
other words, not so precise as to a priori yield only a single possible
curve.\186\ There is thus a range of legitimate options open to the
agencies in developing curve shapes. The agencies may of course
consider statutory objectives in choosing among the many reasonable
alternatives since the statutes do not dictate a particular
mathematical function for curve shape. For example, curve shapes that
might have some theoretical basis could lead to perverse outcomes
contrary to the intent of the statutes to conserve energy and reduce
GHG emissions.\187\ Thus, the decision of how to set the target curves
cannot always be just about most ``clearly'' using a mathematical
function to define the relationship between fuel economy and the
attribute; it often has to reflect legitimate policy judgments, where
the agencies adjust the function that would define the relationship in
order to achieve environmental goals, reduce petroleum consumption,
encourage application of fuel-saving technologies, not adversely affect
highway safety, reduce disparities of manufacturers' compliance burdens
(increasing the likelihood of improved fuel economy and reduced GHG
emissions across the entire spectrum of footprint targets), preserve
consumer choice, etc. This is true both for the decisions that guide
the mathematical function defining the sloped portion of the target
curves, and for the separate decisions that guide the agencies' choice
of ``cutpoints'' (if any) that define the fuel economy/CO2
levels and footprints at each end of the curves where the curves become
flat. Data informs these decisions, but how the agencies define and
interpret the relevant data, and then the choice of methodology for
fitting a curve to the data, must include a consideration of both
technical data and policy goals.
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\186\ In fact, numerous manufacturers have confidentially shared
with the agencies what they describe as ``physics based'' curves,
with each OEM showing significantly different shapes, and footprint
relationships. The sheer variety of curves shown to the agencies
further confirm the lack of an underlying principle of ``fundamental
physics'' driving the relationship between CO2 emission
or fuel consumption and footprint, and the lack of an underlying
principle to dictate any outcome of the agencies' establishment of
footprint-based standards.
\187\ For example, if the agencies set weight-based standards
defined by a steep function, the standards might encourage
manufacturers to keep adding weight to their vehicles to obtain less
stringent targets.
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The next sections examine the policy concerns that the agencies
considered in developing the target curves that define
[[Page 62690]]
the MYs 2017-2025 CAFE and CO2 standards presented in this
final rule, and the technical work supporting selection of the curves
defining those standards.
4. What curves are the agencies promulgating for MYs 2017-2025?
The mathematical functions for the MYs 2017-2025 curves are
somewhat changed from the functions for the MYs 2012-2016 curves, in
response to comments received from stakeholders pre-proposal in order
to address technical concerns and policy goals that the agencies judge
more significant in this rulemaking than in the prior one, given their
respective timeframes, and have retained those same mathematical
functions for the final rule as supported by commenters. This section
discusses the methodology the agencies selected as, at this time, best
addressing those technical concerns and policy goals, given the various
technical inputs to the agencies' current analyses. Below the agencies
discuss how the agencies determined the cutpoints and the flat portions
of the MYs 2017-2025 target curves. We also note that both of these
sections address only how the curves were fit to fuel consumption and
CO2 emission values determined using the city and highway
test procedures, and that in determining respective regulatory
alternatives, the agencies made further adjustments to the curves to
account for improvements to mobile air conditioners.
Thus, recognizing that there are many reasonable statistical
methods for fitting curves to data points that define vehicles in terms
of footprint and fuel economy, as in past rules, the agencies added
equivalent levels of technology to the baseline fleet as a starting
point for the curve analysis. The agencies continue to believe that
this is a valid method to adjust for technology differences between
actual vehicle models in the MY 2008 and MY 2010 fleets. The
statistical method for fitting that curve, however, was revisited by
the agencies in this rule. For the NPRM, the agencies chose to fit the
proposed standard curves using an ordinary least-squares formulation,
on sales-weighted data, using a fleet that has had technology applied,
and after adjusting the data for the effects of weight-to-footprint, as
described below. This represented a departure from the statistical
approach for fitting the curves in MYs 2012-2016, as explained in the
next section. The agencies considered a wide variety of reasonable
statistical methods in order to better understand the range of
uncertainty regarding the relationship between fuel consumption (the
inverse of fuel economy), CO2 emission rates, and footprint,
thereby providing a range within which decisions about standards would
be potentially supportable. In preparing for analysis supporting
today's final rule, the agencies updated analytical inputs, including
by developing two market forecasts (as discussed above in Section II.B
of the preamble and in Chapter 1 of the joint TSD). Using all of this
information, the agencies repeated the curve fitting analysis, once for
each market forecast. The agencies obtained results that were broadly
similar, albeit not identical, to those supporting the NPRM. Results
obtained for the NPRM and for today's final rule span similar regions
in footprint--fuel economy space, areas within which it would be
technically reasonable to select specific linear relationships upon
which to base new attribute-based standards. The agencies thus believe
it is reasonable to finalize the curves as proposed. This updated
analysis is presented in Chapter 2 of the joint TSD.
a. What concerns were the agencies looking to address that led them to
change from the approach used for the MYs 2012-2016 curves?
During the year and a half between when the MYs 2012-2016 final
rule was issued and when the MYs 2017-2025 NPRM was issued, NHTSA and
EPA received a number of comments from stakeholders on how curves
should be fitted to the passenger car and light truck fleets. Some
limited-line manufacturers have argued that curves should generally be
flatter in order to avoid discouraging production of small vehicles,
because steeper curves tend to result in more stringent targets for
smaller vehicles. Most full-line manufacturers have argued that a
passenger car curve similar in slope to the MY 2016 passenger car curve
would be appropriate for future model years, but that the light truck
curve should be revised to be less difficult for manufacturers selling
the largest full-size pickup trucks. These manufacturers argued that
the MY 2016 light truck curve was not ``physics-based,'' and that in
order for future tightening of standards to be feasible for full-line
manufacturers, the truck curve for later model years should be steeper
and extended further (i.e., made less stringent) into the larger
footprints. The agencies do not agree that the MY 2016 light truck
curve was somehow deficient in lacking a ``physics basis,'' or that it
was somehow overly stringent for manufacturers selling large pickups--
manufacturers making these arguments presented no ``physics-based''
model to explain how fuel economy should depend on footprint.\188\ The
same manufacturers indicated that they believed that the light truck
standard should be somewhat steeper after MY 2016, primarily because,
after more than ten years of progressive increases in the stringency of
applicable CAFE standards, large pickups would be less capable of
achieving further improvements without compromising load carrying and
towing capacity. The related issue of the stringency of the CAFE and
GHG standards for light trucks is discussed in sections and III.D and
IV.F of the preamble to this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ See footnote 186
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In developing the curve shapes for the proposed rule, the agencies
were aware of the current and prior technical concerns raised by OEMs
concerning the effects of the stringency on individual manufacturers
and their ability to meet the standards with available technologies,
while producing vehicles at a cost that allowed them to recover the
additional costs of the technologies being applied. Although we
continued to believe that the methodology for fitting curves for the
MYs 2012-2016 standards was technically sound, we recognized
manufacturers' concerns regarding their abilities to comply with a
similarly shallow curve after MY 2016 given the anticipated mix of
light trucks in MYs 2017-2025. As in the MYs 2012-2016 rules, the
agencies considered these concerns in the analysis of potential curve
shapes. The agencies also considered safety concerns which could be
raised by curve shapes creating an incentive for vehicle downsizing as
well the economic losses that could be incurred if curve shapes unduly
discourage market shifts--including vehicle upsizing--that have vehicle
buyers value. In addition, the agencies sought to improve the balance
of compliance burdens among manufacturers, and thereby increase the
likelihood of improved fuel economy and reduced GHG emissions across
the entire spectrum of footprint targets. Among the technical concerns
and resultant policy trade-offs the agencies considered were the
following:
Flatter standards (i.e., curves) increase the risk that
both the weight and size of vehicles will be reduced, potentially
compromising highway safety.
Flatter standards potentially impact the utility of
vehicles by providing an incentive for vehicle downsizing.
Steeper footprint-based standards may create incentives to
upsize
[[Page 62691]]
vehicles, thus increasing the possibility that fuel economy and
greenhouse gas reduction benefits will be less than expected.
Given the same industry-wide average required fuel economy
or CO2 level, flatter standards tend to place greater
compliance burdens on full-line manufacturers.
Given the same industry-wide average required fuel economy
or CO2 level, steeper standards tend to place greater
compliance burdens on limited-line manufacturers (depending of course,
on which vehicles are being produced).
If cutpoints are adopted, given the same industry-wide
average required fuel economy, moving small-vehicle cutpoints to the
left (i.e., up in terms of fuel economy, down in terms of
CO2 emissions) discourages the introduction of small
vehicles, and reduces the incentive to downsize small vehicles in ways
that could compromise overall highway safety.
If cutpoints are adopted, given the same industry-wide
average required fuel economy, moving large-vehicle cutpoints to the
right (i.e., down in terms of fuel economy, up in terms of
CO2 emissions) better accommodates the design requirements
of larger vehicles--especially large pickups--and extends the size
range over which downsizing is discouraged.
All of these were policy goals that required weighing and
consideration. Ultimately, the agencies did not agree that the MY 2017
target curves for the proposal, on a relative basis, should be made
significantly flatter than the MY 2016 curve,\189\ as we believed that
this would undo some of the safety-related incentives and balancing of
compliance burdens among manufacturers--effects that attribute-based
standards are intended to provide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ While ``significantly'' flatter is subjective, the year
over year change in curve shapes is discussed in greater detail in
Section II.C.6.a and Chapter 2 of the joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, the agencies recognized full-line OEM concerns and
tentatively concluded that further increases in the stringency of the
light truck standards would be more feasible if the light truck curve
was made steeper than the MY 2016 truck curve and the right (large
footprint) cut-point was extended over time to larger footprints. This
conclusion was supported by the agencies' technical analyses of
regulatory alternatives defined using the curves developed in the
manner described below.
The Alliance, GM, and the UAW commented in support of the
reasonableness of the agencies' proposals regarding the shape and slope
of the curves and how they were developed, although the Alliance stated
that the weighting and regression analysis used to develop the curves
for MYs 2022-2025 should be reviewed during the mid-term evaluation
process.
Other commenters objected to specific aspects of the agencies'
approach to developing the curves. ACEEE provided extensive comments,
arguing generally that agencies appeared to be proposing curve choices
in response to subjective policy concerns (namely, protecting large
trucks) rather than on a sound technical basis.\190\ ACEEE recommended
that the agencies choose ``the most robust technical approach,'' and
then make policy-driven adjustments to the curves for a limited time as
necessary, and explain the curves in those terms, revisiting this issue
for the final rule.\191\
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\190\ ACEEE comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528 at 6.
\191\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies reaffirm the reasonable technical and policy basis for
selecting the truck curve. Three primary drivers form this technical
basis: (a) The largest trucks have unique equipment and design, as
described in the Ford comment referenced below in section II.C.4.f; (b)
the agencies agree with those large truck manufacturers who indicated
in discussions prior to the proposal that they believed that the light
truck standard should be somewhat steeper after MY 2016, primarily
because, after more than ten recent years of progressive increases in
the stringency of applicable CAFE standards (after nearly ten years
during which Congress did not allow NHTSA to increase light truck CAFE
standards), manufacturers of large pickups would have limited options
to comply with more stringent standards without resorting to
compromising large truck load carrying and towing capacity; and (c)
given the relatively few platforms which comprise the majority of the
sales at the largest truck footprints, the agencies were concerned
about requiring levels of average light truck performance that might
lead to overly aggressive technology penetration rates in this
important segment of the work fleet. Specifically, the agencies were
concerned at proposal, and remain concerned about issues of lead time
and cost with regard to manufacturers of these work vehicles. As noted
later in this chapter, while the largest trucks are a small segment of
the overall truck fleet, and an even smaller segment of the overall
fleet, \192\ these changes to the truck slope have been made in order
to provide a clearer path toward compliance for manufacturers of these
vehicles, and reduce the potential that new standards would lead these
manufacturers to choose to downpower, modify the structure, or
otherwise reduce the utility of these work vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ The agencies' market forecast used at proposal includes
about 24 vehicle configurations above 74 square feet with a total
volume of about 50,000 vehicles or less during any MY in the 2017-
2025 time frame, In the MY2010 based market forecast, there are 14
vehicle configurations with a total volume of 130,000 vehicles or
less during any MY in the 2017-2025 time frame. This is a similarly
small portion of the overall number of vehicle models or vehicle
sales.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in the NPRM and in Chapter 2 of the TSD, as well as in
section III.D and IV.E below, we considered all of the utilized methods
of normalizing (including not normalizing) fuel economy levels and the
different methods for fitting functional forms to the footprint and
fuel economy and CO2 levels, to be technically reasonable
options. We indicated that, within the range spanned by these
technically reasonable options, the selection of curves for purposes of
specifying standards involves consideration of technical concerns and
policy implications. Having considered the above comments on the
estimation and selection of curves, we have not changed our judgment
about the process--that is, that the agencies can make of policy-
informed selection within the range spanned by technically reasonable
quantitative methods. We disagree with ACEEE's portrayal of this
involving the ``protection'' of large trucks. We have selected a light
truck slope that addresses real engineering aspects of large light
trucks and real fleet aspects of the manufacturers producing these
trucks, and sought to avoid creating an incentive for such
manufacturers to reduce the hauling and towing capacity of these
vehicles, an undesirable loss of utility. Such concerns are applicable
much more directly to light trucks than to passenger cars. The
resulting curves are well within the range of curves we have estimated.
The steeper slope at the right hand of the truck curve recognizes the
physical differences in these larger vehicles \193\ and the fleet
differences in
[[Page 62692]]
manufacturers that produce them. Further, we disagree with ACEEE's
suggestion that the agencies should commit to a particular method for
selecting curves; as the approaches we have considered demonstrate that
the range of technically reasonable curve fitting methods spans a wide
range, indicating uncertainty that could make it unwise to ``lock in''
a particular method for all future rulemakings. The agencies plan on
observing fleet trends in the future to see if there are any unexpected
shifts in the distribution of technology and utility within the
footprint range for both cars and trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ As Ford Motor Company detailed, in its public comments,
``towing capability generally requires increased aerodynamic drag
caused by a modified frontal area, increased rolling resistance, and
a heavier frame and suspension to support this additional
capability.'' Ford further noted that these vehicles further require
auxiliary transmission oil coolers, upgraded radiators, trailer
hitch connectors and wiring harness equipment, different steering
ratios, upgraded rear bumpers and different springs for heavier
tongue load (for upgraded towing packages), body-on-frame (vs.
unibody) construction (also known as ladder frame construction) to
support this capability and an aggressive duty cycle, and lower axle
ratios for better pulling power/capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We note that comments by CBD, ACEEE, NACAA, and an individual,
Yegor Tarazevich, referenced a 2011 study by Whitefoot and Skerlos,
``Design incentives to increase vehicle size created from the U.S.
footprint-based fuel economy standards.'' \194\ This study concluded
that MY 2014 standards, as proposed, ``create an incentive to increase
vehicle size except when consumer preference for vehicle size is near
its lower bound and preference for acceleration is near its upper
bound.'' \195\ The commenters who cited this study generally did so as
part of arguments in favor of flatter standards (i.e., curves that are
flatter across the range of footprints) for MYs 2017-2025. While the
agencies consider the concept of the Whitefoot and Skerlos analysis to
have some potential merits, it is also important to note that, among
other things, the authors assumed different inputs than the agencies
actually used in the MYs 2012-2016 rule regarding the baseline fleet,
the cost and efficacy of potential future technologies, and the
relationship between vehicle footprint and fuel economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ Available at Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\195\ page 410.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Were the agencies to use the Whitefoot and Skerlos methodology
(e.g., methods to simulate manufacturers' potential decisions to
increase vehicle footprint) with the actual inputs to the MYs 2012-2016
rules, the agencies would likely obtain different findings. Underlining
the potential uncertainty, the authors obtained a wide range of results
in their analyses. Insofar as Whitefoot and Skerlos found, for some
scenarios, that manufacturers might respond to footprint-based
standards by deliberately increasing vehicle footprint, these findings
are attributable to a combination of (a) the assumed baseline market
characteristics, (b) the assumed cost and fuel economy impacts involved
in increasing vehicle footprint, (c) the footprint-based fuel economy
targets, and (d) the assumed consumer preference for vehicle size.
Changes in any of these assumptions could yield different analytic
results, and potentially result in different technical implications for
agency action. As the authors note when interpreting their results:
``Designing footprint-based fuel-economy standards in practice such
that manufacturers have no incentive to adjust the size of their
vehicles appears elusive at best and impossible at worst.''
Regarding the cost impacts of footprint increases, that authors
make an ad hoc assumption that changes in footprint would incur costs
linearly, such that a 1% change in footprint would entail a 1% increase
in production costs. The authors refer to this as a conservative
assumption, but present no supporting evidence. The agencies have not
attempted to estimate the engineering cost to increase vehicle
footprint, but we expect that it would be considerably nonlinear, with
costs increasing rapidly once increases available through small
incremental changes--most likely in track width--have been exhausted.
Moreover, we expect that were a manufacturer to deliberately increase
footprint in order to ease compliance burdens, it would confine any
significant changes to coincide with vehicle redesigns, and engaging in
multiyear planning, would consider how the shifts would impact
compliance burdens and consumer desirability in ensuing model years.
With respect to the standards promulgated today, the standards become
flatter over time, thereby diminishing any ``reward'' for deliberately
increasing footprint beyond normal market expectations.
Regarding the fuel economy impacts of footprint increases, the
authors present a regression analysis based on which increases in
footprint are estimated to entail increases in weight which are, in
turn, estimated to entail increases in fuel consumption. However, this
relationship was not the relationship the agencies used to develop the
MY 2014 standards the authors examine in that study. Where the target
function's slope is similar to that of the tendency for fuel
consumption to increase with footprint, fuel economy should tend to
decrease approximately in parallel with the fuel economy target,
thereby obviating the ``benefit'' of deliberate increases in vehicle
footprint. The agencies' analysis supporting today's final rule
indicates relatively wide ranges wherein the relationship between fuel
consumption and footprint may reasonably be specified.
As part of the mid-term evaluation and future NHTSA rulemaking, the
agencies plan to further investigate methods to estimate the potential
that standards might tend to induce changes in the footprint. The
agencies will also continue to closely monitor trends in footprint (and
technology penetration) as manufacturers come into compliance with
increasing levels of the footprint standards.
b. What methodologies and data did the agencies consider in developing
the MYs 2017-2025 curves?
In considering how to address the various policy concerns discussed
in the previous sections, the agencies revisited the data and performed
a number of analyses using different combinations of the various
statistical methods, weighting schemes, adjustments to the data and the
addition of technologies to make the fleets less technologically
heterogeneous. As discussed above, in the agencies' judgment, there is
no single ``correct'' way to estimate the relationship between
CO2 or fuel consumption and footprint--rather, each
statistical result is based on the underlying assumptions about the
particular functional form, weightings and error structures embodied in
the representational approach. These assumptions are the subject of the
following discussion. This process of performing many analyses using
combinations of statistical methods generates many possible outcomes,
each embodying different potentially reasonable combinations of
assumptions and each thus reflective of the data as viewed through a
particular lens. The choice of a proposed standard developed by a given
combination of these statistical methods was consequently a decision
based upon the agencies' determination of how, given the policy
objectives for this rulemaking and the agencies' MY 2008-based forecast
of the market through MY 2025, to appropriately reflect the current
understanding of the evolution of automotive technology and costs, the
future prospects for the vehicle market, and thereby establish curves
(i.e., standards) for cars and light trucks. As discussed below, for
today's final rule, the agencies used updated information to repeat
these analyses, found that results were generally similar and spanned a
similarly wide range, and found that the curves underlying the
[[Page 62693]]
proposed standards were well within this range.
c. What information did the agencies use to estimate a relationship
between fuel economy, CO2 and footprint?
For each fleet, the agencies began with the MY 2008-based market
forecast developed to support the proposal (i.e., the baseline fleet),
with vehicles' fuel economy levels and technological characteristics at
MY 2008 levels.\196\ For today's final rule, the agencies made minor
corrections to this market forecast, and also developed a MY 2010-based
market forecast. The development, scope, and content of these market
forecasts are discussed in detail in Chapter 1 of the joint Technical
Support Document supporting the rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ While the agencies jointly conducted this analysis, the
coefficients ultimately used in the slope setting analysis are from
the CAFE model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. What adjustments did the agencies evaluate?
The agencies believe one possible approach is to fit curves to the
minimally adjusted data shown above (the approach still includes sales
mix adjustments, which influence results of sales-weighted
regressions), much as DOT did when it first began evaluating potential
attribute-based standards in 2003.\197\ However, the agencies have
found, as in prior rulemakings, that the data are so widely spread
(i.e., when graphed, they fall in a loose ``cloud'' rather than tightly
around an obvious line) that they indicate a relationship between
footprint and CO2 and fuel consumption that is real but not
particularly strong. Therefore, as discussed below, the agencies also
explored possible adjustments that could help to explain and/or reduce
the ambiguity of this relationship, or could help to support policy
outcomes the agencies judged to be more desirable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ 68 FR 74920-74926.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Adjustment to Reflect Differences in Technology
As in prior rulemakings, the agencies consider technology
differences between vehicle models to be a significant factor producing
uncertainty regarding the relationship between CO2/fuel
consumption and footprint. Noting that attribute-based standards are
intended to encourage the application of additional technology to
improve fuel efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions, the
agencies, in addition to considering approaches based on the unadjusted
engineering characteristics of MY 2008 vehicle models, therefore also
considered approaches in which, as for previous rulemakings, technology
is added to vehicles for purposes of the curve fitting analysis in
order to produce fleets that are less varied in technology content.
The agencies adjusted the baseline fleet for technology by adding
all technologies considered, except for the most advanced high-BMEP
(brake mean effective pressure) gasoline engines, diesel engines, ISGs,
strong HEVs, PHEVs, EVs, and FCVs. The agencies included 15 percent
mass reduction on all vehicles.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ As described in the preceding paragraph, applying
technology in this manner helps to reduce the effect of technology
differences across the vehicle fleet. The particular technologies
used for the normalization were chosen as a reasonable selection of
technologies which could potentially be used by manufacturers over
this time period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Adjustments Reflecting Differences in Performance and ``Density''
For the reasons discussed above regarding revisiting the shapes of
the curves, the agencies considered adjustments for other differences
between vehicle models (i.e., inflating or deflating the fuel economy
of each vehicle model based on the extent to which one of the vehicle's
attributes, such as power, is higher or lower than average).
Previously, NHTSA had rejected such adjustments because they imply that
a multi-attribute standard may be necessary, and the agencies judged
most multi-attribute standards to be more subject to gaming than a
footprint-only standard.199,200 Having considered this issue
again for purposes of this rulemaking, NHTSA and EPA conclude the need
to accommodate in the target curves the challenges faced by
manufacturers of large pickups currently outweighs these prior
concerns. Therefore, the agencies also evaluated curve fitting
approaches through which fuel consumption and CO2 levels
were adjusted with respect to weight-to-footprint alone, and in
combination with power-to-weight. While the agencies examined these
adjustments for purposes of fitting curves, the agencies are not
promulgating a multi-attribute standard; the proposed fuel economy and
CO2 targets for each vehicle are still functions of
footprint alone. No adjustment will be used in the compliance process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ For example, in comments on NHTSA's 2008 NPRM regarding MY
2011-2015 CAFE standards, Porsche recommended that standards be
defined in terms of a ``Summed Weighted Attribute'', wherein the
fuel economy target would be calculated as follows: target = f(SWA),
where target is the fuel economy target applicable to a given
vehicle model and SWA = footprint + torque1/1.5 + weight
1/2.5. (NHTSA-2008-0089-0174.)
\200\ 74 FR 14359.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the proposal, the agencies also examined some differences
between the technology-adjusted car and truck fleets in order to better
understand the relationship between footprint and CO2/fuel
consumption in the agencies' MY 2008 based forecast. The agencies
investigated the relationship between HP/WT and footprint in the
agencies' MY 2008-based market forecast. On a sales weighted basis,
cars tend to become proportionally more powerful as they get larger. In
contrast, there is a minimally positive relationship between HP/WT and
footprint for light trucks, indicating that light trucks become only
slightly more powerful as they get larger.
This analysis, presented in chapter 2.4.1.2 of the joint TSD,
indicated that vehicle performance (power-to-weight ratio) and
``density'' (curb weight divided by footprint) are both correlated to
fuel consumption (and CO2 emission rate), and that these
vehicle attributes are also both related to vehicle footprint. Based on
these relationships, the agencies explored adjusting the fuel economy
and CO2 emission rates of individual vehicle models based on
deviations from ``expected'' performance or weight/footprint at a given
footprint; the agencies inflated fuel economy levels of vehicle models
with higher performance and/or weight/footprint than the average of the
fleet would indicate at that footprint, and deflated fuel economy
levels with lower performance and/or weight. While the agencies
considered this technique for purposes of fitting curves, the agencies
are not promulgating a multi-attribute standard, as the proposed fuel
economy and CO2 targets for each vehicle are still functions
of footprint alone. No adjustment will be used in the compliance
process.
For today's final rule, the agencies repeated the above analyses,
using the corrected MY 2008-based market forecast and, separately, the
MY 2010-based market forecasts. As discussed in section 2.6 of the
joint TSD and further detailed in a memorandum available at Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0131-0325, doing so produced results similar to the analysis
used in the proposal.
The agencies sought comment on the appropriateness of the
adjustments described in Chapter 2 of the joint TSD, particularly
regarding whether these adjustments suggest that standards should be
defined in terms of other attributes in addition to footprint, and
whether they may encourage changes other than encouraging the
application of technology to improve fuel economy
[[Page 62694]]
and reduce CO2 emissions. The agencies also sought comment
regarding whether these adjustments effectively ``lock in'' through MY
2025 relationships that were observed in MY 2008.
ACEEE objected to the agencies' adjustments to the truck curves,
arguing that if the truck slope needs to be adjusted for ``density,''
then that suggests that the MY 2008-based market forecast used to build
up the reference fleet must be ``incorrect and show * * *
unrealistically low pickup truck fuel consumption, due to the
overstatement of the benefits of certain technologies.'' \201\ ACEEE
stated that ``If that is the case, the agencies should revisit the
adjustments made to generate the reference fleet and remove
technologies from pickups that are not suited to those trucks,'' which
``would be a far more satisfactory approach than the speculative and
non-quantitative approach of adjusting for vehicle density.'' \202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ ACEEE comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528 at 3-
4.
\202\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACEEE further stated that ``the fuel consumption trend that the
density adjustment is meant to correct appears in the unadjusted fleet
as well as the technology-adjusted fleet of light trucks (TSD Figures
2-1 and 2-2),'' which they argued is evidence that ``the flattening of
fuel consumption at higher footprints is not a byproduct of unrealistic
technology adjustments, but rather a reflection of actual fuel economy
trends in today's market.'' \203\ ACEEE stated that therefore it did
not make sense to adjust the fuel consumption of ``low-density'' trucks
upwards before fitting the curve.\204\ ACEEE pointed out that it would
appear that trucks' HP-to-weight ratio should be higher than the
agencies' analysis indicated, and stated that the weight-based EU
CO2 standard curves are adjusted for HP-to-weight, which
resulted in flatter curves, and which are intended to avoid
incentivizing up-weighting.\205\ ACEEE argued that by not choosing this
approach and by adjusting for density, along with using sales-weighting
and an OLS method instead of MAD, the proposed curves encourage vehicle
upsizing.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ Id.
\204\ Id.
\205\ Id.
\206\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, ACEEE stated, the deviations from the analytical approach
previously adopted were not justified with data provided in the NPRM,
and the resulting ``ad hoc adjustments'' to the curve-fitting process
detracted from the agencies' argument for the proposals. ACEEE further
commented that increasing the slope of the truck curve would be
``counter-productive'' from a policy perspective as well, implying that
challenging light truck standards have helped manufacturers of light
trucks to recover from the recent downturn in the light vehicle
market.\207\ The Sierra Club and CBD also opposed increasing the slope
of the truck curve for MYs 2017 and beyond as compared to the MY 2016
truck curve, on the basis that it would encourage upsizing and reduce
fuel economy and CO2 emissions improvements.\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ Id. at 6
\208\ Sierra Club et al. comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799-9549 at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conversely, the UAW strongly supported the agencies' balancing of
``the challenges of adding fuel-economy improving technologies to the
largest light trucks with the need to maintain the full functionality
of these vehicles across a wide range of applications'' \209\ through
their approach to curve fitting. The Alliance also expressed support
for the agencies' analyses (including the consideration of different
weightings), and the selected relationships between the fuel
consumption and footprint for MYs 2017-2021.\210\ Both ACEEE and the
Alliance urged the agencies to revisit the estimation and selection of
curves during the mid-term evaluation, and the agencies plan to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ UAW comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563, at 2.
\210\ Alliance comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487,
at 86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response, the agencies maintain that the adjustments (including
no adjustments) considered in the NPRM are all reasonable to apply for
purposes of developing potential fuel economy and GHG target curves,
and that it is left to policy makers to determine an appropriate
perspective involved in selecting weights (if any) to be applied, and
to interpret the consequences of various alternatives. As described
above and in Chapter 2 of the TSD, the agencies believe that the
adjustments made to the truck curve are appropriate because work trucks
provide utility (towing and load-carrying capability) that requires
more torque and power, more cooling and braking capability, and more
fuel-carrying capability (i.e., larger fuel tanks) than would be the
case for other vehicles of similar size and curb weight. Continuing the
2016 truck curve would disadvantage full-line manufacturers active in
this portion of the fleet disproportionately to the rest of the trucks.
The agencies do not include power to weight, density, towing, or
hauling, as a technology. Neither does the agency consider them as part
of a multi-attribute standard. Considering these factors, the agencies
believe that the ``density'' adjustment, as applied to the data
developed for the NPRM, provided a reasonable basis to develop curves
for light trucks. Having repeated our analysis using a corrected MY
2008-based market forecast and, separately, a new MY 2010-based market
forecast, we obtained results spanning ranges similar to those covered
by the analysis we performed for the NPRM. See section 2.6 of the Joint
TSD. In the agencies' judgment, considering the above comments (and
others), the curves proposed in the NPRM strike a sound balance between
the legitimate policy considerations discussed in section II.C. 2--the
interest in discouraging manufacturers from responding to standards by
reducing vehicle size in ways that might compromise highway safety, the
interest in more equitably balancing compliance burdens among limited-
and full-line manufacturers, and the interest in avoiding excessive
risk that projected energy and environmental benefits might be less
than expected due to regulation-incented increases in vehicle size.
Regarding ACEEE's specific comments about the application of these
adjustments to the light truck fleet, we disagree with the
characterization of the adjustments as ad hoc. Choosing from among a
range of legitimate possibilities based on relevant policy and
technical considerations is not an arbitrary, ad hoc exercise.
Throughout multiple rulemaking analyses, NHTSA (more recently, with
EPA) has applied normalization to adjust for differences in
technologies. Also, while the agencies have previously considered and
declined to apply normalizations to reflect differences in other
characteristics, such as power, our judgment that some such
normalizations could be among the set of technically reasonable
approaches was not ad hoc, but in fact based on further technical
analysis and reconsideration. Moreover, that reconsideration occurred
with respect to passenger cars as well as light trucks. Still, we
recognize that results of the different methods we have examined depend
on inputs that are subject to uncertainty; for example, normalization
to adjust for differences in technology depend on uncertain estimates
of technology efficacy, and sales-weighted regressions depend on
uncertain forecasts of future market volumes. Such uncertainties
support the agencies' strong preference to avoid permanently ``locking
in'' any particular curve estimation technique.
[[Page 62695]]
e. What statistical methods did the agencies evaluate?
For the NPRM, the above approaches resulted in three data sets each
for (a) vehicles without added technology and (b) vehicles with
technology added to reduce technology differences, any of which may
provide a reasonable basis for fitting mathematical functions upon
which to base the slope of the standard curves: (1) Vehicles without
any further adjustments; (2) vehicles with adjustments reflecting
differences in ``density'' (weight/footprint); and (3) vehicles with
adjustments reflecting differences in ``density,'' and adjustments
reflecting differences in performance (power/weight). Using these data
sets, the agencies tested a range of regression methodologies, each
judged to be possibly reasonable for application to at least some of
these data sets. Beginning with the corrected MY 2008-based market
forecast and the MY 2010-based market forecast developed for today's
final rule, the above approaches resulted in six data sets--three for
each of the two market forecasts.
i. Regression Approach
In the MYs 2012-2016 final rules, the agencies employed a robust
regression approach (minimum absolute deviation, or MAD), rather than
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.\211\ MAD is generally
applied to mitigate the effect of outliers in a dataset, and thus was
employed in that rulemaking as part of our interest in attempting to
best represent the underlying technology. NHTSA used OLS in early
development of attribute-based CAFE standards, but NHTSA (and then
NHTSA and EPA) subsequently chose MAD instead of OLS for both the MY
2011 and the MYs 2012-2016 rulemakings. These decisions on regression
technique were made both because OLS gives additional emphasis to
outliers \212\ and because the MAD approach helped achieve the
agencies' policy goals with regard to curve slope in those
rulemakings.\213\ In the interest of taking a fresh look at appropriate
regression methodologies as promised in the 2012-2016 light duty
rulemaking, in developing this rule, the agencies gave full
consideration to both OLS and MAD. The OLS representation, as
described, uses squared errors, while MAD employs absolute errors and
thus weights outliers less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ See 75 FR 25359.
\212\ Id. at 25362-63.
\213\ Id. at 25363.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted, one of the reasons stated for choosing MAD over least
square regression in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking was that MAD reduced
the weight placed on outliers in the data. However, the agencies have
further considered whether it is appropriate to classify these vehicles
as outliers. Unlike in traditional datasets, these vehicles'
performance is not mischaracterized due to errors in their measurement,
a common reason for outlier classification. Being certification data,
the chances of large measurement errors should be near zero,
particularly towards high CO2 or fuel consumption. Thus,
they can only be outliers in the sense that the vehicle designs are
unlike those of other vehicles. These outlier vehicles may include
performance vehicles, vehicles with high ground clearance, 4WD, or boxy
designs. Given that these are equally legitimate on-road vehicle
designs, the agencies concluded that it would appropriate to reconsider
the treatment of these vehicles in the regression techniques.
Based on these considerations as well as the adjustments discussed
above, the agencies concluded it was not meaningful to run MAD
regressions on gpm data that had already been adjusted in the manner
described above. Normalizing already reduced the variation in the data,
and brought outliers towards average values. This was the intended
effect, so the agencies deemed it unnecessary to apply an additional
remedy to resolve an issue that had already been addressed, but we
sought comment on the use of robust regression techniques under such
circumstances. ACEEE stated that either MAD (i.e., one robust
regression technique) or OLS was ``technically sound,'' \214\ and other
stakeholders that commented on the agencies' analysis supporting the
selection of curves did not comment specifically on robust regression
techniques. On the other hand, ACEEE did suggest that the application
of multiple layers of normalization may provide tenuous results. For
this rulemaking, we consider the range of methods we have examined to
be technically reasonable, and our selected curves fall within those
ranges. However, all else being equal, we agree that simpler or more
stable methods are likely preferable to more complex or unstable
methods, and as mentioned above, we agree with ACEEE and the Alliance
that revisiting the selection of curves would be appropriate as part of
the required future NHTSA rulemaking and mid-term evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ ACEEE comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528 at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Sales Weighting
Likewise, the agencies reconsidered employing sales-weighting to
represent the data. As explained below, the decision to sales weight or
not is ultimately based upon a choice about how to represent the data,
and not by an underlying statistical concern. Sales weighting is used
if the decision is made to treat each (mass produced) unit sold as a
unique physical observation. Doing so thereby changes the extent to
which different vehicle model types are emphasized as compared to a
non-sales weighted regression. For example, while total General Motors
Silverado (332,000) and Ford F-150 (322,000) sales differed by less
than 10,000 in the MY 2021 market forecast (in the MY 2008-based
forecast), 62 F-150s models and 38 Silverado models were reported in
the agencies baselines. Without sales-weighting, the F-150 models,
because there are more of them, were given 63 percent more weight in
the regression despite comprising a similar portion of the marketplace
and a relatively homogenous set of vehicle technologies.
The agencies did not use sales weighting in the MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking analysis of the curve shapes. A decision to not perform
sales weighting reflects judgment that each vehicle model provides an
equal amount of information concerning the underlying relationship
between footprint and fuel economy. Sales-weighted regression gives the
highest sales vehicle model types vastly more emphasis than the lowest-
sales vehicle model types thus driving the regression toward the sales-
weighted fleet norm. For unweighted regression, vehicle sales do not
matter. The agencies note that the MY 2008-based light truck market
forecast shows MY 2025 sales of 218,000 units for Toyota's 2WD Sienna,
and shows 66 model configurations with MY 2025 sales of fewer than 100
units. Similarly, the agencies' MY 2008-based market forecast shows MY
2025 sales of 267,000 for the Toyota Prius, and shows 40 model
configurations with MY2025 sales of fewer than 100 units. Sales-
weighted analysis would give the Toyota Sienna and Prius more than a
thousand times the consideration of many vehicle model configurations.
Sales-weighted analysis would, therefore, cause a large number of
vehicle model configurations to be virtually ignored in the
regressions.\215\ The MY 2010-based market forecast includes similar
examples of extreme disparities in production volumes, and therefore,
degree of influence over sales-
[[Page 62696]]
weighted regression results. Moreover, unlike unweighted approaches,
sales-weighted approaches are subject to more uncertainties surrounding
sales volumes. For example, in the MY 2008-based market forecast,
Chrysler's production volumes are projected to decline significantly
through MY 2025, in stark contrast to the prediction for that company
in the MY 2010-based market forecast. Therefore, under a sales-weighted
approach, Chrysler's vehicle models have considerably less influence on
regression results for the MY 2008-based fleet than for the MY 2010-
based fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ 75 FR 25362 and n. 64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the agencies did note in the MYs 2012-2016 final rules
that, ``sales weighted regression would allow the difference between
other vehicle attributes to be reflected in the analysis, and also
would reflect consumer demand.'' \216\ In reexamining the sales-
weighting for this analysis, the agencies note that there are low-
volume model types account for many of the passenger car model types
(50 percent of passenger car model types account for 3.3 percent of
sales), and it is unclear whether the engineering characteristics of
these model types should equally determine the standard for the
remainder of the market. To expand on this point, low volume cars in
the agencies' MY 2008 and 2010 baseline include specialty vehicles such
as the Bugatti Veyron, Rolls Royce Phantom, and General Motors Funeral
Coach Hearse. These vehicle models all represent specific engineering
designs, and in a regression without sales weighting, they are given
equal weighting to other vehicles with single models with more
relevance to the typical vehicle buyer including mass market sedans
like the Toyota Prius referenced above. Similar disparities exist on
the truck side, where small manufacturers such as Roush manufacturer
numerous low sale vehicle models that also represent specific
engineering designs. Given that the curve fit is ultimately used in
compliance, and compliance is based on sales-weighted average
performance, although the agencies are not currently attempting to
estimate consumer responses to today's standards, sales weighting could
be a reasonable approach to fitting curves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ 75 FR 25632/3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the interest of taking a fresh look at appropriate methodologies
as promised in the last final rule, in developing the proposal, the
agencies gave full consideration to both sales-weighted and unweighted
regressions.
iii. Analyses Performed
For the NPRM, we performed regressions describing the relationship
between a vehicle's CO2/fuel consumption and its footprint,
in terms of various combinations of factors: Initial (raw) fleets with
no technology, versus after technology is applied; sales-weighted
versus non-sales weighted; and with and without two sets of normalizing
factors applied to the observations. The agencies excluded diesels and
dedicated AFVs because the agencies anticipate that advanced gasoline-
fueled vehicles are likely to be dominant through MY 2025, based both
on our own assessment of potential standards (see Sections III.D and
IV.G below) as well as our discussions with large number of automotive
companies and suppliers. Supporting today's final rule, we repeated all
of this analysis twice--once for the corrected MY 2008-based market
forecast, and once for the MY 2010-based market forecast. Doing so
produced results generally similar to those documented in the joint TSD
supporting the NPRM. See section 2.6 of the joint TSD and the docket
memo.
Thus, the basic OLS regression on the initial data (with no
technology applied) and no sales-weighting represents one perspective
on the relation between footprint and fuel economy. Adding sales
weighting changes the interpretation to include the influence of sales
volumes, and thus steps away from representing vehicle technology
alone. Likewise, MAD is an attempt to reduce the impact of outliers,
but reducing the impact of outliers might perhaps be less
representative of technical relationships between the variables,
although that relationship may change over time in reality. Each
combination of methods and data reflects a perspective, and the
regression results simply reflect that perspective in a simple
quantifiable manner, expressed as the coefficients determining the line
through the average (for OLS) or the median (for MAD) of the data. It
is left to policy makers to determine an appropriate perspective and to
interpret the consequences of the various alternatives.
We sought comments on the application of the weights as described
above, and the implications for interpreting the relationship between
fuel efficiency (or CO2) and footprint. As discussed above,
ACEEE questioned adjustment of the light truck data. The Alliance, in
contrast, generally supported the weightings applied by the agencies,
and the resultant relationships between fuel efficiency and footprint.
Both ACEEE and the Alliance commented that the agencies should revisit
the application of weights--and broader aspects of analysis to develop
mathematical functions--in the future. We note that although ACEEE
expressed concern regarding the outcomes of the application of the
weight/footprint adjustment, ACEEE did not indicate that all adjustment
would be problematic, rather, they endorsed the method of adjusting
fuel economy data based on differences in vehicle models' levels of
applied technology. As we have indicated above, considering the policy
implications, the agencies have selected curves that fall within the
range spanned by the many methods we have evaluated and consider to be
technically reasonable. We disagree with ACEEE that we have selected
curves that are, for light trucks, too steep. However, recognizing
uncertainties in the estimates underlying our analytical results, and
recognizing that our analytical results span a range of technically
reasonable outcomes, we agree with ACEEE and the Alliance that
revisiting the curve shape would be appropriate as part of the required
future NHTSA rulemaking and planned mid-term evaluation.
f. What results did the agencies obtain and why were the selected
curves reasonable?
For both the NPRM and today's final rule, both agencies analyzed
the same statistical approaches. For regressions against data including
technology normalization, NHTSA used the CAFE modeling system, and EPA
used EPA's OMEGA model. The agencies obtained similar regression
results, and have based today's joint rule on those obtained by NHTSA.
Chapter 2 of the joint TSD contains a large set of illustrative figures
which show the range of curves determined by the possible combinations
of regression technique, with and without sales weighting, with and
without the application of technology, and with various adjustments to
the gpm variable prior to running a regression.
For the curves presented in the NPRM and finalized today, the
choice among the alternatives presented in Chapter 2 of the draft Joint
TSD was to use the OLS formulation, on sales-weighted data developed
for the NPRM (with some errors not then known to the agencies), using a
fleet that has had technology applied, and after adjusting the data for
the effect of weight-to-footprint, as described above. The agencies
believe that this represented a technically reasonable approach for
purposes of developing target curves to define the proposed standards,
and that
[[Page 62697]]
it represented a reasonable trade-off among various considerations
balancing statistical, technical, and policy matters, which include the
statistical representativeness of the curves considered and the
steepness of the curve chosen. The agencies judge the application of
technology prior to curve fitting to have provided a reasonable means--
one consistent with the rule's objective of encouraging manufacturers
to add technology in order to increase fuel economy--of reducing
variation in the data and thereby helping to estimate a relationship
between fuel consumption/CO2 and footprint.
Similarly, for the agencies' MY 2008-based market-forecast and the
agencies' current estimates of future technology effectiveness, the
inclusion of the weight-to-footprint data adjustment prior to running
the regression also helped to improve the fit of the curves by reducing
the variation in the data, and the agencies believe that the benefits
of this adjustment for the proposed rule likely outweigh the potential
that resultant curves might somehow encourage reduced load carrying
capability or vehicle performance (note that we are not suggesting that
we believe these adjustments will reduce load carrying capability or
vehicle performance). In addition to reducing the variability, the
truck curve is also steepened, and the car curve flattened compared to
curves fitted to sales weighted data that do not include these
normalizations. The agencies agreed with manufacturers of full-size
pick-up trucks that in order to maintain towing and hauling utility,
the engines on pick-up trucks must be more powerful, than their low
``density'' nature would statistically suggest based on the agencies'
current MY 2008-based market forecast and the agencies' current
estimates of the effectiveness of different fuel-saving technologies.
Therefore, it may be more equitable (i.e., in terms of relative
compliance challenges faced by different light truck manufacturers) to
have adjusted the slope of the curve defining fuel economy and
CO2 targets.
Several comments were submitted subsequent to the NPRM with regard
to the non-homogenous nature of the truck fleet, and the ``unique''
attributes of pickup trucks. As noted above, Ford described the
attributes of these vehicles, noting that ``towing capability generally
requires increased aerodynamic drag caused by a modified frontal area,
increased rolling resistance, and a heavier frame and suspension to
support this additional capability.'' \217\ Ford further noted that
these vehicles further require auxiliary transmission oil coolers,
upgraded radiators, trailer hitch connectors and wiring harness
equipment, different steering ratios, upgraded rear bumpers and
different springs for heavier tongue load (for upgraded towing
packages), body-on-frame (vs. unibody) construction (also known as
ladder frame construction) to support this capability and an aggressive
duty cycle, and lower axle ratios for better pulling power/capability.
ACEEE, as discussed above, objected to the adjustments to the truck
curves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ Ford comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463 at 5-
6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the agencies' judgment, the curves and cutpoints defining the
light truck standards appropriately account for engineering differences
between different types of vehicles. For example, the agencies'
estimates of the applicability, cost, and effectiveness of different
fuel-saving technologies differentiate between small, medium, and large
light trucks. While we acknowledge that uncertainties regarding
technology efficacy affect the outcome of methods including
normalization to account for differences in technology, the other
normalizations we have considered are not intended to somehow
compensate for this uncertainty, but rather to reflect other analytical
concepts that could be technically reasonable for purposes of
estimating relationships between footprint and fuel economy.
Furthermore, we agree with Ford that pickup trucks have distinct
attributes that warrant consideration of slopes other than the flattest
within the range spanned by technically reasonable options. We also
note that, as documented in the joint TSD, even without normalizing
light truck fuel economy values for any differences (even technology),
unweighted MAD and OLS yielded slopes close to or steeper than those
underlying today's light truck standards. We will revisit the
estimation and selection of these curves as part of NHTSA's future
rulemaking and the mid-term evaluation.
As described above, however, other approaches are also technically
reasonable, and also represent a way of expressing the underlying
relationships. The agencies revisited the analysis for the final rule,
having corrected the underlying 2008-based market forecast, having
developed a MY 2010-based market forecast, having updated estimates of
technology effectiveness, and having considered relevant public
comments. In addition, the agencies updated the technology cost
estimates, which altered the NPRM analysis results, but not the balance
of the trade-offs being weighed to determine the final curves.
As discussed above, based in part on the Whitefoot/Skerlos paper
and its findings regarding the implied potential for vehicle upsizing,
some commenters, such as NACAA and Center for Biological Diversity,
considered the slopes for both the car and truck curves to be too
steep, and ACEEE, Sierra Club, Volkswagen, Toyota, and Honda more
specifically commented that the truck slope was too steep. On the other
hand, the UAW, Ford, GM, and Chrysler supported the slope of both the
car and truck curves. ICCT commented, as they have in prior
rulemakings, that the car and the truck curve should be identical, and
UCS commented that the curves should be adjusted to minimize the
``gap'' in target stringency in the 45 ft\2\ (+/- 3 ft\2\) range to
avoid giving manufacturers an incentive to classify CUVs as trucks
rather than as cars.\218\
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\218\ UCS comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567 at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As also discussed above, the agencies continue to believe that the
slopes for both the car and the truck curves finalized in this
rulemaking remain appropriate. There is also good reason for the slopes
of the car and truck curves potentially to be distinct from one
another--for one, our analysis produces different results for these
fleets based on their different characteristics, and more importantly
for NHTSA, EPCA/EISA requires that standards for passenger cars and
light trucks be established separately. The agencies agree with Ford
(and others) that the properties of cars and trucks are different. The
agencies agree with Ford's observation (and illustration) that ``* * *
cars and trucks have different functional characteristics, even if they
have the same footprint and nearly the same base curb weights. For
example, the Ford Edge and the Ford Taurus have the same footprint, but
vastly different capabilities with respect to cargo space and towing
capacity. Some of the key features incorporated on the Edge that enable
the larger tow capability include an engine oil cooler, larger radiator
and updated cooling fans. This is just one of the many examples that
show the functional difference between cars and trucks * * *'' \219\ On
balance, given the agencies' analysis, and all of the issues the
agencies have taken into account, we believe that the slopes of cars
and trucks have been
[[Page 62698]]
selected with proper consideration and represent a reasonable and
appropriate balance of technical and policy factors.
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\219\ Ford comment, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463 at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Implications of the slope compared to MY 2016
The slope has several implications relative to the MY 2016 curves,
with the majority of changes on the truck curve. For the NPRM, the
agencies selected a car curve slope similar to that finalized in the
MYs 2012-2016 final rulemaking (4.7 g/mile-ft\2\ in MY 2016, vs. 4.5 g/
mile-ft\2\ proposed in MY 2017). By contrast, the selected truck curve
is steeper in MY 2017 than in MY 2016 (4.0 g/mile-ft\2\ in MY 2016 vs.
4.9 g/mile-ft\2\ in MY 2017). As discussed previously, a steeper slope
relaxes the stringency of targets for larger vehicles relative to those
for smaller vehicles, thereby shifting relative compliance burdens
among manufacturers based on their respective product mix.
5. Once the agencies determined the slope, how did the agencies
determine the rest of the mathematical function?
The agencies continue to believe that without a limit at the
smallest footprints, the function--whether logistic or linear--can
reach values that would be unfairly burdensome for a manufacturer that
elects to focus on the market for small vehicles; depending on the
underlying data, an unconstrained form could result in stringency
levels that are technologically infeasible and/or economically
impracticable for those manufacturers that may elect to focus on the
smallest vehicles. On the other side of the function, without a limit
at the largest footprints, the function may provide no floor on
required fuel economy. Also, the safety considerations that support the
provision of a disincentive for downsizing as a compliance strategy
apply weakly, if at all, to the very largest vehicles. Limiting the
function's value for the largest vehicles thus leads to a function with
an inherent absolute minimum level of performance, while remaining
consistent with safety considerations.
Just as for slope, in determining the appropriate footprint and
fuel economy values for the ``cutpoints,'' the places along the curve
where the sloped portion becomes flat, the agencies took a fresh look
for purposes of this rule, taking into account the updated market
forecast and new assumptions about the availability of technologies.
The next two sections discuss the agencies' approach to cutpoints for
the passenger car and light truck curves separately, as the policy
considerations for each vary somewhat.
a. Cutpoints for Passenger Car Curve
The passenger car fleet upon which the agencies based the target
curves proposed for MYs 2017-2025 was derived from MY 2008 data, as
discussed above. In MY 2008, passenger car footprints ranged from 36.7
square feet, the Lotus Exige 5, to 69.3 square feet, the Daimler
Maybach 62. In that fleet, several manufacturers offer small, sporty
coupes below 41 square feet, such as the BMW Z4 and Mini, Honda S2000,
Mazda MX-5 Miata, Porsche Carrera and 911, and Volkswagen New Beetle.
Because such vehicles represent a small portion (less than 10 percent)
of the passenger car market, yet often have performance, utility, and/
or structural characteristics that could make it technologically
infeasible and/or economically impracticable for manufacturers focusing
on such vehicles to achieve the very challenging average requirements
that could apply in the absence of a constraint, EPA and NHTSA again
proposed to cut off the sloped portion of the passenger car function at
41 square feet, consistent with the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking. The
agencies recognized that for manufacturers who make small vehicles in
this size range, putting the cutpoint at 41 square feet creates some
incentive to downsize (i.e., further reduce the size, and/or increase
the production of models currently smaller than 41 square feet) to make
it easier to meet the target. Putting the cutpoint here may also create
the incentive for manufacturers who do not currently offer such models
to do so in the future. However, at the same time, the agencies believe
that there is a limit to the market for cars smaller than 41 square
feet--most consumers likely have some minimum expectation about
interior volume, among other things. The agencies thus believe that the
number of consumers who will want vehicles smaller than 41 square feet
(regardless of how they are priced) is small, and that the incentive to
downsize to less than 41 square feet in response to this rule, if
present, will be at best minimal. On the other hand, the agencies note
that some manufacturers are introducing mini cars not reflected in the
agencies MY 2008-based market forecast, such as the Fiat 500, to the
U.S. market, and that the footprint at which the curve is limited may
affect the incentive for manufacturers to do so.
Above 56 square feet, the only passenger car models present in the
MY 2008 fleet were four luxury vehicles with extremely low sales
volumes--the Bentley Arnage and three versions of the Rolls Royce
Phantom. The MY 2010 fleet was similar, with three BMW models, the
Maybach 57S, the Rolls Royce Ghost, and four versions of the Rolls
Royce Phantom in this size range. As in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking,
NHTSA and EPA therefore proposed again to cut off the sloped portion of
the passenger car function at 56 square feet.
While meeting with manufacturers prior to issuing the proposal, the
agencies received comments from some manufacturers that, combined with
slope and overall stringency, using 41 square feet as the footprint at
which to cap the target for small cars would result in unduly
challenging targets for small cars. The agencies do not agree. No
specific vehicle need meet its target (because standards apply to fleet
average performance), and maintaining a sloped function toward the
smaller end of the passenger car market is important to discourage
unsafe downsizing, the agencies thus proposed to again ``cut off'' the
passenger car curve at 41 square feet, notwithstanding these comments.
The agencies sought comment on setting cutpoints for the MYs 2017-
2025 passenger car curves at 41 square feet and 56 square feet. IIHS
expressed some concern regarding the ``breakpoint'' of the fuel economy
curve at the lower extreme where footprint is the smallest-that is, the
leveling-off point on the fuel economy curve where the fuel economy
requirement ceases to increase as footprint decreases.\220\ IIHS stated
that moving this breakpoint farther to the left so that even smaller
vehicles have increasing fuel economy targets would reduce the chance
that manufacturers would downsize the lightest vehicles for further
fuel economy credits.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ IIHS comments, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0222, at 1.
\221\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies agree with IIHS that moving the 41 square foot
cutpoint to an even smaller value would additionally discourage
downsizing of the smallest vehicles--that is, the vehicles for which
downsizing would be most likely to compromise occupant protection.
However, in the agencies' judgment, notwithstanding narrow market
niches for some types vehicles (exemplified by, e.g., the Smart
Fortwo), consumer preferences are likely to remain such that
manufacturers will be unlikely to deliberately respond to today's
standards by downsizing the smallest vehicles. However, the agencies
will monitor developments in the passenger car market and revisit this
issue as part of NHTSA's future rulemaking to establish final MYs 2022-
2025
[[Page 62699]]
standards and the concurrent mid-term evaluation process.
b. Cutpoints for Light Truck Curve
The light truck fleet upon which the agencies based the proposed
target curves for MYs 2017-2025, like the passenger car fleet, was
derived from MY 2008 data, as discussed in Section 2.4 above. In MY
2008, light truck footprints ranged from 41.0 square feet, the Jeep
Wrangler, to 77.5 square feet, the Toyota Tundra. For consistency with
the curve for passenger cars, the agencies proposed to cut off the
sloped portion of the light truck function at the same footprint, 41
square feet, although we recognized that no light trucks are currently
offered below 41 square feet. With regard to the upper cutpoint, the
agencies heard from a number of manufacturers during the discussions
leading up to the proposal of the MY 2017-2025 standards that the
location of the cutpoint in the MYs 2012-2016 rules, 66 square feet,
resulted in challenging targets for the largest light trucks in the
later years of that rulemaking. See 76 FR 74864-65. Those manufacturers
requested that the agencies extend the cutpoint to a larger footprint,
to reduce targets for the largest light trucks which represent a
significant percentage of those manufacturers light truck sales. At the
same time, in re-examining the light truck fleet data, the agencies
concluded that aggregating pickup truck models in the MYs 2012-2016
rule had led the agencies to underestimate the impact of the different
pickup truck model configurations above 66 square feet on
manufacturers' fleet average fuel economy and CO2 levels (as
discussed immediately below). In disaggregating the pickup truck model
data, the impact of setting the cutpoint at 66 square feet after model
year 2016 became clearer to the agencies.
In the agencies' view, there was legitimate basis for these
comments. The agencies' MY 2008-based market forecast supporting the
NPRM included about 24 vehicle configurations above 74 square feet with
a total volume of about 50,000 vehicles or less during any MY in the
2017-2025 time frame. While a relatively small portion of the overall
truck fleet, for some manufacturers, these vehicles are a non-trivial
portion of sales. As noted above, the very largest light trucks have
significant load-carrying and towing capabilities that make it
particularly challenging for manufacturers to add fuel economy-
improving/CO2-reducing technologies in a way that maintains
the full functionality of those capabilities.
Considering manufacturer CBI and our estimates of the impact of the
66 square foot cutpoint for future model years, the agencies determined
to adopt curves that transition to a different cut point. While noting
that no specific vehicle need meet its target (because standards apply
to fleet average performance), we believe that the information provided
to us by manufacturers and our own analysis supported the gradual
extension of the cutpoint for large light trucks in the proposal from
66 square feet in MY 2016 out to a larger footprint square feet before
MY 2025.
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.008
[[Page 62700]]
The agencies proposed to phase in the higher cutpoint for the truck
curve in order to avoid any backsliding from the MY 2016 standard. A
target that is feasible in one model year should never become less
reasonable in a subsequent model year--manufacturers should have no
reason to remove fuel economy-improving/CO2-reducing
technology from a vehicle once it has been applied. Put another way,
the agencies proposed to not allow ``curve crossing'' from one model
year to the next. In proposing MYs 2011-2015 CAFE standards and
promulgating MY 2011 standards, NHTSA proposed and requested comment on
avoiding curve crossing, as an ``anti-backsliding measure.'' \222\ The
MY 2016 2-cycle test curves are therefore a floor for the MYs 2017-2025
curves. For passenger cars, which have minimal change in slope from the
MY 2012-2016 rulemakings and no change in cut points, there were no
curve crossing issues in the proposed (or final) standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ 74 FR 14370 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies received some comments on the selection of these
cutpoints. ACEEE commented that the extension of the light truck
cutpoint upward from 66 square feet to 74 square feet. would reduce
stringency for large trucks even though there is no safety-related
reason to discourage downsizing of these trucks.\223\ Sierra Club \224\
and Volkswagen commented that moving this cutpoint could encourage
trucks to get larger and may be detrimental to societal fatalities, and
the Sierra Club suggested that the agencies could mitigate this risk by
providing an alternate emissions target for light trucks of 60 square
feet or more that exceed the sales projected in the rule in the year
that sales exceed the projection.\225\ ACEEE similarly suggested that
the agencies include a provision to fix the upper bound for the light
truck targets at the 66 square foot target once sales of trucks larger
than that in a given year reach the level of MY 2008 sales, to
discourage upsizing.\226\ Global Automakers commented that the cutpoint
for the smallest light trucks should be set at approximately ten
percent of sales (as for passenger cars) rather than at 41 square
feet.\227\ Conversely, IIHS commented that, for both passenger cars and
light trucks, the 41 square foot cutpoint should be moved further to
the left (i.e., to even smaller footprints), to reduce the incentive
for manufacturers to downsize the lightest vehicles.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ ACEEE, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528 at 4-5.
\224\ Sierra Club et al., Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549
at 6.
\225\ Sierra Club et al., Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549
at 6.
\226\ ACEEE, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528 at 7.
\227\ Global Automakers, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0237, at 4.
\228\ IIHS, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0222, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies have considered these comments regarding the cutpoint
applied to the high footprint end of the target function for light
trucks, and we judge there to be minimal risk that manufacturers would
respond to this upward extension of the cutpoint by deliberately
increasing the size of light trucks that are already at the upper end
of marketable vehicle sizes. Such vehicles have distinct size,
maneuverability, fuel consumption, storage, and other characteristics
as opposed to the currently more popular vehicles between 43 and 48
square feet, and are likely not suited for all consumers in all usage
scenarios. Further, larger vehicles typically also have additional
production costs that make it unlikely that these vehicles will become
the predominant vehicles in the fleet. Therefore, we remain concerned
that not to extend this cutpoint to 74 square feet would fail to take
into adequate consideration the challenges to improving fuel economy
and CO2 emissions to the levels required by this final rule
for vehicles with footprints larger than 66 square feet, given their
increased utility. As noted above, because CAFE and GHG standards are
based on average performance, manufacturers need not ensure that every
vehicle model meets its CAFE and GHG targets. Still, the agencies are
concerned that standards with stringent targets for large trucks would
unduly burden full-line manufacturers active in the market for full-
size pickups and other large light trucks, as discussed earlier, and
evidenced by the agencies' estimates of differences between compliance
burdens faced by OEMs active and not active in the market for full-size
pickups. While some manufacturers have recently indicated \229\ that
buyers are currently willing to pay a premium for fuel economy
improvements, the agencies are concerned that disparities in long-term
regulatory requirements could lead to future market distortions
undermining the economic practicability of the standards. Absent an
upward extension of the cutpoint, such disparities would be even
greater. For these reasons, the agencies do not expect that gradually
extending the cutpoint to 74 square feet will create incentives to
upsize large trucks and, thus, believe there will be no adverse effects
on societal safety. Therefore, we are promulgating standards that, as
proposed, gradually extend the cutpoint to 74 square feet We have also
considered the above comments by Global Automakers and IIHS on the
cutpoints for the smallest passenger cars and light trucks. In our
judgment, placing these cutpoints at 41 square feet continues to strike
an appropriate balance between (a) not discouraging manufacturers from
introducing new small vehicle models in the U.S. and (b) not
encouraging manufacturers to downsize small vehicles.
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\229\ For example, in its June 11, 2012 edition, Automotive News
quoted a Ford sales official saying that ``fuel efficiency continues
to be a top purchaser driver.'' (``More MPG--ASAP'', Automotive
News, Jun 11, 2012.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have considered the Sierra Club and ACEEE suggestion that the
agencies provide an alternate emissions target for light trucks larger
than 60 square feet (Sierra Club) or 66 square feet (ACEEE) that exceed
the sales projected in the rule in the year that sales exceed the
projection. Doing so would effectively introduce sales volume as a
second ``attribute''; in our judgment, this would introduce additional
uncertainty regarding outcomes under the standards, and would not
clearly be within the scope of notice provided by the NPRM.
6. Once the Agencies Determined the Complete Mathematical Function
Shape, How Did the Agencies Adjust the Curves To Develop the Proposed
Standards and Regulatory Alternatives?
The curves discussed above all reflect the addition of technology
to individual vehicle models to reduce technology differences between
vehicle models before fitting curves. This application of technology
was conducted not to directly determine the proposed standards, but
rather for purposes of technology adjustments, and set aside
considerations regarding potential rates of application (i.e., phase-in
caps), and considerations regarding economic implications of applying
specific technologies to specific vehicle models. The following
sections describe further adjustments to the curves discussed above,
that affected both the shape of the curve, and the location of the
curve, that helped the agencies determine curves that defined the
proposed standards.
The minimum stringency determination was done using the two cycle
curves. Stringency adjustments for air conditioning and other credits
were calculated after curves that did not cross were determined in two
cycle space. The year over year increase in these
[[Page 62701]]
adjustments cause neither the GHG nor CAFE curves (with A/C) to contact
the 2016 curves when charted.
a. Adjusting for Year Over Year Stringency
As in the MYs 2012-2016 rules, the agencies developed curves
defining regulatory alternatives for consideration by ``shifting''
these curves. For the MYs 2012-2016 rules, the agencies did so on an
absolute basis, offsetting the fitted curve by the same value (in gpm
or g/mi) at all footprints. In developing the proposal for MYs 2017-
2025, the agencies reconsidered the use of this approach, and concluded
that after MY 2016, curves should be offset on a relative basis--that
is, by adjusting the entire gpm-based curve (and, equivalently, the
CO2 curve) by the same percentage rather than the same
absolute value. The agencies' estimates of the effectiveness of these
technologies are all expressed in relative terms--that is, each
technology (with the exception of A/C) is estimated to reduce fuel
consumption (the inverse of fuel economy) and CO2 emissions
by a specific percentage of fuel consumption without the technology. It
is, therefore, more consistent with the agencies' estimates of
technology effectiveness to develop standards and regulatory
alternatives by applying a proportional offset to curves expressing
fuel consumption or emissions as a function of footprint. In addition,
extended indefinitely (and without other compensating adjustments), an
absolute offset would eventually (i.e., at very high average
stringencies) produce negative (gpm or g/mi) targets. Relative offsets
avoid this potential outcome. Relative offsets do cause curves to
become, on a fuel consumption and CO2 basis, flatter at
greater average stringencies; however, as discussed above, this outcome
remains consistent with the agencies' estimates of technology
effectiveness. In other words, given a relative decrease in average
required fuel consumption or CO2 emissions, a curve that is
flatter by the same relative amount should be equally challenging in
terms of the potential to achieve compliance through the addition of
fuel-saving technology.
On this basis, and considering that the ``flattening'' occurs
gradually for the regulatory alternatives the agencies have evaluated,
the agencies tentatively concluded that this approach to offsetting the
curves to develop year-by-year regulatory alternatives neither re-
creates a situation in which manufacturers are likely to respond to
standards in ways that compromise highway safety, nor undoes the
attribute-based standard's more equitable balancing of compliance
burdens among disparate manufacturers. The agencies invited comment on
these conclusions, and on any other means that might avoid the
potential outcomes--in particular, negative fuel consumption and
CO2 targets--discussed above. As indicated earlier, ACEEE
\230\ and the Alliance \231\ both expressed support for the application
of relative adjustments in order to develop year-over-year increases in
the stringency of fuel consumption and CO2 targets, although
the Alliance also commented that this approach should be revisited as
part of the mid-term evaluation. EPCA/EISA requires NHTSA to establish
the maximum feasible passenger car and light truck standards separately
in each specific model year--a requirement that is not necessarily
compatible with any predetermined approach to year-over-year changes in
stringency. As part of the future NHTSA rulemaking to finalize
standards for MYs 2022-2025 and the concurrent mid-term evaluation, the
agencies plan to reexamine potential approaches to developing
regulatory options for successive model years.
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\230\ ACEEE, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528 at 6.
\231\ Alliance, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, at 86.
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b. Adjusting for Anticipated Improvements to Mobile Air Conditioning
Systems
The fuel economy values in the agencies' market forecasts are based
on the 2-cycle (i.e., city and highway) fuel economy test and
calculation procedures that do not reflect potential improvements in
air conditioning system efficiency, refrigerant leakage, or refrigerant
Global Warming Potential (GWP). Recognizing that there are significant
and cost effective potential air conditioning system improvements
available in the rulemaking timeframe (discussed in detail in Chapter 5
of the draft joint TSD), the agencies are increasing the stringency of
the target curves based on the agencies' assessment of the capability
of manufacturers to implement these changes. For the proposed CAFE
standards and alternatives, an offset was included based on air
conditioning system efficiency improvements, as these improvements are
the only improvements that effect vehicle fuel economy. For the
proposed GHG standards and alternatives, a stringency increase was
included based on air conditioning system efficiency, leakage and
refrigerant improvements. As discussed above in Chapter 5 of the joint
TSD, the air conditioning system improvements affect a vehicle's fuel
efficiency or CO2 emissions performance as an additive
stringency increase, as compared to other fuel efficiency improving
technologies which are multiplicative. Therefore, in adjusting target
curves for improvements in the air conditioning system performance, the
agencies adjusted the target curves by additive stringency increases
(or vertical shifts) in the curves.
For the GHG target curves, the offset for air conditioning system
performance is being handled in the same manner as for the MYs 2012-
2016 rules. For the CAFE target curves, NHTSA for the first time is
accounting for potential improvements in air conditioning system
performance. Using this methodology, the agencies first use a
multiplicative stringency adjustment for the sloped portion of the
curves to reflect the effectiveness on technologies other that air
conditioning system technologies, creating a series of curve shapes
that are ``fanned'' based on two-cycle performance. Then the curves
were offset vertically by the air conditioning improvement by an equal
amount at every point.
While the agencies received many comments regarding the provisions
for determining adjustments to reflect improvements to air
conditioners, the agencies received no comments regarding how curves
developed considering 2-cycle fuel economy and CO2 values
should be adjusted to reflect the inclusion of A/C adjustments in fuel
economy and CO2 values used to determine compliance with
corresponding standards. For today's final rule, the agencies have
maintained the same approach as applied for the NPRM.
D. Joint Vehicle Technology Assumptions
For the past five years, the agencies have been working together
closely to follow the development of fuel consumption- and GHG-reducing
technologies, which continue to evolve rapidly. We based the proposed
rule on the results of two major joint technology analyses that EPA and
NHTSA had recently completed--the Technical Support Document to support
the MYs 2012-2016 final rule and the 2010 Technical Analysis Report
(which supported the 2010 Notice of Intent and was also done in
conjunction with CARB). For this final rule, we relied on our joint
analyses for the proposed rule, as well as new information and
analyses, including information we
[[Page 62702]]
received during the public comment period.
In the proposal, we presented our assessments of the costs and
effectiveness of all the technologies that we believe manufacturers are
likely to use to meet the requirements of this rule, including the
latest information on several quickly-changing technologies. The
proposal included new estimates for hybrid costs based on a peer-
reviewed ANL battery cost model. We also presented in the proposal new
cost data and analyses relating to several technologies based on a
study by FEV: an 8-speed automatic transmission replacing a 6-speed
automatic transmission; an 8-speed dual clutch transmission replacing a
6-speed dual clutch transmission; a power-split hybrid powertrain with
an I4 engine replacing a conventional engine powertrain with V6 engine;
a mild hybrid with stop-start technology and an I4 engine replacing a
conventional I4 engine; and the Fiat Multi-Air engine technology. Also
in the proposal, we presented an updated assessment of our estimated
costs associated with mass reduction.
As would be expected given that some of our cost estimates were
developed several years ago, we have also updated all of our base
direct manufacturing costs to put them in terms of more recent dollars
(2010 dollars are used in this final rule while 2009 dollars were used
in the proposal). As proposed, we have also updated our methodology for
calculating indirect costs associated with new technologies since
completing both the MYs 2012-2016 final rule and the TAR. We continue
to use the indirect cost multiplier (ICM) approach used in those
analyses, but have made important changes to the calculation
methodology--changes done in response to ongoing staff evaluation and
public input.
Since the MYs 2012-2016 rule and TAR, the agencies have updated
many of the technologies' effectiveness estimates largely based on new
vehicle simulation work conducted by Ricardo Engineering. This
simulation work provides the effectiveness estimates for a number of
the technologies most heavily relied on in the agencies' analysis of
potential standards for MYs 2017-2025. Additionally for the final rule,
NHTSA conducted a vehicle simulation project with Argonne National
Laboratory (ANL), as described in NHTSA's FRIA, that performed
additional analyses on mild hybrid technologies and advanced
transmissions to help NHTSA develop effectiveness values better
tailored for the CAFE model's incremental structure. The effectiveness
values for the mild hybrid vehicles were applied by both agencies for
the final rule.\232\ Additionally, NHTSA updated the effectiveness
values of advanced transmissions coupled with naturally-aspirated
engines for the final rule.\233\
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\232\ EPA's lumped parameter model gave similar results as ANL's
model for three of five vehicle classes, which served as a valuable
validation to the tool. However EPA used the same ANL effectiveness
values for mild hybrids to be harmonized with NHTSA's inputs.
\233\ The Ricardo simulations did not include this technology
combination, and EPA did not include this combination in their
packages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies also reviewed the findings and recommendations in the
updated NAS report ``Assessment of Fuel Economy Technologies for Light-
Duty Vehicles'' that was completed and issued after the MYs 2012-2016
final rule.\234\ NHTSA's sensitivity analysis examining the impact of
using some of the NAS cost and effectiveness estimates on the proposed
standards is presented in NHTSA's final RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\ ``Assessment of Fuel Economy Technologies for Light-Duty
Vehicles'', National Research Council of the National Academies,
June 2010.
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The agencies received comments to the proposal on some of these
assessments as discussed further below. Also, since the time of the
proposal, in some cases we have been able to improve on our earlier
assessments. We note these comments and the improvements made in the
assessments in the discussion of each technology, below. However, the
agencies did not receive comments for most of the technical and cost
assessments presented in the proposal, and the agencies have concluded
the assessments in the proposal remain valid for this final rule.
Key changes in the final rule relative to the proposal are the use
of 2010 dollars rather than 2009 dollars, updates to all battery pack
and non-battery costs for hybrids, plug-in hybrids and full electric
vehicles (because an updated version of the Argonne National Labs
BatPaC model was available which more appropriately included a battery
discharge safety system in the costs), and the inclusion of a mild
hybrid technology that was not included in the proposal. NHTSA updated
the effectiveness values of advanced transmissions coupled with
naturally-aspirated engines based on ANL's simulation work. We describe
these changes below and in Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD. We next provide
a brief summary of the technologies that we considered for this final
rule; Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD presents our assessments of these
technologies in much greater detail.
1. What technologies did the agencies consider?
The agencies conclude that manufacturers can add a variety of
technologies to each of their vehicle models and/or platforms in order
to improve the vehicles' fuel economy and GHG performance. In order to
analyze a variety of regulatory alternative scenarios, it was essential
to have a thorough understanding of the technologies available to the
manufacturers. As was the case for the proposal, the analyses we
performed for this final rule included an assessment of the cost,
effectiveness, availability, development time, and manufacturability of
various technologies within the normal redesign and refresh periods of
a vehicle line (or in the design of a new vehicle). As we describe in
the Joint TSD, the point in time when we project that a technology can
be applied affects our estimates of the costs as well as the technology
penetration rates (``phase-in caps'').
The agencies considered dozens of vehicle technologies that
manufacturers could use to improve the fuel economy and reduce
CO2 emissions of their vehicles during the MYs 2017-2025
timeframe. Many of the technologies we considered are available today,
are in production of some vehicles, and could be incorporated into
vehicles more widely as manufacturers make their product development
decisions. These are ``near-term'' technologies and are identical or
very similar to those anticipated in the agencies' analyses of
compliance strategies for the MYs 2012-2016 final rule. For this
rulemaking, given its time frame, we also considered other technologies
that are not currently in production, but that are beyond the initial
research phase, and are under development and expected to be in
production in the next 5-10 years. Examples of these technologies are
downsized and turbocharged engines operating at combustion pressures
even higher than today's turbocharged engines, and an emerging hybrid
architecture combined with an 8-speed dual clutch transmission, a
combination that is not available today. These are technologies that
the agencies believe that manufacturers can, for the most part, apply
both to cars and trucks, and that we expect will achieve significant
improvements in fuel economy and reductions in CO2 emissions
at reasonable costs in the MYs 2017 to 2025 timeframe. The agencies did
not consider technologies that are currently in an initial stage of
research because of the uncertainty involved in the availability and
feasibility of
[[Page 62703]]
implementing these technologies with significant penetration rates for
this analysis. The agencies recognize that due to the relatively long
time frame between the date of this final rule and 2025, it is very
possible that new and innovative technologies will make their way into
the fleet, perhaps even in significant numbers, that we have not
considered in this analysis. We expect to reconsider such technologies
as part of the mid-term evaluation, as appropriate, and manufacturers
may be able to use them to generate credits under a number of the
flexibility and incentive programs provided in this final rule.
The technologies that we considered can be grouped into four broad
categories: engine technologies; transmission technologies; vehicle
technologies (such as mass reduction, tires and aerodynamic
treatments); and electrification technologies (including hybridization
and changing to full electric drive).\235\ We discuss the specific
technologies within each broad group below. The list of technologies
presented below and in the proposal is nearly identical to that
presented in both the MYs 2012-2016 final rule and the 2010 TAR, with
the following new technologies added to the list since the last final
rule: the P2 hybrid, a newly emerging hybridization technology that was
also considered in the 2010 TAR; mild hybrid technologies that were not
included in the proposal; continued improvements in gasoline engines,
with greater efficiencies and downsizing; continued significant
efficiency improvements in transmissions; and ongoing levels of
improvement to some of the seemingly more basic technologies such as
lower rolling resistance tires and aerodynamic treatments, which are
among the most cost effective technologies available for reducing fuel
consumption and GHGs. Not included in the list below are technologies
specific to air conditioning system improvements and off-cycle
controls, which are presented in Section II.F of this preamble and in
Chapter 5 of the Joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\ NHTSA's analysis considers these technologies in five
groups rather than four--hybridization is one category, and
``electrification/accessories'' is another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Few comments were received specific to these technologies. The
Alliance emphasized the agencies should examine the progress in the
development of powertrain improvements as part of the mid-term
evaluation and determine if researchers are making the kind of
breakthroughs anticipated by the agencies for technologies like high-
efficiency transmissions. VW cautioned the agencies about the
uncertainties with high BMEP engines, including the possible costs due
to increased durability requirements and questioned the potential
benefit for this type of engine of engine technology. VW commented that
additional development is necessary to overcome the significant
obstacles of these types of engines. ICCT emphasized that many of the
powertrain effectiveness values, derived by Ricardo, were too
conservative as technology in this area is expected to improve at a
faster pace during the rulemaking period. As described in the joint
TSD, the agencies relied on a number of technical sources for this
engine technology. Additionally as described in the Ricardo report,
Ricardo was tasked with extrapolating technologies to their expected
performance and efficiency levels in the 2020-2025 timeframe to account
for future improvements. The agencies continue to believe that the
modeling and simulation conducted by Ricardo is robust, as they have
built prototypes of these engines and used their knowledge to help
inform the modeling. The agencies will, of course, continue to watch
the development of this key technology in the future. For transparency
purposes and full disclosure, it is important to note the ICCT
partially funded the Ricardo study.
a. Types of Engine Technologies Considered
Low-friction lubricants including low viscosity and advanced low
friction lubricant oils are now available with improved performance. If
manufacturers choose to make use of these lubricants, they may need to
make engine changes and conduct durability testing to accommodate the
lubricants. The costs in our analysis consider these engine changes and
testing requirements. This level of low friction lubricants is expected
to exceed 85 percent penetration by MY 2017 and reach nearly 100
percent in MY 2025.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ The penetration rates shown in this section are general
results applicable to either the NHTSA or EPA analysis, to either
the 2008 based or the 2010 based fleet projection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduction of engine friction losses (first level) can be achieved
through low-tension piston rings, roller cam followers, improved
material coatings, more optimal thermal management, piston surface
treatments, and other improvements in the design of engine components
and subsystems that improve the efficiency of engine operation. This
level of engine friction reduction is expected to exceed 70 percent
penetration by MY 2017
Advanced low friction lubricants and reduction of engine friction
losses (second level) are new for our analysis for the proposal and
this final rule. As technologies advance in the coming years, we expect
that there will be further development in both low friction lubricants
and engine friction reductions. The agencies grouped the development in
these two related areas into a single technology and applied them for
MY 2017 and beyond.
Cylinder deactivation disables the intake and exhaust valves and
prevents fuel injection into some cylinders during light-load
operation. The engine runs temporarily as though it were a smaller
engine which substantially reduces pumping losses.
Variable valve timing alters the timing of the intake valves,
exhaust valves, or both, primarily to reduce pumping losses, increase
specific power, and control residual gases.
Discrete variable valve lift increases efficiency by optimizing air
flow over a broader range of engine operation, which reduces pumping
losses. This is accomplished by controlled switching between two or
more cam profile lobe heights.
Continuous variable valve lift is an electromechanical or electro-
hydraulic system in which valve timing is changed as lift height is
controlled. This yields a wide range of opportunities for optimizing
volumetric efficiency and performance, including enabling the engine to
be valve-throttled.
Stoichiometric gasoline direct-injection technology injects fuel at
high pressure directly into the combustion chamber to improve cooling
of the air/fuel charge as well as combustion quality within the
cylinder, which allows for higher compression ratios and increased
thermodynamic efficiency.
Turbocharging and downsizing increases the available airflow and
specific power level, allowing a reduced engine size while maintaining
performance. Engines of this type use gasoline direct injection (GDI)
and dual cam phasing. This reduces pumping losses at lighter loads in
comparison to a larger engine. We continue to include an 18 bar brake
mean effective pressure (BMEP) technology (as in the MYs 2012-2016
final rule) and are also including both 24 bar BMEP and 27 bar BMEP
technologies. The 24 bar BMEP technology would use a single-stage,
variable geometry turbocharger which would provide a higher intake
boost pressure available across a broader
[[Page 62704]]
range of engine operation than conventional 18 bar BMEP engines. The 27
bar BMEP technology would require higher boost levels and thus would
use a two-stage turbocharger, necessitating use of cooled exhaust gas
recirculation (EGR) as described below. The 18 bar BMEP technology is
applied with 33 percent engine downsizing, 24 bar BMEP is applied with
50 percent engine downsizing, and 27 bar BMEP is applied with 56
percent engine downsizing.
Cooled exhaust-gas recirculation (EGR) reduces the incidence of
knocking combustion with additional charge dilution and obviates the
need for fuel enrichment at high engine power. This allows for higher
boost pressure and/or compression ratio and further reduction in engine
displacement and both pumping and friction losses while maintaining
performance. Engines of this type use GDI and both dual cam phasing and
discrete variable valve lift. The EGR systems considered in this
assessment would use a dual-loop system with both high and low pressure
EGR loops and dual EGR coolers. For the proposal and this final rule,
cooled EGR is considered to be a technology that can be added to a 24
bar BMEP engine and is an enabling technology for 27 bar BMEP engines.
Diesel engines have several characteristics that give superior fuel
efficiency, including reduced pumping losses due to lack of (or greatly
reduced) throttling, high pressure direct injection of fuel, a
combustion cycle that operates at a higher compression ratio, and a
very lean air/fuel mixture relative to an equivalent-performance
gasoline engine. This technology requires additional enablers, such as
a NOX adsorption catalyst system or a urea/ammonia selective
catalytic reduction system for control of NOX emissions
during lean (excess air) operation.
b. Types of Transmission Technologies Considered
Improved automatic transmission controls optimize the shift
schedule to maximize fuel efficiency under wide ranging conditions and
minimizes losses associated with torque converter slip through lock-up
or modulation. This technology is included because it exists in the
baseline fleets, but its penetration is expected to decrease over time
as it is replaced by other more efficient technologies.
Shift optimization is a strategy whereby the engine and/or
transmission controller(s) emulates a CVT by continuously evaluating
all possible gear options that would provide the necessary tractive
power and selecting the best gear ratio that lets the engine run in the
most efficient operating zone.
Six-, seven-, and eight-speed automatic transmissions are optimized
by changing the gear ratio span to enable the engine to operate in a
more efficient operating range over a broader range of vehicle
operating conditions. While a six speed transmission application was
most prevalent for the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, eight speed
transmissions are expected to be readily available and applied in the
MYs 2017 through 2025 timeframe.
Dual clutch or automated shift manual transmissions are similar to
manual transmissions, but the vehicle controls shifting and launch
functions. A dual-clutch automated shift manual transmission (DCT) uses
separate clutches for even-numbered and odd-numbered gears, so the next
expected gear is pre-selected, which allows for faster and smoother
shifting. The MYs 2012-2016 final rule limited DCT applications to a
maximum of 6 speeds. For the proposal and this final rule, we have
considered both 6-speed and 8-speed DCT transmissions.
Continuously variable transmission commonly uses V-shaped pulleys
connected by a metal belt rather than gears to provide ratios for
operation. Unlike manual and automatic transmissions with fixed
transmission ratios, continuously variable transmissions can provide
fully variable and an infinite number of transmission ratios that
enable the engine to operate in a more efficient operating range over a
broader range of vehicle operating conditions. The CVT is maintained
for existing baseline vehicles and not considered for future vehicles
in this rule due to the availability of more cost effective
transmission technologies.
Manual 6-speed transmission offers an additional gear ratio, often
with a higher overdrive gear ratio, than a 5-speed manual transmission.
High Efficiency Gearbox (automatic, DCT or manual) represents
continuous improvement in seals, bearings and clutches; super finishing
of gearbox parts; and development in the area of lubrication--all aimed
at reducing frictional and other parasitic load in the system for an
automatic or DCT type transmission.
c. Types of Vehicle Technologies Considered
Lower-rolling-resistance tires have characteristics that reduce
frictional losses associated with the energy dissipated mainly in the
deformation of the tires under load, thereby improving fuel economy and
reducing CO2 emissions. For the proposal and final rule, we
considered two levels of lower rolling resistance tires that reduce
frictional losses even further. The first level of low rolling
resistance tires would have 10 percent rolling resistance reduction
while the 2nd level would have 20 percent rolling resistance reduction
compared to 2008 baseline vehicle. This second level of development
marks an advance over low rolling resistance tires considered during
the MYs 2014-2018 medium- and heavy- duty vehicle greenhouse gas
emissions and fuel efficiency rulemaking, see 76 FR 57207, 57229.) The
first level of lower rolling resistance tires is expected to exceed 90
percent penetration by the 2017.
Low-drag brakes reduce the sliding friction of disc brake pads on
rotors when the brakes are not engaged, because the brake pads are
pulled away from the rotors.
Front or secondary axle disconnect for four-wheel drive systems
provides a torque distribution disconnect between front and rear axles
when torque is not required for the non-driving axle. This results in
the reduction of associated parasitic energy losses.
Aerodynamic drag reduction can be achieved via two approaches,
either reducing the drag coefficients or reducing vehicle frontal area.
To reduce the drag coefficient, skirts, air dams, underbody covers, and
more aerodynamic side view mirrors can be applied. In addition to the
standard aerodynamic treatments, the agencies have included a second
level of aerodynamic technologies, which could include active grill
shutters, rear visors, and larger under body panels. We estimate that
the first level of aerodynamic drag improvement will reduce aerodynamic
drag by 10 percent relative to the baseline 2008 vehicle while the
second level would reduce aerodynamic drag by 20 percent relative to
2008 baseline vehicles. The second level of aerodynamic technologies
was not considered in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule.
Mass Reduction can be achieved through either substitution of lower
density and/or higher strength materials, or changing the design to use
less material. With design optimization, part consolidation, and
improved manufacturing processes, these strategies can be applied while
maintaining the performance attributes of the component, system, or
vehicle. The agencies applied mass reduction of up to 20 percent
relative to MY 2008 levels in this final rule compared to only 10
percent in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule. The agencies also determined
effectiveness values for hybrid, plug-in
[[Page 62705]]
and electric vehicles based on net mass reduction, or the difference
between the applied mass reduction (capped at 20 percent) and the added
mass of electrification components. In assessing compliance strategies
and in structuring the standards, the agencies only considered levels
of vehicle mass reduction that, in our estimation, would not adversely
affect overall fleet safety. An extensive discussion of mass reduction
technologies and their associated costs is provided in Chapter 3 of the
Joint TSD, and the discussion on safety is in Section II.G of the
Preamble.
d. Types of Electrification/Accessory and Hybrid Technologies
Considered
Electric power steering (EPS)/Electro-hydraulic power steering
(EHPS) is an electrically-assisted steering system that has advantages
over traditional hydraulic power steering because it replaces the
engine-driven and continuously operated hydraulic pump, thereby
reducing parasitic losses from the accessory drive. Manufacturers have
informed the agencies that full EPS systems are being developed for all
light-duty vehicles, including large trucks. However, lacking data
about when these transitions will occur, the agencies have applied the
EHPS technology to large trucks and the EPS technology to all other
light-duty vehicles.
Improved accessories (IACC) may include high efficiency alternators
and electrically driven (i.e., on-demand) water pumps and cooling fans.
This excludes other electrical accessories such as electric oil pumps
and electrically driven air conditioner compressors. New for this rule
is a second level of IACC (IACC2), which consists of the IACC
technologies with the addition of a mild regeneration strategy and a
higher efficiency alternator. The first level of IACC improvements is
expected to be at more than 50 percent penetration by the 2017MY.
12-volt Stop-Start, sometimes referred to as idle-stop or 12-volt
micro hybrid, is the most basic hybrid system that facilitates idle-
stop capability. These systems typically incorporate an enhanced
performance battery and other features such as electric transmission
and cooling pumps to maintain vehicle systems during idle-stop.
Higher Voltage Stop-Start/Belt Integrated Starter Generator (BISG)
sometimes referred to as a mild hybrid, provides idle-stop capability
and uses a higher voltage battery with increased energy capacity over
typical automotive batteries. The higher system voltage allows the use
of a smaller, more powerful electric motor. This system replaces a
standard alternator with an enhanced power, higher voltage, higher
efficiency starter-alternator that is belt driven and that can recover
braking energy while the vehicle slows down (regenerative braking).
This technology was mentioned but not included in the proposal because
the agencies had incomplete information at that time. Since the
proposal, the agencies have obtained better data on the costs and
effectiveness of this technology (see Chapter 3.4.3 of the joint TSD).
Therefore, the agencies have revised their technical analysis on both
the cost and effectiveness and found that the technology is now
competitive with the others in NHTSA's technology decision trees and
EPA's technology packages. EPA and NHTSA are providing incentives to
encourage this and other hybrid technologies on full-size pick-up
trucks, as described in Section II.F.3.
Integrated Motor Assist (IMA)/Crank integrated starter generator
(CISG) provides idle-stop capability and uses a high voltage battery
with increased energy capacity over typical automotive batteries. The
higher system voltage allows the use of a smaller, more powerful
electric motor and reduces the weight of the wiring harness. This
system replaces a standard alternator with an enhanced power, higher
voltage and higher efficiency starter-alternator that is crankshaft
mounted and can recover braking energy while the vehicle slows down
(regenerative braking). The IMA technology is not included by either
agency as an enabling technology in the analysis supporting this rule
because we believe that other technologies provide better cost
effectiveness, although it is included as a baseline technology because
it exists in our 2008 and 2010 baseline fleets.
P2 Hybrid is a newly emerging hybrid technology that uses a
transmission integrated electric motor placed between the engine and a
gearbox or CVT, much like the IMA system described above except with a
wet or dry separation clutch which is used to decouple the motor/
transmission from the engine. In addition, a P2 hybrid would typically
be equipped with a larger electric machine. Disengaging the clutch
allows all-electric operation and more efficient brake-energy recovery.
Engaging the clutch allows efficient coupling of the engine and
electric motor and, when combined with a DCT transmission, provides
similar efficiency at lower cost than power-split or 2-mode hybrid
systems.
2-Mode Hybrid is a hybrid electric drive system that uses an
adaptation of a conventional stepped-ratio automatic transmission by
replacing some of the transmission clutches with two electric motors
that control the ratio of engine speed to vehicle speed, while clutches
allow the motors to be bypassed. This improves both the transmission
torque capacity for heavy-duty applications and reduces fuel
consumption and CO2 emissions at highway speeds relative to
other types of hybrid electric drive systems. The 2-mode hybrid
technology is not included by either agency as an enabling technology
in the analysis supporting this rule because we believe that other
technologies provide better cost effectiveness, although it is included
as a baseline technology because it exists in our 2008 and 2010
baseline fleets.
Power-split Hybrid is a hybrid electric drive system that replaces
the traditional transmission with a single planetary gearset and two
motor/generators. One motor/generator uses the engine to either charge
the battery or supply additional power to the drive motor. A second,
more powerful motor/generator is permanently connected to the vehicle's
final drive and always turns with the wheels. The planetary gear splits
engine power between the first motor/generator and the drive motor to
either charge the battery or supply power to the wheels. The power-
split hybrid technology is not included by either agency as an enabling
technology in the analysis supporting this rule because we believe that
other technologies provide better cost effectiveness, although it is
included as a baseline technology because it exists in our 2008
baseline fleet.
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) are hybrid electric
vehicles with the means to charge their battery packs from an outside
source of electricity (usually the electric grid). These vehicles have
larger battery packs with more energy storage and a greater capability
to be discharged than other hybrid electric vehicles. They also use a
control system that allows the battery pack to be substantially
depleted under electric-only or blended mechanical/electrical operation
and batteries that can be cycled in charge-sustaining operation at a
lower state of charge than is typical of other hybrid electric
vehicles. These vehicles are sometimes referred to as Range Extended
Electric Vehicles (REEV). In this MYs 2017-2025 analysis, the agencies
have included PHEVs with several all-electric ranges as potential
technologies. EPA's analysis includes a 20-mile and 40-mile range
PHEVs, while NHTSA's analysis only includes a 30-mile PHEV.
[[Page 62706]]
Electric vehicles (EV) are equipped with all-electric drive and
with systems powered by energy-optimized batteries charged primarily
from grid electricity. For this rule, the agencies have included EVs
with several ranges--75 miles, 100 miles, and 150 miles--as potential
technologies.
e. Technologies Considered but Deemed ``Not Ready'' in the MYs 2017-
2025 Timeframe
Fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) utilize a full electric drive
platform but consume electricity generated by an on-board fuel cell and
hydrogen fuel. Fuel cells are electro-chemical devices that directly
convert reactants (hydrogen and oxygen via air) into electricity, with
the potential of achieving more than twice the efficiency of
conventional internal combustion engines. Most automakers that
currently have FCEVs under development use high-pressure gaseous
hydrogen storage tanks. The high-pressure tanks are similar to those
used for compressed gas storage in more than 10 million CNG vehicles
worldwide, except that they are designed to operate at a higher
pressure (350 bar or 700 bar vs. 250 bar for CNG). While we expect
there will be some limited introduction of FCEVs into the marketplace
in the time frame of this rule, we expect the total number of vehicles
produced with this technology will be relatively small. Thus, the
agencies did not consider FCEVs in the modeling analysis conducted for
this rule.
There are a number of other potential technologies available to
manufacturers in meeting the 2017-2025 standards that the agencies have
evaluated but have not considered in our final analyses. These include
HCCI, ``multi-air'', and camless valve actuation, and other advanced
engines currently under development.
2. How did the agencies determine the costs of each of these
technologies?
As noted in the introduction to this section, most of the direct
cost estimates for technologies carried over from the MYs 2012-2016
final rule and subsequently used in this final rule are fundamentally
unchanged since the MYs 2012-2016 final rule analysis and/or the 2010
TAR. We say ``fundamentally'' unchanged since the basis of the direct
manufacturing cost estimates have not changed; however, the costs have
been updated to more recent dollars, our estimated learning effects
have resulted in further cost reductions for some technologies, the
indirect costs are calculated using a modified methodology, and the
impact of long-term ICMs is now present during the rulemaking
timeframe. Besides these changes, there are also some other notable
changes to the costs used in previous analyses. We highlight these
changes in Section II.D.2.a, below. We highlight the changes to the
indirect cost methodology and adjustments to more recent dollars in
Sections II.D.2.b and c. Lastly, we present some updated terminology
used for our approach to estimating learning effects in an effort to
eliminate confusion with our past terminology. This is discussed in
Section II.D.2.d, below.
New for the final rule relative to the proposal are the use of 2010
dollars rather than 2009 dollars, updates to all battery pack and non-
battery costs for hybrids, plug-in and full electric vehicles because
an updated version of the ANL BatPaC model was available and because we
wanted to include a battery discharge safety system in the costs, and
the inclusion of a mild hybrid technology that was not included in the
proposal. We describe these changes below and in Chapter 3 of the Joint
TSD.
The agencies note that the technology costs included in this final
rule take into account those associated with the initial build of the
vehicle. We received comments on the proposal for this rule suggesting
that there could be additional maintenance required with some new
technologies, and that additional maintenance costs could occur as a
result because ``the technology will be more complicated and time
consuming for mechanics to repair.'' \237\ For this final rule, the
agencies have estimated such maintenance costs. The maintenance costs
are not included as new vehicle costs and are not, therefore, used in
either agency's modeling work. However, the maintenance costs are
included when estimating costs to society in each agency's benefit-cost
analyses. We discuss these maintenance costs briefly in section II.D.5
below, and in detail in Chapter 3 of the final Joint TSD and in
sections III and IV of this preamble.
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\237\ See NADA (OAR-2009-0472-7182.1, p.10) and Dawn Brooks
(OAR-2009-0472-3851, pp.1-2).
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a. Direct Manufacturing Costs (DMC)
For direct manufacturing costs (DMC) related to turbocharging,
downsizing, gasoline direct injection, transmissions, as well as non-
battery-related costs on hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and electric vehicles,
the agencies have relied on costs derived from ``tear-down'' studies
(see below). For battery-related DMC for HEVs, PHEVs, and EVs, the
agencies have relied on the BatPaC model developed by Argonne National
Laboratory for the Department of Energy. For mass reduction DMC, the
agencies have relied on several studies as described in detail in
Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD. We discuss each of these briefly here and
in more detail in the Joint TSD. For the majority of the other
technologies considered in this rule and described above, and where no
new data were available, the agencies have relied on the MYs 2012-2016
final rule and sources described there for estimates of DMC.
i. Costs From Tear-Down Studies
As a general matter, the agencies believe that the best method to
derive technology cost estimates is to conduct studies involving tear-
down and analysis of actual vehicle components. A ``tear-down''
involves breaking down a technology into its fundamental parts and
manufacturing processes by completely disassembling actual vehicles and
vehicle subsystems and precisely determining what is required for its
production. The result of the tear-down is a ``bill of materials'' for
each and every part of the relevant vehicle systems. This tear-down
method of costing technologies is often used by manufacturers to
benchmark their products against competitive products. Historically,
vehicle and vehicle component tear-down has not been done on a large
scale by researchers and regulators due to the expense required for
such studies. While tear-down studies are highly accurate at costing
technologies for the year in which the study is intended, their
accuracy, like that of all cost projections, may diminish over time as
costs are extrapolated further into the future because of uncertainties
in predicting commodities (and raw material) prices, labor rates, and
manufacturing practices. The projected costs may be higher or lower
than predicted.
Over the past several years, EPA has contracted with FEV, Inc. and
its subcontractor Munro & Associates, to conduct tear-down cost studies
for a number of key technologies evaluated by the agencies in assessing
the feasibility of future GHG and CAFE standards. The analysis
methodology included procedures to scale the tear-down results to
smaller and larger vehicles, and also to different technology
configurations. EPA documented FEV's methodology in a report published
as part of the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, detailing the costing of the
first tear-down conducted in this work (1 in the list
below).\238\
[[Page 62707]]
This report was peer reviewed by experts in the industry, who focused
especially on the methodology used in the tear-down study, and revised
by FEV in response to the peer review comments.\239\ EPA documented
subsequent tear-down studies (2-5 in the list below)
using the peer reviewed methodology in follow-up FEV reports made
available in the public docket for the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking,
although the results for some of these additional studies were not peer
reviewed.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\ U.S. EPA, ``Light-Duty Technology Cost Analysis Pilot
Study,'' Contract No. EP-C-07-069, Work Assignment 1-3, December
2009, EPA-420-R-09-020, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472-11282.
\239\ FEV pilot study response to peer review document November
6, 2009, is at EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472-11285.
\240\ U.S. EPA, ``Light-duty Technology Cost Analysis--Report on
Additional Case Studies,'' EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472-11604.
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Since then, FEV's work under this contract has continued.
Additional cost studies have been completed and are available for
public review.\241\ The most extensive study, performed after the MYs
2012-2016 final rule, involved whole-vehicle tear-downs of a 2010 Ford
Fusion power-split hybrid and a conventional 2010 Ford Fusion. (The
latter served as a baseline vehicle for comparison.) In addition to
providing power-split HEV costs, the results for individual components
in these vehicles were subsequently used by FEV/Munro to estimate the
cost of another hybrid technology, the P2 hybrid, which employs similar
hardware. This approach to costing P2 hybrids was undertaken because P2
HEVs were not yet in volume production at the time of hardware
procurement for tear-down. Finally, an automotive lithium-polymer
battery was torn down to provide supplemental battery costing
information to that associated with the NiMH battery in the Fusion. FEV
has extensively documented this HEV cost work, including the extension
of results to P2 HEVs, in a new report.\242\ Because of the complexity
and comprehensive scope of this HEV analysis, EPA commissioned a
separate peer review focused exclusively on the new tear down costs
developed for the HEV analysis. Reviewer comments generally supported
FEV's methodology and results, while including a number of suggestions
for improvement, many of which were subsequently incorporated into
FEV's analysis and final report. The peer review comments and responses
are available in the rulemaking docket.243,244
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\ FEV, Inc., ``Light-Duty Technology Cost Analysis, Report
on Additional Transmission, Mild Hybrid, and Valvetrain Technology
Case Studies'', November 2011.
\242\ FEV, Inc., ``Light-Duty Technology Cost Analysis, Power-
Split and P2 HEV Case Studies'', EPA-420-R-11-015, November 2011.
\243\ ICF, ``Peer Review of FEV Inc. Report Light Duty
Technology Cost Analysis, Power-Split and P2 Hybrid Electric Vehicle
Case Studies'', EPA-420-R-11-016, November 2011.
\244\ FEV and EPA, ``FEV Inc. Report `Light Duty Technology Cost
Analysis, Power-Split and P2 Hybrid Electric Vehicle Case Studies',
Peer Review Report--Response to Comments Document'', EPA-420-R-11-
017, November 2011.
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Over the course of this contract, teardown-based studies have been
performed thus far on the technologies listed below. These completed
studies provide a thorough evaluation of the new technologies' costs
relative to their baseline (or replaced) technologies.
1. Stoichiometric gasoline direct injection (SGDI) and
turbocharging with engine downsizing (T-DS) on a DOHC (dual overhead
cam) I4 engine, replacing a conventional DOHC I4 engine.
2. SGDI and T-DS on a SOHC (single overhead cam) on a V6 engine,
replacing a conventional 3-valve/cylinder SOHC V8 engine.
3. SGDI and T-DS on a DOHC I4 engine, replacing a DOHC V6 engine.
4. 6-speed automatic transmission (AT), replacing a 5-speed AT.
5. 6-speed wet dual clutch transmission (DCT) replacing a 6-speed
AT.
6. 8-speed AT replacing a 6-speed AT.
7. 8-speed DCT replacing a 6-speed DCT.
8. Power-split hybrid (Ford Fusion with I4 engine) compared to a
conventional vehicle (Ford Fusion with V6). The results from this tear-
down were extended to address P2 hybrids. In addition, costs from
individual components in this tear-down study were used by the agencies
in developing cost estimates for PHEVs and EVs.
9. Mild hybrid with stop-start technology (Saturn Vue with I4
engine), replacing a conventional I4 engine. New for this final rule,
the agencies have used portions of this tear-down study in estimating
mild hybrid costs.
10. Fiat Multi-Air engine technology. (Although results from this
cost study are included in the rulemaking docket, they were not used by
the agencies in this rulemaking's technical analyses because the
technology is under a very recently awarded patent and we have chosen
not to base our analyses on its widespread use across the industry in
the 2017-2025 timeframe.)
Items 6 through 10 in the list above are new since the MYs 2012-
2016 final rule.
In addition, FEV and EPA extrapolated the engine downsizing costs
for the following scenarios that were based on the above study cases:
1. Downsizing a SOHC 2 valve/cylinder V8 engine to a DOHC V6.
2. Downsizing a DOHC V8 to a DOHC V6.
3. Downsizing a SOHC V6 engine to a DOHC 4 cylinder engine.
4. Downsizing a DOHC 4 cylinder engine to a DOHC 3 cylinder engine.
The agencies have relied on the findings of FEV for estimating the
cost of the technologies covered by the tear-down studies.
ii. Costs of HEVs, EVs & PHEVs
The agencies have also reevaluated the costs for HEVs, PHEVs, and
EVs since we issued the MYs 2012-2016 final rule and the 2010 TAR. In
the proposal, we noted that electrified vehicle technologies were
developing rapidly and the agencies sought to capture results from the
most recent analysis. Further, we noted that the MYs 2012-2016 rule
employed a single $/kWh estimate and did not consider the specific
vehicle and technology application for the battery when we estimated
the cost of the battery. Specifically, batteries used in HEVs (high
power density applications) versus EVs (high energy density
applications) need to be considered appropriately to reflect the design
differences, the chemical material usage differences, and differences
in $/kWh as the power to energy ratio of the battery varies for
different applications.
To address those issues for the proposal, the agencies did two
things. First, EPA developed a spreadsheet tool \245\ that the agencies
used to size the motor and battery based on the different road loads of
various vehicle classes. Second, the agencies used a battery cost model
developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) for the Vehicle
Technologies Program of the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)).\246\ The model developed by
ANL allows users to estimate unique battery pack costs using user
customized input sets for different hybridization applications, such as
strong hybrid, PHEV and EV. The DOE has established long term industry
goals and targets for advanced battery systems as it does for many
energy efficient technologies. ANL was funded by DOE to provide an
independent assessment of Li-ion battery costs because of ANL's
expertise in the field as one of the primary DOE National Laboratories
responsible for basic and applied battery
[[Page 62708]]
energy storage technologies for future HEV, PHEV and EV applications.
Since publication of the 2010 TAR, ANL's battery cost model underwent
peer-review and ANL subsequently updated the model and documentation to
incorporate suggestions from peer-reviewers, such as including a
battery management system, a battery disconnect unit, a thermal
management system, and other changes.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ See ``LDGHG 2017-2025 Cost Development Files,'' CD in
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\246\ ANL BatPac model Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\247\ Nelson, P.A., Santini, D.J., Barnes, J. ``Factors
Determining the Manufacturing Costs of Lithium-Ion Batteries for
PHEVs,'' 24th World Battery, Hybrid and Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle
Symposium and Exposition EVS-24, Stavenger, Norway, May 13-16, 2009
(www.evs24.org).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequent to the proposal for this rule, the agencies requested
changes to the BatPaC model. These requests were that an option be
added to select between liquid or air thermal management and that
adequate surface area and cell spacing be determined accordingly. Also,
the agencies requested a feature to allow battery packs to be
configured as subpacks in parallel or modules in parallel, as
additional options for staying within voltage and cell size limits for
large packs. ANL added these features in a version of the model
distributed March 1, 2012. This version of the model is used for the
battery cost estimates in the final rule.
The agencies have chosen to use the ANL model as the basis for
estimating the cost of large-format lithium-ion batteries for this
assessment for several reasons. The model was developed by scientists
at ANL who have significant experience in this area. Also, the model
uses a bill of materials methodology for developing cost estimates. The
ANL model appropriately considers the vehicle application's power and
energy requirements, which are two of the fundamental parameters when
designing a lithium-ion battery for an HEV, PHEV, or EV. The ANL model
can estimate production costs based on user defined inputs for a range
of production volumes. The ANL model's cost estimates, while generally
lower than the estimates we received from the OEMs, are generally
consistent with the supplier cost estimates that EPA received from
large-format lithium-ion battery pack manufacturers. This includes data
the EPA received during on-site visits in the 2008-2011 time frame.
Finally, the agencies chose to use the ANL model because it has been
described and presented in the public domain and does not rely upon
confidential business information (which could not be reviewed by the
public).
The potential for future reductions in battery cost and
improvements in battery performance relative to current batteries will
play a major role in determining the overall cost and performance of
future PHEVs and EVs. The U.S. Department of Energy manages major
battery-related R&D programs and partnerships, and has done so for many
years, including the ANL model utilized in this report. DOE has
reviewed the updated BatPaC model and supports its use in this final
rule.
As we did in the proposal, we have also estimated the costs
(hardware and labor) associated with in-home electric vehicle charging
equipment, which we expect to be necessary for PHEVs and EVs, and their
installation. New for the final rule are costs associated with an on-
vehicle battery discharge system. These battery discharge systems allow
the batteries in HEVs, PHEVs and EVs to be discharged safely at the
site of an accident prior to moving affected vehicles to storage or
repair facilities. Charging equipment and battery discharge system
costs are covered in more detail in Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD.
iii. Mass Reduction Costs
The agencies have revised the costs for mass reduction from the MYs
2012-2016 rule and the 2010 Technical Assessment Report. For this rule,
the agencies are relying on a wide assortment of sources from the
literature as well as data provided from a number of OEMs. Based on
this review, the agencies have estimated a new cost curve such that the
costs increase as the levels of mass reduction increase. Both agencies
have mass reduction feasibility and cost studies that were completed in
time for the final rule. However the results from these studies were
not employed in the rulemaking analysis because the peer reviews had
not been completed and changes to the studies based on the peer reviews
were not completed. Both have since been completed. For the primary
analyses, both agencies use the same mass reduction costs as were used
in the proposal, although they have been updated to 2010 dollars. All
of these studies are discussed in Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD as well as
in the respective publications. The use of the new cost results from
the studies would have made little difference to the final rule cost
analysis for two reasons:
(1) The NPRM (+/- 40%) sensitivity analysis conducted by the
agencies showed little difference in overall costs due to the change in
mass reduction costs;
(2) The agencies project even less mass reduction levels in the
final rule compared to the NPRM based on the use of revised fatality
coefficients from NHTSA's updated study of the effects on vehicle mass
and size on highway safety, which is discussed in section II.G of this
preamble.
b. Indirect Costs (IC)
i. Markup Factors To Estimate Indirect Costs
As done in the proposal, the agencies have estimated the indirect
costs by applying indirect cost multipliers (ICM) to direct cost
estimates. EPA derived ICMs a basis for estimating the impact on
indirect costs of individual vehicle technology changes that would
result from regulatory actions. EPA derived separate ICMs for low-,
medium-, and high-complexity technologies, thus enabling estimates of
indirect costs that reflect the variation in research, overhead, and
other indirect costs that can occur among different technologies. The
agencies also applied ICMs in our MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking.
Prior to the development of the ICM methodology,\248\ EPA and NHTSA
both applied a retail price equivalent (RPE) factor to estimate
indirect costs. RPEs are estimated by dividing the total revenue of a
manufacturer by the direct manufacturing costs. As such, it includes
all forms of indirect costs for a manufacturer and assumes that the
ratio applies equally for all technologies. ICMs are based on RPE
estimates that are then modified to reflect only those elements of
indirect costs that would be expected to change in response to a
regulatory-induced technology change. For example, warranty costs would
be reflected in both RPE and ICM estimates, while marketing costs might
only be reflected in an RPE estimate but not an ICM estimate for a
particular technology, if the new regulatory-induced technology change
is not one expected to be marketed to consumers. Because ICMs
calculated by EPA are for individual technologies, many of which are
small in scale, they often reflect a subset of RPE costs; as a result,
for low complexity technologies, the RPE is typically higher than the
ICM. This is not always the case, as ICM estimates for particularly
complex technologies, specifically hybrid technologies (for
[[Page 62709]]
near term ICMs), and plug-in hybrid battery and full electric vehicle
technologies (for near term and long term ICMs), reflect higher than
average indirect costs, with the resulting ICMs for those technologies
equaling or exceeding the averaged RPE for the industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\ The ICM methodology was developed by RTI International,
under contract to EPA. The results of the RTI report were published
in Alex Rogozhin, Michael Gallaher, Gloria Helfand, and Walter
McManus, ``Using Indirect Cost Multipliers to Estimate the Total
Cost of Adding New Technology in the Automobile Industry.''
International Journal of Production Economics 124 (2010): 360-368.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is some level of uncertainty surrounding both the ICM and RPE
markup factors. The ICM estimates used in this rule group all
technologies into four broad categories in terms of complexity and
treat them as if individual technologies within each of the categories
(``low'', ``medium'', ``high1'' and ``high2'' complexity) will have the
same ratio of indirect costs to direct costs. This simplification means
it is likely that the direct cost for some technologies within a
category will be higher and some lower than the estimate for the
category in general. More importantly, the ICM estimates have not been
validated through a direct accounting of actual indirect costs for
individual technologies. Rather, the ICM estimates were developed using
adjustment factors developed in two separate occasions: the first, a
consensus process, was reported in the RTI report; the second, a
modified Delphi method, was conducted separately and reported in an EPA
memo.\249\ Both of these processes were carried out by panels composed
of EPA staff members with previous background in the automobile
industry; the memberships of the two panels overlapped but were not
identical.\250\ The panels evaluated each element of the industry's RPE
estimates and estimated the degree to which those elements would be
expected to change in proportion to changes in direct manufacturing
costs. The method used in the RTI report were peer reviewed by three
industry experts and subsequently by reviewers for the International
Journal of Production Economics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\249\ Helfand, Gloria, and Sherwood, Todd. ``Documentation of
the Development of Indirect Cost Multipliers for Three Automotive
Technologies.'' Memorandum, Assessment and Standards Division,
Office of Transportation and Air Quality, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, August 2009.
\250\ NHTSA staff participated in the development of the process
for the second, modified Delphi panel, and reviewed the results as
they were developed, but did not serve on the panel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RPEs themselves are inherently difficult to estimate because the
accounting statements of manufacturers do not neatly categorize all
cost elements as either direct or indirect costs. Hence, each
researcher developing an RPE estimate must apply a certain amount of
judgment to the allocation of the costs. Since empirical estimates of
ICMs are ultimately derived from the same data used to measure RPEs,
this affects both measures. However, the value of RPE has not been
measured for specific technologies, or for groups of specific
technologies. Thus applying a single average RPE to any given
technology by definition overstates costs for very simple technologies,
or understates them for advanced technologies.
In every recent GHG and fuel economy rulemaking proposal, we have
requested comment on our ICM factors and whether it is most appropriate
to use ICMs or RPEs. We have generally received little to no comment on
the issue specifically, other than basic comments that the ICM values
are too low. In addition, in the June 2010 NAS report, NAS noted that
the under the initial ICMs, no technology would be assumed to have
indirect costs as high as the average RPE. NRC found that ``RPE factors
certainly do vary depending on the complexity of the task of
integrating a component into a vehicle system, the extent of the
required changes to other components, the novelty of the technology,
and other factors. However, until empirical data derived by means of
rigorous estimation methods are available, the committee prefers to use
average markup factors.'' \251\ The committee also stated that ``The
EPA (Rogozhin et al., 2009), however, has taken the first steps in
attempting to analyze this problem in a way that could lead to a
practical method of estimating technology-specific markup factors''
where ``this problem'' spoke to the issue of estimating technology-
specific markup factors and indirect cost multipliers.\252\
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\251\ NRC, Finding 3-2 at page 3-23.
\252\ NRC at page 3-19.
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As EPA has developed its ICM approach to indirect cost estimation,
the agency has publicly discussed and responded to comment on its
approach during the MYs 2012-2016 light-duty GHG rule, and also in the
more recent heavy-duty GHG rule (see 76 FR 57106) and in the 2010 TAR.
The agency published its work in the Journal of Production Economics
\253\ and has also published a memorandum furthering the development of
ICMs.\254\ As thinking has matured, we have adjusted our ICM factors
such that they are slightly higher and, importantly, we have changed
the way in which the factors are applied. For the proposal for this
rule, EPA concluded that ICMs are fully developed for regulatory
purposes and used these factors in developing the indirect costs
presented in the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ Alex Rogozhin, Michael Gallaher, Gloria Helfand, and
Walter McManus, ``Using Indirect Cost Multipliers to Estimate the
Total Cost of Adding New Technology in the Automobile Industry.''
International Journal of Production Economics 124 (2010): 360-368.
\254\ Helfand, Gloria, and Sherwood, Todd. ``Documentation of
the Development of Indirect Cost Multipliers for Three Automotive
Technologies.'' Memorandum, Assessment and Standards Division,
Office of Transportation and Air Quality, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, August 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies received comments on the approach used to estimate
indirect costs in the proposal. One commenter (NADA) argued that the
ICM approach was not valid and an RPE approach was the only appropriate
approach.\255\ Further, that commenter argued that the RPE factor
should be 2.0 times direct costs rather than the 1.5 factor that is
supported by filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Another
commenter (ICCT) commented positively on the new ICM approach as
presented in the proposal, but argued that sensitivity analyses
examining the impact of using an RPE should be deleted from the final
rule.\256\ Both agencies have conducted thorough analysis of the
comments received on the RPE versus ICM approach. Regarding NADA's
concerns about the accuracy of ICMs, although the agencies recognize
that there is uncertainty regarding the impact of indirect costs on
vehicle prices, they have retained ICMs for use in the central analysis
because it offers advantages of focusing cost estimates on only those
costs impacted by a regulatory imposed change, and it provides a
disaggregated approach that better differentiates among technologies.
The agencies disagree with NADA's contention that the correct factor to
reflect the RPE should be 2.0, and we cite data in Chapter 3 of the
joint TSD that demonstrates that the overall RPE should average about
1.5. Regarding ICCTs contention that NHTSA should delete sensitivity
analyses examining the impact of using an RPE, NHTSA rejects this
proposal. OMB Circular No. A-94 establishes guidelines for conducting
benefit-cost analysis of Federal programs and recommends sensitivity
analyses to address uncertainty and imprecision in both underlying data
and modeling assumptions. The agencies have addressed uncertainty in
separate sensitivity analyses, with NHTSA examining uncertainty
stemming from the shift away from the use of the RPE and EPA examining
uncertainty around the ICM values. Further analysis of NADA's comments
is summarized in
[[Page 62710]]
Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD and in Chapter 7 of NHTSA's FRIA and in
EPA's Response to Comments document. NHTSA's full response to ICCT is
also presented in chapter 7 of NHTSA's FRIA. For this final rule, each
agency is using an ICM approach with ICM factors identical to those
used in the proposal. The impact of using an RPE rather than ICMs to
calculate indirect costs is examined in sensitivity and uncertainty
analyses in chapters 7, 10, and 12 of NHTSA's FRIA where NHTSA shows
that even under the higher cost estimates that result using the RPE,
the rulemaking is highly cost beneficial. The impact of alternate ICMs
is examined in Chapter 3 of EPA's RIA.
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\255\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 4.
\256\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 19-20.
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Note that our ICM, while identical to those used in the proposal,
have changed since the MYs 2012-2016 rule. The first change--increased
ICM factors--was done as a result of further thought among EPA and
NHTSA that the ICM factors presented in the original RTI report for low
and medium complexity technologies should no longer be used and that we
should rely solely on the modified-Delphi values for these complexity
levels. For that reason, we eliminated the averaging of original RTI
values with modified-Delphi values and instead are relying solely on
the modified-Delphi values for low and medium complexity technologies.
The second change was a re-evaluation by agency staff of the complexity
classification of each of the technologies that were not directly
examined in the RTI and modified Delphi studies. As a result, more
technologies have been classified as medium complexity and fewer as low
complexity. The third change--the way the factors are applied--resulted
in the warranty portion of the indirect costs being applied as a
multiplicative factor (thereby decreasing going forward as direct
manufacturing costs decrease due to learning), and the remainder of the
indirect costs being applied as an additive factor (thereby remaining
constant year-over-year and not being reduced due to learning). This
third change has a comparatively large impact on the resultant
technology costs and, we believe, more appropriately estimates costs
over time. In addition to these changes, a secondary-level change was
made as part of this ICM recalculation. That change was to revise
upward the RPE level reported in the original RTI report from an
original value of 1.46 to 1.5, to reflect the long term average RPE.
The original RTI study was based on 2008 data. However, an analysis of
historical RPE data indicates that, although there is year to year
variation, the average RPE has remained roughly constant at 1.5. ICMs
are applied to future years' data and, therefore, NHTSA and EPA staffs
believed that it would be appropriate to base ICMs on the historical
average rather than a single year's result. Therefore, ICMs were
adjusted to reflect this average level. These changes to the ICMs since
the MYs 2012-2016 rule and the methodology are described in greater
detail in Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD. NHTSA also has further discussion
of ICMs in Chapter 7 of NHTSA's FRIA.
ii. Stranded Capital
Because the production of automotive components is capital-
intensive, it is possible for substantial capital investments in
manufacturing equipment and facilities to become ``stranded'' (where
their value is lost, or diminished). This would occur when the capital
is rendered useless (or less useful) by some factor that forces a major
change in vehicle design, plant operations, or manufacturer's product
mix, such as a shift in consumer demand for certain vehicle types. It
can also be caused by new standards that phase in at a rate too rapid
to accommodate planned replacement or redisposition of existing capital
to other activities. The lost value of capital equipment is then
amortized in some way over production of the new technology components.
It is difficult to quantify accurately any capital stranding
associated with new technology phase-ins under the standards in this
final rule because of the iterative dynamic involved--that is, the new
technology phase-in rate strongly affects the potential for additional
cost due to stranded capital, but that additional cost in turn affects
the degree and rate of phase-in for other individual competing
technologies. In addition, such an analysis is very company-, factory-,
and manufacturing process-specific, particularly in regard to finding
alternative uses for equipment and facilities. Nevertheless, in order
to account for the possibility of stranded capital costs, the agencies
asked FEV to perform a separate analysis of potential stranded capital
costs associated with rapid phase-in of technologies due to new
standards, using data from FEV's primary teardown-based cost
analyses.\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ FEV, Inc., ``Potential Stranded Capital Analysis on EPA
Light-Duty Technology Cost Analysis'', Contract No. EP-C-07-069 Work
Assignment 3-3. November 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The assumptions made in FEV's stranded capital analysis with
potential for major impacts on results are:
All manufacturing equipment was bought brand new when the
old technology started production (no carryover of equipment used to
make the previous components that the old technology itself replaced).
10-year normal production runs: Manufacturing equipment
used to make old technology components is straight-line depreciated
over a 10-year life.
Factory managers do not optimize capital equipment phase-
outs (that is, they are assumed to routinely repair and replace
equipment without regard to whether or not it will soon be scrapped due
to adoption of new vehicle technology).
Estimated stranded capital is amortized over 5 years of
annual production at 450,000 units (of the new technology components).
This annual production is identical to that assumed in FEV's primary
teardown-based cost analyses. The 5-year recovery period is chosen to
help ensure a conservative analysis; the actual recovery would of
course vary greatly with market conditions.
The stranded capital analysis was performed for three transmission
technology scenarios, two engine technology scenarios, and one hybrid
technology scenario. The methodology used by EPA in applying the
results to the technology costs is described in Chapter 3.8.7 and
Chapter 5.1 of EPA's RIA. The methodology used by NHTSA in applying the
results to the technology costs is described in NHTSA's RIA section V.
In their written comments on the proposal, the Center for
Biological Diversity and the International Council on Clean
Transportation argued that the long lead times being provided for the
phase-in of new standards, stretching out as they do over two complete
redesign cycles, will virtually eliminate any capital stranding, making
it inappropriate to carry over what they consider to be a ``relic''
from shorter-term rulemakings. As discussed above, it is difficult to
quantify accurately any capital stranding associated with new
technology phase-ins, especially given the projected and unprecedented
deployment of technologies in the rulemaking timeframe. The FEV
analysis attempted to define the possible stranded capital costs, for a
select set of technologies, using the above set of assumptions. Since
the direct manufacturing costs developed by FEV assumed a 10 year
production life (i.e., capital costs amortized over 10 years) the
agencies applied the FEV
[[Page 62711]]
derived stranded capital costs whenever technologies were replaced
prior to being utilized for the full 10 years. The other option would
be to assume a 5 year product life (i.e., capital costs amortized over
5 years), which would have increased the direct manufacturing costs. It
seems only reasonable to account for stranded capital costs in the
instances where the fleet modeling performed by the agencies replaced
technologies before the capital costs were fully amortized. The
agencies did not derive or apply stranded capital costs to all
technologies only the ones analyzed by FEV. While there is uncertainty
about the possible stranded capital costs (i.e., understated or
overstated), their impact would not call into question the overall
results of our cost analysis or otherwise affect the stringency of the
standards, since costs of stranded capital are a relatively minor
component of the total estimated costs of the rules.
c. Cost Adjustment to 2010 Dollars
This simple change from the earlier analyses and from the proposal
is to update any costs presented in earlier analyses to 2010 dollars
using the GDP price deflator as reported by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis on January 27, 2011. The factors used to update costs from
2007, 2008 and 2009 dollars to 2010 dollars are shown below.
Table II-17--GDP Price Deflators Used in This Final Rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 2008 2009 2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Price Index for Gross Domestic Product.......... 106.2 108.6 109.7 111.0
Factor applied to convert to 2010 dollars....... 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product, downloaded 2/9/2012,
last revised 1/27/2012.
d. Cost Effects Due to Learning
The agencies have not changed the approach to manufacturer learning
since the proposal. For many of the technologies considered in this
rulemaking, the agencies expect that the industry should be able to
realize reductions in their costs over time as a result of ``learning
effects,'' that is, the fact that as manufacturers gain experience in
production, they are able to reduce the cost of production in a variety
of ways. For this rule, the agencies continue to apply learning effects
in the same way as we did in both the MYs 2012-2016 final rule and in
the 2010 TAR. However, in the proposal, we employed some new
terminology in an effort to eliminate some confusion that existed with
our old terminology. (This new terminology was described in the recent
heavy-duty GHG final rule (see 76 FR 57320)). Our old terminology
suggested we were accounting for two completely different learning
effects--one based on volume production and the other based on time.
This was not the case since, in fact, we were actually relying on just
one learning phenomenon, that being the learning-by-doing phenomenon
that results from cumulative production volumes.
As a result, the agencies have also considered the impacts of
manufacturer learning on the technology cost estimates by reflecting
the phenomenon of volume-based learning curve cost reductions in our
modeling using two algorithms depending on where in the learning cycle
(i.e., on what portion of the learning curve) we consider a technology
to be--``steep'' portion of the curve for newer technologies and
``flat'' portion of the curve for more mature technologies. The
observed phenomenon in the economic literature which supports
manufacturer learning cost reductions are based on reductions in costs
as production volumes increase with the highest absolute cost reduction
occurring with the first doubling of production. The agencies use the
terminology ``steep'' and ``flat'' portion of the curve to distinguish
among newer technologies and more mature technologies, respectively,
and how learning cost reductions are applied in cost analyses.
Learning impacts have been considered on most but not all of the
technologies expected to be used because some of the expected
technologies are already used rather widely in the industry and,
presumably, quantifiable learning impacts have already occurred. The
agencies have applied the steep learning algorithm for only a handful
of technologies considered to be new or emerging technologies such as
PHEV and EV batteries which are experiencing heavy development and,
presumably, rapid cost declines in coming years. For most technologies,
the agencies have considered them to be more established and, hence,
the agencies have applied the lower flat learning algorithm. For more
discussion of the learning approach and the technologies to which each
type of learning has been applied the reader is directed to Chapter 3
of the Joint TSD. NHTSA has further discussion in Chapter 7 of the
NHTSA FRIA. Note that, since the agencies had to project how learning
will occur with new technologies over a long period of time, we request
comments on the assumptions of learning costs and methodology. In
particular, we are interested in input on the assumptions for advanced
27-bar BMEP cooled exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) engines, which are
currently still in the experimental stage and not expected to be
available in volume production until 2017. For our analysis, we have
based estimates of the costs of this engine on current (or soon to be
current) production technologies (e.g., gasoline direct injection fuel
systems, engine downsizing, cooled EGR, 18-bar BMEP capable
turbochargers), and assumed that, since learning (and the associated
cost reductions) begins in 2012 for them that it also does for the
similar technologies used in 27-bar BMEP engines.
The agencies did not receive comments on the issue of manufacturer
learning.
3. How did the agencies determine the effectiveness of each of these
technologies?
For this final rule, EPA has conducted another peer reviewed study
with the global engineering consulting firm, Ricardo, Inc., adding to
and refining the results of the 2007 study, consistent with a longer-
term outlook through model years MYs 2017-2025. The 2007 study was a
detailed, peer reviewed vehicle simulation project to quantify the
effectiveness of a multitude of technologies for the MYs 2012-2016 rule
(as well as the 2010 NOI) published in 2008. The extent of the new
study was vast, including hundreds of thousands of vehicle simulation
runs. The results were, in turn, employed to calibrate and update EPA's
lumped parameter model, which is used to quantify the synergies and
dis-synergies associated with combining technologies together for the
purposes of generating
[[Page 62712]]
inputs for the agencies respective OMEGA and CAFE modeling.
Additionally, there were a number of technologies that Ricardo did
not model explicitly. For these, the agencies relied on a variety of
sources in the literature. A few of the values are identical to those
presented in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, while others were updated
based on the newer version of the lumped parameter model. More details
on the Ricardo simulation, lumped parameter model, as well as the
effectiveness for supplemental technologies are described in Chapter 3
of the Joint TSD.
The agencies note that the effectiveness values estimated for the
technologies considered in the modeling analyses may represent average
values, and do not reflect the virtually unlimited spectrum of possible
values that could result from adding the technology to different
vehicles. For example, while the agencies have estimated an
effectiveness of 0.6 to 0.8 percent for low-friction lubricants,
depending on the vehicle class, each vehicle could have a unique
effectiveness estimate depending on the baseline vehicle's oil
viscosity rating. Similarly, the reduction in rolling resistance (and
thus the improvement in fuel economy and the reduction in
CO2 emissions) due to the application of low rolling
resistance tires depends not only on the unique characteristics of the
tires originally on the vehicle, but on the unique characteristics of
the tires being applied, characteristics that must be balanced between
fuel efficiency, safety, and performance. Aerodynamic drag reduction is
much the same--it can improve fuel economy and reduce CO2
emissions, but it is also highly dependent on vehicle-specific
functional objectives. For purposes of this rule, NHTSA and EPA believe
that employing average values for technology effectiveness estimates,
as adjusted depending on vehicle class, is an appropriate way of
recognizing the potential variation in the specific benefits that
individual manufacturers (and individual vehicles) might obtain from
adding a fuel-saving technology.
As discussed in the proposal, the U.S. D.O.T. Volpe Center entered
into a contract with Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) to provide full
vehicle simulation modeling support for this MYs 2017-2025 rulemaking.
While modeling was not complete in time for use in the NPRM, the ANL
results were available for the final rule and were used to define the
effectiveness of mild hybrids for both agencies, and NHTSA used the
results to update the effectiveness of advanced transmission
technologies coupled with naturally-aspirated engines for the CAFE
analysis, as discussed in the Joint TSD and more fully in NHTSA's RIA.
This simulation modeling was accomplished using ANL's full vehicle
simulation tool called ``Autonomie,'' which is the successor to ANL's
Powertrain System Analysis Toolkit (PSAT) simulation tool, and that
includes sophisticated models for advanced vehicle technologies. The
ANL simulation modeling process and results are documented in multiple
reports and are peer reviewed. Both the ANL reports and peer review
report can be found in NHTSA's docket.\258\
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\258\ Docket No: NHTSA-2010-0131.
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4. How did the agencies consider real-world limits when defining the
rate at which technologies can be deployed?
a. Refresh and Redesign Schedules
During MYs 2017-2025 manufacturers are expected to go through the
normal automotive business cycle of redesigning and upgrading their
light-duty vehicle products, and in some cases introducing entirely new
vehicles not in the market today. The MYs 2017-2025 standards timeframe
allows manufacturers the time needed to incorporate GHG reduction and
fuel-saving technologies into their normal business cycle while
considering the requirements of the MYs 2012-2016 standards. This is
important because it has the potential to avoid the much higher costs
that could occur if manufacturers need to add or change technology at
times other than their scheduled vehicle redesigns. This time period
also provides manufacturers the opportunity to plan for compliance
using a multi-year time frame, again consistent with normal business
practice. Over these 9 model years, and the 5 prior model years that
make up the MYs 2012-2016 standards, there will be an opportunity for
manufacturers to evaluate, presumably, every one of their vehicle
platforms and models and add technology in a cost effective way to
control GHG emissions and improve fuel economy. This includes all the
technologies considered here and the redesign of the air conditioner
systems in ways that will further reduce GHG emissions and improve fuel
economy.
Because of the complexities of the automobile manufacturing
process, manufacturers are generally only able to add new technologies
to vehicles on a specific schedule; just because a technology exists in
the marketplace or is made available, does not mean that it is
immediately available for applications on all of a manufacturer's
vehicles. In the automobile industry there are two terms that describe
when technology changes to vehicles occur: redesign and refresh (i.e.,
freshening). Vehicle redesign usually refers to significant changes to
a vehicle's appearance, shape, dimensions, and powertrain. Redesign is
traditionally associated with the introduction of ``new'' vehicles into
the market, often characterized as the ``next generation'' of a
vehicle, or a new platform. Across the industry, redesign of models
generally takes place about every 5 years. However, while 5 years is a
typical design period, there are many instances where redesign cycles
can be longer or shorter. For example, it has generally been the case
that pickup trucks and full size vans have longer redesign cycles
(e.g., 6 to 7 years), while high-volume cars have shorter redesign
cycles in order to remain competitive in the market. There are many
other factors that can also affect redesign such as availability of
capital and engineering resources and the extent of platform and
component sharing between models, or even manufacturers.
We have a more detailed discussion in Chapter 3.4 of the joint TSD
that describes how refresh and redesign cycles play into the modeling
each agency has done in support of the final standards.
b. Vehicle Phase-In Caps
GHG-reducing and fuel-saving technologies for vehicle applications
vary widely in function, cost, effectiveness and availability. Some of
these attributes, like cost and availability vary from year to year.
New technologies often take several years to become available across
the entire market. The agencies use phase-in caps to manage the maximum
rate that the CAFE and OMEGA models can apply new technologies.
Phase-in caps are intended to function as a proxy for a number of
real-world limitations in deploying new technologies in the auto
industry. These limitations can include but are not limited to,
engineering resources at the OEM or supplier level, restrictions on
intellectual property that limit deployment, and/or limitations in
material or component supply as a market for a new technology develops.
Without phase-in caps, the models may apply technologies at rates that
are not representative of what the industry is actually capable of
producing, which would suggest that more stringent standards might be
feasible than actually would be.
[[Page 62713]]
EPA applies the caps on an OEM vehicle platform basis for most
technologies. For a given technology with a cap of x%, this means that
x% of a vehicle platform can receive that technology. On a fleet
average basis, since all vehicle platforms can receive x% of this
technology, x% of a manufacturer's fleet can also receive that
technology. EVs and PHEVs are an exception to this rule as the agencies
limit the availability of these technologies to some subclasses. Unlike
other technologies, in order to maintain utility, EPA only allows non-
towing vehicle types to be electrified in the OMEGA model. As a result,
the PHEV and EV cap was applied so that the average manufacturer could
produce to the cap levels. As would be expected, manufacturers that
make more non-towing vehicles can have a higher fraction of their fleet
converted to EVs and PHEVs, while those that make fewer non-towing
vehicles have a lower potential maximum limit on EV and PHEV
production.
NHTSA applies phase-in caps in addition to refresh/redesign cycles
used in the CAFE model, which constrain the rate of technology
application at the vehicle level so as to ensure a period of stability
following any modeled technology applications, Unlike vehicle-level
cycle settings, phase-in caps, defined on a percent per year basis,
constrain technology application at the OEM level. As discussed above
phase-in caps are intended to reflect a manufacturer's overall resource
capacity available for implementing new technologies (such as
engineering and development personnel and financial resources) thereby
ensuring that resource capacity is accounted for in the modeling
process. At a high level, phase-in caps and refresh/redesign cycles
work in conjunction with one another to avoid the CAFE modeling process
out-pacing an OEM's limited pool of available resources during the
rulemaking time frame, especially in years where many models may be
scheduled for refresh or redesign. This helps to ensure technological
feasibility and economic practicability in determining the stringency
of the standards.
We have a more detailed discussion of phase-in caps in Chapter 3.4
of the joint TSD.
5. Maintenance and Repair Costs Associated With New Technologies
In the proposal, we requested comment on maintenance, repair, and
other operating-costs and whether these might increase or decrease with
the new technologies. (See 76 FR 74925) We received comments on this
topic from NADA. These comments stated that the agencies should include
maintenance and repair costs in estimates of total cost of ownership
(i.e., in our payback analyses).\259\ NADA proffered their Web site
\260\ as a place to find information on operating costs that might be
used in our final analyses. This Web site tool is meant to help
consumers quantify the cost of ownership of a new vehicle. The tool
includes estimates for depreciation, fees, financing, insurance, fuel
maintenance, opportunity costs and repairs for the first five years of
ownership. The agencies acknowledge that the tool may be useful for
consumers; however, there is no information provided on how these
estimates were determined. Without documentation of the basis for
estimates, the Web site information is of limited use in this
rulemaking where the agencies document the source and basis for each
factual assertion. There are also evident substantive anomalies in the
Web site information.\261\ For these reasons, the agencies have
performed an independent analysis to quantify maintenance costs.
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\259\ See NADA (EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0639, p.10).
\260\ http://www.nadaguides.com/Cars/Cost-to-Own.
\261\ For example, comparing the 2012 Hyundai Sonata showed the
same cost for fuel ($11,024) regardless of whether it is a hybrid
option or not. The HEV fuel economy rating is 35/40 mpg City/Highway
for the HEV and 2.4L non HEV rating is 24/35. Another example is the
2012 Ford Fusion SEL: the front wheel drive and the all-wheel drive
versions have identical fuel cost despite having different fuel
economies.
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For the first time in CAFE and GHG rulemaking, both agencies now
include maintenance costs in their benefit-cost analyses and in their
respective payback analyses. This analysis is presented in Chapter 3.6
of the joint TSD and the maintenance intervals and costs per
maintenance event used by both agencies are summarized in Table II-18.
For information on how each agency has folded the maintenance costs
into their respective final analyses, please refer to each agency's
respective RIA (Chapter 5 of EPA's RIA, Chapter VIII of NHTSA's FRIA).
Table II-18--Maintenance Event Costs & Intervals
[2010 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Maintenance
New technology Reference case maintenance interval
event (mile)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low rolling resistance tires level 1.......... Standard tires.................. $6.44 40,000
Low rolling resistance tires level 2.......... Standard tires.................. 43.52 40,000
Diesel fuel filter replacement................ Gasoline vehicle................ 49.25 20,000
EV oil change................................. Gasoline vehicle................ -38.67 7,500
EV air filter replacement..................... Gasoline vehicle................ -28.60 30,000
EV engine coolant replacement................. Gasoline vehicle................ -59.00 100,000
EV spark plug replacement..................... Gasoline vehicle................ -83.00 105,000
EV/PHEV battery coolant replacement........... Gasoline vehicle................ 117.00 150,000
EV battery health check....................... Gasoline vehicle................ 38.67 15,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Negative values represent savings due to the EV not needing the maintenance required of the gasoline
vehicle; EPA applied a battery coolant replacement cost to PHEVs and EVs, while NHTSA applied it to EVs only.
E. Joint Economic and Other Assumptions
The agencies' analysis of CAFE and GHG standards for the model
years covered by this final rule rely on a range of forecast
information, estimates of economic variables, and input parameters.
This section briefly describes the sources of the agencies' estimates
of each of these values. These values play a significant role in
assessing the benefits of both CAFE and GHG standards.
In reviewing these variables and the agencies' estimates of their
values for purposes of this final rule, NHTSA and EPA considered
comments received in
[[Page 62714]]
response to the proposed rule, and also reviewed newly available
literature. For this final rule, we made several changes to the
economic assumptions used in our proposed rule, including revised
technology costs to reflect more recently available data; updated
values of the cost of owning a vehicle based on new data; updated fuel
price and transportation demand forecasts that reflect the Annual
Energy Outlook (AEO) 2012 Early Release; and changes to vehicle miles
travelled (VMT) schedules, survival rates, and projection methods. The
final values summarized below are discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 4 of the joint TSD and elsewhere in the preamble and in the
agencies' respective RIAs.
Costs of fuel economy-improving technologies--These inputs
are discussed in summary form in Section II.D above and in more detail
in the agencies' respective sections of this preamble, in Chapter 3 of
the joint TSD, and in the agencies' respective RIAs. The direct
manufacturing cost estimates for fuel economy improving and GHG
emissions reducing technologies that are used in this analysis are
intended to represent manufacturers' direct costs for high-volume
production of vehicles equipped with these technologies in the year for
which we state the cost is considered ``valid.'' Technology direct
manufacturing cost estimates are the same as those used to analyze the
proposed rule, with the exception of those for hybrid electric
vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) and electric vehicle
(EV) battery costs which have been updated using an updated version of
Argonne National Laboratory's (ANL's) BatPaC model.\262\ Indirect costs
are accounted for by applying near-term indirect cost multipliers
ranging from 1.24 to 1.77 to the estimates of vehicle manufacturers'
direct costs for producing or acquiring each technology, depending on
the complexity of the technology and the time frame over which costs
are estimated. These values are reduced to 1.19 to 1.50 over the long
run as some aspects of indirect costs decline. As explained at
proposal, the indirect cost markup factors have been revised from the
MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking and the Interim Joint TAR to reflect the
agencies current thinking regarding a number of issues. The final rules
use the same factors the agencies used at proposal. These factors are
discussed in detail in Section II.D.2 of this preamble and in Chapter 3
of the joint TSD, where we also discuss comments received on the
proposal and our response to them. Details of the agencies' technology
cost assumptions and how they were derived can be found in Chapter 3 of
the joint TSD. We did not receive specific comments on our estimated
technology direct manufacturing costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\ Technology direct manufacturing cost estimates for most
technologies are fundamentally unchanged from those used by the
agencies in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, the heavy-duty truck rule
(to the extent relevant), and TAR, although the agencies have
revised costs for mass reduction, transmissions, and a few other
technologies from those used in these earlier regulatory actions and
analyses.
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Potential opportunity costs of improved fuel economy--This
issue addresses the possibility that achieving the fuel economy
improvements required by alternative CAFE or GHG standards would
require manufacturers to compromise the performance, carrying capacity,
safety, or comfort of their vehicle models. If this were the case, the
resulting sacrifice in the value of these attributes to consumers would
represent an additional cost of achieving the required improvements,
and thus of manufacturers' compliance with stricter standards.
Currently the agencies assume that these vehicle attributes will not
change as a result of these rules. Section II.C above and Chapter 2 of
the joint TSD describe how the agencies carefully selected an
attribute-based standard to minimize manufacturers' incentive to reduce
vehicle capabilities. While manufacturers may choose to do this for
other reasons, the agencies continue to believe that the rules
themselves will not result in such changes. Importantly, EPA and NHTSA
have sought to include the cost of maintaining these attributes as part
of the cost and effectiveness estimates for technologies that are
included in the analysis for this final rule. For example, downsized
engines are assumed to be turbocharged, so that they provide the same
performance and utility even though they are smaller, and the costs of
turbocharging and downsizing are included in the agencies' cost
estimates.\263\ The two instances where the rules might result in loss
of vehicle utility, as described in Section III.D.3, III.H.1.b, and
Section IV.G, involve cases where vehicles are converted to hybrid or
full electric vehicles (EVs) and some buyers may experience a loss of
welfare due to the reduced range of driving on a single charge compared
to the range of an otherwise similar gasoline vehicle. However, in such
cases, we believe that sufficient options would exist for consumers
concerned about the possible loss of this utility (e.g., they could
purchase the non-hybridized version of the vehicle or not buy an EV)
that the agencies do not attribute a welfare loss for these vehicles
resulting from the final rules. Though some comments raised concerns
over consumer acceptance of EVs, other comments expressed optimism that
consumer interest in EVs would be sufficient for the low levels of
adoption projected in these rules to be used for compliance with the
standards. The agencies maintain their assumption that purchasers of
EVs will not incur welfare losses given that they will have sought out
vehicles with these properties. Moreover, given the modest levels of EV
penetration which the agencies project as a compliance strategy for
manufacturers, the agencies likewise do not project any general loss of
societal welfare since many other compliance alternatives remain
available to manufacturers and thus to vehicle purchasers.
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\263\ The modeling work underlying the agencies' estimates of
technology effectiveness build in the need to maintain vehicle
performance (utility). See chapter 3.2 of the Joint TSD for details
behind these effectiveness estimates. Our technology costs include
all costs of implementing the technologies required to achieve these
effectiveness values while maintaining performance and other
utility. Thus, the costs of maintaining performance and other
utility are an inherent element of the agencies' cost estimation
process. The agencies consequently believe it reasonable to conclude
that there will be no loss of vehicle utility as a direct result of
these final rules. The agencies also do not believe that adding
fuel-saving technology should preclude future improvements in
performance, safety, or other attributes, though it is possible that
the costs of these additions may be affected by the presence of
fuel-saving technology.
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Consumer vehicle choice modeling is a method to understand and
predict what vehicles consumers might buy. In principle these models
can be used to estimate the effects of these rules on vehicle sales and
fleet mix. In practice, though, past analyses using such models have
not produced consistent estimates of how buyers might respond to
improved fuel economy, and it is difficult to decide whether one data
source, model specification, or estimation procedure is clearly
preferable over another. Thus, for these final rules, the agencies
continue to use forecasts of total industry sales, the share of total
sales accounted for by passenger cars, and the market shares of
individual models for all years between 2010 and 2025 that do not vary
among regulatory alternatives.
The agencies requested comment on how to estimate explicitly the
changes in vehicle buyers' choices and welfare from the combination of
higher prices for new vehicle models, increases in their fuel economy,
and any accompanying changes in vehicle attributes such as performance,
passenger- and cargo-carrying capacity, or other dimensions of utility.
Some
[[Page 62715]]
commenters considered vehicle choice models too uncertain for use in
this rulemaking, while another requested that we conduct explicit
consumer vehicle choice modeling (although without providing a
justification as to which models to use or why any particular modeling
approach is likely to generate superior estimates). Because the
agencies have not yet developed sufficient confidence in their vehicle
choice modeling efforts, we believe it is premature to use them in this
rulemaking. The agencies have continued to explore the possible use of
these models, as discussed in Sections III.H.1.a and IV.G.6, below.
The on-road fuel economy ``gap'' -- Actual fuel economy
levels achieved by light-duty vehicles in on-road driving fall somewhat
short of their levels measured under the laboratory test conditions
used by EPA to establish compliance with CAFE and GHG standards (and
which is mandated by statute for measuring compliance with CAFE
passenger car standards) \264\. The modeling approach in this final
rule is consistent with the proposal, and also follows the MYs 2012-
2016 final rule and the Interim Joint TAR. In calculating benefits of
the program, the agencies estimate that actual on-road fuel economy
attained by light-duty models that operate on liquid fuels will be 20
percent lower than their fuel economy ratings as measured for purposes
of CAFE fuel economy testing. For example, if the measured CAFE fuel
economy value of a light truck is 20 mpg, the on-road fuel economy
actually achieved by a typical driver of that vehicle is expected to be
16 mpg (20*.80).\265\ Based on manufacturer confidential business
information, as well as data derived from the 2006 EPA fuel economy
label rule, the agencies use a 30 percent gap for consumption of wall
electricity for electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles.\266\ The U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars suggested
that the on-road gap used in the proposal was overly conservative at
20%, and that advanced technology vehicles may have on-road gaps that
are larger than current vehicles. The agencies recognize the potential
for future changes in driver behavior or vehicle technology to change
the on-road gap to be either larger or smaller. The agencies continue
to use the same estimates of the on-road gap as in the proposed rule
for estimating fuel savings and other impacts, and will monitor the EPA
fuel economy database as these future model year vehicles enter the
fleet.
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\264\ 49 U.S.C. 32904(c).
\265\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Final Technical
Support Document, Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicle Revisions
to Improve Calculation of Fuel Economy Estimates, EPA420-R-06-017,
December 2006. (Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1125).
\266\ See 71 FR 77887, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Final Technical Support Document, Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor
Vehicle Revisions to Improve Calculation of Fuel Economy Estimates,
EPA420-R-06-017, December 2006 for general background on the
analysis. See also EPA's Response to Comments (EPA-420-R-11-005,
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1113) to the 2011 labeling rule,
page 189, first paragraph, specifically the discussion of the
derived five cycle equation and the non-linear adjustment with
increasing MPG.
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Fuel prices and the value of saving fuel--Projected future
fuel prices are a critical input into the preliminary economic analysis
of alternative standards, because they determine the value of fuel
savings both to new vehicle buyers and to society, and fuel savings
account for the majority of the rule's estimated benefits. For these
rules, the agencies are using the most recent fuel price projections
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA) Annual Energy
Outlook (AEO) 2012 Early Release reference case. The projections of
fuel prices reported in EIA's AEO 2012 Early Release extend through
2035. Fuel prices beyond the time frame of AEO's forecast were
estimated by applying the average growth rate for the years 2017-2035
for each year after 2035. This is the same general methodology used by
the agencies in the analysis for the proposed rule, as well as in the
MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, in the heavy duty truck and engine rule (76
FR 57106), and in the Interim Joint TAR. For example, the AEO 2012
Early Release projections of gasoline fuel prices (in constant 2010$)
are $3.63 per gallon in 2017, $3.76 in 2020, and $4.09 in 2035.
Extrapolating as described above, retail gasoline prices are projected
to reach $4.57 per gallon in 2050 (measured in constant 2010 dollars).
Several commenters (Volkwagen, Consumer Federation of America,
Environmental Defense Fund, Consumer's Union, National Resources
Defense Council, Union of Concerned Scientists) stated that the EIA AEO
2011 future fuel price projections used in the proposal were similar to
current prices, and thus were modest, or lower than expected. The
agencies note that if a higher fuel prices projection were used, it
would increase the value of the fuel savings from the rule, while a
lower fuel price projection would decrease the value of the fuel
savings from the rule. Another commenter noted the uncertainty
projecting automotive fuel prices during this extended time period
(National Auto Dealers' Association). As discussed in Chapter 4 of the
Joint TSD, while the agencies believe that EIA's AEO reference case
generally represents a reasonable forecast of future fuel prices for
use in our analysis of the benefits of this rule, we recognize that
there is a great deal of uncertainty in future fuel prices. However,
given that no commenters offered alternative sources for fuel price
projections, and the agencies have found no better source since the
NPRM, in this final rulemaking the agencies continue to rely upon EIA
projections of future gasoline and diesel prices.
Consumer cost of ownership and payback period--The
agencies provide, in Sections III.H.3 and IV.G.4, estimates of the
impacts of these rules on the net costs of owning new vehicles, as well
as the time period necessary for the fuel savings to outweigh the
expected increase in prices for the new vehicles (i.e., the payback
period). These analyses focus specifically on the buyers' perspectives,
and therefore take into account the effect of the rule on insurance
premiums, sales tax, and finance charges. From a social perspective,
these are transfers of money from one group to another, rather than net
gains or losses, and thus have no net effect on the net benefits of the
rules. For instance, a sales tax is a cost to a vehicle buyer, but the
money does not represent economic resources that are consumed; instead,
it goes to finance state and local government activities, such as
schools or roads. The role of finance charges is to spread payments
over time, taking into account the opportunity cost of financing; this
is just a reversal of the process of discounting, and thus does not
affect the present value of the vehicle cost. Though the net benefits
analysis is not affected by these payments, from the buyers' viewpoint,
these are additional costs. In the NPRM, EPA included these factors in
its payback period analysis and asked for comment on them; no comments
were received. The agencies have updated these values for these final
rules; the details of the estimation of these factors are found in TSD
Chapter 4.2.13. Though the agencies use these common values for their
respective cost of ownership and payback period analyses, each agency's
estimates for the cost of ownership and the payback period differ due
to somewhat different estimates for vehicle cost increases and fuel
savings. Some comments encouraged our inclusion of maintenance and
repair costs in these calculations and the agencies have responded by
including maintenance costs in that analysis of the final rule.
[[Page 62716]]
The potential effects of the rule on maintenance and repair costs are
discussed in Sections III.H.2, IV.C.2, and Chapter 3.6 of the Joint
TSD. When a new vehicle is destroyed in an accident, the higher costs
of the replacement vehicle are already accounted for in the technology
costs of new vehicles sold, since some of these are purchased to
replace vehicles destroyed in accidents.\267\
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\267\ The agencies do not have information to estimate the
effect of the rule on repair costs for vehicles that are damaged but
not destroyed. Some repairs, such as minor dents, may be unaffected
by changes in vehicles; others may be more or less expensive.
Insurance premiums in principle could provide insight into the costs
of damages associated with more expensive vehicles, but, because
insurance premiums include costs for destroyed vehicles, which are
already implicitly covered in the sales estimates, it is not
possible to separately estimate the costs for repairs from insurance
data. See Joint TSD Chapter 3.6 for further discussion of this
issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle sales assumptions--The first step in estimating
lifetime fuel consumption by vehicles produced during a model year is
to calculate the number of vehicles that are expected to be produced
and sold. The agencies relied on the AEO 2011 and AEO 2012 Early
Release Reference Cases for forecasts of total vehicle sales, while the
baseline market forecast developed by the agencies (discussed in
Section II.B and in Chapter 1 of the TSD) divided total projected sales
into sales of cars and light trucks.
Vehicle lifetimes and survival rates--As in the analysis
for the proposed rule (and as in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule and
Interim Joint TAR), we apply updated values of age-specific survival
rates for cars and light trucks to the adjusted forecasts of passenger
car and light truck sales to determine the number of these vehicles
expected to remain in use during each year of their lifetimes. Since
the proposal, these values were updated using the same methodology with
which the original estimates were developed, together with recent
vehicle registration data obtained from R.L. Polk. No comments were
received on the vehicle lifetime and survival rates in the proposal.
Vehicle miles traveled (VMT)--We calculated the total
number of miles that cars and light trucks produced in each model year
will be driven during each year of their lifetimes using estimates of
annual vehicle use by age tabulated from the Federal Highway
Administration's 2009 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS).\268\ In
order to insure that the resulting mileage schedules imply reasonable
estimates of future growth in total car and light truck use, we
calculated the rate of future growth in annual mileage at each age that
would be necessary for total car and light truck travel to meet the
levels projected in the AEO 2012 Early Release Reference Case. The
growth rate in average annual car and light truck use produced by this
calculation is approximately 0.6 percent per year, and is applied in
the agencies' modeling through 2050. We applied this growth rate to the
mileage figures derived from the 2009 NHTS to estimate annual mileage
by vehicle age during each year of the expected lifetimes of MY 2017-
2025 vehicles. A generally similar approach to estimating future
vehicle use was used in the MYs 2012-2016 final rules and Interim Joint
TAR, but the future growth rates in average vehicle use have been
revised for this rule. No substantive technical comments were received
on this approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ For a description of the Survey, see http://www.bts.gov/programs/national_household_travel_survey/ (last accessed Sept.
9, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accounting for the fuel economy rebound effect--The fuel
economy rebound effect refers to the increase in vehicle use (VMT) that
results if an increase in fuel economy lowers the cost of driving. The
agencies are continuing to use a 10 percent fuel economy rebound
effect, consistent with the proposal, in their analyses of fuel savings
and other benefits from more stringent standards. This value is also
consistent with that used in the MYs 2012-2016 light-duty vehicle
rulemaking and the Interim Joint TAR. That is, we assume that a 10
percent decrease in fuel cost per mile resulting from our standards
would result in a 1 percent increase in the annual number of miles
driven at each age over a vehicle's lifetime. We received comments
recommending values both higher and lower than our proposed value of 10
percent for the fuel economy rebound effect, as well as comments
maintaining that there were indirect rebound effects for which the
agencies should account. The agencies discuss comments on this topic in
more detail in sections III.H.4 and IV.C.3 of the preamble. The
agencies do not regard any of these comments as providing new data or
analysis that justify revising the 10 percent value. In Chapter 4 of
the joint TSD, we provide a detailed explanation of the basis for our
fuel economy rebound estimate, including a summary of new literature
published since the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking that lends further support
to the 10 percent rebound estimate. We also refer the reader to
Chapters X and XII of NHTSA's RIA and Chapter 4 of EPA's RIA for
sensitivity and uncertainty analyses of alternative fuel economy
rebound assumptions.
Benefits from increased vehicle use--The increase in
vehicle use from the rebound effect results from vehicle buyers'
decisions to make more frequent trips or travel farther to reach more
desirable destinations. This additional travel provides benefits to
drivers and their passengers by improving their access to social and
economic opportunities away from home. The analysis estimates the
economic benefits from increased rebound-effect driving as the sum of
the fuel costs they incur during that additional travel, plus the
consumer surplus drivers receive from the improved accessibility their
travel provides. No comments were received on this particular issue. As
in the analysis for the proposed rule (and as in the MYs 2012-2016
final rule) we estimate the economic value of this consumer surplus
using the conventional approximation, which is one half of the product
of the decline in operating costs per vehicle-mile and the resulting
increase in the annual number of miles driven.
Added costs from congestion, accidents, and noise--
Although it provides benefits to drivers as described above, increased
vehicle use associated with the fuel economy rebound effect also
contributes to increased traffic congestion, motor vehicle accidents,
and highway noise. Depending on how the additional travel is
distributed over the day and where it takes place, additional vehicle
use can contribute to traffic congestion and delays by increasing the
number of vehicles using facilities that are already heavily traveled.
These added delays impose higher costs on drivers and other vehicle
occupants in the form of increased travel time and operating expenses.
At the same time, this additional travel also increases costs
associated with traffic accidents and vehicle noise. No comments were
received on the specific economic assumptions employed in the proposal.
The agencies are using the same methodology as used in the analysis for
the proposed rule, relying on estimates of congestion, accident, and
noise costs imposed by automobiles and light trucks developed by the
Federal Highway Administration to estimate these increased external
costs caused by added driving.\269\ This method is also
[[Page 62717]]
consistent with the MYs 2012-2016 final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\ These estimates were developed by FHWA for use in its 1997
Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study; http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/hcas/final/index.htm (last accessed July 8, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum consumption and import externalities--U.S.
consumption of imported petroleum products imposes costs on the
domestic economy that are not reflected in the market price for crude
oil, or in the prices paid by consumers of petroleum products such as
gasoline (often referred to as ``energy security'' costs). These costs
include (1) higher prices for petroleum products resulting from the
effect of increased U.S. demand for imported oil on the world oil price
(the ``monopsony effect''); (2) the expected costs associated with the
risk of disruptions to the U.S. economy caused by sudden reductions in
the supply of imported oil to the U.S. (often referred to as
``macroeconomic disruption and adjustment costs''); and (3) expenses
for maintaining a U.S. military presence to secure imported oil
supplies from unstable regions, and for maintaining the strategic
petroleum reserve (SPR) to cushion the U.S. economy against the effects
of oil supply disruptions (i.e., ``military/SPR costs'').\270\ While
the agencies received a number of comments regarding these energy
security costs, particularly the treatment of military costs, we
continue to use the same methodology from the proposal. Further
discussion of these comments and the agencies' responses can be found
in Sections III.H.8 and IV.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\ See, e.g., Bohi, Douglas R. and W. David Montgomery
(1982). Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Import Policy Washington,
DC: Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press; Bohi,
D. R., and M. A. Toman (1993). ``Energy and Security: Externalities
and Policies,'' Energy Policy 21:1093-1109; and Toman, M. A. (1993).
``The Economics of Energy Security: Theory, Evidence, Policy,'' in
A. V. Kneese and J. L. Sweeney, eds. (1993). Handbook of Natural
Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. III. Amsterdam: North-Holland,
pp. 1167-1218.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monopsony Component--The energy security analysis
conducted for this rule estimates that the world price of oil will fall
modestly in response to lower U.S. demand for refined
fuel.271,272 Although the reduction in the global price of
crude oil and refined petroleum products due to decreased demand for
fuel in the U.S. resulting from this rule represents a benefit to the
U.S. economy, it simultaneously represents an economic loss to sellers
of crude petroleum and refined products from other countries.
Recognizing the redistributive nature of this ``monopsony effect'' when
viewed from a global perspective (which is consistent with the
agencies' use of a global estimate for the social cost of carbon to
value reductions in CO2 emissions), the energy security
benefits estimated to result from this program exclude the value of
this monopsony effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\ Leiby, Paul. Oak Ridge National Laboratory. ``Approach to
Estimating the Oil Import Security Premium for the MY 2017-2025
Light Duty Vehicle Rule'' 2012, EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-
41789.
\272\ Note that this change in world oil price is not reflected
in the AEO fuel price projections described earlier in this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Macroeconomic Disruption Component: In contrast to
monopsony costs, the macroeconomic disruption and adjustment costs that
arise from sudden reductions in the supply of imported oil to the U.S.
do not have offsetting impacts outside of the U.S., so we include the
estimated reduction in their expected value stemming from reduced U.S.
petroleum imports in our energy security benefits estimated for this
program.
Military and SPR Component: We recognize that there may be
significant (if unquantifiable) benefits in improving national security
by reducing U.S. oil imports, and public comments supported the
agencies inclusion of such benefits. Quantification of military
security benefits is challenging because attribution to particular
missions or activities is difficult and because it is difficult to
anticipate the impact of reduced U.S. oil imports on military spending.
The agencies do not have a robust way to calculate these benefits at
this time, and thus exclude U.S. military costs from the analysis.
Similarly, since the size of the SPR, or other factors affecting
the cost of maintaining the SPR, historically have not varied in
response to changes in U.S. oil import levels, we exclude changes in
the cost of maintaining the SPR from the estimates of the energy
security benefits of the program. The agencies continue to examine
appropriate methodologies for estimating the impacts on military and
SPR costs as U.S. oil imports are reduced.
To summarize, the agencies have included only the macroeconomic
disruption and adjustment costs portion of potential energy security
benefits to estimate the monetary value of the total energy security
benefits of this program. The energy security premium values in this
final rule have been updated since the proposal to reflect the AEO2012
Early Release Reference Case projection of future world oil prices.
Otherwise, the methodology for estimating the energy security benefits
is consistent with that used in the proposal. Based on an update of an
earlier peer-reviewed Oak Ridge National Laboratory study that was used
in support of the both the MYs 2012-2016 light duty vehicle and the MYs
2014-2018 medium- and heavy-duty vehicle rulemakings, we estimate that
each gallon of fuel saved will reduce the expected macroeconomic
disruption and adjustment costs of sudden reductions in the supply of
imported oil to the U.S. economy by $0.197 (2010$) in 2025. Each gallon
of fuel saved as a consequence of higher standards is anticipated to
reduce total U.S. imports of crude oil or refined fuel by 0.95
gallons.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\ Each gallon of fuel saved is assumed to reduce imports of
refined fuel by 0.5 gallons, and the volume of fuel refined
domestically by 0.5 gallons. Domestic fuel refining is assumed to
utilize 90 percent imported crude petroleum and 10 percent
domestically-produced crude petroleum as feedstocks. Together, these
assumptions imply that each gallon of fuel saved will reduce imports
of refined fuel and crude petroleum by 0.50 gallons + 0.50 gallons *
90 percent = 0.50 gallons + 0.45 gallons = 0.95 gallons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air pollutant emissions--
Impacts on criteria air pollutant emissions--Criteria air
pollutants emitted by vehicles, during fuel production and
distribution, and during electricity generation include carbon monoxide
(CO), hydrocarbon compounds (usually referred to as ``volatile organic
compounds,'' or VOC), nitrogen oxides (NOX), fine
particulate matter (PM2.5), and sulfur oxides
(SOX). Although reductions in domestic fuel refining and
distribution that result from lower fuel consumption will reduce U.S.
emissions of these pollutants, additional vehicle use associated with
the rebound effect, and additional electricity generation to power
PHEVs and EVs will increase emissions. Thus the net effect of more
stringent GHG and fuel economy standards on emissions of each criteria
pollutant depends on the relative magnitudes of reduced emissions from
fuel refining and distribution, and increases in emissions resulting
from added vehicle use. The agencies' analysis assumes that the per-
mile criteria pollutant emission rates for cars and light trucks
produced during the model years affected by the rule will remain
constant at the levels resulting from EPA's Tier 2 light duty vehicle
emissions standards. The agencies' approach to estimating criteria air
pollutant emissions is consistent with the method used in the proposal
and in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule (where the agencies received no
significant adverse comments), although the agencies employ a more
recent version of the EPA's MOVES (Motor Vehicle Emissions Simulator)
model, as well as new estimates of the emission rates from electricity
generation. No comments were received on the use of the MOVES model.
The agencies analyses of
[[Page 62718]]
emissions from electric power plants are discussed in EPA RIA chapter
4, NHTSA RIA chapter VIII and NHTSA's EIS.
Economic value of reductions in criteria pollutant
emissions--To evaluate benefits from reducing emissions of criteria
pollutants over the lifetimes of MY 2017-2025 vehicles, EPA and NHTSA
estimate the economic value of the human health impacts associated with
reducing population exposure to PM2.5 using a ``dollar-per-
ton'' method. These PM2.5-related dollar-per-ton estimates
provide the total monetized impacts to human health (the sum of changes
in the incidence of premature mortality and morbidity) that result from
eliminating or adding one ton of directly emitted PM2.5, or
one ton of PM2.5 precursor (such as NOX,
SOX, and VOCs, which are emitted as gases but form
PM2.5 as a result of atmospheric reactions), from a
specified source. These unit values remain unchanged from the proposal.
Note that the agencies' joint analysis of criteria air pollutant
impacts over the model year lifetimes of 2017-2025 vehicles includes no
estimates of the direct health or other impacts associated with
emissions of criteria pollutants other than PM2.5 (as
distinguished from their indirect effects as precursors to
PM2.5). The agencies did receive comments arguing that the
agencies should have included these impacts in their analyses, however,
no ``dollar-per-ton'' method exists for ozone or toxic air pollutants
due to complexity associated with atmospheric chemistry (for ozone and
toxics) and a lack of economic valuation data and methods (for air
toxics).
For the final rule, however, EPA and NHTSA also conducted full
scale, photochemical air quality modeling to estimate the change in
ambient concentrations of ozone, PM2.5 and air toxics (i.e.,
hazardous air pollutants listed in section 112(b) of the Clean Air Act)
for the year 2030, and used these results as the basis for estimating
the human health impacts and their economic value of the rule in 2030.
However, the agencies have not conducted such modeling over the
complete life spans of the vehicle model years subject to this
rulemaking, due to timing and resource limitations. Section III.H.7
below and Appendix E of NHTSA's Final EIS present these impact
estimates.
Impacts on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions--NHTSA estimates
reductions in emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from
passenger car and light truck use by multiplying the estimated
reduction in consumption of fuel (gasoline and diesel) by the quantity
or mass of CO2 emissions released per gallon of fuel
consumed. EPA directly calculates reductions in total CO2
emissions from the projected reductions in CO2 emissions by
each vehicle subject to these rules.\274\ Both agencies also calculate
the impact on CO2 emissions that occur during fuel
production and distribution resulting from lower fuel consumption, as
well as the emission impacts due to changes in electricity production.
Although CO2 emissions account for nearly 95 percent of
total GHG emissions that result from fuel combustion during vehicle
use, emissions of other GHGs are potentially significant as well
because of their higher ``potency'' as GHGs than that of CO2
itself. EPA and NHTSA therefore also estimate the changes in emissions
of non-CO2 GHGs that occur during fuel production,
electricity use, and vehicle use due to their respective
standards.\275\ The agencies approach to estimating GHG emissions is
consistent with the method used at proposal (and in the MYs 2012-2016
final rule and the Interim Joint TAR). No comments were received on the
method for calculating impacts on greenhouse gas emissions, although
several commenters discussed the emission factors used for electricity
generation. These comments are discussed in section III.C and IV.X.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\ The weighted average CO2 content of
certification gasoline is estimated to be 8,887 grams per gallon,
while that of diesel fuel is estimated to be approximately 10,180
grams per gallon.
\275\ There is, however, an exception. NHTSA does not and cannot
claim benefit from reductions in downstream emissions of HFCs
because they do not relate to fuel economy, while EPA does because
all GHGs are relevant for purposes of EPA's Clean Air Act standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic value of reductions in CO2 emissions--
EPA and NHTSA assigned a dollar value to reductions in CO2
emissions, consistent with the proposal, using recent estimates of the
``social cost of carbon'' (SCC) developed by a federal interagency
group that included representatives from both agencies and reported the
results of its work in February 2010. As that group's report observed,
``The SCC is an estimate of the monetized damages associated with an
incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year. It is
intended to include (but is not limited to) changes in net agricultural
productivity, human health, property damages from increased flood risk,
and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change.'' \276\
Published estimates of the SCC, as well as those developed by the
interagency group, vary widely as a result of uncertainties about
future economic growth, climate sensitivity to GHG emissions,
procedures used to model the economic impacts of climate change, and
the choice of discount rates.\277\ The SCC Technical Support Document
(SCC TSD) provides a complete discussion of the methods used by the
federal interagency group to develop its SCC estimates. Several
commenters expressed support for using SCC to value reductions in
CO2 emissions and provided detailed recommendations directed
at improving the estimates. One commenter disagreed with the use of
SCC. However, as discussed in III.H.6 and IV.C.3 of the preamble, the
SCC estimates were developed using a reasonable set of input
assumptions that are supported by published literature. As noted in the
SCC TSD, the U.S. government intends to revise these estimates over
time, if appropriate, taking into account new research findings that
were not available in 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\ SCC TSD, see page 2. Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0737,
Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory
Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, Interagency Working
Group on Social Cost of Carbon, with participation by Council of
Economic Advisers, Council on Environmental Quality, Department of
Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy,
Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency,
National Economic Council, Office of Energy and Climate Change,
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and Department of Treasury (February 2010). Also available
at http://epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations.htm.
\277\ SCC TSD, see pages 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters also recommended presenting monetized estimates
of the benefits of reductions in non-CO2 GHG emissions
(i.e., methane, nitrous oxides, and hydrofluorocarbons) expected to
result from the final rule. Although the agencies are not basing their
primary analyses on this suggested approach, they have conducted
sensitivity analyses of the final rule's monetized non-CO2
GHG impacts in preamble section III.H.6 and Chapter X of NHTSA's FRIA.
Preamble sections III.H.6 and IV.C.3 also provide a more detailed
discussion about the response to comments on SCC.
The value of changes in driving range--By reducing the
frequency with which drivers typically refuel their vehicles and by
extending the upper limit of the range they can travel before requiring
refueling, improving fuel efficiency provides additional benefits to
vehicle owners. The primary benefits from reducing the required
frequency of refueling are the value of time saved by drivers and other
vehicle occupants, as well as the value of the minor savings in fuel
that would have been consumed during refueling trips that are no longer
[[Page 62719]]
required. Using recent data on vehicle owners' refueling patterns
gathered from a survey conducted by the National Automotive Sampling
System (NASS), NHTSA was able to more accurately estimate the
characteristics of refueling trips. NASS data provided NHTSA with the
ability to estimate the average time required for a refueling trip, the
average time and distance drivers typically travel out of their way to
reach fueling stations, the average number of adult vehicle occupants
during refueling trips, the average quantity of fuel purchased, and the
distribution of reasons given by drivers for refueling. From these
estimates, NHTSA constructed a revised set of assumptions to update
those used in the MYs 2012-2016 FRM for calculating refueling-related
benefits. The MYs 2012-2016 FRM discussed NHTSA's intent to utilize the
NASS data on refueling trip characteristics in future rulemakings.
While the NASS data improve the precision of the inputs used in the
analysis of benefits resulting from less frequent refueling, the
framework of the analysis remains essentially the same as in the MYs
2012-2016 final rule. Note that this topic and associated benefits were
not covered in the Interim Joint TAR. No comments were received on the
refueling analysis presented in the NPRM. Detailed discussion and
examples of the agencies' approaches are provided in Chapter VIII of
NHTSA's FRIA and Chapter 7 of EPA's RIA.
Discounting future benefits and costs--Discounting future
fuel savings and other benefits is intended to account for the
reduction in their value to society when they are deferred until some
future date, rather than received immediately.\278\ The discount rate
expresses the percent decline in the value of these future fuel-savings
and other benefits--as viewed from today's perspective--for each year
they are deferred into the future. In evaluating the non-climate
related benefits of the final standards, the agencies have employed
discount rates of both 3 percent and 7 percent, consistent with the
proposal. One commenter (UCS) agreed with the agencies' use of 3 and 7
percent discount rates, while another (API) stated that the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) uses a 15 percent ``consumer-relevant
discount rate when evaluating the economic cost-effectiveness of new
vehicle efficiency technology,'' which it noted would affect the
agencies' assumptions of benefits if employed. The agencies have
continued to employ the 3 and 7 percent discount rate values for the
final rule analysis, as discussed further below in section IV.C.3 and
in Chapter 4 of the Joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ Because all costs associated with improving vehicles' fuel
economy and reducing CO2 emissions are assumed to be
incurred at the time they are produced, these costs are already
expressed in their present values as of each model year affected by
the rule, and require discounting only for the purpose of expressing
them as present values as of a common year (2012 for the Calendar
Year analysis; the first year of production for each MY vehicle--
2017 through 2025--for the Model Year analysis).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the reader's reference, Table II-19 and Table II-20 below
summarize the values used by both agencies to calculate the impacts of
the final standards. The values presented in these tables are summaries
of the inputs used for the models; specific values used in the
agencies' respective analyses may be aggregated, expanded, or have
other relevant adjustments. See the Joint TSD, Chapter 4, and each
agency's respective RIA for details.
A wide range of estimates is available for many of the primary
inputs that are used in the agencies' CAFE and GHG emissions models.
The agencies recognize that each of these values has some degree of
uncertainty, which the agencies further discuss in the Joint TSD. The
agencies tested the sensitivity of their estimates of costs and
benefits to a range of assumptions about each of these inputs, and
found that the magnitude of these variations would not have changed the
final standards. For example, NHTSA conducted separate sensitivity
analyses for, among other things, discount rates, fuel prices, the
social cost of carbon, the fuel economy rebound effect, consumers'
valuation of fuel economy benefits, battery costs, mass reduction
costs, energy security costs, and the indirect cost markup factor. This
list is similar in scope to the list that was examined in the proposal,
but includes post-warranty repair costs and transmission shift
optimizer effectiveness as well. NHTSA's sensitivity analyses are
contained in Chapter X of NHTSA's RIA.
Similarly, EPA conducted sensitivity analyses on discount rates,
the social cost of carbon, the rebound effect, battery costs, mass
reduction costs, the indirect cost markup factor and on the cost
learning curves used in this analysis. These analyses are found in
Chapters 3, 4, and 7 of the EPA RIA. In addition, NHTSA performed a
probabilistic uncertainty analysis examining simultaneous variation in
the major model inputs including technology costs, technology benefits,
fuel prices, the rebound effect, and military security costs. This
information is provided in Chapter XII of NHTSA's RIA.
Table II-19--Economic Values for Benefits Computations (2010$)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rebound effect 10%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Gap'' between test and on- 20%.
road MPG for liquid-fueled
vehicles.
``Gap'' between test and on- 30%.
road electricity consumption
for electric and plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles.
Annual growth in average 0.6.
vehicle use.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel Prices (2017-50 average, $/gallon)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retail gasoline price........ $4.13.
Pre-tax gasoline price....... 3.78.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic Benefits from Reducing Oil Imports ($/gallon)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Monopsony'' Component...... $ 0.0.0.
Macroeconomic Disruption 0.197 in 2025.
Component.
Military/SPR Component....... 0.00.
Total Economic Costs ($/ 0.197 in 2025.
gallon).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emission Damage Costs (2020, $/short ton, 3% discount rate)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carbon monoxide.............. $ 0.
[[Page 62720]]
Nitrogen oxides (NOX)-- 5,600.
vehicle use.
Nitrogen oxides (NOX)--fuel 5,400.
production and distribution.
Particulate matter (PM2.5)-- 310,000.
vehicle use.
Particulate matter (PM2.5)-- 250,000.
fuel production and
distribution.
Sulfur dioxide (SO2)......... 33,000.
Annual CO2 Damage Cost (per Variable, depending on discount rate and
metric ton). year (see Table II-20 for 2017
estimate).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
External Costs from Additional Automobile Use ($/vehicle-mile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congestion................... $ 0.056.
Accidents.................... 0.024.
Noise........................ 0.001.
------------------------------------------
Total External Costs..... $ 0.081.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
External Costs from Additional Light Truck Use ($/vehicle-mile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congestion................... $0.050.
Accidents.................... 0.027.
Noise........................ 0.001.
------------------------------------------
Total External Costs..... 0.078.
Discount Rates Applied to 3%, 7%.
Future Benefits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II-20--Social Cost of CO2 ($/metric ton), 2017 (2010$)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discount rate 5% 3% 2.5% 3%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source of Estimate.............................. Mean of Estimated Values 95th
percentile
estimate.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 Estimate................................... $6 $26 $41 $79.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. CO2 Credits and Fuel Consumption Improvement Values for Air
Conditioning Efficiency, Off-Cycle Reductions, and Full-Size Pickup
Trucks
For the MYs 2012-2016 rule, EPA provided an option for
manufacturers to generate credits for complying with GHG standards by
incorporating efficiency-improving vehicle technologies that would
reduce CO2 and fuel consumption from air conditioning (A/C)
operation. EPA also provided another credit generating option for
vehicle operation that is not captured by the Federal Test Procedure
(FTP) and Highway Fuel Economy Test (HFET), also collectively known as
the ``two-cycle'' test procedure. EPA referred to these credits as
``off-cycle credits.'' See 76 FR 74937, 74998, 75020.
EPA proposed to continue these credit mechanisms in the MYs 2017-
2025 GHG program, and is finalizing these proposals in this notice. EPA
also proposed that certain of the A/C credits and the off-cycle credits
be included under the CAFE program. See id. and 76 FR 74995-998. For
this rule, under EPA's EPCA authority, EPA is allowing manufacturers to
generate fuel consumption improvement values for purposes of CAFE
compliance based on the use of A/C efficiency and the other off-cycle
technologies. These fuel consumption improvement values will not apply
to compliance with the CAFE program for MYs 2012-2016. Also, reductions
in direct A/C emissions resulting from leakage of HFCs from air
conditioning systems, which are generally unrelated to fuel consumption
reductions, will not apply to compliance with the CAFE program. Thus,
as discussed below, credits for refrigerant leakage emission reductions
will continue to apply only to the EPA GHG program.
The agencies expect that, because of the significant credits and
fuel consumption improvement values available for improvements to the
efficiency of A/C systems (up to 5.0 g/mi for cars and 7.2 g/mi for
trucks which is equivalent to a fuel consumption improvement value of
0.000563 gal/mi for cars and 0.000810 gal/mi for trucks), manufacturers
will take technological steps to maximize these benefits. Since we
project that all manufacturers will adopt these A/C improvements to
their maximum extent, EPA has adjusted the stringency of the two-cycle
tailpipe CO2 standards in order to account for this
projected widespread penetration of A/C credits (as described more
fully in Section III.C),\279\ and NHTSA has also accounted for expected
A/C efficiency improvements in determining the maximum feasible CAFE
standards. The agencies discuss these CO2 credits and fuel
consumption improvement values below and in more detail in Chapter 5 of
the Joint TSD. We also discuss below how other (non-A/C) off-cycle
improvements in CO2 and fuel consumption may be eligible to
apply towards compliance with the GHG and CAFE standards; however, with
two exceptions (for the two-cycle benefits of stop-start and active
aerodynamic improvements--technologies which EPA expects manufacturers
to adopt widely and whose benefits can be reliably quantified), these
off-cycle improvements are not incorporated in the stringency of the
standards Finally, EPA discusses in Section III.C below the
[[Page 62721]]
GHG A/C leakage credits that are exclusive to the GHG standards.
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\279\ Similarly, the MYs 2012-2016 GHG standards reflect direct
and indirect A/C improvements. See 75 FR 25371, May 7, 2010.
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EPA, in coordination with NHTSA, is also introducing for MYs 2017-
2025 a new incentive for certain advanced technologies used in full-
sized pickup trucks. Under its EPCA authority for CAFE and under its
CAA authority for GHGs, EPA is establishing GHG credits and fuel
economy improvement values for manufacturers that hybridize a
significant quantity of their full size pickup trucks, or that use
other technologies that significantly reduce CO2 emissions
and fuel consumption from these full-sized pickup trucks.
We discuss each of these types of credits and incentives, in detail
below and throughout Chapter 5 of the Joint TSD. We also discuss and
respond to the key comments throughout this section.
1. Air Conditioning Efficiency Credits and Fuel Consumption Improvement
Values
After detailed consideration of the comments and other available
information, the agencies are finalizing a program of A/C efficiency
credits and fuel consumption improvement values. Although the agencies
are making some minor changes for the final rule, as described below,
we are finalizing the program establishing efficiency credits and fuel
consumption improvement values largely in its proposed form.
Specifically, efficiency credits will continue to be calculated from a
technology ``menu'' once manufacturers qualify for eligibility to
generate A/C efficiency credits through specified A/C CO2
emissions testing.
The efficiency credits and fuel consumption improvement values in
this rule reflect an understanding of the relationships between A/C
technologies and CO2 emissions and fuel consumption that is
improved from the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking. Much of this understanding
results from the use of a new vehicle simulation tool that EPA has
developed and that the agencies used for the proposal and for this
final rulemaking. EPA designed this model to simulate, in an integrated
way, the dynamic behavior of the several key systems that affect
vehicle efficiency: The engine, electrical, transmission, and vehicle
systems. The simulation model is supported by data from a wide range of
sources, and no comments were received raising concerns about the model
or its use in this rule. Chapter 2 of the EPA Regulatory Impact
Analysis discusses the development of this model in more detail.
The agencies have identified several technologies related to
improvements in A/C efficiency. Most of these technologies already
exist on current vehicles, but manufacturers can improve the energy
efficiency of the technology designs and operation. For example, most
of the additional air conditioning related load on an engine is due to
the compressor, which pumps the refrigerant around the system loop. The
less the compressor operates, the less load the compressor places on
the engine, resulting in less fuel consumption and CO2
emissions. Thus, optimizing compressor operation to align with cabin
demand by using more sophisticated sensors and control strategies is
one path to improving the overall efficiency of the A/C system. See
generally section 5.1.3 of Joint TSD Chapter 5.
A broad range of stakeholders submitted general comments expressing
support for the overall proposed program for A/C efficiency credits and
fuel consumption improvement values as an appropriate method of
encouraging efficiency-improving technologies. One commenter, Center
for Biological Diversity, stated that ``[t]echnology that will be
available during the rulemaking period and can be incorporated in an
economically feasible manner should be built into the standard and not
merely used as an `incentive'.'' In fact, all of these A/C improvements
(for both indirect and direct A/C improvements) are reflected in the
standard stringency.\280\ See section II.C.7.b above. Moreover, we have
every expectation that manufacturers will use most if not all of these
technologies--precisely because of their ready availability and
relatively low cost.
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\280\ As explained in section I.B above, one reason the CAFE and
GHG standards are not the same in miles-per-gallon space is that
direct leakage A/C improvements are reflected in the GHG standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automaker and auto supplier commenters broadly supported the
agencies' assessments of likely A/C efficiency-improving technologies
and the credit values assigned to them. Several commenters suggested
relatively minor changes in these assessments. One commenter, ICCT,
suggested an approach that would attempt to vary A/C efficiency credits
based on the degree to which other off-cycle improvements--specifically
solar load reductions--may have independently reduced the demand for A/
C cooling. ICCT's suggestion was to address what the commenter viewed
as a potential for `double-counting.' EPA agrees with the observation
that A/C efficiency improvements and solar load improvements are
related technically. However, we believe that the added complexity of
scaling the established credit values for A/C technologies according to
solar load improvements would not be warranted, given relatively small
change in the overall credit values that would likely result. We are
thus finalizing separate treatment of A/C efficiency and other off-
cycle improvements, as proposed. (We summarize and discuss comments on
A/C efficiency test procedures below.)
As described in Chapter 5.1.3.2 of the Joint TSD, EPA calculated
the total eligible A/C efficiency credits from an analysis of the
average impact of air conditioning on tailpipe CO2
emissions. This methodology differs from the one used for the MYs 2012-
2016 rule, though it does give similar values. In the MYs 2012-2016
rule, the total impact of A/C on tailpipe emissions was estimated to be
3.9% of total GHG emissions, or approximately 14.3 g/mi. Largely based
on an SAE feasibility study,\281\ EPA assumed that 40% of those
emissions could be reduced through advanced technologies and controls.
Thus, EPA calculated a maximum credit of 5.7 g/mi (for both cars and
trucks) from efficiency improvements. EPA also assumed that there would
be 85% penetration of these technologies when setting the standard, and
consequently made the standard more stringent by 5.0 g/mi. For the MYs
2017-2025 proposal, EPA recalculated the A/C tailpipe impact using its
vehicle simulation tool. Based on these simulations, it was determined
that trucks should have a higher impact than cars, and the total
emissions due to A/C was calculated to be 11.9g/mi for cars and 17.1 g/
mi for trucks. In the proposal, the feasible level of control was
increased slightly from the MYs 2012-2016 final rule to 42% (within the
uncertainty bounds of the studies cited). Thus the maximum credit
became 5.0 for cars and 7.2 for trucks, and the proposed stringency of
the standards reflected these new levels as the penetrations increased
from 85% in MY 2016 to 100% in MY 2017 (for car) and 2019 (for truck).
Volkswagen commented that the change in split in the maximum car/truck
efficiency credit from the previous rule changed the context for their
compliance plans for cars. The agencies understand that a slightly
lower maximum credit level could have a modest effect on compliance
plans. We note that the level of stringency for cars due to A/C has not
changed from the value we used
[[Page 62722]]
for MY 2016, as this was assumed to be 5.0 g/mi in the previous rule as
well as in the more recent proposal. We also believe that it is
appropriate that the program evolve as our understanding of the
inventory of in-use GHG emission inventories improves--as is the case
in this instance. Having said this, the levels of the credits did not
change significantly for cars and thus should not significantly affect
A/C related GHG credit and fuel consumption improvement value
calculations. We are therefore, finalizing the 5.0 and 7.2 g/mi maximum
credits for cars and trucks respectively as proposed. This represents
an improvement in current A/C related CO2 and fuel
consumption of 42% (again, as proposed) and the agencies are using this
level of improvement to represent the maximum efficiency credit
available to a manufacturer. This degree of improvement is reflected in
the stringency of the final standards.
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\281\ Society of Automotive Engineers, ``IMAC Team 2--Improved
Efficiency, Final Report,'' April 2006 (EPA Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specific components and control strategies that are available to
manufacturers to reduce the air conditioning load on the engine are
listed in Table II-21 below and are discussed in more detail in Chapter
5 of the joint TSD.
a. A/C Idle Test
Demonstrating the degree of efficiency improvement that a
manufacturer's air conditioning systems achieve--thus quantifying the
appropriate GHG credit and CAFE fuel consumption improvement value that
the manufacturer is eligible for--would ideally involve a performance
test. That is, manufacturers would use a test that would directly
measure CO2 (and thus allow calculation of fuel consumption)
before and after the incorporation of the improved technologies. A
performance test would be preferable to a predetermined menu value
because it could--potentially--provide a more accurate assessment of
the efficiency improvements of differently designed A/C systems.
Progress toward such a test (or tests) continues. As mentioned in the
introduction to this section, the primary vehicle emissions and fuel
consumption test, the Federal Test Procedure (FTP) or ``two-cycle''
test, does not require or simulate air conditioning usage through the
test cycle. The existing SC03 test, which is used for developing the
fuel economy and environment label values, is designed to identify any
effect that the air conditioning system has on other emissions when it
is operating under extreme temperature and solar conditions, but that
test is not designed to measure the relatively small differences in
tailpipe CO2 due to different A/C efficiency technologies.
At the time of the final rule for the MYs 2012-2016 GHG program,
EPA concluded that a practical, performance-based test procedure
capable of quantifying efficiency credits was not yet available.
Instead, EPA adopted a specialized new procedure for the more limited
purpose of demonstrating that the design improvements for which a
manufacturer was earning credits produced actual efficiency
improvements. That is, passing the test was a precondition to
generating A/C efficiency credits, but the test was not used in
measuring the amount of those credits. See 76 FR 74938. EPA's test is
fairly simple, performed while the vehicle is at idle, and thus named
the A/C Idle Test, or just Idle Test. Beginning with the 2014 model
year, manufacturers are required to achieve a certain CO2
level on the Idle Test in order to then be able to use the technology-
based lookup table (``menu'') and thus quantify the appropriate number
of GHG efficiency credits that the vehicle can generate. See 75 FR
25427-31.
In meetings since the MYs 2012-2016 final rule was published and
during the public comment period for this rule, several manufacturers
provided data that raise questions about the ability of the Idle Test
to completely fulfill its intended purpose. Especially for smaller,
lower-powered vehicles, the data show that it can be difficult to
achieve a degree of test-to-test repeatability that manufacturers
believe is necessary in order to comply with the Idle Test requirement
and generate credits. Similarly, manufacturers and others have stated
that the Idle Test does not accurately or sufficiently capture the
improvements from many of the technologies listed in the menu. While
two commenters (Hyundai and Kia) supported retaining the Idle Test for
the purpose of generating A/C credits, most commenters strongly opposed
any use of the Idle Test. In some cases, although they recommended that
EPA abandon the Idle Test, several manufacturers suggested changes to
the test if it is to remain as a part of the program. Specifically,
these manufacturers supported the EPA proposals to scale the Idle Test
results by engine size and to broaden the ambient temperature and
humidity specifications for the Idle Test.
EPA noted many of these concerns in the preamble to the proposed
rule, and proposed certain changes to the A/C Idle Test as a result.
See 76 FR 74938. EPA also notes that the Idle Test was never meant to
directly quantify the credits generated and we acknowledge that it is
inadequate to that task. The Idle Test was meant simply to set a
threshold in order to access the menu to generate credits (and in some
cases to adjust the menu values for partial credit). EPA also discussed
that it had developed a more rigorous (albeit more complicated and
expensive to perform) test--the AC17 test--which includes the SC03
driving cycle, the fuel economy highway cycle, a preconditioning cycle,
and a solar peak period. EPA proposed that the AC17 test would be
mandatory in MYs 2017 and following model years, but that the AC Idle
Test would continue to be used in MYs 2014-2016 (with the AC17 test
used as a report-only alternative in those earlier model years).\282\
Under the proposal, the AC17 test (unlike the AC Idle Test) would be
used in fixing the amount of available credit. Specifically, if the
AC17 test result, compared to a baseline AC17 test of a previous model
year vehicle without the improved technology, equaled or surpassed the
amount of menu credit, the manufacturer would receive the full menu
credit amount. If the AC17 test result was less than the menu value,
the manufacturer would receive the amount of credit corresponding to
the AC17 test result.\283\
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\282\ 76 FR 74940.
\283\ 76 FR 74940.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since proposal, EPA has continued to carefully evaluate the
concerns and suggestions relating to the Idle Test. The agency
recognizes that there are technical shortcomings as well as advantages
to this relatively simple and inexpensive test. EPA has concluded that,
given that a more sophisticated A/C is now available, the most
appropriate course is to maintain the availability of the AC Idle Test
through MY 2016, but to also allow manufacturers the option of using
the AC17 test to demonstrate that A/C components are indeed functioning
effectively. This use of the AC17 test as an alternative to the Idle
Test will be allowed, commencing with MY 2014. Thus, for MYs 2014,
2015, and 2016, manufacturers will be able to generate A/C efficiency
credits from the technology menu by performing and reporting results
from the AC17 test in lieu of passing the Idle Test. During these model
years, the level of credit and fuel consumption improvement value
manufacturers can generate from the menu will be based on the design of
the A/C system. In MYs 2017-2019, eligibility for AC efficiency credits
will be determined solely by performing and reporting AC17 test
results. During this time, the process for determining the
[[Page 62723]]
level of credit and fuel consumption improvement value will be the same
as during MYs 2014, 2015, and 2016. Finally, starting in MY 2020, AC17
test results will be used both to determine eligibility for AC
efficiency credits and to play a role in determining the amount of the
credit, as proposed. In order to determine the amount of credit or fuel
consumption improvement value after MY 2020, an A to B comparison will
be required. The credit and fuel consumption improvement menu will
continue to be used. Because of the general technical support for the
AC17 test, and in light of several important clarifications and changes
that EPA is implementing to minimize the AC17 testing burden on
manufacturers, EPA believes that most if not all manufacturers wishing
to generate efficiency credits will choose to perform the AC17 test.
Specifically, EPA is modifying the proposed AC17 test procedure to
reduce the number of vehicles requiring testing, so that many fewer
vehicles will need to be tested on the AC17 than on the Idle Test.
Further discussion of the AC17 test appears below in this section of
the preamble and in Chapter 5.1.3.6 of the Joint TSD.
However, EPA is continuing to allow the Idle Test as a testing
option through MY 2016. In addition, EPA is finalizing the
modifications that we proposed to the Idle Test, making the threshold
for access to the menu a function of engine displacement an option
instead of the flat threshold, as well as adjusting the temperature and
humidity specifications in the AC Idle Test. We are also finalizing the
proposed modification that would allow a partial credit if the Idle
Test performance is better than typical performance, based on historic
EPA results from Idle Testing. Chapter 5.1.3.5 of the Joint TSD further
describes the adjustments that EPA is making to the Idle Test for MYs
2014-2016.
b. AC17 Test
As mentioned above, EPA, working in a joint collaboration with
manufacturers (through USCAR) and CARB, has made significant progress
in developing a more robust A/C-related emissions test. As noted above,
the AC17 test is a four-part performance test, which combines the
existing SC03 driving cycle, the fuel economy highway cycle, as well as
a pre-conditioning cycle and a solar soak period. As proposed, and as
discussed below, EPA will allow manufacturers choosing to generate
efficiency credits to report the results of the AC17 test in lieu of
the Idle Test requirements for MYs 2014-2016, and will require them to
use the AC17 test after MY 2016. Until MY 2019, as for MYs 2014-2016,
manufacturers will need to report the results from AC17 testing, but
not to achieve a specific CO2 emissions reduction in order
to access the menu. However, beginning with MY 2020, they will need to
compare the test results to those of a baseline vehicle to demonstrate
a measureable improvement in A/C CO2 emissions and fuel
consumption as a precondition to generating AC efficiency credits from
the A/C credit and fuel consumption improvement menu; in the event that
the improvement is less than the menu value, the amount of credit would
be determined by the AC17 test result.
EPA is making several technical and programmatic changes to the
proposed AC17 test to minimize the number of vehicles that
manufacturers will need to test, and to further streamline each test in
order to minimize the testing burden. Since the appropriateness of the
AC17 test for actually quantifying absolute A/C efficiency improvements
(as opposed to demonstrating a relative improvement) is still being
evaluated, manufacturers wishing to generate A/C efficiency credits
will continue to use the technology menu to quantify the amount of
CO2 credits and fuel consumption improvement values for
compliance with the GHG and CAFE programs. A number of commenters,
including the Alliance, Ford, The Global Automakers, and others
suggested that further work with the industry on the test should occur
before implementing its use. However, we believe that the general
robustness of the test, combined with the technical and programmatic
improvements that EPA is incorporating in this final rule (as discussed
below), and the de facto phase-in of the test in MYs 2014-2016 as well
as MYs 2017-2019, support our decision to implement the test.
i. AC17 Technical Issues
Commenters universally agreed that in most technical respects the
AC17 test represents an improvement over the Idle Test. A few
commenters suggested specific technical changes, which EPA has
considered. Several auto industry commenters suggested that the
proposed temperature and humidity tolerances of the test cell
conditions may result in voided tests, due to the difficulty they see
in maintaining these conditions throughout a 4-hour test interval.
However, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of the joint TSD, we
are allowing manufacturers to utilize a 30-second moving average for
the test chamber temperature; we have concluded that these tolerances
are achievable with this revision, and that widening these tolerances
would negatively affect the accuracy and repeatability of the test. As
a result, we are finalizing the tolerances as originally proposed.
Also, one commenter (Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive Association
or EPGAA) suggested that for manual A/C systems, the A/C temperature
control settings for the test be based on actual cabin temperatures
rather than on the duration of lapsed time of the test, as proposed.
EPA does not disagree in theory with the purpose of such a change--to
attempt to better align the control requirements for a manual A/C
system with those for an automatic system. However, the effect on test
results of the slightly different control requirements is not large,
and we believe that it would be impractical for the technician/driver
to monitor cabin temperature and adjust the system accordingly during
the test. We are therefore finalizing the automatic and manual A/C
system control requirements as proposed.
In several cases, commenters suggested other technical changes to
the AC17 test that EPA agrees will make performance of the test more
efficient, with no appreciable effect on test accuracy. The relatively
minor technical changes that we are finalizing include provisions
relating to: the points during the test when cell solar lamps are
turned on; establishing a specification for test cell wind speed; and a
simplification of the placement requirements for ambient temperature
sensors in the passenger cabin. See joint TSD section 5.1.3.5
explaining these changes more fully.
Overall, EPA has concluded that the AC17 test as proposed, with the
improvements described above, is a technically robust method for
demonstrating differences in A/C system efficiency as manufacturers
progressively apply new efficiency-improving technologies.
ii. AC17 Program Issues
Beyond technical issues related to the AC17 test itself, many
commenters expressed concerns about several related program issues--
i.e., how the agency proposed to use the test as a part of determining
eligibility for A/C efficiency credits. First, many manufacturers and
their trade associations stated that some characteristics of the AC17
test unnecessarily add to the burden on manufacturers of performing
each individual test. For example, the roughly 4-hour duration of the
AC17 test limits the number of tests that can be performed in a given
facility over a period of time. Also, the test requires the use of
relatively costly SC03 test
[[Page 62724]]
chambers, and manufacturers say that they have, or have access to, only
a limited number of these chambers.
Most of these concerns, however, are direct results of necessary
design characteristics of the test. Specifically, the impacts on
vehicle efficiency of improved A/C technologies are relatively small
compared to total vehicle CO2 emissions and fuel
consumption. Similarly, the relative contributions of various A/C-
related components, systems, and controls can be difficult to isolate
from one another. For these reasons, the joint government and industry
collaborators designed the test to accurately and repeatably measure
small differences in the efficiency of the entire vehicle related to A/
C operation. The result has been that the AC17 test takes a fairly long
time to perform (about 4 hours) and requires the special climate-
controlled capability of an SC03 chamber, as well as relatively tight
test parameters.
As discussed above, EPA believes that the AC17 represents a major
step toward the eventual goal of performance-based testing that could
be used to directly quantify the very significant A/C efficiency
credits and fuel consumption improvement values that are available to
eligible manufacturers under this program. In this context, EPA
believes that the characteristics of the AC17 test identified by the
manufacturers in their comments generally tend to be inherent aspects
needed for a robust test, and in most respects we are finalizing the
requirements for the use of the AC17 as proposed.
In addition to concerns about the effort required to perform each
AC17 test, manufacturers also commented on what they understood as a
requirement to run an unreasonable number of tests in order to qualify
for efficiency credits and improvement values. On the other hand, ICCT
commented that they believe that given the frequent changes in A/C
technology, one or two tests per year for a manufacturer is too few,
and that ``each significantly changed model should be tested.'' In
response to these concerns, EPA has taken several steps in this final
rule to clarify how a manufacturer will be able to use the AC17 to
demonstrate the effectiveness of its different A/C systems and
technologies while minimizing the number of tests that it will need to
perform. In general, EPA believes that it is appropriate to limit the
number of vehicles a manufacturer must test in any given model year to
no more than one vehicle from each platform that generates credits (and
CAFE improvement values) during each model year. For the purpose of the
AC17 test and generating efficiency credits, EPA will use a definition
for ``platform'' that allows a manufacturer to include several
generally similar vehicle models in a single ``platform'' and to
generate credits (or improvement values) for all of the vehicles with
that platform based on a limited number of AC17 tests, as described
below. This definition is slightly modified from the proposed
definition, primarily by making clear that manufacturers need not
necessarily associate vehicles that have different powertrains with
different platforms for A/C credit purposes. The modified definition
follows:
``Platform'' means a segment of an automobile manufacturer's
vehicle fleet in which the vehicles have a degree of commonality in
construction (primarily in terms of body and chassis design). Platform
does not consider the model name, brand, marketing division, or level
of decor or opulence, and is not generally distinguished by such
characteristics as powertrain, roof line, or number of doors, seats, or
windows. A platform may include vehicles from various fuel economy
classes, including both light-duty vehicles and light-duty trucks/
medium-duty passenger vehicles.
At the same time, EPA believes that if only a limited number of
vehicles in a platform are to be tested on the AC17 in any given model
year, it is important that vehicles in that platform with substantially
different air conditioning designs be included in that testing over
time. Thus, manufacturers with vehicles in a platform that are
generating credits will need to choose a different vehicle model each
year for AC17 testing. Testing will begin with the model that is
expected to have highest sales. In the following model year, the
manufacturer will choose the model in that platform representing the
next-highest expected sales not already tested, and so on. This process
will continue either until all vehicles in that platform that are
generating credits have been tested (in which case the previous test
data can be carried over) or until the platform experiences a major
redesign (at which point the AC17 testing process will start over.) We
believe that by clarifying the definition of ``platform'' and more
clearly limiting testing to one test per platform per year, we have
addressed the manufacturers' concerns about unreasonable test burdens.
Finally, in order to further minimize the number of tests that will
be required for A/C efficiency credit purposes, instead of requiring
replicate testing in all cases, EPA will allow a manufacturer to submit
data from as few as one AC17 test for each instance in which testing is
required. A manufacturer concerned about the variability of its testing
program may at its option choose to perform additional replicate tests
and use of the AC17 test in MYs 2014-2016 is for reporting only)
because the data from these initial years will form the basis on which
future credits are measured as described below, and a more robust
confirmation of test-to-test consistency may be in their interest.
As mentioned above, for MYs 2019 and earlier (including optional
AC17 testing prior to MY 2017), AC17 testing will only require
reporting of results (and system characteristics) for manufacturers to
be eligible to generate credits and improvement values from the
technology menu. Beginning in MY 2020, manufacturers will also need to
use AC17 testing to demonstrate that the A/C efficiency-improving
technologies or systems on which the desired credits are based are
indeed reducing CO2 emissions and fuel consumption. EPA
proposed to have the manufacturer identify an appropriate comparison
``baseline'' vehicle that did not incorporate the new technology, and
generate CO2 emissions data on both vehicles. The
manufacturer would be eligible for credits and fuel consumption
improvement values to the extent that the test results showed an
improvement over the earlier version of the vehicle without the
improved technology. If the test result with the new technology
demonstrated an emission reduction that is greater than or equal to the
menu-based credit potential of those technologies, the manufacturer
would generate the appropriate credit based on the menu. However, if
the test result did not demonstrate the full menu-based potential of
the technology, partial credit could still be earned, in proportion to
how far away the result was from the expected menu-based credit amount.
In their comments, auto manufacturers raised concerns about the
potential difficulty of identifying and testing an acceptable baseline
vehicle. EPA has considered these comments, and continues to believe
that identifying and testing a baseline vehicle will not be overly
burdensome in most cases. However, we agree that establishing an
appropriate baseline vehicle can be difficult in some cases, including
when the manufacturer has made major technological improvements to the
vehicle, beyond the A/C technology improvements in question. Some
manufacturers recommended that because of this difficulty and the other
issues discussed above, the AC17 test should only be used in a
``research'' role to validate credit values on the credit
[[Page 62725]]
menu, rather than in a regulatory compliance role. However, EPA
believes that with the adjustments in its use described below, the AC17
can appropriately serve as a part of the GHG and CAFE compliance
programs. One such adjustment is to allow the manufacturer to compare
vehicles from different ``generations'' of design (i.e., from earlier
major design cycles), which expands the universe of potentially
appropriate comparative baseline vehicles. Further, if cases arise
where no appropriate baseline comparison vehicles are available,
manufacturers will instead be able to submit an engineering analysis
that describes why a comparison to a baseline vehicle is neither
available nor appropriate, and also justifies the generating of credits
and improvement values, in lieu of a baseline vehicle test result. EPA
would evaluate these submissions as part of the vehicle certification
process. EPA discusses such an engineering analysis in Chapter 5
(Section 5.5.2.8) of the Joint TSD. Other than these adjustments, this
final rule adopts the AC17 testing of certification vehicles and
comparative baseline vehicles beginning in MY 2020, as proposed. Thus,
starting in MY 2020, the AC17 test will be used not only to establish
eligibility for generating credits, but will also play a role in
determining the amount of the credit.
EPA discusses the revised AC17 test in more detail in Chapter 5
(section 5.1.3.8) of the joint TSD, including a graphical flow-chart
designed to illustrate how the AC17 test will be used at various points
during the implementation of the GHG (and from MY 2017 on, CAFE)
programs.
c. Technology ``Menu'' for Quantifying A/C Efficiency Credits and
Fuel Consumption Improvement Values
EPA believes that more testing and development will be necessary
before the AC17 test could be used to measure absolute CO2
and fuel consumption performance with sufficient accuracy to completely
replace the technology menu as the method for quantifying efficiency
credits and fuel consumption improvement values. As EPA did in the MYs
2012-2016 rule, the agencies have used a design-based ``menu'' approach
for the actual quantification of efficiency credits (upon which fuel
consumption improvement values are also based) for this final rule. The
menu established today is very similar to that of the earlier rule,
both in terms of the technologies included in the lookup table and the
effectiveness values assigned to each technology. As in the earlier
rule, the agencies assign an appropriate amount of CO2
credit to each efficiency-improving air conditioning technology that
the manufacturer incorporates into a vehicle model. The sum of these
values for all of the technologies used on a vehicle will be the amount
of CO2 credit generated by that vehicle, up to a maximum of
5.0 g/mi for cars and 7.2 g/mi for trucks. As stated above, these
maximum values are equivalent to fuel consumption improvement values of
0.000563 gallons/mi for cars and 0.000810 gallons/mi for trucks. (If
amendments to the menu values are made in the future, EPA will consult
with NHTSA on the amount of fuel consumption improvement value
manufacturers may factor into their CAFE calculations.)
Several comments addressed the technology menu and its use. The
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers said that they believe that
projected A/C CO2 emissions--and thus the maximum potential
reductions against which credits can be generated--are actually higher
than EPA had projected. We have reassessed this issue since the MYs
2012-2017 rulemaking, including the question of how much time vehicles
spend in a ``compressor on'' mode, and on balance we continue to
believe that our projected A/C CO2 emissions values--and
thus the potential credits from the technology menu--are appropriate.
We discuss the development of the maximum efficiency credit values in
more detail in Chapter 5 (section 5.5.2.1) of the Joint TSD.
Honeywell recognized that a performance-based test procedure for
quantifying credits is not yet available, but asked EPA to be open to
using such a test if one is developed. EPA agrees, and we are making
clear that the off-cycle technology provisions discussed in the next
section can be applied to A/C technologies if all criteria are met. We
will also continue to monitor the quality of A/C efficiency testing
procedures as they develop and consider specific revisions to the AC17
as appropriate. Finally, ICCT proposed accounting for any efficiency
impact of alternative refrigerants in quantifying efficiency credits.
However, because the effect on efficiency of the most likely future
alternative refrigerant, HFO-1234yf, is only minimal when the A/C
system design is optimized for its use, we are finalizing the
technology menu with no adjustments for the use of alternative
refrigerants. Here too, however, EPA will monitor the development and
use of alternative refrigerants and any data on their impact on A/C
efficiency, and consider adjustments in the future as appropriate.
Table II-21 presents the A/C efficiency credits and estimated CAFE
fuel consumption improvement values being finalized in this rule for
each of the efficiency-improving air conditioning technologies. We
provide more detail on the agencies' development of the A/C efficiency
credits and CAFE fuel consumption improvement values in Chapter 5 of
the Joint TSD. In addition, that Chapter 5 presents very specific
definitions of each of the technologies in the table below, definitions
intended to ensure that the A/C technologies used by manufacturers
correspond with the technologies we used to derive the credits and fuel
consumption improvement values.
Table II-21--A/C Efficiency Credits and Fuel Consumption Improvement Values
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated
reduction in A/ Car A/C Truck A/C
C CO2 Car A/C Truck A/C efficiency efficiency
Technology description emissions and efficiency efficiency fuel fuel
fuel credit (g/mi credit (g/mi consumption consumption
consumption CO2) CO2) improvement improvement
(percent) (gallon/mi) (gallon/mi)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduced reheat, with externally- 30 1.5 2.2 0.000169 0.000248
controlled, variable-
displacement compressor........
Reduced reheat, with externally- 20 1.0 1.4 0.000113 0.000158
controlled, fixed-displacement
or pneumatic variable
displacement compressor........
[[Page 62726]]
Default to recirculated air with 30 1.5 2.2 0.000169 0.000248
closed-loop control of the air
supply (sensor feedback to
control interior air quality)
whenever the outside ambient
temperature is 75 [deg]F or
higher (although deviations
from this temperature are
allowed based on additional
analysis)......................
Default to recirculated air with 20 1.0 1.4 0.000113 0.000158
open-loop control of the air
supply (no sensor feedback)
whenever the outside ambient
temperature is 75 [deg]F or
higher (although deviations
from this temperature are
allowed if accompanied by an
engineering analysis)..........
Blower motor controls that limit 15 0.8 1.1 0.000090 0.000124
wasted electrical energy (e.g.
pulse width modulated power
controller)....................
Internal heat exchanger (or 20 1.0 1.4 0.000113 0.000158
suction line heat exchanger)...
Improved evaporators and 20 1.0 1.4 0.000113 0.000158
condensers (with engineering
analysis on each component
indicating a COP improvement
greater than 10%, when compared
to previous design)............
Oil Separator (internal or 10 0.5 0.7 0.000056 0.000079
external to compressor)........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the CAFE program, EPA will determine fleet average fuel
consumption improvement values in a manner consistent with the way
fleet average CO2 credits will be determined. EPA will
convert the metric tons of CO2 credits for air conditioning
(as well as for other off-cycle technologies and for full size pick-up
trucks) into fleet-wide fuel consumption improvement values, consistent
with the way EPA would convert the improvements in CO2
performance to metric tons of credits. Section III.C discusses this
methodology in more detail. There will be separate improvement values
for each type of credit, calculated separately for cars and for trucks.
These improvement values are subtracted from the manufacturer's two-
cycle-based fleet fuel consumption value to yield a final new fleet
fuel consumption value, which would be inverted to determine a final
fleet fuel CAFE value.
2. Off-Cycle CO2 Credits
Although EPA employs a five-cycle test methodology to evaluate fuel
economy for fuel economy labeling purposes, EPA uses the established
two-cycle (city, highway or correspondingly FTP, HFET) test methodology
for GHG and CAFE compliance.\284\ EPA recognizes that there are
technologies that provide real-world GHG benefits to consumers, but
that the benefit of some of these technologies is not represented on
the two-cycle test. For MYs 2012-2016, EPA provided an option for
manufacturers to generate adjustments (credits) for employing new and
innovative technologies that achieve CO2 reductions which
are not reflected on current 2-cycle test procedures if, after
application to EPA, EPA determined that the credits were technically
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\ As noted earlier, use of the two-cycle test is mandated by
statute for passenger car CAFE standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During meetings with vehicle manufacturers prior to the proposal of
the MY 2017-2025 standards, manufacturers raised concerns that the
approval process in the MYs 2012-2016 rule for generating off-cycle
credits was complicated and did not provide sufficient certainty on the
amount of credits that might be approved. Commenters also maintained
that it is impractical to measure small incremental improvements on top
of a large tailpipe measurement, similar to comments received related
to quantifying air conditioner efficiency improvements. These same
manufacturers believed that such a process could stifle innovation and
fuel efficient technologies from penetrating into the vehicle fleet.
In the MYs 2017-2025 proposal, EPA, in coordination with NHTSA,
proposed to extend the off-cycle credit program to MY 2017 and later,
and to apply the off-cycle credits and equivalent fuel consumption
improvement values to both the CAFE and GHG programs.\285\ The proposal
to extend the off-cycle credits program to CAFE was a change from the
MYs 2012-2016 final rule where EPA provided the off-cycle credits only
for the GHG program. In addition, in response to the concerns noted
above, EPA proposed to substantially streamline the off-cycle credit
program process by establishing means of obtaining credits without
having to prove case-by-case that such credits are justified.
Specifically, EPA proposed a menu with a number of technologies that
the agency believed would show real-world CO2 and fuel
consumption benefits not measured, or not fully measured, by the two-
cycle test procedures, which benefits could be reasonably quantified by
the agencies at this time. For each of the preapproved technologies in
the menu, EPA proposed a quantified default value that would be
available without additional testing. Manufacturers would thus have to
demonstrate that they were in fact using the menu technology but would
not have to do testing to quantify the technology's effects unless they
wished to receive a credit larger than the default value. This list is
conceptually similar to the menu-driven approach just described for A/C
efficiency credits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\ 76 FR 74941-944.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed default values for these off-cycle credits were
largely determined from research, analysis, and simulations, rather
than from full vehicle testing, which would have been both cost and
time prohibitive. EPA believed that these predefined estimates were
somewhat conservative to avoid the potential for windfall credits.\286\
If
[[Page 62727]]
manufacturers believe their specific off-cycle technology achieves
larger improvement, they could apply for greater credits and fuel
consumption improvement values with supporting data using the case-by-
case demonstration approach. For technologies not listed on the menu,
EPA proposed to continue the case-by-case demonstration approach from
the MYs 2012-2016 rule but with important modifications to streamline
the decision-making process. Comments to the proposal (addressed at the
end of this preamble section) were largely supportive. In the final
rule, EPA is continuing the off-cycle credit program established in the
MYs 2012-2016 rule (but with some significant procedural changes), as
proposed. EPA is also finalizing a list of pre-approved technologies
and credit values. The pre-defined list, with credit values and CAFE
fuel consumption improvement values, is shown in Table II-21 below.
Fuel consumption improvement values under the CAFE program based on
off-cycle technology would be equivalent to the off-cycle credit
allowed by EPA under the GHG program, and these amounts would be
determined using the same procedures and test methods for use in EPA's
GHG program, as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ While many of the assumptions made for the analysis were
``conservative'', others were ``central''. For example, in some
cases an average vehicle was selected on which the analysis was
conducted. In this case, a smaller vehicle may presumably be
deserving of fewer credits whereas a larger vehicle may be deserving
of more. Where the estimates are central, it would obviously be
inappropriate for the Agencies to grant greater credit for the
larger vehicles since this value is already balanced by the smaller
vehicles in the fleet. The agency will take these matters into
consideration when applications are submitted to modify credits on
the menu.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM, EPA proposed capping the amount of credits a
manufacturer may generate using the defined technology list to 10 g/
mile per year on a combined car and truck fleet-wide average basis. EPA
also proposed to require minimum penetration rates for several of the
listed technologies as a condition for generating credit from the list
as a way to further encourage their significant adoption by MY 2017 and
later. Based on comments and consideration on the amount of data that
are available, we are finalizing the cap of 10 g/mile per year on a
combined car and truck fleet-wide average basis. The fleetwide cap is
being finalized because the default credit values are based on limited
data, and also because EPA recognizes that some uncertainty is
introduced when credits are provided based on a general assessment of
off-cycle performance as opposed to testing on the individual vehicle
models. However, we are not finalizing the minimum penetration rates
applicable to certain technologies, primarily based the agencies'
agreement with commenters stating that penetration caps might stifle
the introduction of fuel economy and GHG improving technologies
particularly in cases where manufacturers would normally introduce the
technologies because manufacturing capacities are limited or low
initial volume reduces risk if consumer acceptance is uncertain.
Allowing credits for lower production volumes may encourage
manufacturers to introduce more off-cycle technologies and then over
several years increase production volumes thereby bringing more of
these technologies into the mainstream. These program details are
discussed in further in Section III.C.5.b.i.
For the final rule analysis, the agencies have developed estimates
for the cost and effectiveness of two off-cycle technologies, active
aerodynamics and stop-start. The agencies assumed that these two
technologies are available to manufacturers for compliance with the
standards, similar to all of the other fuel economy improving
technologies that the analysis assumes are available. EPA and NHTSA's
modeling and other final rule analyses use the 2-cycle effectiveness
values for these technologies and include the additional off-cycle
adjustment that reflects the real world effectiveness of the
technologies. Therefore, NHTSA has included the assessment of these two
off-cycle technologies in the assessment of maximum feasible standards
for this final rulemaking. Including these technologies that are on the
pre-defined menu recognizes that these technologies have a higher
degree of effectiveness in the real-world than reflected in 2-cycle
testing. EPA likewise considered the 2-cycle benefits of these
technologies in determining the stringency of the final standards. The
agencies note that they did not consider the availability of other off-
cycle technologies in their modeling analyses for the proposal or for
the final rule. There are two reasons for this. First, the agencies
have virtually no data on the cost, development time necessary,
manufacturability, etc. of these other technologies. The agencies thus
cannot project the degree of emissions reduction and fuel economy
improvements properly attributable to these technologies within the MYs
2017-2025 timeframe. Second, the agencies have no data on what the
penetration rates for these technologies would be during the rule
timeframe, even assuming their feasibility. See 76 FR 74944 (agencies
need information on ``effectiveness, cost, and availability'' before
considering inclusion of off-cycle technology benefits in determining
the standards).
This section provides an overview of the pre-defined technology
list being finalized and the key comments the agencies received
regarding the technologies on the list and the proposed credit values.
Provisions regarding how the pre-defined list fits into the overall
off-cycle credit program are discussed in section III.C.5, including
the MY 2014 start date for using the list, the 10 g/mile credit cap for
the list, and the proposed penetration thresholds for listed
technologies. In addition, a detailed discussion of the comments the
agencies received regarding the technical details of individual
technologies and how the credit values were derived is provided in
Chapter 5 of the joint TSD.
In the proposal, the agencies requested comments on all aspects of
the off-cycle credit menu technologies and derivations. EPA and NHTSA
received many comments and, in addition, several stakeholders including
Denso, Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive Association (EPGAA), ICCT
and Honda, requested meetings and met with the agencies. Overall, there
was general support for the menu based approach and the technologies
included in the proposed list, but there were also suggestions to re-
evaluate the definition of some of the technologies included in the
menu, the calculation and/or test methods for determining the credits
values, and recommendations to periodically re-evaluate the menu as
technologies emerge or become pervasive.
For most of the listed technologies, the agencies proposed single
fixed credit values and for other technologies a step-function (e.g., x
amount of credit for y amount of reduction or savings).\287\ The
agencies received comments requesting a scalable calculation method for
some technologies rather than the proposed fixed value or step-function
approach. Some commenters requested that the credits for active
aerodynamics, high efficiency exterior lighting, waste heat recovery
(proposed as ``engine heat recovery'' but revised based on comments to
the proposal) and solar panels (proposed as ``solar roof panels'' but
also revised based on comments) be scalable (variable based on system
capability) rather than an ``all-or-
[[Page 62728]]
nothing'' single value approach proposed.\288\ The agencies agree with
the commenters and are allowing scaling of these credits. In some
cases, this created issues with the simplified methodology for
determining the default values used for the proposal. Therefore, the
proposed methodology required revision in order to calculate the
default values for the technologies with scalable credits. The revised
calculation methodology for each scalable technology is discussed in
detail in Chapter 5 of the TSD. Notably, the calculation method for the
solar panel credit has been changed, to provide scalability of the
credit and a better estimate the benefits of solar panels for HEVs,
PHEVs, and EVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\ In the Proposal (76 FR 74943/1), we described the engine
heat recovery and solar roof panel credits as `scalable', however
this was an error. The engine heat recovery did allow 0.7g/mi credit
per 100W generated step-function, however the solar panels were not
scalable. In actuality, glazing was the only continuously scalable
credit on the proposed off-cycle menu.
\288\ For example, in the proposal, a manufacturer had to
install high efficiency lighting on all systems in order to get the
1.1 g/mi credit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although we are allowing scaling of the credits, we are not
accepting a request or granting credit for any level of credit less
than 0.05 g/mi CO2. We are requiring reporting
CO2 values to the nearest tenth and, therefore, anything
below 0.05 g/mi of CO2 would be rounded down to zero.
Therefore, for any credit requested as part of the off-cycle credit
program (e.g., scalable or fixed; via the pre-defined technology list
or alternate method approval process), only credit values equal to 0.05
g/mi or greater will be accepted and approved.
In addition to supporting the off-cycle credit program in the MYs
2017-2025 program, comments received from the National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) and ICCT urged the agencies to ensure that off-
cycle credits are verifiable via actual testing or reflect real-world
in-use data from a statistically representative fleet. These comments
also expressed concern that some of the proposed menu technologies
would not achieve appreciably greater reductions than measured over the
2-cycle tests, that the off-cycle credit process had not fully assured
that there would be component and/or system durability and had not
accounted for in-use degradation. These commenters' ultimate concern is
that the off-cycle credit flexibility could create windfall credits or
avoid cost-effective 2-cycle improvements.
The agencies believe that the off-cycle credit program, as proposed
and finalized, legitimately accounts for real-world emission reductions
and fuel consumption improvements not measured, or not fully measured,
under the two-cycle test methodologies. The off-cycle technologies on
the defined list have been assessed by the agencies using the best
available data and information at the time of this action to
appropriately assign default credit values. The agencies conducted
extensive reviews of the proposed credit values and technologies and,
based on comments (such as those from ICCT) and analysis, did adjust
some credit values and technology descriptions. In addition, the
comments from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers provided data
that aligned with and supported some of the estimated credit default
values (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of the joint TSD). As
with the proposal and further refinement in these final rules, the
agencies have structured the off-cycle credit program extension for MYs
2017-2025 to employ conservative calculation methodologies and
estimates for the credit values on the defined technology list. In
addition, the agencies will continue, as proposed, to apply a 10 g/mi
cap to the total amount of available off-cycle credits to help address
issues of uncertainty and potential windfalls. Based on review of the
technologies and credits provided for those technologies, the cap
balances the goal of providing a streamlined pathway for the
introduction of off-cycle technologies while controlling potential
environmental risk from the uncertainty inherent with the estimated
level of credits being provided. Manufacturers would need to use
several listed technologies across a very large portion of their fleet
before they would reach the cap. Based on manufacturer comments
regarding the proposed sales thresholds, discussed below, the agencies
are not anticipating widespread adoption of these technologies, at
least not in the early years of the program. Also, the cap is not an
absolute limitation because manufacturers have the option of submitting
data and applying for credits which would not be subject to the 10 g/
mile credit limit as discussed in III.C.5. Therefore, we are confident
in the underlying analysis and default values for the identified off-
cycle credit technologies, and are finalizing the defined list of off-
cycle credit technologies, and associated default values, with minimal
changes in this final rule as discussed below.
For off-cycle technologies not on the pre-defined technology list,
or to obtain a credit greater than the default value for a menu pre-
defined technology, a manufacturer would be required to demonstrate the
benefits of the technology via 5-cycle testing or via an alternate
methodology that would be subject to a public review and comment
process. Further, a manufacturer must certify the in-use durability of
the technology for the full useful life of the vehicle for any
technologies submitted for off-cycle credit application to ensure
enforceability of the credits granted.
The agencies proposed an additive approach where manufacturers
could add the credit values for all of the listed technologies employed
on a vehicle model (up to the 10 g/mile cap, as discussed in III.C.5).
The agencies received comments from ICCT recommending a multiplicative
approach where the credit values for each technology on the list is
determined by taking the total amount of available credits for off-
cycle technologies and distributing it based on each technology's
percent contribution to the overall off-cycle benefit (e.g., percent
benefit of technology A, B, * * * n x total available credit equals the
off-cycle credit for technology A, B, * * * n).
EPA understands ICCT's recommendation, as this is similar how to
the calculation methods employed in the EPA Lumped Parameter Model
combine the effectiveness of some technologies when the interaction of
differing technologies does not yield the combined absolute fuel
consumption improvement for each technology, but rather the actual
effectiveness is a fractional value of each technology's effectiveness
(often described as ``synergies''). The agencies carefully evaluated
these comments and, as stated previously, held a meeting with ICCT at
their request to discuss the comments fully.\289\ Overall, the agencies
believe the recommended multiplicative approach is inherently difficult
since the fractional contribution of each technology to the overall
off-cycle benefit must be determined, and then the combined synergistic
effectiveness would also require accurate and robust determination.
This would require extensive iterative testing to determine the
synergistic affects for every possible combination of off-cycle
technology included on each vehicle. In addition, this would be highly
dependent on the base design of the vehicle and, therefore, would need
to be determined for each unique vehicle content combination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\ The ICCT also submitted a number of additional detailed
comments on the credit magnitude of certain off-cycle technologies
which are discussed in Chapter 5 of the Joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies agree there may be synergistic (or non-synergistic)
affects, but believe the combination of employing conservative credit
value estimates and a 10 g/mi cap to the total amount of available off-
cycle credits
[[Page 62729]]
will achieve nearly the same overall effect of limiting the additive
effect of multiple off-cycle technologies to a vehicle. Therefore, we
are finalizing the calculation approach as defined in this final rule.
As discussed above, the agencies are allowing scaling of the credit
values in lieu of fixed values based on the comments received for the
following technologies on the menu: high efficiency exterior lighting,
waste heat recovery, solar panels and active aerodynamics. In the case
of waste heat recovery and active aerodynamics, this did not change the
numerical credit values we proposed. For waste heat recovery, 0.7 g/mi
CO2 per 100 watts serves as the basis for scaling the
credit. For active aerodynamics, we used the value of 0.6 g/mi for cars
and 1.0 g/mi for trucks based on a 3% aerodynamic drag improvement from
the table of values in the NPRM TSD. The comments simply asked to use
this entire range of values rather than just using the credit values
corresponding to 3% aerodynamic drag improvement. These scaling factors
were calculated using both the Ricardo simulation results (described in
Chapter 3 of the TSD) and the EPA full vehicle simulation tool
(described in Chapter 2 of the EPA's RIA).
In contrast, for high efficiency exterior lighting and solar
panels, this required a revision in the methodology to allow for proper
scaling. For high efficiency exterior lighting, the comments also
requested credit allowance for high efficiency lighting on individual
lighting elements rather than on all lighting elements. In the NPRM,
our methodology assumed a package approach where each lighting element
was weighted based on contribution to the overall electrical load
savings, and then this was scaled by our base load reduction estimate
for 5-cycle testing (e.g., 3.2 g/mile per 100 watts saved; see TSD
5.2.2). Using this package approach, it is difficult to de-couple the
grams per mile CO2 contribution of individual lighting
elements. Therefore, we revised our approach by accounting for the gram
per mile CO2 credit for each individual high efficiency
lighting element separately.
The agencies are finalizing the pre-defined technology list for
off-cycle credits fundamentally as proposed with the exception of six
technologies, primarily in response to the comments received: engine
idle start-stop, electric heater circulation pump, high efficiency
exterior lighting, solar panels, and active transmission and active
engine warm-up.
First, the pre-defined credit values for engine idle start-stop are
revised in response to comments questioning some vehicle operation and
VMT assumptions and some methods for calculating the pre-defined credit
values. More details on these changes can be found in Chapter 5 of the
Joint TSD.
Second, the proposed stand-alone credit for an electric heater
circulation pump is incorporated into the pre-defined credit for engine
stop-start, thus aligning with the integrated nature of these two
technologies. As the agencies re-evaluated the pre-defined credit
values for engine idle start-stop, we recognized that a substantive
amount of the off-cycle benefit attributed to engine stop-start would
not be achievable in cold temperature conditions (e.g., temperatures
below 40 deg F) without a technology that performs a similar function
to the electric heater circulation pump as defined in the NPRM. The
agencies believe that a mechanism allowing heat transfer to continue,
even after the engine has shut-off, is necessary in order to maintain
basic comfort in the cabin especially in colder ambient temperatures.
This could occur, for example, when a vehicle is stopped at a multiple
lane intersection controlling high traffic volumes. This technology can
be an electric heater circulation pump, or some other cabin heat
exchanger. Without this technology, the engine would need to continue
operating and, therefore, circulating warm engine coolant through the
HVAC system to continue providing heat to the cabin. Therefore, two
credit values are being finalized for stop-start systems: a higher
value (similar to the credits proposed) for systems with an electric
heater circulation pump and a lesser value for stop-start systems
without a pump or heat transfer mechanism.
Third, the agencies have revised the proposed pre-defined credit
values for high-efficiency exterior lighting after evaluation of the
numerous industry data provided via comments. The fundamental impetus
for the revisions resulted from the research study cited as a basis for
many pre-defined values as described in Chapter 5 of the TSD. When
reviewing the additional data, the agencies concluded the initially
referenced research study (Schoettle, et al.\290\) provided current
draw values for high-efficiency low beam lighting that were too high
when compared to traditional incandescent lighting, resulting in a
reduced projected benefit. Data from the automakers showed a much lower
power demand for high-efficiency low beam lighting and, consequently, a
much larger benefit than projected in the draft TSD.\291\ Therefore,
the agencies increased the overall amount of credit for high-efficiency
exterior lighting on the menu to reflect the additional analysis based
on the data received via comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\ Schoettle, B., et al., ``LEDS and Power Consumption of
Exterior Automotive Lighting: Implications for Gasoline and Electric
Vehicles,'' University of Michigan Transportation Research
Institute, October, 2008.
\291\ Alliance, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, page 27 of 93;
Appendix 2, page 2 of 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, as discussed above, the need for scaling the credit value
resulted in a new methodology for solar panels, and, consequently,
adjusted credit values. For the NPRM, we assumed a fixed solar panel
power output and scaled this according to our base load estimate (e.g.,
3.2 g/mile per 100 watts saved; see TSD 5.2.2). However, the rated
solar panel power output depends on several factors including the size
and efficiency of the panel, and the energy that the panel is able to
capture and convert to useful power. Therefore, these factors need to
be considered when scaling, and our new methodology takes these factors
into account. The agencies also accounted for the possibility of
combining solar panels for both energy storage and active ventilation
in the scaling algorithm.
Finally, we discuss active transmission and active engine warm-up
together (although they are listed separately) since the methodology
for them is the same. Chrysler commented that there should be separate
car and truck credits for active transmission and active engine warm-
up, as formulated for other advanced load reduction technologies (e.g.,
engine idle start-stop, electric heater circulation pump). In the NPRM,
we used the credit value corresponding to a mid-size car to arrive at
1.8 g/mi. After considering these comments, we re-analyzed (using the
Ricardo data) the credit values for active transmission and active
engine warm-up using expanded vehicle classes on a sales-weighted
basis. As a result, there was a clear disparity between the credit
values for active transmission and active engine warm-up on cars and
trucks. Accordingly, we now have separate car (1.5 g/mi) and truck (3.2
g/mi) active transmission and active engine warm-up credits.
There were no other changes to the off-cycle credit defined
technology list other than the expansion or clarification of
definitions for certain technologies as discussed in Chapter 5 of the
TSD. Many commenters advocated for the inclusion of additional
technologies on the off-cycle credit defined technology
[[Page 62730]]
list. Some commenters suggested that technologies should be added such
as high efficiency alternators (Alliance, Denso, VW, Porsche, Ford),
electric cooling fans (Bosch), HVAC eco-modes, transmission cooler
bypass valves (Ford), navigation systems (Garmin), separate credits for
congestion mitigation/crash avoidance systems (Daimler), engine block
heaters (Honda), and an ``integral'' approach utilizing a combination
of technologies (Global Automakers).
Some commenters were opposed to adding any technologies to the menu
(CBD) and others suggested some of the proposed values should be re-
evaluated (ICCT) or that the values should be based on real test data,
not simulation modeling (NRDC).
After reviewing and considering the comments, in general, we did
not see evidence at this time to add any of these technologies to the
pre-defined technology list. In many cases, there are no consistent,
established methods or supporting data to determine the appropriate
level of credit. Consequently, there is no reasonable basis or
verifiable method for the agencies to substantiate or refute the
performance claims used to support a request for pre-assigned, default
credit values for such technologies, particularly for systems requiring
driver intervention or action.
Therefore, we are not adding any of these technologies we were
asked to consider to the pre-defined technology list. In the case of
crash avoidance technologies, we are prohibiting off-cycle credits for
these technologies under any circumstances. In the case of the other
technologies for consideration, we are allowing manufacturers to use
the alternate demonstration methods for technologies not on the pre-
defined technology list menu as discussed in Section III.C. (see
``Demonstration not based on 5-cycle testing'') to request credit. We
respond below to the comments urging the agencies to add further
technologies to the pre-defined list. Additional responses are found in
TSD Chapter 5 and Section 7 of EPA's Response to Comment Document.
In addition, there were substantial comments regarding allowing
credits for glazing. Specifically, the comments expressed concerns
about incentivizing the use of metallic glazing which may impact
signals emanating from within the passenger compartment and the desire
for a separate credit for polycarbonate (PC) glazing. This is discussed
below as well.
a. High Efficiency Alternators
Several commenters from the automobile industry associations,
individual manufacturers, and suppliers urged the agencies to include
high efficiency alternators on the off-cycle defined technology list.
The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers stated that the test
cycles are performed with the accessories off but that ``actual real
world driving has average higher loads due to accessory use.'' They
cited GM testing comparing three different alternators on four vehicles
with efficiencies ranging from 61% to 70% using the Verband der
Automobilindustrie (VDA; the trade association representing German
automobile manufacturers) test procedure that demonstrated a savings of
1.0 grams per mile CO2 on average for an alternator with an
efficiency of 68% VDA. Volkswagen and Porsche supported the comments
from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, however Porsche felt
that a default credit of 1.6 grams per mile CO2 was possible
based on their independent analysis. The Global Automakers echoed the
comments above regarding real-world versus test cycle accessory usage
but did not supply supporting data.
Two suppliers, Bosch and Denso, also supported adding high
efficiency alternators to the defined technology list. Bosch cited
testing on a General Motors 2.4 liter 4 cylinder gasoline engine with
an increased alternator efficiency from 65%, the level of efficiency
assumed in the NPRM, to 75% showed the potential for an increase of
0.7% in fuel economy by increasing alternator efficiency by 10%. Bosch
also stated that increases in efficiency up to 82% are possible using
existing and new technologies. Denso used performed a similar analysis
by simulating an increase in alternator efficiency of 10% (65% to 75%).
Using our NPRM values for CO2 emissions reductions of 3.0
grams per mile CO2 on the 2-cycle and 3.7 grams per mile
CO2 on the 5-cycle tests, they calculated a potential credit
of 2.8 grams per mile CO2.
In response, we agree that high efficiency alternators have the
potential to reduce electrical load, resulting in lower fuel
consumption and CO2 emissions. However, the problem with
including this technology on the defined technology list is assigning
an appropriate default credit value due to the lack of supporting data
across a range of vehicle categories and range of implementation
strategies.
First, we appreciate commenters submitting data but we would need
to have similar data from the range of available vehicle categories.
With the exception of the data from the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers that included a Cadillac SRX with, most recently, a 3.6
liter V6 engine, most of the data is from smaller displacement
vehicles. Therefore, the range of data would need to be expanded to the
mid-size and large car, and large truck to even begin to develop a
default credit value.
Second, similar to high efficiency exterior lighting, the type of
and number of electrical accessories on the vehicle may cause
significant variability in the base electrical load and, consequently,
the level of reduction and associated benefit of high efficiency
alternator technology. However, unlike high efficiency exterior
lighting with a limited amount of components, the vehicle components
and accessories that affect high efficiency alternator load are
seemingly unlimited. As the information from Denso suggests, there are
some typical standard components but the list of standard versus
optional components changes depending on manufacturer, nameplate and
trim level (e.g., optional accessories on a lower trim level vehicle
may be standard on a upper/luxury trim level vehicle). This makes it
difficult to develop a default value given this level of variability.
Third, high efficiency alternators present the opportunity for
manufacturers to add vehicle content that does not contribute to
reducing fuel consumption or CO2 emissions. Due to the extra
electrical capacity resulting from using the high efficiency
alternator, other content (e.g., seat heaters/coolers, cup holder
cooler/warmers, higher amplification sound system) can be added that
may increase consumer value, however, that consumer value is unrelated
to reducing fuel consumption or CO2 emissions. This
potential for electrical load ``backsliding'' can counteract the
benefits of a high efficiency alternator, and can also potentially
affect mass reduction depending on the mass of the added content.
A good example of a beneficial use of additional electrical load is
the synergy between solar panels and active cabin ventilation. The
solar panel can be used to power active cabin ventilation system motors
but the amount of power produced by the panel may exceed the motor
power requirements. Moreover, the active cabin ventilation system is
only effective for the hot/sunny summer portion of the year. Rather
than directing this excess power to other
[[Page 62731]]
non-fuel consumption related content (or wasting it), we are
incentivizing manufacturers to use this excess power for battery
charging to drive the wheels, and thus displace fuel and CO2
emissions.
However, unlike a solar panel, the high efficiency alternator
supplies power to many vehicle features, and the EPA does not wish to
directly regulate the electrical usage on vehicles in order to prevent
``load backsliding''. This load backsliding could convert a fuel
efficient technology into one that is detrimental to CO2
emissions reductions and fuel economy improvements. Because of this
uncertainty the agencies are not adding high efficiency alternators to
the defined technology list. However, manufacturers may request credits
for high-efficiency alternators using the case-by-case procedures for
technologies not on the defined technology list. There are two general
issues, at a minimum, which a manufacturer would need to consider and
address in such a request. First, the manufacturer would need to
consider the level of alternator efficiency improvement. As stated by
the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, current alternator
efficiencies are in the range of ``60% to 64%, with high efficiency
models having ratings above 68% VDA.'' Therefore, any request for high
efficiency alternator credit should significantly exceed current
alternator technology efficiency. The 68% VDA number stated by the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers seems to be an appropriate
starting point given current technology although EPA would make a
specific determination as to the amount of needed improvement when
evaluating a specific off-cycle credit application, and so is not
making any final determination here. Second, manufacturers should
ensure proper accounting of vehicle components and accessories and
associated loads. A good example of this is Table 1 in the comments
from Denso that identifies the content loads and their occurrence on
the 2-cycle test versus real world. The manufacturer may need to
perform this type of comparison on an annual basis so that there is a
clear assessment of load content adjustments over time to minimize
electrical load ``backsliding'' (i.e., adding more content due to the
availability of additional load capacity) as discussed above.
b. Transmission Oil Cooler Bypass Valve
The transmission oil cooler is used on vehicles to cool the
transmission fluid under heavy loads, especially by large trucks during
towing or large payload operations. As stated by the Alliance, one of
the drawbacks is that this system operates continuously even under
conditions where faster warm-up, such as cold conditions, would be
beneficial. Therefore, the Alliance comments suggested that we add
bypass valves for transmission oil coolers to the pre-defined
technology list since ``a bypass valve for the transmission oil cooler
allows the oil flow to be controlled to provide maximum fuel economy
under a wide variety of operating conditions.'' They suggested a credit
of 0.3 g/mi CO2 based on General Motors (GM) engineering
development and that this credit could be additive with active
transmission warm up strategy.
The reason we are not including this technology on the pre-defined
technology list is lack of available data and multiple methodologies
for implementation that make determining an appropriate credit value
difficult. As stated by the Alliance, ``bypass valves are not currently
commonly used with transmission oil coolers.'' As a result, there is
very limited data on the performance of such systems other than the
engineering data cited by the Alliance. Also, the bypass valve could be
implemented passively (e.g., viscosity based), actively (e.g., valve
controllers based on temperature or viscosity), or by some other smart
design. Consequently, depending on the implementation method, the
credit value may not correspond effectively to the level of
performance.
However, this technology can be demonstrated using 5-cycle or
alternate demonstration methods. Therefore, we recommend that
manufacturers seeking credit for this technology separately or in
conjunction with active transmission warm-up credits explore this
approach.
c. Electronic Thermostat
Porsche stated in their comments that there is ``potential GHG
benefit for electronic thermostat * * * in configurations which do not
include an electric water pump.'' In lieu of a traditional mechanical
water pump, an electric water pump facilitates engine coolant flow
without the penalty of using an energy-sapping belt driven system.
However, for systems that use a mechanical water pump, an electronic
thermostat could be used in lieu of an electric water pump to optimally
control the flow of coolant (e.g., close off coolant flow to the
radiator when the engine is cold). Porsche requested that the agencies
allow credit for this technology irrespective of the other cooling
system specifics (e.g., mechanical or electric water pump).
This technology is not on the pre-defined technology list, nor does
this appear to be the intent of Porsche's comments. As such, the
electronic thermostat can be demonstrated using 5-cycle or alternate
demonstration methods. Therefore, we agree with Porsche and, if a
benefit for the electronic thermostat regardless of the type of water
pump used can be demonstrated, the electronic thermostat would be
eligible under the procedures for evaluating technologies not on the
pre-defined technology list.
d. Other Vehicle Relays
Honda requested that we consider allowing credit for other
electrical relays on the vehicle such as those used for power windows,
wiper motors, power tailgate, defroster, and seat heaters. However,
Honda states that they are unsure of how to measure the impact
suggesting that lifetime usage data might be a basis to support the
credit granted.
In response, we feel that granting credits for other vehicle relays
is best considered using the demonstration methods for evaluating
technologies not on the predefined technology list.
The confounding issue, as Honda points out in their comments, is
how to quantify the benefit and, further, how to directly relate this
benefit to fuel consumption savings. The complexity of identifying
single and multiple relay impact is a daunting task and must be
considered when pursuing this path. Further, the use of lifetime usage
data only captures activity but does not couple this activity with a
gram-per-mile CO2 benefit, thus falling short of
demonstrating direct savings. Therefore, although the granting of
credit is possible, these issues, and any others, would need to be
addressed before credit is granted for other vehicle relays.
e. Brushless Motor Technology for Engine Cooling Fans
The comments from Bosch advocated for adding brushless motor
technology for engine cooling fans to the pre-defined technology list.
In their comments, Bosch stated that the current baseline technology is
series-parallel brushed motors requiring 149 watts to operate. By
switching to a brushless engine cooling fan motor, the wattage
requirement is reduced to 68 watts for a savings of 87 watts, according
to Bosch. Bosch reduced this number further to 81.2 watts since they
considered a range of series-parallel brushed motors with varying
wattage values. Based on this savings and Bosch's assumption that
reducing electrical load by 30 watts saves 0.1 mile per gallon, Bosch
projected a fuel
[[Page 62732]]
savings of 0.27 miles per gallon. Using our load reduction assumption
of reducing 100 watts saves 0.7 gram per mile of CO2, this
equates to a credit of 0.56 gram per mile of CO2.
After consideration of Bosch's comments and the data provided
showing potential benefits, it is not clear from the data provided if
this would be the actual benefit once this technology is implemented.
Absent real-world vehicle data, it is difficult to determine what the
baseline and, consequently, the resulting benefit would be. In
addition, it is likely that some or all of the benefit of brushless
motor technology for engine cooling fans is captured on the 2-cycle
test procedures.
Consequently, we are not adding brushless motor technology for
engine cooling fans to the pre-defined technology list due to
insufficient data on real-world, power requirements, activity profiles,
and test data demonstrating the 2-cycle versus 5-cycle benefits. These
factors prevent us from determining a default credit value necessary
for addition to the off-cycle technology menu. A manufacturer that
believes its engine cooling fan brushless motor merits credit can
request it using the demonstration methods for technologies not on the
predefined technology list.
f. Integral Fuel Saving Technologies and Advanced Combustion Concepts
The Global Automakers and Ford Motor Company encouraged the
agencies to consider granting credit for integral fuel saving
technologies and advanced combustion concepts (e.g., camless engines,
variable compression ratio engines, micro air/hydraulic launch assist
devices, advanced transmissions) using demonstration methods for
technologies that are not on the predefined technology list. Both
parties took issue with our statements in the NPRM Preamble (see 76 FR
75024):
``EPA proposes that technologies integral or inherent to the basic
vehicle design including engine, transmission, mass reduction, passive
aerodynamic design, and base tires would not be eligible for credits.
EPA believes that it would be difficult to clearly establish an
appropriate A/B test (with and without technologies) for technologies
so integral to the basic vehicle design. EPA proposes to limit the off-
cycle program to technologies that can be clearly identified as add-on
technologies conducive to A/B testing.''
These commenters urged EPA to allow demonstration of benefits using
some alternative testing or analytical method, or to provide an
opportunity to perform some type of demonstration, for integral fuel
saving technologies and advance combustion concepts.
In response, since these methods are integral to basic vehicle
design, there are fundamental issues as to whether they would ever
warrant off-cycle credits. Being integral, there is no need to provide
an incentive for their use, and (more important), these technologies
would be incorporated regardless. Granting credits would be a windfall.
As we stated in the NPRM Preamble (see 76 FR 75024), these technologies
are included in the base vehicle design to meet the standard and it is
consequently inappropriate for these types of technologies to receive
off-cycle credits. EPA (in coordination with NHTSA) will continue to
track the progress of these technologies and attempt to collect data on
their effectiveness and use.
g. Congestion Avoidance Devices, Other Interactive, Driver-Based
Technologies and Driver-Selectable Features
As mentioned above, many commenters advocated for the inclusion of
additional technologies on the off-cycle credit defined technology list
such as congestion avoidance, interactive/driver-based technologies,
which provide information to the driver that the driver may use to
alter his/her driving route or technique, and driver-selectable
technologies, which cause the vehicle to operate in a different manner.
Daimler commented that the agencies should provide ``congestion
mitigation credits based on crash avoidance technologies,'' because
crash avoidance technologies can potentially reduce traffic congestion
associated with motor vehicle collisions and thus, ``similar to off-
cycle technologies,'' provide ``significant CO2 and fuel
consumption benefits.'' \292\ Daimler argued that doing so was within
both agencies' authority, referring to the authority under which the
agencies had proposed off-cycle credits.\293\ Daimler provided a menu
of suggested congestion reduction credit values of 1.0 g/CO2
per mile for its ``Primary Longitudinal Assistance Package'' (comprised
of forward collision warning plus adaptive brake assist) and an
additional 0.5 g/CO2 per mile for its ``Advanced
Longitudinal Assistance Package'' (the primary package plus autonomous
emergency braking and adaptive cruise control), based on calculations
using figures from its own analysis of the effectiveness of these
technologies and from a German insurance institute,\294\ along with
values for other congestion mitigation technologies such as driver
attention monitoring and adaptive forward lighting.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\ Daimler, EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483,
at 10.
\293\ Id. at 11, 17.
\294\ Id. at 13-14.
\295\ Id. at 14-16.
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In addition to requesting that the agencies create a new category
of credits, the comment further addressed means of evaluating and
approving applications for such credits. Daimler suggested that NHTSA
require manufacturers to submit data ``specific to [their] product
offerings showing that [their] technology is effective in reducing
vehicle collisions,'' and that ``NHTSA may approve the application and
determine the amount of the credit'' and determine whether the
technology is ``robust and effective in terms of crash avoidance and
the consequent fuel savings.'' \296\ Daimler suggested that NHTSA's
review process for such information could be considerably less
stringent than that for ``regulation to mandate new technology and/or
to link technology directly to fatalities or injuries,'' because
fatalities and injuries would not be at issue for congestion mitigation
credits.\297\ Instead, Daimler stated that ``technologies [should be]
appropriate if they can reasonably be shown to avoid accidents, and
thereby reduce congestion and its associated fuel consumption and
CO2 emissions.'' \298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\ Id. at 15.
\297\ Id.
\298\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies agree that there is a clear nexus between congestion
mitigation and fuel/CO2 savings for the entire on-road
fleet. It is less clear, however, whether there is a calculable
relationship between congestion mitigation and fuel/CO2
savings directly attributable to individual vehicles produced by a
manufacturer, or even to a manufacturer's fleet of vehicles. Daimler
argued that emissions of 6.0 gCO2/mi could be averted if all
accidents were avoided. However, even assuming such a result were
achievable, Daimler agreed that attributing those fuel consumption/
CO2 benefits from reduced traffic congestion to specific
individual technologies on specific vehicles would be difficult.
NHTSA has extensive familiarity with the safety technologies
usually associated with crash avoidance, having required some (most
notably, electronic stability control) as standard equipment on all
newly manufactured light vehicles, and being deeply engaged in research
on others, including the
[[Page 62733]]
braking technologies mentioned in Daimler's comment. When NHTSA's
research indicates sufficient maturity of a crash avoidance technology,
the agency may either promote its use through its New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP) or mandate its use by issuing a Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard (FMVSS) requiring the technology on all or some
categories of new vehicles.
Under the NCAP program, NHTSA tests new vehicles to determine how
well they protect drivers and passengers during a crash, and how well
they resist rollovers. These vehicles are then rated using a 5-star
safety rating system. Five stars indicate the highest safety rating;
one star, the lowest. In addition, NHTSA began in model year 2011
identifying on its Web site, www.SaferCar.gov, new vehicles equipped
with any of three recommended advanced crash avoidance technologies
that meet the agency's established requirements. These technologies,
Electronic Stability Control, Forward Collision Warning, and Lane
Departure Warning, can help drivers avoid crashes.
Additional technologies may be added to the NCAP list of crash
avoidance technologies when there is sufficient information and
analysis to confirm their safety value. NHTSA, for example, is
carefully analyzing advanced braking systems of the type discussed in
Daimler's comments and could decide in the near future that they are
ripe for inclusion in NCAP. Alternatively, NHTSA may conclude that such
technologies are sufficiently developed, their safety benefits
sufficiently clear, and relevant test procedures sufficiently defined
that they should be the subject of a mandatory safety standard. NHTSA
could not render a determination on such a request without thoroughly
testing the technology as applied in that specific model and developing
a specialized benefits analysis. The agency's higher priority would
clearly have to be analyzing the technologies it found to offer great
safety promise on a broader basis and developing standardized tests for
those technologies. Therefore the agencies believe that evaluation of
crash avoidance technologies is better addressed under NHTSA's vehicle
safety authority than under a case-by-case off-cycle credit process.
Furthermore, the A/C efficiency, off-cycle, and pickup truck credit
provisions being finalized by the agencies are premised on the
installation of specific technologies that directly reduce the fuel
consumption and CO2 emissions of the specific vehicles in
which they are installed. For all of these credits, the amount of GHG
emission reduction and fuel economy improvement attributable to the
technology being credited can be reliably determined, and those
improvements can be directly attributed to the improved fuel economy
performance of the vehicle on which the technology is installed. Thus,
for a technology to be ``counted'' under the credit provisions, it must
make direct improvements to the performance of the specific vehicle to
which it is applied. The agencies have never considered indirect
improvements \299\ for the fleet as a whole, and did not discuss that
possibility in the proposal. The agencies believe that there is a very
significant distinction between technologies providing direct and
reliably quantifiable improvements to fuel economy and GHG emission
reductions, and technologies which provide those improvements by
indirect means, where the improvement is not reliably quantifiable, and
may be speculative (or in many instances, non-existent), or may provide
benefit to other vehicles on the road more than for themselves. As the
agencies have reiterated, and many commenters have likewise maintained,
credits should be available only for technologies providing real-world
improvements, the improvements must be verifiable, and the process by
which credits are granted and implemented must be transparent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\ i.e. improvements that improve the fuel economy or GHG
emissions of other vehicles on the road.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
None of these factors would be satisfied for credits for these
types of indirect technologies used for crash avoidance systems,
safety-critical systems, or other technologies that may reduce the
frequency of vehicle crashes. The agencies are consequently not
providing off-cycle credits potentially attributable to crash avoidance
systems, safety-critical systems, or technologies that may reduce the
frequency of vehicle crashes. . Therefore, the agencies are not
providing off-cycle credits for technologies and systems including, but
not limited to, Electronic Stability Control, Tire Pressure Monitoring
System, Forward Collision Warning, Lane Departure Warning and/or
Intervention, Collision Imminent Braking, Dynamic Brake Support,
Adaptive Lighting, Blind Spot Detection, Adaptive Cruise Control, Curve
Speed Warning, Fatigue Warning, systems that reduce driver distraction,
and any other technologies that may reduce the likelihood of crashes.
Thus, manufacturers will not receive credits or fuel economy
improvement adjustments for installing these technologies. If a
manufacturer has an off-cycle technology that is not included on this
list and brings it to the agencies for assessment, NHTSA will determine
whether it is ineligible for a credit or adjustment by reason of the
agency's judgment that it is related to crash avoidance systems, is
related to motor vehicle safety within the meaning of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety act, as amended, or may otherwise
reduce the possibility and or frequency of vehicle crashes.
The agencies believe that the advancement of crash avoidance
systems specifically is best left to NHTSA's exercise of its vehicle
safety authority. NHTSA looks forward to working with manufacturers and
other interested parties on creating opportunities to encourage the
general introduction of these technologies in the context of the NCAP
program and possible safety standards. To that end, the agency would
welcome relevant data and analysis from interested parties.
The agencies also received comments related to other technologies
that may reduce CO2 emissions and fuel consumption by
reducing traffic congestion or that provide information to the driver
with which the driver may change his or her driving technique or the
route driven (more direct route or traffic avoidance \300\). All
commenters addressing these issues acknowledged the difficulty of
quantifying benefits associated with congestion mitigation and driver-
selectable technologies.\301\ Commenters generally noted that the off-
cycle credit provisions in the MYs 2012-2016 GHG rule, and the off-
cycle credit provisions proposed in this rulemaking did not appear to
cover technologies such as in-dash GPS navigation systems, driver
coaching and feedback systems (such as ``eco modes''), vehicle
maintenance alerts and reminders, and ``other automatic and driver-
initiated location content-
[[Page 62734]]
based technologies that have been shown to reduce fuel consumption.''
\302\ These commenters requested the opportunity to work with the
agencies at developing such procedures.\303\ With regard to EPA's
request for comment on whether the regulatory text should clarify how
EPA treats driver-selectable modes,\304\ the Alliance stated that it
believed there was no need to clarify regulatory text, but that EPA
should simply update or refine informal guidance as necessary to
address issues as they develop.\305\ MEMA stated that there was
``precedent for providing CAFE credits based on a projected usage
factor of a fuel saving device,'' citing EPA letters regarding the
impact of a shift indicator light on fuel economy.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\ Agencies distinguish between congestion mitigation and
congestion avoidance. Congestion mitigation affects the fuel economy
and GHG emissions mainly of other vehicles on the road, whereas
congestion avoidance affects the fuel economy mainly of the single
vehicle with the technology.
\301\ Alliance, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, at 11 (stating
that it did not seem like there is sufficient information at this
time to define specific credit opportunities); Ford, Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0131-0235, at 16 (stating that ``quantifying the benefit
is an acknowledged challenge''); MEMA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-
[fill in], at 9 (stating that the benefits from these technologies
``cannot be quantified literally* * *'').
\302\ See, e.g., MEMA at 9; Ford at 16; Garmin, Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0131-0245, at 2-3 (requesting an alternate way for
manufacturers to prove the real-world fuel economy and
CO2 benefits of in-dash GPS navigation systems (with or
without traffic avoidance) to the agencies besides the ways laid out
in the off-cycle credit approval provisions at 40 CFR 86.1866-
12(d)(2) and (d)(3)).
\303\ Alliance at 11, Ford at 16, MEMA at 9.
\304\ See 76 FR 75025.
\305\ Id. at 90.
\306\ MEMA at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At proposal, EPA addressed the possibility of evaluating
applications for off-cycle credits for technologies involving driver
interaction, indicating that ``driver interactive technologies face the
highest demonstration hurdle because manufacturers would need to
provide actual real-world usage data on driver response rates.'' 76 FR
75025. The agencies still believe it to be highly unlikely that off-
cycle credits could be justified for these non-safety technologies.
This issue is addressed in detail in section III.C.5.ii below. These
technologies do not improve the fuel efficiency of the vehicle under
any given operating condition, but rather provide information the
driver may use to change the driving cycle over which the vehicle
overrates which, in turn, may improve the real-world fuel economy
(miles driven per gallon consumed)/CO2 emissions (per mile
driven) compared to what the fuel economy and CO2 emissions
per mile would have been had the driver not used the information or if
the technology was not on the vehicle. The agencies believe, for
example, there would be a number of specific challenges to quantifying
the effect on fuel economy and CO2 emissions per mile driven
of GPS/real time traffic navigation systems. First, given that the
systems available today are available through subscription services,
the manufacturer would need to prove that the vehicle operators will
pay for such a service for the useful life of the vehicle or the
manufacturer would have to provide the service at no cost to vehicle
operators over the useful life of the vehicle. Second, there would need
to be an extensive data collection program to show that drivers were
using the system and that they were taking alternate routes that
actually improved fuel economy. It would be necessary to determine the
level of fuel economy improvement as well as to show evidence that this
level of improvement would be expected to be achieved by vehicle
operators over the useful life of the vehicle. In addition, it would be
necessary to show the sampling is representative, the effects are
statistically significant, and the results are reproducible. Third, the
real time traffic information must be proven to be accurate and
assurances provided that the level of accuracy would be maintained over
the useful life of the vehicle. Inaccurate information might lead to
poorer fuel economy. Fourth, anecdotal information indicates that
navigations systems are most often used to direct the driver using the
shortest temporal path. The agencies believe that only rarely would a
driver choose the route that achieves the highest fuel economy over one
that takes the least time--especially if the time savings would be
significant. In addition, other factors may need to be demonstrated,
such as the effect of these technologies in differing geographical
regions with various road and traffic patterns and the effect of these
technologies during different parts of the day (e.g., rush hour vs.
mid-day). It is for these reasons that the agencies believe that
meeting the burden of proof for these class of technologies will be
extremely difficult. Other ``driver interactive'' off-cycle
technologies will present similar challenges. These may include, but
are not limited to, in-dash GPS navigation systems, driver coaching and
feedback systems such as ``eco modes,'' fuel economy performance
displays and indicators, or haptic devices such as, for example,
throttle pedal feedback systems, vehicle maintenance alerts and
reminders, and other automatic or driver-initiated location content-
based technologies that may improve fuel economy.
Finally, the agencies requested comments on the treatment of driver
selectable technologies as stated in 76 FR 75089: ``EPA is requesting
comments on whether there is a need to clarify in the regulations how
EPA treats driver selectable modes (such as multi-mode transmissions
and other user-selectable buttons or switches) that may impact fuel
economy and GHG emissions.'' If we did not receive comments to the
contrary, we also stated that ``EPA would apply the same approach to
testing for compliance with the in-use CO2 standard, so
testing for the CO2 fleet average and testing for compliance
with the in-use CO2 standard would be consistent.''
The current EPA policy on select-shift transmissions (SSTs) and
multimode transmissions (MMT), and shift indicator lights (SILs) is
under Manufacturer Guidance Letter CISD-09-19 (December 3, 2009) and
supersedes several previous letters on both of these topics. For, SSTs
and MMTs, the manufacturer must determine the predominant mode (e.g.,
75% of the drivers will have at least 90% of vehicle shift operation
performed in one mode, and, on average, 75% of vehicle shift operation
is performed in that mode), using default criteria in the guidance
letter or a driver survey. If the worst-case mode is determined to be
the predominant mode, the manufacturer must test in this mode and use
the results with no benefit from the driver-selectable technology
reflected in the fuel economy values. If the best-case mode is
determined to be the predominant mode, the manufacturer may test in
this mode and use the results with the full benefit of the driver-
selectable technology reflected in the fuel economy values. If the
predominant mode is not discernible, the manufacturer must test in all
modes and harmonically average the results (Note: in most cases, there
are only two modes so this becomes a 50/50 average between best- and
worst-case modes). Based on the EPA decision process under CISD-09-19,
both the label and CAFE/GHG could reflect 0, 50, or 100% of the benefit
of a driver-selectable device. However, when calculating CAFE, only the
2-cycle test results (e.g., Federal Test Procedure (FTP) and Highway
Fuel Economy test (HWFET)) are used. Thus, the higher fuel economy
results would only affect the 2-cycle testing values for CAFE purposes.
For SILs, the manufacturer must perform an instrumented vehicle survey
on a prototype vehicle to determine the appropriate shift schedule to
optimize fuel economy. Previous guidance for SILs contained the option
for A-B testing with and without the SIL. This has been eliminated in
the latest guidance, allowing only an instrumented vehicle survey as
the basis for determining SIL related fuel economy improvements.
However, for purposes of determining CAFE compliance reporting values,
the 2-cycle test results (e.g., Federal Test Procedure
[[Page 62735]]
(FTP) and Highway Fuel Economy test (HWFET)) are used to align
statutory provisions allowing for these two test cycles when
determining program compliance. Therefore, only fuel economy
improvement values identified on during the FTP and HWFET test cycles
would be applicable to the CAFE program.
In response to EPA's request for comment on whether the regulatory
text should clarify how EPA treats driver-selectable modes, the
Alliance stated that it believed there was no need to clarify
regulatory text, but that EPA should simply update or refine informal
guidance as necessary to address issues as they develop.\307\ MEMA
stated that there was ``precedent for providing CAFE credits based on a
projected usage factor of a fuel saving device,'' citing EPA letters
regarding the impact of a shift indicator light on fuel economy.\308\
Finally, the Alliance provided data from General Motors on their HVAC
Eco-Mode button based on On-Star data from in-use vehicles (n=3,500;
50.3% of the drivers use the system 90% of the time or greater, 57.4%
use it 50% of the time or greater, and 34% never use it). Based on the
data supplied, they anticipate a benefit of 1.8 g/mi and, with 50% of
the people using the HVAC Eco-Mode, a credit of 0.9 g/mi is warranted
(i.e., 1.8 x 0.5).
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\307\ Id. at 90.
\308\ MEMA at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the comments from the Alliance that there is no need to clarify
regulatory text and the informal guidance should be updated or refined
as necessary, we agree that the current regulations and the latest
guidance letter, CISD-09-19, appropriately supersedes previous guidance
letters and addresses select-shift transmissions (SSTs) and multimode
transmissions, and shift indicator lights (SILs). Therefore, we will
not attempt to clarify the regulatory text and we will continue to
update our guidance as necessary.
Regarding the comment from MEMA that there is ``precedent for
providing CAFE credits based on a projected usage factor of a fuel
saving device,'' citing EPA letters regarding the impact of a shift
indicator light on fuel economy, the manufacturer guidance letters
referenced by MEMA (CD-82-10 (LD) and CD-83-10(LD)) have been
superseded by CISD-09-19. Thus, the procedures in CISD-09-19 would be
the applicable guidance for comparison. As previously mentioned, CISD-
09-19 requires the manufacturer to 1) determine the potential benefit
of a driver selectable feature and 2) discern the predominant mode in-
use. This process is very similar and consistent with the process we
proposed for demonstrating technologies not on the defined technology
list. Therefore, we agree with MEMA that there is a precedent within
our current policy to consider the influence of driver-selectable
features on test cycle results.
For the comments from the Alliance on the HVAC Eco-Mode \309\, as
discussed above, the existing policy in CISD-09-19 requires using
instrumented vehicle survey data to determine the predominant mode and
test the vehicle in this mode to determine the fuel economy benefits.
This is very similar to the process we are using for alternate method
demonstrations under the off-cycle credit program. Therefore, this
further supports our previous assertion for addressing driver-
selectable technologies under our alternate method demonstration
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\309\ Alliance, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, page 38 of 93;
Appendix 2, page 13 of 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, we want to emphasize that although we acknowledge the
similarities between the procedures under the existing policy in CISD-
09-19 and the procedures used in the off-cycle program, our discussion
of driver-selectable devices is completely limited to their potential
impact on off-cycle credits. The procedures used to conduct FTP and
HFET testing for the purpose of determining CAFE and GHG values for a
model type are not at issue here. Following our request for comments on
how we handle these devices when testing on the FTP and HFET, comments
suggested no changes to existing guidance are needed. We agree and will
continue to handle these devices on a case-by-case basis consistent
with the existing policy in CISD-09-19. In addition, the existing
guidance and FTP/HFET testing policy in CISD-09-19 is not applicable in
the context of the off-cycle program since driver-selectable
technologies will always require the need for estimates of real-world
customer usage to receive off-cycle credit. Therefore, in summary we
believe that there is a precedent set by the existing policy in CISD-
09-19 to determine a usage in-use but that the existing policy in CISD-
09-19 has no bearing on the credit determinations in the off-cycle
program, and the converse (i.e., the off-cycle credit program affecting
existing policy in CISD-09-19). Specifically, the section entitled
``Alternative Methods for Determination of Usage Rates'' in CISD-09-19
that allows an instrumented vehicle survey or on-board data collection
are most consistent with the procedures for the off-cycle program as
discussed in III.C.5.iii. and 40 CFR Sec. 86.1869-12(c).
In the context of the off-cycle program, the test values applicable
to a vehicle's fuel economy label value are mostly independent from
those generated for the CAFE compliance; where the 2-cycle results for
compliance and the combination of all 5-cycle test results are used for
the fuel economy label. However, as indicated with other technologies
included in the finalized pre-defined technology menu, fuel economy
improvements are reflected in the 2-cycle test result values used for
CAFE compliance revealing the need to account for the improved 2-cycle
test results when considering off-cycle credits for driver-selectable
technologies. Therefore, if a manufacturer is requesting off-cycle
credit but has previously used the improved fuel economy test results
under the existing policy in CISD-09-19 for a driver-selectable
technology, the manufacturer must use the 2-cycle results determined
under CISD-09-19 for both the A and B values of the FTP and HWFET A-B
tests to determine the potential benefit of the driver selectable
technology when requesting off-cycle credit. This approach effectively
negates the 2-cycle results and benefits, and which is consistent with
the treatment for the other off-cycle technologies where credit is not
granted for improvements reflected on current 2-cycle test procedures.
Accordingly, we are allowing driver-selectable technologies to be
eligible for credit in the off-cycle credit program using procedures
and processes demonstrating technologies not on the defined technology
list using alternative methods and the public process. Under these
provisions, the manufacturer must determine the benefit of the driver-
selectable technology using approved methodologies and a usage factor
for the technology using an instrumented vehicle survey, and applying
this factor to the measured benefit to estimate and request credit. As
discussed above, if a manufacturer has previously received some fuel
economy improvement as a result of the decision process under CISD-09-
19, the manufacturer must use the 2-cycle results from that decision
process as the A and B values for the 2-cycle A-B tests to estimate the
off-cycle credit. Consequently, if a manufacturer uses 5-cycle testing
to demonstrate the benefit of a driver selectable technology, the
manufacturer must use the previously determined 2-cycle test values for
the FTP and HWFET A-B tests, which effectively only captures the
benefit from the remaining three cycles of 5-cycle testing (i.e., US06,
[[Page 62736]]
SC03, Cold FTP). The usage factor would then be applied to these 5-
cycle results (or any other approved methodology for non-5-cycle test
methodologies). For driver-selectable technologies, the manufacturers
must adhere to all criteria and requirements as discussed below in
III.C.5.iii. and 40 CFR Sec. 86.1869-12(b) and (c).
While we are allowing credit for driver-selectable and driver
interactive technologies (including congestion avoidance), the agencies
believe that applicants would face formidable burdens of showing that
improvements over baseline are legitimate, reliably quantifiable,
certain, and transparently demonstrable as described above. As
identified in CISD-09-19, there will need to be an extensive data
collection program to show that drivers are using the technology and to
generate a reliable usage factor, if this has not previously been
established. In addition, the usage factor applied to the benefit from
the driver-selectable technology will tend to lower the amount of
credit unless a manufacturer can demonstrate 100% usage of a driver-
selectable technology. Therefore, depending on the level of benefit,
the amount of resulting credit could be minimal compared the effort to
generate the necessary, supporting data, and manufacturers should
consider this before undertaking this process.
In summary, the agencies are not adding driver-selectable or
driver-interactive features to the defined technology list. However,
driver-selectable and driver-interactive features are eligible for off-
cycle credits using procedures and processes for demonstrating
technologies not on the defined technology list under the off-cycle
program as discussed above.
h. Credit for Glass and Glazing Technologies: Concerns With Metallic
Glazing and Request for Separate Polycarbonate Glazing Credit
Multiple comments were received with concerns regarding the use of
metallic glazing from the Crime Victims Unit of California (CVUC),
California State Sheriffs, Garmin, Honda and TechAmerica. Many
commenters raised concerns the credit for glazing may unintentionally
create incentives to use metallic films or small metallic particles to
achieve reduced vehicle solar heat loading and access the off-cycle
credit. The commenters indicated this type of metallic glazing can
potentially interfere with signals for global positioning systems
(GPS), cell phones, cellular signal based prisoner tracking systems,
emergency and/or electronic 911 (E911) calls or other signals emanating
from within or being transmitted to a vehicle's passenger compartment/
cabin. In addition, some commenters cited this concern as the reason
that the California Air Resources Board (CARB) removed their mandate
for metallic glazing from the ``Cool Cars'' Regulation in California.
To address these concerns, the agencies met with the Enhanced
Protective Glass Automotive Association (EPGAA), which represents
automotive glass manufacturers and suppliers. The meeting included
representatives from the automotive glass suppliers Pittsburgh Glass
Works LLC (PGW), Guardian Industries, and Asahi Glass Company (AGC) to
discuss the potential concerns with metallic glazing, signal
interference and/or radio frequency (RF) attenuation (details of this
meeting are available in EPA docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-
41752 and docket NHTSA-2010-0131). At this meeting, EPGAA provided data
to the agencies that showed: In general, any glazing material can
create signal interference and RF attenuation, and depending on the
situation, RF attenuation and signal interference can occur without the
presence of metallic glazing material; there was no statistically-
significant increase in signal interference and RF attenuation when
metallic glazing was used. Furthermore, many vehicles in production
today are designed with metallic solar control deletion areas or zones
around the window edges and/or defined areas in either the front
windshield of rear backlight to minimize signal interference and RF
attenuation. Following the meeting, EPGAA representatives provided a
list of vehicles currently utilizing metallic glazing demonstrating to
the agencies that this technology is currently in-use without
significant signal interference/RF attenuation issues being raised.
EPGAA representatives indicated the technology is especially prevalent
in Europe and with no significant consumer complaints.
In addition, the agencies received comments from the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) in response to the specific comments submitted
to the proposal regarding the California Cool Cars Regulation
indicating the program was withdrawn as a result of the metallic solar
glazing concerns (see EPA docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). CARB
stated the mandate for metallic glazing in the Cool Cars Regulation was
withdrawn was primarily related to the timing of when the concerns
regarding metallic glazing were raised in relation to the proposed
mandate's targeted finalization than to substantive concerns. CARB also
clarified that they were not requiring a specific type of glazing and
that a performance-based approach ultimately adopted in the Advanced
Clean Cars Regulation accomplished the same objectives as proposed
under the Cool Cars Regulation without the need for a mandate. In
addition, CARB performed testing of signal interference and RF
attenuation by CARB (see test results in EPA docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799-41752) echoing the findings of the automotive glass
industry that there is ``[n]o effect of reflective glazing observed on
monitoring ankle bracelets or cell phones'' and that any ``[e]ffects on
GPS navigation devices [are] completely mitigated by use of [the]
deletion window'' placing either the device or the external antennae in
this area''. CARB urged EPA to finalize the proposed credit values for
glass and glazing as proposed. Finally, CARB issued a formal memorandum
\310\ confirming the timing related reasons for withdrawing the Cool
Cars mandate and its test results regarding signal interference and RF
attenuation, and urging the agencies to finalize the proposed credit
values for glass and glazing as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\ CARB memorandum available at EPA docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799 and NHTSA docket NHTSA-2010-0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on this information, the agencies are finalizing the proposed
credit values and calculation procedures for solar control glazing. EPA
and NHTSA note further the off-cycle credit is performance-based and
not a mandate for vehicle manufacturers. Manufacturers have options to
choose from a variety of glazing technologies that meet their desired
performance for rejecting vehicle cabin solar loading. We reiterate
that the rule is technology neutral and that none of these potential
glazing technologies are foreclosed. Second, we did not see evidence
contravening the information that the automotive glass industry and
CARB presented showing that there would not be significant adverse
effects on signal interference and RF attenuation by any of the
recognized glazing technologies. However, to address the concerns of
other commenters, we will emphasize to manufacturers that they should
evaluate the potential for signal interference and RF attenuation when
requesting the solar control glazing credit to ensure that their
designs do not cause any interference.
i. Summary of Off-Cycle Credit Values
As proposed, EPA is finalizing that a CAFE improvement value for
off-cycle improvements be determined at the fleet
[[Page 62737]]
level by converting the CO2 credits determined under the EPA
program (in metric tons of CO2) for each fleet (car and
truck) to a fleet fuel consumption improvement value. This improvement
value would then be used to adjust the fleet's CAFE level upward. See
the regulations at 40 CFR 600.510-12. Note that although the table
below presents fuel consumption values equivalent to a given
CO2 credit value, these consumption values are presented for
informational purposes and are not meant to imply that these values
will be used to determine the fuel economy for individual vehicles.
Finally, the agencies proposed that the pre-approved menu list of
off-cycle technologies and default credit values would be predicated on
a certain minimum percentage of technology penetration in a
manufacturer's domestic fleet. 76 FR 75381. Commenters persuasively
argued that such a requirement would discourage introduction and
utilization of beneficial off-cycle technologies. They pointed out that
new technologies are often introduced on limited model lines or
platforms both to gauge consumer acceptance and to gain additional
experience with the technology before more widespread introduction.
Requiring levels of technology penetration such as the 10 percent
proposed for many of the menu technologies could thus create a negative
rather than positive incentive to deploy off-cycle technologies. The
agencies agree, and note further that having an aggressive penetration
rate requirement also raises issues of sufficiency of lead time in the
early years of the program. The agencies are therefore not adopting
minimum penetration requirements as a prerequisite to claim default
credits from the preapproved technology menu.
Table II-22 shows the list of off-cycle technologies and credits
and equivalent fuel consumption improvement values for cars and trucks
that the agencies are finalizing in today's action. The credits and
fuel consumption improvement values for active aerodynamics, high-
efficiency exterior lighting, waste heat recovery and solar roof panels
are scalable, depending on the amount of respective improvement these
systems can generate for the vehicle. The Solar/Thermal control
technologies are varied and are limited to a total of 3.0 and 4.3 g/mi
(car and truck respectively) The various pre-defined solar/thermal
control technologies eligible for off-cycle credit are shown in Table
II-22 below.
Table II-22--Off-Cycle Technologies and Credits and Equivalent Fuel Consumption Improvement Values for Cars and
Light Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adjustments for cars Adjustments for trucks
Technology ---------------------------------------------------------------
g/mi gallons/mi g/mi gallons/mi
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ High Efficiency Exterior Lights* (at 100 watt 1.0 0.000113 1.0 0.000113
savings).......................................
+ Waste Heat Recovery (at 100W)................. 0.7 0.000079 0.7 0.000079
+ Solar Panels (based on a 75 watt solar
panel)**;
Battery Charging Only....................... 3.3 0.000372 3.3 0.000372
Active Cabin Ventilation and Battery 2.5 0.000282 2.5 0.000282
Charging...................................
+ Active Aerodynamic Improvements (for a 3% 0.6 0.000068 1.0 0.000113
aerodynamic drag or Cd reduction)..............
Engine Idle Start-Stop;
w/ heater circulation system #.............. 2.5 0.000282 4.4 0.000496
w/o heater circulation system............... 1.5 0.000169 2.9 0.000327
Active Transmission Warm-Up..................... 1.5 0.000169 3.2 0.000361
Active Engine Warm-up........................... 1.5 0.000169 3.2 0.000361
Solar/Thermal Control........................... Up to 3.0 0.000338 Up to 4.3 0.000484
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* High efficiency exterior lighting credit is scalable based on lighting components selected from high
efficiency exterior lighting list (see Joint TSD Section 5.2.3, Table 5-21).
** Solar Panel credit is scalable based on solar panel rated power, (see Joint TSD Section 5.2.4). This credit
can be combined with active cabin ventilation credits.
# In order to receive the maximum engine idle start stop, the heater circulation system must be calibrated to
keep the engine off for 1 minute or more when the external ambient temperature is 30 deg F and when cabin heat
is demanded (see Joint TSD Section 5.2.8.1).
+ This credit is scalable; however, only a minimum credit of 0.05 g/mi CO[ihel2] can be granted.
Table II-23--Off-Cycle Technologies and Credits for Solar/Thermal
Control Technologies for Cars and Light Trucks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credit (g CO2/mi)
Thermal control technology -----------------------------------------
Car Truck
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Glass or Glazing.............. Up to 2.9.......... Up to 3.9
Active Seat Ventilation....... 1.0................ 1.3
Solar Reflective Paint........ 0.4................ 0.5
Passive Cabin Ventilation..... 1.7................ 2.3
Active Cabin Ventilation*..... 2.1................ 2.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Active cabin ventilation has potential synergies with solar panels as
described in Chapter 5.2 of the joint TSD.
j. Vehicle Simulation Tool
Chapter 2 of EPA's RIA provides a detailed description of the
vehicle simulation tool that EPA had developed and has used for the
final rule. This tool is capable of simulating a wide range of
conventional and advanced engine, transmission, and vehicle
technologies over various driving cycles. It evaluates technology
package effectiveness while taking into account synergy (and dis-
synergy) effects among vehicle components and estimates GHG emissions
for various combinations of
[[Page 62738]]
technologies. For the MYs 2017 to 2025 GHG rule, this simulation tool
was used to assist estimating the amount of GHG credits for improved A/
C systems and off-cycle technologies. EPA sought public comment on this
approach of using the tool for generating some of the credits. The
agency received no specific comment on the model itself or on the
documentation of the model. However, based on the comments described in
the previous section (particularly on allowing scalable credits on off-
cycle technologies), EPA modified and fine-tuned the vehicle simulation
tool in order to properly capture the amount of scalable GHG reductions
provided by off-cycle technologies. More specifically, based on the
comments from the Auto Alliance, EPA used the simulation tool to
generate scalable credits for the active aerodynamic technology. For
this final rule, EPA utilized the simulation tool in order to quantify
the (scalable) credits for Active Aerodynamics, High Efficiency
Exterior Lights, Solar Panel, and Waste Heat Recovery \311\ more
accurately. The details of this analysis are presented in Chapter 5.2
of the Joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\ This technology was termed `engine heat recovery' at
proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are other technologies that would result in additional GHG
reduction benefits that cannot be fully captured on the combined FTP/
Highway cycle test. These technologies typically reduce engine loads by
utilizing advanced engine controls, and they range from enabling the
vehicle to turn off the engine at idle, to reducing cabin temperature
and thus A/C compressor loading when the vehicle is restarted. Examples
include Engine Start-Stop, Electric Heater Circulation Pump, Active
Engine/Transmission Warm-Up, and Solar Control. For these types of
technologies, the overall GHG reduction largely depends on the control
and calibration strategies of individual manufacturers and vehicle
types. EPA utilized the simulation tool to estimate the default credit
values for the engine start-stop technology. Details of the analysis
are provided in the chapter 5.2.8.1 of Joint TSD. However, the current
vehicle simulation tool does not have the capability to properly
simulate the vehicle behaviors that depend on thermal conditions of the
vehicle and its surroundings, such as Active Engine/Transmission Warm-
Up and Solar Control. Therefore, the vehicle simulation cannot provide
full benefits of these technologies on the GHG reductions. For this
reason, the agency did not use the simulation tool to generate the
default GHG credits for these technologies, though future versions of
the model may be more capable of quantifying the efficacy of these off-
cycle technologies as well. As described in Chapter 5 of the Joint TSD,
the Active Engine/Transmission Warm-up credits were estimated using the
results from the Ricardo vehicle simulation results.
In summary, for the MYs 2017 to 2025 GHG final rule, EPA used the
simulation tool to quantify the amount of GHG emissions reduced by
improvements in A/C systems and to determine the default credit values
for some of the off-cycle technologies such as active aerodynamics,
electrical load reduction, and engine start-stop. Details of the
analysis and values of these scalable credits are described in Chapter
5 of Joint TSD. This simulation tool will not be officially used for
credit compliance purposes (as proposed) because EPA has already made
several of the credits scalable for the purposes of this final rule.
However, EPA may use the tool as part of the case-by-case of off-cycle
credit determination process. EPA encourages manufacturers to use this
simulation tool in order to estimate the credits values of their off-
cycle technologies.
3. Advanced Technology Incentives for Full-Size Pickup Trucks
The agencies recognize that the standards for MYs 2017-2025 will be
challenging for large vehicles, including full-size pickup trucks that
are often used for commercial purposes and have generally higher
payload and towing capabilities than other light-duty vehicles. Section
II.C and Chapter 2 of the joint TSD describe the adjustments made to
the slope of the truck curve compared to the MYs 2012-2016 rule,
reflecting these considerations. Sections III.B and IV.E describe the
progression of the stringency of the truck standards. Large pick-up
trucks represent are a significant portion of the overall light-duty
vehicle fleet and generally have higher levels of fuel consumption and
GHG emissions than most other light-duty vehicles. Improvements in the
fuel economy and GHG emissions of these vehicles can have significant
impact on overall light-duty fleet fuel use and GHG emissions. The
agencies believe that offering incentives in the earlier years of this
program that encourage the deployment of technologies that can
significantly improve the efficiency of these vehicles and that also
will foster production of those technologies at levels that will help
achieve economies of scale, will promote greater fuel savings overall
and make these technologies more cost effective and available in the
later model years of this rulemaking to assist in compliance with the
standards.
The agencies are therefore finalizing the proposed approach to
encourage penetration of these technologies both through the standards
themselves, but also through various provisions providing regulatory
incentives for advanced technology use in full-size pick-up trucks. The
agencies' goal is to incentivize the penetration into the marketplace
of ``game changing'' technologies for these pickups, including the
marketing of hybrids. For that reason, EPA, in coordination with NHTSA,
proposed and is adopting provisions for credits and corresponding
equivalent fuel consumption improvement values for manufacturers that
hybridize a significant number of their full-size pickup trucks, or use
other technologies that significantly reduce CO2 emissions
and fuel consumption.\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\ Note that EPA's calculation methodology in 40 CFR 600.510-
12 does not use vehicle-specific fuel consumption adjustments to
determine the CAFE increase due to the various incentives allowed
under the program. Instead, EPA will convert the total
CO2 credits due to each incentive program from metric
tons of CO2 to a fleetwide CAFE improvement value. The
fuel consumption values are presented here to show the relationship
between CO2 and fuel consumption improvements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most of the commenters on this issue supported the large truck
credit concept. Some OEM commenters argued that it should be extended
to other vehicles such as SUVs and minivans. ICCT, Volkswagen, and CBD
opposed adopting the proposed incentive, arguing that this vehicle
segment is not especially challenged by the proposed standards, that
hybrid systems would readily transfer to it from other vehicle classes,
and that the credit essentially amounts to an economic advantage for
manufacturers of large trucks. CBD also commented that this credit
should be eliminated, since they believe hybrid technology should be
forced by aggressive standards rather than encouraged through
regulatory incentives. Other environmental group commenters also
expressed concern about the real-world impacts of offering this credit,
and suggested various ways to tailor it to ensure that fuel savings and
emissions reductions associated with it are genuine.
We believe that extending the large truck credit to other light-
duty trucks such as SUVs and minivans would greatly expand, and
therefore dilute, the intended credit focus. The agencies do not
believe that providing such incentives for hybridization in these
additional categories is necessary, or that the performance levels
required of
[[Page 62739]]
non-hybrid technologies eligible for credits are of such stringency
that extending credits to all or most light-duty trucks would amount to
anything more than a de facto lowering of overall program stringency.
Although commenters rightly pointed out that some of these non-truck
vehicles do have substantial towing capacity, most are not used as
towing vehicles, in contrast to full-size pickup trucks that often
serve as work vehicles. Moreover, the smaller footprint trucks fall on
the lower part of the truck curve, which have a higher rate of
improvement (in stringency) than the larger trucks, thus making them
more comparable to cars in terms of technology access and effectiveness
(as well as not having access to these credits).
Arguments made by commenters for not adopting the large truck
technology credit are not convincing. Although there may not be
inherent reasons for a lack of hybrid technology migration to large
trucks, it is clear that this migration has nevertheless been slow to
materialize for practical/economic reasons, including in-use duty
cycles and customer expectations. These issues still need to be
addressed by the designers of large pickups to successfully introduce
these technologies in these trucks, and we believe that assistance in
the form of a focused, well-defined incentive program is warranted. See
section III.D.6 and 7 for further discussion of EPA's justification for
this credit program in the context of the stringency of the truck
standards.
Volkswagen commented that any HEV or performance-based credits
generated by large trucks should not be transferable to other vehicle
segments, arguing that if compliance for the large truck segment is
really as challenging as predicted, there should be no excess of
credits to transfer anyway. This may be the case, but we do not agree
that it argues for restricting the use of large pickup truck credits.
We think the sizeable technology hurdle involved and the limited model
years in which credits are available preclude the potential for credit
windfalls. Furthermore, neither the size of the large truck market nor
the size of the per-vehicle credit are so substantial that they could
lead to a large pool of credits capable of skewing the competition in
the lighter vehicle market. As described in Section III.D of this
preamble, EPA will continue to monitor the net level of credit
transfers from cars to trucks and vice versa in the MYs 2017-2025
timeframe.
As proposed, the agencies are defining a full-size pickup truck
based on minimum bed size and hauling capability, as detailed in
86.1866-12(e) of the regulations being adopted. This definition is
meant to ensure that the larger pickup trucks, which provide
significant utility with respect to bed access and payload and towing
capacities, are captured by the definition, while smaller pickup trucks
with more limited capacities are not covered. A full-size pickup truck
is defined as meeting requirements (1) and (2) below, as well as either
requirement (3) or (4) below. A more detailed discussion can be found
in section III.C.3.
(1) Bed Width--The vehicle must have an open cargo box with a
minimum width between the wheelhouses of 48 inches. And--
(2) Bed Length--The length of the open cargo box must be at least
60 inches. And--
(3) Towing Capability--the gross combined weight rating (GCWR)
minus the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) must be at least 5,000
pounds. Or--
(4) Payload Capability--the GVWR minus the curb weight (as defined
in 40 CFR 86.1803) must be at least 1,700 pounds.
EPA sought comment on extending these credits to smaller pickup
trucks, specifically to those with narrower beds, down to 42 inches,
but still with towing capability comparable to large trucks. This
request for comment produced mixed reactions among truck manufacturers,
and some argued that EPA should go further and drop the bed size limit
entirely. ICCT and CBD strongly opposed any extension of credits,
arguing that adopting the 42'' bed width criterion would allow
virtually all pickup trucks to qualify, thereby distorting technology
requirements and reducing the benefits of the rule. None of the
commenters argued convincingly in favor of the extension and so we are
adopting the 48'' minimum requirement as proposed. Chrysler commented
that the proposed payload and towing capability minimums are too
restrictive, making a sizeable number of Ram 1500 configurations
ineligible to earn credits. However, the company provided no sales
information to enable the agencies to reassess this issue. Moreover,
the agencies did not premise the proposed incentive on every full-size
truck configuration being eligible. Manufacturers typically offer a
variety of truck options to suit varied customer needs in the work and
recreational truck markets, and the fact that one manufacturer (or
more) markets to applications lacking the towing and payload demands of
the core group of vehicles in this segment does not, in the agencies'
view, justify a revision of the hauling requirements that were a
fundamental consideration in establishing the credit.
The agencies also sought comment on the definitions of mild and
strong hybrids based on energy capture on braking (brake regeneration).
Minor modifications to these definitions were made based on these
comments as well as new testing performed by the EPA. Due to the
detailed nature of these comments, these responses and the description
of the testing are included in section 5.3.3 of the Joint TSD.
The program requirements and incentive amounts differ somewhat for
mild and strong HEV pickup trucks. As proposed, mild HEVs will be
eligible for a per-vehicle credit of 10 g/mi (equivalent to 0.0011
gallon/mile for a gasoline-fueled truck) during MYs 2017-2021.
Eligibility also requires that the technology be used on a minimum
percentage of a company's full size pickups, beginning with at least
20% of a company's full-size pickup production in 2017 and ramping up
to at least 80% in MY 2021. These minimum percentages are lower in MYs
2017 and 2018 than proposed (20% and 30%, respectively, compared to the
proposed 30% and 40%), based on our assessment of the comments arguing
reasonably that the proposed percentages were too demanding, especially
in the initial model years when there is the least lead time. Strong
HEV pickup trucks will be eligible for a 20 g/mi CO2 credit
(0.0023 gallon/mile) during MYs 2017-2025 if the technology is used on
at least 10% of the company's full-size pickups. The technology
penetration thresholds and their basis, as well as comments received on
our proposal for them, are discussed in more detail in section III.C
below. Because of their importance in assigning credit amounts, EPA is
adopting explicit regulatory definitions for mild and strong HEVs.
These definitions and the relevant comments we received are discussed
in section III.C.3 and in section 5.3.3 of the Joint TSD.
Because there are other, non-HEV, advanced technologies that can
provide significant reductions in pickup truck GHG emissions and fuel
consumption (e.g., hydraulic hybrid), EPA is also adopting the
proposed, more generalized, credit provisions for full-size pickup
trucks that achieve emissions levels significantly below their
applicable CO2 targets. This performance-based credit will
be 10 g/mi CO2 (equivalent to 0.0011 gal/mi for the CAFE
program) or 20 g/mi CO2 (0.0023 gal/mi) for full-size
pickups achieving 15 or 20%, respectively,
[[Page 62740]]
better CO2 than their footprint-based targets in a given
model year. The basis for our choice of the 15 and 20% over-compliance
targets is explained in Section 5.3.4 of the Joint TSD.
These performance-based credits have no specific technology or
design requirements; automakers can use any technology or set of
technologies as long as the vehicle's CO2 performance is at
least 15 or 20% below its footprint-based target. However, a vehicle
cannot receive both HEV and performance-based credits. Because the
footprint target curve has been adjusted to account for A/C-related
credits, the CO2 level to be compared with the target will
also include any A/C-related credits generated by the vehicles.
The 10 g/mi performance-based credit will be available for MYs 2017
to 2021. In recognition of the nature of automotive redesign sequence,
a vehicle model meeting the requirements in a model year will receive
the credit in subsequent model years through MY 2021, unless its
CO2 level increases or its production drops below the
penetration threshold described below, even if the year-by-year
reduction in standards levels causes the vehicle to fall short of the
15% over-compliance threshold. The 10 g/mi credit is not available
after MY 2021 because the post-2021 standards quickly overtake designs
that were originally 15% over-compliant, making the awarding of credits
to them inappropriate. The 20 g/mi CO2 performance-based
credit will be available for a maximum of five consecutive model years
within the 2017 to 2025 model year period, provided the vehicle model's
CO2 level does not increase from the level determined in its
first qualifying model year, and subject to the penetration requirement
described below. A qualifying vehicle model that subsequently undergoes
a major redesign can requalify for the credit for an additional period
starting in the redesign model year, not to exceed five model years and
not to extend beyond MY 2025.
As with the HEV incentives, eligibility for the performance-based
credit and fuel consumption improvement value requires that the
technology be used on a minimum percentage of a manufacturer's full-
size pickup trucks. That minimum percentage for the 10 g/mi
CO2 credit (0.0011 gal/mi) is 15% in MY 2017, with a ramp up
to 40% in MY 2021. The minimum percentage for the 20 g/mi credit
(0.0023 gal/mi) is 10% in each year over the model years 2017-2025. The
technology penetration thresholds and their basis, as well as comments
received on our proposal for them, are discussed in more detail in
section III.C.
ICCT opposed allowing vehicle models that earn performance-based
credits in one year to continue receiving them in subsequent years as
the increasingly more stringent standards progressively diminish the
vehicle's performance margin compared to the standard. We view the
incentive over the longer term, as a multi-year package, intending it
to encourage investment in lasting technology shifts. The fact that it
is somewhat easier to exceed performance by 15 or 20% in the earlier
years, when the bar is set lower, and, once earned, to retain that
benefit for a fixed number of years (provided sales remain strong),
works to focus the credit as intended--on incentivizing the
introduction of new technology as early in the program as possible.
G. Safety Considerations in Establishing CAFE/GHG Standards
1. Why do the Agencies consider safety?
The primary goals of CAFE and GHG standards are to reduce fuel
consumption and GHG emissions from the on-road light-duty vehicle
fleet, but in addition to these intended effects, the agencies also
consider the potential of the standards to affect vehicle safety.\313\
As a safety agency, NHTSA has long considered the potential for adverse
safety consequences when establishing CAFE standards,\314\ and under
the CAA, EPA considers factors related to public health and human
welfare, including safety, in regulating emissions of air pollutants
from mobile sources.\315\ Safety trade-offs associated with fuel
economy increases have occurred in the past, particularly before NHTSA
CAFE standards were attribute-based,\316\ and the agencies must be
mindful of the possibility of future ones. These past safety trade-offs
may have occurred because manufacturers chose at the time, partly in
response to CAFE standards, to build smaller and lighter vehicles,
rather than adding more expensive fuel-saving technologies while
maintaining vehicle size and safety, and the smaller and lighter
vehicles did not fare as well in crashes as larger and heavier
vehicles. Historically, as shown in FARS data analyzed by NHTSA, the
safest cars generally have been heavy and large, while the cars with
the highest fatal-crash rates have been light and small. The question,
then, is whether past is necessarily prologue when it comes to
potential changes in vehicle size (both footprint and ``overhang'') and
mass in response to the more stringent future CAFE and GHG standards.
Manufacturers have stated that they will reduce vehicle mass as one of
the cost-effective means of increasing fuel economy and reducing
CO2 emissions in order to meet the standards, and the
agencies have incorporated this expectation into our modeling analysis
supporting the standards. Because the agencies discern a historical
relationship between vehicle mass, size, and safety, it is reasonable
to assume that these relationships will continue in the future. The
agencies are encouraged by comments to the NPRM from the Alliance of
Automotive Manufacturers reflecting a commitment to safety stating
that, while improving the fuel efficiency of the vehicles, the vehicle
manufacturers are ``mindful that such improvements must be implemented
in a manner that does not compromise the rate of safety improvement
that has been achieved to date.'' The question of whether vehicle
design can mitigate the adverse effects of mass reduction is discussed
below.
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\313\ In this rulemaking document, ``vehicle safety'' is defined
as societal fatality rates per vehicle miles traveled (VMT), which
include fatalities to occupants of all the vehicles involved in the
collisions, plus any pedestrians.
\314\ This practice is recognized approvingly in case law. As
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated in
upholding NHTSA's exercise of judgment in setting the 1987-1989
passenger car standards, ``NHTSA has always examined the safety
consequences of the CAFE standards in its overall consideration of
relevant factors since its earliest rulemaking under the CAFE
program.'' Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA (``CEI I''),
901 F.2d 107, 120 at n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
\315\ As noted in Section I.D above, EPA has considered the
safety of vehicular pollution control technologies from the
inception of its Title II regulatory programs. See also NRDC v. EPA,
655 F. 2d 318, 332 n. 31 (D.C. Cir. 1981). (EPA may consider safety
in developing standards under section 202(a) and did so
appropriately in the given instance).
\316\ National Research Council, ``Effectiveness and Impact of
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards,'' National Academy
Press, Washington, DC (2002), Finding 2, p. 3, Available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309076013 (last accessed Aug. 2,
2012).
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Manufacturers are less likely than they were in the past to reduce
vehicle footprint in order to reduce mass for increased fuel economy.
The primary mechanism in this rulemaking for mitigating the potential
negative effects on safety is the application of footprint-based
standards, which create a disincentive for manufacturers to produce
smaller-footprint vehicles (see Section II.C.1 above). This is because,
as footprint decreases, the corresponding fuel economy/GHG emission
target becomes more stringent. We also believe that the shape of the
footprint curves themselves is approximately ``footprint-
[[Page 62741]]
neutral,'' that is, that it should neither encourage manufacturers to
increase the footprint of their fleets, nor to decrease it. Upsizing
footprint is also discouraged through the curve ``cut-off'' at larger
footprints.\317\ However, the footprint-based standards do not
discourage downsizing the portions of a vehicle in front of the front
axle and to the rear of the rear axle, or of other areas of the vehicle
outside the wheels. The crush space provided by those portions of a
vehicle can make important contributions to managing crash energy.
Additionally, simply because footprint-based standards minimize
incentive to downsize vehicles does not mean that some manufacturers
will not downsize if doing so makes it easier for them to meet the
overall CAFE/GHG standard in a cost-efficient manner, as for example if
the smaller vehicles are so much lighter (or de-contented) that they
exceed their targets by much greater amounts. On balance, however, we
believe the target curves and the incentives they provide generally
will not encourage down-sizing (or up-sizing) in terms of footprint
reductions (or increases).\318\ Consequently, all of our analyses are
based on the assumption that this rulemaking, in and of itself, will
not result in any differences in the sales weighted distribution of
vehicle sizes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\ The agencies recognize that at the other end of the curve,
manufacturers who make small cars and trucks below 41 square feet
(the small footprint cut-off point) have some incentive to downsize
their vehicles to make it easier to meet the constant target. That
cut-off may also create some incentive for manufacturers who do not
currently offer models that size to do so in the future. However, at
the same time, the agencies believe that there is a limit to the
market for cars and trucks smaller than 41 square feet: most
consumers likely have some minimum expectation about interior
volume, for example, among other things. Additionally, vehicles in
this segment are the lowest price point for the light-duty
automotive market, with several models in the $10,000-$15,000 range.
Manufacturers who find themselves incentivized by the cut-off will
also find themselves adding technology to the lowest price segment
vehicles, which could make it challenging to retain the price
advantage. Because of these two reasons, the agencies believe that
the incentive to increase the sales of vehicles smaller than 41
square feet due to this rulemaking, if any, is small. See Section
II.C.1 above and Chapter 1 of the Joint TSD for more information on
the agencies' choice of ``cut-off'' points for the footprint-based
target curves.
\318\ This statement makes no prediction of how consumer choices
of vehicle size will change in the future, independent of this
proposal.
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Given that we expect manufacturers to reduce vehicle mass in
response to the final rule, and do not expect manufacturers to reduce
vehicle footprint in response to the final rule, the agencies must
attempt to predict the safety effects, if any, of the final rule based
on the best information currently available. This section explained why
the agencies consider safety; the following section discusses how the
agencies consider safety.
2. How do the Agencies consider safety?
Assessing the effects of vehicle mass reduction and size on
societal safety is a complex issue. One part of estimating potential
safety effects involves trying to understand better the relationship
between mass and vehicle design. The extent of mass reduction that
manufacturers may be considering to meet more stringent fuel economy
and GHG standards may raise different safety concerns from what the
industry has previously faced. The principal difference between the
heavier vehicles, especially truck-based LTVs, and the lighter
vehicles, especially passenger cars, is that mass reduction has a
different effect in collisions with another car or LTV. When two
vehicles of unequal mass collide, the change in velocity (delta V) is
higher in the lighter vehicle, similar to the mass ratio proportion. As
a result of the higher change in velocity, the fatality risk may also
increase. Removing more mass from the heavier vehicle than in the
lighter vehicle by amounts that bring the mass ratio closer to 1.0
reduces the delta V in the lighter vehicle, possibly resulting in a net
societal benefit. This was reinforced by comments to the proposal from
Volvo which stated ``Everything else being equal, several of the
studies presented indicate a significant increase, up to a factor ten,
in the fatality risk for the occupants in the lighter vehicle for a
two-to-one weight ratio between the colliding vehicles in a head-on
crash.''\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0243; Section: Safety
Consideration.
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Another complexity is that if a vehicle is made lighter,
adjustments must be made to the vehicle's structure such that it will
be able to manage the energy in a crash while limiting intrusion into
the occupant compartment. To maintain an acceptable occupant
compartment deceleration, the effective front-end stiffness has to be
managed such that the crash pulse does not increase as lighter yet
stiffer materials are utilized. If the energy is not well managed, the
occupants may have to ``ride down'' a more severe crash pulse, putting
more burdens on the restraint systems to protect the occupants. There
may be technological and physical limitations to how much the restraint
system may mitigate these effects.
The agencies must attempt to estimate now, based on the best
information currently available to us for analyzing these CAFE and GHG
standards, how the assumed levels of mass reduction without additional
changes (i.e. footprint, performance, functionality) might affect the
safety of vehicles, and how lighter vehicles might affect the safety of
drivers and passengers in the entire on-road fleet. The agencies seek
to ensure that the standards are designed to encourage manufacturers to
pursue a path toward compliance that is both cost-effective and safe.
To estimate the possible safety effects of the MY 2017-2025
standards, then, the agencies have undertaken research that approaches
this question from several angles. First, we are using a statistical
approach to study the effect of vehicle mass reduction on safety
historically, as discussed in greater detail in section C below.
Statistical analysis is performed using the most recent historical
crash data available, and is considered as the agencies' best estimate
of potential mass-safety effects. The agencies recognize that negative
safety effects estimated based on the historical relationships could
potentially be tempered with safety technology advances in the future,
and may not represent the current or future fleet. Second, we are using
an engineering approach to investigate what amount of mass reduction is
affordable and feasible while maintaining vehicle safety and
functionality such as durability, drivability, NVH, and acceleration
performance. Third, we are also studying the new challenges these
lighter vehicles might bring to vehicle safety and potential
countermeasures available to manage those challenges effectively.
Comments to the proposal from the Alliance of Automakers supported
NHTSA's approach of using both engineering and statistical analyses to
assess the effects of the standards on safety, stating ``The Alliance
supports NHTSA's intention to examine safety from the perspective of
both the historical field crash data and the engineering analysis of
potential future Advanced Materials Concept vehicles. NHTSA's planned
analysis rightly looks backward and forward.'' \320\ DRI furnished
alternative statistical analyses in which the significant fatality
increase seen for mass reduction in cars weighing less than 3,106
pounds in Kahane's analysis tapers off to a non-significant or near-
zero level. Other commenters (including ICCT, Center for Biological
Diversity (CBD), Consumers Union, NRDC, and the Aluminum Association),
in contrast, stated that
[[Page 62742]]
mass reduction can be implemented safely and there should be no safety
impacts associated with the CAFE/GHG standards. Some commenters argued
that safety of future vehicles will be solely a function of vehicle
design and not of weight or size, while others argued that better
material usage, better design, and stronger materials will improve
vehicle safety if vehicle size is maintained. More specifically,
comments from ICCT stated that reducing vehicle weight through the use
of strong lightweight materials, while maintaining size can reduce
intrusion, as the redesigned vehicle can reduce crash forces with
equivalent crush space. ICCT further stated that ``this also supports
that size-based standards that encourage the use of lightweight
materials should reduce intrusion and, hence, fatalities.'' \321\ The
American Iron and Steel Institute indicated that steel structures are
particularly effective in absorbing energy during a collision over the
engineered crush space (or crumple zone), and further indicated that
new advanced high-strength steel technology has already demonstrated
its ability to reduce mass and maintain or improve test crashworthiness
performance all within the same vehicle footprint, although
acknowledging that these comments did not necessarily reflect crash
performance with vehicles of different sizes and masses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\ Alliance comments, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131, at pg 5.
\321\ ICCT comments, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799, Document
ID: 9512, at pg 13.
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The agencies have looked closely at these issues, and we believe
that our approach of using both statistical analyses of historical data
to assess societal safety effects, and design studies to assess the
ability of individual designs to comply with the FMVSS and perform well
on NCAP and IIHS tests responds to these concerns.
The sections below discuss more specifically the state of the
research on the mass-safety relationship, and how the agencies have
integrated that research into our assessment of the safety effects of
the MY 2017-2025 CAFE and GHG standards.
3. What is the current state of the research on statistical analysis of
historical crash data?
a. Background
Researchers have been using statistical analysis to examine the
relationship of vehicle mass and safety in historical crash data for
many years, and continue to refine their techniques over time. In the
MY 2012-2016 final rule, the agencies stated that we would conduct
further study and research into the interaction of mass, size and
safety to assist future rulemakings, and start to work collaboratively
by developing an interagency working group between NHTSA, EPA, DOE, and
CARB to evaluate all aspects of mass, size and safety. The team would
seek to coordinate government supported studies and independent
research, to the greatest extent possible, to help ensure the work is
complementary to previous and ongoing research and to guide further
research in this area.
The agencies also identified three specific areas to direct
research in preparation for future CAFE/GHG rulemaking in regards to
statistical analysis of historical data.
First, NHTSA would contract with an independent institution to
review the statistical methods that NHTSA and DRI have used to analyze
historical data related to mass, size and safety, and to provide
recommendations on whether the existing methods or other methods should
be used for future statistical analysis of historical data. This study
would include a consideration of potential near multicollinearity in
the historical data and how best to address it in a regression
analysis. The 2010 NHTSA report was also peer reviewed by two other
experts in the safety field--Charles Farmer (Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety) and Anders Lie (Swedish Transport Administration).\322\
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\322\ All three of the peer reviews are available in Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0152. You can access the docket at http://www.regulations.gov/#!home by typing `NHTSA-2010-0152' where it says
``enter keyword or ID'' and then clicking on ``Search.''
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Second, NHTSA and EPA, in consultation with DOE, would update the
MY 1991-1999 database on which the safety analyses in the NPRM and
final rule are based with newer vehicle data, and create a common
database that could be made publicly available to help address concerns
that differences in data were leading to different results in
statistical analyses by different researchers.
And third, in order to assess if the design of recent model year
vehicles that incorporate various mass reduction methods affect the
relationships among vehicle mass, size and safety, the agencies sought
to identify vehicles that are using material substitution and smart
design, and to try to assess if there is sufficient crash data
involving those vehicles for statistical analysis. If sufficient data
exists, statistical analysis would be conducted to compare the
relationship among mass, size and safety of these smart design vehicles
to vehicles of similar size and mass with more traditional designs.
Significant progress has been made on these tasks since the MY
2012-2016 final rule: The independent review of recent and updated
statistical analyses of the relationship between vehicle mass, size,
and crash fatality rates has been completed. NHTSA contracted with the
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) to
conduct this review, and the UMTRI team led by Paul Green evaluated
over 20 papers, including studies done by NHTSA's Charles Kahane, Tom
Wenzel of the U.S. Department of Energy's Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, Dynamic Research, Inc., and others. UMTRI's basic findings
will be discussed below. Some commenters in recent CAFE rulemakings,
including some vehicle manufacturers, suggested that the designs and
materials of more recent model year vehicles may have weakened the
historical statistical relationships between mass, size, and safety.
The agencies agree that the statistical analysis would be improved by
using an updated database that reflects more recent safety
technologies, vehicle designs and materials, and reflects changes in
the overall vehicle fleet, and an updated database was created and
employed for assessing safety effects in this final rule. The agencies
also believe, as UMTRI also found, that different statistical analyses
may have produced different results because they each used slightly
different datasets for their analyses. In order to try to mitigate this
issue and to support the current rulemaking, NHTSA has created a
common, updated database for statistical analysis that consists of
crash data of model years 2000-2007 vehicles in calendar years 2002-
2008, as compared to the database used in prior NHTSA analyses which
was based on model years 1991-1999 vehicles in calendar years 1995-
2000. The new database is the most up-to-date possible, given the
processing lead time for crash data and the need for enough crash cases
to permit statistically meaningful analyses. NHTSA made the preliminary
version of the new database, which was the basis for NHTSA's 2011
report, available to the public in May 2011, and an updated version in
April 2012,\323\ enabling other researchers to analyze the same data
and hopefully minimizing discrepancies in the results that would have
been due to inconsistencies across databases.\324\ The agencies
recognize, however, that the updated database may not represent the
future fleet, because vehicles have continued and will
[[Page 62743]]
continue to change. NHTSA published a preliminary report with the NPRM
in November 2011, which has subsequently been revised based on peer
review comments. The final report is being published concurrently with
this rulemaking.\325\
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\323\ The new databases are available at ftp://ftp.nhtsa.dot.gov/CAFE/.
\324\ 75 FR 25324 (May 7, 2010); the discussion of planned
statistical analyses is on pp. 25395-25396.
\325\ The final report can be found in Docket No. NHTSA-2010-
0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies are aware that several studies have been initiated
using the 2011 version or the 2012 version of NHTSA's newly established
safety database. In addition to new Kahane studies, which are discussed
in section II.G.3.d, other on-going studies include two by Wenzel at
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) under contract with the
U.S. DOE, and one by Dynamic Research, Inc. (DRI) contracted by the
International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT). These studies
take somewhat different approaches to examine the statistical
relationship between fatality risk, vehicle mass and size. In addition
to a detailed assessment of the NHTSA 2011 report, Wenzel considers the
effect of mass and footprint reduction on casualty risk per crash,
using data from thirteen states. Casualty risk includes both fatalities
and serious or incapacitating injuries. Both LBNL studies were peer
reviewed and subsequently revised and updated. DRI used models that
separate the effect of mass reduction on two components of fatality
risk, crash avoidance and crashworthiness. The LBNL and DRI studies are
available in the docket for this final rule.\326\ The database is
available for download to the public from NHTSA's Web site.
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\326\ Wenzel, T. (2011a). Assessment of NHTSA's Report
``Relationships Between Fatality Risk, Mass, and Footprint in Model
Year 2000-2007 Passenger Cars and LTVs--Draft Final Report.''
(Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152-0026). Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory; Wenzel, T. (2011b). An Analysis of the
Relationship between Casualty Risk Per Crash and Vehicle Mass and
Footprint for Model Year 2000-2007 Light-Duty Vehicles--Draft Final
Report.'' (Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152-0028). Berkeley, CA: Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory; Wenzel, T. (2012a). Assessment of
NHTSA's Report ``Relationships Between Fatality Risk, Mass, and
Footprint in Model Year 2000-2007 Passenger Cars and LTVs--Final
Report.'' (To appear in Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152). Berkeley, CA:
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; Wenzel, T. (2012b). An
Analysis of the Relationship between Casualty Risk Per Crash and
Vehicle Mass and Footprint for Model Year 2000-2007 Light-Duty
Vehicles--Final Report.'' (To appear in Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152).
Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; Van Auken,
R.M., and Zellner, J. W. (2012a). Updated Analysis of the Effects of
Passenger Vehicle Size and Weight on Safety, Phase I. Report No.
DRI-TR-11-01. (Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152-0030). Torrance, CA:
Dynamic Research, Inc.; Van Auken, R.M., and Zellner, J. W. (2012b).
Updated Analysis of the Effects of Passenger Vehicle Size and Weight
on Safety, Phase II; Preliminary Analysis Based on 2002 to 2008
Calendar Year Data for 2000 to 2007 Model Year Light Passenger
Vehicles to Induced-Exposure and Vehicle Size Variables. Report No.
DRI-TR-12-01, Vols. 1-3. (Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152-0032).
Torrance, CA: Dynamic Research, Inc.; Van Auken, R.M., and Zellner,
J. W. (2012c). Updated Analysis of the Effects of Passenger Vehicle
Size and Weight on Safety, Phase II; Preliminary Analysis Based on
2002 to 2008 Calendar Year Data for 2000 to 2007 Model Year Light
Passenger Vehicles to Induced-Exposure and Vehicle Size Variables.
Report No. DRI-TR-12-01, Vols. 4-5. (Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152-
0033). Torrance, CA: Dynamic Research, Inc.; Van Auken, R.M., and
Zellner, J. W. (2012d). Updated Analysis of the Effects of Passenger
Vehicle Size and Weight on Safety; Sensitivity of the Estimates for
2002 to 2008 Calendar Year Data for 2000 to 2007 Model Year Light
Passenger Vehicles to Induced-Exposure and Vehicle Size Variables.
Report No. DRI-TR-12-03. (Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152-0034).
Torrance, CA: Dynamic Research, Inc.
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Finally, EPA and NHTSA with DOT's Volpe Center, part of DOT's
Research and Innovative Technology Administration, attempted to
investigate the implications of ``Smart Design,'' by identifying and
describing the types of ``Smart Design'' and methods for using ``Smart
Design'' to result in vehicle mass reduction, selecting analytical
pairs of vehicles, and using the appropriate crash database to analyze
vehicle crash data. The analysis identified several one-vehicle and
two-vehicle crash datasets with the potential to shed light on the
issue, but the available data for specific crash scenarios was
insufficient to produce consistent results that could be used to
support conclusions regarding historical performance of ``smart
designs.'' This study is also available in the docket for this final
rule.\327\
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\327\ Brewer, John. An Assessment of the Implications of ``Smart
Design'' on Motor Vehicle Safety. 2011. Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undertaking these tasks has helped the agencies come closer to
resolving some of the ongoing debates in statistical analysis research
of historical crash data. We intend to apply these conclusions going
forward in the midterm review and future rulemakings, and we believe
that the public discussion of the issues will be facilitated by the
research conducted. The following sections discuss the findings from
these studies and others in greater detail, to present a more nuanced
picture of the current state of the statistical research.
b. NHTSA Workshop on Vehicle Mass, Size and Safety
On February 25, 2011, NHTSA hosted a workshop on mass reduction,
vehicle size, and fleet safety at the Headquarters of the U.S.
Department of Transportation in Washington, DC.\328\ The purpose of the
workshop was to provide the agencies with a broad understanding of
current research in the field and provide stakeholders and the public
with an opportunity to weigh in on this issue. NHTSA also created a
public docket to receive comments from interested parties that were
unable to attend.
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\328\ A video recording, transcript, and the presentations from
the NHTSA workshop on mass reduction, vehicle size and fleet safety
is available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy (look for ``NHTSA
Workshop on Vehicle Mass-Size-Safety on Feb. 25.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The speakers included Charles Kahane of NHTSA, Tom Wenzel of
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, R. Michael Van Auken of Dynamic
Research Inc. (DRI), Jeya Padmanaban of JP Research, Inc., Adrian Lund
of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Paul Green of the
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI),
Stephen Summers of NHTSA, Gregg Peterson of Lotus Engineering, Koichi
Kamiji of Honda, John German of the International Council on Clean
Transportation (ICCT), Scott Schmidt of the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, Guy Nusholtz of Chrysler, and Frank Field of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The wide participation in the workshop allowed the agencies to hear
from a broad range of experts and stakeholders. The contributions were
particularly relevant to the agencies' analysis of the effects of mass
reduction for this final rule. The presentations were divided into two
sessions that addressed the two expansive sets of issues: statistical
evidence of the roles of mass and size on safety, and engineering
realities regarding structural crashworthiness, occupant injury and
advanced vehicle design.
The first session focused on previous and ongoing statistical
studies of crash data that attempt to identify the relative recent
historical effects of vehicle mass and size on fleet safety. There was
consensus that there is a complicated relationship with many
confounding influences in the data. Wenzel summarized a recent study he
conducted comparing four types of risk (fatality or casualty risk, per
vehicle registration-years or per crash) using police-reported crash
data from five states. This study was updated and finalized in March of
2012.\329\ He showed that the trends in risk for various classes of
vehicles--e.g., non-sports car passenger cars, vans, SUVs,
[[Page 62744]]
crossover utility vehicles (CUV), pickups--were similar regardless of
what risk was being measured (fatality or casualty) or what exposure
metric was used (e.g., registration years, police-reported crashes,
etc.). In general, most trends showed that societal risk tends to
decrease as car or CUV size increases, while societal risk tends to
increase as pickup or SUV size increases.
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\329\ Wenzel, T.P. (2012). Analysis of Casualty Risk per Police-
Reported Crash for Model Year 2000 to 2004 Vehicles, Using Crash
Data from Five States, March 2012, LBNL-4897E, available at: http://energy.lbl.gov/ea/teepa/pdf/lbnl-4897e.pdf (last accessed Jun. 18,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Wenzel's analysis was focused on differences in the four
types of risk on the relative risk by vehicle type, he cautioned that,
when analyzing casualty risk per crash, analysts should control for
driver age and gender, crash location (urban vs. rural), and the state
in which the crash occurred (to account for crash reporting biases).
Several participants pointed out that analyses must also control
for individual technologies with significant safety effects (e.g.,
Electronic Stability Control, airbags). It was not always conclusive
whether a specialty vehicle group (e.g., sports cars, two-door cars,
early crossover SUVs) were outliers that confound the trend or unique
datasets that isolate specific vehicle characteristics. Unfortunately,
specialty vehicle groups are usually adopted by specific driver groups,
often with outlying vehicle usage or driver behavior patterns. Green,
who conducted an independent review of 18 previous statistical
analyses, suggested that evaluating residuals will give an indication
of whether or not a data subset can be legitimately removed without
inappropriately affecting the analytical results.
It was recognized that the physics of a two-vehicle crash require
that the lighter vehicle experience a greater change in velocity,
which, all else being equal, often leads to disproportionately more
injury risk. Lund noted persistent historical trends that, in any time
period, occupants of the smallest and lightest vehicles had, on
average, fatality rates approximately twice those of occupants of the
largest and heaviest vehicles, but also predicted that ``the sky will
not fall'' as the fleet downsizes, insofar as we will not see an
increase in absolute injury risk because smaller cars will become
increasingly protective of their occupants. Padmanaban also noted in
her research of the historical trends that mass ratio and vehicle
stiffness are significant predictors with mass ratio consistently the
dominant parameter when correlating harm. Reducing the mass of any
vehicle may have competing societal effects as it increases the injury
risk in the lightened vehicle and decreases them in the partner
vehicle.
The separation of key parameters was also discussed as a challenge
to the analyses, as vehicle size has historically been highly
correlated with vehicle mass. Presenters had varying approaches for
dealing with the potential multicollinearity between these two
variables. Van Auken of DRI stated that there was disagreement on what
value of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF, a measure of
multicollinearity) that would call results into question, and suggested
that a large value of VIF for curb weight might imply ``perhaps the
effect of weight is too small in comparison to other factors.'' Green,
of UMTRI, stated that highly correlated variables may not be
appropriate for use in a predictive model and that ``match[ing] on
footprint'' (i.e., conducting multiple analyses for data subsets with
similar footprint values) may be the most effective way to resolve the
issue.
There was no consensus on whether smaller, lighter vehicles
maneuver better, and thus avoid more crashes, than larger, heavier
vehicles. German noted that lighter vehicles should have improved
handling and braking characteristics and ``may be more likely to avoid
collisions.'' Lund presented crash involvement data that implied that,
among vehicles of similar function and use rates, crash risk does not
go down for more ``nimble'' vehicles. Several presenters noted the
difficulties of projecting past data into the future as new
technologies will be used that were not available when the data were
collected. The advances in technology through the decades have
dramatically improved safety for all weight and size classes. A video
of IIHS's 50th anniversary crash test of a 1959 Chevrolet Bel Air and
2009 Chevrolet Malibu graphically demonstrated that stark differences
in design and technology can possibly mask the discrete mass effects,
while videos of compatibility crash tests between smaller, lighter
vehicles and contemporary larger, heavier vehicles graphically showed
the significance of vehicle mass and size.
Kahane presented results from his 2010 report \330\ that found that
a scenario which took some mass out of heavier vehicles but little or
no mass out of the lightest vehicles did not impact safety in absolute
terms. Kahane noted that if the analyses were able to consider the mass
of both vehicles in a two-vehicle crash, the results may be more
indicative of future crashes. There is apparent consistency with other
presentations (e.g., Padmanaban, Nusholtz) that reducing the overall
ranges of masses and mass ratios seems to reduce overall societal harm.
That is, the effect of mass reduction exclusively does not appear to be
a ``zero sum game'' in which any increase in harm to occupants of the
lightened vehicle is precisely offset by a decrease in harm to the
occupants of the partner vehicle. If the mass of the heavier vehicle is
reduced by a larger percentage than that of its lighter crash partner,
the changes in velocity from the collision are more nearly equal and
the injuries suffered in the lighter vehicle are likely to be reduced
more than the injuries in the heavier vehicle are increased.
Alternatively, a fixed absolute mass reduction (say, 100 pounds) in all
vehicles could increase societal harm whereas a fixed percentage mass
reduction is more likely to be neutral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\ Kahane, C. J. (2010). ``Relationships Between Fatality
Risk, Mass, and Footprint in Model Year 1991-1999 and Other
Passenger Cars and LTVs,'' Final Regulatory Impact Analysis:
Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY 2012-MY 2016 Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, pp. 464-542, available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/CAFE_2012-2016_FRIA_04012010.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Padmanaban described a series of studies conducted in recent years.
She included numerous vehicle parameters including bumper height and
several measures of vehicle size and stiffness and also commented on
previous analyses that using weight and wheelbase together in a
logistic regression model distorts the estimates, resulting in high
variance inflation factors with wrong signs and magnitudes in the
results. Her results consistently showed that the ratio between the
masses of two vehicles involved in a two-vehicle crash was a more
important parameter than variables describing vehicle geometry or
stiffness. Her ultimate conclusion was that removing mass (e.g., 100
lbs.) from all passenger cars would cause an overall increase in
fatalities in truck-to-car crashes while removing the same amount from
light trucks would cause an overall decrease in fatalities.
c. Report by Green et al., UMTRI--``Independent Review: Statistical
Analyses of Relationship Between Vehicle Curb Weight, Track Width,
Wheelbase and Fatality Rates,'' April 2011
As explained above, NHTSA contracted with the University of
Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) to conduct an
independent review \331\ of a set of
[[Page 62745]]
statistical analyses of relationships between vehicle curb weight, the
footprint variables (track width, wheelbase) and fatality rates from
vehicle crashes. The purpose of this review was to examine analysis
methods, data sources, and assumptions of the statistical studies, with
the objective of identifying the reasons for any differences in
results. Another objective was to examine the suitability of the
various methods for estimating the fatality risks of future vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\ The review is independent in the sense that it was
conducted by an outside third party without any interest in the
reported outcome.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
UMTRI reviewed a set of papers, reports, and manuscripts provided
by NHTSA (listed in Appendix A of UMTRI's report, which is available in
the docket to this rulemaking) that examined the statistical
relationships between fatality or casualty rates and vehicle properties
such as curb weight, track width, wheelbase and other variables.
It is difficult to summarize a study of that length and complexity
for purposes of this discussion, but fundamentally, the UMTRI team
concluded the following:
Differences in data may have complicated comparisons of
earlier analyses, but if the methodology is robust, and the methods
were applied in a similar way, small changes in data should not lead to
different conclusions. The main conclusions and findings should be
reproducible. The database created by Kahane appears to be an
impressive collection of files from appropriate sources and the best
ones available for answering the research questions considered in this
study.
In statistical analysis simpler models generally lead to
improved inference, assuming the data and model assumptions are
appropriate. In that regard, the disaggregate logistic regression model
used by NHTSA in the 2003 report \332\ seems to be the most appropriate
model, and valid for the analysis in the context that it was used:
finding general associations between fatality risk and mass--and the
general directions of the reported associations are correct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\ Kahane, C. J. (2003). Vehicle Weight, Fatality Risk and
Crash Compatibility of Model Year 1991-99 Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks, NHTSA Technical Report. DOT HS 809 662. Washington, DC:
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809662.PDF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The two-stage logistic regression model in combination
with the two-step aggregate regression used by DRI seems to be more
complicated than is necessary based on the data being analyzed, and
summing regression coefficients from two separate models to arrive at
conclusions about the effects of reductions in weight or size on
fatality risk seems to add unneeded complexity to the problem.
One of the biggest issues regarding the various
statistical analyses is the historical correlation between curb weight,
wheelbase, and track width. Including three variables that are highly
correlated in the same model can have adverse effects on the fit of the
model, especially with respect to the parameter estimates, as discussed
by Kahane. UMTRI makes no conclusions about multicollinearity, other
than to say that inferences made in the presence of multicollinearity
should be judged with great caution. At the NHTSA workshop on size,
safety and mass, Paul Green suggested that a matched analysis, in which
regressions are run on the relationship between mass reduction and risk
separately for vehicles of similar footprint, could be undertaken to
reduce the effect of multicollinearity between vehicle mass and size.
Kahane has combined wheelbase and track width into one variable
(footprint) to compare with curb weight. NHTSA believes that the 2012
Kahane analysis has done all it can to lessen concerns about
multicollinearity, but a concern still exists.
In considering other studies provided by NHTSA for evaluation
by the UMTRI team:
Papers by Wenzel, and Wenzel and Ross, addressing
associations between fatality risk per vehicle registration-year,
weight, and size by vehicle model contribute to understanding some of
the relationships between risk, weight, and size. However, least
squares linear regression models, without modification, are not
exposure-based risk models and inferences drawn from these models tend
to be weak since they do not account for additional differences in
vehicles, drivers, or crash conditions that could explain the variance
in risk by vehicle model.
A 2009 J.P. Research paper focused on the difficulties
associated with separating out the contributions of weight and size
variables when analyzing fatality risk properly recognized the problem
arising from multicollinearity and included a clear explanation of why
societal fatality risk in two-vehicle crashes is expected to increase
with increasing mass ratio. UMTRI concluded that the increases in
fatality risk associated with a 100-pound reduction in weight allowing
footprint to vary with weight as estimated by Kahane and JP Research,
are broadly more convincing than the 6.7 percent reduction in fatality
risk associated with mass reduction while holding footprint constant,
as reported by DRI.
A paper by Nusholtz et al. focused on the question of
whether vehicle size can reasonably be the dominant vehicle factor for
fatality risk, and finding that changing the mean mass of the vehicle
population (leaving variability unchanged) has a stronger influence on
fatality risk than corresponding (feasible) changes in mean vehicle
dimensions, concluded unequivocally that reducing vehicle mass while
maintaining constant vehicle dimensions will increase fatality risk.
UMTRI concluded that if one accepts the methodology, this conclusion is
robust against realistic changes that may be made in the force vs.
deflection characteristics of the impacting vehicles.
Two papers by Robertson, one a commentary paper and the
other a peer-reviewed journal article, were reviewed. The commentary
paper did not fit separate models according to crash type, and included
passenger cars, vans, and SUVs in the same model. UMTRI concluded that
some of the claims in the commentary paper appear to be overstated, and
intermediate results and more documentation would help the reader
determine if these claims are valid. The second paper focused largely
on the effects of electronic stability control (ESC), but generally
followed on from the first paper except that fuel economy is used as a
surrogate for curb weight.
The UMTRI study provided a number of useful suggestions that Kahane
considered in updating his 2011 analysis, and that have been
incorporated into the safety effects estimates for the current
rulemaking.
d. Two Reports by Dr. Charles Kahane, NHTSA titled ``Relationships
Between Fatality Risk, Mass, and Footprint in Model Year 2000-2007
Passenger Cars and LTVs'': Preliminary Report, November 2011 and Final
Report, August 2012
The relationship between a vehicle's mass, size, and fatality risk
is complex, and varies in different types of crashes. NHTSA, along with
others, has been examining this relationship for over a decade. The
safety chapter of NHTSA's April 2010 final regulatory impact analysis
(FRIA) of CAFE standards for
[[Page 62746]]
MYs 2012-2016 passenger cars and light trucks included a statistical
analysis of relationships between fatality risk, mass, and footprint in
MY 1991-1999 passenger cars and LTVs (light trucks and vans), based on
calendar year (CY) 1995-2000 crash and vehicle-registration data.\333\
The 2010 analysis used the same data as the 2003 analysis, but included
vehicle mass and footprint in the same regression model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\ Kahane (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The principal findings of NHTSA's 2010 analysis were that mass
reduction in lighter cars, even while holding footprint constant, would
significantly increase societal fatality risk, whereas mass reduction
in the heavier LTVs would significantly reduce net societal fatality
risk, because it would reduce the fatality risk of occupants in lighter
vehicles which collide with the heavier LTVs. NHTSA concluded that, as
a result, any reasonable combination of mass reductions while holding
footprint constant in MYs 2012-2016 vehicles--concentrated, at least to
some extent, in the heavier LTVs and limited in the lighter cars--would
likely be approximately safety-neutral; it would not significantly
increase fatalities and might well decrease them.
NHTSA's 2010 report partially agreed and partially disagreed with
analyses published during 2003-2005 by Dynamic Research, Inc. (DRI).
NHTSA and DRI both found a significant protective effect for footprint,
and that reducing mass and footprint together (downsizing) on smaller
vehicles was harmful. DRI's analyses estimated a significant overall
reduction in fatalities from mass reduction in all light-duty vehicles
if wheelbase and track width were maintained, whereas NHTSA's report
showed overall fatality reductions only in the heavier LTVs, and
benefits only in some types of crashes for other vehicle types. Much of
NHTSA's 2010 report, as well as recent work by DRI, involved
sensitivity tests on the databases and models, which generated a range
of estimates somewhere between the initial DRI and NHTSA results.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\ Van Auken, R. M., and Zellner, J. W. (2003). A Further
Assessment of the Effects of Vehicle Weight and Size Parameters on
Fatality Risk in Model Year 1985-98 Passenger Cars and 1986-97 Light
Trucks. Report No. DRI-TR-03-01. Torrance, CA: Dynamic Research,
Inc.; Van Auken, R. M., and Zellner, J. W. (2005a). An Assessment of
the Effects of Vehicle Weight and Size on Fatality Risk in 1985 to
1998 Model Year Passenger Cars and 1985 to 1997 Model Year Light
Trucks and Vans. Paper No. 2005-01-1354. Warrendale, PA: Society of
Automotive Engineers; Van Auken, R. M., and Zellner, J. W. (2005b).
Supplemental Results on the Independent Effects of Curb Weight,
Wheelbase, and Track on Fatality Risk in 1985-1998 Model Year
Passenger Cars and 1986-97 Model Year LTVs. Report No. DRI-TR-05-01.
Torrance, CA: Dynamic Research, Inc.; Van Auken, R.M., and Zellner,
J. W. (2011).2012a). Updated Analysis of the Effects of Passenger
Vehicle Size and Weight on Safety, Phase I. Report No. DRI-TR-11-01.
(Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0152-0030). Torrance, CA: Dynamic Research,
Inc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 2010, NHTSA, working closely with EPA and the Department
of Energy (DOE), commenced a new statistical analysis of the
relationships between fatality rates, mass and footprint, updating the
crash and exposure databases to the latest available model years,
refining the methodology in response to peer reviews of the 2010 report
and taking into account changes in vehicle technologies. The previous
databases of MYs 1991-1999 vehicles in CYs 1995-2000 crashes had become
outdated as new safety technologies, vehicle designs and materials were
introduced. The new databases are comprised of MYs 2000-2007 vehicles
in CY 2002-2008 crashes with the most up-to-date possible data, given
the processing lead time for crash data and the need for enough crash
cases to permit statistically meaningful analyses. NHTSA made the first
version of the new databases available to the public in May 2011 and an
updated version in April 2012,\335\ enabling other researchers to
analyze the same data and hopefully minimizing discrepancies in the
results due to inconsistencies across the data used.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\ http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
\336\ 75 FR 25324 (May 7, 2010); the discussion of planned
statistical analyses is on pp. 25395-25396.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One way to estimate these effects is the use of statistical
analyses of societal fatality rates per vehicle miles traveled (VMT),
by vehicles' mass and footprint, for the current on-road vehicle fleet.
The basic analytical method used for the 2011-2012 NHTSA reports is the
same as in NHTSA's 2010 report: cross-sectional analyses of the effect
of mass and footprint reductions on the societal fatality rate per
billion vehicle miles of travel (VMT), while controlling for driver age
and gender, vehicle type, vehicle safety features, crash times and
locations, and other factors. Separate logistic regression models are
run for three types of vehicles and nine types of crashes. Societal
fatality rates include occupants of all vehicles in the crash, as well
as non-occupants, such as pedestrians and cyclists. NHTSA's 2011-2012
reports\337\ analyze MYs 2000-2007 cars and LTVs in CYs 2002-2008
crashes. Fatality rates were derived from FARS data, 13 State crash
files, and registration and mileage data from R.L. Polk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\ Kahane, C. J. (2011). ``Relationships Between Fatality
Risk, Mass, and Footprint in Model Year 2000-2007 Passenger Cars and
LTVs--Preliminary Report,'' is available in the NHTSA docket, NHTSA-
2010-0152 as item no. 0023. Kahane, C. J. (2012). ``Relationships
Between Fatality Risk, Mass, and Footprint in Model Year 2000-2007
Passenger Cars and LTVs--Final Report,'' is also in that docket. You
can access the docket at http://www.regulations.gov/#!home by typing
``NHTSA-2010-0152'' where it says ``enter keyword or ID'' and then
clicking on ``Search.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most noticeable change in MYs 2000-2007 vehicles from MYs 1991-
1999 has been the increase in crossover utility vehicles (CUV), which
are SUVs of unibody construction, sometimes built upon a platform
shared with passenger cars. CUVs have blurred the distinction between
cars and trucks. The new analyses treat CUVs and minivans as a separate
vehicle class, because they differ in some respects from pickup-truck-
based LTVs and in other respects from passenger cars. In the 2010
report, the many different types of LTVs were combined into a single
analysis. NHTSA believes that this may have made the analyses too
complex and might have contributed to some of the uncertainty in the
results.
The new database has more accurate VMT estimates than NHTSA's
earlier databases, derived from a file of odometer readings by make,
model, and model year recently developed by R.L. Polk and purchased by
NHTSA.\338\ For the 2011-2012 reports, the relative distribution of
crash types has been changed to reflect the projected distribution of
crashes during the period from 2017 to 2025, based on the estimated
effectiveness of electronic stability control (ESC) in reducing the
number of fatalities in rollover crashes and crashes with a stationary
object. The annual target population of fatalities or the annual
fatality distribution baseline \339\ was not decreased in the period
between 2017 and 2025 for the safety statistics analysis, but is taken
into account later in the Volpe model analysis, since all light-duty
vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2011 are required to be
equipped with ESC.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\ In the 1991-1999 data base, VMT was estimated only by
vehicle class, based on NASS CDS data.
\339\ MY 2004-2007 vehicles with fatal crashes occurred in CY
2004-2008 are selected as the annual fatality distribution baseline
in the Kahane analysis.
\340\ In the Volpe model, NHTSA assumed that the safety trend
would result in 12.6 percent reduction between 2007 and 2020 due to
the combination of ESC, new safety standard, and behavior changes
anticipated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the 2011-2012 reports, vehicles are now grouped into five
classes rather than four: passenger cars (including both 2-door and 4-
door cars) are split in half by median weight; CUVs and minivans; and
truck-based LTVs, which
[[Page 62747]]
are also split in half by median weight of the model year 2000-2007
vehicles. Table II-24 presents the 2011 preliminary report's estimated
percent increase in U.S. societal fatality risk per ten billion VMT for
each 100-pound reduction in vehicle mass, while holding footprint
constant, for each of the five classes of vehicles.
Table II-24--Results of 2011 NHTSA Preliminary Report: Fatality Increase (%) per 100-Pound Mass Reduction While
Holding Footprint Constant
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatality increase (%) per 100-pound mass reduction while
holding footprint constant
MY 2000-2007 CY 2002-2008 ----------------------------------------------------------------
Point estimate 95% confidence bounds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars < 3,106 pounds............................ 1.44 +.29 to +2.59
Cars >= 3,106 pounds........................... .47 -.58 to +1.52
CUVs and minivans.............................. -.46 -1.75 to +.83
Truck-based LTVs < 4,594 pounds................ .52 -.43 to +1.46
Truck-based LTVs >= 4,594 pounds............... -.39 -1.06 to +.27
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Farmer, Paul E. Green, and Anders Lie, who reviewed NHTSA's
2010 report, again peer-reviewed the 2011 preliminary report.\341\ In
preparing its 2012 final report, NHTSA also took into account Wenzel's
assessment of the preliminary report and its peer reviews, DRI's
analyses published early in 2012, and public comments such as those by
ICCT.\342\ These comments prompted supplementary analyses, especially
sensitivity tests, discussed below. However, the basic analysis of the
2012 final report is almost unchanged from the 2011 preliminary report,
differing only in the addition of some crash data that became available
in the interim and a minor change in the formula for estimating annual
VMT. Table II-25 presents the 2012 final report's estimated percent
increase in U.S. societal fatality risk per ten billion VMT for each
100-pound reduction in vehicle mass, while holding footprint constant,
for each of the five classes of vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\ Items 0035 (Lie), 0036 (Farmer) and 0037 (Green) in Docket
No. NHTSA-2010-0152.
\342\ Item 0258 in Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131.
Table II-25--Results of 2012 NHTSA Final Report: Fatality Increase (%) per 100-Pound Mass Reduction While
Holding Footprint Constant
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatality increase (%) per 100-pound mass reduction While
holding footprint constant
MY 2000-2007 CY 2002-2008 ----------------------------------------------------------------
Point estimate 95% confidence bounds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars < 3,106 pounds............................ 1.56 +.39 to +2.73
Cars >= 3,106 pounds........................... .51 -.59 to +1.60
CUVs and minivans.............................. -.37 -1.55 to +.81
Truck-based LTVs < 4,594 pounds................ .52 -.45 to +1.48
Truck-based LTVs >= 4,594 pounds............... -.34 -.97 to +.30
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only the 1.56 percent risk increase in the lighter-than-average
cars is statistically significant. There are nonsignificant increases
in the heavier-than-average cars and the lighter-than-average truck-
based LTVs, and non-significant societal benefits for mass reduction in
CUVs, minivans, and the heavier-than-average truck-based LTVs. The
report concludes that judicious combinations of mass reductions that
maintain footprint and are proportionately higher in the heavier
vehicles are likely to be safety-neutral--i.e., they are unlikely to
have a societal effect large enough to be detected by statistical
analyses of crash data. The primarily non-significant results are not
due to a paucity of data, but because the societal effect of mass
reduction while maintaining footprint, if any, is small.
MY 2000-2007 vehicles of all types are heavier and larger than
their MY 1991-1999 counterparts. The average mass of passenger cars
increased by 5 percent from 2000 to 2007 and the average mass of pickup
trucks increased by 19 percent. Other types of vehicles became heavier,
on the average, by amounts within this range. There are several reasons
for these increases: During this time, some of the lighter make-models
were discontinued; many models were redesigned to be heavier and
larger; and consumers more often selected stretched versions such as
crew cabs in their new-vehicle purchases.
It is interesting to compare the new results to NHTSA's 2010
analysis of MY 1991-1999 vehicles in CY 1995-2000, especially the new
point estimate to the ``actual regression result scenario'' in the 2010
report:
Table II-26--2010 Report: MY 1991-1999, CY 1995-2000 Fatality Increase (%) per 100-Pound Mass Reduction While
Holding Footprint Constant
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual regression
result scenario Upper-estimate scenario Lower-estimate scenario
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars < 2,950 pounds.................. 2.21 2.21 1.02
[[Page 62748]]
Cars >= 2,950 pounds................. 0.90 0.90 0.44
LTVs < 3,870 pounds.................. 0.17 0.55 0.41
LTVs >= 3,870 pounds................. -1.90 -0.62 -0.73
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II-27--Fatality Increase (%) per 100-Pound Mass Reduction While
Holding Footprint Constant
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA NHTSA
(2010) (2012)
(percent) (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lighter cars.................................... 2.21 1.56
Heavier cars.................................... 0.90 0.51
Lighter LTVs.................................... 0.17* 0.52
Heavier LTVs.................................... -1.90* -0.34
CUV/minivan..................................... .......... -0.37
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Includes CUV/minivan
The new results are directionally similar to the 2010 results:
Fatality increase in the lighter cars, safety benefit in the heavier
LTVs. But the effects may have become weaker at both ends. (NHTSA does
not consider this conclusion to be definitive because of the relatively
wide confidence bounds of the estimates.) The fatality increase in the
lighter cars tapered off from 2.21 percent to 1.56 percent while the
societal fatality-reduction benefit of mass reduction in the heaviest
LTVs diminished from 1.90 percent to 0.34 percent and is no longer
statistically significant.
The agencies believe that the changes may be due to a combination
of the characteristics of newer vehicles and revisions to the analysis.
NHTSA believes, above all, that several light, small car models with
poor safety performance were discontinued by 2000 or during MYs 2000-
2007. Also, the tendency of light, small vehicles to be driven in a
manner that results in high crash rates is not as strong as it used to
be.\343\ Both agencies believe that at the other end of the weight/size
spectrum, blocker beams and other voluntary compatibility improvements
in LTVs, as well as compatibility-related self-protection improvements
to cars, have made the heavier LTVs less aggressive in collisions with
lighter vehicles (although the effect of mass disparity remains). This
report's analysis of CUVs and minivans as a separate class of vehicles
may have relieved some inaccuracies in the 2010 regression results for
LTVs. Interestingly, the new actual-regression results are quite close
to the previous report's ``lower-estimate scenario,'' which was an
attempt to adjust for supposed inaccuracies in some regressions and for
a seemingly excessive trend toward higher crash rates in smaller and
lighter cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\ Kahane (2012), pp. 30-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The principal difference between the heavier vehicles, especially
truck-based LTVs, and the lighter vehicles, especially passenger cars,
is that mass reduction has a different effect depending on whether the
crash partner is another car or LTV (34 percent of fatalities occurred
in crashes involving two light-duty vehicles, and another 6 percent
occurred in crashes involving a light-duty vehicle and a heavy-duty
vehicle) When two vehicles of unequal mass collide, the delta V is
higher in the lighter vehicle, in the same proportion as the mass
ratio. As a result, the fatality risk is also higher. Removing some
mass from the heavy vehicle reduces delta V in the lighter vehicle,
where fatality risk is higher, resulting in a large benefit, offset by
a small penalty because delta V increases in the heavy vehicle, where
fatality risk is low--adding up to a net societal benefit. Removing
some mass from the lighter vehicle results in a large penalty offset by
a small benefit--adding up to net harm. These considerations drive the
overall result: Fatality increase in the lighter cars, reduction in the
heavier LTVs, and little effect in the intermediate groups. However, in
some types of crashes, especially first-event rollovers and impacts
with fixed objects (which, combined, accounted for 23 percent of
fatalities), mass reduction is usually not harmful and often
beneficial, because the lighter vehicles respond more quickly to
braking and steering. Offsetting this beneficial, is the continuing
historical tendency of lighter and smaller vehicles to be driven less
well--although it continues to be unknown why that is so, and to what
extent, if any, the lightness or smallness of the vehicle contributes
to people driving it less safely.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\ Ibid., pp. 27-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The estimates in Table II-25 of the model are formulated for each
100-pound reduction in mass; in other words, if risk increases by 1
percent for 100 pounds reduction in mass, it would increase by 2
percent for a 200-pound reduction, and 3 percent for a 300-pound
reduction (more exactly, 2.01 percent and 3.03 percent, because the
effects work like compound interest). Confidence bounds around the
point estimates will grow wider by the same proportions.
The regression results are best suited to predict the effect of a
small change in mass, leaving all other factors, including footprint,
the same. With each additional change from the current environment, the
model may become somewhat less accurate and it is difficult to assess
the sensitivity to additional mass reduction greater than 100 pounds.
The agencies recognize that the light-duty vehicle fleet in the MYs
2017-2025 timeframe will be different from the MYs 2000-2007 fleet
analyzed for this study. Nevertheless, one consideration provides some
basis for confidence in applying the regression results to estimate the
effects of mass reductions larger than 100 pounds or over longer time
periods. This is NHTSA's fourth evaluation of the effects of mass
reduction and/or downsizing, comprising databases ranging from MYs 1985
to 2007. The results of the four studies are not identical, but they
have been consistent up to a point. During this time period, many makes
and models have increased substantially in mass, sometimes as much as
30-40 percent.\345\ If the statistical analysis has, over the past
years, been able to accommodate mass increases of this magnitude,
perhaps it will also succeed in modeling the effects of mass reductions
on the order of 10-20 percent, if they occur in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\345\ For example, one of the most popular models of small 4-
door sedans increased in curb weight from 1,939 pounds in MY 1985 to
2,766 pounds in MY 2007, a 43 percent increase. A high-sales mid-
size sedan grew from 2,385 to 3,354 pounds (41%); a best-selling
pickup truck from 3,390 to 4,742 pounds (40%) in the basic model
with 2-door cab and rear-wheel drive; and a popular minivan from
2,940 to 3,862 pounds (31%).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA's 2011 preliminary report acknowledged another source of
uncertainty, namely that the baseline statistical model can be varied
by choosing different control variables or redefining the vehicle
classes or crash types, for example. Alternative models produce
different point estimates.
[[Page 62749]]
NHTSA believed it was premature to address that in the preliminary
report. ``The potential for variation will perhaps be better understood
after the public and other agencies have had an opportunity to work
with the new database.'' \346\ Indeed, the principal comments on the
2011 preliminary report were suggestions or demonstrations of other
ways to analyze NHTSA's database, especially by Farmer and Green in
their peer reviews, Van Auken (DRI) in his most recent analyses, and
Wenzel in his assessment of NHTSA's report. The analyses and findings
of Wenzel's and Van Auken's reports are summarized in Sections
II.G.3.e, II.G.3.f, and II.G.3.g, below. These reports, among other
analyses, define and run specific alternative regression models to
analyze NHTSA's 2011 or 2012 databases.\347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\ Kahane (2011), p. 81.
\347\ Wenzel (2012a), Van Auken and Zellner (2012b, 2012c,
2012d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From these suggestions and demonstrations, NHTSA garnered 11 more
or less plausible alternative techniques that could be construed as
sensitivity tests of the baseline model.\348\ The models use NHTSA's
databases and regression-analysis approach, but differ from the
baseline model in one or more terms or assumptions. All of them try to
control for fundamentally the same driver, vehicle, and crash factors,
but differ in how they define these factors or how much detail or
emphasis they provide for some of them. NHTSA applied the 11 techniques
to the latest databases to generate alternative estimates of the
societal effect of 100-pound mass reductions in the five classes of
vehicles. The range of estimates produced by the sensitivity tests
gives an idea of the uncertainty inherent in the formulation of the
models, subject to the caveat that these 11 tests are, of course, not
an exhaustive list of conceivable alternatives. Below are the baseline
and alternative results, ordered from the lowest to the highest
estimated increase in societal risk for cars weighing less than 3,106
pounds:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\348\ See Kahane (2012), pp. 14-16 and 109-128 for a further
discussion of the alternative models and the rationales behind them.
Table II-28--Societal Fatality Increase (%) per 100-Pound Mass Reduction While Holding Footprint * Constant
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CUVs & LTVs [dagger] LTVs [dagger]
Cars < 3,106 Cars >= 3,106 minivans < 4,594 >= 4,594
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline estimate............... 1.56 .51 - .37 .52 - .34
95% confidence bounds (sampling
error):
Lower....................... .39 - .59 - 1.55 - .45 - .97
Upper....................... 2.73 1.60 .81 1.48 .30
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Alternative Models
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Track width/wheelbase w. .25 - .89 - .13 - .09 - .97
stopped veh data...............
2. With stopped -vehicle State .97 - .62 - .33 .35 - .80
data...........................
3. By track width & wheelbase... .97 .24 - .24 - .07 - .58
4. W/O CY control variables..... 1.53 .43 .04 1.20 .30
5. CUVs/minivans weighted by 1.56 .51 .53 .52 - .35
2010 sales.....................
6. W/O non - significant control 1.64 .68 - .46 .35 - .54
variables......................
7. Incl. muscle/police/AWD cars/ 1.81 .49 - .37 .49 - .76
big vans.......................
8. Control for vehicle 1.91 .75 1.64 .68 - .13
manufacturer...................
9. Control for veh manufacturer/ 2.07 1.82 1.31 .66 - .13
nameplate......................
10. Limited to drivers with 2.32 1.06 - .19 .86 - .58
BAC=0..........................
11. Limited to good drivers 3.00 1.62 -.00 1.09 - .30
[Dagger].......................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* While holding track width and wheelbase constant in alternative model nos. 1 and 3.
[dagger] Excluding CUVs and minivans.
[Dagger] Blood alcohol content = 0, no drugs, valid license, at most 1 crash and 1 violation during the past 3
years.
For example, in cars weighing less than 3,106 pounds, the baseline
estimate associates 100minus;pound mass reduction, while holding
footprint constant, with a 1.56 percent increase in societal fatality
risk. The corresponding estimates for the 11 sensitivity tests range
from a 0.25 to a 3.00 percent increase. The sensitivity tests
illustrate both the fragility and the robustness of the baseline
estimate. On the one hand, the variation among the alternative
estimates is quite large relative to the baseline estimate: In the
preceding example of cars < 3,106 pounds, from almost zero to almost
double the baseline. In fact, the difference in estimates is a
reflection of the small statistical effect that mass reduction has on
societal risk, relative to other factors. Thus, sensitivity tests which
vary vehicle, driver, and crash factors can appreciably change the
estimate of the effect of mass reduction on societal risk in relative
terms.
On the other hand, the variations are not all that large in
absolute terms. The ranges of the alternative estimates, at least these
alternatives, are about as wide as the sampling-error confidence bounds
for the baseline estimates. As a general rule, in the alternative
models, as in the baseline models, mass reduction tends to be
relatively more harmful in the lighter vehicles, and more beneficial in
the heavier vehicles. Thus, in all models, the estimated effect of mass
reduction is a societal fatality increase (not necessarily a
statistically significant increase) for cars < 3,106 pounds, and in all
models except one, a societal fatality reduction for LTVs >= 4,594
pounds. None of these models suggest mass reduction in small cars would
be beneficial. All suggest mass reduction in heavy LTVs would be
beneficial or, at least, close to neutral. In general, any judicious
combination of mass reductions that maintain footprint and are
proportionately higher in the heavier vehicles is unlikely to have a
societal effect large enough to be detected by statistical analyses of
crash data. NHTSA has conducted a sensitivity analysis to estimate the
fatality impact of the alternative models using the coefficients for
these 11 test
[[Page 62750]]
cases. The results for these sensitivity runs can be found in Table IX-
6 of NHTSA's FRIA.
Four additional comments on NHTSA's 2011 report are addressed in
the 2012 report. ICCT noted that DRI's latest analyses are two-stage
analyses that subdivide the effect of mass reduction into a fatalities-
per-crash component (called ``effect on crashworthiness'') and a
crashes-per-VMT component (called ``effect on crash avoidance''). ICCT
believes it counterintuitive that DRI's two-stage analysis using the
same independent variables as NHTSA's basic model shows mass reduction
harms ``crash avoidance''; thus, ICCT prefers DRI's alternative models
(using different independent variables) that do not show mass reduction
harming crash avoidance. NHTSA's response is that DRI's estimates of
separate fatalities-per-crash and crashes-per-VMT components appear to
be valid, but, in NHTSA's opinion, these components do not necessarily
correspond to the intuitive concepts of ``crashworthiness'' and ``crash
avoidance.'' Specifically, the fatalities-per-crash component is
affected not only by the crashworthiness of the vehicles, but also by
how severe their crashes are: a crash-avoidance issue. Farmer
recommended that, in the analyses of crashes between two light
vehicles, NHTSA estimate the effect of mass reduction in the case
vehicle separately for the occupants of that vehicle and for the
occupants of the other vehicle. The analysis shows that mass reduction
consistently and substantially increases risk for the vehicle's own
occupants and substantially lowers it for the occupants of the partner
vehicle. Several commenters suggested that NHTSA consider logistic
ridge regression as a tool for addressing multicollinearity; NHTSA was
unable to acquire software for logistic ridge regression now, but will
attempt to acquire it for future analyses. Lie requested--and NHTSA
added--a comparison of the estimated safety effects of mass reduction
to the effects of safety technologies and the differences in risk
between vehicles with good and poor test ratings.
e. Report by Tom Wenzel, LBNL, ``An Assessment of NHTSA's Report
`Relationships Between Fatality Risk, Mass, and Footprint in Model Year
2000-2007 Passenger Cars and LTVs' '', 2011
DOE contracted with Tom Wenzel of Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory to conduct an assessment of NHTSA's updated 2011 study of
the effect of mass and footprint reductions on U.S. fatality risk per
vehicle miles traveled (LBNL Phase 1 report), and to provide an
analysis of the effect of mass and footprint reduction on casualty risk
per police-reported crash, using independent data from thirteen states
(LBNL Phase 2 report). Both reports have been reviewed by NHTSA, EPA,
and DOE staff, as well as by a panel of reviewers.\349\ The final
versions of the reports reflect responses to comments made in the
formal review process, as well as changes made to the VMT weights
developed by NHTSA for the final rule, and inclusion of 2008 data for
six states that were not available for the analyses in the draft final
versions included in the NPRM docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\ EPA sponsored the peer review of the LBNL Phase 1 and 2
Reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The LBNL Phase 1 report replicates Kahane's analysis for NHTSA,
using the same data and methods, and in many cases using the same SAS
programs, in order to confirm NHTSA's results. The LBNL report confirms
NHTSA's 2012 finding that mass reduction is associated with a
statistically significant 1.55% increase in fatality risk per vehicle
miles travelled (VMT) for cars weighing less than 3,106 pounds; for
other vehicle types, mass reduction is associated with a smaller
increase, or even a small decrease, in risk. Wenzel tested the
sensitivity of these estimates to changes in the measure of risk and
the control variables and data used in the regression models. Wenzel
also concluded that there is a wide range in fatality risk by vehicle
model for models that have comparable mass or footprint, even after
accounting for differences in drivers' age and gender, safety features
installed, and crash times and locations. This section summarizes the
results of the Wenzel assessment of the most recent NHTSA analysis.
The LBNL Phase 1 report notes that many of the control variables
NHTSA includes in its logistic regressions are statistically
significant, and have a much larger estimated effect on fatality risk
than vehicle mass. For example, installing torso side airbags,
electronic stability control, or an automated braking system in a car
is estimated to reduce fatality risk by about 10%; cars driven by men
are estimated to have a 40% higher fatality risk than cars driven by
women; and cars driven at night, on rural roads, or on roads with a
speed limit higher than 55 mph are estimated to have a fatality risk
over 100 times higher than cars driven during the daytime on low-speed
non-rural roads. While the estimated effect of mass reduction may
result in a statistically-significant increase in risk in certain
cases, the increase is small and is overwhelmed by other known vehicle,
driver, and crash factors.
NHTSA notes these findings are additional evidence that estimating
the effect of mass reduction is a complex statistical problem, given
the presence of other factors that have large effects. The findings do
not propose future technologies that could neutralize the potentially
deleterious effects of mass reduction. Indeed, the preceding examples
are limited to technologies emerging in the 2002-2008 timeframe of the
crash database but that will be in all model year 2017-2025 vehicles
(side airbags, electronic stability control) or factors that are simply
unchangeable circumstances in the crash environment outside the control
of CAFE or other vehicle regulations (for example, that about half of
the drivers are males and that much driving is at night or on rural
roads).
Sensitivity tests: LBNL tested the sensitivity of the NHTSA
estimates of the relationship between vehicle weight and risk using 19
different regression analyses that changed the measure of risk, the
control variables used, or the data used in the regression models.
Table II-29--Societal Fatality Increase (%) per 100-Pound Mass Reduction While Holding Footprint * Constant From
Wenzel Study
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LTVS[dagger]
Cars < 3,106 Cars >= 3,106 CUVS & LTVS[dagger] >= 4,594
minivans < 4,594
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline estimate............... 1.55 0.51 -0.38 0.52 -0.34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62751]]
19 Alternative Models
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Weighted by current 1.27 0.37 -0.70 0.42 -0.36
distribution of fatalities.....
2. Single regression model for 1.26 0.35 -0.74 0.41 -0.42
all crash types................
3. Excluding footprint (allowing 2.74 1.95 0.60 0.47 -0.39
footprint to vary with mass)...
4. Fatal crashes per VMT........ 1.95 0.89 -0.47 0.54 -0.42
5. Fatalities per induced -0.22 -1.45 -0.84 -1.13 -0.76
exposure crash.................
6. Fatalities per registered 0.93 2.40 -0.40 -0.09 -0.76
vehicle-year...................
7. Accounting for vehicle 1.90 0.75 1.62 0.59 -0.11
manufacturer...................
8. Accounting for vehicle 2.04 1.80 1.28 0.57 -0.11
manufacturer plus five luxury
brands.........................
9. Accounting for initial 1.42 0.84 -0.92 0.45 -0.52
vehicle purchase price.........
10. Excluding CY variables...... 1.52 0.43 0.03 1.20 0.30
11. Excluding crashes with 1.88 0.88 -0.16 0.78 -0.35
alcohol/drugs..................
12. Excluding crashes with 2.32 1.19 -0.01 1.01 -0.11
alcohol/drugs or bad drivers...
13. Accounting for median 1.20 0.16 -0.44 0.68 -0.30
household income...............
14. Including sports, squad, AWD 1.79 0.49 -0.38 0.49 -0.77
cars and fullsize vans.........
15. Stopped instead of non- 0.97 -0.63 -0.33 0.35 -0.80
culpable vehicles for induced
exposure.......................
16. Including track width and 0.95 0.24 -0.25 -0.07 -0.58
wheelbase instead of footprint.
17. Using stopped vehicles and 0.26 -0.90 -0.14 -0.10 -0.97
track width/wheelbase..........
18. Reweighting CUVs and 1.55 0.51 0.55 0.52 -0.34
minivans by 2010 sales.........
19. Excluding non-significant 1.63 0.69 -0.46 0.35 -0.54
control variables..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* While holding track width and wheelbase constant in alternative model nos. 1 and 3.
[dagger] Excluding CUVs and minivans.
For all five vehicle types, the range in estimates from the
nineteen alternative models spanned zero, with the individual estimated
effects of a 100-pound mass reduction in Table II-28 ranging from a
1.45 percent fatality reduction (cars >= 3,106 pounds, alternative 5)
up to an increase in risk of 2.74 percent (cars < 3,106 pounds,
alternative 3). Nevertheless, for cars weighing less than 3,106 pounds,
only one of the 19 alternative regressions estimated a reduction rather
than an increase in U.S. fatality risk: Alternative 5, where risk was
defined as fatalities per induced exposure crash (rather than
fatalities per VMT). Whereas for LTVs >= 4,594 pounds, only one of the
19 alternatives estimated an increase in fatality risk, namely the
model without CY variables (alternative 10).
NHTSA notes that all of these models suggest mass reduction in
small cars would be harmful or, at best, close to neutral; all suggest
mass reduction in heavy LTVs would be beneficial or, at worst, close to
neutral. The range on these 19 sensitivity tests is similar to the
range in the 11 tests included in the Kahane write-up.
Multicollinearity issues (from LBNL study): Using two or more
variables that are strongly correlated in the same regression model
(referred to as multicollinearity) can lead to inaccurate results.
However, the correlation between vehicle mass and footprint may not be
strong enough to cause serious concern. The Pearson correlation
coefficient r between vehicle mass and footprint ranges from 0.90 for
four-door sedans and SUVs, to just under 0.50 for minivans. The
variance inflation factor (VIF) is a more formal measure of
multicollinearity of variables included in a regression model. Allison
\350\ ``begins to get concerned'' with VIF values greater than 2.5,
while Menard \351\ suggests that a VIF greater than 5 is a ``cause for
concern'', while a VIF greater than 10 ``almost certainly indicates a
serious collinearity problem''; however, O'Brien \352\ suggests that
``values of VIF of 10, 20, 40 or even higher do not, by themselves,
discount the results of regression analyses.'' When both weight and
footprint are included in the regression models, the VIF associated
with weight exceeds 5 for four-door cars, small pickups, SUVs, and
CUVs, and exceeds 2.5 for two-door cars and large pickups; the VIF
associated with weight is only 2.1 for minivans. NHTSA included several
analyses to address possible effects of the near-multicollinearity
between mass and footprint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\350\ Allison, P.D.. Logistic Regression Using SAS, Theory and
Application. SAS Institute Inc., Cary NC, 1999.
\351\ Menard, S. Applied Logistic Regression Analysis, Second
Edition. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA 2002.
\352\ O'Brien, R.M. ``A Caution Regarding Rules of Thumb for
Variance Inflation Factors,'' Quality and Quantity, (41) 673-690,
2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, NHTSA ran a sensitivity case where footprint is not held
constant, but rather allowed to vary as mass varies (i.e., NHTSA ran a
regression model which includes mass but not footprint.\353\ If the
multicollinearity was so great that including both variables in the
same model gave misleading results, removing footprint from the model
would give much different results than keeping it in the model. NHTSA's
sensitivity test estimates that when footprint is allowed to vary with
mass, the effect of mass reduction on risk increases from 1.55% to
2.74% for cars weighing less than 3,106 pounds, from a non-significant
0.51% to a statistically-significant 1.95% for cars weighing more than
3,106 pounds, and from a non-significant 0.38% decrease to a
statistically-significant 0.60% increase in risk for CUVs and minivans;
however, the effect of mass reduction on light trucks is unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\ Kahane (2012), pp. 93-94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, NHTSA conducted a stratification analysis of the effect of
mass reduction on risk by dividing vehicles into deciles based on their
footprint, and running a separate regression model for each vehicle and
crash type, for each footprint decile (3 vehicle types times 9 crash
types times
[[Page 62752]]
10 deciles equals 270 regressions).\354\ This analysis estimates the
effect of mass reduction on risk separately for vehicles with similar
footprint. The analysis indicates that reducing vehicle mass does not
consistently increase risk across all footprint deciles for any
combination of vehicle type and crash type. Risk increases with
decreasing mass in a majority of footprint deciles for 12 of the 27
crash and vehicle combinations, but few of these increases are
statistically significant. On the other hand, risk decreases with
decreasing mass in a majority of footprint deciles for 5 of the 27
crash and vehicle combinations; in some cases these risk reductions are
large and statistically significant.\355\ If reducing vehicle mass
while maintaining footprint inherently leads to an increase in risk,
the coefficients on mass reduction should be more consistently
positive, and with a larger R\2\, across the 27 vehicle/crash
combinations, than shown in the analysis. These findings are consistent
with the conclusion of the basic regression analyses; namely, that the
effect of mass reduction while holding footprint constant, if any, is
small.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\ Ibid., pp. 73-78.
\355\ And in 10 of the 27 crash and vehicle combinations, risk
increased in 5 deciles and decreased in 5 deciles with decreasing
vehicle mass.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One limitation of using logistic regression to estimate the effect
of mass reduction on risk is that a standard statistic to measure the
extent to which the variables in the model explain the range in risk,
equivalent to the R\2\ statistic in a linear regression model, does not
exist. (SAS does generate a pseudo-R\2\ value for logistic regression
models; in almost all of the NHTSA regression models this value is less
than 0.10). For this reason LBNL conducted an analysis of risk versus
mass by vehicle model. LBNL used the results of the NHTSA logistic
regression model to predict the number of fatalities expected after
accounting for all vehicle, driver, and crash variables included in the
NHTSA regression model except for vehicle weight and footprint. LBNL
then plotted expected fatality risk per VMT by vehicle model against
the mass of each model, and analyzed the change in risk as mass
increases, as well as how much of the change in risk was explained by
all of the variables included in the model.
The analysis indicates that, after accounting for all the control
variables except vehicle mass and footprint, risk does decrease as mass
increases; however, risk and mass are not strongly correlated, with the
R\2\ ranging from 0.32 for CUVs to less than 0.13 for all other vehicle
types (as shown in Figure II-2). This means that, on average, risk
decreases as mass increases, but the variation in risk among individual
vehicle models is stronger than the trend in risk from light to heavy
vehicles. For full-size (i.e. \3/4\- and 1-ton) pickups, societal risk
increases as mass increases, with an R\2\ of 0.45; this is consistent
with NHTSA's basic regression results for light trucks weighing more
than 4,594 pounds, with societal risk decreasing as mass decreases.
LBNL also examined the relationship between vehicle mass and residual
risk, that is, the remaining unexplained risk after accounting for all
other vehicle, driver and crash variables, and found similarly poor
correlations. This implies that the remaining factors not included in
the regression model that account for the observed range in risk by
vehicle model also are not correlated with mass. (LBNL found similar
results when the analysis compared risk to vehicle footprint.)
Figure II-2 indicates that some vehicles on the road today have the
same, or lower, fatality risk than models that weigh substantially
more, and are substantially larger in terms of footprint. After
accounting for differences in driver age and gender, safety features
installed, and crash times and locations, there are numerous examples
of different models with similar weight and footprint yet widely
varying fatality risk. The variation of fatality risk among individual
models may reflect differences in vehicle design, differences in the
drivers who choose such vehicles (beyond what can be explained by
demographic variables such as age and gender), and statistical
variation of fatality rates based on limited data for individual
models.
The figure shows that when the data are aggregated at the make-
model level, the combination of differences in vehicle design, vehicle
selection, and statistical variations has more influence than mass on
fatality rates. The figure perhaps also suggests that, to the extent
these variations in fatality rates are due to differences in vehicle
design rather than vehicle selection or statistical variations, there
is potential for lowering fatality rates through improved vehicle
design. This is consistent with NHTSA's opinion that some of the
changes in its regression results between the 2003 study and the 2011
study are due to the redesign or removal of certain smaller and lighter
models of poor design.
[[Page 62753]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.009
f. Report by Tom Wenzel, LBNL, ``An Analysis of the Relationship
Between Casualty Risk per Crash and Vehicle Mass and Footprint for
Model Year 2000-2007 Light-Duty Vehicles'', 2012 (LBNL Phase 2 Report)
LBNL compared the logistic regression results of NHTSA's analysis
of U.S. fatality risk per VMT, replicated in the LBNL Phase 1 report,
with an independent analysis of 13-state fatality risk and casualty
risk per crash (LBNL Phase 2 report). The LBNL Phase 2 analysis differs
from the NHTSA analysis in two respects: first, it analyzes risk per
crash, using data on all police-reported crashes from thirteen states,
rather than risk per estimated VMT; and second, it analyzes casualty
(fatality plus serious injury) risk, as opposed to just fatality risk.
There are several good reasons to investigate the effect of mass and
footprint reduction on casualty risk per crash. First, risk per VMT
includes two components that influence whether a person is killed or
seriously injured in a crash: how well a vehicle can be (based on its
handling, acceleration, and braking capabilities), or actually is,
driven to avoid being involved in a serious crash (crash avoidance),
and, once a serious crash has occurred, how well a vehicle protects its
occupants from fatality or serious injury (crashworthiness) as well as
the occupants of any crash partner (compatibility). By encompassing
both of these aspects of vehicle design, risk per VMT gives a complete
picture of how vehicle design can promote, or reduce, road user safety.
On the other hand, risk per crash isolates the second of these two
safety effects, crashworthiness/compatibility, by examining the
relationship between mass or footprint and how well a vehicle protects
its occupants and others once a crash occurs.
Second, estimating risk on a per crash basis only requires using
data on police-reported crashes from states, and does not require
combining them with data from other sources, such as vehicle
registration data and VMT information, as in NHTSA's 2012 analysis.
Only 16 states currently record the vehicle identification number of
vehicles involved in police-reported crashes, which is necessary to
determine vehicle characteristics, and only 13 states also report the
posted speed limit of the roadway on which the crash occurred. Given
the limited number of fatality cases in 13 States, extending the
analysis to casualties (fatalities plus serious/incapacitating
injuries; i.e., level ``K'' and ``A'' injuries in police reports, a
substantially larger number of cases than fatalities alone) reduces the
statistical uncertainty of the results. Finally, a serious
incapacitating injury can be just as traumatic to the victim and his or
her family, and costly from an economic perspective, as a fatality.
Limiting the analysis to the risk of fatality, which is a relatively
rare event, ignores the effect vehicle design may have on reducing the
large number of incapacitating injuries that occur each year on the
nation's roadways. All risks in the report are societal risk, including
fatalities and serious injuries in the case vehicle and any crash
partners, and include not only driver but passenger casualties as well
as non-occupant casualties such as pedestrians.
NHTSA notes that casualty severity is identified by public safety
officers at the crash scene prior to examination by medical
professionals, and therefore reported casualty severity will inherently
have a degree of subjectivity.\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\ NHTSA notes that police-reported ``A'' injuries do not
necessarily correspond to life-threatening or seriously disabling
injuries as defined by medical professionals. In 2000-2008 CDS data,
59% of the injuries that were coded ``A'' injuries were in fact
medically minor (AIS 0-1), while 39% of serious (AIS 3) and 27% of
life-threatening (AIS 4-5) injuries are not coded ``A.'' NHTSA does
not include serious casualties in its analysis of the effects of
vehicle mass and size on societal safety because of these
inaccuracies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62754]]
The LBNL Phase 2 report estimates that mass reduction increases
crash frequency (columns B and E) in all five vehicle types, with
larger estimated increases in lighter-than-average cars and light-duty
trucks. As a result, mass reduction is estimated to have a more
beneficial effect on casualty risk per crash (column F) than on
casualty risk per VMT (column G), and on fatality risk per crash
(column C) than on fatality risk per VMT (column D). Mass reduction is
associated with decreases in casualty risk per crash (column F) in all
vehicles except cars weighing less than 3,106 pounds; in two of the
four cases these estimated reductions are statistically significant,
albeit small. For cars and light trucks, lower mass is associated with
a more beneficial effect on fatality risk per crash (column C) than on
casualty risk per crash (column F); for CUVs/minivans we estimate the
opposite: lower mass is associated with a more beneficial effect on
casualty risk than fatality risk per crash.
Table II-30--Estimated Effect of Mass or Footprint Reduction on two Components of 13-State Fatality and Casualty Risk per VMT: Crash Frequency (Crashes
per VMT) and Crashworthiness/Compatibility (Risk per Crash)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. NHTSA
U.S. B. 13-state C. 13-state D. 13-state E. 13-state F. 13-state G. 13-state
Variable Case vehicle type fatalities crashes per fatalities fatalities crashes per casualties casualties
per VMT VMT per crash per VMT VMT per crash per VMT
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mass Reduction...................... Cars < 3106 lbs........ 1.55 * 2.00 -0.54 1.42 2.00 0.09 1.86
Cars > 3106 lbs........ 0.51 1.50 -2.39 -1.07 1.50 -0.77 0.73
LTs < 4594 lbs......... 0.52 1.44 -1.61 -0.13 1.44 -0.11 1.55
LTs > 4594 lbs......... -0.34 0.94 -1.25 -0.34 0.94 -0.62 -0.04
CUV/minivan............ -0.38 0.95 0.98 1.60 0.95 -0.16 0.10
Footprint Reduction................. Cars................... 1.87 0.64 0.92 2.11 0.64 0.23 1.54
LTs.................... -0.07 1.04 0.48 1.64 1.04 -0.25 0.94
CUV/minivan............ 1.72 -0.55 -1.67 -1.24 -0.55 0.56 1.54
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Based on NHTSA's estimation of uncertainty using a jack-knife method, only mass reduction in cars less than 3,106 pounds has a statistically
significant effect on U.S. fatality risk.
Estimates that are statistically significant at the 95% level are shown in italics.
It is unclear why lower vehicle mass is associated with higher
crash frequency, but lower risk per crash, in the regression models. It
is possible that including variables that more accurately account for
important differences among vehicles and driver behavior would reverse
this relationship. For example, adding vehicle purchase price as a
control variable reduces the estimated increase in crash frequency as
vehicle mass decreases, for all five vehicle types; in the case of cars
weighing more than 3,106 pounds, controlling for purchase price even
reverses the sign of the relationship: mass reduction is estimated to
slightly decrease crash frequency.\357\ It also appears that, in model
year 2000-2007 vehicles, the effect of mass reduction on casualties per
crash is simply very small, if any (estimated effects in Table II-30,
column F are under 1% per 100-pound reduction in all five vehicle
groups).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\357\ Wenzel (2012b), pp. 59-60, especially Figure 4-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The association of mass reduction with 13-state casualty risk per
VMT (column G) is quite consistent with that NHTSA estimated for U.S.
fatality risk per VMT in its 2012 report (column A), although LBNL
estimated the effects on casualty risk to be more detrimental than the
effects on fatality risk, for all vehicle types. In contrast with
NHTSA's estimates of U.S. fatality risk per VMT (column A), mass
reduction is estimated to reduce casualty risk per crash (column F) for
four of the five vehicle types, with two of these four reductions
estimated to be statistically significant. Mass reduction is associated
with a small but insignificant increase in casualty risk per crash for
cars weighing less than 3,106 pounds.
As in the LBNL Phase 1 study, replicating NHTSA methodology, many
of the control variables included in the logistic regressions are
statistically significant, and have a large effect on fatality or
casualty risk per crash, in some cases one to two orders of magnitude
larger than those estimated for mass or footprint reduction. However,
the estimated effect of these variables on risk per crash is not as
large as their estimated effect on fatality risk per VMT. LBNL
concludes that the estimated effect of mass reduction on casualty risk
per crash is small and is overwhelmed by other known vehicle, driver,
and crash factors.
NHTSA notes that to estimate the effect of mass reduction on safety
requires careful examination of how to model the covariant effects of
vehicle, driver, and crash factors.
LBNL states that regarding the control variables, there are several
results that, at first glance, would not be expected: side airbags in
light trucks and CUVs/minivans are estimated to reduce crash frequency;
ESC and ABS, crash avoidance technologies, are estimated to reduce risk
once a crash has occurred; and AWD and brand new vehicles are estimated
to increase risk once a crash has occurred. In addition, male drivers
are estimated to have essentially no effect on crash frequency, but are
associated with a statistically significant increase in fatality risk
once a crash occurs. And driving at night, on high-speed or rural
roads, are associated with higher increases in risk per crash than on
crash frequency. A possible explanation for these unexpected results is
that important control variables are not being included in the
regression models. For example, crashes involving male drivers, in
vehicles equipped with AWD, or that occur at night on rural or high-
speed roads, may not be more frequent but rather more severe than other
crashes, and thus lead to greater fatality or casualty risk. And
drivers who select vehicles with certain safety features may tend to
drive more carefully, resulting in vehicle safety features designed to
improve
[[Page 62755]]
crashworthiness or compatibility, such as side airbags, being also
associated with lower crash frequency.
As with NHTSA's analysis of fatality risk per VMT, lower mass is
not consistently associated with increased casualty risk per crash
across all footprint deciles for any combination of vehicle type and
crash type. Lower mass is associated with increased casualty risk per
crash in a majority of footprint deciles for 9 of the 27 crash and
vehicle combinations, but few of these increases are statistically
significant. On the other hand, lower mass is associated with decreased
risk in a majority of footprint deciles for 12 of the 27 crash and
vehicle combinations.
The correlation between mass and the casualty risk per crash by
vehicle model is very low, after accounting for all of the control
variables in the logistic regression model except for vehicle mass and
footprint. Furthermore, when casualty rates are aggregated at the make-
model level, there is no significant correlation between the residual,
unexplained risk and vehicle weight. Even after accounting for many
vehicle, driver, and crash factors, the variation in casualty risk per
crash by vehicle model is quite large and unrelated to vehicle weight.
That parallels the LBNL Phase 1 report, which found similar variation
in fatality rates per VMT at the make-model level. The variations among
individual models may reflect differences in vehicle design,
differences in the drivers who choose such vehicles, and statistical
variation due to the limited data for individual models. To the extent
the variations are due to differences in vehicle design rather than
vehicle selection or statistical variations, there is potential for
lowering fatality or casualty rates through improved vehicle design. To
the extent that the variations are due to differences in what drivers
choose what vehicles, it is possible that including variables that
account for these factors in the regression models would change the
estimated relationship between mass or footprint and risk.
NHTSA notes that the statistical variation due to the limited data
for individual models is an additional source of uncertainty inherent
in the technique of aggregating the data by make and model, a technique
whose primary goal is not the estimation of the effect of mass
reduction on safety.
g. Reports by Van Auken & Zellner, DRI--``Updated Analysis of the
Effects of Passenger Vehicle Size and Weight on Safety,'' 2012
The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), the
Energy Foundation, and American Honda Motor Co. contracted Mike Van
Auken and John Zellner of Dynamic Research Institute (DRI) to conduct a
study to update the analysis of the effects of passenger vehicle size
and weight on safety, based on the newly released NHTSA 2011 database.
As noted earlier, DRI reports its study in three parts: Phase I,\358\
II,\359\ and Supplement.\360\ This study was not complete in time for
the NPRM, but was finished in time to be submitted to the docket as
part of ICCT's public comments. The study has not yet been peer
reviewed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\ Van Auken and Zellner (2012a).
\359\ Van Auken and Zellner (2012b), Van Auken and Zellner
(2012c).
\360\ Van Auken and Zellner (2012d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase I, which analyzed CY 1995-2000 fatalities in MY 1991-1999
vehicles to replicate the NHTSA 2003 and 2010 studies, has already been
discussed and responded to above. The purpose of Phase II was to extend
and refined the analytical methods used by DRI in the Phase I of this
program to the more recent model year and calendar year data used in
the Kahane (2011) analysis, in order to confirm the Kahane (2011)
results and to estimate the effects of vehicle weight and size
reduction on fatalities per 100 reported crash involvements and
reported crash involvements per VMT (which DRI calls, respectively,
``effect on crashworthiness/crash compatibility'' and ``effect on crash
avoidance'').
The Phase II study was accomplished by updating the regression
analysis tools to use the newer databases for 2000 through 2007 model
year light passenger vehicles in the 2002 through 2008 calendar years.
The fatal and induced exposure databases were compiled by NHTSA from
the U.S. DOT FARS database and accident data files from 13 U.S. States.
In addition, police reported accident data files were obtained from 10
states. These 10 states were a subset of the 13 induced-exposure data
states which NHTSA used. Data for the other three states were not
available to non-government researchers at the time of this analysis.
The main results of the DRI Phase II analyses are as follows:
The DRI one-stage analysis was able to reproduce NHTSA's
baseline results very closely. However, in these analyses, DRI, like
NHTSA, defines the induced-exposure cases to be the non-culpable
vehicles involved in two-vehicle crashes. Later, in its supplemental
report, DRI considers limiting the induced-exposure cases to stopped
vehicles.
The DRI two-stage analysis was able to replicate the DRI
and NHTSA one stage results.
The DRI Phase II two-stage results, which used more recent
data were directionally similar to the DRI Phase I two-stage results.
They showed an increase in reported crash involvements per VMT for
lighter and smaller vehicles, but reductions of fatalities per 100
reported crash involvements. The DRI results for crash avoidance are
also similar to those of Wenzel Phase 2 (2011b).
The two-stage results for passenger cars weighing less
than 3,106 pounds indicated that the increase in fatalities attributed
to mass reduction was due to an increase in the number of crashes per
exposure, more than offsetting a reduction in the number of fatalities
per crash. The underlying reasons for these offsetting effects are
unknown at this time, but could involve driver, vehicle, environment or
accident factors that have not been controlled for in the current
analyses. These results are similar to those obtained in Wenzel Phase 2
(2011b).
The overall results from DRI Phase II indicated very close
agreement between the DRI and NHTSA one-stage results using the same
methods and data. The results also indicate that the DRI one-stage and
two-stage results are similar but have some differences due to the
number of stages in the regression analysis. It may be possible to
reduce these differences in the future by updating the state accident
data for the 2008 calendar year, and adding ``internal control
variables.''
The DRI Supplemental report discusses in further detail two
previous key assumptions that were used in the Kahane (2011), Wenzel
(2011b), and DRI (2012b) reports, and describes two alternative
assumptions. The previous key assumptions were that the effects of
vehicle weight and size can be best modeled by curb weight and
footprint; and that the crash exposure is best represented by non-
culpable vehicle induced-exposure data. The alternative assumptions are
that the weight and size can be best modeled by curb weight, wheelbase,
and track width; and that the crash exposure is best represented by
stopped-vehicle induced-exposure data (because non-culpable vehicle
data may underrepresent vehicles and drivers that are better at
avoiding crashes, even if they would have been non-culpable in those
crashes). Some of the potential advantages and disadvantages of the
previous assumptions and these alternative assumptions are described in
the DRI supplemental report.
[[Page 62756]]
The results in the DRI Supplemental report indicate a range of
estimates for the effects of a 100 pound curb mass reduction based on
the type of induced-exposure data that is used and the candidate
vehicle weight and size model. These results indicate:
The estimated effects of mass reduction on fatalities are
not statistically significant for any vehicle category, if the
wheelbase and track model is used with the non-culpable vehicle
induced-exposure data. (This assumes the width of confidence bounds is
similar to those seen in the Kahane (2011) analyses.)
The estimated effects of mass reduction on fatalities
either result in a statistically significant decrease in fatalities
(for truck-based LTVs weighing 4,594 lbs or more), or are not
statistically significant (for all other vehicle categories), if the
stopped-vehicle induced-exposure data is used (irrespective of the two
candidate size models, e.g., the footprint model, or the wheelbase and
track width model).
The estimated effect of curb mass reduction for passenger
cars weighing less than 3,106 pounds is a statistically significant
increase in fatalities (when compared to the jackknife based confidence
intervals) only if the curb weight and footprint model is used with the
non-culpable vehicle induced-exposure data.
All other estimated effects of mass reduction on
fatalities are not statistically significant when compared to the
jackknife based confidence intervals.
In addition, the variance inflation factors are approximately the
same when modeling the independent effects of curb weight, wheelbase
and track width as when modeling curb weight and footprint, which
suggests there is no adverse effect for modeling with track width and
wheelbase in the context of potential overparameterization and
excessive multicollinearity. In addition, wheelbase and track width
would be expected to have separate, different, physics-based effects on
vehicle crash avoidance and crashworthiness/compatibility, which
effects are confounded when they are combined into a single variable,
footprint.
DRI further recommended that the final version of the Kahane (2011)
report include models based on curb weight, wheelbase and track width;
and also include results based on non-culpable stopped-vehicle induced-
exposure data as well as non-culpable vehicle induced-exposure. DRI
concludes that the latter could be addressed by averaging the estimates
from both the stopped-vehicle induce-exposure and the non-culpable
vehicle induced-exposure, and incorporate the range of estimates into
the reported uncertainty in the results (i.e., confidence intervals).
DRI also recommended that NHTSA provide the following additional
variables in the current publicly available induced-exposure dataset so
that other researchers can reproduce the sensitivity to the induced-
exposure definition:
An additional variable indicating whether each induced-
exposure vehicle was moving or stopped at the time of the initial
impact. This variable could then be used to derive a non-culpable
stopped-vehicle induced-exposure dataset from the non-culpable vehicle
induced-exposure dataset.
Add accident case identifiers to the induced-exposure
dataset that are suitable for linking to the original state accident
data files, but do not otherwise disclose any private information. This
would assist researchers with access to the original accident data in
better understanding the induced-exposure data.
As noted in the preceding discussion of the Kahane (2012) and
Wenzel (2012a) reports, NHTSA and LBNL have added models based on track
width and wheelbase and/or stopped-vehicle induced exposure to the
report. Table II-28 (test nos. 1, 2, and 3) and Table II-29 (tests nos.
15, 16, and 17) show results for those models. NHTSA has also made
available to the public an induced-exposure database limited to stopped
vehicles.
h. DOT Summary and Response to Recent Statistical Studies
The preceding sections reviewed three groups of reports issued in
2012 that estimated the effect of mass reduction on societal fatality
or casualty risk, based on statistical analyses of crash and exposure
data for model year 2000-2007 vehicles: NHTSA/Kahane's report and LBNL/
Wenzel's Phase 1 report analyze fatality rates per VMT. DRI/Van Auken's
reports likewise estimate the overall effect of mass reduction on
fatalities per VMT, but they also provide separate sub-estimates of the
effect on fatalities per 100 reported crash involvements and on
reported crash involvements per VMT (which Van Auken calls ``effect on
crashworthiness/compatibility'' and ``effect on crash avoidance'').
Wenzel's Phase 2 report analyzes casualty rates per VMT, including sub-
estimates of the effects on casualties per 100 crash involvements and
crashes per VMT. ``Casualties'' include fatalities and the highest
police-reported level of nonfatal injury (usually called level ``A'').
For the final regulatory analysis, like the preliminary analysis,
NHTSA and EPA rely on the coefficients in the NHTSA/Kahane study for
estimating the potential safety effects of the CAFE and GHG standards
for MYs 2017-2025. NHTSA takes this opportunity to summarize and
compare the reports and also explain why we continue to rely on the
results of our own study in projecting safety effects.
The important common feature of these 2012 reports is that they all
support the same principal conclusions--in NHTSA's words:
The societal effect of mass reduction while maintaining
footprint, if any, is small.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\ Kahane (2012), p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any judicious combination of mass reductions that maintain
footprint and are proportionately higher in the heavier vehicles is
[likely to be safety-neutral--i.e., it is] unlikely to have a societal
effect large enough to be detected by statistical analyses of crash
data.\362\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\362\ Ibid., p. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This greatly contrasts with the disagreement in 2004-2005, based on
earlier fatality databases, when DRI estimated a decrease of 1,518
fatalities per 100-pound mass reduction in all vehicles while
maintaining wheelbase and track width \363\ while NHTSA estimated a
1,118-fatality increase for downsizing all vehicles by 100 pounds (with
commensurate reductions in wheelbase and track width).\364\ In
comparison, the estimates from 11 sensitivity tests using the current
database only range from a 211-fatality reduction to an increase of
486, only 25 percent of the earlier range, and basically down to the
level of statistical uncertainty typically inherent in this type of
analysis.\365\ NHTSA believes two or possibly three conditions may have
contributed to the extensive convergence of the results. One is the
extensive dialogue and cooperation among researchers, including the
agreement to use NHTSA's database and discussions that led to
consistent definitions of control variables or shared analysis
techniques. The second is the real change in the new-vehicle fleet and
perhaps also in driving patterns over the
[[Page 62757]]
past decade, which appears to have attenuated some of the stronger
effects of mass reduction and footprint reduction. A third possible
factor is that multicollinearity may somehow have become less of an
issue with the new database and with the new technique of treating CUVs
and minivans as a separate class of vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\ Van Auken and Zellner (2005b), sum of 836 for passenger
cars (Table 2, p. 27) and 682 for LTVs (Table 5, p. 36).
\364\ Kahane, C.J. (2003), Vehicle Weight, Fatality Risk and
Crash Compatibility of Model Year 1991-99 Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks, NHTSA Technical Report. DOT HS 809 662. Washington, DC:
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809662.PDF. sum of 71 and 234 on p. ix, 216
and 597 on p. xi.
\365\ Kahane (2012), p. 113, scenario 3 in Table 4-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though the studies now agree more than they disagree, there
are still qualitative differences among the results. The baseline NHTSA
findings indicate a statistically significant fatality increase for
mass reduction in cars weighing less than 3,106 pounds. The NHTSA
results do not encourage mass reduction in the lightest cars, at least
for the foreseeable future, as long as so many heavy cars and LTVs
remain on the road. But DRI's two analyses substituting track width and
wheelbase for footprint or stopped-vehicle induced exposure for non-
culpable vehicles each reduce the estimate fatality-increasing effect
of mass reduction in lighter-than-average cars to a statistically non-
significant level, while the simultaneous application of both
techniques reduces the effect close to zero.
DRI suggests that track width and wheelbase have more intuitive
relationships with crash and fatality risk than footprint and do not
aggravate multicollinearity issues, as evidenced by variance inflation
factors; and that stopped-vehicle induced-exposure data may be
preferable because non-culpable vehicle data may underrepresent
vehicles and drivers that are good at avoiding crashes. NHTSA finds
DRI's argument plausible and has now included both techniques among the
sensitivity tests in its 2012 report. But these sensitivity tests have
not replaced NHTSA's baseline analysis. In the regressions for cars and
LTVs, wheelbase often did not have the expected relationships with risk
and added little information (In the regressions for CUVs and minivans,
it was track width that had little relationship with risk). Limiting
the induced-exposure data to stopped vehicles is a technique that
earlier peer reviewers criticized, eliminates 75 percent of the
induced-exposure cases (even more on high-speed roads), and may
underrepresent older drivers. Furthermore, Table II-28 shows that some
of the other sensitivity tests increase the fatality-increasing effect
of mass reduction in light cars to about the same extent that these
techniques diminish it. On the whole, NHTSA does not now see adequate
justification for mass reduction in light cars, but additional analysis
may be considered as the vehicle fleet changes.\366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\ Ibid., pp. 115-119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another analysis strategy of DRI and also of Wenzel's Phase 2
report is to obtain separate estimates of the effect of mass reduction
on fatalities [or casualties] per reported crash and reported crashes
per VMT, as well as the composite estimate of its effect on fatalities
per VMT. Van Auken and Wenzel both call the first estimate the ``effect
on crashworthiness/compatibility'' and the second, the ``effect on
crash avoidance.'' NHTSA believes the separate estimates are
computationally valid, but these names are inaccurate characterizations
that can lead to misunderstandings. For example, ICCT argues that the
relationship between mass reduction and crash avoidance observed in the
DRI and LBNL Phase 2 studies (i.e., that crash frequency increases as
mass decreases) is counterintuitive.\367\ NHTSA believes the metric of
fatalities per reported crash takes into account not just
crashworthiness but also certain important aspects of crash avoidance,
namely the severity of a crash. In addition, it could be influenced by
how often crashes are reported or not reported, which varies greatly
from State to State and depending on local circumstances. As Wenzel
notes, these analyses produced unexpected results, such as a reduction
in crash frequency with side air bags, or an increase in fatalities per
crash when the driver is male (when, in fact, males are less vulnerable
than females, given the same physical insult \368\) or when it is
nighttime. The fatality rates are higher for male drivers and at night
because the crashes are more severe, not primarily because of
crashworthiness issues. By the same token, the effect of mass reduction
on fatalities or casualties per crash need not be purely an effect on
``crashworthiness and compatibility'' but may also comprise some
aspects of crash avoidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\367\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, p. 10.
\368\ Evans, L. (1991). Traffic Safety and the Driver. New York:
Van Nostrand Reinhold, pp. 22-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wenzel's Phase 1 and Phase 2 reports show that when fatality or
casualty rates are aggregated at the make-model level, differences
between the models ``overwhelm'' the effect of mass. Likewise, in the
basic regression analyses, the effects of many control variables are
much stronger than the effect of mass. NHTSA does not dispute the
validity of these analyses or disagree with the findings, but they must
not be misinterpreted. Specifically, it would be wrong to conclude that
the effect of mass reduction should not be estimated at all because
other ambient effects are considerably stronger. Researchers must often
measure a weak effect in the presence of strong effects--for example:
Studying the light from faraway galaxies despite the presence of much
stronger light from nearby stars; evaluating a dietary additive based
on a sample of test subjects who vary greatly in age, weight, and
eating habits. Furthermore, the technique of aggregating the rates by
make-model, while useful for graphically depicting the effect of mass
relative to other factors, is no substitute for regression analyses on
the full database in terms of directly estimating the effects of mass
reduction on safety; at best, the analysis aggregated by make-model can
indirectly generate less precise estimates of these effects. NHTSA
believes the sensitivity tests in Table II-28 and Table II-29 are
useful for addressing the effects of other factors, since most of these
tests consist of alternative ways to quantify those factors. The tests
showed two consistent trends: almost all (18 of Wenzel's 19 and all 11
of Kahane's) estimated a fatality increase for mass reduction in cars
weighing less than 3,106 pounds and almost all (18 of Wenzel's and 10
of Kahane's) estimated a societal benefit if mass is reduced in the
LTVs weighing 4,594 pounds or more.
Wenzel's Phase 2 report on casualty risk introduces one more source
of data-driven uncertainty. To achieve adequate sample size, it must
rely on the injury data in State crash files, specifically the highest
reported level of nonfatal injury, usually called level ``A.'' But the
coding of injury in police-reported crash databases is usually not
based on medical records. ``A'' injuries do not necessarily correspond
to life-threatening or seriously disabling injuries as defined by
medical professionals. In 2000-2008 National Automotive Sampling System
data, 59% of ``A'' injuries were in fact medically minor (levels 0 or 1
on the Abbreviated Injury Scale, based on subsequently retrieved
medical records), while 39% of the serious (AIS 3) and 27% of life-
threatening (AIS 4-5) injuries were not coded ``A.'' Despite this,
Wenzel's composite results for casualties per VMT show about the same
effects for mass reduction as Kahane's analyses of fatalities per VMT--
e.g., in the lighter cars, the estimated effect of a 100-pound mass
reduction is slightly more detrimental for casualties per VMT (1.86%
increase\369\) than for fatalities
[[Page 62758]]
(1.56% increase \370\). NHTSA concurs with analyzing casualties per
VMT, but, given that so many of the ``A'' injuries are minor while
quite a few disabling injuries are not ``A,'' does not believe the
results are as critical as the fatality analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\369\ Wenzel (2012b), p. v, Table ES.1, column G.
\370\ Kahane (2012), p. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Based on this information, what do the Agencies consider to be
the current state of statistical research on vehicle mass and safety?
The agencies believe that statistical analysis of historical crash
data continues to be an informative and important tool in assessing the
potential safety impacts of the proposed standards. The effect of mass
reduction while maintaining footprint is a complicated topic and there
are open questions whether future vehicle designs will reduce the
historical correlation between weight and size. It is important to note
that while the updated database represents more current vehicles with
technologies more representative of vehicles on the road today, that
database cannot fully represent what vehicles will be on the road in
the MYs 2017-2025 timeframe. The vehicles manufactured in the 2000-2007
timeframe were not subject to footprint-based fuel economy standards.
As explained earlier, the agencies expect that the attribute-based
standards will likely facilitate the design of vehicles such that
manufacturers may reduce mass while maintaining footprint. Therefore,
it is possible that the analysis for MYs 2000-2007 vehicles may not be
fully representative of the vehicles that will be on the road in 2017
and beyond.
We recognize that statistical analysis of historical crash data may
not be the only way to think about the future relationship between
vehicle mass and safety. However, we recognize that other assessment
methods are also subject to uncertainties, which makes statistical
analysis of historical data an important starting point if employed
mindfully and recognized for how it can be useful and what its
limitations may be.
NHTSA funded an independent review of statistical studies and held
a mass-safety workshop in February 2011 in order to help the agencies
sort through the ongoing debates over how statistical analysis of the
historical relationship between mass and safety should be interpreted.
Previously, the agencies have assumed that differences in results were
due in part to inconsistent databases. By creating the updated common
database and making it publicly available, we are hopeful that this
aspect of the problem has been resolved. Moreover, the independent
review of 18 statistical reports by UMTRI suggested that differences in
data were probably less significant than the agencies may have thought.
UMTRI stated that statistical analyses of historical crash data should
be examined more closely for potential multicollinearity issues that
exist in some of the current analyses. The agencies will continue to
monitor issues with multicollinearity in our analyses, and hope that
outside researchers will do the same. And finally, based on the
findings of the independent review, the agencies continue to be
confident that Kahane's analysis is one of the best for the purpose of
analyzing potential safety effects of future CAFE and GHG standards.
UMTRI concluded that Kahane's approach is valid, and Kahane has
continued and refined that approach for the current analysis. The NHTSA
2012 statistical fatality report finds directionally similar but fewer
statistically significant relationships between vehicle mass, size, and
footprint, as discussed above. Based on these findings, the agencies
believe that in the future, fatalities due to mass reduction will be
best reduced if mass reduction is concentrated in the heaviest
vehicles. NHTSA considers part of the reason that more recent
historical data shows a dampened effect in the relationship between
mass reduction and safety is that all vehicles, including traditionally
lighter ones, grew heavier during that timeframe (2000s). As lighter
vehicles might become more prevalent in the fleet again over the next
decade, it is possible that the trend could strengthen again. On the
other hand, extensive use of new lightweight materials and optimized
vehicle design may weaken the relationship. As the Alliance mentioned
in its comments noted above, future updated analyses will be necessary
to determine how the effect of mass reduction on safety changes over
time.
Both agencies agree that there are several identifiable safety
trends already in place or expected to occur in the foreseeable future
that are not accounted for in the study, since they were not in effect
at the time that the vehicles in question were manufactured. For
example, there are two important new safety standards that have already
been issued and have been phasing in after MY 2008. FMVSS No. 126 (49
CFR Sec. 571.126) requires electronic stability control in all new
vehicles by MY 2012, and the upgrade to FMVSS No. 214 (Side Impact
Protection, 49 CFR Sec. 571.214) will likely result in all new
vehicles being equipped with head-curtain air bags by MY 2014.
Additionally, based on historical trends, we anticipate continued
improvements in driver (and passenger) behavior, such as higher safety
belt use rates. All of these may tend to reduce the absolute number of
fatalities. Moreover, as crash avoidance technology improves, future
statistical analysis of historical data may be complicated by a lower
number of crashes. In summary, the agencies have relied on the
coefficients in the Kahane 2012 study for estimating the potential
safety effects of the CAFE and GHG standards for MYs 2017-2025, based
on our assumptions regarding the amount of mass reduction that could be
used to meet the standards in a cost-effective way without adversely
affecting safety. Section II.G.5.a below discusses the methodology used
by the agencies in more detail. While the results of the safety effects
analysis are less statistically significant than the results in the MYs
2012-2016 final rule, the agencies still believe that any statistically
significant results warrant careful consideration of the assumptions
about appropriate levels of mass reduction, and have acted accordingly
in developing the final standards.
4. How do the Agencies think technological solutions might affect the
safety estimates indicated by the statistical analysis?
As mass reduction becomes a more important technology option for
manufacturers in meeting future CAFE and GHG standards, manufacturers
will invest more and more resources in developing increasingly
lightweight vehicle designs that meet their needs for manufacturability
and the public's need for vehicles that are also safe, useful,
affordable, and enjoyable to drive. There are many different ways to
reduce mass, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this TSD and in Sections II,
III, and IV of the preamble, and a considerable amount of information
is available today on lightweight vehicle designs currently in
production and that may be able to be put into production in the
rulemaking timeframe. Discussion of lightweight material designs from
NHTSA's workshop is presented below.
Besides ``lightweighting'' technologies themselves, though, there
are a number of considerations when attempting to evaluate how future
technological developments might affect the safety estimates indicated
by the historical statistical analysis. As discussed in the first part
of this section, for example, careful changes in design and/or
materials used might mitigate some of the potential increased risk from
mass reduction for vehicle self-protection,
[[Page 62759]]
through improved distribution of crash pulse energy, etc. At the same
time, these lightweighting techniques can sometimes lead to other
problems, such as increased crash forces on vehicle occupants that have
to be mitigated, or greater aggressivity against other vehicles in
crashes. Manufacturers may develop new and better restraints--air bags,
seat belts, etc.--to protect occupants in lighter vehicles in crashes,
but NHTSA's current safety standards for restraint systems are designed
based on the current fleet, not the yet-unknown future fleet. The
agency will need to monitor trends in the crash data to see whether
changes to the safety standards (or new safety standards) become
advisable. Manufacturers are also increasingly investigating a variety
of crash avoidance technologies--ABS, electronic stability control
(ESC), lane departure warnings, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communications--that, as they become more prevalent in the fleet, are
expected to reduce the number of overall crashes, and thus crash
fatalities. Until these technologies are present in the fleet in
greater numbers, however, it will be difficult to assess whether they
can mitigate the observed relationship between vehicle mass and safety
in the historical data.
Along with the California Air Resources Board (CARB), the agencies
have completed several technical/engineering projects described below
to estimate the maximum potential for advanced materials and improved
designs to reduce mass in the MY 2017-2021 timeframe, while continuing
to meet safety regulations and maintain functionality and affordability
of vehicles. Another NHTSA-sponsored study will estimate the effects of
these design changes on overall fleet safety. The detailed discussions
about these studies can be found in the Joint TSD section 3.3.5.5.
A. NHTSA awarded a contract in December 2010 to Electricore, with
EDAG and George Washington University (GWU) as subcontractors, to study
the maximum feasible amount of mass reduction of a mid-size car--
specifically, a Honda Accord--while maintaining the functionality of
the baseline vehicle. The project team was charged to maximize the
amount of mass reduction with the technologies that are considered
feasible for 200,000 units per year production volume during the time
frame of this rulemaking while maintaining the retail price in parity
(within 10% variation) with the baseline vehicle. When
selecting materials, technologies and manufacturing processes, the
Electricore/EDAG/GWU team utilized, to the extent possible, only those
materials, technologies and design which are currently used or planned
to be introduced in the near term (MY 2012-2015) on low-volume
production vehicles. This approach, commonly used in the automotive
industry, is employed by the team to make sure that the technologies
used in the study will be feasible for mass production for the time
frame of this rulemaking. The Electricore/EDAG/GWU team took a ``clean
sheet of paper'' approach and adopted collaborative design, engineering
and CAE process with built-in feedback loops to incorporate results and
outcomes from each of the design steps into the overall vehicle design
and analysis. The team tore down and benchmarked 2011 Honda Accord and
then undertook a series of baseline design selections, new material
selections, new technology selections and overall vehicle design
optimization. Vehicle performance, safety simulation and cost analyses
were run in parallel to the design and engineering effort to help
ensure that the design decisions are made in-line with the established
project constrains.
While the project team worked within the constraint of maintaining
the baseline Honda Accord's exterior size and shape, the body structure
was first redesigned using topology optimization with six load cases,
including bending stiffness, torsion stiffness, IIHS frontal impact,
IIHS side impact, FMVSS pole impact, FMVSS rear impact and FMVSS roof
crush cases. The load paths from topology optimization were analyzed
and interpreted by technical experts and the results were then fed into
low fidelity 3G (Gauge, Grade and Geometry) optimization programs to
further optimize for material properties, material thicknesses and
cross-sectional shapes while trying to achieve the maximum amount of
mass reduction. The project team carefully reviewed the optimization
results and built detailed CAD/CAE models for the body structure,
closures, bumpers, suspension, and instrumentation panel. The vehicle
designs were also carefully reviewed to ensure that they can be
manufactured at high volume production rates,
Multiple materials were used for this study. The body structure was
redesigned using a significant amount of high strength steel. The
closures and suspension were designed using a significant amount of
aluminum. Magnesium was used for the instrument panel cross-car beam. A
limited amount of composite material was used for the seat structure.
Safety performance of the light-weighted design was compared to the
safety rating of the baseline MY2011 Honda Accord for seven consumer
information and federal safety crash tests using LS-DYNA.\371\ These
seven tests are the NCAP frontal test, NCAP lateral MDB test, NCAP
lateral pole test, IIHS roof crush, IIHS lateral MDB, IIHS front offset
test, and FMVSS No. 301 rear impact tests. These crash simulation
analyses did not include use of a dummy model. Therefore only the crash
pulse and intrusion were compared with the baseline vehicle test
results. The vehicle achieved equivalent safety performance in all
seven self-protection tests comparing to MY 2011 Honda Accord with no
damage to the fuel tank. Vehicle handling is evaluated using MSC/ADAMS
\372\ modeling on five maneuvers, fish-hook test, double lane change
maneuver, pothole test, 0.7G constant radius turn test and 0.8G forward
braking test. The results from the fish-hook test show that the light-
weighted vehicle can achieve a five-star rating for rollover, same as
baseline vehicle. The double lane change maneuver tests show that the
chosen suspension geometry and vehicle parameter of the light-weighted
design are within acceptable range for safe high speed maneuvers.
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\371\ LS-DYNA is a software developed by Livermore Software
Technologies Corporation used widely by industry and researchers to
perform highly non-linear transient finite element analysis.
\372\ MSC/ADAMS: Macneal-Schwendler Corporation/Automatic
Dynamic Analysis of Mechanical Systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall the complete light weight vehicle achieved a total weight
savings of 22 percent (332kg) relative to the baseline vehicle (1480
kg). The study has been peer reviewed by three technical experts from
the industry, academia and a DOE national lab. The project team
addressed the peer review comments in the report and also composed a
response to peer review comment document. The final report, CAE model
and cost model are published in docket NHTSA-2010-0131 and can also be
found on NHTSA's Web site.\373\ The peer review comments with responses
to peer review comments can also be found at the same docket and Web
site.
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\373\ Final report, CAE model and cost model for NHTSA's light
weighting study can be found at NHTSA's Web site: http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. EPA, along with ICCT, funded a contract with FEV, with
subcontractors EDAG (CAE modeling) and Munro & Associates, Inc.
(component technology research) to study the feasibility, safety and
cost of 20% mass reduction on a 2017-2020 production ready mid-size
[[Page 62760]]
CUV (crossover utility vehicle) specifically, a Toyota Venza while
trying to achieve the same or lower cost. The EPA report is entitled
``Light-Duty Vehicle Mass-Reduction and Cost Analysis--Midsize
Crossover Utility Vehicle''. \374\ This study is a Phase 2 study of the
low development design in the 2010 Lotus Engineering study ``An
Assessment of Mass Reduction Opportunities for a 2017-2020 Model Year
Vehicle Program'',\375\ herein described as ``Phase 1''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\374\ FEV, ``Light-Duty Vehicle Mass-Reduction and Cost
Analysis--Midsize Crossover Utility Vehicle''. July 2012, EPA
Docket: EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\375\ Systems Research and Application Corporation, ``Peer
Review of Demonstrating the Safety and Crashworthiness of a 2020
Model-Year, Mass-Reduced Crossover Vehicle (Lotus Phase 2 Report)'',
February 2012, EPA docket: EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The original 2009/2010 Phase 1 effort by Lotus Engineering was
funded by Energy Foundation and ICCT to generate a technical paper
which would identify potential mass reduction opportunities for a
selected vehicle representing the crossover utility segment, a 2009
Toyota Venza. Lotus examined mass reduction for two scenarios--a low
development (20% MR and 2017 production with technology readiness of
2014) and high development (40% MR and 2020 production with technology
readiness of 2017). Lotus disassembled a 2009 Toyota Venza and created
a bill of materials (BOM) with all components. Lotus then investigated
emerging/current technologies and opportunities for mass reduction. The
report included the BOM for full vehicle, systems, sub-systems and
components as well as recommendations for next steps. The potential
mass reduction for the low development design includes material changes
to portions of the body in white (underfloor and body, roof, body side,
etc.), seats, console, trim, brakes, etc. The Phase 1 project achieved
19% (without the powertrain), 246 kg, at 99% of original cost at full
phase-in after peer review comments taken into
consideration.376,377 This was calculated to be -$0.45/kg
utilizing information from Lotus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\ The original powertrain was changed to a hybrid
configuration.
\377\ Cost estimates were given in percentages--no actual cost
analysis was presented for it was outside the scope of the study,
though costs were estimated by the agency based on the report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The peer reviewed Lotus Phase 1 study created a good foundation for
the next step of analyses of CAE modeling for safety evaluations and
in-depth costing (these steps were not within the scope of the Phase 1
study) as noted by the peer reviewer recommendations.\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\ RTI International,``Peer Review of Lotus Engineering
Vehicle Mass Reduction Study'' EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0710, November
2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar to Lotus Phase 1 study, the EPA Phase 2 study begins with
vehicle tear down and BOM development. FEV and its subcontractors tore
down a MY 2010 Toyota Venza in order to create a BOM as well as
understand the production methods for each component. Approximately 140
coupons from the BIW were analyzed in order to understand the full
material composition of the baseline vehicle. A baseline CAE model was
created based on the findings of the vehicle teardown and analysis. The
model's results for static bending, static torsion, and modal frequency
simulations (NVH) were obtained and compared to actual results from a
Toyota Venza vehicle. After confirming that the results were within
acceptable limits, this model was then modified to create light-
weighted vehicle models. EDAG reviewed the Lotus Phase 1 low
development BIW ideas and found redesign was needed to achieve the full
set of acceptable NVH characteristics. EDAG utilized a commercially
available computerized optimization tool called HEEDS MDO to build the
optimization model. The model consisted of 484 design variables, 7 load
cases (2 NVH + 5 crash), and 1 cost evaluation. The outcome of EDAG's
lightweight design optimization included the optimized vehicle assembly
and incorporated the following while maintaining the original BIW
design: Optimized gauge and material grades for body structure parts,
laser welded assembly at shock towers, rocker, roof rail, and rear
structure subassemblies, aluminum material for front bumper, hood, and
tailgate parts, TRBs on B-pillar, A-pillar, roof rail, and seat cross
member parts, design change on front rail side members. EDAG achieved
13% mass reduction in the BIW including closure. If aluminum doors were
included then an additional decrease of 28 kg could be achieved for a
total of 18% mass reduction from the body structure. All other systems
within the vehicle were examined for mass reduction, including the
powertrain (engine, transmission, fuel tank, exhaust, etc.). FEV and
Munro incorporated the Lotus Phase 1 low development concepts into
their own idea matrix. Each component and sub-system chosen for mass
reduction was scaled to the dimensions of the baseline vehicle, trying
to maximize the amount of mass reduction with cost effective
technologies and techniques that are considered feasible and
manufacturable in high volumes in MY2017. FEV included a full
discussion of the chosen mass reduction options for each component and
subsystem.
Safety performance of the baseline and light-weighted designs
(Lotus Phase 1 low development and the final EPA Phase 2 design) were
evaluated by EDAG through their constructed detailed CAD/CAE vehicle
models. Five federal safety crash tests were performed, including FMVSS
flat frontal crash, side impact, rear impact and roof crush (using IIHS
resistance requirements) as well as Euro NCAP/IIHS offset frontal
crash. Criteria including the crash pulse, intrusion and visual crash
information were evaluated to compare the results of the light weighted
models to the results of the baseline model. The light weighted vehicle
achieved equivalent safety performance in all tests to the baseline
model with no damage to the fuel tank. In addition, CAE was used to
evaluate the BIW vibration modes in torsion, lateral bending, rear end
match boxing, and rear end vertical bending, and also to evaluate the
BIW stiffness in bending and torsion.
The Phase 2 study 2010 Toyota Venza light weight vehicle achieved,
with powertrain, a total weight savings of 18 percent (312 kg) relative
to the baseline vehicle (1710 kg) at -$0.43/kg, and the cost figure is
near zero at 20 percent. The study report and models have been peer
reviewed by four technical experts from a material association,
academia, DOE, and a National Laboratory. The peer review comments for
this study were generally complimentary, and concurred with the ideas
and methodology of the study. A few of the comments required further
investigation, which were completed for the final report. The project
team addressed the peer review comments in the report and also composed
a response to peer review comment document. Changes to the BIW CAE
models resulted in minimal differences. The final report is published
in EPA's docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799 and the CAE LS DYNA model files
and overview cost model files are found on EPA's Web site http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/publications.htm#vehicletechnologies. The peer
review comments with responses to peer review comments can also be
found at the same docket and Web site.
C. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) funded a study with
Lotus Engineering to further develop the high development design from
Lotus' 2010 Toyota Venza work (``Phase 1''). The CARB-sponsored Lotus
``Phase 2'' study
[[Page 62761]]
provides the updated design, crash simulation results, detailed
costing, and analysis of the manufacturing feasibility of the BIW and
closures. Based on the safety validation work, Lotus strengthened the
design with a more aluminum-intensive BIW (with less magnesium). In
addition to the increased use of advanced materials, the new design by
Lotus included a number of instances in which multiple parts were
integrated, resulting in a reduction in the number of manufactured
parts in the lightweight BIW. The Phase 2 study reports that the number
of parts in the BIW was reduced from 419 to 169. The BIW was analyzed
for torsional stiffness and crash test safety with Computer-Aided
Engineering (CAE). The new design's torsional stiffness was 32.9 kNm/
deg, which is higher than the baseline vehicle and comparable to more
performance-oriented models. The research supported the conclusion that
the lightweight vehicle design could pass standard FMVSS 208 frontal
impact, FMVSS 210 seatbelt anchorages, FMVSS child restraint anchorage,
FMVSS 214 side impact and side pole, FMVSS 216 roof crush (with 3xcurb
weight), FMVSS 301 rear impact, IIHS low speed front, and IIHS low
speed rear. Crash tests simulated in CAE showed results that were
listed as acceptable for all crash tests analyzed. No comparisons or
conclusions were made if the vehicle performed better or worse than the
baseline Venza. For FMVSS 208 frontal impact, Lotus based its CAE crash
test analyses on vehicle crash acceleration data rather than occupant
injury as is done in the actual vehicle crash. The report from the
study stated that accelerations were within acceptable levels compared
to current production vehicle acceleration results and it should be
possible to tune the occupant restraint system to handle the specific
acceleration pulses of the Phase 2 high development vehicle. FMVSS 210
seatbelt anchorages is concerned with seatbelt retention and certain
dimensional constraints for the relationship between the seatbelts and
the seats. Overall both the front and rear seatbelt anchorages met the
requirements specified in the standard. FMVSS 214 side impact show the
energy is effectively managed. Since dummy injury criteria was not used
in the CAE modeling, a maximum intrusion tolerance level of 300 mm was
instituted which is the typical distance between the door panel and
most outboard seating positions. For example, the Phase 2 design was
measured at 115mm for the crabbed barrier test. The side pole test
resulted in 120 mm intrusion for the 5th percentile female and
intrusion was measured at 190 mm for the 50th percentile male. The
report stated FMVSS 216 roof crush simulation shows the Phase 2 high
development vehicle will meet roof crush performance requirements under
the specified load case of 3 times the vehicle weight. For the FMVSS
rear impact, results show plastic strain in the fuel tank/system
components to be less than 3.5%, which is less than the 10% strain
allowed in the test. The pressure change in the fuel tank is less than
2% so risk of tank splitting is minimal. The IIHS low speed front and
rear show no body structural issues, however styling adjustments should
be made to improve the rear bumper low speed performance.
The Lotus design achieved a 37% (141 kg) mass reduction in the body
structure, a 38% (484kg) mass reduction in the vehicle excluding the
powertrain, and a 32% (537 kg) mass reduction in the entire vehicle
including the powertrain. The report was peer reviewed by a cross
section of experts and the comments were addressed by Lotus in the peer
review documents. The comments requiring modification were incorporated
into the final document. The documents can be found on EPA's Web site
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/publications.htm#vehicletechnologies.
D. NHTSA has contracted with GWU to build a fleet simulation model
to study the impact and relationship of light-weighted vehicle design
with injuries and fatalities. This study will also include an
evaluation of potential countermeasures to reduce any safety concerns
associated with lightweight vehicles in the second phase. NHTSA has
included three light-weighted vehicle designs in this study: the one
from Electricore/EDAG/GWU mentioned above, one from Lotus Engineering
funded by California Air Resource Board for the second phase of the
study, evaluating mass reduction levels around 35 percent of total
vehicle mass, and one funded by EPA and the International Council on
Clean Transportation (ICCT). In addition to the lightweight vehicle
models, these projects also created CAE models of the baseline
vehicles. To estimate the fleet safety implications of light-weighting,
CAE crash simulation modeling was conducted to generate crash pulse and
intrusion data for the baseline and three light-weighted vehicles when
they crash with objects (barriers and poles) and with four other
vehicle models (Chevy Silverado, Ford Taurus, Toyota Yaris and Ford
Explorer) that represent a range of current vehicles. The simulated
acceleration and intrusion data were used as inputs to MADYMO occupant
models to estimate driver injury. The crashes were conducted at a range
of speeds and the occupant injury risks were combined based on the
frequency of the crash occurring in real world data. The change in
driver injury risk between the baseline and light-weighed vehicles will
provide insight into the safety performance these light-weighting
design concepts. This is a large and ambitious project involves several
stages over several years. NHTSA and GWU have completed the first stage
of this study. The frontal crash simulation part of the study is being
finished and will be peer reviewed. The report for this study will be
available in NHTSA-2010-0131. Information for this study can also be
found at NHTSA's Web site.\379\
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\379\ Web site for fleet study can be found at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The countermeasures section of the study is expected to be finished
in early 2013. This phase of the study is expected to provide
information about the relationship of light-weighted vehicle design
with injuries and fatalities and to provide the capability to evaluate
the potential countermeasures to safety concerns associated with light-
weighted vehicles. NHTSA plans to include the following items in future
phases of the study to help better understanding the impact of mass
reduction on safety.
Light-weighted concept vehicle to light-weighted concept
vehicle crash simulation;
Additional crash configurations, such as side impact,
oblique and rear impact tests;
Risk analysis for elderly and vulnerable occupants;
Safety of light-weighted concept vehicles for different
size occupants.
Partner vehicle protection in crashes with other light-
weighted concept vehicles;
While this study is expected to provide information about the
relationship of light-weighted vehicle design with injuries and
fatalities and to provide meaningful information to NHTSA on potential
countermeasures to reduce any safety concerns associated with
lightweight vehicles, because this study cannot incorporate all of the
variations in vehicle crashes that occur in the real world, it is
expected to provide trend information on the effect of potential future
designs on highway safety, but is not expected to provide information
that can be used to modify the coefficients derived by Kahane that
relate mass reduction to highway crash fatalities. Because the
coefficients from
[[Page 62762]]
the Kahane study are used in the agencies' assessment of the amount of
mass reduction that may be implemented with a neutral effect on highway
safety, the fact that the fleet simulation modeling study is not
complete does not affect the agencies' assessment of the amount of mass
reduction that may be implemented with a neutral effect on safety.
Global Automakers commented that lightweighting strategies ``should
be based on real world experience and in reliance upon laboratory test
data.'' \380\ The agencies continue to believe that reasonable
conclusions regarding the safety implication of mass reduction can be
drawn from CAE simulations. As ICCT stated in their comments, CAE
simulations are powerful tools that have improved rapidly over the
years in terms of their ability to optimize vehicle designs and predict
material and vehicle behavior in real life. Use of these highly
sophisticated CAE tools has become standard industry practice in
helping to verify and validate designs before real parts and vehicles
are built. As the Alliance stated, however, CAE capabilities for
conventional materials, such as steel and aluminum, are more mature
than those of advanced materials, such as magnesium and composites.
Steel and aluminum are the major materials used in some of the studies,
such as EPA's and NHTSA's light-weighting studies that determined that
a baseline vehicle's mass could be reduced by approximately 20 percent
while maintaining safety comparable to the baseline vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\ Global Automakers comments, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131, at
pg 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, even though CAE tools are used heavily, the agencies
acknowledge the concerns the Alliance raised in its comments about CAE
capabilities for some potential advanced materials for crashworthiness,
and have been mindful of this issue in developing our studies. NHTSA's
study took a similar approach in vehicle body structure design as the
FutureSteelVehicle, but with less aggressive material usage (e.g.,
using thicker gauges of steel). Only those materials, technologies and
design which are currently used or planned to be introduced in the near
term (MY 2012-2015) on low-volume production vehicles are used in
NHTSA's concept design. This approach is employed by the team to make
sure that the technologies used in the study will be feasible for mass
production for the time frame of this rulemaking. Even though NHTSA's
study is not directly based on laboratory testing of the light-weighted
design as Global Automaker suggested, the materials, designs and
approaches used in the study are currently employed in mass production
vehicles, which gives NHTSA confidence that results from its study are
practical and feasible in the rulemaking timeframe. EPA's study used a
similar approach. It includes a baseline model which was run through
crash simulations and the results were comparable to physical crash
data of the vehicle in the same tests. For the light weighted design,
the BIW was maintained while various components were lightened through
incorporation of high strength steels whose properties reflect those
materials commonly used today. The light weighted CAE model crash
results were then compared to those from the baseline CAE model crash
results. The model run results from the light weighted vehicle had
equal or better performance on intrusion, acceleration, etc. The
materials, designs and approaches used in the study are currently
employed in mass production vehicles, which gives EPA confidence that
results from its study are practical, feasible and reasonable in the
rulemaking timeframe.
a. NHTSA Workshop on Vehicle Mass, Size and Safety
As stated above in section C.2, on February 25, 2011, NHTSA hosted
a workshop on mass reduction, vehicle size, and fleet safety at the
headquarters of the U.S. Department of Transportation in Washington,
DC. The purpose of the workshop was to provide the agencies with a
broad understanding of current research in the field and provide
stakeholders and the public with an opportunity to weigh in on this
issue. The agencies also created a public docket to receive comments
from interested parties that were unable to attend. The presentations
were divided into two sessions that addressed the two expansive sets of
issues. The first session explored statistical evidence of the roles of
mass and size on safety, and is summarized in section C.2. The second
session explored the engineering realities of structural
crashworthiness, occupant injury and advanced vehicle design, and is
summarized here. The speakers in the second session included Stephen
Summers of NHTSA, Gregg Peterson of Lotus Engineering, Koichi Kamiji of
Honda, John German of the International Council on Clean Transportation
(ICCT), Scott Schmidt of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Guy
Nusholtz of Chrysler, and Frank Field of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
The second session explored what degree of mass reduction and
occupant protection are feasible from technical, economic, and
manufacturing perspectives. Field emphasized that technical feasibility
alone does not constitute feasibility in the context of vehicle mass
reduction. Sufficient material production capacity and viable
manufacturing processes are essential to economic feasibility. Both
Kamiji and German noted that both good materials and good designs will
be necessary to reduce fatalities. For example, German cited the
examples of hexagonally structured aluminum columns, such as used in
the Honda Insight, that can improve crash absorption at lower mass, and
of high-strength steel components that can both reduce weight and
improve safety. Kamiji made the point that widespread mass reduction
will reduce the kinetic energy of all crashes which should produce some
beneficial effect.
Summers described NHTSA's plans for a model to estimate fleet wide
safety effects based on an array of vehicle-to-vehicle computational
crash simulations of current and anticipated vehicle designs. In
particular, three computational models of lightweight vehicles are
under development. They are based on current vehicles that have been
modified or redesigned to substantially reduce mass. The most ambitious
was the ``high development'' derivative of a Toyota Venza developed by
Lotus Engineering and discussed by Mr. Peterson. The Lotus light-
weighted Venza structure contains about 75% aluminum, 12% magnesium, 8%
steel, and 5% advanced composites. Peterson expressed confidence that
the design had the potential to meet federal safety standards. Nusholtz
emphasized that computational crash simulations involving more advanced
materials were less reliable than those involving traditional metals
such as aluminum and steel.
Nusholtz presented a revised data-based fleet safety model in which
important vehicle parameters were modeled based on trends from current
NCAP crash tests. For example, crash pulses and potential intrusion for
a particular size vehicle were based on existing distributions. Average
occupant deceleration was used to estimate injury risk. Through a range
of simulations of modified vehicle fleets, he was able to estimate the
net effects of various design strategies for lighter weight vehicles,
such as various scaling approaches for vehicle stiffness or intrusion.
The approaches were selected based on engineering requirements for
modified vehicles. Transition from the current fleet was considered. He
concluded that protocols resulting in safer transitions
[[Page 62763]]
(e.g., removing more mass from heavier vehicles with appropriate
stiffness scaling according to a \3/2\ power law) were not generally
consistent with those that provide the greatest reduction in GHG
production: i.e., that the most effective mass reduction in terms of
reducing GHG emissions was not necessarily the safest.
German discussed several important points on the future of mass
reduction. Similar to Kahane's discussion of the difficulties of
isolating the impact of mass reduction, German stated that other
important variables, such as vehicle design and compatibility factors,
must be held constant in order for size or weight impacts to be
quantified in statistical analyses. He presented results that the
safety impacts of size and weight are small and difficult to quantify
when compared to driver, driving influences, and vehicle design
influences. He noted that several scenarios, such as rollovers, greatly
favored the occupants of smaller and lighter cars once a crash
occurred. He pointed out that if size and design are maintained, lower
weight should translate into a lower total crash force. He thought that
advanced material designs have the potential to ``decouple'' the
historical correlation between vehicle size and weight, and felt that
effective design and driver attributes may start to dominate size and
weight issues in future vehicle models.
Other presenters noted industry's perspective of the effect of
incentivizing mass reduction. Field highlighted the complexity of
institutional changes that may be necessitated by mass reduction,
including redesign of material and component supply chains and
manufacturing infrastructure. Schmidt described an industry perspective
on the complicated decisions that must be made in the face of
regulatory change, such as evaluating goals, gains, and timing.
Field and Schmidt noted that the introduction of technical
innovations is generally an innate development process involving both
tactical and strategic considerations that balance desired vehicle
attributes with economic and technical risk. In the absence of
challenging regulatory requirements, a substantial technology change is
often implemented in stages, starting with lower volume pilot
production before a commitment is made to the infrastructure and supply
chain modifications which are necessary for inclusion on a high-volume
production model. Joining, damage characterization, durability, repair,
and significant uncertainty in final component costs are also concerns.
Thus, for example, the widespread implementation of high-volume
composite or magnesium structures might be problematic in the short or
medium term when compared to relatively transparent aluminum or high
strength steel implementations. Regulatory changes will affect how
these tradeoffs are made and these risks are managed.
Koichi Kamiji presented data showing in increased use of high
strength steel in their Honda product line to reduced vehicle mass and
increase vehicle safety. He stated that mass reduction is clearly a
benefit in 42% of all fatal crashes because absolute energy is reduced.
He followed up with slides showing the application of certain optimized
designs can improve safety even when controlling for weight and size.
A philosophical theme developed that explored the ethics of
consciously allowing the total societal harm associated with mass
reduction to approach the anticipated benefits of enhanced safety
technologies. Although some participants agreed that there may
eventually be specific fatalities that would not have occurred without
downsizing, many also agreed that safety strategies will have to be
adapted to the reality created by consumer choices, and that ``We will
be ok if we let data on what works--not wishful thinking--guide our
strategies.''
5. How have the Agencies estimated safety effects for the final rule?
a. What was the Agencies' methodology for estimating safety effects for
the final rule?
As explained above, the agencies consider the latest 2012
statistical analysis of historical crash data by NHTSA to represent the
best estimates of the potential relationship between mass reduction and
fatality increases in the future fleet. This section discusses how the
agencies used NHTSA's 2012 analysis to calculate specific estimates of
safety effects of the final rule, based on the analysis of how much
mass reduction manufacturers might use to meet the final rule.
The CAFE/GHG standards do not mandate mass reduction, or require
that mass reduction occur in any specific manner. However, mass
reduction is one of the technology applications available to the
manufacturers and a degree of mass reduction is used by both agencies'
models to determine the capabilities of manufacturers and to predict
both cost and fuel consumption/emissions impacts of more stringent
CAFE/GHG standards. To estimate the amount of mass reduction to apply
in the rulemaking analysis, the agencies considered fleet safety
effects for mass reduction. As shown in Table II-24 and Table II-25,
both the Kahane 2011 preliminary report and the Kahane 2012 final
report show that applying mass reduction to CUVs and light duty trucks
will generally decrease societal fatalities, while applying mass
reduction to passenger cars will increase fatalities. The CAFE model
uses coefficients from the Kahane study along with the mass reduction
level applied to each vehicle model to project societal fatality
effects in each model year. NHTSA used the CAFE model and conducted
iterative modeling runs varying the maximum amount of mass reduction
applied to each subclass in order to identify a combination that
achieved a high level of overall fleet mass reduction while not
adversely affecting overall fleet safety. These maximum levels of mass
reduction for each subclass were then used in the CAFE model for the
rulemaking analysis. The agencies believe that mass reduction of up to
20 percent is feasible on light trucks, CUVs and minivans as discussed
in the Joint TSD Section 3.3.5.5. Thus, the amount of mass reduction
selected for this rulemaking is based on our assumptions about how much
is technologically feasible without compromising safety. While we are
confident that manufacturers will build safe vehicles and meet (or
surpass) all applicable federal safety standards, we cannot predict
with certainty that they will choose to reduce mass in exactly the ways
that the agencies have analyzed in response to the standards. In the
event that manufacturers ultimately choose to reduce mass and/or
footprint in ways not analyzed or anticipated by the agencies, the
safety effects of the rulemaking may likely differ from the agencies'
estimates.
In this final rule analysis, NHTSA utilized the 2012 Kahane study
relationships between weight and safety, expressed as percent changes
in fatalities per 100-pound mass reduction while holding footprint
constant. However, as mentioned previously, there are several
identifiable safety trends already occurring, or expected to occur in
the foreseeable future, which are not accounted for in the study. For
example, the two important new safety standards that were discussed
above for electronic stability control and side curtain airbags, have
already been issued and began phasing in after MY 2008. The recent
shifts in market shares from pickups and SUVs to cars and CUVs may
continue, or grow, if gasoline
[[Page 62764]]
prices remain high, or rise further. The growth in vehicle miles
travelled may continue to stagnate if the economy does not improve, or
gasoline prices remain high. And improvements in driver (and passenger)
behavior, such as higher safety belt use rates, may continue. All of
these will tend to reduce the absolute number of fatalities in the
future. The agencies estimated the overall change in fatalities by
calendar year after adjusting for ESC, Side Impact Protection, and
other Federal safety standards and behavioral changes projected through
this time period. The smaller percent changes in risk from mass
reduction (from both the Kahane 2011prelimirary analysis and the Kahane
2012 final analysis), coupled with the reduced number of baseline
fatalities, results in smaller absolute increases in fatalities than
those predicted in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking.
NHTSA examined the impacts of identifiable safety trends over the
lifetime of the vehicles produced in each model year from 2007 through
2020. An estimate of these impacts was contained in a previous agency
report that examined the impact of both safety standards and behavioral
safety trends on fatality rates.\381\ In the NPRM analysis, based on
these projections, we estimated a 12.6 percent reduction in fatality
levels between the 2007 fatality base year and 2020 for the combination
of safety standards and behavioral changes anticipated in this study
(such as electronic stability control, head-curtain air bags, and
increased belt use). See 76 FR 74959. The estimates derived from
applying NHTSA fatality percentages to a baseline of 2007 fatalities
were multiplied by 0.874 to account for changes that NHTSA believes
will take place in passenger car and light truck safety between the
2007 baseline on-road fleet used for this particular safety analysis
and year 2020. Using this same methodology, for the final rule
analysis, which is based on a 2010 baseline fleet, we estimated a 9.6
percent reduction in fatality level between 2010 and 2020 for the
anticipated combination of safety standards and behavioral changes that
will occur during that time frame.\382\ The estimates derived from
applying NHTSA fatality percentages to a baseline of 2010 fatalities
were multiplied by 0.904 to account for changes that NHTSA believes
will take place in passenger car and light truck safety between the
2010 baseline on-road fleet and year 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\ Blincoe, L. and Shankar, U, ``The Impact of Safety
Standards and Behavioral Trends on Motor Vehicle Fatality Rates,''
DOT HS 810 777, January 2007. See Table 5 comparing 2020 to 2007
(37,906/43,363 = 0.874 or a reduction of 12.6% (100%-87.4% = 12.6%).
Since 2008 was a recession year, it did not seem appropriate to use
that as a baseline, so 2007 was used as the baseline for fatalities
in the NPRM. Note that additional improvements may occur between
2020 and 2025. However, since current research only projected the
impact of changes through 2020, only those improvements could have
been applied to that analysis.
\382\ Blincoe, L. and Shankar, U, ``The Impact of Safety
Standards and Behavioral Trends on Motor Vehicle Fatality Rates,''
DOT HS 810 777, January 2007. See Table 5 comparing 2020 to 2010
(37,906/41,945 = 0.904 or a reduction of (100%-90.4% = 9.6%). Note
that additional improvements may occur between 2020 and 2025.
However, since current research only projected the impact of changes
through 2020, only those improvements could be applied to this
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To estimate the amount of mass reduction to apply in the rulemaking
analysis, the agencies considered fleet safety effects for mass
reduction. As previously discussed the agencies believe that mass
reduction of up to 20 percent is feasible on light trucks, CUVs and
minivans, \383\ but that less mass reduction should be implemented on
other vehicle types to avoid increases in societal fatalities. For the
NPRM analysis, NHTSA used the mass reduction levels shown in Table II-
31 with the fatality coefficients derived in Kahane 2011 preliminary
study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\ When applying mass reduction, NHSTA capped the maximum
amount of mass reduction to 20 percent for any individual vehicle
class. The 20 percent cap is the maximum amount of mass reduction
the agencies believe to be feasible in MYs 2017-2025 time frame.
Table II-31--Mass Reduction Levels To Achieve Safety Neutral Results in the CAFE NPRM Analysis
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subcompact and
Subcompact Compact and Midsize PC and Large PC and Minivan LT Small, Midsize
Absolute (percent) Perf. PC Compact Perf. Midsize Perf. Large Perf. PC (percent) and Large LT
(percent) PC (percent) PC (percent) (percent) (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR1*.................................................... 0.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
MR2..................................................... 0.0 0.0 5.0 7.5 7.5 7.5
MR3..................................................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
MR4..................................................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 15.0
MR5..................................................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 20.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
*MR1-MR5: different levels of mass reduction used in CAFE model.
In order to find a safety neutral compliance path for use in the
agencies' final rulemaking analysis given the coefficients from the
Kahane 2012 study, the maximum amount of mass reduction applied in the
final rule analysis has been modified from the NPRM levels for compact
passenger cars and midsize passenger cars as shown in Table II-32.
Specifically, the maximum amount of mass reduction for compact
passenger cars and compact performance passenger cars is reduced in the
agencies' respective models from 2% as used in the NPRM to 0% in the
final rule analysis, while for midsize passenger cars and midsize
performance passenger cars, it is reduced from 5% as used in the NPRM
to 3.5% in the final rule analysis.
Table II-32--Mass Reduction Levels To Achieve Safety Neutral Results in the Final Rule Analysis
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subcompact and
subcompact Compact and Midsize PC and Large PC and Minivan LT Small, midsize
Absolute (%) Perf. PC compact Perf. midsize Perf. large Perf. PC (percent) and large LT
(percent) PC (percent) PC (percent) (percent) (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR1*.................................................... 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
[[Page 62765]]
MR2..................................................... 0.0 0.0 3.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
MR3..................................................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
MR4..................................................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 15.0
MR5..................................................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 20.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
*MR1-MR5: different levels of mass reduction used in CAFE model
For the CAFE model, these percentages apply to a vehicle's total
weight, including the powertrain. Table II-33 shows the amount of mass
reduction in pounds for these percentage mass reduction levels for a
typical vehicle weight in each subclass.
Table II-33--Examples of Mass Reduction (in Pounds) for Different Vehicle Subclasses Using the Percentage Information As Defined in Table II-32 for
Final Rule Analysis
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subcom-pact
and Compact and Midsize PC Large PC
Mass Reduction (lbs) Subcompact Compact and Midsize and Large Minivan LT Small LT Midsize LT Large LT
Perf. PC Perf. PC Perf. PC Perf. PC
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Typical Vehicle Weight (lbs).................... 2795 3359 3725 4110 4250 3702 4260 5366
MR1 (lbs)....................................... 0 0 56 62 64 56 64 80
MR2 (lbs)....................................... 0 0 130 308 319 278 320 402
MR3 (lbs)....................................... 0 0 0 411 425 370 426 537
MR4 (lbs)....................................... 0 0 0 0 638 555 639 805
MR5 (lbs)....................................... 0 0 0 0 850 740 852 1073
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
These maximum amounts of mass reduction discussed above were
applied in the technology input files for the CAFE model. Within some
of the light truck classes, additional limitations were placed on the
maximum amount of mass reduction for some of the vehicles based on
which Kahane study safety class the vehicles were in, as is explained
below. By way of background, NHTSA divides vehicles into classes for
purposes of applying technology in the CAFE model in a way that differs
from the Kahane study which divides vehicles into classes for purposes
of determining safety coefficients. These differences require that the
``safety class'' coefficients be applied to the appropriate vehicles in
the CAFE ``technology subclasses.'' For the reader's reference, for
purposes of this final rule, the safety classes and the technology
subclasses relate \384\ as shown in Table II-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\ This is not to say that all vehicles within a technology
subclass will necessarily fall within a single safety class--as the
chart shows, some technology subclasses are divided among safety
classes.
Table II-34--Mapping Between Safety Classes and Technology Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety class Technology class
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PC (Passenger Car).................. Subcompact PC.
Subcompact Perf. PC.
Compact PC.
Compact Perf. PC.
Midsize PC.
Midsize Perf. PC.
Large PC.
Large Perf. PC.
LT (Light Truck).................... Small LT.
Midsize LT.
Large LT.
CM (CUV and Minivan)................ Subcompact PC.
Subcompact Perf. PC.
Large PC.
Large Perf. PC.
Minivan.
Small LT.
Midsize LT.
Large LT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM analysis, the maximum amount of mass reduction for
vehicles that would fall into the light truck safety class and would
also fall into the small and midsize light truck technology subclasses
was limited to 10%, as shown in Table II-35. In the final rule
analysis, in order to find a safety-neutral compliance path using the
new safety coefficients, for vehicles in the light truck safety class
that also fall into the SmallLT technology subclass, mass reduction was
limited to a maximum of 1.5%, as shown in Table II-36. For vehicles in
the light truck safety class that also fall into the MidsizeLT
technology subclass, the amount of mass reduction applied depends on
vehicle mass: if the vehicle curb weight is greater than or equal to
4,000 pounds, the maximum amount of mass reduction allowed is 7.5%; if
the vehicle curb weight is less than 4,000 pounds, the maximum amount
is 1.5%. Small and midsize light truck (SmallLT and MidsizeLT) that
fall in the CUV and Minivan (CM) safety class are allowed up to 20%
mass reduction. These changes from the NPRM analysis were incorporated
in order to maximize the amount of overall fleet mass reduction in a
way that achieved a safety neutral result with the updated coefficients
from the Kahane 2012 study.
[[Page 62766]]
Table II-35--Maximum Amount of Mass Reduction Limits for Light Truck
Safety Vehicle Class for the NPRM CAFE Model Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRPM--2008 Market input file Tech class
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Class Small LT Midsize LT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LT............................ Apply MR3 at 10%... Apply MR3 at 10%
CM *.......................... MR5 (20%).......... MR5 (20%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* CM = CUV and MiniVan.
Table II--36--Maximum Amount of Mass Reduction Limits for Light Truck
Safety Vehicle Class for the Final Rule CAFE Model Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final rule--2008 & 2010 market Tech class
input file -----------------------------------------
-------------------------------
Safety Class Small LT Midsize LT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LT............................ Apply MR1 at 1.5%.. Vehicle Weight >=
4000, apply MR2 at
7.5%; Vehicle
Weight >= 4000,
apply MR1 at 1.5%.
CM............................ MR5 (20%).......... MR5 (20%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II-37 shows CAFE model results for societal safety for each
model year based on the application of the above mass reduction
limits.\385\ These are the estimated increases or decreases in
fatalities over the lifetime of the model year fleet. A positive number
means that fatalities are projected to increase, a negative number
(indicated by parentheses) means that fatalities are projected to
decrease. The results are significantly affected by the mass reduction
limitations used in the CAFE model, which allow more mass reduction in
the heavy LTVs, CUVs, and minivans than in other vehicles. As the
negative coefficients only appear for LTVs greater than 4,594 lbs.,
CUVs, and minivans, a statistically significant improvement in safety
can only occur if more weight is taken out of these vehicles than out
of passenger cars or smaller light trucks. Combining passenger car and
light truck safety estimates for the final rule results in a decrease
in fatalities over the lifetime of the nine model years of MY 2017-2025
of 8 fewer fatalities with the 2010 baseline and of 107 fewer
fatalities with the 2008 baseline. Broken up into passenger car and
light truck categories, there is an increase of 135 fatalities in
passenger cars and a decrease of 143 fatalities in light trucks with
the 2010 baseline, and there is an increase of 78 fatalities in
passenger cars and a decrease of 185 fatalities in light trucks with
the 2010 baseline. NHTSA also analyzed the results for different
regulatory alternatives in Chapter IX of its FRIA; the difference in
the results by alternative depends upon how much mass reduction is used
in that alternative and the types and sizes of vehicles that the mass
reduction applies to.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\385\ NHTSA has changed the definitions of a passenger car and
light truck for fuel economy purposes between the time of the Kahane
2003 analysis and the NPRM (as well as this final rule). About 1.4
million 2 wheel drive SUVs have been redefined as passenger cars
instead of light trucks. The Kahane 2011 and 2012 analyses continue
to use the definitions used in the Kahane 2003 analysis.
Table II-37--NHTSA Calculated Mass-Safety-Related Fatality Impacts of the Final Rule Over the Lifetime of the Vehicles Produced in each Model Year Using
2008 and 2010 Baseline
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline
Fatalities fleet MY 2017 MY 2018 MY 2019 MY 2020 MY 2021 MY 2022 MY 2023 MY 2024 MY 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars............... 2010....... 3-....... 7-....... 13-...... 12-...... 18-...... 19-...... 23-...... 22-...... 19-...... 135-
2008....... 2........ 5........ 13....... 12....... 13....... 10....... 11....... 9........ 1........ 78
Light Trucks................. 2010....... (5)-..... (9)-..... 0-....... (5)-..... (18)-.... (21)-.... (24)-.... (30)-.... (31)-.... (143)-
2008....... (5)...... (13)..... (17)..... (29)..... (27)..... (27)..... (27)..... (29)..... (11)..... (185)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................... 2010....... (2)-..... (3)-..... 13-...... 7-....... (1)-..... (2)-..... (2)-..... (8)-..... (12)-.... (8)-
2008....... (3)...... (8)...... (3)...... (17)..... (14)..... (17)..... (16)..... (20)..... (10)..... (107)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using the same coefficients from the 2012 Kahane study, EPA used
the OMEGA model to conduct a similar analysis. After applying these
percentage increases to the estimated mass reductions per vehicle size
by model year assumed in the Omega model, Table II-38 shows the results
of EPA's safety analysis separately for each model year. These are
estimated increases or decreases in fatalities over the lifetime of the
model year fleet. A positive number means that fatalities are projected
to increase; a negative number means that fatalities are projected to
decrease. For details, see the EPA RIA Chapter 3.
[[Page 62767]]
Table II-38--EPA Calculated Mass-Safety-Related Fatality Impacts of the Proposed Standards Over the Lifetime of the Vehicles Produced in Each Model Year
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY 2017 MY 2018 MY 2019 MY 2020 MY 2021 MY 2022 MY 2023 MY 2024 MY 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................................................ 5 9 14 20 26 30 35 40 45 223
Light trucks.................................................. -5 -11 -16 -22 -29 -40 -52 -64 -77 -317
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 -10 -18 -25 -32 -94
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Why might the real-world effects be less than or greater than what
the Agencies have calculated?
As discussed above, the ways in which future technological advances
could potentially mitigate the safety effects estimated for this
rulemaking include the following: lightweight vehicles could be
designed to be both stronger and not more aggressive; restraint systems
could be improved to deal with higher crash pulses in lighter vehicles;
crash avoidance technologies could reduce the number of overall
crashes; roofs could be strengthened to improve safety in rollovers. As
also stated above, however, while we are confident that manufacturers
will strive to build safe vehicles, it will be difficult for both the
agencies and the industry to know with certainty ahead of time how
crash trends will change in the future fleet as light-weighted vehicles
become more prevalent. Going forward, we will continue to monitor the
crash data as well as changes in vehicle mass and conduct analyses to
understand the interaction of vehicle mass and size on safety.
Additionally, we note that the total amount of mass reduction used
in the agencies' analysis for this rulemaking was chosen based on our
assumptions about how much is technologically feasible without
compromising safety. Again, while we are confident that manufacturers
are motivated to build safe vehicles, we cannot predict with certainty
that they will choose to reduce mass in exactly the ways or amounts
that the agencies have analyzed in response to the standards. In the
event that manufacturers ultimately choose to reduce mass and/or
footprint in ways not analyzed by the agencies, the safety effects of
the rulemaking may likely differ from the agencies' estimates.
As discussed in Chapter 2 of the Joint TSD, the agencies note that
the standard is flat for vehicles smaller than 41 square feet and that
downsizing in this category could help achieve overall compliance, if
the vehicles are desirable to consumers. The agencies note that fewer
than 10 percent of MY 2008 passenger cars were below 41 square feet,
and due to the overall lower level of utility of these vehicles, and
the engineering challenges involved in ensuring that these vehicles
meet all applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS), we
do not expect a significant increase in this segment of the market.
Please see Chapter 2 of the Joint TSD for additional discussion.
The agencies acknowledge that this final rule does not prohibit
manufacturers from redesigning vehicles to change wheelbase and/or
track width (footprint). However, as NHTSA explained in promulgating
the MY 2008-2011 light truck CAFE standards and the MY 2011 passenger
car and light truck CAFE standards, and as the agencies jointly
explained in promulgating the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE and GHG standards and
the proposal for this final rule, we believe that such engineering
changes are significant enough to be unattractive as a measure to
undertake solely to reduce compliance burdens. Similarly, the agencies
acknowledge that a manufacturer could, without actually reengineering
specific vehicles to increase footprint, shift production toward those
that perform well with respect to their footprint-based targets.
However, NHTSA and EPA have previously explained, because such
production shifts could run counter to market demands, they could also
be competitively unattractive. We sought comment on the appropriateness
of the overall analytic assumption that the attribute-based aspect of
the proposed standards will have no effect on the overall distribution
of vehicle footprints. Detailed responses to the comments that the
agencies received on this topic can be found in preamble Section II.C.
Notwithstanding the agencies' current judgment that such deliberate
reengineering or production shifts are unlikely as pure compliance
strategies, both agencies are considering the potential future
application of vehicle choice models, and anticipate that doing so
could result in estimates that market shifts induced by changes in
vehicle prices and fuel economy levels could lead to changes in fleet's
footprint distribution. However, neither agency is currently able to
include vehicle choice modeling in our analysis. So, based on the
regulatory design, the analysis assumes this final rule will not have
the effects described above. The agencies will monitor the vehicle
fleet going forward to see if there are changes in vehicle footprint,
weight, or if there are shifts in the production volumes of models that
are produced, and consistent with confidentiality and other
requirements, the agencies intend to make these data publicly available
when they are compiled and will use that information to inform the mid-
term review.
c. What are the Agencies' plans going forward?
The agencies will closely be monitoring the visible effects of
CAFE/GHG standards on vehicle safety as these standards are
implemented, and will conduct a full analysis of safety impacts as part
of NHTSA's future rulemaking to establish final MYs 2022-2025 standards
and the mid-term evaluation. We are mindful of the comments submitted
by the Alliance and Volvo that there are many uncertainties associated
with the agencies' safety analysis in this rulemaking, including the
course of development of vehicle technologies (including, but not
limited to, light-weighting technologies) to achieve these standards
given the timeframe covered by this rulemaking, the composition of the
future fleet mix with respect to vehicle weight, vehicle size, vehicle
compatibility/incompatibility that could result in response to the
standards set in this rulemaking, the continued development of
alternative drive trains and their penetration and how those changes
interact with changes in vehicle weight, the new development of safety
technologies (both active and passive), and the vehicle turn-over rate,
which is driven by many factors outside of the agencies' or
manufacturers' control. As the Alliance stated in its comments,
``Achieving the proposed CAFE and GHG standards will rely on the
availability of commercially viable emerging technologies for
manufacturers to adopt. Should these technologies fail to mature as
[[Page 62768]]
anticipated, greater reliance on mass reduction and downsizing in order
to achieve these standards could occur.'' \386\ The agencies emphasize
that the final standards are premised almost entirely on increased
penetration of technologies which already exist, or which are expected
to be in commercial application in the early model years of the
standards. See Joint TSD section 3.1. (explaining, technology-by-
technology, which are already in use and their effectiveness, and which
are considered available for purposes of the analyses underlying this
rulemaking). The Alliance also stressed that the agencies should
``continuously update the safety analysis'' going forward, and that
updating the safety analysis as part of the mid-term evaluation was
``critical'' ``to reflect the most recent crash data and revised
projections regarding mass reduction scenarios,'' because ``the
proposed mid-term evaluation is essential in order to assure that the
maximum feasible fuel economy benefits are obtained in a cost-effective
and safety neutral manner.'' \387\ With respect to NHTSA's looking-
ahead approach \388\ in assessing the feasible amount of mass reduction
and the evaluation of concept vehicles, the Alliance stated that ``it
is not sufficient to only consider regulatory and consumer information
crash tests. A comprehensive evaluation of vehicle safety must also
take into account real-world impact scenarios and the special
requirements of vulnerable populations (e.g., children and elderly).
These must also be adequately accounted for in any agency policy
decisions.'' NHTSA does its best in the fleet simulation study to
consider as many real world crash scenarios as possible. In the fleet
simulation study, NHTSA is including risk functions for different
populations. All of the crash results are weighted for their actual
occurrence rates. As stated in NHTSA's 2011-2013 research and
rulemaking priority plan,\389\ the agency currently has programs
looking into the areas of safety for vulnerable occupants. NHTSA will
monitor the performance of these vulnerable occupants in the context of
the changing fleet in response to the fuel economy program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\386\ Alliance comments, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131, at pg 5.
\387\ Id., at pg 6.
\388\ Alliance categorized NHTSA's studies for feasible amount
of mass reduction and fleet simulation as ``looking-ahead'' approach
versus the statistical analysis as ``looking-back'' approach which
investigates the historical data.
\389\ http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/2011-2013_Vehicle_Safety-Fuel_Economy_Rulemaking-Research_Priority_Plan.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA acknowledges these concerns and will closely monitor the
safety data, the trends in vehicle weight and size, the trends in
vehicle mass reduction, as well as the trend for the active and passive
vehicle safety during the period between the release of this final rule
and the future rulemaking to establish final CAFE standards for MYs
2022-2025 and the mid-term evaluation. Consistent with confidentiality
and other requirements, NHTSA intends to make these data publicly
available when they are compiled. We agree with the comments by Global
Automakers that ``with sufficient lead-time, the implementation of
vehicle lightweighting strategies can be phased in, making it possible
to observe the safety implications in comparison with vehicles in the
existing fleet.'' \390\ The lead-time incorporated into these standards
will help the agencies and manufacturers monitor these trends and take
appropriate action. NHTSA will also continue and finish its study for
estimating fleet safety impacts due to lightweighting using the CAE
models available to the agency. NHTSA will also make appropriate
updates to the statistical study of historical data on the effects on
mass and size societal safety on an ongoing basis. At the same time,
NHTSA will continue to assess its analytical methods for assessing the
effects of vehicle mass and size on societal safety and make
appropriate updates if necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\ Global Automakers comments, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131, at
pg 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. EPA MYs 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards
A. Overview of EPA Rule
1. Introduction
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is finalizing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for light-duty vehicles,
light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles (hereafter light-
duty vehicles) for MYs 2017 through 2025. These vehicle categories,
which include cars, sport utility vehicles, minivans, and pickup trucks
used for personal transportation, are currently responsible for almost
60% of all U.S. transportation related GHG emissions.
This rule is the second EPA rule to regulate light-duty vehicle GHG
emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA), building upon the GHG
emissions standards for MYs 2012-2016 that were established in
2010,\391\ and the third rule to regulate GHG emissions from the
transportation sector.\392\ Combined with the standards already in
effect for MYs 2012-2016, these standards will result in MY 2025 light-
duty vehicles emitting approximately one-half of the GHG emissions of
MY 2010 light duty vehicles and represent the most significant federal
action ever taken to reduce GHG emissions (and improve fuel economy) in
this country's history.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\ 75 FR 25324 (May 7, 2010).
\392\ 76 FR 57106 (September 15, 2011) established GHG emission
standards for heavy-duty vehicles and engines for model years 2014-
2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soon after the completion of the successful MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking in May 2010, the President, with support from the auto
manufacturers and the United Auto Workers, requested that EPA and NHTSA
work to extend the National Program to MYs 2017-2025 light duty
vehicles. The agencies were requested by the President to develop ``a
coordinated national program under the CAA (Clean Air Act) and the EISA
(Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007) to improve fuel
efficiency and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of passenger cars and
light-duty trucks of model years 2017-2025.'' \393\ EPA's standards are
a result of our work with NHTSA and CARB in developing such a
continuation of the National Program. This final rule provides
important benefits to society and consumers in the form of reduced GHG
emissions and reduced consumption of oil, and significant fuel savings
for consumers. It provides the automobile industry with the important
certainty and lead time needed to implement the technology changes that
will achieve these benefits, as part of a harmonized set of federal
requirements. Acting now to address the standards for MYs 2017-2025
allows for the important continuation of the National Program that
started with MYs 2012-2016, and ensures that automakers will be able to
continue producing and selling a single fleet of vehicles across the
U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\ The Presidential Memorandum is found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-fuel-efficiency-standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From a societal standpoint, the GHG emissions standards are
projected to save approximately 2 billion metric tons of GHG emissions
and 4 billion barrels of oil over the lifetimes of those light-duty
vehicles sold in MYs 2017-2025. These savings come on top of savings
that would already be achieved through the continuation of EPA's MYs
2012-2016 standards.\394\ EPA estimates that
[[Page 62769]]
fuel savings will far outweigh higher vehicle costs, and that the net
benefits to society will be in the range of $326 billion (7% discount
rate) to $451 billion (3% discount rate) over the lifetimes of those
vehicles sold in MYs 2017-2025. Just in calendar year 2040 alone, after
the on-road vehicle fleet has largely turned over to vehicles sold in
MY 2025 and later, EPA projects GHG emissions savings of 455 million
metric tons, oil savings of 2.5 million barrels per day, and net
benefits of $158 billion using the $22/ton CO2 social cost
of carbon value. Cumulative net benefits, for calendar years 2017
through 2050 and expressed as a net present value in 2012, are
projected to be $616 billion (7% discount rate) to $1.4 trillion (3%
discount rate).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\ The cost and benefit estimates provided here are only for
the MYs 2017-2025 rulemaking. EPA and DOT's rulemakings establishing
standards for MYs 2012-2016, and DOT's MY 2011 rulemaking, are
already part of the baseline for this analysis. See EPA Regulatory
Impact Analysis 7.4 for the combined cost and benefit projections
for the MYs 2012-2016 and 2017-2025 rulemakings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These standards will save consumers significant monies over time.
The new technology that will be necessary to meet the CO2
standards is projected to add $1800 to the cost of a new MY 2025
vehicle. These costs come on top of costs that would already be imposed
through the continuation of EPA's MYs 2012-2016 standards. But those
consumers who drive their MY 2025 vehicle for its entire lifetime will
save, on average, $5700 (7% discount rate) to $7400 (3% discount rate)
in fuel savings, for a net lifetime savings of $3400 (7% discount rate)
to $5000 (3% discount rate).
For those consumers who purchase a new MY 2025 vehicle with cash,
the discounted fuel savings will offset the higher vehicle cost (plus
sales tax and higher insurance and maintenance costs up to that time)
in about 3.2 years (3% discount rate), i.e., that is the ``break-even''
point and after that ongoing fuel savings will greatly exceed the small
increases in insurance and maintenance costs. Those consumers that buy
a new MY 2025 vehicle with a 5-year loan (assuming a 5.35% interest
rate) will benefit from a positive monthly cash flow of about $12 (or
$140 per year), on average, as the monthly fuel savings more than
offsets the higher monthly payment.
EPA projects even more favorable payback and monthly cash flow for
used vehicle buyers, as most of the incremental technology cost is paid
for by the initial buyer due to depreciation. A consumer who pays cash
for a 5 or 10-year old used vehicle will typically reach payback in
approximately one year, while the monthly cash flow savings for a
credit purchase (assuming a 9.35% interest rate) will typically be
around $20 per month.
The standards are designed to allow full consumer choice, in that
they are footprint-based, i.e., larger vehicles have higher absolute
GHG emissions targets and smaller vehicles have lower absolute GHG
emissions targets. While the GHG emissions targets become more
stringent each year, the emissions targets have been selected to allow
compliance by vehicles of all sizes and with current levels of vehicle
attributes such as utility, size, safety, and performance. Accordingly,
these standards are projected to allow consumers to choose from the
same mix of vehicles that are currently in the marketplace.
Section I above provides a comprehensive overview of the joint EPA/
NHTSA rule including the history and rationale for a National Program
that allows manufacturers to build a single fleet of light-duty
vehicles that can satisfy all federal and state requirements for GHG
emissions and fuel economy, the level and structure of the GHG
emissions and corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, the
compliance flexibilities available to manufacturers, the mid-term
evaluation, and a summary of the costs and benefits of the GHG and CAFE
standards based on a ``model year lifetime analysis.''
In this Section III, EPA provides more detailed information about
EPA's GHG emissions standards. After providing an overview of key
information in this section (III.A), EPA discusses the standards
(III.B); the vehicles covered by the standards, various compliance
flexibilities available to manufacturers, and a mid-term evaluation
(III.C); the feasibility of the standards (III.D); provisions for
certification, compliance, and enforcement (III.E); the projected
reductions in GHG emissions due to the standards and the associated
effects of these reductions (III.F); the impact of the rule on non-GHG
emissions and their associated effects (III.G); the estimated cost,
economic, and other impacts of the rule (III.H); and various statutory
and executive order issues (III.I).
2. Why is EPA establishing MYs 2017-2025 standards for light-duty
vehicles?
a. Light Duty Vehicle Emissions Contribute to Greenhouse Gases and the
Threat of Climate Change
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are gases in the atmosphere that
effectively trap some of the Earth's heat that would otherwise escape
to space. GHGs are both naturally occurring and anthropogenic. The
primary GHGs of concern that are directly emitted by human activities
include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.
These gases, once emitted, remain in the atmosphere for decades to
centuries. They become well mixed globally in the atmosphere and their
concentrations accumulate when emissions exceed the rate at which
natural processes remove GHGs from the atmosphere. The heating effect
caused by the human-induced buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere is very
likely the cause of most of the observed global warming over the last
50 years. The key effects of climate change observed to date and
projected to occur in the future include, but are not limited to, more
frequent and intense heat waves, more severe wildfires, degraded air
quality, heavier and more frequent downpours and flooding, increased
drought, greater sea level rise, more intense storms, harm to water
resources, continued ocean acidification, harm to agriculture, and harm
to wildlife and ecosystems. All of these findings were recently
affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v.
EPA (No. 09-1322, June 26, 2012 (D.C. Circuit)).\395\ A more in depth
explanation of observed and projected changes in GHGs and climate
change, and the impact of climate change on public health, welfare,
society, and the environment, is included in Section III.F below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ See slip op. p. 30 (upholding all of EPA's findings and
stating ``EPA had before it substantial record evidence that
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases `very likely' caused
warming of the climate over the last several decades. EPA further
had evidence of current and future effects of this warming on public
health and welfare. Relying again upon substantial scientific
evidence, EPA determined that anthropogenically induced climate
change threatens both public health and public welfare. It found
that extreme weather events, changes in air quality, increases in
food- and water-borne pathogens, and increases in temperatures are
likely to have adverse health effects. The record also supports
EPA's conclusion that climate change endangers human welfare by
creating risk to food production and agriculture, forestry, energy,
infrastructure, ecosystems, and wildlife. Substantial evidence
further supported EPA's conclusion that the warming resulting from
the greenhouse gas emissions could be expected to create risks to
water resources and in general to coastal areas as a result of
expected increase in sea level.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobile sources represent a significant share of U.S. GHG emissions
and include light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, medium-duty
passenger vehicles, heavy-duty trucks, airplanes, railroads, marine
vessels and a variety of other sources. In 2010, mobile sources emitted
30% of all U.S. GHGs, and have been the source of the largest absolute
increase in U.S. GHGs since
[[Page 62770]]
1990. Transportation sources, which do not include certain off highway
sources such as farm and construction equipment, account for 27% of
U.S. GHG emissions, and motor vehicles (CAA section 202(a)), which
include light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, medium-duty passenger
vehicles, heavy-duty trucks, buses, and motorcycles, account for 23% of
total U.S. GHGs.
Light-duty vehicles emit carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and
hydrofluorocarbons. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the end product
of fossil fuel combustion. During combustion, the carbon stored in the
fuels is oxidized and emitted as CO2 and smaller amounts of
other carbon compounds. Methane (CH4) emissions are a
function of the methane content of the motor fuel, the amount of
hydrocarbons passing uncombusted through the engine, and any post-
combustion control of hydrocarbon emissions (such as catalytic
converters). Nitrous oxide or N2O (and nitrogen oxide or
NOX) emissions from vehicles and their engines are closely
related to air-fuel ratios, combustion temperatures, and the use of
pollution control equipment. For example, some types of catalytic
converters installed to reduce motor vehicle NOX, carbon
monoxide (CO) and hydrocarbon (HC) emissions can promote the formation
of N2O. Hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) are progressively replacing
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC) in
vehicle air conditioning systems as CFCs and HCFCs are being phased out
under the Montreal Protocol and Title VI of the CAA. There are multiple
emissions pathways for HFCs with emissions occurring during charging of
cooling and refrigeration systems, during operations, and during
decommissioning and disposal.
b. Basis for Action Under the Clean Air Act
Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) states that ``the
Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time
revise) * * * standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant
from any class or classes of new motor vehicles * * *, which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.'' The Administrator
has found that the elevated concentrations of a group of six GHGs in
the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
and welfare, and that emissions of GHGs from new motor vehicles and new
motor vehicle engines contribute to this air pollution.
As a result of these findings, section 202(a) requires EPA to issue
standards applicable to GHG emissions, and authorizes EPA to revise
them from time to time. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA
(No. 09-1322, June 26, 2012 (D.C. Circuit)) holding that under section
202(a), EPA has a mandatory duty to issue standards controlling
emissions of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles once it made a
positive endangerment determination, and rejecting all arguments to the
contrary as inconsistent with ``[b]oth the plain text of Section 202(a)
and precedent'' (slip op. p. 40). This preamble describes the revisions
to the current standards to control emissions of CO2 and
HFCs from new light-duty motor vehicles.\396\ For further discussion of
EPA's authority under section 202(a), see Section I.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\ EPA is not amending the substantive standards adopted in
the 2012-2016 light-duty vehicle rule for N2O and
CH4, but is revising the options that manufacturers have
in meeting the N2O and CH4 standards, and to
the timeframe for manufacturers to begin measuring N2O
emissions. See Section III.B below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. EPA's Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act
On December 15, 2009, EPA published its findings that elevated
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs are reasonably anticipated to
endanger the public health and welfare of current and future
generations, and that emissions of GHGs from new motor vehicles
contribute to this air pollution. Further information on these findings
may be found at 74 FR 66496 (December 15, 2009) and 75 FR 49566 (Aug.
13, 2010). As noted, the D.C. Circuit rejected all industry and State
challenges to the endangerment finding, holding that EPA's endangerment
determination was supported by ``substantial scientific evidence''.
Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA (No. 09-1322, June 26, 2012
(D.C. Circuit)) slip op. p. 30.
3. What is EPA finalizing?
a. Light-Duty Vehicle, Light-Duty Truck, and Medium-Duty Passenger
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Projected Emissions
Levels
This section provides an overview of EPA's final rule. The key
public comments are discussed in the sections that follow, which
provide the details of the program. A fuller discussion of comments is
in EPA's separate Response to Comments document.
The major elements of EPA's final rule are being finalized as
proposed, including overall stringency and timing, and the
CO2-footprint target curves. With respect to the key program
design elements, a few changes have been made subsequent to the
proposal, in response to public comment, including the addition of
multiplier incentives for dedicated and dual fuel CNG vehicles for MYs
2017-2021, temporary lead time provisions for intermediate volume
manufacturers, and some relatively minor changes in the off-cycle
credit and hybrid pick-up truck incentive programs.
EPA is finalizing new tailpipe carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions standards for cars and light trucks based on the
CO2 emissions-footprint curves for cars and light trucks
that are shown above in Section I.B.3 and below in Section III.B.\397\
These curves establish different CO2 emissions targets for
each unique car and truck footprint value. Generally, the larger the
vehicle footprint, the higher the corresponding vehicle CO2
emissions target. Vehicle CO2 emissions will be measured
over the EPA city and highway tests. Under this rule, various
incentives and credits are available for manufacturers to demonstrate
compliance with the standards. See Section I.B for a comprehensive
overview of both the CO2 emissions-footprint standard curves
and the various compliance flexibilities that are available to the
manufacturers in meeting the tailpipe CO2 standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\ EPA is not changing the 0.010 gram per mile N2O
or 0.030 gram per mile CH4 standards which were
established in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking. See Section III.B for a
discussion of the N2O and CH4 standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA projects that the tailpipe CO2 standards will yield
a fleetwide average light vehicle CO2 emissions compliance
target level in MY 2025 of 163 grams per mile,\398\ which represents an
average fleetwide reduction of 35 percent relative to the projected
average light vehicle CO2 level in MY 2016. On average, car
CO2 emissions would be reduced by about 5 percent per year,
while light truck CO2 emissions would be reduced by about
3.5 percent per year from MYs 2017 through 2021, and by about 5 percent
per year from MYs 2022 through 2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\ This translates to 54.5 mpg if met exclusively with fuel
economy technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following three tables, Table III-1 through Table III-3,
summarize EPA's projections of what the standards mean in terms of
CO2 emissions reductions for passenger cars, light trucks,
and the overall fleet combining passenger cars and light trucks for MYs
2017-2025. It is important to emphasize that these
[[Page 62771]]
projections are based on technical assumptions by EPA about various
matters, including the mix of cars and trucks, as well as the mix of
vehicle footprint values, in the fleet in varying years. It is possible
that the actual CO2 emissions values, as well as the actual
utilization of incentives and credits, will be either higher or lower
than the EPA projections.\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\ All EPA projections in the preamble are relative to a
2008-based reference fleet; see the EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis
for projections relative to a 2010-based reference fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In each of these tables, the column ``Projected CO2
Compliance Target'' represents our projected fleetwide average
CO2 compliance target value based on the CO2-
footprint curve standards as well as the projected mixes of cars and
trucks and vehicle footprint distributions.
The columns under ``Incentives'' represent the projected emissions
impact of the advanced technology multiplier incentives,\400\ as well
as the pickup truck incentives. Also shown under incentives is the
projected impact of the flexibilities provided to intermediate volume
manufacturers. These incentives allow manufacturers to meet their
compliance targets with CO2 emissions levels slightly higher
than they would otherwise have to be, but do not reflect actual real-
world CO2 emissions reductions. As such they reduce the
emissions reductions that the CO2 standards would be
expected to achieve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\ The advanced technology multiplier incentive applies to
EVs, PHEVs, FCVs, and CNG vehicles. The projections reflect EPA
projections of the use of EVs and PHEVs for MYs 2017-2021. It is, of
course, possible that there will be FCVs and CNG vehicles during
this timeframe as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The column ``Projected Achieved CO2'' is the sum of the
CO2 Compliance Target and the values in the ``Incentive''
columns. This Achieved CO2 value is a better reflection of
the CO2 emissions benefits of the standards, since it
accounts for the incentive programs.
One incentive that is not reflected in these tables is the 0 gram
per mile compliance value for EV/PHEV/FCVs. The 0 gram per mile value
accurately reflects the tailpipe CO2 gram per mile achieved
by these vehicles; however, fuel use from these vehicles will impact
the overall GHG reductions associated with the standards due to fuel
production and distribution-related upstream GHG emissions which are
projected to be greater than the upstream GHG emissions associated with
gasoline from oil. The combined impact of the 0 gram per mile
compliance value for EV/PHEV/FCVs and the advanced technology
multiplier on overall program GHG emissions is discussed in more detail
below in Section III.C.2.d.
The columns under ``Credits'' quantify the projected CO2
emissions credits that we project manufacturers will achieve through
improvements in air conditioner refrigerants and efficiency, as well as
certain off-cycle technologies. These credits reflect real world
emissions reductions, so they do not raise the levels of the Achieved
CO2 values, but they do allow manufacturers to meet their
compliance targets with 2-cycle test CO2 emissions values
higher than otherwise. For the off-cycle credit program, values are
projected for two technologies--active aerodynamics and stop-start
systems--EPA is not quantifying the use of additional off-cycle
technologies at this time because of a lack of information with respect
to the likely use of additional off-cycle technologies.
In the MYs 2012-2016 rule, we estimated the impact of the Temporary
Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards credit in MY 2016 to be 0.1
gram/mile. Due to the small magnitude, we have not included this in the
following tables for the MY 2016 base year.
The column ``Projected 2-cycle CO2'' is the projected
fleetwide 2-cycle CO2 emissions values that manufacturers
would have to achieve in order to be able to comply with the standards.
This value is the sum of the projected fleetwide credit, incentive, and
Compliance Target values.
Table III-1--EPA Projections for Fleetwide Tailpipe Emissions Compliance With CO2 Standards--Passenger Cars \401\
[Grams per mile]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incentives \402\ Credits
Projected ---------------------------- Projected -----------------------------------------
Model year CO2 Advanced Intermediate achieved Projected 2-
compliance technology volume CO2 Off cycle A/C A/C cycle CO2
target multiplier provisions credit refrigerant efficiency
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 (base)................................. 225 \403\ 0 0 225 0.4 5.4 4.8 235
2017........................................ 212 0.6 0.1 213 0.5 7.8 5.0 226
2018........................................ 202 1.1 0.3 203 0.6 9.3 5.0 218
2019........................................ 191 1.6 0.1 193 0.7 10.8 5.0 210
2020........................................ 182 1.5 0.1 183 0.8 12.3 5.0 201
2021........................................ 172 1.2 0.0 173 0.8 13.8 5.0 193
2022........................................ 164 0.0 0.0 164 0.9 13.8 5.0 184
2023........................................ 157 0.0 0.0 157 1.0 13.8 5.0 177
2024........................................ 150 0.0 0.0 150 1.1 13.8 5.0 170
2025........................................ 143 0.0 0.0 143 1.4 13.8 5.0 163
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\401\ Projected results using 2008-based fleet projection
analysis. These values differ slightly from those shown in the
proposal because of revisions to the MY 2008-based fleet and updates
to the analysis.
\402\ An incentive not reflected in this table is the 0 gram per
mile compliance value for EV/PHEV/FCVs. See text for explanation.
\403\ The projected compliance levels for 2016 are different
than those which were projected in the MYs 2012-2016 rule. Our
assessment for this rule is based on a predicted 2016 compliance
target of 224 for cars, 297 for trucks, and 252 for the fleet. This
is because the standards are footprint based and the fleet
projections, hence the footprint distributions, change slightly with
each update of our projections, as described below. In addition, the
actual fleet compliance levels for any model year will not be known
until the end of that model year based on actual vehicle sales.
[[Page 62772]]
Table III-2--EPA Projections for Fleetwide Tailpipe Emissions Compliance with CO2 Standards--Light Trucks \404\
[Grams per mile]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incentives \405\ Credits
Projected ---------------------------- Projected -----------------------------------------
Model year CO2 Pickup mild Intermediate achieved Projected 2-
compliance HEV + strong volume CO2 Off cycle A/C A/C cycle CO2
target HEV provisions credit refrigerant efficiency
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 (base)................................. \406\ 298 0 0.0 298 0.7 6.6 4.8 310
2017........................................ 295 0.1 0.2 295 0.9 7 5 308
2018........................................ 286 0.2 0.3 287 1.0 11 5 304
2019........................................ 277 0.3 0.2 278 1.2 13.4 7.2 299
2020........................................ 269 0.4 0.2 270 1.4 15.3 7.2 294
2021........................................ 249 0.5 0.0 250 1.5 17.2 7.2 276
2022........................................ 237 0.6 0.0 238 2.2 17.2 7.2 264
2023........................................ 225 0.6 0.0 226 2.9 17.2 7.2 253
2024........................................ 214 0.7 0.0 214 3.6 17.2 7.2 242
2025........................................ 203 0.8 0.0 204 4.3 17.2 7.2 233
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\ Projected results using 2008-based fleet projection analysis. These values differ slightly from those shown in the proposal because of revisions
to the MY 2008-based fleet and updates to the analysis.
\405\ An incentive not reflected in this table is the 0 gram per mile compliance value for EV/PHEV/FCVs. See text for explanation.
\406\ The projected compliance levels for 2016 are different than those which were projected in the MYs 2012-2016 rule. Our assessment for this rule is
based on a predicted 2016 compliance target of 224 for cars, 297 for trucks, and 252 for the fleet. This is because the standards are footprint based
and the fleet projections, hence the footprint distributions, change slightly with each update of our projections, as described below. In addition,
the actual fleet compliance levels for any model year will not be known until the end of that model year based on actual vehicle sales.
Table III-3--EPA Projections for Fleetwide Tailpipe Emissions Compliance With CO2 Standards--Combined Passenger Cars and Light Trucks \407\
[Grams per mile]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incentives \408\ Credits
Projected ------------------------------------------ Projected ------------------------------------- Projected
Model year CO2 Advanced Pickup mild Intermediate achieved 2-cycle
compliance technology HEV + strong volume CO2 Off cycle A/C A/C CO2
target multiplier HEV provision credit refrigerant efficiency
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 (base)......................... \409\250 0 0 ............ 250 0.5 5.8 4.8 261
2017................................ 243 0.4 0.0 0.1 243 0.6 7.5 5.0 256
2018................................ 232 0.7 0.1 0.3 234 0.8 9.9 5.0 249
2019................................ 222 1.0 0.1 0.1 223 0.9 11.7 5.8 242
2020................................ 213 1.0 0.1 0.1 214 1.0 13.4 5.8 234
2021................................ 199 0.8 0.2 ............ 200 1.1 15.0 5.8 222
2022................................ 190 0.0 0.2 ............ 190 1.4 15.0 5.8 212
2023................................ 180 0.0 0.2 ............ 181 1.7 15.0 5.8 203
2024................................ 171 0.0 0.2 ............ 172 1.9 14.9 5.7 194
2025................................ 163 0.0 0.3 ............ 163 2.3 14.9 5.7 186
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\ Projected results using 2008-based fleet projection analysis. These values differ slightly from those shown in the proposal because of revisions
to the MY 2008-based fleet and updates to the analysis.
\408\ The one incentive not reflected in this table is the 0 gram per mile compliance value for EV/PHEV/FCVs. See text for explanation.
\409\ The projected compliance levels for 2016 are different than those which were projected in the MYs 2012-2016 rule. Our assessment for this rule is
based on a predicted 2016 compliance target of 224 for cars, 297 for trucks, and 252 for the fleet. This is because the standards are footprint based
and the fleet projections, hence the footprint distributions, change slightly with each update of our projections, as described below. In addition,
the actual fleet compliance levels for any model year will not be known until the end of that model year based on actual vehicle sales.
Table III-4 shows the projected real world CO2 emissions
and fuel economy values associated with the CO2 standards.
These real world estimates, similar to values shown on new vehicle
labels, reflect the fact that the way cars and trucks are operated in
the real world generally results in higher CO2 emissions and
lower fuel economy than laboratory test results used to determine
compliance with the standards, which are performed under tightly
controlled conditions. There are many assumptions that must be made for
these projections and real world CO2 emissions and fuel
economy performance can vary based on many factors.
The real world tailpipe CO2 emissions projections in
Table III-4 are calculated starting with the projected 2-cycle
CO2 emissions values in Table III-1 through Table III-3,
subtracting the air conditioner efficiency and off-cycle credits,\410\
and then multiplying by a factor of 1.25. The 1.25 factor is an
approximation of the ratio of real world CO2 emissions to 2-
cycle test CO2 emissions for the fleet in the recent past.
It is not possible to know the appropriate factor for future vehicle
fleets, as this factor will depend on many factors such as technology
[[Page 62773]]
performance, driver behavior, climate conditions, fuel composition,
congestion, etc. Issues associated with future projections of this
factor are discussed in TSD 4. The real world fuel economy value is
calculated by dividing 8887 grams of CO2 per gallon of
gasoline by the real world tailpipe CO2 emissions
value.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\ Air conditioner efficiency and off-cycle credits are
subtracted from the Projected 2-cycle CO2 values (which
include the air conditioner efficiency and off-cycle credits)
because they will decrease real world CO2 emissions and
increase real world fuel economy. The same results can be obtained
from starting with the Projected Achieved CO2 values in
Tables III-1 through Table III-3 and adding the A/C Refrigerant
values.
\411\ So this value will be different if there is significant
use of diesel fuel.
Table III-4--EPA Projections for the Average, Real World Fleetwide Tailpipe CO2 Emissions and Fuel Economy Associated With the CO2 Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Real world tailpipe CO2 (grams per mile) Real World Fuel Economy (miles per gallon)
Model year -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks Cars + trucks Cars Trucks Cars + trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 (base)............................................. 287 381 320 30.9 23.3 27.8
2017.................................................... 276 378 313 32.2 23.5 28.4
2018.................................................... 266 373 304 33.5 23.9 29.2
2019.................................................... 255 363 294 34.8 24.5 30.2
2020.................................................... 244 357 284 36.4 24.9 31.3
2021.................................................... 234 334 269 38.0 26.6 33.1
2022.................................................... 223 318 256 39.9 27.9 34.7
2023.................................................... 215 304 244 41.3 29.3 36.4
2024.................................................... 205 289 233 43.4 30.8 38.1
2025.................................................... 196 277 223 45.4 32.1 40.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed both in Section I and later in Section III, EPA is
finalizing provisions for averaging, banking, and trading of credits,
that allow annual credits for a manufacturer's over-compliance with its
unique fleet-wide average standard, carry-forward and carry-backward of
credits, the ability to transfer credits between a manufacturer's car
and truck fleets, and credit trading between manufacturers. EPA is also
finalizing a one-time provision allowing credits generated in MYs 2012-
2016 to be carried forward through MY 2021. These provisions are not
expected to change the emissions reductions achieved by the standards,
but should reduce the cost of achieving those reductions. The tables
above do not reflect the year to year impact of these provisions. For
example, car-to-truck or truck-to-car credit transfers could affect the
projected values in Table III-1 and Table III-2, but such credit
transfers between cars and trucks would not be expected to change the
results for the combined fleet, reflected in Table III-3.
The rule also exempts from the standards a limited set of vehicles:
emergency and police vehicles, and (as in the MYs 2012-2016 GHG
standards) vehicles manufactured by small businesses. As discussed in
Section III.B below, these exclusions have a very limited impact on the
total GHG emissions reductions from the light-duty vehicle fleet. We
also do not anticipate significant impacts on total GHG emissions
reductions from the provisions allowing small volume manufacturers to
petition EPA for alternative standards. See Section III.B.5 below.
b. Environmental and Economic Benefits and Costs of EPA's Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Standards
i. Model Year Lifetime Analysis
Section I.C provides a comprehensive discussion of the projected
benefits and costs associated with MYs 2017-2025 GHG and CAFE standards
based on a ``model year lifetime'' analysis, i.e., the benefits and
costs associated with the lifetime operation of the new vehicles sold
in these nine model years. It is important to note that while the
incremental vehicle technology costs associated with MY 2017 vehicles
will in fact occur in calendar year 2017, the benefits associated with
MY 2017 vehicles will be split among all the calendar years from 2017
through the calendar year during which the last MY 2017 vehicle is
retired.
Table III-5 provides a summary of the GHG emissions and oil savings
associated with the lifetime operation of all the vehicles sold in each
model year. Cumulatively, for the nine model years from 2017 through
2025, the standards are projected to save approximately 2 billion
metric tons of GHG emissions and nearly 4 billion barrels of oil. These
savings come on top of savings that would already be achieved through
the continuation of EPA's MYs 2012-2016 standards.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\ The cost and benefit estimates provided here are only for
the MYs 2017-2025 rulemaking. EPA and DOT's rulemakings establishing
standards for MYs 2012-2016, and DOT's MY 2011 rulemaking, are
already part of the baseline for this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-6 provides a summary of the most important projected
economic impacts of the GHG emissions standards based on this model
year lifetime analytical approach. These monetized dollar values are
all discounted to the first year of each model year, and then are
summed up across all model years. With a 3% discount rate, cumulative
incremental vehicle program costs for MYs 2017-2025 vehicles are $150
billion (with $136 billion of that being new technology and $14 billion
being increased maintenance), fuel savings are $475 billion, other
monetized benefits are $126 billion, and program net benefits are
projected to be $451 billion. Using a 7% discount rate, the projected
program net benefits are $326 billion.
Table III-5--Summary of GHG Emissions and Oil Savings for Model Year Lifetime Analysis of CO2 Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative
MY 2017 MY 2018 MY 2019 MY 2020 MY 2021 MY 2022 MY 2023 MY 2024 MY 2025 MY 2017-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GHG Savings (MMT)............................... 30.5 69.6 108 149 216 270 320 371 423 1,956
[[Page 62774]]
Oil Savings (Billion Barrels)................... 0.06 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.41 0.53 0.64 0.75 0.86 3.87
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-6--Summary of Key Projected Economic Impacts, on a Lifetime
Present Value Basis, \413\ for Model Year Lifetime Analysis of CO2
Standards
[Billions of 2010 dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% 7%
discount discount
rate rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental Vehicle Program Cost.................. $150 $144
Societal Fuel Savings \414\....................... 475 364
Other Benefits.................................... 126 106
Program Net Benefits.............................. 451 326
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\ Present value discounts all values to the first year of each MY,
then susms those present values across MYs, in 2010 dollars.
ii. Calendar Year Analysis
In addition to the model year lifetime analysis projections
summarized above, EPA also performs a ``calendar year'' analysis that
projects the environmental and economic impacts associated with the
tailpipe CO2 standards during specific calendar years out to
2050. This calendar year approach reflects the timeframe when the
benefits would be achieved and the costs incurred. Because the EPA
CO2 emissions standards will remain in effect unless and
until they are changed, the projected impacts in this calendar year
analysis beyond calendar year 2025 reflect vehicles sold in model years
after 2025 (e.g., most of the benefits in calendar year 2040 would be
due to vehicles sold after MY 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ All fuel impacts are calculated with pre-tax fuel prices
of $3.22 per gallon in calendar year 2017, rising to $3.49 per
gallon in calendar year 2025, and $3.88 per gallon in calendar year
2040, and electricity prices of $0.09 per kWh in 2017 and $0.10 in
2025, and $0.11 per kWh in 2040, all in 2010 dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-7 provides a summary of the most important projected
benefits and costs of the EPA GHG emissions standards based on this
calendar year analysis. In calendar year 2025, EPA projects GHG savings
of 140 million metric tons and oil savings of 0.76 million barrels per
day. These would grow to 569 million metric tons of GHG savings and 3.2
million barrels of oil per day by calendar year 2050. Program net
benefits are projected to be $19.3 billion in calendar year 2025,
growing to $217 billion in calendar year 2050. Program net benefits
over the 34-year period from 2017 through 2050 are projected to have a
net present value in 2012 of $616 billion (7% discount rate) to $1.4
trillion (3% discount rate).
More details associated with this calendar year analysis of the GHG
standards are presented in Sections III.F (including projected annual
GHG savings for CYs 2017-2050) and III.H (including projected annual
oil savings for CYs 2017-2050).
Table III-7--Summary of Key Projected Impacts for CO2 Standards--Calendar Year Analysis 415
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2017-2050 Net Present
Value in 2012
CY 2017 CY 2020 CY 2025 CY 2030 CY 2040 CY 2050 -------------------------------
3% discount 7% discount
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GHG Savings (MMT per Year)............................ 2.4 27.0 140 271 455 569 .............. ..............
Oil Savings (Million Barrels per Year)................ 4.7 51.2 277 547 926 1,161 .............. ..............
Oil Savings (Million Barrels per Day)................. 0.01 0.14 0.76 1.5 2.5 3.2 .............. ..............
Incremental Vehicle Program Cost (billions of 2010$).. -$2.47 -$9.19 -$32.9 -$35.9 -$41.0 -$46.5 -$561 -$247
Societal Fuel Savings (billions of 2010$) \416\....... $0.65 $7.4 $41.7 $86.4 $155 $212 $1,600 $607
Other Benefits (billions of 2010$).................... $0.14 $1.59 $9.28 $21.2 $40.0 $47.2 $395 $256
Program Net Benefits (billions of 2010$) \417\........ -$1.65 $0.15 $19.3 $73.9 $158 $217 $1,430 $616
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Consumer Analysis
The model year lifetime and calendar year analytical approaches
discussed above aggregate the environmental and economic impacts across
the nationwide light vehicle fleet. EPA has also projected the average
impact of the CO2 emissions standards on individual
consumers who own and drive MY 2025 light-duty vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ Values in columns 2 through 7 are undiscounted annual
values, values in columns 8 and 9 are discounted to a net present
value in 2012.
\416\ All fuel impacts are calculated with pre-tax fuel prices
of $3.22 per gallon in calendar year 2017, rising to $3.49 per
gallon in calendar year 2025, and $3.88 per gallon in calendar year
2040, and electricity prices of $0.09 per kWh in 2017, rising to
$0.10 in 2025, and $0.11 per kWh in 2040, all in 2010 dollars.
\417\ Assuming the 3% average SCC value and other benefits of
the program not presented in this table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-8 projects, on average, several key consumer impacts
associated with the tailpipe CO2 emissions standards for MY
2025 vehicles. Some of these factors are dependent on the assumed
discount factors, and this table uses the same 3% and 7% discount
factors used throughout this preamble. EPA uses AEO2012 early release
fuel price projections of $3.63 per gallon in calendar year 2017,
rising to $3.87 per gallon in calendar year 2025 and $4.24 per gallon
in calendar year 2040 (all fuel prices include taxes).
EPA projects that the new technology necessary to meet the MY 2025
tailpipe emissions standards would add, on average, an extra $1800
(including markup) to the sticker price of a new
[[Page 62775]]
MY 2025 light-duty vehicle. Including higher vehicle sales taxes, and
first-year insurance and maintenance costs, the projected incremental
first-year cost to the consumer is about $2000 on average. The
projected incremental lifetime vehicle cost to the consumer, reflecting
higher maintenance costs and insurance premiums over the life of the
vehicle, is, on average, about $2400 (3% discount rate) or $2300 (7%
discount rate). For consumers who drive MY 2025 light-duty vehicles
over the full vehicle lifetimes, the final standards are projected to
yield a net savings of $3,400 (7% discount rate) to $5,000 (3%
discount) over the lifetime of the vehicle, as the discounted lifetime
fuel savings of $5,700-$7,400 (7% and 3% discount rates, respectively)
is 2.5-3.1 times greater than the incremental lifetime vehicle cost to
the consumer.
Of course, many vehicles are owned by more than one consumer. The
payback period and monthly cash flow approaches are two ways to
evaluate the economic impact of the MY 2025 standard on those new car
buyers who do not own the vehicle for its entire lifetime. Projected
payback periods of 3.2-3.4 years means that, for a consumer that buys a
new MY 2025 vehicle with cash, the discounted fuel savings for that
consumer would more than offset the total incremental vehicle costs
(including technology, sales tax, insurance and maintenance), up to
that time, in about 3.3 years. If the consumer owns the vehicle beyond
this payback period, the vehicle will save money for the consumer as
the ongoing fuel savings greatly exceed the small ongoing incremental
insurance and maintenance costs. For a consumer that buys a new MY 2025
vehicle with a 5-year loan, the average monthly cash flow savings of
$11 (7% discount rate) or $13 (3% discount rate), or annual savings of
$130-$150, shows that the consumer would benefit immediately as the
discounted monthly fuel savings more than offsets the higher monthly
costs from higher incremental loan payments, plus insurance and
maintenance costs.
The consumer impacts are even more favorable for used vehicle
buyers, as most of the incremental technology cost is paid for by the
original purchaser. EPA projects that the payback period would be 1.1
years for a 5-year old used vehicle, and about 6 months for a 10-year
old used vehicle. Consumers that buy a used 5-year old vehicle with a
3-year loan would realize monthly cash flow savings of about $21-23 per
month, and these savings would be $23-24 for a buyer of a 10-year old
vehicle with a 3-year loan.
The final entries in Table III-8 show the CO2 and oil
savings that would be associated with the MY 2025 vehicles on average,
both on a lifetime basis and in the first full year of operation. On
average, a consumer who owns a MY 2025 vehicle for its entire lifetime
is projected to emit 21 fewer metric tons of CO2 and consume
2,300 fewer gallons of gasoline due to the tailpipe CO2
emissions standards.
Table III-8--Summary of Key Projected Consumer Impacts for MY 2025 CO2
Standards 418 419
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% Discount rate 7% Discount rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental Vehicle $1800.
Technology Cost.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental First-Year $2000.
Vehicle Cost to Consumer
\420\.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental Lifetime Vehicle $2400............... $2300.
Cost to Consumer \421\.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Consumer Fuel $7400............... $5700.
Savings \422\.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Consumer Net $5000............... $3400.
Savings \423\.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payback Period-New Vehicle- 3.2 years........... 3.4 years.
Cash Purchase.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payback Period-Used 5 Year 1.1 years........... 1.1 years.
Old Vehicle-Cash Purchase.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payback Period-Used 10 Year 0.5 years........... 0.5 years.
Old Vehicle-Cash Purchase.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly Cash Flow Savings- $13................. $11.
New Vehicle-5 Year Loan.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly Cash Flow Savings- $23................. $21.
Used 5 Year Old Vehicle-3
Year Loan.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly Cash Flow Savings- $24................. $23.
Used 10 Year Old Vehicle-3
Year Loan.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
First Year CO2 Savings \424\ 1.6 metric tons.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime CO2 Savings........ 21 metric tons.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
First Year Gasoline/Oil 180 gallons.
Savings.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Gasoline/Oil 2300 gallons.
Savings.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62776]]
4. Basis for the GHG Standards under Section 202(a)
EPA has significant discretion under section 202(a) of the Act in
how to structure the standards that apply to the emission of the air
pollutant at issue here, the aggregate group of six GHGs, as well as to
the content of such standards. See generally 74 FR 49464-65. EPA
statutory authority under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA)
is discussed in more detail in Section I.D of the preamble. In this
rulemaking, EPA is adopting a CO2 tailpipe emissions
standard that provides for credits based on reductions of HFCs, as the
appropriate way to issue standards applicable to emissions of the
single air pollutant, the aggregate group of six GHGs. EPA is not
changing the methane and nitrous oxide emissions standards already in
place (although EPA is changing some compliance mechanisms for these
standards as explained in Section III.B below). EPA is not setting any
standards for perfluorocarbons or sulfur hexafluoride, as they are not
emitted by motor vehicles. The following is a summary of the basis for
the GHG emissions standards under section 202(a), which is discussed in
more detail in the following portions of Section III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\ Average impact of all MY 2025 light-duty vehicles,
excluding VMT rebound effect.
\419\ Most values have been rounded to two significant digits in
this summary table and therefore may be slightly different than
tables elsewhere.
\420\ Incremental First-Year Vehicle Cost to Consumer includes
the incremental vehicle technology cost, average nationwide sales
tax, first-year increased insurance premiums, and first-year
increased maintenance costs.
\421\ Incremental Lifetime Vehicle Cost to Consumer includes the
incremental vehicle technology cost, average nationwide sales tax,
and the discounted costs associated with incremental lifetime
insurance premiums and maintenance costs.
\422\ All fuel impacts are calculated with fuel prices,
including fuel taxes, of $3.87 per gallon in calendar year 2025,
rising to $4.24 per gallon in calendar year 2040, and electricity
prices of $0.10 per kWh 2025, and $0.11 per kWh in 2040, all in 2010
dollars.
\423\ Lifetime Consumer Fuel Savings minus Incremental Lifetime
Vehicle Cost to Consumer.
\424\ CO2 and gasoline savings reflect vehicle
tailpipe-only and do not include CO2 and oil savings
associated with fuel production and distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to CO2 and HFCs, EPA is setting attribute-
based light-duty car and truck standards that achieve large and
important emissions reductions of GHGs. EPA has evaluated the
technological feasibility of the standards, and the information and
analysis performed by EPA indicates that these standards are feasible
in the lead time provided. EPA and NHTSA have carefully evaluated the
effectiveness of individual technologies as well as the interactions
when technologies are combined. EPA projects that manufacturers will be
able to meet the standards by employing a wide variety of technologies
that are already commercially available, as well as some emerging
technologies. EPA's analysis also takes into account certain
flexibilities that will facilitate compliance. These flexibilities
include averaging, banking, and trading of various types of credits.
For a few very small volume manufacturers, EPA is allowing
manufacturers to petition EPA to develop a manufacturer-specific
standard in lieu of the main standard.
EPA, as a part of its joint technology analysis with NHTSA, has
performed what we believe is the most comprehensive federal vehicle
technology analysis in history. We carefully considered the cost to
manufacturers of meeting the standards, estimating costs for all
candidate technologies including direct manufacturing costs, cost
markups to account for manufacturers' indirect costs, and manufacturer
cost reductions attributable to learning. In estimating manufacturer
costs, EPA took into account manufacturers' own practices such as
making major changes to vehicle technology packages during a planned
redesign cycle. EPA then projected the average cost across the industry
to employ this technology, as well as manufacturer-by-manufacturer
costs. EPA considers the per-vehicle costs estimated by this analysis
to be within a reasonable range in light of the emissions reductions
and benefits achieved. EPA also projects that the fuel savings over the
life of the vehicles will more than offset the increase in cost
associated with the technology used to meet the standards.
EPA recognizes that most of the technologies that we are
considering for purposes of setting standards under section 202(a) are
commercially available and already being utilized to at least a limited
extent across the fleet, or will soon be commercialized by one or more
major manufacturers. As discussed in Section III.D.7, after accounting
for expected improvements in air conditioning systems, many MY 2012 and
MY 2013 vehicles would already be able to meet GHG emissions targets
for MY 2017 without additional changes in powertrain technology, and
some vehicles could meet GHG emissions targets for some later model
years as well. The vast majority of the emission reductions that would
result from this rule would result from the increased use of currently
available technologies such as engines with direct injection,
turbocharging, and cooled exhaust gas recirculation, stop-start
systems, advanced transmissions with more gears and more efficient
gearing mechanisms, and improved tires, aerodynamics, and accessories.
Various combinations of these technologies can work for different
vehicle models, and typically there are multiple technology paths for
achieving compliance for a given model. EPA also recognizes that this
rule would enhance the development and commercialization of more
advanced technologies, such as PHEVs and EVs and strong hybrids as
well. In this technological context, there is no clear cut line that
indicates that only one projection of technology penetration could
potentially be considered feasible for purposes of section 202(a), or
only one standard that could potentially be considered a reasonable
balancing of the factors relevant under section 202(a). EPA therefore
evaluated several alternative standards, some more stringent than the
promulgated standards and some less stringent. Less stringent standards
would forego emission reductions which are feasible, cost effective,
and cost feasible, with short consumer payback periods. More stringent
standards would increase cost--both to manufacturers and to consumers--
with the potential for overly aggressive penetration rates for advanced
technologies, especially in the face of unknown degree of consumer
acceptance of both the increased costs and the technologies themselves.
See Section III.D.6 for EPA's analysis of alternative GHG emissions
standards.
EPA has also evaluated the impacts of these standards with respect
to reductions in GHGs and reductions in oil usage. For the lifetime of
the MYs 2017-2025 vehicles we estimate GHG reductions of approximately
2 billion metric tons and fuel reductions of nearly 4 billion barrels
of oil. These savings come on top of savings that would already be
achieved through the continuation of EPA's MYs 2012-2016
standards.\425\ These are important and significant reductions. EPA has
also analyzed a variety of other impacts of the standards, ranging from
the standards' effects on emissions of non-GHG pollutants, impacts on
noise, energy, safety and congestion. EPA has also quantified the cost
and benefits of the standards, to the extent practicable. Our analysis
indicates that the overall
[[Page 62777]]
quantified benefits of the standards far outweigh the projected costs.
We estimate the total net social benefits (lifetime present value
discounted to the first year of the model year) over the life of MYs
2017-2025 vehicles to be $451 billion with a 3% discount rate and $326
billion with a 7% discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\ The cost and benefit estimates provided here are only for
the MYs 2017-2025 rulemaking. EPA and DOT's rulemakings establishing
standards for MYs 2012-2016, and DOT's MY 2011 rulemaking, are
already part of the baseline for this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under section 202(a), EPA is called upon to set standards that
provide adequate lead time for the development and application of
technology to meet the standards. EPA's standards satisfy this
requirement given the present existence of the technologies on which
the rule is predicated and the substantial lead times afforded under
the proposal (which by MY 2025 allow for multiple vehicle redesign
cycles and so affords opportunities for adding technologies in the most
cost efficient manner, see 75 FR 25407). In setting the standards, EPA
is called upon to weigh and balance various factors, and to exercise
judgment in setting standards that are a reasonable balance of the
relevant factors. In this case, EPA has considered many factors, such
as cost, impacts on emissions (both GHG and non-GHG), impacts on oil
conservation, impacts on noise, energy, safety, and other factors, and
has where practicable quantified the costs and benefits of the rule. In
summary, given the technical feasibility of the standard, the cost per
vehicle in light of the savings in fuel costs over the lifetime of the
vehicle, the very significant reductions in emissions and in oil usage,
and the significantly greater quantified benefits compared to
quantified costs, EPA is confident that the standards are an
appropriate and reasonable balance of the factors to consider under
section 202(a). See Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F. 3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (great discretion to balance statutory factors in considering
level of technology-based standard, and statutory requirement ``to
[give appropriate] consideration to the cost of applying * * *
technology'' does not mandate a specific method of cost analysis); see
also Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F. 2d 91, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (``In
reviewing a numerical standard we must ask whether the agency's numbers
are within a zone of reasonableness, not whether its numbers are
precisely right''); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 797
(1968) (same); Federal Power Commission v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271,
278 (1976) (same); Exxon Mobil Gas Marketing Co. v. FERC, 297 F. 3d
1071, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same).
5. Other Related EPA Motor Vehicle Regulations
a. EPA's Heavy-Duty GHG Emissions Rulemaking
In August 2011, EPA and NHTSA completed a joint rulemaking to
establish a comprehensive Heavy-Duty National Program that will reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and fuel consumption for on-road heavy-duty
vehicles beginning in MY 2014 (76 FR 57106 (September 15, 2011)). EPA's
final carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O),
and methane (CH4) emissions standards, along with NHTSA's
final fuel consumption standards, are tailored to each of three
regulatory categories of heavy-duty vehicles: (1) Combination Tractors;
(2) Heavy-duty Pickup Trucks and Vans; and (3) Vocational Vehicles. The
rules include separate standards for the engines that power combination
tractors and vocational vehicles. EPA also set hydrofluorocarbon
standards to control leakage from air conditioning systems in
combination tractors and heavy-duty pickup trucks and vans.
The agencies estimate that the combined standards will reduce
CO2 emissions by approximately 270 million metric tons and
save 530 million barrels of oil over the life of vehicles sold during
the 2014 through 2018 model years, providing $49 billion in net
societal benefits when private fuel savings are considered. See 76 FR
57125-27.
b. EPA's Plans for Further Standards for Light-Duty Vehicle Criteria
Pollutants and Gasoline Fuel Quality
In the May 21, 2010 Presidential Memorandum, in addition to
addressing GHGs and fuel economy, the President also requested that EPA
examine its broader motor vehicle air pollution control program. The
President requested that ``[t]he Administrator of the EPA review for
adequacy the current non-greenhouse gas emissions regulations for new
motor vehicles, new motor vehicle engines, and motor vehicle fuels,
including tailpipe emissions standards for nitrogen oxides and air
toxics, and sulfur standards for gasoline. If the Administrator of the
EPA finds that new emissions regulations are required, then I request
that the Administrator of the EPA promulgate such regulations as part
of a comprehensive approach toward regulating motor vehicles.'' \426\
EPA has been conducting an assessment of the potential need for
additional controls on light-duty vehicle non-GHG emissions and
gasoline fuel quality. EPA has been actively engaging in technical
conversations with the automobile industry, the oil industry,
nongovernmental organizations, the states, and other stakeholders on
the potential need for new regulatory action, including the areas that
are specifically mentioned in the Presidential Memorandum. EPA is also
coordinating with the State of California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ The Presidential Memorandum is found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-fuel-efficiency-standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on this assessment, in the near future, EPA expects to
propose a separate program that would, in general, affect the same set
of new vehicles on approximately the same timeline as would the new
light-duty vehicle GHG emissions standards. It would be designed to
primarily address air quality problems with ozone and PM, which
continue to be serious problems in many parts of the country, and
light-duty vehicles continue to contribute to these problems.
EPA expects that this program, called ``Tier 3'' vehicle and fuel
standards, would among other things propose tailpipe and evaporative
standards to reduce non-GHG pollutants from light-duty vehicles,
including volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, particulate
matter, and air toxics. EPA's intent, based on extensive interaction to
date with the automobile manufacturers and other stakeholders, is to
propose a Tier 3 program that would allow manufacturers to proceed with
coordinated future product development plans with a full understanding
of the major regulatory requirements they will be facing over the long
term. This regulatory approach would give manufacturers certainty in
planning given the long time period and would allow manufacturers to
design their future vehicles so that any technological challenges
associated with meeting both the GHG and Tier 3 standards could be
efficiently addressed.
It should be noted that under EPA's current regulations, GHG
emissions and CAFE compliance testing for gasoline vehicles is
conducted using a defined fuel that does not include any amount of
ethanol.\427\ If the certification test fuel is changed to include
ethanol through a future rulemaking, EPA would be required under EPCA
to address the need for a test procedure adjustment to preserve the
level of stringency of the
[[Page 62778]]
CAFE standards.\428\ EPA is committed to doing so in a timely manner to
ensure that any change in certification fuel will not affect the
stringency of future GHG emission standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\ See 40 CFR Sec. 86.113-94(a).
\428\ EPCA requires that CAFE tests be determined from the EPA
test procedures in place as of 1975, or procedures that give
comparable results. 49 U.S.C. 32904(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Model Year 2017-2025 GHG Standards for Light-duty Vehicles, Light-
duty Trucks, and Medium duty Passenger Vehicles
EPA is establishing standards to control the emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) from MY 2017 and later light-duty vehicles.
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas resulting
from the combustion of vehicular fuels, and the amount of
CO2 emitted is directly correlated to the amount of fuel
consumed. The standards regulate CO2 on a gram per mile (g/
mile) basis, and are separately applied to a manufacturer's car and
truck fleets. Under these standards, industry-wide average emissions
for the light-duty fleet are projected to be 163 g/mile of
CO2 in model year 2025.\429\ EPA will conduct a mid-term
evaluation of the GHG standards and other requirements for MYs 2022-
2025, as further discussed in Section III.B.3 below. EPA is not
changing the averaging, banking, and trading program elements from the
MY 2012-2016 rule, as discussed in Section III.B.4, with the exception
of a one-time carry-forward of any credits generated in MYs 2010-2016
to be used anytime through MY 2021. The standards described herein
apply to passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger
vehicles (MDPVs). As an overall group, they are referred to in this
preamble as light-duty vehicles or simply as vehicles. In this preamble
section, passenger cars may be referred to simply as ``cars'', and
light-duty trucks and MDPVs as ``light trucks'' or ``trucks.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\ The reference to CO2 here refers to
CO2 equivalent reductions, as this level includes some
reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases other than
CO2, from refrigerant leakage, as one part of the AC
related reductions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA is also establishing provisions for small and intermediate-
sized manufacturers. For small volume manufacturers with less than
5,000 vehicles, EPA is finalizing its proposal to allow these
manufacturers to petition EPA for alternative standards, which would be
established on a case-by-case basis (see Section III.B. 5). For
intermediate-sized limited line manufacturers, EPA had requested
comment on whether there is a need for additional lead time, and after
considering public comments on this topic, is finalizing provisions
providing additional lead time until MY 2021 for manufacturers with
sales of less than 50,000 vehicles (see Section III.B.6). As with the
MY 2012-2016 light-duty vehicle standards, EPA is exempting
manufacturers that meet the Small Business Administration's definition
of a small business from the standards (see section III.B. 7). EPA is
also finalizing its proposal to exempt police and emergency vehicles
from the GHG standards, beginning in MY 2012, consistent with how these
vehicles are treated under the CAFE program (see section III.B.8).
The MY 2012-2016 rule established several program elements that
will remain in place, without change. EPA is not changing the
CH4 and N2O emissions standards from the MY 2012-
2016 rule, but is making revisions to a manufacturer's options for
meeting the CH4 and N2O standards, and to the
date when N2O emissions must be measured rather than
estimated using engineering judgment (see section III.B.9). These
revisions are not intended to change the stringency of the
CH4 and N2O standards, but are aimed at
addressing implementation concerns regarding the standards.
The opportunity to earn credits toward the fleet-wide average
CO2 standards for improvements to air conditioning systems
will remain in place for MY 2017 and later, including improvements to
address both hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) refrigerant direct losses (i.e.,
system ``leakage'') and indirect CO2 emissions related to
the increased load on the engine (also referred to as ``A/C
efficiency'' related emissions). The overall maximum number of credits
available for reducing the effects of A/C system leakage (including
shifting to alternative refrigerants) and for improving A/C efficiency
remain the same as those in the MY 2012-2016 rule, although we are
incorporating a new test procedure for measuring A/C efficiency
improvements and making several minor program revisions, as discussed
in section III.C.1 and chapter 5.1 of the joint TSD. The CO2
standards take into account EPA's projection of the average amount of
air conditioner credits expected to be generated across the industry.
As discussed in section III.C, EPA is finalizing several provisions
that allow manufacturers to generate credits for use in complying with
the standards or that provide additional incentives for use of advanced
technologies. These include credits for technologies that reduce
CO2 emissions during off-cycle operation that are not
reasonably accounted for by the 2-cycle tests used for compliance
purposes. Compared to the promulgated MY 2012-2016 program, EPA is
streamlining the process by which off-cycle credits can be documented
and approved. The streamlining includes establishing a pre-defined list
of off-cycle technologies and associated credits which may be utilized
by manufacturers without prior approval by EPA. The pre-defined list
will be available beginning in MY 2014. EPA proposed the pre-defined
list for MYs 2017 and later, but has revised the start date in response
to comments, as discussed in III.C.5. In addition, EPA is establishing
incentives for the use of certain types of alternate fueled vehicles or
advanced GHG control technologies. Thus, EPA is adopting multipliers
for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, whereby these vehicles count as more than one
vehicle in a manufacturer's compliance calculation. In addition, in
response to comments, EPA is also finalizing a multiplier for
compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles. The multiplier incentives are
described in section III.C.2. EPA is also adopting specified g/mile
credits for full size pick-up trucks that meet various efficiency
performance criteria and/or include hybrid technology at a minimum
level of production volumes. These full-size pick-up credits and
incentives for advanced ``game changing'' technologies are described in
section III.C.3.
1. What fleet-wide emissions levels correspond to the CO2
standards?
Consistent with the proposal, EPA is establishing standards that
are projected to meet an industry-wide average for the light-duty fleet
of 163 g/mile of CO2 in model year 2025. The level of 163 g/
mile CO2 would be equivalent on a mpg basis to 54.5 mpg, if
this level was achieved solely through improvements in fuel
efficiency.430 431 EPA continues to have separate standards
for cars and light trucks, and to have identical definitions of cars
and trucks as NHTSA, in order to harmonize with CAFE standards. For
passenger cars, the footprint curves call for reducing CO2
by 5 percent per year on average from the model year 2016 passenger car
standard through model year 2025. In recognition of the challenges
manufacturers of full-
[[Page 62779]]
size pickup trucks face in reducing the GHG emissions while preserving
the utility (e.g., towing and payload capabilities) of those vehicles,
EPA is setting standards requiring a lower annual rate of improvement
for light-duty trucks in the early years of the program. For light-duty
trucks, the footprint curves call for reducing CO2 by 3.5
percent per year on average from the model year 2016 truck standard
through model year 2021. EPA is also changing the slopes of the
CO2-footprint curves for light-duty trucks from those in the
MY 2012-2016 rule, in a manner that effectively means that the annual
rate of improvement for smaller light-duty trucks in model years 2017
through 2021 would be higher than 3.5 percent, and the annual rate of
improvement for larger light-duty trucks over the same time period
would be lower than 3.5 percent to account for the special challenges
for improving the GHG of large light trucks while maintaining cargo
hauling and towing utility. For model years 2022 through 2025, EPA is
setting a rate of CO2 reduction for light-duty trucks of 5
percent per year, starting from the model year 2021 truck standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ In comparison, the MY 2016 CO2 standard was
projected (in the previous rule) to achieve a national fleet-wide
average, covering both cars and trucks, of 250 g/mile.
\431\ Real-world CO2 is typically 25 percent higher
and real-world fuel economy is typically 20 percent lower than the
CO2 and CAFE values discussed here. Also, the fuel
economy equivalent assumes gasoline fuel is primary; diesel fuels
(for example) would give a different fuel economy equivalent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA's standards include EPA's projection of average industry wide
CO2-equivalent emission reductions from A/C improvements,
where the footprint curve is made more stringent by an amount
equivalent to this projection of A/C credits. This projection of A/C
credits builds on the projections from MYs 2012-2016, with the
increases in credits mainly due to the full penetration of low GWP
alternative refrigerant by MY 2021.
The tables below show overall fleet average levels for both cars
and light trucks that are projected over the phase-in period of these
standards. The actual fleet-wide average g/mile level that would be
achieved in any year for cars and trucks will depend on the actual
production for that year, as well as the use of the various credit and
averaging, banking, and trading provisions. For example, in any year,
manufacturers would be able to generate credits from cars and use them
for compliance with the truck standard, or vice versa. Such transfer of
credits between cars and trucks is not reflected in the table below. In
Section III.F, EPA discusses the year-by-year estimate of emissions
reductions that are projected to be achieved by the standards.
In general, the schedule of standards allows an incremental phase-
in to the MY 2025 level, and reflects consideration of the appropriate
lead-time and engineering redesign cycles for each manufacturer to
implement emission reductions technology across its product line. Note
that MY 2025 is the final model year in which the standards become more
stringent. The MY 2025 CO2 standards would remain in place
for later model years, unless and until revised by EPA in a future
rulemaking.
EPA has estimated the overall fleet-wide CO2-equivalent
emission levels that correspond with the attribute-based standards,
based on the projections of the composition of each manufacturer's
fleet in each year of the program. As noted above, EPA estimates that,
on a combined fleet-wide national basis, the 2025 MY standards would
require a level of 163 g/mile CO2. The derivation of the 163
g/mile estimate is described in section III.B.2. Tables Table III-9 and
Table III-10 provide these estimates for each manufacturer. The values
in the tables presented in this section utilize the 2008-based fleet
projection as described in section II.B of the preamble. For an
analysis of the standards using the 2010-based projection, refer to
chapter 10 of EPA's RIA (Regulatory Impact Analysis).
Table III-9--Estimated Fleet CO2-Equivalent Levels Corresponding to the Standards for Cars (G/Mile)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin.................................................. 210 200 190 180 171 163 156 149 142
BMW........................................................... 216 205 195 185 175 168 160 153 146
Chrysler/Fiat................................................. 218 207 196 187 176 168 161 153 146
Daimler....................................................... 221 211 200 190 180 172 164 157 150
Ferrari....................................................... 222 211 201 191 181 173 165 158 150
Ford.......................................................... 218 207 196 187 177 169 162 154 147
Geely-Volvo................................................... 220 209 198 188 178 170 163 155 148
General Motors................................................ 215 204 193 184 174 166 159 151 144
Honda......................................................... 211 200 190 180 171 163 156 149 142
Hyundai....................................................... 211 200 190 180 171 163 156 149 142
Kia........................................................... 207 197 186 177 167 160 153 146 139
Lotus......................................................... 195 185 175 166 157 150 143 137 131
Mazda......................................................... 208 198 187 178 169 161 154 147 140
Mitsubishi.................................................... 207 197 187 177 168 160 153 146 139
Nissan........................................................ 214 204 193 183 174 166 159 152 145
Porsche....................................................... 195 185 175 166 157 150 143 137 131
Spyker-Saab................................................... 207 197 187 177 168 160 153 146 139
Subaru........................................................ 199 189 180 170 161 154 147 140 134
Suzuki........................................................ 196 186 177 167 158 151 144 138 132
Tata-JLR...................................................... 237 225 214 203 193 184 176 168 161
Tesla......................................................... 195 185 175 166 157 150 143 137 131
Toyota........................................................ 210 199 189 179 170 162 155 148 141
Volkswagen.................................................... 205 194 185 175 166 158 151 144 138
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-10--Estimated Fleet CO2-Equivelent Levels Corresponding to the Standards for Light Trucks (G/Mile)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin.................................................. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
BMW........................................................... 283 272 264 255 236 225 214 204 194
Chrysler/Fiat................................................. 293 283 275 266 246 234 223 212 201
Daimler....................................................... 299 289 280 272 253 241 229 218 208
[[Page 62780]]
Ferrari....................................................... N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ford.......................................................... 304 294 287 281 261 248 236 223 212
Geely-Volvo................................................... 278 266 258 250 231 220 209 199 189
General Motors................................................ 309 299 291 283 262 249 236 224 213
Honda......................................................... 280 270 262 253 234 223 212 201 191
Hyundai....................................................... 277 266 258 249 231 219 209 198 188
Kia........................................................... 289 279 271 262 243 231 220 209 199
Lotus......................................................... N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mazda......................................................... 272 259 252 244 227 216 206 196 186
Mitsubishi.................................................... 266 254 246 238 220 209 199 189 180
Nissan........................................................ 293 283 275 266 248 236 224 212 202
Porsche....................................................... 286 274 266 257 238 226 215 205 195
Spyker-Saab................................................... 278 265 258 249 230 219 208 198 188
Subaru........................................................ 252 240 233 225 207 197 187 178 169
Suzuki........................................................ 269 257 249 240 222 211 201 191 181
Tata-JLR...................................................... 270 258 250 241 223 212 202 191 182
Tesla......................................................... N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Toyota........................................................ 292 282 274 266 247 235 223 211 201
Volkswagen.................................................... 295 284 276 267 248 236 225 214 203
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Companies with ``N/A'' do not presently have trucks in their fleet.
These estimates were aggregated based on projected production
volumes into the fleet-wide averages for cars, trucks, and the entire
fleet, shown in Table III-11.\432\ The combined fleet estimates are
based on the assumption of a fleet mix of cars and trucks that vary
over the MY 2017-2025 timeframe. This fleet mix distribution can be
found in Section II.B of this preamble and Chapter 1 of the joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ Due to rounding during calculations, the estimated fleet-
wide CO2-equivalent levels may vary by plus or minus 1
gram.
Table III-11--Estimated Fleet-Wide CO2-Equivalent Levels Corresponding to the Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars CO2 (g/ Trucks CO2 (g/ Fleet CO2 (g/
Model year mile) mile) mile)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................................................ 212 295 243
2018............................................................ 202 285 232
2019............................................................ 191 277 222
2020............................................................ 182 269 213
2021............................................................ 172 249 199
2022............................................................ 164 237 190
2023............................................................ 157 225 180
2024............................................................ 150 214 171
2025 and later.................................................. 143 203 163
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in Table III-11, fleet-wide CO2-equivalent
emission levels for cars under the approach are projected to decrease
from 212 to 143 g/mile between MY 2017 and MY 2025. Similarly, fleet-
wide CO2-equivalent emission levels for trucks are projected
to decrease from 295 to 203 g/mile. These numbers do not reflect the
effects of flexibilities and credits in the program.\433\ The estimated
achieved values can be found in Chapter 3 of the RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\ Nor do they reflect ABT (Averaging Banking and Trading).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, EPA is establishing standards that set increasingly
stringent levels of CO2 control from MY 2017 though MY 2025.
Applying the CO2 footprint curves applicable in each model
year to the vehicles (and their footprint distributions) expected to be
sold in each model year produces progressively more stringent estimates
of fleet-wide CO2 emission standards. Manufacturers can
achieve the standards' important CO2 emissions reductions
through the application of feasible control technology at reasonable
cost. The standards provide manufacturers with the needed lead time for
this program and reflect appropriate consideration of manufacturer
product redesign cycles. EPA places important weight on the fact that
the rule provides a long planning horizon to achieve the very
challenging emissions standards being established, and provides
manufacturers with certainty when planning future products. The time-
frame and levels for the standards are expected to provide
manufacturers the time needed to develop and incorporate technology
that will achieve GHG reductions, and to do this as part of the normal
vehicle redesign process. EPA's full discussion of lead time and the
feasibility of the final standards, including our response to these
comments, can be found in Section III.D.
In the MY 2012-2016 final rule, EPA established several provisions
which will continue to apply for the MY 2017-2025 standards. Consistent
with the requirement of CAA section 202(a)(1) that standards be
applicable to vehicles ``for their useful life,'' the MY 2017-2025
vehicle standards will apply for the useful life of the vehicle. Under
section 202(i) of the Act, which
[[Page 62781]]
authorized the Tier 2 standards, EPA established a useful life period
of 10 years or 120,000 miles, whichever first occurs, for all light-
duty vehicles and light-duty trucks.\434\ This useful life applies to
the MY 2012-2016 GHG standards and EPA is adopting it as well for MYs
2017-2025. As with the MY 2012-2016 standards, the in-use emission
standard is 10% higher for a model than the emission levels used for
certification and compliance with the fleet average standards based on
the footprint curves. This difference in the in-use standard reflects
issues of production variability and test-to-test variability. The in-
use standard is discussed in section III.E. Finally, EPA is not making
any changes to the test procedures over which emissions are measured
and weighted to determine compliance with the standards. These
procedures are the Federal Test Procedure (FTP or ``city'' test) and
the Highway Fuel Economy Test (HFET or ``highway'' test).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ See 65 FR 6698 (February 10, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA has analyzed the feasibility of achieving the CO2
standards, based on projections of the technology and technology
penetration rates to reduce emissions of CO2, during the
normal redesign process for cars and trucks, taking into account the
effectiveness and cost of the technology. The results of the analysis
are discussed in detail in Section III.D below and in the RIA. EPA also
presents the overall estimated costs and benefits of the car and truck
CO2 standards in section III.H. In developing the rule, EPA
has evaluated the kinds of technologies that could be utilized by the
automobile industry, as well as the associated costs for the industry
and fuel savings for the consumer, the magnitude of the GHG and oil
reductions that may be achieved, and other factors relevant under
section 202(a) of the CAA.
The vast majority of public comments expressed strong support for
the stringency levels proposed in the 2017-2025 National Program.
Stakeholders in support included environmental NGO's, consumer groups,
automakers, automotive suppliers, labor unions, veterans groups and
national security organizations, and many private citizens. Notably,
there was broad support for the proposed standards by auto
manufacturers including BMW, Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai, Kia,
Jaguar/Land Rover, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Tesla, Toyota, Volvo as
well as the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the Global
Automakers.
Several environmental organizations and consumer groups (Center for
Biological Diversity, Union of Concerned Scientists, Northeast States
for Coordinated Air Use Management, Consumers Union, and American
Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, International Council on Clean
Transportation) suggested that alternatives evaluated by the EPA with
higher penetration rates of advanced technologies were technically
feasible. A description of the EPA's statutory authority under the CAA
as it related to the application of technology-based standards to
achieve emissions reductions are provided in Section I.D.2. A
discussion of the feasibility of this rulemaking and that of
alternative scenarios evaluated can be found in III.D.
Some manufacturers that supported the proposed standards noted
various challenges in achieving them. Chrysler noted challenges of
meeting the standard within the timeframe of product development
cycles, BMW suggested that prior adoption of advanced technologies
results in fewer options available for compliance, and Nissan expressed
concern regarding the uncertainty projecting cost-effective and
feasible technologies so far into the future. These comments are
addressed in Section III.D.
Porsche, Jaguar Land Rover, and Suzuki raised concerns about
feasibility and adequate lead time for intermediate volume, limited
line manufacturers. As discussed in section III.B.6, EPA is providing
intermediate volume manufacturers with additional lead time in response
to these comments. Aston Martin, Lotus and McLaren, three manufacturers
who currently qualify as small volume manufacturers under the MY 2012-
2016 program, commented in support of EPA's proposal to allow SVMs to
petition for manufacturer-specific alternative standards. These
manufacturers stressed the unique challenges they would face in meeting
the MY 2017-2025 standards due to their extremely limited ability to
average across small volume fleets and their disadvantage in the
marketplace due to the lack of economies of scale. EPA is finalizing
the proposal to allow SVMs to petition EPA for alternative
CO2 standards based on a demonstration of significant
feasibility and lead-time difficulties in meeting the primary standards
(see section III.B.5). Ferrari, several Ferrari dealers, and Global
Automakers raised significant feasibility concerns regarding the
proposed standards and commented in strong support of provisions which
would allow a manufacturer to establish SVM status by showing that it
is operationally independent of other companies. As discussed in
section III.B.5, EPA is finalizing provisions allowing manufacturers
with sales of less than 5,000 vehicles owned by a larger manufacturer
to make a demonstration that they are operationally independent from
their parent company and thus allow these manufacturers to be eligible
for SVM alternative standards.
2. What are the CO2 attribute-based standards?
As with the MY 2012-2016 standards, for MYs 2017-2025 EPA is
establishing separate car and truck standards; that is, vehicles
defined as cars have one set of footprint-based curves, and vehicles
defined as trucks have a different set. In general, for a given
footprint, the CO2 g/mile target \435\ for trucks is less
stringent than for a car with the same footprint. EPA's approach for
establishing the footprint curves for model years 2017 and later,
including changes from the approach used for the MY 2012-2016 footprint
curves, is discussed in Section II.C and Chapter 2 of the joint TSD.
The curves are described mathematically by a family of piecewise linear
functions (with respect to vehicle footprint) that gradually and
continually ramp down from the MY 2016 curve established in the
previous rule. As Section II.C describes, EPA has modified the curves
from MY 2016, particularly for trucks. To make this modification, we
wanted to ensure that starting from the 2016 curve, there is a gradual
transition to the new slopes and cut point out to 74 sq ft (rather than
66 sq ft as in the curves for the MY 2012-2016 standards). The
transition is also designed to prevent the curve from one year from
crossing the previous year's curve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\ Because compliance is based on the full range of vehicles
in a manufacturer's car and truck fleets, with lower emitting
vehicles compensating for higher emitting ones, the emission levels
of specific vehicles within the fleet are referred to as targets,
rather than standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Written in mathematic notation, the function is as follows: \436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ See Regulatory text for the official coefficients and
equation. The information presented here is a summary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
[[Page 62782]]
Passenger Car Target = min (b,max(a, c * footprint+d))
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coefficient 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A............................................................. 194.7 184.9 175.3 166.1 157.2 150.2 143.3 136.8 130.5
B............................................................. 262.7 250.1 238.0 226.2 214.9 205.5 196.5 187.8 179.5
C............................................................. 4.53 4.35 4.17 4.01 3.84 3.69 3.54 3.40 3.26
D............................................................. 8.9 6.5 4.2 1.9 -0.4 -1.1 -1.8 -2.5 -3.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light Truck Target = min(min (b,max(a, c * footprint+d)),min(f,max(e, g*footprint+h)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coefficient 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A............................................................. 238.1 226.8 219.5 211.9 195.4 185.7 176.4 167.6 159.1
B............................................................. 347.2 341.7 338.6 336.7 334.8 320.8 305.6 291.0 277.1
C............................................................. 4.87 4.76 4.68 4.57 4.28 4.09 3.91 3.74 3.58
D............................................................. 38.3 31.6 27.7 24.6 19.8 17.8 16.0 14.2 12.5
E............................................................. 246.4 240.9 237.8 235.9 234.0 234.0 234.0 234.0 234.0
F............................................................. 347.4 341.9 338.8 336.9 335.0 335.0 335.0 335.0 335.0
G............................................................. 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04
H............................................................. 80.5 75.0 71.9 70.0 68.1 68.1 68.1 68.1 68.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.010
[[Page 62783]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.011
BILLING CODE 6560-50-C
The MY 2017 car curve is similar to the MY 2016 curve in slope. By
contrast, the MY 2017 truck curve is steeper relative to the MY 2016
curve.\437\ Both car and truck curves gradually flatten from year to
year as increases in stringency are applied consistently across
footprints; i.e. a constant percentage increase in stringency along the
entire curve results in greater absolute reductions for larger
footprints than for smaller ones.\438\ As a further change from the MY
2012-2016 rule, the truck curve does not reach the ultimate cutpoint of
74 sq ft until 2022. The gap between the 2020 curve and the 2021 curve
is indicative of design of the truck standards described earlier, where
a significant proportion of the increased stringency over the first
five years occurs between MY 2020 and MY 2021. For further discussion
of these topics, please see section II.C and chapter 2 of the joint
TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\ Furthermore, curves are constrained so that they do not
cross the previous year's curve, as described in Chapter 2 of the
Joint TSD.
\438\ There is more justification provided in chapter 2.5.3.1 of
the joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were a number of comments on the relative stringency of the
car versus truck curves. Several manufacturers noted that the relative
stringency of car and truck curves was appropriate (Ford, GM). Of the
larger manufacturers, Volkswagen, Toyota, Honda and Mercedes commented
that the standards for passenger cars were too stringent relative to
light trucks. Volkswagen suggested that the difference in stringency
places manufactures that primarily make passenger cars at a
disadvantage, and proposed reducing the annual reduction in GHG
emissions from passenger cars to 4%. Mercedes noted the standards ``are
extremely aggressive, especially for a company that traditionally sells
in the luxury car market'', and suggested additional flexibilities
(off-cycle credits) to account for crash avoidance technologies and to
allow for trading between the light-duty and heavy-duty fleets.
Comments from other organizations expressed similar concern that
the curves favor trucks over cars (American Council for an Energy-
Efficient Economy, Consumers Union, Union of Concerned Scientists).
Some commenters suggested that the difference between car and truck
curves would lead to gaming, through the reclassification of less-
efficient cars as trucks (International Council on Clean
Transportation, Consumers Union).
There were also a number of comments on the shape of the car and
truck curves. Several commenters proposed that the curves be modified
by moving the cutpoints for the smaller vehicles to the left, to
discourage
[[Page 62784]]
downsizing (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Institute for
Policy Integrity), or to make the curves flatter, to discourage
upsizing (Whitefoot and Skerlos). The agencies' consideration of these
and other comments and of the updated technical analyses did not lead
to changes to the level of the standards nor in the shapes of the
curves discussed above. These comments and the agencies' response are
discussed in greater detail in section II.B and III.D of the Preamble,
as well as Chapter 2 of the joint TSD.
3. Mid-Term Evaluation
Given the long time frame at issue in implementing standards for
MY2022-2025, and given NHTSA's obligation to conduct a separate
rulemaking in order to establish final standards for vehicles for those
model years, EPA and NHTSA will conduct a comprehensive mid-term
evaluation and agency decision-making process as described below. No
changes are being made to the mid-term evaluation that was discussed
and proposed.
Up to date information will be developed and compiled for the
evaluation, through a collaborative, robust and transparent process,
including public notice and comment. The evaluation will be based on
(1) A holistic assessment of all of the factors considered by the
agencies in setting standards, including those set forth in the rule
and other relevant factors, and (2) the expected impact of those
factors on the manufacturers' ability to comply, without placing
decisive weight on any particular factor or projection. The
comprehensive evaluation process will lead to final agency action by
both agencies.
Consistent with the agencies' commitment to maintaining a single
national framework for regulation of vehicle emissions and fuel
economy, the agencies fully expect to conduct the mid-term evaluation
in close coordination with the California Air Resources Board (CARB).
Moreover, the agencies fully expect that any adjustments to the
standards will be made with the participation of CARB and in a manner
that ensures continued harmonization of state and Federal vehicle
standards. In order to align the agencies proceedings for MYs 2022-2025
and to maintain a joint national program, EPA and NHTSA will finalize
their actions related to MYs 2022-2025 standards concurrently.
EPA will conduct a mid-term evaluation of the later model year
light-duty GHG standards (MY2022-2025). The evaluation will determine
whether those standards are appropriate under section 202(a) of the
Act. Under the regulations adopted today, EPA would be legally bound to
make a final decision, by April 1, 2018, on whether the MY2022-2025 GHG
standards are appropriate under section 202(a), in light of the record
then before the agency.
EPA, NHTSA and CARB will jointly prepare a draft Technical
Assessment Report (TAR) to inform EPA's determination on the
appropriateness of the GHG standards and to inform NHTSA's rulemaking
for the CAFE standards for MY 2022-2025. The TAR will examine the same
issues and underlying analyses and projections considered in the
original rulemaking, including technical and other analyses and
projections relevant to each agency's authority to set standards as
well as any relevant new issues that may present themselves. There will
be an opportunity for public comment on the draft TAR, and appropriate
peer review will be performed of underlying analyses in the TAR. The
assumptions and modeling underlying the TAR will be available to the
public, to the extent consistent with law.
EPA will also seek public comment on whether the standards are
appropriate under section 202(a), e.g. comments to affirm or change the
GHG standards (either more or less stringent). The agencies will
carefully consider comments and information received and respond to
comments in their respective subsequent final actions.
EPA and NHTSA will consult and coordinate in developing EPA's
determination on whether the MY2022-2025 GHG standards are appropriate
under section 202(a) and NHTSA's NPRM. In making its determination, EPA
will evaluate and determine whether the MY2022-2025 GHG standards are
appropriate under section 202(a) of the CAA based on a comprehensive,
integrated assessment of all of the results of the review, as well as
any public comments received during the evaluation, taken as a whole.
The decision making required of the Administrator in making that
determination is intended to be as robust and comprehensive as that in
the original setting of the MY2017-2025 standards.
In making this determination, EPA will consider information on a
range of relevant factors, including but not limited to those listed in
the rule\439\ and below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\ See 40 CFR 86.1818-12(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Development of powertrain improvements to gasoline and diesel
powered vehicles.
2. Impacts on employment, including the auto sector.
3. Availability and implementation of methods to reduce weight,
including any impacts on safety.
4. Actual and projected availability of public and private charging
infrastructure for electric vehicles, and fueling infrastructure for
alternative fueled vehicles.
5. Costs, availability, and consumer acceptance of technologies to
ensure compliance with the standards, such as vehicle batteries and
power electronics, mass reduction, and anticipated trends in these
costs.
6. Payback periods for any incremental vehicle costs associated
with meeting the standards.
7. Costs for gasoline, diesel fuel, and alternative fuels.
8. Total light-duty vehicle sales and projected fleet mix.
9. Market penetration across the fleet of fuel efficient
technologies.
10. Any other factors that may be deemed relevant to the review.
If, based on the evaluation, EPA decides that the GHG standards are
appropriate under section 202(a), then EPA will announce that final
decision and the basis for EPA's decision. The decision will be final
agency action which also will be subject to judicial review on its
merits. EPA will develop an administrative record for that review that
will be no less robust than that developed for the initial
determination to establish the standards. In the midterm evaluation,
EPA will develop a robust record for judicial review that is the same
kind of record that would be developed and before a court for judicial
review of the adoption of standards.
Where EPA decides that the standards are not appropriate, EPA will
initiate a rulemaking to adopt standards that are appropriate under
section 202(a), which could result in standards that are either less or
more stringent. In this rulemaking EPA will evaluate a range of
alternative standards that are potentially effective and reasonably
feasible, and the Administrator will propose the alternative that in
her judgment is the best choice for a standard that is appropriate
under section 202(a).\440\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\ The provisions of CAA section 202(b)(1)(C) are not
applicable to any revisions of the greenhouse standards adopted in a
later rulemaking based on the mid-term evaluation. Section
202(b)(1)(C) refers to EPA's authority to revise ``any standard
prescribed or previously revised under this subsection,'' and
indicates that ``[a]ny revised standard'' shall require a reduction
of emissions from the standard that was previously applicable. These
provisions apply to standards that are adopted under subsection
202(b) of the Act and are later revised. These provisions are
limited by their terms to such standards, and do not otherwise limit
EPA's general authority under section 202(a) to adopt standards and
revise them ``from time to time.'' Since the greenhouse gas
standards are not adopted under subsection 202(b), section
202(b)(1)(C) does not apply to these standards or any subsequent
revision of these standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62785]]
If EPA initiates a rulemaking, it will be a joint rulemaking with
NHTSA. Any final action taken by EPA at the end of that rulemaking is
also judicially reviewable. The MY2022-2025 GHG standards will remain
in effect unless and until EPA changes them by rulemaking. NHTSA
intends to issue conditional standards for MY2022-2025 in the LDV
rulemaking being initiated this fall for MY2017 and later model years.
The CAFE standards for MY2022-2025 will be determined with finality in
a subsequent, de novo notice and comment rulemaking conducted in full
compliance with section 32902 of title 49 U.S.C. and other applicable
law.
Accordingly, NHTSA's development of its proposal in that later
rulemaking will include the making of economic and technology analyses
and estimates that are appropriate for those model years and based on
then-current information. Any rulemaking conducted jointly by the
agencies or by NHTSA alone will be timed to provide sufficient lead
time for industry to make whatever changes to their products that the
rulemaking analysis deems feasible based on the new information
available. At the very latest, the three agencies will complete the
mid-term evaluation process and subsequent rulemaking on the standards
that may occur in sufficient time to promulgate final standards for
MY2022-2025 with at least 18 months lead time, but additional lead time
may be provided.
EPA understands that California intends to conduct a mid-term
evaluation of its program that is coordinated with EPA and NHTSA and is
based on a similar set of factors as outlined above. California
submitted a waiver request under the Clean Air Act to EPA on June 27,
2012 for its MYs 2017-2025 standards.\441\ The regulatory package
submitted to EPA for a waiver includes such a mid-term evaluation. EPA
understands that California intends to continue promoting harmonized
state and federal vehicle standards. The waiver request notes
California's commitment to accept compliance with EPA greenhouse gas
emission standards, as compliant with California's greenhouse gas
program.\442\ Therefore, if EPA revises its standards in response to
the mid-term evaluation, California may need to amend one or more of
its 2022-2025 MY standards and would submit such amendments to EPA with
a request for a waiver, or for confirmation that said amendments fall
within the scope of an existing waiver, as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\441\ Letter from Mary D. Nicols, Chairman, California Air
Resources Board to Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.E. EPA
requesting the Administrator treat the amended ZEV requirements as
within the scope of the previously granted waivers for the ZEV
program or alternatively to grant a new waiver of preemption under
CAA section 209(b). The waiver request also asks for an expedited
review prior to the start of its Clean Cars Program. Until the
waiver is granted, California will not be able to enforce the
program. The waiver process requires an opportunity for a public
hearing and a 30 day comment period after the hearing before making
a determination on the waiver.
\442\ State of California Air Resources Board. Resolution 12-11,
January 26, 2012, at 20 incorporated by referenced in Board's March
22, 2012 final approval action. Available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/cfo2012/res12-11.pdf (last accessed July 9, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Support for Finalizing the Mid-term Evaluation
Every automaker and associations representing either auto makers or
suppliers who commented on the proposed mid-term evaluation indicated
that this evaluation was essential to their support of the proposal and
urged the agencies to finalize a comprehensive mid-term evaluation.
These commenters included General Motors, Chrysler, Ford, Nissan,
Toyota, Hyundai America Technical Center, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi
Motors, Volvo Car Corporation, Porsche, Ferrari, KIA, the Alliance of
Auto Manufacturers, the Global Automakers, the Motor & Equipment
Manufacturers Association (MEMA), National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM), EcoMotors International, Inc., and Johnson Controls, Inc. Two
automakers, Chrysler and Nissan, specifically predicated their support
of the MY2017-2025 National Program on the agencies finalizing the
proposed mid-term evaluation. In addition, a number of other
organizations including the United Auto Workers (UAW), the
International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE), as well as 112
members of the U.S. House of Representatives (in a letter to both
agency heads) expressed strong support for finalizing the proposed mid-
term evaluation.
Many environmental and consumer organizations, as well as many
private citizens, both at the three public hearings and in written
comments, expressed concern that the mid-term evaluation might be used
as an opportunity to weaken the standards or to delay the environmental
benefits of the National Program. Many stressed the expectation that
the mid-term should be used as an opportunity to strengthen the MY2017-
2025 standards. These commenters included the Pew Charitable Trust,
Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), American Medical
Association of California, the National Association of Clean Air
Agencies (NAACA), the Ecology Center and more than 30,000 individual
citizens who submitted letters to the docket. The ICCT expressed their
strong support for the mid-term evaluation and NESCAUM in discussing
the need to evaluate technology incentives on the overall GHG goals of
the program indicated their support of the mid-term review for this
purpose.
As discussed above, the mid-term evaluation will be a comprehensive
and robust evaluation of all of the relevant factors. EPA is clear that
any evaluation of the appropriateness of the standards and any decision
to go forward with revising the standards will consider making the
standards more or less stringent, whatever is most appropriate under
the circumstances at that time. It would be inappropriate to limit
EPA's consideration to either just increasing or just reducing the
stringency of the standards. Instead, EPA will determine the
appropriate course to follow based on all of the information, evidence,
and views in front of it, including those provided during public notice
and comment.
Two commenters opposed finalizing the mid-term evaluation. Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) stated that it was both unnecessary
and potentially disruptive to automakers' product planning and would
add uncertainty to a nine year period. The National Automobile Dealers
Association (NADA) did not support the mid-term evaluation since it did
not support the need for the underlying rulemaking ``so soon after
having set standards for MY2012-2016, and before having had the benefit
of learning from how those standards work in the real world.'' EPA
believes that the evaluation process will not be disruptive to the
automakers product planning. Instead it provides a framework that
allows manufacturers the certainty to go forward and prepare for these
standards, as it both adopts them now as final standards and
establishes a mechanism to evaluate and change them in the future, if
appropriate. The common support from the manufacturers indicates that
this is the case. The opposition by NADA is premised on their
opposition to adopting standards in this rulemaking, which is addressed
elsewhere.
[[Page 62786]]
Ensuring Coordination of Mid-term Evaluation
Ford, Toyota, NRDC and the UCS stressed the importance of a
coordinated mid-term evaluation by EPA and NHTSA that should also
include the California Air Resources Board (CARB). EPA agrees with this
comment, as indicated by the discussion above. In adopting their GHG
standards the California Air Resources Board (CARB), directed CARB's
Executive Officer to, ``participate in U.S. EPA's mid-term review of
the 2022 through 2025 model year passenger vehicle greenhouse gas
standards * * *'' and to also, ``continue collaborating with EPA and
NHTSA as their standards are finalized and in the mid-term review.''
\443\ In addition, the Board directed CARB's Executive Officer that
``It is appropriate to accept compliance with the 2017 through 2025
model year National Program as compliance with California's greenhouse
gas emission standards in the 2017 through 2025 model years, once
United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) issues their
final rule on or after its current July 2012 planned release, provided
that the greenhouse gas reductions set forth in U.S. EPA's December 1,
2011 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for 2017 through 2025 model year
passenger vehicles are maintained, except that California shall
maintain its own reporting requirements.''\444\
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\443\ See California Low-Emission Vehicles (LEV) & GHG 2012
regulations approved by State of California Air Resources Board,
Resolution 12-11 (March 22, 2012). Available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/leviiighg2012/leviiighg2012.htm (last
accessed June 5, 2012).
\444\ Id., CARB Resolution 12-11 at 20.
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Clean Air Act Authority To Conduct a Mid-term Evaluation
A number of auto manufacturers submitted comments agreeing that
section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes the proposed mid-
term evaluation. Chrysler noted that the EPA had a ``firm legal basis
to conduct the mid-term evaluation under section 307(d) of the Clean
Air Act (CAA) and the Administrative Procedures Act to reconsider
regulations based on new information as well as under section 202(a) of
the CAA under which EPA proposed the mid-term evaluation.'' The Global
Automakers stated that a mid-term evaluation was, ``not only
permissible under the Clean Air Act, but also required because of the
uncertainties inherent in projecting regulatory requirements nine to
twelve years into the future,'' continuing that it ``would have been
arbitrary and capricious for EPA to promulgate GHG emissions standards
for model years as far into the future as MY2022-2025 without providing
for a mid-term evaluation.'' Nissan indicated support for the views
expressed by the Global Automakers and stated further that ``a robust
and comprehensive mid-term review is legally necessary to ensure that
the standards for the later model years are supported by substantial
evidence and are not arbitrary and capricious. (Citing Motor Vehicle
Mfr's Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29,42 (1983) listing examples of
arbitrary and capricious agency activity).''
EPA agrees that section 202(a) provides the agency with ample
authority to undertake the mid-term evaluation. EPA does not agree that
the mid-term evaluation is authorized under CAA section 307(d), as the
mid-term evaluation is not a reconsideration of the standards under
that provision. Instead the mid-term evaluation will be undertaken
under EPA's general authority to establish emissions standards under
section 202(a). EPA does not agree that the mid-term evaluation is
legally required, or that the standards adopted today would be
arbitrary and capricious or without substantial evidence to support
them absent such a mid-term evaluation. The final rule and supporting
information and analysis amply justify the reasonableness and
appropriateness of the final GHG standards adopted by EPA, irrespective
of the provisions for a mid-term evaluation. In any case, that issue is
not before EPA as EPA is exercising its discretion to adopt provisions
for a mid-term evaluation, for the reasons discussed above.
The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) challenged the basis for
the mid-term evaluation and specifically argued that any interim
rulemaking should be based on a presumption that the stringencies of
the standards will not decrease. As discussed above, the mid-term
evaluation will be a robust and comprehensive evaluation, and it would
be inappropriate to limit EPA's consideration to either just increasing
or just reducing the stringency of the standards. Instead, EPA will
determine the appropriate course to follow based on all of the
information, evidence, and views in front of it, including those
provided during public notice and comment. CBD also raised a concern
that EPA would be applying a faulty weighting of the statutory factors
under the CAA. CBD stated that highlighting the manufacturers' ability
to comply was improper, and instead decisive weighting should be placed
on energy conservation. EPA disagrees that it is improper to carefully
consider the impact on manufacturers' ability to comply. When EPA
conducts the mid-term evaluation, EPA will be evaluating standards that
have already been adopted and for which manufacturers are required to
comply. The ability to comply is an important part of determining the
appropriateness of these standards. For example, ability to comply is
directly tied to lead time, a factor EPA is required to consider under
section 202(a). EPA does not agree that it is appropriate to assign
decisive weighting to any one factor, such as energy conservation. That
is contrary to conducting a holistic assessment, where EPA carefully
considers all of the relevant factors under section 202(a) and gives
them the weight that is appropriate in light of all of the
circumstances.
Recommendations for Additional ``Check-ins'' or Periodic Status Reports
Several automakers, auto suppliers and industry associations
(General Motors, Chrysler, Daimler Automotive Group, Hyundai, Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers, Global Automakers, Inc and Johnson
Controls) suggested that, in addition to the proposed formal mid-term
evaluation, the agencies should also undertake a series of smaller,
focused technical evaluations or ``check-ins' leading up to and
potentially following the mid-term evaluation. Such check-ins, these
commenters asserted, would allow the agencies to consider the latest
relevant technical information, as well as other key issues. Several
environmental organizations (Sierra Club, UCS, NRDC, and CBD) submitted
comments opposing these focused technical evaluations or ``check-ins,''
arguing that these would be time consuming and too premature to judge
technology readiness for the MY2022-2025 standards, and would undermine
the intent and effectiveness of the mid-term evaluation. A number of
environmental organizations also supported periodic updates on
technology progress and compliance trends. The Sierra Club, while not
supportive of the ``check-in'' concept, did urge agency transparency
and access to data that would allow the public to ``effectively and
timely monitor compliance trends and technology applications.'' The
ICCT recommended that EPA and NHTSA conduct periodic updates on
technology progress and consider periodic status reports in advance of
the mid-term evaluation so that all interested parties could have
access to key data that would be important in documenting progress in
technology improvements and implementation.
[[Page 62787]]
As discussed above, the agencies will conduct a comprehensive mid-
term evaluation and agency decision-making process for the MYs 2022-
2025 standards as described in the proposal. The agencies expect to
continue ongoing stakeholder dialogue, including in depth technical
dialogue with automakers on their confidential technology development
efforts and product plans for MYs 2022-2025. EPA does not believe that
additional or more frequent reports, as suggested by some commenters
would be an efficient way to prepare for the mid-term evaluation.
Timeline and Process for Mid-term Evaluation
Several auto companies including Ford, Toyota and Porsche noted the
importance of the agencies meeting the proposed November 15, 2017,
deadline for issuing the draft Technical Assessment Report (TAR) so
that there is adequate time for a reasonable public comment period
while still insuring that EPA meet its proposed April 1, 2018 deadline
for determining whether the standards established for MY2022-2025 are
appropriate under CAA section 202(a). The Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, Global Automakers, and the National Association of
Manufacturers also expressed concern with the agencies' proposed
schedule for undertaking the mid-term evaluation. These commenters
recommended that additional details be written into the final
regulatory text to provide more procedural certainty including: a start
date for the evaluation, a schedule of major milestones, specific
studies the agencies plan to conduct, and details of the peer review
process. Toyota, Hyundai and Mercedes-Benz in their comments noted
their support for these recommendations as well. Mitsubishi urged the
agency to work with stakeholders well in advance of the mid-term to
develop a sound review process and framework. Both the Union of
Concerned Scientists and NRDC stated that the timing of the mid-term
evaluation should be conducted as close as possible to the beginning of
MY2022 so that the mid-term evaluation could most accurately capture
the status of technology and the vehicle market for those model years
under review.
EPA acknowledges the timing and other concerns raised by all
commenters and continues to believe that the approach laid out in the
proposal provides an appropriate balance between certainty and needed
flexibility by providing end dates by which it must issue the draft TAR
(November 15, 2017) and determine whether the MY2022-2025 standards are
appropriate under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (April 1, 2018).
Additional regulatory details on the timing or content of the mid-term
evaluation are not needed and would not be an efficient way to prepare
for and conduct the mid-term evaluation.
Additional Evaluation Factors Should Be Considered
In its proposal, EPA indicated that it would consider a range of
relevant factors in conducting the mid-term evaluation, including but
not limited to those listed in the preamble and proposed regulatory
text. Quite a few commenters suggested that EPA expand the list of
these high level factors. The Alliance of Automobile Manufactures
recommended numerous additions to the list of factors including,
``current and expected availability of state and Federal incentives/
subsidies for advanced technology vehicles,'' ``the end-of-life costs
associated with advanced technology vehicles,'' and ``consumer demand
for and acceptance of fuel-efficient technologies, and consumer
valuation of fuel savings.'' Honeywell encouraged the agencies to,
``commit * * * to a detailed review of emerging boosting technologies
that may considerably advance vehicle emissions and fuel economy
performance during the later years of the rulemaking.'' The Institute
for Policy Integrity commented that the agencies ``should amend their
list of factors to specifically reflect any potential changes to
benefits estimates, in addition to changes to costs or the state of
technology.'' Mitsubishi Motors commented that the mid-term factors
must include an evaluation of the sufficiency of the EV infrastructure,
including whether there have been any significant industry-wide
economic setbacks making EVs and other overall fuel economy targets
impracticable, consumer acceptance of EVs and a thorough evaluation of
an EV multiplier in MYs 2022 through 2025 in order to continue EV
market penetration. Also, Mitsubishi noted that the mid-term should
include consideration of compliance options for OEMs with limited
product lines. The National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)
suggested that EPA evaluate the use of credits by automobile
manufacturers and the impact of credit use on average fleet
performance. The Clean Air Association of the Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) noted that it expected EPA to
monitor upstream emissions from the power grid to determine whether the
improvements assumed to occur were realized. Finally, the Sierra Club
recommended that the agencies provide the public with data on credit
use by manufacturers, technology penetration both overall and by
manufacturers, and sales by vehicle footprints. The Alliance for
Automakers also indicated that the agencies should seek expert peer-
reviewed information including the National Academy of Sciences to
answer a number of questions associated with the Mid-term reviews.
A number of other commenters, including Ford, the UCS and ICCT
supported the mid-term evaluation provisions as proposed by EPA. Ford
commented that they believed the agencies had struck an appropriate
balance between an exhaustive list and a high-level approach and
pointed to proposed regulatory language ``including but not limited to
* * *'' as critical language that should be maintained in final rule.
Ford further noted that factors that turn out to be most important six
years from now are not necessarily foreseeable today and not
necessarily the ones listed in the proposed rule. The ICCT noted that
``it is impossible to define all the criteria for review at this time *
* *'' And UCS agreed that ``a holistic assessment of all of the factors
* * * without placing decisive weight on any particular factor or
projects'' is the correct approach in conducting the mid-term
evaluation.''
EPA is finalizing the list of factors as proposed.\445\ We believe
these factors are broad enough to encompass all appropriate factors
that should be considered during the mid-term evaluation, and provide
the agency with an appropriate balance in that the list identifies
major factors to consider and includes a clear provision for inclusion
of other appropriate factors. This avoids trying to identify in detail
at this time the myriad issues and factors that will be of concern in
the mid-term evaluation. As in this rulemaking, in the mid-term
evaluation EPA expects to place primary reliance on peer-reviewed
studies. Additionally, as NAS reports are published, EPA will give
careful consideration to reports and their findings as well as any
reports and findings from other scientific and technical organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\445\ See Sec. 86.1818-12 (h).
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As discussed above, the MY2022-2025 GHG standards will remain in
effect unless and until EPA changes them by rulemaking. The National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) commented that EPA should not take
the default position that the existing 2022-2025 model year standards
will remain in place unless changed by
[[Page 62788]]
rulemaking. Rather, they argued the existing standards should be
rescinded immediately upon a determination that they are inappropriate,
leaving the 2021 standards in effect until the revised standards are
finalized. Another commenter, Toyota requested that, ``in the event EPA
does not take final agency action concerning the 2022-2025 model year
standards by April 1, 2020, the 2021 model year GHG standards remain as
the `default' standards until such time as EPA does take final agency
action providing at least 18-months of lead time prior to the
applicable model year. EPA believes the appropriate approach is what
was proposed; EPA is adopting the MY2022-2025 GHG standards at this
time, and they will go into effect unless EPA revises them. The mid-
term evaluation process is an effective and timely way to address any
concerns that may arise in the future concerning the appropriateness of
these standards. EPA believes this provides the right degree of
certainty to the standards that are adopted today, along with a clear
and effective mechanism for the timely evaluation of the standards and
their revision if EPA determines in the future that they are no longer
appropriate based on the circumstances at that time.
4. Averaging, Banking, and Trading Provisions for CO2
Standards
In the MY 2012-2016 rule, EPA adopted credit provisions for credit
carry-back, credit carry-forward, credit transfers, and credit trading.
These kinds of provisions are collectively termed Averaging, Banking,
and Trading (ABT), and have been an important part of many mobile
source programs under CAA Title II, both for fuels programs as well as
for engine and vehicle programs.\446\ As proposed, EPA is continuing
essentially the same comprehensive program for averaging, banking, and
trading of credits as provided in the MY2012-2016 program, which
together will help manufacturers in planning and implementing the
orderly phase-in of emissions control technology in their production,
consistent with their typical redesign schedules. ABT is important
because it can help to address many issues of technological feasibility
and lead-time, as well as considerations of cost. ABT is an integral
part of the standard setting itself, and is not just an add-on to help
reduce costs. In many cases, ABT resolves issues of cost or technical
feasibility which might otherwise arise, allowing EPA to set a standard
that is numerically more stringent. The ABT provisions are integral to
the fleet averaging approach established in the MY 2012-2016 rule and
we view them as equally integral to the MY 2017-2025 standards.\447\ As
proposed, EPA is finalizing a change to the credit carry-forward
provisions as described below, but the program otherwise would remain
in place unchanged for model years 2017 and later.
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\446\ See 75 FR 25412-413.
\447\ These reasons likewise underly EPA's decision to adopt
similar types of ABT provisions in the GHG standards for heavy duty
vehicles and engines. See 76 FR 57127-29.
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As noted above, the ABT provisions consist primarily of credit
carry-back, credit carry-forward, credit transfers, and credit trading.
Credit carry-back refers to using credits to offset any deficit in
meeting the fleet average standards that had accrued in a prior model
year. A manufacturer may have a deficit at the end of a model year
(after averaging across its fleet using credit transfers between cars
and trucks)--that is, a manufacturer's fleet average level may fail to
meet the required fleet average standard. The credit carry-back
provisions allow a manufacturer to carry a deficit in its fleet average
standards for up to three model years. After satisfying any needs to
offset pre-existing debits within a vehicle category, remaining credits
may be banked, or saved, for use in future years. This is referred to
as credit carry-forward. The EPCA/EISA statutory framework for the CAFE
program includes a 5-year credit carry-forward provision and a 3-year
credit carry-back provision. In the MYs 2012-2016 program, EPA chose to
adopt 5-year credit carry-forward and 3-year credit carry-back
provisions as a reasonable approach that maintained consistency between
the agencies' provisions. EPA is continuing with this approach for the
MY 2017-2025 standards. (A further discussion of the ABT provisions can
be found at 75 FR 25412-14 (May 7, 2010)).
Although the credit carry-forward and carry-back provisions
generally remain in place for MY 2017 and later, EPA is finalizing its
proposal to allow all unused credits generated in MY 2010-2016 (but not
MY 2009 early credits) to be carried forward through MY 2021. See Sec.
86.1865-12(k)(6)(ii). This amounts to the normal 5 year carry-forward
for MY 2016 and later credits, but provides additional carry-forward
years for credits earned in MYs 2010-2015. Extending the life for MY
2010-2015 credits provides greater flexibility for manufacturers in
using the credits they have generated. These credits would help
manufacturers resolve lead-time issues they might face in the early
model years of today's program as they transition from the 2016
standards to the progressively more stringent standards for MY 2017 and
later. It also provides an additional incentive for manufacturers to
generate credits earlier, for example in MYs 2014 and 2015, because
those credits may be used through MY 2021, thereby encouraging the
earlier use of additional CO2 reducing technology.
While this provision provides greater flexibility in how
manufacturers use credits they have generated, it would not change the
overall CO2 benefits of the National Program, as EPA does
not expect that any of the credits at issue would otherwise have been
allowed to expire. Rather, the credits would be used or traded to other
manufacturers.
EPA did not propose to allow MY 2009 early credits to be carried
forward beyond the normal 5 years due to concerns expressed during the
2012-2016 rulemaking that there may be the potential for large numbers
of credits that could be generated in MY 2009 for companies that are
over-achieving on CAFE and that some of these credits could represent
windfall GHG credits.\448\ In response to these concerns, EPA placed
restrictions on the use of MY 2009 credits (for example, MY 2009
credits may not be traded) and did not propose to expand opportunities
for their utilization.
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\448\ 75 FR 25442. Moreover, as pointed out in the earlier
rulemaking, there can be no legitimate expectation that these 2009
MY credits could be used as part of a compliance strategy in model
years after 2014, and thus no reason to carry forward the credits
past 5 years due to action in reliance by manufacturers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transferring credits refers to exchanging credits between the two
averaging sets, passenger cars and trucks, within a manufacturer. For
example, credits accrued by over-compliance with a manufacturer's car
fleet average standard could be used to offset debits accrued due to
that manufacturer not meeting the truck fleet average standard in a
given year. Finally, accumulated credits may be traded to another
manufacturer. EPA is finalizing provisions consistent with MYs 2012-
2016 to allow no limits on the amount of credits that may be
transferred or traded.
The averaging, banking, and trading provisions are generally
consistent with those included in the CAFE program, with a few notable
exceptions. As with EPA's approach (except for the provision just
discussed above for a one-time extended carry-forward of MY2010-2016
credits), under EISA, credits generated in the CAFE program can be
carried forward for 5 model years
[[Page 62789]]
or back for 3, and can also be transferred between a manufacturer's
fleets or traded to another manufacturer. Transfers of credits across a
manufacturer's car and truck averaging sets are also allowed under
CAFE, but with limits established by EISA on the use of transferred
credits. The amount of transferred credits that can be used in a year
is limited under CAFE, and transferred credits may not be used to meet
the CAFE minimum domestic passenger car standard, also per statute.
CAFE allows credit trading, but again, traded credits cannot be used to
meet the minimum domestic passenger car standard.\449\
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\449\ See generally 49 U.S.C. Sec. 32903 and section IV below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA received comments from manufacturers, suppliers, and others
emphasizing the need for flexibility and supporting the credit programs
in general. Manufacturers supported the proposed approach to the ABT
program. Manufacturers commented that the one-time carry-forward of
greenhouse gas reduction credits through the 2021 model year rewards
early investment and provides better flexibility to account for market
conditions that may impact year-over-year compliance. NESCAUM commented
that allowing credit transfers between a manufacturer's passenger car
and light truck fleet will facilitate compliance without reducing the
GHG benefits of the program, as do provisions for carry-forward and
carry-back of generated credits.
One commenter raised concerns regarding the ABT provisions. CBD
commented that the proposed one-time carry forward of GHG credits was
contrary to EISA provisions, and unjustified, and recommended that EPA
not finalize the provision. CBD further commented similarly that, ``the
Agencies may not increase the availability of credit transfers between
the two fleets, passenger vehicles and light trucks. The existence of
statutory caps for these transfers is a strong indication of
Congressional disapproval of extending them further, and the Clean Air
Act's silence on that issue does not override EISA's statutory
restriction.''
EPA does not agree with these comments. The extension of the credit
carry-forward provisions supports the ultimate objectives of CAA
section 202 (a) by providing flexibility to achieve GHG emission
reductions at lower cost, and to reduce the lead time needed to do so.
And although the agencies have worked stringently to harmonize the two
sets of standards under the different statutory authorities, the
National Program also properly takes advantage of the additional
flexibilities afforded by the CAA to achieve reductions of GHGs where
appropriate to do so. See section I.B and I.D above (noting features
such as more flexible credit generating and unlimited transferring
mechanisms, and no option to pay fines in lieu of compliance). Since
EPA believes that extending the carry-forward provision allows
additional flexibility, encourages earlier penetration of emission
reduction technologies sooner than might otherwise occur, and does so
without reducing the overall effectiveness of the program. EPA is
therefore extending the credit carry-forward provision as proposed.
Volkswagen recommended that EPA allow a 5 year carry back of
debits, but did not provide supporting rationale as to why such a
change is needed. As noted in section I.B above, EPA is retaining a 3
year credit carry-back due to concerns that a five year period could
slow progress toward meeting standards, and could lead to situations
where some manufacturers find it impossible to make up past year
deficits. EPA believes that credit carry-back is an important
flexibility because it allows manufacturers to address situations where
they fall into a deficit because, for example, their fleet mix at the
end of the year is not the same as the fleet mix anticipated at the
beginning of the year. EPA is concerned that a longer period may
encourage manufacturers to rely on deficits as a primary strategy to
comply with the program and would slow the rate of progress
manufacturers would make in reducing emissions.
Daimler Automotive Group commented that EPA should allow credits
for Class 2b vehicles (heavy duty pickups and vans) generated in the
medium duty GHG program to be applied in the light duty truck programs
as well. Daimler commented that the medium duty GHG program for these
vehicles has an ABT program which is similar to the light duty program
and that these similarities should allow credits to be traded between
them. In response, EPA believes such a change is outside the scope of
the proposal as EPA did not propose any changes that would affect the
heavy-duty vehicle standards. EPA believes the suggested approach
raises significant issues regarding the potential impact on both
programs, including competitiveness issues, which would need to be
thoroughly explored through a notice and comment rulemaking process.
Only a small portion of light-duty vehicle manufacturers produce
vehicles in the heavy-duty category and EPA believes that it is
important to maintain a level playing field for light-duty vehicle
manufacturers not participating in the heavy-duty vehicle market.
Moreover, the standards for heavy duty pickups and vans are based on a
different attribute (a work factor attribute which is not determined
exclusively by footprint) than the standards for light duty trucks, the
projected technology basis for the standards differ, and the programs'
model years do not coincide. Furthermore, it is possible that allowing
credit transfers between heavy-duty and light-duty vehicles could
impact stringency of both the light and heavy-duty standards. ABT
provisions are an integral part of establishing appropriate standards
under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. In order to properly
evaluate the implications of adopting such credit transfers, a detailed
analysis would need to be done to assess the potential impacts of these
types of credit transfers, with an opportunity for public review and
input, and EPA has not performed such an analysis.\450\ All of these
factors require careful analysis before any decisions can reasonably be
made regarding credit transfers between these different vehicle
sectors.
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\450\ In the heavy-duty vehicle and engine final rule, EPA noted
that it intends to consider whether broader credit transfers are
appropriate, including transfers between light and heavy-duty
vehicles, as part of the next phase of the heavy-duty regulations.
See 76 FR 57128.
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5. Small Volume Manufacturer Standards
EPA is finalizing provisions, as proposed, allowing eligible small
volume manufacturers (SVMs) the option to petition EPA to develop an
alternative CO2 standard for their company, determined on a
case-by-case basis in a public process. An SVM utilizing this option
will be required to submit data and information that the agency would
use in addition to other available information to establish
CO2 standards for that specific manufacturer. The detailed
approach being finalized for the SVM standards and the eligibility
requirements for these standards, as well as comments received by EPA,
are described in detail below. EPA is also extending eligibility for
the SVM GHG provisions to very small manufacturers that are owned by
large manufacturers but are able to establish that they are
operationally independent. All of the comments EPA received on these
issues supported the proposal to allow manufacturer-specific standards
for SVMs, and also supported extending these provisions to include
operationally independent manufacturers which are otherwise
[[Page 62790]]
SVMs. There are three manufacturers that meet the definition of SVM
currently: Aston Martin, Lotus, and McLaren. These manufacturers make
up much less than one percent of total U.S. vehicles sales, so the
environmental impact of these alternative standards would be very
small.
In the MY 2012-2016 program, EPA recognized that for very small
volume manufacturers, the CO2 standards adopted for MY 2012-
2016 would be extremely challenging and potentially infeasible for very
small manufacturers, at least absent purchase of credits from other
manufacturers. EPA therefore deferred small volume manufacturers (SVMs)
with annual U.S. sales less than 5,000 vehicles from having to meet
CO2 standards, and stated that we would establish
appropriate SVM standards at a later time. See 76 FR 74988. As part of
establishing eligibility for the exemption from the MY 2012-2016
standards, manufacturers must make a good faith effort to secure
credits from other manufacturers, if they are reasonably available, to
cover the emissions reductions they would have otherwise had to achieve
under applicable standards.
EPA continues to believe that these small volume manufacturers face
a greater challenge in meeting CO2 standards compared to
large manufacturers because they only produce a few vehicle models,
mostly focusing on high performance sports cars and luxury vehicles.
These manufacturers have limited product lines across which to average
emissions, and the few models they produce often have very high
CO2 levels. As SVMs noted in comments and discussions
leading to the proposal, SVMs only produce one or two vehicle types but
must compete directly with brands that are part of larger manufacturer
groups that have more resources available to them. There is often a
time lag in the availability of technologies from suppliers between
when the technology is supplied to large manufacturers and when it is
available to small volume manufacturers. Also, incorporating new
technologies into vehicle designs costs the same or more for small
volume manufacturers, yet the costs are spread over significantly
smaller volumes. Therefore, SVMs typically have longer vehicle model
life cycles in order to recover their investments. SVMs further noted
that despite constraints facing them, SVMs need to innovate in order to
differentiate themselves in the market and often lead in incorporating
technological innovations, particularly lightweight materials.
Prior to EPA's proposal, the agencies held detailed technical
discussions with the manufacturers eligible for the exemption under the
MY 2012-2016 program and reviewed detailed confidential product plans
of each manufacturer. Based on the information provided and subsequent
public comments, EPA continues to believe that SVMs would face great
difficulty meeting the primary CO2 standards and that
establishing challenging but less stringent SVM standards is
appropriate given the limited product offerings of SVMs. However,
selecting a single set of standards that would apply to all SVMs would
be difficult, if not unreasonable, because each manufacturer's product
lines vary significantly. Standards that would be appropriate for one
manufacturer may not be feasible for another, potentially driving them
from the domestic market. Alternatively, a less stringent standard may
only cap emissions for some manufacturers, providing little incentive
for them to reduce emissions. Therefore, EPA is finalizing, as
proposed, a case-by-case alternative standard approach as a way to
establish standards that will require SVMs to continue to innovate to
reduce emissions and do their ``fair share'' under the GHG program.
a. Overview of Existing Case-by-Case Approaches
A case-by-case approach for establishing standards for SVMs has
been adopted by NHTSA for CAFE, CARB in their GHG program, and the
European Union (EU) for European CO2 standards. For the CAFE
program, EPCA allows manufacturers making less than 10,000 vehicles per
year worldwide to petition the agency to have an alternative standard
established for them.\451\ NHTSA has adopted alternative standards for
some small volume manufacturers under these CAFE provisions and
continually reviews applications as they are submitted.\452\ Under the
CAFE program, petitioners must include projections of the most fuel
efficient production mix of vehicle configurations for a model year and
a discussion demonstrating that the projections are reasonable.
Petitioners must include, among other items, annual production data,
efforts to comply with applicable fuel economy standards, and detailed
information on vehicle technologies and specifications. The petitioner
must explain why they have not pursued additional means that would
allow them to achieve higher average fuel economy. NHTSA publishes a
proposed decision in the Federal Register and accepts public comments.
Petitions may be granted for up to three years.
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\451\ See 49 U.S.C. 32902(d) and 49 CFR Part 525. Under the CAFE
program, manufacturers who manufacture less than 10,000 passenger
cars worldwide annually may petition for an exemption from
generally-applicable CAFE standards, in which case NHTSA will
determine what level of CAFE would be maximum feasible for that
particular manufacturer if the agency determines that doing so is
appropriate.
\452\ Alternative CAFE standards are provided in 49 CFR
531.5(e).
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For the California GHG standards for MYs 2009-2016, CARB
established a process that would start at the beginning of MY2013,
where small volume manufacturers would identify all MY 2012 vehicle
models certified by large volume manufacturers that are comparable to
the SVM's planned MY 2016 vehicle models.\453\ The comparison vehicles
were to be selected on the basis of horsepower and power to weight
ratio. The SVM was required to demonstrate the appropriateness of the
comparison models selected. CARB would then provide a target
CO2 value based on the emissions performance of the
comparison vehicles to the SVM for each of their vehicle models to be
used to calculate a fleet average standard for each test group for
MY2016 and later. Since CARB provides that compliance with the National
Program for MYs 2012-2016 will be deemed compliance with the CARB
program, it has not taken action to set unique SVM standards, but its
program nevertheless was a useful model to consider. In their LEV III
rule, CARB adopted SVM alternative CO2 standard provisions
that are essentially the same as those being finalized by EPA.\454\
CARB also adopted provisions for operationally independent
manufacturers, similar to those described in EPA's request for comments
in the proposed rule.
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\453\ 13 CCR 1961.1(D).
\454\ Final Regulatory Order, Amendments to Sections 1900,
1956.8, 1960.1, 1961, 1961.1, 1965, 1968.2, 1968.5, 1976, 1978,
2037, 2038, 2062, 2112, 2139, 2140, 2145, 2147, 2235, and 2317, and
Adoption of new Sections 1961.2 and 1961.3, Title 13, California
Code of Regulations, p. 82.
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The EU process allows small manufacturers to apply for a derogation
from the primary CO2 emissions reduction targets.\455\
Applications for 2012 were required to be submitted by manufacturers no
later than March 31, 2011, and the Commission will assess the
application within 9 months of the receipt of a complete application.
Applications for derogations for 2012 have been submitted by several
manufacturers and non confidential versions are currently available to
the
[[Page 62791]]
public.\456\ In the EU process, the SVM proposes an alternative
emissions target supported by detailed information on the applicant's
economic activities and technological potential to reduce
CO2 emissions. The application also requires information on
individual vehicle models such as mass and specific CO2
emissions of the vehicles, and information on the characteristics of
the market for the types of vehicles manufactured. The proposed
alternative emissions standards may be the same numeric standard for
multiple years or a declining standard, and the alternative standards
may be established for a maximum period of five years. Where the
European Commission is satisfied that the specific emissions target
proposed by the manufacturer is consistent with its reduction
potential, including the economic and technological potential to reduce
its specific emissions of CO2, and taking into account the
characteristics of the market for the type of car manufactured, the
Commission will grant a derogation to the manufacturer.
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\455\ Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 and EU No 63/
2011. See also ``Frequently asked questions on application for
derogation pursuant to Aticle 11 of Regulation (EC) 443/2009.''
\456\ http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/vehicles/cars_en.htm
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b. EPA's Framework for Case-by-Case SVM Standards
As proposed, SVMs will become subject to the GHG program beginning
with MY 2017. Starting in MY 2017, SVMs will be required to meet the
primary program standards unless EPA establishes alternative standards
for the manufacturer. In addition, since SVMs will no longer be exempt
from the program, they will no longer be required to seek to purchase
credits from other manufacturers in order to maintain the exemption. As
proposed, eligible manufacturers seeking alternative standards must
petition EPA for alternative standards by July 30, 2013, providing the
information described below. If EPA finds that the application is
incomplete, EPA will notify the manufacturer and provide an additional
30 days for the manufacturer to provide all necessary information. EPA
will then publish a notice in the Federal Register of the
manufacturer's petition and recommendations for an alternative
standard, as well as EPA's proposed alternative standard. Non-
confidential business information portions of the petition will be
available to the public for review in the docket. After a period for
public comment, EPA will make a determination on an alternative
standard for the manufacturer and publish final notice of the
determination in the Federal Register for the general public as well as
the applicant. EPA expects the process to establish the alternative
standard to take about 12 months once a complete application is
submitted by the manufacturer.
As proposed, manufacturers may petition for alternative standards
for up to 5 model years (i.e., MYs 2017-2021) as long as sufficient
information is available on which to base the alternative standards
(see application discussion below). This initial round of establishing
case-by-case standards may be followed by one or more additional rounds
until standards are established for the SVM for all model years up to
and including MY 2025. For the later round(s) of standard setting, the
SVM must submit their petition 36 months prior to the start of the
first model year for which the standards would apply in order to
provide sufficient time for EPA to evaluate and set alternative
standards (e.g., January 1, 2018 for MY 2022). The 36 month requirement
does not apply to new market entrants, discussed in section III.C.5.e
below. The subsequent case-by-case standard setting will follow the
same notice and comment process as outlined above.
As proposed, if EPA does not establish SVM standards for a
manufacturer at least 12 months prior to the start of the model year in
cases where the manufacturer provided all required information by the
established deadline, the manufacturer may request an extension of the
alternative standards currently in place, on a model year by model year
basis. See 76 FR 74989. This provides assurance to manufacturers that
they will have at least 12 months lead time to prepare for the upcoming
model year.
EPA received comments from Aston Martin, Lotus, and McLaren (the
three manufacturers potentially eligible for SVM standards based on
their status under the MY2012-2016 program) fully supporting EPA's
proposed approach to establishing alternative standards through a case-
by-case manufacturer petition process. They commented that this
approach is not only technically appropriate but that adopting the
case-by-case SVM GHG mechanism would align EPA's approach with that of
NHTSA, the EU, and CARB, furthering the desirable objective of
harmonization.
EPA received comments from the Global Automakers that the standards
should be issued at least 18 months prior to the first affected model
year. Global Automakers did not provide supporting data or rationale
for their comments and EPA did not receive similar comments directly
from others, including the SVMs most directly affected. EPA is
concerned with the timing suggested by the commenter. EPA expects that
the EPA rulemaking process will take about 12 months, which would
provide manufacturers with a minimum of 17 months lead time prior to
the earliest possible start date for MY 2017, if they submit their
petition by the July 30, 2013 deadline (August 1, 2014 to January 1,
2016). EPA views this scenario as worst case in terms of lead time
because manufacturers may petition earlier than July 30, 2014 and also
may begin their MY 2017 production later than January 1, 2016. EPA
expects that in most cases, manufacturers will have more than 18 months
lead time. In addition, lead time will be one of the primary
considerations in determining the feasibility of potential alternative
standards. EPA is retaining the 12 month lead time provisions as
proposed, as EPA views the 12 month period as a reasonable balance
between the timing constraints of establishing reasonable alternative
standards prior to MY 2017 and the need to provide adequate lead time
to manufacturers to meet those standards.
EPA requested comments on allowing SVMs to comply early with the MY
2017 SVM alternative standard established for them. As discussed in the
NPRM, manufacturers may want to certify to the MY 2017 standards in
earlier model years (e.g., MY 2015 or MY 2016). See 76 FR 74989. Under
the MY 2012-2016 program, SVMs are eligible for an exemption from the
CO2 standards, but as part of the exemption are required to
make a good faith effort to purchase credits from other manufacturers.
By opting to certify early to the SVM alternative standard in lieu of
this exemption, manufacturers would avoid having to seek out credits to
purchase. As noted in the proposal, EPA would not allow certification
for vehicles already produced by the manufacturer, so the applicability
of this early opt-in provision would be limited to the later years of
the MY 2012-2016 program, due to the timing of establishing the SVM
standards. An early compliance option also may be beneficial for new
manufacturers entering the market that qualify as SVMs.
EPA did not receive any critical comments and received supportive
comments from the SVMs regarding its request for comment regarding
early optional compliance. Therefore, EPA is including in the final
program early opt-in provisions for manufacturers, allowing them the
option of meeting their MY 2017 standard (i.e. the case-by-case
standard adopted pursuant to the standards and procedures described
[[Page 62792]]
below) in MYs 2015 and 2016. Manufacturers selecting this option will
not be required to seek to purchase credits from other manufacturers in
those earlier model years when they choose optional certification.
c. Petition Data and Information Requirements
As described in detail in section I.D.2, EPA establishes motor
vehicle standards under section 202(a) that are based on technological
feasibility, and considering lead time, safety, costs and other impacts
on consumers, and other factors such as energy impacts associated with
use of the technology. As proposed, SVMs petitioning EPA for
alternative standards must submit the data and information listed below
which EPA will use, in addition to other relevant information, in
determining an appropriate alternative standard for the SVM. EPA will
also consider data and information provided by commenters during the
comment process in determining the final level of the individual SVM's
standards. EPA did not receive comments on these data requirements.
SVMs must provide the following information as part of their
petition for SVM standards:
Vehicle Model and Fleet Information
MYs that the application covers--up to five MYs.
Sufficient information must be provided to establish alternative
standards for each year
Vehicle models and sales projections by model for each MY
Description of models (vehicle type, mass, power, footprint,
expected pricing)
Description of powertrain
Production cycle for each model including new vehicle model
introductions
Vehicle footprint based targets and projected fleet average
standard under primary program by model year
Technology Evaluation
CO2 reduction technologies employed or expected to
be on the vehicle model(s) for the applicable model years, including
effectiveness and cost information
--Including A/C and potential off-cycle technologies
Evaluation of vehicles produced by other manufacturers similar
to those produced by the petitioning SVM and certified in MYs 2012-2013
(or latest two MYs for later applications) for each vehicle model
including CO2 results and any A/C credits generated by the
models
--Similar vehicles must be selected based on vehicle type, horsepower,
mass, power-to-weight, vehicle footprint, vehicle price range, and
other relevant factors as explained by the SVM
Discussion of CO2 reducing technologies employed on
vehicles offered by the manufacturer outside of the U.S. market but not
in the U.S., including why those vehicles/technologies are not being
introduced in the U.S. market as a way of reducing overall fleet
CO2 levels
Evaluation of technologies projected by EPA as technologies
likely to be used to meet the MYs 2012-2016 and MYs 2017-2025 standards
that are not projected to be fully utilized by the petitioning SVM and
explanation of reasons for not using the technologies, including
relevant cost information \457\
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\457\ See 75 FR 25444 (Section III.D) for MY 2012-2016
technologies and Section III.D below for discussion of projected MY
2017-2025 technologies.
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SVM Projected Standards
The most stringent CO2 level estimated by the SVM
to be feasible and appropriate by model and MY and the technological
and other basis for the estimate
For each MY, projection of the lowest fleet average
CO2 production mix of vehicle models and discussion
demonstrating that these projections are reasonable
A copy of any applications submitted to NHTSA for MY 2012 and
later alternative standards
Eligibility
U.S. sales for previous three model years and projections for
production volumes over the time period covered by the application
Complete information on ownership structure in cases where SVM
has ties to other manufacturers with U.S. vehicle sales
As proposed, EPA will weigh several factors in determining what
CO2 standards are appropriate for a given SVM's fleet. These
factors will include the level of technology applied to date by the
manufacturer, the manufacturer's projections for the application of
additional technology, CO2 reducing technologies being
employed by other manufacturers including on vehicles with which the
SVM competes directly and the CO2 levels of those vehicles,
and the technological feasibility and reasonableness of employing
additional technology not projected by the manufacturer in the time-
frame for which standards are being established. EPA will also consider
opportunities to generate A/C and off-cycle credits that are available
to the manufacturer. Lead time will be a key consideration both for the
initial years of the SVM standard, where lead time would be shorter due
to the timing of the notice and comment process to establish the
standards, and for the later years where manufacturers would have more
time to achieve additional CO2 reductions.
d. SVM Credits Provisions
As discussed in Section III.B.4, EPA's program includes a variety
of credit averaging, banking, and trading provisions. As proposed,
these provisions will generally apply to SVM standards as well, with
the exception that SVMs meeting alternative standards will not be
allowed to trade credits (i.e., sell or otherwise provide) to other
manufacturers. SVMs will be able to use credits purchased from other
manufacturers generated in the primary program. Although EPA does not
expect significant credits to be generated by SVMs due to the
manufacturer-specific standard setting approach being finalized, SVMs
will be able to generate and use credits internally, under the credit
carry-forward and carry-back provisions. Under a case-by-case approach,
EPA does not view such credits as windfall credits and not allowing
internal banking could stifle potential innovative approaches for SVMs.
SVMs will also be able to transfer credits between the car and light
trucks categories. EPA did not receive any comments regarding the ABT
provisions as they apply to SVMs meeting alternative standards.
e. SVM Standards Eligibility
i. Current SVMs
The MY 2012-2016 rulemaking limited eligibility for the SVM
exemption to manufacturers in the U.S. market in MY 2008 or MY 2009
with U.S. sales of less than 5,000 vehicles per year. After initial
eligibility has been established, the SVM remains eligible for the
exemption if the rolling average of three consecutive model years of
sales remains below 5,000 vehicles. Manufacturers going over the 5,000
vehicle rolling average limit would have two additional model years to
transition to having to meet applicable CO2 standards. Based
on these eligibility criteria, there are three companies that qualify
currently as SVMs under the MY2012-2016 standards: Aston Martin, Lotus,
and McLaren.\458\
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\458\ Under the MY 2012-2016 program, manufacturers must also
make a good faith effort to purchase CO2 credits in order
to maintain eligibility for SVM status.
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[[Page 62793]]
As proposed, EPA is retaining the 5,000 vehicle cut-point and
rolling three year average approach which we believe is appropriate as
a primary criterion for eligibility as an SVM. The 5,000 vehicle sales
threshold allows for some sales growth by SVMs, as the SVMs in the
market today typically have annual sales of below 2,000 vehicles.
Manufacturers with unusually strong sales in a given year would still
likely remain eligible, based on the three year rolling average.
However, if a manufacturer expands in the U.S. market on a permanent
basis such that they consistently sell more than 5,000 vehicles per
year, they would likely increase their rolling average to above 5,000
and no longer be eligible. EPA believes a manufacturer will be able to
consider these provisions, along with other factors, in its planning to
significantly expand in the U.S. market. EPA did not receive comments
on these provisions. As discussed below, EPA is not tying eligibility
to having been in the market in MY 2008 or MY 2009, or in any other
year, and is instead finalizing eligibility criteria for new SVMs newly
entering the U.S. market.
ii. New SVMs (New Entrants to the U.S. Market)
The SVM exemption under the MY 2012-2016 program included a
requirement that a manufacturer had to have been in the U.S. vehicle
market in MY 2008 or MY 2009. This provision ensured that a known
universe of manufacturers would be eligible for the exemption in the
short term and manufacturers would not be driven from the market as EPA
proceeded to develop appropriate SVM standards. EPA did not propose to
include such a provision for the SVM standards eligibility criteria for
MY 2017-2025. See 76 FR 74991. EPA believes that with SVM standards in
place, tying eligibility to being in the market in a prior year is no
longer necessary because SVMs will be required to achieve appropriate
levels of emissions control. Also, this type of eligibility condition
could serve as a potential market barrier by hindering new SVMs from
entering the U.S. market.
For new market entrants, EPA is finalizing the proposed provision
allowing a manufacturer the option of applying for an alternative
standard for MY2017-2025 pursuant to the criteria and process described
above. The new SVM would not be able to certify their vehicles under
the alternative standards until those standards are established. As
discussed in the proposal, EPA would expect the manufacturer to submit
an application as early as possible but at least 30 months prior to
when they expect to begin producing vehicles in order to provide enough
time for EPA to evaluate the application and develop standards using
the public process just described, and to provide necessary lead-time
to the manufacturer. EPA received no adverse comments regarding the
timing of the process contemplated in the proposal. In addition to the
information and data described below, EPA is requiring new market
entrants to provide evidence that the company intends to enter the U.S.
market within the time frame of the MY2017-2025 SVM standards. Such
evidence would include documentation of work underway to establish a
dealer network, appropriate financing and marketing plans, and evidence
the company is working to meet other federal vehicle requirements such
as other EPA emissions standards and NHTSA vehicle safety standards.
EPA is concerned about the administrative burden that could be created
for the agency by companies with no firm plans to enter the U.S. market
submitting applications in order to see what standard might be
established for them. This information, in addition to a complete
application with the information and data outlined above, will provide
evidence of the applicant's legitimacy. As part of this review, EPA
reserves the right to not undertake its SVM standards development
process for companies that do not exhibit a legitimate and documented
effort to enter the U.S. market.
As discussed in the proposal, EPA remains concerned about the
potential for gaming by a manufacturer that sells less than 5,000
vehicles in the first year, but with plans for significantly larger
sales volumes in the following years. See 76 FR 74991. EPA believes
that it would not be appropriate to establish alternative SVM standards
for a new market entrant that plans a steep ramp-up in U.S. vehicle
sales. Therefore, as proposed for new entrants, U.S. vehicle sales must
remain below 5,000 vehicles for the each of its first three years in
the market. After the initial three years, the manufacturer must
maintain a three year rolling average below 5,000 vehicles (e.g., the
rolling average of years 2, 3 and 4, must be below 5,000 vehicles). The
certificate(s) of conformity for vehicles sold by new entrant SVMs will
be conditioned on staying within the sales threshold, as provided in
Sec. 40 CFR 86.1848. If a new market entrant sells more than this
number of vehicles for the first five years in the market, vehicles
sold above the 5,000 vehicle threshold will not be covered by the
alternative standards. In such cases where the resulting fleet average
is not in compliance with the standards, the manufacturer will be
subject to enforcement action and the manufacturer will also lose
eligibility for the SVM standards until it has reestablished three
consecutive years of sales below 5,000 vehicles.
By not tying the 5,000 vehicle eligibility criteria to a particular
model year, it will be possible for a manufacturer already in the
market that drops below the 5,000 vehicle threshold in a future year to
attempt to establish eligibility. As proposed, EPA will treat such
manufacturers as new entrants to the market for purposes of determining
eligibility for SVM standards. However, the requirements to demonstrate
that the manufacturer intends to enter the U.S. market obviously would
not be relevant in this case, and therefore will not apply. EPA did not
receive comments regarding the above provisions for SVM new market
entrants.
iii. Corporate Ownership Aggregation Requirements and an Operational
Independence Concept
In determining eligibility for the MY 2012-2016 exemption, sales
volumes must be aggregated across manufacturers according to the
provisions of 40 CFR 86.1838-01(b)(3), which requires the sales of
different firms to be aggregated in various situations, including where
one firm has a 10% or more equity ownership of another firm, or where a
third party has a 10% or more equity ownership of two or more firms.
These are the same aggregation requirements used in other EPA small
volume manufacturer provisions, such as those for other light-duty
emissions standards.\459\ As proposed, EPA is generally retaining these
aggregation provisions as part of the eligibility criteria for the SVM
standards for MYs 2017-2025.\460\ However, as discussed below, EPA
requested comment on and is finalizing provisions allowing
manufacturers that otherwise would not be eligible for the GHG SVM
provisions due to these aggregation requirements, to demonstrate to the
Administrator that they are ``operationally independent'' based on the
criteria described below. If the Administrator determines that a
manufacturer is operationally
[[Page 62794]]
independent, that manufacturer will be eligible for the alternative SVM
CO2 standards as well as the remaining years of the MY 2012-
2016 exemption even if the manufacturer is more than 10 percent owned
by another firm.
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\459\ For other programs, the eligibility cut point for SVM
flexibility is 15,000 vehicles rather than 5,000 vehicles.
\460\ Manufacturers also retain, no matter their size, the
option to meet the full set of GHG requirements on their own, and do
not necessarily need to demonstrate compliance as part of a
corporate parent company fleet.
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As we noted at proposal, Ferrari requested in its comments to the
proposed 2012-2016 GHG standards that manufacturers be allowed to apply
to EPA to establish SVM status based on the independence of its
research, development, testing, design, and manufacturing from another
firm that has ownership interest in that manufacturer. Ferrari is
majority owned by Fiat and would be aggregated with other Fiat brands,
including Chrysler, Maserati, and Alfa Romeo, for purposes of
determining eligibility for SVM standards; therefore Ferrari does not
meet the current eligibility criteria for SVM status. However, Ferrari
believed that it would qualify as ``operationally independent'' under
appropriate criteria and would qualify as an SVM for the GHG program if
evaluated independent of the other Fiat brands. In the MY 2012-2016
final rule, EPA noted that it would further consider the issue of
operational independence and seek public comments on this concept (see
75 FR 25420) and EPA pursued the issue further in this proceeding. See
76 FR 74991-92. Specifically, we sought comment on expanding
eligibility for the SVM GHG standards and provisions to manufacturers
who would have U.S. annual sales of less than 5,000 if its own vehicles
based on a demonstration that they are ``operationally independent'' of
other companies because it operates its research, design, production,
and manufacturing independently from the parent company.
In particular, EPA requested comments regarding the degree to which
this concept could unnecessarily open up the SVM standards to several
smaller manufacturers that are integrated into large companies--smaller
companies that may be capable of and planning to meet the
CO2 standards as part of the larger manufacturer's fleet.
EPA also requested comment on the concern that manufacturers could
change their corporate structure to take advantage of such provisions
(that is, gaming). EPA requested comment on approaches to narrowly
define the operational independence criteria to ensure that qualifying
companies are truly independent and to avoid gaming to meet the
criteria. EPA also requested comments on the possible implications of
this approach on market competition. EPA acknowledged that regardless
of the criteria for operational independence, a small manufacturer
under the umbrella of a large manufacturer is fundamentally different
from other SVMs because the large manufacturer has several options
under the GHG program to bring the smaller subsidiary into compliance,
including the use of averaging or credit transfer provisions,
purchasing credits from another manufacturer, or providing technical
and financial assistance to the smaller subsidiary. Truly independent
SVMs do not have the potential access to these options, with the
exception of buying credits from another manufacturer. EPA requested
comments on the need for and appropriateness of allowing companies to
apply for less stringent SVM standards based on sales that are not
aggregated with other companies because of operational independence.
All of the comments on this issue supported allowing manufacturers
to qualify for alternative standards based on a showing of operational
independence. Ferrari commented in full support of the operational
independence concept and the criteria laid out in the proposal, stating
that the GHG standards could otherwise severely limit Ferrari in the
U.S. market. Several Ferrari dealers commented in the support of the
operational independence provision, citing potential for loss of sales
and jobs at dealerships if this provision were not finalized. Global
Automakers also strongly supported the operational independence
provisions.
With regard to EPA's request for comments regarding the potential
for gaming, Ferrari commented that the criteria considered by EPA,
discussed below, will serve as a sufficient safeguard. Ferrari
commented that the cost of restructuring a company to separate all
design, R&D, production and testing facilities from the parent company,
along with the expense of developing completely new powertrains and
platforms, would be prohibitively expensive. Ferrari also commented
that the requirements for a newly spun-off manufacturer to establish
itself as operationally independent over a two year period, during
which the company will have to meet the GHG standards in order to
remain in the U.S. market, will also discourage potential gaming.
Several Ferrari dealers also commented that the criteria will ensure
that a manufacturer seeking operational independence is truly
independent. The Global Automakers commented that the criteria are
sufficiently stringent and there would be virtually no ability for
manufacturers to abuse the operational independence provision.
EPA is finalizing the operational independence criteria listed
below, which were detailed in the request for comments in the proposal
(see 76 FR 74992). These criteria are meant to establish that a
company, though owned by another manufacturer, does not benefit
operationally or financially from this relationship, and should
therefore be considered independent for purposes of calculating the
sales volume for determining eligibility for the GHG SVM program.
Manufacturers must demonstrate compliance with all of these criteria in
order to be found to be operationally independent. By ``related
manufacturers'' below, EPA means all manufacturers that would be
aggregated together under the 10 percent ownership provisions contained
in EPA's current small volume manufacturer definition (i.e., the parent
company and all subsidiaries where there is 10 percent or greater
ownership).
As proposed, EPA will determine based on information provided by
the manufacturer in its application, if the manufacturer currently
meets the following criteria and has met them for at least 24 months
preceding the application submittal and is therefore operationally
independent:
1. No financial or other support of economic value was provided by
related manufacturers for purposes of design, parts procurement, R&D
and production facilities and operation. Any other transactions with
related manufacturers must be conducted under normal commercial
arrangements like those conducted with other parties. Any such
transactions shall be at competitive pricing rates to the manufacturer.
2. The applicant maintains separate and independent research and
development, testing, and manufacturing/production facilities.
3. The applicant does not use any vehicle engines, powertrains, or
platforms developed or produced by related manufacturers.
4. Patents are not held jointly with related manufacturers.
5. The applicant maintains separate business administration, legal,
purchasing, sales, and marketing departments as well as autonomous
decision making on commercial matters.
6. Overlap of Board of Directors is limited to 25 percent with no
sharing of top operational management, including president, chief
executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and chief
operating officer (COO), and provided that no individual overlapping
director or combination of overlapping directors exercises exclusive
management control over either or both companies.
[[Page 62795]]
7. Parts or components supply agreements between related companies
must be established through open market process and to the extent that
manufacturer sells parts/components to non-related auto manufacturers,
it does so through the open market at competitive pricing.
Volkswagen commented in support of the operational independence
provision, but raised concerns that the above criteria are too
prescriptive and difficult to apply across all circumstances of
captured small volume brands. Volkswagen requested that EPA ``consider
the operational independence of each manufacturer on an individual
basis during the petition process. As such the degree of independence
could be part of the negotiation process for setting standards for a
particular SVM.'' In response, the criteria were not intended to apply
to ``all circumstances'' of captured brands. The criteria were written
narrowly to purposely exclude captured brands that are integrated or
managed by the parent company in any substantive way. EPA's intention,
as described in the proposal, is to include only companies that can be
demonstrated to be completely independent, held at arm's length by the
parent company without access to the resources of the parent company or
related manufacturers. Further, EPA is concerned that broadening the
criteria in ways suggested by the commenter would lead to gaming issues
EPA is seeking to avoid, as discussed above. EPA believes that it is
important to retain the above criteria in order to avoid having to make
determinations regarding ``degrees'' of independence.
In addition to the criteria listed above, EPA is finalizing the
following programmatic elements and framework. EPA is requiring the
manufacturer applying for operational independence to provide an attest
engagement from an independent auditor verifying the accuracy of the
information provided in the application.\461\ EPA foresees possible
difficulty verifying the information in the application, especially if
the company is located overseas. The principal purpose of the attest
engagement would be to provide an independent review and verification
of the information provided. Ferrari submitted supportive comments on
using the EPA fuel programs as a template for the attest engagement
provisions. EPA is also requiring that the application be signed by the
company president or CEO.
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\461\ EPA has required attest engagements as part of its fuels
programs. See 40 CFR Sec. 80.125, 40 CFR Sec. 80.1164 and Sec.
80.1464.
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After EPA approval, the manufacturer will be required to report
within 60 days any material changes to the information provided in the
application. A manufacturer will lose eligibility automatically after
the material change occurs. However, EPA will confirm that the
manufacturer no longer meets one or more of the criteria and thus is no
longer considered operationally independent, and will notify the
manufacturer. In such cases, EPA will provide two full model years lead
time after the MY in which the manufacturer loses eligibility for the
manufacturer to transition to the primary program standards. For
example, if the manufacturer lost eligibility sometime during the
manufacturer's model year 2018 (based on when the material change
occurs), the manufacturer would need to meet primary program standards
in MY 2021. A manufacturer losing eligibility must subsequently meet
the criteria for three consecutive years before it would be allowed to
petition to re-establish operational independence.
6. Additional Lead Time for Intermediate Volume Manufacturers
EPA is finalizing provisions to allow additional lead time for
intermediate volume manufacturers that sell less than 50,000 vehicles
per year, for the first four years of the program (MY 2017-2020). The
2012-2016 GHG vehicle standards include Temporary Lead Time Allowance
Alternative Standards (TLAAS) which provide alternative standards to
certain intermediate sized manufacturers (those with U.S. sales between
5,000 and 400,000 during model year 2009) to accommodate two
situations: manufacturers which traditionally paid civil penalties
instead of complying with CAFE standards, and limited line
manufacturers facing special compliance challenges due to less
flexibility afforded by averaging, banking and trading. The TLAAS
includes additional flexibility for manufacturers with MY 2009 sales of
less than 50,000 vehicles through MY 2016. For manufacturers with sales
of greater than 50,000 vehicles (but less than 400,000), the program
ends in MY 2015. See 75 FR 25414-416.
EPA did not propose to continue the TLAAS program for MYs 2017-
2025. See 76 FR 74994. First, the allowance was premised on the need to
provide adequate lead time, given the (at the time the rule was
finalized) rapidly approaching MY 2012 deadline, and given that
manufacturers were transitioning from a CAFE regime that allows civil
penalties in lieu of compliance, to a Clean Air Act regime that does
not. That concern is no longer applicable, given that there is ample
lead time before the MY 2017 standards begin. More importantly, the
Temporary Lead Time Allowance was just as the name describes--
temporary--and EPA provided it to allow manufacturers to transition to
full compliance in later model years. See 75 FR 25416. EPA received one
comment, from Natural Resources Defense Council, generally supporting
EPA's decision not to propose an extension of the TLAAS program.
EPA also requested comment on whether there is a need to provide
some type of additional lead time for intermediate volume, limited line
manufacturers. Prior to proposal, one company with U.S. sales on the
order of 25,000 vehicles per year presented confidential business
information indicating that it believes that the CO2
standards for MY2017-2025 would present significant technical
challenges for their company, due to the relatively small volume of
products it sells in the U.S., its limited ability to average across
their limited line fleet, and the performance-oriented nature of its
vehicles. This firm indicated that absent access, several years in
advance, to CO2 credits that it could purchase from other
firms, this firm would need to significantly change the types of
products they currently market in the U.S. (thus affecting their
``brand'') beginning in model year 2017, even if it adds substantial
CO2 reducing technology to its vehicles. EPA noted in its
request for comments that potential flexibilities could include an
extension of the TLAAS program for lower volume companies, or a one-to-
three year delay in the applicable model year standard (e.g., the
proposed MY 2017 standards could be delayed to begin in MY 2018, MY
2019, or MY 2020). See 76 FR 74995.
Public comments supported the concept of providing additional
flexibility for limited line intermediate volume manufacturers. In
particular, EPA received comments from Jaguar Land Rover, Porsche, and
Suzuki supporting approaches that would provide intermediate volume
manufacturers with additional flexibility. These three manufacturers
are eligible under the MY 2012-2016 program for the expanded TLAAS
provisions through MY 2016, based on their MY 2009 sales of less than
50,000 vehicles.
Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) commented that they will be achieving very
significant CO2 reductions well in excess of industry
averages. However,
[[Page 62796]]
JLR further commented that the required rates of reduction implied by
the proposed curves between MY2016 and MY2017 are very challenging for
lower volume, limited line manufacturers coming out of the expanded
TLAAS program. JLR further commented that companies participating in
the expanded TLAAS program in MY 2016 will start MY 2017 with either no
CO2 credits banked or CO2 debits carrying
forward. JLR provided confidential information regarding the companies'
projected situation in the early years of the MY 2017-2025 program. JLR
requested in their comments that EPA consider phasing in the MY 2017
and later program for lower volume, limited line niche manufacturers
when the expanded TLAAS program ends, starting in MY 2017 and ending
with MY 2021 production, with full compliance with the primary program
standards in MY 2022.
Porsche commented that the transition from TLAAS to the base
standards is a disproportionate burden for niche carmakers, and that
the transition cannot be accomplished by gradual incremental
improvements. Porsche commented that their development costs for new
technology cannot be spread over a large fleet to take advantage of
natural economies of scale, and that there is a disproportionate
financial impact on small manufacturers, due to higher per unit cost.
Porsche further commented that larger competitors can support sports
car sales by fleet averaging over a broad range of products, and that
their smallest competitors (SVMs) can request alternate CO2
standards. Porsche commented that it cannot utilize either of these
options. Porsche noted that EPA projected in the NPRM far greater
penetration of electrification for them than for any other
manufacturer. For example, EPA projected in the proposal a 30 percent
HEV and 24 percent PHEV/EV penetration for Porsche in 2021. See 76 FR
75073. Porsche commented that, in the absence of relief, Porsche would
face a 25 percent reduction in the GHG standards at the expiration of
MY 2016, and that the proposed standards would create a hurdle that
would drive them from the marketplace.
Porsche recommended three possible approaches to address their
concerns; a fixed alternative standard with a program like TLAAS, case-
by-case standards setting based on the performance of competitor
vehicles similar to the approach proposed for SVMs, or an alternative
phase-in that mitigates the potential 25 percent drop in standards in
MY 2017 after TLAAS expires.
Suzuki similarly commented raising concerns that the proposed
standards did not adequately recognize the lead time concerns of low-
volume, limited line manufacturers like Suzuki. Suzuki commented that
``when small-volume manufacturers need to develop new technology and
develop a new model/new engine to make the significant improvements
necessary to comply with the proposed standards, the per-vehicle cost
for the special development that is needed specifically for the U.S.
market is much higher than for manufacturers with larger sales
volumes.'' Suzuki suggested that EPA provide three years additional
lead time to manufacturers with average U.S. sales of less than 50,000
vehicles. Under Suzuki's suggestion, such manufacturers would not be
required to meet the MY 2017 standards until MY 2020 and would be
required to meet MY 2018-2025 standards until MY 2021-2028. Suzuki did
not provide any data or information regarding their fleet or plans for
technology introduction in support of their comments.
After reviewing the comments and the feasibility issues potentially
facing these manufacturers in the early years of the program, EPA is
finalizing additional lead time provisions for intermediate volume
manufacturers. The additional lead time will help manufacturers
transition from the expanded TLAAS program in MY 2016 to the primary
standards being adopted for MY 2017-2025, by helping to mitigate the
steep increase in standard stringency that would otherwise occur for
them in the MY 2016-2017 time frame. As discussed in the feasibility
section III.D, the standards will be especially challenging for them.
Also, intermediate volume manufacturers have limited ability to average
due to their limited product line and will not have credits available
from their own fleet due to the credit restrictions included in the
TLAAS program. It is possible that the manufacturers could purchase
credits from other manufacturers (and eligibility for the expanded
TLAAS provisions requires manufacturers to exhaust credit purchasing
opportunities), but the availability of credits is highly uncertain due
to the competitive nature of the auto industry and the one time carry
forward credit provision to 2021.
Manufacturers participating in the expanded TLAAS program in MY
2016 will be eligible for the additional lead time shown in the table
below. Manufacturers not eligible for the expanded TLAAS program,
including new market entrants, will not be eligible for the additional
lead time.\462\ EPA is structuring eligibility in this way because
manufacturers meeting the primary program standards in MY 2016 will not
be facing such a steep change in stringency in the early years of the
program. As shown in the table below, in MY 2017-2018 intermediate
volume manufacturers must meet their MY 2016 base standards that would
have applied in MY 2016 under the primary program (i.e., in the absence
of TLAAS). In effect, this requires the manufacturers to meet the
standards that would have applied in MY 2017 absent the new standards
being set in this MY 2017-2025 rule. By MY 2021, the manufacturer must
be fully compliant with the primary MY 2021 standards.
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\462\ Expanded TLAAS is available only to manufacturers in the
market in MY 2009 with annual U.S. sales of less than 50,000
vehicles.
Table III-12--Additional Lead Time for Intermediate Volume Manufacturers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year Primary program standards that apply
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................. MY 2016.
2018............................. MY 2016.
2019............................. MY 2018.
2020............................. MY 2019.
2021............................. MY 2021 (full compliance).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA recognizes that the additional lead time being finalized does
not provide the full level of relaxation recommended by the commenters
and that the standards remain very challenging for these intermediate
sized companies. However, EPA believes that the additional lead time
provided will be sufficient to ease the transition to more stringent
standards in the early years of the 2017-2025 program that could
otherwise present a difficult hurdle for them to overcome. In this
regard, we received comments, consistent with our assessment,
indicating that additional lead time should be sufficient to allow
manufacturers to meet the standards. The added lead time will allow
manufacturers to better plan the introduction of technologies to bring
them into compliance with the primary standards. Also, EPA is not
adopting any restrictions on credit banking such as those contained in
the MYs 2012-2016 TLAAS program, allowing intermediate volume
manufacturers to bank credits in these years to further help smooth the
transition from one model year to the next. EPA is, however,
prohibiting any intermediate volume manufacturer opting to use these
provisions from trading credits
[[Page 62797]]
generated under the alternative phase-in to another firm for the same
reasons credit trading cannot be used by small volume manufacturers.
Furthermore, because EPA believes it is reasonable, based on
intermediate volume manufacturer comments and on the analysis in
section III.D.6 below (documenting compliance paths for all
manufacturers), for these manufacturers to achieve the primary
standards by MY 2021, EPA does not believe that any further lead time
is warranted. Since it is important to limit as much as possible the
loss of emissions reductions associated with the additional flexibility
provided, EPA is not adopting permanent alternative standards, longer
phase-ins, or other flexibilities for intermediate volume
manufacturers.
Porsche noted that the company submitted comments under the
assumption that they would remain independent from Volkswagen and that
if the status of their relationship changed such that a supplement to
their comments would be in order, Porsche reserved the possibility that
it may submit such comments. On August 1, 2012, VW completed its
acquisition of 100 percent of Porsche's automotive business.\463\ It is
EPA's expectation that Porsche will no longer be eligible for the lead
time provisions discussed above for MY 2017-2020. EPA expects that
Porsche's fleet will be absorbed into VW's fleet for purposes of
determining compliance with the GHG standards. Nevertheless, EPA has
considered Porsche's comments and recommendations with regard to
intermediate volume manufacturers.
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\463\ ``Volkswagen and Porsche finalize creation of Integrated
Automotive Group,'' Volkswagen news release, August 1, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Small Business Exemption
EPA is finalizing, as proposed, a provision to exempt small
businesses from the MY2017-2025 standards, as well as establishing a
voluntary opt-in provision for those small business manufacturers that
wish to certify to the GHG standards in order to generate and sell
credits.\464\ In the MY 2012-2016 rule, EPA exempted entities from the
GHG emissions standard, if the entity met the Small Business
Administration (SBA) size criteria of a small business as described in
13 CFR 121.201. \465\ The small business size criterion for vehicle
manufacturers is less than 1000 employees. This includes both U.S.-
based and foreign small entities in three distinct categories of
businesses for light-duty vehicles: small manufacturers, independent
commercial importers (ICIs), and alternative fuel vehicle converters.
As proposed, EPA is continuing this exemption for the MY 2017-2025
standards. EPA did not receive any adverse comments regarding
continuing the exemption for small businesses, as defined.
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\464\ Note that `small businesses' are not the same as small
volume manufacturers. The potential overlap of these terms is
discussed later in this preamble sub-section.
\465\ See final regulations at 40 CFR 86.1801-12(j).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA has identified about 24 entities that fit the Small Business
Administration (SBA) size criterion of a small business. EPA estimates
there currently are approximately five small manufacturers including
three electric vehicle small business vehicle manufacturers that have
recently entered the market, eight ICIs, and eleven alternative fuel
vehicle converters in the light-duty vehicle market. EPA estimates that
these small entities comprise less than 0.1 percent of the total light-
duty vehicle sales in the U.S., and therefore the exemption will have a
negligible impact on the GHG emissions reductions from the standards.
Further detail regarding EPA's assessment of small businesses is
provided in Regulatory Flexibility Act Section III.I.3 of this
preamble, and in RIA Chapter 9.
At least one small business manufacturer, Fisker Automotive, in
discussions with EPA prior to proposal, suggested that small businesses
should have the option of voluntarily opting-in to the GHG standards.
This manufacturer sells electric vehicles, and sees a potential market
for selling credits to other manufacturers. As discussed in the
proposal, EPA believes that there could be several benefits to this
approach, as it would allow small businesses an opportunity to generate
revenue to offset their technology investments and to encourage
commercialization of the innovative technology. There would likewise be
a benefit to any manufacturer seeking those credits to meet their
compliance obligations. EPA proposed and is finalizing allowing small
businesses to waive their small entity exemption and opt-in to the
primary GHG standards based on this same rationale. This will allow
small business manufacturers to earn CO2 credits under the
program, which may be an especially attractive option for the new
electric vehicle manufacturers entering the market. The small business
would have to meet the primary standard for its fleet (that is, the
small business would be allowed to opt-in to the primary program
standard, but not the small volume manufacturer standards, since SVMs
that receive approval of alternative standards are not eligible to
generate credits for trading as explained above). As proposed,
manufacturers waiving their small entity exemption must meet all
aspects of the GHG standards and program requirements across their
entire product line.
EPA proposed to make the opt-in available starting in MY 2014, as
the MY 2012, and potentially the MY 2013, certification process will
have already occurred by the time this rulemaking is finalized. See 76
FR 74994. EPA proposed this timing to avoid retroactively certifying
vehicles that have already been produced. EPA proposed, however, that
manufacturers certifying to the GHG standards for MY 2014 would be
eligible to generate credits for vehicles sold in MY 2012 and MY 2013
based on the number of vehicles sold and the manufacturer's footprint-
based standard under the primary program that would have otherwise
applied to the manufacturer if it were a large manufacturer. This
approach would be similar to that used by EPA for early credits
generated in MYs 2009-2011, where manufacturers did not certify
vehicles to CO2 standards in those years but were able to
generate credits. See 75 FR 25441.
EPA received comments from Fisker requesting that EPA reconsider
the timing of the opt-in provisions. Fisker commented that under EPA's
proposal, manufacturers would not be able to generate credits until the
end of MY 2014, even for vehicles that are produced in MYs 2012-2013.
Fisker commented that this would significantly diminish the revenue
generating benefit of these credits, particularly during the critical
early years of their company when potential credit revenues would be of
most benefit to the company. EPA is persuaded by this reasoning, and
the final rule therefore provides that the opt-in provisions begin with
MY 2013. See Sec. 86.1801-12(j)(2)(i). The timing of the final rule
will allow the GHG requirements to be integrated into the MY 2013
certification process for these small businesses. Once the small
business manufacturer opting into the GHG program completes
certification for MY 2013, the company will be eligible to generate GHG
credits for their MY 2012 production. Manufacturers will not have to
wait until the end of MY 2013 to generate MY 2012 credits. EPA believes
this provision is responsive to the concerns of the commenter while
still ensuring that the manufacturer is certified under the GHG program
prior to generating credits.
EPA also received comments from Vehicle Production Group that small
business entities are discussed in terms of small volume manufacturers,
[[Page 62798]]
independent commercial importers, and alternative fuel converters, and
that limited line manufacturers should be added to the list of types of
small entities affected. EPA is clarifying that, as proposed,
manufacturers meeting the SBA definition of small business (1,000
employees) are exempt regardless of their production volume or number
of vehicle lines produced. Also, not all small volume manufacturers
qualify as small businesses, and EPA is adopting special provisions for
SVMs that are non-small business companies. See Section III.B.5. EPA
did not propose to change the use of the SBA definition for determining
whether a manufacturer is considered a small business. EPA does not
believe that using the number of vehicle lines is appropriate to
determine eligibility for the small business exemption. This approach
would create a loophole for large manufacturers producing a limited
product line for the U.S. market and such a manufacturer would
potentially be capable of selling a large volume of vehicles under such
an exemption.
8. Police and Emergency Vehicle Exemption From GHG Standards
EPA is finalizing its proposal to exempt police and other emergency
vehicles from the GHG standards, starting in MY2012. Under EPCA,
manufacturers are allowed to exclude police and other emergency
vehicles from their CAFE fleet and all manufacturers that produce
emergency vehicles have historically done so. EPA is adopting an
exemption parallel to the EPCA exemption allowing manufacturers to
exempt police and emergency vehicles upon sending notification to EPA
(the same notification that is sent to NHTSA would suffice). EPA
received comments in the MY 2012-2016 rulemaking that these vehicles
should be exempt from the GHG emissions standards and EPA committed to
further consider the issue in a future rulemaking.466,467
EPA continues to believe it is appropriate to provide an exemption at
this time for these vehicles because of the unique features of vehicles
designed specifically for law enforcement and emergency response
purposes, which have the effect of raising their GHG emissions, as well
as for purposes of harmonization with the CAFE program. As proposed,
EPA is exempting vehicles that are excluded under EPCA and NHTSA
regulations which define emergency vehicle as ``a motor vehicle
manufactured primarily for use as an ambulance or combination
ambulance-hearse or for use by the United States Government or a State
or local government for law enforcement, or for other emergency uses as
prescribed by regulation by the Secretary of Transportation.'' \468\
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\466\ 75 FR 25409
\467\ Manufacturers may exclude police and emergency vehicles
from fleet average calculations (both for determining fleet
compliance levels and fleet standards) starting in MY 2012. Because
this would have the effect of making the fleet standards easier to
meet for manufacturers, EPA does not believe there would be lead
time issues associated with the exemption, even though it would take
effect well into MY 2012.
\468\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(e)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA received comments from manufacturers supporting the proposed
emergency vehicle exemption and harmonization with the EPCA exemption.
Ford further commented that without the exemption, ``manufacturers may
be forced to choose between (1) deciding whether to degrade the
performance of the emergency vehicles, (2) deciding to restrict the
sales of its emergency vehicles, potentially even exiting the market
altogether, or (3) facing non-compliance with the federal GHG
standards.'' \469\ EPA also received comments from Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection that the new technologies to
generate more horsepower can be used to downsize a vehicle's engine and
that ``No logical reason seems to exist as to why this new technology
cannot be used for police and emergency vehicles in order to gain fuel
efficiency without loss of power. Police and emergency vehicles
constitute a large fleet in the United States; not including them so
they can benefit from the same GHG-reducing technology would be
unfortunate.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\469\ Ford's comment was originally submitted for the MY 2012-
2016 rulemaking and is incorporated by reference into Ford's
comments in the MY 2017-2025 rulemaking. See Docket items EPA-HQ-
OAR-2009-0472-7082.1 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in the proposal, the unique features of these vehicles
result in significant added weight including: heavy-duty suspensions,
stabilizer bars, heavy-duty/dual batteries, heavy-duty engine cooling
systems, heavier glass, bullet-proof side panels, and high strength
sub-frame. Police pursuit vehicles are often equipped with specialty
steel rims and increased rolling resistance tires designed for high
speeds, and unique engine and transmission calibrations to allow high-
power, high-speed chases. Police and emergency vehicles also have
features that tend to reduce aerodynamics, such as emergency lights,
increased ground clearance, and heavy-duty front suspensions.
EPA remains concerned that manufacturers may not be able to
sufficiently reduce the emissions from these vehicles, and absent an
exemption would be faced with a difficult choice of compromising
necessary vehicle features or dropping vehicles from their fleets, as
they may not have credits under the fleet averaging provisions
necessary to cover the excess emissions from these vehicles as
standards become more stringent. EPA continues to believe that without
the exemption, there could be situations where a manufacturer is more
challenged in meeting the GHG standards simply due to the inclusion of
these higher emitting emergency vehicles. Technical feasibility issues
go beyond those of other high-performance vehicles, and vehicles with
these performance characteristics must continue to be made available in
the market. Therefore, EPA is finalizing the proposed exemption for
police and emergency vehicles and thus not including these vehicles in
the National Program at this time. MY 2012-2016 standards, as well as
MY 2017 and later standards would be fully harmonized with CAFE
regarding the treatment of these vehicles.
EPA received comments from manufacturers that EPA should exempt
police and emergency vehicles from the CH4 and
N2O standards as well as the fleet-average CO2
standards in order to ensure full consistency with CAFE. EPA
understands that the NPRM was unclear on this point and EPA is
clarifying that the exemption applies to the overall GHG program
including the N2O and CH4 standards.
EPA received comments from Vehicle Production Group that the police
and emergency vehicle exemption should be expanded to include vehicles
manufactured ``for the public good,'' which would include vehicles
manufactured for the specific purpose of transporting wheelchair users.
EPA is not expanding the police and emergency vehicle exemption to
include vehicles used ``for the public good'' as this term is not
defined in current regulations and is not included in the EPCA
exemption. EPA also does not believe that these other types of vehicles
are designed for the severe duty cycles that are experienced by police
and emergency vehicles, and therefore do not face the same potential
constraints in terms of vehicle design and the application of
technology.
[[Page 62799]]
9. Nitrous Oxide, Methane, and CO2-Equivalent Approaches
EPA is not amending the standards for nitrous oxides
(N2O) or methane (CH4) adopted in the 2012-2016
light-duty vehicle GHG rules. These standards serve to cap emissions of
N2O and CH4, and generally ensure that emissions
of these GHGs will not increase above current levels. The issues
addressed in this rulemaking relate to means of demonstrating and
documenting compliance with these standards. As proposed, EPA is
extending to MY 2017 and later the provisions allowing manufacturers to
use CO2 credits on a CO2-equivanent basis to
comply with the standards for N2O and CH4. EPA is
also finalizing additional lead time for manufacturers to use
compliance statements in lieu of N2O testing through MY
2016, as proposed. In addition, in response to comments, EPA is
allowing the continued use of compliance statements in MYs 2017-2018 in
cases where manufacturers are not conducting new emissions testing for
a test group, but rather carrying over certification data from a
previous year. EPA is also clarifying that manufacturers will not be
required to conduct in-use testing for N2O in cases where a
compliance statement has been used for certification. All of these
provisions are discussed in detail below. The Response to Comments
document provides a full review of all comments received by EPA on
issues relating to the standards for N2O and CH4.
a. N2O and CH4 Standards and Flexibility
For light-duty vehicles, as part of the MY 2012-2016 rulemaking,
EPA finalized standards for nitrous oxide (N2O) of 0.010 g/
mile and methane (CH4) of 0.030 g/mile for MY 2012 and later
vehicles. 75 FR 25421-24. The light-duty vehicle standards for
N2O and CH4 were established to cap emissions of
these GHGs, where current levels are generally significantly below the
cap. The cap were intended to prevent future emissions increases, and
these standards were generally not expected to result in the
application of new technologies or significant costs for manufacturers
using current vehicle designs. In the MY 2012-2016 rule, EPA also
finalized an alternative CO2 equivalent standard option,
which manufacturers may choose to use in lieu of complying with the
N2O and CH4 cap standards. The CO2-
equivalent standard option allows manufacturers to fold all 2-cycle
weighted N2O and CH4 emissions, on a
CO2-equivalent basis, along with CO2 into their
CO2 emissions fleet average compliance level.\470\ The
applicable CO2 fleet average standard is not adjusted to
account for the addition of N2O and CH4. For
flexible fueled vehicles, the N2O and CH4
standards must be met on both fuels (e.g., both gasoline and E-85).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\ The global warming potentials (GWP) used in this rule are
consistent with the 100-year time frame values in the 2007
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment
Report (AR4). At this time, the 100-year GWP values from the 1995
IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) are used in the official U.S.
GHG inventory submission to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) per the reporting requirements under that
international convention. The UNFCCC recently agreed on revisions to
the national GHG inventory reporting requirements, and will begin
using the 100-year GWP values from AR4 for inventory submissions in
the future. According to the AR4, N2O has a 100-year GWP
of 298 and CH4 has a 100-year GWP of 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the light-duty standards were finalized, manufacturers raised
concerns that for a few of the vehicle models in their existing fleet
they were having difficulty meeting the N2O and/or
CH4 standards, in the near-term. In such cases,
manufacturers would still have the option of complying using the
CO2 equivalent alternative. On a CO2 equivalent
basis, folding in all N2O and CH4 emissions could
add up to 3-4 g/mile to a manufacturer's overall fleet-average
CO2 emissions level because the alternative standard must be
used for the entire fleet, not just for the problem vehicles. The 3-4
g/mile assumes all emissions are actually at the level of the cap. See
75 FR 74211. As we noted at proposal, this could be especially
challenging in the early years of the MY 2012-2016 program for
manufacturers with little compliance margin because there is very
limited lead time to develop strategies to address these additional
emissions. Some manufacturers believe that the CO2-
equivalent fleet-wide option ``penalizes'' manufacturers that choose
this option, by requiring them to fold in both CH4 and
N2O emissions for their entire fleet, even if they have
difficulty meeting the cap on only one vehicle model.
In response to these concerns, EPA has already amended the MY 2012-
2016 standards (as part of the heavy-duty GHG rulemaking) to allow
manufacturers to use CO2 credits, on a CO2-
equivalent basis, to meet the light-duty N2O and
CH4 standards in MYs 2012-2016.\471\ Manufacturers have the
option of using CO2 credits to meet either or both the
N2O standard and the CH4 standard on a test group
basis as needed. In their public comments to the proposal (in the
heavy-duty rulemaking) on this issue, manufacturers urged EPA to extend
this flexibility for model years after 2016, as they believed this
option was more advantageous than the CO2-equivalent fleet
wide option (discussed previously) already provided in the light-duty
MY 2012-2016 program, because it allowed manufacturers to address
N2O and CH4 separately and on a test group basis,
rather than across their whole fleet. Further, manufacturers believed
that since this option is allowed under the heavy-duty standards,
allowing it for post-2016 model years in the light-duty program would
make the light- and heavy-duty GHG programs more consistent. In the
final rule for heavy-duty vehicle GHG standards, EPA noted that it
intended to consider this issue further in the context of new standards
for MYs 2017-2025, in the then-planned future light-duty vehicle
rulemaking. 76 FR 57194.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\471\ See 76 FR 57193-94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acting on this intention, EPA proposed to extend the option of
using CO2 credits on a CO2-equivalent basis to
meet the light-duty vehicle N2O and CH4 standards
for MYs 2017 and later. EPA is adopting this provision as proposed. EPA
continues to believe that allowing use of CO2 credits to
meet CH4 and N2O standards on a CO2
equivalent basis is a reasonable approach to provide additional
flexibility without diminishing overall GHG emissions reductions. All
of the comments on this issue from automakers and others supported
extending this option beyond MY 2016.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\472\ There likewise was no opposition to EPA's earlier proposal
to amend the MYs 2012-2016 light-duty GHG standards to allow this
option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA also requested comment on establishing an adjustment to the
CO2-equivalent standard for manufacturers selecting the
CO2-equivalent option. See 76 FR 74993. Under the approach
described in the proposal, manufacturers would continue to be required
to fold in all of their CH4 and N2O emissions,
along with CO2, into their CO2-equivalent levels.
They would then apply an agency-established adjustment factor to the
CO2-equivalent standard which would slightly increase the
amount of allowed fleet average CO2 equivalent emissions for
the manufacturer's fleet. For example, if the adjustment for
CH4 and N2O combined was 1 to 2 g/mile CO2
equivalent (taking into account the GWP of N2O and
CH4), manufacturers would determine their CO2
fleet emissions standard and add the 1 to 2 g/mile adjustment factor to
it to determine their CO2-equivalent standard. The purpose
of this adjustment would be so manufacturers do not have to offset the
typical N2O
[[Page 62800]]
and CH4 vehicle emissions, while holding manufacturers
responsible for higher than average N2O and CH4
emissions levels reflected by the adjustment factor. EPA did not set
out in the proposal a specific adjustment value due to a current lack
of test data on estimated in-use N2O emissions on which to
base the adjustment value for N2O. EPA requested comment on
actual N2O data which could be used as the basis for such an
adjustment.\473\
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\473\ See 76 FR 74993.
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EPA received comments both in support of and against establishing
an adjustment factor for the fleet-wide CO2-equivalent
option. Volkswagen commented in support of an adjustment factor,
pledging to work with EPA to generate proper data such that an
appropriate adjustment factor could be established. General Motors (GM)
disagreed with establishing an adjustment factor, arguing that using an
average value for all passenger cars and light trucks to establish an
adjustment factor will inherently and unduly lessen the stringency of
some manufacturers' fleet average standard while increasing the
stringency for others. In light of the concerns voiced by GM and a lack
of data on which to base an adjustment factor for N2O, EPA
is not adopting such an approach. Thus, the CO2 equivalent
option as adopted in the MY2012 and later program, and described above,
remains in effect.
GM commented that a second approach would be to modify the
CO2-equivalent equations instead of adjusting the
CO2 standard. GM commented that currently if a manufacturer
chooses the option to use the CO2-equivalent carbon related
exhaust emissions (CREE) equations, it has to include all
CH4 and N2O emissions which would result in an
increase of up to approximately 3 g/mile for vehicles that would have
otherwise been able to meet the N2O and CH4
emission standards. So, in order to make the CO2-equivalent
option more appealing, EPA would have to modify the CO2-
equivalent equations in such a fashion as to not penalize a
manufacturer for meeting the current CH4 and N2O
emission standards while still including a mechanism that would require
a manufacturer to account for exceedances of the standards (i.e., fold
in only CH4 and N2O emissions above their
respective standards). EPA has considered this suggestion and believes
it offers essentially the same flexibility that we are adopting in
today's final rule; allowing CO2 credits on a
CO2-equivalent basis to be used to offset exceedances of the
N2O and CH4 standards. Because the suggested
option is effectively the same as the flexibility already being
finalized for MYs 2017 and beyond, EPA is not including such an
approach in this final rule.
EPA also received comments from Global Automakers regarding the
CO2-equivalent fleet option provisions which require that
manufacturers selecting the option use it for both their car and light
truck fleets, and for both N2O and CH4. Global
Automakers commented that they would like to see an allowance to use
different compliance options for CH4 and/or N2O
and also for passenger car and light truck fleets in the same model
year. Global Automakers further commented that the restrictions limit
manufacturers' compliance options without clear environmental benefit.
In response, EPA is concerned that opening the program to allow
manufacturers to mix their compliance options in this way would add to
the complexity of the program in terms of tracking compliance, without
providing meaningful additional flexibility to the manufacturer not
already provided by allowing CO2 credits to be used to
offset exceedances of either the CH4 or N2O
standards on a vehicle test group basis. Global Automakers did not
provide comments regarding why this type of flexibility would be useful
to manufacturers or examples of how it would be used in lieu of other
compliance options. Therefore, EPA is not adopting these requested
changes for the fleet-wide CO2-equivalent option.
b. N2O Measurement
For the N2O standard, EPA finalized provisions in the MY
2012-2016 rule allowing manufacturers to support an application for a
certificate by supplying a compliance statement based on good
engineering judgment, in lieu of N2O test data, through MY
2014. EPA required N2O testing starting with MY 2015. See 75
FR 25423. This flexibility provided manufacturers with lead time needed
to make necessary facilities changes and install N2O
measurement equipment.
In the MY 2017-2025 proposal, EPA proposed to extend the ability
for manufacturers to use compliance statements based on good
engineering judgment in lieu of test data through MY 2016. See 76 FR
74994. Prior to proposal, manufacturers raised concerns that the lead-
time provided to begin N2O measurement is not sufficient, as
their research and evaluation of N2O measurement
instrumentation had involved a greater level of effort than previously
expected. EPA evaluated new instruments for N2O measurement
and discussed in the proposal that newer instruments evaluated since
the time of the 2012-2016 rulemaking have the potential to provide more
precise emissions measurement. EPA believed that it would be prudent to
provide manufacturers with additional time to evaluate, procure, and
install the new equipment in their test cells.\474\ EPA proposed that
beginning in MY 2017, manufacturers would be required to measure
N2O emissions to verify compliance with the standard. This
approach would provide the manufacturers with two additional years of
lead-time to evaluate, procure, and install N2O measurement
systems throughout their certification laboratories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\474\ ``Data from the evaluation of instruments that measure
Nitrous Oxide (N2O),'' Memorandum from Chris Laroo to
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799, October 31, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA is finalizing the additional lead-time for N2O
testing essentially as proposed. As discussed below, in response to
comments, EPA is temporarily (for MYs 2017 and 2018) allowing
manufacturers to continue to use compliance statements for test groups
certified using carry-over data. EPA is also clarifying, in response to
comments, that manufacturers will not be required to conduct in-use
testing for vehicle test groups certified using a compliance statement.
EPA received several comments from manufacturers regarding
N2O testing. Manufacturers remain concerned that test
equipment will not be available in time to provide accurate measurement
for MY 2017 and some recommended that EPA re-evaluate N2O
testing as part of the mid-term review. The Alliance commented that
there is currently no accurate measurement technology available that is
suitable for high-volume testing and that laser based N2O
analysis is so new that most of the instruments are still in the
development stages and hence are prototypes. The Alliance commented
that it would take 4.5 years to install a new analyzer in a single test
site and therefore testing would not be ready until MY 2019. Global
Automakers commented that that the Non-Dispersive Infrared Analyzer
(NDIR) and Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) bag analysis methods
currently have repeatability, durability and/or practicality concerns.
Hyundai and Volvo expressed a preference for bag measurement methods to
minimize testing throughput and also noted that no new equipment is
available for this type of testing.
In response, although EPA recognizes manufacturers' concerns about
the
[[Page 62801]]
challenges associated with the measurement of N2O, we are
confident that the improvements in N2O measurement
technology over the past few years, specifically with respect to the
development of laser source based instruments, has provided an avenue
for accurate low-level N2O measurement.
At this time we are aware of four manufactures of laser source
instruments, and we have evaluated the instruments from three of these
manufacturers. Horiba's MEXA-1100QL and Sensors' LASAR systems have
performed very well and are suitable for measurement of N2O
from light-duty passenger vehicles. We also note that the gas
chromatograph-electron capture detector (GC-ECD) still remains a viable
option for low level measurement of N2O.\475\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\475\ ``Data from the evaluation of instruments that measure
Nitrous Oxide (N2O),'' Memorandum from Chris Laroo to
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799, March 19, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our evaluations of these N2O measurement systems have
shown how measurement technologies have evolved over time. While we
have acknowledged the challenges associated with measurement using
photoacoustic spectroscopy (PAS), non-dispersive infrared spectroscopy
(NDIR), and Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR); the laser
source systems have been shown to be a marked improvement.
In an initial evaluation of existing N2O measurement
technologies, EPA found that interference from CO, CO2, and
H2O was contributing positive error (high bias) for PAS,
NDIR, and FTIR technologies. It was also thought that a small amount of
error could be attributed to bag blending error. EPA's subsequent
evaluations of laser source instruments have shown marked improvement
in measurement accuracy and elimination of interference, leaving just a
small amount of measurement error associated with EPA bag blend
measurements, which is primarily due to blending error.\5\ The Alliance
points out that our N2O measurements are slightly low, while
NDIR measurements of CO and CO2 are slightly high. The
Alliance points to interference as the culprit. We would like to point
out that our NDIR instruments have internal compensation detectors that
internally correct for the effects of CO, CO2, and
H2O interference on the measurement of CO and
CO2. Thus the error shown in these measurements is not due
to interference effects, but rather to bag blend errors. These blending
errors are also responsible for the slight underreporting of
N2O as measured by the laser instruments, keeping in mind
that any associated interference would have biased the N2O
measurements high, not low.
With respect to timing, we do not see why it would take 4.5 years
to properly install a new N2O analyzer into a single test
site. While we understand that some time is needed for manufacturers to
determine which measurement technology to purchase, we would expect the
time to evaluate, procure, and install one of these instruments to be
more like one year, which is the timing EPA has experienced with
acquiring these instruments at our National Vehicle and Fuels Emissions
Laboratory.
The Alliance also recommended that the requirement to measure
N2O only be applied to new emission certification programs
that are implemented after the establishment of proper N2O
measurement instrumentation and procedures. Manufacturers routinely use
``carryover'' emissions certification and durability data from a
previous model year in lieu of repeating the same emission tests. The
Alliance commented that assuming that N2O measurement
capabilities are not available until the MY 2017, manufacturers would
be forced to rerun all of their emission durability and certification
testing in one model year. This would be an unnecessary and unwarranted
certification burden for that particular model year. EPA believes that
this recommendation has merit, as it would allow for a more reasonable
testing workload as manufacturers transition to N2O
measurement. Therefore, for MYs 2017-2018, EPA is requiring
N2O testing only for new emission certification programs and
not in cases where the manufacturer is using carryover emissions data.
In cases where manufacturers are using carry-over data in MY 2017-2018,
the manufacturer may continue to provide a compliance statement in lieu
of measured N2O test data. Applying the new testing
requirements in this way will allow manufacturers to spread out the new
testing burden over a number of years. EPA believes this type of phase-
in is appropriate. EPA will no longer accept compliance statements for
any vehicle test groups starting with MY 2019.
The Alliance commented that N2O testing should not be
required for manufacturer in-use testing (IUVP and IUCP) for all model
years and test groups that certify to the N2O standards via
a compliance statement. The Alliance commented that ``EPA should not
hold the manufacturers accountable for measuring N2O
utilizing a method that will have been established subsequent to
certification, nor should EPA hold a manufacturer responsible for
meeting a standard for which accurate measurement methods were not
available at the time of certification.'' EPA believes this
recommendation is reasonable and is not requiring manufacturers to
conduct in-use testing for the IUVP and IUCP programs for test groups
certified using an N2O compliance statement. This will
further ease the testing burden in the initial years of the measurement
program and allow manufacturers to focus on new certification testing.
EPA notes, however, that manufacturers remain responsible for meeting
the N2O standard in-use and EPA maintains the discretion to
conduct its own in-use N2O testing of test groups certified
using compliance statements.
EPA also received comments from the Global Automakers that because
N2O is a small fraction of overall GHGs and should remain
small, and the testing equipment is expensive, EPA should allow the use
of compliance statements until such time as there is evidence that
N2O emissions may be an issue. In response, EPA believes
that it is important for manufacturers to demonstrate compliance with
the emissions standard for N2O through testing as soon as it
is reasonable to do so to ensure that N2O does not increase
with the introduction of new technologies.
10. Test Procedures
In the proposal, EPA announced that it is considering revising the
procedures for measuring fuel economy and calculating average fuel
economy for the CAFE program, effective beginning in MY 2017, to
account for three impacts on fuel economy not currently included in
these procedures--increases in fuel economy because of increases in
efficiency of the air conditioner; increases in fuel economy because of
technology improvements that achieve ``off-cycle'' benefits; and
incentives for use of certain hybrid technologies in full size pickup
trucks, and for the use of other technologies that help those vehicles
exceed their targets, in the form of increased values assigned for fuel
economy. EPA is adopting the proposed changes. As discussed in section
IV of this Notice, NHTSA has taken these changes into account in
determining the maximum feasible fuel economy standard, to the extent
practicable. In this section, EPA discusses the legal framework for
these changes, and the mechanisms by which these changes will be
implemented. EPA is adopting this approach as appropriate after
[[Page 62802]]
consideration of all comments on these issues.
These changes are the same as program elements that are part of
EPA's greenhouse gas performance standards, discussed in section
III.B.1 and 2, above. EPA is adopting these changes for A/C efficiency
and off-cycle technology because they are based on technology
improvements that affect real world fuel economy, and the incentives
for light-duty trucks will promote greater use of hybrid technology to
improve fuel economy in these vehicles. In addition, adoption of these
changes would lead to greater coordination between the greenhouse gas
program under the CAA and the fuel economy program under EPCA. As
discussed below, these three elements would be implemented in the same
manner as in the EPA's greenhouse gas program--a vehicle manufacturer
would have the option to generate these fuel economy values for vehicle
models that meet the criteria for these ``credits,'' and to use these
values in calculating their fleet average fuel economy.
a. Legal Framework
EPCA provides that:
(c) Testing and calculation procedures. The Administrator [of EPA]
shall measure fuel economy for each model and calculate average fuel
economy for a manufacturer under testing and calculation procedures
prescribed by the Administrator. However * * *, the Administrator shall
use the same procedures for passenger automobiles the Administrator
used for model year 1975 * * *, or procedures that give comparable
results. 49 U.S.C. 32904(c)
Thus, EPA is charged with developing and adopting the procedures
used to measure fuel economy for vehicle models and for calculating
average fuel economy across a manufacturer's fleet. While this
provision provides broad discretion to EPA, it contains an important
limitation for the measurement and calculation procedures applicable to
passenger automobiles. For passenger automobiles, EPA has to use the
same procedures used for model year 1975 automobiles, or procedures
that give comparable results.\476\ This limitation does not apply to
vehicles that are not passenger automobiles. The legislative history
explains that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\476\ For purposes of this discussion, EPA need not determine
whether the changes relating to A/C efficiency, off-cycle, and
light-duty trucks involve changes to procedures that measure fuel
economy or procedures for calculating a manufacturer's average fuel
economy. The same provisions apply irrespective of which procedure
is at issue. This discussion generally refers to procedures for
measuring fuel economy for purposes of convenience, but the same
analysis applies whether a measurement or calculation procedure is
involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compliance by a manufacturer with applicable average fuel economy
standards is to be determined in accordance with test procedures
established by the EPA Administrator. Test procedures so established
would be the procedures utilized by the EPA Administrator for model
year 1975, or procedures which yield comparable results. The words ``or
procedures which yield comparable results'' are intended to give EPA
wide latitude in modifying the 1975 test procedures to achieve
procedures that are more accurate or easier to administer, so long as
the modified procedure does not have the effect of substantially
changing the average fuel economy standards. H. R. Rep. No. 94-340, at
91-92 (1975).\477\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\ Unlike the House Bill, the Senate bill did not restrict
EPA's discretion to adopt or revise test procedures. Senate Bill
1883, section 503(6). However, the Senate Report noted that:
The fuel economy improvement goals set in section 504 are based
upon the representative driving cycles used by the Environmental
Protection Agency to determine automobile fuel economies for model
year 1975. In the event that these driving cycles are changed in the
future, it is the intent of this legislation that the numerical
miles per gallon values of the fuel economy standards be revised to
reflect a stringency (in terms of percentage-improvement from the
baseline) that is the same as the bill requires in terms of the
present test procedures. S. Rep. No. 94-179, at 19 (1975).
In Conference, the House version of the bill was adopted, which
contained the restriction on EPA's authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA measures fuel economy for the CAFE program using two different
test procedures--the Federal Test Procedure (FTP) and the Highway Fuel
Economy Test (HFET). These procedures originated in the early 1970s,
and were intended to generally represent city and highway driving,
respectively. These two tests are commonly referred to as the ``2-
cycle'' test procedures for CAFE. The FTP is also used for measuring
compliance with CAA emissions standards for vehicle exhaust. EPA has
made various changes to the city and highway fuel economy tests over
the years. These have ranged from changes to dynamometers and other
mechanical elements of testing, changes in test fuel properties,
changes in testing conditions, to changes made in the 1990s when EPA
adopted additional test procedures for exhaust emissions testing,
called the Supplemental Federal Test Procedures (SFTP).
When EPA has made changes to the FTP or HFET, we have evaluated
whether it is appropriate to provide for an adjustment to the measured
fuel economy results, to comply with the EPCA requirement for passenger
cars that the test procedures produce results comparable to the 1975
test procedures. These adjustments are typically referred to as a CAFE
or fuel economy test procedure adjustment or adjustment factor. In 1985
EPA evaluated various test procedure changes made since 1975, and
applied fuel economy adjustment factors to account for several of the
test procedure changes that reduced the measured fuel economy,
producing a significant CAFE impact for vehicle manufacturers. 50 FR
27172 (July 1, 1985). EPA defined this significant CAFE impact as any
change or group of changes that has at least a one-tenth of a mile per
gallon impact on CAFE results. Id. at 27173. EPA also concluded in this
proceeding that no adjustments would be provided for changes that
removed the manufacturer's ability to take advantage of flexibilities
in the test procedure and derive increases in measured fuel economy
values which were not the result of design improvements or marketing
shifts, and which would not result in any improvement in real world
fuel economy. EPA likewise concluded that test procedure changes that
provided manufacturers with an improved ability to achieve increases in
measured fuel economy based on real world fuel economy improvements
also would not warrant a CAFE adjustment. Id. at 27172, 27174, 27183.
EPA adopted retroactive adjustments that had the effect of increasing
measured fuel economy (to offset test procedure changes that reduced
the measured fuel economy level) but declined to apply retroactive
adjustments that reduced fuel economy.
The D.C. Circuit reviewed two of EPA's decisions on CAFE test
procedure adjustments. Center for Auto Safety et al. v. Thomas, 806
F.2d 1071 (1986). First, the Court rejected EPA's decision to apply
only positive retroactive adjustments, as the appropriateness of an
adjustment did not depend on whether it increased or decreased measured
fuel economy results. Second, the Court upheld EPA's decision to not
apply any adjustment for the change in the test setting for road load
power. The 1975 test procedure provided a default setting for road load
power, as well as an optional, alternative method that allowed a
manufacturer to develop an alternative road load power setting. The
road load power setting affected the amount of work that the engine had
to perform during the test, hence it affected the amount of fuel
consumed during the test and the measured fuel
[[Page 62803]]
economy. EPA changed the test procedure by replacing the alternative
method in the 1975 procedure with a new alternative coast down
procedure. Both the original and the replacement alternative procedures
were designed to allow manufacturers to obtain the benefit of vehicle
changes, such as changes in aerodynamic design, that improved real
world fuel economy by reducing the amount of work that the engine
needed to perform to move the vehicle. The Center for Auto Safety (CAS)
argued that EPA was required to provide a test procedure adjustment for
the new alternative coast down procedure as it increased measured fuel
economy compared to the values measured for the 1975 fleet. In 1975,
almost no manufacturers made use of the then available alternative
method, while in later years many manufacturers made use of the option
once it was changed to the coast down procedure. CAS argued this
amounted to a change in test procedure that did not achieve comparable
results, and therefore required a test procedure adjustment. CAS did
not contest that the coast down method and the prior alternative method
achieved comparable results.
The D.C. Circuit rejected CAS' arguments, stating that:
The critical fact is that a procedure that credited reductions in a
vehicle's road load power requirements achieved through improved
aerodynamic design was available for MY1975 testing, and those
manufacturers, however few in number, that found it advantageous to do
so, employed that procedure. The manifold intake procedure subsequently
became obsolete for other reasons, but its basic function, to measure
real improvements in fuel economy through more aerodynamically
efficient designs, lived on in the form of the coast down technique for
measuring those aerodynamic improvements. We credit the EPA's finding
that increases in measured fuel economy because of the lower road load
settings obtainable under the coast down method, were increases
``likely to be observed on the road,'' and were not ``unrepresentative
artifact[s] of the dynamometer test procedure.'' Such real improvements
are exactly what Congress meant to measure when it afforded the EPA
flexibility to change testing and calculating procedures. We agree with
the EPA that no retroactive adjustment need be made on account of the
coast down technique. Center for Auto Safety et al. v. EPA, 806 F.2d
1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
Some years later, in 1996, EPA adopted a variety of test procedure
changes as part of updating the emissions test procedures to better
reflect real world operation and conditions. 61 FR 54852 (October 22,
1996). EPA adopted new test procedures to supplement the FTP, as well
as modifications to the FTP itself. For example, EPA adopted a new
supplemental test procedure specifically to address the impact of air
conditioner use on exhaust emissions. Since this new test directly
addressed the impact of A/C use on emissions, EPA removed the specified
A/C horsepower adjustment that had been in the FTP since 1975. Id. at
54864, 54873. Later EPA determined that there was no need for CAFE
adjustments for the overall set of test procedures changes to the FTP,
as the net effect of the changes was no significant change in CAFE
results.
As evidenced by this regulatory history, EPA's traditional approach
is to consider the impact of potential test procedure changes on CAFE
results for passenger automobiles and determine if a CAFE adjustment
factor is warranted to meet the requirement that the test procedure
produce results comparable to the 1975 test procedure. This involves
evaluating the magnitude of the impact on measured fuel economy
results. It also involves evaluating whether the change in measured
fuel economy reflects real word fuel economy impacts from changes in
technology or design, or whether it is an artifact of the test
procedure or test procedure flexibilities such that the change in
measured fuel economy does not reflect a real world fuel economy
impact.
In this case, allowing credits for improvements in air conditioner
efficiency and off-cycle efficiency for passenger cars would lead to an
increase (i.e., improvement) in the fuel economy results for the
vehicle model. The impact on fuel economy and CAFE results clearly
could be greater than one-tenth of a mile per gallon (the level that
EPA has previously indicated as having a substantial impact). The
increase in fuel economy results would reflect real world improvements
in fuel economy and not changes that are just artifacts of the test
procedure or changes that come from closing a loophole or removing a
flexibility in the current test procedure. However, these changes in
procedure would not have the ``critical fact'' that the CAS Court
relied upon--the existence of a 1975 test provision that was designed
to account for the same kind of fuel economy improvements from changes
in A/C or off-cycle efficiency. Under EPA's traditional approach, these
changes would appear to have a significant impact on CAFE results,
would reflect real world changes in fuel economy, but would not have a
comparable precedent in the 1975 test procedure addressing the impact
of these technology changes on fuel economy. EPA's traditional approach
would be expected to lead to a CAFE adjustment factor for passenger
cars to account for the impact of these changes.
However, EPA believes a change in approach is appropriate based on
the existence of similar EPA provisions for the greenhouse gas
emissions procedures and standards. In the past, EPA has determined
whether a CAFE adjustment factor for passenger cars would be
appropriate in a context where manufacturers are subject to a CAFE
standard under EPCA and there is no parallel greenhouse gas standard
under the CAA. That is not the case here, as MY2017-2025 passenger cars
will be subject to both CAFE and greenhouse gas standards. As such, EPA
believes it is appropriate to consider the impact of a CAFE procedure
change in this broader context.
The term ``comparable results'' is not defined in section 32904(c),
and the legislative history indicates that it is intended to address
changes in procedure that result in a substantial change in the average
fuel economy standard. As explained above, EPA has considered a change
of one-tenth of a mile per gallon as having a substantial impact, based
in part on the one-tenth of a mile per gallon rounding convention in
the statute for CAFE calculations. 48 FR 56526, 56528 fn. 14 (December
21, 1983). A change in the procedure that changes fuel economy results
to this or a larger degree has the effect of changing the stringency of
the CAFE standard, either making it more or less stringent. A change in
stringency of the standard changes the burden on the manufacturers, as
well as the fuel savings and other benefits to society expected from
the standard. A CAFE adjustment factor is designed to account for these
impacts.
Here, however, there is a companion EPA standard for greenhouse gas
emissions. In this case, the changes would have an impact on the fuel
economy results and therefore the stringency of the CAFE standard, but
would not appear to have a real world impact on the burden placed on
the manufacturers, as the provisions would be the same as provisions in
EPA's greenhouse gas standards. Similarly it would not appear to have a
real world impact on the fuel savings and other benefits of the
National Program which would remain identical. If that is the case,
then it would appear reasonable to interpret section 32904(c) in these
circumstances as not restricting these changes in procedure for
passenger
[[Page 62804]]
automobiles. EPA considers the fuel economy results to be ``comparable
results'' to the 1975 procedure as there would not be a substantial
impact on real world CAFE stringency and benefits, given the changes in
procedure are the same as provisions in EPA's companion greenhouse gas
procedures and standards.
EPA received a limited number of comments on the proposed changes
to the CAFE procedures discussed above. One commenter noted that there
are various statutory limitations on the CAFE program as compared to
the GHG program, including the limitations discussed above on the CAFE
test procedure for passenger cars. The commenter noted that EPA's
proposal was a major change from the position EPA and NHTSA took in the
MY2012-2016 rulemaking. EPA recognizes that the interpretation and
approach discussed above are a major change from the prior
interpretation of the statutory limitations on testing and calculation
procedures for passenger cars. However there has been a significant
change in circumstances that justifies this change in interpretation.
As discussed above, EPA is changing its interpretation of when a
procedure produces results comparable to the 1975 test procedure based
on the effect of a coordinated and harmonized GHG and CAFE program.
Because of the National Program, the changes to the CAFE procedures
would not have a real world impact on the burden placed on the
manufacturers, as the provisions would be the same as provisions in
EPA's greenhouse gas standards. Similarly it would not have a real
world impact on the fuel savings and other benefits of the National
Program which would remain identical. Under these circumstances it is
reasonable to interpret section 32904(c) as not restricting adoption of
these changes in procedure for passenger automobiles.
Other commenters, largely from the motor vehicle industry,
supported EPA's proposal to allow for fuel consumption improvements
credits for increases in efficiency of the air conditioner; increases
in fuel economy because of technology improvements that achieve ``off-
cycle'' benefits; and incentives for use of certain hybrid technologies
in full size pickup trucks, where these credits are comparable to the
GHG emissions credits for these technology improvements. The commenters
noted that the efficiency improvements are real, they will occur in the
real world, and the change will further coordinate and harmonize the
CAFE program and the GHG program. EPA agrees with these points, and
they support EPA's analysis discussed above.
The discussion above focuses primarily on the procedures for
passenger cars, as section 32904(c) only limits changes to the CAFE
test and calculation procedures for these automobiles. There is no such
limitation on the procedures for light-trucks. The credit provisions
for improvements in air conditioner efficiency and off-cycle
performance would apply to light-trucks as well. In addition, the
limitation in section 32904(c) does not apply to the provisions for
credits for use of hybrids in light-trucks, if certain criteria are
met, as these provisions apply to light-trucks and not passenger
automobiles.
b. Implementation of This Approach
As discussed in section IV, NHTSA has taken these changes in
procedure into account in setting the applicable CAFE standards for
passenger cars and light-trucks, to the extent practicable. As in EPA's
greenhouse gas program, the allowance of AC credits for cars and trucks
results in a more stringent CAFE standard than otherwise would apply
(although in the CAFE program the AC credits would only be for AC
efficiency improvements, since refrigerant improvements do not
generally impact fuel economy). The allowance of off-cycle credits and
hybrid credits for full size pickup trucks has been considered in
setting the CAFE standards for passenger car and light-trucks.
EPA further discusses the criteria and test procedures for
determining AC credits, off-cycle technology credits, and hybrid/
performance-based credits for full size pickup trucks in Section III.C
below.
C. Additional Manufacturer Compliance Flexibilities
1. Air Conditioning Related Credits
Air conditioning (A/C) is virtually standard equipment in new cars
and trucks today. Over 95% of the new cars and light trucks in the
United States are equipped with A/C systems. Given the large number of
vehicles with A/C in use in today's light duty vehicle fleet, their
impact on the amount of energy consumed and on the amount of
refrigerant leakage that occurs due to their use is significant.
In this final rule, EPA is allowing manufacturers to comply with
their fleetwide average CO2 standards described above by
generating and using credits for improved A/C systems. Because such
improved A/C technologies tend to be relatively inexpensive compared to
other GHG-reducing technologies, EPA expects that most manufacturers
will choose to generate and use such A/C compliance credits as a part
of their compliance demonstrations. For this reason, EPA has
incorporated the projected costs of compliance with A/C related
emission reductions into the overall cost analysis for the program. As
discussed in section II.F.1, and III.B.10, EPA, in coordination with
NHTSA, is also allowing manufacturers to include fuel consumption
reductions resulting from the use of A/C efficiency improvements in
their CAFE compliance calculations. Manufacturers will be able to
generate ``fuel consumption improvement values'' essentially equivalent
to EPA CO2 credits, for improved fuel efficiency, for use in
the CAFE program. The changes to the CAFE program to incorporate A/C
efficiency improvements are discussed below in section III.C.1.b.
As in the MY's 2012-2016 final rule, EPA is structuring the A/C
provisions as optional credits for achieving compliance, not as
separate standards. That is, unlike standards for N2O and
CH4, there are no separate GHG standards related to A/C-
related emissions. Instead, EPA provides manufacturers the option to
generate A/C GHG emission reductions that could be used as part of
their CO2 fleet average compliance demonstrations. As in the
MY's 2012-2016 final rule, EPA also included projections of A/C credit
generation in determining the appropriate level of the standards.\478\
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\478\ See Section II.F above and Section IV below for more
information on the use of such credits in the CAFE program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the time since the analyses supporting the MY's 2012-2016 FRM
were completed, EPA has re-assessed its estimates of overall A/C
emissions and the fraction of those emissions that might be controlled
by technologies that are or will be available to manufacturers.\479\ As
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of the Joint TSD, the revised
estimates remain very similar to those of the earlier rule. This
includes the leakage of refrigerant during the vehicle's useful life,
as well as the subsequent leakage associated with maintenance and
servicing, and with disposal at the end of the vehicle's life (also
called ``direct emissions''). The refrigerant universally used today is
HFC-134a with a global warming potential (GWP) of 1,430.\480\ Together
[[Page 62805]]
these leakage emissions are equivalent to CO2 emissions of
13.8 g/mi for cars and 17.2 g/mi for trucks (see Section 5.1.2 of the
Joint TSD). (Due to the high GWP of HFC-134a, a small amount of leakage
of the refrigerant has a much greater global warming impact than a
similar amount of emissions of CO2 or other mobile source
GHGs). EPA also estimates that A/C efficiency-related emissions (also
called ``indirect'' A/C emissions), account for CO2-
equivalent emissions of 11.9 g/mi for cars and 17.1 g/mi for
trucks.\481\ Chapter 5 of the Joint TSD (see Section 5.5.2.2) discusses
the derivation of these estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\479\ The A/C-related emission inventories presented in this
paragraph are discussed in Chapter 4 of the RIA.
\480\ The global warming potentials (GWP) used in this rule are
consistent with the 100-year time frame values in the 2007
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment
Report (AR4). At this time, the 100-year time frame values in the
1995 IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) are used in the official
U.S. GHG inventory submission to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) per the reporting requirements
under that international convention. The UNFCCC recently agreed on
revisions to the national GHG inventory reporting requirements, and
will begin using the 100-year GWP values from AR4 for inventory
submissions in the future.
\481\ Indirect emissions are additional CO2 emitted
due to the load of the A/C system on the engine.
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Achieving GHG reductions in the most cost-effective ways is a
primary goal of the program, and EPA believes that allowing
manufacturers to comply with the standards by using credits generated
from incorporating A/C GHG-reducing technologies is a key factor in
meeting that goal.\482\ EPA accounts for projected reductions from A/C
related credits in developing the standards (curve targets), and
includes these emission reductions in estimating the achieved benefits
of the program. See Section II.C and III.F above.
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\482\ The recent GHG standards for medium and heavy duty
vehicles included separate standards for A/C leakage, rather than a
credit based approach. EPA did so because the quantity of these
leakage emissions is small relative to CO2 emissions from
driving and moving freight, so that a credit does not create
sufficient incentive to adopt leakage controls. 76 FR 57118; 75 FR
74211. EPA also did not adopt standards to control A/C leakage from
vocational vehicles, and did not adopt standards to control indirect
emissions from any medium or heavy duty vehicle for reasons
explained at 75 FR 74211 and 74212.
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Manufacturers can make very feasible improvements to their A/C
systems to reduce leakage and increase efficiency. Manufacturers can
reduce A/C leakage emissions by using components that tend to limit or
eliminate refrigerant leakage. Also, manufacturers can significantly
reduce the global warming impact of leakage emissions by adopting
systems that use an alternative, low-GWP refrigerant, acceptable under
EPA's Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) program, as discussed
below, especially if systems are also designed to minimize leakage and
thus avoid opportunities for owners to recharge the system with less-
expensive--but higher GWP--refrigerant.\483\ Manufacturers can also
increase the overall efficiency of the A/C system and thus reduce A/C-
related CO2 emissions. This is because the A/C system
contributes to increased CO2 emissions through the
additional work required to operate the compressor, fans, and blowers.
This additional work typically is provided through the engine's
crankshaft, and delivered via belt drive to the alternator (which
provides electric energy for powering the fans and blowers) and the A/C
compressor (which pressurizes the refrigerant during A/C operation).
The additional fuel used to supply the power through the crankshaft
necessary to operate the A/C system is converted into CO2 by
the engine during combustion. This incremental CO2 produced
from A/C operation can thus be reduced by increasing the overall
efficiency of the vehicle's A/C system, which in turn will reduce the
additional load on the engine from A/C operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\483\ Refrigerant emissions during service, maintenance, repair,
and disposal are also addressed by the CAA Title VI stratospheric
ozone program, as described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with the earlier GHG rule and in the proposal for this one, EPA
is finalizing two separate credit approaches to address leakage
reductions and efficiency improvements independently. A leakage
reduction credit would take into account the various technologies that
could be used to reduce the GHG impact of refrigerant leakage,
including the use of an alternative refrigerant with a lower GWP. An
efficiency improvement credit would account for the various types of
hardware and control of that hardware available to increase the A/C
system efficiency. To generate credits toward compliance with the fleet
average CO2 standard, manufacturers would be required to
attest to the durability of the leakage reduction and the efficiency
improvement technologies over the full useful life of the vehicle.
EPA believes that both reducing A/C system leakage and increasing
A/C efficiency will be highly cost-effective and technologically
feasible for light-duty vehicles in the 2017-2025 timeframe. EPA is
maintaining most of the existing framework for quantifying, generating,
and using A/C Leakage Credits and Efficiency Credits. EPA expects that
most manufacturers will choose to use these A/C credit provisions,
although some may choose not to do so. Consistent with the 2012-2016
final rule, the standard reflects this projected widespread penetration
of A/C control technology.
The following table summarizes the maximum credits that EPA is
making available in the overall A/C program.
Table III-13--Summary of Maximum per-Vehicle Credit for A/C
[In g/mi]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012-2016 2017-2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Max Credit Car Leakage..................... 6.3 6.3
Direct Max Credit Car Alt Refrigerant............. 13.8 13.8
Direct Max Credit Truck Leakage................... 7.8 7.8
Direct Max Credit Truck Alt Refrigerant........... 17.2 17.2
Indirect Max Credit Car........................... 5.7 5
Indirect Max Credit Truck......................... 5.7 7.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The next table shows the credits on a model year basis that EPA
projects that manufacturers will generate on average (starting with the
ending values from the MY's 2012-2016 final rule). In the MY's 2012-
2016 rule, the total average car and total average truck credits
accounted for the difference between the GHG and CAFE standards.
Table III-14--Projected Average Credits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fleet avg
Car credit Car credit Total car Truck credit Truck credit Total truck combined car
leakage avg efficiency credit avg leakage avg efficiency credit avg & truck
avg avg credit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016.................................... 5.4 4.8 10.2 6.6 4.8 11.5 10.6
2017.................................... 7.8 5.0 12.8 7.0 5.0 12.1 12.5
2018.................................... 9.3 5.0 14.3 11.0 6.5 17.5 15.5
2019.................................... 10.8 5.0 15.8 13.4 7.2 20.6 17.5
[[Page 62806]]
2020.................................... 12.3 5.0 17.3 15.3 7.2 22.5 19.1
2021.................................... 13.8 5.0 18.8 17.2 7.2 24.4 20.7
2022.................................... 13.8 5.0 18.8 17.2 7.2 24.4 20.7
2023.................................... 13.8 5.0 18.8 17.2 7.2 24.4 20.7
2024.................................... 13.8 5.0 18.8 17.2 7.2 24.4 20.7
2025.................................... 13.8 5.0 18.8 17.2 7.2 24.4 20.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The year-on-year progression of credits was determined as follows.
The credits are assumed to increase starting from their MY 2016 value
at a rate approximately commensurate with the increasing stringency of
the MY's 2017-2025 GHG standards, but not exceeding a 20% penetration
rate increase in any given year, until the maximum credits are achieved
by MY 2021. EPA expects that manufacturers would be changing over to
alternative refrigerants at the time of complete vehicle redesign,
which occurs about every 5 years. However, in confidential meetings,
some manufacturers/suppliers have informed EPA that a modification of
the hardware for some alternative refrigerant systems may be able to be
installed outside of the redesign cycle, as so could be done more
rapidly, between redesign periods. Given the significant number of
credits for using low GWP refrigerants, as well as the variety of
alternative refrigerants that appear to be available, EPA believes that
a total phase-in of alternative refrigerants is likely to begin in the
near future and be completed by no later than MY 2021 (as shown in
Table III-14 above).
The progression of the average credits (relative to the maximum)
also defines the relative year-on-year costs as described in Chapter 5
of the Joint TSD. The costs are apportioned by the ratio of the average
credit in any given year to the maximum credit. This is nearly
equivalent to apportioning costs to technology penetration rates as is
done for all the other technologies. However, because the maximum
efficiency credits for cars and trucks have changed since the MY's
2012-2016 rule, apportioning to the credits provides a more realistic
and smoother year-on-year sequencing of costs.\484\
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\484\ In contrast, the technology penetration rates could have
anomalous (and unrealistic) discontinuities that would be reflected
in the cost progressions. This issue is only specific to A/C credits
and costs and not to any other technology analysis in this rule.
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In this section, we discuss the A/C leakage credit program. The A/C
efficiency credit program is discussed in Section II.F and in Chapter 5
of the Joint TSD. EPA sought comment on all aspects of the A/C credit
program, including changes from the current A/C credit program and the
details in the Joint TSD. We respond to comments received below, in
Section II.F, in the Joint TSD, and in the Response to Comments
document.
a. Air Conditioning Leakage (``Direct'') Emissions and Credits
i. Quantifying A/C Leakage Credits for Today's Refrigerant
As previously discussed, EPA is finalizing the proposed leakage
credit program, with minor modifications. There was broad support among
commenters from the auto and refrigerant supply industries, as well as
from other commenters, for the proposed leakage credit program.
Although in general EPA continues to prefer performance-based
standards whenever possible, A/C leakage is very difficult to
accurately measure in a laboratory test, due to the typical slowness of
such leaks and the tendency of leakage to develop unexpectedly as
vehicles age. At this time, no appropriate performance test for
refrigerant leakage is available. Thus, as in the existing MYs 2012-
2016 program, EPA associates each available leakage-reduction
technology with associated leakage credit value, which will be added
together to quantify the overall system credit, up to the maximum
available credit. EPA's Leakage Credit method is drawn from the SAE
J2727 method (HFC-134a Mobile Air Conditioning System Refrigerant
Emission Chart, February 2012 version), which in turn was based on
results from the cooperative ``IMAC'' study.\485\ EPA has incorporated
several minor modifications that SAE made to the J2727 method, but
these do not affect the credit values for the technologies. Chapter 5
of the joint TSD includes a full discussion of why EPA is continuing to
use the design-based ``menu'' approach to quantifying Leakage Credits,
including definitions of each of the technologies associated with the
values in the menu, and commenters supported continuation of the menu
approach as well.
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\485\ Society of Automotive Engineers, ``IMAC Team 1--
Refrigerant Leakage Reduction, Final Report to Sponsors,'' 2006.
This document is available in Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the above ``menu'' for vehicles using the current
high-GWP refrigerant (HFC-134a), EPA also continues to provide the
leakage credit calculation for vehicles using an alternative, lower-GWP
refrigerant. This provision was also a part of the MYs 2012-2016 rule.
As with the earlier rule, the agency is including this provision
because shifting to lower-GWP alternative refrigerants will
significantly reduce the climate-change concern about HFC-134a
refrigerant leakage by reducing the direct climate impacts. Thus, the
credit a manufacturer can generate by using an alternative refrigerant
is a function of the degree to which the GWP of an alternative
refrigerant is less than that of the current refrigerant (HFC-134a).
In recent years, the global automotive industry has given serious
attention primarily to three of the alternative refrigerants: HFO-
1234yf, HFC-152a, and carbon dioxide (R-744). Work on additional low
GWP alternatives continues. HFO1234yf has a GWP of 4, HFC-152a has a
GWP of 124 and CO2 has a GWP of 1.\486\ (In addition, two
new potential refrigerants, AC-5 and AC-6, are being researched and
have GWPs less than that of HFC-134a.) Both HFC-152a and CO2
are produced
[[Page 62807]]
commercially in large amounts and thus the supply of refrigerant is not
a significant factor preventing their use.\487\ HFC-152a has been shown
to be comparable to HFC-134a with respect to cooling performance and
fuel use in A/C systems.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\486\ The global warming potentials (GWP) used in this rule are
consistent with the 100-year time frame values in the 2007
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment
Report (AR4). At this time, the 100-year time frame values in the
1995 IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) are used in the official
U.S. GHG inventory submission to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) per the reporting requirements
under that international convention. The UNFCCC recently agreed on
revisions to the national GHG inventory reporting requirements, and
will begin using the 100-year GWP values from AR4 for inventory
submissions in the future.
\487\ The U.S. has one of the largest industrial quality
CO2 production facilities in the world (Gale Group,
2011). HFC-152a is used widely as an aerosol propellant in many
commercial products and thus potentially available for refrigerant
use in motor vehicle A/C. Production volume for non-confidential
chemicals reported under the 2006 Inventory Update Rule. Chemical:
Ethane, 1,1-difluoro-. Aggregated National Production Volume: 50 to
<100 million pounds. [US EPA; Non-Confidential 2006 Inventory Update
Reporting. National Chemical Information. Ethane, 1,1-difluoro- (75-
37-6). Available from, as of September 21, 2009: http://cfpub.epa.gov/iursearch/index.cfm?s=chem&err=t.
\488\ United Nations Environment Program, Technology and
Economic Assessment Panel, ``Assessment of HCFCs and Environmentally
Sound Alternatives,'' TEAP 2010 Progress Report, Volume 1, May 2010.
http://www.unep.ch/ozone/Assessment_Panels/TEAP/Reports/TEAP_Reports/teap-2010-progress-report-volume1-May2010.pdf. This document
is available in Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the MYs 2012-2016 GHG rule, a manufacturer using an alternative
refrigerant would receive no credit for leakage-reduction technologies.
At that time, EPA believed that from the perspective of primary climate
effect, leakage of a very low GWP refrigerant is largely irrelevant.
However, there is reason to believe that the need for repeated
recharging (top-off) of A/C systems with another, potentially costly
refrigerant could lead some consumers and/or repair facilities to
recharge a system designed for use with an alternative, low GWP
refrigerant with either HFC-134a or another high GWP refrigerant.
Depending on the refrigerant, it may still be feasible, although
inappropriate, for systems designed for a low GWP refrigerant to
operate on HFC-134a; in particular, the A/C system operating pressures
for HFO-1234yf and HFC-152a might allow this type of substitution.
Thus, the need for repeated recharging in use could slow the transition
away from the high-GWP refrigerant even though recharging with a
refrigerant different from that already in the A/C system is not
authorized under current Clean Air Act Title VI regulations.\489\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\489\ See appendix D to 40 CFR part 82, subpart G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For alternative refrigerant systems, EPA is finalizing as proposed
a provision that adds to the existing credit calculation approach for
alternative-refrigerant systems a disincentive for manufacturers if
systems designed to operate with HFO-1234yf, HFC-152a, R744, or some
other low GWP refrigerant incorporated fewer leakage-reduction
technologies. This ``high leak disincentive'' provision will encourage
manufacturers to continue to use low-leak components that are in
typical use today even with low-GWP alternative refrigerants. We
believe that this will help ensure that refrigerant leakage will remain
low, avoiding opportunities for vehicle owners to recharge a depleted
system with HFC-134a or another refrigerant with a GWP higher than that
with which the vehicle was originally equipped (e.g., HFO-1234yf,
CO2, or HFC-152a). Some stakeholders have suggested that EPA
take precautions to address the potential for HFC-134a to replace HFO-
1234yf, for example, in vehicles designed for use with the new
refrigerant (see comment and response section of EPA's SNAP rule on
HFO-1234yf p. 660 of 1991, 76 FR 17509; March 29, 2011).\490\ In EPA's
disincentive provision, manufacturers can avoid some or all of a
deduction in their Leakage Credit of about 2 g/mi by maintaining the
use of low-leak components after a transition to an alternative
refrigerant. Specifically, the disincentive will be avoided when
leakage components in a new alternative refrigerant system, as
quantified in the leakage credit menu, maintain a target level of
leakage reduction typical of today's systems, accounting for the fact
that designing larger systems that are charged with larger volumes of
refrigerant for low leakage is relatively more challenging than for
smaller systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\490\ Regulations in Appendix D to Subpart G of 40 CFR part 82
prohibit topping off the refrigerant in a motor vehicle A/C system
with a different refrigerant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA received a number of comments on this proposed provision. A
number of automobile manufacturers and a chemical manufacturer, in
particular, raised concerns that the high-leak disincentive was
potentially reducing the credits available under the MY's 2012-2016
rules. These commenters said that this would complicate their ability
to comply and would penalize early adopters of low GWP refrigerants.
Further, some automobile manufacturers stated that they were already
making efforts to prevent the replacement of a low GWP alternative
refrigerant, such as HFO-1234yf, with the less expensive, high GWP
refrigerant HFC-134a. Some commenters stated that there are fittings
unique to HFO-1234yf on the air conditioning system that would not
allow someone to add HFC-134a into a car designed to use HFO-1234yf.
Other commenters stated that it was not fair to penalize automobile
manufacturers for activities taken by others who would refill with HFC-
134a an A/C system containing HFO-1234yf. ICCT supported such an anti-
leak credit, but believed that full credit should be given only where
manufacturers demonstrate designs that cause the system to fail
operating when recharged with higher GWP refrigerants.
In response to these comments, EPA has maintained as proposed the
general approach of a credit deduction to discourage high leak rates
for systems designed for use of an alternative, low GWP refrigerant.
However, the final rule allows greater flexibility so that the
disincentive would only occur if a manufacturer eliminates a
significant number of leakage-reduction technologies that are in broad
use today. Thus, if a manufacturer takes reasonable care to reduce
leaks and thus reduce the opportunity for the illegal top-off or
charging of refrigerants not designed for use with low-GWP A/C systems,
the manufacturer will be able to take full advantage of the credits for
using a low-GWP alternative refrigerant. EPA discusses the final
criteria for avoiding the disincentive in Chapter 5.1.2.3.2.5 of the
Joint TSD.
ii. Issues Raised by a Potential Broad Transition to Alternative
Refrigerants
As described previously, use of alternative, lower-GWP refrigerants
for mobile use reduces the climate effects of leakage or release of
refrigerant through the entire life-cycle of the A/C system. Because
the impact of direct emissions of such refrigerants on climate is
significantly less than that for the current refrigerant HFC-134a,
release of these refrigerants into the atmosphere through direct
leakage, as well as release due to maintenance or vehicle scrappage, is
predictably less of a concern than with the current refrigerant.
For a number of years, the automotive industry has explored lower-
GWP refrigerants and the systems required for them to operate
effectively and efficiently, taking into account refrigerant costs,
toxicity, flammability, environmental impacts, and A/C system costs,
weight, complexity, and efficiency. European Union regulations require
a transition to alternative refrigerants with a GWP of 150 or less for
motor vehicle air conditioning. The European Union's Directive on
mobile air-conditioning systems (MAC Directive\491\) aims at reducing
emissions of specific fluorinated greenhouse gases in the air-
conditioning systems fitted to passenger cars (vehicles under EU
[[Page 62808]]
category M1) and light commercial vehicles (EU category N1, class 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\491\ 2006/40/EC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The main objectives of the EU MAC Directive are: to control leakage
of fluorinated greenhouse gases with a GWP higher than 150 used in this
sector; and to prohibit by a specified date the use of higher GWP
refrigerants in MACs. The MAC Directive is part of the European Union's
overall objectives to meet commitments made under the UNFCCC's Kyoto
Protocol. This transition calls with new car models starting in 2011
and continues with a complete transition to manufacturing all new cars
with low GWP refrigerant by January 1, 2017.
One alternative refrigerant has generated significant interest in
the automobile manufacturing industry and it appears likely to be used
broadly in the near future for this application. This refrigerant,
called HFO-1234yf, has a GWP of 4. The physical and thermodynamic
properties of this refrigerant are similar enough to HFC-134a that auto
manufacturers would need to make relatively minor technological changes
to their vehicle A/C systems in order to manufacture and market
vehicles capable of using HFO-1234yf. Although HFO-1234yf is flammable,
it requires a high amount of energy to ignite, and is expected to have
flammability risks that are not significantly different from those of
HFC-134a or other refrigerants found acceptable subject to use
conditions (see 76 FR 17494-17496, 17507; March 29, 2011).
There are some drawbacks to the use of HFO-1234yf. Some vehicle
technological changes, such as the addition of an internal heat
exchanger in the A/C system and associated packaging issues, may be
necessary in order to transition to HFO-1234yf. Also, some vehicle
manufacturers may require changes to the refrigerant charging and
storage facilities at their vehicle assembly plants to accommodate the
use of HFO-1234yf. In addition, the anticipated cost of HFO-1234yf is
several times that of HFC-134a. At the time that EPA's Significant New
Alternatives Policy (SNAP) program issued its determination allowing
the use of HFO-1234yf in motor vehicle A/C systems, the agency cited
estimated costs of $40 to $60 per pound, and stated that this range was
confirmed by an automobile manufacturer (76 FR 17491; March 29, 2011)
and a component supplier.\492\ By comparison, recent reported costs for
HFC-134a range from about $4.50 to $10 per pound.\493\ The higher cost
of HFO-1234yf is largely because of limited global production
capability at this time. However, because it is more complicated to
produce the molecule for HFO-1234yf, it is unlikely that it will ever
be as inexpensive as HFC-134a is currently. In Chapter 5 of the TSD
(see Section 5.1.4), the EPA has accounted for this additional cost of
both the refrigerant as well as the hardware upgrades. (We do not
include potential costs for manufacturing facility changes to
accommodate a new refrigerant; some may incur such costs, some may not.
Commenters did not provide specific data relating to such costs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\492\ Automotive News, April 18, 2011.21.
\493\ [generate docket memo from this site: www.r-134a.com.]
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Manufacturers have seriously considered other alternative
refrigerants in recent years. One of these, HFC-152a, has a GWP of
124.\494\ HFC-152a is produced commercially in large amounts.\495\ HFC-
152a has been shown to be comparable to HFC-134a with respect to
cooling performance and fuel use in A/C systems.\496\ HFC-152a is
flammable, listed as A2 by ASHRAE.\497\ Air conditioning systems using
this refrigerant would require engineering strategies or devices in
order to reduce flammability risks to acceptable levels (e.g., use of
release valves or secondary-loop systems). Alternatively,
CO2 can be used as a refrigerant. It has a GWP of 1, and is
widely available commercially.\498\ The SNAP program has listed R-744
as acceptable for motor vehicle A/C systems. (June 6, 2012; 77 FR
33315). Air conditioning systems using CO2 would require
different designs than other refrigerants, primarily due to the higher
operating pressures that are required. Research continues exploring the
potential for these alternative refrigerants for automotive
applications. Finally, EPA is aware that the chemical and automobile
manufacturing industries continue to consider additional refrigerants
with GWPs less than 150. For example, SAE International is currently
running a cooperative research program looking at two low GWP
refrigerant blends, with the program to complete in 2012.\499\ The
producers of these blends have not to date applied for SNAP approval.
However, we expect that there may well be additional alternative
refrigerants available to vehicle manufacturers in the next few years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\ IPCC 4th Assessment Report.
\495\ HFC-152a is used widely as an aerosol propellant in many
commercial products and may potentially be available for refrigerant
use in motor vehicle A/C systems. Aggregated national production
volume is estimated to be between 50 and 100 million pounds. [US
EPA; Non-Confidential 2006 Inventory Update Reporting. National
Chemical Information.]
\496\ May 2010 TEAP XXI/9 Task Force Report, http://www.unep.ch/ozone/Assessment_Panels/TEAP/Reports/TEAP_Reports/teap-2010-progress-report-volume1-May2010.pdf.
\497\ A wide range of concentrations has been reported for HFC-
152a flammability where the gas poses a risk of ignition and fire
(3.7%-20% by volume in air) (Wilson, 2002). EPA finalized a rule in
2008 listing HFC-152a as acceptable subject to use conditions in
motor vehicle air-conditioning, one of these restricting refrigerant
concentrations in the passenger compartment resulting from leaks
above the lower flammability limit of 3.7% (see 71 FR 33304; June
12, 2008).
\498\ The U.S. has one of the largest industrial quality
CO2 production facilities in the world (Gale Group,
2011).
\499\ ``Recent Experiences in MAC System Development: `New
Alternative Refrigerant Assessment' Technical Update. Enrique Peral-
Antunez, Renault. Presentation at SAE Alternative Refrigerant and
System Efficiency Symposium. September, 2011. Available online at
http://www.sae.org/events/aars/presentations/2011/Enrique%20Peral%20Renault%20Recent%20Experiences%20in%20MAC%20System%20Dev.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Related EPA Actions to Date and Potential Actions Concerning
Alternative Refrigerants
EPA is addressing potential environmental and human health concerns
of low-GWP alternative refrigerants through a number of actions. The
SNAP program has issued final rules regulating the use of HFC-152a and
HFO-1234yf in order to reduce their potential risks (June 12, 2008, 73
FR 33304; March 29, 2011, 76 FR 17488; and March 26, 2012, 77 FR
17344). The SNAP rule for HFC-152a allows its use in new motor vehicle
A/C systems where proper engineering strategies and/or safety devices
are incorporated into the system. EPA has also recently issued a final
rule allowing use of R-744 as a refrigerant in new motor vehicle A/C
systems subject to use conditions for motor vehicle A/C systems (June
6, 2012; 77 FR 33315). The SNAP rules for all three alternative
refrigerants HFC-152a and HFO-1234yf require meeting safety
requirements of the industry standard SAE J639. With HFO-1234yf and
HFC-152a, EPA expects that manufacturers conduct and keep on file
failure mode and effect analysis for the motor vehicle A/C system, as
stated in SAE J1739. Similarly, for CO2, EPA requires
manufacturers to keep records of the tests they perform to ensure that
MVAC systems are designed with devices to avoid concentrations in
excess of the limits in the final rule.
Under Section 612(d) of the Clean Air Act, any person may petition
EPA to add alternatives to or remove them from the list of acceptable
substitutes for ozone depleting substances. The National Resource
Defense Council
[[Page 62809]]
(NRDC) submitted a petition on behalf of NRDC, the Institute for
Governance & Sustainable Development (IGSD), and the Environmental
Investigation Agency-US (EIA-US) to EPA under Clean Air Act Section
612(d), requesting that the Agency remove HFC-134a from the list of
acceptable substitutes and add it to the list of unacceptable
(prohibited) substitutes for motor vehicle A/C, among other uses.\500\
EPA has found this petition complete specifically for use of HFC-134a
in new motor vehicle A/C systems for use in passenger cars and light
duty vehicles. EPA intends to initiate a separate notice and comment
rulemaking in response to this petition in the future.\501\
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\500\ NRDC et al. Re: Petition to Remove HFC-134a from the List
of Acceptable Substitutes under the Significant New Alternatives
Policy Program (November 16, 2010).
\501\ EPA received a supplemental petition from the Institute
for Sustainable Governance, The Environmental Investigation Agency,
and the National Resources Defense Council to find unacceptable HFC-
134a for other uses in April, 2012.
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EPA addresses potential toxicity issues with the use of
CO2 as a refrigerant in automotive A/C systems in the final
SNAP rule mentioned above. CO2 has a workplace exposure
limit of 5000 ppm on an 8-hour time-weighted average, a short-term
exposure limit (STEL) of 3% over a 15-minute time-weighted average, and
a ceiling limit of 4.0% CO2 at any time.\502\ EPA has also
addressed potential toxicity issues with HFO-1234yf through a
significant new use rule (SNUR) under the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) (October 27, 2010; 75 FR 65987). The SNUR for HFO-1234yf allows
its use as an A/C refrigerant for light-duty vehicles and light-duty
trucks, and found no significant toxicity issues with that use. As
mentioned in the NPRM for a VOC exemption for HFO-1234yf, ``The EPA
considered the results of developmental testing available at the time
of the final SNUR action to be of some concern, but not a sufficient
basis to find HFO-1234yf unacceptable under the SNUR determination. As
a result, the EPA requested additional toxicity testing and issued the
SNUR for HFO-1234yf. The EPA has received and is presently reviewing
the results of the additional toxicity testing. The EPA continues to
believe that HFO-1234yf, when used in new automobile air conditioning
systems in accordance with the use conditions under the SNAP rule, does
not result in significantly greater risks to human health than the use
of other available substitutes.'' (76 FR 64063, October 17, 2011). HFC-
152a is considered relatively low in toxicity and comparable to HFC-
134a, both of which have a workplace environmental exposure limit from
the American Industrial Hygiene Association of 1000 ppm on an 8-hour
time-weighted average (73 FR 33304; June 12, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\ The 8-hour time-weighted average worker exposure limit for
CO2 is consistent with OSHA's PEL-TWA, and ACGIH'S TLV-
TWA of 5,000 ppm (0.5%).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA has issued a proposed rule, proposing to exempt HFO-1234yf from
the definition of ``volatile organic compound'' (VOC) for purposes of
preparing State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to attain the national
ambient air quality standards for ozone under Title I of the Clean Air
Act (October 17, 2011; 76 FR 64059). VOCs are a class of compounds that
can contribute to ground level ozone, or smog, in the presence of
sunlight. Some organic compounds do not react enough with sunlight to
create significant amounts of smog. EPA has already determined that a
number of compounds, including the current automotive refrigerant, HFC-
134a as well as HFC-152a, are low enough in photochemical reactivity
that they do not need to be regulated under SIPs. CO2 also
is not considered a VOC for purposes of preparing SIPs.
(2) Vehicle Technology Requirements for Alternative Refrigerants
As discussed above, significant hardware changes could be needed to
allow use of HFC-152a or CO2, because of the flammability of
HFC-152a and because of the high operating pressure required for
CO2. In the case of HFO-1234yf, manufacturers have said that
A/C systems for use with HFO-1234yf would need a limited amount of
additional hardware to maintain cooling efficiency compared to HFC-
134a. In particular, A/C systems may require an internal heat exchanger
to use HFO-1234yf, because HFO-1234yf would be less effective in A/C
systems not designed for its use. Because EPA's SNAP ruling allows for
use of all three low-GWP alternative refrigerants in new vehicles only,
we expect that manufacturers would introduce cars using alternative
refrigerants during complete vehicle redesigns or when introducing new
models.\503\ This need for complete vehicle redesign limits the
potential pace of a transition from HFC-134a to alternative
refrigerants. In meetings with EPA and in their public comments,
manufacturers have informed EPA that, in the case of HFO-1234yf, for
example, they would need to upgrade their refrigerant storage
facilities and charging stations on their assembly lines. During the
transition period between the refrigerants, some of these assembly
lines might need to have the infrastructure for both refrigerants
simultaneously since many lines produce multiple vehicle models.
Moreover, many of these plants might not immediately have the
facilities or space for two refrigerant infrastructures, thus likely
further increasing necessary lead time. EPA took these kinds of factors
into account in estimating the penetration of alternative refrigerants,
and the resulting estimated average credits over time shown in Table
III-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\503\ Some suppliers and manufacturers have informed us that
some vehicles may be able to upgrade A/C systems to use HFO-1234yf
during a refresh of an existing model (between redesign years).
However, this is highly dependent on the vehicle, space constraints
behind the dashboard, and the manufacturing plant, so an upgrade
between redesign years may be feasible for only a select few models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Switching to alternative refrigerants in the U.S. market continues
to be an attractive option for automobile manufacturers because
vehicles with low GWP refrigerant could qualify for a significantly
larger leakage credit. Manufacturers have expressed to EPA that they
would plan to place a significant reliance on, or in some cases believe
that they would need, alternative refrigerant credits for compliance
with GHG fleet emission standards starting in MY 2017.
(3) Alternative Refrigerant Supply
EPA is aware that another practical factor affecting the rate of
transition to alternative refrigerants is their supply. As mentioned
above, both HFC-152a and CO2 are being produced commercially
in large quantities and thus, although their supply chain does not at
this time include auto manufacturers, it may be easier to increase
production to meet additional demand that would occur if manufacturers
adopt either as a refrigerant. However, HFO-1234yf, supply is currently
limited. There are currently two major producers of HFO-1234yf, DuPont
and Honeywell that are licensed to produce this chemical for the U.S.
market. Both companies will likely provide most of their production for
the next few years from a single overseas facility, as well as some
production from small pilot plants. The initial emphasis for these
companies is to provide HFO-1234yf to the European market, where
regulatory requirements for low GWP refrigerants are already in effect.
The expected mass production of HFO-1234yf has been delayed until later
this year. As a result, the European Union has delayed the requirement
for newly approved types of vehicles to be filled with a refrigerant
with GWP less than 150 by one year until December 31,
[[Page 62810]]
2012.\504\ The producers of HFO-1234yf have indicated that they plan to
construct a new facility in the 2014 timeframe. This facility should be
designed to provide sufficient production volume for a worldwide market
in coming years. EPA expects that the speed of the transition to
alternative refrigerants in the U.S. may depend on how rapidly chemical
manufacturers are able to provide supply to automobile manufacturers
sufficient to allow most or all vehicles sold in the U.S. to be built
using the alternative refrigerant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\504\ April 18, 2012 Note to the Attention of the Members of the
Technical Committee on Motor Vehicles, ``The supply shortage of an
essential component in mobile air conditioning systems and its
impact to the application of Directive 2006/40/EC in the automotive
industry''. Philippe Jean, Chairman of the Technical Committee--
Motor Vehicles, European Commission Enterprise and Industry
Directorate-General.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One manufacturer (GM) has announced its intention to begin
introducing vehicle models using HFO-1234yf as early as MY 2013.\505\
According to a commenter, some automobile manufacturers expect to begin
using HFO-1234yf on some models in 2013. As of spring of 2012, EPA is
aware of at least two manufacturers already producing vehicles using
HFO-1234yf--GM and Subaru. As described above, we expect that in most
cases a change-over to systems designed for alternative refrigerants
would be limited to vehicle product redesign cycles, typically about
every 5 years. Because of this, the pace of introduction is likely to
be limited to about 20% of a manufacturer's fleet per year. In
addition, the current uncertainty about the availability of supply of
the new refrigerant in the early years of introduction into vehicles in
the U.S. vehicles, also discussed above, means that the change-over may
not occur at every vehicle redesign point. Thus, even with the
announced intention of these manufacturers to begin early introduction
of an alternative refrigerant, EPA's analysis of the overall industry
trend will assume minimal penetration of the U.S. vehicle market before
MY 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\505\ General Motors Press Release, July 23, 2010. ``GM First to
Market Greenhouse Gas-Friendly Air Conditioning Refrigerant in
U.S.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-14 shows that, starting from MY 2017, EPA projects that
virtually all of the expected increase in generated credits would be
due to a gradual increase in penetration of alternative refrigerants.
In earlier model years, EPA attributes the expected increase in Leakage
Credits to improvements in low-leak technologies. These projections are
for analytical purposes, and, as described above, this final rule does
not in any way require that the auto and refrigerant supply industries
transition to alternative refrigerants, or to do so according to any
specified timeline.
(4) Projected Potential Scenarios for Auto Industry Changeover to
Alternative Refrigerants
As discussed above, EPA is planning on issuing a proposed SNAP
rulemaking in the future requesting comment on whether to move HFC-134a
from the list of acceptable substitutes to the list of unacceptable
(prohibited) substitutes. However, the agency has not determined the
specific content of that proposal, and the results of any final action
are unknowable at this time. EPA recognizes that a major element of
that proposal will be the evaluation of the time needed for a
transition for automobile manufacturers away from HFC-134a. Thus, there
could be multiple scenarios for the timing of a transition considered
in that future proposed rulemaking. Should EPA finalize a rule under
the SNAP program that prohibits the use of HFC-134a in new vehicles,
the agency plans to evaluate the impacts of such a SNAP rule to
determine whether it would be necessary to consider revisions to the
availability and use of the compliance credit for MY 2017-2025.
EPA is basing this final rule on the current status of
refrigerants, where there are no U.S. regulatory requirements for
manufacturers to eliminate the use of HFC-134a for newly manufactured
vehicles. Thus, the agency expects that the market penetration of
alternatives will proceed based on supply and demand and the strong
incentives in this final rule. Given the combination of clear interest
from automobile manufacturers in switching to an alternative
refrigerant, the interest from the manufacturers of the alternative
refrigerant HFO-1234yf to expand their capacity to produce and market
the refrigerant, and current commercial availability of HFC-152a and
CO2, EPA believes it is reasonable to project that supply
will be adequate to support the orderly rate of transition to an
alternative refrigerant described above. As mentioned earlier, at least
one U.S. manufacturer already has plans to introduce models using the
alternative refrigerant HFO-1234yf beginning in MY 2013. However, it is
not certain how widespread the transition to alternative refrigerants
will be in the U.S., nor how quickly that transition will occur in the
absence of requirements or strong incentives. (Some commenters stated
that EPA should not require a phase-out of HFC-134a. This action is
beyond the scope of this final rule; such comments will be appropriate
for a future NPRM on that subject.
There are other factors that could lead to an overall fleet
changeover from HFC-134a to alternative refrigerants. For example, the
governments of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico have proposed to the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer that production of HFCs be reduced over time. The North American
Proposal to amend the Montreal Protocol allows the global community to
make near-term progress on climate change by addressing this group of
potent greenhouse gases. The proposal would result in lower emissions
in developed and developing countries through the phase-down of the
production and consumption of HFCs. If an amendment were adopted by the
Parties, then switching from HFC-134a to alternative refrigerants would
likely become an attractive option for decreasing the overall use and
emissions of high-GWP HFCs, and the Parties would likely initiate or
expand policies to incentivize suppliers to ramp up the supply of
alternative refrigerants. Options for reductions would include
transition from HFCs, moving from high to lower GWP HFCs, and reducing
charge sizes.
In February, the Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Administrator Lisa Jackson announced the Climate and Clean Air
Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, a new initiative
seeking to realize benefits by addressing black carbon, HFCs, and
methane.
2. Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles,
Fuel Cell Vehicles, and Dedicated and Dual Fuel Compressed Natural Gas
Vehicles
EPA is finalizing temporary regulatory incentives for electric
vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), fuel cell
vehicles (FCVs), and dedicated and dual fuel compressed natural gas
(CNG) vehicles. This section is divided into four subsections: (a)
Introductory context, (b) summary overview of the public comments on
this topic, (c) a detailed topic-by-topic discussion of what EPA
proposed, major public comments on that proposal, EPA's response to
comments, and EPA's final decision, and (d) the projected impact of the
temporary regulatory incentives on GHG emissions reductions.
[[Page 62811]]
a. Context
i. Agency Rationale for Temporary Regulatory Incentives
EPA believes that these temporary regulatory incentives are
justified under CAA section 202 (a) as they promote the
commercialization of technologies that have, or of technologies that
can be critical facilitators of next-generation technologies that have,
the potential to transform the light-duty vehicle sector by achieving
zero or near-zero GHG emissions and oil consumption, but which face
major near-term market barriers. However, providing temporary
regulatory incentives for certain advanced technologies will decrease
the overall GHG emissions reductions associated with the program in the
near term. EPA believes it is worthwhile to forego modest additional
emissions reductions in the near term in order to lay the foundation
for the potential for much larger ``game-changing'' GHG emissions and
oil reductions in the longer term.\506\ EPA accounts for the higher
real world GHG emissions and lower GHG emissions reductions associated
with these temporary regulatory incentives in all of our regulatory
analyses, e.g., in this section, in Section III.F, and in the
Regulatory Impact Analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\ EPA has adopted this strategy in previous mobile source
rulemakings, such as its Tier 2 Light-Duty Vehicle, 2007 Heavy-Duty
Highway, and Tier 4 Nonroad Diesel rulemakings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for MYs 2012-
2016
The light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards for model
years (MYs) 2012-2016 provide a regulatory incentive for EVs, FCVs, and
for the electric portion of operation of PHEVs. See generally 75 FR
25434-438. This is designed to promote advanced technologies that have
the potential to provide ``game changing'' GHG emissions reductions in
the future. This incentive is the use of a 0 grams per mile (g/mi)
compliance value (i.e., a compliance value based on measured vehicle
tailpipe GHG emissions) up to a cumulative EV/PHEV/FCV production cap
threshold for individual manufacturers. There is a two-tier cumulative
EV/PHEV/FCV production cap for MYs 2012-2016: the cap is 300,000
vehicles for those manufacturers that sell at least 25,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs
in MY 2012, and the cap is 200,000 vehicles for all other
manufacturers. For manufacturers that exceed the cumulative production
cap over MYs 2012-2016, compliance values for those vehicles in excess
of the cap will be based on a full accounting of the net upstream (fuel
production and distribution) GHG emissions associated with those
vehicles relative to the fuel production and distribution GHG emissions
associated with comparable gasoline vehicles. For an electric vehicle,
this accounting is based on the vehicle electricity consumption over
the EPA compliance tests, an eGRID2007 national average power plant GHG
emissions factor, and multiplicative factors to account for electricity
grid transmission losses and pre-power plant feedstock GHG related
emissions.\507\ The accounting for a hydrogen fuel cell vehicle would
be done in a comparable manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\507\ See 40 CFR 600.113-12(m).
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The 0 g/mi compliance value decreases the GHG emissions reductions
associated with the MYs 2012-2016 standards compared to the same
standards and a compliance value that accounts for the upstream GHG
emissions associated with these vehicles, compared to conventional
vehicles. It is impossible to know the precise number of vehicles that
will utilize this approach in MYs 2012-2016. In the preamble to the
final rule, EPA projected the decrease in GHG emissions reductions that
would be associated with a scenario of 500,000 EVs certified with a
compliance value of 0 g/mi during the MYs 2012-2016 timeframe. This
likely maximum bounding scenario would result in a projected decrease
of 25 million metric tons of GHG emissions reductions, or less than 3
percent of the total projected GHG benefits of the program of 962
million metric tons. This GHG emissions impact could be smaller or
larger, of course, based on the actual number of EVs that would certify
at 0 g/mi.
iii. Proposed Approach for MYs 2017-2025
EPA proposed the following approach for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs.\508\
For MYs 2017-2021, EPA proposed two incentives: allowing all EVs, PHEVs
(electric operation), and FCVs to use an uncapped GHG emissions
compliance value of 0 g/mi; and to use a multiplier for these vehicles
which would allow each of these vehicles to ``count'' as more than one
vehicle in a manufacturer's compliance calculation. The proposed
multipliers varied by model year and by vehicle type, the maximum
proposed multiplier being 2.0 for EVs and FCVs in MYs 2017-2019, and
the lowest proposed multiplier being 1.3 for PHEVs in MY 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\508\ These proposals were consistent with the discussion in the
August 2011 Supplemental Notice of Intent. 76 FR 48758.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For MYs 2022-2025, EPA proposed the 0 g/mi GHG emissions compliance
treatment for EVs, PHEVs (electric operation), and FCVs up to a per-
company cumulative production threshold for those model years. EPA
proposed a two-tier, per-company cap based on cumulative production in
prior years. Thus, for manufacturers that sell 300,000 or more EV/PHEV/
FCVs combined in MYs 2019-2021, the proposed cumulative production cap
would be 600,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs for MYs 2022-2025. Other manufacturers
would have a proposed cumulative production cap of 200,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs
in MYs 2022-2025. EPA did not propose multipliers for these later model
years. See 76 FR 75012-013.
b. Overview of Comments
EPA received many comments in response to these proposals. Almost
exclusively, automakers supported these kinds of regulatory incentives
for a wide range of advanced technologies, and many automakers
preferred larger and/or longer-lasting incentives than those that EPA
proposed. On the other hand, environmental public interest groups
generally opposed the proposed incentives either out of concern for
reduced emissions reductions, or to have a program which is technology-
neutral. Electric vehicle advocacy organizations supported incentives
for EVs and PHEVs, while natural gas advocacy stakeholders supported
adding incentives for dedicated and dual fuel CNG vehicles. Proponents
of other fuels often opposed incentives for electric and natural gas
vehicles. Representative comments will be addressed in the topic-by-
topic discussion below. For a more comprehensive treatment of comments
on this topic, see the separate EPA Response to Comments document.
c. Final Rule for Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards
for MYs 2017-2025
i. Appropriateness of Regulatory Incentives
Every automaker that commented on this topic supported some type of
regulatory incentives for advanced technologies. Honda's comment is
illustrative: ``Alternative fuel vehicles and advanced technologies
face unique challenges in coming to market: developing appropriate
infrastructure and overcoming initial consumer resistance to new,
unfamiliar technologies. Incentives that are limited in time and
appropriately phased-out
[[Page 62812]]
can help accelerate the introduction of these vehicles.'' Nissan also
strongly supported regulatory incentives: ``[G]overnment incentives and
support are essential to ensuring manufacturer investment and consumer
adoption of these technologies * * *. Without the incentives and
continued focus on tailpipe emissions when calculating GHG emissions *
* * consumers will be slower to adopt these advanced technologies and
continue to rely on traditional internal combustion vehicles, which
will result in higher overall greenhouse gas emissions long term. It is
not until consumers adopt these technologies that the United States can
realize the benefits of these transformational, `game changing' vehicle
technologies.'' Tesla made a direct link between the proposal and the
business case for EV investment: ``Tesla notes that incentives such as
credit multipliers not only serve to accelerate the commercialization
and widespread adoption of advanced technology vehicles like EVs, they
provide support for the businesses seeking to introduce such technology
* * *. GHG and CAFE credits earned from the production and sales of EVs
like the Model S will allow Tesla to generate revenue for more rapid EV
development and production. This will, in turn, speed the introduction
of the next generation of EVs at higher volumes and lower price
points.'' Another dozen or so automakers also supported temporary
regulatory incentives, as did three organizations that advocate for EV
issues: Edison Electric Institute, Electric Drive Transportation
Association, and Securing America's Energy Future. The latter supported
``incentives to help promote the adoption of electric drive vehicles.
Further, we believe the incentive is justified because of the critical
contribution that the technology employed in the qualifying vehicles
can make in improving our economic and national security. For the
vehicles to achieve their potential, however, they will need incentives
of sufficient size and duration for the vehicles to achieve scale,
reduce costs, and penetrate the mainstream market.'' Pew Charitable
Trusts supported ``[i]ncentives designed to spur deployment of electric
and hybrid vehicle technologies in the U.S. light duty fleet [to]
provide a clear path for auto manufacturers to invest in research,
development, and production, which can improve the competitiveness of
U.S. manufacturing and enhance exports to nations with growing
demand.''
On the other hand, several commenters expressed opposition to the
proposed regulatory incentives. The American Petroleum Institute
stated: ``Regulatory agencies should not be in the business of
promoting investments and innovations in government-selected
technologies applied to government-selected vehicle categories.
Regulators should instead set broad, performance-based targets that
reward innovation directed at achieving outcomes, not the
implementation of specific technologies. The market, via consumer
choice, should then be allowed to select the winners and losers.'' The
Union of Concerned Scientists ``strongly opposed these incentives
during the 2012-2016 rulemaking on the grounds that they do not reflect
real emissions reductions and thus erode the benefits of the National
Program and that there are other, more effective ways of accelerating
the market for electric cars (e.g., the California ZEV program, federal
tax credits, loan guarantees, and other state and local incentives). We
continue to oppose them here for the same reasons, and express grave
concern that they, like many auto industry incentives over the years,
will again be extended and continue to undermine the goals of the
program they serve.'' The International Council on Clean Transportation
commented that ``[w]hile the ICCT strongly supports development of
electric and fuel cell vehicles, one of our core principles is that
efficiency and greenhouse gas emission standards should be technology
neutral.'' The Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University
School of Law, argued that ``subsidization of new technology should be
neutral with respect to greenhouse gas emissions * * *. By giving
inflated regulatory incentives to a certain type of technology rather
than allowing manufacturers to find the most efficient and effective
solution, EPA will disincentivize other forms of technology that may be
more cost-effective at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.'' The Center
for Biological Diversity stated that any incentives beyond actual
emissions reductions ``are inappropriate'' and ``[w]hile we believe
that credits may have provided a valuable incentive for electric
vehicles during the 2012-2016 rulemaking to encourage this relatively
new technology, such concerns are now misplaced. The 2017-2025
rulemaking years no longer constitute a start-up period for these
vehicles.''
EPA is adopting temporary regulatory incentives for MYs 2017-2025
similar to those proposed. Critics of the proposal tended to emphasize
three primary arguments: that regulatory incentives are not technology
neutral and therefore pick ``winners and losers'' among the advanced
technologies, that they reduce the GHG benefits of the program, and
that they are no longer needed for technologies such as EVs. EPA
believes that the issue of technology neutrality is a much more complex
issue than some commenters suggest. Given that internal combustion
engines and petroleum-based fuels have dominated the U.S. light-duty
vehicle market for 100 years, with massive sunk investments, there are
major barriers for new vehicle technologies and fuels to be able to
gain the opportunity to compete on any type of level playing field. In
this context, temporary regulatory incentives do not so much ``pick
winners and losers'' (an inefficient or unattractive technology is not
going to achieve long-term success based on temporary incentives) as to
give new technologies more of an opportunity to compete with the
established technologies. The agency recognizes that the temporary
regulatory incentives will reduce the short-term benefits of the
program, but as noted above believes that it is worth a limited short-
term loss of benefits to increase the potential for far-greater game-
changing benefits in the longer run. EPA also believes that temporary
regulatory incentives may help bring some technologies to market more
quickly than in the absence of incentives. Finally, EPA disagrees that
such incentives are no longer needed. Although it is true that several
EVs and PHEVs are now on the U.S. market, sales of EVs and PHEVs
amounted to less than 0.2% of all sales in 2011.\509\ On the other
hand, EPA believes there must be limits on the use of the incentives,
and the Agency is adopting temporary regulatory incentives that we
believe balance our objectives of achieving GHG emissions reductions
and promoting game-changing technologies.
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\509\ Total 2011 U.S. light-duty vehicle sales were 12.8 million
(see http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203513604577140440852581080.html, last accessed on
July 10, 2012). Total 2011 U.S. EV/PHEV sales were less than 20,000
(see http://www.plugincars.com/nissan-leaf-sales-trump-chevy-volt-2011-111308.html, last accessed July 10, 2012, for total Leaf EV
plus Volt PHEV sales of 17,345).
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ii. Incentive Multipliers for EV/PHEV/FCVs for MYs 2017-2021
An incentive multiplier allows a vehicle to ``count'' as more than
one vehicle in the manufacturer's compliance calculation.\510\ As noted
[[Page 62813]]
above, EPA proposed incentive multipliers for three technologies--EVs,
PHEVs, and hydrogen FCVs--that have the potential to achieve game-
changing GHG emissions reductions in the future if the electricity and
hydrogen used by these vehicles are produced from low-GHG emissions
feedstocks or from fossil fuels with carbon capture and
sequestration.\511\ Although the Agency rejected an incentive
multiplier in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, we proposed a multiplier
for MYs 2017-2021 because, while advanced technologies were not
necessary for compliance in MYs 2012-2016, we project that they will be
necessary, for some manufacturers, to comply with the GHG standards in
the MYs 2022-2025 timeframe, and we believe that an incentive
multiplier for MYs 2017-2021 can promote the initial commercialization
of these advanced technologies that need to be available in later
years. Table III-15 lists the incentive multipliers that EPA proposed.
EPA also sought comment on whether there should be a single, fixed
incentive multiplier for all PHEVs (as proposed) or whether the PHEV
incentive multiplier should vary based on range or on another PHEV
metric such as battery capacity or ratio of electric motor power to
engine or total vehicle power.
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\510\ In the extremely unlikely case where an advanced
technology vehicle might have an overall GHG emissions compliance
value that is higher than its compliance target, the manufacturer
can choose not to use the multiplier.
\511\ EPA did not propose, but is finalizing, incentive
multipliers for dedicated and dual fuel CNG vehicles. See Section
III.C.2.c.iv below.
Table III-15--EV, FCV, and PHEV Incentive Multipliers for MYs 2017-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EVs and
Model year(s) FCVs PHEVs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-2019....................................... 2.0 1.6
2020............................................ 1.75 1.45
2021............................................ 1.5 1.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall, public comments about the incentive multipliers for EV/
PHEV/FCVs mirrored the general comments on regulatory incentives. Every
automaker supported the concept of a multiplier for these vehicles,
though some automakers wanted the multiplier to go beyond 2021
(Mitsubishi and Tesla supported incentive multipliers through 2025) and
others wanted higher multipliers for some technologies (Mercedes-Benz
USA suggested a multiplier of 4.0 for FCVs). The United Auto Workers
also supported the multiplier, as did the EV advocacy stakeholders (the
Electric Drive Transportation Association also supported extension to
2025). Some environmental organizations explicitly opposed the
multipliers, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists and Center for
Biological Diversity. The Union of Concerned Scientists was
``particularly disappointed by the agency's proposal on incentive
multipliers, given its intellectual inconsistency with an EPA
determination on the very same issue made only a year and a half
earlier'' when EPA stated that ``the multiplier, in combination with
the zero grams/mile compliance value, would be excessive.'' \512\
Several other environmental groups did not state an explicit position
on the multipliers, though expressed general opposition to regulatory
incentives. The multipliers for EV/PHEV/FCVs were also opposed by a
wide range of non-electricity fuel advocacy groups, as well as by
several state governmental agencies. The Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers was the only commenter to address the issue of a single
versus a variable multiplier for PHEVs, and it supported a single,
fixed multiplier for all PHEVs arguing that a variable multiplier could
have unintended consequences by encouraging the use of battery capacity
or power that might not be demanded by consumers.
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\512\ 75 FR 25436.
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EPA is finalizing the multipliers for EV/PHEV/FCVs as proposed.
Consistent with the general rationale just discussed, EPA believes it
has struck a reasonable balance in finalizing the multipliers shown in
Table III-15 for MYs 2017-2021. EPA believes that it is both reasonable
and appropriate to accept some short-term loss of emissions benefits in
the short run to increase the potential for far-greater game-changing
benefits in the longer run. The agency believes that these multipliers
may help bring some technologies to market more quickly than in the
absence of incentives. EPA disagrees with the comment by the Union of
Concerned Scientists of ``intellectual inconsistency'' with the MYs
2012-2016 standards in that EPA did not project that advanced
technologies like EVs and PHEVs were necessary to meet the MY 2016
standards so that no further incentive was needed. In contrast, EPA
projects here that, for some manufacturers, EVs and PHEVs are in fact
projected for meeting the much more stringent MY 2025 standards. As EPA
stated in the proposal, providing multipliers for MYs 2017-2021 can lay
the foundation for commercialization of these technologies that can
then contribute toward compliance with standards in MYs 2022-2025. 76
FR 75012. On the other hand, EPA disagrees with those commenters that
support higher multipliers and/or multipliers of longer duration, as we
believe that such incentives could lead to a significant reduction in
program GHG savings, particularly if EV/PHEV/FCV sales increase
significantly after MY 2021. In addition, the Agency agrees with the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers about the possible unintended
consequences of a variable multiplier, and is finalizing a fixed
multiplier for all PHEVs that meet the eligibility requirements below.
iii. PHEV Eligibility Requirements for Incentive Multiplier
EPA proposed that, in order for a PHEV to be eligible for the
multiplier discussed in the previous section, the PHEV be required to
be able to complete a full EPA highway test (10.2 miles), without using
any conventional fuel, or alternatively, have a minimum equivalent all-
electric range of 10.2 miles as measured over the EPA highway cycle.
See 76 FR 75012.
EPA received only a few comments on this issue. Both the Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers and Ford supported the 10.2 mile all-
electric or equivalent all-electric range eligibility requirement. The
only commenter to suggest an alternative approach was Securing
America's Future Energy, which recommended that the PHEV eligibility
requirement be a minimum battery energy storage capacity of 4 kilowatt-
hours, maintaining that this would be simpler to administer and
consistent with the current minimum battery capacity for the federal
income tax credit for PHEVs.
EPA is finalizing, as proposed, the PHEV multiplier eligibility
requirement of 10.2 miles all-electric or equivalent all-electric
range. EPA agrees that a 4 kilowatt-hour minimum battery energy storage
requirement would be a reasonable alternative, but generally prefers
performance-based metrics over design-based metrics, unless there are
compelling reasons to prefer the latter. This is because performance-
based metrics typically allow maximum flexibility. In this instance,
EPA believes that there are no such compelling reasons to prefer a
design-based approach.
iv. Incentive Multiplier for Dedicated and Dual Fuel CNG Vehicles for
MYs 2017-2021
EPA did not propose multipliers for CNG vehicles, but asked for
comment on the merits of providing multipliers for dedicated and/or
dual fuel CNG vehicles. See 76 FR 75013.
[[Page 62814]]
A large majority of the public commenters on this topic supported
providing regulatory incentives in this rule for both dedicated and
dual fuel CNG vehicles.
Most natural gas advocacy groups supported both multipliers for CNG
vehicles, as well as use of a ``0.15 divisor'' for GHG emissions
compliance values for CNG vehicles. This value comes from EPCA, where
it is used to calculate fuel economy for alternative fueled vehicles
through MY 2019.\513\ Use of this divisor would result in a much lower
GHG emissions compliance value and hence a much bigger incentive and,
advocates claimed, would allow GHG emissions compliance to be
harmonized with a CAFE compliance approach that also uses the 0.15
divisor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\ See 49 U.S.C. 32905, which deems a gallon equivalent of
gaseous fuel to contain only 0.15 gallon of fuel. This means that 1
gallon of alternative fuel is treated as 0.15 gallons of fuel,
essentially increasing the fuel economy of a vehicle on alternative
fuel by a factor of 6.67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The joint America's Natural Gas Alliance/American Gas Association
comment summarized the perspective of the natural gas advocates:
``While EPA proposes generous incentives for EVs and PHEVs because they
represent `potential for game-changing GHG emissions and oil savings in
the long term,' both dedicated and dual fuel NGVs represent actual
`game changing GHG emissions and oil savings' right now that justify
comparable incentives. Moreover, considering NGVs superior cost-benefit
performance in reducing GHGs compared to EVs, EPA should consider an
even larger multiplier incentive, perhaps equal to the incentive
Congress mandated for NGVs based on their oil-displacement performance
* * *. [A]ny GHG multiplier that is less than the fuel economy one
essentially negates the Congressional mandate in AMFA to the extent of
that difference, a result at odds with the very purpose of this joint
rulemaking. We strongly encourage EPA to take into account the fuel
economy goals of this joint program in crafting their GHG standards,
and the fact that NGVs are more cost-effective than EVs in reducing
GHGs should allow EPA to establish a GHG multiplier incentive
equivalent to the Congressionally-mandated fuel economy incentive.''
This position was echoed by the American Clean Skies Foundation: ``All
qualified alternative fuel vehicles, including EVs and NGVs, should
qualify for these incentives which would use a multiplier to give extra
credit for the emission reduction benefits of such vehicles in
calculating each manufacturer's fleet averages * * *. Unlike the NHTSA
rules, the EPA's new GHG standards contain additional EV-only
incentives. These supplemental incentives arbitrarily and capriciously
favor EVs over NGVs * * *. EPA's new rules would abolish the benefits
NGVs gain under the NHTSA standards from the 0.15 `divisor'
incentive.''
NGV America echoed these arguments, and also maintained that CNG
vehicles can serve as a potential bridge to hydrogen FCVs: ``NGVs also
likely will play an important role in facilitating the market
penetration of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) * * *. [t]he
development of NGVs--and particularly natural gas refueling
infrastructure--has long been recognized as a key bridge technology on
a `path to hydrogen.' * * * Due to the chemical and physical
similarities of these two gases, they share a number of technology
synergies, so that the proliferation of NGVs and natural gas fueling
infrastructure will facilitate and accelerate deployment of FCEVs.
Indeed, the development of the NGV market serves to reduce or eliminate
all four of the near-term market barriers to FCEV adoption identified
by the Agencies: low-GHG fuel production and distribution, * * * fuel
cost, * * * vehicle cost, and * * * consumer acceptance.'' VNG. Co also
emphasized the bridge-to-hydrogen theme: ``It is critical for the
Agencies to provide appropriate support for the natural gas-to-hydrogen
path so that both NGVs and FCEVs will be a viable option for consumers
and automakers from 2017 to 2025, as well as during the post-2025
period as emission and fuel economy standards become ever more
stringent. Keeping this gaseous fuel pathway `open' to automakers is
particularly important given the Agencies' acknowledged and well-
founded concerns over the consumer acceptance of EV technology due to
cost as well as range and refueling issues. It is, simply, too soon to
put all of the Nation's eggs in the EV basket--and it would be a clear
mistake to overlook the gaseous fuel pathway just as the supplies and
economics of natural gas in the US are undergoing a historic
transformation. Ultimately, both EVs and FCEVs will be necessary to
achieve long-term environmental and energy security goals, and NGVs
will play an essential role in reducing ICE vehicle emissions as well
as enabling the transition to hydrogen.''
Most automakers that commented on this issue also supported CNG
incentive multipliers. Honda, which markets a dedicated Civic CNG
vehicle, argued that: ``NGVs have similar environmental and energy
security benefits compared to EVs and PHEVs, and their marketing
challenges (infrastructure and consumer acceptance) are similar, as
well. Honda supports the addition of dedicated NGVs to the group of
dedicated vehicle multipliers (EVs and FCVs) and bi-fuel NGVs to the
bi-fuel vehicle multipliers (PHEVs). A differential in the multiplier
for dedicated and bi-fuel natural gas vehicles is fully justified
because there is no guarantee that the latter will operate on natural
gas all of the time.'' Chrysler stated: ``NGVs represent a significant
opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to improve energy
independence * * *. However, several roadblocks exist to the widespread
adoption of NGVs. These include limited vehicle availability and a lack
of public fueling infrastructure * * *. Chrysler recommends that
dedicated and ``extended range'' natural gas vehicles receive at least
the same multipliers as electric vehicles, and that dual fuel NGVs
receive at least the same multipliers as plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles.'' Chrysler and the Vehicle Production Group were the two
automakers who also supported the use of the 0.15 divisor for GHG
emissions compliance, to harmonize with the use of the 0.15 divisor in
CAFE compliance. A comment from Boyden Gray and Associates also
supported the use of the 0.15 divisor for GHG emissions compliance.
Toyota was the one automaker that provided a different view:
``Toyota believes the primary consideration for including any
technology in this provision should be its CO2 reduction
potential. The CAFE regulations already recognize the oil saving
benefit of CNG vehicles by structuring the fuel economy calculations to
provide a significant boost in their reported fuel economy. EPA's
advanced technology provisions should be squarely focused on
CO2 benefits of a technology.''
The broad set of comments, briefly summarized above, on CNG
incentives raises several relevant issues. EPA disagrees with those
comments that suggest that CNG vehicles provide the same GHG emissions
reductions as EVs. Table III-16 compares GHG emissions for three MY
2012 vehicles: a Honda Civic gasoline vehicle, the Honda Civic CNG
vehicle, and the Nissan Leaf EV (the highest-selling EV in the US
market). The tailpipe GHG emissions values for all three vehicles are
taken directly from the EPA GHG emissions certification database. The
upstream value for the Civic gasoline vehicle was calculated based on a
gasoline upstream GHG emissions factor of 2478 grams
[[Page 62815]]
upstream GHG emissions per gallon.\514\ The upstream value for the
Civic CNG vehicle was projected based on natural gas extraction,
processing and distribution emissions values in GREET, which are based
in part on the 2011 EPA GHG emissions inventory.\515\ The upstream
values for the Leaf EV account for electricity feedstock, power plant,
and distribution related GHG emissions, with the power plant and
distribution data from EPA's eGRID2012 based on 2009 data.\516\ Two
upstream values are shown for the Leaf, the higher of which is based on
U.S. national average electricity (which is relevant if EV sales are
distributed proportionally throughout the U.S.), and the lower value is
for California electricity (where initial EV sales have been much
higher than average, and whose electricity GHG emissions are reasonably
representative of some of the other areas on the east and west coasts
where EV sales are higher than average). The ``average'' Leaf has an
upstream GHG emissions profile somewhere between these two values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\514\ This gasoline upstream GHG emissions factor is calculated
from 21,546 grams upstream GHG emissions per million Btu (EPA value
for future gasoline based on DOE's GREET model modified by EPA
standards and data; see docket memo to MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking
titled ``Calculation of Upstream Emissions for the GHG Vehicle
Rule'') and multiplying by 0.115 million Btu per gallon of gasoline.
\515\ The upstream value for the Civic CNG vehicle was based on
data from DOE's GREET model that shows that CNG vehicle upstream GHG
emissions are 28% higher than current gasoline vehicle upstream GHG
emissions (see default estimates for target year 2015 using the
GREET model developed by Argonne National Laboratory, ``GREET 1--
2011'', available at http://greet.es.anl.gov/, last accessed July
10, 2012). Note that for this table, and to be consistent with
analyses elsewhere in this document, the Civic gasoline vehicle
upstream GHG emissions value has been revised to a slightly higher
value as discussed in the previous footnote. Therefore, in the table
the upstream GHG emissions value for the Civic CNG vehicle is 16%,
not 28%, higher than that of the Civic gasoline vehicle.
\516\ See EPA eGRID2012 at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/egrid/index.html for 2009 national average
powerplant GHG emissions factor of 0.554 grams/watt-hour and 2009
California powerplant GHG emissions factor of 300 grams/watt-hour.
These powerplant values were adjusted upward to account both for
regional transmission/grid losses from eGRID2012 (6.5% national
average) and regional feedstock-related GHG emissions from DOE/
Argonne National Laboratory's GREET model (10% national average).
The total national average electricity upstream GHG value for
electricity delivered to a wall outlet is 0.654 grams/watt-hour, and
the total California value is 0.405 grams/watt-hour.
Table III-16--Tailpipe and Upstream GHG Emissions Comparison--MY 2012 (grams per mile) (values in parentheses
are relative to Civic Gasoline)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Civic Gasoline Civic CNG Leaf EV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tailpipe............................. 207 163 0
(-21%) (-100%)
Upstream............................. 58 67 96 to 156
(CA and US)
Tailpipe + Upstream.................. 265 230 96 to 156
(-13%) (-64% to -41%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The data in Table III-16 support several conclusions. First, CNG
vehicles provide a reduction in tailpipe GHG emissions relative to
gasoline vehicles. The data from the two Civics suggest that the
tailpipe CNG benefit is approximately 20%, primarily due to natural
gas' more favorable hydrogen-to-carbon ratio relative to gasoline.
Second, based on the latest EPA data for natural gas extraction,
processing, and distribution, upstream GHG emissions for a CNG vehicle
are slightly higher than those for a comparable gasoline vehicle.
Third, it is clear that the Leaf EV is superior to the Civic CNG in
terms of both tailpipe only and tailpipe + upstream GHG emissions.
Although the Leaf's GHG emissions advantage over the Civic CNG is
largest in California and other cleaner-electricity states, the Leaf
has demonstrably lower tailpipe + upstream GHG emissions even if EVs
are assumed to operate on ``national average'' electricity.
From a vehicle tailpipe perspective, EVs are a game-changing
technology. However, given the current electricity upstream emissions
profile, as shown in Table III-16, the full potential for zero or near-
zero GHG emissions from EVs will only be realized if and when the
electricity sector is transformed so that upstream emissions are lower.
Current trends, where lower-GHG natural gas is displacing higher-GHG
coal use, will decrease EV upstream GHG emissions, which means that the
comparison between the Civic CNG and Leaf EV in Table III-16 above will
become more favorable for EVs over time as more electricity is produced
with natural gas and less with coal. However, this is not the ultimate
pathway for EVs to become a true game-changing technology from a GHG
emissions perspective.
EPA agrees with the comment by Toyota that EPA should base its
decision on this issue by focusing on GHG emissions performance. Based
on the data above, EPA does not believe that CNG vehicles are a game-
changing technology in terms of GHG emissions.
Comments raised two other factors relevant to the potential for CNG
to be a game-changer with respect to GHG emissions. The first is the
potential for the use of biomethane, or methane produced from non-
fossil sources, that can yield very low lifecycle GHG emissions. EPA
agrees that there will be some production of biomethane, but we believe
that biomethane will remain a small part of the overall natural gas
market for the foreseeable future, particularly given the remarkable
drop in natural gas prices and the likelihood that natural gas prices
in the US will remain at relatively low levels for the foreseeable
future.
The second is the potential for CNG to be a bridge technology for
the commercialization of hydrogen FCVs. EPA agrees that CNG investments
have the potential to facilitate the introduction of hydrogen FCVs in
several respects. Examples include:
Innovations with on-board vehicle CNG fuel tanks could
translate directly to improved on-board hydrogen fuel tanks, since the
primary challenge with both is the safe and economic storage of
sufficient gaseous fuel to provide reasonable vehicle range; \517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\517\ Natural Gas and Hydrogen Infrastructure Opportunities
Workshop October 18-19, 2011, Argonne National Laboratory, February
21, 2012, page 18, http://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/AF/812.PDF
(last accessed August 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
synergistic innovations in tube trailer designs could
apply to the delivery of CNG and hydrogen to end users; \518\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\518\ Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Manufacturing R&D Workshop August
11-12, 2011, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/mfg2011_iv_newhouse.pdf (last accessed August 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
engineering innovations to improve the design of natural
gas compressors
[[Page 62816]]
and/or dispensers that might translate to hydrogen compressors and/or
dispensers; \519\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\519\ Natural Gas and Hydrogen Infrastructure Opportunities
Workshop October 18-19, 2011, Argonne National Laboratory, February
21, 2012, page 7, http://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/AF/812.PDF
(last accessed August 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pipelines, including new fiber reinforced polymer (FRP)
technology, to natural gas refueling stations could be used for
hydrogen refueling, either by carrying hydrogen from central production
facilities (while it is not considered feasible to transport pure
hydrogen in pipelines designed for natural gas, one active research
pathway is transporting natural gas/hydrogen blends and separating the
fuels at the refueling station) or by providing the natural gas
feedstock for on-site hydrogen production, such as steam methane
reforming and combined heat, hydrogen and power (CHHP), at the
refueling station.\520\ So, although EPA does not consider the direct
CNG vehicle pathway to be a potential GHG emissions game-changer, we do
consider investments in CNG technology and refueling infrastructure to
be a valuable, indirect step towards hydrogen FCVs, which can be a
game-changer in terms of GHG emissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\520\ Natural Gas and Hydrogen Infrastructure Opportunities
Workshop October 18-19, 2011, Argonne National Laboratory, February
21, 2012, page 19, http://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/AF/812.PDF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA also agrees with those commenters who argued that CNG vehicles
share some of the market barriers faced by technologies for which EPA
is providing temporary regulatory incentives; for example, higher
vehicle cost, lower vehicle range, the need for new refueling
infrastructure, and consumer acceptance. On the other hand, EPA also
believes that CNG vehicles do not face the same magnitude of barriers
with respect to overall consumer acceptance as EVs, which involve a
completely different consumer refueling paradigm compared to both CNG
and gasoline vehicles.
On the basis of the above discussion, EPA believes that it is
appropriate to provide a temporary regulatory incentive for CNG
vehicles, but not to the same extent as EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs. Based on
the considerations just discussed, EPA consequently disagrees with
comments that distinctions between CNG vehicles and those other
advanced technology vehicles, for which EPA is providing temporary
regulatory incentives, are arbitrary.
EPA is adopting an incentive multiplier, for both dedicated and
dual fuel CNG vehicles, equal to the multipliers for PHEVs: 1.6 in MYs
2017-2019, 1.45 in MY 2020, and 1.3 in MY 2021. As discussed above, EPA
believes these multipliers for CNG vehicles are justified because CNG
vehicles and infrastructure indirectly support future commercialization
of hydrogen FCVs, which are a potential game-changing GHG emissions
technology, and because CNG vehicles face significant market barriers
such as lack of fueling infrastructure, vehicle cost and range, and
consumer acceptance. EPA is finalizing the same incentive multiplier
for both dedicated and dual fuel CNG vehicles, rather than a higher
multiplier for dedicated vehicles and a lower multiplier for dual fuel
vehicles, because we believe that most owners of dual fuel CNG vehicles
will use CNG fuel as much as possible. This is because, once a consumer
has paid a premium to be able to use CNG fuel, and given the
expectation that CNG fuel will continue to be much cheaper than
gasoline, there will be a strong economic motivation for consumers to
seek out and use CNG fuel. While the CNG incentive multipliers are
equal to those for PHEVs, the effective value of the CNG multiplier to
an automaker will be lower relative to most (and possibly all) PHEVs
because the multipliers will be applied to the vehicles' respective
tailpipe emissions, and most CNG vehicles will likely have lower
tailpipe GHG emissions reductions (relative to the footprint-based
CO2 targets) than most PHEVs.
EPA is not adopting additional regulatory incentives for dedicated
and dual fuel CNG vehicles beyond the incentive multipliers for MYs
2017-2021. EPA disagrees with those commenters that argued that EPA
should provide the same ``0.15 divisor'' incentive for GHG emissions
compliance that is used for the calculation of CAFE credits for
alternative fuel vehicles. Congress provided the 0.15 divisor for CAFE
compliance because a vehicle that operates on a nonpetroleum fuel (like
CNG) consumes zero or near-zero petroleum, and petroleum conservation
is a primary objective of the CAFE program. But, as shown above, the
tailpipe GHG emissions from CNG vehicles, while approximately 20% lower
than from comparable gasoline vehicles, are substantial and do not
reflect game-changing GHG emissions performance. The primary focus of
the GHG standards is GHG emissions. EPA is not persuaded that adopting
the divisor is warranted from a GHG standpoint because there would be a
significant reduction of GHG programmatic benefits that is not
warranted by these vehicles. As discussed above, the fact that CNG
technology can be a helpful, indirect step toward hydrogen FCVs does
justify providing an incentive multiplier, but this same rationale is
not sufficient to justify a far larger regulatory incentive. We also
disagree with those commenters who argued that EPA must adopt the 0.15
divisor in order to not ``negate the Congressional mandate'' for CAFE
credits. The Congressional mandate still applies for CAFE purposes.
EPA's GHG program and NHTSA's CAFE program are harmonized in numerous
ways, but there are a number of instances where the programs diverge
with respect to incentives and flexibilities. See section I.B.4 above.
Here, EPA believes that the paramount emission reduction goals of the
CAA warrant the difference in approach.
v. 0 g/mi Compliance Treatment for EV/PHEV/FCVs with MYs 2022-2025 Per-
Company Cap and Net Upstream GHG Emissions Compliance Beyond Cap
The tailpipe GHG emissions from EVs, from PHEVs operated on grid
electricity, and from hydrogen-fueled FCVs are zero, and traditionally
the emissions of the vehicle itself are all that EPA takes into account
for purposes of compliance with standards set under Clean Air Act
section 202(a). Focusing on vehicle tailpipe emissions has not raised
any issues for criteria pollutants, as upstream criteria emissions
associated with production and distribution of the fuel are addressed
by comprehensive regulatory programs focused on the upstream sources of
those emissions. At this time, however, there is no such comprehensive
program addressing upstream emissions of GHGs,\521\ and the upstream
GHG emissions associated with production and distribution of
electricity are higher, on a national average basis, than the
corresponding upstream GHG emissions of gasoline or other petroleum
based fuels.\522\ In the future, if there were a program to
comprehensively address upstream GHG emissions, then the zero tailpipe
levels from these vehicles have the potential to contribute to very
large
[[Page 62817]]
GHG reductions, and to transform the transportation sector's
contribution to nationwide GHG emissions (as well as oil consumption).
For a discussion of this issue in the MYs 2012-2016 rule see 75 FR
25434-438.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\521\ EPA has proposed a New Source Performance Standard for
greenhouse gas emissions from new electricity generating units, see
77 FR 22392.
\522\ There is significant regional variation with upstream GHG
emissions associated with electricity production and distribution.
Based on EPA's eGRID2012 database, comprised of 26 regions, the
average 2009 power plant GHG emissions rates per kilowatt-hour for
those regions with the highest GHG emissions rates are over 3 times
higher than those with the lowest GHG emissions rates. See http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/egrid/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Original equipment manufacturers currently offer several EVs and
PHEVs in the U.S. market. EVs on the market include the Nissan Leaf,
Mitsubishi MIEV, Ford Focus EV, Tesla S, Honda Fit EV, and Coda Sedan.
PHEVs on the market include the Chevrolet Volt, Toyota Prius PHEV, and
Fisker Karma. Some of these models are available nationwide, others are
available in selected markets. At this time, no original equipment
manufacturer offers FCVs to the general public except for some limited
demonstration programs.\523\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\523\ For example, Honda has leased up to 200 Clarity fuel cell
vehicles in southern California (see Honda.com) and Toyota has
announced plans for a limited fuel cell vehicle introduction in 2015
(see Toyota.com).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EVs and FCVs represent some of the most significant changes in
automotive technology in the industry's history.\524\ Although EVs face
major consumer barriers such as significantly higher vehicle cost and
lower range, EPA remains optimistic about consumer acceptance of EVs,
PHEVs, and FCVs in the long run, but believes that near-term market
acceptance is less certain. EVs have a completely different consumer
refueling paradigm, which might appeal to some consumers and discourage
other consumers. EVs also have attributes that could be attractive to
consumers: lower and more predictable fuel price, no need for oil
changes or spark plugs, and reducing one's personal contribution to
local air pollution, climate change, and oil dependence.\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\524\ A PHEV is not such a big change since, if the owner so
chooses, it can operate on gasoline.
\525\ PHEVs and FCVs share many of these same challenges and
opportunities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the most successful new automotive powertrain technologies--
conventional hybrid electric vehicles like the Toyota Prius--
illustrates the challenges involved with consumer acceptance of new
technologies, even those that do not involve vehicle attribute
tradeoffs. While conventional hybrids have now been on the U.S. market
for over a decade, their market share hovers around 2 to 3 percent,
even though they offer higher vehicle range than their traditional
gasoline vehicle counterparts, involve no significant consumer
tradeoffs (other than cost), and have reduced their incremental cost.
The cost and consumer tradeoffs associated with EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs
are more significant than those associated with conventional hybrids.
Given the long leadtimes associated with major transportation
technology shifts, there is value in providing incentives for these
potential game-changing technologies today if we want to retain the
possibility of achieving their major environmental and energy benefits
in the future.
In terms of the relative relationship between tailpipe and upstream
fuel production and distribution GHG emissions, EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs
are very different than conventional gasoline vehicles. Combining
vehicle tailpipe and fuel production/distribution sources, gasoline
vehicles emit about 80 percent of these GHG emissions at the vehicle
tailpipe with the remaining 20 percent associated with ``upstream''
fuel production and distribution GHG emissions.\526\ On the other hand,
vehicles using electricity and hydrogen emit no GHG emissions at the
vehicle tailpipe, and therefore all GHG emissions associated with
powering the vehicle are due to fuel production and distribution.\527\
Depending on how the electricity and hydrogen fuels are produced, these
fuels can have high fuel production/distribution GHG emissions (for
example, if coal is used with no GHG emissions control) or very low GHG
emissions (for example, if renewable processes with minimal fossil
energy inputs are used, or if carbon capture and sequestration is
used). As shown in Table III-16, today's Nissan Leaf EV would have an
upstream GHG emissions value of 156 grams per mile based on national
average electricity, and a value of 96 grams per mile based on the
average electricity in California, one of the initial major markets for
the Leaf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\526\ Fuel production and distribution GHG emissions have
received much attention because there is the potential for more
widespread commercialization of transportation fuels that have very
different GHG emissions characteristics in terms of the relative
contribution of GHG emissions from the vehicle tailpipe and those
associated with fuel production and distribution. Other GHG
emissions source categories include vehicle production, including
the raw materials used to manufacture vehicle components, and
vehicle disposal. These categories are less important from an
emissions inventory perspective, they raise complex accounting
questions that go well beyond vehicle testing and fuel-cycle
analysis, and in general there are fewer differences across
technologies. See section III.G.5.
\527\ The Agency notes that many other fuels currently used in
light-duty vehicles, such as diesel from conventional oil, ethanol
from corn, and compressed natural gas from conventional natural gas,
have tailpipe GHG and fuel production/distribution GHG emissions
characteristics fairly similar to that of gasoline from conventional
oil. See 75 FR 25437. The Agency recognizes that future
transportation fuels may be produced from renewable feedstocks with
lower fuel production/distribution GHG emissions than gasoline from
oil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because these upstream GHG emissions values are generally higher
than the upstream GHG emissions values associated with gasoline
vehicles, and because there is currently no national program in place
to reduce GHG emissions from electric power plants, EPA believes it is
appropriate to consider the incremental upstream GHG emissions
associated with electricity production and distribution for the model
years at issue in this rulemaking. But, we also think it is appropriate
to encourage the initial commercialization of EV/PHEV/FCVs as well, in
order to retain the potential for game-changing GHG emissions and oil
savings in the long term.
As noted above, EPA proposed that, for MYs 2017-2021, all EVs,
PHEVs (electric operation), and FCVs would have a GHG emissions
compliance value of 0 grams per mile (g/mi). For MYs 2022-2025, EPA
proposed a compliance value of 0 g/mi for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs for that
vehicle production below a per-company, cumulative production cap
threshold for those four model years. The proposed cap had two tiers,
consistent with the two-tier cap approach that was adopted in the
rulemaking for MYs 2012-2016.\528\ For manufacturers that sell 300,000
or more EV/PHEV/FCVs combined in MYs 2019-2021, the proposed cumulative
production cap would be 600,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs for MYs 2022-2025. Other
automakers would have a proposed cumulative production cap of 200,000
EV/PHEV/FCVs in MYs 2022-2025. The rationale for this two-tier approach
was that it would provide an extra incentive to those automakers
willing to take early leadership in commercializing EV/PHEV/FCVs. In
other words, a manufacturer would be allowed to continue using a 0 g/mi
compliance value for EV/PHEV/FCVs during MYs 2022-2025 until its per-
company production cap was exceeded, at which point the manufacturer
would begin calculating compliance using net upstream GHG emissions
accounting. See 76 FR 75013. The agency also asked for comments on an
alternative industry-wide cap design. This would place an industry-wide
cumulative production cap of 2 million EV/PHEV/FCVs eligible for the 0
g/mi incentive in MYs 2022-2025. EPA would allocate this 2 million
vehicle cap to individual automakers in calendar year 2022 based on
cumulative EV/PHEV/FCV sales in MYs 2019-2021, i.e., if an automaker
sold X percent of industry-wide EV/
[[Page 62818]]
PHEV/FCV sales in MYs 2019-2021, that automaker would get X percent of
the 2 million industry-wide cumulative production cap in MYs 2022-2025
(or possibly somewhat less than X percent, if EPA were to reserve some
small volumes for those automakers that sold zero EV/PHEV/FCVs in MYs
2019-2021). See 76 FR 75013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\528\ 75 FR 25436.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For both the proposed per-company cap and the alternative industry-
wide cap, EPA proposed that, for production beyond the cumulative
vehicle production cap for a given manufacturer in MYs 2022-2025,
compliance values would be calculated according to a methodology that
accounts for the full net increase in upstream GHG emissions relative
to that of a comparable gasoline vehicle. See Section III.C.2.c.vi
below for the details of this methodology.
Finally, EPA also asked for comments on approaches for phasing in
from a 0 g/mi value to a full net increase value, e.g., an interim
period when the compliance value might be one-half of the net increase.
EPA recognized in the proposal that the use of EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs
in the 2017-2025 timeframe, in conjunction with both the incentive
multiplier and the 0 g/mi compliance treatment, would decrease the
overall GHG emissions reductions associated with the program as the
upstream emissions associated with the generation and distribution of
national average electricity are higher than the upstream emissions
associated with production and distribution of gasoline. EPA accounted
for this difference in projections of the overall program's impacts and
benefits. In the proposal, EPA projected that, based on plausible
assumptions about EV/PHEV/FCV sales, the decrease in GHG emissions
reductions due to the temporary regulatory incentives would likely be
on the order of 5% or so.\529\ EPA has updated that analysis in Section
III.C.2.d below and in the Regulatory Impact Analysis.
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\529\ 76 FR 75015.
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EPA received a large number of comments on the topic of compliance
treatment for EV/PHEV/FCVs. Two commenters, the Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use Management and the National Association of Clean
Air Agencies, supported the proposal. But the great bulk of commenters
opposed the proposed treatment, with opponents approximately split on
whether the proposed EV/PHEV/FCV incentives were too much or too
little.
The most addressed issue was the proposed 0 g/mi compliance
treatment. Almost all automakers strongly supported 0 g/mi as the most
appropriate compliance value for EV/PHEV/FCVs and that upstream
emissions should never be factored into vehicle GHG emissions
compliance values. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers summarized
many of the themes that were repeated by most automakers: ``Automakers
should not be required to account for utility GHG emissions * * *.
Clearly automakers have no control over the feedstocks that power
plants use to create electricity nor do we have control over the
conversion or transportation processes, or where and when a vehicle
owner recharges a vehicle. * * * [m]aking vehicle manufacturers
responsible for emissions over which they have no control is contrary
to the Clean Air Act. * * * [t]he attribution of upstream emissions
impacts to grid-powered vehicles alone would be arbitrary, capricious
and an abuse of discretion * * *. If Americans agree that programs to
address upstream GHG emissions are appropriate, then such programs
should be put in place through appropriate regulation of electricity
generators, not by imposing additional burdens on vehicle
manufacturers.'' Nissan echoed many of these same themes: ``The
proposal to focus on tailpipe emissions is consistent with the policy
objective of fostering electric vehicles and with the fact that
automobile manufacturers only control tailpipe emissions and have no
control over the fuel source for electric power * * *. Not only is
EPA's proposal to measure EVs as zero grams per mile the best policy
decision to promote EV deployment, it is also legally required * * *.
Section 202 [of the Clean Air Act] gives EPA discretion to incentivize
new technologies, but Section 202 does not give EPA the authority to
consider non-vehicle related emissions when setting compliance
standards. Doing so would disrupt the careful structure of the CAA * *
*. Specifically, Title I of the CAA regulates stationary sources, while
Title II of the CAA regulated mobile sources.'' Several other
automakers made similar arguments. The United Auto Workers ``believes
that zero grams per mile are the most faithful representation of the
tailpipe pollution for a vehicle that in many cases has no tailpipe.
Accordingly, while the UAW believes that the proposed caps for zero
gram per mile treatment by the EPA for model years 2022-2025 are likely
adequate to avoid assigning upstream emissions to large numbers of
these vehicles, we urge the EPA to reconsider its stance that the
emissions of electricity producers should be assigned to the products
that use electricity. The proper place to measure and regulate these
emissions is of course where the electricity is produced and the grid
system that distributes electricity.'' Electric vehicle advocates also
echoed these same themes, and the Edison Electric Institute argued that
0 g/mi ``is not an `incentive' but a recognition of actual EV emissions
which are 0.0 g/mile when measured at the tailpipe.''
Two automakers opposed the use of 0 g/mi. Honda ``believes that EPA
should separate incentives and credits from the measurement of
emissions. Honda believes that without accounting for the upstream
emissions of all fuels, inaccurate comparisons between technologies
will take place * * *. EPA's regulations need to be comprehensive and
transparent. By zeroing out the upstream emissions, EPA is conflating
incentives and credits with proper emissions accounting.'' EcoMotors
International ``encourages EPA to drop the 0 g/mile tailpipe compliance
value.'' Environmental advocacy groups also opposed the 0 g/mi
compliance treatment. The Natural Resources Defense Council claimed
that 0 g/mi ``undermines'' the pollution and technology benefits of the
program. Along with other environmental groups, the American Council
for an Energy Efficient Economy also opposed 0 g/mi, but added that
``[m]ost important, however, is that a zero-upstream treatment of plug-
in vehicles not be continued indefinitely, and that full upstream
accounting be applied to these vehicles by a date certain. EPA's
proposed treatment of EVs largely accomplishes this, so we strongly
support that aspect of the proposal.'' The American Petroleum Institute
argued that ``[i]gnoring the significant contribution of (and extensive
compilation of published literature on) upstream CO2
emissions from electricity generation, defies principles of
transparency and sound science and distorts the market for developing
transportation fuel alternatives. It incentivizes the electrification
of the vehicle fleet with a pre-defined specific and costly set of
technologies whose future potential is not measured with the same well-
to-wheels methodology against that of advanced biofuels or other carbon
mitigation strategies.'' Organizations advocating fuels other than
electricity also opposed the use of 0 g/mi.
EPA received many fewer comments on the proposed cap on the number
of vehicles that would be eligible for the 0 g/mi compliance treatment
in MYs 2022-2025. The specific questions here are (1) whether the cap
should be a per-company cap where individual
[[Page 62819]]
companies would have greater advance certainty, but there would be
greater uncertainty with the overall environmental outcome, or an
industry-wide cap, where there would be greater environmental certainty
regarding the maximum number of vehicles that would be eligible for the
0 g/mi treatment, but where individual manufactures would not know
their effective per-company caps until some point in the future, and
(2) the production/sales threshold for the cap. The joint Sierra Club/
Environment America/Safe Climate Campaign/Clean Air Council comment
recommended ``a floating industry wide cap for number of EV sales
eligible for zero emissions treatment in 2022-2025 be set at 1 million
minus cumulative sales in 2017-2021 rather than the 2 million vehicle
cap in the proposed rule.'' The American Council for an Energy
Efficient Economy recommended that ``in the 2017-2025 period, the
number of such EVs should be capped at 2 million.'' The Natural
Resources Defense Council ``recommends that EPA adopt an industry-wide
cap following the structure described in the NPRM as the alternative to
the proposed manufacturer-specific cap. NRDC recommends the industry-
wide cap because it ensures the environmental benefits of the program.
If set appropriately * * * the industry-wide cap could ensure that no
more than 5 percent of the program GHG reductions are lost. NRDC
recommends that the industry-wide cap be set based on cumulative plug-
in electric vehicles produced beginning in 2012 because even these
early volumes will help pave the way for electric vehicle production
cost reductions and greater market acceptance * * *. [T]he post 2021
cap of no more than 2 million vehicles would be lowered by the
cumulative sales that occurred before 2022 to reflect the technology
advancement in the early years of the program.''
Nissan and BMW were the only individual automakers to comment on
this question. Nissan stated that: ``[a]ny regulatory cap should be
industry based in order to encourage investment in electric powertrains
now for use in the coming model years, and the cap should not reserve
any volume for manufacturers selling zero electric vehicles in MYs
2019-2021 * * *. The purpose of the proposed incentives is to encourage
manufacturer investment in potentially game-changing technologies now
to accelerate their adoption rate. Adopting an industry-wide cap will
serve that purpose.'' On the other hand, BMW ``prefers company-based
cap. * * * [as it provides] clear planning certainty in the whole time
period of the regulation * * * [while the industry-wide cap provides a]
big advantage for [high] volume manufacturer.'' The Association of
Global Automakers stated that ``[i]f EPA decides to adopt company-
specific caps, we recommend that it adopt a simple linear function
based on vehicle sales levels to establish the caps, rather than using
the proposed two-step approach.'' No other individual automaker
addressed this issue. EPA recognizes that almost every automaker
supported the permanent adoption of the 0 g/mi compliance treatment,
and under that approach the concept of caps is meaningless. Finally,
the Electric Drive Transportation Association stated that: ``[a]n
industry-wide cap is especially problematic, because each
manufacturer's cap would depend on that manufacturer's relative share
of the market, not its absolute sales volume; a cap based on relative
share is very difficult for a manufacturer to predict, because it is
tied to decisions made by other manufacturers.''
No commenters suggested any alternatives to basing EV/PHEV/FCV GHG
emissions compliance values, for production beyond the cumulative
vehicle production cap for a given manufacturer in MY 2022 and later,
on the full net increase in upstream GHG emissions relative to that of
a comparable gasoline vehicle.
The agency received one comment on the question of whether the
transition from a 0 g/mi compliance treatment to a full net increase in
upstream GHG emissions, for production beyond the cumulative vehicle
production cap in MY 2022 and later. Nissan stated that ``[t]he interim
period between a zero grams per mile compliance value and full net
increase in upstream emissions value should be equal to the number of
vehicles each manufacturer can assign a zero grams per mile compliance
value for MYs 2022-2025, and the interim period compliance value should
be one-half of the net increase.''
EPA is finalizing, as proposed, the 0 g/mi compliance treatment for
EV/PHEV/FCVs with a per-company vehicle production cap in MYs 2022-2025
and net upstream GHG emissions compliance beyond the cap. As the above
summary shows, there were strong public comments, on both sides, on the
proposed approach for the compliance treatment for EV/PHEV/FCVs,
beginning with 0 g/mi and transitioning to a full net increase in GHG
upstream emissions if and when a manufacturer exceeds its vehicle
production cap threshold. But there was no new information or
rationales provided to EPA that changes the Agency's perspective on
these matters. EPA disagrees with those commenters who believe that
compliance values for vehicle GHG emissions standards under section
202(a) cannot take fuel-related upstream GHG emissions into account,
and that it is ``arbitrary and capricious'' to do so and ``contrary''
to the Clean Air Act. As EPA explained when discussing this issue in
the MYs 2012-2016 light duty vehicle GHG rulemaking, ``EPA is not
directly regulating upstream GHG emissions from stationary sources, but
instead is deciding how much value to assign to a motor vehicle for
purposes of compliance calculations with the motor vehicle standard.
While the logical place to start is the emissions level measured under
the test procedure, section 202(a)(1) does not require that EPA limit
itself to only that level.'' 75 FR 25437. Furthermore, there is a
reasoned basis for accounting for upstream GHG emissions here because,
as shown in Table III-16 above, upstream GHG emissions attributable to
increased electricity production to operate EVs or PHEVs currently
exceed the upstream GHG emissions attributable to gasoline vehicles.
EPA thus believes that although section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act
does not require the inclusion of upstream GHG emissions in these
regulations, the discretion afforded under this provision allows EPA to
consider upstream GHG emissions, particularly when such emissions from
new technologies are higher than those from conventional vehicles. On
the other hand, EPA also disagrees with those commenters who claim
that, by allowing a 0 g/mi compliance treatment, the Agency is
``ignoring'' upstream emissions and ``not being transparent.'' The
agency has discussed and quantified the upstream GHG emissions
associated with EVs and PHEVs at length in the rulemaking analyses for
both the MYs 2012-2016 rule and this rule. EPA also disagrees that the
0 g/mi compliance treatment ``undermines'' the program, as the Agency
believes that it will likely lead to only a small percentage loss of
overall program GHG emissions reductions (see Section III.C.2.d for
these projections), while creating an important incentive for
potentially enormous emissions reductions from these vehicles in the
longer term. The broad discretion to set emissions standards under
section 202(a)(1) includes authority to structure those standards in a
way that provides an incentive to promote advances in emissions control
technology, which includes discretion in how to structure
[[Page 62820]]
a compliance regime so as to promote use of advanced technologies.
In summary, EPA continues to believe that finalizing the proposed
compliance treatment for EV/PHEV/FCVs strikes a reasonable balance
between promoting the commercialization of EV/PHEV/FCVs, which have the
potential to achieve game-changing GHG emissions reductions in the
future, and accounting for upstream emissions once such vehicles reach
a reasonable threshold in the market. The mid-term evaluation will
provide an opportunity to review the status of advanced vehicle
technology commercialization, the status of upstream GHG emissions
control programs, and other relevant factors.
EPA is also finalizing, as proposed, the per-company vehicle
production caps for MYs 2022-2025. The cumulative per-company caps for
MYs 2022-2025 are 600,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs for those manufacturers that
produce a total of 300,000 or more EV/PHEV/FCVs in MYs 2019-2021, and
200,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs for all other manufacturers. The central tension
in the design of a cap relates to certainty and uncertainty with
respect to both individual automaker caps and the overall number of
vehicles that may fall under the cap, which determines the maximum
decrease in GHG emissions reductions. A per-company cap would provide
clear certainty for individual manufacturers at the time of the final
rule, but would yield uncertainty about how many vehicles industry-wide
would take advantage of the 0 g/mi compliance treatment and therefore
the overall impact on GHG emissions. With an industry-wide cap, EPA
would establish a finite limit on the total number of vehicles eligible
for the 0 g/mi incentive, with a method for allocating this industry-
wide cap to individual automakers. An industry-wide cap would provide
certainty with respect to the maximum number of vehicles and GHG
emissions impact and would reward those automakers who show early
leadership. If EPA were to make a specific numerical allocation at the
time of the final rule, automakers would have certainty, but EPA is
concerned that we may not have sufficient information to make an
equitable allocation for a timeframe that is over a decade away. If EPA
were to adopt an allocation formula in the final rule that was
dependent on future sales, automakers would have much less certainty
and leadtime for compliance planning as they would not know their
individual caps until some point in the future. Public comments on the
relative merits of per-company and industry-wide caps were mixed. EPA
has chosen to finalize the per-company cap because of the concern that
the uncertainty faced by individual automakers about how they would
fare under an industry-wide cap could, in effect, act as a disincentive
to pursue advanced vehicle technology commercialization.
Finally, EPA is finalizing the full net upstream GHG emissions
approach for the compliance treatment for EV/PHEV/FCVs beyond the per-
company vehicle production threshold caps in MYs 2022-2025. EPA is not
adopting any type of ``phase-in'', i.e., the compliance value will
change from 0 g/mi to the full net upstream GHG emissions value once a
manufacturer exceeds the cap. EPA believes that the levels of the per-
company vehicle production caps in MYs 2017-2025 are high enough to
provide a sufficient incentive such that any production beyond those
caps should use the full net upstream GHG emissions accounting.
vi. Methodology for Determining Net Upstream GHG Emissions Compliance
for EVs Beyond Cap
EPA proposed a specific methodology for calculating the net
upstream GHG emissions compliance value for EVs (and the electric
portion of PHEV operation). This methodology was based on four key
inputs: (1) The vehicle electricity consumption over EPA city and
highway compliance tests (under EPA test protocols, this accounts for
the losses associated in vehicle charging as well), (2) an adjustment
to account for electricity losses during electricity grid transmission,
(3) a projected 2025 nationwide average electricity upstream GHG
emissions rate of 0.574 grams/watt-hour at the power plant, which
accounts for both power plant and feedstock GHG emissions, and (4) the
upstream GHG emissions of a comparable gasoline vehicle meeting its MY
2025 GHG emissions target. See 76 FR 75014.
The 0.574 grams/watt-hour electricity upstream GHG emissions factor
that EPA proposed was based on a nationwide average power plant value
for 2025, based on simulations with the EPA Office of Atmospheric
Programs' Integrated Planning Model (IPM), and a 1.06 multiplicative
factor to account for additional upstream GHG emissions associated with
feedstock extraction, transportation, and processing. EPA recognized in
the proposal that there were other approaches for projecting a future
upstream GHG emissions factor for EVs and PHEVs, and that EPA would be
considering running the IPM model with more detailed vehicle and
vehicle charging-specific assumptions to generate a more robust
electricity upstream GHG emissions factor for EVs and PHEVs in the
final rulemaking. Specifically, the Agency discussed its intention to
account for the likely regional sales variation for initial EV/PHEV/
FCVs, and the likely frequency of daytime and nighttime charging. EPA
sought comment on whether there were additional factors that the Agency
should try to include in the IPM modeling for the final rulemaking.
All of the relevant comments directly or indirectly supported a
more sophisticated approach for determining the electricity upstream
GHG emissions factor. Nissan noted that most of its initial Leaf sales
have been in California and other states with lower-than-average
electricity GHG emissions. It concluded: ``By accounting for upstream
emissions using a national average, electric vehicle manufacturers
would be penalized because their compliance standard will not be
reflective of actual upstream emissions.'' Edison Electric Institute
stated: ``[i]t is inappropriate for EPA, now in 2012, to calculate any
upstream electricity GHG emissions rate for 2025, as there is no way
that this value could reasonably approximate actual electric generating
unit (EGU) emissions 13 years in the future * * *. Unless EPA
dramatically changes its assumptions about the makeup of the generating
fleet in 2025 to better reflect current and expected regulations, any
additional IPM runs--even those using updated vehicle and charging
assumptions--will be equally unable to provide an upstream electricity
GHG emissions rate that has any relationship to actual emissions in
2025. If EPA does decide to conduct additional IPM runs for the final
rule, the Agency must do more than update vehicle and charging
assumptions * * *. In 2011, California residents purchased more than 60
percent of the Nissan Leafs and about 30 percent of the Chevrolet Volts
sold in the U.S. * * *. The Agency would be better served by waiting
until MY 2021 to estimate upstream GHG electricity emissions, using
actual emissions data and the most up-to-date information about the EGU
generating fleet. EPA easily could conduct this analysis concurrently
with the planned midterm evaluation of the vehicle standards necessary
to support NHTSA's required, separate rulemaking to establish CAFE
standards for MY 2022-2025.''
The Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA) argued that
``[t]his national average--or any national average for that matter--
fails to take into account the wide variation in actual `upstream
emissions' among different regions, demographic groups, and
[[Page 62821]]
vehicle types. The fundamental point is that average GHG emissions from
electricity generation are not necessarily representative of the
incremental emissions resulting from the charging of a particular
vehicle or vehicle model. The additional emissions associated with
charging a particular vehicle or vehicle model will depend on many
factors. First, any estimate of upstream emissions would need to take
into account the geographic distribution of the users of the vehicles,
since the electricity generation mix varies considerably by region. In
addition, it would need to take into account the expected driving
habits and charging habits of those users, which could vary
significantly for different vehicle models. It also would need to take
into account a host of capital investment and operational decisions
made by electric utilities and grid operators, including decisions
about the electricity generation mix for both base load and peak load
that are made on a daily basis in managing the grid, and over time, in
planning the energy inventory of a service territory.'' Ford stated
that it supported the EDTA comment. The American Petroleum Institute
stated: ``API concurs with the EPA's observation that there is
significant regional as well as temporal variation in the fuels and
equipment used for electric power generation. Consequently, a more
robust analysis and representation of upstream electricity GHG
emissions that incorporates this regional and temporal variability is
preferable if the ultimate objective is to reflect real-world fuel
usage patterns.'' Referring to the 1.06 multiplicative factor that EPA
used to account for feedstock-related GHG emissions, API stated:
``Using the most recent version of GREET (version 1--2011) yields an
adjustment factor of 9.2% for the average US electricity mix in
calendar year 2020.'' The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
noted that ``there are several factors to consider including marginal
versus average power plant emissions rates, regional variability and
how to project emission rates for vehicles that are charging over many
years. NRDC provided comments in the 2012-2016 GHG proposed rule along
these lines and we recognize that on-going analysis could be
appropriate to most accurately quantify electric vehicle emission rates
for real-world operation.''
EPA agrees with the commenters that developing an appropriate
electricity upstream GHG emissions factor for vehicles that will be
sold in MYs 2022-2025, and be on the road out to 2040 or even 2050, is
a challenging task, due to the many assumptions that must be made to
reflect relevant variables. EPA continues to believe that the IPM model
is the best tool for making such long-term projections, as it is a
long-term capacity expansion and production costing model for analyzing
the U.S. electric power sector. EPA has used IPM for most electricity
sector analysis for the last 15 years, including for several major EPA
power sector regulatory initiatives. While continuing to use the IPM
model, EPA has made several refinements in the approach that we are
adopting for estimating the electricity upstream GHG emissions for
vehicles sold in MYs 2022-2025 subsequent to the proposal. One, we are
using a newer IPM version (version 4.10) that is harmonized with new
EPA stationary source emissions controls (such as the Mercury and Air
Toxics Standards and the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule) and reflects
recent economic conditions such as lower natural gas prices and lower
electricity demand growth. This newer IPM version should address many
of the concerns expressed by the Edison Electric Institute that use of
IPM will necessarily overestimate future electricity GHG emissions.
Two, as we suggested in the proposal and as supported by public
comments, EPA changed from a ``national average'' electricity GHG
emissions factor to one that projects the average electricity GHG
emissions factor for the additional electricity demand represented by
the EVs and PHEVs that EPA projects will be sold in MYs 2022-2025 and
on the road in calendar year 2030. Three, rather than assuming that EVs
and PHEVs would be distributed proportionally throughout the U.S., EPA
distributed EV and PHEV sales into the 32 IPM regions based on the
distribution of hybrid vehicle sales in 2006-2009 (e.g., much higher
per capita sales in California, lower per capita sales in Montana).
Four, EPA assumed that EVs and PHEVs would charge 25 percent of the
time on-peak and 75 percent of the time off-peak, which is consistent
with early vehicle charging data from the DOE ``EV Project.'' \530\ The
cumulative effect of these changes is that IPM projects that about 80
percent of the additional electricity needed to reflect the extra
demand by EVs and PHEVs in 2030 will come from natural gas, with 14
percent from coal, and 6 percent from wind and other feedstocks (66.3%
of this average power plant GHG emissions factor originates from
natural gas combustion emissions, 33.4% from coal combustion emissions,
and 0.3% from combustion emissions of other feedstocks such as landfill
gas petroleum coke, and oil). This is a lower-GHG mix of feedstocks
than the mix that was projected for the national average approach in
the proposal. Using this approach, the average power plant electricity
GHG emissions factor is projected by IPM to be 0.445 grams/watt-hour.
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\530\ http://www.theevproject.com/downloads/documents/45.%20Battery%20Electric%20Vehicle%20Driving%20and%20Charging%20Behavior%20Observed%20Early%20in%20The%20EV%20Project%20(April%202012).pdf
, last accessed July 10, 2012.
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Since the proposal, EPA has also re-evaluated the appropriate
multiplicative factor to account for the feedstock-related GHG
emissions upstream of the power plant. This is necessary for three
reasons: The feedstock mix in the new approach is very different than
the national average feedstock mix assumed in the proposal (i.e.,
natural gas represents a much higher fraction of the projected 2030
feedstock mix under the new approach), there are more recent data on
the upstream GHG emissions associated with natural gas production that
were not reflected in the 1.06 feedstock factor that was used in the
proposal, and EPA recently promulgated a New Source Performance
Standard (NSPS) for natural gas operations beginning in 2015.\531\ EPA
is now using a projected multiplicative factor of 1.20 for feedstock-
related GHG emissions for the additional electricity necessary to
support EVs and PHEVs in 2030. This factor is derived from application
of Argonne National Laboratory's GREET model, which was used to
estimate GHG emissions that occur upstream of the power plant emissions
(for example, the emissions associated with the extraction, processing
and transportation of power plant feedstocks). EPA used the GREET
default values for different feedstocks with one exception. EPA
adjusted a default GREET value for upstream methane emissions
associated with natural gas-fired power plants to account for the
impact of the recently promulgated NSPS for natural gas
operations.\532\ The NSPS will result in a 95 percent reduction of
uncontrolled VOC emissions (causing a corresponding reduction in
methane
[[Page 62822]]
emissions) due to requirements for flaring and reduced emissions
completions and workovers for hydraulically fractured wells. This
adjustment to the one GREET model default value had a minimal impact on
the total life cycle emissions from natural gas electricity generation
because these completion and workovers are only a few of many emissions
sources included in natural gas emissions totals, and because the GREET
emission values for these activities already accounted for state
regulatory efforts and industry best practices. Expressing the results
of the GREET modeling effort in terms of multiplicative factors of life
cycle GHG emissions mass per power plant GHG emissions mass for each
feedstock, coal has a feedstock multiplier of 1.05 and natural gas has
a feedstock multiplier of 1.28. The emissions from the other feedstocks
are low enough, less than 0.3 percent, to ignore the feedstock
multipliers (effectively assigning a value of 1.0). Weighting these
feedstock multipliers by the IPM run GHG emissions percentages (33.4
percent natural gas, 66.3 percent coal, 0.3 percent other feedstocks)
yields an overall feedstock multiplier of 1.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\531\ EPA signed the final rule on 4/17/12; publication of the
official version in the Federal Register is forthcoming. For
internet version of final rule, see http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417finalrule.pdf.
\532\ EPA utilized GREET 1--2011, available at http://greet.es.anl.gov/ (last accessed July 10, 2012). EPA revised the
default emissions estimate of about 481 g CH4 per mmBtu
of natural gas for electricity generation to 458 g CH4
per mmBtu (see ``NG'' worksheet, C156).
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The overall electricity upstream GHG emissions factor, for the
additional electricity needed to reflect the extra demand by EVs and
PHEVs in 2030, is the product of the 0.445 grams/watt-hour power plant
value and the 1.20 factor for feedstock-related emissions, or 0.534
grams/watt-hour. This is somewhat lower than the 0.574 grams/watt-hour
value that was used in the proposal.
Below is an example of the 4-step methodology in today's final rule
for calculating the GHG emissions compliance value for vehicle
production in excess of the cumulative production cap for an individual
automaker for MYs 2022-2025, for an EV that has the same electricity
consumption, 238 watt-hours/mile, as the 2012 Nissan Leaf:
A measured 2-cycle vehicle electricity consumption of 238
watt-hours/mile over the EPA city and highway tests
Adjusting this watt-hours/mile value upward to account for
electricity losses during electricity transmission (dividing 238 watt-
hours/mile by 0.935 to account for grid/transmission losses yields a
value of 255 watt-hours/mile)
Multiplying the adjusted watt-hours/mile value by a 2030
EV/PHEV electricity upstream GHG emissions rate of 0.534 grams/watt-
hour at the power plant (255 watt-hours/mile multiplied by 0.534 grams
GHG/watt-hour yields 136 grams/mile)
Subtracting the upstream GHG emissions of a comparable
midsize gasoline vehicle of 41 grams/mile \533\ to reflect a full net
increase in upstream GHG emissions (136 grams/mile for the EV minus 41
grams/mile for the gasoline vehicle yields a net increase and EV
compliance value of 95 grams/mile).\534\
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\533\ A midsize gasoline vehicle with a footprint of 46 square
feet would have a MY 2025 GHG target of about 147 grams/mile;
dividing 8887 grams CO2/gallon of gasoline by 147 grams/mile yields
an equivalent fuel economy level of 60.5 mpg; and dividing 2478
grams upstream GHG/gallon of gasoline by 60.5 mpg yields a midsize
gasoline vehicle upstream GHG value of 41 grams/mile. The 2478 grams
upstream GHG/gallon of gasoline is calculated from 21,546 grams
upstream GHG/million Btu (EPA value for future gasoline based on
DOE's GREET model modified by EPA standards and data; see docket
memo to MY2012-2016 rulemaking titled ``Calculation of Upstream
Emissions for the GHG Vehicle Rule'') and multiplying by 0.115
million Btu/gallon of gasoline.
\534\ Manufacturers can utilize alternate calculation
methodologies if shown to yield equivalent or superior results and
if approved in advance by the Administrator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The full accounting methodology for FCVs and the portion of PHEV
operation on grid electricity would use this same approach. The final
regulations adopt EPA's proposed method to determine the compliance
value for PHEVs, and EPA will develop a similar methodology for FCVs if
and when the need arises based on the fuel production and distribution
GHG emissions associated with hydrogen production for various
feedstocks and processes.\535\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\535\ 40 CFR 600.113-12(m).
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The final issue raised by the Edison Electric Institute was that it
would be better for EPA to wait until the midterm evaluation to adopt
an electricity upstream GHG emissions factor. EPA disagrees with this
comment. EPA believes it is critical to provide the automobile
manufacturers, for their long-term compliance planning, a value that we
expect to be used for compliance purposes in MYs 2022-2025, for those
manufacturers who exceed their vehicle production caps for EVs and
PHEVs. We understand that there are many factors that could lead to an
electricity upstream GHG emissions factor for EVs and PHEVs that may be
higher or lower, such as future regulations, market forces, regional
distribution of EV/PHEV sales, and vehicle charging patterns. EPA will
continue to evaluate these factors, including in the mid-term
evaluation, and will address these issues there.
vii. Should Other Technologies Be Eligible for Incentives?
The proposal included temporary regulatory incentives for three
technologies: EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs. Sections III.C.2.c.ii and
III.C.2.c.v discuss the final incentives for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs. EPA
also solicited comment on whether incentives should be provided for CNG
vehicles, and Section III.C.2.c.iv discusses the final incentives for
those vehicles. The Agency also received comments recommending that
other technologies receive regulatory incentives.
The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Association of Global
Automakers, and Ford recommended that incentive multipliers be
available for manufacturers of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) vehicles.
EPA is not adopting incentive multipliers for LPG vehicles because the
Agency does not believe that LPG vehicles promote the commercialization
of technologies that have, or technologies whose commercialization can
be critical facilitators of next-generation technologies that have, the
potential to transform the light-duty vehicle sector by achieving zero
or near-zero GHG emissions and oil consumption.
Toyota suggested that conventional hybrid electric vehicles should
receive incentive multipliers, if, as is the case, CNG vehicles receive
such multipliers. EPA is not adopting incentive multipliers for
conventional hybrid vehicles. Although the Agency agrees with Toyota
that conventional hybrids share many of the same electric drive
components of EVs and PHEVs (e.g., batteries, motors, controllers),
with respect to consumer acceptance and barriers to utilization, the
Agency believes that conventional hybrids are much more similar to
gasoline vehicles than they are to EVs, in that all of the propulsion
energy comes from gasoline, vehicle range is improved, and hybrids need
no new refueling infrastructure. As such there is not the same degree
of market barriers inhibiting increased use of this technology.
Volkswagen also recommended incentives for ``advanced technology
compression ignition engines,'' or what are more commonly referred to
as advanced diesel engines. EPA is not adopting an incentive multiplier
for advanced diesel vehicles because the Agency does not believe that
advanced diesel vehicles promote the commercialization of technologies
that have, or technologies whose commercialization can be critical
facilitators of next-generation technologies that have, the potential
to transform the light-duty vehicle sector by achieving zero or near-
zero GHG emissions and oil consumption, nor do advanced diesels face
significant barriers with respect to consumer acceptance, relative to
EV/PHEV/FCVs and CNG vehicles.
[[Page 62823]]
Finally, the Agency received many comments related to a broad set
of issues related to biofuels.
The Clean Fuels Development Coalition, Growth Energy, the 25x'25
Alliance (and partners), Volkswagen, and the Association of Global
Automakers recommended that EPA provide GHG emissions incentives to
automakers that produce vehicles capable of operating on biofuels, such
as ethanol and biodiesel, beyond MY 2015 (when incentives under the
light-duty vehicle GHG program currently expire) and/or gasoline/
biofuels blends. EPA recognizes that the use of certain biofuels has
the potential to reduce lifecycle GHG emissions. EPA also recognizes
that other programs already either require the increasing use of
renewable fuels in the transportation sector or provide incentives for
vehicle manufacturers to produce vehicles capable of operating on more
than one fuel. In that context, EPA believes it is not appropriate to
adopt incentive multipliers, or the 0.15 divisor, in this rule for
manufacturers of biofuel-capable vehicles. The tailpipe GHG emissions
of biofuel-capable vehicles when operated on biofuels are typically
slightly lower than GHG emissions from conventional vehicles, and those
GHG emissions performance-based reductions would be accounted for in
EPA compliance calculations based on the actual use of biofuels. On the
other hand, biofuels-capable vehicles are typically no more expensive
than conventional vehicles, they may or may not use a biofuel (since
they can operate on conventional fuel), and they do not face
significant consumer acceptance barriers since they can, and most often
are, operated on fuels with high gasoline content. As noted above, one
purpose of the incentive multipliers for vehicles such as EVs, PHEVs,
FCVs, and CNG vehicles is to address barriers to the increased use in
the marketplace of those vehicles and their fuels. The factors above
indicate there are not similar barriers for the increased production of
biofuel-capable vehicles. As such, there is not a similar basis for
adopting incentive multipliers for biofuel-capable vehicles.
The 25x'25 Alliance (and partners) specifically recommended that
EPA adopt a ``0.15 multiplier'' for CO2 emissions compliance
``in order to preserve existing statutory incentives for alternative
fuels'' under the CAFE program. As discussed above when the same issue
arose with respect to CNG vehicles, EPA disagrees with this comment.
Congress provided the 0.15 divisor for CAFE compliance because a
vehicle that operates on a nonpetroleum fuel (like E85) consumes zero
or near-zero petroleum, and petroleum conservation is a primary
objective of the CAFE program. The primary focus of the GHG standards
is GHG emissions. EPA believes that compliance must be based on
demonstrated GHG emissions performance, not on a 0.15 incentive. We
also disagree that EPA must adopt the 0.15 incentive in order to
``preserve existing statutory incentives'' for CAFE credits. EPA's GHG
program and NHTSA's CAFE program are harmonized in numerous ways, but
compliance with one program does not imply compliance with the other.
There are a number of instances where the programs diverge with respect
to incentives and flexibilities. See section I.B.4 above. Here, EPA
believes that the paramount emission reduction goals of the CAA warrant
the difference in approach.
Several commenters, including Growth Energy and Plant Oil Powered
Diesel Fuel Systems, pointed out that cellulose-based ethanol and other
renewable fuels have the potential to yield large lifecycle GHG
emissions benefits due to the CO2 uptake during plant
growth, and recommended that such fuels be given credits to reflect the
upstream GHG emissions benefits. The use of low-GHG biofuels is already
required under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, which has
been in place since 2006 and is designed to achieve GHG emissions
benefits through the required use of renewable transportation fuels
that have better lifecycle GHG emissions performance than the gasoline
or diesel fuel that they displace. EPA has already quantified the GHG
emissions benefits associated with the RFS program. Providing an
additional incentive in the MYs 2017-2025 GHG program, which is focused
on vehicle tailpipe emissions and not lifecycle emissions, would not
achieve any greater use of renewable fuels than is already required
under the RFS program, and thus would not achieve any greater emissions
reductions from the use of such fuel. Thus, providing an additional
incentive would only lead to a reduction in the emissions benefits of
the MYs 2017-2025 light-duty vehicle GHG emissions program. Given that
renewable fuel use is already required by and accounted for under the
RFS program, it therefore would be inappropriate to provide additional
incentives in the MYs 2017-2025 program.\536\
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\536\ The plant oil-based fuel produced by POP Diesel is not
currently identified as an acceptable renewable fuel under the RFS
program. EPA is currently considering the company's petition seeking
approval of its product under the RFS program. The RFS program
established by Congress is the appropriate mechanism for evaluating
the full lifecycle emissions impact of this type of biofuel use,
rather than a program focused principally on vehicle tailpipe
emissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A related comment from Growth Energy, the 25x'25 Alliance (and
partners), the National Corn Growers Association, and the Minnesota
Department of Commerce was that, by not providing incentives for
ethanol or biofuel vehicles, the proposal was ``inconsistent'' with the
RFS, and, as stated by Growth Energy, ``will make the volumetric
biofuels requirements of Title II in EISA unachievable.'' EPA disagrees
with these comments. There is nothing inconsistent between the MYs
2017-2025 GHG program and the RFS program. The MYs 2017-2025 GHG
program is designed to achieve GHG emission reductions from vehicle
operation as measured at the tailpipe. The RFS program is a standalone
program designed to increase the use of renewable fuels and to achieve
GHG emission reductions primarily through upstream emission reductions.
The RFS program can be achieved independent of the vehicle GHG
standards. The RFS program does not mandate any particular type of fuel
(or vehicle) and relies on market forces to determine the most cost-
effective approaches for meeting the RFS program's volume requirements.
Achievement of the RFS volume mandates is largely based on decisions
that will be made by the fuel industries about what renewable fuels to
produce and how to distribute and market them. The RFS program already
contains mechanisms to create market incentives to facilitate such
increases. No additional incentives for vehicle manufacturers are
needed to do so.
Furthermore, there have been CAFE incentives for automakers that
produce ethanol FFVs (and other dual fuel vehicles) for many years (see
75 FR 25432-33), and CAFE incentives will remain in place. Although the
GHG emissions incentive under the light-duty vehicle GHG rule, designed
to be equivalent to the CAFE incentive, will end in MY 2015, automakers
can achieve lower GHG emissions compliance values for ethanol FFVs
based on lower tailpipe GHG emissions when operating on E85 and a
weighting of E85 and gasoline emissions performance based on actual E85
use, an option that EPA is finalizing. (See Section III.C.4 for more
detail on the methodology for calculating GHG emissions from ethanol
FFVs.) There are approximately 10 million ethanol FFVs on the road in
the U.S. today (far more than any other incentivized technology),
[[Page 62824]]
and automakers produced approximately 2 million ethanol FFVs in MY 2011
alone. Although the great majority of ethanol FFVs currently use
gasoline, EPA believes that automakers will continue to produce ethanol
FFVs, as more consumers begin to fuel their ethanol FFVs with E85 fuel.
Given the long history of federal incentives for ethanol FFVs, and the
fact that ethanol FFVs can achieve small GHG emissions credits after
the GHG emissions incentives expire, the Agency believes that there is
no need to provide additional incentives for ethanol FFVs in this
rulemaking, beyond those already provided.
viii. Applicability of Credits for EV/PHEV/FCVs
In the proposal, EPA did not propose any restrictions on the use of
GHG emissions credits for those vehicles eligible for the 0 g/mi GHG
emissions compliance incentive. The Natural Resources Defense Council
commented that ``if the agencies proceed with their proposed 0 g/mi
treatment, other incentives, such as off-cycle credits, should not be
available for the portion of an advanced vehicle's driving range that
is powered by grid electricity or off-board hydrogen. No vehicles
should be allowed to have negative emissions.'' EPA is finalizing, as
proposed and consistent with the MYs 2012-2016 program, no restrictions
on the use of GHG emissions credits for those vehicles eligible for the
0 g/mi GHG emissions compliance treatment, i.e., EV/PHEV/FCVs can earn
air conditioner efficiency, air conditioner refrigerant, and off-cycle
credits. EPA will be accounting for these credits at the manufacturer
fleet level, not at the individual vehicle model level, though we
accept the point by NRDC that, in effect, if one were to assess the
actual credits earned on a per vehicle basis, the overall compliance
value would appear to be negative for this limited set of vehicles.
Because of the relatively small number of EV/PHEV/FCVs expected during
MYs 2017-2025, EPA expects the fleetwide impact of these additional
credits to be very small (see Table III-17), and EPA does not want to
discourage improvements in air conditioner and other technologies for
EV/PHEV/FCVs that provide real world GHG emissions benefits (including,
in the case of air conditioner refrigerants, some of the most potent
GHGs).
ix. Changes to MYs 2012-2016 Regulations
In the proposal, EPA sought comments on whether any changes should
be made for MYs 2012-2016, i.e., whether the compliance value for
production beyond the cap should be one-half of the net increase in
upstream GHG emissions, or whether the current cap for MYs 2012-2016
should be removed. See 76 FR 75013. EPA received two comments on this
topic. Within a broader context of reiterating its support for a 0 g/mi
tailpipe-based compliance treatment for EVs, Nissan recommended that if
a manufacturer reaches its vehicle production threshold for MYs 2012-
2016, there be an ``interim period'' (for the same volume of vehicles
that initially triggers the cap) where the non-0 g/mi compliance value
be equal to one-half of the net increase. Alternatively, the Natural
Resources Defense Council supported no change in the MYs 2012-2016
regulations. EPA is not adopting changes to the MYs 2012-2016
regulations as we believe that the incentives currently in place for
MYs 2012-2016 provide a sufficient incentive.
x. Impact of Temporary Regulatory Incentives for EV/PHEVs on Projected
GHG Emissions Reductions
In this section, EPA projects the potential impact on GHG emissions
that will be associated with both the temporary incentive multiplier
and the 0 g/mi compliance value for EV/PHEVs over the MYs 2017-2025
timeframe. Since it is impossible to know precisely how many vehicles
will be sold in the MYs 2017-2025 timeframe that will utilize the
proposed incentives, EPA provides projections for two scenarios: (1)
the number of EV/PHEV sales in MYs 2017-2025 that EPA's OMEGA
technology and cost model predicts for the most cost-effective way for
the industry to meet the standards, and (2) an alternative scenario
with a greater number of EV/PHEVs, based not only on compliance with
the standards, but on other factors that could affect the market for
EV/PHEVs as well.\537\ For this analysis, EPA assumes that EVs and
PHEVs each account for 50 percent of all EV/PHEVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\537\ These projections do not include any FCVs or CNG vehicles.
Table III-17--Projected Impact of EV/PHEV Incentives on GHG Emissions Reductions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage
Cumulative decrease decrease in
Cumulative EV/PHEV Cumulative EV/PHEV in GHG emissions GHG emissions
Scenario sales 2017-2025 sales 2022-2025 reductions 2017- reductions
2025 \538\ 2017-2025
\539\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA OMEGA model projection....... 1.5 million........ 1.1 million........ 56 MMT............. 2.7%
EPA alternative projection....... 2.8 million........ 2.0 million........ 101 MMT............ 5.0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA projects that the cumulative GHG emissions savings of the MYs
2017-2025 standards, on a model year lifetime basis, is approximately 2
billion metric tons. Table III-17 projects that the likely decrease in
cumulative GHG emissions reductions due to the EV/PHEV incentives for
MYs 2017-2025 vehicles is in the range of 56 to 101 million metric
tons, or 2.7 to 5.0 percent of overall program savings.
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\538\ The number of metric tons represents the number of
additional tons that would be reduced if the standards stayed the
same and there was no temporary incentive multiplier and no 0 gram
per mile compliance value.
\539\ The percentage change represents the ratio of the
cumulative decrease in GHG emissions reductions from the prior
column to the total cumulative GHG emissions reductions associated
with the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to note that the above projections of the possible
impact of the EV/PHEV incentives on the overall program GHG emissions
reductions assumes that there would be no change to the standard even
if the EV 0 g/mi incentive were not in effect, i.e., that EPA would
promulgate exactly the same standard if the 0 g/mi compliance value
were not allowed for any EV/PHEVs. Although EPA has not analyzed such a
scenario, it is clear that not allowing a 0 g/mi compliance value would
change the technology mix and cost projected for the standards.
Of course, either technology innovation or a future comprehensive
program addressing upstream emissions
[[Page 62825]]
of GHGs from the generation of electricity could decrease the loss of
GHG reductions associated with the temporary regulatory incentives.
On the other hand, EPA also recognizes that EV/PHEV sales could be
higher than projected, and that there are factors which could increase
the appropriate electricity upstream GHG emissions factor in the
future, such as greater use of high-power charging, and the possibility
that EVs won't displace gasoline vehicle use on a 1:1 basis (i.e.,
multi-vehicle households may use EVs for more shorter trips and fewer
longer trips, which could lead to lower overall travel for typical EVs
and higher overall travel for gasoline vehicles).
3. Incentives for Using Advanced ``Game-Changing'' Technologies in
Full-Size Pickup Trucks
As explained in section II.C, the agencies recognize that the MY
2017-2025 standards will be challenging for large vehicles, including
full-size pickup trucks that are often used for commercial purposes. In
Section II.C, and in Chapter 2 of the joint TSD, EPA and NHTSA describe
how the slope of the truck curve has been adjusted compared to the
2012-2016 rule to reflect these disproportionate challenges. In Section
III.B, EPA describes the progression of the truck standards. In this
section, EPA describes advanced technology incentives that were
proposed and are being adopted for full-size pickup trucks under both
section 202(a) of the CAA and section 32904(c) of EPCA. These
incentives are in the form of credits under the EPA GHG program, and
fuel consumption improvement values (equivalent to EPA's credits) under
the CAFE program.
The agencies' goal is to incentivize the penetration into the
marketplace of ``game changing'' technologies for these pickups,
including their hybridization. For that reason, EPA proposed and is
adopting per-vehicle credit provisions for manufacturers that hybridize
a significant number of their full-size pickup trucks, or use other
technologies that comparably reduce CO2 emissions and fuel
consumption. As described in sections II.F.3 and III.B.10, EPA and
NHTSA are coordinating to allow manufacturers to include ``fuel
consumption improvement values'' equivalent to EPA CO2
credits in the CAFE program.\540\ Comments on the need for and scope of
these provisions are discussed in section II.F.3.
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\540\ Note that EPA's calculation methodology in 40 CFR 600.510-
12 does not use vehicle-specific fuel consumption adjustments to
determine the CAFE increase due to the various incentives allowed
under the program. Instead, EPA will convert the total
CO2 credits due to each incentive program from metric
tons of CO2 to a fleetwide CAFE improvement value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As was proposed, the agencies are defining a full-size pickup truck
based on minimum bed size and hauling capability, as detailed in
86.1866-12(e) of the regulations being adopted. This definition is
meant to ensure that the larger pickup trucks, which provide
significant utility with respect to bed access and payload and towing
capacities, are captured by the definition, while smaller pickup trucks
with more limited capacities are not covered. A full-size pickup truck
is defined as meeting requirements (1) and (2) below, as well as either
requirement (3) or (4) below. Section II.F.3 includes a discussion of
comments received on this definition.
(1) Bed Width--The vehicle must have an open cargo box with a
minimum width between the wheelhouses of 48 inches, measured as the
minimum lateral distance between the limiting interferences (pass-
through) of the wheelhouses, excluding any transitional arc, local
protrusions, and depressions or pockets (dimension W202 in SAE
Procedure J1100). An open cargo box means a cargo bed without a
permanent roof or cover. Vehicles sold with detachable covers are
considered ``open'' for the purposes of these criteria. And--
(2) Bed Length--The length of the open cargo box must be at least
60 inches, as measured at both the top of the body and at the bed floor
(dimensions L506 and L505 in SAE Procedure J1100). And--
(3) Towing Capability--the gross combined weight rating (GCWR)
minus the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) must be at least 5,000
pounds. Or--
(4) Payload Capability--the GVWR minus the curb weight (as defined
in 40 CFR 86.1803) must be at least 1,700 pounds.
Full-size pickup trucks using mild hybrid technology will be
eligible for a per-truck 10 g/mi CO2 credit (equivalent to
0.0011 gal/mi for a gasoline-fueled truck) during MYs 2017-2021. Full-
size pickup trucks using strong hybrid technology will be eligible for
a per-truck 20 g/mi CO2 credit (0.0023 gal/mi) during MYs
2017-2025. Eligibility for both the mild and strong hybrid credit is
dependent on the manufacturer reaching the technology penetration
thresholds discussed below.
Because of their importance in assigning credit amounts, the
definitions of mild and strong hybrids for purposes of this credit
program must be fair and unambiguous. The proposal included explicit
criteria regarding a hybrid's percent efficiency in recovering braking
energy (75% to qualify as a strong hybrid, 15% for a mild hybrid). EPA
received a number of manufacturer comments on the proposed definitions.
Some industry commenters objected to EPA's characterization of the
credit provisions as applying to hybrid ``gasoline-electric'' vehicles.
We agree that this would be an overly narrow characterization, and are
clarifying that the provisions also apply to non-gasoline (including
diesel-, ethanol-, and CNG-fueled) hybrids. Further extension to
hybrids employing non-electric battery storage (including hydraulic-,
capacitive-, and mechanical-energy storage) is complicated, however, by
the difficulty in developing regulatory procedures for all conceivable
energy-storage media. We believe that these technologies are not
hampered in participating in the large truck credit program because
manufacturers using them can take the alternative, performance-based
pathway described below to gain the credits.
Ford, Toyota, and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
suggested improvements to the proposed procedure for determining
whether hybrid technology is categorized as strong, mild, or having
energy recovery too minimal to warrant credits. Most importantly, they
argued that the proposed approach improperly integrated energy
contributions over the entire city cycle FTP, thereby capturing more
than just the intended recovered braking energy and creating an
opportunity for gaming through tailoring of the direct addition of
energy from the engine. They offered alternative procedures and
corresponding recovered energy threshold levels based on energy input
only during decelerations, with the recovery efficiency cutpoint
between strong and mild hybrids correspondingly reduced from 75% to
40%. Chrysler maintained that a 75% energy recovery rate would be
challenging for large pickups because of the need to design the braking
system for maximum payload and trailer capability while maintaining
drivability in the absence of loads. Chrysler's specific recommendation
was for a cutpoint of 50% energy recovery rate. Ford and Toyota also
suggested an additional metric for qualifying strong HEVs--that at
least 10% of the total tractive energy during positive accelerations on
the FTP must be from the electric drive with the engine off.
As discussed in detail in section 5.3.3 of the TSD, we have
evaluated these
[[Page 62826]]
concerns and the suggested changes and have concluded that the proposed
metric remains adequate for our purposes, and furthermore has the
advantage of being simpler and easier to measure than other metrics.
However, based on the comments received from Chrysler and follow-up
testing described in section 5.3.3 of the TSD, showing that the only
large hybrid truck currently marketed would not satisfy the proposed
75% metric, we believe that 65% is a more appropriate threshold for
defining strong hybrid energy recovery while remaining consistent with
the overall goals of this incentive program, and so are adopting this
threshold into the final regulations. We are retaining the proposed 15%
threshold for mild hybrid energy recovery; commenters supported this
threshold. Because there are other, non-hybrid, advanced technologies
that can reduce pickup truck GHG emissions and fuel consumption at
rates comparable to strong and mild hybrid technology, EPA is also
adopting the proposed credit provisions for full-size pickup trucks
that achieve emissions levels significantly below their applicable
CO2 targets. This performance-based credit will be 10 g/mi
CO2 (equivalent to 0.0011 gal/mi for the CAFE program) or 20
g/mi CO2 (0.0023 gal/mi) for full-size pickups achieving 15%
or 20%, respectively, better CO2 than their footprint-based
targets in a given model year. The basis for our choice of the 15 and
20% over-compliance minimums is explained in Section 5.3.4 of the TSD.
These performance-based credits have no specific technology or
design requirements; automakers can use any technology or set of
technologies as long as the vehicle's CO2 performance is at
least 15 or 20% below the vehicle's footprint-based target. However, a
vehicle cannot receive both hybrid and performance-based credits, since
that would be double-counting. In addition, because the footprint
target curve has been adjusted to account for A/C-related credits, the
CO2 level to be compared with the target will also include
any A/C-related credits generated by the vehicles.
The 10 g/mi performance-based credit will be available for MYs 2017
to 2021. In recognition of the nature of automotive redesign cycles, a
vehicle model meeting the requirements in a model year will receive the
credit in subsequent model years through 2021 unless its CO2
level increases or its production level drops below the penetration
threshold described below, even if the year-by-year reduction in
standards levels causes the vehicle to fall below the 15% over-
compliance threshold. Not doing so would reduce substantially the
incentive to introduce advanced technology in earlier model years if
the incentive wasn't available for the design cycle period. The 10 g/mi
credit is not available after MY 2021 because the post-MY 2021
standards quickly overtake designs that were originally 15% over-
compliant, making the awarding of credits to them inappropriate. The 20
g/mi CO2 performance-based credit will be available for a
maximum of 5 consecutive model years (the typical redesign cycle
period) within the 2017 to 2025 model year period, provided the vehicle
model's CO2 level does not increase from the level
determined in its first qualifying model year, and subject to the
technology penetration requirement described below. A qualifying
vehicle model that subsequently undergoes a major redesign can
requalify for the credit for an additional period starting in the
redesign model year, not to exceed 5 model years and not to extend
beyond MY 2025.
Access to any of these large pickup truck credits requires that the
technology be used on a minimum percentage of a manufacturer's full-
size pickup trucks. These minimum percentages are set to encourage
significant penetration of these technologies, leading to long-term
market acceptance. Meeting the penetration threshold in one model year
does not ensure credits in subsequent years; if the production level in
a model year drops below the required threshold, the credit is not
earned for that model year. The required penetration levels are:
For strong hybrid credits: 10% in each model year 2017
through 2025.
For mild hybrid credits: 20-30-55-70-80% in model years
2017-2018-2019-2020-2021, respectively.
For ``20 percent better'' performance-based credits: 10%
in each model year 2017 through 2025.
For ``15 percent better'' performance-based credits: 15-
20-28-35-40% in model years 2017-2018-2019-2020-2021, respectively.
These are identical to the proposed levels except that the levels
for MY 2017 and 2018 vehicles using the mild hybrid credits, 20 and
30%, are lower than the proposed 30 and 40% levels, for reasons
explained below.
EPA received a number of comments on the proposed minimum
penetration thresholds, primarily from manufacturers arguing that they
should be reduced or eliminated. These commenters felt that the
requirements run counter to the agencies' goal of incentivizing
technology introduction, because they add uncertainty over whether the
investment in a technology, a commitment that is made years ahead of
time, will reap the credits if a decline in sales causes the production
level to fall short of the minimum in a model year. These commenters
also noted that new technologies are often phased in at rates lower
than the proposed minimum penetration rates in order to gauge consumer
interest and acceptance. GM specifically objected to the proposed rapid
ramp up of the mild hybrid penetration rate as not being aligned with
historic rates of customer acceptance of new and/or advanced
technologies. GM requested that the levels be instead cut in half to
match those proposed for the ``15 percent better'' performance-based
credits.
Our reason for setting ambitious market penetration thresholds
remains--our goal is to create an incentive for manufacturers to commit
to the large-scale application of hybrids and other advanced
technologies in the challenging large truck sector and specifically
that at least mild hybrid or comparable technology become a standard
technology feature for large pickup trucks. Eliminating or greatly
tempering the minimum penetration requirements might retain the
incentive for niche applications but would lose any assurance of
widespread ``game-changing'' technology introduction and substantial
penetration. We do agree with comments that the ambitious penetration
levels proposed for mild hybrid credits in the initial model years may
be counter-productive, as launching a complex new technology on almost
a third of first-year sales could be a risky business strategy in this
highly competitive large truck market segment. As a result, we are
scaling this requirement back to 20 and 30% in model years 2017 and
2018 (compared to the proposed levels of 30 and 40% in MY 2017 and
2018, respectively), to help facilitate the smooth introduction of mild
hybrid technology. However, we are retaining the substantial
penetration requirements that were proposed for later model years to
maintain our focus on encouraging this technology to be more or less
standard on large trucks. We note that a manufacturer which is unable
to meet these penetration requirements may continue to generate credits
through the 2021 model year for mild hybrid trucks under the
performance-based credit option, assuming the less aggressive
penetration threshold requirements for the performance-based credit
provision are satisfied.
[[Page 62827]]
4. Treatment of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, Dual Fuel Compressed
Natural Gas Vehicles, and Ethanol Flexible Fuel Vehicles for GHG
Emissions Compliance
This section describes the approaches for determining the
compliance values for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fuel economy
for those vehicles that can use two different fuels, typically referred
to as dual fuel vehicles under the CAFE program.\541\ Three specific
technologies are addressed: plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs),
dual fuel compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles, and ethanol flexible
fuel vehicles (FFVs).\542\ Since the compliance approaches for GHG
emissions and fuel economy vary across different time periods and
across different technologies, the first part of this section addresses
GHG emissions compliance and the second part of this section addresses
fuel economy compliance (which likewise is administered by EPA pursuant
to authority delegated under EPCA rather than under the Clean Air Act
\543\).
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\541\ EPA is not making any changes to the tailpipe GHG
emissions or fuel economy regulations for the compliance treatment
for dedicated alternative fuel vehicles, i.e., those vehicles that
operate on a single alternative fuel. For the GHG emissions
compliance treatment for dedicated alternative fuel vehicles, see 75
FR 25434. For CAFE treatment for dedicated alternative vehicles, see
49 U.S.C. 32905.
\542\ EPA recognizes that other vehicle technologies may be
introduced in the future that can use two (or more) fuels. For
example, the original FFVs were designed for up to 85% methanol/15%
gasoline, rather than the 85% ethanol/15% gasoline for which current
FFVs are designed. EPA has regulations that address methanol
vehicles (both FFVs and dedicated vehicles), and, for GHG emissions
compliance in MYs 2017-2025, EPA would treat methanol vehicles in
the same way as ethanol vehicles. EPA would treat B20-capable
vehicles in the same way as ethanol FFVs. Other technologies that
could use multiple fuels would be addressed on an as needed basis
under 40 CFR 600.111-08(f), which allows EPA to prescribe special
test procedures for vehicles (such as new, advanced, technologies)
for which there are no applicable regulatory test procedures.
\543\ See 49 U.S.C. 32904(a) and (c).
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a. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
EPA's underlying principle is to base GHG emissions compliance
values on demonstrated vehicle tailpipe CO2 emissions
performance. The key issue with vehicles that can use more than one
fuel is how to weight the GHG emissions performance on the two
different fuels. EPA is adopting an approach to do this on a
technology-by-technology basis, and the sections below explain the
rationale for choosing a particular approach for each vehicle
technology.
i. Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles
PHEVs can operate both on an on-board battery that can be charged
by wall electricity from the grid, and on a conventional liquid fuel
(such as gasoline or diesel). Depending on how these vehicles are
fueled and operated, PHEVs could operate exclusively on grid
electricity, exclusively on the conventional fuel, or on a combination
of both fuels. EPA can determine the CO2 emissions
performance when operated in charge depleting mode (when the battery is
being used to provide grid electricity, either as the sole source of
power or in combination with the engine) and in charge sustaining mode
(when the battery is not providing grid electricity). But, in order to
generate a single CO2 emissions compliance value, EPA must
adopt an approach for determining the appropriate weighting of the
CO2 emissions performance in these two modes.\544\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\544\ PHEVs operated in all-electric mode have zero gram per
mile tailpipe emissions. See Section III.C.2.c.v for the explanation
of how and when the Agency will also account for the upstream fuel
production and distribution GHG emissions associated with the use of
grid electricity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA proposed to use the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
cycle-specific fleet-based utility factor approach for PHEV compliance
calculations first adopted by EPA in the joint EPA/DOT final rulemaking
establishing new fuel economy and environment label requirements for MY
2013 and later vehicles.\545\ This utility factor approach is based on
several key assumptions. One, PHEVs are designed such that the first
mode of operation is all-electric drive or electric assist. Every PHEV
design with which EPA is familiar is consistent with this assumption.
Two, PHEVs will have a full battery charge at the beginning of each
day. Although this assumption is unlikely to be met by every PHEV
driver every day, EPA believes that a large majority of PHEV owners
will be highly motivated to re-charge as frequently as possible, both
because the owner has paid a considerably higher initial vehicle cost
to be able to operate on grid electricity, and because electricity is
considerably cheaper, on a per mile basis, than gasoline.\546\ Three,
PHEV drivers will retain driving profiles similar to those of past
drivers on which the utility factors were based. Based on this utility
factor approach, and individual PHEV-specific test data for charge
depleting range and charge sustaining range, the cycle-specific utility
factor methodology yields individual PHEV-specific values for projected
average percent of operation in charge depleting and charge sustaining
modes over both the city and highway test cycles. See 76 FR 75018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\545\ 76 FR 39504-39505 and 40 CFR 600.116-12(b). For more
detailed information on the development of this SAE utility factor
approach, see http://www.SAE.org, specifically SAE J2841 ``Utility
Factor Definitions for Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles Using Travel
Survey Data,'' September 2010.
\546\ It is also possible that some PHEV owners will charge
their vehicles more than once per day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA received a small number of comments on our proposed compliance
treatment for PHEVs. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Fisker
Automotive, the Electric Drive Transportation Association, and the
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) supported the
use of the SAE utility factor methodology for PHEVs. The American
Petroleum Institute (API) was the one commenter expressing several
concerns, such as whether PHEVs and other dual fuel vehicles will
always have a full tank of fuel at the beginning of each day, and
whether the driving behavior of early adopters will be similar to those
of the average drivers, on which the utility factor methodology is
based. Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE) argued that the SAE-
based utility factors would be too conservative for PHEVs, because PHEV
buyers are more likely to be drivers who will maximize their
electricity-to-gasoline use, due to various factors. SAFE also
suggested that the agencies should continue to monitor the usage
patterns of PHEVs and update the utility factor methodology if
appropriate. ACEEE and API recommended that EPA use lower 5-cycle range
values for all-electric (or equivalent all-electric) operation in the
calculation of the utility factor, to better simulate the relative
electric and conventional fuel operation in the real world. ACEEE also
recommended that this rule use fleet based utility factors for
compliance, rather than the individual based utility factors that are
used for fuel economy and environment labels.
EPA is finalizing the PHEV compliance treatment as proposed, which
was supported by most of the commenters who addressed this topic. While
some of the comments suggest that the utility factors may be too high
or favorable to PHEVs (since some PHEVs may not always have a fully
charged battery each morning, and use of 2-cycle range in the
calculations may not always be appropriate), other comments suggest
that the utility factors may be too low or unfavorable to PHEVs (some
PHEVs may be charged more than once per day, PHEVs may on average be
driven fewer miles than the average
[[Page 62828]]
vehicle, and PHEVs may be purchased by owners with driving patterns
that allow them to optimize for maximum electricity use). No commenter
suggested a specific alternative to the SAE utility factor methodology.
Given the variables that could yield both higher and lower utility
factors, EPA believes the SAE utility factor methodology is a
reasonable approach to use at this time. EPA also agrees with SAFE that
the agency should monitor PHEV usage patterns in the real world and use
that data to refine the development of future utility factors if
necessary. Finally, EPA notes that we are finalizing, as proposed, to
use the fleet based utility factors, as suggested by ACEEE (see 40 CFR
600.116(b)(1)).
For example, based on the cycle-specific, fleet utility factors,
the 2012 Chevrolet Volt PHEV, which has an all-electric range of 50
miles over EPA's 2-cycle tests, has a combined city/highway cycle
utility factor of 0.69, meaning that the average Volt driver is
projected to drive about 69 percent of miles on grid electricity and
about 31 percent of miles on gasoline.
Based on this utility factor approach, EPA calculates the GHG
emissions compliance value for an individual PHEV as the sum of 1) the
GHG emissions value for charge depleting operation (for all electric
operation, either 0 g/mi or a non-zero value reflecting the net
upstream GHG emissions accounting depending on whether automaker EV/
PHEV/FCV production is below or above its cumulative production cap as
discussed in Section III.C.2 above; or a blended value for electric and
gasoline/diesel operation) multiplied by the utility factor, and 2) the
tailpipe CO2 emissions value on gasoline/diesel multiplied
by (1 minus the utility factor).
ii. Dual Fuel Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles
Current dual fuel CNG vehicles operate on either compressed natural
gas or gasoline, but not both at the same time, and have separate tanks
for the two fuels.\547\ There are no OEM dual fuel CNG vehicles in the
U.S. market today, but some manufacturers have expressed interest in
bringing them to market during the MYs 2017-2025 time frame. Under
current EPA regulations through MY 2015, GHG emissions compliance
values for dual fuel CNG vehicles are based on a methodology that
provides significant GHG emissions incentives equivalent to the ``CAFE
credit'' approach for dual and flexible fuel vehicles. For MY 2016,
current EPA regulations utilize a methodology based on demonstrated
vehicle emissions performance and real world fuels usage, similar to
that for ethanol flexible fuel vehicles discussed below.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\547\ EPA considers ``bi-fuel'' CNG vehicles to be those
vehicles that can operate on a mixture of CNG and gasoline. Bi-fuel
vehicles would not be eligible for this compliance treatment, since
they are not designed to allow the use of CNG only. There are no bi-
fuel CNG vehicles sold in the US market, and EPA has no regulations
in place for bi-fuel CNG vehicles.
\548\ See 75 FR 25433-34. See also section III.C.2.c.iv above
for the discussion of tailpipe GHG emissions from current CNG
vehicles and of incentives for dedicated and dual fuel CNG vehicles.
Based on data available to EPA, assuming equivalent energy
efficiency on both gasoline and CNG, operation on CNG typically
yields about 20% lower tailpipe CO2 emissions than
gasoline operation. Dual fuel CNG compliance values would be based
on demonstrated emissions performance over EPA 2-cycle tests, so
tailpipe CO2 emission reductions from CNG operation,
relative to gasoline, could be higher or lower than 20%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA proposed a new approach for dual fuel CNG vehicle GHG emissions
compliance based on the fleet-based utility factor approach described
above for PHEVs, beginning in MY 2016. In the proposal, EPA suggested
that, as with PHEVs, owners of dual fuel CNG vehicles would be expected
to preferentially seek to refuel and operate on CNG fuel as much as
possible, both because the owner would have to pay a higher vehicle
price for the dual fuel capability, and because CNG fuel is
considerably cheaper than gasoline on a per mile basis. EPA noted that
there are some relevant differences between dual fuel CNG vehicles and
PHEVs, some of which might strengthen the case for the use of utility
factors and some of which might weaken the case, but in the aggregate
EPA believed that the use of utility factors for dual fuel CNG vehicles
was appropriate. Further, for dual fuel CNG vehicles in MYs 2012-2015,
EPA also proposed to allow the option, at the manufacturer's
discretion, to use the utility factor-based methodology. The rationale
for providing this option was that, without it, some manufacturers are
likely to reach the maximum allowable dual fuel vehicle GHG emissions
credits for MYs 2012-2015 (which are consistent with the statutory CAFE
credits) through their production of ethanol FFVs, and therefore would
not be able to gain any GHG emissions compliance benefit even if they
produced dual fuel CNG vehicles that demonstrated superior GHG
emissions performance. Finally, EPA also asked for comments on the
desirability of additional design or performance-based eligibility
constraints for dual fuel CNG vehicles to be able to use the utility
factor methodology.
Commenters expressed widespread support for the proposal. Natural
gas advocacy groups (including America's Natural Gas Alliance/American
Gas Association, American Public Gas Association, Clean Energy, Encana
Natural Gas Inc., NGV America, and VNG.Co) supported the use of cycle-
specific fleet-based utility factors for dual fuel CNG vehicles,
supported the extension of this approach for MYs 2012-2015, and
generally argued against any eligibility requirements for the
application of utility factors for dual fuel CNG vehicles. One natural
gas advocacy group, the American Clean Skies Foundation, recommended a
fixed 95% utility factor so as not to ``require a case-by-case
review.'' The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers also supported the
utility factor methodology, and for pulling it ahead to MYs 2012-2015,
and proposed a work group to discuss possible eligibility requirements
for dual fuel CNG vehicles. Chrysler also supported using utility
factors beginning in MY 2012. In addition, several of the natural gas
and automobile commenters asked EPA to consider a ``separate track''
for all dual fuel CNG vehicles (e.g., NGV America), or for ``extended
range'' dual fuel CNG vehicles (e.g., Chrysler), in order to allow
manufacturers of dual fuel CNG vehicles the option to benefit from the
lower GHG emissions, which otherwise would not be possible for those
manufacturers that have ``maxed out'' with ethanol FFV credits in the
MYs 2012-2015 timeframe. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
also supported the use of utility factors, but was the one commenter to
condition its support upon eligibility constraints. It suggested
``[t]he agencies should consider prioritizing a minimum requirement for
natural gas-to-gasoline range of at least 80 percent on natural gas.''
Finally, as with PHEVs, the American Petroleum Institute was the only
commenter to express some concerns with the use of utility factors for
dual fuel CNG vehicles, but did not suggest an alternative approach.
EPA is finalizing, as proposed, the use of SAE fleet-based utility
factors for dual fuel CNG vehicles, and is also finalizing some
additional requirements in order for a dual fuel CNG vehicle to be able
to use the utility factors. Dual fuel CNG vehicles must meet two
requirements in order to use the utility factor approach. One, the
vehicle must have a minimum natural gas range-to-gasoline range of 2.0.
This is to ensure that there is a vehicle range incentive to encourage
vehicle owners to seek to use CNG fuel as much as possible (for
[[Page 62829]]
example, if a vehicle had equal or greater range on gasoline than on
natural gas, the agency is concerned that some owners would fuel more
often on gasoline). While NRDC suggested a minimum natural gas range-
to-gasoline range of 4.0, the agency believes that a ratio of 2.0, in
concert with a (currently) much less expensive fuel, is very strong
incentive to use natural gas fuel. Two, the vehicle must be designed
such that gasoline can only be used when the CNG tank is empty, though
EPA is permitting a de minimis exemption for those dual fuel vehicle
designs where a very small amount of gasoline is used to initiate
combustion before changing over to a much greater volume of natural gas
to sustain combustion. With these eligibility requirements, EPA
believes that there will be strong economic motivation for consumers to
preferentially seek out and use CNG fuel in dual fuel CNG vehicles.
Consumers will have paid a premium for this feature, and will have
greater range on CNG. We also believe that the utility factor approach
is the most reasonable approach for projecting the real world use of
CNG and gasoline fuels in such dual fuel CNG vehicles. Any dual fuel
CNG vehicles that do not meet the above eligibility requirements would
use a utility factor of 0.50, the value that has been used in the past
for dual fuel vehicles under the CAFE program.
As noted above, there was widespread public support from the
commenters for the utility factor approach for dual fuel CNG vehicles.
EPA is rejecting the one alternative approach that was suggested, the
use of a fixed 95% utility factor, because it would allow a dual fuel
CNG vehicle with a small CNG tank to benefit from a very large utility
factor. Further, EPA is finalizing the option for manufacturers to
begin using this approach in MY 2012, at the manufacturer's discretion.
EPA agrees with the arguments from many commenters that, for those
manufacturers who are already obtaining maximum dual fuel vehicle GHG
emissions credits from the production of ethanol FFVs, there is
effectively ``no room'' for additional GHG emissions credits from dual
fuel CNG vehicles, even though these vehicles are likely to provide
real world GHG emissions reductions. Allowing these manufacturers to
use the utility factor approach, beginning in MY 2012, effectively
provides the ``separate track'' that was requested by several
commenters.
Table III-18 shows the utility factors that EPA is adopting, based
on the SAE methodology, for use for dual fuel CNG vehicles that meet
the eligibility requirements. A dual fuel CNG vehicle with a 150-mile
2-cycle CNG range would result in a compliance assumption of 92.5%
percent operation on CNG and 7.5% operation on gasoline.\549\ A dual
fuel CNG vehicle with a driving range of less than 30 miles would use a
utility factor of 0.50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\549\ See SAE J2841 ``Utility Factor Definitions for Plug-In
Hybrid Electric Vehicles Using Travel Survey Data,'' September 2010,
available at http://www.SAE.org, which we are adopting for dual fuel
CNG vehicles as well.
Table III-18--EPA Utility Factors for Dual Fuel CNG Vehicles as a
Function of 2-Cycle Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CNG driving range (miles) UF
------------------------------------------------------------------------
30........................................................... 0.523
40........................................................... 0.617
50........................................................... 0.689
60........................................................... 0.743
70........................................................... 0.785
80........................................................... 0.818
90........................................................... 0.844
100.......................................................... 0.865
110.......................................................... 0.882
120.......................................................... 0.896
130.......................................................... 0.907
140.......................................................... 0.917
150.......................................................... 0.925
160.......................................................... 0.932
170.......................................................... 0.939
180.......................................................... 0.944
190.......................................................... 0.949
200.......................................................... 0.954
210.......................................................... 0.958
220.......................................................... 0.962
230.......................................................... 0.965
240.......................................................... 0.968
250.......................................................... 0.971
260.......................................................... 0.973
270.......................................................... 0.976
280.......................................................... 0.978
290.......................................................... 0.980
300.......................................................... 0.981
------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Ethanol Flexible Fuel Vehicles
Ethanol flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) can operate on E85 (a blend
of 85 percent ethanol and 15 percent gasoline, by volume), gasoline, or
any blend of the two. There are many ethanol FFVs in the U.S. market
today.\550\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\550\ While there are no B20-capable light-duty diesel vehicles
in the U.S. market today, the compliance treatment for B20-capable
vehicles in the future will be the same as for ethanol FFVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the final rulemaking for MYs 2012-2016, EPA promulgated
regulations for MYs 2012-2015 ethanol FFVs that provide significant GHG
emissions incentives equivalent to the long-standing ``CAFE credits''
for ethanol FFVs under EPCA, since many manufacturers had relied on the
availability of these credits in developing their compliance
strategies.\551\ Beginning in MY 2016, EPA ended the GHG emissions
compliance incentives and adopted a methodology based on demonstrated
vehicle emissions performance. This methodology established a default
value where ethanol FFVs are assumed to be operated 100 percent of the
time on gasoline, but allows manufacturers to use a relative E85 and
gasoline vehicle emissions performance weighting based either on
national average E85 and gasoline sales data, or manufacturer-specific
data showing the percentage of miles that are driven on E85 vis-
[agrave]-vis gasoline for that manufacturer's ethanol FFVs.\552\ Since
tailpipe GHG emissions from FFVs operated on E85 are typically slightly
lower than those from gasoline operation, this methodology provides an
opportunity for ethanol FFVs to earn GHG emissions credits,
particularly if E85 use grows in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\551\ 75 FR 25432-433.
\552\ 75 FR 25433-434.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA did not propose to make any changes to this methodology for MYs
2017-2025. In the proposal, the Agency laid out its rationale for not
adopting a utility factor-based approach, as discussed above for PHEVs
and dual fuel CNG vehicles, for ethanol FFVs. Unlike with PHEVs and
dual fuel CNG vehicles, owners of ethanol FFVs do not pay any more for
the E85 fueling capability. Unlike with PHEVs and dual fuel CNG
vehicles, operation on E85 is not cheaper than gasoline on a per mile
basis, it is typically the same or somewhat more expensive to operate
on E85. Accordingly, there is no direct economic motivation for the
owner of an ethanol FFV to seek E85 refueling, and in some cases there
is an economic disincentive. Because E85 has a lower energy content per
gallon than gasoline, an ethanol FFV will have a lower range on E85
than on gasoline, which provides an additional disincentive to use E85
fuel. The data confirm that, on a national average basis in 2008, less
than one percent of the fuel used in FFVs was E85.\553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\553\ 75 FR 14762 (March 26, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most commenters who addressed FFVs that can operate on ethanol or
other biofuels focused on the need for broader incentives, not the more
narrow compliance issues like utility factors that are the focus of
this preamble section.\554\ The Renewable Fuels Association argued in
favor of utility factors for ethanol FFVs, stating: ``EPA/NHTSA's
rationale for allowing the use of these utility factors for some dual
fuel
[[Page 62830]]
vehicles but not for others is highly questionable. EPA and NHTSA state
that PHEV and CNG vehicle owners paid a premium for their vehicles and
thus will seek out and predominantly use alternative fuels more
frequently than they will use gasoline. EPA/NHTSA also assume that
alternative fuels used by PHEVs and CNGVs will be cheaper than gasoline
on a per mile basis. These assumptions do not take into account that
refueling access for these vehicles may be limited or unavailable (EPA/
NHTSA also assume, without basis, that PHEV drivers will always
recharge once per day). Further, the cost per mile for these fuels may
actually prove to be higher than gasoline, and prices may fluctuate as
demand increases. If theoretical utility factors are to be applied to
PHEVs and CNGVs, they should also apply to FFVs and any other dual
fueled vehicles.'' The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM),
Ford, and General Motors supported the concept of not using utility
factors for ethanol FFVs, and instead basing FFV emissions values on a
relative gasoline/E85 weighting based on national average E85 usage in
FFVs (this would count all ethanol consumption beyond E10 and convert
this volume of ethanol to E85). These automakers asked for ``early
guidance'' so that automakers would have the relevant information for
development of compliance plans, and want the guidance to reflect the
expected ethanol volumes that will be necessary to comply with future
Renewable Fuel Standard program volume requirements. The 25x'25
Alliance (and partners) recommended that the agency either adopt the
utility factor methodology for FFVs or adopt the recommendation for
gasoline/E85 weighting by AAM. The National Corn Growers Association
argued that: ``[T]he concern for high relative cost of mid or high
level ethanol blends does not seem to be justified in the term of the
CAFE/GHG and RFS2 rules since at some point in the renewable fuel
volume ramp-up of RFS2, market forces would result in competitive
prices for ethanol and gasoline in order for the required volumes to be
sold.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\554\ For a discussion of why the Agency is not promulgating
incentives for biofuel-capable vehicles like ethanol FFVs for model
years beyond 2015, see Section III.C.2.c.vii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA is finalizing its proposed approach of not using utility
factors for ethanol FFVs and, instead, to base the relative weighting
of gasoline and E85 emissions performance on the actual national
average use of E85 in ethanol FFVs, consistent with the provisions in
the MYs 2012-2016 standards final rulemaking.\555\ EPA understands the
request from manufacturers for early guidance regarding the relative
weightings of gasoline and E85 usage in FFVs and that planning and
manufacturing commitments for future production of FFVs may depend on
knowing the future regulatory environment. EPA commits to providing
early guidance to manufacturers well in advance of each model year. The
agency disagrees with the objections raised by the Renewable Fuels
Association with respect to the selective use of utility factors for
various dual fuel vehicles. EPA continues to believe that it is
appropriate to assume that owners of some types of dual fuel vehicles,
such as PHEVs and CNG vehicles, will preferentially seek to use the
alternative fuel when the vehicle is much more expensive to purchase
and much less expensive to operate on the alternative fuel--why else
would the consumer pay more for the vehicle if (s)he did not intend to
use the cheaper fuel? Similarly, EPA believes it is appropriate to
assume that ethanol FFVs will primarily use gasoline fuel, as there is
no extra vehicle cost, E85 fuel is no cheaper and in fact usually more
expensive per mile, and use of E85 reduces overall vehicle range since
there is only one fuel tank (as opposed to PHEVs and dual fuel CNG
vehicles which have two fuel storage devices and therefore the use of
the alternative fuel raises overall vehicle range). Further, even with
approximately 10 million ethanol FFVs in the U.S. car and light truck
fleet, fuel use data demonstrate that ethanol FFVs only use E85 less
than one percent of the time. EPA considers the comment from the
Renewable Fuels Association about relative fuel prices to be without
merit. While it is true that prices of all motor fuels can be volatile,
CNG prices are approximately one-half those of gasoline \556\ (and
electricity prices, per mile, are even lower), and expected to remain
low for the foreseeable future. Finally, our approach is responsive to
comments from automakers, the 25x'25 Alliance, and the National Corn
Growers Association, in that if actual use of E85 and other higher-
ethanol blends increases, for example in response to future RFS
requirements and/or due to more competitive pricing, then the
regulations already allow automakers to apply a higher E85 weighting
consistent with the greater use of the fuel, which in turn could allow
ethanol FFVs to generate emissions credits if GHG emissions from E85
operation are lower than from gasoline operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\555\ The preamble to the 2012-2016 final rule stated: ``EPA
plans to make this assigned fuel usage factor available through
guidance prior to the start of MY 2016 and adjust it annually as
necessary.'' 75 FR 25434, May 7, 2010.
\556\ http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/pdfs/afpr_apr_12.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. CAFE Calculations for MY 2020 and Later
49 U.S.C. 32905 specifies how the fuel economy of dual fuel
vehicles is to be calculated for the purposes of CAFE through the 2019
model year. The basic calculation is a 50/50 harmonic average of the
fuel economy for the alternative fuel and the conventional fuel,
irrespective of the actual usage of each fuel. In addition, the fuel
economy value for the alternative fuel is significantly increased by
dividing by 0.15 in the case of CNG and ethanol and by using a
petroleum equivalency factor methodology that yields a similar overall
increase in the CAFE mpg value for electricity.\557\ In a related
provision, 49 U.S.C. 32906, the amount by which a manufacturer's CAFE
value (for domestic passenger cars, import passenger cars, or light-
duty trucks) can be improved by the statutory incentive for dual fuel
vehicles is limited by EPCA to 1.2 mpg through 2014, and then gradually
reduced until it is phased out entirely starting in model year
2020.\558\ With the expiration of the special calculation procedures in
49 U.S.C. 32905 for dual fueled vehicles, the CAFE calculation
procedures for model years 2020 and later vehicles need to be set under
the general provisions authorizing EPA to establish testing and
calculation procedures.\559\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\557\ 49 U.S.C. 32905.
\558\ 49 U.S.C. 32906. NHTSA interprets section 32906(a) as not
limiting the impact of duel fueled vehicles on CAFE calculations
after MY2019.
\559\ 49 U.S.C. 32904(a), (c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the expiration of the specific procedures for dual fueled
vehicles, there is less need to base the procedures on whether a
vehicle meets the specific definition of a dual fueled vehicle in EPCA.
Instead, EPA's focus is on establishing appropriate procedures for the
broad range of vehicles that can use both alternative and conventional
fuels. For convenience, this discussion uses the term dual fuel to
refer to vehicles that can operate separately on both an alternative
fuel and on a conventional fuel.
EPA proposed, for PHEVs, dual-fuel CNG vehicles, and FFVs, to apply
the same fuel weighting approaches for CAFE purposes as we do for GHG
emissions compliance. For PHEVs and dual-fuel CNG vehicles, the Agency
proposed that fuel economy weightings would be determined using the SAE
utility factor methodology, while for ethanol FFVs, manufacturers could
[[Page 62831]]
choose to use a default based on 100% gasoline operation, can choose to
base the fuel economy weightings on national average E85 and gasoline
use, or can use manufacturer-specific data showing the percentage of
miles that are driven on E85 vis-[agrave]-vis gasoline for that
manufacturer's ethanol FFVs. EPA further proposed for model years 2020
and later to continue to use the 0.15 divisor for CNG and ethanol, and
the petroleum equivalency factor for electricity, both of which the
statute requires to be used through 2019. EPA sought comment on an
alternative approach where we would not adopt the 0.15 divisor and
petroleum equivalency factor for model years 2020 and later. Under this
alternative approach, the fuel economy for the CNG portion of a dual
fuel CNG vehicle, E85 portion of FFVs, and the electric portion of a
PHEV would be determined strictly on an energy-equivalent basis,
without any adjustment based on the 0.15 divisor or petroleum
equivalency factor. See 76 FR 75019.
No commenters specifically addressed utility factors for CAFE
beginning in MY 2020, though the general arguments for and against
utility factors for CAFE compliance would be the same as those
discussed above for GHG emissions compliance. With one exception,
commenters supported the proposal to continue to use the 0.15 divisor
for CAFE compliance beginning in MY 2020. Nissan summarized the most
common argument for retaining the 0.15 divisor for CAFE compliance,
stating that the 0.15 divisor ``is consistent with the purpose of the
CAFE program--to reduce our country's dependence on foreign oil.'' The
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers argued that ``this approach will
maintain consistency between dedicated and dual fuel vehicle
calculations and will continue to encourage manufacturers to build
vehicles capable of operating on fuels other than petroleum.'' There
was also support for retaining the 0.15 divisor for the CAFE program
from other automakers, natural gas advocacy groups, and ethanol/
renewable fuel groups. The one comment against retaining the 0.15
divisor was the American Petroleum Institute. It argued: ``Section
32906 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 phased-out
the maximum fuel economy credit attributable to dual fuel vehicles
(except electric vehicles) that could be taken by manufacturers of
those vehicles such that the credit was reduced from 1.2 mpg in model
year 2014 (and previous model years) to 0.2 mpg in model year 2019 to
`0 miles per gallon for model years after 2019.' Clearly, the EPA and
NHTSA proposed treatment of model year 2020 and later dual fueled
natural gas vehicles is overly generous and inconsistent with the
intent and will of Congress. It should be set aside.''
EPA is finalizing the CAFE compliance treatment for MY 2020 and
later, as proposed, with one change being the addition of eligibility
requirements for dual fuel CNG vehicles to be able to use the utility
factor approach. For the reasons discussed above for GHG emissions
compliance, EPA is adopting the same approaches for weighting the fuel
economy compliance values for dual fuel vehicles: using utility factors
for PHEVs and dual fuel CNG vehicles (the latter must meet the
eligibility requirements), and providing manufacturers the option of
using national average E85 usage data, manufacturer-specific E85 usage
data, or a 100% gasoline default value for ethanol FFVs. EPA is
adopting the 0.15 divisor, and petroleum equivalency factor for PHEVs,
for dual fuel vehicle CAFE compliance in MY 2020 and later, for two
reasons. One, this approach is directionally consistent with the
overall petroleum reduction goals of EPCA and the CAFE program, because
it reflects the much lower or zero petroleum content of alternative
fuels and continues to encourage manufacturers to build vehicles
capable of operating on fuels other than petroleum. Two, the 0.15
divisor and petroleum equivalency factor (PEF) are used under EPCA to
calculate CAFE compliance values for dedicated alternative fuel
vehicles, and retaining this approach for dual fuel vehicles maintains
consistency, for MY 2020 and later, between the approaches for
dedicated alternative fuel vehicles and for the alternative fuel
portion of dual fuel vehicle operation.
In response to the comment from the American Petroleum Institute,
EPA recognizes that use of the 0.15 divisor, and petroleum equivalency
factor for PHEVs, will continue to provide a large increase in CAFE
compliance values for the vehicles previously covered by the special
calculation procedures in 49 U.S.C. 32905, and that Congress chose both
to end the specific calculation procedures in that section and over
time to reduce the benefit for CAFE purposes of the increase in fuel
economy mandated by those special calculation procedures. However, the
MY 2020 and later methodology differs significantly in important ways
from the special calculation provisions mandated by EPCA. Most
importantly, the MY 2020 and later methodology reflects actual usage
rates of the alternative fuel and does not use the artificial 50/50
weighting previously mandated by 49 U.S.C. 32905. In practice this
means the primary vehicles to benefit from the MY 2020 and later
methodology will be PHEVs and dual-fuel CNG vehicles, and not ethanol
FFVs, while the primary source of benefit to manufacturers under the
statutory provisions came from ethanol FFVs. Changing the weighting to
better reflect real world usage is a major change from that mandated by
49 U.S.C. 32905, and it orients the calculation procedure more to the
real world impact on petroleum usage, consistent with the statute's
overarching purpose of petroleum conservation. In addition, as noted
above, Congress maintained the 0.15 divisor in the calculation
procedures for dedicated alternative fuel vehicles that result in
increased fuel economy values. Finalizing the 0.15 divisor for dual
fuel vehicles is consistent with this, as it uses the same approach for
calculating fuel economy on the alternative fuel when there is real
world usage of the alternative fuel. Since the MY 2020 and later
methodology is quite different in effect from the specified provisions
in 49 U.S.C. 32905, and is consistent with the calculation procedures
for dedicated vehicles that use the same alternative fuel, EPA believes
this methodology is an appropriate exercise of discretion under the
general authority provided in 49 U.S.C. 32904.
Bosch and the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association
commented that all types of alternative fuels, including biodiesel, be
treated ``equivalently'' under the CAFE program. EPA agrees with these
comments, and all dedicated alternative fuel vehicles will use the 0.15
divisor in CAFE calculations for MY 2020 and later. In addition,
vehicles capable of operating on diesel containing at least 85%
biodiesel (B85), will also use the 0.15 divisor in CAFE calculations
for MY 2020 and later. While B85 may not be considered an alternative
fuel under EPCA at this time, 20% biodiesel (B20) is recognized by
Congress for purposes of section 32905, and B85 exhibits the same or
better petroleum replacement benefits as the 85% alcohol blend
alternative fuels currently used in FFVs. The American Council for an
Energy-Efficient Economy, Encana Natural Gas, Inc., and NGV America
recommended that utility factors be used for CAFE calculations prior to
2020. EPA is rejecting this recommendation, as EPCA requires the Agency
to assume 50% use of the conventional fuel and 50% use of the
alternative fuel for CAFE calculations through MY 2019. Finally,
[[Page 62832]]
VNG.Co suggested that that agencies consider possible ways to provide
CAFE credits, in the pre-2020 timeframe, for duel fuel CNG vehicles
that have a CNG range of less than 200 miles. EPA is rejecting this
recommendation as well, as the 200-mile minimum range requirement is
required under 49 U.S.C. 32901(c).
5. Off-cycle Technology Credits
For MYs 2012-2016, EPA provided an option for manufacturers to
generate credits by employing new and innovative technologies that
achieve CO2 reductions which are not reflected on current 2-cycle test
procedures. For this final rule, EPA, in coordination with NHTSA, is
applying the off-cycle credits, and equivalent fuel consumption
improvement values, to both the GHG and CAFE programs for MY 2017 and
later. This is a change from the 2012-16 final rule where EPA only
provided the off-cycle credits for the GHG program. For MY 2017 and
later, manufacturers may continue to use off-cycle credits for GHG
compliance and begin to generate and use fuel consumption improvement
values (essentially equivalent to EPA credits) for CAFE compliance. In
addition, EPA, in coordination with NHTSA, is adopting a list of
defined (i.e. default) values for identified off-cycle technologies
that would apply unless the manufacturer demonstrates that a different
value for its technologies is appropriate.
There are two key changes EPA is making to the proposal based on
comments received. First, EPA is allowing the pre-defined list to be
used starting in MY 2014, rather than the proposed starting point of MY
2017. This change does not apply to CAFE, where the off-cycle credits
program does not begin until MY 2017. Second, EPA is not finalizing the
proposed minimum penetration thresholds for technologies on the pre-
defined list. For most of the listed technologies, the minimum
threshold as proposed would have required manufacturers to use the
listed technologies on at least 10 percent of their production before
the manufacturer could begin generating credits based on the pre-
defined list. All of the changes to the EPA off-cycle credit program
for the GHG program are described in Section III.C.5.a-b below, and
those for the CAFE program are described in Section III.C.5.c below.
a. Background on the Off-Cycle Credit Program Adopted in MY 2012-2016
GHG Rule
In the MY 2012-2016 final rule, EPA adopted an optional credit
opportunity for new and innovative technologies that reduce vehicle
CO2 emissions, but for which the CO2 reduction
benefits are not significantly captured over the 2-cycle test
procedures used to determine compliance with the fleet average
standards (i.e., ``off-cycle'').\560\ EPA established eligibility
criteria requiring technologies to be innovative, relatively newly
introduced in one or more vehicle models, but not yet implemented in
widespread use in the light-duty fleet, and which provide novel
approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The technologies must
be used to achieve verifiable and demonstrable real-world GHG
reductions.\561\ EPA adopted the off-cycle credit option to provide an
incentive to encourage the introduction of these types of technologies,
believing that bona fide reductions from these technologies should be
considered in determining a manufacturer's fleet average, and that a
credit mechanism is an effective way to do this. The optional off-cycle
credit opportunity adopted in the MY 2012-2016 GHG rule is available
through the 2016 model year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\560\ 75 FR 25438-440.
\561\ See 40 CFR section 1866.12(d); 75 FR 25438.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the MY 2012-2016 rule, EPA finalized a two-tiered process for
OEMs to demonstrate that CO2 reductions of an innovative and
novel technology are verifiable and measureable but are not captured by
the 2-cycle test procedures. First, a manufacturer must determine
whether the benefit of the technology could be captured using the 5-
cycle methodology currently used to determine fuel economy label
values. EPA established the 5-cycle test methods to better represent
real-world factors impacting fuel economy, including higher speeds and
more aggressive driving, colder temperature operation, and the use of
air conditioning. If this determination is affirmative, the
manufacturer must follow the 5-cycle procedures to demonstrate
potential benefits and to quantify CO2 gram per mile
credits.
If the manufacturer finds that the technology is such that the
benefit is not adequately captured using the 5-cycle approach, then the
manufacturer would have to develop a robust methodology, subject to EPA
approval, to demonstrate the benefit and determine the appropriate
CO2 gram per mile credit. This case-by-case, non-5-cycle
credits approach includes an opportunity for public comment as part of
the approval process. The demonstration program must be robust,
verifiable, and capable of demonstrating the real-world emissions
benefit of the technology with strong statistical significance. Whether
the approach involves on-road testing, modeling, or some other
analytical approach, the manufacturer is required to present a proposed
methodology to EPA. EPA will approve the methodology and credits only
if certain criteria are met. Baseline emissions and control emissions
must be clearly demonstrated over a wide range of real world driving
conditions and over a sufficient number of vehicles to address issues
of uncertainty with the data. Data must be on a vehicle model-specific
basis unless a manufacturer demonstrated model specific data was not
necessary. See generally 75 FR 25438-40.
b. Changes to the Off-Cycle Credits Program
EPA has been encouraged by automakers' interest in developing
innovative technologies which could be used to generate off-cycle
credits. Though it is early in the program, several manufacturers have
shown interest in introducing off-cycle technologies which are in
various stages of development and testing. EPA believes that continuing
the option for off-cycle credits will further encourage innovative
strategies for reducing CO2 emissions beyond those measured
by the 2-cycle test procedures. Continuing the program provides
manufacturers with additional flexibility in reducing CO2 to
meet increasingly stringent CO2 standards and encourages
early penetration of off-cycle technologies into the light duty fleet.
Furthermore, extending the program may encourage automakers to invest
in off-cycle technologies that could have the benefit of realizing
additional reductions in the light-duty fleet over the longer-term. EPA
received a significant number of comments from manufacturers and
suppliers supporting the continuation of the off-cycle program, and no
opposition to doing so. For these reasons, EPA proposed and is
finalizing extending the off-cycle credits program to 2017 and later
model years.
In implementing the program, some manufacturers expressed concern
prior to proposal that a drawback to using the program is uncertainty
over which technologies may be eligible for off-cycle credits plus
uncertainties resulting from a potentially cumbersome case-by-case
approval process. See 76 FR 75021. As noted above, EPA eligibility
criteria adopted in the MY 2012-2016 final rule require technologies to
be new, innovative, and not in widespread use in order to qualify as a
source of off-cycle credit generation. Also, the MY 2012-2016 final
rule specifies that technologies must not be significantly
[[Page 62833]]
measurable on the 2-cycle test procedures. As discussed below, EPA is
adopting the modifications it proposed to the technology eligibility
criteria, as the current criteria are not well defined and have been a
source of uncertainty for manufacturers, thereby interfering with the
goal of providing an incentive for the development and use of
additional technologies to achieve real world reductions in
CO2 emissions. The focus will be on whether or not off-cycle
technologies can be demonstrated to provide off-cycle CO2
emissions reductions that are not sufficiently reflected on the 2-cycle
tests.
In addition, as described below in section III.C.5.b.i, EPA is
finalizing a new credit pathway that allows manufacturers to generate
credits by using technologies listed on an EPA pre-defined and pre-
approved technology list, and to do so starting with MY 2014. These
credits will be verified and approved as part of certification with no
prior approval process needed. We believe this new option significantly
streamlines and simplifies the program for manufacturers choosing to
use it and will provide manufacturers with certainty that credits may
be generated through the use of pre-evaluated and approved
technologies. For credits not based on the pre-defined list, EPA is
finalizing as proposed a streamlined and better defined step-by-step
process for demonstrating emissions reductions and for applying for
credits under the existing credit pathways. EPA is finalizing these
procedural changes to the existing case-by-case pathways effective for
new credit applications for the MY 2012-2016 program as well as for MY
2017 and later for credits that are not based on the pre-defined list.
As discussed in section II.F and III.B.10, EPA, in coordination
with NHTSA, is also finalizing the proposed provision allowing
manufacturers to include fuel consumption reductions resulting from the
use of off-cycle technologies in their CAFE compliance calculations.
This provision would apply starting in MY 2017. Manufacturers may
generate ``fuel consumption improvement values'' essentially equivalent
to EPA credits, for use in the CAFE program. The changes to the CAFE
program to incorporate off-cycle technologies are discussed below in
section III.5.c.
i. Pre-Defined Credit List
As noted above, EPA proposed and is finalizing a list of off-cycle
technologies from which manufacturers can select and by doing so
automatically generate a pre-defined level of CO2 credits.
This provision will apply starting in MY 2014 and apply in each
successive model year. Both technologies and credit values based on the
list are established by rule. That is, there is no approval process
associated with obtaining the credit. Prior to MY 2014, manufacturers
must provide a demonstration of off-cycle emissions reductions in order
to generate credits for off-cycle technologies, as is required under
the program finalized in the MY 2012-2016 rule, including for those
technologies on the list. Requirements for demonstrating off-cycle
credits not based on the list are described below. EPA received several
comments supporting EPA's proposal to establish a pre-defined and pre-
approved technology list for the off-cycle program. Manufacturers
supported the list as a necessary element to streamline and simplify
the off-cycle program. EPA did not receive any comments against
establishing a pre-defined list, but did receive comments on various
aspects of the list, as discussed in this section and Section II.F.
EPA proposed that manufacturers could begin generating credits
based on the pre-defined list beginning in MY 2017. EPA also solicited
comment generally on ways to liberalize the pre-2017 MY procedures for
obtaining off-cycle CO2 credits, and proposed to change some
of the criteria in the MY 2012-2016 rule for obtaining such credits.
See 76 FR 75023, 75024. The agencies received several comments from
manufacturers that the pre-defined list should also be available for
use in MY 2012-2016. Commenters stated that: (1) These are real and
measurable GHG and fuel consumption reductions and estimated benefits
will equally apply to MY 2012-2016 vehicles as to MY 2017 and later
vehicles, (2) since the credits for technologies on the list are based
on conservative estimates, there is no reason to limit availability,
(3) the reasons for streamlining and simplifying the off-cycle credits
program apply equally to pre-MY 2017 model years, (4) allowing the list
in MY 2012-2016 promotes earlier implementation of CO2-
reducing technology, and (5) requiring testing in the MY 2012-2016 time
frame has the potential to create significant discrepancies and
potential unfairness among manufacturers if EPA awards credits either
higher or lower than the list value.
EPA agrees that the credits on the pre-defined list are based on
conservative estimates of real world off-cycle CO2 and fuel
consumption benefits. Allowing manufacturers to pursue credits through
the use of the pre-defined list provides a significantly streamlined
pathway under the existing program, and therefore has the potential to
encourage the earlier introduction of off-cycle technologies. Allowing
manufacturers to use the list in pre-2017 model years also helps
address concerns raised by manufacturers regarding uncertainty with the
existing credit application and approval process, and potentially
reduces the cost associated with the program by providing a pathway
that does not include testing requirements. These reasons support
applying the list prior to MY 2017.
EPA is allowing use of the credit list starting with MY 2014. For
MY 2012-2013, it is too late for the provisions to have the desired
effect of encouraging the use of off-cycle technologies on additional
vehicle models (MY 2012 is almost complete and MY 2013 is underway).
Allowing the pre-defined list to be used in these model years would
effectively provide credits for actions manufacturers have already
taken for reasons other than gaining off-cycle credits. For
manufacturers not pursuing credits under the existing program, they
would have already decided to forego potential off-cycle credits in
these model years. Providing credits for MY 2012-2013 through the use
of the list thus could be viewed as a windfall--providing credits for
conduct which would occur anyway rather than creating an incentive to
introduce new technologies. EPA therefore is not allowing the list to
be used before MY 2014.
Extending the use of the pre-defined list to MYs 2014-2016 is not
appropriate for the CAFE program. Although EPA included the off-cycle
credit program when adopting the GHG emissions standards for these
model years, see 76 FR 75022, NHTSA did not include an off-cycle credit
program when adopting the CAFE standards for those model years. Fuel
economy improvement values in the CAFE program, and associated
comments, are discussed further in section III.5.c, below.
Table III-19 provides the list of the technologies and per vehicle
credit levels included in the final rule for cars and light trucks. The
manufacturer must demonstrate in the certification process that its
technology meets the definition for the listed technology (see Sec.
86.1869-12(d)(1)(iv)). EPA has made changes to some of the technologies
and credit values on the list based on comments the agencies received.
Section II.F of the preamble provides an overview of the technologies,
credit values, and comments the agencies received on the proposed
technology list. Chapter 5 of the joint TSD provides a further detailed
description of how these technologies
[[Page 62834]]
are defined and how the credit levels were derived. EPA continues to
believe that these values reasonably estimate the amount of GHG
improvement associated with use of the technology, albeit
conservatively (in keeping with the list's function as providing
default values, and providing assurance that the credits will not
result in a loss of CO2 benefits). EPA used a combination of
available activity data from the MOVES model, vehicle and test data,
and EPA's vehicle simulation tool described in Section II.F, to
estimate these credit values. In particular, the vehicle simulation
tool was used to determine the credit amount for electrical load
reduction technologies (e.g. high efficiency exterior lighting, engine
heat recovery, and solar roof panels) and active aerodynamic
improvements.
Table III-19--Off-Cycle Technologies and Credits for Cars and Light
Trucks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credit for cars Credit for light
--------------------- trucks
Technology -------------------
g/mi g/mi
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Efficiency Exterior 1.0 1.0
Lighting (at 100W).
Waste Heat Recovery (at 100W; 0.7 0.7
scalable).
Solar Roof Panels (for 75 W, 3.3 3.3
battery charging only).
Solar Roof Panels (for 75 W, 2.5 2.5
active cabin ventilation plus
battery charging).
Active Aerodynamic Improvements 0.6 1.0
(scalable).
Engine Idle Start-Stop w/heater 2.5 4.4
circulation system.
Engine Idle Start-Stop without/ 1.5 2.9
heater circulation system.
Active Transmission Warm-Up.... 1.5 3.2
Active Engine Warm-Up.......... 1.5 3.2
Solar/Thermal Control.......... Up to 3.0 Up to 4.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As proposed, EPA is capping the amount of credits a manufacturer
may generate using the above list to 10 g/mile per year on a combined
car and truck fleet-wide average basis. As proposed, manufacturers
wanting to generate credits in excess of the 10 g/mile limit for these
listed technologies could do so by generating necessary data and going
through the credit approval process described below in Section
III.C.5.b.iii and iv. In addition, the cap does not apply on a vehicle
model basis, allowing manufacturers the flexibility to focus off-cycle
technologies on certain vehicle models and to generate credits for that
vehicle model in excess of 10 g/mile. (The vehicle is of course part of
the manufacturer's fleet wide average, and further credits from the
list could remain available so long as the manufacturer's fleetwide
credits remained less than or equal to 10 g/mile.) EPA is finalizing a
fleet-wide cap because the default credit values are based on limited
data, and also because EPA recognizes that some uncertainty is
introduced when credits are provided based on a general assessment of
off-cycle performance as opposed to testing on the individual vehicle
models.
EPA received several comments regarding the 10 g/mile credit cap
for the pre-defined technology list. Some manufacturers commented that
the credit cap should be removed, primarily for the following reasons;
(1) the credits on the list are based on conservative estimates of
real-world reductions and industry should receive credits for all
applications without requiring additional testing, and (2) the cap is
counterproductive as it discourages the maximum adoption of the pre-
defined off-cycle technologies (since there would be less incentive to
introduce technologies that would take the manufacturer beyond the
cap). NRDC and ICCT commented in support of the 10 g/mile credit cap
because some uncertainty is inherent with using estimates rather than
vehicle model specific test data. NRDC recommended that EPA fully
evaluate the adequacy of the 10 g/mile cap level, given the
uncertainties in real, verifiable emissions reductions, and to adopt a
lower cap if necessary.
EPA has reviewed the level of credits being provided for listed
technologies and the basis for those estimates, as discussed in section
II.F, and EPA continues to believe that the 10 g/mile cap is
appropriate. The cap balances the goal of providing a streamlined
pathway to encourage significant introduction of innovative off-cycle
technologies with the environmental risk from the uncertainty inherent
with the estimated level of credits being provided. EPA believes that
10 g/mile is substantial relative to the overall emissions reduction
obligation of manufacturers (for example, 10 g/mile represents over 11%
of the difference between a fleet average of 250 g/mile and 163 g/
mile), and that the cap will not be particularly limiting or deter
manufacturers from introducing technology. Manufacturers would need to
use several listed technologies across a very large portion of their
fleet before they would reach the cap. Based on manufacturer comments
regarding the proposed penetration thresholds, discussed below,
manufacturers in general are not anticipating widespread adoption of
these technologies, at least not in the early years of the program.
Also, the cap is not an absolute limitation because manufacturers have
the option of submitting data and applying for credits which would not
be subject to the 10 g/mile credit limit. EPA thus believes credits
generated beyond the 10 g/mile credit cap should be based on additional
manufacturer-specific data.
In the NPRM, EPA discussed the possibility of adding technologies
to the list based on data provided by manufacturers, and other
available data, through future rulemaking. EPA received comments
supporting revisiting the list annually, or from time to time as data
become available, with one commenter recommending that the list be
revisited and fully examined during the mid-term review. EPA received
one comment objecting to providing additional credits without a
rulemaking. EPA also received comment that the 10 g/mile cap discussed
above should be revisited if the list is expanded in the future. EPA is
not announcing a regular schedule to revisit the list, since it is
unclear what the timing might be for other technologies to emerge with
sufficient data supporting their consideration. However, EPA plans to
monitor the emission reduction potential of off-cycle technologies in
coordination with NHTSA. If the CO2 reduction benefits of a
technology have been established through manufacturer data and testing,
or other available data, it would be appropriate to consider listing
the technology and a conservative associated credit value. EPA agrees
that
[[Page 62835]]
any changes to the list would need to be done through a rulemaking
(which would provide an opportunity for public comment), since the list
is part of the regulation, so it would be the regulation itself that
would change. EPA understands commenter interest in revisiting the
issue of the credit cap in conjunction with revisiting the list, and
expects the cap to be a topic for further consideration should a
rulemaking be undertaken in the future and to be one of the issues the
agencies examine during the mid-term review.
EPA also proposed to require minimum penetration rates for several
of the listed technologies as a condition for generating credit from
the list as a way to further encourage their significant adoption by MY
2017 and later. This proposal was intended to support the programmatic
objective of encouraging market penetration of the technologies. See 76
FR 75023. Under the proposed approach, at the end of the model year for
which the off-cycle credit is claimed, manufacturers would need to
demonstrate that production of vehicles equipped with the technologies
for that model year met or exceeded the percentage thresholds in order
to receive the listed credit. EPA proposed to set the threshold at 10
percent of a manufacturer's overall combined car and light truck
production for some technologies on the list.
EPA received several comments from manufacturers and suppliers
recommending that EPA not adopt the proposed penetration thresholds.
Commenters provided several reasons for not adopting thresholds,
including; (1) actions to reduce emissions should be recognized on a
per-vehicle-so-equipped basis, (2) thresholds unfairly withholds credit
for actual, real-world emission reductions that are achieved in the
early stages of technology roll-out, (3) the minimum threshold does not
incentivize the introduction of these technologies, which typically
require extensive development at significant cost. Instead,
manufacturers may choose not to implement new technologies, or to delay
introduction based on the fact that they cannot know with certainty if
they will be able to meet the proposed penetration rates. Business
cases for some of these new technologies will be based on the ability
to achieve expected credit amounts, (4) it is common practice for new
automotive technologies to be introduced on a single model, or even
single configuration within a model. This low production trial period
allows manufacturers to monitor technology performance and reliability,
and to gauge consumer acceptance. Achieving a 10 percent market
penetration can take a decade or more for certain technologies, (5)
new, expensive technologies often are applied first on more expensive,
lower volume models. This process has the salutary effect of lowering a
manufacturer's risk, (6) a smaller penetration rate would create a
correspondingly smaller credit, so we see no problem being created at
lower penetration levels, and (7) EPA has failed to demonstrate a clear
need for the minimum penetration restriction. EPA did not receive any
comments in support of the proposed penetration thresholds.
EPA has decided not to adopt penetration thresholds as a condition
for generation credits using the pre-defined list. EPA proposed the
thresholds as a way to encourage the widespread adoption of off-cycle
technologies by encouraging manufacturers to use the technologies on
larger volume models. EPA believes that several points raised by the
commenters are persuasive in demonstrating that a penetration threshold
could have the opposite effect, dissuading manufacturers from
introducing technologies. EPA agrees that in some cases manufacturers
would proceed by introducing technologies on lower production volume
vehicles in order to gain experience with them and to gauge market
acceptance. EPA does not want to discourage this practice. The ability
to generate additional credits by increasing the use of the
technologies across their fleet will encourage manufacturers to bring
off-cycle technologies into the mainstream. In addition, there is no
loss of environmental benefits if the thresholds are not adopted.
ii. Technology Eligibility Criteria
As discussed above, EPA originally established the off-cycle credit
program in the MY 2012-2016 program. EPA expects that the pre-defined
list may become the primary pathway for off-cycle credit generation due
to the streamlined process the list provides. However, the ability of
manufacturers to generate credits beyond or in addition to those
included in the pre-defined technology list based on manufacturer test
data remains part of the off-cycle credits program under both the MYs
2012-2016 and MY 2017-2025 programs. EPA proposed and is finalizing
several changes to the off-cycle credits pathway procedures originally
established in the MY 2012-2016 rule.
As proposed, EPA is removing the criteria in the 2012-2016 rule
that off-cycle technologies must be `new, innovative, and not in
widespread use.' EPA proposed to remove the criteria from the program
because these terms are imprecise and have created implementation
questions and uncertainty in the program. See 76 FR 75024. For example,
under the criteria that technology must be ``new'' it has been unclear
if technologies developed in the past but not used extensively would be
considered new, if only the first one or two manufacturers using the
technology would be eligible or if all manufacturers could use a
technology to generate credits, or if credits for a technology would
sunset after a period of time. These criteria have interfered with the
goal of providing an incentive for the development and use of off-cycle
technology that reduces CO2 emissions. EPA received only
supportive comments for these proposed changes to the eligibility
criteria. EPA believes it is appropriate to provide credit
opportunities for off-cycle technologies that achieve significant real
world reductions beyond those measured under the two-cycle test without
further making (somewhat subjective) judgments regarding the newness
and innovativeness of the technology. Therefore, as proposed, EPA is
implementing this program change for new MY 2012-2016 credits as well
as for MY 2017-2025.
A further uncertainty in the MY2012-2016 rule was the requirement
that off-cycle credits not be significantly measureable over the 2-
cycle test. As noted at proposal, this left unclear whether
technologies partially measureable over the 2-cycle test but generating
significant additional CO2 reductions in fact (as measured
by the 5-cycle test for example) could generate off-cycle credits. 76
FR 75024. As proposed, EPA would provide off-cycle credits for any
technologies that are added to a vehicle model that are demonstrated to
provide significant off-cycle CO2 reductions, like those on
the list. EPA includes technologies providing small reductions on the
2-cycle tests but additional significant reductions off-cycle. Thus, as
proposed, EPA is removing the ``not significantly measurable over the
2-cycle test'' criteria. The technology demonstration and step-by-step
application process is described in detail below in section
III.C.5.b.ii
As proposed, technologies included in EPA's assessment in this
rulemaking of technology for purposes of developing the standard would
not be allowed to generate off-cycle credits, as their cost and
effectiveness and expected use are already included in the assessment
of the standard (with the exception of stop start and active
[[Page 62836]]
aerodynamic improvements whose credits are included in determining the
appropriateness of the standards, and potential exception of high
efficiency alternators, as discussed in section II.F.) Also, as
proposed, technologies integral or inherent to the basic vehicle design
including engine, transmission, mass reduction, passive aerodynamic
design, and base tires will not be eligible for credits. For example,
manufacturers may not generate off-cycle credits by moving to an eight-
speed transmission. EPA continues to believe that it would be difficult
to clearly establish an appropriate A/B test (i.e., testing with and
without the technology) for technologies so integral to the basic
vehicle design. EPA is limiting the off-cycle program to technologies
that can be clearly identified as add-on technologies conducive to A/B
testing. Further, EPA will not provide credits for a technology
required to be used by Federal law, as EPA would consider such credits
to be windfall credits (i.e. not generated as a result of the rule).
The base versions of such technologies would be considered part of the
base vehicle. If a manufacturer demonstrates that an improvement to
such technologies provides additional off-cycle benefits above and
beyond a system meeting minimum Federal requirements, those incremental
improvements could be eligible for off-cycle credits, assuming an
appropriate quantification of credits is demonstrated. In addition, as
discussed in II.F above, the agencies are not providing off-cycle
credits potentially attributable to crash avoidance systems, safety
critical systems, or technologies that may reduce the frequency of
vehicle crashes.
EPA received a variety of comments on these aspects of the program.
Environmental groups were concerned that there could be double counting
of credits if a technology provided 2-cycle emissions reductions. As
noted above, only emissions reductions above and beyond those provided
over the 2-cycle test may be counted as off-cycle credits. The test
data provided by manufacturers, either 5-cycle or through the public
process described below, must be sufficient to allow EPA to determine
an incremental off-cycle benefit that is significantly greater than the
2-cycle benefit.
Global Automakers commented that eligibility for off-cycle credits
should not be limited to add-on technologies. They commented that
although it may be that making a credible demonstration of benefits for
some integral technologies will be difficult, that is no reason to deny
manufacturers the opportunity to do so. If EPA finds such a
demonstration to lack credibility, it would be able to deny the
manufacturer's credit request. Ford similarly commented that EPA should
work with manufacturers to develop methods to demonstrate integral
technologies that cannot be turned off or disabled such as advanced
combustion concepts, cam-less engines, variable compression ratio
engines, air/hydraulic micro hybrids/launch assist devices, and
advanced transmissions.
EPA continues to believe it is appropriate to not provide off-cycle
credits for technologies that are integral to basic vehicle design. EPA
continues to believe it would be very difficult to accurately parse out
the off-cycle benefits for some integral technologies such as engine
changes and transmission improvements. EPA is also concerned that
certain fundamental vehicle design elements may inherently provide
better CO2 performance and fuel economy under certain off-
cycle conditions than over the 2-cycle test. For example, a V-12 engine
may provide improved performance over the USO6 test cycle. EPA believes
it would be inappropriate to provide off-cycle credits in such
circumstances, as these benefits are inherent to the vehicle design
rather than to development in reaction to the off-cycle credit program.
EPA views such credits as windfalls. The intent of the off-cycle
provisions is to provide an incentive for CO2 and fuel
consumption reducing off-cycle technologies that would otherwise not be
developed because they do not offer a significant 2-cycle benefit.
Unlike off-cycle technologies that provide a small 2-cycle benefit and
significant 5-cycle benefits, 2-cycle technologies that are fundamental
to vehicle design would never generate additional 5-cycle reductions in
reaction to the off-cycle credit program. These reductions would occur
regardless, and thus are not appropriate for credits.
Global Automakers further commented on EPA's proposal that
technologies included in the agencies' standard-setting analysis may
not generate off-cycle credits (with the exception of active
aerodynamic devices and engine stop-start systems). EPA states that
allowing such credits for these technologies would amount to ``double-
counting'' of benefits. Global Automakers comment that there may emerge
by 2025 advanced levels for current technologies that are capable of
achieving greater benefits than current systems. Global Automakers
commented that if a manufacturer can demonstrate that an advanced
version of one of the technologies that is included in the standard-
setting analysis can achieve greater benefits than projected by the
agencies, and those benefits are not captured with the current test
procedure, there is no justification for excluding these technologies
from the off-cycle credit program.
Similarly, MEMA commented that there will very likely be future
technologies--in addition to stop/start and active aerodynamics--that
could result in both significant on-cycle and off-cycle benefits. MEMA
believes that these dual-benefit technologies should not be precluded
from consideration. For example, for any of the technologies that are
considered in setting the standard (in other words, baseline
technologies for the program), there could come a time when an on-cycle
technology may evolve and provide a significant off-cycle benefit.
In response to these comments, EPA remains concerned with double
counting issues if the program were to allow credits for technologies
that EPA has accounted for in establishing the level of the standards.
As with 2-cycle technologies which are fundamental to vehicle design,
EPA believes the use of these technologies will be driven by the
standards. As noted above, the fundamental purpose of the off-cycle
credit program is to provide incentive for manufacturers to develop new
technologies that provide significantly greater emissions reductions
off-cycle than over the 2-cycle test. Therefore, double counting and
windfall credits issues remain a concern for technologies EPA already
accounts for in establishing the standards and therefore expects
manufacturers to use widely to meet the standards. For these reasons,
as proposed, EPA is not allowing credits for technologies described in
Chapter 3 of the TSD.\562\
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\562\ With the exception of stop start and active aerodynamics
and the potential exception of high efficiency alternators, as
discussed in section II.F.
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As noted in the proposal, by removing the ``new, innovative, not
widespread use'' criteria initially established in the MY 2012-2016
rule, EPA is also making clear that once approved, EPA does not intend
to sunset a technology's credit eligibility or to deny credits to other
vehicle applications using the technology, as may have been implied by
those criteria under the MY 2012-2016 program. EPA believes, at this
time, that it should encourage the wider use of technologies with
legitimate off-cycle emissions benefits. See 76 FR 75024. Manufacturers
demonstrating through the EPA approval process that the technology is
effective on additional vehicle models would be eligible for
[[Page 62837]]
credits. Limiting the application of a technology or sunsetting the
availability of credits during the 2017-2025 time frame would be
counterproductive because it would remove part of the incentive for
manufacturers to invest in developing and deploying off-cycle
technologies, some of which may be promising but have considerable
development costs associated with them. Also, approving a technology
only to later disallow it could lead to a manufacturer discontinuing
the use of the technology even if it remained a cost effective way to
reduce emissions. EPA also believes that this approach provides an
incentive for manufacturers to continue to improve technologies without
concern that they will become ineligible for credits at some future
time.
EPA received comments from manufacturers and suppliers in general
support of not sunsetting the off-cycle credits program. EPA received
comments from CBD that ``the concept of allowing credit for the
installation of new and energy efficient technology that cannot be
measured by existing testing mechanisms is sound, as long as the
duration of the credit period is brief and provides no disincentive to
the implementation of other available features.'' The commenter did not
provide additional rationale as to why the credit period should be
brief. For the reasons described above, EPA continues to believe that
it is appropriate not to sunset credits for off-cycle technologies.
iii. Demonstrating Off-cycle Emissions Reductions
5-Cycle Testing
In those instances when a manufacturer is not using the default
credit value provided by the pre-defined menu, EPA is retaining a two-
tiered process for demonstrating the CO2 reductions of off-
cycle technologies, but is clarifying several of the requirements. The
process described below would be used for all credits not based on the
pre-defined list described in Section III.C.5.i, above.
The 5-cycle test procedures remain the starting point for
manufacturers to demonstrate off-cycle emissions reductions. The MY
2012-2016 rulemaking established general 5-cycle testing requirements
and EPA is finalizing several provisions to delineate what EPA expects
as part of a 5-cycle based demonstration. EPA has received and approved
one off-cycle credit application from a single manufacturer under the
5-cycle testing approach. Manufacturers requested clarification on the
amount of 5-cycle testing that would be needed to demonstrate off-cycle
credits, and EPA is finalizing the following as part of the step-by-
step methodology manufacturers would follow to seek approval of
credits. EPA is also finalizing a specific requirement that all
applications include an engineering analysis for how the technology
provides off-cycle emissions reductions.
As proposed, EPA is specifying that manufacturers would run an
initial set of three 5-cycle tests with and without the technology
providing the off-cycle CO2 reduction. Testing must be
conducted on a representative vehicle, selected using good engineering
judgment, for each vehicle test group. As proposed, manufacturers could
bundle off-cycle technologies together for testing in order to reduce
testing costs and to improve their ability to demonstrate consistently
measurable reductions over the tests. If these A/B 5-cycle tests
demonstrate an off-cycle benefit of 3 percent or greater, comparing
average test results with and without the off-cycle technology, the
manufacturer would be able to use the data as the basis for credits.
EPA has long used 3 percent as a threshold in fuel economy confirmatory
testing for determining if a manufacturer's fuel economy test results
are comparable to those run by EPA.\563\
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\563\ 40 CFR 600.008(b)(3).
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EPA proposed that if the initial three sets of 5-cycle results
demonstrate a reduction of less than a 3 percent difference in the 5-
cycle results with and without the off-cycle technology, the
manufacturer would have to run two additional 5-cycle tests with and
without the off-cycle technologies and verify the emission reduction
using the EPA Light-duty Simulation Tool described in Section II.F. See
76 FR 75024-25. If the simulation tool supports credits that are less
than 3 percent of the baseline 2-cycle emissions, then EPA would
approve the credits based on the test results. EPA received comments
from manufacturers that the additional 5-cycle testing would be
burdensome and be unlikely to yield significantly different results.
EPA also received comment that the use of the simulation tool should
not be required, as it may not be appropriate for some applications.
After reviewing the comments, EPA is not adopting an automatic
triggering of the additional testing (i.e., the additional two sets of
5-cycle tests) and use of the vehicle simulation tool to verify
credits. EPA agrees that there may be instances where additional test
data is unnecessary. Instead, EPA will have the discretion to request
additional testing in cases where the agency determines that the
additional test would provide useful data in verifying credit levels.
Further, EPA is not requiring manufacturers to use the EPA simulation
tool, but EPA may use the simulation tool as a check to help verify the
level of credits as part of the credit approval process. EPA is
adopting the requirement for the initial three sets of 5-cycle testing
as proposed. As outlined below, credits based on this methodology would
be subject to a 60 day EPA review period starting when EPA receives a
complete application, and this process based on 5-cycle testing would
not include a public review.
EPA received comments that in many cases technologies would
reasonably be expected to have no impact on certain test cycles. For
example, cold weather technologies would be expected to have no impact
on the SCO3 cycle. In these cases, it would be wasteful to require
multiple tests for cycles that are not relevant and have no impact on
the credits determination. EPA agrees with these comments and will
allow manufacturers to submit an engineering analysis demonstrating
that the technology has no effect (either positive or negative) on
emissions for one or more of the 5-cycle tests. If EPA concurs with the
manufacturer's engineering analysis, the manufacturer must submit only
one test result for that test cycle, either with or without the off-
cycle technology. The value will be held constant and used for all of
the 5-cycle weighting calculations. If EPA does not agree with the
manufacturer's determination and believes that the test cycles are
relevant, EPA may request that the manufacturer conduct the testing and
provide the test data.
EPA also received comment from Center for Biological Diversity
disagreeing with the agencies' suggestion that even more off-cycle
credits should be allowed, without any rulemaking, if some unspecified
data supports them. In response, EPA has specified in the final rule
(and in fact, in the proposal (76 FR 75024/3)), the data needed under
the 5-cycle approach. Manufacturers may generate credits beyond the
conservative credit values provided on the pre-defined list only if
they provide the required vehicle specific test data supporting the
credit application. This is a case by case application process by a
manufacturer, and this type of adjudicative process does not require a
rulemaking procedure. As discussed below, EPA has included a public
review and comment process in cases where manufacturers develop non 5-
cycle demonstrations.
[[Page 62838]]
EPA believes this process will provide opportunity for public review
and comment.
Demonstrations not Based on 5-Cycle Testing
In cases where the benefit of a technological approach to reducing
CO2 emissions cannot be adequately represented using 5-cycle
testing, manufacturers will need to develop test procedures and
analytical approaches to estimate the effectiveness of the technology
for the purpose of generating credits. These provisions were
established as part of the MY 2012-2016 program. See 75 FR 25440. No
applications under these provisions have been received to date. EPA did
not propose to make significant changes to this aspect of the program.
If the specific technology being considered by the manufacturer does
not demonstrate emissions reductions over the 5-cycle tests (i.e., the
5-cycle tests do not capture the specific real-world reductions of the
technology), then an alternative approach may be developed by the
manufacturer and submitted to EPA for evaluation and approval. The
demonstration program must be robust, verifiable, and capable of
demonstrating the real-world emissions benefit of the technology with
strong statistical significance. The methodology developed and
submitted to EPA would be subject to public review as explained at 75
FR 25440 and in 86.1866 (d)(2)(ii). Because these applications involve
a public comment opportunity, the EPA review period would be longer
than 60 days.
EPA has identified two general situations where manufacturers would
need to develop their own demonstration methodology. The first is a
situation where the technology is active only during certain operating
conditions that are not represented by any of the 5-cycle tests. To
determine the overall emissions reductions, manufacturers must
determine not only the emissions impacts during operation but also
real-world activity data to determine how often the technology is
utilized during actual, in-use driving on average across the fleet. EPA
has identified some of these types of technologies and has calculated a
default credit for them, including items such as high efficiency (e.g.,
LED) lights and solar panels on hybrids. See Table III-19 above. In
their demonstrations, manufacturers may be able to apply the same type
of methodologies used by EPA as a basis for these default values (see
TSD Chapter 5).
The second type of situation where manufacturers would need to
develop their own demonstration data would be for technologies that
involve action by the driver to make the technology effective in
reducing CO2 emissions. EPA believes that driver interactive
technologies face the highest demonstration hurdle because
manufacturers would need to provide actual real-world usage data on
driver response rates. Such technologies would include ``eco buttons''
where the driver has the option of selecting more fuel efficient
operating modes, and traffic mitigation systems. EPA believes that data
would need to be from instrumented vehicle studies and not through
driver surveys where results may be influenced by the driver's failure
to accurately recall their response behavior. Systems such as OnStar
could be one promising way to collect driver response data if they are
designed to do so. Manufacturers might have to design extensive on-road
test programs. Any such on-road testing programs would need to be
statistically robust and based on average U.S. driving conditions,
factoring in differences in geography, climate, and driving behavior
across the U.S.
Several manufacturers expressed interested in credit opportunities
based on eco driving modes and other driver interactive technologies,
as discussed in Section II.F. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
commented that eco driving technologies are not sufficiently defined
for the Alliance to propose specific credit definitions and criteria at
this time, but the industry hopes that it can work with the agencies in
the future to create off-cycle credits for these technologies.
Commenters encouraged the agencies to consider alternative
demonstration pathways and that they look forward to working with the
agencies to develop new methodologies. Some manufacturers commented
that the non 5-cycle credit pathway remains unclear. In response, EPA
continues to believe that the data needed for demonstrating non 5-cycle
technologies will likely be highly specific to the candidate technology
and does not believe that it is practical to attempt to provide more
specificity to the testing and data requirements at this time. EPA
plans to work with manufacturers interested in pursuing credits under
the non 5-cycle pathway. Upon request, EPA will informally review a
manufacturer's planned methodology in coordination with NHTSA early in
the process prior to the manufacturer undertaking testing and/or data
gathering efforts in support of their application. This informal review
would occur prior to the manufacturer submitting a formal application
(and therefore would not include a public review process).
iv. In-use Emissions Requirements
EPA requires off-cycle components to be durable in-use and
continues to believe that this is an important aspect of the program.
See 86.1866-12(d)(1)(iii). The technologies upon which the credits are
based are subject to full useful life compliance provisions, as with
other emissions controls. Unless the manufacturer can demonstrate that
the technology would not be subject to in-use deterioration over the
useful life of the vehicle, the manufacturer must account for
deterioration in the estimation of the credits in order to ensure that
the credits are based on real in-use emissions reductions over the life
of the vehicle. In-use requirements apply to technologies generating
credits based on the pre-defined list as well as to those based on a
manufacturer's demonstration.
Prior to proposal, manufacturers requested clarification of these
provisions and guidance on how to demonstrate in-use performance. As
discussed in the proposal, EPA is clarifying that off-cycle
technologies are considered emissions related components and all in-use
requirements apply including defect reporting, warranty, and recall.
See 76 FR 75026. OBD requirements do not apply under either the MY
2012-2016 or MY 2017 and later program and EPA did not propose any OBD
requirements for off-cycle technologies. Manufacturers may establish
maintenance intervals for these components in the same way they would
for other emissions related components. The performance of these
components would be considered in determining compliance with the
applicable in-use CO2 standards. Manufacturers may
demonstrate in-use emissions durability at time of certification by
submitting an engineering analysis describing why the technology is
durable and expected to last for the full useful life of the vehicle.
This demonstration may also include component durability testing or
through whole vehicle aging if the manufacturer has such data. The
demonstration will be subject to EPA approval prior to credits being
awarded.\564\ EPA believes these provisions are important to ensure
that promised emissions reductions and fuel economy benefit to the
consumer are delivered in-use.
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\564\ Listed technologies are pre-approved assuming the
manufacturer demonstrates durability.
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EPA received one comment requesting clarification regarding when
[[Page 62839]]
durability testing must be conducted. The commenter recommended that
manufacturers have the flexibility to conduct durability testing during
the model year in which credits would be generated, rather than being
required to submit the data before the beginning of the model year,
since credits are not actually awarded by EPA to the manufacturer until
the end of the model year. EPA believes this is a reasonable approach
and is clarifying in the regulations that manufacturers may submit data
during the model year in which credits would be generated (Sec.
86.1869-12). EPA will review the data as part of the end of year credit
review and approval process. EPA notes that data submitted late in the
model year may delay the end of year review and approval of credits.
v. Step-by-Step EPA Review Process
As proposed, EPA is finalizing a step-by-step process and timeline
for reviewing credit applications and providing a decision to
manufacturers. EPA proposed and is finalizing these clarifications and
further detailed step-by-step instructions for new MY 2012-2016 credits
as well as for MY 2017-2025. EPA believes these additional details are
consistent with the general off-cycle requirements adopted in the MY
2012-2016 rule. As discussed above, starting in MY 2014, manufacturers
may generate credits using a pre-defined technology list, and these
technologies would not be required to go through the approval process
described below.
Step 1: Manufacturer Conducts Testing and Prepares Application
5-cycle--Manufacturers would conduct the three sets of A/B
5-cycle testing as described above
Non 5-cycle--Manufacturers would develop a methodology for
non 5-cycle based demonstration and carry-out necessary testing and
analysis
[cir] Manufacturers may opt to meet with EPA to discuss their plans
for demonstrating technologies and seek EPA input prior to conducting
testing or analysis
Manufacturers conduct engineering analysis and/or testing
to demonstrate in-use durability
Step 2: Manufacturer Submits Application
The manufacturer application must contain the following:
Description of the off-cycle technologies and engineering
analysis of how they function to reduce off-cycle emissions
The vehicle models on which the technology will be applied
Test vehicles selection and supporting engineering
analysis for their selection
Required three sets of A/B 5-cycle test data
An estimate of off-cycle credits by vehicle model, and
fleetwide based on projected vehicle sales
Engineering analysis and/or component durability testing
or whole vehicle test data (as necessary) demonstrating in-use
durability of components
For credits not based on 5-cycle testing, all of the above
with the exception of 5-cycle data, plus a complete description of
methodology used to estimate credits and supporting data (vehicle test
data and activity data)
[cir] Manufacturer may seek EPA input on methodology prior to
conducting testing or analysis
Step 3: EPA Review
Once EPA receives an application:
EPA will review the application for completeness and
within 30 days will notify the manufacturer if additional information
or data is needed
EPA will review the data and information provided to
determine if the application supports the level of credits estimated by
the manufacturers
EPA will consult with NHTSA on the application and the
data received in cases where the manufacturer intends to generate fuel
consumption improvement values for CAFE in MY 2017 and later
For 5-cycle based credits:
[cir] EPA may request additional sets of A/B 5-cycle test data
where there is less than a three percent difference in A/B 5-cycle test
results
[cir] EPA may conduct vehicle simulation tool analysis for
candidate technology where there is less than a three percent
difference in A/B 5-cycle test results
For non 5-cycle based credits:
[cir] EPA will make the applications available to the public within
60 days of receiving a complete application
[cir] The public review period will be 30 day review of the
methodology used by the manufacturer to estimate credits, during which
time the public may submit comments.
[cir] Manufacturers may submit a written rebuttal of comments for
EPA consideration or may revise their application in response to
comments following the end of the public review period.
Step 4: EPA Decision
For 5-cycle based credits, EPA, after consultation with
NHTSA in cases where the manufacturer intends to generate fuel
consumption improvement values for CAFE in MY 2017 and later, will
notify the manufacturer of its decision within 60 days of receiving a
complete application
For non 5-cycle based applications where the rule does
specify public participation and review, EPA will notify the
manufacturer of its decision on the application after reviewing public
comments.
EPA will notify manufacturers in writing of its decision
to approve or deny the credits application, and provide a written
explanation for its action (supported by the administrative record for
the application proceeding)
EPA received one comment that it is unclear from the proposal
language whether the approval process will be completed and credits
will be available in the same year the automaker provides data and
requests approval for new off-cycle technologies. In response, EPA
clarifies that submitting an application for off-cycle technologies is
viewed as independent from the certification application process and
off-cycle applications are not required to be submitted prior to the
beginning of the model year. EPA has laid out its expectations
regarding the timing of its review of credit applications. The specific
timing of when credits are awarded will depend on when the agency
receives a complete application and has concluded its review. If a
manufacturer submits an application late in the model year, the
approval process might not be concluded until after the end of the
model year. Credits would not be available for use by the manufacturer
until the application process has been concluded and credits have been
verified. However, manufacturers would generate credits for the model
year that has concluded for each vehicle built with the off-cycle
technology, as long as the application is submitted prior to the end of
the model year.
c. Off-cycle Technology Fuel Consumption Improvement Values in the CAFE
Program
As proposed, EPA in coordination with NHTSA, will allow
manufacturers to generate fuel consumption improvement values
equivalent to CO2 off-cycle credits for use in the CAFE
program. The CAFE improvement value for off-cycle improvements will be
determined at the fleet level by converting the CO2 credits
determined under the EPA program (in metric tons of CO2) for
each fleet (car and truck) to a fleet fuel consumption improvement
value. This improvement value would
[[Page 62840]]
then be used to adjust the fleet's CAFE level upward. See the
regulations at 40 CFR 600.510-12. Note that while the following table
presents fuel consumption values equivalent to a given CO2
credit value, these consumption values are presented for informational
purposes and are not meant to imply that these values will be used to
determine the fuel economy for individual vehicles. For off-cycle
CO2 credits not based on the list, manufacturers must go
though the steps described above in Section III.C.5.b. Again, all off-
cycle CO2 credits would be converted to a gallons-per-mile
fuel consumption improvement value at a fleet level for purposes of the
CAFE program. EPA would approve credit generation, and corresponding
equivalent fuel consumption improvement values, in consultation with
NHTSA.
Table III-20--Fuel Consumption Improvement Values Equivalent to CO2 Off-
cycle Credits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credit for Cars Credit for Light
Technology gallons/mi Trucks gallons/mi
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Efficiency Exterior 0.000113.......... 0.000113
Lighting (at 100W).
Waste Heat Recovery (per 100W; 0.000079.......... 0.000079
scalable).
Solar Roof Panels (for 75 W, 0.000372.......... 0.000372
battery charging only).
Solar Roof Panels (for 75 W, 0.000282.......... 0.000282
active cabin ventilation plus
battery charging).
Active Aerodynamic Improvements 0.000068.......... 0.000113
(scalable).
Engine Idle Start-Stop w/heater 0.000282.......... 0.000496
circulation system.
Engine Idle Start-Stop without/ 0.000169.......... 0.000327
heater circulation system.
Active Transmission Warm-Up..... 0.000169.......... 0.000361
Active Engine Warm-Up........... 0.000169.......... 0.000361
Solar/Thermal Control........... Up to 0.000338.... Up to 0.000484
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturers commented in support of providing equivalent fuel
consumption improvement values for off-cycle technologies under the
CAFE program, supporting the harmonization of the GHG and CAFE programs
to the maximum extent possible. EPA and NHTSA also received comments
that fuel consumption improvement values based on the pre-defined list
should be available for CAFE in the MY 2012-2016 program. As discussed
above, EPA is allowing credits toward the GHG standards to be generated
based on the list in MY 2014. EPA believes that this is appropriate
because it is a modification to an existing off-cycle credits program,
which reduces manufacturer testing associated with the program. In
contrast, CAFE does not contain an off-cycle program for MY 2012-2016.
NHTSA did not take such credits into account when adopting the CAFE
standards for those model years. As such extending the credit program
to the CAFE program for those model years would not be appropriate.
D. Technical Assessment of the CO2 Standards
The CO2 standards in this rule are based on the need to
obtain significant GHG emissions reductions from the transportation
sector, and the recognition that there are cost-effective technologies
available in this timeframe to achieve such reductions for MY 2017-2025
light duty vehicles. As in many prior mobile source rulemakings, the
decision on what standard to set is largely based on the effectiveness
of the emissions control technology, the cost and other impacts of
implementing the technology, and the lead time needed for manufacturers
to employ the control technology. The standards derived from assessing
these factors are also evaluated in terms of the need for reductions of
greenhouse gases, the degree of reductions achieved by the standards,
and the impacts of the standards in terms of costs, quantified
benefits, and other impacts of the standards. The availability of
technology to achieve reductions and the cost and other aspects of this
technology are therefore a central focus of this rulemaking.
As described in the proposal, EPA is taking the same basic approach
in this rulemaking as that taken in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking and
evaluating emissions control technologies which reduce CO2
and other greenhouse gases. CO2 emissions from automobiles
are largely the product of fuel combustion. Vehicles combust fuel to
perform two basic functions: 1) to transport the vehicle, its
passengers and its contents (and any towed loads), and 2) to operate
various accessories during the operation of the vehicle such as the air
conditioner. Technology can reduce CO2 emissions by either
making more efficient use of the energy that is produced through
combustion of the fuel or reducing the energy needed to perform either
of these functions.
This focus on efficiency calls for looking at the vehicle as an
entire system, and as in the MYs 2012-2016 rule, the final standards
reflect this basic paradigm. In addition to fuel delivery, combustion,
and aftertreatment technology, any aspect of the vehicle that affects
the consumption of energy must also be considered. For example, the
efficiency of the transmission system, which transmits mechanical
energy from the engine to the wheels, and the rolling resistance of the
tires both have major impacts on the amount of energy that is consumed
while operating the vehicle. The braking system, the aerodynamics of
the vehicle, and the efficiency of accessories, such as the air
conditioner, also affect energy consumption. The mass of the vehicle
also has a significant impact on its energy consumption.\565\
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\565\ Like other vehicular greenhouse gas control technologies,
the agencies' joint analysis of mass reduction is discussed in TSD
3.
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In evaluating vehicle efficiency, EPA's analysis preserves all
existing vehicle utility. That is, in evaluating available technologies
and potential compliance pathways, we preserve vehicle utility and thus
do not consider fundamental changes in vehicles' utility.\566\ For
example, we did not evaluate converting minivans and SUVs to station
wagons, converting vehicles with four wheel drive to two wheel drive,
or reducing headroom in order to lower the roofline and reduce
aerodynamic drag. We have limited our assessment of technical
feasibility and resultant vehicle cost to technologies which maintain
vehicle utility as much as possible (and, in our assessment of the
costs of the rule, included the costs to manufacturers of preserving
vehicle utility).
[[Page 62841]]
Manufacturers may decide to alter the utility of the vehicles which
they sell, but this would not be a consequence of the rule but rather a
matter of automaker choice.
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\566\ EPA recognizes that electric vehicles, a technology
considered in this analysis, have unique attributes and discusses
these considerations in Section III.H.1.b. There is also a fuller
discussion of the utility of Atkinson engine hybrid vehicles in EPA
RIA Chapter 1.
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The Center for Biological Diversity commented that ``[t]he Agencies
have selected standards that value purported consumer choice and the
continued production of every vehicle in its current form over the need
to conserve energy: as soon as increased fuel efficiency begins to
affect any attribute of any existing vehicle, stringency increases
cease. That is clearly impermissible and contrary to Congressional
purpose.'' (CBD Comments p. 4). The commenter is mistaken. In
evaluating the costs of the rule, the agencies have included costs to
preserve vehicle utility but certainly have not ``ceased * * *
increases in stringency'' in the face of those costs. Indeed, were the
commenter correct, the standards for cars and trucks would not increase
in stringency each model year. Moreover, ``if CBD is advocating a
radical reshifting of domestic fleet composition (such as requiring
U.S. consumers to purchase much smaller vehicles and requiring U.S.
consumers to purchase vehicles with manual transmissions), it is
sufficient to say that standards forcing such a result are not
compelled under section 202(a), where reasonable preservation of
consumer choice remains a pertinent factor for EPA to consider in
balancing the relevant statutory factors.'' 75 FR 25467 (May 7, 2010).
The agencies' approach also makes evident common sense. If vehicles
subject to these standards lack the utility that consumers desire, the
vehicles will not be purchased and the ultimate goals of decreased GHG
emissions and energy conservation will be derogated rather than
furthered. See also International Harvester v. EPA, 478 F. 2d 615, 640
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (EPA required to consider issues of basic demand for
passenger vehicles in making technical feasibility and lead time
determinations). Consequently, EPA believes this comment to be
misplaced and incorrect.
This need to focus on the efficient use of energy by the vehicle as
a system leads to a broad focus on a wide variety of technologies that
affect vehicle design. As discussed below, there are many technologies
that are currently available which can reduce vehicle energy
consumption. Several of these are advanced technologies and are already
being commercially utilized to a limited degree in the current light-
duty fleet. Examples include hybrid technologies that use high
efficiency batteries and electric motors in combination with or instead
of internal combustion engines, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and
battery-electric vehicles. While already commercialized, these
technologies continue to be developed and offer the potential for even
more significant efficiency improvements. There are also other advanced
technologies under development and not yet on production vehicles, such
as 24 and 27 bar BMEP engines with cooled EGR, which offer the
potential to move gasoline combustion efficiency closer to its
thermodynamic limit. In addition, the available technologies are not
limited to powertrain improvements but also include a number of
technologies that are expected to continually improve incrementally,
such as engine friction reduction, tire rolling resistance reduction,
mass reduction, electrical system efficiencies, and aerodynamic
improvements.
The large number of possible technologies to consider and the
breadth of vehicle systems that are affected mean that consideration of
the manufacturer's design, product development and manufacturing
process plays a major role in developing the final standards. Vehicle
manufacturers typically develop many different models based on a
limited number of vehicle platforms. The platform typically consists of
a common set of vehicle architecture and structural components.\567\
This allows for efficient use of design and manufacturing resources.
Given the very large investment put into designing and producing each
vehicle model, manufacturers typically plan on a major redesign for the
models approximately every 5 years.\568\ At the redesign stage, the
manufacturer will upgrade or add all of the technology and make most
other changes supporting the manufacturer's plans for the next several
years, including plans to comply with emissions, fuel economy, and
safety regulations.\569\ This redesign often involves significant
engineering, development, manufacturing, and marketing resources to
create a new product with multiple new features. In order to leverage
this significant upfront investment, manufacturers plan vehicle
redesigns with several model years' of production in mind. Vehicle
models are not completely static between redesigns as limited changes
are often incorporated for each model year. This interim process is
called a ``refresh'' of the vehicle and generally does not allow for
major technology changes although more minor ones can be done (e.g.,
small aerodynamic improvements, valve timing improvements, etc). More
major technology upgrades that affect multiple systems of the vehicle
thus occur at the vehicle redesign stage and not in the time period
between redesigns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\567\ Examples of shared vehicle platforms include the Ford
Taurus and Ford Explorer, or the Chrysler Sebring/200 and Dodge
Journey.
\568\ See TSD Chapter 3; see also 75 FR 25467 (May 7, 2010).
\569\ TSD 3 discusses redesign schedules in greater detail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This final rule affects nine years of vehicle production, model
years 2017-2025.\570\ Given the five year redesign cycle, many vehicles
will be redesigned three times between MY 2012 and MY 2025 and are
expected to be redesigned twice during the 2017-2025 timeframe. Due to
the relatively long lead time before 2017, there are fewer lead time
concerns with regard to product redesign in this final rule than with
the MYs 2012-2016 rule (or the MY 2014-2018 rule for heavy duty
vehicles and engines). However, there are still some technologies that
require significant lead time, and are not projected to be heavily
utilized in the first years of this final rule. An example is the
advanced 24 and 27 bar BMEP, cooled EGR engines. Although a number of
demonstration projects have been completed, these engines are not yet
in production vehicles today, and a further research and development
period is required (as discussed in Chapter 3 of the joint TSD).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\570\ In absence of additional EPA action, the MY 2025 standard
would continue indefinitely for later model years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA's technical assessment of the final MY2017-2025 standards is
described below. EPA has also evaluated a set of alternative standards
for these model years, two of which are more stringent and two of which
are less stringent than the promulgated standards. The technical
assessment of these alternative standards in relation to the final
standards is discussed at the end of this section.
Evaluating the appropriateness of these standards includes a core
focus on identifying available technologies and assessing their
effectiveness, cost, and impact on relevant aspects of vehicle
performance and utility. The wide number of technologies which are
available and likely to be used in combination requires a sophisticated
assessment of their combined cost and effectiveness. An important
factor is also the degree that these technologies are already being
used in the current vehicle fleet and thus, unavailable for use to
reduce GHGs beyond current levels. Finally, we consider the challenge
for manufacturers to design
[[Page 62842]]
the technology into their products within the constraints of the
redesign cycles, and the appropriate lead time needed to employ the
technology over the product line of the industry.
Applying these technologies efficiently to the wide range of
vehicles produced by various manufacturers is a challenging task
involving dozens of technologies and hundreds of vehicle platforms. In
order to assist in this task, as in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, EPA
is again using a computerized program called the Optimization Model for
reducing Emissions of Greenhouse gases from Automobiles (OMEGA). No
comments were received on the use of the OMEGA model. Broadly, OMEGA
starts with a description of the future vehicle fleet (i.e. the
`reference fleet'; see section II.B above),\571\ including
manufacturer, sales, base CO2 emissions, footprint and the
extent to which emission control technologies are already employed. For
the purpose of this analysis, EPA uses OMEGA to analyze over 200
vehicle platforms comprising approximately 1300 vehicle models in order
to capture the important differences in vehicle utility and engine
design among future vehicles with sales of roughly 15-17 million units
annually in the MYs 2017-2025 timeframe. The model is then provided
with a list of technologies, or packages of technologies, which are
applicable to various types of vehicles, along with the technologies'
cost and effectiveness, and an upper limit for the percentage of
vehicle sales that can receive each technology during the redesign
cycle or cycles of interest. The model combines this information with
economic parameters, such as fuel prices and a discount rate, to
project how various manufacturers would apply the available technology
in order to meet increasing levels of emission control. The result is a
description of which technologies are added to each vehicle platform,
along with the resulting cost. Although OMEGA can apply technologies
that reduce GHG emissions related to air conditioning efficiency
improvements and reduction of refrigerant leakage this task is
currently handled outside of the OMEGA model. A/C improvements are
relatively cost-effective, and we reasonably project that they would
always be added to vehicles by the model. We thus simply added
projected A/C improvements into the results at the projected
penetration levels. The model can also be set to account for the
various final compliance flexibilities (and to accommodate compliance
flexibilities in general) and was set to account for some of the off-
cycle and full size pickup credits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\571\ Note that we worked with two ``baseline'' fleets in this
analysis--the 2008 based fleet projection and the 2010 based fleet
projection--and used the 2008 based fleet projection to analyze our
primary case (i.e., the final standards). For alternative standards
and sensitivities, as discussed later in this section and in Chapter
10 of EPA's RIA, we have presented results for the 2010 based fleet
projections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The remainder of this section describes the technical feasibility
analysis in greater detail. Section III.D.1 describes the development
of our reference and control case projections of the MY 2017-2025
fleet. Section III.D.2 describes our estimates of the effectiveness and
cost of the control technologies available for application in the 2017-
2025 timeframe. Section III.D.3 describes how these technologies are
combined into packages that are likely to be applied by manufacturers
to comply with the standards. In this section, the overall
effectiveness of the technology packages vis-[agrave]-vis their
effectiveness when adopted individually is described. Section III.D.4
describes EPA's OMEGA model and its approach to estimating how
manufacturers will add technology to their vehicles in order to comply
with potential CO2 emission standards. Section III.0
presents the results of the OMEGA modeling, namely the level of
technology added to manufacturers' vehicles and the cost of adding that
technology. Section III.D.6 discusses the appropriateness of the final
standards in relation to the alternative standards of greater and
lesser stringency which we analyzed. Further technical detail on all of
these issues can be found in EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis.
1. How did EPA develop reference and control fleets for evaluating
standards?
In order to calculate the impacts of this final rule, it is
necessary to project the GHG emissions characteristics of the future
vehicle fleet absent the final regulation. As discussed in Preamble I,
for this final rulemaking, EPA has analyzed the costs and benefits of
the standards using two different scenarios of the baseline fleet and
future fleet projections. EPA is presenting its primary analysis of the
standards using essentially the same baseline/future fleet projection
that was used in the NPRM (i.e., based on the MY 2008 baseline fleet,
AEO2011 interim projection of future fleet sales volume, and the future
fleet forecast conducted by CSM).\572\ EPA also conducted an
alternative analysis of the standards based on MY2010 based fleet
projection using a 2010 baseline fleet, an updated AEO 2012 (early
release) projections of the future fleet sales volumes, and an
alternative forecast of the future fleet mix projections to 2025
conducted by LMC Automotive (formerly J.D. Powers Automotive). EPA is
presenting the 2008 baseline fleet and CSM future fleet forecast for
its primary analysis based on a number of factors as described in
Section I.C of the preamble. A detailed sensitivity analysis of the
standards using the MY 2010 based fleet projection is contained in EPA
RIA Chapter 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\572\ As explained in detail in section 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.1 of the
joint TSD, there are minor changes from proposal in the 2008 MY
fleet-based reference fleet. Namely, there are minor corrections to
some of the footprint data used, which on average, slightly reduced
the footprint of the fleet. In aggregate, incorporating these
changes resulted in practically no change from the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA and NHTSA develop this projection of the future vehicle fleet
using a three step process. (1) Develop a set of detailed vehicle
characteristics and sales for a specific model year (in this case,
2008). This is called the baseline fleet. (2) Adjust the sales of this
baseline fleet using projections made by the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) and CSM to account for projected sales volumes in
future MYs absent future regulation.\573\ (3) Apply fuel saving and
emission control technology to these vehicles to the extent necessary
for manufacturers to comply with the existing 2016 standards and the
final standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\573\ See generally Chapter 1 of the Joint TSD for details on
development of the baseline fleet, and Section III.H.1 for a
discussion of the potential sales impacts of this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the analyzed fleet differs from the MY 2008 baseline fleet in
both the level of technology utilized and in terms of the sales of any
particular vehicle. A similar method is used to analyze both reference
(which assume that the MY 2016 standards are maintained indefinitely)
and the control cases, with the major distinction being the stringency
of the standards.
EPA and NHTSA perform steps one and two above in an identical
manner. The development of the characteristics of the baseline 2008
fleet and the sales adjustment to match AEO and CSM forecasts is
described in Section II.B above and in greater detail in Chapter 1 of
the joint TSD. The two agencies perform step three in a conceptually
identical manner, but each agency utilizes its own vehicle technology
and emission model to project the technology needed to comply with the
reference and final standards. Further, each agency evaluates its own
final and MY 2016 standards; neither NHTSA nor
[[Page 62843]]
EPA evaluated the other agency's standard in this final rule.\574\ The
models employed by the two agencies are distinct due to the differences
in the statutory requirements of the two agencies (as discussed in
Section I of the preamble).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\574\ While the MY 2012-2016 standards are largely similar, some
important differences remain. See 75 FR 25342
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The use of MY 2008 vehicles \575\ in our fleet projections includes
vehicle models which already have or will be discontinued by the time
this rule takes effect and will be replaced by more advanced vehicle
models. However, we believe that the use of MY 2008 vehicle designs is
reasonable for this final rule.\576\ With regard to the issue of which
models are included, we note that the designs of MYs 2017-2025 vehicles
at the level of detail required for emission and cost modeling are not
publically available, and in many cases, do not yet exist. Even
confidential descriptions of these vehicle designs provided by
manufacturers are usually not of sufficient detail to facilitate the
level of technology and emission modeling performed by both agencies.
Second, steps two and three of the process used to create the reference
case fleet adjust both the sales and technology of the 2008 vehicles.
Thus, our reference fleet reflects the extent that completely new
vehicles are expected to shift the light duty vehicle market in terms
of both segment and manufacturer. Also, by adding technology to
facilitate compliance with the MY 2016 standards, we account for the
vast majority of ways in which these new vehicles will differ from
their older counterparts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\575\ While this discussion focuses on MY 2008 vehicles, the
same concepts apply the MY 2010 based fleet projection.
\576\ See section I.C concerning the selection of MY 2008 as an
appropriate baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Reference Fleet Scenario Modeled
In this final rule, EPA is assuming, based on the following
rationale and as in the proposal, that in the absence of more stringent
GHG and CAFE standards, the reference case fleet in MY 2017-2025 would
have fleetwide GHG emissions performance equal to that necessary to
meet the MY 2016 standards.
One critical factor supporting the final approach is that AEO2012
Early Release projects relatively stable gasoline prices over the next
13 years. The average actual price in the U.S. for the first four
months of 2012 for regular gasoline was $3.68 per gallon \577\ with
prices approaching $4.00 in March and April.\578\ The AEO2012 Early
Release reference case projects the regular gasoline price to be $3.87
per gallon in 2025, only slightly higher than the price for the first
four months of 2012.\579\ Accordingly, the reference fleet for MYs
2017-2025 reflects constant GHG emission standards (i.e. the MY 2016
standards continuing to apply in each of those model years), and
gasoline prices only slightly higher than today's gasoline prices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\577\ In 2012 dollars. As 2012 is not yet complete, we are not
relating this value to 2010 dollars. See RIA 1 for additional
details on the conversion between dollar years.
\578\ http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/ and click on
``full history'' for weekly regular gasoline prices through May 7,
2012, last accessed on May 8, 2012.
\579\ http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/ last accessed on May
8, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed at proposal, these are reasonable assumptions to make
for a reference case. See 76 FR 75030-31. EPA has reviewed the
historical record for similar periods when there were relatively stable
fuel economy standards and gasoline prices. EPA maintains, and
publishes every year, the authoritative reference on new light-duty
vehicle CO2 emissions and fuel economy.\580\ This report
contains very detailed data from MYs 1975-2011. There was an extended
18-year period from 1986 through 2003 during which CAFE standards were
essentially unchanged,\581\ and gasoline prices were relatively stable
and remained below $1.50 per gallon for almost the entire period. The
1975-1985 and 2004-2011 timeframes are not relevant in this regard due
to either rising gasoline prices, rising CAFE standards, or both. Thus,
the 1986-2003 timeframe is analogous to the period out to MY 2025
during which AEO projects relatively stable gasoline prices. EPA staff
have analyzed the fuel economy trends data from the 1986-2003 timeframe
(during which CAFE standards did not vary by footprint) and have drawn
three conclusions: (1) There was a small, industry average over-
compliance with CAFE on the order of 1-2 mpg or 3-4%, (2) almost all of
this industry-wide over-compliance was from 3 companies (Toyota, Honda,
and Nissan) that routinely over-complied with the universal (i.e., non-
footprint based) CAFE standards simply because they produced smaller
and lighter vehicles relative to the industry average, and (3) full
line car and truck manufacturers, such as General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler, which produced larger and heavier vehicles relative to the
industry average and which were constrained by the universal CAFE
standards, rarely over-complied during the entire 18-year period.\582\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\580\ Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 through 2011, March 2012,
available at www.epa.gov/otaq/fetrends.htm.
\581\ There are no EPA LD GHG emissions regulations prior to MY
2012.
\582\ See Regulatory Impact Analysis, Chapter 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the MYs 2012-2016 standards are footprint-based, every major
manufacturer is expected to be constrained by the new standards in
2016, and manufacturers of small vehicles will not routinely over-
comply as they had with the past universal CAFE standards.\583\ Thus,
the historical evidence and the footprint-based design of the MY 2016
GHG emissions and CAFE standards strongly support the use of a
reference case fleet where there are no further fuel economy
improvements beyond those required by the MY 2016 standards. There are
additional factors that reinforce the historical evidence. While it is
possible that one or two companies may over-comply, any voluntary over-
compliance by one company would generate credits that could be sold to
other companies to substitute for their more expensive compliance
technologies. This ability to buy and sell credits could eliminate any
over-compliance for the overall fleet.\584\ NHTSA (for the proposal)
also evaluated EIA assumptions and inputs employed in the version of
NEMS used to support AEO 2011 and found, based on this analysis, that
when fuel economy standards were held constant after MY 2016, EIA
appears to forecast market-driven levels of over- and under-compliance
generally consistent with a CAFE model analysis using a flat, 2016-
based reference case fleet. From a market driven perspective, while
there is considerable evidence that many consumers now care more about
fuel economy than in past decades, the MY 2016 compliance level is
projected to be several mpg higher than that being achieved in the
market today.\585\ On the other hand, some manufacturers have already
announced plans to introduce technology well beyond that required by
[[Page 62844]]
the MY 2016 GHG standards.\586\ However, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to separate future fuel economy improvements made for
marketing purposes from those designed to efficiently plan for
compliance with anticipated future CAFE or CO2 emission
standards (e.g., some manufacturers may have made public statements
about higher mpg levels in the future in part because of the
expectation of higher future standards).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\583\ With the notable exception of manufacturers who only
market electric vehicles or other limited product lines.
\584\ Oates, Wallace E., Paul R. Portney, and Albert M.
McGartland. ``The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation: A Case
Study of Environmental Standard Setting.'' American Economic Review
79(5) (December 1989): 1233-1242.
\585\ The average, fleetwide ``laboratory'' or ``unadjusted''
fuel economy value for MY 2011 is 28.6 mpg (see Light-Duty
Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and Fuel Economy
Trends: 1975 Through 2011, March 2012, available at www.epa.gov/otaq/fetrends.htm), 6 mpg less than the 34-35 mpg levels necessary
to meet the EPA GHG and NHTSA CAFE levels in MY 2016.
\586\ For example, Hyundai has made a public commitment to
achieve 50 mpg by 2025. See also section III.D.8 below documenting
those vehicles either achieving their post-MY 2016 targets, or which
could do so with the use of A/C credits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While EPA exclusively assumed a ``flat'' baseline in the proposal,
NHTSA used a flat baseline for its primary analysis, but assumed an
``increasing'' baseline (i.e., a market-driven fuel economy improvement
in MYs 2017-2025 beyond the projected 34.1 mpg fleetwide CAFE level in
MY 2016) in a sensitivity analysis. The agencies received five comments
on this topic. The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy
stated ``[t]here is little historical basis for a scenario in which
there is a sustained increase in fuel economy in the absence of
increases in standards. Public interest in fuel economy does shift with
fuel prices, but even that interest typically has followed from large,
rapid changes in price and has been short-lived. The fuel prices on
which the various agency analyses are largely based are EIA projections
and do not contain dramatic increases in price.'' The Environmental
Defense Fund ``supports EPA's proposal to assume the reference case
fleet in MY 2017-2025 would have fleet wide GHG emissions performance
no better than that projected to be necessary to meet the MY 2016
standards. Because EPA is using AEO2011 fuel price forecasts, which
project relatively stable fuel prices over the next 15 years, it is
reasonable to assume that manufacturers will not over comply with the
2016 standards and/or consumers will not demand fuel economy greater
than the 2016 standard.'' The International Council on Clean
Transportation argued that ``[t]he proposed 2017-2025 standards follow
aggressive increases in standards from 2011 through 2016. Further, the
change to a footprint-based standard means that all manufacturers must
increase the efficiency of their vehicles to comply, even manufacturers
of primarily smaller vehicles. Thus, the 2012-2016 standards have
already driven the market beyond the level of efficiency it would have
demanded in the absence of standards.'' The Natural Resources Defense
Council and joint Sierra Club/Environment America/Safe Climate
Campaign/Clean Air Council comment echoed these arguments.
In sum, all five comments on this topic supported EPA's exclusive
use of a flat baseline, and no comments supported a sensitivity case
with an increasing baseline.
Based on the above data-driven rationale for a flat baseline, along
with the fact that all of the public comments on this topic support a
flat baseline, EPA reaffirms the reasonableness of its assumption in
the proposal that, in the absence of more stringent standards, the
greenhouse gas emissions performance of MY 2017-2025 vehicles would
remain at MY 2016 levels, and therefore has used a ``flat'' baseline
for the analysis in this final rulemaking.
Based on this assessment, the EPA My 2008 based reference case
fleet is estimated through the target curves defined in the MY 2016
rulemaking applied to the projected MYs 2017-2025 fleet.\587\ As in the
MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, EPA assumes that manufacturers make use of
10.2 grams of air conditioning credits on cars and 11.5 on light
trucks, or an average of approximately 11 grams on the U.S. fleet and
the technology for doing so is included in the reference case (Section
III.C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\587\ 75 FR 25686.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Emission Control Scenarios Modeled
For the emission control scenario (i.e. scenarios where there are
standards for MYs 2017-2025 which differ from the MY 2016 standards),
EPA modeled the final standard curves discussed in Section III.B, as
well as the alternative scenarios discussed in III.D.6.d. Certain
flexibilities are also accounted for in the analysis. Air conditioning
credits (both leakage and efficiency) discussed in section III.C.1 and
III.D.2 are included in the cost and technology analysis described
below. Full size pick-up truck HEV credits are also modeled in this
final rule analysis. See 76 FR 75082 (noting that modeling for the
final rule might include these credits.) The compliance value of 0 g/
mile for EVs and the electric portion of PHEVs are also included. In a
change from the proposal, we have also included some off-cycle credits
(start-stop systems and active aerodynamic improvements) in the cost
assessment as these technologies' two-cycle benefits were already
assumed in EPA's list of technology packages (i.e. the technology
packages modeled by OMEGA). See 76 FR 75022 and section III.C.5
above.\588\ However, advanced technology multipliers through MY 2021,
intermediate volume manufacturer provisions, flexible fuel, and carry
forward/back credits are not included explicitly in the cost analysis.
These flexibilities will offer the manufacturers more compliance
options and lower compliance costs. Moreover, the overall cost analysis
includes small volume manufacturers in the fleet, while in actuality,
these companies would likely have company specific standards (see
section III.B.5). Thus, in these respects EPA is utilizing a
conservative costing methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\588\ The off-cycle technologies not part of EPA's technology
packages are not included in the analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA notes that the stringency of the final standards reflects use
of air conditioning improvements and use of the 2-cycle values for the
stop-start and active aerodynamic off-cycle technologies. These
technologies are highly cost effective, and the improvements in GHG
emissions attributable to use of these technologies can be reliably
quantified.\589\ The standards do not directly reflect use of the
credits related to use of advanced technologies on full size pickup
trucks, notwithstanding that EPA believes that there is sufficient
information to reflect and quantify use of these credits in its cost
and feasibility modeling. The reason the standards do not reflect use
of these advanced technology credits is the same reason EPA is
establishing the provisions as incentives: use of advanced technologies
in large pickup trucks may face issues of consumer acceptance of both
the extra cost and of the technologies themselves. Consequently, EPA
has made a reasonable policy choice to encourage penetration of these
technologies into the large pickup truck sector rather than to adopt
standards premised on aggressive penetration rates of these
technologies. See 76 FR 75082.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\589\ See generally TSD 3 and 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Vehicle Groupings Used
In order to create future technology projections and enable
compliance with the modeled standards, EPA aggregates vehicle sales by
a combination of manufacturer, vehicle platform, and engine design for
the OMEGA model. As discussed above, manufacturers implement major
design changes at vehicle redesign and tend to implement these changes
across a vehicle platform (such as large SUV, mid-size SUV, large
automobile, etc) at a given manufacturing plant. Because the cost of
[[Page 62845]]
modifying the engine depends on the valve train design (such as SOHC,
DOHC, etc.), the number of cylinders, and in some cases head design,
the vehicle sales are broken down beyond the platform level to reflect
relevant engine differences. The vehicle groupings are shown in Table
III-21. While there were no comments on this topic, EPA has updated
these groupings from those used in the proposal. The new groupings
provide a more accurate mapping of vehicle technologies to vehicle
platforms.
Table III-21--Vehicle Groupings \a\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle description Vehicle type Vehicle class
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Auto Subcompact I3 DOHC 4v.... 1 Small car.
Auto Subcompact I4 SOHC/DOHC
2v/4v
Auto Subcompact Electric
Auto Compact SOHC 2v.......... 2 Standard car.
Auto Compact SOHC/DOHC 4v
Auto Midsize SOHC/DOHC 4v
Pickup Small DOHC 4v
Auto Subcompact I5 SOHC 4v.... 3 Standard car.
Auto Subcompact V6 SOHC/DOHC
4v
Auto Subcompact I4 SOHC/DOHC
4v turbo/supercharged
Auto Compact Rotary
Auto Compact I5 DOHC 4v
Auto Compact V6 SOHC/DOHC 4v
Auto Compact I4 SOHC/DOHC 4v
turbo/supercharged
Auto Midsize V6 SOHC/DOHC 4v
Auto Midsize I4 SOHC/DOHC 4v
tubo/supercharged
Auto Large V6 SOHC/DOHC 4v
Auto Midsize I4 SOHC 4v tubo/
supercharged
Auto Subcompact V6 SOHC 3v.... 4 Standard car.
Auto Compact V6 OHV 2v
Auto Midsize V6 SOHC 2v
Auto Midsize V6 OHV 2v
Auto Large V6 OHV 2v
Auto Subcompact V8 DOHC 4v.... 5 Large car.
Auto Compact V10 DOHC 4v
Auto Compact V8 DOHC 4v turbo/
supercharged
Auto Compact V8 DOHC 4v/5v
Auto Compact V6 DOHC 4v
Auto Compact V5 DOHC 4v turbo/
supercharged
Auto Midsize V12 DOHC 4v
Auto Midsize V10 DOHC 4v
Auto Midsize V8 DOHC 4v/5v
Auto Midsize V8 SOHC 4v
Auto Midsize V6 DOHC 4v
Auto Midsize V7 DOHC 4v
Auto Large V16 DOHC 4v turbo/
supercharged
Auto Large V12 SOHC 4v turbo/
supercharged
Auto Large V12 DOHC 4v
Auto Large V10 DOHC 4v
Auto Large V8 DOHC 4v turbo/
supercharged
Auto Large V8 DOHC 2v/4v
Auto Large V8 SOHC 4v
Auto Subcompact V10 OHV 2v.... 6 Large car.
Auto Subcompact V8 SOHC 3v
Auto Midsize V8 SOHC 3v turbo/
supercharged
Auto Midsize V8 SOHC 3v
Auto Midsize V8 OHV 2v
Auto Large V12 SOHC 3v turbo/
supercharged
Auto Large V8 SOHC 3v turbo/
supercharged
Auto Large V8 SOHC 2v
Auto Large V8 OHV 2v/4v
SUV Small I4 DOHC 4v.......... 7 Small MPV.
SUV Midsize SOHC/DOHC 4v
SUV Large DOHC 4v
Minivan I4 DOHC 4v
SUV Small I4 DOHC 4v turbo/ 8 Large MPV.
supercharged.
SUV Midsize V6 SOHC/DOHC 4v
SUV Midsize I4 SOHC/DOHC 4v
turbo/supercharged
SUV Large V6 SOHC/DOHC 4v
SUV Large I5 DOHC 2v
SUV Large I4 DOHC 4v turbo/
supercharged
SUV Midsize V6 SOHC 2v........ 9 Large MPV.
SUV Large V6 SOHC 2v
SUV Small V6 OHV 2v........... 10 Large MPV.
SUV Midsize V6 OHV 2v
SUV Large V6 OHV 2v
[[Page 62846]]
Minivan V6 OHV 2v
Cargo Van V6 OHV 2v
SUV Large V10 DOHC 4v turbo/ 11 Truck.
supercharged.
SUV Large V8 DOHC 4v turbo/
supercharged
SUV Large V8 SOHC/DOHC 4v
SUV Large V6 DOHC 4v turbo/
supercharged
SUV Large V8 SOHC 3v turbo/ 12 Truck.
supercharged.
SUV Large V8 SOHC 2v/3v
SUV Large V8 OHV 2v
Cargo Van V10 SOHC 2v
Cargo Van V8 SOHC/OHV 2v
Pickup Large DOHC 4v.......... 13 Small MPV.
Pickup Small V6 SOHC 4v....... 14 Large MPV.
Pickup Small I5 DOHC 2v
Pickup Large V6 DOHC 2v/4v
Pickup Large I5 DOHC 2v
Pickup Small V6 SOHC 2v....... 15 Large MPV.
Pickup Small V6 OHV 2v
Pickup Large V6 SOHC 2v
Pickup Large V6 OHV 2v
Pickup Large V8 DOHC 4v....... 16 Truck.
Pickup Large V8 SOHC 2v....... 17 Truck.
Pickup Large V8 SOHC/DOHC 3v 18 Truck.
turbo/supercharged.
Pickup Large V8 SOHC 3v
Pickup Large V8 OHV 2v........ 19 Truck.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ I4 = 4 cylinder engine, I5 = 5 cylinder engine, V6, V7, and V8 = 6,
7, and 8 cylinder engines, respectively, DOHC = Double overhead cam,
SOHC = Single overhead cam, OHV = Overhead valve, v = number of valves
per cylinder.
2. What are the effectiveness and costs of CO2-reducing
technologies?
EPA and NHTSA worked together to develop information on the
effectiveness and cost of most CO2-reducing and fuel
economy-improving technologies. This joint work is reflected in Chapter
3 of the Joint TSD and in Section II.D of this preamble. The work on
technology cost and effectiveness also includes maximum penetration
rates, or ``phase-in caps'' for the OMEGA model. These caps are an
important input to OMEGA that capture the agencies' analysis of the
rate at which technologies can be added to the fleet (see Chapter 3.4.2
of the joint TSD for more detail). This preamble section, rather than
repeating those details, focuses upon EPA-only technology assumptions,
specifically, those relating to air conditioning (A/C) refrigerant.
EPA expects all manufacturers will choose to use A/C improvement
credit opportunities as a strategy for complying with the
CO2 standards, and has set the stringency of the proposed
and final standards accordingly (see section III.C.1). EPA estimates
that the average level of the credits earned will increase from 2017
(13 g/mile) to 2021 (21 g/mile) as more vehicles in the fleet convert
to use of the new alternative refrigerant.\590\ By 2021, we project
that 100% of the MY 2021 fleet will be using alternative refrigerants,
and that credit usage will remain constant on a car and truck fleet
basis until 2025. Note from the table below that costs then decrease
from 2021 to 2025 due to manufacturer learning as discussed in Section
II of this preamble and in Chapter 3 of the joint TSD. A more in-depth
discussion of feasibility and availability of low GWP alternative
refrigerants can be found in Section III.C.1 of the Preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\590\ See table in III.B.
Table III-22--Total Costs for A/C Technologies Related to Alternative Refrigerants
[Costs in 2010 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology 2017 2021 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car:
Leakage reduction (continued from the 2012-2016 rule)....... $3 $3 $3
Low GWP refrigerant......................................... 17 58 50
Low GWP refrigerant hardware................................ 4 17 16
-----------------------------------------------
Total................................................... 23 77 68
Truck:
Leakage reduction (continued from the 2012-2016 rule)....... 1 3 3
Low GWP refrigerant......................................... 0 58 50
Low GWP refrigerant hardware................................ 0 17 16
-----------------------------------------------
Total................................................... 1 77 68
Fleet:
Total....................................................... 24 77 68
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62847]]
Additionally, by MY 2019, EPA estimates that 100% of the A/C
efficiency improvements will by fully phased-in. However 85% of these
costs are already in the reference fleet, as this is the level of
penetration assumed in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule. The penetration of
A/C improvements and costs for this final rule can be found in Chapter
5 of the joint TSD.
3. How were technologies combined into ``Packages'' and what is the
cost and effectiveness of packages?
Individual technologies can be used by manufacturers to achieve
incremental CO2 reductions. However, as discussed
extensively in the MYs 2012-2016 Rule, EPA believes that manufacturers
are more likely to bundle technologies into ``packages'' to capture
synergistic aspects and reflect progressively larger CO2
reductions with additions or changes to any given package. In this
manner, and consistent with the concept of a redesign cycle,
manufacturers can optimize their available resources, including
engineering, development, manufacturing and marketing activities to
create a product with multiple new features. Therefore, the approach
taken here is to group technologies into packages of increasing cost
and effectiveness.
As in the proposal, EPA built unique technology packages for each
of 19 ``vehicle types,'' which, as in the MYs 2012-2016 rule and the
proposal, provides sufficient resolution to represent the technology of
the entire fleet at varying levels of stringency.\591\ This was the
result of analyzing the existing light duty fleet with respect to
vehicle size and powertrain configurations. All vehicles, including
cars and trucks, were first distributed based on their relative size,
starting from compact cars and working upward to large trucks. Next,
each vehicle was evaluated for powertrain, specifically the engine size
(I4, V6, and V8), valvetrain configuration (DOHC, SOHC, OHV), and
number of valves per cylinder. For purposes of calculating some
technology costs and effectiveness values, each of these 19 vehicle
types is mapped into one of six classes of vehicles: Small car,
Standard car, Large car, Small MPV, Large MPV and Truck.\592\ We
believe that these six vehicle classes, along with engine cylinder
count and valvetrain configuration, provide adequate representation for
the cost basis associated with most technology application. A detailed
table showing the 19 vehicle types, their baseline packages and their
descriptions is contained in Table III-21 and in Chapter 1 of EPA's
RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\591\ Note that the 19 vehicle types have been significantly
modified for this final rule relative to the proposal. These changes
allow more accurate placement of vehicles into the appropriate
vehicle types, such as towing and non-towing vehicles. See Chapter 1
of EPA's final RIA for more detail on the new vehicle types.
\592\ Note that, for this final rule and representing an update
since the proposal, EPA has used vehicle class designations that are
consistent with those in the lumped parameter model used for
effectiveness determinations. As such, the 19 vehicle types are
mapped into vehicle classes with different names although the
proposal's names and the final rule's names are essentially
identical in meaning. This semantic change is meant to reduce
confusion and to more closely tie the cost elements of our modeling
with the effectiveness elements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within each of the 19 vehicle types, multiple technology packages
were created with increasing technology content and resulting increases
in effectiveness. As stated earlier, with few exceptions, each
technology package is meant to provide the same driver-perceived
performance and utility as the baseline package. Note that we refer
throughout this discussion of package building to a ``baseline''
package. This should not be confused with the baseline fleet, which is
the fleet of roughly 16 million 2008MY individual vehicles comprised of
over 1,300 vehicle models. In this discussion, when we refer to
``baseline'' packages we refer to the ``baseline'' configuration of the
given vehicle type. So, we have 19 baseline packages in the context of
building packages. Each of those 19 baseline packages is comprised of a
port fuel injected engine and a 4 speed automatic transmission, the
valvetrain configuration and the number of cylinders changes for each
vehicle type in an effort to encompass the diversity in the 2008
baseline fleet as discussed above. We describe this in more detail in
Chapter 1 of EPA's RIA.
To develop a set of packages as OMEGA inputs, EPA builds packages
consisting of every feasible combination of technology available,
subject to constraints.\593\ For the 2025MY, this ``master-set'' of
packages consists of roughly 2,500 possible packages of technologies
for each of 19 vehicle types, or roughly 47,000 packages in all. The
cost of each package is determined by adding the cost of each
individual technology contained in the package for the given year of
interest. The effectiveness of each package is determined in a more
complex manner; one cannot simply add the effectiveness of individual
technologies to arrive at a package-level effectiveness because of the
synergistic effects of technologies when grouped with other
technologies that seek to improve the same or similar efficiency loss
mechanism. As an example, the benefits of the engine and transmission
technologies can usually be combined multiplicatively,\594\ but in some
cases, the benefit of the transmission-related technologies overlaps
with the engine technologies. This occurs because the transmission
technologies shift operation of the engine to more efficient locations
on the engine map by incorporating more ratio selections and a wider
ratio span into the transmissions. Some of the engine technologies have
the same goal, such as cylinder deactivation, advanced valve trains,
and turbocharging. In order to account for this overlap and avoid over-
estimating emissions reduction effectiveness, EPA uses an engineering
approach known as the lumped-parameter technique. The results from this
approach were then applied directly to the vehicle packages. The
lumped-parameter technique is well documented in the literature, and
the specific approach developed by EPA is detailed in Chapter 3
(Section 3.3.2) of the joint TSD as well as in Chapter 1 of EPA's RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\593\ Example constraints include the requirement for
stoichiometric gasoline direct injection on every turbocharged and
downsized engine and/or any 27 bar BMEP turbocharged and downsized
engine must also include cooled EGR. Some constraints are the result
of engineering judgment while others are the result of effectiveness
value estimates which are tied to specific combinations of
technologies.
\594\ For example, if an engine technology reduces
CO2 emissions by five percent and a transmission
technology reduces CO2 emissions by four percent, the
benefit of applying both technologies is 8.8 percent (100%-(100%-4%)
* (100%-5%)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-23 presents technology costs for a subset of the more
prominent technologies in our analysis (note that all technology costs
are presented in Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD and in Chapter 1.2 of EPA's
RIA). Table III-23 includes technology costs for a V6 dual overhead cam
midsize car and a V8 overhead valve large pickup truck. This table is
meant to illustrate how technology costs are similar and/or different
for these two large selling vehicle classes and how the technology
costs change over time due to learning and indirect cost changes as
described in section II.D of this preamble and at length in Chapter 3.2
of the Joint TSD. Note that these costs are not package costs but,
rather, individual technology costs. We present package costs for the
V6 midsize car in Table III-24, below.
As discussed in II.D, we received relatively few detailed comments
on technology cost and effectiveness, with the primary comments from
NADA and
[[Page 62848]]
ICCT. At a high level, the changes made since the proposal discussed in
Section II.D of this preamble. More detailed discussion of technology
cost and effectiveness is presented in Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD.
Table III-23--Total Costs of Select Technologies for V6 Midsize Car and V8 Large Pickup Truck
[2010 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle class & base engine Technology 2017 MY 2021 MY 2025 MY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Midsize/Standard car.................... Dual cam phasing on V6 $205 $178 $168
V6 DOHC................................. Dual cam phasing on I4 95 83 78
4 valves/cylinder....................... (used when downsized 417 362 340
Port fuel injected...................... to I4 DOHC). 277 240 226
4 speed auto trans...................... Stoichiometric
gasoline direct
injection on V6.
Stoichiometric
gasoline direct
injection on I4 (used
when downsized).
18-bar BMEP with 248 161 169
downsize from V6 DOHC
to I4 DOHC.
24-bar BMEP with 510 449 383
downsize from V6 DOHC
to I4 DOHC.
Cooled EGR on I- 305 288 249
configuration (used
when downsized).
Advanced diesel....... 2965 2572 2420
8 speed dual clutch 47 45 39
transmission (wet).
High efficiency 251 227 202
gearbox.
Aerodynamic treatments 213 199 176
(active, Aero2).
Stop-start (12 Volt).. 401 338 308
P2 hybrid electric 3,847 3,230 2,861
technology \a\.
Plug-in hybrid 13,148 9,950 8,145
technology with 20
mile range \a\.
Electric vehicle 17,684 13,232 9,795
technology with 75
mile range \a\.
Large pickup truck...................... Dual cam phasing on V6 205 178 168
V8 OHV.................................. (used when downsized 501 435 409
2 valves/cylinder....................... to V6 DOHC). 417 362 340
Port fuel injected...................... Stoichiometric
4 speed auto trans...................... gasoline direct
injection on V8.
Stoichiometric
gasoline direct
injection on V6 (used
when downsized).
18-bar BMEP with 1,339 1,151 1,080
downsize from V8 OHV
to V6 DOHC.
24-bar BMEP with 1,781 1,636 1,441
downsize from V8 OHV
to V6 DOHC.
Cooled EGR on V- 305 288 249
configuration.
Advanced diesel....... 4,154 3,605 3,392
8 speed automatic 62 54 50
transmission.
High efficiency 251 227 202
gearbox.
Aerodynamic treatments 213 199 176
(active, Aero2).
Stop-start (12 Volt).. 498 420 383
P2 hybrid electric 4,575 3,851 3,399
technology \a\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Assumes application of weight reduction technology resulting in 10% weight reduction before adding back the
weight of batteries and motors resulting in a net weight reduction less than 10% (see Chapter 3.4.3.8 of the
Joint TSD for more details).
As detailed in Chapter 1 of EPA's RIA, this master-set of packages
is then ranked according to technology application ranking factors
(TARFs) to eliminate packages that are not as cost-effective as
others.\595\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\595\ The Technology Application Ranking Factor (TARF) is
discussed further in III.D.4. More detail on the TARF can be found
in the OMEGA model supporting documentation (see EPA-420-B-10-042).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OMEGA model can utilize several approaches to determining the
order in which vehicles receive technologies. For this analysis, EPA
used a ``manufacturer-based net cost-effectiveness factor'' to rank the
technology packages in the order in which a manufacturer is likely to
apply them. Conceptually, this approach estimates the cost of adding
the technology from the manufacturer's perspective and divides it by
the mass of CO2 the technology will reduce. One component of
the cost of adding a technology is its production cost, as discussed
above. However, it is expected that purchasers of new vehicles value
improved fuel economy since it reduces the cost of operating the
vehicle. Typical vehicle purchasers are assumed to value the fuel
savings accrued over the period of time which they will own the
vehicle, which is estimated to be roughly five years. It is also
assumed that consumers discount these savings at the same rate as that
used in the rest of the analysis (3 or 7 percent).\596\ Any residual
value of the additional technology which might remain when the vehicle
is sold is not considered. The CO2 emission reduction is the
change in CO2 emissions multiplied by the percentage of
vehicles surviving after each year of use multiplied by the annual
miles travelled by age.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\596\ While our costs and benefits are discounted at 3% or 7%,
the decision algorithm (TARF) used in OMEGA was run at a discount
rate of 3%. Given that manufacturers must comply with the standard
regardless of the discount rate used in the TARF, this has little
impact on the technology projections shown here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given this definition, the higher priority technologies are those
with the lowest manufacturer-based net cost-effectiveness value
(relatively low technology cost or high fuel savings leads to lower
values). Because the order of technology application is set for each
vehicle, the model uses the manufacturer-based net cost-effectiveness
primarily to decide which vehicle receives the next technology
addition. Initially, technology package 1 is the only one
available to any particular vehicle. However, as soon as a vehicle
receives technology package 1, the model considers the
manufacturer-based net cost-effectiveness of technology package
2 for that vehicle and so on. In general terms, the equation
describing the calculation of manufacturer-based cost effectiveness is
as follows:
[[Page 62849]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.012
Where:
CostEffManuft = Manufacturer-Based Cost Effectiveness (in
dollars per kilogram CO2),
[Delta]TechCost = Difference in marked up cost of the technology
(dollars),
[Delta]FS = Difference in fuel consumption due to the addition of
technology times fuel price and discounted over the payback period,
or the number of years of vehicle use over which consumers value
fuel savings when evaluating the value of a new vehicle at time of
purchase
[Delta]CO2 = Difference in CO2 emissions (g/
mile) due to the addition of technology
VMTregulatory = the statutorily defined VMT
EPA describes the technology ranking methodology and manufacturer-
based cost effectiveness metric in greater detail in the OMEGA
documentation.\597\ For this final rulemaking, we have additionally
incorporated the off-cycle and hybrid credits into the TARF
equations.\598\ As the calculation is from the manufacturers'
perspective, the credit value is considered as additional
CO2 savings when the model calculates the TARF.\599\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\597\ OMEGA model documentation. EPA-420-B-10-042.
\598\ As noted previously, selected off-cycle credits were
included in the cost analysis. Thus, their usage was also included
in the TARF (technology selection algorithm), so that the model
could consider both the two cycle and off-cycle effectiveness when
choosing technologies.
\599\ Of the off-cycle credits on the menu, only stop start and
the active aerodynamics are considered when analyzing costs of
complying with the standards the final analysis. We have done this
because of their relatively high expected penetration rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When calculating the fuel savings in the TARF equation, the full
retail price of fuel, including taxes is used. While taxes are not
generally included when calculating the cost or benefits of a
regulation, the net cost component of the manufacturer-based net cost-
effectiveness equation is not a measure of the social cost of this
final rule, but a measure of the private cost, (i.e., a measure of the
vehicle purchaser's willingness to pay more for a vehicle with higher
fuel efficiency). Since vehicle operators pay the full price of fuel,
including taxes, they value fuel costs or savings at this level, and
OMEGA presumes that manufacturers will consider this when choosing
among the technology options.\600\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\600\ This definition of manufacturer-based net cost-
effectiveness ignores any change in the residual value of the
vehicle due to the additional technology when the vehicle is five
years old. Based on historic used car pricing, applicable sales
taxes, and insurance, vehicles are worth roughly 23% of their
original cost after five years, discounted to year of vehicle
purchase at 7% per annum. It is reasonable to estimate that the
added technology to improve CO2 level and fuel economy
will retain this same percentage of value when the vehicle is five
years old. However, it is less clear whether first purchasers, and
thus, manufacturers consider this residual value when making vehicle
purchases and ranking technology choices, respectively. For this
final rule, this factor was not included in our determination of
manufacturer-based net cost-effectiveness in the analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The values of manufacturer-based net cost-effectiveness for
specific technologies will vary from vehicle to vehicle, often
substantially. This occurs for three reasons. First, the technology
cost, change in ownership fuel costs, and lifetime CO2
effectiveness of a specific technology all vary by the type of vehicle
or engine to which it is being applied (e.g., small car versus large
truck, or 4-cylinder versus 8-cylinder engine). Second, the
effectiveness of a specific technology often depends on the presence of
other technologies already being used on the vehicle (i.e., the dis-
synergies). Third, the absolute fuel savings and CO2
reduction of a percentage are an incremental reduction in fuel
consumption depends on the CO2 level of the vehicle prior to
adding the technology. Chapter 1 of EPA's RIA contains further detail
on the values of manufacturer-based net cost-effectiveness for the
various technology packages.
The result of this TARF ranking process is a ``ranked-set'' of over
700 packages for use as OMEGA inputs, or roughly 40 per vehicle type.
EPA prepares a ranked-set of packages for any MY in which OMEGA is
run,\601\ the initial packages represent what we believe a manufacturer
will most likely implement on all vehicles, including lower rolling
resistance tires, low friction lubricants, engine friction reduction,
aggressive shift logic, early torque converter lock-up, improved
electrical accessories, and low drag brakes (to the extent not
reflected in the baseline vehicle).\602\ Subsequent packages include
gasoline direct injection, turbocharging and downsizing, and more
advanced transmission technologies such as six and eight speed dual-
clutch transmissions and 6 and 8 speed automatic transmissions. The
most technologically advanced packages within a vehicle type include
hybrid-electric, plug-in hybrid-electric and battery-electric
technologies. Note that plug-in hybrid and electric vehicle packages
are only modeled for the non-towing vehicle types, in order to better
maintain utility (see RIA chapter 1). In the proposal, we requested
comment on this approach and whether we should consider plug-in hybrids
for towing vehicle types. We did not receive any comments on this topic
and have maintained the same approach in the final rule as used in the
proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\601\ Note that a ranked-set of package is regenerated for any
year for which OMEGA is run due to the changes in costs and maximum
penetration rates. EPA's RIA chapter 3 contains more details on the
OMEGA modeling and Joint TSD Chapter 3 has more detail on both costs
changes over time and the maximum penetration limits of certain
technologies used in the agencies modeling.
\602\ When making reference to low friction lubricants, the
technology being referred to is the engine changes and possible
durability testing that would be done to accommodate the low
friction lubricants, not the lubricants themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-24 presents the cost and effectiveness values from a
2025MY ranked-set of packages used in the OMEGA model for EPA's vehicle
type 3, a midsize or standard car class equipped with a V6 engine.
Similar packages were generated for each of the 19 vehicle types and
the costs and effectiveness estimates for each of those packages are
discussed in detail in Chapter 1 of EPA's RIA.
Table III-24--CO2 Reducing Technology Vehicle Packages Used in OMEGA for a V6 Midsize Car Effectiveness and
Costs in the 2025MY
[Costs in 2010 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mass Rdxn
Tech Pkg Engine & vehicle applied Cost Effectiveness
technologies (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.0000......................... Auto 4VDV6............... base $0 0.0
[[Page 62850]]
3.0131......................... Auto 4VDV6 +EFR2 +ASL2 5 822 29.8
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero1
+LRRT1 +HEG +DCP +WR5%
+6sp.
3.0195......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 5 1,070 36.8
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero1
+LRRT1 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS18 +WR5% +6sp.
3.0196......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 5 1,287 40.4
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS18 +WR5% +6sp.
3.0388......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 5 1,402 42.3
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS18 +WR5% +8sp.
3.0772......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 10 1,519 43.9
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS18 +WR10% +8sp.
3.1156......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 15 1,745 45.5
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS18 +WR15% +8sp.
3.0804......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 10 1,733 45.7
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS24 +WR10% +8sp.
3.0836......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 10 1,982 47.7
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS24 +EGR +WR10% +8sp.
3.1220......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 15 2,209 49.2
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS24 +EGR +WR15% +8sp.
3.2004......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 10 2,722 50.2
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +TDS18 +WR10% +8sp.
3.1604......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 2,506 50.7
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+TDS24 +EGR +WR20% +8sp.
3.1612......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 2,814 51.2
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+SS +TDS24 +EGR +WR20%
+8sp.
3.2196......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 15 2,948 51.4
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +TDS18 +WR15% +8sp.
3.1628......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 2,896 51.5
+LDB +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+SS +SAX +TDS24 +EGR
+WR20% +8sp.
3.2204......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 15 3,030 51.8
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +SAX +TDS18 +WR15%
+8sp.
3.2020......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 10 2,936 51.9
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +TDS24 +WR10% +8sp.
3.2396......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 3,327 53.0
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +SAX +TDS18 +WR20%
+8sp.
3.2400......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 3,461 53.4
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +DVVL
+GDI +MHEV +SAX +TDS18
+WR20% +8sp.
3.2220......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 15 3,245 53.4
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +SAX +TDS24 +WR15%
+8sp.
3.2036......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 10 3,185 53.6
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +TDS24 +EGR +WR10%
+8sp.
3.2228......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 15 3,412 54.7
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +TDS24 +EGR +WR15%
+8sp.
3.2236......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 15 3,494 55.1
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +SAX +TDS24 +EGR
+WR15% +8sp.
3.2428......................... Auto 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 3,791 56.2
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI
+MHEV +SAX +TDS24 +EGR
+WR20% +8sp.
3.1680......................... Auto 4VDV6 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 5,156 57.3
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +DVVL
+GDI +HEV +SAX +ATKCS
+WR20% +8sp.
3.2465......................... Auto 4VDV6 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 11,047 74.3
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +DVVL
+GDI +ATKCS +REEV20
+WR20% +8sp.
3.2466......................... Auto 4VDV6 +EFR2 +ASL2 20 13,534 83.8
+LDB +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2
+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +DVVL
+GDI +ATKCS +REEV40
+WR20% +8sp.
3.2467......................... +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2 +LRRT2 20 11,451 100.0
+EV75 mile +WR20% +0sp.
3.2468......................... +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2 +LRRT2 20 13,376 100.0
+EV100 mile +WR20% +0sp.
3.2469......................... +IACC1 +EPS +Aero2 +LRRT2 20 18,306 100.0
+EV150 mile +WR20% +0sp.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6sp = 6sp transmission (DCT-wet for vehicle type 3); 8sp = 8 speed DCT-wet; Aero = aerodynamic treatments; ASL =
aggressive shift logic; AT = auto trans; ATKCS = Atkinson-cycle; DCP = dual cam phasing; DCT = dual clutch
trans; DSL-Adv = advanced diesel; DOHC = dual overhead cam; EFR = engine friction reduction; EGR = exhaust gas
recirculation; EPS = electric power steering; EV = electric vehicle; GDI = stoich gasoline direct injection;
HEG = high efficiency gearbox; HEV = hybrid EV; MHEV = Mild HEV; IACC = improved accessories; LDB = low drag
brakes; LRRT = lower rolling resistance tires; REEV = range extended EV or plug-in HEV; SAX = secondary axle
disconnect; S-S = stop-start; TDS18/24/27 = turbocharged & downsized 18 bar BMEP/24 bar BMEP/27 bar BMEP.
``1'' and ``2'' suffixes to certain technologies indicate the first level versus the second level of the
technology as described in Chapter 3 of the joint TSD.
[[Page 62851]]
Note that MHEV, HEV, REEV and EV technologies include both the cost and effectiveness of IACC2 within the
electrification technology, so IACC2 is not independently listed in the package description.
Note that the level of weight reduction actually applied to a given vehicle is controlled within OMEGA based on
safety constraints.
4. How does EPA project how a manufacturer would decide between options
to improve CO2 performance to meet a fleet average standard?
As discussed, there are many ways for a manufacturer to reduce
CO2-emissions from its vehicles. A manufacturer can choose
from a myriad of CO2 reducing technologies and can apply one
or more of these technologies to some or all of its vehicles. Thus, for
a variety of levels of CO2 emission control, there are an
almost infinite number of technology combinations which produce a
desired CO2 reduction. As explained above, EPA used the
OMEGA model, in order to make a reasonable estimate of how
manufacturers will add technologies to vehicles in order to meet a
fleet-wide CO2 emissions level. EPA has described OMEGA's
specific methodologies and algorithms previously in model
documentation,\603\ makes the model publically available on its Web
site,\604\ and has subjected the model to peer review.\605\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\603\ Previous OMEGA documentation for versions used in MYs
2012-2016 final rule (EPA-420-B-09-035), Interim Joint TAR (EPA-420-
B-10-042)
\604\ http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/models.htm
\605\ EPA-420-R-09-016, September 2009.
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The OMEGA model utilizes four basic sets of input data. The first
is a description of the vehicle fleet. The key pieces of data required
for each vehicle are its manufacturer, CO2 emission level,
fuel type, projected sales and footprint. The model also requires that
each vehicle be assigned to one of the 19 vehicle types described
above, which tells the model which set of technologies can be applied
to that vehicle. In addition, the degree to which each baseline vehicle
already reflects the effectiveness and cost of each available
technology must also be input. This avoids the situation, for example,
where the model might try to add a basic engine improvement to a
current hybrid vehicle, or to a vehicle that already has this
equipment. The development of the required data regarding the reference
fleet is described in Section II.B and III.D.1 above and in Chapter 1
of the Joint TSD.
The second type of input data used by the model is a description of
the technologies available to manufacturers, primarily their cost,
effectiveness, and any credit value that they accrue during the
compliance process. As noted previously, accounting for credit value is
a change from the proposal, and allows EPA to more accurately reflect
compliance related impacts of technology usage in its cost assessment.
This information was described above as well as in Chapter 3 of the
Joint TSD and Chapter 1 of EPA's RIA. In all cases, the order of the
technologies or technology packages for a particular vehicle type is
determined by the model user prior to running the model. The third type
of input data describes vehicle operational data, such as annual
vehicle scrappage rates and mileage accumulation rates, and economic
data, such as fuel prices and discount rates. These estimates are
described in Section II.E above, Section III.H below and Chapter 4 of
the Joint TSD.
The fourth type of data describes the CO2 emission
standards being modeled. These include the MY 2016 (reference case)
standards, and the MY 2021 and MY 2025 control case standards as well
as the alternative standards described later in this chapter. The
results for intermediate years are interpolated as described in Chapter
5 of the EPA RIA. As described in more detail below, the application of
A/C technology is evaluated in a separate analysis from those
technologies which impact CO2 emissions over the 2-cycle
test procedure. Thus, for the percent of vehicles that are projected to
achieve A/C related reductions, the CO2 credit associated
with the projected use of improved A/C systems is used to adjust the
final CO2 standard which will be applicable to each
manufacturer to develop a target for CO2 emissions over the
2-cycle test which is assessed in our OMEGA modeling. As an example, on
an industry wide basis, EPA projects that manufacturers will generate
11 g/mile of A/C credit in MY 2016. Thus, the MY 2016 CO2
target in OMEGA was approximately eleven grams less stringent for each
manufacturer than predicted by the curves. Similar adjustments were
made for the control cases (i.e. the A/C credits allowed by the rule
are accounted for in the standards), but for a larger amount of A/C
credit (approximately 21 grams).
As mentioned above for the market data input file utilized by
OMEGA, which characterizes the vehicle fleet, our modeling accounts for
the fact that many baseline vehicles are already equipped with one or
more of the technologies discussed in Section III.D.2 above. Because of
the choice to apply technologies in packages, and because MY 2008
vehicles are equipped with individual technologies in a wide variety of
combinations, accounting for the presence of specific technologies in
terms of their proportion of package cost and CO2
effectiveness required a detailed analysis.
Thus, EPA developed a method to account for the presence of the
combinations of applied technologies in terms of their proportion of
the technology packages. This analysis can be broken down into four
steps.
The first step in the process is to break down the available GHG
control technologies into five groups: (1) Engine-related, (2)
transmission-related, (3) hybridization, (4) weight reduction and (5)
other. Within each group, each individual technology was given a
ranking which generally followed the degree of complexity, cost and
effectiveness of the technologies within each group. More specifically,
the ranking is based on the premise that a technology on a baseline
vehicle with a lower ranking would be replaced by one with a higher
ranking which was contained in one of the technology packages which we
included in our OMEGA modeling. The corollary of this premise is that a
technology on a baseline vehicle with a higher ranking would be not be
replaced by one with an equal or lower ranking which was contained in
one of the technology packages which we chose to include in our OMEGA
modeling. This ranking scheme can be seen in an OMEGA pre-processor
(the TEB/CEB calculation macro), available in the docket.
In the second step of the process, these rankings were used to
estimate the complete list of technologies which would be present on
each baseline vehicle after the application of a technology package. In
other words, this step indicates the specific technology on each
baseline vehicle after a package has been applied to it. EPA then used
the lumped parameter model to estimate the total percentage
CO2 emission reduction associated with the technology
present on the baseline vehicle (termed package 0), as well as the
total percentage reduction after application of each package. A similar
approach was used to determine the total cost of all of the technology
present on the baseline vehicle and after the application of each
applicable technology package.
The third step in this process is to account for the degree to
which each technology package's incremental effectiveness and
incremental cost is affected by the technology already
[[Page 62852]]
present on the baseline vehicle. Termed the technology effectiveness
basis (TEB) and cost effectiveness basis (CEB), respectively, the
values are calculated in this step using the equations shown in EPA RIA
chapter 3. For this final rulemaking, we also account for the credit
values using a factor termed other effectiveness basis (OEB).
As described in Section III.D.3 above, technology packages are
applied to groups of vehicles which generally represent a single
vehicle platform and which are equipped with a single engine size
(e.g., compact cars with four cylinder engine produced by Ford). These
groupings are described in Table III-21. Thus, the fourth step is to
combine the fractions of the CEB and TEB of each technology package
already present on the individual MY 2008 vehicle models for each
vehicle grouping. For cost, percentages of each package already present
are combined using a simple sales-weighting procedure, since the cost
of each package is the same for each vehicle in a grouping. For
effectiveness, the individual percentages are combined by weighting
them by both sales and base CO2 emission level. This
appropriately weights vehicle models with either higher sales or
CO2 emissions within a grouping. Once again, this process
prevents the model from adding technology which is already present on
vehicles, and thus ensures that the model does not double count
technology effectiveness and cost associated with complying with the
modeled standards.
Conceptually, the OMEGA model begins by determining the specific
CO2 emission standard applicable for each manufacturer and
its vehicle class (i.e., car or truck). Since the final rule allows for
averaging across a manufacturer's cars and trucks, the model determines
the CO2 emission standard applicable to each manufacturer's
car and truck sales from the two sets of coefficients describing the
piecewise linear standard functions for cars and trucks (i.e. the
respective car and truck curves) in the inputs, and creates a combined
car-truck standard for that manufacturer. This combined standard
considers the difference in lifetime VMT of cars and trucks, as
indicated in the final regulations which govern credit trading between
these two vehicle classes (which reflect the final MYs 2012-2016 rules
on this point).
As noted above, EPA estimated separately the cost of the improved
A/C systems required to generate the credit. In the reference case
fleet that complies with the MY 2016 standards, 85% of vehicles are
modeled with improved A/C efficiency and leakage prevention technology.
The model then works with one manufacturer at a time to add
technologies until that manufacturer meets its applicable standard.
5. Projected Compliance Costs and Technology Penetrations
The following tables present the projected incremental costs and
technology penetrations for the final program. The most significant
differences between the proposal analysis and the final rulemaking
analysis presented below include:
Cost-impacts of the off-cycle, strong, and mild hybrid
full size pickup provisions: In the proposal, although we included
these credits in our assessment of program impacts, we did not include
these credits in the cost analysis. For this final rulemaking, we
include these credits as further described in EPA RIA chapter 3.\606\
As discussed in III.C.5, while manufacturers were also given the
opportunity to use these credits from the off-cycle menu under the
reference MY 2016 standards, in all cases, these additional compliance
options lead to reductions in costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\606\ Of the many off-cycle credits on the menu, only stop start
and active aerodynamics are included in this analysis. As we
explained at proposal, EPA has sufficient information on these
technologies' effectiveness, cost, and availability to reliably
model them, and also has adjusted the stringency of the standard
based on their 2-cycle effectiveness to reflect their use. See 76 FR
75022. This is not the case for the remaining ``menu'' off-cycle
technologies where EPA has virtually no information on costs. Id. at
75022-023. At proposal, we used only the 2-cycle benefits associated
with use of the stop-start and active aero, but in the modeling for
the final rule, we now include their off-cycle credit value in the
analysis of the costs and benefits of the program and, as at
proposal, use these technologies' 2-cycle benefits in setting the
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mild hybrid technology: As described in Chapter 3 of the
TSD, we did not model a mild hybrid technology in the proposal. Between
proposal and final rulemaking, new technical information has become
available for this technology, and the mild hybrid technology has been
included in the assessment. In combination with the off-cycle credits,
this technology has the potential to be a highly cost-effective
compliance option, and leads to cost reductions in this analysis.
Updated safety coefficients: As a result of the safety
analysis described in Section II.G, the amount of mass reduction
applied to the fleet was modified in order to show a compliance path
and cost-assessment that is safety neutral. This led to a smaller
application of mass reduction compared to the proposal. This change
slightly increased the costs relative to the proposal since mass
reduction is a relative cost effective technology at the levels we are
estimating it will be implemented.
As a result, the projected MY 2025 compliance costs are slightly
less than those projected in the proposal (despite the increased cost
from less mass reduction). These changes do not change the agency's
overall assessment of the appropriateness of the standards we are
adopting. As will be discussed later in this section, the proposal
analysis using the MY 2008 based fleet projection, the final rulemaking
results using the MY 2008 based fleet projection, and the final
rulemaking analysis using the MY 2010 based fleet projection, all
support EPA's assessment of the appropriateness of the standards.
Analysis results in the remainder of this section are for the MY
2008 based fleet projection only. EPA has additionally replicated many
of the analyses discussed in this chapter using the MY 2010 based fleet
projection (EPA RIA chapter 10). As noted, the differences in costs,
benefits, and technology penetrations between results of the two fleet
projections are relatively minor, and do not alter EPA's judgment of
the appropriateness of the final standards.
Overall projected per vehicle cost increases relative to the
reference fleet (i.e. the MY 2008 based fleet complying with the MY
2016 standard) are $766 in MY 2021 and $1836 in MY 2025. Captured in
these costs, we see significant increases in advanced transmission
technologies such as the high efficiency gear box and 8 speed
transmissions, as well as more moderate increase in turbo downsized,
cooled EGR 24 bar BMEP engines. In the control case, 31 percent of the
MY 2025 fleet is projected to have strong P2 hybrid or mild hybrid
technology (5% P2, 26% MHEV) as compared to 5% in the 2016 reference
case (5% P2, 0% MHEV). Similarly, 2% percent of the MY 2025 fleet are
projected to be electric vehicles while less than 1% percent are
projected to be electric vehicles in the reference case. EPA notes that
we have projected one potential compliance path for each company and
for the industry as a whole--this does not mean that other potential
technology penetrations and pathways are not possible. In fact, it is
likely that each firm will plot their own future course to compliance.
For example, while we show relatively low levels of EV and PHEV
technologies, several firms have announced plans to aggressively pursue
EV and PHEV technologies and thus the actual
[[Page 62853]]
penetration of those technologies may turn out to be much higher than
the compliance pathway we present here.
Table III-25--Total Costs per Vehicle by Company, Incremental to the MY 2016 Standards
[2010$]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 2025
Company -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks Fleet Cars Trucks Fleet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW..................................................... $967 $529 $852 $2,147 $1,250 $1,910
Chrysler/Fiat........................................... 681 796 733 1,617 2,388 1,950
Daimler................................................. 1,985 659 1,655 3,011 1,284 2,616
Ferrari \607\........................................... 6,712 0 6,712 7,864 0 7,864
Ford.................................................... 680 875 746 1,811 2,505 2,025
Geely-Volvo............................................. 2,132 734 1,698 3,177 1,504 2,681
GM...................................................... 519 720 619 1,518 2,237 1,861
Honda................................................... 532 829 624 1,525 1,923 1,642
Hyundai................................................. 773 875 794 1,673 2,268 1,792
Kia..................................................... 625 908 689 1,572 1,977 1,658
Mazda................................................... 959 1,246 1,010 1,979 2,449 2,057
Mitsubishi.............................................. 611 1,127 791 1,939 2,169 2,015
Nissan.................................................. 644 904 725 1,618 2,391 1,847
Porsche \608\........................................... 4,878 604 3,871 4,807 1,274 4,044
Spyker-Saab............................................. 3,019 607 2,674 3,580 964 3,238
Subaru.................................................. 982 1,594 1,128 1,926 2,495 2,054
Suzuki.................................................. 1,032 1,210 1,064 2,112 1,848 2,066
Tata-JLR................................................ 3,916 1,061 2,495 5,077 1,447 3,390
Toyota.................................................. 488 600 532 1,239 1,700 1,407
VW...................................................... 1,492 508 1,293 2,412 1,237 2,181
Fleet................................................... 767 763 766 1,726 2,059 1,836
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs for Aston Martin, Lotus and Tesla are not included here but can be found in EPA's RIA.
Costs include stranded capital and A/C-related costs.
\607\ Note that Ferrari is shown as a separate entity in the table above but could be combined with other Fiat-owned companies for purposes of GHG
compliance at the manufacturer's discretion. Also, as discussed in Section III.B., companies with U.S. sales below 5,000 vehicles that are able to
demonstrate ``operational independence'' from their parent company will be eligible to petition EPA for SVM alternative standards. However, since
these determinations have not yet been made, the costs shown above are based on Ferrari meeting the primary program standards.
\608\ EPA analyzed Porsche and VW as separate fleets for the final rule. However, on August 1, 2012, VW completed its acquisition of Porsche and thus
EPA expects that the Porsche fleet will be combined with the VW fleet for purposes of compliance with the MY 2017-2025 standards.
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6. How does the technical assessment support the final CO2
standards as compared to the alternatives EPA has considered?
a. What are the targets and achieved levels for the fleet in this final
rule?
In this section EPA analyzes the final standards alongside several
potential alternative GHG standards. These alternatives (car and truck
standards which are 20 g/mile more and less stringent than those
adopted) reasonably bound the range of alternatives. All analyses shown
in this section are conducted using the MY 2008 based fleet projection.
The analysis using the MY 2010 based fleet projection is shown in EPA
RIA chapter 10 and leads to the same conclusions.
Table III-30 includes a summary of the final standards and the four
alternatives considered by EPA. In this table and for the majority of
the data presented in this section, EPA focuses on two specific model
years in the MYs 2017-2025 time frame addressed by this final rule. For
the purposes of considering alternatives, EPA assessed these two
specific years as being reasonably separated in time in order to
evaluate a range of meaningfully different standards, rather than
analyzing alternatives for each individual model year. Table III-30
presents the projected reference case targets for the fleet in MYs 2021
and 2025, that is the estimated industry wide targets that would be
required for the projected fleet in those years by the MY 2016
standards.\609\ The alternatives, like the final standards, account for
projected use of A/C related credits. They represent the average
targets for cars and trucks projected for the final standards and the
four alternative standards. They do not represent the manner in which
manufacturers are projected to achieve compliance with these targets,
which includes the ability to transfer credits to and from the car and
truck fleets. That is discussed later, and in tables shown in Section
III.A.
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\609\ The reference case targets for MYS 2021 and 2025 may be
different even though the footprint based standards are identical
(the MY 2016 curves). This is because the fleet distribution of cars
and trucks may change in the intervening years thus changing the
targets in MYs 2021 and 2025.
Table III-30--MYs 2021 and 2025 Fleet Targets for the Final Rule and Alternative Standards
[g/mile CO2] \610\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car target Truck target Fleet target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 Final Rule................................................. 172 249 199
Alternative 1: 2021 Trucks + 20................................. 172 229 206
Alternative 2: 2021 Trucks-20................................... 172 269 192
Alternative 3: 2021 Cars + 20................................... 192 249 212
Alternative 4: 2021 Cars-20..................................... 152 249 186
2021 Reference Case............................................. 224 296 250
2025 Final Rule................................................. 143 203 163
Alternative 1: 2025 Trucks + 20................................. 143 223 170
Alternative 2: 2025 Trucks-20................................... 143 183 156
Alternative 3: 2025 Cars + 20................................... 163 203 176
Alternative 4: 2025 Cars-20..................................... 123 203 150
2025 Reference Case............................................. 224 295 248
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternatives 1 and 2 are focused on changes in the level of
stringency for light-duty trucks only. Alternative 1 is 20 g/mile less
stringent (higher) in 2021 and 2025, and Alternative 2 is 20 g/mile
more stringent (lower) in 2021 and 2025. Alternatives 3 and 4 are
focused on changes in the level of stringency for just passenger cars:
Alternative 3 is 20 g/mile less stringent (higher) in MYs 2021 and
2025, and Alternative 4 is 20 g/mile more stringent (lower) in 2021 and
2025. When combined with the sales projections for MYs 2021 and 2025,
these alternatives span fleet wide targets with a range of 186-212 g/
mile in MY 2021 (equivalent to a range of 42-48 mpge if all
improvements were made with fuel economy technologies) and a range of
150-176 g/mile in MY 2025 (equivalent to a range of 50-59 mpg if all
improvements were made with fuel economy technologies).
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\610\ These targets are slightly different than those shown in
the proposal due to minor updates to footprint values in the fleet
projection. On average, many vehicles become slightly smaller, but
this change is not significant at a fleet level. (See TSD 1.3.2).
The target curves are unchanged from proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using the OMEGA model, EPA evaluated the final standards and each
of the alternatives in MY 2021 and in MY 2025. It is worth noting that
although Alternatives 1 and 2 consider different truck footprint curves
compared to the final rule and Alternatives 3 and 4 evaluate different
car footprint curves compared to the final rule, in all cases EPA
evaluated the alternatives by modeling both the car and truck footprint
curves together (which achieve the fleet targets shown in Table III-30)
as this is how manufacturers would view the future standards given the
opportunity to transfer credits between their car and truck fleets
under the GHG rule.\611\ A manufacturer's ability to transfer GHG
credits between its car and truck fleets without limit does have the
effect of muting the ``truck'' focused and ``car'' focused nature of
the alternatives EPA is evaluating. For example, while Alternative 1
has truck standards projected in MYs 2021 and 2025 to be 20 g/mile less
stringent than the final truck standards and the same car standards as
the final car standards, individual firms may over comply on trucks and
under-comply on cars (or vice versa) in order to meet Alternative 1 in
a cost effective manner from each company's perspective. EPA's modeling
of manufacturer fleets appropriately reflects this flexibility, since
as just noted, it reflects manufacturers' expected response.
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\611\ The curves for the alternatives were developed using the
same methods as the final curves, however with different targets.
Thus, just as in the final curves, the car and truck curves
described in TSD 2 were ``fanned'' up or down to determine the
curves of the alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-31 shows the projected target and projected achieved
levels in MY 2025 for the final standards. This accounts for a
manufacturer's ability to transfer credits to and from cars and trucks
to meet a manufacturer's car and truck targets and consequent standard.
[[Page 62863]]
Table III-31--MY2025 Projected Target and Achieved Levels for the Final Rule for Individual Firms
[g/mile CO2]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Target Achieved Truck
Company ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Car target- target-
Cars Trucks Fleet Cars Trucks Fleet achieved achieved
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW................................................... 146 194 159 144 199 158 2 -5
Chrysler/Fiat......................................... 146 201 170 154 191 170 -8 10
Daimler............................................... 150 208 163 140 233 161 10 -25
Ferrari............................................... 150 0 150 168 0 168 -17 n/a
Ford.................................................. 147 212 167 157 192 168 -10 20
Geely-Volvo........................................... 148 189 160 138 207 159 10 -18
GM.................................................... 144 213 177 156 202 178 -12 11
Honda................................................. 142 191 156 145 183 156 -3 8
Hyundai............................................... 142 188 151 146 172 152 -4 16
Kia................................................... 139 199 152 145 177 152 -6 22
Mazda................................................. 140 186 148 145 163 148 -5 22
Mitsubishi............................................ 139 180 153 146 166 153 -7 14
Nissan................................................ 145 202 162 149 191 162 -5 10
Porsche............................................... 131 195 144 118 231 143 12 -37
Spyker-Saab........................................... 139 188 146 132 231 145 7 -43
Subaru................................................ 134 169 142 145 138 143 -11 31
Suzuki................................................ 132 181 140 133 174 140 -2 8
Tata-JLR.............................................. 161 182 171 114 228 167 47 -46
Toyota................................................ 141 201 163 146 193 163 -5 8
VW.................................................... 138 203 151 131 228 150 7 -25
Fleet................................................. 143 203 163 147 194 163 -4 9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: This table and the remainder in this section do not include projections for Aston Martin and Lotus. These two firms would qualify for
consideration of the unique Small Volume Manufacturer alternative standards discussed in Section III.B, and thus while we have included modeling for
these companies in the RIA, we do not present the results in this section. In addition, we do not present in this section results for the firm Tesla,
as our forecast assumes they only make all electric vehicles, and thus under any standard we analyzed the firm always complies without the addition of
any technology.
Similar tables for each of the alternatives for MY 2025 and for the
alternatives and the final rule for MY 2021 are contained in Chapter 3
of EPA's RIA. With the final standards and for Alternatives 1 and 2,
all companies are projected to be able to comply both in MYs2021 and
2025, with the exception of Ferrari, which in each case falls 17 g/mile
short of its projected fleet wide obligation in MY 2025.\612\ In
Alternatives 3 and 4, where the car stringency varies, all companies
are again projected to comply with the exception of Ferrari, which has
a 38 gram shortfall under Alternative 4.
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\612\ Note that Ferrari is shown as a separate entity in the
table above but could be combined with other Fiat-owned companies
for purposes of GHG compliance at the manufacturer's discretion.
Also, as discussed above in this section and in Section III.B.5,
companies with U.S. sales below 5,000 vehicles that are able to
demonstrate ``operational independence'' from their parent company
will be eligible to petition EPA for SVM alternative standards.
However, since these determinations have not yet been made, the
costs shown above are based on Ferrari meeting the primary program
standards. As a result of these provisions, Ferrari is not discussed
in the remainder of this section as we discuss the appropriateness
and feasibility of the standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Why is the relative rate of car truck stringency appropriate?
Table III-31 illustrates the importance of car-truck credit
transfer for individual firms. For example, the OMEGA model projects
for the final standards that in MY 2025, Daimler would under comply for
trucks by 25 g/mile but over comply in their car fleet by 10 g/mile in
order to meet their overall compliance obligation. By contrast, the
OMEGA model projects that under the final standards Kia's truck fleet
would over comply by 22 g/mile and under comply in their car fleet by 6
g/mile in order to meet their compliance obligations. The choice of
transferring credits from cars to trucks, or trucks to cars, is
dependent on the fleet configuration of the individual manufacturers.
Individual manufacturers will be influenced by their relative number of
cars and trucks, as well as by the starting technology and emissions
performance of those vehicles.
Under the FRM analysis, we project a slightly larger quantity of
credit transfer than that which was projected in the proposal. The
increase in credit transfer is largely attributable to the FRM modeling
of stop start and active aerodynamics off-cycle credits and full-size
pick-up truck HEV flexibilities, which were not included in the cost
modeling used for the proposal. These credits either offer larger
benefits to trucks than to cars (in the case of off-cycle credits), or
are not available to cars (the full size pickup HEV flexibilities).
However, while the total credit transfer value has increased relative
to the proposal analysis, for the fleet as a whole, we project only a
relatively small degree of net credit transfers from the truck fleet to
the car fleet. From the reference case emission level (sales weighted
average of approximately 250) to the control case (sales weighted
average of approximately 163) is a drop of approximately 90 grams. Four
grams of credit transfer (Table III-31) to the car fleet is relatively
small in this context, and demonstrates the appropriate balance between
car and truck stringencies. Table III-25 shows that the average costs
for cars and trucks are also similar for MY 2021 and MY 2025. For MY
2021, the average cost to comply with the car standards is $767, while
it is $763 for trucks. For MY 2025, the average cost to comply with the
car standards is $1,726, while it is $2,059 for trucks. These results
are consistent with the small degree of net projected credit transfer
between cars and trucks. While costs are generally higher for trucks in
MY 2025, these higher estimates reflect the degree of credit transfer
expected in the fleet, and are not necessarily indicative of a
relatively more or less stringent truck standard. One factor in this
cost delta is the relatively larger degree of mass reduction modeled
for trucks under our analysis of safety impacts (see section II.G.5
above).
[[Page 62864]]
After including these factors, the average cost for complying with
the truck and car standards are largely similar, even though the level
of stringency for trucks is increasing at a slower rate than for cars
in the program's initial model years. As described in Section I.B.2 of
the preamble, the final car standards are decreasing (in CO2
space, and therefore increasing in stringency) at a rate of 5% per year
from MYs 2017-2025, while the final truck standards are decreasing at a
rate of 3.5% per year on average from MYs 2017-2021, and 5% per year
thereafter through MY2025. Given this difference in percentage rates of
increase in stringency, the similarity in average cost stems from the
fact that it is more costly to add the technologies to trucks (in
general) than to cars as described in Chapter 1 of the EPA RIA.
Moreover, some technologies are not made available for towing trucks.
These include EVs, PHEVs, Atkinson Cycle engines (matched with HEVs),
and DCTs--the prior two provide significant effectiveness, and the
latter two are relatively cost effective. Together these differences
result in a decrease in effectiveness potential for the heavier towing
trucks compared to non-towing trucks and cars. In addition, while there
is more mass reduction projected for these vehicles, this comes at
higher cost as well, as the cost per pound for mass reduction goes up
with higher levels of mass reduction (that is, the cost increase curves
upward rather than being linear). As described in greater detail in
Chapter 2 of the joint TSD, these factors are among the reasons the
truck curve is steeper relative to the MY 2016 truck curve, resulting
in a truck curve that is ``more parallel'' to cars than was the MY 2016
truck curve.
Taken together, EPA's analysis shows that under the final
standards, there is relatively little net trading between cars and
trucks as a fraction of the overall improvement; average costs for
compliance with cars is generally similar to that of trucks in MY 2021
as well as MY 2025; and it is more costly to add technologies to trucks
than to cars. These facts corroborate the reasonableness for increasing
the slope of the truck curve relative to MY 2016. These observations
also lead us to the conclusion that (at a fleet level) starting from
MYs 2017-2021, the slower rate of increase for trucks compared to cars
(3.5% compared to 5% per year), and the same rate of increase (5% per
year) for both cars and trucks for MYs 2022-2025 results in car and
truck standards that reflect increases in stringency over time that are
comparable from the perspective of the costs born by cars versus
trucks.
Many commenters questioned the relative stringency of the car and
truck curves, manufacturers whose fleets are dominated by passenger
cars generally indicating that the curves favored trucks at the expense
of cars, and several groups going so far as maintaining that the
difference in stringency and slope created an inherent incentive to
upsize the fleet. These comments are not supported by the analysis
conducted here. There are no indications that either the truck or car
standards will encourage manufacturers to choose technology paths that
lead to significant over or under compliance for cars or trucks, on an
industry wide level. That is, there is no indication that on average,
in light of the truck standard, manufacturers would consistently under
or over comply with the car standard, or vice versa. As seen in our
final rule modeling, seven manufacturers over-complied on cars, while
twelve over-complied on trucks. A consistent pattern across the
industry of manufacturers choosing to under or over comply with a car
or trucks standard could indicate that the car or truck standard should
be evaluated further to determine if the relative stringency is
appropriate in light of the technology choices available to
manufacturers, and the costs of those technology choices. As just
shown, that is not the case for the final car and truck standards.
Moreover, as noted above, we project only a relatively small overall
degree of net credit transfers from the truck fleet to the car fleet.
In addition, as discussed further below, EPA did evaluate the effect of
the relative stringency of the car and truck standards using
alternative standards and this analysis leads to the same conclusions.
EPA thus continues to believe that the relative stringency of the car
and truck curves is reasonable and appropriate.
c. What are the costs and advanced technology penetration rates for the
alternative standards in relation to the final standards?
Below we discuss results for the final car and truck standards
compared first to the truck alternatives (Alternatives 1 and 2),
followed by a comparison to the car alternatives (Alternatives 3 and
4).
Table III-32 presents our projected per-vehicle cost for the
average car, truck and for the fleet in model years 2021 and 2025 for
the final rule and for Alternatives 1 and 2. All costs are relative to
the reference case (i.e. the fleet with technology added to meet the
2016 MY standards). As can be seen, even though only the truck
standards vary among these three scenarios, in each case the projected
average car and truck costs vary as a result of car-truck credit
transfer by individual companies.
Table III-32--2021 and 2025 Fleet Average Projected Per-Vehicle Costs for Final Rule and Alternatives 1 and 2
[2010$/vehicle]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks Fleet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 Final Rule................................................. $767 $763 $766
Alternative 1: 2021 Trucks + 20................................. 497 492 496
Alternative 2: 2021 Trucks-20................................... 1,062 1,159 1,096
2025 Final Rule................................................. 1,726 2,059 1,836
Alternative 1: 2025 Trucks + 20................................. 1,460 1,582 1,500
Alternative 2: 2025 Trucks-20................................... 2,146 2,434 2,241
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-33 presents the per-vehicle cost estimates in MY 2021 by
company for the final rule, Alternative 1, and Alternative 2.
[[Page 62865]]
Table III-33--2021 Projected Per-Vehicle Costs for the Final Rule and Alternatives 1 and 2 by Company
[cars & trucks, 2010$/vehicle]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Final rule (trucks + 20) (trucks-20)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW............................................................. $852 $467 $1,307
Chrysler/Fiat................................................... 733 377 1,156
Daimler......................................................... 1,655 1,226 2,196
Ferrari......................................................... 6,712 6,712 6,712
Ford............................................................ 746 438 1,116
Geely-Volvo..................................................... 1,698 1,171 2,376
GM.............................................................. 619 271 1,087
Honda........................................................... 624 450 841
Hyundai......................................................... 794 620 963
Kia............................................................. 689 550 872
Mazda........................................................... 1,010 858 1,198
Mitsubishi...................................................... 791 468 1,192
Nissan.......................................................... 725 495 990
Porsche......................................................... 3,871 3,397 4,468
Spyker-Saab..................................................... 2,674 2,375 3,009
Subaru.......................................................... 1,128 865 1,379
Suzuki.......................................................... 1,064 840 1,265
Tata-JLR........................................................ 2,495 1,365 3,652
Toyota.......................................................... 532 359 746
VW.............................................................. 1,293 945 1,678
Fleet........................................................... 766 496 1,096
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-34 presents the per-vehicle cost estimates in MY 2025 by
company for the final rule, Alternative 1 and Alternative 2. In
general, for most of the companies our projected results show the same
trends as for the industry as a whole, with Alternative 1 generally
less costly than the final rule, and Alternative 2 generally more
costly. Notably, the incremental average cost is higher for the more
stringent alternative than for an equally less stringent alternative
standard. This is not a surprise as more technologies must be added to
vehicles to meet more stringent standards, and these technologies
increase in cost in a non-linear fashion.
Table III-34--MY 2025 Projected Per-Vehicle Costs for Final Rule and Alternatives 1 and 2 by Company
[cars & trucks, 2010$/vehicle]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Final rule (trucks + 20) (trucks-20)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW............................................................. $1,910 $1,566 $2,300
Chrysler/Fiat................................................... 1,950 1,494 2,474
Daimler......................................................... 2,616 2,176 2,995
Ferrari......................................................... 7,864 7,864 7,864
Ford............................................................ 2,025 1,650 2,390
Geely-Volvo..................................................... 2,681 2,141 3,250
GM.............................................................. 1,861 1,347 2,517
Honda........................................................... 1,642 1,376 1,907
Hyundai......................................................... 1,792 1,617 2,025
Kia............................................................. 1,658 1,449 1,868
Mazda........................................................... 2,057 1,911 2,233
Mitsubishi...................................................... 2,015 1,609 2,369
Nissan.......................................................... 1,847 1,530 2,168
Porsche......................................................... 4,044 3,678 4,434
Spyker-Saab..................................................... 3,238 2,971 3,360
Subaru.......................................................... 2,054 1,842 2,314
Suzuki.......................................................... 2,066 1,946 2,381
Tata-JLR........................................................ 3,390 2,534 4,627
Toyota.......................................................... 1,407 1,163 1,788
VW.............................................................. 2,181 1,953 2,538
Fleet........................................................... 1,836 1,500 2,241
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The previous tables present the costs for the final rule and
alternatives 1 and 2 at both the industry and company level. In
addition to costs, another key is the technology expected to be needed
to meet future standards. The EPA assessment of the final rule, as well
as Alternatives 1 and 2, predict the penetration into the fleet of a
large number of technologies at various rates. A subset of these
technologies are discussed below, while EPA's RIA Chapter 3 includes
the details on this much longer list for the passenger car, light-duty
truck, and the overall fleet at both the industry and individual
company level. Table III-35 and Table III-36 present only a sub-set of
the technologies EPA estimates could be used to meet the final
standards as well as alternatives 1 and 2 in MY 2021.
[[Page 62866]]
Table III-37 and Table III-38 show the same for MY 2025. The
technologies listed in these tables are those for which there is a
large difference in penetration rates between the final rule and the
alternatives. We have not included here, for example, the penetration
rates for improved high efficiency gear boxes or eight speed
transmissions because for MY 2021, our modeling estimates similar total
fleet penetrations of these technologies for the final rule and
alternatives 1 and 2.
Table III-35 shows that in MY 2021, the final rule requires higher
levels of penetration for several technologies for trucks than
alternative 1. For example for trucks, compared to the final rule,
alternative 1 leads to a decrease in the penetration of 24 bar turbo-
charged/downsized engines, a decrease in the penetration of cooled EGR,
and a decrease in the penetration of gasoline direct injection fuel
systems. We also see that due to credit transfer between cars and
trucks, the lower level of stringency considered for trucks in
alternative 1 also impacts the penetration of technology to the car
fleet--with alternative 1 leading to a decrease in penetration of 18
bar turbo-downsized engines, a decrease in penetration of 24 bar turbo-
downsize engines, a decrease in penetration of 8 speed dual clutch
transmissions, and a decrease in penetration of gasoline direct
injection fuel systems in the car fleet. For the more stringent
alternative 2, we see increases in the penetration of many of these
technologies projected for MY 2021, and we see this for the truck fleet
as well as for the car fleet. Table III-36 shows these same overall
trends but at the sales weighted fleet level in MY 2021.
Although EPA does not project dramatic differences in technology
penetration between the final MY 2021 standards and those modeled in
Alternative 2 during these earlier years of the program, EPA remains
concerned about lead time relative to rapid increases in truck standard
stringency between MYs 2016 and 2021. Several vehicle manufacturers,
particularly those who manufacture large trucks, voiced concerns about
the increase in stringency during MYs 2012-2016 as described in the
NPRM (76 FR 74862-865). In comments on the NPRM, Ford noted that it
viewed the MYs 2012-2016 standards as ``overly stringent standards
imposed on light duty trucks in the 2012-2016 model year regulation.''
As discussed in TSD 2.4, EPA does not agree that the MYs 2012-2016
program is overly stringent, however we do acknowledge that it will be
challenging for some manufacturers and furthermore, we acknowledge the
possibility that it may be more challenging for the larger truck market
than the smaller truck or car market. Several issues are unique to the
trucks with the largest footprints (pickup trucks in particular).
Although no individual vehicle need comply with its target, the large
truck segment is dominated by relatively few vehicle platforms with
relatively large sales, and this limited number of vehicle platforms
makes rapid technology changes a greater challenge than in other market
segments. See TSD p. 2-23. The pick-up trucks tend to have longer
redesign cycles. Though there may be evidence to show that redesign
periods are getting shorter for both cars and pickup trucks, the
utility requirements of pick-up trucks relative to smaller vehicles
results in longer development times for validation of a new platform.
Pick-up truck product validation occurs across a broader range of gross
vehicle weights for each platform due to a relatively large payload
capacity and can include validation of trailer towing capability for
multiple trailer configurations. Consequently, EPA is choosing to
provide appropriate lead time in the MY 2017-2021 truck standards.
Further, EPA has carefully weighed the issue of consumer
acceptance. As many commenters stressed, without consumer acceptance of
these vehicles, the rule's benefits will not accrue. As noted by the
U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesels, battery electric technologies have
had limited commercial success in larger trucks.\613\ Although EPA has
maintained utility in its analysis of compliance costs and while we do
not expect that future hybrid applications will have the same degree of
consumer resistance, nonetheless EPA regards the issue of consumer
acceptance as legitimate and we therefore are being appropriately
cautious in crafting the standards. We are thus structuring the MY 2021
truck standard to provide appropriate lead time rather than
significantly depending on electrified technologies in the earlier
years of the program.\614\ The MY 2021 truck standard, as shown in
Table III-35, is also projected to require a significant amount of
turbo-charged and downsized engines, in addition to other advanced
technologies. At the same time, we are providing regulatory incentives
and flexibilities to promote further acceptance of electrified
technologies into the pickup truck market sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\613\ The U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars commented:
``Hybrid powertrains have been available on pickup trucks in the
U.S. market since MY 2005. Since that time, some hybrid variants
have been dropped by manufacturers due to the lack of customer
demand. By 2011, in fact, less than one-quarter of a percent (0.23%)
of customers selected the hybrid pickup truck option where it was
available as an option. In contrast, depending on the model, 15% to
50% of customers selected a diesel powertrain when such an option
was offered.'' Docket no. NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.4
\614\ See Table III-35 below, where under alternative 2, we
project that 20% of the vehicle fleet will be MHEV or HEV (the
projection is 18% MHEV) in MY 2021. By comparison, the final rule is
projected to be 13% MHEV & HEV (11% MHEV).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These issues of consumer acceptance are not as pronounced for
smaller light trucks and cars. On an industry basis, single vehicle
models do not similarly dominate these segments. Further, hybrid
electric technology is more common in both passenger cars and the
smaller light truck fleet. Consumer perception of vehicle utility is
also significant for the largest trucks, and greater challenges exist
in convincing truck buyers that hybrid and even other advanced
powertrains can provide equivalent utility, despite these technologies
existing in other market segments.\615\ Finally, as is shown in section
III.D.7, the rate of increase in stringency for smaller trucks and cars
are similar under the final standards, so that the challenges to the
stringency of the truck standards are essentially addressed only to the
larger footprint trucks. As to these vehicles, EPA is being properly
cautious with respect to issues of lead time and consumer acceptances,
as just explained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\615\ When mass reduction technologies and turbo-charged and
downsized engines were introduced to full size pickups, analogous
consumer acceptance challenges were experienced (http://moneyland.time.com/2012/07/31/can-an-aluminum-truck-really-be-considered-ford-tough/), despite the eventual popularity of these
technologies.
[[Page 62867]]
Table III-35--MY 2021 Projected Technology Penetrations for Final Rule and Alternatives 1 and 2 for all Cars and Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Final rule Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Final rule Alt. 1 Alt. 2
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbo-downsize(18 bar).................................. 43 38 50 53 50 58
Turbo-downsize (24 bar)................................. 14 9 19 16 12 24
8 speed DCT............................................. 61 61 62 7 6 7
Cooled EGR*............................................. 11 7 17 16 8 22
Hybrid Electric Vehicle................................. 4 4 5 2 1 2
LRRT2................................................... 72 72 72 74 74 74
IACC2................................................... 71 56 70 64 57 61
GDI..................................................... 60 49 74 73 65 86
MHEV.................................................... 5 4 6 11 7 18
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* In EPA packages TDS27 engines have cooled EGR, nearly all TDS24 engines also have cooled EGR, virtually none of the TDS18 bar engines have cooled EGR
(See Chapter 1 of the RIA).
Table III-36--MY 2021 Projected Technology Penetrations for Final Rule and Alternatives 1 and 2 for Fleet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final rule Alt. 1 Alt. 2
(percent) (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbo-downsize (18 bar)......................................... 46 42 53
Turbo-downsize (24 bar)......................................... 15 10 21
8 speed DCT..................................................... 42 42 43
Cooled EGR...................................................... 12 7 18
Hybrid Electric Vehicle......................................... 4 3 4
LRRT2........................................................... 73 73 73
IACC2........................................................... 68 56 67
GDI............................................................. 65 54 78
MHEV............................................................ 7 5 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-37 shows that in MY 2025, there is only a small change in
many of these technology penetration rates when comparing the final
rule standards to alternative 1 for trucks, and most of the change
shows up in the car fleet. One important exception is mild hybrid
electric vehicles, where the less stringent alternative 1 is projected
to be met with a decrease in penetration of mild HEVs compared to the
final rule standards. As in MY 2021, we see that due to credit transfer
between cars and trucks, the lower level of stringency considered for
trucks in alternative 1 also impacts the car fleet penetration--with
alternative 1 leading to a decrease in penetration of 24 bar turbo-
downsized engines, a decrease in penetration of cooled EGR, a decrease
in penetration of mild HEVs, and a decrease in penetration of electric
vehicles. For the more stringent alternative 2, we see only small
increases in the penetration of many of these technologies projected
for MY 2025, with a major exception being a significant increase (more
than double) in the penetration of HEVs for trucks compared to the
final rule standards, an increase in the penetration of HEVs and MHEVs
for cars compared to the final rule standards, and a small increase in
the penetration of EVs for cars compared to the final rule standards.
Table III-37--MY 2025 Projected Technology Penetrations for Final Rule and Alternatives 1 and 2 for all Cars and Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final rule Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Final rule Alt. 1 Alt. 2
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbo-downsize (18 bar)................................. 25 24 18 19 17 18
Turbo-downsize (24 bar)................................. 63 60 69 67 64 69
8 speed DCT............................................. 79 79 78 9 9 9
Cooled EGR.............................................. 65 57 71 74 72 74
Hybrid Electric Vehicle................................. 4 4 5 5 2 11
EV...................................................... 3.0 2.3 4.6 0.3 0.1 0.5
LRRT2................................................... 96 96 96 99 99 99
IACC2................................................... 73 81 59 55 71 50
GDI..................................................... 93 87 92 97 92 99
MHEV.................................................... 20 13 31 39 27 38
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62868]]
Table III-38--2025 Projected Technology Penetrations for Final Rule and Alternatives 1 and 2 for Fleet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final rule Alt. 1 Alt. 2
(percent) (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbo-downsize (18 bar)......................................... 23 21 18
Turbo-downsize (24 bar)......................................... 64 61 69
8 speed DCT..................................................... 56 56 55
Cooled EGR...................................................... 68 62 72
Hybrid Electric Vehicle......................................... 5 3 7
EV.............................................................. 2.1 1.6 3.3
LRRT2........................................................... 97 97 97
IACC2........................................................... 67 78 56
GDI............................................................. 94 89 94
MHEV............................................................ 26 17 33
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The results are similar for Alternatives 3 and 4, where the truck
standard stays at the final rule level and the car stringency varies,
+20 g/mile and -20 g/mile respectively. Table III-39 presents our
projected per-vehicle cost for the average car, truck and for the fleet
in model years 2021 and 2025 for the final rule and for Alternatives 3
and 4. Compared to the final rule, Alternative 3 (with a MYs 2021 and
2025 car target 20 g/mile less stringent then the final rule) is
considerably less costly on average than the final rule in MY 2021 and
in 2025. Alternative 4 (with a MYs 2021 and 2025 car target 20 g/mile
more stringent then the final rule) is considerably more costly on
average than the final rule in MY 2021 and in MY 2025. The differences
for these alternatives relative to the final rule are even more
pronounced than the differences for Alternatives 1 and 2. As in the
analysis above, the cost increases are greater for more stringent
alternatives than the reduced costs from the less stringent
alternatives.
Table III-39--MYs 2021 and 2025 Fleet Average Projected Per-Vehicle Costs for Final Rule and Alternatives 3 and
4
[2010$/vehicle]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks Fleet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 Final rule................................................. $767 $763 $766
Alternative 3: 2021 Cars + 20................................... 298 388 330
Alternative 4: 2021 Cars-20..................................... 1,422 1,261 1,365
2025 Final rule................................................. 1,726 2,059 1,836
Alternative 3: 2025 Cars + 20................................... 1,151 1,448 1,249
Alternative 4: 2025 Cars-20..................................... 2,556 2,612 2,574
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-40 presents the per-vehicle cost estimates in MY 2021 by
company for the final rule, Alternative 3, and Alternative 4. In
general, for most of the companies our projected results show the same
trends as for the industry as a whole, with Alternative 3 being several
hundred dollars per vehicle less expensive then the final rule, and
Alternative 4 being several hundred dollars per vehicle more expensive
(with larger increment for the more stringent alternative than the less
stringent alternative). In some cases the differences exceed $1,000
(e.g. BMW, Daimler, Geely/Volvo, Spyker/Saab, Suzuki and Tata).
Table III-40--MY 2021 Projected Per-Vehicle Costs for Final Rule and Alternatives 3 and 4 by Company
[Cars & trucks combined, 2010$/vehicle]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alt. 3 (cars + Alt. 4 (cars-
Final rule 20) 20)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW............................................................. $852 -$65 $2,075
Chrysler/Fiat................................................... 733 377 1,206
Daimler......................................................... 1,655 673 3,181
Ferrari......................................................... 6,712 6,712 6,712
Ford............................................................ 746 254 1,403
Geely-Volvo..................................................... 1,698 623 3,151
GM.............................................................. 619 313 1,015
Honda........................................................... 624 327 1,083
Hyundai......................................................... 794 351 1,426
Kia............................................................. 689 353 1,249
Mazda........................................................... 1,010 412 1,920
Mitsubishi...................................................... 791 263 1,562
Nissan.......................................................... 725 282 1,292
Porsche......................................................... 3,871 2,663 4,788
Spyker-Saab..................................................... 2,674 1,308 4,324
Subaru.......................................................... 1,128 474 1,950
Suzuki.......................................................... 1,064 356 2,039
Tata-JLR........................................................ 2,495 1,365 3,723
[[Page 62869]]
Toyota.......................................................... 532 312 857
VW.............................................................. 1,293 215 2,734
Fleet........................................................... 766 330 1,365
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-41 presents the per-vehicle cost estimates in MY 2025 by
company for the final rule, Alternative 3 and Alternative 4. In
general, for most of the companies our projected results show the same
trends as for the industry as a whole, with Alternative 3 less costly
than the final rule, and Alternative 4 more costly. Again these
differences are more pronounced for the car alternatives than the truck
alternatives.
Table III-41--MY 2025 Projected Per-Vehicle Costs for Final Rule and Alternatives 3 and 4 by Company
[Cars & trucks, 2010$/vehicle]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alt. 3 (cars + Alt. 4 (cars-
Final rule 20) 20)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW............................................................. $1,910 $1,102 $3,041
Chrysler/Fiat................................................... 1,950 1,419 2,556
Daimler......................................................... 2,616 1,622 3,826
Ferrari......................................................... 7,864 7,416 7,864
Ford............................................................ 2,025 1,302 2,800
Geely-Volvo..................................................... 2,681 1,647 3,998
GM.............................................................. 1,861 1,400 2,417
Honda........................................................... 1,642 1,105 2,293
Hyundai......................................................... 1,792 1,138 2,666
Kia............................................................. 1,658 1,040 2,452
Mazda........................................................... 2,057 1,284 3,064
Mitsubishi...................................................... 2,015 1,307 2,782
Nissan.......................................................... 1,847 1,244 2,583
Porsche......................................................... 4,044 2,997 5,296
Spyker-Saab..................................................... 3,238 2,059 4,507
Subaru.......................................................... 2,054 1,405 2,893
Suzuki.......................................................... 2,066 1,379 3,070
Tata-JLR........................................................ 3,390 2,264 4,815
Toyota.......................................................... 1,407 1,020 1,971
VW.............................................................. 2,181 1,281 3,471
Fleet........................................................... 1,836 1,249 2,574
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-42 shows that in MY 2021, for several technologies
Alternative 3 leads to lower levels of technology penetration for cars
as well as for trucks compared to the final rule. For example, on cars
there is a decrease in the 18 bar turbo-charged/downsized engines, a
decrease in the penetration of cooled EGR, and a decrease in the
penetration of gasoline direct injection fuel systems. We also see that
due to credit transfer between cars and trucks, the lower level of
stringency considered for cars in alternative 3 also impacts the
penetration of technology to the truck fleet--with alternative 3
leading to a decrease in penetration of 24 bar turbo-downsized engines,
a decrease in penetration of cooled EGR, and a decrease in penetration
of gasoline direct injection fuel systems in the car fleet. For the
more stringent alternative 4, we see increases in the penetration of
many of these technologies projected for MY 2021, for the truck fleet
as well as for the car fleet. Table III-43 shows these same overall
trends but at the sales weighted fleet level in MY 2021.
Table III-42--MY 2021 Projected Technology Penetrations for Final Rule and Alternatives 3 and 4 for all Cars and Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Final rule Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Final rule Alt. 3 Alt. 4
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbo-downsize (18 bar)................................. 43 37 55 53 50 57
Turbo-downsize (24 bar)................................. 14 7 22 16 10 25
8 speed DCT............................................. 61 60 63 7 6 7
Cooled EGR.............................................. 11 5 19 16 8 24
Hybrid Electric Vehicle................................. 4 4 7 2 1 3
LRRT2................................................... 72 72 72 74 74 74
IACC2................................................... 71 48 67 64 52 60
[[Page 62870]]
GDI..................................................... 60 45 84 73 63 87
MHEV.................................................... 5 3 7 11 5 19
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-43--MY 2021 Projected Technology Penetrations for Final Rule and Alternatives 3 and 4 for Fleet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final rule Alt. 3 Alt. 4
Technologies (percent) (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbo-downsize (18 bar)......................................... 46 41 56
Turbo-downsize (24 bar)......................................... 15 8 23
8 speed DCT..................................................... 42 41 43
Cooled EGR...................................................... 12 6 21
Hybrid Electric Vehicle......................................... 4 3 6
LRRT2........................................................... 73 73 73
IACC2........................................................... 68 49 65
GDI............................................................. 65 51 85
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-44 shows that in MY 2025, there are significant
differences in technology penetration rates when comparing the final
rule to alternative 3 for cars, and additional change shows up in the
truck fleet. As compared to the final rule, Alternative 3 would require
approximately half the number of MHEVs, HEVs, and EVs As in MY 2021, we
see that due to credit transfer between cars and trucks, the lower
level of stringency considered for cars in alternative 3 also impacts
the truck fleet penetration--with alternative 3 leading to a
significant decrease in penetration of HEVs and MHEVs. For the more
stringent alternative 4, we see a significant increase in the
penetration of EVs, MHEVs and HEVs for cars compared to the final
rule., Further, we see a sharp increase (a tripling) in the penetration
of HEVs for trucks compared to the final rule.
Table III-44--MY 2025 Projected Technology Penetrations for Final Rule and Alternatives 3 and 4 for all Cars and Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technologies Final rule Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Final rule Alt.3 Alt. 4
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbo-downsize (18 bar)................................. 25 20 16 19 19 19
Turbo-downsize (24 bar)................................. 63 52 67 67 62 67
8 speed DCT............................................. 79 79 77 9 9 8
Cooled EGR.............................................. 65 44 70 74 71 73
Hybrid Electric Vehicle................................. 4 4 6 5 2 15
EV...................................................... 3 1.5 6.5 0 0.0 1.1
LRRT2................................................... 96 96 97 99 98 99
IACC2................................................... 73 86 49 55 76 48
GDI..................................................... 93 76 90 97 92 98
MHEV.................................................... 20 9 45 39 23 35
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-45--MY 2025 Projected Technology Penetrations for Final Rule and Alternatives 3 and 4 for Fleet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final rule Alt. 3 Alt. 4
Technologies (percent) (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbo-downsize (18 bar)......................................... 23 20 16
Turbo-downsize (24 bar)......................................... 64 56 67
8 speed DCT..................................................... 56 56 55
Cooled EGR...................................................... 68 53 71
Hybrid Electric Vehicle......................................... 5 3 9
EV.............................................................. 2 1.0 4.7
LRRT2........................................................... 97 97 98
IACC2........................................................... 67 83 49
GDI............................................................. 94 81 93
MHEV............................................................ 26 13 36
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62871]]
As stated above, EPA's analysis indicates that there is a
technology pathway for all manufacturers to build vehicles that would
meet their final standards as well as the alternative standards.\616\
The differences between the final standards and these analyzed
alternatives lie in the per-vehicle costs and the associated technology
penetrations. We have also shown that the relative rate of increase in
the stringencies of cars and trucks is appropriate such that there is
greater balance among the manufacturers where the distribution of the
burden is relatively evenly spread between cars and trucks, and that
neither standard is disproportionately stringent relative to the other
since the modeled flow of credits between cars and trucks is relatively
equal. By MY 2025, the final rule standards are projected to result in
MHEV or stronger battery technology on 33% of the new vehicle fleet.
Our modeling shows that this level of technology is feasible and cost
effective. In Section I.C of the Preamble, we also showed that the
benefits of the program are significant, and that vehicle purchasers
can recover this cost within the first four years of vehicle ownership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\616\ Except Ferrari.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA's analysis of the four alternatives indicates that under all of
the alternatives the projected response of the manufacturers is to
apply technology to both their car and truck fleets. Whether the car or
truck standard is being changed, and whether it is being made more or
less stringent, the response of the manufacturers is to make changes
across their fleet, in light of their ability to transfer credits
between cars and trucks. For example, Alternatives 1 and 3 make either
car or truck standards less stringent, and keep the other standard as
is. For both alternatives, manufacturers' car and truck fleets each
increase their projected CO2 g/mile level. Similarly, for
alternatives 2 and 4, where either the truck or car fleet standard is
made more stringent, and the other standard is kept as is,
manufacturers reduce the projected CO2 g/mile level achieved
by both their car and trucks fleets, in a generally comparable fashion.
This is summarized in Table III-46 for MY 2025.
Table III-46--A Comparison of the Achieved CO[ihel2] levels in Relation to the Final Achieved Levels for all
Alternative Scenarios in MY 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Change in truck
Change in car achieved achieved level compared
Alternative level compared to final to final rule achieved
rule achieved level level
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1: truck + 20................................................. +6 +10
2: truck -20.................................................. -8 -6
3: car + 20................................................... +12 +13
4: car -20.................................................... -15 -9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This demonstrates that the four alternatives are indicative of what
would happen if EPA increased the stringency of both the car and truck
fleet at the same time, or decreased the stringency of the car and
truck fleet at the same time. E.g., Alternative 4 would be comparable
to an alternative where EPA made the car standard more stringent by 14
g/mile and the truck standard more stringent by 9 g/mile. Under such an
alternative, there would logically be little if any net transfer of
credits between cars and trucks. Similarly, the results from
alternatives 1 and 3 indicate what would be expected if EPA decreased
the stringency of both the car and truck standards, and alternatives 2
and 4 indicate what would happen if EPA increased the stringency of
both the car and truck standards. In general, it appears that
decreasing the stringency of the standards would lead the manufacturers
to comparably increase the CO2 g/mile of both cars and
trucks (alternatives 1 and 3). Increasing the stringency of the car and
truck standards would also generally lead to comparable decreases in g/
mile for both cars and trucks. Again, these analyses (which were
presented at proposal and not directly controverted in any of the
comments) support the relative stringency of the car and truck curves
and their relation to each other. This is because there is not a
disproportionate shift of projected compliance paths from car to truck
improvements, or vice versa, under the final standards or the
alternatives.\617\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\617\ As also noted above, this analysis serves as a response to
those commenters claiming that the truck standard was insufficiently
stringent or created inherent incentives to upsize the light duty
vehicle fleet. The analysis shows no indication that either the
truck or car standards will encourage manufacturers to choose
technology paths that lead to significant over or under compliance
for cars or trucks, on an industry wide level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA is not selecting either alternative 1 or 3 as a final standard.
Under these less stringent alternatives, there would be significantly
less emission reductions (as shown in section III.F.1), and would
therefore forego important benefits that the final standards achieve at
reasonable costs and penetrations of technology. EPA judges that there
is not a good reason to forego such benefits, and is not adopting less
stringent standards such as alternatives 1 and 3. Indeed, although a
handful of commenters urged EPA not to establish MYs 2017-2025
standards at all, no commenters endorsed these specific standard
stringencies.
Alternatives 2 and 4 increase the per vehicle estimates by roughly
$300 and $600, respectively, in MY 2021 and $400 and $700,
respectively, in MY2025. This increase in cost relative to the costs of
the final rule standards stems from the increases in the costlier
electrification technologies, such as HEVs and EVs that we project
these standards would effectively force. The following tables and
charts show the technology penetrations by manufacturer in greater
detail.
Table III-47 and later tables describe the projected penetration
rates for the OEMs of some key technologies in MY 2021 and MY2025 under
the final standards. TDS27, HEV, MHEV, and PHEV+EV technologies
represent the most costly technologies added in the package generation
process, and the OMEGA model generally adds them as one of the last
technology choices for compliance. They are therefore an indicator of
the extent to which the stringency of the standard is pushing the
manufacturers to utilize the most costly technology. Cost (as shown
above) is a similar indicator.
Table III-47 describes technology penetration for MY2021 under the
final rule.
[[Page 62872]]
Table III-47--Percent Projected Penetration of Technologies in MY 2021 for the Final Standards
[Ferrari has been removed from this table]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 Car 2021 Truck 2021 Fleet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW...................................... 28 6 9 21 4 30 5 0 30 0 29 6 7 23 3
Chrysler/Fiat............................ 21 1 0 0 0 19 3 0 11 0 20 2 0 5 0
Daimler.................................. 29 12 7 22 9 28 10 0 30 0 29 11 5 24 7
Ford..................................... 17 1 2 6 0 21 6 2 21 0 19 3 2 11 0
Geely/Volvo.............................. 30 13 13 17 9 30 6 0 30 0 30 11 9 21 6
GM....................................... 15 1 0 0 0 15 5 0 10 0 15 3 0 5 0
Honda.................................... 5 0 3 0 0 18 0 0 4 0 9 0 2 1 0
Hyundai.................................. 14 0 0 1 0 25 0 0 5 0 17 0 0 2 0
Kia...................................... 5 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 5 0 10 0 0 1 0
Mazda.................................... 28 0 0 4 0 28 0 0 14 0 28 0 0 6 0
Mitsubishi............................... 29 0 0 6 0 30 0 3 26 0 29 0 1 13 0
Nissan................................... 19 0 1 0 0 17 3 0 15 0 18 1 1 5 0
Porsche.................................. 28 15 25 5 27 30 11 2 28 0 29 14 20 10 21
Spyker/Saab.............................. 30 15 22 8 14 30 9 2 28 0 30 14 19 11 12
Subaru................................... 29 0 0 19 0 30 0 20 10 0 30 0 5 17 0
Suzuki................................... 30 0 0 25 0 30 0 0 30 0 30 0 0 26 0
Tata/JLR................................. 30 15 25 5 17 30 12 22 8 0 30 13 23 7 9
Toyota................................... 0 0 15 0 0 2 3 5 0 0 1 1 12 0 0
VW....................................... 30 12 1 29 8 30 7 0 30 0 30 11 1 29 6
Fleet.................................... 14 2 4 5 1 16 4 2 11 0 15 3 4 7 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TDS24 = 24 bar bmep Turbo downsized GDI Engines, where most of these are EGR boosted, TDS27 = EGR boosted turbo downsized GDI 24 bar bmep, HEV = Hybrid
Electric Vehicle, MHEV = Mild HEV, EV = Electric Vehicle, PHEV = Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle.
It can be seen from this table that the larger volume manufacturers
have levels of the most advanced technologies, such as plug-in and
electric vehicles, 27 bar BMEP engines, and hybridization that are
significantly below the modeled maximum penetration rates (i.e. the
phase-in caps, described in the next table). On the other hand, some of
the ``luxury'' manufacturers tend to require higher levels of these
technologies than do the broader market manufacturers.\618\ Together
these seven ``luxury'' vehicle manufacturers represent 12% of vehicle
sales and, as shown in Table III-48, their estimated cost of compliance
is considerably higher than for broader market manufacturers in both
MYs 2021 and 2025 regardless of the standard level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\618\ These ``luxury'' manufacturers are BMW, Daimler, Volvo,
Porsche, Saab, Jaguar/LandRover, and VW. Note that we group these
manufacturers here only for sake of differentiation in the analysis
presented in this Section III.D.6. The term ``luxury'' manufacturer,
as used here, carries no regulatory meaning and the use here should
not be confused with any of our compliance flexibilities.
Table III-48--Costs by Alternative for ``Luxury'' Manufacturers vs. Broader Market Manufacturers
[Cars & trucks, 2010$/vehicle]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 2025
---------------------------------------------------------------
Luxury Broad market Luxury Broad market
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary......................................... $1,438 $672 $2,364 $1,763
Alternative 1................................... 1,002 423 2,000 1,430
Alternative 2................................... 1,943 979 2,797 2,165
Alternative 3................................... 410 316 1,439 1,222
Alternative 4................................... 2,819 1,166 3,604 2,432
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Several of the luxury manufacturers, including Porsche and Tata (Jaguar/Land Rover) are eligible for
compliance flexibility based on their sales volumes; therefore, their costs would be lower than the sales
weighted results used to generate the ``luxury'' manufacturer costs presented here.
The caps or limits on the technology phase in rates described in
Chapter 3.4.2 of the joint TSD relate to the remainder of this
discussion. As a modeling tool, EPA imposes upper limits on the
penetration rates allowed under our modeling. These maximum penetration
rates may reflect technical judgments about technology feasibility and
availability, consumer acceptance, lead time, supplier capacity, up-
front investment capital requirements, manufacturability, and other
reasons as detailed in Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD. The maximum
penetration rates are not a judgment that rates below that cap are
practical or reasonable.\619\ Table III-49 summarizes the caps on the
phase in rates of some of the key technologies. A projected penetration
rate that approaches the caps for these technologies for a given
manufacturer is an indication of how much that manufacturer is being
``pushed'' to the limits of available technology by the standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\619\ For example, in MY 2010, there were 3% HEVs in the new
vehicle fleet. In MYs 2016, 2021 and 2025 we project that the cap on
this technology penetration rate increases to 15%, 30% and 50%
respectively. In MY 2010, there were practically no PH/EVs. In MYs
2016, 2021, and 2025 we project that this cap on technology
penetration rate increases to approximately 5%, 10%, and 15%
respectively for EVs and PHEVs separately. These highly complex
technologies also have the slowest penetration phase-in rates to
reflect the relatively long lead time required to implement into
substantial fractions of the fleet subject to the manufacturers'
product redesign schedules. In contrast, an advanced technology for
improved engine design still under development, TDS27, has a cap on
penetration phase in rate in MYs 2016, 2021, and 2025 of 0%, 15%,
and 50%, indicative of a longer lead time to develop the technology,
but a relatively faster phase in rate once the technology is
``ready'' (consistent with other ``conventional'' evolutionary
improvements).
[[Page 62873]]
Table III-49--Phase-in Rates for Some Key Advanced Technologies
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2021 2025
Technology (percent) (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turbocharging & downsizing with EGR Level 1 (w/cooled EGR, 24 15 30 75
bar)...........................................................
Turbocharging & downsizing with EGR Level 2 (w/cooled EGR, 27 0 15 50
bar)...........................................................
Mild and StrongHybrid........................................... 15 30 50
Plug-in Hybrid.................................................. 5 10 14
Electric Vehicle................................................ 6 11 15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-50 shows the technology penetrations for Alternative 2.
In MY2021, penetration rates of truck mild and strong HEVs doubles in
comparison to the final rule. The Ford truck fleet increases the MHEV
penetration significantly relative to the final rule in Alternative 2.
There are other significant increases in the larger manufacturers
and even more dramatic increases in the HEV penetration in smaller
manufacturers' fleets. There are also now six manufacturers with total
fleet PH/EV penetration rates equal to 9% or greater.
The broader market manufacturers have an estimated per vehicle cost
of compliance with 2021 alternative 2 standards of roughly $1,000 which
is roughly $300 more than under the final standards (see Table III-48,
above). The seven ``luxury'' vehicle manufacturers now have estimated
costs in 2021 of roughly $1,950, which is roughly $500 higher than the
final standards (See Table III-48, above).
Table III-50--Percent Penetration of Technologies in MY 2021 for Alternative 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 Car 2021 Truck 2021 Fleet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW...................................... 28 6 12 18 7 30 9 0 30 0 29 7 9 21 5
Chrysler/Fiat............................ 28 1 0 3 0 27 3 0 21 0 28 2 0 11 0
Daimler.................................. 30 13 16 14 13 28 10 0 30 0 29 13 12 18 10
Ford..................................... 26 1 2 12 0 29 6 2 27 0 27 3 2 17 0
Geely/Volvo.............................. 30 14 21 9 14 30 6 4 26 0 30 11 16 14 10
GM....................................... 25 1 0 2 0 24 5 0 23 0 25 3 0 12 0
Honda.................................... 10 0 3 0 0 18 0 0 6 0 12 0 2 2 0
Hyundai.................................. 17 0 0 1 0 25 0 0 5 0 18 0 0 2 0
Kia...................................... 12 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 5 0 15 0 0 1 0
Mazda.................................... 30 0 0 11 0 29 0 1 21 0 30 0 0 12 0
Mitsubishi............................... 30 0 3 26 0 30 0 4 26 1 30 0 4 26 1
Nissan................................... 21 0 1 0 0 25 3 0 18 0 22 1 1 6 0
Porsche.................................. 28 15 25 5 30 30 11 13 17 0 29 14 23 7 23
Spyker/Saab.............................. 30 15 22 8 17 30 9 2 28 0 30 14 19 11 14
Subaru................................... 29 0 14 15 0 30 0 20 10 0 30 0 15 14 0
Suzuki................................... 30 0 19 7 0 30 0 0 30 0 30 0 15 11 0
Tata/JLR................................. 25 15 26 4 30 30 12 22 8 0 27 13 24 6 15
Toyota................................... 4 0 15 0 0 19 3 5 8 0 10 1 11 3 0
VW....................................... 30 15 1 29 11 30 7 0 30 0 30 13 1 29 9
Fleet.................................... 19 2 5 6 2 24 4 2 18 0 21 3 4 10 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-51 shows the technology penetrations for Alternative 4
for MY 2021. The large volume manufacturer, Ford now has a significant
increase compared to the final standards of truck MHEVs and the fleet
MHEV penetration has gone up significantly for this company in
comparison to the final standards.
Cars for several manufacturers now reach closer to the maximum
technology penetration cap of 30% for HEVs. Also, there are now six
manufacturers with fleet PH/EV penetration rates greater than 10%.
The broader market manufacturers now have an estimated per vehicle
cost of compliance with 2021 alternative 4 standards of roughly $1,200,
which is approximately $600 higher than the final standards. The seven
``luxury'' vehicle manufacturers now have estimated costs of roughly
$2,800, which is approximately $1,100 higher than the final standard
(See Table III-48, above). For the seven luxury manufacturers, this per
vehicle cost in MY 2021 exceeds the full fleet costs under the final
rule for complying with the considerably more stringent 2025 standards.
[[Page 62874]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.021
Table III-52 shows the technology penetrations for the final
standards in MY 2025. The larger volume manufacturers have levels of
advanced technologies that are below the maximum penetration rates
though there are some notably high penetration rates for truck HEVs for
Ford and Nissan. For the fleet in general, we note a 2% penetration
rate of PHEVs and EVs, which coincidentally is similar to the current
penetration rate of HEVs. It has taken approximately 10 years for HEV
penetration to reach this level, without an increase in the stringency
of passenger car CAFE standards. Therefore, EPA believes that there is
sufficient lead time for PHEVs and EVs to reach this level of
penetration by 2025.
[[Page 62875]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.022
All of the luxury manufacturers have significant MHEV penetrations.
Several luxury manufacturers reach the maximum MHEV penetration cap on
their truck portion of their fleet. 6 of the 7 luxury vehicle
manufacturers also have greater than 10% penetration of PH/EVs (which
has a total cap of 29%). Several companies have large penetration rates
(>15%) of TDS27, such as Jaguar/LandRover, BMW, and Geely.
The estimated per vehicle cost of compliance with 2025 final
standards is roughly $1,800 for the broader market manufacturers and
roughly $2,400 for the seven ``luxury'' vehicle manufacturers.
Table III-53 shows the technology penetrations for Alternative 2 in
MY 2025. In this alternative, Chrysler trucks increase their
penetration of HEVs. GM has a large increase in truck HEVs, and
PHEVs+EVs as well. Toyota also has an increased number of HEVs. In this
alternative there are many more companies with a significant number of
HEVs. As we noted at proposal when presenting this type of analysis,
these penetration rates may well be overly aggressive in the face of
uncertain consumer acceptance of both the added costs and the
technologies themselves. 76 FR 75082. EPA continues to believe
[[Page 62876]]
that these technology penetration rates are inappropriate given the
concerns just voiced.\620\ The estimated per vehicle cost of compliance
with 2025 alternative 2 standards is roughly $2,200, which is roughly
$400 higher than the final standards. The seven luxury vehicle
manufacturers now have costs of roughly $2,800, which is roughly $400
higher than the final standards. See Table III-48 above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\620\ ACEEE stated that the more stringent alternative was
preferable because ``[t]hese alternatives adhere to technology
penetration rates that fall within the caps set by EPA to ensure
feasibility.'' ACEEE Comments p. 8. However, the technology caps
reflect the physical limits of technical capability, as explained
above. That so many manufacturers are pushing up against those
limits in this analysis raises legitimate issues of not only lead
time and cost, but consumer acceptance as well. ACEEE's further
comment that the truck standards should be more stringent in light
of the incentives for advanced technologies for pickup trucks (ACEEE
Comments p. 8) simply questions the agencies' policy judgment that
it is more appropriate to encourage introduction of these advanced
technologies into the large pickup truck sector by means of
incentives, rather than to try and compel the technologies'
penetration through more stringent standards, with the attendant
issues just noted of rejection due to cost and consumer acceptance.
Moreover, for the final rule, EPA modeled the incentives for large
pickup trucks in its cost analysis and the results strongly support
the decision not to adopt the more stringent alternative standards.
See section d below. In addition, the agencies' policy choice is
further appropriate as not creating an incentive to reduce pickup
truck utility as a compliance strategy, as noted in section II.C
above.
Table III-53--Percent Penetration of Technologies in MY 2025 for Alternative 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car Truck Fleet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW...................................... 51 20 7 43 16 65 19 0 50 0 55 20 5 45 12
Chrysler/Fiat............................ 73 3 3 45 4 70 8 9 41 1 72 5 5 44 2
Daimler.................................. 56 14 4 46 21 58 23 0 50 0 56 16 3 47 16
Ford..................................... 70 4 6 37 5 64 20 28 23 1 68 9 13 33 4
Geely/Volvo.............................. 44 24 5 45 24 72 6 0 50 0 53 18 3 47 17
GM....................................... 72 3 1 41 4 67 15 15 35 0 70 9 8 38 2
Honda.................................... 73 0 3 14 0 75 0 2 41 0 73 0 3 22 0
Hyundai.................................. 75 0 0 23 0 75 0 0 50 0 75 0 0 28 0
Kia...................................... 75 0 0 9 0 75 0 0 50 0 75 0 0 17 0
Mazda.................................... 75 0 4 45 2 75 0 5 45 2 75 0 4 45 2
Mitsubishi............................... 74 0 3 46 8 70 0 7 43 2 73 0 4 45 6
Nissan................................... 74 0 0 41 2 70 9 17 33 2 73 3 5 38 2
Porsche.................................. 52 9 2 48 37 61 28 0 50 0 54 13 1 49 29
Spyker/Saab.............................. 65 8 2 48 22 65 19 0 50 0 65 10 1 49 19
Subaru................................... 75 0 11 35 6 75 0 12 38 5 75 0 12 36 6
Suzuki................................... 75 0 16 34 7 75 0 0 50 0 75 0 13 37 6
Tata/JLR................................. 13 22 20 30 45 59 33 33 17 0 34 27 26 24 24
Toyota................................... 63 1 15 13 0 68 8 6 43 0 65 4 12 24 0
VW....................................... 70 2 1 49 18 69 11 0 50 0 70 4 1 49 14
Fleet.................................... 69 3 5 31 5 69 11 11 38 1 69 6 7 33 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-54 shows the technology penetrations for Alternative 4 in
2025. In this alternative every company has a significant fraction of
MHEVS and HEVs. Many of the large volume manufacturers have even more
dramatic increases in the volumes of P/H/EVs than in Alternative 2.
The estimated per vehicle cost of compliance with 2025 alternative
4 standards is roughly $2,600, which is approximately $700 higher than
the final standards. The seven luxury vehicle manufacturers now have
costs of roughly $3,600, which is approximately $1,200 higher than the
final standards. Much of this non-linear increase in cost is due to
increased penetration of PHEVs and EVs (more so than HEVs).
Table III-54--Percent Penetration of Technologies in MY 2025 for Alternative 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car Truck Fleet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV TDS24 TDS27 HEV MHEV PHEV+EV
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW...................................... 48 20 7 43 22 65 19 0 50 0 52 20 5 45 16
Chrysler/Fiat............................ 72 3 3 47 4 69 8 10 40 1 71 5 6 44 2
Daimler.................................. 52 14 4 46 29 58 23 0 50 0 54 16 3 47 23
Ford..................................... 70 4 6 43 8 62 20 30 21 2 68 9 13 37 6
Geely/Volvo.............................. 30 23 14 36 30 72 6 0 50 0 42 18 10 40 21
GM....................................... 72 3 1 41 2 67 15 15 35 0 70 9 8 38 1
Honda.................................... 73 0 4 29 2 75 0 8 42 2 73 0 5 33 2
Hyundai.................................. 75 0 5 45 3 75 0 0 50 0 75 0 4 46 3
Kia...................................... 75 0 2 36 3 75 0 0 50 0 75 0 1 39 3
Mazda.................................... 66 0 11 39 9 63 0 15 35 5 65 0 11 39 9
Mitsubishi............................... 71 0 10 40 12 70 0 7 43 2 70 0 9 41 9
Nissan................................... 74 0 4 46 5 62 9 23 27 3 71 3 9 40 4
Porsche.................................. 46 5 5 45 45 50 50 39 11 0 47 15 12 38 35
Spyker/Saab.............................. 56 8 2 48 34 65 19 0 50 0 57 10 1 49 30
Subaru................................... 74 0 11 39 10 48 0 34 16 10 68 0 16 33 10
Suzuki................................... 44 0 40 10 14 75 0 0 50 0 50 0 33 17 12
Tata/JLR................................. 13 22 20 30 45 59 41 50 0 0 34 31 34 16 24
Toyota................................... 63 1 14 21 0 68 8 16 37 1 65 4 15 27 0
VW....................................... 65 2 1 49 26 69 11 0 50 0 66 3 1 49 21
Fleet.................................... 67 3 6 37 7 67 11 15 35 1 67 6 9 36 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62877]]
d. Summary of the Technology Penetration Rates and Costs From the
Alternative Scenarios in Relation to the Final Standards
As described above, alternatives 2 and 4 would lead to significant
increases in the penetration of advanced technologies into the fleet
during the time frame of these standards. In general, both alternatives
would lead to an increase in the average penetration rate for advanced
technologies in MY 2021, in effect accelerating some of the technology
penetration that would otherwise occur in the MYs 2022-2025 timeframe.
As discussed above, EPA maintains lead time concerns about requiring
aggressive technology penetration early in this time period subsequent
to the advances in stringency during the MYs 2012-2016. In MY 2025,
these alternatives would dramatically affect penetration rates of
MHEVs, HEVs, EVs, and PHEVs, in each case leading to significant
increases on average for the fleet. Again, Alternative 4 would lead to
greater penetration rates than Alternative 2. When one considers the
technology penetration rates for individual manufacturers, in MY 2021
the alternatives lead to much higher increases than average for some
individual large volume manufacturers. Smaller volume manufacturers
start out with higher penetration rates and are pushed to even higher
levels. This result is even more pronounced in MY 2025.
This increase in technology penetration rates raises serious
concerns about the ability and likelihood manufacturers can smoothly
implement the increased technology penetration in a fleet that has so
far seen limited usage of these technologies, especially for trucks--
and for towing trucks in particular. While this is more pronounced for
2025, the lead time issues discussed previously remain for MY 2021 and
earlier years.. Although EPA believes that these penetration rates are,
in the narrow sense, technically achievable, it is more a question of
judgment whether we are confident at this time that these increased
rates of advanced technology usage can be practically and smoothly
implemented into the fleet. This concern is one reason the agencies are
attempting to encourage more utilization of these advanced technologies
with the advanced technology incentive programs but being reasonably
prudent in not adopting standards that could as a practical matter
force high degrees of penetration of these technologies on towing
trucks.\621\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\621\ See 76 FR 57220 discussing a similar issue in the context
of the standards for heavy duty pickups and vans: ``Hybrid electric
technology likewise could be applied to heavy-duty vehicles, and in
fact has already been so applied on a limited basis. However, the
development, design, and tooling effort needed to apply this
technology to a vehicle model is quite large, and seems less likely
to prove cost-effective in this time frame, due to the small sales
volumes relative to the light-duty sector. Here again, potential
customer acceptance would need to be better understood because the
smaller engines that facilitate much of a hybrid's benefit are
typically at odds with the importance pickup truck buyers place on
engine horsepower and torque, whatever the vehicle's real
performance''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA notes that the same concerns support the final decision to
steepen the slope of the truck curve in acknowledgement of the special
challenges these larger footprint trucks (which in many instances are
towing vehicles) would face. Without the steepening, the penetration
rates of these challenging technologies would have been even greater.
From a cost point of view, the impacts on cost track fairly closely
with the technology penetration rates discussed above. The average cost
increases under Alternatives 2 and 4 are significant for 2021
(approximately $300 and $600), and for some manufacturers they result
in very large cost increases. For 2025 the cost increases are even
higher (approximately $400 and $700). Alternative 4, as expected, is
significantly more costly than alternative 2. From another perspective,
the average cost of compliance to the industry on average is $12 and
$31 billion for the MYs 2021 and 2025 final standards, respectively.
Alternative 2 will cost the industry on average $5 and $7 billion in
excess, while Alternative 4 will cost the industry on average $9 and
$13 billion in excess of the costs for the final standards. These are
large increases in percentage terms, ranging from approximately 40% to
70% in MY 2021, and from approximately 20% to 40% in MY 2025.
Under the more stringent alternatives, per vehicle costs would also
increase dramatically, including for some of the largest, full-line
manufacturers. Under Alternative 2, per vehicle costs for the large
volume manufacturers increase roughly 50% to meet the 2021 standards
and roughly 20% to meet the 2025 standards (see Table III-48, above).
The per-vehicle costs to meet Alternative 4 for these manufacturers are
roughly 75% in MY 2021 and 40% in MY 2025 (see Table III-48, above).
As noted, these cost increases are associated especially with
increased utilization of advanced technologies. As shown in Figure III-
3 below, HEV+PHEV+EV penetration are projected to increase in MY 2025
from 6% in the final standards, to 11% and nearly 13% under
Alternatives 2 and 4, respectively, for manufacturers with annual sales
above 500,000 vehicles (including Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai,
Nissan, Toyota, and VW). The differences are less pronounced for MY
2021, but still (in alternative 4) over double the penetration level of
the final rule. EPA regards these differences as significant, given the
factors of expense, consumer cost, consumer acceptance, and potentially
(for MY 2021) lead time.
The figures below also do not show the significant penetration of
mild hybrid technology into the fleet. Under the primary scenario, we
project mild hybrid penetration of approximately 26% for the larger
manufacturers, which rises to 33% and 37% under the two more stringent
alternatives.
[[Page 62878]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.023
Figure III-4 below shows the HEV+PHEV+EV penetration for
manufacturers with sales below 500,000 but exceeding 30,000 (including
BMW, Daimler, Volvo, Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Porsche, Subaru, Suzuki,
and Jaguar/LandRover while excluding Aston Martin, Ferrari, Lotus,
Saab, and Tesla). While the penetration rates of these advanced
technologies also increase, the distribution within these are shifting
to the higher cost EVs and PHEVs as noted above.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.024
EPA modeled a number of flexibilities when conducting the analysis
for the FRM. Unlike in the proposal, where PHEV, EV, and fuel cell
vehicle incentive multipliers for 2017-2021, full size pickup truck HEV
incentive credits, full size pickup truck performance based incentive
credits, and off-cycle credits, were not modeled, we have included the
full size pickup truck incentive credits and some off-cycle credits in
our cost analysis.\622\ These credits reduce the estimated costs of the
program for most manufacturers relative to the proposal. The average
(non A/C) projected credit usage by manufacturer is approximately 2.7
grams (Table III-3). From an industry wide perspective, the overall
impact on costs, technology penetration, and emissions reductions and
other benefits is limited, as seen in projected costs and technology
[[Page 62879]]
penetrations that are largely similar to those from the proposal. The
new analysis demonstrates that these credits provide important
flexibility in achieving the final levels and promoting more advanced
technology and supports the reasonableness of the final standards. As
shown in the previously presented technology projections, the standards
and off-cycle credits appropriately encourage technologies that will
yield real benefit that is not reflected on the two cycle compliance
test. Relative to the NPRM modeling, which did not consider the off-
cycle credits, there is a significant increase in the modeled
projections of start-stop technology. In the proposal, only 15% of the
MY 2025 control case fleet was projected to receive start stop
technology.\623\ By contrast, in the analysis presented here,
approximately 45% of vehicles have technologies that shut off engine at
stop.\624\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\622\ We did not model the manufacturer minimums as a
requirement for the pick-up truck credits. See section III.C for a
discussion of these minimums, and EPA RIA Chapter 3 for a table of
credits by company.
\623\ 76 FR 75050. Of this 15%, nearly all are HEVs.
\624\ These vehicles are a mixture of MHEVS (26%), HEVs (5%) and
start-stop (15%).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall, EPA believes that the characteristics and impacts of these
and other alternative standards generally reflect a continuum in terms
of technical feasibility, cost, lead time, consumer impacts, emissions
reductions and oil savings, and other factors evaluated under section
202(a). In determining the appropriate standard to adopt in this
context, EPA judges that the final standards are appropriate and
preferable to more stringent alternatives based largely on
consideration of cost--both to manufacturers and to consumers--and the
potential for overly aggressive penetration rates for advanced
technologies relative to the penetration rates seen in the final
standards, especially in the face of unknown degree of consumer
acceptance of both the increased costs and of the technologies
themselves. At the same time, the final rule helps to address these
issues by providing incentives to promote early and broader deployment
of advanced technologies, and so provides a means of encouraging their
further penetration while leaving manufacturers alternative technology
choices. EPA thus judges that the increase in technology penetration
rates and the increase in costs under the increased stringency for the
car and truck fleets reflected in alternatives 2 and 4 are such that it
would not be appropriate to propose standards that would increase the
stringency of the car and truck fleets in this manner.
The two tables below show the year on year costs as described in
greater detail in Chapter 5 of the RIA. These projections show a steady
increase in costs from 2017 thru 2025 (as interpolated).
Table III-55--Costs by Manufacturer by MY--Combined Fleet (2010$)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Company 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW........................................................... $193 $386 $531 $673 $852 $1,283 $1,565 $1,826 $1,910
Chrysler/Fiat................................................. 180 314 416 521 733 1,092 1,454 1,799 1,950
Daimler....................................................... 349 723 1,014 1,305 1,655 2,242 2,460 2,652 2,616
Ferrari....................................................... 1,720 3,250 4,403 5,565 6,712 7,280 7,763 8,174 7,864
Ford.......................................................... 133 291 412 517 746 1,102 1,491 1,860 2,025
Geely-Volvo................................................... 412 794 1,075 1,357 1,698 2,366 2,567 2,746 2,681
GM............................................................ 125 241 333 418 619 940 1,322 1,684 1,861
Honda......................................................... 110 241 343 448 624 883 1,194 1,497 1,642
Hyundai....................................................... 166 343 477 611 794 1,105 1,400 1,679 1,792
Kia........................................................... 123 269 388 511 689 957 1,251 1,532 1,658
Mazda......................................................... 193 430 606 775 1,010 1,312 1,634 1,942 2,057
Mitsubishi.................................................... 148 321 438 565 791 1,055 1,455 1,831 2,015
Nissan........................................................ 136 290 411 531 725 1,022 1,369 1,697 1,847
Porsche....................................................... 39 62 1,734 2,447 3,871 4,790 4,672 4,534 4,044
Spyker-Saab................................................... 703 1,304 1,754 2,205 2,674 3,185 3,315 3,422 3,238
Subaru........................................................ 262 505 673 854 1,128 1,337 1,655 1,951 2,054
Suzuki........................................................ 50 66 477 651 1,064 1,377 1,686 1,972 2,066
Tata-JLR...................................................... 31 61 1,057 1,486 2,495 3,891 3,832 3,756 3,390
Toyota........................................................ 94 210 299 380 532 780 1,043 1,291 1,407
Volkswagen.................................................... 311 602 825 1,044 1,293 1,749 1,972 2,176 2,181
Fleet......................................................... 154 311 438 557 766 1,115 1,425 1,718 1,836
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-56--Industry Average Vehicle Costs Associated With the Final Standards (2009$)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model Year 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$/car......................................................... $206 $374 $510 $634 $767 $1,079 $1,357 $1,622 $1,726
$/truck....................................................... 57 196 304 415 763 1,186 1,562 1,914 2,059
Combined...................................................... 154 311 438 557 766 1,115 1,425 1,718 1,836
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure III-5 below shows graphically the year on year average costs
presented in Table III-56 with the per vehicle costs on the left axis
and the projected CO2 target standards on the right axis. It
is quite evident and intuitive that as the stringency of the standard
gets tighter, the average per vehicle costs increase. It is also clear
that the costs for cars exceed that of trucks for the early years of
the program, but then truck costs exceed car costs for the years 2022
through 2025. It is interesting to note that the slower rate of
progression of the standards for trucks seems to result in a slower
rate of increase in costs for both cars and trucks. This initial slower
rate of stringency for trucks is appropriate due primarily to concerns
over lead time relative to the standards and disproportionately higher
costs for adding technologies to trucks than cars, as described in
Section III.D.6.b above. The figure below corroborates these
[[Page 62880]]
conclusions and further demonstrates that based on the smooth
progression of average costs (from MYs 2017-2025), the year on year
increase in stringency of the standards is also reasonable. Though
there are undoubtedly a range of minor modifications that could be made
to the progression of standards, EPA believes that the progression is
reasonable and appropriate. Also, EPA believes that any progression of
standards that significantly deviates from the final standards (such as
those in Alternatives 1 through 4) are much less appropriate for the
reasons provided in the discussion above.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.025
7. Comments Received on the Analysis of Technical Feasibility and
Appropriateness of the Standards
Several comments were received on the feasibility of the standards.
These comments addressed the standards' technical feasibility, their
feasibility for small manufacturers, and the relative stringency of the
car and truck standards.
In comments on the overall feasibility of the proposed standards,
some organizations, such as American Chemistry Council, Hyundai, Kia,
and NADA affirmed the technical feasibility of the proposed standards.
Other organizations, such as the Center for Biological Diversity,
International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), Northeast States
for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM), and the Union of
Concerned Scientists commented that more stringent standards would also
be technically feasible. Several comments were submitted that the
technological feasibility of the full program would not be known until
the mid-term evaluation (Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, Alliance, Global
Automakers). EPA agrees with commenters that this program is
technically feasible and cost-effective. As shown in the analysis
earlier in this section, significant reductions can be made in tailpipe
GHG emissions with technology that is either currently available, or
available in the near term.
Lead time is a significant component of technical feasibility, and
several comments were received with regard to the appropriateness of
the lead time provided to meet the standards. Consumers' Union,
Hyundai, and Kia commented that the amount of lead time provided by
this rulemaking was appropriate. In contrast, Mitsubishi, Suzuki and
Chrysler commented on the difficulty of forecasting consumer
preferences into the future, and were therefore concerned as to the
number of model years covered by the rules, even though not questioning
that the rules provide sufficient lead time to meet the standards. The
ICCT and CBD both commented that the long lead time should virtually
eliminate costs of stranded capital. EPA agrees that the long lead time
in this rulemaking should provide additional certainty to manufacturers
in their product planning. EPA believes that there are several factors
that have quickened the pace with which new technologies are being
brought to market, and this will also facilitate regulatory compliance.
These factors are discussed in Technical
[[Page 62881]]
Support Document section 3.4. EPA plans to assess consumer acceptance
of vehicles produced under the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, as well as
under this rulemaking, during the mid-term evaluation. Indeed, the mid-
term evaluation is a chief mechanism for evaluating the assumptions on
which the standards are based, and so addresses comments such as those
of Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and Chrysler.
EPA agrees with the commenters that the analyses supporting this
final rulemaking have demonstrated the feasibility of these standards,
particularly as further supported by the number of vehicles today which
meet the MY 2017 (and later) standards (see III.D.8 below). However, as
discussed earlier in Section III.D.6, our analyses have shown that
increasing the stringency beyond the promulgated levels would add
significant cost with diminishing additional benefit, and for light
trucks, potentially leading to overly aggressive penetration rates of
certain advanced technologies, raising issues of lead time, costs, and
consumer acceptance, as well as creating incentives to comply by
reducing vehicle utility. As such, EPA has not made changes to increase
or decrease the overall stringency across the car and truck fleets from
the levels proposed.
Several comments addressed the feasibility of the standards for
smaller manufacturers. As an example, Jaguar/Land Rover, and Porsche
commented that the technology penetrations the agency projected for
their companies were too severe, disproportionate to improvements
needed for other companies to comply with the standards, and requested
additional lead time to meet the standards. EPA's analyses tend to
confirm the thrust of these comments. See, e.g. Table III-47 and Table
III-48 and accompanying text above. In light of the comments regarding
smaller manufacturers, EPA is finalizing provisions to allow
intermediate volume manufacturers some amount of additional lead time
out to MY 2021. Details of this alternative standard, and the rationale
for it, can be found in Section III.B.6.
The comments on the relative car and truck stringency were largely
divided between NGOs and OEMs (typically manufacturers of smaller
trucks) that were concerned with the shape and relative rate of
increase of the truck curve, and OEMs (typically manufacturers of
larger trucks) who expressed concern about their ability to comply with
a large truck standard that continued to increase in stringency at the
rate of the MY 2016 standard. For example, Ford Motor Company
commented: ``Ford also believes that the relative stringency levels for
the car and truck fleets, as proposed by the agencies, are appropriate
* * *. In terms of the product actions necessary to comply, the
proposed car and truck standards are roughly equivalent in stringency.
This is attributable to the unique attributes expected from trucks--
particularly the larger work trucks that constitute a significant
portion of our full-line vehicle fleet offering--and also to the overly
stringent standards imposed on light duty trucks in the 2012-2016 model
year regulation.'' General Motors submitted comments that the company
``supports the target standard curve shapes, [and] the relative car and
truck stringency.'' Chrysler submitted similar comments. The UAW
commented that ``In particular the UAW supports the aspects of the
proposals that recognize the importance of balancing the challenges of
adding fuel-economy improving technologies to the largest light trucks
with the need to maintain the full functionality of these vehicles
across a wide range of applications.''
As mentioned above, several commenters raised concerns about the
relative stringency between cars and trucks. ACEEE commented that
``[t]he weakness of the standards at the large footprint end of the
light truck spectrum not only will result in a direct loss in GHG
reductions relative to what would have been saved with a uniform five
percent annual emissions reduction across all classes, but also runs
the risk of pushing production towards that larger end.'' Honda
commented that it was ``concerned that the relative stringency between
small footprint light trucks and large footprint light trucks diverge
dramatically from one another, and that the stringency increases fall
disproportionately on the smaller foot-print light trucks. Consumer's
Union stated that ``[t]here are several strong indicators that the gap
between the curves is too large.'' The ICCT wrote: ``the 2017-2025 rule
increased the gap between cars and light trucks, providing stronger
incentives for manufacturers to reclassify cars as light trucks and
potentially undermining the benefits of the rule.'' The agencies
received similar comments from several mass comment campaigns (Union of
Concerned Scientists, NACAA, NRDC), and other NGOs. VW, Toyota, and
Nissan also expressed similar concerns, with Toyota stating ``we remain
concerned about two aspects of the proposed standards. First, the
targets for trucks require a lower average rate of improvement than for
cars. And second, the targets for larger trucks require a lower average
rate of improvement than smaller trucks.''
EPA recognizes that significant differences in the year-to-year
stringency for cars and trucks could lead to the result of an
increasingly widening gap between the car and truck curves and increase
the incentives to reclassify cars as light trucks, thus undermining the
fuel economy and greenhouse gas reduction benefits of the standards.
However, even with reduced stringency of the truck standard in the
early model years of the rule, the trend of a gradually widening gap
during this period is reversed during the MY 2021-2025 period. As shown
in Table III-57, by MY 2025 the gap for larger footprint vehicles is at
levels similar to the MY 2012-2016 rule, while for smaller footprint
vehicles, the gap is less than during the MY 2012-2016 rule. EPA
believes that the increase in stringency for the truck standard in the
latter phase of the rule is a reasonable approach for avoiding a large
gap between car and truck curves while also taking account of the
challenges of implementing efficiency technologies in trucks during the
first phase of the rule as explained in Section III.D.6 above.
Table III-57--Gap Between Car and Truck Curves, MYs 2012-2025 (g/mile)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller Footprint Vehicles............................ 50 47 47 44 41 43.4 41.9 44.2 45.8 38.2 35.5 33.1 30.8 28.6
(left car cutpoint = 41 sq. ft.)......................
Larger Footprint Vehicles \a\......................... 39.8 37.9 36.6 33.3 30.3 44.0 48.1 51.8 54.3 44.6 41.3 38.5 35.8 33.5
(right car cutpoint = 56 sq. ft.).....................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Vehicles with footprints of approximately 56 sq. ft. include the MY 2010 Lincoln Town Car, and Toyota Tacoma. Only a few MY 2010 cars have
footprints greater than 56 sq. ft.
[[Page 62882]]
EPA's determination of the standards was based on considerations of
the technical differences between the cars and trucks, as described in
Chapter 2 of the Joint TSD and Section II.C of the Preamble. As
compared to the MY 2016 standard, the gap between the MY 2025 car and
truck targets decreases in the smaller footprint range where these
regulatory classes share the most design attributes, and the target
curves appropriately reflect differences in the vehicle characteristics
at the larger footprint end (see discussion in TSD chapter 2.4.2) As a
result, the car and truck curves developed from this analysis exhibit
differences in both the relative level of the target at a given
footprint, and the overall stringency as standards increase year-to-
year. EPA believes that the final standards reasonably balance the
issues and address the concerns raised by commenters, resulting in
significant CO2 emissions reductions using technologies that
can be feasibly adopted over the rulemaking timeframe. It is important
to note that while it was not an express goal of the EPA's analysis or
standards to distribute compliance burdens equitably among
manufacturers and vehicle types, we believe that the promulgated
standards will do just that, by promoting emissions reductions across
the full range of vehicles. Furthermore, by considering the technical
features unique to cars and trucks at all footprint sizes, the
standards avoid the technically inappropriate result of the car and
truck curves converging at footprint levels at which cars and truck
properties are most different.
With regard to the year-to-year increase in stringency, the
promulgated standards encourage manufacturers to apply additional
technologies throughout the rulemaking timeframe. The standards are
based on footprint, and increase in stringency at all vehicle
sizes.\625\ The year-to-year stringency for trucks is in general lower
than cars in the early years of the program, in consideration of the
technical challenges involved in applying efficiency technologies to
these vehicles as well as lead time concerns relative to the early
years of the programs. Moreover, EPA recognizes that trucks do not
uniformly face the same technical challenges,\626\ and the standards
reflect these differences. Thus, the promulgated standards promote
similar levels of emission reductions for smaller trucks and for cars
of the same size. For example, the average year-to-year increase in the
target level over the entire MY 2017-2025 period is identical for cars
and trucks at the 41 sq. ft. curve cutpoint (5.1 percent per year), and
is nearly the same over the initial MY 2017-2021 period (4.8 and 4.5
percent per year, for cars and trucks, respectively.) Some commenters
expressed concern that manufactures will use the initially lower truck
standards to delay implementation of efficient technologies, and then
use this circumstance to argue in the mid-term evaluation for relaxed
standards. EPA does not believe this concern in justified, since the
mid-term evaluation will occur before many of these vehicles are in
production. EPA will carefully monitor this issue during the mid-term
evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\625\ This was achieved by applying a proportional year-to-year
increase (multiplicative) to the target at every footprint level,
unlike the MY 2012-2016 rule in which a constant-value (additive)
increase was applied by offsetting curves vertically.
\626\ See preamble II.C for discussion of these technical
challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. To what extent do any of today's vehicles meet or surpass the final
MY 2017-2025 CO2 footprint-based targets with current
powertrain designs?
In addition to the analysis discussed above regarding what
technologies could be added to vehicles in order to achieve the
projected CO2 obligation for each automotive company under
the final MY 2017 to 2025 standards, EPA performed an assessment of the
light-duty vehicles available in the market today to see how such
vehicles compare to the MY 2017-2025 footprint-based standard curves.
This analysis supports EPA's overall assessment that there are a broad
range of effective and available technologies that could be used to
achieve the standards, and illustrates the need for the leadtime
between today and MY 2017 to MY 2025 in order for continued refinement
of today's technologies and their broader penetration across the fleet
for the industry as a whole as well as individual companies. In
addition, this assessment supports EPA's view that the standards would
not interfere with consumer utility. Footprint-attribute standards
provide manufacturers with the ability to offer consumers a full range
of vehicles with the utility customers want, and do not require or
encourage companies to just produce small passenger cars with very low
CO2 emissions.
Using publicly available data, EPA compiled a list of current
vehicles and their 2-cycle CO2 emissions performance (that
is, the performance over the city and highway test cycles that are used
for compliance with this rule). Data is currently available for all MY
2012 vehicles and some MY 2013 vehicles. EPA gathered vehicle footprint
data from EPA reports, manufacturer submitted CAFE reports, and
manufacturer Web sites.
EPA evaluated these vehicles against the final CO2
footprint-based standard curves to determine which vehicles would meet
or exceed the final MY 2017-MY 2025 footprint-based CO2
targets assuming air conditioning credit generation consistent with
today's final rule, but no other changes. Under the final MY 2017-2025
greenhouse gas emissions standards, each vehicle will have a unique
CO2 target based on the vehicle's footprint. However, it is
important to note that the overall manufacturer obligation is a
company-specific, sales-weighted, fleet-wide CO2 standard
for each company's passenger cars and truck fleets calculated using the
final footprint-based standard curves. No individual vehicle is
required to achieve a specific CO2 target. In this analysis,
EPA assumed usage of air conditioner credits because air conditioner
improvements are considered to be among the cheapest and easiest
technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, manufacturers are
already investing in air conditioner improvements, and air conditioner
changes do not impact engine, transmission, or aerodynamic designs so
assuming such credits does not affect consideration of cost and
leadtime for use of these other technologies. In this analysis, EPA
assumed increasing air conditioner efficiency and refrigerant credits
over time with a phase-in of alternative refrigerant for the generation
of HFC leakage reduction credits consistent with the assumed phase-in
schedule discussed in Section III.C.1. of this preamble. No adjustments
were made to vehicle CO2 performance other than this
assumption of air conditioning credit generation, although additional
credits may be available. The details regarding this assessment are in
Chapter 3 of the EPA RIA.
This assessment shows that a significant number of vehicles models
sold today (over 100 models) have CO2 values at or below the
final MY 2017 footprint-based targets with current powertrain designs,
assuming air conditioning credit generation consistent with our final
rule. The list of vehicles meeting MY 2017 targets, with no technology
improvements other than air conditioning system upgrades, cover a full
suite of vehicle sizes and classes, including midsize cars, minivans,
sport utility vehicles, compact cars, small pickup trucks and full size
pickup trucks. These vehicles utilize a wide variety of powertrain
[[Page 62883]]
technologies and operate on a variety of different fuels including
gasoline, diesel, electricity, and compressed natural gas. Nearly every
major manufacturer currently produces vehicles that would meet or
exceed the MY 2017 footprint CO2 targets with only
improvements in air conditioning systems. For all of these vehicle
classes the MY 2017 targets are achieved with conventional gasoline
powertrains, with the exception of the full size (or ``standard'')
pickup trucks. In the case of full size pickups trucks, only HEV
versions of the Chevrolet Silverado and the GMC Sierra meet 2017
targets (though the HEV Silverado and Sierra's meet not just the MY
2017 footprint-based CO2 targets with A/C improvements, but
their respective targets through MY 2022). EPA also assessed the subset
of these vehicles that have emissions within 5% of the final
CO2 targets. As detailed in Chapter 3 of the EPA RIA, the
analysis shows that there are more than 66 additional vehicle models
(primarily with gasoline and diesel powertrains) that are within 5% of
the MY 2017 CO2 targets, including compact cars, midsize
cars, large cars, SUVs, station wagons, minivans, small and standard
pickup trucks. In total, nearly 175 current vehicle models (or about
15% of all models) meet or are within 5% of the final MY 2017 targets.
The number of vehicles available that meet the final MY 2017
targets has already significantly increased since the proposal. In
particular, the number of vehicles with conventional gasoline
powertrains that meet or exceed the final MY 2017 targets has increased
from 27 at the time of proposal to 65 models currently. An additional
58 vehicles currently available with conventional gasoline powertrains
are within 5% of the final MY 2017 standards. As the CO2
targets become more stringent each model year, fewer MY 2012 and MY
2013 vehicles achieve or surpass the final CO2 targets, in
particular for gasoline powertrains. While approximately 65 unique
gasoline vehicle models achieve or surpass the MY 2017 targets, this
number falls to approximately 38 for the MY 2018 targets, 23 for the
model year 2019 targets, and 12 unique gasoline vehicle models can
achieve the MY 2020 final CO2 targets with A/C improvements.
Table III-58--Number of Vehicles Compliant With MY2017 Targets
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year Gasoline Diesel CNG HEV PHEV EV FCV Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011/2012....................................................... 27 1 1 27 1 3 0 60
2012/2013....................................................... 65 3 1 29 1 8 1 108
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-59--Number of Vehicles Within 5% of the MY2017 Targets
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year Gasoline Diesel CNG HEV PHEV EV FCV Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011/2012....................................................... 38 6 0 3 0 0 0 47
2012/2013....................................................... 58 6 0 2 0 0 0 66
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to each model year, EPA receives projected sales data from
each manufacturer. Based on this data, approximately 17% of MY 2012
sales will be vehicles that meet or are lower than their vehicle
specific MY 2017 targets, requiring only improvements in air
conditioning systems. This is more than double the 7% of MY 2011 sales
that EPA projected to meet the MY 2017 targets. An additional 12% of
projected MY 2012 sales will be within 5% of the MY 2017 footprint
CO2 target with only simple improvements to air conditioning
systems, five model years before the standard takes effect.
With improvements to air conditioning systems, the most efficient
gasoline internal combustion engines would meet the MY 2022 footprint
targets. After MY 2022, the only current vehicles that continue to meet
the footprint-based CO2 targets (assuming improvements in
air conditioning) are hybrid-electric, plug-in hybrid-electric, and
fully electric vehicles, and CNG vehicles. However, the MY 2021
standards would not need to be met for another 8 years. Today's Toyota
Prius (three versions), Ford Fusion Hybrid, Chevrolet Volt, Nissan
Leaf, Honda Civic Hybrid, Camry Hybrid, Lexus CT 200h Hybrid, Lincoln
MKZ Hybrid, and Hyundai Sonata Hybrid all meet or surpass the
footprint-based CO2 targets through MY 2025. In fact, the
current Prius, Volt, and several EVs meet the 2025 CO2
targets without air conditioning credits.
This assessment of MY 2012 and MY 2013 vehicles makes it clear that
HEV technology (and of course EVs and PHEVs) is capable of achieving
the MY 2025 standards. However, as discussed earlier in this section,
EPA's modeling projects that the MY 2017-2025 standards can primarily
be achieved by advanced gasoline vehicles--for example, in MY 2025, we
project more than 75 percent of the new vehicles could be advanced
gasoline powertrains. The assessment of MY 2012 and MY 2013 vehicles
available in the market today indicates advanced gasoline vehicles (as
well as diesels) can achieve the targets for the early model years of
the program (i.e., model years 2017-2022) with only improvements in air
conditioning systems. However, significant improvements in technologies
are needed and penetrations of those technologies must increase
substantially in order for individual manufacturers (and the fleet
overall) to achieve the standards for the early years of the program,
and certainly for the later years. These technology improvements are
the very technologies EPA and NHTSA describe in detail in Chapter 3 of
the Joint Technical Support Document and for which we project
penetration rates earlier in this section III.D. These technologies
include, for example: Gasoline direct injection fuel systems; downsized
and turbocharged gasoline engines (including in some cases with the
application of cooled exhaust gas recirculation); continued
improvements in engine friction reduction and low friction lubricants;
transmissions with an increased number of forward gears (e.g., 8
speeds); improvements in transmission shifting logic; improvements in
transmission gear box efficiency; vehicle mass reduction; lower rolling
resistance tires, and improved vehicle aerodynamics. In most cases,
these technologies are beginning to penetrate the U.S. light-duty
vehicle market.
In general, these technologies must go through the automotive
product development cycle in order to be introduced into a vehicle. In
some cases additional research is needed before the technologies'
CO2 benefits can be fully
[[Page 62884]]
realized and large-scale manufacturing can be achieved. The subject of
technology penetration phase-in rates is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 3.4.2 of the Joint Technical Support Document. In that Chapter,
we explain that many CO2 reducing technologies should be
able to penetrate the new vehicle market at high levels between now and
MY 2016. These are also many of the key technologies we project as
being needed to achieve the MYs 2017-2025 standards which will only be
able to penetrate the market at relatively low levels (e.g., a maximum
level of 30% or less) by MY 2016, and even by MY 2021. These include
important powertrain technologies such as 8-speed transmissions and
second or third generation downsized engines with turbocharging.
The majority of these technologies must be integrated into vehicles
during the product redesign schedule, which is typically on a 5-year
cycle. EPA discussed in the MY 2012-2016 rule the significant costs and
potential risks associated with requiring major technologies to be
added in-between the typical 5-year vehicle redesign schedule (see 75
FR 25467-68, May 7, 2010). In addition, engines and transmissions
generally have longer lifetimes than 5 years, typically on the order of
10 years. Thus, major powertrain technologies generally take longer to
penetrate the new vehicle fleet than can be done in a 5-year redesign
cycle. As detailed in Chapter 3.4 of the Joint TSD, EPA projects that
8-speed transmissions could increase their maximum penetration in the
fleet from 30% in MY 2016 to 80% in MY 2021 and to 100% in MY 2025.
Similarly, we project that second generation downsized and turbocharged
engines (represented in our assessment as engines with a brake-mean
effective pressure of 24 bars) could penetrate the new vehicle fleet at
a maximum level of 15% in MY 2016, 30% in MY 2021, and 75% in MY 2025.
When coupled with the typical 5-year vehicle redesign schedule, EPA
projects that it is not possible for all of the advanced gasoline
vehicle technologies we have assessed to penetrate the fleet in a
single 5-year vehicle redesign schedule.
Given the status of the technologies we project to be used to
achieve the MY 2017-2025 standards and the product development and
introduction process which is fairly standard in the automotive
industry today, our assessment of the MY 2012 and MY 2013 vehicles in
comparison to the standards supports our overall feasibility
assessment, and reinforces our assessment of the lead time needed for
the industry to achieve the standards.
E. Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement
1. Compliance Program Overview
This section summarizes EPA's comprehensive program to ensure
compliance with emission standards for carbon dioxide (CO2),
nitrous oxide (N2O), and methane (CH4), as
described in Section III.B. An effective compliance program is
essential to achieving the environmental and public health benefits
promised by these mobile source GHG standards. EPA's GHG compliance
program is designed around two overarching priorities: (1) To address
Clean Air Act (CAA) requirements and policy objectives; and (2) to
streamline the compliance process for both manufacturers and EPA by
building on existing practice wherever possible, and by structuring the
program such that manufacturers can use a single data set to satisfy
both GHG and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) testing and
reporting requirements. EPA has had the statutorily-designated
responsibility for managing the testing, data collection, and
calculation procedures of the CAFE program since the 1970's, see 49
U.S.C. 32904(c) and EPA's experience with that program allowed EPA to
integrate the newer GHG requirements with the older CAFE requirements
such that little to no additional test data is required and data and
reporting requirements are largely synchronized. The EPA and NHTSA
programs for MYs 2017 and later replicate the compliance protocols
established in the MY 2012-2016 rule.\627\ The certification, testing,
reporting, and associated compliance activities track current practices
and are thus familiar to manufacturers. As is the case under the MYs
2012-2016 program, EPA and NHTSA have designed a coordinated compliance
approach for MY 2017 and later model years such that the compliance
mechanisms for both GHG and CAFE standards are consistent and non-
duplicative. Readers are encouraged to review the MYs 2012-2016 final
rule for background and a detailed description of these certification,
compliance, and enforcement requirements.\628\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\627\ See 75 FR 25468, May 7, 2010.
\628\ Also see current regulations at 40 CFR Part 86, Subpart S,
and 40 CFR Part 600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle emission standards established under the CAA apply
throughout a vehicle's full useful life. Today's rule establishes two
sets of EPA standards: fleet average greenhouse gas standards and in-
use standards. Compliance with the fleet average standard in a given
model year is determined based on testing performed prior to production
and on actual vehicle production in that model year, as with the
current CAFE standards. EPA is also establishing in-use standards that
apply throughout a vehicle's useful life, with the in-use standard
determined by adding an adjustment factor to the emission results used
to calculate the fleet average.\629\ EPA's program will thus not only
assess compliance with the fleet average standards described in Section
III.B, but will also assess compliance with the in-use standards. As it
does now, EPA will use a variety of compliance mechanisms to conduct
these assessments, including pre-production certification and post-
production in-use monitoring once vehicles enter customer service.
Under this compliance program manufacturers will also be afforded
numerous flexibilities to help achieve compliance, both stemming from
the program design itself in the form of a manufacturer-specific
CO2 fleet average standard, as well as in various credit
banking and trading opportunities, as described in Section III.C.
Because much of the compliance program was largely finalized with the
2012-2016 GHG standards, there were very few comments specifically
related to these elements of the 2017 and later GHG program. Comments
mostly addressed some of the newly proposed provisions, such as new
flexibilities for off-cycle credits, credits for certain pickup trucks,
small volume alternative standards, and others. These comments are
discussed in Sections III.B and III.C. The compliance program is
summarized in further detail below.
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\629\ Dual fuel vehicles (with the exception of plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles) are treated slightly differently. These vehicles
would be potentially tested in use on either or both fuels, and each
fuel would have an associated standard.
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2. Compliance With Fleet-Average CO2 Standards
Fleet average emission levels can only be determined when a
complete fleet profile becomes available at the close of the model
year. Therefore, EPA will determine compliance with the fleet average
CO2 standards when the model year closes out, based on
actual production figures for each model type \630\ and on emissions
data collected through testing over the course of the model year.
Manufacturers will submit this information to EPA in an end-of-year
report which is discussed in detail
[[Page 62885]]
in Section III.E.5.h of the MYs 2012-2016 final rule preamble (see 75
FR 25481). EPA received no significant comments on these general
compliance provisions, unless specifically noted below, and these
provisions are being finalized as they were proposed.
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\630\ A model type is ``a unique combination of car line, basic
engine, and transmission class'' (40 CFR 600.002).
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a. Compliance Determinations
As described in Section III.B above, the fleet average standards
will be determined on a manufacturer-by-manufacturer basis, separately
for cars and trucks, using the footprint attribute curves. EPA will
calculate the fleet average emission level using actual production
figures and CO2 emission test values generated at the time
of a manufacturer's CAFE testing. EPA will then compare the actual
fleet average to the manufacturer's footprint-based fleet standard to
determine compliance, taking into consideration use of averaging and
credits.
Final determination of compliance with fleet average CO2
standards may not occur until several years after the close of the
model year due to the flexibilities allowing the carry-forward and
carry-back of credits and the remediation of deficits (see Section
III.B). A failure to meet the fleet average standard after credit
opportunities have been exhausted could ultimately result in penalties
and injunctive orders under the CAA as described in Section III.E.6
below.
b. Required Minimum Testing For Fleet Average CO2
EPA will require and use the same test data to determine a
manufacturer's compliance with both the CAFE standard and the fleet
average CO2 emissions standard. Please see Section III.E.2.b
of the MYs 2012-2016 final rule preamble (75 FR 25469) for details.
3. Vehicle Certification
CAA section 203(a)(1) prohibits manufacturers from introducing a
new motor vehicle into commerce unless the vehicle is covered by an
EPA-issued certificate of conformity. Section 206(a)(1) of the CAA
describes the requirements for EPA issuance of a certificate of
conformity, based on a demonstration of compliance with the emission
standards established by EPA under section 202 of the Act. The
certification demonstration requires emission testing, and must be done
for each model year.\631\
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\631\ CAA section 206(a)(1).
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Since compliance with a fleet average standard depends on actual
production volumes, it is not possible to determine compliance with the
fleet average at the time the manufacturer applies for and receives a
certificate of conformity for a test group. Instead, EPA will continue
to condition each certificate of conformity for the GHG program upon a
manufacturer's demonstration of compliance with the manufacturer's
fleet-wide average CO2 standard. Please see Section III.E.3
of the MYs 2012-2016 final rule preamble (75 FR 25470) for a discussion
of how EPA will certify vehicles under the GHG standards.
4. Useful Life Compliance
Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA requires emission standards to apply
to vehicles throughout their statutory useful life, as further
described in Section III.A. The in-use CO2 standard under
the greenhouse gas program would apply to individual vehicles and is
separate from the fleet-average standard. The in-use CO2
standard for each model type would be the model-specific CO2
level used in calculating the fleet average, adjusted to be 10% higher
to account for test-to-test and production variability that might
affect in-use test results. Please see Section III.E.4 of the MYs 2012-
2016 final rule preamble (75 FR 25473) for a detailed discussion of the
in-use standard, in-use testing requirements, and use of deterioration
factors for CO2, N2O, and CH4.
5. Credit Program Implementation
As described in Section III.C, several credit programs are
available under this rulemaking, including some new programs which are
not part of the MYs 2012-2016 rule (e.g., credits for certain pickup
trucks). Please see Section III.E.5 of the MYs 2012-2016 final rule
preamble (75 FR 25477) for a detailed explanation of credit program
implementation, sample credit and deficit calculations, and end-of-year
reporting requirements.
6. Enforcement
The enforcement structure EPA promulgated under the MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking remains in place. Please see Section III.E.6 of the MYs
2012-2016 final rule preamble (75 FR 25482) for a discussion of these
provisions.
Section 203 of the Clean Air Act describes acts that are prohibited
by law. This section and associated regulations apply equally to the
greenhouse gas standards as to any other regulated emissions. Acts that
are prohibited by section 203 of the Clean Air Act include the
introduction into commerce or the sale of a vehicle without a
certificate of conformity, removing or otherwise defeating emission
control equipment, the sale or installation of devices designed to
defeat emission controls, and other actions. EPA finalized language in
the 2012 greenhouse gas regulations that details the specific
prohibited acts under the Clean Air Act. While these regulations carry
no specific regulatory burden and essentially repeat the Clean Air Act
language, EPA believed that providing that language was helpful and
added clarity to our regulations. We proposed no changes to this
language in this rulemaking for the 2017 and later model years, no
comments were received, and thus the language will continue to apply to
the 2017 and later model years.
7. Other Certification Issues
a. Carryover/Carry Across Certification Test Data
EPA's certification program for vehicles allows manufacturers to
carry certification test data over and across certification testing
from one model year to the next, when no significant changes to models
are made. EPA would continue to apply this policy to CO2,
N2O and CH4 certification test data and would
allow manufacturers to use carryover and carry across data to
demonstrate CO2 fleet average compliance if they have done
so for CAFE purposes. For test groups that are using carry-over data
for certification, EPA will allow those test groups to carry over the
N2O compliance statement (now allowed through the 2016 model
year) into the 2017 and 2018 model years.
b. Compliance Fees
The CAA allows EPA to collect fees to cover the costs of issuing
certificates of conformity for the classes of vehicles covered by this
rule.
At this time the extent of any added costs to EPA as a result of
this rule is not known. EPA will assess its compliance testing and
other activities associated with the rule and may amend its fees
regulations in the future to include any warranted new costs.
c. Small Entity Exemption
As discussed in Section III.B.7, businesses meeting the Small
Business Administration (SBA) criterion of a small business as
described in 13 CFR 121.201 were entirely exempted from the MYs 2012-
2016 GHG requirements. However, based on comments from at least one
small business, we are including a provision in this final rule that
will provide these previously exempted manufacturers with the option of
voluntarily opting in to the program. Once opted in, however, such a
manufacturer would be fully subject to
[[Page 62886]]
all the GHG standards and requirements in the regulations.
As discussed in detail in Section III.B.5, small volume
manufacturers with annual sales volumes of less than 5,000 vehicles
will be required to meet the primary GHG standards, with the option of
petitioning the Agency for alternative standards developed on a case-
by-case basis.
d. Onboard Diagnostics (OBD) and CO2 Regulations
As under the current program, EPA will not require CO2,
N2O, and CH4 emissions as one of the applicable
standards required for the OBD monitoring threshold.
e. Applicability of Current High Altitude Provisions to Greenhouse
Gases
As under the current program, vehicles covered by this rule would
be required to meet the CO2, N2O and
CH4 standard at altitude but would not normally be required
to submit vehicle CO2 test data for high altitude. Instead,
they would submit an engineering evaluation indicating that common
calibration approaches will be utilized at high altitude.
f. Applicability of Standards to Aftermarket Conversions
With the exception of the small business exemption and the
conditional exemption for small volume manufacturers available through
the 2016 model year, EPA's emission standards, including greenhouse gas
standards, will continue to apply as stated in the applicability
sections of the relevant regulations. EPA expects that some aftermarket
conversion companies will qualify for and seek the small business
exemption, but those that do not qualify will be required to meet the
applicable emission standards, including the greenhouse gas standards,
to qualify for a tampering exemption under 40 CFR subpart F. Because
fuel converters are not required to meet a fleet average standard, the
new provisions allowing a small volume manufacturer to petition EPA for
alternative standards do not apply. Fleet average standards are not
generally appropriate for fuel conversion manufacturers because the
``fleet'' of vehicles to which a conversion system may be applied has
already been accounted for under the OEM's fleet average standard.
Therefore, EPA is retaining the process promulgated in 40 CFR part 85
subpart F anti-tampering regulations whereby conversion manufacturers
demonstrate compliance at the vehicle rather than the fleet level. Fuel
converters will continue to show compliance with greenhouse gas
standards by submitting data to demonstrate that the conversion
emission data vehicle N2O, CH4 and CREE results
are less than or equal to the OEM's in-use standard for that
subconfiguration. EPA is also continuing to allow conversion
manufacturers, on a test group basis, to convert CO2 over-
compliance into CO2 equivalents of N2O and/or
CH4 that can be subtracted from the CH4 and
N2O measured values to demonstrate compliance with
CH4 and/or N2O standards.
g. Geographical Location of Greenhouse Gas Fleet Vehicles
EPA emission certification regulations require emission compliance
\632\ in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands.
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\632\ Section 216 of the Clean Air Act defines the term commerce
to mean ``(A) commerce between any place in any State and any place
outside thereof; and (B) commerce wholly within the District of
Columbia.'' Section 302(d) of the Clean Air Act reads ``The term
``State'' means a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa and
includes the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.'' In
addition, 40 CFR 85.1502 (14) regarding the importation of motor
vehicles and motor vehicle engines defines the United States to
include ``the States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.''
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h. Temporary Lead-time Allowance Alternative Standards (TLAAS)
Implementation
EPA is also clarifying provisions of the MYs 2012-2016 light duty
vehicle GHG standards to address an inadvertent gap in those rules
dealing with situations of mergers between non-TLAAS manufacturers and
TLAAS manufacturers. By way of background, the TLAAS provisions provide
additional lead time for limited volume manufacturers, whereby a
specified number of vehicles are subject to a less stringent standard
in either MYs 2012-2015, or (for smaller volume manufacturers), MY
2016. See 75 FR 25414-419. Limited volume manufacturers may elect to
use the TLAAS provisions, but are not required to do so.
The TLAAS rule provisions address situations where TLAAS
manufacturers merge with or are acquired by another manufacturer. See
section 86.1818-12(e)(1)(i)(B) and (C). These provisions address two
scenarios. The first is when companies merge and the new company
exceeds the 400,000 vehicle sale threshold (the eligibility threshold
for the base TLAAS program). In such cases, the manufacturer may use
TLAAS in the model year underway at the point of the merger, but loses
eligibility in the model year following the merger.\633\ For example,
if the merger takes place during MY 2013 (which began January 2, 2012),
beginning in MY 2014, the merged entity may not use TLAAS. The second
scenario addressed by the regulations is where the companies being
merged are both TLAAS manufacturers, and both participate in TLAAS, and
the merged company does not exceed the 400,000 vehicle threshold. In
such cases the allotments of the two companies under TLAAS are not
additive and the new (merged) company only receives a single TLAAS
allotment.
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\633\ The model year following the merger is referred to as the
model year that is numerically two years greater than the calendar
year in which the merger/acquisition took place in the regulatory
text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA received a comment from Volkswagen requesting clarification in
cases where the parent company, while eligible for TLAAS, has not
elected to use TLAAS and does not plan to use TLAAS for future years.
The commenter recommended that in such a case, the parent company
should have the option of being treated in the same manner as when the
company resulting from the merger exceeds the 400,000 vehicle threshold
(i.e., the first scenario described above). The company would no longer
be allowed to use TLAAS in the model year following the merger but
could use TLAAS for the company being acquired for the model years
already underway. EPA recognizes that this was not a scenario
specifically contemplated by the existing regulatory language, but we
believe that this is a reasonable approach since it brings parity to
the transitional merger provisions of a large (non-TLAAS eligible)
company compared to those of a TLAAS eligible company that chooses to
forgo its opportunity to participate in the TLAAS program. EPA is
adding this clarification to the MYs2012-2016 regulations. The revised
regulatory text clarifies that in cases where one manufacturer that is
eligible for TLAAS but nevertheless elects to forgo the use of TLAAS
acquires another company that is already using TLAAS, the parent
company is required to end the use of TLAAS for the acquired company in
the model year following the merger (whether or not the 400,000 sales
threshold is exceeded). The
[[Page 62887]]
manufacturer must notify EPA in writing prior to the end of the model
year in which the merger is effective of its decision to elect not to
use the TLAAS program in any year. As provided in the current rules,
the total cumulative allotment that may be used for the manufacturer
being acquired is limited to 100,000 vehicles (i.e., the lower level of
allotments available to companies with between 50,000-400,000 vehicle
sales).
In addition to treating all non-TLAAS participants identically in
this situation, the clarified rule leads to environmental benefits
compared to the alternative. Consider the case of a merger between a
TLAAS-eligible TLAAS non-participant and a TLAAS manufacturer with
sales under 50,000, where the merged entity remains under the 400,000
sales threshold. Without today's clarified rule, the merged entity
would have a strong incentive to elect to use TLAAS, because the
present rules only provide all-or-nothing alternatives due to the lack
of explicit provisions allowing the additional model year of TLAAS for
the smaller merger partner. Thus, the merged entity could produce up to
100,000 vehicles (minus the TLAAS allotment already used by the smaller
company) through MY 2015 which would be subject to the more lenient
TLAAS standards. Under the clarified rule, the merged entity could use
the TLAAS allotment for the smaller company for one additional model
year, at which point the merged entity would be subject to the
principal GHG standards (i.e. just as if the merger exceeded the
400,000 sales threshold, as in present section 86.1818-12 (e)(1) (i)).
8. Warranty, Defect Reporting, and Other Emission-related Components
Provisions
This rulemaking would retain warranty, defect reporting, and other
emission-related component provisions promulgated in the MY 2012-2016
rulemaking. Please see Section III.E.10 of the MYs 2012-2016 final rule
preamble (75 FR 25486) for a discussion of these provisions.
9. Miscellaneous Technical Amendments and Corrections
EPA is including a number of noncontroversial amendments and
corrections to the existing regulations in this final rule. Because the
regulatory provisions for the EPA greenhouse gas program, NHTSA's CAFE
program, and the joint fuel economy and environment labeling program
are all intertwined in 40 CFR Part 600, this rule presents an
opportunity to make corrections and clarifications to all or any of
these programs. Consequently, EPA proposed and is now finalizing a
number of minor and non-substantive corrections to the regulations that
implement these programs. We note that certain provisions of the
existing model year 2012-2016 program are repeated in the final
regulations for readers' convenience. We are not reopening.
reconsidering. or otherwise reexamining those provisions.
Amendments include the following:
In section 86.135-12, we have removed references to the model year
applicability of N2O measurement. This applicability is
covered elsewhere in the regulations, and we believe that--where
possible--testing regulations should be limited to the specifics of
testing and measurement.
EPA proposed to revise the definition of ``Footprint'' in 86.1803-01 to
clarify measurement and rounding. The previous definition stated that
track width is ``measured in inches,'' which may inadvertently imply
measuring and recording to the nearest inch. The revised definition
clarifies that measurements should be to the nearest one tenth of an
inch, and average track width should be rounded to the nearest tenth of
an inch. EPA received no comments on this provision, and is finalizing
as proposed.
We are also finalizing a solution to a situation in which a
manufacturer of a clean alternative fuel conversion is attempting to
comply with the fuel conversion regulations (see 40 CFR part 85 subpart
F) at a point in time before which certain data is available from the
original manufacturer of the vehicle. Clean alternative fuel
conversions are subject to greenhouse gas standards if the vehicle as
originally manufactured was subject to greenhouse gas standards, unless
the conversion manufacturer qualifies for exemption as a small
business. Compliance with light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas emission
standards is demonstrated by complying with the N2O and
CH4 standards and the in-use CO2 exhaust emission
standard set forth in 40 CFR 86.1818-12(d) as determined by the
original manufacturer for the subconfiguration that is identical to the
fuel conversion emission data vehicle (EDV). However, the
subconfiguration data may not be available to the fuel conversion
manufacturer at the time they are seeking EPA certification. Several
compliance options are currently provided to fuel conversion
manufacturers that are consistent with the compliance options for the
original equipment manufacturers. EPA is adding another option that
will be applicable starting with the 2012 model year. The new option
will allow clean alternative fuel conversion manufacturers to satisfy
the greenhouse gas standards if the pre-conversion sum of
CH4 plus N2O plus CREE emissions from the vehicle
is less than the post-conversion emissions, adjusting for the global
warming potential of the constituents.
10. Base Tire Definition
One of the factors in a manufacturer's calculation of vehicle
footprint is the base tire. Footprint is based on a vehicle's wheel
base and track width, and track width in turn is ``the lateral distance
between the centerlines of the base tires at ground, including the
camber angle.'' \634\ EPA's current definition of base tire is the
``tire specified as standard equipment by the manufacturer.'' \635\
NHTSA proposed a specific change to the base tire definition for the
CAFE program (see Section IV.I.5.g, and proposed 49 CFR 523.2), and EPA
requested comment on whether the base tire definition should be
clarified to ensure a more uniform application across manufacturers (76
FR 75088, December 1, 2011).
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\634\ See 40 CFR 86.1803-01
\635\ See 40 CFR 86.1803-01, and 40 CFR 600.002. Standard
equipment means those features or equipment which are marketed on a
vehicle over which the purchaser can exercise no choice.
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Vehicle manufacturers were the only parties providing comments on
this issue, and they were essentially unanimous in stating a desire for
a level playing field, while reiterating that the issue is complex.
Several manufacturers pointed out that the proposed NHTSA definition,
which includes a connection to a vehicle configuration, may not be
workable because the definition of a configuration is independent of
vehicle size, or footprint. Several manufacturers suggested that EPA,
NHTSA, and the auto companies should postpone action on this issue in
this rule and work together to ensure a consistent and complete
understanding of the issue. Others agreed that the definition could
benefit from some clarification. After consideration of the comments,
and a recognition of the importance that the footprint calculation (and
therefore all the elements that comprise the footprint calculation) be
harmonized across EPA and NHTSA, EPA is finalizing a revised definition
in this final rule, which is consistent with the definition being
finalized by NHTSA. The revised definition is as follows:
Base tire means the tire size specified as standard equipment by
the manufacturer on each unique
[[Page 62888]]
combination of a vehicle's footprint and model type. Standard equipment
is defined in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.
This definition appropriately removes the link to vehicle
configuration that was in NHTSA's proposal, and improves upon EPA's
existing definition with additional specificity that is consistent with
the goal of a footprint-based program, which, as stated by the Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers, is that ``All vehicles should be included
* * * using a representative footprint based on the physical vehicle *
* *'' EPA agrees with this broadly stated goal, and we believe that the
revised definition offers reasonable clarification that should help
ensure a consistent application of the footprint-based standards across
manufacturers. This new definition, which is harmonized with the
definition being finalized by NHTSA, is also consistent with existing
regulatory language that specifies how EPA intends that footprint-based
standards be implemented. For example, EPA regulations currently state
that ``Each CO2 target value, which represents a unique
combination of model type and footprint value, shall be multiplied by
the total production of that model type/footprint combination for the
appropriate model year'' (see 40 CFR 86.1818-12(c)(2)).
11. Treatment of Driver-Selectable Modes and Conditions
EPA requested comments on whether there is a need to clarify in the
regulations how EPA treats driver-selectable modes (such as multi-mode
transmissions and other user-selectable buttons or switches) that may
impact fuel economy and GHG emissions in certification testing. See 76
FR 75089; see also section II.F of this preamble for a discussion of
how driver-selectable technologies may be eligible for off-cycle
credits under the case-by-case demonstration provisions in the rule.
New technologies continue to arrive on the market, with increasing
complexity and an increasing array of ways a driver can make choices
that affect the fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions. For example,
some start-stop systems may offer the driver the option of choosing
whether or not the system is enabled. Similarly, vehicles with ride
height adjustment or grill shutters may allow drivers to override those
features. Note that this discussion pertains specifically to
implementing the testing required on the Federal Test Procedure and the
Highway Fuel Economy Test to generate combined City/Highway GHG and MPG
values for each model type for use in calculating fleet average GHG and
MPG values. For the purpose of assigning off-cycle credit values that
may be based on a driver-selectable technology (see section II.F),
where determination of an accurate real-world benefit of the technology
is a fundamental goal, the policy described here and in current EPA
guidance may not be appropriate.
Under the current regulations, EPA draws a distinction between
vehicles tested for purposes of CO2 emissions performance
and fuel economy and vehicles tested for non-CO2 emissions
performance. When testing emission data vehicles for certification
under Part 86 for non-CO2 emissions standards, a vehicle
that has multiple operating modes must meet the applicable emission
standards in all modes, and on all fuels. Sometimes testing may occur
in all modes, but more frequently the worst-case mode is selected for
testing to represent the emission test group. For example, a vehicle
that allows the user to disengage the start-stop capability must meet
the standards with and without the start-stop system operating.
Similarly, a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle is tested in charge-
sustaining (i.e., gasoline-only) operation. Current regulations require
the reporting of CO2 emissions from certification tests
conducted under Part 86, but EPA regulations also recognize that these
values, from emission data vehicles that represent a test group, are
ultimately not the values that are used to establish in-use
CO2 standards (which are established on much more detailed
sub-configuration-specific level) or the model type CO2 and
fuel economy values used for fleet averaging under Part 600.
When EPA tests vehicles for fuel economy and CO2
emissions performance, user-selectable modes are treated somewhat
differently, where the goals are different and where worst-case
operation may not be the appropriate choice for testing. For example,
EPA does not believe that the fuel economy and CO2 emissions
value for a PHEV should ignore the use of grid electricity, or that
other dual fuel vehicles should ignore the real-world use of
alternative fuels that reduce GHG emissions. For PHEVs and dual fuel
CNG vehicles, where the consumer pays an up-front premium for the
vehicle but can recoup that investment by using a less expensive fuel,
the regulations allow the use of utility factors to weight the
CO2 performance on the conventional fuel and the alternative
fuel. Similarly, non-CO2 emission certification testing may
be done in a transmission mode that is not likely to be the predominant
mode used by consumers. Testing under Part 600 must determine a single
fuel economy value for each model type for the CAFE program and a
single CO2 value for each model type for EPA's program. With
respect to transmissions, Part 600 refers to 40 CFR 86.128, which
states the following:
``All test conditions, except as noted, shall be run according
to the manufacturer's recommendations to the ultimate purchaser,
Provided, That: Such recommendations are representative of what may
reasonably be expected to be followed by the ultimate purchaser
under in-use conditions.''
For multi-mode transmissions EPA relies on guidance letter CISD-09-
19 (December 3, 2009) to guide the determination of what is
``representative of what may reasonably be expected to be followed by
the ultimate purchaser under in-use conditions.'' If EPA can make a
determination that a certain mode is the ``predominant'' mode (meaning
nearly total usage), then testing may be done in that mode. However, if
EPA cannot be convinced that a single mode is predominant, then fuel
economy and GHG results from each mode are typically averaged with
equal weighting. There are also detailed provisions that explain how a
manufacturer may conduct surveys to support a statement that a given
mode is predominant. However, CISD-09-19 only addresses transmissions,
and states the following regarding other technologies:
``Please contact EPA in advance to request guidance for vehicles
equipped with future technologies not covered by this document,
unusual default strategies or driver selectable features, e.g.,
hybrid electric vehicles where the multimode button or switch
disables or modifies any fuel saving features of the vehicle (such
as the stop-start feature, air conditioning compressor operation,
electric-only operation, etc.).''
The unique operating characteristics of these technologies often
requires that EPA determine fuel economy and CO2 testing and
calculations on a case-by-case basis. Because the CAFE and
CO2 programs require a single value to represent a model
type, EPA must make a decision regarding how to account for multiple
modes of operation. When a manufacturer brings such a technology to us
for consideration, we will evaluate the technology (including possibly
requiring that the manufacturer give us a vehicle to test) and provide
the manufacturer with instructions on how to determine fuel economy and
CO2 emissions. In general we will evaluate these
technologies in the same way and following the same principles we use
to evaluate transmissions under CISD-09-19, making a determination as
to whether a given operating mode is predominant or not (using the
criteria for predominance described in CISD-
[[Page 62889]]
09-19). These instructions are provided to the manufacturer under the
authority for special test procedures described in 40 CFR 600.111-08.
EPA would apply the same approach to testing for compliance with the
in-use CO2 standard, so testing for the CO2 fleet
average and testing for compliance with the in-use CO2
standard would be consistent.
EPA requested comment on whether the current approach and
regulatory provisions are sufficient, or whether additional regulations
or guidance should be developed to describe EPA's process.
Manufacturers, who were the only commenters on this issue, commented
that the current case-by-case approach is adequate, and EPA agrees. We
recognize that no regulation can anticipate all options, devices, and
operator controls that may arrive in the future, and adequate
flexibility to address future situations is an important attribute for
fuel economy and CO2 emissions testing. We believe it would
be difficult at this time to construct regulations that adequately and
generically address the use of multiple modes in GHG/MPG testing.
12. Publication of GHG Compliance Information
As was the case in the MYs 2012-2016 regulation, EPA received
several comments about the need for transparency in its implementation
of the greenhouse gas program and specifically about the need for
public access to information about Agency compliance determinations.
NRDC argued that EPA and NHTSA should publish data on each
manufacturer's credit status and technology penetration on an annual
basis. They suggested specific data that should be disclosed, by car
and truck fleets, including the amount of cumulative credits or debits,
the within-manufacturer credit transfers between car and truck fleets,
air conditioning credits, use of multipliers for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs,
full size pick-up truck HEV and performance-based credits, and off-
cycle technology credits. They further suggested that the Fuel Economy
Trends Report and the Fuel Economy Guide and associated online database
could be enhanced to include additional vehicle and technology
information, by model and manufacturer. The Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS) reiterated these comments, noting that EPA should have
a ``clear public accounting of credits and program compliance.'' They
specifically request that data at the ``sub-model level'' be published
regularly, and that such data include the following: model year, make,
model/nameplate, engine family, transmission type, criteria pollutant
certification levels, number of cylinders, fuel type, drive type,
horsepower, footprint, GHG emissions and fuel economy test results,
window label fuel economy, sales volume, sales origin, market
classification, EPA classification, and whether a vehicle is using the
TLAAS program standards. Like NRDC, UCS also requested enhancements to
the Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and
Fuel Economy Trends report by adding information on car/truck
designations and vehicle size/footprint.
EPA remains committed to the principle of transparency and to
disseminating as much information as we are reasonably and legally able
to provide. Not surprisingly, manufacturers have also commented about
the need to protect confidential business information, a practice to
which we also remain committed. As stated in the MYs 2012-2016 final
rule, EPA expects that the dissemination of GHG program data will
possibly take place through the annual Fuel Economy Trends report, the
annual Compliance Report, or through other means, such as online
distribution through fueleconomy.gov or other EPA Web sites, new GHG-
specific reports, or through some combination of all of these. Given
that the data will be released well after the conclusion of a given
model year, certain information is clearly no longer confidential
business information. For example, vehicle production volumes by model
type are unlikely to be treated as confidential given that essentially
the same information can be purchased from sources like WardsAuto. But
production volumes at a finer level of detail, such as at the
subconfiguration or configuration level, could potentially be
considered confidential because those volumes, which are not available
elsewhere, may potentially reveal something about a manufacturer's
long-term strategies. These are issues and questions that EPA expects
to be addressing as we move forward with publishing our compliance
data.
EPA already releases a considerable amount of information regarding
fuel economy, emissions, and vehicle characteristics, both at the test
level and at the model type level.\636\ The downloadable model type
data available at fueleconomy.gov will soon have CO2
emissions values (adjusted label values and unadjusted values, similar
to the MPG reporting) in addition to the 127 columns of data we already
provide for each model type. However, we plan to expand what we release
publicly such that more information is available regarding GHG program
compliance, For example, EPA intends to publish the applicable fleet
average standards (for cars and for trucks) and the actual fleet
performance for each manufacturer, and the resulting credits or debits
(in Megagrams, or metric tons). In addition, EPA anticipates publishing
the amount of credits generated by each manufacturer (separately for
each of the car and truck fleets) under the optional credit programs,
and the associated volumes of vehicles to which those credits apply.
EPA will also likely publish various credit transactions (transfers
among fleets within a manufacturer and trades between manufacturers),
as well as the total credits or debits accumulated in a model year and
the resulting overall credit or debit balance, taking into account the
credit and debit carry-forward provisions. EPA anticipates that the
data publication will evolve over time, both as the program progresses
and as our data systems adapt to the new requirements and are able to
manage and report data accurately and effectively. For example, our
first public release of information is likely to be a summary of the
early credits generated in the 2009-2011 model years that, at least
initially, may not be as comprehensive as the reporting that follows
the 2012 model year.\637\ EPA is currently assessing how to best
release these data (both the content and the mechanism), but expects
that publication will occur later this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\636\ See http://www.epa.gov/otaq/tcldata.htm and http://www.fueleconomy.gov/.
\637\ Reporting of these credits was due from manufacturers at
the end of March, 2012, and EPA is currently evaluating the data to
ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. How will this rule reduce GHG emissions and their associated
effects?
This action is an important step towards curbing growth of GHG
emissions from cars and light trucks. In the absence of control, GHG
emissions worldwide and in the U.S. are projected to continue steady
growth. Table III-60 shows emissions of carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N2O) and air conditioning refrigerant (HFC-134a) on a
CO2-equivalent basis for calendar years 2010, 2020, 2030,
2040 and 2050. As shown below, in 2010 U.S. GHG emissions made up
roughly 15 percent of total worldwide emissions. The contribution of
direct emissions from cars and light-trucks to this U.S. share is an
estimated 16 percent of U.S. emissions by 2030 in the
[[Page 62890]]
absence of control (beyond the control provided by the MY 2016 GHG
standards for these vehicles). As discussed later in this section, this
steady rise in GHG emissions is associated with numerous adverse
impacts on human health, food and agriculture, air quality, and water
and forestry resources.
Table III-60--GHG Emissions by Calendar Year Without the MY 2017-2025 Standards
[MMTCO2eq] \638\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Sectors (Worldwide) \a\..... 45,000 53,000 61,000 69,000 76,000
All Sectors (U.S. Only) a b..... 6,800 7,300 7,600 8,000 8,100
U.S. Cars/Light Truck Only \c\.. 1,100 1,200 1,200 1,400 1,600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM).\639\
\b\ 2010 data is from USEPA GHG Inventory,\640\ future year data is from Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global
Economy (ADAGE) model.\641\
\c\ 2010 data is from USEPA GHG Inventory, future year data from OMEGA model, Tailpipe CO2 and HFC134a only
(includes impacts of MYs 2012-2016 standards).
This rule will result in significant GHG reductions as newer,
cleaner vehicles come into the fleet. EPA estimates the reductions
attributable to the MYs 2017-2025 standards over time assuming the
model year 2025 standards continue indefinitely post-2025, compared to
a reference scenario in which the 2016 model year GHG standards
continue indefinitely beyond 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\638\ ADAGE and GCAM model projections of worldwide and U.S. GHG
emissions are provided for context only. The baseline data in these
models differ in certain assumptions from the baseline used in this
rule. For example, the ADAGE baseline is calibrated to AEO 2010,
which includes the EISA 35 MPG by 2020 provision, but does not
explicitly include the MYs 2012-2016 rule or the 2014-2018 HD GHG
rule. All emissions data were rounded to two significant digits.
\639\ Based on the Representative Concentration Pathway scenario
in GCAM available at www.globalchange.umd.edu/gcamrcp. See section
III.F.3 and RIA Chapter 6.4 for additional information on GCAM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this rule, EPA estimates greenhouse gas impacts from several
sources including: (a) The impact of the standards on tailpipe
CO2 emissions, (b) projected improvements in the efficiency
of vehicle air conditioning systems as a result of the credit program,
(c) reductions in direct emissions of the refrigerant and potent
greenhouse gas HFC-134a from air conditioning systems, (d) ``upstream''
emission reductions from gasoline extraction, production and
distribution processes as a result of reduced gasoline demand
associated with this rule, and (e) ``upstream'' emission increases from
power plants as electric powertrain vehicles increase in the light duty
fleet as a result of this rule. EPA also accounted for the greenhouse
gas impacts of additional vehicle miles travelled (VMT) due to the
``rebound'' effect discussed in Section III.H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\640\ U.S. EPA (2012) Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2010. EPA 430-R-12-001. Available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads12/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf.
\641\ Based on the ADAGE reference case used in U.S. EPA (2010).
``EPA Analysis of the American Power Act of 2010'' U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, USA (www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/economicanalyses.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA has updated a number of analytic inputs for this final rule
analysis, as compared to the proposal. The majority of these changes
have small impacts. Two notable changes are a lower VMT projection,
corresponding to a lower projection in Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2012
as compared to the AEO 2011 estimates used in the NPRM, and new
emission factors for electricity, discussed later in this section and
in EPA RIA Chapter 4. No significant comments were received on the
general methods used for calculating greenhouse gas impacts, including
the use of the OMEGA model. All tables in this section contain data
from the analysis with the MY 2008 based future fleet projection. For
the analysis containing the MY 2010 alternate future fleet projection,
please see EPA RIA chapter 10.
Using this approach EPA estimates the standards will reduce annual
fleetwide car and light truck vehicle GHG emissions by approximately
220 million metric tons (MMT) CO2eq or 17 percent by 2030,
when 85 percent of car and light truck miles will be travelled by
vehicles meeting the MY 2017 or later standards. An additional 60
MMTCO2eq of reduced emissions are attributable to reductions
in gasoline production, distribution and transport. 10
MMTCO2eq of additional emissions will be attributable to
increased electricity production. In total, EPA estimates that compared
to a baseline of indefinite 2016 model year standards, net GHG emission
reductions from the program will be approximately 270
MMTCO2-equivalent (MMTCO2eq) annually by 2030,
which represents a reduction of 4% percent of total U.S. GHG emissions
and 0.5% percent of total worldwide GHG emissions projected in that
year. That year, these GHG emission reductions will result in savings
of approximately 23 billion gallons of petroleum-based gasoline.\642\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\642\ All estimates of fuel savings presented here assume that
manufacturers use air conditioning leakage credits as part of their
compliance strategy. If these credits are not used, then
manufacturers would be meeting the standards via adding more fuel
efficient technologies, and thus the fuel savings of the program
would be larger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA projects the total GHG reductions of the program over the full
life of model year 2017-2025 vehicles to be about 1,960
MMTCO2eq, with fuel savings of 160 billion gallons (3.9
billion barrels) of gasoline over the life of these vehicles.
Section III.F.1 discusses the emission inventory impacts of this
rulemaking, while III.F.2 discusses the climate change impacts of GHGs.
The impacts of this rule on atmospheric CO2 concentrations,
global mean surface temperature, sea level rise, and ocean pH are
discussed in Section III.F.3.
1. Impact on GHG Emissions
The modeling of fuel savings and greenhouse gas emissions is
substantially similar to the modeling conducted in the proposal as well
as in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking and the MYs 2017-2025 Interim Joint
Technical Assessment Report (TAR). As detailed in EPA RIA chapter 4,
EPA estimated calendar year tailpipe CO2 reductions based on
pre- and post-control CO2 gram per mile levels from EPA's
OMEGA model, coupled with VMT schedules derived from AEO 2012 Early
Release. These estimates reflect the real-world CO2
emissions reductions projected for the entire U.S. vehicle fleet in a
specified calendar year. EPA also estimated full lifetime impacts for
model years 2017-2025 using pre- and post-control CO2 levels
projected by the OMEGA model, coupled with projected vehicle sales and
lifetime mileage estimates. These estimates reflect the real-world GHG
emission reductions projected for model years 2017 through
[[Page 62891]]
2025 vehicles over their entire life. Upstream impacts from power plant
emissions came from OMEGA estimates of EV/PHEV penetration into the
fleet as a result of the final GHG rule (approximately 2% in MY 2025).
For both calendar year and model year assessments, EPA estimated the
environmental impact of the advanced technology multiplier, pickup
truck hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) incentive credits, intermediate
volume manufacturer provisions, and air conditioning credits. While the
projected usage of off-cycle credits was quantified, their
environmental impacts are not explicitly estimated, as these credits
are assumed to be inherently environmentally neutral (see Section
III.C). EPA also did not assess the impact of the credit banking carry-
forward programs.
As in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, this rule allows manufacturers
to earn credits for improvements for controls of both direct and
indirect AC emissions. Since these improvements are relatively low
cost, EPA again projects that manufacturers will utilize these
flexibilities widely, leading to additional reductions from GHG
emissions associated with vehicle air conditioning systems. As
explained above, these reductions will come from both direct emissions
of air conditioning refrigerant over the life of the vehicle and
tailpipe CO2 emissions produced by the increased load of the
A/C system on the engine (so called indirect A/C emissions). In
particular, EPA estimates that direct emissions of the refrigerant HFC-
134a, one of the most potent greenhouse gases, will be fully removed
from light-duty vehicles through the phase-in of alternative
refrigerants. More efficient air conditioning systems will also lead to
fuel savings and additional reductions in upstream emissions from fuel
production and distribution. Our estimated reductions from the A/C
credit program assume that manufacturers will fully utilize the program
(i.e. have 100% refrigerant replacement, and obtain the maximum credit
for control of indirect A/C emissions) by MY 2021.
Upstream greenhouse gas emission reductions associated with the
production and distribution of fuel were estimated using emission
factors from the Department of Energy's (DOE's) GREET1.8c model, with
modifications as detailed in Chapter 4 of the RIA. These estimates
include both international and domestic emission reductions, since
reductions in foreign exports of finished gasoline and/or crude make up
a significant share of the fuel savings resulting from the GHG
standards. Thus, significant portions of the upstream GHG emission
reductions will occur outside of the U.S.; a breakdown of projected
international versus domestic reductions is included in the EPA RIA.
Electricity emission factors were derived from EPA's Integrated
Planning Model (IPM). EPA uses IPM to analyze the projected impact of
environmental policies on the electric power sector in the 48
contiguous states and the District of Columbia. IPM is a multi-
regional, dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S.
electric power sector. It provides forecasts of least-cost capacity
expansion, electricity dispatch, and emission control strategies for
meeting energy demand and environmental, transmission, dispatch, and
reliability constraints. For the proposal, we derived average national
GHG emission factors (EFs) from the IPM version 4.10 base case run for
the ``Proposed Transport Rule.\643\ '' The proposal further discussed
the potential consideration of emission factors other than national
power generation, such as marginal power emission factors, or regional
emission factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\643\ EPA. IPM. http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/epa-ipm/BaseCasev410.html. ``Proposed Transport Rule/NODA version'' of IPM .
TR--SB--Limited Trading v.4.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA received several comments on the use of marginal or incremental
emission factors. These comments are discussed extensively in section
III.C.2.a.vi, but generally favored the use of marginal power as
opposed to national average during the impacts analysis. A national
average EF is based on all power in U.S., including existing hydro-
electric, coal, and nuclear. Some of these power sources may not be
available to electric vehicles, as they are at full capacity with
current demands. For this final rulemaking, EPA updated the electricity
emission factor in several ways. The final rulemaking emission factors
include a newer IPM version that incorporates new EPA stationary source
emissions controls (such as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards and
the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule) \644\ and reflects recent economic
conditions. EPA also changed from a ``national average'' electricity
GHG emissions factor to one that projects the average electricity GHG
emissions factor for the additional electricity demand represented by
the EVs and PHEVs that EPA projects will be on the road in calendar
year 2030 as a result of this final, and bases the locations of these
vehicles on the distribution of hybrid vehicle sales in 2006-2009. The
cumulative effect of the changes is that IPM projects that about 80
percent of the electricity that will be used by EVs and PHEVs in 2030
will come from natural gas, with 15 percent from coal, and 5 percent
from wind and other feedstocks. Details of this analysis can be found
in EPA RIA chapter 4.7.3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\644\ Citations to rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Calendar Year Reductions for Future Years
Table III-61 shows reductions estimated from these GHG standards
assuming a reference case of 2016 MY standards continuing indefinitely
beyond 2016, and a post-control case in which 2025 MY GHG standards
continue indefinitely beyond 2025. These reductions are broken down by
upstream and downstream components, including air conditioning
improvements, and also account for the offset from a 10 percent ``VMT
rebound effect'' as discussed in Section III.H.
For selected years, Table III-61 contains the detailed breakdown of
the sources contributing to the GHG reductions. Table III-62 contains
total GHG impacts and fuel savings for all years.
Table III-61--Projected Detailed GHG Impacts From the MY 2017-2025 Standards
[MMTCO2eq per year]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year: 2020 2030 2040 2050
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Delta \*\................................... -27 -271 -455 -569
Net CO2......................................... -23 -247 -417 -522
Net other GHG................................... -4 -25 -38 -47
Downstream...................................... -22 -223 -374 -467
CO2 (excluding A/C)............................. -18 -201 -341 -428
A/C--indirect CO2............................... -1 -3 -4 -5
[[Page 62892]]
A/C--direct HFCs................................ -3 -19 -28 -35
CH4 (VMT rebound effect)........................ 0 0 0 0
N2O (VMT rebound effect)........................ 0 0 0 0
Gasoline Upstream............................... -5 -57 -96 -121
CO2............................................. -5 -50 -84 -105
CH4............................................. -1 -7 -12 -15
N2O............................................. 0 0 0 -1
Electricity Upstream............................ 1 9 15 19
CO2............................................. 1 7 13 16
CH4............................................. 0 1 2 3
N2O............................................. 0 0 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-62--Projected Annual Impacts from the MY 2017-2025 Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light duty
fuel Light duty
GHG impact consumption fuel
Calendar year (MMT CO2 Eq) impact consumption
(billion impact (%)
gallons)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................................................ -2 0 0
2018............................................................ -8 -1 0
2019............................................................ -16 -1 0
2020............................................................ -27 -2 0
2021............................................................ -43 -3 0
2022............................................................ -63 -5 0
2023............................................................ -85 -7 0
2024............................................................ -111 -9 1
2025............................................................ -140 -12 2
2026............................................................ -167 -14 3
2027............................................................ -195 -16 4
2028............................................................ -221 -19 6
2029............................................................ -247 -21 7
2030............................................................ -271 -23 9
2031............................................................ -295 -25 11
2032............................................................ -317 -27 13
2033............................................................ -338 -29 15
2034............................................................ -358 -30 16
2035............................................................ -377 -32 18
2036............................................................ -394 -34 19
2037............................................................ -411 -35 20
2038............................................................ -427 -36 21
2039............................................................ -441 -38 22
2040............................................................ -455 -39 23
2041............................................................ -468 -40 24
2042............................................................ -480 -41 25
2043............................................................ -492 -42 25
2044............................................................ -504 -43 26
2045............................................................ -515 -44 26
2046............................................................ -526 -45 26
2047............................................................ -537 -46 27
2048............................................................ -548 -47 27
2049............................................................ -558 -48 27
2050............................................................ -569 -49 27
-----------------------------------------------
Total 2017-2050............................................. -10,605 -903 ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The total program emission reductions yield significant emission
decreases relative to worldwide and national total emissions.
Table III-63--Projected GHG Reductions From the MY 2017-2025 Standards as a Percentage of Total Emissions
[MMTCO2eq per year]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020 2030 2040 2050
Emission Reduction Relative to: (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Worldwide reference............................. -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8
[[Page 62893]]
U.S. reference (all sectors).................... -0.4 -3.6 -5.7 -7.0
U.S. reference (cars + light trucks)\*\......... -2.5 -22.6 -32.5 -35.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ Note that total emission reductions include sectors (such as fuel refineries) that are not part of this
reference.
b. Lifetime Reductions for 2017-2025 Model Years
EPA also analyzed the emission reductions over the full life of the
2017-2025 model year cars and light trucks that will be affected by
this program.\645\ These results, including both upstream and
downstream GHG contributions, are presented in Table III-64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\645\ As detailed in RIA Chapter 4 and TSD Chapter 4, for this
analysis the full life of the vehicle is represented by average
lifetime mileages for cars (196,000 miles [MY 2017] and 206,000
miles [MY 2025]) and trucks (213,000 miles [MY 2017] and 224,000
miles [MY 2025]). These estimates are a function of how far vehicles
are driven per year and scrappage rates.
Table III-64--Projected net MY 2017-2025 Lifetime GHG Impacts
[MMTCO2eq per year]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upstream
MY Downstream (Gasoline) Electricity Total CO2e
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................................ -25 -6 1 -30
2018............................................ -58 -14 2 -70
2019............................................ -89 -21 3 -108
2020............................................ -124 -29 4 -149
2021............................................ -178 -43 5 -216
2022............................................ -222 -55 7 -270
2023............................................ -262 -66 9 -320
2024............................................ -304 -78 11 -371
2025............................................ -347 -90 14 -423
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total....................................... -1,610 -402 57 -1,956
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Impacts of VMT Rebound Effect
As noted above and discussed more fully in Section III.H., the
effect of a decrease in fuel cost per mile on vehicle use (i.e., the
VMT rebound effect) was accounted for in our assessment of economic and
environmental impacts of this rule. A 10 percent rebound case was used
for this analysis, meaning that VMT for affected model years is modeled
as increasing by 10 percent as much as the decrease in fuel cost per
mile; i.e., a 10 percent decrease in fuel cost per mile from our
standards would result in a 1 percent increase in VMT. Detailed results
are shown in Table III-65. (This increase is accounted for in the GHG
impacts previously presented in this section). The table below compares
the GHG emissions under two different scenarios: One in which the
control scenario VMT estimate is entirely insensitive to the cost of
travel, and one in which the control scenario is affected by the
rebound effect. RIA Chapter 4.5 includes a sensitivity analysis of GHG
emissions impacts from this rule assuming higher and lower values of
the VMT rebound effect.
Table III-65--Delta GHG Increase From a 10% VMT Rebound Effect \a\
[MMTCO2eq per year]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upstream Electricity
CY Downstream gasoline \646\ Total CO2e
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020............................................ 2 1 0 2
2030............................................ 16 4 0 21
2040............................................ 26 7 0 34
2050............................................ 33 9 1 43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ These impacts are included in the reductions shown in Table III-61 through Table III-64.
d. Analysis of Alternatives
EPA analyzed four alternative standard scenarios for this rule
using the MY 2008 based future fleet projection (Table III-66, Table
III-67, Table III-68). EPA assumed that manufacturers would use air
conditioning improvements in identical penetrations as in the primary
scenario. EPA re-estimated the impact of the electric vehicle
multiplier and the HEV pickup incentives under each alternative. Under
these alternatives, EPA projects that the achieved fleetwide average
emission levels would be 156 g/mile CO2 to 176 g/mile
CO2eq in MY 2025. As in the primary scenario, EPA assumed
that the fleet complied with
[[Page 62894]]
the standards. For full details on modeling assumptions, please refer
to RIA Chapter 4.2. EPA's assessment of these alternative standards is
discussed in Section III.D.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\646\ This assessment assumes that owners of grid-electric
powered vehicles react similarly to changes in the cost of driving
as owners of conventional gasoline vehicles.
Table III-66--GHG g/mile targets of Alternative Scenarios
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 CO2 g/mile targets 2025 CO2 g/mile Targets
Title -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars Trucks Fleet Cars Trucks Fleet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary................................................. 172 249 199 143 203 163
A--Cars +20 g/mile...................................... 192 249 212 163 203 176
B--Cars -20 g/mile...................................... 152 249 186 123 203 150
C--Trucks +20 g/mile.................................... 172 229 206 143 223 170
D--Trucks -20 g/mile.................................... 172 269 192 143 183 156
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-67--Calendar Year Impacts of Alternative Scenarios
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GHG delta (MMT2 CO2eq) Fuel savings (B. Gallons petroleum gasoline)
Scenario -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary......................................... -27 -271 -455 -569 -2 -23 -39 -49
A--Cars +20 g/mile.............................. -19 -223 -382 -480 -1 -18 -32 -40
B--Cars -20 g/mile.............................. -34 -311 -514 -641 -3 -28 -46 -58
C--Trucks +20 g/mile............................ -27 -249 -420 -526 -2 -21 -36 -45
D--Trucks -20 g/mile............................ -36 -294 -484 -604 -3 -25 -42 -53
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-68--Model Year Lifetime Impacts of Alternative Scenarios
[Summary of MY 2017-MY 2025]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel delta Fuel delta
Total CO2e (b. gal (b. barrels
(MMT) petroleum petroleum
gasoline) gasoline)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary......................................................... -1,956 -163 -3.9
A--Cars +20 g/mile.............................................. -1,537 -122 -2.9
B--Cars -20 g/mile.............................................. -2,314 -200 -4.8
C--Trucks +20 g/mile............................................ -1,781 -146 -3.5
D--Trucks -20 g/mile............................................ -2,231 -189 -4.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Climate Change Impacts From GHG Emissions
The impact of GHG emissions on the climate has been reviewed in the
NPRM, as well as in the MYs 2012-2016 light-duty rulemaking and the
heavy-duty GHG rulemaking. See 76 FR 75096; 75 FR 25491; 76 FR 57294.
This section briefly discusses again the issue of climate impacts
noting the context of transportation emissions.
Once emitted, GHGs that are the subject of this regulation can
remain in the atmosphere for decades to millennia, meaning that (1)
their concentrations become well-mixed throughout the global atmosphere
regardless of emission origin, and (2) their effects on climate are
long lasting. GHG emissions come mainly from the combustion of fossil
fuels (coal, oil, and gas), with additional contributions from the
clearing of forests, agricultural activities, cement production, and
some industrial activities. Transportation activities, in aggregate,
were the second largest contributor to total U.S. GHG emissions in 2010
(27 percent of total domestic emissions).\647\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\647\ U.S. EPA (2012) Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2010. EPA 430-R-12-001. Available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads12/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Administrator relied on thorough and peer-reviewed assessments
of climate change science prepared by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (``IPCC''), the United States Global Change Research
Program (``USGCRP''), and the National Research Council of the National
Academies (``NRC'') \648\ as the primary scientific and technical basis
for the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (74 FR 66496, December
15, 2009). These assessments comprehensively address the scientific
issues the Administrator had to examine, providing her both data and
information on a wide range of issues pertinent to the Endangerment
Finding. These assessments have been rigorously reviewed by the expert
community, and also by United States government agencies and
scientists, including by EPA itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\648\ For a complete list of core references from IPCC, USGCRP/
CCSP, NRC and others relied upon for development of the TSD for
EPA's Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings see section
1(b), specifically, Table 1.1 of the TSD. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on these assessments, the Administrator determined that
greenhouse gases cause warming; that levels of greenhouse gases are
increasing in the atmosphere due to human activity; the climate is
warming; recent warming has been attributed to the increase in
greenhouse gases; and that warming of the climate threatens human
health and welfare. The Administrator further found that emissions of
well-mixed greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles and engines
contribute to the air pollution that endangers
[[Page 62895]]
public health and welfare. Specifically, the Administrator found under
section 202(a) of the Act that six greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and
sulfur hexafluoride) taken in combination endanger both the public
health and the public welfare of current and future generations, and
further found that the combined emissions of these greenhouse gases
from new motor vehicles and engines contribute to the greenhouse gas
air pollution that endangers public health and welfare. The D.C.
Circuit recently emphatically upheld the reasonableness of all of these
conclusions. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, (No. 09-
1322, (June 26, 2012) (D.C. Circuit)) slip op. p. 30 (upholding all of
EPA's findings and stating ``EPA had before it substantial record
evidence that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases `very likely'
caused warming of the climate over the last several decades. EPA
further had evidence of current and future effects of this warming on
public health and welfare. Relying again upon substantial scientific
evidence, EPA determined that anthropogenically induced climate change
threatens both public health and public welfare. It found that extreme
weather events, changes in air quality, increases in food- and water-
borne pathogens, and increases in temperatures are likely to have
adverse health effects. The record also supports EPA's conclusion that
climate change endangers human welfare by creating risk to food
production and agriculture, forestry, energy, infrastructure,
ecosystems, and wildlife. Substantial evidence further supported EPA's
conclusion that the warming resulting from the greenhouse gas emissions
could be expected to create risks to water resources and in general to
coastal areas as a result of expected increase in sea level.'')
More recent assessments have reached similar conclusions to those
of the assessments upon which the Administrator relied. In May 2010,
the NRC published its comprehensive assessment, ``Advancing the Science
of Climate Change.'' \649\ It concluded that ``climate change is
occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant
risks for--and in many cases is already affecting--a broad range of
human and natural systems.'' Furthermore, the NRC stated that this
conclusion is based on findings that are ``consistent with the
conclusions of recent assessments by the U.S. Global Change Research
Program, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Fourth
Assessment Report, and other assessments of the state of scientific
knowledge on climate change.'' These are the same assessments that
served as the primary scientific references underlying the
Administrator's Endangerment Finding. Another NRC assessment, ``Climate
Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over
Decades to Millennia'', was published in 2011. This report found that
climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions will persist for many
centuries. The report also estimates a number of specific climate
change impacts, finding that every degree Celsius (C) of warming could
lead to increases in the heaviest 15% of daily rainfalls of 3 to 10%,
decreases of 5 to 15% in yields for a number of crops (absent
adaptation measures that do not presently exist), decreases of Arctic
sea ice extent of 25% in September and 15% annually averaged, along
with changes in precipitation and streamflow of 5 to 10% in many
regions and river basins (increases in some regions, decreases in
others). The assessment also found that for an increase of 4 degrees C
nearly all land areas would experience summers warmer than all but 5%
of summers in the 20th century, that for an increase of 1 to 2 degrees
C the area burnt by wildfires in western North America will likely more
than double, that for an increase of 3 degrees C the sea level will
rise 1.6 to 3.3 feet by 2100, and that coral bleaching and erosion will
increase due both to warming and ocean acidification. The assessment
notes that many important aspects of climate change are difficult to
quantify but that the risk of adverse impacts is likely to increase
with increasing temperature, and that the risk of abrupt climate
changes can be expected to increase with the duration and magnitude of
the warming.
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\649\ National Research Council (NRC) (2010). Advancing the
Science of Climate Change. National Academy Press. Washington, DC.
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
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In the 2010 report cited above, the NRC stated that some of the
largest potential risks associated with future climate change may come
not from relatively smooth changes that are reasonably well understood,
but from extreme events, abrupt changes, and surprises that might occur
when climate or environmental system thresholds are crossed. Examples
cited as warranting more research include the release of large
quantities of GHGs stored in permafrost (frozen soils) across the
Arctic, rapid disintegration of the major ice sheets, irreversible
drying and desertification in the subtropics, changes in ocean
circulation, and the rapid release of destabilized methane hydrates in
the oceans.
On ocean acidification, the same report noted the potential for
broad, ``catastrophic'' impacts on marine ecosystems. Ocean acidity has
increased 25 percent since pre-industrial times, and is projected to
continue increasing. By the time atmospheric CO2 content
doubles over its preindustrial value, there would be virtually no place
left in the ocean that can sustain coral reef growth. Ocean
acidification could have dramatic consequences for polar food webs
including salmon, the report said.
Importantly, these recent NRC assessments represent another
independent and critical inquiry of the state of climate change
science, separate and apart from the previous IPCC and USGCRP
assessments.
3. Changes in Global Climate Indicators Associated With This Rule's GHG
Emissions Reductions
Although ``EPA need not establish a minimum threshold of risk or
harm before determining whether an air pollutant endangers'', and
similarly need not condition regulation under section 202(a) ``on
evidence of a particular level of mitigation''. see Coalition for
Responsible Regulation v. EPA No. 09-1322, June 26, 2012 (D.C. Circuit)
slip op. pp. 33, 43, EPA examined \650\ the reductions in
CO2 and other GHGs associated with this rulemaking and
analyzed the projected effects on atmospheric CO2
concentrations, global mean surface temperature, sea level rise, and
ocean pH which are common variables used as indicators of climate
change. The analysis projects that the final rule will reduce
atmospheric concentrations of CO2, global climate warming,
ocean acidification, and sea level rise relative to the reference case.
Although the projected reductions and improvements are small in
comparison to the total projected climate change, they are
quantifiable, directionally consistent, and will contribute to reducing
the risks associated with climate change. Climate change is a global
phenomenon and EPA recognizes that this one national action alone will
not prevent it: EPA
[[Page 62896]]
notes this would be true for any given GHG mitigation action when taken
alone or when considered in isolation. See Coalition for Responsible
Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322, June 26, 2012 (D.C. Circuit)) slip op.
p 43 noting that the GHG emission reductions of the MYs 2012-2016 rule
``result in meaningful mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions''; the
projected emissions reductions of this MYs 2017-2025 rule are projected
to be approximately double those of the MYs 2012-2016 rule so that this
rule obviously results in ``meaningful mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions'' as well. EPA also repeats that a substantial portion of
CO2 emitted into the atmosphere is not removed by natural
processes for millennia, and therefore each unit of CO2 not
emitted into the atmosphere due to this rule avoids essentially
permanent climate change on centennial time scales.
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\650\ Using the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas
Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) 5.3v2, http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/wigley/magicc/), EPA estimated the effects of this rulemaking's
greenhouse gas emissions reductions on global mean temperature and
sea level. EPA applied the CO2SYS program to estimate the effects of
this rulemaking's greenhouse gas emissions reductions on ocean
acidification. Please refer to Chapter 6.4 of the RIA for additional
information.
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EPA determines that the projected reductions in atmospheric
CO2, global mean temperature, sea level rise, and ocean
acidification are meaningful in the context of this action. The results
of the analysis demonstrate that relative to the reference case, by
2100 projected atmospheric CO2 concentrations are estimated
to be reduced by 3.21 to 3.58 part per million by volume (ppmv), global
mean temperature is estimated to be reduced by 0.0074 to 0.0176[deg]C,
and sea-level rise is projected to be reduced by approximately 0.071-
0.159 cm, based on a range of climate sensitivities (described below).
The analysis also demonstrates that ocean pH will increase by 0.0017 pH
units by 2100 relative to the reference case (ie, reduced
acidification).
a. Estimated Reductions in Atmospheric CO2 Concentration,
Global Mean Surface Temperatures, Sea Level Rise, and Ocean pH
As in the NPRM, EPA estimated changes in the atmospheric
CO2 concentration, global mean temperature, and sea level
rise out to 2100 resulting from the emissions reductions in this
rulemaking using the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM, formerly
MiniCAM) \651\ coupled with the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse
Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC, version 5.3v2).\652\ GCAM was used
to create the globally and temporally consistent set of climate
relevant variables required for running MAGICC. MAGICC was then used to
estimate the projected change in these variables over time. Given the
magnitude of the estimated emissions reductions associated with this
action, a simple climate model such as MAGICC is reasonable for
estimating the atmospheric and climate response. This widely-used, peer
reviewed modeling tool was also used to project temperature and sea
level rise under different emissions scenarios in the Third and Fourth
Assessments of the IPCC.
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\651\ GCAM is a long-term, global integrated assessment model of
energy, economy, agriculture and land use, that considers the
sources of emissions of a suite of GHG's, emitted in 14 globally
disaggregated regions, the fate of emissions to the atmosphere, and
the consequences of changing concentrations of greenhouse related
gases for climate change. GCAM begins with a representation of
demographic and economic developments in each region and combines
these with assumptions about technology development to describe an
internally consistent representation of energy, agriculture, land-
use, and economic developments that in turn shape global emissions.
Brenkert A, S. Smith, S. Kim, and H. Pitcher, 2003: Model
Documentation for the MiniCAM. PNNL-14337, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, Richland, Washington. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799)
\652\ Wigley, T.M.L. 2008. MAGICC 5.3.v2 User Manual. UCAR--
Climate and Global Dynamics Division, Boulder, Colorado. http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/wigley/magicc/ (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
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The integrated impact of the following non-GHG and GHG emissions
changes are considered: CO2, CH4, N2O,
HFC-134a, NOX, CO, SO2, and volatile organic
compounds (VOC). For these pollutants an annual time-series of
(upstream + downstream) emissions reductions estimated from the
rulemaking were applied as net reductions to a global reference case
(or baseline) emissions scenario in GCAM to generate an emissions
scenario specific to this rule.\653\ The emissions reductions past
calendar year 2050 for all gases were scaled with total U.S. road
transportation fuel consumption from the GCAM reference scenario. Road
transport fuel consumption past 2050 does not change significantly and
thus emissions reductions remain relatively constant from 2050 through
2100. Specific details about the GCAM reference case scenario can be
found in Chapter 6.4 of the RIA that accompanies this final rule.
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\653\ Due to timing constraints, this analysis was conducted
with preliminary estimates of the emissions reductions projected
from the final rule, which were highly similar to the final
estimates presented in Chapter 4 of the RIA. For example, the final
projected CO2 emissions reductions for most years in the
2017-2050 time period were roughly one-tenth of a percent smaller
than the preliminary estimates. The preliminary emissions reduction
projections are available in the docket (see ``Emissions for MAGICC
modeling'' in Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799), and the files used as
inputs for the MAGICC model are also available (see ``MAGICC Input
File (policy)'' and ``MAGICC Input File (reference)'').
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MAGICC calculates the forcing response at the global scale from
changes in atmospheric concentrations of CO2,
CH4, N2O, HFCs, and tropospheric ozone
(O3). It also includes the effects of temperature changes on
stratospheric ozone and the effects of CH4 emissions on
stratospheric water vapor. Changes in CH4, NOX,
VOC, and CO emissions affect both O3 concentrations and
CH4 concentrations. MAGICC includes the relative climate
forcing effects of changes in sulfate concentrations due to changing
SO2 emissions, including both the direct effect of sulfate
particles and the indirect effects related to cloud interactions.
However, MAGICC does not calculate the effect of changes in
concentrations of other aerosols such as nitrates, black carbon, or
organic carbon, making the assumption that the sulfate cooling effect
is a proxy for the sum of all the aerosol effects. Therefore, the
climate effects of changes in PM2.5 emissions and precursors
(besides SO2) that are presented in the RIA Chapter 6 were
not included in the calculations. MAGICC also calculates all climate
effects at the global scale. This global scale captures the climate
effects of the long-lived, well-mixed greenhouse gases, but does not
address the fact that short-lived climate forcers such as aerosols and
ozone can have effects that vary with location and timing of emissions.
Black carbon in particular is known to cause a positive forcing or
warming effect by absorbing incoming solar radiation, but there are
uncertainties about the magnitude of that warming effect and the
interaction of black carbon (and other co-emitted aerosol species) with
clouds. See 77 FR 38890, 38991-993 (June 29, 2012). While black carbon
is likely to be an important contributor to climate change, it would be
premature to include quantification of black carbon climate impacts in
an analysis of these final standards. See generally, EPA, Response to
Comments to the Endangerment Finding Vol. 9 section 9.1.6.1 \654\ and
the discussion of black carbon in the endangerment finding at 74 FR
66520 as well as EPA's discussion in the recent proposal to revise the
PM NAAQS (77 FR 38991-993). Additionally, the magnitude of
PM2.5 emissions changes (and therefore, black carbon
emission changes) related to these final standards are small in
comparison to the changes in the pollutants which have been included in
the MAGICC model simulations.
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\654\ See http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/comments/volume9.html#1-6-1 (last accessed August 10, 2012) or Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2009-0171-11676.
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[[Page 62897]]
The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) and the
Manufacturers of Emissions Control Association (MECA) mentioned the
benefits of black carbon reductions. Since the proposed rule, EPA has
recently released a Report to Congress addressing black carbon.\655\
EPA continues to recognize that black carbon is an important climate
forcing agent and takes very seriously the emerging science on black
carbon's contribution to global climate change in general and the high
rates of observed climate change in the Arctic in particular. MECA also
mentioned the effects of NOX on climate. As discussed above,
changes in NOX emissions are included as an input into the
MAGICC model. However, the effects due to NOX changes alone
have not been isolated, and because NOX emissions lead to
decreased levels of methane in addition to increased levels of ozone,
the net effect on climate of changes in NOX emissions is
unclear.
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\655\ See EPA, March 2012. Report to Congress on Black Carbon
(EPA-450/R-12-001) available at http://epa.gov/blackcarbon/ (last
accessed August 10, 2012).
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Changes in atmospheric CO2 concentration, global mean
temperature, and sea level rise for both the reference case and the
emissions scenarios associated with this action were computed using
MAGICC. To calculate the reductions in the atmospheric CO2
concentrations as well as in temperature and sea level resulting from
this final rule, the output from the policy scenario associated with
EPA's final standards was subtracted from an existing Global Change
Assessment Model (GCAM, formerly MiniCAM) reference emission scenario.
To capture some key uncertainties in the climate system with the MAGICC
model, changes in atmospheric CO2, global mean temperature
and sea level rise were projected across the most current IPCC range of
climate sensitivities, from 1.5 [deg]C to 6.0 [deg]C.\656\ This range
reflects the uncertainty for equilibrium climate sensitivity for how
much global mean temperature would rise if the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere were to double. The information for this
range come from constraints from past climate change on various time
scales, and the spread of results for climate sensitivity from
ensembles of models.\657\ Details about this modeling analysis can be
found in the RIA Chapter 6.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\656\ In IPCC reports, equilibrium climate sensitivity refers to
the equilibrium change in the annual mean global surface temperature
following a doubling of the atmospheric equivalent carbon dioxide
concentration. The IPCC states that climate sensitivity is
``likely'' to be in the range of 2 [deg]C to 4.5 [deg]C, ``very
unlikely'' to be less than 1.5 [deg]C, and ``values substantially
higher than 4.5 [deg]C cannot be excluded.'' IPCC WGI, 2007, Climate
Change 2007--The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/ (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
\657\ Meehl, G.A. et al. (2007) Global Climate Projections. In:
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M.
Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller
(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and
New York, NY, USA. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Institute for Energy Research (IER) argued that the climate
sensitivity is likely to be below or in the low end of the range used
by the EPA. However, this assertion was based on only two recent
studies, while other recent studies have come to different conclusions.
The EPA has relied on assessments like those of the National Academies,
U.S. Global Change Research Program, and IPCC because assessments cover
the full range of the literature and place the individual studies in
context. In addition, one of the two specific studies relied on by IER
to assert that EPA overestimated the climate sensitivity provided
estimates of transient climate sensitivity. Transient sensitivity is a
measure of the temperature change precisely at the time of doubling of
CO2 concentrations, before the climate system has come to
equilibrium. The transient sensitivity is usually about half of the
equilibrium sensitivity. Therefore, it would be premature to conclude
that the range used by the EPA either under or overestimates the likely
equilibrium climate sensitivity.
The results of this modeling, summarized in Table III-69, show
quantified reductions in atmospheric CO2 concentrations,
projected global mean temperature and sea level resulting from this
action, across all climate sensitivities. As a result of the emission
reductions from the final standards, relative to the reference case the
atmospheric CO2 concentration is projected by 2100 to be
reduced by 3.21-3.58 ppmv, the global mean temperature is projected to
be reduced by approximately 0.0074-0.0176 [deg]C by 2100, and global
mean sea level rise is projected to be reduced by approximately 0.071-
0.159 cm by 2100. The range of reductions in global mean temperature
and sea level rise is larger than that for CO2
concentrations because CO2 concentrations are only weakly
coupled to climate sensitivity through the dependence on temperature of
the rate of ocean absorption of CO2, whereas the magnitude
of temperature change response to CO2 changes (and therefore
sea level rise) is more tightly coupled to climate sensitivity in the
MAGICC model.
Table III-69--Impact of GHG Emissions Reductions on Projected Changes in Global Climate Associated With EPA's
Final GHG Standards for MYs 2017-2025
[Based on a range of climate sensitivities from 1.5-6 [deg]C]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Units Year Projected change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atmospheric CO2 Concentration.............. ppmv......................... 2100 -3.21 to -3.58
Global Mean Surface Temperature............ [deg]C....................... 2100 -0.0074 to -0.0176
Sea Level Rise............................. cm........................... 2100 -0.071 to -0.159
Ocean pH................................... pH units..................... 2100 +0.0017 \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ The value for projected change in ocean pH is based on a climate sensitivity of 3.0.
The projected reductions are small relative to the change in
temperature (1.8-4.8 [deg]C), sea level rise (23-55 cm), and ocean
acidity (-0.30 pH units) from 1990 to 2100 from the MAGICC simulations
for the GCAM reference case. However, this is to be expected given the
magnitude of emissions reductions expected from the program in the
context of global emissions. This uncertainty range does not include
the effects of uncertainty in future emissions. It should also be noted
that the calculations in MAGICC do not include the possible effects of
[[Page 62898]]
accelerated ice flow in Greenland and/or Antarctica: the recent NRC
report estimated a likely sea level increase for a business-as-usual
scenario of 0.5 to 1.0 meters.\658\ Further discussion of EPA's
modeling analysis is found in the RIA, Chapter 6.
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\658\ National Research Council (NRC), 2011. Climate
Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over
Decades to Millennia. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
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IER and a number of private citizens asserted that the reductions
in temperature and other climate factors are too small to be
meaningful. However, as has been stated, no one rule will prevent
climate change by itself. As stated in the Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act; final rule (74 FR at 66543), ``The commenters' approach,
if used globally, would effectively lead to a tragedy of the commons,
whereby no country or source category would be accountable for
contributing to the global problem of climate change, and nobody would
take action as the problem persists and worsens.'' \659\ While this
rule does not single-handedly eliminate climate change, it is an
important contribution to reducing the rate of change, and this
reduction in rate is global and long-lived. EPA appropriately placed
the benefits of reductions in context in the rule, by calculating the
likely reductions in temperature and comparing them to total projected
changes in temperature over the same time period. In addition, EPA used
the social cost of carbon methodology in order to estimate a
monetization of the benefits of these reductions (see section III.H.6),
and the net present value resulting from the CO2 reductions
due to this rule (between years 2017 and 2050) was calculated to be
between tens to hundreds of billions of dollars. As noted above, the
D.C. Circuit pointedly rejected the argument that EPA should refrain
from issuing GHG standards under section 202(a) due to claimed lack of
mitigating effect on the endangerment, and further held that ``the
emission standards would result in meaningful mitigation of greenhouse
gas emissions'' in the form of ``960 million metric tons of
CO2e over the lifetime of the model year 2012-2016
vehicles''. Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322,
(June 26, 2012) (D.C. Circuit)) slip op. p 43; projected emissions
reductions of this MYs 2017-2025 rule are projected to be approximately
double those of the MYs 2012-2016 rule and thus, in the D.C. Circuit's
language, ``result in meaningful mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions.''
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\659\ The Supreme Court likewise spoke to this issue, stating
that ``[a]gencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve
massive problems'' like climate change ``in one fell regulatory
swoop.'' Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524. They ``whittle away
at them over time.'' Id. The Supreme Court additionally emphasized
that ``reducing domestic automobile [greenhouse gas] emissions is
hardly a tentative step'' toward addressing climate change, inasmuch
as ``the United States transportation sector emits an enormous
quantity of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.'' Id. Thus,
``[j]udged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a
meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations.'' Id. at
525.
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The National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Union of Concerned
Scientists, American Medical Association of California, Ceres,
Environmental Defense Fund, and several private citizens also discussed
the importance of these standards in terms of mitigating climate risks,
noting impacts to heat, ozone, extreme events, wildfires, floods,
agriculture, coastal regions, droughts, and vulnerable populations. The
EPA agrees that the reductions enacted in this rule are an important
step towards reducing climate risks over the coming decades and
centuries.
A summary of comments on climate change impacts from GHG emissions
and other climate-forcing agents as well as changes in global
indicators associated with GHG emissions reductions from this rule is
available in sections 16.2 and 16.3 of EPA's Response to Comments
document. These sections also contain EPA's more detailed responses to
these comments.
EPA used the computer program CO2SYS,\660\ version 1.05, to
estimate projected changes in ocean pH for tropical waters based on the
atmospheric CO2 concentration change (reduction) resulting
from this final rule.\661\ The program performs calculations relating
parameters of the CO2 system in seawater. EPA used the
program to calculate ocean pH as a function of atmospheric
CO2 concentrations, among other specified input conditions.
Based on the projected atmospheric CO2 concentration
reductions resulting from this final rule, the program calculates an
increase in ocean pH of 0.0017 pH units in 2100 relative to the
reference case (compared to a decrease of 0.3 pH units from 1990 to
2100 in the reference case). Thus, this analysis indicates the
projected decrease in atmospheric CO2 concentrations from
EPA's final standards will result in an increase in ocean pH. For
additional validation, results were generated using different known
constants from the literature. A comprehensive discussion of the
modeling analysis associated with ocean pH is provided in the RIA,
Chapter 6.
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\660\ Lewis, E., and D.W.R. Wallace. 1998. Program Developed for
CO2 System Calculations. ORNL/CDIAC-105. Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S.
Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799)
\661\ Due to timing constraints, this analysis was conducted
with preliminary estimates of the CO2 emissions
reductions projected from the final rule, which were highly similar
to the final estimates presented in Chapter 4 of this RIA. The final
projected CO2 emissions reductions for most years in the
2017-2050 time period were roughly one-tenth of a percent smaller
than the preliminary estimates. The preliminary CO2
emissions reduction projections are available in the docket (see
``Emissions for MAGICC modeling'' in Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
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As discussed in III.F.2, the 2011 NRC assessment on ``Climate
Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over
Decades to Millennia'' determined how a number of climate impacts--such
as heaviest daily rainfalls, crop yields, and Arctic sea ice extent--
would change with a temperature change of 1 degree Celsius (C) of
warming. These relationships of impacts with temperature change could
be combined with the calculated reductions in warming in Table II-63 to
estimate changes in these impacts associated with this rulemaking.
b. Program's Effect on Climate
As a substantial portion of CO2 emitted into the
atmosphere is not removed by natural processes for millennia, each unit
of CO2 not emitted into the atmosphere avoids some degree of
permanent climate change. Therefore, reductions in emissions in the
near-term are important in determining climate impacts experienced not
just over the next decades but over thousands of years.\662\ Though the
magnitude, in isolation, of the avoided climate change projected here
is small in comparison to the total projected changes, these reductions
represent a reduction in the adverse risks associated with climate
change (though these risks were not formally estimated for this action)
across a range of equilibrium climate sensitivities.
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\662\ National Research Council (NRC) (2011). Climate
Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over
Decades to Millennia. National Academy Press. Washington, DC.
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
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EPA's analysis of this rule's impact on global climate conditions
is intended to quantify these potential reductions using the best
available science. EPA's modeling results show repeatable, consistent
reductions relative to the reference case in changes of CO2
concentration, temperature, sea-level rise, and ocean pH over the next
century.
[[Page 62899]]
G. How will the rule impact non-GHG emissions and their associated
effects?
Although this rule focuses on GHGs, it will also have an impact on
the emissions of non-GHG pollutants. Section III.G.1 of this preamble
details the criteria pollutant and air toxic inventory impacts of this
rule. The subsequent sections, III.G.2 and III.G.3, discuss the health
and environmental effects associated with the criteria and toxic air
pollutants that are being impacted by this rule. In Section III.G.4, we
discuss the potential impact of this rule on concentrations of criteria
and air toxic pollutants in the ambient air. The tools and
methodologies used in this analysis are substantially similar to those
used in the proposal and in the MYs 2012-2016 light duty rulemaking.
1. Inventory
a. Impacts
In addition to reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases, this
rule will influence ``non-GHG'' pollutants, i.e., ``criteria'' air
pollutants and their precursors, and air toxics. The rule will affect
emissions of carbon monoxide (CO), fine particulate matter
(PM2.5), sulfur dioxide (SOX), volatile organic
compounds (VOC), nitrogen oxides (NOX), benzene, 1,3-
butadiene, formaldehyde, acetaldehyde, and acrolein. Our estimates of
these non-GHG emission impacts from the GHG program are shown by
pollutant in Table III-70 and Table III-71 both in total and broken
down by the three drivers of these changes: (a) ``Downstream'' emission
changes, reflecting the estimated effects of VMT rebound (discussed in
Sections III.F and III.H) and decreased consumption of fuel; (b)
``upstream'' emission reductions due to decreased extraction,
production and distribution of motor vehicle gasoline; (c) ``upstream''
emission increases from power plants as electric powertrain vehicles
increase in the light duty fleet as a result of this rule. The GHG
rule's impacts on criteria and toxics emissions are discussed below,
followed by individual discussions of the methodology used to calculate
each of these three sources of impacts.
As shown in Table III-70, EPA estimates that the light duty vehicle
program will result in reductions of NOX, VOC,
PM2.5 and SOX, but will increase CO emissions.
For NOx, VOC, and PM2.5, we estimate net
reductions because the net emissions reductions from reduced fuel
refining, distribution and transport is larger than the emission
increases due to increased VMT and increased electricity production. In
the case of CO, we estimate slight emission increases, because there
are relatively small reductions in upstream emissions, and thus the
projected emission increases due to VMT rebound and electricity
production are greater than the projected emission decreases due to
reduced fuel production. For SOX, downstream emissions are
roughly proportional to fuel consumption, therefore a decrease is seen
in both downstream and fuel refining sources.
We received several comments on the methods used to quantify
emissions from advanced technology vehicles. Growth Energy commented
that ``There is substantial evidence that GDI increases PM mass and PM
number emissions compared to the conventional port fuel injection (PFI)
technology now in widespread use * * *. Therefore, the final rule
should evaluate and consider both the increased PM due to GDI use and
the potential for more widespread ethanol use to decrease PM mass and
number emissions.'' The Clean Fuels Development Coalition submitted
similar comments. EPA agrees with the commenter that testing on initial
GDI technology, primarily wall-guided systems, has shown an increase in
PM emissions over the FTP as compared to conventional PFI gasoline
engines. However, the technology is still evolving, making it difficult
to predict future PM emission performance of GDI vehicles. Testing on
initial spray-guided GDI systems has shown less of a PM increase over
the FTP, and even reduced PM emissions over the USO6 compared to PFI
vehicles.\663\ Due to the improved fuel economy and reduced emissions
offered by spray-guided GDI technology, it is anticipated that spray-
guided GDI will replace wall-guided systems in the 2017 to 2025
timeframe.\664\ As a result, in the technical assessment conducted by
the agencies as part of this rulemaking, the agencies assessed the
emissions and fuel consumption improvements associated with spray-
guided GDI systems and assumed that their overall in-use PM emission
performance was comparable to that of PFI vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\663\ ``Test Program to evaluate PM emissions from GDI
vehicles,'' Memo from Michael Olechiw to EPA docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799
\664\ The technology modeling for this rule includes a spray
guided GDI system. See Joint TSD Section 3.3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For all criteria pollutants the overall impact of the program will
be small compared to total U.S. inventories across all sectors. In
2030, EPA estimates that the program will reduce total NOX,
PM2.5, VOC and SOX inventories by 0.1 to 1.0
percent, while increasing the total national CO inventory by 0.4
percent.
As shown in Table III-71, EPA estimates that the program will
result in similarly small changes for air toxic emissions compared to
total U.S. inventories across all sectors. In 2030, EPA estimates the
program will increase total 1,3-butadiene and acetaldehyde emissions by
0.1 to 0.2 percent. Total acrolein, benzene and formaldehyde emissions
will decrease by similarly small amounts.
Table III-70--Annual Criteria Emission Impacts of Program
[Short tons]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2020 CY 2030
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pollutant Impacts % of total Impacts % of total
(short tons) U.S. inventory (short tons) U.S. inventory
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total......................... VOC............. -11,712 -0.1 -123,070 -1.0
CO.............. 14,164 0.0 224,875 0.4
NOX............. -904 0.0 -6,509 -0.1
PM2.5........... -136 0.0 -1,254 0.0
SOX............. -1,270 0.0 -13,377 -0.2
Downstream.................... VOC............. 249 0.0 4,835 0.0
CO.............. 14,414 0.0 227,250 0.4
NOX............. 498 0.0 8,281 0.1
PM2.5........... 40 0.0 568 0.0
[[Page 62900]]
SOX............. -420 0.0 -4,498 -0.1
Fuel Production and VOC............. -12,043 -0.1 -128,823 -1.0
Distribution.
CO.............. -749 0.0 -8,009 0.0
NOX............. -1,757 0.0 -18,795 -0.2
PM2.5........... -280 0.0 -3,000 -0.1
SOX............. -1,198 0.0 -12,813 -0.2
Electricity................... VOC............. 81 0.0 917 0.0
CO.............. 499 0.0 5,634 0.0
NOX............. 355 0.0 4,005 0.0
PM2.5........... 104 0.0 1,179 0.0
SOX............. 348 0.0 3,933 0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-71--Annual Air Toxic Emission Impacts of Program
[Short tons]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2020 CY 2030
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pollutant Impacts % of total Impacts % of total
(short tons) U.S. inventory (short tons) U.S. inventory
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total......................... 1,3-Butadiene... 1 0.0 25 0.2
Acetaldehyde.... 3 0.0 57 0.1
Acrolein........ 0 0.0 2 0.0
Benzene......... -16 0.0 -101 0.0
Formaldehyde.... -7 0.0 -43 0.0
Downstream.................... 1,3-Butadiene... 1 0.0 28 0.2
Acetaldehyde.... 4 0.0 70 0.1
Acrolein........ 0 0.0 3 0.0
Benzene......... 8 0.0 160 0.1
Formaldehyde.... 3 0.0 66 0.0
Fuel Production and 1,3-Butadiene... 0 0.0 -2 0.0
Distribution.
Acetaldehyde.... -1 0.0 -14 0.0
Acrolein........ 0 0.0 -2 0.0
Benzene......... -24 0.0 -261 -0.1
Formaldehyde.... -10 0.0 -110 -0.1
Electricity................... 1,3-Butadiene... 0 0.0 0 0.0
Acetaldehyde.... 0 0.0 1 0.0
Acrolein........ 0 0.0 1 0.0
Benzene......... 0 0.0 0 0.0
Formaldehyde.... 0 0.0 1 0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Methodology
As in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking and in the proposal, for the
downstream analysis, the current version of the EPA motor vehicle
emission simulator (MOVES2010a) was used to estimate VOC, CO,
NOX, PM and air toxics emission rates. Additional emissions
from light duty cars and trucks attributable to the rebound effect were
then calculated using the OMEGA model post-processor. A more complete
discussion of the inputs, methodology, and results is contained in RIA
Chapter 4.
This rule assumes that MY 2017 and later vehicles are compliant
with the agency's Tier 2 emission standards. This rule does not model
any future Tier 3 emission standards, because these standards have not
yet been proposed (see Section III.A).
As in the MYs 2012-2016 GHG rulemaking, for this analysis we
attribute decreased fuel consumption from this program to petroleum-
based fuels only, while assuming no effect on volumes of ethanol and
other renewable fuels because they are mandated under the Renewable
Fuel Standard (RFS2). For the purposes of this emission analysis, we
assume that all gasoline in the timeframe of the analysis is blended
with 10 percent ethanol (E10). However, as a consequence of the fixed
volume of renewable fuels mandated in the RFS2 rulemaking and the
decreasing petroleum consumption predicted here, we anticipate that
this rulemaking would in fact increase the fraction of the U.S. fuel
supply that is made up by renewable fuels. The impacts of this increase
are difficult to project at the present time. Since it is not centrally
relevant to the analysis for this rulemaking, we have not included
renewable fuel volumes in this analysis beyond the assumption that all
gasoline is E10.
In this rulemaking EPA modeled the three impacts on criteria
pollutant emissions (VMT rebound driving, changes in fuel production,
and changes in electricity production) discussed above.
While electric vehicles have zero tailpipe emissions, EPA assumes
that manufacturers will plan for these vehicles in their regulatory
compliance strategy for non-GHG emissions standards, and will not over-
comply with those standards. Since the Tier 2 emissions standards are
fleet-average
[[Page 62901]]
standards, we assume that if a manufacturer introduces EVs into its
fleet, that it would correspondingly compensate through changes to
vehicles elsewhere in its fleet, rather than meet an overall lower
fleet-average emissions level.\665\ Consequently, EPA assumes neither
tailpipe pollutant benefit (other than CO2) nor an
evaporative emission benefit from the introduction of electric vehicles
into the fleet. Other factors which may impact downstream non-GHG
emissions, but which are not estimated in the final rulemaking
inventory analysis, include: the potential for decreased criteria
pollutant emissions due to increased air conditioner efficiency;
reduced refueling emissions due to less frequent refueling events and
reduced annual refueling volumes resulting from the GHG standards; and
increased hot soak evaporative emissions due to the likely increase in
number of trips associated with VMT rebound modeled in this rule. In
all, these additional analyses would likely result only in small
changes relative to the national inventory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\665\ Historically, manufacturers have reduced precious metal
loading in catalysts in order to reduce costs. See http://www.platinum.matthey.com/media-room/our-view-on-.-.-./thrifting-of-precious-metals-in-autocatalysts/ Accessed 11/08/2011.
Alternatively, manufacturers could also modify vehicle calibration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To determine the upstream fuel production impacts, EPA estimated
the impact of reduced petroleum volumes on the extraction and
transportation of crude oil as well as the production and distribution
of finished gasoline. For the purpose of assessing domestic-only
emission reductions it was necessary to estimate the fraction of fuel
savings attributable to domestic finished gasoline, and of this
gasoline what fraction is produced from domestic crude. For this
analysis EPA estimated that 50 percent of fuel savings is attributable
to domestic finished gasoline and that 90 percent of this gasoline
originated from imported crude. Emission factors for most upstream
emission sources are based on the GREET1.8 model, developed by DOE's
Argonne National Laboratory,\666\ but in some cases the GREET values
were modified or updated by EPA to be consistent with the National
Emission Inventory (NEI) or other relevant data.\667\ EPA made several
additional updates between proposal and final rulemaking to the non-GHG
emission rates as discussed in chapter 4 of the RIA. The primary
updates for this analysis were to incorporate newer information on
gasoline distribution emissions for VOC from the NEI, which were
significantly higher than GREET estimates; newer information on on-site
refinery emissions from the NEI, which were significantly lower than
GREET estimates; new mobile source emission factors; and the
incorporation of upstream emission factors for the air toxics estimated
in this analysis: benzene, 1,3-butadiene, acetaldehyde, acrolein, and
formaldehyde. The development of these emission factors is detailed in
a memo to the docket and in RIA Chapter 4. These emission factors were
incorporated into the OMEGA post-processor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\666\ Greenhouse Gas, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in
Transportation model (GREET), U.S. Department of Energy, Argonne
National Laboratory, http://www.transportation.anl.gov/modeling_simulation/GREET/.
\667\ U.S. EPA. 2002 National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Data and
Documentation, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2002inventory.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with the GHG emission analysis discussed in section III.F,
electricity emission factors were derived from EPA's Integrated
Planning Model (IPM). EPA uses IPM to analyze the projected impact of
environmental policies on the electric power sector in the 48
contiguous states and the District of Columbia. IPM is a multi-
regional, dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S.
electric power sector. It provides forecasts of least-cost capacity
expansion, electricity dispatch, and emission control strategies for
meeting energy demand and environmental, transmission, dispatch, and
reliability constraints. EPA discusses revisions to these emission
factors in Section III.F and in RIA chapter 4.
2. Health Effects of Non-GHG Pollutants
In this section we discuss health effects associated with exposure
to some of the criteria and air toxic pollutants impacted by the
vehicle standards.
a. Particulate Matter
Particulate matter (PM) is a highly complex mixture of solid
particles and liquid droplets distributed among numerous atmospheric
gases which interact with solid and liquid phases. Particles range in
size from those smaller than 1 nanometer (10-9 meter) to
over 100 micrometer ([micro]m, or 10-6 meter) in diameter
(for reference, a typical strand of human hair is 70 um in diameter and
a grain of salt is about 100 [micro]m). Atmospheric particles can be
grouped into several classes according to their aerodynamic and
physical sizes, including ultrafine particles (<0.1 [micro]m),
accumulation mode or `fine' particles (< 1 to 3 [micro]m), and coarse
particles (>1 to 3 [micro]m). For regulatory purposes, fine particles
are measured as PM2.5 and inhalable or thoracic coarse
particles are measured as PM10-2.5, corresponding to their
size (diameter) range in micrometers and referring to total particle
mass under 2.5 and between 2.5 and 10 micrometers, respectively. The
EPA currently has standards that measure PM2.5 and
PM10.\668\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\668\ Regulatory definitions of PM size fractions, and
information on reference and equivalent methods for measuring PM in
ambient air, are provided in 40 CFR Parts 50, 53, and 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Particles span many sizes and shapes and consist of hundreds of
different chemicals. Particles are emitted directly from sources and
are also formed through atmospheric chemical reactions; the former are
often referred to as ``primary'' particles, and the latter as
``secondary'' particles. Particle pollution also varies by time of year
and location and is affected by several weather-related factors, such
as temperature, clouds, humidity, and wind. A further layer of
complexity comes from particles' ability to shift between solid/liquid
and gaseous phases, which is influenced by concentration and
meteorology, especially temperature.
Fine particles are produced primarily by combustion processes and
by transformations of gaseous emissions (e.g., sulfur oxides
(SOX), nitrogen oxides (NOX), and volatile
organic compounds (VOC)) in the atmosphere. The chemical and physical
properties of PM2.5 may vary greatly with time, region,
meteorology, and source category. Thus, PM2.5 may include a
complex mixture of different components including sulfates, nitrates,
organic compounds, elemental carbon and metal compounds. These
particles can remain in the atmosphere for days to weeks and travel
hundreds to thousands of kilometers.
i. Health Effects of Particulate Matter
Scientific studies show ambient PM is associated with a series of
adverse health effects. These health effects are discussed in detail in
EPA's Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Particulate Matter.\669\
Further discussion of health effects associated with PM can also be
found in the RIA for this final rule. The ISA summarizes health effects
evidence associated with both short-term and long-term exposures to
PM2.5, PM10-2.5, and ultrafine particles.\670\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\669\ U.S. EPA (2009) Integrated Science Assessment for
Particulate Matter (Final Report). U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-08/139F, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
\670\ See also 77 FR 38906-909 (proposing revisions to the
primary PM NAAQS and summarizing evidence on health effects related
to exposure to fine particulate matter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62902]]
The ISA concludes that health effects associated with short-term
exposures (hours to days) to ambient PM2.5 include
mortality, cardiovascular effects, such as altered vasomotor function
and hospital admissions and emergency department visits for ischemic
heart disease and congestive heart failure, and respiratory effects,
such as exacerbation of asthma symptoms in children and hospital
admissions and emergency department visits for chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease and respiratory infections.\671\ The ISA notes that
long-term exposure (months to years) to PM2.5 is associated
with the development/progression of cardiovascular disease, premature
mortality, and respiratory effects, including reduced lung function
growth, increased respiratory symptoms, and asthma development.\672\
The ISA concludes that the currently available scientific evidence from
epidemiologic, controlled human exposure, and toxicological studies
supports a causal association between short- and long-term exposures to
PM2.5 and cardiovascular effects and mortality. Furthermore,
the ISA concludes that the collective evidence supports likely causal
associations between short- and long-term PM2.5 exposures
and respiratory effects. The ISA also concludes that the scientific
evidence is suggestive of a causal association for reproductive and
developmental effects and cancer, mutagenicity, and genotoxicity and
long-term exposure to PM2.5.\673\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\671\ See U.S. EPA, 2009 Final PM ISA, Note 669, at Section
2.3.1.1.
\672\ See U.S. EPA 2009 Final PM ISA, Note 669, at page 2-12,
Sections 7.3.1.1 and 7.3.2.1.
\673\ See U.S. EPA 2009 Final PM ISA, Note 669, at Section
2.3.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For PM10-2.5, the ISA concludes that the current
evidence is suggestive of a causal relationship between short-term
exposures and cardiovascular effects. There is also suggestive evidence
of a causal relationship between short-term PM10-2.5
exposure and mortality and respiratory effects. Data are inadequate to
draw conclusions regarding the health effects associated with long-term
exposure to PM10-2.5.674,675
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\674\ See U.S. EPA 2009 Final PM ISA, Note 669, at Section
2.3.4, Table 2-6.
\675\ See also 77 FR 38947-948 (discussing health effects
related to exposure to PM10-2.5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For ultrafine particles, the ISA concludes that there is suggestive
evidence of a causal relationship between short-term exposures and
cardiovascular effects, such as changes in heart rhythm and blood
vessel function. It also concludes that there is suggestive evidence of
association between short-term exposure to ultrafine particles and
respiratory effects. Data are inadequate to draw conclusions regarding
the health effects associated with long-term exposure to ultrafine
particles.\676\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\676\ See U.S. EPA 2009 Final PM ISA, Note 669, at Section
2.3.5, Table 2-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Ozone
Ground-level ozone pollution is typically formed by the reaction of
VOC and NOX in the lower atmosphere in the presence of
sunlight. These pollutants, often referred to as ozone precursors, are
emitted by many types of pollution sources, such as highway and nonroad
motor vehicles and engines, power plants, chemical plants, refineries,
makers of consumer and commercial products, industrial facilities, and
smaller area sources.
The science of ozone formation, transport, and accumulation is
complex. Ground-level ozone is produced and destroyed in a cyclical set
of chemical reactions, many of which are sensitive to temperature and
sunlight. When ambient temperatures and sunlight levels remain high for
several days and the air is relatively stagnant, ozone and its
precursors can build up and result in more ozone than typically occurs
on a single high-temperature day. Ozone can be transported hundreds of
miles downwind from precursor emissions, resulting in elevated ozone
levels even in areas with low local VOC or NOX emissions.
i. Health Effects of Ozone
The health and welfare effects of ozone are well documented and are
assessed in EPA's 2006 Air Quality Criteria Document and 2007 Staff
Paper.677,678 People who are more susceptible to effects
associated with exposure to ozone can include children, the elderly,
and individuals with respiratory disease such as asthma. Those with
greater exposures to ozone, for instance due to time spent outdoors
(e.g., children and outdoor workers), are of particular concern. Ozone
can irritate the respiratory system, causing coughing, throat
irritation, and breathing discomfort. Ozone can reduce lung function
and cause pulmonary inflammation in healthy individuals. Ozone can also
aggravate asthma, leading to more asthma attacks that require medical
attention and/or the use of additional medication. Thus, ambient ozone
may cause both healthy and asthmatic individuals to limit their outdoor
activities. In addition, there is suggestive evidence of a contribution
of ozone to cardiovascular-related morbidity and highly suggestive
evidence that short-term ozone exposure directly or indirectly
contributes to non-accidental and cardiopulmonary-related mortality,
but additional research is needed to clarify the underlying mechanisms
causing these effects. In a report on the estimation of ozone-related
premature mortality published by NRC, a panel of experts and reviewers
concluded that short-term exposure to ambient ozone is likely to
contribute to premature deaths and that ozone-related mortality should
be included in estimates of the health benefits of reducing ozone
exposure.\679\ Animal toxicological evidence indicates that with
repeated exposure, ozone can inflame and damage the lining of the
lungs, which may lead to permanent changes in lung tissue and
irreversible reductions in lung function. The respiratory effects
observed in controlled human exposure studies and animal studies are
coherent with the evidence from epidemiologic studies supporting a
causal relationship between acute ambient ozone exposures and increased
respiratory-related emergency room visits and hospitalizations in the
warm season. In addition, there is suggestive evidence of a
contribution of ozone to cardiovascular-related morbidity and non-
accidental and cardiopulmonary mortality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\677\ U.S. EPA. (2006). Air Quality Criteria for Ozone and
Related Photochemical Oxidants (Final). EPA/600/R-05/004aF-cF.
Washington, DC: U.S. EPA. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\678\ U.S. EPA. (2007). Review of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Ozone: Policy Assessment of Scientific and
Technical Information, OAQPS Staff Paper. EPA-452/R-07-003.
Washington, DC, U.S. EPA. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\679\ National Research Council (NRC), 2008. Estimating
Mortality Risk Reduction and Economic Benefits from Controlling
Ozone Air Pollution. The National Academies Press: Washington, DC
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Oxides
Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) is a member of the NOX
family of gases. Most NO2 is formed in the air through the
oxidation of nitric oxide (NO) emitted when fuel is burned at a high
temperature. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) a member of the sulfur
oxide (SOX) family of gases, is formed from burning fuels
containing sulfur (e.g., coal or oil derived), extracting gasoline from
oil, or extracting metals from ore.
SO2 and NO2 can dissolve in water droplets
and further oxidize to form sulfuric and nitric acid which react with
ammonia to form sulfates and nitrates, both of which are important
components of ambient PM. The health
[[Page 62903]]
effects of ambient PM are discussed in Section III.G.2.a of this
preamble. NOX and NMHC are the two major precursors of
ozone. The health effects of ozone are covered in Section III.G.2.b.i.
i. Health Effects of NO2
Information on the health effects of NO2 can be found in
the EPA Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Nitrogen Oxides.\680\
The EPA has concluded that the findings of epidemiologic, controlled
human exposure, and animal toxicological studies provide evidence that
is sufficient to infer a likely causal relationship between respiratory
effects and short-term NO2 exposure. The ISA concludes that
the strongest evidence for such a relationship comes from epidemiologic
studies of respiratory effects including symptoms, emergency department
visits, and hospital admissions. Based on both short- and long-term
studies, the ISA concludes that associations of NO2 with
respiratory health effects are stronger among a number of groups; these
include individuals with preexisting pulmonary conditions (e.g., asthma
or COPD), children and older adults. The ISA also draws two broad
conclusions regarding airway responsiveness following NO2
exposure. First, the ISA concludes that NO2 exposure may
enhance the sensitivity to allergen-induced decrements in lung function
and increase the allergen-induced airway inflammatory response
following 30-minute exposures of asthmatics to NO2
concentrations as low as 0.26 ppm. Second, exposure to NO2
has been found to enhance the inherent responsiveness of the airway to
subsequent nonspecific challenges in controlled human exposure studies
of asthmatic subjects. Small but significant increases in non-specific
airway hyperresponsiveness were reported following 1-hour exposures of
asthmatics to 0.1 ppm NO2. Enhanced airway responsiveness
could have important clinical implications for asthmatics since
transient increases in airway responsiveness following NO2
exposure have the potential to increase symptoms and worsen asthma
control. Together, the epidemiologic and experimental data sets form a
plausible, consistent, and coherent description of a relationship
between NO2 exposures and an array of adverse health effects
that range from the onset of respiratory symptoms to hospital
admission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\680\ U.S. EPA (2008). Integrated Science Assessment for Oxides
of Nitrogen--Health Criteria (Final Report). EPA/600/R-08/071.
Washington, DC: U.S.EPA. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the weight of evidence supporting a causal relationship is
somewhat less certain than that associated with respiratory morbidity,
NO2 has also been linked to other health endpoints. These
include all-cause (nonaccidental) mortality, hospital admissions or
emergency department visits for cardiovascular disease, and decrements
in lung function growth associated with chronic exposure.
ii. Health Effects of SO2
Information on the health effects of SO2 can be found in
the EPA Integrated Science Assessment for Sulfur Oxides.\681\
SO2 has long been known to cause adverse respiratory health
effects, particularly among individuals with asthma. Other potentially
sensitive groups include children and the elderly. During periods of
elevated ventilation, asthmatics may experience symptomatic
bronchoconstriction within minutes of exposure. Following an extensive
evaluation of health evidence from epidemiologic and laboratory
studies, the EPA has concluded that there is a causal relationship
between respiratory health effects and short-term exposure to
SO2. Separately, based on an evaluation of the epidemiologic
evidence of associations between short-term exposure to SO2
and mortality, the EPA has concluded that the overall evidence is
suggestive of a causal relationship between short-term exposure to
SO2 and mortality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\681\ U.S. EPA. (2008). Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for
Sulfur Oxides--Health Criteria (Final Report). EPA/600/R-08/047F.
Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Carbon Monoxide
Carbon monoxide (CO) is a colorless, odorless gas emitted from
combustion processes. Nationally and, particularly in urban areas, the
majority of CO emissions to ambient air come from mobile sources.
i. Health Effects of CO
Information on the health effects of CO can be found in the EPA
Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Carbon Monoxide.\682\ The ISA
concludes that ambient concentrations of CO are associated with a
number of adverse health effects.\683\ This section provides a summary
of the health effects associated with exposure to ambient
concentrations of CO.\684\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\682\ U.S. EPA, 2010. Integrated Science Assessment for Carbon
Monoxide (Final Report). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-09/019F, 2010. Available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=218686. Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799
\683\ The ISA evaluates the health evidence associated with
different health effects, assigning one of five ``weight of
evidence'' determinations: causal relationship, likely to be a
causal relationship, suggestive of a causal relationship, inadequate
to infer a causal relationship, and not likely to be a causal
relationship. For definitions of these levels of evidence, please
refer to Section 1.6 of the ISA.
\684\ Personal exposure includes contributions from many
sources, and in many different environments. Total personal exposure
to CO includes both ambient and nonambient components; and both
components may contribute to adverse health effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human clinical studies of subjects with coronary artery disease
show a decrease in the time to onset of exercise-induced angina (chest
pain) and electrocardiogram changes following CO exposure. In addition,
epidemiologic studies show associations between short-term CO exposure
and cardiovascular morbidity, particularly increased emergency room
visits and hospital admissions for coronary heart disease (including
ischemic heart disease, myocardial infarction, and angina). Some
epidemiologic evidence is also available for increased hospital
admissions and emergency room visits for congestive heart failure and
cardiovascular disease as a whole. The ISA concludes that a causal
relationship is likely to exist between short-term exposures to CO and
cardiovascular morbidity. It also concludes that available data are
inadequate to conclude that a causal relationship exists between long-
term exposures to CO and cardiovascular morbidity.
Animal studies show various neurological effects with in-utero CO
exposure. Controlled human exposure studies report inconsistent neural
and behavioral effects following low-level CO exposures. The ISA
concludes the evidence is suggestive of a causal relationship with both
short- and long-term exposure to CO and central nervous system effects.
A number of epidemiologic and animal toxicological studies cited in
the ISA have evaluated associations between CO exposure and birth
outcomes such as preterm birth or cardiac birth defects. The
epidemiologic studies provide limited evidence of a CO-induced effect
on preterm births and birth defects, with weak evidence for a decrease
in birth weight. Animal toxicological studies have found associations
between perinatal CO exposure and decrements in birth weight, as well
as other developmental outcomes. The ISA concludes these studies are
suggestive of a causal relationship between long-term exposures to CO
and developmental effects and birth outcomes.
[[Page 62904]]
Epidemiologic studies provide evidence of effects on respiratory
morbidity such as changes in pulmonary function, respiratory symptoms,
and hospital admissions associated with ambient CO concentrations. A
limited number of epidemiologic studies considered copollutants such as
ozone, SO2, and PM in two-pollutant models and found that CO
risk estimates were generally robust, although this limited evidence
makes it difficult to disentangle effects attributed to CO itself from
those of the larger complex air pollution mixture. Controlled human
exposure studies have not extensively evaluated the effect of CO on
respiratory morbidity. Animal studies at levels of 50-100 ppm CO show
preliminary evidence of altered pulmonary vascular remodeling and
oxidative injury. The ISA concludes that the evidence is suggestive of
a causal relationship between short-term CO exposure and respiratory
morbidity, and inadequate to conclude that a causal relationship exists
between long-term exposure and respiratory morbidity.
Finally, the ISA concludes that the epidemiologic evidence is
suggestive of a causal relationship between short-term exposures to CO
and mortality. Epidemiologic studies provide evidence of an association
between short-term exposure to CO and mortality, but limited evidence
is available to evaluate cause-specific mortality outcomes associated
with CO exposure. In addition, the attenuation of CO risk estimates
which was often observed in copollutant models contributes to the
uncertainty as to whether CO is acting alone or as an indicator for
other combustion-related pollutants. The ISA also concludes that there
is not likely to be a causal relationship between relevant long-term
exposures to CO and mortality.
e. Air Toxics
Light-duty vehicle emissions contribute to ambient levels of mobile
source air toxics, which are compounds that are known or suspected as
human or animal carcinogens, or that have noncancer health
effects.\685\ The population experiences an elevated risk of cancer and
other noncancer health effects from exposure to the class of pollutants
known collectively as air toxics.\686\ These compounds include, but are
not limited to, benzene, 1,3-butadiene, formaldehyde, acetaldehyde,
acrolein, polycyclic organic matter, and naphthalene. These compounds
were identified as national or regional risk drivers or contributors in
the 2005 National-scale Air Toxics Assessment and have significant
inventory contributions from mobile sources.\687\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\685\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007). Control of
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources; final rule. 72 FR
8434, February 26, 2007.
\686\ U.S. EPA. (2011) Summary of Results for the 2005 National-
Scale Assessment. www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005/05pdf/sum_results.pdf. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\687\ U.S. EPA (2011) 2005 National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment.
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Benzene
The EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) database lists
benzene as a known human carcinogen (causing leukemia) by all routes of
exposure, and concludes that exposure is associated with additional
health effects, including genetic changes in both humans and animals
and increased proliferation of bone marrow cells in
mice.688,689,690 EPA states in its IRIS database that data
indicate a causal relationship between benzene exposure and acute
lymphocytic leukemia and suggest a relationship between benzene
exposure and chronic non-lymphocytic leukemia and chronic lymphocytic
leukemia. The International Agency for Research on Carcinogens (IARC)
has determined that benzene is a human carcinogen and the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has characterized
benzene as a known human carcinogen.691,692
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\688\ U.S. EPA. 2000. Integrated Risk Information System File
for Benzene. This material is available electronically at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0276.htm. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\689\ International Agency for Research on Cancer. 1982.
Monographs on the evaluation of carcinogenic risk of chemicals to
humans, Volume 29. Some industrial chemicals and dyestuffs, World
Health Organization, Lyon, France, p. 345-389. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799
\690\ Irons, R.D.; Stillman, W.S.; Colagiovanni, D.B.; Henry,
V.A. 1992. Synergistic action of the benzene metabolite hydroquinone
on myelopoietic stimulating activity of granulocyte/macrophage
colony-stimulating factor in vitro, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 89:3691-
3695. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\691\ See IARC, Note 689, above.
\692\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services National
Toxicology Program 11th Report on Carcinogens available at: http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/go/16183. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799
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A number of adverse noncancer health effects including blood
disorders, such as preleukemia and aplastic anemia, have also been
associated with long-term exposure to benzene.693,694 The
most sensitive noncancer effect observed in humans, based on current
data, is the depression of the absolute lymphocyte count in
blood.695,696 In addition, published work, including studies
sponsored by the Health Effects Institute (HEI), provides evidence that
biochemical responses are occurring at lower levels of benzene exposure
than previously known.697,698,699,700 EPA's IRIS program has
not yet evaluated these new data.
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\693\ Aksoy, M. (1989). Hematotoxicity and carcinogenicity of
benzene. Environ. Health Perspect. 82: 193-197. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799.
\694\ Goldstein, B.D. (1988). Benzene toxicity. Occupational
medicine. State of the Art Reviews. 3: 541-554. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799.
\695\ Rothman, N., G.L. Li, M. Dosemeci, W.E. Bechtold, G.E.
Marti, Y.Z. Wang, M. Linet, L.Q. Xi, W. Lu, M.T. Smith, N. Titenko-
Holland, L.P. Zhang, W. Blot, S.N. Yin, and R.B. Hayes (1996)
Hematotoxicity among Chinese workers heavily exposed to benzene. Am.
J. Ind. Med. 29: 236-246. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\696\ U.S. EPA (2002) Toxicological Review of Benzene (Noncancer
Effects). Environmental Protection Agency, Integrated Risk
Information System, Research and Development, National Center for
Environmental Assessment, Washington DC. This material is available
electronically at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0276.htm. Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\697\ Qu, O.; Shore, R.; Li, G.; Jin, X.; Chen, C.L.; Cohen, B.;
Melikian, A.; Eastmond, D.; Rappaport, S.; Li, H.; Rupa, D.;
Suramaya, R.; Songnian, W.; Huifant, Y.; Meng, M.; Winnik, M.; Kwok,
E.; Li, Y.; Mu, R.; Xu, B.; Zhang, X.; Li, K. (2003) HEI Report 115,
Validation & Evaluation of Biomarkers in Workers Exposed to Benzene
in China. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\698\ Qu, Q., R. Shore, G. Li, X. Jin, L.C. Chen, B. Cohen, et
al. (2002) Hematological changes among Chinese workers with a broad
range of benzene exposures. Am. J. Industr. Med. 42: 275-285. Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\699\ Lan, Qing, Zhang, L., Li, G., Vermeulen, R., et al. (2004)
Hematotoxically in Workers Exposed to Low Levels of Benzene. Science
306: 1774-1776. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\700\ Turtletaub, K.W. and Mani, C. (2003) Benzene metabolism in
rodents at doses relevant to human exposure from Urban Air. Research
Reports Health Effect Inst. Report No.113. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
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ii. 1,3-Butadiene
EPA has characterized 1,3-butadiene as carcinogenic to humans by
inhalation.701,702 The IARC has determined that 1,3-
butadiene is a human carcinogen and the U.S. DHHS has characterized
1,3-butadiene as a known human carcinogen.703,704 There
[[Page 62905]]
are numerous studies consistently demonstrating that 1,3-butadiene is
metabolized into genotoxic metabolites by experimental animals and
humans. The specific mechanisms of 1,3-butadiene-induced carcinogenesis
are unknown; however, the scientific evidence strongly suggests that
the carcinogenic effects are mediated by genotoxic metabolites. Animal
data suggest that females may be more sensitive than males for cancer
effects associated with 1,3-butadiene exposure; there are insufficient
data in humans from which to draw conclusions about sensitive
subpopulations. 1,3-butadiene also causes a variety of reproductive and
developmental effects in mice; no human data on these effects are
available. The most sensitive effect was ovarian atrophy observed in a
lifetime bioassay of female mice.\705\
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\701\ U.S. EPA (2002) Health Assessment of 1,3-Butadiene. Office
of Research and Development, National Center for Environmental
Assessment, Washington Office, Washington, DC. Report No. EPA600-P-
98-001F. This document is available electronically at http://www.epa.gov/iris/supdocs/buta-sup.pdf. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\702\ U.S. EPA (2002) Full IRIS Summary for 1,3-butadiene (CASRN
106-99-0). Environmental Protection Agency, Integrated Risk
Information System (IRIS), Research and Development, National Center
for Environmental Assessment, Washington, DC http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0139.htm. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\703\ International Agency for Research on Cancer (1999)
Monographs on the evaluation of carcinogenic risk of chemicals to
humans, Volume 71, Re-evaluation of some organic chemicals,
hydrazine and hydrogen peroxide and Volume 97 (in preparation),
World Health Organization, Lyon, France. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
\704\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2005)
National Toxicology Program 11th Report on Carcinogens available at:
ntp.niehs.nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=32BA9724-F1F6-975E-7FCE50709CB4C932. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\705\ Bevan, C.; Stadler, J.C.; Elliot, G.S.; et al. (1996)
Subchronic toxicity of 4-vinylcyclohexene in rats and mice by
inhalation. Fundam. Appl. Toxicol. 32:1-10. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
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iii. Formaldehyde
In 1991, EPA concluded that formaldehyde is a carcinogen based on
nasal tumors in animal bioassays.\706\ An Inhalation Unit Risk for
cancer and a Reference Dose for oral noncancer effects were developed
by the Agency and posted on the Integrated Risk Information System
(IRIS) database. Since that time, the National Toxicology Program (NTP)
and International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) have concluded
that formaldehyde is a known human carcinogen.707,708,709
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\706\ EPA. Integrated Risk Information System. Formaldehyde
(CASRN 50-00-0) http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0419/htm.
\707\ National Toxicology Program, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), 12th Report on Carcinogens, June 10, 2011.
\708\ IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to
Humans Volume 88 (2006): Formaldehyde, 2-Butoxyethanol and 1-tert-
Butoxypropan-2-ol.
\709\ IARC Mongraphs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to
Humans Volume 100F (2012): Formaldehyde.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conclusions by IARC and NTP reflect the results of
epidemiologic research published since 1991 in combination with
previous animal, human and mechanistic evidence. Research conducted by
the National Cancer Institute reported an increased risk of
nasopharyngeal cancer and specific lymphohematopoietic malignancies
among workers exposed to formaldehyde.710,711,712 A National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health study of garment workers
also reported increased risk of death due to leukemia among workers
exposed to formaldehyde.\713\ Extended follow-up of a cohort of British
chemical workers did not report evidence of an increase in
nasopharyngeal or lymphohematopoietic cancers, but a continuing
statistically significant excess in lung cancers was reported.\714\
Finally, a study of embalmers reported formaldehyde exposures to be
associated with an increased risk of myeloid leukemia but not brain
cancer.\715\
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\710\ Hauptmann, M..; Lubin, J. H.; Stewart, P. A.; Hayes, R.
B.; Blair, A. 2003. Mortality from lymphohematopoetic malignancies
among workers in formaldehyde industries. Journal of the National
Cancer Institute 95: 1615-1623. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\711\ Hauptmann, M..; Lubin, J. H.; Stewart, P. A.; Hayes, R.
B.; Blair, A. 2004. Mortality from solid cancers among workers in
formaldehyde industries. American Journal of Epidemiology 159: 1117-
1130. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\712\ Beane Freeman, L. E.; Blair, A.; Lubin, J. H.; Stewart, P.
A.; Hayes, R. B.; Hoover, R. N.; Hauptmann, M. 2009. Mortality from
lymphohematopoietic malignancies among workers in formaldehyde
industries: The National Cancer Institute cohort. J. National Cancer
Inst. 101: 751-761. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\713\ Pinkerton, L. E. 2004. Mortality among a cohort of garment
workers exposed to formaldehyde: an update. Occup. Environ. Med. 61:
193-200. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\714\ Coggon, D, EC Harris, J Poole, KT Palmer. 2003. Extended
follow-up of a cohort of British chemical workers exposed to
formaldehyde. J National Cancer Inst. 95:1608-1615. Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799.
\715\ Hauptmann, M,; Stewart P. A.; Lubin J. H.; Beane Freeman,
L. E.; Hornung, R. W.; Herrick, R. F.; Hoover, R. N.; Fraumeni, J.
F.; Hayes, R. B. 2009. Mortality from lymphohematopoietic
malignancies and brain cancer among embalmers exposed to
formaldehyde. Journal of the National Cancer Institute 101:1696-
1708.
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Health effects of formaldehyde in addition to cancer were reviewed
by the Agency for Toxics Substances and Disease Registry in 1999 \716\
and supplemented in 2010,\717\ and by the World Health
Organization.\718\ These organizations reviewed the literature
concerning effects on the eyes and respiratory system, the primary
point of contact for inhaled formaldehyde, including sensory irritation
of eyes and respiratory tract, pulmonary function, nasal
histopathology, and immune system effects. In addition, research on
reproductive and developmental effects and neurological effects were
discussed.
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\716\ ATSDR. 1999. Toxicological Profile for Formaldehyde, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), July 1999.
\717\ ATSDR. 2010. Supplement to the Toxicological Profile for
Formaldehyde U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
October 2010.
\718\ IPCS. 2002. Concise International Chemical Assessment
Document 40. Formaldehyde. World Health Organization.
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EPA released a draft Toxicological Review of Formaldehyde--
Inhalation Assessment through the IRIS program for peer review by the
National Research Council (NRC) and public comment in June 2010.\719\
The draft assessment reviewed more recent research from animal and
human studies on cancer and other health effects. The NRC released
their review report in April 2011 \720\ (http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13142). The EPA is currently revising the draft
assessment in response to this review.
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\719\ EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). 2010.
Toxicological Review of Formaldehyde (CAS No. 50-00-0)--Inhalation
Assessment: In Support of Summary Information on the Integrated Risk
Information System (IRIS). External Review Draft. EPA/635/R-10/002A.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington DC [online].
Available: http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/irs_drats/recordisplay.cfm?deid=223614.
\720\ NRC (National Research Council). 2011. Review of the
Environmental Protection Agency's Draft IRIS Assessment of
Formaldehyde. Washington DC: National Academies Press.
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iv. Acetaldehyde
Acetaldehyde is classified in EPA's IRIS database as a probable
human carcinogen, based on nasal tumors in rats, and is considered
toxic by the inhalation, oral, and intravenous routes.\721\
Acetaldehyde is reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen by the
U.S. DHHS in the 11th Report on Carcinogens and is classified as
possibly carcinogenic to humans (Group 2B) by the
IARC.722,723 EPA is currently conducting a reassessment of
cancer risk from inhalation exposure to acetaldehyde.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\721\ U.S. EPA. 1991. Integrated Risk Information System File of
Acetaldehyde. Research and Development, National Center for
Environmental Assessment, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0290.htm. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\722\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services National
Toxicology Program 11th Report on Carcinogens available at:
ntp.niehs.nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=32BA9724-F1F6-975E-7FCE50709CB4C932. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\723\ International Agency for Research on Cancer. 1999. Re-
evaluation of some organic chemicals, hydrazine, and hydrogen
peroxide. IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risk of
Chemical to Humans, Vol 71. Lyon, France. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
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The primary noncancer effects of exposure to acetaldehyde vapors
include irritation of the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract.\724\ In
short-term (4 week) rat studies, degeneration of olfactory epithelium
was observed at various concentration levels of acetaldehyde
exposure.725,726 Data from
[[Page 62906]]
these studies were used by EPA to develop an inhalation reference
concentration. Some asthmatics have been shown to be a sensitive
subpopulation to decrements in functional expiratory volume (FEV1 test)
and bronchoconstriction upon acetaldehyde inhalation.\727\ The agency
is currently conducting a reassessment of the health hazards from
inhalation exposure to acetaldehyde.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\724\ See Integrated Risk Information System File of
Acetaldehyde, Note 721, above.
\725\ Appleman, L.M., R.A. Woutersen, V.J. Feron, R.N. Hooftman,
and W.R.F. Notten. 1986. Effects of the variable versus fixed
exposure levels on the toxicity of acetaldehyde in rats. J. Appl.
Toxicol. 6: 331-336. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\726\ Appleman, L.M., R.A. Woutersen, and V.J. Feron. 1982.
Inhalation toxicity of acetaldehyde in rats. I. Acute and subacute
studies. Toxicology. 23: 293-297. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\727\ Myou, S.; Fujimura, M.; Nishi K.; Ohka, T.; and Matsuda,
T. 1993. Aerosolized acetaldehyde induces histamine-mediated
bronchoconstriction in asthmatics. Am. Rev. Respir.Dis.148(4 Pt 1):
940-3. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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v. Acrolein
Acrolein is extremely acrid and irritating to humans when inhaled,
with acute exposure resulting in upper respiratory tract irritation,
mucus hypersecretion and congestion. The intense irritancy of this
carbonyl has been demonstrated during controlled tests in human
subjects, who suffer intolerable eye and nasal mucosal sensory
reactions within minutes of exposure.\728\ These data and additional
studies regarding acute effects of human exposure to acrolein are
summarized in EPA's 2003 IRIS Human Health Assessment for
acrolein.\729\ Evidence available from studies in humans indicate that
levels as low as 0.09 ppm (0.21 mg/m\3\) for five minutes may elicit
subjective complaints of eye irritation with increasing concentrations
leading to more extensive eye, nose and respiratory symptoms.\730\
Lesions to the lungs and upper respiratory tract of rats, rabbits, and
hamsters have been observed after subchronic exposure to acrolein.\731\
Acute exposure effects in animal studies report bronchial hyper-
responsiveness.\732\ In one study, the acute respiratory irritant
effects of exposure to 1.1 ppm acrolein were more pronounced in mice
with allergic airway disease by comparison to non-diseased mice which
also showed decreases in respiratory rate.\733\ Based on these animal
data and demonstration of similar effects in humans (e.g., reduction in
respiratory rate), individuals with compromised respiratory function
(e.g., emphysema, asthma) are expected to be at increased risk of
developing adverse responses to strong respiratory irritants such as
acrolein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\728\ U.S. EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). (2003)
Toxicological review of acrolein in support of summary information
on Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) National Center for
Environmental Assessment, Washington, DC. EPA/635/R-03/003. p. 10.
Available online at: http://www.epa.gov/ncea/iris/toxreviews/0364tr.pdf. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\729\ See U.S. EPA 2003 Toxicological review of acrolein, Note
728, above.
\730\ See U.S. EPA 2003 Toxicological review of acrolein, Note
728, at p. 11.
\731\ Integrated Risk Information System File of Acrolein.
Office of Research and Development, National Center for
Environmental Assessment, Washington, DC. This material is available
at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0364.htm. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
\732\ See U.S. 2003 Toxicological review of acrolein, Note 728,
at p. 15.
\733\ Morris JB, Symanowicz PT, Olsen JE, et al. 2003. Immediate
sensory nerve-mediated respiratory responses to irritants in healthy
and allergic airway-diseased mice. J Appl Physiol 94(4):1563-1571.
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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EPA determined in 2003 that the human carcinogenic potential of
acrolein could not be determined because the available data were
inadequate. No information was available on the carcinogenic effects of
acrolein in humans and the animal data provided inadequate evidence of
carcinogenicity.\734\ The IARC determined in 1995 that acrolein was not
classifiable as to its carcinogenicity in humans.\735\
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\734\ U.S. EPA. 2003. Integrated Risk Information System File of
Acrolein. Research and Development, National Center for
Environmental Assessment, Washington, DC. This material is available
at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0364.htm. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
\735\ International Agency for Research on Cancer. 1995.
Monographs on the evaluation of carcinogenic risk of chemicals to
humans, Volume 63. Dry cleaning, some chlorinated solvents and other
industrial chemicals, World Health Organization, Lyon, France.
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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vi. Polycyclic Organic Matter
The term polycyclic organic matter (POM) defines a broad class of
compounds that includes the polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon compounds
(PAHs). One of these compounds, naphthalene, is discussed separately
below. POM compounds are formed primarily from combustion and are
present in the atmosphere in gas and particulate form. Cancer is the
major concern from exposure to POM. Epidemiologic studies have reported
an increase in lung cancer in humans exposed to diesel exhaust, coke
oven emissions, roofing tar emissions, and cigarette smoke; all of
these mixtures contain POM compounds.736,737 Animal studies
have reported respiratory tract tumors from inhalation exposure to
benzo[a]pyrene and alimentary tract and liver tumors from oral exposure
to benzo[a]pyrene.\738\ In 1997 EPA classified seven PAHs
(benzo[a]pyrene, benz[a]anthracene, chrysene, benzo[b]fluoranthene,
benzo[k]fluoranthene, dibenz[a,h]anthracene, and indeno[1,2,3-
cd]pyrene) as Group B2, probable human carcinogens.\739\ Since that
time, studies have found that maternal exposures to PAHs in a
population of pregnant women were associated with several adverse birth
outcomes, including low birth weight and reduced length at birth, as
well as impaired cognitive development in preschool children (3 years
of age).740,741 These and similar studies are being
evaluated as a part of the ongoing IRIS assessment of health effects
associated with exposure to benzo[a]pyrene.
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\736\ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR).
1995. Toxicological profile for Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
(PAHs). Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Service. Available electronically at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/TP.asp?id=122&tid=25.
\737\ U.S. EPA (2002). Health Assessment Document for Diesel
Engine Exhaust. EPA/600/8-90/057F Office of Research and
Development, Washington DC. http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=29060. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\738\ International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
(2012). Monographs on the Evaluation of the Carcinogenic Risk of
Chemicals for Humans, Chemical Agents and Related Occupations. Vol.
100F. Lyon, France.
\739\ U.S. EPA (1997). Integrated Risk Information System File
of indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene. Research and Development, National Center
for Environmental Assessment, Washington, DC. This material is
available electronically at http://www.epa.gov/ncea/iris/subst/0457.htm.
\740\ Perera, F.P.; Rauh, V.; Tsai, W-Y.; et al. (2002) Effect
of transplacental exposure to environmental pollutants on birth
outcomes in a multiethnic population. Environ Health Perspect. 111:
201-205.
\741\ Perera, F.P.; Rauh, V.; Whyatt, R.M.; Tsai, W.Y.; Tang,
D.; Diaz, D.; Hoepner, L.; Barr, D.; Tu, Y.H.; Camann, D.; Kinney,
P. (2006) Effect of prenatal exposure to airborne polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons on neurodevelopment in the first 3 years of
life among inner-city children. Environ Health Perspect 114: 1287-
1292.
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vii. Naphthalene
Naphthalene is found in small quantities in gasoline and diesel
fuels. Naphthalene emissions have been measured in larger quantities in
both gasoline and diesel exhaust compared with evaporative emissions
from mobile sources, indicating it is primarily a product of
combustion. Acute (short-term) exposure of humans to naphthalene by
inhalation, ingestion, or dermal contact is associated with hemolytic
anemia and damage to the liver and the nervous system.\742\ Chronic
(long term) exposure of workers and rodents to naphthalene has been
reported to cause cataracts and retinal
[[Page 62907]]
damage.\743\ EPA released an external review draft of a reassessment of
the inhalation carcinogenicity of naphthalene based on a number of
recent animal carcinogenicity studies.\744\ The draft reassessment
completed external peer review.\745\ Based on external peer review
comments received, a revised draft assessment that considers all routes
of exposure, as well as cancer and noncancer effects, is under
development. The external review draft does not represent official
agency opinion and was released solely for the purposes of external
peer review and public comment. The National Toxicology Program listed
naphthalene as ``reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen'' in
2004 on the basis of bioassays reporting clear evidence of
carcinogenicity in rats and some evidence of carcinogenicity in
mice.\746\ California EPA has released a new risk assessment for
naphthalene, and the IARC has reevaluated naphthalene and re-classified
it as Group 2B: possibly carcinogenic to humans.\747\ Naphthalene also
causes a number of chronic non-cancer effects in animals, including
abnormal cell changes and growth in respiratory and nasal tissues.\748\
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\742\ U.S. EPA. 1998. Toxicological Review of Naphthalene
(Reassessment of the Inhalation Cancer Risk), Environmental
Protection Agency, Integrated Risk Information System, Research and
Development, National Center for Environmental Assessment,
Washington, DC. This material is available electronically at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0436.htm.
\743\ U.S. EPA. 1998. Toxicological Review of Naphthalene
(Reassessment of the Inhalation Cancer Risk), Environmental
Protection Agency, Integrated Risk Information System, Research and
Development, National Center for Environmental Assessment,
Washington, DC. This material is available electronically at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0436.htm.
\744\ U.S. EPA. 1998. Toxicological Review of Naphthalene
(Reassessment of the Inhalation Cancer Risk), Environmental
Protection Agency, Integrated Risk Information System, Research and
Development, National Center for Environmental Assessment,
Washington, DC. This material is available electronically at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0436.htm. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\745\ Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education. (2004).
External Peer Review for the IRIS Reassessment of the Inhalation
Carcinogenicity of Naphthalene. August 2004. http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=84403. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\746\ National Toxicology Program (NTP). (2004). 11th Report on
Carcinogens. Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Research Triangle Park, NC. Available from: http://ntp-server.niehs.nih.gov.
\747\ International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
(2002). Monographs on the Evaluation of the Carcinogenic Risk of
Chemicals for Humans. Vol. 82. Lyon, France. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
\748\ U.S. EPA. 1998. Toxicological Review of Naphthalene,
Environmental Protection Agency, Integrated Risk Information System,
Research and Development, National Center for Environmental
Assessment, Washington, DC. This material is available
electronically at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0436.htm.
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viii. Other Air Toxics
In addition to the compounds described above, other compounds in
gaseous hydrocarbon and PM emissions from light-duty vehicles will be
affected by this rule. Mobile source air toxic compounds that would
potentially be impacted include ethylbenzene, propionaldehyde, toluene,
and xylene. Information regarding the health effects of these compounds
can be found in EPA's IRIS database.\749\
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\749\ U.S. EPA Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS)
database is available at: www.epa.gov/iris.
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f. Exposure and Health Effects Associated With Traffic-Related Air
Pollution
Populations who live, work, or attend school near major roads
experience elevated exposure to a wide range of air pollutants, as well
as higher risks for a number of adverse health effects. While the
previous sections of this preamble have focused on the health effects
associated with individual criteria pollutants or air toxics, this
section discusses the mixture of different exposures near major
roadways, rather than the effects of any single pollutant. As such,
this section emphasizes traffic-related air pollution, in general, as
the relevant indicator of exposure rather than any particular
pollutant.
Concentrations of many traffic-generated air pollutants are
elevated for up to 300-500 meters downwind of roads with high traffic
volumes.\750\ Numerous sources on roads contribute to elevated roadside
concentrations, including exhaust and evaporative emissions, and
resuspension of road dust and tire and brake wear. Concentrations of
several criteria and hazardous air pollutants are elevated near major
roads. Furthermore, different semi-volatile organic compounds and
chemical components of particulate matter, including elemental carbon,
organic material, and trace metals, have been reported at higher
concentrations near major roads.
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\750\ Zhou, Y.; Levy, J.I. (2007) Factors influencing the
spatial extent of mobile source air pollution impacts: a meta-
analysis. BMC Public Health 7: 89. doi:10.1186/1471-2458-7-89 Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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Populations near major roads experience greater risk of certain
adverse health effects. The Health Effects Institute published a report
on the health effects of traffic-related air pollution.\751\ It
concluded that evidence is ``sufficient to infer the presence of a
causal association'' between traffic exposure and exacerbation of
childhood asthma symptoms. The HEI report also concludes that the
evidence is either ``sufficient'' or ``suggestive but not sufficient''
for a causal association between traffic exposure and new childhood
asthma cases. A review of asthma studies by Salam et al. (2008) reaches
similar conclusions.\752\ The HEI report also concludes that there is
``suggestive'' evidence for pulmonary function deficits associated with
traffic exposure, but concluded that there is ``inadequate and
insufficient'' evidence for causal associations with respiratory health
care utilization, adult-onset asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease symptoms, and allergy. A review by Holguin (2008) notes that
the effects of traffic on asthma may be modified by nutrition status,
medication use, and genetic factors.\753\
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\751\ HEI Panel on the Health Effects of Air Pollution. (2010)
Traffic-related air pollution: a critical review of the literature
on emissions, exposure, and health effects. [Online at
www.healtheffects.org] Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\752\ Salam, M.T.; Islam, T.; Gilliland, F.D. (2008) Recent
evidence for adverse effects of residential proximity to traffic
sources on asthma. Current Opin Pulm Med 14: 3-8. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799.
\753\ Holguin, F. (2008) Traffic, outdoor air pollution, and
asthma. Immunol Allergy Clinics North Am 28: 577-588. Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799.
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The HEI report also concludes that evidence is ``suggestive'' of a
causal association between traffic exposure and all-cause and
cardiovascular mortality. There is also evidence of an association
between traffic-related air pollutants and cardiovascular effects such
as changes in heart rhythm, heart attack, and cardiovascular disease.
The HEI report characterizes this evidence as ``suggestive'' of a
causal association, and an independent epidemiological literature
review by Adar and Kaufman (2007) concludes that there is ``consistent
evidence'' linking traffic-related pollution and adverse cardiovascular
health outcomes.\754\
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\754\ Adar, S.D.; Kaufman, J.D. (2007) Cardiovascular disease
and air pollutants: evaluating and improving epidemiological data
implicating traffic exposure. Inhal Toxicol 19: 135-149. Docket EPA-
HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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Some studies have reported associations between traffic exposure
and other health effects, such as birth outcomes (e.g., low birth
weight) and childhood cancer. The HEI report concludes that there is
currently ``inadequate and insufficient'' evidence for a causal
association between these effects and traffic exposure. A review by
Raaschou-Nielsen and Reynolds (2006) concluded that evidence of an
association between childhood cancer and traffic-related air pollutants
is weak, but noted the inability to draw firm conclusions based on
limited evidence.\755\
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\755\ Raaschou-Nielsen, O.; Reynolds, P. (2006) Air pollution
and childhood cancer: A review of the epidemiological literature.
Int J Cancer 118: 2920-2929. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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[[Page 62908]]
There is a large population in the United States living in close
proximity of major roads. According to the Census Bureau's American
Housing Survey for 2007, approximately 20 million residences in the
United States, 15.6% of all homes, are located within 300 feet (91 m)
of a highway with 4+ lanes, a railroad, or an airport.\756\ Therefore,
at current population of approximately 309 million, assuming that
population and housing are similarly distributed, there are over 48
million people in the United States living near such sources. The HEI
report also notes that in two North American cities, Los Angeles and
Toronto, over 40% of each city's population live within 500 meters of a
highway or 100 meters of a major road. It also notes that about 33% of
each city's population resides within 50 meters of major roads.
Together, the evidence suggests that a large U.S. population lives in
areas with elevated traffic-related air pollution.
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\756\ U.S. Census Bureau (2008) American Housing Survey for the
United States in 2007. Series H-150 (National Data), Table 1A-7.
[Accessed at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs07/ahs07.html on January 22, 2009] Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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People living near roads are often socioeconomically disadvantaged.
According to the 2007 American Housing Survey, a renter-occupied
property is over twice as likely as an owner-occupied property to be
located near a highway with 4+ lanes, railroad or airport. In the same
survey, the median household income of rental housing occupants was
less than half that of owner-occupants ($28,921/$59,886). Numerous
studies in individual urban areas report higher levels of traffic-
related air pollutants in areas with high minority or poor
populations.757,758,759
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\757\ Lena, T.S.; Ochieng, V.; Carter, M.; Holgu[iacute]n-Veras,
J.; Kinney, P.L. (2002) Elemental carbon and PM2.5 levels
in an urban community heavily impacted by truck traffic. Environ
Health Perspect 110: 1009-1015. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\758\ Wier, M.; Sciammas, C.; Seto, E.; Bhatia, R.; Rivard, T.
(2009) Health, traffic, and environmental justice: collaborative
research and community action in San Francisco, California. Am J
Public Health 99: S499-S504. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\759\ Forkenbrock, D.J. and L.A. Schweitzer, Environmental
Justice and Transportation Investment Policy. Iowa City: University
of Iowa, 1997. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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Students may also be exposed in situations where schools are
located near major roads. In a study of nine metropolitan areas across
the United States, Appatova et al. (2008) found that on average greater
than 33% of schools were located within 400 m of an Interstate, U.S.,
or state highway, while 12% were located within 100 m.\760\ The study
also found that among the metropolitan areas studied, schools in the
Eastern United States were more often sited near major roadways than
schools in the Western United States.
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\760\ Appatova, A.S.; Ryan, P.H.; LeMasters, G.K.; Grinshpun,
S.A. (2008) Proximal exposure of public schools and students to
major roadways: A nationwide U.S. survey. J Environ Plan Mgmt Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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Demographic studies of students in schools near major roadways
suggest that this population is more likely than the general student
population to be of non-white race or Hispanic ethnicity, and more
often live in low socioeconomic status locations.761,762,763
There is some inconsistency in the evidence, which may be due to
different local development patterns and measures of traffic and
geographic scale used in the studies.\760\
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\761\ Green, R.S.; Smorodinsky, S.; Kim, J.J.; McLaughlin, R.;
Ostro, B. (2004) Proximity of California public schools to busy
roads. Environ Health Perspect 112: 61-66. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799.
\762\ Houston, D.; Ong, P.; Wu, J.; Winer, A. (2006) Proximity
of licensed child care facilities to near-roadway vehicle pollution.
Am J Public Health 96: 1611-1617. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\763\ Wu, Y.; Batterman, S. (2006) Proximity of schools in
Detroit, Michigan to automobile and truck traffic. J Exposure Sci
Environ Epidemiol 16: 457-470. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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3. Environmental Effects of Non-GHG Pollutants
In this section we discuss some of the environmental effects of PM
and its precursors such as visibility impairment, atmospheric
deposition, and materials damage and soiling, as well as environmental
effects associated with the presence of ozone in the ambient air, such
as impacts on plants, including trees, agronomic crops and urban
ornamentals, and environmental effects associated with air toxics.
a. Visibility
Visibility can be defined as the degree to which the atmosphere is
transparent to visible light.\764\ Visibility impairment is caused by
light scattering and absorption by suspended particles and gases.
Visibility is important because it has direct significance to people's
enjoyment of daily activities in all parts of the country. Individuals
value good visibility for the well-being it provides them directly,
where they live and work, and in places where they enjoy recreational
opportunities. Visibility is also highly valued in significant natural
areas, such as national parks and wilderness areas, and special
emphasis is given to protecting visibility in these areas. For more
information on visibility see the final 2009 PM ISA.\765\
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\764\ National Research Council, 1993. Protecting Visibility in
National Parks and Wilderness Areas. National Academy of Sciences
Committee on Haze in National Parks and Wilderness Areas. National
Academy Press, Washington, DC. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799. This
book can be viewed on the National Academy Press Web site at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309048443/html/.
\765\ See U.S. EPA 2009 Final PM ISA, Note 669.
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EPA is pursuing a two-part strategy to address visibility
impairment. First, EPA developed the regional haze program (64 FR
35714) which was put in place in July 1999 to protect the visibility in
Mandatory Class I Federal areas. There are 156 national parks, forests
and wilderness areas categorized as Mandatory Class I Federal areas (62
FR 38680-38681, July 18, 1997). These areas are defined in CAA section
162 as those national parks exceeding 6,000 acres, wilderness areas and
memorial parks exceeding 5,000 acres, and all international parks which
were in existence on August 7, 1977. Second, EPA has concluded that
PM2.5 causes adverse effects on visibility in other areas
that are not protected by the Regional Haze Rule, depending on
PM2.5 concentrations and other factors that control their
visibility impact effectiveness such as dry chemical composition and
relative humidity (i.e., an indicator of the water composition of the
particles), and has set secondary PM2.5 standards to address
these areas. The existing annual primary and secondary PM2.5
standards have been remanded by the DC Circuit and EPA has proposed to
revise the suite of secondary PM standards by adding a distinct
standard for PM2.5 to address PM-related visibility
impairment.\766\
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\766\ See American Farm Bureau v. EPA, 559 F. 3d 512, 528-32 (DC
Cir. 2009) (remanding secondary NAAQS) and 77 FR 38979-991
(proposing distinct secondary standard for PM2.5 to
address visibility impairment).
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b. Plant and Ecosystem Effects of Ozone
Elevated ozone levels contribute to environmental effects, with
impacts to plants and ecosystems being of most concern. Ozone can
produce both acute and chronic injury in sensitive species depending on
the concentration level and the duration of the exposure. Ozone effects
also tend to accumulate over the growing season of the plant, so that
even low concentrations experienced for a longer duration have the
potential to create chronic stress on vegetation. Ozone damage to
plants includes visible injury to leaves and impaired photosynthesis,
both of which can lead to reduced plant growth and reproduction,
resulting in reduced crop yields, forestry production, and use of
sensitive ornamentals in landscaping. In addition, the impairment of
photosynthesis, the process by which
[[Page 62909]]
the plant makes carbohydrates (its source of energy and food), can lead
to a subsequent reduction in root growth and carbohydrate storage below
ground, resulting in other, more subtle plant and ecosystems impacts.
These latter impacts include increased susceptibility of plants to
insect attack, disease, harsh weather, interspecies competition and
overall decreased plant vigor. The adverse effects of ozone on forest
and other natural vegetation can potentially lead to species shifts and
loss from the affected ecosystems, resulting in a loss or reduction in
associated ecosystem goods and services. Lastly, visible ozone injury
to leaves can result in a loss of aesthetic value in areas of special
scenic significance like national parks and wilderness areas. The final
2006 Ozone Air Quality Criteria Document presents more detailed
information on ozone effects on vegetation and ecosystems.
c. Atmospheric Deposition
Wet and dry deposition of ambient particulate matter delivers a
complex mixture of metals (e.g., mercury, zinc, lead, nickel, aluminum,
cadmium), organic compounds (e.g., polycyclic organic matter, dioxins,
furans) and inorganic compounds (e.g., nitrate, sulfate) to terrestrial
and aquatic ecosystems. The chemical form of the compounds deposited
depends on a variety of factors including ambient conditions (e.g.,
temperature, humidity, oxidant levels) and the sources of the material.
Chemical and physical transformations of the compounds occur in the
atmosphere as well as the media onto which they deposit. These
transformations in turn influence the fate, bioavailability and
potential toxicity of these compounds. Atmospheric deposition has been
identified as a key component of the environmental and human health
hazard posed by several pollutants including mercury, dioxin and
PCBs.\767\
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\767\ U.S. EPA (2000) Deposition of Air Pollutants to the Great
Waters: Third Report to Congress. Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards. EPA-453/R-00-0005. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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Adverse impacts on water quality can occur when atmospheric
contaminants deposit to the water surface or when material deposited on
the land enters a waterbody through runoff. Potential impacts of
atmospheric deposition to waterbodies include those related to both
nutrient and toxic inputs. Adverse effects to human health and welfare
can occur from the addition of excess nitrogen via atmospheric
deposition. The nitrogen-nutrient enrichment contributes to toxic algae
blooms and zones of depleted oxygen, which can lead to fish kills,
frequently in coastal waters. Deposition of heavy metals or other
toxics may lead to the human ingestion of contaminated fish, impairment
of drinking water, damage to freshwater and marine ecosystem
components, and limits to recreational uses. Several studies have been
conducted in U.S. coastal waters and in the Great Lakes Region in which
the role of ambient PM deposition and runoff is
investigated.768,769,770,771,772
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\768\ U.S. EPA (2004) National Coastal Condition Report II.
Office of Research and Development/Office of Water. EPA-620/R-03/
002. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\769\ Gao, Y., E.D. Nelson, M.P. Field, et al. 2002.
Characterization of atmospheric trace elements on PM2.5
particulate matter over the New York-New Jersey harbor estuary.
Atmos. Environ. 36: 1077-1086. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\770\ Kim, G., N. Hussain, J.R. Scudlark, and T.M. Church. 2000.
Factors influencing the atmospheric depositional fluxes of stable
Pb, 210Pb, and 7Be into Chesapeake Bay. J. Atmos. Chem. 36: 65-79.
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\771\ Lu, R., R.P. Turco, K. Stolzenbach, et al. 2003. Dry
deposition of airborne trace metals on the Los Angeles Basin and
adjacent coastal waters. J. Geophys. Res. 108(D2, 4074): AAC 11-1 to
11-24. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\772\ Marvin, C.H., M.N. Charlton, E.J. Reiner, et al. 2002.
Surficial sediment contamination in Lakes Erie and Ontario: A
comparative analysis. J. Great Lakes Res. 28(3): 437-450. Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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Atmospheric deposition of nitrogen and sulfur contributes to
acidification, altering biogeochemistry and affecting animal and plant
life in terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems across the United States.
The sensitivity of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems to acidification
from nitrogen and sulfur deposition is predominantly governed by
geology. Prolonged exposure to excess nitrogen and sulfur deposition in
sensitive areas acidifies lakes, rivers and soils. Increased acidity in
surface waters creates inhospitable conditions for biota and affects
the abundance and nutritional value of preferred prey species,
threatening biodiversity and ecosystem function. Over time, acidifying
deposition also removes essential nutrients from forest soils,
depleting the capacity of soils to neutralize future acid loadings and
negatively affecting forest sustainability. Major effects include a
decline in sensitive forest tree species, such as red spruce (Picea
rubens) and sugar maple (Acer saccharum), and a loss of biodiversity of
fishes, zooplankton, and macro invertebrates.
In addition to the role nitrogen deposition plays in acidification,
nitrogen deposition also leads to nutrient enrichment and altered
biogeochemical cycling. In aquatic systems increased nitrogen can alter
species assemblages and cause eutrophication. In terrestrial systems
nitrogen loading can lead to loss of nitrogen sensitive lichen species,
decreased biodiversity of grasslands, meadows and other sensitive
habitats, and increased potential for invasive species. For a broader
explanation of the topics treated here, refer to the description in
Section 6.1.2.3.1 of the RIA.
Adverse impacts on soil chemistry and plant life have been observed
for areas heavily influenced by atmospheric deposition of nutrients,
metals and acid species, resulting in species shifts, loss of
biodiversity, forest decline, damage to forest productivity and
reductions in ecosystem services. Potential impacts also include
adverse effects to human health through ingestion of contaminated
vegetation or livestock (as in the case for dioxin deposition),
reduction in crop yield, and limited use of land due to contamination.
Atmospheric deposition of pollutants can reduce the aesthetic
appeal of buildings and culturally important articles through soiling,
and can contribute directly (or in conjunction with other pollutants)
to structural damage by means of corrosion or erosion. Atmospheric
deposition may affect materials principally by promoting and
accelerating the corrosion of metals, by degrading paints, and by
deteriorating building materials such as concrete and limestone.
Particles contribute to these effects because of their electrolytic,
hygroscopic, and acidic properties, and their ability to adsorb
corrosive gases (principally sulfur dioxide).
d. Environmental Effects of Air Toxics
Emissions from producing, transporting and combusting fuel
contribute to ambient levels of pollutants that contribute to adverse
effects on vegetation. Volatile organic compounds, some of which are
considered air toxics, have long been suspected to play a role in
vegetation damage.\773\ In laboratory experiments, a wide range of
tolerance to VOCs has been observed.\774\ Decreases in harvested seed
pod weight have been reported for the more sensitive plants, and some
studies have reported effects on seed germination, flowering and fruit
[[Page 62910]]
ripening. Effects of individual VOCs or their role in conjunction with
other stressors (e.g., acidification, drought, temperature extremes)
have not been well studied. In a recent study of a mixture of VOCs
including ethanol and toluene on herbaceous plants, significant effects
on seed production, leaf water content and photosynthetic efficiency
were reported for some plant species.\775\
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\773\ U.S. EPA. 1991. Effects of organic chemicals in the
atmosphere on terrestrial plants. EPA/600/3-91/001. Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799.
\774\ Cape JN, ID Leith, J Binnie, J Content, M Donkin, M
Skewes, DN Price AR Brown, AD Sharpe. 2003. Effects of VOCs on
herbaceous plants in an open-top chamber experiment. Environ.
Pollut. 124:341-343. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\775\ Cape JN, ID Leith, J Binnie, J Content, M Donkin, M
Skewes, DN Price AR Brown, AD Sharpe. 2003. Effects of VOCs on
herbaceous plants in an open-top chamber experiment. Environ.
Pollut. 124:341-343. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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Research suggests an adverse impact of vehicle exhaust on plants,
which has in some cases been attributed to aromatic compounds and in
other cases to nitrogen oxides.776,777,778 The impacts of
VOCs on plant reproduction may have long-term implications for
biodiversity and survival of native species near major roadways. Most
of the studies of the impacts of VOCs on vegetation have focused on
short-term exposure and few studies have focused on long-term effects
of VOCs on vegetation and the potential for metabolites of these
compounds to affect herbivores or insects.
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\776\ Viskari E-L. 2000. Epicuticular wax of Norway spruce
needles as indicator of traffic pollutant deposition. Water, Air,
and Soil Pollut. 121:327-337. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\777\ Ugrekhelidze D, F Korte, G Kvesitadze. 1997. Uptake and
transformation of benzene and toluene by plant leaves. Ecotox.
Environ. Safety 37:24-29. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\778\ Kammerbauer H, H Selinger, R Rommelt, A Ziegler-Jons, D
Knoppik, B Hock. 1987. Toxic components of motor vehicle emissions
for the spruce Picea abies. Environ. Pollut. 48:235-243. Docket EPA-
HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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4. Air Quality Impacts of Non-GHG Pollutants
Air quality modeling was performed to assess the impact of the
vehicle standards on criteria and air toxic pollutants. In this
section, we present information on current levels of pollution as well
as projections for 2030, with respect to ambient PM2.5,
ozone, selected air toxics, visibility levels and nitrogen and sulfur
deposition. The results are discussed in more detail in Section 6.2.2
of the RIA.
a. Ozone
i. Current Levels
Concentrations that exceed the level of the ozone NAAQS occur in
many parts of the country. The primary and secondary NAAQS for ozone
are 8-hour standards with a level of 0.075 ppm. The most recent
revision to the ozone standards was in 2008; the previous 8-hour ozone
standards, set in 1997, had a level of 0.08 ppm. In 2004, the U.S. EPA
designated nonattainment areas for the 1997 8-hour ozone
NAAQS.779,780 As of July 20, 2012, there were 43 ozone
nonattainment areas for the 1997 ozone NAAQS composed of 237 full or
partial counties, with a total population of over 129 million.
Nonattainment designations for the 2008 ozone standards were finalized
on April 30, 2012 and May 31, 2012.\781\ These designations include 46
areas, composed of 227 full or partial counties, with a population of
over 123 million. As of July 20, 2012, 140 million people are living in
ozone nonattainment areas.
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\779\ 69 FR 23858 (April 30, 2004).
\780\ A nonattainment area is defined in the Clean Air Act (CAA)
as an area that is violating an ambient standard or is contributing
to a nearby area that is violating the standard.
\781\ 77FR 30088 (May 21, 2012).
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ii. Projected Levels Without the Vehicle Standards
States with ozone nonattainment areas are required to take action
to bring those areas into attainment. The attainment date assigned to
an ozone nonattainment area is based on the area's classification. Most
ozone nonattainment areas are required to attain the 1997 8-hour ozone
NAAQS in the 2007 to 2013 time frame and attainment dates for the 2008
8-hour ozone NAAQS are in the 2015 to 2032 timeframe.\782\ Once an
ozone nonattainment area has attained the NAAQS they are then required
to maintain it thereafter.
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\782\ The Los Angeles South Coast Air Basin 8-hour ozone
nonattainment area and the San Joaquin Valley Air Basin 8-hour ozone
nonattainment area are designated as extreme and will have to attain
before June 15, 2024. The Sacramento, Coachella Valley, Western
Mojave and Houston 8-hour ozone nonattainment areas are designated
as severe and will have to attain by June 15, 2019.
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EPA has already adopted many emission control programs that are
expected to reduce ambient ozone levels. As a result of these and other
federal, state and local programs, 8-hour ozone levels are expected to
improve in the future. Even so, our air quality modeling projects that
in 2030, with all current controls but excluding the impacts of the
vehicle standards, up to 10 counties with a population of over 30
million would have projected design values above the level of the 2008
ozone standard of 0.075 ppm (75 ppb). These numbers do not account for
those areas that are close to (e.g., within 10 percent of) the 2008
ozone standard. These areas, although not above the standards, will
also be impacted by changes in ozone concentrations as they work to
ensure long-term maintenance of the ozone NAAQS.
iii. Projected Levels With the Vehicle Standards
Our modeling indicates that there will be very small changes in
ambient ozone concentrations across most of the country. However, there
will be small decreases in ozone design value concentrations in some
areas of the country and small increases in ozone design value
concentrations in other areas.\783\ The increases in ozone design
values are likely due mainly to the VMT rebound effect in some places
and in other places are likely due mainly to increased electricity
generation. The ozone decreases are likely due mainly to changes in the
location of EGUs, or power plants, in some places and in other places
are likely due mainly to reduced fuel production. The average modeled
8-hour ozone design values are projected to increase by 0.01 ppb in
2030 and the design values for those counties that are projected to be
above the 2008 ozone standard in 2030 will decrease by 0.14 ppb due to
the vehicle standards.
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\783\ An 8-hour ozone design value is the concentration that
determines whether a monitoring site meets the 8-hour ozone NAAQS.
The full details involved in calculating an 8-hour ozone design
value are given in appendix I of 40 CFR part 50.
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b. Particulate Matter
i. Current Levels
There are many areas of the country that are currently in
nonattainment for the PM2.5 NAAQS. There are two NAAQS for
PM2.5: An annual standard (15 micrograms per cubic meter
([mu]g/m\3\) and a 24-hour standard (35 [mu]g/m\3\). The most recent
revisions to these standards were in 1997 and 2006. In June 2012, EPA
proposed to revise the PM2.5 NAAQS and is scheduled to issue
final revisions in December 2012 under a court-ordered schedule. The
proposed changes include revising the annual PM2.5 standard
to a level between 12 and 13 [mu]g/m\3\, and establishing a distinct
secondary PM2.5 standard for the protection of visibility,
particularly in urban areas.
In 2005 EPA designated nonattainment areas for the 1997
PM2.5 NAAQS.\784\ As of July 20, 2012, over 91 million
people lived in the 35 areas that are designated as nonattainment for
the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS. These PM2.5 nonattainment
areas are comprised of 191 full or partial counties. On October 8,
2009, the EPA issued final nonattainment area designations for the 2006
24-hour PM2.5 NAAQS.\785\ These designations include 32
areas,
[[Page 62911]]
composed of 121 full or partial counties, with a population of over 70
million. In total, there are 50 PM2.5 nonattainment areas
with a population of over 105 million people.\786\
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\784\ 70 FR 19844 (April 14, 2005).
\785\ 74 FR 58688 (November 13, 2009).
\786\ Data come from Summary Nonattainment Area Population
Exposure Report, current as of July 20, 2012 at: http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/popexp.html and contained in Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799.
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ii. Projected Levels Without the Vehicle Standards
States with PM2.5 nonattainment areas will be required
to take action to bring those areas into attainment in the future. The
1997 PM2.5 nonattainment areas are required to attain the
1997 PM2.5 NAAQS in the 2010 to 2015 time frame and then
maintain it thereafter. The 2006 24-hour PM2.5 nonattainment
areas are required to attain the 2006 24-hour PM2.5 NAAQS in
the 2014 to 2019 time frame and then maintain it thereafter.\787\
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\787\ U.S. EPA. (2011). PM Standards Revision--2006: Timeline.
Available at http://www.epa.gov/PM/naaqsrev2006.html#timeline.
Accessed December 31, 2011.
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EPA has already adopted many mobile source emission control
programs that are expected to reduce ambient PM levels. As a result of
these and other federal, state and local programs, the number of areas
that fail to meet the PM2.5 NAAQS in the future is expected
to decrease. Even so, our air quality modeling projects that in 2030,
with all current controls but excluding the impacts of the vehicle
standards adopted here, at least 4 counties with a population of almost
7 million would have projected design values above the level of the
1997 annual PM2.5 standard of 15 [mu]g/m\3\ and 21 counties
with a population of over 31 million would have projected design values
above the level of the 2006 24-hour PM2.5 standard of 35
[mu]g/m\3\. These numbers do not account for those areas that are close
to (e.g., within 10 percent of) the PM2.5 standards. These
areas, although not above the standards, will also be impacted by any
changes in PM2.5 concentrations as they work to ensure long-
term maintenance of the PM2.5 NAAQS.
iii. Projected Levels With the Vehicle Standards
Our modeling indicates that there will be very small changes in
ambient PM2.5 concentrations across most of the country.
However, there will be small decreases in PM2.5 design value
concentrations in some areas of the country and small increases in
PM2.5 design value concentrations in other areas.\788\ The
decreases in PM2.5 design values for some counties are
likely due to emission reductions related to lower fuel production and
the increases are likely due to increased emissions from the VMT
rebound effect or increased electricity generation.
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\788\ An annual PM2.5 design value is the
concentration that determines whether a monitoring site meets the
annual NAAQS for PM2.5. The full details involved in
calculating an annual PM2.5 design value are given in
appendix N of 40 CFR part 50. A 24-hour PM2.5 design
value is the concentration that determines whether a monitoring site
meets the 24-hour NAAQS for PM2.5. The full details
involved in calculating a 24-hour PM2.5 design value are
given in appendix N of 40 CFR part 50.
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c. Air Toxics
i. Current Levels
The majority of Americans continue to be exposed to ambient
concentrations of air toxics at levels which have the potential to
cause adverse health effects.\789\ The levels of air toxics to which
people are exposed vary depending on where people live and work and the
kinds of activities in which they engage, as discussed in detail in
U.S. EPA's 2007 Mobile Source Air Toxics Rule.\790\ According to the
National Air Toxic Assessment (NATA) for 2005,\791\ mobile sources were
responsible for 43 percent of outdoor toxic emissions and over 50
percent of the cancer risk and noncancer hazard associated with primary
emissions. Mobile sources are also large contributors to precursor
emissions which react to form secondary concentrations of air toxics.
Formaldehyde is the largest contributor to cancer risk of all 80
pollutants quantitatively assessed in the 2005 NATA. Mobile sources
were responsible for over 40 percent of primary emissions of this
pollutant in 2005, and are major contributors to formaldehyde precursor
emissions. Benzene is also a large contributor to cancer risk, and
mobile sources account for over 70 percent of ambient exposure. Over
the years, EPA has implemented a number of mobile source and fuel
controls which have resulted in VOC reductions, which also reduced
formaldehyde, benzene and other air toxic emissions.
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\789\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007). Control of
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources; final rule. 72 FR
8434, February 26, 2007.
\790\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007). Control of
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources; final rule. 72 FR
8434, February 26, 2007.
\791\ U.S. EPA. (2011). 2005 National-Scale Air Toxics
Assessment. http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005/.
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ii. Projected Levels
Our modeling indicates that national average ambient concentrations
of the modeled air toxics change less than 1 percent across most of the
country due to the final standards. Additional detail on the air toxics
results can be found in Section 6.2.2.3 of the RIA.
d. Nitrogen and Sulfur Deposition
i. Current Nitrogen and Sulfur Deposition Levels
Over the past two decades, the EPA has undertaken numerous efforts
to reduce nitrogen and sulfur deposition across the U.S. Analyses of
long-term monitoring data for the U.S. show that deposition of both
nitrogen and sulfur compounds has decreased over the last 17 years. The
data show that reductions were more substantial for sulfur compounds
than for nitrogen compounds. In the eastern U.S., where data are most
abundant, total sulfur deposition decreased by about 44 percent between
1990 and 2007, while total nitrogen deposition decreased by 25 percent
over the same time frame.\792\ These numbers are generated by the U.S.
national monitoring network and they likely underestimate nitrogen
deposition because neither ammonia nor organic nitrogen is measured.
Although total nitrogen and sulfur deposition has decreased over time,
many areas continue to be negatively impacted by deposition. Deposition
of inorganic nitrogen and sulfur species routinely measured in the U.S.
between 2005 and 2007 were as high as 9.6 kilograms of nitrogen per
hectare (kg N/ha) averaged over three years and 20.8 kilograms of
sulfur per hectare (kg S/ha) averaged over three years.\793\
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\792\ U.S. EPA. (2012). U.S. EPA's Report on the Environment.
Data accessed online February 15, 2012 at: http://cfpub.epa.gov/eroe/index.cfm?fuseaction=detail.viewPDF&ch=46&lShowInd=0&subtop=341&lv=list.listByChapter&r=216610 and contained in Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799.
\793\ U.S. EPA. (2012). U.S. EPA's Report on the Environment.
Data accessed online February 15, 2012 at: http://cfpub.epa.gov/eroe/index.cfm?fuseaction=detail.viewPDF&ch=46&lShowInd=0&subtop=341&lv=list.listByChapter&r=216610 and contained in Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799.
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ii. Projected Nitrogen and Sulfur Deposition Levels
Our air quality modeling projects increases in nitrogen deposition
in some localized areas across the U.S. along with a few areas of
decreases in nitrogen deposition as a result of the GHG standards. The
increases in nitrogen deposition are likely due to projected upstream
emissions increases in NOX from increased electricity
generation and increased driving due to the VMT rebound effect. The
decreases in nitrogen deposition are likely due to projected upstream
emissions decreases in NOX from changes in the location of
electricity generation. The remainder of
[[Page 62912]]
the country will experience only minimal changes in nitrogen
deposition, ranging from decreases of less than 0.5% to increases of
less than 0.5%.
Our air quality modeling also projects both increases and decreases
in sulfur deposition as a result of the GHG standards. The decreases in
sulfur deposition are likely due to projected upstream emissions
decreases from changes in the location of electricity generation and
from reduced gasoline production. The increases in sulfur deposition
are likely due to projected upstream emissions increases from increased
electricity generation. The remainder of the country will experience
only minimal changes in sulfur deposition, ranging from decreases of
less than 0.5% to increases of less than 0.5%.
For maps of 2030 deposition impacts and additional information on
these impacts see Section 6.2.2.4 of the RIA.
e. Visibility
i. Current Visibility Levels
As mentioned in Section III.G.4.i, millions of people live in
nonattainment areas for the PM2.5 NAAQS. These populations,
as well as large numbers of individuals who travel to these areas, are
likely to experience visibility impairment. In addition, while
visibility trends have improved in mandatory class I federal areas, the
most recent data show that these areas continue to suffer from
visibility impairment. In summary, visibility impairment is experienced
throughout the U.S., in multi-state regions, urban areas, and remote
mandatory class I federal areas.
ii. Projected Visibility Levels
Air quality modeling was used to project visibility conditions in
139 mandatory class I federal areas across the U.S. The results show
that in 2030 all the modeled areas would continue to have annual
average deciview levels above background.\794\ Overall the vehicle
standards will have a very small impact on visibility. The average
visibility at all modeled mandatory class I federal areas on the 20
percent worst days is projected to improve by 0.003 deciviews, or 0.03
percent, in 2030. Section 6.2.2.5 of the RIA contains more detail on
the visibility portion of the air quality modeling.
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\794\ The level of visibility impairment in an area is based on
the light-extinction coefficient and a unitless visibility index,
called a ``deciview'', which is used in the valuation of visibility.
The deciview metric provides a scale for perceived visual changes
over the entire range of conditions, from clear to hazy. Under many
scenic conditions, the average person can generally perceive a
change of one deciview. The higher the deciview value, the worse the
visibility. Thus, an improvement in visibility is a decrease in
deciview value.
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5. Other Unquantified Health and Environmental Effects
In the NPRM, EPA sought comment on whether there are any other
health and environmental impacts associated with advancements in
vehicle GHG reduction technologies that the agency should consider. In
particular, EPA requested information on studies or research underway
on a vehicle's life-cycle impacts (e.g., materials usage,
manufacturing, end of life disposal) beyond issues regarding fuel
production and distribution (upstream) discussed in Section III.C.\795\
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\795\ See 76 FR 75112.
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EPA received a mix of comments on this topic, many highlighting
recent or upcoming studies including new research from the University
of California, Davis and the University of Michigan. Some commenters
argued that EPA should base future GHG standards on life-cycle
emissions in order to avoid favoring technologies that have lower
emissions during operation or the ``use phase,'' but higher total
greenhouse gas emissions when production and other stages of a
vehicle's life are considered. For example, several organizations from
the steel industry recommended that EPA and NHTSA consider
incorporating life-cycle assessment into vehicle regulations as part of
the 2018 mid-term evaluation and outlined one potential framework for
establishing such life-cycle based standards.
Other commenters agreed with the agencies' proposal not to consider
life-cycle impacts as part of the standards, arguing that life-cycle
analysis (LCA) is beyond the intended scope of the rulemaking and that
regulating emissions from vehicle operation addresses the majority of
GHG emissions. The American Chemistry Council also noted, ``Further,
this type of rulemaking is not an appropriate place to apply LCA
because of the lack of consensus regarding how to calculate inputs and
outputs in an LCA evaluation at this time.''
EPA is glad to see the advances in research on this important topic
and plans to monitor new work in this area. However, the agency
continues to believe that, as of the time of this rulemaking, there is
too much uncertainty about the life-cycle impacts of future advanced
technologies to conduct the type of detailed, vehicle-specific
assessments that would be needed in a regulatory context. See the EPA
Response to Comments document for a more detailed discussion on this
topic and a fuller summary of comments received.\796\
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\796\ Also, see Ch. 6 of NHTSA's Environmental Impact Statement
for this rulemaking, ``Literature Synthesis of Life-cycle
Environmental Impacts of Certain Vehicle Materials and
Technologies,'' Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0056. The range of different
models and approaches utilized in the surveyed LCA studies, and the
sensitivity of the results to study assumptions, demonstrate the
challenge of developing a fair and robust method to evaluate life-
cycle impacts across a range of different vehicle technologies at
this time.
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H. What are the estimated cost, economic, and other impacts of the
rule?
In this section, EPA presents the costs and impacts of the GHG
standards. It is important to note that NHTSA's CAFE standards and
EPA's GHG standards will both be in effect, and each will lead to
average fuel economy increases and CO2 emissions reductions.
The two agencies' standards comprise the National Program, and this
discussion of costs and benefits of EPA's GHG standard does not change
the fact that both the CAFE and GHG standards, jointly, will be the
source of the benefits and costs of the National Program. These costs
and benefits are appropriately analyzed separately by each agency and
should not be added together.
This section outlines the basis for assessing the benefits and
costs of the GHG standards and provides estimates of these costs and
benefits. Some of these effects are private, meaning that they affect
consumers and producers directly in their sales, purchases, and use of
vehicles. These private effects include the increase in vehicle prices
due to costs of the technology, fuel savings, and the benefits of
additional driving and reduced refueling. Other costs and benefits
affect people outside the markets for vehicles and their use; these
effects are termed external, because they affect people in ways other
than the effect on the market for and use of new vehicles and are
generally not taken into account by the purchaser of the vehicle. The
external effects include the climate impacts, the effects on non-GHG
pollutants, energy security impacts, and the effects on traffic,
accidents, and noise due to additional driving. The sum of the private
and external benefits and costs is the net social benefits of the
standards.
There is some debate about the behavior of private markets in the
context of these standards: if consumers optimize their purchases of
fuel economy, with full information and perfect foresight, in perfectly
efficient markets, they should have already
[[Page 62913]]
considered these benefits in their vehicle purchase decisions. If so,
then no net private benefits would result from the program, because
consumers would already buy vehicles with the amount of fuel economy
that is optimal for them; requiring additional fuel economy would alter
both the purchase prices of new cars and their lifetime streams of
operating costs in ways that will inevitably reduce consumers' well-
being. Section III.H.1 discusses this issue more fully.
The net benefits of EPA's rule consist of the effects of the
standards on:
The vehicle costs;
Fuel savings associated with reduced fuel usage resulting
from the program;
Greenhouse gas emissions;
Other air pollutants;
Other impacts, including noise, congestion, accidents;
Energy security impacts;
Changes in refueling events;
Increased driving due to the VMT ``rebound'' effect.
EPA also presents the cost per ton of GHG reductions associated
with the GHG standards on a CO2eq basis, in Section III.H.3
below.
The total present value of monetized benefits (excluding fuel
savings) under the standards are projected to be between $257 to $743
billion, using a 3 percent discount rate and depending on the value
used for the social cost of carbon. With a 7 percent discount rate, the
total present value of monetized benefits (excluding fuel savings)
under the standards are projected to be between $118 to $604 billion,
depending on the value used for the social cost of carbon. These
benefits are summarized below in Table 103. The present value in 2012
of technology and maintenance costs of the standards are estimated to
be between $247 to $561 billion for new vehicle technology (assuming a
7 and 3 percent discount rate, respectively, and costs through 2050),
less $607 to $1,600 billion in savings realized by consumers through
fewer fuel expenditures (calculated using pre-tax fuel prices and using
a 7 and 3 percent discount rate, respectively, and fuel savings through
2050). These costs are summarized below in Table III-101 and the fuel
savings are summarized in Table III-102. The total net present value of
net benefits under the standards are projected to be between $1,290 and
$1,780 billion, using a 3 percent discount rate and depending on the
value used for the social cost of carbon. With a 7 percent discount
rate, the total net present value of net benefits under the standards
are projected to be between $478 billion to $964 billion, depending on
the value used for the social cost of carbon. The estimates developed
here use as a baseline for comparison the greenhouse gas performance
and fuel economy associated with MY 2016 standards. To the extent that
greater fuel economy improvements than those assumed to occur under the
baseline may have occurred due to market forces alone (absent these
standards), the analysis overestimates private and social net benefits.
While NHTSA and EPA each modeled their respective regulatory
programs, the analyses were generally consistent and featured similar
parameters. For this rule, EPA has not conducted an overall uncertainty
analysis of the impacts associated with its regulatory program, though
it did conduct sensitivity analyses of individual components of the
analysis (e.g., alternative SCC estimates, VMT rebound effect, battery
costs, mass reduction costs, the indirect cost markup factor, and cost
learning curves); these analyses are found in Chapters 3, 4, and 7 of
the EPA RIA. NHTSA, however, conducted a Monte Carlo simulation of the
uncertainty associated with its regulatory program. The focus of the
simulation model was variation around the chosen uncertainty parameters
and their resulting impact on the key output parameters, fuel savings,
and net benefits. Because of the similarities between the two analyses,
EPA references NHTSA RIA Chapters X and XII as indicative of the
relative magnitude, uncertainty and sensitivities of parameters of the
cost/benefit analysis. EPA has also analyzed the potential impact of
this rule on vehicle sales and employment. These impacts are not
included in the analysis of overall costs and benefits of the
standards. Further information on these and other aspects of the
economic impacts of EPA's rule are summarized in the following sections
and are presented in more detail in the RIA for this rulemaking.
1. Conceptual Framework for Evaluating Consumer Impacts
For this rule, EPA projects significant private gains to consumers
in three major areas: (1) reductions in spending on fuel; (2) for
gasoline-fueled vehicles, time saved due to less refueling; and (3)
additional driving that results from the VMT rebound effect. In
combination, these private benefits, mostly from fuel savings, appear
to outweigh the costs of the standards, even without accounting for
externalities.
Admittedly, these findings pose an economic conundrum. On the one
hand, consumers are expected to gain significantly from the rules, as
the increased cost of fuel-efficient cars is smaller than the fuel
savings. Yet many of these technologies are readily available;
financially savvy consumers could have sought vehicles with improved
fuel efficiency, and auto makers seeking those customers could have
offered them. Assuming full information, perfect foresight, perfect
competition, and financially rational consumers and producers, standard
economic theory suggests that normal market operations would have
provided the private net gains to consumers, and the only benefits of
the rule would be due to external benefits. If our analysis projects
net private benefits that consumers have not realized in this perfectly
functioning market, then, with the above assumptions, there must be
additional costs of these private net benefits that are not accounted
for. This calculation assumes that consumers accurately predict and act
on all the fuel-saving benefits they will get from a new vehicle, and
that producers market products providing those benefits. The estimate
of large private net benefits from this rule, then, suggests either
that the assumptions noted above do not hold, or that EPA's analysis
has missed some factor(s) tied to improved fuel economy that reduce(s)
consumer welfare.
This subsection discusses the economic principles underlying the
assessment of impacts on consumer well-being due to the changes in the
vehicles. Because conventional gasoline- and diesel-fueled vehicles
have quite different characteristics from alternatively fueled vehicles
(especially electric vehicles), the principles for these different
kinds vehicles are discussed separately below.
a. Conventional Vehicles
For conventional vehicles, the estimates of technology costs
developed for this rule take into account the cost needed to ensure
that vehicle utility (including performance, reliability, and size)
stay constant, except for fuel economy and vehicle price, with some
minor exceptions (e.g., see the discussion of the ``Atkinson-cycle''
engine and towing capacity in III.D.5). For example, using a 4-cylinder
engine instead of a 6-cylinder engine reduces fuel economy, but also
reduces performance; turbocharging the 4-cylinder engine, though,
produces fuel savings while maintaining performance. The cost estimates
assume turbocharging accompanies engine downsizing. As a result, if the
market for fuel economy is efficient and these
[[Page 62914]]
cost estimates are correct, then the existence of large private net
benefits implies that there would need to be some other changed
qualities, missed in the cost estimates, which would reduce the
benefits consumers receive from their vehicles.
We sought comments that identify any such changed qualities omitted
from the analysis. Some comments asserted that these costs must exist,
because it is implausible that the market would otherwise not provide
all the cost-effective fuel savings found in the rule. In the absence
of identified impacts, though, the conundrum remains. A number of
comments discussed consumer acceptance of the vehicles that will be
built in response to this rule; some expressed worry that people would
not want them, and that they will find their choices of vehicles
limited; others expressed confidence that people will want more fuel-
efficient vehicles and note the increase in choices that will be
available to consumers. We note that the footprint-based standards are
intended to preserve the current range of choice of vehicles, and the
costs of the rule take into account the costs of preserving the current
attributes of those vehicles (see RIA Chapter 1.3). Some comments
suggested that auto makers would substitute improvements in fuel
economy for improvements in other vehicle attributes, such as power.
Though that tradeoff may be true for a given engine or vehicle cost,
those comments do not take into account that it is possible to have
improvements in both fuel economy and other attributes through
applications of additional technologies. Those combinations would
increase vehicle costs. The costs of this rule have been estimated for
vehicles with maintained power, size, and other attributes. Because
increases in power or changes in other vehicle attributes are voluntary
design choices by auto makers, we have not included the costs of those
changes in the rule. If those changes would have taken place in the
absence of the rule, and if those changes would be more expensive for
vehicles with increased fuel economy, then there may be some
incremental costs of these technologies not accounted for in the rule--
the difference in cost, for instance, for greater power with and
without higher fuel economy. In the absence of data to estimate this
effect, we rely on our cost estimates based on holding those other
attributes constant.
The central conundrum observed in this market, that consumers
appear not to purchase products featuring levels of energy efficiency
that are in their economic self-interest, has been referred to as the
Energy Paradox in this setting (and in several others).\797\ There are
many possible reasons discussed in academic research why this might
occur: \798\
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\797\ Jaffe, A.B., and Stavins, R.N. (1994). ``The Energy
Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation Technology.'' Resource and
Energy Economics 16(2), 91-122. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0651.
\798\ For an overview, see Helfand, Gloria and Ann Wolverton,
``Evaluating the Consumer Response to Fuel Economy: A Review of the
Literature.'' International Review of Environmental and Resource
Economics 5 (2011): 103-146, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0652.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consumers might be ``myopic'' and hence undervalue future
fuel savings in their purchasing decisions.
Consumers might lack the information necessary to estimate
the value of future fuel savings, or not have a full understanding of
this information even when it is presented.
Consumer may be accounting for uncertainty in future fuel
savings when comparing upfront cost to future returns.
Consumers may consider fuel economy after other vehicle
attributes and, as such, not optimize the level of this attribute
(instead ``satisficing''--that is, selecting a vehicle that is
acceptable rather than optimal--or selecting vehicles that have some
sufficient amount of fuel economy).
Consumers might be especially averse to the short-term
losses associated with the higher prices of energy efficient products
relative to the future fuel savings (the behavioral phenomenon of
``loss aversion'').
Consumers might associate higher fuel economy with
inexpensive, less well designed vehicles.
When buying vehicles, consumers may focus on visible
attributes that convey status, such as size, and pay less attention to
attributes such as fuel economy that do not visibly convey status.
Even if consumers have relevant knowledge, selecting a
vehicle is a highly complex undertaking, involving many vehicle
characteristics. In the face of such a complicated choice, consumers
may use simplified decision rules.
In the case of vehicle fuel efficiency, and perhaps as a
result of one or more of the foregoing factors, consumers may have
relatively few choices to purchase vehicles with greater fuel economy
once other characteristics, such as vehicle class, are chosen.\799\
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\799\ For instance, in MY 2010, the range of fuel economy
(combined city and highway) available among all listed 6-cylinder
minivans was 18 to 20 miles per gallon. With a manual-transmission
4-cylinder minivan, it is possible to get 24 mpg. See http://www.fueleconomy.gov, which is jointly maintained by the U.S.
Department of Energy and the EPA.
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A great deal of work in behavioral economics identifies and
elaborates factors of this sort, which help account for the Energy
Paradox.\800\ This paradox is found in the context of fuel savings (the
main focus here), but it applies equally to the other private benefits,
including reductions in refueling frequency and additional driving. For
example, it might well be questioned whether significant reductions in
refueling frequency, and corresponding private savings, are fully
internalized when consumers are making purchasing decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\800\ Jaffe, A.B., and Stavins, R.N. (1994). ``The Energy
Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation Technology.'' Resource and
Energy Economics 16(2), 91-122, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0651.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA discussed this issue at length in the MYs 2012-2016 light duty
rulemaking and in the medium- and heavy-duty greenhouse gas rulemaking
(see 75 FR 25510-13; 76 FR 57315-19), as well in as the NPRM and in RIA
Chapter 8.1.2.6. Considerable research indicates that the Energy
Paradox may be a real and significant phenomenon, although the
literature has not reached a consensus about the reasons for its
existence. Studies regularly show that fuel economy plays a role in
consumers' vehicle purchases, but modeling that role is still in
development, and there is no consensus that most consumers make fully
informed tradeoffs.\801\ A review commissioned by EPA finds great
variability in estimates of the role of fuel economy in consumers'
vehicle purchase decisions.\802\ Of 27 studies, significant numbers of
them find that consumers undervalue, overvalue, or value approximately
correctly the fuel savings that they will receive from improved fuel
economy. The variation in the value of fuel economy in these studies is
so high that it appears to be inappropriate to identify one central
estimate of this value from the literature. Thus, estimating consumer
response to higher vehicle fuel economy is still unsettled science.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\801\ Helfand, Gloria and Ann Wolverton, ``Evaluating the
Consumer Response to Fuel Economy: A Review of the Literature.''
International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 5
(2011): 103-146 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0652).
\802\ Greene, David L. ``How Consumers Value Fuel Economy: A
Literature Review.'' EPA Report EPA-420-R-10-008, March 2010 (Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0711).
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EPA requested and received a number of comments discussing the role
of the Energy Paradox in consumer vehicle
[[Page 62915]]
purchase decisions. Some comments argued that it is possible that
consumers rationally discount higher than the 3 and 7 percent rates
used in this rulemaking, because of uncertainty and volatility related
to fuel savings; those comments recommend that those higher rates
should be used in estimating the value of the fuel savings achieved by
the rule. Other comments support the use of 3 and 7 percent as the
discount rates in our analysis of fuel savings as representing the
opportunity costs of capital. We note that the high discount rates
affect how consumers think about fuel savings in the course of buying a
vehicle, and thus may affect vehicle sales (see Section III.H.11), but
do not represent the social opportunity costs of capital that the
discount rate is intended to reflect; we thus continue our use of 3 and
7 percent as the discount rates for fuel savings in the benefit-cost
analysis. Other arguments state that it is unprofitable for
manufacturers to make vehicles with better fuel economy and the vehicle
attributes that consumers desire, because consumers are unwilling to
pay for the fuel-saving technologies; if there are profit-making
opportunities, EPA has not explained why auto makers have not pursued
them. These arguments, which do not come with data or references to
support them, serve to reinforce the existence of the paradox without
explaining it. EPA cannot fully explain why we appear to have
identified possible profit-making opportunities associated with fuel-
saving technologies that the auto makers have historically not adopted.
We agree that the forces of competition would be expected to lead to
auto makers offering these technologies in response to consumer demand.
As discussed in Section III.D.1, though, we do not have a basis to
expect that auto makers will go beyond the standards for MY 2016 in the
absence of this rule. Other comments emphasize the ``positional''
nature of cars and trucks: people buy them as a reflection of their
status, and focus on vehicle attributes, such as size, that visibly
convey that status. These comments argue that consumers may become
better off through reduced incentives to compete on these positional
attributes and perhaps increased incentives to compete on fuel economy.
EPA acknowledges that vehicles can be positional, and appreciates the
possibility that fuel economy may become a more valued attribute for
consumers; at the same time, the positional nature of vehicles may not
be sufficient by itself to explain the energy paradox, and increasing
the visibility of fuel economy as an attribute may not by itself be
sufficient to meet the greenhouse gas standards of this rule. Any
increase in the desirability of fuel economy, though, would be expected
to facilitate meeting those emissions goals. Other comments addressed
consumer heterogeneity: though some will benefit, others may be made
worse off, and a ``one size fits all'' policy reduces consumer options.
We note that the footprint-based standard as well as the numerous
flexibilities in the rule mean that there are many different paths to
compliance that maintain consumer options; we expect no reduction in
consumer choices. Some commenters expressed that the rule would
increase choices through options for advanced technologies. Though some
consumers who drive little may face longer-than-average payback
periods, those who drive more are expected to benefit, with the gains
outweighing the losses.\803\
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\803\ One commenter noted that aggregating consumers'
preferences is a controversial area of economic theory. In fact,
aggregating consumers' preferences is the basis of benefit-cost
analysis and welfare analysis more generally. Though people discuss
the merits of benefit-cost analysis as a decision rule versus a
contribution to a decision, and ethical questions can arise about
the distributional impacts of policies, the practice of aggregating
preferences is quite common.
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EPA and NHTSA recently revised the fuel economy label on new
vehicles in ways intended to improve information for consumers.\804\
For instance, it presents fuel consumption data in addition to miles
per gallon, in response to the concern over the difficulties of
translating mpg into fuel savings; it also reports expected fuel
savings or additional costs relative to an average vehicle. Whether the
new label will help consumers to overcome the energy paradox is not
known at this point. A literature review that contributed to the fuel
economy labeling rule points out that consumers increasingly do a great
deal of research on the internet before going to an auto dealer.\805\
To the extent that the label improves consumers' understanding of the
value of fuel economy, purchase decisions could change. At least until
the newly revised labels enter the marketplace with MY 2013 vehicles
(or optionally sooner), the agencies may not be able to determine how
vehicle purchase decisions are likely to change as a result of the new
labels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\804\ Environmental Protection Agency and Department of
Transportation, ``Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel
Economy Label,'' Federal Register 76(129) (July 6, 2011): 39478-
39587.
\805\ PRR, Inc., ``Environmental Protection Agency Fuel Economy
Label: Literature Review.'' EPA-420-R-10-906, August 2010, available
at http://www.epa.gov/fueleconomy/label/420r10906.pdf 2010 (Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0712).
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If there is a difference between expected fuel savings and
consumers' willingness to pay for those fuel savings, the next question
is, which is the appropriate measure of consumer benefit? Fuel savings
measure the actual monetary value that consumers will receive after
purchasing a vehicle; the willingness to pay for fuel economy measures
the value that, before a purchase, consumers place on additional fuel
economy. As noted, there are a number of reasons that consumers may
incorrectly estimate the benefits that they get from improved fuel
economy, including risk or loss aversion, and poor ability to calculate
savings. Also as noted, fuel economy may not be as salient as other
vehicle characteristics when a consumer is considering vehicles. If
these arguments are valid, then there will be significant gains to
consumers of the government mandating additional fuel economy. Several
commenters specifically supported this argument in support of using
expected future fuel savings in the benefit-cost analysis. Other
comments argued that consumers are willing to pay only 25 percent of
expected future fuel savings, and that that value should be used in the
benefit-cost analysis,\806\ while also arguing against the existence of
the energy paradox.\807\ We note, again, the difference between what
consumers think about when they buy their vehicles (which may not be
expected future fuel savings) and what they will experience once they
have bought their vehicles.
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\806\ The comment that consumers are willing to pay for only 25
percent of expected future fuel savings is based on a study, not of
consumer preferences, but rather of vehicle technology
(Bandivadekar, Anup, et al. (July 2008). On the Road in 2035:
Reducing Transportation's Petroleum Consumption and GHG Emissions,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory for Energy and the
Environment Report No. LFEE 2008-05 RP, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-
0736); it is based on a comparison of the fuel-saving technology
that auto companies provide in European vs. U.S. vehicles.
Technology tradeoffs do not estimate consumer behavior, unless auto
manufacturers perfectly understand and respond to consumer desires.
Using the technology tradeoffs to measure consumer behavior is
additionally unnecessary and inappropriate because a number of
studies specifically examine consumer behavior for fuel economy;
see, e.g., Greene's review in note 802, above.
\807\ These two statements are contradictory. The existence of
the energy paradox is based on comparing consumer willingness to pay
for fuel savings with the expected fuel savings they will receive.
If consumers are willing to pay for only 25% of fuel savings, they
undervalue fuel savings, and there is an energy paradox; if they do
not undervalue fuel savings, and there is no energy paradox, they
are willing to pay for 100% of fuel savings.
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[[Page 62916]]
While acknowledging the conundrum, EPA continues to value fuel
savings from the standards using the projected market value over the
vehicles' entire lifetimes, and to report that value among private
benefits of the rule. Improved fuel economy will significantly reduce
consumer expenditures on fuel, thus benefiting consumers. Real money is
being saved and accrued by the initial buyer and by subsequent owners.
We note that comments arguing for use of less than fuel savings did not
dispute the existence of those fuel savings, but only how to estimate
their value; we continue to use the market valuation rather than the
subjective preference at the time of vehicle purchase. In addition to
these other factors, using a measure based on consumer consideration at
the time of vehicle purchase would involve a very wide range of
uncertainty, due to the lack of consensus in the relevant literature on
the value of additional fuel economy. Due partly to this factor, it is
true that limitations in modeling affect our ability to estimate how
much of these savings would have occurred in the absence of the rule.
For example, some of the technologies predicted to be adopted in
response to the rule may already be in the deployment process due to
shifts in consumer demand for fuel economy, or due to expectations by
auto makers of future GHG/fuel economy standards. It is possible that
some of these savings would have occurred in the absence of the
standards.\808\ To the extent that greater fuel economy improvements
than those assumed to occur under the baseline may have occurred due to
market forces alone (absent the standards), the analysis overestimates
private and social benefits and also overestimates the rule's costs. As
discussed below, limitations in modeling also affect our ability to
estimate the effects of the rule on net benefits in the market for
vehicles.
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\808\ However, as discussed at section III.D.1 above, the
assumption of a flat baseline absent this rule rests on strong
historic evidence of lack of increase in fuel economy absent either
regulatory control or sharply rising fuel prices.
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Consumer vehicle choice models estimate what vehicles consumers buy
based on vehicle and consumer characteristics. In principle, such
models could provide a means of understanding both the role of fuel
economy in consumers' purchase decisions and the effects of this rule
on the benefits that consumers will get from vehicles. Helfand and
Wolverton discuss the wide variation in the structure and results of
these models.\809\ Models or model results have not frequently been
systematically compared to each other. When they have, the results show
large variation over, for instance, the value that consumers place on
additional fuel economy.
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\809\ Helfand, Gloria and Ann Wolverton, ``Evaluating the
Consumer Response to Fuel Economy: A Review of the Literature.''
International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 5
(2011): 103-146 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0652).
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In order to develop greater understanding of these models, EPA has
developed a preliminary vehicle choice model. As described in the NPRM,
it uses a ``nested logit'' structure common in the vehicle choice
modeling literature. ``Nesting'' refers to the decision-tree structure
of buyers' choices among vehicles the model employs, and ``logit''
refers to the specific pattern by which buyers' choices respond to
differences in the overall utility that individual vehicle models and
their attributes provide.\810\ The nesting structure in EPA's model
involves a hierarchy of choices. For instance, at the initial decision
node, consumers choose between buying a new vehicle or not. Conditional
on choosing a new vehicle, consumers then choose among passenger
vehicles, cargo vehicles, and ultra-luxury vehicles. After two more
nodes, at the bottom are the individual models. At this bottom level,
vehicles that are similar to each other end up in the same nest; for
example, two such nests are standard subcompacts and prestige large
vehicles. Substitution within a nest is considered much more likely
than substitution across nests, because the vehicles within a nest are
more similar to each other than vehicles in different nests. For
instance, a person is more likely to substitute between a Chevrolet
Aveo and a Toyota Yaris (both subcompacts) than between an Aveo and a
pickup truck. In addition, substitution is greater at low decision
nodes (such as individual vehicles) than at higher decision nodes (such
as the buy/no buy decision), because there are more choices at lower
levels than at higher levels. Parameters for the model (including
demand elasticities and the value of fuel economy in purchase
decisions) are based on a review of values found in the literature on
vehicle choice modeling. Additional discussion of this model can be
found in Chapter 8.1.2.8 of the RIA and in the model
documentation.\811\
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\810\ Logit refers to a statistical analysis method used for
analyzing the factors that affect discrete choices (i.e., yes/no
decisions or the choice among a countable number of options).
\811\ Greene, David L., and Changzheng Liu (March 2012).
``Consumer Vehicle Choice Model Documentation.'' Prepared for the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by Oak Ridge National
Laboratory. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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In the peer review of EPA's model, the reviewers found the basic
structure of the model to be reasonable, while pointing out, first,
that its use in policy analysis depended on its integration with OMEGA,
and second, that conducting uncertainty analysis would be important
given the uncertainties around the model's parameters.\812\ These are
valuable suggestions for next steps in the modeling process, now that a
preliminary model has been developed.
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\812\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. ``Peer Review for
the Consumer Vehicle Choice Model and Documentation.'' Office of
Transportation and Air Quality, Assessment and Standards Division,
EPA-420-R-12-013, April 2012. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
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In the NPRM, EPA asked for comments on the use of vehicle choice
modeling for predicting changes in sales mix, and on methods to test
the predictive abilities of models. See 76 FR 75116. Several commenters
expressed concern that consumer choice models are too uncertain to be
used in policy making. One comment argued that the rulemaking should
not continue if the agencies do not use vehicle choice models that have
been subject to public comment and peer review, to reflect consumer
acceptability. As discussed in greater detail in Section 18.1 of the
Response to Comment Document, we disagree that the rulemaking requires
the use of vehicle choice models. Because the predictive ability of
these models has not been well tested, the quality of the information
that would come from a vehicle choice model is not well understood.
Instead, we provide here and in Section III.H.11(a) thorough discussion
of the effects of the rule on consumer welfare and on vehicle sales.
EPA agrees with some commenters that there is yet much to learn
about consumer vehicle choice models and their predictive abilities.
EPA is therefore not using its preliminary consumer choice model in
this rulemaking because we believe it needs further development and
testing before we have confidence in its use and results. As the peer
review noted, it has not yet been integrated with OMEGA, an important
step for ensuring that changes in the vehicle fleet estimated by the
model will result in a fleet compliant with the standards. In addition,
concerns remain that vehicle choice models have rarely been validated
against real-world data. In response to these concerns, we would expect
any use of the model to involve, at the least,
[[Page 62917]]
a number of sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of results
to key parameters. We will continue model development and testing to
understand better the results and limitations of using the model.
The next issue is the potential for loss in consumer welfare due to
the rule. As mentioned above (and discussed more thoroughly in Section
III.D.3 of this preamble), the technology cost estimates developed here
for conventional vehicles take into account the costs to hold other
vehicle attributes, such as size and performance, constant.\813\ In
addition, the analysis assumes that the full technology costs are
passed along to consumers. With these assumptions, because paying the
consumers back the technology costs would completely compensate them
for their losses,\814\ the price increase measures the loss to the
buyer.\815\ Assuming that the full technology cost gets passed along to
the buyer as an increase in price, the technology cost thus measures
the welfare loss to the consumer. Increasing fuel economy would have to
lead to other changes in the vehicles that consumers find undesirable
for there to be additional losses not bounded by the technology costs.
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\813\ If the reference-case vehicles include different vehicle
characteristics, such as improved acceleration or towing capacity,
then the costs for the standards would be, as here, the costs of
adding compliance technologies to those reference-case vehicles.
These costs may differ from those estimated here, due to our lack of
information on how those vehicle characteristics might change
between now and 2025.
\814\ This approach describes the economic concept of
compensating variation, a payment of money after a change that would
make a consumer as well off after the change as before it. A related
concept, equivalent variation, estimates the income change that
would be an alternative to the change taking place. The difference
between them is whether the consumer's point of reference is her
welfare before the change (compensating variation) or after the
change (equivalent variation). In practice, these two measures are
typically very close together for marketed goods.
\815\ Indeed, it is likely to be an overestimate of the loss to
the consumer, because the consumer has choices other than buying the
same vehicle with a higher price; she could choose a different
vehicle, or decide not to buy a new vehicle. The consumer would
choose one of those options only if the alternative involves less
loss than paying the higher price. Thus, the increase in price that
the consumer faces would be the upper bound of loss of consumer
welfare, unless there are other changes to the vehicle due to the
fuel economy improvements, unaccounted for in the costs, that make
the vehicle less desirable to consumers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Electric Vehicles and Other Advanced Technology Vehicles
The analysis of this rule finds that alternative-fuel vehicles,
especially electric vehicles (EVs), may form a part (albeit limited) of
some manufacturers' compliance strategies. The following discussion
will focus on EVs, because they are expected to play more of a role in
compliance than vehicles with other alternative fuels, but related
issues may arise for other alternative fuel vehicles. It should be
noted that EPA's projection of the penetration of EVs in the MY 2025
fleet is very small (under 3%).
Electric vehicles (EVs), at the time of this rulemaking, have very
different refueling infrastructures than conventional gasoline- or
diesel-fueled vehicles: refueling EVs requires either access to
electric charging facilities or battery replacement. In addition,
because of the expense of increased battery capacity, EVs commonly have
a smaller driving range than conventional vehicles. Because of these
differences, the vehicles cannot be considered conventional vehicles
unmodified except for cost and fuel economy. As a result, the consumer
welfare arguments presented above may need adjustments to account for
these differences.
Comments differed on consumer attitudes toward EVs. The National
Automobile Dealers Association and some fuels-related organizations
argued that consumers are likely to hesitate to buy even hybrid
electric vehicles, in part because they like vehicles that are familiar
to them, and it is risky to depend on EVs to meet the standards of this
program. Some fuels organizations pointed to low sales of existing EVs
and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) as evidence of consumer
unwillingness to consider these vehicles, and thus as evidence that the
standards are too stringent because they rely on electrification. We
note that electrification is an option for compliance but is not
required under this rule (and indeed, EPA projects minimal penetration
of electrification as the likely compliance path even for the MY 2025
standards, as documented in section III.D.6.c above). Others note the
expense of EVs. Environmental and consumer organizations argue that
there are reasons to be optimistic about consumer adoption of these
vehicles because consumers may appreciate their low or zero gasoline
consumption. EPA recognizes all these as possibilities in response to
this rule. Many of the organizations skeptical of EVs expressed concern
that the rule would reduce vehicle choices for consumers, by requiring
people to buy more fuel-efficient vehicles when they might otherwise
not choose them. Those optimistic about EVs said that choices were
expected to increase, because consumers could choose between
conventional and alternative fuel vehicles.
A first important point to observe in response to these concerns is
that, although auto makers are required to comply with the standards,
producing EVs as a compliance strategy is not required. Auto makers
will choose to provide EVs either if they have few alternative ways to
comply, or if EVs are, for some range of production, likely to be more
profitable (or less unprofitable) than other ways of complying.
From the consumer perspective, it is important to observe that
there is no mandate for any consumer to choose any particular kind of
vehicle. An individual consumer will buy an EV only if the price and
characteristics of the vehicle make it more attractive to her than
other vehicles. If the range of vehicles in the conventional fleet does
not shrink, the availability of EVs should not reduce consumer welfare
compared to a fleet with no EVs: increasing options should not reduce
consumer well-being, because other existing options still are
available. On the other hand, if the variety of vehicles in the
conventional market does change, there may be consumers who may need to
substitute to alternative vehicles. The use of the footprint-based
standard is intended in part to help maintain the diversity of vehicle
sizes. Because the agencies do not expect any vehicle classes to become
unavailable, consumers who buy EVs therefore are expected to choose
them voluntarily, in preference to the other vehicles available to
them.
From a practical perspective, the key issue is whether the consumer
demand for EVs is large enough to absorb all the EVs that automakers
will produce in order to comply with these standards, or whether
automakers will need to increase consumer purchases by providing
subsidies to consumers. If enough consumers find EVs more attractive
than other vehicles, and automakers therefore do not need to subsidize
their purchase, then both consumers and producers will benefit from the
introduction of EVs. On the other hand, it is possible that automakers
will find EVs to be part of a cost-effective compliance technology but
nevertheless need to price them below cost them to sell sufficient
numbers. If so, then there is a welfare loss associated with the sale
of EVs beyond those that would be sold in the free market. While it is
theoretically possible to quantify such a welfare loss, the data needed
to support such a calculation is not available at this time. To
quantify this value, the deadweight loss can be approximated as one-
half of the size of the subsidy needed for the
[[Page 62918]]
marginal purchaser, times the number of sales that would need the
subsidy.\816\ Estimating this value would require knowing the number of
sales necessary beyond the expected sales level in an unregulated
market, and the amount of the subsidy that would be necessary to induce
the desired number of sales. Given the fledgling state of the market
for EVs, neither of these values is easily knowable for the 2017 to
2025 time frame.
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\816\ This calculation approximately measures the area between
the supply and demand curves for these vehicles when the number sold
exceeds the equilibrium value. The supply curve approximately
measures the costs of producing the vehicles, and the demand curve
estimates how much consumers are willing to pay for the vehicles.
The measure described here estimates the difference between the
extra cost for these excess vehicles and their value to their
buyers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of factors will affect the likelihood of consumer
acceptance of EVs. People with short commutes may find little obstacle
in the relatively short driving range, but others who regularly drive
long distances may find EVs' ranges limiting. The reduced tailpipe
emissions and reduced noise may be attractive features to some
consumers.\817\ Recharging at home could be a convenient, desirable
feature for people who have garages with electric charging capability,
but not for people who park on the street. If an infrastructure
develops for recharging vehicles with the convenience approaching that
of buying gasoline, limited range or lack of home recharging may become
less of a barrier to purchase. Of course, other attributes of the
marketed EVs, such as their cost, performance, and their passenger and
storage capacity, will also affect the share of consumers who will
consider them. As infrastructure, EV technology, and costs evolve over
time, consumer interest in EVs will adjust as well. Thus, modeling
consumer response to advanced technology vehicles in the 2017-2025 time
frame poses even more challenges than those associated with modeling
consumer response for conventional vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\817\ For instance, Hidrue et al. (Hidrue, Michael K., George R.
Parsons, Willett Kempton, and Meryl P. Gardner. ``Willingness to Pay
for Electric Vehicles and their Attributes.'' Resource and Energy
Economics 33(3) (2011): 686-705 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)) find
that some consumers are willing to pay $5100 for vehicles with 95%
lower emissions than the vehicles they otherwise aim to purchase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because range is a major factor in EV acceptability, it is starting
to draw attention in the research community. For instance, several
studies have examined consumers' willingness to pay for increased
vehicle range. Results vary, depending on when the survey was conducted
(studies from the early 1990s have much higher values than more recent
studies) and on household income and other demographic factors; some
find range to be statistically indistinguishable from zero, while
others find the value of increasing range from 150 to 300 miles to be
as much as $59,000 (2010$) (see RIA Chapter 8.1.2.7 for more
discussion).
Other research has examined how the range limitation may affect
driving patterns. Pearre et al. observed daily driving patterns for 484
vehicles in the Atlanta area over a year.\818\ In their sample, 9
percent of vehicles never exceeded 100 miles in one day, and 21 percent
never exceeded 150 miles in one day. Lin and Greene compared the cost
of reduced range to the cost of additional battery capacity for
EVs.\819\ They find that an ``optimized'' range of about 75 miles would
be sufficient for 98% of days for ``modest'' drivers (those who average
about 25 miles per day); the optimized EV range for ``average'' drivers
(who average about 43 miles per day), close to 120 miles, would meet
their needs on 97 percent of days. Turrentine et al. studied drivers
who leased MINI E EVs (a conversion of the MINI Cooper) for a
year.\820\ They found that drivers adapted their driving patterns in
response to EV ownership: for instance, they modified where they
shopped and increased their use of regenerative braking in order to
reduce range as a constraint. These findings suggest that, for some
consumers, range may be a limiting factor only occasionally. If those
consumers are willing to consider alternative ways of driving long
distances, such as renting a gasoline vehicle or exchanging vehicles
within the household, then limited range may not be a barrier to
adoption for them. These studies also raise the question whether
analysis of EV use should be based on the driving patterns from
conventional vehicles, because consumers may use EVs differently than
conventional vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\818\ Pearre, Nathaniel S., Willett Kempton, Randall L.
Guensler, and Vetri V. Elango. ``Electric vehicles: How much range
is required for a day's driving?'' Transportation Research Part C
19(6) (2011): 1171-1184 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0668).
\819\ Lin, Zhenhong, and David Greene. ``Rethinking FCV/BEV
Vehicle Range: A Consumer Value Trade-off Perspective.'' The 25th
World Battery, Hybrid and Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Symposium and
Exhibition, Shenzhen, China, Nov. 5-9, 2010 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799-0670).
\820\ Turrentine, Tom, Dahlia Garas, Andy Lentz, and Justin
Woodjack. ``The UC Davis MINI E Consumer Study.'' UC Davis Institute
of Transportation Research Report UCD-ITS-RR-11-05, May 4, 2011
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0671).
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EVs themselves are expected to change over time, as battery
technologies and costs develop. In addition, consumer interest in EVs
is likely to change over time, as early adopters share their
experiences. The initial research in the area suggests that consumers
put a high value on increased range, though this value appears to be
changing over time. The research also suggests that some segments of
the driving public may experience little, if any, restriction on their
driving due to range limitations if they were to purchase EVs. At this
time we do not estimate whether the number of people who will choose to
purchase EVs at private-market prices will be more or less than the
number that auto makers are expected to produce to comply with the
standards. As noted above, our projections of technology penetrations
indicate that a very small portion (fewer than 3 percent) of new
vehicles produced in MY 2025 will need to be EVs. For the purposes of
the analysis presented here for this rule, we assume that the consumer
market will be sufficient to absorb the number of EVs expected to be
used for compliance under this rule.
c. Summary
The Energy Paradox, also known as the efficiency gap, raises the
question, why do private markets not provide energy savings that
engineering technology cost analyses find are cost-effective? Though a
number of hypotheses have been raised to explain the paradox, studies
have not been able at this time to identify the relative importance of
different explanations. As a result, it is not possible at this point
to state with any degree of certainty whether the market for fuel
efficiency is operating efficiently, or whether the market has
failings.
For conventional vehicles, the key implication is that the there
may be two different estimates of the value of fuel savings. One value
comes from the engineering estimates, based on consumers' expected
driving patterns over the vehicle's lifetime; the other value is what
the consumer factors into the purchase decision when buying a vehicle.
Although economic theory suggests that these two values should be the
same in a well functioning market, if engineering estimates accurately
measure fuel savings that consumers will experience, the available
evidence does not provide support for that theory. The fuel savings
estimates presented here are based on expected consumers' in-use fuel
consumption rather than the value they estimate at the time that they
consider purchasing a vehicle. Though
[[Page 62919]]
the cost estimates may not have taken into account some changes that
consumers may not find desirable, those omitted costs would have to be
of very considerable magnitude to have a significant effect on the net
benefits of this rule. The costs imposed on the consumer are measured
by the costs of the technologies needed to comply with the standards.
Because the cost estimates have built into them the costs required to
hold other vehicle attributes constant, then, in principle,
compensating consumers for the increased costs would hold them
harmless, even if they paid no attention to the fuel efficiency of
vehicles when making their purchase decisions.
For electric vehicles, and perhaps for other advanced-technology
vehicles, other vehicle attributes are not expected to be held
constant. In particular, their ranges and modes of refueling will be
different from those of conventional vehicles. From a social welfare
perspective, the key question is whether the number of consumers who
will want to buy EVs at their private-market prices will exceed the
number that auto makers are expected to produce to comply with the
standards. If too few consumers are willing to buy them at their
private-market prices, then auto makers may have to subsidize their
prices, if they have no other less costly technologies available to
meet the standards. Though current research finds that consumers
typically have a high value for increasing the range of EVs (and thus
would consider a shorter range a cost of an EV), current research also
suggests that some consumers may find ways to adapt to the shorter
range so that it is less constraining. The technologies, prices,
infrastructure, and consumer experiences associated with EVs are all
expected to evolve between now and when the MY 2017-25 standards take
effect. The analysis in this rule assumes that the consumer market is
sufficient to absorb the expected number of EVs without subsidies.
2. Costs Associated With the Vehicle Standards
In this section, EPA presents our estimate of the costs associated
with the vehicle program. The presentation here summarizes the vehicle
level costs associated with the new technologies expected to be added
to meet the GHG standards, including hardware costs to comply with the
A/C credit program. The analysis summarized here provides our estimate
of incremental costs on a per vehicle basis and on an annual total
basis.
The presentation here summarizes the outputs of the OMEGA model
that was discussed in some detail in Section III.D of this preamble.
For details behind the analysis such as the OMEGA model inputs and the
estimates of costs associated with individual technologies, the reader
is directed to Chapter 1 of the EPA's final RIA and Chapter 3 of the
Joint TSD. For more detail on the outputs of the OMEGA model and the
overall vehicle program costs summarized here, the reader is directed
to Chapters 3 and 5 of EPA's RIA.
With respect to the aggregate cost estimations presented here, EPA
notes that there are a number of areas where the results of our
analysis may be conservative and, in general, EPA believes we have
directionally overestimated the costs of compliance with these new
standards, especially in not accounting for the full range of credit
opportunities available to manufacturers. For example, some cost saving
programs are considered in our analysis, such as full car/truck
trading, while others are not, such as the full suite of available off-
cycle credits.
a. New Technology Costs per Vehicle
To develop technology costs per vehicle, EPA has used the same
methodology as that used in the recent 2012-2016 final rule, the 2010
TAR and the proposal for this rule. Individual technology direct
manufacturing costs have been estimated in a variety of ways--vehicle
and technology tear down, models developed by outside organizations,
and literature review--and indirect costs have been estimated using the
updated and revised indirect cost multiplier (ICM) approach that was
first developed for the 2012-2016 final rule.\821\ All of these
individual technology costs are described in detail in Chapter 3 of the
joint TSD. Also described there are the ICMs used in this rule and the
ways the ICMs have been updated and revised since the 2012-2016 final
rule which results in considerably higher indirect costs in this rule
than estimated in the 2012-2016 final rule. Further, we describe in
detail the adjustments to technology costs to account for manufacturing
learning and the cost reductions that result from that learning. We
note here that learning impacts are applied only to direct
manufacturing costs which differs from the 2012-2016 final rule which
applied learning to both direct and indirect costs. Learning effects in
this final rule are applied exactly as was done in the proposal.
Lastly, we have included costs associated with stranded capital (i.e.,
capital investments that are not fully recaptured by auto makers
because they would be forced to update vehicles on a more rapid
schedule than they may have intended absent this rule). Again, this is
detailed in Chapter 3 of the joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\821\ The ICM approach was updated for the proposal and has not
changed for this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We requested comment on all aspects of our technology cost
analysis--the DMCs themselves, the ICMs, learning effects, etc. We
received a comment from NADA that our ICMs were too low and that we
should use a Retail Price Equivalent (RPE) approach to estimating
indirect costs rather than the ICM approach.\822\ Using the RPE
approach would result in all indirect costs incurred by industry
increasing due to regulatory demands. In contrast, the ICM approach
results in a subset of all indirect costs increasing--the subset of
indirect costs that are tied to changes in regulatory demands. For
example, healthcare costs of currently retired employees would not be
expected to increase due to a new regulation. An RPE approach would
estimate increased healthcare costs for retired employees while an ICM
approach would not. Further, the NADA comment suggested that an RPE
factor of 2x was most appropriate, despite industry filings to the
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) that support a factor of
1.5x.\823\ EPA disagrees with both of these comments, as discussed in
more detail in Chapter 3.1.2.2 of the Joint TSD.
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\822\ See NADA (Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575, at page
4).
\823\ Rogozhin, Alex, Michael Gallaher, Gloria Helfand, and
Walter McManus, ``Using Indirect Cost Multipliers to Estimate the
Total Cost of Adding New Technology in the Automobile Industry.''
International Journal of Production Economics 124 (2010): 360-368.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We received comments from ICCT that our ICM approach was more
appropriate than an RPE approach, and that our updated method of
applying ICMs to estimate indirect costs was much more appropriate than
our old approach (i.e., delinking indirect costs and learning
effects).\824\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\824\ See ICCT (EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472-7156, at page 19).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We did not receive comments on our approach to manufacturer
learning. We did not receive any specific comments suggesting that our
estimates of technology direct manufacturing costs were inappropriately
high or low.
EPA used the technology costs to build GHG and fuel consumption
reducing packages of technologies for each of 19 different vehicle
types meant to fully represent the range of baseline vehicle
technologies in the marketplace (i.e., number of cylinders, valve train
[[Page 62920]]
configuration, vehicle class, etc.). This package building process as
well as the process we use to determine the most cost effective
packages for each of the 19 vehicle types is summarized in Section
III.D.3 of this preamble and is detailed in Chapter 1 of EPA's final
RIA. These packages are then used as inputs to the OMEGA model to
estimate the most cost effective means of compliance with the standards
giving due consideration to the timing required for manufacturers to
implement the needed technologies. That is, we assume that
manufacturers cannot add the full suite of needed technologies in the
first year of implementation. Instead, we expect them to add
technologies to vehicles during the typical 4 to 5 year redesign cycle.
As such, we expect that every vehicle can be redesigned to add
significant levels of new technology every 4 to 5 years. Further, we do
not expect manufacturers to redesign or refresh vehicles at a pace more
rapid than the industry standard four to five year cycle.
The results, including costs associated with the air conditioning
program and estimates of stranded capital as described in Chapter 3 of
the joint TSD, are shown in Table III-72. Not included in the costs
presented in Table III-72 are costs associated with maintenance. We
discuss maintenance costs in Section III.H.2.b, below.
Table III-72--Industry Average Vehicle Costs Associated With the Standards
[2010 dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2030 2040 2050
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$/car........................... $206 $374 $510 $634 $767 $1,079 $1,357 $1,622 $1,726 $1,710 $1,710 $1,710
$/truck......................... 57 196 304 415 763 1,186 1,562 1,914 2,059 2,044 2,044 2,044
Combined........................ 154 311 438 557 766 1,115 1,425 1,718 1,836 1,818 1,816 1,816
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Costs of the National Program
i. Technology Costs
The costs presented here represent the incremental costs for newly
added technology to comply with the program. Together with the
projected increases in car and truck sales, the increases in per-car
and per-truck average costs shown in Table III-72, above result in the
total annual costs presented in Table III-73 below. Note that the costs
presented in Table III-73 do not include the fuel savings that
consumers would experience as a result of driving a vehicle with
improved fuel economy. Those impacts are presented in Section III.H.4.
Similarly, the costs presented in Table III-73 do not include the
maintenance costs that we have estimated in this final rule.
Maintenance costs, presented below, were not included in the proposal.
Note also that the costs presented here represent costs estimated to
occur presuming that the MY 2025 standards would continue in
perpetuity. Any changes to the standards would be considered as part of
a future rulemaking. In other words, the standards would not apply only
to 2017-2025 model year vehicles--they would, in fact, apply to all
2025 and later model year vehicles.
Table III-73--Undiscounted Annual Technology Costs, & Annual Technology Costs Discounted Back to 2012
[millions of 2010 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total annual
Calendar year Cars Truck costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................................................ $2,060 $334 $2,440
2020............................................................ 6,530 2,320 8,860
2030............................................................ 21,400 12,200 33,700
2040............................................................ 24,100 13,300 37,400
2050............................................................ 27,100 14,900 42,000
NPV, 3%......................................................... 336,000 186,000 521,000
NPV, 7%......................................................... 149,000 81,900 231,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual costs represent undiscounted values; net present values represent annual costs discounted to 2012.
Looking at these costs by model year gives us the technology costs
as shown in Table III-74.
Table III-74--Model Year Lifetime Present Value Technology Costs, Discounted Back to the 1st Year of Each MY at 3% and 7% Discount Rates
[Millions of 2010 dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV at 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Sum
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3%............................................. Car.............................. $2,030 $3,650 $5,020 $6,430 $7,940 $11,400 $14,700 $18,000 $19,600 $88,800
Truck............................ 330 1,100 1,670 2,290 4,280 6,670 8,750 10,700 11,600 47,400
Fleet............................ 2,400 4,780 6,720 8,730 12,200 18,100 23,400 28,700 31,200 136,000
7%............................................. Car.............................. 1,990 3,580 4,930 6,320 7,800 11,200 14,400 17,700 19,300 87,200
Truck............................ 323 1,080 1,640 2,250 4,200 6,540 8,590 10,500 11,400 46,500
Fleet............................ 2,360 4,690 6,590 8,570 12,000 17,700 23,000 28,100 30,600 134,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62921]]
ii. Maintenance Costs
New for this final rule is consideration and quantification of
maintenance costs associated with the new technologies added to comply
with the standards. In the proposal, we requested comment on
maintenance and repair costs and whether they might increase or
decrease with the new technologies. We did not receive many comments,
but NADA did comment that the agencies should include maintenance and
repair costs in estimates of total cost of ownership (i.e., in our
payback analyses).\825\ NADA offered their Web site as a place to find
useful information on maintenance and repair costs that might be used
in our final analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\825\ See NADA (EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575, p.10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here we summarize what we have done for the final rule with respect
to maintenance costs. To make clear, we distinguish maintenance from
repair costs as follows: maintenance costs are those costs that are
required to keep a vehicle properly maintained and, as such, are
usually recommended to occur by auto makers on a regular, periodic
schedule. Examples of maintenance costs are oil and air filter changes,
tire replacements, etc. Repair costs are those costs that are
unexpected and, as such, occur randomly and uniquely for every driver,
if at all. Examples of repair costs would be parts replacement
following an accident, turbocharger replacement following a mechanical
failure, etc.
In the joint TSD (see Chapter 3.6), we present our estimates for
maintenance cost impacts along with how we derived them. For most
technologies that we expect will be added to comply with the final
standards, we expect no impact on maintenance costs. In other words,
the new technologies have identical maintenance intervals and identical
costs per interval as the technologies they will replace. However, for
a few technologies, we do expect some maintenance costs changes. As
detailed in the Joint TSD, those technologies expected to result in a
change in maintenance costs are low rolling resistance tires levels 1
and 2 since they cost more than traditional tires and must be replaced
at similar intervals, diesel fuel filters since they must be replaced
more frequently and at higher cost than gasoline fuel filters, and
several items for full EVs (oil changes, air filter changes, engine
coolant flushes, spark plug replacements, etc.) since they do not need
to be done on full EVs.
Using the maintenance costs and intervals presented in the Joint
TSD, we can estimate the annual maintenance cost increases/decreases
for each of these technologies relative to their reference case
gasoline counterparts. Clearly, while in the year 2017 roughly 15-16
million vehicles will be sold, very few of those vehicles will
experience any maintenance costs during their first year despite the
fact that all will have low rolling resistance tires 1 or 2 (the
typical replacement interval for tires is 40,000 miles). As such, the
estimated maintenance costs are comparitively low in the year 2017. As
more compliant vehicles enter the market in subsequent years, the
annual maintenance costs increase as maintenance intervals begin to
result in increasing numbers of vehicles incurring costs. The results
are shown in Table III-75. We provide details of these maintenance
costs in Chapter 5 of our RIA.
Table III-75--Undiscounted Annual Maintenance Costs, and Annual Maintenance Costs Discounted Back to 2012
[Millions of 2010 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total annual
Calendar year Cars Trucks costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................................................ $22 $16 $37
2020............................................................ 199 131 330
2030............................................................ 1,430 836 2,260
2040............................................................ 2,320 1,310 3,630
2050............................................................ 2,860 1,680 4,540
NPV, 3%......................................................... 24,900 14,500 39,500
NPV, 7%......................................................... 9,830 5,760 15,600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual costs represent undiscounted values; net present values represent annual costs discounted to 2012.
We can also look at the costs on a model year basis by looking at
the net present value of costs and savings over the full lifetime of
each model year of vehicles. The net present value lifetime costs and
savings for each MY 2017-2025 are shown in Table III-76.
Table III-76--Model Year Lifetime Present Value Maintenance Costs, Discounted Back to the 1st Year of Each MY at 3% and 7% Discount Rates
[2010 dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV at 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Sum
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3%............................................ Car............................. $222 $406 $600 $819 $1,040 $1,150 $1,250 $1,380 $1,490 $8,360
Truck........................... 153 279 404 534 686 747 810 867 936 5,420
Fleet........................... 375 684 1,000 1,350 1,730 1,890 2,060 2,240 2,430 13,800
7%............................................ Car............................. 172 314 465 634 812 887 977 1,060 1,160 6,480
Truck........................... 118 214 310 411 523 570 620 669 718 4,150
Fleet........................... 290 528 775 1,050 1,330 1,460 1,600 1,730 1,880 10,600
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62922]]
iii. Vehicle Program Costs
Annual costs of the vehicle program are the annual technology costs
shown in Table III-73 and the annual maintenance costs shown in Table
III-75. Those results are shown in Table III-77.
Table III-77--Undiscounted Annual Program Costs, and Annual Costs Discounted Back to 2012
[Millions of 2010 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total annual
Calendar year Cars Trucks costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................................................ $2,080 $350 $2,470
2020............................................................ 6,730 2,450 9,190
2030............................................................ 22,900 13,100 35,900
2040............................................................ 26,400 14,600 41,000
2050............................................................ 29,900 16,600 46,500
NPV, 3%......................................................... 361,000 200,000 561,000
NPV, 7%......................................................... 159,000 87,700 247,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual costs represent undiscounted values; net present values represent annual costs discounted to 2012.
Model year lifetime costs of the vehicle program are the lifetime
technology costs shown in Table III-74 and the lifetime maintenance
costs shown in Table III-76. Those results are shown in Table III-78.
Table III-78--Model Year Lifetime Present Value Program Costs, Discounted Back to the 1st Year of Each MY at 3% and 7% Discount Rates
[Millions of 2010 dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV at 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Sum
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3%............................................ Car............................. $2,250 $4,050 $5,620 $7,250 $8,990 $12,600 $15,900 $19,400 $21,100 $97,200
Truck........................... 483 1,370 2,070 2,820 4,960 7,410 9,560 11,600 12,500 52,800
Fleet........................... 2,770 5,460 7,720 10,100 14,000 19,900 25,400 30,900 33,600 150,000
7%............................................ Car............................. 2,170 3,890 5,400 6,950 8,610 12,100 15,400 18,700 20,400 93,600
Truck........................... 441 1,290 1,950 2,660 4,720 7,110 9,210 11,200 12,100 50,600
Fleet........................... 2,650 5,220 7,370 9,610 13,300 19,200 24,600 29,900 32,500 144,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Cost per Ton of Emissions Reduced
EPA has calculated the cost per ton of GHG reductions associated
with the GHG standards on a CO2eq basis using the annual
program costs presented above and the emissions reductions described in
Section III.F. These values are presented in Table III-79 for cars,
trucks and the combined fleet. The cost per metric ton of GHG emissions
reductions has been calculated in the years 2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050
using the annual vehicle compliance costs and emission reductions for
each of those years. The value in 2050 represents the long-term cost
per ton of the emissions reduced. EPA has also calculated the cost per
metric ton of GHG emission reductions including the savings associated
with reduced fuel consumption (presented below in Section III.H.4).
This latter calculation does not include the other benefits associated
with this program such as those associated with energy security
benefits as discussed later in Section III. By including the fuel
savings, the cost per ton is generally less than $0 since the estimated
value of fuel savings outweighs the program costs.
Table III-79--Annual Cost per Metric Ton of CO2eq Reduced
[2010 dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undiscounted
Calendar Year Undiscounted annual pre-tax Annual CO2eq $/ton $/ton
annual costs Fuel Savings reduction
............... ($millions) ($millions) (mmt) (w/o fuel (w/ fuel
savings) savings)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cars.............................................. 2020 $6,730 $6,000 21 $316 $34
2030 22,900 56,700 179 128 -189
2040 26,400 102,000 300 88 -252
2050 29,900 138,000 374 80 -289
Trucks............................................ 2020 2,450 1,430 6 430 179
2030 13,100 29,700 92 142 -180
2040 14,600 53,400 155 94 -251
2050 16,600 73,700 196 85 -292
Combined.......................................... 2020 9,190 7,430 27 340 65
2030 35,900 86,400 271 132 -186
2040 41,000 155,000 455 90 -251
2050 46,500 212,000 569 82 -291
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62923]]
4. Reduction in Fuel Consumption and its Impacts
a. What Are the Projected Changes in Fuel Consumption?
The CO2 standards will result in significant
improvements in the fuel efficiency of affected vehicles. Drivers of
those vehicles will see corresponding savings associated with reduced
fuel expenditures. EPA has estimated the impacts on fuel consumption
for both the tailpipe CO2 standards and the A/C credit
program. While gasoline consumption would decrease under the GHG
standards, electricity consumption would increase slightly due to the
small penetration of EVs and PHEVs (1-3% for the 2021 and 2025 MYs).
The fuel savings includes both the gasoline consumption reductions and
the electricity consumption increases. Note that the total number of
miles that vehicles are driven each year is different under the control
case than in the reference case due to the ``VMT rebound effect,''
which is discussed in Section III.H.4.c and in Chapter 4 of the joint
TSD. EPA also notes that consumers who drive more than our average
estimates for vehicle miles traveled (VMT) will experience more fuel
savings; consumers who drive less than our average VMT estimates will
experience less fuel savings.
The expected impacts on fuel consumption are shown in Table III-80.
The gallons reduced and kilowatt hours increased (kWh) as shown in the
tables reflect impacts from the CO2 standards, including the
A/C credit program, and include increased consumption resulting from
the VMT rebound effect.
Table III-80--Fuel Consumption Impacts of the Standards and A/C Credit Programs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum-based
Calendar year gasoline Petroleum-based Electricity
reference gasoline reduced increased
(million gallons) (million gallons) (million kWh) \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017................................................... 128,136 197 125
2020................................................... 124,513 2,149 1,242
2030................................................... 129,995 22,986 14,026
2040................................................... 150,053 38,901 24,661
2050................................................... 177,323 48,743 30,943
--------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................................. 5,464,349 903,298 564,873
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Electricity increase by vehicles not by power plants.
b. What are the Fuel Savings to the Consumer?
Using the fuel consumption estimates presented in Section
III.H.4.a, EPA can calculate the monetized fuel savings associated with
the standards. To do this, we multiply reduced fuel consumption in each
year by the corresponding estimated average fuel price in that year,
using the reference case taken from the AEO 2012 Early Release.\826\
These estimates do not account for the significant uncertainty in
future fuel prices; the monetized fuel savings would be understated if
actual future fuel prices are higher (or overstated if fuel prices are
lower) than estimated. AEO is a standard reference used by NHTSA and
EPA and many other government agencies to estimate the projected price
of fuel. This has been done using both the pre-tax and post-tax
gasoline prices. Since the post-tax gasoline prices are the prices paid
at fuel pumps, the fuel savings calculated using these prices represent
the savings consumers would see. The pre-tax fuel savings are those
savings that society would see. Assuming no change in gasoline tax
rates, the difference between these two columns represents the
reduction in fuel tax revenues that will be received by state and
federal governments--about $85 million in 2017 and $4.7 billion by
2025. These results are shown in Table III-81. Note that in Section
III.H.9, the overall benefits and costs of the rule are presented and,
for that reason, only the pre-tax fuel savings are presented there.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\826\ In the Executive Summary to AEO2012 Early Release, the
Energy Information Administration describes the reference case. They
state that, ``Projections * * * in the Reference case focus on the
factors that shape U.S. energy markets in the long term, under the
assumption that current laws and regulations remain generally
unchanged throughout the projection period. The AEO2012 Reference
case provides the basis for examination and discussion of energy
market trends and serves as a starting point for analysis of
potential changes in U.S. energy policies, rules, or regulations or
potential technology breakthroughs.''
Table III-81--Undiscounted Annual Fuel Savings, & Annual Fuel Savings Discounted Back to 2012
[Millions of 2010 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gasoline Gasoline Electricity Total fuel Total fuel
Calendar year savings savings costs savings savings
(pre-tax) (taxed) .............. (pre-tax) (taxed)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................ $662 $747 $11.5 $651 $735
2020............................ 7,540 8,440 114 7,430 8,320
2030............................ 87,900 97,000 1,450 86,400 95,500
2040............................ 158,000 172,000 2,800 155,000 169,000
2050............................ 216,000 233,000 3,800 212,000 229,000
NPV, 3%......................... 1,630,000 1,780,000 28,100 1,600,000 1,750,000
NPV, 7%......................... 617,000 677,000 10,600 607,000 666,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual values represent undiscounted values; net present values represent annual costs discounted to 2012.
[[Page 62924]]
As shown in Table III-81, the agencies are projecting that
consumers would realize very large fuel savings as a result of the
standards. As discussed further in the introductory paragraphs of
Section III.H.1, it is a conundrum from an economic perspective that
these large fuel savings have not been provided by automakers and
purchased by consumers. A number of behavioral and market phenomena may
lead to this disparity between the fuel economy that makes financial
sense to consumers and the fuel economy they purchase. Regardless how
consumers make their decisions on how much fuel economy to purchase,
EPA expects that, in the aggregate, they will gain these fuel savings,
which will provide actual money in consumers' pockets.
c. VMT Rebound Effect
The VMT rebound effect refers to the increase in vehicle use that
results if an increase in fuel efficiency lowers the cost per mile of
driving. Consistent with the proposal, EPA is using an estimate of 10
percent for the VMT rebound effect for this final rule (i.e., we assume
a 10 percent decrease in fuel cost per mile from our standards would
result in a 1 percent increase in VMT).
As we discussed in the proposed rule, in the MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking, and more fully in Chapter 4 of the Joint TSD, this value
was not derived from a single point estimate or from a particular
study, but instead represents a reasonable compromise between
historical estimates and projected future estimates. This value is
consistent with the VMT rebound estimate for the most recent time
period analyzed in the Small and Van Dender 2007 paper,\827\ and falls
within the range of the larger body of historical work on the VMT
rebound effect.\828\ Recent work by David Greene on the VMT rebound
effect for light-duty vehicles in the U.S. supports the hypothesis that
the rebound effect is decreasing over time,\829\ which could mean that
rebound estimates based on recent time period data may be more reliable
than historical estimates that are based on older time period data. New
work by Hymel, Small, and Van Dender also supports the proposition that
the VMT rebound effect is declining over time, although the Hymel et
al. estimates are higher than the 2007 Small and Van Dender
estimates.\830\ Furthermore, by using an estimate of the future VMT
rebound effect, analysis by Small and Greene show that the rebound
effect could be in the range of 5 percent or lower.\831\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\827\ Small, K. and K. Van Dender, 2007. ``Fuel Efficiency and
Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect'', The Energy
Journal, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 25-51 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-
0755).
\828\ Sorrell, S. and J. Dimitropoulos, 2007. ``UKERC Review of
Evidence for the Rebound Effect, Technical Report 2: Econometric
Studies'', UKERC/WP/TPA/2007/010, UK Energy Research Centre, London,
October (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
\829\ Greene, David, 2012. ``Rebound 2007: Analysis of National
Light-Duty Vehicle Travel Statistics,'' Energy Policy, vol. 41, pp.
14-28. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
\830\ Hymel, Kent M., Kenneth A. Small, and Kurt Van Dender,
``Induced demand and rebound effects in road transport,''
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Volume 44, Issue 10,
December 2010, Pages 1220-1241, ISSN 0191-2615, DOI: 10.1016/
j.trb.2010.02.007. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
\831\ Report by Kenneth A. Small of University of California at
Irvine to EPA, ``The Rebound Effect from Fuel Efficiency Standards:
Measurement and Projection to 2030'', June 12, 2009 (Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-2010-0799). See also Greene, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We received four comments suggesting values both lower and higher
than our proposed value of the VMT rebound effect. The Consumer
Federation of America suggested that we use 5 percent in our national
analysis since it would better reflect the income effect (consumers
having more money in their pockets to spend on driving) and not the
price effect (consumers wanting to drive more because it costs less)
associated with lower driving costs. The International Council for
Clean Transportation (ICCT) suggested we should rely solely on
projected estimates that account for future incomes and fuel prices,
which tend to be lower than 10 percent for the years covered by this
rule. The Defour Group suggested using an estimate of 20 percent or
higher; it commented that it believes there are potential
methodological shortcomings in recent studies and suggested using the
elasticity of demand for gasoline as a basis for estimating the VMT
rebound effect. Finally Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.
(POP Diesel) cited a recent study in Germany based on household survey
data as evidence that EPA had underestimated the VMT rebound effect.
POP Diesel also suggested that EPA should account for the energy and
GHG emissions impact associated with the so-called ``indirect rebound
effects'' of consumers using their increased disposable income from
fuel savings to purchase goods and services that were produced with
energy or that consume energy. POP Diesel also commented that there is
a potential for consumers to shift to larger, more powerful vehicles
that are less fuel-efficient in response to our standards. POP Diesel
described this as a direct rebound effect; however, since this behavior
does not influence VMT, we would classify it as another type of
indirect effect unrelated to the direct VMT rebound effect.
Commenters did not provide any persuasive new data or analysis that
justify revising the 10 percent value at this time. We relied on a wide
range of peer-reviewed literature to inform our estimate of the VMT
rebound effect (as discussed above and in Chapter 4 of the Joint TSD),
including recent studies and projected estimates as well as a larger
body of historic literature using both aggregate and household level
data. Most of the literature we reviewed controls for income (since all
sources of income, not just income associated with fuel savings, can
influence VMT) and, therefore, only captures the price effect. We
recognize the merit of projected estimates of the VMT rebound effect
that take into account future incomes, fuel efficiency, and fuel prices
over the period impacted by our rulemaking, particularly since recent
studies have found evidence that the VMT rebound effect is declining
over time. Estimates of the elasticity of demand for gasoline, while a
useful point of comparison, are not appropriate for measuring the VMT
rebound effect because they reflect consumer selection of vehicle fuel
efficiency in addition to VMT.\832\ In response to the comment that we
should consider the rebound effect estimates from a German study, we
focused on U.S.-based studies of the VMT rebound effect to inform our
analysis because driver behavior in the U.S. differs from driver
behavior in other countries (e.g., there is likely to be less elastic
demand for VMT in the U.S. than Germany because of longer driving
distances and fewer transportation alternatives).\833\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\832\ We sought comment in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking on using
the elasticity of demand for gasoline to estimate the VMT rebound
effect. We received one comment during that rulemaking, from ICCT,
that this elasticity should not be used to guide the choice of a
value for the VMT rebound effect.
\833\ Frondel, Manuel and Vance, Colin, 2011. ``Re-Identifying
the Rebound--What About Asymmetry?'', Ruhr Economic Papers
276. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are not aware of any data on potential indirect rebound effects
(distinct from the VMT rebound effect), if any, from this rule
associated with consumer purchase of energy-intensive goods and
services with the disposable income they gain from fuel savings.
Research on indirect rebound effects is nascent and POP Diesel did not
provide analysis in its comments indicating an appropriate method or
value to use to estimate these putative effects from our rule. We
believe it is unreasonable to consider potential indirect rebound
effects, if any, from our rule based on
[[Page 62925]]
the commenter's speculative assertions. As to the comment that
consumers may shift to larger, more powerful vehicles that are less
fuel-efficient as a type of indirect rebound response to our standards,
we note that we have explained above that there is persuasive evidence
that the standards do not create an incentive to upsize vehicles and
that the footprint attribute provides incentives to make fuel economy
and greenhouse gas emission improvements across the entire spectrum of
vehicle footprints. See preamble sections III.D.7 (analysis of car and
truck trading) and joint TSD section 2.1. If the comment refers solely
to potential consumer purchasing behavior, we note that predictions of
such behavior are highly uncertain. We recognize that there is a
potential for consumers to shift to larger, more powerful vehicles that
are less fuel-efficient just as there is a potential for consumers to
buy even more fuel-efficient vehicles than we predict in our analysis
\834\; these are potential consumer responses to our standards
(unrelated to the VMT rebound effect) that we plan to monitor (see
Section III.H.1.a for a discussion of the challenge of predicting
consumer vehicle purchase decisions, section II.C and TSD Chapter 2.1
and 2.2. for a discussion of how our rule sets attribute-based
standards that reduce incentives to change the size distribution of
vehicles in the fleet, and section II.B.5 for information on the mid-
term evaluation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\834\ Comments from the Institute for Policy Integrity suggest
our rule could make fuel-efficient vehicles more popular and that we
have therefore underestimated the benefits of our rule (see their
discussion of ``positionality'' and the ``bandwagon effect'' in EPA-
HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 19-21).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We sought comment on the potential that the VMT rebound effect
could be lower than estimates in the literature if drivers respond more
to changes in fuel prices than fuel efficiency, price rises than
decreases, and price shocks than gradual changes (discussed more fully
in Chapter 4.2.5.2 of the Joint TSD), but we did not receive any
comments on these topics. See 76 FR 75126.
We also sought comment on whether there may be differences in the
way consumers respond to changes in the cost per mile of driving that
result from driving an electric-powered vehicle instead of a
conventional gasoline vehicle. We did not receive any comments on this
topic and therefore continue to assume in this final rule that the VMT
rebound effect will be the same whether a consumer is driving a
conventional gasoline vehicle or a vehicle powered by grid electricity.
Chapter 4.2.5 of the Joint TSD reviews the relevant literature and
discusses in more depth the reasoning for the VMT rebound value used
here. The VMT rebound effect is also discussed in Section II.E of the
preamble. A summary of comments on the rebound effect and our more
detailed response to those comments is available in section 15 of EPA's
Response to Comments document.
5. Cost of Ownership, Payback Period and Lifetime Savings on New
Vehicle Purchases
Here we look at the cost of owning a new vehicle complying with the
standards and the payback period--the point at which savings exceed
costs. For example, a new 2025 MY vehicle is estimated to cost roughly
$1,800 more (on average, and relative to the reference case vehicle)
due to the addition of new GHG reducing/fuel economy improving
technology. This new technology will result in lower fuel consumption
and, therefore, savings in fuel expenditures. But how many months or
years would pass before the fuel savings exceed the upfront costs?
Table III-82 presents our estimate of increased costs associated
with owning a new 2025MY vehicle. The table uses annual miles driven
(vehicle miles traveled, or VMT) and survival rates consistent with the
emission and benefits analyses presented in Chapter 4 of the Joint TSD.
The control case includes fuel savings associated with A/C controls.
Newly included here as opposed to our proposed analysis, are estimated
maintenance costs that owners of these vehicles will likely incur.
Further, this analysis does not include other private impacts, such as
reduced refueling events, or other societal impacts, such as the
potential rebound miles driven or the value of driving those rebound
miles, or noise, congestion and accidents, since the focus is meant to
be on those factors consumers think about most while in the showroom
considering a new car purchase and those factors that result in more or
fewer dollars in their pockets. To estimate the upfront vehicle cost
(i.e., the lifetime increased cost discounted back to purchase), we
have included not only the sales tax on the new car purchase but also
the increased insurance premiums that would result from the more
valuable vehicle. Car/truck fleet weighting is handled as described in
Chapter 1 of the Joint TSD. The present value of the increased vehicle
costs shown in the table are $2,389 at a 3% discount rate and $2,300 at
a 7% discount rate.
Table III-82--Increased Costs on a 2025MY New Vehicle Purchase Via Cash (2010$)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative
Increased Increased Increased Total discounted Cumulative
Year of ownership purchase costs insurance maintenance increased increased discounted
\a\ costs costs costs costs at 3% increased
\b\ costs at 7%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1....................................................... -$1,937 -$34 -$14 -$1,984 -$1,984 -$1,984
2....................................................... 0 -33 -13 -46 -2,029 -2,027
3....................................................... 0 -31 -13 -44 -2,070 -2,065
4....................................................... 0 -29 -12 -41 -2,108 -2,099
5....................................................... 0 -28 -12 -39 -2,143 -2,129
6....................................................... 0 -26 -11 -38 -2,175 -2,156
7....................................................... 0 -25 -11 -35 -2,205 -2,179
8....................................................... 0 -23 -10 -33 -2,232 -2,200
[darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr]
NPV, 3%................................................. -1,937 -313 -139 -2,389 -2,389 ..............
NPV, 7%................................................. -1,937 -254 -109 -2,300 .............. -2,300
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ [insert necessary notes].
[[Page 62926]]
However, most people purchase a new vehicle using credit rather
than paying cash up front. A common car loan today is a five year, 60
month loan. The national average interest rate for a 4 or 5 year new
car loan was 5.35 percent.\835\ For the credit purchase, the increased
costs would look like that shown in Table III-83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\835\ ``National Auto Loan Rates for July 21, 2011,'' http://www.bankrate.com/finance/auto/national-auto-loan-rates-for-july-21-2011.aspx, accessed 7/26/11.
Table III-83--Increased Costs on a 2025 MY New Vehicle Purchase Via Credit (2010$)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative Cumulative
Increased Increased Increased Total discounted discounted
Year of ownership purchase costs insurance maintenance increased increased increased
\a\ costs costs costs costs at 3% costs at 7% \
\b\ b\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1....................................................... -$452 -$34 -$14 -$500 -$500 -$500
2....................................................... -452 -33 -13 -497 -982 -964
3....................................................... -452 -31 -13 -495 -1,449 -1,397
4....................................................... -452 -29 -12 -493 -1,900 -1,799
5....................................................... -452 -28 -12 -491 -2,337 -2,174
6....................................................... 0 -26 -11 -38 -2,369 -2,201
7....................................................... 0 -25 -11 -35 -2,399 -2,224
8....................................................... 0 -23 -10 -33 -2,425 -2,245
[darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr]
NPV, 3%................................................. -2,131 -313 -139 -2,583 -2,583 ..............
NPV, 7%................................................. -1,982 -254 -109 -2,345 .............. -2,345
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ This uses the same increased cost as Table III[dash]82 but spreads it out over 5 years assuming a 5 year car loan at 5.35 percent.
\b\ Calculated using AEO 2012 early release reference case fuel prices including taxes.
The above discussion covers costs, but what about the fuel savings
side. Of course, fuel savings are the same whether a vehicle is
purchased using cash or credit. Table III-84 shows the fuel savings for
a 2025MY vehicle while excluding rebound driving.
Table III-84--Fuel Savings for a 2025MY Vehicle (2010$)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative Cumulative
discounted discounted
Year of ownership Fuel price Miles driven Reference fuel Control fuel Fuel savings fuel savings fuel savings
at 3% at 7%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1....................................... $3.87 16,779 $2,407 $1,702 $705 $695 $682
2....................................... 3.91 16,052 2,325 1,644 681 1,347 1,298
3....................................... 3.94 15,539 2,265 1,601 664 1,964 1,859
4....................................... 3.96 14,902 2,183 1,543 640 2,541 2,365
5....................................... 4.00 14,424 2,134 1,508 626 3,089 2,827
6....................................... 4.04 13,941 2,082 1,471 611 3,608 3,248
7....................................... 3.96 13,106 1,912 1,350 562 4,072 3,610
8....................................... 3.96 11,866 1,739 1,229 510 4,480 3,917
[darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr]
NPV, 3%................................. .............. .............. 25,261 17,859 7,402 7,402 ..............
NPV, 7%................................. .............. .............. 19,354 13,680 5,674 .............. 5,674
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Fuel prices include taxes; miles driven exclude rebound miles.
We can now compare the cumulative discounted costs to the
cumulative discounted fuel savings to determine the point at which
savings begin to exceed costs. This comparison is shown in Table III-85
for the 3% discounting case and in Table III-86 for the 7% discounting
case.
Table III-85--Payback Period for Cash & Credit Purchases--3% Discount Rate (2010$)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative Cumulative
discounted discounted Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
Year of ownership increased increased discounted discounted net discounted net
costs--cash costs--credit fuel savings savings--cash savings--credit
purchase\b\ purchase\b\ purchase purchase
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.............................. -$1,984 -$500 $695 -$1,290 $195
2.............................. -2,029 -982 1,347 -682 365
3.............................. -2,070 -1,449 1,964 -106 515
4.............................. -2,108 -1,900 2,541 433 641
5.............................. -2,143 -2,337 3,089 946 752
6.............................. -2,175 -2,369 3,608 1,433 1,239
7.............................. -2,205 -2,399 4,072 1,867 1,673
8.............................. -2,232 -2,425 4,480 2,249 2,055
[[Page 62927]]
[darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr]
NPV, 3%........................ -2,389 -2,583 7,402 5,013 4,819
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-86--Payback Period for Cash & Credit Purchases--7% Discount Rate (2010$)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
discounted discounted Cumulative Cumulative discounted net
Year of ownership increased increased discounted discounted net savings--
costs--cash costs--credit fuel savings savings--cash credit
purchase \b\ purchase \b\ purchase purchase
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............................... -$1,984 -$500 $682 -$1,302 $183
2............................... -2,027 -964 1,298 -729 334
3............................... -2,065 -1,397 1,859 -206 462
4............................... -2,099 -1,799 2,365 266 565
5............................... -2,129 -2,174 2,827 697 653
6............................... -2,156 -2,201 3,248 1,092 1,047
7............................... -2,179 -2,224 3,610 1,431 1,386
8............................... -2,200 -2,245 3,917 1,717 1,672
[darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr] [darr]
NPV, 7%......................... -2,300 -2,345 5,674 3,375 3,330
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III-85 shows that early in the 4th year of ownership (3.2
years), the savings have started to outweigh the costs of the cash
purchase. More interestingly, the savings immediately outweigh the cost
of a credit purchase and, in fact, this is true even in the first month
of ownership when the increased cost on the monthly car loan payment at
$42 and the first month's fuel savings are $59 and, presumably, no
maintenance costs have yet been incurred (none of these values are
shown since the tables present annual values). So, for a new car
purchaser who does not keep the vehicle for the full lifetime, the
increased costs will payback within 4 years. For that rare owner that
keeps the vehicle for its full life, the payback period would be the
point at which the savings outweigh the full lifetime costs which
occurs somewhat later since more costs are being included. For this
case, referring again to Table III-85, we want the point at which the
fuel savings exceed $2,389 or $2,583 for cash and credit purchases,
respectively. Those payback periods would be 3.7 years for the cash
purchase and 4.1 years for the credit purchase. Note that the full
lifetime net savings amount to $5,013 for the cash purchase and $4,819
for the credit purchase. These very large net savings may not be
realized by many individual owners since very few people keep vehicles
for their full lifetime. However, those savings would be realized in
combination by all owners of the vehicle.
Table III-86 shows the same information using a 7 percent discount
rate. Here, the fuel savings being to outweigh the costs in 3.4 years
for the cash purchase and within the first year for the credit
purchase. For the full lifetime owner, the lifetime payback period
would be 3.9 years for the cash purchase and 4.0 years for the credit
purchase. The full lifetime net savings would be $3,375 for the cash
purchase and $3,330 for the credit purchase.
Note that throughout this consumer payback discussion, the analysis
reflects the average number of vehicle miles traveled per year. Drivers
who drive more miles than the average would incur fuel-related savings
more quickly and, therefore, the payback would come sooner. Drivers who
drive fewer miles than the average would incur fuel related savings
more slowly and, therefore, the payback would come later.
Note also that the insurance costs and sales taxes included here in
the cost of ownership analysis have not been included in the benefit-
cost analysis (BCA) because those costs are transfer payments and have
no net impact on the societal costs of interest in a BCA. Likewise, the
fuel savings presented here include taxes since those are the cost
incurred by drivers. However, fuel taxes are not included in the BCA
since, again, they are transfer payments. Lastly, in this cost of
ownership analysis, we have not included rebound miles in determining
maintenance costs or fuel savings, and we have not included other
private benefits/costs such as the value of driving rebound miles or
reduced time spent refueling since we do not believe that consumers
consider such impacts in their daily lives. In the BCA, we always
include rebound miles in estimating maintenance costs and fuel savings,
and we include the other private benefits/costs listed here.
6. CO2 Emission Reduction Benefits
EPA has assigned a dollar value to reductions in CO2
emissions using global estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC) in
the primary benefits analysis for this rule. The SCC is an estimate of
the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon
emissions in a given year. It is intended to include (but is not
limited to) changes in net agricultural productivity, human health,
property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem
services due to climate change. The SCC estimates used in this analysis
were developed through an interagency process that included EPA, DOT/
NHTSA, and other executive branch entities, and concluded in February
2010. The interagency group focused on global SCC values because
emissions of CO2 involve a global externality: Greenhouse
gases contribute to damages around the world wherever they are emitted.
Consequently, to address the global nature of the climate change
problem, the SCC must
[[Page 62928]]
incorporate the full (global) damages caused by GHG emissions.
Furthermore, climate change occurs over very long time horizons and
represents a problem that the United States cannot solve independently.
We first used these SCC estimates in the benefits analysis for the
2012-2016 light-duty GHG rulemaking; see 75 FR 25520. We have continued
to use these estimates in other rulemaking analyses, including the
heavy-duty GHG rulemaking; see 76 FR 57332. The SCC Technical Support
Document (SCC TSD) provides a complete discussion of the methods used
to develop these SCC estimates.\836\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\836\ Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0737, Technical Support
Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under
Executive Order 12866, Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of
Carbon, with participation by Council of Economic Advisers, Council
on Environmental Quality, Department of Agriculture, Department of
Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation,
Environmental Protection Agency, National Economic Council, Office
of Energy and Climate Change, Office of Management and Budget,
Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Department of Treasury
(February 2010). Also available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The interagency group selected four SCC values for use in
regulatory analyses, which we have applied in this analysis: $5, $22,
$37, and $68 per metric ton of CO2 emissions in 2010, in
2010 dollars.\837\ The first three values are based on the average SCC
from three integrated assessment models, at discount rates of 5, 3, and
2.5 percent, respectively. SCCs at several discount rates are included
because the literature shows that the SCC is quite sensitive to
assumptions about the discount rate, and because no consensus exists on
the appropriate rate to use in an intergenerational context. The fourth
value is the 95th percentile of the SCC from all three models at a 3
percent discount rate. It is included to represent higher-than-expected
impacts from temperature change further out in the tails of the SCC
distribution. Low probability, high impact events are incorporated into
all of the SCC values through explicit consideration of their effects
in two of the three models as well as the use of a probability density
function for equilibrium climate sensitivity in all three models.
Treating climate sensitivity probabilistically allows the estimation of
SCC at higher temperature outcomes, which lead to higher projections of
damages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\837\ The SCC estimates were converted from 2008 dollars to 2010
dollars using a GDP price deflator (1.02). (EPA originally updated
the interagency SCC estimates from 2007 to 2008 dollars in the 2012-
2016 light-duty GHG rulemaking using a GDP price deflator of 1.021).
All price deflators were obtained from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 1.1.4, Prices
Indexes for Gross Domestic Product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SCC increases over time because future emissions are expected
to produce larger incremental damages as physical and economic systems
become more stressed in response to greater climatic change. Note that
the interagency group estimated the growth rate of the SCC directly
using the three integrated assessment models rather than assuming a
constant annual growth rate. This helps to ensure that the estimates
are internally consistent with other modeling assumptions. Table III-87
presents the SCC estimates used in this analysis.
When attempting to assess the incremental economic impacts of
carbon dioxide emissions, the analyst faces a number of serious
challenges. A recent report from the National Academies of Science
points out that any assessment will suffer from uncertainty,
speculation, and lack of information about (1) future emissions of
greenhouse gases, (2) the effects of past and future emissions on the
climate system, (3) the impact of changes in climate on the physical
and biological environment, and (4) the translation of these
environmental impacts into economic damages.\838\ As a result, any
effort to quantify and monetize the harms associated with climate
change will raise serious questions of science, economics, and ethics
and should be viewed as provisional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\838\ National Research Council (2009). Hidden Costs of Energy:
Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use. National
Academies Press. See docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0738.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The interagency group noted a number of limitations to the SCC
analysis, including the incomplete way in which the integrated
assessment models capture catastrophic and non-catastrophic impacts,
their incomplete treatment of adaptation and technological change,
uncertainty in the extrapolation of damages to high temperatures, and
assumptions regarding risk aversion. The limited amount of research
linking climate impacts to economic damages makes the interagency
modeling exercise even more difficult. As noted in the SCC TSD, the
interagency group hopes that over time researchers and modelers will
work to fill these gaps and that the SCC estimates used for regulatory
analysis by the Federal government will continue to evolve with
improvements in modeling.
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the Institute for Policy
Integrity (IPI), and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
discussed these limitations and stated that EPA should update the SCC
estimates. These commenters provided specific methodological
recommendations that focused on issues such as discount rate selection,
evaluation of catastrophic impacts and non-monetized impacts, and risk
aversion. EPA has considered each of the commenters' recommendations to
update the SCC estimates and to modify the methodology in the context
of this rulemaking. However, EPA has determined that these
recommendations require additional research, review, and public comment
before we can apply them to a rulemaking context. EPA has therefore
continued to use the SCC estimates developed through the 2009-2010
interagency process in this rulemaking, consistent with the proposal.
See the EPA Response to Comments document, Section 18.4.1, for detailed
responses to these recommendations.
On the other hand, the Institute for Energy Research disagreed with
the use of SCC in general to value GHG benefits, describing it as an
unsupportable metric. EPA disagrees with this comment and notes that
the SCC estimates were developed through an extensive, interagency
process using a defensible set of input assumptions that are grounded
in the existing literature. In this way, key uncertainties and model
differences more transparently and consistently inform the range of SCC
estimates used in the rulemaking process. In addition, these estimates
have been subject to public comment through multiple rulemaking
processes.\839\ See EPA's Response to Comments document for a more
detailed response to this comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\839\ For example, see: (1) EPA/DOT Rulemaking to establish
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards (75 FR 25324; 5/7/10); (2) Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium-
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles (76 FR 57106; 9/15/11); and (3)
Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews (77
FR 49490; August 16, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another limitation of the primary benefits analysis is that it does
not include the valuation of non-CO2 GHG impacts (i.e.,
CH4, N2O, and HFCs). The interagency group did
not directly estimate the social costs of non-CO2 GHG
emissions when it developed the current social cost of CO2
values. One way to approximate the value of marginal non-CO2
GHG emission reductions in the absence of direct model estimates is to
convert the reductions to CO2-equivalents which may then be
valued using the SCC. Conversion to CO2-e is typically done
[[Page 62929]]
using the global warming potential (GWP) for the non-CO2
gas. We refer to this as the ``GWP approach.''
Recognizing that non-CO2 GHG impacts associated with
this rulemaking (net reductions in CH4, N2O, and
HFCs) would provide economic benefits to society, EPA requested comment
on a methodology to value such impacts. The Center for Biological
Diversity, EDF, IPI, and NRDC strongly encouraged EPA to value non-
CO2 GHG impacts associated with this final rule. EDF and
NRDC suggested that EPA use the GWP approach, and EDF also recommended
using direct model estimates and presenting a range of estimates in the
final rule. Aside from the Institute for Energy Research, which
disagreed with use of SCC in general to value GHG impacts, none of the
commenters opposed the valuation of non-CO2 GHG impacts.
While the GWP approach would provide an approximation of the
monetized value of the non-CO2 GHG reductions anticipated
from this rule, for a variety of reasons it produces estimates that are
less accurate than those obtained from direct model computations (see
RIA Chapter 7.1 for detailed discussion). These reasons include the
differences in atmospheric lifetime of non-CO2 gases
relative to CO2. This is a potentially confounding issue
given that the social cost of GHGs is based on a discounted stream of
damages that are non-linear in temperature. For example, CH4
has an expected adjusted atmospheric lifetime of about 12 years and
associated GWP of 25 (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) 100-year GWP
estimate). Gases with a relatively shorter lifetime, such as methane,
have impacts that occur primarily in the near term and thus are not
discounted as heavily as those caused by longer-lived gases, such as
CO2, while the GWP treats additional forcing the same
independent of when it occurs in time. Furthermore, the baseline
temperature change is lower in the near term and therefore the
additional warming from relatively short lived gases will have a lower
marginal impact relative to longer lived gases that have an impact
further out in the future when baseline warming is higher. In addition,
impacts other than temperature change also vary across gases in ways
that are not captured by GWP. For instance, CO2 emissions,
unlike CH4, N2O, or HFCs, will result in
CO2 passive fertilization to plants.
A limited number of studies in the published literature explore the
implications of using a GWP versus a direct estimation approach to
quantify the benefits of changes in non-CO2 GHG emissions
from a given policy.\840\ One recent working paper (Marten and Newbold,
2011), found that the GWP-weighted benefit estimates for CH4
and N2O are likely to be lower than those that would be
derived using a directly modeled social cost of these gases for a
variety of reasons.\841\ The GWP reflects only the integrated radiative
forcing of a gas over 100 years. In contrast, the directly modeled
social cost differs from the GWP because the differences in timing of
the warming between gases are explicitly modeled, the non-linear
effects of temperature change on economic damages are included, and
rather than treating all impacts over a hundred years equally, the
modeled social cost applies a discount rate but calculates impacts
through the year 2300.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\840\ For example: Hope, C. (2005) ``The climate change benefits
of reducing methane emissions.'' Climatic Change, 68(1-2):21-39. See
also Stephanie Waldhoff, David Anthoff, Steven Rose, and Richard
S.J. Tol (2011). The Marginal Damage Costs of Different Greenhouse
Gases: An Application of FUND. Economics Discussion Papers, No 2011-
43, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2011-43.
\841\ Marten, A. and S. Newbold. 2011. ``Estimating the Social
Cost of Non-CO2 GHG Emissions: Methane and Nitrous
Oxide.'' NCEE Working Paper Series 11-01. http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/WPNumber/2011-01?opendocument.
Accessed May 24, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the absence of direct model estimates from the interagency
analysis, EPA has used the GWP approach to estimate the dollar value of
the non-CO2 benefits of this rule in a sensitivity analysis.
Specifically, the EPA converted each non-CO2 GHG
(CH4, N2O, HFC-134a) to CO2
equivalents using the GWP of each gas, then multiplied these
CO2 equivalent emission reductions by the social cost of
carbon developed by the 2009-2010 interagency process. EPA has
presented these estimates for illustrative purposes in a sensitivity
analysis, i.e., the estimates are not included in the total benefit
estimate of this rulemaking. EPA views the GWP approach as an interim
method for analysis until we develop values for non-CO2
GHGs. EPA also recently used this approach to estimate the
CH4 co-benefits in a sensitivity analysis for the New Source
Performance Standards final rule for oil and gas exploration.\842\ The
methane co-benefits were presented for illustrative purposes and
therefore not included in the total benefit estimate for the
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\842\ EPA signed final rule on 4/17/12; publication of the
official version in the Federal Register is forthcoming. For
internet version of final rule, see http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417finalrule.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applying the global SCC estimates, shown in Table III-87, to the
estimated reductions in CO2 emissions under the final
standards, we estimate the dollar value of the CO2-related
benefits for our primary benefits analysis (see EPA's RIA for estimates
in each year). For internal consistency, the annual benefits are
discounted back to net present value terms using the same discount rate
as each SCC estimate (i.e., 5%, 3%, and 2.5%) rather than 3% and
7%.\843\ These estimates are provided in Table III-88.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\843\ It is possible that other benefits or costs of final
regulations unrelated to CO2 emissions will be discounted
at rates that differ from those used to develop the SCC estimates.
Table III-87--Social Cost of CO2, 2017-2050 \a\
[in 2010 dollars per metric ton]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discount rate and statistic
---------------------------------------------------------------
Year 3% 95th
5% Average 3% Average 2.5% Average Percentile
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................................ $6 $26 $41 $79
2020............................................ 7 27 43 84
2030............................................ 10 34 52 104
2040............................................ 13 41 61 124
2050............................................ 16 47 68 142
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ The SCC values are dollar-year and emissions-year specific.
[[Page 62930]]
Table III-88--Undiscounted Annual Monetized CO2 Benefits of Vehicle Program, Annual CO2 Emission Reductions \a\
and CO2 Benefits Discounted Back to 2012
[Dollar values in millions of 2010$]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits
---------------------------------------------------------------
CO2 emissions 95th
Year reduction Avg SCC at 5% Avg SCC at 3% Avg SCC at percentile SCC
(MMT) ($6-$16) \a\ ($26-$47) \a\ 2.5% ($41-$68) at 3% ($79-
\a\ $142) \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................ 2.1 $14 $55 $87 $167
2020............................ 23.1 164 633 1,000 1,940
2030............................ 246.7 2,500 8,410 12,900 25,700
2040............................ 417.0 5,510 17,000 25,400 51,800
2050............................ 522.4 8,540 24,400 35,400 74,100
Net Present Value \b\....... .............. 32,400 170,000 290,000 519,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Except for the last row (net present value), the SCC values are dollar-year and emissions-year specific.
\b\ Net present value of reduced CO2 emissions is calculated differently from other benefits. The same discount
rate used to discount the value of damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, 2.5 percent) is used to
calculate net present value of SCC for internal consistency. Refer to the SCC TSD for more detail.
We also apply the GWP approach in a sensitivity analysis to
estimate the benefits associated with reductions of three non-
CO2 GHGs. Estimates are given for illustrative purposes and
represent the CO2-e estimate of CH4,
N2O, and HFC reductions multiplied by the SCC estimates
(``GWP approach''), as described further above. CO2-e is
calculated using the AR4 100-year GWP of each gas: CH4 (25),
N2O (298), and HFC-134a (1,430).\844\ The total net present
value of the annual 2017 through 2050 GHG benefits for this rulemaking
would increase by about $3 billion to $50 billion, depending on
discount rate used for the SCC estimate, or roughly 10 percent if these
non-CO2 estimates were included (an amount which is small in
the context of the total costs and benefits considered in this rule,
and which would not affect any of the decisions regarding the
appropriateness of the standards EPA is adopting here). The estimates
are provided in the table below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\844\ As in the MY 2012-2016 LD rules and in the MY 2014-2018 MD
and HD rule, the global warming potentials (GWP) used in this
rulemaking are consistent with the 100-year time frame values in the
2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth
Assessment Report (AR4). At this time, the 100-year GWP values from
the 1995 IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) are used in the
official U.S. GHG inventory submission to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (per the reporting
requirements under that international convention). The UNFCCC
recently agreed on revisions to the national GHG inventory reporting
requirements, and will begin using the 100-year GWP values from AR4
for inventory submissions in the future. According to the AR4,
CH4 has a 100-year GWP of 25, N2O has a 100-
year GWP of 298, and HFC-134a has a 100-year GWP of 1430.
Table III-89--Undiscounted Annual Monetized Non-CO2 GHG Benefits of MY 2017-2025 Standards in Annual CO2
Equivalents \a\ and CO2 Equivalents Benefits Discounted Back to 2012
[Dollar values in millions of 2010$]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits
Non-CO2 GHG ---------------------------------------------------------------
emissions 95th
Year reduction (MMT Avg SCC at 5% Avg SCC at 3% Avg SCC at percentile SCC
CO2-e) ($6-$16) \a\ ($26-$47) \a\ 2.5% ($41-$68) at 3% ($79-
\a\ $142) \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................ 0.28 $2 $7 $12 $22
2020............................ 3.92 28 107 170 330
2030............................ 24.6 250 838 1,280 2,560
2040............................ 38.0 503 1,550 2,310 4,720
2050............................ 46.9 767 2,190 3,170 6,650
Net Present Value \b\........... .............. 3,120 16,300 27,700 49,600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Except for the last row (net present value), the SCC values are dollar-year and emissions-year specific.
\b\ Net present value of non-CO2 emissions changes is calculated differently from other benefits. The same
discount rate used to discount the value of damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, 2.5 percent) is used
to calculate net present value of SCC for internal consistency. Refer to the SCC TSD for more detail.
7. Non-Greenhouse Gas Health and Environmental Impacts
This section presents EPA's analysis of the criteria pollutant-
related health and environmental impacts that will occur as a result of
the final standards. Light-duty vehicles and fuels are significant
sources of mobile source air pollution such as direct PM,
NOX, SOX, VOCs and air toxics. The impact that
improved fuel economy will have on rebound driving will affect exhaust
and evaporative emissions of these pollutants from vehicles. In
addition, increased fuel savings associated with improved fuel economy
achieved under the standards will affect emissions from upstream
sources (see Section III.G for a complete description of emission
impacts associated with the final standards). Emissions of
NOX (a precursor to ozone formation and secondarily-formed
PM2.5), SOX (a precursor to secondarily-formed
PM2.5), VOCs (a precursor to ozone formation and, to a
lesser degree, secondarily-formed PM2.5) and directly-
emitted
[[Page 62931]]
PM2.5 contribute to ambient concentrations of
PM2.5 and ozone. Exposure to ozone and PM2.5 is
linked to adverse human health impacts such as premature deaths as well
as other important public health and environmental effects.
As many commenters noted, it is important to quantify the health
and environmental impacts associated with the final rule because it
allows us to more accurately assess the net costs and benefits of the
standards. Moreover, co-pollutant impacts tend to accrue in the near
term, while any effects from reduced climate change mostly accrue over
a time frame of several decades or longer.
This section is split into two sub-sections: the first presents the
PM- and ozone-related health and environmental impacts associated with
the final rule in calendar year (CY) 2030; the second presents the PM-
related dollar-per-ton values used to monetize the PM-related co-
benefits associated with the model year (MY) analysis (i.e., over the
lifetimes of the MY 2017-2025 vehicles) of the final rule.\845\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\845\ EPA typically analyzes rule impacts (emissions, air
quality, costs and benefits) in the year in which they occur; for
this analysis, we selected 2030 as a representative future year. We
refer to this analysis as the ``Calendar Year'' (CY) analysis. EPA
also conducted a separate analysis of the impacts over the model
year lifetimes of the 2017 through 2025 model year vehicles. We
refer to this analysis as the ``Model Year'' (MY) analysis. In
contrast to the CY analysis, the MY lifetime analysis shows the
lifetime impacts of the program on each MY fleet over the course of
its lifetime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA did receive adverse comments regarding the omission of some
non-GHG impacts in the proposal. In that analysis, we used ``dollar-
per-ton'' estimates to monetize the health-related impacts of reduced
exposure to PM2.5. We continue to apply these values in the
MY analysis for the final rule. No ``dollar-per-ton'' method exists for
ozone or toxic air pollutants due to complexity associated with
atmospheric chemistry (for ozone and toxics) and a lack of economic
valuation data/methods (for air toxics). However, we have conducted
full-scale photochemical air quality modeling to estimate the change in
ambient concentrations of ozone, PM2.5 and air toxics for
the CY analysis in 2030 and used these modeling results as the basis
for estimating the human health impacts and their economic value of the
rule in 2030. EPA had neither the time nor resources to conduct such
modeling for the Model Year analysis.
a. Quantified and Monetized Non-GHG Human Health Benefits of the 2030
Calendar Year (CY) Analysis
This analysis reflects the impact of the final light-duty GHG rule
in 2030 compared to a future-year reference scenario without the rule
in place.
We estimate that the final rule will lead to a small net reduction
in PM2.5-related health impacts--the reduction in
population-weighted national average PM2.5 exposure results
in a small net reduction in adverse PM-related human health impacts
(the reduction in national population-weighted annual average
PM2.5 is 0.0065 [mu]g/m3).
The air quality modeling also projects a very small increase in
ozone concentrations in many areas (population-weighted maximum 8-hour
average ozone increases by 0.0009 ppb). While the ozone-related impacts
are very small, the increase in population-weighted national average
ozone exposure results in a very small increase in ozone-related health
impacts.
We base our analysis of the final rule's impact on human health in
2030 on peer-reviewed studies of air quality and human health
effects.846,847 These methods are described in more detail
in the RIA that accompanies this action. Our benefits methods are also
consistent with recent rulemaking analyses such as the proposed
Portland Cement National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants (NESHAP) RIA,\848\ the final NO2 NAAQS,\849\ and
the final Category 3 Marine Engine rule,\850\ and the final Cross State
Air Pollution Rule.\851\ To model the ozone and PM air quality impacts
of the final rule, we used the Community Multiscale Air Quality (CMAQ)
model (see Section III.G.4). The modeled ambient air quality data
serves as an input to the Environmental Benefits Mapping and Analysis
Program (BenMAP).\852\ BenMAP is a computer program developed by the
U.S. EPA that integrates a number of the modeling elements used in
previous analyses (e.g., interpolation functions, population
projections, health impact functions, valuation functions, analysis and
pooling methods) to translate modeled air concentration estimates into
health effects incidence estimates and monetized benefits estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\846\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2006). Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the Proposed National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter. Prepared by: Office of
Air and Radiation. Retrieved March, 26, 2009 at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/ria.html.
\847\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2008). Final Ozone
NAAQS Regulatory Impact Analysis. Prepared by: Office of Air and
Radiation, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. Retrieved
March, 26, 2009 at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/ria.html.
\848\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2009a.
Regulatory Impact Analysis: National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement Manufacturing
Industry. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research
Triangle Park, NC. April. Available on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/portlandcementria_4-20-09.pdf.
Accessed March 15, 2010.
\849\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2010.
Final NO2 NAAQS Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC. April.
Available on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/FinalNO2RIAfulldocument.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2010.
\850\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2009. Regulatory
Impact Analysis: Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Category
3 Marine Diesel Engines. EPA-420-R-09-019, December 2009. Prepared
by Office of Air and Radiation. http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/420r09019.pdf. Accessed February 9, 2010.
\851\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2011. Regulatory
Impact Analysis for the Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce
Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone in 27
States; Correction of SIP Approvals for 22 States. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-
0491, June 2011. Prepared by Office of Air and Radiation. http://www.epa.gov/airtransport/pdfs/FinalRIA.pdf. Accessed May 16, 2012.
\852\ Information on BenMAP, including downloads of the
software, can be found at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/benmodels.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The range of total monetized ozone- and PM-related health impacts
is presented in Table III-90. We present total benefits (the sum of
morbidity-related benefits and mortality-related benefits) based on the
PM- and ozone-related premature mortality function used. The benefits
ranges therefore reflect the addition of each estimate of ozone-related
premature mortality (across six selected studies, each with its own row
in Table III-90) to each estimate of PM-related premature mortality
(based on either Pope et al., 2002 or Laden et al., 2006), along with
all morbidity-related benefits. These estimates represent EPA's
preferred approach to characterizing a best estimate of monetized
impacts. As is the nature of Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs), the
assumptions and methods used to estimate air quality impacts evolve to
reflect the Agency's most current interpretation of the scientific and
economic literature.
[[Page 62932]]
Table III-90--Estimated 2030 Monetized PM-and Ozone-Related Health Impacts \a\
2030 total ozone and PM benefits--PM mortality derived from American Cancer Society analysis and six-cities
analysis \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total benefits Total benefits
Premature ozone mortality function Reference (billions, 2010$, 3% (billions, 2010$, 7%
discount rate) b,c,d discount rate) b,c,d
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multi-city analyses.................. Bell et al., 2004...... Total: $1.0-$2.6....... Total: $0.92-$2.3.
PM: $1.1-$2.6.......... PM: $0.95-$2.3.
Ozone: -$0.006......... Ozone: -$0.006.
Huang et al., 2005..... Total: $1.0-$2.6....... Total: $0.92-$2.3.
PM: $1.1-$2.6.......... PM: $0.95-$2.3.
Ozone: -$0.006......... Ozone: -$0.006.
Schwartz, 2005......... Total: $1.0-$2.6....... Total: $0.92-$2.3.
PM: $1.1-$2.6.......... PM: $0.95-$2.3.
Ozone: -$0.009......... Ozone: -$0.009.
Meta-analyses........................ Bell et al., 2005...... Total: $1.0-$2.6....... Total: $0.92-$2.3.
PM: $1.1-$2.6.......... PM: $0.95-$2.3.
Ozone: -$0.019......... Ozone: -$0.019.
Ito et al., 2005....... Total: $1.0-$2.6....... Total: $0.92-$2.3.
PM: $1.1-$2.6.......... PM: $0.95-$2.3.
Ozone: -$0.026......... Ozone: -$0.026.
Levy et al., 2005...... Total: $1.0-$2.6....... Total: $0.92-$2.3.
PM: $1.1-$2.6.......... PM: $0.95-$2.3.
Ozone: -$0.027......... Ozone: -$0.027.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Total includes premature mortality-related and morbidity-related ozone and PM2.5 benefits. Range was
developed by adding the estimate from the ozone premature mortality function to the estimate of PM2.5-related
premature mortality derived from either the ACS study (Pope et al., 2002) or the Six-Cities study (Laden et
al., 2006).
\b\ Note that totals presented here do not include a number of unquantified health impact categories. A detailed
listing of unquantified health and welfare effects is provided in Table III-91.
\c\ Results reflect the use of both a 3 and 7 percent discount rate, as recommended by EPA's Guidelines for
Preparing Economic Analyses and OMB Circular A-4. Results are rounded to two significant digits for ease of
presentation and computation.
\d\ Negatives indicate a disbenefit, or an increase in health effect incidence. Monetized impacts are rounded to
two significant digits. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
The monetized impacts in Table III-90 include all of the human
health impacts we are able to quantify and monetize at this time.
However, the full complement of human health and welfare effects
associated with PM, ozone and other criteria pollutants remain
unquantified because of current limitations in methods or available
data. We have not quantified a number of known or suspected health
effects linked with ozone, PM and other criteria pollutants for which
appropriate health impact functions are not available or which do not
provide easily interpretable outcomes (e.g., changes in heart rate
variability). Additionally, we are unable to quantify a number of known
welfare effects, including reduced acid and particulate deposition
damage to cultural monuments and other materials, and environmental
benefits due to reductions of impacts of eutrophication in coastal
areas. These are listed in Table III-91. As a result, the health
benefits quantified in this section do not reflect the full range of
possible impacts attributable to the final rule.
Table III-91--Unquantified and Non-Monetized Potential Effects
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pollutant/effects Effects not included in analysis--changes in:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ozone Health \a\............................... Chronic respiratory damage.\b\
Premature aging of the lungs.\b\
Non-asthma respiratory emergency room visits.
Exposure to UVb (+/-).\e\
Ozone Welfare.................................. Yields for
--commercial forests.
--some fruits and vegetables.
--non-commercial crops.
Damage to urban ornamental plants.
Impacts on recreational demand from damaged forest aesthetics.
Ecosystem functions.
Exposure to UVb (+/-).\e\
PM Health \c\.................................. Premature mortality--short term exposures.\d\
Low birth weight.
Pulmonary function.
Chronic respiratory diseases other than chronic bronchitis.
Non-asthma respiratory emergency room visits.
Exposure to UVb (+/-)\e\
PM Welfare..................................... Residential and recreational visibility in non-Class I areas.
Soiling and materials damage.
Damage to ecosystem functions.
Exposure to UVb (+/-)\e\
Nitrogen and Sulfate Deposition Welfare........ Commercial forests due to acidic sulfate and nitrate deposition.
Commercial freshwater fishing due to acidic deposition.
[[Page 62933]]
Recreation in terrestrial ecosystems due to acidic deposition.
Existence values for currently healthy ecosystems.
Commercial fishing, agriculture, and forests due to nitrogen deposition.
Recreation in estuarine ecosystems due to nitrogen deposition.
Ecosystem functions.
Passive fertilization.
CO Health...................................... Behavioral effects.
HC/Toxics Health \f\........................... Cancer (benzene, 1,3-butadiene, formaldehyde, acetaldehyde)
Anemia (benzene).
Disruption of production of blood components (benzene).
Reduction in the number of blood platelets (benzene).
Excessive bone marrow formation (benzene).
Depression of lymphocyte counts (benzene).
Reproductive and developmental effects (1,3-butadiene).
Irritation of eyes and mucus membranes (formaldehyde).
Respiratory irritation (formaldehyde).
Asthma attacks in asthmatics (formaldehyde).
Asthma-like symptoms in non-asthmatics (formaldehyde).
Irritation of the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract (acetaldehyde).
Upper respiratory tract irritation and congestion (acrolein).
HC/Toxics Welfare.............................. Direct toxic effects to animals.
Bioaccumulation in the food chain.
Damage to ecosystem function.
Odor.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ The public health impact of biological responses such as increased airway responsiveness to stimuli, inflammation in the lung, acute inflammation
and respiratory cell damage, and increased susceptibility to respiratory infection are likely partially represented by our quantified endpoints.
\b\ The public health impact of effects such as chronic respiratory damage and premature aging of the lungs may be partially represented by quantified
endpoints such as hospital admissions or premature mortality, but a number of other related health impacts, such as doctor visits and decreased
athletic performance, remain unquantified.
\c\ In addition to primary economic endpoints, there are a number of biological responses that have been associated with PM health effects including
morphological changes and altered host defense mechanisms. The public health impact of these biological responses may be partly represented by our
quantified endpoints.
\d\ While some of the effects of short-term exposures are likely to be captured in the estimates, there may be premature mortality due to short-term
exposure to PM not captured in the cohort studies used in this analysis. However, the PM mortality results derived from the expert elicitation do take
into account premature mortality effects of short term exposures.
\e\ May result in benefits or disbenefits.
\f\ Many of the key hydrocarbons related to this rule are also hazardous air pollutants listed in the CAA.
While there will be impacts associated with air toxic pollutant
emission changes that result from the final rule, we do not attempt to
monetize those impacts. This is primarily because currently available
tools and methods to assess air toxics risk from mobile sources at the
national scale are not adequate for extrapolation to incidence
estimations or benefits assessment. The best suite of tools and methods
currently available for assessment at the national scale are those used
in the National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment (NATA). The EPA Science
Advisory Board specifically commented in their review of the 1996 NATA
that these tools were not yet ready for use in a national-scale
benefits analysis, because they did not consider the full distribution
of exposure and risk, or address sub-chronic health effects.\853\ While
EPA has since improved the tools, there remain critical limitations for
estimating incidence and assessing benefits of reducing mobile source
air toxics. EPA continues to work to address these limitations;
however, we did not have the methods and tools available for national-
scale application in time for the analysis of the final rule.\854\
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\853\ Science Advisory Board. 2001. NATA--Evaluating the
National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment for 1996--an SAB Advisory.
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/sab/sabrev.html.
\854\ In April, 2009, EPA hosted a workshop on estimating the
benefits of reducing hazardous air pollutants. This workshop built
upon the work accomplished in the June 2000 Science Advisory Board/
EPA Workshop on the Benefits of Reductions in Exposure to Hazardous
Air Pollutants, which generated thoughtful discussion on approaches
to estimating human health benefits from reductions in air toxics
exposure, but no consensus was reached on methods that could be
implemented in the near term for a broad selection of air toxics.
Please visit http://epa.gov/air/toxicair/2009workshop.html for more
information about the workshop and its associated materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA is also unaware of specific information identifying any effects
on listed endangered species from the small fluctuations in pollutant
concentrations associated with this rule (see Section III.G.4).
Furthermore, our current modeling tools are not designed to trace
fluctuations in ambient concentration levels to potential impacts on
particular endangered species.
i. Quantified Human Health Impacts
Table III-92 and Table III-93 present the annual PM2.5
and ozone health impacts in the 48 contiguous U.S. states associated
with the final rule for 2030. For each endpoint presented in Table III-
92 and Table III-93, we provide both the mean estimate and the 90%
confidence interval.
Using EPA's preferred estimates, based on the American Cancer
Society (ACS) and Six-Cities studies and no threshold assumption in the
model of mortality, we estimate that the final rule will reduce between
110 and 280 cases of PM2.5-related premature mortality
annually in 2030. For ozone-related premature mortality in 2030, we
estimate a range of between 1 to 3 cases of additional premature
mortality.
[[Page 62934]]
Table III-92--Estimated PM2.5-Related Health Impacts a
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2030 Annual reduction in incidence
Health effect (5th%-95th%ile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Premature Mortality--Derived from
epidemiology literature: \b\
Adult, age 30+, ACS Cohort 110 (30-190)
Study (Pope et al., 2002).
Adult, age 25+, Six-Cities 280 (130-440)
Study (Laden et al., 2006).
Infant, age <1 year (Woodruff 0 (0-1)
et al., 1997).
Chronic bronchitis (adult, age 26 76 (1-150)
and over).
Non-fatal myocardial infarction 130 (32-230)
(adult, age 18 and over).
Hospital admissions-respiratory 20 (8-32)
(all ages) \c\.
Hospital admissions- 50 (33-60)
cardiovascular (adults, age >18)
\d\.
Emergency room visits for asthma 72 (34-110)
(age 18 years and younger).
Acute bronchitis, (children, age 160 (-42-370)
8-12).
Lower respiratory symptoms 2,100 (770-3,400)
(children, age 7-14).
Upper respiratory symptoms 1,600 (260-2,900)
(asthmatic children, age 9-18).
Asthma exacerbation (asthmatic 3,500 (-120-9,700)
children, age 6-18).
Work loss days................... 14,000 (12,000-16,000)
Minor restricted activity days 81,000 (65,000-96,000)
(adults age 18-65).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Incidence is rounded to two significant digits. Estimates represent
incidence within the 48 contiguous United States.
\b\ PM-related adult mortality based upon the American Cancer Society
(ACS) Cohort Study (Pope et al., 2002) and the Six-Cities Study (Laden
et al., 2006). Note that these are two alternative estimates of adult
mortality and should not be summed. PM-related infant mortality based
upon a study by Woodruff, Grillo, and Schoendorf, (1997).\855\
\c\ Respiratory hospital admissions for PM include admissions for
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), pneumonia and asthma.
\d\ Cardiovascular hospital admissions for PM include total
cardiovascular and subcategories for ischemic heart disease,
dysrhythmias, and heart failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\855\ Woodruff, T.J., J. Grillo, and K.C. Schoendorf. 1997.
``The Relationship Between Selected Causes of Postneonatal Infant
Mortality and Particulate Air Pollution in the United States.''
Environmental Health Perspectives 105(6):608-612.
Table III-93--Estimated Ozone-Related Health Impacts a
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2030 Annual reduction in incidence
Health effect (5th%-95th%ile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Premature Mortality, All ages \b\
Multi-City Analyses:
Bell et al. (2004)--Non- -1 (-4-3)
accidental.
1Huang et al. (2005)-- -1 (-5-4)
Cardiopulmonary.
Schwartz (2005)--Non- -1 (-6-4)
accidental.
Meta-analyses:
Bell et al. (2005)--All cause -2 (-10-6)
Ito et al. (2005)--Non- -3 (-11-6)
accidental.
Levy et al. (2005)--All -3 (-10-4)
causes.
\c\ Hospital admissions-- -6 (-30-15)
respiratory causes (adult, 65
and older).
Hospital admissions--respiratory -3 (-12-6)
causes (children, under 2).
Emergency room visit for asthma -1 (-18-15)
(all ages).
Minor restricted activity days -930 (-18,000-16,000)
(adults, age 18-65).
School absence days.............. -850 (-6,700-5,100)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Negatives indicate a disbenefit, or an increase in health effect
incidence. Incidence is rounded to two significant digits. Estimates
represent incidence within the 48 contiguous U.S.
\b\ Estimates of ozone-related premature mortality are based upon
incidence estimates derived from several alternative studies: Bell et
al. (2004); Huang et al. (2005); Schwartz (2005); Bell et al. (2005);
Ito et al. (2005); Levy et al. (2005). The estimates of ozone-related
premature mortality should therefore not be summed.
\c\ Respiratory hospital admissions for ozone include admissions for all
respiratory causes and subcategories for COPD and pneumonia.
ii. Monetized Impacts
Table III-94 presents the estimated monetary value of changes in
the incidence of ozone and PM2.5-related health effects. All
monetized estimates are stated in 2010$. These estimates account for
growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita between the
present and 2030. Our estimate of total monetized impacts in 2030 for
the final rule, using the ACS and Six-Cities PM mortality studies and
the range of ozone mortality assumptions, is between $1.0 and $2.6
billion, assuming a 3 percent discount rate, and between $0.92 and $2.3
billion, assuming a 7 percent discount rate. As the results below
indicate, monetized impacts are driven primarily by the change in
premature fatalities in 2030.
[[Page 62935]]
Table III-94--Estimated Monetary Value of Changes in Incidence of Health
and Welfare Effects
[In millions of 2010$] a b
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2030 (5th and 95th %ile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PM[bdi2].[bdi5]-Related Health Effect
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Premature Mortality--Derived from
Epidemiology Studies: c d
Adult, age 30+--ACS study
(Pope et al., 2002):
3% discount rate......... $980 ($110-$2,600)
7% discount rate......... $880
($97-$2,400)
Adult, age 25+--Six-Cities
study (Laden et al., 2006):
3% discount rate......... $2,500
($340-$6,300)
7% discount rate......... $2,300
($310-$5,700)
Infant Mortality, <1 year-- $3.8 (-$3.9-$15)
(Woodruff et al. 1997).
Chronic bronchitis (adults, 26 $42 ($0.4-$140)
and over).
Non-fatal acute myocardial
infarctions:
3% discount rate............. $14 ($2.3-$36)
7% discount rate............. $12 ($1.8-$30)
Hospital admissions for $0.32 ($0.13-$0.51)
respiratory causes.
Hospital admissions for $0.73 ($0.07-$1.4)
cardiovascular causes.
Emergency room visits for asthma. $0.03 ($0.01-$0.05)
Acute bronchitis (children, age 8- $0.08 (-$0.02-$0.21)
12).
Lower respiratory symptoms $0.04 ($0.01-$0.09)
(children, 7-14).
Upper respiratory symptoms $0.05 ($0.009-$0.12)
(asthma, 9-11).
Asthma exacerbations............. $0.20 (-$0.007-$0.58)
Work loss days................... $2.2 ($1.9-$2.6)
Minor restricted-activity days $5.6 ($3.2-$8.1)
(MRADs).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ozone-related Health Effect
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Premature Mortality, All ages--
Derived from Multi-city
analyses:
Bell et al., 2004............ -$5.8 (-$45-$27)
Huang et al., 2005........... -$6.2 (-$60-$41)
Schwartz, 2005............... -$8.7 (-$71-$44)
Premature Mortality, All ages--
Derived from Meta-analyses:
Bell et al., 2005............ -$19 (-$120-$38)
Ito et al., 2005............. -$26 (-$140-$58)
Levy et al., 2005............ -$27 (-$120-$38)
Hospital admissions--respiratory -$0.16 (-$0.77-$0.39)
causes (adult, 65 and older).
Hospital admissions--respiratory -$0.03 (-$130-$0.07)
causes (children, under 2).
Emergency room visit for asthma -$0.0003 (-$0.007-$0.006)
(all ages).
Minor restricted activity days -$0.06 (-$1.3-$1.1)
(adults, age 18-65).
School absence days.............. -$0.08 (-$0.65-$0.49)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Negatives indicate a disbenefit, or an increase in health effect
incidence. Monetized impacts are rounded to two significant digits for
ease of presentation and computation. PM and ozone benefits are
nationwide.
\b\ Monetary benefits adjusted to account for growth in real GDP per
capita between 1990 and the analysis year (2030).
\c\ Valuation assumes discounting over the SAB recommended 20 year
segmented lag structure. Results reflect the use of 3 percent and 7
percent discount rates consistent with EPA and OMB guidelines for
preparing economic analyses.
iii. What Are the Limitations of the Benefits Analysis?
Every benefit-cost analysis examining the potential effects of a
change in environmental protection requirements is limited to some
extent by data gaps, limitations in model capabilities (such as
geographic coverage), and uncertainties in the underlying scientific
and economic studies used to configure the benefit and cost models.
Limitations of the scientific literature often result in the inability
to estimate quantitative changes in health and environmental effects,
such as potential increases in premature mortality associated with
increased exposure to carbon monoxide. Deficiencies in the economics
literature often result in the inability to assign economic values even
to those health and environmental outcomes which can be quantified.
These general uncertainties in the underlying scientific and economics
literature, which can lead to valuations that are higher or lower, are
discussed in detail in the RIA and its supporting references. Key
uncertainties that have a bearing on the results of the benefit-cost
analysis of the final rule include the following:
The exclusion of potentially significant and unquantified
benefit categories (such as health, odor, and ecological benefits of
reduction in air toxics, ozone, and PM);
Errors in measurement and projection for variables such as
population growth;
Uncertainties in the estimation of future year emissions
inventories and air quality;
Uncertainty in the estimated relationships of health and
welfare effects to changes in pollutant concentrations including the
shape of the concentration-response function, the
[[Page 62936]]
size of the effect estimates, and the relative toxicity of the many
components of the PM mixture;
Uncertainties in exposure estimation; and
Uncertainties associated with the effect of potential
future actions to limit emissions.
As Table III-94 indicates, total benefits are driven primarily by
the reduction in premature mortalities each year. Some key assumptions
underlying the premature mortality estimates include the following,
which may also contribute to uncertainty:
Inhalation of fine particles is causally associated with
premature death at concentrations near those experienced by most
Americans on a daily basis. Although biological mechanisms for this
effect have not yet been completely established, the weight of the
available epidemiological, toxicological, and experimental evidence
supports an assumption of causality. The impacts of including a
probabilistic representation of causality were explored in the expert
elicitation-based results of the 2006 p.m. NAAQS RIA.
All fine particles, regardless of their chemical
composition, are equally potent in causing premature mortality. This is
an important assumption, because PM produced via transported precursors
emitted from stationary sources may differ significantly from PM
precursors released from mobile sources and other industrial sources.
However, no clear scientific grounds exist for supporting differential
effects estimates by particle type.
The C-R function for fine particles is approximately
linear within the range of ambient concentrations under consideration.
Thus, the estimates include health benefits from reducing fine
particles in areas with varied concentrations of PM, including both
regions that may be in attainment with PM2.5 standards and
those that are at risk of not meeting the standards.
There is uncertainty in the magnitude of the association
between ozone and premature mortality. The range of ozone impacts
associated with the final standards is estimated based on the risk of
several sources of ozone-related mortality effect estimates. In a 2008
report on the estimation of ozone-related premature mortality published
by the National Research Council, a panel of experts and reviewers
concluded that short-term exposure to ambient ozone is likely to
contribute to premature deaths and that ozone-related mortality should
be included in estimates of the health benefits of reducing ozone
exposure.\856\ EPA has requested advice from the National Academy of
Sciences on how best to quantify uncertainty in the relationship
between ozone exposure and premature mortality in the context of
quantifying benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\856\ National Research Council (NRC), 2008. Estimating
Mortality Risk Reduction and Economic Benefits from Controlling
Ozone Air Pollution. The National Academies Press: Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acknowledging the data limitations and uncertainties, we present a
best estimate of the total monetized health impacts based on our
interpretation of the best available scientific literature and methods
supported by EPA's technical peer review panel, the Science Advisory
Board's Health Effects Subcommittee (SAB-HES). The National Academies
of Science (NRC, 2002) has also reviewed EPA's methodology for
analyzing the health benefits of measures taken to reduce air
pollution. EPA addressed many of these comments in the analysis of the
final PM NAAQS.857,858 The analysis in this final rule
incorporates this most recent work to the extent possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\857\ National Research Council (NRC). 2002. Estimating the
Public Health Benefits of Proposed Air Pollution Regulations. The
National Academies Press: Washington, DC.
\858\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. October 2006. Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the Proposed National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter. Prepared by: Office of
Air and Radiation. Available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/ria.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. PM-Related Monetized Benefits of the Model Year (MY) Analysis
As described in Section III.G, the final standards will in some
cases increase and other cases decrease emissions of several criteria
and toxic air pollutants and precursors. In the MY analysis, EPA
estimates the economic value of the human health impacts associated
with PM2.5 exposure. Due to analytical limitations, this
analysis does not estimate impacts related to other criteria pollutants
(such as ozone, NO2 or SO2) or toxics pollutants,
nor does it monetize all of the potential health and welfare effects
associated with PM2.5.
The MY analysis uses a ``dollar-per-ton'' method to estimate a
selected suite of PM2.5-related health impacts described
below. These PM2.5 dollar-per-ton estimates provide the
total monetized human health impacts (the sum of premature mortality
and premature morbidity) of reducing/increasing one ton of directly
emitted PM2.5, or its precursors (such as NOX,
SOX, and VOCs), from a specified source. Ideally, the human
health impacts associated with the MY analysis would be estimated based
on changes in ambient PM2.5 as determined by full-scale air
quality modeling.
The agency did receive adverse comments regarding the omission of
these impacts in the analysis, however, no ``dollar-per-ton'' method
exists for ozone or toxic air pollutants due to complexity associated
with atmospheric chemistry (for ozone and toxics) and a lack of
economic valuation data/methods (for air toxics). However, EPA also
conducted full scale, photochemical air quality modeling to estimate
the change in ambient concentrations of both ozone and PM2.5
and used this as a basis for estimating the human health impacts and
their economic value of the rule in 2030. Section III.G.4 presents
these impact estimates.
The dollar-per-ton estimates used in this analysis are provided in
Table III-95. In the summary of costs and benefits, Section III.H.10 of
this preamble, EPA presents the monetized value of PM-related
improvements associated with the rule.
Table III-95--PM2.5-related Dollar-per-Ton Values
[2010$]a b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All sources Upstream (non-EGU) sources Mobile sources
\d\ \d\ -------------------------------
Year ------------------------------------------------
SO2 NOX Direct PM2.5 NOX Direct PM2.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dollar-per-ton Derived from American Cancer Society Analysis (Pope et al., 2002) Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate
\c\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015............................ $30,000 $4,900 $230,000 $5,100 $280,000
2020............................ 33,000 5,400 250,000 5,600 310,000
[[Page 62937]]
2030............................ 38,000 6,400 290,000 6,700 370,000
2040............................ 45,000 7,600 340,000 8,000 440,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dollar-per-ton Derived from American Cancer Society Analysis (Pope et al., 2002) Estimated Using a 7 Percent
Discount Rate \c\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015............................ 27,000 4,500 210,000 4,600 250,000
2020............................ 30,000 4,900 230,000 5,100 280,000
2030............................ 35,000 5,800 270,000 6,100 330,000
2040............................ 41,000 6,900 310,000 7,300 400,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dollar-per-ton Derived from Six Cities Analysis (Laden et al., 2006) Estimated Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate
\c\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015............................ 73,000 12,000 560,000 12,000 680,000
2020............................ 80,000 13,000 620,000 14,000 750,000
2030............................ 94,000 16,000 720,000 16,000 900,000
2040............................ 110,000 19,000 840,000 20,000 1,100,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dollar-per-ton Derived from Six Cities Analysis (Laden et al., 2006) Estimated Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate
\c\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015............................ 66,000 11,000 510,000 11,000 620,000
2020............................ 72,000 12,000 560,000 12,000 680,000
2030............................ 84,000 14,000 650,000 15,000 810,000
2040............................ 99,000 17,000 760,000 18,000 960,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Total dollar-per-ton estimates include monetized PM2.5-related premature mortality and morbidity endpoints.
Range of estimates are a function of the estimate of PM2.5-related premature mortality derived from either the
ACS study (Pope et al., 2002) or the Six-Cities study (Laden et al., 2006).
\b\ Dollar-per-ton values were estimated for the years 2015, 2020, and 2030. For 2040, EPA extrapolated
exponentially based on the growth between 2020 and 2030.
\c\ The dollar-per-ton estimates presented in this table assume either a 3 percent or 7 percent discount rate in
the valuation of premature mortality to account for a twenty-year segmented cessation lag.
\d\ Note that the dollar-per-ton value for SO2 is based on the value for Stationary (Non-EGU) sources; no SO2
value was estimated for mobile sources.
The dollar-per-ton technique has been used in previous analyses,
including EPA's recent Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) RIA,\859\ the Portland Cement National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) RIA,\860\ and the final
NO2 NAAQS.\861\ Table III-96 shows the quantified and
unquantified PM2.5-related co-benefits captured in those
benefit-per-ton estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\859\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2008.
Regulatory Impact Analysis, 2008 National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ground-level Ozone, Chapter 6. Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC. March. Available
at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/6-ozoneriachapter6.pdf.
Accessed March 15, 2010.
\860\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2009.
Regulatory Impact Analysis: National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement Manufacturing
Industry. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research
Triangle Park, NC. April. Available on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/portlandcementria_4-;20-09.pdf.
Accessed March 15, 2010.
\861\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2010.
Final NO2 NAAQS Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). Office
of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC.
April. Available on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/FinalNO2RIAfulldocument.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2010.
[[Page 62938]]
Table III-96--Human Health and Welfare Effects of PM2.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantified and Monetized in Dollar-per-ton Estimates:
Adult premature mortality.
Bronchitis: Chronic and acute.
Hospital admissions: Respiratory and cardiovascular.
Emergency room visits for asthma.
Nonfatal heart attacks (myocardial infarction).
Lower and upper respiratory illness.
Minor restricted-activity days.
Work loss days.
Asthma exacerbations (asthmatic population).
Infant mortality.
Unquantified Effects Changes in:
Subchronic bronchitis cases.
Low birth weight.
Pulmonary function.
Chronic respiratory diseases other than chronic bronchitis.
Non-asthma respiratory emergency room visits.
Visibility.
Household soiling.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the NO2 NAAQS,\862\ the dollar-per-ton
estimates utilize the concentration-response functions as reported in
the epidemiology literature. To calculate the total monetized impacts
associated with quantified health impacts, EPA applies values derived
from a number of sources. For premature mortality, EPA applies a value
of a statistical life (VSL) derived from the mortality valuation
literature. For certain health impacts, such as chronic bronchitis and
a number of respiratory-related ailments, EPA applies willingness-to-
pay estimates derived from the valuation literature. For the remaining
health impacts, EPA applies values derived from current cost-of-illness
and/or wage estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\862\ Although we summarize the main issues in this chapter, we
encourage interested readers to see the benefits chapter of the
NO2 NAAQS for a more detailed description of recent
changes to the PM benefits presentation and preference for the no-
threshold model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readers interested in reviewing the complete methodology for
creating the dollar-per-ton estimates used in this analysis can consult
the Technical Support Document (TSD) \863\ accompanying the final ozone
NAAQS RIA. Readers can also refer to Fann et al. (2009) \864\ for a
detailed description of the dollar-per-ton methodology.\865\ A more
detailed description of the dollar-per-ton estimates is also provided
in the Joint TSD that accompanies this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\863\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2008b.
Technical Support Document: Calculating Benefit Per-Ton estimates,
Ozone NAAQS Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2007-0225-0284. Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC. March.
Available on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov.
\864\ Fann, N. et al. (2009). The influence of location, source,
and emission type in estimates of the human health benefits of
reducing a ton of air pollution. Air Qual Atmos Health. Published
online: 09 June, 2009.
\865\ The values included in this report are different from
those presented in the article cited above. Benefits methods change
to reflect new information and evaluation of the science. Since
publication of the June 2009 article, EPA has made two significant
changes to its benefits methods: (1) We no longer assume that a
threshold exists in PM-related models of health impacts; and (2) We
have revised the Value of a Statistical Life to equal $6.3 million
(year 2000$), up from an estimate of $5.5 million (year 2000$) used
in the June 2009 report. Please refer to the following Web site for
updates to the dollar-per-ton estimates: http://www.epa.gov/air/benmap/bpt.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described in the documentation for the dollar-per-ton estimates
cited above, national per-ton estimates were developed for selected
pollutant/source category combinations. The per-ton values calculated
therefore apply only to changes in tons from those specific pollutant/
source combinations (e.g., NO2 emitted from mobile sources;
direct PM emitted from stationary sources). Our estimate of
PM2.5-related impacts is therefore based on the total direct
PM2.5 and PM-related precursor emissions changes by sector
and multiplied by each per-ton value.
The dollar-per-ton estimates are subject to a number of assumptions
and uncertainties.
[cir] Dollar-per-ton estimates do not reflect local variability in
population density, meteorology, exposure, baseline health incidence
rates, or other local factors that might lead to an overestimate or
underestimate of the actual impacts of fine particulates. In Section
III.G, we describe the full-scale air quality modeling conducted for
the 2030 calendar year analysis in an effort to capture this
variability.
[cir] There are several health impact categories that EPA was
unable to quantify in the MY analysis due to limitations associated
with using dollar-per-ton estimates. Because NOX and VOC
emissions are also precursors to ozone, changes in NOX and
VOC would also impact ozone formation and the health effects associated
with ozone exposure. Dollar-per-ton estimates for ozone, however, do
not exist due to issues associated with the complexity of the
atmospheric air chemistry and nonlinearities associated with ozone
formation. The PM-related dollar-per-ton estimates also do not include
any human welfare or ecological impacts. Please refer to Chapter 6 of
the RIA that accompanies this rule for a description of the
quantification and monetization of health impacts for the CY analysis
and a description of the unquantified non-GHG impacts associated with
this rulemaking.
[cir] The dollar-per-ton estimates used in this analysis
incorporate projections of key variables, including atmospheric
conditions, source level emissions, population, health baselines and
incomes, technology. These projections introduce some uncertainties to
the dollar-per-ton estimates.
As mentioned above, emissions changes and dollar-per-ton estimates
alone are not a good indication of local or regional air quality and
health impacts, as there may be localized impacts associated with this
rulemaking. Additionally, the atmospheric chemistry related to ambient
concentrations of PM2.5, ozone and air toxics is very
complex. Full-scale photochemical modeling is therefore necessary to
provide the needed spatial and temporal detail to more completely and
accurately estimate the changes in ambient levels of these pollutants
and their associated health and welfare impacts. Timing and resource
constraints precluded EPA from conducting full-scale photochemical air
quality modeling for the MY analysis. We have, however, conducted
national-scale air quality modeling for the CY analysis to analyze the
impacts of the standards on PM2.5, ozone, and selected air
toxics (see the preceding section, Section III.7.a).
8. Energy Security Impacts
The GHG standards require improvements in light-duty vehicle fuel
efficiency which, in turn, will reduce overall fuel consumption and
help to reduce U.S. petroleum imports. Reducing U.S. petroleum imports
lowers both the financial and strategic risks caused by potential
sudden disruptions in the supply of imported petroleum to the U.S. The
economic value of reductions in these risks provides a measure of
improved U.S. energy security. This section summarizes EPA's estimates
of U.S. oil import reductions and energy security benefits from this
rule. Additional discussion of this issue can be found in Chapter 4.2.8
of the Joint TSD.
a. Implications of Reduced Petroleum Use on U.S. Imports
In 2011, the United States imported 45 percent of the petroleum it
consumed,\866\ while the transportation sector accounted for 70 percent
of total U.S. petroleum consumption.\867\
[[Page 62939]]
Requiring vehicle technology that reduces GHGs and fuel consumption in
light-duty vehicles is expected to lower U.S. oil imports. EPA's
estimates of reductions in fuel consumption resulting from these
standards are discussed in Section III.H.4 and in EPA's RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\866\ http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec3_3.pdf.
\867\ http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec3_3.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on analysis of historical and projected future variation in
U.S. petroleum consumption and imports, EPA estimates that
approximately 50 percent of the reduction in fuel consumption resulting
from adopting improved GHG emission standards is likely to be reflected
in lower U.S. imports of refined fuel, while the remaining 50 percent
is expected to be reflected in reduced domestic fuel refining. Of this
latter figure, 90 percent is anticipated to reduce U.S. imports of
crude petroleum for use as a refinery feedstock, while the remaining 10
percent is expected to reduce U.S. domestic production of crude
petroleum. Thus, on balance, each gallon of fuel saved as a consequence
of our final standards is anticipated to reduce total U.S. imports of
petroleum by 0.95 gallons.\868\ Table III-97 below compares EPA's
estimates of the reduction in imports of U.S. crude oil and petroleum-
based products from this program to projected total U.S. imports for
selected years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\868\ This figure is calculated as 0.50 + 0.50*0.9 = 0.50 + 0.45
= 0.95.
Table III-97--Projected Import Reductions From This Rule and Total U.S.
Petroleum-Based Imports for Selected Years
[millions of barrels per day, mmbd]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. petroleum- U.S. total
based import petroleum-based
Year reductions from imports without
the rule (mmbd) the rule (mmbb)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020................................ 0.133 9.26
2030................................ 1.42 8.94
2040................................ 2.41 NA
2050................................ 3.02 NA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: NA--Not available, forecasts reported in EIA's Annual Energy
Outlook 2012 (Early Release) extend only to 2035.
b. Overview of EPA's Analysis of Energy Security Benefits
U.S. consumption of imported petroleum products imposes costs on
the domestic economy that are not reflected in the market price for
crude oil, or in the prices paid by consumers of petroleum products
such as gasoline (i.e., energy security costs). These costs include (1)
higher prices for petroleum products resulting from the effect of
increased U.S. demand for imported oil on the world oil price
(``monopsony effect''); (2) the expected costs associated with the risk
of disruptions to the U.S. economy caused by sudden reductions in the
supply of imported oil to the U.S. (i.e., ``macroeconomic disruption
and adjustment costs''); and (3) expenses for maintaining a U.S.
military presence to secure imported oil supplies from unstable
regions, and for maintaining the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) to
cushion the U.S. economy against the effects of oil supply disruptions
(i.e., ``military/SPR costs'').\869\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\869\ See, e.g., Bohi, Douglas R. and W. David Montgomery
(1982). Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Import Policy Washington,
DC: Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press; Bohi,
D. R., and M. A. Toman (1993). ``Energy and Security: Externalities
and Policies,'' Energy Policy 21:1093-1109; and Toman, M. A. (1993).
``The Economics of Energy Security: Theory, Evidence, Policy,'' in
A. V. Kneese and J. L. Sweeney, eds. (1993). Handbook of Natural
Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. III. Amsterdam: North-Holland,
pp. 1167-1218.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to understand the energy security implications of reducing
U.S. petroleum imports, EPA worked with Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL), which has developed approaches for evaluating the energy
security implications of oil use. The energy security estimates or
``premiums'' provided below are based upon a methodology developed in a
peer-reviewed study entitled, ``The Energy Security Benefits of Reduced
Oil Use, 2006-2015,'' completed in March 2008. This study is included
as part of the docket for this rule.870,871
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\870\ Leiby, Paul N., ``Estimating the Energy Security Benefits
of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports'' Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/
TM-2007/028, Final Report, 2008. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0162).
\871\ The ORNL study ``The Energy Security Benefits of Reduced
Oil Use, 2006-2015,'' completed in March 2008, is an updated version
of the approach used for estimating the energy security benefits of
U.S. oil import reductions developed in an ORNL 1997 Report by
Leiby, Paul N., Donald W. Jones, T. Randall Curlee, and Russell Lee,
entitled ``Oil Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs.''
(Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0162).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When conducting its analysis, ORNL estimated energy security
premiums by quantifying two components of the economic cost of
importing petroleum into the U.S. (in addition to the purchase price of
petroleum itself): Monopsony and macroeconomic disruption costs. For
this rule, EPA worked with ORNL to update the energy security premiums
by incorporating the AEO 2012 Early Release oil price forecasts and
market trends.\872\ Energy security premiums for the selected years are
presented in Table III-2 as well as a breakdown of the components of
the energy security premiums for each of these years.873,874
The components of ORNL's energy security premiums and their values are
discussed in detail in the Joint TSD Chapter 4.2.8. EPA did not include
the monopsony cost component in our cost-benefit analysis (see
discussion in Section III.H.8.c). The ORNL analysis did not include
military or SPR costs nor did EPA quantify them for this rule (see
discussion in Section III.H.8.e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\872\ Leiby, Paul. Oak Ridge National Laboratory. ``Approach to
Estimating the Oil Import Security Premium for the MY 2017-2025
Light Duty Vehicle Rule'' 2012.
\873\ AEO 2012 (Early Release) forecasts energy market trends
and values only to 2035. The energy security premium estimates post-
2035 were assumed to be the 2035 estimate. Due to timing
constraints, the energy security premiums ($/gallon) were derived
using estimates of the gasoline consumption reductions projected
from this rule proposal.
\874\ Due to timing constraints, this analysis was conducted
with preliminary estimates of the fuel savings projected from this
rule, which were highly similar to the final estimates for the rule.
Table III-98--Energy Security Premiums in Selected Years
[2010$/Barrel]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Macroeconomic disruption/
Monopsony adjustment costs Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020........................................ $10.02 ($3.35-$17.09) $7.63 ($3.71-$11.00) $17.64 ($9.83-$25.00)
2025........................................ $9.77 ($3.25-$16.69) $8.26 ($4.03-$11.92) $18.03 ($10.15-$25.47)
2030........................................ $9.28 ($3.10-$18.03) $8.77 ($4.33-$12.60) $18.05 ($10.29-$25.20)
[[Page 62940]]
2035+....................................... $9.73 ($3.24-$16.68) $9.46 ($4.72-$13.61) $19.19 ($10.94-$26.78)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The main values in Table III-2 represent the mid-point of the ranges (90% confidence levels) of the values presented in the parentheses.
Numerous private citizens and commenters from a large number of
consumer groups, environmental organizations, and energy security
advocacy organizations expressed strong support in both written
comments and at the agencies' public hearings that these standards will
have significant benefits for U.S. energy and national security,
including energy independence. For example, the BlueGreen Alliance
commented that ``[s]trong standards will keep more of the dollars here
in the United States * * *'' and ``[t]hey will also set the stage for
weaning America off oil dependence * * *'' Similarly, a Michigan State
Senator, District 18 commented that ``[g]reater fuel economy benefits
all of us in four ways: firstly, it benefits our environment by
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; secondly, it secures our energy
independence; thirdly, its saves us money at the pump; and finally, it
creates high-quality U.S. jobs that strengthen the economy.'' The Pew
Charitable Trusts stated that ``[o]ur bipartisan poll commissioned in
July 2011 found that 91 percent of Americans identify U.S. dependence
on foreign oil as a threat to our national security, and significant
bipartisan majorities in every region of the country believe that
adopting stronger fuel economy standards is the best way to lessen that
dependence.'' Finally, the Union of Concerned Scientist estimated that
``* * * the cumulative oil savings of the National Program (MYs 2012-
2025) could result in a total reduction in U.S. oil consumption of
nearly 3.5 mbd in 2030, nearly double the amount the U.S. currently
imports from the entire Persian Gulf. No other federal policy has
delivered greater oil savings, energy security benefits, or greenhouse
gas emissions reductions to the country.''
In contrast, the Defour Group commented that there is no
relationship between the energy security benefits of the U.S. and
reduced oil consumption by the U.S., since the world economies are all
tied together, thus calling into question estimates of the energy
security benefits of the rule. Moreover, the Defour Group believes
there is too much uncertainty in generating energy security premiums.
EPA sponsored an extensive peer review of the methodology on which
the proposed energy security benefits for this rule were based. The
peer reviewers were generally highly supportive of the energy security
methodology developed by ORNL and used by EPA. Also, EPA used this same
energy security methodology in a number of previous rulemakings
including the MYs 2012-2016 light duty vehicle GHG rule and the MYs
2014-2018 medium- and heavy-duty vehicle GHG rule, with numerous
commenters to those rules supporting the use of the methodology. Thus,
while EPA considered all these comments, we continue to believe that
the peer-reviewed, well scrutinized methodology used at proposal is
reasonable and we are continuing to use it in this final rule for
estimating the energy security benefits of this rule.
EPA also solicited comments in the proposal on how to estimate the
energy security benefits of the wider use of PHEVs and EVs including
any relevant studies or research that have been published on these
issues. Tesla Motors, Inc. commented that ``[r]educing our dependence
on petroleum in the transportation sector is a national imperative.''
They go on to state that shifting the transportation sector to
electricity would lessen the U.S. dependence on foreign oil and
increase national security. However, no commenter provided EPA with a
robust methodology for estimating the energy security benefits of the
wider use of PHEVs and EVs as a result of this rule. Thus, due to
timing constraints and the technical complexity of examining this
issue, EPA was unable to conduct such an analysis for this rule. This
is an issue that EPA will continue to study and will evaluate as part
of the midterm review work.
c. Monopsony Component
The literature on energy security for the last two decades has
routinely combined the monopsony and the macroeconomic disruption
components when calculating the total value of the energy security
premium. However, in the context of using a global social cost of
carbon (SCC) value (discussed in III.H.6), the question arises: how
should the energy security premium be determined when a global
perspective is taken? Monopsony benefits represent avoided payments by
the United States to oil producers in foreign countries that result
from a decrease in the world oil price as the U.S. reduces its
consumption of imported oil. Although there is clearly a benefit to the
U.S. when considered from a domestic perspective, the decrease in price
due to reduced demand in the U.S. also represents a loss to other
countries. Given the redistributive nature of this monopsony effect
from a global perspective, EPA excluded monopsony costs from the
quantified energy security benefits for the proposed rule. The Union of
Concerned Scientists recommended that the monopsony benefits of the
rule be included in EPA's overall estimates of the energy security
benefits, since it is a benefit to the U.S. EPA continues to view
energy security from a global perspective, and therefore excludes
monopsony benefits to the U.S. in this final rule since these benefits
are offset by losses to foreign oil producers. However, we present the
monopsony energy security premiums in Table III-97 to show the general
magnitude of their effects.
One potential result of the potential decline in the world price of
oil as a result of this rule would be an increase in the consumption of
petroleum products, particularly outside the U.S. In addition, other
fuels could be displaced from the increasing use of oil worldwide. For
example, if a decline in the world oil price causes an increase in oil
use in China, India, or another country's industrial sector, this
increase in oil consumption may displace natural gas usage.
Alternatively, the increased oil use could result in a decrease in coal
used to produce electricity. An increase in the consumption of
petroleum products particularly outside the U.S., could lead to a
modest increase in emissions of GHGs, criteria air pollutants, and
airborne toxics from their refining and use. However, lower usage of,
for example, displaced coal would result in a decrease in GHG
emissions. Therefore, any assessment of
[[Page 62941]]
the impacts on GHG emissions and other pollutants from a potential
increase in world oil demand would need to take into account the
impacts on all portions of global energy sector. EPA has not attempted
to estimate these effects.
d. Macroeconomic Disruption Component
In contrast to monopsony costs, the macroeconomic disruption and
adjustment costs that arise from sudden reductions in the supply of
imported oil to the U.S. do not have offsetting impacts outside of the
U.S., so we include the estimated reduction in their expected value
stemming from reduced U.S. petroleum imports in our energy security
benefits estimated for this rule (as discussed in sections III.H.8.b
and III.H.8.f).
e. Military and SPR Components
The energy security benefits EPA presented in the NPRM from
reducing U.S. oil imports did not include an estimate of potential
reductions in costs for maintaining a U.S. military presence to help
secure stable oil supply from potentially vulnerable regions of the
world because attributing military spending to particular missions or
activities is difficult. A number of commenters, including consumer
advocacy and environmental organizations (e.g. Consumer Federation of
America, Environmental Defense Fund, and National Wildlife Federation),
natural gas organizations (e.g. America's Natural Gas Alliance, and
American Gas Association), as well as energy security advocates (Center
for Naval Analysis) and numerous private individuals, felt that EPA
should quantify, to the extent possible, a military component of the
energy security benefits associated with this rulemaking. These
commenters felt that, although they understand that EPA would have
difficulties in determining a point estimate of the energy security
benefits from reduced military costs as a result of the rule, that even
ranges would be useful. The American Petroleum Institute commented that
military expenditures will not likely change with a reduction in U.S.
oil imports, and therefore should not be included in the assessment of
this rulemaking.
Like most of the commenters, EPA believes that there is an evident
connection between U.S. oil imports and a military presence to secure
those imports and that this presence is influenced by the extent of
importing. As Lt. Gen (Ret.) Zilmer stated at the Philadelphia public
hearing on the proposed rule: ``The United States uses about 20 million
barrels of oil a day, 11 million of that is imported'' and ``its often
imported from customers who would rather not have to work with you * *
* We have not gotten any closer to energy independence, and it becomes
an increasing national security issue when we have to constantly have
forces deployed in that region of the world, the Middle East and
southwest Asia.'' \875\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\875\ Transcript of Philadelphia public hearing, pp. 172-73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA has examined methodologies for estimating the military
component of the energy security benefits of our rule and has faced two
major challenges: ``attribution'' and ``incremental'' analysis. The
attribution analysis challenge is to determine which military programs
and expenditures can properly be attributed to oil supply protection,
rather than to some other objective. The incremental analysis challenge
is to estimate how much the supply protection costs might vary if U.S.
oil use is reduced or eliminated.
We reviewed a number of recent studies that attempt to overcome
these challenges.\876\ Although these recent studies provide
significant, useful insights into the military components of U.S.
energy security, they do not provide enough substantive analysis to
develop a robust methodology for quantifying the military components of
energy security for this rulemaking. Thus, while EPA plans to continue
to review new studies that provide better estimates of the military
components of U.S. energy security benefits, for this rulemaking EPA
continues to exclude military cost components in our quantified energy
security benefits. Additional discussion of this issue can be found in
Chapter 4.2.8 of the Joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\876\ More information, including citations for these recent
studies, is available in Leiby, Paul. ``Military Costs of Energy
Security'', 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A further potential component of the full economic costs of oil
imports is the costs of building and maintaining the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The SPR is clearly related to U.S. oil use and
imports. Indeed, a stated purpose of the Energy Policy Conservation Act
is ``to provide for the creation of a Strategic Petroleum Reserve
capable of reducing the impact of severe energy supply interruptions'',
a provision enacted following the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo.\877\
However, these costs have not varied historically in response to
changes in U.S. oil import levels. Thus, although the influence of the
SPR on oil price increases resulting from a disruption of U.S. oil
imports is reflected in the ORNL estimate of the macroeconomic and
adjustment cost component of the oil import premium, potential changes
in the cost of maintaining the SPR associated with variation in U.S.
petroleum imports are excluded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\877\ See 42 U.S.C section 6201 (2) and Center for Auto Safety
v. NHTSA, 739 F. 2d 1322, 1324 (DC Cir. 1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
f. Total Energy Security Benefits
To summarize, EPA has included only the macroeconomic disruption
and adjustment costs portion of potential energy security benefits to
estimate the monetary value of the total energy security benefits of
this rule. The energy security premium values in this final rule have
been updated since the proposal to reflect the AEO2012 Early Release
Reference Case world oil prices. Otherwise, the methodology for
estimating the energy security benefits is consistent with that used in
the proposal. Based on an update of an earlier peer-reviewed Oak Ridge
National Laboratory study that was used in support of the both the
2012-2016 light duty vehicle and the 2014-2018 medium- and heavy-duty
vehicle GHG rulemakings, we estimate that each gallon of fuel saved
will reduce expected macroeconomic disruption and adjustment costs of
sudden reductions in the supply of imported oil to the U.S. economy by
$0.182 in 2020, $0.197 in 2025, $0.208 in 2030 and $0.225 in 2035, in
2010 dollars.
Using our fuel consumption analysis in conjunction with the
macroeconomic disruption and adjustment cost component of ORNL's energy
security premium estimates,878 879 we developed estimates of
the total energy security benefits of this rule for the years 2017
through 2050 as shown in Table III-99.\880\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\878\ AEO 2012 (Early Release) forecasts energy market trends
and values only to 2035. The energy security premium estimates post-
2035 were assumed to be the 2035 estimate.
\879\ Due to timing constraints, the energy security premiums
($/gallon) were derived using estimates of the gasoline consumption
reductions projected from this rule proposal.
\880\ Estimated reductions in U.S. imports of finished petroleum
products and crude oil are 95 percent of 54.2 million barrels (MMB)
in 2020, 609 MMB in 2030, 962 MMB in 2040, and 1,140 MMB in 2050.
[[Page 62942]]
Table III-99--Undiscounted Annual Energy Security Benefits & Program
Benefits Discounted Back to 2012
[2010$]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oil imports
Year reduced Benefits ($
(mmb) millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017......................................... 4.5 $33
2018......................................... 14.0 105
2019......................................... 28.6 216
2020......................................... 48.6 371
2021......................................... 77.7 601
2022......................................... 114 896
2023......................................... 158 1,260
2024......................................... 207 1,680
2025......................................... 263 2,170
2030......................................... 520 4,560
2040......................................... 880 8,320
2050......................................... 1,103 10,400
NPV, 3%...................................... ............ 84,500
NPV, 7%...................................... ............ 32,200
------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Additional Impacts
There are other impacts associated with the CO2
emissions standards and associated reduced fuel consumption that vary
with miles driven. Lower fuel consumption would, presumably, result in
fewer trips to the filling station to refuel and, thus, time saved. The
VMT rebound effect, discussed in detail in Section III.H.4.c, produces
additional benefits to vehicle owners in the form of consumer surplus
from the increase in vehicle-miles driven, but may also increase the
societal costs associated with traffic congestion, motor vehicle
crashes, and noise. These effects are likely to be relatively small in
comparison to the value of fuel saved as a result of the standards, but
they are nevertheless important to include. Table III-100 summarizes
the other economic impacts. Please refer to Preamble Section II.E and
the Joint TSD that accompanies this rule for more information about
these impacts and how EPA and NHTSA use them in their analyses.
Table III-100--Additional Impacts Associated With the Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Program
[Millions of 2010 dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 NPV, 3% NPV, 7%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accidents, Noise, Congestion Costs \a\.. -$54 -$564 -$5,710 -$9,650 -$12,100 -$101,000 -$39,200
Benefits of Increased Driving \b\....... 79 865 9,560 17,000 14,500 167,000 64,800
Benefits of Less Frequent Refueling..... 25 282 3,360 6,350 8,870 64,900 24,500
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Note that accidents, congestion and noise are costs, so the negative values shown represent increased costs which we treat as negative benefits.
\b\ Calculated using post-tax fuel prices.
10. Summary of Costs and Benefits
In this section, the agencies present a summary of costs, benefits,
and net benefits of the final program. Table III-101 shows the
estimated annual monetized costs of the final program for the indicated
calendar years. The table also shows the net present values of those
costs for the calendar years 2012-2050 using both 3 percent and 7
percent discount rates.\881\ Table III-102 shows the undiscounted
annual monetized fuel savings of the final program. The table also
shows the net present values of those fuel savings for the same
calendar years using both 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates. In
this table, the aggregate value of fuel savings is calculated using
pre-tax fuel prices since savings in fuel taxes do not represent a
reduction in the value of economic resources utilized in producing and
consuming fuel. Note that the fuel savings shown here result from
reductions in fleet-wide fuel use. Thus, fuel savings grow over time as
an increasing fraction of the fleet meets the final standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\881\ For the estimation of the stream of costs and benefits, we
assume that after implementation of the proposed MY 2017-2025
standards, the 2025 standards apply to each year thereafter.
Table III-101--Undiscounted Annual Costs & Costs of the Final Program Discounted Back to 2012 at 3% and 7% Discount Rates
[Millions, 2010$] \a\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV, years NPV, years
2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 2012-2050, 3% 2012-2050, 7%
discount rate discount rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Costs........................ $2,440 $8,860 $33,700 $37,400 $42,000 $521,000 $231,000
Maintenance Costs....................... 37 330 2,260 3,630 4,540 39,500 15,600
Vehicle Program Costs................... 2,470 9,190 35,900 41,000 46,500 561,000 247,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:
\a\ Technology costs for separate light-duty vehicle segments can be found in Section III.H.2. Annual costs shown are undiscounted values.
[[Page 62943]]
Table III-102--Undiscounted Annual Fuel Savings & Final Program Fuel Savings Discounted Back to 2012 at 3% and 7% Discount Rates
[Millions, 2010$] \a\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV, years 2012- NPV, years 2012-
2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050, 3% 2050, 7%
discount rate discount rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel Savings (pre-tax)........... $651 $7,430 $86,400 $155,000 $212,000 $1,600,000 $607,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:
\a\ Fuel savings for separate light-duty vehicle segments can be found in Section III.H.3. Annual costs shown are undiscounted values.
Table III-103 presents estimated annual monetized benefits for the
indicated calendar years. The table also shows the net present values
of those benefits for the calendar years 2012-2050 using both 3 percent
and 7 percent discount rates. The table shows the benefits of reduced
CO2 emissions--and consequently the annual quantified
benefits (i.e., total benefits)--for each of the four social cost of
carbon (SCC) values estimated by the interagency working group. As
discussed in the RIA Chapter 7.2, there are some limitations to the SCC
analysis, including the incomplete way in which the integrated
assessment models capture catastrophic and non-catastrophic impacts,
their incomplete treatment of adaptation and technological change,
uncertainty in the extrapolation of damages to high temperatures, and
assumptions regarding risk aversion.
In addition, these monetized GHG benefits exclude the value of net
reductions in non-CO2 GHG emissions (CH4,
N2O, HFC) expected under this action. Although EPA has not
monetized the benefits of reductions in non-CO2 GHGs, the
value of these reductions should not be interpreted as zero. Rather,
the net reductions in non-CO2 GHGs will contribute to this
program's climate benefits, as explained in Section III.H.5.
Table III-103--Monetized Undiscounted Annual Benefits & Benefits of the Final Program Discounted Back to 2012 at 3% and 7% Discount Rates
[Millions, 2010$]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV, Years NPV, Years
2012-2050, 3% 2012-2050, 7%
2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 discount rate discount rate
\a\ \a\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduced CO[ihel2] Emissions at Each Assumed SCC Value \b\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% (avg SCC)............................ $14 $164 $2,500 $5,510 $8,540 $32,400 $32,400
3% (avg SCC)............................ 55 633 8,410 17,000 24,400 170,000 170,000
2.5% (avg SCC).......................... 87 1,000 12,900 25,400 35,400 290,000 290,000
3% (95th %ile).......................... 167 1,940 25,700 51,800 74,100 519,000 519,000
Energy Security Benefits (macro- 33 371 4,560 8,320 10,400 84,500 32,200
disruption costs)......................
Accidents, Congestion, Noise Costs \g\.. -54 -564 -5,710 -9,650 -12,100 -101,000 -39,200
Increased Travel Benefits \h\........... 79 865 9,560 17,000 14,500 167,000 64,800
Refueling Time Savings.................. 25 282 3,360 6,350 8,870 64,900 24,500
Non-GHG Related Health Impacts \c,d,e\.. B B 920-1,000 920-1,000 920-1,000 9,190 3,050
Non-CO2 GHG Impacts \f\................. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Benefits at Each Assumed SCC Value \b\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% (avg SCC)............................ 97 1,120 15,300 28,500 31,300 257,000 118,000
3% (avg SCC)............................ 138 1,590 21,200 40,000 47,200 395,000 256,000
2.5% (avg SCC).......................... 171 1,960 25,600 48,400 58,100 515,000 376,000
3% (95th %ile).......................... 250 2,890 38,500 74,800 96,900 743,000 604,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Net present value of reduced CO2 emissions is calculated differently than other benefits. The same discount rate used to discount the value of
damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, 2.5 percent) is used to calculate net present value of SCC for internal consistency. Refer to the SCC TSD
for more detail. Annual costs shown are undiscounted values.
\b\ Section III.H.5 notes that SCC increases over time. For the years 2012-2050, the SCC estimates range as follows: For Average SCC at 5%: 5-$16; for
Average SCC at 3%: $23-$46; for Average SCC at 2.5%: $38-$67; and for 95th percentile SCC at 3%: $70-$140.
\c\ Note that ``B'' indicates unquantified criteria pollutant benefits in years prior to 2030 (2017-2029). For the final rule, EPA only conducted full-
scale photochemical air quality modeling to estimate the rule's PM2.5- and ozone-related impacts in the calendar year 2030. For the purposes of
estimating a stream of future-year criteria pollutant benefits associated with the final standards, we assume that the annual benefits out to 2050 are
equal to, and no less than, those modeled in 2030 as reflected by the stream of estimated future emission reductions. The NPV of criteria pollutant-
related benefits should therefore be considered a conservative estimate of the potential benefits associated with the final rule.
[[Page 62944]]
\d\ The PM2.5-related portion of the health benefits presented in this table are based on an estimate of premature mortality derived from the ACS study
(Pope et al., 2002). However, EPA's primary method of characterizing PM-related premature mortality is to use both the ACS and the Six Cities study
(Laden et al., 2006) to generate a co-equal range of benefits estimates. The decision to present only the ACS-based estimate in this table does not
convey any preference for one study over the other. We note that this is also the more conservative of the two estimates--PM-related benefits would be
approximately 245 percent (or nearly two-and-a-half times) larger had we used the per-ton benefit values based on the Six Cities study instead. Refer
to Section III.H.7 to see the full range of non-GHG related health benefits in Calendar Year 2030.
\e\ The range of calendar year non-GHG benefits presented in this table assume either a 3% discount rate in the valuation of PM-related premature
mortality ($1,000 million) or a 7% discount rate ($920 million) to account for a twenty-year segmented cessation lag. Note that the benefits estimated
using a 3% discount rate were used to calculate the NPV using a 3% discount rate and the benefits estimated using a 7% discount rate were used to
calculate the NPV using a 7% discount rate.
\f\ The monetized GHG benefits presented in this analysis exclude the value of changes in non-CO2 GHG emissions expected under this program (See RIA
Chapter 7.1). Although EPA has not monetized changes in non-CO2 GHGs, the value of any increases or reductions should not be interpreted as zero. We
seek comment on a method of quantifying non-CO2 GHG benefits in Section III.H.5.
\g\ Negative values for Accidents, Congestion, and Noise costs represent disbenefits.
\h\ Refer to Chapter 4.2.6 of the joint TSD for a description of how increased travel benefits are derived.
Table III-104 presents estimated annual net benefits for the
indicated calendar years. The table also shows the net present values
of those net benefits for the calendar years 2012-2050 using both 3
percent and 7 percent discount rates. The table includes the benefits
of reduced CO2 emissions (and consequently the annual net
benefits) for each of the four SCC values considered by EPA.
Table III-104--Undiscounted Annual Monetized Net Benefits & Net Benefits of the Final Program Discounted Back to 2012 at 3% and 7% Discount Rates
[Millions, 2009$]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2020 2030 2040 2050 NPV, 3%\a\ NPV, 7%\a\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle Program Costs................... $2,470 $9,190 $35,900 $41,000 $46,500 $561,000 $247,000
Fuel Savings............................ 651 7,430 86,400 155,000 212,000 1,600,000 607,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Benefits at Each Assumed SCC Value \b\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% (avg SCC)............................ 97 1,120 15,300 28,500 31,300 257,000 118,000
3% (avg SCC)............................ 138 1,590 21,200 40,000 47,200 395,000 256,000
2.5% (avg SCC).......................... 171 1,960 25,600 48,400 58,100 515,000 376,000
3% (95th %ile).......................... 250 2,890 38,500 74,800 96,900 743,000 604,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monetized Net Benefits at Each Assumed SCC Value \c\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% (avg SCC)............................ -1,690 -316 68,000 146,000 201,000 1,290,000 478,000
3% (avg SCC)............................ -1,650 153 73,900 158,000 217,000 1,430,000 616,000
2.5% (avg SCC).......................... -1,610 524 78,300 166,000 228,000 1,550,000 736,000
3% (95th %ile).......................... -1,530 1,460 91,200 192,000 267,000 1,780,000 964,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Net present value of reduced CO2 emissions is calculated differently than other benefits. The same discount rate used to discount the value of
damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, 2.5 percent) is used to calculate net present value of SCC for internal consistency. Refer to the SCC TSD
for more detail. Annual costs shown are undiscounted values.
\b\ Section VIII.H.5 notes that SCC increases over time. For the years 2012-2050, the SCC estimates range as follows: for Average SCC at 5%: $5-$16; for
Average SCC at 3%: $23-$46; for Average SCC at 2.5%: $38-$67; and for 95th percentile SCC at 3%: $70-$140. Section VIII.H.5 also presents these SCC
estimates.
\c\ Net Benefits equal Fuel Savings minus Technology Costs plus Benefits.
EPA also conducted a separate analysis of the total benefits over
the model year lifetimes of the 2017 through 2025 model year vehicles.
In contrast to the calendar year analysis presented above in Table III-
101 through Table III-104, the model year lifetime analysis below shows
the impacts of the final program on vehicles produced during each of
the model years 2017 through 2025 over the course of their expected
lifetimes. The net societal benefits over the full lifetimes of
vehicles produced during each of the nine model years from 2017 through
2025 are shown in Table III-105 and Table III-106 at both 3 percent and
7 percent discount rates, respectively.
Table III-105--Monetized Technology Costs, Fuel Savings, Benefits, and Net Benefits Associated With the Lifetimes of 2017-2025 Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicles
[Millions, 2009$; 3% discount rate] \h\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 MY 2018 MY 2019 MY 2020 MY 2021 MY 2022 MY 2023 MY 2024 MY 2025 MY Sum
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle Program Costs.................... $2,770 $5,460 $7,720 $10,100 $14,000 $19,900 $25,400 $30,900 $33,600 $150,000
Fuel Savings (pre-tax)................... 7,040 15,500 24,300 34,100 50,400 64,900 78,500 92,800 107,000 475,000
Energy Security Benefits (macro- 365 807 1,260 1,780 2,650 3,430 4,170 4,950 5,750 25,200
disruption costs).......................
[[Page 62945]]
Accidents, Congestion, Noise Costs \f\... -548 -1,150 -1,770 -2,440 -3,480 -4,420 -5,270 -6,160 -7,040 -32,300
Increased Travel Benefits \i\............ 1,000 2,180 3,390 4,700 6,840 8,650 10,200 11,900 13,600 62,500
Refueling Time Savings................... 273 604 945 1,330 1,970 2,550 3,100 3,680 4,280 18,700
PM2.5 Related Health Impacts \c,d,e\..... 74 171 271 385 606 776 928 1,090 1,250 5,540
Non-CO2 GHG Impacts \g\.................. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduced CO[ihel2] Emissions at Each Assumed SCC Value \a,b\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% (avg SCC)............................. 152 344 551 794 1,210 1,590 1,970 2,380 2,820 11,800
3% (avg SCC)............................. 642 1,440 2,270 3,230 4,850 6,330 7,740 9,260 10,800 46,600
2.5% (avg SCC)........................... 1,040 2,320 3,660 5,190 7,760 10,100 12,300 14,700 17,100 74,100
3% (95th %ile)........................... 1,970 4,390 6,950 9,880 14,800 19,300 23,600 28,300 33,000 142,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monetized Net Benefits at Each Assumed SCC Value \a,b\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% (avg SCC)............................. 5,590 13,000 21,200 30,500 46,200 57,500 68,100 79,700 94,400 416,000
3% (avg SCC)............................. 6,080 14,100 22,900 33,000 49,900 62,200 73,900 86,600 102,000 451,000
2.5% (avg SCC)........................... 6,480 15,000 24,300 34,900 52,800 66,000 78,500 92,000 109,000 479,000
3% (95th %ile)........................... 7,400 17,100 27,600 39,600 59,800 75,200 89,800 106,000 125,000 547,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Net present value of reduced CO2 emissions is calculated differently than other benefits. The same discount rate used to discount the value of
damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, 2.5 percent) is used to calculate net present value of SCC for internal consistency. Refer to the SCC TSD
for more detail.
\b\ Section III.H.5 notes that SCC increases over time. For the years 2012-2050, the SCC estimates range as follows: For Average SCC at 5%: $5-$16; for
Average SCC at 3%: $23-$46; for Average SCC at 2.5%: $38-$67; and for 95th percentile SCC at 3%: $70-$140. Section III.H.5 also presents these SCC
estimates.
\c\ Note that the non-GHG impacts associated with the standards presented here do not include the full complement of endpoints that, if quantified and
monetized, would change the total monetized estimate of rule-related impacts. Instead, the non-GHG benefits are based on benefit-per-ton values that
reflect only human health impacts associated with reductions in PM2.5 exposure. Ideally, human health and environmental benefits would be based on
changes in ambient PM2.5 and ozone as determined by full-scale air quality modeling. However, EPA was unable to conduct a full-scale air quality
modeling for the Model Year analysis. Full scale air quality modeling was conducted for the Calendar Year analysis. See Section III.G and III.H.7 for
a discussion of that analysis.
\d\ The PM2.5-related health benefits (derived from benefit-per-ton values) presented in this table are based on an estimate of premature mortality
derived from the ACS study (Pope et al., 2002). However, EPA's primary method of characterizing PM-related premature mortality is to use both the ACS
and the Six Cities study (Laden et al., 2006) to generate a co-equal range of benefits estimates. The decision to present only the ACS-based estimate
in this table does not convey any preference for one study over the other. We note that this is also the more conservative of the two estimates--PM-
related benefits would be approximately 245 percent (or nearly two-and-a-half times) larger had we used the per-ton benefit values based on the Six
Cities study instead. See Joint TSD 4 for a detailed description of the dollar-per-ton values used in this analysis.
\e\ The PM2.5-related health benefits (derived from benefit-per-ton values) presented in this table assume a 3% discount rate in the valuation of
premature mortality to account for a twenty-year segmented cessation lag. If a 7% discount rate had been used, the values would be approximately 9%
lower.
\f\ Negative values for Accidents, Congestion, and Noise costs represent disbenefits.
\g\ The monetized GHG benefits presented in this analysis exclude the value of changes in non-CO2 GHG emissions expected under this action (See RIA
Chapter 7.1). Although EPA has not monetized changes in non-CO2 GHGs, the value of any increases or reductions should not be interpreted as zero. We
seek comment on a method of quantifying non-CO2 GHG benefits in Section III.H.5.
\h\ Model year values are discounted to the first year of each model year; the ``Sum'' represents those discounted values summed across model years.
\i\ Refer to Chapter 4.2.6 of the joint TSD for a description of how increased travel benefits are derived.
Table III-106--Monetized Technology Costs, Fuel Savings, Benefits, and Net Benefits Associated With the Lifetimes of 2017-2025 Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicles
[Millions, 2009; 7% discount rate] \h\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 MY 2018 MY 2019 MY 2020 MY 2021 MY 2022 MY 2023 MY 2024 MY 2025 MY Sum
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle Program Costs..................... $2,650 $5,220 $7,370 $9,610 $13,300 $19,200 $24,600 $29,900 $32,500 $144,000
Fuel Savings (pre-tax).................... 5,410 11,900 18,600 26,100 38,600 49,700 60,100 71,100 82,300 364,000
Energy Security Benefits (macro-disruption 279 615 964 1,360 2,020 2,620 3,180 3,780 4,400 19,200
costs)...................................
[[Page 62946]]
Accidents, Congestion, Noise Costs \f\.... -425 -893 -1,370 -1,890 -2,690 -3,410 -4,070 -4,760 -5,440 -24,900
Increased Travel Benefits \i\............. 761 1,650 2,550 3,530 5,120 6,470 7,640 8,870 10,100 46,700
Refueling Time Savings.................... 209 461 721 1,020 1,500 1,940 2,360 2,800 3,260 14,300
PM2.5 Related Health Impacts c,d,e........ 59 136 215 305 478 607 721 840 959 4,320
Non-CO2 GHG Impacts \g\................... n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduced CO[ihel2] Emissions at Each Assumed SCC Value \a,b\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% (avg SCC).............................. 152 344 551 794 1,210 1,590 1,970 2,380 2,820 11,800
3% (avg SCC).............................. 642 1,440 2,270 3,230 4,850 6,330 7,740 9,260 10,800 46,600
2.5% (avg SCC)............................ 1,040 2,320 3,660 5,190 7,760 10,100 12,300 14,700 17,100 74,100
3% (95th %ile)............................ 1,970 4,390 6,950 9,880 14,800 19,300 23,600 28,300 33,000 142,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monetized Net Benefits at Each Assumed SCC Value a,b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% (avg SCC).............................. 3,800 9,010 14,900 21,600 32,900 40,300 47,300 55,100 65,800 291,000
3% (avg SCC).............................. 4,290 10,100 16,600 24,100 36,500 45,000 53,100 62,000 73,800 326,000
2.5% (avg SCC)............................ 4,690 11,000 18,000 26,000 39,400 48,800 57,600 67,400 80,100 353,000
3% (95th %ile)............................ 5,610 13,100 21,300 30,700 46,500 58,000 69,000 81,000 96,100 421,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\a\ Net present value of reduced CO2 emissions is calculated differently than other benefits. The same discount rate used to discount the value of
damages from future emissions (SCC at 5, 3, 2.5 percent) is used to calculate net present value of SCC for internal consistency. Refer to the SCC TSD
for more detail.
\b\ Section III.H.5 notes that SCC increases over time. For the years 2012-2050, the SCC estimates range as follows: For Average SCC at 5%: $5-$16; for
Average SCC at 3%: $23-$46; for Average SCC at 2.5%: $38-$67; and for 95th percentile SCC at 3%: $70-$140. Section III.H.5 also presents these SCC
estimates.
\c\ Note that the non-GHG impacts associated with the standards presented here do not include the full complement of endpoints that, if quantified and
monetized, would change the total monetized estimate of rule-related impacts. Instead, the non-GHG benefits are based on benefit-per-ton values that
reflect only human health impacts associated with reductions in PM2.5 exposure. Ideally, human health and environmental benefits would be based on
changes in ambient PM2.5 and ozone as determined by full-scale air quality modeling. However, EPA was unable to conduct a full-scale air quality
modeling for the Model Year analysis. Full scale air quality modeling was conducted for the Calendar Year analysis. See Section III.G and III.H.7 for
a discussion of that analysis.
\d\ The PM2.5-related health benefits (derived from benefit-per-ton values) presented in this table are based on an estimate of premature mortality
derived from the ACS study (Pope et al., 2002). However, EPA's primary method of characterizing PM-related premature mortality is to use both the ACS
and the Six Cities study (Laden et al., 2006) to generate a co-equal range of benefits estimates. The decision to present only the ACS-based estimate
in this table does not convey any preference for one study over the other. We note that this is also the more conservative of the two estimates--PM-
related benefits would be approximately 245 percent (or nearly two-and-a-half times) larger had we used the per-ton benefit values based on the Six
Cities study instead. See Joint TSD 4 for a detailed description of the dollar-per-ton values used in this analysis.
\e\ The PM2.5-related health benefits (derived from benefit-per-ton values) presented in this table assume a 3% discount rate in the valuation of
premature mortality to account for a twenty-year segmented cessation lag. If a 7% discount rate had been used, the values would be approximately 9%
lower.
\f\ Negative values for Accidents, Congestion, and Noise costs represent disbenefits.
\g\ The monetized GHG benefits presented in this analysis exclude the value of changes in non-CO2 GHG emissions expected under this action (See RIA
Chapter 7.1). Although EPA has not monetized changes in non-CO2 GHGs, the value of any increases or reductions should not be interpreted as zero. We
seek comment on a method of quantifying non-CO2 GHG benefits in Section III.H.5.
\h\ Model year values are discounted to the first year of each model year; the ``Sum'' represents those discounted values summed across model years.
\i\ Refer to Chapter 4.2.6 of the joint TSD for a description of how increased travel benefits are derived.
11. U.S. Vehicle Sales Impacts and Affordability of New Vehicles
a. Vehicle Sales Impacts
Predicting the effects of this rule on vehicle sales entails
comparing two effects. On the one hand, the vehicles designed to meet
the standards will become more expensive, which would, by itself,
discourage sales. On the other hand, the vehicles will have improved
fuel economy and thus lower operating costs due to significant fuel
savings, which could encourage sales. Which of these effects dominates
for potential vehicle buyers when they are considering a purchase will
determine the effect on sales. Assessing the net effect of these two
competing effects is uncertain, as it rests on how consumers value fuel
savings at the time of purchase and the extent to which manufacturers
and dealers reflect technology costs in the purchase price. The
empirical literature does not provide clear evidence on how much of the
value of fuel savings consumers consider at the time of purchase. It
also generally does not speak to the efficiency of manufacturing and
dealer pricing decisions. Thus, we do not provide quantified estimates
of potential sales impacts in this final rule.
An additional source of uncertainty in the analysis is
understanding what would happen in the absence of this rule. Standard
economic theory would suggest that, if automakers could profitably
increase sales by adding more fuel-saving technologies to their
vehicles, then manufacturers' profit motives would lead them to
voluntarily
[[Page 62947]]
add those technologies in the absence of this rule. As discussed in
Preamble Section III.D.1, we project, based on historical patterns,
that auto makers would not go beyond the MY 2016 standards in the
absence of this rule. Yet, if consumers consider just over three years'
worth of fuel savings in their vehicle purchase decisions and our
assumptions about technology costs and future gas prices are correct,
the payback period analysis in Section III.H.5 suggests that sales
would increase in response to this rule.
Although it is possible that manufacturers would not find it
profitable to add at least some of the vehicle technologies in the
absence of the rule (see Section III.H.1.a for a discussion), there may
be the potential for increases in vehicle sales as a result of the
rule. These explanations focus on conditions where the rule stimulates
investments that would not happen in the rule's absence. The
explanations posed below raise possibilities that the rule, by
requiring all automakers to meet the standards, may lead to mutually
beneficial outcomes that might not happen in the absence of the rule.
Consumers would then have the opportunity to purchase vehicles that
would not be available in the absence of the rule; if consumers
consider at least as many years of fuel savings when buying new
vehicles as the payback period for the new technologies, and if
manufacturers nonetheless would not have produced these vehicles in the
absence of the rule, positive sales impacts could occur as a result of
these final standards. The three possibilities we suggest for such
outcomes are promotion of social learning, reduction of risk and
uncertainty for manufacturers, and promotion of innovation.
i. Social Learning
For many years, fuel economy standards did not change (see Preamble
III.D.1).\882\ As discussed in Preamble III.H.1.a, consumers may not
have focused on fuel economy, or may have found it difficult to do
calculations involving the tradeoffs between fuel economy and increased
vehicle costs, or may not have found vehicles with their preferred
combination of fuel economy and other features. In recent years,
though, fuel economy standards have started to increase.\883\ In
addition, high fuel prices have helped to focus consumer attention
toward vehicle fuel economy. Finally, the recently revised fuel economy
label, with prominent information on fuel savings, are starting to
appear on new vehicles. These factors may contribute to consumers
gaining experience with the benefits that accrue to them from owning
and operating vehicles with greater fuel efficiency. Consumer
households that include vehicles with a fairly wide range of fuel
economy have an opportunity to learn about the value of fuel economy on
their own. Consumer demand may be shifting towards such vehicles, not
only because of higher fuel prices but also if many consumers are
learning about the value of purchases based not only on initial costs
but also on the total cost of owning and operating a vehicle over its
lifetime. This type of learning should continue before and during the
model years affected by this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\882\ Car CAFE standards did not change from MYs 1990 through
2010. Truck CAFE standards did not change from MYs 1996 through
2004, and changed only 0.5 mpg cumulatively from MYs 1991 through
2004. See ``Summary of Fuel Economy Performance,'' March 12, 2012,
DOT/NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
\883\ Truck CAFE standards began to rise in MY 2005 and have
risen every year since. Car CAFE standards began to rise in MY 2011.
Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today's rule, combined with the new and easier-to-understand fuel
economy labels required to be on all new vehicles in MY 2013, may
increase sales by hastening this very type of consumer learning. As
more consumers experience the savings in time and expense from owning
more fuel efficient vehicles, demand may shift yet further in the
direction of the vehicles with improved fuel economy and reduced GHG
emissions mandated under the rule. This social learning can take place
both within and across households, as consumers learn from one another.
First and most directly, the time and fuel savings associated with
operating more fuel efficient vehicles may be more salient to
individuals who own them, which might cause their subsequent purchase
decisions to shift closer to minimizing the total cost of ownership
over the lifetime of the vehicle. Second, this appreciation may spread
across households through word of mouth, marketing and advertising, and
other forms of communications. Third, as more motorists experience the
time and fuel savings associated with greater fuel efficiency, the
price of used cars may better reflect such efficiency, further reducing
the cost of owning more efficient vehicles for the buyers of new
vehicles (since the resale price may increase). If these induced
learning effects are strong, the rule could potentially increase total
vehicle sales over time. This effect may be speeded or slowed by other
factors that enter into a consumer's valuation of fuel efficiency in
selecting vehicles.
The possibility that the rule could (after a lag for consumer
learning) increase sales need not rest on the assumption that
automobile manufacturers are failing to pursue profitable opportunities
to supply the vehicles that consumers demand. In the absence of the
rule, no individual automobile manufacturer would find it profitable to
move toward more efficient vehicles to increase consumer learning
because no individual company can fully internalize the potential
future boost to demand. If one company were to make more efficient
vehicles, counting on consumer learning to enhance demand in the
future, that company would capture only a fraction of the extra sales
so generated, because the learning at issue is not specific to any one
company's fleet. Many of the extra sales could accrue to that company's
competitors.
In other words, consumer learning about the benefits of fuel
efficient vehicles involves positive externalities (spillovers) from
one company to the others.\884\ These positive externalities may lead
to benefits for manufacturers as a whole if they increase the demand
for vehicles. We emphasize that this discussion has been tentative and
qualified. It is not possible to quantify these learning effects years
in advance, and these effects may be speeded or slowed by other factors
that enter into a consumer's valuation of fuel efficiency in selecting
vehicles. To be sure, social learning of related kinds has been
identified in a number of contexts.\885\ We asked for comments on the
discussion offered here, with particular reference to any relevant
empirical findings. 76 FR 75150. We continue to explore this issue but
did not receive any comments on the role of social learning, except in
the context (discussed in Section III.H.1.a) of the effect of the rule
on the visibility of and
[[Page 62948]]
status associated with owning vehicles with improved fuel economy.
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\884\ Industrywide positive spillovers of this type are hardly
unique to this situation. In many industries, companies form trade
associations to promote industry-wide public goods. For example,
merchants in a given locale may band together to promote tourism in
that locale. Antitrust law recognizes that this type of coordination
can increase output.
\885\ See Hunt Alcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation,
Journal of Public Economics (forthcoming 2011), available at http://web.mit.edu/allcott/www/Allcott%202011%20JPubEc%20-%20Social%20Norms%20and%20Energy%20Conservation.pdf (Docket EPA-HQ-
OAR-0799-0825); Christophe Chamley, Rational Herds: Economic Models
of Social Learning (Cambridge, 2003) (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-0799-1110).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Reduction in Risk and Uncertainty for Manufacturers
As discussed in Preamble III.H.1.a, there appears to be a great
deal of uncertainty about how consumers will respond to increases in
fuel economy. Automakers may be cautious about adding more fuel-saving
technology to vehicles if they are uncertain how buyers will respond.
Even if they believe that buyers will respond positively, if a company
is risk-averse, it may nevertheless hesitate to make the substantial
major investments in new technologies and in research that would lead
to increases in fuel economy across its fleet.\886\ If a manufacturer
invests substantially in fuel efficient technologies expecting higher
consumer demand than realized, then the manufacturer has incurred the
costs of investment but not reaped the benefits of those investments.
On the other hand, if a manufacturer does not invest in fuel-efficient
technologies, then the manufacturers may lose some sales in the short
run if demand for fuel economy is higher than expected, but it still
retains the option of investing in fuel-efficient technologies in the
longer run. If its investments proved unsuccessful, the company might
face substantial losses. Even if the probability of being unsuccessful
is low, the manufacturer may nevertheless perceive the losses in that
scenario as a substantial risk. If the investment proved successful,
the company would, of course, take market share from other companies--
but, assuming that there are not brand-loyalty or other advantages to
being first in the market with new fuel-saving technologies, only until
the other auto companies caught up. In other words, for a risk-averse
company, being a first mover may appear to have a greater downside risk
than upside risk, even if the investment, on an expected-value basis,
would pay off. If all companies are risk-averse, then they may all seek
a strategy of waiting for some other company to be the first mover. In
this case, caution about these major investments may lead to a lack of
adoption of new technologies, in the absence of the rulemaking,
consistent with the flat baseline assumption. This rulemaking, by
requiring that all companies act at the same time, removes the scenario
of one company bearing all the risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\886\ Sunding, David, and David Zilberman, ``The Agricultural
Innovation Process: Research and Technology Adoption in a Changing
Agricultural Sector,'' Chapter 4 in Handbook of Agricultural
Economics, Volume 1, edited by B. Gardner and G. Rausser (Elsevier,
2001) show how delaying adoption of a new technology in order to
gain more information may be a more profitable activity than
adopting a technology, even if it has positive net benefits, when a
potential adopter is risk-averse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, there may be risk aversion on the consumer side. The
simultaneous investment by all companies may also encourage consumer
confidence in the new technologies. If only one company adopted new
technologies, early adopters might gravitate toward that company, but
early adopters tend to be a relatively small portion of the public.
More cautious buyers, who are likely to be more numerous, might wait
for greater information before moving away from well-known
technologies. If all companies adopt advanced technologies at the same
time, though, potential buyers may perceive the new technologies as the
new norm rather than as a risky innovation. They will then be more
willing to move to the new technologies. As some commenters have
pointed out, simultaneous action required by the rule may change
buyers' expectations (their reference points) for fuel economy, and
investing in more fuel economy may seem less risky than in the absence
of the rule.
The rule, then, may reduce manufacturers' risk of making
significant investments in fuel-saving technologies by requiring that
all companies produce more fuel-efficient vehicles. Under this outcome,
it is possible for the rule to facilitate investment that would not
happen in the absence of the rule, and vehicle sales could increase as
a result of the rule.
iii. Promotion of Innovation
Research among multiple parties can be a synergistic process: Ideas
by one researcher may stimulate new ideas by others, and more and
better results occur than if the one researcher operated in
isolation.\887\ Collaboration between automotive companies or
automotive suppliers does occur; for example, in 2011 Toyota and Ford
announced a new effort to collaborate on the development of hybrid
technology for pickup trucks.\888\ Another example was the four-year
joint development effort between General Motors and Ford from 2002-2006
for the development of a new six-speed automatic transmission.\889\ One
function that standards can serve is to promote research into low-
CO2 technologies that would not take place in the absence of
the standards. Because all companies (both auto firms and auto
suppliers) will have incentives to find better, less expensive ways of
meeting the standards in this rule, the possibilities for synergistic
interactions may increase. Thus, the rule, by focusing all companies on
finding more efficient ways of achieving the standards, may lead to
better outcomes than if any one company operated on its own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\887\ Powell, Walter W., and Eric Giannella, ``Collective
Invention and Inventor Networks,'' Chapter 13 in Handbook of the
Economics of Innovation, Volume 1, edited by B. Hall and N.
Rosenberg (Elsevier, 2010) (EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799) discuss
how a ``collective momentum'' has led uncoordinated research efforts
among a diverse set of players to develop advances in a number of
technologies (such as electricity and telephones). They contrast
this view of technological innovation with that of proprietary
research in corporate laboratories, where the research is part of a
corporate strategy. Such momentum may result in part from alignment
of economic, social, political, and other goals.
\888\ ``Ford and Toyota To Work Together on Hybrid System for
Trucks'', New York Times, August 22, 2011. (EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799).
\889\ ``Ford, GM Launch Joint 6-speed Automatic,'' Wards
Automotive, August 31, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An additional aspect of the standards is the possibility of greater
standardization. As more companies adopt new technologies, the
incentives increase for additional suppliers and more availability of
after-market replacement parts; these suppliers would be likely to find
ways to increase compatibility across vehicle types. For example,
though electric vehicles (EVs) are not expected to be more than a few
percent of the vehicles produced in response to this rule, their
adoption depends on such factors as batteries and charging methods that
are compatible across different companies. These are examples of
``network externalities,'' where use of a technology by one party has
greater benefits if more people are also using the technology. In this
case, just as the ability to buy gasoline from any station facilitates
owning a gasoline-based vehicle, the ability to recharge an EV or get
replacement parts easily facilitates ownership of an EV. In the absence
of the rule, fewer companies would be pursuing this technology, and it
would be considered a specialty product; the incentives to coordinate
might be low. If EVs become more common, though, compatible
infrastructure and batteries may become more desirable, as potential
buyers are likely to be encouraged toward this technology if they can
easily find places to charge batteries.
Thus, the rule may direct and promote innovation and
standardization that would not happen in the absence of this rule. Such
changes could reduce the cost increases associated with the rule and
improve the qualities of the technologies, which could result in an
[[Page 62949]]
increase in vehicle sales. Further, the certainty of the regulations
reduces the costs of meeting them, because there will be more economies
of scale and more learning curve benefits due to greater cumulative
production of fuel-efficient technologies.
Several commenters requested that we conduct a quantitative vehicle
sales analysis. As discussed in the proposal, in previous rulemakings,
EPA and NHTSA conducted vehicle sales analyses by comparing the up-
front costs of the vehicles with the present value of five years' worth
of fuel savings; the direction of vehicle sales would depend on whether
up-front costs exceeded fuel savings (in which case sales would be
expected to decline), or vice versa (in which case sales would be
expected to increase).\890\ Some commenters specifically requested that
we use the method found in the MYs 2012-16 rule; some specifically
supported the five-year payback period; others argued for the
importance of conducting the analysis without recommending methods.
Ceres estimates that the rule will increase vehicle sales by 4.7
percent; \891\ the Defour Group provided estimates that the rule will
decrease vehicle sales by 6-10 percent.\892\ The differences in the
results appear to depend on the cost estimates used and on assumptions
made about how vehicle buyers think about fuel savings when deciding on
vehicle purchases. The Defour Group, for instance, uses cost estimates
of about $3000 per vehicle based on summing costs (but not benefits)
across multiple rules (an estimate we consider to be unfounded for
reasons explained in this section below and also in TSD Chapter 3.1.2)
and the assumption that consumers consider only 25 percent of fuel
savings in their vehicle purchase decisions (see discussion in Section
III.H.1.a). Other commenters wanted specific information on the effect
of the rule on vehicle costs and whether consumers will be willing to
buy the new vehicles, while consumer and environmental organizations
indicated that consumers want more fuel-efficient vehicles, even if the
up-front costs of the vehicles increase. The costs of the rule are
discussed in Preamble Section III.H.2. As discussed in Preamble Section
III.H.1.a, we do not at this point have sufficient confidence in the
estimates of the role of fuel economy in consumers' vehicle purchases
to come to definitive conclusions about the impacts of the rule on
vehicle sales. We do not, however, consider this uncertainty grounds
for delaying the rule, as one comment suggested. The midterm evaluation
provides an opportunity to revisit the impact of the rule on vehicle
sales and consumer acceptance of the new technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\890\ For instance, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(April 2010). ``final rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards: Regulatory Impact Analysis.'' EPA-420-R-10-009, Chapter
8.1.1, pp. 8-1 to 8-4.
\891\ Comments on this rule from Ceres, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799-9475, referring to a forthcoming report, Citi Investment
Research and Analysis, ``U.S. Autos and Auto Parts: Fuel Economy
Focus: Industry Perspectives on 2020,'' April 3, 2012, Docket EPA-
HQ-OAR-2010-0799.
\892\ Walton, Thomas F., and Dean Drake, Defour Group, LLC.
``Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis for MY 2017 to 2025 Fuel Economy
Standards.'' February 13, 2012. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This rule takes effect for MY 2017-2025. In the intervening years,
it is possible that the assumptions underlying a quantitative analysis,
as well as market conditions, might change. As the United Auto Workers
points out, the state of the economy is a major, if not the primary,
determinant of total vehicle sales. The impact of the rule on sales may
therefore depend, among other factors, on changes in the state of the
economy. Other commenters discussed the importance of consumer
confidence, fuel prices, and even of publicity over fuel prices, in
consumers' interest in additional fuel economy. Sales could be
negatively affected if gasoline prices are lower than expected or
technology costs are higher than expected. In these cases, it is
possible that the standards could require manufacturers to produce cars
with higher levels of fuel economy than consumers would wish to buy. On
the other hand, manufacturers' marketing of increased fuel economy
levels is also likely to play a role in consumer response to these
vehicles. EPA agrees that these factors are important, but we are not
sufficiently confident in quantitative estimates of the impacts of
those factors to develop numerical estimates. We instead provide this
qualitative assessment to highlight the factors important for
understanding the effects of this rule on vehicle sales.
As several commenters point out, the effect of this rule on the use
and scrappage of older vehicles will be related to its effects on new
vehicle prices, the fuel efficiency of new vehicle models, the fuel
efficiency of used vehicles, and the total sales of new vehicles. If
the value of fuel savings resulting from improved fuel efficiency to
the typical potential buyer of a new vehicle outweighs the average
increase in new models' prices, sales of new vehicles could rise, the
used vehicle market may increase in volume as new vehicle buyers sell
their older vehicles, and scrappage rates of used vehicles may increase
slightly. This will cause both an influx of more efficient vehicles
into the used vehicle market and an increase in the turnover of the
vehicle fleet (i.e., the retirement of used vehicles and their
replacement by new models), thus accentuating the anticipated effect of
the rule on fleet-wide fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.
However, if potential buyers value future fuel savings resulting from
the increased fuel efficiency of new models at less than the increase
in their average selling price, sales of new vehicles will decline, the
used vehicle market may decrease in volume as people hold onto their
vehicles longer, and there will be a reduction in the rate at which
used vehicles are retired from service. These effects will partly
reduce the anticipated effects of this rule on fuel use and emissions.
Because we do not have good estimates of the relationships between the
new and used vehicle markets, we have not attempted to estimate
explicitly the effects of the rule on the used vehicle market,
scrappage of older vehicles, and the turnover of the vehicle fleet.
Consumer, environmental, and investor organizations, the United
Auto Workers, as well as a citizens' campaign suggested that the rule
will help the domestic auto industry, including the domestic supply
base, compete in the global marketplace, through its encouragement of
advanced technologies that may be useful in meeting emissions standards
and consumer demands in foreign markets. We agree that this is likely
for all global automakers, as generally the emission standards
established in this rule are similar in stringency to emissions and
fuel economy standards being considered by Japan, the European Union,
South Korea, Canada, China and other international markets. Global
manufacturers also design vehicles using a common platform in order to
reduce costs. Vehicles built on these common platforms are sold in many
markets around the world. To the extent the domestic OEMs and suppliers
can focus their limited research and product development efforts on the
same technologies for the U.S. market as for international markets,
this should enable the companies to compete more effectively outside
the U.S.
Chapter 8 of EPA's RIA has further discussion of methods for
examining the effects of this rule on vehicle sales.
[[Page 62950]]
b. Impact of the Rule on Affordability of Vehicles and Low-Income
Households
Several organizations provided comments about the effect of the
rule on the affordability of new vehicles, as well as the impacts of
the rule specifically on low-income households.
Comments from Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and 23 other
consumer groups, as well as Consumers Union (CU) and several
environmental organizations, argued that low-income households will
benefit from the rule. These commenters cite Bureau of Labor Statistics
data that low-income households spend more on fuel than they do on new
vehicles each year and are thus more vulnerable to fuel costs. CU
comments that low-income households pay a disproportionately large
portion of their income on fuel and are thus most vulnerable to price
spikes in gasoline. CFA reported that in 2010, households with incomes
below $20,000 spent 7.3 times as much on gasoline as on new car
payments, compared with 1.2 times as much for households with incomes
above $70,000. This commenter believes that consumers will benefit
greatly from the fuel savings that come with improved fuel economy.
These organizations note that low-income households account for a very
small portion of new car buyers, since they primarily purchase used
cars, and are therefore less affected by the up-front costs of the more
efficient vehicles than those who buy new vehicles. CU further comments
that Consumers Reports survey data show that low-income households
support improved fuel economy. In a recent survey, 71% of low-income
households responded that they expect to choose a model with better
fuel economy, compared to 59% of moderate and high-income respondents.
In addition, 79% of low-income respondents to the survey reported that
they were willing to pay extra for a more fuel efficient vehicle if
they can recover the additional cost through lower fuel costs within
five years, compared to 86% of moderate and high-income respondents.
In addition, these commenters agreed with EPA's assessment in the
NPRM that consumers who buy their vehicles with loans save more in fuel
each month than they do in increased loan payments. CU points out that
this is especially true for buyers of future, more fuel-efficient used
vehicles: The increase in up-front cost is much lower on a used
vehicle, due to depreciation, while the fuel economy of the vehicle is
unlikely to change over time. Because low-income households
disproportionately buy used vehicles, they will benefit from this more
rapid cost recovery. Because most of the increased vehicle cost
depreciates after five years, the payback period for improved fuel
economy in used MY 2017 and later vehicles will be shorter than the
payback period for these vehicles when newly purchased (under two years
for some examples). EPA agrees that more efficient vehicles will reduce
operating costs for buyers of used vehicles as well as new vehicles,
because the fuel-saving technologies maintain their effectiveness over
time; indeed, GHG standards continue to apply in-use. As shown in RIA
Chapter 5.5, our estimate of the payback period for five-year-old MY
2025 vehicles is approximately 1.1 years, less than the payback period
of about 3.2-3.4 years for new MY 2025 vehicles. We also note that
depreciation rates may be affected by the rule: increases in
reliability would decrease depreciation, and decreases in reliability
would increase depreciation. Finally, CU points out that some auto
lenders take into consideration the fuel economy of new vehicles, and
offer discounted rates for more efficient vehicles.\893\ As discussed
further below, EPA also finds that a number of financial institutions
give a discount on loans for more fuel-efficient vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\893\ See, for instance, Ladika, Susan (2009). `` `Green' auto
loans offer lower rates,'' Bankrate.com, http://www.bankrate.com/finance/auto/green-auto-loans-offer-lower-rates-1.aspx, accessed 2/
28/12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) and the
Institute for Energy Research emphasized that the increase in the up-
front vehicle costs would be a factor in consumers' abilities to
purchase. In particular, they stated that, if vehicle buyers are not
able to get loans for vehicles that have become more expensive as a
result of new standards, because they cannot get access to credit for
the additional cost, then they will be unable to participate in the new
vehicle market even if the new vehicles offer significant fuel savings.
This argument is based on the statement from NADA that auto lenders do
not take into account the fuel economy of the vehicles when they are
deciding on providing loans; the lenders consider only consumers' debt-
to-income ratios. NADA provided an analysis that concludes that 6.8
million licensed drivers may no longer have access to new vehicles.
According to NADA's analysis, this estimate is the number of licensed
drivers who live in the 3.1-4.2 million households that could borrow
$11,750, the loan amount for the least expensive new vehicle in 2011
after a $1000 down payment, but could not borrow $14,750.\894\ This
difference of $3,000 is meant to represent what NADA views as the cost
increase of new fuel economy standards, which EPA believes is incorrect
and responds to further below.
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\894\ Wagner, D., P. Nusinovich, and E. Plaza-Jennings, National
Automobile Dealers Association (February 13, 2012). ``The Effect of
Proposed MY 2017-2025 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
Standards on the New Vehicle Market Population.'' Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
0799.
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In assessing these comments, EPA finds that the NADA study does not
provide a usable estimate of those consumers in the market for new
vehicles who might have trouble getting loans, and is not a usable
estimate of the impacts of the rule on the new vehicle market. Because
the NADA study does not separate consumers who might consider new
vehicles from consumers who are not in the market for new vehicles, the
6.8 million licensed driver figure significantly overestimates any
impact of this rule on the new vehicle market.
The NADA study suffers from a number of inaccuracies and
weaknesses. First, it is important to understand what NADA's 6.8
million estimate actually represents. NADA simply looked at the 113
million households in the U.S. who could afford to borrow $11,750 and
estimated which ones of those could not afford to take out a loan of
$14,750.\895\ NADA's analysis unfortunately neglects a fundamental
factor that could make this analysis relevant to this rulemaking--how
many of those households would in fact even be in the market for a new
vehicle. EPA believes that the vast majority of these households would
not be in the market for new vehicles (for context, the total new
vehicle market is estimated to be 17.2 million vehicles in 2025; see
TSD Chapter 1.3.2.1). As documented by many other commenters and as can
be found in the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer
Finances,\896\ low-
[[Page 62951]]
income households account for a very small portion of new car buyers,
since they primarily purchase used cars. Thus, the NADA estimate is
severely flawed and does not contribute usable information to identify
the impacts of this rule on the vehicle market or on low-income
households.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\895\ The Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure
Survey, on which the Wagner et al. paper is based, measures 121,000
households in the U.S. in 2010. Wagner et al. find that ``an
estimated 93% of all consumer units have a financial profile that
would allow them to meet the 40% maximum debt to income ratio after
purchasing the current minimum cost new vehicle ($12,750).'' (See
footnote 894, p. 4.) Ninety-three percent of 121 million households
is about 113 million households; Wagner et al.'s estimate of 3.1 to
4.2 million of those who can borrow $11,750 but not $14,750 is 2.8
to 3.7 percent of that total.
\896\ In the Federal Reserve Board's 2007 Survey of Consumer
Finances, households with income below $35,200 (about the lower 40%
of population by income) bought about 17% of new vehicles; those in
the bottom quintile of income bought fewer than 2% of new vehicles.
See Federal Reserve Board, 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2007.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the NADA estimate is based, not on people who are
considering purchasing new vehicles, but on the number of licensed
drivers in households in the U.S. who could theoretically qualify to
borrow $11,750, but not $14,750, based purely on debt-to-income
ratio.\897\ Even accepting NADA's study at face value, the relevant
unit for the financial decision would be the number of households--not
every licensed driver in a low income household would purchase a
separate vehicle. The number of households in the NADA study is 3.1 to
4.2 million, already far lower than the estimate of 6.8 million
drivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\897\ As noted, these amounts are based on the cost of the least
expensive vehicle in 2011, with $1,000 down payment, with the
assumption that it will become $3,000 more expensive as the result
of three rulemakings, for MYs 2011, 2012-16, and 2017-25 (see Wagner
et al., footnote 894).
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Third, NADA's assumption of a $3,000 cost increase per vehicle is
based on summing the costs of MY 2011, MY 2012-16, and MY 2017-25
rules. This estimate does not correspond to EPA's estimate, an average
cost of about $1,800 per vehicle by MY 2025, in several ways. For
analyzing the effects of this rulemaking, it is appropriate to focus on
the costs and benefits associated with this rulemaking, not those of
previous rulemakings. The impacts of the other rules are included in
the reference case for this rule. The NADA cost estimate, based on a MY
2011 vehicle, appears to double-count MY 2011 costs, because those
should already be included in the price of the MY 2011 vehicle used in
its study. Further, the costs of meeting MY 2016 standards in 2025 are
expected to be lower than the costs of meeting those standards in 2016,
the value used by NADA, due to manufacturer learning. Moreover, EPA's
costs estimates are based on industry-wide averages, not applicable to
specific vehicle models. As discussed further below, impacts of the
rule on the prices of low-price vehicles may well be less than these
averages.
Fourth, the estimate does not take into account, as pointed out by
CU and as EPA has documented, that some lenders currently give
discounts for loans to purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles.\898\ It
is possible (though unknown at this time) that the auto loan market may
evolve to include further consideration of fuel savings, as those
savings play a significant factor in offsetting the increase in up-
front costs of vehicles.
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\898\ See footnote 893, above. An Internet search on the term
``green auto loan'' produced more than 50 lending institutions that
provide reduced rates for more efficient vehicles. See Helfand,
Gloria (2012). ``Memorandum: Lending institutions that provide
discounts for more fuel-efficient vehicles.'' Assessment and
Standards Division, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-0799.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fifth, the NADA analysis is based on the cost of the least
expensive vehicle in the MY 2011 market, but the market size for low-
priced vehicles is only about one-tenth the size of NADA's estimate of
6.8 million affected people. The agencies' baseline estimates of the
vehicle fleet in 2025 finds that total sales of vehicles costing less
than $15,000 (a price point that low income consumers in the new car
market would most likely be pursuing) in the absence of the rule are
estimated to be well below 1 million in MY 2025; there is also no
relationship between the NADA estimate and the potential impact of this
rule on sales of low-priced vehicles.
Sixth, if NADA's estimate reflected a measurable effect of the
rule, that effect would be reflected in a commensurate reduction in
vehicle sales. Yet there is no connection between any vehicle sales
estimates provided in comments on this rule and the NADA estimate. As
discussed in section III.H.11.a, many commenters predict an increase in
vehicle sales as a result of the rule, though others predict
decreases.\899\ However, even the most negative estimate provided in
public comments of the GHG rule's impact on vehicle sales, from the
Defour Group (which we address in detail in Section III.H.11.a), is a
reduction of 1.8 million vehicles. The NADA estimate appears
significantly overstated even compared to this commenter's most
negative estimate of vehicle sales impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\899\ We note that the role of vehicle financing in vehicle
purchase decisions is not a separate factor in typical studies of
the determinants of vehicle sales. Estimates of vehicle sales in the
literature, which commonly are dependent on both up-front vehicle
costs and fuel costs, implicitly account for effects of the loan
market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, we find the NADA study does not provide a usable
estimate of consumers in the market for new vehicles who might have
trouble getting new vehicle loans, nor do we find it a usable estimate
of the impacts of the rule on the new vehicle market.
It is possible that future trends in the auto loan market may
affect future vehicle sales. It is also possible that some people who
have significant debt loads may not be able to get financing for some
of these new vehicles; they may have to buy different vehicles
(including used vehicles) or delay purchase. For others who borrow on
credit, though, as discussed in Section III.H.5, the fuel savings are
expected to outweigh the increased loan costs from the time of vehicle
purchase. As some comments suggest, the rule thus may make vehicles
more affordable to the public, by reducing consumers' vulnerability to
fuel price jumps. Some comments raised concerns about the impacts of
the rule specifically on low-priced vehicles. EPA agrees that vehicles
in the low-priced (economy-class) segment will bear technology costs
needed to meet the new standards, but it is not known how manufacturers
will decide to pass on these costs across their vehicle fleets,
including in the low-priced vehicle segment. If manufacturers decide to
pass on the full cost of compliance in this segment, then it is
possible that consumers who might barely afford new vehicles may be
priced out of the new-vehicle market or may not have access to loans.
As just discussed, the rule's impacts on availability of loans are
unclear, because some lenders do factor fuel economy into their loans,
and it is possible that this trend may expand. In addition, as the
Union of Concerned Scientists comments, auto makers have some
flexibility in how both technologies and price changes are applied to
these vehicles; auto makers have ways to keep some vehicles in the low-
priced vehicle segment if they so choose. Though the rule is expected
to increase the prices of these vehicles, the degrees of price increase
and the impacts of the price increases, especially when combined with
the fuel savings that will accompany these changes, are much less
clear.
The Defour Group suggests that the standards are regressive, with
adverse impacts falling disproportionately on low-income households,
and possibly limiting their ability to obtain employment because of
limited mobility. The commenter's regressivity assessment is based on a
study of a non-footprint-based fuel economy program; \900\ the
disproportionate impact on low-income households is based on the
increased prices of used vehicles and the shift toward smaller
vehicles. As discussed above in Section III.H.11.a,
[[Page 62952]]
EPA finds that the impact on the used vehicle market depends on the
impact of the rule on new vehicle sales, which we have not quantified.
Because the footprint-based standard reduces incentives to downsize
vehicles, we do not accept the conclusion that the rule will result in
buyers of used vehicles getting smaller ones with a consequent welfare
loss. For these reasons, the regressivity finding from Jacobsen's paper
is not applicable to the effects of this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\900\ Jacobsen, Mark. ``Evaluating U.S. Fuel Economy Standards
in a Model With Producer and Household Heterogeneity.'' Working
paper, University of California, San Diego, September 2010. Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-0799-0829.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, the net effect of the rule on low-income households
depends on several factors: The way that manufacturers choose to
translate cost increases into price increases; the effects on sales of
used vehicles, which depend on the effects on sales of new vehicles;
the fuel savings that the new (and used) vehicles will provide; and any
effects on access to credit for new and used vehicles. For reasons
outlined above, we do not at this time have quantitative assessments of
how these effects interact and affect low-income households. However,
due to the significant effect of the rule on fuel savings, especially
for used vehicles (see RIA Chapter 5.5), we expect low-income
households to benefit from the more rapid payback period for used
vehicles, though some of this benefit may be affected by the net effect
of this rule on the prices and availability of used vehicles, which we
have not estimated.
In addition, the net effect of the rule on low-priced vehicles is
difficult to assess; though we expect the prices of these vehicles to
increase, it is also possible that auto makers may find ways to
preserve the entry-vehicle segment, by adding less additional
technology to these vehicles or through pricing strategies. The net
effect of the rule on access to credit is also difficult to assess:
though some consumers may find themselves credit-constrained, some auto
lenders are already giving interest rate discounts for more fuel-
efficient vehicles, and the loan market may continue to evolve.
12. Employment Impacts
a. Introduction
Although analysis of employment impacts is not part of a cost-
benefit analysis (except to the extent that labor costs contribute to
costs), employment impacts of federal rules are of particular concern
in the current economic climate of sizeable unemployment. When
President Obama requested that the agencies develop this program, he
sought a program that would ``strengthen the [auto] industry and
enhance job creation in the United States.'' \901\ The recently issued
Executive Order 13563, ``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review''
(January 18, 2011), states, ``Our regulatory system must protect public
health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic
growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation'' (emphasis
added). EPA is accordingly providing partial estimates of the effects
of this rule on domestic employment in the auto manufacturing and parts
sectors, while qualitatively discussing how it may affect employment in
other sectors more generally. Several commenters specifically pointed
to the desirability of our conducting employment analyses, to provide
insights into the effects of the rule on economic recovery and the
health of the auto industry; we did not receive comments opposed to the
inclusion of employment impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\901\ President Barack Obama. ``Presidential Memorandum
Regarding Fuel Efficiency Standards. The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, May 21, 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-fuel-efficiency-standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This rule is expected to affect employment in the United States
through the regulated sector--the auto manufacturing industry--and
through several related sectors, specifically, industries that supply
the auto manufacturing industry (e.g., vehicle parts), auto dealers,
the fuel refining and supply sectors, and the general retail sector.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2010, about
677,000 people in the U.S. were employed in Motor Vehicle and Parts
Manufacturing Sector (NAICS 3361, 3362, and 3363). About 129,000 people
in the U.S. were employed specifically in the Automobile and Light
Truck Manufacturing Sector (NAICS 33611), the directly regulated
sector, since it encompasses the auto manufacturers that are
responsible for complying with the standards.\902\ The employment
effects of this rule are expected to expand beyond the regulated
sector. Though some of the parts used to achieve the standards are
likely to be built by auto manufacturers themselves, the auto parts
manufacturing sector also plays a significant role in providing those
parts, and will also be affected by changes in vehicle sales. Changes
in light duty vehicle sales, discussed in Section III.H.11, could
affect employment for auto dealers. As discussed in Section III.H.4,
this rule is expected to reduce the amount of fuel these vehicles use,
and thus affect the petroleum refinery and supply industries. Finally,
since the net reduction in cost associated with this rule is expected
to lead to lower household expenditures on fuel net of vehicle costs,
consumers then will have additional discretionary income that can be
spent on other goods and services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\902\ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages, as accessed on August 9, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the economy is at full employment, an environmental regulation
is unlikely to have much impact on net overall U.S. employment;
instead, labor would primarily be shifted from one sector to another.
These shifts in employment impose an opportunity cost on society,
approximated by the wages of the employees, as regulation diverts
workers from other activities in the economy. In this situation, any
effects on net employment are likely to be transitory as workers change
jobs (e.g., some workers may need to be retrained or require time to
search for new jobs, while shortages in some sectors or regions could
bid up wages to attract workers).
On the other hand, if a regulation comes into effect during a
period of high unemployment, a change in labor demand due to regulation
may affect net overall U.S. employment because the labor market is not
in equilibrium. In such a period, both positive and negative employment
effects are possible.\903\ Schmalansee and Stavins point out that net
positive employment effects are possible in the near term when the
economy is at less than full employment due to the potential hiring of
idle labor resources by the regulated sector to meet new requirements
(e.g., to install new equipment) and new economic activity in sectors
related to the regulated sector.\904\ In the longer run, the net effect
on employment is more difficult to predict and will depend on the way
in which the related industries respond to the regulatory requirements.
As Schmalansee and Stavins note, it is possible that the magnitude of
the effect on employment could vary over time, region, and sector, and
positive effects on employment in some regions or sectors could be
offset by negative effects in other regions or sectors. For this
reason, they urge caution in reporting partial employment effects since
it can ``paint an inaccurate
[[Page 62953]]
picture of net employment impacts if not placed in the broader economic
context.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\903\ Masur and Posner, 2011. ``Regulation, Unemployment, and
Cost-Benefit Analysis.'' http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920441 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1222).
\904\ Schmalensee, Richard, and Robert N. Stavins. ``A Guide to
Economic and Policy Analysis of EPA's Transport Rule.'' White paper
commissioned by Excelon Corporation, March 2011 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-
2010-0799-0676).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is assumed that the official unemployment rate will have
declined to 5.3 percent by the time by the time this rule takes effect
and so the effect of the regulation on labor will be to shift workers
from one sector to another.\905\ Those shifts in employment impose an
opportunity cost on society, approximated by the wages of the
employees, as regulation diverts workers from other activities in the
economy. In this situation, any effects on net employment are likely to
be transitory as workers change jobs (e.g., some workers may need to be
retrained or require time to search for new jobs, while shortages in
some sectors or regions could bid up wages to attract workers). It is
also possible that the state of the economy will be such that positive
or negative employment effects will occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\905\ Office of Management and Budget, ``Fiscal Year 2012 Mid-
Session Review: Budget of the U.S. Government.'' http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/12msr.pdf, p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measuring the employment impacts of a policy depend on a number of
inputs and assumptions. For instance, as discussed, assumptions about
the overall state of unemployment in the economy play a major role in
measured job impacts. The inputs to the models commonly are the changes
in quantities or expenditures in the affected sectors; model results
may vary in different studies depending on the assumptions about the
levels of those inputs, and which sectors receive those changes. Which
sectors are included in the study can also affect the results. For
instance, a study of this program that looks only at employment impacts
in the refinery sector may find negative effects, because consumers
will purchase less gasoline; a study that looks only at the auto parts
sector, on the other hand, may find positive impacts, because the
program will require redesigned or additional parts for vehicles. In
both instances, these would only be partial perspectives on the overall
change in national employment due to Federal regulation.
The NPRM included a discussion of different methods for conducting
employment analysis (see the discussion in RIA Chapter 8.2.2),
including computable general equilibrum models, input-output models,
hybrid models, and single-sector models, and requested comment on those
methods. See 76 FR 75155-156. That discussion noted that all potential
methods of estimating employment impacts of a rule have advantages and
limitations. We did not receive comments about methods, except for some
support for EPA's approach in the NPRM, and some support (discussed
further below) for including multiplier impacts.
We received a number of comments (from the Defour Group and from
some private individuals) asserting that there will be decreases in
employment as a result of the costs of the rule, and a number of
comments (from the United Auto Workers, environmental organizations,
sustainable business groups, some private individuals, and others)
asserting increases in employment, based on the development of advanced
technologies and the reduction in net costs due to fuel savings. An
assessment by the Defour Group predicts a loss of 155,000 jobs in
manufacturing and supply, plus another 50,000 in distribution.\906\ A
study by Ceres predicts job gains of 43,000 in the auto industry and
484,000 economy-wide.\907\ Some comments cite a study by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, and United
Auto Workers that 150,000 auto workers already are working to supply
clean, fuel-efficient technologies.\908\ The differences in results for
quantitative employment impacts are due to factors such as those
discussed above. Estimates of decreases in employment commonly come
from studies that use cost estimates higher than those of EPA, and
sometimes lower benefits estimates, resulting in reductions in vehicle
sales. For instance, some comments from individuals cite the National
Automobile Dealers Association and Center for Automotive Research for
cost estimates of $5000 to $6000 per vehicle, much higher than those
estimated in Section III.H.2; EPA does not endorse those alternative
cost estimates, as discussed in Section 18.2 of the Response to
Comments. The NADA estimates inappropriately include the costs of other
rulemakings and use indirect cost estimates which we consider
inappropriate (see TSD Chapter 3.1.2.2). The Center for Automotive
Research estimates do not take into account expected technological
advances, do not reflect the use of air conditioning credits in this
rule, and calculate costs from a baseline of 2008 instead of MY 2016
standards. Those studies commonly look at the employment associated
with vehicle sales, but not the employment associated with producing
the technologies needed to comply with the standards, or changes in
labor intensity of production. Analyses that find increases in
employment commonly start with increased vehicle sales as a result of
the rule, and take into consideration the employment effects associated
with additional technologies. In both cases, ``multiplier'' effects,
which extend employment impacts beyond the auto sector to impacts on
suppliers, other sectors, and expenditure changes by workers, lead to
large estimates, either positive or negative, of the employment effects
of the rule. We received the suggestion to include in our analysis an
alternative scenario where there is less than full employment; the
implication of less than full employment is that multiplier effects are
more likely. We also requested comment on other sectors that warranted
consideration in this rule, 76 FR 75157, but we did not receive
suggestions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\906\ Walton, Thomas F., and Dean Drake, Defour Group LLC
(February 13, 2012). ``Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis for MY 2017 to 2025 Fuel
Economy Standards.'' Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319.
\907\ Management Information Services, Inc. (July 2011). ``More
Jobs per Gallon: How Strong Fuel Economy/GHG Standards Will Fuel
American Jobs.'' Boston, MA: Ceres. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-
0709.
\908\ Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife
Federation, and United Auto Workers (August 2011). ``Supplying
Ingenuity: U.S. Suppliers of Clean, Fuel-Efficient Vehicle
Technologies.'' http://www.nrdc.org/transportation/autosuppliers/files/SupplierMappingReport.pdf (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After considering these comments, EPA is continuing with the
employment approach in the NPRM, though with some updating of
quantitative impacts in the auto sector. For impacts in the auto
sector, EPA uses a conceptual framework that identifies employment
impacts due to changes in vehicle sales, changes in costs, and changes
in the labor intensity of production. For impacts in related sectors,
EPA presents qualitative discussions. We do not quantify multiplier
effects, due to uncertainty over the state of the economy at the time
this rule takes effect as well as the market evolutions that are likely
to occur between now and implementation.
b. Conceptual Framework for Employment Impacts in the Regulated Sector
A study by Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih\909\ provides a
retrospective look at the impacts of regulation in employment in the
regulated sectors by estimating the effects on employment of
[[Page 62954]]
spending on pollution abatement for four highly polluting/regulated
U.S. industries (pulp and paper, plastics, steel, and petroleum
refining) using data for six years between 1979 and 1991. The paper
provides a theoretical framework that can be useful for examining the
impacts of a regulatory change on the regulated sector in the medium to
longer term. In particular, it identifies three separate ways that
employment levels may change in the regulated industry in response to a
new (or more stringent) regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\909\ Morgenstern, Richard D., William A. Pizer, and Jhih-Shyang
Shih. ``Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry-Level
Perspective.'' Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43
(2002): 412-436 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Demand effect: Higher production costs due to the regulation will
lead to higher market prices; higher prices in turn reduce demand for
the good, reducing the demand for labor to make that good. In the
authors' words, the ``extent of this effect depends on the cost
increase passed on to consumers as well as the demand elasticity of
industry output.''
Cost effect: As costs go up, plants add more capital and labor
(holding other factors constant), with potentially positive effects on
employment. In the authors' words, as ``production costs rise, more
inputs, including labor, are used to produce the same amount of
output.''
Factor-shift effect: Post-regulation production technologies may be
more or less labor-intensive (i.e., more/less labor is required per
dollar of output). In the authors' words, ``environmental activities
may be more labor intensive than conventional production,'' meaning
that ``the amount of labor per dollar of output will rise,'' though it
is also possible that ``cleaner operations could involve automation and
less employment, for example.''
According to the authors, the ``demand effect'' is expected to have
a negative effect on employment,\910\ the ``cost effect'' to have a
positive effect on employment, and the ``factor-shift effect'' to have
an ambiguous effect on employment. Without more information with
respect to the magnitudes of these competing effects, it is not
possible to predict the total effect environmental regulation will have
on employment levels in a regulated sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\910\ As will be discussed below, the demand effect is
potentially an exception to this rule. While the vehicles become
more expensive, they also produce reduced fuel expenditures; the
reduced fuel costs provide a countervailing impact on vehicle sales.
As discussed in Preamble Section III.H.1, this possibility that
vehicles may become more attractive to consumers after the program
poses a conundrum: Why have interactions between vehicle buyers and
producers not provided these benefits without government
intervention?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The authors conclude that increased abatement expenditures
generally have not caused a significant change in employment in those
sectors. More specifically, their results show that, on average across
the industries studied, each additional $1 million spent on pollution
abatement results in a (statistically insignificant) net increase of
1.5 jobs.
This approach to employment analysis has the advantage of carefully
controlling for many possibly confounding effects in order to separate
the effect of changes in regulatory costs on employment. It was,
however, conducted for only four sectors. It could also be very
difficult to update the study for other sectors, because one of the
databases on which it relies, the Pollution Abatement Cost and
Expenditure survey, has been conducted infrequently since 1994, with
the last survey conducted in 2005. The empirical estimates provided by
Morgenstern et al. are not relevant to the case of fuel economy
standards, which are very different from the pollution control
standards on industrial facilities that were considered in that study.
In addition, it does not examine the effects of regulation on
employment in sectors related to but outside of the regulated sector.
Nevertheless, the theory that Morgenstern et al. developed continues to
be useful in this context for examining the impacts of the rule on the
auto sector.
c. Employment Analysis of This Rule
As mentioned above, this program is expected to affect employment
in the regulated sector (auto manufacturing) and other sectors directly
affected by the rule: auto parts suppliers, auto dealers, and the fuel
supply market (which will face reduced petroleum production due to
reduced fuel demand but which may see additional demand for electricity
or other fuels). Changes in consumer expenditures due to higher vehicle
costs and lower fuel expenses will also affect employment. In addition,
as the discussion above suggests, each of these sectors could
potentially have ripple effects in the rest of the economy. These
ripple effects depend much more heavily on the state of the
macroeconomy than do the direct effects. At the national level,
employment may increase in one industry or region and decrease in
another, with the net effect being smaller than either individual-
sector effect. EPA does not attempt to quantify the net effects of the
regulation on overall national employment.
The discussion that follows provides a partial, bottom-up
quantitative estimate of the effects of this rule on the regulated
sector (the auto industry; for reasons discussed below, we include some
quantitative assessment of effects on suppliers to the industry,
although they are not regulated directly). It also includes qualitative
discussion of the effects of the rule on other sectors. Focusing
quantification of employment impacts on the regulated sector has some
advantages over quantifying all impacts. The analysis relies on data
generated as part of the rulemaking process, which focuses on the
regulated sector; as a result, what is presented here is based on
internally consistent assumptions and estimates made in this rule.
Focusing on the regulated sector provides insight into employment
effects in that sector without having to make assumptions about the
state of the economy when this rule has its impacts. We include a
qualitative discussion of employment effects in other sectors to
provide a broader perspective on the impacts of this rule.
As noted above, in a full-employment economy, any changes in
employment will result from people changing jobs or voluntarily
entering or exiting the workforce. In a full-employment economy,
employment impacts of this rule will change employment in specific
sectors, but it will have small, if any, effect on aggregate
employment. This rule would take effect in 2017 through 2025; by then,
the current high unemployment may be moderated or ended. For that
reason, this analysis does not include multiplier effects, but instead
focuses on employment impacts in the most directly affected industries.
Those sectors are likely to face the most concentrated employment
impacts.
i. Employment Impacts in the Auto Industry
Following the Morgenstern et al. conceptual framework for the
impacts of regulation on employment in the regulated sector, we
consider three effects for the auto sector: The demand effect, the cost
effect, and the factor shift effect. However, we are only able to offer
quantitative estimates for the cost effect. We note that these
estimates, based on extrapolations from current data, become more
uncertain as time goes on.
(1) The Demand Effect
The demand effect depends on the effects of this rule on vehicle
sales. If vehicle sales increase, then more people will be required to
assemble vehicles and their components. If vehicle sales decrease,
employment associated with these activities will unambiguously
decrease. Unlike in Morgenstern et al.'s study, where the demand effect
decreased employment, there are countervailing effects in the vehicle
[[Page 62955]]
market due to the fuel savings resulting from this program. On one
hand, this rule will increase vehicle costs; by itself, this effect
would reduce vehicle sales. On the other hand, this rule will reduce
the fuel costs of operating the vehicle; by itself, this effect would
increase vehicle sales, especially if potential buyers have an
expectation of higher fuel prices. The sign of the demand effect will
depend on which of these effects dominates. This issue is discussed
further in Sections III.H.1 and III.H.11. Some comments encouraged us
to quantify this effect, once we quantified estimates for vehicle
sales. Because, as described in Section III.H.11, we have not
quantified the impact on sales for this rule, we do not quantify the
demand effect.
(2) The Cost Effect
The demand effect measures employment changes due to new vehicle
sales only. The cost effect measures employment impacts due to the
development, manufacturing, and installation by auto suppliers and
manufacturers of the new or additional technologies needed for vehicles
to comply with the standards. As RIA Chapter 8.2.3.1.2 explains, we
estimate the cost effect by multiplying the costs of rule compliance by
ratios of workers to each $1 million of expenditures in that sector.
The magnitude and relative size of these ratios depends on the sectors'
labor intensity of the production process. Several commenters mentioned
the importance of this rule in encouraging employment related to the
technologies expected to be used to comply with this rule. We received
no comments criticizing the approach used here; the UAW commended EPA
for it.
The use of these ratios has both advantages and limitations. It is
often possible to estimate these ratios for quite specific sectors of
the economy; as a result, it is not necessary to extrapolate employment
ratios from possibly unrelated sectors. On the other hand, these
estimates are averages for the sectors, covering all the activities in
those sectors; they may not be representative of the labor required
when expenditures are required on specific activities, as the factor
shift effect (discussed below) indicates. In addition, these estimates
do not include changes in sectors that supply these sectors, such as
steel or electronics producers. They thus may best be viewed as the
effects on employment in the auto sector due to the changes in
expenditures in that sector, rather than as an assessment of all
employment changes due to these changes in expenditures.
Some of the costs of this rule will be spent directly in the auto
manufacturing sector, but some of the costs will be spent in the auto
parts manufacturing sector. Because we do not have information on the
proportion of expenditures in each sector, we separately present the
ratios for both the auto manufacturing sector and the auto parts
manufacturing sector. These are not additive, but should instead be
considered as a range of estimates for the cost effect, depending on
which sector adds technologies to the vehicles to comply with the
regulation.
We use several public sources for estimates of employment per $1
million expenditures: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS)
Employment Requirements Matrix (ERM); \911\ the Census Bureau's Annual
Survey of Manufactures \912\ (ASM); and the Census Bureau's Economic
Census. RIA Chapter 8.2.3.1.2 provides details on all these sources.
The ASM and the Economic Census have more sectoral detail than the ERM;
we provide estimates for both Motor Vehicle Manufacturing and Light
Duty Vehicle Manufacturing sectors for comparison purposes. For all of
these, we adjust for the ratio of domestic production to domestic sales
(as supported by a commenter). The maximum value for employment impacts
per $1 million expenditures (after accounting for the share of domestic
production) in 2010 was estimated to be 1.809 if all the additional
costs are in the parts sector; the minimum value is 0.402, if all the
additional costs are in the light-duty vehicle manufacturing sector:
that is, the range of employment impacts is between 0.4 and 2
additional jobs per $1 million expenditures in the sector. The
different data sources provide similar magnitudes for the estimates for
the sectors. Parts manufacturing appears to be more labor-intensive
than vehicle manufacturing; light-duty vehicle manufacturing appears to
be slightly less labor-intensive than motor vehicle manufacturing as a
whole. As discussed in the RIA, trends in the BLS ERM are used to
estimate productivity improvements over time that are used to adjust
these ratios over time. Table III-107 shows the cost estimates
developed for this rule, discussed in Section III.H.2. Multiplying
those cost estimates by the maximum and minimum values for the cost
effect (maximum using the Economic Census ratio if all additional costs
are in the parts sector, and minimum using the Economic Census ratio
for the light-duty sector if all additional costs are borne by auto
manufacturers) provides the cost effect employment estimates. This is a
simple way to examine the relationship between labor required and
expenditure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\911\ http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_data_emp_requirements.htm.
\912\ http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While we estimate employment impacts, in job-years, beginning with
the first year of the standard (2017), some of these employment gains
may occur earlier as auto manufacturers and parts suppliers hire staff
in anticipation of compliance with the standard. A job-years is a way
to calculate the amount of work needed to complete a specific task. For
example, a job-year is one year of work for one person, or 6 months of
work for 2 people.
Table III-107--Employment Effects Due to Increased Expenditures on Vehicles and Parts, in Job-Years
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum
Costs (before employment effect Maximum
adjustment for if all employment effect
Year domestic expenditures are if all
proportion of in light duty expenditures are
production) vehicle mfg in the parts
($millions) sector sector
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017................................................... $2,435 700 3,200
2018................................................... 4,848 1,300 6,200
2019................................................... 6,818 1,700 8,400
2020................................................... 8,858 2,100 10,500
2021................................................... 12,400 2,900 14,200
2022................................................... 18,323 4,100 20,200
2023................................................... 23,734 5,100 25,200
[[Page 62956]]
2024................................................... 29,101 6,000 29,700
2025................................................... 31,678 6,300 31,100
--------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................................. ................. 30,300 148,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) The Factor Shift Effect
The factor shift effect looks at the effects on employment due to
changes in labor intensity associated with a regulation. As noted
above, the estimates of the cost effect assume constant labor per $1
million in expenditures, though the new technologies may be either more
or less labor-intensive than the existing ones. An estimate of the
factor shift effect would either increase or decrease the estimate used
for the cost effect.
We are not quantifying the factor shift effect here, for lack of
data on the labor intensity of all the possible technologies that
manufacturers could use to comply with the standards. As discussed in
RIA Chapter 8.2.3.1.3, for a subset of the technologies, EPA-sponsored
research (discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.1 of the Joint TSD), which
compared new technologies to existing ones at the level of individual
components, found that labor use for those new technologies increased:
those new fuel-saving technologies use more labor than the baseline
technologies. For instance, switching from a conventional mid-size
vehicle to a hybrid version of that vehicle involves an additional
$395.85 in labor costs, which we estimate to require an additional 8.6
hours per vehicle.\913\ For a subset of the technologies likely to be
used to meet the standards in this rule, then, the factor shift effect
increases labor demand, at least in the short run; in the long run, as
with all technologies, the cost structure is likely to change due to
learning, economies of scale, etc. The technologies examined in this
research are, however, only a subset of the technologies that auto
makers may use to comply with the standards. As a result, these results
cannot be considered definitive evidence that the factor-shift effect
increases employment for this rule. We therefore do not quantify the
factor shift effect. Comments supported this approach and encouraged
development of these estimates for more technologies. Because of the
complexity of the estimation process, we are not presenting additional
estimates in the RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\913\ FEV, Inc. ``Light-Duty Technology Cost Analysis, Power-
Split and P2 HEV Case Studies.'' EPA Report EPA-420-R-11--015,
November 2011 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1101).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Summary of Employment Effects in the Auto Sector
While we are not able to quantify the demand or factor shift
effects, the cost effect results show that the employment effects of
the increased spending in the regulated sector (and, possibly, the
parts sector) are expected to be positive and on the order of a few
thousand in the initial years of the program. As noted above, the motor
vehicle and parts manufacturing sectors employed about 677,000 people
in 2010, with automobile and light truck manufacturing accounting for
about 129,000 of that total.
ii. Effects on Employment for Auto Dealers
The effects of the standards on employment for auto dealers depend
principally on the effects of the standards on light duty vehicle
sales: increases in sales are likely to contribute to employment at
dealerships, while reductions in sales are likely to have the opposite
effect. In addition, auto dealers may be affected by changes in
maintenance and service costs. Increases in those costs are likely to
increase labor demand in dealerships, and reductions are likely to
decrease labor demand.
The Defour Group as part of its employment estimate (discussed in
III.H.12.a) expressed concern about employment in this sector, due to
the potential impacts of the rule on vehicle sales; they provide an
estimate of 35,000 jobs lost at auto dealers due to their predicted
sales reductions for MY 2025.\914\ As discussed in III.H.11, we do not
at this point provide a quantitative estimate of the effects of this
rule on vehicle sales. The National Automobile Dealers Association
encouraged additional information to help consumers better understand
the benefits of investing in improved fuel economy, and noted the
information provided by the new fuel economy label developed by the
agencies.\915\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\914\ See footnote 906.
\915\ Information on the label may be found at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/carlabel/index.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although this rule predicts very small penetration of plug-in
hybrids and electric vehicles, the uncertainty on consumer acceptance
of such technology vehicles is even greater. As discussed in Section
III.H.1.b, consumers may find some characteristics of electric vehicles
and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, such as the ability to fuel with
electricity rather than gasoline, attractive; they may find other
characteristics, such as the limited range for electric vehicles,
undesirable. As a result, some consumers will find that EVs will meet
their needs, but other buyers will choose more conventional vehicles.
Auto dealers may play a major role in explaining the merits and
disadvantages of these new technologies to vehicle buyers. There may be
a temporary need for increased employment to train sales staff in the
new technologies as the new technologies become available. We agree
with the comment that consumer information has the potential to play an
important role in consumer acceptance of vehicles subject to this rule.
iii. Effects on Employment in the Auto Parts Sector
As discussed in the context of employment in the auto industry,
some vehicle parts are made in-house by auto manufacturers; others are
made by independent suppliers who are not directly regulated, but who
will be affected by the standards as well. The additional expenditures
on technologies are expected to have a positive effect on employment in
the parts sector as well as the manufacturing sector; the breakdown in
employment between the two sectors is difficult to predict. The effects
on the parts sector also depend
[[Page 62957]]
on the effects of the standards on vehicle sales and on the labor
intensity of the new technologies, qualitatively in the same ways as
for the auto manufacturing sector. The United Auto Workers, Blue-Green
Alliance, environmental organizations, and various others specifically
noted the employment gains associated with development and use of these
advanced technologies.
iv. Effects on Employment for Fuel Suppliers
In addition to the effects on the auto manufacturing and parts
sectors, these rules will result in changes in fuel use that lower GHG
emissions. Fuel saving, principally reductions in liquid fuels such as
gasoline and diesel, will affect employment in the fuel suppliers
industry sectors throughout the supply chain, from refineries to
gasoline stations. To the extent that the standards result in increased
use of electricity, natural gas, or other fuels, employment effects
will result from providing these fuels and developing the
infrastructure to supply them to consumers.
Expected petroleum fuel consumption reductions can be found in
Section III.H.4. While those figures represent fuel savings for
purchasers of fuel, it represents a loss in value of output for the
petroleum refinery industry, fuel distribution, and gasoline stations.
The loss of expenditures to petroleum fuel suppliers throughout the
petroleum fuel supply chain, from the petroleum refiners to the
gasoline stations, is likely to result in reduced employment in these
sectors. Comments from the United Auto Workers (UAW), Blue-Green
Alliance, environmental organizations, and Investor Network on Climate
Risk suggested that, because other sectors are more labor-intensive
than gasoline production and sales, reducing expenditures on gasoline
and making them available for other consumer goods may increase
employment. EPA has not estimated this effect.
This rule is also expected to lead to increases in electricity
consumption by vehicles, as discussed in Section III.H.4. This new fuel
may require additional infrastructure, such as electricity charging
locations. Providing this infrastructure will require some increased
employment. In addition, the generation of electricity will also
require some additional labor. We have insufficient information at this
time to predict whether the increases in labor associated with
increased infrastructure provision and fuel generation for these newer
fuels will be greater or less than the employment reductions associated
with reduced demand for petroleum fuels.
v. Effects on Employment Due to Impacts on Consumer Expenditures
As a result of these standards, consumers will pay a higher up-
front cost for the vehicles, but they will recover those costs in a
fairly short payback period (see Section III.H.5); indeed, people who
finance their vehicles are expected to find that their fuel savings per
month exceed the increase in the loan cost (except at very high
interest rate levels). As a result, consumers will have additional
money to spend on other goods and services (for those consumers who pay
cash for their vehicles, it will occur after the initial payback
period). These increased expenditures will support employment in those
sectors where consumers spend their savings.
These increased expenditures will occur in 2017 and beyond. If the
economy returns to full employment by that time, any change in consumer
expenditures would primarily represent a shift in employment among
sectors. If, on the other hand, the economy still has substantial
unemployment, these expenditures would contribute to employment through
increased consumer demand.
Environmental organizations, CFA, the National Association of Clean
Air Agencies, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE),
UAW, Business for Innovative Climate & Energy Policy (BICEP), Ceres,
and some private citizens suggested in written comments and in public
hearings that this rule would increase economic growth in the U.S. The
Center for Biological Diversity, International Council for Clean
Transportation, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Union of
Concerned Scientists (UCS) recommended that EPA include an analysis of
the economy-wide impacts of the rule, including impacts on U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP) and consumption patterns. ACEEE, Ceres, BICEP,
and UCS suggested that fuel savings from the rule would allow consumers
to increase their spending on other goods and services in more
productive sectors of the economy, which would likely increase GDP and
consumption in the U.S. CFA specifically recommended that EPA use a GDP
multiplier approach that recognizes that national output would increase
from the rule as a result of reducing U.S. oil imports. Ceres, BICEP,
UCS, and the National Wildlife Federation cited a report for Ceres by
Management Information Services, Inc. that found that a 4% annual
improvement in fuel economy would increase U.S. gross economic output
by $21.3 billion, personal income by $14.2 billion, and revenue for
federal, state, and local governments by $12.7 billion in 2030.\916\ On
the other hand, other private citizens suggested the economy could be
harmed as a result of this rule, but did not offer any specific data to
support the claim. Analyzing the economy-wide impacts from this rule is
challenging due to the inherent uncertainty in projecting a myriad of
economic parameters into the future (e.g., levels of employment of
labor and capital, the structure of the economy, prices of goods and
services) and determining an appropriate economic framework to model
(e.g., supply equaling demand in all markets and specific forms of
market interactions). EPA has not been able to identify a widely agreed
upon methodology and thus we continue to not quantify the impacts of
the rule on overall economic patterns in the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\916\ Management Information Services, Inc., July 2011, ``More
Jobs Per Gallon: How Strong Fuel Economy/GHG Standards Will Fuel
American Jobs'', A Ceres Report, Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Summary
The primary employment effects of this rule are expected to be
found throughout several key sectors: Auto manufacturers, auto dealers,
auto parts manufacturing, fuel production and supply, and consumers.
This rule initially takes effect in model year 2017, a time period
sufficiently far in the future that the current sustained high
unemployment at the national level may be moderated or ended. In an
economy with full employment, the primary employment effect of a
rulemaking is likely to be to move employment from one sector to
another, rather than to increase or decrease employment. For that
reason, we focus our partial quantitative analysis on employment in the
regulated sector, to examine the impacts on that sector directly. We
discuss the likely direction of other impacts in the regulated sector
as well as in other directly related sectors, but we do not quantify
those impacts, because they are more difficult to quantify with
reasonable accuracy, particularly so far into the future.
For the regulated sector, we have not quantified the demand effect.
The cost effect is expected to increase employment by 700-3,200 jobs-
year in 2017 depending on the share of that employment that is in the
auto manufacturing sector compared to the auto parts manufacturing
sector. As mentioned above, some of these job
[[Page 62958]]
gains may occur earlier as auto manufacturers and parts suppliers hire
staff to prepare to comply with the standard. Though we do not have
estimates of the factor shift effect for all potential compliance
technologies, the evidence which we do have for some technologies
suggests that many of the technologies will have increased labor needs.
Changes in vehicle sales are expected to affect labor needs in auto
dealerships and in parts manufacturing. Increased expenditures for auto
parts are expected to require increased labor to build parts, though
this effect also depends on any changes in the labor intensity of
production; as noted, the subset of potential compliance technologies
for which data are available show increased labor requirements. Reduced
fuel production implies less employment in the petroleum sectors.
Finally, consumer spending is expected to affect employment through
changes in expenditures in general retail sectors; net fuel savings by
consumers are expected to increase demand (and therefore employment) in
other sectors.
I. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
a. Executive Order 12866: ``Regulatory Planning and Review and
Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review''
Under section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735,
October 4, 1993), this action is an ``economically significant
regulatory action'' because it is likely to have an annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more. Accordingly, EPA submitted this
action to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 (76 FR 3821, January 21, 2011) and any
changes made in response to OMB recommendations have been documented in
the docket for this action as required by CAA section 307(d)(4)(B)(ii).
In addition, EPA prepared an analysis of the potential costs and
benefits associated with this action. This analysis is contained in the
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, which is available in the docket for
this rulemaking and at the docket internet address listed under
ADDRESSES above.
b. Paperwork Reduction Act
The information collection requirements in this rule have been
submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. The
Information Collection Request (ICR) document prepared by EPA has been
assigned EPA ICR number 0783.61. The information collection
requirements are not enforceable until OMB approves them.
The Agency is finalizing requirements for manufacturers to submit
information to ensure compliance with the provisions in this rule. This
includes a variety of requirements for vehicle manufacturers. Section
208(a) of the Clean Air Act requires that vehicle manufacturers provide
information the Administrator may reasonably require to determine
compliance with the regulations; submission of the information is
therefore mandatory. We will consider confidential all information
meeting the requirements of section 208(c) of the Clean Air Act.
As shown in Table III-108, the total annual reporting burden
associated with this rule is about 5,700 hours and $1.4 million, based
on a projection of 33 respondents. The estimated burden for vehicle
manufacturers is a total estimate for new reporting requirements.
Burden means the total time, effort, or financial resources expended by
persons to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose or provide
information to or for a Federal agency. This includes the time needed
to review instructions; develop, acquire, install, and utilize
technology and systems for the purposes of collecting, validating, and
verifying information, processing and maintaining information, and
disclosing and providing information; adjust the existing ways to
comply with any previously applicable instructions and requirements;
train personnel to be able to respond to a collection of information;
search data sources; complete and review the collection of information;
and transmit or otherwise disclose the information.
Table III-108--Estimated Burden for Reporting and Recordkeeping
Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual
Number of respondents burden hours Annual costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
33.......................................... 5,667 $1,399,632
------------------------------------------------------------------------
An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a
currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control numbers for EPA's
regulations in 40 CFR are listed in 40 CFR part 9. In addition, EPA is
amending the table in 40 CFR part 9 of currently approved OMB control
numbers for various regulations to list the regulatory citations for
the information requirements contained in this final rule.
The American Petroleum Institute commented that EPA must seek
approval for the paperwork burden associated with the information
collection that the 2017 car rule could impose on stationary sources
newly subject to permitting requirements. In response, this rule does
not contain any paperwork requirements for entities other than the auto
manufacturers discussed above.
c. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires an agency
to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis of any rule subject to
notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the Administrative
Procedure Act or any other statute unless the agency certifies that the
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Small entities include small businesses,
small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions.
For purposes of assessing the impacts of this rule on small
entities, small entity is defined as: (1) A small business as defined
by the Small Business Administration's (SBA) regulations at 13 CFR
121.201 (see table below); (2) a small governmental jurisdiction that
is a government of a city, county, town, school district or special
district with a population of less than 50,000; and (3) a small
organization that is any not-for-profit enterprise which is
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.
Table III-109 provides an overview of the primary SBA small
business categories included in the light-duty vehicle sector:
[[Page 62959]]
Table III-109--Primary SBA Small Business Categories in the Light-Duty Vehicle Sector
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defined as small entity by SBA if
Industry \a\ less than or equal to: NAICS codes \b\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle manufacturers (including small volume 1,000 employees...................... 336111, 336112
manufacturers).
Independent commercial importers.............. $7 million annual sales.............. 811111, 811112, 811198
$23 million annual sales............. 441120
100 employees........................ 423110
Alternative Fuel Vehicle Converters........... 750 employees........................ 336312, 336322, 336399
1,000 employees...................... 335312
$7 million annual sales.............. 811198
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Light-duty vehicle entities that qualify as small businesses are not subject to this rule. We are exempting
small business entities from the GHG standards.
\b\ North American Industrial Classification System.
After considering the economic impacts of today's rule on small
entities, EPA certifies that this action will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Consistent
with the MY 2012-2016 GHG standards, EPA is exempting manufacturers
meeting SBA's definition of small business as described in 13 CFR
121.201 due to unique issues involved with establishing appropriate GHG
standards for these small businesses and the potential need to develop
a program that would be structured differently for them (which would
require more time), and the extremely small emissions contribution of
these entities.
Potentially affected small entities fall into three distinct
categories of businesses for light-duty vehicles: small volume
manufacturers (SVMs), independent commercial importers (ICIs), and
alternative fuel vehicle converters. Based on our preliminary
assessment, EPA has identified a total of about 24 entities that fit
the Small Business Administration (SBA) criterion of a small business.
There are about 5 small manufacturers; including three electric vehicle
manufacturers, 8 ICIs, and 11 alternative fuel vehicle converters in
the light-duty vehicle market which are small businesses (no major
vehicle manufacturers meet the small-entity criteria as defined by
SBA). EPA estimates that these small entities comprise less than 0.1
percent of the total light-duty vehicle sales in the U.S., and
therefore the exemption will have a negligible impact on the GHG
emissions reductions from the standards.
As discussed in Section III.B.7, EPA is allowing small businesses
to waive their small entity exemption and optionally certify to the GHG
standards. This will allow small business manufacturers to earn
CO2 credits under the GHG program, if their actual fleetwide
CO2 performance was better than their fleetwide
CO2 target standard. Manufacturers may choose to opt-in as
early as MY 2013. Once the small business manufacturer opting into the
GHG program in MY 2013 completes certification for MY 2013, the company
will also be eligible to generate GHG credits for their MY 2012
production. Manufacturers waiving their small entity exemption must
meet all aspects of the GHG standards and program requirements across
their entire product line. However, the exemption waiver would be
optional for small entities and presumably manufacturers would only opt
into the GHG program if it is economically advantageous for them to do
so, for example through the generation and sale of CO2
credits. Therefore, EPA believes adding this voluntary option does not
affect EPA's determination that the standards would impose no
significant adverse impact on small entities.
The American Petroleum Institute commented that EPA is obligated
under the RFA to consider indirect impacts of the rules in assessing
impacts on small businesses, in particular potential impacts on
stationary sources that would not be directly regulated by the rule.
EPA disagrees. When considering whether a rule should be certified, the
RFA requires an agency to look only at the small entities to which the
rule will apply and which will be subject to the requirement of the
specific rule in question. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 603, 605 (b); Mid-Tex Elec.
Coop. v. FERC, 773 F.3d 327, 342 (DC Cir. 1985). Reading section 605 in
light of section 603, we conclude that an agency may properly certify
that no regulatory flexibility analysis is necessary when it determines
that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities that are subject to the
requirements of the rule; see also Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition, v.
EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 869 (DC Cir. 2001). DC Circuit has consistently
rejected the contention that the RFA applies to small businesses
indirectly affected by the regulation of other entities.\917\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\917\ In any case, any impacts on stationary sources arise
because of express statutory requirements in the CAA, not as a
result of vehicle GHG regulation. Moreover, GHGs have become subject
to regulation under the CAA by virtue of other regulatory actions
taken by EPA before this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the rule regulates exclusively large motor vehicle
manufacturers and small vehicle manufacturers are exempted from the
standards, EPA is properly certifying that the 2017-2025 standards will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities directly subject to the rule or otherwise would have a
positive economic effect on all of the small entities opting in to the
rule.
d. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), P.L.
104-4, establishes requirements for Federal agencies to assess the
effects of their regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal
governments and the private sector.
This rule contains no Federal mandates (under the regulatory
provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local, or tribal
governments. The rule imposes no enforceable duty on any State, local
or tribal governments. This action is also not subject to the
requirements of section 203 of UMRA because EPA has determined that
this rule contains no regulatory requirements that might significantly
or uniquely affect small governments. EPA has determined that this rule
contains a Federal mandate that may result in expenditures of $100
million or more for the private sector in any one year. EPA believes
that the rule represents the least costly, most cost-effective approach
to revise the light duty vehicle standards as authorized by section
202(a)(1). The costs and benefits associated with the rule are
discussed above and in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, as
required by the UMRA.
e. Executive Order 13132: ``Federalism''
This action does not have federalism implications. It will not have
substantial
[[Page 62960]]
direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government, as specified
in Executive Order 13132. This rulemaking applies to manufacturers of
motor vehicles and not to state or local governments; state and local
governments that purchase new model year 2017 and later vehicles will
enjoy substantial fuel savings from these more fuel efficient vehicles.
Thus, Executive Order 13132 does not apply to this action. Although
section 6 of Executive Order 13132 does not apply to this action, EPA
did consult with representatives of state and local governments in
developing this action.
In the spirit of Executive Order 13132, and consistent with EPA
policy to promote communications between EPA and State and local
governments, EPA specifically solicited comments on the action from
State and local officials. A number of State and local governments
submitted public comments on the rule, the majority of which were
supportive of the EPA's proposed action. However, these entities did
not provide comments indicating there would be a substantial direct
effect on State or local governments resulting from this rule.
f. Executive Order 13175: ``Consultation and Coordination With Indian
Tribal Governments''
This action does not have tribal implications, as specified in
Executive Order 13175 (65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000). This rule will
be implemented at the Federal level and impose compliance costs only on
vehicle manufacturers. Tribal governments will be affected only to the
extent they purchase and use regulated vehicles; tribal governments
that purchase new model year 2017 and later vehicles will enjoy
substantial fuel savings from these more fuel efficient vehicles. Thus,
Executive Order 13175 does not apply to this rule.
g. Executive Order 13045: ``Protection of Children From Environmental
Health Risks and Safety Risks''
This action is subject to EO 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997)
because it is an economically significant regulatory action as defined
by EO 12866, and EPA believes that the environmental health or safety
risk addressed by this action may have a disproportionate effect on
children. Climate change impacts, and in particular the determinations
of the Administrator in the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act
(74 FR 66496, December 15, 2009), are summarized in Section III.F.2. In
making those Findings, the Administrator placed weight on the fact that
certain groups, including children, are particularly vulnerable to
climate-related health effects. In those Findings, the Administrator
determined that the health effects of climate change linked to observed
and projected elevated concentrations of GHGs include the increased
likelihood of more frequent and intense heat waves, increases in ozone
concentrations over broad areas of the country, an increase of the
severity of extreme weather events such as hurricanes and floods, and
increasing severity of coastal storms due to rising sea levels. These
effects can all increase mortality and morbidity, especially in
vulnerable populations such as children, the elderly, and the poor. In
addition, the occurrence of wildfires in North America have increased
and are likely to intensify in a warmer future. PM emissions from these
wildfires can contribute to acute and chronic illnesses of the
respiratory system, including pneumonia, upper respiratory diseases,
asthma, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, especially in
children.
EPA has estimated reductions in projected global mean surface
temperature and sea level rise as a result of reductions in GHG
emissions associated with the standards finalized in this action
(Section III.F.3). Due to their vulnerability, children may receive
disproportionate benefits from these reductions in temperature and the
subsequent reduction of increased ozone and severity of weather events.
h. Executive Order 13211: ``Energy Effects''
Executive Order 13211 \918\ applies to any rule that: (1) Is
determined to be economically significant as defined under E.O. 12866,
and is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a
significant energy action. If the regulatory action meets either
criterion, we must evaluate the adverse energy effects of the proposed
rule and explain why the proposed regulation is preferable to other
potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives considered
by us.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\918\ 66 FR 28355 (May 18, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The action establishes passenger car and light truck fuel economy
standards that will significantly reduce the consumption of petroleum,
achieve energy security benefits, and have no adverse energy effects
(Section III.H.8). In fact, this rule has a positive effect on energy
supply and use. Because the GHG emission standards finalized today
result in significant fuel savings, this rule encourages more efficient
use of fuels. Accordingly, this rulemaking action is not designated as
a significant energy action as defined by E.O. 13211.
i. National Technology Transfer Advancement Act
Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995 (``NTTAA''), Public Law 104-113, 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272 note)
directs EPA to use voluntary consensus standards in its regulatory
activities unless to do so would be inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical. Voluntary consensus standards are technical
standards (e.g., materials, specifications, test methods, sampling
procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies. NTTAA directs EPA to provide
Congress, through OMB, explanations when the Agency decides not to use
available and applicable voluntary consensus standards.
This rulemaking involves technical standards. Therefore the Agency
conducted a search to identify potentially applicable voluntary
consensus standards. For CO2, emissions, we identified no
such standards, and none were brought to our attention in comments.
Therefore, for CO2, emissions EPA is collecting data over
the same tests that are used for the MY 2012-2016 CO2
standards and for the CAFE program. This will minimize the amount of
testing done by manufacturers, since manufacturers are already required
to run these tests. For A/C credits, EPA is using a consensus
methodology developed by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and
also a new A/C test. EPA knows of no consensus standard available for
the A/C test.
j. Executive Order 12898: ``Federal Actions To Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations''
Executive Order (EO) 12898 (59 FR 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994)) establishes
federal executive policy on environmental justice. Its main provision
directs federal agencies, to the greatest extent practicable and
permitted by law, to make environmental justice part of their mission
by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high
and adverse human health or
[[Page 62961]]
environmental effects of their programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations in the United States.
With respect to GHG emissions, EPA has determined that this final
rule will not have disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects on minority or low-income populations because it
increases the level of environmental protection for all affected
populations without having any disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects on any population, including any
minority or low-income population. The reductions in CO2 and
other GHGs associated with the standards will affect climate change
projections, and EPA has estimated reductions in projected global mean
surface temperatures and sea-level rise (Section III.F.3). Within
settlements experiencing climate change, certain parts of the
population may be especially vulnerable; these include the poor, the
elderly, those already in poor health, the disabled, those living
alone, and/or indigenous populations dependent on one or a few
resources.\919\ Therefore, these populations may receive
disproportionate benefits from reductions in GHGs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\919\ U.S. EPA. (2009). Technical Support Document for
Endangerment or Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. Washington, DC: U.S. EPA.
Retrieved on April 21, 2009 from http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/TSD_Endangerment.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For non-GHG co-pollutants such as ozone, PM2.5, and
toxics, EPA has concluded that it is not practicable to determine
whether there would be disproportionately high and adverse human health
or environmental effects on minority and/or low income populations from
this rule.
k. Congressional Review Act
The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et. seq., as added by
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,
generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency
promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy
of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller
General of the United States. EPA will submit a report containing this
rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House
of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States
prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register. A Major rule
cannot take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal
Register. This action is a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C.
804(2). This rule will be effective [date], sixty days after date of
publication in the Federal Register.
J. Statutory Provisions and Legal Authority
Statutory authority for the vehicle controls finalized today is
found in section 202(a) (which authorizes standards for emissions of
pollutants from new motor vehicles which emissions cause or contribute
to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare), 202(d), 203-209, 216, and 301 of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. 7521(a), 7521(d), 7522, 7523, 7524, 7525, 7541, 7542, 7543,
7550, and 7601. Statutory authority for EPA to establish CAFE test
procedures is found in section 32904(c) of the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C. 32904(c).
IV. NHTSA Final Rule for Passenger Car and Light Truck CAFE Standards
for Model Years 2017 and Beyond
A. Executive Overview of NHTSA Final Rule
1. Introduction
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is
establishing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for
passenger automobiles (passenger cars) and nonpassenger automobiles
(light trucks) for model years (MY) 2017-2021. NHTSA's final CAFE
standards would, on average, require manufacturers' passenger car and
light truck fleets to achieve a combined 40.3-41.0 mpg in MY 2021. This
represents an average annual increase of 3.3-3.5 percent from the
estimated 34.3-34.5 mpg expected to be required, on average, in MY
2016. NHTSA is also presenting what we are describing as ``augural''
standards for MYs 2022-2025 in this final rule and accompanying
regulatory documents. The National Program, of which this final rule is
a part, covers 9 model years of standards--2017-2025--but NHTSA is
directed by statute to set CAFE standards for ``at least 1, but not
more than 5'' model years at a time.\920\ To facilitate longer-term
product planning by industry and in the interest of harmonization,
NHTSA is presenting the augural standards for MYs 2022-2025 in these
rulemaking documents as representative of what levels of stringency the
agency currently believes would be appropriate in those model years,
based on the information before us today. The augural standards, if
finalized, would require manufacturers' passenger car and light truck
fleets to achieve an average of 48.7-49.7 mpg in MY 2025. Thus, for the
entire 2017-2025 period, the final standards plus the augural standards
represent an average annual increase of 4.0-4.1 percent from the
estimated 34.3-34.5 mpg expected to be required, on average, in MY
2016. The augural standards alone represent an average annual increase
of 4.8-4.9 percent from the estimated 40.3-41.0 mpg expected to be
required, on average, in MY 2021.
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\920\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3)(B).
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For brevity, information about the impacts of the standards will be
provided throughout the document without distinguishing between the
final standards and the augural standards, but we emphasize that the
augural standards are not final, and that a future full rulemaking
consistent with all applicable law will be necessary in order for NHTSA
to establish final CAFE standards for MYs 2022-2025 passenger cars and
light trucks.
Because the overarching goal of the CAFE program is energy
conservation, two of the most important impacts of the standards are
reductions in U.S. petroleum consumption and the corresponding benefits
to society of avoiding that petroleum consumption. Due to the combined
final and augural standards, we project total fuel savings of
approximately 180-184 billion gallons over the lifetimes of the
vehicles sold in model years 2017-2025, with corresponding net societal
benefits of over $498-507 billion using a 3 percent discount rate,\921\
or $372-377 billion using a 7 percent discount rate.
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\921\ This value is based on what NHTSA refers to as ``Reference
Case'' inputs, which are based on the assumptions that NHTSA has
employed for its main analysis (as opposed to sensitivity analyses
to examine the effect of variations in the assumptions on costs and
benefits). The Reference Case inputs include fuel prices based on
the AEO 2012 Early Release Reference Case, a 3 percent and a 7
percent discount rate, a 10 percent rebound effect, a value for the
social cost of carbon (SCC) of $22/metric ton CO2 (in
constant 2010 dollars for emissions occurring in 2010, rising to
$47/metric ton in 2050, at a 3 percent discount rate), etc. For a
full listing of the Reference Case input assumptions, see Section
IV.C.3 below.
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While NHTSA has been setting fuel economy standards since the
1970s, as discussed in Section I, NHTSA's final MYs 2017-2021 CAFE
standards and augural MYs 2022-2025 CAFE standards are part of a
National Program made up of complementary regulations by NHTSA and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Today's standards build upon the
success of the first phase of the National Program, finalized on May 7,
2010, in which NHTSA and EPA set coordinated CAFE and greenhouse gas
(GHG) standards for MYs 2012-2016 passenger cars and light trucks.
Because of the very close relationship between improving fuel economy
and reducing
[[Page 62962]]
carbon dioxide (CO2) tailpipe emissions, a large majority of
the projected benefits are achieved jointly with EPA's GHG rule, which
is described in detail above in Section III of this preamble. These
CAFE standards are consistent with the President's National Fuel
Efficiency Policy announcement of May 19, 2009, which called for
harmonized rules for all automakers, instead of three overlapping and
potentially inconsistent requirements from DOT, EPA, and the California
Air Resources Board. And finally, the CAFE standards and the analysis
supporting them also respond to President Obama's May 2010 memorandum
requesting the agencies to develop, through notice and comment
rulemaking, a coordinated National Program for passenger cars and light
trucks for MYs 2017 to 2025.
2. Why does NHTSA set CAFE standards for passenger cars and light
trucks?
Improving vehicle fuel economy has been long and widely recognized
as one of the key ways of achieving energy independence, energy
security, and a low carbon economy.\922\ The significance accorded to
improving fuel economy reflects several factors. Conserving energy,
especially reducing the nation's dependence on petroleum, benefits the
U.S. in several ways. Improving energy efficiency has benefits for
economic growth and the environment, as well as other benefits, such as
reducing pollution and improving security of energy supply. More
specifically, reducing total petroleum use decreases our economy's
vulnerability to oil price shocks. Reducing dependence on oil imports
from regions with uncertain conditions enhances our energy security.
Additionally, the emission of CO2 from the tailpipes of cars
and light trucks due to the combustion of petroleum is one of the
largest sources of U.S. CO2 emissions.\923\ Using vehicle
technology to improve fuel economy, and thereby reducing tailpipe
emissions of CO2, is one of the three main measures of
reducing those tailpipe emissions of CO2.\924\ The two other
measures for reducing the tailpipe emissions of CO2 are
switching to vehicle fuels with lower carbon content, and changing
driver behavior, i.e., inducing people to drive less.
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\922\ Among the reports and studies noting this point are the
following:
John Podesta, Todd Stern and Kim Batten, ``Capturing the Energy
Opportunity; Creating a Low-Carbon Economy,'' Center for American
Progress (November 2007), pp. 2, 6, 8, and 24-29, available at:
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/pdf/energy_chapter.pdf (last accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
Sarah Ladislaw, Kathryn Zyla, Jonathan Pershing, Frank
Verrastro, Jenna Goodward, David Pumphrey, and Britt Staley, ``A
Roadmap for a Secure, Low-Carbon Energy Economy; Balancing Energy
Security and Climate Change,'' World Resources Institute and Center
for Strategic and International Studies (January 2009), pp. 21-22;
available at: http://pdf.wri.org/secure_low_carbon_energy_economy_roadmap.pdf (last accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
Alliance to Save Energy et al., ``Reducing the Cost of
Addressing Climate Change Through Energy Efficiency'' (2009),
available at: http://www.aceee.org/files/pdf/white-paper/ReducingtheCostofAddressingClimateChange_synopsis.pdf (last
accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
John DeCicco and Freda Fung, ``Global Warming on the Road; The
Climate Impact of America's Automobiles,'' Environmental Defense
(2006) pp. iv-vii; available at: http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/5301_Globalwarmingontheroad_0.pdf (last accessed Jun. 23,
2012).
``Why is Fuel Economy Important?,'' a Web page maintained by the
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, available
at http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/why.shtml (last accessed Jun. 23,
2012).
Robert Socolow, Roberta Hotinski, Jeffery B. Greenblatt, and
Stephen Pacala, ``Solving The Climate Problem: Technologies
Available to Curb CO2 Emissions,'' Environment, volume
46, no. 10, 2004. pages 8-19, available at: http://www.princeton.edu/mae/people/faculty/socolow/ENVIRONMENTDec2004issue.pdf (last accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
\923\ Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2010 (April 2012), EPA-430-R-12-001, pp. ES-4 (Table ES-2), ES-
15, and 2-20 through 2-23. Available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf (last accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
\924\ Podesta et al., p. 25; Ladislaw et al. p. 21; DeCicco et
al. p. vii; ``Reduce Climate Change, a Web page maintained by the
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency at http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/climate.shtml (last accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
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a. Reducing Petroleum Consumption To Improve Energy Security and Save
the U.S. Money
In 1975, Congress enacted the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA), mandating that NHTSA establish and implement a regulatory
program for motor vehicle fuel economy to meet the various facets of
the need to conserve energy, including ones having energy independence
and security, environmental, and foreign policy implications. Improving
our energy and national security by reducing our dependence on foreign
oil has been a national objective since the first oil price shocks in
the 1970s, and the need to reduce energy consumption is even more
crucial today than it was when EPCA was enacted. Net petroleum imports
accounted for approximately 45 percent of U.S. petroleum consumption in
2011.\925\ World crude oil production is highly concentrated,
exacerbating the risks of supply disruptions and price shocks as the
recent unrest in North Africa and the Persian Gulf highlights. The
export of U.S. assets for oil imports continues to be an important
component of U.S. trade deficits. Transportation accounted for about 71
percent of U.S. petroleum consumption in 2009.\926\ Light-duty vehicles
account for about 60 percent of transportation oil use,\927\ which
means that they alone account for about 40 percent of all U.S. oil
consumption.
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\925\ Energy Information Administration, ``How dependent are we
on foreign oil?'' Available at http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm?featureclicked=3 (last
accessed Jun. 23, 2012). EIA notes that U.S. dependence on imported
oil has declined since peaking in 2005 as a result of a variety of
factors, including improvements in efficiency as well as economic
trends.
\926\ Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook
2011, ``Oil/Liquids.'' Available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_liquidfuels.cfm (last accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
\927\ Energy Information Administration, ``Use of Energy in the
United States Explained, Energy Use for Transportation.'' Available
at http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_energy_transportation (last accessed Aug. 9, 2012).
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Gasoline consumption in the U.S. has historically been relatively
insensitive to fluctuations in both price and consumer income, and
people in most parts of the country tend to view gasoline consumption
as a non-discretionary expense. Thus, when gasoline's share in consumer
expenditures rises, the public experiences fiscal distress. Recent
tight global oil markets led to prices over $100 per barrel, with
gasoline reaching as high as $4 per gallon in many parts of the U.S.,
causing financial hardship for many families and businesses. This
fiscal distress can, in some cases, have macroeconomic consequences for
the economy at large.
Additionally, since U.S. oil production is only affected by
fluctuations in prices over a period of years, any changes in petroleum
consumption (as through increased fuel economy levels for the on-road
fleet) largely flow into changes in the quantity of imports. Since
petroleum imports account for about 2 percent of GDP, increases in oil
imports can create a discernible fiscal drag. As a consequence,
measures that reduce petroleum consumption, like fuel economy
standards, will directly benefit the balance-of-payments account, and
strengthen the U.S. economy to some degree. And finally, U.S. foreign
policy has been affected by decades by rising U.S. and world dependency
on crude oil as the basis for modern transportation systems, although
fuel economy standards have at best an indirect impact on U.S. foreign
policy.
[[Page 62963]]
b. Reducing Petroleum Consumption To Reduce Climate Change Impacts
CO2 is the natural by-product of the combustion of
fossil fuel to power motor vehicles. The more fuel-efficient a vehicle
is, the less fuel it needs to burn to travel a given distance. The less
fuel it burns, the less CO2 it emits in traveling that
distance.\928\ Since the amount of CO2 emissions is
essentially constant per gallon combusted of a given type of fuel, the
amount of fuel consumption per mile is closely related to the amount of
CO2 emissions per mile. Transportation is the second largest
GHG-emitting sector in the U.S. after electricity generation, and
accounted for 27 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions in 2010; passenger
cars and light trucks make up 62 percent of transportation sector GHG
emissions.\929\ Concentrations of greenhouse gases are at unprecedented
levels compared to the recent and distant past, which means that fuel
economy improvements to reduce those emissions are a crucial step
toward addressing the risks of global climate change. These risks are
well documented in Section III of this notice, and in NHTSA's Final
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) accompanying this final rule.
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\928\ Panel on Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming,
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering,
Institute of Medicine, ``Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming:
Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base,'' National Academies
Press, 1992, at 287. Available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=1605 (last accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
\929\ EPA Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2010 (April 2012), p. 2-20. Available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Chapter-2-Trends.pdf (last accessed Jun. 23, 2012).
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Fuel economy gains since 1975, due both to the standards and to
market factors, have resulted in saving billions of barrels of oil and
avoiding billions of metric tons of CO2 emissions. In
December 2007, Congress enacted the Energy Independence and Security
Act (EISA), amending EPCA to require substantial, continuing increases
in fuel economy. NHTSA thus sets CAFE standards today under EPCA, as
amended by EISA, in order to help the U.S. passenger car and light
truck fleet save fuel to promote energy independence, energy security,
and a low carbon economy.
3. Why is NHTSA presenting CAFE standards for MYs 2017-2025 now?
a. President's Memorandum
During the public comment period for the MY 2012-2016 proposed
rulemaking, many stakeholders encouraged NHTSA and EPA to begin working
toward standards for MY 2017 and beyond in order to maintain a single
nationwide program. After the publication of the final rule
establishing MYs 2012-2016 CAFE and GHG standards, President Obama
issued a Memorandum on May 21, 2010 requesting that NHTSA, on behalf of
the Department of Transportation, and EPA work together to develop a
national program for model years 2017-2025.\930\ Specifically, he
requested that the agencies develop `` * * * a coordinated national
program under the CAA [Clean Air Act] and the EISA [Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007] to improve fuel efficiency and to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions of passenger cars and light-duty trucks of
model years 2017-2025.'' The President recognized that our country
could take a leadership role in addressing the global challenges of
improving energy security and reducing greenhouse gas pollution,
stating that ``America has the opportunity to lead the world in the
development of a new generation of clean cars and trucks through
innovative technologies and manufacturing that will spur economic
growth and create high-quality domestic jobs, enhance our energy
security, and improve our environment.''
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\930\ The Presidential Memorandum is found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-fuel-efficiency-standards. For the reader's reference, the
President also requested the Administrators of EPA and NHTSA to
issue joint rules under the CAA and EISA to establish fuel
efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions standards for commercial
medium-and heavy-duty on-highway vehicles and work trucks beginning
with the 2014 model year. The agencies promulgated final GHG and
fuel efficiency standards for heavy duty vehicles and engines for
MYs 2014-2018 in 2011. 76 FR 57106 (September 15, 2011).
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The Presidential Memorandum stated ``The program should also seek
to achieve substantial annual progress in reducing transportation
sector greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel consumption, consistent
with my Administration's overall energy and climate security goals,
through the increased domestic production and use of existing,
advanced, and emerging technologies, and should strengthen the industry
and enhance job creation in the United States.'' Among other things,
the agencies were tasked with researching and then developing standards
for MYs 2017 through 2025 that would be appropriate and consistent with
EPA's and NHTSA's respective statutory authorities, in order to
continue to guide the automotive sector along the road to reducing its
fuel consumption and GHG emissions, thereby ensuring corresponding
energy security and environmental benefits. Several major automobile
manufacturers and CARB sent letters to EPA and NHTSA in support of a
MYs 2017 to 2025 rulemaking initiative as outlined in the President's
May 21, 2010 announcement.\931\ The agencies began working immediately
on the next phase of the National Program, work which has culminated in
the standards for MYs 2017-2025 contained in this final rule.
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\931\ These commitment letters in response to the May 21, 2010
Presidential Memorandum are available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/Laws+&+Regulations/CAFE+-+Fuel+Economy/Stakeholder+Commitment+Letters (last accessed August 5, 2012).
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b. Benefits of Continuing the National Program
The National Program is both needed and possible because the
relationship between improving fuel economy and reducing CO2
tailpipe emissions is a very close one. There is a single pool of
technologies for reducing fuel consumption and CO2
emissions. Using these technologies to minimize fuel consumption also
minimizes CO2 emissions. While there are emission control
technologies that can capture or destroy the pollutants that are
produced by imperfect combustion of fuel (e.g., carbon monoxide), there
are at present no such technologies for CO2. In fact, the
only way at present to reduce tailpipe emissions of CO2 is
by reducing fuel consumption. The National Program thus has dual
benefits: it conserves energy by improving fuel economy, as required of
NHTSA by EPCA and EISA; in the process, it necessarily reduces tailpipe
CO2 emissions consonant with EPA's purposes and
responsibilities under the Clean Air Act. While the vast majority of
commenters strongly supported this goal, the Institute for Energy
Research (IER) argued that because the agencies' analysis showed that
the proposed standards would reduce global climate change by roughly 2/
100th of a degree Celsius in 2100, therefore EPA was not accomplishing
the goal of reducing the risk of GHGs to public health and welfare, and
should not be regulating GHGs for light-duty vehicles under the
CAA.\932\ Environmental Consultants of Michigan commented similarly,
and suggested that EPA regulate fuels rather than vehicles to reduce
emissions more effectively.\933\ Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)
\934\ also argued, as did the
[[Page 62964]]
U.S. Chamber of Commerce,\935\ the National Automobile Dealers
Association,\936\ and joint comments from the American Petrochemical
Institute (API), the National Manufacturers Association (NAM), and the
American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers Association (AFPM),\937\
that NHTSA should be setting CAFE standards and that EPA should not be
concurrently setting GHG standards under the CAA. Some commenters, such
as CEI \938\ and AFPM,\939\ further argued that standards for MYs 2017-
2025 should not be set at this time. Other commenters, such as the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), strongly supported the joint
action, pointing to EPA's relatively broad authority under the CAA to
argue that a joint action can accomplish more than what NHTSA can
accomplish under its EPCA/EISA authority.\940\ Consumer Federation of
America also supported the joint action, stating that coordinated
national standards reflecting a steady rate of increase in stringency
over a long time give consumers and the industry certainty and time to
adapt to change.\941\ Again, we note that of the hundreds of thousands
of comments received to the proposals, the overwhelming majority were
positive.
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\932\ IER, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573, at 3-7.
\933\ Environmental Consultants of Michigan, Docket No. NHTSA-
2010-0131-0166, at 1-4.
\934\ CEI, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552, at 1-2.
\935\ U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-
9521, at 3-5.
\936\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 12.
\937\ API/NAM/AFPM, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509, at 8.
\938\ CEI, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552, at 1-2.
\939\ AFPM, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485, at 2.
\940\ NRDC, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472, at 2, 7-8.
\941\ CFA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419, at 10.
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NHTSA believes that the benefits of the National Program extend far
beyond the potential future reduction in global temperature that can be
associated with the standards being finalized today. The fuel savings
and related CO2 emissions reductions that will occur as a
result of the standards will be real, and the fact that this rulemaking
cannot, by itself, solve our energy security and climate change
challenges does not obviate the agencies' need to act.\942\ NHTSA is
required by Congress to set CAFE standards to promote energy
conservation, and today's standards will meaningfully reduce consumers'
future fuel expenses and the nation's exposure to economic and other
risks related to petroleum consumption. Moreover, EPA, due to its
Endangerment Finding, is required to prescribe standards under the CAA
to reduce the risks associated with climate change. By setting
harmonized Federal standards now to regulate both fuel economy and
greenhouse gas emissions, the agencies are able to provide a
predictable regulatory framework for the automotive industry while
preserving the legal authorities of NHTSA, EPA, and the State of
California. Consistent, harmonized, and streamlined requirements under
the National Program, both for MYs 2012-2016 and for MYs 2017-2025,
hold out the promise of continuing to deliver energy and environmental
benefits, cost savings, and administrative efficiencies on a nationwide
basis that might not be available under a less coordinated approach.
The National Program makes it possible for the standards of two
different Federal agencies and the standards of California and other
``Section 177'' states to act in a unified fashion in providing these
benefits. A harmonized approach to regulating passenger car and light
truck fuel economy and GHG emissions is critically important given the
interdependent goals of addressing climate change and ensuring energy
independence and security. Additionally, a harmonized approach would
help to mitigate the cost to manufacturers of having to comply with
multiple sets of Federal and State standards.
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\942\ As the Supreme Court has stated, ``Agencies, like
legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell
regulatory swoop. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla, Inc., 349
U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (``[A] reform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute
to the legislative mind''). They instead whittle away at them
overtime, refining their preferred approach as circumstances change
and as they develop a more nuanced understanding of how best to
proceed.'' Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).
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One aspect of this phase of the National Program that is unique for
NHTSA, however, is that the passenger car and light truck CAFE
standards presented in this final rule for MYs 2022-2025 are augural,
while EPA's standards for those model years will be legally binding
when adopted in this round. As noted above, EISA requires NHTSA to
issue CAFE standards for ``at least 1, but not more than 5, model
years.'' To maintain the harmonization benefits of the National
Program, NHTSA has finalized standards for MYs 2017-2021 and presented
standards for MYs 2022-2025, but the last 4 years of standards are not
legally binding as part of this rulemaking. The passenger car and light
truck CAFE standards for MYs 2022-2025 will be determined with finality
in a subsequent, de novo notice and comment rulemaking conducted in
full compliance with EPCA/EISA and other applicable law--more than
simply reviewing the analysis and findings in the present rulemaking to
see whether they are still accurate and applicable, but taking a fresh
look at all relevant factors based on the best and most current
information available at that future time. Global Automakers commented
that NHTSA should not include the passenger car and light truck
standards for MYs 2022-2025 in its regulatory text for inclusion in the
CFR, on the grounds that those standards must be finalized in the
future de novo rulemaking.\943\ We are continuing to include the
augural standards for MYs 2022-2025 in the regulatory text as part of
this final rule, but we have clarified, as will be evident in NHTSA's
revisions to 49 CFR Part 531 and Part 533 at the end of this preamble,
that they are separate from the final standards for MYs 2017-2021. The
proposed regulatory text already explained that the standards for MYs
2022-2025 would only be applicable if NHTSA determines in the future
rulemaking that they are maximum feasible; those provisions are made
final in this rule. NAM and Toyota argued that the agencies should
immediately rescind the standards for MYs 2022-2025 if they are
determined to be inappropriate, leaving the MY 2021 standards in effect
for those future model years until new standards are finalized.\944\
Since NHTSA's standards for MYs 2022-2025 are augural and must be
finalized in a subsequent de novo rulemaking, this concern is not an
issue for the CAFE program. Toyota suggested that NHTSA simply enact
standards at the MY 2021 levels for MYs 2022-2025 if the future
rulemaking is not completed prior to 18 months before the start of MY
2022,\945\ but NHTSA does not intend to prejudge the outcome of that
future rulemaking, and at any rate fully expects to complete it well in
advance of the statutory lead-time requirement.
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\943\ Global Automakers, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0237, at 12.
\944\ NAM, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9587, at 3; Toyota,
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586, at 8-9.
\945\ Toyota, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586, at 8-9.
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To facilitate that future rulemaking effort, NHTSA and EPA will
concurrently conduct a comprehensive mid-term evaluation. Up to date
information will be developed and compiled for the evaluation, through
a collaborative, robust, and transparent process, including notice and
comment. Toyota commented that it supported the participation of the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) in the mid-
[[Page 62965]]
term evaluation process, and the conditioning of the CAA preemption
waiver for CARB's MYs 2017-2025 GHG standards on CARB's acceptance of
any changes to the EPA GHG standards for MYs 2022-2025 that may result
from the mid-term evaluation.\946\ The agencies fully expect to conduct
the mid-term evaluation in close coordination with the CARB, consistent
with the agencies' commitment to maintaining a single national
framework for regulation of fuel economy and GHG emissions.\947\ Prior
to beginning NHTSA's rulemaking process and EPA's mid-term evaluation,
the agencies plan to jointly prepare a draft Technical Assessment
Report (TAR) to examine afresh the issues and, in doing so, conduct
similar analyses and projections as those considered in the current
rulemaking, including technical and other analyses and projections
relevant to each agency's authority to set standards as well as any
relevant new issues that may present themselves. The agencies plan to
provide an opportunity for public comment on the draft TAR, and to
arrange for appropriate peer review of underlying analyses, and to make
the assumptions and modeling underlying the TAR available to the public
to the extent consistent with law. The draft TAR is expected to be
issued no later than November 15, 2017. The agencies plan to consult
and coordinate as NHTSA develops its NPRM. NHTSA will ensure that the
subsequent final rule will be timed to provide sufficient lead time for
industry to make whatever changes to their products that the rulemaking
analysis deems maximum feasible based on the new information available.
At the very latest, NHTSA will complete its subsequent rulemaking on
the standards with at least 18 months lead time as required by
EPCA,\948\ but additional lead time may be provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\946\ Toyota, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586, at 9.
\947\ The agencies also fully expect that any adjustments to the
standards as a result of NHTSA's rulemaking and the mid-term
evaluation process from the levels enumerated in the current
rulemaking will be made with the participation of CARB and in a
manner that continues the harmonization of state and Federal vehicle
standards.
\948\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Background
1. Chronology of Events Since the MY 2012-2016 Final Rule Was Issued
Section I above covers the chronology of events in considerable
detail, and we refer the reader there.
2. How has NHTSA developed the CAFE standards since the President's
announcement, and what has changed between the proposal and the final
rule?
The CAFE standards proposed in the NPRM and presented in this final
rule are based on much more analysis conducted by the agencies since
the TAR, including in-depth modeling analysis by DOT/NHTSA to support
the CAFE standards, and further refinement of a number of our baseline,
technology, and economic assumptions used to evaluate the standards and
their impacts. While much of the analytical basis for the proposed
standards was carried forward into the final rule analysis, some
aspects of the final rule are different from the proposal, such as the
following:
a. Programmatic Changes
As discussed above and in more detail in Section IV.E
below, NHTSA is clarifying in this final rule that the standards for
MYs 2022-2025 are augural, and will be finalized in a future de novo
rulemaking;
Fuel consumption improvements due to A/C efficiency
improvements--menu: the agencies had originally proposed that
manufacturers must perform the A-to-B ``AC17'' test and report their
full results in order to access the credit/fuel consumption improvement
menu. For the final rule, manufacturers are required to report only
results of the AC17 ``B'' testing for MY 2017-2019 in order to access
the full menu credit for installed technologies. For MY 2020 and
beyond, AC17 ``A'' test results or engineering analysis and AC17 ``B''
test results must be submitted to determine actual credit
availability.\949\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\949\ The fuel consumption improvement values in the A/C
efficiency menu have not changed, but this procedural change has the
effect of making it easier for manufacturers to demonstrate
improvements in their A/C systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As proposed, a manufacturer could obtain credit for
installation of off-cycle technologies but had to meet a 10%
penetration threshold requirement. The minimum penetration rate
requirements have been eliminated for this final rule.
NHTSA is adding to its regulations a description of the
process it plans to use provide its views to EPA related to
manufacturers' applications to use off-cycle technologies to improve
their average CAFE performance values.
To obtain credits for implementation of mild hybrids on
large pick-up trucks, the installation rate has been reduced in the
final rule from 30% and 40% to 20% and 30% for MYs 2017 and 2018,
respectively.
[cir] Certain proposed definitions have been revised to address
comments and add further clarification:
[cir] The base tire definition is revised to better align with the
approach manufacturers use to determine model type target standards.
[cir] Mild hybrid and strong hybrid vehicle definitions are no
longer limited to gasoline-electric vehicles but may include non-
gasoline (i.e., diesel, ethanol, and CNG-fueled) hybrid vehicles.
Proposed Part 537 reporting requirements have been revised
to address comments and add further clarification:
[cir] Manufacturers will be required to submit pre- and mid-model
year reports containing purported confidential business information on
CD-ROM (2-copies) versus email to a secure agency email address as
stated in the NPRM.
[cir] Aspects of the proposed requirement that manufacturers of
light trucks provide specific data in the pre-model year report
substantiating classification decisions have been clarified.
[cir] Manufacturers taking advantage of technology incentives (A/C
efficiency, off-cycle and large pick-up hybrid and efficiency
improvement technology) are required to report cumulatively for the
application of its vehicles versus for each vehicle configuration as
was proposed.
[cir] Modified requirements to include the provision that
manufacturers can optionally report target standard values for each
reported unique model type/footprint combination.
b. Analytical Changes
NHTSA and EPA have revised the 2008-based baseline market
forecast to correct some errors in the version used for the NPRM, and
added a 2010-based baseline market forecast. Analysis throughout the
NHTSA rulemaking documents reflects both forecasts.
Battery costs: Argonne National Laboratories (ANL) updated
its ``BatPaC'' battery cost model to include cost estimates of options
for liquid or air thermal management with adequate surface area and
cell spacing, the option of parallel subpacks or modules battery
configuration, and NHTSA-estimated costs for a battery discharging
system. Using these updates, EPA updated the battery costs for strong
hybrids, PHEVs, and EVs, and the results are used in both agencies'
analyses.
Work with ANL: Between the NPRM and the final rule, DOT/
NHTSA contracted with ANL (separately from the battery cost work
described above) to study some aspects of advanced
[[Page 62966]]
transmission and hybrid technology effectiveness. Based on the results
from the ANL study, NHTSA updated the certain transmission technology
effectiveness values in the CAFE model when advanced transmissions are
matched with naturally aspirated engines. Additionally, based on ANL's
work for DOT/NHTSA, both agencies have added mild hybrids (similar to
GM's Buick eAssist) as an enabling technology applicable to all vehicle
classes in their analyses for this final rule. The cost for the mild
hybrid technology is derived based on the teardown study performed by
FEV for EPA and battery costs from ANL's BatPaC model.
Amount of mass reduction: Between the NPRM and the final
rule, NHTSA updated the amount of mass reduction applied in the CAFE
model as a result of updates to the safety coefficients from the most
recent Kahane study, in order to achieve the maximum amount of mass
reduction while maintaining a safety-neutral outcome.
Updates to economic inputs:
[cir] Fuel prices are now based on EIA's AEO 2012 Early Release
forecasts
[cir] VMT schedules and vehicle survival rates have been updated
[cir] Changes to benefits associated with reduced refueling time
[cir] Accounting for maintenance costs during the warranty period
(sensitivity analysis to consider repair costs beyond the warranty
period)
[cir] Accounting for financing costs and insurance costs from the
consumer perspective
[cir] Updating all costs and benefits to 2010$
Changes to the CAFE model:
[cir] Corrections to incremental accounting for cost of diesel
engines
[cir] For purposes of selecting among available options to add
technology incrementally, corrections to model to look at fuel prices
during years following vehicle's sale, rather than before vehicle's
sale
[cir] Corrections to accounting for the fuel economy of dual-fueled
E85-capable vehicles (often called ``flexible fuel vehicles'' or
``FFVs'') to recognize technologies' fuel economy effectiveness when
operating on E85
[cir] Corrections to accounting for on-road energy consumption by
EVs and PHEVs by removing Petroleum Equivalency Factor from on-road
equivalent fuel economy
[cir] Corrections to account for mobility benefit (value of travel)
to account for value of fuel for travel attributable to the rebound
effect
[cir] Other changes to implement the analytic and programmatic
changes listed above
This final rule, the joint TSD, and NHTSA's FRIA and EPA's RIA
contain much more information about the analysis underlying the final
standards. The following sections in this preamble provide the basis
for NHTSA's final passenger car and light truck CAFE standards for MYs
2017-2021 and augural standards for MYs 2022-2025, the standards
themselves, the estimated impacts of the standards, and much more
information about the CAFE program relevant to the 2017-2025 timeframe.
C. Development and Feasibility of the Proposed Standards
1. How was the baseline vehicle fleet developed?
a. Why do the agencies establish a baseline and reference vehicle
fleet?
As also discussed in Section II.B above, in order to determine what
levels of stringency are feasible in future model years, the agencies
must project what vehicles will exist in those model years, and then
evaluate what technologies can feasibly be applied to those vehicles in
order to raise their fuel economy and lower their CO2
emissions. The agencies therefore established two ``baseline'' vehicle
fleets representing those vehicles, based on the best available
transparent information. The agencies then developed two ``reference''
fleets, projecting the baseline fleet sales into MYs 2017-2025 and
accounting for the effect that the MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards have on
the baseline fleet.\950\ These reference fleets are then used for
comparisons of technologies' incremental cost and effectiveness, as
well as for other relevant comparisons in the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\950\ In order to calculate the impacts of the proposed future
GHG and CAFE standards, it is necessary to estimate the composition
of the future vehicle fleet absent those proposed standards in order
to conduct comparisons. The first step in this process was to
develop a fleet based on data from a given model year. This given-
model-year-based fleet includes vehicle sales volumes, GHG/fuel
economy performance, and contains a listing of the base technologies
on every vehicle sold in that model year. The second step was to
project that given-model-year-based fleet volume into MYs 2017-2025.
This is called the reference fleet, and it represents the fleet
volumes (but, until later steps, not levels of technology) that the
NHTSA and EPA expect would exist in MYs 2017-2025 absent any change
due to regulation in 2017-2025.
After determining the reference fleet, a third step is needed to
account for technologies (and corresponding increases in cost and
reductions in fuel consumption and CO2 emissions) that
could be added to the given-model-year vehicles in the future,
taking into previously-promulgated standards, and assuming MY 2016
standards are extended through MY 2025. NHTSA accomplished this by
using the CAFE model to add technologies to the MY 2008-based market
forecast and the MY 2010-based market forecast such that each
manufacturer's car and truck CAFE and average CO2 levels
reflect baseline standards. The model's output, the reference case
(or adjusted baseline, or no-action alternative), is the light-duty
fleet estimated to exist in MYs 2017-2025 without new GHG/CAFE
standards covering MYs 2017-2025. Section II above and Chapter 1 of
the joint TSD provide additional information on development of the
baseline and reference fleets for this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. What data did the agencies use to construct the baseline, and how
did they do so?
As explained in Chapter 1 of the joint TSD, both agencies used
baseline vehicle fleets constructed beginning with EPA fuel economy
certification data for the 2008 and 2010 model years, the latter being
the most recent model year for which final data is currently available
from manufacturers. These data were used as the source for MY 2008 and
MY 2010 production volumes and some vehicle engineering
characteristics, such as fuel economy compliance ratings, engine sizes,
numbers of cylinders, and transmission types.
Some information important for analyzing new CAFE standards is not
contained in the EPA fuel economy certification data. EPA staff
estimated vehicle wheelbase and track widths using data from
Motortrend.com and Edmunds.com. This information is necessary for
estimating vehicle footprint, which is required for the analysis of
footprint-based standards.
Considerable additional information regarding vehicle engineering
characteristics is also important for estimating the potential to add
new technologies in response to new CAFE standards. In general, such
information helps to avoid ``adding'' technologies to vehicles that
already have the same or a more advanced technology. Examples include
valvetrain configuration (e.g., OHV, SOHC, DOHC), presence of cylinder
deactivation, and fuel delivery (e.g., MPFI, SIDI). To the extent that
such engineering characteristics were not available in certification
data, EPA staff relied on data published by Ward's Automotive,
supplementing this with information from Internet sites such as
Motortrend.com and Edmunds.com. NHTSA staff also added some more
detailed engineering characteristics (e.g., type of variable valve
timing) using data available from ALLDATA[supreg] Online. Combined with
the certification data, all of this information yielded the MY 2008 and
MY 2010 baseline vehicle fleets. NHTSA also reviewed information from
[[Page 62967]]
manufacturers' confidential product plans submitted to the agency, but
did not rely on that information for developing the baseline or
reference fleets.
After the baseline was created the next step was to project the
sales volumes for 2017-2025 model years. For the MY 2008-based
forecast, the agencies used projected car and truck volumes for this
period from Energy Information Administration's (EIA's) 2011 Interim
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO).\951\ For the MY 2010-based forecast, the
agencies used EIA's AEO 2012 Early Release. However, AEO projects sales
only at the car and truck level, not at the manufacturer and model-
specific level, which are needed in order to estimate the effects new
standards will have on individual manufacturers. Therefore, for the MY
2008-based forecast EPA purchased data from CSM-Worldwide in 2009 and
used their projections of the number of vehicles of each type predicted
to be sold by manufacturers in 2017-2025. This provided the year-by-
year percentages of cars and trucks sold by each manufacturer as well
as the percentages of each vehicle segment. Using these percentages
normalized to the AEO projected volumes then provided the manufacturer-
specific market share and model-specific sales for model years 2011-
2016. For the MY 2010-based forecast, EPA purchased data from LMC in
2011 and used its manufacturer- and segment-level forecasts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\951\ Both agencies regard AEO a credible source not only of
such forecasts, but also of many underlying forecasts, including
forecasts of the size of the future light vehicle market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The processes for constructing the MY 2008 and MY 2010 baseline
vehicle fleets and subsequently adjusting sales volumes to construct
the MY 2017-2025 baseline vehicle fleets are presented in detail in
Chapter 1 of the joint TSD accompanying today's final rule.
In the main analysis, the agencies assume that without adoption of
the proposed rule, manufacturers will not improve fuel economy levels
during the 2017-2025 period beyond the levels required in the MY 2016
standards. However, it is possible that manufacturers may be driven by
market forces to raise the fuel economy of their fleets. The recently-
adopted fuel economy and environment labels (``window stickers''), for
example, may make consumers more aware of the benefits of higher fuel
economy, and may cause them to demand more fuel-efficient vehicles
during that timeframe. Moreover, the agencies' analysis indicates that
some fuel-saving technologies may save money for manufacturers. In
Chapter X of the FRIA, NHTSA examines the impact of an alternative
``market-driven'' baseline, which estimates the potential that, insofar
as sufficiently cost-effective opportunities to add technology are
available, manufacturers might increase fuel economy beyond levels
required by the MY 2016 standards. In the NPRM, NHTSA sought comment on
what assumptions about fuel economy increases are most likely to
accurately predict what would happen in the absence of the proposed
rule. As discussed at greater length below in Section IV.G, some
environmental organizations submitted comments relevant to this
question, including (1) suggestions that buyers value fuel much more
highly than assumed by NHTSA in either the main analysis or in the
sensitivity analysis with the market-driven baseline; (2) suggestions
that given stable standards, manufacturers might voluntarily increase
fuel efficiency; (3) claims that the historical record indicates
manufacturers would not voluntarily increase fuel economy; and (4)
arguments that NHTSA should not account for voluntary fuel economy
increase because doing so would reduce benefits attributable to the new
standards. Having considered these comments, our central analysis
follows the approach followed for the NPRM--that is, our central
analysis and majority of our sensitivity analyses assume that
manufacturers will never (e.g., even if gasoline is much more expensive
than assumed for our central analysis) apply more technology than
necessary to achieve compliance with fuel economy standards that remain
unchanged from MY 2016 through MY 2025.
In the NPRM, NHTSA also invited comment on the process used to
develop the market forecast, and on whether the agencies should
consider alternative approaches to producing a forecast at the
necessary level of detail. While the agencies received comments on the
characteristics of the market forecast supporting the NPRM, NHTSA did
not receive any responses to our request for comments on the process
for developing the market forecast. At this time, NHTSA, like EPA, is
making use of market forecasts developed using the same process as
applied for the NPRM and the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking. However, NHTSA
expects to revisit the market forecast development process during the
future rulemaking to develop final standards for MYs 2022-2025 and the
concurrent mid-term evaluation.
c. How is the development of baseline fleets for this final rule
different from the baseline fleet that NHTSA used for proposed rule?
The development of the baseline fleets for this rulemaking utilizes
the same procedures used in the development of the baseline fleet for
the proposed rule and, previously, the MY 2012-2016 rulemaking. For
this final rule, we are using two baseline fleets. The first, as in the
NPRM, is basically the same MY 2008 based file as the starting point in
the MY 2012-2016 analysis, and simply using an updated AEO forecast and
an updated CSM forecast (and, relative to the NPRM, correcting some
erroneous footprint values, as discussed in Chapter 1 of the joint
TSD). The second baseline used to analyze today's final rule was
developed using essentially the same process, but making use of MY 2010
CAFE certification data (rather than MY 2008), the AEO 2012 Early
Release version of NEMS (rather than AEO 2011), and a manufacturer- and
segment-level forecast provided to EPA in 2011 by LMC (rather than the
forecast provided to EPA in 2009 by CSM). Of those, most differences
(relative to the baseline supporting the MY 2012-2016 rulemaking) are
in input assumptions rather than the basic approach and methodology.
These include changes in various macroeconomic assumptions underlying
the AEO, CSM, and LCM forecasts and the use of results obtained by
using DOE's National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) to repeat the AEO
2011 and AEO 2012 analysis without forcing increased passenger car
volumes, and without assuming post-MY 2016 increases in the stringency
of CAFE standards.\952\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\952\ Similar to the analyses supporting the MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking, the agencies have used the Energy Information
Administration's (EIA's) National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) to
estimate the future relative market shares of passenger cars and
light trucks. However, NEMS methodology includes shifting vehicle
sales volume, starting after 2007, away from fleets with lower fuel
economy (the light-truck fleet) towards vehicles with higher fuel
economies (the passenger car fleet) in order to facilitate
compliance with CAFE and GHG MYs 2012-2016 standards. Because we use
our market projection as a baseline relative to which we measure the
effects of new standards, and we attempt to estimate the industry's
ability to comply with new standards without changing product mix,
the Interim AEO 2011- and Early Release AEO 2012-projected shifts in
passenger car market share as a result of required fuel economy
improvements create a circularity. Therefore, for the current
analysis, the agencies developed new projections of passenger car
and light truck sales shares by running scenarios from the Interim
AEO 2011 and Early Release AEO 2012 reference cases that first
deactivate the above-mentioned sales-volume shifting methodology and
then hold post-2017 CAFE standards constant at MY 2016 levels.
Incorporating these changes reduced the projected passenger car
share of the light vehicle market by an average of about 5 percent
during 2017-2025. NHTSA and EPA refer to this as the ``Unforced
Reference Case.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62968]]
d. How are these baselines different quantitatively from the baseline
that NHTSA used for the proposed rule?
As discussed above, the current baselines were developed from
adjusted MY 2008 and MY 2010 compliance data, respectively, and cover
MY 2017-2025. This section describes, for the reader's comparison, some
of the differences between the current baselines and baseline
supporting the NPRM. These comparisons provide a basis for
understanding general characteristics and measures of the difference
between the three baselines. The current MY 2008-based baseline, while
largely identical to that supporting the NPRM, reflects corrections to
the footprint of some vehicle models, and corrections to the regulatory
classification of a few General Motors vehicle models. The MY 2010-
based baseline reflects use of MY 2010 certification data, a newer
commercially-available forecast purchased by EPA in 2011 from LMC
(formerly J.D. Power), and total passenger car and light truck volumes
based on use of EIA's National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) for AEO
2012. The differences are in input assumptions rather than the basic
approach and methodology.
e. Estimated Vehicle Sales During MYs 2017-2025
The fleetwide sales forecasts, based on the Energy Information
Administration's (EIA's) Early Annual Energy Outlooks for 2011 and 2012
(Interim AEO 2011 and Early Release AEO 2012), used in the current MY
2008-based and MY 2010-based baselines, respectively, indicate that the
total number of light vehicles expected to be sold during MYs 2017-2025
is 143-146 million, or about 15.9-16.2 million vehicles annually.
NHTSA's NPRM forecast, also based on AEO 2011, of the total number of
light vehicles likely to be sold during MY 2012 through MY 2016 was 146
million, or about 16.2 million vehicles annually. Light trucks are
expected to make up 34-35 percent of the MY 2017-2025 baseline market
forecast in the current baselines, compared to 35 percent of the
baseline market forecast in the proposed rule.
f. Estimated Manufacturer Market Shares in MY 2016
Table IV-1 shows the agency's sales forecasts for passenger cars
and light trucks under the current baselines and NPRM baseline. The MY
2008-based baseline is nearly identical to the NPRM baseline. The MY
2010-based baseline exhibits several significant differences,
including, but not limited to, the following: A significant increase in
Chrysler's market share; declines in some other manufacturers' (e.g.,
BMW's, Suzuki's, and Toyota's) market shares; relative declines in
light trucks as a share of many manufacturers' total production; the
exit of Saab from the light vehicle market; and a lack of MY 2010-based
data for Tesla. Also, underlying the overall volumes reported below for
some manufacturers are some significant brand-level differences between
the MY 2008- and MY 2010-based fleets, reflecting significant changes
in some manufacturers' offerings--changes that began in MY 2007/2008
and were complete or in progress by MY 2010. In particular, the MY
2010-based forecast for General Motors contains about 90% fewer Hummers
and about 75% fewer Pontiacs than the MY 2008-based forecast,
reflecting GM's discontinuation of those brands.
Table IV-1--NHTSA Sales Forecasts
[Production for U.S. sale in MY 2016, thousand units]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPRM baseline Current Baselines
Manufacturer Fleet MY ---------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Non-passenger Passenger Non-passenger
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin.................... 2008 1 .............. 1- 0-
2010 1 .............. .............. 0
BMW............................. 2008 383 184 383- 184-
2010 .............. .............. 317 107
Daimler......................... 2008 245 136 245- 136-
2010 .............. .............. 250 97
Fiat/Chrysler................... 2008 392 498 394- 495-
2010 .............. .............. 725 794
Ford............................ 2008 1,393 930 1,393- 930-
2010 .............. .............. 1,354 1,039
Geely/Volvo..................... 2008 94 50 94- 50-
2010 .............. .............. 58 34
General Motors \953\............ 2008 1,391 1,444 1,444- 1,391-
2010 .............. .............. 1,672 1,222
Honda........................... 2008 862 588 862- 588-
2010 .............. .............. 1,127 531
Hyundai......................... 2008 489 99 489- 99-
2010 .............. .............. 847 136
Kia............................. 2008 512 124 512- 124-
2010 .............. .............. 333 46
Lotus........................... 2008 0.3 - 0.3- 0.0-
2010 .............. .............. 0.4 0.0
Mazda........................... 2008 393 78 378- 93-
2010 .............. .............. 258 60
Mitsubishi...................... 2008 80 60 98- 42-
2010 .............. .............. 57 13
Nissan.......................... 2008 869 410 869- 410-
2010 .............. .............. 907 310
[[Page 62969]]
Porsche......................... 2008 30 18 30- 18-
2010 .............. .............. 19 20
Spkyer/Saab..................... 2008 18 2 18- 2-
2010 .............. .............. 0 0
Subaru.......................... 2008 236 74 236- 74-
2010 .............. .............. 213 94
Suzuki.......................... 2008 94 21 94- 21-
2010 .............. .............. 43 3
Tata............................ 2008 59 46 59- 46-
2010 .............. .............. 29 53
Tesla........................... 2008 27 - 27- 0-
2010 .............. .............. .............. ..............
Toyota.......................... 2008 2,043 1,159 2,043- 1,159-
2010 .............. .............. 1,532 970
Volkswagen...................... 2008 528 134 528- 134-
2010 .............. .............. 486 104
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total \954\................. 2008 10,140 6,055 10,198- 5,997-
2010 .............. .............. 10,227 5,635
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Estimated Unadjusted Baseline Achieved Fuel Economy Levels in MY
2016
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\953\ For this final rule, the MY 2008-based baseline was
corrected to reassign the Chevrolet Blazer, GMC Envoy, and Pontiac
Torrent to the General Motors passenger car fleet.
\954\ For this final rule, the MY 2008-based baseline was
corrected to reassign the Chevrolet Blazer, GMC Envoy, and Pontiac
Torrent to the General Motors passenger car fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-2, below, compares unadjusted average fuel economy levels
(i.e., levels reflecting vehicle model fuel economy levels the CAFE
certification data and vehicle model sales volumes adjusted to produce
estimated future baseline fleets) in the current market forecasts to
those in the market forecast supporting the NPRM. Under the current
baselines, average fuel economy for MY 2016 is 27.0-27.9 mpg, versus
27.0 mpg under the baseline in the NPRM. The upward extension of this
range relative to the value from the NPRM reflects a combination of
changes in technology and fuel economy between MY 2008 and MY 2010
(e.g., the introduction of Ford's ``Ecoboost'' engine). Manufacturer-
specific CAFE levels are shown below in Table IV-2, which does not
count FFV credits that some manufacturers expect to earn. Table IV-3
shows the combined averages of these planned CAFE levels in the
respective baseline fleets. Because the agencies have, based today's
market forecasts on vehicles in the MY 2008 and MY 2010 fleets,
respectively, these CAFE levels the projected future vehicle mix, not
changes in the fuel economy that might be achieved by individual
vehicle models by MY 2016.
Table IV-2--Current Baseline CAFE Levels in MY 2016 Versus MY 2012-2016 Rulemaking CAFE Levels
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPRM Baseline Current Baselines
Manufacturer Fleet MY ---------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Non-passenger Passenger Non-passenger
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin.................... 2008 18.8 .............. 18.8- ..............
2010 .............. .............. 19.0 ..............
BMW............................. 2008 27.2 23.0 27.2- 23.0-
2010 .............. .............. 27.4 24.1
Daimler......................... 2008 25.5 21.1 25.5- 21.1-
2010 .............. .............. 24.7- 21.0-
Fiat/Chrysler................... 2008 27.7 22.2 27.7- 22.2-
2010 .............. .............. 28.2 21.7
Ford............................ 2008 28.2 21.3 28.2- 21.3-
2010 .............. .............. 30.3 22.2
Geely/Volvo..................... 2008 25.9 21.1 25.9- 21.1-
2010 .............. .............. 28.2 22.8
General Motors.................. 2008 28.4 21.4 28.2- 21.4-
2010 .............. .............. 30.3 22.5
Honda........................... 2008 33.8 25.0 33.8- 25.0-
2010 .............. .............. 34.5 25.1
Hyundai......................... 2008 31.7 24.3 31.7- 24.3-
2010 .............. .............. 32.9 28.2
Kia............................. 2008 32.7 23.8 32.7- 23.8-
2010 .............. .............. 35.2 25.0
[[Page 62970]]
Lotus........................... 2008 29.7 .............. 29.7- ..............
2010 .............. .............. 26.7 ..............
Mazda........................... 2008 30.8 26.4 31.3- 25.6-
2010 .............. .............. 32.0 25.2
Mitsubishi...................... 2008 28.8 23.6 27.5- 23.9-
2010 .............. .............. 32.5 28.1
Nissan.......................... 2008 32.0 22.1 32.0- 22.1-
2010 .............. .............. 32.6 23.6
Porsche......................... 2008 26.2 20.0 26.2- 20.0-
2010 .............. .............. 25.4 20.5
Spkyer/Saab..................... 2008 26.6 19.8 26.6 19.8
2010 .............. .............. .............. ..............
Subaru.......................... 2008 29.6 27.3 29.6- 27.3-
2010 .............. .............. 29.7 30.7
Suzuki.......................... 2008 30.8 23.3 30.8- 23.3-
2010 .............. .............. 33.1 26.1
Tata............................ 2008 24.6 19.7 24.6- 19.7-
2010 .............. .............. 23.3 18.9
Tesla........................... 2008 244.0 .............. 244.0 ..............
2010 .............. .............. .............. ..............
Toyota.......................... 2008 35.2 24.3 35.2- 24.3-
2010 .............. .............. 35.4 24.1
Volkswagen...................... 2008 28.9 20.2 28.9- 20.2-
2010 .............. .............. 31.8 24.0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total....................... 2008 30.7 22.6 30.6- 22.6-
2010 .............. .............. 31.6 23.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-3--Current Baseline CAFE Levels in MY 2016 Versus MY 2012-2016 Rulemaking CAFE Levels (Combined)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current
Manufacturer Fleet MY NPRM baseline baselines
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin................................................. 2008 18.8 18.8-
2010 .............. 19.0
BMW.......................................................... 2008 25.7 25.7-
2010 .............. 26.5
Daimler...................................................... 2008 23.7 23.7-
2010 .............. 23.6
Fiat/Chrysler................................................ 2008 24.3 24.3-
2010 .............. 24.4
Ford......................................................... 2008 25.0 25.0-
2010 .............. 26.1
Geely/Volvo.................................................. 2008 24.0 24.0-
2010 .............. 25.9
General Motors............................................... 2008 24.4 24.4-
2010 .............. 26.4
Honda........................................................ 2008 29.6 29.6-
2010 .............. 30.8
Hyundai...................................................... 2008 30.2 30.2-
2010 .............. 32.2
Kia.......................................................... 2008 30.5 30.5-
2010 .............. 33.5
Lotus........................................................ 2008 29.7 29.7-
2010 .............. 26.7
Mazda........................................................ 2008 30.0 30.0-
2010 .............. 30.5
Mitsubishi................................................... 2008 26.3 26.3-
2010 .............. 31.6
Nissan....................................................... 2008 28.0 28.0-
2010 .............. 29.7
Porsche...................................................... 2008 23.5 23.5-
2010 .............. 22.6
Spkyer/Saab.................................................. 2008 25.7 25.7
2010 .............. .................
Subaru....................................................... 2008 29.0 29.0-
[[Page 62971]]
2010 .............. 30.0
Suzuki....................................................... 2008 29.1 29.1-
2010 .............. 32.5
Tata......................................................... 2008 22.2 22.2-
2010 .............. 20.3
Tesla........................................................ 2008 244.0 244.0
2010 .............. .................
Toyota....................................................... 2008 30.3 30.3-
2010 .............. 30.0
Volkswagen................................................... 2008 26.6 26.6-
2010 .............. 30.1
--------------------------------------------------
Total.................................................... 2008 27.0 27.0-
2010 .............. 27.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
h. What sensitivity analyses is NHTSA conducting on the baseline?
As discussed below in Section IV.G, when evaluating the potential
impacts of new CAFE standards, NHTSA considered the potential that,
depending on how the cost and effectiveness of available technologies
compare to the price of fuel, manufacturers would add more fuel-saving
technology than might be required solely for purposes of complying with
CAFE standards. This reflects that agency's consideration that there
could, in the future, be at least some market for fuel economy
improvements beyond the required MY 2016 CAFE levels. In these
sensitivity analyses, this causes some additional technology to be
applied, more so under baseline standards than under the more stringent
standards proposed today by the agency. Results of these sensitivity
analyses are summarized in Section IV.G and in NHTSA's FRIA
accompanying today's notice.
i. How else is NHTSA considering looking at the baseline in the future?
Beyond the sensitivity analysis discussed above, NHTSA is also in
the process of developing a vehicle choice model to estimate the extent
to which sales volumes would shift in response to changes in vehicle
prices and fuel economy levels. As discussed in IV.C.4 of the NPRM, the
agency is currently sponsoring research directed toward developing such
a model. However, that effort is still underway, so the agency has not
integrated such a model into the CAFE modeling system. The agency may
do so in the future, and use the integrated system for future analysis
of potential CAFE standards. If the agency does so, we expect that the
vehicle choice model would impact estimated fleet composition not just
under new CAFE standards, but also under baseline CAFE standards.
For today's rulemaking, the agency has, for purposes of the
probabilistic uncertainty analysis documented in the accompanying FRIA,
considered uncertainty regarding the future relative shares of
passenger cars and light trucks. As discussed in the FRIA, we applied
an approach relating these shares to, among other things, the price of
fuel, such that shares varied as we varied fuel price, leading to
changes in estimated outcomes such as fuel consumption and
CO2 emissions.
2. How were the technology inputs developed?
As discussed above in Section II.D, for developing the technology
inputs for the proposed MYs 2017-2025 CAFE and GHG standards, which
have been carried over largely unchanged since the NPRM, the agencies
primarily began with the technology inputs used in the MYs 2012-2016
CAFE final rule and in the 2010 TAR. For the NPRM, the agencies also
updated information based on newly completed FEV tear-down studies and
new vehicle simulation work conducted by Ricardo Engineering, both of
which were contracted by EPA. The agencies also relied on a model
developed by Argonne National Laboratory to estimate hybrid, plug-in
hybrid and electric vehicle battery costs, which was updated between
the NPRM and final rule. As another update for the final rule analysis,
NHTSA used information from vehicle simulation work conducted by
Argonne National Laboratory, which was contracted by the U.S. DOT Volpe
Center to support CAFE rulemaking analyses. The Argonne work was used
to inform several technology effectiveness estimates. More detail is
available regarding how the agencies developed the technology inputs
for the final rule above in Section II.D, in Chapter 3 of the Joint
TSD, and in Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA.
a. What technologies does NHTSA consider?
For purposes of this final rule and as discussed in greater detail
in the Joint TSD, NHTSA and EPA built upon the list of technologies
used by the agencies for the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE and GHG standards.
Section II.D.1 above describes the fuel-saving technologies considered
by the agencies that manufacturers could use to improve the fuel
economy of their vehicles during MYs 2017-2025. Many of the
technologies described in this section are readily available, well
known, and could be incorporated into vehicles once production
decisions are made. Other technologies, added for this rulemaking
analysis, are considered that are not currently in production, but are
beyond the initial research phase, under development and are expected
to be in production in the next 5-10 years. These new technologies
include higher BMEP turbocharged and downsized engines, advanced diesel
engines, higher efficiency transmissions, additional mass reduction
levels, PHEVs, EVs, etc. As discussed, the technologies considered fall
into five broad categories: engine technologies, transmission
technologies, vehicle technologies, electrification/accessory
technologies, and hybrid technologies. We note that one technology has
been added since the NPRM--Integrated Starter Generator (or Mild
Hybrid)--based on the Argonne work. This addition is discussed in more
detail in Chapter V of the FRIA.
Table IV-4 below lists all the technologies considered and provides
the abbreviations used for them in the
[[Page 62972]]
CAFE model,\955\ as well as their year of availability, which for
purposes of NHTSA's analysis means the first model year in the
rulemaking period that the CAFE model is allowed to apply a technology
to a manufacturer's fleet.\956\ ``Year of availability'' recognizes
that technologies must achieve a level of technical viability before
they can be implemented in the CAFE model, and are thus a means of
constraining technology use until such time as it is considered to be
technologically feasible. Year of availability may vary in NHTSA's
analysis depending on whether the modeling runs are for purposes of
evaluating whether a given regulatory alternative is maximum feasible
(``standard-setting runs''), or for evaluating the real-world impacts
of a given regulatory alternative (``real-world runs'')--the difference
occurs because EPCA/EISA restricts NHTSA's ability to consider the
availability of certain technologies in certain model years. For a more
detailed description of each technology and their costs and
effectiveness, we refer the reader to Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD and
Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\955\ The abbreviations are used in this section both for
brevity and for the reader's reference if they wish to refer to the
expanded decision trees and the model input and output sheets, which
are available in Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131 and at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
\956\ A date of 2007 or 2012 means the technology can be applied
in all model years, while a date of 2020, for example, means the
technology can only be applied in model years 2020 through 2025.
Table IV-4--List of Technologies in NHTSA's Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Model abbreviation Year available
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low Friction Lubricants--Level 1 LUB1............... 2007
Engine Friction Reduction--Level EFR1............... 2007
1.
Low Friction Lubricants and LUB2--EFR2......... 2017
Engine Friction Reduction--
Level 2.
Variable Valve Timing (VVT)-- CCPS............... 2007
Coupled Cam Phasing (CCP) on
SOHC.
Discrete Variable Valve Lift DVVLS.............. 2007
(DVVL) on SOHC.
Cylinder Deactivation on SOHC... DEACS.............. 2007
Variable Valve Timing (VVT)-- ICP................ 2007
Intake Cam Phasing (ICP).
Variable Valve Timing (VVT)-- DCP................ 2007
Dual Cam Phasing (DCP).
Discrete Variable Valve Lift DVVLD.............. 2007
(DVVL) on DOHC.
Continuously Variable Valve Lift CVVL............... 2007
(CVVL).
Cylinder Deactivation on DOHC... DEACD.............. 2007
Stoichiometric Gasoline Direct SGDI............... 2007
Injection (GDI).
Cylinder Deactivation on OHV.... DEACO.............. 2007
Variable Valve Actuation--CCP VVA................ 2007
and DVVL on OHV.
Stoichiometric Gasoline Direct SGDIO.............. 2007
Injection (GDI) on OHV.
Turbocharging and Downsizing-- TRBDS1--SD......... 2007
Level 1 (18 bar BMEP)--Small
Displacement.
Turbocharging and Downsizing-- TRBDS1--MD......... 2007
Level 1 (18 bar BMEP)--Medium
Displacement.
Turbocharging and Downsizing-- TRBDS1--LD......... 2007
Level 1 (18 bar BMEP)--Large
Displacement.
Turbocharging and Downsizing-- TRBDS2--SD......... 2012
Level 2 (24 bar BMEP)--Small
Displacement.
Turbocharging and Downsizing-- TRBDS2--MD......... 2012
Level 2 (24 bar BMEP)--Medium
Displacement.
Turbocharging and Downsizing-- TRBDS2--LD......... 2012
Level 2 (24 bar BMEP)--Large
Displacement.
Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation CEGR1--SD.......... 2012
(EGR)--Level 1 (24 bar BMEP)--
Small Displacement.
Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation CEGR1--MD.......... 2012
(EGR)--Level 1 (24 bar BMEP)--
Medium Displacement.
Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation CEGR1--LD.......... 2012
(EGR)--Level 1 (24 bar BMEP)--
Large Displacement.
Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation CEGR2--SD.......... 2017
(EGR)--Level 2 (27 bar BMEP)--
Small Displacement.
Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation CEGR2--MD.......... 2017
(EGR)--Level 2 (27 bar BMEP)--
Medium Displacement.
Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation CEGR2--LD.......... 2017
(EGR)--Level 2 (27 bar BMEP)--
Large Displacement.
Advanced Diesel--Small ADSL--SD........... 2017
Displacement.
Advanced Diesel--Medium ADSL--MD........... 2017
Displacement.
Advanced Diesel--Large ADSL--LD........... 2017
Displacement.
6-Speed Manual/Improved 6MAN............... 2007
Internals.
High Efficiency Gearbox (Manual) HETRANSM........... 2017
Improved Auto. Trans. Controls/ IATC............... 2007
Externals.
6-Speed Trans with Improved NAUTO.............. 2007
Internals (Auto).
6-Speed DCT..................... DCT................ 2007
8-Speed Trans (Auto or DCT)..... 8SPD............... 2014
High Efficiency Gearbox (Auto or HETRANS............ 2017
DCT).
Shift Optimizer................. SHFTOPT............ 2017
Electric Power Steering......... EPS................ 2007
Improved Accessories--Level 1... IACC1.............. 2007
Improved Accessories--Level 2 (w/ IACC2.............. 2014
Alternator Regen and 70%
efficient alternator).
12V Micro-Hybrid (Stop-Start)... MHEV............... 2007
Integrated Starter Generator ISG................ 2012
(Mild Hybrid).
Strong Hybrid--Level 1.......... SHEV1.............. 2012
Strong Hybrid--Level 2.......... SHEV2.............. 2017
Plug-in Hybrid--30 mi range..... PHEV1.............. *2020
Electric Vehicle (Early EV1................ **2017
Adopter)--75 mile range.
Electric Vehicle (Broad Market)-- EV4................ **2017
150 mile range.
Mass Reduction--Level 1......... MR1................ 2007
[[Page 62973]]
Mass Reduction--Level 2......... MR2................ 2007
Mass Reduction--Level 3......... MR3................ 2007
Mass Reduction--Level 4......... MR4................ 2011
Mass Reduction--Level 5......... MR5................ 2016
Low Rolling Resistance Tires-- ROLL1.............. 2007
Level 1.
Low Rolling Resistance Tires-- ROLL2.............. 2017
Level 2.
Low Drag Brakes................. LDB................ 2007
Secondary Axle Disconnect....... SAX................ 2007
Aero Drag Reduction, Level 1.... AERO1.............. 2007
Aero Drag Reduction, Level 2.... AERO2.............. 2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* PHEV is applied in NHTSA's standard setting analysis starting from MY
2020 and in the real-world analysis starting from MY 2017.
** EV is not applied in NHTSA's standard setting analysis and applied in
the real-world analysis starting from MY 2017.
b. How did NHTSA determine the costs and effectiveness of each of these
technologies for use in its modeling analysis?
Building on the estimates developed for the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE and
GHG final rule and the 2010 TAR, the agencies incorporated new cost and
effectiveness estimates for the new technologies being considered and
some of the technologies carried over from the MYs 2012-2016 final rule
and 2010 TAR. This joint work is reflected in Chapter 3 of the Joint
TSD and in Section II of this preamble, as summarized below. For more
detailed information on the effectiveness and cost of fuel-saving
technologies, please refer to Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD and Chapter V
of NHTSA's FRIA.
For costs, the FEV tear-down work was expanded between the 2012-
2016 final rule and the proposal to include an 8-speed DCT, a power-
split hybrid, which was used to determine a P2 hybrid cost, and a mild
hybrid with stop-start technology; the estimates based on this work
were carried forward into the final rule. Battery costs were revised
between the 2012-2016 final rule and the NPRM using Argonne National
Laboratory's battery cost model, which allows users to estimate unique
battery pack cost using user customized input sets for different
hybridization applications, such as strong hybrid, PHEV and EV. Argonne
updated the model and EPA updated costs for battery packs between the
NPRM and this final rule to account for air cooling (for HEVs) and
parallel battery modules. EPA and NHTSA also modified how the indirect
costs (using ICM factors) were derived and applied for the NPRM based
on staff input and public feedback, and carried this change forward
into the final rule. The updates are discussed at length in Chapter 3
of the Joint TSD and in Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA.
Some of the effectiveness estimates for technologies applied in MYs
2012-2016 and 2010 TAR have remained the same. However, nearly all of
the effectiveness estimates for carryover technologies have been
updated based on a newer version of EPA's lumped parameter model, which
was calibrated by the vehicle simulation work performed by Ricardo
Engineering. The Ricardo simulation study was also used to estimate the
effectiveness for the technologies newly considered for this proposal,
like higher BMEP turbocharged and downsized engine, advanced
transmission technologies, and P2 hybrids. For the final rule, NHTSA
conducted a vehicle simulation project with Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL), described in more detail in NHTSA's FRIA, that performed
additional analyses on mild hybrid technologies and advanced
transmissions to help NHTSA develop effectiveness values better
tailored for the CAFE model's incremental structure. The effectiveness
values that were developed by ANL for the mild hybrid vehicles were
applied by both agencies for the final rule. Additionally, NHTSA
updated the effectiveness values of advanced transmissions when coupled
with naturally-aspirated engines based on ANL's simulation work for the
final rule. While NHTSA and EPA apply technologies differently, the
agencies have sought to ensure that the resultant effectiveness of
applying technologies is consistent between the two agencies.
NHTSA notes that, in developing technology cost and effectiveness
estimates, the agencies have made every effort to hold constant aspects
of vehicle performance and utility typically valued by consumers, such
as horsepower, carrying capacity, drivability, durability, noise,
vibration and harshness (NVH) and towing and hauling capacity. For
example, NHTSA includes in its analysis technology cost and
effectiveness estimates that are specific to performance passenger cars
(i.e., sports cars), as compared to non-performance passenger cars.
NHTSA sought comment on the extent to which commenters believed that
the agencies have been successful in holding constant these elements of
vehicle performance and utility in developing the technology cost and
effectiveness estimates.
With respect to the cost estimates employed in the NPRM analysis,
ICCT commented that technology costs continue to drop in the agencies'
assessments over the past several rulemakings, which is evidence that
technology will be even cheaper in the future.\957\ ICCT expressed
optimism that reductions in technology costs could lead the agencies to
set higher standards for MYs 2022-2025 as part of NHTSA's future
rulemaking and the mid-term evaluation.\958\ With regard to the FEV
tear-down studies in particular, ICCT stated that it was continuing to
fund such work, and that it would share the cost estimates for P2
hybrids, advanced diesel engines, basic start-stop systems, manual
transmissions, and cooled EGR systems with the agencies when they
became available.\959\ CBD concurred with ICCT's assessment.\960\ NACAA
suggested that costs could be brought down more quickly if more
technology was introduced earlier.\961\ NADA provided a number of
comments related to cost, albeit focused on the broader issue of
programmatic costs rather than on costs for specific technologies. NADA
argued generally that attempting to estimate cost increases so far in
advance was ``inherently suspect,'' given the uncertainty involved, and
that
[[Page 62974]]
the agencies' cost estimates were very likely significantly
undervalued.\962\ NRDC commented that NADA's cost estimates appeared to
be incorrect and overstated.\963\ API commented that the agencies
should review and use the technology cost estimates employed in AEO
2011.\964\ BMW commented that the agencies' assessment of costs for BMW
was understated, because BMW had already employed many of the
technologies considered for BMW in the agencies' NPRM analysis, and
thus further improvements will have to come from more advanced (and
expensive) technologies than the agencies had estimated.\965\ In
response, while we recognize that our cost analyses only identify one
feasible path for manufacturers to comply with the standards and that
individual manufacturers may pursue other approaches, we continue to
believe that tear-down analyses are the most accurate method to
estimate costs for purposes of rulemaking analysis. We also recognize
the inherent uncertainty in estimating costs in the 2017-2025
timeframe; to address some of this uncertainty, we are conducting
sensitivity analyses to understand its magnitude with respect to costs
and benefits. We will closely monitor the development of the
technologies and their cost over the next several years, and will
revisit these areas as needed during the future rulemaking to develop
the MYs 2022-2025 standards and concurrent mid-term evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\957\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 8.
\958\ Id.
\959\ Id.
\960\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 7.
\961\ NACAA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084, at 3.
\962\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 3.
\963\ NRDC, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472, at 20.
\964\ API, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0238, at 10.
\965\ BMW, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0250, at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to battery costs, ICCT commented that future versions
of the BatPaC model should include the option to select either air or
liquid cooling.\966\ Tesla commented that that while it thought the
BatPaC model was helpful, Tesla rather ``supports a more comprehensive
approach to assessing battery cost,'' i.e., by ``factor[ing] in all the
costs of the battery and attendant systems including cell management,
thermal management and the disconnect unit.'' \967\ Tesla stated that
the battery systems in its Model S would cost only $350/kWh at
production levels of 25,000/year, and that it expected its costs to
come down in the future.\968\ Porsche, in contrast, argued that the
battery costs used in the NPRM were significantly underestimated, which
``inflates the apparent cost-effectiveness'' of the standards.\969\ As
stated above, for the final rulemaking the agencies requested that ANL
update the BatPaC model to allow for either air or liquid cooling.
These updates were incorporated in the final rule analysis.
Additionally, the agencies are accounting for the costs of cell
management, thermal management, and battery disconnect. As mentioned
above, recognizing that future battery costs are uncertain, we have run
sensitivity analyses using upper and lower bounds of expected battery
cost. The cost projections produced by BatPaC are sensitive to the
inputs and assumptions the user provides. The battery pack cost
projection from BatPaC model ranges from $160/kWh for EV150 for a large
truck to $306/kWh for a PHEV40 for large passenger cars using NMC
battery chemistry, and up to $376/kWh for a PHEV20 for large passenger
cars using LMO battery chemistry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\966\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 21-22.
\967\ Tesla, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0259, at 5.
\968\ Id.
\969\ Porsche, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0224, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the cost estimate for mass reduction, ICCT
commented that it expected costs to drop in the future as computer
modeling improves manufacturers' ability to reduce mass.\970\ ICCT
recommended that the agencies use the Lotus and FEV mass reduction
studies for the final rule.\971\ VW, on the other hand, agreed that
mass reduction costs were likely best represented by an exponential
function, but argued that based on its experience, the agencies' cost
curve was too shallow and should increase faster in general and even
faster for passenger cars as compared to light trucks, since passenger
cars are already lighter and may have fewer opportunities for simple
mass removal.\972\ We agree, as VW implies, that the cost of mass
reduction may vary between manufacturers, depending on what a
manufacturer has already applied in its current fleet and the approach
the OEMs take to address mass reduction, such as the material usage,
manufacturing process, etc. As suggested by ICCT, the study sponsored
by NHTSA took advantage of computer optimization, computer simulation,
and advanced materials. The costs derived from NHTSA's study are based
on a clean-sheet-of-paper approach and take advantage of secondary mass
reduction. NHTSA's study is discussed in greater details in Chapter V
of NHTSA's FRIA and Chapter 3 of the joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\970\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 8.
\971\ Id. at 9.
\972\ VW, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0247, at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in Section II.D above and Chapter 3 of the joint TSD,
as well as in Chapter V of NHTSA's RIA, however, the agencies are
continuing to employ the NPRM estimates for mass reduction costs in
this final rule. The agencies considered updating cost estimates based
on the studies that were underway when the NPRM was issued. Those
studies included the EPA/ICCT funded Phase 2 Toyota Venza Low
Development project and the NHTSA funded Honda Accord mass reduction
project, which are described in the section titled ``What additional
studies are the agencies conducting to inform our estimates of mass
reduction amounts, cost, and effectiveness?'' However, these studies
were in the middle of the peer review process and had not yet been
finalized at the time when the inputs for the main analysis for this
final rule were required. We continue to believe the NPRM estimates are
reasonable and appropriate for several reasons. First, given what we
know about how differently individual manufacturers may undertake mass
reduction, coming up with a single cost curve applicable to the entire
industry is inherently uncertain. The mass reduction amounts and costs
derived by design studies are typically directly applicable to a
particular vehicle model and may not be completely applicable to other
vehicle models and vehicle subclasses. The NPRM estimates were
developed by reviewing nearly every available information source for
mass reduction costs, which gives the agency some confidence that even
if the estimates are not exactly correct for every vehicle model and
subclass, they are reasonable to some extent by virtue of being fully
informed. Second, while NHTSA's study was not completed in time to
incorporate its results in the final rule analysis, we note that
NHTSA's study developed mass reduction cost estimates both for the
glider only, and for the glider plus the powertrain. At 20 percent mass
reduction, the NPRM cost essentially falls in between the two cost
estimates from the NHTSA study. On balance, NHTSA believes that
continuing to employ the NPRM estimates for mass reduction cost is a
reasonable surrogate for the result that the agency might have obtained
if it had been able to incorporate results from NHTSA's mass reduction
study in time for the final rule analysis. Third, the agencies
conducted sensitivity studies varying the cost for mass reduction using
a 40% unit cost range, and found that even when using
[[Page 62975]]
costs at these limits, there was little change in the average vehicle
technology cost. This supports that had the agencies used a different
cost curve based on the completion of their studies, the use of the
revised cost curve would have had very little effect on the results of
agencies' analyses. Therefore, the agencies conclude that it is
reasonable and appropriate to use the NPRM cost estimates for mass
reduction in the final rule.
The agency notes that the technology costs included in this final
rule for the central analysis take into account only those associated
with the initial build of the vehicle. Although comments were received
to the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking that suggested there could be
additional maintenance required with some new technologies (e.g.,
turbocharging, hybrids, etc.), and that additional maintenance costs
could occur as a result, in the proposal the agencies did not
explicitly incorporate maintenance costs (or potential savings) as a
separate element. The agency sought comments on this topic and
undertook a more detailed review of these potential costs for the final
rule. NADA commented that the agencies should evaluate the potential
impact on a vehicle's total cost of ownership, including maintenance
costs, in the final rule. In response, NHTSA identified a list of
technologies for which sufficient data on frequency and cost of
maintenance events exists to support quantification of changes in
vehicle maintenance costs. This list includes costs associated with low
rolling resistance tires, diesel fuel filters, and benefits resulting
from electric vehicle characteristics that eliminate the need for oil
changes as well as engine air filter changes. These repair costs during
the warranty period that are identifiably different for new
technologies were included in the central analysis for the final rule.
The full list of technologies shown is in Chapter 3 of the joint TSD,
along with the maintenance interval comparisons, and costs per
maintenance event. In the final rule as in the NPRM, repair costs
during the warranty period that are common for all vehicles remain a
component of the indirect cost multiplier. A sensitivity analysis was
added to the FRIA to examine repair costs in the post-warranty period,
discussed further in Chapter X of NHTSA's FRIA. For example, EVs may
have reduced total life compared to a conventional vehicle due to
battery degradation. For the NPRM analysis, the agencies assumed that
the batteries would last the full useful life of the vehicle. In the
final rule analysis, NHTSA has considered a cost to estimate the value
of the possibility for an EV to have a different lifetime than a
conventional vehicle. NHTSA only applied this cost to ``broad-market''
EVs (those sold above a 5 percent penetration threshold), as it assumed
that early-adopters would not be concerned by the possibility of
earlier end-of-life (this is consistent with our previous assumption
that early adopters would not be concerned by EVs' shorter driving
range). This out-of-warranty cost is only included in a sensitivity
analysis, not the central run. For further detail on how this cost is
implemented in our analysis, please refer to Chapter VII of NHTSA's
FRIA.
For some of the technologies, NHTSA's inputs, which are designed to
be as consistent as practicable with EPA's, indicate negative
incremental costs. In other words, the agency is estimating that some
technologies, if applied in a manner that holds performance and utility
constant, will, following initial investment (for, e.g., R&D and
tooling) by the manufacturer and its suppliers, incrementally improve
fuel savings and reduce vehicle costs. Nonetheless, in the agency's
central analysis, these and other technologies are applied only insofar
as is necessary to achieve compliance with standards defining any given
regulatory alternative (where the baseline no action alternative
assumes CAFE standards are held constant after MY 2016). The agency has
also performed a sensitivity analysis involving market-based
application of technology--that is, the application of technology
beyond the point needed to achieve compliance, if the cost of the
technology is estimated to be sufficiently attractive relative to the
accompanying fuel savings. NHTSA invited comment on all of its
technology estimates, and specifically requested comment on the
likelihood that each technology will, if applied in a manner that holds
vehicle performance and utility constant, be able to both deliver the
estimated fuel savings and reduce vehicle cost. NHTSA did not receive
any comment on this aspect. The agency also invited comment on whether
its central analysis should be revised to include estimated market-
driven application of technology. Some comments addressed this specific
question; these will be summarized and discussed below.
The agencies received several comments on the approach used to
estimate indirect costs in the proposal. NADA argued that the ICM
approach was not valid and an RPE approach was the only appropriate
approach, and that the RPE factor should be 2.0 x direct costs \973\
rather than the 1.5 that is supported by filings to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. ICCT agreed with the new ICM approach as presented
in the proposal, but argued that sensitivity analyses examining the
impact of using an RPE should be deleted from the final rule.\974\ Both
agencies have conducted thorough analysis of the comments received on
the RPE versus ICM approach. Regarding NADA's concerns about the
accuracy of ICMs, although the agencies recognize that there is
uncertainty regarding the impact of indirect costs on vehicle prices,
they have retained ICMs for use in the central analysis because it
offers the advantage of a disaggregated approach that better
differentiates among technologies. The impact of using an RPE is
examined in sensitivity analyses, and we note that even under the
higher cost estimates that result from using the RPE, the rulemaking is
highly cost beneficial. The agencies disagree with NADA's contention
that the correct factor to reflect the RPE should be 2.0, and we cite
data demonstrating that the overall RPE should average about 1.5.
Regarding ICCT's contention that NHTSA should delete sensitivity
analyses examining the impact of using an RPE, NHTSA disagrees based on
both compliance with OMB guidance and good analytical practice. Further
analysis of NADA's comments is summarized in Chapter 3 of the joint
TSD. NHTSA's full response to both NADA and ICCT is presented in
Chapter VII of NHTSA's FRIA. For this final rule, each agency is using
an ICM approach with ICM factors identical to those used in the
proposal. The impact of using an RPE rather than ICMs to calculate
indirect costs is examined in sensitivity and uncertainty analyses in
Chapters VII, X, and XII of NHTSA's FRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\973\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 4.
\974\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 19-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to technology effectiveness, ICCT commented generally
in support of simulation modeling, but argued that the Ricardo work
resulted in conservative effectiveness estimates because it is
restricted to currently-available data and engine maps, and cannot
account for future improvements that might result from CAD used in
technology design and on-board vehicle controls that will increase
technology effectiveness.\975\ ICCT stated that estimates for
[[Page 62976]]
technology effectiveness continue to improve, citing the example of
turbocharging and downsizing, which ICCT said the agencies used to
estimate at 5-7 percent and now estimate at closer to 12-20 percent
effectiveness improvement.\976\ Therefore, ICCT stated, the agencies'
technology effectiveness estimates were likely to be understated.\977\
Several commenters also discussed the agencies' effectiveness estimates
for various technologies. For example, VW suggested that the
effectiveness of high BMEP engines might be overstated, because the
torque curve for future engines may be constrained over the rpm range
by charging limits, exhaust temperature, peak cylinder pressures and
mechanical forces that may limit the practicable increase in BMEP.\978\
VW also commented that the maximum cost-effective amount of mass
reduction is likely closer to 10 percent instead of 20 percent. In
response, NHTSA recognizes that different manufacturers may obtain
different amounts of ``bang for their buck,'' at different costs, when
they apply different technologies. We maintain that we analyze a
possible feasible path for compliance with the standards, although we
recognize that actual manufacturer compliance paths may vary due to
their judgment of cost-effectiveness. We will continue to monitor
changes in cost and effectiveness of technologies and will revisit all
estimates during the mid-term review and future rulemaking for the MYs
2022-2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\975\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 4-7.
\976\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258,. at 7.
\977\ Id.
\978\ VW, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0247, at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tables below provide examples of the incremental cost and
effectiveness estimates employed by the agency in developing this final
rule, according to the decision trees used in the CAFE modeling
analysis. Thus, the effectiveness and cost estimates are not absolute
to a single reference vehicle, but are incremental to the technology or
technologies that precede it.
Table IV-5--NHTSA Technology Effectiveness Estimates Employed in the CAFE Model for Certain Technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perform. Perform. Perform.
Subcomp. Compact Midsize Large car subcomp. compact midsize Perform. Minivan Small LT Midsize Large LT
car car car car car car large car LT LT
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY INCREMENTAL FUEL CONSUMPTION REDUCTION (-%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low friction lubricants (level 1)........................... 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
Engine friction reduction (level 1)......................... 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.0 2.6 2.4
VVT--Dual cam phasing (DCP)................................. 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.0 2.6 2.4
Discrete variable valve lift (DVVL) on DOHC................. 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.9 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.9 3.5 2.8 3.5 3.4
Cylinder deactivation on OHV................................ 4.7 4.7 5.9 6.3 4.7 4.7 5.9 6.3 5.9 4.7 5.9 5.5
Stoichiometric gasoline direct injection.................... 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5
Turbocharging and downsizing (level 1)...................... 7.2 7.2 8.3 7.8 7.2 6.7 7.5 7.8 7.9 7.1 7.9 7.3
Turbocharging and downsizing (level 2)...................... 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.7 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.7 3.4 2.9 3.4 3.4
Cooled exhaust gas recirculation (EGR)--(level 1)........... 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Cooled exhaust gas recirculation (EGR)--(level 2)........... 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2
Advanced Diesel............................................. 5.5 5.5 2.8 2.9 5.5 5.5 2.8 2.9 3.4 5.3 3.4 3.5
6-speed auto. trans. with improved internals................ 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1
6-speed DCT................................................. 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.8 4.0 3.4 4.1 3.8 n/a 3.8 n/a n/a
High Efficiency Gearbox..................................... 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.6 3.1 2.5 3.1 3.7
Shift Optimizer............................................. 3.3 3.3 4.1 4.3 3.3 3.3 4.1 4.3 4.1 3.3 4.1 3.9
Electric power steering..................................... 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.8
12V micro-hybrid............................................ 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.1
Integrated Starter-Generator (Mild Hybrid).................. 7.5 7.5 6.6 6.4 7.5 7.5 6.6 6.4 5.7 6.1 5.7 3.0
Strong Hybrid (level 2)..................................... 3.0 3.0 0.1 0.6 3.0 3.0 0.1 0.6 (0.3) 4.3 (0.3) 1.6
Plug-in Hybrid.............................................. 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7
[[Page 62977]]
Electric Vehicle (Early Adopter)............................ 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5
Low Rolling Resistance Tires (level 1)...................... 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Low Rolling Resistance Tires (level 2)...................... 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Aero Drag Reduction (level 1)............................... 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Aero Drag Reduction (level 2)............................... 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-6 NHTSA Technology Cost Estimates Employed in the CAFE Model for Certain Technologies, MY 2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perform. Perform. Perform.
Subcomp. Compact Midsize Large car subcomp. compact midsize Perform. Minivan Small LT Midsize Large LT
car car car car car car large car LT LT
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY ICM COSTS PER VEHICLE (2010$)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal baseline engine (for cost purposes)................. Inline 4 Inline 4 Inline 4 V6 Inline 4 V6 V6 V8 V6 Inline 4 V6 V8
Low friction lubricants (level 1)........................... 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Engine friction reduction (level 1)......................... 60 60 60 91 60 91 91 121 91 60 91 121
VVT--Dual cam phasing (DCP)................................. 44 44 44 89 44 89 89 89 89 44 89 89
Discrete variable valve lift (DVVL) on DOHC................. 163 163 163 245 163 245 245 326 245 163 245 326
Cylinder deactivation on OHV................................ 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208
Stoichiometric gasoline direct injection.................... 268 268 268 403 268 403 403 537 403 268 403 537
Turbocharging and downsizing (level 1)...................... 494 494 494 19 494 19 19 621 19 494 19 621
Turbocharging and downsizing (level 2)...................... 26 26 26 262 26 262 262 442 262 26 262 442
Cooled exhaust gas recirculation (EGR)--(level 1)........... 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302
Cooled exhaust gas recirculation (EGR)--(level 2)........... 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 (300) 525 525 525 (300)
Advanced Diesel............................................. 889 889 889 855 889 855 855 1,710 855 889 855 1,710
6-speed auto. trans. with improved internals................ (39) (39) (39) (39) (39) (39) (39) (39) (39) (39) (39) (39)
6-speed DCT................................................. (109) (109) (75) (75) (75) (75) (75) (75) 0 (75) 0 0
High Efficiency Gearbox..................................... 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251
Shift Optimizer............................................. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Electric power steering..................................... 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
12V micro-hybrid............................................ 325 351 385 414 325 351 385 414 414 366 424 480
Integrated Starter-Generator (Mild Hybrid).................. 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976
Strong Hybrid (level 2)..................................... 1,921 1,921 2,334 3,054 1,921 1,921 2,334 3,054 2,723 2,205 2,723 3,111
[[Page 62978]]
Plug-in Hybrid.............................................. 11,043 11,043 13,449 18,538 11,043 11,043 13,449 18,538 0 12,828 0 0
Electric Vehicle (Early Adopter)............................ 2,416 2,416 3,711 4,614 2,416 2,416 3,711 4,614 0 2,208 0 0
Low Rolling Resistance Tires (level 1)...................... 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Low Rolling Resistance Tires (level 2)...................... 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73
Aero Drag Reduction (level 1)............................... 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Aero Drag Reduction (level 2)............................... 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. How does NHTSA use these assumptions in its modeling analysis?
NHTSA relies on several inputs and data files to conduct the
compliance analysis using the CAFE model, as discussed further below
and in Chapter V of the FRIA. For the purposes of applying
technologies, the CAFE model primarily uses three data files, one that
contains data on the vehicles expected to be manufactured in the model
years covered by the rulemaking and identifies the appropriate stage
within the vehicle's life-cycle for the technology to be applied, one
that contains data/parameters regarding the available technologies the
model can apply, and one that contains economic assumption inputs for
calculating the costs and benefits of the standards. The inputs for the
first two data files are discussed below.
As discussed above, the CAFE model begins with an initial state of
the domestic vehicle market, which in this case is the market for
passenger cars and light trucks to be sold during the period covered by
the proposed standards. The vehicle market is defined on a year-by-
year, model-by-model, engine-by-engine, and transmission-by-
transmission basis, such that each defined vehicle model refers to a
separately defined engine and a separately defined transmission.
Comparatively, EPA's OMEGA model defines the vehicle market using
representative vehicles at the vehicle platform level, which are binned
into 5 year timeframes instead of year-by-year.
For the current standards, which cover MYs 2017-2025, the light-
duty vehicle (passenger car and light truck) two sets of market
forecast were developed jointly by NHTSA and EPA staff using MY 2008
and 2010 CAFE compliance data. The 2008 data was used in the NPRM
analysis, while both the 2008 and 2010 data are used in the final rule
analysis. The MY 2008 compliance data includes about 1,100 vehicle
models, about 400 specific engines, and about 200 specific
transmissions, which is a somewhat lower level of detail in the
representation of the vehicle market than that used by NHTSA in prior
CAFE analyses--previous analyses would count a vehicle as ``new'' in
any year when significant technology differences are made, such as at a
redesign.\979\ However, within the limitations of information that can
be made available to the public, it provides the foundation for a
reasonable analysis of manufacturer-specific costs and the analysis of
attribute-based CAFE standards, and is much greater than the level of
detail used by many other models and analyses relevant to light-duty
vehicle fuel economy.\980\ The MY 2010 compliance data includes about
1,170 vehicle models, about 330 specific engines, and about 330
specific transmissions, while the MY 2008 compliance data includes
about 1,300 vehicle models, about 440 specific engines and about 210
specific transmissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\979\ The market file for the MY 2011 final rule, which included
data for MYs 2011-2015, had 5500 vehicles, about 5 times what we are
using in this analysis of the MY 2010 certification data.
\980\ Because CAFE standards apply to the average performance of
each manufacturer's fleet of cars and light trucks, the impact of
potential standards on individual manufacturers cannot be credibly
estimated without analysis of the fleets that manufacturers can be
expected to produce in the future. Furthermore, because required
CAFE levels under an attribute-based CAFE standard depend on
manufacturers' fleet composition, the stringency of an attribute-
based standard cannot be predicted without performing analysis at
this level of detail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to containing data about each vehicle, engine, and
transmission, this file contains information for each technology under
consideration as it pertains to the specific vehicle (whether the
vehicle is equipped with it or not), the estimated model year the
vehicle is undergoing a refresh or redesign, and information about the
vehicle's subclass for purposes of technology application. In essence,
the model considers whether it is appropriate to apply a technology to
a vehicle.
i. Is a vehicle already equipped, or can it not be equipped, with a
particular technology?
The market forecast file provides NHTSA the ability to identify, on
a technology-by-technology basis, which technologies may already be
present (manufactured) on a particular vehicle, engine, or
transmission, or which technologies are not applicable (due to
technical considerations or engineering constraints) to a particular
vehicle, engine, or transmission. These identifications are made on a
model-by-model, engine-by-engine, and transmission-by-transmission
basis. For example, if the market forecast file indicates that
Manufacturer X's Vehicle Y is manufactured with Technology Z, then for
this vehicle Technology Z will be shown as used. Additionally, NHTSA
has determined that some technologies are only suitable or unsuitable
when certain vehicle, engine, or transmission conditions exist. For
example, secondary axle disconnect is only suitable for 4WD vehicles
and cylinder deactivation is unsuitable for any engine with fewer than
6 cylinders. Similarly, comments received to the 2012-2016 NPRM
indicated that cylinder deactivation could not likely be applied to
vehicles equipped with manual transmissions during the rulemaking
timeframe, due primarily to the cylinder
[[Page 62979]]
deactivation system not being able to anticipate gear shifts. The CAFE
model employs ``engineering constraints'' to address issues like these,
which are a programmatic method of controlling technology application
that is independent of other constraints. Thus, the market forecast
file would indicate that the technology in question should not be
applied to the particular vehicle/engine/transmission (i.e., is
unavailable). Since multiple vehicle models may be equipped with an
engine or transmission, this may affect multiple models. In using this
aspect of the market forecast file, NHTSA ensures the CAFE model only
applies technologies in an appropriate manner, since before any
application of a technology can occur, the model checks the market
forecast to see if it is either already present or unavailable. NHTSA
sought comment on the continued appropriateness of the engineering
constraints used by the model, and specifically whether many of the
technical constraints will be resolved (and therefore the engineering
constraints should be changed) given the increased focus of engineering
resources that will be working to solve these technical challenges.
NHTSA did not receive any comments on this issue.
Whether a vehicle can be equipped with a particular technology
could also theoretically depend on certain technical considerations
related to incorporating the technology into particular vehicles. For
example, GM commented on the MY 2012-2016 NPRM that there are certain
issues in implementing turbocharging and downsizing technologies on
full-size trucks, like concerns related to engine knock, drivability,
control of boost pressure, packaging complexity, enhanced cooling for
vehicles that are designed for towing or hauling, and noise, vibration
and harshness. NHTSA stated in response that we believed that such
technical considerations are well recognized within the industry and it
is standard industry practice to address each during the design and
development phases of applying turbocharging and downsizing
technologies. The cost and effectiveness estimates used in the final
rule for MYs 2012-2016, as well as the cost and effectiveness estimates
employed in this final rule, are based on analysis that assumes each of
these factors is addressed prior to production implementation of the
technologies. NHTSA sought comment on whether the engineering
constraints should be used to address concerns like these (and if so,
how), or alternatively, whether some of the things that the agency
currently treats as engineering constraints should be (or actually are)
accounted for in the cost and effectiveness estimates through
assumptions like those described above, and whether the agency might be
double-constraining the application of technology. The Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection and Clean Fuel Development
Coalition both commented that the agencies should evaluate the benefits
of higher octane fuels and whether or not they are required for some of
the advanced engine technologies like turbocharging and downsizing.
While the agencies agree that higher octane ratings could provide
additional benefits, the agencies relied in the rulemaking analyses on
the Ricardo simulation study, which assumed certification gasoline
which typically has a Research Octane Number (RON) of approximately 95
versus approximately 91 RON for regular grade 87 anti-knocking index
gasoline, to determine the effectiveness of engine technologies. We
note, however, that in the Ricardo simulation cooled EGR was included
on higher BMEP engines and it as assumed that all of the 27-bar BMEP
engine packages with cooled EGR would allow for the use of 91 RON
(regular grade) fuels while reducing the need for enrichment and spark
retard to prevent the onset of knocking combustion.
ii. Is a vehicle being redesigned or refreshed?
Manufacturers typically plan vehicle changes to coincide with
certain stages of a vehicle's life cycle that are appropriate for the
change, or in this case the technology being applied. In the automobile
industry there are two terms that describe when technology changes to
vehicles occur: Redesign and refresh (i.e., freshening). Vehicle
redesign usually refers to significant changes to a vehicle's
appearance, shape, dimensions, contents, material usage and powertrain.
Redesign is traditionally associated with the introduction of ``new''
vehicles into the market, often characterized as the ``next
generation'' of a vehicle, or a new platform. Vehicle refresh usually
refers to less extensive vehicle modifications, such as minor changes
to a vehicle's appearance, a moderate upgrade to a powertrain system,
or small changes to the vehicle's feature or safety equipment content.
Refresh is traditionally associated with mid-cycle cosmetic changes to
a vehicle, within its current generation, to make it appear ``fresh.''
Vehicle refresh generally occurs no earlier than two years after a
vehicle redesign, or at least two years before a scheduled redesign. To
be clear, this is a general description of how manufacturers manage
their product lines and refresh and redesign cycles but in some cases
the timeframes could be shorter and others longer depending on market
factors, regulations, etc. For many of the technologies discussed
today, manufacturers will only be able to apply them at a refresh or
for a majority of the technologies at redesign, because their
application would be significant enough to involve some level of
engineering, testing, and calibration work.\981\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\981\ For example, applying material substitution through weight
reduction, or even something as simple as low rolling-resistance
tires, to a vehicle will likely require some level of validation and
testing to ensure that the vehicle may continue to be certified as
compliant with NHTSA's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS). Weight reduction might affect a vehicle's crashworthiness;
low rolling-resistance tires might change a vehicle's braking
characteristics or how it performs in crash avoidance tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some technologies (e.g., those that require significant revision)
are nearly always applied only when the vehicle is expected to be
redesigned, like turbocharging and engine downsizing, conversion to
diesel or hybridization, or significant amounts of mass reduction.
Other technologies, like cylinder deactivation, electric power
steering, and low rolling resistance tires can be applied either when
the vehicle is expected to be refreshed or when it is expected to be
redesigned, while low friction lubricants can be applied at any time,
regardless of whether a refresh or redesign event is conducted.
Accordingly, the CAFE model will only apply a technology at the
particular point deemed suitable. These constraints are intended to
produce results consistent with how we assume manufacturers will apply
technologies in the future based on how they have historically
implemented new technologies. For each technology under consideration,
NHTSA specifies whether it can be applied any time, at refresh/
redesign, or only at redesign. The data forms another input to the CAFE
model. NHTSA develops redesign and refresh schedules for each of a
manufacturer's vehicles included in the analysis, essentially based on
the last known redesign year for each vehicle and projected forward
using a 5- to 8-year redesign and a 2-3 year refresh cycle, and this
data is also stored in the market forecast file. While most vehicles
are projected to follow a 5-year redesign a few of the niche market or
small-volume manufacturer vehicles (e.g., luxury and performance
vehicles) and large trucks are assumed to have 6- to
[[Page 62980]]
8-year redesigns based on historic redesign schedules and the agency's
understanding of manufacturers' intentions moving forward. This
approach is used because of the nature of the current baseline, which
as a single year of data does not contain its own refresh and redesign
cycle cues for future model years, and to ensure the complete
transparency of the agency's analysis. We note that this approach is
different from what NHTSA has employed previously for determining
redesign and refresh schedules, where NHTSA included the redesign and
refresh dates in the market forecast file as provided by manufacturers
in confidential product plans. Vehicle redesign/refresh assumptions are
discussed in more detail in Chapter V of the FRIA and in Chapter 3 of
the TSD.
NHTSA has previously received comments stating that manufacturers
do not necessarily adhere to strict five-year redesign cycles, and may
add significant technologies by redesigning vehicles at more frequent
intervals, albeit at higher costs. Conversely, other comments received
stated that as compared to full-line manufacturers, small-volume
manufacturers in fact may have 7- to 8-year redesign cycles.\982\ The
agency believes that manufacturers can and will accomplish much
improvement in fuel economy and GHG reductions while applying
technology consistent with their redesign schedules. No comments were
received on this specific issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\982\ In the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA noted that the CAR report
submitted by the Alliance, prepared by the Center for Automotive
Research and EDF, stated that ``For a given vehicle line, the time
from conception to first production may span two and one-half to
five years,'' but that ``The time from first production
(``Job1'') to the last vehicle off the line (``Balance
Out'') may span from four to five years to eight to ten years or
more, depending on the dynamics of the market segment.'' The CAR
report then stated that ``At the point of final production of the
current vehicle line, a new model with the same badge and similar
characteristics may be ready to take its place, continuing the
cycle, or the old model may be dropped in favor of a different
product.'' See NHTSA-2008-0089-0170.1, Attachment 16, at 8 (393 of
pdf). NHTSA explained that this description, which states that a
vehicle model will be redesigned or dropped after 4-10 years, was
consistent with other characterizations of the redesign and
freshening process, and supported the 5-year redesign and 2-3 year
refresh cycle assumptions used in the MY 2011 final rule. See id.,
at 9 (394 of pdf). Given that the situation faced by the auto
industry today is not so wholly different from that in March 2009,
when the MY 2011 final rule was published, and given that the
commenters did not present information to suggest that these
assumptions are unreasonable (but rather simply that different
manufacturers may redesign their vehicles more or less frequently,
as the range of cycles above indicates), NHTSA believes that the
assumptions remain reasonable for purposes of this NPRM analysis.
See also ``Car Wars 2009-2012, The U.S. automotive product
pipeline,'' John Murphy, Research Analyst, Merrill Lynch research
paper, May 14, 2008 and ``Car Wars 2010-2013, The U.S. automotive
product pipeline,'' John Murphy, Research Analyst, Bank of America/
Merrill Lynch research paper, July 15, 2009. Available at http://www.autonews.com/assets/PDF/CA66116716.PDF (last accessed Jul. 8,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once the model indicates that a technology should be applied to a
vehicle, the model must evaluate which technology should be applied.
This will depend on the vehicle subclass to which the vehicle is
assigned; what technologies have already been applied to the vehicle
(i.e., where in the ``decision tree'' the vehicle is); when the
technology is first available (i.e., year of availability); whether the
technology is still available (i.e., ``phase-in caps''); and the costs
and effectiveness of the technologies being considered. Technology
costs may be reduced, in turn, by learning effects and short- vs. long-
term ICMs, while technology effectiveness may be increased or reduced
by synergistic effects between technologies. In the technology input
file, NHTSA has developed a separate set of technology data variables
for each of the twelve vehicle subclasses. Each set of variables is
referred to as an ``input sheet,'' so for example, the subcompact
passenger car input sheet holds the technology data that is appropriate
for the subcompact subclass. Each input sheet contains a list of
technologies available for members of the particular vehicle subclass.
The following items are provided for each technology: the name of the
technology, its abbreviation, the decision tree with which it is
associated, the (first) year in which it is available, the year-by-year
cost estimates and effectiveness (fuel consumption reduction)
estimates, its applicability and the consumer value loss. The phase-in
values and the potential stranded capital costs are common for all
vehicle subclasses and are thus listed in a separate input sheet that
is referenced for all vehicle subclasses.
iii. To which vehicle subclass is the vehicle assigned?
As part of its consideration of technological feasibility, the
agency evaluates whether each technology could be implemented on all
types and sizes of vehicles, and whether some differentiation is
necessary in applying certain technologies to certain types and sizes
of vehicles, and with respect to the cost incurred and fuel consumption
and CO2 emissions reduction achieved when doing so. The 2010
NAS Report differentiated technology application using eight vehicle
``classes'' (4 car classes and 4 truck classes).\983\ NAS's purpose in
separating vehicles into these classes was to create groups of ``like''
vehicles, i.e., vehicles similar in size, powertrain configuration,
weight, and consumer use, and for which similar technologies are
applicable. NAS also used these vehicle classes along with powertrain
configurations (e.g., 4 cylinder, 6 cylinder or 8 cylinder engines) to
determine unique cost and effectiveness estimates for each class of
vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\983\ The NAS classes included two-seater convertibles and
coupes; small cars; intermediate and large cars; high-performance
sedans; unit-body standard trucks; unit-body high-performance
trucks; body-on-frame small and midsize trucks; and body-on-frame
large trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA similarly differentiates vehicles by ``subclass'' for the
purpose of applying technologies to ``like'' vehicles and assessing
their incremental costs and effectiveness. NHTSA assigns each vehicle
manufactured in the rulemaking period to one of 12 subclasses: for
passenger cars, Subcompact, Subcompact Performance, Compact, Compact
Performance, Midsize, Midsize Performance, Large, and Large
Performance; and for light trucks, Small SUV/Pickup/Van, Midsize SUV/
Pickup/Van, Large SUV/Pickup/Van, and Minivan. The agency sought
comment on the appropriateness of these 12 subclasses for the MYs 2017-
2025 timeframe. The agency also sought comment on the continued
appropriateness of maintaining separate ``performance'' vehicle classes
or if as fuel economy stringency increases the market for performance
vehicles will decrease. NHTSA did not receive any comments on this
issue.
For this final rule, as in the NPRM, NHTSA divides the vehicle
fleet into subclasses based on model inputs, and applies subclass-
specific estimates, also from model inputs, of the applicability, cost,
and effectiveness of each fuel-saving technology. The model's estimates
of the cost to improve the fuel economy of each vehicle model thus
depend upon the subclass to which the vehicle model is assigned. Each
vehicle's subclass is stored in the market forecast file. When
conducting a compliance analysis, if the CAFE model seeks to apply
technology to a particular vehicle, it checks the market forecast to
see if the technology is available and if the refresh/redesign criteria
are met. If these conditions are satisfied, the model determines the
vehicle's subclass from the market data file, which it then uses to
reference another input called the technology input file. NHTSA
reviewed its methodology for dividing vehicles into subclasses for
purposes of
[[Page 62981]]
technology application that it used in the MY 2011 final rule and for
the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, and concluded that the same methodology
would be appropriate for this final rule for MYs 2017-2025. Vehicle
subclasses are discussed in more detail in Chapter V of the FRIA and in
Chapter 3 of the TSD.
For the reader's reference, the subclasses and example vehicles
from the market forecast file are provided in Table IV-7 and Table IV-
8.
Table IV-7--NHTSA Passenger Car Subclasses Example (MY 2008) Vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class Example vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subcompact........................ Chevrolet Aveo, Hyundai Accent
Subcompact performance............ Mazda MX-5, BMW Z4
Compact........................... Chevrolet Cobalt, Nissan Sentra and
Altima
Compact performance............... Audi S4, Mazda RX-8
Mid-size.......................... Chevrolet Impala, Toyota Camry,
Honda Accord, Hyundai Azera
Mid-size performance.............. Chevrolet Corvette, Ford Mustang
(V8), Nissan 350Z
Large............................. Audi A8, Cadillac CTS and DTS
Large performance................. Bentley Arnage, Mercedes-Benz CL600
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-8--NHTSA Light Truck Subclasses Example (MY 2008) Vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class Example vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minivans.......................... Dodge Grand Caravan, Toyota Sienna
Small SUV/Pickup/Van.............. Ford Escape and Ranger, Nissan Rogue
Mid-size SUV/Pickup/Van........... Chevrolet Colorado, Jeep Wrangler,
Toyota Tacoma
Large SUV/Pickup/Van.............. Chevrolet Silverado, Ford E-Series,
Toyota Sequoia
------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. What technologies have already been applied to the vehicle (i.e.,
where in the ``decision trees'' is it)?
NHTSA's methodology for technology analysis evaluates the
application of individual technologies and their incremental costs and
effectiveness. Individual technologies are assessed relative to the
prior technology state, which means that it is crucial to understand
what technologies are already present on a vehicle in order to
determine correct incremental cost and effectiveness values. The
benefit of the incremental approach is transparency in accounting,
insofar as when individual technologies are added incrementally to
individual vehicles, it is clear and easy to determine how costs and
effectiveness add up as technology levels increase and explicitly
account for any synergies that exist between technologies which are
already present on the vehicle and new technologies being applied.
To keep track of incremental costs and effectiveness and to know
which technology to apply and in which order, the CAFE model's
architecture uses a logical sequence, which NHTSA refers to as
``decision trees,'' for applying fuel economy-improving technologies to
individual vehicles. For purposes of this proposal, NHTSA reviewed the
MYs 2012-2016 final rule's technology sequencing architecture, which
was based on the MY 2011 final rule's decision trees that were jointly
developed by NHTSA and Ricardo, and, as appropriate, updated the
decision trees to include new technologies that have been defined for
the MYs 2017-2025 timeframe.
In general, and as described in great detail in Chapter V of the
current FRIA,\984\ each technology is assigned to one of the five
following categories based on the system it affects or impacts: engine,
transmission, electrification/accessory, hybrid or vehicle. Each of
these categories has its own decision tree that the CAFE model uses to
apply technologies sequentially during the compliance analysis. The
decision trees were designed and configured to allow the CAFE model to
apply technologies in a cost-effective, logical order that also
considers ease of implementation. For example, software or control
logic changes are implemented before replacing a component or system
with a completely redesigned one, which is typically a much more
expensive and integration-intensive option. In some cases, and as
appropriate, the model may combine the sequential technologies shown on
a decision tree and apply them simultaneously, effectively developing
dynamic technology packages on an as-needed basis. For example, if
compliance demands indicate, the model may elect to apply LUB, EFR, and
ICP on a dual overhead cam engine, if they are not already present, in
one single step. An example simplified decision tree for engine
technologies is provided below; the other simplified decision trees may
be found in Chapter V of the FRIA. Expanded decision trees are
available in the docket for this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\984\ Additional details about technologies are categorized can
be found in the MY 2011 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 62982]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.026
Each technology within the decision trees has an incremental cost
and an incremental effectiveness estimate associated with it, and
estimates are specific to a particular vehicle subclass (see the tables
in Chapter V of the FRIA). Each technology's incremental estimate takes
into account its position in the decision tree path. If a technology
[[Page 62983]]
is located further down the decision tree, the estimates for the costs
and effectiveness values attributed to that technology are influenced
by the incremental estimates of costs and effectiveness values for
prior technology applications. In essence, this approach accounts for
``in-path'' effectiveness synergies, as well as cost effects that occur
between the technologies in the same path. When comparing cost and
effectiveness estimates from various sources and those provided by
commenters in this and the previous CAFE rulemakings, it is important
that the estimates evaluated are analyzed in the proper context,
especially as concerns their likely position in the decision trees and
other technologies that may be present or missing. Not all estimates
available in the public domain or that have been (or will be) offered
for the agencies' consideration can be evaluated in an ``apples-to-
apples'' comparison with those used by the CAFE model, since in some
cases the order of application, or included technology content, is
inconsistent with that assumed in the decision tree.
The MY 2011 final rule discussed in detail the revisions and
improvements made to the CAFE model and decision trees during that
rulemaking process, including the improved handling and accuracy of
valve train technology application and the development and
implementation of a method for accounting path-dependent correction
factors in order to ensure that technologies are evaluated within the
proper context. The reader should consult the MY 2011 final rule
documents for further information on these modeling techniques, all of
which continued to be utilized in developing this proposal.\985\ To the
extent that the decision trees have changed for purposes of the MYs
2012-2016 final rule and this final rule, it was due not to revisions
in the order of technology application, but rather to redefinitions of
technologies or addition or subtraction of technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\985\ See, e.g., 74 FR 14238-46 (Mar. 30, 2009) for a full
discussion of the decision trees in NHTSA's MY 2011 final rule, and
Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0062-0003.1 for an expanded decision tree used
in that rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
v. Is the next technology available in this model year?
Some of technologies considered are available on vehicles today,
and thus will be available for application (albeit in varying degrees)
in the model starting in MY 2017. Other technologies, however, will not
become available for purposes of NHTSA's analysis until later in the
rulemaking time frame. When the model is considering whether to add a
technology to a vehicle, it checks its year of availability--if the
technology is available, it may be added; if it is not available, the
model will consider whether to switch to a different decision tree to
look for another technology, or will skip to the next vehicle in a
manufacturer's fleet. The year of availability for each technology is
provided above in Table IV-4.
The agency has received comments previously stating that if a
technology is currently available or available prior to the rulemaking
timeframe that it should be immediately made available in the model. In
response, as discussed above, technology ``availability'' is not
determined based simply on whether the technology exists, but depends
also on whether the technology has achieved a level of technical
viability that makes it appropriate for widespread application. This
depends in turn on component supplier constraints, capital investment
and engineering constraints, and manufacturer product cycles, among
other things. Moreover, even if a technology is available for
application, it may not be available for every vehicle. Some
technologies may have considerable fuel economy benefits, but are not
applied to some vehicles due to technological constraints--for example,
cylinder deactivation has not been applied to vehicles with current 4-
cylinder engines (because operating on three or fewer cylinders can
cause unacceptable noise, vibration and harshness) or on vehicles with
manual transmissions within the rulemaking timeframe. The agencies have
provided for increases over time to reach the mpg level of the MY 2025
standards precisely because of these types of constraints, because they
have a real effect on how quickly manufacturers can apply technology to
vehicles in their fleets. NHTSA sought comment on the appropriateness
of the assumed years of availability. As discussed above, VW raised
concerns with the viability of high BMEP engines.
vi. Has the technology reached the phase-in cap for this model year?
Besides the refresh/redesign cycles used in the CAFE model, which
constrain the rate of technology application at the vehicle level so as
to ensure a period of stability following any modeled technology
applications, the other constraint on technology application employed
in NHTSA's analysis is ``phase-in caps.'' Unlike vehicle-level cycle
settings, phase-in caps constrain technology application at the vehicle
manufacturer level.\986\ They are intended to reflect a manufacturer's
overall resource capacity available for implementing new technologies
(such as engineering and development personnel and financial
resources), thereby ensuring that resource capacity is accounted for in
the modeling process. At a high level, phase-in caps and refresh/
redesign cycles work in conjunction with one another to avoid the
modeling process out-pacing an OEM's limited pool of available
resources during the rulemaking time frame and the years leading up to
the rulemaking time frame, especially in years where many models may be
scheduled for refresh or redesign. Even though this rulemaking is being
proposed 5 years before it takes effect, OEMs will still be utilizing
their limited resources to meet the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE standards. This
helps to ensure technological feasibility and economic practicability
in determining the stringency of the standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\986\ While phase-in caps are expressed as specific percentages
of a manufacturer's fleet to which a technology may be applied in a
given model year, phase-in caps cannot always be applied as precise
limits, and the CAFE model in fact allows ``override'' of a cap in
certain circumstances. When only a small portion of a phase-in cap
limit remains, or when the cap is set to a very low value, or when a
manufacturer has a very limited product line, the cap might prevent
the technology from being applied at all since any application would
cause the cap to be exceeded. Therefore, the CAFE model evaluates
and enforces each phase-in cap constraint after it has been exceeded
by the application of the technology (as opposed to evaluating it
before application), which can result in the described overriding of
the cap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA has been developing the concept of phase-in caps for purposes
of the agency's modeling analysis over the course of the last several
CAFE rulemakings, as discussed in greater detail in the MY 2011 final
rule,\987\ in the MY 2012-2016 final rule and in Chapter V of the FRIA
and Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD. The MYs 2012-2016 final rule like the
MY 2011 final rule employed non-linear phase-in caps (that is, caps
that varied from year to year) that were designed to respond to
previously received comments on technology deployment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\987\ 74 FR 14195-14456 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For purposes of this final rule, as in the MY 2011 and MYs 2012-
2016 final rules, NHTSA combines phase-in caps for some groups of
similar technologies, such as valve phasing technologies that are
applicable to different forms of engine design (SOHC, DOHC, OHV), since
they are very similar from an engineering and implementation
standpoint. When the phase-in caps for two technologies are combined,
the maximum total application of either or
[[Page 62984]]
both to any manufacturer's fleet is limited to the value of the
cap.\988\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\988\ See 74 FR 14270 (Mar. 30, 2009) for further discussion and
examples.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In developing phase-in cap values for purposes of this final rule,
NHTSA reviewed the MYs 2012-2016 final rule's phase-in caps, which for
the majority of technologies were set to reach 85 or 100 percent by MY
2016, although more advanced technologies like diesels and strong
hybrids reach only 15 percent by MY 2016. The phase-in caps used in the
MYs 2012-2016 final were developed to harmonize with EPA's proposal and
consider the fact that manufacturers, as part of the information shared
during the discussions that occurred during summer 2011, appeared to be
anticipating higher technology application rates than assumed in prior
rules. NHTSA determined that these phase-in caps for MY 2016 were still
reasonable and thus used those caps as the starting point for the MYs
2017-2025 phase-in caps. For many of the carryover technologies this
means that for MYs 2017-2025 the phase-in caps are assumed to be 100
percent. NHTSA along with EPA used confidential OEM submissions, trade
press articles, company publications and press releases to estimate the
phase-in caps for the newly defined technologies that will be entering
the market just before or during the MYs 2017-2025 time frame. For
example, advanced cooled EGR engines have a phase-in cap of 3 percent
per year through MY 2021 and then 10 percent per year through 2025. The
agency sought comment on the appropriateness of both the carryover
phase-in caps and the newly defined ones proposed in this NPRM. The
only comment received on phase-in caps was from AFPM, who stated that
the agencies should use lower phase-in caps for electrification
technologies, and consider the 2011 NAS report in developing them. In
our analyses for the final rule, the penetration of electrification
technologies (from strong hybrid to EV) was significantly below the
phase-in caps; thus, changing the phase-in caps would not affect the
analysis. The agencies will continue to monitor the application of
electrification technologies and will revisit the levels of the phase-
in caps for the future rulemaking to develop final standards for MYs
2022-2025 and the concurrent mid-term evaluation.
vii. Is the technology less expensive due to learning effects?
In the past two rulemakings NHTSA has explicitly accounted for the
cost reductions a manufacturer might realize through learning achieved
from experience in actually applying a technology. These cost
reductions, due to learning effects, were taken into account through
two kinds of mutually exclusive learning, ``volume-based'' and ``time-
based.'' NHTSA and EPA included a detailed description of the learning
effect in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule and the more recent heavy-duty
rule.\989\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\989\ 76 FR 57106, 57320 (Sept. 15, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most studies of the effect of experience or learning on production
costs appear to assume that cost reductions begin only after some
initial volume threshold has been reached, but not all of these studies
specify this threshold volume. The rate at which costs decline beyond
the initial threshold is usually expressed as the percent reduction in
average unit cost that results from each successive doubling of
cumulative production volume, sometimes referred to as the learning
rate. Many estimates of experience curves do not specify a cumulative
production volume beyond which cost reductions would no longer occur,
instead depending on the asymptotic behavior of the effect for learning
rates below 100 percent to establish a floor on costs.
In past rulemaking analyses, as noted above, both agencies have
used a learning curve algorithm that applied a learning factor of 20
percent for each doubling of production volume. NHTSA has used this
approach in analyses supporting recent CAFE rules. In its analyses, EPA
has simplified the approach by using an ``every two years'' based
learning progression rather than a pure production volume progression
(i.e., after two years of production it was assumed that production
volumes would have doubled and, therefore, costs would be reduced by 20
percent).\990\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\990\ To clarify, EPA has simplified the steep portion of the
volume learning curve by assuming that production volumes of a given
technology will have doubled within two years time. This has been
done largely to allow for a presentation of estimated costs during
the years of implementation, without the need to conduct a feedback
loop that ensures that production volumes have indeed doubled. If
EPA was to attempt such a feedback loop, it would need to estimate
first year costs, feed those into OMEGA, review the resultant
technology penetration rate and volume increase, calculate the
learned costs, feed those into OMEGA (since lower costs would result
in higher penetration rates, review the resultant technology
penetration rate and volume increase, etc., until an equilibrium was
reached. To do this for the dozens of technologies considered in the
analysis for this rulemaking was deemed not feasible. Instead, EPA
estimated the effects of learning on costs, fed those costs into
OMEGA, and reviewed the resultant penetration rates. The assumption
that volumes have doubled after two years is based solely on the
assumption that year two sales are of equal or greater number than
year one sales and, therefore, have resulted in a doubling of
production. This could be done on a daily basis, a monthly basis, or
a yearly basis as was done for this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, the agencies employed an
additional learning algorithm to reflect the volume-based learning cost
reductions that occur further along on the learning curve. This
additional learning algorithm was termed ``time-based'' learning simply
as a means of distinguishing this algorithm from the volume-based
algorithm mentioned above, although both of the algorithms reflect the
volume-based learning curve supported in the literature. To avoid
confusion, we are now referring to this learning algorithm as the
``flat portion'' of the learning curve. This way, we maintain the
clarity that all learning is, in fact, volume-based learning, and that
the level of cost reductions depend only on where on the learning curve
a technology's learning progression is. We distinguish the flat portion
of the curve from the ``steep portion'' of the curve to indicate the
level of learning taking place in the years following implementation of
the technology. The agencies have applied the steep portion learning
algorithm for those technologies considered to be newer technologies
likely to experience rapid cost reductions through manufacturer
learning, and the flat portion learning algorithm for those
technologies considered to be mature technologies likely to experience
only minor cost reductions through manufacturer learning. The agencies
employ a number of different learning curves, depending on the nature
of the technology. As an example, as noted above, the steep portion
learning algorithm results in 20 percent lower costs after two full
years of implementation (i.e., the MY 2016 costs are 20 percent lower
than the MYs 2014 and 2015 costs). Once two steep portion learning
steps have occurred (for technologies having the steep portion learning
algorithm applied while flat portion learning would begin in year 2 for
technologies having the flat portion learning algorithm applied), flat
portion learning at 3 percent per year becomes effective for 5 years.
Beyond 5 years of learning at 3 percent per year, 5 years of learning
at 2 percent per year, then 5 at 1 percent per year become effective.
Technologies assumed to be on the steep portion of the learning
curve are hybrids and electric vehicles, while no learning is applied
to technologies likely to be affected by commodity costs (LUB, ROLL) or
that have loosely-
[[Page 62985]]
defined Bills of Materials (EFR, LDB), as was the case in the MY 2012-
2016 final rule. Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD and the Chapter 7 of the
FRIA show the specific learning factors that NHTSA has applied in this
analysis for each technology, and discuss learning factors, each
agency's use of them and how much learning reduces the cost of each
technology. EPA and NHTSA included discussion of learning cost
assumptions in the FRIAs and TSD Chapter 3. Since the agencies had to
project how learning will occur with new technologies over a long
period of time, we requested comments on the assumptions of learning
costs and methodology. In particular, we were interested in input on
the assumptions for advanced 27-bar BMEP cooled EGR engines, which are
currently still in the experimental stage and not expected to be
available in volume production until 2017. For our analysis, we have
based estimates of the costs of high-BMEP engines on current (or soon
to be current) production engines, and assumed that learning (and the
associated cost reductions) begins as early as 2012. We sought comment
on the appropriateness of these pre-production applications of
learning. There were no significant comments on the issue of learning
curves.
viii. Is the technology more or less effective due to synergistic
effects?
When two or more technologies are added to a particular vehicle
model to improve its fuel efficiency and reduce CO2
emissions, the resultant fuel consumption reduction may sometimes be
higher or lower than the product of the individual effectiveness values
for those items.\991\ This may occur because one or more technologies
applied to the same vehicle partially address the same source (or
sources) of engine, drivetrain or vehicle losses. Alternately, this
effect may be seen when one technology shifts the engine operating
points, and therefore increases or reduces the fuel consumption
reduction achieved by another technology or set of technologies. The
difference between the observed fuel consumption reduction associated
with a set of technologies and the product of the individual
effectiveness values in that set is referred to for purposes of this
rulemaking as a ``synergy.'' Synergies may be positive (increased fuel
consumption reduction compared to the product of the individual
effects) or negative (decreased fuel consumption reduction). An example
of a positive synergy might be a vehicle technology that reduces road
loads at highway speeds (e.g., lower aerodynamic drag or low rolling
resistance tires), that could extend the vehicle operating range over
which cylinder deactivation may be employed. An example of a negative
synergy might be a variable valvetrain system technology, which reduces
pumping losses by altering the profile of the engine speed/load map,
and a six-speed automatic transmission, which shifts the engine
operating points to a portion of the engine speed/load map where
pumping losses are less significant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\991\ More specifically, the products of the differences between
one and the technology-specific levels of effectiveness in reducing
fuel consumption. For example, not accounting for interactions, if
technologies A and B are estimated to reduce fuel consumption by 10
percent (i.e., 0.1) and 20 percent (i.e., 0.2) respectively, the
``product of the individual effectiveness values'' would be (1 -
0.1) times (1 - 0.2), or 0.9 times 0.8, which equals 0.72,
corresponding to a combined effectiveness of 28 percent rather than
the 30 percent obtained by adding 10 percent to 20 percent. The
``synergy factors'' discussed in this section further adjust these
multiplicatively combined effectiveness values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the complexity of the technology combinations is increased, and
the number of interacting technologies grows accordingly, it becomes
increasingly important to account for these synergies. NHTSA and EPA
determined synergistic impacts for this proposed rule using EPA's
``lumped parameter'' analysis tool, which EPA describes at length in
Chapter 3 of the joint TSD. The lumped parameter tool is a spreadsheet
model that represents energy consumption in terms of average
performance over the fuel economy test procedure, rather than
explicitly analyzing specific drive cycles. The tool begins with an
apportionment of fuel consumption across several loss mechanisms and
accounts for the average extent to which different technologies affect
these loss mechanisms using estimates of engine, drivetrain and vehicle
characteristics that are averaged over the 2-cycle CAFE drive cycle.
Results of this analysis were generally consistent with those of full-
scale vehicle simulation modeling performed in 2010-2011 for EPA by
Ricardo, Inc.
For the current rulemaking, NHTSA is using an updated version of
lumped parameter tool that incorporates results from simulation
modeling performed in 2010-2011 by Ricardo, Inc. NHTSA and EPA
incorporate synergistic impacts in their analyses in slightly different
manners. Because NHTSA applies technologies individually in its
modeling analysis, NHTSA incorporates synergistic effects between
pairings of individual technologies. The use of discrete technology
pair incremental synergies is similar to that in DOE's National Energy
Modeling System (NEMS).\992\ Inputs to the CAFE model incorporate NEMS-
identified pairs, as well as additional pairs from the set of
technologies considered in the CAFE model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\992\ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Transportation Sector Module of the National Energy
Modeling System: Model Documentation 2007, May 2007, Washington, DC,
DOE/EIAM070(2007), at 29-30. Available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/modeldoc/m070(2007).pdf (last accessed Sept. 25, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA notes that synergies that occur within a decision tree are
already addressed within the incremental values assigned and therefore
do not require a synergy pair to address. For example, all engine
technologies take into account incremental synergy factors of preceding
engine technologies, and all transmission technologies take into
account incremental synergy factors of preceding transmission
technologies. These factors are expressed in the fuel consumption
improvement factors in the input files used by the CAFE model.
For applying incremental synergy factors in separate path
technologies, the CAFE model uses an input table (see the tables in
Chapter 3 of the TSD and in the FRIA) that lists technology pairings
and incremental synergy factors associated with those pairings, most of
which are between engine technologies and transmission/electrification/
hybrid technologies. When a technology is applied to a vehicle by the
CAFE model, all instances of that technology in the incremental synergy
table which match technologies already applied to the vehicle (either
pre-existing or previously applied by the CAFE model) are summed and
applied to the fuel consumption improvement factor of the technology
being applied. Many of the synergies for the strong hybrid technology
fuel consumption reductions are included in the incremental value for
the specific hybrid technology block since the model applies all
available electrification, engine and transmission technologies before
applying strong hybrid technologies.
As discussed in the proposal, the U.S. DOT Volpe Center has entered
into a contract with Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) to provide full
vehicle simulation modeling support for this MYs 2017-2025 rulemaking.
While modeling was not complete in time for use in the NPRM, the ANL
results were available for the final rule and were used to define the
effectiveness of mild hybrids for both agencies, and NHTSA used the
results to update the effectiveness of advanced transmission
technologies coupled with naturally-aspirated engines for the CAFE
analysis.
[[Page 62986]]
This simulation modeling was accomplished using ANL's full vehicle
simulation tool called ``Autonomie,'' which is the successor to ANL's
Powertrain System Analysis Toolkit (PSAT) simulation tool, and which
includes sophisticated models for advanced vehicle technologies. The
ANL simulation modeling process and results are discussed in greater
detail in Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA and fully documented in multiple
reports that can be found in NHTSA's docket.\993\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\993\ Moawad, A. and Rousseau, A., ``Impact of Transmission
Technologies on Fuel Efficiency,'' Energy Systems Division, Argonne
National Laboratory, ANL/ESD/12-6, August 2012, and Moawad, A. and
Rousseau, A., ``Impact of Electric Drive Vehicle Technologies on
Fuel Efficiency,'' Energy Systems Division, Argonne National
Laboratory, ANL/ESD/12-7, August 2012, are available in Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Where can readers find more detailed information about NHTSA's
technology analysis?
Much more detailed information is provided in Chapter 5 of the
FRIA, and a discussion of how NHTSA and EPA jointly reviewed and
updated technology assumptions for purposes of this final rule is
available in Chapter 3 of the TSD. Additionally, all of NHTSA's model
input and output files are now public and available for the reader's
review and consideration. The technology input files can be found in
the docket for this final rule, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131, and on
NHTSA's Web site. And finally, because much of NHTSA's technology
analysis for purposes of this final rule builds on the work that was
done for the MY 2011 and MYs 2012-2016 final rules, we refer readers to
those documents as well for background information concerning how
NHTSA's methodology for technology application analysis has evolved
over the past several rulemakings, both in response to comments and as
a result of the agency's growing experience with this type of
analysis.\994\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\994\ 74 FR 14233-308 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. How did NHTSA develop its economic assumptions?
NHTSA's analysis of alternative CAFE standards for the model years
covered by this rulemaking relies on a range of forecast variables,
economic assumptions, and parameter values. This section describes the
sources of these forecasts, the rationale underlying each assumption,
and the agency's choices of specific parameter values. These economic
values play a significant role in determining the benefits of
alternative CAFE standards, as they have for the last several CAFE
rulemakings. Under those alternatives where standards would be
established by reference to their costs and benefits, these economic
values also affect the levels of the CAFE standards themselves. Some of
these variables have more important effects on the level of CAFE
standards and the benefits from requiring alternative increases in fuel
economy than do others, and the following discussion places more
emphasis on these inputs.
In reviewing these variables and the agency's estimates of their
values for purposes of this final rule, NHTSA considered comments
received on the NPRM and also reviewed newly available literature. Many
of the estimates have been carried forward from the NPRM without
substantive change, and were based then on the agency's reconsideration
of comments it had previously received on the NPRM for MYs 2012-16 CAFE
standards and to the NOI/Interim Joint TAR, and newly available
literature at that time. The agency elected to revise some of its
economic assumptions and parameter estimates for this rulemaking, while
retaining others.
Between the final rule establishing CAFE standards for MY 2012-16
passenger cars and light trucks and the proposed rule for MY 2017-25,
the agency extensively revised its method for estimating benefits from
less frequent refueling of vehicles with higher fuel economy, and also
revised its forecasts of fuel prices and future growth in total vehicle
use to be consistent with those reported in Annual Energy Outlook 2011.
For this final rule, NHTSA made several changes to the economic
assumptions it used to analyze the impacts of its proposed rule,
including revising its technology cost estimates to reflect more
recently available data; updating the estimated cost of owning a
vehicle based to include additional categories of ownership costs and
utilize newer data; updating its fuel price and transportation demand
forecasts to be consistent with those presented in the Annual Energy
Outlook (AEO) 2012 Early Release; and updating and revising its
estimates of vehicle use (VMT) schedules, survival rates, and methods
for projecting total VMT in future years. For the reader's reference,
Table IV-9 below summarizes the values used to calculate the economic
benefits from each alternative.
Table IV-9--NHTSA Economic Values for Estimating Benefits
[2010$]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel Economy Rebound Effect.. 10%
``Gap'' between test and on- 20%
road MPG for liquid-fueled
vehicles.
``Gap'' between test and on- 30%
road wall electricity
consumption for electric and
plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles.
Value of refueling time per $21.45 cars
($ per vehicle-hour).
$21.81 trucks
Average tank volume refilled 65%
during refueling stop.
Annual growth in average 0.6%
vehicle use.
Fuel Prices (2017-50 average,
$/gallon):
Retail gasoline price.... $4.13
Pre-tax gasoline price... $3.78
Economic Benefits from
Reducing Oil Imports ($/
gallon):
``Monopsony'' Component.. $ 0.00
Macroeconomic Disruption $ 0.197 in 2025
(``Price Shock'')
Component.
Military Security/SPR $ 0.00
Component.
Total Economic Costs ($/ $ 0.197 in 2025
gallon).
Emission Damage Costs (2020,
$/short ton):
Carbon monoxide.......... $ 0
Volatile organic $ 1,700
compounds (VOC).
Nitrogen oxides (NOX)-- $ 5,600
vehicle use.
Nitrogen oxides (NOX)-- $ 5,400
fuel production and
distribution.
Particulate matter $ 310,000
(PM2.5)--vehicle use.
[[Page 62987]]
Particulate matter $ 250,000
(PM2.5)--fuel production
and distribution.
Sulfur dioxide (SO2)..... $ 33,000
Annual CO2 Damage Cost (per variable depending on discount rate and
metric ton). year (see Table II-9 above for 2017
estimates)
External Costs from
Additional Automobile Use ($/
vehicle-mile):
Congestion............... $ 0.056
Accidents................ $ 0.024
Noise.................... $ 0.001
------------------------------------------
Total External Costs. $ 0.081
External Costs from
Additional Light Truck Use
($/vehicle-mile):
Congestion............... $0.050
Accidents................ $0.027
Noise.................... $0.001
------------------------------------------
Total External Costs. $0.078
Discount Rates Applied to 3%, 7%
Future Benefits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Costs of Fuel Economy-Improving Technologies
Building on cost estimates developed for the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE and
GHG final rule and the 2010 TAR, the agencies incorporated new cost
estimates in the NPRM for the new technologies considered for the
proposal and for some of the technologies carried over from the MYs
2012-2016 final rule and 2010 TAR. This joint work is described in
Chapter 3 of the joint TSD and in Section II of this preamble, as
summarized below. For more detailed information on cost of fuel-saving
technologies, please refer to Chapter 3 of the joint TSD and Chapter V
of NHTSA's FRIA.
The technology cost estimates used in this analysis are intended to
represent manufacturers' direct costs for high-volume production of
vehicles with these technologies. NHTSA explicitly accounts for the
cost reductions a manufacturer might realize through learning achieved
from experience in actually applying a technology, which means that
technologies become cheaper over the rulemaking time frame; learning
effects are described above and in Chapter 3 of the joint TSD and
Chapters V and VII of NHTSA's FRIA. NHTSA notes that, in developing
technology cost estimates, the agencies have made every effort to hold
constant aspects of vehicle performance and utility typically valued by
consumers, such as horsepower, carrying capacity, drivability,
durability, noise, vibration and harshness (NVH) and towing and hauling
capacity. For example, NHTSA includes in its analysis technology cost
estimates that are specific to performance passenger cars (i.e., sports
cars), as compared to conventional passenger cars, and its cost
estimates for improving the fuel economy of performance cars are higher
than those for other models because of the additional costs necessary
to maintain the performance levels their buyers expect. NHTSA sought
comment in the NPRM on the extent to which commenters believe that the
agencies have been successful in holding constant these elements of
vehicle performance and utility in developing the technology cost
estimates. Few commenters addressed this issue, but comments regarding
the agencies' cost estimates and the agency's response are presented in
Section IV.C.2 above. Additionally, the agency notes that the
technology costs included in this proposal take into account only those
associated with the initial build of the vehicle, although comments
were received to the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking that suggested there
could be additional maintenance required with some new technologies
(e.g., turbocharging, hybrids, etc.), and that additional maintenance
costs could occur as a result. The agency also sought comments on this
topic in the NPRM and stated that it would undertake a more detailed
review of these potential costs for the final rule. NHTSA did, in fact,
receive comments regarding costs of ownership, and incorporated certain
additional maintenance costs in the final rule analysis. More
discussion of this topic is available in Section IV.C.2 above and in
Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA.
Additionally, NHTSA recognizes that manufacturers' actual costs for
employing these technologies include additional outlays for
accompanying design or engineering changes to models that use them,
development and testing of prototype versions, recalibrating engine
operating parameters, and integrating the technology with other
attributes of the vehicle. Manufacturers' indirect costs for employing
these technologies also include expenses for product development and
integration, modifying assembly processes and training assembly workers
to install them, increased expenses for operation and maintaining
assembly lines, higher initial warranty costs for new technologies, any
added expenses for selling and distributing vehicles that use these
technologies, and manufacturer and dealer profit. These indirect costs
have been accounted for in this rulemaking through use of ICMs, which
have been revised for this rulemaking as discussed above, in Chapter 3
of the joint TSD, and in Chapters V and VII of NHTSA's FRIA. NHTSA also
sought and received comments to the NPRM on the use of ICMs; those
comments and the agency's response are presented above in Section
IV.C.2 and in Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA.
b. Potential Opportunity Costs of Improved Fuel Economy
An important concern is whether achieving the fuel economy
improvements required by the final CAFE standards will require
manufacturers to modify the performance, carrying capacity, safety, or
comfort of some vehicle models. To the extent that compliance with the
standards requires such modifications, the resulting sacrifice in the
value of those models represents an additional cost of achieving the
required improvements in fuel economy. (This possibility is addressed
in detail in Section IV.G.6.) Although exact dollar values that
potential buyers attach to specific vehicle attributes are difficult to
infer, differences in vehicle purchase prices and buyers' choices among
competing models that feature varying
[[Page 62988]]
combinations of these characteristics clearly demonstrate that changes
in these attributes affect the utility and economic value they offer to
potential buyers.\995\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\995\ See, e.g., Kleit A.N., 1990. ``The Effect of Annual
Changes in Automobile Fuel Economy Standards.'' Journal of
Regulatory Economics 2: 151-172 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472-0015);
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes, 1995. ``Automobile
Prices in Market Equilibrium,'' Econometrica 63(4): 841-940 (Docket
NHTSA-2009-0059-0031); McCarthy, Patrick S., 1996. ``Market Price
and Income Elasticities of New Vehicle Demands'', Review of
Economics and Statistics 78: 543-547.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA and EPA approached this potential problem by developing cost
estimates for fuel economy-improving technologies that are intended to
include any additional manufacturing costs that would be necessary to
maintain the originally planned levels of performance, comfort,
carrying capacity, and safety of any light-duty vehicle model to which
those technologies are applied. In doing so, the agencies followed the
precedent established by the 2002 NAS Report, which estimated
``constant performance and utility'' costs for fuel economy
technologies. NHTSA has followed this precedent in its efforts to
refine the technology costs it uses to analyze alternative passenger
car and light truck CAFE standards for MYs 2017-2025. Although the
agency has reduced its estimates of manufacturers' costs for most
technologies for use in this rulemaking, these revised estimates are
still intended to represent costs that would allow manufacturers to
maintain the performance, carrying capacity, and utility of vehicle
models while improving their fuel economy.
As NHTSA stated in the NPRM, while we believe that our cost
estimates for fuel economy-improving technologies include adequate
provisions for accompanying costs that are necessary to prevent any
degradation in other vehicle attributes, it is possible that they do
not include adequate allowance to prevent sacrifices in these
attributes on all vehicle models. If this is the case, the true
economic costs of achieving higher fuel economy should include the
opportunity costs to vehicle owners of any accompanying reductions in
vehicles' performance, carrying capacity, and utility, and omitting
these will cause the agency's estimated technology costs to
underestimate the true economic costs of improving fuel economy.
It would be desirable to estimate explicitly the changes in vehicle
buyers' welfare from the combination of higher prices for new vehicle
models, increases in their fuel economy, and any accompanying changes
in other vehicle attributes. The net change in buyer's welfare that
results from the combination of these changes would provide a more
accurate estimate of the true economic costs for improving fuel
economy. The agency is in the process of developing an empirical model
of potential vehicle buyers' decisions about whether to purchase a new
car or light truck and their choices among available vehicle models,
which will eventually allow it to conduct such an analysis. This
process was not completed on a schedule that allowed it to be used in
analyzing final CAFE standards for this rulemaking, as discussed in
Section IV.C.4 below, but Section IV.G.6 below includes a detailed
analysis and discussion of how omitting possible changes in vehicle
attributes other than their prices and fuel economy might affect its
estimates of benefits and costs resulting from the final standards.
c. The On-Road Fuel Economy ``Gap''
Actual fuel economy levels achieved by light-duty vehicles in on-
road driving fall somewhat short of their levels measured under the
laboratory-like test conditions used by EPA to establish its published
fuel economy ratings for different models. In analyzing the fuel
savings from alternative CAFE standards, NHTSA has previously adjusted
the actual fuel economy performance of each light truck model downward
from its rated value to reflect the expected size of this on-road fuel
economy ``gap.'' On December 27, 2006, EPA adopted changes to its
regulations on fuel economy labeling, which were intended to bring
vehicles' rated fuel economy levels closer to their actual on-road fuel
economy levels.\996\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\996\ 71 FR 77871 (Dec. 27, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In that final rule, however, EPA acknowledged that actual on-road
fuel economy for light-duty vehicles averages approximately 20 percent
lower than published fuel economy levels, somewhat larger than the 15
percent shortfall it had previously assumed. For example, if the
overall EPA fuel economy rating of a light truck is 20 mpg, EPA
estimated that the on-road fuel economy actually achieved by a typical
driver of that vehicle is expected to be only 80 percent of that
figure, or 16 mpg (20*.80). NHTSA employed EPA's revised estimate of
this on-road fuel economy gap in its analysis of the fuel savings
resulting from alternative CAFE standards evaluated in the MY 2011
final rule.
In the course of developing its CAFE standards for MY 2012-16,
NHTSA conducted additional analysis of this issue. The agency combined
data on the number of passenger cars and light trucks of each model
year that were registered for use during calendar years 2000 through
2006, average rated fuel economy for passenger cars and light trucks
produced during each model year, and estimates of average miles driven
per year by cars and light trucks of different ages. It used these data
to develop estimates of the average fuel economy that the U.S. light-
duty vehicle fleet would have achieved from 2000 through 2006 if cars
and light trucks of each model year achieved the same fuel economy
levels in actual on-road driving as they did under test conditions when
new.
Table IV-10 compares NHTSA's estimates of fleet-wide average fuel
economy under test conditions for 2000 through 2006 to the Federal
Highway Administration's (FHWA) published estimates of actual on-road
fuel economy achieved by passenger cars and light trucks during each of
those years.\997\ As it shows, FHWA's estimates of actual fuel economy
for passenger cars ranged from 21-23 percent lower than NHTSA's
estimates of its fleet-wide average value under test conditions over
this period, and FHWA's estimates of actual fuel economy for light
trucks ranged from 16-18 percent lower than NHTSA's estimates of its
fleet-wide average value under test conditions. Thus, NHTSA concluded
in the NPRM that these results appear to confirm that the 20 percent
on-road fuel economy gap represents a reasonable estimate for use in
evaluating the fuel savings likely to result from more stringent fuel
economy and CO2 standards in MYs 2017-2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\997\ Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, 2000
through 2006 editions, Table VM-1; See http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohpi/hss/hsspubs.cfm (last accessed March 1, 2010).
[[Page 62989]]
Table IV-10--NHTSA Estimated Fleet-Wide Fuel Economy of Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Compared to Reported
Fuel Economy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars Light trucks
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year NHTSA FHWA Percent NHTSA FHWA Percent
estimated reported difference estimated reported difference
test MPG actual MPG (%) test MPG actual MPG (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000.............................. 28.2 21.9 -22.2 20.8 17.4 -16.3
2001.............................. 28.2 22.1 -21.7 20.8 17.6 -15.5
2002.............................. 28.3 22.0 -22.3 20.9 17.5 -16.2
2003.............................. 28.4 22.2 -21.9 21.0 17.2 -18.0
2004.............................. 28.5 22.5 -21.1 21.0 17.2 -18.3
2005.............................. 28.6 22.1 -22.8 21.1 17.7 -16.3
2006.............................. 28.8 22.5 -21.8 21.2 17.8 -16.2
Avg., 2000-2006................... 28.4 22.2 -22.0 21.0 17.5 -16.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The comparisons reported in this table must be interpreted with
some caution, however, because the estimates of annual car and truck
use used to develop these estimates are submitted to FHWA by individual
states, which use differing definitions of passenger cars and light
trucks. (For example, some states classify minivans as cars, while
others define them as light trucks.) At the same time, while total
gasoline consumption can be reasonably estimated from excise tax
receipts, separate estimates of gasoline consumption by cars and trucks
are not available. For these reasons, NHTSA has chosen not to rely on
its separate estimates of the on-road fuel economy gap for cars and
light trucks. However, the agency stated in the NPRM that we do believe
that these results confirm that the 20 percent on-road fuel economy
discount represents a reasonable estimate for use in evaluating the
fuel savings likely to result from CAFE standards for both cars and
light trucks. NHTSA employed this value for vehicles operating on
liquid fuels (gasoline, diesel, and gasoline/alcohol blends), and used
it to analyze the impacts of proposed CAFE standards for model years
2017-25 on the use of these fuels.
In the 2010 TAR, EPA and NHTSA assumed that the overall energy
shortfall for the vehicles employing electric drivetrains, including
plug-in hybrid and battery-powered electric vehicles, is 30 percent.
This value was derived from the agencies' engineering judgment based on
the limited available information. During the stakeholder meetings
conducted prior to the technical assessment, confidential business
information (CBI) was supplied by several manufacturers which indicated
that electrically powered vehicles had greater variability in their on-
road energy consumption than vehicles powered by internal combustion
engines, although other manufacturers suggested that the on-road/
laboratory differential attributable to electric operation should
approach that of liquid fuel operation in the future. Second, data from
EPA's 2006 analysis of the ``five cycle'' fuel economy label as part of
the rulemaking discussed above supported a larger on-road shortfall for
vehicles with hybrid-electric drivetrains, partly because real-world
driving tends to have higher acceleration/deceleration rates than are
employed on the 2-cycle test. This diminishes the fuel economy benefits
of regenerative braking, which can result in a higher test fuel economy
for hybrids than is achieved under normal on-road conditions.\998\
Finally, heavy accessory load, extremely high or low temperatures, and
aggressive driving have deleterious impacts of unknown magnitudes on
battery performance. Consequently, the agencies judged that 30 percent
was a reasonable estimate for use in the TAR, and NHTSA believes that
it continues to represent the most reliable estimate for use in the
current analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\998\ EPA, Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicles: Revisions To
Improve Calculation of Fuel Economy Estimates; final rule, 40 CFR
Parts 86 and 600, 71 FR 77872, 77879 (Dec. 27, 2006). Available at
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-AIR/2006/December/Day-27/a9749.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the most significant factors responsible for the difference
between test and on-road fuel economy is the use of air conditioning.
While the air conditioner is turned off during the FTP and HFET tests,
drivers often use air conditioning under warm, humid conditions. The
air conditioning compressor can also be engaged during ``defrost''
operation of the heating system.\999\ In the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking,
EPA estimated the impact of an air conditioning system at approximately
14.3 grams CO2/mile for an average vehicle without any of
the improved air conditioning technologies discussed in that
rulemaking. For a 27 mpg (330 g CO2/mile) vehicle, this
would account for is approximately 20 percent of the total estimated
on-road gap (or about 4 percent of total fuel consumption).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\999\ EPA, Final Technical Support Document: Fuel Economy
Labeling of Motor Vehicle Revisions to Improve Calculation of Fuel
Economy Estimates, at 70. Office of Transportation and Air Quality
EPA420-R-06-017 December 2006, Chapter II, http://www.epa.gov/fueleconomy/420r06017.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the MY 2012-2016 rule, EPA estimated that 85 percent of MY 2016
vehicles would reduce their tailpipe CO2 emissions
attributable to air conditioner efficiency by 40 percent through the
use of advanced air conditioning technologies, and that incorporating
this change would reduce the average on-road gap by about 2
percent.\1000\ However, air conditioning-related fuel consumption does
not decrease proportionally as engine efficiency improves, because the
engine load due attributable to air conditioner operation is
approximately constant across engine efficiency and technology. As a
consequence, air conditioning operation represents an increasing
percentage of vehicular fuel consumption as engine efficiency
increases.\1001\ Because these two effects are expected approximately
to counterbalance each other, NHTSA elected not to adjust its estimate
of the on-road gap for use in the analysis for the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1000\ 4% of the on-road gap x 40% reduction in air conditioning
fuel consumption x 85% of the fleet = ~2%.
\1001\ As an example, the air conditioning load of 14.3 g/mile
of CO2 is a smaller percentage (4.3%) of 330 g/mile than 260 (5.4%).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA received only two comments to the NPRM regarding the on-road
fuel economy gap. The Sierra Club commented that the agencies had
pledged in the final rule establishing the MYs 2012-2016 standards to
address the disparity between the standards and on-road mileage, but
that given the timing of this rulemaking for MYs 2017-
[[Page 62990]]
2205, had not done so.\1002\ The Sierra Club stated that the disparity
is further impacted by the inclusion of fuel economy improvements for
A/C efficiency and off-cycle technologies in CAFE compliance.\1003\ The
Sierra Club suggested that CAFE testing be reformed to reduce this
disparity, but did not suggest revisions to the on-road fuel economy
gap.\1004\ The U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars suggested that
the on-road gap used in the proposal was overly conservative, and that
advanced technology vehicles may have on-road gaps larger than 20
percent.\1005\ The agencies recognize this potential issue--future
changes in driver behavior or vehicle technology may change the on-road
gap. As an example, while some technologies such as electrification may
increase the on-road gap, other off-cycle technologies such as tire
pressure management systems, air conditioning improvements and
aerodynamic improvements may decrease it. The agencies will continue to
compare monitor the EPA fuel economy ratings for new vehicle models to
other sources of data on their actual on-road fuel economy as these
vehicles are incorporated into the fleet, in an effort to improve and
update their estimate of the on-road gap. For purposes of evaluating
this final rule, however, both NHTSA and EPA will continue to use the
estimate of the on-road gap they employed in evaluating the proposed
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1002\ Sierra Club et al., Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0053, at
9.
\1003\ Id.
\1004\ Id. at 9-10.
\1005\ U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars, Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0131-0246, at 11-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving Fuel
Future fuel prices are the single most important input into the
economic analysis of the benefits of alternative CAFE standards because
they determine the value of future fuel savings, which account for
approximately 90 percent of the total economic benefits from requiring
higher fuel economy. NHTSA relies on the most recent fuel price
projections from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA)
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) to estimate the economic value of fuel
savings projected to result from alternative CAFE standards: in the
NPRM, the most recent edition of this publication was the AEO 2011
Reference Case, while for the final rule, this is the AEO 2012 Early
Release Reference Case. Although EIA released the final version of AEO
2012 prior to the publication of this final rule, as of the time by
which the analysis had to be completed, the AEO 2012 Early Release
Reference Case projections of gasoline and diesel fuel prices
represented EIA's most up-to-date estimate of the most likely course of
future prices for petroleum products. EIA is widely recognized as an
impartial and authoritative source of analysis and forecasts of U.S.
energy production, consumption, and prices, and its forecasts are
widely relied upon by federal agencies for use in regulatory analysis
and for other purposes. Its forecasts are derived using EIA's National
Energy Modeling System (NEMS), which includes detailed representations
of supply pathways, sources of demand, and their interaction to
determine prices for different forms of energy.
As compared to the gasoline prices used in the NPRM, the AEO 2012
Early Release Reference Case fuel prices are slightly higher through
the year 2020, but slightly lower for most years thereafter. Expressed
in constant 2010 dollars, the AEO 2012 Early Release Reference Case
forecast of retail gasoline prices (which include federal, state, and
local taxes) during 2017 is $3.62 per gallon, rising gradually to $4.08
by the year 2035. However, valuing fuel savings over the full lifetimes
of passenger cars and light trucks affected by the standards proposed
for MYs 2017-25 requires fuel price forecasts that extend through 2060,
approximately the last year during which a significant number of MY
2025 vehicles will remain in service.\1006\ To obtain fuel price
forecasts for the years 2036 through 2060, the agency assumes that
retail fuel prices will continue to increase after 2035 at the average
annual rate (0.8%) projected for 2017-2035 in the AEO 2012 Early
Release Reference Case. This assumption results in a projected retail
price of gasoline that reaches $4.94 in 2050. Over the entire period
from 2017-2050, retail gasoline prices are projected to average $4.13,
as Table IV-9 reported previously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1006\ The agency defines the maximum lifetime of vehicles as
the highest age at which more than 2 percent of those originally
produced during a model year remain in service. In the case of light
trucks, for example, this age has typically been 36 years for recent
model years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The value of fuel savings resulting from improved fuel economy to
buyers of light-duty vehicles is determined by the retail price of
fuel, which includes Federal, State, and any local taxes imposed on
fuel sales. Because fuel taxes represent transfers of resources from
fuel buyers to government agencies, however, rather than real resources
that are consumed in the process of supplying or using fuel, NHTSA
deducts their value from retail fuel prices to determine the real
economic value of fuel savings resulting from more stringent CAFE
standards to the U.S. economy.
NHTSA follows the assumptions used by EIA in AEO 2012 Early Release
that State and local gasoline taxes will keep pace with inflation in
nominal terms, and thus remain constant when expressed in constant
dollars. In contrast, EIA assumes that Federal gasoline taxes will
remain unchanged in nominal terms, and thus decline throughout the
forecast period when expressed in constant dollars. These differing
assumptions about the likely future behavior of Federal and State/local
fuel taxes are consistent with recent historical experience, which
reflects the fact that Federal as well as most State motor fuel taxes
are specified on a cents-per-gallon rather than an ad valorem basis,
and typically require legislation to change. Subtracting fuel taxes
from the retail prices forecast in AEO 2012 results in projected values
for saving gasoline of $3.22 per gallon during 2017, rising to $3.73
per gallon by the year 2035, and to $4.61 by the year 2050. Over this
entire period, pre-tax gasoline prices are projected to average $3.77
per gallon.
EIA also includes forecasts reflecting high and low global oil
prices in each year's complete AEO, which reflect uncertainties
regarding OPEC behavior as well as future levels of oil production and
demand. However, the Early Release versions of AEO, including the AEO
2012 Early Release relied upon by NHTSA for this analysis, does not
include alternative forecasts reflecting high and low global oil price
scenarios. In their absence, NHTSA constructed high and low fuel price
forecasts that were consistent with the Reference Case forecast of fuel
prices from the AEO 2012 Early Release, as well as with the
relationship of the high and low fuel price forecasts to the Reference
Case forecast in AEO 2011. These alternative scenarios project retail
gasoline prices that range from a low of $2.46 to a high of $4.90 per
gallon during 2020, and from $2.53 to $5.12 per gallon during 2035 (all
figures in 2010 dollars). In conjunction with our assumption that fuel
taxes will remain constant in real or inflation-adjusted terms over
this period, these forecasts imply pre-tax values of saving fuel
ranging from $2.07 to $4.51 per gallon during 2020, and from $2.18 to
$4.77 per gallon in 2035 (again, all figures are in constant 2010
dollars). In conducting the analysis of uncertainty in benefits and
costs from
[[Page 62991]]
alternative CAFE standards required by OMB, NHTSA evaluated the
sensitivity of its benefits estimates to these alternative forecasts of
future fuel prices; detailed results and discussion of this sensitivity
analysis can be found in Chapter X of NHTSA's FRIA. Generally, this
analysis confirms that the primary economic benefit resulting from the
rule--the value of fuel savings--is extremely sensitive to alternative
forecasts of future fuel prices.
Many environmental and consumer group commenters argued that the
fuel price estimates employed in the NPRM were too low. Consumers Union
\1007\ and UCS \1008\ stated that EIA consistently underestimates
future gasoline prices. NRDC,\1009\ CFA,\1010\ and Sierra Club \1011\
also commented that AEO 2011 fuel price estimates were too low; UCS
suggested that the agencies use the AEO 2012 Early Release estimates
for the final rule because they were higher, and requested that the
agencies try to account for gasoline price spikes in the fuel cost
estimates.\1012\ UCS \1013\ and EDF\1014\ commented that the agencies
should conduct sensitivity analysis using AEO's High Price Case.
Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Protection suggested that
the agencies' analysis should include the additional cost of the higher
octane gasoline that would be required as a result of the
standards.\1015\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1007\ Consumers Union attachment, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
0799-9454, at 1-2.
\1008\ UCS, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, at 7.
\1009\ NRDC, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472, at 3.
\1010\ CFA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419., at 15.
\1011\ Sierra Club et al., Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0068, at
10.
\1012\ UCS, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, at 7, 14.
\1013\ Id. at 7.
\1014\ EDF, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0302, at 9.
\1015\ PA DEP, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In keeping with its usual practice of employing fuel price
forecasts from the most recently published version of AEO, NHTSA has
elected to use the Reference Case fuel price forecast from the AEO 2012
Early Release in its analysis of benefits form this final rule. As
suggested by some commenters, NHTSA has also conducted sensitivity
analyses using the high and low fuel price forecasts it constructed to
be consistent with the AEO 2012 Early Release Reference Case forecast,
although the agency notes that this is also its usual practice. The
agency accounts separately for the economic costs associated with the
potential for rapid increases in fuel prices (``price spikes'') or
interruptions in the supply of petroleum products as part of the
macroeconomic disruption costs of U.S. petroleum imports; these costs
are discussed in Section IV.C.3.k.ii.
e. Consumer Valuation of Fuel Economy and Payback Period
The agency uses slightly different assumptions about the length of
time over which potential vehicle buyers consider fuel savings from
higher fuel economy, and about how they discount those future fuel
savings, in different aspects of its analysis. For most purposes, the
agency assumes that buyers value fuel savings over the first five years
of a new vehicle's lifetime; the five-year figure represents
approximately the current average term of consumer loans to finance the
purchase of new vehicles.
To simulate manufacturers' assessment of the net change in the
value of an individual vehicle model to prospective buyers from
improving its fuel economy, NHTSA discounts fuel savings over the first
five years of its lifetime using a 7 percent rate. The resulting value
is deducted from the technology costs that would be incurred by its
manufacturer to improve that model's fuel economy, in order to
determine the change in its value to potential buyers. Since this is
also the amount by which its manufacturer could expect to change that
model's selling price, this difference can also be viewed as the
``effective cost'' of the improvement from its manufacturers'
perspective. The CAFE model uses these estimates of effective costs to
identify the sequence in which manufacturers are likely to select
individual models for improvements in fuel economy, as well as to
identify the most cost-effective technologies for doing so.
The effective cost to its manufacturer for increasing the fuel
economy of a model also represents the change in its value from the
perspective of potential buyers. Under the assumption that
manufacturers change the selling price of each model by this amount,
the effective cost of improving its fuel economy also represents the
average change in its net or effective price to would-be buyers. As
part of our sensitivity case analyzing the potential for manufacturers
to over-comply with CAFE standards--that is, to produce a lineup of
vehicle models whose sales-weighted average fuel economy exceeds that
required by prevailing standards--NHTSA used the extreme assumption
that potential buyers value fuel savings only during the first year
they expect to own a new vehicle. This assumption produces an extremely
conservative estimate of the extent to which manufacturers are likely
to over-comply with the prevailing CAFE standard.
Several commenters addressed the issue of payback periods. EDF
commented that the payback period should be 5 years or greater, in
order to ``accurately reflect the current and forecasted buying trends
of consumers,'' including increases in the average length of ownership
of new vehicles since the 2008 recession.\1016\ EDF argued that as a
result, ``the period of time that potential vehicle buyers can be
assumed to value fuel economy improvements in making their purchasing
decisions may also be increasing.'' \1017\ The Sierra Club also
supported the use of a 5 year payback period, noting increasing
consumer interest in fuel economy.\1018\ NADA and VW commented that the
real-life payback period for consumer decisions was likely shorter.
NADA commented that the payback period should be ``at most'' 5 years,
suggesting that even if consumers value fuel economy, they will still
be in a hurry to recoup their costs.\1019\ VW commented that while the
agencies had estimated that the average consumer would recoup his
higher purchase price in ``just less than 4 years,'' the payback period
``for a consumer purchasing a passenger car will be longer than a
consumer purchasing a light truck,'' and suggested that consumers would
likely choose vehicles with shorter payback periods.\1020\ NADA also
suggested that the agencies' approach in the NPRM to estimating the
payback period was too simplistic, and requested that the agencies
account for ``real-world finance, opportunity, and additional
maintenance costs'' in that estimate for the final rule.\1021\ ICCT
commented that David Greene had found in 2010 that using reasonable
estimates of the uncertainty in in-use fuel economy, future fuel
prices, annual vehicle use, vehicle lifetime, and incremental vehicle
price yielded an average customer payback period of roughly 3
years.\1022\ In the context of the
[[Page 62992]]
sensitivity analysis looking at market-driven overcompliance, however,
a number of environmental and consumer groups argued that the agency
should not assume any such overcompliance. These comments will be
summarized and addressed in Section IV.G below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1016\ EDF, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0302, at 9.
\1017\ Id.
\1018\ Sierra Club et al., Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0068, at
3.
\1019\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 10.
\1020\ VW, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0247, at 12.
\1021\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 10.
\1022\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After considering these comments, the agency has elected to retain
the five-year payback period for use in most aspects of its analysis.
In addition, NHTSA has elected to include increases in financing,
insurance, and other components of the cost of vehicle ownership that
would be expected to increase in proportion to increases in vehicle
purchase prices in its analysis of the rule's impacts on individual
buyers, as well as in its analysis of potential changes in total sales
of new vehicles.
The agency notes that these varying assumptions about future time
horizons and discount rates for valuing fuel savings are used only to
analyze manufacturers' responses to requiring higher fuel economy and
buyers' behavior in response to manufacturers' compliance strategies.
When estimating the aggregate value to the U.S. economy of fuel savings
resulting from alternative increases in CAFE standards--or the
``social'' value of fuel savings--the agency includes fuel savings over
the entire expected lifetimes of vehicles that would be subject to
higher standards, rather than over the shorter periods we assume
manufacturers employ to represent the preferences of vehicle buyers, or
that buyers are assumed to employ when assessing changes in the net
price of purchasing and owning new vehicles. Valuing fuel savings over
vehicles' entire lifetimes recognizes the savings in fuel costs that
subsequent owners of vehicles will experience from higher fuel economy,
even if their initial purchasers do not expect to recover the remaining
value of fuel savings when they re-sell those vehicles, or for other
reasons do not value fuel savings beyond the assumed five-year time
horizon.
The procedure the agency uses for calculating lifetime fuel savings
is discussed in detail in the following section, while a more detailed
analysis of the time horizon over which potential buyers may consider
fuel savings in their vehicle purchasing decisions is provided in
Section IV.G.6 below.
f. Vehicle Survival and Use Assumptions
NHTSA's analysis of fuel savings and related benefits from adopting
more stringent fuel economy standards for MYs 2017-2025 passenger cars
and light trucks begins by estimating the resulting changes in fuel use
over the entire lifetimes of the affected vehicles. The change in total
fuel consumption by vehicles produced during each model year is
calculated as the difference between their total fuel use over their
lifetimes with a higher CAFE standard in effect, and their total
lifetime fuel consumption under a baseline in which CAFE standards
remained at their MY 2016 levels. The first step in estimating lifetime
fuel consumption by vehicles of each model year is to calculate the
number of vehicles originally produced during that model year that are
expected to remain in service during each subsequent year.\1023\ This
is calculated by multiplying the number of vehicles originally produced
during a model year by the proportion typically expected to remain in
service at their age during each later year, often referred to as a
``survival rate.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1023\ Vehicles are defined to be of age 1 during the calendar
year corresponding to the model year in which they are produced;
thus for example, model year 2000 vehicles are considered to be of
age 1 during calendar year 2000, age 2 during calendar year 2001,
and to reach their maximum age of 26 years during calendar year
2025. NHTSA considers the maximum lifetime of vehicles to be the age
after which less than 2 percent of the vehicles originally produced
during a model year remain in service. Applying these conventions to
vehicle registration data indicates that passenger cars have a
maximum age of 26 years, while light trucks have a maximum lifetime
of 36 years. See Lu, S., NHTSA, Regulatory Analysis and Evaluation
Division, ``Vehicle Survivability and Travel Mileage Schedules,''
DOT HS 809 952, 8-11 (January 2006). Available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809952.pdf (last accessed Jul. 9, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in more detail in Section II.B.3 and in Chapter 1 of
the TSD, to estimate production volumes of passenger cars and light
trucks for individual manufacturers, NHTSA relied on a baseline market
forecast constructed by EPA staff beginning with MY 2008 CAFE
certification data. After constructing a MY 2008 baseline, EPA and
NHTSA used projected car and truck volumes for this period from Energy
Information Administration's (EIA's) Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2011
in the NPRM analysis.\1024\ However, Annual Energy Outlook forecasts
only total car and light truck sales, rather than sales at the
manufacturer and model-specific level, which the agencies require in
order to estimate the effects new standards will have on individual
manufacturers.\1025\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1024\ Available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/index.cfm
(last accessed Sept. 26, 2011). NHTSA and EPA made the simplifying
assumption that projected sales of cars and light trucks during each
calendar year from 2012 through 2016 represented the likely
production volumes for the corresponding model year. The agency did
not attempt to establish the exact correspondence between projected
sales during individual calendar years and production volumes for
specific model years.
\1025\ Because AEO 2011's ``car'' and ``truck'' classes did not
reflect NHTSA's recent reclassification (in March 2009 for
enforcement beginning MY 2011) of many two wheel drive SUVs from the
non-passenger (i.e., light truck) fleet to the passenger car fleet,
EPA staff made adjustments to account for such vehicles in the
baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To estimate sales of individual car and light truck models produced
by each manufacturer, EPA purchased data from CSM Worldwide (for the MY
2008-based market forecast) and LMC (for the MY 2010-based fleet) and
used these firms' projections of the number of vehicles of each type
(car or truck) that will be produced and sold by manufacturers in model
years 2011 through 2025.\1026\ This provided year-by-year estimates of
the percentage of cars and trucks sold by each manufacturer, as well as
the sales percentages accounted for by each vehicle market segment.
(The distributions of car and truck sales by manufacturer and by market
segment for the 2016 model year and beyond were assumed to be the same
as CSM's and LMC's forecasts for the 2025 calendar year.) Normalizing
these percentages to the total car and light truck sales volumes
projected for 2017 through 2025 in AEO 2011 (for the MY 2008-based
market forecast) and AEO 2012 (for the MY 2010-based market forecast)
provided manufacturer-specific market share and model-specific sales
estimates for those model years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1026\ EPA also considered other sources of similar information,
such as J.D. Powers, and concluded that CSM and LMC were better able
to provide forecasts at the requisite level of detail for most of
the model years of interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To estimate the number of passenger cars and light trucks
originally produced during model years 2017 through 2025 that will
remain in use during subsequent years, the agency applied age-specific
survival rates for cars and light trucks to its forecasts of passenger
car and light truck sales for each of those model years. For use in
this final rule, NHTSA updated its previous estimates of car and light
truck survival rates using registration data for vehicles produced for
model years through 2010 from R.L. Polk, Inc, in order to ensure that
they reflected recent increases in the durability and expected life
spans of cars and light trucks. However, the agency does not attempt to
forecast changes in those survival rates over the future.
The next step in estimating fuel use is to calculate the total
number of miles that cars and light trucks will be driven each year
they remain in use. To estimate the total number of miles vehicles
produced in a model year are
[[Page 62993]]
driven during each year of their lifetimes, the number projected to
remain in use during that year is multiplied by the average number of
miles vehicles are projected to be driven at the age they will have
reached in that year. The agency estimated annual usage of household
vehicles during 2008 using data from the Federal Highway
Administration's 2009 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS), together
with data on the use of fleet cars and light trucks from the Annual
Energy Outlook for that same year.\1027\ Because these estimates
reflect the gasoline prices that prevailed at the time, however, NHTSA
adjusted them to account for the effect on vehicle use of the higher
fuel prices projected over the lifetimes of model year 2017-25 cars and
light trucks. Details of this adjustment are provided in Chapter VIII
of the FRIA and Chapter 4 of the Joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1027\ For a description of the Survey, see http://nhts.ornl.gov/introduction.shtml (last accessed Aug. 5, 2012).
Because much of the survey was conducted during 2008, it was used to
develop estimates of vehicle use for that year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The estimates of annual miles driven by vehicles of different
vehicle ages during 2008 were also adjusted to reflect projected future
growth in average use of vehicles over their entire lifetimes.
Increases in average annual use of cars and light trucks, which have
averaged approximately 1 percent annually over the past two decades,
have been an important source of historical growth in the total number
of miles they are driven each year. To estimate future growth in their
average annual use for purposes of this rulemaking, NHTSA calculated
the rate of growth in the adjusted mileage schedules derived for 2008
that would be necessary for total car and light truck travel to
increase at the rate forecast in the AEO 2012 Early release Reference
Case.\1028\ This rate was calculated to be consistent with future
changes in the overall size and age distributions of the U.S. passenger
car and light truck fleets that result from the agency's forecasts of
total car and light truck sales, and with the updated survival rates
described above. The resulting growth rate in average annual car and
light truck use is approximately 0.6 percent from 2017 through 2060.
While the adjustment for forecast fuel prices reduces average annual
mileage in most future years from the values derived for 2008, the
adjustment for expected future growth in average vehicle use increases
it. The net effect of these two adjustments is to increase expected
lifetime mileage for MY 2017-25 passenger cars and light trucks by
about 13 percent from the estimates originally derived for 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1028\ This approach differs from that used in the MY 2011 final
rule, where it was assumed that future growth in the total number of
cars and light trucks in use resulting from projected sales of new
vehicles was adequate by itself to account for growth in total
vehicle use, without assuming continuing growth in average vehicle
use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the agency estimates total fuel consumption by passenger
cars and light trucks remaining in use each year by dividing the total
number of miles surviving vehicles are driven by the fuel economy they
are expected to achieve under each alternative CAFE standard. Each
model year's total lifetime fuel consumption is the sum of fuel use by
the cars or light trucks produced during that model year over their
life span. In turn, the savings in lifetime fuel use by cars or light
trucks produced during each model year affected by this proposed rule
that will result from each alternative CAFE standard is the difference
between its lifetime fuel use at the fuel economy level it attains
under the Baseline alternative, and its lifetime fuel use at the higher
fuel economy level it is projected to achieve under that alternative
standard.\1029\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1029\ To illustrate these calculations, the agency's adjustment
of the AEO 2009 Revised Reference Case forecast indicates that 9.26
million passenger cars will be produced during 2012, and the
agency's updated survival rates show that 83 percent of these
vehicles, or 7.64 million, are projected to remain in service during
the year 2022, when they will have reached an age of 10 years. At
that age, passenger cars achieving the fuel economy level they are
projected to achieve under the Baseline alternative are driven an
average of about 800 miles, so surviving model year 2012 passenger
cars will be driven a total of 82.5 billion miles (= 7.64 million
surviving vehicles x 10,800 miles per vehicle) during 2022. Summing
the results of similar calculations for each year of their 26-year
maximum lifetime, model year 2012 passenger cars will be driven a
total of 1,395 billion miles under the Baseline alternative. Under
that alternative, they are projected to achieve a test fuel economy
level of 32.4 mpg, which corresponds to actual on-road fuel economy
of 25.9 mpg (= 32.4 mpg x 80 percent). Thus their lifetime fuel use
under the Baseline alternative is projected to be 53.9 billion
gallons (= 1,395 billion miles divided by 25.9 miles per gallon).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Accounting for the Fuel Economy Rebound Effect
The fuel economy rebound effect refers to the fact that some of the
fuel savings expected to result from higher fuel economy, including
increases in fuel economy required by the adoption of higher CAFE
standards, may be offset by additional vehicle use. The increase in
vehicle use occurs because higher fuel economy reduces the fuel cost of
driving, which is typically the largest single component of the
monetary cost of operating a vehicle, and vehicle owners respond to
this reduction in operating costs by driving more. Even with higher
fuel economy, this additional driving consumes some fuel, so this
effect reduces the fuel savings that result when raising CAFE standards
requires manufacturers to improve fuel economy. The rebound effect
refers to the fraction of fuel savings expected to result from
increased fuel economy that is offset by additional driving.\1030\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1030\ Formally, the rebound effect is often expressed as the
elasticity of vehicle use with respect to the cost per mile driven.
Additionally, it is consistently expressed as a positive percentage
(rather than as a negative decimal fraction, as this elasticity is
normally expressed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The magnitude of the rebound effect is an important determinant of
the actual fuel savings that are likely to result from adopting
stricter CAFE standards. Research on the magnitude of the rebound
effect in light-duty vehicle use dates to the early 1980s, and
generally concludes that a significant rebound effect occurs when
vehicle fuel efficiency improves.\1031\ The most common approach to
estimating its magnitude has been to analyze survey data on household
vehicle use, fuel consumption, fuel prices, household characteristics,
and vehicle attributes to isolate the response of vehicle use to
differences in the fuel efficiency of individual vehicles. Because this
approach most closely matches the definition of the rebound effect,
which is the response of vehicle use to changes in fuel economy, the
agency regards such studies as likely to produce the most reliable
estimates of the rebound effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1031\ Some studies estimate that the long-run rebound effect is
significantly larger than the immediate response to increased fuel
efficiency. Although their estimates of the adjustment period
required for the rebound effect to reach its long-run magnitude
vary, this long-run effect is probably more appropriate for
evaluating the fuel savings and emissions reductions resulting from
stricter standards that would apply to future model years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other studies have relied on econometric analysis of annual U.S.
data on vehicle use, fuel efficiency, fuel prices, and other variables
influencing aggregate travel demand to estimate the response of total
or average vehicle use to changes in fleet-wide average fuel economy or
fuel cost per mile driven. More recent studies have analyzed yearly
variation in vehicle ownership and use, fuel prices, and fuel economy
among states over an extended time period in order to measure the
response of vehicle use to changing fuel costs per mile.\1032\ A
recurring problem with studies that use national or state-level
aggregate data on vehicle use is that their measures of fuel efficiency
are constructed from data on national or
[[Page 62994]]
state total fuel consumption and the same national or state measure of
vehicle use that is used as their dependent variable. This means that
their measures of fuel efficiency and fuel cost per mile are
``definitionally'' related to their dependent variables, and that the
usual statistical techniques for minimizing the effect of such joint
causality cannot be fully effective. At the same time, their measures
of aggregate VMT and average fuel economy obscure the shifting of
travel among vehicles with different fuel economy levels during the
time period (usually a year) they span, which means that both variables
already incorporate the effect the model is attempting to measure. For
these reasons, estimates of the rebound effect based on aggregate VMT
data need to be interpreted cautiously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1032\ In effect, these studies treat U.S. states as a data
``panel'' by applying appropriate estimation procedures to data
consisting of each year's average values of these variables for the
separate states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is also important to note that many studies attempting to
measure the rebound effect using aggregate data on vehicle use actually
quantify the price elasticity of gasoline demand, or the elasticity of
VMT with respect to the per-gallon price of gasoline, rather than the
elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel efficiency or the fuel cost per
mile of driving. Because neither of these measures actually corresponds
to the definition of the fuel economy rebound effect, these studies
provide limited evidence of its actual magnitude. Another important
distinction among studies of the rebound effect is whether they assume
that the effect is constant, or instead allow it to vary in response to
changes in fuel costs, personal income, or vehicle ownership. Most
studies using aggregate annual data for the U.S. assume a constant
rebound effect, although some of these studies test whether the effect
varies as changes in retail fuel prices or average fuel efficiency
alter fuel cost per mile driven. Studies using household survey data
estimate significantly different rebound effects for households owning
varying numbers of vehicles, with most concluding that the rebound
effect is larger among households that own more vehicles. Finally,
recent studies using state-level data conclude that the rebound effect
varies directly in response to changes in personal income, the degree
of urbanization of U.S. cities, and differences in traffic congestion
levels, as well as fuel costs. Many studies conclude that the long-run
rebound effect is significantly larger than the short-term response of
vehicle use to increased fuel efficiency. Although their estimates of
the time required for the rebound effect to reach its long-run
magnitude vary, this long-run effect is probably more appropriate for
evaluating the fuel savings likely to result from adopting stricter
CAFE standards for future model years.
In order to provide a more comprehensive overview of previous
estimates of the rebound effect, NHTSA has updated its previous review
of published studies of the rebound effect to include those conducted
as recently as 2011. The agency performed a detailed analysis of
several dozen separate estimates of the long-run rebound effect
reported in these studies, which is summarized in Table IV-11
below.\1033\ As the table indicates, these estimates range from as low
as 7 percent to as high as 75 percent, with a mean value of 22 percent.
Both the type of data used and authors' assumption about whether the
rebound effect varies over time have important effects on its estimated
magnitude. The 34 estimates derived from analysis of U.S. annual time-
series data produce a mean estimate of 18 percent for the long-run
rebound effect, while the mean of 28 estimates based on household
survey data is considerably larger (25 percent), and the mean of 15
estimates based on pooled state data (23 percent) is close to that for
the entire sample. The 48 estimates assuming a constant rebound effect
produce a mean of 22 percent, identical to the mean of the 37 estimates
reported in studies that allowed the rebound effect to vary in response
to fuel prices and fuel economy levels, vehicle ownership, or household
income. Updated to reflect the most recent available information on
these variables, the mean of these estimates is 19 percent, as Table
IV-11 reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1033\ In some cases, NHTSA derived summary estimates of the
rebound effect from more detailed results reported in the studies.
For example, where studies estimated different rebound effects for
households owning different numbers of vehicles but did not report
an overall value, the agency computed a weighted average of the
reported values using the distribution of households among vehicle
ownership categories.
Table IV-11--NHTSA Summary of Published Estimates of the Rebound Effect
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Range Distribution
--------------------------------------------
Category of estimates Number of Number of Std.
studies estimates Low High Median Mean dev.
percent percent percent percent percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Estimates............................ 27 87 6 75 19 22 13
Published Estimates...................... 20 68 7 75 19 23 13
Authors' Preferred Estimates............. 20 20 9 75 22 22 15
U.S. Time-Series Estimates............... 7 34 7 45 14 18 9
Household Survey Estimates............... 17 38 6 75 22 25 15
Pooled U.S. State Estimates.............. 3 15 8 58 22 23 12
Constant Rebound Effect (1).............. 18 48 6 75 16 22 15
Variable Rebound Effect (1) Reported 12 37 10 45 20 22 9
Estimates...............................
Updated to Current Conditions............ 12 37 7 56 16 19 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some recent studies provide evidence that the rebound effect has
been declining over time. This result appears plausible for two
reasons: first, the responsiveness of vehicle use to variation in fuel
costs would be expected to decline as they account for a smaller
proportion of the total monetary cost of driving, which has been the
case until recent years. Second, rising personal incomes would be
expected to reduce the sensitivity of vehicle use to fuel costs as the
hourly value of time spent driving--which is likely to be related to
income levels--accounts for a larger fraction of the total cost of
automobile travel. At the same time, however, rising incomes are
strongly associated with higher auto ownership levels, which increase
households' opportunities to substitute among those vehicles in
response to varying fuel prices and differences in their fuel economy
levels. This effect is likely to increase the sensitivity of
households' overall vehicle use to differences in the fuel economy
levels of
[[Page 62995]]
individual vehicles. Thus on balance, it is not clear how rising income
levels are likely to affect the magnitude of the rebound effect.
Small and Van Dender combined annual time series data on aggregate
vehicle use, fuel prices, average fuel economy, and other variables for
individual states to estimate the rebound effect, allowing its
magnitude to vary in response to fuel prices, fleet-wide average fuel
economy, the degree of urbanization of U.S. cities, and personal income
levels.\1034\ The authors employ a model specification that allows the
effect of fuel cost per mile on statewide average vehicle use to vary
in response to changes in personal income levels and increasing
urbanization of each state's population. For the time period 1966-2001,
their analysis implied a long-run rebound effect of 22 percent, which
is consistent with many previously published studies. Continued growth
in personal incomes over this period reduces their estimate of the
long-run rebound effect during its last five years (1997-2001) to 11
percent, while an unpublished update through 2004 prepared by the
authors reduced their estimate of the long-run rebound effect for the
period 2000-2004 to 6 percent.\1035\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1034\ Small, K. and K. Van Dender, 2007a. ``Fuel Efficiency and
Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect'', The Energy
Journal, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 25-51. Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0130.
\1035\ Small, K. and K. Van Dender, 2007b. ``Long Run Trends in
Transport Demand, Fuel Price Elasticities and Implications of the
Oil Outlook for Transport Policy,'' OECD/ITF Joint Transport
Research Centre Discussion Papers 2007/16, OECD, International
Transport Forum. Available at http://internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/DiscussionPapers/DiscussionPaper16.pdf (last accessed Jul. 12, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More recently, Hymel, Small and Van Dender extended the previous
analysis to incorporate the effect on vehicle use of traffic congestion
levels in urbanized areas.\1036\ Although controlling for the effect of
congestion on vehicle use increased their estimates of the rebound
effect, these authors also found that the rebound effect appeared to be
declining over time. For the time period 1966-2004, their estimate of
the long-run rebound effect was 24 percent, while for the last year of
that period their estimate was 13 percent, significantly above the
previous Small and Van Dender estimate of a 6 percent rebound effect
for the period 2000-2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1036\ Hymel, Kent M., Kenneth A. Small, and Kurt Van Dender,
``Induced demand and rebound effects in road transport,''
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Volume 44, Issue 10,
December 2010, Pages 1220-1241, ISSN 0191-2615, DOI: 10.1016/
j.trb.2010.02.007. Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent research by Greene (under contract to EPA) using U.S.
national time-series data for the period 1966-2007 lends further
support to the hypothesis that the rebound effect is declining over
time.\1037\ Greene found that fuel prices generally had a statistically
significant impact on VMT, yet fuel efficiency sometimes did not, and
statistical testing rejected the hypothesis of equal elasticities of
vehicle use with respect to gasoline prices and fuel efficiency. Greene
also tested model formulations that allowed the effect of fuel cost per
mile on vehicle use to decline with rising per capita income; his
preferred form of this model produced estimates of the rebound effect
that declined to 12 percent by 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1037\ Greene, David, 2012. ``Rebound 2007: Analysis of National
Light-Duty Vehicle Travel Statistics,'' Energy Policy 41: 14-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More recent research provides contrasting evidence on the magnitude
of the rebound effect. Bento et al. analyzed data on household vehicle
ownership and use from the 2001 National Household Travel Survey using
a complex model of household purchases, ownership, retirement, and use
of both new and used vehicles.\1038\ These authors estimated that the
rebound effect averaged 34 percent for all households, but varied
widely among those owning different types and ages of automobiles, and
among households with varying demographic characteristics. Gillingham
used a large sample of vehicles registered in California and detailed
estimates of local fuel prices to estimate elasticities of vehicle use
with respect to gasoline prices and fuel economy. His estimate of the
former elasticity was -0.17, while his corresponding estimate of the
elasticity of vehicle use with respect to fuel economy was 0.06,
corresponding to a rebound effect of 6 percent.\1039\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1038\ Bento, Antonio M., Lawrence H. Goulder, Mark R. Jacobsen,
and Roger H. von Haefen, ``Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of
Increased US Gasoline Taxes,'' American Economic Review 99 (2009),
pp. 1-37. For information on the 2001 National Household Travel
Survey, see http://nhts.ornl.gov/introduction.shtml#2001 (last
accessed July 17, 2012).
\1039\ Gillingham, Kenneth. ``The Consumer Response to Gasoline
Price Changes: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications.'' Ph.D.
diss., Stanford University, 2011. See https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:wz808zn3318/Gillingham_Dissertation-augmented.pdf (last
accessed Aug 14, 2012). Docket NHTSA-2010-0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
West and Pickrell used a sample of nearly 300,000 vehicles from the
2009 National Household Travel Survey to analyze vehicle use decisions
among households owning different numbers of vehicles.\1040\
Controlling for vehicle type and age, as well as for household
characteristics and location, they estimated that the fuel economy
rebound effect ranged from 0-9 percent among single-vehicle households,
10-26 percent among households owning two vehicles, and 26-34 percent
among three-vehicle households. Most recently, Su\1041\ used quantile
regression analysis to analyze variation in the rebound effect among
households included in the 2009 National Household Travel Survey. Su's
estimates of the rebound effect varied from 11 to 19 percent depending
on the total number of miles driven annually by members of the
household, with the smallest values applying to households at the
extremes of the distribution of annual vehicle use, and the largest
values to households in the middle of that distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1040\ West, Rachel, and Don Pickrell, ``Factors Affecting
Vehicle Use in Multiple-Vehicle Households,'' http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/conferences/2011/NHTS1/West.pdf (last
accessed July 17, 2012). For information on the 2009 National
Household Travel Survey, see http://nhts.ornl.gov/introduction.shtml
(last accessed July 17, 2012).
\1041\ Su, Qing, ``A Quantile Regresssion Analysis of the
Rebound Effect: Evidence from the 2009 National Household
Transportation Survey in the United States,'' Energy Policy 45
(2012), pp. 368-377. See http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512001620 (last accessed on Aug 14, 2012).
Docket NHTSA-2010-0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of findings from recent research, the agencies judged that
the apparent decline over time in the magnitude of the rebound effect
justified using a value that is lower than previous estimates, which
are concentrated within the 15-30 percent range. Thus, as we elected to
do in our previous analysis of the effects of raising CAFE standards
for MY 2012-16 cars and light trucks, NHTSA used a 10 percent rebound
effect in its analysis of fuel savings and other benefits from the
proposed CAFE standards that would apply to MY 2017-25 cars and light
trucks. The 10 percent estimate lies between the 10-30 percent range of
estimates for the rebound effect reported in most previous research,
and is at the upper end of the 5-10 percent range of estimates for the
future rebound effect reported in recent studies. Thus the 10 percent
value was not derived from a single estimate or particular study, but
instead represented a compromise between historical estimates and
projected future estimates. Recognizing the wide range of uncertainty
surrounding its correct value, however, the agency also employed
estimates of the rebound effect ranging from 5 to 20 percent in its
sensitivity testing.
In their comments on the analysis of the proposed standards for MY
2017-25,
[[Page 62996]]
CFA\1042\ and ICCT suggested that the agencies' estimate of the rebound
effect should be smaller. ICCT argued that the 10 percent rebound
effect estimate was based simply on compromise, and that only future
projections of the rebound effect that include the impacts of personal
income, vehicle efficiency, and fuel price should be used to calculate
the future rebound effect.\1043\ ICCT suggested that only the recent
Greene paper and the Small and Van Dender work from 2007 should be used
for estimating the value for the final rule.\1044\ CFA suggested that
``from the point of view of the individual consumer, the analysis must
assume that all of the savings increase consumer welfare and that
consumers choose to use those savings in a manner that maximizes their
individual welfare.'' \1045\ Thus, CFA argued, ``the rebound effect
should be subtracted in the national cost benefits analysis but not the
consumer pocketbook analysis.'' \1046\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1042\ CFA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419, at 16.
\1043\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 25-26.
\1044\ Id.
\1045\ CFA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419, at 16, 54.
\1046\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the comments offered by CFA and ICCT, the agency
notes that the effect of future growth in income levels on the
magnitude of the rebound effect is uncertain, because rising incomes
are associated with higher vehicle ownership levels, and there is
evidence that the rebound effect is larger among households owning
multiple vehicles. In addition, AEO 2012 and the agencies'
extrapolation of its forecasts anticipate rising fuel prices throughout
the lifetimes of cars and light trucks subject to this final rule,
which by themselves would be expected to increase the magnitude of the
rebound effect. Further, as the previous summary of published estimates
of the rebound effect indicates, the Small-Van Dender and Greene
studies must be considered in the context of many other studies of the
fuel economy rebound effect that have published over the past three
decades. In that context, these studies represent lower outliers in the
distribution of reported estimates of the rebound effect, and for that
reason should not be relied upon by themselves for estimates of its
likely current or future magnitude. Thus the agency's estimate takes
adequate account of the findings from the Small-Van Dender and Greene
studies, while also giving due consideration to the large body of
previous and subsequent research on the fuel economy rebound effect.
NHTSA believes that it accords appropriate weight to estimates derived
using different measurement approaches, estimation methods, data
sources, and time periods, and is thus likely to represent a reliable
estimate of increases in vehicle use resulting from the increases in
fuel economy that this final rule requires manufacturers to achieve.
In response to the observation by CFA, the agency notes that its
analysis of the consumer impacts of the rule accounts for fuel
consumption and fuel costs associated with increased driving due to the
fuel economy rebound effect. At the same time, this analysis also
accounts for the benefits that vehicle buyers derive from that
additional travel, which clearly exceed the increased fuel costs they
pay because they voluntarily elect to drive more. The nature of these
benefits and the procedure the agency uses to estimate their value are
described in the following section. Thus on balance, the additional
vehicle use stemming from the rebound effect increases the welfare of
individual vehicle buyers, and is properly included in the agency's
analysis. NHTSA continues to include both the consumer benefits and
higher fuel costs associated with additional vehicle use in its
analyses of the individual (or private) and economy-wide (or social)
impacts of this final rule.
h. Benefits From Increased Vehicle Use
The increase in vehicle use resulting from the fuel economy rebound
effect provides additional benefits to their users, who make more
frequent trips or travel farther to reach more desirable destinations.
This additional travel provides benefits to drivers and their
passengers by improving their access to social and economic
opportunities away from home. As evidenced by their decisions to make
more frequent or longer trips when improved fuel economy reduces their
costs for driving, the benefits from this additional travel exceed the
fuel and other costs drivers and passengers incur in traveling these
additional distances.
The agency's analysis estimates the economic benefits from
increased rebound-effect driving as the sum of fuel costs drivers incur
plus the consumer surplus they receive from the additional
accessibility it provides.\1047\ NHTSA estimates the value of the
consumer surplus provided by added travel as one-half of the product of
the decline in fuel cost per mile and the resulting increase in the
annual number of miles driven, a standard approximation for changes in
consumer surplus resulting from small changes in prices. Because the
increase in travel depends on the extent of improvement in fuel
economy, the value of benefits it provides differs among model years
and alternative CAFE standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1047\ The consumer surplus provided by added travel is
estimated as one-half of the product of the decline in fuel cost per
mile and the resulting increase in the annual number of miles
driven.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Benefits Due to Reduced Refueling Time
Direct estimates of the value of extended vehicle range are not
available in the literature, so the agencies instead calculate the
reduction in the required annual number of refueling cycles due to
improved fuel economy, and assess the economic value of the resulting
benefits. Chief among these benefits is the time that owners save by
spending less time both in search of fueling stations and in the act of
pumping and paying for fuel.
The economic value of refueling time savings was calculated by
applying DOT-recommended valuations for travel time savings to
estimates of how much time is saved.\1048\ The value of travel time
depends on average hourly valuations of personal and business time,
which are functions of total hourly compensation costs to employers.
The total hourly compensation cost to employers, inclusive of benefits,
in 2010$ is $29.68.\1049\ Table IV-12 below demonstrates the agencies'
approach to estimating the value of travel time ($/hour) for both urban
and rural (intercity) driving. This approach relies on the use of DOT-
recommended weights that assign a lesser valuation to personal travel
time than to business travel time, as well as weights that adjust for
the distribution between personal and business travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1048\ See http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/VOT97guid.pdf and
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/VOTrevision1_2-11-03.pdf (last
accessed Aug. 5, 2012).
\1049\ Total hourly employer compensation costs for 2010
(average of quarterly observations across all occupations for all
civilians). See http://www.bls.gov/ect/ (last accessed Aug. 5,
2012).
[[Page 62997]]
Table IV-12--NHTSA Estimates of the Value of Travel Time for Urban and Rural (Intercity) Travel \1050\
[$/hour]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Personal travel Business travel Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urban Travel
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wage Rate ($/hour)............................................. $29.68 $29.68 .........
DOT-Recommended Value of Travel Time Savings, as % of Wage Rate 50% 100% .........
Hourly Valuation (=Wage Rate * DOT-Recommended Value).......... $14.84 $29.68 .........
% of Total Urban Travel........................................ 94.4% 5.6% 100%
Hourly Valuation (Adjusted for % of Total Urban Travel)........ $14.01 $1.66 $15.67
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rural (Intercity) Travel
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wage Rate ($/hour)............................................. $29.68 $29.68 .........
DOT-Recommended Value of Travel Time Savings, as % of Wage Rate 70% 100% .........
Hourly Valuation (=Wage Rate * DOT-Recommended Value).......... $20.77 $3.86 .........
% of Total Rural Travel........................................ 87.0% 13.0% 100%
Hourly Valuation (Adjusted for % of Total Rural Travel)........ $18.07 $3.86 $21.93
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The estimates of the hourly value of urban and rural travel time
($15.67 and $21.93, respectively) shown in Table IV-12 above must be
adjusted to account for the nationwide ratio of urban to rural driving.
By applying this adjustment (as shown in Table IV-13 below), an overall
estimate of the hourly value of travel time--independent of urban or
rural status--may be produced. Note that the calculations above assume
only one adult occupant per vehicle. To fully estimate the average
value of vehicle travel time, the presence of additional adult
passengers during refueling trips must be accounted for. The agencies
apply such an adjustment as shown in Table IV-13; this adjustment is
performed separately for passenger cars and for light trucks, yielding
occupancy-adjusted valuations of vehicle travel time during refueling
trips for each fleet. Note that children (persons under age 16) are
excluded from average vehicle occupancy counts, as it is assumed that
the opportunity cost of children's time is zero.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1050\ Time spent on personal travel during rural (intercity)
travel is valued at a greater rate than that of urban travel. There
are several reasons behind the divergence in these values: 1) time
is scarcer on a long trip; 2) a long trip involves complementary
expenditures on travel, lodging, food, and entertainment, since time
at the destination is worth such high costs.
Table IV-13--NHTSA Estimates of the Value of Travel Time for Light-Duty Vehicles
[$/hour]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unweighted value Weight (% of Weighted value of
of travel time ($/ total miles travel time ($/
hour) driven) \1051\ hour)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urban Travel........................................... $15.67 67.1% $10.51
Rural Travel........................................... $21.93 32.9% $7.22
--------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................................. -- 100.0% $17.73
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars Light trucks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average Vehicle Occupancy During 1.21 1.23
Refueling Trips (persons)\1052\..
Weighted Value of Travel Time ($/ $17.73 $17.73
hour)............................
Occupancy-Adjusted Value of $21.45 $21.81
Vehicle Travel Time During
Refueling Trips ($/hour).........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies estimated the amount of refueling time saved using
(preliminary) survey data gathered as part of our 2010-2011 National
Automotive Sampling System's Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS)
study. \1053\ The study was conducted at fueling stations nationwide,
and researchers made observations regarding a variety of
characteristics of thousands of individual fueling station visits from
August, 2010 through April, 2011.\1054\ Among these characteristics of
fueling station visits is the total amount of time spent pumping and
paying for fuel. From a separate sample (also part of the TPMS study),
researchers conducted interviews at the pump to gauge the distances
that drivers travel in transit to and from fueling stations, how long
that transit takes, and how many gallons of fuel are being purchased.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1051\ Weights used for urban vs. rural travel are computed
using cumulative 2011 estimates of urban vs. rural miles driven
provided by the Federal Highway Administration. Available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/travel_monitoring/tvt.cfm (last
accessed Aug. 5, 2012).
\1052\ Source: National Automotive Sampling System 2010-2011
Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) study. See next page for
further background on the TPMS study. TPMS data are preliminary at
this time and rates are subject to change pending availability of
finalized TPMS data. Average occupancy rates shown here are specific
to refueling trips, and do not include children under 16 years of
age.
\1053\ TPMS data are preliminary and not yet published.
Estimates derived from TPMS data are therefore preliminary and
subject to change. Observational and interview data are from
distinct subsamples, each consisting of approximately 7,000
vehicles. For more information on the National Automotive Sampling
System and to access TPMS data when they are made available, see
http://www.nhtsa.gov/NASS.
\1054\ The data collection period for the TPMS study ranged from
08/10/2010 to 04/15/2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This analysis of refueling benefits considers only those refueling
trips which interview respondents indicated the primary reason was due
to a low
[[Page 62998]]
reading on the gas gauge.\1055\ This restriction was imposed so as to
exclude drivers who refuel on a fixed (e.g., weekly) schedule and may
be unlikely to alter refueling patterns as a result of increased
driving range. The relevant TPMS survey data on average refueling trip
characteristics are presented below in Table IV-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1055\ Approximately 60 percent of respondents indicated ``gas
tank low'' as the primary reason for the refueling trip in question.
Table IV-14--NHTSA Average Refueling Trip Characteristics for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Round-trip
distance Round-trip time Time to
Gallons of to/from to/from fueling fill and Total time
fuel fueling station pay (minutes)
purchased station (minutes) (minutes)
(miles)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars........................... 9.8 0.97 2.28 4.10 6.38
Light Trucks............................. 13.0 1.08 2.53 4.30 6.83
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an illustration of how we estimate the value of extended
refueling range, assume a small light truck model has an average fuel
tank size of approximately 20 gallons, and a baseline actual on-road
fuel economy of 24 mpg (its assumed level in the absence of a higher
CAFE standard for the given model year). TPMS survey data indicate that
drivers who indicated the primary reason for their refueling trips was
a low reading on the gas gauge typically refuel when their tanks are 35
percent full (i.e. as shown in Table IV-14, with 7.0 gallons in
reserve, and the consumer purchases 13 gallons). By this measure, a
typical driver would have an effective driving range of 312 miles (=
13.0 gallons x 24 mpg) before he or she is likely to refuel. Increasing
this model's actual on-road fuel economy from 24 to 25 mpg would
therefore extend its effective driving range to 325 miles (= 13.0
gallons x 25 mpg). Assuming that the truck is driven 12,000 miles/
year,\1056\ this 1 mpg improvement in actual on-road fuel economy
reduces the expected number of refueling trips per year from 38.5 (=
12,000 miles per year/312 miles per refueling) to 36.9 (= 12,000 miles
per year/325 miles per refueling), or by 1.6 refuelings per year. If a
typical fueling cycle for a light truck requires a total of 6.83
minutes, then the annual value of time saved due to that 1 mpg
improvement would amount to $3.97 (= (6.83/60) x $21.81 x 1.6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1056\ Source of annual vehicle mileage: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 2009 National
Household Travel Survey (NHTS). See http://nhts.ornl.gov/2009/pub/stt.pdf (table 22, p.48). 12,000 miles/year is an approximation of a
light duty vehicle's annual mileage during its initial decade of use
(the period in which the bulk of benefits are realized). The Volpe
model estimates VMT by model year and vehicle age, taking into
account the rebound effect, secular growth rates in VMT, and fleet
survivability; these complexities are omitted in the above example
for simplicity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the central analysis, this calculation was repeated for each
future calendar year that light-duty vehicles of each model year
affected by the standards considered in this rule would remain in
service. The resulting cumulative lifetime valuations of time savings
account for both the reduction over time in the number of vehicles of a
given model year that remain in service and the reduction in the number
of miles (VMT) driven by those that stay in service. We also adjust the
value of time savings that will occur in future years both to account
for expected annual growth in real wages \1057\ and to apply a discount
rate to determine the net present value of time saved.\1058\ A further
adjustment is made to account for evidence from the interview-based
portion of the TPMS study which suggests that 40 percent of refueling
trips are for reasons other than a low reading on the gas gauge. It is
therefore assumed that only 60 percent of the theoretical refueling
time savings will be realized, as it was assumed that owners who refuel
on a fixed schedule will continue to do. NHTSA sought feedback from
peer reviewers (one from DOT's Office of the Secretary, one from DOT's
Research and Innovative Technology Adminstration, and one from West
Virginia University's Department of Economics) regarding the NPRM
analysis of refueling time savings and has updated its analysis and
discussion to address peer reviewers' comments.\1059\ NHTSA's and EPA's
approaches to assessing future fuel tank sizes and the associated
benefit to refueling are explained in the agencies' respective RIAs
(EPA RIA Chapter 7 and NHTSA RIA Chapter VIII).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1057\ A 1.1 percent annual rate of growth in real wages is used
to adjust the value of travel time per vehicle ($/hour) for future
years for which a given model is expected to remain in service. This
rate is supported by a BLS analysis of growth in real wages from
2000-2009. See http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110224.htm.
\1058\ Note that here, as elsewhere in the analysis, discounting
is applied on a mid-year basis. For example, at a 3% discount rate,
the sequence of discount factors is calculated as: {1/
((1+0.03)-(0.5)), 1/((1+0.03)-(1.5)), * * * , 1/((1+0.03)-(T-
0.5)){time} . NHTSA utilized mid-year discounting to reflect the
fact that a given model year's vehicles are sold over the course of
one or more years, therefore costs and benefits do not begin to
fully accrue on January 1st of the model year.
\1059\ Peer review materials, peer reviewer backgrounds,
comments, and NHTSA responses are available at Docket NHTSA-2012-
0001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since a reduction in the expected number of annual refueling trips
leads to a decrease in miles driven to and from fueling stations, we
can also calculate the value of consumers' fuel savings associated with
this decrease. As shown in Table IV-14, the typical incremental round-
trip mileage per refueling cycle is 1.08 miles for light trucks and
0.97 miles for passenger cars. Going back to the earlier example of a
light truck model, a decrease of 1.6 in the number of refuelings per
year leads to a reduction of 1.73 miles driven per year (= 1.6
refuelings x 1.08 miles driven per refueling). Again, if this model's
actual on-road fuel economy was 24 mpg, the reduction in miles driven
yields an annual savings of approximately 0.07 gallons of fuel (= 1.73
miles/24 mpg), which at $3.77/gallon\1060\ results in a savings of
$0.27 per year to the owner. Note that this example is illustrative
only of the approach the agencies use to quantify this benefit. In
practice, the societal value of this benefit excludes fuel taxes (as
they are transfer payments) from the calculation, and is modeled using
fuel price forecasts specific to each year the given fleet will remain
in service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1060\ Estimate of $3.77/gallon is in 2010$. This figure is an
average of forecasted cost per gallon (including taxes, as
individual consumers consider reduced tax expenditures to be
savings) for motor gasoline for years 2017 to 2027. Source of price
forecasts: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy
Outlook Early Release 2012 (see table VIII-9a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The annual savings to each consumer shown in the above example may
seem like a small amount, but the reader should recognize that the
valuation of the cumulative lifetime benefit of this
[[Page 62999]]
savings to owners is determined separately for passenger car and light
truck fleets and then aggregated to show the net benefit across all
light-duty vehicles--which is much more significant at the macro level.
Calculations of benefits realized in future years are adjusted for
expected real growth in the price of gasoline, for the decline in the
number of vehicles of a given model year that remain in service as they
age, for the decrease in the number of miles (VMT) driven by those that
stay in service, and for the percentage of refueling trips that occur
for reasons other than a low reading on the gas gauge; a discount rate
is also applied in the valuation of future benefits. The agencies
considered using this direct estimation approach to quantify the value
of this benefit by model year, however concluded that the value of this
benefit is implicitly captured in the separate measure of overall
valuation of fuel savings. Therefore direct estimates of this benefit
are not added to net benefits calculations.\1061\ We note that there
are other benefits resulting from the reduction in miles driven to and
from fueling stations, such as a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions--CO2 in particular--which, as per the case of fuel
savings discussed in the preceding paragraph, are implicitly accounted
for elsewhere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1061\ Estimates of the net present value of fuel savings are
presented in the agencies' respective RIAs (EPA RIA Chapter 7 and
NHTSA RIA Chapter VIII).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special mention must be made with regard to the value of refueling
time savings benefits to owners of electric and plug-in electric (both
referred to here as EV) vehicles. EV owners who routinely drive daily
distances that do not require recharging on-the-go may eliminate the
need for trips to fueling or charging stations. It is likely that early
adopters of EVs will factor this benefit into their purchasing
decisions and maintain driving patterns that require once-daily at-home
recharging (a process which takes two to six hours for a full charge).
However, EV owners who regularly or periodically need to drive
distances further than the fully-charged EV range may need to recharge
at fixed locations. A distributed network of charging stations (e.g.,
in parking lots, at parking meters) may allow some EV owners to
recharge their vehicles while at work or while shopping, yet the
lengthy charging cycles of current charging technology may pose a cost
to owners due to the value of time spent waiting for EVs to charge.
Moreover, EV owners who primarily recharge their vehicles at home will
still experience some level of inconvenience due to their vehicle being
either unavailable for unplanned use, or to its range being limited
during this time should they interrupt the charging process. Therefore,
at present EVs hold potential in offering significant time savings to
owners with driving patterns optimally suited for EV characteristics.
If fast-charging technologies emerge and a widespread network of fast-
charging stations is established, it is expected that a larger segment
of EV vehicle owners will fully realize the potential refueling time
savings benefits that EVs offer. This is an area of significant
uncertainty.
j. Added Costs From Congestion, Crashes and Noise
Increased vehicle use associated with the rebound effect also
contributes to increased traffic congestion, motor vehicle accidents,
and highway noise. To estimate the economic costs associated with these
consequences of added driving, NHTSA applies estimates of per-mile
congestion, accident, and noise costs caused by increased use of
automobiles and light trucks developed previously by the Federal
Highway Administration.\1062\ These values are intended to measure the
increased costs resulting from added congestion and the delays it
causes to other drivers and passengers, property damages and injuries
resulting from traffic accidents, and noise levels contributed by
automobiles and light trucks. NHTSA previously employed these estimates
in its analysis accompanying the MY 2011 final CAFE rule, as well as in
its analysis of the effects of higher CAFE standards for MY 2012-16.
After reviewing the procedures used by FHWA to develop them and
considering other available estimates of these values, and recognizing
that no commenters addressed these costs directly, the agency continues
to find them appropriate for use in this final rule. The agency
multiplies FHWA's estimates of per-mile costs by the annual increases
in automobile and light truck use from the rebound effect to yield the
estimated increases in total congestion, accident, and noise
externality costs during each year over the lifetimes of MY 2017-25
cars and light trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1062\ These estimates were developed by FHWA for use in its
1997 Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study; See http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/hcas/final/index.htm (last accessed Jul. 9,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
k. Petroleum Consumption and Import Externalities
i. Changes in Petroleum Imports
Based on a detailed analysis of differences in fuel consumption,
petroleum imports, and imports of refined petroleum products among
alternative scenarios presented in AEO 2011,\1063\ NHTSA estimates that
approximately 50 percent of the reduction in fuel consumption resulting
from adopting higher CAFE standards is likely to be reflected in
reduced U.S. imports of refined fuel, while the remaining 50 percent
would reduce domestic fuel refining.\1064\ Of this latter figure, 90
percent is anticipated to reduce U.S. imports of crude petroleum for
use as a refinery feedstock, while the remaining 10 percent is expected
to reduce U.S. domestic production of crude petroleum.\1065\ Thus on
balance, each 100 gallons of fuel saved as a consequence of higher CAFE
standards is anticipated to reduce total U.S. imports of crude
petroleum or refined fuel by 95 gallons.\1066\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1063\ The AEO 2012 Early Release did not contain the ``side
cases'' that NHTSA used to conduct this analysis, so the agency
relied on AEO 2011 for the work discussed in this section.
\1064\ Differences in forecast annual U.S. imports of crude
petroleum and refined products among the Reference, High Oil Price,
and Low Oil Price scenarios analyzed in EIA's Annual Energy Outlook
2011 range from 35-74 percent of differences in projected annual
gasoline and diesel fuel consumption in the U.S. These differences
average 53 percent over the forecast period spanned by AEO 2011.
\1065\ Differences in forecast annual U.S. imports of crude
petroleum among the Reference, High Oil Price, and Low Oil Price
scenarios analyzed in EIA's Annual Energy Outlook 2011 range from
67-104 percent of differences in total U.S. refining of crude
petroleum, and average 90 percent over the forecast period spanned
by AEO 2011.
\1066\ This figure is calculated as 50 gallons + 50 gallons*90%
= 50 gallons + 45 gallons = 95 gallons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Benefits From Reducing U.S. Petroleum Imports
U.S. consumption and imports of petroleum products impose costs on
the domestic economy that are not reflected in the market price for
crude petroleum, or in the prices paid by consumers of refined
petroleum products such as gasoline. These costs include (1) higher
prices for petroleum products resulting from the effect of U.S.
petroleum demand on the world oil price; (2) increased risk of
disruptions to the U.S. economy caused by sudden reductions in the
supply of imported oil to the U.S.; and (3) expenses for maintaining a
U.S. military presence to secure imported oil supplies from unstable
regions, and for maintaining the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) to
cushion against
[[Page 63000]]
resulting price increases.\1067\ Higher U.S. imports of crude oil or
refined petroleum products increase the magnitude of these external
economic costs, thus increasing the true economic cost of supplying
transportation fuels above their market prices. Conversely, lowering
U.S. imports of crude petroleum or refined fuels by reducing domestic
fuel consumption can reduce these external costs, and any reduction in
their total value that results from improved fuel economy represents an
economic benefit of more stringent CAFE standards, in addition to the
value of saving fuel itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1067\ See, e.g., Bohi, Douglas R. and W. David Montgomery
(1982). Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Import Policy Washington,
DC: Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press; Bohi,
D.R., and M.A. Toman (1993). ``Energy and Security: Externalities
and Policies,'' Energy Policy 21:1093-1109, Docket NHTSA-2009-0062-
24; and Toman, M.A. (1993). ``The Economics of Energy Security:
Theory, Evidence, Policy,'' in A.V. Kneese and J.L. Sweeney, eds.
(1993) Docket NHTSA-2009-0062-23. Handbook of Natural Resource and
Energy Economics, Vol. III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1167-1218.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first component of the external costs imposed by U.S. petroleum
consumption and imports (often termed the ``monopsony cost'' of U.S.
oil imports), measures the increase in payments from domestic oil
consumers to foreign oil suppliers beyond the increased purchase price
of petroleum itself that results when increased U.S. import demand
raises the world price of petroleum.\1068\ However, this monopsony cost
or premium represents a financial transfer from consumers of petroleum
products to oil producers, and does not consume real economic
resources. Thus, the decline in its value that occurs when reduced U.S.
demand for petroleum products causes a reduction in global petroleum
prices produces no savings in economic resources globally or
domestically, although it does reduce the value of the financial
transfer from U.S. consumers of petroleum products to foreign suppliers
of petroleum. Accordingly, NHTSA's analysis of the benefits from
adopting proposed CAFE standards for MY 2017-2025 cars and light trucks
excluded the reduced value of monopsony payments by U.S. oil consumers
that would result from lower fuel consumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1068\ The reduction in payments from U.S. oil purchasers to
domestic petroleum producers is not included as a benefit, since it
represents a transfer that occurs entirely within the U.S. economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACEEE stated that not including an estimate for monopsony value was
a ``departure from previous rules,'' and argued that monopsony effects
should be counted among the final rule's economic benefits, because (1)
reduction in the price of petroleum would bring a net benefit in terms
of job creation due to the low labor intensity of the energy sector,
and (2) reduced demand means that the most expensive sources of
petroleum are not used, which also reduces the price of all
petroleum.\1069\ CFA commented simply that the monopsony effect is a
true consumption externality, and should be included for the final rule
at a value of $0.30/gallon.\1070\ SAFE suggested that even if reducing
domestic demand for oil does not necessarily lead to lower fuel prices,
it might lead to production levels that are adjusted downward based on
expectations that increased fuel economy will reduce aggregate
demand.\1071\ UCS argued that if the purpose of the CAFE program is
conserve energy and improve energy security by raising fuel economy
standards, NHTSA must include a value for the monopsony effect in the
final rule or risk ``abdication of [its] statutory responsibility.''
\1072\ NHTSA also received comments from the Department of Energy
during interagency review of the final rule suggesting that we consider
including the monopsony effect not in the current analysis, but in
future analyses, stating that doing so would be appropriate because (1)
U.S. efforts to reduce CO2 emissions will be accompanied by
similar efforts in other nations, (2) climate change could promote
political instability in other parts of the world that could be harmful
to the U.S., and (3) the U.S. should value preservation of biodiversity
and reduction of environmental impacts around the world and not just in
the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1069\ ACEEE, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528, at 1-2.
\1070\ CFA, Docket No EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419, at 16, 54-55.
\1071\ SAFE, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0259, at 4.
\1072\ UCS, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131, at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to ACEEE, NHTSA previously excluded any reduction in
these monopsony costs resulting from lower U.S. fuel consumption in its
analyses of CAFE standards for MY 2008-11 light trucks, MY 2011
passenger cars and light trucks, and MY 2012-16 cars and light trucks.
The rationale for doing so--namely that these costs represent a
financial transfer rather than a use of real economic resources, and
that reducing them does not provide a savings in the use of economic
resources--is thus well-established, remains sound, and is consistent
with the global perspective of NHTSA's analysis of this final rule. The
agency also notes that job ``creation'' is not among the economic
benefits attributable to higher CAFE standards (and in any case
increased employment represents the consumption of additional economic
resources, which is an economic cost rather than a benefit), and that
any reduction in the price of petroleum that continues to be purchased
after a decline in total demand also represents a financial transfer
rather than a true economic benefit.
In response to the assertion by CFA, the monopsony effect does not
meet the definition of a consumption externality, because it is
transmitted completely through the price mechanism and does not
directly affect the welfare of individuals or the production functions
of firms. Further, the economic benefit resulting from any decline in
production levels of crude petroleum is already accounted for in the
agency's estimates of the (pre-tax) value of fuel savings. Finally, by
excluding any reduction in monopsony payments from its analysis of
benefits from higher fuel economy, the agency is simply being
consistent with the usual principles of economic analysis and with OMB
guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis, and is thus in no way
failing to meet its statutory responsibilities. With respect to the
comment by UCS, NHTSA agrees that the overarching purpose of EPCA/EISA
is energy conservation, but disagrees that the statute requires us to
include the monopsony effect in our calculation of benefits associated
with higher fuel economy standards, particularly when the level of the
standards is not driven by benefit-cost considerations. As explained
above, NHTSA has consistently excluded the monopsony value in its
rulemakings since it has used a global SCC value, and continues to
believe that doing so is appropriate for this final rule. With respect
to the comments by DOE about including a monopsony effect in future
analyses, we reiterate that any future analyses will represent a
totally fresh look at all relevant factors. If the situation in future
rulemaking changes such that including a value for the monopsony effect
is appropriate, NHTSA would certainly consider one at that time.
The second component of external costs imposed by U.S. petroleum
consumption and imports reflects the potential costs to the U.S.
economy from disruptions in the supply of imported petroleum. These
costs arise because interruptions in the supply of petroleum products
reduce U.S. economic output while (and potentially after) they occur,
as well as because firms incur real economic costs in attempting to
adjust prices, output levels, and their use of
[[Page 63001]]
energy, labor and other inputs rapidly in response to sudden changes in
prices for petroleum products caused by interruptions in their supply.
Reducing U.S. petroleum consumption and imports lowers these potential
costs and may also reduce the probability that U.S. petroleum imports
will be disrupted, and both of these effects reduce the probabilistic
``expected value'' of the costs of oil supply disruptions to the U.S.
economy. The amount by which it does so represents an economic benefit
in addition to the savings in resources from producing and distributing
fuel that results from higher fuel economy. NHTSA estimated and
included this value in its NPRM analysis of the economic benefits from
adopting higher CAFE standards for MY 2017-2025 cars and light trucks.
Several environmental group and other NGO commenters suggested that
the standards would have significant energy security benefits in terms
of avoiding macroeconomic disruption. UCS stated that ``No other
federal policy has delivered greater oil savings, energy security
benefits, or greenhouse gas emissions reductions to the country,'' and
requested that we monetize improved energy security through reduced oil
consumption and lower carbon emissions for the final rule
analysis.\1073\ EDF described a study by Jamie Fine that found ``that
cost savings from avoided gasoline and diesel use in the event of an
energy price shock in 2020 could be in the range of $2.4 to $5.2
billion for the state of California alone'' under California's plan to
reduce GHGs to 1990 levels by 2020, and requested that the agencies at
least report a range of estimates for benefits associated with energy
security.\1074\ EDF suggested that the agencies ``consider cost
estimation proposals such as that included in Sen. Richard Lugar's (R-
Ind.) Practical Energy and Climate Plan, S. 3464,'' which ``included
both an extensive list of potential impacts of energy security to be
considered and an alternative approximation valuation methodology for
the ``external cost of petroleum use'' (i.e. this does not include the
actual fuel savings).'' \1075\ EDF stated that ``For inputs that the
agencies cannot quantify, the final rule should include a list and
explain that the benefits of the rule are likely undervalued due to
such factors.'' \1076\ SAFE commented simply that electrification of
the fleet is good for energy security because it reduces the risk of
macroeconomic disruptions, as a domestic fuel source.\1077\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1073\ UCS, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, at 5-6.
\1074\ EDF, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0302, at 3-4, 15.
\1075\ Id. at 15.
\1076\ Id.
\1077\ SAFE, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0259, at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to these comments, the agency notes that its estimate
of benefits from reducing U.S. petroleum consumption and imports
incorporates both the potential economic cost of oil supply disruptions
and the reduced probability that such disruptions will occur, exactly
as advocated by UCS and other commenters. In addition, the agency
analyzes the sensitivity of its benefit estimates to plausible
variation in the per-gallon value of reduced macroeconomic disruption
costs that result from lowering U.S. petroleum consumption and imports.
The agency relies on estimates of this value and the range of
uncertainty surrounding it prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratories,
which are described in detail in Chapter 4 of the joint TSD
accompanying this rulemaking.
The third component of external costs imposed by U.S. petroleum
consumption and imports includes expenses for maintaining a U.S.
military presence to secure imported oil supplies from unstable
regions, and for maintaining the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) to
cushion against resulting price increases. NHTSA recognizes that
potential national and energy security risks exist due to the
possibility of tension over oil supplies. Much of the world's oil and
gas supplies are located in countries facing social, economic, and
demographic challenges, thus making them even more vulnerable to
potential local instability. Because of U.S. dependence on oil, the
military could be called on to protect energy resources through such
measures as securing shipping lanes from foreign oil fields. Thus, to
the degree to which the proposed rules reduce reliance upon imported
energy supplies or promote the development of technologies that can be
deployed by either consumers or the nation's defense forces, the United
States could expect benefits related to national security, reduced
energy costs, and increased energy supply.
As discussed in the NPRM, although NHTSA recognizes that there
would clearly be significant economic benefits from eliminating the
nation's dependence on foreign oil, no serious analysis has been able
to estimate the potential reduction in U.S. military activity and
spending that is likely to result exclusively from the fuel savings and
reductions in U.S. petroleum imports this final rule is expected to
produce by itself. Two principal difficulties that have prevented
researchers from developing credible estimates of the potential
reduction in military activity that might accompany a significant
reduction in U.S. oil imports are isolating the specific missions that
are intended to secure foreign oil supplies and transportation routes,
and anticipating how extensively they would be scaled back in response
to a decline in U.S. petroleum imports. Analysts have been unable to
answer either of these questions with sufficient confidence to produce
reliable estimates of potential savings in U.S. military outlays. As a
consequence, the agency has included only the macroeconomic disruption
portion of the energy security benefits to estimate the economic value
of the total energy security benefits of this program. We have
calculated energy security benefits in very specific terms, as the
reduction of both financial and strategic risks caused by potential
sudden disruptions in the supply of imported petroleum to the U.S.
Reducing the amount of oil imported reduces those risks, and thus
increases the nation's energy security.
Similarly, while the costs for building and maintaining the SPR are
more clearly attributable to U.S. petroleum consumption and imports,
these costs have not varied historically in response to changes in U.S.
oil import levels. Thus the agency has not estimated the potential
reduction in the cost for maintaining the SPR that might result from
lower U.S. petroleum imports, or to include an estimate of this value
among the benefits of reducing petroleum consumption through higher
CAFE standards.
Comments addressing the potential benefits from a reduced military
presence as a result of higher CAFE standards were mixed. While API
agreed with NHTSA's discussion in the NPRM and supported a reiteration
of such discussion for the final rule (and sensitivity analysis in the
FRIA),\1078\ other commenters strongly supported developing a specific
estimate of potential savings in U.S. military spending that would
accompany reduced petroleum imports. AGA/
[[Page 63002]]
ANGA,\1079\ CBD,\1080\ CFA,\1081\ and UCS \1082\ commented that the
difficulty of quantifying the costs of maintaining a military presence
abroad to protect oil resources did not obviate the need to attempt to
do so. SAFE also provided a number of citations regarding how much the
U.S. spends to import oil and maintain an overseas military
presence.\1083\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1078\ API attachment, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0238, at 11-
12.
\1079\ AGA/ANGA provided the example of the Navy's Fifth Fleet,
``reestablished in 1995 and based in Bahrain,'' which it said exists
``to secure the Persian Gulf sea-lanes,'' at an ``annual cost * * *
in the billions of dollars.'' AGA/ANGA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-
0237, at 5-6.
\1080\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 7.
\1081\ CFA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419, at 16.
\1082\ UCS provided the example of ``a recent peer-reviewed
study [that] found that the U.S. military spent $7.3 trillion
maintaining aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf from 1976-2007,''
stating that ``Since this presence is largely purposed to protect
key oil shipping lanes, it provides an indication of the significant
cost to the U.S. economy as a result of our reliance on oil.'' UCS,
Docket No.EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, at 7.
\1083\ SAFE, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0259, at 2-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency believes that eliminating or significantly reducing U.S.
consumption and imports of petroleum would provide an opportunity to
reduce military activities that are dedicated to the purposes of
securing oil supplies in unstable regions of the globe, and protecting
international transportation routes. However, NHTSA has been unable to
identify research that reports credible estimates of the extent to
which these opportunities would arise and be acted upon as a
consequence of reductions in U.S. petroleum consumption of the
magnitude projected to result from this final rule, either alone or in
conjunction with its previous actions to establish higher CAFE
standards. This conclusion was echoed in a recent study conducted for
EPA by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the results of which are
described in detail in Chapter 4 of the Final TSD accompanying this
rulemaking. Thus as indicated previously, NHTSA's analysis of benefits
from adopting this final rule includes only the reduction in economic
disruption costs that is anticipated to result from reduced consumption
of petroleum-based fuels and the associated decline in U.S. petroleum
imports.
In analyzing benefits from its recent actions to increase light
truck CAFE standards for model years 2005-07 and 2008-11, NHTSA relied
on a 1997 study by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to estimate the
value of reduced economic externalities from petroleum consumption and
imports.\1084\ More recently, ORNL updated its estimates of the value
of these externalities, using the analytic framework developed in its
original 1997 study, in conjunction with recent estimates of the
variables and parameters that determine their value.\1085\ The updated
ORNL study was subjected to a detailed peer review commissioned by EPA,
and ORNL's estimates of the value of oil import externalities were
subsequently revised to reflect the comments and recommendations
provided by peer reviewers.\1086\ Finally, at the request of EPA, ORNL
has repeatedly revised its estimates of external costs from U.S. oil
imports to reflect changes in the outlook for world petroleum prices,
as well as continuing changes in the structure and characteristics of
global petroleum supply and demand. ORNL's updated analysis reports
that this benefit, which is in addition to the savings in costs for
producing fuel itself, is most likely to amount to $0.197 per gallon of
fuel saved by requiring MY 2017-25 cars and light trucks to achieve
higher fuel economy. However, considerable uncertainty surrounds this
estimate, and ORNL's updated analysis also indicates that a range of
values extending from a low of $0.096 per gallon to a high of $0.284
per gallon should be used to reflect this uncertainty. We note that the
calculation of energy security benefits does not include any
consideration of potential energy security costs associated with
increased reliance on foreign sources of lithium and rare earth metals
for HEVs and EVs. Any such costs would partially offset the energy
security benefits from reducing U.S. petroleum imports. The agencies
sought public input that would enable us to develop such an estimate,
but received no useful information to support the necessary analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1084\ Leiby, Paul N., Donald W. Jones, T. Randall Curlee, and
Russell Lee, Oil Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, ORNL-
6851, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, November 1, 1997. Available at
http://www.esd.ornl.gov/eess/energy_analysis/files/ORNL6851.pdf
(last accessed October 11, 2011).
\1085\ Leiby, Paul N. ``Estimating the Energy Security Benefits
of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports,'' Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/
TM-2007/028, Revised July 23, 2007. Available at http://www.esd.ornl.gov/eess/energy_analysis/files/Leiby2007%20Estimating%20the%20Energy%20Security%20Benefits%20of%20Reduced%20U.S.%20Oil%20Imports%20ornl-tm-2007-028%20rev2007Jul25.pdf
(last accessed October 11, 2011).
\1086\ Peer Review Report Summary: Estimating the Energy
Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports, ICF, Inc., September
2007. Available at Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0059-0160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
l. Air Pollutant Emissions
i. Changes in Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions
Criteria air pollutants include carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbon
compounds (usually referred to as ``volatile organic compounds,'' or
VOC), nitrogen oxides (NOX), fine particulate matter
(PM2.5), and sulfur oxides (SOX). These
pollutants are emitted during vehicle storage and use, as well as
throughout the fuel production and distribution system. While
reductions in domestic fuel refining, storage, and distribution that
result from lower fuel consumption will reduce emissions of these
pollutants, additional vehicle use associated with the fuel economy
rebound effect will increase their emissions. The net effect of
stricter CAFE standards on total emissions of each criteria pollutant
depends on the relative magnitudes of reductions in its emissions
during fuel refining and distribution, and increases in its emissions
resulting from additional vehicle use. Because the relationship between
emissions in fuel refining and vehicle use is different for each
criteria pollutant, the net effect of fuel savings from the proposed
standards on total emissions of each pollutant is likely to differ.
With the exception of SO2, NHTSA calculated annual
emissions of each criteria pollutant resulting from vehicle use by
multiplying its estimates of car and light truck use during each year
over their expected lifetimes by per-mile emission rates for each
vehicle class, fuel type, model year, and age. These emission rates
were developed by U.S. EPA using its Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator
(MOVES 2010a).\1087\ Emission rates for SO2 were calculated
by NHTSA using estimates of average fuel sulfur content supplied by
EPA, together with the assumption that the entire sulfur content of
fuel is emitted in the form of SO2.\1088\ Total
SO2 emissions under each alternative CAFE standard were
calculated by applying the resulting emission rates directly to
estimated annual gasoline and diesel fuel use by cars and light trucks.
Changes in emissions of criteria air pollutants resulting from
alternative increases in CAFE standards for MY 2017-2025 cars
[[Page 63003]]
and light trucks are calculated as the difference between emissions
under each alternative increase in CAFE standards, and emissions under
the baseline alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1087\ The MOVES model assumes that the per-mile rates at which
these pollutants are emitted are determined by EPA regulations and
the effectiveness of catalytic after-treatment of engine exhaust
emissions, and are thus unaffected by changes in car and light truck
fuel economy.
\1088\ These are 30 and 15 parts per million (ppm, measured on a
mass basis) for gasoline and diesel respectively, which produces
emission rates of 0.17 grams of SO2 per gallon of
gasoline and 0.10 grams per gallon of diesel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emissions of criteria air pollutants also occur during each phase
of fuel production and distribution, including crude oil extraction and
transportation, fuel refining, and fuel storage and transportation.
NHTSA estimates the reductions in criteria pollutant emissions from
producing and distributing fuel that would occur under alternative CAFE
standards using emission rates obtained by EPA using Argonne National
Laboratories' Greenhouse Gases and Regulated Emissions in
Transportation (GREET) model, which provides estimates of air pollutant
emissions that occur during different phases of fuel production and
distribution 1089,1090 EPA modified the GREET model to
change certain assumptions about emissions during crude petroleum
extraction and transportation, as well as to update its emission rates
to reflect adopted and pending EPA emission standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1089\ Argonne National Laboratories, The Greenhouse Gas and
Regulated Emissions from Transportation (GREET) Model, Version
1.8c.0, April 2008. This version of the model is no longer
available; for updated versions, see http://greet.es.anl.gov/greet_1_series (last accessed July 12, 2012).
\1090\ Emissions that occur during vehicle refueling at retail
gasoline stations (primarily evaporative emissions of volatile
organic compounds, or VOCs) are already accounted for in the
``tailpipe'' emission factors used to estimate the emissions
generated by increased light truck use. GREET estimates emissions in
each phase of gasoline production and distribution in mass per unit
of gasoline energy content; these factors are then converted to mass
per gallon of gasoline using the average energy content of gasoline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA used the resulting emission rates, together with its previous
estimates of how reductions in total fuel use would be reflected in
reductions in domestic fuel refining and crude petroleum production, to
calculate emissions of each criteria pollutant that would occur during
domestic fuel production, as well as in the distribution of domestic
and imported fuel within the U.S. The agency's analysis assumes that
reductions in imports of refined fuel would reduce domestic emissions
of criteria pollutants during the fuel storage and distribution stages
only. Reductions in domestic fuel refining using imported crude oil are
assumed to reduce emissions during fuel refining, as well as during
fuel storage and distribution. Finally, reduced domestic fuel refining
using domestically-produced crude oil is assumed to reduce emissions
during all phases of fuel production and distribution.\1091\ As with
emissions from vehicle use, the impact of alternative CAFE standards on
total emissions from fuel production and distribution is estimated as
the difference between emissions under the baseline alternative, and
emissions with a higher CAFE standard in effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1091\ In effect, this assumes that the distances crude oil
travels to U.S. refineries are approximately the same regardless of
whether it travels from domestic oilfields or import terminals, and
that the distances that gasoline travels from refineries to retail
stations are approximately the same as those from import terminals
to gasoline stations. We note that while assuming that all changes
in upstream emissions result from a decrease in petroleum production
and transport, our analysis of downstream criteria pollutant impacts
assumes no change in the composition of the gasoline fuel supply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, NHTSA calculated the net changes in domestic emissions of
each criteria pollutant by combining the increases in emissions
projected to result from increased vehicle use with the reductions
anticipated to result from lower domestic fuel refining and
distribution.\1092\ As indicated previously, the effect of adopting
higher CAFE standards on total emissions of each criteria pollutant
depends on the relative magnitudes of the resulting reduction in
emissions from fuel refining and distribution, and the increase in
emissions from additional vehicle use. Although these net changes vary
significantly among individual criteria pollutants, the agency projects
that on balance, adopting higher CAFE standards for MY 2017-25 cars and
light trucks would reduce emissions of all criteria air pollutants
except carbon monoxide (CO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1092\ All emissions from increased vehicle use are assumed to
occur within the U.S., since CAFE standards would apply only to
vehicles produced for sale in the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The net changes in direct emissions of fine particulates
(PM2.5) and other criteria pollutants that contribute to the
formation of ``secondary'' fine particulates in the atmosphere (such as
NOX, SOX, and VOCs) are converted to economic
values using estimates of the reductions in health damage costs per ton
of emissions of each pollutant that would be avoided, which were
developed by EPA. These savings represent reductions in the value of
damages to human health resulting from lower atmospheric concentrations
and population exposure to air pollution that result from lower when
emissions of each pollutant that contributes to atmospheric
PM2.5 concentrations. The value of reductions in the risk of
premature death due to exposure to fine particulate pollution
(PM2.5) account for the majority of EPA's estimated values
of reducing criteria pollutant emissions, although the value of
avoiding other health impacts is also included in these estimates.
These values do not include a number of unquantified benefits, such
as reductions in the impacts of PM2.5 pollution on the
natural environment, or reductions in health and welfare impacts
related to other criteria air pollutants (ozone, NO2, and
SO2) and air toxics. EPA estimates different per-ton values
for reducing emissions of PM2.5 and other criteria
pollutants from vehicle use than for reductions in emissions of those
same pollutants during fuel production and distribution; differences in
these values primarily reflect differences in population exposure to
these separate sources of emissions.\1093\ NHTSA applies these separate
values to its estimates of changes in emissions from vehicle use and
from fuel production and distribution to determine the net change in
total economic damages from emissions of these pollutants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1093\ These reflect differences in the typical geographic
distributions of emissions of each pollutant, their contributions to
ambient PM2.5 concentrations, pollution levels
(predominantly those of PM2.5), and resulting changes in
population exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA projects that the per-ton values for reducing emissions of
criteria pollutants from both mobile sources (including motor vehicles)
and stationary sources such as fuel refineries and storage facilities
will increase rapidly over time. These projected increases reflect
rising income levels, which are assumed to increase affected
individuals' willingness to pay for reduced exposure to health threats
from air pollution. They also reflect expected future population
growth, which is anticipated to increase population exposure to
potentially harmful levels of air pollution.
The commenter Growth Energy urged the agency to evaluate the effect
of increased use of gasoline direct injection technology on emissions
of fine particulate matter, as well as the potential for more
widespread ethanol use and after-treatment technologies to decrease
such emissions. In response, NHTSA reiterates that this final rule does
not require vehicle manufacturers to employ specific technologies;
instead, it specifies the fuel economy levels they must achieve, while
leaving decisions about the use of available technologies to individual
manufacturers. In making these choices, manufacturers must continue to
comply with EPA's standards for emissions of fine particulate matter
and other criteria air pollutants, and this requirement limits the
potential impact of their choices on
[[Page 63004]]
fleet-wide average emissions of each pollutant.
ii. Reductions in CO2 Emissions
Emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) occur
throughout the process of producing and distributing transportation
fuels, as well as from fuel combustion itself. Emissions of GHGs also
occur in generating electricity, which NHTSA's analysis anticipates
will account for a small but growing share of energy consumption by
cars and light trucks produced in the model years that would be subject
to the final standards. By reducing the volume of fuel consumed by
passenger cars and light trucks, higher CAFE standards will reduce GHG
emissions generated by fuel combustion, as well as throughout the fuel
supply system. Lowering these emissions is likely to slow the projected
pace and reduce the ultimate extent of future changes in the global
climate, thus reducing future economic damages that changes in the
global climate are expected to cause. By reducing the probability that
climate changes with potentially catastrophic economic or environmental
impacts will occur, lowering GHG emissions may also result in economic
benefits that exceed the resulting reduction in the expected future
economic costs caused by more gradual changes in the earth's climatic
systems.
Quantifying and monetizing benefits from reducing GHG emissions is
thus an important step in estimating the total economic benefits likely
to result from establishing higher CAFE standards. Because carbon
dioxide emissions account for nearly 95 percent of total GHG emissions
that result from fuel combustion during vehicle use, NHTSA's analysis
of the effect of higher CAFE standards on GHG emissions focuses mainly
on estimating changes in emissions of CO2. The agency
estimates emissions of CO2 from passenger car and light
truck use by multiplying the number of gallons of each type of fuel
(gasoline and diesel) they are projected to consume under alternative
CAFE standards by the mass of CO2 emissions released per
gallon of fuel consumed. This calculation assumes that the entire
carbon content of each fuel is converted to CO2 emissions
during the combustion process. For other GHGs, NHTSA calculates annual
emissions from vehicle use by multiplying its estimates of car and
light truck use during each future year by per-mile emission rates for
each vehicle class, fuel type, model year, and age.
NHTSA estimates emissions of CO2 and other GHGs that
occur during fuel production and distribution using emission rates for
each stage of this process (feedstock production and transportation,
fuel refining and fuel storage and distribution) derived from Argonne
National Laboratories' Greenhouse Gases and Regulated Emissions in
Transportation (GREET) model. For liquid fuels, NHTSA converts these
rates to a per-gallon basis using the energy content of each fuel, and
multiplies them by the number of gallons of each type of fuel produced
and consumed under alternative standards to estimate total GHG
emissions from fuel production and distribution. GREET supplies
emission rates for electricity generation that are expressed as grams
of CO2 per unit of energy, so these rates are simply
multiplied by the estimates of electrical energy used to charge the on-
board storage batteries of plug-in hybrid and battery electric
vehicles.
As with other effects of alternative CAFE standards, the reductions
in emissions of CO2 and other GHGs resulting from each
alternative increase is measured by the difference in total emissions
from producing and consuming fuel energy used by MY 2017-25 cars and
light trucks with a higher CAFE standard in effect, and total emissions
from supplying and using fuel energy consumed under the baseline
alternative. Unlike criteria pollutants, the agency's estimates of GHG
emissions include those occurring in overseas production of petroleum
and refined fuel for export to the U.S., as well as during domestic
fuel production and consumption. Overseas emissions are included
because GHG emissions throughout the world contribute equally to the
potential for future changes in the global climate.
iii. Economic Value of Reducing CO2 Emissions
NHTSA takes the economic benefits from reducing CO2
emissions into account in developing and analyzing the alternative CAFE
standards it has considered for MY 2017-25. Because research on the
impacts of climate change does not produce direct estimates of the
economic benefits from reducing CO2 or other GHG emissions,
these benefits are assumed to be the ``mirror image'' of the estimated
incremental costs resulting from increases in emissions. Thus the
benefits from reducing CO2 emissions are usually measured by
the savings in estimated economic damages that an equivalent increase
in emissions would otherwise have caused, although they can also be
measured in other ways. While the agency did not include estimates of
the economic benefits from reducing GHGs other than CO2 in
its analysis of alternative CAFE standards for the NPRM, in response to
comments from CBD \1094\ and EDF,\1095\ we have added a sensitivity
analysis that estimates these benefits using the ``GWP method'' for the
final rule; see Chapter X of the Final RIA for details and results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1094\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 7.
\1095\ EDF, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0302, at 11-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA estimates the value of the reductions in emissions of
CO2 resulting from adopting alternative CAFE standards using
a measure usually referred to as the ``social cost of carbon'' (or
SCC). The SCC is intended to provide a monetary measure of the
additional economic impacts likely to result from changes in the global
climate that would result from an incremental increase in
CO2 emissions. These potential effects include changes in
agricultural productivity, the economic damages caused by adverse
effects on human health, property losses and damages resulting from
rising sea levels, and the value of ecosystem services. The SCC is
expressed in (constant) dollars per additional metric ton of
CO2 emissions occurring during a specific future year. The
SCC is higher for more distant future years, because the climate-
related economic damages caused by an additional ton of emissions are
projected to increase as larger concentrations of CO2
accumulate in the earth's atmosphere.
Reductions in CO2 emissions that are projected to result
from lower fuel production and consumption during each year over the
lifetimes of MY 2017-25 cars and light trucks are multiplied by the
estimated SCC appropriate for that year to determine the economic
benefit from reducing emissions during that year. The net present value
of these annual benefits is calculated using a discount rate that is
consistent with that used to develop each alternative estimate of the
SCC. This calculation is repeated for the reductions in CO2
emissions projected to result from each alternative increase in CAFE
standards.
NHTSA's evaluates the economic benefits from reducing
CO2 emissions using estimates of the SCC developed by an
interagency working group convened for the specific purpose of
developing new estimates for use by U.S. Federal agencies in regulatory
evaluations. The group's purpose in developing new estimates of the SCC
was to allow Federal agencies to incorporate the
[[Page 63005]]
social benefits of reducing CO2 emissions into cost-benefit
analyses of regulatory actions that have individually modest impacts on
cumulative global emissions, as most Federal regulatory actions can be
expected to have. NHTSA previously relied on the SCC estimates
developed by this interagency group to analyze the alternative CAFE
standards it considered for MY 2012-16 cars and light trucks, as well
as the fuel efficiency standards it adopted for MY 2014-18 heavy-duty
vehicles.
The interagency group convened on a regular basis over the period
from June 2009 through February 2010, to explore technical literature
in relevant fields and develop key inputs and assumptions necessary to
generate estimates of the SCC. Agencies participating in the
interagency process included the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Transportation, and
Treasury. This process was convened by the Council of Economic Advisers
and the Office of Management and Budget, with active participation and
regular input from the Council on Environmental Quality, National
Economic Council, Office of Energy and Climate Change, and Office of
Science and Technology Policy.
The interagency group's main objective was to develop a range of
SCC values using clearly articulated input assumptions grounded in the
existing scientific and economic literatures, in conjunction with a
range of models that employ different representations of climate change
and its economic impacts. The group clearly acknowledged the many
uncertainties that its process identified, and recommended that its
estimates of the SCC should be updated periodically to incorporate
developing knowledge of the science and economics of climate impacts.
The group ultimately selected four SCC values for use in federal
regulatory analyses. Three values were based on the average of SCC
estimates developed using three different climate economic models
(referred to as integrated assessment models), using discount rates of
2.5, 3, and 5 percent. The fourth value, which represents the 95th
percentile SCC estimate from the combined distribution of values
generated by the three models at a 3 percent discount rate, represents
the possibility of extreme climate impacts from the accumulation of
GHGs in the earth's atmosphere, and the consequently larger economic
damages.
Table IV-15 summarizes the interagency group's estimates of the SCC
during various future years, which the agency has updated to 2010
dollars to correspond to the other values it uses to estimate economic
benefits from the alternative CAFE standards considered in this final
rule.\1096\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1096\ The SCC estimates reported in the table assume that the
damages resulting from increased emissions are constant for small
departures from the baseline emissions forecast incorporated in each
estimate, an approximation that is reasonable for policies with
projected effects on CO2 emissions that are small
relative to cumulative global emissions.
Table IV-15--NHTSA Estimate of Social Cost of CO[ihel2] Emissions for Selected Future Years
[2010$ per metric ton]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discount rate 5% 3% 2.5% 3%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source Average of estimates 95th
percentile
estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012.............................................................. $5.33 $23.26 $37.87 $70.88
2015.............................................................. 5.97 24.82 39.94 75.77
2017.............................................................. 6.39 25.86 41.32 79.10
2020.............................................................. 7.03 27.42 43.38 83.99
2025.............................................................. 8.59 30.77 47.73 94.09
2030.............................................................. 10.14 34.12 52.07 104.08
2035.............................................................. 11.70 37.48 56.42 114.17
2040.............................................................. 13.26 40.83 60.76 124.16
2045.............................................................. 14.82 43.794 64.22 133.01
2050.............................................................. 16.38 46.76 67.68 141.75
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Table IV-15 shows, the four SCC estimates selected by the
interagency group for use in regulatory analyses are $6, $26, $41, and
$79 per metric ton (in 2010 dollars) for emissions that occurr during
the year 2017. The value that the interagency group centered its
attention on is the average SCC estimate developed using different
models and a 3 percent discount rate, which corresponds to the $26 per
metric ton figure shown in the table for 2017. To capture the
uncertainties involved in regulatory impact analysis, however, the
group emphasized the importance of considering the full range of
estimated SCC values. As the table also shows, the SCC estimates also
rise over time; for example, the average SCC at the 3 percent discount
rate increases to $27 per metric ton of CO2 by 2020, and
reaches $47 per metric ton of CO2 in 2050.
Details of the process used by the interagency group to develop its
SCC estimates, complete results including year-by-year estimates of
each of the four values, and a thorough discussion of their intended
use and limitations is provided in the document Social Cost of Carbon
for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States Government,
February 2010.\1097\
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\1097\ This document is available in the docket for the 2012-
2016 rulemaking (NHTSA-2009-0059).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies received a number of lengthy, detailed comments on the
SCC values recommended by the interagency group, as well as on the
process the group used to develop them. Most of these comments
addressed the topics of incorporating updated knowledge about climate
impacts, more fully considering the potential for catastrophic impacts
of future climate change, valuing the population's presumed aversion to
the risk of significant climate impacts on economic well-being, and the
discount rate used to convert distant future economic impacts to their
present values. EDF, NRDC, and IPI each urged the agency to revise its
estimates of the SCC to incorporate recent improvements in
understanding the range and severity of economic impacts from climate
change. NRDC and EDF noted that the three integrated assessment models
used
[[Page 63006]]
by the federal interagency group to develop the SCC estimates used to
analyze the proposed rule have been updated to reflect recent estimates
of climate sensitivity to GHG accumulations and to expand the range of
monetized economic damages resulting from climate change, and
encouraged the agency to update its estimates of the SCC using these
newest versions of these models. NRDC further recommended that these
models be updated to reflect recent research identifying adverse
climate impacts on agricultural productivity. EDF and IPI recommended
that the agency provide a complete listing of known and potential
economic damages resulting from climate change, identify which of these
were monetized in the interagency group's estimates of the SCC, and
explicitly note which of them were excluded. NRDC urged NHTSA to
develop ``multipliers'' that could be applied to reductions in the use
value of natural resources and ecosystem services to account for
accompanying reductions in their non-use values (that is, the value
that non-users attached to the option of having them available).
All three commenters also urged the agency to revise its SCC
estimates to more fully reflect the potential for catastrophic economic
damages resulting from future climate change. NRDC recommended doing so
by integrating such damages directly into the three integrated
assessment models used by the interagency group, while IPI recommended
adjusting those models' estimates of benefits from reducing GHG
emissions to account for their undervaluation of the risk and magnitude
of catastrophic damages. EDF urged revisions to the mathematical form
of the models' functions relating GHG accumulations to changes in
global climate indicators and resulting economic damages, in order to
remedy what EDF views as their underestimation of the probability that
such damages will result. NRDC also recommended that the agency report
the magnitude of extremely low-probability economic damages in order to
inform the public and decision-makers about the impact of catastrophic
scenarios. NRDC also urged the agency to conduct sensitivity analysis
of the SCC using various ``equity weights,'' which would increase the
value of climate damages likely to be experienced by lower-income
regions of the world.
IPI, EDF, and NRDC each urged the agency to incorporate the
economic value of the population's aversion to the risk of large losses
in welfare in its SCC estimates. Specifically, the commenters
recommended that the SCC be revised to include a measure of the typical
consumer's willingness to sacrifice current income to avoid being
exposed to the risk of a large welfare loss from potential climate
change. Including such a ``risk premium,'' which would be in addition
to the conventional expected value of damages from different degrees of
potential climate change, could increase the agency's estimates of the
SCC significantly. IPI noted that such a risk premium could be
approximated by reducing the discount rate applied to future climate-
related economic damages if it could not be estimated directly, while
NRDC referred the agency to published research describing a recently-
developed alternative method for incorporating the value of risk
aversion.
Finally, all three of the same commenters urged NHTSA to base its
estimates of the SCC on lower discount rates than those the interagency
group applied to future economic damages, which would increase the
agency's SCC values. NRDC noted that OMB Circular A-4 recommends a 1%
rate as a lower bound for discounting where future benefits or costs
will be experienced by future generations, and also pointed out that
short-term interest rates are currently well below this figure. As an
alternative, NRDC recommended using declining future discount rates to
account for more fully for long-run uncertainty about interest rates
than the procedure used by the interagency group. EDF similarly
encouraged the agency to reduce the discount rates incorporated in the
interagency group's SCC estimates below 3%, and also to consider using
declining discount rates to account more appropriately for scientific
and economic uncertainty surrounding the correct social discount rate
for use over long time periods.
Finally, NRDC noted than an alternative to using the SCC to value
reductions in GHG emissions would be to estimate the cost of achieving
the final reduction in emissions necessary to reach a target emissions
level (or ``marginal abatement cost'') that is consistent with the
maximum acceptable degree of climate change. While NRDC acknowledged
that the determination of what constitutes an acceptable degree of
climate change would ultimately be a political decision, the associated
level of emissions and the marginal cost of reducing emissions to that
level from today's baseline could be determined scientifically with
reasonable accuracy and allowing some margin for error.
The agency appreciates the careful thought and detailed analyses
that are reflected in the extensive comments it received on the SCC. In
the time frame for evaluating and adopting this final rule, however,
NHTSA judged that it would be impractical to replicate the detailed
process the federal interagency group used to produce its recommended
values for the SCC, and to develop the updated input assumptions and
revised modeling procedures advocated by the commenters. Additionally,
other federal agencies use the SCC estimates to analyze benefits of
rulemakings, and consistency across government analyses is useful in
this regard. If the SCC estimates are to be updated in the future, an
interagency-group approach is likely to be a more fruitful way of
accomplishing that than NHTSA attempting the process on its own.
Recognizing this, the agency has elected to continue using the
interagency group's recommended SCC values to estimate the economic
benefits stemming from the reductions in GHG emissions that are
projected to result from this final rule.
m. Discounting Future Benefits and Costs
Discounting future fuel savings and other benefits is intended to
account for the reduction in their value when they are deferred or will
not occur until some future date, rather than received immediately. The
value of benefits that are not expected to occur until the future is
lower partly because people value current consumption more highly than
equivalent consumption at some future date--stated simply, they are
impatient--and partly because they expect their living standards to be
higher in the future, so the same amount of additional consumption will
improve their well-being by more today than it will in the future. The
discount rate expresses the percent decline in the value of these
benefits--as viewed from today's perspective--for each year they are
deferred into the future. In evaluating the benefits from alternative
increases in CAFE standards for MY 2017-2025 passenger cars and light
trucks, NHTSA employs discount rates of both 3 and 7 percent per year,
in accordance with OMB guidance.
While we present results that reflect both discount rates, NHTSA
believes that the 3 percent rate is more appropriate for discounting
future benefits from increased CAFE standards, because the agency
expects that most or all of vehicle manufacturers' costs for complying
with higher CAFE standards will ultimately be reflected in higher
selling prices for their new vehicle models. By increasing sales prices
for new cars and light trucks, CAFE regulations will thus primarily
affect
[[Page 63007]]
vehicle purchases and other private consumption decisions. Both
economic theory and OMB guidance on discounting indicate that the
future benefits and costs of regulations that mainly affect private
consumption should be discounted at consumers' rate of time
preference.\1098\
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\1098\ For example, OMB Circular A-4 states that ``When
regulation primarily and directly affects private consumption (e.g.,
through higher consumer prices for goods and services), a lower
[than 7 percent] discount rate is appropriate. The alternative most
often used is sometimes called the ``social rate of time
preference.'' This simply means the rate at which ``society''
discounts future consumption flows to their present value. Available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4 (last accessed
Jul. 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current OMB guidance further indicates that savers appear to
discount future consumption at an average real (that is, adjusted to
remove the effect of inflation) rate of about 3 percent when they face
little risk about the future. Since the real interest rate that savers
require to persuade them to defer consumption into the future
represents a reasonable estimate of consumers' rate of time preference,
NHTSA believes that the 3 percent rate is more appropriate for
discounting projected future benefits and costs resulting from higher
CAFE standards.
Because there is some uncertainty about whether vehicle
manufacturers will completely recover their costs for complying with
higher CAFE standards by increasing vehicle sales prices, however,
NHTSA also presents benefit and cost estimates discounted using a
higher rate. To the extent that manufacturers are unable to recover
their costs for meeting higher CAFE standards by increasing new vehicle
prices, these costs are likely to displace other investment
opportunities available to them. OMB guidance indicates that the real
economy-wide opportunity cost of capital is the appropriate discount
rate to apply to future benefits and costs when the primary effect of a
regulation is ``* * * to displace or alter the use of capital in the
private sector,'' and OMB estimates that this rate currently averages
about 7 percent.\1099\ Thus the agency's analysis of alternative
increases in CAFE standards for MY 2017-25 cars and light trucks also
reports benefits and costs discounted at a 7 percent rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1099\ Id.
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UCS supported the agencies' use of 3 and 7 percent discount rates
in the analysis for the final rule,\1100\ while API commented that EIA
used a discount rate of 15 percent in the analysis for AEO 2011 when
evaluating the cost-effectiveness of vehicle fuel efficiency-improving
technology, and stated that a similar rate employed in the CAFE
analysis would reduce the present value of fuel savings by about 40-50
percent.\1101\ NHTSA notes that the 15 percent rate recommended by API
is more than double the higher rate prescribed by OMB for use in
regulatory analysis. It is thus likely to be more appropriate for
evaluating investments in future fuel-saving technologies that are as
yet unknown or unproven, and are consequently viewed as extremely risky
from today's perspective. Thus the agency has elected to retain the 3
and 7 percent discount rates in its evaluation of future benefits from
adopting this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1100\ UCS, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, at 13.
\1101\ API attachment, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0238, at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One important exception to the agency's use of 3 percent and 7
percent discount rates is arises in discounting benefits from reducing
CO2 emissions over the lifetimes of MY 2017-2025 cars and
light trucks to their present values. In order to ensure consistency in
the derivation and use of the interagency group's estimates of the unit
values of reducing CO2 emissions (or SCC), the benefits from
reducing CO2 emissions during each future year are
discounted using the same ``intergenerational'' discount rates that
were used to derive each of the alternative values. As indicated in
Table IV-15 above, these rates are 2.5 percent, 3 percent, and 5
percent depending on which estimate of the SCC is being employed.\1102\
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\1102\ The fact that the 3 percent discount rate used by the
interagency group to derive its central estimate of the SCC is
identical to the 3 percent short-term or ``intra-generational''
discount rate used by NHTSA to discount future benefits other than
reductions in CO2 emissions is coincidental, and should
not be interpreted as a required condition that must be satisfied in
future rulemakings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
n. Accounting for Uncertainty in Benefits and Costs
In analyzing the uncertainty surrounding its estimates of benefits
and costs from alternative CAFE standards, NHTSA considers alternative
estimates of those assumptions and parameters that are subject to the
most uncertainty, and where alternative values are likely to have the
largest effect. These include the distribution of sales of MY 2017-25
vehicles between passenger cars and light trucks, expected lifetime
utilization of cars and light trucks, the payback period assumed by
manufacturers when choosing to adopt fuel economy technologies,
projected costs of fuel economy-improving technologies and their
anticipated effectiveness in reducing fuel consumption, forecasts of
future fuel prices, the magnitude of the rebound effect, the value of
reducing CO2 emissions (the SCC), and the reduction in
external economic costs resulting from lower U.S. oil imports. The
range for each of these variables employed in the uncertainty analysis
was previously identified in the sections of this notice discussing
each variable.
The uncertainty analysis was conducted by assuming either
independent normal or beta probability distributions for each of these
variables, using the low and high estimates for each variable as the
limits between which 90 percent of observed values are expected to
fall. In cases where the data on the possible distribution of
parameters was relatively sparse, making the choice of distributions
difficult, a beta distribution is commonly employed to give more weight
to both tails than would be the case had a normal distribution been
employed. Each trial of the uncertainty analysis employed a set of
values randomly drawn from these probability distributions, under the
assumption that the value of each variable is independent from those of
the others. Benefits and costs of each alternative standard were
estimated using each combination of variables, and a total of nearly
40,000 trials were used to estimate the likely range of estimated
benefits and costs for each alternative standard.
o. Where can readers find more information about the economic
assumptions?
Much more detailed information is provided in Chapter VIII of the
FRIA, and a discussion of how NHTSA and EPA jointly reviewed and
updated economic assumptions for purposes of this final rule is
available in Chapter 4 of the Joint TSD. In addition, all of NHTSA's
model input and output files are now public and available for the
reader's review and consideration. The economic input files can be
found in the docket for this final rule, NHTSA-2010-0131, and on
NHTSA's Web site.\1103\
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\1103\ See http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, because much of NHTSA's economic analysis for purposes of
this final rule builds on the work that was done for the final rule
establishing CAFE standards for MYs 2012-16, we refer readers to that
document as well. It contains valuable background information
concerning how NHTSA's assumptions regarding economic inputs for CAFE
analysis have evolved over the past several rulemakings, both in
response to comments and as a result of
[[Page 63008]]
the agency's growing experience with this type of analysis.\1104\
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\1104\ 74 FR 14308-14358 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. How does NHTSA use the assumptions in its modeling analysis?
In developing today's CAFE standards, NHTSA has made significant
use of results produced by the CAFE Compliance and Effects Model
(commonly referred to as ``the CAFE Model'' or ``the Volpe model''),
which DOT's Volpe National Transportation Systems Center developed,
expanded, and refined over time specifically to support NHTSA's CAFE
rulemakings. The model, which has been constructed specifically for the
purpose of analyzing potential CAFE standards, integrates the following
core capabilities:
(1) Estimating how manufacturers could apply technologies in
response to new fuel economy standards,
(2) Estimating the costs that would be incurred in applying these
technologies,
(3) Estimating the physical effects resulting from the application
of these technologies, such as changes in travel demand, fuel
consumption, and emissions of carbon dioxide and criteria pollutants,
and
(4) Estimating the monetized societal benefits of these physical
effects.
An overview of the model follows below. Separate model
documentation provides a detailed explanation of the functions the
model performs, the calculations it performs in doing so, and how to
install the model, construct inputs to the model, and interpret the
model's outputs. Documentation of the model, along with model
installation files, source code, and sample inputs are available at
NHTSA's Web site.\1105\ The model documentation is also available in
the docket for today's rule, as are inputs for and outputs from
analysis of today's CAFE standards.\1106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1105\ http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
\1106\ Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. How does the model operate?
As discussed above, the agency uses the CAFE model to estimate how
manufacturers could attempt to comply with a given CAFE standard by
adding technology to fleets that the agency anticipates they will
produce in future model years. This exercise constitutes a simulation
of manufacturers' decisions regarding compliance with CAFE standards.
This compliance simulation begins with the following inputs: (a)
the baseline and reference market forecasts discussed above in Section
IV.C.1 and Chapter 1 of the TSD, (b) technology-related estimates
discussed above in Section IV.C.2 and Chapter 3 of the TSD, (c)
economic inputs discussed above in Section IV.C.3 and Chapter 4 of the
TSD, and (d) inputs defining baseline and potential new CAFE standards.
For each manufacturer, the model applies technologies in a sequence
that follows a defined engineering logic (``decision trees,'' discussed
in the MY 2011 final rule and in the model documentation) and a cost-
minimizing strategy in order to identify a set of technologies the
manufacturer could apply in response to new CAFE standards.\1107\ The
model applies technologies to each of the projected individual vehicles
in a manufacturer's fleet, considering the combined effect of
regulatory and market incentives. Depending on how the model is
exercised, it will apply technology until one of the following occurs:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1107\ NHTSA does its best to remain scrupulously neutral in the
application of technologies through the modeling analysis, to avoid
picking technology ``winners.'' The technology application
methodology has been reviewed by the agency over the course of
several rulemakings, and commenters have been generally supportive
of the agency's approach. See, e.g., 74 FR 14238-14246 (Mar. 30,
2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) The manufacturer's fleet achieves compliance \1108\ with the
applicable standard, and continuing to add technology in the current
model year would be attractive neither in terms of stand-alone (i.e.,
absent regulatory need) cost-effectiveness nor in terms of facilitating
compliance in future model years; \1109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1108\ Prior to the NPRM, DOT modified the model to provide the
ability--as an option--to account for credit mechanisms (i.e.,
carry-forward, carry-back, transfers, and trades) when determining
whether compliance has been achieved. For purposes of determining
the effect of maximum feasible CAFE standards, NHTSA cannot consider
these mechanisms, and exercises the CAFE model without enabling
these options.
\1109\ In preparation for the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, the
model was modified in order to apply additional technology in early
model years if doing so will facilitate compliance in later model
years. This is designed to simulate a manufacturer's decision to
plan for CAFE obligations several years in advance (often described
as ``multi-year planning''). NHTSA believes that integrating multi-
year planning in the modeling analysis better informs the agency
with regard to what levels of standards may be maximum feasible in
each model year, as required by EPCA/EISA, because it better
replicates manufacturers' actual behavior as compared to the year-
by-year evaluation which EPCA/EISA would otherwise imply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) The manufacturer ``exhausts'' \1110\ available technologies; or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1110\ In a given model year, the model makes additional
technologies available to each vehicle model within several
constraints, including (a) whether or not the technology is
applicable to the vehicle model's technology class, (b) whether the
vehicle is undergoing a redesign or freshening in the given model
year, (c) whether engineering aspects of the vehicle make the
technology unavailable (e.g., secondary axle disconnect cannot be
applied to two-wheel drive vehicles), and (d) whether technology
application remains within ``phase in caps'' constraining the
overall share of a manufacturer's fleet to which the technology can
be added in a given model year. Once enough technology is added to a
given manufacturer's fleet in a given model year that these
constraints make further technology application unavailable, the
CAFE model concludes that technologies are ``exhausted'' for that
manufacturer in that model year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) For manufacturers estimated to be willing to pay civil
penalties, the manufacturer reaches the point at which doing so would
be more cost-effective (from the manufacturer's perspective) than
adding further technology.\1111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1111\ This possibility was added to the model to account for
the fact that under EPCA/EISA, manufacturers must pay civil
penalties if they do not achieve compliance with applicable CAFE
standards. 49 U.S.C. 32912(b). NHTSA recognizes that some
manufacturers will find it more cost-effective to pay civil
penalties than to achieve compliance, and believes that to assume
these manufacturers would exhaust available technologies before
paying civil penalties would cause unrealistically high estimates of
market penetration of expensive technologies such as diesel engines
and strong HEVs, as well as correspondingly inflated estimates of
both the costs and benefits of any potential CAFE standards. NHTSA
thus includes the possibility of manufacturers choosing to pay civil
penalties in its modeling analysis in order to achieve what the
agency believes is a more realistic simulation of manufacturer
decision-making. Unlike flex-fuel and other credits, NHTSA is not
barred by statute from considering fine-payment in determining
maximum feasible standards under EPCA/EISA. 49 U.S.C. 32902(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed below, the model has also been modified in order to--
as an option--apply more technology than may be necessary for a
manufacturer to achieve compliance in a given model year, or to
facilitate compliance in later model years. This ability to simulate
``market-driven overcompliance'' reflects the potential that
manufacturers will apply some technologies to some vehicles if doing so
would be sufficiently inexpensive compared to the expected reduction in
owners' outlays for fuel.
The model accounts explicitly for each model year, applying most
technologies when vehicles are scheduled to be redesigned or freshened,
and carrying forward technologies between model years once they are
applied (until, if applicable, they are superseded by other
technologies). The CAFE model accounts explicitly for each model year
because EPCA/EISA requires that NHTSA make a year-by-year determination
of the appropriate level of stringency and then set the standard at
that level, while ensuring ratable increases in average fuel
economy.\1112\
[[Page 63009]]
The multi-year planning capability, (optional) simulation of ``market-
driven overcompliance,'' and EPCA credit mechanisms increase the
model's ability to simulate manufacturers' real-world behavior,
accounting for the fact that manufacturers will seek out compliance
paths for several model years at a time, while accommodating the year-
by-year requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1112\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(a) states that at least 18 months before
the beginning of each model year, the Secretary of Transportation
shall prescribe by regulation average fuel economy standards for
automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer in that model year, and
that each standard shall be the maximum feasible average fuel
economy level that the Secretary decides the manufacturers can
achieve in that year. NHTSA has long interpreted this statutory
language to require year-by-year assessment of manufacturer
capabilities. 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(C) also requires that standards
increase ratably between MY 2011 and MY 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The model also calculates the costs, effects, and benefits of
technologies that it estimates could be added in response to a given
CAFE standard.\1113\ It calculates costs by applying the cost
estimation techniques discussed above in Section IV.C.2 (i.e.,
incrementally accumulating additive incremental technology costs
specified separately for discrete technological steps along several
``decision trees,'' and applying adjustments to account for, among
other things, ``learning'' effects), and by accounting for the number
of affected vehicles. It accounts for effects such as changes in
vehicle travel, changes in fuel consumption, and changes in greenhouse
gas and criteria pollutant emissions. It does so by applying the fuel
consumption estimation techniques also discussed in Section IV.C.2
(i.e., incrementally accumulating multiplicative incremental technology
fuel consumption reductions specified separately for discrete
technological steps along several ``decision trees,'' and applying
``synergy'' factors to account for interactions between some
technologies), and the vehicle survival and mileage accumulation
forecasts, the rebound effect estimate and the fuel properties and
emission factors discussed in Section IV.C.3. Considering changes in
travel demand and fuel consumption, the model estimates the monetized
value of accompanying benefits to society, as discussed in Section
IV.C.3. The model calculates both the undiscounted and discounted value
of benefits that accrue over time in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1113\ As for all of its other rulemakings, NHTSA is required by
Executive Order 12866 (as amended by Executive Order 13563) and DOT
regulations to analyze the costs and benefits of CAFE standards.
Executive Order 12866, 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993); DOT Order 2100.5,
``Regulatory Policies and Procedures,'' 1979, available at http://regs.dot.gov/rulemakingrequirements.htm (last accessed July 4,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CAFE model has other capabilities that facilitate the
development of a CAFE standard. The integration of (a) compliance
simulation and (b) the calculation of costs, effects, and benefits
facilitates the agency's analysis of the sensitivity of results to
model inputs. The model can also be used to evaluate many (e.g., 200
per model year) potential levels of stringency sequentially, and to
identify the stringency at which specific criteria are met. For
example, it can identify the stringency at which net benefits to
society are maximized, the stringency at which a specified total cost
is reached, or the stringency at which a given estimated average
required fuel economy level is attained. This allows the agency to
compare more easily the impacts in terms of fuel savings, emissions
reductions, and costs and benefits of achieving different levels of
stringency according to different criteria. The model can also be used
to perform uncertainty analysis (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation), in
which input estimates are varied randomly according to specified
probability distributions, such that the uncertainty of key measures
(e.g., fuel consumption, costs, benefits) can be evaluated.
b. Has NHTSA considered other models?
As discussed in the most recent CAFE rulemaking, while nothing in
EPCA requires NHTSA to use the CAFE model, and in principle, NHTSA
could perform all of these tasks through other means, the model's
capabilities have greatly increased the agency's ability to rapidly,
systematically, transparently, and reproducibly conduct key analyses
relevant to the formulation and evaluation of new CAFE standards.\1114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1114\ 75 FR 25598-25599.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA notes that the CAFE model not only has been formally peer-
reviewed and tested and reviewed through three rulemakings (not include
the current rulemaking), but also has some features especially
important for the analysis of CAFE standards under EPCA/EISA. Among
these are the ability to perform year-by-year analysis, and the ability
to account for engineering differences between specific vehicle models.
EPCA requires that NHTSA set CAFE standards for each model year at
the level that would be ``maximum feasible'' for that year. This
requires the ability to analyze each model year covered by the
regulatory period to account for the interdependency in terms of the
appropriate levels of stringency for every model year. Also, as part of
the evaluation of the economic practicability of the standards, as
required by EPCA, NHTSA has traditionally assessed the annual costs and
benefits of the standards. In response to comments regarding an early
version of the CAFE model, DOT modified the CAFE model in order to
account for dependencies between model years and to better represent
manufacturers' planning cycles, in a way that still allowed NHTSA to
comply with the statutory requirement to determine the appropriate
level of the standards for each model year.
The CAFE model is also able to account for important engineering
differences between specific vehicle models by combining technologies
incrementally and on a model-by-model basis, and thus reduce the risk
of creating unlikely technology combinations by applying technologies
that may be incompatible with or already present on a given vehicle
model. The CAFE model produces a single vehicle-level output file that,
for each vehicle model, shows which technologies were present at the
outset of modeling, which technologies were superseded by other
technologies, and which technologies were ultimately present at the
conclusion of modeling. For each vehicle, the same file shows resultant
changes in vehicle weight, fuel economy, and cost. This provides for
efficient identification, analysis, and correction of errors, a task
with which members of the public can assist the agency if they are so
inclined, since all inputs and outputs are public.
Such considerations, as well as those related to the efficiency
with which the CAFE model is able to analyze attribute-based CAFE
standards and changes in vehicle classification, and to perform higher-
level analysis such as stringency estimation (to meet predetermined
criteria), sensitivity analysis, and uncertainty analysis, lead the
agency to conclude that the model remains the best available to the
agency for the purposes of analyzing potential new CAFE standards.
c. What changes has DOT made to the model?
Between promulgation of the MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards and last
year's proposal regarding MY 2017-2025 standards, the CAFE model was
revised to make some minor improvements, and to add some significant
new capabilities: (1) Accounting for electricity used to charge
electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs),
(2) accounting for use of ethanol blends in flexible-fuel vehicles
(FFVs), (3) accounting for costs (i.e., ``stranded capital'') related
to early replacement of technologies, (4) accounting for
[[Page 63010]]
previously-applied technology when determining the extent to which a
manufacturer could expand use of the technology, (5) applying
technology-specific estimates of changes in consumer value, (6)
simulating the extent to which manufacturers might utilize EPCA's
provisions regarding generation and use of CAFE credits, (7) applying
estimates of fuel economy adjustments (and accompanying costs)
reflecting increases in air conditioner efficiency, (8) reporting
privately-valued benefits, (9) simulating the extent to which
manufacturers might voluntarily apply technology beyond levels needed
for compliance with CAFE standards, and (10) estimating changes in
highway fatalities attributable to any applied reductions in vehicle
mass. These capabilities are described below, and in greater detail in
the CAFE model documentation.
To support evaluation of the effects that electric vehicles (EVs)
and plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs) could have on energy consumption
and associated costs and environmental effects, DOT expanded the CAFE
model to estimate the amount of electricity that would be required to
charge these vehicles (accounting for the potential that PHEVs can also
run on gasoline), taking into account input assumptions regarding the
share of PHEV operation that would rely on electricity. The model
calculates the cost of this electricity, as well as the accompanying
upstream criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions. Related
inputs applied for today's analysis are presented in chapters V and
VIII of the FRIA.
Similar to this expansion to account for the potential that PHEVs
can be refueled with gasoline or recharged with electricity, DOT
expanded the CAFE model to account for the potential that other
flexible-fuel vehicles (FFVs) can be operated on multiple fuels. In
particular, the model can account for ethanol FFVs consuming E85 or
gasoline, taking into account input assumptions regarding the share of
FFV operation that would rely on E85 (see chapters V and VIII of the
FRIA), and report consumption of both fuels, as well as corresponding
costs and upstream emissions.
Among the concerns raised in the past regarding how technology
costs are estimated has been one that stranded capital costs be
considered. Capital becomes ``stranded'' when capital equipment is
retired or its use is discontinued before the equipment has been fully
depreciated and the equipment still retains some value or usefulness.
DOT modified the CAFE model to apply a stream of costs representing the
stranded capital cost of a replaced technology when that technology is
replaced by a newly applied technology, if specified for a given
technology. This cost is in addition to the cost for producing the
newly applied technology in the first year of production. Stranded
capital costs are discussed more generally in Section II.D above, in
Chapter 3 of the joint TSD, and in Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA.
As documented in prior CAFE rulemakings and in Chapter V of NHTSA's
FRIA, the CAFE model applies ``phase-in caps'' to constrain technology
application at the vehicle manufacturer level. These caps are intended
to reflect a manufacturer's overall resource capacity available for
implementing new technologies (such as engineering and development
personnel and financial resources), thereby ensuring that resource
capacity is accounted for in the modeling process. This helps to ensure
technological feasibility and economic practicability in determining
the stringency of the standards. In the MY 2012-2016 rulemaking
analysis, the model performed the relevant test by comparing a given
phase-in cap to the amount (i.e., the share of the manufacturer's
fleet) to which the technology had been added by the model. DOT
subsequently modified the CAFE model to take into account the extent to
which a given manufacturer has already applied the technology (i.e., as
reflected in the market forecast specified as a model inputs), and to
apply the relevant test based on the total application of the
technology. In NHTSA's judgment, doing so better represents constraints
on the rates at which each manufacturer can add various technologies,
thereby providing a better means of accounting for technological
feasibility and economic practicability of potential standards.
The CAFE model requires inputs defining the technology-specific
cost and effectiveness (i.e., percentage reduction of fuel
consumption). Considering that some technologies may offer owners
greater or lesser value (beyond that related to fuel outlays, which the
model calculates internally based on vehicle fuel type and fuel
economy), the CAFE accepts and applies technology-specific estimates of
any value gain realized or loss incurred by vehicle purchasers.\1115\
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\1115\ For example, a value gain could be specified for a
technology expected to improve ride quality, and a value loss could
be specified for a technology expected to reduce vehicle range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE rulemaking analysis, DOT modified the
CAFE model to accommodate specification and accounting for credits a
manufacturer is assumed to earn by producing flexible fuel vehicles
(FFVs). Although NHTSA cannot consider such credits when determining
maximum feasible CAFE standards, the agency presented an analysis that
included FFV credits, in order to communicate the extent to which use
of such credits might cause actual costs, effects, and benefits to be
lower than estimated in NHTSA's primary analysis. As DOT explained at
the time, it was unable to account for other EPCA credit mechanisms,
because attempts to do so had been limited by complex interactions
between those mechanisms and the multi-year planning aspects of the
CAFE model. DOT subsequently modified the CAFE model to provide the
ability to account for any or all of the following flexibilities
provided by EPCA: FFV credits, credit carry-forward and carry-back
(between model years), credit transfers (between passenger car and
light truck fleets), and credit trades (between manufacturers). The
model accounts for EPCA-specified limitations applicable to these
flexibilities (e.g., limits on the amount of credit that can be
transferred between passenger car and light truck fleets). These
capabilities in the model provide a basis for more accurately
estimating costs, effects, and benefits that may actually result from
new CAFE standards. Insofar as some manufacturers actually do earn and
use CAFE credits, this provides NHTSA with the ability to examine
outcomes more realistically than EPCA allows for purposes of setting
new CAFE standards.
NHTSA is today promulgating CAFE standards reflecting EPA's
changing fuel economy calculation procedures such that a vehicle's fuel
consumption improvement will be accounted for if the vehicle has
technologies that reduce the amount of energy needed to power the air
conditioner. To facilitate analysis of these standards, DOT modified
the CAFE model to account for these adjustments, based on inputs
specifying the average amount of improvement anticipated, and the
estimated average cost to apply the underlying technology. Similarly,
NHTSA's new CAFE standards reflect EPA's further changing fuel economy
calculation procedures to account for some other technologies that
reduce fuel consumption under conditions not represented by the city or
highway test procedures. While DOT was not able to modify the CAFE
model
[[Page 63011]]
prior to the NPRM to account for these adjustments, it has since done
so.
Considering that past CAFE rulemakings indicate that most of the
benefits of CAFE standards are realized by vehicle owners, DOT modified
the CAFE model prior to the NPRM in order to estimate not just social
benefits, but also private benefits. The model accommodates separate
discount rates for these two valuation methods (e.g., a 3% rate for
social benefits with a 7% rate for private benefits). When calculating
private benefits, the model includes changes in outlays for fuel taxes
(which, as economic transfers, are excluded from social benefits) and
excludes changes in economic externalities (e.g., monetized criteria
pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions). Since the NPRM, DOT has
further modified the CAFE model to provide the ability to account for
owners' operating costs including financing, insurance, scheduled
maintenance, and out-of-warranty repairs in response to comment from
NADA suggesting that the agencies should evaluate the effect of the
rulemaking on a vehicle's total cost of ownership.\1116\ Among these,
the model includes only scheduled maintenance and out-of-warranty
repairs in overall estimates of societal costs.
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\1116\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 10.
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Since 2003, the CAFE model, and its predecessors, have provided the
ability to estimate the extent to which a manufacturer with a history
of paying civil penalties allowed under EPCA might decide to add some
fuel-saving technology, but not enough to comply with CAFE standards.
In simulating this decision-making, the model considers the cost to add
the technology, the calculated reduction in civil penalties, and the
calculated present value (at the time of vehicle purchase) of the
change in fuel outlays over a specified ``payback period'' (e.g., 5
years). For a manufacturer assumed to be willing to pay civil
penalties, the model stops adding technology once paying penalties
becomes more attractive than continuing to add technology, considering
these three factors. As an extension of this simulation approach, DOT
has modified the CAFE model to simulate, if specified, the potential
that a manufacturer would add more technology than required for
purposes of compliance with CAFE standards. When set to operate in this
manner, the model will continue to apply technology to a manufacturer's
fleet, even if it already complies with the CAFE standard in that model
year, until applying further technology will incur more in cost than it
will yield in calculated fuel savings over a specified ``payback
period'' (this payback period is set separately from the payback period
that is applicable until compliance is achieved).
In its analysis supporting MY 2012-2016 standards adopted in 2010,
NHTSA estimated the extent to which reductions in vehicle mass might
lead to changes in the number of highway fatalities occurring over the
useful life of the MY 2012-2016 fleet. At that time, NHTSA performed
these calculations outside the CAFE model (using vehicle-specific mass
reduction calculations from the model), based on agency analysis of
relevant highway safety data. DOT has since modified the CAFE model to
perform these calculations based on the underlying statistical analysis
of the safety impacts of vehicle mass reductions discussed in Section
II.G above and in Chapter IX of the FRIA. The model also applies an
input value indicating the economic value of a statistical life, and
includes resultant benefits (or disbenefits) in the calculation of
total social benefits.
In comments on recent NHTSA rulemakings, some reviewers have
suggested that the CAFE model should be modified to estimate the extent
to which new CAFE standards would induce changes in the mix of vehicles
in the new vehicle fleet. NHTSA agrees that a ``market shift'' model,
also called a consumer vehicle choice model, could provide useful
information regarding the possible effects of potential new CAFE
standards. NHTSA has contracted with the Brookings Institution (which
has subcontracted with researchers at U.C. Davis and U.C. Irvine) to
develop a vehicle choice model estimated at the vehicle configuration
level that can be implemented as part of DOT's CAFE model. As discussed
further in Chapter V of the FRIA for MYs 2012-2016, past efforts by DOT
staff demonstrated that a vehicle could be added to the CAFE model, but
did not yield credible coefficients specifying such a model. While the
NHTSA-sponsored effort is still underway and was not completed in time
to incorporate in the analysis for this final rule, if a suitable and
credibly calibrated vehicle choice model becomes available in the
future, DOT may integrate a vehicle choice model into the CAFE model to
support future rulemakings.
NHTSA anticipates this integration of a vehicle choice model would
be structurally and operationally similar to the integration we
implemented previously. As in today's analysis, the CAFE model would
begin with an agency-estimated market forecast, estimate to what extent
manufacturers might apply additional fuel-saving technology to each
vehicle model in consideration of future fuel prices and baseline or
alternative CAFE standards and fuel prices, and calculate resultant
changes in the fuel economy (and possibly fuel type) and price of
individual vehicle models. With an integrated vehicle choice model, the
CAFE model would then estimate how the sales volumes of individual
vehicle models would change in response to changes in fuel economy
levels and prices throughout the light vehicle market, possibly taking
into account interactions with the used vehicle market. Having done so,
the model would replace the sales estimates in the original inputted
market forecast with those reflecting these model-estimated shifts,
repeating the entire modeling cycle until converging on a stable
solution.
Based on past experience, we anticipate that this recursive
simulation will be necessary to ensure consistency between sales
volumes and modeled fuel economy standards, because achieved CAFE
levels depend on sales mix and, under attribute-based CAFE standards,
required CAFE levels also depend on sales mix. NHTSA anticipates,
therefore, that application of a vehicle choice model would impact
estimates of all of the following for a given schedule of CAFE
standards: overall market volume, individual manufacturer market shares
and product mix, required and achieved CAFE levels, technology
application rates and corresponding incurred costs, fuel consumption,
greenhouse gas emissions, and criteria pollutant emissions, changes in
highway fatalities, and economic benefits.
Past testing by DOT/NHTSA staff did not indicate major shifts in
broad measures (e.g., in total costs or total benefits), but that
testing emphasized shorter modeling periods (e.g., 1-5 model years)
with less lead time and relatively less stringent standards than
reflected in today's final rule. Especially without knowing the
characteristics of a future vehicle choice model, it is difficult to
anticipate the potential degree to which its inclusion would impact
analytical outcomes.
NHTSA invited comment on changes made to the CAFE model prior to
the NPRM's release, and regarding the above-mentioned prospects for
inclusion of a vehicle choice model. The agency only received comments
regarding the possibility of utilizing a vehicle choice model. Two
environmental organizations--the
[[Page 63012]]
National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS)--urged the agency not to include any vehicle choice
model in its analysis, citing concerns regarding uncertainties
surrounding such models, and in NRDC's case, the potential that use of
a choice model would lead NHTSA to adopt less stringent standards than
if the agency continues not to analyze potential market effects.\1117\
NRDC argued that vehicle choice models may be useful for analyzing the
potential result of some market-based policies, but not for standards
that drive the adoption of technology. NRDC suggested that choice
models rely on stated and/or revealed preferences that are based only
on existing vehicles, not a future market in which vehicles widely
offer higher fuel economy than today's vehicles. On the other hand, the
American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) expressed concern
that the proposal was based on an analysis that did not incorporate a
vehicle choice model, citing this as a serious deficiency that must be
addressed to properly understand the implications of the
proposal.\1118\ AFPM suggested that the proposed standards were not
feasible, and indicated that use of a peer-reviewed consumer choice
model would show less reliance on HEVs, PHEVs, and EVs, and that a
corresponding new proposal would assist NHTSA's development of a
revised proposal that is feasible and coincides with Congress' mandate
in this area.\1119\ The Alliance supported NHTSA's development of a
vehicle choice model to inform the planned mid-term evaluation and
forthcoming rulemaking to establish final standards for MYs 2022-2025,
stating that such a model should use real-world data, be developed in a
transparent manner with full peer review, and assess uncertainties in
its predictions.\1120\ IPI commented that a vehicle choice model should
incorporate positional goods theory (a theory describing the value of a
product as significantly determined by the product's value to others),
and be used to explain why the agency's cost estimates are not likely
to underestimate consumer welfare losses, but rather predict that the
cost projections are more likely to be overestimates (because they do
not reflect that the positional aspect of light vehicles--that is,
their role in defining owners' ``status''--artificially inflates the
value of vehicle performance and utility).\1121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1117\ NRDC, Docket No EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472, at 19, UCS,
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, at 14.
\1118\ AFPM, Docket No EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485, at 4.
\1119\ AFPM, at 8.
\1120\ Alliance, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, at 19.
\1121\ IPI, Docket No.EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480, at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As mentioned above, we do not yet have available a credible vehicle
choice model suitable for integration with our CAFE modeling system.
However, we disagree with NRDC's comment that vehicle choice models are
not useful toward evaluation of standards that drive the adoption of
technology: market effects are among the range of consequences that--
intended or not--could be real, important, and warranting evaluation.
NHTSA also disagrees with NRDC's suggestion that that choice models
based on current vehicles cannot reasonably be applied to future
vehicle markets, and with UCS's suggestion that application of a choice
model should be rejected out of hand. While we acknowledge that future
consumer preferences could be different from those evidenced by
currently-available data, we disagree that these potential differences
provide an a priori basis not to use a choice model to estimate
potential market impacts of fuel economy standards. In our judgment,
such uncertainties should be instead considered and, as practicable,
addressed through sensitivity analysis (e.g., to test a choice model's
sensitivity to changes in defining coefficients). We also disagree with
NRDC that application of a vehicle choice model would lead the agency
to adopt less stringent standards. We expect that a choice model would
show sales shifting among different vehicle models and among
manufacturers, and that specific characteristics of such shifts would
depend heavily on different model inputs, not just on standards. While
such shifts would impact results relevant to consideration of statutory
factors governing decisions regarding maximum feasible stringency, we
consider it just as likely that such shifts could support more
stringent standards as that they could support less stringent
standards.
Nor do we agree with AFPM that the proposed standards were beyond
maximum feasible; the agency's assessment of why the final standards,
which are identical to the proposed standards, are maximum feasible is
discussed below in Section IV.F. We do not agree with AFPM that a
choice model would, by definition, indicate less reliance on HEVs,
PHEVs, or EVs: a choice model could show shifts either toward such
technologies or away from such technologies, based on a range of model
inputs and on comparative implications for specific vehicle models. In
any event, we also disagree with AFPM's suggestion that such shifts
would necessarily indicate that maximum feasible standards would be
less stringent than we proposed in the NPRM and are promulgating today,
just as we disagree with NRDC's suggestion that application of a choice
model would lead the agency to promulgate less stringent standards.
We agree with the Alliance that NHTSA should continue efforts to
develop a vehicle choice model suitable for integration with the CAFE
modeling system and application toward informing the planned mid-term
evaluation and future rulemaking for MYs 2022-2025. NHTSA considers it
possible that a vehicle choice model would be informed by consideration
of economic theory regarding ``positional goods,'' and has provided
copies of IPI's comments on this theory to the U.C. Davis and U.C.
Irvine researchers supporting NHTSA. However, in our judgment, IPI's
comments prejudge the applicability, relevance, and implications of
such theory in this context. Section IV.G, below, discusses IPI's
comments regarding the theory's relevance to estimates of consumer
benefits of fuel economy standards.
The researchers supporting NHTSA in the development of a vehicle
choice model suitable for use in the analysis of CAFE standards have
made significant progress collecting and integrating data to support
the estimation of a choice model, developing options for structuring
such a model in a manner that allows for integration with DOT's CAFE
modeling system, and developing and testing algorithms to statistically
estimate coefficients defining a choice model. NHTSA is hopeful that
continuation of this effort will lead to development of a vehicle
choice model that can be integrated with the CAFE modeling system and
used for CAFE rulemaking analysis.
In preparation for today's analysis, DOT also made some further
(i.e., beyond those discussed above) changes to the CAFE modeling
system. To facilitate external analysis, the CAFE model now produces
``flat'' text files (comma separated value or ``CSV'', format) as model
output. DOT also corrected some errors DOT staff identified in the
version of the model supporting the NPRM, the most significant of which
include the following: First, the model was corrected to ensure that
advanced diesel technology is not applied without accounting for
incremental costs and effects of TURB2, CEGR1, or CEGR2--
[[Page 63013]]
engine technologies placed before diesels on the model's decision tree
for engine technologies. Second, the model was corrected to ensure that
when fuel-saving technologies are applied to a flexible fuel vehicle
(FFV), the vehicle's fuel economy when operating on E85 is increased in
parallel with its fuel economy when operating on gasoline. Third, the
model was corrected to ensure that, when calculating the ``effective
cost'' for purposes of deciding among potential technology
applications, the model refers to fuel prices estimated to prevail
after the vehicle's purchase. Further details regarding the model's
design and operation are presented in the model documentation available
on NHTSA's Web site.
d. Does the model set the standards?
Since NHTSA began using the CAFE model in CAFE analysis, some
commenters have interpreted the agency's use of the model as the way by
which the agency chooses the maximum feasible fuel economy standards.
As the agency explained in the final rule establishing CAFE standards
for MYs 2012-2016, this is incorrect.\1122\ Although NHTSA currently
uses the CAFE model as a tool to inform its consideration of potential
CAFE standards, the CAFE model does not determine the CAFE standards
that NHTSA proposes or promulgates as final regulations. The results it
produces are completely dependent on inputs selected by NHTSA, based on
the best available information and data available in the agency's
estimation at the time standards are set. Ultimately, NHTSA's selection
of appropriate CAFE standards is governed and guided by the statutory
requirements of EPCA, as amended by EISA: NHTSA sets the standard at
the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it determines is
achievable during a particular model year, considering technological
feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other standards of
the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the nation to conserve
energy, among other factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1122\ 75 FR 25600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. How does NHTSA make the model available and transparent?
Model documentation, which is publicly available in the rulemaking
docket and on NHTSA's Web site, explains how the model is installed,
how the model inputs (all of which are available to the public) \1123\
and outputs are structured, and how the model is used. The model can be
used on any Windows-based personal computer with Microsoft Office 2003
or 2007 and the Microsoft .NET framework installed (the latter
available without charge from Microsoft). The executable version of the
model and the underlying source code are also available at NHTSA's Web
site. The input files used to conduct the core analysis documented in
today's final rule are available to the public at Docket No. NHTSA-
2010-0131, which can be accessed at http://www.regulations.gov. With
the model and these input files, anyone is capable of independently
running the model to repeat, evaluate, and/or modify the agency's
analysis.
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\1123\ We note, however, that files from any supplemental
analysis conducted that relied in part on confidential manufacturer
product plans cannot be made public, see 49 CFR part 512.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the model is available on NHTSA's Web site, the agency has
no way of knowing how widely the model has been used. The agency is,
however, aware that the model has been used by other federal agencies,
vehicle manufacturers, private consultants, academic researchers, and
foreign governments. Some of these individuals have found the model
complex and challenging to use. Insofar as the model's sole purpose is
to help DOT staff efficiently analyze potential CAFE standards, DOT has
not expended significant resources trying to make the model as ``user
friendly'' as commercial software intended for wide use, but we
continue to encourage interested parties to contact the agency if they
encounter difficulties using the model or have questions about it that
are not answered here or in the model documentation.
NHTSA arranged for a formal peer review of an older version of the
model, has responded to reviewers' comments, and has considered and
responded to model-related comments received over the course of four
CAFE rulemakings. In the agency's view, this steady and expanding
outside review over the course of nearly a decade of model development
has helped DOT to significantly strengthen the model's capabilities and
technical quality, and has greatly increased transparency, such that
all model code is publicly available, and all model inputs and outputs
are publicly available in a form that should allow reviewers to
reproduce the agency's analysis. NHTSA plans to arrange for a formal
peer review of the CAFE model after the pending integration of a
vehicle choice model. All relevant materials will be docketed as part
of that peer review, and NHTSA expects to re-release a new version of
the integrated CAFE model once the peer review is completed.
D. Statutory Requirements
1. EPCA, as Amended by EISA
a. Standard Setting
EPCA, as amended by EISA, contains a number of provisions regarding
how NHTSA must set CAFE standards. NHTSA must establish separate CAFE
standards for passenger cars and light trucks \1124\ for each model
year,\1125\ and each standard must be the maximum feasible that NHTSA
believes the manufacturers can achieve in that model year.\1126\ When
determining the maximum feasible level achievable by the manufacturers,
EPCA requires that the agency consider the four statutory factors of
technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other
motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need
of the United States to conserve energy.\1127\ In addition, the agency
has the authority to and traditionally does consider other relevant
factors, such as the effect of the CAFE standards on motor vehicle
safety. The ultimate determination of what standards can be considered
maximum feasible involves a weighing and balancing of these factors,
and the balance may shift depending on the information before the
agency about the expected circumstances in the model years covered by
the rulemaking. Always in conducting that balancing, however, the
implication of the ``maximum feasible'' requirement is that it calls
for setting a standard that exceeds what might be the minimum
requirement if the agency determines that the manufacturers can achieve
a higher level, and that the agency's decision support the overarching
purpose of EPCA, energy conservation.\1128\
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\1124\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(1).
\1125\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(a).
\1126\ Id.
\1127\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(f).
\1128\ Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172,
1197 (9th Cir. 2008) (``Whatever method it uses, NHTSA cannot set
fuel economy standards that are contrary to Congress' purpose in
enacting the EPCA--energy conservation.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Besides the requirement that standards be maximum feasible for the
fleet in question, EPCA/EISA also contains several other requirements.
The standards must be attribute-based and expressed in the form of a
mathematical function: NHTSA has thus far based standards on vehicle
footprint, and for this rulemaking has expressed them in the form of a
constrained linear function that generally sets higher (more stringent)
mpg targets for smaller-
[[Page 63014]]
footprint vehicles and lower (less stringent) mpg targets for larger-
footprint vehicles. Second, the standards are subject to a minimum
requirement regarding stringency: they must be set at levels high
enough to ensure that the combined U.S. passenger car and light truck
fleet achieves an average fuel economy level of not less than 35 mpg
not later than MY 2020.\1129\ Third, between MY 2011 and MY 2020, the
standards must ``increase ratably'' in each model year.\1130\ This
requirement does not have a precise mathematical meaning, particularly
because it must be interpreted in conjunction with the requirement to
set the standards for each model year at the level determined to be the
maximum feasible level for that model year. Generally speaking, the
requirement for ratable increases means that the annual increases
should not be disproportionately large or small in relation to each
other. The second and third requirements no longer apply after MY 2020,
at which point standards must simply be maximum feasible. And fourth,
EISA requires NHTSA to issue CAFE standards for ``at least 1, but not
more than 5, model years.'' \1131\ This issue is discussed in section
IV.A above.
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\1129\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(A).
\1130\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(C).
\1131\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3)(B).
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Commenters raised a number of issues regarding NHTSA's authority to
set CAFE standards under EPCA/EISA, which will be discussed throughout
this section. For example, Securing America's Energy Future (SAFE)
commented that NHTSA should consider setting CAFE standards in gallons
per mile rather than miles per gallon, because consumers often do not
understand mpg and the agency could more effectively incentivize
alternative fuel vehicles by using gallons per mile, since the
numerator of ``gallons'' would be zero.\1132\ In response, NHTSA is
required by statute to set CAFE standards in terms of miles per
gallon--``fuel economy,'' as expressly defined in EPCA, means ``the
average number of miles traveled by an automobile for each gallon of
gasoline (or equivalent amount of other fuel) used.'' \1133\ NHTSA
agrees that gallons per mile, as a metric, may more accurately describe
to consumers the fuel savings impacts of their vehicle choices, which
is why the newly-revised fuel economy and environment label for which
NHTSA is also responsible under EISA contains a gallons per mile
metric. NHTSA does not, however, currently have discretion under the
statute to set CAFE standards in terms of anything but mpg. NHTSA
agrees with SAFE that changing this requirement would be up to
Congress. The agency has, however, presented the estimated required mpg
levels in this final rule in terms of gallons per mile in Section IV.G,
for the reader's reference.
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\1132\ SAFE, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0259, at 16-18.
\1133\ 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(10).
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Two commenters, CBD and ICCT, stated that the agencies should set a
single footprint curve for both passenger cars and light trucks, to
avoid manufacturers deliberately classifying their vehicles as light
trucks in order to obtain a less stringent target.\1134\ Ford, in
contrast, commented in support of separate footprint curves for
passenger cars and light trucks, providing the example of the different
towing (and thus fuel economy) capabilities of the Ford Taurus (a
passenger car) and the Ford Edge (a light truck) as a reason why
targets should be different for cars and trucks even if they have the
same footprint.\1135\ NHTSA continues to interpret the clear statutory
requirement that separate standards be set for passenger cars and for
light trucks in each model year \1136\ as indicating Congress' intent
that the separate standards reflect the distinct capabilities of those
fleets of vehicles, particularly given that NHTSA must balance the four
statutory factors each time it determines maximum feasible average fuel
economy.\1137\ Given that requirement, if a consistent approach to
balancing is taken for the separate passenger car and light truck
fleets, then the agency believes that the passenger car and light truck
standards in a given model year could only be identical (in terms of
both the shape of the function and the given mpg values at each
footprint target) if the capabilities of each fleet happened to be
identical, which is highly unlikely given the differences between those
fleets. To the extent that CBD and ICCT mean to comment on the related
question of the classification of vehicles as passenger cars or light
trucks, those issues will be addressed in Section IV.H below.
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\1134\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 17; ICCT, Docket
No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 50-51.
\1135\ Ford, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0235, at 8.
\1136\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B); 32902(b)(2)(A),
etc.
\1137\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(g).
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CBD also expressed concern that the fleet would not meet the
required 35 mpg average in 2020 because the standards would encourage
manufacturers to build larger passenger cars and light trucks, which
would lower the overall achieved levels given the attribute-based
nature of the standards.\1138\ It is true that attribute-based
standards do not, by themselves, guarantee that the industry will
achieve a particular mpg level, but NHTSA disagrees that the proposed
standards (and the final standards, which are identical to the
proposal) create any incentive for manufacturers to essentially
backslide as CBD suggests. The MY 2010 unadjusted composite fleet fuel
economy, according to EPA, is a record high 28.3 miles per
gallon.\1139\ Market trends indicate that as fuel prices remain high
and as manufacturers are providing more and more vehicle offerings with
better fuel economy, consumers are responding by prioritizing fuel
economy, and its associated cost savings, as a key purchase
consideration.\1140\ Even under the agency's analysis, which is based
on market forecasts purchased in 2009 and 2011, and therefore may not
fully incorporate the most recent trends, we currently estimate that
manufacturers will achieve an average fleet fuel economy of 33.9-34.1
mpg by MY 2016, and of 39.9-40.8 mpg by MY 2020. We have also evaluated
the extent to which we believe the target curves might incentivize
vehicle upsizing beyond what the market could demand--see Section II.C
and Chapter 2 of the joint TSD--and we continue to disagree that this
is likely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1138\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 15.
\1139\ ``Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2011,'' at iv.
Available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/cert/mpg/fetrends/2012/420r12001a.pdf (last accessed July 11, 2012).
\1140\ ``Fuel Economy, GHG, Other Emissions, and Alternative
Fuels Consumer Education Program: Quantitative Survey Report,''
available at Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0126.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, NHTSA has the authority to revise CAFE standards at any
time, up or down, given sufficient lead-time. If the market changes to
the extent feared by CBD, it is well within NHTSA's authority to revise
the standards to ensure that the 35 mpg fleetwide achieved levels
occur--indeed, we believe that is what Congress intended. Thus, we
disagree that the final standards would be likely to result in
fleetwide average fuel economy levels that fall below the 35-in-2020
requirement.
CBD further commented that NHTSA's proposed truck standards did not
increase ratably, because the targets for the largest light trucks
remain the same for several years, and because the average increase in
stringency for light trucks is ``a mere 0.6 mpg * * * per year from
2017 to 2020,'' and then ``jump[s] to 2.1 mpg in 2021, a near four-fold
increase, and stays in a higher
[[Page 63015]]
range for the remaining rulemaking period * * *.'' \1141\ Because those
increases did not meet the agency's definition of ratable as
``increases that are not disproportionately large or small in relation
to each other,'' either temporally or between passenger cars and light
trucks, CBD argued that NHTSA had failed to propose ratable
standards.\1142\ CBD mistakes the statutory requirement: EISA clearly
states that standards must only increase ratably ``beginning with model
year 2011 and ending with model year 2020.'' \1143\ Thus, if the
standards increase at different rates between 2017-2020 and 2021 and
thereafter, as long as they are maximum feasible, there is no other
statutory requirement with respect to the rate of their increase. NHTSA
explained above that the agency interprets the requirement for ratable
increases to mean that the annual increases should not be
disproportionately large or small in relation to each other. NHTSA
believes that the increases in light truck stringency from 2017-2020
are indeed ratable, increasing slowly but proportionately during those
model years at rates between 0.2 and 0.6 mpg. It is also an inaccurate
reading of the statute to focus on increases in target stringency for a
particular subset of vehicles--the increases that must be ratable are
increases in the standards, and the standards are corporate average
requirements that apply to the fleet as a whole, not to particular
subsets of the fleet, or even to every subset of the fleet. Moreover,
the plain language of the statute indicates that the question of
whether increases are ratable applies separately to cars and trucks--
that is, the question is not whether increases in stringency for cars
are ratable compared to increases in stringency for trucks, or vice
versa, but only whether the increases in stringency for cars (or for
trucks) are themselves ratable. 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(C) states that
NHTSA ``shall prescribe annual fuel economy standard increases that
increase the applicable average fuel economy standard ratably * * *.''
Average fuel economy standards are set separately for (are separately
applicable to) passenger cars and light trucks. NHTSA therefore
disagrees that Congress intended for the ratable requirement to apply
between cars and trucks rather than within cars and within trucks
separately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1141\ Id., at 10.
\1142\ Id.
\1143\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following sections discuss the statutory factors behind
``maximum feasible'' in more detail.
i. Statutory Factors Considered in Determining the Achievable Level of
Average Fuel Economy
As none of the four factors is defined in EPCA and each remains
interpreted only to a limited degree by case law, NHTSA has
considerable latitude in interpreting them. NHTSA interprets the four
statutory factors as set forth below.
(1) Technological Feasibility
``Technological feasibility'' refers to whether a particular
technology for improving fuel economy is available or can become
available for commercial application in the model year for which a
standard is being established. Thus, the agency is not limited in
determining the level of new standards to technology that is already
being commercially applied at the time of the rulemaking. It can,
instead, set technology-forcing standards, i.e., ones that make it
necessary for manufacturers to engage in research and development in
order to bring a new technology to market. There are certain
technologies that the agency has considered for this rulemaking, for
example, that we know to be in the research phase now but which we are
fairly confident can be commercially applied by the rulemaking
timeframe, and very confident by the end of the rulemaking timeframe.
CBD commented that given the extended timeframe of the rulemaking,
NHTSA must set technology forcing standards. CBD argued that standards
set so far in advance could not reasonably be set based on technology
already in use today or projected to be in use a few years from today,
and that NHTSA is required to drive technology innovation and force
manufacturers to invent new technologies.\1144\ CBD further argued that
uncertainty about future technologies is not an excuse for failing to
set more technology-forcing standards, and the agency should ``assess
those uncertainties within reasonable ranges, and include the clearly
foreseeable impact of technological innovations rather than to
disregard research-stage technology altogether,'' by assuming that
technological innovation in the rulemaking timeframe will proceed at
the same rate as it has in the past decade.\1145\ NADA, in contrast,
commented that technological feasibility directly relates to what
manufacturers can accomplish and when they can accomplish it, and that
the further in the future the standards are set, the less likely NHTSA
is to have credible information to accurately predict technological
feasibility.\1146\ NADA therefore argued that setting standards too far
in advance significantly increases the risk that they will turn out to
be technologically infeasible.\1147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1144\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 5.
\1145\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 20.
\1146\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 11.
\1147\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA agrees with CBD that given the timeframe of the rulemaking,
the technological feasibility factor may encourage the agency to look
toward more technology-forcing standards, which could certainly be
appropriate given EPCA's overarching purpose of energy conservation
depending on the rulemaking. For example, in the analysis for this
final rule, the agency is projecting that manufacturers could meet the
standards by using research-stage high Brake Mean Effective Pressure
engines across a significant portion of the fleet by MY 2021. At the
same time, however, it would not be reasonable for the agency to
predicate stringency on completely unforeseen future improvements in
unknown technologies. It is important to remember that technological
feasibility must also be balanced with the other of the four statutory
factors. Thus, while ``technological feasibility'' can drive standards
higher by assuming the use of technologies that are not yet commercial,
``maximum feasible'' is still also defined in terms of economic
practicability, for example, which might caution the agency against
basing standards (even fairly distant future standards) entirely on
such technologies. NHTSA believes that this is what NADA refers to by
arguing that setting the standards too far in advance could result in
standards that are technologically infeasible, which we do not believe
we have done in this rulemaking. By setting standards at levels
consistent with an analysis that assumes the use of these nascent
technologies at levels that seem reasonable, the agency believes a more
reasonable balance is ensured. Nevertheless, as the ``maximum
feasible'' balancing may vary depending on the circumstances at hand
for the model years in which the standards are set, the extent to which
technological feasibility is simply met or plays a more dynamic role
may also shift. Moreover, as will be true for all of the factors, NHTSA
will have the opportunity to revisit the technological feasibility of
the augural MYs 2022-2025 standards in the future rulemaking concurrent
with the mid-term evaluation.
[[Page 63016]]
(2) Economic Practicability
``Economic practicability'' refers to whether a standard is one
``within the financial capability of the industry, but not so stringent
as to'' lead to ``adverse economic consequences, such as a significant
loss of jobs or the unreasonable elimination of consumer choice.''
\1148\ The agency has explained in the past that this factor can be
especially important during rulemakings in which the automobile
industry is facing significantly adverse economic conditions (with
corresponding risks to jobs). Consumer acceptability is also an element
of economic practicability, one which is particularly difficult to
gauge during times of uncertain fuel prices.\1149\ In a rulemaking such
as the present one, looking out into the more distant future, economic
practicability is a way to consider the uncertainty surrounding future
market conditions and consumer demand for fuel economy in addition to
other vehicle attributes. In an attempt to ensure the economic
practicability of attribute-based standards, NHTSA considers a variety
of factors, including the annual rate at which manufacturers can
increase the percentage of their fleet that employ a particular type of
fuel-saving technology, the specific fleet mixes of different
manufacturers, and assumptions about the cost of the standards to
consumers and consumers' valuation of fuel economy, among other things.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1148\ 67 FR 77015, 77021 (Dec. 16, 2002).
\1149\ See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA (CAS), 793
F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Administrator's consideration of market
demand as component of economic practicability found to be
reasonable); Public Citizen v. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256 (Congress
established broad guidelines in the fuel economy statute; agency's
decision to set lower standard was a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, however, the law does not preclude a CAFE
standard that poses considerable challenges to any individual
manufacturer. The Conference Report for EPCA, as enacted in 1975, makes
clear, and the case law affirms, ``(A) determination of maximum
feasible average fuel economy should not be keyed to the single
manufacturer which might have the most difficulty achieving a given
level of average fuel economy.'' \1150\ Instead, the agency is
compelled ``to weigh the benefits to the nation of a higher fuel
economy standard against the difficulties of individual automobile
manufacturers.'' \1151\ The law permits CAFE standards exceeding the
projected capability of any particular manufacturer as long as the
standard is economically practicable for the industry as a whole. Thus,
while a particular CAFE standard may pose difficulties for one
manufacturer, it may also present opportunities for another. NHTSA has
long held that the CAFE program is not necessarily intended to maintain
the relative competitive positioning of each particular company.
Rather, it is intended to enhance the fuel economy of the vehicle fleet
on American roads, while protecting motor vehicle safety and being
mindful of the risk to the overall United States economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1150\ CEI-I, 793 F.2d 1322, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
\1151\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consequently, ``economic practicability'' must be considered in the
context of the competing concerns associated with different levels of
standards. Prior to the MY 2005-2007 rulemaking, the agency generally
sought to ensure the economic practicability of standards in part by
setting them at or near the capability of the ``least capable
manufacturer'' with a significant share of the market, i.e., typically
the manufacturer whose vehicles were, on average, the heaviest and
largest. In the first several rulemakings establishing attribute-based
standards, the agency applied marginal cost-benefit analysis. This
ensured that the agency's application of technologies was limited to
those technologies that would pay for themselves and thus should have
significant appeal to consumers. We note that for this rulemaking, the
agency can and has limited its application of technologies to those
that are projected to be cost-effective within the rulemaking time
frame, with or without the use of such analysis.
Whether the standards maximize net benefits has thus been a
touchstone in the past for NHTSA's consideration of economic
practicability. Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Order
13563, states that agencies should ``select, in choosing among
alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net
benefits * * *.'' In practice, however, agencies, including NHTSA, must
consider situations in which the modeling of net benefits does not
capture all of the relevant considerations of feasibility. In this
case, the NHTSA balancing of the statutory factors, discussed in
Section IV.F below, suggests that the maximum feasible stringency for
this rulemaking points to another level besides the modeled net
benefits maximum, and such a situation is well within the guidance
provided by Executive Orders 12866 and 13563.\1152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1152\ See 70 FR 51435 (Aug. 30, 2005); CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d
at 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency's consideration of economic practicability depends on a
number of factors. Expected availability of capital to make investments
in new technologies matters; manufacturers' expected ability to sell
vehicles with new technologies matters; likely consumer choices matter;
and so forth. NHTSA's analysis of the impacts of this rulemaking does
incorporate assumptions to capture aspects of consumer preferences,
vehicle attributes, safety, and other factors relevant to an impacts
estimate; however, it is difficult to capture every such constraint.
Therefore, it is well within the agency's discretion to deviate from
the level at which modeled net benefits are maximized in the face of
evidence of economic impracticability, and if the agency concludes that
the level at which modeled net benefits are maximized would not
represent the maximum feasible level for future CAFE standards.
Economic practicability is a complex factor, and like the other factors
must also be considered in the context of the overall balancing and
EPCA's overarching purpose of energy conservation. Depending on the
conditions of the industry and the assumptions used in the agency's
analysis of alternative stringencies, NHTSA could well find that
standards that maximize net benefits, or that are higher or lower,
could be at the limits of economic practicability, and thus potentially
the maximum feasible level, depending on the other factors to be
balanced.
Comments varied on whether the proposed standards were at, or above
or below, the limits of economic practicability. CBD suggested that the
proposed standards were below the economically practicable levels,
commenting that NHTSA had unduly focused on consumer choice in
tentatively determining the proposed maximum feasible standards, and
that the agency should not be seeking through its stringency
determination to preserve the same mix of vehicles that are currently
in the marketplace or the current mix of vehicle attributes available
to consumers.\1153\ CBD stated that the purpose of EPCA/EISA is to
drive market forces ``toward the conservation of energy,'' and that
instead, NHTSA had proposed standards ``that will create the market
forces that drive increased production of the least energy efficient
vehicles on our highways.'' \1154\ CBD further argued that the fact
that the rulemaking's benefits
[[Page 63017]]
``exceed its costs by hundreds of billions of dollars'' was evidence
that NHTSA had ``left substantial, achievable fuel economy improvements
and public benefits unrealized due to industry objections,'' which was
contrary to EPCA/EISA.\1155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1153\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 4.
\1154\ Id., at 12-13.
\1155\ Id., at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Growth Energy (a biofuels company) and NADA, in contrast, argued
that the standards may be beyond the limits of economic practicability.
Growth Energy argued that the proposed standards' feasibility depended
heavily on sales of grid-electricity-powered vehicles, the cost of
which Growth Energy argued the agencies had underestimated.\1156\ Given
that the agencies had, in its view, underestimated the costs of
implementing such a crucial technology, Growth Energy argued that NHTSA
could not establish the economic practicability of the proposed
standards. NADA argued more generally that while it was confident that
manufacturers would be able to ``research, design, manufacture, and
incorporate technologies and designs aimed to meet the proposed
standards, serious questions exist regarding whether they will be able
to do so in a cost effective or economically practicable manner.''
\1157\ Therefore, NADA argued, given how many variables are involved
with the reasonable modeling of economic practicability, such as fuel
costs, materials costs, general economic conditions, interest rates,
and so forth, standards should be set only for MYs 2017-2021, and not
for MYs 2022-2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1156\ Growth Energy, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9540, at
2.
\1157\ NADA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA agrees that many variables are involved in assessing economic
practicability, and, as required by statute, is setting final standards
only for MYs 2017-2021. That said, NHTSA does not believe that the
consideration of consumer demand for fuel economy during the rulemaking
timeframe leads, in any way, to the standards being below the maximum
feasible level. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, NHTSA may consider
consumer demand, as long as it does not ``rely on consumer demand to
such an extent that it ignore[s] the overarching goal of energy
conservation.'' \1158\ As the D.C. Circuit has held, however, ``[a]t
the other extreme, a standard with harsh economic consequences for the
auto industry also would represent an unreasonable balancing of EPCA's
policies.'' \1159\ By the test of whether the standards conserve
energy, there can be no question that they do: NHTSA estimates that the
final standards for MYs 2017-2021 will save 65-67 billion gallons of
fuel over the lifetimes of the vehicles subject to those standards, and
when combined with the augural standards for MYs 2022-2025, that number
rises to 169-171 billion gallons. This would be more than a decade's
total petroleum imports from Venezuela, for example.\1160\ By the test
of whether more stringent standards would conserve more energy, our
analysis suggests that they would, but they could only do so if
manufacturers are able to sell the vehicles that they build to meet
those higher standards. As discussed below in Section IV.F, NHTSA
continues to believe that the evidence presented by manufacturers
during the summer of 2011 warrants consideration in choosing the
appropriate levels of the final standards. Therefore, the agency cannot
reasonably avoid consideration of consumer demand as part of its
analysis of economic practicability, and thus as part of its analysis
of what standards will be maximum feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1158\ CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).
\1159\ Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1340
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
\1160\ EIA indicates U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil and
petroleum products averaged 912 thousand barrels per day in 2011.
(Data obtained July 12, 2012 from http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_neti_dc_NUS-NVE_mbblpd_a.htm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA also notes that Growth Energy's comment is misplaced--grid-
electricity-powered vehicles do not play such a significant role in the
agency's analysis. In fact, our analysis assumes that in order to meet
the standards, the industry as a whole need produce no grid-powered
PHEVs or EVs in MY 2021, and only up to 3 percent in MY 2025. Moreover,
NHTSA is statutorily prohibited from considering the fuel economy of
dedicated alternative fuel vehicles like EVs in determining the maximum
feasible levels of the standards, so manufacturers' ability to sell EVs
is actually irrelevant to our determination of stringency. Thus, NHTSA
disagrees that the standards are not economically practicable because
they ``rely too heavily'' on PHEVs and EVs.
(3) The Effect of Other Motor Vehicle Standards of the Government on
Fuel Economy
``The effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on
fuel economy,'' involves an analysis of the effects of compliance with
emission, safety, noise, or damageability standards on fuel economy
capability and thus on average fuel economy. In previous CAFE
rulemakings, the agency has said that pursuant to this provision, it
considers the adverse effects of other motor vehicle standards on fuel
economy. It said so because, from the CAFE program's earliest years
\1161\ until present, the effects of such compliance on fuel economy
capability over the history of the CAFE program have been negative
ones. In those instances in which the effects are negative, NHTSA has
said that it is called upon to ``mak[e] a straightforward adjustment to
the fuel economy improvement projections to account for the impacts of
other Federal standards, principally those in the areas of emission
control, occupant safety, vehicle damageability, and vehicle noise.
However, only the unavoidable consequences should be accounted for. The
automobile manufacturers must be expected to adopt those feasible
methods of achieving compliance with other Federal standards which
minimize any adverse fuel economy effects of those standards.'' \1162\
For example, safety standards that have the effect of increasing
vehicle weight lower vehicle fuel economy capability and thus decrease
the level of average fuel economy that the agency can determine to be
feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1161\ 42 FR 63184, 63188 (Dec. 15, 1977). See also 42 FR 33534,
33537 (Jun. 30, 1977).
\1162\ 42 FR 33534, 33537 (Jun. 30, 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``other motor vehicle standards'' consideration has thus in
practice functioned in a fashion similar to the provision in EPCA, as
originally enacted, for adjusting the statutorily-specified CAFE
standards for MY 1978-1980 passengers cars.\1163\ EPCA did not permit
NHTSA to amend those standards based on a finding that the maximum
feasible level of average fuel economy for any of those three years was
greater or less than the standard specified for that year. Instead, it
provided that the agency could only reduce the standards and only on
one basis: if the agency found that there had been a Federal standards
fuel economy reduction, i.e., a reduction in fuel economy due to
changes in the Federal vehicle standards, e.g., emissions and safety,
relative to the year of enactment, 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1163\ That provision was deleted as obsolete when EPCA was
codified in 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``other motor vehicle standards'' provision is broader than the
Federal standards fuel economy reduction provision. Although the
effects analyzed to date under the ``other motor vehicle standards''
provision have been negative, there could be circumstances in which the
effects are positive. In the event that the agency encountered such
[[Page 63018]]
circumstances, it would be required to consider those positive effects.
For example, if changes in vehicle safety technology led to NHTSA's
amending a safety standard in a way that permits manufacturers to
reduce the weight added in complying with that standard, that weight
reduction would increase vehicle fuel economy capability and thus
increase the level of average fuel economy that could be determined to
be feasible.
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA and of EPA's endangerment
finding, granting of a waiver to California for its motor vehicle GHG
standards, and its own establishment of GHG standards, NHTSA is
confronted with the issue of how to treat those standards under EPCA/
EISA, such as in the context of the ``other motor vehicle standards''
provision. To the extent the GHG standards result in increases in fuel
economy, they would do so almost exclusively as a result of inducing
manufacturers to install the same types of technologies used by
manufacturers in complying with the CAFE standards.
NHTSA sought comment on whether and in what way the effects of the
California and EPA standards should be considered under EPCA/EISA,
e.g., under the ``other motor vehicle standards'' provision, consistent
with NHTSA's independent obligation under EPCA/EISA to issue CAFE
standards. The Sierra Club commented in response, and stated that ``the
process of joint standard setting with California and EPA carries out
the Mass. v. EPA decision.'' \1164\ Thus, NHTSA believes that further
consideration of this issue is unnecessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1164\ Sierra Club et al., Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549,
at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) The Need of the United States To Conserve Energy
``The need of the United States to conserve energy'' means ``the
consumer cost, national balance of payments, environmental, and foreign
policy implications of our need for large quantities of petroleum,
especially imported petroleum.'' \1165\ Environmental implications
principally include those associated with reductions in emissions of
criteria pollutants and CO2. A prime example of foreign
policy implications are energy independence and energy security
concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1165\ 42 FR 63184, 63188 (1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving Fuel
Projected future fuel prices are a critical input into the economic
analysis of alternative CAFE standards, because they determine the
value of fuel savings both to new vehicle buyers and to society, which
is related to the consumer cost (or rather, benefit) of our need for
large quantities of petroleum. In this rule, NHTSA relies on fuel price
projections from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA)
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2012 Early Release for this analysis.
Federal government agencies generally use EIA's projections in their
assessments of future energy-related policies. A number of commenters
discussed our use of the AEO in the proposal, generally stating that we
should use a higher price forecast; these comments and NHTSA's response
are discussed fully in Section IV.C.3 above.
iii. Petroleum Consumption and Import Externalities
U.S. consumption and imports of petroleum products impose costs on
the domestic economy that are not reflected in the market price for
crude petroleum, or in the prices paid by consumers of petroleum
products such as gasoline. These costs include (1) higher prices for
petroleum products resulting from the effect of U.S. oil import demand
on the world oil price; (2) the risk of disruptions to the U.S. economy
caused by sudden reductions in the supply of imported oil to the U.S.;
and (3) expenses for maintaining a U.S. military presence to secure
imported oil supplies from unstable regions, and for maintaining the
strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) to provide a response option should a
disruption in commercial oil supplies threaten the U.S. economy, to
allow the United States to meet part of its International Energy Agency
obligation to maintain emergency oil stocks, and to provide a national
defense fuel reserve. Higher U.S. imports of crude oil or refined
petroleum products increase the magnitude of these external economic
costs, thus increasing the true economic cost of supplying
transportation fuels above the resource costs of producing them.
Conversely, reducing U.S. imports of crude petroleum or refined fuels
or reducing fuel consumption can reduce these external costs. A number
of commenters raised the issue of petroleum consumption and import
externalities; these comments and NHTSA's response are discussed fully
in Section IV.C.3 above.
iv. Air Pollutant Emissions
While reductions in domestic fuel refining and distribution that
result from lower fuel consumption will reduce U.S. emissions of
various pollutants, additional vehicle use associated with the rebound
effect \1166\ from higher fuel economy will increase emissions of these
pollutants. Thus, the net effect of stricter CAFE standards on
emissions of each pollutant depends on the relative magnitudes of its
reduced emissions in fuel refining and distribution, and increases in
its emissions from vehicle use.\1167\ Fuel savings from stricter CAFE
standards also result in lower emissions of CO2, the main
greenhouse gas emitted as a result of refining, distribution, and use
of transportation fuels. Reducing fuel consumption reduces carbon
dioxide emissions directly, because the primary source of
transportation-related CO2 emissions is fuel combustion in
internal combustion engines. A number of commenters noted this point as
well, and cited the agencies' estimates of the considerable GHG-
reducing benefits of the proposed standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1166\ The ``rebound effect'' refers to the tendency of drivers
to drive their vehicles more as the cost of doing so goes down, as
when fuel economy improves.
\1167\ See Section IV.G below for NHTSA's evaluation of this
effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA has considered environmental issues, both within the context
of EPCA and the National Environmental Policy Act, in making decisions
about the setting of standards from the earliest days of the CAFE
program. As courts of appeal have noted in three decisions stretching
over the last 20 years,\1168\ NHTSA defined the ``need of the Nation to
conserve energy'' in the late 1970s as including ``the consumer cost,
national balance of payments, environmental, and foreign policy
implications of our need for large quantities of petroleum, especially
imported petroleum.'' \1169\ In 1988, NHTSA included climate change
concepts in its CAFE notices and prepared its first environmental
assessment addressing that subject.\1170\ It cited concerns about
climate change as one of its reasons for limiting the extent of its
reduction of the CAFE standard for MY 1989 passenger cars.\1171\ Since
then, NHTSA has considered the benefits of reducing tailpipe carbon
dioxide emissions in its fuel economy rulemakings pursuant to the
statutory requirement to consider
[[Page 63019]]
the nation's need to conserve energy by reducing fuel consumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1168\ Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1325 n.
12 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Public Citizen v. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256, 262-3 n.
27 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that ``NHTSA itself has interpreted the
factors it must consider in setting CAFE standards as including
environmental effects''); and Center for Biological Diversity v.
NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007).
\1169\ 42 FR 63184, 63188 (Dec. 15, 1977).
\1170\ 53 FR 33080, 33096 (Aug. 29, 1988).
\1171\ 53 FR 39275, 39302 (Oct. 6, 1988).
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v. Other Factors Considered by NHTSA
The agency historically has considered the potential for adverse
safety consequences in setting CAFE standards. This practice is
recognized approvingly in case law. As the courts have recognized,
``NHTSA has always examined the safety consequences of the CAFE
standards in its overall consideration of relevant factors since its
earliest rulemaking under the CAFE program.'' Competitive Enterprise
Institute v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 120 n. 11 (DC Cir. 1990) (``CEI I'')
(citing 42 FR 33534, 33551 (June 30, 1977)). The courts have
consistently upheld NHTSA's implementation of EPCA in this manner. See,
e.g., Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321, 322 (DC
Cir. 1992) (``CEI II'') (in determining the maximum feasible fuel
economy standard, ``NHTSA has always taken passenger safety into
account.'') (citing CEI I, 901 F.2d at 120 n. 11); Competitive
Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 45 F.3d 481, 482-83 (DC Cir. 1995)
(``CEI III'') (same); Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538
F.3d 1172, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding NHTSA's analysis of
vehicle safety issues associated with weight in connection with the MY
2008-11 light truck CAFE rule). Thus, in evaluating what levels of
stringency would result in maximum feasible standards, NHTSA assesses
the potential safety impacts and considers them in balancing the
statutory considerations and to determine the maximum feasible level of
the standards.
Under the universal or ``flat'' CAFE standards that NHTSA was
previously authorized to establish, manufacturers were encouraged to
respond to higher standards by building smaller, less safe vehicles in
order to ``balance out'' the larger, safer vehicles that the public
generally preferred to buy, which resulted in a higher mass
differential between the smallest and the largest vehicles, with a
correspondingly greater risk to safety. Under the attribute-based
standards being established today, that risk is reduced because
building smaller vehicles would tend to raise a manufacturer's overall
CAFE obligation, rather than only raising its fleet average CAFE, and
because all vehicles are required to continue improving their fuel
economy. In prior rulemakings, NHTSA limited the application of mass
reduction in our modeling analysis to vehicles over 5,000 lbs
GVWR,\1172\ but for purposes of today's final standards, NHTSA has
revised its modeling analysis to allow some application of mass
reduction for most types of vehicles, although it is concentrated in
the largest and heaviest vehicles, because we believe that this is more
consistent with how manufacturers will actually respond to the
standards. However, as discussed above, NHTSA does not mandate the use
of any particular technology by manufacturers in meeting the standards.
A number of commenters raised issues related to the potential safety
effects of the CAFE standards and on the agency's approach to mass
reduction. More information on the approach to modeling manufacturer
use of mass reduction is available in Chapter 3 of the Joint TSD and in
Chapter V of the FRIA; and the estimated safety effects that may be due
to the final MY 2017-2021 CAFE standards and augural MY 2022-2025 CAFE
standards are described in Section II.G above and Section IV.G below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1172\ See 74 FR 14396-14407 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
vi. Factors That NHTSA Is Prohibited From Considering
EPCA also provides that in determining the level at which it should
set CAFE standards for a particular model year, NHTSA may not consider
the ability of manufacturers to take advantage of several EPCA
provisions that facilitate compliance with the CAFE standards and
thereby reduce the costs of compliance.\1173\ As discussed further
below, manufacturers can earn compliance credits by exceeding the CAFE
standards and then use those credits to achieve compliance in years in
which their measured average fuel economy falls below the standards.
EPCA also provides that manufacturers can increase their CAFE levels
through MY 2019 by producing dual-fueled alternative fuel vehicles.
EPCA provides an incentive for producing these vehicles by specifying
that their fuel economy is to be determined using a special calculation
procedure that results in those vehicles being assigned a high fuel
economy level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1173\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effect of the prohibitions against considering these statutory
flexibilities in setting the CAFE standards is that the flexibilities
remain voluntarily-employed measures. If the agency were instead to
assume manufacturer use of those flexibilities in setting new
standards, that assumption would result in higher standards and thus
tend to require manufacturers to use those flexibilities. By keeping
NHTSA from including them in our stringency determination, the
provision ensures that the statutory credits described above remain
true compliance flexibilities.
On the other hand, NHTSA does not believe that flexibilities other
than those expressly identified in EPCA are similarly prohibited from
being included in the agency's determination of what standards would be
maximum feasible. In order to better meet EPCA's overarching purpose of
energy conservation, the agency has therefore considered manufacturers'
ability to increase the calculated fuel economy levels of their
vehicles through A/C efficiency improvements, as finalized by EPA, in
the presented CAFE stringency levels for passenger cars and light
trucks for MYs 2017-2025. NHTSA similarly considers manufacturers'
ability to raise their fuel economy using off-cycle technologies as
potentially relevant to our determination of maximum feasible CAFE
standards, but because we and EPA did not believe that we could
reasonably predict an average amount by which manufacturers will take
advantage of this opportunity, the agencies did not include off-cycle
credits in our stringency determination for the proposal. Since the
proposal, the agencies have developed estimates for the cost and
effectiveness of two off-cycle technologies, active aerodynamics and
stop-start. For the final rule analysis, NHTSA assumed that these two
technologies are available to manufacturers for compliance with the
standards, similar to all of the other fuel economy-improving
technologies that the analysis assumes are available. The costs and
benefits of these technologies are included in the analysis, similar to
all other available technologies, and NHTSA has consequently included
the assessment of some amount of off-cycle credits in the determination
of the maximum feasible standards.
Additionally, because we interpret the prohibition against
including the defined statutory credits in our determination of maximum
feasible standards as applying only to the flexibilities expressly
identified in 49 U.S.C. 32902(h), NHTSA must, for the first time in
this rulemaking, determine how to consider the fuel economy of dual-
fueled automobiles after the statutory credit sunsets in MY 2019. Once
there is no statutory credit to protect as a compliance flexibility, it
does not seem reasonable to NHTSA to continue to interpret the statute
as prohibiting the agency from setting maximum feasible standards at a
higher level, if possible, by considering the fuel economy of dual-
fueled automobiles as measured by EPA. The overarching purpose of EPCA
is better served by
[[Page 63020]]
interpreting 32902(h)(2) as moot once the statutory credits provided
for in 49 U.S.C. 32905 and 32906 have expired.
49 U.S.C. 32905(b) and (d) state that the special fuel economy
measurement prescribed by Congress for dual-fueled automobiles applies
only ``in model years 1993 through 2019.'' 49 U.S.C. 32906(a) also
provides that the section 32905 calculation will sunset in 2019, as
evidenced by the phase-out of the allowable increase due to that
credit; it is clear that the phase-out of the allowable increase in a
manufacturer's CAFE levels due to use of dual-fueled automobiles
relates only to the special statutory calculation (and not to other
ways of incorporating the fuel economy of dual-fueled automobiles into
the manufacturer's fleet calculation) by virtue of language in section
32906(b), which states that ``in applying subsection (a) [i.e., the
phasing out maximum increase], the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency shall determine the increase in a manufacturer's
average fuel economy attributable to dual fueled automobiles by
subtracting from the manufacturer's average fuel economy calculated
under section 32905(e) the number equal to what the manufacturer's
average fuel economy would be if it were calculated by the formula
under section 32904(a)(1) * * *.'' By referring back to the special
statutory calculation, Congress makes clear that the phase-out applies
only to increases in fuel economy attributable to dual-fueled
automobiles due to the special statutory calculation in sections
32905(b) and (d). Similarly, we interpret Congress' statement in
section 32906(a)(7) that the maximum increase in fuel economy
attributable to dual-fueled automobiles is ``0 miles per gallon for
model years after 2019'' within the context of the introductory
language of section 32906(a) and the language of section 32906(b),
which, again, refers clearly to the statutory credit, and not to dual-
fueled automobiles generally. It would be an unreasonable result if the
phase-out of the credit meant that manufacturers would be effectively
penalized, in CAFE compliance, for building dual-fueled automobiles
like plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, which may be important
``bridge'' vehicles in helping consumers move toward full electric
vehicles.
NHTSA has therefore considered the fuel economy of plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles, which are the only dual-fueled automobiles that we
predict in significant numbers in MY 2020 and beyond; E85-capable FFVs
are not predicted in great numbers after the statutory credit sunsets,
and we do not have sufficient information about potential dual-fueled
CNG/gasoline vehicles to make reasonable estimates now of their numbers
in that time frame in determining the maximum feasible level of the MY
2020-2025 CAFE standards for passenger cars and light trucks.
vii. Determining the Level of the Standards by Balancing the Factors
As discussed further below in Section IV.F, NHTSA has broad
discretion in balancing the above factors in determining the
appropriate levels of average fuel economy at which to set the CAFE
standards for each model year. Congress ``specifically delegated the
process of setting * * * fuel economy standards with broad guidelines
concerning the factors that the agency must consider.'' \1174\ The
breadth of those guidelines, the absence of any statutorily prescribed
formula for balancing the factors and other considerations, the fact
that the relative weight to be given to the various factors may change
from rulemaking to rulemaking as the underlying facts change, and the
fact that the factors may often be conflicting with respect to whether
they militate toward higher or lower standards give NHTSA broad
discretion to decide what weight to give each of the competing policies
and concerns and then determine how to balance them. The exercise of
that discretion is subject to the need to ensure that NHTSA's balancing
supports the fundamental purpose of EPCA, energy conservation,\1175\ as
long as that balancing reasonably accommodates ``conflicting policies
that were committed to the agency's care by the statute.'' \1176\ The
balancing of the factors in any given rulemaking depends highly on the
factual and policy context of that rulemaking and the agency's
assumptions about the factual and policy context during the time frame
covered by the standards at issue. Given the changes over time in facts
bearing on assessment of the various factors, such as those relating to
economic conditions, fuel prices, and the state of climate change
science, the agency recognizes that what was a reasonable balancing of
competing statutory priorities in one rulemaking may or may not be a
reasonable balancing of those priorities in another rulemaking.\1177\
Nevertheless, the agency retains substantial discretion under EPCA to
choose among reasonable alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1174\ Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1341
(C.A.D.C. 1986).
\1175\ Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172,
1195 (9th Cir. 2008).
\1176\ CAS, 1338 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845).
\1177\ CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPCA neither requires nor precludes the use of any type of cost-
benefit analysis as a tool to help inform the balancing process. As
discussed above, while NHTSA used marginal cost-benefit analysis in the
first two rulemakings to establish attribute-based CAFE standards, it
was not required to do so and is not required to continue to do so.
Regardless of what type of analysis is or is not used, considerations
relating to costs and benefits remain an important part of CAFE
standard setting.
Because the relevant considerations and factors can reasonably be
balanced in a variety of ways under EPCA, and because of uncertainties
associated with the many technological and cost inputs, NHTSA considers
a wide variety of alternative sets of standards, each reflecting a
different balancing of those policies and concerns, to aid it in
discerning the maximum feasible fuel economy levels. Among the
alternatives providing for an increase in the standards in this
rulemaking, the alternatives range in stringency from a set of
standards that increase, on average, 2 percent annually to a set of
standards that increase, on average, 7 percent annually.
viii. Other Standards
(1) Minimum Domestic Passenger Car Standard
The minimum domestic passenger car standard was added to the CAFE
program through EISA, when Congress gave NHTSA explicit authority to
set universal standards for domestically-manufactured passenger cars at
the level of 27.5 mpg or 92 percent of the average fuel economy of the
combined domestic and import passenger car fleets in that model year,
whichever was greater.\1178\ This minimum standard was intended to act
as a ``backstop,'' ensuring that domestically-manufactured passenger
cars reached a given mpg level even if the market shifted in ways
likely to reduce overall fleet mpg. Congress was silent as to whether
the agency could or should develop similar backstop standards for
imported passenger cars and light trucks. NHTSA has struggled with this
question since EISA was enacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1178\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA proposed minimum standards for domestically-manufactured
passenger cars in Section IV.E of the NPRM, but we also sought
[[Page 63021]]
comment on whether to consider, for the final rule, the possibility of
minimum standards for imported passenger cars and light trucks. NHTSA
stated that although we were not proposing such standards, it may be
prudent to explore this concept again given the considerable amount of
time between now and 2017-2025 (particularly the later years), and the
accompanying uncertainty in our market forecast and other assumptions,
that might make such minimum standards relevant to help ensure that
currently-expected fuel economy improvements occur during that time
frame. To help commenters' consideration of this question, Section IV.E
presented illustrative levels of minimum standards for those other
fleets.
In the MY 2011 final rule, having received comments split fairly
evenly between support and opposition to additional backstop standards,
NHTSA noted Congress' silence with respect to minimum standards for
imported passenger cars and light trucks and ``accept[ed] at least the
possibility that * * * [it] could be reasonably interpreted as
permissive rather than restrictive,'' but concluded, based on the
record for that rulemaking as a whole, that additional minimum
standards were not necessary for MY 2011, given the lack of leadtime
for manufacturers to change their MY 2011 vehicles, the apparently-
growing public preference for smaller vehicles, and the anti-
backsliding characteristics of the footprint-based curves.\1179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1179\ 74 FR 14412 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the MYs 2012-2016 final rule where NHTSA declined to set minimum
standards for imported passenger cars and light trucks, the agency did
so not because we believed that we did not have authority to do so, but
because we believed that our assumptions about the future fleet mix
were reliable within the rulemaking time frame, and that backsliding
was very unlikely and would not be sufficient to warrant the regulatory
burden of additional minimum standards for those fleets.\1180\ NHTSA
also expressed concern about the possibility of additional minimum
standards imposing inequitable regulatory burdens of the kind that
attribute-based standards sought to avoid, stating that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1180\ 75 FR 25324, at 25368-70 (May 7, 2010).
Unless the backstop was at a very weak level, above the high end
of this range, then some percentage of manufacturers would be above
the backstop even if the performance of the entire industry remains
fully consistent with the emissions and fuel economy levels
projected for the final standards. For these manufacturers and any
other manufacturers who were above the backstop, the objectives of
an attribute-based standard would be compromised and unnecessary
costs would be imposed. This could directionally impose increased
costs for some manufacturers. It would be difficult if not
impossible to establish the level of a backstop standard such that
costs are likely to be imposed on manufacturers only when there is a
failure to achieve the projected reductions across the industry as a
whole. An example of this kind of industry-wide situation could be
when there is a significant shift to larger vehicles across the
industry as a whole, or if there is a general market shift from cars
to trucks. The problem the agencies are concerned about in those
circumstances is not with respect to any single manufacturer, but
rather is based on concerns over shifts across the fleet as a whole,
as compared to shifts in one manufacturer's fleet that may be more
than offset by shifts the other way in another manufacturer's fleet.
However, in this respect, a traditional backstop acts as a
manufacturer-specific standard.\1181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1181\ Id. at 25369.
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that the agency continued to believe
that the risk of additional minimum standards imposing inequitable
regulatory burdens on certain manufacturers is real, but at the same
time, to recognize that given the time frame of the current rulemaking,
the agency cannot be as certain about the unlikelihood of future market
changes. Depending on the price of fuel and consumer preferences, the
``kind of industry-wide situation'' described in the MYs 2012-2016 rule
could be possible in the 2017-2025 time frame, particularly in the
later years.
Thus, because the agency did not have sufficient information at the
time of the NPRM regarding what tradeoffs might be associated with
additional minimum standards, specifically, whether the risk of
backsliding during MYs 2017-2025 sufficiently outweighed the
possibility of imposing inequitable regulatory burdens on certain
manufacturers, we sought comment in the NPRM on these issues but did
not propose additional minimum standards. We also sought comment on how
to structure additional minimum standards (e.g., whether they should be
flat or attribute-based, and if the latter, how that would work), and
at what level additional minimum standards should potentially be set.
Industry commenters opposed the inclusion of additional backstop
standards for imported passenger cars and for light trucks. The
Alliance commented that it disagreed that NHTSA might have authority to
adopt backstop standards for those other fleets, and argued that doing
so would be inconsistent with the principle of attribute-based
standards, because they could ``unduly limit[ ] consumer choice and
hamper[ ] the industry's ability to achieve the goals of continuing the
national program as cost-effectively as possible.'' \1182\ While the
Alliance agreed with NHTSA that future uncertainty could lead to market
shifts, it maintained that the appropriate way to address such issues
was through the future rulemaking to develop final standards for MYs
2022-2025, rather than through adding new regulatory
requirements.\1183\ Daimler \1184\ and Toyota \1185\ made similar
arguments. The UAW neither opposed nor encouraged the adoption of
additional backstop standards, but simply approved of what the agency
had proposed as being consistent with EISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1182\ Alliance, at 87.
\1183\ Id. at 87-88.
\1184\ Daimler, at 21.
\1185\ Toyota, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental and consumer group commenters, on the other hand,
strongly supported the inclusion of additional backstop standards for
imported passenger cars and light trucks. CBD expressed concern that
without a backstop, manufacturers would be encouraged by the footprint-
based target curves to increase the size of their vehicles and would
take advantage of numerous available flexibilities, and thus undermine
the anticipated fuel economy and GHG gains estimated by the
agencies.\1186\ CBD further stated that the amount of lead time
provided by the agencies in this rulemaking gave manufacturers ample
time to adjust their fleets to obtain lower targets, and argued that
given so much lead time, a backstop could not be unduly burdensome to
industry, because industry would have ample time to adjust to the new
requirements.\1187\ CBD insisted that NHTSA determine whether or not to
adopt a backstop based on the four statutory factors of technological
feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle
standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the nation
to conserve energy.\1188\ The Sierra Club \1189\ and NRDC expressed
similar concerns; NRDC recommended that NHTSA ``adopt manufacturer-
specific backstops on the combined car and light truck standards that
that bar an individual automaker from exceeding its forecast * * * fuel
economy levels by
[[Page 63022]]
approximately 0.5 mpg,'' allowing a manufacturer ``no more than three
years to make up any exceedance in its manufacturer-specific backstop
standard.'' \1190\ UCS and Consumers Union, in contrast, suggested that
a backstop include ``an automatic re-computation or `ratchet' of
stringencies for subsequent years,'' so that total anticipated oil
savings are fully achieved in 2025 regardless of outcomes in earlier
years.\1191\ All of the commenters supporting additional backstop
standards strongly urged NHTSA to revisit this question as part of its
future rulemaking to develop final standards for MYs 2022-2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1186\ CBD, at 18-19.
\1187\ Id.
\1188\ Id., citing CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1206.
\1189\ Sierra Club, at 5-6.
\1190\ NRDC, at 17.
\1191\ UCS, at 8; Consumers Union, at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As proposed, the agency will not be establishing any additional
backstop standards as part of this final rule. We continue to agree
with the environmental and consumer group commenters that we have
authority to adopt additional backstop standards if we deem it
appropriate to do so. However, we also continue to conclude that
insufficient time has passed in which manufacturers have been subject
to the attribute-based standards to assess whether or not backstops
would in fact help ensure that fuel savings anticipated by the agency
at the time of the final rule are met, and even if they did, whether
the benefits of that insurance outweigh potential impacts consumer
choice that could occur by heading down the road that Congress rejected
when it required CAFE standards to be attribute-based. If we determined
that backstops for imported passenger cars and light trucks were
necessary, it would be because consumers are choosing different (likely
larger) vehicles in the future than the agencies assumed in this
rulemaking analysis. Imposing additional backstop standards for those
fleets would require manufacturers to build vehicles which the majority
of consumers (under this scenario) would presumably not want. Vehicles
that cannot be sold are the essence of economic impracticability, and
vehicles that do not sell cannot save fuel or reduce emissions, because
they are not on the roads, and thus do not meet the need of the nation
to conserve fuel.
On the other hand, based on the assumptions underlying the analysis
for this rulemaking, consumers will experience significant benefits as
a result of buying the vehicles manufactured to meet these standards.
We have no reason to expect that consumers will turn a blind eye to
these benefits, and recent trends indicate that fuel economy is rising
in importance as a factor in vehicle purchasing decisions. We thus
conclude, for purposes of this final rule, that imposing additional
backstop standards for imported passenger cars and light trucks would
be premature. As stated in the NPRM, NHTSA will continue to monitor
vehicle sales trends and manufacturers' response to the standards, and
we will revisit this issue as part of the future rulemaking to develop
final standards for MYs 2022-2025.
(2) Alternative standards for certain manufacturers
Because EPCA states that standards must be set for ``* * *
automobiles manufactured by manufacturers,'' \1192\ and because
Congress provided specific direction on how small-volume manufacturers
could obtain exemptions from the passenger car standards, NHTSA has
long interpreted its authority as pertaining to setting standards for
the industry as a whole. Prior to the NPRM, some manufacturers raised
with NHTSA the possibility of NHTSA and EPA setting alternate standards
for part of the industry that met certain (relatively low) sales volume
criteria--specifically, that separate standards be set so that
``intermediate-size,'' limited-line manufacturers do not have to meet
the same levels of stringency that larger manufacturers have to meet
until several years later. These manufacturers argued that the same
level of standards would not be technologically feasible or
economically practicable in the same time frame for them, due to their
inability to spread compliance burden across a larger product lineup,
and difficulty in obtaining fuel economy-improving technologies quickly
from suppliers. NHTSA sought comment in the NPRM on whether or how
EPCA, as amended by EISA, could be interpreted to allow such alternate
standards for certain parts of the industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1192\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(1)(A) and (B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two commenters, Daimler and Volkswagen, requested that both NHTSA
and EPA consider allowing manufacturers to meet an ``alternate
stringency pathway'' for the passenger car standards. Both defined the
alternate pathway in terms of a ``slower ramp-up'' in stringency, with
lower increases in stringency in early years and higher increases in
later years (which Volkswagen clarified would only occur ``should
technology and market factors make this feasible'').\1193\ The
increases would lead manufacturers who chose this approach to meet the
same rough mpg level in, for example, MY 2021 as the rest of the
manufacturers in the passenger car fleet, but would provide additional
flexibility through the less stringent requirements in the earlier
model years,\1194\ although that flexibility would presumably disappear
as the standards grew tighter to make up for the slower start.
Volkswagen suggested that this approach was similar to what the
agencies had already proposed for the truck fleet in terms of
stringency increases over time.\1195\ Neither commenter provided legal
analysis in response to the agency's request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1193\ Daimler, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483, at 2, 4-5;
Volkswagen, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0247, at 28.
\1194\ Id.
\1195\ Volkswagen, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0247, at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA continues to interpret EPCA, as amended by EISA, as directing
the agency to set only one passenger car and one light truck standard
for each model year that applies to the fleet as a whole, with the
exception of the small volume manufacturer standards permitted by 49
U.S.C. 32902(d) and the minimum standard for domestically manufactured
passenger cars required under 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(4). While there have
been instances in the past when NHTSA allowed multiple standards for
light trucks to co-exist in a given model year, such as the ``flat''
and ``Reformed'' options for the MYs 2008-2010 light truck standards,
or the different light truck standards for 2WD, 4WD, and captive import
light trucks in MYs 1979-1981, NHTSA believes that those situations are
distinguishable from the ``alternate pathway'' standards sought by
Daimler and Volkswagen for several reasons.
First, when NHTSA previously allowed different classes of light
trucks to meet different standards, or when NHTSA allowed different
options for complying with light truck standards, we did that under
statutory language that expressly authorized the agency to set multiple
standards for light trucks if the agency deemed that appropriate.\1196\
The EISA revisions removed that language, so it is not clear that
Congress intended the agency to continue offering separate standards
for different classes of light trucks, and even less clear that the
agency would have authority to offer separate standards for different
types of passenger cars, when we never had such authority to begin
with. Moreover, the EISA revisions already added ways in which there
can be multiple standards
[[Page 63023]]
for passenger cars in a given model year: there is the backstop
standard of 32902(b)(4) for domestically-manufactured passenger
cars,\1197\ and there is the exemption provision of 32902(d) for low-
volume manufacturers. The latter is the provision that speaks most
clearly to this question of whether Congress has considered the
possibility of multiple standards being ``maximum feasible'' for the
passenger car fleet--NHTSA has the authority to set alternate ``maximum
feasible'' standards for passenger cars, but only for manufacturers
producing fewer than 10,000 cars in a model year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1196\ Under EPCA prior to the EISA revisions, 49 U.S.C.
32902(a) expressly stated that separate standards could be
prescribed for different classes of non-passenger automobiles.
\1197\ We note that taking the ``doesn't say we can't'' approach
with backstop authority (i.e., that just because Congress
established a backstop requirement for domestic cars doesn't mean we
can't also create backstop standards for import cars and light
trucks) is different from taking the same approach with multiple
standards being maximum feasible for the same fleet in a single
model year. Having additional backstops for other fleets does not
defeat the purpose of the Congressionally-required backstop. Having
multiple standards be simultaneously ``maximum feasible'' for
passenger cars seems to defeat the purpose of ``maximum,'' which is
inherently singular.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the fact patterns under which NHTSA previously set multiple
standards for a compliance category in the same model year are
different from the fact pattern presented in the current rulemaking for
the ``alternate pathway'' standards. In the most recent example, the
MYs 2008-2011 rulemaking, NHTSA was changing both the structure of CAFE
standards (from the flat MY 2007 standard to the attribute-based MY
2011 standard) and changing the technical approach to determining
maximum feasible stringency (from a ``stage analysis''/``least-
capable'' approach in MY 2007 to an industry-wide net benefit
maximizing approach in MY 2011). To manage this change, the ``flat''
and ``reformed'' light truck standards co-existing during MYs 2008-2010
were set with reference to each other: specifically, the agency first
used the ``stage analysis'' approach to determine the maximum feasible
``flat'' standard in each model year, and then used the CAFE model to
set the stringency of the ``reformed'' standard in each model year at a
level producing approximately the same level of cost to the industry as
a whole. After this transition period, the MY 2011 standard was
promulgated as a single attribute-based standard, the stringency of
which was set at a level estimated to maximize net benefits to society.
This cost equalization between the two sets of standards established
for MYs 2008-2010 helped ensure that the reformed standards would be
feasible for the industry as a whole, and was intended to avoid a
situation in which one form of the standards would be so much easier to
meet than the other that all manufacturers would choose that form and
not gain experience with the other. Both sets of standards, thus, were
designed to require a similar ``lift'' from the industry as a whole in
any given model year. The fact pattern for the ``alternate pathway''
would be designed to require exactly the opposite: the ``alternate
pathway'' standards would be much easier in some years, and much more
difficult in others, than the ``main pathway'' standards. EPCA/EISA
expressly requires that standards must be maximum feasible in each
separate model year. Based on the suggestions from Daimler and
Volkswagen, there is no indication that the ``main pathway'' and
``alternate pathway'' standards would be similar in any given year in
terms of costs, technology required, fuel saved, or any other metric
that NHTSA considers for determining maximum feasible. It is difficult
to see how two completely different standards can both be maximum
feasible for the industry as a whole in the same model year.
And finally, NHTSA did not suggest in the NPRM that it might be
considering setting multiple ``maximum feasible'' passenger car
standards for MYs 2017-2021, and nothing in NHTSA's past practice
\1198\ suggests that this might be something the agency would consider
in the CAFE context, particularly for passenger car standards. Since
first promulgating attribute-based CAFE standards, NHTSA has
interpreted the maximum feasible requirement as no longer requiring a
``least capable manufacturer'' approach, and the proposed standards
were consistent with that interpretation by being maximum feasible for
the industry as a whole, if not necessarily feasible for every
manufacturer in every model year. EPCA/EISA expressly provides a
solution for the manufacturers who cannot meet the main standards in
the civil penalty provisions of Sec. 32912. If NHTSA had to account
for the traditional fine payers in determining the maximum feasible
standards, we would fundamentally be precluded from pushing the rest of
the industry as far as we thought it could go. The NPRM was based on
this interpretation, as is the final rule, and the analysis supporting
both rulemaking documents accounted for it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1198\ Having allowed multiple light truck CAFE standards and
having allowed alternate phase-ins for safety standards would not be
sufficient indication that NHTSA might suddenly be considering
multiple passenger car CAFE standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, NHTSA is not finalizing the ``alternate
pathway'' approach requested by the commenters. If commenters wish to
pursue this issue again in the future rulemaking to develop final
standards for MYs 2022-2025, NHTSA again requests that they provide
legal analysis of EPCA/EISA in support of their position.
2. Administrative Procedure Act
To be upheld under the ``arbitrary and capricious'' standard of
judicial review in the APA, an agency rule must be rational, based on
consideration of the relevant factors, and within the scope of the
authority delegated to the agency by the statute. The agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for
its action including a ``rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.'' Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
Statutory interpretations included in an agency's rule are
subjected to the two-step analysis of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694
(1984). Under step one, where a statute ``has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue,'' id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, the court and
the agency ``must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress,'' id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If the statute is silent or
ambiguous regarding the specific question, the court proceeds to step
two and asks ``whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.'' Id.
If an agency's interpretation differs from the one that it has
previously adopted, the agency need not demonstrate that the prior
position was wrong or even less desirable. Rather, the agency would
need only to demonstrate that its new position is consistent with the
statute and supported by the record, and acknowledge that this is a
departure from past positions. The Supreme Court emphasized this
recently in FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009). When an
agency changes course from earlier regulations, ``the requirement that
an agency provide a reasoned explanation for its action would
ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing
position,'' but ``need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that
the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old
one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute,
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to
be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.''
\1199\ The APA also requires
[[Page 63024]]
that agencies provide notice and comment to the public when proposing
regulations,\1200\ as we did in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1199\ Ibid., 1181.
\1200\ 5 U.S.C. 553.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. National Environmental Policy Act
As discussed above, EPCA requires the agency to determine the level
at which to set CAFE standards for each model year by considering the
four factors of technological feasibility, economic practicability, the
effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel
economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) directs that environmental
considerations be integrated into that process.\1201\ To accomplish
that purpose, NEPA requires an agency to compare the potential
environmental impacts of its proposed action to those of a reasonable
range of alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1201\ NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 4321-47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To explore the environmental consequences of the agency's action in
depth, NHTSA has prepared a Final Environmental Impact Statement
(``Final EIS''). The purpose of an EIS is to ``provide full and fair
discussion of significant environmental impacts and [to] inform
decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which
would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the
human environment.'' 40 CFR 1502.1.
NEPA is ``a procedural statute that mandates a process rather than
a particular result.'' Stewart Park & Reserve Coal., Inc. v. Slater,
352 F.3d 545, 557 (2nd Cir. 2003). The agency's overall EIS-related
obligation is to ``take a `hard look' at the environmental consequences
before taking a major action.'' Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d
437 (1983). Significantly, ``[i]f the adverse environmental effects of
the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency
is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the
environmental costs.'' Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989).
The agency must identify the ``environmentally preferable''
alternative, but need not adopt it. ``Congress in enacting NEPA * * *
did not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other
appropriate considerations.'' Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). Instead, NEPA
requires an agency to develop alternatives to the proposed action in
preparing an EIS. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(2)(C)(iii). The statute does not
command the agency to favor an environmentally preferable course of
action, only that it make its decision to proceed with the action after
taking a hard look at environmental consequences.
This final rule contains the Record of Decision (ROD) for NHTSA's
rulemaking action, pursuant to NEPA and the Council on Environmental
Quality's (CEQ) implementing regulations, in Section IV.J.\1202\ See 40
CFR Sec. 1505.2. The ROD explains NHTSA's decision and the
considerations relevant to NHTSA's decision, including the information
contained in the Final EIS. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1202\ CEQ NEPA implementing regulations are codified at 40 Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 1500-08.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. What are the CAFE standards?
1. Form of the Standards
Each of the CAFE standards that NHTSA is promulgating today for
passenger cars and light trucks is expressed as a mathematical function
that defines a fuel economy target applicable to each vehicle model
and, for each fleet, establishes a required CAFE level determined by
computing the sales-weighted harmonic average of those targets.\1203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1203\ Required CAFE levels shown here are estimated required
levels based on NHTSA's current projection of manufacturers' vehicle
fleets in MYs 2017-2025, given the MY 2008-based and MY 2010-based
market forecasts. Actual required levels are not determined until
the end of each model year, when all of the vehicles produced by a
manufacturer in that model year are known and their compliance
obligation can be determined with certainty. The target curves, as
defined by the constrained linear function, and as embedded in the
function for the sales-weighted harmonic average, are the real
``standards'' being promulgated today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above in Section II.C, NHTSA has determined passenger
car fuel economy targets using a constrained linear function defined
according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.027
Here, TARGET is the fuel economy target (in mpg) applicable to
vehicles of a given footprint (FOOTPRINT, in square feet), b and a are
the function's lower and upper asymptotes (also in mpg), respectively,
c is the slope (in gallons per mile per square foot) of the sloped
portion of the function, and d is the intercept (in gallons per mile)
of the sloped portion of the function (that is, the value the sloped
portion would take if extended to a footprint of 0 square feet). The
MIN and MAX functions take the minimum and maximum, respectively, of
the included values.
NHTSA is establishing, consistent with the standards for MYs 2011-
2016, that the CAFE level required of any given manufacturer be
determined by calculating the production-weighted harmonic average of
the fuel economy targets applicable to each vehicle model:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.028
PRODUCTIONi is the number of units produced for sale in
the United States of each ith unique footprint within each model type
produced for sale in the United States, and TARGETi is the
corresponding fuel economy target (according to the equation shown
above and based on the corresponding footprint), and the summations in
the numerator and denominator are both performed over all unique
footprint and model type combinations in the fleet in question.
The final standards for passenger cars are, therefore, specified by
the four coefficients defining fuel economy targets:
a = upper limit (mpg)
[[Page 63025]]
b = lower limit (mpg)
c = slope (gallon per mile per square foot)
d = intercept (gallon per mile)
For light trucks, NHTSA is defining fuel economy targets in terms
of a mathematical function under which the target is the maximum of
values determined under each of two constrained linear functions. The
second of these establishes a ``floor'' reflecting the MY 2016
standard, after accounting for estimated adjustments reflecting
increased air conditioner efficiency. This prevents the target at any
footprint from declining between model years. The resultant
mathematical function is as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.029
The final standards for light trucks are, therefore, specified by
the eight coefficients defining fuel economy targets:
a = upper limit (mpg)
b = lower limit (mpg)
c = slope (gallon per mile per square foot)
d = intercept (gallon per mile)
e = upper limit (mpg) of ``floor''
f = lower limit (mpg) of ``floor''
g = slope (gallon per mile per square foot) of ``floor''
h = intercept (gallon per mile) of ``floor''
2. Passenger Car Standards for MYs 2017-2025
For passenger cars, NHTSA is establishing CAFE standards for MYs
2017-2021 and presenting augural standards for MYs 2022-2025 defined by
the following coefficients:
Table IV-16--NHTSA Coefficients Defining Final MYs 2017-2025 Fuel Economy Targets for Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coefficient 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a (mpg)..................................... 43.61 45.21 46.87 48.74 50.83 53.21 55.71 58.32 61.07
b (mpg)..................................... 32.65 33.84 35.07 36.47 38.02 39.79 41.64 43.58 45.61
c (gpm/sf).................................. 0.0005131 0.0004954 0.0004783 0.0004603 0.0004419 0.0004227 0.0004043 0.0003867 0.0003699
d (gpm)..................................... 0.001896 0.001811 0.001729 0.001643 0.001555 0.001463 0.001375 0.001290 0.001210
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For reference, the coefficients defining the MYs 2012-2016
passenger car standards are also provided below:
Table IV-17--NHTSA Coefficients Defining Final MYs 2012-2016 Fuel Economy Targets for Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coefficient 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a (mpg)............................................. 35.95 36.80 37.75 39.24 41.09
b (mpg)............................................. 27.95 28.46 29.03 29.90 30.96
c (gpm/sf).......................................... 0.0005308 0.0005308 0.0005308 0.0005308 0.0005308
d (gpm)............................................. 0.0060507 0.005410 0.004725 0.003719 0.002573
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section II.C above and Chapter 2 of the Joint TSD discusses how the
coefficients in Table IV-16 were developed for this final rule. The
coefficients result in the footprint-dependent targets shown
graphically below for MYs 2017-2025. The MY 2012-2016 final standards
are also shown for comparison.
[[Page 63026]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.030
As discussed, the CAFE levels ultimately required of individual
manufacturers will depend on the mix of vehicles they produce for sale
in the United States. Based on the market forecasts of future sales
that NHTSA has used to examine today's final and augural CAFE
standards, the agency currently estimates that the target curves shown
above will result in the following average required fuel economy levels
for individual manufacturers during MYs 2017-2025 (an updated estimate
of the average required fuel economy level under the final MY 2016
standard is also shown for comparison).\1204\ This table has changed
since the NPRM in that it now shows the estimated required levels
starting from both the MY 2008-based market forecast and the MY 2010-
based market forecast, as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1204\ In the May 2010 final rule establishing MYs 2012-2016
standards for passenger cars and light trucks, NHTSA estimated that
the required fuel economy levels for passenger cars would average
37.8 mpg under the MY 2016 passenger car standard. Based on the
agency's current forecast of the MY 2016 passenger car market, NHTSA
estimates that the average required fuel economy level for passenger
cars will be 38.2-38.7 mpg in MY 2016.
[[Page 63027]]
Table IV-18--NHTSA Estimated Average Fuel Economy Required Under Final MY 2016 and Final and Augural MYs 2017-2025 CAFE Standards for Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY baseline 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin................... 2008......... 39.0-.... 40.5-.... 41.9-.... 43.5-.... 45.2-.... 47.2-.... 49.4-... 51.7-... 54.1-... 56.6-
2010......... 37.4..... 38.8..... 40.2..... 41.6..... 43.3..... 45.1..... 47.3.... 49.5.... 51.8.... 54.2
BMW............................ 2008......... 38.0-.... 39.4-.... 40.9-.... 42.4-.... 44.1-.... 46.0-.... 48.1-... 50.4-... 52.7-... 55.2-
2010......... 37.9..... 39.4..... 40.8..... 42.3..... 43.9..... 45.8..... 47.9.... 50.1.... 52.5.... 55.0
Daimler........................ 2008......... 37.3-.... 38.6-.... 39.9-.... 41.4-.... 43.0-.... 44.9-.... 47.0-... 49.2-... 51.4-... 53.9-
2010......... 36.7..... 38.0..... 39.4..... 40.9..... 42.5..... 44.3..... 46.4.... 48.5.... 50.9.... 53.2
Fiat........................... 2008......... 37.3-.... 39.1-.... 40.6-.... 42.1-.... 43.7-.... 45.7-.... 47.9-... 50.2-... 52.6-... 55.1-
2010......... 37.3..... 38.7..... 39.9..... 41.4..... 43.0..... 44.9..... 47.0.... 49.2.... 51.6.... 54.0
Ford........................... 2008......... 37.9-.... 39.1-.... 40.6-.... 42.1-.... 43.7-.... 45.6-.... 47.7-... 49.9-... 52.3-... 54.7-
2010......... 38.1..... 39.5..... 41.0..... 42.5..... 44.1..... 46.0..... 48.2.... 50.4.... 52.8.... 55.3
Geely.......................... 2008......... 37.4-.... 38.8-.... 40.3-.... 41.7-.... 43.4-.... 45.3-.... 47.4-... 49.6-... 51.9-... 54.4-
2010......... 38.7..... 40.1..... 41.5..... 43.0..... 44.7..... 46.6..... 48.7.... 50.9.... 53.3.... 55.8
General Motors................. 2008......... 37.9-.... 39.6-.... 41.1-.... 42.6-.... 44.3-.... 46.2-.... 48.4-... 50.7-... 53.1-... 55.6-
2010......... 37.9..... 39.3..... 40.8..... 42.2..... 43.9..... 45.7..... 47.9.... 50.1.... 52.5.... 54.9
Honda.......................... 2008......... 38.9-.... 40.4-.... 41.9-.... 43.4-.... 45.2-.... 47.1-.... 49.3-... 51.6-... 54.0-... 56.6-
2010......... 38.2..... 39.7..... 41.1..... 42.6..... 44.2..... 46.1..... 48.3.... 50.5.... 52.9.... 55.4
Hyundai........................ 2008......... 39.0-.... 40.4-.... 41.9-.... 43.4-.... 45.2-.... 47.1-.... 49.3-... 51.6-... 54.1-... 56.6-
2010......... 38.3..... 39.8..... 41.3..... 42.7..... 44.5..... 46.4..... 48.6.... 50.8.... 53.2.... 55.7
Kia............................ 2008......... 39.9-.... 41.1-.... 42.6-.... 44.2-.... 46.0-.... 48.0-.... 50.3-... 52.6-... 55.1-... 57.7-
2010......... 39.4..... 40.8..... 42.3..... 43.8..... 45.6..... 47.5..... 49.8.... 52.1.... 54.5.... 57.1
Lotus.......................... 2008......... 42.0-.... 43.6-.... 45.2-.... 46.9-.... 48.7-.... 50.8-.... 53.2-... 55.7-... 58.3-... 61.1-
2010......... 40.3..... 41.8..... 43.3..... 44.9..... 46.7..... 48.7..... 51.0.... 53.4.... 55.9.... 58.5
Mazda.......................... 2008......... 39.9-.... 41.5-.... 43.0-.... 44.5-.... 46.3-.... 48.3-.... 50.6-... 53.0-... 55.5-... 58.1-
2010......... 38.7..... 40.1..... 41.6..... 43.0..... 44.7..... 46.6..... 48.8.... 51.1.... 53.5.... 56.0
Mitsubishi..................... 2008......... 38.9-.... 40.5-.... 42.0-.... 43.6-.... 45.3-.... 47.3-.... 49.5-... 51.8-... 54.2-... 56.8-
2010......... 40.3..... 41.8..... 43.3..... 44.9..... 46.7..... 48.7..... 51.0.... 53.4.... 55.9.... 58.6
Nissan......................... 2008......... 38.4-.... 39.8-.... 41.2-.... 42.8-.... 44.4-.... 46.3-.... 48.5-... 50.7-... 53.1-... 55.6-
2010......... 38.2..... 39.6..... 41.0..... 42.5..... 44.2..... 46.0..... 48.2.... 50.4.... 52.8.... 55.2
Porsche........................ 2008......... 42.0-.... 43.6-.... 45.2-.... 46.9-.... 48.7-.... 50.8-.... 53.2-... 55.7-... 58.3-... 61.1-
2010......... 37.6..... 39.1..... 40.5..... 42.0..... 43.6..... 45.4..... 47.5.... 49.7.... 52.1.... 54.5
Spyker/Saab.................... 2008......... 39.6-.... 41.1-.... 42.6-.... 44.2-.... 46.0-.... 47.9-.... 50.2-... 52.5-... 55.0-... 57.6-
2010......... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0..... 0.0..... 0.0..... 0.0
Subaru......................... 2008......... 41.1-.... 42.6-.... 44.2-.... 45.8-.... 47.6-.... 49.7-.... 52.0-... 54.4-... 57.0-... 59.6-
2010......... 39.6..... 41.1..... 42.6..... 44.1..... 45.8..... 47.7..... 49.9.... 52.2.... 54.7.... 57.2
Suzuki......................... 2008......... 41.7-.... 43.3-.... 44.9-.... 46.5-.... 48.4-.... 50.5-.... 52.8-... 55.3-... 57.9-... 60.6-
2010......... 40.6..... 42.1..... 43.6..... 45.2..... 46.9..... 48.9..... 51.2.... 53.6.... 56.1.... 58.7
Tata........................... 2008......... 35.6-.... 36.9-.... 38.3-.... 39.7-.... 41.2-.... 43.0-.... 45.0-... 47.1-... 49.3-... 51.7-
2010......... 36.0..... 37.4..... 38.8..... 40.4..... 41.9..... 43.8..... 45.9.... 48.0.... 50.3.... 52.7
Tesla.......................... 2008......... 42.0-.... 43.6-.... 45.2-.... 46.9-.... 48.7-.... 50.8-.... 53.2-... 55.7-... 58.3-... 61.1-
2010......... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0...... 0.0..... 0.0..... 0.0..... 0.0
Toyota......................... 2008......... 39.2-.... 40.6-.... 42.1-.... 43.7-.... 45.4-.... 47.4-.... 49.6-... 51.9-... 54.3-... 56.9-
2010......... 38.3..... 39.7..... 41.2..... 42.7..... 44.3..... 46.2..... 48.4.... 50.7.... 53.0.... 55.5
Volkswagen..................... 2008......... 39.9-.... 41.4-.... 43.0-.... 44.5-.... 46.3-.... 48.3-.... 50.6-... 52.9-... 55.4-... 58.0-
2010......... 39.0..... 40.5..... 41.9..... 43.5..... 45.2..... 47.1..... 49.3.... 51.6.... 54.1.... 56.6
Average........................ 2008......... 38.7-.... 40.1-.... 41.6-.... 43.1-.... 44.8-.... 46.8-.... 49.0-... 51.2-... 53.6-... 56.2-
2010......... 38.2..... 39.6..... 41.1..... 42.5..... 44.2..... 46.1..... 48.2.... 50.5.... 52.9.... 55.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because a manufacturer's required average fuel economy level for a
model year under the final standards will be based on its actual
production numbers in that model year, its official required fuel
economy level will not be known until the end of that model year.
However, because the targets for each vehicle footprint will be
established in advance of the model year, a manufacturer should be able
to estimate its required level accurately. Readers should remember that
the mpg levels describing the ``estimated required standards'' shown
throughout this section are not necessarily the ultimate mpg level with
which manufacturers will have to comply, for the reasons explained
above, and that the mpg level designated as ``estimated required'' is
exactly that, an estimate.
3. Minimum Domestic Passenger Car Standards
EISA expressly requires each manufacturer to meet a minimum flat
fuel economy standard for domestically manufactured passenger cars in
addition to meeting the standards set by NHTSA. According to the
statute (49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(4)), the minimum standard shall be the
greater of (A) 27.5 miles per gallon; or (B) 92 percent of the average
fuel economy projected by the Secretary for the combined domestic and
nondomestic passenger automobile fleets manufactured for sale in the
United States by all manufacturers in the model year. The agency must
publish the projected minimum standards in the Federal Register when
the passenger car standards for the model year in question are
promulgated. As a practical matter, as standards for both cars and
trucks continue to rise over time, 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(4)(A) will likely
eventually cease to be relevant.
As discussed in the final rule establishing the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE
standards, because 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(4)(B) states that the minimum
domestic passenger car standard shall be 92 percent of the projected
average fuel economy for the passenger car fleet, ``which projection
shall be published in the Federal Register when the standard
[[Page 63028]]
for that model year is promulgated in accordance with this section,''
NHTSA interprets EISA as indicating that the minimum domestic passenger
car standard should be based on the agency's fleet assumptions when the
passenger car standard for that year is promulgated.
However, we note that we do not read this language to preclude any
change, ever, in the minimum standard after it is first promulgated for
a model year. As long as the 18-month lead-time requirement of 49
U.S.C. 32902(a) is respected, NHTSA believes that the language of the
statute suggests that the 92 percent should be determined anew any time
the passenger car standards are revised. This issue will be
particularly relevant for the current rulemaking, given the
considerable lead-time involved and the necessity of a new rulemaking
to develop and establish the MYs 2022-2025 standards. We sought comment
in the NPRM on this interpretation, and on whether or not the agency
should consider instead for MYs 2017-2025 designating the minimum
domestic passenger car standards proposed as ``estimated,'' just as the
passenger car standards are ``estimated,'' and waiting until the end of
each model year to finalize the 92 percent mpg value. While NHTSA
received a number of comments on the topic of ``backstops'' generally,
no commenters addressed this particular question. We are therefore
finalizing the approach proposed, but we will continue to monitor this
issue going forward to assess whether the difference between the final
required passenger car standards and the minimum standards promulgated
today grows over time.
We note also that in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, we interpreted
EISA as indicating that the 92 percent minimum standard should be based
on the estimated required CAFE level rather than, as suggested by the
Alliance, the estimated achieved CAFE level (which would likely be
lower than the estimated required level if it reflected manufacturers'
use of dual-fuel vehicle credits under 49 U.S.C. 32905, at least in the
context of the MYs 2012-2016 standards). No comments were received on
this position as stated in the NPRM, and NHTSA continues to believe
that this interpretation is appropriate for the final rule.
The determination of the minimum domestic passenger car standard is
complicated somewhat in this final rule by the fact that the 92 percent
calculation depends on the agency's assessment of the estimated
required passenger car mpg level in a given model year--with two
baseline market forecasts, the estimated required mpg levels are
presented throughout this document as a range. The minimum domestic
passenger car standard, however, must be a single mpg level. Given the
uncertainty associated with the baseline market forecasts that led the
agencies to use both for the final rule analysis, the agency concluded
that it would be reasonable to determine 92 percent of the estimated
required level in each year under both the MY 2008-based market
forecast and the MY 2010-based market forecast, and average the two.
Table IV-19 below shows the 92 percent mpg levels for both forecasts:
Table IV-19--NHTSA Values for 92 Percent of the Estimated Required MYs 2017-2025 MPG Levels for Passenger Cars Under Both Market Forecasts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY 2008.............................................. 36.9 38.3 39.7 41.2 43.0 45.0 47.1 49.4 51.7
MY 2010.............................................. 36.4 37.8 39.1 40.6 42.4 44.4 46.4 48.6 50.9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final minimum standards for domestically manufactured passenger
cars for MYs 2017-2021 and the augural standards for MYs 2022-2025
(and, for comparison, the final MY 2016 minimum domestic passenger car
standard) are presented below in Table IV-20.
Table IV-20--NHTSA Estimated Minimum Standard for Domestically Manufactured Passenger Cars Under Final MY 2016 and Final and Augural MYs 2017-2025 CAFE
Standards for Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
34.7 36.7 38.0 39.4 40.9 42.7 44.7 46.8 49.0 51.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in Section IV.D, NHTSA also sought comment on whether
to consider, for the final rule, the possibility of minimum standards
for imported passenger cars and light trucks. Although we did not
propose such standards, we explored this concept again in the NPRM in
light of the considerable amount of time between now and 2017-2025
(particularly the later years), and the accompanying uncertainty in our
market forecast and other assumptions, which we explained might make
such minimum standards relevant to help ensure that currently-expected
fuel economy improvements occur during that time frame. Comments
received on this question were decidedly mixed; NHTSA's full discussion
of this issue is presented in Section IV.D. In summary, NHTSA believes
it is likely most prudent to wait until we are able to observe
potential market changes during the implementation of the MYs 2012-2016
standards and to consider additional minimum standards in a future
rulemaking action. Any additional minimum standards for MYs 2022-2025
that may be set in the future would, like the primary standards, be a
part of the future rulemaking concurrent with the mid-term evaluation,
and potentially revised at that time.
4. Light Truck Standards
For light trucks, NHTSA is promulgating final CAFE standards for
MYs 2017-2021 and presenting augural standards for MYs 2022-2025
defined by the following coefficients:
[[Page 63029]]
Table IV-21--NHTSA Coefficients Defining Final and Augural MYs 2017-2025 Fuel Economy Targets for Light Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coefficient 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a (mpg)..................................... 36.26 37.36 38.16 39.11 41.80 43.79 45.89 48.09 50.39
b (mpg)..................................... 25.09 25.20 25.25 25.25 25.25 26.29 27.53 28.83 30.19
c (gpm/sf).................................. 0.0005484 0.0005358 0.0005265 0.0005140 0.0004820 0.0004607 0.0004404 0.0004210 0.0004025
d (gpm)..................................... 0.005097 0.004797 0.004623 0.004494 0.004164 0.003944 0.003735 0.003534 0.003343
e (mpg)..................................... 35.10 35.31 35.41 35.41 35.41 35.41 35.41 35.41 35.41
f (mpg)..................................... 25.09 25.20 25.25 25.25 25.25 25.25 25.25 25.25 25.25
g (gpm/sf).................................. 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546
h (gpm)..................................... 0.009851 0.009682 0.009603 0.009603 0.009603 0.009603 0.009603 0.009603 0.009603
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For reference, the coefficients defining the MYs 2012-2016 light
truck standards (which did not include a ``floor'' term, defined by
coefficients e, f, g, and h) are also provided below:
Table IV-22--NHTSA Coefficients Defining Final MYs 2012-2016 Fuel Economy Targets for Light Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coefficient 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a (mpg)............................................. 29.82 30.67 31.38 32.72 34.42
b (mpg)............................................. 22.27 22.74 23.13 23.85 24.74
c (gpm/sf).......................................... 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546 0.0004546
d (gpm)............................................. 0.014900 0.013968 0.013225 0.011920 0.010413
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The coefficients result in the footprint-dependent targets shown
graphically below for MYs 2017-2025. MYs 2012-2016 final standards are
shown for comparison.
[[Page 63030]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.031
Again, given these targets, the CAFE levels required of individual
manufacturers will depend on the mix of vehicles they produce for sale
in the United States. Based on the market forecasts that NHTSA has used
to examine today's final and augural CAFE standards, the agency
currently estimates that the target curves shown above will result in
the following average required fuel economy levels for individual
manufacturers during MYs 2017-2025 (an updated estimate of the average
required fuel economy level under the final MY 2016 standard is shown
for comparison).\1205\ This table has changed since the NPRM in that it
now shows the estimated required levels starting from both the MY 2008-
based market forecast and the MY 2010-based market forecast, as
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1205\ In the May 2010 final rule establishing MYs 2012-2016
standards for passenger cars and light trucks, NHTSA estimated that
the required fuel economy levels for light trucks would average 28.8
mpg under the MY 2016 light truck standard. Based on the agency's
current forecasts of the MY 2016 light truck market, NHTSA estimates
that the required fuel economy levels will average 28.9-29.2 mpg in
MY 2016. The agency has made no changes to MY 2016 standards and
projects no changes in fleet-specific average requirements (although
within-fleet market shifts could, under an attribute-based standard,
produce such changes).
[[Page 63031]]
Table IV-23--NHTSA Estimated Average Fuel Economy Required Under Final MY 2016 and Final and Augural MYs 2017-2025 CAFE Standards for Light Trucks
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY baseline 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aston Martin................... 2008......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.0-
2010......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0
BMW............................ 2008......... 30.7-........ 30.6-........ 31.4-........ 32.1-........ 32.9-........ 35.1-........ 36.7-....... 38.4-....... 40.2-....... 42.1-
2010......... 31.0......... 31.2......... 32.0......... 32.7......... 33.5......... 35.8......... 37.5........ 39.3........ 41.1........ 43.1
Daimler........................ 2008......... 29.5-........ 29.1-........ 29.6-........ 30.2-........ 30.9-........ 32.9-........ 34.5-....... 36.1-....... 37.8-....... 39.5-
2010......... 30.0......... 30.1......... 30.8......... 31.4......... 32.2......... 34.4......... 36.0........ 37.7........ 39.5........ 41.4
Fiat........................... 2008......... 29.4-........ 29.6-........ 30.2-........ 30.8-........ 31.5-........ 33.7-........ 35.3-....... 37.0-....... 38.8-....... 40.6-
2010......... 29.5......... 29.6......... 30.2......... 30.7......... 31.5......... 33.6......... 35.2........ 36.9........ 38.6........ 40.4
Ford........................... 2008......... 28.5-........ 28.6-........ 29.1-........ 29.6-........ 30.0-........ 32.0-........ 33.5-....... 35.2-....... 37.0-....... 38.8-
2010......... 27.3......... 27.5......... 27.8......... 28.0......... 28.4......... 30.2......... 31.7........ 33.1........ 34.7........ 36.4
Geely.......................... 2008......... 31.0-........ 31.1-........ 32.1-........ 32.7-........ 33.5-........ 35.8-........ 37.5-....... 39.3-....... 41.2-....... 43.1-
2010......... 31.2......... 31.4......... 32.4......... 33.0......... 33.9......... 36.2......... 37.9........ 39.7........ 41.6........ 43.6
General Motors................. 2008......... 27.7-........ 28.0-........ 28.5-........ 29.1-........ 29.6-........ 31.7-........ 33.2-....... 34.9-....... 36.6-....... 38.4-
2010......... 27.7......... 27.8......... 28.1......... 28.6......... 29.2......... 31.2......... 32.8........ 34.3........ 36.0........ 37.8
Honda.......................... 2008......... 30.9-........ 31.0-........ 31.7-........ 32.3-........ 33.1-........ 35.4-........ 37.0-....... 38.8 -...... 40.7-....... 42.6-
2010......... 30.2......... 30.4......... 31.1......... 31.7......... 32.5......... 34.7......... 36.4........ 38.1........ 39.9........ 41.8
Hyundai........................ 2008......... 31.2-........ 31.3-........ 32.1-........ 32.8-........ 33.6-........ 35.9-........ 37.6-....... 39.4-....... 41.3-....... 43.2-
2010......... 31.7......... 32.1......... 33.0......... 33.7......... 34.6......... 36.9......... 38.7........ 40.5........ 42.5........ 44.5
Kia............................ 2008......... 30.0-........ 30.0-........ 30.6-........ 31.2-........ 32.0-........ 34.2-........ 35.8-....... 37.5-....... 39.3-....... 41.1-
2010......... 30.1......... 30.3......... 31.0......... 31.7......... 32.5......... 34.8......... 36.5........ 38.3........ 40.1........ 42.1
Lotus.......................... 2008......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.0-
2010......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0
Mazda.......................... 2008......... 31.7-........ 31.4-........ 32.4-........ 33.1-........ 33.8-........ 35.9-........ 37.6-....... 39.3-....... 41.2-....... 43.2-
2010......... 31.3......... 31.6......... 32.5......... 33.1......... 33.9......... 36.2......... 38.0........ 39.8........ 41.7........ 43.6
Mitsubishi..................... 2008......... 32.5-........ 32.9-........ 33.9-........ 34.6-........ 35.5-........ 37.9-........ 39.7-....... 41.6-....... 43.6-....... 45.7-
2010......... 33.4......... 34.1......... 35.1......... 35.9......... 36.7......... 39.3......... 41.1........ 43.1........ 45.2........ 47.3
Nissan......................... 2008......... 29.4-........ 29.6-........ 30.3-........ 30.9-........ 31.6-........ 33.5-........ 35.1-....... 36.8-....... 38.7-....... 40.6-
2010......... 29.4......... 29.6......... 30.1......... 30.5......... 31.1......... 33.1......... 34.6........ 36.2........ 37.9........ 39.7
Porsche........................ 2008......... 30.3-........ 30.3-........ 31.2-........ 31.8-........ 32.6-........ 34.8-........ 36.5-....... 38.2-....... 40.0-....... 41.9-
2010......... 30.2......... 30.3......... 31.1......... 31.8......... 32.6......... 34.8......... 36.4........ 38.2........ 40.0........ 41.9
Spyker/Saab.................... 2008......... 31.1-........ 31.2-........ 32.1-........ 32.8-........ 33.6-........ 35.9-........ 37.6-....... 39.4-....... 41.3-....... 43.3-
2010......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0
Subaru......................... 2008......... 33.7-........ 34.4-........ 35.4-........ 36.1-........ 37.1-........ 39.6-........ 41.5-....... 43.5-....... 45.5-....... 47.7-
2010......... 34.0......... 34.9......... 35.9......... 36.7......... 37.6......... 40.2......... 42.1........ 44.1........ 46.2........ 48.4
Suzuki......................... 2008......... 31.9-........ 32.2-........ 33.2-........ 33.9-........ 34.7-........ 37.1-........ 38.9-....... 40.7-....... 42.7-....... 44.7-
2010......... 33.5......... 34.2......... 35.2......... 36.0......... 36.9......... 39.4......... 41.3........ 43.3........ 45.3........ 47.5
Tata........................... 2008......... 31.8-........ 32.1-........ 33.1-........ 33.8-........ 34.6-........ 37.0-........ 38.8-....... 40.6-....... 42.6-....... 44.6-
2010......... 31.4......... 31.6......... 32.5......... 33.2......... 34.0......... 36.3......... 38.1........ 39.9........ 41.8........ 43.8
Tesla.......................... 2008......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-......... 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.0-
2010......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0
Toyota......................... 2008......... 29.5-........ 29.7-........ 30.4-........ 31.0-........ 31.6-........ 33.7-........ 35.3-....... 37.0-....... 38.9-....... 40.7-
2010......... 29.2......... 29.4......... 30.0......... 30.5......... 31.1......... 32.9......... 34.4........ 36.1........ 37.8........ 39.6
Volkswagen..................... 2008......... 29.7-........ 29.5-........ 30.1-........ 30.8-........ 31.5-........ 33.5-........ 35.1-....... 36.7-....... 38.5-....... 40.3-
2010......... 30.7......... 30.9......... 31.7......... 32.4......... 33.2......... 35.4......... 37.1........ 38.9........ 40.8........ 42.7
Average........................ 2008......... 29.2-........ 29.4-........ 30.0-........ 30.6-........ 31.2-........ 33.3-........ 34.9-....... 36.6-....... 38.5-....... 40.3-
2010......... 28.9......... 29.1......... 29.6......... 30.0......... 30.6......... 32.6......... 34.2........ 35.8........ 37.5........ 39.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above with respect to the estimated final passenger
cars standards, we note that a manufacturer's required light truck fuel
economy level for a model year under the ultimate final standards will
be based on its actual production numbers in that model year.
F. How do the final standards fulfill NHTSA's statutory obligations?
1. Overview
The discussion that follows is necessarily complex, but the central
points are straightforward. NHTSA has concluded that the standards
presented above in Section IV.E are the maximum feasible standards for
passenger cars and light trucks in MYs 2017-2021. EPCA/EISA requires
NHTSA to consider four statutory factors in determining the maximum
feasible CAFE standards in a rulemaking: specifically, technological
feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle
standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the nation
to conserve energy. The agency considered a number of regulatory
alternatives in its analysis of potential CAFE standards for those
model years, including several that increase stringency on average at
set percentages each year, one that approximates the point at which the
modeled net benefits are maximized in each model year, and one that
approximates the point at which the modeled total costs equal total
benefits in each model year. Some of those alternatives represent
standards that would be more stringent than the final standards,\1206\
and some are less
[[Page 63032]]
stringent.\1207\ As the discussion below explains, we conclude that the
correct balancing of the relevant factors that the agency must consider
in determining the maximum feasible standards recognizes economic
practicability concerns as discussed below, and sets standards
accordingly. Additionally, consistent with Executive Order 13563, the
agency believes that the benefits of the preferred alternative amply
justify the costs; indeed, the monetized benefits exceed the monetized
costs by $137-192 billion over the lifetime of the vehicles covered by
the final standards for MYs 2017-2021.\1208\ In full consideration of
all of the information currently before the agency, we have weighed the
statutory factors carefully and selected final passenger car and light
truck standards that we believe are the maximum feasible for MYs 2017-
2021. We have also conducted a similar analysis for the augural
standards presented for MYs 2022-2025, which represent the agency's
best estimate of what standards would be maximum feasible, based on the
information currently before us, had we the authority to set standards
for 9 model years at a time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1206\ We recognize that more stringent standards would help the
need of the nation to conserve more energy and might potentially be
technologically feasible (in the narrowest sense) during those model
years, but based on our analysis and the evidence presented by the
industry, we do not believe that higher standards would not
represent the proper balancing for MYs 2017-2025 cars and trucks,
because they would raise serious questions about economic
practicability. As explained above, NHTSA's modeled estimates
necessarily do not perfectly capture all of the factors of economic
practicability, and this conclusion regarding net benefits versus
economic practicability is similar to the conclusion reached in the
MY 2012-2016 analysis.
\1207\ We also recognize that less stringent standards might be
less burdensome on the industry, but considering the environmental
impacts of the different regulatory alternatives as required under
NEPA and the need of the nation to conserve energy, we do not
believe they would have represented the appropriate balancing of the
relevant factors, because they would have left technology, fuel
savings, and emissions reductions on the table unnecessarily, and
not contributed as much as possible to reducing our nation's energy
security and climate change concerns. They would also have lower net
benefits than the Preferred Alternative.
\1208\ This range represents the agency's estimates of monetized
net benefits under both a 3% and a 7% discount rate. For purposes of
monetized net benefits associated with both the final and augural
standards (MYs 2017-2025, aggregated), the range becomes $372-507
billion, under both a 3% and a 7% discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. What are NHTSA's statutory obligations?
As discussed above in Section IV.D, NHTSA sets CAFE standards under
EPCA, as amended by EISA, and is also subject to the APA and NEPA in
developing and promulgating CAFE standards.
NEPA requires the agency to develop and consider the findings of an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for ``major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.'' NHTSA
has prepared an EIS to inform its development and consideration of the
final standards. The agency has evaluated the environmental impacts of
a range of regulatory alternatives in the Final EIS and this final
rule, and integrated the results of that consideration into our
balancing of the EPCA/EISA factors, as discussed below.
The APA and relevant case law requires our rulemaking decision to
be rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors, and within
the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by EPCA/EISA. The
relevant factors are those required by EPCA/EISA and the additional
factors approved in case law as those historically considered by the
agency in determining the maximum feasible CAFE standards, such as
safety. The statute requires us to set standards at the maximum
feasible level for passenger cars and light trucks for each model year,
and the agency concludes that the final standards would satisfy this
requirement. NHTSA has carefully examined the relevant data and other
considerations, as discussed below in the explanation of our conclusion
that the final standards are the maximum feasible levels for MYs 2017-
2021 based on our evaluation of the information before us for this
final rule.
As discussed in Section IV.D, EPCA/EISA requires that NHTSA
establish separate passenger car and light truck standards at ``the
maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the
manufacturers can achieve in that model year,'' based on the agency's
consideration of four statutory factors: technological feasibility,
economic practicability, the effect of other standards of the
Government on fuel economy, and the need of the nation to conserve
energy.\1209\ NHTSA has developed definitions for these terms over the
course of multiple CAFE rulemakings \1210\ and determines the
appropriate weight and balancing of the terms given the circumstances
in each CAFE rulemaking.\1211\ For MYs 2011-2020, EPCA further requires
that separate standards for passenger cars and for light trucks be set
at levels high enough to ensure that the CAFE of the industry-wide
combined fleet of new passenger cars and light trucks reaches at least
35 mpg not later than MY 2020. For model years after 2020, standards
need simply be set at the maximum feasible level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1209\ As explained in Section IV.D, EPCA also provides that in
determining the level at which it should set CAFE standards for a
particular model year, NHTSA may not consider the ability of
manufacturers to take advantage of several statutory provisions that
facilitate compliance with the CAFE standards and thereby reduce the
costs of compliance. Specifically, in determining the maximum
feasible level of fuel economy for passenger cars and light trucks,
NHTSA cannot consider the fuel economy benefits of ``dedicated''
alternative fuel vehicles (like battery electric vehicles or natural
gas vehicles), must consider dual-fueled automobiles to be operated
only on gasoline or diesel fuel (at least through MY 2019), and may
not consider the ability of manufacturers to use, trade, or transfer
credits. This provision limits, to some extent, the fuel economy
levels that NHTSA can find to be ``maximum feasible''--if NHTSA
cannot consider the fuel economy of electric vehicles, for example,
NHTSA cannot set standards predicated on manufacturers' usage of
electric vehicles to meet the standards.
\1210\ These factors are defined in Section IV.D; for brevity,
we do not repeat those definitions here.
\1211\ Public Citizen v. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256 (Congress
established broad guidelines in the fuel economy statute; agency's
decision to set lower standard was a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency thus balances the relevant factors to determine the
maximum feasible level of the CAFE standards for each fleet, in each
model year. The next section discusses briefly how the agency balanced
the factors for the proposal, and why we tentatively concluded at that
time that the proposed standards were the maximum feasible; the
following section discusses the comments received on that tentative
conclusion; and the final section discusses how the agency balanced the
factors for this final rule and why the agency believes that the final
standards are, indeed, maximum feasible.
3. How did the agency balance the factors for the NPRM?
In the NPRM, the agency explained that there are numerous ways in
which the relevant factors can be balanced to determine what standards
would be maximum feasible, depending on the information and the policy
priorities before the agency at the time. We explained that standards
that may meet the objectives of one factor, such as technological
feasibility, may not meet the objectives of other factors, such as
economic practicability, and may thus not be maximum feasible. We
discussed the preliminary analysis conducted following the first SNOI
and prior to the second SNOI--thus, between the end of 2010 and July
2011, in which the agency tentatively concluded that the 5%, 6%, 7%,
MNB, and TC=TB alternatives were likely beyond the level of economic
practicability based on the information available to the agency at the
time, but that the alternatives including up to 4% per year for cars
and 4% per year for trucks should reasonably remain under
consideration. We further discussed the intensive discussions with
stakeholders, including many individual manufacturers, between June 21,
2011 and July 27, 2011, to determine whether additional information
would aid NHTSA in further consideration. Manufacturer stakeholders
provided
[[Page 63033]]
comments, much of which was confidential business information, which
included projections of how they might comply with concept standards,
the challenges that they expected, and their recommendations on program
stringency and provisions.\1212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1212\ Feedback from these stakeholder meetings is summarized in
section IV.B and documents that are referenced in that section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding passenger cars, in meetings prior to the NPRM,
manufacturers generally suggested that the most significant challenges
to meeting a constant 4% (or faster) year-over-year increase in the
passenger car standards related to their ability to implement the new
technologies quickly enough to achieve the required levels, based on
the following considerations: their need to implement fuel economy
improvements in both the passenger car and light truck fleets
concurrently; challenges related to the cadence of redesign and refresh
schedules; the pace at which new technology can be implemented
considering economic factors such as availability of engineering
resources to develop and integrate the technologies into products; and
the pace at which capital costs can be incurred to acquire and
integrate the manufacturing and production equipment necessary to
increase the production volume of the technologies. Manufacturers often
expressed concern that the 4% levels could require greater numbers of
advanced technology vehicles than they thought they would be able to
sell in that time frame, given their belief that the cost of some
technologies was much higher than the agencies had estimated and their
observations of current consumer acceptance of and willingness to pay
for advanced technology vehicles that are available now in the
marketplace. A number of manufacturers argued that they did not believe
that they could create a sustainable business case under passenger car
standards that increased at the rate required by the 4% alternative.
Most manufacturers expressed significantly greater concerns over
the 4% alternative for light trucks than for passenger cars. Many
argued that increases in light truck standard stringency should be
slower than increases in passenger car standard stringency, based on,
among other things, the greater payload, cargo capacity and towing
utility requirements of light trucks, and what they perceived to be
lower consumer acceptance of certain (albeit not all) advanced
technologies on light trucks. Many also commented that redesign cycles
are longer on trucks than they are on passenger cars, which reduces the
frequency at which significant changes can be made cost-effectively to
comply with increasing standards, and that the significant increases in
stringency in the MY 2012-2016 program \1213\ in combination with
redesign schedules would not make it possible to comply with the 4%
alternative in the earliest years of the MY 2017-2025 program, such
that only significantly lower stringencies in those years would be
feasible in their estimation. Manufacturers generally stated that the
most significant challenges to meeting a constant 4% (or faster) year-
over-year increase in the light truck standards were similar to what
they had described for passenger cars as enumerated in the paragraph
above, but were compounded by concerns that applying technologies to
meet the 4% alternative standards would result in trucks that were more
expensive and provided less utility to consumers. Manufacturers argued
that their technology cost estimates were higher than the agencies' and
consumers are less willing to accept/pay for some advanced technologies
in trucks than in cars, and that they were not optimistic that they
could recoup the costs through higher prices for vehicles with the
technologies that would be needed to comply with the 4% alternative.
Given their concerns about having to reduce utility and raise truck
prices, and about their ability to apply technologies quickly enough
given the longer redesign periods for trucks, a number of manufacturers
argued that they did not believe that they could create a sustainable
business case under light truck standards that increased at the rate
required by the 4% alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1213\ Some manufacturers indicated that their light truck fleet
fuel economy would be below what they anticipated their required
fuel economy level would be in MY 2016, and that they currently
expect that they will need to employ available flexibilities to
comply with that standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the NPRM, other stakeholders, such as environmental and
consumer groups, consistently stated that stringent standards are
technologically achievable and critical to important national
interests, such as improving energy independence, reducing climate
change, and enabling the domestic automobile industry to remain
competitive in the global market. Labor interests stressed the need to
carefully consider economic impacts and the opportunity to create and
support new jobs, and consumer advocates emphasized the economic and
practical benefits to consumers of improved fuel economy and the need
to preserve consumer choice. In addition, a number of stakeholders
stated that the standards under development should not have an adverse
impact on safety.
We thus explained in the NPRM that, in collaboration with EPA and
in coordination with CARB, NHTSA carefully considered the inputs
received from all stakeholders, conducted additional independent
analyses, and deliberated over the feedback received on the agencies'
analyses. Based on our own analysis of manufacturers' capabilities and
based on that feedback, particularly as it concerned consumer
acceptance of some advanced technologies and consumers' willingness to
pay for improved fuel economy, we tentatively concluded that the
agency's preliminary analysis supporting consideration of standards
that increased up to 4%/year may not have captured fully the level of
uncertainty that surrounds economic practicability in these future
model years. Nevertheless, while we believe there may be some
uncertainty, we do not agree that it is nearly as significant as a
number of manufacturers maintained, especially for passenger cars. The
most persuasive information received from stakeholders for passenger
cars concerned practicability issues in MYs 2017-2021, so the agency
tentatively concluded that the maximum feasible stringency levels for
passenger cars are only slightly different from the 4%/year levels
suggested as the high end preliminarily considered by the agency;
increasing on average 3.7%/year in MYs 2017-2021, and on average 4.5%/
year in MYs 2022-2025. For the overall MYs 2017-2025 period, the
maximum feasible stringency curves increase on average at 4.1%/year,
and our analysis in the proposal indicated that the costs and benefits
attributable to the 4% alternative and the preferred alternative for
passenger cars are very similar: the preferred alternative was 8.8
percent less expensive for manufacturers than the 4% alternative
(estimated total costs were $113 billion for the preferred alternative
and $124 billion for the 4% alternative), and achieved only $20 billion
less in total benefits than the 4% alternative (estimated total
benefits are $310 billion for the preferred alternative and $330
billion for the 4% alternative), which the agency stated was a very
small difference given that benefits are spread across the entire
lifetimes of all vehicles subject to the standards. The analysis also
showed that the lifetime cumulative fuel savings was only 5 percent
higher for the 4% alternative than the preferred alternative (the
estimated fuel savings was 104 billion
[[Page 63034]]
gallons for the preferred alternative, and 110 billion gallons for the
4% alternative). At the same time, the increase in average vehicle cost
in MY 2025 in the NPRM was 9.4 percent higher for the 4% alternative
(the estimated cost increase for the average vehicle was $2,023 for the
preferred alternative, and $2,213 for the 4% alternative).\1214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1214\ See discussion at 76 FR 75243 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that we were concerned that requiring
manufacturers to invest that capital to meet higher standards in MYs
2017-2021, rather than allowing them to increase fuel economy in those
years slightly more slowly, would reduce the levels that would be
feasible in the second phase of the program by diverting research and
development resources to those earlier model years. Thus, after
considerable deliberation with EPA and consultation with CARB, NHTSA
tentatively selected the preferred alternative as the maximum feasible
alternative for MYs 2017-2025 passenger cars based on consideration of
inputs from manufacturers and the agency's independent analysis, which
reaches the stringency levels of the 4% alternative in MY 2025, but has
a slightly slower ramp up rate in the earlier years.
Regarding light trucks, we explained that while NHTSA did not agree
with the manufacturer's overall cost assessments and believed that our
technology cost and effectiveness methodology allowed manufacturers to
preserve all necessary vehicle utility, the agency also believed there
was merit to some of the concerns raised in stakeholder feedback.
Specifically, concerns about longer redesign schedules for trucks,
compounded by the need to invest simultaneously in raising passenger
car fuel economy, may not have been fully captured in NHTSA's
preliminary analysis, which could lead manufacturers to implement
technologies that do not maintain vehicle utility, based on the cadence
of the standards under the 4% alternative. A number of manufacturers
repeatedly stated, in providing feedback, that the MYs 2012-2016
standards for trucks, while feasible, required significant investment
to reach the required levels, and that given the redesign schedule for
trucks, that level of investment throughout the entire MYs 2012-2025
time period was not sustainable. Based on the confidential business
information that manufacturers provided to the agencies through that
feedback, NHTSA explained that we believed that this point may be
valid. If the agency pushes CAFE increases that require considerable
sustained investment at a faster rate than industry redesign cycles,
adverse economic consequences could ensue. The best information that
the agency had at the NPRM, therefore, indicated that requiring light
truck fuel economy improvements at the 4% annual rate could create
potentially severe economic consequences. Our NRPM analysis indicated
that the preferred alternative had 48 percent lower cost than the 4%
alternative (estimated total costs were $44 billion for the preferred
alternative and $83 billion for the 4% alternative), and the total
benefits of the preferred alternative were 30 percent lower ($87
billion lower) than the 4% alternative (estimated total benefits were
$206 billion for the preferred alternative and $293 billion for the 4%
alternative), spread across the entire lifetimes of all vehicles
subject to the standards. The analysis also showed that the lifetime
cumulative fuel savings was 42 percent higher for the 4% alternative
than the preferred alternative (the estimated fuel savings was 69
billion gallons for the preferred alternative, and 98 billion gallons
for the 4% alternative). At the same time, the increase in average
vehicle cost in MY 2025 in the NPRM was 54 percent higher for the 4%
alternative (the estimated cost increase for the average vehicle was
$1,578 for the preferred alternative, and $2,423 for the 4%
alternative).
Thus, evaluating the inputs from stakeholders and the agency's
independent analysis, the agency also considered further how it thought
the factors should be balanced to determine the maximum feasible light
truck standards for MYs 2017-2025. Based on that consideration of the
information before the agency and how it informs our balancing of the
factors, NHTSA tentatively concluded in the NPRM that 4%/year CAFE
stringency increases for light trucks in MYs 2017-2021 were likely
beyond maximum feasible, and in fact, in the earliest model years of
the MY 2017-2021 period, that the 3%/year and 2%/year alternatives for
trucks were also likely beyond maximum feasible. NHTSA therefore
tentatively concluded that the preferred alternative, which would in
MYs 2017-2021 increase on average 2.6%/year, and in MYs 2022-2025 would
increase on average 4.6%/year, was the maximum feasible level that the
industry can reach in those model years. For the overall MY 2017-2025
period, the maximum feasible stringency curves would increase on
average 3.5%/year.
The agency also explained that NHTSA had accounted for the effect
of EPA's standards in light of the agencies' close coordination and the
fact that both sets of standards were developed together to harmonize
as part of the National Program. Given the close relationship between
fuel economy and CO2 emissions, and the efforts NHTSA and
EPA made to conduct joint analysis and jointly deliberate on
information and tentative conclusions,\1215\ the agencies have sought
to harmonize and align their proposed standards to the greatest extent
possible, consistent with their respective statutory authorities. Thus,
NHTSA tentatively concluded that the standards represented by the
preferred alternative were the maximum feasible standards for passenger
cars and light trucks in MYs 2017-2025, based on the information before
the agency at the time of the NPRM. We explained that while we
recognized that higher standards would help the need of the nation to
conserve more energy and might potentially be technologically feasible
(in the narrowest sense) during those model years, based on our
analysis and the evidence presented by the industry, higher standards
would not appear to represent the proper balancing for MYs 2017-2025
cars and trucks. We therefore concluded in the NPRM that the correct
balancing would recognize economic practicability concerns as discussed
above, and proposed standards based on the preferred alternative for
MYs 2017-2025.
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\1215\ NHTSA and EPA conducted joint analysis and jointly
deliberated on information and tentative conclusions related to
technology cost, effectiveness, manufacturers' capability to
implement technologies, the cadence at which manufacturers might
support the implementation of technologies, economic factors, and
the assessment of comments from manufacturers.
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4. What comments did the agency receive regarding the proposed maximum
feasible levels?
Of the several hundred thousand commenters, including industry and
union commenters, environmental and consumer groups, national security
interest groups, U.S. senators and representatives, State legislators,
State and local government organizations and representatives, and many
individual citizens, the considerable majority supported the proposed
levels of stringency, citing the significant benefits associated with
the standards.
However, many commenters urged the agencies to set more stringent
standards. Individual commenters sent in thousands of form letters
calling on the agencies to set standards that require 60 mpg in 2025,
which they described as equivalent to a 6 percent/year rate of
[[Page 63035]]
increase.\1216\ NESCAUM also supported a 6 percent/year rate of
increase,\1217\ as did UCS, which stated that the agencies' analysis
showed that many current vehicles already meet the targets that would
apply to them under the future standards, and that the technology
exists to set standards that increase at 6 percent/year.\1218\
Ceres,\1219\ Consumers Union,\1220\ and UCS \1221\ argued that the
higher the standards, the greater the economic benefits (both to
consumers individually in terms of fuel savings and to the economy as a
whole), and therefore the final standards should be as stringent as
possible. NRDC commented that the agencies' determination of stringency
should account for the higher fuel price projections in the AEO 2012
Early Release, and that higher fuel prices would justify more
application of technology, and thus more stringent standards.\1222\
ACEEE commented that the agencies' analyses appeared to show that more
stringent alternatives than the one proposed were feasible for the
majority of the industry, and that the agencies' rejection of those
more stringent alternatives was insufficient given the relatively low
cost and considerable benefits associated with them.\1223\ ACEEE
suggested that the agencies show the cost of compliance in each year
for each manufacturer rather than focusing on MYs 2021 and 2025.\1224\
ICCT supported the proposed stringency increases, but expressed concern
that the proposed rule was not sufficiently technology-forcing, and
that credits and incentives might undermine the projected fuel savings
and emissions reductions.\1225\
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\1216\ See, e.g., Care2 form letters, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-
0131-0190; Sierra Club member form letters, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-
0131-0189.
\1217\ NESCAUM, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476, at 1-2.
\1218\ UCS, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, at 6-8.
\1219\ Ceres, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475, at 3.
\1220\ Consumers Union, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454, at
6.
\1221\ UCS at 6.
\1222\ NRDC, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472, at 9.
\1223\ ACEEE, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528, at 7.
\1224\ Id.
\1225\ ICCT, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0258, at 2.
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CBD provided extensive comments regarding why it thought the final
standards should be more stringent, commenting that the most stringent
alternative analyzed by NHTSA was the maximum feasible alternative,
since that is the only alternative that CBD believed would actually
reduce emissions.\1226\ CBD stated that given that much fuel economy-
improving technology already exists today (including mass reduction,
which CBD said should be mandated in greater amounts \1227\), given
that real-life technology costs will be much lower than the agencies
estimate, and given the tremendous benefits associated with the most
stringent alternative, therefore the most stringent alternative
represented the best balancing of the EPCA factors,\1228\ and choosing
the proposed alternative would leave ``substantial, achievable fuel
economy improvements and public benefits unrealized due to industry
objections.'' \1229\ CBD argued that the agencies appeared to be over-
emphasizing the importance of consumer choice ``and the continued
production of every vehicle in its current form over the need to
conserve energy,'' as evidenced by what CBD saw ``as soon as increased
FE begins to affect any attribute of any existing vehicle, stringency
increases cease.'' \1230\ CBD further argued that without an analysis
of ``maximized social benefits, where the benefits most optimally
compare to the anticipated costs,'' ``there is no rigorous analysis of
economic feasibility that justifies rejecting [the most stringent
alternative] as the appropriate standard for this rulemaking.'' \1231\
As discussed above in Section IV.D, CBD asserted that the proposed
standards were below the maximum feasible level because they were not
sufficiently technology-forcing, and because the agency had given too
much weight in the balancing of relevant factors to consumer demand.
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\1226\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 23.
\1227\ Id. at 6.
\1228\ Id. at 23.
\1229\ Id. at 8.
\1230\ Id. at 4
\1231\ Id. at 23.
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Other commenters argued that the final standards should be less
stringent than what was proposed. AFPM argued that because the agencies
had not employed a vehicle choice model in the NPRM analysis, the
agencies had chosen an alternative that required too much in the way of
electrification technologies, stating that ``[t]he agency predicts that
annual sales of hybrids, plug-in hybrids and all electric vehicles
could represent 15% of new sales by 2025,'' while ``[i]n reality, EVs,
HEVs, etc have been a huge disappointment for automakers.'' \1232\ AFPM
stated that therefore the standards were beyond maximum feasible.
Environmental Consultants of Michigan similarly argued that the
proposed standards are arbitrary and capricious because most vehicles
in existence today could not meet the 2025 standards, and the few that
could are all HEVs, PHEVs, or EVs, which cost significantly more than
the agencies' per-vehicle cost estimates for the 2025 standards, and
the agencies' cost estimates must therefore be incorrect.\1233\
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\1232\ AFPM, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485, at 4-5.
\1233\ Environmental Consultants of Michigan, NHTSA-2010-0131-
0166, at 5-6.
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The Alliance commented that its members supported the proposed
increases in stringency, but that consumers had to purchase the
vehicles that were made to meet those standards,\1234\ while several
individual industry commenters argued that the standards were very
challenging and possibly too stringent as applied to them. BMW, for
example, commented that because its vehicles are very ``content-
heavy,'' it had already implemented much of the technology examined by
the agencies, and thus would have to work harder than other
manufacturers to meet the standards.\1235\ BMW stated that in order to
comply, it would have to build significant numbers of EVs, which might
need government subsidies to encourage consumers to purchase
them.\1236\ VW presented analysis to make a similar argument for
itself,\1237\ and commented that the standards for cars were
significantly more stringent than the standards for trucks, and that
the car standards exceeded what VW would consider to be feasible and
balanced.\1238\ VW further stated that the standards for MYs 2022-2025
were too aggressive, and based on ``critical assumptions about the
market and technologies which are simply too uncertain to appropriately
comprehend.'' \1239\
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\1234\ Alliance, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, at 3.
\1235\ BMW, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0250, at 3-4.
\1236\ Id. at 2.
\1237\ VW, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0247, at 10-12.
\1238\ Id. at 8.
\1239\ Id.
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Many commenters focused on the stringency of the truck standards.
Some argued that the truck standards should be more stringent, and
suggested that the agencies should have required more improvements in
the largest trucks rather than implementing the curve adjustments and
technology incentives proposed for those vehicles. Many of these
commenters focused on the relative burden of the standards on small
trucks versus large trucks, or on
[[Page 63036]]
the burden on cars versus on trucks. VW, for example, commented that
the lower stringency for larger trucks,\1240\ ``combined with segment-
exclusive credit opportunities has the potential to distort the future
light duty market,'' and that even if the agencies are correct that
``work trucks have special needs,'' ``the agencies could have still
created a regulation that was more equitable with equal stringency for
cars and trucks.'' \1241\ VW suggested that both the car and the truck
standards should increase at roughly 4 percent/year, and that
manufacturers who struggle with the truck standards could simply over-
comply with the car standards and transfer credits.\1242\ Nissan, in
contrast, stated that it would not be feasible to rely on transfers of
car credits to cover truck fleet shortfalls under CAFE, since EISA
limits the amount of credits that can be transferred in a given
year.\1243\ VW stated that the difference in stringency between trucks
and cars ``may disproportionately drive cost into passenger cars versus
trucks and may ultimately discourage customer consideration of lower
CO2-emitting passenger cars,'' which VW stated ``seems
counterintuitive to environmental and energy goals.'' \1244\ Sierra
Club \1245\ and CBD \1246\ provided similar comments. VW suggested that
the agencies may have underestimated the domestic manufacturers' future
truck share.\1247\
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\1240\ VW stated that while EPA described the average annual
truck stringency increase as 3.5 percent/year, the increase for the
larger trucks was 1 percent or less in the first several years of
the program. Id. at 20-21.
\1241\ Id. at 8-9.
\1242\ Id.
\1243\ Nissan, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471, at 8.
\1244\ VW at 9.
\1245\ Sierra Club et al., Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549,
at 6.
\1246\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 13.
\1247\ VW at 12.
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Toyota \1248\ and Honda objected to the relative stringency of the
truck curve for small trucks as compared to large trucks, with Honda
stating that based on its review of EPA's analysis, a small footprint
light truck like a Honda CR-V and a large truck like a Ford F150 may
receive similar technology ``packages'' at similar costs, but based on
the target curves, the small truck's proposed target would require an
18 percent increase in stringency, while the large truck's target would
require an increase of less than 5 percent.\1249\ Consumers Union took
a slightly different approach, arguing that while it is
``counterintuitive and counterproductive to let the least fuel
efficient models improve more slowly than more efficient models,'' the
light truck curve should be made more stringent overall: not just for
larger light trucks, but also for smaller light trucks (more similar to
the car standards), so that manufacturers of CUVs are not encouraged to
reclassify cars as trucks.\1250\
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\1248\ Toyota, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586, at 5.
\1249\ Honda, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0239, at 1.
\1250\ Consumers Union, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454, at
6.
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CBD commented that the proposed standards ``substantially and
improperly favor light trucks, particularly the largest and least fuel
efficient trucks,'' and argued that the shape of the curves and the
rate of increase of the truck standards would encourage manufacturers
to build more and larger trucks, thus undermining the goals of the
program.\1251\ NACAA expressed similar concern.\1252\ CBD stated that
the Ricardo analysis of technology effectiveness showed that
manufacturers should be capable of improving the fuel economy of their
large trucks while maintaining towing and hauling, so the agencies
should not cite the need to preserve truck utility in setting the truck
standards, and that since big trucks are the most profitable vehicles,
the cost of applying technology should not be a factor for the agencies
in determining the rate of stringency increase for those
vehicles.\1253\ CBD argued that the light truck curve should increase
at the same rate as the passenger car curve in order to ``comport with
Congressional intent'' that the standards be ratable and conserve
energy.\1254\
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\1251\ CBD, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0255, at 9-10.
\1252\ NACAA, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084, at 3.
\1253\ CBD at 11-12.
\1254\ Id. at 14.
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In contrast, some commenters described the MYs 2022-2025 targets
for the largest light trucks as especially challenging, arguing that
the cost feasibility of applying the advanced technologies necessary to
meet the standards in that time frame may be limited, given the cost
sensitivity of buyers in that market segment, and suggesting that sales
may be impacted.\1255\ Ford provided extensive comments on the utility
requirements of large trucks, and argued that consumers who purchase
these trucks do so for the utility, and consumers who purchase these
trucks without a need for the utility will dwindle over the rulemaking
timeframe.\1256\
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\1255\ Nissan, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471, at 8; RVIA,
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550, at 1-2.
\1256\ Ford, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0235, at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And finally, a number of industry commenters commented that NHTSA's
standards would harmonize better with EPA's standards if NHTSA allowed
additional credit flexibilities or modified its curves to make the
standards less difficult in case manufacturers were relying heavily on
the flexibilities provided by EPA. For example, the Alliance argued
that because NHTSA does not offer certain flexibilities that EPA
offers, ``While the impact of the program differences is relatively
small in the early years of the program, it will increase with the
passage of time, particularly as manufacturers rely more and more on
vehicle electrification in order to comply with the standards.'' \1257\
The Alliance further stated that ``Unless this imbalance is corrected,
it will result in significant disharmony in the middle and later years
of the time period covered by this proposal.'' \1258\ Toyota provided
similar comments; \1259\ GM supported the Alliance comments.\1260\
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\1257\ Alliance, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, at 14-15.
\1258\ Id. at 15.
\1259\ Toyota, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586, at 6
\1260\ GM, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131-0236, at 2.
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5. How has the agency balanced the factors for this final rule?
a. What alternatives did the agency consider, and why?
The relevant factors (and thus the weight given to each factor) can
be balanced in many different ways depending on the agency's policy
priorities and on the information before the agency regarding any given
model year. The agency thus considered a range of alternatives that
represent different regulatory options that seemed potentially
reasonable for purposes of this rulemaking. For this final rule, as for
the proposal, the agency considered nine regulatory alternatives,
including what we describe as the ``preferred alternative'' in the
Draft and Final EIS, which is what the agency proposed and is
finalizing. The other regulatory alternatives include six in which fuel
economy levels increase annually, on average, at set rates as follows:
2%/year,
3%/year,
4%/year,
5%/year,
6%/year, and
[[Page 63037]]
7%/year.\1261\
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\1261\ This is an approach similar to that used by the agency in
the MY 2012-2016 rulemaking, in which we also considered several
alternatives that increased annually, on average, at 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%
and 7%/year. The ``percent-per-year'' alternatives in this proposal
are somewhat different from those considered in the MY 2012-2016
rulemaking, however, in terms of how the annual rate of increase is
applied. For this final rule, as for the proposal, the stringency
curves are themselves advanced directly by the annual increase
amount, without reference to any yearly changes in the fleet mix. In
the 2012-2016 rule, the annual increases for the stringency
alternatives reflected the estimated required fuel economy of the
fleet which accounted for both the changes in the target curves and
changes in the fleet mix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We considered these alternatives because analysis of these various
rates of increase effectively encompasses the entire range of fuel
economy improvements that, based on information currently available to
the agency, could conceivably fall within the statutory boundary of
``maximum feasible'' standards. The regulatory alternatives also
include two that are based on benefit-cost criteria: one in which
standards would be set at the point where the modeled net benefits
would be maximized for each fleet in each year (``MNB''), and another
in which standards would be set at the point at which total costs would
be most nearly equal to total benefits for each fleet in each year
(``TC=TB'').\1262\ These alternatives are discussed in more detail in
Chapter III of the FRIA accompanying this final rule.\1263\ Because the
agency could conceivably select any of the regulatory alternatives
above, all of which fall between 2%/year and 7%/year, inclusive, the
Final EIS that informed this final rule analyzes these lower and upper
bounds as well as the preferred alternative. Additionally, the Final
EIS analyzes a ``No Action Alternative,'' which assumes that, for MYs
2017 and beyond, NHTSA would set standards at the same level as MY
2016. The No Action Alternative provides a baseline for comparing the
environmental impacts of the other alternatives.
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\1262\ We included the MNB and TC=TB alternatives in part for
the reference of commenters familiar with NHTSA's past several CAFE
rulemakings--these alternatives represent balancings carefully
considered by the agency in past rulemaking actions as potentially
maximum feasible--and because Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 focus
attention on an approach that maximizes net benefits. The assessment
of maximum net benefits is challenging in the context of setting
CAFE standards, in part because standards which maximize net
benefits for each fleet, for each model year, would not necessarily
be the standards that lead to the greatest net benefits over the
entire rulemaking period.
\1263\ Chapter III of the FRIA contains an extensive discussion
of the relative impacts of the alternatives in terms of fuel
savings, costs (both per-vehicle and aggregate), carbon dioxide
emissions avoided, and many other metrics.
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This approach to selecting regulatory alternatives clearly
communicates the level of stringency of each alternative and allows us
to identify alternatives that would represent different ways to balance
the relevant factors. Each of the alternatives represents, in part, a
different way in which NHTSA could conceivably balance different
policies and considerations in setting the standards that achieve the
maximum feasible levels. For example, the 2% Alternative, the least
stringent alternative, (other than No Action), would represent a
balancing in which economic practicability--which include concerns
about availability of technology, capital, and consumer preferences for
vehicles built to meet the future standards--weighs more heavily in the
agency's consideration, and other factors weigh less heavily. In
contrast, under the 7% Alternative, one of the most stringent, the need
of the nation to conserve energy--which includes energy conservation
and climate change considerations--would weigh more heavily in the
agency's consideration, and other factors would weigh less heavily.
Whether different alternatives may be maximum feasible can also be
influenced by differences and uncertainties in the way in which key
economic factors (e.g., the price of fuel and the social cost of
carbon) and technological inputs could be assessed and valued. While
NHTSA believes that our analysis for this final rule uses the best and
most transparent technology-related inputs and economic assumption
inputs that the agencies could derive for MYs 2017-2025, we recognize
that there is uncertainty in these inputs, and the balancing could be
different if the inputs were different. When the agency undertakes the
future rulemaking to develop final standards for MYs 2022-2025, for
example, we expect that much new information will inform that future
analysis, which may potentially lead us to choose different standards
than the augural ones presented today.\1264\
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\1264\ We emphasize, nevertheless, that the augural standards
for MYs 2022-2025 represent the agency's best judgment of what
standards would be maximum feasible for those model years, based on
the information before us today, if the agency had authority to set
standards for 9 model years at a time.
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This is the first CAFE rulemaking in which the agency has looked
this far into the future, which makes our traditional approach to
balancing more challenging than in past (even recent past) rulemakings.
The following discussion explains what we believe each factor means in
the context of this rulemaking, and how the agency therefore balanced
the factors for determining the maximum feasible final and augural
passenger car and light truck standards.
b. What does technological feasibility mean in the context of this
rulemaking?
Technological feasibility, as the agency defines it, is less
constraining in this rulemaking than it has been in the past in light
of the rulemaking time frame. ``Technological feasibility'' refers to
whether a particular method of improving fuel economy can be available
for commercial application in the model year for which a standard is
being established. In previous CAFE rulemakings, it has been more
difficult for the agency to say that the most advanced technologies
would be available for commercial application in the model years in
question. For this longer term rulemaking, NHTSA has considered all
types of technologies that improve real-world fuel economy, including
air-conditioner efficiency and other off-cycle technology, PHEVs, EVs,
and highly-advanced internal combustion engines not yet in production.
The agencies expect all of these to be commercially applicable by the
rulemaking time frame. In terms of what would be technologically
feasible, then, on the one hand, we recognize that some technologies
that currently have limited commercial use cannot be deployed on every
vehicle model in MY 2017, but require a realistic schedule for
widespread commercialization to be feasible. On the other hand,
however, based on our analysis, all of the alternatives appear as
though they could narrowly be considered technologically feasible, in
that they could be achieved based on the existence or projected future
existence of technologies that could be incorporated on future
vehicles. Any of the alternatives could thus be achieved on a technical
basis alone if the level of resources that might be required to
implement the technologies is not considered. If all alternatives are
at least theoretically technologically feasible in the MY 2017-2025
timeframe, and the need of the nation is best served by pushing
standards as stringent as possible, then the agency might be inclined
to select the alternative that results in the very most stringent
standards considered.
Many commenters agreed with this assessment, and urged the agency
to set more stringent standards than those we proposed. If the
technology exists or is projected to exist, and if the agency's
assessment is that benefits (fuel savings and emissions avoided) only
increase as
[[Page 63038]]
stringency increases, why would the most stringent standards assessed
not be maximum feasible? The reason they might not is that the agency
must also consider what is required to practically implement
technologies, which is part of economic practicability, and to which
the most stringent alternatives give little weight.
c. What does economic practicability mean in the context of this
rulemaking?
``Economic practicability'' refers to whether a standard is one
``within the financial capability of the industry, but not so stringent
as to lead to adverse economic consequences, such as a significant loss
of jobs or the unreasonable elimination of consumer choice.'' Consumer
acceptability is also an element of economic practicability, one that
is particularly difficult to gauge during times of uncertain fuel
prices.\1265\ In a rulemaking such as this, determining economic
practicability requires consideration of the uncertainty surrounding
relatively distant future market conditions and consumer demand for
fuel economy in addition to other vehicle attributes. In an attempt to
evaluate the economic practicability of attribute-based standards,
NHTSA includes a variety of factors in its modeling analysis, including
the annual rate at which manufacturers can increase the percentage of
their fleet that employ a particular type of fuel-saving technology,
the specific fleet mixes of different manufacturers, and assumptions
about the cost of the standards to consumers and consumers' valuation
of fuel economy, among other things. Ensuring that a reasonable amount
of lead time exists to make capital investments and to devote the
resources and time to design and prepare for commercial production of a
more fuel efficient fleet is also relevant. Yet there are some aspects
of economic practicability that the agency's analysis is not able to
capture at this time--for example, the computer model that we use to
analyze alternative standards does not account for all aspects of
uncertainty, in part because the agency cannot know what cannot be
known. The agency must thus account for uncertainty in the context of
economic practicability in other ways as best as we can, given the
entire record before us.
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\1265\ See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA (CAS), 793
F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Administrator's consideration of market
demand as component of economic practicability found to be
reasonable).
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The agency does not believe that there is necessarily a bright-line
test for whether a regulatory alternative is economically practicable,
but there are several metrics that we discuss below that we find useful
for making the assessment, as follows:
Compliance ``shortfalls''--The difference between the
required fuel economy level that applies to a manufacturer's fleet and
the level of fuel economy that the agency projects the manufacturer
would achieve in that year, based on our analysis, is called a
``compliance shortfall.'' \1266\ If it appears, in our modeling
analysis, that a significant portion of the industry cannot meet the
standards defined by a regulatory alternative in a model year, given
that our modeling analysis accounts for manufacturers' expected ability
to design, produce, and sell vehicles (through redesign cycle cadence,
technology costs and benefits, etc.), then that suggests that the
standards may not be economically practicable.
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\1266\ The agency's modeling estimates how the application of
technologies could increase vehicle costs, reduce fuel consumption,
and reduce CO2 emissions, and affect other factors. In
response to comments suggesting that the agency mandate higher
levels of certain technologies, such as mass reduction, as CAFE
standards are performance-based, NHTSA does not mandate that
specific technologies be used for compliance. CAFE modeling,
therefore projects one way that manufacturers could comply.
Manufacturers may choose a different mix of technologies based on
their unique circumstances and products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Application rate of technologies--even if shortfalls are
not extensive, whether it appears that a regulatory alternative would
impose undue burden on manufacturers in either or both the near and
long term in terms of how much and which technologies might be
required. For example, NHTSA currently estimates that the cumulative
effect of CAFE standards promulgated under the previous and current
administrations will require considerable technology and cost beyond
that reflected by technology present in the most recent fleet (MY 2010)
for which complete transparent information is available.
Other technology-related considerations--related to the
application rate of technologies, whether it appears that the burden on
several or more manufacturers might cause them to respond to the
standards in ways that compromise, for example, vehicle safety, or
other aspects of performance that are important to consumer acceptance
of new products.
Cost of meeting the standards--even if the technology
exists and it appears that manufacturers can apply it consistent with
their product cadence, if meeting the standards will raise per-vehicle
cost more than we believe consumers are likely to accept, which could
negatively impact sales and employment in this sector, the standards
may not be economically practicable.
Uncertainty and consumer acceptance of technologies--
considerations not accounted for expressly in our modeling analysis,
but important to an assessment of economic practicability given the
time frame of this rulemaking.
We discuss below how some of the alternatives compare in terms of
these metrics.
d. What do other motor vehicle standards of the government mean in the
context of this rulemaking?
As discussed in Section IV.D above, ``other motor vehicle standards
of the government'' involves an analysis of the effects of compliance
with emission, safety, noise, or damageability standards on fuel
economy capability and thus on average fuel economy. In addition to the
expected and possible NHTSA safety standards and known EPA emissions
standards, in developing this joint final rule with EPA, NHTSA has also
sought to harmonize the final and augural standards with EPA's.
e. What does the need of the nation to conserve energy mean in the
context of this rulemaking?
``The need of the United States to conserve energy'' means ``the
consumer cost, national balance of payments, environmental, and foreign
policy implications of our need for large quantities of petroleum,
especially imported petroleum.'' Environmental implications principally
include those associated with reductions in emissions of criteria
pollutants, mobile source air toxics, and GHGs (including
CO2). NHTSA has been informed regarding the environmental
implications of the final and augural standards by the Final EIS, which
analyzes the environmental impacts of the regulatory alternatives
discussed above. A prime example of foreign policy implications are
energy independence and energy security concerns.
A number of commenters raised environmental and energy security
concerns as paramount for the agency's consideration, and urged the
agency both to quantify impacts related to these concerns and to set as
stringent standards as possible to address them. The need of the nation
to conserve energy has long operated to push the balancing toward more
stringent standards, given that the overarching purpose of EPCA is
energy conservation.
[[Page 63039]]
In this final rule, then, the question raised by this factor, combined
with technological feasibility, becomes ``how stringent can NHTSA set
standards before economic practicability concerns intercede?''
f. Given what the factors mean in the context of this rulemaking, which
alternative is maximum feasible for the final standards, and why?
If the need of the nation to conserve energy always pushes the
balancing toward greater stringency and technological feasibility is
not particularly limiting in a given rulemaking, then maximum feasible
standards would be represented by the mpg levels that we could require
of the industry before we reach a tipping point that presents risk of
significantly adverse economic consequences. While determination of
that tipping point is within the agency's discretion to balance the
relevant factors, standards that are lower than that point would likely
not be maximum feasible, because such standards would leave fuel-saving
technologies on the table unnecessarily; standards that are higher than
that point would likely be beyond what the agency would consider
economically practicable, and therefore beyond what we would consider
maximum feasible, even if they might be technologically feasible or
better meet the need of the nation to conserve energy. The agency does
not believe that standards are balanced if they weight one or two
factors so heavily as to ignore another.
The question of the tipping point is slightly different in the
context of the final standards and augural standards. The final
standards for MYs 2017-2021 are nearer-term, albeit still several years
away; the augural standards for MYs 2022-2025, clearly, are even more
distant, and the inputs that inform our balancing are less certain.
Based on the information currently before the agency, we continue to
believe that the standards as proposed are maximum feasible for MYs
2017-2025.
For the final standards, the annual rate of increase in the
passenger car and light truck standards is as follows (in terms of
average required fuel economy levels estimated using the MY 2010-based
market forecast):
Table IV-24--NHTSA Annual Rate of Increase in the Stringency of the
Final Standards for Each Model Year From 2017 to 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger car Light truck
Model year (percent) (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017.................................... 3.7 0.6
2018.................................... 3.6 1.7
2019.................................... 3.6 1.5
2020.................................... 3.9 2.1
2021.................................... 4.2 6.5
2017-2021............................... 3.8 2.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the augural standards, the annual rate of increase in the
passenger car and light truck standards is as follows:
Table IV-25--NHTSA Annual Rate of Increase in the Stringency of the
Augural Standards for Each Model Year From 2022 to 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger car Light truck
Model year (percent) (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2022.................................... 4.8 4.9
2023.................................... 4.6 4.7
2024.................................... 4.7 4.8
2025.................................... 4.7 4.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the tables show, in terms of the average rate of increase over
the MYs 2017-2021 period, the final passenger car standards fall
between the 3/yr and 4/yr alternatives, while the final light truck
standards fall between the 2/yr and the 3/yr alternatives. The average
rate of increase for the augural passenger car and light truck
standards for MYs 2022-2025 falls between the 4/y and 5/y alternatives.
The overall average annual rate of increase over the different
periods covered by this rulemaking, for the reader's reference, is thus
as follows:
Table IV-26--NHTSA Annual Rate of Increase in the Stringency of the
Final and Augural Standards Over Various Periods
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger car Light truck
Model years (percent) (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-2021............................... 3.8 2.5
2022-2025............................... 4.7 4.8
2017-2025............................... 4.2 3.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63040]]
Part of the way that we try to evaluate economic practicability,
and thus where the tipping point in the balancing of factors might be
for a given model year, is through a variety of model inputs, such as
phase-in caps (the annual rate at which we estimate that manufacturers
can increase the percentage of their fleet that employ a particular
type of fuel-saving technology) and redesign schedules to account for
needed lead time. These inputs limit how much technology can be applied
to a manufacturer's fleet in the agency's analysis, which attempts to
simulate a way for the manufacturer to comply with different regulatory
alternatives. If a sufficient number of manufacturers do not appear
able to meet the standards in a given model year; if the amounts of
technology or per-vehicle cost increases required to meet the standards
appear to be beyond what we believe the market would bear, or if the
limits (and technology cost-effectiveness) prevent enough manufacturers
from meeting the required levels of stringency,\1267\ the agency may
decide that the standards under consideration may not be economically
practicable. We underscore again that the modeling analysis does not
dictate the ``answer,'' it is merely one source of information among
others that aids the agency's balancing of the standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1267\ The difference between the required fuel economy level
that applies to a manufacturer's fleet and the level of fuel economy
that the agency projects the manufacturer would achieve in that
year, based on our analysis, is called a ``compliance shortfall.''
The agency's modeling estimates how the application of technologies
could increase vehicle costs, reduce fuel consumption, and reduce
CO2 emissions, and affect other factors. In response to
comments suggesting that the agency mandate higher levels of certain
technologies, such as mass reduction, as CAFE standards are
performance-based, NHTSA does not mandate that specific technologies
be used for compliance. CAFE modeling, therefore projects one way
that manufacturers could comply. Manufacturers may choose a
different mix of technologies based on their unique circumstances
and products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Compliance Shortfalls
In looking at the projected compliance shortfall results from our
modeling analysis, the agency concludes, based on the information
before us at the time, that for both passenger car and for light
trucks, the MNB and TC=TB alternatives, 6/Year and 7/Year alternatives
do not appear to be economically practicable, and are thus likely
beyond maximum feasible levels for MYs 2017-2025. In other words,
despite the theoretical technological feasibility of achieving these
levels, various manufacturers would likely lack the financial and
engineering resources and sufficient lead time to do so.\1268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1268\ Lead time is incorporated into our modeling analysis
through redesign/refresh schedules, phase-in caps, estimates of the
first model year by which some technologies (e.g., high BMEP
engines) are assumed to be available for commercial application,
consideration of stranded capital costs, and representation of
multi-year planning effects. However, there are many factors related
to lead time that, though considered generally when specifying
phase-in caps, we are not able to represent explicitly, and that
introduce uncertainty and risk vis-[agrave]-vis the rate at which
CAFE standards can feasibly be increased. Examples include, but are
not limited to the following: availability and cost of capital,
supply and cost of engineering and other labor resources, capability
and extent of supporting infrastructure (e.g., maintenance and
repair facilities), and consumer acceptance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For purposes of passenger cars, the agency's analysis indicates the
following levels of compliance shortfall, by manufacturer and by model
year, for the following regulatory alternatives (a dash indicating
cases where the manufacturer exceeds a standard):
Table IV-27--NHTSA--Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Passenger Cars by Manufacturer Under the Preferred Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. ......... 0.0 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Ford................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0 0.0
General Motors....................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0 .........
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mazda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mitsubishi........................................... ......... ......... 0.5 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.8
Nissan............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Subaru............................................... 1.9 2.6 ......... ......... ......... 0.1 1.7 ......... .........
Suzuki............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 1.1 0.0
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-28--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Passenger Cars by Manufacturer Under the 5%/y Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0 2.5 0.2
Ford................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 2.1 ......... 0.3
General Motors....................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Mazda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0 ......... ......... ......... 2.6
Mitsubishi........................................... ......... 0.5 2.8 ......... ......... 0.8 3.8 6.9 1.7
Nissan............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Subaru............................................... 2.6 4.0 0.7 ......... 0.9 3.8 6.0 8.3 9.0
Suzuki............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.5
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63041]]
Table IV-29--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Passenger Cars by Manufacturer Under the 6%/y Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.1 3.2 5.4 8.8 7.7
Ford................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.3 2.9 6.3 4.2 6.6
General Motors....................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.8 3.9 6.5 6.7
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 1.3
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.8 2.9
Mazda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.8 1.1 3.6 7.2 0.7
Mitsubishi........................................... ......... 1.5 4.4 ......... ......... 0.1 3.9 8.0 12.1
Nissan............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 1.6 2.8 6.1
Subaru............................................... 3.0 5.0 2.3 0.4 3.8 7.4 10.5 13.8 15.6
Suzuki............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.9 5.1 7.8
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-30--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Passenger Cars by Manufacturer Under the ``MNB'' Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. 1.4 2.2 1.0 ......... ......... 0.3 ......... ......... 0.0
Ford................................................. 0.3 2.4 2.4 0.1 0.9 0.2 1.0 ......... 0.0
General Motors....................................... 1.9 0.4 1.9 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Mazda................................................ 0.0 1.4 2.8 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mitsubishi........................................... 2.6 5.2 7.5 ......... ......... ......... ......... 1.9 2.6
Nissan............................................... ......... 0.0 ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0 ......... 0.0
Subaru............................................... 7.0 8.7 5.3 1.9 3.3 4.2 4.6 6.2 5.8
Suzuki............................................... ......... 2.3 ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0 2.4 2.2
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-31--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Passenger Cars by Manufacturer Under the ``TC=TB'' Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. 2.1 2.5 1.0 ......... 0.4 1.7 ......... 1.2 0.4
Ford................................................. 1.0 2.6 2.4 0.1 1.4 1.6 2.7 1.8 1.1
General Motors....................................... 2.6 0.6 1.9 ......... ......... 0.7 ......... 0.5 .........
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... 0.0 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mazda................................................ 0.7 1.6 2.8 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Mitsubishi........................................... 3.3 5.5 7.5 ......... ......... ......... 0.5 3.5 4.2
Nissan............................................... ......... 0.1 ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.8 ......... 0.8
Subaru............................................... 7.7 8.9 5.3 1.9 3.9 5.7 6.4 8.6 8.3
Suzuki............................................... 0.5 2.5 ......... ......... ......... 0.9 1.7 4.8 4.8
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, for alternatives that increase at 6%/y and faster, the
majority of the industry would face compliance shortfalls for passenger
cars, according to our analysis, which seems to indicate economic
impracticability.\1269\ Standards that increase less rapidly, such as
under the 5%/y and slower alternatives, thus remain under consideration
for being economically practicable for passenger cars. We note that the
maximizing net benefits alternative, while showing relatively little
shortfalling by industry in later years of the rulemaking time frame,
shows considerable shortfalling for a number of major manufacturers'
passenger car fleets early in the program. This is due to the fact that
the maximizing net benefits standards are fairly front-loaded and
require more rapid increases at first, which we believe would be
exceedingly difficult for manufacturers following the challenging MYs
2012-2016 standards, as discussed further below,\1270\ and likely
beyond economically practicable levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1269\ We note here that even if manufacturers could conceivably
comply through use of credits, the agency is barred by statute from
considering availability of credits in the determination of maximum
feasible standards.
\1270\ It should be noted that in discussing the MYs 2012-2016
standards, NHTSA is not reconsidering those standards. Rather,
NHTSA's analysis of today's post-MY 2016 standards considers impacts
the baseline standards could have after MY 2016, as well as impacts
today's post-MY 2016 standards could have prior to MY 2017 (due to
multiyear planning effects).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For purposes of light trucks, the agency's analysis indicates the
[[Page 63042]]
following levels of compliance shortfall, by manufacturer and by model
year, for the following regulatory alternatives:
Table IV-32--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Light Trucks by Manufacturer Under the Preferred Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.5 ......... ......... 0.0
Ford................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
General Motors....................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mazda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mitsubishi........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Nissan............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Subaru............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Suzuki............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-33--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Light Trucks by Manufacturer Under the 5%/y Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. 0.0 1.7 2.9 2.2 3.5 5.5 1.3 3.4 4.3
Ford................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.2 2.4
General Motors....................................... ......... 0.1 ......... ......... ......... ......... 1.0 2.6 0.1
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.7
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mazda................................................ 0.2 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mitsubishi........................................... ......... ......... 1.9 4.2 ......... ......... ......... ......... 1.4
Nissan............................................... ......... 0.0 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Subaru............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Suzuki............................................... ......... ......... 0.7 2.9 ......... ......... 1.1 3.9 6.8
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-34--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Light Trucks by Manufacturer Under the 6%/y Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. 0.3 2.4 4.1 3.8 5.7 8.3 4.7 7.5 9.3
Ford................................................. ......... ......... 0.5 1.1 ......... 0.2 2.8 4.8 5.3
General Motors....................................... ......... 0.8 ......... ......... ......... 1.2 3.2 5.3 4.0
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 2.8
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mazda................................................ 0.6 ......... ......... ......... ......... 1.2 1.6 2.8 6.4
Mitsubishi........................................... ......... 0.7 3.3 6.1 ......... ......... ......... 1.5 5.4
Nissan............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.1 2.7 1.7 4.5
Subaru............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.1 3.5 ......... .........
Suzuki............................................... ......... 0.2 2.1 4.9 ......... 1.8 5.2 8.9 12.8
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 2.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-35--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Light Trucks by Manufacturer Under the ``MNB'' Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. 1.6 2.4 4.3 3.9 6.8 7.4 1.8 2.4 2.1
Ford................................................. ......... ......... 0.7 1.2 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
General Motors....................................... 0.8 0.8 ......... ......... 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.0
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mazda................................................ 1.9 ......... ......... ......... 1.0 1.7 ......... ......... .........
Mitsubishi........................................... ......... 0.7 3.5 6.2 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Nissan............................................... ......... 0.0 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Subaru............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
[[Page 63043]]
Suzuki............................................... ......... 0.3 2.3 5.0 ......... 0.7 1.7 2.8 4.2
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-36--NHTSA Estimated Annual Compliance Shortfalls (mpg) for Light Trucks by Manufacturer Under the ``TC=TB'' Alternative
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiat................................................. 1.9 2.8 4.3 3.9 7.0 7.6 2.0 2.4 2.3
Ford................................................. ......... 0.0 0.7 1.2 ......... ......... ......... 0.0 .........
General Motors....................................... 1.1 1.2 ......... ......... 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 .........
Honda................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
Hyundai.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kia.................................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Mazda................................................ 2.3 ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.1 ......... ......... .........
Mitsubishi........................................... 0.1 1.1 3.5 6.2 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Nissan............................................... ......... 0.0 ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0 ......... 0.0
Subaru............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Suzuki............................................... ......... 0.7 2.3 5.0 0.1 0.9 2.0 2.8 4.5
Toyota............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 0.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For light trucks, the 5%/y alternative appears to present
significant risk of several manufacturers facing shortfalls in most
model years. Thus, for alternatives that increase at 5%/y and faster,
the majority of the industry would face compliance shortfalls for light
trucks, according to our analysis, which indicates economic
impracticability. Standards that increase less rapidly, such as under
the 4%/y and slower alternatives, thus remain under consideration for
being economically practicable for light trucks. Again, we note that
the maximizing net benefits alternative, while showing relatively
little shortfalling by industry in later years of the rulemaking time
frame, shows considerable shortfalling for a number of major
manufacturers' light truck fleets early in the program. This is due to
the fact that the maximizing net benefits standards are fairly front-
loaded and require more rapid increases at first, which we believe
would be exceedingly difficult for manufacturers following the
challenging MYs 2012-2016 standards, as discussed further below, and
likely beyond economically practicable levels.
h. Application Rate of Technologies
As discussed above, when considering the economic practicability of
a regulatory alternative in terms of how much technology manufacturers
have to apply in order to meet it, the agency must consider both which
technologies appear to be necessary and when they would have to be
applied, given manufacturers' product redesign cadence. While the need
of the nation to conserve energy encourages the agency to be more
technology-forcing in its balancing, and while technological
feasibility is arguably less limiting in this rulemaking given its time
frame, regulatory alternatives that require extensive application of
very advanced technologies (that may have known or unknown consumer
acceptance issues) or that require manufacturers to apply additional
technology in earlier model years, in which meeting the standards is
already challenging, may not be economically practicable, and thus may
be beyond maximum feasible.
The first issue is timing of technology application. The MYs 2012-
2016 standards, in the agency's view, are feasible but challenging, and
represent some of the most rapid increases in stringency in the history
of the CAFE program. In NHTSA's judgment, technology deployment
necessitated by these baseline standards poses a considerable challenge
to the industry, at least through MY 2016. Most manufacturers indicated
during meetings with the agency that, even considering flexibilities
(e.g., FFV credits, credit transfers, and credit carry-forward) that
the agency may not consider for purposes of determining maximum
feasible stringency, CAFE standards already in place through MY 2016
will require significant application of technology and will leave some
manufacturers' reserves of CAFE credits largely depleted going into MY
2017. Tables IV-37 through IV-40 show significant additional
application of technology during those earlier model years to enable
compliance with the more stringent post-MY 2016 standards defined by
the Preferred Alternative and some of the other regulatory alternatives
the agency has considered. Many commenters noted the lead time
available in this rulemaking, since the first standards would not be
effective until MY 2017, and suggested that such ample lead time should
certainly make higher standards economically practicable in that time
frame. While consideration of future model years in isolation might
suggest manufacturers have ample lead time to make further
improvements, NHTSA does not consider model years in isolation, because
that is not consistent with how industry responds to standards, and
thus would not accurately reflect practicability. NHTSA's analysis
tries to estimate manufacturers' product ``cadence,'' representing them
in terms of estimated schedules for redesigning and ``freshening''
vehicles, and assuming that significant technology changes will be
implemented during vehicle redesigns, and that once applied, a
technology will be carried forward to future model years until
superseded by a more advanced technology. If manufacturers are already
applying technology widely and intensively to meet standards in earlier
years, requiring manufacturers to add yet more technology in those
model years in order to meet future standards may not be economically
practicable. The question is not whether a standard is economically
practicable in the model year in which the standard is effective, but
whether getting to that model year's standard (in part, through the
[[Page 63044]]
application of technologies in earlier model years) is economically
practicable. The tables below illustrate how the agency has modeled
that process of manufacturers applying technologies in order to comply
with different alternative standards; the technologies are described in
more detail in Section IV.D and in Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA:
Table IV-37--NHTSA Estimated Application of Selected Technologies--Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Standards 2014 (%) 2015 (%) 2016 (%) 2017 (%) 2018 (%) 2019 (%) 2020 (%) 2021 (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SGDI................................................. Baseline 10 11 13 16 18 18 18 18
2%/Year 14 20 24 30 37 40 41 42
3%/Year 17 24 32 40 48 60 63 71
Preferred 21 29 41 48 57 69 72 78
4%/Year 18 27 38 47 58 70 72 78
5%/Year 25 37 47 55 68 72 75 78
Turbocharging........................................ Baseline 13 15 17 19 21 20 20 21
2%/Year 20 25 28 33 39 43 46 46
3%/Year 23 33 40 46 53 66 71 80
Preferred 29 36 47 54 63 74 82 88
4%/Year 25 34 45 54 65 76 82 88
5%/Year 32 45 53 62 74 78 85 88
Cooled EGR........................................... Baseline 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
2%/Year 0 0 2 2 2 3 3 3
3%/Year 0 0 2 2 3 5 5 6
Preferred 0 0 2 2 4 7 11 15
4%/Year 0 0 4 4 5 6 15 19
5%/Year 0 1 4 5 7 15 20 27
High BMEP............................................ Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Preferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
4%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
5%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5
Diesel............................................... Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Preferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
5%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3
Advanced Transmissions............................... Baseline 24 31 36 36 38 38 39 38
2%/Year 23 30 35 36 41 47 52 58
3%/Year 24 31 36 39 47 63 65 70
Preferred 24 31 36 39 47 61 66 70
4%/Year 28 39 45 47 59 69 69 70
5%/Year 26 33 45 51 63 79 80 76
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-38--NHTSA Estimated Application of Selected Technologies--Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Standards 2014 (%) 2015 (%) 2016 (%) 2017 (%) 2018 (%) 2019 (%) 2020 (%) 2021 (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric Power Steering.............................. Baseline 15 26 37 38 38 38 38 38
2%/Year 20 31 48 52 53 60 61 64
3%/Year 20 31 47 50 51 60 63 64
Preferred 17 28 43 46 52 62 62 62
4%/Year 28 39 56 60 62 63 63 66
5%/Year 28 39 58 62 64 65 65 66
Micro & Mild Hybrids................................. Baseline 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
2%/Year 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
3%/Year 2 4 4 4 5 5 6 6
Preferred 2 4 5 5 5 6 11 12
4%/Year 3 4 5 5 6 6 11 11
5%/Year 4 10 10 10 16 26 36 46
Strong Hybrid........................................ Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Preferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
5%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
15-20% Mass Reduction................................ Baseline 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
2%/Year 0 2 3 4 5 6 8 8
3%/Year 0 2 3 4 5 5 5 6
Preferred 0 2 3 4 5 7 8 10
4%/Year 0 2 3 4 6 10 11 12
[[Page 63045]]
5%/Year 0 2 3 4 6 8 12 13
Aerodynamic Improvements............................. Baseline 40 50 68 74 77 80 80 80
2%/Year 40 50 68 74 80 82 85 85
3%/Year 40 50 68 74 82 84 85 85
Preferred 40 50 68 74 82 84 85 85
4%/Year 40 50 68 74 82 84 85 85
5%/Year 40 50 68 74 82 84 85 85
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-39--NHTSA Estimated Application of Selected Technologies--Light Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Standards 2014 (%) 2015 (%) 2016 (%) 2017 (%) 2018 (%) 2019 (%) 2020 (%) 2021 (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SGDI................................................. Baseline 27 32 39 40 41 41 40 40
2%/Year 32 47 56 59 63 64 64 66
3%/Year 34 43 57 60 67 72 71 75
Preferred 29 36 42 45 49 57 61 73
4%/Year 33 43 56 61 64 69 69 72
5%/Year 35 45 57 63 68 72 72 75
Turbocharging........................................ Baseline 34 42 50 52 52 52 52 52
2%/Year 45 62 70 73 74 75 76 78
3%/Year 47 63 72 74 79 84 85 88
Preferred 37 47 55 58 60 69 73 84
4%/Year 47 63 72 75 76 83 83 86
5%/Year 49 65 74 77 79 85 84 88
Cooled EGR........................................... Baseline 0 0 4 5 5 5 5 5
2%/Year 0 0 4 5 5 5 5 6
3%/Year 0 0 4 5 7 7 7 7
Preferred 0 0 4 5 5 6 6 6
4%/Year 0 0 4 5 7 16 23 34
5%/Year 0 0 4 5 6 14 20 35
High BMEP............................................ Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Preferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 8
5%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 12
Diesel............................................... Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Preferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
4%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
5%/Year 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 4
Advanced Transmissions............................... Baseline 6 6 10 11 11 14 15 15
2%/Year 6 7 11 13 16 29 45 56
3%/Year 8 10 15 17 21 36 42 53
Preferred 6 6 11 13 18 33 47 62
4%/Year 8 10 17 22 30 45 53 56
5%/Year 6 8 15 22 30 46 51 53
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-40--NHTSA Estimated Application of Selected Technologies--Light Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Standards 2014 (%) 2015 (%) 2016 (%) 2017 (%) 2018 (%) 2019 (%) 2020 (%) 2021 (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPS.................................................. Baseline 18 36 60 64 64 64 64 65
2%/Year 18 35 61 67 70 73 73 78
3%/Year 18 35 61 67 68 70 72 81
Preferred 17 35 60 64 64 69 70 79
4%/Year 18 35 66 72 76 79 80 81
5%/Year 19 37 67 74 78 80 80 83
Micro & Mild Hybrids................................. Baseline 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
2%/Year 7 9 12 13 12 13 13 13
3%/Year 8 9 13 13 13 14 15 15
Preferred 4 6 9 10 10 10 15 14
4%/Year 13 18 21 22 23 24 26 26
5%/Year 24 40 44 45 47 53 59 65
Strong Hybrid........................................ Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[[Page 63046]]
3%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Preferred 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5%/Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
15-20% Mass Reduction................................ Baseline 1 1 5 6 6 6 6 6
2%/Year 1 1 5 10 11 12 12 12
3%/Year 1 1 6 10 11 13 14 22
Preferred 1 1 6 7 7 8 8 16
4%/Year 1 1 6 10 20 26 37 39
5%/Year 1 1 6 11 20 27 41 49
Aerodynamic Improvements............................. Baseline 57 64 67 76 76 75 76 76
2%/Year 57 64 67 76 77 79 81 84
3%/Year 57 64 67 76 77 79 81 84
Preferred 57 64 67 76 77 79 81 84
4%/Year 57 64 67 76 77 79 83 86
5%/Year 57 64 67 76 77 79 83 86
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although NHTSA's analysis is intended to estimate ways
manufacturers could respond to new standards, not to predict how
manufacturers will respond to new standards, manufacturers have
indicated in meetings with the agency, and in confidential product
planning data submitted to the agency, that they do engage in strategic
timing of the application of technology, relating product planning
cycles to future increases in the stringency of CAFE standards. Thus,
insofar as we have estimated that manufacturers will redesign vehicles
during MYs 2012-2016, our analysis indicates that many manufacturers
may need to add further technology (i.e., more than would be
necessitated solely by MYs 2012-2016 standards) in order to facilitate
compliance with post-MY 2016 standards.\1271\ As discussed below, our
selection of the preferred alternative is informed, in part, by
consideration of additional technology and corresponding costs that may
be incurred in the near term (prior to MY 2017) in order to enable
compliance with future standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1271\ As NHTSA has long recognized in CAFE rulemakings, while
it may be technologically feasible for manufacturers to add
technology to their vehicles outside of their normal product
redesign and refresh cycles, doing so tends to be significantly more
complicated and expensive than adding technology at redesigns and
refresh. See Section IV.C.2.c.ii for more information about NHTSA's
consideration of product development cycles in its modeling
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that technology that could be applied in response to the
baseline standards poses a considerable challenge to the industry, at
least through MY 2016, NHTSA is concerned that regulatory alternatives
more stringent than the Preferred Alternative would require even
further application of technology, including much in earlier model
years--beyond levels the agency judges economically practicable. This
is the second issue described above: that greater and earlier
application of advanced technologies (which may have known or unknown
consumer acceptance issues) could affect the economic practicability of
certain alternatives. For example, under the 4%/Year Alternative for
passenger cars, the agency's analysis indicates that currently-
experimental high BMEP engines might need to appear a year earlier and
on twice as many vehicles in MY 2020 as under the Preferred
Alternative; that diesels and strong hybrids might need to be added
beginning MY 2019, versus not at all under the Preferred Alternative;
that many more advanced transmissions (e.g., 25% more in MY 2016) and
electric power steering (EPS) systems (e.g., 30% more in MY 2016) might
need to be applied in early model years as under the Preferred
Alternative, and that from MY 2018 forward, and more passenger cars
might need to receive significant mass reduction (15-20%) than under
the Preferred Alternative.
Much as for passenger cars, NHTSA's analysis indicates that
regulatory alternatives more stringent than the Preferred Alternative
for light trucks might also need to entail significant increases in
technology application--including in earlier model years--beyond that
reflected by the Preferred Alternative and, even more so, the baseline
standards. In addition to many of the technologies discussed above
(e.g., advanced transmissions, EPS, significant mass reduction), the
agency's analysis of even the 3%/year alternative for light trucks also
shows high early-MY application of technologies such as SGDI (35% more
in MY 2016), turbocharging with engine downsizing (31% more in MY
2016), cooled EGR (gradually reaching more than five times as many
units in MY 2021), and micro and mild hybrid systems (44% more in MY
2016).
This assessment of technology application is important in response
to comments suggesting that if technology to meet future standards
exists today, and if vehicles currently on the market might be able to
meet or exceed their targets in future model years, that must mean that
the standards defining such targets are feasible. There is a
significant difference in the level of capital and resources required
to implement one or more new technologies on a single vehicle model,
and the level of capital and resources required to implement those same
technologies across the entire vehicle fleet. NHTSA's analysis tries to
estimate both manufacturers' redesign cadence which affects when
significant new technologies may be most economically added to
individual vehicle models as well as the capital, engineering, and
manufacturing capacity resource constraints that affect how quickly new
technologies may be expanded across manufacturers' products. As
illustrated in the discussion of compliance shortfalls, when
considering these resource constraints, it would not be economically
practicable to expand some the most advanced technologies to every
vehicle in the fleet within the rulemaking timeframe, although it
should be possible to increase the application of advanced technologies
across the fleet in a progression that accounts for those resource
constraints. That is what NHTSA's analysis tries to do.
[[Page 63047]]
i. Other Technology Considerations
The discussion above covers application of technology that the
agency projects manufacturers may use to meet the standards defined by
different regulatory alternatives, but the agency emphasizes that it
models only one path to compliance, and we recognize that each
manufacturer will pursue their own path which may or may not align with
the one we model for them, as they may focus on a different mix of
technologies. In terms of how manufacturers will meet the passenger car
standards under different alternatives, the agency is concerned that
increasing the stringency of passenger cars beyond the Preferred
Alternative would increase the risk that manufacturers might reduce the
mass of passenger cars beyond the safety-neutral levels evaluated by
the agency. Tables IV-37 through IV-40 show the agency's estimates of
the rates at which a number of key technologies could be applied in
response to standards defined by the No-Action Alternative, the
Preferred Alternative, and alternatives specified as annual rates of
increase ranging from 2% to 6%. Most of these technologies are already
in use on some vehicles available for sale today in the United States
(a few, notably high-BMEP (27 bar) cooled EGR engines, are not).
However, these technologies are not currently applied throughout the
light vehicle fleet and in meetings with the agency manufacturers have
expressed concern regarding the potential to increase application rates
given constraints such as component supply, engineering resources, and
consumer acceptance. While, in the agency's judgment, most of these
technologies can become common in the marketplace by MY 2025, we expect
that there are limitations on the rates at which adoption of these
technologies can be increased, and we consider the outlook for
widespread adoption through MY 2025 to be uncertain. At stringencies
that require the application of several, but not all, advanced
technologies, if a given technology is not as successful as currently
assumed in NHTSA's analysis, manufacturers could likely compensate by
substituting one or more of the other advanced technologies, and apply
mass reduction levels more in line with NHTSA's analysis. However, for
regulatory alternatives more stringent than the Preferred Alternative,
the agency is concerned that there would be less ``headroom,''
increasing the risk that some manufacturers would resort to mass
reduction in ways that could compromise highway safety. This suggests
that passenger car standards defined by the 4%/year and faster (in
terms of the pace of stringency increases) regulatory alternatives may
not be economically practicable, and thus may be beyond the maximum
feasible levels for MYs 2017-2025.
Similarly, for light trucks, while many of these powertrain
technologies are already achieving notable marketplace success, some
(e.g., high BMEP) are not proven in load- and towing-intensive
applications, and the agency is concerned that widespread simultaneous
increases in the application of many of these advanced technologies is
likely to leave manufacturers little room to adjust should some
technologies not be as successful as currently reflected in NHTSA's
analysis. This suggests that light truck standards defined by the 3%/
year and faster (in terms of the pace of stringency increases)
regulatory alternatives may not be economically practicable, and thus
may be beyond the maximum feasible levels for MYs 2017-2025.
j. Cost of Meeting the Standards
Another consideration for economic practicability is the extent to
which new standards could increase the average cost to acquire new
vehicles, because even insofar as the underlying application of
technology leads to reduced outlays for fuel over the useful lives of
the affected vehicles, these per-vehicle cost increases provide both a
measure of the degree of challenge faced by manufacturers, and also the
degree of adjustment, in the form of potential vehicle price increases,
that will ultimately be required of vehicle purchasers. Tables IV-41
through IV-44, below, show the agency's estimates of average cost
increase under the Preferred Alternative for passenger cars and light
trucks. Because our analysis includes estimates of manufacturers'
indirect costs and profits, as well as civil penalties some
manufacturers (as allowed under EPCA/EISA) might elect to pay in lieu
of achieving compliance with CAFE standards, we report cost increases
as estimated average increases in vehicle price (as MSRP). These are
average values, and the agency does not expect that the prices of every
vehicle would increase by the same amount; rather, the agency's
underlying analysis shows unit costs varying widely between different
vehicle models. For example, while our analysis shows (as indicated
below) an average cost increase of $1,400 for Fiat/Chrysler's MY 2019
passenger cars under the Preferred Alternative, that $1,400 value is
the production-weighted average of values ranging from $0 to $3,282.
While we recognize that manufacturers might distribute regulatory costs
throughout their fleet in order to maximize profit, we have not
attempted to estimate strategic pricing. To provide an indication of
potential increase relative to today's vehicles, we report increases
relative to the market forecast using technology in the MY 2010 fleet--
the most recent actual fleet for which we have information sufficient
for use in our analysis. We provide results starting in MY 2014 in part
to illustrate the cost impacts in the first model year that we believe
manufacturers might actually be able to change their products in
preparation for compliance with standards in MYs 2017 and beyond:
Table IV-41--NHTSA Estimated Total (vs. MY 2010 Technology) Average MSRP Increases During MYs 2014-2019 Under Preferred Alternative--Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry................................................ 537 711 934 1,044 1,166 1,286
Aston Martin............................................ 1,753 1,832 2,250 3,397 3,437 3,281
BMW..................................................... 490 814 1,104 1,205 1,642 1,579
Daimler................................................. 1,033 1,128 1,516 1,616 1,670 1,607
Fiat.................................................... 794 941 1,256 1,250 1,287 1,400
Ford.................................................... 601 997 1,081 1,285 1,291 1,319
Geely................................................... 896 1,031 1,120 1,229 1,538 1,752
General Motors.......................................... 569 928 1,146 1,148 1,369 1,304
Honda................................................... 401 400 760 901 1,069 1,079
Hyundai................................................. 408 449 903 1,096 1,076 1,354
Kia..................................................... 197 374 428 616 675 1,007
Lotus................................................... 709 1,502 1,590 1,879 1,942 2,894
[[Page 63048]]
Mazda................................................... 645 660 1,302 1,292 1,394 1,278
Mitsubishi.............................................. 1,153 1,811 1,778 1,749 1,791 1,667
Nissan.................................................. 836 857 948 1,192 1,275 1,450
Porsche................................................. 728 1,045 1,123 1,480 1,650 1,756
Spyker.................................................. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Subaru.................................................. 1,381 1,551 1,497 1,568 1,660 2,271
Suzuki.................................................. 932 1,265 1,365 1,349 1,356 1,963
Tata.................................................... 864 974 1,201 1,616 2,212 2,109
Tesla................................................... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Toyota.................................................. 235 295 418 482 621 996
Volkswagen.............................................. 234 445 692 802 1,066 1,099
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-42--NHTSA Estimated Total (vs. MY 2010 Technology) Average MSRP Increases During MYs 2020-2025 Under Preferred Alternative--Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry................................................ 1,480 1,608 1,699 1,821 2,074 2,153
Aston Martin............................................ 3,338 3,963 4,026 4,296 4,765 4,719
BMW..................................................... 1,652 1,792 1,996 2,128 2,594 2,595
Daimler................................................. 1,821 1,893 2,157 2,476 2,566 2,905
Fiat.................................................... 1,623 1,878 1,888 2,314 2,464 2,666
Ford.................................................... 1,814 1,850 2,018 2,020 2,477 2,588
Geely................................................... 1,784 1,868 1,961 2,123 2,327 2,472
General Motors.......................................... 1,562 1,659 1,661 1,831 1,981 2,268
Honda................................................... 1,067 1,257 1,255 1,490 1,493 1,460
Hyundai................................................. 1,362 1,503 1,662 1,689 1,832 1,833
Kia..................................................... 1,234 1,324 1,571 1,554 1,538 1,730
Lotus................................................... 2,952 3,022 3,109 3,339 3,439 3,381
Mazda................................................... 1,586 1,568 1,970 2,073 2,067 2,251
Mitsubishi.............................................. 2,766 3,052 3,016 2,983 2,950 3,017
Nissan.................................................. 1,506 1,528 1,647 1,752 2,108 2,071
Porsche................................................. 1,834 2,018 2,336 2,457 2,571 2,600
Spyker.................................................. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Subaru.................................................. 2,758 2,694 2,645 2,694 5,228 4,457
Suzuki.................................................. 2,203 2,533 2,526 2,501 2,522 2,666
Tata.................................................... 2,188 2,216 2,296 2,633 2,724 2,889
Tesla................................................... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Toyota.................................................. 1,111 1,341 1,397 1,397 1,640 1,578
Volkswagen.............................................. 1,298 1,460 1,570 1,707 1,932 2,257
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-43--NHTSA Estimated Total (vs. MY 2010 Technology) Average MSRP Increases During MYs 2014-2019 Under Preferred Alternative--Light Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry................................................ 705 931 1,159 1,226 1,264 1,377
Aston Martin............................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
BMW..................................................... 581 694 1,223 1,751 1,727 1,614
Daimler................................................. 838 1,038 1,117 2,162 2,269 2,115
Fiat.................................................... 1,102 1,499 2,035 2,064 2,046 1,982
Ford.................................................... 445 1,146 1,140 1,141 1,153 1,145
Geely................................................... 833 1,055 1,217 1,257 1,958 1,828
General Motors.......................................... 775 844 977 1,006 1,034 1,385
Honda................................................... 638 709 883 995 1,032 1,018
Hyundai................................................. 380 406 405 747 751 1,360
Kia..................................................... 285 430 1,070 1,119 1,118 1,146
Lotus................................................... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Mazda................................................... 842 855 1,046 1,037 1,771 1,612
Mitsubishi.............................................. 1,406 1,362 1,341 1,323 1,317 1,215
Nissan.................................................. 818 870 1,091 1,309 1,313 1,440
Porsche................................................. 705 1,294 1,328 1,355 1,434 2,379
Spyker.................................................. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Subaru.................................................. 962 954 938 989 1,005 1,399
Suzuki.................................................. 1,002 1,110 1,360 1,344 1,329 1,209
Tata.................................................... 798 1,022 2,260 2,276 2,302 2,235
Tesla................................................... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Toyota.................................................. 610 615 978 968 1,038 1,166
[[Page 63049]]
Volkswagen.............................................. 398 642 731 725 874 957
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-44--NHTSA Estimated Total (vs. MY 2010 Technology) Average MSRP Increases During MYs 2020-2025 Under Preferred Alternative--Light Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry................................................ 1,599 1,866 1,893 1,991 2,070 2,125
Aston Martin............................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
BMW..................................................... 1,620 1,772 2,094 2,055 2,050 2,063
Daimler................................................. 2,104 2,078 2,524 2,546 2,582 2,551
Fiat.................................................... 2,629 2,719 2,708 3,119 3,074 3,126
Ford.................................................... 1,242 2,074 2,037 2,016 2,005 2,074
Geely................................................... 1,800 1,795 1,992 2,592 2,585 2,537
General Motors.......................................... 1,828 1,803 1,776 1,774 1,842 2,025
Honda................................................... 1,037 1,435 1,563 1,575 1,698 1,663
Hyundai................................................. 1,392 1,370 1,607 1,603 1,836 1,774
Kia..................................................... 1,133 1,584 1,531 1,831 1,794 1,733
Lotus................................................... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Mazda................................................... 1,603 1,570 1,549 1,778 1,917 1,853
Mitsubishi.............................................. 1,197 2,439 2,380 2,346 2,313 2,206
Nissan.................................................. 1,621 1,682 1,779 1,762 1,971 1,939
Porsche................................................. 2,341 2,302 2,303 2,625 2,672 2,620
Spyker.................................................. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Subaru.................................................. 1,378 1,359 1,379 1,344 1,656 1,607
Suzuki.................................................. 1,193 2,671 2,607 2,569 2,532 2,406
Tata.................................................... 2,247 2,822 2,899 2,967 3,031 3,020
Tesla................................................... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Toyota.................................................. 1,168 1,480 1,492 1,695 1,882 1,875
Volkswagen.............................................. 1,193 1,173 1,177 1,344 1,673 1,890
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Relative to current vehicles (as represented here by technology in
the MY 2010 fleet, the most recent for which NHTSA has complete data),
NHTSA judges these cost increases to be significant, but considering
the accompanying fuel savings, likely to be accepted by consumers well
enough to avoid undue distortion (e.g., significant shifts--
attributable to today's standards--in manufacturers' respective market
shares) of the light vehicle market.
However, relative to the Preferred Alternative, NHTSA noted
significant further cost increases for several major manufacturers--
even in MY 2016--under the 3%/y and 4%/y alternatives for light trucks.
Tables IV-45 and IV-46 below show additional costs estimated to be
incurred under the 3%/y and 4%/y alternatives as compared to the
preferred alternative:
Table IV-45--NHTSA Estimated Difference Between Estimated Average MSRP Increase Under 3%/y and Preferred Alternatives for Selected Manufacturers' Light
Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry...................................... 116 173 173 210 261 201 120 8
Fiat.......................................... 164 63 56 139 159 222 (72) 22
Ford.......................................... 75 481 474 460 487 408 446 (6)
General Motors................................ 278 251 245 279 335 244 (3) (7)
Mazda......................................... 496 443 450 439 177 142 147 153
Mitsubishi.................................... 591 580 517 515 636 600 622 (46)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-46--NHTSA Estimated Difference Between Estimated Average MSRP Increases Under 4%/y and Preferred Alternatives for Selected Manufacturers' Light
Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry........................................ 148 224 246 288 374 448 455 387
Fiat............................................ 173 73 93 179 230 309 142 228
Ford............................................ 75 525 517 507 495 541 694 520
General Motors.................................. 426 449 454 486 646 790 735 720
Mazda........................................... 650 576 596 587 536 480 459 459
Mitsubishi...................................... 733 718 652 647 636 633 716 476
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63050]]
For example, in MY 2016, NHTSA estimates that compliance with
already-promulgated light truck CAFE standards could increase average
MSRP by $1,053, as mentioned above; under the preferred alternative, we
estimate that cumulative compliance costs increase to $1,159 due to
early application of technology in order to meet future anticipated
standards; under the 3%/y and 4%/y alternatives, we estimate this
amount would increase to $1,333 and $1,405, respectively. For some
manufacturers (e.g., Ford, GM, Mazda, Mitsubishi), these increases are
large even prior to MY 2016. Particularly during the earlier model
years, the agency is concerned that these further costs represent
significant increases in ``lift'' beyond levels anticipated when the
MYs 2012-2016 standards were promulgated in MY 2010. In the agency's
judgment, these additional costs augment the basis--discussed above in
terms of technology application--to determine that light truck
standards increasing at a pace of 3%/year or faster after MY2016 are
beyond the maximum feasible levels for MYs 2017-2021.
The above considerations relate to matters of technological
feasibility and economic practicability--two of the factors NHTSA must
take into account when determining the maximum feasible stringency of
each standard in each model year. The agency must also consider the
need of the nation to conserve energy. Two of the regulatory
alternatives the agency has considered--the maximum net benefit (MNB)
and total cost = total benefit (TC=TB) alternatives--are defined in
terms of explicit quantitative means of weighing all the social costs
NHTSA has attempted to quantify against all of the corresponding
monetized social benefits (e.g., reduced fuel outlays, reduced
environmental damages from motor vehicle GHG emissions) of energy
conservation achieved through increases in the stringency of fuel
economy standards. As discussed above, the agency has determined that,
considering resultant technology application and costs, the standards
defined by these two regulatory alternatives exceed maximum feasible
levels. Although NHTSA has quantified all regulatory alternatives in
terms of their respective costs and monetized benefits, the agency also
considers it appropriate to compare alternatives more simply in terms
of total fuel savings and average per-vehicle costs. Below, Tables IV-
47 through IV-50 present the agency's findings on this basis for
passenger cars and light trucks, respectively. Fuel savings are
expressed in terms of cumulative incremental fuel savings throughout
the useful lives of fleets in all affected model years through MY 2021,
measuring savings relative to fuel consumption estimated to occur under
the baseline standards defined by the No-Action Alternative. Costs are
measured in terms of average incremental MSRP increases relative to
average prices estimated to result under the baseline standards defined
by the No-Action Alternative.
Table IV-47--NHTSA Estimated Passenger Car Cumulative Lifetime Fuel Savings Through MY 2021 and Average Vehicle Cost Increases During MYs 2014-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ave. MSRP increase relative to no-action alternative
Alternative Fleet MY basis -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fuel savings (b. Fuel savings (b.
2022 2023 2024 2025 gal.) MY2022-2025 gal.) through MY2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2%............................... 2008................. 566-................. 611-................. 628-................. 644-................. 30-................. 53-
2010................. 650.................. 705.................. 728.................. 730.................. 28.................. 50
3%............................... 2008................. 840-................. 883-................. 958-................. 1,059-............... 43-................. 78-
2010................. 961.................. 1,027................ 1,102................ 1,125................ 41.................. 70
Final Standards.................. 2008................. 951-................. 997-................. 1,081-............... 1,183-............... 46-................. 71-
2010................. 948.................. 1,056................ 1,148................ 1,226................ 42.................. 63
4%............................... 2008................. 1,300-............... 1,370-............... 1,530-............... 1,654-............... 54-................. 101-
2010................. 1,375................ 1,500................ 1,620................ 1,746................ 52.................. 88
MNB.............................. 2008................. 2,149-............... 2,226-............... 2,383-............... 2,525-............... 62-................. 133-
2010................. 2,000................ 2,120................ 2,212................ 2,247................ 57.................. 101
TC=TB............................ 2008................. 2,137-............... 2,258-............... 2,430-............... 2,532-............... 62-................. 133-
2010................. 1,979................ 2,097................ 2,182................ 2,272................ 57.................. 102
5%............................... 2008................. 1,991-............... 2,151-............... 2,462-............... 2,619-............... 63-................. 118-
2010................. 1,882................ 2,070................ 2,313................ 2,498................ 57.................. 98
6%............................... 2008................. 2,493-............... 2,741-............... 3,104-............... 3,250-............... 67-................. 131-
2010................. 2,302................ 2,585................ 2,889................ 3,168................ 60.................. 104
7%............................... 2008................. 2,831-............... 3,127-............... 3,504-............... 3,632-............... 68-................. 136-
2010................. 2,510................ 2,817................ 3,267................ 3,538................ 62.................. 109
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-48--NHTSA Estimated Passenger Car Cumulative Lifetime Fuel Savings and Average Vehicle Cost Increases During MYs 2022-2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ave. MSRP increase relative to no-action alternative
Alternative Fleet MY basis -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fuel savings (b. Fuel savings (b.
2022 2023 2024 2025 gal.) MY2022-2025 gal.) through MY2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2%............................... 2008................. 638-................. 677-................. 730-................. 758-................. 40-................. 65-
2010................. 575.................. 629.................. 675.................. 683.................. 39.................. 66
3%............................... 2008................. 897-................. 949-................. 1,110-............... 1,174-............... 56-................. 93-
2010................. 868.................. 939.................. 1,009................ 1,037................ 57.................. 99
Final Standards.................. 2008................. 1,272-............... 1,394-............... 1,751-............... 1,827-............... 68-................. 113-
2010................. 1,091................ 1,221................ 1,482................ 1,578................ 69.................. 118
4%............................... 2008................. 1,341-............... 1,469-............... 1,779-............... 1,865-............... 69-................. 121-
2010................. 1,153................ 1,292................ 1,487................ 1,577................ 70.................. 124
MNB.............................. 2008................. 1,739-............... 1,810-............... 1,964-............... 1,943-............... 73-................. 148-
[[Page 63051]]
2010................. 1,593................ 1,772................ 2,096................ 2,104................ 78.................. 154
TC=TB............................ 2008................. 2,041-............... 2,189-............... 2,568-............... 2,475-............... 80-................. 158-
2010................. 1,755................ 2,086................ 2,524................ 2,488................ 82.................. 159
5%............................... 2008................. 1,797-............... 2,152-............... 2,730-............... 2,719-............... 81-................. 141-
2010................. 1,599................ 1,970................ 2,624................ 2,648................ 82.................. 146
6%............................... 2008................. 2,245-............... 2,677-............... 3,391-............... 3,513-............... 86-................. 152-
2010................. 2,183................ 2,408................ 3,315................ 3,461................ 88.................. 159
7%............................... 2008................. 2,938-............... 3,579-............... 4,223-............... 4,121-............... 92-................. 164-
2010................. 3,091................ 3,514................ 3,977................ 3,970................ 95.................. 172
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-49--NHTSA Estimated Light Truck Cumulative Lifetime Fuel Savings Through MY 2021 and Average Vehicle Cost Increases During MYs 2014-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ave. MSRP increase relative to no-action alternative Fuel savings
Alternative Fleet MY basis -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (b. gal.)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 through MY2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2%............................. 2008........... 62-........... 85-........... 101-.......... 177-.......... 244-.......... 335-.......... 429-.......... 522-.......... 24-
2010........... 113........... 231........... 266........... 327........... 378........... 452........... 533........... 607........... 22
3%............................. 2008........... 88-........... 168-.......... 197-.......... 270-.......... 371-.......... 506-.......... 633-.......... 767-.......... 35-
2010........... 129........... 242........... 280........... 357........... 458........... 598........... 750........... 916........... 29
Final Standards................ 2008........... 04-........... 07-........... 14-........... 78-........... 192-.......... 423-.......... 622-.......... 854-.......... 25-
2010........... 13............ 69............ 106........... 147........... 196........... 397........... 629........... 908........... 21
4%............................. 2008........... 134-.......... 248-.......... 300-.......... 393-.......... 546-.......... 788-.......... 998-.......... 1,201-........ 46-
2010........... 161........... 294........... 353........... 435........... 571........... 845........... 1,085......... 1,295......... 36
MNB............................ 2008........... 595-.......... 823-.......... 973-.......... 1,296-........ 1,535-........ 1,684-........ 1,915-........ 2,025-........ 71-
2010........... 260........... 473........... 535........... 705........... 854........... 1,222......... 1,593......... 1,957......... 44
TC=TB.......................... 2008........... 618-.......... 845-.......... 999-.......... 1,354-........ 1,572-........ 1,708-........ 1,938-........ 2,062-........ 71-
2010........... 273........... 482........... 558........... 742........... 903........... 1,260......... 1,610......... 1,943......... 45
5%............................. 2008........... 223-.......... 348-.......... 413-.......... 550-.......... 770-.......... 1,125-........ 1,556-........ 1,845-........ 56-
2010........... 249........... 459........... 504........... 607........... 806........... 1,100......... 1,434......... 1,737......... 41
6%............................. 2008........... 379-.......... 538-.......... 654-.......... 774-.......... 1,042-........ 1,344-........ 1,907-........ 2,313-........ 64-
2010........... 283........... 477........... 539........... 664........... 906........... 1,262......... 1,630......... 2,005......... 44
7%............................. 2008........... 438-.......... 626-.......... 739-.......... 878-.......... 1,190-........ 1,565-........ 2,263-........ 2,622-........ 68-
2010........... 296........... 486........... 566........... 719........... 1,018......... 1,528......... 1,906......... 2,316......... 47
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-50--NHTSA Estimated Light Truck Cumulative Lifetime Fuel Savings and Average Vehicle Cost Increases During MY2022-2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ave. MSRP increase relative to no-action alternative
Alternative Fleet MY basis -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fuel savings (b. Fuel savings (b.
2022 2023 2024 2025 gal.) MY2022-2025 gal.) through MY2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2%............................... 2008................. 566-................. 611-................. 628-................. 644-................. 30-................. 53-
2010................. 650.................. 705.................. 728.................. 730.................. 28.................. 50
3%............................... 2008................. 840-................. 883-................. 958-................. 1,059-............... 43-................. 78-
2010................. 961.................. 1,027................ 1,102................ 1,125................ 41.................. 70
Final Standards.................. 2008................. 951-................. 997-................. 1,081-............... 1,183-............... 46-................. 71-
2010................. 948.................. 1,056................ 1,148................ 1,226................ 42.................. 63
4%............................... 2008................. 1,300-............... 1,370-............... 1,530-............... 1,654-............... 54-................. 101-
2010................. 1,375................ 1,500................ 1,620................ 1,746................ 52.................. 88
MNB.............................. 2008................. 2,149-............... 2,226-............... 2,383-............... 2,525-............... 62-................. 133-
2010................. 2,000................ 2,120................ 2,212................ 2,247................ 57.................. 101
TC=TB............................ 2008................. 2,137-............... 2,258-............... 2,430-............... 2,532-............... 62-................. 133-
2010................. 1,979................ 2,097................ 2,182................ 2,272................ 57.................. 102
5%............................... 2008................. 1,991-............... 2,151-............... 2,462-............... 2,619-............... 63-................. 118-
2010................. 1,882................ 2,070................ 2,313................ 2,498................ 57.................. 98
6%............................... 2008................. 2,493-............... 2,741-............... 3,104-............... 3,250-............... 67-................. 131-
2010................. 2,302................ 2,585................ 2,889................ 3,168................ 60.................. 104
7%............................... 2008................. 2,831-............... 3,127-............... 3,504-............... 3,632-............... 68-................. 136-
2010................. 2,510................ 2,817................ 3,267................ 3,538................ 62.................. 109
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63052]]
Through MY 2021, the Preferred Alternative for passenger cars is
more stringent than the 2%/Year and 3%/Year alternatives. In MY 2021,
the Preferred Alternative for light trucks is more stringent than the
2%/Year alternative, but it is less stringent than the 2%/Year
alternative in earlier model years. During MYs 2022-2025, the preferred
alternatives for passenger cars and light trucks are both more than the
corresponding 2%/Year and 3%/Year alternatives.The tables above show
that, according to our analysis, the Preferred Alternative for
passenger cars achieves considerably more in fuel savings through MY
2021 and during MYs 2022-2025 than the less stringent alternatives,
still at a cost that the agency deems to be economically practicable if
it was passed directly on to consumers in the form of MSRP increases.
For light trucks, the agency's analysis indicates that, through MY
2012, the Preferred Alternative achieves fuel savings very similar to
the 2%/Year alternative, while incurring early-MY costs the agency
considers economically practicable. During MYs 2022-2025, our analysis
indicates the Preferred Alternative for light trucks achieves greater
fuel savings than the 3%/Year alternative, while still incurring costs
the agency considers economically practicable.
Based on recent EIA estimates of future fuel prices, the fuel
savings presented above will significantly reduce future outlays for
fuel purchases, and will significiantly reduce future CO2
emissions. Setting aside outlays for fuel taxes (which, as explained
below, are economic transfers), accounting for estimated economic
externalities associated with petroleum use and CO2
emissions, and accounting for other impacts (e.g., increased
congestion, reduced VOC emissions) with estimable economic value, we
have also estimated the total social costs and benefits relative to the
baseline standards. Chapter X of the FRIA accompanying today's notice
documents these estimates for each regulatory alternative. While the
FRIA presents year-by-year results, Tables IV-51 and IV-52, below,
summarize cumulative results for model years covered by today's final
(i.e., through MY 2021) and augural (i.e., during MYs 2022-2025)
standards.
Table IV-51--NHTSA Estimated Benefits and Costs ($b) Relative to Preferred Alternative--Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through MY2021 MY2022-2025 Through MY2025
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory alternative MY Basis Net Net Net
Benefits Costs benefits Benefits Costs benefits Benefits Costs benefits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2%/Year...................... 2008....... 90-........ 23-........ 67-....... 145-...... 35-....... 111-...... 235-...... 57-....... 178-
2010....... 97......... 24......... 73........ 142....... 31........ 111....... 239....... 56........ 184
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3%/Year...................... 2008....... 131-....... 32-........ 100-...... 203-...... 48-....... 155-...... 334-...... 80-....... 255-
2010....... 148........ 34......... 114....... 208....... 44........ 163....... 356....... 79........ 277
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred.................... 2008....... 158-....... 40-........ 118-...... 246-...... 71-....... 175-...... 404-...... 111-...... 293-
2010....... 170........ 42......... 128....... 250....... 60........ 190....... 420....... 102....... 317
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4%/Year...................... 2008....... 180-....... 47-........ 133-...... 249-...... 73-....... 176-...... 429-...... 120-...... 309-
2010....... 188........ 46......... 142....... 255....... 61........ 193....... 443....... 107....... 336
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5%/Year...................... 2008....... 208-....... 60-........ 148-...... 281-...... 104-...... 177-...... 489-...... 164-...... 326-
2010....... 222........ 61......... 162....... 288....... 96........ 192....... 510....... 156....... 354
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-52--NHTSA Estimated Benefits and Costs ($b) Relative to Preferred Alternative--Light Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through MY2021 MY2022-2025 Through MY2025
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory alternative MY basis Net Net Net
Benefits Costs benefits Benefits Costs benefits Benefits Costs benefits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2%/Year...................... 2008....... 82-........ 12-........ 70-........ 109-....... 16-....... 92-....... 191-...... 29-....... 162-
2010....... 75......... 17......... 59......... 101........ 17........ 84........ 177....... 34........ 143
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3%/Year...................... 2008....... 122-....... 18-........ 104-....... 155-....... 24-....... 131-...... 277-...... 42-....... 235-
2010....... 101........ 21......... 79......... 145........ 25........ 120....... 246....... 46........ 200
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred.................... 2008....... 88-........ 13-........ 74-........ 165-....... 26-....... 139-...... 253-...... 40-....... 213-
2010....... 71......... 14......... 57......... 150........ 26........ 124....... 221....... 40........ 181
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4%/Year...................... 2008....... 160-....... 28-........ 133-....... 197-....... 35-....... 161-...... 357-...... 63-....... 294-
2010....... 124........ 28......... 95......... 183........ 36........ 147....... 307....... 64........ 243
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5%/Year...................... 2008....... 192-....... 41-........ 151-....... 222-....... 54-....... 168-...... 414-...... 95-....... 319-
2010....... 139........ 39......... 100........ 202........ 49........ 153....... 340....... 88........ 253
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our analysis indicates that both through MY 2021 and during MYs
2022-2025, the Preferred Alternative for passenger cars yields
significantly greater net benefits than the 3%/Year alternative, and
yields almost as much net benefit as the 4%/Year alternative. Through
MY 2021, our analysis indicates that the Preferred Alternative for
light trucks yields greater net benefits that the 2%/Year alternative,
at similar social cost. Our analysis also indicates net benefits
through MY 2021 would be higher under the 3%/Year alternative for light
trucks, but the social
[[Page 63053]]
costs would potentially be 50% higher than under the Preferred
Alternative. During MYs 2022-2025, our analysis indicates that the
Preferred Alternative would produce greater net benefits than the 3%/
Year alternative, and would do so at very similar cost. Our analysis
also that net benefits during MYs 2022-2025 would be higher under the
4%/Year alternative for light trucks, but that social costs would be
more than 30% higher than under the Preferred Alternative.
Alternatives less stringent than the Preferred Alternatives would
still be economically practicable, but in terms of the technology that
they might leave on the table, the agency concludes that they would not
meet the need of the nation to conserve energy, and would thus be below
maximum feasible.
k. Uncertainty and Consumer Acceptance of Technologies
In evaluating economic practicability, while NHTSA considered
individual manufacturers' redesign cycles and, where available, the
level of technologies planned for their future products that improve
fuel economy, as well as some estimation of the resources that would
likely be needed to support those plans and the potential future
standards, the agency also considered whether we agreed with
manufacturers that there could conceivably be compromises to vehicle
utility depending on the technologies chosen to meet the potential new
standards. NHTSA considered feedback on consumer acceptance of some
advanced technologies and consumers' willingness to pay for improved
fuel economy. In addition, the agency carefully considered whether
manufacturer assertions about potential uncertainties in the agency's
technical, economic, and consumer acceptance assumptions and estimates
were potentially valid, and if so, what the potential effects of these
uncertainties might be on economic practicability.
Regarding passenger cars, after considering the feedback from
stakeholders received prior to and in response to the NPRM, the agency
considered further how it thought the factors should be balanced to
determine the maximum feasible passenger car standards for MYs 2017-
2025. Based on that consideration of the information before the agency
and how it informs our balancing of the factors, NHTSA concludes that
the points raised by stakeholders support NHTSA's careful consideration
of the factors described above, which take into account a level of
uncertainty that surrounds economic practicability in these future
model years. We believe the level of uncertainty that we have factored
into the analysis is reasonable and do not agree that uncertainty
levels are nearly as significant as a number of manufacturers
maintained, especially for passenger cars that would suggest that the
preferred alternative is not economically practicable. The most
persuasive information received from stakeholders for passenger cars
concerned practicability issues in MYs 2017-2021, which the agency's
analysis generally supports. We are concerned that requiring
manufacturers to invest that capital to meet higher standards in MYs
2017-2021, rather than allowing them to increase fuel economy in those
years slightly more slowly, would impact their ability to also support
the development and implementation of technologies across their light
truck fleet, and well as to conduct the engineering development and
future investment necessary comply with the preferred alternative's
more stringent standards in the later years. Thus, after considerable
deliberation, we conclude that the stringency levels required by the
Preferred Alternative for passenger cars, which increase on average
3.6%/y in MYs 2017-2021 (only slightly different from the 4%/y levels)
are economically practicable, but that the 4%/y alternative and higher
alternatives are likely not economically practicable.
Regarding light trucks, while NHTSA does not agree with the
manufacturers' overall cost assessments expressed to us last summer
prior to issuance of the NPRM, and believes, based on our analysis
using our technology cost and effectiveness assumptions, that
manufacturers should be able to preserve all necessary vehicle utility.
NHTSA does believe there is merit to some of the concerns raised in
stakeholder feedback. Specifically, concerns about longer redesign
schedules for trucks, compounded by the need to invest simultaneously
in raising passenger car fuel economy, and we have incorporated those
considerations into our assessment for this final rule. Based on our
assessment, we believe that alternatives more stringent than the
preferred alternative could lead manufacturers to implement
technologies that do not maintain vehicle utility, based on the cadence
of the standards under the more stringent alternatives. As discussed
above, a number of manufacturers repeatedly stated, in providing
feedback, that the MYs 2012-2016 standards for trucks, while feasible,
required significant investment to reach the required levels, and that
given the redesign schedule for trucks, that level of investment
throughout the entire MYs 2012-2025 time period was not sustainable.
Based on the confidential business information that manufacturers
provided to us, we believe that this point is valid. If the agency
pushes CAFE increases that require considerable sustained investment at
a faster rate than industry redesign cycles, adverse economic
consequences could ensue. Especially for light trucks, these risks
appear most pronounced during MYs 2017-2021, as evidenced by the
agency's analysis indicating that, given our expectations regarding
manufacturers' product cadence (i.e., redesign schedules) increasing
stringency beyond baseline standards during the few model years
following MY 2016 could necessitate considerable additional technology
and cost even prior to MY 2016. The best information that the agency
has at this time, therefore, indicates that requiring light truck fuel
economy improvements at rates more stringent than the preferred
alternative could create potentially severe economic consequences, and
likely would not be economically practicable.
Thus, evaluating the inputs from stakeholders and the agency's
independent analysis, the agency also considered further how it thought
the factors should be balanced to determine the maximum feasible light
truck standards for MYs 2017-2021. Based on that consideration of the
information before the agency and how it informs our balancing of the
factors, NHTSA has concluded for the final standards for MYs 2017-2021
that 4%/y CAFE stringency increases for passenger cars and 3%/y
stringency increases for light trucks are economically impracticable.
NHTSA therefore concludes that the preferred alternative, which would
in MYs 2017-2021 increase on average 3.8%/y for passenger cars and
2.5%/y for light trucks, is the most stringent alternative that is
still economically practicable in those model years.
As discussed above, the question of the tipping point is slightly
different in the context of the final standards and augural standards.
The augural standards for MYs 2022-2025 are distant, and while
manufacturers benefit from regulatory certainty, no manufacturer has
begun to plan in earnest for vehicles that they expect to produce in
that time frame. Moreover, the inputs that inform our balancing are
less certain. We reiterate that the agency's assessment of what augural
standards would be maximum feasible is based on the best, most
transparent information available to the agency today, and that the
final standards for
[[Page 63054]]
MYs 2022-2025 will be determined in a future rulemaking, at which time
the agency expects to have much new information that may affect how it
chooses to balance the relevant factors at that time.
Recognizing that the augural standards are distant, and that
manufacturers do not yet have fixed plans for those model years, the
agency believes that despite considerable uncertainty, economic
practicability may not necessarily be as limiting for MYs 2022-2025 as
we conclude it is for MYs 2017-2021. Our analysis showed that
shortfalls did not begin to accrue for the passenger car standards
until the 5%/y alternative, for example, as the table below
demonstrates. For light trucks, the analysis showed increasing
shortfall risk for more manufacturers in MYs 2022-2025 under the 5%/y
alternative. Other indicators of economic practicability confirmed that
the 5%/y alternative was likely not economically practicable in MYs
2022-2025, but that the 4%/y and slower alternatives would likely leave
technology on the table unnecessarily. NHTSA therefore concludes that
the preferred alternative, which would in MYs 2022-2025 increase on
average 4.7%/y for passenger cars and 4.8%/y for light trucks, is the
most stringent alternative that would still be economically practicable
in those model years.
The reader will likely note that in most model years, the
difference between the final/augural standards and the next most
stringent alternative is minor. The agency grappled with whether the
4%/y alternative for the final passenger car standards, the 3%/y
alternative for the final light truck standards, and the 5%/y
alternative for the augural standards might be maximum feasible, given
that they would save 5-7% and 8-11% more fuel, respectively, for
passenger cars and light trucks, respectively, for 5-8% and 5-15% more
cost, respectively, as compared to the final and augural standards
presented here.
As discussed above, while consideration of future model years in
isolation might suggest manufacturers have ample lead time to make
further improvements, that is not how industry responds to standards,
and NHTSA thus tries to account for manufacturers' product cadence and
use of multiyear planning in its analysis in order to improve how
accurately we reflect practicability. NHTSA now has standards in place
for MY 2012, the current model year, through MY 2016, is finalizing
standards for MYs 2017-2021, and is presenting a potential road map of
standards for MYs 2022-2025. Manufacturers will be making concurrent
and continual fuel economy improvements to both their car and truck
fleets in response to these standards for well beyond their current
product plans. The agency's analysis includes an assumption of market-
driven improvements to fuel economy across a manufacturer's fleet
(i.e., improvements beyond those required by the standards); if this is
the case, then all of these improvements will be made along with, or at
the expense of, improvements to every other facet of vehicle
performance during the 2012-2025 time frame. We expect that the
standards will therefore cause manufacturers to be more resource-
constrained in the future than they may have been in the past, given
that improvements will be required in every year for over ten years,
and given uncertainty with regard to future fuel prices and consumer
demand for fuel economy, and thus manufacturers' ability to sell the
vehicles that they make in response to the standards. This uncertainty
is inherent in the agency's analysis of alternative standards: We model
only one path to compliance, and we cannot possibly have perfect
information about every input to that analysis, even if the information
is the best and most transparent available. NHTSA believes that
standards set at the finalized levels for MYs 2017-2021 will help
address concerns raised by manufacturer stakeholders and reduce the
risk for adverse economic consequences during that time frame. Given
the year-over-year challenge of the standards and the ``lift'' required
to meet the final standards for MYs 2017-2021, NHTSA believes that the
final standards, as proposed, are maximum feasible for those model
years.
With regard to the augural standards for MYs 2022-2025, the time
frame and the uncertainty makes evaluation of maximum feasible levels
more challenging, but NHTSA believes that the provisions for incentives
for advanced technologies to encourage their development and
implementation, and the agencies' expectation that some of the
uncertainties surrounding consumer acceptance of new technologies in
light trucks should have resolved themselves by that time frame based
on consumers' experience with the advanced technologies, will enable
considerable increases in stringency by then, and help to ensure most
of the substantial improvements in fuel efficiency initially envisioned
over the entire period and supported by other stakeholders. This helps
give NHTSA more confidence that a balancing that weights the need of
the nation to conserve energy slightly more heavily and economic
practicability slightly less heavily in MYs 2022-2025 is maximum
feasible for the augural standards.
The final and augural standards also account for the effect of
EPA's standards, in light of the agencies' close coordination and the
fact that both sets of standards were developed together to harmonize
as part of the National Program. Given the close relationship between
fuel economy and CO2 emissions, and the efforts NHTSA and
EPA have made to conduct joint analysis and jointly deliberate on
information and tentative conclusions,\1272\ the agencies have sought
to harmonize and align their proposed standards to the greatest extent
possible, consistent with their respective statutory authorities. In
comparing the final standards, the agencies' stringency curves are
equivalent, except for the fact that the stringency of EPA's passenger
car standards reflect the ability to improve GHG emissions through
reductions in A/C system refrigerant leakage and the use of lower GWP
refrigerants (direct A/C improvements),\1273\ and that EPA provides
incentives for PHEV, EV and FCV vehicles, which NHTSA does not provide
because statutory incentives have already been defined for these
technologies. The stringency of NHTSA's final standards for passenger
cars for MYs 2017-2025 align with the stringency of EPA's equivalent
standards when these differences are considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1272\ NHTSA and EPA conducted joint analysis and jointly
deliberated on information and tentative conclusions related to
technology cost, effectiveness, manufacturers' capability to
implement technologies, the cadence at which manufacturers might
support the implementation of technologies, economic factors, and
the assessment of comments from manufacturers.
\1273\ As these A/C system improvements do not influence fuel
economy, the stringency of NHTSA's preferred alternatives do not
reflect the availability of these technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We note, however, that the alignment is based on the assumption
that manufacturers implement the same level of direct A/C system
improvements as EPA currently forecasts for those model years, and on
the assumption of PHEV, EV, and FCV penetration at specific levels. If
a manufacturer implements a higher level of direct A/C improvement
technology (although EPA predicts 100% of manufacturers will use
substitute refrigerants by MY 2021, and the GHG standards assume this
rate of substitution) and/or a higher penetration of PHEVs, EVs and
FCVs,
[[Page 63055]]
then NHTSA's standards would effectively be more stringent than EPA's.
Conversely, if a manufacturer implements a lower level of direct A/C
improvement technology and/or a lower penetration of PHEVs, EVs and
FCVs, then EPA's proposed standards would effectively be more stringent
than NHTSA's. Several manufacturers commented on this point and
suggested that this meant that the standards were not aligned, because
NHTSA's standards might be more stringent in some years than EPA's.
This reflects a misunderstanding of the agencies' purpose. The agencies
have sought to craft harmonized standards such that manufacturers may
build a single fleet of vehicles to meet both agencies' requirements.
That is the case for these final standards. Manufacturers will have to
plan their compliance strategies considering both the NHTSA standards
and the EPA standards and assure that they are in compliance with both,
but they can still build a single fleet of vehicles to accomplish that
goal. NHTSA is thus finalizing the preferred alternative based on the
tentative determination of maximum feasibility as described earlier in
the section, but, based on efforts NHTSA and EPA have made to conduct
joint analysis and jointly deliberate on information and tentative
conclusions, NHTSA has also aligned the final and augural CAFE
standards with EPA's final standards.
Thus, NHTSA has concluded that the standards represented by the
preferred alternative are the maximum feasible standards for passenger
cars and light trucks in MYs 2017-2021, and that the augural standards
presented for MYs 2022-2025 would be maximum feasible in those model
years, based on the information currently before the agency, had we the
authority to finalize them at this time. We recognize that higher
standards would help the need of the nation to conserve more energy and
might potentially be technologically feasible (in the narrowest sense)
during those model years, but based on our analysis and the evidence
presented by the industry, we conclude that higher standards would not
represent the proper balancing for MYs 2017-2025 cars and trucks.\1274\
We conclude that the correct balancing recognizes economic
practicability concerns as discussed above, and sets standards at the
levels that the agency is promulgating in this final rule for MYs 2017-
2021 and presenting for MYs 2022-2025.\1275\ In the same vein, lower
standards might be less burdensome on the industry, but considering the
environmental impacts of the different regulatory alternatives as
required under NEPA and the need of the nation to conserve energy, we
do not believe they would represent the appropriate balancing of the
relevant factors, because they would have left technology, fuel
savings, and emissions reductions on the table unnecessarily, and not
contributed as much as possible to reducing our nation's energy
security and climate change concerns. Additionally, consistent with
Executive Order 13563, the agency believes that the benefits of the
preferred alternative amply justify the costs; indeed, the monetized
benefits exceed the monetized costs by $185-192 billion over the
lifetime of the vehicles covered by the final standards for MYs 2017-
2021, and by $314 billion over the lifetime of the vehicles covered by
the final standards for MYs 2022-2025. In full consideration of all of
the information currently before the agency, we have weighed the
statutory factors carefully and selected final passenger car and light
truck standards for MYs 2017-2021 and presented augural passenger car
and light truck standards for MYs 2022-2025 that we believe are the
maximum feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1274\ We note, for example, that while Executive Orders 12866
and 13563 focus attention on an approach that maximizes net
benefits, both Executive Orders recognize that this focus is subject
to the requirements of the governing statute. In this rulemaking,
the standards represented by the ``MNB'' alternative are more
stringent than what NHTSA has concluded would be maximum feasible
for MYs 2017-2025, and thus setting standards at that level would be
inconsistent with the requirements of EPCA/EISA to set maximum
feasible standards.
\1275\ We underscore that the agency's decision regarding what
standards would be maximum feasible for MYs 2017-2025 is made with
reference to the rulemaking time frame and circumstances of this
final rule. Each CAFE rulemaking (indeed, each stage of any given
CAFE rulemaking) presents the agency with new information that may
affect how we balance the relevant factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Impacts of the Final CAFE standards
1. How will these standards improve fuel economy and reduce GHG
emissions for MY 2017-2025 vehicles?
As discussed above, the CAFE level required under an attribute-
based standard depends on the mix of vehicles produced for sale in the
U.S. Based on the market forecast that NHTSA and EPA have used to
develop and analyze the final and augural CAFE and CO2
emissions standards, NHTSA estimates that the final and augural CAFE
standards would lead average required fuel consumption (fuel
consumption is the inverse of fuel economy) levels to increase by an
average of 4.0 percent annually through MY 2025, reaching a combined
average fuel economy requirement of between 48.7 and 49.7 mpg in that
model year:
Table IV-53--NHTSA Estimated Required Average Fuel Economy (mpg) under the Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008-.............. 40.1-............. 41.6-............. 43.1-............. 44.8-............. 46.8-
2010............... 39.6.............. 41.1.............. 42.5.............. 44.2.............. 46.1
Light trucks................... 2008-.............. 29.4-............. 30.0-............. 30.6-............. 31.2-............. 33.3-
2010............... 29.1.............. 29.6.............. 30.0.............. 30.6.............. 32.6
Combined....................... 2008-.............. 35.4-............. 36.5-............. 37.7-............. 38.9-............. 41.0-
2010............... 35.1.............. 36.1.............. 37.1.............. 38.3.............. 40.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-54--NHTSA Estimated Required Average Fuel Economy (mpg) Under the Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008-2010............. 49.0-48.2............. 51.2-50.5............. 53.6-52.9............ 56.2-55.3
Light trucks...................... 2008-2010............. 34.9-34.2............. 36.6-35.8............. 38.5-37.5............ 40.3-39.3
Combined.......................... 2008-2010............. 43.0-42.3............. 45.1-44.3............. 47.4-46.5............ 49.7-48.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63056]]
Accounting for differences between fuel economy levels under
laboratory conditions and operating conditions in the real world, NHTSA
estimates that these requirements would translate into the following
required average on-road fuel economy levels using on-road fuel
economy:
Table IV-55--NHTSA Estimated Required Average Fuel Economy (On-Road mpg) Under the Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008-2010.......... 32.1-31.7......... 33.3-32.8......... 34.5-34.0......... 35.9-35.3......... 37.4-36.8
Light trucks................... 2008-2010.......... 23.6-23.3......... 24.0-23.7......... 24.5-24.0......... 24.9-24.5......... 26.6-26.1
Combined....................... 2008-2010.......... 28.3-28.1......... 29.2-28.9......... 30.1-29.7......... 31.1-30.6......... 32.8-32.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-56--NHTSA Estimated Required Average Fuel Economy (On-Road mpg) Under the Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008-2010............. 39.2-38.6............. 41.0-40.4............. 42.9-42.3............ 44.9-44.3
Light trucks...................... 2008-2010............. 27.9-27.4............. 29.3-28.7............. 30.8-30.0............ 32.2-31.5
Combined.......................... 2008-2010............. 34.4-33.9............. 36.1-35.5............. 37.9-37.2............ 39.8-39.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the reader's reference, these mpg levels would translate to the
following in gallons per mile:
Table IV-57--NHTSA Estimated Required Average Fuel Economy (gpm) Under the Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008-2010.......... 0.0249-0.0252..... 0.0240-0.0244..... 0.0232-0.0235..... 0.0223-0.0226..... 0.0214-0.0217
Light trucks................... 2008-2010.......... 0.0340-0.0344..... 0.0333-0.0338..... 0.0327-0.0333..... 0.0321-0.0326..... 0.0300-0.0306
Combined....................... 2008-2010.......... 0.0282-0.0285..... 0.0274-0.0277..... 0.0265-0.0270..... 0.0257-0.0261..... 0.0244-0.0248
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-58--NHTSA Estimated Required Average Fuel Economy (gpm) Under the Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008.................. 0.0204 -.............. 0.0195 -.............. 0.0187 -............. 0.0178 -
2010.................. 0.0207................ 0.0198................ 0.0189............... 0.0181
Light trucks...................... 2008.................. 0.0287-............... 0.0273-............... 0.0260-.............. 0.0248-
2010.................. 0.0292................ 0.0279................ 0.0266............... 0.0254
Combined.......................... 2008.................. 0.0233-............... 0.0222-............... 0.0211-.............. 0.0201-
2010.................. 0.0236................ 0.0226................ 0.0215............... 0.0205
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If manufacturers apply technology only as far as necessary to
comply with CAFE standards, NHTSA estimates that, setting aside factors
the agency cannot consider for purposes of determining maximum feasible
CAFE standards,\1276\ average achieved fuel economy levels would
correspondingly increase through MY 2025, but that manufacturers would,
on average, under-comply \1277\ in some model years and over-comply
\1278\ in others, reaching a combined average fuel economy in a range
from 48.1 mpg to 48.8 mpg (taking into account estimated adjustments
reflecting improved air conditioner efficiency) in MY 2025:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1276\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(h) states that NHTSA may not consider the
fuel economy of dedicated alternative fuel vehicles, the
alternative-fuel portion of dual-fueled automobile fuel economy, or
the ability of manufacturers to earn and use credits for over-
compliance, in determining the maximum feasible stringency of CAFE
standards.
\1277\ ``Under-compliance'' with CAFE standards can be mitigated
either through use of FFV credits, use of existing or ``banked''
credits, or through fine payment. Although, as mentioned above,
NHTSA cannot consider availability of statutorily-provided credits
in setting standards, NHTSA is not prohibited from considering fine
payment. Therefore, the estimated achieved CAFE levels presented
here include the assumption that Aston Martin, BMW, Daimler (i.e.,
Mercedes), Geely (i.e., Volvo), Lotus, Porsche, Spyker (i.e., Saab),
and, Tata (i.e., Jaguar and Rover), and Volkswagen will only apply
technology up to the point that it would be less expensive to pay
civil penalties.
\1278\ In NHTSA's analysis, ``over-compliance'' occurs through
multi-year planning: manufacturers apply some ``extra'' technology
in early model years (e.g., MY 2014) in order to carry that
technology forward and thereby facilitate compliance in later model
years (e.g., MY 2016).
[[Page 63057]]
Table IV-59--NHTSA Estimated Achieved Average Fuel Economy (mpg) Under the Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 40.4-............. 42.6-............. 44.7-............. 47.2-............. 49.0-
2010............... 40.3.............. 41.8.............. 44.1.............. 46.3.............. 48.1
Light trucks................... 2008............... 30.0-............. 31.1-............. 33.0-............. 34.5-............. 36.8-
2010............... 29.8.............. 30.2.............. 31.8.............. 33.3.............. 35.5
Combined....................... 2008............... 35.9-............. 37.6-............. 39.7-............. 41.9-............. 43.9-
2010............... 35.8.............. 36.8.............. 38.8.............. 40.8.............. 42.9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-60--NHTSA Estimated Achieved Average Fuel Economy (mpg) Under the Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008.................. 50.2-................. 51.2-................. 53.0-................ 54.4-
2010.................. 49.2.................. 50.9.................. 52.7................. 54.1
Light trucks...................... 2008.................. 37.7-................. 38.4-................. 39.4-................ 40.3-
2010.................. 36.2.................. 37.3.................. 38.4................. 39.3
Combined.......................... 2008.................. 45.0-................. 46.0-................. 47.6-................ 48.8-
2010.................. 43.8.................. 45.3.................. 46.8................. 48.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the reader's reference, these mpg levels would translate to the
following in gallons per mile:
Table IV-61--NHTSA Estimated Achieved Average Fuel Economy (gpm) Under the Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 0.0245-........... 0.0233-........... 0.0222-........... 0.0212-........... 0.0204-
2010............... 0.0248............ 0.0239............ 0.0227............ 0.0216............ 0.0208
Light trucks................... 2008............... 0.0324-........... 0.0312-........... 0.0295-........... 0.0284-........... 0.0273-
2010............... 0.0336............ 0.0331............ 0.0315............ 0.0300............ 0.0281
Combined....................... 2008............... 0.0274-........... 0.0261-........... 0.0248-........... 0.0237-........... 0.0228-
2010............... 0.0279............ 0.0272............ 0.0258............ 0.0245............ 0.0233
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-62--NHTSA Estimated Achieved Average Fuel Economy (gpm) Under the Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008.................. 0.0199-............... 0.0195-............... 0.0188-.............. 0.0184-
2010.................. 0.0203................ 0.0197................ 0.0190............... 0.0185
Light trucks...................... 2008.................. 0.0266-............... 0.0261-............... 0.0254-.............. 0.0249-
2010.................. 0.0276................ 0.0268................ 0.0261............... 0.0255
Combined.......................... 2008.................. 0.0222-............... 0.0218-............... 0.0210-.............. 0.0205-
2010.................. 0.0228................ 0.0221................ 0.0214............... 0.0208
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The estimated achieved average fuel economy levels presented above
all derive from analysis that does not attempt to estimate the
potential that today's attribute-based standards might induce shifts in
vehicle footprint--shifts that would change manufacturers' average
required and achieved fuel economy levels. As discussed above in
Sections II.C and IV.D, the agency judges today's standards unlikely to
induce significant shifts in vehicle footprint. We note, however, that
comments by CBD, ACEEE, NACAA, and an individual, Yegor Tarazevich,
referenced a 2011 study by Whitefoot and Skerlos, ``Design incentives
to increase vehicle size created from the U.S. footprint-based fuel
economy standards.'' \1279\ This study concluded that MY 2014
standards, as proposed, ``create an incentive to increase vehicle size
except when consumer preference for vehicle size is near its lower
bound and preference for acceleration is near its upper bound.'' \1280\
The commenters who cited this study generally did so as part of
arguments in favor of flatter standards (i.e., curves that are flatter
across the range of footprints) for MYs 2017-2025. While NHTSA
considers the concept of the Whitefoot and Skerlos analysis to have
some potential merits, it is also important to note that, among other
things, the authors assumed different inputs than NHTSA actually used
in the MYs 2012-2016 rule regarding the baseline fleet, the cost and
efficacy of potential future technologies, and the relationship between
vehicle footprint and fuel economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1279\ Available at http://energy.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/Whitefoot_Skerlos_CAFE-SIZE.pdf, last accessed August 3, 2012.
\1280\ Ibid, pg 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63058]]
Were NHTSA to use the Whitefoot and Skerlos methodology (e.g.,
methods to simulate manufacturers' potential decisions to increase
vehicle footprint) with the actual inputs to the MYs 2012-2016 rules,
the agencies would likely obtain different findings. Underlining the
potential uncertainty, the authors obtained a wide range of results in
their analyses. Insofar as Whitefoot and Skerlos found, for some
scenarios, that manufacturers might respond to footprint-based
standards by deliberately increasing vehicle footprint, these findings
are attributable to a combination of (a) the assumed baseline market
characteristics, (b) the assumed cost and fuel economy impacts involved
in increasing vehicle footprint, (c) the footprint-based fuel economy
targets, and (d) the assumed consumer preference for vehicle size.
Changes in any of these assumptions could yield different analytic
results, and potentially result in different technical implications for
NHTSA action. As the authors note when interpreting their results:
``designing footprint-based fuel-economy standards in practice such
that manufacturers have no incentive to adjust the size of their
vehicles appears elusive at best and impossible at worst.''
Regarding the cost impacts of footprint increases, that authors
make an ad hoc assumption that footprint changes would incur costs
linearly, such that a 1% change in footprint would entail a 1% increase
in production costs. The authors refer to this as a conservative
assumption, but present no supporting evidence. NHTSA has not attempted
to estimate the engineering cost to increase vehicle footprint, but we
expect that it would be considerably nonlinear, with costs increasing
rapidly once increases available through small incremental changes--
most likely in track width--have been exhausted.\1281\ Moreover, we
expect that were a manufacturer to deliberately increase footprint in
order to ease compliance burdens, it would confine any significant
changes to coincide with vehicle redesigns, and engaging in multiyear
planning, would consider how the shifts would impact compliance burdens
and consumer desirability in ensuing model years. With respect to the
standards promulgated today, the standards become flatter over time,
thereby diminishing any ``reward'' for deliberately increasing
footprint beyond normal market expectations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1281\ See, e.g., 71 FR 17595 (Apr. 6, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the fuel economy impacts of footprint increases, the
authors present a regression analysis based on which increases in
footprint are estimated to entail increases in weight which are, in
turn, estimated to entail increases in fuel consumption. However, this
relationship was not the relationship the agencies used to develop the
MY 2014 standards the authors examine in that study. Where the target
function's slope is similar to that of the tendency for fuel
consumption to increase with footprint, fuel economy should tend to
decrease approximately in parallel with the fuel economy target,
thereby obviating the ``benefit'' of deliberate increases in vehicle
footprint. NHTSA's analysis supporting today's final rule indicates
relatively wide ranges wherein the relationship between fuel
consumption and footprint may reasonably be specified. The underlying
slopes selected for purposes of defining MY 2017 and beyond standards
fall toward the flatter end of those reasonable ranges. Therefore,
while the agencies expect the standards to have little tendency to
induce deliberate changes in vehicle size, the agencies would have more
reason to expect that such changes would be slightly in the direction
of reducing vehicle footprint in order to increase achieved fuel
economy levels by more than the increase in the corresponding fuel
economy targets.
Nonetheless, NHTSA considers the concept of the authors'
investigation to have merits. In support of today's rulemaking, NHTSA
considered including footprint increases as a ``technology'' available
in its analysis, such that its CAFE model would increase footprint in
cases where the cost to do so would be attractive considering both the
accompanying decrease in the fuel economy target (if the vehicle is not
on the flat portion of the target function) and the accompanying
decrease in vehicle fuel economy. However, NHTSA was unable to estimate
the underlying cost function and complete and test this approach in
time to support today's final rule. In support of future NHTSA
rulemakings, NHTSA plans to further investigate methods to estimate the
potential that standards might tend to induce changes in the footprint.
Accounting for differences between fuel economy levels under
laboratory conditions and real-world driving behavior, NHTSA estimates
that these requirements would translate into the following achieved
average on-road fuel economy levels:
Table IV-63--NHTSA Estimated Achieved Average Fuel Economy (On-Road mpg) Under the Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 32.3-............. 34.1-............. 35.7-............. 37.8-............. 39.2-
2010............... 32.2.............. 33.4.............. 35.3.............. 37.0.............. 38.5
Light trucks................... 2008............... 24-............... 24.9-............. 26.4-............. 27.6-............. 29.4-
2010............... 23.8.............. 24.2.............. 25.4.............. 26.6.............. 28.4
Combined....................... 2008............... 28.7-............. 30.1-............. 31.7-............. 33.5-............. 35.1-
2010............... 28.6.............. 29.4.............. 31.0.............. 32.6.............. 34.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-64--NHTSA Estimated Achieved Average Fuel Economy (On-Road mpg) Under the Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008.................. 40.1-................. 41-................... 42.4-................ 43.5-
2010.................. 39.4.................. 40.7.................. 42.2................. 43.3
Light trucks...................... 2008.................. 30.1-................. 30.7-................. 31.5-................ 32.2-
2010.................. 29.................... 29.8.................. 30.7................. 31.4
Combined.......................... 2008.................. 36.0-................. 36.8-................. 38.1-................ 39.0-
[[Page 63059]]
2010.................. 35.0.................. 36.2.................. 37.4................. 38.5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Setting aside the potential to produce additional EVs (or, prior to
MY 2020, PHEVs) or take advantage of EPCA's provisions regarding CAFE
credits, NHTSA estimates that today's final standards could increase
achieved fuel economy levels by average amounts of up to 0.7 mpg during
the few model years leading into MY 2017, as manufacturers apply
technology during redesigns leading into model years covered by today's
new standards.\1282\ As shown below, these ``early'' fuel economy
increases yield corresponding reductions in fuel consumption and
greenhouse gas emissions, and incur corresponding increases in
technology outlays.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1282\ This outcome is a direct result of revisions, made to
DOT's CAFE model in preparation for the MY 2012-2016 rule, to
simulate ``multiyear planning'' effects--that is, the potential that
manufacturers will apply ``extra'' technology in one model year if
doing so will be sufficiently advantageous with respect to the
ability to comply with CAFE standards in later model years. For
example, for today's rulemaking analysis, NHTSA has estimated that
Ford will redesign the F-150 pickup truck in MY 2015, and again in
MY 2021. As explained in Chapter V of the RIA, NHTSA's expects that
many technologies would be applied as part of a vehicle redesign.
Therefore, in NHTSA's analysis, if Ford does not anticipate ensuing
standards when redesigning the MY 2015 F-150, Ford may find it more
difficult to comply with light truck standard during MY 2016-2020.
Through simulation of multiyear planning effects, NHTSA's analysis
indicates that Ford could apply more technology to the MY 2015 F-150
if standards continue to increase after MY 2016 than Ford need apply
if standards remain unchanged after MY 2016, and that this
additional technology would yield further fuel economy improvements
of up to 1.3 mpg, depending on pickup configuration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the context EPCA requires NHTSA to apply for purposes of
determining maximum feasible stringency of CAFE standards (i.e.,
setting aside EVs, pre-MY 2020 PHEVs, and all statutory CAFE credit
provisions), NHTSA estimates that these fuel economy increases would
lead to fuel savings totaling a range from 180 billion to 184 billion
gallons during the useful lives of vehicles manufactured in MYs 2017-
2025 and the few MYs preceding MY 2017:
Table IV-65--NHTSA Estimated Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons) Under the Final and Augural Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PC........................... 2008....... 5.3-.... 2.8-.... 5.3-.... 7.7-.... 10.9-... 13.0-... 14.4-... 15.8-... 18.0-... 19.7-... 112.9-
2010....... 7.7..... 3.6..... 5.3..... 8.3..... 10.8.... 13.0.... 14.3.... 16.2.... 18.3.... 20.0.... 117.4
LT........................... 2008....... 0.5-.... 1.0-.... 2.5-.... 4.8-.... 6.8-.... 9.4-.... 10.3-... 10.9-... 11.8-... 12.7-... 70.7-
2010....... 0.9..... 0.8..... 1.5..... 3.7..... 5.6..... 8.2..... 8.9..... 10.0.... 11.1.... 12.1.... 62.9
Combined..................... 2008....... 5.9-.... 3.9-.... 7.8-.... 12.5-... 17.7-... 22.3-... 24.7-... 26.7-... 29.8-... 32.4-... 183.5-
2010....... 8.6..... 4.4..... 6.7..... 12.0.... 16.4.... 21.1.... 2.32.... 26.2.... 29.5.... 32.1.... 180.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency also estimates that these new CAFE standards would lead
to corresponding reductions of CO2 emissions totaling a
range from 1,950 million metric tons (mmt) to 1,990 mmt during the
useful lives of vehicles sold in MYs 2017-2025 and the few MYs
preceding MY 2017:
Table IV-66--NHTSA Estimated Carbon Dioxide Emissions Avoided (mmt) Under the Final and Augural Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PC........................... 2008....... 58-..... 31-..... 58-..... 84-..... 117-.... 140-.... 156-.... 171-.... 193-.... 211-.... 1,218-
2010....... 84...... 40...... 57...... 90...... 117..... 141..... 156..... 176..... 199..... 216..... 1,276
LT........................... 2008....... 6-...... 11-..... 27-..... 52-..... 74-..... 102-.... 112-.... 119-.... 129-.... 138-.... 769-
2010...... 10...... 9....... 16...... 40...... 60...... 88...... 96...... 108..... 120..... 131..... 677
Combined..................... 2008....... 64-..... 42-..... 85-..... 136-.... 191-.... 242-.... 268-.... 290-.... 321-.... 349-.... 1,987-
2010....... 94...... 48...... 73...... 130..... 178..... 229..... 252..... 284..... 318..... 347..... 1,953
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. How will these standards improve fleet-wide fuel economy and reduce
GHG emissions beyond MY 2025?
Under the assumption that CAFE standards at least as stringent as
those being presented today for MY 2025 would be established for
subsequent model years, the effects of the standards on fuel
consumption and GHG emissions will continue to increase for many years.
This will occur because over time, a growing fraction of the U.S.
light-duty vehicle fleet will be comprised of cars and light trucks
that meet at least the MY 2025 standard. The impact of the new
standards on fuel use and GHG emissions would therefore continue to
grow through approximately 2060, when virtually all cars and light
trucks in service will have met standards as stringent as those
established for MY 2025.
As Table IV-67 shows, NHTSA estimates that the fuel economy
increases resulting from the final standards will lead to reductions in
total fuel consumption by cars and light trucks of 3 billion gallons
during 2020, increasing to a range from 38 billion to 44 billion
gallons by 2060. Over the period from 2017, when the final standards
would begin to take effect, through 2060, cumulative fuel savings would
total between 1,080 billion and 1,190 billion gallons, as Table IV-67
also indicates.
[[Page 63060]]
Table IV-67--NHTSA Estimated Reduction in Fleet-Wide Fuel Use (Billion Gasoline Gallon Equivalents) Under the Final and Augural Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 Total 2017-2060
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 2-................... 11-.................. 17-.................. 20-.................. 23-................. 620-
2010................. 2.................... 11................... 16................... 18................... 20.................. 572
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1-................... 10-.................. 16-.................. 19-.................. 22-................. 574-
2010................. 1.................... 9.................... 14................... 16................... 18.................. 506
Combined......................... 2008................. 3-................... 21-.................. 32-.................. 39-.................. 44-................. 1,194-
2010................. 3.................... 20................... 30................... 34................... 38.................. 1,078
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The energy security analysis conducted for this rule estimates that
the world price of oil will fall modestly in response to lower U.S.
demand for refined fuel. One potential result of this decline in the
world price of oil would be an increase in the consumption of petroleum
products outside the U.S., which would in turn lead to a modest
increase in emissions of greenhouse gases, criteria air pollutants, and
airborne toxics from their refining and use. While additional
information would be needed to analyze this ``leakage effect'' in
detail, NHTSA provides a sample estimate of its potential magnitude in
its Final EIS. This analysis indicates that the leakage effect is
likely to offset only a very small fraction of the reductions in fuel
use and emissions projected to result from the rule.
As a consequence of these reductions in fleet-wide fuel
consumption, the agency also estimates that the new CAFE standards for
MYs 2017-2025 would lead to corresponding reductions in CO2
emissions from the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet. Specifically, NHTSA
estimates that total annual CO2 emissions associated with
passenger car and light truck use in the U.S. would decline by between
36 million metric tons (mmt) and 38 mmt in 2020 as a consequence of the
new CAFE standards, as Table IV-68 reports. The table also shows that
this annual reduction is estimated to grow to a range from 409 mmt to
475 mmt by the year 2060, and will total between 11.6 billion and 12.8
billion metric tons over the period from 2017, when the final and
augural standards would take effect, through 2060.
Table IV-68--NHTSA Estimated Reduction in Fleet-Wide Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) From Passenger Car and Light Truck Use Under the Final and Augural Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 Total 2017-2060
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 21-.................. 117-................. 180-................. 212-................. 240-................ 6,593-
2010................. 21................... 115.................. 172.................. 195.................. 215................. 6,195
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 15-.................. 107-................. 169-................. 204-................. 235-................ 6,239-
2010................. 16................... 100.................. 148.................. 174.................. 194................. 5,446
Combined......................... 2008................. 36-.................. 224-................. 349-................. 416-................. 475-................ 12,832-
2010................. 38................... 215.................. 320.................. 369.................. 409................. 11,641
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
These reductions in fleet-wide CO2 emissions, together
with corresponding reductions in other GHG emissions from fuel
production and use, would lead to small but significant reductions in
projected changes in the future global climate. These changes, based on
analysis documented in the Final EIS that informed the agency's
decisions regarding this final rule, are summarized in Table IV-69
below.
Table IV-69--NHTSA Estimated Effects of Reduction in Fleet-Wide Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) on Projected Changes in Global Climate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projected change in measure
-----------------------------------------------
Measure Units Date MY Baseline With final
No action standards Difference
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atmospheric CO2 concentration............. Ppm......................... 2100 2008 677.8 673.8 4.0
2010 677.8 674.3 3.5
Increase in global mean surface [deg]C...................... 2100 2008 2.564 2.548 0.016
temperature.
............................ .............. 2010 2.564 2.550 0.014
Sea level rise............................ Cm.......................... 2100 2008 33.42 33.29 0.13
............................ .............. 2010 33.42 33.30 0.12
Global mean precipitation................. % change from 1980-1999 avg. 2090 2008 3.89% 3.87% 0.02%
2010 3.89% 3.87% 0.02%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63061]]
3. How will these standards impact non-GHG emissions and their
associated effects?
Under the assumption that CAFE standards at least as stringent as
those presented for MY 2025 would be established for subsequent model
years, the effects of the new standards on air quality and its
associated health effects will continue to be felt over the foreseeable
future. This will occur because over time a growing fraction of the
U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet will be comprised of cars and light
trucks that meet the MY 2025 standard, and this growth will continue
until approximately 2060.
Increases in the fuel economy of light-duty vehicles required by
the new CAFE standards will cause a slight increase in the number of
miles they are driven, through the fuel economy ``rebound effect.'' In
turn, this increase in vehicle use will lead to increases in emissions
of criteria air pollutants and some airborne toxics, since these are
products of the number of miles vehicles are driven.
At the same time, however, the projected reductions in fuel
production and use reported in Tables IV-65 and IV-67 above will lead
to corresponding reductions in emissions of these pollutants that occur
during fuel production and distribution (``upstream'' emissions). For
most of these pollutants, the reduction in upstream emissions resulting
from lower fuel production and distribution will outweigh the increase
in emissions from vehicle use, resulting in a net decline in their
total emissions.\1283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1283\ As stated elsewhere, while the agency's analysis assumes
that all changes in upstream emissions result from a decrease in
petroleum production and transport, the analysis of non-GHG
emissions in future calendar years also assumes that retail gasoline
composition is unaffected by this rule; as a result, the impacts of
this rule on downstream non-GHG emissions (more specifically, on air
toxics) may be underestimated. See also Section III.G above for more
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-70 and Table IV-71 report estimated reductions in
emissions of selected criteria air pollutants (or their chemical
precursors) and airborne toxics expected to result from the final and
augural standards during calendar year 2040. By that date, cars and
light trucks meeting the MY 2025 CAFE standards will account for the
majority of light-duty vehicle use, so these reductions provide a
useful index of the long-term impact of the final standards on air
pollution and its consequences for human health. In the tables below,
positive values indicate increases in emissions, while negative values
indicate reductions.
Table IV-70--NHTSA Projected Changes in Emissions of Criteria Air Pollutants From Passenger Car and Light Truck Use
[calendar year 2040; tons]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criteria air pollutant
---------------------------------------------------------------
Volatile
Vehicle class Source of emissions MY Baseline Nitrogen Particulate Sulfur oxides organic
oxides (NOX) matter (PM2.5) (SOX) compounds
(VOC)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars............................ Vehicle use................. 2008 3,433.80 140.75 -2,775.59 1,615.82
2010 7,108.88 360.68 -2,519.62 4,148.13
Fuel production and 2008 -20,396.77 -3,040.73 -117.30 -48,321.79
distribution 2010 -26,394.68 -3,083.65 -12,990.78 -44,119.22
All sources................. 2008 -16,962.97 -2,899.98 -2,892.89 -46,705.98
2010 -19,285.80 -2,722.97 -15,510.40 -39,971.09
Light trucks.............................. Vehicle use................. 2008 5,988.04 432.25 -2,445.61 3,607.27
2010 8,643.21 316.07 -2,134.45 2,920.02
Fuel production and 2008 -26,580.28 -3,042.32 -14,005.44 -42,674.17
distribution.
2010 -24,256.73 -2,682.23 -13,277.14 -38,331.48
All sources................. 2008 -20,592.23 -2,610.07 -16,451.05 -39,066.90
2010 -15,613.51 -2,366.16 -15,411.59 -35,411.46
Total..................................... Vehicle use................. 2008 9,421.85 573.00 -5,221.20 5,223.09
2010 15,752.09 676.75 -4,654.06 7,068.15
Fuel production and 2008 -46,977.04 -6,083.05 -14,122.74 -90,995.96
distribution. 2010 -50,651.41 -5,765.88 -26,267.93 -82,450.70
All sources................. 2008 -37,555.20 -5,510.05 -19,343.94 -85,772.87
2010 -34,899.31 -5,089.13 -30,921.99 -75,382.56
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-71--NHTSA Projected Changes in Emissions of Airborne Toxics From Passenger Car and Light Truck Use
[calendar year 2040; tons]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toxic air pollutant
Vehicle class Source of MY Baseline -----------------------------------------------
emissions Benzene 1,3-Butadiene Formaldehyde
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................ Vehicle use..... 2008 40.38 9.33 58.94
2010 121.78 23.50 97.25
Fuel production 2008 -215.10 -2.30 -78.85
and 2010 -195.05 -2.09 -71.49
distribution.
All sources..... 2008 -174.72 7.03 -19.91
2010 -73.27 21.41 25.77
Light trucks.................. Vehicle use..... 2008 117.46 20.06 49.05
2010 60.36 17.42 147.09
[[Page 63062]]
Fuel production 2008 -188.73 -2.04 -69.87
and 2010 -164.99 -1.73 -59.28
distribution.
All sources..... 2008 -71.26 18.02 -20.81
2010 -104.64 15.69 87.82
Total......................... Vehicle use..... 2008 157.85 29.39 108.00
2010 182.13 40.91 244.35
Fuel production 2008 -403.83 -4.34 -148.71
and 2010 -360.04 -3.82 -130.76
distribution.
All sources..... 2008 -245.98 25.05 -40.72
2010 -177.90 37.10 113.58
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In turn, the reductions in emissions reported in the tables above
are projected to result in significant declines in the adverse health
effects that result from population exposure to these pollutants. Table
IV-72 reports the estimated reductions in selected PM2.5-
related human health impacts that are expected to result from reduced
population exposure to unhealthful atmospheric concentrations of
PM2.5. The estimates reported in Table IV-72 based on
analysis documented in the Final EIS that informed the agency's
decisions regarding this final rule, are derived from PM2.5-
related dollar-per-ton estimates that reflect the quantifiable
reductions in health impacts likely to result from reduced population
exposure to particular matter (PM2.5). They do not include
all health impacts related to reduced exposure to PM, nor do they
include any reductions in health impacts resulting from lower
population exposure to other criteria air pollutants (particularly
ozone) and air toxics. The table displays results using both baseline
fleets as well as both a reference electricity emissions case and a
cleaner alternative side-case. The table also illustrates mortality
impacts from the rule using two different source values for marginal
mortality rates.
There may be localized air quality and health impacts associated
with this rulemaking that are not reflected in the estimates of
aggregate air quality changes and health impacts reported in this
analysis. Emissions changes and dollar-per-ton estimates alone are not
necessarily a good indication of local or regional air quality and
health impacts, because the atmospheric chemistry governing formation
and accumulation of ambient concentrations of PM2.5, ozone,
and air toxics is very complex. Full-scale photochemical modeling would
provide the necessary spatial and temporal detail to more completely
and accurately estimate the changes in ambient levels of these
pollutants and their associated health and welfare impacts. Due to
timing issues with the analysis, NHTSA conducted such modeling for
purposes of the FEIS using data from the NPRM, and we refer the readers
to the FEIS for more information.
Table IV-72--NHTSA Projected Reductions in Health Impacts From Exposure to Criteria Air Pollutants Due to Final
and Augural Standards
[Calendar year 2040]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projected
Health impact Measure MY Baseline reduction
(2040)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mortality (ages 30 and older), Pope et al. premature deaths per year..... 2008 360/420
(2002). 2010 390/420
Mortality (ages 30 and older), Laden et al. premature deaths per year..... 2008 920/1,100
(2006). 2010 1,000/1,100
Chronic bronchitis.......................... cases per year................ 2008 230/270
2010 250/260
Emergency room visits for asthma............ number per year............... 2008 320/370
2010 350/370
Work loss................................... workdays per year............. 2008 40,000/46,000
2010 43,000/46,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. What are the estimated costs and benefits of these standards?
NHTSA estimates that the final and augural standards could entail
significant additional technology beyond the levels that could be
applied under baseline CAFE standards (i.e., the application of MY 2016
CAFE standards to MYs 2017-2025). This additional technology will lead
to increases in costs to manufacturers and vehicle buyers, as well as
fuel savings to vehicle buyers. Also, as discussed above, NHTSA
estimates that today's standards could induce manufacturers to apply
technology during redesigns leading into model years covered by today's
new standards, and to incur corresponding increases in technology
outlays.
Technology costs are assumed to change over time due to the
influence of cost learning and the conversion from short- to long-term
ICMs. Table IV-73 represents the CAFE model inputs for MY 2012, MY
2017, MY 2021 and MY 2025 approximate net (accumulated)
[[Page 63063]]
technology costs for some of the key enabling technologies as applied
to Midsize passenger cars.\1284\ Additional details on technology cost
estimates can be found in Chapter V of NHTSA's FRIA and Chapter 3 of
the Joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1284\ The net (accumulated) technology costs represent the
costs from a baseline vehicle (i.e. the top of the decision tree) to
each of the technologies listed in the table. The baseline vehicle
is assumed to utilize a fixed-valve naturally aspirated inline 4
cylinder engine, 5-speed transmission and no electrification/
hybridization improvements.
Table IV-73--NHTSA Estimated Net (Accumulated) Technology Costs, Midsize PC
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final technology (as compared to baseline vehicle MY Baseline....... 2012 2017 2021 2025
prior to technology application)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stoichiometric Gasoline Direct SGDIc................. 2008.............. $75-.............. $67-.............. $58-............. $55-
Injection (GDI). 2010.............. $75............... $67............... $58.............. $55
Turbocharging and Downsizing-- TRBDS1................ 2008.............. $542-............. $494-............. $420-............ $398-
Level 1 (18 bar BMEP). 2010.............. $542.............. $494.............. $420............. $398
Turbocharging and Downsizing-- TRBDS2................ 2008.............. $18-.............. $26-.............. $20-............. $5-
Level 2 (24 bar BMEP). 2010.............. $18............... $26............... $20.............. $5
Cooled Exhaust Gas CEGR1................. 2008.............. $336-............. $302-............. $285-............ $247-
Recirculation (EGR)--Level 1 2010.............. $336.............. $302.............. $285............. $247
(24 bar BMEP).
Cooled Exhaust Gas CEGR2................. 2008.............. $583-............. $525-............. $495-............ $428-
Recirculation (EGR)--Level 2 2010.............. $583.............. $525.............. $495............. $428
(27 bar BMEP).
Advanced Diesel............... ADSL.................. 2008.............. $1,031-........... $889-............. $911-............ $702-
2010.............. $1,031............ $889.............. $911............. $702
6-speed DCT................... DCT................... 2008.............. ($94)-............ ($75)-............ ($79)-........... ($70)-
2010.............. ($94)............. ($75)............. ($79)............ ($70)
8-Speed Trans (Auto or DCT)... 8SPD.................. 2008.............. $286-............. $257-............. $223-............ $210-
2010.............. $286.............. $257.............. $223............. $210
Shift Optimizer............... SHFTOPT............... 2008.............. $2-............... $2-............... $2-.............. $1-
2010.............. $2................ $2................ $2............... $1
12V Micro-Hybrid (Stop-Start). MHEV.................. 2008.............. $561-............. $385-............. $325-............ $296-
2010.............. $561.............. $385.............. $325............. $296
Strong Hybrid--Level 2........ SHEV2................. 2008.............. $2,619-........... $2,290-........... $1,830-.......... $1,669-
2010.............. $2,671............ $2,334............ $1,867........... $1,702
Plug-in Hybrid--30 mi range... PHEV1................. 2008.............. $17,415-.......... $13,060-.......... $9,727-.......... $7,772-
2010.............. $17,915........... $13,449........... $10,019.......... $8,015
Electric Vehicle (Early EV1................... 2008.............. $6,089-........... $3,577-........... $2,655-.......... $1,188-
Adopter)--75 mile range.
2010.............. $6,280............ $3,711............ $2,779........... $1,254
Electric Vehicle (Broad EV4................... 2008.............. $14,970-.......... $10,526-.......... $7,682-.......... $5,640-
Market)--150 mile range.
2010.............. $15,145........... $10,648........... $7,771........... $5,705
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to pay for this additional technology (and, for some
manufacturers, civil penalties), NHTSA estimates that the cost of an
average passenger car will increase relative to levels resulting from
compliance with baseline (MY 2016) standards by between $244 and $364
in MY to between $1,577 and $1,826 in MY 2025. Similarly, light truck
prices are estimated to rise from between $77 and $147 in MY 2017 to
between $1,185 and $1,228 in MY 2025. The following tables summarize
the agency's estimates of average cost increases for each
manufacturer's passenger car, light truck, and overall fleets (with
corresponding averages for the industry):
Table IV-74--NHTSA Estimated Average Passenger Car Incremental Cost Increases ($) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer MY baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Average.............. 2008.................. 244-.............. 454-.............. 630-.............. 929-............. 1,141-
2010.................. 364............... 483............... 659............... 857.............. 991
Aston Martin.................. 2008.................. 79-............... 156-.............. 244-.............. 337-............. 447-
2010.................. 73................ 150............... 227............... 321.............. 420
BMW........................... 2008.................. 96-............... 149-.............. 209-.............. 297-............. 492-
2010.................. 88................ 255............... 325............... 407.............. 501
Daimler....................... 2008.................. 97-............... 175-.............. 244-.............. 585-............. 687-
2010.................. 79................ 158............... 225............... 308.............. 387
Fiat.......................... 2008.................. 278-.............. 644-.............. 628-.............. 1,088-........... 1,114-
2010.................. 338............... 372............... 579............... 811.............. 1,077
Ford.......................... 2008.................. 390-.............. 443-.............. 755-.............. 1,515-........... 1,854-
2010.................. 309............... 326............... 438............... 945.............. 993
Geely......................... 2008.................. 69-............... 361-.............. 700-.............. 727-............. 848-
2010.................. 66................ 146............... 504............... 555.............. 640
General Motors................ 2008.................. 144-.............. 526-.............. 630-.............. 1,015-........... 1,185-
2010.................. 225............... 462............... 486............... 758.............. 868
Honda......................... 2008.................. 228-.............. 484-.............. 510-.............. 513-............. 1,100-
2010.................. 632............... 805............... 825............... 816.............. 1,009
Hyundai....................... 2008.................. 510-.............. 549-.............. 844-.............. 920-............. 969-
[[Page 63064]]
2010.................. 605............... 591............... 898............... 913.............. 1,060
KIA........................... 2008.................. 13-............... 94-............... 339-.............. 780-............. 915-
2010.................. 353............... 414............... 759............... 988.............. 1,081
Lotus......................... 2008.................. 90-............... 178-.............. 255-.............. 354-............. 469-
2010.................. 242............... 322............... 1,228............. 1,306............ 1,396
Mazda......................... 2008.................. 337-.............. 447-.............. 423-.............. 767-............. 758-
2010.................. 737............... 845............... 773............... 1,086............ 1,073
Mitsubishi.................... 2008.................. 500-.............. 1,015-............ 988-.............. 1,299-........... 1,737-
2010.................. 575............... 634............... 603............... 1,722............ 2,022
Nissan........................ 2008.................. 409-.............. 645-.............. 1,054-............ 1,100-........... 1,125-
2010.................. 565............... 653............... 864............... 926.............. 953
Porsche....................... 2008.................. 86-............... 286-.............. 382-.............. 474-............. 572-
2010.................. 64................ 95................ 190............... 286.............. 397
Spyker........................ 2008.................. 79-............... 222-.............. 325-.............. 408-............. 529-
2010.................. 0................. 0................. 0................. 0................ 0
Subaru........................ 2008.................. 173-.............. 257-.............. 542-.............. 1,191-........... 1,161-
2010.................. 50................ 126............... 895............... 1,407............ 1,367
Suzuki........................ 2008.................. 13-............... 20-............... 1,420-............ 1,555-........... 1,666-
2010.................. 84................ 109............... 825............... 1,080............ 1,426
Tata.......................... 2008.................. 95-............... 434-.............. 431-.............. 527-............. 582-
2010.................. 66................ 133............... 217............... 261.............. 378
Tesla......................... 2008.................. 2-................ 2-................ 2-................ 2-............... 2-
2010.................. 0................. 0................. 0................. 0................ 0
Toyota........................ 2008.................. 220-.............. 507-.............. 657-.............. 852-............. 1,082-
2010.................. 322............... 460............... 840............... 957.............. 1,189
Volkswagen.................... 2008.................. 78-............... 162-.............. 248-.............. 639-............. 789-
2010.................. 84................ 397............... 484............... 686.............. 851
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-75--NHTSA Estimated Average Passenger Car Incremental Cost Increases ($) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Average.................. 2008.................. 1,271-................ 1,391-................ 1,748-............... 1,826-
2010.................. 1,090................. 1,219................. 1,480................ 1,577
Aston Martin...................... 2008.................. 568-.................. 695-.................. 827-................. 964-
2010.................. 541................... 662................... 783.................. 915
BMW............................... 2008.................. 651-.................. 789-.................. 1,293-............... 1,367-
2010.................. 750................... 882................... 1,357................ 1,427
Daimler........................... 2008.................. 951-.................. 1,177-................ 1,288-............... 1,608-
2010.................. 627................... 957................... 1,088................ 1,499
Fiat.............................. 2008.................. 1,349-................ 1,692-................ 1,770-............... 2,045-
2010.................. 1,103................. 1,530................. 1,692................ 1,910
Ford.............................. 2008.................. 2,075-................ 2,076-................ 3,345-............... 2,961-
2010.................. 1,172................. 1,184................. 1,651................ 1,780
Geely............................. 2008.................. 944-.................. 1,203-................ 1,365-............... 1,446-
2010.................. 757................... 945................... 1,164................ 1,360
General Motors.................... 2008.................. 1,189-................ 1,475-................ 1,739-............... 2,010-
2010.................. 879................... 1,062................. 1,220................ 1,531
Honda............................. 2008.................. 1,132-................ 1,309-................ 1,310-............... 1,284-
2010.................. 1,009................. 1,249................. 1,254................ 1,229
Hyundai........................... 2008.................. 1,126-................ 1,133-................ 1,585-............... 1,501-
2010.................. 1,226................. 1,259................. 1,408................ 1,419
KIA............................... 2008.................. 999-.................. 1,154-................ 1,163-............... 1,447-
2010.................. 1,330................. 1,316................. 1,302................ 1,497
Lotus............................. 2008.................. 601-.................. 739-.................. 882-................. 1,036-
2010.................. 1,503................. 758................... 894.................. 1,025
Mazda............................. 2008.................. 1,676-................ 1,784-................ 1,875-............... 2,070-
2010.................. 1,481................. 1,589................. 1,589................ 1,782
Mitsubishi........................ 2008.................. 1,686-................ 1,734-................ 2,080-............... 3,757-
2010.................. 2,001................. 1,982................. 1,962................ 2,051
Nissan............................ 2008.................. 1,368-................ 1,440-................ 1,851-............... 1,805-
2010.................. 1,080................. 1,191................. 1,555................ 1,531
Porsche........................... 2008.................. 609-.................. 748-.................. 867-................. 1,031-
2010.................. 649................... 839................... 991.................. 1,094
Spyker............................ 2008.................. 700-.................. 983-.................. 1,274-............... 1,355-
2010.................. 0..................... 0..................... 0.................... 0
Subaru............................ 2008.................. 1,235-................ 1,331-................ 2,144-............... 3,356-
2010.................. 1,337................. 1,389................. 3,963................ 3,231
Suzuki............................ 2008.................. 1,687-................ 1,689-................ 1,820-............... 2,283-
2010.................. 1,435................. 1,426................. 1,462................ 1,630
Tata.............................. 2008.................. 833-.................. 1,090-................ 1,199-............... 1,323-
[[Page 63065]]
2010.................. 483................... 848................... 961.................. 1,192
Tesla............................. 2008.................. 2-.................... 2-.................... 2-................... 2-
2010.................. 0..................... 0..................... 0.................... 0
Toyota............................ 2008.................. 1,125-................ 1,115-................ 1,276-............... 1,265-
2010.................. 1,247................. 1,248................. 1,493................ 1,433
Volkswagen........................ 2008.................. 932-.................. 1,110-................ 1,267-............... 1,639-
2010.................. 960................... 1,099................. 1,337................ 1,670
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-76--NHTSA Estimated Average Light Truck Incremental Cost Increases ($) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Average............... 2008............... 77-............... 193-.............. 424-.............. 623-.............. 858-
2010............... 147............... 197............... 398............... 631............... 912
Aston Martin................... 2008............... 0-................ 0-................ 0-................ 0-................ 0-
2010............... 0................. 0................. 0................. 0................. 0
BMW............................ 2008............... 416-.............. 489-.............. 495-.............. 513-.............. 654-
2010............... 321............... 378............... 394............... 428............... 661
Daimler........................ 2008............... 438-.............. 453-.............. 446-.............. 491-.............. 510-
2010............... 187............... 335............... 338............... 361............... 406
Fiat........................... 2008............... 100-.............. 108-.............. 173-.............. 939-.............. 1,013-
2010............... 469............... 468............... 538............... 1,199............. 1,316
Ford........................... 2008............... 7-................ 85-............... 97-............... 297-.............. 1,089-
2010............... 87................ 116............... 195............... 303............... 1,150
Geely.......................... 2008............... 128-.............. 404-.............. 502-.............. 494-.............. 496-
2010............... 34................ 499............... 474............... 470............... 524
General Motors................. 2008............... 1-................ 162-.............. 656-.............. 993-.............. 957-
2010............... 1................. 40................ 471............... 921............... 905
Honda.......................... 2008............... 196-.............. 199-.............. 345-.............. 395-.............. 688-
2010............... 210............... 252............... 310............... 336............... 741
Hyundai........................ 2008............... 288-.............. 301-.............. 423-.............. 418-.............. 408-
2010............... 272............... 282............... 911............... 949............... 932
KIA............................ 2008............... 49-............... 103-.............. 229-.............. 342-.............. 833-
2010............... 316............... 324............... 369............... 365............... 825
Mazda.......................... 2008............... 4-................ 561-.............. 509-.............. 532-.............. 502-
2010............... 15................ 762............... 686............... 690............... 669
Mitsubishi..................... 2008............... 284-.............. 319-.............. 269-.............. 269-.............. 2,092-
2010............... 276............... 283............... 275............... 254............... 1,509
Nissan......................... 2008............... 237-.............. 252-.............. 481-.............. 609-.............. 993-
2010............... 178............... 201............... 414............... 608............... 682
Porsche........................ 2008............... -2-............... 27-............... 481-.............. 459-.............. 513-
2010............... -0................ 48................ 928............... 912............... 927
Spyker......................... 2008............... 52-............... 93-............... 101-.............. 104-.............. 497-
2010............... 0................. 0................. 0................. 0................. 0
Subaru......................... 2008............... -49-.............. 102-.............. 685-.............. 644-.............. 615-
2010............... 810............... 854............... 1,238............. 1,218............. 1,200
Suzuki......................... 2008............... 1-................ 13-............... 594-.............. 585-.............. 745-
2010............... 252............... 251............... 231............... 228............... 1,719
Tata........................... 2008............... 18-............... 75-............... 96-............... 143-.............. 768-
2010............... 10................ 79................ 108............... 179............... 550
Toyota......................... 2008............... 13-............... 234-.............. 402-.............. 479-.............. 749-
2010............... 6................. 88................ 313............... 327............... 650
Volkswagen..................... 2008............... 10-............... 131-.............. 669-.............. 684-.............. 742-
2010............... 52................ 184............... 341............... 587............... 590
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV--77 NHTSA Estimated Average Light Truck Incremental Cost Increases ($) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Average 2008.................. 954-.................. 1,001-................ 1,086-............... 1,185-
2008.................. 949................... 1,061................. 1,151................ 1,228
Aston Martin...................... 2008.................. 0-.................... 0-.................... 0-................... 0-
2010.................. 0..................... 0..................... 0.................... 0
BMW............................... 2008.................. 1,407-................ 1,413-................ 1,472-............... 1,416-
2010.................. 887................... 909................... 935.................. 962
Daimler........................... 2008.................. 1,366-................ 1,381-................ 1,389-............... 1,339-
[[Page 63066]]
2010.................. 866................... 925................... 940.................. 944
Fiat.............................. 2008.................. 992-.................. 1,286-................ 1,324-............... 1,611-
2010.................. 1,314................. 1,747................. 1,726................ 1,816
Ford.............................. 2008.................. 1,166-................ 1,187-................ 1,198-............... 1,389-
2010.................. 1,126................. 1,118................. 1,120................ 1,209
Geely............................. 2008.................. 765-.................. 1,090-................ 1,114-............... 1,131-
2010.................. 727................... 1,334................. 1,340................ 1,306
General Motors.................... 2008.................. 940-.................. 928-.................. 974-................. 1,233-
2010.................. 887................... 894................... 972.................. 1,169
Honda............................. 2008.................. 911-.................. 978-.................. 959-................. 945-
2010.................. 878................... 897................... 1,025................ 1,002
Hyundai........................... 2008.................. 901-.................. 865-.................. 1,288-............... 1,254-
2010.................. 1,174................. 1,175................. 1,413................ 1,369
KIA............................... 2008.................. 818-.................. 934-.................. 919-................. 936-
2010.................. 780................... 1,089................. 1,060................ 1,016
Mazda............................. 2008.................. 488-.................. 739-.................. 811-................. 793-
2010.................. 661................... 901................... 1,051................ 1,008
Mitsubishi........................ 2008.................. 2,020-................ 1,986-................ 1,958-............... 1,824-
2010.................. 1,462................. 1,441................. 1,421................ 1,337
Nissan............................ 2008.................. 1,221-................ 1,172-................ 1,256-............... 1,415-
2010.................. 791................... 786................... 1,007................ 997
Porsche........................... 2008.................. 611-.................. 1,296-................ 1,321-............... 1,297-
2010.................. 972................... 1,276................. 1,322................ 1,311
Spyker............................ 2008.................. 481-.................. 559-.................. 659-................. 738-
2010.................. 0..................... 0..................... 0.................... 0
Subaru............................ 2008.................. 674-.................. 734-.................. 1,351-............... 1,245-
2010.................. 1,225................. 1,233................. 1,501................ 1,464
Suzuki............................ 2008.................. 712-.................. 702-.................. 712-................. 1,015-
2010.................. 1,668................. 1,643................. 1,618................ 1,504
Tata.............................. 2008.................. 806-.................. 889-.................. 990-................. 1,039-
2010.................. 704................... 801................... 898.................. 984
Toyota............................ 2008.................. 776-.................. 817-.................. 938-................. 895-
2010.................. 674................... 887................... 1,086................ 1,095
Volkswagen........................ 2008.................. 760-.................. 1,022-................ 1,487-............... 1,367-
2010.................. 640................... 824................... 1,135................ 1,411
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-78--NHTSA Estimated Average Incremental Cost Increases ($) by Manufacturer Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Average............... 2008............... 183-.............. 360-.............. 557-.............. 823-.............. 1,043-
2010............... 287............... 382............... 567............... 779............... 964
Aston Martin................... 2008............... 79-............... 156-.............. 244-.............. 337-.............. 447-
2010............... 73................ 150............... 227............... 321............... 420
BMW............................ 2008............... 194-.............. 248-.............. 288-.............. 354-.............. 535-
2010............... 146............... 285............... 342............... 412............... 538
Daimler........................ 2008............... 177-.............. 240-.............. 292-.............. 563-.............. 643-
2010............... 110............... 213............... 259............... 324............... 393
Fiat........................... 2008............... 192-.............. 385-.............. 412-.............. 1,020-............ 1,069-
2010............... 405............... 420............... 559............... 999............... 1,191
Ford........................... 2008............... 248-.............. 313-.............. 525-.............. 1,098-............ 1,596-
2010............... 212............... 235............... 333............... 672............... 1,059
Geely.......................... 2008............... 88-............... 375-.............. 637-.............. 654-.............. 739-
2010............... 54................ 273............... 493............... 526............... 601
General Motors................. 2008............... 78-............... 355-.............. 642-.............. 1,004-............ 1,077-
2010............... 130............... 282............... 480............... 828............... 884
Honda.......................... 2008............... 217-.............. 392-.............. 458-.............. 477-.............. 972-
2010............... 496............... 631............... 662............... 669............... 928
Hyundai........................ 2008............... 465-.............. 497-.............. 755-.............. 817-.............. 855-
2010............... 561............... 551............... 900............... 917............... 1,045
KIA............................ 2008............... 22-............... 96-............... 313-.............. 680-.............. 897-
2010............... 348............... 404............... 715............... 920............... 1,054
Lotus.......................... 2008............... 90-............... 178-.............. 255-.............. 354-.............. 469-
2010............... 242............... 322............... 1,228............. 1,306............. 1,396
Mazda.......................... 2008............... 260-.............. 475-.............. 443-.............. 710-.............. 693-
2010............... 600............... 829............... 757............... 1,016............. 1,002
Mitsubishi..................... 2008............... 446-.............. 842-.............. 813-.............. 1,052-............ 1,822-
2010............... 520............... 566............... 540............... 1,442............. 1,925
Nissan......................... 2008............... 351-.............. 517-.............. 872-.............. 948-.............. 1,084-
[[Page 63067]]
2010............... 466............... 535............... 746............... 843............... 884
Porsche........................ 2008............... 62-............... 221-.............. 406-.............. 471-.............. 558-
2010............... 30................ 70................ 582............... 615............... 673
Spyker......................... 2008............... 75-............... 202-.............. 289-.............. 364-.............. 524-
2010............... 0................. 0................. 0................. 0................. 0
Subaru......................... 2008............... 116-.............. 217-.............. 578-.............. 1,057-............ 1,030-
2010............... 291............... 355............... 1,001............. 1,349............. 1,316
Suzuki......................... 2008............... 11-............... 19-............... 1,266-............ 1,380-............ 1,502-
2010............... 96................ 119............... 778............... 1,015............. 1,449
Tata........................... 2008............... 56-............... 254-.............. 263-.............. 338-.............. 675-
2010............... 30................ 97................ 146............... 208............... 488
Tesla.......................... 2008............... 2-................ 2-................ 2-................ 2-................ 2-
2010............... 0................. 0................. 0................. 0................. 0
Toyota......................... 2008............... 134-.............. 398-.............. 559-.............. 710-.............. 952-
2010............... 200............... 315............... 636............... 717............... 985
Volkswagen..................... 2008............... 65-............... 156-.............. 338-.............. 649-.............. 779-
2010............... 78................ 359............... 458............... 668............... 804
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV--79 NHTSA Estimated Average Incremental Cost Increases ($) by Manufacturer Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Average.................. 2008.................. 1,162-................ 1,259-................ 1,528-............... 1,616-
2010.................. 1,042................. 1,165................. 1,370................ 1,461
Aston Martin...................... 2008.................. 568-.................. 695-.................. 827-................. 964-
2010.................. 541................... 662................... 783.................. 915
BMW............................... 2008.................. 851-.................. 952-.................. 1,342-............... 1,380-
2010.................. 782................... 888................... 1,264................ 1,326
Daimler........................... 2008.................. 1,055-................ 1,229-................ 1,313-............... 1,546-
2010.................. 701................... 947................... 1,042................ 1,325
Fiat.............................. 2008.................. 1,188-................ 1,509-................ 1,575-............... 1,861-
2010.................. 1,202................. 1,630................. 1,707................ 1,868
Ford.............................. 2008.................. 1,770-................ 1,790-................ 2,671-............... 2,478-
2010.................. 1,153................. 1,157................. 1,433................ 1,547
Geely............................. 2008.................. 889-.................. 1,169-................ 1,290-............... 1,353-
2010.................. 747................... 1,073................. 1,222................ 1,343
General Motors.................... 2008.................. 1,072-................ 1,222-................ 1,389-............... 1,655-
2010.................. 883................... 990................... 1,114................ 1,377
Honda............................. 2008.................. 1,065-................ 1,210-................ 1,208-............... 1,185-
2010.................. 970................... 1,146................. 1,189................ 1,166
Hyundai........................... 2008.................. 1,081-................ 1,079-................ 1,525-............... 1,452-
2010.................. 1,220................. 1,250................. 1,408................ 1,413
KIA............................... 2008.................. 959-.................. 1,106-................ 1,110-............... 1,338-
2010.................. 1,273................. 1,293................. 1,278................ 1,450
Lotus............................. 2008.................. 601-.................. 739-.................. 882-................. 1,036-
2010.................. 1,503................. 758................... 894.................. 1,025
Mazda............................. 2008.................. 1,372-................ 1,518-................ 1,610-............... 1,761-
2010.................. 1,339................. 1,472................. 1,497................ 1,652
Mitsubishi........................ 2008.................. 1,765-................ 1,793-................ 2,052-............... 3,319-
2010.................. 1,899................. 1,880................. 1,862................ 1,918
Nissan............................ 2008.................. 1,323-................ 1,358-................ 1,672-............... 1,690-
2010.................. 1,006................. 1,088................. 1,416................ 1,396
Porsche........................... 2008.................. 610-.................. 876-.................. 969-................. 1,088-
2010.................. 817................... 1,065................. 1,163................ 1,207
Spyker............................ 2008.................. 670-.................. 926-.................. 1,193-............... 1,274-
2010.................. 0..................... 0..................... 0.................... 0
Subaru............................ 2008.................. 1,104-................ 1,192-................ 1,962-............... 2,880-
2010.................. 1,303................. 1,342................. 3,214................ 2,691
Suzuki............................ 2008.................. 1,516-................ 1,518-................ 1,628-............... 2,066-
2010.................. 1,454................. 1,442................. 1,474................ 1,620
Tata.............................. 2008.................. 820-.................. 991-.................. 1,099-............... 1,191-
2010.................. 623................... 819................... 922.................. 1,063
Tesla............................. 2008.................. 2-.................... 2-.................... 2-................... 2-
2010.................. 0..................... 0..................... 0.................... 0
Toyota............................ 2008.................. 991-.................. 1,003-................ 1,152-............... 1,130-
2010.................. 1,033................. 1,115................. 1,344................ 1,311
Volkswagen........................ 2008.................. 898-.................. 1,092-................ 1,312-............... 1,586-
2010.................. 902................... 1,050................. 1,301................ 1,623
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63068]]
These cost estimates reflect the potential that a given
manufacturer's efforts to minimize overall regulatory costs could focus
technology where the most fuel can be saved at the least cost, and not
necessarily, for example, where the cost to add technology would be
smallest relative to baseline production costs. Therefore, if average
incremental vehicle cost increases (including any civil penalties) are
measured as increases relative to baseline prices (estimated by adding
baseline costs to MY 2008 prices), the agency's analysis shows relative
cost increases declining as baseline vehicle price increases. Figure
IV-4 shows the trend for MY 2025, for vehicles with estimated baseline
prices up to $100,000:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.032
If manufacturers pass along these costs rather than reducing
profits, and pass these costs along where they are incurred rather than
``cross-subsidizing'' among products, the quantity of vehicles produced
at different price levels would change. Shifts in production may
potentially occur, which could create marketing challenges for
manufacturers that are active in certain segments. We recognize,
however, that many manufacturers do in fact cross-subsidize to some
extent, and take losses on some vehicles while continuing to make
profits from others. NHTSA has no evidence to indicate that
manufacturers will inevitably shift production plans in response to
these final standards, but nevertheless believes that this issue is
worth monitoring in the market going forward. NHTSA continues to seek
comment on potential market effects related to this issue.
As mentioned above, these estimated costs derive primarily from the
additional application of technology under the final and augural
standards. The following three tables summarize the incremental extent
to which the agency estimates technologies could be added to the
passenger car, light truck, and overall fleets in each model year in
response to the standards. Percentages reflect the technology's
additional application in the market, relative to the estimated
application under baseline standards (i.e., application of MY 2016
standards through MY 2025), and are negative in cases where one
technology is superseded (i.e., displaced) by another. For example, the
agency estimates that manufacturers could apply many improvements to
transmissions (e.g., dual clutch transmissions, denoted below by
``DCT'') through MY 2025 under baseline standards. However, the agency
also estimates that manufacturers could apply even more advanced high
efficiency transmissions (denoted below by ``HETRANS'') under the final
and augural standards, and that these transmissions would supersede
DCTs and other transmission advances. Therefore, as shown in the
following three tables, the incremental application of DCTs under the
standards is negative.
[[Page 63069]]
Table IV-80--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Application of Technologies to Passenger Car Fleet Under Final and Augural Standards--MYs 2017-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Baseline MY 2017 (%) 2018 (%) 2019 (%) 2020 (%) 2021 (%) 2022 (%) 2023 (%) 2024 (%) 2025 (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LUB1......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... (0)........ (0)........ (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)
EFR1......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 4.......... 5.......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6
LUB2--EFR2................... 2008....... 8-......... 13-........ 19-....... 27-....... 37-....... 45-....... 48-....... 52-....... 54-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 1......... 4......... 8......... 9......... 11........ 19........ 24
CCPS......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)
DVVLS........................ 2008....... 0-......... (0)-....... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
DEACS........................ 2008....... (1)-....... (1)-....... (1)-...... (1)-...... (2)-...... (2)-...... (2)-...... (2)-...... (2)-
2010....... (1)........ (1)........ (2)....... (2)....... (2)....... (2)....... (2)....... (2)....... (3)
ICP.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
DCP.......................... 2008....... 12-........ 13-........ 13-....... 12-....... 12-....... 12-....... 12-....... 12-....... 12-
2010....... 10......... 10......... 10........ 10........ 10........ 10........ 10........ 10........ 10
DVVLD........................ 2008....... 11-........ 13-........ 13-....... 13-....... 14-....... 14-....... 14-....... 14-....... 14-
2010....... 8.......... 9.......... 9......... 9......... 9......... 9......... 9......... 10........ 9
CVVL......................... 2008....... 4-......... 4-......... 4-........ 6-........ 6-........ 6-........ 6-........ 6-........ 6-
2010....... 7.......... 7.......... 9......... 9......... 9......... 9......... 9......... 9......... 9
DEACD........................ 2008....... (1)-....... (1)-....... (1)-...... (2)-...... (2)-...... (2)-...... (3)-...... (5)-...... (5)-
2010....... (2)........ (2)........ (4)....... (6)....... (8)....... (8)....... (8)....... (9)....... (9)
SGDI......................... 2008....... 12-........ 16-........ 23-....... 28-....... 37-....... 41-....... 45-....... 50-....... 50-
2010....... 31......... 38......... 49........ 52........ 57........ 59........ 60........ 61........ 62
DEACO........................ 2008....... 0-......... (1)-....... (2)-...... (4)-...... (5)-...... (4)-...... (4)-...... (4)-...... (4)-
2010....... 0.......... (2)........ (2)....... (2)....... (2)....... (2)....... (2)....... (2)....... (2)
VVA.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
SGDIO........................ 2008....... 0-......... 2-......... 2-........ 4-........ 5-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-
2010....... 0.......... 2.......... 2......... 2......... 3......... 2......... 2......... 3......... 3
TRBDS1--SD................... 2008....... 6-......... 6-......... 5-........ 4-........ 10-....... 7-........ 8-........ 0-........ (6)-
2010....... 29......... 29......... 32........ 32........ 32........ 28........ 22........ 15........ 9
TRBDS1--MD................... 2008....... 2-......... 5-......... 7-........ 10-....... 8-........ 6-........ 5-........ 0-........ (3)-
2010....... 4.......... 8.......... 11........ 14........ 16........ 16........ 15........ 13........ 8
TRBDS1--LD................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 1-........ 1-........ 0-........ 0-........ (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-
2010....... 0.......... 1.......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... (0)....... (0)
TRBDS2--SD................... 2008....... (0)-....... 1-......... 4-........ 4-........ 5-........ 6-........ 5-........ 8-........ 9-
2010....... 0.......... 1.......... 3......... 3......... 6......... 6......... 11........ 11........ 12
TRBDS2--MD................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 1-........ 1-........ 0-........ 2-........ 3-........ 5-........ 6-
2010....... 2.......... 2.......... 2......... 2......... 0......... 1......... 2......... 3......... 3
TRBDS2--LD................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
CEGR1--SD.................... 2008....... 2-......... 3-......... 6-........ 11-....... 13-....... 18-....... 21-....... 26-....... 29-
2010....... 0.......... 2.......... 4......... 8......... 8......... 13........ 14........ 20........ 25
CEGR1--MD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 1-........ 2-........ 2-........ 4-........ 6-........ 10-....... 10-
2010....... (0)........ 0.......... 0......... 0......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 5......... 9
CEGR1--LD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... (0)....... 0......... 0......... 0
CEGR2--SD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 1-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 1
CEGR2--MD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 2-........ 3-........ 3-........ 3-........ 3-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1
CEGR2--LD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 1-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 3-........ 3-........ 2-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 2......... 3......... 3......... 2
ADSL--SD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
ADSL--MD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-
2010....... 0.......... (0)........ 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
ADSL--LD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
6MAN......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... (0)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (1)....... (1)....... (1)
HETRANSM..................... 2008....... 1-......... 2-......... 3-........ 5-........ 6-........ 7-........ 7-........ 7-........ 7-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 2......... 2......... 3......... 4......... 4......... 4
IATC......................... 2008....... 3-......... 3-......... (0)-...... (0)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)
NAUTO........................ 2008....... 5-......... 2-......... 2-........ (0)-...... (1)-...... (2)-...... (2)-...... (2)-...... (2)-
2010....... 1.......... 4.......... 5......... 4......... 4......... 4......... (1)....... (1)....... (1)
DCT.......................... 2008....... 0-......... (6)-....... (14)-..... (22)-..... (30)-..... (31)-..... (32)-..... (31)-..... (32)-
2010....... (1)........ 1.......... 3......... (7)....... (8)....... (12)...... (18)...... (26)...... (27)
[[Page 63070]]
8SPD......................... 2008....... 4-......... 4-......... 3-........ (2)-...... (7)-...... (9)-...... (10)-..... (11)-..... (13)-
2010....... 3.......... 6.......... 10........ 12........ 10........ 9......... 5......... 2......... 1
HETRANS...................... 2008....... 9-......... 22-........ 35-....... 47-....... 59-....... 65-....... 68-....... 65-....... 64-
2010....... 0.......... 2.......... 10........ 23........ 29........ 39........ 47........ 56........ 54
SHFTOPT...................... 2008....... 9-......... 22-........ 35-....... 49-....... 66-....... 71-....... 76-....... 73-....... 69-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 12........ 23........ 36........ 44........ 58........ 59........ 60
EPS.......................... 2008....... 4-......... 9-......... 9-........ 9-........ 13-....... 13-....... 13-....... 13-....... 13-
2010....... 8.......... 14......... 24........ 24........ 24........ 24........ 25........ 27........ 28
IACC1........................ 2008....... 9-......... 12-........ 17-....... 21-....... 36-....... 39-....... 44-....... 45-....... 45-
2010....... 6.......... 9.......... 17........ 18........ 28........ 29........ 34........ 38........ 45
IACC2........................ 2008....... 7-......... 12-........ 20-....... 31-....... 38-....... 53-....... 64-....... 67-....... 69-
2010....... 3.......... 7.......... 17........ 27........ 37........ 41........ 50........ 59........ 63
MHEV......................... 2008....... 1-......... 0-......... 2-........ 7-........ 10-....... 11-....... 12-....... 13-....... 10-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 2......... 3......... 3......... 4......... 5......... 5
ISG.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 3-........ 6-........ 7-........ 11-....... 15-....... 19-....... 26-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 2......... 4......... 5......... 6......... 8......... 12........ 17
SHEV1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
SHEV1--2..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
SHEV2........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 3-........ 6-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 2......... 5
PHEV1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 2-........ 2-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 1
PHEV2........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV1.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV2.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV3.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV4.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
FCV.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
MR1.......................... 2008....... 5-......... 6-......... 5-........ 5-........ 5-........ 5-........ 6-........ 6-........ 5-
2010....... 10......... 13......... 19........ 20........ 21........ 20........ 21........ 20........ 21
MR2.......................... 2008....... 8-......... 17-........ 25-....... 29-....... 29-....... 29-....... 30-....... 30-....... 29-
2010....... 2.......... 10......... 25........ 28........ 32........ 33........ 38........ 41........ 42
MR3.......................... 2008....... 3-......... 5-......... 6-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-........ 11-....... 11-....... 11-
2010....... 1.......... 2.......... 5......... 6......... 7......... 6......... 9......... 10........ 11
MR4.......................... 2008....... 2-......... 3-......... 3-........ 3-........ 3-........ 3-........ 4-........ 5-........ 8-
2010....... 1.......... 2.......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 4......... 4......... 7
MR5.......................... 2008....... 1-......... 2-......... 2-........ 4-........ 5-........ 5-........ 6-........ 7-........ 10-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 1......... 3......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 6......... 7
ROLL1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 2-......... 3-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-
2010....... 1.......... 2.......... 2......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3
ROLL2........................ 2008....... 0-......... 16-........ 33-....... 42-....... 50-....... 59-....... 62-....... 63-....... 63-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 21........ 35........ 44........ 55........ 71........ 81........ 87
ROLL3........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
LDB.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-
2010....... 0.......... 1.......... 1......... 1......... 2......... 2......... 2......... 2......... 2
SAX.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
AERO1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 3-......... 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-
2010....... 0.......... 5.......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5
AERO2........................ 2008....... 2-......... 13-........ 23-....... 29-....... 32-....... 33-....... 34-....... 34-....... 33-
2010....... 8.......... 21......... 31........ 40........ 44........ 47........ 48........ 49........ 51
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-81--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Application of Technologies to Light Truck Fleet Under Final and Augural Standards--MYs 2017-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Baseline MY 2017 (%) 2018 (%) 2019 (%) 2020 (%) 2021 (%) 2022 (%) 2023 (%) 2024 (%) 2025 (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LUB1......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
[[Page 63071]]
EFR1......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 2.......... 2.......... 2......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4
LUB2--EFR2................... 2008....... 1-......... 14-........ 31-....... 40-....... 56-....... 66-....... 73-....... 84-....... 86-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 11........ 24........ 41........ 44........ 48........ 56........ 63
CCPS......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 2.......... 1.......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 2......... 2
DVVLS........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
DEACS........................ 2008....... (1)-....... (1)-....... (3)-...... (3)-...... (11)-..... (12)-..... (12)-..... (12)-..... (12)-
2010....... (1)........ (2)........ (3)....... (2)....... (11)...... (11)...... (13)...... (12)...... (13)
ICP.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
DCP.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
DVVLD........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 1-........ 1-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
CVVL......................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
DEACD........................ 2008....... (4)-....... (6)-....... (7)-...... (9)-...... (14)-..... (15)-..... (15)-..... (22)-..... (22)-
2010....... (0)........ (1)........ (3)....... (3)....... (5)....... (6)....... (7)....... (8)....... (8)
SGDI......................... 2008....... 4-......... 5-......... 8-........ 11-....... 25-....... 26-....... 27-....... 34-....... 34-
2010....... 5.......... 8.......... 12........ 12........ 24........ 25........ 26........ 28........ 28
DEACO........................ 2008....... (0)-....... (1)-....... (2)-...... (4)-...... (4)-...... (4)-...... (5)-...... (5)-...... (6)-
2010....... 0.......... (0)........ (5)....... (10)...... (10)...... (10)...... (10)...... (9)....... (9)
VVA.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 2-........ 3-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
SGDIO........................ 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 5-........ 12-....... 11-....... 11-....... 11-....... 11-....... 14-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 5......... 8......... 9......... 9......... 11........ 11........ 11
TRBDS1--SD................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ (3)-...... (3)-...... (4)-...... (6)-
2010....... 2.......... 2.......... 3......... 3......... 2......... 2......... 2......... 1......... (4)
TRBDS1--MD................... 2008....... 4-......... 7-......... 9-........ 17-....... 21-....... 18-....... 14-....... 15-....... (1)-
2010....... 3.......... 5.......... 6......... 6......... 8......... 8......... 7......... 2......... (7)
TRBDS1--LD................... 2008....... 2-......... 2-......... 6-........ 8-........ 13-....... 12-....... 12-....... 11-....... 14-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 7......... 12........ 22........ 22........ 25........ 25........ 23
TRBDS2--SD................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 2-........ 2-........ 3-........ 4-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 6
TRBDS2--MD................... 2008....... (0)-....... (0)-....... 1-........ 1-........ 2-........ 3-........ 7-........ 10-....... 24-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 8......... 16
TRBDS2--LD................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 2
CEGR1--SD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 3-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
CEGR1--MD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 1-........ 1-........ 5-........ 7-........ 8-........ 11-....... 13-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 2
CEGR1--LD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
CEGR2--SD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
CEGR2--MD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
CEGR2--LD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 1-........ 2-........ 2-........ 3-........ 3-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
ADSL--SD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
ADSL--MD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
ADSL--LD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
6MAN......................... 2008....... 0-......... (0)-....... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)
HETRANSM..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
IATC......................... 2008....... (6)-....... (7)-....... (15)-..... (16)-..... (22)-..... (22)-..... (22)-..... (22)-..... (23)-
2010....... 0.......... (0)........ (1)....... (1)....... (4)....... (3)....... (5)....... (5)....... (5)
NAUTO........................ 2008....... 2-......... (1)-....... (11)-..... (12)-..... (14)-..... (17)-..... (17)-..... (16)-..... (16)-
2010....... (1)........ (2)........ (2)....... (6)....... (9)....... (9)....... (13)...... (18)...... (18)
DCT.......................... 2008....... 1-......... 0-......... (1)-...... (5)-...... (5)-...... (5)-...... (5)-...... (6)-...... (6)-
2010....... 0.......... 2.......... 1......... (3)....... (4)....... (4)....... (4)....... (6)....... (6)
8SPD......................... 2008....... 3-......... 3-......... (1)-...... (6)-...... (17)-..... (19)-..... (22)-..... (23)-..... (23)-
2010....... 1.......... 3.......... 7......... 10........ 7......... 7......... 6......... 0......... (6)
[[Page 63072]]
HETRANS...................... 2008....... 4-......... 16-........ 36-....... 52-....... 69-....... 78-....... 82-....... 83-....... 83-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 12........ 24........ 43........ 47........ 58........ 69........ 73
SHFTOPT...................... 2008....... 3-......... 10-........ 31-....... 46-....... 62-....... 70-....... 84-....... 87-....... 90-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 15........ 27........ 31........ 35........ 43........ 62........ 70
EPS.......................... 2008....... 6-......... 7-......... 10-....... 12-....... 16-....... 19-....... 23-....... 23-....... 24-
2010....... (0)........ 1.......... 5......... 6......... 15........ 15........ 14........ 16........ 16
IACC1........................ 2008....... 2-......... 2-......... 7-........ 9-........ 23-....... 25-....... 28-....... 31-....... 33-
2010....... 7.......... 11......... 18........ 22........ 29........ 31........ 31........ 31........ 32
IACC2........................ 2008....... 3-......... 4-......... 17-....... 22-....... 25-....... 27-....... 38-....... 49-....... 54-
2010....... 4.......... 10......... 21........ 27........ 37........ 41........ 43........ 52........ 55
MHEV......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 4.......... 4.......... 4......... 8......... 8......... 8......... 8......... 8......... 7
ISG.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 1-
2010....... 3.......... 3.......... 3......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 5
SHEV1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
SHEV1--2..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
SHEV2........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
PHEV1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
PHEV2........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV1.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV2.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV3.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV4.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
FCV.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
MR1.......................... 2008....... 2-......... 2-......... 5-........ 8-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-
2010....... 4.......... 5.......... 9......... 18........ 27........ 27........ 28........ 32........ 32
MR2.......................... 2008....... 10-........ 17-........ 23-....... 31-....... 35-....... 34-....... 34-....... 35-....... 40-
2010....... 4.......... 11......... 19........ 24........ 35........ 36........ 38........ 45........ 58
MR3.......................... 2008....... (0)-....... (0)-....... 3-........ 7-........ 11-....... 20-....... 25-....... 30-....... 33-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 2......... 4......... 22........ 26........ 30........ 36........ 55
MR4.......................... 2008....... (0)-....... (0)-....... (0)-...... 1-........ 5-........ 11-....... 12-....... 20-....... 25-
2010....... 1.......... 2.......... 2......... 2......... 9......... 10........ 15........ 17........ 22
MR5.......................... 2008....... (0)-....... (0)-....... (0)-...... (0)-...... 5-........ 7-........ 8-........ 12-....... 18-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 2......... 5......... 5......... 8
ROLL1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 2......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3
ROLL2........................ 2008....... 1-......... 15-........ 33-....... 47-....... 59-....... 74-....... 76-....... 83-....... 84-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 14........ 29........ 47........ 52........ 66........ 81........ 91
ROLL3........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
LDB.......................... 2008....... 2-......... 2-......... 3-........ 4-........ 5-........ 6-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-
2010....... 1.......... 2.......... 3......... 3......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6
SAX.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 2-......... 7-........ 9-........ 14-....... 17-....... 18-....... 18-....... 18-
2010....... 5.......... 7.......... 10........ 10........ 10........ 12........ 12........ 12........ 12
AERO1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 2-......... 2-........ 2-........ 3-........ 3-........ 3-........ 3-........ 3-
2010....... 0.......... 2.......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4
AERO2........................ 2008....... 2-......... 6-......... 15-....... 25-....... 31-....... 35-....... 36-....... 36-....... 36-
2010....... 0.......... 2.......... 11........ 22........ 24........ 28........ 31........ 33........ 41
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-82--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Application of Technologies to Overall Fleet Under Final and Augural Standards--MYs 2017-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology Baseline MY 2017 (%) 2018 (%) 2019 (%) 2020 (%) 2021 (%) 2022 (%) 2023 (%) 2024 (%) 2025 (%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LUB1......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... (0)........ (0)........ (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)
EFR1......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 3.......... 4.......... 4......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5
[[Page 63073]]
LUB2--EFR2................... 2008....... 6-......... 14-........ 23-....... 31-....... 44-....... 52-....... 57-....... 62-....... 65-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 5......... 11........ 20........ 21........ 23........ 32........ 37
CCPS......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 1......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
DVVLS........................ 2008....... 0-......... (0)-....... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1
DEACS........................ 2008....... (1)-....... (1)-....... (1)-...... (2)-...... (5)-...... (5)-...... (5)-...... (5)-...... (5)-
2010....... (1)........ (1)........ (2)....... (2)....... (5)....... (5)....... (6)....... (6)....... (6)
ICP.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
DCP.......................... 2008....... 8-......... 8-......... 8-........ 8-........ 8-........ 8-........ 8-........ 8-........ 8-
2010....... 7.......... 6.......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 7......... 7
DVVLD........................ 2008....... 7-......... 8-......... 8-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-........ 9-
2010....... 5.......... 6.......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 7......... 6
CVVL......................... 2008....... 2-......... 2-......... 3-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-
2010....... 5.......... 5.......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 6......... 7......... 7......... 7
DEACD........................ 2008....... (2)-....... (3)-....... (3)-...... (5)-...... (6)-...... (6)-...... (7)-...... (10)-..... (11)-
2010....... (1)........ (2)........ (3)....... (5)....... (7)....... (8)....... (8)....... (9)....... (9)
SGDI......................... 2008....... 9-......... 12-........ 18-....... 22-....... 33-....... 36-....... 39-....... 45-....... 45-
2010....... 22......... 27......... 36........ 38........ 46........ 48........ 49........ 50........ 50
DEACO........................ 2008....... (0)-....... (1)-....... (2)-...... (4)-...... (4)-...... (4)-...... (5)-...... (4)-...... (5)-
2010....... 0.......... (1)........ (3)....... (5)....... (5)....... (5)....... (5)....... (5)....... (5)
VVA.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 1-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
SGDIO........................ 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 3-........ 7-........ 7-........ 7-........ 7-........ 6-........ 7-
2010....... 0.......... 1.......... 3......... 4......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 5
TRBDS1--SD................... 2008....... 4-......... 4-......... 3-........ 3-........ 6-........ 3-........ 4-........ (1)-...... (6)-
2010....... 19......... 19......... 22........ 22........ 22........ 20........ 15........ 10........ 5
TRBDS1--MD................... 2008....... 3-......... 5-......... 8-........ 12-....... 12-....... 10-....... 8-........ 5-........ (2)-
2010....... 4.......... 7.......... 9......... 11........ 13........ 13........ 13........ 9......... 3
TRBDS1--LD................... 2008....... 1-......... 1-......... 3-........ 3-........ 5-........ 4-........ 4-........ 3-........ 4-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 3......... 5......... 8......... 8......... 9......... 8......... 8
TRBDS2--SD................... 2008....... (0)-....... 1-......... 3-........ 3-........ 3-........ 5-........ 4-........ 6-........ 7-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 2......... 2......... 4......... 4......... 7......... 8......... 10
TRBDS2--MD................... 2008....... (0)-....... 0-......... 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 2-........ 4-........ 6-........ 12-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 1......... 1......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 4......... 7
TRBDS2--LD................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1
CEGR1--SD.................... 2008....... 2-......... 2-......... 4-........ 7-........ 9-........ 12-....... 14-....... 18-....... 20-
2010....... 0.......... 1.......... 3......... 5......... 5......... 9......... 10........ 13........ 17
CEGR1--MD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 1-........ 2-........ 3-........ 5-........ 7-........ 10-....... 11-
2010....... (0)........ 0.......... 0......... 0......... 2......... 2......... 2......... 3......... 7
CEGR1--LD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-...... (0)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... (0)....... 0......... 0......... 0
CEGR2--SD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 1
CEGR2--MD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
CEGR2--LD.................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 1-........ 2-........ 2-........ 3-........ 3-........ 2-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 1......... 1......... 2......... 2......... 2......... 2
ADSL--SD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
ADSL--MD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-........ 1-
2010....... 0.......... (0)........ 0......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 1......... 0......... 0
ADSL--LD..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
6MAN......................... 2008....... 0-......... (0)-....... (0)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-...... (1)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)....... (0)
HETRANSM..................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 2-........ 3-........ 5-........ 5-........ 5-........ 5-........ 5-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 1......... 1......... 2......... 2......... 3......... 3......... 3
IATC......................... 2008....... 0-......... (0)-....... (5)-...... (6)-...... (8)-...... (8)-...... (8)-...... (8)-...... (8)-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... (0)....... (0)....... (1)....... (1)....... (2)....... (2)....... (2)
NAUTO........................ 2008....... 4-......... 1-......... (3)-...... (4)-...... (5)-...... (7)-...... (7)-...... (7)-...... (7)-
2010....... 0.......... 2.......... 2......... 1......... (0)....... (1)....... (5)....... (7)....... (7)
DCT.......................... 2008....... 0-......... (4)-....... (9)-...... (16)-..... (21)-..... (22)-..... (23)-..... (23)-..... (23)-
2010....... (1)........ 1.......... 2......... (6)....... (6)....... (9)....... (13)...... (19)...... (20)
8SPD......................... 2008....... 4-......... 4-......... 2-........ (4)-...... (11)-..... (13)-..... (14)-..... (15)-..... (16)-
2010....... 3.......... 5.......... 9......... 11........ 9......... 8......... 6......... 2......... (1)
HETRANS...................... 2008....... 7-......... 20-........ 35-....... 49-....... 62-....... 70-....... 73-....... 71-....... 70-
2010....... 0.......... 2.......... 11........ 23........ 34........ 42........ 51........ 60........ 61
[[Page 63074]]
SHFTOPT...................... 2008....... 7-......... 18-........ 34-....... 48-....... 65-....... 71-....... 79-....... 77-....... 76-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 13........ 25........ 34........ 41........ 53........ 60........ 63
EPS.......................... 2008....... 5-......... 8-......... 9-........ 10-....... 14-....... 15-....... 16-....... 16-....... 16-
2010....... 5.......... 9.......... 17........ 18........ 21........ 21........ 21........ 23........ 24
IACC1........................ 2008....... 6-......... 8-......... 13-....... 17-....... 32-....... 34-....... 39-....... 40-....... 41-
2010....... 6.......... 10......... 17........ 19........ 28........ 30........ 33........ 36........ 41
IACC2........................ 2008....... 6-......... 9-......... 19-....... 28-....... 34-....... 44-....... 55-....... 61-....... 64-
2010....... 4.......... 8.......... 19........ 27........ 37........ 41........ 48........ 57........ 60
MHEV......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 2-........ 5-........ 7-........ 7-........ 8-........ 8-........ 7-
2010....... 2.......... 2.......... 2......... 4......... 4......... 5......... 5......... 6......... 6
ISG.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 2-........ 4-........ 5-........ 7-........ 10-....... 13-....... 18-
2010....... 1.......... 2.......... 2......... 4......... 5......... 5......... 7......... 9......... 13
SHEV1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
SHEV1--2..................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 1......... 1
SHEV2........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 2-........ 4-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 2......... 3
PHEV1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 1-........ 1-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
PHEV2........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV1.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV2.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV3.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
EV4.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
FCV.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
MR1.......................... 2008....... 4-......... 4-......... 5-........ 6-........ 7-........ 7-........ 7-........ 7-........ 7-
2010....... 8.......... 10......... 15........ 19........ 23........ 23........ 23........ 24........ 24
MR2.......................... 2008....... 8-......... 17-........ 24-....... 30-....... 31-....... 31-....... 31-....... 31-....... 33-
2010....... 3.......... 10......... 23........ 26........ 33........ 34........ 38........ 42........ 47
MR3.......................... 2008....... 2-......... 3-......... 5-........ 8-........ 10-....... 13-....... 15-....... 17-....... 19-
2010....... 1.......... 2.......... 4......... 5......... 12........ 13........ 16........ 19........ 26
MR4.......................... 2008....... 1-......... 2-......... 2-........ 2-........ 4-........ 6-........ 7-........ 10-....... 14-
2010....... 1.......... 2.......... 3......... 3......... 5......... 6......... 7......... 9......... 12
MR5.......................... 2008....... 1-......... 1-......... 1-........ 3-........ 5-........ 6-........ 6-........ 9-........ 12-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 1......... 2......... 3......... 3......... 5......... 6......... 7
ROLL1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 2-
2010....... 0.......... 1.......... 1......... 2......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3
ROLL2........................ 2008....... 0-......... 16-........ 33-....... 44-....... 53-....... 64-....... 67-....... 69-....... 70-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 19........ 33........ 45........ 54........ 69........ 81........ 88
ROLL3........................ 2008....... 0-......... 0-......... 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-........ 0-
2010....... 0.......... 0.......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0......... 0
LDB.......................... 2008....... 1-......... 1-......... 2-........ 2-........ 2-........ 3-........ 4-........ 3-........ 4-
2010....... 1.......... 1.......... 2......... 2......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3......... 3
SAX.......................... 2008....... 0-......... 1-......... 2-........ 3-........ 5-........ 6-........ 6-........ 6-........ 6-
2010....... 2.......... 2.......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4......... 4
AERO1........................ 2008....... 0-......... 3-......... 3-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-........ 4-
2010....... 0.......... 4.......... 4......... 5......... 5......... 5......... 4......... 4......... 4
AERO2........................ 2008....... 2-......... 11-........ 20-....... 28-....... 32-....... 34-....... 35-....... 35-....... 34-
2010....... 5.......... 14......... 24........ 34........ 37........ 41........ 42........ 44........ 48
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the agencies' estimates of manufacturers' future sales
volumes, and taking into account early outlays attributable to
multiyear planning effects (discussed above), the cost increases
associated with this additional application of technology will lead to
a total of between $134 billion and $140 billion in incremental outlays
during MYs 2017-2025 (and model years leading up to MY 2017) for
additional technology attributable to the final and augural standards:
[[Page 63075]]
Table IV-83--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Technology Outlays ($M) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Average................. 2008................. 4.0-................. 2.8-................. 5.4-................. 8.4-................. 12.8-............... 16.5-
2010................. 8.7.................. 4.4.................. 5.8.................. 8.7.................. 11.9................ 14.9
Aston Martin..................... 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................ 0.0-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.0
BMW.............................. 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.1-................. 0.1-................. 0.1-................. 0.1-................ 0.1-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.1.................. 0.1.................. 0.1................. 0.1
Daimler.......................... 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.2-................ 0.2-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.0
Fiat............................. 2008................. 0.3-................. 0.2-................. 0.3-................. 0.3-................. 0.8-................ 0.8-
2010................. 1.2.................. 0.6.................. 0.6.................. 0.8.................. 1.5................. 1.8
Ford............................. 2008................. 0.8-................. 0.5-................. 0.6-................. 1.1-................. 2.3-................ 3.4-
2010................. 0.7.................. 0.5.................. 0.6.................. 0.8.................. 1.6................. 2.5
Geely............................ 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.1-................. 0.1-................ 0.1-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.0
General Motors................... 2008................. 0.5-................. 0.2-................. 1.0-................. 1.9-................. 3.1-................ 3.3-
2010................. 1.2.................. 0.4.................. 0.8.................. 1.4.................. 2.3................. 2.5
Honda............................ 2008................. 0.1-................. 0.4-................. 0.7-................. 0.8-................. 0.8-................ 1.7-
2010................. 1.8.................. 0.8.................. 1.1.................. 1.1.................. 1.1................. 1.6
Hyundai.......................... 2008................. 0.4-................. 0.3-................. 0.4-................. 0.6-................. 0.6-................ 0.7-
2010................. 0.6.................. 0.6.................. 0.5.................. 0.9.................. 0.9................. 1.0
KIA.............................. 2008................. -0.0-................ 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.1-................. 0.3-................ 0.4-
2010................. 0.2.................. 0.1.................. 0.2.................. 0.3.................. 0.3................. 0.4
Lotus............................ 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................ 0.0-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.0
Mazda............................ 2008................. 0.2-................. 0.1-................. 0.2-................. 0.1-................. 0.2-................ 0.2-
2010................. 0.4.................. 0.2.................. 0.3.................. 0.2.................. 0.3................. 0.3
Mitsubishi....................... 2008................. 0.2-................. 0.0-................. 0.1-................. 0.1-................. 0.1-................ 0.2-
2010................. 0.1.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.1................. 0.1
Nissan........................... 2008................. 0.2-................. 0.5-................. 0.7-................. 1.1-................. 1.2-................ 1.4-
2010................. 1.0.................. 0.6.................. 0.6.................. 0.9.................. 1.0................. 1.0
Porsche.......................... 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................ 0.0-
2010................. 0.0.................. -0.0................. -0.0................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.0
Spyker........................... 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................ 0.0-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.0
Subaru........................... 2008................. 0.1-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.1-................. 0.3-................ 0.3-
2010................. 0.2.................. 0.1.................. 0.1.................. 0.3.................. 0.4................. 0.4
Suzuki........................... 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.1-................. 0.2-................ 0.2-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.1
Tata............................. 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................ 0.1-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.0
Tesla............................ 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................ 0.0-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.0................. 0.0
Toyota........................... 2008................. 1.3-................. 0.4-................. 1.2-................. 1.7-................. 2.2-................ 3.0-
2010................. 1.3.................. 0.5.................. 0.8.................. 1.6.................. 1.8................. 2.4
Volkswagen....................... 2008................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.0-................. 0.1-................. 0.4-................ 0.4-
2010................. 0.0.................. 0.0.................. 0.2.................. 0.2.................. 0.3................. 0.4
Passenger Car.................... 2008................. 3.9-................. 2.3-................. 4.3-................. 6.1-................. 9.4-................ 11.7-
2010................. 7.7.................. 3.6.................. 4.8.................. 6.5.................. 8.5................. 9.9
Light Truck...................... 2008................. 0.1-................. 0.4-................. 1.1-................. 2.3-................. 3.4-................ 4.8-
2010................. 1.1.................. 0.8.................. 1.1.................. 2.2.................. 3.4................. 4.9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................ 2008................. 4.0-................. 2.8-................. 5.4-................. 8.4-................. 12.8-............... 16.5-
2010................. 8.7.................. 4.4.................. 5.8.................. 8.7.................. 11.9................ 14.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-84--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Technology Outlays ($M) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025 (and total through MY 2025)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Average............... 2008............... 18.5-............. 20.2-............. 24.9-............. 26.8-............. 140.3-
2010............... 16.1.............. 18.1.............. 21.7.............. 23.3.............. 133.7
Aston Martin................... 2008............... 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-
2010............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0
BMW............................ 2008............... 0.3-.............. 0.3-.............. 0.5-.............. 0.5-.............. 1.9-
2010............... 0.2............... 0.2............... 0.4............... 0.3............... 1.5
Daimler........................ 2008............... 0.3-.............. 0.4-.............. 0.4-.............. 0.5-.............. 2.1-
2010............... 0.1............... 0.2............... 0.2............... 0.3............... 1.1
Fiat........................... 2008............... 0.9-.............. 1.2-.............. 1.2-.............. 1.4-.............. 7.6-
2010............... 1.9............... 2.6............... 2.7............... 3.0............... 16.8
Ford........................... 2008............... 3.8-.............. 3.9-.............. 5.9-.............. 5.5-.............. 27.7-
[[Page 63076]]
2010............... 2.7............... 2.8............... 3.5............... 3.8............... 19.4
Geely.......................... 2008............... 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.8-
2010............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.5
General Motors................. 2008............... 3.3-.............. 3.8-.............. 4.3-.............. 5.3-.............. 26.9-
2010............... 2.5............... 2.9............... 3.3............... 4.1............... 21.3
Honda.......................... 2008............... 1.9-.............. 2.2-.............. 2.2-.............. 2.2-.............. 12.9-
2010............... 1.7............... 2.0............... 2.1............... 2.1............... 15.3
Hyundai........................ 2008............... 0.8-.............. 0.9-.............. 1.3-.............. 1.2-.............. 7.1-
2010............... 1.2............... 1.3............... 1.5............... 1.5............... 10.0
KIA............................ 2008............... 0.4-.............. 0.5-.............. 0.5-.............. 0.6-.............. 2.8-
2010............... 0.5............... 0.5............... 0.5............... 0.6............... 3.5
Lotus.......................... 2008............... 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-
2010............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0
Mazda.......................... 2008............... 0.5-.............. 0.5-.............. 0.6-.............. 0.6-.............. 3.3-
2010............... 0.4............... 0.5............... 0.5............... 0.5............... 3.5
Mitsubishi..................... 2008............... 0.2-.............. 0.2-.............. 0.2-.............. 0.4-.............. 1.6-
2010............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.2............... 0.2............... 1.1
Nissan......................... 2008............... 1.8-.............. 1.9-.............. 2.3-.............. 2.4-.............. 13.4-
2010............... 1.2............... 1.3............... 1.7............... 1.7............... 11.0
Porsche........................ 2008............... 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.1-
2010............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.2
Spyker......................... 2008............... 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.1-
2010............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0
Subaru......................... 2008............... 0.3-.............. 0.3-.............. 0.6-.............. 0.9-.............. 3.0-
2010............... 0.4............... 0.4............... 1.0............... 0.8............... 4.1
Suzuki......................... 2008............... 0.2-.............. 0.2-.............. 0.2-.............. 0.3-.............. 1.3-
2010............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.5
Tata........................... 2008............... 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.5-
3020............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.1
Tesla.......................... 2008............... 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-
2010............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0\1285\
Toyota......................... 2008............... 3.2-.............. 3.3-.............. 3.8-.............. 3.8-.............. 23.8-
2010............... 2.6............... 2.8............... 3.4............... 3.3............... 10.4
Volkswagen..................... 2008............... 0.5-.............. 0.6-.............. 0.6-.............. 0.8-.............. 3.4-
2010............... 0.4............... 0.5............... 0.6............... 0.8............... 3.4
Passenger Car.................. 2008............... 13.1-............. 14.6-............. 18.8-............. 20.2-............. 104.4-
2010............... 11.0.............. 12.4.............. 15.5.............. 16.7.............. 96.6
Light Truck.................... 2008............... 5.4-.............. 5.6-.............. 6.1-.............. 6.6-.............. 35.9-
2010............... 5.1............... 5.7............... 6.2............... 6.6............... 37.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................... 2008............... 18.5-............. 20.2-............. 24.9-............. 26.8-............. 140.3-
2010............... 16.1.............. 18.1.............. 21.7.............. 23.3.............. 133.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA notes that these estimates of the economic costs for meeting
higher CAFE standards omit certain potentially important categories of
costs, and may also reflect underestimation (or possibly
overestimation) of some costs that are included. For example, although
the agency's analysis is intended--with very limited exceptions\1286\--
to hold vehicle performance, capacity, and utility constant when
applying fuel-saving technologies to vehicles, the analysis imputes no
cost to any actual reductions in vehicle performance, capacity, and
utility that may result from manufacturers' efforts to comply with the
final and augural CAFE standards. Although these costs are difficult to
estimate accurately, they nonetheless represent a notable category of
omitted costs if they have not been adequately accounted for in the
cost estimates. Similarly, the agency's estimates of net benefits for
meeting higher CAFE standards includes estimates of the economic value
of potential changes in motor vehicle fatalities that could result from
reductions in the size or weight of vehicles, but not of changes in
non-fatal injuries that could result from reductions in vehicle size
and/or weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1285\ Tesla is not included in the agencies 2010 baseline
fleet.
\1286\ For example, the agencies have assumed no cost changes
due to our assumption that HEV towing capability is not maintained;
due to potential drivability issues with the P2 HEV; and due to
potential drivability and NVH issues with the shift optimizer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, while NHTSA is confident that the cost estimates are the
best available and appropriate for purposes of this final rule, it is
possible that the agency may have underestimated or overestimated
manufacturers' direct costs for applying some fuel economy
technologies, or the increases in manufacturer's indirect costs
associated with higher vehicle manufacturing costs. In either case, the
technology outlays reported here will not correctly represent the costs
of meeting higher CAFE standards.
Since the NPRM, NHTSA has revised its analysis to incorporate the
social cost associated with the incremental cost of maintaining more
technologically advanced vehicles. Table IV-85 below summarizes these
incremental costs by regulatory class, and illustrates that increased
maintenance costs contribute about another $10 billion to the cost of
the rule.
[[Page 63077]]
Table IV-85--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Maintenance Costs Associated With Technology Applied To Meet CAFE Standards, MY 2017-2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008......... 0-........... 0.2-......... 0.5-......... 0.7-......... 0.8-......... 0.9-......... 1.0-........ 1.0-........ 1.1-........ 6.2-
2010......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.3.......... 0.5.......... 0.6.......... 0.8.......... 1.1......... 1.2......... 1.3......... 5.9
Light trucks................... 2008......... 0.0-......... 0.1-......... 0.3-......... 0.4-......... 0.5-......... 0.6-......... 0.6-........ 0.7-........ 0.7-........ 3.8-
2010......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.1.......... 0.3.......... 0.4.......... 0.4.......... 0.5......... 0.7......... 0.8......... 3.2
Combined....................... 2008......... 0.0-......... 0.3-......... 0.7-......... 1.0-......... 1.3-......... 1.5-......... 1.6-........ 1.7-........ 1.8-........ 10.0-
2010......... 0.0.......... 0.0.......... 0.4.......... 0.8.......... 1.0.......... 1.2.......... 1.6......... 1.9......... 2.1......... 9.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, NHTSA's estimates of increased costs of congestion,
accidents, and noise associated with added vehicle use are drawn from a
1997 study, and the correct magnitude of these values may have changed
since they were developed. If this is the case, the costs of increased
vehicle use associated with the fuel economy rebound effect will differ
from the agency's estimates in this analysis. Thus, like the agency's
estimates of economic benefits, estimates of total compliance costs
reported here may underestimate or overestimate the true economic costs
of the final standards.
However, offsetting these costs, the achieved increases in fuel
economy will also produce significant benefits to society. Most of
these benefits are attributable to reductions in fuel consumption; fuel
savings are valued using forecasts of pretax prices in EIA's reference
case forecast from the AEO 2012 Early Release. The total benefits also
include other benefits and dis-benefits, examples of which include the
social values of reductions in CO2 and criteria pollutant
emissions, the value of additional travel (induced by the rebound
effect), and the social costs of additional congestion, accidents, and
noise attributable to that additional travel. The FRIA accompanying
today's final rule presents a detailed analysis of the rule's specific
benefits.
As Tables IV-86 and IV-87 show, NHTSA estimates that at the
discount rates of 3 percent prescribed in OMB guidance for regulatory
analysis, the present value of total benefits from the final and
augural CAFE standards over the lifetimes of MY 2017-2025 (and,
accounting for multiyear planning effects discussed above, model years
leading up to MY 2017) passenger cars and light trucks will be in a
range from $671 billion to $688 billion.
Table IV-86--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($b) Under Final Standards Using 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021\1287\
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\1287\
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 19.2-................ 10.4-................ 19.6-................ 28.6-................ 40.2-............... 48.4-
2010................. 27.5................. 13.2................. 19.3................. 30.5................. 40.1................ 48.5
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1.9-................. 3.7-................. 8.9-................. 17.3-................ 24.8-............... 34.4-
2010................. 3.3.................. 2.8.................. 5.3.................. 13.1................. 19.9................ 29.4
Combined......................... 2008................. 21.1-................ 14.1-................ 28.5-................ 45.9-................ 65.0-............... 82.8-
2010................. 30.8................. 16................... 24.5................. 43.6................. 60.................. 77.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-87--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($b) Under Augural Standards Using 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025 (and Total Through MY
2025)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 54.2-............. 60.1-............. 68.6-............. 75.9-............. 425.3-
2010............... 54................ 61.6.............. 70.1.............. 77................ 441.9
Light trucks................... 2008............... 38.1-............. 40.7-............. 44.5-............. 48.3-............. 262.6-
2010............... 32.4.............. 36.7.............. 41.3.............. 45.6.............. 229.9
Combined....................... 2008............... 92.3-............. 100.7-............ 113.1-............ 124.2-............ 687.5-
2010............... 86.4.............. 98.3.............. 111.3............. 122.5............. 671.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tables below report that the present value of total benefits
from requiring cars and light trucks to achieve the fuel economy levels
specified in the final and augural CAFE standards for MYs 2017-25 will
range from $536 billion to $549 billion when discounted at the 7
percent rate also required by OMB guidance. Thus the present value of
fuel savings and other benefits over the lifetimes of the vehicles
covered by the final and augural standards is about 20 percent lower
when discounted at a 7 percent annual rate than when discounted using
the 3 percent annual rate.\1288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1287\ Unless otherwise indicated, all tables in Section IV
report benefits calculated using the Reference Case input
assumptions, with future benefits resulting from reductions in
carbon dioxide emissions discounted at the 3 percent rate deemed
central by in the interagency guidance on the social cost of carbon.
\1288\ For tables that report total or net benefits using a 7
percent discount rate, future benefits from reducing carbon dioxide
emissions are discounted at 3 percent in order to maintain
consistency with the discount rate used to develop the reference
case estimate of the social cost of carbon. All other future
benefits reported in these tables are discounted using the 7 percent
rate.
[[Page 63078]]
Table IV-88--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($b) Under Final Standards Using 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 15.3-................ 8.3-................. 15.7-................ 22.9-................ 32.2-............... 38.8-
2010................. 22................... 10.6................. 15.5................. 24.5................. 32.1................ 38.9
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1.5-................. 2.9-................. 7.0-................. 13.7-................ 19.7-............... 27.3-
2010................. 2.6.................. 2.2.................. 4.2.................. 10.4................. 15.8................ 23.4
Combined......................... 2008................. 16.8-................ 11.2-................ 22.7-................ 36.6-................ 51.9-............... 66.0-
2010................. 24.7................. 12.8................. 19.6................. 34.8................. 47.9................ 62.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-89--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($b) Under Augural Standards Using 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025 (and Total Through
MY2025)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 43.4-............. 48.2-............. 55.0-............. 60.8-............. 340.7-
2010............... 43.3.............. 49.4.............. 56.2.............. 61.7.............. 354.1
Light trucks................... 2008............... 30.2-............. 32.3-............. 35.3-............. 38.3-............. 208.2-
2010............... 25.7.............. 29.1.............. 32.8.............. 36.1.............. 182.3
Combined....................... 2008............... 73.6-............. 80.4-............. 90.3-............. 99.1-............. 548.6-
2010............... 69................ 78.4.............. 88.8.............. 97.8.............. 536
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For both the passenger car and light truck fleets, NHTSA estimates
that the benefits of today's standards will exceed the corresponding
costs in every model year, so that the net social benefits from
requiring higher fuel economy--the difference between the total
benefits that result from higher fuel economy and the technology
outlays required to achieve it--will be substantial. Because the
technology outlays required to achieve the fuel economy levels required
by the standards are incurred during the model years when the vehicles
are produced and sold, however, they are not subject to discounting, so
that their present value does not depend on the discount rate used.
Thus the net benefits of the standards differ depending on whether the
3 percent or 7 percent discount rate is used, but only because the
choice of discount rates affects the present value of total benefits,
and not that of technology costs.
As Tables IV-90 and IV-91 show, over the lifetimes of the affected
(MY 2017-2025, and MYs leading up to MY 2017) vehicles, the agency
estimates that when the benefits of the standards are discounted at a 3
percent rate, they will exceed the costs of the final and augural
standards by between $498 billion and $507 billion:
Table IV-90--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($b) Under Final Standards Using 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 14-.................. 8-................... 14-.................. 21-.................. 28-................. 34-
2010................. 18................... 9.................... 14................... 22................... 29.................. 35
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 2-................... 3-................... 7-................... 14-.................. 20-................. 28-
2010................. 2.................... 2.................... 4.................... 10................... 16.................. 23
Combined......................... 2008................. 16-.................. 11-.................. 21-.................. 35-.................. 48-................. 61-
2010................. 21................... 11................... 18................... 32................... 45.................. 59
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-91--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($b) Under Augural Standards Using 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025 (and Total Through
MY 2025)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 37-............... 42-............... 45-............... 51-............... 293-
2010............... 40................ 45................ 50................ 55................ 317
Light trucks................... 2008............... 31-............... 33-............... 36-............... 39-............... 213-
2010............... 26................ 29................ 33................ 36................ 181
Combined....................... 2008............... 68-............... 74-............... 82-............... 90-............... 507-
2010............... 65................ 74................ 83................ 92................ 498
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As indicated previously, when fuel savings and other future
benefits resulting from the standards are discounted at the 7 percent
rate prescribed in OMB guidance, they are about 20% lower than when the
3 percent discount rate is applied. Nevertheless, Tables IV-92 and IV-
93 show that the net benefits from requiring passenger cars and light
trucks to achieve higher fuel economy are still substantial even when
future benefits are discounted at the higher rate, totaling $372-377
billion over MYs 2017-25. Net benefits are thus about a quarter lower
when future benefits are discounted at a 7 percent annual rate than at
a 3 percent rate.
[[Page 63079]]
Table IV-92--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($b) Under Final Standards Using 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 11-.................. 6-................... 10-.................. 15-.................. 21-................. 25-
2010................. 13................... 6.................... 10................... 17................... 22.................. 27
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1-................... 2-................... 6-................... 11-.................. 15-................. 21-
2010................. 1.................... 1.................... 3.................... 8.................... 12.................. 17
Combined......................... 2008................. 12-.................. 8-................... 16-.................. 26-.................. 36-................. 46-
2010................. 15................... 8.................... 13................... 24................... 33.................. 44
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-93--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($b) Under Augural Standards Using 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025 (and Total Through
MY 2025)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 27-............... 30-............... 33-............... 37-............... 215-
2010............... 30................ 34................ 37................ 41................ 236
Light trucks................... 2008............... 23-............... 25-............... 27-............... 30-............... 162-
2010............... 19................ 22................ 25................ 28................ 136
Combined....................... 2008............... 51-............... 55-............... 60-............... 67-............... 377-
2010............... 49................ 56................ 62................ 69................ 372
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA's estimates of economic benefits from establishing higher
CAFE standards are subject to considerable uncertainty. Most important,
the agency's estimates of the fuel savings likely to result from
adopting higher CAFE standards depend critically on the accuracy of the
estimated fuel economy levels that will be achieved under both the
baseline scenario, which assumes that manufacturers will continue to
comply with the MY 2016 CAFE standards, and under alternative increases
in the standards that apply to MYs 2017-25 passenger cars and light
trucks. Specifically, if the agency has underestimated the fuel economy
levels that manufacturers would have achieved under the baseline
scenario--or is too optimistic about the fuel economy levels that
manufacturers will actually achieve under the standards--its estimates
of fuel savings and the resulting economic benefits attributable to
this rule will be too large.
Another major source of potential overestimation in the agency's
estimates of benefits from requiring higher fuel economy stems from its
reliance on the Reference Case fuel price forecasts reported in AEO
2012, Early Release. Although NHTSA believes that these forecasts are
the most reliable that are available, they are nevertheless
significantly higher than the fuel price projections reported in most
previous editions of EIA's Annual Energy Outlook, and reflect
projections of world oil prices that are well above forecasts issued by
other firms and government agencies. If the future fuel prices
projected in AEO 2012 prove to be too high, the agency's estimates of
the value of future fuel savings--the major component of benefits from
this rule--will also be too high.
However, it is also possible that NHTSA's estimates of economic
benefits from establishing higher CAFE standards underestimate the true
economic benefits of the fuel savings the standards would produce. If
the AEO 2012 Early Release projections of fuel prices prove to be too
low, for example, NHTSA will have underestimated the value of fuel
savings that will result from adopting higher CAFE standards for MY
2017-25. As another example, the agency's estimate of benefits from
reducing the threat of economic damages from disruptions in the supply
of imported petroleum to the U.S. applies to calendar year 2020. If the
magnitude of this estimate would be expected to grow after 2015 in
response to increases in U.S. petroleum imports, growth in the level of
U.S. economic activity, or increases in the likelihood of disruptions
in the supply of imported petroleum, the agency may have underestimated
the benefits from the reduction in petroleum imports expected to result
from adopting higher CAFE standards.
NHTSA's benefit estimates could also be too low because they
exclude or understate the economic value of certain potentially
significant categories of benefits from reducing fuel consumption. As
one example, EPA's estimates of the economic value of reduced damages
to human health resulting from lower exposure to criteria air
pollutants includes only the effects of reducing population exposure to
PM2.5 emissions. Although this is likely to be the most
significant component of health benefits from reduced emissions of
criteria air pollutants, it excludes the value of reduced damages to
human health and other impacts resulting from lower emissions and
reduced population exposure to other criteria air pollutants, including
ozone and nitrous oxide (N2O), as well as to airborne
toxics. EPA's estimates exclude these benefits because no reliable
dollar-per-ton estimates of the health impacts of criteria pollutants
other than PM2.5 or of the health impacts of airborne toxics
were available to use in developing estimates of these benefits.
Similarly, the agency's estimate of the value of reduced climate-
related economic damages from lower emissions of GHGs excludes many
sources of potential benefits from reducing the pace and extent of
global climate change.\1289\ For example, none of the three models used
to value climate-related economic damages includes those resulting from
ocean acidification or loss of species and wildlife. The models also
may not adequately capture certain other impacts, including potentially
abrupt changes in climate associated with thresholds that govern
climate system responses, interregional interactions such as global
security impacts of extreme warming, or limited near-term
substitutability between damage to natural systems and increased
consumption. Including monetized estimates of benefits from reducing
the extent of climate change and these associated impacts would
increase the
[[Page 63080]]
agency's estimates of benefits from adopting higher CAFE standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1289\ Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis
Under Executive Order 12866, Interagency Working Group on Social
Cost of Carbon, United States Government, February 2010. Available
in Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0059.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following tables present itemized costs and benefits for the
combined passenger car and light truck fleets for each model year
affected by the standards and for all model years combined, using both
discount rates prescribed by OMB regulatory guidance. Tables IV-94 and
IV-95 report technology outlays, each separate component of benefits
(including costs associated with additional driving due to the rebound
effect, labeled ``dis-benefits''), the total value of benefits, and net
benefits using the 3 percent discount rate. (Numbers in parentheses
represent negative values.)
Table IV-94--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($b) Under Final Standards Using 3 Percent Discount
Rate--MYs 2017-2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY
Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology costs............ 2008...... 4.0-...... 2.8-...... 5.4-...... 8.4-...... 12.8-..... 16.5-
2010...... 8.7....... 4.4....... 5.8....... 8.4....... 11.9...... 14.9
Additional cost of 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.3-...... 0.7-...... 1.0-...... 1.3-
maintaining more advanced
vehicles.
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.4....... 0.8....... 1.0
Savings in lifetime fuel 2008...... 15.8-..... 10.7-..... 21.7-..... 35.0-..... 49.6-..... 63.3-
expenditures.
2010...... 23.3...... 12.2...... 18.7...... 33.4...... 46.0...... 59.6
Consumer surplus from 2008...... 1.6-...... 1.0-...... 2.0-...... 3.2-...... 4.6-...... 5.7-
additional driving.
2010...... 2.3....... 1.2....... 1.8....... 3.1....... 4.2....... 5.5
Value of savings in 2008...... 0.7-...... 0.4-...... 0.8-...... 1.2-...... 1.6-...... 2.0-
refueling time.
2010...... 0.9....... 0.4....... 0.6....... 1.1....... 1.3....... 1.7
Reduction in petroleum 2008...... 0.9-...... 0.6-...... 1.2-...... 1.9-...... 2.7-...... 3.4-
market externalities.
2010...... 1.3....... 0.7....... 1.0....... 1.8....... 2.4....... 3.1
Reduction in climate-related 2008...... 1.5-...... 1.0-...... 2.1-...... 3.4-...... 4.9-...... 6.3-
damages from lower CO2
emissions.
2010...... 2.2....... 1.2....... 1.8....... 3.3....... 4.6....... 6.0
Value of reduced highway 2008...... (0.1)-.... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-
fatalities from changes in
vehicle mass.
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... -0.1...... 0.0....... 0.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduction in health damage costs from lower emissions of criteria air pollutants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO.......................... 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0
VOC......................... 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.1-...... 0.1-
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.1....... 0.1
NOX......................... 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.1-...... 0.1-...... 0.1-...... 0.1-
2010...... 0.1....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.1....... 0.1....... 0.1
PM.......................... 2008...... 0.2-...... 0.2-...... 0.3-...... 0.5-...... 0.8-...... 1.0-
2010...... 0.4....... 0.2....... 0.3....... 0.5....... 0.7....... 0.9
SOX......................... 2008...... 0.2-...... 0.1-...... 0.3-...... 0.5-...... 0.6-...... 0.8-
2010...... 0.3....... 0.2....... 0.2....... 0.4....... 0.6....... 0.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dis-benefits from increased driving
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congestion costs............ 2008...... 0.7-...... 0.4-...... 0.9-...... 1.4-...... 1.9-...... 2.4-
2010...... 1.0....... 0.5....... 0.8....... 1.3....... 1.8....... 2.3
Noise costs................. 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0
Crash costs................. 2008...... 0.3-...... 0.2-...... 0.4-...... 0.6-...... 0.9-...... 1.1-
2010...... 0.5....... 0.2....... 0.4....... 0.6....... 0.8....... 1.1
Total benefits.............. 2008...... 21.1-..... 14.1-..... 28.5-..... 45.9-..... 65.0-..... 82.8-
2010...... 30.8...... 16........ 24.5...... 43.6...... 60........ 77.9
Net benefits................ 2008...... 15.9-..... 10.6-..... 21.4-..... 34.7-..... 48.3-..... 61.4-
2010...... 20.6...... 10.8...... 17.6...... 32.5...... 44.6...... 58.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-95--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($b) Under Augural Standards Using 3 Percent Discount
Rate--MYs 2022-2025 and Total for All MYs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology costs.............. 2008........ 18.5-....... 20.2-....... 24.9-....... 26.8-...... 140.3-
2010........ 16.1........ 18.1........ 21.7........ 23.3....... 133.7
Additional cost of maintaining 2008........ 1.5-........ 1.6-........ 1.7-........ 1.8-....... 10.0-
more advanced vehicles.
2010........ 1.2......... 1.6......... 1.9......... 2.1........ 9.0
Savings in lifetime fuel 2008........ 70.5-....... 76.9-....... 86.5-....... 94.9-...... 524.9-
expenditures.
2010........ 66.0........ 75.1........ 85.1........ 93.6....... 512.9
Consumer surplus from 2008........ 6.4-........ 7.0-........ 7.8-........ 8.5-....... 47.8-
additional driving.
2010........ 6.1......... 7.0......... 7.8......... 8.6........ 47.5
Value of savings in refueling 2008........ 2.3-........ 2.5-........ 2.8-........ 3.1-....... 17.3-
time.
2010........ 1.9......... 2.2......... 2.5......... 2.7........ 15.5
Reduction in petroleum market 2008........ 3.7-........ 4.0-........ 4.5-........ 4.9-....... 27.7-
externalities.
2010........ 3.4......... 3.9......... 4.4......... 4.7........ 26.7
Reduction in climate-related 2008........ 7.2-........ 7.9-........ 8.9-........ 9.9-....... 53.2-
damages from lower CO2
emissions.
[[Page 63081]]
2010........ 6.7......... 7.8......... 8.9......... 9.9........ 52.2
Value of reduced highway 2008........ 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.1-........ 0.2-....... 0.3-
fatalities from changes in
vehicle mass.
2010........ 0.1......... 0.1......... 0.1......... 0.2........ 0.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduction in health damage costs from lower emissions of criteria air pollutants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO............................ 2008........ 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.0-........ 0.0-....... 0.0-
2010........ 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0......... 0.0........ 0.0
VOC........................... 2008........ 0.1-........ 0.1-........ 0.1-........ 0.1-....... 0.7-
2010........ 0.1......... 0.1......... 0.1......... 0.1........ 0.6
NOX........................... 2008........ 0.2-........ 0.2-........ 0.2-........ 0.2-....... 1.2-
2010........ 0.2......... 0.2......... 0.2......... 0.2........ 1.2
PM............................ 2008........ 1.1-........ 1.2-........ 1.3-........ 1.4-....... 8.0-
2010........ 1.0......... 1.1......... 1.3......... 1.4........ 7.7
SOX........................... 2008........ 0.9-........ 1.0-........ 0.9-........ 0.9-....... 6.2-
2010........ 0.9......... 1.0......... 1.0......... 1.1........ 6.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dis-benefits from increased driving
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congestion costs.............. 2008........ 2.7-........ 3.0-........ 3.3-........ 3.7-....... 20.3-
2010........ 2.6......... 2.9......... 3.3......... 3.6........ 20.2
Noise costs................... 2008........ 0.1-........ 0.1-........ 0.1-........ 0.1-....... 0.4-
2010........ 0.0......... 0.1......... 0.1......... 0.1........ 0.4
Crash costs................... 2008........ 1.3-........ 1.4-........ 1.6-........ 1.7-....... 9.6-
2010........ 1.2......... 1.4......... 1.6......... 1.7........ 9.4
Total benefits................ 2008........ 92.3-....... 100.7-...... 113.1-...... 124.2-..... 687.5-
2010........ 86.4........ 98.3........ 111.3....... 122.5...... 671.4
Net benefits.................. 2008........ 68.2-....... 74.5-....... 81.6-....... 90.2-...... 507.0-
2010........ 65.2........ 74.2........ 82.8........ 91.7....... 498.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, Tables IV-96 and IV-97 below report technology outlays,
the individual components of benefits (including ``dis-benefits''
resulting from additional driving) and their total and net benefits
using the 7 percent discount rate. (Again, numbers in parentheses
represent negative values.)
Table IV-96--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($b) Under Final Standards Using 7 Percent Discount
Rate--MYs 2017-2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY
Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology costs............ 2008...... 4.0-...... 2.8-...... 5.4-...... 8.4-...... 12.8-..... 16.5-
2010...... 8.7....... 4.4....... 5.8....... 8.4....... 11.9...... 14.9
Additional cost of 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.3-...... 0.7-...... 1.0-...... 1.3-
maintaining more advanced
vehicles.
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.4....... 0.8....... 1.0
Savings in lifetime fuel 2008...... 12.4-..... 8.4-...... 16.9-..... 27.3-..... 38.7-..... 49.3-
expenditures.
2010...... 18.3...... 9.5....... 14.6...... 26.1...... 35.9...... 46.5
Consumer surplus from 2008...... 1.3-...... 0.8-...... 1.6-...... 2.5-...... 3.6-...... 4.5-
additional driving.
2010...... 1.8....... 0.9....... 1.4....... 2.4....... 3.3....... 4.3
Value of savings in 2008...... 0.5-...... 0.3-...... 0.6-...... 0.9-...... 1.3-...... 1.6-
refueling time.
2010...... 0.7....... 0.4....... 0.5....... 0.8....... 1.1....... 1.4
Reduction in petroleum 2008...... 0.7-...... 0.5-...... 0.9-...... 1.5-...... 2.1-...... 2.6-
market externalities.
2010...... 1.0....... 0.5....... 0.8....... 1.4....... 1.9....... 2.5
Reduction in climate-related 2008...... 1.5-...... 1.0-...... 2.1-...... 3.4-...... 4.9-...... 6.3-
damages from lower CO2
emissions.
2010...... 2.2....... 1.2....... 1.8....... 3.3....... 4.6....... 6.0
Value of reduced highway 2008...... -0.1-..... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-
fatalities from changes in
vehicle mass.
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduction in health damage costs from lower emissions of criteria air pollutants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO.......................... 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0
VOC......................... 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.1-...... 0.1-
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.1
NOX......................... 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.1-...... 0.1-...... 0.1-
2010...... 0.1....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.1....... 0.1....... 0.1
PM.......................... 2008...... 0.2-...... 0.1-...... 0.3-...... 0.4-...... 0.6-...... 0.8-
2010...... 0.3....... 0.1....... 0.2....... 0.4....... 0.6....... 0.7
SOX......................... 2008...... 0.2-...... 0.1-...... 0.2-...... 0.4-...... 0.5-...... 0.6-
[[Page 63082]]
2010...... 0.3....... 0.1....... 0.2....... 0.3....... 0.5....... 0.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dis-benefits from increased driving
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congestion costs............ 2008...... 0.6-...... 0.3-...... 0.7-...... 1.1-...... 1.5-...... 1.9-
2010...... (0.8)..... 0.4....... 0.6....... 1.1....... 1.4....... 1.8
Noise costs................. 2008...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-...... 0.0-
2010...... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0....... 0.0
Crash costs................. 2008...... 0.2-...... 0.2-...... 0.3-...... 0.5-...... 0.7-...... 0.9-
2010...... 0.4....... 0.2....... 0.3....... 0.5....... 0.7....... 0.9
Total benefits.............. 2008...... 16.8-..... 11.2-..... 22.7-..... 36.6-..... 51.9-..... 66.0-
2010...... 24.7...... 12.8...... 19.6...... 34.8...... 47.9...... 62.2
Net benefits................ 2008...... 11.9-..... 7.9-...... 16.1-..... 26.1-..... 36.0-..... 45.8-
2010...... 14.7...... 7.8....... 12.9...... 24.2...... 33.3...... 43.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-97--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($b) Under Augural Standards Using 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025 and Total for All
MYs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology costs............... 2008............... 18.5-............. 20.2-............. 24.9-............. 26.8-............. 140.3-
2010............... 16.1.............. 18.1.............. 21.7.............. 23.3.............. 133.7
Additional cost of maintaining 2008............... 1.5-.............. 1.6-.............. 1.7-.............. 1.8-.............. 10.0-
more advanced vehicles.
2010............... 1.2............... 1.6............... 1.9............... 2.1............... 9.0
Savings in lifetime fuel 2008............... 55.0-............. 60.0-............. 67.4-............. 74.0-............. 409.5-
expenditures.
2010............... 51.5.............. 58.6.............. 66.3.............. 72.9.............. 400.3
Consumer surplus from 2008............... 5.0-.............. 5.4-.............. 6.1-.............. 6.6-.............. 37.3-
additional driving.
2010............... 4.8............... 5.4............... 6.1............... 6.7............... 37.1
Value of savings in refueling 2008............... 1.8-.............. 2.0-.............. 2.2-.............. 2.4-.............. 13.6-
time.
2010............... 1.5............... 1.7............... 2.0............... 2.2............... 12.2
Reduction in petroleum market 2008............... 2.9-.............. 3.2-.............. 3.6-.............. 3.9-.............. 21.9-
externalities.
2010............... 2.7............... 3.1............... 3.4............... 3.7............... 21.1
Reduction in climate-related 2008............... 7.2-.............. 7.9-.............. 8.9-.............. 9.9-.............. 53.2-
damages from lower CO2
emissions.
2010............... 6.7............... 7.8............... 8.9............... 9.9............... 52.2
Value of reduced highway 2008............... 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.2-.............. 0.2-
fatalities from changes in
vehicle mass.
2010............... 0.1............... 0.0............... 0.1............... 0.2............... 0.3
Reduction in health damage
costs from lower emissions of
criteria air pollutants.
CO............................. 2008............... 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-
2010............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0
VOC............................ 2008............... 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.5-
2010............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.5
NOX............................ 2008............... 0.1-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.2-.............. 0.2-.............. 1.0-
2010............... 0.1............... 0.1............... 0.2............... 0.2............... 1.0
PM............................. 2008............... 0.9-.............. 0.9-.............. 1.0-.............. 1.1-.............. 6.4-
2010............... 0.8............... 0.9............... 1.0............... 1.1............... 6.2
SOX............................ 2008............... 0.7-.............. 0.8-.............. 0.7-.............. 0.7-.............. 4.9-
2010............... 0.7............... 0.8............... 0.8............... 0.9............... 5.1
Dis-benefits from increased
driving:.
Congestion costs............... 2008............... 2.1-.............. 2.3-.............. 2.6-.............. 2.9-.............. 16.0-
2010............... 2.0............... 2.3............... 2.6............... 2.9............... 15.9
Noise costs.................... 2008............... 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.0-.............. 0.1-.............. 0.3-
2010............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.0............... 0.1............... 0.3
Crash costs.................... 2008............... 1.0-.............. 1.1-.............. 1.2-.............. 1.4-.............. 7.5-
2010............... 1.0............... 1.1............... 1.2............... 1.3............... 7.4
Total benefits................. 2008............... 73.6-............. 80.4-............. 90.3-............. 99.1-............. 548.6-
2010............... 69................ 78.4.............. 88.8.............. 97.8.............. 536
Net benefits................... 2008............... 50.8-............. 55.5-............. 60.2-............. 66.7-............. 376.9-
2010............... 48.9.............. 55.7.............. 61.9.............. 68.6.............. 371.8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
These benefit and cost estimates do not reflect the availability
and use of certain flexibility mechanisms, such as compliance credits
and credit trading, because EPCA prohibits NHTSA from considering the
effects of those mechanisms in setting CAFE standards. However, the
agency notes that, in reality, manufacturers are likely to rely
[[Page 63083]]
to some extent on flexibility mechanisms and would thereby reduce the
cost of complying with the standards to a meaningful extent.
As discussed in the FRIA, NHTSA has performed an analysis to
estimate costs and benefits taking into account EPCA's provisions
regarding EVs, PHEVs produced before MY 2020, FFV credits, and other
CAFE credit provisions. Accounting for these provisions indicates that
achieved fuel economies would be 1.4-2.1 mpg lower than when these
provisions are not considered:
Table IV-98--NHTSA Estimated Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 39.5-............. 41.5-............. 43.8-............. 46.3-............. 47.9-
2010............... 39.4-............. 41.1-............. 43.3-............. 45.1-............. 47.1-
Light trucks................... 2008............... 29.3-............. 30.3-............. 31.9-............. 33.3-............. 35.2-
2010............... 28.8-............. 29.3-............. 31.3-............. 32.8-............. 34.9-
Combined....................... 2008............... 35.0-............. 36.6-............. 38.7-............. 40.8-............. 42.6-
2010............... 34.8-............. 36.0-............. 38.2-............. 39.9-............. 42.0-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-99--NHTSA Estimated Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008.................. 49.3-................. 50.0-................. 51.5-................ 52.9-
2010.................. 48.1.................. 49.6.................. 51.3................. 52.1
Light trucks...................... 2008.................. 36.1-................. 36.8-................. 37.9-................ 39.0-
2010.................. 35.5.................. 36.5.................. 37.4................. 37.6
Combined.......................... 2008.................. 43.8-................. 44.6-................. 46.0-................ 47.4-
2010.................. 42.9.................. 44.2.................. 45.6................. 46.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, NHTSA estimates that, when EPCA AFV and credit
provisions are taken into account, fuel savings will total about 170
billion gallons, as compared to the 180-184 billion gallons estimated
when these flexibilities are not considered:
Table IV-100--NHTSA Estimated Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 6-................... 3-................... 5-................... 8-................... 10-................. 12-
2010................. 6.................... 4.................... 5.................... 8.................... 10.................. 12
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1-................... 1-................... 2-................... 4-................... 6-.................. 8-
2010................. 2.................... 1.................... 2.................... 4.................... 6................... 8
Combined......................... 2008................. 6-................... 4-................... 7-................... 12-.................. 16-................. 20-
2010................. 8.................... 5.................... 7.................... 12................... 15.................. 20
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-101--NHTSA Estimated Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 14-............... 15-............... 17-............... 19-............... 107-
2010............... 13................ 15................ 17................ 18................ 108
Light trucks................... 2008............... 9-................ 10-............... 11-............... 12-............... 63-
2010............... 8................. 9................. 10................ 11................ 62
Combined....................... 2008............... 23-............... 25-............... 28-............... 31-............... 170-
2010............... 22................ 24................ 28................ 29................ 169
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency similarly estimates CO2 emissions reductions
will total 1,832-1,843 million metric tons (mmt), as compared to the
1,953-1,987 mmt estimated when these EPCA provisions are not
considered:\1290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1290\ Differences in the application of diesel engines and
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles lead to differences in the
percentage changes in fuel consumption and carbon dioxide emissions
between the with- and without-credit cases.
[[Page 63084]]
Table IV-102--NHTSA Estimated Avoided Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 60-.................. 32-.................. 55-.................. 82-.................. 112-................ 131-
2010................. 66................... 39................... 56................... 85................... 105................. 130
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 8-................... 10-.................. 24-.................. 44-.................. 64-................. 86-
2010................. 22................... 13................... 18................... 46................... 60.................. 82
Combined......................... 2008................. 68-.................. 43-.................. 79-.................. 126-................. 176-................ 217-
2010................. 89................... 52................... 73................... 131.................. 166................. 213
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-103--NHTSA Estimated Avoided Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 149-.............. 161-.............. 181-.............. 197-.............. 1,158-
2010............... 144............... 163............... 185............... 197............... 1,171
Light trucks................... 2008............... 98-............... 105-.............. 116-.............. 128-.............. 684-
2010............... 91................ 102............... 112............... 115............... 662
Combined....................... 2008............... 247-.............. 266-.............. 297-.............. 325-.............. 1,843-
2010............... 234............... 265............... 298............... 312............... 1,832
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This analysis further indicates that significant reductions in
outlays for additional technology will result when EPCA's AFV and
credit provisions are taken into account. Tables IV-104 and IV-105
below show that, total technology costs are estimated to decline to
about $120 billion as a result of manufacturers' use of these
provisions, as compared to the $134-140 billion estimated when
excluding these flexibilities:
Table IV-104--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Technology Outlays ($ Billion) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 3-................... 2-................... 4-................... 6-................... 8-.................. 11-
2010................. 5.................... 3.................... 4.................... 6.................... 8................... 9
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 0-................... 1-................... 1-................... 2-................... 3-.................. 4-
2010................. 2.................... 1.................... 1.................... 2.................... 3................... 5
Combined......................... 2008................. 4-................... 2-................... 5-................... 7-................... 11-................. 14-
2010................. 6.................... 4.................... 5.................... 8.................... 11.................. 14
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-105--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Technology Outlays ($ Billion) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 12-............... 13-............... 16-............... 17-............... 92-
2010............... 10................ 11................ 14................ 14................ 85
Light trucks................... 2008............... 4-................ 5-................ 5-................ 6-................ 30-
2010............... 5................. 5................. 6................. 6................. 35
Combined....................... 2008............... 16-............... 18-............... 21-............... 23-............... 121-
2010............... 15................ 17................ 20................ 20................ 120
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because NHTSA's analysis indicated that these EPCA provisions will
modestly reduce fuel savings and related benefits, the agency's
estimate of the present value of total benefits is $629-639 billion
when discounted at a 3 percent annual rate, as Tables IV-106 and IV-107
below report. This estimate of total benefits is lower than the $671-
688 billion reported previously for the analysis that excluded these
provisions:
[[Page 63085]]
Table IV-106--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($ Billion) Under Final Standards Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate-- MYs 2017-2021
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 19.7-................ 10.8-................ 18.7-................ 27.8-................ 38.4-............... 45.2-
2010................. 21.8................. 12.9................. 18.7................. 28.9................. 36.................. 44.9
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 2.7-................. 3.4-................. 8.0-................. 14.8-................ 21.5-............... 29.2-
2010................. 7.2.................. 4.4.................. 5.9.................. 15................... 19.9................ 27.6
Combined......................... 2008................. 22.4-................ 14.2-................ 26.6-................ 42.5-................ 59.8-............... 74.4-
2010................. 29................... 17.3................. 24.6................. 43.8................. 55.8................ 72.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-107--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($ Billion) Under Augural Standards Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate-- MYs 2022-2025
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 51.9-............. 56.8-............. 64.4-............. 71.1-............. 404.8-
2010............... 49.9.............. 57................ 65.4.............. 70.2.............. 405.6
Light trucks................... 2008............... 33.4-............. 36.0-............. 40.3-............. 44.8-............. 234.2-
2010............... 30.6.............. 34.7.............. 38.7.............. 40.2.............. 224.1
Combined....................... 2008............... 85.2-............. 92.7-............. 104.6-............ 115.9-............ 638.5-
2010............... 80.3.............. 91.6.............. 104............... 110.2............. 629.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, NHTSA estimates that the present value of total benefits
will decline modestly from its previous estimate when future fuel
savings and other benefits are discounted at the higher 7 percent rate.
Tables IV-108 and IV-109 report that the present value of benefits from
requiring higher fuel economy for MY 2017-25 cars and light trucks will
total $502-510 billion when discounted using a 7 percent rate, as
compared to the previous $536-549 billion estimate of total benefits
when FFV credits were not permitted:
Table IV-108--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($ Billion) Under Final Standards Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate-- MYs 2017-2021
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 15.8-................ 8.7-................. 15.0-................ 22.3-................ 30.8-............... 36.2-
2010................. 17.4................. 10.3................. 15................... 23.1................. 28.8................ 36
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 2.1-................. 2.7-................. 6.3-................. 11.8-................ 17.1-............... 23.2-
2010................. 5.7.................. 3.5.................. 4.7.................. 11.9................. 15.8................ 21.9
Combined......................... 2008................. 17.9-................ 11.4-................ 21.3-................ 34.0-................ 47.8-............... 59.4-
2010................. 23.2................. 13.8................. 19.6................. 35................... 44.6................ 57.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-109--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($ Billion) Under Augural Standards Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 41.6-............. 45.5-............. 51.6-............. 57.0-............. 324.3-
2010............... 40................ 45.7.............. 52.5.............. 56.2.............. 325
Light trucks................... 2008............... 26.5-............. 28.6-............. 32.0-............. 35.5-............. 185.7-
2010............... 24.3.............. 27.5.............. 30.7.............. 31.8.............. 177.7
Combined....................... 2008............... 68.0-............. 74.0-............. 83.5-............. 92.5-............. 509.7-
2010............... 64.1.............. 73.1.............. 83................ 88................ 502.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the discounted present value of total benefits will be
modestly lower when EPCA AFV and credit provisions are taken into
account, the agency estimates that these provisions will reduce net
benefits by a smaller proportion. As Tables IV-110 and IV-111 show, the
agency estimates that these will reduce net benefits from the CAFE
standards to $475-483 billion from the previously-reported estimate of
$498-507 billion without those credits.
[[Page 63086]]
Table IV-110--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($ Billion) Under Final Standards Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 15 -................. 8 -.................. 14 -................. 20 -................. 28 -................ 32 -
2010................. 16................... 9.................... 14................... 21................... 26.................. 33
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 2 -.................. 3 -.................. 7 -.................. 12 -................. 18 -................ 24 -
2010................. 5.................... 3.................... 5.................... 12................... 16.................. 22
Combined......................... 2008................. 18 -................. 11 -................. 21 -................. 33 -................. 45 -................ 56 -
2010................. 21................... 13................... 18................... 33................... 42.................. 55
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-111--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($ Billion) Under Augural Standards Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 37 -.............. 40 -.............. 45 -.............. 50 -.............. 289 -
2010............... 36................ 42................ 47................ 51................ 296
Light trucks................... 2008............... 28 -.............. 30 -.............. 34 -.............. 37 -.............. 194 -
2010............... 24................ 28................ 31................ 33................ 179
Combined....................... 2008............... 64 -.............. 70 -.............. 79 -.............. 87 -.............. 483 -
2010............... 61................ 70................ 78................ 84................ 475
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, Tables IV-112 and IV-113 below show that NHTSA estimates
manufacturers' use of EPCA AFV and credit provisions will reduce net
benefits from requiring higher fuel economy for MY 2017-25 cars and
light trucks--to $356-362 billion--if a 7 percent discount rate is
applied to future benefits. This estimate is approximately 4% less than
the previously-reported $372-377 billion estimate of net benefits
without the availability of EPCA AFV and credit provisions using that
same discount rate.
Table IV-112--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($ Billion) Under Final Standards Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 12-.................. 6-................... 11-.................. 15-.................. 20-................. 24-
2010................. 12................... 7.................... 10................... 16................... 20.................. 24
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 2-................... 2-................... 5-................... 9-................... 14-................. 19-
2010................. 4.................... 2.................... 3.................... 9.................... 12.................. 16
Combined......................... 2008................. 13-.................. 8-................... 16-.................. 25-.................. 34-................. 42-
2010................. 16................... 9.................... 13................... 25................... 32.................. 41
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-113--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($ Billion) Under Augural Standards Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025
[With EPCA AFV and credit provisions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 27-............... 30-............... 33-............... 36-............... 214-
2010............... 27................ 31................ 35................ 38................ 221
Light trucks................... 2008............... 21-............... 23-............... 26-............... 28-............... 148-
2010............... 18................ 21................ 23................ 25................ 135
Combined....................... 2008............... 48-............... 52-............... 59-............... 65-............... 362-
2010............... 46................ 52................ 59................ 63................ 356
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this final rule, NHTSA has included an analysis that accounts
for the cumulative costs and benefits of the final fuel economy
standards that affect MY 2011-2021 vehicles and the augural standards
that affect MY 2022-2025 vehicles. This analysis enables the agency to
assess the cumulative effects of previously adopted CAFE standards for
MY 2011 and MY 2012-2016, as well as the final standards for MY 2017-
2021 and augural standards for MY 2022-2025 that this final rule
presents. The table below shows the total fuel savings, reductions in
carbon dioxide emissions, and social costs and benefits resulting from
the sequence of CAFE standards established for MYs 2011-21, as well as
program totals with the inclusion of the augural standards for MY 2022-
2025. Each of these impacts is measured against a baseline that assumes
the CAFE standards for MY 2010 would have been extended to
[[Page 63087]]
apply to MYs 2011-25 if the agency had not developed standards for
those model years.
As is the case elsewhere in this preamble, the table below
represents the estimated impact of the CAFE rules based on required
fuel economy levels, excluding consideration of credit banking,
transfers and trading, dedicated alternative fuel vehicles, and dual
fuel vehicles operating on alternative fuels, as required under EPCA/
EISA. The technology costs reported in the table represent the costs of
technologies used by manufacturers to increase fuel economy to the
levels required by the higher standards. (These cost estimates are the
same whether we use a 3 percent or 7 percent discount rate to discount
future benefits or costs, because they occur at the time the vehicle is
purchased, so no discounting is involved.) The discounted social costs
include the technology costs associated with the sequence of standards,
as well monetized social costs associated with any increases in traffic
congestion, noise, accidents and fatalities that occur in response to
the increases in fuel economy resulting from compliance with the
standards.
Instead of using the estimated impacts from previous regulatory
analyses accompanying the standards for MY 2011 and MYs 2012-16, the
costs and benefits provided in this analysis are estimated using the
current version of the CAFE model. Thus, they are based on the agency's
most up-to-date estimates of the costs of technologies that are
available to improve fuel economy. All costs from previous years are
adjusted to 2010 dollars using the implicit price deflator for gross
domestic product (GDP).
Table IV-114 illustrates that the combined effects of the
previously established CAFE standards for MY 2011 and MY 2012-2016,
together with the final CAFE standards for MY 2017-2021 and augural
CAFE standards for MY 2022-2025 presented in this final rule, would be
to save 450-520 billion gallons of fuel, reduce CO2
emissions by 4.9-5.7 billion metric tons, and provide net economic
benefits in excess of $1 trillion.
Table IV-114--NHTSA Summary of Estimated Impacts From All Final and Augural Standards for MY 2011-2025 Light Duty Vehicles
[Compared to Continuation of MY 2010 Standards]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011-2016 2011-2021 2011-2025
MY baseline -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PC LT Combined PC LT Combined PC LT Combined
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel saved (b gallons)....... 2008....... 59-........ 41-........ 100-...... 176-...... 118-...... 294-...... 313-...... 208-...... 520-
2010....... 42......... 33......... 75........ 144....... 102....... 246....... 266....... 183....... 449
Oil saved (billion barrels).. 2008....... 1.4-....... 1.0-....... 2.4-...... 4.2-...... 2.8-...... 7.0-...... 7.5-...... 5.0-...... 12.4-
2010....... 1.0........ 0.8........ 1.8....... 3.4....... 2.4....... 5.9....... 6.3....... 4.4....... 10.7
Retail fuel savings, 2008....... 177-....... 121-....... 298-...... 541-...... 358-...... 899-...... 980-...... 642-...... 1,622-
discounted at 3% ($B). 2010....... 126........ 96......... 222....... 444....... 305....... 749....... 835....... 562....... 1,397
CO2 saved (mmt).............. 2008....... 645-....... 447-....... 1,092-.... 1,914-.... 1,286-.... 3,200-.... 3,399-.... 2,260-.... 5,659-
2010....... 458........ 353........ 811....... 1,568..... 1,095..... 2,663..... 2,894..... 1,979..... 4,873
Discounted social benefits, 2008....... 212-....... 144-....... 355-...... 648-...... 426-...... 1,072-.... 1,176-.... 765-...... 1,939-
3% ($B). 2010....... 149........ 114........ 263....... 527....... 362....... 889....... 996....... 668....... 1,662
Technology costs ($B)........ 2008....... 33-........ 20-........ 53-....... 106-...... 57-....... 163-...... 204-...... 99-....... 303-
2010....... 27......... 18......... 44........ 92........ 56........ 147....... 172....... 98........ 270
Discounted social costs, 3% 2008....... 44-........ 26-........ 70-....... 233-...... 140-...... 372-...... 393-...... 236-...... 627-
($B). 2010....... 34......... 23......... 57........ 187....... 123....... 309....... 318....... 207....... 522
Discounted net benefits, 3%.. 2008....... 168-....... 118-....... 285-...... 415-...... 286-...... 700-...... 783-...... 529-...... 1,312-
2010....... 115........ 91......... 206....... 340....... 239....... 580....... 678....... 461....... 1,140
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency performed a number of sensitivity analyses to examine
important assumptions. All sensitivity analyses were based on the
``standard setting'' output of the CAFE model, and are based solely
upon the 2010 baseline fleet. We examine sensitivity with respect to
the following economic parameters:
The price of gasoline: The main analysis uses the Reference
Case AEO 2012 Early Release estimate for the price of gasoline. As the
AEO 2012 Early Release does not contain Low and High Price Cases,
ranges derived from the Low and High Price Cases from the AEO 2011 were
utilized in conjunction with the Reference Case AEO 2012 Early Release
to study the effect of the Low and High Price Cases on the model
results.
The rebound effect: The main analysis uses a rebound effect of
10 percent to project increased miles traveled as the cost per mile
driven decreases. In the sensitivity analysis, we examine the effect of
using a 5, 15, or 20 percent rebound effect instead.
The value of CO2 benefits: The main analysis uses
$22 per ton discounted at a 3 percent discount rate to quantify the
benefits of reducing CO2 emissions and $0.199 per gallon to
quantify the benefits of reducing fuel consumption. In the sensitivity
analysis, we examine the following values and discount rates applied
only to the social cost of carbon to value carbon benefits, considering
valuations of approximately $5, $36, and $68 per ton, at discount rates
of 5 percent (model average), 2.5 percent (model average) and 3 percent
(95th percentile), respectively, with regard to the benefits of
reducing CO2 emissions.\1291\ These are the 2010 values,
which increase over time. These values can be translated into cents per
gallon by multiplying by 0.0089,\1292\ giving the following values:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1291\ The low, high, and very high valuations of $5, $36, and
$67 are rounded for brevity. While the model uses the unrounded
values, the use of unrounded values is not intended to imply that
the chosen values are precisely accurate to the nearest cent;
rather, they are average levels resulting from the many published
studies on the topic.
\1292\ The molecular weight of Carbon (C) is 12, the molecular
weight of Oxygen (O) is 16, thus the molecular weight of
CO2 is 44. 1 gallon of gas weighs 2,819 grams, of that
2,433 grams are carbon. One ton of CO2/One ton of C (44/
12)* 2433grams C/gallon *1 ton/1000kg * 1 kg/1000g = (44 *
2433*1*1)/(12*1*1000 * 1000) = 0.0089. Thus, one ton of
CO2*0.0089 = 1 gallon of gasoline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[cir] ($4.91 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.044 per gallon
discounted at 5%
[cir] ($22.22 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.198 per gallon
discounted at 3%
[[Page 63088]]
(used in the main analysis)
[cir] ($36.49 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.325 per gallon
discounted at 2.5%
[cir] And a 95th percentile estimate of
[cir] ($67.55 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.601 per gallon
discounted at 3%
Global Warming Potential (non-CO2 GHG benefits):
The main analysis does not monetize benefits associated with the
reduction of non-CO2 GHGs (methane, nitrous oxide, HFC-
134a). This sensitivity analysis uses a GWP approach to convert non-
CO2 gases to CO2-equivalence to monetize these
benefits using the same methods with which the benefits of
CO2 reductions are valued.
Military security: The main analysis does not assign a value
to the military security benefits of reducing fuel consumption. In the
sensitivity analysis, we examine the impact of using a value of 12
cents per gallon instead.
Consumer Benefit: The main analysis assumes there is no loss
in value to consumers resulting from vehicles that have an increase in
price and higher fuel economy. This sensitivity analysis assumes that
there is a 25, or 50 percent loss in value to consumers--equivalent to
the assumption that consumers will only value the calculated benefits
they will achieve at 75, or 50 percent, respectively, of the main
analysis estimates.
Post-warranty repair costs: The main analysis includes repair
costs during the warranty period; post-warranty repair costs are
addressed in a sensitivity analysis. The warranty period is assumed to
be 5 years for the powertrain and 3 years for the rest of the vehicle.
This sensitivity analysis scales the frequency of repair by vehicle
survival rates, assumes that per-vehicle repair costs during the post-
warranty period are the same as in the in-warranty period, and that
repair costs are proportional to incremental direct costs (therefore
vehicles with additional components will have increased repair costs).
Battery cost: The agency conducted a sensitivity analysis of
battery costs for HEV, PHEV and EV technologies. The ranges for battery
costs are based on the recommendations from the technical experts in
the field of battery energy storage technologies at Department of
Energy (DOE) and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). These ranges of
battery costs are developed using the Battery Performance and Cost
(BatPaC) model developed by ANL and funded by DOE.\1293\ The values for
these ranges are shown in Table IV-115 and are calculated with 95%
confidence interval after analyzing the confidence bound using the
BatPaC model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1293\ Section 3.4.3.9 in TSD Chapter 3 has detailed
descriptions of the history of the BatPac model and how the agencies
used the BatPac model in this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM central analysis, EPA developed direct manufacturing
costs (DMC) for battery systems using ANL's BatPaC model. For this
sensitivity analysis, NHTSA scaled these central battery system costs
by the percentages shown in Table IV-115, per guidance from DOE and ANL
experts on reasonable ranges for these costs.
Table IV-115--NHTSA Suggested Confidence Bounds as a Percentage of the Calculated Point Estimate for a Graphite-
Based Li-ion Battery Using the Default Inputs in BatPac
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Confidence interval
Battery type Cathodes ---------------------------
Lower (%) Upper (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEV............................................. LMO, LFP, NCA, NMC................ -10 10
PHEV, EV........................................ NMC, NCA.......................... -10 20
PHEV, EV........................................ LMO, LFP.......................... -20 35
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figures IV-4 to IV-8 show these battery system DMCs in terms of $/
kW for HEV and $/kWh for 20-mile range PHEV (PHEV20), 40-mile range
PHEV (PHEV40), 75-mile range EV (EV75), 100-mile range EV (EV100) and
150-mile range EV (EV150). We note that battery system cost varies with
vehicle subclasses and driving range. Smaller batteries tend to be
relatively more expensive per kWh because the cost for the battery
management system, disconnect units and baseline thermal management
system is the same from vehicle to vehicle for each type of
electrification system, such as HEV, PHEV and EV (but varies between
different electrification systems) and this cost is spread over fewer
kWh for smaller vehicle. For example, the battery system cost for EVs
ranges from $221/kWh for subcompact cars for EV75, to $160/kWh for
large trucks for EV150 in MY 2021. Note: the agencies do not apply PHEV
or EV technology to large MPVs/minivans or large trucks; however, the
estimated costs of such a system are shown here for completeness.
[[Page 63089]]
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[[Page 63090]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.034
[[Page 63091]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.035
For the reader's reference, this sensitivity was conducted using
what the agency refers to as ``standard setting'' analytical runs, in
which the agency restricts the operation of the model consistent with
statutory requirements related to how the agency may determine maximum
feasible CAFE standards (for example, the standard setting runs do not
include EVs, because NHTSA may not consider the fuel economy of EVs
when setting maximum feasible CAFE standards, nor do they consider
PHEVs prior to MY 2020, for the same reason), as compared to the
``real-world'' analysis, in which the agency attempts to model how
manufacturers might respond to the standards (and regulatory
alternatives) taking account of all available technologies and
compliance flexibilities. NHTSA used the ``standard setting'' runs for
this sensitivity analysis to show the regulatory impact of the battery
cost. In the ``standard setting'' runs, NHTSA included 30-mile range
PHEV (PHEV30) only after MY 2019 to represent all PHEVs, the cost of
which is the average cost of PHEV20 and PHEV40. NHTSA did not apply any
EVs in this analysis.
Mass reduction cost: Due to the wide range of mass
reduction cost as stated in TSD Chapter 3, a sensitivity analysis was
performed examining the impact of the cost of vehicle mass reduction to
the total technology cost. The direct manufacturing cost (DMC) for mass
reduction is represented as a linear function between the unit DMC
versus percent of mass reduction as shown in Figure IV-10. The slope of
this line used for NPRM central analysis is $4.36 (2010$) per pound per
percent of mass reduction. The slope of the line is varied
40% as the upper and lower bound for this sensitivity study. The values
for the range of mass reduction cost are shown in Table IV-116.
Table IV-116--NHTSA Bounds for Mass Reduction Direct Manufacturing Cost
[2010$]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example unit Example total
Slope of mass direct direct
Sensitivity bound reduction line manufacture cost manufacture cost
[$/(lb-%MR)] \1\ [$/lb] \2\ [$/lb]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lower Bound............................................... $2.61 $0.39 $235
NPRM Central Analysis..................................... 4.36 0.65 392
Upper Bound............................................... 6.10 0.92 549
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes
\1\ Example is based on 15% mass reduction.
Unit direct manufacturing cost [$/lb] = Slope x Percent of Mass Reduction.
\2\ Example is based on 15% mass reduction for a 4000-lb vehicle.
Total direct manufacturing cost $[] = Unit Direct Manufacturing Cost x Amount of Mass Reduction.
[[Page 63092]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.036
Market-driven response: The baseline for the central
analysis is based on the MY 2016 CAFE standards and assumes that
manufacturers will make no changes in the fuel economy from that level
through MY 2025. A sensitivity analysis was performed to simulate
potential increases in fuel economy over the compliance level required
if MY 2016 standards were to remain in place. The assumption is that
the market would drive manufacturers to put technologies into their
vehicles that they believe consumers would value and be willing to pay
for. Using parameter values consistent with the central analysis, the
agency simulated a market-driven response baseline by applying a
payback period of one year for purposes of calculating the value of
future fuel savings when simulating whether manufacturers would apply
additional technology to an already CAFE-compliant fleet. In other
words we assumed that manufacturers that were above their MY 2016 CAFE
level would compare the cost to consumers to the fuel savings in the
first year of operation and decide to voluntarily apply those
technologies to their vehicles when benefits for the first year
exceeded costs for the consumer. For a manufacturer's fleet that that
has not yet achieved compliance with CAFE standards, the agency
continued to apply a five-year payback period. In other words, for this
sensitivity analysis the agency assumed that manufacturers that have
not yet met CAFE standards for future model years will apply technology
as if buyers were willing to pay for the technologies as long as the
fuel savings throughout the first five years of vehicle ownership
exceeded their costs. Once having complied with those standards,
however, manufacturers are assumed to consider making further
improvements in fuel economy as if buyers were only willing to pay for
fuel savings to be realized during the first year of vehicle ownership.
The `market-drive response' analysis assumes manufacturers will
overcomply if additional technology is sufficiently cost effective.
Because this assumption has a greater impact under the baseline
standards, its application reduces the incremental costs, effects, and
benefits attributable to the new standards. This does not mean costs,
effects, and benefits would actually be smaller with a market-driven
response; rather it means costs, effects, and benefits would be at
least as great, but would be partially attributable not to the new
standards, but instead to the market.
Transmission shift optimization technology disabled: As
part of the simulation work for the final rule, ANL attempted to
replicate the shift optimizer technology but was not able to identify
any significant fuel consumption reductions. For this reason a
sensitivity case analysis was conducted with the transmission shift
optimizer technology disabled.
Varying each of the above 10 parameters in isolation results in a
variety of economic scenarios. These are listed in Table IV-117 below
along with the preferred alternative.
[[Page 63093]]
Table IV-117--List of NHTSA Economic Sensitivity Analyses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military
Name Fuel price Discount rate Rebound SCC ($) security
(%) effect (%) ([cent]/gal)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reference................................... Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
High Fuel Price............................. High...................................... 3 10 22 0
Low Fuel Price.............................. Low....................................... 3 10 22 0
5% Rebound Effect........................... Reference................................. 3 5 22 0
15% Rebound Effect.......................... Reference................................. 3 15 22 0
20% Rebound Effect.......................... Reference................................. 3 20 22 0
12[cent]/gal Military Security Value........ Reference................................. 3 10 22 12
$5/ton CO2 Value............................ Reference................................. 3 10 5 0
$36/ton CO2 Value........................... Reference................................. 3 10 36 0
$68/ton CO2 Value........................... Reference................................. 3 10 68 0
Global Warming Potential.................... Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
50% Consumer Benefit........................ Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
75% Consumer Benefit........................ Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
Post-Warranty Repair Costs.................. Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
Low Battery Cost............................ Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
High Battery Cost........................... Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
Low Cost Mass Reduction..................... Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
High Cost Mass Reduction.................... Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
Market-Driven Response...................... Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
No Shift Optimization....................... Reference................................. 3 10 22 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The basic results of these sensitivity analyses are contained in
Chapter X of the FRIA, but several selected findings are as follows:
Varying the economic assumptions has almost no impact on
achieved mpg. The mass reduction cost sensitivities, battery cost
reduction sensitivities, market-based baseline sensitivity, and no
shift optimization sensitivity cases are the only instances in which
achieved mpg differs from the reference case of the Preferred
Alternative. None of these alter the outcome by more than 0.3 mpg for
either fleet.
Varying the economic assumptions has, at most, a small
impact on per-vehicle costs, with only the no shift optimization
variation affecting the per-vehicle cost by more than 10 percent from
the central analysis level. Similarly, fuel saved and CO2
emissions reductions vary only slightly across the sensitivity cases,
where the only substantial impact results from the market-driven
baseline sensitivity in which voluntary overcompliance reduces the
number of gallons of fuel saved as well as the quantity of
CO2 emissions by just under 28 percent.
The category most affected by variations in the economic
parameters considered in these sensitivity analyses is net benefits.
The sensitivity analyses examining the AEO low and high fuel price
scenarios demonstrate the potential to negatively impact net benefits
by up to 38 percent or to increase them by about 32 percent relative to
those of the Preferred Alternative. Other large impacts on net benefits
occurred with the $68/ton CO2 valuation, in which net
benefits increased by nearly 22 percent, the market-driven baseline,
which reduces net benefits by close to 32 percent, and (as expected)
the 50 and 75 percent consumer fuel savings valuation cases, which
decrease net benefits by approximately 52 and 26 percent, respectively.
Even if consumers value the benefits achieved at 50% of
the main analysis assumptions, total benefits still exceed costs, with
net benefits greater than $135 billion.
Regarding the lower fuel savings and CO2 emissions
reductions predicted by the sensitivity analysis as fuel price
increases, which initially may seem counterintuitive, we note that
there are some counterbalancing factors occurring. As fuel price
increases, people will drive less and so fuel savings and
CO2 emissions reductions may decrease.
The agency performed two additional sensitivity analyses presented
in Tables IV-118 through IV-120. First, the agency analyzed the impact
that having a retail price equivalent (RPE) factor of 1.5 for all
technologies would have on the various alternatives instead of using
the indirect cost methodology (ICM). The ICM methodology results in an
overall markup factor of 1.2 to 1.25 compared to the RPE markup factor
from variable cost of 1.5. Next, the agency conducted a separate
sensitivity analysis using values that were derived from the 2011 NAS
report.\2\ This analysis used an RPE markup factor of 1.5 for non-
electrification technologies, which is consistent with the NAS
estimation for technologies manufactured by suppliers, and a RPE markup
factor of 1.33 for electrification technologies (HEV, PHEV and EV);
three types of learning which include no learning for mature
technologies, 1.25 percent annual learning for evolutionary
technologies, and 2.5 percent annual learning for revolutionary
technologies; technology cost estimates for 52 percent (33 out of 63)
technologies; and technology effectiveness estimates for 56 percent (35
out of 63) of technologies. Cost learning was applied to technology
costs in a manner similar to how cost learning is applied in the
central analysis for many technologies which have base costs which are
applicable to recent or near-term future model years. As noted above,
the cost learning factors used for the sensitivity case are different
than the values used in the central analysis. For the other inputs in
the sensitivity case, where the NAS study has inconsistent information
or lacks projections, NHTSA used the same input values that were used
in the central analysis.
[[Page 63094]]
Table IV-118--NHTSA Estimated Achieved MPG Level, MY 2025, Comparing Different Cost Mark-Up Methodologies
[3% Discount rate]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICM Method RPE Method
(main analysis (main analysis Difference
costs) costs) (mpg)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred Alternative..................................... 54.07 53.92 0.16
Max Net Benefits.......................................... 56.52 56.42 0.10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred Alternative..................................... 39.29 39.14 0.15
Max Net Benefits.......................................... 43.66 43.56 0.10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-119--NHTSA Estimated Achieved MPG Level, MY 2025, Comparing ICM Method With Main Analysis Costs vs. NAS
Costs
[3% Discount rate]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICM Method
(main analysis ICM Method (NAS Difference
costs) Cost estimates) (mpg)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred Alternative..................................... 54.07 52.78 1.29
Max Net Benefits.......................................... 56.52 55.32 1.20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred Alternative..................................... 39.29 37.71 1.58
Max Net Benefits.......................................... 43.66 43.27 0.39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-120--NHTSA Sensitivity Analyses
[Estimated Achieved mpg, per-vehicle cost, net benefits, fuel saved, and CO2 emissions reduced]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average MY MY 2017-2025
2025 per- net benefits, MY 2017-2025 MY 2017-2025
Cost method and set of cost MY 2025 vehicle discounted 3%, fuel saved, in CO2 Emissions
estimates Achieved mpg technology in millions of millions of reduced, in
cost $ gallons mmT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICM w/Main Analysis Costs....... 54.07 $1,578 $293,062 109,852 2,384
RPE w/Main Analysis Costs....... 53.92 1,943 273,307 107,200 2,325
ICM w/NAS Costs................. 52.78 2,103 242,912 100,496 2,155
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICM w/Main Analysis Costs....... 39.29 1,226 175,793 61,984 1,333
RPE w/Main Analysis Costs....... 39.14 1,491 181,243 65,083 1,397
ICM w/NAS Costs................. 37.71 1,375 154,597 56,337 1,217
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For today's rulemaking analysis, as for the NPRM, the agency has
also performed a sensitivity analysis where manufacturers are allowed
to voluntarily apply more technology than would be required to comply
with CAFE standards for each model year. Manufacturers are assumed to
do so as long as applying each additional technology would increase
vehicle production costs (including markup) by less than it would
reduce buyers' fuel costs during the first year they own the vehicle.
This analysis makes use of the ``voluntary overcompliance'' simulation
capability DOT has recently added to its CAFE model. This capability,
which is discussed further above in section IV.C.4.c and in the CAFE
model documentation, is a logical extension of the model's simulation
of some manufacturers' decisions to respond to EPCA by paying civil
penalties once additional technology becomes economically unattractive.
It attempts to simulate manufacturers' responses to buyers' demands for
higher fuel economy levels than prevailing CAFE standards would require
when fuel costs are sufficiently high, and technologies that
manufacturers have not yet fully utilized are available to improve fuel
economy at relatively low costs.
NHTSA introduced this analysis for the NPRM because some
stakeholders commenting on the recently-promulgated standards for
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles had indicated that it would be
unrealistic for the agency to
[[Page 63095]]
assume that in the absence of new regulations, technology and fuel
economy would not improve at all in the future. In other words, these
stakeholders argued that market forces are likely to result in some
fuel economy improvements over time, as potential vehicle buyers and
manufacturers respond to changes in fuel prices and in the availability
and costs of technologies to increase fuel economy. NHTSA agreed that,
in principle, its analysis should estimate a potential that
manufacturers will apply technology as if buyers place some value on
fuel economy improvements. Considering uncertainties discussed below
regarding the degree to which manufacturers will do so, the agency
judged it appropriate to conduct its central rulemaking analysis
without attempting to simulate these effects. Nonetheless, the agency
considered voluntary overcompliance sufficiently plausible to warrant
corresponding sensitivity analysis.
In the NPRM, NHTSA invited comment on this sensitivity analysis, in
particular regarding the reasonableness of the assumption that
manufacturers might consider further fuel economy improvements,
depending on technology costs and fuel prices; the reasonableness of
the agency's approach (comparing technology costs to the present value
of fuel savings over some payback period) to simulating such decisions;
and what payback period (or periods) would most likely to reflect
manufacturers' decisions regarding technology application through
MY2025.
Several environmental organizations submitted comments on NHTSA's
analysis. The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) commented that the
agency's baseline ``suggests a much lower fuel efficiency increase
driven solely by market forces than actual experience demonstrates
occurs.'' \1294\ The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) commented
that manufacturers might add more technology than required by
standards, but that such decisions are too uncertain to be included in
NHTSA's baseline projection. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
commented that, given relatively stable future fuel prices, and given
provisions allowing credit transfers between manufacturers,
manufacturers will not likely overcomply with MY2016 standards, on
average, after MY2016. The American Council for an Energy-Efficient
Economy (ACEEE) commented that the historical record contains little
evidence of sustained fuel economy increases absent sustained increases
in fuel economy standards. ACEEE also commented that an alternative
``non-flat'' baseline would reduce NHTSA's estimates of the benefits
(and costs) of the new standards, the net effect being a reduction in
the cost-effectiveness of the standards, because the most cost-
effective technologies are the ones that will appear in the alternative
baseline scenario, leaving the more expensive technologies for the rule
to bring into the market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1294\ CBD, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, several stakeholders on the ``payback period'' NHTSA
should apply in its analysis. EDF indicated that any payback period
shorter than five years would not accurately reflect the current and
forecasted buying trends of consumers. The Sierra Club also submitted
comments suggesting a five-year payback period. Volkswagen commented
that buyers' preferences will suggest payback periods of less than four
years. The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
commented that analysis in 2010 by David Greene supported an average
payback period of three years.\1295\ NADA commented that analysis based
on a payback period oversimplifies the calculation of consumer
benefits, but did not comment on the payback period as basis to
estimate the potential that manufacturers might add technology beyond
that required by regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1295\ Greene, David 2010. ``Uncertainty, loss aversion, and
markets for energy efficiency'', Energy Economics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA recognizes the uncertainty inherent in forecasting whether
and to what extent the average fuel economy level of light-duty
vehicles will continue to increase beyond the level necessary to meet
regulatory standards. However, because market forces could
independently result in changes to the future light-duty vehicle fleet
even in the absence of agency action, to the extent they can be
estimated, those changes should be incorporated into the baseline. As a
result, today's final rule continues to present impacts in terms of two
sets of analyses: one assuming that the average fleetwide fuel economy
for light-duty vehicles will not exceed the minimum level necessary to
comply with CAFE standards, and one assuming continued improvement in
average fleetwide fuel economy for light-duty vehicles due to higher
market demand for fuel-efficient vehicles.
From a market-driven perspective, there is considerable historical
evidence that manufacturers have an economic incentive to improve the
fuel economy of their fleets beyond the level of the CAFE standards
when they are able to do so. Although there was an historical period of
stagnation in average fuel economy starting in the 1990s, when
manufacturers allocated efficiency improvements to weight and power, it
was accompanied by a prolonged period of historically low gasoline
prices, where real prices remained below $1.50 per gallon for nearly 15
years. Even during that period, passenger car fuel economy exceeded
CAFE standards every year and light-truck fuel economy exceeded
standards in most years. This trend supports the proposition that
consumers have historically recognized the benefits that accrue from
operating vehicles with greater fuel efficiency even in an environment
of low fuel prices.
In recent years, overcompliance with standards has increased,
likely in response to higher fuel prices, with the market shifting
toward more fuel-efficient models and toward passenger cars rather than
trucks, even in the absence of regulatory pressure. This suggests that,
at the fuel prices that have been prevalent in recent years, consumers
are placing a greater value on fuel economy than the longer term
historical average. Consumers appear to be recognizing the value of
purchases based not only on initial costs but also on the total cost of
owning and operating a vehicle over its lifetime. The fuel economy of
the combined car and light-truck fleet has increased since 2005, with
the largest increase in 2009. NHTSA also expects the new fuel economy
labels will increase awareness of the consumer savings that result from
purchasing a vehicle with higher fuel economy and will impact consumer
demand for more fuel-efficient vehicles. NHTSA discusses how consumers
value fuel savings in Chapter VIII of the FRIA accompanying today's
notice.
Consumer demand for fuel-efficient vehicles is expected to continue
in the future. Increasing uncertainty about future fuel prices and
growing concern for the energy security and environmental impacts of
petroleum use are likely to have an increasing impact on the vehicle
market. In response, a number of manufacturers have announced plans to
introduce technology beyond what is necessary to meet the MY 2016
standards. This evidence aligns with the AEO 2012 Early Release, which
shows continued fuel economy improvements in the Reference Case through
2035 in the absence of the MY 2017-2025 standards.
NHTSA performed today's analysis by simulating potential
overcompliance under the no-action alternative, the
[[Page 63096]]
preferred alternative, and other regulatory alternatives. In doing so,
the agency used all the same parameter values as in the agency's
central analysis, but applied a payback period of one year for purposes
of calculating the value of future fuel savings when simulating whether
a manufacturer would apply additional technology to an already CAFE-
compliant fleet. For technologies applied to a manufacturer's fleet
that has not yet achieved compliance with CAFE standards, the agency
continued to apply a five-year payback period.
In other words, for this sensitivity analysis the agency assumed
that manufacturers that have not yet met CAFE standards for future
model years will apply technology as if buyers were willing to pay for
fuel savings throughout the first five years of vehicle ownership. Once
having complied with those standards, however, manufacturers are
assumed to consider making further improvements in fuel economy as if
buyers were only willing to pay for fuel savings to be realized during
the first year of vehicle ownership. This reflects the agency's
assumptions for this sensitivity analysis, that (1) civil penalties,
though legally available, carry a stigma that manufacturers will strive
to avoid, and that (2) having achieved compliance with CAFE standards,
manufacturers will avoid competitive risks entailed in charging higher
prices for vehicles that offer additional fuel economy, rather than
offering additional performance or utility.
Since CAFE standards were first introduced, some manufacturers have
consistently exceeded those standards, and the industry as a whole has
consistently overcomplied with both the passenger car and light truck
standards. Although the combined average fuel economy of cars and light
trucks declined in some years, this resulted from buyers shifting their
purchases from passenger cars to light trucks, not from undercompliance
with either standard. Even with those declines, the industry still
overcomplied with both passenger car and light truck standards. In
recent years, between MYs 1999 and 2009, fuel economy overcompliance
has been increasing on average for both the passenger car and the light
truck fleets. NHTSA considers it impossible to say with certainty why
past fuel economy levels have followed their observed path. If the
agency could say with certainty how fuel economy would have changed in
the absence of CAFE standards, it might be able to answer this
question; however, NHTSA regards this ``counterfactual'' case as simply
unknowable.
NHTSA has, however, considered other relevant indications regarding
manufacturers' potential future decisions. Published research regarding
how vehicle buyers have previously viewed fuel economy suggests that
they have only a weak quantitative understanding of the relationship
between fuel economy and future fuel outlays, and that potential buyers
value fuel economy improvements by less than theoretical present-value
calculations of lifetime fuel savings would suggest. These findings are
generally consistent with manufacturers' confidential and, in some
cases, public statements. Manufacturers have tended to communicate not
that buyers absolutely ``don't care'' about fuel economy, but that
buyers have, in the past, not been willing to pay the full cost of most
fuel economy improvements. Manufacturers have also tended to indicate
that sustained high fuel prices would provide a powerful incentive for
increased fuel economy; this implies that manufacturers believe buyers
are willing to pay for some fuel economy increases, but that buyers'
willingness to do so depends on their expectations for future fuel
prices. In their confidential statements to the agency, manufacturers
have also tended to indicate that in their past product planning
processes, they have assumed buyers would only be willing to pay for
technologies that ``break even'' within a relatively short time--
generally the first two to four years of vehicle ownership.
NHTSA considers it not only feasible but appropriate to simulate
such effects by calculating the present value of fuel savings over some
``payback period.'' The agency also believes it is appropriate to
assume that specific improvements in fuel economy will be implemented
voluntarily if manufacturers' costs for adding the technology necessary
to implement them to specific models would be lower than potential
buyers' willingness to pay for the resulting fuel savings. This
approach takes fuel costs directly into account, and is therefore
responsive to manufacturers' statements regarding the role that fuel
prices play in influencing buyers' demands and manufacturers' planning
processes. Under this approach, a short payback period can be employed
if manufacturers are expected to act as if buyers place little value on
fuel economy. Conversely, a longer payback period can be used if
manufacturers are expected to act as if buyers will place comparatively
greater value on fuel economy.
NHTSA cannot be certain to what extent vehicle buyers will, in the
future, be willing to pay for fuel economy improvements, or to what
extent manufacturers would, in the future, voluntarily apply more
technology than needed to comply with fuel economy standards. The
agency is similarly hopeful that future vehicle buyers will be more
willing to pay for fuel economy improvements than has historically been
the case. In meetings preceding today's standards, two manufacturers
stated they expected fuel economy to increase two percent to three
percent per year after MY 2016, absent more stringent regulations. And
in August 2010, one manufacturer stated its combined fleet would
achieve 50 mpg by MY 2025, supporting that at a minimum some
manufacturers believe that exceeding fuel economy standards will
provide them a competitive advantage. The agency is hopeful that future
vehicle buyers will be better-informed than has historically been the
case, in part because recently-promulgated requirements regarding
vehicle labels will provide clearer information regarding fuel economy
and the dollar value of resulting fuel savings. The agency is similarly
hopeful that future vehicle buyers will be more willing to pay for fuel
economy improvements than past buyers. In meetings preceding today's
standards, many manufacturers indicated significant shifts in their
product plans--shifts consistent with expectations that compared to
past buyers, future buyers will ``care more'' about fuel economy.
Nevertheless, considering the uncertainties mentioned above, NHTSA
continues to consider it appropriate to conduct its central rulemaking
analysis in a manner that ignores the possibility that in the future,
manufacturers will voluntarily apply more technology than the minimum
necessary to comply with CAFE standards. Also, in conducting its
sensitivity analysis to simulate voluntary overcompliance with the
standards, the agency has applied the conservative assumption that when
considering whether to employ ``extra'' technology, manufacturers will
act as if buyers' value the resulting savings in fuel costs only during
their first year of ownership (i.e., as if a 1-year payback period
applies).
Results of the agency's analysis simulating this potential for
voluntary overcompliance are summarized below. Compared to results from
the agencies' central analysis presented above, differences are
greatest for the baseline scenario (i.e., the No-Action Alternative),
under which CAFE
[[Page 63097]]
standards remain unchanged after MY 2016. These results also suggest,
as the agency would expect, that because increasingly stringent
standards require progressively more technology than the market will
demand, the likelihood of voluntary overcompliance will decline with
increasing stringency. Achieved fuel economy levels under baseline
standards are as follows:
Table IV-121--NHTSA Estimated Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Baseline Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 39.0-............. 39.5-............. 40.0-............. 40.2-............. 40.5-
2010............... 38.6-............. 39.1-............. 39.4-............. 39.8-............. 40.3-
Light trucks................... 2008............... 30.4-............. 31.0-............. 31.7-............. 32.0-............. 32.3-
2010............... 29.4-............. 29.6-............. 30.4-............. 31.0-............. 31.5-
Combined....................... 2008............... 35.3-............. 35.9-............. 36.6-............. 36.9-............. 37.2-
2010............... 34.7-............. 35.1-............. 35.7-............. 36.2-............. 36.8-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-122--NHTSA Estimated Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Baseline Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008.................. 40.8-................. 40.9-................. 41.0-................ 41.1-
2010.................. 40.5.................. 40.6.................. 40.7................. 40.9
Light trucks...................... 2008.................. 32.5-................. 32.7-................. 32.9-................ 33.1-
2010.................. 31.8.................. 32.0.................. 32.2................. 32.4
Combined.......................... 2008.................. 37.5-................. 37.7-................. 37.9-................ 38.1-
2010.................. 37.0.................. 37.2.................. 37.4................. 37.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
With no change in standards after MY 2016, while combined average
fuel economy is the same in MY 2017 both with and without simulated
voluntary overcompliance, differences grow over time, reaching nearly 3
mpg by MY 2025. In other words, without simulating voluntary
overcompliance, the agency estimated that combined average achieved
fuel economy would reach 34.7-35.4 mpg in MY 2025, whereas the agency
estimates that it would reach 37.6-38.1 mpg in that year if voluntary
overcompliance occurred.
In contrast, the effect on achieved fuel economy levels of allowing
voluntary overcompliance with the standards was minimal. Allowing
manufacturers to overcomply with the standards for MY 2025 led to
combined average achieved fuel economy levels approximately equal to
levels of values obtained without simulating voluntary overcompliance:
Table IV-123--NHTSA Estimated Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 40.8-............. 43.0-............. 45.1-............. 47.2-............. 48.9-
2010............... 40.5-............. 42.2-............. 44.3-............. 46.4-............. 48.6-
Light trucks................... 2008............... 30.9-............. 32.0-............. 33.9-............. 35.3-............. 36.7-
2010............... 29.9-............. 30.5-............. 32.2-............. 33.6-............. 35.6-
Combined....................... 2008............... 36.5-............. 38.3-............. 40.4-............. 42.2-............. 43.9-
2010............... 36.0-............. 37.1-............. 39.1-............. 41.0-............. 43.2-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-124--NHTSA Estimated Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars.................... 2008.................. 50.2-................. 51.2-................. 53.1-................ 54.3-
2010.................. 49.6.................. 51.1.................. 53.0................. 54.4
Light trucks...................... 2008.................. 37.6-................. 38.3-................. 39.4-................ 40.2-
2010.................. 36.3.................. 37.5.................. 38.4................. 39.3
Combined.......................... 2008.................. 45.0-................. 46.0-................. 47.6-................ 48.7-
2010.................. 44.1.................. 45.5.................. 47.0................. 48.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63098]]
As a result, NHTSA estimates that, when the potential for voluntary
overcompliance is taken into account, fuel savings attributable to more
stringent standards will total 131-133 billion gallons, as compared to
the 180-184 billion gallons estimated when potential voluntary
overcompliance is not taken into account:
Table IV-125--NHTSA Estimated Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 4-................... 3-................... 5-................... 7-................... 9-.................. 10-
2010................. 5.................... 3.................... 4.................... 7.................... 8................... 10
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 0-................... 1-................... 1-................... 3-................... 4-.................. 5-
2010................. 1.................... 1.................... 1.................... 2.................... 3................... 5
Combined......................... 2008................. 5-................... 3-................... 6-................... 9-................... 13-................. 16-
2010................. 6.................... 4.................... 5.................... 9.................... 12.................. 15
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-126--NHTSA Estimated Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 11-............... 13-............... 15-............... 16-............... 92-
2010............... 11................ 13................ 15................ 16................ 92
Light trucks................... 2008............... 6-................ 6-................ 7-................ 8-................ 41-
2010............... 5................. 6................. 7................. 7................. 39
Combined....................... 2008............... 17-............... 19-............... 22-............... 24-............... 133-
2010............... 16................ 19................ 21................ 23................ 131
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency is not projecting, however, that fuel consumption will
be greater when voluntary overcompliance is taken into account. Rather,
under today's final and augural standards, the agency's analysis shows
lower fuel consumption (by 0.7-1.1 percent less over the useful lives
of MY 2017-2025 vehicles) when potential voluntary overcompliance is
taken into account. Simulation of voluntary overcompliance, therefore,
does not reduce the agency's estimate of future fuel savings over the
baseline scenario. Rather it changes the attribution of those fuel
savings to the standards, because voluntary overcompliance attributes
some of the fuel savings to the market. The same holds for the
attribution of costs, other effects, and monetized benefits--inclusion
of voluntary overcompliance does not necessarily change their amounts,
but it does attribute some of each cost, effect, or benefit to the
workings of the market, rather than to the final and augural standards.
The agency further estimates CO2 emissions reductions
attributable to today's final and augural standards will total 1,432-
1,414 million metric tons (mmt), versus the 1,953-1,987 mmt estimated
when potential voluntary overcompliance is not taken into account:
\1296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1296\ Differences in the application of diesel engines and
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles lead to differences in the
incremental percentage changes in fuel consumption and carbon
dioxide emissions.
Table IV-127--NHTSA Estimated Avoided Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 46-.................. 29-.................. 51-.................. 71-.................. 95-................. 110-
2010................. 54................... 31................... 46................... 71................... 92.................. 111
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 5-................... 8-................... 15-.................. 28-.................. 42-................. 56-
2010................. 12................... 8.................... 13................... 26................... 36.................. 52
Combined......................... 2008................. 52-.................. 36-.................. 65-.................. 99-.................. 136-................ 166-
2010................. 66................... 39................... 58................... 98................... 127................. 162
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-128--NHTSA Estimated Avoided Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 123-.............. 135-.............. 155-.............. 171-.............. 985-
2010............... 121............... 137............... 158............... 172............... 993
Light trucks................... 2008............... 64-............... 68-............... 77-............... 84-............... 447-
2010............... 56................ 66................ 73................ 80................ 421
Combined....................... 2008............... 187-.............. 203-.............. 232-.............. 255-.............. 1,432-
[[Page 63099]]
2010............... 177............... 203............... 231............... 252............... 1,414
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This analysis further indicates smaller or similar incremental
outlays for additional technology under the standards when potential
voluntary overcompliance is taken into account. Table IV-129 and Table
IV-130 below show that total incremental technology costs attributable
to today's standards are estimated at $127-140 billion, as compared to
the $134-140 billion estimated when potential voluntary overcompliance
was not taken into account:
Table IV-129--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Technology Outlays ($ billion) Under Final Standards--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 5-................... 3-................... 5-................... 7-................... 9-.................. 12-
2010................. 5.................... 3.................... 4.................... 6.................... 9................... 11
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 0-................... 0-................... 1-................... 2-................... 3-.................. 4-
2010................. 1.................... 1.................... 1.................... 2.................... 3................... 4
Combined......................... 2008................. 5-................... 3-................... 5-................... 8-................... 12-................. 16-
2010................. 7.................... 4.................... 5.................... 8.................... 11.................. 14
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-130--NHTSA Estimated Incremental Technology Outlays ($ billion) Under Augural Standards--MYs 2022-2025
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 14-............... 15-............... 19-............... 20-............... 109-
2010............... 12................ 13................ 16................ 17................ 97
Light trucks................... 2008............... 5-................ 5-................ 6-................ 6-................ 31-
2010............... 4................. 5................. 5................. 5................. 30
Combined....................... 2008............... 18-............... 20-............... 25-............... 26-............... 140-
2010............... 16................ 18................ 21................ 22................ 127
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because NHTSA's analysis indicated that voluntary overcompliance
with baseline standards will reduce the share of fuel savings
attributable to today's standards, the agency's estimate of the present
value of total benefits will be $484-495 billion when discounted at a 3
percent annual rate, as Tables IV-131 and IV-132 following report. This
estimate of total benefits is lower than the $671-687 billion reported
previously for the analysis in which potential voluntary overcompliance
was not taken into account:
Table IV-131--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($ billion) Under Final Standards Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 15.2-................ 9.5-................. 17.1-................ 24.1-................ 32.4-............... 38.0-
2010................. 17.7................. 10.3................. 15.3................. 24.1................. 31.2................ 38
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1.7-................. 2.5-................. 4.8-................. 9.2-................. 13.8-............... 18.8-
2010................. 3.9.................. 2.5.................. 4.2.................. 8.5.................. 11.7................ 17.2
Combined......................... 2008................. 17.0-................ 12.1-................ 21.9-................ 33.3-................ 46.3-............... 56.9-
2010................. 21.5................. 12.8................. 19.4................. 32.6................. 42.9................ 55.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-132--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($ billion) Under Augural Standards Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025
[including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 42.7-............. 47.3-............. 55.3-............. 61.4-............. 343.1-
[[Page 63100]]
2010............... 41.9.............. 47.9.............. 55.5.............. 61.1.............. 343.1
Light trucks................... 2008............... 21.6-............. 23.2-............. 26.6-............. 29.2-............. 151.6-
2010............... 18.9.............. 22.3.............. 25................ 27.5.............. 141.6
Combined....................... 2008............... 64.3-............. 70.5-............. 81.9-............. 90.6-............. 494.6-
2010............... 60.7.............. 70.1.............. 80.6.............. 88.7.............. 484.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, when accounting for potential voluntary overcompliance,
NHTSA estimates that the present value of total benefits will decline
from its previous estimate when future fuel savings and other benefits
are discounted at the higher 7 percent rate. Tables IV-133 and IV-134
report that the present value of benefits from requiring higher fuel
economy for MY 2017-25 cars and light trucks will total $387-395
billion when discounted using a 7 percent rate, as compared to the
previous $525-536 billion estimate of total benefits when potential
voluntary overcompliance is not taken into account:
Table IV-133--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($ Billion) Under Final Standards Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 12.2-................ 7.6-................. 13.7-................ 19.4-................ 26.0-............... 30.5-
2010................. 14.1................. 8.3.................. 12.3................. 19.3................. 25.................. 30.4
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1.4-................. 2.0-................. 3.8-................. 7.3-................. 11.0-............... 14.9-
2010................. 3.1.................. 2.................... 3.3.................. 6.7.................. 9.3................. 13.6
Combined......................... 2008................. 13.5-................ 9.7-................. 17.5-................ 26.6-................ 37.0-............... 45.4-
2010................. 17.2................. 10.3................. 15.5................. 26................... 34.3................ 44
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-134--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Benefits ($ Billion) Under Augural Standards Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 34.2-............. 37.9-............. 44.3-............. 49.2-............. 275.0-
2010............... 33.6.............. 38.4.............. 44.5.............. 49................ 275
Light trucks................... 2008............... 17.2-............. 18.4-............. 21.1-............. 23.2-............. 120.2-
2010............... 15................ 17.6.............. 19.8.............. 21.8.............. 112.3
Combined....................... 2008............... 51.3-............. 56.3-............. 65.4-............. 72.4-............. 395.1-
2010............... 48.5.............. 56................ 64.4.............. 70.8.............. 387
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency estimates, as shown in Tables IV-135 and IV-136, that net
benefits from the CAFE standards will be $329-335 billion. This is
compared to the previously-reported estimate of $498-507 billion which
did not incorporate the potential for voluntary overcompliance and is
based primarily on the reduction of benefits attributable to the
standards when voluntary overcompliance is taken into account.
Table IV-135--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($ Billion) Under Final Standards Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 10-.................. 6-................... 11-.................. 16-.................. 21-................. 24-
2010................. 11................... 7.................... 10................... 16................... 21.................. 25
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1-................... 2-................... 4-................... 7-................... 11-................. 14-
2010................. 2.................... 2.................... 3.................... 6.................... 9................... 13
Combined......................... 2008................. 11-.................. 8-................... 15-.................. 23-.................. 31-................. 38-
2010................. 14................... 8.................... 13................... 23................... 29.................. 38
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63101]]
Table IV-136--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($ Billion) Under Augural Standards Using a 3 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 26-............... 29-............... 33-............... 38-............... 214-
2010............... 28................ 32................ 37................ 41................ 228
Light trucks................... 2008............... 16-............... 17-............... 20-............... 22-............... 115-
2010............... 14................ 17................ 19................ 21................ 106
Combined....................... 2008............... 43-............... 47-............... 53-............... 60-............... 329-
2010............... 42................ 49................ 56................ 62................ 335
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, Tables IV-137 and IV-138 below show that NHTSA estimates
voluntary overcompliance could reduce net benefits attributable to
today's standards to $235-242 billion if a 7 percent discount rate is
applied to future benefits. This estimate is lower than the previously-
reported $372-377 billion estimate of net benefits when potential
voluntary overcompliance is not taken into account, using that same
discount rate.
Table IV-137--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($ Billion) Under Final Standards Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2017-2021
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline Earlier 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................... 2008................. 7-................... 4-................... 8-................... 12-.................. 15-................. 17-
2010................. 8.................... 5.................... 7.................... 12................... 15.................. 18
Light trucks..................... 2008................. 1-................... 2-................... 3-................... 5-................... 8-.................. 10-
2010................. 2.................... 1.................... 2.................... 5.................... 6................... 9
Combined......................... 2008................. 8-................... 6-................... 11-.................. 17-.................. 23-................. 27-
2010................. 10................... 6.................... 9.................... 16................... 21.................. 28
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-138--NHTSA Estimated Present Value of Net Benefits ($ Billion) Under Augural Standards Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate--MYs 2022-2025
[Including voluntary overcompliance]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY Baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars................. 2008............... 18-............... 21-............... 23-............... 26-............... 150-
2010............... 20................ 23................ 26................ 30................ 164
Light trucks................... 2008............... 12-............... 13-............... 15-............... 16-............... 85-
2010............... 11................ 12................ 14................ 16................ 78
Combined....................... 2008............... 31-............... 33-............... 37-............... 43-............... 235-
2010............... 31................ 36................ 40................ 45................ 242
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above, these reductions in fuel savings and avoided
CO2 emissions (and correspondingly, in total and net
benefits) attributable to today's standards, do not indicate that fuel
consumption and CO2 emissions will be higher when potential
voluntary overcompliance with standards is taken into account than when
it is set aside. Rather, these reductions reflect differences in
attribution; when potential voluntary overcompliance is taken into
account, portions of the avoided fuel consumption and CO2
emissions (and, correspondingly, in total and net benefits) are
effectively attributed to the actions of the market, rather than to the
CAFE standards.
For more detailed information regarding NHTSA's sensitivity
analyses for this final rule, please see Chapter X of NHTSA's FRIA.
Additionally, due to the uncertainty and difficulty in projecting
technology cost and efficacy through 2025, and consistent with Circular
A-4, NHTSA conducted a full probabilistic uncertainty analysis, which
is included in Chapter XII of the FRIA. Results of the uncertainty
analysis are summarized below for the model year 2017-2025 standards,
combining the passenger car and light truck fleets:
Total Benefits at 7% discount rate: Societal benefits will
total $7.5 billion to $721 billion, with a mean estimate of $373
billion.
Total Benefits at 3% discount rate: Societal benefits will
total $9 billion to $912 billion, with a mean estimate of $467 billion.
Total Costs at 7% discount rate: Costs will total between
$429 million and $247 billion, with a mean estimate of $125 billion.
Total Costs at 3% discount rate: Costs will total between
$421 million and $250 billion, with a mean estimate of $126 billion
5. How would these final standards impact vehicle sales and employment?
The effect of this rule on sales of new vehicles depends largely on
how potential buyers evaluate and respond to its effects on vehicle
prices and fuel economy. The rule will make new cars and light trucks
more expensive, as manufacturers attempt to recover their costs for
complying with the rule by raising vehicle prices. At the same time,
the rule will require manufacturers to improve the fuel economy of many
of their models, which will lower the operating costs of those models.
While the initial purchase price of those vehicles will increase, the
overall cost of owning them--including their operating
[[Page 63102]]
costs--will decrease, because their fuel consumption will decline
significantly. The net effect on sales will depend on the extent to
which consumers are willing to pay for higher fuel economy and the
resulting savings in operating costs, versus their sensitivity to
changes in vehicles' initial purchase prices, and is thus challenging
to evaluate.
The agency anticipates that consumers will place some value on
improved fuel economy, both because it reduces the operating cost of
the vehicles, and because recently promulgated EPA and DOT regulations
require vehicles sold during 2017 through 2025 to display labels that
more clearly communicate to potential buyers the fuel savings,
economic, and environmental benefits of owning more fuel-efficient
vehicles. We recognize that the magnitude of this effect cannot be
predicted at this time, and that how consumers value fuel economy is a
subject of ongoing debate. We also expect that consumers may consider
other factors besides direct purchase price increases that affect the
costs they pay for new vehicles, and have included these factors in the
analysis.
There is a broad consensus in the economic literature that the
price elasticity of demand for automobiles is approximately -
1.0,1297,1298,1299,1300 meaning that every one percent
increase in the price of the vehicle would reduce sales by one percent
(assuming no change in fuel economy, quality, or other attributes of
vehicles). NHTSA typically assumes that manufacturers will be able to
pass all of their costs to improve fuel economy on to consumers in the
form of higher sales prices for models offering higher fuel economy.
The subsequent discussion of consumer welfare, however, suggests that
by itself, a net decrease in overall operating costs may not
necessarily produce a net increase in sales. Many consumers are more
sensitive to vehicles' initial purchase prices than to their subsequent
operating costs, and thus may not be willing to purchase vehicles with
higher fuel economy even when it appears that doing so would reduce
their overall costs to own a vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1297\ Kleit, A.N. (1990). ``The Effect of Annual Changes in
Automobile Fuel Economy Standards,'' Journal of Regulatory
Economics, vol. 2, pp 151-172. Available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/m04787480k056018/ (last accessed August
1, 2012) or Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131.
\1298\ Bordley, R. (1994). ``An Overlapping Choice Set Model of
Automotive Price Elasticities,'' Transportation Research B, vol 28B,
no 6, pp 401-408. Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V99-466M3VD-1/2/3ecfe61bac45f1afb8d9b370330e3f0c (last
accessed August 1, 2012).
\1299\ McCarthy, P.S. (1996). ``Market Price and Income
Elasticities of New Vehicle Demands,'' The Review of Economics and
Statistics, vol. LXXVII, no. 3, pp. 543-547. Available at http://econpapers.repec.org/article/tprrestat/v_3a78_3ay_3a1996_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a543-47.htm (last accessed August 1, 2012) or Docket No.
NHTSA-2010-0131.
\1300\ This elasticity is generally considered to be a short-run
elasticity, reflecting the immediate impacts of a price change on
vehicle sales. For a durable good such as an auto, the elasticity
may be smaller in the long run: though people may be able to change
the timing of their purchase when price changes in the short run,
they must eventually make the investment. Using a smaller elasticity
would reduce the magnitude of the estimates presented here for
vehicle sales, but it would not change the direction. A short-run
elasticity is more valid for initial responses to changes in price,
but, over time, a long-run elasticity may better reflect behavior;
thus, the results presented for the initial years of the program may
be more appropriate for modeling with the short-run elasticity than
the later years of the program. A search of the literature has not
found studies more recent than the 1970s that specifically
investigate long-run elasticities. See., e.g., Hymans, Saul H.,
``Consumer Durable Spending: Explanation and Prediction,'' Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1970), which finds a short-run
elasticity of auto expenditures (not sales) with respect to price of
0.78 to 1.17, and a long-run elasticity of 0.3 to 0.46 (pp. 173-
206). Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/bpea/
editions/~/media/Projects/BPEA/1970%202/1970b--bpea--hymans--
ackley--juster.PDF or Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131 (last accessed
August 1, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is considerable uncertainty in the economics literature about
the extent to which consumers value fuel savings from increased fuel
economy, and there is still more uncertainty about possible changes in
consumer behavior over time (especially with the likelihood of consumer
learning) and the extent to which this final rule could affect consumer
behavior. In addition, consumers' valuation of fuel economy
improvements depends upon the price of gasoline, which has recently
been very volatile. On balance, the effect of this final rule on
vehicle sales will depend upon whether the value that potential buyers
place on the increased fuel economy that this rule requires is greater
or less than the increase in vehicle prices that results from the rule,
as well as on how automakers interpret buyers' likely responses to
higher prices and increased fuel economy. Additional data would enhance
the accuracy of predictions on these issues. In addition, it would be
helpful to assess important emerging trends, such as the degree that
longer financing terms affect consumers' decisionmaking as they weigh
operating costs versus upfront costs, and the degree to which extreme
and continued volatility itself in gas prices affects assumptions about
likely returns on upfront technology investments.
a. How do consumers value fuel economy?
The first question to evaluate is how consumers value fuel economy,
or more accurately, how they value fuel savings attributable to
increased fuel economy. Two interrelated economic concepts are commonly
used to summarize how consumers appear to value future fuel savings
that result from higher fuel economy. The first relates to the length
of time that consumers consider when valuing fuel savings, or ``payback
period,'' while the second relates to the discount rate that consumers
apply to future savings. Although either of these two concepts can be
used by itself to indicate how buyers value future fuel savings, our
analysis uses a combination of the two to characterize consumers'
valuation of future fuel savings.
The length of time that consumers consider when valuing future fuel
savings can significantly affect their comparisons of fuel savings to
the increased cost of purchasing a vehicle that offers higher fuel
economy. For example, there will be a significant difference in
aggregate fuel savings if consumers consider 1 year, 3 years, 5 years,
10 years, or the lifetime of the vehicle as the relevant payback
period. The discount rate that consumers use to discount future fuel
savings to their present value can also have a significant impact;
higher discount rates will reduce the importance of future fuel savings
relative to a vehicle's initial purchase price. If consumers value fuel
savings over a short payback period, such as 1 to 2 years, then the
discount rate will be less important, but if consumers consider fuel
savings over a longer period, then the discount rate will become
important.
The payback period and discount rate are conceptual proxy measures
for consumer decisions that may often be made without any explicit
quantitative analysis. For example, some buyers choosing among a set of
vehicles may know what they have been paying recently for fuel, what
they are likely to pay to buy each of the vehicles considered, and some
attributes--including labeled fuel economies--of those vehicles.
However, these buyers may then make a choice without actually trying to
estimate how much they would pay to fuel each of the vehicles they are
considering buying; for such buyers, the idea of a payback period and
discount rate may have no explicit meaning. This does not, however,
limit the utility of these concepts for the agency's analysis. If, as a
group, buyers behave as if they value fuel consumption by considering
an
[[Page 63103]]
explicit payback period and discount rate, these concepts remain useful
as a basis for estimating the market response to increases in fuel
economy accompanied by increases in price.
Information regarding the number of years that consumers value fuel
savings comes from several sources. In past analyses, NHTSA has used
five years as representing the average payback period, because this is
the average length of time of a financing agreement.\1301\ We conducted
a search of the literature for additional estimates of consumer
valuation of fuel savings, in order to determine whether the 5 year
assumption was accurate or should be revised. A recent paper by David
Greene \6\ examined studies from the past 20 years of consumers'
willingness to pay for fuel economy and found that ``the available
literature does not provide a reasonable consensus,'' although the
author states that ``manufacturers have repeatedly stated that
consumers will pay, in increased vehicle price, for only 2-4 years in
fuel savings'' based on manufacturers' own market research. The
National Research Council \1302\ also used a 3 year payback period as
one way to compare consumer valuation of benefits to a full lifetime
value. A survey conducted for the Department of Energy in 2004, which
asked 1,000 households how much they would pay for a vehicle that saved
them $400 or $1,200 per year in fuel costs, found implied payback
periods of 1.5 to 2.5 years. In reviewing this survey, Greene
concluded: ``The striking similarity of the implied payback periods
from the two subsamples would seem to suggest that consumers understand
the questions and are giving consistent and reliable responses: They
require payback in 1.5 to 2.5 years.'' However, Turrentine and Kurani's
\1303\ in-depth interviews of 57 households found almost no evidence
that consumers think about fuel economy in terms of payback periods.
When asked such questions, some consumers became confused while others
offered time periods that were meaningful to them for other reasons,
such as the length of their car loan or lease.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1301\ National average financing terms for automobile loans are
available from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
G.19 ``Consumer Finance'' release. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/ (last accessed August 25,
2011). The average new car loan at an auto finance company in the
first quarter of 2011 is for 62 months at 4.73%.
\1302\ National Research Council (2002), ``Effectiveness and
Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards'',
National Academies Press, Washington DC.
\1303\ Turrentine, T.S. and K.S. Kurani, 2007. ``Car Buyers and
Fuel Economy,'' Energy Policy, vol. 35, pp. 1213-1223.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effective discount rate that consumers have used in the past to
value future fuel economy savings has been studied in many different
ways and by many different economists. Greene examined and compiled
many of these analyses and found: ``Implicit consumer discount rates
were estimated by Greene (1983) based on eight early multinomial logit
choice models. * * *The estimates range from 0 to 73% * * * Most fall
between 4 and 40%.'' Greene added: ``The more recent studies exhibit as
least a wide a range as the earlier studies.''
This is an extremely broad range. With such uncertainty about how
consumers value future fuel savings and the discount rates they might
use to determine the present value of future fuel savings, NHTSA chose
for purposes of this analysis to utilize the standard 3 and 7 percent
social discount rates recommended by OMB guidance to evaluate the costs
and benefits of regulation. To the extent that some consumers appear to
apply higher discount rates, the analysis of likely sales consequences
would be different. This review leads us to conclude that consumer
valuation of future fuel savings is highly uncertain, leading to
different potential scenarios for vehicle sales. A negative impact on
sales is possible if consumers don't value the fuel savings or desire
very short payback periods, because the final rule will lead to an
increase in the perceived ownership cost of vehicles. In addition,
sales decreases are possible if gasoline prices are lower than
projected by manufacturers and the agencies or technology costs are
higher than projected. A positive impact on sales is also possible,
because the final rule will lead to a significant decrease in the
lifetime cost of vehicles, and with consumer learning over time, this
effect may produce an increase in sales. Whether a change in sales will
result from this final rule, or will result from other factors that
affect the way drivers consider fuel economy in their purchasing
decisions, is subject to uncertainty.
b. How do manufacturers believe consumers value fuel savings
attributable to higher fuel economy?
Although some manufacturers have indicated in public remarks or
confidential statements to NHTSA that their plans to apply fuel-saving
technology depend on fuel prices and consumers' willingness to pay for
fuel economy improvements, the agency does not have specific and robust
information regarding how manufacturers interpret consumers' valuation
of fuel savings. Based on our review of the literature and available
evidence, it is not clear how accurately manufacturers are accounting
for consumer valuation of fuel economy in making their pricing
decisions, nor how that accuracy will be affected in the future as
manufacturers' costs to produce vehicles rise in response to the final
standards. In standard economic theory, if manufacturers believe that
consumers value the fuel savings at a higher dollar level than the
technology costs, then manufacturers' profit motives would lead them to
voluntarily add the cost-effective technologies to their vehicles in
the absence of government mandates, in the belief that their sales and
profits would increase.
This concept ties into the basic question of whether manufacturers
are providing the amount of fuel economy that consumers wish to
purchase--whether there is matching between consumers' demand for fuel
economy and the firms' supply of fuel economy. It is possible that the
light-duty vehicle market is currently operating according to standard
economic assumptions, and manufacturers are providing approximately the
amount of fuel economy that consumers wish to purchase, because they
correctly interpret consumers' valuation of fuel economy. On the other
hand, it is possible that manufacturers are providing more or less fuel
economy than consumers wish to purchase, because they do not correctly
understand consumers' valuation of fuel economy. Because NHTSA does not
know which scenario is correct today, and cannot predict which will
apply in the future, we evaluate the response of sales under both
scenarios in the following sections in order to assess the range of
potential impacts that could be attributable to this final rule.
As discussed above, it is very difficult to determine how consumers
will react to fuel economy improvements, and manufacturers presumably
face this same challenge. Consumer consideration of fuel economy
appears to evolve based on a variety of factors (fuel price,
recessions, marketing), and consumers can react quickly to changes in
these factors, sometimes more rapidly than the industry is able to
change its product offerings. There have been examples of periods when
demand for fuel efficient vehicles exceeded the available supply of
highly efficient vehicles, and other periods where very efficient
vehicle models were introduced into the market but sales stalled. If
manufacturers did not
[[Page 63104]]
accurately forecast consumers' demand for fuel efficient vehicles,
manufacturers' investment in vehicle technologies would not result in
desired payoff. Manufacturers may be likely to be particularly risk
averse with regard to future changes in fuel prices, in large part due
to the substantial capital investments that are necessary to develop
and market fuel-efficient models. If a manufacturer invests
substantially in fuel efficient technologies expecting higher consumer
demand than realized, then the manufacturer has incurred the costs of
investment but not reaped the benefits of those investments. On the
other hand, if a manufacturer does not invest in fuel efficient
technologies, then the manufacturer may lose some market share in the
short run if demand for fuel economy is higher than expected, but they
still retain the option of investing in fuel efficient technologies.
The predicted level of investment under uncertainty related to consumer
demand for fuel efficient vehicles and irreversibility of investment
for fuel efficient technologies would be less than the predicted level
of investment under no uncertainty and complete reversibility.
In addition, there is reason to believe there may be risk aversion
on the consumer side. The simultaneous investment by all companies may
also encourage consumer confidence in the new technologies. If only one
company adopted new technologies, early adopters might gravitate toward
that company, but early adopters tend to be a relatively small portion
of the public. More cautious buyers, who are likely to be more
numerous, might wait for greater information before moving away from
well-known technologies. If all companies adopt advanced technologies
at the same time, though, potential buyers may perceive the new
technologies as the new norm rather than as a risky innovation. They
will then be more willing to move to the new technologies. As some
commenters have pointed out, simultaneous action required by the rule
may change buyers' expectations (their reference points) for fuel
economy, and investing in more fuel economy may seem less risky than in
the absence of the rule.\1304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1304\ We note that this risk aversion by itself does not
indicate a market failure; but that the risk aversion leads to
under-provision of social benefits (e.g., reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the certainty of the regulations reduces the costs of
meeting them, because there will be a) more economies of scale and more
learning curve benefits due to greater cumulative production of fuel-
efficient technologies and b) more incentive for automakers and
suppliers to invest in R&D to create future fuel-efficient
technologies.\1305\ We note that this risk aversion by itself does not
indicate a market failure; it is the fact that the risk aversion leads
to under provision of social benefits (e.g., reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1305\ The literature reviewed by Popp, Newell, and Jaffe (2010)
shows that environmental regulation has played an important role in
inducing innovation that reduces the cost of achieving environmental
goals; Popp (2011) provides evidence that consumer pressure alone is
rarely sufficient to achieve broad diffusion of environmentally
friendly technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. How did NHTSA attempt to calculate potential impacts of the final
rule on vehicle sales under the different scenarios discussed above?
Given the considerable uncertainty associated with consumer
valuation of fuel savings and manufacturers' understanding of that
valuation, NHTSA sought to assess potential sales impacts under two
possible basic scenarios: first, one in which the light-duty vehicle
market is currently operating according to standard theoretical
economic principles, and manufacturers are providing exactly the amount
of fuel economy that consumers wish to purchase, because they perfectly
understand consumers' valuation of fuel economy; and second, one in
which manufacturers are not providing the exact amount of fuel economy
that consumers wish to purchase (either too much or too little),
because they do not have perfect information regarding consumers'
valuation of fuel economy. In the first scenario, manufacturers and
consumers would behave as though they are assuming the same payback
period (and/or discount rate) for fuel savings attributable to higher
fuel economy; in the second, manufacturers and consumers would behave
as though they are assuming different payback periods (and/or discount
rates).
For years, consumers have been learning about the benefits that
accrue to them from owning and operating vehicles with greater fuel
efficiency. This type of learning is expected to continue before and
during the model years affected by this rule, particularly given the
new fuel economy labels that clarify potential economic effects and
should therefore reinforce that learning. Therefore, some increase in
the demand for, and production of, more fuel efficient vehicles is
incorporated in the market driven baseline.
The fuel savings associated with operating more fuel efficient
vehicles will be more salient to individuals who own them, causing
their subsequent purchase decisions to shift closer to minimizing the
total cost of ownership over the lifetime of the vehicle. Second, this
appreciation may spread across households through word of mouth and
other forms of communications. Third, as more motorists experience the
time and fuel savings associated with greater fuel efficiency, the
price of used cars will better reflect such efficiency, further
reducing the cost of owning more efficient vehicles for the buyers of
new vehicles (since the resale price will increase). If these induced
learning effects are strong, the rule could potentially increase total
vehicle sales over time. These increased sales would not occur in the
model years first affected by the rule, but they could occur once the
induced learning takes place. It is not possible to quantify these
learning effects years in advance and that effect may be speeded or
slowed by other factors that enter into a consumer's valuation of fuel
efficiency in selecting vehicles.
The possibility that the rule will (after a lag for consumer
learning) increase sales need not rest on the assumption that
automobile manufacturers are failing to pursue profitable opportunities
to supply the vehicles that consumers demand. In the absence of the
rule, no individual automobile manufacturer would find it profitable to
move toward the more efficient vehicles mandated under the rule. In
particular, no individual company can fully internalize the future
boost to demand resulting from the rule. If one company were to make
more efficient vehicles, counting on consumer learning to enhance
demand in the future, that company would capture only a fraction of the
extra sales so generated, because the learning at issue is not specific
to any one company's fleet. Many of the extra sales would accrue to
that company's competitors.
In the language of economics, consumer learning about the benefits
of fuel efficient vehicles involves positive externalities (spillovers)
from one company to the others.\1306\ These positive externalities may
lead to benefits for manufacturers as a whole. We emphasize that this
discussion has been tentative and qualified. Social learning of related
kinds has been
[[Page 63105]]
identified in a number of contexts,\1307\ and the agency expects that
it will influence consumers' future valuation of fuel economy. Thus,
while it is difficult to determine how consumers will react to fuel
economy improvements attributable to the final rule, we believe that it
is likely that consumers will learn more about and increasingly value
fuel economy improvements in the future. If manufacturers assume that
consumers value fuel economy less than consumers actually value fuel
economy, there will be a demand pull for better fuel economy vehicles
into the market, and by virtue of the final standards forcing
manufacturers to increase better fuel economy product offerings; it is
possible that sales could increase as a result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1306\ Industry-wide positive spillovers of this type are hardly
unique to this situation. In many industries, companies form trade
associations to promote industry-wide public goods. For example,
merchants in a given locale may band together to promote tourism in
that locale. Antitrust law recognizes that this type of coordination
can increase output.
\1307\ See Hunt Alcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation,
Journal of Public Economics (March 2011), available at http://opower.com/uploads/library/file/1/allcott_2011_jpubec_-_social_norms_and_energy_conservation.pdf (last accessed August 1, 2012);
Christophe Chamley, Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social
Learning (Cambridge, 2004), available at http://bilder.buecher.de/zusatz/21/21995/21995098_lese_1.pdf (last accessed August 1,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. How did NHTSA illustrate these scenarios analytically?
The agency examined a number of cases to illustrate these
scenarios. Sales impacts were determined for 6 cases that are
combinations of manufacturers' beliefs of how consumers value fuel
savings and consumers' valuation of fuel savings. The first two cases
assume a flat baseline (no voluntary improvement in fuel economy above
the MY 2016 standards by manufacturers absent new regulations),
consistent with the agency's main analysis in this rulemaking. In these
first two cases we assume consumers value fuel savings for a 3 year
period or a 5 year period (the average length of a loan), and we also
determine the breakeven point of consumer valuation of fuel savings,
where there would be no impact on sales, assuming all other factors
remain constant. As can be seen in Table IV-140 below, with a flat
baseline and assuming that consumers consider fuel economy benefits
over a 3 or 5 year period, benefits exceed costs to the point that
consumers will purchase more vehicles and sales will increase. NHTSA
estimates a break-even point of 2.35 years for scenarios with a flat
baseline; that is, if consumers value fuel savings over an average 2.35
years, neither an increase nor a decrease in sales is expected.
The next 4 cases assume that manufacturers will, absent new
regulations, implement technologies in response to their belief that
consumers have either a 1 year, 3 year, or 5 year payback period, and
for 3 of these scenarios where the consumer also values fuel economy
over the same payback periods assumed by manufacturers. For example,
the agency also examined the impact on sales and employment under the
sensitivity analysis assumption that the baseline fleet included the
manufacturers voluntarily implementing any technology that had a 1 year
or less payback period for consumers. In this analysis, the least
expensive technologies relative to their effects on fuel economy
improvement (those that had a consumer payback where fuel savings over
the first year of use were higher than new vehicle price increases)
were assumed to be voluntarily implemented by manufacturers, resulting
in improved fuel economy in the baseline case which would have occurred
without adoption of this rule. The same methodology was used in the
cases where both manufacturers and consumers value fuel savings over
either a 3 year period or a 5 year period. All three of these cases
result in reductions in sales, with the impact decreasing as the
manufacturer's baseline increases from 1 year to 3 year to 5 years. In
a final case we assume that manufacturers voluntarily implement any
technology that had a 1 year or less payback period for consumers, but
that consumers value fuel savings over a 3 year period.
Under that case, the breakeven point for consumers is about 3.1
years--meaning that if consumers valued their fuel savings over 3.1
years in this scenario, there would be no impact on sales; in other
words if the payback period of the fuel saving technologies was less
than 3.1 years, then the vehicle sales would increase and vice versa.
For the reader's reference, Table IV-139 below shows the included
combinations of payback periods assumed--for these different cases--to
represent consumers' and manufacturers' decisions. The agency
considered these different cases to represent an illustrative range of
possible outcomes under the scenarios described above.
Table IV-139--Scenarios Considered for Sales Impact Analysis
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payback period representing buyers' decisions
Payback period representing --------------------------------------------------------------------------
manufacturers' decisions 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 Years (Flat)....................... ....................... Included.............. Included.
1 Year............................... Included.............. Included. .......................
3 Years.............................. ....................... Included.............. .......................
5 Years.............................. ....................... ....................... Included.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the analysis for each of these cases, NHTSA makes several
assumptions. For the fuel savings part of the equation, as shown in the
table, we assumed that the average purchaser considers the fuel savings
they would receive over a 1, 3, or 5 year timeframe. The present values
of these savings were calculated using a 3 and 7 percent discount rate.
We used a fuel price forecast that included taxes, because this is what
consumers must pay. Fuel savings were calculated over the first 1, 3,
or 5 years and discounted back to a present value.
The agency believes that consumers may consider several other
factors over the 5 year horizon when contemplating the purchase of a
new vehicle. The agency added some of these factors into the
calculation to represent how an increase in technology costs might
affect consumers' buying considerations.
First, consumers might consider the sales taxes they have to pay at
the time of purchasing the vehicle. As these costs are transfer
payments, they are not included in the societal cost of the program,
but they are included as one of the increased costs to the consumer for
these standards. We took the most recent auto sales tax by state \1308\
and
[[Page 63106]]
weighted them by population by state to determine a national weighted-
average sales tax of 5.46 percent (hereafter rounded to 5.5 percent in
the discussion). NHTSA sought to weight sales taxes by new vehicle
sales by state; however, such data were unavailable. NHTSA recognizes
that for this purpose, new vehicle sales by state is a superior
weighting mechanism to Census population; in an effort to approximate
new vehicle sales by state NHTSA studied the change in new vehicle
registrations (using R.L. Polk data) by state across recent years and
developed a corresponding set of weights. The resulting national
weighted-average sales tax rate was almost identical to that resulting
from the use of Census population estimates as weights, just slightly
above 5.5 percent. NHTSA opted to utilize Census population rather than
the registration-based proxy of new vehicle sales as the basis for
computing this weighted average, as the end results were negligibly
different and the analytical approach involving new vehicle
registrations had not been as thoroughly reviewed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1308\ See http://www.factorywarrantylist.com/car-tax-by-state.html (last accessed August 1, 2012). Note that county, city,
and other municipality-specific taxes were excluded from NHTSA's
weighted average, as the variation in locality taxes within states,
lack of accessible documentation of locality rates, and difficulty
in obtaining reliable sets of weights to apply to locality taxes
complicates the ability to perform this analysis. Localities with
relatively high automobile sales taxes may have relatively fewer
auto dealerships, as consumers would likely endeavor to purchase
vehicles in areas with lower locality taxes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, we considered insurance costs over the 5 year period. More
expensive vehicles will require more expensive collision and
comprehensive (e.g., theft) car insurance. The increase in insurance
costs is estimated from the average value of collision plus
comprehensive insurance as a proportion of average new vehicle price.
Collision plus comprehensive insurance is the portion of insurance
costs that depend on vehicle value. A recent study by Quality Planning
\1309\ provides the average value of collision plus comprehensive
insurance for new vehicles, in 2010$, is $521 ($396 of which is
collision and $125 of which is comprehensive). The average consumer
expenditure for a new passenger car in 2011, according to the Bureau of
Economic Analysis was $24,572 and the average price of a new light
truck was $31,721 in $2010.\1310\ Using sales volumes from the Bureau,
we determined an average passenger car and an average light truck price
was $27,953 in $2010 dollars.\1311\ Average prices and estimated sales
volumes are needed because price elasticity is an estimate of how a
percent increase in price \1312\ affects the percent decrease in sales.
Dividing the cost to insure a new vehicle by the average price of a new
vehicle gives the proportion of comprehensive plus collision insurance
as 1.86 percent of the price of a vehicle. As vehicles' values decline
with vehicle age, comprehensive and collision insurance premiums
likewise decline. Data on the change in insurance premiums as a
function of vehicle age are scarce; however, NHTSA utilized data from
the aforementioned Quality Planning study that cite the cost to insure
the average vehicle on the road today (average age 10.8 years)\1313\ to
enable a linear interpolation of the change in insurance premiums
during the first 11 years of a typical vehicle's life. Using this
interpolation, as a percentage of the base vehicle price of $27,953,
the cost of collision and comprehensive insurance in each of the first
five years of a vehicle's life is 1.86 percent, 1.82 percent, 1.75
percent, 1.64 percent, and 1.50 percent, respectively, or 8.57 percent
in aggregate. Discounting that stream of insurance costs back to
present value indicates that the present value of the component of
insurance costs that vary with vehicle price is equal to 8.0 percent of
the vehicle's price at a 3 percent discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1309\ ``During Recession, American Drivers Assumed More Risk to
Reduce Auto Insurance Costs,'' Quality Planning, March 2011. See
https://www.qualityplanning.com/media/4312/110329%20tough%20times_f2.pdf (last accessed August 1, 2012).
\1310\ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis,--Table 7.2.5S. Auto and Truck Unit Sales, Production,
Inventories, Expenditures, and Price, Available at http://www.bea.gov/itable/ (last accessed August 1, 2012)
\1311\ http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid11av.pdf, Table 1A. Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U): U.S. city average, by
expenditure category and commodity and service group, for new
vehicles. (Last accessed August 1, 2012)
\1312\ When estimating the sales impact, the price of the
vehicle was increased from these MY 2011 prices based on the costs
of estimated safety and MY 2011-2016 fuel economy rules. See the
cumulative impact section for an estimate of those costs. For
passenger cars $871 was added to the average price of a MY 2011
passenger car to make the total baseline price for MY 2017 $25,443
($24,572 + $871), for light trucks $1,090 was added to the average
price of a MY 2011 light truck to make the total baseline price for
MY 2017 $32,811 ($31,721 + $1,090). All of these values are in 2010
dollars.
\1313\ See https://www.polk.com/company/news/average_age_of_vehicles_reaches_record_high_according_to_polk (last accessed
August 1, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, we considered that 70 percent of new vehicle purchasers take
out loans to finance their purchase.\1314\ Using proprietary forecasts
available from Global Insight, NHTSA developed an average of 48-month
\1315\ bank and auto finance company loan rates for years 2017 through
2025, which--when deflated by Global Insight's corresponding forecasts
of the CPI--is 5.16 percent. In the construction of this estimate,
NHTSA assumed an equal distribution of bank and auto finance company
loans--an assumption necessitated by the lack of data on the
distribution of the volume of loans between the differing types of
creditors. NHTSA opted to adjust future loan rates using the CPI rather
than the GDP deflator as this analysis is intended to facilitate
further analysis from the perspective of the consumer, for which the
CPI is the preferred deflation factor. At these terms the average
person taking a loan will pay 13.7 percent more (undiscounted) for
their vehicle over the 5 years than a consumer paying cash for the
vehicle at the time of purchase. Discounting future loan payments at a
3 percent discount rate, a consumer financing a vehicle purchase pays
5.43 percent more as opposed to an all cash purchase. Taking into
account to make the total baseline price for MY 2017 $25,443 ($24,572 +
$871), for light trucks $1,090 was added to the average price of a MY
2011 light truck to make the total baseline price for MY 2017 $32,811
($31,721 + $1,090). All of these values are in 2010 dollars. Assuming
that only 70 percent of vehicle purchases are financed, the average
consumer would pay 3.80 (=0.70 * 5.43 percent) percent more than the
retail price of a vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1314\ Bird, Colin. ``Should I Pay Cash, Lease or Finance My New
Car?'' http://www.cars.com/go/advice/Story.jsp?section=fin&story=should-i-pay-cash&subject=loan-quick-start&referer=advice&aff=sacbee, July 12, 2011, citing CNW Marketing
Research. (Last accessed August 1, 2012)
\1315\ No projections were available for rates of loan terms of
60 months. NHTSA compared the historical difference of 48-month and
60-month loan rates and determined the 48-month rate to be a
suitable proxy for the 60-month rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, we considered the residual value (or resale value) of the
vehicle after 5 years and expressed this as a percentage of the new
vehicle price. If the price of the vehicle increases due to fuel
economy technologies, the resale value of the vehicle will go up
proportionately. The average resale price of a vehicle after 5 years is
about 35 percent \1316\ of the original purchase price. Discounting the
residual value back 5 years using a 3 percent discount rate (=35
percent * .8755) gives an effective residual value of 30.64 percent.
Note that added CAFE technology could also result in more expensive or
more frequent repairs. However, we do not have data to verify the
extent to which this would be a factor during the first 5 years of
vehicle life. We add these four factors together. At a 3 percent
discount
[[Page 63107]]
rate, the consumer considers that he could get 30.64 percent back upon
resale in 5 years, but will pay 5.5 percent more for taxes, 8.0 percent
more in insurance, and 5.1 percent more for loans, resulting in an 12.0
percent return on the increase in price for fuel economy technology
(=30.6 percent - 5.5 percent-8.0 percent - 5.1 percent). Thus, the
increase in price per vehicle would be multiplied by 0.88 (=1 - 0.12)
before subtracting the fuel savings to determine the overall net
consumer valuation of the increase of costs on this purchase decision.
This process results in estimates of the payback period for MY 2025
vehicles of 2 years for light trucks and 4 years for passenger cars at
a 3 percent discount rate. For ease of presentation, we combine the
impact on passenger car and light truck sales for the Preferred
Alternative only for the combined 9 year period of 2017-2025, and we
compare the sales impact for both the MY 2010 baseline and for the MY
2008 baseline at the 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates. There is
not a significant difference in sales impacts depending upon the
baseline considered (2010 versus 2008) and the discount rate impact is
predictable, with sales increasing to a lesser extent under a 7 percent
discount rate than in the case of a 3 percent discount rate, since
benefits are valued lower with a higher discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1316\ Consumer Reports, August 2008, ``What That Car Really
Costs to Own,'' Available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/pricing/what-that-car-really-costs-to-own-4-08/overview/what-that-car-really-costs-to-own-ov.htm (last accessed August 1, 2012).
Table IV-140--Potential Sales Impact for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks
[Vehicles in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MYs 2017-2025 Sales impact in MYs 2017-2025 Sales impact in
thousands and in percent of thousands and in percent of
Years fuel valued by Years fuel total sales (3% discount total sales (7% discount
manufacturers valued by rate) rate)
consumers ---------------------------------------------------------------
(000's) (%) (000's) (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Baseline
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 Flat.......................... 3 yr. 911 0.6 757 0.5
0 Flat.......................... 5 yr. 3,784 2.7 3,232 2.3
1 yr. *......................... 1 yr. * -2,696 -1.9 -2,322 -1.6
1 yr............................ 3 yr. -360 -0.3 -445 -0.3
3 yr. *......................... 3 yr. * -530 -0.4 -542 -0.4
5 yr. *......................... 5 yr. * -3 -0.0 -36 -0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Baseline
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 Flat.......................... 3 yr. 988 0.7 867 0.6
0 Flat.......................... 5 yr. 3,804 2.7 3,261 2.3
1 yr. *......................... 1 yr. * -2,405 -1.7 -2,611 -1.8
1 yr............................ 3 yr. -50 -0.0 -130 -0.1
3 yr. *......................... 3 yr. * -309 -0.2 -314 -0.2
5 yr. *......................... 5 yr. * 124 0.1 94 0.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These scenarios are presented as theoretical cases. NHTSA believes it is unlikely that manufacturers and
consumers would value improvements in fuel economy identically, and believes that on average, manufacturers
will behave more conservatively in their assumptions of how consumers value fuel economy than how on average
consumers will actually behave. NHTSA expects that in practice the number of years fuel is valued by
manufacturers will be shorter than the number of years fuel is valued by consumers.
e. What have commenters and other sources said in terms of potential
sales impacts attributable to the final rule?
A recent study on the effects on sales, attributable to NHTSA
regulatory programs, including the fuel economy program was undertaken
by the Center for Automotive Research (CAR).\1317\ CAR examined the
impacts of alternative fuel economy increases of 3%, 4%, 5%, and 6% per
year on the outlook for the U.S. motor vehicle market, including the
impacts of likely increases in costs for increased fuel economy (based
on the NAS report, which estimates higher costs than NHTSA's current
estimates) and required safety features. The CAR analysis also examined
the technologies that would be used to achieve higher fuel economy, and
how their production and use would affect the new vehicle market,
production volumes, and automotive manufacturing employment in the year
2025. The required safety mandates were assumed to cost $1,500 per
vehicle in 2025, but CAR did not evaluate the value of those safety
mandates to consumers. Thus the CAR study cannot be compared to other
studies, as it combines the cost of additional safety mandates along
with costs for fuel economy improvements. The CAR study likely
underestimates sales (that is, it overestimates the reduction in sales
resulting from increased CAFE standards alone), as it assigns no value
to consumers' perceived values of additional safety features. In any
case, unlike other analyses discussed in this final rule, sales changes
shown cannot be solely attributed to the rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1317\ ``The U.S. Automotive Market and Industry in 2025,''
Center for Automotive Research, June 2011, available at http://www.cargroup.org/assets/files/ami.pdf (last accessed August 1,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are many factors that go into the CAR analysis of sales. CAR
assumes a 22.0 mpg baseline, two gasoline price scenarios of $3.50 and
$6.00 per gallon, VMT schedules by age, and a rebound rate of 10
percent (although it appears that the CAR report assumes a rebound
effect even for the baseline and thus negates the impact of the rebound
effect). Fuel savings are assumed to be valued by consumers over a 5
year period at a 10 percent discount rate. The impact on sales varies
by scenario, the estimates of the cost of technology, the price of
gasoline, etc. At $3.50 per gallon, the net change in consumer savings
(costs minus the fuel savings valued by consumers) is a net cost to
consumers of $359 for the 3% scenario, a net cost of $1,644 for the 4%
scenario, a net cost of $2,858 for the 5% scenario, and a net consumer
cost of $6,525 for the 6% scenario. At $6.00 per gallon, the net change
in consumer savings (costs minus the fuel savings valued by consumers)
is a net savings to consumers of $2,107 for the 3% scenario, a net
savings of $1,131 for the 4% scenario, a net savings of $258 for
[[Page 63108]]
the 5% scenario, and a net consumer cost of $3,051 for the 6% scenario.
Thus, the price of gasoline can be a significant factor in affecting
how consumers view whether they are getting value for their
expenditures on technology. Table 14 on page 42 of the CAR report
presents the results of their estimates of the 4 alternative mpg
scenarios and the 2 prices of gasoline on light vehicle sales and
automotive employment. The table below shows these estimates. The
baseline for the CAR report is 17.9 million sales and 877,075
employees. The price of gasoline at $6.00 per gallon, rather than $3.50
per gallon results in about 2.1 million additional sales per year and
100,000 more employees in year 2025.
Table IV-141--Center for Automotive Research (CAR) Report Estimates of Sales and Employment Impacts in 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAFE Requirement CAFE Requirement CAFE Requirement CAFE Requirement
of a 3% increase of a 4% increase of a 5% increase of a 6% increase
in mpg per year in mpg per year in mpg per year in mpg per year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gasoline at $3.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sales (millions).................... 16.4 15.5 14.7 12.5
Employment.......................... 803,548 757,700 717,626 612,567
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gasoline at $6.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sales............................... 18.5 17.6 16.9 14.5
Employment.......................... 903,135 861,739 826,950 711,538
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 13 on page 44 of the CAR report shows a graph of historical
automotive labor productivity, indicating that there has been a long
term 0.4 percent productivity growth rate from 1960-2008, to indicate
that there will be 12.26 vehicles produced in the U.S. per worker in
2025 (which is higher than NHTSA's estimate--see below). In addition,
the CAR report discusses the jobs multiplier. For every one automotive
manufacturing job, they estimate the economic contribution to the U.S.
economy of 7.96 jobs \1318\ stating ``In 2010, about 1 million direct
U.S. jobs were located at an auto and auto parts manufacturers; these
jobs generated an additional 1.966 million supplier jobs, largely in
non-manufacturing sectors of the economy. The combined total of 2.966
jobs generated a further spin-off of 3.466 million jobs that depend on
the consumer spending of direct and supplier employees, for a total
jobs contribution from U.S. auto manufacturing of 6.432 million jobs in
2010. The figure actually rises to 7.96 million when direct jobs
located at new vehicle dealerships (connected to the sale and service
of new vehicles) are considered.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1318\ Kim Hill, Debbie Menk, and Adam Cooper, ``Contribution of
the Automotive Industry to the Economies of All Fifty States and the
United States,'' The Center for Automotive Research, Ann Arbor, MI,
April 2010. Available at http://www.cargroup.org/?module=Publications&event=View&pubID=16. Docket No. NHTSA-2010-
0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAR uses econometric estimates of the sensitivity of new vehicle
purchases to prices and consumer incomes and forecasts of income growth
through 2025 to translate these estimated changes in net vehicle prices
to estimates of changes in sales of MY 2025 vehicles; higher net
prices--which occur when increases in vehicle prices exceeds the value
of fuel savings--reduce vehicle sales, while lower net prices increase
new vehicle sales in 2025. We do not have access to the statistical
models that CAR develops to estimate the effects of price and income
changes on vehicle sales. CAR's analysis assumes continued increases in
labor productivity over time and then translates the estimated impacts
of higher CAFE standards on net vehicle prices into estimated impacts
on sales and employment in the automobile production and related
industries.
The agency disagrees with the cost estimates in the CAR report for
new technologies, the addition of safety mandates into the costs, and
various other assumptions. Many commenters stated that they expected
vehicle sales to increase as a result of the final rule, and cited an
analysis conducted by Ceres and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.\1319\
that examined the impact on automotive sales in 2020, with a baseline
assumption of an industry fuel economy standard of 42 mpg, a $4.00
price of gasoline, a 12.2 percent discount rate and an assumption that
buyers value 48% of fuel savings over seven years in purchasing
vehicles. The main finding on sales was that light vehicle sales were
predicted to increase by 6% from 16.3 million to 17.3 million in 2020.
That analysis has subsequently been revised to predict a 4% increase
from 15.8 million to 16.4 million.\1320\ Elasticity is not provided in
the report but it states that they use a complex model of price
elasticity and cross elasticities developed by GM. A fuel price risk
factor \1321\ was utilized. Little rationale was provided for the
baseline assumptions, but sensitivity analyses were examined around the
price of fuel ($2, $4, and $7 per gallon), the discount rate (5.2%,
12.2%, 17.2%), purchasers consider fuel savings over (3, 7, or 15
years), fuel price risk factor of (30%, 70%, or 140%), and VMT of
(10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 in the first year and declining
thereafter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1319\ ``U.S. Autos, CAFE and GHG Emissions'', March 2011, Citi
Ceres, UMTRI, Baum and Associates, Meszler Engineering Services, and
the Natural Resources Defense Council, available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/fuel-economy-focus (last accessed
August 1, 2012).
\1320\ ``U.S. Autos, CAFE and GHG Emissions'', March 2011, Citi
Ceres, UMTRI, Baum and Associates, Meszler Engineering Services, and
the Natural Resources Defense Council, available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/fuel-economy-focus (last accessed
August 1, 2012).
\1321\ Fuel price risk factor measures the rate at which
consumers are willing to trade reductions in fuel costs for
increases in purchase price. For example, a fuel price risk factor
of 1.0 would indicate the consumers would be willing to pay $1 for
an improvement in fuel economy that resulted in reducing by $1 the
present value of the savings in fuel costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The UAW, along with NRDC and the National Wildlife Foundation, also
submitted reports indicating their assessment that the additional
technology content needed to meet higher fuel economy standards would
lead to considerable sales and employment growth. For example, the 2010
UAW/NRDC/Center for American Progress study, ``Driving Growth,''
concluded that if 75 percent of the
[[Page 63109]]
additional content needed for the vehicle fleet to reach an average 40
mpg by 2020 was produced in the U.S., as many as 150,000 jobs would be
created.\1322\ Similarly, the 2011 UAW/NRDC/NWF study, ``Supplying
Ingenuity,'' found that 504 facilities across 43 states employing over
500,000 people are devoted to researching, developing, or producing
clean-car technologies, and that 67 percent of these jobs are related
to advanced conventional technologies such as better engines and
transmissions and components like electric power steering and high
strength steel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1322\ UAW/NRDC/Center for American Progress, ``Driving Growth:
How Clean Cars and Climate Policy Can Create Jobs,'' March 2010.
NHTSA-2010-0131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
f. Based on all of the above, what does NHTSA believe the likely impact
on vehicle sales attributable to this final rule will be?
While NHTSA conducted and considered a variety of vehicle sales
``cases'' as presented above, we do not believe that we can state with
certainty that any given case is ``correct'' for the rulemaking
timeframe. Given that this final rule affects multiple years, many
years in the future, and that during that time there will be a dynamic
situation occurring with dramatically changing fuel economy levels and
technology being added to vehicles, we anticipate that consumers'
consideration of fuel economy will evolve over time. NHTSA believes
that there is much uncertainty in how much consumers' consideration of
fuel economy will change as a result of this final rule alone, as
compared to other rules such as the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE and GHG
emissions rules and the Fuel Economy Labeling rule, or manufacturers'
marketing efforts. We anticipate that manufacturers will be tracking
consumers' behavior and marketing their products to affect consumer
behavior, as they always have. We have made several simplifying
assumptions in order to estimate the potential impact on sales, but as
discussed above, there are uncertainties in how this final rule will
affect sales and employment. We note, as is likely evident in the table
above, that the impact on sales in this analysis is heavily impacted by
the difference between manufacturers' beliefs of how consumers value
fuel savings and consumers' valuation of fuel savings.
This uncertainty, however, supports our conclusion in Section IV.F
of the preamble that higher standards than the ones finalized in this
rulemaking may not be economically practicable. The agency has tried to
grapple with potential sales impacts as an important aspect of economic
practicability, but reaching no definitive conclusion, believes that a
conservative approach will be most likely to help us avoid setting
standards that are beyond what would be economically practicable, and
thus beyond the maximum feasible levels. NHTSA will monitor sales
trends going forward, and anticipates that the intervening years
between this final rule and the future rulemaking to develop and
establish final standards for MYs 2022-2025 will provide significant
additional insight into the questions of how consumers value fuel
savings associated with increased fuel economy, how manufacturers
believe consumers value that fuel savings, and corresponding effects on
vehicle sales attributable to CAFE standards.
As discussed elsewhere in the preamble and FRIA, the literature
provides mixed evidence that consumers consistently value future fuel
savings consistent with shorter payback periods and/or higher discount
rate than the full lifetime value of fuel savings over the useful life
of vehicles discounted as the social discount rates. That also provides
an explanation for one of the potential reasons that manufacturers do
not voluntarily provide all of the fuel saving technologies that are
cost-effective and available, on a societal basis considered over the
lifetime of the vehicle. In the past, consumers have not been willing
to pay the additional price for such fuel economy improvements. One
question is whether consumers will place a greater value on fuel
savings as a result of this rule, and only as a result of this rule. In
the past, large spikes in gasoline prices and consistently high
gasoline prices have spurred consumers to consider fuel economy more
prevalent in their purchasing decisions. The agency believes that the
new and improved fuel economy labels and the large increase in fuel
economy required as a result of the MY 2012-2016 fuel economy
standards, may all have an impact on consumer valuation of fuel
savings. However, these effects are not due to this rule. This final
rule with its very large increase in average fuel economy, as well as
manufacturers marketing these increased fuel economy levels, should
also have a significant effect on consumers' realization that fuel
economy is changing rapidly and significantly. As a result, we believe
consumers will pay more attention to fuel savings as a result of this
final rule assuming that fuel prices do not decrease significantly, but
there is uncertainty whether all sales impacts will be the result of
this final rule alone. It is possible that consumers will not demand
increased fuel economy even when such increases would reduce overall
costs for them. Some vehicle owners may also react to persistently
higher vehicle costs by owning fewer vehicles, and keeping existing
vehicles in service for somewhat longer. For these consumers, the
possibility exists that there may be permanent sales losses, compared
with a situation in which vehicle prices are lower. There is a wide
variety in the number of miles that owners drive per year. Some drivers
only drive 5,000 miles per year and others drive 25,000 miles or more.
Rationally those that drive many miles have more incentive to buy
vehicles with high fuel economy levels. In summary, there are a variety
of types of consumers that are in different financial situations and
drive different mileages per year. Since consumers are different and
use different reasoning in purchasing vehicles, and we do not yet have
an account of the distribution of their preferences or how that may
change over time as a result of this rulemaking, the answer is quite
ambiguous. Some may be induced by better fuel economy to purchase
vehicles more often to keep up with technology, some may purchase no
new vehicles because of the increase in vehicle price, and some may
purchase fewer vehicles and hold onto their vehicles longer. There is
great uncertainty about how consumers value fuel economy, and for this
reason, the impact of this fuel economy proposal on sales is uncertain.
While it is difficult to determine how consumers will react to fuel
economy improvements attributable to the final rule, we believe that it
is likely that consumers will learn more about and increasingly value
fuel economy improvements in the future, but we also believe that
manufacturers and consumers are unlikely to place identical valuation
on fuel economy benefits. We believe for the reasons discussed above
that manufacturers will behave more conservatively in their assumptions
of how consumers value fuel economy than how on average consumers will
actually behave.
Some commenters stated that sales will increase as a result of the
rule, as evidenced above in the above discussion of comments from Ceres
and the UAW. Others, including NADA, expressed concern that sales may
fall.
[[Page 63110]]
g. How does NHTSA plan to address this issue in the future?
NHTSA is currently sponsoring work to develop a vehicle choice
model for potential use in the agency's future rulemaking analyses--
this work may help to better estimate the market's effective valuation
of future fuel economy improvements. This rule did not rely on a
vehicle choice model. With an integrated market share model, the CAFE
model would estimate how the sales volumes of individual vehicle models
would change in response to changes in fuel economy levels and prices
throughout the light vehicle market, possibly taking into account
interactions with the used vehicle market. Having done so, the model
would replace the sales estimates in the original market forecast with
those reflecting these model-estimated shifts, repeating the entire
modeling cycle until converging on a stable solution. We sought comment
on the potential for this approach to help the agency estimate sales
effects. Several commenters wanted the agency to either have the
vehicle choice model go through a full peer review (the Alliance) or to
be provided for public comment and review (NRDC) before being used.
There was wide disparity in the comments on the concept of using a
vehicle choice model to estimate the impacts on sales. The Alliance
supported the use of a vehicle choice model. The American Fuel and
Petrochemical Manufacturers \1323\ stated that it was concerned that
the analysis is not based on a model that considered consumer choices
and the impacts on different industries and individuals that would be
affected. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) \1324\ and Union
of Concerned Scientists (UCS) \1325\ did not support the use of a
consumer choice model and stated that the agencies should not rely on a
highly uncertain and idealized consumer choice model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1323\ See EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485.
\1324\ See EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0284.
\1325\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRDC stated that a consumer choice model could only rely on stated
or revealed preferences based on existing vehicles in the market place
and such a model is inappropriate for standards that drive the use of
new technology. In response, NHTSA agrees that further work on the
vehicle choice model is necessary, and is continuing to develop it.
Section IV.C.4 of the preamble discusses the current progress with the
choice model and next steps, and we refer the reader there for more
information.
h. Potential Impact on Employment in the Automotive Industry in the
Short Run
There are three potential areas of employment in the automotive
industry that fuel economy standards could affect.\1326\ We briefly
outline those areas here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1326\ For a general analysis of the potentially complex
employment effects of regulation, see Morgenstern, Richard D.,
William A. Pizer, and Jhih-Shyang Shih. ``Jobs Versus the
Environment: An Industry-Level Perspective.'' Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 43 (2002): 412-436 (Docket
EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first is the hiring of additional engineers by
automobile companies and their suppliers to do research and development
and testing on new technologies to determine their capabilities,
durability, platform introduction, etc. The agency anticipates that
there may be some level of additional job creation due to the added
research and development, overall program management, and subsequent
sales efforts required to market vehicles that have been redesigned for
significant improvements in fuel economy, especially for revolutionary
technologies such as hybrid and electric vehicles. In this respect, the
final rule will likely have a positive effect on employment. At the
same time, the levels of added employment are uncertain. In addition,
it is not clear how much of this effort will be accomplished by added
employment and how much by diverting existing employees to focus on
CAFE instead of other company priorities such as improved acceleration
performance, styling, marketing, new vehicle concepts, etc.
The second area is the impact that new technologies would
have on production employment, both at suppliers and at auto
assemblers. Added parts, like turbochargers, or complexity of assembly
could have a positive impact on employment. The use of more exotic
steels, aluminum, or other materials to save weight could affect the
number of welds or attachment methods. It is uncertain to what extent
new CAFE technologies would require added steps in the assembly process
that would necessitate new hiring, but generally when content is added,
the number of employees in the supplier industry and on the assembly
line goes up.
The third area is the potential impact that sales gains or
losses could have on production employment. This area is potentially
much more sensitive to change than the first two areas discussed above,
although for reasons discussed above its estimation is highly
uncertain. An increase in sales, produced for example by consumer
attention to overall costs and learning over time, would have a
positive effect on employment. A decrease in sales, produced by
increases in initial costs, would have a negative effect.
We received a number of comments (from the Defour Group and some
private individuals) asserting that there will be decreases in
employment as a result of the costs of the rule, and a number of
comments (from the United Auto Workers, environmental organizations,
sustainable business groups, some private individuals, and others)
asserting increases in employment, based on the development of advanced
technologies and the reduction in net costs due to fuel savings. An
assessment by the Defour Group predicts a loss of 155,000 jobs in
manufacturing and supply, plus another 50,000 in distribution.\1327\ A
study by Ceres predicts job gains of 43,000 in the auto industry and
484,000 economy-wide.\1328\ Some comments cite a study by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, and United
Auto Workers that 150,000 auto workers already are working to supply
clean, fuel-efficient technologies.\1329\ The differences in results
for quantitative employment impacts are mainly due to difference in the
price impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1327\ Walton, Thomas F., and Dean Drake, Defour Group LLC
(February 13, 2012). ``Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis for MY 2017 to 2025 Fuel
Economy Standards.'' Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319.
\1328\ Management Information Services, Inc. (July 2011). ``More
Jobs per Gallon: How Strong Fuel Economy/GHG Standards Will Fuel
American Jobs.'' Boston, MA: Ceres. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-
0709.
\1329\ Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife
Federation, and United Auto Workers (August 2011). ``Supplying
Ingenuity: U.S. Suppliers of Clean, Fuel-Efficient Vehicle
Technologies,'' available at http://www.nrdc.org/transportation/autosuppliers/files/SupplierMappingReport.pdf (last accessed August
1, 2012). (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimates of decreases in employment commonly come from studies
that use cost estimates higher than those estimated by the agencies,
and sometimes lower benefits estimates, resulting in reductions in
vehicle sales. For instance, some comments from individuals cite the
National Automobile Dealers Association and Center for Automotive
Research for cost estimates of $5,000 to $6,000 per vehicle, much
higher than those
[[Page 63111]]
estimated by the agencies. Those studies commonly look at the
employment associated with vehicle sales, but not the employment
associated with producing the technologies needed to comply with the
standards, or changes in labor intensity of production. Analyses that
find increases in employment commonly start with increased vehicle
sales as a result of the rule. Many of these analyses also note that
even without increased unit sales, employment is likely to rise due to
the additional technology content of the vehicles sold.\1330\ In both
cases, ``multiplier'' effects, which extend employment impacts beyond
the auto sector to impacts on suppliers, other sectors, and expenditure
changes by workers, lead to large estimates, either positive or
negative, of the employment effects of the rule. We received the
suggestion to include in our analysis an alternative scenario where
there is less than full employment; the implication of less than full
employment is that multiplier effects are more likely. While we
examined all of these different employment estimates, we decided to
continue using our methodology from previous analyses, with some
updates to our method of calculating the impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1330\ UAW/NRDC/Center for American Progress, ``Driving Growth:
How Clean Cars and Climate Policy Can Create Jobs,'' March 2010, p.
11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to obtain an estimate of potential job increases per unit
sales increase, we examined recent U.S. employment (original equipment
manufacturers and suppliers) and U.S. production. Total employment in
2000 reached a peak in the Motor Vehicle and Parts Manufacturing sector
of the economy averaging 1,313,500 workers (NAICS codes of 3361, 2, 3).
Then there was a steady decline to 1,096,900 in 2006 and more rapid
decreases in 2008, and 2009. Employment in 2009 averaged 664,000,
employment in 2010 averaged 675,000 and employment in the first six
months of 2011 has averaged 699,000. Table VII-19 shows how many
vehicles are produced by the average worker in the industry. Averaging
the information shown for the even years of 2000-2010, the average U.S.
domestic employee produces 11.3 vehicles (the same number as in 2008
and 2010). Thus, assuming that a projected sales gain or loss divided
by 11.3 would be one method of estimating the potential employment gain
or loss in any one year. This provides a measurement in job years. This
method underestimates the number of jobs per vehicle sold under the
rule, because it does not take into account the additional employment
associated with the additional fuel-saving technologies.
We also examined the employment impact for production and non-
supervisory workers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to see if there
was a more direct link between their employment level and production
than the white collar workers. There is a closer link between light
vehicle production in the U.S. and the number of production and non-
supervisory workers (for example, from 2002 to 2010, production fell by
44 percent; the number of production and non-supervisory workers in the
industry fell by 44 percent and the number of white collar workers fell
by 31 percent). However, in some years (2004 and 2006) the white-collar
jobs had a higher percentage loss than the blue-collar jobs. In this
analysis, the agency examines all jobs in the industry.
Table IV-142--U.S. Light Duty Vehicle Production and Employment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motor vehicle
U.S. Light and parts U.S. Production per
Year vehicle employment employee
production \1331\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000...................................................... 12,773,714 1,313,500 9.7
2002...................................................... 13,568,385 1,151,300 11.8
2004...................................................... 13,527,309 1,112,700 12.2
2006...................................................... 12,855,845 1,069,800 11.7
2008...................................................... 9,870,473 875,400 11.3
2010...................................................... 7,597,147 674,600 11.3
-----------------------------------------------------
Total/Average......................................... 70,192,873 6,197,300 11.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Administration projects that full employment will return in
2018.\1332\ When the economy is at full employment, a fuel economy
regulation is unlikely to have much impact on net overall U.S.
employment; instead, labor would primarily be shifted from one sector
to another. These shifts in employment impose an opportunity cost on
society, approximated by the wages of the employees, as regulation
diverts workers from other activities in the economy. In this
situation, any effects on net employment are likely to be transitory as
workers change jobs (e.g., some workers may need to be retrained or
require time to search for new jobs, while shortages in some sectors or
regions could bid up wages to attract workers). On the other hand, if a
regulation comes into effect during a period of high unemployment, a
change in labor demand due to regulation may affect net overall U.S.
employment because the labor market is not in equilibrium. Schmalansee
and Stavins point out that net positive employment effects are possible
in the near term when the economy is at less than full employment due
to the potential hiring of idle labor resources by the regulated sector
to meet new requirements (e.g., to install new equipment) and new
economic activity in sectors related to the regulated sector longer
run, the net effect on employment is more difficult to predict and will
depend on the way in which the related industries respond to the
regulatory requirements. This program is expected to affect employment
in the regulated sector (auto manufacturing) and other sectors directly
affected by the final rule: auto parts suppliers, auto dealers, the
fuel supply market (which will face reduced petroleum production due to
reduced fuel demand but which may see additional demand for electricity
or other fuels). As discussed in the CAR and Ceres reports above, each
of these sectors could potentially have ripple
[[Page 63112]]
effects throughout the rest of the economy. These ripple effects depend
much more heavily on the state of the economy than do the direct
effects. As noted above, though, in a full-employment economy, any
changes in employment will result from people changing jobs or
voluntarily entering or exiting the workforce. In a full-employment
economy, employment impacts of this proposal will change employment in
specific sectors, but it will have small, if any, effect on aggregate
employment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1331\ U.S. employment data is from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, available at http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES3133600101?data_tool=XGtable (last accessed Aug. 10, 2012).
\1332\ Based on the Congressional Budget Office January 2012
Report, ``The Budget and Economic Outlook, Fiscal Years 2012-2022,''
which predicted unemployment levels of 5.5% in 2018. See http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42905 (last accessed Aug. 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This rule would take effect in 2017 through 2025; by then, the
current high unemployment may be moderated or ended. The Congressional
Budget Office has predicted full employment by 2018.\1333\ To the
extent that full employment is achieved, increases in employment are
not possible. For that reason, this analysis does not include
multiplier effects, but instead focuses on employment impacts in the
most directly affected industries. Those sectors are likely to face the
most concentrated employment impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1333\ Based on the Congressional Budget Office January 2012
Report, ``The Budget and Economic Outlook, Fiscal Years 2012-2022,''
which predicted unemployment levels of 5.5% in 2018. See http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42905 (last accessed Aug. 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-143 shows the potential cumulative impact on auto sector
employment over the MY 2017-2025 period in job years, without
considering or quantifying the ripple effect. This table takes the
results from sales and divides by 11.3 to obtain the impact on auto
sector employment. To estimate the proportion of domestic employment
affected by the change in sales, we use data from Ward's Automotive
Group for total car and truck production in the U.S. compared to total
car and truck sales in the U.S. For the period 2001-2010, the
proportion is 66.7 percent. We thus weight sales by this factor to get
an estimate of the effect on U.S. employment in the motor vehicle
manufacturing sector due to this rule. As in the sales analysis, the
table shows the potential impact for the preferred alternative for both
the MY 2010 baseline and for the MY 2008 baseline at the 3 percent and
7 percent discount rates for 6 different cases.
Since the impact of this final rule on sales is very difficult to
predict, and sales have the largest potential effect on employment, the
impact of this final rule on employment is also very difficult to
predict. As with sales, the impact on employment is heavily affected by
the difference between manufacturers' investments in fuel-saving
technologies \1334\ and consumers' valuation of fuel savings. However,
since any negative impact of the rule on unit sales is partially offset
by increased employment per vehicle sold, it is highly unlikely that
the rule would lead to significant job losses in the short term in the
automotive industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1334\ As discussed above, these investments are affected both
by manufacturers' beliefs about consumers' valuation of fuel
economy, and by competitive dynamics, since the industry is composed
of multiple firms, each of which considers the case where a
competitor that doesn't invest ends up in a better position due to
gas prices at the low end of the expected distribution.
Table IV--143 Analysis of Alternative Scenarios in Automotive \1335\ Sector Employment--in Thousands of Job
Years
[Passenger cars and light trucks combined preferred alternative]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MYs 2017-2025 MYs 2017-2025
Years fuel employment employment
Years fuel valued by manufacturers valued by impact (3% impact (7%
consumers discount rate) discount rate)
(000's) (000's)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Baseline
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 Flat.......................................................... 3 yr 54 45
0 Flat.......................................................... 5 yr 223 191
* 1 yr.......................................................... * 1 yr -160 -138
1 yr............................................................ 3 yr -21 -26
* 3 yr.......................................................... * 3 yr -31 -32
* 5 yr.......................................................... * 5 yr 0 -2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Baseline
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 Flat.......................................................... 3 yr 59 51
0 Flat.......................................................... 5 yr 225 193
* 1 yr.......................................................... * 1 yr -143 -155
1 yr............................................................ 3 yr -3 -8
* 3 yr.......................................................... * 3 yr -18 -19
* 5 yr.......................................................... * 5 yr 7 6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1335\ The analysis does not reflect the likely positive impact in industry employment due to a change in
vehicle content resulting from this rule.
* These scenarios are presented as theoretical cases. NHTSA believes it is unlikely that manufacturers and
consumers would value improvements in fuel economy identically, and believes that on average, manufacturers
will behave more conservatively in their assumptions of how consumers value fuel economy than how on average
consumers will actually behave. NHTSA expects that in practice the number of years fuel is valued by
manufacturers will be shorter than the number of years fuel is valued by consumers.
i. Scrappage Rates
The effect of this rule on the use and scrappage of older vehicles
will be related to its effects on new vehicle prices, the fuel
efficiency of new vehicle models, and the total sales of new vehicles.
If the value of fuel savings resulting from improved fuel efficiency to
the typical potential buyer of a new vehicle outweighs the average
increase in new models' prices, sales of new vehicles will rise, while
scrappage rates of used vehicles will increase slightly. This will
cause the ``turnover'' of the vehicle fleet--that is, the retirement of
used vehicles and their replacement by new models--to accelerate
slightly, thus accentuating the anticipated effect of the
[[Page 63113]]
rule on fleet-wide fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.
However, if potential buyers value future fuel savings resulting from
the increased fuel efficiency of new models at less than the increase
in their average selling price, sales of new vehicles will decline, as
will the rate at which used vehicles are retired from service. This
effect will slow the replacement of used vehicles by new models, and
thus partly offset the anticipated effects of the final rules on fuel
use and emissions.
Because the agencies are uncertain about how the value of projected
fuel savings from the final rules to potential buyers will compare to
their estimates of increases in new vehicle prices, we have not
attempted to estimate explicitly the effects of the rule on scrappage
of older vehicles and the turnover of the vehicle fleet.
6. Social Benefits, Private Benefits, and Potential Unquantified
Consumer Welfare Impacts of the Standards
There are two viewpoints for evaluating the costs and benefits of
the increase in CAFE standards: the private perspective of vehicle
buyers themselves on the higher fuel economy levels that the rule would
require, and the economy-wide or ``social'' perspective. In order to
appreciate how these viewpoints can diverge, it is important to
distinguish between costs and benefits that are borne privately by
those who would have purchased new vehicles in the absence of the rule,
and costs and benefits that are distributed broadly throughout the
economy. The agency's analysis of benefits and costs from requiring
higher fuel efficiency, presented in detail above, includes several
categories of benefits (identified as ``social benefits'') that are not
limited to automobile buyers, and instead extend throughout the U.S.
(and global) economy. Examples of these benefits include reductions in
the energy security costs associated with U.S. petroleum imports, and
in the economic damages expected to result from climate change and
local air pollution. In contrast, other categories of benefits--
principally future fuel savings projected to result from higher fuel
economy, but also, for example, the value of less frequent refueling--
will be experienced exclusively by the initial purchasers and
subsequent owners of vehicle models whose fuel economy manufacturers
elect to improve (and are thus referred to as ``private benefits'').
While the economy-wide or social benefits from increased fuel
economy represent a small but important share of the total economic
benefits from raising CAFE standards, NHTSA estimates that benefits to
vehicle buyers themselves will significantly exceed vehicle
manufacturers' costs for complying with the stricter fuel economy
standards this final rule establishes. The agency also assumes that the
costs of new technologies manufacturers employ to improve fuel economy
will ultimately be borne by vehicle buyers in the form of higher
purchase prices. Thus NHTSA concludes that the benefits to vehicle
buyers from requiring higher fuel efficiency will far outweigh the
costs they will be required to pay to obtain it. As an illustration,
Tables IV-144 and IV-145 report the agency's estimates of the average
lifetime values of fuel savings for MY 2017-2025 passenger cars and
light trucks, calculated using projected future retail fuel prices
consistent with the pre-tax prices used in its analysis of social costs
and benefits. The table compares NHTSA's estimates of the average
lifetime value of fuel savings for cars and light trucks to the price
increases it expects to occur as manufacturers attempt to recover their
costs for complying with increased CAFE standards. As the table shows,
the agency's estimates of the present value of lifetime fuel savings
(discounted using the OMB-recommended 3% rate) substantially outweigh
projected vehicle price increases for both cars and light trucks in
every model year, even under the assumption that all of manufacturers'
technology outlays are passed on to buyers in the form of higher
selling prices for new cars and light trucks. By model year 2025, NHTSA
projects that average lifetime fuel savings will exceed the average
price increase by between $3,800 and $4,300 for cars, and by more than
$5,800 for light trucks.
Table IV-144--NHTSA Estimated Value of Lifetime Fuel Savings vs. Vehicle Price Increases--MYs 2017-2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year
Fleet Measure MY ------------------------------------------------------
baseline 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars............... Value of fuel 2008 $872- $1,657- $2,390- $3,269- $3,852-
savings.
2010 $1,090 $1,609 $2,540 $3,311 $3,954
Average price 2008 $233- $434- $602- $904- $1,105-
increase.
2010 $364 $484 $659 $858 $994
Difference..... 2008 $639- $1,222- $1,789- $2,366- $2,747-
2010 $726 $1,125 $1,881 $2,453 $2,960
Light Trucks................. Value of fuel 2008 $537- $1,340- $2,665- $3,793- $5,183-
savings.
2010 $427 $817 $2,031 $3,142 $4,621
Average price 2008 $78- $191- $422- $620- $853-
increase.
2010 $147 $196 $396 $628 $907
Difference..... 2008 $459- $1,149- $2,243- $3,173- $4,330-
2010 $280 $621 $1,635 $2,514 $3,714
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-145--NHTSA Estimated Value of Lifetime Fuel Savings vs. Vehicle Price Increases--MYs 2022-2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year
Fleet Measure MY -------------------------------------------
baseline 2022 2023 2024 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars.................... Value of fuel savings 2008 $4,216- $4,571- $5,101- $5,496-
2010 $4,339 $4,880 $5,440 $5,881
Average price 2008 $1,219- $1,326- $1,666- $1,738-
increase.
2010 $1,091 $1,221 $1,482 $1,578
[[Page 63114]]
Difference........... 2008 $2,997- $3,245- $3,435- $3,758-
2010 $3,248 $3,659 $3,958 $4,303
Light Trucks...................... Value of fuel savings 2008 $5,707- $6,094- $6,673- $7,180-
2010 $5,068 $5,747 $6,431 $7,017
Average price 2008 $949- $994- $1,076- $1,171-
increase.
2010 $948 $1,056 $1,148 $1,226
Difference........... 2008 $4,758- $5,100- $5,597- $6,008-
2010 $4,126 $4,694 $5,289 $5,804
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The comparisons above immediately raise the question of why buyers
would not purchase vehicles with the higher fuel economy levels the
rule requires manufacturers to achieve in future model years even if
NHTSA did not adopt it. They also raise the question of whether it is
appropriate to assume that manufacturers would not elect to provide
higher fuel economy even in the absence of increases in CAFE standards,
since the comparisons in Tables IV-144 and IV-145 suggest that doing so
would increase the prices that potential buyers would be willing to pay
for many new vehicle models by far more than it would raise their
manufacturers' costs of produce them. In other words, these comparisons
suggest that increasing fuel economy would be an effective strategy for
many manufacturers to expand their sales of new vehicles and increase
profits. More specifically, why would potential buyers of new vehicles
hesitate to purchase models offering higher fuel economy, when doing so
would produce the substantial economic savings implied by the
comparisons presented in Tables IV-144 and IV-145? And why would
manufacturers voluntarily forego opportunities to increase the
attractiveness, value, and competitive positioning of their car and
light truck models--and thus their own profits--by improving their fuel
economy?
One explanation for why this might arise is that the market for
vehicle fuel economy does not appear to work perfectly, and that higher
CAFE standards are necessary to require manufacturers to produce--and
potential buyers to purchase--models with higher fuel economy. One
source of such market imperfections might be limited availability of
information to consumers about the savings from purchasing models that
offer higher fuel economy. However, such information is increasingly
available and has become easier to obtain, and new fuel economy labels
will provide a wide range of information about the economic and
environmental benefits of increased fuel economy.
While Tables IV-144 and IV-145 illustrate large net (discounted)
savings from reduced fuel expenditures over the useful life of the
vehicle, fuel expenditures are not the only relevant operating cost
associated with vehicle ownership. By forcing manufacturers to add new
fuel economy technologies to their vehicle offerings, this rule creates
additional costs that will be borne by the purchasers of those
vehicles. By model year 2025, buyers of new passenger cars and light
trucks will face an average increase of $80 per vehicle in additional
taxes and fees at the time of purchase and registration. Over the
vehicle's useful life, buyers of MY 2025 new vehicles will spend an
additional $225 in financing charges, $280 in the cost of insurance,
and another $130 in vehicle maintenance costs. These costs combine to
add over $700 (discounted) to the cost of ownership, and further erode
the savings in fuel expenditures. However, Tables IV-144 and IV-145
suggest much larger net savings, even accounting for ancillary
ownership costs.
Many commenters noted that recent poll results and changes in
attitudes suggest that consumers are becoming more aware of the
importance and value of fuel economy, and that this will increasingly
be reflected in their future vehicle purchasing decisions. NRDC, the
Sierra Club, Consumer Federation of America, and Consumers' Union each
cited recent polls indicating that consumers are increasingly concerned
about fuel prices and U.S. energy security, and are increasingly aware
that purchasing vehicles with higher fuel economy can reduce both their
gasoline costs and U.S. dependence on imported petroleum. Some of these
commenters also noted that recent polls have shown growing support for
higher CAFE standards as a strategy for increasing the range of vehicle
models offering high fuel economy, and increased willingness of vehicle
buyers to pay for improved fuel economy and advanced technologies such
as electric vehicles.
The agency agrees that there appears to be growing awareness of
fuel economy generally and increased interest in higher fuel economy
among vehicle buyers, but notes that some of this may reflect the
persistence of high fuel prices in recent years. Thus if fuel prices
decline from recent high levels, some of this increased awareness and
willingness to pay for higher fuel economy could erode. In addition, if
significant failures in the market for fuel economy--such as those
identified in the preceding discussion--exist, then increased consumer
awareness of and interest in fuel economy may be inadequate by
themselves to result in the levels of fuel economy that would be
economically desirable. In this case, increased CAFE standards are
still likely to be necessary to require manufacturers to supply--and
buyers to demand--the higher fuel economy levels that can be
economically justified on the basis of their benefits and costs.
Other potential sources of market failure include phenomena
highlighted by the field of behavioral economics, including loss
aversion, inadequate consumer attention to long-term effects of their
decisions, or a lack of salience of benefits such as fuel savings to
consumers at the time they make purchasing decisions. For example, some
research suggest that many consumers are unwilling to make energy-
efficiency investments that appear likely to pay off in the relatively
short-term, in part because they are deterred by the prospect that
those investments require immediate, known outlays but produce deferred
and uncertain returns.\1336\ As an illustration,
[[Page 63115]]
Greene et al. (2009) calculate that the expected net present value of
increasing the fuel economy of a passenger car from 28 to 35 miles per
gallon falls from $405 when calculated using standard net present value
calculations, to nearly zero when uncertainty regarding future cost
savings and buyers' reluctance to accept the risk of losses are taken
into account.\1337\Other research finds that consumers may undervalue
benefits or costs that are less salient, difficult to isolate, or that
they will realize only in the future.\1338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1336\ Jaffe, A. B., and Stavins, R. N. (1994). The Energy
Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation Technology. Resource and
Energy Economics, 16(2); see Hunt Alcott and Nathan Wozny, Gasoline
Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox (2009), available at
http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/cres/research/calendar/files/AllcottH.pdf
(last accessed Jul. 13, 2012). For relevant background, with an
emphasis on the importance of salience and attention, see Kahneman,
D. Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011).
\1337\ Greene, D., J. German, and M. Delucchi (2009). ``Fuel
Economy: The Case for Market Failure'' in Reducing Climate Impacts
in the Transportation Sector, Sperling, D., and J. Cannon, eds.
Springer Science. Surprisingly, the authors find that uncertainty
regarding the future price of gasoline appears to be less important
than uncertainty surrounding the expected lifetimes of new vehicles.
(Docket NHTSA-2009-0059-0154). On loss aversion in general, and its
relationship to prospect theory (which predicts that certain losses
will loom larger than probabilistic gains of higher expected value),
see Kahneman.
\1338\ Mutulinggan, S., C.Corbett, S.Benzarti, and B. Oppenheim.
``Investment in Energy Efficiency by Small and Medium-Size Firms: An
Empirical Analysis of the Adoption of Process Improvement
Recommendations'' (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=1947330. Hossain, Janjim, and John Morgan
(2009). ``* * * Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non)
Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay,'' Advances in Economic
Analysis and Policy vol. 6; Barber, Brad, Terrence Odean, and Lu
Zheng (2005). ``Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of Expenses
on Mutual Fund Flows,'' Journal of Business vol. 78, no. 6, pp.
2095-2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another possible explanation for manufacturers' unwillingness to
offer models with improved fuel economy is that many consumers appear
to undervalue potential savings in gasoline costs when purchasing
vehicles. Fuel costs may be a ``shrouded'' attribute in consumers'
decisions, because it may simply not be in many shoppers' interest to
spend the time and effort necessary to determine the economic value of
higher fuel economy, to isolate the component of a new vehicle's
selling price that is related to its fuel economy, and compare these
two. It may also be difficult for potential buyers to disentangle the
cost of purchasing a more fuel-efficient vehicle from its overall
purchase price, or to isolate the value of higher fuel economy from
accompanying differences in more prominent features of new vehicles,
such as passenger and cargo-carrying capacity, performance, or safety.
Some recent research finds that because of these or other reasons, many
buyers are unwilling to pay $1 more to purchase a vehicle that offers a
$1 reduction in the discounted present value of its future gasoline
costs.\1339\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1339\ See, e.g., Alcott and Wozny. On shrouded attributes and
their importance, see Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, 2006.
``Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression
in Competitive Markets.'' Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2):
505-540.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other research suggests that the manufacturers' hesitance to offer
e more fuel efficient vehicles stems from consumers' inability to value
future fuel savings correctly. For example, Larrick and Soll (2008)
find evidence that consumers do not understand how to translate changes
in fuel economy, which is denominated in miles per gallon (MPG), into
resulting changes in fuel consumption and fuel costs per mile driven or
in a time period.\1340\ The recently redesigned fuel economy label
should help overcome this difficulty, because it draws attention to
purely economic effects of fuel economy, although the vehicle's MPG
itself remains a prominent measure. Sanstad and Howarth (1994) argue
that consumers often resort to imprecise but convenient rules of thumb
to compare vehicles that offer different fuel economy ratings, and that
this can cause many buyers to underestimate the value of fuel savings,
particularly from large increases in fuel economy.\1341\ If the
behavior identified in these studies is widespread, then the agency's
estimates that the benefits to vehicle owners from requiring higher
fuel economy significantly exceed the costs of providing it may indeed
be consistent with the unwillingness of vehicle manufacturers to
offer--and buyers to purchase--the levels of fuel economy this rule
would require.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1340\ Larrick, R. P., and J.B. Soll (2008). ``The MPG
illusion'' Science 320: 1593-1594.
\1341\ Sanstad, A., and R. Howarth (1994). '' `Normal' Markets,
Market Imperfections, and Energy Efficiency.'' Energy Policy 22(10):
811-818.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another possible reconciliation of the large net benefits the
agency projects for individual buyers and its assumption that producers
would not offer the level of fuel economy this final rule requires is
that many of the technologies projected by the agency to be available
beginning in MY 2017 offer significantly improved efficiency per unit
of cost, but are not available for application to new vehicles sold
currently. Still another is that the actual value of future fuel
savings resulting from the standards will vary widely among potential
vehicle buyers. These differences primarily reflect variation in the
amount they drive, but differences in their driving styles may also
affect the fuel economy they expect to achieve, and buyers undoubtedly
have varying expectations about future fuel prices. Thus while the
agency's assertion that fuel savings for the average buyer will
significantly exceed the increase in vehicle prices may be correct, the
reverse may nevertheless be true for some potential buyers. Defects in
the market for cars and light trucks could also lead manufacturers to
undersupply fuel economy, even in cases where many buyers were willing
to pay the increased prices necessary to compensate manufacturers for
providing it. To be sure, the market for new automobiles as a whole
exhibits a great deal of competition, but this apparently vigorous
competition among manufacturers may not extend to the provision of some
individual vehicle attributes. Incomplete or ``asymmetric'' access to
information about vehicle attributes such as fuel economy--whereby
manufacturers of new cars and light trucks or sellers of used models
have more complete knowledge about vehicles' actual fuel economy
performance than is available to their potential buyers--may also
prevent sellers of new or used vehicles from being able to capture its
full value. In this situation, the level of fuel efficiency provided in
the markets for new or used vehicles might remain persistently lower
than that demanded by well-informed potential buyers.
Constraints on the combinations of fuel economy, carrying capacity,
and performance that current technologies allow manufacturers to offer
in individual vehicle models undoubtedly limit the range of fuel
economy available within certain vehicle classes, particularly those
including larger vehicles. However, it is also possible that deliberate
decisions by manufacturers further limit the range of fuel economy
available within individual vehicle market segments, if they
underestimate the premiums that prospective buyers of those models are
willing to pay for improved fuel economy. As an illustration, the range
of highway fuel economy ratings among current minivan models extends
only from 23 to 28 mpg, while their combined city and highway ratings
ranges only from 19 to 24 mpg.\1342\ If this phenomenon is widespread,
the average fuel efficiency of their entire new vehicle fleet could
remain below the levels that potential buyers demand and are willing to
pay for.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1342\ This is the range of combined city and highway fuel
economy levels from lowest (Toyota Sienna AWD) to highest (Mazda 5)
available for model year 2012; http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/bestworstEPAtrucks.htm (last accessed Jul. 13, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63116]]
Some commenters endorsed the agency's analysis of the potential for
various sources of market failure to inhibit manufacturers from
supplying adequate fuel economy levels, and to cause potential buyers
to underestimate the value of purchasing models that offer higher fuel
economy. Consumer Federation of America endorsed the agency's focus on
sources of manufacturers' hesitance to offer models with higher fuel
economy, as well as on the more commonly cited market failures that can
make buyers unwilling to invest in higher fuel economy. CFA also
submitted more detailed discussions of some of these sources of
potential market failure in support of its general comments. ICCT noted
that the combination of uncertainty about the cost and effectiveness of
new technologies to improve fuel economy with buyers' aversion to
potential losses from purchasing higher-priced vehicles offering
uncertain fuel savings was sufficient to explain the underinvestment in
fuel economy, and to justify higher fuel economy standards. ICCT also
argued that by removing consumers' option to buy low fuel economy
vehicles, higher fuel economy standards minimize the effect of aversion
on buyers' willingness to invest in higher fuel economy.
A fundamentally different explanation for buyers' apparent
unwillingness to invest in higher fuel economy when it appears to offer
such large financial returns is that NHTSA's estimates of private
benefits and costs from requiring manufacturers to improve fuel
efficiency do not match potential buyers' assessment of the likely
benefits and costs from purchasing models with higher fuel economy
ratings. This could occur because the agency's underlying assumptions
about some of the factors that affect the value of fuel savings differ
from those made by potential buyers, because NHTSA has used different
estimates for some benefits from saving fuel than do buyers, or simply
because the agency has failed to account for some potential costs of
achieving higher fuel economy. For example, buyers may not value
increased fuel economy as highly as the agency's calculations suggest,
because they have shorter time horizons than the full vehicle lifetimes
NHTSA uses in these calculations, or because they discount future fuel
savings using higher rates than those prescribed by OMB for evaluating
Federal regulations. Potential buyers may also anticipate lower fuel
prices in the future than those forecast by the Energy Information
Administration, or may expect larger differences between vehicles' MPG
ratings and their own actual on-road fuel economy than the 20 percent
gap (30 percent for HEVs) the agency estimates.
To illustrate the first of these possibilities, Table IV-146 shows
the effect of differing assumptions about vehicle buyers' time horizons
on their assessment of the value of future fuel savings. Specifically,
the table reports the value of fuel savings consumers might consider
when purchasing a MY 2025 car or light truck that features the higher
fuel economy levels required by the final rule, when those fuel savings
are evaluated over different time horizons. The table then compares
these values to the agency's estimates of the increases in these
vehicles' prices that are likely to result for MY 2025. This table
shows that when fuel savings are evaluated over the average lifetime of
a MY 2025 car (approximately 14 years) or light truck (about 16 years),
their present value (discounted at 3 percent) exceeds the estimated
average price increase by $2,900-3,300 for cars and by $4,400-4,900 for
light trucks.
If buyers are instead assumed to consider fuel savings over only a
10-year time horizon, Table IV-146 shows that this reduces the
difference between the present value of fuel savings and the projected
price increase for a MY 2025 car to $2,100-2,500, and to about $3,300-
3,600 for a MY 2025 light truck. Finally, Table IV-146 shows that if
buyers consider fuel savings only over the length of time for which
they typically finance new car purchases (slightly more than 5 years
during 2011), the value of fuel savings exceeds the estimated increase
in the price of a MY 2025 car by only about $550-830, while the
corresponding difference is reduced to $1,500-1,700 for a MY 2025 light
truck.
Table IV-146--NHTSA Estimated Value of Fuel Savings Considered by Buyers vs. Vehicle Price Increases With
Alternative Assumptions About Vehicle Buyer Time Horizons
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Value over alternative time
horizons
--------------------------------
Vehicle Measure Baseline (3% Discount rate)
fleet --------------------------------
Average Average
lifetime 10 Years loan term
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY 2025 Passenger Car................... Fuel Savings.............. 2008 $4,506- $3,694- $2,121-
2010 $4,659 $3,820 $2,193
Price Increase............ 2008 ($1,577)- ($1,577)- ($1,577)-
2010 ($1,361) ($1,361) ($1,361)
Difference................ 2008 $2,929- $2,118- $545-
2010 $3,298 $2,459 $833
MY 2025 Light Truck..................... Fuel Savings.............. 2008 $5,900- $4,683- $2,722-
2010 $5,472 $4,343 $2,525
Price Increase............ 2008 ($1,040) ($1,040) ($1,040)
2010 ($1,047) ($1,047) ($1,047)
Difference................ 2008 $4,860- $3,643- $1,682-
2010 $4,425 $3,296 $1,477
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential vehicle buyers may also discount future fuel savings
using higher rates than those typically used to evaluate Federal
regulations. OMB guidance prescribes that future benefits and costs of
regulations that mainly affect private consumption decisions, as will
be the case if manufacturers' costs for complying with higher fuel
economy standards are passed on to vehicle buyers, should be discounted
using a consumption rate of time preference.\1343\
[[Page 63117]]
OMB estimates that savers currently discount future consumption at an
average real or inflation-adjusted rate of about 3 percent when they
face little risk about its likely level, making this figure a
reasonable estimate of the consumption rate of time preference.
However, vehicle buyers may view the value of future fuel savings that
results from purchasing a vehicle with higher fuel economy as risky or
uncertain, or they may instead discount future consumption at rates
reflecting their costs for financing the higher capital outlays
required to purchase more fuel-efficient models. In either case, buyers
comparing models with different fuel economy ratings are likely to
discount the future fuel savings from purchasing one that offers higher
fuel economy at rates well above the 3% assumed in NHTSA's evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1343\ Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4,
``Regulatory Analysis,'' September 17, 2003, 33. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf (last accessed Jul. 13, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-147 shows the effects of higher discount rates on vehicle
buyers' evaluation of the fuel savings projected to result from the
CAFE standards presented in this final rule, again using MY 2025
passenger cars and light trucks as an example. As Table IV-146 showed
previously, average future fuel savings discounted at the OMB 3 percent
consumer rate exceed the agency's estimated price increases by $2,900-
3,300 for MY 2025 passenger cars and by $4,400-4,900 for MY 2025 light
trucks. If vehicle buyers instead discount future fuel savings at the
typical new-car loan rate prevailing during 2011 (approximately 5.2
percent), however, these differences decline to $2,500-2,800 for cars
and $3,800-4,200 for light trucks, as Table IV-147 illustrates. This is
a plausible alternative assumption, because buyers are likely to
finance the increases in purchase prices resulting from compliance with
higher CAFE standards as part of the process of financing the vehicle
purchase itself.
Finally, as the table also shows, discounting future fuel savings
using a consumer credit card rate (which averaged about 13 percent
during 2011) reduces these differences to $1,100-1,500 for a MY 2025
passenger car and $2,200-2,500 for the typical MY 2025 light truck.
Even at these significantly higher discount rates, however, the table
shows that the private net benefits from purchasing new vehicles with
the levels of fuel economy this rule would require--rather than those
that would result from simply extending the MY 2016 CAFE standards to
apply to future model years--remain large.
Table IV-147--NHTSA Estimated Value of Fuel Savings Considered by Buyers vs. Vehicle Price Increases With
Alternative Assumptions About Consumer Discount Rates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Value at Alternative Discount Rates
-----------------------------------------------
Baseline Consumer
Vehicle Measure fleet OMB consumer New car loan credit card
rate (3%) rate (5.2%) rate (12.7%)
\1344\ \1345\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY 2025 passenger car........... Fuel savings....... 2008 $4,506- $4,041- $2,725-
2010 $4,659 $4,178 $2,818
Price increase..... 2008 ($1,577)- ($1,577)- ($1,577)-
2010 ($1,361) ($1,361) ($1,361)
Difference......... 2008 $2,929- $2,464- $1,148-
2010 $3,298 $2,817 $1,457
MY 2025 light truck............. Fuel savings....... 2008 $5,900- $5,266- $3,507-
2010 $5,472 $4,883 $3,252
Price increase..... 2008 ($1,040)- ($1,040)- ($1,040)-
2010 ($1,047) ($1,047) ($1,047)
Difference......... 2008 $4,860 $4,226 $2,467
................... 2010 $4,425 $3,836 $2,205
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1344\ Interest rates on 48-month new vehicle loans made by commercial banks during 2011 averaged 5.73%, while
new car loan rates at auto finance companies averaged 4.73%; See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19, Consumer Credit. Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/Current releases/g19/Current (last accessed July 13, 2012).
\1345\ The average rate on consumer credit card accounts at commercial banks during 2011 was 12.74%; See Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19, Consumer Credit.
Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/Current (last accessed July 13, 2012).
Some evidence also suggests that vehicle buyers may employ
combinations of high discount rates and short time horizons in their
purchase decisions. For example, consumers surveyed by Kubik (2006)
reported that fuel savings would have to be adequate to pay back the
additional purchase price of a more fuel-efficient vehicle in less than
3 years to persuade them to purchase it, and that even over this short
time horizon they were likely to discount fuel savings using credit
card-like rates.\1346\ Combinations of a shorter time horizon and a
higher discount rate could further reduce--or potentially even
eliminate--the difference between the value of fuel savings and the
agency's estimates of increases in vehicle prices. One plausible
combination would be for buyers to discount fuel savings over the term
of a new car loan, using the interest rate on that loan as a discount
rate. Doing so would reduce the amount by which future fuel savings
exceed the estimated increase in the prices of MY 2025 vehicles
considerably further, to about $200-300 for passenger cars and $1,300-
1,600 for light trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1346\ Kubik, M. (2006). Consumer Views on Transportation and
Energy. Second Edition. Technical Report: National Renewable Energy
Laboratory. Available at Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0059-0038.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As these comparisons illustrate, reasonable alternative assumptions
about how consumers might evaluate future fuel savings, the major
private benefit from requiring higher fuel economy, can significantly
affect the benefits they consider when deciding whether to purchase
more fuel-efficient vehicles. Readily imaginable combinations of
shorter time horizons, higher discount rates, and lower expectations
about future fuel prices or annual vehicle use and fuel savings could
make some potential buyers hesitant--or perhaps even unwilling--to
[[Page 63118]]
purchase vehicles offering the increased fuel economy levels this final
rule would require manufacturers to provide in future model years.
Thus, vehicle buyers' assessment of the benefits and costs of this
final rule in their purchase decisions may differ markedly from NHTSA's
estimates.
If consumers' views about critical variables such as future fuel
prices or the appropriate discount rate differ sufficiently from the
assumptions used by the agency, some potential vehicle buyers might
conclude that the value of fuel savings and other benefits from higher
fuel economy they are considering are not sufficient to justify the
increase in purchase prices they expect to pay. In conjunction with the
possibility that manufacturers misinterpret potential buyers'
willingness to pay for improved fuel economy, this might explain why
the current choices among available models do not result in average
fuel economy levels approaching those this rule would require.
Another possibility is that achieving the fuel economy improvements
required by stricter fuel economy standards might lead manufacturers to
forego planned future improvements in performance, carrying capacity,
safety, or other features of their vehicle models that provide
important sources of utility to their owners, even if manufacturers
could--at some cost--retain those other features while improving fuel
economy. Although the specific economic values that buyers attach to
individual vehicle attributes such as fuel economy, performance, or
passenger- and cargo-carrying capacity are difficult to infer from
vehicle prices or buyers' choices among competing models, changes in
vehicle attributes can significantly affect the overall utility that
vehicles offer. Thus if requiring manufacturers to provide higher fuel
economy leads them to sacrifice improvements in these or other highly-
valued attributes, potential buyers are likely to view these sacrifices
as an additional cost of improving fuel economy. If the range of models
offered ensures that vehicles with those attributes continue to be
available, then vehicle buyers will still have the opportunity to
purchase them, although only at higher costs than they were previously
available.
As indicated in its previous discussion of technology costs, NHTSA
has approached this problem by attempting to develop cost estimates for
fuel economy-improving technologies that include allowances for any
additional costs necessary to maintain the reference fleet (or
baseline) levels of performance, comfort, capacity, and safety of
light-duty vehicle models. Although NHTSA has revised its estimates of
manufacturers' costs for some technologies significantly for use in
this rulemaking, these revised estimates are still intended to allow
manufacturers to maintain the performance, safety, carrying capacity,
and utility of vehicle models while improving their fuel economy, in
the majority of cases. The agency's continued specification of
footprint-based CAFE standards also addresses this concern, by
establishing less demanding fuel economy targets for larger cars and
light trucks.
Finally, vehicle buyers may simply prefer the choices of vehicle
models they now have available to the combinations of price, fuel
economy, and other attributes that manufacturers are likely to offer
when required to achieve the higher overall fuel economy levels
presented in this final rule. If this is the case, their choices among
models--and even some buyers' decisions about whether to purchase a new
vehicle--will respond accordingly, and their responses to these new
choices will reduce their overall welfare. Some may buy models with
combinations of price, fuel efficiency, and other attributes that they
consider less desirable than those they would otherwise have purchased,
while others may simply postpone buying a new vehicle.
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the agency cannot offer a
complete answer to the question of why the apparently large differences
between its estimates of private benefits from requiring higher fuel
economy and manufacturers' costs for providing it would not result in
fuel economy levels comparable to those required by the rule even in
its absence. One explanation is that these estimates are reasonable,
but that for some combination of the reasons outlined above, the market
for fuel economy is not responding efficiently to these potential
economic returns. NHTSA believes the existing literature offers some
support for the view that various failures in the market for fuel
economy prevent an economically desirable outcome, which implies that
there are likely to be substantial private gains from the final rule.
NHTSA acknowledges the possibility that it has incorrectly
characterized the impact on the market of the CAFE standards this rule
proposes, and that this could cause its estimates of benefits and costs
to misrepresent the effects of the final rule. To recognize this
possibility, this section presents an alternative accounting of the
benefits and costs of CAFE standards for MYs 2017-2025 passenger cars
and light trucks and discusses its implications. Table IV-148 and Table
IV-149 display the aggregate economic impacts of the rule as viewed
from the perspective of potential buyers.
As the table shows, the final rule's total benefits to vehicle
buyers (line 4) consist of the value of fuel savings over vehicles'
full lifetimes measured using retail fuel prices (line 1), the economic
value of vehicle occupants' savings in refueling time (line 2), and the
economic benefits from added rebound-effect driving (line 3). As the
zero entries in line 5 of the table suggest, no losses in consumer
welfare from changes in vehicle attributes (other than those from
increases in vehicle prices) are assumed to occur. The only reduction
in the total private benefits to vehicle owners occurs as a result of
the increased cost of maintaining the more technologically
sophisticated vehicles that this rule forces manufacturers to produce
and consumers to buy. Thus, the net private benefits to vehicle buyers
(line 7) are equal to total private benefits (reported previously in
line 4) minus the estimated incremental maintenance costs (line 6). The
decline in fuel tax revenues (line 8) that results from reduced fuel
purchases offsets the savings in fuel tax payments by vehicle buyers,
which was previously included in the retail value of fuel savings (line
1). The offsetting savings in tax payments to vehicle buyers and tax
revenue loss to government agencies is simply a transfer of funds
between consumers and government, and thus does not represent a net
social cost.\1347\ (Thus the sum of lines 1 and 8 equals the savings in
fuel production costs that were reported previously as the value of
fuel savings at pre-tax prices in the agency's accounting of economy-
wide benefits and costs.) Lines 9 and 10 of Table IV-148 and Table IV-
149 report the value of reductions in air pollution and climate-related
externalities resulting from lower emissions of criteria air pollutants
and CO2 during fuel production and consumption, while line
11 reports the savings in energy security externalities to the U.S.
economy from reduced consumption
[[Page 63119]]
and imports of petroleum and refined fuel. Line 13 reports the costs of
increased congestion delays, accidents, and noise that result from
additional driving due to the fuel economy rebound effect. Net external
benefits--those that extend beyond the realm of vehicle buyers--from
the final and augural CAFE standards (line 14) are thus the sum of the
change in fuel tax revenues, the reduction in environmental and energy
security externalities, and increased external costs from added
driving.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1347\ Strictly speaking, fuel taxes represent a transfer of
resources from consumers of fuel to government agencies and not a
use of economic resources. Reducing the volume of fuel purchases
simply reduces the value of this transfer, and thus cannot produce a
real economic cost or benefit. Representing the change in fuel tax
revenues in effect as an economy-wide cost is necessary to offset
the portion of fuel savings included in line 1 that represents
savings in fuel tax payments by consumers. This prevents the savings
in tax revenues from being counted as a benefit from the economy-
wide perspective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Line 15 of Table IV-148 and Table IV-149 shows manufacturers'
technology outlays for meeting higher CAFE standards for passenger cars
and light trucks, which represent the principal private and social cost
of requiring higher fuel economy. The net social benefits (line 16 of
the table) resulting from the final rule consist of the sum of private
(line 7) and external (line 14) benefits, minus technology costs (line
15). As expected, the figures reported in line 16 of the table are
identical to those reported previously. Table IV-148 and Table IV-149
highlight several important features of this rule's economic impacts.
First, comparing the rule's net private benefits (line 7) to its
external effects (lines 8 through 14) makes it clear that a very large
proportion of the final rule's benefits would be experienced by vehicle
buyers, while only the small remaining fraction would be extend beyond
vehicle buyers themselves. In turn, the vast majority of private
benefits resulting from the higher fuel economy levels the final rule
would require stem from fuel savings to vehicle buyers. Net external
benefits from the final rule (line 14) are actually projected to be
small, because losses in tax revenue and external costs from added
driving combine to exceed the value of reductions in environmental and
energy security externalities. As a consequence, the net social
benefits of the rule mirror almost exactly its net private benefits to
vehicle buyers, under the assumption that manufacturers will recover
their technology outlays for achieving higher fuel economy by raising
new car and light truck prices. Once again, this result highlights the
extreme importance of accounting for any other effects of the rule on
the economic welfare of vehicle buyers.
Table IV-148--NHTSA Estimated Private, Social, and Total Benefits and Costs of MYs 2017-2021 CAFE Standards--
Passenger Cars Plus Light Trucks
[3% discount rate]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year
Entry -------------------------------------------------
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Value of fuel savings (at retail prices)................... $13.5 $20.7 $37.0 $50.8 $65.8
2. Savings in refueling time.................................. 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.7
3. Consumer surplus from added driving........................ 1.2 1.8 3.1 4.2 5.5
4. Total private benefits (= 1 + 2 + 3)....................... 15.2 23.1 41.2 56.4 73.0
5. Reduction in private benefits from changes in other vehicle 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
attributes...................................................
6. Maintenance costs.......................................... (0) (0) (0) (1) (1)
7. Net private benefits (= 4 + 5 + 6)......................... 15.2 23.1 41.2 56.4 73.0
8. Change in fuel tax revenues................................ (1.3) (2.0) (3.6) (4.9) (6.3)
9. Reduced health damages from criteria emissions............. 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.9
10. Reduced climate damages from CO2 emissions................ 1.2 1.8 3.3 4.6 6.0
11. Reduced energy security externalities..................... 0.7 1.0 1.8 2.4 3.1
12. Reduction in externalities (= 9 + 10 + 11)................ 2.3 3.4 6.2 8.5 11.0
13. Increased costs of congestion, etc........................ (0.8) (1.2) (2.0) (2.7) (3.4)
14. Net external benefits (= 8 + 12 + 13)..................... 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.3
15. Technology costs.......................................... (4.4) (5.8) (8.7) (11.9) (14.8)
16. Net social benefits (= 7 + 14 + 15)....................... 5.50 13.90 24.60 32.00 42.20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV-149--NHTSA Estimated Private, Social, and Total Benefits and Costs of MYs 2022-2025 and Total MYs 2017-
2025 CAFE Standards--Passenger Cars Plus Light Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year
------------------------------------------------------
Entry Total,
2022 2023 2024 2025 2017-2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Value of fuel savings (at retail fuel prices)......... $72.9 $82.8 $93.8 $103.0 $540.3
2. Savings in refueling time............................. 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 14.6
3. Consumer surplus from added driving................... 6.1 7.0 7.8 8.6 45.2
4. Total private benefits (= 1 + 2 + 3).................. 80.9 92.0 104.1 114.4 600.1
5. Reduction in private benefits from changes in other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
vehicle attributes......................................
6. Maintenance costs..................................... (1) (2) (2) (2) (9)
7. Net private benefits (= 4 + 5 + 6).................... 80.9 92.0 104.1 114.4 600.1
8. Change in fuel tax revenues........................... (6.9) (7.7) (8.7) (9.4) (50.8)
9. Reduced health damages from criteria emissions........ 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.8 15.2
10. Reduced climate damages from CO2 emissions........... 6.7 7.8 8.9 9.9 50.0
11. Reduced energy security externalities................ 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.7 25.4
12. Reduction in externalities (= 9 + 10 + 11)........... 12.2 14.0 15.9 17.4 90.6
13. Increased costs of congestion, etc................... (3.7) (4.3) (4.9) (5.2) (29.6)
14. Net external benefits (= 8 + 12 + 13)................ 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.8 10.2
15. Technology costs..................................... (16.1) (18.1) (21.7) (23.3) (133.7)
16. Net social benefits (= 7 + 14 + 15).................. 49.10 53.80 59.40 66.50 346.60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63120]]
As discussed in detail previously, NHTSA believes that the
aggregate benefits from this final rule amply justify its total costs,
but it remains possible that the agency has overestimated the value of
fuel savings to buyers and subsequent owners of the cars and light
trucks to which the higher CAFE standards it establishes would apply.
It is also possible that the agency has failed to include adequate cost
allowances to allow manufacturers to maintain other vehicle attributes
as part of their efforts to achieve higher fuel economy. To acknowledge
these possibilities, NHTSA has examined their potential impact on its
estimates of the final rule's benefits and costs. This analysis, which
appears in Chapter VIII of the Final RIA accompanying this rule, shows
the rule's economic impacts under alternative assumptions about the
private benefits from higher fuel economy, and the value of potential
changes in other vehicle attributes. An important conclusion of this
analysis is that even if the private savings are significantly
overstated, the benefits of the final and augural standards continue to
exceed the costs.
7. What other impacts (quantitative and unquantifiable) will these
standards have?
In addition to the quantified benefits and costs of fuel economy
standards, the final standards established by this rule will have other
impacts that we have not quantified in monetary terms. The decision on
whether or not to quantify a particular impact depends on several
considerations:
How likely is it to occur, and can the magnitude of the
impact reasonably be attributed to the outcome of this rulemaking?
Would quantification of its physical magnitude or economic
value help NHTSA and the public evaluate the CAFE standards that may be
set in rulemaking?
Is the impact readily quantifiable in physical terms?
If so, can it readily be translated into an economic
value?
Is this economic value likely to be material?
Can the impact be quantified with a sufficiently narrow
range of uncertainty so that the estimate is useful?
NHTSA expects that this rulemaking will have a number of genuine,
material impacts that have not been quantified due to one or more of
these considerations. In some cases, further research may yield
estimates that are useful for future rulemakings.
a. Technology Forcing
The final rule will improve the fuel economy of the U.S. new
vehicle fleet, but it will also increase the cost (and presumably, the
price) of new passenger cars and light trucks built during MYs 2017-
2025. We anticipate that the cost, scope, and duration of this rule, as
well as the steadily rising standards it requires, will cause
automakers and suppliers to devote increased attention to methods of
improving vehicle fuel economy.
This increased attention will stimulate additional research and
engineering, and we anticipate that, over time, innovative approaches
to reducing the fuel consumption of light duty vehicles will emerge.
These innovative approaches may reduce the cost of the final rule in
its later years, and also increase the set of feasible technologies in
future years. We have attempted to estimate the effect of learning
effects on the costs of producing known technologies within the period
of the rulemaking, which is one way that technologies become cheaper
over time, and may reflect innovations in application and use of
existing technologies to meet the future standards.
However, we have not attempted to estimate the extent to which not-
yet-invented technologies will appear, either within the time period of
the current rulemaking or that might be available after MY 2016. Nor
have we projected whether technologies that were considered but not
applied in the current rulemaking because of concerns about the
likelihood of their commercialization during its timeframe, will in
fact be helped towards commercialization as a result of the final
standards.
b. Effects on Vehicle Costs
Actions that increase the cost of new vehicles could subsequently
make such vehicles more costly to maintain, repair, and insure. In
general, NHTSA expects that this effect to be a positive linear
function of vehicle costs. In its central analysis, NHTSA estimates
that the final rule could raise average vehicle technology costs by
over $1,500 by 2025, and for some manufacturers, average costs will
increase by more than $2,500 (for some specific vehicle models, we
estimate that the final rule could increase technology costs by more
than $10,000). Depending on the retail price of the vehicle, this could
represent a significant increase in the overall vehicle cost and
subsequently increase insurance rates, operation costs, and maintenance
costs. Comprehensive and collision insurance costs are likely to be
directly related to price increases, but liability premiums will go up
by a smaller proportion because the bulk of liability coverage reflects
the cost of personal injury. Also, although they represent economic
transfers, sales and excise taxes would also increase with increases in
vehicle prices (unless rates are reduced). NHTSA has attempted to
quantify these increased costs in detail, as reported in the previous
discussion of the rule's likely impacts on vehicle sales.
The impact on operation and maintenance costs is less clear,
because the maintenance burden and useful life of each technology are
not known. However, one of the common consequences of using more
complex or innovative technologies is a decline in vehicle reliability
and an increase in maintenance costs. These costs are borne in part by
vehicle manufacturers (through warranty costs, which are included in
the indirect costs of production), and in part by vehicle owners. NHTSA
believes that this effect may be significant, but has been unable to
quantify these costs for purposes of this final rule.
To the extent that the final standards require manufacturers to
build and sell more PHEVs and EVs, vehicle manufacturers and owners may
face additional costs for charging infrastructure and battery disposal.
While Chapter 3 of the final Joint TSD discusses the costs of charging
infrastructure, neither of these costs have been incorporated into the
rulemaking analysis.
c. Effects on Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT)
While NHTSA has estimated the impact of the rebound effect on the
use of MY 2017-25 vehicles, we have not estimated how a change in new
vehicle sales would impact aggregate vehicle use. Changes in new
vehicle sales may be accompanied by complex but difficult-to-quantify
effects on overall vehicle use and its composition by vehicle type and
age, because the same factors affecting sales of new vehicles are also
likely to influence their use, as well as how intensively older
vehicles are used and when they are retired from service. These changes
may have important consequences for total fleet-wide fuel consumption.
NHTSA has been unable to quantify these effects for purposes of this
final rule.
d. Effect on Composition of Passenger Car and Light Truck Sales
To the extent that manufacturers pass on costs to buyers by raising
prices for
[[Page 63121]]
new vehicle models, they may distribute these price increases across
their model lineups in ways that affect the composition of their total
sales. If changes in the composition of sales occur, this could affect
fuel savings to some degree. However, NHTSA's view is that the scope
for such effects is relatively small, since most vehicles will to some
extent be impacted by the standards. Compositional effects might be
important with respect to compliance costs for individual
manufacturers, but are unlikely to be material for the rule as a whole.
e. Effects on the Used Vehicle Market
The effect of this rule on the lifetimes, use, and retirement dates
of older vehicles will be related to its effects on new vehicle prices,
the fuel efficiency of new vehicle models, and total sales of new
vehicles. If the value of fuel savings resulting from improved fuel
efficiency to the typical potential buyer of a new vehicle outweighs
the average increase in new models' prices, sales of new vehicles will
rise while retirement rates of used vehicles will increase slightly.
This will cause the ``turnover'' of the vehicle fleet--that is, the
retirement of used vehicles and their replacement by new models--to
accelerate slightly, thus accentuating the anticipated effect of the
rule on fleet-wide fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.
However, if potential buyers value future fuel savings resulting from
the increased fuel efficiency of new models at less than the increase
in their average selling price, sales of new vehicles will decline, as
will the rate at which used vehicles are retired from service. This
effect will slow the replacement of used vehicles by new models, and
thus partly offset the anticipated effects of the final rules on fuel
use and emissions.
Because the agencies are uncertain about how the value of projected
fuel savings from the final rules to potential buyers will compare to
their estimates of increases in new vehicle prices, we have not
attempted to estimate explicitly the effects of the rule on retirement
of older vehicles and the turnover of the vehicle fleet.
f. Impacts of Changing Fuel Composition on Costs, Benefits, and
Emissions
EPAct, as amended by EISA, creates a Renewable Fuels Standard that
sets targets for greatly increased usage of renewable fuels over the
next decade. The law requires fixed volumes of renewable fuels to be
used--volumes that are not linked to actual usage of transportation
fuels.
Ethanol and biodiesel (in the required volumes) may increase or
decrease the cost of blended gasoline and diesel, depending on crude
oil prices and tax subsidies offered for renewable fuels. The potential
extra cost of renewable fuels would be borne through a cross-subsidy:
the price of every gallon of blended gasoline could rise sufficiently
to pay for any extra cost of using renewable fuels in these blends.
However, if the price of gasoline or diesel increases enough, the
consumer could actually realize a savings through the increased usage
of renewable fuels. By reducing total fuel consumption, the CAFE
standards in this rule could tend to increase any necessary cross-
subsidy per gallon of fuel, and hence raise the market price of
transportation fuels, while there would be no change in the volume or
cost of renewable fuels used.
These effects are indirectly incorporated in NHTSA's analysis of
the final CAFE standards, because they are reflected in EIA's
projections of future gasoline and diesel prices in the Annual Energy
Outlook, which incorporates in its baseline both a Renewable Fuel
Standard and higher CAFE standards.
The net effect of incorporating an RFS then might be to slightly
reduce the benefits of the rule, because affected vehicles might be
driven slightly less if the RFS makes blended gasoline relatively more
expensive, and because fuels blended with more ethanol emit slightly
fewer greenhouse gas emissions per gallon. In addition, there might be
corresponding benefit losses from the induced reduction in VMT. All of
these effects are difficult to estimate, because of uncertainty in
future crude oil prices, uncertainty in future tax policy, and
uncertainty about how petroleum marketers will actually comply with the
RFS, but they are likely to be small, because the cumulative deviation
from baseline fuel consumption induced by the final rule will itself be
small.
g. Distributional Effects
The agency's analysis of the final rule reports impacts only as
nationwide aggregate or per-vehicle average values. NHTSA also shows
the effects of the EIA high and low fuel price forecasts on the
aggregate benefits in its sensitivity analysis. Generally, this final
rule would have its largest effects on individuals who purchase new
vehicles produced during the model years it would affect (2017-25). New
vehicle buyers who drive more than the agency's estimates of average
vehicle use will experience larger fuel savings and economic benefits
than the average values reported in this final rule, while those who
drive less than our average estimates will experience smaller fuel
savings and benefits.
H. Vehicle Classification
Vehicle classification, for purposes of the CAFE program, refers to
manufacturers' decisions regarding whether a vehicle is a passenger car
or a light truck and whether NHTSA agrees; the vehicle would then be
subject to the applicable passenger car or the light truck
standards.\1348\ As NHTSA explained in the MY 2011 rulemaking and in
the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, vehicle classification is based in part
on EPCA/EISA, and in part on NHTSA's regulations. EPCA categorizes some
light 4-wheeled vehicles as ``passenger automobiles'' (cars) and the
balance as ``non-passenger automobiles'' (light trucks). EPCA defines
passenger automobiles as any automobile (other than an automobile
capable of off-highway operation) which NHTSA decides by rule is
manufactured primarily for use in the transportation of not more than
10 individuals.\1349\ NHTSA created regulatory definitions for
passenger automobiles and light trucks, found at 49 CFR Part 523, to
guide the manufacturers in classifying vehicles and NHTSA in reviewing
those classifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1348\ For the purpose of the MYs 2012-2016 standards and this
final rule establishing standards for MYs 2017 and beyond, EPA has
agreed to use NHTSA's regulatory definitions for determining which
vehicles would be subject to which CO2 standards.
\1349\ EPCA 501(2), 89 Stat. 901, codified at 49 U.S.C.
32901(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under EPCA, there are two general groups of automobiles that
qualify as non-passenger automobiles or light trucks: (1) Those defined
by NHTSA in its regulations as other than passenger automobiles due to
their having design features that indicate they were not manufactured
``primarily'' for transporting up to ten individuals; and (2) those
expressly excluded from the passenger category by statute due to their
capability for off-highway operation, regardless of whether they might
have been manufactured primarily for passenger transportation.\1350\ 49
CFR 523.5
[[Page 63122]]
directly tracks those two broad groups of non-passenger automobiles in
subsections (a) and (b), respectively. We note that NHTSA tightened the
definition of light truck in the rulemaking establishing the MY 2011
standards to ensure that only vehicles that actually have 4WD will be
classified as off-highway vehicles by reason of having 4WD (to prevent
2WD SUVs that also come in a 4WD ``version'' from qualifying
automatically as ``off-road capable'' simply due to the existence of
the 4WD version), which resulted in the reclassification of over 1
million vehicles from the truck fleet to the car fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1350\ 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(18). The statute refers both to
vehicles that are 4WD and to vehicles over 6,000 lbs GVWR as
potential candidates for off-road capability, if they also meet the
``significant feature * * * designed for off-highway operation'' as
defined by the Secretary. We note that we consider ``AWD'' vehicles
as 4WD for purposes of this determination--both systems have the
capability of providing power to all four wheels, which appears to
make them equal candidates for off-road capability given other
necessary characteristics. We also underscore, as we have in the
past, that despite comments in prior rulemakings suggesting that any
vehicle that appears to be manufactured ``primarily'' for
transporting passengers must be classified as a passenger car, the
statute as currently written clearly provides that vehicles that are
off-highway capable are not passenger cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the original passage of EPCA, and consistently through the
passage of EISA, Congress has expressed its intent that different
vehicles with different characteristics and capabilities should be
subject to different CAFE standards in two ways: first, through whether
a vehicle is classified as a passenger car or as a light truck, and
second, by requiring NHTSA to set separate standards for passenger cars
and for light trucks.\1351\ Creating two categories of vehicles and
requiring separate standards for each, however, can lead to two issues
which may either detract from the fuel savings that the program is able
to achieve, or increase regulatory burden for manufacturers simply
because they are trying to meet market demand. Specifically,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1351\ See, e.g., discussion of legislative history in 42 FR
38362, 38365-66 (Jul. 28, 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the stringency of the standards that NHTSA establishes
seems to favor either cars or trucks, manufacturers may have incentive
to change their vehicles' characteristics in order to reclassify them
and average them into the ``easier'' fleet; and
``Like'' vehicles, such as the 2WD and 4WD versions of the
same CUV, may have generally similar fuel economy-achieving
capabilities, but different target standards due to differences in the
car and truck curves.
NHTSA recognizes that manufacturers may have an incentive to
classify vehicles as light trucks if the fuel economy target for light
trucks with a given footprint is less stringent than the target for
passenger cars with the same footprint. This is often the case given
the current fleet. Because of characteristics like 4WD and towing and
hauling capacity (and correspondingly, although not necessarily,
heavier weight), the vehicles in the current light truck fleet are
generally less capable of achieving higher fuel economy levels as
compared to the vehicles in the passenger car fleet. 2WD SUVs and CUVs
are the vehicles that could be most readily redesigned so that they can
be ``moved'' from the passenger car to the light truck fleet. A
manufacturer could do this by adding a third row of seats, for example,
or boosting GVWR over 6,000 lbs for a 2WD SUV or CUV that already meets
the ground clearance requirements for ``off-road capability.'' A change
like this may only be possible during a vehicle redesign, but since
vehicles are redesigned, on average, every 5 years, at least some
manufacturers could possibly choose to make such changes before or
during the model years covered by this rulemaking, either because of
market demands or because of interest in changing the vehicle's
classification.
In the NPRM, the agency stated that it continues to believe that
the definitions as they currently exist are consistent with the text of
EISA and with Congress' original intent. However, the time frame of
this rulemaking is longer than any CAFE rulemaking that NHTSA has
previously undertaken, and no one can predict with certainty how the
market will change between now and 2025. The agency therefore has less
assurance than in prior rulemakings that manufacturers will not have
greater incentives and opportunities during that time frame to make
more deliberate redesign efforts to move vehicles out of the car fleet
and into the truck fleet in order to obtain the lower target, and
potentially reducing overall fuel savings. Recognizing this
possibility, NHTSA sought comment on how best to avoid it while still
classifying vehicles appropriately based on their characteristics and
capabilities.
One of the potential options that we explored in the MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking for MYs 2017 and beyond was changing the definition of light
truck to remove paragraph (5) of 49 CFR 523.5(a), which allows vehicles
to be classified as light trucks if they have three or more rows of
seats that can either be removed or folded flat to allow greater cargo-
carrying capacity. NHTSA has received comments in the past arguing that
vehicles with three or more rows of seats, unless they are capable of
transporting more than 10 individuals, should be classified as
passenger cars rather than as light trucks because they would not need
to have so many seats if they were not intended primarily to carry
passengers.
In the NPRM for MYs 2017 and beyond, NHTSA explained that we
recognize that there are arguments both for and against maintaining the
definition as currently written. The agency continues to believe that
three or more rows of seats that can be removed or folded flat is a
reasonable proxy for a vehicle's ability to provide expanded cargo
space, consistent with the agency's original intent in developing the
light truck definitions that expanded cargo space is a fundamentally
``truck-like'' characteristic. Much of the public reaction to this
definition, which is mixed, tends to be visceral and anecdotal--for
example, for parents with minivans and multiple children, the ability
of seats to fold flat to provide more room for child-related cargo may
have been a paramount consideration in purchasing the vehicle, while
for CUV owners with cramped and largely unused third rows, those extra
seats may seem to have sprung up entirely in response to the
regulation, rather than in response to the consumer's need for utility.
If we believe, for the sake of argument, that the agency's decision
might be reasonable from both a policy and a legal perspective whether
we decided to change the definition or to leave it alone, the most
important questions in making the decision become (1) whether removing
523.5(a)(5), and thus causing vehicles with three or more rows to be
classified as passenger cars in the future, will save more fuel, and
(2) if more fuel will be saved, at what cost.
In considering these questions in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking,
NHTSA conducted an analysis in that final rule to attempt to consider
the impact of moving these vehicles. We identified all of the 3-row
vehicles in the baseline (MY 2008) fleet,\1352\ and then considered
whether any could be properly classified as a light truck under a
different provision of 49 CFR 523.5--about 40 vehicles were
classifiable under Sec. 523.5(b) as off-highway capable. We then
transferred those remaining 3-row vehicles from the light truck to the
passenger car input sheets for the CAFE model, re-estimated the
relative stringency of the passenger car and light truck standards,
shifted the curves to obtain the same overall average required fuel
economy as under the final standards, and ran the model to evaluate
potential impacts (in terms of costs, fuel savings, etc.) of moving
these vehicles. The agency's hypothesis had been that moving 3-row
vehicles from the truck to the car fleet would tend to bring the
achieved fuel economy levels down in both fleets--the car fleet
achieved levels could theoretically fall due to the introduction of
many more vehicles that
[[Page 63123]]
are relatively heavy for their footprint and thus comparatively less
fuel economy-capable, while the truck fleet achieved levels could
theoretically fall due to the characteristics of the vehicles remaining
in the fleet (4WDs and pickups, mainly) that are often comparatively
less fuel economy-capable than 3-row vehicles, although more vehicles
would be subject to the relatively more stringent passenger car
standards, assuming the curves were not refit to the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1352\ Of the 430 light trucks models in the fleet, 175 of these
had 3 rows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the agency found, however, moving the vehicles reduced the
stringency of the passenger car standards by approximately 0.8 mpg on
average for the five years of the rule, and reduced the stringency of
the light truck standards by approximately 0.2 mpg on average for the
five years of the rule, but it also resulted in approximately 676
million fewer gallons of fuel consumed (equivalent to about 1 percent
of the reduction in fuel consumption under the final standards) and 7.1
mmt fewer CO2 emissions (equivalent to about 1 percent of
the reduction in CO2 emissions under the final standards)
over the lifetime of the MYs 2012-2016 vehicles. This result was
attributable to slight differences (due to rounding precision) in the
overall average required fuel economy levels in MYs 2012-2014, and to
the retention of the relatively high lifetime mileage accumulation
(compared to ``traditional'' passenger cars) of the vehicles moved from
the light truck fleet to the passenger car fleet. The net effect on
technology costs was approximately $200 million additional spending on
technology each year (equivalent to about 2 percent of the average
increase in annual technology outlays under the final standards).
Assuming manufacturers would pass that cost forward to consumers by
increasing vehicle costs, NHTSA estimated that vehicle prices would
increase by an average of approximately $13 during MYs 2012-2016. With
less fuel savings and higher costs, and a substantial disruption to the
industry, removing 523.5(a)(5) did not seem advisable in the context of
the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking.
Looking forward, however, and given the considerable uncertainty
regarding the incentive to reclassify vehicles in the MYs 2017 and
beyond timeframe, the agency considered whether a fresh attempt at this
analysis would be warranted, but did not believe that it would be
informative given the uncertainty. One important point to note in the
comparative analysis in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking is that, due to
time constraints, the agency did not attempt to refit the respective
fleet target curves or to change the intended required stringency in MY
2016 of 34.1 mpg for the combined fleets. If we had refitted curves,
considering the vehicles in question, we might have obtained a somewhat
steeper passenger car curve, and a somewhat flatter light truck curve,
which could have affected the agency's findings. NHTSA explained in the
NPRM that the same is true for MYs 2017 and beyond. Without refitting
the curves and changing the required levels of stringency for cars and
trucks, simply moving vehicles from one fleet to another would not
inform the agency in any substantive way as to the impacts of a change
in classification. Moreover, even if we did attempt to make those
changes, the results would be somewhat speculative; for example, a MY
2008 baseline (or for that matter, a MY 2010 baseline) may have limited
utility for predicting relatively small changes (moving only 40
vehicles, as noted above) in the fleet makeup during the rulemaking
timeframe. As a result, NHTSA did not attempt in the NPRM to quantify
the impact of such a reclassification of 3-row vehicles, but sought
comment on whether and how we should do so for the final rule. If
commenters believed that we should attempt to quantify the impact, we
specifically sought comment on how to refit the footprint curves and
how the agency should consider stringency levels under such a scenario.
Another potential option that we explored in the MYs 2012-2016
rulemaking for MYs 2017 and beyond was classifying ``like'' vehicles
together. Many commenters objected in the rulemaking for the MY 2011
standards to NHTSA's regulatory separation of ``like'' vehicles.
Industry commenters argued that it was technologically inappropriate
for NHTSA to place 4WD and 2WD versions of the same SUV in separate
classes. They argued that the vehicles are the same except for their
drivetrain features, thus giving them similar fuel economy improvement
potential. They further argued that all SUVs should be classified as
light trucks. Environmental and consumer group commenters, on the other
hand, argued that 4WD SUVs and 2WD SUVs that are ``off-highway
capable'' by virtue of a GVWR above 6,000 pounds should be classified
as passenger cars, since they are primarily used to transport
passengers. In the MY 2011 rulemaking, NHTSA rejected both of these
sets of arguments. NHTSA concluded that 2WD SUVs that were neither
``off-highway capable'' nor possessed ``truck-like'' functional
characteristics were appropriately classified as passenger cars. At the
same time, NHTSA also concluded that because Congress explicitly
designated vehicles with GVWRs over 6,000 pounds as ``off-highway
capable'' (if they meet the ground clearance requirements established
by the agency), NHTSA did not have authority to move these vehicles to
the passenger car fleet.
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that the agency continues to believe
that this would not be an appropriate solution for addressing either
the risk of gaming or perceived regulatory inequity going forward. As
explained in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, with regard to the first
argument, that ``like'' vehicles should be classified similarly (i.e.,
that 2WD SUVs should be classified as light trucks because, besides
their drivetrain, they are ``like'' the 4WD version that qualifies as a
light truck), NHTSA continues to believe that 2WD SUVs that do not meet
any part of the existing regulatory definition for light trucks should
be classified as passenger cars. However, NHTSA recognizes the
additional point raised by industry commenters in the MY 2011
rulemaking that manufacturers may respond to this tighter
classification by ceasing to build 2WD versions of SUVs, which could
reduce fuel savings. In response to that point, NHTSA stated in the MY
2011 final rule that it expects that manufacturer decisions about
whether to continue building 2WD SUVs will be driven in much greater
measure by consumer demand than by NHTSA's regulatory definitions. As
stated in the NPRM, if it appears, in the course of the next several
model years, that manufacturers are indeed responding to the CAFE
regulatory definitions in a way that reduces overall fuel savings from
expected levels, it may be appropriate for NHTSA to review this
question again. At the time of the NPRM, however, since so little time
has passed since our last rulemaking action, NHTSA explained that the
agency does not believe that we have enough information about changes
in the fleet to ascertain whether this is yet ripe for consideration.
We sought comment on how the agency might go about reviewing this
question as more information about manufacturer behavior is accumulated
over time.
Few commenters provided much substantive analysis in response to
the agency's request. Industry commenters generally opposed any changes
to the car and truck definitions. The Alliance commented that the
existing definitions for classifying vehicles are consistent with the
statutes and Congress' intent, and that while NHTSA's adjustments to
[[Page 63124]]
the definitions in prior rules were helpful clarifications, no further
changes should be made.\1353\ The Alliance stated that gaming of the
definitions was unlikely because consumer demand for vehicle features
is significantly more important to manufacturer decisions than
regulatory classifications, and argued that the attribute-based
standards decrease the incentive to reclassify vehicles since ``even
larger vehicles can be `CAFE positive' based on their status relative
to their footprint target.'' \1354\ The Alliance further argued that
stability in the definitions was crucial, to avoid opening up the
possibility of gaming and/or reduction in consumer choice, and because
the current definitions were the basis for the analysis supporting the
proposed rules.\1355\ The Alliance stated that ``as a practical matter,
a change to the classification definitions can be equivalent to a major
change to the standards themselves, so ``[a]n amendment to the car/
truck definitions could easily mean the difference between compliance
and non-compliance for many manufacturers.'' \1356\ Therefore, the
Alliance argued, ``amendments to the classification rules would
necessitate a brand new, top-to-bottom reanalysis of the standards by
all manufacturers as well as NHTSA and EPA,'' and ``large portions of
the rulemaking package [c]ould need significant readjustment as a
result of that exercise.'' \1357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1353\ Alliance, at 8.
\1354\ Id. at 9.
\1355\ Id.
\1356\ Id.
\1357\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Automakers similarly argued that if NHTSA adjusted
definitions to make 3-row vehicles passenger cars rather than light
trucks, it would ``likely necessitate changes to the * * * standards to
make [them] less stringent to accommodate these vehicles, potentially
reducing fuel savings.'' \1358\ Global further argued that any changes
to definitions would impose ``significant compliance costs on
manufacturers,'' as the effective stringency of the standards would
change, and disagreed that manufacturers would add a third row to CUVs
in order to obtain the light truck target, because ``There are
substantial cost and weight penalties associated with the addition of
third row seats, so installing these seats cannot be justified in the
absence of consumer demand for them.'' \1359\ Ford \1360\ and GM \1361\
supported the Alliance comments; Toyota provided similar comments,
stating that it knew of no new information that should cause the agency
to revisit its conclusion on this issue from the 2012-2016 final
rule.\1362\ Toyota suggested that ``to the extent NHTSA is concerned
about whether the classification definitions can keep pace with the
evolving market through the 2017-2025 model year period, * * * the
issue [should] be revisited during the mid-term review.'' \1363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1358\ Global, at 11.
\1359\ Id.
\1360\ Ford, at 28.
\1361\ GM, at 2.
\1362\ Toyota, at 21.
\1363\ Id. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental group commenters generally supported changes to the
definitions. CBD expressed concern that manufacturers will be
encouraged to redesign 2WD versions of SUVs and CUVs by giving them 4WD
and other ``off-highway features'' to obtain the lower light truck
curve target, particularly given the ``even greater disparity in
mileage standards between trucks and passenger cars created by the
NPRM.'' \1364\ CBD argued, as it did in CBD v. NHTSA, that because
light trucks may be used for carrying passengers, ``EPCA's drafters
surely never intended manufacturers to be able to manipulate their
products for the sole purpose of escaping higher efficiency
standards.'' \1365\ CBD stated that NHTSA must ``close the SUV
loophole,'' \1366\ but provided no legal analysis of how the agency
should revise the definitions to address its concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1364\ CBD, at 16.
\1365\ Id. at 16-17.
\1366\ Id. at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRDC also stated that manufacturers could easily add 4WD technology
to vehicles to reclassify them as light trucks rather than as cars, and
the decision would be ``influenced by whether or not the cost to add
the 4WD technology is less than adding the fuel efficiency and
emissions technology necessary to stay compliant on the car curve.''
\1367\ NRDC thus argued that the truck definitions should be revised to
ensure that trucks have technologies ``that are necessary for true off-
road capability vs. typical all-wheel on-road driving.'' \1368\ UCS
offered similar examples, and suggested that NHTSA add new criteria to
ensure that light trucks have ``true off-road capability,'' such as ``a
majority subset of the following 5 items: Limited slip center
differential, limited slip rear differential, locking axles, skid
plates, and 2-speed transfer cases.'' \1369\ The Sierra Club also
commented that NHTSA should revisit the light truck definition, but
provided no suggestions as to what, specifically, it believed should be
revised.\1370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1367\ NRDC, at 10.
\1368\ Id.
\1369\ UCS, at 9.
\1370\ Sierra Club et al., at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response, NHTSA agrees with the point raised by industry
commenters that the underlying analysis for this final rule was
premised on the passenger car and light truck fleets being defined per
the current definitions in 49 CFR Part 523, and we recognize that any
change to those definitions in this final rule could conceivably
require a fresh analysis and determination of what standards are
maximum feasible for the separate car and truck fleets in each model
year. If the determination of maximum feasible standards is based on a
balancing of factors that accounts, in part, for the unique
capabilities of a given fleet, then any changes to that fleet that
affect its overall capabilities could presumably change the balancing,
and thus the level of stringency that is maximum feasible. Thus, the
following discussion is directed toward the future, i.e., the future
rulemaking to develop final standards for MYs 2022-2025.
A number of commenters expressed concern that manufacturers would
convert passenger car 2WD SUVs and CUVs to 4WD versions, or add a third
row, in order to obtain the lower target under the light truck curves.
Industry commenters maintain that the decision to make such a change to
a vehicle model is driven by consumer demand and not by regulations; in
fact, Global argued, a vehicle may be better off as a car than as a
truck in terms of how its fuel economy compares to its target, insofar
as a third row adds cost and weight that may obviate the benefit of the
lower target by making it harder to meet it. This contrasts with NRDC's
argument that a manufacturer is likely to add 4WD to obtain the light
truck target if doing so is cheaper than adding the technology
necessary to meet the passenger car target. As discussed above, the
agency does not have sufficient information at this time to evaluate
the seriousness of this risk. We expect that the calculus of vehicle
classification will vary significantly between manufacturers and
between model years, and we agree with the suggestion by industry that
consumer demand is likely the primary driver of decisions such as 4WD
or a third row. Industry cannot remain profitable if it provides too
many vehicles that the public does not want; public demand for features
such as 2WD and cargo space currently appears to be just as robust as
demand for 4WD and third rows, and we have no reason to think
[[Page 63125]]
that those trends will change significantly in the near future.
That said, while EPCA continues to be clear that some vehicles are
to be passenger cars and some to be light trucks, the agency agrees
with environmental and consumer group commenters that the question of
what makes a vehicle ``off-road capable'' and what functional
characteristics make a vehicle ``truck like'' are within the agency's
discretion to resolve. We appreciate and will consider further the
suggestions by UCS with regard to greater specification of what factors
may be appropriate for the regulatory definition of ``off-road
capable,'' even though we are not implementing them as part of this
final rule for the reasons discussed above. We will continue to monitor
this issue and will revisit it in the future rulemaking to develop
final standards for MYs 2022-2025. During the interim, if interested
parties compile information on these issues that they believe may be
helpful to the agency's future consideration, we welcome them to
contact us.
The final issue under the category of vehicle classification was
raised by Ford: A discussion of whether aerodynamic components (often
referred to as ``strakes'') made of flexible plastic and affixed in
front of wheels, prevent a vehicle from meeting the running clearance
requirements for being ``off-road capable.'' That question was answered
by NHTSA in a letter of interpretation dated July 30, 2012, and thus
does not need further discussion as part of this preamble.
I. Compliance and Enforcement
1. Overview
NHTSA's CAFE enforcement program is largely established by
statute--unlike the CAA, EPCA, as amended by EISA, is very prescriptive
with regard to enforcement. EPCA and EISA also clearly specify a number
of flexibilities that are available to manufacturers to help them
comply with the CAFE standards. Some of those flexibilities are
constrained by statute--for example, while Congress required that NHTSA
allow manufacturers to transfer credits earned for over-compliance from
their car fleet to their truck fleet and vice versa, Congress also
limited the amount by which manufacturers could increase their CAFE
levels using those transfers.\1371\ NHTSA believes Congress balanced
the energy-saving purposes of the statute against the benefits of
certain flexibilities and incentives and intentionally placed some
limits on certain statutory flexibilities and incentives. With that
goal in mind, of maximizing compliance flexibility while also
implementing EPCA/EISA's overarching purpose of energy conservation as
fully as possible, NHTSA has done its best in crafting the credit
transfer and trading regulations authorized by EISA to ensure that
total fuel savings are preserved when manufacturers exercise their
statutorily-provided compliance flexibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1371\ See 49 U.S.C. 32903(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, to achieve the level of standards described in this
final rule for the 2017-2025 program, NHTSA expects automakers to
continue increasing the use of innovative and advanced technologies as
they evolve. The additional incentive programs finalized will encourage
early adoption of these innovative and advanced technologies and help
to maximize both compliance flexibility and energy conservation. These
incentive programs for CAFE compliance are not under NHTSA's EPCA/EISA
authority, but under EPA's EPCA authority--as discussed in more detail
below and in Section III of this preamble, EPA measures and calculates
a manufacturer's compliance with the CAFE standards, and it will be in
the calculation of fuel economy levels that the additional incentives
are applied. Specifically, what is being finalized in the CAFE program,
as proposed by EPA: 1) Fuel economy performance adjustments due to
improvements in air conditioning system efficiency; 2) utilization of
``game changing'' technologies installed on full size pick-up trucks
including hybridization; and 3) installation of ``off-cycle''
technologies. In addition, for model years 2020 and later, EPA will
utilize calculation methods for dual-fueled vehicles, to fill the gap
left in EPCA/EISA by the expiration of the dual-fuel incentive. A more
thorough description of the basis for the new incentive programs can be
found in Sections II.F, III.C, and Chapter 5 of the joint TSD.
The following sections explain how NHTSA determines whether
manufacturers are in compliance with the CAFE standards for each model
year, and how manufacturers may address potential non-compliance
situations through the use of compliance flexibilities or fine payment.
The following sections also explain, for the reader's reference, the
new incentives and calculations finalized, but we also refer readers to
Section III.C for EPA's explanation of its authority and more specific
detail regarding these changes to the CAFE program.
2. How does NHTSA determine compliance?
a. Manufacturer Submission of Data and CAFE Testing by EPA
NHTSA begins to determine CAFE compliance by reviewing projected
estimates in pre- and mid-model year reports submitted by manufacturers
pursuant to 49 CFR part 537, Automotive Fuel Economy Reports.\1372\
Those reports for each compliance model year are submitted to NHTSA by
December of the calendar year prior to the corresponding subsequent
model year (for the pre-model year report) and in July of the given
model year (for the mid-model year report). NHTSA has already received
pre- and mid-model year reports from manufacturers for MY 2012. NHTSA
uses these reports for reference to help the agency, and the
manufacturers who prepare them, anticipate potential compliance issues
as early as possible, and help manufacturers plan compliance
strategies. NHTSA also uses the reports for auditing and testing
purposes, which helps manufacturers correct errors prior to the end of
the model year and facilitates acceptance of their final CAFE report by
EPA. In addition, NHTSA issues reports to the public twice a year that
provide a summary of manufacturers' fleet fuel economy projected
performances using pre- and mid-model year data. Currently, NHTSA
receives manufacturers' CAFE reports in paper form. In order to
facilitate submission by manufacturers, NHTSA amended part 537 to allow
for electronic submission of the pre- and mid-model year CAFE reports
in 2010 (see 75 FR 25324). Electronic reports are optional and must be
submitted in a pdf format. NHTSA proposes to modify these provisions in
this NPRM, as described below, in order to eliminate hardcopy
submissions and help the agency more readily process and utilize the
electronically-submitted data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1372\ 49 CFR part 537 is authorized by 49 U.S.C. 32907.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout the model year, NHTSA audits manufacturers' reports and
conducts vehicle testing to confirm the accuracy of track width and
wheelbase measurements as a part of its footprint validation
program,\1373\ which helps the agency understand better how
manufacturers may adjust vehicle characteristics to change a vehicle's
footprint measurement, and thus its fuel economy target. NHTSA resolves
discrepancies with the manufacturer prior to the end of the calendar
year
[[Page 63126]]
corresponding to the respective model year with the primary goal of
manufacturers submitting accurate final reports to EPA. NHTSA makes its
ultimate determination of a manufacturer's CAFE compliance obligation
based on official reported and verified CAFE data received from EPA.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 32904(e), EPA is responsible for calculating
manufacturers' CAFE values so that NHTSA can determine compliance with
its CAFE standards. The EPA-verified data is based on any
considerations from NHTSA testing, its own vehicle testing, and final
model year data submitted by manufacturers to EPA pursuant to 40 CFR
600.512. A manufacturer's final model year report must be submitted to
EPA no later than 90 days after December 31st of the model year. EPA
test procedures including those used to establish the new incentive
fuel economy performance values for model year 2017 to 2025 vehicles
are contained in sections 40 CFR Part 600 and 40 CFR Part 86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1373\ See http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/Vehicle%20Safety/Test%20Procedures/Associated%20Files/TP-537-01.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. NHTSA Then Analyzes EPA-Certified CAFE Values for Compliance
NHTSA's determination of CAFE compliance is fairly straightforward:
After testing, EPA verifies the data submitted by manufacturers and
issues final CAFE reports sent to manufacturers and to NHTSA in a pdf
format between April and October of each year (for the previous model
year), and NHTSA then identifies the manufacturers' compliance
categories (fleets) that do not meet the applicable CAFE fleet
standards. NHTSA plans to construct a new, more automated database
system in the near future to store manufacturer data and the EPA data.
The new database is expected to simplify data submissions to NHTSA,
improve the quality of the agency's data, expedite public reporting,
improve audit verifications and testing, and enable more efficient
tracking of manufacturers' CAFE credits with greater transparency.
NHTSA uses the verified data from EPA to compare fleet average
standards with performance. A manufacturer complies with NHTSA's fuel
economy standard if its fleet average performance is greater than or
equal to its required standard, or if it is able to use available
compliance flexibilities to resolve its non-compliance difference.
NHTSA calculates a cumulative credit status for each of a
manufacturer's vehicle compliance categories according to 49 U.S.C.
32903. If a manufacturer's compliance category exceeds the applicable
fuel economy standard, NHTSA adds credits to the account for that
compliance category. The amount of credits earned in a given year are
determined by multiplying the number of tenths of an mpg by which a
manufacturer exceeds a standard for a particular category of
automobiles by the total volume of automobiles of that category
manufactured by the manufacturer for that model year. Credits may be
used to offset shortfalls in other model years, subject to the three
year ``carry-back'' and five-year ``carry-forward'' limitations
specified in 49 U.S.C. 32903(a); NHTSA does not have authority to allow
credits to be carried forward or back for periods longer than that
specified in the statute. A manufacturer may also transfer credits to
another compliance category, subject to the limitations specified in 49
U.S.C. 32903(g)(3), or trade them to another manufacturer. The value of
each credit received via trade or transfer, when used for compliance,
is adjusted using the adjustment factor described in 49 CFR 536.4,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 32903(f)(1). As part of this rulemaking, NHTSA
proposed and is finalizing the VMT values that are part of the
adjustment factor for credits earned in MYs 2017-2025 at a single level
that does not change from model year to model year, as discussed
further below.
If a manufacturer's vehicles in a particular compliance category
fall below the standard fuel economy value, NHTSA will provide written
notification to the manufacturer that it has not met a particular fleet
standard. The manufacturer will be required to confirm the shortfall
and must either submit a plan indicating it will allocate existing
credits, or if it does not have sufficient credits available in that
fleet, how it will earn, transfer and/or acquire credits, or pay the
appropriate civil penalty. The manufacturer must submit a plan or
payment within 60 days of receiving agency notification. Credit
allocation plans received from the manufacturer will be reviewed and
approved by NHTSA. NHTSA will approve a credit allocation plan unless
it finds the proposed credits are unavailable or that it is unlikely
that the plan will result in the manufacturer earning sufficient
credits to offset the subject credit shortfall. If a plan is approved,
NHTSA will revise the manufacturer's credit account accordingly. If a
plan is rejected, NHTSA will notify the manufacturer and request a
revised plan or payment of the appropriate fine.
In the event that a manufacturer does not comply with a CAFE
standard even after the consideration of credits, EPCA provides for the
assessment of civil penalties. The Act specifies a precise formula for
determining the amount of civil penalties for noncompliance.\1374\ The
penalty, as adjusted for inflation by law, is $5.50 for each tenth of a
mpg that a manufacturer's average fuel economy falls short of the
standard for a given model year multiplied by the total volume of those
vehicles in the affected fleet (i.e., import or domestic passenger car,
or light truck), manufactured for that model year. The amount of the
penalty may not be reduced except under the unusual or extreme
circumstances specified in the statute. All penalties are paid to the
U.S. Treasury and not to NHTSA itself.
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\1374\ See 49 U.S.C. 32912.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, EPCA does
not provide for recall and remedy in the event of a noncompliance. The
presence of recall and remedy provisions \1375\ in the Safety Act and
their absence in EPCA is believed to arise from the difference in the
application of the safety standards and CAFE standards. A safety
standard applies to individual vehicles; that is, each vehicle must
possess the requisite equipment or feature that must provide the
requisite type and level of performance. If a vehicle does not, it is
noncompliant. Typically, a vehicle does not entirely lack an item or
equipment or feature. Instead, the equipment or features fails to
perform adequately. Recalling the vehicle to repair or replace the
noncompliant equipment or feature can usually be readily accomplished.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1375\ 49 U.S.C. 30120, Remedies for defects and noncompliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, a CAFE standard applies to a manufacturer's entire
fleet for a model year. It does not require that a particular
individual vehicle be equipped with any particular equipment or feature
or meet a particular level of fuel economy. It does require that the
manufacturer's fleet, as a whole, comply. Further, although under the
attribute-based approach to setting CAFE standards fuel economy targets
are established for individual vehicles based on their footprints, the
vehicles are not required to comply with those targets on a model-by-
model or vehicle-by-vehicle basis. However, as a practical matter, if a
manufacturer chooses to design some vehicles so they fall below their
target levels of fuel economy, it will need to design other vehicles so
they exceed their targets if the manufacturer's overall fleet average
is to meet the applicable standard.
Thus, under EPCA, there is no such thing as a noncompliant vehicle,
only a noncompliant fleet. No particular
[[Page 63127]]
vehicle in a noncompliant fleet is any more, or less, noncompliant than
any other vehicle in the fleet.
After enforcement letters are sent, NHTSA continues to monitor
receipt of credit allocation plans or civil penalty payments that are
due within 60 days from the date of receipt of the letter by the
vehicle manufacturer, and takes further action if the manufacturer is
delinquent in responding. If NHTSA receives and approves a
manufacturer's carryback plan to earn future credits within the
following three years in order to comply with current regulatory
obligations, NHTSA will defer levying fines for non-compliance until
the date(s) when the manufacturer's approved plan indicates that
credits will be earned or acquired to achieve compliance, and upon
receiving confirmed CAFE data from EPA. If the manufacturer fails to
acquire or earn sufficient credits by the plan dates, NHTSA will
initiate compliance proceedings. 49 CFR part 536 contains the detailed
regulations governing the use and application of CAFE credits
authorized by 49 U.S.C. 32903.
c. What exemptions are allowed by NHTSA?
NHTSA allows vehicles defined as emergency vehicles to be exempted
from complying with CAFE standards. The NHTSA definition for emergency
vehicle was established in 1972 by EPCA and is defined for NHTSA in 49
U.S.C. 32902(e) \1376\ and includes ambulances and law enforcement
vehicles. The EPA definition was proposed as a part of the NPRM \1377\
for this rulemaking and establishes for the EPA GHG program a
harmonized definition for emergency vehicles similar to that prescribed
by EPCA.\1378\ The agencies received a comment from the Alliance in
response to the NPRM, on July 27, 2012, asking for the agencies to
consider broadening their definitions for emergency vehicles to include
other types of vehicles used for emergency purposes. The Alliance
comment requested that the EPCA definition be expanded to include
``fire suppression, search and rescue and other emergency vehicle
types.''The Alliance also recommended adding these vehicles in the
definition for emergency vehicle adopted by EPA in the June 8, 2012,
DFR (see 77 FR 34130) for the EPA emissions criteria program. The
Alliance argued that it is important to ensure harmonized treatment of
emergency vehicles under EPA's criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas
emission regulations and NHTSA's CAFE regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1376\ In 32902(e), the definition is as follows: Emergency
vehicles.--(1) In this subsection, ``emergency vehicle'' means an
automobile manufactured primarily for use--
(A) as an ambulance or combination ambulance-hearse;
(B) by the United States Government or a State or local
government for law enforcement; or
(C) for other emergency uses prescribed by regulation by the
Secretary of Transportation.
\1377\ See 76 FR 75362 (Dec. 1, 2011).
\1378\ In the NPRM, EPA proposed the following definition in 40
CFR 86.1818-12: (b)(4) Emergency vehicle means a motor vehicle
manufactured primarily for use as an ambulance or combination
ambulance-hearse or for use by the United States Government or a
State or local government for law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At this time, NHTSA does not believe that it has sufficient
information to create a regulatory definition for ``emergency
vehicles'' that is different from the text in EPCA. The Alliance
provided no definitions, examples, or testing data on the model types
of fire suppression, search and rescue and other emergency type
vehicles which could be analyzed to determine whether sufficient need
exists to add them to the definition and allow for their exclusion.
Without this information, amending the definition as requested by the
Alliance could inadvertently allow for the exclusion of vehicles that
are capable of complying with the CAFE standards, which would be
contrary to the overarching purpose of EPCA, energy conservation.
Therefore, NHTSA will retain the use of the EPCA definition for the
CAFE program, which is already harmonized with EPA's proposed
definition of ``emergency vehicle'' for the GHG program. While we
expect to examine this issue further, our initial understanding is that
harmonizing exempted vehicles between EPA's criteria emissions program
and the CAFE/GHG programs may not be necessary. The most fundamental
issue underlying the Alliance comment is concern over a loss in vehicle
performance caused by the operation of the criteria emission control
system on diesel vehicles. However, to comply with the final CAFE and
GHG emission standards, the agencies do not believe that manufacturers
would need to implement technologies that would reduce vehicle
performance. In the agencies' analyses of the how the industry could
comply with the standards, the CAFE and OMEGA models applied
technologies that were projected to maintain vehicle performance.
Therefore, it is not expected that broadening the definition of
emergency vehicles for the CAFE program would affect vehicle
performance. NHTSA notes, however, that should a manufacturer wish to
exempt a vehicle that falls outside the coverage provided by EPCA, such
as the ``other types of emergency vehicles'' identified by the
Alliance, 49 U.S.C. 32902(e)(1)(C) allows DOT to undertake rulemaking
to consider adding other vehicles to this category.
3. What compliance flexibilities are available under the CAFE program
and how do manufacturers use them?
There are three basic flexibilities outlined by EPCA/EISA that
manufacturers can currently use to achieve compliance with CAFE
standards beyond applying fuel economy-improving technologies: (1)
Building dual- and alternative-fueled vehicles; (2) banking (carry-
forward and carry-back), trading, and transferring credits earned for
exceeding fuel economy standards; and (3) paying civil penalties. We
note that while these flexibility mechanisms will reduce compliance
costs to some degree for most manufacturers, 49 U.S.C. 32902(h)
expressly prohibits NHTSA from considering the availability of
statutorily-established credits (either for building dual- or
alternative-fueled vehicles or from accumulated transfers or trades) in
determining the level of the standards. Thus, NHTSA may not raise CAFE
standards because manufacturers have enough of those credits to meet
higher standards. This is an important difference from EPA's authority
under the CAA, which does not contain such a restriction, and which
allows EPA to set higher standards as a result.
a. Dual- and Alternative-Fueled Vehicles
EPCA/EISA sets forth statutory provisions for manufacturers
building alternative-fueled and dual- (or flexible-) fueled vehicles by
providing special fuel economy calculations for ``dedicated'' (that is,
100 percent) alternative fueled vehicles and ``dual-fueled'' (that is,
capable of running on both the alternative fuel and gasoline/diesel)
vehicles. Consistent with the overarching purpose of EPCA/EISA, these
statutory provisions establish incentives to help reduce petroleum
usage and thus improve our nation's energy security.
By statute, the fuel economy of a dedicated alternative fuel
vehicle is determined by dividing its fuel economy in equivalent miles
per gallon of gasoline or diesel fuel by 0.15.\1379\ Thus, a 15 mpg
dedicated alternative fuel vehicle would be rated as 100 mpg. Likewise,
for dual-fueled vehicles, the vehicle's fuel economy rating is
determined as the harmonic average of
[[Page 63128]]
the fuel economy on gasoline or diesel and the fuel economy on the
alternative fuel vehicle divided by 0.15.\1380\ For example, a dual-
fueled vehicle that averages 25 mpg on gasoline or diesel could be
considered a 40 mpg vehicle for CAFE purposes when considering its
performance on the alternative fuel. This assumes that (1) the vehicle
operates on gasoline or diesel 50 percent of the time and on
alternative fuel 50 percent of the time; (2) fuel economy while
operating on alternative fuel is 15 mpg (15/.15 = 100 mpg); and (3)
fuel economy while operating on gas or diesel is 25 mpg. Thus:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1379\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(a).
\1380\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(b).
CAFE FE = 1/{0.5/(mpg gas) + 0.5/(mpg alt fuel){time} = 1/{0.5/25 +
0.5/100{time} = 40 mpg
Equation IV-4 NHTSA Example Dual Fueled Vehicle MPG Calculation
Considering a similar example for an alternative fueled vehicle
powered by natural gas, a vehicle averaging 25 miles per 100 ft\3\ of
natural gas could have a 203 mpg fuel economy rating. The CAFE fuel
economy while operating on the natural gas is determined by dividing
its fuel economy in equivalent miles per gallon of gasoline by
0.15.\1381\ The equivalent fuel economy for 100 cubic feet (ft\3\) of
natural gas is equivalent to 0.823 gallons of gasoline as provided by
EISA. Thus, if a vehicle averages 25 miles per 100 ft\3\ of natural
gas, then:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1381\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(c).
CAFE FE = (25/100) * (100/.823)*(1/0.15) = 203 mpg
Equation IV-5 NHTSA Example Natural Gas Vehicle MPG Calculation
EISA prescribes the incentive for dual-fueled automobiles not only
as an adjustment to the vehicle but also limits the overall impact of
these vehicles on a manufacturer's fleet performance. A cap for the
overall impact of dual-fueled vehicles is specified through MY 2019,
but progressively phases-out between MYs 2015 and 2019.\1382\ The
maximum fleet fuel economy increase attributable to this statutory
incentive is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1382\ 49 U.S.C. 32906(a). NHTSA notes that the incentive for
dedicated alternative-fuel automobiles, automobiles that run
exclusively on an alternative fuel, at 49 U.S.C. 32905(a), was not
phased-out by EISA.
We note additionally and for the reader's reference that EPA
will be treating dual- and alternative-fueled vehicles under its GHG
program similarly to the way EPCA/EISA provides for CAFE through MY
2015, but for MY 2016, EPA established CO2 emission
levels for alternative fuel vehicles based on measurement of actual
CO2 emissions during testing, plus a manufacturer
demonstration that the vehicles are actually being run on the
alternative fuel. The manufacturer would then be allowed to weight
the gasoline and alternative fuel test results based on the
proportion of actual usage of both fuels. Because EPCA/EISA provides
the explicit CAFE measurement methodology for EPA to use for
dedicated vehicles and dual-fueled vehicles through MY 2019, we
explained in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule that the CAFE program
would not require that vehicles manufactured for the purpose of
obtaining the credit actually be run on the alternative fuel.
Table IV-150--Statutory Fleet mpg Increase Caps by Model Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fleet mpg
Model year increase
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MYs 1993-2014............................................... 1.2
MY 2015..................................................... 1.0
MY 2016..................................................... 0.8
MY 2017..................................................... 0.6
MY 2018..................................................... 0.4
MY 2019 0.2
After MY 2019............................................... 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR part 538 codifies in regulation the statutory alternative-
fueled and dual-fueled automobile manufacturing incentives.
Given that the statutory incentive for dual-fueled vehicles in 49
U.S.C. 32906 and the measurement methodology specified in 49 U.S.C.
32905(b) and (d) expire in MY 2019, NHTSA questioned how the fuel
economy of dual-fueled vehicles should be determined for CAFE
compliance in MYs 2020 and beyond. NHTSA and EPA believe that the
expiration of the dual-fueled vehicle measurement methodology in the
statute leaves a gap to be filled that must be addressed to avoid the
inappropriate result of dual-fueled vehicles' fuel economy being
measured like that of conventional gasoline vehicles, with no
recognition of their alternative fuel capability, which would be
contrary to the intent of EPCA/EISA. The need for such a method is of
greater importance for future model years when the number of plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles is expected to increase in MYs 2020 and
beyond. If the overarching purpose of the statute is energy
conservation and reducing petroleum usage, the agencies believe that
that goal is best met by continuing to reflect through CAFE
calculations the reduced petroleum usage that dual-fueled vehicles
achieve through their alternative fuel usage.
Therefore, after the expiration of the special calculation
procedures in 49 U.S.C. 32905 for dual fuel vehicles, the agencies
proposed for model years 2020 and later vehicles that the general
provisions authorizing EPA to establish testing and calculation
procedures would provide discretion to set the CAFE calculation
procedures.\1383\ EPA proposed to harmonize with the approach it uses
under the GHG program to measure the emissions of dual-fuel vehicles,
to reflect the real-world percentage of usage of alternative fuels by
dual-fuel vehicles, but also to continue to incentivize the use of
certain alternative fuels in dual-fuel vehicles as appropriate under
EPCA/EISA to reduce petroleum usage. EPA is finalizing this approach as
proposed for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) that runs on both
gasoline (or diesel) and electricity. Specifically, for MYs 2020 and
beyond, EPA will calculate the fuel economy test values for a plug-in
hybrid electric vehicle PHEV, but rather than assuming that the dual-
fueled vehicle runs on the alternative fuel 50 percent of the time as
the current statutory measurement methodology requires, EPA will
instead use the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) ``utility
factor'' methodology \1384\ (based on vehicle range on the alternative
fuel and typical daily travel mileage) to determine the assumed
percentage of operation on gasoline/diesel and percentage of operation
on the alternative fuel for those vehicles. Using the utility factor,
rather than making an a priori assumption about the amount of
alternative fuel used by dual-fueled vehicles, recognizes that once a
consumer has paid several thousand dollars to be able to use a fuel
that is considerably cheaper than gasoline or diesel, it is very likely
that the consumer will seek to use the cheaper fuel as much as
possible. For MYs 2020 and beyond, EPA will calculate the fuel economy
test values for a dual fuel CNG vehicle (that runs on both the
alternative fuel and on gasoline or diesel), EPA will use one of two
calculation methods. EPA will use the SAE ``utility factor''
methodology if the dual fuel CNG vehicle meets two requirements. First,
the vehicle must have a minimum natural gas range-to-gasoline range of
2.0. Second, the vehicle must be designed such that gasoline can only
be used when the CNG tank is empty, though EPA is permitting a de
minimis exemption for those dual fuel vehicle designs where a very
small amount of gasoline is used to initiate combustion before changing
over to a much greater volume of natural gas to sustain combustion. A
dual fuel CNG vehicle that does not meet the above eligibility
requirements would use a utility factor of 0.50, the value that has
been used in the past for dual fuel vehicles under the CAFE program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1383\ 49 U.S.C. 32904(a), (c).
\1384\ SAE Standard J2841 ``Utility Factor Definitions for Plug-
In Hybrid Electric Vehicles Using Travel Survey Data.'' Available at
http://standards.sae.org/j2841_201009/ (last accessed Jul. 13,
2012).
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[[Page 63129]]
Consistent with this approach, however, EPA's proposal did not
extend the utility factor method to flexible fueled vehicles (FFVs)
that use E-85 and gasoline, since there is not a significant cost
differential between an FFV and conventional gasoline vehicle and
historically consumers have only fueled these vehicles with E85 a very
small percentage of the time. Therefore, for CAFE compliance in MYs
2020 and beyond, EPA will continue treatment of E85 and other FFVs
(other than PHEVs and CNG) as finalized in the MY 2016 GHG program,
based on the relative weighting of gasoline and E85 (or other fuels)
emissions performance on the actual national average use of E85 (or
other fuels) in ethanol FFVs or optionally the manufacturer-specific
data showing the percentage of miles that are driven on E85 vis-
[agrave]-vis gasoline for that manufacturer's FFVs. For clarification
in our regulations, NHTSA proposed, and is adding, Part 536.10(d) which
states that for model years 2020 and beyond a manufacturer must
calculate the fuel economy of dual-fuel vehicles in accordance with 40
CFR 600.510-12(c), (2)(v) and (vii), the sections of EPA's calculation
regulations where EPA is proposing to incorporate these changes.
Additionally, to avoid manufacturers being encouraged to build only
dedicated alternative fuel vehicles (which may be harder to refuel in
some instances) because of the incentive of the continued statutory
0.15 CAFE divisor under 49 U.S.C. 32905(a) and the calculation for EV
fuel economy under 49 U.S.C. 32904, and being discouraged from building
dual-fuel vehicles which might not get a similar bonus, EPA proposed
and is finalizing the use of the Petroleum Equivalency Factor (PEF) and
a 0.15 divisor for calculating the fuel economy of PHEVs' electrical
operation and for natural gas operation of CNG-gasoline vehicles. This
is consistent with the statutory approach for dedicated alternative
fuel vehicles, and continues to incentivize the usage of alternative
fuels and reduction of petroleum usage, but when combined with the
utility factor approach described above, does not needlessly over-
incentivize their usage--it gives credit for what is used, and does not
give credit for what is not used. Because it does not give credit for
what is not used, EPA proposed that manufacturers may increase their
calculated fleet fuel economy for dual-fuel vehicles by an unlimited
amount using these flexibilities.
As an example, for MYs 2020 and beyond, the calculation procedure
for a dual-fuel vehicle that uses both gasoline and CNG (and meets the
two criteria for using the ``utility factor'' method) could result in a
combined fuel economy value of 150 mpg for CAFE purposes. This assumes
that (1) the ``utility factor'' for the alternative fuel is found to be
95 percent, and so the vehicle operates on gasoline for the remaining 5
percent of the time; (2) fuel economy while operating on natural gas is
203 mpg [(25/100) * (100/.823)*(1/0.15)] as shown above utilizing the
PEF and the .15 incentive factor; and (3) fuel economy while operating
on gasoline is 25 mpg. Thus:
CAFE FE = 1/{0.05/(mpg gas) + 0.95/(mpg CNG){time} = 1/{0.05/25 +
0.95/203{time} = 150 mpg
As discussed in Section III.C, the agencies received favorable
comments on the proposals for dual fuel and alternative fuel vehicles
(with most focusing on PHEVs and dual fuel CNG vehicles). The Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers, Fisker Automotive, the Electric Drive
Transportation Association, and the American Council for an Energy-
Efficient Economy (ACEEE) supported the use of the SAE utility factor
methodology for PHEVs. The natural gas advocacy groups (including
America's Natural Gas Alliance/American Gas Association, American
Public Gas Association, Clean Energy, Encana Natural Gas Inc., NGV
America, and VNG.Co) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
supported the use of cycle-specific fleet-based utility factors for
dual fuel CNG vehicles, and supported the extension of this approach
for MYs 2012-2015, but generally argued against any eligibility
requirements for the application of utility factors for dual fuel CNG
vehicles. NRDC suggested that EPA adopt the additional constraints on
the design of dual-fuel CNG vehicles that were suggested in the NPRM to
ensure that these vehicles operate preferentially on CNG. The groups
opposing the use of the SAE utility factor did not necessarily reject
its use, but rather argued that the values were too conservative. The
American Petroleum Institute (API) and Securing America's Future Energy
(SAFE) argued that agencies were underestimating the behavior of owners
in maximizing tank refills and the likelihood of PHEV buyers to
maximize their electricity vs. gasoline use. Other comments included
ACEEE's and API's recommendation that EPA use lower 5-cycle range
values for all-electric (or equivalent all-electric) operation in the
calculation of the utility factor, and ACEEE's recommendation that
fleet based utility factors be used for compliance, rather than the
multiple-day individual utility factors (MDIUFs) that are used for fuel
economy and environment labels.
Commenters generally supported the proposal for FFVs. The Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers, Ford, and General Motors supported the
NPRM proposal as presented. The Renewable Fuels Association commented
that the agencies should instead consider utility factors for ethanol
FFVs, supporting its position by possibility of higher fuel prices than
gasoline on a per mile basis (i.e., due to prices increasing with
demand or limited refueling access) for CNG and PHEVs. The National
Corn Growers Association argued that ``[t]he concern for high relative
cost of mid or high level ethanol blends does not seem to be justified
in the term of the CAFE/GHG and RFS2 rules since at some point in the
renewable fuel volume ramp-up of RFS2, market forces would result in
competitive prices for ethanol and gasoline in order for the required
volumes to be sold.''
In consideration of the comments received, EPA and NHTSA are
finalizing the proposed requirements for dual fuel PHEV and for
alternative fueled vehicles, with the exception of adopting the use of
a fleet based utility factor for PHEVs, as suggested by ACEEE (see 40
CFR 600.116(b)(1)). The bases for arguments opposing adoption were not
substantial enough to deviate for the proposal compliance treatment of
these vehicles (see Section III.C for further explanations).
As mentioned above, EPA and NHTSA are finalizing, as proposed, the
use of SAE fleet-based utility factors for dual fuel CNG vehicles, and
are also finalizing some additional requirements in order for a dual
fuel CNG vehicle to be able to use the utility factors. Dual fuel CNG
vehicles must meet two requirements in order to use the utility factor
approach. One, the vehicle must have a minimum natural gas range-to-
gasoline range of 2.0. This is to ensure that there is a vehicle range
incentive to encourage vehicle owners to seek to use CNG fuel as much
as possible (for example, if a vehicle had equal or greater range on
gasoline than on natural gas, the agency is concerned that some owners
would fuel more often on gasoline). While NRDC suggested a minimum
natural gas range-to-gasoline range of 4.0, the agency believes that a
ratio of 2.0, in concert with a (currently) much less expensive fuel,
is very strong incentive to use natural gas fuel. Two, the vehicle must
be designed such that gasoline can only be used when the CNG tank is
empty, though the agencies are permitting a de minimis exemption for
those dual fuel vehicle designs
[[Page 63130]]
where a very small amount of gasoline is used to initiate combustion
before changing over to a much greater volume of natural gas to sustain
combustion. With these eligibility requirements, EPA and NHTSA believe
that there will be strong economic motivation for consumers to
preferentially seek out and use CNG fuel in dual fuel CNG vehicles.
Consumers will have paid a premium for this feature, and will have
greater range on CNG. We also believe that the utility factor approach
is the most reasonable approach for projecting the real world use of
CNG and gasoline fuels in such dual fuel CNG vehicles. The agencies
believe that dual fuel CNG vehicles that would not meet the two
criteria because they have higher driving ranges on gasoline/diesel
would be more likely to operate more often on gasoline/diesel and the
``utility factor'' method would overestimate the operation on CNG.
Therefore the agencies believe it is appropriate to use a fixed utility
factor of 0.50, the value that has been used in the past for dual fuel
vehicles under the CAFE program for these vehicles.
As noted above, there was widespread public support from the
commenters for the utility factor approach for dual fuel CNG vehicles.
The agencies are rejecting the one alternative approach that was
suggested, the use of a fixed 95% utility factor, because it would
allow a dual fuel CNG vehicle with a small CNG tank to benefit from a
very large utility factor.
NHTSA and EPA are finalizing the proposed approach without changes
for ethanol-capable dual-fueled vehicles. The agencies disagree with
using utility factors for these vehicles. NHTSA supports EPA's
positions that ethanol FFVs will primarily use gasoline fuel, as there
was no extra vehicle cost, E85 fuel is no cheaper and in fact usually
more expensive per mile, and use of E85 reduces overall vehicle range
since there is only one fuel tank (as opposed to PHEVs and dual fuel
CNG vehicles which have two fuel storage devices and therefore the use
of the alternative fuel raises overall vehicle range). Data compiled by
EPA shows that approximately 10 million ethanol FFVs in the US car and
light truck fleet, fuel use data demonstrate that ethanol FFVs only use
E85 less than one percent of the time. Therefore, NHTSA agrees with EPA
to finalize FFVs compliance relative to the weighting of gasoline and
E85 emissions performance on the actual national average use of E85 in
ethanol FFVs, consistent with the provisions in the MYs 2012-2016
standards for GHG compliance.
b. Credit Trading and Transfer
As part of the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA created 49 CFR part 536
for credit trading and transfer. Part 536 implements the provisions in
EISA authorizing NHTSA to establish by regulation a credit trading
program and directing it to establish by regulation a credit transfer
program.\1385\ Since its enactment, EPCA has permitted manufacturers to
earn credits for exceeding the standards and to carry those credits
backward or forward. EISA extended the ``carry-forward'' period from
three to five model years, and left the ``carry-back'' period at three
model years. Under part 536, credit holders (including, but not limited
to, manufacturers) will have credit accounts with NHTSA, and will be
able to hold credits, use them to achieve compliance with CAFE
standards, transfer them between compliance categories, or trade them.
A credit may also be cancelled before its expiration date, if the
credit holder so chooses. Traded and transferred credits are subject to
an ``adjustment factor'' to ensure total oil savings are preserved, as
required by EISA. EISA also prohibits credits earned before MY 2011
from being transferred, so NHTSA has developed several regulatory
restrictions on trading and transferring to facilitate Congress' intent
in this regard. As discussed above, EISA establishes a ``cap'' for the
maximum increase in any compliance category attributable to transferred
credits: for MYs 2011-2013, transferred credits can only be used to
increase a manufacturer's CAFE level in a given compliance category by
1.0 mpg; for MYs 2014-2017, by 1.5 mpg; and for MYs 2018 and beyond, by
2.0 mpg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1385\ Congress required that DOT establish a credit
``transferring'' regulation, to allow individual manufacturers to
move credits from one of their fleets to another (e.g., using a
credit earned for exceeding the light truck standard for compliance
with the domestic passenger car standard). Congress allowed DOT to
establish a credit ``trading'' regulation, so that credits may be
bought and sold between manufacturers and other parties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed that the VMT estimates used in the
credit adjustment factor should be 195,264 miles for passenger car
credits and 225,865 miles for light truck credits for all over-
compliance credits earned in MYs 2017-2025. NHTSA did not propose to
change the VMT estimates used for these purposes for MYs 2012-2016.
NHTSA proposed these values in the interest of harmonizing with EPA's
GHG program, and sought comment on this approach as compared to the
prior approach of adjustment factors with VMT estimates that vary by
year. Additionally, NHTSA proposed to include VMT estimates for MY
2011, which the agency had not included in Part 536 as part of the MYs
2012-2016 rulemaking. The proposed MY 2011 VMT value for passenger cars
was 152,922 miles, and for light trucks was 172,552 miles. The Alliance
supported the fixed value VMT approach for MYs 2017-2025, and requested
that NHTSA also revise the VMT values for MYs 2012-2016 to harmonize
with EPA. NHTSA is finalizing the VMT value approach as proposed. With
respect to the Alliance's comment regarding the VMT values for credits
earned in MYs 2012-2016, the agency expressly did not propose to make
this change, and we do not believe that the benefits of harmonization
in this particular aspect for these model years outweigh the potential
fuel savings losses that may occur if a change is made at this time.
c. Payment of Civil Penalties
If a manufacturer's average miles per gallon for a given compliance
category (domestic passenger car, imported passenger car, light truck)
falls below the applicable standard, and the manufacturer cannot make
up the difference by using credits earned or acquired, the manufacturer
is subject to penalties. The penalty, as mentioned, is $5.50 for each
tenth of a mpg that a manufacturer's average fuel economy falls short
of the standard for a given model year, multiplied by the total volume
of those vehicles in the affected fleet, manufactured for that model
year. NHTSA has collected $818,724,551.00 to date in CAFE penalties,
the largest ever being paid by DaimlerChrysler for its MY 2006 import
passenger car fleet, $30,257,920.00. For their MY 2010 fleets, five
manufacturers paid CAFE fines for not meeting an applicable standard--
Fiat, which included Ferrari and Maserati; Daimler (Mercedes-Benz);
Porsche; Tata (Jaguar Land Rover) and Volvo--for a total of
$23,803,411.50. As mentioned above, civil penalties paid for CAFE non-
compliance go to the U.S. Treasury, and not to DOT or NHTSA.
NHTSA recognizes that some manufacturers may use the option to pay
civil penalties as a CAFE compliance flexibility--presumably, when
paying civil penalties is deemed more cost-effective than applying
additional fuel economy-improving technology, or when adding fuel
economy-improving technology would fundamentally change the
characteristics of the vehicle in ways that the manufacturer believes
its target consumers would not accept. NHTSA has no authority under
EPCA/EISA to prevent manufacturers from turning to payment of civil
penalties if they choose
[[Page 63131]]
to do so. This is another important difference from EPA's authority
under the CAA, which allows EPA to revoke a manufacturer's certificate
of conformity that permits it to sell vehicles if EPA determines that
the manufacturer is in non-compliance, and does not permit
manufacturers to pay fines in lieu of compliance with applicable
standards.
NHTSA has grappled repeatedly with the issue of whether civil
penalties are motivational for manufacturers, and whether raising them
would increase manufacturers' compliance with the standards. EPCA
authorizes increasing the civil penalty very slightly up to $10.00,
exclusive of inflationary adjustments, if NHTSA decides that the
increase in the penalty ``will result in, or substantially further,
substantial energy conservation for automobiles in the model years in
which the increased penalty may be imposed; and will not have a
substantial deleterious impact on the economy of the United States, a
State, or a region of a State.'' 49 U.S.C. 32912(c).
To support a decision that increasing the penalty would result in
``substantial energy conservation'' without having ``a substantial
deleterious impact on the economy,'' NHTSA would likely need to provide
some reasonably certain quantitative estimates of the fuel that would
be saved, and the impact on the economy, if the penalty were raised.
Comments received on this issue in the past have not explained in clear
quantitative terms what the benefits and drawbacks to raising the
penalty might be. Additionally, it may be that the range of possible
increase that the statute provides, i.e., up to $10 per tenth of a mpg,
is insufficient to result in substantial energy conservation, although
changing this would require an amendment to the statute by Congress.
NHTSA continues to seek to gain information on this issue and requested
that commenters wishing to address this issue please provide, as
specifically as possible, estimates of how raising or not raising the
penalty amount will or will not substantially raise energy conservation
and impact the economy. No comments specific to this issue were
received, so the agency will continue to attempt to evaluate this issue
on its own.
4. What new incentives are being added to the CAFE program for MYs
2017-2025?
All of the CAFE compliance incentives discussed below are being
finalized by EPA under its EPCA authority to calculate fuel economy
levels for individual vehicles and for fleets. We refer the reader to
Section III for more details, as well as Chapter 5 of the Joint TSD for
more information on the precise mechanics of the incentives, but we
present them here in summary form so that the reader may understand
more comprehensively what compliance options will be available for
manufacturers meeting MYs 2017-2025 CAFE standards.
As mentioned above with regard to EPA's finalized changes for the
calculation of dual-fueled automobile fuel economy for MYs 2020 and
beyond, NHTSA is modifying its own regulations to reflect the fact that
these incentives may be used as part of the determination of a
manufacturer's CAFE level. The requirements for determining the vehicle
and fleet average performance for passenger cars and light trucks
inclusive of the proposed incentives are defined in 49 CFR 531 and 49
CFR 533, respectively. Part 531.6(a) specifies that the average fuel
economy of all passenger automobiles that are manufactured by a
manufacturer in a model year shall be determined in accordance with
procedures established by the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency under 49 U.S.C. 32904 of the Act and set forth in 40
CFR part 600. Part 533.6(b) specifies that the average fuel economy of
all non-passenger automobiles is required to be determined in
accordance with the procedures established by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency under 49 U.S.C. 32904 and set forth in
40 CFR Part 600. The final changes to these sections simply clarify
that in model years 2017 to 2025, manufacturers may adjust their
vehicle fuel economy performance values in accordance with 40 CFR Part
600 for improvements due to the new incentives.
a. ``Game Changing'' Technologies for Full Size Pick-Up Trucks
EPA is adopting two new types of incentives for improving the fuel
economy performance of full size pickup trucks. The first incentive
provides a credit to manufacturers that employ significant quantities
of hybridized full size pickup trucks. The second incentive is a
performance-based incentive for full size pickup trucks that achieve a
significant reduction in fuel consumption as compared to the applicable
fuel economy target for the vehicle in question. These incentives are
designed to promote technologies improving fuel economy and GHG
performance for addressing the significant difficulty full size pickup
trucks have in meeting CAFE standards while still maintaining the
levels of utility to which consumers have become accustomed, which
require higher payload and towing capabilities and greater cargo
volumes than other light-duty vehicles. Technologies that provide
substantial fuel economy benefits are often not attractive to
manufacturers of full size pickups and other large trucks due to these
tradeoffs in utility purposes, and therefore have not been utilized to
the same extent as they have in other vehicle classes. The goal of
these incentives is to facilitate the application of these ``game
changing'' technologies for large pickups, both to save more fuel and
to help provide a bridge for industry to future more stringent light
truck standards. As manufacturers gain experience with applying more
fuel-saving technology for these vehicles and consumers become more
accustomed to certain advanced technologies in pickup trucks, the
agencies anticipate that higher CAFE levels will be more feasible for
the fleet as a whole.\1386\ In the context of the CAFE program, these
incentives would be used as an adjustment to a full size pickup truck's
fuel economy performance. The same vehicle would not be allowed to
receive an adjustment to its calculated fuel economy for both the
hybridization incentive and the performance-based incentive, to avoid
double-counting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1386\ NHTSA is not prohibited from considering this
availability of this incentive in determining the maximum feasible
levels of stringency for the light truck standards, because it is
not one of the statutory flexibilities enumerated in 49 U.S.C.
32902(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA and NHTSA proposed adopting the eligibility criteria for the
incentives by adding definitions with the characteristics for: (1) Full
size pickup trucks; (2) mild hybrid electric pickup trucks, and; (3)
strong hybrid electric pickup trucks. NHTSA is finalizing these
definitions by reference to 40 CFR 86.1803-01 in its regulation 49 CFR
523, ``Vehicle Classification.'' The agencies proposed that trucks
meeting an overall bed width and length as well as a minimum towing or
payload capacity could be qualified as full size pickup trucks. Part
523 was established by NHTSA to include its regulatory definitions for
passenger automobiles and trucks and to guide the agency and
manufacturers in classifying vehicles. NHTSA believes these references
are necessary to help explain to readers that the characteristics of
full size pickup trucks make them eligible to gain fuel economy
improvement values after a manufacturer meets either a minimum
penetration of hybridized technologies or has other technologies that
[[Page 63132]]
significantly reduce fuel consumption. The improvement will be
available on a per-vehicle basis for mild and strong HEVs, as well as
for other technologies that significantly improve the efficiency of
full sized pickup trucks.
i. Pickup Truck Hybridization
EPA proposed criteria that would provide an adjustment to the fuel
economy of a manufacturer's full size pickup trucks if the manufacturer
employs certain defined hybrid technologies for a significant quantity
of its full size pickup trucks. After meeting minimum production
percentages, manufacturers would gain an adjustment to the fuel economy
performance for each ``mild'' or ``strong'' hybrid full size pickup
truck it produces. EPA is finalizing that manufacturers producing mild
hybrid pickup trucks would gain a 0.0011 gal/mi (10 g/mi CO2
equivalent) incentive by applying mild hybrid technology to at least 20
percent of the company's full sized pickups produced in MY 2017, which
increases each year up to at least 80 percent of the company's full
size pickups produced in MY 2021 (20-30-55-70-80% in model years 2017-
2018-2019-2020-2021, respectively), after which point the adjustment
would no longer be applicable. The mild hybrid penetration rates
represent a change from the proposed rates, in response to comments
received from industry that penetration levels proposed for mild hybrid
credits are too ambitious in the initial model years and may be
counter-productive, as launching a complex new technology on almost a
third of first-year sales could be a risky business strategy in this
highly competitive large truck market segment. As a result, EPA has
changed this requirement to 20 and 30% in model years 2017 and 2018,
respectively (compared to the proposed levels of 30% and 40% in MY 2017
and 2018, respectively), to help facilitate the smooth introduction of
mild hybrid technology. NHTSA is incorporating reference to EPA's
requirements in 40 CFR 600.512, which contains the final provisions.
For strong hybrids, EPA is adopting provisions for strong hybrid
technology to be applied to at least 10 percent of a company's full
sized pickup production in each year for model years 2017-2025 to gain
a 0.0023 gal/mi (20 g/mi CO2 equivalent) incentive.
The fuel economy adjustment for each mild and strong hybrid full
size pickup would be a decrease in measured fuel consumption. These
adjustments are consistent with the GHG credits under EPA's program for
mild and strong hybrid pickups. A manufacturer would then be allowed to
adjust the fuel economy performance of its light truck fleet by
converting the benefit gained from those improvements in accordance
with the procedures specified in 40 CFR Part 600.
A number of comments were received in response to the proposed
definitions for mild and strong hybrids. EPA had proposed that a 75
percent brake energy recovery criteria would be needed to qualify as a
strong hybrid and a 15 percent recovery for a mild hybrid; the
Alliance, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, and MEMA recommended changing the
criteria for determining whether a hybrid pickup truck is categorized
as strong or mild by the percentage of energy recovery achieved during
braking. GM also provided late oral comments to the agencies suggesting
revisions to those percentage definitions, meeting with the agencies
and providing a hybrid pickup truck for EPA's use in testing. Other
industry commenters objected to EPA's characterization of the credit
provisions as applying to only hybrid ``gasoline-electric'' vehicles,
and requested that hybrids be defined more broadly. EPA and NHTSA agree
that the provisions should not be applicable only to ``gasoline-
electric'' vehicles and are clarifying in this final rule that the
provisions also apply to non-gasoline (including diesel-, ethanol-, and
CNG-fueled) hybrids. EPA also agreed with manufacturers that defining
strong hybrids based upon the proposed percent efficiency in recovering
braking energy is inappropriate. As identified through recent testing
by EPA, the only large hybrid truck currently marketed would not
satisfy the proposed 75 percent metric. Therefore, EPA is finalizing
changes to the criteria, as discussed in Sections II and III above,
such that now a 65 percent threshold instead of 75 percent is required
for a pickup truck to qualify as a strong hybrid. NHTSA is finalizing
the same definitions as EPA by referencing EPA's definitions in Part
523.
ii. Performance-Based Incentive for Full-Size Pickups
Another proposed incentive that is being finalized for full size
pickup trucks will provide an adjustment to the fuel economy of a
manufacturer's full sized pickup truck if it achieves a fuel economy
performance level significantly above the CAFE target for its
footprint. This incentive recognizes that not all manufacturers may
wish to pursue hybridization for their pickup trucks, but still rewards
them for applying fuel-saving technologies above and beyond what they
might otherwise do. The incentive will allow a performance-based credit
without the need for a specific technology or design requirements. A
manufacturer can use any technology or set of technologies as long as
the vehicle's CO2 performance is at least 15 or 20% below
the vehicle's footprint-based target. The fuel economy adjustment for
each full size pickup that exceeds its applicable footprint curve
target by 15 percent will decrease the vehicle's measured fuel
consumption by a value of 0.0011gal/mi. Likewise, for each full size
pickup that exceeds its applicable footprint curve target by 20
percent, the decrease in measured fuel consumption will be 0.0023 gal/
mi. These adjustments are consistent with the GHG credits under EPA's
program of 10 g/mi CO2 and 20 g/mi CO2,
respectively, for beating the applicable CO2 targets by 15
and 20 percent, respectively.
The 0.0011 gal/mi performance-based adjustment would be available
for MYs 2017 to 2021, and a vehicle model meeting the requirement in a
given model year would continue to receive the credit until MY 2021--
that is, the credit remains applicable to that vehicle model if the
target is exceeded in only one model year--unless its fuel consumption
increases from one year to the next or its sales drop below the
penetration threshold. The 0.0023 gal/mi adjustment would be available
for a maximum of 5 consecutive years within model years 2017-2025,
provided the vehicle model's fuel consumption does not increase. As
explained above for the hybrid incentive, a manufacturer would then be
allowed to adjust the fuel economy performance of its light truck fleet
by converting the benefit gained from those improvements in accordance
with the procedures specified in 40 CFR Part 600.
Comments received to the NPRM primarily concerned the minimum
penetration thresholds for full size pickup truck incentives requesting
to reduce or eliminate the thresholds. Manufacturers cited multiple
reasons for lower thresholds based upon prevailing production needs,
unfamiliarity with new technology, and customer acceptance rates. EPA
discusses in section III.C.3 that the goal of the ``game changing''
credits is to incentivize the widespread adoption of advanced
technologies. Therefore, EPA has decided to finalize the penetration
requirements as proposed, citing that eliminating or greatly reducing
the minimum penetration requirements might retain the incentive for
niche applications but would lose any assurance of widespread ``game-
changing'' technology introduction and substantial penetration.
[[Page 63133]]
b. A/C Efficiency-Improving Technologies
Air conditioning (A/C) use places excess load on an engine, which
results in additional fuel consumption. A number of methods related to
the A/C system components and their controls can be used to improve A/C
system efficiencies. EPA proposed to allow manufacturers, starting in
MY 2017, to include fuel consumption reductions resulting from the use
of improved A/C systems in their CAFE calculations. This will more
accurately account for achieved real-world fuel economy improvements
due to improved A/C technologies, and better fulfill EPCA's overarching
purpose of energy conservation. Manufacturers would not be allowed to
claim CAFE-related benefits for reducing A/C leakage or switching to an
A/C refrigerant with a lower global warming potential, because while
these improvements reduce GHGs consistent with the purpose of the CAA,
they generally do not relate to fuel economy and thus are not relevant
to the CAFE program. This proposal to allow manufacturers to consider
A/C efficiency improvement technologies for determining CAFE
performance values is being finalized in this final rule.
Based upon comments received to the proposal, EPA is making several
technical and programmatic changes to the proposed ``AC17'' test. The
A/C 17 test is a more extensive test than the ``idle test'' used for
MYs 2012-2016 and has four elements, including two drive cycles, US03
and the highway fuel economy cycle, which capture steady state and
transient operating conditions. It also includes a solar soak period to
measure the energy required to cool down a car that has been sitting in
the sun, as well as a pre-conditioning cycle. The A/C 17 test cycle
will be able to capture improvements in all areas related to efficient
operation of a vehicle's A/C system. The A/C 17 test cycle measures
CO2 emissions in grams per mile (g/mi), and--beginning in
2020--the agencies will require that baseline emissions be measured in
addition to emissions from vehicles with improved A/C systems.
Industry and industry representatives--including the Alliance, BMW,
Ford, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai, Honeywell, and others--asked that an AC17
baseline configuration test in addition to an AC17 test of a vehicle
with an improved A/C system not be required in 2017 since few or no
baseline vehicles will be available in that time period. In response,
EPA is finalizing that from 2017 to 2019 manufacturers will be eligible
to receive GHG credits and fuel consumption improvement values from the
menu simply by reporting the results of the AC17 test. In addition, a
number of commenters, including the Alliance, Volvo, BMW, Ford, and
others, asked the agencies to change the required AC17 test
conditions--such as temperature, humidity, and solar soak period--to
improve repeatability and reduce test burden. In response, EPA has
altered some of the test condition requirements. A number of
manufacturers commented that the definition of vehicle platform would
require many vehicles to be tested, and asked for clarification on
which vehicles are required to be tested, and on aspects of the test
procedure, such as which instrumentation can be used during the test.
In response, EPA has defined vehicle platform more clearly to minimize
the testing burden. More detail on the technical and programmatic
changes along with the comments received are provided in section II.F.
The details of the A/C efficiency performance provision are
discussed as follows and in greater detail in Sections II.F, III.C, and
Chapter 5 of the joint TSD.
For MYs 2017-2019, eligibility for A/C efficiency fuel consumption
improvement values will be determined solely by completion of the AC17
testing on vehicles with more efficient A/C systems. Manufacturers can
earn the A/C efficiency GHG credit and fuel consumption improvement
values between 2017 and 2019 by running the A/C 17 test procedure on
the highest sales volume vehicle in a platform that incorporates the
new technologies, with the A/C system off and then on, and then report
these test results to the EPA. In addition to reporting the test
results, EPA will require that manufacturers provide detailed vehicle
and A/C system information for each vehicle tested (e.g. vehicle class,
model type, curb weight, engine size, transmission type, interior
volume, climate control type, refrigerant type, compressor type, and
evaporator/condenser characteristics). The amount of the fuel
consumption improvement value that can be included in the
manufacturer's CAFE calculations is equal to the value(s) on the menu
for the particular technolog(ies) installed on the vehicle--up to a
maximum amount, which is described in more detail below.
Starting in MY 2020, however, AC17 test results will be used not
only to determine eligibility for AC efficiency fuel consumption
improvement values, but will also play a part in calculating the amount
of the value that can be claimed. From 2020 to 2025, the AC17 test
would be run on the highest sales volume vehicle in a platform to
validate that the performance and efficiency of a vehicle's A/C
technology is commensurate with the level of improvement value that is
being earned. To determine whether the efficiency improvements of these
technologies are being realized, the results of an AC17 test performed
on a new vehicle model will be compared to a ``baseline'' vehicle which
does not incorporate the efficiency-improving technologies. The
baseline vehicle is defined as one with characteristics which are
similar to the new vehicle, only it is not equipped with efficiency-
improving technologies (or they are de-activated). The difference
between the test of the baseline vehicle and the vehicle with new A/C
technologies will determine the fuel consumption improvement value that
can be included in the CAFE calculations. The manufacturer will be
eligible for GHG credits and fuel consumption improvement values if the
test results show an improvement over the baseline vehicle. If the test
result comparisons indicate an emission and fuel consumption reduction
greater than or equal to the maximum menu-based credit/fuel consumption
improvement value, then the manufacturer will generate the appropriate
maximum value based on the menu. However, if the test result does not
demonstrate the full menu-based potential of the technology, then only
partial GHG credit and fuel consumption improvement value can be
earned.
Manufacturers take the results of the AC17 test(s) and access a
credit menu (shown in the table below) to determine A/C related fuel
consumption improvement values. The maximum value possible is limited
to 0.000563 gal/mi for cars and 0.000810 gal/mi for trucks. As an
example, a manufacturer uses two technologies listed in the table, for
which the combined improvement value equals 0.000282 gal/mi. For model
years 2020 and later, if the results of the AC17 tests for the baseline
and vehicle with improved A/C system demonstrates a 0.000282 gal/mi or
greater improvement, then the full fuel consumption improvement value
provided in the table for those two technologies can be taken. If the
AC17 test result falls short of the improvement value for the two
technologies, then a fraction of the improvement value may be counted
in CAFE calculations. The improvement value fraction is calculated in
the following way: the AC17 test result for both the baseline vehicle
and the vehicle with an
[[Page 63134]]
improved A/C system are measured. The difference in the test result of
the baseline and the improved vehicle is divided by the test result of
the baseline vehicle. This fraction is multiplied by the fuel
consumption improvement value for the specific technologies. Thus, if
the AC17 test yielded an improvement equal to \2/3\ of the summed
values listed in the table, then \2/3\ of the summed fuel consumption
improvement values can be counted. Table IV-151 below shows the fuel
consumption improvement values associated with different A/C efficiency
improving technologies.
Table IV-151--NHTSA Efficiency Improving A/C Technologies and Improvement Values
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated
reduction in Car A/C Truck A/C
A/C CO2 efficiency efficiency
Technology description emissions and fuel fuel
fuel consumption consumption
consumption improvement improvement
(percent) (gallon/mi) (gallon/mi)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduced reheat, with externally-controlled, variable- 30 0.000169 0.000248
displacement compressor........................................
Reduced reheat, with externally-controlled, fixed-displacement 20 0.000113 0.000158
or pneumatic variable displacement compressor..................
Default to recirculated air with closed-loop control of the air 30 0.000169 0.000248
supply (sensor feedback to control interior air quality)
whenever the outside ambient temperature is 75 [deg]F or higher
(although deviations from this temperature are allowed based on
additional analysis)...........................................
Default to recirculated air with open-loop control of the air 20 0.000113 0.000158
supply (no sensor feedback) whenever the outside ambient
temperature is 75 [deg]F or higher (although deviations from
this temperature are allowed if accompanied by an engineering
analysis)......................................................
Blower motor controls that limit wasted electrical energy (e.g. 15 0.000090 0.000124
pulsewidth modulated power controller).........................
Internal heat exchanger (or suction line heat exchanger)........ 20 0.000113 0.000158
Improved evaporators and condensers (with engineering analysis 20 0.000113 0.000158
on each component indicating a COP improvement greater than
10%, when compared to previous design).........................
Oil Separator (internal or external to compressor).............. 10 0.000090 0.000079
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As stated above, if more than one technology is utilized by a
manufacturer for a given vehicle model, the A/C fuel consumption
improvement values can be added, but the maximum value possible is
limited to 0.000563 gal/mi for cars and 0.000810 gal/mi for trucks.
More A/C related fuel consumption improvement values are discussed in
the off-cycle credits section of this chapter. The approach for
determining the manufacturers adjusted fleet fuel economy performance
due to improvements in A/C efficiency is described in 40 CFR Part 600.
For model years 2020 and later if a vehicle with new A/C
technologies is tested and the result is not commensurate with the
expected level of fuel consumption reduction for technologies included
on the vehicle, an engineering analysis can be submitted by the
manufacturer to justify a claim for the fuel consumption improvement
values.
c. Off-Cycle Technologies and Adjustments
For MYs 2012-2016, EPA provided an optional credit for new and
innovative ``off-cycle'' technologies that reduce vehicle
CO2 emissions, but for which the CO2 reduction
benefits are not recognized under the 2-cycle test procedure used to
determine compliance with the fleet average standards. The off-cycle
credit option was intended to encourage the introduction of off-cycle
technologies that achieve real-world benefits. The off-cycle credits
were to be determined using the 5-cycle methodology currently used to
determine fuel economy label values, which EPA established to better
represent real-world factors impacting fuel economy, including higher
speeds and more aggressive driving, colder temperature operation, and
the use of air conditioning. A manufacturer must determine whether the
benefit of the technology could be captured using the 5-cycle test; if
this determination is affirmative, the manufacture must follow the 5-
cycle procedures to determine the CO2 reductions. If the
manufacturer finds that the technology is such that the benefit is not
adequately captured using the 5-cycle approach, then the manufacturer
would have to develop a robust methodology, subject to EPA approval, to
demonstrate the benefit and determine the appropriate CO2
gram per mile credit. The demonstration program must be robust,
verifiable, and capable of demonstrating the real-world emissions
benefit of the technology with strong statistical significance. The
non-5-cycle approach includes an opportunity for public comment as part
of the approval process.
EPA has been encouraged by automakers' interest in off-cycle
credits since the program was finalized for the MYs 2012-2016 GHG
program and concluded that extending the program to MY 2017 and beyond
may continue to encourage automakers to invest in off-cycle
technologies that could have the benefit of realizing additional
reductions in the light-duty fleet over the longer-term. Therefore, EPA
proposed to extend the off-cycle credits program to 2017 and later
model years. EPA also proposed, under its EPCA authority, to make
available a comparable off-cycle technology incentive under the CAFE
program beginning in MY 2017. However, instead of manufacturers gaining
credits as done under the GHG program, a direct adjustment would be
made to the manufacturer's fuel economy fleet performance value. The
proposed off-cycle incentive for the CAFE program is being finalized
for MYs 2017 and later as discussed below.
Starting with MY 2017, manufacturers will be able to generate fuel
economy improvements by applying technologies listed on a pre-defined
and pre-approved technology list. These credits would be verified and
approved as part of certification, with no prior approval process
needed. The ``pick list'' option will significantly simplify the
program for manufacturers and provide certainty that improvement values
may be generated through the use of pre-approved technologies. For
improvements from technologies not on
[[Page 63135]]
the pre-defined list, the agencies have clarified the step-by-step
application and approval process for demonstration of fuel consumption
reductions and approval.
EPA and NHTSA are finalizing the off-cycle program as proposed with
the exception of two differences made in response to comments received.
The first change applies to EPA only and allows the pre-defined list to
be used starting in MY 2014, rather than the proposed starting point of
MY 2017. This change does not apply to CAFE, where the off-cycle
credits program does not begin until MY 2017. Second, the agencies are
deleting the minimum sales thresholds for technologies on the pre-
defined list. For further explanation of the changes for the GHG
program, see Section III.C.5.a and Section III.C.5.b, and for the CAFE
program, see Section III.C.5.c. The agencies are also finalizing the
step-by-step process and timeline for reviewing credit applications and
providing a decision to manufacturers. The agencies plan to coordinate
approvals whereas EPA will consult with NHTSA on the application and
the data received in cases where the manufacturer intends to generate
fuel consumption improvement values for CAFE in MY 2017 and later. The
details of the testing protocols used for determining off-cycle
technology benefits and the step-by-step EPA review and approval
process are detailed more thoroughly in Section III.C.5.b.iii and
Section III.C.5.b.v. The agencies are also clarifying, for purposes of
the off-cycle program for CAFE, how consultation and coordination as
required by 49 U.S.C. 32904(e) will occur. NHTSA has added regulatory
text in 49 CFR 531.6 and 533.6 explaining that NHTSA will consult with
EPA on manufacturer applications under 40 CFR 86.1869-12 and provide
its views on the specific off-cycle technology under consideration to
ensure its impact on fuel economy and the suitability of using the off-
cycle technology to adjust the fuel economy performance. NHTSA's
evaluation and review will consider whether the technology has a direct
impact upon improving fuel economy performance; whether the technology
is related to crash-avoidance technologies, safety critical systems or
systems affecting safety-critical functions, or technologies designed
for the purpose of reducing the frequency of vehicle crashes;
information from any assessments conducted by EPA related to the
application, the technology and/or related technologies; and other
relevant factors. NHTSA also notes that since the off-cycle program for
CAFE does not begin until MY 2017, but manufacturers may obtain
approval for off-cycle credits in the GHG program prior to that model
year which they wish to carry into the CAFE program, clarification is
needed to explain what manufacturers should do in those circumstances.
In those cases, manufacturers must concurrently submit a copy to NHTSA
of the application that is being submitted to EPA if manufacturers
anticipate seeking fuel consumption improvements for CAFE beginning in
MY 2017 to ensure the smooth functioning of the program.
The changes finalized today by the agencies respond to issues
raised by commenters. The agencies received several comments supporting
the proposal to establish a pre-defined and pre-approved technology
list for the CAFE program. Manufacturers who supported the list stated
that it is a necessary element to streamline and simplify the off-cycle
program for EPA and NHTSA. There were no comments received objecting to
the pre-defined list, but comments were received on various aspects of
the list, as discussed in detail in Section II.F. EPA has made changes
to some of the technologies and credit values on the list as a result
of these comments. Based on received information and meetings with
manufacturers, the agencies are also clarifying the proposed credit
values and calculation procedures for active transmission warmup, solar
panels and solar control glazing in the final rule. These clarified
values are presented in Table III-19 and the calculation methods
described in detail in the Joint TSD Chapter 5.
Section II.F of the preamble provides an overview of the
technologies, credit values, and comments the agencies received on the
proposed technology list. Table IV-152 provides the list of the
technologies and per vehicle credit levels for the CAFE program that
are being adopted for the final rule.
Table IV-152--NHTSA Off-cycle Technologies and Final Improvement Values for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adjustments for cars Adjustments for trucks
Technology ---------------------------------------------------------------
g/mi gallons/mi g/mi gallons/mi
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\+\High Efficiency Exterior Lights* (at 100 watt 1.0 0.000113 1.0 0.000113
savings).......................................
\+\Waste Heat Recovery (at 100W)................ 0.7 0.000079 0.7 0.000079
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\+\Solar Panels (based on a 75 watt solar Battery Charging Only.................. 3.3 0.000371 3.3 0.000371
panel)**.
Active Cabin Ventilation and Battery 2.5 0.000281 2.5 0.000281
Charging.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\+\Active Aerodynamic Improvements (for a 3% aerodynamic drag or Cd reduction).......... 0.6 0.000068 1.0 0.000113
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Engine Idle Start-Stop......................... w/heater circulation system #.......... 2.5 0.000281 4.4 0.000495
w/o heater circulation system.......... 1.5 0.000169 2.9 0.000326
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Transmission Warm-Up............................................................. 1.5 0.000169 3.2 0.000360
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Engine Warm-up................................................................... 1.5 0.000169 3.2 0.000360
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solar/Thermal Control................................................................... Up to 3.0 0.000338 Up to 4.3 0.000484
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 63136]]
Since one purpose of the off-cycle improvement incentive is to
encourage market penetration of the technologies (see 75 FR 25438), EPA
proposed to require minimum penetration rates for non-hybrid based
listed technologies as a condition for generating improvements from the
list as a way to further encourage their widespread adoption by MY 2017
and later. At the end of the model year for which the off-cycle
improvement is claimed, manufacturers would need to demonstrate that
production of vehicles equipped with the technologies for that model
year exceeded the percentage thresholds in order to receive the listed
improvement. EPA proposed to set the threshold at 10 percent of a
manufacturer's overall combined car and light truck production for all
technologies not specific to HEVs. Ten percent seemed to be an
appropriate threshold as it would encourage manufacturers to develop
technologies for use on larger volume models and bring the technologies
into the mainstream. For solar roof panels and electric heat
circulation pumps, which are specific to HEVs, PHEVs, and EVs, EPA is
not proposing a minimum penetration rate threshold for credit
generation. Hybrids may be a small subset of a manufacturer's fleet,
less than 10 percent in some cases, and EPA does not believe that
establishing a threshold for hybrid-based technologies would be useful
and could unnecessarily complicate the introduction of these
technologies. The agencies requested comments on applying this type of
threshold, the appropriateness of 10 percent as the threshold for
listed technologies that are not P/H/EV-specific, and the proposed
treatment of hybrid-based technologies.
The agencies received comments from several manufacturers and
suppliers recommending not to adopt the proposed sales thresholds.
Commenters argued, for example, that a sales threshold would impede the
development of these early stage technologies because manufacturers
typically introduce new, expensive technologies on high-end, low-volume
models, and requiring a technology across a certain percentage of the
fleet in order to allow access to credits would create incentives for
the manufacturer simply to forego the technology, if no credit is
available, and focus instead on other ways to improve fuel economy. The
agencies believe these issues have merit and consequently for the final
rule have decided not to adopt sales thresholds as a condition. The
agencies believe that several points raised by the commenters are
persuasive in demonstrating that a sales threshold could have the
opposite effect, dissuading manufacturers from introducing
technologies.
The agencies also proposed in the NPRM to impose a cap on the
amount of improvement a manufacturer could generate to 0.001125 gal/
mile per year on a combined car and truck fleet-wide average basis for
the CAFE program. As proposed, the cap would not have applied on a
vehicle model basis, allowing manufacturers the flexibility to focus
off-cycle technologies on certain vehicle models and generate
improvements for that vehicle model in excess of 0.001125 gal/mile.
Additionally, if manufacturers wished to generate improvements in
excess of the 0.001125 gal/mile limit using listed technologies, they
could do so by generating necessary data and going through the approval
process.
The agencies are finalizing the proposed technology cap as
specified in the NPRM. Some commenters had argued that the cap is too
conservative or, conversely, that it may discourage the maximum
adoption of the pre-defined off-cycle technologies, but the agencies
believe that the cap is sufficient enough and appropriately structured.
The cap is appropriate because the default credit values are based on
limited data, and also because the agencies recognize that some
uncertainty is introduced when credits are provided based on a general
assessment of off-cycle performance as opposed to testing on the
individual vehicle models. Furthermore, the agencies are finalizing the
approach discussed above by which manufacturers may generate credits
beyond the cap limitation through the agency approval process. Comments
were also received requesting to change the approach for adding
technologies in meeting the cap limitation. The agencies view these
issues as beyond the scope of this rulemaking, and expect to review
these issues further and address them as a part of the future NHTSA
rulemaking to develop final standards for MYs 2022-2025 and concurrent
mid-term evaluation.
As proposed, EPA is finalizing that a CAFE improvement value for
off-cycle improvements be determined at the fleet level by converting
the CO2 credits determined under the EPA program (in metric
tons of CO2) for each fleet (car and truck) to a fleet fuel
consumption improvement value. This improvement value would then be
used to adjust the fleet's CAFE level upward. See the regulations at 40
CFR 600.510-12. Note that although the table above presents fuel
consumption values equivalent to a given CO2 credit value,
these consumption values are presented for informational purposes and
are not meant to imply that these values will be used to determine the
fuel economy for individual vehicles.
5. Other CAFE Enforcement Issues
a. Electronic Reporting
NHTSA proposed in the NPRM to modify 49 CFR Part 537 to eliminate
the current option for manufacturers to mail hardcopy submissions of
CAFE reports to NHTSA and proposed to receive all reports
electronically. 49 CFR Part 537 requires light vehicle manufacturers to
submit pre-model year (PMY), mid-model year (MMY), and supplemental
reports to NHTSA containing projected estimates of how manufacturers
plan to comply with NHTSA standards. Manufacturers are required to
submit pre-model year reports by December prior to each year, mid-model
reports by July of the model year and a supplemental report whenever
changes are needed to a previously submitted CAFE report. After the end
of the model year, EPA verifies manufacturers' end-of-the-year data and
sends the final verified values to NHTSA. In general, manufacturers'
pre and mid model reports contain projected estimates of the
manufacturers' CAFE standards, the average fuel economy for each fleet,
and, primarily in the PMY report, more specific information about the
vehicles in each manufacture's fleet, such as loaded vehicle weight,
engine displacement, horsepower and other defining characteristics of
the vehicle. Manufacturers currently may provide reports either by
hardcopy or CD-ROM including 5 copies of reports mailed to the NHTSA
Administrator or electronically sending reports to a secure email
address, [email protected], an option that was added in the MYs 2012-2016
final rule. NHTSA proposed in the NPRM to modify Sec. 537.5(c)(4) to
require manufacturers to submit all reports electronically by CD-ROM or
by email. The agency proposed that electronic data be submitted in a
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet format for all of the manufacturer's data,
with the exception of any supporting documentation such as cover
letters or any requests for confidentiality which had to be provided in
a pdf format. The agency explained that its long range goal was to use
the data as part of a step approach it discussed in the NPRM to
eventually develop a new CAFE database allowing manufacturers to submit
electronic CAFE reports through the NHTSA Web site using an XML schema.
[[Page 63137]]
Having examined the issue more closely, NHTSA has discovered that
there are complications with the amendment to Part 537 in the MYs 2012-
2016 final rule allowing confidential pre- and mid-model year reports
to be submitted via email. The regulation governing NHTSA's
determinations of confidentiality, 49 CFR Part 512, currently states
that if a manufacturer wishes to submit information that it claims to
be confidential to the agency electronically, the only acceptable
electronic format is a ``physical medium such as a CD-ROM.'' \1387\
Email submissions of confidential material would not conform with this
requirement. The only exception to this requirement under the current
Part 512 is early warning reporting data submitted to NHTSA under 49
CFR part 579.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1387\ See 49 CFR 512.6(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, unless and until the agency undertakes rulemaking to include
submission of confidential CAFE data by email within Part 512, NHTSA
will have to continue to accept such data in electronic format by CD-
ROM only. Because manufacturers are required under Part 537 to submit
both confidential and non-confidential (i.e., redacted) versions of the
pre- and mid-model year reports to NHTSA, we will continue to accept
the non-confidential versions by email to [email protected], but the
confidential versions will need to come in by CD-ROM. As discussed in
the NPRM, we will also be eliminating the option of providing pre- and
mid-model year reports in hard copy, in the interest of maximizing
efficiency and reducing paperwork burden. No comments were received
disagreeing with this proposal.
The only comments that were received on the question of electronic
CAFE reporting were from Ford, who supported the concept of electronic
reporting and NHTSA's move to all electronic reporting in an Excel
format. However, Ford argued that when the agency eventually made that
transition, it should continue to allow manufacturers to submit data in
formats to which they are already accustomed, such as the current
(totally unrestricted) formats allowed for hardcopy submissions under
Part 537, or the same format as required by EPA's ``VERIFY'' database.
Ford argued that manufacturers have spent significant time and
resources updating their databases to conform to EPA's new VERIFY
requirements commencing in model year 2009,\1388\ and that Canada also
uses the VERIFY database system to access CAFE information, so it would
be easiest for manufacturers if NHTSA employed an identical format for
CAFE reporting under Part 537.
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\1388\ See 76 FR 75340
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In response, we reiterate that NHTSA's intent in the NPRM proposal
was not to impact the format of the existing reports but simply to
require manufacturers to submit CD-ROMs rather than paper. No changes
are being made at this time to the format of the Part 537 submissions.
However, as discussed in the NPRM and as supported by comments, the
agency does intend to continue investigating the possibility of
reducing industry's reporting burdens even further through a long term
goal of developing a means to receive electronic submissions through
the NHTSA Web site using an XML schema. NHTSA will consider the
existing formats of the EPA VERIFY system as it moves forward towards
this goal. We note, however, that while NHTSA is currently aware of a
number of data requirements that NHTSA and EPA already share in common
where the EPA VERIFY system format could be used for receiving data, at
the same time, NHTSA has unique data requirements not collected by EPA
that may require additional information to be independently reported to
NHTSA. For example, only NHTSA requires manufacturers to report
information on the criteria used to classify an automobile as a non-
passenger vehicle or a light truck. Any future changes to the Part 537
reporting requirements would, of course, occur through rulemaking, and
we continue to invite manufacturer feedback as the agency develops its
ideas for modernizing this data collection system.
b. Reporting of How a Vehicle Is Classified as a Light Truck
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed to restructure and clarify how
manufacturers report information used to make the determination that an
automobile can be classified as a light truck for CAFE purposes, and
sought comments on the proposed change. The agency felt that this
proposed change was necessary because the previous requirements in 49
CFR Part 537 specified that manufacturers must provide information on
some, but not all, of the functions and features used to classify an
automobile as a light truck, and it is important for compliance reasons
to understand and be able to readily verify the methods used to ensure
manufacturers are classifying vehicles correctly. In addition, the
regulation required that the information be distributed in different
locations throughout a manufacturer's report, making it difficult for
the agency to clearly determine exactly what functions or features a
manufacturer is using to classify a vehicle as a light truck. For the
NPRM, NHTSA proposed to relocate the language requesting manufacturers
to provide their vehicle classification determination information in
Sections 537.7(c)(4)(xvi)(B)(1) and(2), (xvii) and (xviii) into a
revised Section 537.7(c)(5) consolidating all the required information.
NHTSA believed that by incorporating all the requirements into one
section, the classification determination process would be
significantly more accurate and easily identifiable.
In response, Ford commented in support of the proposed
consolidation of all truck classification determination data into one
location, but argued that the proposed regulatory text had duplicative
requirements for reporting light truck cargo-carrying volumes in
sections 537.7(c)(4)(xix)(B)(2) and (5)(i)(D). Ford requested that
NHTSA allow manufacturers to streamline their reporting, as long as all
the data required for NHTSA to confirm CAFE calculations, fleet
classification, and NHTSA's fleet analyses are present and easily
identified.
Upon further review of the proposed regulatory text, we believe
that our intentions were not clearly articulated. In the proposal,
NHTSA intended for sections 537.7(c)(4)(xix)(B)(1) and (2) to require
manufacturers to provide the passenger-carrying volume and cargo-
carrying volume values, respectively, and for section 537.7(c)(5)(i)(D)
to require the difference between the two volumes and an indication
whether a vehicle's cargo volume is larger than its passenger volume.
However, after reviewing Ford's comment, we now understand how these
requirements could be interpreted as duplicative. Therefore, for the
final rule, NHTSA is revising section 537.7(c)(5)(i)(D) to clarify that
the manufacturer must indicate whether the cargo-carrying volume is
greater than the passenger-carrying volume; if so it must also provide
the difference between the two values. Finally, Ford requested that
NHTSA allow manufacturers to streamline their reporting, as long as all
the data required to confirm CAFE calculations, fleet classification,
and NHTSA's fleet analyses are present and easily identified. NHTSA
agrees that streamlining its reporting requirements is important, and
believes that the changes finalized in this rule to Part 537 will help
to accomplish that. With these changes, manufacturers can provide the
agency with all the necessary data in a
[[Page 63138]]
simpler format that allows the agency, and perhaps also the
manufacturer, to understand quickly and easily how light truck vehicle
classification determination decisions are made.
c. Base Tire Definition Revision
The CAFE standards are attribute-based, and thus each manufacturer
has its own ``standard,'' or compliance obligation, defined by the
vehicles it produces for sale in each fleet in a given model year. A
manufacturer calculates its fleet standard from the attribute-based
target curve standards derived from the unique footprint values, which
are the products of the average front and rear vehicle track width and
wheelbase dimensions, of the vehicles in each model type. Vehicle track
width dimensions are determined with a vehicle equipped with ``base
tires,'' which NHTSA currently defines in 49 CFR Part 523 as the tire
specified as standard equipment by a manufacturer on each vehicle
configuration of a model type.\1389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1389\ See 49 CFR 523.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The calculation of footprint, and thus the definition of base tire,
is important in the CAFE program because they ultimately affect a
manufacturer's compliance obligation, and consistency in how
manufacturers' compliance obligations are determined is vital for
predictability and fairness of the program. In the NPRM (See 76 FR
75351), NHTSA proposed to modify the definition of base tire by
deleting the reference to ``standard equipment'' and adding a reference
to ``the tire installed by the vehicle manufacturer that has the
highest production sales volume on each vehicle configuration of a
model type.'' NHTSA believed that this modification would ensure that
the tires most frequently installed on each vehicle configuration would
become the basis for setting a manufacturer's fuel economy standard,
which the agency expected would help to reduce inconsistencies and
confusion that existed in identifying base tires for both the agency
and the manufacturers. NHTSA sought comment on this approach, and on
other approaches that could be used for selecting base tires.\1390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1390\ For reference, EPA currently defines ``base tire'' as the
``tire specified as standard equipment by the manufacturer.'' 40 CFR
600.002. It further defines ``standard equipment'' as ``those
features or equipment which are marketed on a vehicle over which the
purchaser can exercise no choice.'' 40 CFR 86.1803-01. In the NPRM,
EPA noted that some manufacturers may be applying this base tire
definition in different ways, which could lead to differences across
manufacturers in how they are calculating footprint values, and thus
compliance obligations. EPA further noted NHTSA's proposal to change
its definition for base tire in 49 CFR 523.2, and sought comment on
whether EPA should change its definition for base tire as well. See
76 FR 75088-89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies received several comments in response to the NPRM.
Global Automakers agreed with NHTSA that clarification would help avoid
different interpretations of ``base tire'' by different manufacturers,
but the Alliance, Toyota and GM requested that the agency defer the
decision on changing the base tire definition and discuss the issue
further with industry before making changes. The Alliance argued that
because the highest sales tire can change throughout the model year
based on many factors beyond a manufacturer's control or foresight,
NHTSA should therefore use a definition which allows all vehicles to be
included in the fleet average ``using a representative footprint based
on the physical vehicle, not a footprint based on a moving target of
sales.'' The Alliance, and Ford individually, stated that specifying
that base tire (and thus footprint measurement) could vary by vehicle
configuration was ``confusing'' because footprint is a physical
measurement and unrelated to vehicle configuration, which the
manufacturers implied was a defined term for purposes of fuel economy.
The Alliance and Ford requested that NHTSA adopt EPA's definition of
``base tire,'' Global Automakers requested that NHTSA and EPA simply
adopt the same definition of ``base tire,'' and Hyundai supported
NHTSA's proposed definition. Additionally, the Alliance warned that a
decision by NHTSA to adopt its proposed definition could impact
manufacturer acceptance of the final standards, since all manufacturers
had assessed their ability to comply with the standards in July 2011
based on their own interpretation and understanding of what base tire
means.
In response, again, any changes to NHTSA's definition for base tire
are in the interest of ensuring consistency in how manufacturers'
compliance obligations are determined, to boost the predictability and
fairness of the program. With respect to the comments on determining a
base tire for each vehicle configuration, NHTSA agrees that the factors
defining a vehicle configuration (engine, transmission, fuel system,
axle ratio and inertial weight) may not necessarily define a unique
footprint. For example, it is possible for a single ``vehicle
configuration'' to contain all cab/bed/wheelbase variations of a pick-
up truck, from a standard cab with a short wheelbase to a crew cab with
a long bed and long wheelbase. In this example, one vehicle
configuration can have multiple unique wheelbases and associated
footprints. Thus, using ``vehicle configuration'' in the definition of
base tire does not clearly address the agency's interest in maximizing
consistency, because if a vehicle configuration includes multiple
footprints, it is not clear which footprint a manufacturer should use
for designating the base tire associated with that configuration, nor
is it clear how the other footprints would be incorporated into the
manufacturer's calculation of its compliance obligation. NHTSA will
therefore be removing the concept of vehicle configuration from its
definition for base tire.
NHTSA also agrees with the commenters' theme that in order to be
most effective, a definition for base tire must be related to
footprint. If ``vehicle configuration'' in the CAFE context is not
particularly related to footprint, and thus to base tire, perhaps
another term is better related. Since the NPRM, NHTSA has analyzed base
tires and the related footprint dimensions submitted by manufacturers
in their pre-model year (PMY) reports \1391\ for model years 2011 and
2012. We have observed that some manufacturers provided wheelbase,
front and rear track width, and footprint values in these reports using
the calculation sheet provided to them by EPA in September 2010
(hereafter referenced as the EPA calculator). EPA, with input from
NHTSA, developed the EPA calculator for manufacturers' and agency use
in calculating the footprint-based fuel economy standard (required mpg
value) for manufacturers' CAFE fleets when submitting end-of-year data
to EPA.\1392\ The majority of manufacturers that did not submit PMY
information on the EPA calculator used a format substantially similar
to it, some for unique model types and others by unique vehicle
configurations. In either case, the information submitted by
manufacturers specified, at a minimum, the carline, basic engine, and
transmission class associated with each footprint. These parameters
match EPA's definition of ``model type,'' which means a unique
combination of car line, basic engine, and transmission class.\1393\
Thus, while ``vehicle configuration'' may not
[[Page 63139]]
necessarily define a unique footprint, it appears that manufacturers
understand and are capable of using ``model type'' as a way to define
groups of vehicles with unique footprints, and that ``model type'' can
be used for determining fleet-specific compliance obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1391\ See 49 CFR 537.7.
\1392\ EPA has also prepared a similar calculator for GHG
standards that are similarly based on all unique footprints of
vehicles in each fleet.
\1393\ ``Transmission class,'' in turn, includes transmission
type, e.g., manual, automatic, or semi-automatic; number of forward
gears used in fuel economy testing; drive system, e.g., front wheel
drive, rear wheel drive, four wheel drive; torque converter type, if
applicable; etc. See 40 CFR 600.002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the comments objecting to NHTSA's proposal to tie
the ``base tire'' definition to the vehicle configuration of the
``highest production sales volume,'' the agency does not believe that
using the highest tire sales volume to select base tires creates any
more difficulty for manufacturers when the supply and volume of other
vehicle components, or vehicles themselves, can unexpectedly change
throughout the model year. As with any other model year, unexpected or
adjusted volume level changes could have an impact on reported base
tires and fleet average standard calculations which we would expect to
be revised accordingly in a manufacturer's final year-end report.
However, in considering the issue further, NHTSA recognizes that
utilizing the highest production sales volume tire instead of ``the
tire used as standard equipment'' may lead to standards not derived
from each unique footprint within a manufacturer's fleet but rather
derived only from those footprints associated with the highest
production tire. The Alliance stated that all vehicles should be
included in the fleet average using a representative footprint based on
the physical vehicle, not a footprint based on a moving target of
sales. It appears that the Alliance is suggesting that the agency
remove the link between footprint and base tire but is not clear as to
its intent. The agency does not disagree with the concept of using
representative vehicles to calculate a manufacturer's fleet average
standard, as long as each unique footprint and base tire combination is
included when calculating each fleet average standard. Otherwise, the
agency does not see how to ensure consistency, and thus predictability
and fairness, in how footprint values are calculated, and thus in how
compliance obligations are calculated.
As mentioned, the Alliance and GM suggested that the agency defer
the decision on changing the base tire definition until further
analysis and discussions with industry could take place. The Alliance
explained that various options exist and stated that each one had its
own risks, but did not provide any details or recommendations. The
Alliance argued that changing the definition now could create a rule
that would not be acceptable by some manufacturers because any change
could negatively impact fleet standard projections. GM also commented
that additional time be taken to make any decisions in order to
minimize the potential for any unnecessary complications and unintended
consequences resulting from revising the definition. Global, Ford and
Toyota stated that the agencies should harmonize any final definitions.
The agency agrees with manufacturers that it should move in the
direction of harmonization with EPA on the base tire definition. We
also agree with manufacturers that the agency should evaluate all the
potential risks on fleet standards associated with the available
options manufacturers have for selecting base tires. The agency
believes that a proper evaluation of the various options will require
additional time and effort beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
For this final rule, the agency has decided to modify the NPRM base
tire definition by removing the terms ``highest production sales
volume'' and ``vehicle configuration'' in response to the concerns
raised by commenters. In addition, to align the definition more closely
with EPA's, we have added back the term ``standard equipment.'' For
clarification purposes, we are adding language to ensure that
manufacturers provide a base tire size for each combination of a
vehicle's footprint and model type.
For the final rule, the definition for base tire will therefore be
as follows: ``the tire size specified as standard equipment by the
manufacturer on each unique combination of a vehicle's footprint and
model type.'' For purposes of harmonization, EPA is adopting this same
definition in its final rule (see preamble section III.E.10 and 40 CFR
600.002). Standard equipment would mean those features or equipment
which are marketed on a vehicle over which the purchaser can exercise
no choice, in accordance with the EPA definition in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.
NHTSA believes these changes will harmonize both agencies' definitions
and will allow manufacturers to use the same approach for calculating
attribute-based standards for NHTSA's Parts 531 and 533 and EPA's GHG
programs. In addition, each unique footprint and model type combination
must be used to calculate a manufacturer's target and fleet standards.
Therefore, NHTSA expects manufacturers to report these projected values
in their PMY reports. These revised reporting requirements for base
tire are a part of the provisions that are being finalized in the
following section. Allowing manufacturers to group and report vehicles
within a model type by similar footprints reduces the burden that would
otherwise exist by having to identify the multiple ``vehicle
configurations'' that exist within each model type. As such,
manufacturers can submit the EPA calculator, or similar formatted data
as specified in Part 537.7, with an additional column reporting the
base tire sizes for each table line entry.
NHTSA does not believe that this definition represents any material
change in the reporting requirements already present in the CAFE
program. Manufacturers are already required to report base tires under
Part 537 beginning in MY 2010, and have been required to calculate
their footprint values since model year 2008 for light trucks,
optionally,\1394\ and then mandatory for both passenger cars and light
trucks in model year 2011.\1395\ Moreover, since EPA already uses
``model type'' as a basis for calculating footprint for the GHG
program, this change to the definition for base tire should enhance
harmonization between the programs and reduce manufacturer reporting
burden, insofar as the submissions to both agencies should better
encompass identical information. And finally, allowing manufacturers to
group and report vehicles within a model type by similar footprints
would reduce the burden that would otherwise exist by having to
identify the multiple ``vehicle configurations'' that exist within each
model type. As such, manufacturers can submit the EPA calculator, or
similar formatted data as specified in Part 537.7, with an additional
column reporting the base tire sizes for each table line entry. NHTSA
believes these changes provide a clear definition for footprint
calculations and, thus, fleet compliance projections, calculations,
finalizations and enforcement efforts.
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\1394\ The final rule was published on April 6, 2006. See 71 FR
17566.
\1395\ The final rule was published on March 30, 2009. See 74 FR
14196, per 49 U.S.C. Sec. 32902(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Confirming Target and Fleet Standards
As discussed in the NPRM, because Part 537 as currently written
requires only a breakdown of footprint values by vehicle configurations
rather than by each unique model type and footprint combination, NHTSA
is currently unable to verify manufacturers' reported target standards.
To remedy that, the agency proposed to harmonize the NHTSA and EPA
reporting requirements relating to the derivation of a manufacturer's
fleet standards. The agency proposed to accomplish this by relocating
paragraphs
[[Page 63140]]
537.7(c)(4)(xvi)(A)(3) through (6) and (B)(3) through (6), to a revised
paragraph 537.7(b)(3). NHTSA sought comments on these proposed changes.
Because no comments were received on this issue, and because NHTSA
continues to believe that the change will be beneficial, NHTSA is
finalizing the proposal as specified with one addition. To harmonize
further with EPA and standardize the data content and format that can
be submitted to both agencies, NHTSA is adding an optional requirement,
shown below in the regulatory text for paragraphs Sec.
537.7(b)(3)(i)(E) and (ii)(E), for manufacturers to provide the
calculated target standard along with each required unique model type
and footprint combination listing used to calculate the fleet standard.
This information would be beneficial to NHTSA for assisting in the
validation of the manufacturer's calculated fleet standards, and the
agency believes that optionally requesting this information in Part 537
does not constitute a material change to the existing reporting
requirements and should require no additional work on the part of
manufacturers, because this information will already be submitted to
EPA. If manufacturers choose not to provide this optional data to NHTSA
along with the related required data, NHTSA may consider changing this
to a mandatory requirement in a future rulemaking.
e. Public Reporting
Several commenters in response to the NPRM requested that NHTSA
consider expanding the amount of CAFE information it provides to the
public each year. NACAA commented that once the program is in place, it
is critical that agencies closely track the progress of manufacturers
in meeting standards. NRDC stated that EPA and NHTSA should create
greater public transparency by annually publishing data on each
manufacturer's credit status and technology penetration rates to ensure
greater public confidence in the program's effectiveness. NRDC further
commented that the agencies should publish an annual public report that
includes at a minimum the following for each manufacturer's passenger
car and light truck fleets: the amount of cumulative credits or
deficits; the amount of transfers; the amount of traded credits and the
name of the receiving party; the amount of credits generated from A/C,
pickup credits, dedicated and dual fuel, and off-cycle.
UCS commented that the agencies could further improve transparency
by having a clear public accounting of credits and program compliance
explaining that over the years it has been exceedingly difficult to
independently verify whether manufacturers are compliant with their
CAFE obligations. Given the numerous compliance flexibility mechanisms
being proposed by the agencies as well as a multitude of opportunities
for trading, transferring, banking, and borrowing of credits, USC
believes that it is critical that manufacturers' compliance ledgers be
documented, publicly available, and sufficiently granular to assess by
which measures companies are complying with the regulations. USC urged
the agencies to undertake an effort to provide clear public accounting
of credits and program compliance. UCS also stated that in order for it
and other public interest groups to effectively assess industry
compliance and behavior, the agencies should expand the public
availability and quality of disaggregated vehicle data. Because of the
new attribute-based standards, USC argued that it is critical that sub-
model level data be regularly published that includes not only fuel
economy and greenhouse gas emissions performance specifications, but at
a minimum, finalized sales, vehicle footprint, regulatory vehicle
classification, and other listed technical data. Additional comments
similar to USC were also received from the Sierra Club. Sierra Club
requested that public information for model years 2017 to 2025 be
expanded to include enough detail to sufficiently assess manufacturers'
credits balances and activities, compliance margins and vehicle model
type characteristics and performance.
In response to the commenters' requests to increase the
transparency of CAFE compliance data, we are continuing to consider
this issue as we develop the new CAFE database discussed above. We also
note that as part of the MY 2011 CAFE final rule, NHTSA issued 49 CFR
part 536 to implement a new CAFE credit trading and transfer program as
authorized by EISA. In Paragraph 536.5(e) of the regulation, NHTSA
adopted new provisions for periodically publishing the names and credit
holdings of all credit holders. Credit holdings will include a
manufacturer's credit balance accounting for all transferred and traded
credit transactions which have occurred over a specified transaction
period. NHTSA plans to make manufacturer's credit balances available to
the public on the NHTSA Web site before the end of calendar year 2012.
NHTSA also already publishes a report on its Web site titled, ``The
Summary of Fuel Economy Report,'' which provides a bi-annual status
report on CAFE fleet standards, performance values and production
volumes by manufacturer, and makes manufacturers' pre-model and mid-
model year CAFE reports publicly available at the end of each current
calendar year in dockets at http://www.regulations.gov. Starting in
model year 2017, and as detailed in the next section, manufacturers'
CAFE reports will also be required to contain most of the information
requested by NRDC such as the amount of the incentive gained by a
manufacturer in its fleet average performance as generated by A/C, full
size pickup trucks, dedicated and dual fuel, and off-cycle technology
improvements. Finally, manufacturers' CAFE reports also already address
USC's concerns for providing information sufficiently granular enough
to assess the measure by which companies will comply with regulations
and provides the information on a vehicle configuration level which
addresses USC's and Sierra Club's requests for model type information.
f. Additional Enforcement Issues
The agency proposed in the NPRM to add requirements in 537.7(c)(4)
for manufacturers to report air conditioning efficiency, full-size
pickup truck and off-cycle technology improvements used to acquire the
incentives in 40 CFR 86.1866, and the amount of each incentive. As
proposed, the technology credits or incentives would need to be
reported for each vehicle configuration making up the model types used
to determine a manufacturer's fleet average performance.
Ford argued that these particular types of vehicle
characteristics--those necessary to earn fuel economy adjustment values
for air conditioning efficiency, full-size pickup truck and off-cycle
technology improvements--will not vary by fuel economy configuration
and will likely only vary by vehicle line. Ford requested instead that
manufacturers be allowed to delineate the credit applicability
specifically, as needed, but for cases where credits apply across a
much broader section of vehicles, manufacturers should be allowed to
report on that level rather than being required to report at the
vehicle configuration level.
Upon further consideration, NHTSA agrees that these technology
improvements likely need not be specified at the vehicle configuration
level because the fuel economy adjustment incentive is derived based
upon the technology and is not necessarily affected by being applied to
[[Page 63141]]
any particular vehicle based upon vehicle configuration or model type.
The important information that NHTSA seeks to receive is what air
conditioning, off-cycle and hybrid technologies are being used, what
the adjustment incentive is (gallons/mile) for each technology, and the
number of vehicles in the fleet using the respective technology. These
adjustment incentives form the inputs to adjust the manufacturer's
fleet CAFE values in accordance with the equations in 40 CFR 600.510-
12, and manufacturers must also submit this adjusted CAFE value to
NHTSA. Therefore, for the final rule, we plan to move the provisions
proposed in section (c)(4)(xvi), (xvii) and (xviii) into a new section
numbered (c)(7) and require manufacturers to report their technologies
by vehicle make and model types. Manufacturers will also be required to
report their adjusted fleet average performance values and other
required information used in the equation specified in 40 CFR 600.510-
12(c)(1).
J. Record of Decision
This final rule constitutes the Record of Decision (ROD) for
NHTSA's final rule for CAFE standards for model years 2017 and beyond,
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the
Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) implementing
regulations.\1396\ See 40 CFR 1505.2.
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\1396\ NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321-47. CEQ NEPA
implementing regulations are codified at 40 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Parts 1500-08.
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As required by CEQ regulations, this ROD sets forth the following:
(1) The agency's decision; (2) alternatives considered by NHTSA in
reaching its decision, including the environmentally preferable
alternative; (3) the factors balanced by NHTSA in making its decision,
including considerations of national policy; (4) how these factors and
considerations entered into its decision; and (5) the agency's
preferences among alternatives based on relevant factors, including
economic and technical considerations and agency statutory missions.
This ROD also briefly addresses mitigation.
1. The Agency's Decision
In the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Draft EIS) and the
Final Environmental Impact Statement (Final EIS), the agency identified
a Preferred Alternative, labeled as Alternative 3. As NHTSA noted in
the Final EIS, under the Preferred Alternative, on an mpg basis, the
estimated annual increases in the average required fuel economy levels
between MYs 2017 and 2021 average 3.8 to 3.9 percent for passenger cars
and 2.5 to 2.7 percent for light trucks. The estimated annual increases
in the average required fuel economy levels set forth for MYs 2022-
2025--also on an mpg basis--are assumed to average 4.7 percent for
passenger cars and 4.8 to 4.9 percent for light trucks.\1397\ After
carefully reviewing and analyzing all of the information in the public
record, the Final EIS, and public and agency comments submitted on the
EIS and the NPRM, NHTSA has decided to finalize the Preferred
Alternative.
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\1397\ Because the standards are attribute-based, average
required fuel economy levels, and therefore rates of increase in
those averages, depend on the future composition of the fleet, which
is uncertain and subject to change. The target curves identified as
the Preferred Alternative and analyzed in the Final EIS are the same
as those that defined the Preferred Alternative in the Draft EIS and
outlined as the proposal in the NPRM. They are also the same as
those being finalized by NHTSA in this final rule.
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2. Alternatives NHTSA Considered in Reaching its Decision
When preparing an EIS, NEPA requires an agency to compare the
potential environmental impacts of its proposed action and a reasonable
range of alternatives. In the Draft and Final EIS, NHTSA analyzed a No
Action Alternative and three action alternatives. The action
alternatives represent a range of potential actions the agency could
take. The environmental impacts of these alternatives, in turn,
represent a range of potential environmental impacts that could result
from NHTSA's chosen action in setting maximum feasible fuel economy
standards for light duty vehicles.
The No Action Alternative in the Draft and Final EIS assumes that
NHTSA would not issue a rule regarding CAFE standards for MY 2017-2025
passenger cars and light trucks; rather, the No Action Alternative
assumes that NHTSA's latest CAFE standards (the MY 2016 fuel economy
standards, issued in conjunction with EPA's MY 2016 GHG standards)
would continue indefinitely. This alternative provides an analytical
baseline against which to compare the environmental impacts of the
other alternatives presented in the EIS.\1398\ NEPA expressly requires
agencies to consider a ``no action'' alternative in their NEPA analyses
and to compare the effects of not taking action with the effects of
action alternatives in order to demonstrate the environmental effects
of the action alternatives. The No Action Alternative assumes that
average fuel economy levels and GHG emissions performance in the
absence of the agencies' action would equal what manufacturers would
achieve without additional regulation.
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\1398\ See 40 CFR 1502.2(e), 1502.14(d). CEQ has explained that
``[T]he regulations require the analysis of the no action
alternative even if the agency is under a court order or legislative
command to act. This analysis provides a benchmark, enabling
decision makers to compare the magnitude of environmental effects of
the action alternatives. [See 40 CFR 1502.14(c).] * * * Inclusion of
such an analysis in the EIS is necessary to inform Congress, the
public, and the President as intended by NEPA. [See 40 CFR
1500.1(a).]'' Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National
Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 FR 18026 (Mar. 23, 1981).
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For the EIS, in addition to the No Action Alternative, NHTSA
analyzed a range of action alternatives with fuel economy stringencies
that increased on average 2 percent to 7 percent annually from the MY
2016 standards for passenger cars and for light trucks. As NHTSA noted
in the Final EIS, the agency believes that, based on the different ways
the agency could weigh EPCA's four statutory factors, the ``maximum
feasible'' level of CAFE stringency falls within this range.
Throughout the Final EIS, estimated impacts were shown for three
action alternatives that illustrate this range of average annual
percentage increases in fuel economy: a 2 percent per year average
increase in stringency for both passenger cars and light trucks
(Alternative 2); the Preferred Alternative with annual percentage
increases in stringency for passenger cars and for light trucks that,
on average, fall between the 2 percent and 7 percent per year increases
(Alternative 3); and a 7 percent per year average increase in
stringency for both passenger cars and light trucks (Alternative 4).
Alternatives 2 and 4 were intended to provide the lower and upper
bounds of a reasonable range of alternatives. In the EIS, the agency
provided environmental analyses of these points to enable the
decisionmaker and the public to determine the environmental impacts of
points that fall between Alternatives 2 and 4. The action alternatives
evaluated in the EIS therefore provided decisionmakers with the ability
to select from a wide variety of other potential alternatives with
stringencies that increase annually at average percentage rates between
2 and 7 percent. This includes, for example, alternatives with
stringencies that increase at different rates for passenger cars and
for light trucks and stringencies that increase by different rates in
different years. For a discussion of the environmental impacts
associated with the alternatives, see Chapters 3-7 of the Final EIS.
[[Page 63142]]
The Final EIS recognizes the unique uncertainties inherent in
projecting the makeup of the U.S. vehicle fleet far into the future. In
order to take account of uncertainties regarding the future vehicle
fleet, and how manufacturers would respond to increased fuel economy
standards in the future, the Final EIS presents the potential
environmental impacts for each of the alternatives using two different
assumptions regarding market-driven fuel economy improvements and two
different sets of fleet-characteristic assumptions. See Sections 2.2.1
and 2.2.2 of the Final EIS for a detailed discussion of NHTSA's
assumptions.
3. NHTSA's Environmental Analysis, Including Consideration of the
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
NHTSA's environmental analysis indicates that Alternative 4 is the
overall Environmentally Preferable Alternative because it would result
in the largest reductions in fuel use and GHG emissions among the
alternatives considered. Under each action alternative the agency
considered, the reduction in fuel consumption resulting from higher
fuel economy causes emissions that occur during fuel refining and
distribution to decline. For most of these pollutants, this decline is
more than sufficient to offset the increase in tailpipe emissions that
results from increased driving due to the fuel efficiency rebound
effect, leading to a net reduction in total emissions from fuel
production, distribution, and use. Because it leads to the largest
reductions in fuel refining, distribution, and consumption among the
alternatives considered, Alternative 4 would also lead to the lowest
total emissions of CO2 and other GHGs, as well as most
criteria air pollutants and mobile source air toxics (MSATs).
Alternative 4 would lead to the greatest reduction of
CO2 and N2O emissions compared to the other
action alternatives, including the Preferred Alternative. Thus,
emissions of these GHGs would be lower under Alternative 4 than under
each of the other action alternatives throughout the analysis period,
regardless of the assumptions used (e.g. fleet characteristics and fuel
economy under the No Action Alternative). While the pattern of
CH4 emissions among the alternatives is more complicated and
changes over time, emissions of CH4 under Alternative 4
would rise compared to the No Action Alternative after about 2050,
depending on the assumptions used, due to increases in tailpipe
emissions resulting from the fuel efficiency rebound effect and from
increased use of diesel-fueled vehicles. However, this slight increase
in CH4 would be vastly outweighed by much larger decreases
in CO2 emissions on a global warming potential-weighted
basis. Alternative 4 would lead to a reduction of global atmospheric
CO2 concentrations in 2100 of up to 0.5 percent, a reduction
in global mean surface temperatures of up to 0.5 percent, and a
reduction in sea-level rise of up to 0.4 percent from their respective
levels under the No Action Alternative.
For toxic air pollutants, results are mixed. Alternatives 3 and 4
are the Environmentally Preferable Alternatives depending on the
pollutant and assumptions used. The greatest reductions in emissions of
benzene and 1,3-butadiene occur under Alternative 4 in later analysis
years. The greatest reductions in diesel particulate matter (DPM) occur
under Alternative 3 (the Preferred Alternative) in later analysis
years. Under all action alternatives, emissions of acetaldehyde,
acrolein, and formaldehyde would generally increase in later years,
depending on the assumptions used. These emissions increases are mainly
due to the fuel efficiency rebound effect, which more than offsets
emission reductions from decreased fuel usage. Under different
assumptions, the fuel efficiency rebound effect would not fully offset
emissions reductions from decreased fuel usage, and emissions of these
pollutants would instead decrease.
For criteria pollutants, the greatest relative reductions in
emissions compared to the No Action Alternative occur under Alternative
4 for CO, PM2.5, and VOCs, for which emissions related to
light duty vehicles decrease by as much as 26 percent by 2060.
Emissions of NOX and SO2 related to the use of
light duty vehicles are an exception in later analysis years. For those
criteria pollutants in later analysis years, NHTSA's analysis indicates
that Alternative 3 is generally the Environmentally Preferable
Alternative because it leads to the largest reductions in
NOX and SO2.
At the time the analysis for the Final EIS was performed, EIA's
final version of AEO 2012 was not yet released. The AEO 2012 Early
Release Reference Case, used for the criteria air pollutant results
described above, did not account for new standards for power plants,
which are expected to result in substantial reductions of emissions of
some air pollutants discussed in the air quality chapter.
As we stated in the Final EIS, NHTSA believes it is reasonable to
consider an additional analysis assuming steady improvements to the
electrical grid during the course of the next several decades--the
period during which any EV deployment associated with this program
would occur. In the Final EIS, NHTSA performed an additional air
quality analysis in order to take into account changes to the
efficiency of power plants and the mix of fuel sources used. Emissions
and other environmental impacts from electricity production depend on
the efficiency of the power plant and the mix of fuel sources used,
sometimes referred to as the ``grid mix.'' In the United States, the
current grid mix is composed of coal, nuclear, natural gas,
hydroelectric, oil, and renewable energy resources, with the largest
single source of electricity being from coal. As a result of EPA's Acid
Rain Program, the Clean Air Interstate Rule, the recent Mercury and Air
Toxics Standards, and general advances in technology, emissions from
the power-generation sector are expected to decline over time. Low
natural gas prices and higher coal prices, as well as slower growth in
electrical demand, are currently resulting in a shift away from coal-
based electricity generation. Together, these trends suggest a future
grid mix that is likely to produce lower upstream emissions per unit of
electricity used to charge EVs than the NEMS AEO 2012 Early Release-
based 2020 projection, especially in terms of reductions in criteria
pollutant emissions.
Under the cleaner grid mix analyzed in the EIS,\1399\ the greatest
relative reductions in emissions of criteria pollutants related to the
use of light duty vehicles occur under Alternative 4 for CO,
PM2.5, and VOCs, for which emissions decrease by as much as
26 percent by 2060 compared to the No Action Alternative. For
SO2 and NOX, the greatest emissions reductions
generally occur under Alternative 3. Under Alternative 4, emissions of
SO2 and NOX either increase or decrease compared
to the No Action Alternative, depending upon assumptions used. Any
increase in emissions of these pollutants is smaller than increases
that occur under Alternative 4 for the analysis described above.
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\1399\ NHTSA analyzed the ``GHG Price, Economy-wide'' case from
AEO 2011, which assumes future carbon trading. This scenario assumes
high levels of natural gas and renewables for electricity
generation, with generation from coal-fired power plants reduced to
21 percent from the EIA projected 2020 contribution of 40 percent
used in the main analysis.
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EIA's final version of AEO 2012, which accounts for new EPA
standards for power plants such as the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards, projects
[[Page 63143]]
nearly a 75 percent decrease in SO2 emissions and a 14
percent reduction in NOX from the electric power sector in
the 2010-2015 timeframe. EIA's Short-term Energy Outlook for July 2012
shows that coal was responsible for nearly 50 percent of U.S.
electrical generation in 2005, and is projected to fall to an average
of less than 37 percent for 2012, which will also contribute to a
reduction in these emissions. The full AEO 2012 projects coal
accounting for 38 percent of total U.S. electricity generation by 2035,
and natural gas accounting for 28 percent. As EIA notes in AEO 2012,
the decrease in coal's generation is mostly offset by growth in natural
gas and renewable energy. Like the cleaner grid mix analyzed in the
Final EIS, EIA's updated projections indicate a cleaner future grid
with lower upstream emissions per unit of electricity generated.
For more detailed discussion of the environmental impacts
associated with the alternatives, see Chapters 3 through 7 of the Final
EIS. For detailed results of NHTSA's Alternate Grid Mix Case, see
Appendix H of the Final EIS.
4. Factors Balanced by NHTSA in Making Its Decision
For discussion of the factors balanced by NHTSA in making Its
decision, see Sections IV.D and IV.F of this final rule.
5. How the Factors and Considerations Balanced by NHTSA Entered Into
Its Decision
For discussion of how the factors and considerations balanced by
the agency entered into NHTSA's Decision, see Section IV.F of this
final rule.
6. The Agency's Preferences among Alternatives Based on Relevant
Factors, Including Economic and Technical Considerations and Agency
Statutory Missions
For discussion of the agency's preferences among alternatives based
on relevant factors, including economic and technical considerations,
see Section IV.F of this final rule.
7. Mitigation
The CEQ regulations specify that a ROD must ``state whether all
practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the
alternative selected have been adopted, and if not, why they were
not.'' 40 CFR 1505.2(c). The majority of the environmental effects of
NHTSA's action are positive, i.e., beneficial environmental impacts,
and would not raise issues of mitigation. Emissions of criteria and
toxic air pollutants are generally projected to decrease under the
final standards under all analysis years as compared to their levels
under the No Action Alternative. Analysis of the environmental trends
reported in the Final EIS for the Preferred Alternative indicates that
the only exceptions to this decline are emissions of CO, acetaldehyde,
acrolein, and 1,3-butadiene, and emissions of SO2 and
formaldehyde in some analyses and years. See Chapter 4 of the Final
EIS. The agency forecasts these emissions increases because, under all
the alternatives analyzed in the EIS, increase in vehicle use due to
improved fuel efficiency is projected to result in growth in total
miles traveled by light duty vehicles. The growth in VMT outpaces
emissions reductions for some pollutants, resulting in projected
increases for these pollutants. In addition, as described above,
NHTSA's NEPA analysis predicted increases in emissions of air toxic and
criteria pollutants under certain alternatives based on assumptions
about the type of technologies manufacturers will use to comply with
the standards and the resulting rate and type of emissions.
NHTSA's authority to promulgate new fuel economy standards is
limited and does not allow regulation of criteria pollutant from
vehicles or of factors affecting those emissions, including driving
habits. Consequently, NHTSA must set CAFE standards but is unable to
take steps to mitigate the impacts of these standards. Chapter 8 of the
Final EIS outlines a number of other initiatives across the government
that could ameliorate the environmental impacts of motor vehicle use,
including the use of light duty vehicles.
K. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
1. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR
51735, Oct. 4, 1993), as amended by Executive Order 13563, ``Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review'' (76 FR 3821, Jan. 21, 2011),
provides for making determinations whether a regulatory action is
``significant'' and therefore subject to OMB review and to the
requirements of the Executive Order. The Order defines a ``significant
regulatory action'' as one that is likely to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local, or Tribal governments or
communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in
the Executive Order.
The CAFE standards promulgated in this final rule will be
economically significant if adopted. Accordingly, OMB reviewed the rule
under Executive Order 12866. The rule is also significant within the
meaning of the Department of Transportation's Regulatory Policies and
Procedures.
The benefits and costs of this proposal are described above.
Because the rule is economically significant under both the Department
of Transportation's procedures and OMB guidelines, the agency has
prepared a Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA) and placed it in the
docket and on the agency's Web site. Further, pursuant to Circular A-4,
we have prepared a formal probabilistic uncertainty analysis for this
final rule. The circular requires such an analysis for complex rules
where there are large, multiple uncertainties whose analysis raises
technical challenges or where effects cascade and where the impacts of
the rule exceed $1 billion. This final rule meets these criteria on all
counts.
2. National Environmental Policy Act
Under NEPA, a Federal agency must prepare an EIS on proposals for
major Federal actions that significantly affect the quality of the
human environment.\1400\ The purpose of an EIS is to inform
decisionmakers and the public of the potential environmental impacts of
a proposed action and reasonable alternative actions the agency could
take.\1401\ The EIS is used by the agency, in conjunction with other
relevant material, to plan actions and make decisions. To inform its
development of the final CAFE standards, NHTSA prepared a Draft and a
Final EIS, which analyze, disclose, and compare the potential
environmental impacts of a reasonable range of action alternatives,
including a Preferred Alternative,\1402\ pursuant to Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA implementing regulations,
[[Page 63144]]
DOT Order 5610.1C, and NHTSA regulations.\1403\ The Final EIS analyzes
direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts, and discusses impacts in
proportion to their significance. For more detailed discussion of the
environmental impacts analyzed, see the Final EIS and Final EIS
Summary, available at Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0056 and on the agency's
Web site at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.
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\1400\ 40 CFR 1502.3.
\1401\ 40 CFR 1502.1.
\1402\ The Preferred Alternative in the Final EIS is equivalent
to the action the agency is adopting in this final rule.
\1403\ NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. CEQ NEPA
implementing regulations are codified at 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508, and
NHTSA's NEPA implementing regulations are codified at 49 CFR Part
520.
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The Final EIS quantitatively and qualitatively analyzes the
potential environmental impacts of a range of alternative CAFE
standards on fuel and energy use, air quality, and global climate
change. The Final EIS also qualitatively describes potential
environmental impacts to a variety of other resources including land
use and development, hazardous materials and regulated wastes, historic
and cultural resources, noise, and environmental justice.
CEQ regulations emphasize agency cooperation early in the NEPA
process and allow a lead agency (in this case, NHTSA) to request the
assistance of other agencies that either have jurisdiction by law or
have special expertise regarding issues considered in an EIS.\1404\
NHTSA invited EPA to be a cooperating agency in the preparation of the
EIS because of its special expertise in the areas of climate change and
air quality.
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\1404\ 40 CFR 1501.6.
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In preparing the Final EIS, NHTSA took a number of steps to ensure
public involvement. On May 10, 2011, NHTSA published a notice of intent
to prepare an environmental impact statement for new CAFE standards,
requesting comment on the scope of the agency's analysis.\1405\ On
November 25, 2011, EPA published a Notice of Availability of the Draft
EIS for the new proposed CAFE standards.\1406\ NHTSA requested public
input on the agency's Draft EIS by January 31, 2012; publication of the
Notice of Availability triggered the Draft EIS public comment period.
NHTSA mailed (both electronically and through regular U.S. mail) over
1,000 copies of the Draft EIS to stakeholders and interested parties,
including Federal, State, and local officials and agencies; elected
officials, environmental and public interest groups; Native American
tribes; and other interested organizations and individuals. NHTSA and
EPA held joint public hearings on the Draft EIS and NPRM on January 17,
2012, in Detroit, Michigan; on January 19, 2012, in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; and on January 24, 2012, in San Francisco, California.
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\1405\ Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement for New Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 76 FR
26996 (May 10, 2011).
\1406\ Notice of Availability of the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement for New Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Model
Year 2017-2025, 76 FR 72702, 72703 (Nov. 25, 2011).
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NHTSA received thousands of written and oral comments to the NPRM
and the Draft EIS. The transcripts from the public hearings and written
comments submitted to NHTSA are part of the administrative record and
are available on the Federal Docket, available online at http://www.regulations.gov, Reference Docket Nos. NHTSA-2011-0056 and NHTSA-
2010-0131. NHTSA reviewed and analyzed all relevant comments received
during the public comment period and revised the Final EIS in response
to comments where appropriate.\1407\ For a more detailed discussion of
the comments NHTSA received, see Section 1.5 of the Draft EIS and
Chapter 9 of the Final EIS.
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\1407\ The agency also changed the Final EIS as a result of
updated information that became available after issuance of the
Draft EIS.
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On July 9, 2012, NHTSA submitted the Final EIS to EPA, in
accordance with CEQ NEPA implementing regulations.\1408\ On that day,
NHTSA also posted the Final EIS on its Web site, http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy, and notified over 1,000 stakeholders and interested
parties about its availability (both electronically and through regular
U.S. mail). On July 13, 2012, EPA published a Notice of Availability of
the Final EIS in the Federal Register. See 77 FR 41403 (July 13, 2012).
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\1408\ 40 CFR Sec. 1506.9.
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In developing the CAFE standards adopted in this final rule, NHTSA
has been informed by the analyses contained in the Final Environmental
Impact Statement, Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, Passenger
Cars and Light Trucks, Model Years 2017-2025, Docket No. NHTSA-2011-
0056 (Final EIS). For purposes of this rulemaking, the agency referred
to an extensive compilation of technical and policy documents available
in NHTSA's EIS and rulemaking dockets and EPA's docket. NHTSA's EIS and
rulemaking dockets and EPA's rulemaking docket can be found online at
http://www.regulations.gov, Reference Docket Nos.: NHTSA-2011-0056
(EIS), NHTSA-2010-0131 (NHTSA rulemaking), and EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799
(EPA rulemaking).
Based on the foregoing, NHTSA concludes that the environmental
analysis and public involvement process complies with NEPA implementing
regulations issued by CEQ, DOT Order 5610.1C, and NHTSA regulations.
3. Clean Air Act (CAA) as Applied to NHTSA's Action
The CAA (42 U.S.C. Sec. 7401) is the primary Federal legislation
that addresses air quality. Under the authority of the CAA and
subsequent amendments, EPA has established National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants, which are relatively
commonplace pollutants that can accumulate in the atmosphere as a
result of normal levels of human activity. EPA is required to review
each NAAQS every five years and to revise those standards as may be
appropriate considering new scientific information.
The air quality of a geographic region is usually assessed by
comparing the levels of criteria air pollutants found in the ambient
air to the levels established by the NAAQS (taking into account, as
well, the other elements of a NAAQS: averaging time, form, and
indicator). Concentrations of criteria pollutants within the air mass
of a region are measured in parts of a pollutant per million parts of
air (ppm) or in micrograms of a pollutant per cubic meter ([mu]g/m\3\)
of air present in repeated air samples taken by monitors using
specified types of monitors. These ambient concentrations of each
criteria pollutant are compared to the levels, averaging time, and form
specified by the NAAQS in order to assess whether the region's air
quality is in attainment with the NAAQS.
When the measured concentrations of a criteria pollutant within a
geographic region are below those permitted by the NAAQS, the region is
designated by the EPA as an attainment area for that pollutant, while
regions where concentrations of criteria pollutants exceed Federal
standards are called nonattainment areas (NAAs). Former NAAs that have
attained the NAAQS are designated as maintenance areas. Each NAA is
required to develop and implement a State Implementation Plan (SIP),
which documents how the region will reach attainment levels within time
periods specified in the CAA. In maintenance areas, the SIP documents
how the State intends to maintain attainment with the NAAQS. When EPA
revises a NAAQS, States must revise their SIPs to address how they will
attain the new standard.
Section 176(c) of the CAA prohibits Federal agencies from taking
actions in nonattainment or maintenance areas
[[Page 63145]]
that do not ``conform'' to the SIP. The purpose of this conformity
requirement is to ensure that Federal activities do not interfere with
meeting the emissions targets in the SIPs, do not cause or contribute
to new violations of the NAAQS, and do not impede the ability to attain
or maintain the NAAQS. EPA has issued two sets of regulations to
implement CAA Section 176(c):
(1) The Transportation Conformity Rules (40 CFR Part 93, Subpart
A), which apply to transportation plans, programs, and projects funded
or approved under U.S.C. Title 23 or the Federal Transit Laws (49
U.S.C. Chapter 53). Projects funded by the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) or the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
usually are subject to transportation conformity. See 40 CFR 93.102.
(2) The General Conformity Rules (40 CFR Part 93, Subpart B) apply
to all other federal actions not covered under transportation
conformity. The General Conformity Rule established emissions
thresholds, or de minimis levels, for use in evaluating the conformity
of a project. If the net emissions increases attributable to the
project are less than these thresholds, then the project is presumed to
conform and no further conformity evaluation is required. If the
emissions increases exceed any of these thresholds, then a conformity
determination is required. The conformity determination can entail air
quality modeling studies, consultation with EPA and state air quality
agencies, and commitments to revise the SIP or to implement measures to
mitigate air quality impacts.
The final fuel economy standards are not funded or approved under
Title 23 or the Federal Transit Act. Further, NHTSA's CAFE program is
not a highway or transit project funded or approved by FHWA or FTA.
Accordingly, this final rule is not subject to transportation
conformity.
Under the General Conformity Rule, a conformity determination is
required where a Federal action would result in total direct and
indirect emissions of a criteria pollutant or precursor equaling or
exceeding the rates specified in 40 CFR 93.153(b)(1) and (2) for
nonattainment and maintenance areas. As explained below, NHTSA's action
results in neither direct nor indirect emissions as defined in 40 CFR
93.152.
The General Conformity Rule defines direct emissions as those of
``a criteria pollutant or its precursors that are caused or initiated
by the Federal action and originate in a nonattainment or maintenance
area and occur at the same time and place as the action and are
reasonably foreseeable.'' 40 CFR 93.152. Because NHTSA's action only
sets fuel economy standards for light duty vehicles, it causes no
direct emissions within the meaning of the General Conformity Rule.
Indirect emissions under the General Conformity Rule include
emissions or precursors: (1) That are caused or initiated by the
Federal action and originate in the same nonattainment or maintenance
area but occur at a different time or place than the action; (2) that
are reasonably foreseeable; (3) that the agency can practically
control; and (4) for which the agency has continuing program
responsibility. 40 CFR 93.152. Each element of the definition must be
met to qualify as an indirect emission. NHTSA has determined that, for
the purposes of general conformity, emissions that occur as a result of
the fuel economy standards are not caused by NHTSA's action, but rather
occur due to subsequent activities that the agency cannot practically
control. ``[E]ven if a Federal licensing, rulemaking, or other
approving action is a required initial step for a subsequent activity
that causes emissions, such initial steps do not mean that a Federal
agency can practically control any resulting emissions'' (75 FR 17254,
17260; 40 CFR 93.152). NHTSA cannot control vehicle manufacturers'
production of vehicles and consumer purchasing and driving behavior.
For the purposes of analyzing the environmental impacts of this action
under NEPA, NHTSA has made assumptions regarding the technologies
manufacturers will install and how companies will react to increased
fuel economy standards. For example, NHTSA's NEPA analysis predicted
increases in air toxic and criteria pollutants to occur in some
nonattainment areas under certain alternatives based on assumptions
about the rebound effect. However, NHTSA's rule does not mandate
specific manufacturer decisions or driver behavior. NHTSA's NEPA
analysis assumes a rebound effect, wherein the standards could create
an incentive for additional vehicle use by reducing the cost of fuel
consumed per mile driven. This rebound effect is an estimate of how
NHTSA assumes some drivers will react to the rule and is useful for
estimating the costs and benefits of the rule, but the agency does not
have the statutory authority, or the program responsibility, to control
the actual vehicle miles traveled by drivers. Accordingly, changes in
air toxic and criteria pollutant emissions that result from NHTSA's
fuel economy standards are not changes that the agency can practically
control; therefore, this action causes no indirect emissions and a
general conformity determination is not required.
4. National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
The NHPA (16 U.S.C. 470) sets forth government policy and
procedures regarding ``historic properties''--that is, districts,
sites, buildings, structures, and objects included in or eligible for
the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). See also 36 CFR Part
800. Section 106 of the NHPA requires federal agencies to ``take into
account'' the effects of their actions on historic properties. The
agency concludes that the NHPA is not applicable to NHTSA's Decision
because it does not directly involve historic properties. The agency
has, however, conducted a qualitative review of the related impacts of
the alternatives on potentially affected resources, including historic
and cultural resources. See Section 7.3 of the Final EIS. Executive
Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
Under Executive Order 12898, Federal agencies are required to
identify and address any disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and
activities on minority and low-income populations. Pursuant to this
order, the Final EIS includes a qualitative analysis of the potential
effects of the standards on minority and low-income populations. See
Section 7.6 of the Final EIS.
5. Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act (FWCA)
The FWCA (16 U.S.C. 2900) provides financial and technical
assistance to States for the development, revision, and implementation
of conservation plans and programs for nongame fish and wildlife. In
addition, the Act encourages all Federal agencies and departments to
utilize their authorities to conserve and to promote conservation of
nongame fish and wildlife and their habitats. The agency concludes that
the FWCA is not applicable to NHTSA's Decision because it does not
directly involve fish and wildlife.
6. Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
The Coastal Zone Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1450) provides for the
preservation, protection, development, and (where possible) restoration
and enhancement of the nation's coastal zone resources. Under the
statute, States are provided with funds and technical assistance in
developing coastal zone management programs. Each
[[Page 63146]]
participating State must submit its program to the Secretary of
Commerce for approval. Once the program has been approved, any activity
of a Federal agency, either within or outside of the coastal zone, that
affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone
must be carried out in a manner that is consistent, to the maximum
extent practicable, with the enforceable policies of the State's
program.
The agency concludes that the CZMA is not applicable to NHTSA's
Decision because it does not involve an activity within, or outside of,
the nation's coastal zones. The agency has, however, conducted a
qualitative review of the related direct, indirect, and cumulative
impacts, positive or negative, of the alternatives on potentially
affected resources, including coastal zones. See Section 5.5 of the
Final EIS.
7. Endangered Species Act (ESA)
Under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA federal agencies must ensure that
actions they authorize, fund, or carry out are ``not likely to
jeopardize'' federally listed threatened or endangered species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of the designated
critical habitat of these species. 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). If a federal
agency determines that an agency action may affect a listed species or
designated critical habitat, it must initiate consultation with the
appropriate Service--the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the
Department of the Interior and/or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's National Marine Fisheries Service of the Department of
Commerce, depending on the species involved--in order to ensure that
the action is not likely to jeopardize the species or destroy or
adversely modify designated critical habitat. See 50 CFR 402.14. Under
this standard, the federal agency taking action evaluates the possible
effects of its action and determines whether to initiate consultation.
See 51 FR 19926, 19949 (Jun. 3, 1986).
NHTSA received one comment to the Draft EIS indicating that the
agency should engage in consultation under Section 7 of the ESA when
analyzing the overall impact of GHG emissions and other air pollutants.
Pursuant to Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, NHTSA has considered the
effects of the proposed CAFE standards and has reviewed applicable ESA
regulations, case law, and guidance to determine what, if any, impact
there might be to listed species or designated critical habitat. NHTSA
has considered issues related to emissions of CO2 and other
GHGs, and issues related to non-GHG emissions. Based on this
assessment, NHTSA has determined that the agency's action of setting
CAFE standards, which will result in nationwide fuel savings and which,
consequently, will generally result in emissions reductions from what
would otherwise occur in the absence of the CAFE standards, does not
require consultation under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. For discussion
of the agency's rationale, see page 9-101 of the Final EIS.
Accordingly, NHTSA has concluded its review of this action under
Section 7 of the ESA.
8. Floodplain Management (Executive Order 11988 and DOT Order 5650.2)
These Orders require Federal agencies to avoid the long- and short-
term adverse impacts associated with the occupancy and modification of
floodplains, and to restore and preserve the natural and beneficial
values served by floodplains. Executive Order 11988 also directs
agencies to minimize the impact of floods on human safety, health and
welfare, and to restore and preserve the natural and beneficial values
served by floodplains through evaluating the potential effects of any
actions the agency may take in a floodplain and ensuring that its
program planning and budget requests reflect consideration of flood
hazards and floodplain management. DOT Order 5650.2 sets forth DOT
policies and procedures for implementing Executive Order 11988. The DOT
Order requires that the agency determine if a proposed action is within
the limits of a base floodplain, meaning it is encroaching on the
floodplain, and whether this encroachment is significant. If
significant, the agency is required to conduct further analysis of the
proposed action and any practicable alternatives. If a practicable
alternative avoids floodplain encroachment, then the agency is required
to implement it.
In this rulemaking, the agency is not occupying, modifying and/or
encroaching on floodplains. The agency, therefore, concludes that the
Orders are not applicable to NHTSA's Decision. The agency has, however,
conducted a review of the alternatives on potentially affected
resources, including floodplains. See Section 5.5 of the Final EIS.
9. Preservation of the Nation's Wetlands (Executive Order 11990 and DOT
Order 5660.1a)
These Orders require Federal agencies to avoid, to the extent
possible, undertaking or providing assistance for new construction
located in wetlands unless the agency head finds that there is no
practicable alternative to such construction and that the proposed
action includes all practicable measures to minimize harms to wetlands
that may result from such use. Executive Order 11990 also directs
agencies to take action to minimize the destruction, loss or
degradation of wetlands in ``conducting Federal activities and programs
affecting land use, including but not limited to water and related land
resources planning, regulating, and licensing activities.'' DOT Order
5660.1a sets forth DOT policy for interpreting Executive Order 11990
and requires that transportation projects ``located in or having an
impact on wetlands'' should be conducted to assure protection of the
Nation's wetlands. If a project does have a significant impact on
wetlands, an EIS must be prepared.
The agency is not undertaking or providing assistance for new
construction located in wetlands. The agency, therefore, concludes that
these Orders do not apply to NHTSA's Decision. The agency has, however,
conducted a review of the alternatives on potentially affected
resources, including wetlands. See Section 5.5 of the Final EIS.
10. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act (BGEPA), Executive Order 13186
The MBTA provides for the protection of migratory birds that are
native to the United States by making it illegal for anyone to pursue,
hunt, take, attempt to take, kill, capture, collect, possess, buy,
sell, trade, ship, import, or export any migratory bird covered under
the statute. The statute prohibits both intentional and unintentional
acts. Therefore, the statute is violated if an agency acts in a manner
that harms a migratory bird, whether it was intended or not. See, e.g.,
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2nd Cir. 1978).
The BGEPA (16 U.S.C. 668) prohibits any form of possession or
taking of both bald and golden eagles. Under the BGEPA, violators are
subject to criminal and civil sanctions as well as an enhanced penalty
provision for subsequent offenses.
Executive Order 13186, ``Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to
Protect Migratory Birds,'' helps to further the purposes of the MBTA by
requiring a Federal agency to develop a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Fish and Wildlife Service when it is taking an action
that has (or is likely to have) a measurable negative impact on
migratory bird populations.
The agency concludes that the MBTA, BGEPA, and Executive Order
13186 do not apply to NHTSA's Decision because
[[Page 63147]]
there is no disturbance and/or take involved in NHTSA's Decision.
11. Department of Transportation Act (Section 4(f))
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 (49
U.S.C. 303), as amended by Pub. Law 109-59, is designed to preserve
publicly owned parklands, waterfowl and wildlife refuges, and
significant historic sites. Specifically, Section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act provides that DOT agencies cannot
approve a transportation program or project that requires the use of
any publicly owned land from a significant public park, recreation
area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or any land from a significant
historic site, unless a determination is made that:
(1) There is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of
land, and
(2) The program or project includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to the property resulting from use, or
(3) A transportation use of Section 4(f) property results in a de
minimis impact.
The agency concludes that Section 4(f) is not applicable to NHTSA's
Decision because this rulemaking does not require the use of any
publicly owned land.
12. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice
of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare and make
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions).
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates
primarily within the United States.'' 13 CFR 121.105(a). No regulatory
flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency certifies the
rule will not have a significant economic impact of a substantial
number of small entities.
I certify that this final rule will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities. The following is
NHTSA's statement providing the factual basis for the certification (5
U.S.C. 605(b)).
The final rule directly affects 19 large single stage motor vehicle
manufacturers.\1409\ According to current information, the final rule
would also affect a total of about 21 entities that fit the Small
Business Administration's criteria for a small business. According to
the Small Business Administration's small business size standards (see
13 CFR 121.201), a single stage automobile or light truck manufacturer
(NAICS code 336111, Automobile Manufacturing; 336112, Light Truck and
Utility Vehicle Manufacturing) must have 1,000 or fewer employees to
qualify as a small business. There are about 4 small manufacturers,
including 3 electric vehicle manufacturers, 8 independent commercial
importers, and 9 alternative fuel vehicle converters in the passenger
car and light truck market which are small businesses. We believe that
the rulemaking would not have a significant economic impact on these
small vehicle manufacturers because under 49 CFR part 525, passenger
car manufacturers making fewer than 10,000 vehicles per year can
petition NHTSA to have alternative standards set for those
manufacturers. Manufacturers that produce only electric vehicles, or
that modify vehicles to make them electric or some other kind of
dedicated alternative fuel vehicle, will have average fuel economy
values far beyond those presented today, so we would not expect them to
need a petition for relief. A number of other small vehicle
manufacturers already petition the agency for relief under Part 525. If
the standard is raised, it has no meaningful impact on those
manufacturers, because they are expected to still go through the same
process to petition for relief. Given that there is already a mechanism
for handling small businesses, which is the purpose of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, and that no comments were received on this issue, a
regulatory flexibility analysis was not prepared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1409\ BMW, Daimler (Mercedes), Fiat/Chrysler (which also
includes Ferrari and Maserati for CAFE compliance purposes), Ford,
Geely (Volvo), General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Lotus, Mazda,
Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Suzuki, Tata (Jaguar Land
Rover), Toyota, and Volkswagen/Audi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
Executive Order 13132 requires NHTSA to develop an accountable
process to ensure ``meaningful and timely input by State and local
officials in the development of regulatory policies that have
federalism implications.'' \1410\ The Order defines the term ``Policies
that have federalism implications'' to include regulations that have
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.'' Under
the Order, NHTSA may not issue a regulation that has federalism
implications, that imposes substantial direct compliance costs, and
that is not required by statute, unless the Federal government provides
the funds necessary to pay the direct compliance costs incurred by
State and local governments, or NHTSA consults with State and local
officials early in the process of developing the proposed regulation.
NHTSA and EPA consulted extensively with California and other states in
the development of the proposal, and several state agencies provided
comments to the proposed standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1410\ 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, in his January 26 memorandum, the President requested
NHTSA to ``consider whether any provisions regarding preemption are
consistent with the EISA, the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA and other relevant provisions of law and the policies underlying
them.'' Comments were received on this topic, but NHTSA is deferring
consideration of the preemption issue. The agency believes that it is
unnecessary to address the issue further at this time because of the
consistent and coordinated Federal standards that will apply nationally
under the National Program.
14. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
Pursuant to Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform,'' \1411\
NHTSA has considered whether this rulemaking would have any retroactive
effect. This final rule does not have any retroactive effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1411\ 61 FR 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996).
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15. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires Federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of a proposed or final rule that includes a
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more
than $100 million in any one year (adjusted for inflation with base
year of 1995). Adjusting this amount by the implicit gross domestic
product price deflator for 2010 results in $136 million (111.000/81.606
= 1.36). Before promulgating a rule for which a written statement is
needed, section 205 of UMRA generally requires NHTSA to identify and
consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and adopt the
least costly, most cost-
[[Page 63148]]
effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives
of the rule. The provisions of section 205 do not apply when they are
inconsistent with applicable law. Moreover, section 205 allows NHTSA to
adopt an alternative other than the least costly, most cost-effective,
or least burdensome alternative if the agency publishes with the final
rule an explanation of why that alternative was not adopted.
This final rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local,
or tribal governments, in the aggregate, of more than $136 million
annually, but it will result in the expenditure of that magnitude by
vehicle manufacturers and/or their suppliers. In promulgating this
final rule, NHTSA considered a variety of alternative average fuel
economy standards lower and higher than those proposed. NHTSA is
statutorily required to set standards at the maximum feasible level
achievable by manufacturers based on its consideration and balancing of
relevant factors and has concluded that the final fuel economy
standards are the maximum feasible standards for the passenger car and
light truck fleets for MYs 2012-2016 in light of the statutory
considerations.
16. Regulation Identifier Number
The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.
17. Executive Order 13045
Executive Order 13045 \1412\ applies to any rule that: (1) Is
determined to be economically significant as defined under E.O. 12866,
and (2) concerns an environmental, health, or safety risk that NHTSA
has reason to believe may have a disproportionate effect on children.
If the regulatory action meets both criteria, we must evaluate the
environmental, health, or safety effects of the final rule on children,
and explain why the final regulation is preferable to other potentially
effective and reasonably foreseeable alternatives considered by us.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1412\ 62 FR 19885 (Apr. 23, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted in Chapter 4 of NHTSA's Final EIS, the criteria pollutants
assessed in the agencies have been shown to cause a range of adverse
health effects at various concentrations and exposures, including:
Damage to lung tissue, reduced lung function, exacerbation of existing
respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, difficulty breathing,
irritation of the upper respiratory tract, bronchitis and pneumonia,
educed resistance to respiratory infections, alterations to the body's
defense systems against foreign materials, reduced delivery of oxygen
to the body's organs and tissues, impairment of the brain's ability to
function properly, cancer and premature death. When these gases and
particles accumulate in the air in high enough concentrations, they can
harm humans, especially children, the elderly, the ill, and other
sensitive individuals.
Diesel Particulate Matter (DPM) is a component of diesel exhaust.
DPM particles are very fine, with most particles smaller than 1 micron,
and their small size allows inhaled DPM to reach the lungs. Particles
typically have a carbon core coated with condensed organic compounds
such as POM, which include mutagens and carcinogens. EPA classifies
many of the compounds included in the POM class as probable human
carcinogens based on animal data. Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs) are a subset of POM that contains only hydrogen and carbon
atoms. Studies have found that maternal exposures to Polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in a population of pregnant women were
associated with several adverse birth outcomes, including low birth
weight and reduced length at birth, and impaired cognitive development
in preschool children (3 years of age) (Perera et al. 2003, 2006).
As noted in Chapter 5 of the Final EIS, potential increases in
allergens under a changing climate could increase respiratory health
risks, particularly for children. Recent research has projected
increases in weed pollen and grass pollen under various climate change
simulations; these allergens are known to exacerbate children's asthma
and cause hospitalizations (Sheffield and Landrigan 2011 citing
H[eacute]guy et al. 2008, Schmier and Ebi 2009, and Ziska et al. 2008).
Consistent with earlier studies, increased temperatures from climate
change are projected to increase ground[hyphen]level ozone
concentrations, triggering asthma attacks among children (Bernstein and
Myers 2011). Exposure to smoke from forest fires, which are likely to
occur more frequently in the future, cause asthma and respiratory
illnesses in children (Bernstein and Myers 2011 citing Liu et al. 2010,
Bernstein and Mysers 2011 citing Kunzli et al. 2006).
Additionally, the Final EIS notes that substantial morbidity and
childhood mortality has been linked to water- and food-borne diseases.
A recent study investigates how six regions in the tropics and
subtropics--including South America, North Africa, the Middle East,
equatorial Africa, southern Africa, and Southeast Asia, all of which
have high incidence of dehydration and diarrhea--could experience
increases in diarrhea incidence as average temperatures rise. This
study estimates an average temperature increase of 4 [deg]C (7.2
[deg]F) over land in the study area by the end of the century, compared
to a 1961 to 1990 baseline, based on an ensemble average of 19 climate
models using a moderate (A1B) emission scenario. A relatively simple
linear regression relationship was developed between diarrhea incidence
and temperature increase based on the results of five independent
studies. Applying this relationship, the projected mean increase in the
relative risk of contracting diarrhea across the six study regions is
eight to 11 percent in the period 2010 to 2039, 15 to 20 percent in the
period 2040 to 2069, and 22 to 29 percent in the period 2070 to 2099
(Kolstad and Johansson 2011). Climate change is also projected to
affect the rates of water[hyphen] and food[hyphen]borne diseases.
Currently, foodborne diseases cause an estimated 5,000 deaths, 325,000
hospitalizations, and 76 million illnesses annually in the United
States (Ge et al. 2011 citing Mead et al. 1999). A new study tested how
climate change can affect the spread of Salmonella. Both extended
dryness and heavy rain were tested, and the authors found that these
conditions facilitated the transfer of Salmonella typhimurium into the
edible portions of lettuce and green onion when Salmonella was present
in the soil. If climate change were to cause excessive drought or heavy
rain, it could increase the risk of disease outbreaks (Ge et al. 2011).
In the United States, Lyme disease is a common vector[hyphen]borne
disease, with children between the ages of 5 and 9 having the highest
incidence of infection (Bernstein and Myers 2011 citing Bacon et al.
2008). In response to warming temperatures, populations of the black
legged tick (Ixodes scapularis, often known as the deer tick) have been
expanding and increasing in number across North America northward
toward Canada and lower Michigan in the United States (Bernstein and
Myers 2011 citing Ogden et al. 2010).
Globally, there has been an increase in cases of skin cancer over
the past several decades, due in part to increased exposure to
UV[hyphen]B radiation caused by
[[Page 63149]]
factors such as lifestyle changes and stratospheric ozone depletion.
Studies suggest that higher temperatures contribute to the development
of skin carcinoma, and one new study estimates that a long[hyphen]term
temperature increase of 2 [deg]C (3.6[emsp14][deg]F) compared to 1990
temperatures could raise the carcinogenesis effects of UV radiation by
10 percent (Andersen 2011 citing van der Leun and de Gruijl 2002).
The impacts of climate change on food and water security will be
particularly burdensome on children, who are more susceptible to
malnutrition and disease (Sheffield and Landrigan 2011). In the Sahel
region of Africa, expanding arid climates could hinder agricultural
production, resulting in an increase in malnutrition, stunting, and
anemia throughout the population. By 2025, an additional six million
people in Mali, Africa--of which one million are children--are at
heightened risk of malnutrition due to climate and livelihood changes
from increasing temperatures and decreased rainfall across the region.
As the arid region expands, it is projected that approximately 250,000
children will suffer stunting, 200,000 children will be malnourished,
and more than 100,000 will be anemic (Jankowska et al. 2012).
Thus, as detailed in the Final EIS, NHTSA has evaluated the
environmental, health, and safety effects of the rule on children and
fetuses. The Final EIS also explains why the standards are preferable
to other potentially effective and reasonably foreseeable alternatives
considered by the agency.
18. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act (NTTAA) requires NHTSA to evaluate and use existing voluntary
consensus standards in its regulatory activities unless doing so would
be inconsistent with applicable law (e.g., the statutory provisions
regarding NHTSA's vehicle safety authority) or otherwise impractical.
Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies. Technical standards
are defined by the NTTAA as ``performance-base or design-specific
technical specification and related management systems practices.''
They pertain to ``products and processes, such as size, strength, or
technical performance of a product, process or material.''
Examples of organizations generally regarded as voluntary consensus
standards bodies include the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), and the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI). If NHTSA does not use available
and potentially applicable voluntary consensus standards, we are
required by the Act to provide Congress, through OMB, an explanation of
the reasons for not using such standards.
There are currently no voluntary consensus standards relevant to
today's final CAFE standards.
19. Executive Order 13211
Executive Order 13211 \1413\ applies to any rule that: (1) is
determined to be economically significant as defined under E.O. 12866,
and is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) as a significant regulatory action. If the regulatory action
meets either criterion, we must evaluate the adverse energy effects of
the final rule and explain why the final regulation is preferable to
other potentially effective and reasonably foreseeable alternatives
considered by us.
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\1413\ 66 FR 28355 (May 22, 2001).
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The final rule seeks to establish passenger car and light truck
fuel economy standards that will reduce the consumption of petroleum
and will not have any adverse energy effects. Accordingly, this final
rulemaking action is not designated as a significant energy action.
20. Department of Energy Review
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32902(j)(1), we submitted this final
rule to the Department of Energy for review. That Department did not
make any comments that we have not addressed.
21. Privacy Act
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an organization, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register (65 FR 19477-78,
April 11, 2000) or you may visit http://www.dot.gov/privacy.html.
List of Subjects
40 CFR Part 85
Confidential business information, Imports, Labeling, Motor vehicle
pollution, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Research,
Warranties.
40 CFR Part 86
Administrative practice and procedure, Confidential business
information, Incorporation by reference, Labeling, Motor vehicle
pollution, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
40 CFR Part 600
Administrative practice and procedure, Electric power, Fuel
economy, Labeling, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 523, 531, and 533
Fuel Economy.
49 CFR Part 536 and 537
Fuel economy, Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements.
Environmental Protection Agency
40 CFR Chapter I
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Environmental
Protection Agency amends parts 85, 86, and 600 of title 40, Chapter I
of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 85--CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION FROM MOBILE SOURCES
0
1. The authority citation for part 85 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q.
Subpart F--[Amended]
0
2. Section 85.525 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(2)(i)(D) to read
as follows:
Sec. 85.525 Applicable standards.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) * * *
(D) Optionally, compliance with greenhouse gas emission
requirements may be demonstrated by comparing emissions from the
vehicle prior to the fuel conversion to the emissions after the fuel
conversion. This comparison must be based on FTP test results from the
emission data vehicle (EDV) representing the pre-conversion test group.
The sum of CO2, CH4, and N2O shall be
calculated for pre- and post-conversion FTP test results, where
CH4 and N2O are weighted by their global warming
potentials of 25 and 298, respectively. The post-conversion sum of
these emissions must be lower than the pre-conversion conversion
greenhouse gas emission results. CO2 emissions are
calculated as specified in 40 CFR 600.113-12. If statements of
[[Page 63150]]
compliance are applicable and accepted in lieu of measuring
N2O, as permitted by EPA regulation, the comparison of the
greenhouse gas results also need not measure or include N2O
in the before and after emission comparisons.
* * * * *
PART 86--CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NEW AND IN-USE HIGHWAY VEHICLES
AND ENGINES
0
3. The authority citation for part 86 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q.
0
4. Section 86.1 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1 Reference materials.
(a) Documents listed in this section have been incorporated by
reference into this part. The Director of the Federal Register approved
the incorporation by reference as prescribed in 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1
CFR part 51. Anyone may inspect copies at the U.S. EPA, Air and
Radiation Docket and Information Center, 1301 Constitution Ave. NW.,
Room B102, EPA West Building, Washington, DC 20460, (202) 566-1744, or
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-
6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
(b) American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). Anyone may
purchase copies of these materials from American Society for Testing
and Materials at 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West
Conshohocken, PA, 19428-2959, (610) 832-9585, or http://www.astm.org/.
(1) ASTM C1549-09, Standard Test Method for Determination of Solar
Reflectance Near Ambient Temperature Using a Portable Solar
Reflectometer, approved August 1, 2009, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1869-
12(b).
(2) ASTM D975-04c, Standard Specification for Diesel Fuel Oils,
published 2004, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.213-11, 86.1910.
(3) ASTM D1945-91, Standard Test Method for Analysis of Natural Gas
by Gas Chromatography, published 1991, IBR approved for Sec. Sec.
86.113-94, 86.513-94, 86.1213-94, 86.1313-94.
(4) ASTM D2163-91, Standard Test Method for Analysis of Liquefied
Petroleum (LP) Gases and Propane Concentrates by Gas Chromatography,
published 1991, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.113-94, 86.1213-94,
86.1313-94.
(5) ASTM D2986-95a (Reapproved 1999), Standard Practice for
Evaluation of Air Assay Media by the Monodisperse DOP (Dioctyl
Phthalate) Smoke Test, published 1999, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1310-
2007.
(6) ASTM D5186-91, Standard Test Method for Determination of
Aromatic Content of Diesel Fuels by Supercritical Fluid Chromatography,
published 1991, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.113-07, 86.1313-91,
86.1313-94, 86.1313-98, 86.1313-2007.
(7) ASTM E29-67 (Reapproved 1980), Standard Recommended Practice
for Indicating Which Places of Figures Are To Be Considered Significant
in Specified Limiting Values, published 1980, IBR approved for Sec.
86.1105-87.
(8) ASTM E29-90, Standard Practice for Using Significant Digits in
Test Data to Determine Conformance with Specifications, published 1990,
IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.609-84, 86.609-96, 86.609-97, 86.609-98,
86.1009-84, 86.1009-96, 86.1442, 86.1708-99, 86.1709-99, 86.1710-99,
86.1728-99.
(9) ASTM E29-93a, Standard Practice for Using Significant Digits in
Test Data to Determine Conformance with Specifications, published 1993,
IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.004-15, 86.007-11, 86.007-15, 86.098-15,
86.1803-01, 86.1823-01, 86.1824-01, 86.1825-01, 86.1837-01.
(10) ASTM E903-96, Standard Test Method for Solar Absorptance,
Reflectance, and Transmittance of Materials Using Integrating Spheres,
approved April 10, 1996, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1869-12(b).
(11) ASTM E1918-06, Standard Test Method for Measuring Solar
Reflectance of Horizontal and Low-Sloped Surfaces in the Field,
approved August 15, 2006, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1869-12(b).
(12) ASTM F1471-93, Standard Test Method for Air Cleaning
Performance of a High-Efficiency Particulate Air-Filter System,
published 1993, IBR approved Sec. 86.1310-2007.
(c) American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Anyone may
purchase copies of these materials from American National Standards
Institute, 25 W 43rd Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10036, (212) 642-
4900, http://www.ansi.org.
(1) ANSI/AGA NGV1-1994, Standard for Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle
(NGV) Fueling Connection Devices, 1994, IBR approved for Sec. Sec.
86.001-9, 86.004-9, 86.098-8, 86.099-8, 86.099-9, 86.1810-01.
(2) [Reserved]
(d) California Air Resources Board, 1001 I Street, Sacramento, CA,
95812, (916) 322-2884, http://www.arb.ca.gov.
(1) California Regulatory Requirements Applicable to the ``LEV II''
Program, including:
(i) California Non-Methane Organic Gas Test Procedures, August 5,
1999, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.1803-01, 86.1810-01, 86.1811-04.
(ii) [Reserved]
(2) California Regulatory Requirements Applicable to the National
Low Emission Vehicle Program, October 1996, IBR approved for Sec. Sec.
86.113-04, 86.612-97, 86.1012-97, 86.1702-99, 86.1708-99, 86.1709-99,
86.1717-99, 86.1735-99, 86.1771-99, 86.1775-99, 86.1776-99, 86.1777-99,
Appendix XVI, Appendix XVII.
(3) California Regulatory Requirements known as On-board
Diagnostics II (OBD-II), Approved on April 21, 2003, Title 13,
California Code Regulations, Section 1968.2, Malfunction and Diagnostic
System Requirements for 2004 and Subsequent Model-Year Passenger Cars,
Light-Duty Trucks, and Medium-Duty Vehicles and Engines (OBD-II), IBR
approved for Sec. 86.1806-05.
(4) California Regulatory Requirements known as On-board
Diagnostics II (OBD-II), Approved on November 9, 2007, Title 13,
California Code Regulations, Section 1968.2, Malfunction and Diagnostic
System Requirements for 2004 and Subsequent Model-Year Passenger Cars,
Light-Duty Trucks, and Medium-Duty Vehicles and Engines (OBD-II), IBR
approved for Sec. Sec. 86.007-17, 86.1806-05.
(e) International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Anyone
may purchase copies of these materials from International Organization
for Standardization, Case Postale 56, CH-1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland,
41-22-749-01-11, http://www.iso.org.
(1) ISO 9141-2, Road vehicles--Diagnostic systems--Part 2: CARB
requirements for interchange of digital information, February 1, 1994,
IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.099-17, 86.1806-
01, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(2) ISO 14230-4:2000(E), Road vehicles--Diagnostic systems--KWP
2000 requirements for emission-related systems, June 1, 2000, IBR
approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.099-17, 86.1806-01,
86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(3) ISO 15765-4.3:2001, Road Vehicles--Diagnostics on Controller
Area Networks (CAN)--Part 4: Requirements for emissions-related
systems, December 14, 2001, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17,
86.007-17, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(4) ISO 15765-4:2005(E), Road Vehicles--Diagnostics on Controller
Area Networks (CAN)--Part 4: Requirements for emissions-related
systems, January 15, 2005, IBR approved
[[Page 63151]]
for Sec. Sec. 86.007-17, 86.010-18, 86.1806-05.
(5) ISO 13837:2008(E), Road Vehicles--Safety glazing materials--
Method for the determination of solar transmittance, First edition,
April 15, 2008, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1869-12(b).
(f) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Anyone
may purchase copies of these materials from National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD, 20899,
http://www.nist.gov.
(1) NIST Special Publication 811, Guide for the Use of the
International System of Units (SI), 1995 Edition, IBR approved for
Sec. 86.1901.
(2) [Reserved]
(g) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). Anyone may purchase
copies of these materials from Society of Automotive Engineers, 400
Commonwealth Dr., Warrendale, PA 15096-0001, (877) 606-7323 (U.S. and
Canada) or (724) 776-4970 (outside the U.S. and Canada), http://
www.sae.org.
(1) SAE J1151, Methane Measurement Using Gas Chromatography,
December 1991, (as found in 1994 SAE Handbook--SAE International
Cooperative Engineering Program, Volume 1: Materials, Fuels, Emissions,
and Noise; Section 13 and page 170 (13.170)), IBR approved for
Sec. Sec. 86.111-94; 86.1311-94.
(2) SAE J1634, Electric Vehicle Energy Consumption and Range Test
Procedure, Cancelled October 2002, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1811-
04(n).
(3) SAE J1349, Engine Power Test Code--Spark Ignition and
Compression Ignition, June 1990, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.094-8,
86.096-8.
(4) SAE J1711, Recommended Practice for Measuring the Exhaust
Emissions and Fuel Economy of Hybrid-Electric Vehicles, Including Plug-
In Hybrid Vehicles, June 2010, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1811-04(n).
(5) SAE J1850, Class B Data Communication Network Interface, July
1995, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.099-17, 86.1806-01.
(6) SAE J1850, Class B Data Communication Network Interface,
Revised May 2001, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17,
86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(7) SAE J1877, Recommended Practice for Bar-Coded Vehicle
Identification Number Label, July 1994, IBR approved for Sec. Sec.
86.095-35, 86.1806-01.
(8) SAE J1892, Recommended Practice for Bar-Coded Vehicle Emission
Configuration Label, October 1993, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.095-
35, 86.1806-01.
(9) SAE J1930, Electrical/Electronic Systems Diagnostic Terms,
Definitions, Abbreviations, and Acronyms, Revised May 1998, IBR
approved for Sec. Sec. 86.004-38, 86.007-38, 86.010-38, 86.096-38,
86.1808-01, 86.1808-07.
(10) SAE J1930, Electrical/Electronic Systems Diagnostic Terms,
Definitions, Abbreviations, and Acronyms--Equivalent to ISO/TR 15031-2:
April 30, 2002, Revised April 2002, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-
17, 86.007-17, 86.010-18, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(11) SAE J1937, Engine Testing with Low Temperature Charge Air
Cooler Systems in a Dynamometer Test Cell, November 1989, IBR approved
for Sec. Sec. 86.1330-84, 86.1330-90.
(12) SAE J1939, Recommended Practice for a Serial Control and
Communications Vehicle Network, Revised October 2007, IBR approved for
Sec. Sec. 86.010-18.
(13) SAE J1939-11, Physical Layer--250K bits/s, Shielded Twisted
Pair, December 1994, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.1806-05.
(14) SAE J1939-11, Physical Layer--250K bits/s, Shielded Twisted
Pair, Revised October 1999, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17,
86.007-17, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(15) SAE J1939-13, Off-Board Diagnostic Connector, July 1999, IBR
approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(15) SAE J1939-13, Off-Board Diagnostic Connector, Revised March
2004, IBR approved for Sec. 86.010-18.
(16) SAE J1939-21, Data Link Layer, July 1994, IBR approved for
Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.1806-05.
(18) SAE J1939-21, Data Link Layer, Revised April 2001, IBR
approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(19) SAE J1939-31, Network Layer, Revised December 1997, IBR
approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(20) SAE J1939-71, Vehicle Application Layer, May 1996, IBR
approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.1806-05.
(21) SAE J1939-71, Vehicle Application Layer--J1939-71 (through
1999), Revised August 2002, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17,
86.007-17, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(22) SAE J1939-71, Vehicle Application Layer (Through February
2007), Revised January 2008, IBR approved for Sec. 86.010-38.
(23) SAE J1939-73, Application Layer--Diagnostics, February 1996,
IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.1806-05.
(24) SAE J1939-73, Application Layer--Diagnostics, Revised June
2001, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.1806-04,
86.1806-05.
(25) SAE J1939-73, Application Layer--Diagnostics, Revised
September 2006, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.010-18, 86.010-38.
(26) SAE J1939-81, Recommended Practice for Serial Control and
Communications Vehicle Network Part 81--Network Management, July 1997,
IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-
05.
(27) SAE J1939-81, Network Management, Revised May 2003, IBR
approved for Sec. 86.010-38.
(28) SAE J1962, Diagnostic Connector, January 1995, IBR approved
for Sec. Sec. 86.099-17, 86.1806-01.
(29) SAE J1962, Diagnostic Connector Equivalent to ISO/DIS 15031-3;
December 14, 2001, Revised April 2002, IBR approved for Sec. Sec.
86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.010-18, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(30) SAE J1978, OBD II Scan Tool--Equivalent to ISO/DIS 15031-4;
December 14, 2001, Revised April 2002, IBR approved for Sec. Sec.
86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.010-18, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(31) SAE J1979, E/E Diagnostic Test Modes, July 1996, IBR approved
for Sec. Sec. 86.099-17, 86.1806-01.
(32) SAE J1979, E/E Diagnostic Test Modes, Revised September 1997,
IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.004-38, 86.007-38, 86.010-38, 86.096-38,
86.1808-01, 86.1808-07.
(33) SAE J1979, E/E Diagnostic Test Modes--Equivalent to ISO/DIS
15031-5; April 30, 2002, Revised April 2002, IBR approved for
Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.099-17, 86.1806-01, 86.1806-04,
86.1806-05.
(34) SAE J1979, (R) E/E Diagnostic Test Modes, Revised May 2007,
IBR approved for Sec. 86.010-18, 86.010-38.
(35) SAE J2012, Recommended Practice for Diagnostic Trouble Code
Definitions, July 1996, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.099-17, 86.1806-
01.
(36) SAE J2012, (R) Diagnostic Trouble Code Definitions Equivalent
to ISO/DIS 15031-6: April 30, 2002, Revised April 2002, IBR approved
for Sec. Sec. 86.005-17, 86.007-17, 86.010-18, 86.1806-04, 86.1806-05.
(37) SAE J2064 FEB2011, R134a Refrigerant Automotive Air-
Conditioned Hose, Revised February 2011, IBR approved for Sec.
86.1867-12(a) and (b).
(38) SAE J2284-3, High Speed CAN (HSC) for Vehicle Applications at
500 KBPS, May 2001, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.096-38, 86.004-38,
86.007-38, 86.010-38, 86.1808-01, 86.1808-07.
(39) SAE J2403, Medium/Heavy-Duty E/E Systems Diagnosis
Nomenclature--Truck and Bus, Revised August 2007, IBR approved for
Sec. Sec. 86.007-17, 86.010-18, 86.010-38, 86.1806-05.
(40) SAE J2534, Recommended Practice for Pass-Thru Vehicle
Programming, February 2002, IBR approved for Sec. Sec. 86.004-38,
86.007-38,
[[Page 63152]]
86.010-38, 86.096-38, 86.1808-01, 86.1808-07.
(41) SAE J2534-1, (R) Recommended Practice for Pass-Thru Vehicle
Programming, Revised December 2004, IBR approved for Sec. 86.010-38.
(42) SAE J2727 FEB2012, Mobile Air Conditioning System Refrigerant
Emission Charts for R-134a and R-1234yf, Revised February 2012, IBR
approved for Sec. 86.1867-12(a) and (b).
(43) SAE J2765 OCT2008, Procedure for Measuring System COP
[Coefficient of Performance] of a Mobile Air Conditioning System on a
Test Bench, issued October 2008, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1868-12(h).
(h) Truck and Maintenance Council, 950 North Glebe Road, Suite 210,
Arlington, VA 22203-4181, (703) 838-1754.
(1) TMC RP 1210B, Revised June 2007, WINDOWSTMCOMMUNICATION API,
IBR approved for Sec. 86.010-38.
(2) [Reserved]
Subpart B--[Amended]
0
5. Section 86.111-94 is amended by revising paragraph (b) introductory
text to read as follows:
Sec. 86.111-94 Exhaust gas analytical system.
* * * * *
(b) Major component description. The exhaust gas analytical system,
Figure B94-7, consists of a flame ionization detector (FID) (heated,
235[deg] 15[emsp14][deg]F (113[deg] 8 [deg]C)
for methanol-fueled vehicles) for the determination of THC, a methane
analyzer (consisting of a gas chromatograph combined with a FID) for
the determination of CH4, non-dispersive infrared analyzers
(NDIR) for the determination of CO and CO2, a
chemiluminescence analyzer (CL) for the determination of
NOX, and an analyzer meeting the requirements specified in
40 CFR 1065.275 for the determination of N2O. A heated flame
ionization detector (HFID) is used for the continuous determination of
THC from petroleum-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles (may also be used with
methanol-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles), Figure B94-5 (or B94-6). The
analytical system for methanol consists of a gas chromatograph (GC)
equipped with a flame ionization detector. The analysis for
formaldehyde is performed using high-pressure liquid chromatography
(HPLC) of 2,4-dinitrophenylhydrazine (DNPH) derivatives using
ultraviolet (UV) detection. The exhaust gas analytical system shall
conform to the following requirements:
* * * * *
0
6. Section 86.135-12 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) and (d) to
read as follows:
Sec. 86.135-12 Dynamometer procedure.
(a) Overview. The dynamometer run consists of two tests, a ``cold''
start test, after a minimum 12-hour and a maximum 36-hour soak
according to the provisions of Sec. Sec. 86.132 and 86.133, and a
``hot'' start test following the ``cold'' start by 10 minutes. Engine
startup (with all accessories turned off), operation over the UDDS, and
engine shutdown make a complete cold start test. Engine startup and
operation over the first 505 seconds of the driving schedule complete
the hot start test. The exhaust emissions are diluted with ambient air
in the dilution tunnel as shown in Figure B94-5 and Figure B94-6. A
dilution tunnel is not required for testing vehicles waived from the
requirement to measure particulates. Six particulate samples are
collected on filters for weighing; the first sample plus backup is
collected during the first 505 seconds of the cold start test; the
second sample plus backup is collected during the remainder of the cold
start test (including shutdown); the third sample plus backup is
collected during the hot start test. Continuous proportional samples of
gaseous emissions are collected for analysis during each test phase.
For gasoline-fueled, natural gas-fueled and liquefied petroleum gas-
fueled Otto-cycle vehicles, the composite samples collected in bags are
analyzed for THC, CO, CO2, CH4, NOX,
and N2O. For petroleum-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles
(optional for natural gas-fueled, liquefied petroleum gas-fueled and
methanol-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles), THC is sampled and analyzed
continuously according to the provisions of Sec. 86.110-94. Parallel
samples of the dilution air are similarly analyzed for THC, CO,
CO2, CH4, NOX, and N2O. For
natural gas-fueled, liquefied petroleum gas-fueled and methanol-fueled
vehicles, bag samples are collected and analyzed for THC (if not
sampled continuously), CO, CO2, CH4,
NOX, and N2O. For methanol-fueled vehicles,
methanol and formaldehyde samples are taken for both exhaust emissions
and dilution air (a single dilution air formaldehyde sample, covering
the total test period may be collected). For ethanol-fueled vehicles,
methanol, ethanol, acetaldehyde, and formaldehyde samples are taken for
both exhaust emissions and dilution air (a single dilution air
formaldehyde sample, covering the total test period may be collected).
Parallel bag samples of dilution air are analyzed for THC, CO,
CO2, CH4, NOX, and N2O.
* * * * *
(d) Practice runs over the prescribed driving schedule may be
performed at test point, provided an emission sample is not taken, for
the purpose of finding the appropriate throttle action to maintain the
proper speed-time relationship, or to permit sampling system
adjustment. Both smoothing of speed variations and excessive
accelerator pedal perturbations are to be avoided. When using two-roll
dynamometers a truer speed-time trace may be obtained by minimizing the
rocking of the vehicle in the rolls; the rocking of the vehicle changes
the tire rolling radius on each roll. This rocking may be minimized by
restraining the vehicle horizontally (or nearly so) by using a cable
and winch.
* * * * *
0
7. Section 86.165-12 is amended by revising paragraphs (c)(1) and (2)
to read as follows:
Sec. 86.165-12 Air conditioning idle test procedure.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) Ambient humidity within the test cell during all phases of the
test sequence shall be controlled to an average of 40-60 grains of
water/pound of dry air.
(2) Ambient air temperature within the test cell during all phases
of the test sequence shall be controlled to 73-80 [deg]F on average and
75 5 [deg]F as an instantaneous measurement. Air
temperature shall be recorded continuously at intervals of not more
than 30 seconds.
* * * * *
Sec. 86.166-12 [Removed and Reserved]
0
8. Section 86.166-12 is removed and reserved:
0
9. Section 86.167-17 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 86.167-17 AC17 Air Conditioning Emissions Test Procedure.
(a) Overview. The AC17 test procedure consists of four elements: a
pre-conditioning cycle, a 30-minute soak period under simulated solar
heat, followed by measurement of emissions over an SC03 drive cycle and
a Highway Fuel Economy Driving Schedule (HFET) drive cycle. The vehicle
is preconditioned with a single UDDS to bring the vehicle to a warmed-
up stabilized condition. This preconditioning is followed by a 30
minute vehicle soak (engine off) that proceeds directly into the SC03
driving
[[Page 63153]]
schedule, during which continuous proportional samples of gaseous
emissions are collected for analysis. The SC03 driving schedule is
followed immediately by the HFET cycle, during which continuous
proportional samples of gaseous emissions are collected for analysis.
This entire sequence is conducted in an environmental test facility.
Vehicles are tested for any or all of the following emissions,
depending upon the specific test requirements and the vehicle fuel
type: gaseous exhaust THC, NMHC, NMOG, CO, NOX,
CO2, N2O, CH4, CH3OH,
C2H5OH, C2H4O, and HCHO.
For purposes of measuring the impact of air conditioning systems on
CO2 emissions, this sequence is run twice: once with air
conditioning on and once with air conditioning off. The following
figure shows the basic sequence of the test procedure.
(b) Equipment requirements. Equipment requirements are specified in
subpart B of part 86 of this chapter.
(c) Fuel specifications. The test fuel specifications are given in
Sec. 86.113. Test fuels representing fuel types for which there are no
specifications provided in Sec. 86.113 may be used if approved in
advance by the Administrator.
(d) Analytical gases. The analytical gases must meet the criteria
given in Sec. 86.114.
(e) Driving cycles. (1) The driving schedules for the EPA Urban
Dynamometer Driving Schedule (UDDS) and the SC03 cycle are contained in
appendix I of this part. The driving schedule for the Highway Fuel
Economy Driving Schedule (HFET) is set forth in appendix I of part 600
of this chapter.
(2) The speed tolerance at any given time on the driving schedules
is defined by upper and lower limits. The upper limit is 2 mph higher
than the highest point on trace within 1 second of the given time. The
lower limit is 2 mph lower than the lowest point on the trace within 1
second of the given time. Speed variations greater than the tolerances
(such as may occur during gear changes) are acceptable provided they
occur for less than 2 seconds on any occasion. Speeds lower than those
prescribed are acceptable provided the vehicle is operated at maximum
available power during such occurrences.
(f) Equipment calibration. The equipment used for fuel economy
testing must be calibrated according to the provisions of Sec. 86.116.
(g) Vehicle preparation. The vehicle shall be prepared for testing
according to Sec. 86.132(a) through (g), concluding with a 12-36 hour
soak.
(h) Dynamometer procedures. (1) The AC17 test procedure consists of
a pre-conditioning UDDS, a 30-minute soak period under simulated solar
heat, followed by measurement of emissions over an SC03 drive cycle and
a Highway Fuel Economy Driving Schedule (HFET) drive cycle.
(2) Except in cases of component malfunction or failure, all
emission control systems installed on or incorporated in a new motor
vehicle must be functioning during all procedures in this subpart. The
Administrator may authorize maintenance to correct component
malfunction or failure.
(3) Use Sec. 86.129 to determine road load power and test weight.
The dynamometer's horsepower adjustment settings shall be set such that
the force imposed during dynamometer operation matches actual road load
force at all speeds.
(4) Tests shall be run on a large single roll electric dynamometer
or an equivalent dynamometer configuration that satisfies the
requirements of Sec. 86.108-00.
(5) The vehicle speed as measured from the dynamometer rolls shall
be used. A speed vs. time recording, as evidence of dynamometer test
validity, shall be supplied at request of the Administrator.
(6) The drive wheel tires may be inflated up to a gauge pressure of
45 psi (310 kPa), or the manufacturer's recommended pressure if higher
than 45 psi, in order to prevent tire damage. The drive wheel tire
pressure shall be reported with the test results.
(7) The driving distance, as measured by counting the number of
dynamometer roll or shaft revolutions, shall be determined separately
for each driving schedule over which emissions are measured (SC03, and
HFET).
(8) Four-wheel drive and all-wheel drive vehicles may be tested
either in a four-wheel drive or a two-wheel drive mode of operation. In
order to test in the two-wheel drive mode, four-wheel drive and all-
wheel drive vehicles may have one set of drive wheels disengaged; four-
wheel and all-wheel drive vehicles which can be shifted to a two-wheel
mode by the driver may be tested in a two-wheel drive mode of
operation.
(i) Testing facility requirements. (1) Ambient air temperature. (i)
Ambient air temperature shall be controlled within the test cell during
all emission sampling phases of the test sequence to 77 2
[deg]F on average and 77 5 [deg]F as an instantaneous
measurement. During phases of the test where emissions are not being
sampled, ambient air temperature shall be controlled to these same
tolerances, except that periods outside the specified ranges are
allowed to occur as long as the total cumulative time outside the
specified ranges does not exceed three minutes.
(ii) Record air temperature continuously at intervals of not more
than 30 seconds. Alternatively, you may use a moving average over
intervals of not more than 30 seconds to record and report air
temperature. You must maintain records of test cell air temperatures
and values of average test temperatures.
(2) Ambient humidity. (i) Ambient humidity shall be controlled,
within the test cell, during all emission sampling phases of the test
sequence to an average of 69 5 grains of water/pound of
dry air and an instantaneous measurement of 69 10 grains
of water/pound of dry air. During phases of the test where emissions
are not being sampled, ambient humidity shall be controlled to these
same tolerances, except that periods outside the specified ranges are
allowed to occur as long as the total cumulative time outside the
specified ranges does not exceed three minutes.
(ii) Humidity shall be recorded continuously at intervals of not
more than 30 seconds. Records of cell humidity and values of average
test humidity shall be maintained by the manufacturer.
(3) Solar heat loading. The requirements of Sec. 86.161-00(d)
regarding solar heat loading specifications shall apply. The solar load
of 850 W/m\2\ is applied only during specified portions of the test
sequence.
(4) Minimum test cell size. The requirements of Sec. 86.161-00(c)
regarding test cell size requirements shall apply.
(5) Test cell air flow requirements. The requirements of Sec.
86.161-00(e) regarding air flow supplied to the vehicle shall apply.
Air flow at a maximum of 4 miles/hour may be provided during periods of
idle and key-off soak if required for maintenance of ambient
requirements.
(j) Interior temperature measurement. The interior temperature of
the vehicle shall be measured during all the emission sampling phases
of the test.
(1) Interior temperatures shall be measured by placement of
thermocouples at the following locations:
(i) The outlet of the center duct on the dash.
(ii) Behind the driver and passenger seat headrests. The location
of the temperature measuring devices shall be 30 mm behind each
headrest.
(2) The temperature at each location shall be recorded a minimum of
every 5 seconds.
[[Page 63154]]
(k) Air conditioning system settings. For tests being conducted to
measure emissions with the air conditioning operating, the air
conditioner settings shall be as follows:
(1) Automatic systems shall be set to automatic and the temperature
control set to 72 deg F, with blower or fan speed and vent location
controlled by the automatic mode.
(2) Manual systems shall be set at the start of the SC03 drive
cycle to full cool with the fan on the highest setting and the airflow
setting to ``recirculation.'' Within the first idle period of the SC03
drive cycle (186 to 204 seconds) the fan speed shall be reduced to the
setting closest to 6 volts at the motor, the temperature setting shall
be adjusted to provide 55 deg F at the center dash air outlet, and the
airflow setting changed to ``outside air.''
(l) Test procedure. The AC17 air conditioning test is composed of
the following sequence of activities.
(1) Position the test vehicle on the dynamometer (vehicle may be
driven) and restrain.
(2)(i) Position the variable speed cooling fan in front of the test
vehicle with the vehicle's hood down. This air flow should provide
representative cooling at the front of the test vehicle (air
conditioning condenser and engine) during the driving cycles. See Sec.
86.161-00(e) for a discussion of cooling fan specifications.
(ii) In the case of vehicles with rear engine compartments (or if
this front location provides inadequate engine cooling), an additional
cooling fan shall be placed in a position to provide sufficient air to
maintain vehicle cooling. The fan capacity shall normally not exceed
5300 cfm (2.50 m\3\/s). If, however, it can be demonstrated that during
road operation the vehicle receives additional cooling, and that such
additional cooling is needed to provide a representative test, the fan
capacity may be increased or additional fans used if approved in
advance by the Administrator.
(3) Open all vehicle windows.
(4) Connect the emission test sampling system to the vehicle's
exhaust tail pipe(s).
(5) Set the environmental test cell ambient test conditions to the
conditions defined in paragraph (c) of this section, except that the
solar heat shall be off.
(6) Set the air conditioning system controls to off.
(7) Start the vehicle (with air conditioning system off) and
conduct a preconditioning EPA urban dynamometer driving cycle (Sec.
86.115).
(i) If engine stalling should occur during any air conditioning
test cycle operation, follow the provisions of Sec. 86.136-90 (Engine
starting and restarting).
(ii) For manual transmission vehicles, the vehicle shall be shifted
according the provisions of Sec. 86.128-00.
(8) Following the preconditioning cycle, the test vehicle and
cooling fan(s) are turned off, all windows are rolled up, and the
vehicle is allowed to soak in the ambient conditions of paragraph (i)
of this section for 30 1 minutes. If emissions are being
measured with the air conditioner operating, the solar heat system must
be turned on and generating 850 W/m\2\ within 1 minute of turning the
engine off. Otherwise the solar heat system shall be turned off.
(9) Initiate data logging, sampling of exhaust gases, and
integrating measured values. Start the engine. If emissions are being
measured with the air conditioner operating, you must start the engine
with the air conditioning system running as specified in paragraph (k)
of this section. Otherwise the air conditioning system should be
completely off. Initiate the driver's trace when the engine starts.
Fifteen seconds after the engine starts, place vehicle in gear.
(10) Eighteen seconds after the engine starts, begin the initial
vehicle acceleration of the SC03 driving schedule.
(11) Operate the vehicle according to the SC03 driving schedule, as
described in appendix I, paragraph (h), of this part.
(12) At the end of the deceleration which is scheduled to occur at
594 seconds, simultaneously stop all SC03 and start all HFET sampling,
recording, and integrating; including background sampling. Record the
measured roll or shaft revolutions.
(13) Allow the vehicle to idle for 14-16 seconds.
(14) Operate the vehicle according to the HFET driving schedule, as
described in appendix I to 40 CFR part 600.
(15) Turn the engine off 2 seconds after the end of the last
deceleration, i.e., engine off at 765 seconds.
(16) Five seconds after the engine stops running, stop all HFET
sampling, recording, and integrating (including background sampling),
indicating the end of the test cycle. Record the measured roll or shaft
revolutions.
(17) Turn off the solar heat system, if applicable.
(m) Calculations. The final reported test results for each emission
constituent being evaluated is the average of the SC03 and HFET gram
per mile emissions, which shall be calculated using the following
formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.037
Where:
YWM = Weighted mass emissions of each pollutant, i.e.,
THC, CO, THCE, NMHC, NMHCE, CH4, NOX, or
CO2, in grams per vehicle mile.
YSC03 = Mass emissions as calculated from the SC03 phase
of the test, in grams per test phase.
DSC03 = The measured driving distance from the SC03 phase
of the test, in miles.
YHFET = Mass emissions as calculated from the HFET phase
of the test, in grams per test phase.
DHFET = The measured driving distance from the HFET phase
of the test, in miles.
(n) Measuring the net impact of air conditioner operation. This
test may be used to determine the net impact of air conditioner
operation as may be required under Sec. 86.1868, which requires that
CO2 be measured using the procedures in this section with
both air conditioning on and off. To do this, you must follow these
steps:
(1) Conduct the test procedure described in this section with the
air conditioning system operating, being sure to follow the appropriate
instructions regarding air conditioner operation and use of the solar
heat system. Analyze the data and calculate the weighted CO2
emissions in grams per mile according to paragraph (m) of this section.
(2) Allow the vehicle to remain on the dynamometer, with the engine
shut off, for 10 to 15 minutes after emissions sampling has concluded.
The solar heat system should be turned off.
(3) Conduct the test procedure described in paragraph (l) of this
section with the air conditioning system turned off, being sure to
follow the appropriate instructions regarding air conditioner operation
(off) and use of the solar heat system (off). Analyze the data and
calculate the weighted CO2 emissions in
[[Page 63155]]
grams per mile according to paragraph (m) of this section.
(4) Calculate the incremental CO2 emissions due to air
conditioning operation by subtracting the CO2 grams per mile
determined in paragraph (n)(3) of this section from the CO2
grams per mile determined in paragraph (n)(1) of this section.
(o) Records required and reporting requirements. For each test the
manufacturer shall record the information specified in Sec. 86.142-90.
Emission results and the results of all calculations must be reported
for each phase of the test. The manufacturer must also report the
following information for each vehicle tested: vehicle class, model
type, carline, curb weight engine displacement, transmission class and
configuration, interior volume, climate control system type and
characteristics, refrigerant used, compressor type, and evaporator/
condenser characteristics.
Subpart S--[Amended]
0
10. Section 86.1801-12 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (j), and
(k) introductory text to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1801-12 Applicability.
* * * * *
(b) Clean alternative fuel conversions. The provisions of this
subpart apply to clean alternative fuel conversions as defined in 40
CFR 85.502, of all model year light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks,
medium duty passenger vehicles, and complete Otto-cycle heavy-duty
vehicles.
* * * * *
(j) Exemption from greenhouse gas emission standards for small
businesses. (1) Manufacturers that qualify as a small business under
the Small Business Administration regulations in 13 CFR part 121 are
exempt from the greenhouse gas emission standards specified in Sec.
86.1818-12 and in associated provisions in this part and in part 600 of
this chapter. This exemption applies to both U.S.-based and non-U.S.-
based businesses. The following categories of businesses (with their
associated NAICS codes) may be eligible for exemption based on the
Small Business Administration size standards in 13 CFR 121.201.
(i) Vehicle manufacturers (NAICS code 336111).
(ii) Independent commercial importers (NAICS codes 811111, 811112,
811198, 423110, 424990, and 441120).
(iii) Alternate fuel vehicle converters (NAICS codes 335312,
336312, 336322, 336399, 454312, 485310, and 811198).
(2)(i) Effective for the 2013 and later model years, a manufacturer
that would otherwise be exempt under the provisions of paragraph (j)(1)
of this section may optionally comply with the greenhouse gas emission
standards specified in Sec. 86.1818. A manufacturer making this choice
is required to comply with all the applicable standards and provisions
in Sec. 86.1818 and with all associated and applicable provisions in
this part and in part 600 of this chapter.
(ii) Such a manufacturer may optionally earn credits in the 2012
model year by demonstrating fleet average CO2 emission
levels below the fleet average CO2 standard that would have
been applicable in model year 2012 if the manufacturer had not been
exempt. Once the small business manufacturer opting into the greenhouse
gas emission standards completes certification for the 2013 model year,
that manufacturer will be eligible to generate greenhouse gas emission
credits for their 2012 model year production, after the conclusion of
the 2012 model year for that manufacturer. Manufacturers electing to
earn these 2012 credits must comply with the model year reporting
requirements in Sec. 600.512-12 for that model year. The 2012 fleet
average must be calculated according to Sec. 600.510 and other
applicable requirements in part 600 of this chapter, and 2012 credits
must be calculated according to Sec. 86.1865 and other applicable
requirements in this part.
(k) Conditional exemption from greenhouse gas emission standards.
Manufacturers meeting the eligibility requirements described in
paragraphs (k)(1) and (2) of this section may request a conditional
exemption from compliance with the emission standards described in
Sec. 86.1818-12(c) through (e) and associated provisions in this part
and in part 600 of this chapter. A conditional exemption under this
paragraph (k) may be requested for the 2012 through 2016 model years.
The terms ``sales'' and ``sold'' as used in this paragraph (k) shall
mean vehicles produced for U.S. sale, where ``U.S.'' means the states
and territories of the United States. For the purpose of determining
eligibility the sales of related companies shall be aggregated
according to the provisions of Sec. 86.1838-01(b)(3) or, if a
manufacturer has been granted operational independence status under
Sec. 86.1838(d), eligibility shall be based on vehicle production of
that manufacturer.
* * * * *
0
11. Section 86.1803-01 is amended as follows:
0
a. By adding definitions for ``full size pickup truck'', ``good
engineering judgment'', ``gross combination weight rating'', mild
hybrid electric vehicle'', ``platform'', and ``strong hybrid electric
vehicle'' in alphabetical order.
0
b. By revising the definitions for ``emergency vehicle'',
``footprint'', and ``gross vehicle weight rating.''
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 86.1803-01 Definitions.
* * * * *
Emergency vehicle means one of the following:
(1) For the greenhouse gas emission standards in Sec. 86.1818,
emergency vehicle means a motor vehicle manufactured primarily for use
as an ambulance or combination ambulance-hearse or for use by the
United States Government or a State or local government for law
enforcement.
(2) For provisions related to defeat devices and other AECDs under
this subpart, emergency vehicle means a motor vehicle that is an
ambulance or a fire truck.
* * * * *
Footprint is the product of average track width (rounded to the
nearest tenth of an inch) and wheelbase (measured in inches and rounded
to the nearest tenth of an inch), divided by 144 and then rounded to
the nearest tenth of a square foot, where the average track width is
the average of the front and rear track widths, where each is measured
in inches and rounded to the nearest tenth of an inch.
* * * * *
Full size pickup truck means a light truck which has a passenger
compartment and an open cargo box and which meets the following
specifications:
(1) A minimum cargo bed width between the wheelhouses of 48 inches,
measured as the minimum lateral distance between the limiting
interferences (pass-through) of the wheelhouses. The measurement shall
exclude the transitional arc, local protrusions, and depressions or
pockets, if present. An open cargo box means a vehicle where the cargo
box does not have a permanent roof or cover. Vehicles produced with
detachable covers are considered ``open'' for the purposes of these
criteria.
(2) A minimum open cargo box length of 60 inches, where the length
is defined by the lesser of the pickup bed length at the top of the
body or the pickup bed length at the floor, where the length at
[[Page 63156]]
the top of the body is defined as the longitudinal distance from the
inside front of the pickup bed to the inside of the closed endgate as
measured at the height of the top of the open pickup bed along vehicle
centerline, and the length at the floor is defined as the longitudinal
distance from the inside front of the pickup bed to the inside of the
closed endgate as measured at the cargo floor surface along vehicle
centerline.
(3)(i) A minimum towing capability of 5,000 pounds, where minimum
towing capability is determined by subtracting the gross vehicle weight
rating from the gross combined weight rating; or
(ii) A minimum payload capability of 1,700 pounds, where minimum
payload capability is determined by subtracting the curb weight from
the gross vehicle weight rating.
* * * * *
Good engineering judgment has the meaning given in 40 CFR 1068.30.
See 40 CFR 1068.5 for the administrative process we use to evaluate
good engineering judgment.
Gross combination weight rating (GCWR) means the value specified by
the vehicle manufacturer as the maximum weight of a loaded vehicle and
trailer, consistent with good engineering judgment.
* * * * *
Gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) means the value specified by the
manufacturer as the maximum design loaded weight of a single vehicle,
consistent with good engineering judgment.
* * * * *
Mild hybrid electric vehicle means a hybrid electric vehicle that
has start/stop capability and regenerative braking capability, where
the recovered energy over the Federal Test Procedure is at least 15
percent but less than 65 percent of the total braking energy, as
measured and calculated according to Sec. 600.116-12(c).
* * * * *
Platform means a segment of an automobile manufacturer's vehicle
fleet in which the vehicles have a degree of commonality in
construction (primarily in terms of body and chassis design). Platform
does not consider the model name, brand, marketing division, or level
of decor or opulence, and is not generally distinguished by such
characteristics as powertrain, roof line, number of doors, seats, or
windows. A platform may include vehicles from various fuel economy
classes, and may include light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, and
medium-duty passenger vehicles.
* * * * *
Strong hybrid electric vehicle means a hybrid electric vehicle that
has start/stop capability and regenerative braking capability, where
the recovered energy over the Federal Test Procedure is at least 65
percent of the total braking energy, as measured and calculated
according to Sec. 600.116-12(c).
* * * * *
0
12. Section 86.1810-09 is amended by revising paragraph (f)(2) to read
as follows:
Sec. 86.1810-09 General standards; increase in emissions; unsafe
condition; waivers.
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(2) For vehicles that comply with the cold temperature NMHC
standards described in Sec. 86.1811-10(g) and the CO2,
N2O, and CH4 exhaust emission standards described
in Sec. 86.1818-12, manufacturers must submit an engineering
evaluation indicating that common calibration approaches are utilized
at high altitudes (except when there are specific high altitude
calibration needs to deviate from low altitude emission control
practices). Any deviation from low altitude emission control practices
must be included in the auxiliary emission control device (AECD)
descriptions submitted at certification. Any AECD specific to high
altitude must require engineering emission data for EPA evaluation to
quantify any emission impact and validity of the AECD.
* * * * *
0
13. Section 86.1818-12 is amended as follows:
0
a. By revising paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(A) through (C).
0
b. By revising paragraphs (c)(3)(i)(A) through (C).
0
c. By adding paragraph (c)(3)(i)(D).
0
d. By adding paragraph (c)(4).
0
e. By revising paragraph (d).
0
f. By revising paragraph (e)(1) introductory text.
0
g. By revising paragraph (e)(1)(i) introductory text.
0
h. By revising paragraph (e)(1)(i)(B).
0
i. By adding paragraph (e)(1)(i)(D).
0
j. By adding paragraph (e)(1)(iv).
0
k. By revising paragraph (e)(3).
0
l. By revising paragraph (f) introductory text.
0
m. By revising paragraphs (f)(3) and (4).
0
n. By adding paragraphs (g) and (h).
The additions and revisions read as follows:
Sec. 86.1818-12 Greenhouse gas emission standards for light-duty
vehicles, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) For passenger automobiles with a footprint of less than or
equal to 41 square feet, the gram/mile CO2 target value
shall be selected for the appropriate model year from the following
table:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO2 target
Model year value (grams/
mile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012.................................................... 244.0
2013.................................................... 237.0
2014.................................................... 228.0
2015.................................................... 217.0
2016.................................................... 206.0
2017.................................................... 195.0
2018.................................................... 185.0
2019.................................................... 175.0
2020.................................................... 166.0
2021.................................................... 157.0
2022.................................................... 150.0
2023.................................................... 143.0
2024.................................................... 137.0
2025 and later.......................................... 131.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) For passenger automobiles with a footprint of greater than 56
square feet, the gram/mile CO2 target value shall be
selected for the appropriate model year from the following table:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO2 target
Model year value (grams/
mile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012.................................................... 315.0
2013.................................................... 307.0
2014.................................................... 299.0
2015.................................................... 288.0
2016.................................................... 277.0
2017.................................................... 263.0
2018.................................................... 250.0
2019.................................................... 238.0
2020.................................................... 226.0
2021.................................................... 215.0
2022.................................................... 205.0
2023.................................................... 196.0
2024.................................................... 188.0
2025 and later.......................................... 179.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(C) For passenger automobiles with a footprint that is greater than
41 square feet and less than or equal to 56 square feet, the gram/mile
CO2 target value shall be calculated using the following
equation and rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile, except that for any
vehicle footprint the maximum CO2 target value shall be the
value specified for the same model year in paragraph (c)(2)(i)(B) of
this section:
Target CO2 = [a x f] + b
Where:
[[Page 63157]]
f is the vehicle footprint, as defined in Sec. 86.1803; and a and b
are selected from the following table for the appropriate model
year:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year a b
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012.................................................... 4.72 50.5
2013.................................................... 4.72 43.3
2014.................................................... 4.72 34.8
2015.................................................... 4.72 23.4
2016.................................................... 4.72 12.7
2017.................................................... 4.53 8.9
2018.................................................... 4.35 6.5
2019.................................................... 4.17 4.2
2020.................................................... 4.01 1.9
2021.................................................... 3.84 -0.4
2022.................................................... 3.69 -1.1
2023.................................................... 3.54 -1.8
2024.................................................... 3.4 -2.5
2025 and later.......................................... 3.26 -3.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
(3) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) For light trucks with a footprint of less than or equal to 41
square feet, the gram/mile CO2 target value shall be
selected for the appropriate model year from the following table:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO2 target
Model year value (grams/
mile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012.................................................... 294.0
2013.................................................... 284.0
2014.................................................... 275.0
2015.................................................... 261.0
2016.................................................... 247.0
2017.................................................... 238.0
2018.................................................... 227.0
2019.................................................... 220.0
2020.................................................... 212.0
2021.................................................... 195.0
2022.................................................... 186.0
2023.................................................... 176.0
2024.................................................... 168.0
2025 and later.......................................... 159.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) For light trucks with a footprint that is greater than 41
square feet and less than or equal to the maximum footprint value
specified in the table below for each model year, the gram/mile
CO2 target value shall be calculated using the following
equation and rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile, except that for any
vehicle footprint the maximum CO2 target value shall be the
value specified for the same model year in paragraph (c)(3)(i)(D) of
this section:
Target CO2 = (a x f) + b
Where:
f is the footprint, as defined in Sec. 86.1803; and a and b are
selected from the following table for the appropriate model year:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum
Model year footprint a b
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012....................................... 66.0 4.04 128.6
2013....................................... 66.0 4.04 118.7
2014....................................... 66.0 4.04 109.4
2015....................................... 66.0 4.04 95.1
2016....................................... 66.0 4.04 81.1
2017....................................... 50.7 4.87 38.3
2018....................................... 60.2 4.76 31.6
2019....................................... 66.4 4.68 27.7
2020....................................... 68.3 4.57 24.6
2021....................................... 73.5 4.28 19.8
2022....................................... 74.0 4.09 17.8
2023....................................... 74.0 3.91 16.0
2024....................................... 74.0 3.74 14.2
2025 and later............................. 74.0 3.58 12.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(C) For light trucks with a footprint that is greater than the
minimum footprint value specified in the table below and less than or
equal to the maximum footprint value specified in the table below for
each model year, the gram/mile CO2 target value shall be
calculated using the following equation and rounded to the nearest 0.1
grams/mile, except that for any vehicle footprint the maximum
CO2 target value shall be the value specified for the same
model year in paragraph (c)(3)(i)(D) of this section:
Target CO2 = (a x f) + b
Where:
f is the footprint, as defined in Sec. 86.1803; and a and b are
selected from the following table for the appropriate model year:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum Maximum
Model year footprint footprint a b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017........................................................ 50.7 66.0 4.04 80.5
2018........................................................ 60.2 66.0 4.04 75.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(D) For light trucks with a footprint greater than the minimum
value specified in the table below for each model year, the gram/mile
CO2 target value shall be selected for the appropriate model
year from the following table:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO2 target
Model year Minimum value (grams/
footprint mile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012.................................... 66.0 395.0
2013.................................... 66.0 385.0
2014.................................... 66.0 376.0
2015.................................... 66.0 362.0
2016.................................... 66.0 348.0
2017.................................... 66.0 347.0
[[Page 63158]]
2018.................................... 66.0 342.0
2019.................................... 66.4 339.0
2020.................................... 68.3 337.0
2021.................................... 73.5 335.0
2022.................................... 74.0 321.0
2023.................................... 74.0 306.0
2024.................................... 74.0 291.0
2025 and later.......................... 74.0 277.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
(4) Emergency vehicles. Emergency vehicles may be excluded from the
emission standards described in this section. The manufacturer must
notify the Administrator that they are making such an election in the
model year reports required under Sec. 600.512 of this chapter. Such
vehicles should be excluded from both the calculation of the fleet
average standard for a manufacturer under this paragraph (c) and from
the calculation of the fleet average carbon-related exhaust emissions
in Sec. 86.510-12.
(d) In-use CO2 exhaust emission standards. The in-use
CO2 exhaust emission standard shall be the combined city/
highway carbon-related exhaust emission value calculated for the
appropriate vehicle carline/subconfiguration according to the
provisions of Sec. 600.113-12(g)(4) of this chapter multiplied by 1.1
and rounded to the nearest whole gram per mile. For in-use vehicle
carlines/subconfigurations for which a combined city/highway carbon-
related exhaust emission value was not determined under Sec. 600.113-
12(g)(4) of this chapter, the in-use CO2 exhaust emission
standard shall be the combined city/highway carbon-related exhaust
emission value calculated according to the provisions of Sec. 600.208
of this chapter for the vehicle model type (except that total model
year production data shall be used instead of sales projections)
multiplied by 1.1 and rounded to the nearest whole gram per mile. For
vehicles that are capable of operating on multiple fuels, except plug-
in hybrid electric vehicles, a separate in-use standard shall be
determined for each fuel that the vehicle is capable of operating on.
These standards apply to in-use testing performed by the manufacturer
pursuant to regulations at Sec. Sec. 86.1845 and 86.1846 and to in-use
testing performed by EPA.
(e) * * *
(1) The interim fleet average CO2 standards in this
paragraph (e) are optionally applicable to each qualifying
manufacturer, where the terms ``sales'' or ``sold'' as used in this
paragraph (e) means vehicles produced for U.S. sale, where ``U.S.''
means the states and territories of the United States.
(i) A qualifying manufacturer is a manufacturer with sales of 2009
model year combined passenger automobiles and light trucks of greater
than zero and less than 400,000 vehicles that elects to participate in
the Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards described in
this paragraph (e).
* * * * *
(B) In the case where two or more qualifying manufacturers combine
as the result of merger or the purchase of 50 percent or more of one or
more companies by another company, and if the combined 2009 model year
sales of the merged or combined companies is less than 400,000 but more
than zero (combined passenger automobiles and light trucks), the
corporate entity formed by the combination of two or more qualifying
manufacturers shall continue to be a qualifying manufacturer, except
the provisions of paragraph (e)(1)(i)(D) shall apply in the case where
one of the merging companies elects to voluntarily opt out of the
Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards as allowed under
paragraph (e)(1)(iv) of this section. The total number of vehicles that
the corporate entity is allowed to include under the Temporary Leadtime
Allowance Alternative Standards shall be determined by paragraph (e)(2)
or (e)(3) of this section, where sales is the total combined 2009 model
year sales of all of the merged or combined companies. Vehicles sold by
the companies that combined by merger/acquisition to form the corporate
entity that were subject to the Temporary Leadtime Allowance
Alternative Standards in paragraph (e)(4) of this section prior to the
merger/acquisition shall be combined to determine the remaining number
of vehicles that the corporate entity may include under the Temporary
Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards in this paragraph (e).
* * * * *
(D) In the case where two or more manufacturers combine as the
result of merger or the purchase of 50 percent or more of one or more
companies by another company, where one of the manufacturers chooses to
voluntarily opt out of the Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative
Standards under the provisions of paragraph (e)(1)(iv) of this section,
the new corporate entity formed by the combination of two or more
manufacturers is not a qualifying manufacturer. Such a manufacturer
shall meet the emission standards in paragraph (c) of this section
beginning with the model year that is numerically two years greater
than the calendar year in which the merger/acquisition(s) took place.
If one or more of the merged or combined manufacturers was complying
with the Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards prior to
the merger/combination, that manufacturer is no longer eligible for the
Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards beginning with the
model year that is numerically two years greater than the calendar year
in which the merger/acquisition(s) took place. The cumulative number of
vehicles that such a manufacturer may include in the Temporary Leadtime
Allowance Alternative Standards, including those that were included by
all merged manufacturers prior to the merger/acquisition, is limited to
100,000.
* * * * *
(iv) In the event of a merger, acquisition, or combination with
another manufacturer, a qualifying manufacturer that has not certified
any vehicles to the Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards
in any model year may voluntarily opt out of the Temporary Leadtime
Allowance Alternative Standards. A manufacturer making this election
must notify EPA in writing of their intent prior to the end of the
model year in which a merger or combination with another manufacturer
becomes effective. The notification must indicate that the manufacturer
is electing to not use the Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative
[[Page 63159]]
Standards in any model year, and that any manufacturers that are either
purchased by or merged with the manufacturer making this election must
also meet the emission standards in paragraph (c) of this section
beginning with the model year that is numerically two years greater
than the calendar year in which the merger/acquisition(s) took place.
* * * * *
(3)(i) Qualifying manufacturers with sales of 2009 model year
combined passenger automobiles and light trucks in the United States of
greater than zero and less than 50,000 vehicles may select any
combination of 2012 through 2015 model year passenger automobiles and/
or light trucks to include under the Temporary Leadtime Allowance
Alternative Standards determined in this paragraph (e) up to a
cumulative total of 200,000 vehicles, and additionally may select up to
50,000 2016 model year vehicles to include under the Temporary Leadtime
Allowance Alternative Standards determined in this paragraph (e). To be
eligible for the provisions of this paragraph (e)(3) qualifying
manufacturers must provide annual documentation of good-faith efforts
made by the manufacturer to purchase credits from other manufacturers.
Without such documentation, the manufacturer may use the Temporary
Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards according to the provisions of
paragraph (e)(2) of this section, and the provisions of this paragraph
(e)(3) shall not apply. Vehicles selected to comply with these
standards shall not be included in the calculations of the
manufacturer's fleet average standards under paragraph (c) of this
section.
(ii) Manufacturers that qualify in the 2016 model year for the
expanded Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards described
in paragraph (e)(3)(i) of this section, may, subject to certain
restrictions, use an alternative compliance schedule that provides
additional lead time to meet the standards in paragraph (c) of this
section for the 2017 through 2020 model years.
(A) The alternative compliance schedule is as follows. In lieu of
the standards in paragraph (c) of this section that would otherwise be
applicable to the model year shown in the first column of the table
below, a qualifying manufacturer may comply with the standards in
paragraph (c) of this section determined for the model year shown in
the second column of the table. In the 2021 and later model years the
manufacturer must meet the standards designated for each model year in
paragraph (c) of this section.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year Applicable standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2016
2018 2016
2019 2018
2020 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) A manufacturer using the alternative compliance schedule in
paragraph (e)(3)(ii) of this section may not sell or otherwise transfer
credits generated in years when the alternative phase-in is used to
other manufacturers. Other provisions in Sec. 86.1865 regarding credit
banking, deficit carry-forward, and within-manufacturer transfers
across fleets apply.
* * * * *
(f) Nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4)
exhaust emission standards for passenger automobiles and light trucks.
Each manufacturer's fleet of combined passenger automobiles and light
trucks must comply with N2O and CH4 standards
using either the provisions of paragraph (f)(1), (2), or (3) of this
section. Except with prior EPA approval, a manufacturer may not use the
provisions of both paragraphs (f)(1) and (2) of this section in a model
year. For example, a manufacturer may not use the provisions of
paragraph (f)(1) of this section for their passenger automobile fleet
and the provisions of paragraph (f)(2) for their light truck fleet in
the same model year. The manufacturer may use the provisions of both
paragraphs (f)(1) and (3) of this section in a model year. For example,
a manufacturer may meet the N2O standard in paragraph
(f)(1)(i) of this section and an alternative CH4 standard
determined under paragraph (f)(3) of this section. Vehicles certified
using the N2O data submittal waiver provisions of Sec.
86.1829(b)(1)(iii)(G) are not required to be tested for N2O
under the in-use testing programs required by Sec. 86.1845 and Sec.
86.1846.
* * * * *
(3) Optional use of alternative N2O and/or
CH4 standards. Manufacturers may select an alternative
standard applicable to a test group, for either N2O or
CH4, or both. For example, a manufacturer may choose to meet
the N2O standard in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this section and
an alternative CH4 standard in lieu of the standard in
paragraph (f)(1)(ii) of this section. The alternative standard for each
pollutant must be greater than the applicable exhaust emission standard
specified in paragraph (f)(1) of this section. Alternative
N2O and CH4 standards apply to emissions measured
according to the Federal Test Procedure (FTP) described in Subpart B of
this part for the full useful life, and become the applicable
certification and in-use emission standard(s) for the test group.
Manufacturers using an alternative standard for N2O and/or
CH4 must calculate emission debits according to the
provisions of paragraph (f)(4) of this section for each test group/
alternative standard combination. Debits must be included in the
calculation of total credits or debits generated in a model year as
required under Sec. 86.1865-12(k)(5). For flexible fuel vehicles (or
other vehicles certified for multiple fuels) you must meet these
alternative standards when tested on any applicable test fuel type.
(4) CO2- equivalent debits. CO2-equivalent
debits for test groups using an alternative N2O and/or
CH4 standard as determined under paragraph (f)(3) of this
section shall be calculated according to the following equation and
rounded to the nearest whole megagram:
Debits = [GWP x (Production) x (AltStd--Std) x VLM]/1,000,000
Where:
Debits = N2O or CH4 CO2-equivalent
debits for a test group using an alternative N2O or
CH4 standard;
GWP = 25 if calculating CH4 debits and 298 if calculating
N2O debits;
Production = The number of vehicles of that test group domestically
produced plus those imported as defined in Sec. 600.511 of this
chapter;
AltStd = The alternative standard (N2O or CH4)
selected by the manufacturer under paragraph (f)(3) of this section;
Std = The exhaust emission standard for N2O or
CH4 specified in paragraph (f)(1) of this section; and
VLM = 195,264 for passenger automobiles and 225,865 for light
trucks.
(g) Alternative fleet average standards for manufacturers with
limited U.S. sales. Manufacturers meeting the criteria in this
paragraph (g) may request that the Administrator establish alternative
fleet average CO2 standards that would apply instead of the
standards in paragraph (c) of this section. The provisions of this
paragraph (g) are applicable only to the 2017 and later model years. A
manufacturer that has sought and received EPA approval for alternative
standards for the 2017 model year may, at their option, choose to
comply with those standards in the 2015 and 2016 model years in lieu of
requesting a conditional exemption under Sec. 86.1801(k).
(1) Eligibility for alternative standards. Eligibility as
determined in this paragraph (g) shall be based on the total sales of
combined passenger
[[Page 63160]]
automobiles and light trucks. The terms ``sales'' and ``sold'' as used
in this paragraph (g) shall mean vehicles produced for U.S. sale, where
``U.S.'' means the states and territories of the United States. For the
purpose of determining eligibility the sales of related companies shall
be aggregated according to the provisions of Sec. 86.1838-01(b)(3),
or, if a manufacturer has been granted operational independence status
under Sec. 86.1838(d), eligibility shall be based on vehicle
production of that manufacturer. To be eligible for alternative
standards established under this paragraph (g), the manufacturer's
average sales for the three most recent consecutive model years must
remain below 5,000. If a manufacturer's average sales for the three
most recent consecutive model years exceeds 4999, the manufacturer will
no longer be eligible for exemption and must meet applicable emission
standards starting with the model year according to the provisions in
this paragraph (g)(1).
(i) If a manufacturer's average sales for three consecutive model
years exceeds 4999, and if the increase in sales is the result of
corporate acquisitions, mergers, or purchase by another manufacturer,
the manufacturer shall comply with the emission standards described in
paragraph (c) of this section, as applicable, beginning with the first
model year after the last year of the three consecutive model years.
(ii) If a manufacturer's average sales for three consecutive model
years exceeds 4999 and is less than 50,000, and if the increase in
sales is solely the result of the manufacturer's expansion in vehicle
production (not the result of corporate acquisitions, mergers, or
purchase by another manufacturer), the manufacturer shall comply with
the emission standards described in paragraph (c), of this section, as
applicable, beginning with the second model year after the last year of
the three consecutive model years.
(2) Requirements for new entrants into the U.S. market. New
entrants are those manufacturers without a prior record of automobile
sales in the United States and without prior certification to (or
exemption from, under Sec. 86.1801-12(k)) greenhouse gas emission
standards in Sec. 86.1818-12. In addition to the eligibility
requirements stated in paragraph (g)(1) of this section, new entrants
must meet the following requirements:
(i) In addition to the information required under paragraph (g)(4)
of this section, new entrants must provide documentation that shows a
clear intent by the company to actually enter the U.S. market in the
years for which alternative standards are requested. Demonstrating such
intent could include providing documentation that shows the
establishment of a U.S. dealer network, documentation of work underway
to meet other U.S. requirements (e.g., safety standards), or other
information that reasonably establishes intent to the satisfaction of
the Administrator.
(ii) Sales of vehicles in the U.S. by new entrants must remain
below 5,000 vehicles for the first three model years in the U.S.
market, and in subsequent years the average sales for any three
consecutive years must remain below 5,000 vehicles. Vehicles sold in
violation of these limits within the first five model years will be
considered not covered by the certificate of conformity and the
manufacturer will be subject to penalties on an individual-vehicle
basis for sale of vehicles not covered by a certificate. In addition,
violation of these limits will result in loss of eligibility for
alternative standards until such point as the manufacturer demonstrates
two consecutive model years of sales below 5,000 automobiles. After the
first five model years, the eligibility provisions in paragraph (g)(1)
of this section apply, where violating the sales thresholds is no
longer a violation of the condition on the certificate, but is instead
grounds for losing eligibility for alternative standards.
(iii) A manufacturer with sales in the most recent model year of
less than 5,000 automobiles, but where prior model year sales were not
less than 5,000 automobiles, is eligible to request alternative
standards under this paragraph (g). However, such a manufacturer will
be considered a new entrant and subject to the provisions regarding new
entrants in this paragraph (g), except that the requirement to
demonstrate an intent to enter the U.S. market in paragraph (g)(2)(i)
of this section shall not apply.
(3) How to request alternative fleet average standards. Eligible
manufacturers may petition for alternative standards for up to five
consecutive model years if sufficient information is available on which
to base such standards.
(i) To request alternative standards starting with the 2017 model
year, eligible manufacturers must submit a completed application no
later than July 30, 2013.
(ii) To request alternative standards starting with a model year
after 2017, eligible manufacturers must submit a completed request no
later than 36 months prior to the start of the first model year to
which the alternative standards would apply.
(iii) The request must contain all the information required in
paragraph (g)(4) of this section, and must be signed by a chief officer
of the company. If the Administrator determines that the content of the
request is incomplete or insufficient, the manufacturer will be
notified and given an additional 30 days to amend the request.
(4) Data and information submittal requirements. Eligible
manufacturers requesting alternative standards under this paragraph (g)
must submit the following information to the Environmental Protection
Agency. The Administrator may request additional information as she
deems appropriate. The completed request must be sent to the
Environmental Protection Agency at the following address: Director,
Compliance and Innovative Strategies Division, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2000 Traverwood Drive, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105.
(i) Vehicle model and fleet information. (A) The model years to
which the requested alternative standards would apply, limited to five
consecutive model years.
(B) Vehicle models and projections of production volumes for each
model year.
(C) Detailed description of each model, including the vehicle type,
vehicle mass, power, footprint, powertrain, and expected pricing.
(D) The expected production cycle for each model, including new
model introductions and redesign or refresh cycles.
(ii) Technology evaluation information. (A) The CO2
reduction technologies employed by the manufacturer on each vehicle
model, or projected to be employed, including information regarding the
cost and CO2 -reducing effectiveness. Include technologies
that improve air conditioning efficiency and reduce air conditioning
system leakage, and any ``off-cycle'' technologies that potentially
provide benefits outside the operation represented by the Federal Test
Procedure and the Highway Fuel Economy Test.
(B) An evaluation of comparable models from other manufacturers,
including CO2 results and air conditioning credits generated
by the models. Comparable vehicles should be similar, but not
necessarily identical, in the following respects: vehicle type,
horsepower, mass, power-to-weight ratio, footprint, retail price, and
any other relevant factors. For manufacturers requesting alternative
standards starting with the 2017 model
[[Page 63161]]
year, the analysis of comparable vehicles should include vehicles from
the 2012 and 2013 model years, otherwise the analysis should at a
minimum include vehicles from the most recent two model years.
(C) A discussion of the CO2-reducing technologies
employed on vehicles offered outside of the U.S. market but not
available in the U.S., including a discussion as to why those vehicles
and/or technologies are not being used to achieve CO2
reductions for vehicles in the U.S. market.
(D) An evaluation, at a minimum, of the technologies projected by
the Environmental Protection Agency in a final rulemaking as those
technologies likely to be used to meet greenhouse gas emission
standards and the extent to which those technologies are employed or
projected to be employed by the manufacturer. For any technology that
is not projected to be fully employed, explain why this is the case.
(iii) Alternative fleet average CO2 standards. (A) The
most stringent CO2 level estimated to be feasible for each
model, in each model year, and the technological basis for this
estimate.
(B) For each model year, a projection of the lowest feasible sales-
weighted fleet average CO2 value, separately for passenger
automobiles and light trucks, and an explanation demonstrating that
these projections are reasonable.
(C) A copy of any application, data, and related information
submitted to NHTSA in support of a request for alternative Corporate
Average Fuel Economy standards filed under 49 CFR Part 525.
(iv) Information supporting eligibility. (A) U.S. sales for the
three previous model years and projected sales for the model years for
which the manufacturer is seeking alternative standards.
(B) Information regarding ownership relationships with other
manufacturers, including details regarding the application of the
provisions of Sec. 86.1838-01(b)(3) regarding the aggregation of sales
of related companies,
(5) Alternative standards. Upon receiving a complete application,
the Administrator will review the application and determine whether an
alternative standard is warranted. If the Administrator judges that an
alternative standard is warranted, the Administrator will publish a
proposed determination in the Federal Register to establish alternative
standards for the manufacturer that the Administrator judges are
appropriate. Following a 30 day public comment period, the
Administrator will issue a final determination establishing alternative
standards for the manufacturer. If the Administrator does not establish
alternative standards for an eligible manufacturer prior to 12 months
before the first model year to which the alternative standards would
apply, the manufacturer may request an extension of the exemption under
Sec. 86.1801-12(k) or an extension of previously approved alternative
standards, whichever may apply.
(6) Restrictions on credit trading. Manufacturers subject to
alternative standards approved by the Administrator under this
paragraph (g) may not trade credits to another manufacturer. Transfers
between car and truck fleets within the manufacturer are allowed, and
the carry-forward provisions for credits and deficits apply.
(h) Mid-term evaluation of standards. No later than April 1, 2018,
the Administrator shall determine whether the standards established in
paragraph (c) of this section for the 2022 through 2025 model years are
appropriate under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, in light of the
record then before the Administrator. An opportunity for public comment
shall be provided before making such determination. If the
Administrator determines they are not appropriate, the Administrator
shall initiate a rulemaking to revise the standards, to be either more
or less stringent as appropriate.
(1) In making the determination required by this paragraph (h), the
Administrator shall consider the information available on the factors
relevant to setting greenhouse gas emission standards under section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act for model years 2022 through 2025,
including but not limited to:
(i) The availability and effectiveness of technology, and the
appropriate lead time for introduction of technology;
(ii) The cost on the producers or purchasers of new motor vehicles
or new motor vehicle engines;
(iii) The feasibility and practicability of the standards;
(iv) The impact of the standards on reduction of emissions, oil
conservation, energy security, and fuel savings by consumers;
(v) The impact of the standards on the automobile industry;
(vi) The impacts of the standards on automobile safety;
(vii) The impact of the greenhouse gas emission standards on the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards and a national harmonized
program; and
(viii) The impact of the standards on other relevant factors.
(2) The Administrator shall make the determination required by this
paragraph (h) based upon a record that includes the following:
(i) A draft Technical Assessment Report addressing issues relevant
to the standard for the 2022 through 2025 model years;
(ii) Public comment on the draft Technical Assessment Report;
(iii) Public comment on whether the standards established for the
2022 through 2025 model years are appropriate under section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act; and
(iv) Such other materials the Administrator deems appropriate.
(3) No later than November 15, 2017, the Administrator shall issue
a draft Technical Assessment Report addressing issues relevant to the
standards for the 2022 through 2025 model years.
(4) The Administrator will set forth in detail the bases for the
determination required by this paragraph (h), including the
Administrator's assessment of each of the factors listed in paragraph
(h)(1) of this section.
0
14. Section 86.1823-08 is amended by revising paragraph (m)(2)(iii) to
read as follows:
Sec. 86.1823-08 Durability demonstration procedures for exhaust
emissions.
* * * * *
(m) * * *
(2) * * *
(iii) For the 2012 through 2016 model years only, manufacturers may
use alternative deterioration factors. For N2O, the
alternative deterioration factor to be used to adjust FTP and HFET
emissions is the deterioration factor determined for (or derived from,
using good engineering judgment) NOX emissions according to
the provisions of this section. For CH4, the alternative
deterioration factor to be used to adjust FTP and HFET emissions is the
deterioration factor determined for (or derived from, using good
engineering judgment) NMOG or NMHC emissions according to the
provisions of this section.
* * * * *
0
15. Section 86.1829-01 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(1)(iii) to
read as follows:
Sec. 86.1829-01 Durability and emission testing requirements;
waivers.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(iii) Data submittal waivers. (A) In lieu of testing a methanol-
fueled diesel-cycle light truck for particulate emissions a
manufacturer may provide a statement in its application for
certification that such light trucks
[[Page 63162]]
comply with the applicable standards. Such a statement shall be based
on previous emission tests, development tests, or other appropriate
information and good engineering judgment.
(B) In lieu of testing an Otto-cycle light-duty vehicle, light-duty
truck, or heavy-duty vehicle for particulate emissions for
certification, a manufacturer may provide a statement in its
application for certification that such vehicles comply with the
applicable standards. Such a statement must be based on previous
emission tests, development tests, or other appropriate information and
good engineering judgment.
(C) A manufacturer may petition the Administrator for a waiver of
the requirement to submit total hydrocarbon emission data. If the
waiver is granted, then in lieu of testing a certification light-duty
vehicle or light-duty truck for total hydrocarbon emissions the
manufacturer may provide a statement in its application for
certification that such vehicles comply with the applicable standards.
Such a statement shall be based on previous emission tests, development
tests, or other appropriate information and good engineering judgment.
(D) A manufacturer may petition the Administrator to waive the
requirement to measure particulate emissions when conducting Selective
Enforcement Audit testing of Otto-cycle vehicles.
(E) In lieu of testing a gasoline, diesel, natural gas, liquefied
petroleum gas, or hydrogen fueled Tier 2 or interim non-Tier 2 vehicle
for formaldehyde emissions when such vehicles are certified based upon
NMHC emissions, a manufacturer may provide a statement in its
application for certification that such vehicles comply with the
applicable standards. Such a statement must be based on previous
emission tests, development tests, or other appropriate information and
good engineering judgment.
(F) In lieu of testing a petroleum-, natural gas-, liquefied
petroleum gas-, or hydrogen-fueled heavy-duty vehicle for formaldehyde
emissions for certification, a manufacturer may provide a statement in
its application for certification that such vehicles comply with the
applicable standards. Such a statement must be based on previous
emission tests, development tests, or other appropriate information and
good engineering judgment.
(G) For the 2012 through 2016 model years, in lieu of testing a
vehicle for N2O emissions, a manufacturer may provide a
statement in its application for certification that such vehicles
comply with the applicable standards. Such a statement may also be used
for 2017 and 2018 model year vehicles only if the application for
certification for those vehicles is based upon data carried over from a
prior model year, as allowed under this subpart. No 2019 and later
model year vehicles may be waived from testing for N2O
emissions. Such a statement must be based on previous emission tests,
development tests, or other appropriate information and good
engineering judgment. Vehicles certified to N2O standards
using a compliance statement in lieu of submitting test data are not
required to collect and submit N2O emission data under the
in-use verification testing requirements of Sec. 86.1845.
* * * * *
0
16. Section 86.1838-01 is amended by adding paragraph (d) to read as
follows:
Sec. 86.1838-01 Small volume manufacturer certification procedures.
* * * * *
(d) Operationally independent manufacturers. Manufacturers may
submit an application to EPA requesting treatment as an operationally
independent manufacturer. A manufacturer that is granted operationally
independent status may qualify for certain specified regulatory
provisions on the basis of its own vehicle production and/or sales
volumes, and would not require aggregation with related manufacturers.
In this paragraph (d), the term ``related manufacturer(s)'' means
manufacturers that would qualify for aggregation under the requirements
of paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(1) To request consideration for operationally independent status,
the manufacturer must submit an application demonstrating that the
following criteria are met, and have been continuously met for at least
two years prior to submitting the application to EPA. The application
must be signed by the president or the chief executive officer of the
manufacturer.
(i) The applicant does not receive any financial or other means of
support of economic value from any related manufacturers for purposes
of vehicle design, vehicle parts procurement, research and development,
and production facilities and operation. Any transactions with related
manufacturers must be conducted under normal commercial arrangements
like those conducted with other external parties. Any such transactions
with related manufacturers shall be demonstrated to have been at
competitive pricing rates to the applicant.
(ii) The applicant maintains wholly separate and independent
research and development, testing, and vehicle manufacturing and
production facilities.
(iii) The applicant does not use any vehicle engines, powertrains,
or platforms developed or produced by related manufacturers.
(iv) The applicant does not hold any patents jointly with related
manufacturers.
(v) The applicant maintains separate business administration,
legal, purchasing, sales, and marketing departments as well as wholly
autonomous decision making on all commercial matters.
(vi) The Board of Directors of the applicant may not share more
than 25 percent of its membership with any related manufacturer. No top
operational management of the applicant may be shared with any related
manufacturer, including the president, the chief executive officer
(CEO), the chief financial officer (CFO), and the chief operating
officer (COO). No individual director or combination of directors that
is shared with a related manufacturer may exercise exclusive management
control over either or both companies.
(vii) Parts or components supply agreements between the applicant
and related companies must be established through open market
processes. An applicant that sells or otherwise provides parts and/or
vehicle components to a manufacturer that is not a related manufacturer
must do so through the open market at competitive pricing rates.
(2) Manufacturers that have been granted operationally independent
status must report any material changes to the information provided in
the application within 60 days of the occurrence of the change. If such
a change occurs that results in the manufacturer no longer meeting the
requirements of the application, the manufacturer will lose the
eligibility to be considered operationally independent. The EPA will
confirm that the manufacturer no longer meets one or more of the
criteria and thus is no longer considered operationally independent,
and will notify the manufacturer of the change in status. A
manufacturer who loses the eligibility for operationally independent
status must transition to the appropriate emission standards no later
than the third model year after the model year in which the loss of
eligibility occurred. For example, a manufacturer that loses
eligibility in their 2018 model year would be required to meet
appropriate standards in the 2021 model year. A manufacturer that loses
eligibility must meet the applicable criteria for three
[[Page 63163]]
consecutive model years before they are allowed to apply for a
reinstatement of their operationally independent status.
(3) The manufacturer applying for operational independence shall
engage an independent certified public accountant, or firm of such
accountants (hereinafter referred to as ``CPA''), to perform an agreed-
upon procedures attestation engagement of the underlying documentation
that forms the basis of the application as required in this paragraph
(d).
(i) The CPA shall perform the attestation engagements in accordance
with the Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
(ii) The CPA may complete the requirements of this paragraph with
the assistance of internal auditors who are employees or agents of the
applicant, so long as such assistance is in accordance with the
Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
(iii) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of
this section, an applicant may satisfy the requirements of this
paragraph (d)(2) if the requirements of this paragraph (d)(2) are
completed by an auditor who is an employee of the applicant, provided
that such employee:
(A) Is an internal auditor certified by the Institute of Internal
Auditors, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ``CIA''); and
(B) Completes the internal audits in accordance with the standards
for internal auditing established by the Institute of Internal
Auditors.
(iv) Use of a CPA or CIA who is debarred, suspended, or proposed
for debarment pursuant to the Governmentwide Debarment and Suspension
Regulations, 2 CFR part 1532, or the Debarment, Suspension, and
Ineligibility Provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 CFR
part 9, subpart 9.4, shall be deemed in noncompliance with the
requirements of this section.
0
17. Section 86.1848-10 is amended by adding paragraphs (c)(9)(iii)
through (v) to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1848-10 Compliance with emission standards for the purpose of
certification.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(9) * * *
(iii) For manufacturers using the conditional exemption under Sec.
86.1801(k), failure to fully comply with the fleet production
thresholds that determine eligibility for the exemption will be
considered a failure to satisfy the terms and conditions upon which the
certificate(s) was (were) issued and the vehicles sold in violation of
the stated sales and/or production thresholds will not be covered by
the certificate(s).
(iv) For manufacturers that are determined to be operationally
independent under Sec. 86.1838(d), failure to report a material change
in their status within 60 days as required by Sec. 86.1838(d)(2) will
be considered a failure to satisfy the terms and conditions upon which
the certificate(s) was (were) issued and the vehicles sold in violation
of the operationally independent criteria will not be covered by the
certificate(s).
(v) For manufacturers subject to an alternative fleet average
greenhouse gas exhaust emission standard approved under Sec.
86.1818(g), failure to comply with the annual sales thresholds that are
required to maintain use of those standards, including the thresholds
required for new entrants into the U.S. market, will be considered a
failure to satisfy the terms and conditions upon which the
certificate(s) was (were) issued and the vehicles sold in violation of
stated sales and/or production thresholds will not be covered by the
certificate(s).
* * * * *
0
18. Section 86.1865-12 is amended as follows:
0
a. By revising paragraph (k)(5) introductory text.
0
b. By revising paragraph (k)(5)(i) through (iii).
0
c. By redesignating paragraph (k)(5)(iv) as (k)(5)(v).
0
d. By adding paragraph (k)(5)(iv).
0
e. By revising paragraph (k)(6).
0
f. By revising paragraph (k)(7)(i).
0
g. By adding paragraph (k)(7)(iv).
0
h. By adding paragraph (k)(7)(v).
0
i. By revising paragraph (k)(8)(iv)(A).
0
j. By revising paragraph (l)(1)(ii) introductory text.
0
k. By revising paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(F).
0
l. By revising paragraph (l)(2)(iii) introductory text.
0
m. By revising paragraph (l)(2)(iv) introductory text.
0
n. By revising paragraph (l)(2)(v).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 86.1865-12 How to comply with the fleet average CO2
standards.
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(5) Total credits or debits generated in a model year, maintained
and reported separately for passenger automobiles and light trucks,
shall be the sum of the credits or debits calculated in paragraph
(k)(4) of this section and any of the following credits, if applicable,
minus any N2O and/or CH4 CO2-
equivalent debits calculated according to the provisions of Sec.
86.1818-12(f)(4):
(i) Air conditioning leakage credits earned according to the
provisions of Sec. 86.1867-12(b);
(ii) Air conditioning efficiency credits earned according to the
provisions of Sec. 86.1868-12(c);
(iii) Off-cycle technology credits earned according to the
provisions of Sec. 86.1869-12(d).
(iv) Full size pickup truck credits earned according to the
provisions of Sec. 86.1870-12(c).
* * * * *
(6) The expiration date of unused CO2 credits is based
on the model year in which the credits are earned, as follows:
(i) Unused CO2 credits from the 2009 model year shall
retain their full value through the 2014 model year. Credits from the
2009 model year that remain at the end of the 2014 model year shall
expire.
(ii) Unused CO2 credits from the 2010 through 2015 model
years shall retain their full value through the 2021 model year.
Credits remaining from these model years at the end of the 2021 model
year shall expire.
(iii) Unused CO2 credits from the 2016 and later model
years shall retain their full value through the five subsequent model
years after the model year in which they were generated. Credits
remaining at the end of the fifth model year after the model year in
which they were generated shall expire.
(7) * * *
(i) Credits generated and calculated according to the method in
paragraphs (k)(4) and (5) of this section may not be used to offset
deficits other than those deficits accrued with respect to the standard
in Sec. 86.1818. Credits may be banked and used in a future model year
in which a manufacturer's average CO2 level exceeds the
applicable standard. Credits may be transferred between the passenger
automobile and light truck fleets of a given manufacturer. Credits may
also be traded to another manufacturer according to the provisions in
paragraph (k)(8) of this section. Before trading or carrying over
credits to the next model year, a manufacturer must apply available
credits to offset any deficit, where the deadline to offset that credit
deficit has not yet passed.
* * * * *
(iv) Credits generated in the 2017 through 2020 model years under
the provisions of Sec. 86.1818(e)(3)(ii) may not be traded or
otherwise provided to another manufacturer.
(v) Credits generated under any alternative fleet average standards
[[Page 63164]]
approved under Sec. 86.1818(g) may not be traded or otherwise provided
to another manufacturer.
* * * * *
(8) * * *
(iv) * * *
(A) If a manufacturer ceases production of passenger automobiles
and light trucks, the manufacturer continues to be responsible for
offsetting any debits outstanding within the required time period. Any
failure to offset the debits will be considered a violation of
paragraph (k)(8)(i) of this section and may subject the manufacturer to
an enforcement action for sale of vehicles not covered by a
certificate, pursuant to paragraphs (k)(8)(ii) and (iii) of this
section.
* * * * *
(l) * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) Manufacturers producing any passenger automobiles or light
trucks subject to the provisions in this subpart must establish,
maintain, and retain all the following information in adequately
organized records for each passenger automobile or light truck subject
to this subpart:
* * * * *
(F) Carbon-related exhaust emission standard, N2O
emission standard, and CH4 emission standard to which the
passenger automobile or light truck is certified.
* * * * *
(2) * * *
(iii) Manufacturers calculating air conditioning leakage and/or
efficiency credits under paragraph Sec. 86.1871-12(b) shall include
the following information for each model year and separately for
passenger automobiles and light trucks and for each air conditioning
system used to generate credits:
* * * * *
(iv) Manufacturers calculating advanced technology vehicle credits
under paragraph Sec. 86.1871-12(c) shall include the following
information for each model year and separately for passenger
automobiles and light trucks:
* * * * *
(v) Manufacturers calculating off-cycle technology credits under
paragraph Sec. 86.1871-12(d) shall include, for each model year and
separately for passenger automobiles and light trucks, all test results
and data required for calculating such credits.
* * * * *
0
19. Section 86.1866-12 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1866-12 CO2 credits for advanced technology
vehicles.
(a) Electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel
cell vehicles, as those terms are defined in Sec. 86.1803-01, that are
certified and produced for U.S. sale, where ``U.S.'' means the states
and territories of the United States, in the 2012 through 2025 model
years may use a value of zero (0) grams/mile of CO2 to
represent the proportion of electric operation of a vehicle that is
derived from electricity that is generated from sources that are not
onboard the vehicle, as specified by this paragraph (a).
(1) Model years 2012 through 2016: The use of zero (0) grams/mile
CO2 is limited to the first 200,000 combined electric
vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell vehicles
produced for U.S. sale, where ``U.S.'' means the states and territories
of the United States, in the 2012 through 2016 model years, except that
a manufacturer that produces 25,000 or more such vehicles for U.S. sale
in the 2012 model year shall be subject to a limitation on the use of
zero (0) grams/mile CO2 to the first 300,000 combined
electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell
vehicles produced and delivered for sale by a manufacturer in the 2012
through 2016 model years.
(2) Model years 2017 through 2021: For electric vehicles, plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell vehicles produced for U.S.
sale, where ``U.S.'' means the states and territories of the United
States, in the 2017 through 2021 model years, such use of zero (0)
grams/mile CO2 is unrestricted.
(3) Model years 2022 through 2025: The use of zero (0) grams/mile
CO2 is limited to the first 200,000 combined electric
vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell vehicles
produced for U.S. sale by a manufacturer in the 2022 through 2025 model
years, except that a manufacturer that produces for U.S. sale 300,000
or more such vehicles in the 2019 through 2021 model years shall be
subject to a limitation on the use of zero (0) grams/mile
CO2 to the first 600,000 combined electric vehicles, plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell vehicles produced for U.S. sale
by a manufacturer in the 2022 through 2025 model years. Vehicles
produced for U.S. sale in excess of these limitations will account for
greenhouse gas emissions according to Sec. 600.113(n).
(b) For electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, fuel
cell vehicles, dedicated natural gas vehicles, and dual-fuel natural
gas vehicles as those terms are defined in Sec. 86.1803-01, that are
certified and produced for U.S. sale in the 2017 through 2021 model
years and that meet the additional specifications in this section, the
manufacturer may use the production multipliers in this paragraph (b)
when determining the manufacturer's fleet average carbon-related
exhaust emissions under Sec. 600.512 of this chapter. Full size pickup
trucks eligible for and using a production multiplier are not eligible
for the performance-based credits described in Sec. 86.1870-12(b).
(1) The production multipliers, by model year, for electric
vehicles and fuel cell vehicles are as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year Production multiplier
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 2.0
2018 2.0
2019 2.0
2020 1.75
2021 1.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2)(i) The production multipliers, by model year, for plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles, dedicated natural gas vehicles, and dual-fuel
natural gas vehicles are as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year Production multiplier
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 1.6
2018 1.6
2019 1.6
2020 1.45
2021 1.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The minimum all-electric driving range that a plug-in hybrid
electric vehicle must have in order to qualify for use of a production
multiplier is 10.2 miles on its nominal storage capacity of electricity
when operated on the highway fuel economy test cycle. Alternatively, a
plug-in hybrid electric vehicle may qualify for use of a production
multiplier by having an equivalent all-electric driving range greater
than or equal to 10.2 miles during its actual charge-depleting range as
measured on the highway fuel economy test cycle and tested according to
the requirements of SAE J1711, Recommended Practice for Measuring the
Exhaust Emissions and Fuel Economy of Hybrid-Electric Vehicles,
Including Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles (incorporated by reference in Sec.
86.1). The equivalent all-electric range of a PHEV is determined from
the following formula:
EAER = RCDA x ((CO2CS - CO2CD/
CO2CS))
Where:
EAER = the equivalent all-electric range attributed to charge-
depleting operation of a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle on the
highway fuel economy test cycle.
[[Page 63165]]
RCDA = The actual charge-depleting range determined
according to SAE J1711, Recommended Practice for Measuring the
Exhaust Emissions and Fuel Economy of Hybrid-Electric Vehicles,
Including Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles (incorporated by reference in
Sec. 86.1).
CO2CS = The charge-sustaining CO2 emissions in
grams per mile on the highway fuel economy test determined according
to SAE J1711, Recommended Practice for Measuring the Exhaust
Emissions and Fuel Economy of Hybrid-Electric Vehicles, Including
Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles (incorporated by reference in Sec. 86.1).
CO2CD = The charge-depleting CO2 emissions in
grams per mile on the highway fuel economy test determined according
to SAE J1711, Recommended Practice for Measuring the Exhaust
Emissions and Fuel Economy of Hybrid-Electric Vehicles, Including
Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles (incorporated by reference in Sec. 86.1).
(3) The actual production of qualifying vehicles may be multiplied
by the applicable value according to the model year, and the result,
rounded to the nearest whole number, may be used to represent the
production of qualifying vehicles when calculating average carbon-
related exhaust emissions under Sec. 600.512 of this chapter.
0
20. Section 86.1867-12 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1867-12 CO[bdi2] credits for reducing leakage of air
conditioning refrigerant.
Manufacturers may generate credits applicable to the CO2
fleet average program described in Sec. 86.1865-12 by implementing
specific air conditioning system technologies designed to reduce air
conditioning refrigerant leakage over the useful life of their
passenger automobiles and/or light trucks. Credits shall be calculated
according to this section for each air conditioning system that the
manufacturer is using to generate CO2 credits. Manufacturers
may also generate early air conditioning refrigerant leakage credits
under this section for the 2009 through 2011 model years according to
the provisions of Sec. 86.1871-12(b).
(a) The manufacturer shall calculate an annual rate of refrigerant
leakage from an air conditioning system in grams per year according to
the procedures specified in SAE J2727 (incorporated by reference in
Sec. 86.1). In doing so, the refrigerant permeation rates for hoses
shall be determined using the procedures specified in SAE J2064
(incorporated by reference in Sec. 86.1) The annual rate of
refrigerant leakage from an air conditioning system shall be rounded to
the nearest tenth of a gram per year. The procedures of SAE J2727 may
be used to determine leakage rates for HFC-134a and HFO-1234yf;
manufacturers should contact EPA regarding procedures for other
refrigerants. The annual rate of refrigerant leakage from an air
conditioning system shall be rounded to the nearest tenth of a gram per
year.
(b) The CO2-equivalent gram per mile leakage reduction
used to calculate the total leakage credits generated by an air
conditioning system shall be determined according to this paragraph
(b), separately for passenger automobiles and light trucks, and rounded
to the nearest tenth of a gram per mile:
(1) Passenger automobile leakage credit for an air conditioning
system:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.038
Where:
MaxCredit is 12.6 (grams CO2-equivalent/mile) for air
conditioning systems using HFC-134a, and 13.8 (grams CO2-
equivalent/mile) for air conditioning systems using a refrigerant
with a lower global warming potential.
LeakScore means the annual refrigerant leakage rate determined
according to the procedures in SAE J2727 (incorporated by reference
in Sec. 86.1), where the refrigerant permeation rates for hoses
shall be determined using the procedures specified in SAE J2064
(incorporated by reference in Sec. 86.1). If the calculated rate is
less than 8.3 grams/year (or 4.1 grams/year for systems using only
electric compressors), the rate for the purpose of this formula
shall be 8.3 grams/year (or 4.1 grams/year for systems using only
electric compressors).
GWPREF means the global warming potential of the
refrigerant as indicated in paragraph (e) of this section or as
otherwise determined by the Administrator;
HiLeakDis means the high leak disincentive, which is zero for
model years 2012 through 2016, and for 2017 and later model years is
determined using the following equation, except that if
GWPREF is greater than 150 or if the calculated result of
the equation is less than zero, HiLeakDis shall be set equal to
zero, or if the calculated result of the equation is greater than
1.8 g/mi, HiLeakDis shall be set to 1.8 g/mi:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.039
Where,
LeakThreshold = 11.0 for air conditioning systems with a refrigerant
capacity less than or equal to 733 grams; or
LeakThreshold = [Refrigerant Capacity x 0.015] for air conditioning
systems with a refrigerant capacity greater than 733 grams, where
RefrigerantCapacity is the maximum refrigerant capacity specified
for the air conditioning system, in grams.
(2) Light truck leakage credit for an air conditioning system:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.040
Where:
MaxCredit is 15.6 (grams CO2-equivalent/mile) for air
conditioning systems using HFC-134a, and 17.2 (grams CO2-
equivalent/mile) for air conditioning systems using a refrigerant
with a lower global warming potential.
LeakScore means the annual refrigerant leakage rate determined
according to the provisions of SAE J2727 (incorporated by reference
in Sec. 86.1),, where the refrigerant permeation rates for hoses
shall be determined using the procedures specified in SAE J2064
(incorporated by reference in Sec. 86.1). If the calculated rate is
less than 10.4 grams/year (or 5.2 grams/year for systems using only
electric compressors), the rate for the purpose of this formula
shall be 10.4 grams/year (or 5.2 grams/year for systems using only
electric compressors).
[[Page 63166]]
GWPREF means the global warming potential of the
refrigerant as indicated in paragraph (e) of this section or as
otherwise determined by the Administrator;
HiLeakDis means the high leak disincentive, which is zero for model
years 2012 through 2016, and for 2017 and later model years is
determined using the following equation, except that if
GWPREF is greater than 150 or if the calculated result of
the equation is less than zero, HiLeakDis shall be set equal to
zero, or if the calculated result of the equation is greater than
2.1 g/mi, HiLeakDis shall be set to 2.1 g/mi:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.041
Where:
LeakThreshold = 11.0 for air conditioning systems with a refrigerant
capacity less than or equal to 733 grams; or
LeakThreshold = [Refrigerant Capacity x 0.015] for air conditioning
systems with a refrigerant capacity greater than 733 grams, where
RefrigerantCapacity is the maximum refrigerant capacity specified
for the air conditioning system, in grams.
(c) The total leakage reduction credits generated by the air
conditioning system shall be calculated separately for passenger
automobiles and light trucks according to the following formula:
Total Credits (Megagrams) = (Leakage x Production x VLM) / 1,000,000
Where:
Leakage = the CO2-equivalent leakage credit value in
grams per mile determined in paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this
section, whichever is applicable.
Production = The total number of passenger automobiles or light
trucks, whichever is applicable, produced with the air conditioning
system to which to the leakage credit value from paragraph (b)(1) or
(b)(2) of this section applies.
VLM = vehicle lifetime miles, which for passenger automobiles shall
be 195,264 and for light trucks shall be 225,865.
(d) The results of paragraph (c) of this section, rounded to the
nearest whole number, shall be included in the manufacturer's credit/
debit totals calculated in Sec. 86.1865-12(k)(5).
(e) The following values for refrigerant global warming potential
(GWPREF), or alternative values as determined by the
Administrator, shall be used in the calculations of this section. The
Administrator will determine values for refrigerants not included in
this paragraph (e) upon request by a manufacturer.
(1) For HFC-134a, GWPREF = 1430;
(2) For HFC-152a, GWPREF = 124;
(3) For HFO-1234yf, GWPREF = 4;
(4) For CO2, GWPREF = 1.
0
21. Section 86.1868-12 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1868-12 CO[bdi2] credits for improving the efficiency of air
conditioning systems.
Manufacturers may generate credits applicable to the CO2
fleet average program described in Sec. 86.1865-12 by implementing
specific air conditioning system technologies designed to reduce air
conditioning-related CO2 emissions over the useful life of
their passenger automobiles and/or light trucks. Credits shall be
calculated according to this section for each air conditioning system
that the manufacturer is using to generate CO2 credits.
Manufacturers may also generate early air conditioning efficiency
credits under this section for the 2009 through 2011 model years
according to the provisions of Sec. 86.1871-12(b). For model years
2012 and 2013 the manufacturer may determine air conditioning
efficiency credits using the requirements in paragraphs (a) through (d)
of this section. For model years 2014 through 2016 the eligibility
requirements specified in either paragraph (e) or (f) of this section
must be met before an air conditioning system is allowed to generate
credits. For model years 2017 and later the eligibility requirements
specified in paragraph (g) of this section must be met before an air
conditioning system is allowed to generate credits.
(a)(1) 2012 through 2016 model year air conditioning efficiency
credits are available for the following technologies in the gram per
mile amounts indicated in the following table:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credit
Air conditioning technology value (g/
mi)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduced reheat, with externally-controlled, variable- 1.7
displacement compressor (e.g. a compressor that controls
displacement based on temperature setpoint and/or cooling
demand of the air conditioning system control settings
inside the passenger compartment)...........................
Reduced reheat, with externally-controlled, fixed- 1.1
displacement or pneumatic variable displacement compressor
(e.g. a compressor that controls displacement based on
conditions within, or internal to, the air conditioning
system, such as head pressure, suction pressure, or
evaporator outlet temperature)..............................
Default to recirculated air with closed-loop control of the 1.7
air supply (sensor feedback to control interior air quality)
whenever the ambient temperature is 75 [deg]F or higher: Air
conditioning systems that operated with closed-loop control
of the air supply at different temperatures may receive
credits by submitting an engineering analysis to the
Administrator for approval..................................
Default to recirculated air with open-loop control air supply 1.1
(no sensor feedback) whenever the ambient temperature is 75
[deg]F or higher. Air conditioning systems that operate with
open-loop control of the air supply at different
temperatures may receive credits by submitting an
engineering analysis to the Administrator for approval......
Blower motor controls which limit wasted electrical energy 0.9
(e.g. pulse width modulated power controller)...............
Internal heat exchanger (e.g. a device that transfers heat 1.1
from the high-pressure, liquid-phase refrigerant entering
the evaporator to the low-pressure, gas-phase refrigerant
exiting the evaporator).....................................
Improved condensers and/or evaporators with system analysis 1.1
on the component(s) indicating a coefficient of performance
improvement for the system of greater than 10% when compared
to previous industry standard designs)......................
Oil separator. The manufacturer must submit an engineering 0.6
analysis demonstrating the increased improvement of the
system relative to the baseline design, where the baseline
component for comparison is the version which a manufacturer
most recently had in production on the same vehicle design
or in a similar or related vehicle model. The
characteristics of the baseline component shall be compared
to the new component to demonstrate the improvement.........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) 2017 and later model year air conditioning efficiency credits
are available for the following technologies in the gram per mile
amounts indicated for each vehicle category in the following table:
[[Page 63167]]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger
automo- Light
Air conditioning technology biles (g/ trucks
mi) (g/mi)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduced reheat, with externally-controlled, 1.5 2.2
variable-displacement compressor (e.g. a
compressor that controls displacement based on
temperature setpoint and/or cooling demand of
the air conditioning system control settings
inside the passenger compartment)...............
Reduced reheat, with externally-controlled, fixed- 1.0 1.4
displacement or pneumatic variable displacement
compressor (e.g. a compressor that controls
displacement based on conditions within, or
internal to, the air conditioning system, such
as head pressure, suction pressure, or
evaporator outlet temperature)..................
Default to recirculated air with closed-loop 1.5 2.2
control of the air supply (sensor feedback to
control interior air quality) whenever the
ambient temperature is 75 [deg]F or higher: Air
conditioning systems that operated with closed-
loop control of the air supply at different
temperatures may receive credits by submitting
an engineering analysis to the Administrator for
approval........................................
Default to recirculated air with open-loop 1.0 1.4
control air supply (no sensor feedback) whenever
the ambient temperature is 75 [deg]F or higher.
Air conditioning systems that operate with open-
loop control of the air supply at different
temperatures may receive credits by submitting
an engineering analysis to the Administrator for
approval........................................
Blower motor controls which limit wasted 0.8 1.1
electrical energy (e.g. pulse width modulated
power controller)...............................
Internal heat exchanger (e.g. a device that 1.0 1.4
transfers heat from the high-pressure, liquid-
phase refrigerant entering the evaporator to the
low-pressure, gas-phase refrigerant exiting the
evaporator).....................................
Improved condensers and/or evaporators with 1.0 1.4
system analysis on the component(s) indicating a
coefficient of performance improvement for the
system of greater than 10% when compared to
previous industry standard designs).............
Oil separator. The manufacturer must submit an 0.5 0.7
engineering analysis demonstrating the increased
improvement of the system relative to the
baseline design, where the baseline component
for comparison is the version which a
manufacturer most recently had in production on
the same vehicle design or in a similar or
related vehicle model. The characteristics of
the baseline component shall be compared to the
new component to demonstrate the improvement....
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Air conditioning efficiency credits are determined on an air
conditioning system basis. For each air conditioning system that is
eligible for a credit based on the use of one or more of the items
listed in paragraph (a) of this section, the total credit value is the
sum of the gram per mile values for the appropriate model year listed
in paragraph (a) of this section for each item that applies to the air
conditioning system.
(1) In the 2012 through 2016 model years the total credit value for
an air conditioning system for passenger automobiles or light trucks
may not be greater than 5.7 grams per mile.
(2) In the 2017 and later model years the total credit value for an
air conditioning system may not be greater than 5.0 grams per mile for
any passenger automobile or 7.2 grams per mile for any light truck.
(c) The total efficiency credits generated by an air conditioning
system shall be calculated separately for passenger automobiles and
light trucks according to the following formula:
Total Credits (Megagrams) = (Credit x Production x VLM) / 1,000,000
Where:
Credit = the CO2 efficiency credit value in grams per
mile determined in paragraph (b) or (e) of this section, whichever
is applicable.
Production = The total number of passenger automobiles or light
trucks, whichever is applicable, produced with the air conditioning
system to which to the efficiency credit value from paragraph (b) of
this section applies.
VLM = vehicle lifetime miles, which for passenger automobiles shall
be 195,264 and for light trucks shall be 225,865.
(d) The results of paragraph (c) of this section, rounded to the
nearest whole number, shall be included in the manufacturer's credit/
debit totals calculated in Sec. 86.1865-12(k)(5).
(e) For the 2014 through 2016 model years, manufacturers must
validate air conditioning credits by using the Air Conditioning Idle
Test Procedure according to the provisions of this paragraph (e) or,
alternatively, by using the AC17 reporting requirements specified in
paragraph (f) of this section. The Air Conditioning Idle Test Procedure
is not applicable after the 2016 model year.
(1) For each air conditioning system selected by the manufacturer
to generate air conditioning efficiency credits, the manufacturer shall
perform the Air Conditioning Idle Test Procedure specified in Sec.
86.165-12 of this part.
(2) Using good engineering judgment, the manufacturer must select
the vehicle configuration to be tested that is expected to result in
the greatest increased CO2 emissions as a result of the
operation of the air conditioning system for which efficiency credits
are being sought. If the air conditioning system is being installed in
passenger automobiles and light trucks, a separate determination of the
quantity of credits for passenger automobiles and light trucks must be
made, but only one test vehicle is required to represent the air
conditioning system, provided it represents the worst-case impact of
the system on CO2 emissions.
(3) The manufacturer shall determine an idle test threshold (ITT)
for the tested vehicle configuration. A comparison of this threshold
value with the CO2 emissions increase recorded over the Air
Conditioning Idle Test Procedure in Sec. 86.165-12 determines the
total credits that may be generated by an air conditioning system. The
manufacturer may choose one of the following idle test threshold (ITT)
values for an air conditioning system:
(i) 14.9 grams per minute; or
(ii) The value determined from the following equation, rounded to
the nearest tenth of a gram per minute:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.042
[[Page 63168]]
Where:
Displacement = the engine displacement of the test vehicle,
expressed in liters and rounded to the nearest one tenth of a liter.
(4)(i) If the CO2 emissions value determined from the
Idle Test Procedure in Sec. 86.165-12 is less than or equal to the
idle test threshold (ITT) determined in paragraph (e)(3) of this
section, the total CO2 efficiency credit value (Credit) for
use in paragraph (c) of this section shall be the applicable value
determined in paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) If the CO2 emissions value determined from the Idle
Test Procedure in Sec. 86.165-12 is greater than the idle test
threshold (ITT) determined in paragraph (e)(3) of this section, the
total CO2 efficiency credit value (Credit) for use in
paragraph (c) of this section shall be determined using the following
formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.043
Where:
Credit = The CO2 efficiency credit value (Credit) that
must be used in paragraph (c) of this section to calculate the total
credits (in Megagrams) of air conditioning efficiency credits;
TCV = The total CO2 efficiency credit value determined
according to paragraph (b) of this section; and
ITP = the increased CO2 emissions determined from the
Idle Test Procedure in Sec. 86.165-14.
ITT = the idle test threshold determined in paragraph (e)(3) of this
section and rounded to the nearest one tenth of a gram per minute:
(iii) Air conditioning systems that record an increased
CO2 emissions value on the Idle Test Procedure in Sec.
86.165-14 that is greater than or equal to the idle test threshold
(ITT) determined in paragraph (e)(3) of this section plus 6.4 grams per
minute are not eligible for an air conditioning efficiency credit.
(5) Air conditioning systems with compressors that are solely
powered by electricity shall submit Air Conditioning Idle Test
Procedure data to be eligible to generate credits in the 2014 and later
model years, but such systems are not required to meet a specific
threshold to be eligible to generate such credits, as long as the
engine remains off for a period of at least 2 minutes during the air
conditioning on portion of the Idle Test Procedure in Sec. 86.165-
12(d).
(f) AC17 reporting requirements. Manufacturers may use the
provisions of this paragraph (f) as an alternative to the use of the
Air Conditioning Idle Test to demonstrate eligibility to generate air
conditioning efficiency credits for the 2014 through 2016 model years.
This paragraph (f) is required for the 2017 through 2019 model years.
(1) The manufacturer shall perform the AC17 test specified in Sec.
86.167-17 of this part on each unique air conditioning system design
and vehicle platform combination for which the manufacturer intends to
accrue air conditioning efficiency credits. The manufacturer must test
at least one unique air conditioning system within each vehicle
platform in a model year, unless all unique air conditioning systems
within a vehicle platform have been previously tested. A unique air
conditioning system design is a system with unique or substantially
different component designs or types and/or system control strategies
(e.g., fixed-displacement vs. variable displacement compressors,
orifice tube vs. thermostatic expansion valve, single vs. dual
evaporator, etc.). In the first year of such testing, the tested
vehicle configuration shall be the highest production vehicle
configuration within each platform. In subsequent model years the
manufacturer must test other unique air conditioning systems within the
vehicle platform, proceeding from the highest production untested
system until all unique air conditioning systems within the platform
have been tested, or until the vehicle platform experiences a major
redesign. Whenever a new unique air conditioning system is tested, the
highest production configuration using that system shall be the vehicle
selected for testing. Air conditioning system designs which have
similar cooling capacity, component types, and control strategies, yet
differ in terms of compressor pulley ratios or condenser or evaporator
surface areas will not be considered to be unique system designs. The
test results from one unique system design may represent all variants
of that design. Manufacturers must use good engineering judgment to
identify the unique air conditioning system designs which will require
AC17 testing in subsequent model years. Results must be reported
separately for all four phases (two phases with air conditioning off
and two phases with air conditioning on) of the test to the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the results of the calculations
required in Sec. 86.167 paragraphs (m) and (n) must also be reported.
In each subsequent model year additional air conditioning system
designs, if such systems exist, within a vehicle platform that is
generating air conditioning credits must be tested using the AC17
procedure. When all unique air conditioning system designs within a
platform have been tested, no additional testing is required within
that platform, and credits may be carried over to subsequent model
years until there is a significant change in the platform design, at
which point a new sequence of testing must be initiated. No more than
one vehicle from each credit-generating platform is required to be
tested in each model year.
(2) The manufacturer shall also report the following information
for each vehicle tested: the vehicle class, model type, curb weight,
engine displacement, transmission class and configuration, interior
volume, climate control system type and characteristics, refrigerant
used, compressor type, and evaporator/condenser characteristics.
(g) AC17 validation testing and reporting requirements. For the
2020 and later model years, manufacturers must validate air
conditioning credits by using the AC17 Test Procedure according to the
provisions of this paragraph (g).
(1) For each air conditioning system selected by the manufacturer
to generate air conditioning efficiency credits, the manufacturer shall
perform the AC17 Air Conditioning Efficiency Test Procedure specified
in Sec. 86.167-17 of this part, according to the requirements of this
paragraph (g).
(2) Complete the following testing and calculations:
(i) Perform the AC17 test on a vehicle that incorporates the air
conditioning system with the credit-generating technologies.
(ii) Perform the AC17 test on a vehicle which does not incorporate
the credit-generating technologies. The tested vehicle must be similar
to the vehicle tested under paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this section and
selected using good engineering judgment. The tested vehicle may be
from an earlier design generation. If the manufacturer cannot identify
an appropriate vehicle to test under this paragraph (g)(2)(ii), they
may submit an engineering analysis that describes why an appropriate
vehicle is
[[Page 63169]]
not available or not appropriate, and includes data and information
supporting specific credit values, using good engineering judgment.
(iii) Subtract the CO2 emissions determined from testing
under paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section from the CO2
emissions determined from testing under paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this
section and round to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile. If the result is less
than or equal to zero, the air conditioning system is not eligible to
generate credits. If the result is greater than or equal to the total
of the gram per mile credits determined in paragraph (b) of this
section, then the air conditioning system is eligible to generate the
maximum allowable value determined in paragraph (b) of this section. If
the result is greater than zero but less than the total of the gram per
mile credits determined in paragraph (b) of this section, then the air
conditioning system is eligible to generate credits in the amount
determined by subtracting the CO2 emissions determined from
testing under paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section from the
CO2 emissions determined from testing under paragraph
(g)(1)(ii) of this section and rounding to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile.
(3) For the first model year for which an air conditioning system
is expected to generate credits, the manufacturer must select for
testing the projected highest-selling configuration within each
combination of vehicle platform and unique air conditioning system. The
manufacturer must test at least one unique air conditioning system
within each vehicle platform in a model year, unless all unique air
conditioning systems within a vehicle platform have been previously
tested. A unique air conditioning system design is a system with unique
or substantially different component designs or types and/or system
control strategies (e.g., fixed-displacement vs. variable displacement
compressors, orifice tube vs. thermostatic expansion valve, single vs.
dual evaporator, etc.). In the first year of such testing, the tested
vehicle configuration shall be the highest production vehicle
configuration within each platform. In subsequent model years the
manufacturer must test other unique air conditioning systems within the
vehicle platform, proceeding from the highest production untested
system until all unique air conditioning systems within the platform
have been tested, or until the vehicle platform experiences a major
redesign. Whenever a new unique air conditioning system is tested, the
highest production configuration using that system shall be the vehicle
selected for testing. Credits may continue to be generated by the air
conditioning system installed in a vehicle platform provided that:
(i) The air conditioning system components and/or control
strategies do not change in any way that could be expected to cause a
change in its efficiency;
(ii) The vehicle platform does not change in design such that the
changes could be expected to cause a change in the efficiency of the
air conditioning system; and
(iii) The manufacturer continues to test at least one unique air
conditioning system within each platform using the air conditioning
system, in each model year, until all unique air conditioning systems
within each platform have been tested.
(4) Each air conditioning system must be tested and must meet the
testing criteria in order to be allowed to generate credits. Credits
may continue to be generated by an air conditioning system in
subsequent model years if the manufacturer continues to test at least
one unique air conditioning system within each platform on an annual
basis, unless all systems have been previously tested, as long as the
air conditioning system and vehicle platform do not change
substantially.
(h) The following definitions apply to this section:
(1) Reduced reheat, with externally-controlled, variable
displacement compressor means a system in which compressor displacement
is controlled via an electronic signal, based on input from sensors
(e.g., position or setpoint of interior temperature control, interior
temperature, evaporator outlet air temperature, or refrigerant
temperature) and air temperature at the outlet of the evaporator can be
controlled to a level at 41 [deg]F, or higher.
(2) Reduced reheat, with externally-controlled, fixed-displacement
or pneumatic variable displacement compressor means a system in which
the output of either compressor is controlled by cycling the compressor
clutch off-and-on via an electronic signal, based on input from sensors
(e.g., position or setpoint of interior temperature control, interior
temperature, evaporator outlet air temperature, or refrigerant
temperature) and air temperature at the outlet of the evaporator can be
controlled to a level at 41 [deg]F, or higher.
(3) Default to recirculated air mode means that the default
position of the mechanism which controls the source of air supplied to
the air conditioning system shall change from outside air to
recirculated air when the operator or the automatic climate control
system has engaged the air conditioning system (i.e., evaporator is
removing heat), except under those conditions where dehumidification is
required for visibility (i.e., defogger mode). In vehicles equipped
with interior air quality sensors (e.g., humidity sensor, or carbon
dioxide sensor), the controls may determine proper blend of air supply
sources to maintain freshness of the cabin air and prevent fogging of
windows while continuing to maximize the use of recirculated air. At
any time, the vehicle operator may manually select the non-recirculated
air setting during vehicle operation but the system must default to
recirculated air mode on subsequent vehicle operations (i.e., next
vehicle start). The climate control system may delay switching to
recirculation mode until the interior air temperature is less than the
outside air temperature, at which time the system must switch to
recirculated air mode.
(4) Blower motor controls which limit waste energy means a method
of controlling fan and blower speeds which does not use resistive
elements to decrease the voltage supplied to the motor.
(5) Improved condensers and/or evaporators means that the
coefficient of performance (COP) of air conditioning system using
improved evaporator and condenser designs is 10 percent higher, as
determined using the bench test procedures described in SAE J2765
``Procedure for Measuring System COP of a Mobile Air Conditioning
System on a Test Bench,'' when compared to a system using standard, or
prior model year, component designs (SAE J2765 is incorporated by
reference in Sec. 86.1). The manufacturer must submit an engineering
analysis demonstrating the increased improvement of the system relative
to the baseline design, where the baseline component(s) for comparison
is the version which a manufacturer most recently had in production on
the same vehicle design or in a similar or related vehicle model. The
dimensional characteristics (e.g., tube configuration/thickness/
spacing, and fin density) of the baseline component(s) shall be
compared to the new component(s) to demonstrate the improvement in
coefficient of performance.
(6) Oil separator means a mechanism which removes at least 50
percent of the oil entrained in the oil/refrigerant mixture exiting the
compressor and returns it to the compressor housing or compressor
inlet, or a compressor design which does not rely on the circulation of
an oil/refrigerant mixture for lubrication.
[[Page 63170]]
0
22. Section 86.1869-12 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1869-12 CO[bdi2] credits for off-cycle CO2-reducing
technologies.
(a) Manufacturers may generate credits for CO2-reducing
technologies where the CO2 reduction benefit of the
technology is not adequately captured on the Federal Test Procedure
and/or the Highway Fuel Economy Test. These technologies must have a
measurable, demonstrable, and verifiable real-world CO2
reduction that occurs outside the conditions of the Federal Test
Procedure and the Highway Fuel Economy Test. These optional credits are
referred to as ``off-cycle'' credits. Off-cycle technologies used to
generate emission credits are considered emission-related components
subject to applicable requirements, and must be demonstrated to be
effective for the full useful life of the vehicle. Unless the
manufacturer demonstrates that the technology is not subject to in-use
deterioration, the manufacturer must account for the deterioration in
their analysis. Durability evaluations of off-cycle technologies may
occur at any time throughout a model year, provided that the results
can be factored into the data provided in the model year report. Off-
cycle credits may not be approved for crash-avoidance technologies,
safety critical systems or systems affecting safety-critical functions,
or technologies designed for the purpose of reducing the frequency of
vehicle crashes. Off-cycle credits may not be earned for technologies
installed on a motor vehicle to attain compliance with any vehicle
safety standard or any regulation set forth in Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations. The manufacturer must use one of the three options
specified in this section to determine the CO2 gram per mile
credit applicable to an off-cycle technology. Note that the option
provided in paragraph (b) of this section applies only to the 2014 and
later model years. The manufacturer should notify EPA in their pre-
model year report of their intention to generate any credits under this
section.
(b) Credit available for certain off-cycle technologies. The
provisions of this paragraph (b) are applicable only to 2014 and later
model year vehicles. EPA may request data, engineering analyses, or
other information that supports a manufacturer's use of the credits in
this paragraph (b).
(1) The manufacturer may generate a CO2 gram/mile credit
for certain technologies as specified in this paragraph (b)(1).
Technology definitions are in paragraph (b)(4) of this section.
Calculated credit values shall be rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/
mile.
(i) Waste heat recovery. The credit shall be calculated using the
following formula, rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.044
Where:
ELR = the electrical load reduction of the waste heat recovery
system, in Watts, calculated as an average over 5-cycle testing.
(ii) High efficiency exterior lights. Credits may be accrued for
high efficiency lighting as defined in paragraph (b)(4) of this section
based on the lighting locations with such lighting installed. Credits
for high efficiency lighting are the sum of the credits for the
applicable lighting locations in the following table (rounded to the
nearest 0.1 grams/mile), or, if all lighting locations in the table are
equipped with high efficiency lighting, the total credit for high
efficiency lighting shall be 1.0 grams/mile. Lighting components that
result in credit levels less than those shown in the following table
are not eligible for credits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credit (grams/
Lighting Component mile)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low beam................................................ 0.38
High beam............................................... 0.05
Parking/position........................................ 0.10
Turn signal, front...................................... 0.06
Side marker, front...................................... 0.06
Tail.................................................... 0.10
Turn signal, rear....................................... 0.06
Side marker, rear....................................... 0.06
License plate........................................... 0.08
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) Solar panels. (A) Credits for solar panels used solely for
charging the battery of an electric vehicle, plug-in hybrid electric
vehicle, or hybrid electric vehicle shall be calculated using the
following equation, and rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.045
Where:
Ppanel is the is the rated power of the solar panel, in
Watts, determined under the standard test conditions of 1000 Watts
per meter squared direct solar irradiance at a panel temperature of
25 degrees Celsius (+/-2 degrees) with an air mass spectrum of 1.5
(AM1.5).
(B) Credits for solar panels used solely for active vehicle
ventilation systems are those specified in paragraph (b)(1)(viii)(E).
(C) Credits for solar panels used both for active cabin ventilation
and for charging the battery of an electric vehicle, plug-in hybrid
electric vehicle, or hybrid electric vehicle shall be calculated using
the following equation, and rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.046
Where:
Cvent is the credit attributable to active cabin
ventilation from paragraph (b)(1)(viii)(E) of this section;
Ppanel is the is the rated power of the solar panel,
in Watts, determined under the standard test conditions of 1000
Watts per meter squared direct solar irradiance at a panel
temperature of 25 degrees Celsius (+/-2 degrees) with an air mass
spectrum of 1.5 (AM1.5); and
Pvent is the amount of power, in Watts, required to run
the active cabin ventilation system.
(iv) Active aerodynamic improvements. (A) The credit for active
aerodynamic improvements for passenger automobiles shall be calculated
using the following equation, and rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/
mile:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.047
Where:
CDreduced is the percent reduction in the coefficient of
drag (Cd), shown as a value from 0 to 1. The coefficient
of drag shall be determined using good engineering
[[Page 63171]]
judgment consistent with standard industry test methods and
practices.
(B) The credit for active aerodynamic improvements for light trucks
shall be calculated using the following equation, and rounded to the
nearest 0.1 grams/mile:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.048
Where:
CDreduced is the percent reduction in the coefficient of
drag (Cd), shown as a value from 0 to 1. The coefficient
of drag shall be determined using good engineering judgment
consistent with standard industry test methods and practices.
(v) Engine idle start-stop.
(A) The passenger automobile credit for engine idle start-stop
systems is 2.5 grams/mile, provided that the vehicle is equipped with
an electric heater circulation system (or a technology that provides a
similar function). For vehicles not equipped with such systems the
credit is 1.5 grams/mile.
(B) The light truck credit for engine idle start-stop systems is
4.4 grams/mile, provided that the vehicle is equipped with an electric
heater circulation system (or a technology that provides a similar
function). For vehicles not equipped with such systems the credit is
2.9 grams/mile.
(vi) Active transmission warm-up. Systems using a single heat-
exchanging loop that serves both transmission and engine warm-up
functions are eligible for the credits in either paragraph (b)(1)(vi)
or (b)(1)(vii) of this section, but not both.
(A) The passenger automobile credit is 1.5 grams/mile.
(B) The light truck credit is 3.2 grams/mile.
(vii) Active engine warm-up. Systems using a single heat-exchanging
loop that serves both transmission and engine warm-up functions are
eligible for the credits in either paragraph (b)(1)(vi) or (b)(1)(vii)
of this section, but not both.
(A) The passenger automobile credit is 1.5 grams/mile.
(B) The light truck credit is 3.2 grams/mile.
(viii) Thermal control technologies. The maximum credit allowed for
thermal control technologies is limited to 3.0 g/mi for passenger
automobiles and to 4.3 g/mi for light trucks.
(A) Glass or glazing. Glass or glazing credits are calculated using
the following equation, and rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.049
Where:
Credit = the total glass or glazing credits, in grams per mile
rounded to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile. The credit may not exceed 2.9
g/mi for passenger automobiles or 3.9 g/mi for light trucks;
Z = 0.3 for passenger automobiles and 0.4 for light trucks;
Gi = the measured glass area of window i, in square
meters and rounded to the nearest tenth;
G = the total glass area of the vehicle, in square meters and
rounded to the nearest tenth;
Ti = the estimated temperature reduction for the glass area of
window i, determined using the following formula:
Ti = 0.3987 x (Ttsbase - Ttsnew)
Where:
Ttsnew = the total solar transmittance of the glass,
measured according to ISO 13837, ``Safety glazing materials--Method
for determination of solar transmittance'' (incorporated by
reference in Sec. 86.1).
Ttsbase = 62 for the windshield, side-front, side-rear,
rear-quarter, and backlite locations, and 40 for rooflite locations.
(B) Active seat ventilation. The passenger automobile credit is 1.0
grams/mile. The light truck credit is 1.3 grams/mile.
(C) Solar reflective surface coating. The passenger automobile
credit is 0.4 grams/mile. The light truck credit is 0.5 grams/mile.
(D) Passive cabin ventilation. The passenger automobile credit is
1.7 grams/mile. The light truck credit is 2.3 grams/mile.
(E) Active cabin ventilation. The passenger automobile credit is
2.1 grams/mile. The light truck credit is 2.8 grams/mile.
(2) The maximum allowable decrease in the manufacturer's combined
passenger automobile and light truck fleet average CO2
emissions attributable to use of the default credit values in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section is 10 grams per mile. If the total of the
CO2 g/mi credit values from the paragraph (b)(1) of this
section does not exceed 10 g/mi for any passenger automobile or light
truck in a manufacturer's fleet, then the total off-cycle credits may
be calculated according to paragraph (f) of this section. If the total
of the CO2 g/mi credit values from the table in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section exceeds 10 g/mi for any passenger automobile or
light truck in a manufacturer's fleet, then the gram per mile decrease
for the combined passenger automobile and light truck fleet must be
determined according to paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section to
determine whether the 10 g/mi limitation has been exceeded.
(i) Determine the gram per mile decrease for the combined passenger
automobile and light truck fleet using the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.050
Where:
Credits = The total of passenger automobile and light truck credits,
in Megagrams, determined according to paragraph (f) of this section
and limited to those credits accrued by using the default gram per
mile values in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
ProdC = The number of passenger automobiles produced by
the manufacturer and delivered for sale in the U.S.
ProdT = The number of light trucks produced by the
manufacturer and delivered for sale in the U.S.
(ii) If the value determined in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section
is greater than 10 grams per mile, the total credits, in Megagrams,
that may be accrued by a manufacturer using the default gram per mile
values in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall be determined using
the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.051
[[Page 63172]]
Where:
ProdC = The number of passenger automobiles produced by
the manufacturer and delivered for sale in the U.S.
ProdT = The number of light trucks produced by the
manufacturer and delivered for sale in the U.S.
(iii) If the value determined in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this
section is not greater than 10 grams per mile, then the credits that
may be accrued by a manufacturer using the default gram per mile values
in paragraph (b)(1) of this section do not exceed the allowable limit,
and total credits may be determined for each category of vehicles
according to paragraph (f) of this section.
(iv) If the value determined in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section
is greater than 10 grams per mile, then the combined passenger
automobile and light truck credits, in Megagrams, that may be accrued
using the calculations in paragraph (f) of this section must not exceed
the value determined in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section. This
limitation should generally be done by reducing the amount of credits
attributable to the vehicle category that caused the limit to be
exceeded such that the total value does not exceed the value determined
in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section.
(3) In lieu of using the default gram per mile values specified in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section for specific technologies, a
manufacturer may determine an alternative value for any of the
specified technologies. An alternative value must be determined using
one of the methods specified in paragraph (c) or (d) of this section.
(4) Definitions for the purposes of this paragraph (b) are as
follows:
(i) Active aerodynamic improvements means technologies that are
automatically activated under certain conditions to improve aerodynamic
efficiency (e.g., lowering of the coefficient of drag, or Cd), while
preserving other vehicle attributes or functions.
(ii) High efficiency exterior lighting means a lighting technology
that, when installed on the vehicle, is expected to reduce the total
electrical demand of the exterior lighting system when compared to
conventional lighting systems. To be eligible for this credit, the high
efficiency lighting must be installed in one or more of the following
lighting components: low beam, high beam, parking/position, front and
rear turn signals, front and rear side markers, taillights, backup/
reverse lights, and/or license plate lighting.
(iii) Engine idle start-stop means a technology which enables a
vehicle to automatically turn off the engine when the vehicle comes to
a rest and restarts the engine when the driver applies pressure to the
accelerator or releases the brake. Off-cycle engine start-stop credits
will only be allowed for a vehicle if the Administrator has made a
determination under the testing and calculation provisions in 40 CFR
Part 600 that engine start-stop is the predominant operating mode for
that vehicle.
(iv) Solar panels means the external installation of horizontally-
oriented solar panels, with direct and unimpeded solar exposure to an
overhead sun, on an electric vehicle, a plug-in hybrid electric
vehicle, a fuel cell vehicle, or a hybrid electric vehicle, such that
the solar energy is used to provide energy to the electric drive system
of the vehicle by charging the battery or directly providing power to
the electric motor or to essential vehicle systems (e.g., cabin heating
or cooling/ventilation). The rated power of the solar panels used to
determine the credit value must be determined under the standard test
conditions of 1,000 W/m\2\ direct solar irradiance at a panel
temperature of 25 +/-2[deg] C with an air mass of 1.5 spectrum (AM1.5).
(v) Active transmission warmup means a system that uses waste heat
from the vehicle to quickly warm the transmission fluid to an operating
temperature range using a heat exchanger, increasing the overall
transmission efficiency by reducing parasitic losses associated with
the transmission fluid, such as losses related to friction and fluid
viscosity.
(vi) Active engine warmup means a system that uses waste heat from
the vehicle to warm up targeted parts of the engine so that it reduces
engine friction losses and enables the closed-loop fuel control more
quickly. It allows a faster transition from cold operation to warm
operation, decreasing CO2 emissions, and increasing fuel
economy.
(vii) Waste heat recovery means a system that captures heat that
would otherwise be lost through the engine, exhaust system, or the
radiator or other sources and converting that heat to electrical energy
that is used to meet the electrical requirements of the vehicle or used
to augment the warming of other load reduction technologies (e.g.,
cabin warming, active engine or transmission warm-up technologies). The
amount of energy recovered is the average value over 5-cycle testing.
(viii) Active seat ventilation means a device which draws air,
pushes or forces air, or otherwise transfers heat from the seating
surface which is in contact with the seat occupant and exhausts it to a
location away from the seat. At a minimum, the driver and front
passenger seat must utilize this technology for a vehicle to be
eligible for credit.
(ix) Solar reflective surface coating means a vehicle paint or
other surface coating which reflects at least 65 percent of the
impinging infrared solar energy, as determined using ASTM standards
E903, E1918-06, or C1549-09 (incorporated by reference in Sec. 86.1).
The coating must be applied at a minimum to all of the approximately
horizontal surfaces of the vehicle that border the passenger and
luggage compartments of the vehicle, (e.g., the rear deck lid and the
cabin roof).
(x) Passive cabin ventilation means ducts, devices, or methods
which utilize convective airflow to move heated air from the cabin
interior to the exterior of the vehicle.
(xi) Active cabin ventilation means devices which mechanically move
heated air from the cabin interior to the exterior of the vehicle.
(xii) Electric heater circulation system means a system installed
in a vehicle equipped with an engine idle start-stop system that
continues to circulate heated air to the cabin when the engine is
stopped during a stop-start event. This system must be calibrated to
keep the engine off for a minimum of one minute when the external
ambient temperature is 30 [deg]F and when cabin heating is enabled.
(c) Technology demonstration using EPA 5-cycle methodology. To
demonstrate an off-cycle technology and to determine a CO2
credit using the EPA 5-cycle methodology, the manufacturer shall
determine the off-cycle city/highway combined carbon-related exhaust
emissions benefit by using the EPA 5-cycle methodology described in 40
CFR Part 600. This method may not be used for technologies that include
elements (e.g., driver-selectable systems) that require additional
analyses, data collection, projections, or modeling, or other
assessments to determine a national average benefit of the technology.
Testing shall be performed on a representative vehicle, selected using
good engineering judgment, for each model type for which the credit is
being demonstrated. The emission benefit of a technology is determined
by testing both with and without the off-cycle technology operating. If
a specific technology is not expected to change emissions on one of the
five test procedures, the manufacturer may submit an engineering
analysis to the EPA that demonstrates that the
[[Page 63173]]
technology has no effect. If EPA concurs with the analysis, then
multiple tests are not required using that test procedure; instead,
only one of that test procedure shall be required--either with or
without the technology installed and operating--and that single value
will be used for all of the 5-cycle weighting calculations. Multiple
off-cycle technologies may be demonstrated on a test vehicle. The
manufacturer shall conduct the following steps and submit all test data
to the EPA.
(1) Testing without the off-cycle technology installed and/or
operating. Determine carbon-related exhaust emissions over the FTP, the
HFET, the US06, the SC03, and the cold temperature FTP test procedures
according to the test procedure provisions specified in 40 CFR part 600
subpart B and using the calculation procedures specified in Sec.
600.113-12 of this chapter. Run each of these tests a minimum of three
times without the off-cycle technology installed and operating and
average the per phase (bag) results for each test procedure. Calculate
the 5-cycle weighted city/highway combined carbon-related exhaust
emissions from the averaged per phase results, where the 5-cycle city
value is weighted 55% and the 5-cycle highway value is weighted 45%.
The resulting combined city/highway value is the baseline 5-cycle
carbon-related exhaust emission value for the vehicle.
(2) Testing with the off-cycle technology installed and/or
operating. Determine carbon-related exhaust emissions over the US06,
the SC03, and the cold temperature FTP test procedures according to the
test procedure provisions specified in 40 CFR part 600 subpart B and
using the calculation procedures specified in Sec. 600.113-12 of this
chapter. Run each of these tests a minimum of three times with the off-
cycle technology installed and operating and average the per phase
(bag) results for each test procedure. Calculate the 5-cycle weighted
city/highway combined carbon-related exhaust emissions from the
averaged per phase results, where the 5-cycle city value is weighted
55% and the 5-cycle highway value is weighted 45%. Use the averaged per
phase results for the FTP and HFET determined in paragraph (c)(1) of
this section for operation without the off-cycle technology in this
calculation. The resulting combined city/highway value is the 5-cycle
carbon-related exhaust emission value including the off-cycle benefit
of the technology but excluding any benefit of the technology on the
FTP and HFET.
(3) Subtract the combined city/highway value determined in
paragraph (c)(1) of this section from the value determined in paragraph
(c)(2) of this section and round to the nearest 0.1 grams/mile. The
result is the off-cycle benefit of the technology or technologies being
evaluated, subject to EPA approval.
(4) Submit all test values to EPA, and include an engineering
analysis describing the technology and how it provides off-cycle
emission benefits. EPA may request additional testing if we determine
that additional testing would be likely to provide significantly
greater confidence in the estimates of off-cycle technology benefits.
(d) Technology demonstration using alternative EPA-approved
methodology. (1) This option may be used only with EPA approval, and
the manufacturer must be able to justify to the Administrator why the
5-cycle option described in paragraph (c) of this section
insufficiently characterizes the effectiveness of the off-cycle
technology. In cases where the EPA 5-cycle methodology described in
paragraph (c) of this section cannot adequately measure the emission
reduction attributable to an off-cycle technology, the manufacturer may
develop an alternative approach. Prior to a model year in which a
manufacturer intends to seek these credits, the manufacturer must
submit a detailed analytical plan to EPA. The manufacturer may seek EPA
input on the proposed methodology prior to conducting testing or
analytical work, and EPA will provide input on the manufacturer's
analytical plan. The alternative demonstration program must be approved
in advance by the Administrator and should:
(i) Use modeling, on-road testing, on-road data collection, or
other approved analytical or engineering methods;
(ii) Be robust, verifiable, and capable of demonstrating the real-
world emissions benefit with strong statistical significance;
(iii) Result in a demonstration of baseline and controlled
emissions over a wide range of driving conditions and number of
vehicles such that issues of data uncertainty are minimized;
(iv) Result in data on a model type basis unless the manufacturer
demonstrates that another basis is appropriate and adequate.
(2) Notice and opportunity for public comment. The Administrator
will publish a notice of availability in the Federal Register notifying
the public of a manufacturer's proposed alternative off-cycle credit
calculation methodology. The notice will include details regarding the
proposed methodology, but will not include any Confidential Business
Information. The notice will include instructions on how to comment on
the methodology. The Administrator will take public comments into
consideration in the final determination, and will notify the public of
the final determination. Credits may not be accrued using an approved
methodology until the first model year for which the Administrator has
issued a final approval.
(3) With respect to fuel consumption improvement values applicable
to the determination of average fuel economy under 600.510-12(c)(3) for
the 2017 and later model years, EPA will consult with the U.S.
Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, prior to making a decision on a manufacturer's
application submitted under the requirements of this paragraph (d).
(e) Review and approval process for off-cycle credits. (1) Initial
steps required. (i) A manufacturer requesting off-cycle credits under
the provisions of paragraph (c) of this section must conduct the
testing and/or simulation described in that paragraph.
(ii) A manufacturer requesting off-cycle credits under the
provisions of paragraph (d) of this section must develop a methodology
for demonstrating and determining the benefit of the off-cycle
technology, and carry out any necessary testing and analysis required
to support that methodology.
(iii) A manufacturer requesting off-cycle credits under paragraphs
(b), (c), or (d) of this section must conduct testing and/or prepare
engineering analyses that demonstrate the in-use durability of the
technology for the full useful life of the vehicle.
(2) Data and information requirements. The manufacturer seeking
off-cycle credits must submit an application for off-cycle credits
determined under paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section. The
application must contain the following:
(i) A detailed description of the off-cycle technology and how it
functions to reduce CO2 emissions under conditions not
represented on the FTP and HFET.
(ii) A list of the vehicle model(s) which will be equipped with the
technology.
(iii) A detailed description of the test vehicles selected and an
engineering analysis that supports the selection of those vehicles for
testing.
(iv) All testing and/or simulation data required under paragraph
(c) or (d) of this section, as applicable, plus any other data the
manufacturer has considered in the analysis.
[[Page 63174]]
(v) For credits under paragraph (d) of this section, a complete
description of the methodology used to estimate the off-cycle benefit
of the technology and all supporting data, including vehicle testing
and in-use activity data.
(vi) An estimate of the off-cycle benefit by vehicle model and the
fleetwide benefit based on projected sales of vehicle models equipped
with the technology.
(vii) An engineering analysis and/or component durability testing
data or whole vehicle testing data demonstrating the in-use durability
of the off-cycle technology components.
(3) EPA review of the off-cycle credit application. Upon receipt of
an application from a manufacturer, EPA will do the following:
(i) Review the application for completeness and notify the
manufacturer within 30 days if additional information is required.
(ii) Review the data and information provided in the application to
determine if the application supports the level of credits estimated by
the manufacturer.
(iii) For credits under paragraph (d) of this section, EPA will
make the application available to the public for comment, as described
in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, within 60 days of receiving a
complete application. The public review period will be specified as 30
days, during which time the public may submit comments. Manufacturers
may submit a written rebuttal of comments for EPA consideration or may
revise their application in response to comments. A revised application
should be submitted after the end of the public review period, and EPA
will review the application as if it was a new application submitted
under this paragraph (e)(3).
(4) EPA decision. (i) For credits under paragraph (c) of this
section, EPA will notify the manufacturer of its decision within 60
days of receiving a complete application.
(ii) For credits under paragraph (d) of this section, EPA will
notify the manufacturer of its decision after reviewing and evaluating
the public comments. EPA will make the decision and rationale available
to the public.
(iii) EPA will notify the manufacturer in writing of its decision
to approve or deny the application, and will provide the reasons for
the decision. EPA will make the decision and rationale available to the
public.
(f) Calculation of total off-cycle credits. Total off-cycle credits
in Megagrams of CO2 (rounded to the nearest whole number)
shall be calculated separately for passenger automobiles and light
trucks according to the following formula:
Total Credits (Megagrams) = (Credit x Production x VLM) / 1,000,000
Where:
Credit = the credit value in grams per mile determined in paragraph
(d)(1), (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this section.
Production = The total number of passenger automobiles or light
trucks, whichever is applicable, produced with the off-cycle
technology to which to the credit value determined in paragraph (b),
(c), or (d) of this section applies.
VLM = vehicle lifetime miles, which for passenger automobiles shall
be 195,264 and for light trucks shall be 225,865.
0
23. Section 86.1870-12 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1870-12 CO2 credits for qualifying full-size
pickup trucks.
Full-size pickup trucks may be eligible for additional credits
based on the implementation of hybrid technologies or on exhaust
emission performance, as described in this section. Credits may be
generated under either paragraph (a) or (b) of this section for a
qualifying pickup truck, but not both.
(a) Credits for implementation of hybrid electric technology. Full
size pickup trucks that implement hybrid electric technologies may be
eligible for an additional credit under this paragraph (a). Pickup
trucks earning the credits under this paragraph (a) may not earn the
credits described in paragraph (b) of this section. To claim this
credit the manufacturer must measure the recovered energy over the
Federal Test Procedure according to Sec. 600.116-12(c) to determine
whether a vehicle is a mild or strong hybrid electric vehicle. To
provide for EPA testing, the vehicle must be able to broadcast battery
pack voltage via an on-board diagnostics parameter ID channel.
(1) Full size pickup trucks that are mild hybrid electric vehicles
and that are produced in the 2017 through 2021 model years are eligible
for a credit of 10 grams/mile. To receive this credit in a model year,
the manufacturer must produce a quantity of mild hybrid electric full
size pickup trucks such that the proportion of production of such
vehicles, when compared to the manufacturer's total production of full
size pickup trucks, is not less than the amount specified in the table
below for that model year.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Required
minimum
percent of
Model year full size
pickup
trucks
(percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017....................................................... 20
2018....................................................... 30
2019....................................................... 55
2020....................................................... 70
2021....................................................... 80
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Full size pickup trucks that are strong hybrid electric
vehicles and that are produced in the 2017 through 2025 model years are
eligible for a credit of 20 grams/mile. To receive this credit in a
model year, the manufacturer must produce a quantity of strong hybrid
electric full size pickup trucks such that the proportion of production
of such vehicles, when compared to the manufacturer's total production
of full size pickup trucks, is not less than 10 percent in that model
year.
(b) Credits for emission reduction performance. Full size pickup
trucks that achieve carbon-related exhaust emission values below the
applicable target value determined in Sec. 86.1818-12(c)(3) may be
eligible for an additional credit. For the purposes of this paragraph
(b), carbon-related exhaust emission values may include any applicable
air conditioning leakage and/or efficiency credits as determined in
Sec. 86.1867 and Sec. 86.1868. Pickup trucks earning the credits
under this paragraph (b) may not earn credits described in paragraph
(a) of this section and may not earn credits based on the production
multipliers described in Sec. 86.1866-12(b).
(1) Full size pickup trucks that are produced in the 2017 through
2021 model years and that achieve carbon-related exhaust emissions less
than or equal to the applicable target value determined in Sec.
86.1818-12(c)(3) multiplied by 0.85 (rounded to the nearest gram/mile)
and greater than the applicable target value determined in Sec.
86.1818-12(c)(3) multiplied by 0.80 (rounded to the nearest gram/mile)
in a model year are eligible for a credit of 10 grams/mile. A pickup
truck that qualifies for this credit in a model year may claim this
credit for subsequent model years through the 2021 model year if the
carbon-related exhaust emissions of that pickup truck do not increase
relative to the emissions in the model year in which the pickup truck
qualified for the credit. To qualify for this credit in a model year,
the manufacturer must produce a quantity of full size pickup trucks
that meet the initial emission eligibility requirements
[[Page 63175]]
of this paragraph (b)(1) such that the proportion of production of such
vehicles, when compared to the manufacturer's total production of full
size pickup trucks, is not less than the amount specified in the table
below for that model year.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Required
minimum
percent of
Model year full size
pickup
truck
(percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017....................................................... 15
2018....................................................... 20
2019....................................................... 28
2020....................................................... 35
2021....................................................... 40
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Full size pickup trucks that are produced in the 2017 through
2025 model years and that achieve carbon-related exhaust emissions less
than or equal to the applicable target value determined in Sec.
86.1818-12(c)(3) multiplied by 0.80 (rounded to the nearest gram/mile)
in a model year are eligible for a credit of 20 grams/mile. A pickup
truck that qualifies for this credit in a model year may claim this
credit for a maximum of four subsequent model years (a total of five
consecutive model years) if the carbon-related exhaust emissions of
that pickup truck do not increase relative to the emissions in the
model year in which the pickup truck first qualified for the credit.
This credit may not be claimed in any model year after 2025. To qualify
for this credit in a model year, the manufacturer must produce a
quantity of full size pickup trucks that meet the emission requirements
of this paragraph (b)(2) such that the proportion of production of such
vehicles, when compared to the manufacturer's total production of full
size pickup trucks, is not less than 10 percent in that model year. A
pickup truck that qualifies for this credit in a model year and is
subject to a major redesign in a subsequent model year such that it
qualifies for the credit in the model year of the redesign may be
allowed to qualify for an additional five years (not to go beyond the
2025 model year) with the approval of the Administrator. Use good
engineering judgment to determine whether a pickup truck has been
subject to a major redesign.
(c) Calculation of total full size pickup truck credits. Total
credits in Megagrams of CO2 (rounded to the nearest whole
number) shall be calculated for qualifying full size pickup trucks
according to the following formula:
Total Credits (Megagrams) = ([(10 x ProductionMHEV) + (10 x
ProductionT15) + (20 x ProductionSHEV) + (20 x
ProductionT20)] x 225,865) / 1,000,000
Where:
ProductionMHEV = The total number of mild hybrid electric
full size pickup trucks produced with a credit value of 10 grams per
mile from paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
ProductionT15 = The total number of full size pickup
trucks produced with a performance-based credit value of 10 grams
per mile from paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
ProductionSHEV = The total number of strong hybrid
electric full size pickup trucks produced with a credit value of 20
grams per mile from paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
ProductionT20 = The total number of full size pickup
trucks produced with a performance-based credit value of 20 grams
per mile from paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
0
24. Section 86.1871-12 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 86.1871-12 Optional early CO2 credit programs.
Manufacturers may optionally generate CO2 credits in the
2009 through 2011 model years for use in the 2012 and later model years
subject to EPA approval and to the provisions of this section.
Manufacturers may generate early fleet average credits, air
conditioning leakage credits, air conditioning efficiency credits,
early advanced technology credits, and early off-cycle technology
credits. Manufacturers generating any credits under this section must
submit an early credits report to the Administrator as required in this
section. The terms ``sales'' and ``sold'' as used in this section shall
mean vehicles produced for U.S. sale, where ``U.S.'' means the states
and territories of the United States.
(a) Early fleet average CO2 reduction credits.
Manufacturers may optionally generate credits for reductions in their
fleet average CO2 emissions achieved in the 2009 through
2011 model years. To generate early fleet average CO2
reduction credits, manufacturers must select one of the four pathways
described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section. The
manufacturer may select only one pathway, and that pathway must remain
in effect for the 2009 through 2011 model years. Fleet average credits
(or debits) must be calculated and reported to EPA for each model year
under each selected pathway. Early credits are subject to five year
carry-forward restrictions based on the model year in which the credits
are generated.
(1) Pathway 1. To earn credits under this pathway, the manufacturer
shall calculate an average carbon-related exhaust emission value to the
nearest one gram per mile for the classes of motor vehicles identified
in this paragraph (a)(1), and the results of such calculations will be
reported to the Administrator for use in determining compliance with
the applicable CO2 early credit threshold values.
(i) An average carbon-related exhaust emission value calculation
will be made for the combined LDV/LDT1 averaging set, where the terms
LDV and LDT1 are as defined in Sec. 86.1803.
(ii) An average carbon-related exhaust emission value calculation
will be made for the combined LDT2/HLDT/MDPV averaging set, where the
terms LDT2, HLDT, and MDPV are as defined in Sec. 86.1803.
(iii) Average carbon-related exhaust emission values shall be
determined according to the provisions of Sec. 600.510-12 of this
chapter, except that:
(A) [Reserved]
(B) The average carbon-related exhaust emissions for alcohol fueled
model types shall be calculated according to the provisions of Sec.
600.510-12(j)(2)(ii)(B) of this chapter, without the use of the 0.15
multiplicative factor.
(C) The average carbon-related exhaust emissions for natural gas
fueled model types shall be calculated according to the provisions of
Sec. 600.510-12(j)(2)(iii)(B) of this chapter, without the use of the
0.15 multiplicative factor.
(D) The average carbon-related exhaust emissions for alcohol dual
fueled model types shall be the value measured using gasoline or diesel
fuel, as applicable, and shall be calculated according to the
provisions of Sec. 600.510-12(j)(2)(vi) of this chapter, without the
use of the 0.15 multiplicative factor and with F = 0. For the 2010 and
2011 model years only, if the California Air Resources Board has
approved a manufacturer's request to use a non-zero value of F, the
manufacturer may use such an approved value.
(E) The average carbon-related exhaust emissions for natural gas
dual fueled model types shall be the value measured using gasoline or
diesel fuel, as applicable, and shall be calculated according to the
provisions of Sec. 600.510-12(j)(2)(vii) of this chapter, without the
use of the 0.15 multiplicative factor and with F = 0. For the 2010 and
2011 model years only, if
[[Page 63176]]
the California Air Resources Board has approved a manufacturer's
request to use a non-zero value of F, the manufacturer may use such an
approved value.
(F) Carbon-related exhaust emission values for electric, fuel cell,
and plug-in hybrid electric model types shall be included in the fleet
average determined under paragraph (a)(1) of this section only to the
extent that such vehicles are not being used to generate early advanced
technology vehicle credits under paragraph (c) of this section.
(iv) Fleet average CO2 credit threshold values.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LDT2/HLDT/
Model year LDV/LDT1 MDPV
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009............................................. 323 439
2010............................................. 301 420
2011............................................. 267 390
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(v) Credits are earned on the last day of the model year.
Manufacturers must calculate, for a given model year, the number of
credits or debits it has generated according to the following equation,
rounded to the nearest megagram:
CO2 Credits or Debits (Mg) = [(CO2 Credit
Threshold - Manufacturer's Sales Weighted Fleet Average CO2
Emissions) x (Total Number of Vehicles Sold) x (Vehicle Lifetime
Miles)] / 1,000,000
Where:
CO2 Credit Threshold = the applicable credit threshold
value for the model year and vehicle averaging set as determined by
paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section;
Manufacturer's Sales Weighted Fleet Average CO2 Emissions
= average calculated according to paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this
section;
Total Number of Vehicles Sold = The number of vehicles domestically
sold as defined in Sec. 600.511-80 of this chapter; and
Vehicle Lifetime Miles is 195,264 for the LDV/LDT1 averaging set and
225,865 for the LDT2/HLDT/MDPV averaging set.
(vi) Deficits generated against the applicable CO2
credit threshold values in paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section in any
averaging set for any of the 2009-2011 model years must be offset using
credits accumulated by any averaging set in any of the 2009-2011 model
years before determining the number of credits that may be carried
forward to the 2012. Deficit carry forward and credit banking
provisions of Sec. 86.1865-12 apply to early credits earned under this
paragraph (a)(1), except that deficits may not be carried forward from
any of the 2009-2011 model years into the 2012 model year, and credits
earned in the 2009 model year may not be traded to other manufacturers.
(2) Pathway 2. To earn credits under this pathway, manufacturers
shall calculate an average carbon-related exhaust emission value to the
nearest one gram per mile for the classes of motor vehicles identified
in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, and the results of such
calculations will be reported to the Administrator for use in
determining compliance with the applicable CO2 early credit
threshold values.
(i) Credits under this pathway shall be calculated according to the
provisions of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, except credits may only
be generated by vehicles sold in a model year in California and in
states with a section 177 program in effect in that model year. For the
purposes of this section, ``section 177 program'' means State
regulations or other laws that apply to vehicle emissions from any of
the following categories of motor vehicles: Passenger automobiles,
light-duty trucks up through 6,000 pounds GVWR, and medium-duty
vehicles from 6,001 to 14,000 pounds GVWR, as these categories of motor
vehicles are defined in the California Code of Regulations, Title 13,
Division 3, Chapter 1, Article 1, Section 1900.
(ii) A deficit in any averaging set for any of the 2009-2011 model
years must be offset using credits accumulated by any averaging set in
any of the 2009-2011 model years before determining the number of
credits that may be carried forward to the 2012 model year. Deficit
carry forward and credit banking provisions of Sec. 86.1865-12 apply
to early credits earned under this paragraph (a)(1), except that
deficits may not be carried forward from any of the 2009-2011 model
years into the 2012 model year, and credits earned in the 2009 model
year may not be traded to other manufacturers.
(3) Pathway 3. Pathway 3 credits are those credits earned under
Pathway 2 as described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section in
California and in the section 177 states determined in paragraph
(a)(2)(i) of this section, combined with additional credits earned in
the set of states that does not include California and the section 177
states determined in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section and calculated
according to this paragraph (a)(3).
(i) Manufacturers shall earn additional credits under Pathway 3 by
calculating an average carbon-related exhaust emission value to the
nearest one gram per mile for the classes of motor vehicles identified
in this paragraph (a)(3). The results of such calculations will be
reported to the Administrator for use in determining compliance with
the applicable CO2 early credit threshold values.
(ii) An average carbon-related exhaust emission value calculation
will be made for the passenger automobile averaging set. The term
``passenger automobile'' shall have the meaning given by the Department
of Transportation at 49 CFR 523.4 for the specific model year for which
the calculation is being made.
(iii) An average carbon-related exhaust emission value calculation
will be made for the light truck averaging set. The term ``light
truck'' shall have the meaning given by the Department of
Transportation at 49 CFR 523.5 for the specific model year for which
the calculation is being made.
(iv) Average carbon-related exhaust emission values shall be
determined according to the provisions of Sec. 600.510-12 of this
chapter, except that:
(A) Vehicles sold in California and the section 177 states
determined in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section shall not be
included.
(B) The average carbon-related exhaust emissions for alcohol fueled
model types shall be calculated according to the provisions of Sec.
600.510-12(j)(2)(ii)(B) of this chapter, without the use of the 0.15
multiplicative factor.
(C) The average carbon-related exhaust emissions for natural gas
fueled model types shall be calculated according to the provisions of
Sec. 600.510-12(j)(2)(iii)(B) of this chapter, without the use of the
0.15 multiplicative factor.
(D) The average carbon-related exhaust emissions for alcohol dual
fueled model types shall be calculated according to the provisions of
Sec. 600.510-12(j)(2)(vi) of this chapter, without the use of the 0.15
multiplicative factor and with F = 0.
(E) The average carbon-related exhaust emissions for natural gas
dual fueled model types shall be calculated according to the provisions
of Sec. 600.510-12(j)(2)(vii) of this chapter, without the use of the
0.15 multiplicative factor and with F = 0.
(F) Electric, fuel cell, and plug-in hybrid electric model type
carbon-related exhaust emission values shall be included in the fleet
average determined under paragraph (a)(1) of this section only to the
extent that such vehicles are not being used to generate early advanced
technology vehicle credits under paragraph (c) of this section.
(v) Pathway 3 fleet average CO2 credit threshold values.
(A) For 2009 and 2010 model year passenger automobiles, the fleet
average
[[Page 63177]]
CO2 credit threshold value is 323 grams/mile.
(B) For 2009 model year light trucks the fleet average
CO2 credit threshold value is 381 grams/mile, or, if the
manufacturer chose to optionally meet an alternative manufacturer-
specific light truck fuel economy standard calculated under 49 CFR
533.5 for the 2009 model year, the gram per mile fleet average
CO2 credit threshold shall be the CO2 value
determined by dividing 8887 by that alternative manufacturer-specific
fuel economy standard and rounding to the nearest whole gram per mile.
(C) For 2010 model year light trucks the fleet average
CO2 credit threshold value is 376 grams/mile, or, if the
manufacturer chose to optionally meet an alternative manufacturer-
specific light truck fuel economy standard calculated under 49 CFR
533.5 for the 2010 model year, the gram per mile fleet average
CO2 credit threshold shall be the CO2 value
determined by dividing 8887 by that alternative manufacturer-specific
fuel economy standard and rounding to the nearest whole gram per mile.
(D) For 2011 model year passenger automobiles the fleet average
CO2 credit threshold value is the value determined by
dividing 8887 by the manufacturer-specific passenger automobile fuel
economy standard for the 2011 model year determined under 49 CFR 531.5
and rounding to the nearest whole gram per mile.
(E) For 2011 model year light trucks the fleet average
CO2 credit threshold value is the value determined by
dividing 8887 by the manufacturer-specific light truck fuel economy
standard for the 2011 model year determined under 49 CFR 533.5 and
rounding to the nearest whole gram per mile.
(vi) Credits are earned on the last day of the model year.
Manufacturers must calculate, for a given model year, the number of
credits or debits it has generated according to the following equation,
rounded to the nearest megagram:
CO2 Credits or Debits (Mg) = [(CO2 Credit
Threshold - Manufacturer's Sales Weighted Fleet Average CO2
Emissions) x (Total Number of Vehicles Sold) x (Vehicle Lifetime
Miles)] / 1,000,000
Where:
CO2 Credit Threshold = the applicable credit threshold
value for the model year and vehicle averaging set as determined by
paragraph (a)(3)(v) of this section.
Manufacturer's Sales Weighted Fleet Average CO2 Emissions
= average calculated according to paragraph (a)(3)(iv) of this
section.
Total Number of Vehicles Sold = The number of vehicles domestically
sold as defined in Sec. 600.511 of this chapter except that
vehicles sold in California and the section 177 states determined in
paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section shall not be included.
Vehicle Lifetime Miles is 195,264 for the LDV/LDT1 averaging set and
225,865 for the LDT2/HLDT/MDPV averaging set.
(vii) Deficits in any averaging set for any of the 2009-2011 model
years must be offset using credits accumulated by any averaging set in
any of the 2009-2011 model years before determining the number of
credits that may be carried forward to the 2012. Deficit carry forward
and credit banking provisions of Sec. 86.1865-12 apply to early
credits earned under this paragraph (a)(3), except that deficits may
not be carried forward from any of the 2009-2011 model years into the
2012 model year, and credits earned in the 2009 model year may not be
traded to other manufacturers.
(4) Pathway 4. Pathway 4 credits are those credits earned under
Pathway 3 as described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section in the set
of states that does not include California and the section 177 states
determined in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section and calculated
according to paragraph (a)(3) of this section. Credits may only be
generated by vehicles sold in the set of states that does not include
California and the section 177 states determined in paragraph (a)(2)(i)
of this section.
(b) Early air conditioning leakage and efficiency credits. (1)
Manufacturers may optionally generate air conditioning refrigerant
leakage credits according to the provisions of Sec. 86.1867 and/or air
conditioning efficiency credits according to the provisions of Sec.
86.1868 in model years 2009 through 2011. The early credits are subject
to five year carry forward limits based on the model year in which the
credits are generated. Credits must be tracked by model type and model
year.
(2) Manufacturers must be participating in one of the early fleet
average credit pathways described in paragraphs (a)(1), (2), or (3) of
this section in order to generate early air conditioning credits for
vehicles sold in California and the section 177 states as determined in
paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section. Manufacturers that select Pathway
4 as described in paragraph (a)(4) of this section may not generate
early air conditioning credits for vehicles sold in California and the
section 177 states as determined in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this
section. Manufacturers not participating in one of the early fleet
average credit pathways described in this section may generate early
air conditioning credits only for vehicles sold in states other than in
California and the section 177 states as determined in paragraph
(a)(2)(i) of this section.
(c) Early advanced technology vehicle incentive. Vehicles eligible
for this incentive are electric vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, and plug-
in hybrid electric vehicles, as those terms are defined in Sec.
86.1803-01. If a manufacturer chooses to not include electric vehicles,
fuel cell vehicles, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in their fleet
averages calculated under any of the early credit pathways described in
paragraph (a) of this section, the manufacturer may generate early
advanced technology vehicle credits pursuant to this paragraph (c).
(1) The manufacturer shall record the sales and carbon-related
exhaust emission values of eligible vehicles by model type and model
year for model years 2009 through 2011 and report these values to the
Administrator under paragraph (e) of this section.
(2) Manufacturers may use the 2009 through 2011 eligible vehicles
in their fleet average calculations starting with the 2012 model year,
subject to a five-year carry-forward limitation.
(i) Eligible 2009 model year vehicles may be used in the
calculation of a manufacturer's fleet average carbon-related exhaust
emissions in the 2012 through 2014 model years.
(ii) Eligible 2010 model year vehicles may be used in the
calculation of a manufacturer's fleet average carbon-related exhaust
emissions in the 2012 through 2015 model years.
(iii) Eligible 2011 model year vehicles may be used in the
calculation of a manufacturer's fleet average carbon-related exhaust
emissions in the 2012 through 2016 model years.
(3)(i) To use the advanced technology vehicle incentive, the
manufacturer will apply the 2009, 2010, and/or 2011 model type sales
volumes and their model type emission levels to the manufacturer's
fleet average calculation.
(ii) The early advanced technology vehicle incentive must be used
to offset a deficit in one of the 2012 through 2016 model years, as
appropriate under paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
(iii) The advanced technology vehicle sales and emission values may
be included in a fleet average calculation for passenger automobiles or
light trucks, but may not be used to generate credits in the model year
in which they are included or in the averaging set in which they are
used. Use of early
[[Page 63178]]
advanced technology vehicle credits is limited to offsetting a deficit
that would otherwise be generated without the use of those credits.
Manufacturers shall report the use of such credits in their model year
report for the model year in which the credits are used.
(4) Manufacturers may use zero grams/mile to represent the carbon-
related exhaust emission values for the electric operation of 2009
through 2011 model year electric vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, and
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles subject to the limitations in Sec.
86.1866. The 2009 through 2011 model year vehicles using zero grams per
mile shall count against the 200,000 or 300,000 caps on use of this
credit value, whichever is applicable under Sec. 86.1866.
(d) Early off-cycle technology credits. Manufacturers may
optionally generate credits for the implementation of certain
CO2-reducing technologies according to the provisions of
Sec. 86.1869 in model years 2009 through 2011. The early credits are
subject to five year carry forward limits based on the model year in
which the credits are generated. Credits must be tracked by model type
and model year.
(e) Early credit reporting requirements. Each manufacturer shall
submit a report to the Administrator, known as the early credits
report, that reports the credits earned in the 2009 through 2011 model
years under this section.
(1) The report shall contain all information necessary for the
calculation of the manufacturer's early credits in each of the 2009
through 2011 model years.
(2) The early credits report shall be in writing, signed by the
authorized representative of the manufacturer and shall be submitted no
later than 90 days after the end of the 2011 model year.
(3) Manufacturers using one of the optional early fleet average
CO2 reduction credit pathways described in paragraph (a) of
this section shall report the following information separately for the
appropriate averaging sets (e.g. LDV/LDT1 and LDT2/HLDT/MDPV averaging
sets for pathways 1 and 2; LDV, LDT/2011 MDPV, LDV/LDT1 and LDT2/HLDT/
MDPV averaging sets for Pathway 3; LDV and LDT/2011 MDPV averaging sets
for Pathway 4):
(i) The pathway that they have selected (1, 2, 3, or 4).
(ii) A carbon-related exhaust emission value for each model type of
the manufacturer's product line calculated according to paragraph (a)
of this section.
(iii) The manufacturer's average carbon-related exhaust emission
value calculated according to paragraph (a) of this section for the
applicable averaging set and region and all data required to complete
this calculation.
(iv) The credits earned for each averaging set, model year, and
region, as applicable.
(4) Manufacturers calculating early air conditioning leakage and/or
efficiency credits under paragraph (b) of this section shall report the
following information for each model year separately for passenger
automobiles and light trucks and for each air conditioning system used
to generate credits:
(i) A description of the air conditioning system.
(ii) The leakage and efficiency credit values and all the
information required to determine these values.
(iii) The total credits earned for each averaging set, model year,
and region, as applicable.
(5) Manufacturers calculating early advanced technology vehicle
credits under paragraph (c) of this section shall report, for each
model year and separately for passenger automobiles and light trucks,
the following information:
(i) The number of each model type of eligible vehicle produced.
(ii) The carbon-related exhaust emission value by model type and
model year.
(6) Manufacturers calculating early off-cycle technology credits
under paragraph (d) of this section shall report, for each model year
and separately for passenger automobiles and light trucks, all test
results and data required for calculating such credits.
PART 600--FUEL ECONOMY AND GREENHOUSE GAS EXHAUST EMISSIONS OF
MOTOR VEHICLES
0
25. The authority citation for part 600 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32901-23919q, Pub. L. 109-58.
Subpart A--General Provisions
0
26. Section 600.002 is amended as follows:
0
a. By revising the definition for ``base tire.''
0
b. By revising the definition for ``combined fuel economy.''
0
c. By adding a definition for ``emergency vehicle'' in alphabetical
order.
0
d. By revising the definition for ``fuel economy.''
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 600.002 Definitions.
* * * * *
Base tire means the tire size specified as standard equipment by
the manufacturer on each unique combination of a vehicle's footprint
and model type. Standard equipment is defined in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.
* * * * *
Emergency vehicle means a motor vehicle manufactured primarily for
use as an ambulance or combination ambulance-hearse or for use by the
United States Government or a State or local government for law
enforcement.
* * * * *
Combined fuel economy means:
(1) The fuel economy value determined for a vehicle (or vehicles)
by harmonically averaging the city and highway fuel economy values,
weighted 0.55 and 0.45, respectively.
(2) For electric vehicles, for the purpose of calculating average
fuel economy pursuant to the provisions of part 600, subpart F, the
term means the equivalent petroleum-based fuel economy value as
determined by the calculation procedure promulgated by the Secretary of
Energy. For the purpose of labeling pursuant to the provisions of part
600, subpart D, the term means the fuel economy value as determined by
the procedures specified in Sec. 600.116-12.
* * * * *
Fuel economy means:
(1) The average number of miles traveled by an automobile or group
of automobiles per volume of fuel consumed as calculated in this part;
or
(2) For the purpose of calculating average fuel economy pursuant to
the provisions of part 600, subpart F, fuel economy for electrically
powered automobiles means the equivalent petroleum-based fuel economy
as determined by the Secretary of Energy in accordance with the
provisions of 10 CFR 474. For the purpose of labeling pursuant to the
provisions of part 600, subpart D, the term means the fuel economy
value as determined by the procedures specified in Sec. 600.116-12.
* * * * *
Subpart B--Fuel Economy and Carbon-Related Exhaust Emission Test
Procedures
0
27. Section 600.111-08 is amended by revising the introductory text to
read as follows:
Sec. 600.111-08 Test procedures.
This section provides test procedures for the FTP, highway, US06,
SC03, and the cold temperature FTP tests. Testing
[[Page 63179]]
shall be performed according to test procedures and other requirements
contained in this part 600 and in part 86 of this chapter, including
the provisions of part 86, subparts B, C, and S. Test hybrid electric
vehicles using the procedures of SAE J1711 (incorporated by reference
in Sec. 600.011). For FTP testing, this generally involves emission
sampling over four phases (bags) of the UDDS (cold-start, transient,
warm-start, transient); however, these four phases may be combined into
two phases (phases 1 + 2 and phases 3 + 4). Test plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles using the procedures of SAE J1711 (incorporated by
reference in Sec. 600.011) as described in Sec. 600.116-12. Test
electric vehicles using the procedures of SAE J1634 (incorporated by
reference in Sec. 600.011) as described in Sec. 600.116-12.
* * * * *
0
28. Section 600.113-12 is amended by revising paragraphs (g)(2)(iv)(C)
and (j) through (n) to read as follows:
Sec. 600.113-12 Fuel economy, CO2 emissions, and carbon-related
exhaust emission calculations for FTP, HFET, US06, SC03 and cold
temperature FTP tests.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(2) * * *
(iv) * * *
(C) For the 2012 through 2016 model years only, manufacturers may
use an assigned value of 0.010 g/mi for N2O FTP and HFET
test values. This value is not required to be adjusted by a
deterioration factor.
* * * * *
(j)(1) For methanol-fueled automobiles and automobiles designed to
operate on mixtures of gasoline and methanol, the fuel economy in miles
per gallon of methanol is to be calculated using the following
equation:
mpg = (CWF x SG x 3781.8)/((CWFexHC x HC) + (0.429 x CO) +
(0.273 x CO2) + (0.375 x CH3OH) + (0.400 x HCHO))
Where:
CWF = Carbon weight fraction of the fuel as determined in paragraph
(f)(2)(ii) of this section and rounded according to paragraph (g)(3)
of this section.
SG = Specific gravity of the fuel as determined in paragraph
(f)(2)(i) of this section and rounded according to paragraph (g)(3)
of this section.
CWFexHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons
= CWF as determined in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section and
rounded according to paragraph (g)(3) of this section (for M100
fuel, CWFexHC = 0.866).
HC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(1) of this section.
CH3OH = Grams/mile CH3OH (methanol) as
obtained in paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
HCHO = Grams/mile HCHO (formaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(1) of this section.
(2)(i) For 2012 and later model year methanol-fueled automobiles
and automobiles designed to operate on mixtures of gasoline and
methanol, the carbon-related exhaust emissions in grams per mile while
operating on methanol is to be calculated using the following equation
and rounded to the nearest 1 gram per mile:
CREE = (CWFexHC/0.273 x HC) + (1.571 x CO) + (1.374 x
CH3OH) + (1.466 x HCHO) + CO2
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002.
CWFexHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons
= CWF as determined in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section and
rounded according to paragraph (g)(3) of this section (for M100
fuel, CWFexHC = 0.866).
HC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this
section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this
section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in
paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CH3OH = Grams/mile CH3OH (methanol) as
obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
HCHO = Grams/mile HCHO (formaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
(ii) For manufacturers complying with the fleet averaging option
for N2O and CH4 as allowed under Sec. 86.1818 of
this chapter, the carbon-related exhaust emissions in grams per mile
for 2012 and later model year methanol-fueled automobiles and
automobiles designed to operate on mixtures of gasoline and methanol
while operating on methanol is to be calculated using the following
equation and rounded to the nearest 1 gram per mile:
CREE = [(CWFexHC/0.273) x NMHC] + (1.571 x CO) + (1.374 x
CH3OH) + (1.466 x HCHO) + CO2 + (298 x
N2O) + (25 x CH4)
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002.
CWFexHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons
= CWF as determined in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section and
rounded according to paragraph (g)(3) of this section (for M100
fuel, CWFexHC = 0.866).
NMHC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this
section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
CH3OH = Grams/mile CH3OH (methanol) as
obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
HCHO = Grams/mile HCHO (formaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
N2O = Grams/mile N2O as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
CH4 = Grams/mile CH4 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
(k)(1) For automobiles fueled with natural gas and automobiles
designed to operate on gasoline and natural gas, the fuel economy in
miles per gallon of natural gas is to be calculated using the following
equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.052
Where:
mpge = miles per gasoline gallon equivalent of natural
gas.
CWFHC/NG = carbon weight fraction based on the
hydrocarbon constituents in the natural gas fuel as obtained in
paragraph (f)(3) of this section and rounded according to paragraph
(g)(3) of this section.
DNG = density of the natural gas fuel [grams/ft\3\ at
68[emsp14][deg]F (20 [deg]C) and 760 mm Hg (101.3 kPa)] pressure as
obtained in paragraph (g)(3) of this section.
CH4, NMHC, CO, and CO2 = weighted mass exhaust
emissions [grams/mile] for methane, non-methane HC, carbon monoxide,
and carbon dioxide as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CWFNMHC = carbon weight fraction of the non-methane HC
constituents in the fuel as determined from the speciated fuel
composition per paragraph (f)(3) of this section and rounded
according to paragraph (g)(3) of this section.
CO2NG = grams of carbon dioxide in the natural gas fuel
consumed per mile of travel.
CO2NG = FCNG x DNG x
WFCO2
Where:
[[Page 63180]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.053
= cubic feet of natural gas fuel consumed per mile
Where:
CWFNG = the carbon weight fraction of the natural gas
fuel as calculated in paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
WFCO2 = weight fraction carbon dioxide of the natural gas
fuel calculated using the mole fractions and molecular weights of
the natural gas fuel constituents per ASTM D 1945 (incorporated by
reference in Sec. 600.011).
(2)(i) For automobiles fueled with natural gas and automobiles
designed to operate on gasoline and natural gas, the carbon-related
exhaust emissions in grams per mile while operating on natural gas is
to be calculated for 2012 and later model year vehicles using the
following equation and rounded to the nearest 1 gram per mile:
CREE = 2.743 x CH4 + CWFNMHC/0.273 x NMHC + 1.571
x CO + CO2
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002.
CH4 = Grams/mile CH4 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
NMHC = Grams/mile NMHC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this
section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
CWFNMHC = carbon weight fraction of the non-methane HC
constituents in the fuel as determined from the speciated fuel
composition per paragraph (f)(3) of this section and rounded
according to paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
(ii) For manufacturers complying with the fleet averaging option
for N2O and CH4 as allowed under Sec. 86.1818 of
this chapter, the carbon-related exhaust emissions in grams per mile
for 2012 and later model year automobiles fueled with natural gas and
automobiles designed to operate on gasoline and natural gas while
operating on natural gas is to be calculated using the following
equation and rounded to the nearest 1 gram per mile:
CREE = (25 x CH4) + [(CWFNMHC/0.273) x NMHC] +
(1.571 x CO) + CO2 + (298 x N2O)
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002.
CH4 = Grams/mile CH4 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
NMHC = Grams/mile NMHC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this
section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
CWFNMHC = carbon weight fraction of the non-methane HC
constituents in the fuel as determined from the speciated fuel
composition per paragraph (f)(3) of this section and rounded
according to paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
N2O = Grams/mile N2O as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
(l)(1) For ethanol-fueled automobiles and automobiles designed to
operate on mixtures of gasoline and ethanol, the fuel economy in miles
per gallon of ethanol is to be calculated using the following equation:
mpg = (CWF x SG x 3781.8)/((CWFexHC x HC) + (0.429 x CO) +
(0.273 x CO2) + (0.375 x CH3OH) + (0.400 x HCHO)
+ (0.521 x C2H5OH) + (0.545 x
C2H4O))
Where:
CWF = Carbon weight fraction of the fuel as determined in paragraph
(f)(4) of this section and rounded according to paragraph (f)(3) of
this section.
SG = Specific gravity of the fuel as determined in paragraph (f)(4)
of this section and rounded according to paragraph (f)(3) of this
section.
CWFexHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons
= CWF as determined in paragraph (f)(4) of this section and rounded
according to paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
HC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(1) of this section.
CH3OH = Grams/mile CH3OH (methanol) as
obtained in paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
HCHO = Grams/mile HCHO (formaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(1) of this section.
C2H5OH = Grams/mile
C2H5OH (ethanol) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(1) of this section.
C2H4O = Grams/mile C2H4O
(acetaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
(2)(i) For 2012 and later model year ethanol-fueled automobiles and
automobiles designed to operate on mixtures of gasoline and ethanol,
the carbon-related exhaust emissions in grams per mile while operating
on ethanol is to be calculated using the following equation and rounded
to the nearest 1 gram per mile:
CREE = (CWFexHC/0.273 x HC) + (1.571 x CO) + (1.374 x
CH3OH) + (1.466 x HCHO) + (1.911 x
C2H5OH) + (1.998 x C2H4O) +
CO2
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002.
CWFexHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons
= CWF as determined in paragraph (f)(4) of this section and rounded
according to paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
HC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
CH3OH = Grams/mile CH3OH (methanol) as
obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
HCHO = Grams/mile HCHO (formaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
C2H5OH = Grams/mile
C2H5OH (ethanol) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
C2H4O = Grams/mile C2H4O
(acetaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
(ii) For manufacturers complying with the fleet averaging option
for N2O and CH4 as allowed under Sec. 86.1818 of
this chapter, the carbon-related exhaust emissions in grams per mile
for 2012 and later model year ethanol-fueled automobiles and
automobiles designed to operate on mixtures of gasoline and ethanol
while operating on ethanol is to be calculated using the following
equation and rounded to the nearest 1 gram per mile:
CREE = [(CWFexHC/0.273) x NMHC] + (1.571 x CO) + (1.374 x
CH3OH) + (1.466 x HCHO) + (1.911 x
C2H5OH) + (1.998 x C2H4O) +
CO2 + (298 x N2O) + (25 x CH4)
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002.
CWFexHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons
= CWF as determined in paragraph (f)(4) of this section and rounded
according to paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
NMHC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this
section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
CH3OH = Grams/mile CH3OH (methanol) as
obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
HCHO = Grams/mile HCHO (formaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
C2H5OH = Grams/mile
C2H5OH (ethanol) as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
C2H4O = Grams/mile C2H4O
(acetaldehyde) as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
N2O = Grams/mile N2O as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
[[Page 63181]]
CH4 = Grams/mile CH4 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
(m)(1) For automobiles fueled with liquefied petroleum gas and
automobiles designed to operate on gasoline and liquefied petroleum
gas, the fuel economy in miles per gallon of liquefied petroleum gas is
to be calculated using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.054
Where:
mpge = miles per gasoline gallon equivalent of liquefied
petroleum gas.
CWFfuel = carbon weight fraction based on the hydrocarbon
constituents in the liquefied petroleum gas fuel as obtained in
paragraph (f)(3) of this section and rounded according to paragraph
(g)(3) of this section.
SG = Specific gravity of the fuel as determined in paragraph (f)(4)
of this section and rounded according to paragraph (f)(3) of this
section.
3781.8 = Grams/mile of H2O per gallon conversion factor.
CWFHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons =
CWFfuel as determined in paragraph (f)(4) of this section
and rounded according to paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
HC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
(2)(i) For automobiles fueled with liquefied petroleum gas and
automobiles designed to operate on gasoline and liquefied petroleum
gas, the carbon-related exhaust emissions in grams per mile while
operating on liquefied petroleum gas is to be calculated for 2012 and
later model year vehicles using the following equation and rounded to
the nearest 1 gram per mile:
CREE = (CWFHC/0.273 x HC) + (1.571 x CO) + CO2
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002.
CWFHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons =
CWFfuel as determined in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this
section and rounded according to paragraph (g)(3) of this section
(for M100 fuel, CWFexHC = 0.866).
HC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
(ii) For manufacturers complying with the fleet averaging option
for N2O and CH4 as allowed under Sec. 86.1818 of
this chapter, the carbon-related exhaust emissions in grams per mile
for 2012 and later model year methanol-fueled automobiles and
automobiles designed to operate on mixtures of gasoline and methanol
while operating on methanol is to be calculated using the following
equation and rounded to the nearest 1 gram per mile:
CREE = [(CWFexHC/0.273) x NMHC] + (1.571 x CO) +
CO2 + (298 x N2O) + (25 x CH4)
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002.
CWFHC = Carbon weight fraction of exhaust hydrocarbons =
CWFfuel as determined in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this
section and rounded according to paragraph (g)(3) of this section.
NMHC = Grams/mile HC as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this
section.
CO = Grams/mile CO as obtained in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
CO2 = Grams/mile CO2 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
N2O = Grams/mile N2O as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
CH4 = Grams/mile CH4 as obtained in paragraph
(g)(2) of this section.
(n) Manufacturers shall determine CO2 emissions and
carbon-related exhaust emissions for electric vehicles, fuel cell
vehicles, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles according to the
provisions of this paragraph (n). Subject to the limitations on the
number of vehicles produced and delivered for sale as described in
Sec. 86.1866 of this chapter, the manufacturer may be allowed to use a
value of 0 grams/mile to represent the emissions of fuel cell vehicles
and the proportion of electric operation of a electric vehicles and
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles that is derived from electricity that
is generated from sources that are not onboard the vehicle, as
described in paragraphs (n)(1) through (3) of this section. For
purposes of labeling under this part, the CO2 emissions for
electric vehicles shall be 0 grams per mile. Similarly, for purposes of
labeling under this part, the CO2 emissions for plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles shall be 0 grams per mile for the proportion
of electric operation that is derived from electricity that is
generated from sources that are not onboard the vehicle. For
manufacturers no longer eligible to use 0 grams per mile to represent
electric operation, and for all 2026 and later model year electric
vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, the
provisions of this paragraph (m) shall be used to determine the non-
zero value for CREE for purposes of meeting the greenhouse gas emission
standards described in Sec. 86.1818 of this chapter.
(1) For electric vehicles, but not including fuel cell vehicles,
the carbon-related exhaust emissions in grams per mile is to be
calculated using the following equation and rounded to the nearest one
gram per mile:
CREE = CREEUP - CREEGAS
Where:
CREE means the carbon-related exhaust emission value as defined in
Sec. 600.002, which may be set equal to zero for eligible 2012
through 2025 model year electric vehicles for a limited number of
vehicles produced and delivered for sale as described in Sec.
86.1866-12(a) of this chapter.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.055
[[Page 63182]]
Where:
EC = The vehicle energy consumption in watt-hours per mile, for
combined FTP/HFET operation, determined according to procedures
established by the Administrator under Sec. 600.116-12.
GRIDLOSS = 0.93 for the 2012 through 2016 model years, and 0.935 for
the 2017 and later model years (to account for grid transmission
losses).
AVGUSUP = 0.642 for the 2012 through 2016 model years, and 0.534 for
the 2017 and later model years (the nationwide average electricity
greenhouse gas emission rate at the powerplant, in grams per watt-
hour).
2478 is the estimated grams of upstream greenhouse gas emissions per
gallon of gasoline.
8887 is the estimated grams of CO2 per gallon of
gasoline.
TargetCO2 = The CO2 Target Value for the fuel
cell or electric vehicle determined according to Sec. 86.1818 of
this chapter for the appropriate model year.
(2) For plug-in hybrid electric vehicles the carbon-related exhaust
emissions in grams per mile is to be calculated according to the
provisions of Sec. 600.116, except that the CREE for charge-depleting
operation shall be the sum of the CREE associated with gasoline
consumption and the net upstream CREE determined according to paragraph
(n)(1)(i) of this section, rounded to the nearest one gram per mile.
(3) For 2012 and later model year fuel cell vehicles, the carbon-
related exhaust emissions in grams per mile shall be calculated using
the method specified in paragraph (n)(1) of this section, except that
CREEUP shall be determined according to procedures
established by the Administrator under Sec. 600.111-08(f). As
described in Sec. 86.1866 of this chapter the value of CREE may be set
equal to zero for a certain number of 2012 through 2025 model year fuel
cell vehicles.
0
29. Section 600.116-12 is amended as follows:
0
a. By revising the heading.
0
b. By revising paragraph (a) introductory text.
0
c. By adding paragraph (c).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 600.116-12 Special procedures related to electric vehicles,
hybrid electric vehicles, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.
(a) Determine fuel economy values for electric vehicles as
specified in Sec. Sec. 600.210 and 600.311 using the procedures of SAE
J1634 (incorporated by reference in Sec. 600.011), with the following
clarifications and modifications:
* * * * *
(c) Determining the proportion of recovered energy for hybrid
electric vehicles. Testing of hybrid electric vehicles under this part
may include a determination of the proportion of energy recovered over
the FTP relative to the total available braking energy required over
the FTP. This determination is required for pickup trucks accruing
credits for implementation of hybrid technology under Sec. 86.1870-12,
and requires the measurement of electrical current (in amps) flowing
into the hybrid system battery for the duration of the test. Hybrid
electric vehicles are tested for fuel economy and GHG emissions using
the 4-bag FTP as required by Sec. 600.114(c). Alternative measurement
and calculation methods may be used with prior EPA approval.
(1) Calculate the theoretical maximum amount of energy that could
be recovered by a hybrid electric vehicle over the FTP test cycle,
where the test cycle time and velocity points are expressed at 10 Hz,
and the velocity (miles/hour) is expressed to the nearest 0.01 miles/
hour, as follows:
(i) For each time point in the 10 Hz test cycle (i.e., at each 0.1
seconds):
(A) Determine the road load power in kilowatts using the following
equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.056
Where:
Proadload is the road load power in kilowatts, where road
load is negative because it always represents a deceleration (i.e.,
resistive) force on the vehicle;
A, B, and C are the vehicle-specific dynamometer road load
coefficients in lb-force, lb-force/mph, and lb-force/mph\2\,
respectively;
Vmph = velocity in miles/hour, expressed to the nearest
0.01 miles/hour;
0.44704 converts speed from miles/hour to meters/second;
4.448 converts pound force to Newtons; and
1,000 converts power from Watts to kilowatts.
(B) Determine the applied deceleration power at each sampling point
in time, t, in kilowatts, using the following equation. Positive values
indicate acceleration and negative values indicate deceleration.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.057
Where:
ETW = the vehicle Equivalent Test Weight (lbs);
Vt = velocity in miles/hour, rounded to the nearest 0.01
miles/hour, at each sampling point;
Vt-1 = the velocity in miles/hour at the previous time
point in the 10 Hz speed vs. time table, rounded to the nearest 0.01
miles/hour;
0.1 represents the time in seconds between each successive velocity
data point;
0.44704 converts speed from miles/hour to meters/second;
2.205 converts weight from pounds to kilograms; and
1,000 converts power from Watts to kilowatts.
(C) Determine braking power in kilowatts using the following
equation. Note that during braking events, Pbrake,
Paccel, and Proadload will all be negative (i.e.,
resistive) forces on the vehicle.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.058
Where:
Paccel = the value determined in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(B)
of this section;
Proadload = the value determined in paragraph
(c)(1)(i)(A) of this section; and
Pbrake = 0 if Paccel is greater than or equal
to Proadload.
(ii) The total maximum braking energy (Ebrake) that
could theoretically be recovered is equal to the absolute value of the
sum of all the values of Pbrake determined in paragraph
(c)(1)(i)(C) of this section, divided by 36000 (to convert 10 Hz data
to hours) and
[[Page 63183]]
rounded to the nearest 0.01 kilowatt hours.
(2) Calculate the actual amount of energy recovered
(Erec) by a hybrid electric vehicle when tested on the FTP
according to the provisions of this part, as follows:
(i) Measure the electrical current in Amps to and from the hybrid
electric vehicle battery during the FTP. Measurements should be made
directly upstream of the battery at a 10 Hz sampling rate.
(ii) At each sampling point where current is flowing into the
battery, calculate the current flowing into the battery, in Watt-hours,
as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.059
Where:
Et = the current flowing into the battery, in Watt-hours,
at time t in the test;
It = the electrical current, in Amps, at time t in the
test; and
Vnominal = the nominal voltage of the hybrid battery
system determined according to paragraph (c)(4) of this section.
(iii) The total energy recovered (Erec) is the absolute
value of the sum of all values of Et that represent current
flowing into the battery, divided by 1000 (to convert Watt-hours to
kilowatt-hours).
(3) The percent of braking energy recovered by a hybrid system
relative to the total available energy is determined by the following
equation, rounded to the nearest one percent:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.060
Where:
Erec = The actual total energy recovered, in kilowatt
hours, as determined in paragraph (c)(2) of this section; and
Ebrake = The theoretical maximum amount of energy, in
kilowatt hours, that could be recovered by a hybrid electric vehicle
over the FTP test cycle, as determined in paragraph (c)(1) of this
section.
(4)(i) Determination nominal voltage (Vnominal) using
the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.061
Where:
VS is the battery voltage measured at the start of the
FTP test, where the measurement is made after the key-on event but
not later than 10 seconds after the key-on event; and
VF is the battery voltage measured at the conclusion of
the FTP test, where the measurement is made before the key-off event
but not earlier than 10 seconds prior to the key-off event.
(ii) If the absolute value of the measured current to and from the
battery during the measurement of either VS or VF
exceeds three percent of the maximum absolute value of the current
measured over the FTP, then that VS or VF value
is not valid. If no valid voltage measurement can be made using this
method, the manufacturer must develop an alternative method of
determining nominal voltage. The alternative must be developed using
good engineering judgment and is subject to EPA approval.
Subpart C--Procedures for Calculating Fuel Economy and Carbon-
Related Exhaust Emission Values
0
30. Section 600.210-12 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)
introductory text and (a)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 600.210-12 Calculation of fuel economy and CO2 emission values
for labeling.
(a) General labels. Except as specified in paragraphs (d) and (e)
of this section, fuel economy and CO2 emissions for general
labels may be determined by one of two methods. The first is based on
vehicle-specific model-type 5-cycle data as determined in Sec.
600.209-12(b). This method is available for all vehicles and is
required for vehicles that do not qualify for the second method as
described in Sec. 600.115 (other than electric vehicles). The second
method, the derived 5-cycle method, determines fuel economy and
CO2 emissions values from the FTP and HFET tests using
equations that are derived from vehicle-specific 5-cycle model type
data, as determined in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Manufacturers
may voluntarily lower fuel economy values and raise CO2
values if they determine that the label values from any method are not
representative of the fuel economy and CO2 emissions for
that model type. MPG values may not be lowered without also making a
corresponding change to the CO2 value for a model type.
* * * * *
(5) General alternate fuel economy and CO2 emissions
label values for fuel cell vehicles. Determine FTP-based city and HFET-
based highway fuel economy label values for fuel cell vehicles using
procedures specified by the Administrator. Convert kilograms of
hydrogen/mile results to miles per kilogram of hydrogen and miles per
gasoline gallon equivalent. CO2 label information is based
on tailpipe emissions only, so CO2 emissions from fuel cell
vehicles are assumed to be zero.
* * * * *
Subpart D--Fuel Economy Labeling
0
31. Section 600.303-12 is amended as follows:
0
a. By revising the introductory text.
0
b. By revising paragraph (b) introductory text.
0
c. By revising paragraph (b)(6).
0
d. By revising paragraph (c).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 600.303-12 Fuel economy label--special requirements for
flexible-fuel vehicles.
Fuel economy labels for flexible-fuel vehicles must meet the
specifications described in Sec. 600.302, with the modifications
described in this section. This section describes how to label
flexible-fuel vehicles equipped with gasoline engines. If the vehicle
has a diesel engine, all the references to ``gas'' or ``gasoline'' in
this section are understood to refer to ``diesel'' or ``diesel fuel'',
respectively. All values described in this section are based on
gasoline operation, unless otherwise specifically noted.
* * * * *
(b) Include the following elements instead of the information
identified in Sec. 600.302-12(c)(1):
* * * * *
(6) Add the following statement after the statements described in
Sec. 600.302-12(c)(2): ``Values are based on gasoline and do not
reflect performance and ratings based on E85.'' Adjust this statement
as appropriate for vehicles designed to operate on different fuels.
(c) You may include the sub-heading ``Driving Range'' below the
combined fuel economy value, with range bars below this sub-heading as
follows:
(1) Insert a horizontal range bar nominally 80 mm long to show how
far the vehicle can drive from a full tank of gasoline. Include a
vehicle logo at the right end of the range bar. Include the following
left-justified expression inside
[[Page 63184]]
the range bar: ``Gasoline: x miles''. Complete the expression by
identifying the appropriate value for total driving range from Sec.
600.311.
(2) Insert a second horizontal range bar as described in paragraph
(c)(1) of this section that shows how far the vehicle can drive from a
full tank with the second fuel. Establish the length of the line based
on the proportion of driving ranges for the different fuels. Identify
the appropriate fuel in the range bar.
0
32. Section 600.310-12 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:
Sec. 600.310-12 Fuel economy label format requirements--electric
vehicles.
* * * * *
(a) Include the following statement instead of the statement
specified in Sec. 600.302-12(b)(4): ``Actual results will vary for
many reasons, including driving conditions and how you drive and
maintain your vehicle. The average new vehicle gets a MPG and costs $ b
to fuel over 5 years. Cost estimates are based on c miles per year at $
d per kW-hr. MPGe is miles per gasoline gallon equivalent. Vehicle
emissions are a significant cause of climate change and smog.'' For a,
b, c, and d, insert the appropriate values established by EPA.
* * * * *
0
33. Section 600.311-12 is amended as follows:
0
a. By revising paragraph (c)(1).
0
b. By revising paragraph (e)(3)(vii).
0
c. By adding paragraph (e)(4).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 600.311-12 Determination of values for fuel economy labels.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) For vehicles with engines that are not plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles, calculate the fuel consumption rate in gallons per 100 miles
(or gasoline gallon equivalent per 100 miles for fuels other than
gasoline or diesel fuel) with the following formula, rounded to the
first decimal place:
Fuel Consumption Rate = 100/MPG
Where:
MPG = The value for combined fuel economy from Sec. 600.210-12(c),
rounded to the nearest whole mpg.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(3) * * *
(vii) Calculate the annual fuel cost based on the combined values
for city and highway driving using the following equation:
Annual fuel cost = ($/milecity x 0.55 + $/milehwy x 0.45) x Average
Annual Miles
(4) Round the annual fuel cost to the nearest $50 by dividing the
unrounded annual fuel cost by 50, then rounding the result to the
nearest whole number, then multiplying this rounded result by 50 to
determine the annual fuel cost to be used for purposes of labeling.
* * * * *
Subpart F--Procedures For Determining Manufacturer's Average Fuel
Economy and Manufacturer's Average Carbon-Related Exhaust Emissions
0
33. Section 600.510-12 is amended as follows:
0
a. By removing and reserving paragraph (b)(3)(iii).
0
b. By adding paragraph (b)(4).
0
c. By revising paragraph (c).
0
d. By revising paragraph (g)(1) introductory text.
0
e. By revising paragraph (g)(3).
0
f. By revising paragraph (h) introductory text.
0
g. By revising paragraph (i).
0
h. By revising paragraph (j)(2)(vii).
The addition and revisions read as follows:
Sec. 600.510-12 Calculation of average fuel economy and average
carbon-related exhaust emissions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4) Emergency vehicles may be excluded from the fleet average
carbon-related exhaust emission calculations described in paragraph (j)
of this section. The manufacturer should notify the Administrator that
they are making such an election in the model year reports required
under Sec. 600.512 of this chapter. Such vehicles should be excluded
from both the calculation of the fleet average standard for a
manufacturer under 40 CFR 86.1818-12(c)(4) and from the calculation of
the fleet average carbon-related exhaust emissions in paragraph (j) of
this section.
(c)(1) Average fuel economy shall be calculated as follows:
(i) Except as allowed in paragraph (d) of this section, the average
fuel economy for the model years before 2017 will be calculated
individually for each category identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this
according to the provisions of paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
(ii) Except as permitted in paragraph (d) of this section, the
average fuel economy for the 2017 and later model years will be
calculated individually for each category identified in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.062
Where:
Average MPG = the fleet average fuel economy for a category of
vehicles;
MPG = the average fuel economy for a category of vehicles determined
according to paragraph (c)(2) of this section;
FCIVAC = Air conditioning fuel economy credits for a
category of vehicles, in gallons per mile, determined according to
paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section;
FCIVOC = Off-cycle technology fuel economy credits for a
category of vehicles, in gallons per mile, determined according to
paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this section; and
FCIVPU = Pickup truck fuel economy credits for the light
truck category, in gallons per mile, determined according to
paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of this section.
(2) Divide the total production volume of that category of
automobiles by a sum of terms, each of which corresponds to a model
type within that category of automobiles and is a fraction determined
by dividing the number of automobiles of that model type produced by
the manufacturer in the model year by:
(i) For gasoline-fueled and diesel-fueled model types, the fuel
economy calculated for that model type in accordance with paragraph
(b)(2) of this section; or
(ii) For alcohol-fueled model types, the fuel economy value
calculated for that model type in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of
this section divided by 0.15 and rounded to the nearest 0.1 mpg; or
(iii) For natural gas-fueled model types, the fuel economy value
calculated for that model type in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of
this section divided by 0.15 and rounded to the nearest 0.1 mpg; or
[[Page 63185]]
(iv) For alcohol dual fuel model types, for model years 1993
through 2019, the harmonic average of the following two terms; the
result rounded to the nearest 0.1 mpg:
(A) The combined model type fuel economy value for operation on
gasoline or diesel fuel as determined in Sec. 600.208-12(b)(5)(i); and
(B) The combined model type fuel economy value for operation on
alcohol fuel as determined in Sec. 600.208-12(b)(5)(ii) divided by
0.15 provided the requirements of paragraph (g) of this section are
met; or
(v) For alcohol dual fuel model types, for model years after 2019,
the combined model type fuel economy determined according to the
following equation and rounded to the nearest 0.1 mpg:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.063
Where:
F = 0.00 unless otherwise approved by the Administrator according to
the provisions of paragraph (k) of this section;
MPGA = The combined model type fuel economy for operation
on alcohol fuel as determined in Sec. 600.208-12(b)(5)(ii) divided
by 0.15 provided the requirements of paragraph (g) of this section
are met; and
MPGG = The combined model type fuel economy for operation
on gasoline or diesel fuel as determined in Sec. 600.208-
12(b)(5)(i).
(vi) For natural gas dual fuel model types, for model years 1993
through 2019, the harmonic average of the following two terms; the
result rounded to the nearest 0.1 mpg:
(A) The combined model type fuel economy value for operation on
gasoline or diesel as determined in Sec. 600.208-12(b)(5)(i); and
(B) The combined model type fuel economy value for operation on
natural gas as determined in Sec. 600.208-12(b)(5)(ii) divided by 0.15
provided the requirements of paragraph (g) of this section are met; or
(vii)(A) For natural gas dual fuel model types, for model years
after 2019, the combined model type fuel economy determined according
to the following formula and rounded to the nearest 0.1 mpg:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.064
Where:
MPGCNG = The combined model type fuel economy for
operation on natural gas as determined in Sec. 600.208-12(b)(5)(ii)
divided by 0.15 provided the requirements of paragraph (g) of this
section are met; and
MPGG = The combined model type fuel economy for operation
on gasoline or diesel fuel as determined in Sec. 600.208-
12(b)(5)(i).
UF = A Utility Factor (UF) value selected from the following table
based on the driving range of the vehicle while operating on natural
gas, except for natural gas dual fuel vehicles that do not meet the
criteria in paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(B) the Utility Factor shall be
0.5. Determine the vehicle's driving range in miles by multiplying
the combined fuel economy as determined in Sec. 600.208-
12(b)(5)(ii) by the vehicle's usable fuel storage capacity (as
defined at Sec. 600.002 and expressed in gasoline gallon
equivalents), and rounding to the nearest 10 miles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Driving range (miles) UF
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 0.228
20 0.397
30 0.523
40 0.617
50 0.689
60 0.743
70 0.785
80 0.818
90 0.844
100 0.865
110 0.882
120 0.896
130 0.907
140 0.917
150 0.925
160 0.932
170 0.939
180 0.944
190 0.949
200 0.954
210 0.958
220 0.962
230 0.965
240 0.968
250 0.971
260 0.973
270 0.976
280 0.978
290 0.980
300 0.981
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Natural gas dual fuel model types must meet the following
criteria to qualify for use of a Utility Factor greater than 0.5:
(1) The driving range using natural gas must be at least two times
the driving range using gasoline.
(2) The natural gas dual fuel vehicle must be designed such that
gasoline is used only when the natural gas tank is effectively empty,
except for limited use of gasoline that may be required to initiate
combustion.
(3) Fuel consumption improvement. Calculate the separate air
conditioning, off-cycle, and pickup truck fuel consumption improvement
as follows:
(i) Air conditioning fuel consumption improvement values are
calculated separately for each category identified in paragraph (a)(1)
of this section using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.065
Where:
FCIVAC = the fleet production-weighted total value of air
conditioning efficiency credits (fuel consumption improvement value)
for all air conditioning systems in the applicable fleet, expressed
in gallons per mile;
ACCredit = the total of all air conditioning efficiency credits for
the applicable vehicle category, in megagrams, from 40 CFR 86.1868-
12(c), and rounded to the nearest whole number;
VLM = vehicle lifetime miles, which for passenger automobiles shall
be 195,264 and for light trucks shall be 225,865; and
Production = the total production volume for the applicable category
of vehicles.
[[Page 63186]]
(ii) Off-cycle technology fuel consumption improvement values are
calculated separately for each category identified in paragraph (a)(1)
of this section using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.066
Where:
FCIVOC = the fleet production-weighted total value of
off-cycle technology credits (fuel consumption improvement value)
for all off-cycle technologies in the applicable fleet, expressed in
gallons per mile;
OCCredit = the total of all off-cycle technology credits for the
applicable vehicle category, in megagrams, from 40 CFR 86.1869-
12(e), and rounded to the nearest whole number;
VLM = vehicle lifetime miles, which for passenger automobiles shall
be 195,264 and for light trucks shall be 225,865; and
Production = the total production volume for the applicable category
of vehicles.
(iii) Full size pickup truck fuel consumption improvement values
are calculated for the light truck category identified in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.067
Where:
FCIVPU = the fleet production-weighted total value of
full size pickup truck credits (fuel consumption improvement value)
for the light truck fleet, expressed in gallons per mile;
PUCredit = the total of all full size pickup truck credits, in
megagrams, from 40 CFR 86.1870-12(c), and rounded to the nearest
whole number; and
Production = the total production volume for the light truck
category.
* * * * *
(g)(1) Dual fuel automobiles must provide equal or greater energy
efficiency while operating on the alternative fuel as while operating
on gasoline or diesel fuel to obtain the CAFE credit determined in
paragraphs (c)(2)(iv) and (v) of this section or to obtain the carbon-
related exhaust emissions credit determined in paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)
and (iii) of this section. The following equation must hold true:
Ealt/Epet = 1
Where:
Ealt = [FEalt/(NHValtx
Dalt)] x 10\6\ = energy efficiency while operating on
alternative fuel rounded to the nearest 0.01 miles/million BTU.
Epet = [FEpet/(NHVpetx
Dpet)] x 10\6\ = energy efficiency while operating on
gasoline or diesel (petroleum) fuel rounded to the nearest 0.01
miles/million BTU.
FEalt is the fuel economy [miles/gallon for liquid fuels
or miles/100 standard cubic feet for gaseous fuels] while operated
on the alternative fuel as determined in Sec. 600.113-12(a) and
(b).
FEpet is the fuel economy [miles/gallon] while operated
on petroleum fuel (gasoline or diesel) as determined in Sec.
600.113-12(a) and (b).
NHValt is the net (lower) heating value [BTU/lb] of the
alternative fuel.
NHVpet is the net (lower) heating value [BTU/lb] of the
petroleum fuel.
Dalt is the density [lb/gallon for liquid fuels or lb/100
standard cubic feet for gaseous fuels] of the alternative fuel.
Dpet is the density [lb/gallon] of the petroleum fuel.
* * * * *
(3) Dual fuel passenger automobiles manufactured during model years
1993 through 2019 must meet the minimum driving range requirements
established by the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR part 538) to
obtain the CAFE credit determined in paragraphs (c)(2)(iv) and (v) of
this section.
(h) For model years 1993 and later, and for each category of
automobile identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the maximum
increase in average fuel economy determined in paragraph (c) of this
section attributable to dual fuel automobiles, except where the
alternative fuel is electricity, shall be as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum
Model year increase
(mpg)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993-2014.................................................. 1.2
2015....................................................... 1.0
2016....................................................... 0.8
2017....................................................... 0.6
2018....................................................... 0.4
2019....................................................... 0.2
2020 and later............................................. 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
(i) For model years 2012 through 2015, and for each category of
automobile identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the maximum
decrease in average carbon-related exhaust emissions determined in
paragraph (j) of this section attributable to alcohol dual fuel
automobiles and natural gas dual fuel automobiles shall be calculated
using the following formula, and rounded to the nearest tenth of a gram
per mile:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.068
Where:
FltAvg = The fleet average CREE value in grams per mile, rounded to
the nearest whole number, for passenger automobiles or light trucks
determined for the applicable model year according to paragraph (j)
of this section, except by assuming all alcohol dual fuel and
natural gas dual fuel automobiles are operated exclusively on
gasoline (or diesel) fuel. For the purposes of these calculations,
the values for natural gas dual fuel automobiles using the optional
Utility Factor approach in paragraph (j)(2)(vii) of this section
shall not be the gasoline CREE values, but the CREE values
determined in paragraph (j)(2)(vii) of this section.
MPGMAX = The maximum increase in miles per gallon
determined for the
[[Page 63187]]
appropriate model year in paragraph (h) of this section.
(1) The Administrator shall calculate the decrease in average
carbon-related exhaust emissions to determine if the maximum decrease
provided in this paragraph (i) has been reached. The Administrator
shall calculate the average carbon-related exhaust emissions for each
category of automobiles specified in paragraph (a) of this section by
subtracting the average carbon-related exhaust emission values
determined in paragraph (j) of this section from the average carbon-
related exhaust emission values calculated in accordance with this
section by assuming all alcohol dual fuel and natural gas dual fuel
automobiles are operated exclusively on gasoline (or diesel) fuel. For
the purposes of these calculations, the values for natural gas dual
fuel automobiles using the optional Utility Factor approach in
paragraph (j)(2)(vii) of this section shall not be the gasoline CREE
values, but the CREE values determined in paragraph (j)(2)(vii) of this
section. The difference is limited to the maximum decrease specified in
paragraph (i) of this section.
(2) [Reserved]
(j) * * *
(2) * * *
(vii)(A) For natural gas dual fuel model types, for model years
2016 and later, or optionally for model years 2012 through 2015, the
combined model type carbon-related exhaust emissions value determined
according to the following formula and rounded to the nearest gram per
mile:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.069
Where:
CREECNG = The combined model type carbon-related exhaust
emissions value for operation on natural gas as determined in Sec.
600.208-12(b)(5)(ii); and
CREEGAS = The combined model type carbon-related exhaust
emissions value for operation on gasoline or diesel fuel as
determined in Sec. 600.208-12(b)(5)(i).
UF = A Utility Factor (UF) value selected from the following table
based on the driving range of the vehicle while operating on natural
gas, except for natural gas dual fuel vehicles that do not meet the
criteria in paragraph (j)(2)(vii)(B) the Utility Factor shall be
0.5. Determine the vehicle's driving range in miles by multiplying
the combined fuel economy as determined in Sec. 600.208-
12(b)(5)(ii) by the vehicle's usable fuel storage capacity (as
defined at Sec. 600.002 and expressed in gasoline gallon
equivalents), and rounding to the nearest 10 miles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Driving range (miles) UF
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 0.228
20 0.397
30 0.523
40 0.617
50 0.689
60 0.743
70 0.785
80 0.818
90 0.844
100 0.865
110 0.882
120 0.896
130 0.907
140 0.917
150 0.925
160 0.932
170 0.939
180 0.944
190 0.949
200 0.954
210 0.958
220 0.962
230 0.965
240 0.968
250 0.971
260 0.973
270 0.976
280 0.978
290 0.980
300 0.981
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Natural gas dual fuel model types must meet the following
criteria to qualify for use of a Utility Factor greater than 0.5:
(1) The driving range using natural gas must be at least two times
the driving range using gasoline.
(2) The natural gas dual fuel vehicle must be designed such that
gasoline is used only when the natural gas tank is effectively empty,
except for limited use of gasoline that may be required to initiate
combustion.
* * * * *
0
34. Section 600.514-12 is amended as follows:
0
a. By revising paragraph (b)(1)(v).
0
b. By revising paragraph (b)(1)(vii).
0
c. By redesignating paragraph (b)(1)(ix) as (x).
0
d. By adding paragraphs (b)(1)(ix).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 600.514-12 Reports to the Environmental Protection Agency.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(v) A description of the various credit, transfer and trading
options that will be used to comply with each applicable standard
category, including the amount of credit the manufacturer intends to
generate for air conditioning leakage, air conditioning efficiency,
off-cycle technology, advanced technology vehicles, hybrid or low-
emission full size pickup trucks, and various early credit programs;
* * * * *
(vii) A summary by model year (beginning with the 2009 model year)
of the number of electric vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles, dedicated compressed natural gas vehicles, and dual
fuel natural gas vehicles using (or projected to use) the advanced
technology vehicle credit and incentives program, including the
projected use of production multipliers;
(viii) The methodology which will be used to comply with
N2O and CH4 emission standards;
(ix) Notification of the manufacturer's intent to exclude emergency
vehicles from the calculation of fleet average standards and the end-
of-year fleet average, including a description of the excluded
emergency vehicles and the quantity of such vehicles excluded.
* * * * *
Title 49
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
In consideration of the foregoing, under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
32901, 32902, and 32903, and delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50,
NHTSA amends 49 CFR Chapter V as follows:
PART 523--VEHICLE CLASSIFICATION
0
35. The authority citation for part 523 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C 32901, delegation of authority at 49 CFR
1.50.
0
36. Revise Sec. 523.2 to read as follows:
Sec. 523.2 Definitions.
Approach angle means the smallest angle, in a plane side view of an
automobile, formed by the level surface on which the automobile is
standing and a line tangent to the front tire static loaded radius arc
and touching the underside of the automobile forward of the front tire.
Axle clearance means the vertical distance from the level surface
on which an automobile is standing to the lowest
[[Page 63188]]
point on the axle differential of the automobile.
Base tire (for passenger automobiles, light trucks, and medium duty
passenger vehicles) means the tire size specified as standard equipment
by the manufacturer on each unique combination of a vehicle's footprint
and model type. Standard equipment is defined in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.
Basic vehicle frontal area is used as defined in 40 CFR 86.1803.
Breakover angle means the supplement of the largest angle, in a
plan side view of an automobile, that can be formed by two lines
tangent to the front and rear static loaded radii arcs and intersecting
at a point on the underside of the automobile.
Cab-complete vehicle means a vehicle that is first sold as an
incomplete vehicle that substantially includes the vehicle cab section
as defined in 40 CFR 1037.801. For example, vehicles known commercially
as chassis-cabs, cab-chassis, box-deletes, bed-deletes, and cut-away
vans are considered cab-complete vehicles. A cab includes a steering
column and a passenger compartment. Note that a vehicle lacking some
components of the cab is a cab-complete vehicle if it substantially
includes the cab.
Cargo-carrying volume means the luggage capacity or cargo volume
index, as appropriate, and as those terms are defined in 40 CFR
600.315-08, in the case of automobiles to which either of these terms
apply. With respect to automobiles to which neither of these terms
apply, ``cargo-carrying volume'' means the total volume in cubic feet,
rounded to the nearest 0.1 cubic feet, of either an automobile's
enclosed non-seating space that is intended primarily for carrying
cargo and is not accessible from the passenger compartment, or the
space intended primarily for carrying cargo bounded in the front by a
vertical plane that is perpendicular to the longitudinal centerline of
the automobile and passes through the rearmost point on the rearmost
seat and elsewhere by the automobile's interior surfaces.
Class 2b vehicles are vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating
(GVWR) ranging from 8,501 to 10,000 pounds (lbs).
Class 3 through Class 8 vehicles are vehicles with a GVWR of 10,001
lbs or more, as defined in 49 CFR 565.15.
Commercial medium- and heavy-duty on-highway vehicle means an on-
highway vehicle with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs or more, as defined in 49
U.S.C. 32901(a)(7).
Complete vehicle means a vehicle that requires no further
manufacturing operations to perform its intended function and is a
functioning vehicle that has the primary load-carrying device or
container (or equivalent equipment) attached or is designed to pull a
trailer. Examples of equivalent equipment include fifth wheel trailer
hitches, firefighting equipment, and utility booms.
Curb weight is defined the same as vehicle curb weight in 40 CFR
86.1803-01.
Departure angle means the smallest angle, in a plane side view of
an automobile, formed by the level surface on which the automobile is
standing and a line tangent to the rear tire static loaded radius arc
and touching the underside of the automobile rearward of the rear tire.
Final stage manufacturer has the meaning given in 49 CFR 567.3.
Footprint is defined as the product of track width (measured in
inches, calculated as the average of front and rear track widths, and
rounded to the nearest tenth of an inch) times wheelbase (measured in
inches and rounded to the nearest tenth of an inch), divided by 144 and
then rounded to the nearest tenth of a square foot. For purposes of
this definition, ``track width'' is the lateral distance between the
centerlines of the base tires at ground, including the camber angle.
For purposes of this definition, ``wheelbase'' is the longitudinal
distance between front and rear wheel centerlines.
Full-size pickup truck has the meaning given in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.
Gross combination weight rating (GCWR) means the value specified by
the manufacturer as the maximum allowable loaded weight of a
combination vehicle (e.g., tractor plus trailer).
Gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) means the value specified by the
manufacturer as the maximum design loaded weight of a single vehicle
(e.g., vocational vehicle).
Heavy-duty engine means any engine used for (or which the engine
manufacturer could reasonably expect to be used for) motive power in a
heavy-duty vehicle. For purposes of this definition in this part, the
term ``engine'' includes internal combustion engines and other devices
that convert chemical fuel into motive power. For example, a fuel cell
and motor used in a heavy-duty vehicle is a heavy-duty engine.
Heavy-duty off-road vehicle means a heavy-duty vocational vehicle
or vocational tractor that is intended for off-road use meeting either
of the following criteria:
(1) Vehicles with tires installed having a maximum speed rating at
or below 55 mph.
(2) Vehicles primarily designed to perform work off-road (such as
in oil fields, forests, or construction sites), and meeting at least
one of the criteria of paragraph (2)(i) of this definition and at least
one of the criteria of paragraph (2)(ii) of this definition.
(i) Vehicles must have affixed components designed to work in an
off-road environment (for example, hazardous material equipment or
drilling equipment) or be designed to operate at low speeds making them
unsuitable for normal highway operation.
(ii) Vehicles must:
(A) Have an axle that has a gross axle weight rating (GAWR), as
defined in 49 CFR Sec. 571.3, of 29,000 pounds or more;
(B) Have a speed attainable in 2 miles of not more than 33 mph; or
(C) Have a speed attainable in 2 miles of not more than 45 mph, an
unloaded vehicle weight that is not less than 95 percent of its GVWR,
and no capacity to carry occupants other than the driver and operating
crew.
Heavy-duty vehicle means a vehicle as defined in Sec. 523.6.
Incomplete vehicle means a vehicle which does not have the primary
load carrying device or container attached when it is first sold as a
vehicle or any vehicle that does not meet the definition of a complete
vehicle. This may include vehicles sold to secondary vehicle
manufacturers. Incomplete vehicles include cab-complete vehicles.
Innovative technology means technology certified as such under 40
CFR 1037.610.
Light truck means a non-passenger automobile as defined in Sec.
523.5.
Medium duty passenger vehicle means a vehicle which would satisfy
the criteria in Sec. 523.5 (relating to light trucks) but for its
gross vehicle weight rating or its curb weight, which is rated at more
than 8,500 lbs GVWR or has a vehicle curb weight of more than 6,000 lbs
or has a basic vehicle frontal area in excess of 45 square feet, and
which is designed primarily to transport passengers, but does not
include a vehicle that:
(1) Is an ``incomplete vehicle'' as defined in this subpart; or
(2) Has a seating capacity of more than 12 persons; or
(3) Is designed for more than 9 persons in seating rearward of the
driver's seat; or
(4) Is equipped with an open cargo area (for example, a pick-up
truck box or bed) of 72.0 inches in interior length or more. A covered
box not readily
[[Page 63189]]
accessible from the passenger compartment will be considered an open
cargo area for purposes of this definition.
Mild hybrid vehicle has the meaning given in in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.
Motor home has the meaning given in 49 CFR 571.3.
Motor vehicle has the meaning given in 40 CFR 85.1703.
Passenger-carrying volume means the sum of the front seat volume
and, if any, rear seat volume, as defined in 40 CFR 600.315-08, in the
case of automobiles to which that term applies. With respect to
automobiles to which that term does not apply, ``passenger-carrying
volume'' means the sum in cubic feet, rounded to the nearest 0.1 cubic
feet, of the volume of a vehicle's front seat and seats to the rear of
the front seat, as applicable, calculated as follows with the head
room, shoulder room, and leg room dimensions determined in accordance
with the procedures outlined in Society of Automotive Engineers
Recommended Practice J1100a, Motor Vehicle Dimensions (Report of Human
Factors Engineering Committee, Society of Automotive Engineers,
approved September 1973 and last revised September 1975).
(1) For front seat volume, divide 1,728 into the product of the
following SAE dimensions, measured in inches to the nearest 0.1 inches,
and round the quotient to the nearest 0.001 cubic feet.
(i) H61-Effective head room--front.
(ii) W3-Shoulder room--front.
(iii) L34-Maximum effective leg room--accelerator.
(2) For the volume of seats to the rear of the front seat, divide
1,728 into the product of the following SAE dimensions, measured in
inches to the nearest 0.1 inches, and rounded the quotient to the
nearest 0.001 cubic feet.
(i) H63-Effective head room--second.
(ii) W4-Shoulder room--second.
(iii) L51-Minimum effective leg room--second.
Pickup truck means a non-passenger automobile which has a passenger
compartment and an open cargo area (bed).
Recreational vehicle or RV means a motor vehicle equipped with
living space and amenities found in a motor home.
Running clearance means the distance from the surface on which an
automobile is standing to the lowest point on the automobile, excluding
unsprung weight.
Static loaded radius arc means a portion of a circle whose center
is the center of a standard tire-rim combination of an automobile and
whose radius is the distance from that center to the level surface on
which the automobile is standing, measured with the automobile at curb
weight, the wheel parallel to the vehicle's longitudinal centerline,
and the tire inflated to the manufacturer's recommended pressure.
Strong hybrid vehicle has the meaning given in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.
Temporary living quarters means a space in the interior of an
automobile in which people may temporarily live and which includes
sleeping surfaces, such as beds, and household conveniences, such as a
sink, stove, refrigerator, or toilet.
Van means a vehicle with a body that fully encloses the driver and
a cargo carrying or work performing compartment. The distance from the
leading edge of the windshield to the foremost body section of vans is
typically shorter than that of pickup trucks and sport utility
vehicles.
Vocational tractor means a tractor that is classified as a
vocational vehicle according to 40 CFR 1037.630.
Vocational vehicle means a vehicle that is equipped for a
particular industry, trade or occupation such as construction, heavy
hauling, mining, logging, oil fields, refuse and includes vehicles such
as school buses, motorcoaches and RVs.
Work truck means a vehicle that is rated at more than 8,500 pounds
and less than or equal to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight, and is
not a medium-duty passenger vehicle as defined in 40 CFR 86.1803
effective as of December 20, 2007.
PART 531--PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS
0
37. The authority citation for part 531 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32902; delegation of authority at 49 CFR
1.50
0
38. Amend Sec. 531.5 by revising paragraph (a) introductory text,
revising paragraphs (b), (c), and (d), redesignating paragraph (e) as
paragraph (f), and adding a new paragraph (e).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 531.5 Fuel economy standards.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, each
manufacturer of passenger automobiles shall comply with the fleet
average fuel economy standards in Table I, expressed in miles per
gallon, in the model year specified as applicable:
* * * * *
(b) For model year 2011, a manufacturer's passenger automobile
fleet shall comply with the fleet average fuel economy level calculated
for that model year according to Figure 1 and the appropriate values in
Table II.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.070
Where:
N is the total number (sum) of passenger automobiles produced by a
manufacturer;
N i is the number (sum) of the ith passenger automobile
model produced by the manufacturer; and
T i is the fuel economy target of the ith model passenger
automobile, which is determined according to the following formula,
rounded to the nearest hundredth:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.071
Where:
Parameters a, b, c, and d are defined in Table II;
e = 2.718; and
x = footprint (in square feet, rounded to the nearest tenth) of the
vehicle model.
[[Page 63190]]
Table II-Parameters for the Passenger Automobile Fuel Economy Targets
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parameters
Model year ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a (mpg) b (mpg) c (gal/mi/ft\2\) d (gal/mi)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011................................ 31.20 24.00 51.41 1.91
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) For model years 2012-2025, a manufacturer's passenger
automobile fleet shall comply with the fleet average fuel economy level
calculated for that model year according to Figure 2 and the
appropriate values in Table III.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.072
Where:
CAFE required is the fleet average fuel economy standard for a given
fleet (domestic passenger automobiles or import passenger
automobiles);
Subscript i is a designation of multiple groups of automobiles,
where each group's designation, i.e., i = 1, 2, 3, etc., represents
automobiles that share a unique model type and footprint within the
applicable fleet, either domestic passenger automobiles or import
passenger automobiles;
Production i is the number of passenger automobiles produced for
sale in the United States within each ith designation, i.e., which
share the same model type and footprint;
TARGET i is the fuel economy target in miles per gallon (mpg)
applicable to the footprint of passenger automobiles within each ith
designation, i.e., which share the same model type and footprint,
calculated according to Figure 3 and rounded to the nearest
hundredth of a mpg, i.e., 35.455 = 35.46 mpg, and the summations in
the numerator and denominator are both performed over all models in
the fleet in question.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.073
Where:
TARGET is the fuel economy target (in mpg) applicable to vehicles of
a given footprint (FOOTPRINT, in square feet);
Parameters a, b,c, and d are defined in Table III; and
The MIN and MAX functions take the minimum and maximum,
respectively, of the included values.
Table III-Parameters for the Passenger Automobile Fuel Economy Targets, MYs 2012-2025
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parameters
---------------------------------------------------------------
Model year c (gal/mi/
a (mpg) b (mpg) ft\2\) d (gal/mi)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012............................................ 35.95 27.95 0.0005308 0.006057
2013............................................ 36.80 28.46 0.0005308 0.005410
2014............................................ 37.75 29.03 0.0005308 0.004725
2015............................................ 39.24 29.90 0.0005308 0.003719
2016............................................ 41.09 30.96 0.0005308 0.002573
2017............................................ 43.61 32.65 0.0005131 0.001896
2018............................................ 45.21 33.84 0.0004954 0.001811
2019............................................ 46.87 35.07 0.0004783 0.001729
2020............................................ 48.74 36.47 0.0004603 0.001643
2021............................................ 50.83 38.02 0.0004419 0.001555
2022............................................ 53.21 39.79 0.0004227 0.001463
2023............................................ 55.71 41.64 0.0004043 0.001375
[[Page 63191]]
2024............................................ 58.32 43.58 0.0003867 0.001290
2025............................................ 61.07 45.61 0.0003699 0.001210
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) In addition to the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of
this section, each manufacturer shall also meet the minimum fleet
standard for domestically manufactured passenger automobiles expressed
in Table IV:
Table IV--Minimum Fuel Economy Standards for Domestically Manufactured
Passenger Automobiles, MYs 2011-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum
Model year standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011.................................................... 27.8
2012.................................................... 30.7
2013.................................................... 31.4
2014.................................................... 32.1
2015.................................................... 33.3
2016.................................................... 34.7
2017.................................................... 36.7
2018.................................................... 38.0
2019.................................................... 39.4
2020.................................................... 40.9
2021.................................................... 42.7
2022.................................................... 44.7
2023.................................................... 46.8
2024.................................................... 49.0
2025.................................................... 51.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) For model years 2022-2025, each manufacturer shall comply with
the standards set forth in paragraphs (c) and (d) in this section, if
NHTSA determines in a rulemaking, initiated after January 1, 2017, and
conducted in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32902, that the standards in
paragraphs (c) and (d) are the maximum feasible standards for model
years 2022-2025. If, for any of those model years, NHTSA determines
that the maximum feasible standard for passenger cars and the
corresponding minimum standard for domestically manufactured passenger
cars should be set at a different level, manufacturers shall comply
with those different standards in lieu of the standards set forth for
those model years in paragraphs (c) and (d), and NHTSA will revise this
section to reflect the different standards.
* * * * *
0
39. Revise Sec. 531.6 to read as follows:
Sec. 531.6 Measurement and calculation procedures.
(a) The fleet average fuel economy performance of all passenger
automobiles that are manufactured by a manufacturer in a model year
shall be determined in accordance with procedures established by the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency under 49 U.S.C.
32904 and set forth in 40 CFR part 600. For model years 2017 to 2025, a
manufacturer is eligible to increase the fuel economy performance of
passenger cars in accordance with procedures established by EPA set
forth in 40 CFR part 600, including any adjustments to fuel economy EPA
allows, such as for fuel consumption improvements related to air
conditioning efficiency and off-cycle technologies.
(b) The eligibility of a manufacturer to increase its fuel economy
performance through use of an off-cycle technology requires an
application request made to EPA in accordance with 40 CFR Part 86.1869-
12 and an approval granted by EPA made in consultation with NHTSA. In
order to expedite NHTSA's consultation with EPA, a manufacturer's
application as part of the off-cycle credit approval process under 40
CFR 86.1869-12(b) or 40 CFR 86.1869-12(c) shall also be submitted to
NHTSA at the same time if the manufacturer is seeking off-cycle fuel
economy improvement values under the CAFE program for those
technologies. For off-cycle technologies which are covered under 40 CFR
86.1869-12(b) or 40 CFR 86.1869-12(c), NHTSA will consult with EPA
regarding NHTSA's evaluation of the specific off-cycle technology to
ensure its impact on fuel economy and the suitability of using the off-
cycle technology to adjust the fuel economy performance. NHTSA will
provide its views on the suitability of the technology for that purpose
to EPA. NHTSA's evaluation and review will consider:
(1) Whether the technology has a direct impact upon improving fuel
economy performance;
(2) Whether the technology is related to crash-avoidance
technologies, safety critical systems or systems affecting safety-
critical functions, or technologies designed for the purpose of
reducing the frequency of vehicle crashes;
(3) Information from any assessments conducted by EPA related to
the application, the technology and/or related technologies; and
(4) Any other relevant factors.
0
40. Revise Appendix A to part 531 to read as follows:
Appendix to Part 531--Example of Calculating Compliance Under Sec.
531.5(c)
Assume a hypothetical manufacturer (Manufacturer X) produces a
fleet of domestic passenger automobiles in MY 2012 as follows:
Appendix Table I
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model type Actual
---------------------------------------------------------------------- measured
Description fuel Volume
Group Carline Basic Transmission economy
name engine (L) class (mpg)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............................ PC A FWD 1.8 A5 2-door sedan... 34.0 1,500
2............................ PC A FWD 1.8 M6 2-door sedan... 34.6 2,000
3............................ PC A FWD 2.5 A6 4-door wagon... 33.8 2,000
4............................ PC A AWD 1.8 A6 4-door wagon... 34.4 1,000
5............................ PC A AWD 2.5 M6 2-door 32.9 3,000
hatchback.
6............................ PC B RWD 2.5 A6 4-door wagon... 32.2 8,000
7............................ PC B RWD 2.5 A7 4-door sedan... 33.1 2,000
8............................ PC C AWD 3.2 A7 4-door sedan... 30.6 5,000
[[Page 63192]]
9............................ PC C FWD 3.2 M6 2-door coupe... 28.5 3,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................... ........... ........... ............ ............... ........... 27,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note to Appendix Table I: Manufacturer X's required fleet average fuel economy standard level would first be
calculated by determining the fuel economy targets applicable to each unique model type and footprint
combination for model type groups 1-9 as illustrated in Appendix Table II:
Manufacturer X calculates a fuel economy target standard for
each unique model type and footprint combination.
Appendix Table II
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model type Fuel
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Track economy
Description Base tire Wheelbase width F&R Footprint Volume target
Group Carline name Basic Transmission size (inches) average (ft\2\) standard
engine (L) class (inches) (mpg)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1....................................... PC A FWD.................. 1.8 A5 2-door sedan.............. 205/75R14 99.8 61.2 42.4 1,500 35.01
2....................................... PC A FWD.................. 1.8 M6 2-door sedan.............. 215/70R15 99.8 60.9 42.2 2,000 35.14
3....................................... PC A FWD.................. 2.5 A6 4-door wagon.............. 215/70R15 100.0 60.9 42.3 2,000 35.08
4....................................... PC A AWD.................. 1.8 A6 4-door wagon.............. 235/60R15 100.0 61.2 42.5 1,000 35.95
5....................................... PC A AWD.................. 2.5 M6 2-door hatchback.......... 225/65R16 99.6 59.5 41.2 3,000 35.81
6....................................... PC B RWD.................. 2.5 A6 4-door wagon.............. 265/55R18 109.2 66.8 50.7 8,000 30.33
7....................................... PC B RWD.................. 2.5 A7 4-door sedan.............. 235/65R17 109.2 67.8 51.4 2,000 29.99
8....................................... PC C AWD.................. 3.2 A7 4-door sedan.............. 265/55R18 111.3 67.8 52.4 5,000 29.52
9....................................... PC C FWD.................. 3.2 M6 2-door coupe.............. 225/65R16 111.3 67.2 51.9 3,000 29.76
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... .......................... ........... ............ .......................... .......... ........... ......... ......... 27,500 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note to Appendix Table II: With the appropriate fuel economy targets determined for each unique model type and footprint combination, Manufacturer X's required fleet average fuel economy
standard would be calculated as illustrated in Appendix Figure 1:
Appendix Figure 1--Calculation of Manufacturer X's fleet average
fuel economy standard using Table II:
Fleet average fuel economy standard =
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.074
[[Page 63193]]
= 31.6 mpg
Appendix Figure 2--Calculation of Manufacturer X's actual fleet
average fuel economy performance level using Table I:
Fleet average fuel economy performance =
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.075
= 32.0 mpg
Note to Appendix Figure 2: Since the actual fleet average fuel
economy performance of Manufacturer X's fleet is 32.0 mpg, as
compared to its required fleet fuel economy standard of 31.6 mpg,
Manufacturer X complied with the CAFE standard for MY 2012 as set
forth in Sec. 531.5(c).
PART 533--LIGHT TRUCK FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS
0
41. The authority citation for part 531 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32902; delegation of authority at 49 CFR
1.50.
0
42. Amend Sec. 533.5 by revising paragraphs (a), (f), (g), (h), (i)
and adding paragraphs (j) and (k) to read as follows:
Sec. 533.5 Requirements.
(a) Each manufacturer of light trucks shall comply with the
following fleet average fuel economy standards, expressed in miles per
gallon, in the model year specified as applicable:
Table I
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2-wheel drive light 4-wheel drive light
trucks trucks Limited
Model year ---------------------------------------------------- product
Captive Captive line light
imports Other imports Other trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1979........................................... ........... 17.2 ........... 15.8 ...........
1980........................................... 16.0 16.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
1981........................................... 16.7 16.7 15.0 15.0 14.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined standard 2-wheel drive light 4-wheel drive light
-------------------------- trucks trucks
Model year ---------------------------------------------------
Captive Others Captive Captive
imports imports Others imports Others
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1982.............................. 17.5 17.5 18.0 18.0 16.0 16.0
1983.............................. 19.0 19.0 19.5 19.5 17.5 17.5
1984.............................. 20.0 20.0 20.3 20.3 18.5 18.5
1985.............................. 19.5 19.5 19.7 19.7 18.9 18.9
1986.............................. 20.0 20.0 20.5 20.5 19.5 19.5
1987.............................. 20.5 20.5 21.0 21.0 19.5 19.5
1988.............................. 20.5 20.5 21.0 21.0 19.5 19.5
1989.............................. 20.5 20.5 21.5 21.5 19.0 19.0
1990.............................. 20.0 20.0 20.5 20.5 19.0 19.0
1991.............................. 20.2 20.2 20.7 20.7 19.1 19.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined standard
-------------------------
Model year Captive
imports Other
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992.......................................... 20.2 20.2
1993.......................................... 20.4 20.4
1994.......................................... 20.5 20.5
1995.......................................... 20.6 20.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year Standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001....................................................... 20.7
2002....................................................... 20.7
2003....................................................... 20.7
2004....................................................... 20.7
2005....................................................... 21.0
[[Page 63194]]
2006....................................................... 21.6
2007....................................................... 22.2
2008....................................................... 22.5
2009....................................................... 23.1
2010....................................................... 23.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.076
Where:
N is the total number (sum) of light trucks produced by a
manufacturer;
Ni is the number (sum) of the ith light truck model type
produced by a manufacturer; and
Ti is the fuel economy target of the ith light truck
model type, which is determined according to the following formula,
rounded to the nearest hundredth:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.077
Where:
Parameters a, b, c, and d are defined in Table V;
e = 2.718; and
x = footprint (in square feet, rounded to the nearest tenth) of the
model type.
Table V--Parameters for the Light Truck Fuel Economy Targets for MYs 2008-2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parameters
---------------------------------------------------
Model year c (gal/mi/
a (mpg) b (mpg) ft\2\) d (gal/mi)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008........................................................ 28.56 19.99 49.30 5.58
2009........................................................ 30.07 20.87 48.00 5.81
2010........................................................ 29.96 21.20 48.49 5.50
2011........................................................ 27.10 21.10 56.41 4.28
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.078
Where:
CAFErequired is the fleet average fuel economy
standard for a given light truck fleet;
Subscript i is a designation of multiple groups of light trucks,
where each group's designation, i.e., i = 1, 2, 3, etc., represents
light trucks that share a unique model type and footprint within the
applicable fleet.
Productioni is the number of light trucks produced
for sale in the United States within each ith
designation, i.e., which share the same model type and footprint;
TARGETi is the fuel economy target in miles per gallon (mpg)
applicable to the footprint of light trucks within each ith
designation, i.e., which share the same model type and footprint,
calculated according to either Figure 3 or Figure 4, as appropriate,
and rounded to the nearest hundredth of a mpg, i.e., 35.455 = 35.46
mpg, and the summations in the numerator and denominator are both
performed over all models in the fleet in question.
Figure 3:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.079
Where:
TARGET is the fuel economy target (in mpg) applicable to
vehicles of a given footprint (FOOTPRINT, in square feet);
Parameters a, b, c, and d are defined in Table VI; and
The MIN and MAX functions take the minimum and maximum,
respectively, of the included values.
[[Page 63195]]
Table VI--Parameters for the Light Truck Fuel Economy Targets for MYs 2012-2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parameters
---------------------------------------------------------------
Model year c (gal/mi/ft
a (mpg) b (mpg) \2\) d (gal/mi)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012............................................ 29.82 22.27 0.0004546 0.014900
2013............................................ 30.67 22.74 0.0004546 0.013968
2014............................................ 31.38 23.13 0.0004546 0.013225
2015............................................ 32.72 23.85 0.0004546 0.011920
2016............................................ 34.42 24.74 0.0004546 0.010413
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 4:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.080
Where:
TARGET is the fuel economy target (in mpg) applicable to
vehicles of a given footprint (FOOTPRINT, in square feet);
Parameters a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h are defined in Table VII;
and
The MIN and MAX functions take the minimum and maximum,
respectively, of the included values.
Table VII-Parameters for the Light Truck Fuel Economy Targets for MYs 2017-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parameters
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model year c (gal/mi/ g (gal/mi/
a (mpg) b (mpg) ft\2\) d (gal/mi) e (mpg) f (mpg) ft\2\) h (gal/mi)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017............................................ 36.26 25.09 0.0005484 0.005097 35.10 25.09 0.0004546 0.009851
2018............................................ 37.36 25.20 0.0005358 0.004797 35.31 25.20 0.0004546 0.009682
2019............................................ 38.16 25.25 0.0005265 0.004623 35.41 25.25 0.0004546 0.009603
2020............................................ 39.11 25.25 0.0005140 0.004494 35.41 25.25 0.0004546 0.009603
2021............................................ 41.80 25.25 0.0004820 0.004164 35.41 25.25 0.0004546 0.009603
2022............................................ 43.79 26.29 0.0004607 0.003944 35.41 25.25 0.0004546 0.009603
2023............................................ 45.89 27.53 0.0004404 0.003735 35.41 25.25 0.0004546 0.009603
2024............................................ 48.09 28.83 0.0004210 0.003534 35.41 25.25 0.0004546 0.009603
2025............................................ 50.39 30.19 0.0004025 0.003343 35.41 25.25 0.0004546 0.009603
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
(f) For each model year 1996 and thereafter, each manufacturer
shall combine its captive imports with its other light trucks and
comply with the fleet average fuel economy standard in paragraph (a) of
this section.
(g) For model years 2008-2010, at a manufacturer's option, a
manufacturer's light truck fleet may comply with the fuel economy
standard calculated for each model year according to Figure 1 and the
appropriate values in Table V, with said option being irrevocably
chosen for that model year and reported as specified in Sec. 537.8.
(h) For model year 2011, a manufacturer's light truck fleet shall
comply with the fleet average fuel economy standard calculated for that
model year according to Figure 1 and the appropriate values in Table V.
(i) For model years 2012-2016, a manufacturer's light truck fleet
shall comply with the fleet average fuel economy standard calculated
for that model year according to Figures 2 and 3 and the appropriate
values in Table VI.
(j) For model years 2017-2025, a manufacturer's light truck fleet
shall comply with the fleet average fuel economy standard calculated
for that model year according to Figures 2 and 4 and the appropriate
values in Table VII.
(k) For model years 2022-2025, each manufacturer shall comply with
the standards set forth in paragraph (j) in this section, if NHTSA
determines in a rulemaking, initiated after January 1, 2017, and
conducted in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32902, that the standards in
paragraph (j) are the maximum feasible standards for model years 2022-
2025. If, for any of those model years, NHTSA determines that the
maximum feasible standard for light trucks should be set at a different
level, manufacturers shall comply with those different standards in
lieu of the standards set forth for those model years in paragraph (j),
and NHTSA will revise this section to reflect the different standards.
0
43. Amend Sec. 533.6 by revising paragraph (b) and adding paragraph
(c) to read as follows:
Sec. 533.6 Measurement and calculation procedures.
* * * * *
(b) The fleet average fuel economy performance of all vehicles
subject to Part 533 that are manufactured by a manufacturer in a model
year shall be determined in accordance with procedures established by
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency under 49
U.S.C. 32904 and set forth in 40 CFR part 600. For model years 2017 to
2025, a manufacturer is eligible to increase the fuel economy
performance of light trucks in accordance with procedures established
by EPA set forth in 40 CFR part 600, including any adjustments to fuel
economy EPA allows, such as for fuel consumption improvements related
[[Page 63196]]
to air conditioning efficiency, off-cycle technologies, and
hybridization and other performance-based technologies for full-size
pickup trucks.
(c) The eligibility of a manufacturer to increase its fuel economy
performance through use of an off-cycle technology requires an
application request made to EPA in accordance with 40 CFR Part 86.1869-
12 and an approval granted by EPA made in consultation with NHTSA. In
order to expedite NHTSA's consultation with EPA, a manufacturer's
application as part of the off-cycle credit approval process under 40
CFR 86.1869-12(b) or 40 CFR 86.1869-12(c) shall also be submitted to
NHTSA at the same time if the manufacturer is seeking off-cycle fuel
economy improvement values under the CAFE program for those
technologies. For off-cycle technologies which are covered under 40 CFR
86.1869-12(b) or 40 CFR 86.1869-12(c), NHTSA will consult with EPA
regarding NHTSA's evaluation of the specific off-cycle technology to
ensure its impact on fuel economy and the suitability of using the off-
cycle technology to adjust the fuel economy performance. NHTSA will
provide its views on the suitability of the technology for that purpose
to EPA. NHTSA's evaluation and review will consider:
(1) Whether the technology has a direct impact upon improving fuel
economy performance;
(2) Whether the technology is related to crash-avoidance
technologies, safety critical systems or systems affecting safety-
critical functions, or technologies designed for the purpose of
reducing the frequency of vehicle crashes.
(3) Information from any assessments conducted by EPA related to
the application, the technology and/or related technologies; and
(4) Any other relevant factors.
0
44. Revise Appendix A to part 533 to read as follows:
Appendix to Part 533--Example of Calculating Compliance Under Sec.
533.5(I)
Assume a hypothetical manufacturer (Manufacturer X) produces a
fleet of light trucks in MY 2012 as follows:
Appendix Table I
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model type
---------------------------------------------------------------- Actual
Basic engine Transmission Description measured fuel Volume
Group Carline name (L) class economy (mpg)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........... Pickup A 2WD.... 4 A5 Reg cab, MB.... 27.1 800
2........... Pickup B 2WD.... 4 M5 Reg cab, MB.... 27.6 200
3........... Pickup C 2WD.... 4.5 A5 Reg cab, LB.... 23.9 300
4........... Pickup C 2WD.... 4 M5 Ext cab, MB.... 23.7 400
5........... Pickup C 4WD.... 4.5 A5 Crew cab, SB... 23.5 400
6........... Pickup D 2WD.... 4.5 A6 Crew cab, SB... 23.6 400
7........... Pickup E 2WD.... 5 A6 Ext cab, LB.... 22.7 500
8........... Pickup E 2WD.... 5 A6 Crew cab, MB... 22.5 500
9........... Pickup F 2WD.... 4.5 A5 Reg cab, LB.... 22.5 1,600
10.......... Pickup F 4WD.... 4.5 A5 Ext cab, MB.... 22.3 800
11.......... Pickup F 4WD.... 4.5 A5 Crew cab, SB... 22.2 800
---------------
Total... ................ ............... .............. ............... .............. 6,700
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note to Appendix Table I: Manufacturer X's required fleet average fuel economy standard level would first be
calculated by determining the fuel economy targets applicable to each unique model type and footprint
combination for model type groups 1-11 as illustrated in Appendix Table II.
Manufacturer X calculates a fuel economy target standard for
each unique model type and footprint combination.
Appendix Table II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model type Fuel
---------------------------------------------------------- Track economy
Basic Description Base tire size Wheelbase width F&R Footprint Volume target
Group Carline name engine Transmission (inches) average (ft\2\) standard
(L) class (inches) (mpg)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........... Pickup A 2WD..... 4 A5 Reg cab, MB...... 235/75R15..... 100.0 68.8 47.8 800 27.30
2........... Pickup B 2WD..... 4 M5 Reg cab, MB...... 235/75R15..... 100.0 68.2 47.4 200 27.44
3........... Pickup C 2WD..... 4.5 A5 Reg cab, LB...... 255/70R17..... 125.0 68.8 59.7 300 23.79
4........... Pickup C 2WD..... 4 M5 Ext cab, MB...... 255/70R17..... 125.0 68.8 59.7 400 23.79
5........... Pickup C 4WD..... 4.5 A5 Crew cab, SB..... 275/70R17..... 150.0 69.0 71.9 400 22.27
6........... Pickup D 2WD..... 4.5 A6 Crew cab, SB..... 255/70R17..... 125.0 68.8 59.7 400 23.79
7........... Pickup E 2WD..... 5 A6 Ext cab, LB...... 255/70R17..... 125.0 68.8 59.7 500 23.79
8........... Pickup E 2WD..... 5 A6 Crew cab, MB..... 285/70R17..... 125.0 69.2 60.1 500 23.68
9........... Pickup F 2WD..... 4.5 A5 Reg cab, LB...... 255/70R17..... 125.0 68.9 59.8 1,600 23.76
10.......... Pickup F 4WD..... 4.5 A5 Ext cab, MB...... 275/70R17..... 150.0 69.0 71.9 800 22.27
11.......... Pickup F 4WD..... 4.5 A5 Crew cab, SB..... 285/70R17..... 150.0 69.2 72.1 800 22.27
Total... ................. .......... ............ ................. .............. .......... .......... .......... 6,700 ..........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note to Appendix Table II: With the appropriate fuel economy targets determined for each unique model type and footprint combination, Manufacturer X's
required fleet average fuel economy standard would be calculated as illustrated in Appendix Figure 1:
[[Page 63197]]
Appendix Figure 1--Calculation of Manufacturer X's Fleet Average Fuel
Economy Standard Using Table II
Fleet average fuel economy standard =
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.081
= 23.7 mpg
Appendix Figure 2--Calculation of Manufacturer X's Actual Fleet Average
Fuel Economy Performance Level Using Table I
Fleet average fuel economy performance =
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.082
= 23.3 mpg
Note to Appendix Figure 2: Since the actual fleet average fuel
economy performance of Manufacturer X's fleet is 23.3 mpg, as
compared to its required fleet fuel economy standard of 23.7 mpg,
Manufacturer X did not comply with the CAFE standard for MY 2012 as
set forth in Sec. 533.5(i).
PART 536--TRANSFER AND TRADING OF FUEL ECONOMY CREDITS
0
45. The authority citation for part 536 it is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32903; delegation of authority at 49 CFR
1.50.
0
46. Amend Sec. 536.4 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 536.4 Credits.
* * * * *
(c) Adjustment factor. When traded or transferred and used, fuel
economy credits are adjusted to ensure fuel oil savings is preserved.
For traded credits, the user (or buyer) must multiply the calculated
adjustment factor by the number of its shortfall credits it plans to
offset in order to determine the number of equivalent credits to
acquire from the earner (or seller). For transferred credits, the user
of credits must multiply the calculated adjustment factor by the number
of its shortfall credits it plans to offset in order to determine the
number of equivalent credits to transfer from the compliance category
holding the available credits. The adjustment factor is calculated
according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR15OC12.083
Where:
A = Adjustment factor applied to traded and transferred credits;
VMTe = Lifetime vehicle miles traveled as provided in the
following table for the model year and compliance category in which
the credit was earned;
VMTu = Lifetime vehicle miles traveled as provided in the
following table for the model year and compliance category in which
the credit is used for compliance;
[[Page 63198]]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT)
Model year ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017-2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars.......................... 152,922 177,238 177,366 178,652 180,497 182,134 195,264
Light Trucks............................ 172,552 208,471 208,537 209,974 212,040 213,954 225,865
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MPGse = Required fuel economy standard for the
originating (earning) manufacturer, compliance category, and model
year in which the credit was earned;
MPGae = Actual fuel economy for the originating
manufacturer, compliance category, and model year in which the
credit was earned;
MPGsu = Required fuel economy standard for the user
(buying) manufacturer, compliance category, and model year in which
the credit is used for compliance; and
MPGau = Actual fuel economy for the user manufacturer,
compliance category, and model year in which the credit is used for
compliance.
0
47. Amend Sec. 536.9 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 536.9 Use of credits with regard to the domestically
manufactured passenger automobile minimum standard.
* * * * *
(c) Transferred or traded credits may not be used, pursuant to 49
U.S.C. 32903(g)(4) and (f)(2), to meet the domestically manufactured
passenger automobile minimum standard specified in 49 U.S.C.
32902(b)(4) and in 49 CFR 531.5(d).
* * * * *
0
48. Amend Sec. 536.10 by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) and adding
paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 536.10 Treatment of dual-fuel and alternative-fuel vehicles--
consistency with 49 CFR part 538.
* * * * *
(b) If a manufacturer's calculated fuel economy for a particular
compliance category, including any statutorily-required calculations
for alternative fuel and dual fuel vehicles, is higher or lower than
the applicable fuel economy standard, manufacturers will earn credits
or must apply credits or pay civil penalties equal to the difference
between the calculated fuel economy level in that compliance category
and the applicable standard. Credits earned are the same as any other
credits, and may be held, transferred, or traded by the manufacturer
subject to the limitations of the statute and this regulation.
(c) For model years up to and including MY 2019, if a manufacturer
builds enough dual fuel vehicles (except plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles) to improve the calculated fuel economy in a particular
compliance category by more than the limits set forth in 49 U.S.C.
32906(a), the improvement in fuel economy for compliance purposes is
restricted to the statutory limit. Manufacturers may not earn credits
nor reduce the application of credits or fines for calculated
improvements in fuel economy based on dual fuel vehicles beyond the
statutory limit.
(d) For model years 2020 and beyond, a manufacturer must calculate
the fuel economy of dual fueled vehicles in accordance with 40 CFR
600.510-12(c).
PART 537--AUTOMOTIVE FUEL ECONOMY REPORTS
0
49. The authority citation for part 537 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32907, delegation of authority at 49 CFR
1.50.
0
50. Amend Sec. 537.5 by revising paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 537.5 General requirements for reports.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) Be submitted on CD-ROM for confidential reports provided in
accordance with Part 537.12 and by email for non-confidential (i.e.,
redacted) versions of reports. The content of reports must be provided
in a pdf or MS Word format except for the information required in 537.7
which must be provided in a MS Excel format. Submit 2 copies of the CD-
ROM to: Administrator, National Highway Traffic Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20590, and submit reports
electronically to the following secure email address: [email protected];
* * * * *
0
51. Amend Sec. 537.7 by revising paragraphs (b)(3), (c)(4), (c)(5) and
adding (c)(7) to read as follows:
Sec. 537.7 Pre-model year and mid-model year reports.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) State the projected required fuel economy for the
manufacturer's passenger automobiles and light trucks determined in
accordance with 49 CFR 531.5(c) and 49 CFR 533.5 and based upon the
projected sales figures provided under paragraph (c)(2) of this
section. For each unique model type and footprint combination of the
manufacturer's automobiles, provide the information specified in
paragraph (b)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section in tabular form. List the
model types in order of increasing average inertia weight from top to
bottom down the left side of the table and list the information
categories in the order specified in paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii) of
this section from left to right across the top of the table. Other
formats, such as those accepted by EPA, which contain all of the
information in a readily identifiable format are also acceptable.
(i) In the case of passenger automobiles:
(A) Beginning model year 2013, base tire as defined in 49 CFR
523.2,
(B) Beginning model year 2013, front axle, rear axle and average
track width as defined in 49 CFR 523.2,
(C) Beginning model year 2013, wheelbase as defined in 49 CFR
523.2, and
(D) Beginning model year 2013, footprint as defined in 49 CFR
523.2.
(E) Optionally, beginning model year 2013, the target standard for
each unique model type and footprint entry listed in accordance with
the equation provided in 49 CFR 531 Figure 3.
(ii) In the case of light trucks:
(A) Beginning model year 2013, base tire as defined in 49 CFR
523.2,
(B) Beginning model year 2013, front axle, rear axle and average
track width as defined in 49 CFR 523.2,
(C) Beginning model year 2013, wheelbase as defined in 49 CFR
523.2, and
(D) Beginning model year 2013, footprint as defined in 49 CFR
523.2.
(E) Optionally, beginning model year 2013, the target standard for
each unique model type and footprint entry listed in accordance with
the equation provided in 49 CFR 533 Figure 4.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) (i) Loaded vehicle weight;
(ii) Equivalent test weight;
(iii) Engine displacement, liters;
(iv) SAE net rated power, kilowatts;
(v) SAE net horsepower;
(vi) Engine code;
(vii) Fuel system (number of carburetor barrels or, if fuel
injection is used, so indicate);
(viii) Emission control system;
(ix) Transmission class;
(x) Number of forward speeds;
[[Page 63199]]
(xi) Existence of overdrive (indicate yes or no);
(xii) Total drive ratio (N/V);
(xiii) Axle ratio;
(xiv) Combined fuel economy;
(xv) Projected sales for the current model year;
(xvi) (A) In the case of passenger automobiles:
(1) Interior volume index, determined in accordance with subpart D
of 40 CFR part 600;
(2) Body style;
(B) In the case of light trucks:
(1) Passenger-carrying volume;
(2) Cargo-carrying volume;
(xvii) Frontal area;
(xviii) Road load power at 50 miles per hour, if determined by the
manufacturer for purposes other than compliance with this part to
differ from the road load setting prescribed in 40 CFR 86.177-11(d);
(xix) Optional equipment that the manufacturer is required under 40
CFR parts 86 and 600 to have actually installed on the vehicle
configuration, or the weight of which must be included in the curb
weight computation for the vehicle configuration, for fuel economy
testing purposes.
(5) For each model type of automobile which is classified as a non-
passenger vehicle (light truck) under part 523 of this chapter, provide
the following data:
(i) For an automobile designed to perform at least one of the
following functions in accordance with 523.5 (a) indicate (by ``yes''
or ``no'' for each function) whether the vehicle can:
(A) Transport more than 10 persons (if yes, provide actual
designated seating positions);
(B) Provide temporary living quarters (if yes, provide applicable
conveniences as defined in 523.2);
(C) Transport property on an open bed (if yes, provide bed size
width and length);
(D) Provide, as sold to the first retail purchaser, greater cargo-
carrying than passenger-carrying volume, such as in a cargo van and
quantify the value which should be the difference between the values
provided in (4)(xvi)(B)(1) and (2) above; if a vehicle is sold with a
second-row seat, its cargo-carrying volume is determined with that seat
installed, regardless of whether the manufacturer has described that
seat as optional; or
(E) Permit expanded use of the automobile for cargo-carrying
purposes or other non-passenger-carrying purposes through:
(1) For non-passenger automobiles manufactured prior to model year
2012, the removal of seats by means installed for that purpose by the
automobile's manufacturer or with simple tools, such as screwdrivers
and wrenches, so as to create a flat, floor level, surface extending
from the forward-most point of installation of those seats to the rear
of the automobile's interior; or
(2) For non-passenger automobiles manufactured in model year 2008
and beyond, for vehicles equipped with at least 3 rows of designated
seating positions as standard equipment, permit expanded use of the
automobile for cargo-carrying purposes or other nonpassenger-carrying
purposes through the removal or stowing of foldable or pivoting seats
so as to create a flat, leveled cargo surface extending from the
forward-most point of installation of those seats to the rear of the
automobile's interior.
(ii) For an automobile capable of off-highway operation, identify
which of the features below qualify the vehicle as off-road in
accordance with 523.5 (b) and quantify the values of each feature:
(A) 4-wheel drive; or
(B) A rating of more than 6,000 pounds gross vehicle weight; and
(C) Has at least four of the following characteristics calculated
when the automobile is at curb weight, on a level surface, with the
front wheels parallel to the automobile's longitudinal centerline, and
the tires inflated to the manufacturer's recommended pressure. The
exact value of each feature should be quantified:
(1) Approach angle of not less than 28 degrees.
(2) Breakover angle of not less than 14 degrees.
(3) Departure angle of not less than 20 degrees.
(4) Running clearance of not less than 20 centimeters.
(5) Front and rear axle clearances of not less than 18 centimeters
each.
* * * * *
(7) Identify any air-conditioning (AC), off-cycle and full-size
pick-up truck technologies used each model year to calculate the
average fuel economy specified in 40 CFR 600.510-12.
(i) Provide a list of each air conditioning efficiency improvement
technology utilized in your fleet(s) of vehicles for each model year.
For each technology identify vehicles by make and model types that have
the technology, which compliance category those vehicles belong to and
the number of vehicles for each model equipped with the technology. For
each compliance category (domestic passenger car, import passenger car
and light truck) report the ``Air conditioning fuel consumption
improvements'' value in gallons/mile in accordance with the equation
specified in 40 CFR 600.510-12(c)(3)(i).
(ii) Provide a list of off-cycle efficiency improvement
technologies utilized in your fleet(s) of vehicles for each model year
that is pending or approved by EPA. For each technology identify
vehicles by make and model that have the technology, which compliance
category those vehicles belong to, the number of vehicles for each
model equipped with the technology, and the associated fuel efficiency
credits (grams/mile) available for each technology. For each compliance
category (domestic passenger car, import passenger car and light truck)
calculate the fleet ``Off-Cycle Credit'' value in gallons/mile in
accordance with the equation specified in 40 CFR 600.510-12(c)(3)(ii).
(iii) Provide a list of full-size pick-up trucks in your fleet that
meet the mild and strong hybrid vehicle definitions. For each mild and
strong hybrid type, identify vehicles by make and model that have the
technology, the number of vehicles produced for each model equipped
with the technology, the total number of full size pick-up trucks
produced with and without the technology, the calculated percentage of
hybrid vehicles relative to the total number of vehicles produced and
the associated fuel efficiency credits (grams/mile) available for each
technology. For the light truck compliance category calculate the fleet
``Pick-up Truck Credit'' value in gallons/mile in accordance with the
equation specified in 40 CFR 600.510-12(c)(3)(iii).
(iv) For each model year and compliance category, provide the
``MPG'' and ``Average MPG'' which are the fleet CAFE value before and
the revised fleet CAFE value after taking into consideration
adjustments for AC, Off-Cycle and full-size pick-up truck technologies
calculated in accordance with 40 CFR 600.510-12 (c)(1)(ii).
0
52. Amend Sec. 537.8 by revising paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows:
Sec. 537.8 Supplementary reports.
(a) * * *
(3) Each manufacturer whose pre-model year report omits any of the
information specified in Sec. 537.7(b), (c)(1) and (2), or (c)(4)
shall file a supplementary report containing the information specified
in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
* * * * *
[[Page 63200]]
Dated: August 28, 2012.
Ray LaHood,
Secretary, Department of Transportation.
Dated: August 28, 2012.
Lisa P. Jackson,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.
[FR Doc. 2012-21972 Filed 10-12-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P