[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 2 (Monday, January 5, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 233-239]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30856]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DHS-2014-0076]
Privacy Act of 1974; Department of Homeland Security
Transportation Security Administration--DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight
Records System of Records
AGENCY: Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Notice Privacy Act System of Records.
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SUMMARY: In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of
Homeland Security proposes to update and reissue a current Department
of Homeland Security system of records titled, ``Department of Homeland
Security/Transportation Security Administration--DHS/TSA-019 Secure
Flight Records System of Records.'' This system of records allows the
Department of Homeland Security/Transportation Security Administration
to collect and maintain records on aviation passengers and certain non-
travelers to screen such individuals before they access airport sterile
areas or board aircraft, in order to identify and prevent a threat to
aviation security or to the lives of passengers and others. TSA is
reissuing this system of records to update the categories of records to
include records containing risk-based assessments generated by
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aircraft operators using data in their Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening Systems (CAPPS). These CAPPS assessments are used in risk-
based analysis of Secure Flight and other prescreening data that
produces a boarding pass printing result for each passenger. This
change identifies additional passengers who may be eligible for
expedited screening at airport security checkpoints. This updated
system will continue to be included in the Department of Homeland
Security's inventory of record systems. Additionally, this notice
includes non-substantive changes to simplify the formatting and text of
the previously published notice.
DATES: Submit comments on or before February 4, 2015. This updated
system will be effective upon publication except that the change to the
categories of records will be effective 30 days after date of
publication in the Federal Register.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number DHS-
2014-0076 by one of the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-343-4010.
Mail: Karen L. Neuman, Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy
Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name
and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments received will be
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, please visit http://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions, please contact:
Peter Pietra, Privacy Officer, TSA-36, Transportation Security
Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598-6036; email:
[email protected]. For privacy questions, please contact: Karen L.
Neuman, Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) proposes to update and reissue a current DHS
system of records titled, ``DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records System of
Records.'' This system of records notice was last updated on September
10, 2013.\1\
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\1\ 78 FR 55270 (Sept. 10, 2013).
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TSA is modifying DHS/TSA-019 by adding Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS) assessments received from aircraft
operators to the Categories of Records. CAPPS assessments are the
product of a risk analysis of passenger name records (PNR) \2\ and
other information associated with flight reservations that aircraft
operators collect in the ordinary course of business. These PNRs and
other data provide risk indications and are used to assess passenger
risk on a per flight basis. The CAPPS assessment, in turn, is used in
the risk-based analysis of Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) \3\ and
other prescreening data that produce a boarding pass printing result
for each passenger. The early use of CAPPS by aircraft operators was to
identify passengers other than those on watch lists who merited
additional screening. TSA now will incorporate the CAPPS assessment to
identify low-risk passengers who may be eligible for expedited
screening in airports with TSA Pre[check][supreg] lanes. By receiving a
CAPPS assessment (as opposed to the underlying data used to arrive at
that assessment), TSA obtains important security value from information
without receiving all the underlying data that are generated when
individuals make their flight reservations.
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\2\ A PNR contains details about an individual's travel on a
particular flight, including information provided by the individual
when making the flight reservation. Though the content of PNRs
varies among airlines, PNRs may include: (1) Passenger name; (2)
reservation date; (3) travel agency or agent; (4) travel itinerary
information; (5) form of payment; (6) flight number; and (7) seating
location. See DHS/TSA-017 Secure Flight Test Records, 70 FR 36320
(June 22, 2005). Some PNR data collected by aircraft operators
provide evidence of potential security risks, and other data provide
indications of low security risk. Other PNR data are security
neutral.
\3\ SFPD is full name, gender, date of birth, redress number or
Known Traveler number, passport information (if applicable),
reservation control number, record sequence number, record type,
passenger update indicator, traveler reference number, and itinerary
information. 49 CFR part 1560.
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TSA established the Secure Flight system of records and published
the System of Records Notice (SORN) in the Federal Register on August
23, 2007.\4\ TSA updated and republished the SORN in the Federal
Register on November 9, 2007,\5\ on November 19, 2012,\6\ and on
September 10, 2013.
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\4\ 72 FR 48392.
\5\ 72 FR 63711.
\6\ 77 FR 69491.
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Background on CAPPS
In response to the changing threat of terrorism,\7\ President
Clinton established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security (Commission) in 1996.\8\ In its final report,\9\ the
Commission recognized that aviation security is a national security
issue and recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
``work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that all
passengers are positively identified and subjected to security
procedures before they board aircraft.'' \10\ Specifically, the
Commission recommended that the FAA, ``based on information already in
[air carriers'] computer databases,'' leverage that industry investment
by separating passengers ``into a very large majority who present
little or no risk, and a small minority who merit additional
attention.'' \11\ The Commission supported the development and
implementation of automated passenger screening systems such as the
system then under development by the FAA and Northwest Airlines.
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\7\ In addition to overseas threats from foreign terrorists,
people and places in the United States were becoming targets, and
Americans joined the ranks of terrorists. The 1993 and 1995 bombings
of the World Trade Center in New York, and the Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, respectively, were clear examples of the shift, as
was the 1996 conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to bomb
American airliners over the Pacific Ocean.
\8\ Executive Order 13015, White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security, 61 FR 43937 (Aug. 22, 1996).
\9\ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,
Final Report to President Clinton, February 12, 1997, found at
www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.html (hereinafter Report).
\10\ Id. at section 3.7.
\11\ Id. at section 3.19. The Commission noted that the U.S.
Customs Service (now U.S. Customs and Border Protection)
successfully used such a system to better focus its resources and
attention.
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Following the Commission's report, CAPPS was created by the FAA
\12\ to serve as a feasible alternative to conducting the Commission-
recommended 100 percent checked baggage matching and explosive
detection screening.\13\ CAPPS was designed ``to exclude from the
additional security measures the great majority of passengers who are
very unlikely to present any threat and, conversely, to identify
passengers to whom heightened security measures
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should be applied.'' \14\ The FAA evaluated whether PNR and other data
associated with flight reservations that the aircraft operator
collected in the ordinary course of business provided indicators of
high security risk or low risk, or whether the data were risk
neutral.\15\ Aircraft operators ran CAPPS in their reservation systems
for originating passengers who checked bags prior to passenger boarding
using the FAA-set standards for assessing these data.\16\ When a CAPPS
assessment raised security concerns the aircraft operator either
screened the passenger's checked baggage using FAA-certified explosives
detection equipment, or matched the bag to the passenger to ensure that
the passenger's checked baggage was not transported aboard an airplane
unless that passenger was aboard the same airplane and flight.
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\12\ The FAA implemented CAPPS pursuant to its general authority
to prescribe regulations ``to protect passengers and property on an
aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation against an act of criminal violence or aircraft
piracy.'' 49 U.S.C. 44903(b).
\13\ See Report at section 3.24.
\14\ See FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Security of Checked
Baggage on Flights Within the United States, 64 FR 19220, 19221
(April 19, 1999).
\15\ These evaluation criteria were reviewed by the Department
of Justice, id. at 19224-25, and implemented in consultation with
aircraft operators.
\16\ Id. FAA funds subsidized a substantial portion of the
aircraft operators' cost for development of the core CAPPS system,
which was provided to eight lead operators (six separate Computer
Reservation Systems), all smaller operators associated with the lead
operators (e.g., regional feeder airlines), plus 19 other regional
and national aircraft operators that collectively served
approximately 95 percent of domestic airline passengers. Id. at
19222.
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TSA was created in 2001 with the enactment of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA),\17\ and assumed responsibility for
the CAPPS program from the FAA.\18\ CAPPS continued to be operated by
U.S. aircraft operators pursuant to the TSA-mandated Aircraft Operator
Standard Security Program (AOSSP). Under this program, and prior to the
implementation of Secure Flight, airlines were required to check
passenger reservation data against watch lists. A CAPPS assessment
indicating risk above a pre-set threshold required enhanced screening
for passengers who were not on a watch list. For those passengers
requiring additional screening as a result of their CAPPS assessment,
the aircraft operator added the additional screening instruction to the
boarding pass and TSA would perform the additional screening. As with
the FAA, TSA did not receive the underlying PNR or associated
reservations information. The additional screening included enhanced
physical searches of individuals and their carry-on bags at the
checkpoint.
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\17\ Pub.L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001).
\18\ In section 136 of ATSA (codified at 49 U.S.C.
44903(j)(2)(C)), Congress directed that aircraft operators use CAPPS
or any successor system to screen all aircraft passengers, not just
those who are checking bags. See also TSA Notice of rulemaking
status, Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the United
States; Certification of Screening Companies, 67 FR 67382, 67383
(Nov. 5, 2002). In addition, ATSA continued in effect all ``orders,
determinations, rules, [and] regulations'' of the FAA ``until
modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in
accordance with law by the [TSA Administrator], any other authorized
official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of law.''
See ATSA, section 141(b). ATSA also explicitly recognized the
continuance of CAPPS when it exempted CAPPS from the requirement
that the screening of passengers and property before boarding
flights originating in the United States be carried out by a Federal
Government employee. See 49 U.S.C. 44901(a).
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The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA) was enacted in December 2004.\19\ Section 4012(a)(1)-(2) of
IRPTA directed TSA and DHS to assume the function of comparing aircraft
operator passenger information to data in the Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) from
aircraft operators.\20\ TSA promulgated its Secure Flight Program
regulations consistent with this statutory directive.\21\ By November
2010, TSA fully assumed the watch list matching function from aircraft
operators and air carriers in Secure Flight. Since that time, CAPPS has
not been used to determine whether additional screening is warranted
for certain passengers. Notably, however, IRTPA did not remove or amend
the statutory requirement for aircraft operators to use CAPPS.
Accordingly, the statutory and regulatory authorities for the use of
CAPPS remain.
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\19\ Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004). A genesis
for IRPTA was the report of the The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), which
recommended that TSA perform watch list matching using the ``larger
set of watch lists maintained by the Federal Government,'' and that
screening issues associated with CAPPS be elevated for high-level
attention and addressed promptly by the government. See Final Report
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, page 393 (July 22, 2004).
\20\ The TSC maintains the Federal Government watch lists,
including the terrorism watch list known as the TSDB. The TSC was
established by the Attorney General in coordination with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the Treasury,
and the Secretary of Defense. The Attorney General, acting through
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
established the TSC in support of Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 6 (HSPD-6), dated September 16, 2003, which required the
Attorney General to establish an organization to consolidate the
Federal Government's approach to terrorism screening and to provide
for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in
screening processes.
\21\ 73 FR 64018 (Oct. 28, 2008).
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Use of CAPPS Assessments in Secure Flight Risk-Based Analysis
TSA plans to incorporate a CAPPS assessment generated by aircraft
operators into its Secure Flight risk-based analysis of passenger and
other prescreening data as part of ongoing efforts to enhance aviation
security by identifying appropriate security screening for aviation
travelers.\22\ The CAPPS assessments are designed to enhance TSA's
analysis of passenger security risk and enable TSA to make better
passenger risk decisions. The incorporation of a CAPPS assessment into
the Secure Flight risk-based analysis program with Secure Flight
Passenger Data (SFPD) and other prescreening data is consistent with
Congress's direction in ATSA to use CAPPS in passenger screening. CAPPS
assessments generated by aircraft operators continue to rely on
information collected by those operators in the ordinary course of
business. Secure Flight does not receive the underlying data that are
used for the CAPPS assessment.\23\
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\22\ For a discussion of Secure Flight risk-based analysis, see
the September 10, 2013 Secure Flight SORN update at 78 FR 55270, and
the Privacy Impact Assessment for Secure Flight, DHS/TSA/PIA-018(f)
(Sept. 4, 2013), found at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-tsa-secure-flight-update-09042013.pdf.
\23\ TSA, however, remains authorized to obtain such data for
transportation security purposes under TSA's general compliance and
enforcement authorities, such as TSA's authority to inspect aircraft
operators to ensure compliance with security programs and TSA
regulations (49 U.S.C. 114(f)(7), 49 CFR 1544.3); and TSA's
authority to issue subpoenas and orders for the production of
information (49 U.S.C. 40113(a) and 46104, 49 CFR 503.203(a)). TSA
also collects the SFPD required to be provided under the Secure
Flight Rulemaking.
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TSA has taken a number of steps to review the security value of
CAPPS data including evaluating whether certain CAPPS data are
indicative of low-risk passengers. First, TSA worked with its airline
partners to re-assess the security value of the individual CAPPS data
elements. This effort resulted in refining CAPPS data elements. Second,
TSA engaged the Civil Aviation Threat Working Group (CATWG), which is
composed of analysts from various Federal Government agencies and led
by a representative from the National Counterterrorism Center, to
provide its assessment of the security value of CAPPS data. The CATWG
provided its report of findings and recommendations in September 2013,
which further refined the security value assigned to CAPPS data
elements. Third, TSA asked the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis
Institute \24\ (a federally-funded research and development center) to
review its approach to risk-based security screening including the use
of CAPPS assessments. In March 2014, the Institute endorsed TSA's
approach for
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conducting Secure Flight risk-based analysis and recommended that TSA
continue to strengthen this analysis by including CAPPS assessments.
Finally, TSA reviewed its plans to use CAPPS assessments with senior
officials from the Department of Homeland Security Offices of Privacy,
Civil Rights and Liberties, and General Counsel. TSA further refined
the security value assigned to CAPPS data elements based on input from
these offices. These offices found that CAPPS assessments may be used
as part of the Secure Flight risk-based analysis while also protecting
passengers' privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. In addition,
these DHS offices will review CAPPS operations on an on-going basis,
including the risk value assigned to individual CAPPS data elements, to
assure CAPPS's continued security value, its connection to evolving
security threat information, and its adherence to privacy, civil
rights, civil liberties, and legal principles.
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\24\ See www.homelandsecurity.org.
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Currently, the Secure Flight passenger prescreening system has
watch lists of high-risk individuals and uses these lists to issue
boarding pass printing results, e.g., selectee screening or ``do not
board'' instructions. TSA also has lists of low-risk individuals who
have been issued known traveler numbers (KTN) \25\ that makes them
eligible for expedited screening. These individuals may receive a
boarding pass printing instruction that enables them to use TSA
Pre[check][supreg] lanes.\26\ TSA also uses risk-based analysis of SFPD
and other prescreening data to make screening determinations (e.g., to
determine whether a passenger is eligible for expedited screening). The
addition of CAPPS assessments to existing Secure Flight risk-based
analysis will strengthen the risk assessment and increase the
confidence level in the determination that a passenger is a lower risk
and eligible for expedited screening.\27\
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\25\ A Known Traveler Number means ``a unique number assigned to
an individual for whom the Federal government has conducted a
security threat assessment and determined does not pose a security
threat.'' 49 CFR 1560.3.
\26\ Passengers who are eligible for expedited screening are
referred to a TSA Pre[check][supreg] lane where they typically are
permitted to leave on their shoes, light outerwear, and belt, to
keep their laptop in its case, and to keep their 3-1-1 compliant
liquids/gels bag in a carry-on. TSA Pre[check][supreg] lanes are
available at more than 118 airports nationwide. See http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck/airlines-airports.
\27\ Another potential outcome of Secure Flight risk-based
analysis is that the addition of a CAPPS score may result in a
passenger receiving standard screening who otherwise may have been
eligible for expedited screening, or receiving enhanced screening
instead of standard screening.
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The CAPPS assessment that a passenger receives for any given flight
may change on the next flight because of the range of CAPPS data and
the associated security risks and benefits.
After these changes are implemented, passengers who are a match to
a watch list will continue to receive appropriate enhanced screening.
For all other passengers, the Secure Flight passenger prescreening
computer system conducts a risk-based analysis of passenger data using:
(1) The SFPD (including KTN) that TSA already receives from aircraft
operators pursuant to Secure Flight regulations; (2) the CAPPS
assessments; (3) frequent flyer designator codes that aircraft
operators submit to TSA; and (4) other prescreening data available to
TSA. The Secure Flight risk-based analysis determines whether
passengers receive expedited, standard, or enhanced screening, and the
results are indicated on the passenger's boarding pass.
No one will be denied the ability to fly or to enter the sterile
area of an airport based solely on the results of the Secure Flight
risk-based analysis, including the use of a CAPPS assessment in that
analysis.
II. Privacy Act
The Privacy Act embodies fair information practice principles in a
statutory framework governing the means by which the Federal Government
agencies collect, maintain, use, and disseminate individuals' records.
The Privacy Act applies to information that is maintained in a ``system
of records.'' A ``system of records'' is a group of any records under
the control of an agency from which information is retrieved by the
name of an individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other
identifying particular assigned to the individual. The Privacy Act
defines ``individual'' as U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.
As a matter of policy, DHS extends administrative Privacy Act
protections to all individuals where systems of records maintain
information on U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and visitors.
Below is the description of the DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records
System of Records.
In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(r), DHS has provided a report of
this system of records to the Office of Management and Budget and to
Congress.
System of Records
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Transportation Security
Administration (TSA)-019.
System name:
DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records.
Security classification:
Unclassified; Sensitive Security Information.
System location:
Records are maintained at the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA, and at
other secure TSA facilities in Annapolis Junction, Maryland and
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Records may also be maintained at the
secured facilities of contractors or other parties performing functions
under the Secure Flight program.
Categories of individuals covered by the system:
(a) Individuals who attempt to make reservations for travel on, who
have traveled on, or who have reservations to travel on a flight
operated by a U.S. aircraft operator; or a flight into, out of, or
overflying the United States that is operated by a foreign air carrier;
or flights operated by the U.S. Government, including flights chartered
or leased by the U.S. Government;
(b) Non-traveling individuals who seek to obtain authorization from
an aircraft or airport operator to enter the sterile area of an
airport;
(c) For flights that TSA grants a request by the operators of
leased or charter aircraft with a maximum take-off weight over 12,500
pounds to screen the individuals using Secure Flight, the following
individuals: (1) Individuals who seek to charter or lease an aircraft
with a maximum take-off weight over 12,500 pounds or who are proposed
to be transported on or operate such charter aircraft; and (2) owners
or operators of such chartered or leased aircraft;
(d)(1) Known or suspected terrorists identified in the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC); and (2) individuals identified on classified and unclassified
governmental databases such as law enforcement, immigration, or
intelligence databases;
(e) Individuals who have been distinguished from individuals on a
watch list through a redress process or by other means; and
(f) Individuals who are identified as Known Travelers for whom the
Federal Government conducted a security threat assessment and
determined that they do not pose a security threat.
Categories of records in the system:
(a) Records containing passenger and flight information (e.g., full
name, date
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of birth, gender, redress number, known traveler number, passport
information, frequent flyer designator code or other identity
authentication or verification code obtained from aircraft operators,
and itinerary); records containing assessments generated by aircraft
operators under the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
(CAPPS); records containing the results of risk-based analysis in the
TSA passenger prescreening system including boarding pass printing
results; records containing information about non-traveling individuals
seeking access to an airport sterile area for a purpose approved by
TSA; and records containing information about individuals who seek to
charter, lease, operate or be transported on aircraft with a maximum
take-off weight over 12,500 pounds if TSA grants the request of an
aircraft owner or operator to use Secure Flight;
(b) Records containing information from an individual's form of
identification or a physical description of the individual;
(c) Records obtained from the TSC of known or suspected terrorists
in the TSDB; and records regarding individuals identified on classified
and unclassified governmental watch lists;
(d) Records containing the matching analyses and results of
comparisons of individuals to the TSDB and other classified and
unclassified governmental watch lists.
(e) Records related to communications between or among TSA and
aircraft operators, airport operators, owners or operators of leased or
charter aircraft with a maximum take-off weight over 12,500 pounds,
TSC, law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, and agencies
responsible for airspace safety or security regarding the screening
status of passengers or non-traveling individuals and any operational
responses to individuals identified in the TSDB;
(f) Records of the redress process that include information on
known misidentified persons, including any Redress Number assigned to
those individuals;
(g) Records that track the receipt, use, access, or transmission of
information as part of the Secure Flight program;
(h) Electronic System for Travel Authorization status code
generated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for international
travelers; and
(i) Records containing information about individuals who are
identified as Known Travelers.
Authority for maintenance of the system:
49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 44901, 44903, and 44909.
Purpose(s):
The Secure Flight Records system are used to identify and protect
against potential and actual threats to transportation security and
support the Federal Government's counterterrorism efforts by assisting
in the identification of individuals who warrant further scrutiny prior
to boarding an aircraft or seek to enter a sterile area or who warrant
denial of boarding or denial of entry to a sterile area on security
grounds. It is also used to identify individuals who are lower-risk and
therefore may be eligible for expedited security screening at the
airport checkpoints. These functions are designed to facilitate the
secure travel of the public.
Routine uses of records maintained in the system, including categories
of users and the purposes of such uses:
(1) To the TSC in order to: (a) Determine whether an individual is
a positive identity match to an individual identified as a known or
suspected terrorist in the watch list; (b) allow redress of passenger
complaints; (c) facilitate an operational response (if one is deemed
appropriate) for individuals who are a positive identity match to an
individual identified as a known or suspected terrorist in the watch
list; (d) provide information and analysis about terrorist encounters
and known or suspected terrorist associates to appropriate domestic and
foreign government agencies and officials for counterterrorism
purposes; and (e) perform technical implementation functions necessary
for the Secure Flight program.
(2) To contractors and their agents, grantees, experts,
consultants, and others performing or working on a contract, service,
grant, cooperative agreement, or other assignment for DHS, when
necessary to accomplish an agency function related to this system of
records. Individuals provided information under this routine use are
subject to the same Privacy Act requirements and limitations on
disclosure as are applicable to DHS officers and employees.
(3) To aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, airport operators,
the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Defense or
other U.S. Government agencies or institutions to communicate
individual screening status and facilitate an operational response
(where appropriate) to individuals who pose or are suspected of posing
a risk to transportation or national security.
(4) To owners or operators of leased or charter aircraft to
communicate individual screening status and facilitate an operational
response (where appropriate) to individuals who pose or are suspected
of posing a risk to transportation or national security.
(5) To the appropriate federal, state, local, tribal, territorial,
or foreign, agency regarding or to identify individuals who pose, or
are under reasonable suspicion of posing a risk to transportation or
national security.
(6) To the Department of Justice (DOJ) or other Federal agencies
for purposes of conducting litigation or administrative proceedings,
when: (a) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or (b) any
employee or former employee of DHS in his or her official capacity, or
(c) any employee or former employee of DHS in his or her individual
capacity where the DOJ or DHS has agreed to represent the employee, or
(d) the United States or any agency thereof, is a party to the
litigation or proceeding or has an interest in such litigation or
proceeding.
(7) To the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) or
other Federal agencies pursuant to records management inspections being
conducted under the authority of 44 U.S.C. 2904 and 2906.
(8) To a congressional office in response to an inquiry from that
congressional office made at the request of the individual.
(9) To the Government Accountability Office or other agency,
organization, or individual for the purposes of performing authorized
audit or oversight operations, but only such information as is
necessary and relevant to such audit and oversight functions.
(10) To the appropriate federal, state, local, tribal, territorial,
or foreign agency responsible for investigating, prosecuting,
enforcing, or implementing a statute, rule, regulation, or order
regarding a violation or potential violation of civil or criminal law,
regulation, or order when such disclosure is proper and consistent with
the performance of the official duties of the person making the
disclosure.
(11) To international and foreign governmental authorities in
accordance with law and formal or informal international agreements
when such disclosure is proper and consistent with the performance of
the official duties of the person making the disclosure.
(12) To appropriate agencies, entities, and persons when (a) TSA
suspects or has confirmed that the security or confidentiality of
information in the system of records has been
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compromised; (b) TSA has determined that as a result of the suspected
or confirmed compromise there is a risk of harm to economic or property
interests, identity theft or fraud, or harm to the security or
integrity of this system or other systems or programs (whether
maintained by TSA or another agency or entity) that rely upon the
compromised information; and (c) the disclosure made to such agencies,
entities, and persons is reasonably necessary to assist in connection
with TSA's efforts to respond to the suspected or confirmed compromise
and prevent, minimize, or remedy such harm.
(13) To appropriate federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign
governmental agencies or multilateral governmental organizations,
including the World Health Organization, for purposes of assisting such
agencies or organizations in preventing exposure to or transmission of
communicable or quarantinable disease or for combating other
significant public health threats; appropriate notice will be provided
of any identified health threat or risk.
Disclosure to consumer reporting agencies:
None.
Policies and practices for storing, retrieving, accessing, retaining,
and disposing of records in the system:
Storage:
Records are maintained at the Transportation Security
Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA, and at other
secure TSA facilities in Annapolis Junction, Maryland and Colorado
Springs, Colorado. Records also may be maintained at the secured
facilities of contractors or other parties that perform functions under
the Secure Flight program. The records are stored on magnetic disc,
tape, digital media, and CD-ROM, and may also be retained in hard copy
format in secure file folders or safes.
Retrievability:
Data are retrievable by the individual's name or other identifier,
as well as non-identifying information such as itinerary.
Safeguards:
All records are protected from unauthorized access through
appropriate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards. The
system is also protected through a multi-layer security approach. The
protective strategies are physical, technical, administrative, and
environmental in nature and provide role-based access control to
sensitive data, physical access control to DHS facilities,
confidentiality of communications, including encryption, authentication
of sending parties, compartmentalizing databases; auditing software and
personnel screening to ensure that all personnel with access to data
are screened through background investigations commensurate with the
level of access required to perform their duties.
Information in this system is safeguarded in accordance with
applicable rules and policies, including any applicable TSA and DHS
automated systems security and access policies. The system will be in
compliance with Office of Management and Budget and National Institute
of Standards and Technology guidance. Access to the computer system
containing the records in this system of records is limited to those
individuals who require it to perform their official duties. The
computer system also maintains a real-time audit of individuals who
access the system.
Retention and disposal:
Records relating to an individual determined by the automated
matching process to be neither a match nor a potential match to a watch
list are destroyed within seven days after completion of the last leg
of the individual's directional travel itinerary. Records relating to
an individual determined by the automated matching process to be a
potential watch list match are retained for seven years after the
completion of the individual's directional travel itinerary. Records
relating to an individual determined to be a confirmed watch list match
are retained for 99 years after the date of match confirmation.
Lists of individuals stored in Secure Flight, such as individuals
identified as Known Travelers and individuals who have been
disqualified from eligibility to receive expedited screening as a
result of their involvement in certain security incidents, are deleted
or destroyed when superseded by an updated list.
System manager and address:
Secure Flight Mission Support Branch Manager, Transportation
Security Administration, TSA-19, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA
20598-6019.
Notification procedure:
To determine whether this system contains records relating to you,
write to the Freedom of Information Act Office, Transportation Security
Administration, TSA-20, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598-
6020.
Record access procedures:
Requests for records access must be in writing and should be
addressed to the Freedom of Information Act Office, Transportation
Security Administration, TSA-20, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA
20598-6020. Requests should conform to the requirements of 6 CFR part
5, subpart B, which provides the rules for requesting access to Privacy
Act records maintained by DHS. The envelope and letter should be
clearly marked ``Privacy Act Access Request.'' The request should
include a general description of the records sought and must include
the requester's full name, current address, and date and place of
birth. The request must be signed and either notarized or submitted
under penalty of perjury. Some information may be exempt from access
provisions. An individual who is the subject of a record in this system
may access those records that are not exempt from disclosure. A
determination whether a record may be accessed will be made at the time
a request is received.
Individuals who believe they have been improperly denied entry by
CBP, refused boarding for transportation, or identified for additional
screening may submit a redress request through the DHS Traveler Redress
Program (``TRIP''). See 72 FR 2294 (Jan. 18, 2007). TRIP is a single
point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution
regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening
at transportation hubs such as airports and train stations, or crossing
U.S. borders. Through TRIP a traveler can correct erroneous data stored
in Secure Flight and other data stored in other DHS databases through
one application. Additionally, for further information on the Secure
Flight program and the redress options please see the accompanying
Privacy Impact Assessment for Secure Flight published on the DHS Web
site at www.dhs.gov/privacy. Redress requests should be sent to: DHS
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), TSA-901, 601 South 12th
Street, Arlington, VA 20598-6036 or online at http://www.dhs.gov/trip.
Contesting record procedures:
Same as ``Notification Procedure'' and ``Record Access Procedure''
above.
Record source categories:
Information contained in the system is obtained from U.S. aircraft
operators, foreign air carriers, the owners and operators of leased or
charter aircraft with a maximum take-off weight over 12,500 pounds who
request TSA screening, the TSC, TSA employees, airport operators,
Federal executive
[[Page 239]]
branch agencies, Federal judicial and legislative branch entities,
State, local, international, and other governmental agencies, private
entities for Known Traveler program participants, and the individuals
to whom the records in the system pertain.
Exemptions claimed for the system:
No exemption will be asserted with respect to identifying
information, or flight information, obtained from passengers, non-
travelers, and aircraft owners or operators.
This system, however, may contain records or information recompiled
or created from information contained in other systems of records,
which are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. For these
records of information only, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and
(k)(2), TSA claims the following exemptions for these records or
information from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4);
(e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f); and (g) of the
Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, as necessary and appropriate to
protect such information. Certain portions or all of these records may
be exempt from disclosure pursuant to these exemptions.
Dated: December 10, 2014.
Karen L. Neuman,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2014-30856 Filed 1-2-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-05-P