Federal Register, Volume 80 Issue 89 (Friday, May 8, 2015)

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 89 (Friday, May 8, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 26644-26750]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-10670]

[[Page 26643]]

Vol. 80

Friday,

No. 89

May 8, 2015

Part II

Department of Transportation

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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, et al.

Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 80 , No. 89 / Friday, May 8, 2015 / Rules and
Regulations

[[Page 26644]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, 174, and 179

[Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251)]
RIN 2137-AE91

Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this final rule, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA), in coordination with the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA), is adopting requirements designed to
reduce the consequences and, in some instances, reduce the probability
of accidents involving trains transporting large quantities of
flammable liquids. The final rule defines certain trains transporting
large volumes of flammable liquids as ``high-hazard flammable trains''
(HHFT) and regulates their operation in terms of speed restrictions,
braking systems, and routing. The final rule also adopts safety
improvements in tank car design standards, a sampling and
classification program for unrefined petroleum-based products, and
notification requirements. These operational and safety improvements
are necessary to address the unique risks associated with the growing
reliance on trains to transport large quantities of flammable liquids.
They incorporate recommendations from the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and from the public comments, and are supported by
a robust economic impact analysis.

DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective July 7, 2015.
Incorporation by reference Date: The incorporation by reference of
the publication listed in this rule is approved by the Director of the
Federal Register as of July 7, 2015.

ADDRESSES: You may find information on this rulemaking (Docket No.
PHMSA-2012-0082) at Federal eRulmaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rob Benedict and Ben Supko, (202) 366-
8553, Standards and Rulemaking Division, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration or Karl Alexy, (202) 493-6245, Office
of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration,
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents of Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. Background and Approach to Rail Safety
A. Braking
B. Speed Restrictions
C. Track Integrity, Securement, Engineer and Conductor
Certification, Crew Size and the Safety of Freight Railroad
Operations
D. Routing
E. Notification
F. Oil Spill Response Planning
G. Classification
H. Packaging/Tank Car
III. Recent Regulatory Actions Addressing Rail Safety
A. Rulemaking Actions
B. Emergency Orders
IV. Non-Regulatory Actions Addressing Rail Safety
A. Safety Alerts and Advisories
B. Operation Classification
C. Call to Action
D. Stakeholder Outreach
V. NTSB Safety Recommendations
VI. Incorporation by Reference Discussion Under 1 CFR part 51
VII. Summary and Discussion of Public Comments
A. Miscellaneous Relevant Comments
1. Harmonization
2. Definition of High-Hazard Flammable Train
3. Crude Oil Treatment
4. Scope of Rulemaking
B. Tank Car Specification
1. New Tank Car Construction
2. Retrofit Standard
3. Performance Standard
4. Implementation Timeline
C. Speed Restrictions
D. Advanced Brake Signal Propagation Systems
E. Classification
F. Routing
G. Notification
VIII. Section by Section Review
IX. Impact of Adopted Regulation on Existing Emergency Orders
X. Regulatory Review and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order
13610, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
C. Executive Order 13132
D. Executive Order 13175
E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Policies and Procedures
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
G. Environmental Assessment
H. Privacy Act
I. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
J. Statutory/Legal Authority for this Rulemaking
K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
L. Executive Order 13211
XI. Regulatory Text

I. Executive Summary

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
in coordination with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), is
issuing this final rule, titled ``Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank
Car Standards and Operational Controls for HHFTs,'' in order to
increase the safety of flammable liquid shipments by rail. The final
rule is necessary due to the expansion in United States (U.S.) energy
production, which has led to significant challenges for the country's
transportation system. PHMSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) on August 1, 2014. See 79 FR 45015. This final rule addresses
comments to the NPRM and amends the existing hazardous materials
regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-180) pertaining to tank car designs,
speed restrictions, braking systems, routing, sampling and
classification, and notification requirements related to certain trains
transporting large quantities of flammable liquids.
Expansion in oil production has resulted in a large volume of crude
oil being transported to refineries and other transport-related
facilities, such as transloading facilities throughout the country.
With a growing domestic supply, rail transportation has emerged as a
flexible alternative to transportation by pipeline or vessel, which
have historically delivered the vast majority of crude oil to U.S.
refineries. The volume of crude oil carried by rail increased 423
percent between 2011 and 2012.^{1 2} In 2013, the number of
rail carloads of crude oil surpassed 400,000.^{3 4} Further,
based on information provided by the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA) asserts
the amount of crude oil and refined petroleum products moved by U.S.
railroads continued to increase by nine percent during the first seven
months of 2014, when compared with the same period in 2013.
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\1\ See U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: Background and
Issues for Congress; http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf.
\2\ See Table 9 of EIA refinery report http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/.
\3\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
\4\ http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17751.

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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.000

Figure 1 visually demonstrates the considerable increase in crude oil
and petroleum shipments by rail.\5\
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\5\ http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17751.
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U.S. ethanol production has also increased considerably during the
last 10 years and has generated similar growth in the transportation of
ethanol by rail.\6\ Ethanol constitutes 26 percent of the total number
of rail hazardous materials shipments, and is 1.1 percent of all
railroad shipments.\7\
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\6\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Railroads and
Ethanol. Available online at https://www.aar.org/BackgroundPapers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf.
\7\ http://ethanolrfa.org/page/-/rfa-association-site/Industry%20Resources/RFA.Ethanol.Rail.Transportation.and.Safety.pdf?nocdn=1.
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Crude oil and ethanol comprise approximately 68 percent of the
flammable liquids transported by rail. The inherent risk of
flammability of these materials is compounded in the context of rail
transportation because petroleum crude oil and ethanol are commonly
shipped in large quantities, either as large blocks of material in a
manifest train or as a single commodity train (commonly referred to as
a ``unit train''). As detailed in the NPRM, in recent years, train
accidents/incidents (train accidents) involving the release of a
flammable liquid and resulting in fires and other severe consequences
have occurred. See the Regulatory Impact Analysis, posted in the
docket, for a detailed description of the accidents considered for this
rulemaking.
Federal hazardous materials transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5101-
5128) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to
``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including
security, of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign
commerce.'' The Secretary delegated this authority to PHMSA. 49 CFR
1.97(b). PHMSA is responsible for overseeing a hazardous materials
safety program that minimizes the risks to life and property inherent
in transportation in commerce. On a yearly basis the HMR provides
safety and security requirements for more than 2.5 billion tons of
hazardous materials (hazmat), valued at about $2.3 trillion, and hazmat
was moved 307 billion miles on the nation's interconnected
transportation network.\8\ In addition, the HMR include operational
requirements applicable to each mode of transportation. The Secretary
also has authority over all areas of railroad transportation safety
(Federal railroad safety laws, principally 49 U.S.C. chapters 201-213),
and this authority is delegated to FRA. 49 CFR 1.89. FRA inspects and
audits railroads, tank car facilities, and hazardous material offerors
for compliance with both FRA and PHMSA regulations. FRA also has an
extensive, well-established research and development program to enhance
all elements of railroad safety, including hazardous materials
transportation. As a result of the shared role in the safe and secure
transportation of hazardous materials by rail, PHMSA and FRA work very
closely when considering regulatory changes and the agencies take a
system-wide, comprehensive approach consistent with the risks posed by
the bulk transport of hazardous materials by rail.
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\8\ 2012 Commodity Flow Survey, Research and Innovative
Technology Administration (RITA), Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS). See http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=CFS_2012_00H01&prodType=table.
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This rulemaking is intended to reduce the likelihood of train
accidents involving flammable liquids, and mitigate the consequences of
such accidents should they occur. In this final rule, PHMSA is revising
the HMR to establish requirements for any ``high-hazard flammable
train'' (HHFT) that is transported over the U.S. rail network. Based on
analysis of the risk of differing train compositions, this rule defines
an HHFT as a train comprised of 20 or more loaded tank cars of a Class
3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or 35 or more loaded tank cars
of a Class 3 flammable liquid across the entire train. For the purposes
of advanced braking systems, this rule also defines a ``high-hazard
flammable unit train'' (HHFUT) as a train comprised of 70 or more
loaded tank cars containing Class 3 flammable liquids traveling speeds
at greater than 30 mph. The rule ensures that the requirements are
closely aligned with the risks posed by the operation of trains that
are transporting large quantities of flammable liquids. As discussed
further in this preamble and in the accompanying RIA, this rule
primarily impacts trains transporting large quantities of ethanol and
crude oil, because ethanol and crude oil are most frequently
transported in high-volume shipments than when transported in a single
train, and such trains would meet the definition of an HHFT. By
revising the definition of HHFT from that which was proposed in the
NPRM, we have clarified the scope of the final rule and focused on the
highest-risk shipments, while not affecting lower-risk trains that

[[Page 26646]]

are not transporting similar bulk quantities of Class 3 flammable
liquids.\9\
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\9\ In the August 1, 2014, NPRM, an HHFT was defined as a train
comprised of 20 or more carloads of a Class 3 flammable liquid. This
rule defines an HHFT as a train comprised of 20 or more tank car
loads of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or 35 tank
car loads of a Class 3 flammable liquid across the entire train.
\10\ As defined the Transportation Security Administration's
regulations at 49 CFR 1580.3--High Threat Urban Area (HTUA) means an
area comprising one or more cities and surrounding areas including a
10-mile buffer zone, as listed in appendix A to 49 CFR Part 1580.
The 50-mph maximum speed restriction for HHFTs is consistent with
the speed restrictions that the AAR issued in Circular No. OT-55-N
on August 5, 2013. The 40-mph builds on an industry imposed
voluntary restriction that applies to any ``Key Crude Oil Train''
with at least one non-CPC 1232 tank car or one non-DOT specification
tank car while that train travels within the limits of any high-
threat urban area (HTUA) as defined by 49 CFR 1580.3.
\11\ A ``high-hazard flammable unit train'' (HHFUT) means a
train comprised of 70 or more loaded tank cars containing Class 3
flammable liquids traveling at greater than 30 mph.
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PHMSA and FRA have used a variety of regulatory and non-regulatory
methods to address the risks of the bulk transport of flammable
liquids, including crude oil and ethanol, by rail. These efforts
include issuing guidance, conducting rulemakings, participating in rail
safety committees, holding public meetings, enhancing enforcement
efforts, and reaching out to the public. All of these efforts are
consistent with our system-wide approach.
PHMSA and FRA focus on prevention, mitigation and response to
manage and reduce the risk posed to people and the environment by the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. When addressing these
issues, PHMSA and FRA focus on solutions designed to reduce the
probability of accidents occurring and to minimize the consequences of
an accident should one occur.
In this final rule, we are revising the HMR to establish
requirements specific to HHFTs. As described in greater detail
throughout this document, the final rule takes a system-wide,
comprehensive approach consistent with the risks posed by HHFTs.
Specifically, Table 1 describes the regulatory changes implemented in
this final rule and identifies entities affected by this final rule.

Table 1--Affected Entities and Requirements
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Adopted requirement Affected entity
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Enhanced Standards for Both New and Tank Car Manufacturers, Tank
Existing Tank Cars Used in HHFTs. Car
New tank cars constructed Owners, Shippers/Offerors
after October 1, 2015 are required to and Rail Carriers.
meet enhanced DOT Specification 117
design or performance criteria.
Existing tank cars must be
retrofitted in accordance with the
DOT-prescribed retrofit design or
performance standard.
Retrofits must be completed
based on a prescriptive retrofit
schedule and a retrofit reporting
requirement is triggered if initial
milestone is not achieved.
More Accurate Classification of Unrefined Offerors/Shippers of
Petroleum-Based Products. unrefined petroleum-based
Develop and carry out sampling products.
and testing program for all unrefined
petroleum-based products, such as crude
oil, to address:.
(1) Frequency of sampling and
testing that accounts for any
appreciable variability of the
material.
(2) Sampling prior to the initial
offering of the material for
transportation and when changes
that may affect the properties of
the material occur;
(3) Sampling methods that ensures
a representative sample of the
entire mixture, as offered, is
collected;
(4) Testing methods that enable
classification of the material
under the HMR;
(5) Quality control measures for
sample frequencies;
(6) Duplicate samples or
equivalent measures for quality
assurance;
(7) Criteria for modifying the
sampling and testing program;
(8) Testing or other appropriate
methods used to identify
properties of the mixture
relevant to packaging
requirements.
Certify that program is in
place, document the testing and
sampling program outcomes, and make
information available to DOT
personnel upon request.
Rail routing--Risk assessment............. Rail Carriers, Emergency
Responders.
Perform a routing analysis
that considers, at a minimum, 27
safety and security factors and
select a route based on its findings.
These planning requirements are
prescribed in 49 CFR Sec. 172.820.
Rail routing--Notification................
Ensures that railroads notify
State and/or regional fusion centers
and State, local, and tribal
officials who contact a railroad to
discuss routing decisions are
provided appropriate contact
information for the railroad in order
to request information related to the
routing of hazardous materials
through their jurisdictions. This
replaces the proposed requirements to
notify State Emergency Response
Commissions (SERCs) or other
appropriate state delegated entity
about the operation of these trains
through their States.
Reduced Operating Speeds.................. Rail Carriers.
Restrict all HHFTs to 50-mph
in all areas.
Require HHFTs that contain
any tank cars not meeting the
enhanced tank car standards required
by this rule operate at a 40-mph
speed restriction in high-threat
urban areas \10\.
Enhanced Braking.......................... Rail Carriers.
Require HHFTs to have in
place a functioning two-way end-of-
train (EOT) device or a distributed
power (DP) braking system.
Require trains meeting the
definition of a ``high-hazard
flammable unit train'' (HHFUT) \11\
be operated with an electronically
controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking
system by January 1, 2021, when
transporting one or more tank cars
loaded with a Packing Group I
flammable liquid.

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Require trains meeting the
definition of a HHFUT be operated
with an ECP braking system by May 1,
2023, when transporting one or more
tank cars loaded with a Packing Group
II or III flammable liquid.
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PHMSA and FRA received over 3,200 public comments representing over
182,000 signatories in response to the NPRM and initial RIA. We
carefully considered each comment and revised, as appropriate, the
final rulemaking to reflect those comments. Table 2 below provides a
high-level overview of what was originally proposed in the NPRM versus
the amendments being adopted in this final rule.

Table 2--NPRM vs. Final Rule Comparison
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Topic NPRM proposal Final rule amendment Justification
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Scope--High-Hazard Flammable Train... High-hazard flammable A continuous block of PHMSA and FRA modified
train means a single 20 or more tank cars the proposed
train carrying 20 or loaded with a definition to capture
more carloads of a flammable liquid or 35 the higher-risk bulk
Class 3 flammable or more tank cars quantities transported
liquid. loaded with a in unit trains, while
flammable liquid excluding lower-risk
dispersed through a manifest trains. This
train. revision better
captures the intended
trains.
Tank Car--New Construction........... Three options for new A modified version of These design
tank car standards Tank Car Option #2 enhancements will
(See table 13). from the NPRM. reduce the
consequences of
accidents involving an
HHFT. These
enhancements will
improve puncture
resistance and thermal
survivability when
exposed to fire. There
will be fewer car
punctures, fewer
releases from the
service equipment (top
and bottom fittings).
See RIA.
Tank Car--Existing Fleet............. Consistent with Tank Car Option #3 from Provides incremental
proposed new tank car the NPRM for retrofits. safety benefit over
standards, the same the current fleet
three options for while minimizing cost.
retrofitted tank car These design
standards. It was enhancements will
proposed that both new reduce the
and retrofitted cars consequences of a
would meet the same derailment of an HHFT.
standard. There will be fewer
car punctures, and
fewer releases from
the service equipment
(top and bottom
fittings). See RIA.
Tank Car--Retrofit Timeline.......... A five-year retrofit A risk-based ten-year Provides for greater
schedule based solely retrofit schedule risk reduction by
on packing group. based on packing group focusing on the
and tank car. A highest risk tank car
retrofit reporting designs and
requirement is commodities first.
triggered if initial Accounts for industry
milestone is not retrofit capacity.
achieved.
Speed Restrictions................... A 50 mph restriction A 50 mph restriction Decreases the kinetic
across the board for across the board for energy involved in
HHFTs and three HHFTs and a 40 mph accidents. Adopts the
options for a 40 mph restriction in HTUA. most cost-effective
restriction in solution and limits
specific areas. the impact of rail
congestion.
Braking.............................. The scaling up of (1) Requires HHFTs to Provides a two-tiered,
braking systems have in place a cost-effective and
culminating in ECP functioning two-way risk-based solution to
braking for HHFTs or a EOT device or a DP reduce the number of
speed limitation for braking system. cars and energy
those not meeting the (2) Requires any HHFUT associated with train
braking requirements. transporting at least accidents. Focuses on
one PG I flammable the highest-risk train
liquid be operated sets
with an ECP braking
system by January 1,
2021.
(3) Requires all other
HHFUTs be operated
with an ECP braking
system by May 1, 2023.

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Classification....................... A classification plan A classification plan Addresses comments
for mined liquids and for unrefined seeking clarity of
gases. petroleum products. requirements. We
Clarified the expect the
materials subject to a requirements would
plan. reduce the expected
damages and ensure
that materials are
properly classified in
accordance with the
HMR.
Routing.............................. Require railroads Require railroads Track type, class, and
operating HHFTs to operating HHFTs to maintenance schedule
conduct a routing conduct a routing as well as training
analysis considering, analysis considering, and skill level of
at a minimum, 27 at a minimum, 27 crews are included in
factors. factors. the 27 risk factors
identified that need
to be considered, at a
minimum, in a route
analysis. Evaluation
of these factors could
result in prevention
of an accident due to
either rail defects or
human factors/errors.
Notification......................... Require trains carrying Use the notification Addresses concerns over
1,000,000 gallons or portion of the routing security sensitive and
more of Bakken Crude requirements (i.e. confidential business
oil to notify SERCs. notification to state/ information. Addresses
regional fusion the need for action in
centers) to satisfy the form of additional
need for pertinent communication between
information. railroads and
emergency responders
to ensure that the
emergency responders
are aware of the
appropriate contacts
at railroads to
discuss routing issues
with.
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With regard to the construction of new tank cars and retrofitting
of existing tank cars for use in HHFTs, PHMSA and FRA are requiring new
tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015 to meet the new design or
performance standard, if those tank cars are used as part of an
HHFT.\12\ In addition, PHMSA and FRA have revised our retrofit
timeline. In the NPRM, the retrofit timeline was based on a single risk
factor, the packing group. In the final rule, the retrofit timeline is
revised to focus on two risk factors, the packing group and differing
types of DOT-111 and CPC-1232 tank car. This revision is based on
comments to the NPRM and the development of a model to demonstrate
industry capacity and learning rates. The revised timeline provides an
accelerated risk reduction that more appropriately addresses the
overall risk. PHMSA and FRA also modified the overall length of the
retrofit to account for issues raised by commenters that were not
considered in the NPRM stage. In this final rule, PHMSA is adopting a
risk-based timeline for the retrofit of existing tank cars to meet an
enhanced CPC-1232 standard (Option #3) when used as part of an HHFT.
The timeline is provided in the following table:
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\12\ Other authorized tank specification as specified in part
173, subpart F will also be permitted however, manufacture of a DOT
specification 111 tank car for use in an HHFT is prohibited.

Table 3--Timeline for Continued Use of DOT Specification 111 (DOT-111)
Tanks for Use in HHFTs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tank car type/service Retrofit deadline
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in (January 1, 2017 *).
PG I service. January 1, 2018.
Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG March 1, 2018.
I service.
Non-Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars April 1, 2020.
in PG I service.
Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in May 1, 2023.
PG II service.
Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG May 1, 2023.
II service.
Non-Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars July 1, 2023.
in PG II service.
Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in PG May 1, 2025.
I and PG II service** and all
remaining tank cars carrying PG
III materials in an HHFT
(pressure relief valve and valve
handles).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The January 1, 2017 date would trigger a retrofit reporting
requirement, and tank car owners of affected cars would have to report
to DOT the number of tank cars that they own that have been
retrofitted, and the number that have not yet been retrofitted.
** We anticipate these will be spread out throughout the 120 months and
the retrofits will take place during normal requalification and
maintenance schedule, which will likely result in fleet being retrofit
sooner.

This final rule takes a system-wide, comprehensive approach to rail
safety commensurate with the risks associated with HHFTs. Specifically,
the requirements in this final rule address:

Tank Car Specifications
Advanced Brake Signal Propagation Systems
Speed Restrictions
Routing Requirements

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Notification Requirements
Classification of unrefined petroleum-based products

In this final rule, the proposals in the NPRM have been revised in
response to the comments received and the final RIA has been revised to
align with the changes made to the final rule. Specifically, the RIA
explains adjustments to the methodology used to estimate the benefits
and costs resulting from the final rule.
The revised RIA is in the docket and supports the amendments made
in this final rule. Table 4 shows the costs and benefits by affected
section and rule provision over a 20-year period, discounted at a 7%
rate. Table 4 also shows an explanation of the comprehensive benefits
and costs (i.e., the combined effects of individual provisions), and
the estimated benefits, costs, and net benefits of each amendment.
Please also note that, given the uncertainty associated with the
risks of HHFT shipments, Table 4 contains a range of benefits
estimates. The low-end of the range of estimated benefits estimates
risk from 2015 to 2034 based on the U.S. safety record for crude oil
and ethanol from 2006 to 2013, adjusting for the projected increase in
shipment volume over the next 20 years. The upper end of the range of
estimated benefits is the 95th percentile of a Monte Carlo simulation.

Table 4--20 Year Costs and Benefits by Stand-Alone Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \13\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected section \14\ Provision Benefits (7%) Costs (7%)
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49 CFR Sec. 172.820............. Rail Routing +....... Cost effective if $8.8 million.
routing were to
reduce risk of an
incident by 0.41%.
49 CFR Sec. 173.41.............. Classification Plan.. Cost effective if $18.9 million.
this requirement
reduces risk by
1.29%.
49 CFR Sec. 174.310............. Speed Restriction: 40 $56 million-$242 $180 million.
mph speed limit in million **.
HTUA *.
Advanced Brake Signal $470.3 million- $492 million.
Propagation Systems. $1,114 million **.
49 CFR part 179................... Existing Tank Car $426 million-$1,706 $1,747 million.
Retrofit/Retirement. million **.
New Car Construction. $23.9 million-$97.4 $34.8 million.
million **.
Cumulative Total.................. ..................... $912 million-$2,905 $2,482 million.
million **.
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``*'' indicates voluntary compliance regarding crude oil trains in high-threat urban areas (HTUA)
``+'' indicates voluntary actions that will be taken by shippers and railroads
``**'' Indicates that the low end of the benefits range is based solely on lower consequence events, while the
high end of the range includes benefits from mitigating high consequence events.

II. Background and Approach to Rail Safety

As noted above the HMR provide safety and security requirements for
shipments valued at more than $2.3 trillion annually.\15\ The HMR are
designed to achieve three goals: (1) To ensure that hazardous materials
are packaged and handled safely and securely during transportation; (2)
to provide effective communication to transportation workers and
emergency responders of the hazards of the materials being transported;
and (3) to minimize the consequences of an incident should one occur.
The hazardous material regulatory system is a risk management system
that is prevention-oriented and focused on identifying a safety or
security hazard, thus reducing the probability and quantity of a
hazardous material release.
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\13\ All costs and benefits are in millions over 20 years, and
are discounted to present value using a seven percent rate and
rounded.
\14\ All affected sections of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) are in Title 49.
\15\ 2012 Commodity Flow Survey, RITA, BTS. See http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=CFS_2012_00H01&prodType=table.
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Under the HMR, hazardous materials are categorized by analysis and
experience into hazard classes and, for some classes, packing groups
based upon the risks that they present during transportation. The HMR
specify appropriate packaging and handling requirements for hazardous
materials based on such classification, and require an offeror to
communicate the material's hazards through the use of shipping papers,
package marking and labeling, and vehicle placarding. The HMR also
require offerors to provide emergency response information applicable
to the specific hazard or hazards of the material being transported.
Further, the HMR (1) mandate training for persons who prepare hazardous
materials for shipment or who transport hazardous materials in
commerce, and (2) require the development and implementation of plans
to address the safety and security risks related to the transportation
of certain types and quantities of hazardous materials in commerce.
The HMR also include operational requirements applicable to each
mode of transportation and the FRA inspects and audits railroads, tank
car facilities, and offerors of hazardous materials for compliance with
PHMSA regulations as well as its own rail safety regulations.
Additionally FRA's research and development program seeks to enhance
all elements of railroad safety, including hazardous materials
transportation.
To address our shared concerns regarding the risks associated with
rail carriage of flammable liquids, and the large volumes of flammable
liquids transported in HHFTs, PHMSA and FRA are focusing on three
areas: (1) Proper classification and characterization; (2) operational
controls to lessen the likelihood and consequences of accidents; and
(3) improvements to tank car integrity. This approach is designed to
minimize the occurrence of train accidents and mitigate the damage
caused should an accident occur.
This overview section provides a general discussion of the major
regulations currently in place that affect the safe transportation of
hazardous materials by rail. These regulations pertain to issues such
as: (1) Braking; (2) speed restrictions; (3) routing; (4) notification
requirements; (5) oil spill response planning; (6) classification; and
(7) packaging requirements.

A. Braking

The effective use of braking on a freight train can result in
accident avoidance. In addition, the effective use of braking on a
freight train can potentially lessen the consequences of an accident by
diminishing in-train forces, which can reduce the likelihood of a tank
car being punctured and

[[Page 26650]]

decrease the likelihood of a derailment. The FRA has promulgated brake
system safety standards for freight and other non-passenger trains and
equipment in 49 CFR part 232. Specifically, part 232 provides
requirements for (1) general braking, (2) inspection and testing, (3)
periodic maintenance and testing, (4) end-of-train (EOT) devices, (5)
introduction of new brake system technologies and (6) electronically
controlled pneumatic braking (ECP) systems.
FRA's brake system safety standards incorporate longstanding
inspection and maintenance requirements related to a train's braking
systems--air brakes and handbrakes--that have been in existence for
well over 100 years. However, FRA's brake system safety standards also
anticipate and allow for new technology. See 49 CFR part 232, subpart
F. In 1996, FRA published regulations establishing requirements
pertaining to the use and design of two-way EOT devices. 62 FR 278
(Jan. 2, 1997). In 2008, FRA published subpart E to part 232, which
established design, inspection, maintenance, and training standards for
railroads implementing ECP brake system technology. 73 FR 61512 (Oct.
16, 2008). Two-way EOT devices and ECP braking systems have the
potential to provide enhanced braking during emergency braking and ECP
brakes allow for enhanced braking and better train control during
normal operational brake applications. Moreover, in recent years,
certain railroads, particularly those in the western half of the U.S.,
have shifted to using distributed power (DP), to move longer trains.
While DP is technically not a braking system, it can provide some
enhanced braking during an emergency braking application over
conventional braking systems because it provides an additional signal
source to speed the application of air brakes.
Three types of braking systems relevant to this rulemaking, two-way
end-of-train (EOT) devices, distributed power (DP) systems, and
electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking systems, and briefly
introduced below. They are discussed in greater detail in the
``Advanced Braking Signal Systems'' section of this rulemaking.
Two-way EOT devices include two pieces of equipment linked by radio
that initiate an emergency brake application command from the front
unit located in the controlling (``lead'') locomotive, which then
activates the emergency air valve at the rear of the train within one
second. The rear unit of the device sends an acknowledgment message to
the front unit immediately upon receipt of an emergency brake
application command. A two-way EOT device is slightly more effective
than conventional air brakes because the rear cars receive the
emergency brake command more quickly in an engineer induced emergency
brake application.
DP systems use multiple locomotives positioned at strategic
locations within the train consist (often at the rear of the train) to
provide additional power and train control in certain operations. For
instance, a DP system may be used to provide power while climbing a
steep incline and to control the movement of the train as it crests the
incline and begins its downward descent. The DP system works through
the control of the rearward locomotives by command signals originating
at the lead locomotive and transmitted to the remote (rearward)
locomotives. While distributed power technically is not a braking
system, the additional power source in or at the rear of the train
consist do provide enhanced braking for a train. The addition of a DP
locomotive allows for the braking effort to be distributed throughout
the train and allows for a more uniform braking effort than with a
conventional air brake system.
ECP brake systems simultaneously send an electronic braking command
to all equipped cars in the train, reducing the time before a car's
pneumatic brakes are engaged compared to conventional air brakes. They
can be installed as an overlay to a conventional air brake system or
replace it altogether; however, FRA regulations do require that ECP
brake systems be interoperable pursuant to the AAR S-4200 standard,
which allows for interchange among the Class I railroads. 49 CFR
232.603.
The simultaneous application of ECP brakes on all cars in a train
also significantly improves train handling by substantially reducing
stopping distances as well as buff and draft forces within the train,
which under certain conditions can result in a derailment. Because ECP
brakes do not rely on changes in air pressure passing from car to car,
there are no delays related to the depletion and recharging of a
train's air brake system. These factors provide railroads with the
ability to decrease congestion or to increase volume by running longer
trains closer together.

B. Speed Restrictions

High speeds can increase the kinetic energy involved in and the
associated damage caused by an accident. With respect to operating
speeds, FRA has developed a system of classification that defines
different track classes based on track quality. The track classes
include Class 1 through Class 9 and ``excepted track.'' See 49 CFR
213.9 and 213.307. Freight trains transporting hazardous materials
currently operate at track speeds associated with Class 1 through Class
5 track and, in certain limited instances, at or below ``excepted
track'' speed limits. Section 213.9 of the FRA regulations on Track
Safety Standards provides the ``maximum allowable operating speed'' for
track Class 1 through Class 5 and ``excepted track.'' The speed limits
range from 10 mph or less up to 80 mph; however, AAR design
specifications effectively limit most freight equipment to a maximum
allowable speed of 70 mph.
In addition, the rail industry, through the AAR, implements a
detailed protocol on recommended operating practices for the
transportation of hazardous materials. This protocol, set forth in AAR
Circular OT-55-N includes a 50-mph maximum speed for any ``key train,''
including any train with 20 car loads of ``any combination of hazardous
material.'' In February 2014, by way of Secretary Foxx's Letter to the
Association of American Railroads, AAR's Railroad Subscribers further
committed to a 40-mph speed limit for certain trains carrying crude oil
within the limits of any High-Threat Urban Area (HTUA), as defined by
TSA regulations (49 CFR 1580.3).

C. Track Integrity, Securement, Engineer and Conductor Certification,
Crew Size and the Safety of Freight Railroad Operations

FRA carries out a comprehensive railroad safety program pursuant to
its statutory authority. FRA's regulations promulgated for the safety
of railroad operations involving the movement of freight address: (1)
Railroad track; (2) signal and train control systems; (3) operating
practices; (4) railroad communications; (5) rolling stock; (6) rear-end
marking devices; (7) safety glazing; (8) railroad accident/incident
reporting; (9) locational requirements for the dispatch of U.S. rail
operations; (10) safety integration plans governing railroad
consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions of control; (11) alcohol and
drug testing; (12) locomotive engineer and conductor certification;
(13) workplace safety; (14) highway-rail grade crossing safety; and
other subjects.
Train accidents are often the culmination of a sequence of events
that are influenced by a variety of factors and conditions. Broken
rails or welds, track geometry, and human factors such as improper use
of switches are leading causes of derailments. Rail defects have caused
major accidents involving HHFTs, including accidents in New

[[Page 26651]]

Brighton, PA, Arcadia, OH and Lynchburg, VA.
While this final rule does not directly address regulations
governing the inspection and maintenance of track, securement, and
human factors, it does indirectly address some of these issues through
the consideration of the 27 safety and security factors as part of the
routing requirements. For a summary of on-going FRA related action,
including track integrity, securement, crew size, and positive train
control, please see the ``Recent Regulatory Actions Addressing HHFTs''
portion of this rulemaking.

D. Routing

Careful consideration of a rail route with regard to a variety of
risk factors can mitigate risk of an accident. For some time, there has
been considerable public and Congressional interest in the safe and
secure rail routing of security-sensitive hazardous materials (such as
chlorine and anhydrous ammonia). The Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 directed the Secretary, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to publish a rule governing
the rail routing of security-sensitive hazardous materials. On December
21, 2006, PHMSA, in coordination with FRA and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), published an NPRM proposing to require rail carriers to
compile annual data on specified shipments of hazardous materials, use
the data to analyze safety and security risks along rail routes where
those materials are transported, assess alternative routing options,
and make routing decisions based on those assessments. 71 FR 76834.
In that NPRM, we proposed that the route analysis requirements
would apply to certain hazardous materials that PHMSA, FRA and TSA
believed presented the greatest transportation safety and security
risks. Those hazardous materials included certain shipments of
explosives, materials poisonous by inhalation (PIH materials), and
highway-route controlled quantities of radioactive materials. We
solicited comment on whether the proposed requirements should also
apply to flammable gases, flammable liquids, or other materials that
could be weaponized, as well as hazardous materials that could cause
serious environmental damage if released into rivers or lakes.
Commenters who addressed this issue indicated that rail shipments of
Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives; Poison Inhalation Hazard (PIH)
materials; and highway-route controlled quantities of radioactive
materials pose significant rail safety and security risks warranting
the enhanced security measures proposed in the NPRM and adopted in a
November 26, 2008, final rule. 73 FR 20752. Commenters generally did
not support enhanced security measures for a broader list of materials
than were proposed in the NPRM.
The City of Las Vegas, Nevada, did support expanding the list of
materials for which enhanced security measures are required, to include
flammable liquids, flammable gases, certain oxidizers, certain organic
peroxides, and 5,000 pounds or greater of pyrophoric materials. While
DOT and DHS agreed that these materials pose certain safety and
security risks in rail transportation, the risks were not as great as
those posed by the explosive, PIH, and radioactive materials specified
in the NPRM, and PHMSA was not persuaded that they warranted the
additional safety and security measures. PHMSA did note, however, that
DOT, in consultation with DHS, would continue to evaluate the
transportation safety and security risks posed by all types of
hazardous materials and the effectiveness of existing regulations in
addressing those risks and would consider revising specific
requirements as necessary.
In 2008 PHMSA, in consultation with FRA, issued the final route
analysis rule. 73 FR 72182. That rule, now found at 49 CFR 172.820,
requires rail carriers to select a practicable route posing the least
overall safety and security risk to transport security-sensitive
hazardous materials. The route analysis final rule requires rail
carriers to compile annual data on certain shipments of explosive, PIH,
and radioactive materials; use the data to analyze safety and security
risks along rail routes where those materials are transported; assess
alternative routing options; and make routing decisions based on those
assessments. In accordance with Sec. 172.820(e), the carrier must
select the route posing the least overall safety and security risk. The
carrier must retain in writing all route review and selection decision
documentation. Additionally, the rail carrier must identify a point of
contact on routing issues involving the movement of covered materials
and provide that contact information to the appropriate State, local,
and tribal personnel.
Rail carriers must assess available routes using, at a minimum, the
27 factors listed in appendix D to part 172 of the HMR to determine the
safest, most secure routes for the transportation of covered hazardous
materials.

Table 5--Minimum Factors To Be Considered in the Performance of the
Safety and Security Risk Analysis Required by 49 CFR Sec. 172.820
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume of hazardous material Rail traffic Trip length for
transported. density. route.
Presence and characteristics of Track type, class, Track grade and
railroad facilities. and maintenance curvature.
schedule.
Presence or absence of signals Presence or Number and types
and train control systems along absence of of grade
the route (``dark'' versus wayside hazard crossings.
signaled territory). detectors.
Single versus double track Frequency and Proximity to
territory. location of track iconic targets.
turnouts.
Environmentally sensitive or Population density Venues along the
significant areas. along the route. route (stations,
events, places of
congregation).
Emergency response capability Areas of high Presence of
along the route. consequence along passenger traffic
the route, along route
including high- (shared track).
consequence
targets.
Speed of train operations....... Proximity to en- Known threats,
route storage or including any
repair facilities. threat scenarios
provided by the
DHS or the DOT
for carrier use
in the
development of
the route
assessment.
Measures in place to address Availability of Past accidents.
apparent safety and security practicable
risks. alternative
routes.
Overall times in transit........ Training and skill Impact on rail
level of crews. network traffic
and congestion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 26652]]

The HMR require carriers to make conscientious efforts to develop
logical and defendable systems using these factors.
FRA enforces the routing requirements of Sec. 172.820 and is
authorized, after consulting with PHMSA, TSA, and the Surface
Transportation Board, to require a railroad to use an alternative route
other than the route selected by the railroad if it is determined that
the railroad's route selection documentation and underlying analysis
are deficient and fail to establish that the route chosen poses the
least overall safety and security risk based on the information
available. 49 CFR 209.501.
On January 23, 2014, in response to its investigation of the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic accident, the NTSB issued three recommendations to
PHMSA and three similar recommendations to FRA. Recommendation R-14-4
requested PHMSA work with FRA to expand hazardous materials route
planning and selection requirements for railroads to include key trains
transporting flammable liquids as defined by the AAR Circular No. OT-
55-N. Additionally, where technically feasible, NTSB recommended that
rerouting be required to avoid transportation of such hazardous
materials through populated and other sensitive areas.

E. Notification

Notification of hazardous materials routes to appropriate
personnel, such as emergency responders, of certain hazardous materials
can aid in emergency preparation and in some instances emergency
response, should an accident occur. As mentioned previously, in
accordance with the routing requirements in Sec. 172.820 of the HMR, a
rail carrier must identify a point of contact for routing issues that
may arise involving the movement of covered materials and provide the
contact information to the following:
1. State and/or regional fusion centers that have been established
to coordinate with state, local, and tribal officials on security
issues within the area encompassed by the rail carrier's rail system;
\16\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\16\ http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. State, local, and tribal officials in jurisdictions that may be
affected by a rail carrier's routing decisions and who have contacted
the carrier regarding routing decisions.
This serves as the current notification procedure for what have
historically been known as the most highly hazardous materials
transported by rail. In addition, an emergency order (Docket No. DOT-
OST-2014-0067 \17\) published on May 7, 2014, requires all railroads
that operate trains containing one million gallons or more of Bakken
crude oil to notify SERCs about the operation of these trains through
their States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\17\ See http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/emergency-order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Oil Spill Response Planning

PHMSA's regulations, see 49 CFR part 130, prescribe prevention,
containment, and response planning requirements applicable to
transportation of oil \18\ by motor vehicles and rolling stock. The
purpose of a response plan is to ensure that personnel are trained and
available and equipment is in place to respond to an oil spill, and
that procedures are established before a spill occurs, so that required
notifications and appropriate response actions will follow quickly when
there is a spill. PHMSA and FRA are addressing the issue of oil spill
response plans in a separate rulemaking action. For a detailed
description of PHMSA's oil spill response plan requirements, search for
docket ``PHMSA-2014-0105'' at www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\18\ For purposes of 49 CFR part 130, oil means oil of any kind
or in any form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil,
sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with the wastes other than dredged
spoil. 49 CFR 130.5. This includes non-petroleum oil such as animal
fat, vegetable oil, or other non-petroleum oil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Classification

An offeror's responsibility to classify and describe a hazardous
material is a key requirement under the HMR. In accordance with Sec.
173.22 of the HMR, it is the offeror's responsibility to properly
``class and describe a hazardous material in accordance with parts 172
and 173 of the HMR.'' For transportation purposes, classification is
ensuring the proper hazard class, packing group, and shipping name are
assigned to a particular material. The HMR do not prescribe a specific
test frequency to classify hazardous materials. However, the HMR
clearly intend for the frequency and type of testing to be based on an
offeror's knowledge of the hazardous material, with specific
consideration given to the nature of hazardous material involved, the
variety of the sources of the hazardous material, and the processes
used to handle and prepare the hazardous material. Section 173.22 also
requires offerors to identify all relevant properties of the hazardous
material to comply with complete hazard communication, packaging, and
operational requirements in the HMR. While the HMR do not prescribe
specific requirements to quantify properties relevant to packaging
selection, the offeror must follow the general packaging requirements
in part 173, subpart B. For example, as indicated in Sec. 173.24(e),
even though certain packagings are authorized for a specific HMR entry,
it is the responsibility of the offeror to ensure that each packaging
is compatible with its specific lading. In addition, offerors must know
the specific gravity of the hazardous material at certain temperatures
to ensure that outage is considered when loading a rail tank car or
cargo tank motor vehicle per Sec. 173.24b(a).
Once an offeror has classified and described the material; selected
the appropriate packaging; loaded the packaging; and marked, labeled,
and placarded the packaging and/or transport vehicle in accordance with
the HMR, the offeror must ``certify'' the shipment per Sec. 172.204 of
the HMR. The certification statement indicates the HMR were followed
and that all requirements have been met. As such, the offeror is
responsible for certifying its material has been properly classified
and all packaging requirements have been met. Improper classification
can have significant negative impacts on transportation safety as a
material may be offered for transportation in an inappropriate package.
The physical and chemical properties of unrefined petroleum-based
products are complex and can vary by region, time of year, and method
of extraction. Heating, agitation, and centrifugal force are common
methods of separation for the initial treatment of unrefined petroleum
to reduce the range of values of the physical and chemical properties.
These methods eliminate much of the gaseous hydrocarbons, sediments,
and water from the bulk material. Blending crude oil from different
sources is the most common method to achieve a uniform material.
However, there may still be considerable variation between mixtures
where separation or blending has occurred at different times or
locations. While blending may generate a uniform profile for an
individual mixture of the material, it does not eliminate the gaseous
hydrocarbons or the related hazards. The separation and blending
methods both create a new product or additional byproducts that may
result in the need to transport flammable gases in addition to
flammable liquids. Manufactured goods and refined products, by
definition, are at the other end of the spectrum from unrefined or raw
materials. This means that the physical and chemical

[[Page 26653]]

properties are more predictable as they are pure substances or well-
studied mixtures.
Crude oil transported by rail is extracted from different sources
and is most often blended in large storage tanks before being loaded
into rail tank cars at transloading facilities. In rare cases, the
crude oil is transferred directly from a cargo tank to a rail car which
may result in more variability of properties among the rail tank cars.
PHMSA and FRA completed audits of crude oil loading facilities, prior
to the issuance of the February 26, 2014, Emergency Restriction/
Prohibition Order, indicated that the classification of crude oil being
transported by rail was often based solely on a Safety Data Sheet
(SDS). The information is usually generic and provides only basic data
and offers a wide range of values for a limited number of material
properties. The flash point and initial boiling point ranges on SDS
referenced during the audits crossed the packaging group threshold
values making it difficult to determine the proper packing group
assignment. In these instances, it is likely no validation of the
information is performed at an interval that would allow for detection
of variability in material properties.
In the case of a flammable liquid (excluded from being defined as a
gas per Sec. 171.8 of the HMR), the proper classification is based on
the flash point and initial boiling point. See Sec. 173.120 of the
HMR. The offeror may additionally need to identify properties such as
corrosivity, vapor pressure, specific gravity at loading and reference
temperatures, and the presence and concentration of specific compounds
(e.g. sulfur) to further comply with complete packaging requirements.
In addition to the regulations detailing the offeror's
responsibility, the rail and oil industry, along with PHMSA's input,
have developed a recommended practice (RP) designed to improve the
crude oil rail safety through proper classification and loading
practices. This effort was led by the API and resulted in the
development of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) recognized
recommend practice, see ANSI/API RP 3000, ``Classifying and Loading of
Crude Oil into Rail Tank Cars.'' This recommend practice, which, during
its development, went through a public comment period in order to be
designated as an American National Standard, addresses the proper
classification of crude oil for rail transportation and quantity
measurement for overfill prevention when loading crude oil into rail
tank cars. This recommended practice was finalized in September 2014,
after the NPRM was published. The development of this recommended
practice demonstrates the importance of proper classification.
The NTSB also supports routine testing for classification of
hazardous materials, such as petroleum crude oil. On January 23, 2014,
as a result of its investigation of the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident,
the NTSB issued three recommendations to PHMSA and FRA. Safety
Recommendation R-14-6 \19\ requested that PHMSA require shippers to
sufficiently test and document the physical and chemical
characteristics of hazardous materials to ensure the proper
classification, packaging, and record-keeping of products offered in
transportation. This and other NTSB Safety Recommendations are
discussed in further detail in the ``NTSB Safety Recommendations''
portion of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\19\ NTSB Recommendation 14-6 .http://phmsa.dot.gov/PHMSA/Key_Audiences/Hazmat_Safety_Community/Regulations/NTSB_Safety_Recommendations/Rail/ci.R-14-6,Hazmat.print.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Packaging/Tank Car

As mentioned previously, in the classification section, proper
classification is essential when selecting an appropriate packaging for
the transportation of hazardous materials. The HMR provides a list of
authorized packagings for each hazardous material. The hazardous
materials table (HMT) of Sec. 172.101 provides the list of packagings
authorized for use by the HMR based on the shipping name of a hazardous
material. For each proper shipping name, bulk packaging requirements
are provided in Column (8C) of the HMT.
The offeror must select a packaging that is suitable for the
properties of the material and based on the packaging authorizations
provided by the HMR. With regard to package selection, the HMR require
in Sec. 173.24(b) that each package used for the transportation of
hazardous materials be ``designed, constructed, maintained, filled, its
contents so limited, and closed, so that under conditions normally
incident to transportation . . . there will be no identifiable (without
the use of instruments) release of hazardous materials to the
environment [and] . . . the effectiveness of the package will not be
substantially reduced.'' Under this requirement, offerors must consider
how the properties of the material (which can vary depending on
temperature and pressure) could affect the packaging.
The packaging authorizations are currently indicated in the HMT and
part 173, subpart F. DOT Specification 111 tank cars are authorized for
low, medium, and high-hazard liquids and solids (equivalent to Packing
Groups III, II, I, respectively). Packing groups are designed to assign
a degree of danger presented within a particular hazard class. Packing
Group I poses the highest danger (``great danger'') and Packing Group
III the lowest (``minor danger'').\20\ In addition, the general
packaging requirements prescribed in Sec. 173.24 provide additional
consideration for selecting the most appropriate packaging from the
list of authorized packaging identified in column (8) of the HMT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\20\ Packing groups, in addition in indicating risk of the
material, can trigger levels of varying requirements. For example,
packing groups can indicate differing levels of testing requirements
for a non-bulk packaging or the need for additional operational
requirements, such as security planning requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

For most flammable liquids, the authorized packaging requirements
for a PG I material are provided in Sec. 173.243 and for PGs II and
III in Sec. 173.242. The following table is provided as a general
guide for the packaging options for rail transport provided by the HMR
for flammable liquids.

Table 6--Tank Car Options \21\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flammable liquid, PG II and
Flammable liquid, PG I III
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 103................................... DOT 103.
DOT 104................................... DOT 104.
DOT 105................................... DOT 105.
DOT 109................................... DOT 109.
DOT 111................................... DOT 111.
DOT 112................................... DOT 112.
DOT 114................................... DOT 114.
DOT 115................................... DOT 115.
DOT 120................................... DOT 120.
AAR 206W.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1. Sections 173.241, 173.242, and 173.243 authorize the use of the
above tank cars.
Note 2. DOT 103, 104,105, 109, 112, 114, and 120 tank cars are pressure
tank cars (HMR; Part 179, subpart C).
Note 3. DOT 111 and 115 tank cars are non-pressure tank cars (HMR; Part
179, subpart D).
Note 4. AAR 203W, AAR 206W, and AAR 211W tank cars are non-DOT
specification tank cars that meet AAR standards. These tank cars are
authorized under Sec. 173.241 of the HMR (see Special Provision B1,
as applicable).
Note 5. DOT 114 and DOT 120 pressure cars are permitted to have bottom
outlets and, generally, would be compatible with the DOT 111.

The DOT Specification 111 tank car is one of several cars currently
authorized

[[Page 26654]]

by the HMR for the rail transportation of many hazardous materials,
including ethanol, crude oil, and other flammable liquids. For a
summary of the design requirements of the DOT Specification 111 tank
car, see Table 13 in the tank car portion of the discussion of
comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\21\ Additional information on tank car specifications is
available at the following URL: http://www.bnsfhazmat.com/refdocs/1326686674.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In published findings from the June 19, 2009, incident in Cherry
Valley, Illinois, the NTSB indicated that the DOT Specification 111
tank car can almost always be expected to breach in the event of a
train accident resulting in car-to-car impacts or pileups.\22\ In
addition, PHMSA received numerous petitions encouraging rulemaking, and
both FRA and PHMSA received letters from members of Congress urging
prompt, responsive actions from the Department. The AAR created the
T87.6 Task Force on July 20, 2011, to consider several enhancements to
the DOT Specification 111 tank car design and rail carrier operations
to enhance rail transportation safety. Simultaneously, FRA conducted
research on long-standing safety concerns regarding the survivability
of the DOT Specification 111 tank cars designed to current HMR
standards and used for the transportation of ethanol and crude oil,
focusing on issues such as puncture resistance and top fittings
protection. The research indicated that special consideration is
necessary for the transportation of ethanol and crude oil in DOT
Specification 111 tank cars, especially in HHFTs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\22\ NTSB, Railroad Accident Report--Derailment of CN Freight
Train U70691-18 With Subsequent Hazardous Materials Release and
Fire, http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1201.pdf (February 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, PHMSA and FRA reviewed the regulatory history
pertaining to flammable liquids transported in tank cars. Prior to
1990, the distinction between material properties that resulted in
different packaging, for flammable liquids in particular, was described
in far more detail in Sec. 173.119. Section 173.119 indicated that the
packaging requirements for flammable liquids are based on a combination
of flash point, boiling point, and vapor pressure. The regulations
provided a point at which a flammable liquid had to be transported in a
tank car suitable for compressed gases, commonly referred to as a
``pressure car'' (e.g., DOT Specifications 105, 112, 114, 120 tank
cars).
In 2011, the AAR issued Casualty Prevention Circular (CPC) 1232,
which outlines industry requirements for certain DOT Specification 111
tanks ordered after October 1, 2011, intended for use in ethanol and
crude oil service (construction approved by FRA on January 25,
2011).\23\ The CPC-1232 requirements are intended to improve the
crashworthiness of the tank cars and include a thicker shell, head
protection, top fittings protection, and pressure relief valves with a
greater flow capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\23\ See ``Background'' section of the August 2014 NPRM for
information regarding a detailed description of PHMSA and FRA
actions to allow construction under CPC-1232.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Despite these improvements of the CPC-1232 on April 6, 2015 the
NTSB issued additional recommendations related to legacy DOT
Specification 111 tank cars as well as the newer CPC-1232 tank cars.
These recommendations, R-15-14 and R-15-15, requested that PHMSA
require that all new and existing tank cars used to transport all Class
3 flammable liquids be equipped with thermal protection systems that
meet or exceed the thermal performance standards outlined in Title 49
Code of Federal Regulations 179.18(a) and be equipped with
appropriately sized pressure relief devices that allow the release of
pressure under fire conditions to ensure thermal performance that meets
or exceeds the requirements of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations
179.18(a), and that minimizes the likelihood of energetic thermal
ruptures.

III. Recent Regulatory Actions Addressing Rail Safety

The August 1, 2014 NPRM extensively detailed the regulatory actions
of PHMSA and FRA that were relevant to the transportation of large
quantities of flammable liquids by rail. Specifically, the NPRM
detailed regulatory actions that addressed prevention, mitigation, and
response through risk reduction. For a description of the PHMSA and FRA
regulatory actions that were taken prior to the August 1, 2014 NPRM
please refer to the ``Regulatory Actions'' section of the NPRM. We
provide a brief summary below of regulatory actions taken by PHMSA and
FRA concurrently with, and after the August 1, 2014 NPRM. In addition
we highlight some additional regulatory actions not discussed in the
NPRM.

A. Rulemaking Actions

On August 1, 2014, in conjunction with its NPRM--``Hazardous
Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for
High-Hazard Flammable Trains (2137-AE91)'', PHMSA, in consultation with
the FRA, published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)
that sought comment on potential revisions to its regulations that
would expand the applicability of comprehensive oil spill response
plans (OSRPs) to high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs) based on
thresholds of crude oil that apply to an entire train consist (See
Docket PHMSA-2014-0105).
On August 9, 2014, FRA published an NPRM that proposed amendments
to strengthen the requirements relating to the securement of unattended
equipment. Specifically, FRA proposed to codify many of the
requirements already included in its Emergency Order 28, Establishing
Additional Requirements for Attendance and Securement of Certain
Freight Trains and Vehicles on Mainline Track or Mainline Siding
Outside of a Yard or Terminal. FRA proposed to amend existing
regulations to include additional securement requirements for
unattended equipment, primarily pertaining to trains transporting PIH
materials or large volumes of Division 2.1 (flammable gases), Class 3
(flammable or combustible liquids, including crude oil and ethanol),
and Division 1.1 or 1.2 (explosives) hazardous materials. For these
trains, FRA proposed requiring attendance on all mainline and sidings
that are outside of and not adjacent to a yard unless the railroad has
determined it would be appropriate to leave the equipment unattended at
the specific location and included the location in its securement plan.
FRA also proposed requirements relating to job briefings and
communication with qualified railroad personnel to verify equipment has
been properly secured before leaving it unattended. Attendance would be
required for any equipment not capable of being secured in accordance
with the proposed and existing requirements. FRA's NPRM also proposed
to require railroads to verify securement in instances where they have
knowledge that emergency responders accessed unattended equipment.
Finally, FRA proposed a new requirement that all locomotives left
unattended outside of a yard be equipped with an operative exterior
locking mechanism. See 75 FR 53356 (Sept. 9, 2014).
In addition to the regulatory initiatives concerning oil spill
response and railroad equipment securement discussed above, PHMSA and
FRA are committed to clarifying and improving our existing regulations
through active and future rulemakings. As a result PHMSA and FRA
continue to work with the regulated community and general public to
implement existing regulations and improve safety through regulatory
action. PHMSA and FRA have many initiatives underway to address freight

[[Page 26655]]

rail safety. Key regulatory actions are outlined below:

Table 7--PHMSA and FRA Safety Initiatives
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety initiative Project summary Current status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Risk Reduction Program (2130-AC11).... FRA is developing an NPRM that will ANPRM was published on
consider appropriate contents for Risk December 8, 2010, and the
Reduction Programs by Class I freight comment period ended on
railroads and how they should be February 7, 2011. Public
implemented and reviewed by FRA. A Risk hearings regarding this rule
Reduction Program is a structured were held on July 19, 2011,
program with proactive processes and in Chicago, IL on July 21,
procedures developed and implemented by 2011, in Washington, DC. The
a railroad to identify hazards and to NPRM was published on
mitigate, if not eliminate, the risks February 27, 2015 and the
associated with those hazards on its comment period ended April
system. A Risk Reduction Program 27, 2015.
encourages a railroad and its employees
to work together to proactively
identify hazards and to jointly
determine what action to take to
mitigate or eliminate the associated
risks.
Track Safety Standards: Improving Rail FRA's final rule prescribes specific FRA published this rule on
Integrity (2130-AC28). requirements for effective rail January 24, 2014 (79 FR
inspection frequencies, rail flaw 4234). The final rule became
remedial actions, minimum operator effective on March 25, 2014.
qualifications, and requirements for
rail inspection records. The bulk of
this regulation codifies current good
practices in the industry. In addition,
it removes the regulatory requirements
concerning joint bar fracture
reporting. Section 403(c) of the Rail
Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA)
(Pub. L. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848
(October 16, 2008)) (49 U.S.C. 20142
note)) mandated that FRA review its
existing regulations to determine if
regulatory amendments should be
developed that would revise, for
example, rail inspection frequencies
and methods and rail defect remedial
actions and consider rail inspection
processes and technologies.
Positive Train Control (PTC) (multiple PTC is a processor-based/communication- FRA published the most recent
rulemakings). based train control system designed to PTC systems final rule on
prevent train accidents. The RSIA August 22, 2014 (79 FR
mandates that PTC be implemented across 49693), addressing the de
a significant portion of the Nation's minimis exception, yard
rail system by December 31, 2015. See movements, en route failures,
49 U.S.C. 20157. With limited and other issues. The final
exceptions and exclusions, PTC is rule became effective on
required to be implemented on Class I October 21, 2014.
railroad main lines (i.e., lines with
over 5 million gross tons annually)
over which any PIH or toxic inhalation
hazard (TIH) materials are transported;
and, on any railroad's main lines over
which regularly scheduled passenger
intercity or commuter operations are
conducted. It is currently estimated
this will equate to approximately
70,000 miles of track and will involve
approximately 20,000 locomotives. PTC
technology is capable of automatically
controlling train speeds and movements
should a train operator fail to take
appropriate action for the conditions
at hand. For example, PTC can force a
train to a stop before it passes a
signal displaying a stop indication, or
before diverging on a switch improperly
lined, thereby averting a potential
collision. PTC systems required to
comply with the requirements of Subpart
I must reliably and functionally
prevent: Train-to-train collisions;
Overspeed derailments; Incursion into
an established work zone; and Movement
through a switch in the wrong position.
Securement............................ The new measures proposed in the The NPRM was published on
securement NPRM would require: (1) Crew September 9, 2014, and the
members leaving equipment carrying comment closed on November
specified hazardous materials 10, 2014.
unattended in certain areas to follow
certain additional procedures to ensure
proper securement. (2) Railroads to
develop a plan identifying such
locations or circumstances. (3)
Railroads to verify securement using
qualified persons; and ensure that
locks on locomotive cab are secure.
Include securement requirements in job
briefings. (4) Railroads to perform
additional inspections by qualified
persons when emergency responders have
been on equipment. (5) Railroads to
install locking mechanisms on
locomotive doors and repair them in a
timely manner.
The proposed rule covers equipment
containing poisonous by inhalation
(PIH) materials and those defined as
Division 2.1 (flammable gas), Class 3
(flammable or combustible liquid),
Class 1.1 or 1.2 (explosive)
materials,\24\ or a hazardous substance
listed in 49 CFR Sec. 173.31(f)(2).
This includes most crude oil moved in
the United States.
Crew Size............................. FRA has initiated a rulemaking to Developing Rulemaking.
address the appropriate oversight to
ensure safety related train crew size.
Retrospective Regulatory Review 49 CFR As part of a retrospective regulatory PHMSA and FRA have evaluated
part 174--Carriage by Rail (78 FR review PHMSA and FRA reviewed the part the comments from the public
42998). 174 ``Carriage by Rail'' section of our meeting and intend to move
regulations in an effort to identify forward with revisions to
areas which could be revised to improve part 174.
clarity. On August 27-28, 2013 as part
of this comprehensive review of
operational factors that impact the
transportation of hazardous materials
by rail PHMSA and FRA held a public
meeting.

[[Page 26656]]

Oil Spill Response Plans for High- In this ANPRM, PHMSA, in consultation Published ANPRM on August 1,
Hazard Flammable Trains (PHMSA-2014- with FRA, sought comment on potential 2014 and the comment closed
0105). revisions to its regulations that would on September 30, 2014.
expand the applicability of Developing follow-up NPRM.
comprehensive oil spill response plans
(OSRPs) to high-hazard flammable trains
(HHFTs) based on thresholds of crude
oil that apply to an entire train
consist.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Emergency Orders

The Department has the authority to issue emergency orders in
certain instances and take action on safety issues that constitute an
imminent hazard to the safe transportation of hazardous materials.
Railroad transportation of hazardous materials in commerce is subject
to the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation
(Secretary), including the authority to impose emergency restrictions,
prohibitions, recalls, or out-of-service orders, without notice or an
opportunity for hearing, to the extent necessary to abate the imminent
hazard. 49 U.S.C. 5121(d). Therefore, an emergency order can be issued
if the Secretary has found that an unsafe condition or an unsafe
practice is causing or otherwise constitutes an imminent hazard to the
safe transportation of hazardous materials.
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\24\ Should have read ``Division'' instead of ``Class.''
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The NPRM extensively detailed the departmental actions taken, in
the form of emergency orders prior to August 1, 2014. Please refer to
the ``Emergency Orders and Non-Regulatory Actions'' section of August
1, 2014 NPRM for a detailed description of emergency orders issued by
the Department that are relevant to the transportation by rail of large
quantities of flammable liquids. The table below briefly summarizes
those orders and the additional emergency order issued since the NPRM
publication.
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\25\ See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-08-07/pdf/2013-19215.pdf.
\26\ Should have read ``Division'' instead of ``Class.''
\27\ See http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Amended%20Emergency%20Order%20030614.pdf.
\28\ See Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0025. See also http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Amended_Emergency_Order_030614.pdf.

Table 8--Emergency Orders Issued Related to Rail Transport of Flammable Liquids
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency order Date issued Action taken
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Order 28 (78 FR 48218) \25\ August 7, 2013............. Addressed securement and attendance
Issued by FRA. issues related to securement of certain
hazardous materials trains;
specifically, trains with:
........................... (1) Five or more tank carloads of any one
or any combination of materials
poisonous by inhalation as defined in
Title 49 CFR Sec. 171.8, and including
anhydrous ammonia (UN1005) and ammonia
solutions (UN3318); or
........................... (2) 20 rail carloads or intermodal
portable tank loads of any one or any
combination of materials listed in (1)
above, or, any Division 2.1 flammable
gas, Class 3 flammable liquid or
combustible liquid, Class 1.1 or 1.2
explosive,\26\ or hazardous substance
listed in 49 CFR 173.31(f)(2).
Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0025. \27\ February 25, 2014; revised Required those who offer crude oil for
and amended Order on March transportation by rail to ensure that
6, 2014. the product is properly tested and
classified in accordance with Federal
safety regulations.\28\ The March 6,
2014 Amended Emergency Restriction/
Prohibition Order required that all rail
shipments of crude oil that are properly
classed as a flammable liquid in Packing
Group (PG) III material be treated as PG
I or II material, until further notice.
The amended emergency order also
instructed that PG III materials be
described as PG III for the purposes of
hazard communication.
Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067............ May 7, 2014................ Required all railroads that operate
trains containing one million gallons or
more of Bakken crude oil to notify SERCs
about the operation of these trains
through their States. Specifically,
identify each county, or a particular
state or commonwealth's equivalent
jurisdiction (e.g., Louisiana parishes,
Alaska boroughs, Virginia independent
cities), in the state through which the
trains will operate.
FRA Emergency Order No. 30.............. April 27, 2015............. Mandated that trains affected by this
order not exceed 40 miles per hour (mph)
in high-threat urban areas (HTUAs) as
defined in 49 CFR Part 1580. Under the
order, an affected train is one that
contains: (1) 20 or more loaded tank
cars in a continuous block, or 35 or
more loaded tank cars, of Class 3
flammable liquid; and, (2) at least one
DOT Specification 111 (DOT-111) tank car
(including those built in accordance
with Association of American Railroads
(AAR) Casualty Prevention Circular 1232
(CPC-1232)) loaded with a Class 3
flammable liquid.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

On June 30, 2014 FRA published an information collection request
(ICR) notice in the Federal Register, 79 FR 36860 with a 60-day comment
period soliciting comments on the May 7, 2014 emergency order.\29\
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\29\ See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-06-30/html/2014-15174.htm.
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On August 29, 2014, FRA received a joint comment from the AAR and
the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
raising three main points. First, AAR and ASLRRA asserted that the
crude oil routing information in the May 7, 2014 emergency order
requires railroads to provide to SERCs sensitive information from a
security perspective and the information should only be available to
persons with a need-to-know for the

[[Page 26657]]

information (e.g., emergency responders and emergency response
planners). Second, AAR and ASLRRA asserted that the same information is
commercially sensitive information that should remain confidential and
not be publically available. Finally, AAR and ASLRRA asserted that the
emergency order is not serving a useful purpose as the information
required by the emergency order to be provided to the SERCs is already
provided to emergency responders through AAR Circular OT-55-N. See AAR,
``Circular OT-55-N: Recommended Railroad Operating Practices For
Transportation of Hazardous Materials,'' Aug. 5, 2013 (OT-55).
On October 3, 2014, FRA published a 30-day ICR notice in the
Federal Register, 79 FR 59891-59893 to extend the current emergency ICR
supporting the crude oil train routing reporting requirements of the
May 7, 2014 emergency order. In this notice, FRA addressed the security
sensitive claim by noting that the information does not fall under any
of the fifteen enumerated categories of sensitive security information
(SSI) set forth in 49 CFR 15.5 or Sec. 1520.5. The ICR goes on to
describe the nature of the information collection and its expected
burden.
On April 17, 2015 FRA issued Emergency Order (80 FR 23321) to
require that certain trains transporting large amounts of Class 3
flammable liquid through certain highly-populated areas adhere to a
maximum authorized operating speed limit.\30\ Under Emergency Order, an
affected train is one that contains (1) 20 or more loaded tank cars in
a continuous block, or 35 or more loaded tank cars, of a Class 3
flammable liquid; and (2) at least one DOT-111 tank car (including
those built in accordance with CPC-1232) loaded with a Class 3
flammable liquid. Affected trains must not exceed 40 mph in HTUAs as
defined in 49 CFR 1580.3.
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\30\ See http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_2DA43BA3704E57F1958957625273D89A29FF0B00/filename/EO_30_FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FRA issued Emergency Order in the interest of public safety to
dictate that an appropriate speed restriction be placed on trains
containing large quantities of a flammable liquid, particularly in
areas where a derailment could cause a significant hazard of death,
personal injury, or harm to the environment until the provisions of
this final rule were issued and become effective. Further, by limiting
speeds for certain higher risk trains, FRA also hopes to reduce in-
train forces related to acceleration, braking, and slack action that
are sometimes the cause of derailments.
Emergency Order not only applies to legacy DOT-111 tank cars but
newer tank cars built to the CPC-1232 standard. While CPC-1232 tank
cars have more robust protections than do legacy DOT-111 tank cars,
recent accidents have shown that those cars may still release hazardous
material when involved in derailments. Derailments in 2015 in Mt.
Carbon, WV, Dubuque, IA, and Galena, IL involved CPC-1232 cars and
resulted in the release of hazardous materials from those cars.
Analysis of certain speed restrictions below 40 mph indicated that
such restrictions could potentially cause harmful effects on interstate
commerce, and actually increase safety risks. Increased safety risks
could occur if speed restrictions cause rail traffic delays resulting
in trains stopping on main track more often and in trains moving into
and out of sidings more often requiring more train dispatching. FRA
believes the restrictions in Emergency Order will address an emergency
situation while avoiding other safety impacts and harm to interstate
commerce and the flow of necessary goods to the citizens of the United
States. FRA and DOT will continue to evaluate whether additional action
with regard to train speeds is appropriate.

IV. Non-Regulatory Actions Addressing Rail Safety

The August 1, 2014, NPRM extensively detailed non-regulatory
actions taken to address the risks associated with rail shipment of
large quantities of flammable liquids prior to the publication of that
document. These non-regulatory actions included but were not limited
to: (1) Safety Alerts and Advisories, (2) Operation Classification, (3)
the DOT Secretary's Call to Action, and (4) PHMSA and FRA outreach and
education efforts. Please refer to the ``Emergency Orders and Non-
Regulatory Actions'' section of August 1, 2014 NPRM or the PHMSA Web
site \31\ for a description these non-regulatory efforts that are
relevant to rail shipment of large quantities of flammable liquids.
Below is a brief description of PHMSA and FRA efforts since the
publication of the August 1, 2014 NPRM.
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\31\ See detailed chronology of PHMSA efforts at http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/osd/chronology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Safety Alerts and Advisories

Safety advisories are documents published in the Federal Register
that inform the public and regulated community of a potential dangerous
situation or issue. In addition to safety advisories, PHMSA and FRA may
also issue other notices, such as safety alerts. Please refer to the
``Emergency Orders and Non-Regulatory Actions'' section of the August
1, 2014, NPRM for a description of safety alerts and advisories that
are relevant to rail shipment of large quantities of flammable liquids
issued prior to the publication of the NPRM.
On April 17, 2015 PHMSA issued a notice (Notice No. 15-7; 80 FR
22781) to remind hazardous materials shippers and carriers of their
responsibility to ensure that current, accurate and timely emergency
response information is immediately available to emergency response
officials for shipments of hazardous materials, and such information is
maintained on a regular basis.\32\ This notice outlined existing
regulatory requirements applicable to hazardous materials shippers
(including re-offerors) and carriers found in the HMR, specifically in
Subpart G of Part 172.
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\32\ See: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-23/pdf/2015-09436.pdf.
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PHMSA Notice 15-7 emphasized that the responsibility to provide
accurate and timely information is a shared responsibility for all
persons involved in the transportation of hazardous materials. It is a
shipper's responsibility to provide accurate emergency response
information that is consistent with both the information provided on a
shipping paper and the material being transported. Likewise, re-
offerors of hazardous materials must ensure that this information can
be verified to be accurate, particularly if the material is altered,
mixed or otherwise repackaged prior to being placed back into
transportation. In addition, carriers must ensure that emergency
response information is maintained appropriately, is accessible and can
be communicated immediately in the event of a hazardous materials
incident.
Also issued on April 17, 2015 was a joint FRA and PHMSA safety
advisory notice (FRA Safety Advisory 2015-02; PHMSA Notice No. 15-11;
80 FR 22778). This joint safety advisory notice was published to remind
railroads operating an HHFT, defined as a train comprised of 20 or more
loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block,
or a train with 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable
liquid across the entire train, as well as the offerors of Class 3
flammable liquids transported on such trains, that certain information
may be

[[Page 26658]]

required by PHMSA and/or FRA personnel during the course of an
investigation immediately following an accident.
Following recent derailments involving HHFTs, FRA and PHMSA
conducted several post-accident investigations and sought to ensure
that stakeholders were fully aware of each agency's investigative
authority and cooperated with agency personnel conducting such
investigations, where time is of the essence in gathering evidence.
Therefore, PHMSA and FRA issued the joint safety advisory notice to
remind railroads operating HHFTs, and offerors of Class 3 flammable
liquids being transported aboard those trains, of their obligation to
provide PHMSA and FRA, as expeditiously as possible, with information
agency personnel need to conduct investigations immediately following
an accident or incident.
FRA issued a safety advisory notice 2015-01 (80 FR 23318) on April
17, 2015 to make recommendations to enhance mechanical safety of tank
cars in HHFTs.\33\ Recent derailments have occurred involving trains
transporting large quantities of petroleum crude oil and ethanol.
Preliminary investigation of the Galena, IL derailment involving a
crude oil train indicates that a mechanical defect involving a broken
tank car wheel may have caused or contributed to the incident. Safety
Advisory 2015-01 recommended that railroads use highly qualified
individuals to conduct the brake and mechanical inspections and
recommends a reduction to the impact threshold levels the industry
currently uses for wayside detectors that measure wheel impacts to
ensure the wheel integrity of tank cars in those trains.
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\33\ See: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-27/pdf/2015-09612.pdf.
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B. Operation Classification

As part of PHMSA and FRA's overall rail safety efforts, the
administration launched a testing and sampling program (Operation
Classification) in August 2013 to verify that crude oil is being
properly classified in accordance with Federal regulations. Early
indications from the July 6, 2013, derailment in Lac-M[eacute]gantic
were that the crude oil involved in that accident was misclassified.
Specifically, the product was assigned a PG III classification (lowest
hazard), despite meeting the criteria for PG II. Therefore, its hazards
were not correctly identified. This was later confirmed by the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada's (TSB) in Railway Investigation
Report R13D0054 (Aug. 19, 2014).\34\
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\34\ See http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Operation Classification continues today, and activities include
unannounced inspections, data collection, and sampling at strategic
terminal and loading locations for crude oil. PHMSA investigators test
samples from various points along the crude oil transportation chain:
From cargo tanks that deliver crude oil to rail loading facilities,
from storage tanks at the facilities, and from pipelines connecting
storage tanks to rail cars that would move the crude across the
country. Concurrently, with the publication of the August 1, 2014 NPRM,
PHMSA issued an update on the results of PHMSA's sampling and testing
effort. See Operation Safe Delivery Update.\35\ Based upon the results
obtained from sampling and testing, the majority of crude oil analyzed
displayed characteristics consistent with those of a Class 3 flammable
liquid, PG I or II, with predominance to PG I, the most dangerous
Packing Group of Class 3 flammable liquids with lower flash points and
initial boiling points than packing groups II and III.
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\35\ See http://phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_8A422ABDC16B72E5F166FE34048CCCBFED3B0500/filename/07_23_14_Operation_Safe_Delivery_Report_final_clean.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Since the issuance of PHMSA's ``Operation Safe Delivery Update,''
PHMSA has continued its testing and sampling activities and refined the
collection methods. PHMSA has purchased closed syringe-style cylinders
and is collecting all samples using these cylinders. Utilizing these
types of cylinders minimizes the opportunity for any dissolved gases to
be lost to the air during collection, thus providing increased
accuracy. In addition, PHMSA has taken samples at other shale play
locations around the United States to compare their characteristics to
that of crude oil from the Bakken region. PHMSA plans to provide
subsequent updates of its testing and sampling activities as we move
forward and to work with the regulated community to ensure the safe
transportation of crude oil across the nation.
As mentioned previously the primary intent of PHMSA's sampling and
analysis of crude oil is to determine if shippers are properly
classifying crude oil for transportation. PHMSA also uses this data to
quantify the range of physical and chemical properties of crude oil.
While the information and data obtained from the sampling and analysis
helped quantify the range of physical and chemical properties of crude
oil, this data did not inform the regulatory amendments in the August
1, 2014, NPRM or this rulemaking.

C. Call to Action

On January 9, 2014, the Secretary issued a ``Call to Action'' to
actively engage all the stakeholders in the crude oil industry,
including CEOs of member companies of API and CEOs of the railroads. In
a meeting held on January 16, 2014, the Secretary and the
Administrators of PHMSA and FRA requested that offerors and carriers
identify prevention and mitigation strategies that can be implemented
quickly. As a result of this meeting, the rail and crude oil industries
agreed to voluntarily consider or implement potential improvements,
including speed restrictions in high consequence areas, alternative
routing, the use of distributive power to improve braking, and
improvements in emergency response preparedness and training. On
January 22, 2014, the Secretary sent a letter to the attendees
recapping the meeting and stressing the importance of this issue.\36\
The August 1, 2014, NPRM provided a detailed listing of all voluntary
actions the crude oil and rail industry agreed to take. See ``Emergency
Orders and Non-Regulatory Actions'', 79 FR at 45031. Since the
publication of the August 1, 2014, NPRM the following items \37\
related to the call to action have been completed.
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\36\ http://phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_AAFF3C0BBA4D0B46209E5528662AC5427B6F0700/filename/Letter_from_Secretary_Foxx_Follow_up_to_January_16.pdf.
\37\ This is not a comprehensive list. These items simply
highlight some of the recently completed call to action items.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Recommended Practice 3000 (RP 3000)--API published a new
set of recommended practices for testing and classifying crude oil for
rail shipment and loading it into rail tank cars. These guidelines were
the product of extensive work and cooperation between the oil and gas
industry, the freight rail industry, and PHMSA to ensure crude
shipments are packaged appropriately, and emergency responders have the
right information. RP 3000 provides guidance on the material
characterization, transport classification, and quantity measurement
for overfill prevention of petroleum crude oil for the loading of rail
tank cars. RP 3000 identifies criteria for determining the frequency of
sampling and testing of petroleum crude oil for transport
classification. It discusses how to establish a sampling and testing
program, and provides an example of such a program.

[[Page 26659]]

Transportation Technology Center Inc. (TTCI) Training--AAR
and Railroad Subscribers committed considerable resources to develop
and provide a hazardous material transportation training curriculum
applicable to petroleum crude oil transport for emergency responders.
This training was completed in the summer of 2014 and continues to be
refined.
Speed Reduction--Railroads began operating certain trains
at 40 mph on July 1, 2014. This voluntary restriction applies to any
HHFT with at least one non-CPC 1232 tank car loaded with crude oil or
one non-DOT specification tank car loaded with crude oil while that
train travels within the limits of any high-threat urban area (HTUA) as
defined by 49 CFR 1580.3.

D. Stakeholder Outreach

PHMSA and FRA are taking a focused approach to increase community
awareness and preparedness for response to incidents involving bulk
transport of crude oil and other high-hazard flammable shipments by
rail such as ethanol. Specific efforts have taken place to develop
appropriate response outreach and training tools to mitigate the impact
of future incidents. The following are some of the actions taken to by
PHMSA to enhance emergency response to rail crude oil incidents over
the past year.
In February 2014, PHMSA hosted a stakeholder meeting with
participants from the emergency response community, the railroad
industry, Transport Canada and Federal partners FRA, and FMCSA. The
objective was to discuss emergency preparedness related to incidents
involving transportation of crude oil by rail. The discussion topics
included: Current state of crude oil risk awareness and operational
readiness/capability; familiarity with bulk shippers of crude oil,
emergency response plans and procedures; available training resources
(sources, accessibility, gaps in training); and the needs of emergency
responders/public safety agencies.
In May 2014, in conjunction with the Virginia Department of Fire
Programs, PHMSA hosted a ``Lessons Learned'' Roundtable forum that
consisted of a panel of fire chiefs and emergency management officials
from some of the jurisdictions that experienced a crude oil or ethanol
rail transportation incident. The purpose of this forum was to share
firsthand knowledge about their experiences responding to and managing
these significant rail incidents. In attendance were public safety
officials from Aliceville, AL, Cherry Valley, IL, Cass County, ND, and
the Lynchburg, VA fire department. Based on the input received from the
forum participants, PHMSA published a ``Crude Oil Rail Emergency
Response Lessons Learned Roundtable Report'' outlining the key factors
that were identified as having a direct impact on the successful
outcome of managing a crude oil transportation incident.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\38\ See http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_0903D018579BF84E6914C0BB932607F5B3F50300/filename/Lessons_Learned_Roundtable_Report_FINAL_070114.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In June 2014, in partnership with FRA and the U.S. Fire
Administration (USFA), PHMSA hosted a stakeholder meeting with
hazardous materials response subject matter experts from the public
safety, railroads, government, and industry to discuss best practices
for responding to a crude oil incident by rail. In coordination with
the working group, PHMSA drafted the ``Commodity Preparedness and
Incident Management Reference Sheet.'' This document contains incident
management best practices for crude oil rail transportation emergency
response operations that include a risk-based hazardous materials
emergency response operational framework. The framework provides first
responders with key planning, preparedness, and response principles to
successfully manage a crude oil rail transportation incident. The
document also assists fire and emergency services personnel in
decision-making and developing an appropriate response strategy to an
incident (i.e., defensive, offensive, or non-intervention).\39\ In
partnership with the USFA's, National Fire Academy (NFA), a series of
six coffee break training bulletins were published and widely
distributed to the emergency response community providing reference to
the response document.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\39\ This document has been widely distributed throughout the
emergency response community and is also available on the PHMSA
Operation Safe Delivery Web site at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/osd/emergencyresponse.
\40\ See http://www.usfa.fema.gov/training/coffee_break/hazmat_index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In October 2014, to further promote the ``Commodity Preparedness
and Incident Management Reference Sheet,'' PHMSA contracted with the
Department of Energy, Mission Support Alliance-Hazardous Materials
Management and Emergency Preparedness (MSA-HAMMER) to develop the
Transportation Rail Incident Preparedness and Response (TRIPR) for
Flammable Liquid Unit Trains training modules. These modules along with
three table-top scenarios offer a flexible approach to increasing
awareness of emergency response personnel on the best practices and
principles related to rail incidents involving hazard class 3 flammable
liquids. A key component of this initiative is to learn from past
experiences and to leverage the expertise of public safety agencies,
rail carriers, and industry subject matter experts in order to prepare
first responders to safely manage rail incidents involving commodities
such as crude oil and ethanol. These modules are not intended to be a
stand alone training program, but are offered to supplement existing
programs. Estimated delivery for this project is May 2015.
In December 2014, PHMSA re-engaged the emergency response
stakeholder group to allow all parties Federal government, the railroad
industry and the response community to provide updates on the various
emergency response related initiatives aimed to increase community
awareness and preparedness for responding to incidents involving crude
oil and other high-hazard flammable shipments by rail.
In addition to PHMSA's efforts mentioned above, in January 2015,
The National Response Team (NRT), led by Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), conducted a webinar titled ``Emerging Risks, Responder
Awareness Training for Bakken Crude Oil'' to educate responders on
Bakken Crude Oil production and transportation methods along with the
health and safety issues facing first responders. In addition to the
training webinar, the NRT also intends to conduct a large scale
exercise scenario in 2015, to assess federal, state, and local response
capabilities to a crude oil incident.
Also in January 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
along with other Federal partners including FEMA, USCG, DOE, DOT, and
DHS hosted conference calls with state officials and representatives
from the appropriate offices, boards, or commissions (emergency
response and planning, environmental cleanup, energy, and
transportation) that play a role in preparing or responding to an
incident involving crude-by-rail. The purpose of these discussions was
to gain better understanding of how states are preparing to respond to
incidents involving crude oil by rail and to identify key needs from
each state. Questions centered on what actions (planning, training,
exercises, etc.) have been planned or conducted in the state and/or
local communities, what communities or areas have the greatest risk,
regional actions or activities states have participated in, and any
other related concerns states would like to discuss.

[[Page 26660]]

Complementing the Federal government's efforts, the railroad
industry has also taken on the challenge to address crude oil response.
API has built new partnerships between rail companies and oil
producers. At the request of FRA, the API is currently developing an
outreach program to deliver training to first responders throughout the
U.S., particularly in states that have seen a rise in crude oil by
rail. This includes working with oil and rail industry members to
identify where existing training initiatives and conferences can be
utilized to provide the training to as many responders as possible.
Lastly, the AAR and API are working together to produce a crude oil by
rail safety training video through their partnership with
Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response (TRANSCAER).
Moving forward, both the railroad industry and the Federal
government will continue their efforts to increase preparedness for
responding to not only crude oil, but all high-hazard flammable
shipments by rail. The stakeholder group will aim to meet again in the
spring of 2015 under the unified goal to provide first responders with
the key information needed to effectively prepare for and manage the
consequences incidents involving bulk shipments of energy products by
rail.
In the meantime, PHMSA will continue its efforts to increase
community awareness and emergency preparedness through public outreach
to state and local emergency responder communities, sustained
engagement with experts from emergency response and industry
stakeholder groups, and participating on interagency working groups.

V. NTSB Safety Recommendations

As previously discussed, in addition to the efforts of PHMSA and
FRA, the NTSB has taken a very active role in identifying the risks
posed by the transportation of large quantities of flammable liquids by
rail. The NPRM for this rulemaking detailed the actions and
recommendations of the NTSB. Since the publication of the August 1,
2014 NPRM, the NTSB has issued additional rail-related safety
recommendations. The table below provides a summary of the rail-related
NTSB Safety Recommendations and identifies the effect of this action on
those recommendations, including those issued to PHMSA and FRA after
the issuance of the August 1, 2014 NPRM. It should be noted that
although some of these recommendations are not addressed in this
rulemaking they are being addressed through other actions, for example,
development of guidance materials, outreach to the regulated community,
and conducting research projects. Further, some are being considered
for other future rulemaking action.

Table 9--Rail-Related NTSB Safety Recommendations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSB Recommendation Summary Addressed in this rule?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R-07-4, Issued April 27, 2007........... Recommends that PHMSA, with the No.
assistance of FRA, require that
railroads immediately provide to
emergency responders accurate, real-time
information regarding the identity and
location of all hazardous materials on a
train.
R-12-5, Issued March 2, 2012............ Recommends that PHMSA require all newly Yes.
manufactured and existing general
service tank cars authorized for
transportation of denatured fuel ethanol
and crude oil in PGs I and II have
enhanced tank head and shell puncture
resistance systems and top fittings
protection that exceed existing design
requirements for DOT Specification 111
(DOT-111) tank cars.
R-12-6, Issued March 2, 2012............ Recommends that PHMSA require all bottom Yes.
outlet valves used on newly manufactured
and existing non-pressure tank cars are
designed to remain closed during
accidents in which the valve and
operating handle are subjected to impact
forces.
R-12-7, Issued March 2, 2012............ Recommends that PHMSA require all newly No.*
manufactured and existing tank cars
authorized for transportation of
hazardous materials have center sill or
draft sill attachment designs that
conform to the revised AAR design
requirements adopted as a result of
Safety Recommendation R-12-9.
R-12-8, Issued March 2, 2012............ Recommends that PHMSA inform pipeline Closed.**
operators about the circumstances of the
accident and advise them of the need to
inspect pipeline facilities after
notification of accidents occurring in
railroad rights-of-way.
R-14-1, Issued January 23, 2014......... Recommends that FRA work with PHMSA to Yes.
expand hazardous materials route
planning and selection requirements for
railroads under the HMR to include key
trains transporting flammable liquids as
defined by the AAR Circular No. OT-55-N
and, where technically feasible, require
rerouting to avoid transportation of
such hazardous materials through
populated and other sensitive areas.
R-14-2, Issued January 23, 2014......... Recommends that FRA develop a program to No.***
audit response plans for rail carriers
of petroleum products to ensure that
adequate provisions are in place to
respond to and remove a worst-case
discharge to the maximum extent
practicable and to mitigate or prevent a
substantial threat of a worst-case
discharge.
R-14-3, Issued January 23, 2014......... Recommends that FRA audit shippers and Closed.
rail carriers of crude oil to ensure
they are using appropriate hazardous
materials shipping classifications, have
developed transportation safety and
security plans, and have made adequate
provision for safety and security.
R-14-4, Issued January 23, 2014......... Recommends that PHMSA work with FRA to Yes.
expand hazardous materials route
planning and selection requirements for
railroads under Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations 172.820 to include key
trains transporting flammable liquids as
defined by the AAR Circular No. OT-55-N
and, where technically feasible, require
rerouting to avoid transportation of
such hazardous materials through
populated and other sensitive areas.
R-14-5, Issued January 23, 2014......... Recommends that PHMSA revise the spill No.***
response planning thresholds contained
in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 130 to require comprehensive
response plans to effectively provide
for the carriers' ability to respond to
worst-case discharges resulting from
accidents involving unit trains or
blocks of tank cars transporting oil and
petroleum products.
R-14-6, Issued January 23, 2014......... Recommends that PHMSA require shippers to Yes.
sufficiently test and document the
physical and chemical characteristics of
hazardous materials to ensure the proper
classification, packaging, and record-
keeping of products offered in
transportation.

[[Page 26661]]

R-14-14, Issued January 23, 2014........ Recommends that PHMSA require railroads Partially.
transporting hazardous materials through
communities to provide emergency
responders and local and state emergency
planning committees with current
commodity flow data and assist with the
development of emergency operations and
response plans.
R-14-18, Issued August 22, 2014......... Recommends that PHMSA take action to No.
ensure that emergency response
information carried by train crews is
consistent with and is at least as
protective as existing emergency
response guidance provided in the
Emergency Response Guidebook.
R-14-19, Issued August 22, 2014......... Recommends that PHMSA require railroads No.
transporting hazardous materials to
develop, implement, and periodically
evaluate a public education program
similar to Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations Parts 192.616 and 195.440
for the communities along railroad
hazardous materials routes.
R-14-20, Issued August 22, 2014......... Recommends that PHMSA collaborate with No.
FRA and ASLRRA and Regional Railroad
Association to develop a risk assessment
tool that addresses the known
limitations and shortcomings of the Rail
Corridor Risk Management System software
tool.
R-14-21, Issued August 22, 2014......... Recommends that PHMSA collaborate with No.
FRA and ASLRRA and Regional Railroad
Association to conduct audits of short
line and regional railroads to ensure
that proper route risk assessments that
identify safety and security
vulnerabilities are being performed and
are incorporated into a safety
management system program.
R-15-14, Issued April 6, 2015........... Require that all new and existing tank Yes.
cars used to transport all Class 3
flammable liquids be equipped with
thermal protection systems that meet or
exceed the thermal performance standards
outlined in Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations 179.18(a) and are
appropriately qualified for the tank car
configuration and the commodity
transported.
R-15-15, Issued April 6, 2015........... Require that all new and existing tank Yes.
cars used to transport all Class 3
flammable liquids be equipped with
appropriately sized pressure relief
devices that allow the release of
pressure under fire conditions to ensure
thermal performance that meets or
exceeds the requirements of Title 49
Code of Federal Regulations 179.18(a),
and that minimizes the likelihood of
energetic thermal ruptures.
R-15-16, Issued April 6, 2015........... Require an aggressive, intermediate Partially.
progress milestone schedule, such as a
20 percent yearly completion metric over
a 5-year implementation period, for the
replacement or retrofitting of legacy
DOT-111 and CPC-1232 tank cars to
appropriate tank car performance
standards, that includes equipping these
tank cars with jackets, thermal
protection, and appropriately sized
pressure relief devices.
R-15-17, Issued April 6, 2015........... Establish a publicly available reporting Partially.
mechanism that reports at least
annually, progress on retrofitting and
replacing tank cars subject to thermal
protection system performance standards
as recommended in safety recommendation
R-15-16.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Under R-12-9, NTSB recommends that AAR: Review the design requirements in the AAR Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices C-III, ``Specifications for Tank Cars for Attaching Center Sills or Draft Sills,'' and
revise those requirements as needed to ensure that appropriate distances between the welds attaching the draft
sill to the reinforcement pads and the welds attaching the reinforcement pads to the tank are maintained in
all directions in accidents, including the longitudinal direction. These design requirements have not yet been
finalized by the AAR.
** On July 31, 2012, PHMSA published an advisory bulletin in the Federal Register to all pipeline operators
alerting them to the circumstances of the Cherry Valley derailment and reminding them of the importance of
assuring that pipeline facilities have not been damaged either during a railroad accident or other event
occurring in the right-of-way. 77 FR 45417. This recommendation was closed by NTSB on September 20, 2012. This
action is accessible at the following URL: http://phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/ntsb/closed.
*** On August 1, 2014, PHMSA in consultation with FRA published an ANPRM, 79 FR 45079, which was responsive to
these recommendations.

The Department believes this comprehensive rulemaking significantly
improves the safety of trains carrying flammable liquids and addresses
many on NTSB's rail related recommendations. Following the publication
of this rulemaking, PHMSA will issue a formal response to NTSB
regarding the recommendations above and how the provisions of this
rulemaking address those recommendations.
In addition to the NTSB recommendations above, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), in August 2014, issued a report entitled
``Department of Transportation is Taking Actions to Address Rail
Safety, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve Pipeline Safety.''
\41\ While the primary GAO recommendations of this report were related
to pipeline safety, PHMSA and FRA believes this rulemaking addresses
rail related issues raised in this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\41\ See http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665404.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Incorporation by Reference Discussion Under 1 CFR Part 51

The American Association of Railroads (AAR) Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices, Section C--Part III, Specifications for Tank
Cars, Specification M-1002, (AAR Specifications for Tank Cars)
reference is available for interested parties to purchase in either
print or electronic versions through the parent organization Web site.
The price charged for this standard helps to cover the cost of
developing, maintaining, hosting, and accessing this standard. This
specific standard is discussed in greater detail in the following
analysis.

VII. Summary and Discussion of Public Comments

In the August 1, 2014, NPRM, PHMSA solicited public comment on
whether the potential amendments would enhance safety and clarify the
HMR with regard to rail transport as well as the cost and benefit
figures associated with these proposals. PHMSA received 3,209
submissions representing more than 181,500 individuals. Comments were
received from a broad array of stakeholders, including trade
organizations, railroads, intermodal carriers, logistic companies, rail

[[Page 26662]]

customers, tank car manufacturers, parts suppliers, consultants, law
firms, environmental groups, labor organizations, non-government or
advocacy organizations, local government organizations or
representatives, tribal governments, state governments, Members of
Congress, and other interested members of the public. Several
organizations attached the views of some of their individual members:
Credo Action (71,900 attached comments), Forest Ethics (5,817 attached
comments) and Center for Biological Diversity (22,981 attached
comments), for example. Other organizations submitted a comment with
attached membership signatures, such as: the Sierra Club (61,998
signatures), Forest Ethics petition (8,820 signatures), Public Citizen
(3,080 signatures), for example. All comments and corresponding
rulemaking materials received may be viewed on the www.regulations.gov
Web site, docket ID PHMSA-2012-0082.
Many comments received in response to the NPRM are: (1) General
statements of support or opposition; (2) personal anecdotes or general
statements that do not address a specific aspect of the proposed
changes; (3) comments that are beyond the scope or authority of the
proposed regulations; or (4) identical or nearly identical letter
write-in campaigns sent in response to comment initiatives sponsored by
different organizations. The remaining comments reflect a wide variety
of views on the merits of particular sections of the proposed
regulations. Many include substantive analyses and arguments in support
of or in opposition to the proposed regulations. The substantive
comments received on the proposed regulations are organized by topic,
and discussed in the appropriate section, together with the PHMSA's
response to those comments.

Table 10--Overall Commenter Breakdown \42\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenter background Docket IDs Signatories Description and example of category
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization................ 58 171,602 Primarily environmental groups, but
includes other Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) such as
hobby, labor, safety organization,
etc.
Individuals................................ 2,695 9,364 Public submissions not directly
representing a specific
organization.
Industry stakeholders...................... 286 318 Trade organizations, railroads,
intermodal carriers, logistic
companies, rail customers, tank
car manufacturers, parts
suppliers, consultants, etc.
Government organizations or representatives 170 238 Local, state, tribal governments or
representatives, NTSB, U.S.
Congress members, etc.
--------------------------------
Total.................................. 3,209 181,522
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\42\ It should be noted that there may be some double-counting
as individuals may have submitted comments individually and as
signatories to NGO or industry stakeholder comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Resolution of the comments are discussed within each appropriate
section of the final rule (e.g. tank car, speed, braking, etc.)

A. Miscellaneous Relevant Comments

1. Harmonization
Almost unanimously, commenters on all sides of the issues stressed
the need to introduce harmonized standards for the rail transport of
flammable liquids. Rail transport is a cross-border issue. Flammable
liquids regularly cross the U.S./Canadian border using an
interconnected rail network.\43\ It is essential to have a
harmonization approach. In addition, as substantial capital investment
will be required to retrofit existing cars and manufacture new cars
both the U.S. DOT and Transport Canada have worked diligently to ensure
our standards are compatible and do not create barriers to movement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\43\ Flammable liquids cross the U.S./Mexican border by rail to
a considerably lesser extent than U.S./Canada shipments.
Furthermore, the HMR requires all shipments to/from Mexico must be
in full conformance with U.S. Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Staff at Transport Canada, PHMSA, and FRA have traditionally
interacted on a frequent basis to ensure harmonized efforts. In light
of the significant rulemaking efforts underway in the past year in both
countries, this interaction has expanded regarding rail safety efforts
and the technical aspects of the rulemakings.
In addition to informal staff level discussion, the DOT and
Transport Canada have held more formal discussions through the
Regulatory Cooperation Council with regard to improvements to rail
safety. Further, leadership at both DOT and Transport Canada have met
frequently to discuss harmonization efforts. Finally, Secretary Foxx
and Transport Minister Lisa Riatt have met on multiple occasions to
specifically discuss the topics addressed in this rulemaking.

Conclusion

PHMSA and FRA believe these discussions have led to the development
of a harmonized final rulemaking that will not create any barriers to
cross border transportation. To the extent possible, the amendments
proposed by PHMSA and FRA in this final rule have been harmonized with
Canadian regulatory requirements. The table below provides a summary of
the areas covered by this rule and corresponding Canadian efforts.

Table 11--United States and Canada Harmonized Efforts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue U.S. position Canadian position Harmonization impacts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scope................................ A continuous block of Tank Car Provisions Not Harmonized--Due to
20 or more tank cars apply to a single tank cost implications in
or 35 or more cars car. using a risk-based
dispersed through a standard of one car.
train loaded with a
flammable liquid.
New Tank Car Specification........... See Table 18 as Canada See Table 18 as Canada Fully Harmonized.
and U.S. are and U.S. are
harmonized fully on harmonized fully on
this issue. this issue.

[[Page 26663]]

Existing Tank Car Specification...... See Table 19--Enhanced See Table 19--Enhanced Fully Harmonized.
CPC-1232. CPC-1232.
Retrofit Timeline.................... See Table 21. Requires Except for the first Harmonized except for
a retrofitting phase of the retrofit first phase.
progress report schedule Transport
provided initial Canada and the U.S.
milestone is not met. have harmonized
retrofit schedules and
similar retrofit
reporting
requirements.
Transport Canada also
includes a
retrofitting progress
report.
Braking.............................. (1) Requires HHFTs to Requires a Two-way End Not Currently
have in place a of Train Device (EOT) Harmonized--Transport
functioning two-way as per the Railway Canada and the United
EOT device or a DP Freight and Passenger States will continue
braking system. (2) Train Brake Inspection to work towards
Requires any HHFUT and Safety Rules. A harmonized approach on
transporting at least two-way EOT may be a braking.
one PG I flammable Sense Braking Unit
liquid be operated (SBU) or a locomotive
with an ECP braking functioning as
system by January 1, distributive braking
2021. (3) Requires all power, as per the U.S.
other HHFUTs be definition. Transport
operated with an ECP Canada will continue
braking system by May to work with Canadian
1, 2023. industry in order to
determine a harmonized
Canadian braking
requirement.
Routing.............................. HHFT carriers must Transport Canada Harmonized to the
perform a routing required carriers to extent needed--While
analysis that complete a risk the applicability of
considers a minimum of assessment within six the requirements and
27 safety and security months of the issuance specifics of the risk
factors. The carrier of an emergency analysis on both sides
must select a route directive to assess of the border are
based on findings of the risk associated different, they
the route analysis. with each ``Key generally focused on
Route'' a ``Key the same types of
Train'' operates. shipments and cover
the same overarching
aspects.
Notification......................... Notification Transport Canada issued Harmonized to the
requirements are a Protective Direction extent needed--While
already included in 32 directing rail harmonization is not
the routing companies to share essential on this
requirements; information with issue, DOT and
therefore a stand- municipalities to help Transport Canada are
alone provision is emergency response fundamentally aligned
unnecessary. planning, risk on the principles of
assessment and first notification.
responder training.
Speed................................ A 50-mph maximum speed Transport Canada issued Harmonization not
restriction for all an Emergency Directive essential--This
HHFTs. A 40-mph speed requiring all operational issue can
restriction for HHFTs companies not operate be handled separately
operating in a HTUA a Key Train at a speed on either side of the
unless all flammable that exceeds 50 mph border.
liquid tank cars meet and not in excess of
the new or retrofitted 40 mph in Census
tank car standards. Metropolitan Areas.
Classification....................... A classification Transport Canada has Harmonized to extent
program for unrefined adopted a requirements needed--DOT and TC are
petroleum-based to: (1) Provide a fully aligned with
products. proof of regard to shipper's
classification, on certifications. With
reasonable notice by regard to sampling
the Minister for any plans TC is
dangerous goods; and considering adoption
(2) Classify petroleum of a classification
crude oil and plan similar to DOT.
petroleum products on
the basis of sampling
and make available to
the Minister of
Transport, the
sampling procedures
and conditions of any
given shipment.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Definition of High-Hazard Flammable Train
In the September 6, 2013, ANPRM we asked several questions
regarding AAR Circular No. OT-55-N including if we should incorporate
the ``key train'' requirements into the HMR, or if it should be
expanded to include trains with fewer than 20 cars. Several commenters
indicated that additional operational requirements should be based upon
the definition for a ``key train'' as provided by AAR Circular No. OT-
55-N. Further, Appendix A to Emergency Order No. 28 mirrors the
definition for a ``key train'' as provided by AAR Circular No. OT-55-N.
While Appendix A to Emergency Order No. 28 and the revised
definition of a ``key train'' under AAR Circular No. OT-55-N both
include Division 2.1 (flammable gas) materials and combustible liquids,
PHMSA did not propose to include them in the definition of a ``high-
hazard flammable train'' in the August 1, 2014, NPRM. Rather, PHMSA and
FRA proposed to define a high-hazard flammable train to mean a single
train carrying 20 or more carloads of a Class 3 flammable liquid. PHMSA
and FRA asked for specific comment on this definition in the August 1,
2014, NPRM.
In response to the proposed amendments to routing, we received a
variety of comments representing differing viewpoints. Specifically, we
received comments representing 62,882 signatories regarding the
definition of an HHFT. The definition of a ``high-hazard flammable
train'' is a critical aspect for this rulemaking as many of the
requirements are tied to that threshold. The table below details the
types and amounts of commenters on the HHFT definition.

[[Page 26664]]

Table 12--Commenter Composition: HHFT Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenter type Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization............................. 62,038
Individuals............................................. 549
Industry stakeholders................................... 200
Government organizations or representatives............. 95
---------------
Totals................................................ 62,882
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Below are some examples from commenters that demonstrate the range
of opinions on the HHFT definition as it relates specifically to
operational controls.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\44\ Other comments/commenters have expressed stances on the
HHFT definition as it applies specifically to tank car enhancements
that may differ from those discussed in reference to operational
controls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments from the concerned public, local government, tribal
communities, towns and cities voiced concern with the 20-car threshold,
and that the 20-car threshold is an arbitrary number that is not
justified in the NPRM. With regard to alternative scopes for this
rulemaking, this group of commenters had varied opinions. Some even
suggested that a train consisting of one or more tank cars carrying
crude oil or any other hazardous material should be classified as an
HHFT.
Tribal communities, such as the Quinault Indian Nation and the
Prairie Island Indian Community felt the proposed threshold was
sufficient but could be even more stringent. Specifically, the Prairie
Island Indian Community supported, ``designating trains carrying more
than 20 tank cars of flammable liquids as ``high-hazard flammable train
(HHFT).'' The Quinault Indian Nation preferred a threshold of a single
tank car.
Environmental Groups such as the Sierra Club, Environmental
Advocates of New York, Earthjustice, the Natural Resources Defense
Council, Forest Keepers, and Oil Change had strong opinions about this
threshold and the need to be more stringent. The Sierra Club noted that
there are known risks associated with trains transporting less than 20
tank cars loaded with crude oil, particularly in legacy DOT-111 tank
cars. The Environmental Advocates of New York suggested eliminating the
combustible liquid exception for rail transportation to capture those
materials. Finally, a joint comment from Earthjustice, Sierra Club, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, Forest Keepers, and Oil Change
suggested in addition to lowering the threshold for defining an HHFT,
ensuring that diluted bitumen (``dilbit'') is included in any amount
towards this definition. Overall environmental groups supported a
threshold below 20 tank cars loaded with Class 3 (flammable liquid)
materials.
The NTSB suggested using a pre-existing industry standard for route
planning, but does not support the use of the 20 tank car threshold for
other purposes. Specifically, their proposal was to align the HHFT
definition to the OT-55N ``Key Train'' definition (20 tank cars loaded
with any combination of hazardous materials) for Routing. With regard
to tank car specifications and retrofits, the NTSB supports a single
tank car approach.
Industry stakeholders took issue with the term ``high-hazard
flammable train'' and the term's connotation. The hazmat shipping
industry provided a variety of suggestions with most of them indicating
that there would be difficulty in determining if a train would meet the
proposed definition of an HHFT prior to shipment. The hazmat shipping
industry had issues with the ambiguity of the definition for HHFT. Most
in the hazmat shipping industry thought the definition would
inadvertently include manifest trains that did not pose as high a risk
as unit trains. It was also noted that in many situations it would be
difficult to pre-determine when an HHFT would be used. The Dangerous
Goods Advisory Council (DGAC) stated that the term ``HHFT'' is not in
use within the industry and may be confused with other terminology such
as ``unit train,'' ``manifest train,'' or ``key train.'' Proposed
definitions from the hazmat shipping industry included:
Trains consisting of 20 or more tank cars loaded with
crude oil or ethanol originating from one consignee to one consignor
without intermediate handling.
A train carrying a continuous block of 20 or more cars of
crude oil or ethanol.
A unit or block train transporting only loaded crude oil
and/or ethanol tank cars shipped from a single point of origin to a
single destination without being split up or stored en route.
Amongst the rail industry, there was wide agreement that the HHFT
definition proposed at the NPRM stage is not a workable definition. The
rail industry had issues with the ambiguity of the definition for HHFT.
Like the shipping industry, most in the rail industry thought the
definition would inadvertently include manifest trains that did not
pose as high a risk as unit trains. The rail industry noted that in
many situations it would be difficult to pre-determine when an HHFT
would be used. There were many comments from the tank car construction
and rail industries suggesting the construction of tank cars not be
tied to the definition of an HHFT. Specifically, those comments noted
the HHFT definition should only be applied to operational requirements.
Some claimed this would shift the scope of the requirements to ``unit
trains'' as opposed to capturing ``manifest trains.'' Finally, AAR
estimated (based on Class I railroads reports) that 20 to 60 percent of
their trains containing 20 or more tank cars of flammable liquids are
in fact ``manifest trains.'' It was also noted that the emphasis of the
NPRM and other voluntary agreements has been on crude oil and ethanol.
AAR provided the following suggested definition as a prospective
solution: ``20 or more tank cars in block or 35 tank cars across the
train consist loaded with a flammable liquid.'' AAR claimed this
definition would focus on the unit train risk while eliminating the
inadvertent inclusion of manifest trains.
PHMSA and FRA agree with many comments regarding this issue and the
need to refine the definition. Therefore, in this final rule, PHMSA and
FRA are adopting a revised definition for a high-hazard flammable
train. The adopted definition of an HHFT is as follows:

A High-Hazard Flammable Train means a single train transporting
20 or more loaded tank cars containing Class 3 flammable liquid in a
continuous block or a single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank
cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid throughout the train consist.

This revision is based on further justification of the threshold,
the intent of the definition, and operational concerns raised by
commenters. Each of these will be discussed further below.
With regard to the inclusion of all hazardous materials as opposed
to just flammable liquids in the definition of an HHFT, PHMSA and FRA
proposed to limit the definition to Class 3 Flammable liquids in the
August 1, 2014, NPRM. Because the NPRM limited the definition to Class
3 Flammable liquids, we feel expanding the definition to include all
hazardous materials is beyond the scope of the NPRM and thus we are
unable to include all hazardous materials in this final rule. Further,
as evidenced with the incidents detailed in the RIA, we believe the
risk posed by the bulk shipments of flammable liquids in DOT
specification 111 tank cars should be included in this final rule but a
similar risk has not currently been identified with other hazardous
materials.
PHMSA and FRA did not intend the proposed definition in the NPRM to
include lower risk manifest trains and

[[Page 26665]]

had crafted the definition with the idea of capturing the higher risk
associated with bulk shipments. This rulemaking action is focused on
the risks associated with large blocks of hazardous materials.
Flammable liquids, specifically crude oil and ethanol, are the only
type of commodity frequently transported in this configuration. The
risk of flammability is compounded in the context of rail
transportation because petroleum crude oil and ethanol are commonly
shipped in large blocks or single commodity trains (unit trains). In
recent years, train accidents/incidents (train accidents) involving a
flammable liquid release and resulting fire with severe consequences
have occurred with increasing frequency (i.e., Arcadia, OH; Plevna, MT;
Casselton, ND; Aliceville, AL; Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec; Lynchburg,
VA, Tiskilwa, IL, Columbus, OH, New Brighton, PA, Mount Carbon, WV,
Galena, IL, Dubuque, IA, Timmins, Ontario, and Gogama, Ontario).\45\ As
we were focused on this particular type of risk, we will continue in
this final rulemaking to limit our focus to Class 3 Flammable Liquids.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\45\ Please note that the last five accidents listed occurred in
2015 are not included in our supporting analysis for this rulemaking
as the information from those incidents is preliminary and not
finalized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter suggested the 20-car threshold was arbitrary and not
founded on data. As detailed in the August 1, 2014, NPRM the 20-car
threshold was derived from the ``key train'' requirements contained in
AAR Circular No. OT-55-N. The proposed definition in the August 1,
2014, NPRM used the key train definition as a starting point because it
is a threshold used in existing railroad practices, and served as a
means to separate the higher-risk trains that carry large volumes of
flammable liquids. In response to comments from both the September 6,
2013, ANPRM and the August 1, 2014, NPRM the definition has been
revised to focus on the specific risks which are the topic of this
final rule. Commenters also suggested the revised threshold being
adopted in this rulemaking, as it would eliminate the inclusion of most
manifest trains and focus on unit trains.
Based on FRA modeling and analysis, 20 tank cars in a continuous
block loaded with a flammable liquid and 35 tank cars loaded with a
flammable liquid dispersed throughout a train display consistent
characteristics as to the number of tank cars likely to be breached in
a derailment. The operating railroads commented that this threshold
would exclude manifest trains and focus on higher risk unit trains. FRA
completed an analysis of a hypothetical train set consisting of 100
cars. The analysis assumes 20 cars derailed. The highest probable
number of cars losing containment in a derailment involving a train
with a 20-car block (loaded with flammable liquid) located immediately
after the locomotive and buffer cars would be 2.78 cars. In addition,
the most probable number of cars losing containment in a derailment
involving a manifest train consisting of 35 cars containing flammable
liquids spread throughout the train would be 2.59 cars. Therefore, 20
tank cars in a block and 35 tank cars or more spread throughout a train
display consistent characteristics. If the number of flammable liquid
cars in a manifest train were increased from 40 or 45, the most likely
number of cars losing containment would be 3.12 and 3.46 cars,
respectively. This serves as one basis for the selection of the revised
HHFT definition.
Many commenters highlighted the potential for logistical issues
when dealing with the proposed definition. Many called it unworkable
and ambiguous. PHMSA and FRA have resolved the ambiguity in the
definition by further clarifying the types of trains to be included.
Furthermore, AAR, who represents the Class 1 railroads in the U.S.,
provided the basis for the revised definition. AAR suggested this
definition would ``exclude manifest trains and focus on higher risk
unit trains.'' Many commenters suggested that we apply the requirements
of this rulemaking to a single tank car for simplicity. PHMSA and FRA
are not doing so for numerous reasons. First, this revision would
include single tank car shipments of flammable liquids which could have
a significant impact on small entities that do not transport large
amounts of flammable liquids. Second, while we acknowledge applying the
requirements to a single tank car may resolve some logistical issues,
such a solution would not be cost justified given the number of tank
cars affected and the associated risk with manifest trains verses the
risk of an HHFT. Third, we feel through fleet management the rail
industry will be able to determine the need for cars that will be part
of an HHFT. This could potentially limit the number of retrofitted
cars. Lastly, as the definition of an HHFT in the August 1, 2014, NPRM
specifically provided a 20-car threshold we feel it would be beyond the
scope of this rulemaking to change the applicability of the
requirements so drastically without notice and comment.

Conclusion

Therefore, based on the above justification, PHMSA and FRA are
adding a definition for high-hazard flammable trains in Sec. 171.8.
Specifically a High-Hazard Flammable Train will be defined as a
continuous block of 20 or more tank cars or 35 or more cars dispersed
through a train loaded with a flammable liquid. This definition will
serve as the applicable threshold of many of the requirements in this
rulemaking.
3. Crude Oil Treatment
In the NPRM, 79 FR 45062 PHMSA asked whether exceptions for
combustible liquids or PG III flammable liquids would incentivize
producers to reduce the volatility of crude oil, and what the impacts
on costs and safety benefits for degasifying to these levels. The
majority of commenters from all backgrounds provided general support
for pre-treatment of crude oil prior to transportation. For example,
Quantum Energy supported pre-treatment, but stated that the current
exceptions for combustible liquids (see Sec. 172.102 Special
provisions B1) are not sufficient to incentivize pre-treatment of
petroleum crude oil. It further suggested adding a definition for
``stabilized crude oil'' and providing several exceptions for
``stabilized crude oil'' throughout the rule.
Some industry stakeholders did not support incentivizing pre-
treatment of crude oil. AFPM provided results from a survey of its
members on data regarding the characteristics of Bakken crude and cited
other studies on the stabilization of crude oil. It stated that the
treatment process used in the Bakken region is unlikely to result in
Bakken crude's reclassification as a combustible liquid. AFPM stated
treated crude should not be regulated differently than non-treated
crude because, ``[o]nce ignited, the burning intensity of unstabilized
and stabilized crude would not substantially differ.''
Commenters also expressed differing views on the role of packing
group-based exceptions. Some commenters suggested more stringent
packing group-based requirements, such as restricting use of PG III for
crude oil. Other commenters recommended various packing group-based
exceptions not proposed in the rulemaking.

Conclusion

As with any hazardous material put into transportation by any mode,
safety is the Department's top priority, and we will continue to
conduct inspections or bring enforcement actions to assure that

[[Page 26666]]

shippers comply with their responsibilities to properly characterize,
classify, and package crude oil regardless of how it is treated prior
to transport. We also continue to work with various stakeholders to
understand best practices for testing and classifying crude oil. For
further discussion on Crude Oil treatment see ``E. Classification''
section of this document.
4. Scope of Rulemaking
Some commenters requested the proposals in the NPRM to be expanded
beyond just flammable liquids to include all hazardous materials. This
request covered all topics in the rulemaking. The operational controls
addressed in this rule are aimed at reducing the risk and consequences
of incidents involving rail shipments of Class 3 flammable liquids. The
analyses, data, and relevant factors considered in developing this rule
are specific to these materials. Information has not been provided to
support expanding these restrictions to all hazardous materials or to
justify the associated negative impacts on rail fluidity and costs.

B. Tank Car Specification

Below is a discussion of the amendments relating to tank car
construction and retrofitting. This topic is broken down into four
areas: new tank car construction, retrofit standard, performance
standard, and an implementation timeline.
1. New Tank Car Construction
In the September 6, 2013 ANPRM, PHMSA requested comments pertaining
to new construction requirements for DOT Specification 111 (DOT-111)
tank cars used in flammable liquid service. See 78 FR 54849. On August
1, 2014, PHMSA, in consultation with FRA, issued an NPRM in response to
comments submitted to the ANPRM. See 79 FR 45015. In the NPRM, we
proposed three options for newly manufactured tank cars that would
address the risks associated with the rail transportation of Class 3
flammable liquids in HHFTs. Though commenters differed on the
applicability of new construction requirements for the rail
transportation of Class 3 flammable liquids, all support prompt action
to address construction standards for tank cars.
Tank cars built to the new standards as adopted in this final rule
will be designated ``DOT Specification 117'' (DOT-117). In addition, we
are adopting a performance standard compliance alternative for the
design and construction of new tank cars or retrofitting of existing
tank cars equivalent to the prescribed DOT Specification 117 standards.
Thus, a new or retrofitted tank car meeting the performance criteria
will be designated as ``DOT Specification 117P'' (See ``Performance
Standard'' section). In addition, we are adopting a retrofit standard
for existing tank cars meeting the DOT Specification 111 or CPC-1232
standard. Thus, a tank car meeting the retrofit standard will be
designated as ``DOT Specification 117R'' (See ``Retrofit Standard''
section). In this final rule, we are adopting the requirement that new
tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015, used to transport Class 3
flammable liquids in an HHFT, meet either the prescriptive standards
for the DOT Specification 117 tank car or the performance standards for
the DOT Specification 117P tank car. Other authorized tank car
specifications, as specified in part 173, subpart F, will also be
permitted; however, use of a DOT specification 111 tank car in an HHFT
is prohibited.
The prescribed specifications and the performance standards adopted
in this rule were developed to provide improved crashworthiness when
compared to the legacy DOT Specification 111 tank car. In addition to
adopting revisions to part 179 of the HMR to include the new DOT
Specification 117, 117P and 117R tank car standards, we are adopting
revisions to the bulk packaging authorizations in Sec. Sec. 173.241,
173.242, and 173.243 to include the DOT Specification 117, 117P, and
117R tank cars as an authorized packaging for those hazardous
materials. We noted that, as stated in the introductory text to
Sec. Sec. 173.241, 173.242, and 173.243, each person selecting a
packaging must also consider the requirements of subparts A and B of
part 173 of the HMR and any special provisions indicated in column (7)
of the HMT.
Lastly, we are incorporating by reference, in Sec. 171.7, appendix
E 10.2.1 of the 2010 version of the AAR Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices, Section C--Part III, Specifications for Tank
Cars, Specification M-1002, (AAR Specifications for Tank Cars).
Appendix E provides requirements for top fittings protection for
certain tank car options.
Replacing the current standard for the DOT Specification 111 tank
car is not a decision that the Department takes lightly. New
construction and retrofit standards will have considerable safety and
economic consequences. Consequently, the DOT Specification 117 tank car
would be phased in over an aggressive but realistic timeline. We limit
our discussion to new tank car standards in this section, but we will
separately discuss the retrofit standard, performance standard and
implementation timeline in the subsequent sections. We seek to ensure
that the car selected will have the greatest net social benefits, with
benefits primarily generated from the mitigation of accident severity.
We are also aware of, and account for, the large economic effects
associated with regulatory changes of this scale, as tank cars are a
long-term investment. For these reasons, we proposed in the NPRM three
separate DOT Specification 117 options and requested comments on each
of them.
The options proposed in the NPRM were designed to enhance the
survivability of the tank car and to mitigate the damages of rail
accidents with design features. Specifically, the tank car options
incorporate several enhancements to increase tank head and shell
puncture resistance; thermal protection to extend lading containment
while in a pool fire environment; and improved top fitting and bottom
outlet protection during a derailment. Under all options, the proposed
system of design enhancements will reduce the consequences of a
derailment of tank cars transporting flammable liquids in an HHFT.
There will be fewer tank car punctures, fewer releases from service
equipment (top and bottom fittings), and improved containment of
flammable liquid from the tank cars through the use of pressure relief
devices and thermal protection systems. The following table summarizes
the tank car options proposed in the August 1, 2014, NPRM. Please note
the shaded cells in the following table indicate design traits that are
the same for more than one proposed option.

[[Page 26667]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.001

In support of this final action, PHMSA and FRA have revised the
analysis to account for public comments and further research. The
revisions resulted in modified effectiveness rates which can be viewed
in the final RIA for this rulemaking, which has been placed into the
docket. The final RIA also describes the baseline accidents, model
inputs, and the assumptions that were used to develop the effectiveness
rates for each tank car option.
Based on the aforementioned, in this final rule, PHMSA and FRA are
adopting Option 2 for new construction of tank cars used in a HHFT
subject to the enhanced braking requirements addressed in the
``Advanced Brake Propagation Systems'' section of this rulemaking. The
following table lists the design features of the adopted DOT
Specification 117 Tank Car:

Table 14--Adopted DOT-117 Specification Tank Car
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tank car feature Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capacity............................. 286,000 lbs. GRL tank car that is
designed and constructed in
accordance with AAR Standard
S286.
Thickness............................ Wall thickness after forming of
the tank shell and heads must be
a minimum of \9/16\ inch
constructed from TC-128 Grade B,
normalized steel.

[[Page 26668]]

Thermal Protection................... Thermal protection system in
accordance with Sec. 179.18,
including a reclosing pressure
relief device in accordance with
Sec. 173.31(b)(2).
Jacketing............................ Minimum 11-gauge jacket
constructed from A1011 steel or
equivalent. The jacket must be
weather-tight as required in
Sec. 179.200-4.
Head Shield.......................... Full-height, \1/2\-inch thick
head shield meeting the
requirements of Sec.
179.16(c)(1).
Bottom outlet........................ Bottom outlet handle removed or
designed to prevent unintended
actuation during a train
accident.
Braking.............................. Braking systems determined by
operational conditions, see
``Advanced Brake Signal
Propagation System'' section.
Top fittings......................... Top fittings protection in
accordance with AAR
Specifications Tank Cars,
appendix E paragraph 10.2.1. The
adopted option excludes the TIH
Top fittings protection system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to tank car-related proposals in the NPRM, we received
comments representing many differing viewpoints. In sum, we received
comments representing approximately 172,000 signatories.

Table 15--Commenter Composition: Tank Car Construction Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenter type Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization............................. 162,776
Individuals............................................. 9,004
Industry stakeholders................................... 119
Government organizations or representatives............. 140
---------------
Totals................................................ 172,039
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Overall, the vast majority of commenters support PHMSA's efforts to
adopt enhanced standards for non-pressure tank cars used to transport
flammable liquids. For example, there were nearly 168,700 signatories
from the general public, NGOs, and government organizations who
requested that PHMSA prohibit the continued use of the existing legacy
DOT Specification 111 tank car fleets. There were, however, 1,878
signatories that supported the proposals in the rulemaking. Moreover,
there were approximately 159,000 signatories that felt the proposed new
tank car standards do not go far enough, including three entities
representing tribal communities, the Tulalip Tribes, the Prairie Island
Indian Community, and the Quinault Indian Nation. Lastly, there were
approximately 40 substantive comments in support of the notion that
alignment with Canada is critical for new construction and retrofit
designs, as well as retrofit timelines. Below, we discuss the comments
specific to each tank car option proposed in the NPRM.
Option 1
Proposed tank car Option 1 received the least support from the
regulated industry (railroads, shippers, offerors, etc.) however it was
fully supported by the NTSB, concerned public, environmental groups,
local communities, and cities. These groups all requested the most
robust tank car specifications be adopted but gave very little
consideration to the costs of such standards.
Option 1 is the most robust design proposed; it also is the most
costly. The comments of API, Railway Supply Institute Committee on Tank
Cars (RSI-CTC), and many others in the rail and shipping industry, do
not support Option 1. U.S. Congressman Kurt Schrader echoed many of
these commenters concerns when he stated that, ``Option 1 appears to
introduce controversy, complexity, and additional expense without any
meaningful increase in safety.'' In his comments, U.S. Congressmen
Peter DeFazio stated ``. . . the rail industry has major concerns with
the viability and effectiveness of ECP brakes and certain roll-over
protections that were included in Option l. If the addition of those
protections appears likely to significantly delay the rulemaking, I
would encourage PHMSA to move forward with Option 2 . . .''
While Option 1 was the most robust tank car proposed in the August
1, 2014, NPRM, the Tulalip Tribes did not believe the design was robust
enough. Specifically, the Tulalip Tribes noted that while, ``proposed
new standards for rail car designs are an improvement,'' they are ``far
from providing an acceptable risk from tank rupture allowing leakage or
an explosion.'' The Tulalip Tribes continued stating that the:

DOT-111 tanks are only safe from collisions for speeds up to 9
miles per hour. Option one only improves the safe speed for
collisions up to 12.3 miles per hour for the shell of the tank. Of
the thirteen major crude oil/ethanol train accidents in the U.S.
listed in the August 1, 2014 Federal Register notice that this
letter is in response to, the proposed new tank car standard would
have only prevented one of them from spilling contents from a
damaged rail car. The rest of the accidents were from trains
travelling from 23 to 48 miles per hour, well above the safe speeds
for the new proposed tank designs.''
The Tulalip Tribes concluded that ``[t]he rail cars need to be
designed in a way that the damages caused by a derailment are
minimized and speed limits are set at or below the maximum speed
that a tanker car can survive without a spill.

In general terms, the arguments against Option 1 typically noted
the overall cost of the tank car, weight issues associated with
increased safety features, the lack of a substantial increase in safety
when compared to other options, and the inclusion of ECP braking and
TIH top fittings protection. The typical arguments in support of Option
1 were that it was the most robust tank car option, and the incremental
safety benefit is justified given recent accident history.
Option 2
The Option 2 tank car has most of the safety features as the Option
1 tank car, including the same increase in shell thickness, jacket
requirement, thermal protection requirement, and head shield
requirement. However, it does not require TIH top fittings protection
and the requirement of ECP brake equipment of Option 1. Installation of
ECP brake equipment largely makes up the cost differential between the
Option 1 and 2 tank cars, and the differences in estimated
effectiveness are also largely a result of ECP brakes. Proposed tank
car Option 2 received more support than option 1 from the regulated
industry, albeit with a variation in shell and head thickness for newly
constructed tank cars. Many commenters in the rail industry supported
this option with an 8/16-inch thick shell as opposed to the proposed 9/
16-inch shell.
In their comments, U.S. Congressman Dave Reichert and Congresswoman
Lynn Jenkins state ``we strongly encourage PHMSA to consider Option 2
identified in the NPRM.'' Another commenter, Bridger, LLC (Bridger)
stated ``Bridger strongly recommends

[[Page 26669]]

that PHMSA promulgate a final rule adopting the Option 2 or the Option
3 tank car design.'' GBW Railcar, a railcar manufacturer, asserted
``that PHMSA adopt Option 2 as the standard for the new tank cars.''
Amsted Rail Company, Inc. (Amsted Rail) fully supports Option 2 as
does the State of Minnesota which stated that ``Minnesota and its
agencies support the safety features and performance level represented
by the Option 2.'' RSI-CTC also supports Option 2 for new tank car
requirements but only for those tank cars transporting crude oil and
ethanol.
Many commenters were opposed to both Options 1 and 2. AFPM
represented many of these sentiments when it stated that, ``numerous
procedural and substantive flaws of PHMSA's cost-benefit analysis make
it clear that Options 1 and 2 would cost far more and provide little in
the way of additional safety improvements.''
The arguments against Option 2 were primarily from the NTSB,
concerned public, environmental groups, local communities, cities, and
towns who, as stated above, supported Option 1. In addition some in the
regulated industry expressed their opposition for both options 1 and 2.
These entities typically noted the overall cost of the tank car, weight
issues associated with increased safety features, and the lack of a
substantial increase in safety when compared to other options.
In summary, the arguments in support of Option 2 were provided by a
wide range of commenters from the regulated industry. These commenters
supported exclusion of ECP braking and TIH top fittings protection.
Finally, it should be stressed that many in the regulated industry
supported this option with the caveat that the shell thickness be 8/16-
inch and not 9/16-inch.
Option 3
Proposed tank car Option 3 received the most support from the
regulated industry for both new construction and retrofitted tank car
requirements and the least support from the NTSB, concerned public,
environmental groups, local communities, and cities. Option 3 is
similar to the jacketed CPC-1232 tank car standard. The option revises
the CPC-1232 standards by requiring improvements to the bottom outlet
handle and pressure relief valve. It also removes options (1) to build
a tank car with the alternative (ASTM A516-70) steel type but with
added shell thickness or (2) to build a tank car with a thicker shell
but no jacket.
This tank car is a substantial safety improvement over the current
DOT Specification 111 but does not achieve the same level of safety as
the Option 1 or Option 2 tank cars. This tank car requirement calls for
a \7/16\-inch shell, which is thinner than Option 1 or Option 2 tank
cars. Similar to the Option 2 tank car, this tank car lacks TIH top
fittings protection and ECP brake equipment. This standard is the tank
car configuration PHMSA believes will be built for HHFT service in
absence of regulation, based on commitments from one of the largest
rail car manufacturers/leasers--Greenbrier, Inc. and the Railway Supply
Institute (consisting of the majority of the tank car manufacturing
industry).\46\ Accordingly, PHMSA assumes no costs or benefits from
Option 3 for new tank cars. Below are a few selected comments that
represent the larger overall support from the regulated industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\46\ Greenbrier: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0155 RSI: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0156
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In its comments, Honeywell Performance Materials and Technologies
asserted, ``[n]ew car construction, as proposed with CPC-1232, is the
most efficient way to enhance safety of the fleet.''
The Dow Chemical Company (Dow) stated that ``Dow believes that
Option 3 will be the most feasible for the crude oil and ethanol
industries . . .'' Dow estimated ``that Option 3 will achieve a more
optimal balance between safety features (resulting in increased tare
weight) and lading quantity, thus reducing the extra number of cars (or
trains) that would need to be put on the rails compared to Options 1
and 2. The size of the Option 3 car also makes it less likely to
negatively affect loading/unloading rack dimensions or fall protection
systems.'' Further, Dow ``strongly encourages PHMSA to incorporate into
the HMR enhanced specifications--as described in CPC-1232--for new DOT
Specification 111 builds for Class 3 materials (other than those
covered by HM-251).''
U.S. Congressman Rep. Kevin Cramer supports the CPC-1232 standard
because the analysis leading to its design has been ``fully
contemplated.''
In its comments, DGAC stated that it ``encourages Option #3
(Enhanced CPC-1232) with jacket and full height headshield.'' The
Independent Fuel Terminal Operators Association also supports the
adoption of Option 3, but only for newly constructed cars built after
October 1, 2015. Biggs Appraisal Service LLC offers mixed support for
new tank car requirements. It believes this is the option that best
fits their interest, but this option still has features that it thinks
is unnecessary. It argues that \7/16\'' is sufficient thickness and
that ``the amount of thickness strength that an additional \1/16\ of an
inch will afford is negligible.''
As mentioned previously, some commenters proposed an alternative
tank car that would fall somewhere between the proposed Options 2 and
3. Specifically, in their comments, AAR/API and Hess propose a new tank
car design standard with an \8/16\-inch shell; jacket; insulation;
full-height head shields; low pressure actuation/high flow pressure
relief device; bottom valve operating handle modification; and top
fittings protection. In their recommendations, they state, ``[t]he Hess
and AAR/API recommendation reflects a joint oil and rail industry
agreement that balances the enhanced safety from increasing shell
thickness against the risk that additional carloads will be required to
move the same volume of product due to a decrease in useable tank car
capacity (maximum weight constraint).''

Hess continues its support for Option 3 with a thicker shell,
stating:
The AAR/API endorsed standard mirrors PHMSA's Options 2 and 3 in
all respects, except that the design would require an \8/16\-inch
minimum shell thickness, instead of a \9/16\-inch shell (Option 2)
or a \7/16\-inch (Option 3) shell. Adopting this standard improves
upon the \7/16\-inch minimum shell in Option 3 by reducing the
likelihood of a release in the event of an incident. At the same
time, it balances the extra protection from the additional steel
with the associated reduction in tank car capacity due to the
increased car weight. Tank car weight and capacity limitations are a
concern with both of PHMSA's \9/16\-inch car proposals.

In opposition, Greenbrier does not support Option 3 and it noted a
fear of having to again revisit this issue in the future if the correct
tank car is not selected. Further, the NTSB asserted that the \7/16\-
inch'' shell and head thickness is too thin.
In summary, the arguments against Option 3 were primarily from the
NTSB, concerned public, environmental groups, local communities,
cities, and towns and a rail car manufacturer. These arguments were
primarily based on the desire to choose the most effective tank car
that has the largest increase in benefit over the existing fleet. In
addition, these commenters noted the need to adopt the most appropriate
tank car now and avoid revisiting the issue in the future. The
arguments in support of Option 3 were more widespread amongst the
regulated industry. This support was primarily due to the concerns of
the weight of tank car, and the lack of the inclusion of ECP braking
and TIH top fittings

[[Page 26670]]

protection. Many in the regulated industry supported this option with
the caveat that the shell thickness should be \8/16\-inch rather than
\9/16\-inch. Lastly, the regulated community consistently supported
either Options 2 or 3.
Tank Car Component Comments
To address comments more effectively, we have arranged our
discussion by tank car component. The following is an overview of the
requirements and a discussion of the comments in support and opposed to
certain proposed requirements.
Bottom Outlet Valve Protection
The bottom outlet valve (BOV) protection ensures that the BOV does
not open during a train accident. The NTSB in recommendation R-12-6
recommends that PHMSA ``require all bottom outlet valves used on newly
manufactured and existing non-pressure tank cars are designed to remain
closed during accidents in which the valve and operating handle are
subjected to impact forces.'' PHMSA and FRA see this issue as one that
can be cost-effectively resolved and in general commenters agreed.
Overall the comments with regard to BOV protection were supportive
by both the regulated industry and public stakeholders. For example,
Earthjustice, the environmental group, stated that it, ``urge[s] PHMSA
to take further steps to reduce the risks posed by bottom outlet
valves.'' The regulated industry also supports this proposal as is
evident in Growth Energy's comment that it, ``support[s] CPC-1232
design with PRD and BOV protection.'' Further, R.L. Banks & Associates,
Inc. (RLBA) also supports the requirement to develop better lower
product discharge valves and valve protectors and would like to see the
development of a performance-based specification for lower discharge
openings to ensure that the system meets minimum desired requirements.
Although there was widespread support, some commenters were opposed
to BOV improvements. Dow stated that, ``in trying to optimize the
bottom outlet valve (BOV) for derailments causing the BOV to open,
which is a somewhat rare occurrence in terms of total number of
derailments, design features that make the valve less safe for loading/
unloading operations have the potential to be introduced . . . we
believe it is premature to mandate such BOV enhancements.'' This was
generally the minority opinion as most support changes to the BOV.
PHMSA and FRA disagree with those commenters who oppose
improvements to the current BOV designs. Protection of the BOV is
currently a regulatory requirement and is invaluable in an accident
scenario as it limits the likelihood of a release of lading which could
potentially result in a pool fire. A BOV designed to prevent actuation
or opening in a derailment is a necessary enhancement. In this final
rule, PHMSA is requiring other design enhancements--such as improved
puncture resistance and top fittings protection--that will reduce the
volume of lading loss from a tank car that is involved in a derailment.
Preventing opening of the BOV during a derailment will further reduce
the volume lost, thereby mitigating environmental damage as well as the
likelihood of a pool fire or the severity of the fire and environmental
damage. We note that an AAR task force has been convened to develop a
BOV design that would prevent opening during a derailment. We believe
that if a car owner and/or offeror chooses not to remove the handle for
transportation, an easy to install design will soon be readily
available at a low cost. Therefore, in this final rule, for new
construction of the DOT-117 tank car, we are adopting as proposed in
the NPRM that all bottom outlet handles either be removed or be
designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.
Head Shields
Currently, the HMR do not require head shields on tank cars used to
transport Class 3 flammable liquids. Further, the CPC-1232 standard
currently in effect only requires half-height head shields for newly
constructed non-jacketed tank cars. In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, PHMSA
and FRA proposed a range of tank car options, each of which included a
full-height, \1/2\-inch thick head shield.
Commenters who addressed the issue in their comments overwhelmingly
support full-height head shield on jacketed tank cars subject to the
new standard. For example, the NTSB noted in its comments, ``[t]he top
half of tank car heads are subject to damage and punctures during train
derailments and half height head shields fail to provide the protection
needed.'' RLBA supports the use of full-height head shields for the
heads. A concerned public individual, William A. Brake, urged that the
new standard require tank cars to be ``equipped with \1/2\ full-head
shields.''
PHMSA and FRA agree with the commenters who support the inclusion
of a \1/2\ inch full-head shields on new constructions of DOT-117 tank
cars. A full-height head shield protects the entire tank car head and
can decrease the likelihood of a puncture at the top half of a tank car
should a train derail. In fact, half of all the punctures that occurred
in the derailments considered in this rulemaking occurred in the head
of the tank. Further, half of the head punctures occurred in the top
half of the head. As the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada
noted in its' report on the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident ``a full-head
shield would have been beneficial, as half-head shields protect only
the bottom portion of the head.'' TSB continued that ``all but 4 of the
63 derailed cars exhibited some form of impact damage (for example,
denting or breach) in the top portion of at least one head'' and about
``half of the tank cars (31) released product due to damage to the tank
car head.'' \47\ This report gives further credence to the importance
of a \1/2\ inch full-head shield. Given the overwhelming support, we
are adopting in this final rule the proposal that all DOT Specification
117 tank cars must include a one-half inch thick, full-height head
shield on new construction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\47\ Railway Investigation Report R13D0054 http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thermal Protection Systems/Pressure Relief Device
Pressure relief devices (PRD) vent gases or vapors under high
pressure in order to reduce the risk of a ruptured tank car. The HMR
limit the allowable start-to-discharge (STD) pressure of the PRD to
approximately one-third of the burst pressure to provide a factor of
safety against at tank rupture. In a pool fire, a loaded tank is
exposed to extreme heat which results in both an increase in tank
pressure as the lading is heated and a reduction in strength of the
tank material commensurate with the increasing material temperature.
When a tank car is exposed to a pool fire the PRD will maintain a low
pressure in the tank and potentially extend the time before a tank car
would thermally rupture.
In the Arcadia derailment there were three high-energy thermal
failures. In two of the three cases the tank fractured into two pieces
and those pieces were thrown from the derailment area. In the third
case, the tank was nearly fractured around the entire circumference.
The AAR T87.6 task force considered the possibility that the PRDs did
not have adequate flow capacity to expel the rapidly increasing
pressure and start to discharge pressure rating (STD). Currently, the
PRDs on tank car used in Class 3 service have a STD pressure of 75 or
165 psi. The PRD maintains the

[[Page 26671]]

internal pressure at or below the STD pressure. When a tank bursts as a
result of exposure to fire conditions, the lower the STD pressure, and
therefore internal pressure, the less energetic the failure will be.
The PRD in combination with the thermal protection system will provide
the appropriate sized pressure relief valve and enhance the lading
containment of the tank car.
A thermal protection system serves to prolong the survivability of
a tank exposed to a pool or torch fire by limiting the heat flux into
the tank and its lading, thereby delaying the increase in pressure in
the tank exceeding the STD pressure of the PRD. If a PRD on a tank car
exposed to a pool fire is under the liquid level of the tank, the
thermal protection system will delay the release of the lading through
the PRD. Based on the results of simulations using the Affect of Fire
on Tank Cars (AFFTAC) model, an approved thermal protection delays
rupture of a tank until most of the lading has been expelled through
the PRD. This results in a lower energy available at the time of
rupture.
Most commenters support a redesigned PRD because they consider it
as a cost-effective solution that provides considerable safety benefit.
Some commenters argue that for a CPC-1232 compliant tank car, any new
requirements should be limited to a redesigned PRD and bottom outlet
valve protection only. Eighty-Eight Oil LLC stated in its comments,
``Eighty-Eight supports allowing the CPC-1232 jacketed fleet to operate
for its full useful life with a potential retrofit limited to an
enhanced BOV handle and a larger pressure relief valve.'' Further, in
their comments, Growth Energy and many others support the CPC-1232
design with PRD and BOV protection.
There are currently high flow capacity, reclosing PRD available
that are relatively low cost and generally easy to install on new or
retrofitted tank cars. Based on these facts and comments received in
support of reclosing PRDs, PHMSA is adopting the installation of
reclosing PRD as proposed on new construction of DOT-117 specification
tank cars.
Thermal protection is intended to limit the heat flux into the
lading when exposed to fire. Thermal protection will extend the tank
car lading retention for a certain period of time in pool fire
conditions. Thermal protection will prevent rapid temperature increase
of the lading and a commensurate increase in vapor pressure in the
tank. The thermal protection system, by reducing the heat flow rate
from the fire to the liquid, lowers the liquid evaporation rate, allows
the evaporated vapor to be discharged through the pressure relieve
valve without significant tank pressure increase and considerably
reduces the possibility of dangerous over pressurization of the tank.
All three DOT Specification 117 options proposed in the NPRM
required a thermal protection system sufficient to meet the performance
standard of Sec. 179.18 of the HMR, and must include a reclosing
pressure release valve. Section 179.18 requires that a thermal
protection system be capable of preventing the release of any lading
within the tank car, except release through the pressure release
device, when subjected to a pool fire for 100 minutes and a torch fire
for 30 minutes. Typically, tank cars with thermal protection are
equipped with a weather-tight 11-gauge jacket. There was general
support for this requirement as there are existing technologies that
can vastly improve the thermal survivability of the existing fleet. We
have summarized a few selected comments below to provide some idea of
the overall comments.
In its comments, RLBA agrees that thermal insulation around the
shell and a steel jacket over the thermal insulation will be highly
beneficial in protecting the shell from structural thermal damage
during a derailment fire and over pressure damage due to cargo
expansion thanks to shell heating.
While many commenters echoed the above comments, some commenters
such as PBF Energy and the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) do not
think jacketing is necessary. In its opposition, DGAC ``believes that
an across-the-board requirement for thermal protection and jacketing on
all flammable liquid tank cars is not supported by incident data, and
may also have unintended consequences detrimental to safety . . . such
as making corrosion under the insulation more difficult to detect.''
PHMSA and FRA disagree with commenters opposing the thermal
protection requirements as proposed in the NPRM. Furthermore, on April
6, 2015 NTSB issued emergency recommendations stressing the importance
of thermal protection in light of the Mount Carbon, WV and Galena, IL
derailments. In the train accidents previously discussed, approximately
10 percent of tank car breaches were attributed to exposure to fire
conditions. Consistent with current minimum industry standards and
Federal regulations for pressure cars for Class 2 materials, the T87.6
Task Force agreed that a survivability time of 100-minutes in a pool
fire should be used as a benchmark for adequate performance. The 100-
minute survival time is the existing performance standard for pressure
tank cars equipped with a thermal protection system and was established
to provide emergency responders with adequate time to assess a
derailment, establish perimeters, and evacuate the public as needed,
while also giving time to vent the hazardous material from the tank and
prevent an energetic failure of the tank car.
With regard to the claim that addition of thermal protection and a
jacket could have ``unintended consequences detrimental to safety . . .
such as making corrosion under the insulation more difficult to
detect'' PHMSA and FRA disagree. In accordance with the current
requirements, the owner of the tank car has to develop a
requalification program. This program would include an inspection
method to check for corrosion to the tank. This is currently done for
jacketed and insulated tank cars.
The thermal protection prolongs the survivability of the tank by
delaying the moment when pressure in the tank exceeds the start to
discharge of the pressure relief valve, thus delaying the release of
flammable liquid or the occurrence of an energetic rupture. Because all
the thermal protection systems meeting the Sec. 179.18 performance
standard that PHMSA studied performed equally well in the simulations,
and because the simulations indicated the importance of a reclosing
pressure relief valve, PHMSA is not requiring a particular system, but
instead is requiring that a thermal protection system meet the
performance standard of Sec. 179.18 and include a reclosing PRD for
new construction of the DOT-117 specification tank car. Finally, it was
consistently noted that there are existing technologies available that
can vastly improve the thermal survivability of the existing fleet.
Thus, the thermal protection requirements for new construction of the
DOT-117 specification tank car as proposed in the NPRM are adopted in
this final rule.
Head and Shell Thickness
Shell and head punctures result in rapid and often complete loss of
tank contents. Minimizing the number of cars punctured in a derailment
is critical because ignited flammable liquids that result in a pool
fire that can quickly affect the integrity of adjacent cars and their
ability to contain their lading. In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, PHMSA and
FRA proposed a range of head and shell thicknesses ranging from \7/16\-
inch to \9/16\-inch. Many commenters opposed the thicker steel but were
willing to

[[Page 26672]]

compromise by recommending an \8/16\-inch shell thickness. More
information regarding the relationship between puncture resistance and
shell thickness is discussed in a subsequent section. Below are a few
selected comments related to the topic.
The NTSB, in support of a thicker shell commented that:

The minimum standards for new DOT-117 tank cars should include:
full height \1/2\-inch thick head shields; thermal protection;
minimum 11-gauge jacket constructed from A1011 steel or equivalent
and weather tight; reclosing and properly sized pressure relief
valves; top fitting rollover protection equivalent to pressure tank
car performance; \9/16\-inch minimum shell thickness TC-128 Grade B
normalized steel or steel with minimum equivalent performance
standards; and enhanced bottom discontinuity protection for outlet
valves and removal of bottom valve handles during transit. The top
half of tank car heads are subject to damage and punctures during
train derailments and half height head shields fail to provide the
protection needed.

A concerned member of the public, Lynne Campbell, urged the
Department to ``Select the most protective tank car standards, using
the latest technology. Tank Car Option #1 would require \9/16\-inch
steel, electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes, and rollover
protection.''
An environmental group, the Sierra Club, requested that ``at a
minimum, DOT must implement the proposed Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and Federal Rail Administration
(FRA) design option [Option 1] for tank car safety improvements.''
Further, in its comments, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
Trainmen (BLET) fully support \9/16\-inch thickness.
In its comments, RLBA stated:

RLBA believes that increasing the shell thickness from \7/16 \to
\9/16\ is a reasonable compromise between safety and commercial
viability of tank cars hauling High-Hazard Flammable materials. RLBA
would not support a reduction of the proposed thickness from \9/16\
to \8/16\ inch but would support an increase from \9/16\ to \5/8\ or
larger.

The Archer Daniels Midland Company in its opposition to Option 1
stated:

The NPRM modeling used to estimate reduction in risk for
increased tank thickness is substantially flawed, and is
inconsistent with real-world assumptions on which PHMSA has
previously relied and has actually endorsed on the record in this
proceeding. This analysis by DOT plainly shows that shell thickness
or the effect of a jacket will not result in an appreciable increase
in puncture velocity. In this crucial part of the NPRM analysis, by
ignoring on the record, and established DOT puncture velocity
methods and studies, PHMSA has clearly failed to articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.

Commenter Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC, used the AAR's Conditional
Probability of Release Model (CPR) to support a claim that Option 2 and
Option 1 (with a \9/16\th inch shell thickness) are not economically
justified.
Greenbrier fully supported Option 2, particularly, the \9/16\ inch
shell. They believe if this thickness is not adopted, PHMSA and FRA
will be forced to revisit this problem in the future. Further,
Greenbrier believes that when adopting a thickness PHMSA and FRA should
accommodate for a margin of safety to avoid a scenario in which the
topic is required to be modified in the future.
Exxon/Mobil supported Option 2, but with \8/16\-inch shell. It
suggested that unlike \9/16\-inch, the \8/16\-inch design has been
fully engineered and can be implemented immediately. According to Exxon
the weight increase by shell thickening is 2% from \7/16\-inch to \8/
16\-inch and 4% from \7/16\-inch to \9/16\-inch so a lesser thickness
would lessen wear on the rail track infrastructure and reduce weight
penalty. It is their understanding that an \8/16\-inch car reduces risk
by 81% over legacy DOT-111 tank car.
API (and AAR) also supported a modified Option 2, with an \8/16\-
inch shell thickness. They state that the added weight of a \9/16\-inch
shell thickness would be offset safety-wise by the increased number of
trains on tracks. Another commenter, NITL, also supports an \8/16\-inch
tank shell under Option 2.
AFPM, quoted a 2009 study conducted by Volpe that concluded,
``shell thickness had a relatively weak effect on preventing releases
during derailments.'' In its comments AFPM ``supports the Option 3
specification for new and retrofitted rail tank cars shipping crude and
ethanol in unit trains of 75 cars or more. The Option 3 specification
tank car is an enhanced CPC-1232 tank car with a \7/16\'' shell and
other enhanced safety features. The Option 1 and 2 tank cars with a \9/
16\'' shell provide only negligible safety benefits at a substantial
incremental cost.''
The Hess Corporation stated, ``[t]he AAR/API recommendation
supported by Hess is based on the Option 3 tank car proposed by PHMSA,
but increases the shell thickness of the jacketed tank car from a \7/
16\-inch shell to an \8/16\-inch shell.'' In its comments, ``Phillips
66 supports the CPC-1232 at \8/16\.''
PHMSA and FRA disagree with those who do not support a \9/16\-inch
thickness. Specifically, the final RIA for this rulemaking provides
support for the effectiveness of the \9/16\-inch thickness. In
addition, PHMSA and FRA agree with commenters like Greenbrier and the
concerned citizens who voiced a desire for the most effective thickness
in preventing punctures. Options 1 and 2 require DOT Specification 117
tank car head and shells to be a minimum of \9/16\-inch thick. This
final rule also requires an 11-gauge steel jacket. The final RIA
contains a detailed discussion of the improvement in the puncture force
for Options 1 and 2 relative to the current specification requirements
for a DOT Specification 111 tank car. The RIA also discusses the
respective effectiveness rates of various tank specifications which
lead to PHMSA and FRA's decision on a shell and head thickness of \9/
16\-inch.
The combination of the shell thickness and head shield of Options 1
and 2 provide a head puncture resistance velocity of 18.4 mph. Because
the Option 3 tank car has a \7/16\-inch shell, as opposed to the \9/
16\-inch shell in Options 1 and 2, it has a head puncture resistance
velocity of 17.0 mph. It is for these reasons, PHMSA is adopting the
\9/16\-inch shell thickness as proposed in the August 1, 2014, NPRM for
new construction of the DOT-117 specification tank car. See also the
final RIA.
Top Fittings/Rollover Protection
The top fitting protection consists of a structure designed to
prevent damage to the tank car service equipment under specified
loading conditions. As adopted in this final rule, newly constructed
tank cars will require top fittings consistent with the AAR's
specification for Tank Cars, M-1002, appendix E, paragraph 10.2.1. In
general, there was support for some top fittings protection, but not
for the dynamic top fittings protections meeting a 9-mph performance
standard required for tank cars required for the transportation of TIH
materials.
Further, some commenters suggested continued development of top
fittings protection. PHMSA is aware that the AAR Tank Car Committee has
started a working group to investigate cost effective advancements in
existing top fittings protections. PHMSA and FRA are supportive of
these efforts as they would apply to both new and retrofitted tank
cars. PHMSA and FRA may conduct further testing and develop future
regulatory requirements if appropriate. We have summarized a few
selected comments below to provide some idea of the overall comments.

[[Page 26673]]

RLBA recommended that the development of structures to contain and
protect the over pressure device be continued including recessing the
device in an inverted dome fastened to the shell.
Earthjustice, an environmental group, strongly urged ``PHMSA to
require existing tank cars to have additional top-fittings protections
(which the Canadian proposed rule would do).''
AAR's comments on top fittings protection were consistent with many
other commenters. In particular the AAR noted the importance of top
fittings protections yet stressed concern with overly burdensome top
fittings standards. AAR stated it ``supports enhanced top-fittings
protection, but not the 9 mph standard.''
Because there was little substantive opposition to the adoption of
enhanced top fittings protection for new construction of the DOT-117
specification tank car, PHMSA and FRA are adopting such requirements
consistent with the AAR's specification for Tank Cars, M-1002, appendix
E, paragraph 10.2.1 as opposed to dynamic top fittings protections
meeting a 9-mph performance standard.
Under proposed Option 1, the DOT Specification 117 tank car would
be required to be equipped with a top fittings protection system and
nozzle capable of sustaining, without failure, a rollover accident at a
speed of 9 mph, in which the rolling protective housing strikes a
stationary surface assumed to be flat, level, and rigid and the speed
is determined as a linear velocity, measured at the geometric center of
the loaded tank car as a transverse vector. Generally this (TIH top
fittings protection) requirement was not supported by the regulated
community but was supported by those endorsing the most robust tank car
possible. Below are a few selected comments to provide some idea of the
overall comments.
Dow stated with regard to the top fittings on Option 1 that,
``[o]ne rail tank car manufacturer indicated at least $8,000 additional
cost for Sec. 179.102-3 dynamic load roll-over protection . . . . The
thicker \9/16\-inch steel tank shell indicated in the NPRM may also
require even larger nozzle reinforcement pads at additional cost.''
Another opposing commenter, Greenbrier, stated that it does not
support TIH rollover protection, claiming it is an unproven technology.
It does, however, support AAR specification M-1002, appendix E,
Paragraph 10.2.1 Top Protection.
ADM asserted, ``PHMSA assumes without any supporting data that top
fittings will decrease the damage to service equipment by 50 percent.''
PHMSA and FRA agree with commenters opposed to the TIH style
rollover protection system proposed in Option 1 for new construction of
the DOT-117 specification tank car. We disagree that it is ``unproven
technology.'' Specifically, this is not a specific technology but
rather a performance standard. Also, the standard exists and is used
for tank car transporting PIH commodities. There are thousands of tank
cars in operation that meet this standard. We do not believe this is a
matter of technology but rather a matter of whether a practical design
could be developed, one that will not introduce excessive stresses
elsewhere in the tank in the event of a roll-over.
Therefore, while we disagree that it is ``unproven technology,'' we
do not feel the effectiveness of the TIH rollover protection is
justified when considering the cost of such a system and thus, we are
not adopting such standards in this final rule.
Braking
For comprehensive analyses, conclusions, and regulatory
codification on the braking proposal, see ``Advanced Brake Signal
Propagation Systems.''
Supporting Analyses and Conclusions
The discussion below provides some of the supporting analysis that
shaped PHMSA and FRA's decisions on the requirements for the new
construction of the DOT-117 specification tank cars. For further detail
and a more comprehensive discussion of our analysis, see the final RIA
for this rulemaking. This section highlights particular areas that were
the focus of numerous comments.
Puncture Resistance
Effective October 1, 2015, for new car construction, the adopted
specification requirements are the same as proposed Option 2. See the
``Advanced Braking Signal Propagation Systems'' section for discussion
on ECP braking. Industry is currently building DOT-111 tank cars
constructed to the CPC-1232 standard. The primary difference between
Option 2 and the jacketed DOT/CPC-1232 car is that the former has a \9/
16\ inch thick shell. Additional required thickness provides improved
shell puncture resistance ranging from 7% to 40% depending on the
initial speed and brake system employed as indicated in the following
table:

Table 16--Reduction in the Number of Punctures Given Tank Car Design, Initial Speed, and Brake System, When
Compared to an Unjacketed Dot 111 Tank Car With a Two-Way EOT Device
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two-way EOT device ECP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tank car option 40 mph 50 mph 40 mph 50 mph
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 111 no jacket............................... 0 0 2.3 1.4
\7/16\-inch w/jacket............................ 5.0 6.5 6.8 7.2
\8/16\-inch w/jacket............................ 5.6 7.3 7.3 8.0
\9/16\-inch w/jacket............................ 6.2 8.1 7.8 8.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tank cars with a jacket are equipped with a one-half inch thick full height head shield. A two-way EOT device is
applied to the end of the last car in a train to monitor functions such as brake line pressure and accidental
separation of the train using a motion sensor. The two-way EOT device also is able to receive a signal from
the lead locomotive of the train to initiate emergency braking from the rear of the train. ECP brakes are
electronically controlled from the locomotive and can be used to initiate braking on all ECP-equipped cars in
a train at substantially the same time. See ``Advanced Brake Signal Propagation Systems,'' below, for
additional discussion.

Based on these effectiveness and the associated incremental cost,
PHMSA and FRA have chosen the 9/16 thickness due to its increased
puncture resistance. See the RIA for this final rule for further
analysis.
Conditional Probability of Release
Many commenters who provided data and analysis in an effort to
refute PHMSA and FRA modeling data did so with the use of the
Conditional Probability of Release (CPR) modeling. In addition, some
commenters challenged PHMSA and FRA modeling as a weakness in our
analysis. In July 2014, FRA released a study conducted by Sharma and
Associates entitled

[[Page 26674]]

``Objective Evaluation of Risk Reduction from Tank Car Design &
Operations Improvements'' that describes a novel and objective
methodology for quantifying and characterizing the reductions in risk
(or reductions in puncture probabilities) that resulted from changes to
tank car designs or the tank car operating environment. This approach
can be used as an alternative to CPR when describing tank car
performance. The report is placed in the docket for this proceeding at
PHMSA-2012-0082-0209 which can be accessed online at
www.regulations.gov. The following is an excerpt from the study
relevant to this discussion:

The methodology captures several parameters that are relevant to
tank car derailment performance, including multiple derailment
scenarios, derailment dynamics, impact load distributions, impactor
sizes, operating conditions, tank car designs, etc., and combines
them into a consistent probabilistic framework to estimate the
relative merit of proposed mitigation strategies.
The industry's approach (CPR) to addressing these questions has
been to rely on past statistical data from accidents. RA-05-02, a
report published by industry, and its more recent derivatives, have
been used by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and other
industry partners as a means to address the above questions, in so
far, as it relates to thickness changes. This approach has
shortcomings, such as:
Limited applicability--cannot be applied to innovative
designs or alternate operating conditions
Inconsistency--risk numbers seem to change with the
version of the data/model being used
Based on a limited dataset, that may not have good
representation from all potential hazards, particularly low
probability-high consequence hazards, and car designs/features
present only in limited quantities in the general population of tank
cars.
While the statistical data may be useful as a general gauge for
safety, it does not make a valuable tool for future engineering
decisions, or, for setting standards. Therefore, there is a distinct
need to develop an objective, analytical approach to evaluate the
overall safety performance and the relative risk reduction,
resulting from changes to tank car design or railroad operating
practices. The research effort described here addresses this need
through a methodology that ties together the load environment under
impact conditions with analytical/test based measures of tank car
puncture resistance capacity, further adapted for expected operating
conditions, to calculate resultant puncture probabilities and risk
reduction in an objective manner. While not intended to predict the
precise results of a given accident, this methodology provides a
basis for comparing the relative benefits or risk reduction
resulting from various mitigation strategies.

In addition, some commenters challenged PHMSA and FRA modeling as a
weakness in our analysis. For example, Dr. Steven Kirkpatrick of
Applied Research Associates, Inc., in his September 29, 2014, comments
to the NPRM, entitled ``Review of Analyses Supporting the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration HM-251 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Technical Report,'' challenged the methodology used in the
July 2014 Sharma & Associates study. These comments were combined with
the AAR and its TTCI comments under docket reference number PHMSA-2012-
0082-3378 of this proceeding.
PHMSA and FRA stand behind the assumptions, conclusions, and
methodology used in the Sharma Associates study on puncture resistance.
In addition, based on the comments received this methodology was
modified, where appropriate, to provide better results. Specific
modifications are discussed below. For a more comprehensive discussion,
see the RIA.
The effect of derailment occurring at different locations
throughout the train was included in the calculations.
In the NPRM, 12 scenarios were used for each calculated
most probable number of cars punctured. The scenarios have been
expanded to 18, based on 3 track stiffness values, 3 friction
coefficients, and 2 derailment initiating force values.
Multiple analyses have been conducted in which the
impactor distribution was varied towards either larger or smaller
impactors.
In addition, the Review of Analyses Supporting the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration HM-251 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Technical Report offered some analysis PHMSA and FRA do not
agree with. Below, PHMSA and FRA explain why they do not agree with
some of the critiques put for the in that technical report. For a more
comprehensive discussion see the RIA.
PHMSA and FRA believe that the ``ground friction
coefficient values'' used in the Sharma modeling analysis are
methodical, reasonable, and adequate for the purposes of evaluating the
relative performance of alternative tank car designs and determining
the effectiveness rates of the proposed tank car design standards.
PHMSA and FRA disagree with the Review of Analyses'
critique of the Sharma modeling's ``assumed impactor distribution'' and
reiterate that the Sharma modeling's assumptions are generally
consistent with ``real life observations.'' In his critique, Dr.
Kirkpatrick states that a larger impactor size should have been used
for the analysis. However, in his report, ``Detailed Puncture Analyses
Tank Cars: Analysis of Different Impactor Threats and Impact
Conditions'', file name:TR_Detailed Puncture Analyses Tank
Cars_20130321_final.pdf, page 2 (page 20 of PDF file) Dr. Kirkpatrick
indicates smaller impactors sizes are appropriate.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\48\ Detailed Puncture Analyses Tank Cars: Analysis of Different
Impactor Threats and Impact Conditions'' can be found at: http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04420.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

``A significant finding from the first phases of the study is that
there are many potential impact threats with a relatively small
characteristic size. When the combinations of complex impactor shapes
and off-axis impactor orientations are considered, many objects will
have the puncture potential of an impactor with a characteristic size
equal to or smaller than the 6-inch impactor used in previous tank car
tests.''
PHMSA and FRA are confident that the findings for the
number of tank cars derailed in derailment simulations are largely
consistent with the ``spread seen in actual derailment data.''
The methodology used for calculating the effectiveness of the
enhanced tank car design features, is covered in detail in the RIA. By
combining well-established and new research with recent, directly
applicable derailment data, this method appropriately considers the
unique risks associated with the operation of HHFTs. The table below
provides the calculated effectiveness rates of the proposed new car
specification and retrofit specification relative to existing tank
cars.

Table 17--Effectiveness of Newly Constructed and Retrofitted Tank Car
Options
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effectiveness rates of the PHMSA/FRA (NPRM Option 1) relative to the
following
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT-111 non-jacketed..................................... * 0.504
CPC-1232 non-jacketed.................................... 0.368
DOT-111 jacketed......................................... 0.428
CPC-1232 jacketed........................................ 0.162
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effectiveness Rates of the Enhanced Jacketed CPC-1232 (NPRM Option 3)
relative to the Following
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT-111 non-jacketed..................................... 0.459
CPC-1232 non-jacketed.................................... 0.31
DOT-111 jacketed......................................... 0.376
CPC-1232 jacketed........................................ 0.01
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These figures represent the percent effectiveness when comparing the
DOT-117 and DOT-117R against the existing fleet in the first column.
For example a DOT-117 is 50% more effective than a DOT-111 non-
jacketed

[[Page 26675]]

Weight Penalty
Some commenters raised concerns about potential loss of lading
capacity due to the increased weight of the new tank cars. Concerns
were raised about the loss of capacity of new or retrofitted tank cars
because of the increased weight of the tank car resulting from the
added safety features. The additional features that will affect the
tare weight of the tank car include an 11-gauge jacket, thicker shell
and full height, \1/2\-inch thick head shield.
The majority of commenters in the rail and shipping industries
cited the potential loss of lading capacity due to the increased weight
of the new tank cars as a central concern related to the selection of a
tank car specification. While most comments from the rail and shipping
industries were concerned with potential loss of lading capacity, one
commenter, Greenbrier, actually refuted the claims of weight issues
made by a larger portion of the regulated community. It noted that
there are those:

who suggest that a \9/16\ inch shell thickness will significantly
lower the volume capacity of the tank car. The legacy DOT-111 tank
cars were limited to 263,000 pounds total weight on rail. Recently,
the AAR and FRA increased that limit to 286,000 pounds, or a 23,000
pound increase. Greenbrier's legacy 263,000 pounds, 30,000 gallon,
tank cars weigh 68,000 pounds (light weight) and have a load limit
of 195,000 pounds. Greenbrier's proposed tank car of the future with
a \9/16\ inch shell weighs 90,500 pounds, has a volume capacity of
30,000 gallons and a load limit of 195,500 pounds. In other words,
while the weight of the proposed car increases by 22,500 pounds, the
volume capacity actually increases by 100 gallons and the weight
capacity increases by 500 pounds.

PHMSA and FRA disagree with commenters' claims that the rule will
necessarily reduce the load limit (i.e. the weight of the lading) of
current and future crude and ethanol tank cars in the absence of this
rule, and consequently disagrees with the claim that the increased tare
weight will necessitate an increase in the number of carloads required
to move a given amount of product. The maximum allowable GRL is 286,000
pounds. PHMSA and FRA believe that, for all but an inconsequentially
small number of such tank car loads, the difference between the current
weight of a loaded car using standard operating practices and 286,000
lbs. is more than the weight that will need to be added to comply with
this rule. This is true for both the current crude and ethanol fleet
and new tank cars (including jacketed and non-jacketed CPC-1232 cars)
as they would have been placed into this service over the next 20 years
in the absence of this rule. Therefore, the vast majority of tank cars
will be able to comply with this rule without realizing any meaningful
loss in capacity. Consequently we have not accounted for any capacity
losses in our analysis. The issue of a weight and capacity limitations
is addressed in-depth in the RIA.
Conclusion
Based on the previous discussion as well as the RIA, in this final
rule, PHMSA and FRA are adopting Option 2 (see braking section of this
rulemaking for discussion of braking systems to be included on tank
cars) as the DOT Specification 117 tank car standard for new
construction. The table below further summarizes details of the adopted
enhanced tank car design standard (DOT specification 117) compared with
the DOT 111A100W1 Specification currently authorized.

Table 18--Safety Features of DOT Specification 117 Tank Car
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thermal
Tank car Bottom outlet GRL Head shield Pressure Shell thickness Jacket Tank material Top fittings protection Braking
handle (lbs.) type relief valve protection system
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Selected Option: DOT Bottom outlet 286K Full-height, \1/ Reclosing \9/16\-inch Minimum 11- TC-128 Grade B, Must be Thermal Dependent on
Specification 117 Tank Car. handle removed 2\ inch thick pressure Minimum. gauge jacket normalized equipped per protection service
or designed to head shield. relief device. constructed steel. AAR system in
prevent from A1011 Specifications accordance
unintended steel or for Tank Cars, with Sec.
actuation equivalent. appendix E 179.18.
during a train The jacket paragraph
accident. must be 10.2.1.
weather-tight.
DOT 111A100W1................ Bottom Outlets 263K Optional; Bare Reclosing \7/16\-inch Jackets are TC-128 Grade B, Not required, Optional....... EOT device (See
Specification (Currently are Optional. Tanks half pressure Minimum. optional. normalized when equipped 49 CFR part
Authorized). height; Jacket relief valve. steel *. per AAR 232)
Tanks full Specifications
height. for Tank Cars,
appendix E
paragraph
10.2.1.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For the purposes of this figure, TC-128 Grade B normalized steel is used to provide a consistent comparison to the proposed options. Section 179.200-7 provides alternative materials, which
are authorized for the DOT Specification 111.

2. Retrofit Standard
In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, we proposed to require that existing
tank cars meet the same DOT Specification 117 standard as new tank
cars, except for the requirement to include top fittings protection. In
this final rule, we are adopting retrofit requirements for existing
tank cars in accordance with Option 3 from the NPRM (excluding top
fittings protection and steel grade). If existing cars do not meet the
retrofit standard by the adopted implementation timeline, they will not
be authorized for use in HHFT service. See the ``Advanced Brake Signal
Propagation Systems'' section of this rulemaking for discussion of
braking systems to be included on tank cars.
In Safety Recommendation R-12-5, the NTSB recommended that new and
existing tank cars authorized for transportation of ethanol and crude
oil in PG I and II be equipped with enhanced tank head and shell
puncture resistance systems and top fittings protection. However, PHMSA
chose not to include top fitting protections and changes in steel grade
as part of any retrofit requirement, as the costliness of such retrofit
is not supported with a corresponding appropriate safety

[[Page 26676]]

benefit.\49\ We do apply the retrofit standard to tank cars carrying
all flammable liquids in HHFTs, and not just ethanol and crude oil in
PG I and II. Retrofitted legacy DOT-111 tank cars will be designated as
``DOT-117R.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\49\ The cost to retrofitting a tank car with the proposed top
fitting protection is estimated to be $24,500 per tank car, while
the comparable effectiveness rates are low. However, the
effectiveness rates were calculated assuming cars punctured would
release all lading through the breach regardless of top fittings
damage. With improved puncture resistance, lading loss through
damaged top fittings will become a more significant point of
release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In consideration of adopting a retrofit standard, two aspects were
considered thoroughly: (1) The technical specifications of the retrofit
standard compared to the current fleet composition and (2) the
corresponding retrofit schedule timeline. The timeline for retrofits
will be discussed in greater detail in the upcoming section of this
document entitled ``Implementation Timeline.'' In this section, we will
focus on the technical specifications of the retrofit standard when
compared with the current fleet composition.
PHMSA firmly believes that reliance on HHFTs to transport millions
of gallons of flammable liquids is a risk that must be addressed. For
the purposes of flammable liquids, under the proposals in the August 1,
2014 NPRM, the legacy DOT Specification 111 tank car would no longer be
authorized for use in an HHFT after the dates specified in the proposed
retrofit schedule. In recent derailments of HHFTs, the DOT
Specification 111 and CPC-1232 tank car has been identified as
providing insufficient puncture resistance, being vulnerable to fire
and top-fittings damage, and they have bottom outlet valves that are
can be inadvertently opened in accident scenarios. These risks have
been demonstrated by recent accidents of HHFTs transporting flammable
liquids.
In the August 1, 2014, NPRM, we proposed to limit continued use of
the DOT Specification 111 tank car to non-HHFTs. In addition, we
proposed to authorize the continued use of legacy DOT Specification 111
tank cars in combustible liquid service. The risks associated with
flammable liquids, such as crude oil and ethanol, are greater than
those of combustible liquids. The requirements proposed in the NPRM
were not applicable to HHFTs of materials that are classed or reclassed
as a combustible liquid. Existing HMR requirements for combustible
liquids will not change as a result of this final rule. Thus, except
for those tank cars intended for combustible liquid service, after the
established implementation timeline, any tank car used in a HHFT must
meet or exceed the DOT Specification 117, 117P, or the 117R standard.
Those tank cars not retrofitted would be retired or repurposed.
Further, if it can be demonstrated that an existing tank car can meet
the new performance standards, it will be authorized for use in a HHFT
as a DOT Specification117P.
General Retrofit Comments
We received a variety of comments representing differing viewpoints
in response to the proposed tank car retrofit standard. Overall, 45
commenters supported the retrofit of existing fleets; 56 commenters
opposed the retrofit of the existing fleets and 41 commenters asserted
the retrofit standards as proposed in the NPRM did not go far enough.
We have summarized a few selected comments below to provide some idea
of the overall comments.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company requests that PHMSA,
``authorize the continued use of existing DOT 111 tank cars for non-
crude and non-ethanol Class 3 flammable service for the remainder of
their useful life. Non-HHFT shipments of crude oil and ethanol also
should be permitted in DOT 111 tank cars for the remainder of their
useful life.''
Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC asserted its belief that ``the CPC-1232
jacketed fleet [should be permitted] to operate for its full useful
life with a potential retrofit limited to an enhanced BOV handle and a
larger pressure relief valve.''
PHMSA sought to limit the unnecessary retirement or repurposing of
tank cars while implementing meaningful safety improvements on the
existing fleet. This final rule requires the tank cars used in an HHFT
to be retrofitted to specifications equivalent to Option 3 in the NPRM.
This enables tank car owners to realize the full useful life of an
asset. The final rule does not impact existing DOT-111 tank cars used
in Class 3 flammable service that are not a part of an HHFT.
In support of retrofitting existing fleets, GBW noted that:

GBW will be making substantial capital investments and will
hire, train, and certify 400 new employees over the next year,
creating jobs throughout the United States. Moreover, GBW is making
its capital investments now to expand retrofit capacity and
conducting hiring activity in advance of a final rule.

In its comments, Bridger noted their economic concerns over an
overly burdensome retrofit standard, noting ``the economics of
retrofitting the older and cheaper DOT-111 tank cars is considerably
different from the economics of retrofitting the newer and costlier
CPC-1232 tank cars.'' Bridger's main concern is that the price of tank
cars has increased significantly, with a CPC-1232 costing 80% more (in
2014) than the DOT-111 (in 2008); and it noted this is very important
because it is not equitable, as its competitors have less costs per
tank car and undergo the same operations (using a retrofitted DOT-111).
The comments of Edward D. Biggs III question whether any other
modifications (including jacketing) for DOT 111 tank cars built with
normalized steel shells are necessary.
Cargill estimated that it would cost in excess of $45 million to
retrofit its existing fleet of tank cars. Cargill expects that
retrofitting costs will be $60,000 per tank car, more than twice the
figure assumed by PHMSA.
In its comments, AFPM stated that it supports ``the Option 3
specification for new and retrofitted rail tank cars shipping crude and
ethanol in unit trains of 75 cars or more. The Option 3 specification
tank car is an enhanced CPC-1232 tank car with a 7/16'' shell and other
enhanced safety features. The Option 1 and 2 tank cars with a 9/16''
shell provide only negligible safety benefits at a substantial
incremental cost.''
The RSI-CTC supported retrofits in accordance with Option 3 for all
PG I and PG II flammable liquid tank cars. But it supports only the
addition of PRV and BOV protection at requalification for Class 3, PG
III tank cars. RLBA echoes RSI-CTC with its recommendation that
existing cars be retrofitted with the latest design of self-closing
high capacity over pressure devices that meet the same standards as new
car construction.
In addition to the previous general comments on the retrofitting of
existing tank cars, the following notable issues were frequently cited
when discussing the topic. In the following, we discuss comments on
each issue, concerns raised and our response to the comments.

Shop Capacity

Numerous commenters asserted that shop capacity is insufficient to
retrofit existing fleets in a timely and cost-effective manner or in
accordance with the schedule proposed in the NPRM. Specifically, RSI-
CTC noted that there are tiers of retrofitting that vary based on
complexity. For example, retrofitting a legacy non-jacketed DOT-111 is
a much more intensive process than retrofitting the most recent
jacketed CPC-1232. RSI-CTC asked in their

[[Page 26677]]

comments that PHMSA and FRA consider the complexity of these retrofits
and the shop capacity to complete them in our analysis. We agree and
have since revised our analysis accordingly. See RIA. Below are some
additional comments that represent issues related to shop capacity.
In its comments, Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC stated, ``[a]ccording to the
regulatory impact analysis in the NPRM (page 89), PHMSA suggests that
66,185 cars can be retrofitted over 3 years, or 22,061 cars per year.
This estimate is considerably higher than the AllTranstek study
estimate of 3,000 per year or RSI's estimate of 5,700 per year (after a
one year ramp up period).'' \50\ Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC continues,
``during this timeframe, thousands of new cars were manufactured to
handle the growing business but there has not been a repair facility of
any significant size put into service. The costs of retrofitting
existing cars will cause many cars to be retired rather than retrofit
thus adding to the shortage of cars in the network.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\50\ It should be noted that this estimate was later revised to
6,400 units per year by RSI-CTC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Honeywell Performance Materials and Technologies stated that the
``backlog for present mechanical needs and requalification on all tank
cars will be increased.'' In addition a report commissioned by RSI and
authored by Brattle noted that shop capacity could be a considerable
issue when determining a retrofit standard.\51\ A similar report
commissioned by API and authored by IFC international noted similar
concerns.\52\ API also expressed implementation concerns about shop
capacity, the current backlog of car orders, and engineering capacity.
Both these reports are discussed in the final RIA but it should be
noted both these reports based their findings on the 5 year retrofit
schedule which has since be revised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\51\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-3415.
\52\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-3418.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In general, commenters expressed concern about the availability of
materials, the availability of skilled labor, and facilities to conduct
the needed procedures involved in a retrofit. PHMSA and FRA considered
these and other concerns when determining a retrofit standard.
PHMSA and FRA understand the concerns with regard to shop
capacities. Specifically, concerns about the time that will be required
to acquire additional resources needed to build and ramp up facilitates
to conduct retrofits, as well as the manufacturing and supply of the
materials needed for the components of the tank cars (i.e., steel
plates and sheets, new valves, etc.). PHMSA and FRA also understand the
limitations of the existing labor force. For example, a skilled labor
force (welders, metal workers, machinists, etc.) must be hired and
trained to perform the necessary retrofit work correctly and safely. We
agree with many of the issues raised by commenters and have revised our
analysis with regard to the retrofit standard.
Trucks
Many public commenters raised technical issues and potential
implementation problems from an industry-wide retrofit for HHFTs. For
example, the API public comment noted issues with the extra weight on
stub sills and tank car structures, and issues with head shields and
brake wheels/end platforms, and issues with truck replacement. Below is
a list of comments that represent concerns over how the retrofit
standard will affect the existing trucks of tank cars.
Amsted Rail believes PHMSA underestimated the cost of a new car
and, in its comments, lists the prices for several components,
suggesting $20,000 for complete car set of new trucks versus the
$16,000 amount used by PHMSA.
It is RSI-CTC's understanding that modifications will add 13,000
pounds to cars; that trucks will require modification from 263,000 to
286,000; and that new wheel sets will cost $10,000 per car; and that
new roller bearings, axles, and adaptor possibly will be added to the
car. In its comments, Amsted Rail Company, Inc. also asserted that
trucks will need replacement on 29,302 ethanol tank cars (pre 2011),
28,300 crude oil tank cars (pre CPC-1232), and 36,000 tank cars in
``other'' Class 3 flammable liquid service.
PHMSA and FRA believe that the majority of tank cars constructed in
the last decade are equipped with trucks, save a particular sized
bearing and bearing adaptor, that are rated for 286,000 pound gross
rail load service. Further, the AAR's Engineering and Equipment
Committee rules require replacement of trucks (bolster and side frames)
and wheel sets when the gross rail load of a rail car is increased from
263,000 to 286,000 pounds. As a result, what would otherwise be a
relatively small cost of approximately $2,000 to replace the bearing
and adaptor, car owners are required to replace the trucks and wheel
sets at the cost of $24,000/truck. The paucity of data distinguishing
the cars that need a major versus minor retrofit leads PHMSA to
conservatively assume all DOT legacy tank cars will require the
replacement of the trucks and wheel sets.
Repurpose/Retirement
In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, we proposed, except for top fittings
protection, to require existing tank cars that are used to transport
flammable liquids as part of a HHFT to be retrofitted to meet the
selected option. Those not retrofitted would be retired, repurposed, or
operated under speed restrictions for up to five years, based on the
packing group assignment of the lading being transported. The following
commenters had varying opinions about this assumed strategy.
The RSI-CTC asserted that the minimum early retired tank cars
rather than retrofit will be approximately 28% (25,600 tank cars).
However, the AAR supports the repurposing of legacy tank cars to
Canadian oil sands service. Eastman Chemical Company ``. . . also
agrees with PHMSA's proposal to retain the exception that permits
flammable liquids with a flash point at or above 38 [deg]C
(100[emsp14][deg]F) to be reclassified as combustible liquids and allow
existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars to continue to be authorized
for these materials.''
The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, ``supports the
requirement of Packing Group III in the enhanced car standards as this
provides consistency in providing packaging appropriate to handle all
flammable liquids. These flammable liquids pose a safety and
environmental risk regardless of the packing group.''
Bridger, does not agree with PHMSA's assumption that DOT-111
jacketed and CPC-1232 jacketed cars would be repurposed for use in
Canadian oil sands service, as it requires heating coils and insulation
in the tank car.
The Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA) stated in
its comments, ``PHMSA's timeline for DOT-111 railcars is predicated on
the assumption that DOT-111s now in use for PG I or PG II hazmat will
be moved into PG III service. Even heavy Canadian crudes once mixed
with diluents and shipped as ``dilbit'' or ``railbit'' are not expected
to qualify as PG III materials, and therefore will not qualify as a
home for the displaced DOT-111 railcars.''
DGAC asserted, ``[t]here is an assumption that all Legacy DOT 111
Jacketed and CPC-1232 Jacketed tank cars would be assigned to Canadian
oil sands; however, under Transport Canada, these cars may also have to
be retrofitted based on regulations.''

[[Page 26678]]

Growth Energy suggests the shift to Canadian oil sands service is
greatly overestimated, and underestimates the costs of doing so
(requires retrofit for heating coils), costs of moving cars, and the
costs of moving leases. According to Exxon Mobil Corporation, ``[t]he
DOT proposal to move DOT-111 tank cars to oil sands service is not
feasible as the diluted bitumen to be shipped is PG I or II and carried
predominantly in unit trains. There is limited projected growth in
other, non-flammable products moved by rail.''
In their comments, Earthjustice, Forest Ethics, Sierra Club, NRDC,
and Oil Change International asserted, ``the proposed rule would allow
the DOT-111 and other unsafe tank cars to be shifted to tar sands
service. The rule is thin on analysis to support this shift. However,
on its face, it would be indefensible to allow unsafe tank cars to be
used to ship tar sands bitumen diluted with chemicals that contain
volatile components. Accidents involving diluted bitumen are notorious
for being impossible to clean up.''
Based on these and other comments, PHMSA and FRA acknowledge that
the assumption of no retirements and the level of repurposing needed to
be revisited. In response to these comments, PHMSA and FRA have made
adjustments to their analysis, and the final RIA to account for
retirements as opposed to shifting of tank cars to tar sand service.
Many of the comments with regard to new construction also apply to
the retrofit specifications. Below PHMSA and FRA discuss the various
components of a retrofit tank car specification (see also new
construction as many of those comments apply to both new and existing
tank cars). The below discussion highlight those comments that were
focused on the retrofit standard.
Shell Thickness
Many commenters posed a concern that a retrofit standard that
called for an increased thickness would be technically infeasible and
result in the scrapping of existing tank cars. For instance, in its
comments, Cargill asserted that it is not feasible to retrofit an
existing tank car built with a \7/16\-inch steel shell to conform to a
\9/16\-inch shell requirement. RSI-CTC also stated that Option 1 is not
feasible for retrofits. Further, GBW ``does not believe it is practical
or economically feasible to bring existing tank cars fully up to the
proposed standards for new tank cars particularly with respect to the
\9/16\ inch shell thickness proposed for the Option 1 and Option 2 tank
car.''
PHMSA and FRA understand the concerns of the commenters and note
the intent of the rule was not to require adding thickness to existing
tank cars, but rather to improve the puncture resistance to the
existing cars to be equivalent to a tank with a thicker shell. As it
would not be technically feasible to add \1/8\th of an inch of steel to
a \7/16\-inch shell and head when retrofitting a tank car, PHMSA will
permit existing DOT-111 fleets to be retrofitted at currently
authorized shell thicknesses (\7/16\-inch).
Top Fittings Protection
The NTSB believes that any retrofits should have top fittings
protection, citing incidents in Cherry Valley, IL and Tiskilwa, IL due
to where those tank cars breached. NSTB stated they will not consider
Safety Recommendation R-12-5 as ``acceptable'' unless top fittings
protection is included in the retrofitting requirements.
PHMSA is aware that the AAR Tank Car Committee has started a task
force to evaluate potential advancements in existing top fittings
protections. PHMSA and FRA urge industry to consider enhancements that
will apply to both new and retrofitted tank cars. PHMSA and FRA are not
requiring such protection in a tank car retrofit in this final rule.
While we do believe this is an important safety feature, it is not cost
justified.
Thermal Protection Systems/Pressure Relief Device
In its comments, the Dow stated, ``[it] does support thermal
protection for crude oil and ethanol . . . Dow suggests that PHMSA
consider non-CPC-1232 cars to be a higher retrofitting priority.'' Dow
continues, ``[h]owever, addition of insulation and a jacket to existing
DOT Specification 111 cars may introduce Plate clearance issues, so not
all existing cars will be able to be retrofitted. Additionally, methods
for attaching heavier jackets to prevent shifting during train handling
will require engineering analysis; finite element analysis of the stub
sill design may also be necessary to determine if existing designs are
capable of handling the increased weight. Estimated cost for all the
engineering and AAR approval application fees is $85,000 per
certificate of construction, as per a major rail supplier.''
PHMSA and FRA do not agree. As stated above, in the Arcadia
derailment, there were three high-energy thermal failures. In two of
the three cases, the tank fractured into two pieces and those pieces
were thrown from the derailment area. In the third case, the tank was
nearly fractured around the entire circumference. In addition, NTSB
restated the importance of thermal protection in their April 6, 2015
Recommendations. These recommendations, R-15-14 and 15, requested that
PHMSA require that all new and existing tank cars used to transport all
Class 3 flammable liquids be equipped with thermal protection systems
that meet or exceed the thermal performance standards outlined in Title
49 Code of Federal Regulations 179.18(a) and be equipped with
appropriately sized pressure relief devices that allow the release of
pressure under fire conditions to ensure thermal performance that meets
or exceeds the requirements of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations
179.18(a), and that minimizes the likelihood of energetic thermal
ruptures.
Jackets and thermal protection are critical in the survival of a
tank car experiencing a thermal event. Thus, thermal protection is
adopted as proposed. However, we do note that the new regulation
provides flexibility for innovation to meet the performance standard.
Steel Retrofit
Much like the argument against requiring added thickness to
retrofitted cars, many posed the relevant concern that a retrofit
standard that called for a change in the type of steel used would be
technically infeasible and result in the scrapping of existing tank
cars. The RSI-CTC requests that non-normalized steel tank cars should
be authorized for retrofit as there are 47,300 DOT-111 tank cars
currently in service. Normalizing the steel after the tank car has been
constructed is impractical. The requirements to this would create
considerable cost which would not increase the ultimate strength of the
steel.
Normalization does change the mechanical properties of the steel;
specifically, a slight improvement in upper shelf toughness and a shift
to a lower ductile-brittle transition temperature. PHMSA and FRA
understand the concerns of the commenters and note the intent of the
rule was not to require a change to the materials specification to
existing tank cars, but rather to improve the puncture resistance to
the existing cars to be equivalent to a tank constructed of the
referenced steel. PHMSA and FRA believe that should a car owner decide
to retrofit a tank car, the owner must consider the material properties
of normalized steel on the design of the retrofit.

[[Page 26679]]

However, tank cars otherwise conforming to the HMR and manufactured of
non-normalized steel may remain in service when retrofitted.
Conclusion
Except for top fittings protection and steel retrofit, retrofits
will conform to Option 3, subject to brake requirements that depend on
the tank car's service, and will be designated ``DOT Specification
117R.'' The retrofit requirements include the addition of an 11-gauge
jacket, full height head shield, and a modified bottom outlet
configuration.

Table 19--Safety Features of Retrofitted DOT Specification 117R Tank Car
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thermal
Tank car Bottom outlet GRL Head shield Pressure relief Shell thickness Jacket Tank material Top fittings protection Braking
handle (lbs.) type valve protection system
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Selected option: DOT Bottom outlet 286K Full-height, \1/ Reclosing \7/16\-inch Minimum 11- Authorized Not required, Thermal Dependent on
Specification 117R handle removed 2\-inch thick pressure minimum. gauge jacket steel at the but when protection service.
retrofitted tank car. or designed to head shield. relief valve. constructed time of equipped per system in
prevent from A1011 construction. AAR accordance
unintended steel or Specifications with Sec.
actuation equivalent. for Tank Cars, 179.18.
during a train The jacket appendix E
accident. must be paragraph
weather-tight. 10.2.1.
DOT 111A100W1 Specification Bottom outlets 263K Optional; bare Reclosing \7/16\-inch- Jackets are TC-128 Grade B, Not required, Optional....... EOT device (See
(currently authorized). are optional. tanks half pressure minimum. optional. normalized but when 49 CFR part
height; jacket relief valve. steel *. equipped per 232).
tanks full AAR
height. Specifications
for Tank Cars,
appendix E
paragraph
10.2.1.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For the purposes of this figure, TC-128 Grade B normalized steel is used to provide a consistent comparison to the proposed options. Section 179.200-7 provides alternative materials which
are authorized for the DOT Specification 111.

3. Performance Standard
The prescribed performance standards adopted in this rule were
developed to provide improved crashworthiness when compared to the
legacy DOT-111 tank car and to foster innovation in the development of
tank cars. In the NPRM, PHMSA and FRA proposed a performance standard
in which the design, modeling and testing results would be approved by
the Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer at
FRA.
Accordingly, the final rule requires that the tank car design must
be approved, and the tank car must be constructed to the conditions of
an approval issued by the Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/
Chief Safety Officer, FRA. The performance of the tank car is subject
to the following:
Puncture Resistance
The tank car must be able to withstand a minimum side impact speed
of 12 mph when impacted at the longitudinal and vertical center of the
shell by a rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of 286,000
pounds. Further, the tank car must be able to withstand a minimum head
impact speed of 18 mph when impacted at the center of the head by a
rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of 286,000 pounds.
Thermal Protection Systems/Pressure Relief Device
The tank car must be equipped with a thermal protection system. The
thermal protection system must be designed in accordance with Sec.
179.18 and include a reclosing PRD in accordance with Sec. 173.31 of
this subchapter.
Bottom Outlet
If the tank car is equipped with a bottom outlet, the handle must
be removed prior to train movement or be designed with a protection
safety system to prevent unintended actuation during train accident
scenarios.
Top Fittings Protection
Tank cars tanks meeting the performance standard must be equipped
per AAR Specifications Tank Cars, appendix E paragraph 10.2.1 (IBR, see
Sec. 171.7 of this subchapter). A tank car that meets the performance
requirements will be assigned to ``DOT Specification 117P.'' Builders
must be able to demonstrate compliance with the performance standards
and receive FRA approval prior to building the cars.
4. Implementation Timeline
In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, we proposed a risk-based timeline for
continued use of the DOT-111 tank car used in HHFTs in Sec. Sec.
173.241, 173.242, and 173.243. This timeline was based on the packing
group requirements in the HMR. The HMR require both the proper
classification of hazardous materials and the selection and use of an
authorized packaging. Packing groups assign a degree of danger posed
within a particular hazard class. Packing Group I poses the highest
danger (``great danger'') and Packing Group III the lowest (``minor
danger''). In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed a timeline in accordance with
the following table:

Table 20--Timeline for Continued Use of DOT Specification 111 Tank Cars
in HHFT Service
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Packing group DOT-111 not authorized after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I......................................... October 1, 2017.
II........................................ October 1, 2018.
III....................................... October 1, 2020.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM, PHMSA and FRA were
confident the risk-based approach proposed provided sufficient time for
car owners to update existing fleets while still prioritizing the
highest danger material. Specifically, given the estimates of the
current fleet size, composition, and production capacity of tank car
manufacturers expressed by

[[Page 26680]]

comments submitted in response to the ANPRM, we were confident that a
two year phase-in of packing group I flammable liquids would not result
in a shortage of available tank cars intended for HHFTs. This strategy
would have also provided additional time for tank cars to meet the DOT
Specification 117 performance standard if offerors were to take steps
to reduce the volatility of the material. Nevertheless, we did seek
comment as to whether the proposed phase-out period provided sufficient
time to increase production capacity and retrofit existing fleets.
As proposed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM, DOT Specification 111 tank
cars may be retrofitted to DOT Specification 117 standards (as a DOT
Specification 117R), retired, repurposed, or operated under speed
restrictions. Further, we proposed limiting the future use of DOT
Specification 111 tank cars only if these tank cars are used in a HHFT.
Under the proposal, DOT Specification 111 tank cars would be able to
continue to be used to transport other commodities, including flammable
liquids, provided they are not in a HHFT. In addition, all retrofitted
tank cars (including the DOT-111 tank cars meeting the CPC-1232
standards) are authorized for use for their full service life. This
proposal provided tank car owners and rail carriers with the
opportunity to make operational changes that focus on the greatest
risks and minimize the associated cost impacts. In response to the
proposed amendments regarding the retrofit timeline, we received a
variety of comments representing differing viewpoints.
Harmonization
Commenters state that it is essential that the U.S. position on
retrofit timelines is consistent with Canada's. PHMSA has been in close
coordination with Transport Canada to ensure the seamless transition
with regard to the retrofit of the existing North American DOT
Specification 111 fleets. To that end, PHMSA recognizes the importance
of harmonization and does not foresee any issues at this time with
cross-border retrofit implementation timelines.
Retrofit Capacity
The capability of the industry to handle retrofit tasks and
requirements within the proposed timeline was a topic of great interest
among commenters. Many questioned PHMSA and FRA's assumptions regarding
the retrofit capacity of the industry. The comments summarized and
discussed below provide an indication as to the commenters' main
concerns on this topic.
The Grain Processing Corporation requests that, ``when setting the
timeline for compliance, please work closely with car builders to have
an accurate understanding of when new cars can reasonably be made
available to the market.'' This commenter further stated, ``current
conditions indicate that it will take much more than three to five
years to replace non-compliant cars in the market.''
The American Chemistry Council (ACC) stated that tank car shop
capacity will not support PHMSA's regulatory timeline and some ACC
members have reported waits of approximately two years from when a tank
car is ordered until the time it was delivered. The ACC also relayed
RSI information stating that the current order backlog is about 53,000
cars.''
The Dakota Gasification Company asserts that:

PHMSA should consider how an influx of a very large number of
DOT 111 cars for retrofit in a market already seeing backlogs for
routine maintenance work will permit shippers to meet the proposed
timelines in the rule. The rulemaking states there are 80,500 DOT
111 cars and 17,300 CPC 1232 cars in Flammable Service or a total of
97,800 cars potentially in need of some form of retrofit. A record
number of tank cars have been produced the past few years.
Retrofitting this number of cars while keeping up with yearly
maintenance and standard repairs will be unattainable within the
proposed timeframe given the current shop system.

In addition a report commissioned by RSI and authored by The
Brattle Group noted that there could be considerable issues with a five
year retrofit standard when considering production levels, fleet size
and the predicted growth of both.\53\ A similar report commissioned by
API and authored by ICF International noted similar concerns.\54\ API
also expressed concerns about shop capacity, the current backlog of car
orders, and engineering capacity. Both the RSI and the API reports are
extensively discussed in the final RIA but it should be noted that both
these reports based their findings on the NPRM's five-year retrofit
schedule which has since been revised. Regardless, based on the
comments received, PHMSA and FRA have modified our analysis and revised
the final RIA to account for changes in retrofit capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\53\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-3415
\54\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-3418
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Retrofit Timeline (Length and Approach)
Overall, commenters agree that retrofits must occur, but the
suggested timelines range from zero to ten years. In addition, RSI and
API commissioned separate reports that evaluated the NPRM's proposed
timeline and demonstrated the potential detrimental effects of an
overly aggressive timeline. PHMSA has summarized and discussed the
differing viewpoints on the retrofit schedule.
Generally, the comments of citizens, environmental groups, tribal
communities and local government either supported the timeline as
proposed in the NPRM or focused on an even more aggressive timeline
than proposed. Some commenters even suggested the immediate ban of DOT
111 Specification tank cars. For example, two tribal communities, the
Quinault Indian Nation and the Prairie Island Indian Community,
represented the views of many citizens, environmental groups when they
stressed the need for an immediate and ``total phase-out of the DOT
111.'' Amtrak encourages PHMSA to require the use of the selected
option on as aggressive a schedule as manufacturing and retrofit
capabilities permit.
As demonstrated in the final RIA, PHMSA and FRA do not believe a
more aggressive timeline than what was proposed in the NPRM is
achievable or prudent. In fact, an overly aggressive timeline could
have a negative impact on safety or the environment. See the
environmental assessment for this rulemaking.
The comments of the regulated industry regarding the implementation
timeline varied, but a general consensus for a ten-year time frame
emerged. The regulated community was generally consistent in noting
that the timeline should account for both the tank car type and the
packing group of the material.
In addition to comments on the timeline, PHMSA and FRA received
many comments on our packing group based approach. Specifically, many
in the regulated community noted that while the proposed method is risk
based, it only accounts for the risk of the material itself and not the
risks posed by the various types of tank cars used in HHFTs. The
general consensus was that a retrofit timeline that accounted for the
type of tank car would provide the greatest risk reduction in the
shortest amount of time. Below are some relevant comments regarding the
proposed timeline.

[[Page 26681]]

GBW suggested that, ``[w]hile the timeline [for retrofitting] is
aggressive, the tank car repair industry, by expanded [sic] capacity at
existing facilities and through new entrants into the industry, should
be able to meet PHMSA's proposed timeline.''
Further, RSI-CTC stated that PHMSA and FRA should retrofit crude
oil and ethanol tank cars first then other Class 3 tank cars. It noted
that retrofit capacity is only 6,400 units per year whereas PHMSA
assumes 22,061 units per year. RSI-CTC continues, ``there are 50K non-
jacketed tank cars in service (23K crude and 27K ethanol/legacy and CPC
1232) that cannot be retrofitted by 10/01/2017--only 15K can be
retrofitted by that time.''
Growth Energy requested a 3- to 10-year retrofit schedule. Arkema
Inc., ``agrees with the RSI-CTC's December 5, 2013 recommendation to
adopt, at a minimum, a 10-year program allowing compliance to be
achieved in phases through modification, re-purposing or retirement of
unmodified tank cars in Class 3, flammable liquid service.''
Quantum Energy, Inc. stated, if PHMSA elects not to adopt this
exclusion for treated crude oil that they support ``at minimum
establishing a phase-out date of October 1, 2022 for the use of DOT-111
tank cars in transporting stabilized crude oil.''
The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC)
stated that tank cars that meet the AAR CPC-1232 standards and were
built after October 1, 2011, should be allowed to continue in service
for their economic life, except for the transportation of Packing Group
I materials past October 1, 2016. Further, WUTU recommends that the
proposed timeline for phasing out DOT Specification 111 tank cars
should be expedited for Packing Group I and II materials by a year, and
that all existing tank cars more than 10 years old have a thorough tank
shell thickness inspection to ensure the tank is suitable for PG II and
PG III, Class 3 flammable liquids. Any tank that shows significant
signs of corrosion should be taken out of crude, ethanol, and any other
Packing Group I or II service immediately.
Suggesting an alternate retrofit strategy, Eighty-Eight Oil, LLC
stated, ``Eighty-Eight supports a 7 year retrofit schedule.'' According
to Eighty Eight, the requirements for retrofitting cars will
necessitate a longer time frame than proposed in the NPRM, given: the
``car cleaning'' process and preparation for ``hot work'' or
retrofitting; training workers for tank car repair work; approval (via
the AAR) of high-flow pressure relief valve technology; and the
enabling of the production of full height head shields within repair
shops.
In addition to these comments, RSI-CTC, API, Exxon, APFM and many
others in the regulated industry provided specific alternative retrofit
timelines which can be viewed in the docket for this rulemaking. PHMSA
and FRA reviewed comments, alternative timelines, and data regarding
the retrofit timeline and revised our implementation schedule
accordingly. PHMSA is confident that retrofits can be accomplished in
the revised timeline adopted in this final rule.
In developing the retrofit schedule, PHMSA and FRA examined the
available shop capacity, the comments received, historical performance
of the rail industry dealing with retrofit requirements, and the
potential impacts associated with the retrofit schedule.
PHMSA has accepted feedback regarding its assumption of no
retirements and the impracticality of transferring jacketed tank cars
to tar sands service. This final rule and the RIA now consider the
number of cars that could be retired early as a result of the rule and
the associated costs of doing so. PHMSA believes that rail cars will be
retired early when their owners have weighed the cost of meeting
retrofit requirements against the marginal cost of acquiring a
replacement rail car early.
Further, to aid in the analysis of an appropriate retrofit
timeline, FRA developed a model to project the tank car retrofit
capacity over time. The model is based on Wright's learning curve
theory, which suggests that every time the total number of units that
have been produced doubles, productivity will increase by a given
percentage. This percentage is known as the learning rate.
The starting point of the analysis was to analyze the rail
industry's forecast, as represented in the Brattle Group Report
commissioned by RSI-CTC. Using the Brattle reports figure of 6,400
retrofits per year the FRA model was able to determine that the Brattle
report would have to assume 40 facilities would be required to dedicate
one crew to retrofits. After making this determination on the number of
facilities, FRA sought to include other variables to model additional
potential scenarios. The intent being to depict the extent to which the
``heavy retrofit'' \55\ capacity will increase to a degree over time.
The variables for the FRA model included the learning rate, number of
crews, and number of facilities. In the model, the values for these
variables are: a learning rate of .95 (which is relatively low for
similar industries) \56\, one crew (initially) per facility, and 40
facilities.\57\ Using these values as the starting point, a parametric
analysis was performed to show the values required to meet the industry
forecasted production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\55\ Heavy retrofits include those that go beyond simply adding
a valve and bottom outlet to the jacketed CPC-1232 cars.
\56\ Represents a 5 percent rate of improvement. See http://www.fas.org/news/reference/calc/learn.htm.
\57\ The variable of 40 facilities is a result of a parametric
analysis. FRA also ran the model with 80, 60, and 40 facilities and
40 enabled us to recreate industry's production forecast.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To determine the capacity of the industry, FRA used facility
registration data to identify 60 current tank car facilities capable of
performing heavy retrofits. Further, FRA identified 160 tank car
facilities capable of performing light modifications, which include
adding a valve and bottom outlet to the jacketed CPC-1232 cars. FRA
also accounts for industry concerns regarding the readiness of current
tank car facilities to perform retrofit services by maintaining the
ramp-up period provided by commenters. In addition to the existing
capacity, FRA's model assumes that capacity will increase to a degree
over time.
FRA's model indicates the 6,400 retrofits per year would require 40
facilities to dedicate one crew to these retrofits. As a result, the
remaining capacity (60 total facilities identified by FRA) would focus
on the normal workload including requalifications, bad order repairs,
and reassignments. As a result, FRA's model assumes:
40 facilities capable of heavy retrofits. FRA selected
this number as a conservative estimate--in reality the number of
facilities dedicated to heavy retrofits may be higher. It accounts for
industry concerns regarding the readiness of current tank car
facilities to perform retrofit services;
A new crew (2 employees) will be added to each facility
every 3 months, beginning in month 4;
After 24 months, no additional resources are added; the
only changes in capacity are based on the Wrights learning curve
theory,\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\58\ Every time production doubles the required resources and
time, decrease by a given percentage, known as the learning rate.
The learning rate for repetitive welding operations is 95 percent,
meaning that when production doubles, the required resources and
time are multiplied by 0.95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The learning rate is 0.95; and
The learning rate is for the facility, not individuals. It
is assumed the crew members all have the required skill set to perform
the work.
In support of these assumptions, Figure 2 indicates the cumulative

[[Page 26682]]

production schedule for industry's model (based on The Brattle Group
report), as well as FRA's model. Based on these assumptions, the FRA
model indicates that a heavy retrofit capacity exceeding the industry's
projection is achievable.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.002

The most extensive retrofits (the ``heavy retrofits'') would need
to take place in the initial phases of the implementation timeline,
thus making these stages critical to the overall implementation
timeline. Stakeholders generally agree that a 120-month timeline for
light retrofits is acceptable.
Conclusion
In the NPRM the retrofit timeline was based on a single risk
factor, the packing group. The packing group is a characteristic of the
hazardous material. In the final rule the retrofit timeline was revised
to focus on two risk factors, the packing group of the material and
differing types of DOT-111 and CPC-1232 tank cars. By adding the
additional risk factor, tank car type, we were able to not only account
for the characteristics of the hazardous material but also those of the
means of containment of that material. This revision as well as the
outputs of FRA model discussed above provided an accelerated risk
reduction that more appropriately addresses the overall risk. PHMSA and
FRA also modified the overall length of the retrofit to account for
issues raised by commenters. The rationale for the change in retrofit
schedule is discussed in further detail in the RIA for this final rule.
Based on the commenters' input and additional analysis, in this
final rule, PHMSA and FRA are adopting a packing group- and tank car-
based implementation timeline for the retrofit of existing tank cars to
the NPRM's Option 3 standard when used as part of HHFT. This risk-based
retrofit schedule will be codified in authorized packaging section in
part 173, subpart F of HMR and the prescriptive retrofit standard is
detailed in Sec. 179.202-13. This timeline is based on public comment,
the FRA modeling output and historical performance of the rail industry
dealing with retrofit requirements. This timeline accounts for an
initial ramp-up period as well as incremental improvements based on a
learning curve throughout the implementation timeline. The
implementation timeline adopted is outlined in the following table:

Table 21--Timeline for Continued Use of DOT Specification 111 (DOT-111)
[Tanks for Use in HHFTs]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tank car type/service Retrofit deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG I service.... (January 1, 2017 *) January 1, 2018.
Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG I service........ March 1, 2018.
Non-Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in PG I service... April 1, 2020.
Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG II service... May 1, 2023.

[[Page 26683]]

Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG II service....... May 1, 2023.
Non-Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in PG II service.. July 1, 2023.
Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in PG I and PG II May 1, 2025.
service ** and all remaining tank cars carrying
PG III materials in an HHFT (pressure relief
valve and valve handles).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The January 1, 2017 date would trigger a retrofit reporting requirement, and tank car owners of affected cars
would have to report to DOT the number of tank cars that they own that have been retrofitted, and the number
that have not yet been retrofitted.
** We anticipate these will be spread out throughout the 120 months and the retrofits will take place during
normal requalification and maintenance schedule, which will likely result in fleet being retrofit sooner.

Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13610 require agencies to
provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation. Accordingly,
PHMSA invited public comment twice (the September 6, 2013, ANPRM and
August 1, 2014, NPRM) on retrofit timeline considerations, including
any cost or benefit figures or other factors, alternative approaches,
and relevant scientific, technical and economic data. Such comments
aided PHMSA and FRA in the evaluation of the proposed requirements.
PHMSA and FRA have since revised our proposed retrofit timelines to
address the public comments received.
PHMSA and FRA have made regulatory decisions within this final rule
based upon the best currently available data and information. PHMSA and
FRA are confident that retrofits can be accomplished in the revised
timeline adopted in this final rule. However, PHMSA and FRA will
continue to gather and analyze additional data. Executive Order 13610
urges agencies to conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to
examine whether they remain justified and whether they should be
modified or streamlined in light of changed circumstances, including
the rise of new technologies. Consistent with its obligations under
E.O. 13610, Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens, PHMSA and FRA
will retrospectively review all relevant provisions in this final rule,
including industry progress toward meeting the established retrofit
timeline.
To this end, the first phase of the timeline includes a January 1,
2017 deadline for retrofitting non-jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG I
service. If the affected industry is unable to meet the January 1, 2017
retrofit deadline a mandatory reporting requirement would be triggered.
This reporting requirement would require owners of non-jacketed DOT-111
tank cars in PG I service to report to Department of Transportation the
following information regarding the retrofitting progress:
The total number of tank cars retrofitted to meet the DOT-
117R specification;
The total number of tank cars built or retrofitted to meet
the DOT-117P specification;
The total number of DOT-111 tank cars (including those
built to CPC-1232 industry standard) that have not been modified;
The total number of tank cars built to meet the DOT-117
specification; and
The total number of tank cars built or retrofitted to a
DOT-117, 117R or 117P specification that are ECP brake ready or ECP
brake equipped.
While this requirement applies to any owner of non-jacketed DOT-111
tank cars in PG I service, the Department of Transportation would
accept a consolidated report from a group representing the affected
industries. Furthermore, while not adhering to the January 1, 2017
retrofit deadline triggers an initial reporting requirement, it would
also trigger a requirement which would allow the Secretary of
Transportation to request additional reports of the above information
with reasonable notice.

C. Speed Restrictions

Speed is a factor that contributes to derailments. Speed can
influence the probability of an accident, as it may allow for a brake
application to stop the train before a collision. Speed also increases
the kinetic energy of a train resulting in a greater possibility of the
tank cars being punctured in the event of a derailment. The kinetic
energy of an object is the energy that it possesses due to its motion.
It is defined as the work needed to accelerate or decelerate a body of
a given mass.

Kinetic Energy = \1/2\ (Mass) x (Velocity)2

Based on this calculation, given a fixed mass, if an accident
occurred at 40 mph instead of 50 mph, we should expect a reduction of
kinetic energy of 36 percent. After consultations with engineers and
subject matter experts, we can assume that this would translate to the
severity of an accident being reduced by 36%. A slower speed may also
allow a locomotive engineer to identify a safety problem ahead and stop
the train before an accident occurs, which could lead to accident
prevention.
A purpose built model developed for FRA by Sharma and Associates,
Inc. was used to simulate a number of derailment scenarios to evaluate
the survivability of the tank cars proposed in the NPRM equipped with
different brake systems and operating a range of speeds. The results of
the simulations were the most probable number of tank cars derailed and
punctured. The results were used to calculate the effectiveness of the
tank car enhancements, speed reduction and brake systems individually
in in combination with one or both of the other parameters. The model
and simulation are discussed in detail in the March 2015 letter report
prepared by Sharma and Associates, Inc. This letter report is available
in the docket for this rulemaking.
As tank car enhancements, brake systems, and speed are interrelated
aspects of this rulemaking and can have an effect on each other,
various combinations of these variables were evaluated by FRA modeling.
For example, by modifying the variables of speed (30 mph-50 mph), tank
car enhancements (shell thickness, steel type, jacketing and head
shielding), and braking (TWEOT, DP and ECP), FRA was able to create a
matrix which could compare the effectiveness and benefits of numerous
combinations of these variables. The table below describes the speeds
that were evaluated with the various combinations of tank car
enhancements and braking systems.

Table 22--Speeds Evaluated in the FRA's Purpose Built Model
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speeds evaluated Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 mph................................... Proposed maximum speed.
40 mph................................... Proposed maximum speed in
High-Threat Urban Areas.

[[Page 26684]]

30 mph................................... Speed in the range at which
most of derailments under
consideration in this
rulemaking occurred.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Given the data from FRA and Sharma & Associates, PHMSA anticipates
the reductions in the speed of trains that employ less safe tank cars,
such as the non-jacketed DOT-111 tank car, will prevent fatalities and
injuries and limit the amount of damages to property and the
environment in an accident. Simulation results indicate that limited
safety benefits would be realized from a reduction in speed as the tank
car fleet is enhanced as proposed in this NPRM. Please refer to the RIA
for a detailed analysis of the impact of speed on the number of cars
derailed and punctured when paired with a range of tank car
enhancements and braking options.
In response to the Secretary Foxx's Call to Action, the rail and
crude oil industries agreed to consider voluntary operational
improvements, including speed restrictions in high consequence areas.
As a result of those efforts, railroads began operating certain trains
at 40 mph on July 1, 2014. This voluntary restriction applies to any
``Key Crude Oil Train'' with at least one non-CPC 1232 tank car or one
non-DOT specification tank car while that train travels within the
limits of any high-threat urban area (HTUA) as defined by 49 CFR
1580.3.
In the August 1, 2014, NPRM, PHMSA and FRA proposed to add a new
Sec. 174.310 to include certain operational requirements for a HHFT.
Among those operational requirements was a proposal to limit the speed
of an HHFT. Specifically, the NPRM proposed to add a new Sec. 174.310
to Part 174--Carriage by Rail that would establish a 50-mph maximum
speed restriction for HHFTs. This 50-mph maximum speed restriction for
HHFTs was generally consistent with the speed restrictions that the AAR
issued in Circular No. OT-55-N on August 5, 2013.
In Sec. 174.310(a)(3), PHMSA also proposed three options for a 40-
mph speed restriction for any HHFT unless all tank cars containing
Class 3 flammable liquids meet or exceed the proposed standards for the
DOT Specification 117 tank car. The three 40-mph speed limit options
are as follows:
Option 1: 40-mph Speed Limit in All Areas
All HHFTs are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph, unless all tank
cars containing flammable liquids meet or exceed the proposed
performance standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank car.
Option 2: 40-mph Speed Limit in Areas With More Than 100,000 People
All HHFTs--unless all tank cars containing flammable liquids meet
or exceed the proposed standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank
car--are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph while operating in an
area that has a population of more than 100,000 people.
Option 3: 40-mph Speed Limit in High-Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs)
All HHFTs--unless all tank cars containing flammable liquids meet
or exceed the proposed standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank
car--are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph while the train travels
within the geographical limits of HTUAs.
In addition, PHMSA proposed to add a new Sec. 174.310(a)(3)(iv) to
Part 174--Carriage by Rail that would prohibit a rail carrier from
operating HHFTs at speeds exceeding 30 mph if the rail carrier does not
comply with the proposed braking requirements set forth in the Advanced
Brake Signal Propagation Systems section of the NPRM. The intention of
this requirement was to further reduce risks through speed restrictions
and encourage adoption of newer braking technology while simultaneously
reducing the burden on small rail carriers that may not have the
capital available to install new braking systems.
On the issue of speed restrictions, PHMSA received public comments
representing approximately 90,821 signatories. Comments in response to
the NPRM's speed restrictions were wide ranging, with comments both
supporting and opposing speed restrictions. Some commenters supported
the speed restrictions explicitly as they were proposed in the NPRM.
Other commenters opposed the NPRM's speed restrictions and proposed
alternatives, such as different speed limits or different geographical
standards for use in determining where a speed limit is applicable.
Further, many commenters did not directly support or oppose any of the
proposed speed restrictions, but rather chose to comment generally.
Below is a table detailing the types and amounts of commenters on the
speed proposals.

Table 23--Commenter Composition: Speed Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenter type Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization............................. 85,023
Individuals............................................. 5,475
Industry stakeholders................................... 265
Government organizations or representatives............. 58
---------------
Totals................................................ 90,821
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Overall, the comments of citizens, environmental groups, tribal
communities and local government representatives supported more
restrictive speed limits. These comments were essentially focused on
how speed restrictions would provide safety benefits to local
communities or the environment. Referencing data from the NPRM, these
groups expressed concerns that derailments and releases of crude oil
and ethanol present public safety risks and have occurred at lower
speeds than the speed limits proposed in NPRM. Environmental groups and
affiliated signatories, in particular, voiced concerns that releases of
hazardous materials in derailments could have far-reaching adverse
impacts on environmental quality, including water quality and
biological diversity. Some commenters asked PHMSA to consider making
the proposed speed restrictions applicable to specific environmental
areas, such as in the vicinity of water resources or national parks. In
illustration of these viewpoints, Clean Water Action has stated:

The agencies' promotion of a 40 miles per hour speed, when in
fact nine of the major 13 train accidents (Table 3 of the NPRM)
occurred with speeds under 40 miles per hour does not seem justified
nor is it in the public interest. Fire resulted in 10 of the 13
accidents, three of which were involved in speeds over 40 miles per
hour and five of which were between 30 miles per hour and 40 miles
per hour. The 6 accidents involving crude oil resulted in over 1.2
million gallons of oil being spilled [. . .] Clean Water Action
encourages the agency to analyze reducing travel speeds to 30 mph
and lower. [. . .] Clean Water Action respectfully encourages the
agency to examine additional speed restrictions in areas near public
drinking water supplies and sensitive environments.

Three entities representing tribal communities, the Tulalip Tribes,
the Prairie Island Indian Community and the Quinault Indian Nation,
expressed specific concerns with regard to the speed restrictions
proposed in the August 1, 2014, NPRM. The Tulalip Tribes noted that
``[t]he maximum speed limit for the trains should not be higher than
the maximum speed the rail cars

[[Page 26685]]

can survive in the case of an accident. Only lowering the speeds to 40
miles per hour is inadequate to protect life and property.'' The
Prairie Island Indian Community supported this viewpoint and expressed
concern noting the proximity of a crude oil route to their primary
residential area and gaming enterprise. They continued that they
``would like to see the non-enhanced HHFT trains slowed down even
further, to 30 miles per hour through residential areas or through
areas with critical or sensitive infrastructure (like nuclear power
plants).'' Finally, the Quinault Indian Nation conveyed their support
of a 40-mph restriction in all areas with further research being
completed on the benefits of a 30-mph restriction in all areas.
In addition, some individual citizens, environmental groups, and
local communities expressed concern that speed restrictions might
protect some cities and towns while potentially leaving others exposed
to safety risks. Consequently, many individual citizens, environmental
groups, and local government representatives supported Option 1, the
40-mph speed limit for HHFTs in all areas, or proposed an alternative
lower speed limit to be applied as a nation-wide speed limit. These
commenters did not address for the costs of implementing Option 1;
rather, they emphasized that Option 1's geographical standard (``all
areas'') is the most protective, and most beneficial, of the three
speed options proposed and would benefit all communities, large and
small. As Earthjustice, Forest Ethics, Sierra Club, et al. have
expressed:

Imposing a 40 m.p.h. speed limit only in the largest cities or
`high-threat urban areas' would be far less protective of the public
than requiring safer speed limits in all populated and sensitive
areas. First, the option that would focus speed restrictions on
areas with more than 100,000 people excludes far too many populated
areas that [are] in harm's way. For example, many U.S. cities that
have experienced dangerous and potentially deadly HHFT derailments
would not be covered by safer speed limits using this threshold,
including Lynchburg, Virginia (78,000 people); Painesville, Ohio
(20,000 people); and Vandergrift, PA (5,000 people).

Comments from rail network users and operators generally supported
less restrictive speed limits. They were essentially concerned with the
cost impacts of the proposed speed restrictions. In illustration of
these potential cost impacts, the rail network users and operators
provided some industry-specific data and analysis on the detrimental
effects to network fluidity and the additional costs that would result
from the proposed speed restrictions. Overall, these commenters and
other stakeholders stated that speed restrictions would lead to: (1)
Increased congestion; (2) slower or less predictable delivery times for
various products, including crude oil, ethanol, and agricultural
commodities; (3) increases in the number of tank cars required to
ensure consistent timely delivery service due to increases in transit
times; (4) increased costs to shippers and carriers; (5) constrained
investments in the rail network's infrastructure and capacity due to
reduced rail carrier revenues; (6) diversions of crude oil and ethanol
transport to other modes of transport; and (7) slower passenger or
commuter rail service.
Several commenters stated that the proposed speed restrictions
would result in additional congestion. These commenters emphasized that
the rail network is already congested and has ``fluidity'' issues. Dow
and the DGAC suggested that the proposed speed restrictions could
inadvertently increase the risk of incidents due to congestion.
According to multiple commenters, increased congestion and subsequent
reductions in network fluidity could ``ripple'' across the rail network
and would affect various commodities that are transported by rail, not
just crude oil and ethanol.
PHMSA received comments from a coalition of agri-business
organizations that have been affected by ``service disruptions'' and
``severe backlogs,'' including the Agricultural Retailers Association,
National Corn Growers Association, U.S. Dry Bean Council, and various
state associations. According to these commenters, the agricultural
sector has succeeded at producing agricultural commodities, such as
grain and oilseed, at ``record or near-record'' levels, but faces
difficulty in making timely deliveries due to increased demand for
freight rail service. This increased demand is due in part to ``non-
agricultural segments of the U.S. economy,'' such as crude oil
production, and has caused a relative scarcity of rail service supply
and competition among shippers seeking to use rail transport. These
commenters have stated that the NPRM's proposed speed restrictions
would further strain the transport of commodities.
Affirming these commenters' concerns, the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) has stated that rail traffic has increased by 4.5
percent from January through October 2014 compared to the same period
in 2013. Over the same period, carloads of crude oil and petroleum
products have increased 13 percent, and these shipments of crude oil
and petroleum are occurring in the parts of the U.S. where there is
also strong demand to move coal and grain by rail.\59\ Along with crude
oil shippers, shippers of coal, grain, ethanol, and propane have
expressed concerns that rail service has been slow.
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\59\ https://www.aar.org/newsandevents/Freight-Rail-Traffic/Documents/2014-11-06-railtraffic.pdf
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In response to these congestion issues, the Surface Transportation
Board (STB) called hearings in April and September 2014 to address rail
``service problems,'' and in October, STB required ``weekly data
reports'' from all Class I railroads.^{60 61} The EIA
information and the STB's actions appear to reflect the commenters'
concerns regarding the current rail transportation environment,
characterized by increased demand, rail service issues, and competition
among shippers of different commodities for the available rail service
supply.
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\60\ STB News Releases. Available online at: http://www.stb.dot.gov/newsrels.nsf/13c1d2f25165911f8525687a00678fa7/b9b95d1200b9d81985257cad006a133a?OpenDocument and http://www.stb.dot.gov/newsrels.nsf/13c1d2f25165911f8525687a00678fa7/037f6ab62281bba985257d380068208a?OpenDocument
\61\ STB Decision Document. Available online at: http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/readingroom.nsf/WebDecisionID/43850?OpenDocument
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Among the proposed speed restrictions, many rail users and
operators and other stakeholders have expressed that Option 1--a 40-mph
speed limit for HHFTs in all areas--would have the greatest negative
impact on network fluidity. The Independent Petroleum Association of
America (IPAA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Council (NDPC) delineated
how Option 1, in particular, would create a chain of effects in the
rail network and increase costs to shippers or carriers:

The consequences of the proposed 40-mph speed restriction in all
areas would be significantly longer turnaround times for unit
trains, thus necessitating the need to have more railcars in the
shipping fleet. Longer turnaround times alone will make railcars in
short supply on the first day the new rule takes effect. A 10-mph
reduction in speed equates to a twenty percent increase in
turnaround time (assuming 50 mph average train speed), requiring a
twenty percent increase in fleet size.

Other commenters have described how transit times and costs to
shippers and carriers would increase. The Alaska Railroad Corporation
stated that a common route from Anchorage to Fairbanks, Alaska, would
``take an extra 69 minutes'' with a maximum speed of 40 mph. Bridger
has stated that ``an increase in round-trip transit time for Bridger's
unit trains from North Dakota to the East Coast from 15 days to 20

[[Page 26686]]

days will increase the cost per barrel [. . .] by 33%.'' In addition to
impacting rail carriers and oil and gas producers, the proposed speed
restrictions could impact a wide variety of shippers. The Council on
Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles (COSTHA) relayed that one of
its members, a large manufacturer and distributor of consumer products,
estimated increased costs of $80 million annually to its operations
alone due to the proposed speed restrictions.
Rail users and operators predicted that the proposed speed
restrictions would constrain their ability to invest in the rail
network's infrastructure (i.e. add capacity) at a time when capacity is
already stressed. Adding capacity would be one way in which the
railroads might seek to counteract the potential network fluidity
impacts resulting from the proposed speed restrictions. Union Pacific
Railroad Company has stated that investments to expand capacity are
risky, expansions require 2-3 years or more to complete, and the
decision to invest depends significantly on the ``ability to generate
returns at reinvestible levels.'' Thus, if the proposed speed
restrictions have a significant impact on revenues or returns,
railroads have implied that they might not be capable of investing in
the rail network's infrastructure at a rate that sufficiently addresses
recently increased demand for rail transport. Railroads have also
stated that they have been investing greatly in the rail network's
infrastructure, but the costs of adding capacity have increased in
recent years. Thus, according to the railroads, the proposed speed
limits would increase costs in a business environment that is already
characterized by increasing costs, which stresses the railroad's
ability to make new capital investments and add capacity.
Rail users and operators and other stakeholders have projected that
reduced network fluidity due to speed restrictions could result in
rail-to-highway diversions or other modal shifts. As the American
Association of Private Rail Car Owners (AAPRCO) commented, ``Since the
railroad network is already near or over capacity in many places, and
consists overwhelmingly of single and double-track lines, widespread,
new speed restrictions would have a major impact [...]. The impact in
some cases could be diversion of freight to less-safe highways.''
Commenters have stated, if the proposed speed restrictions were to
negatively influence rail network fluidity, some crude oil and ethanol
transport by rail would be diverted to highway transport, and this
would expose users of the nation's highways to increased flammable
cargos transported by trucks.
Rail users and operators have stated that the proposed speed
restrictions and subsequent reductions in network fluidity would have
adverse effects on passenger or commuter rail, and they state that
network fluidity is already stressed for these types of rail. The
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) has commented:

Amtrak believes that any significant slowing of the general
railroad system could have an adverse effect on the performance of
intercity passenger rail service, which has already been slowed by
the recent increase of freight traffic, including the increase in
the number of Key Crude Oil Trains.

Similarly, the Sao Joaquin Partnership has contextualized this effect
for commuters, stating:

Overly restrictive speeds will reduce the fluidity of the rail
network and may reduce rail capacity for both people and freight.
Passenger rail service via ACE Train carries over 1 million riders
from Stockton to San Jose each year servicing major technology
employers in Silicon Valley providing high wage opportunities for
San Joaquin residents. Slowing freight will delay transit along this
important trade rail corridor.

Thus, if the proposed speed restrictions affect the performance of
commuter trains, adverse impacts on labor output might also occur.
Regarding industry data or projections, PHMSA often times could not
corroborate the data provided by industry stakeholders. Some commenters
did not supply data, while others supplied only limited data. PHMSA
made efforts to acquire and analyze different data that was required
for the RIA and the rulemaking's decision-making process.
Despite having voiced some cautions about speed restrictions, some
rail network users and operators expressed their support for the
voluntary speed restrictions that were agreed upon by industry members
as a result of Secretary Foxx's Call to Action and subsequent Letter to
the Association of American Railroads published on February 21,
2014.\62\ These voluntary speed restrictions are generally consistent
with the proposed 50-mph maximum speed limit and Option 3, the 40-mph
speed limit in HTUAs. Notably, Option 3 had substantial support among
the rail network users and operators and related trade associations.
Some commenters concluded that all proposed speed restrictions would
have negative impacts on industry, but, if a speed restriction were to
be implemented, Option 3 should be implemented as it would minimize
these negative impacts.
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\62\ Available online at: http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/letter-association-american-railroads
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Regarding Option 2, the 40-mph speed limit in areas with a
population of 100,000 or more, commenters raised additional concerns.
One commenter stated that the risk to a population from a train
accident depends less on the size of the population in a given area
than on the proximity of that population to the railway. Thus, Option 2
might not accurately address the true number of people threatened by
railway accidents. The Kansas City Southern Railway Company stated that
the term ``area'' is ``unacceptably vague,'' and Option 2 is therefore
``unworkable.'' This concern was echoed by other commenters.
Some commenters expressed that Option 2 would also adversely impact
network fluidity. While significantly less restrictive in a
geographical sense than Option 1, some commenters, such as Amsted Rail
and the National Shippers Strategic Transportation Council, still
considered Option 2 to be overly restrictive or costly.
Some commenters considered Option 2 to be an acceptable
``compromise'' between competing concerns for the efficiency of the
rail transportation system and enhanced safety. According to the State
of Minnesota:

Option 1, a 40 MPH speed limit in all areas, would have
extensive negative effects on the shipment capacity, reliability,
cost, and overall system velocity for Minnesota and its market
connections. Option 2, a 40 MPH limit in areas with more than
100,000 people, would be an acceptable limit for trains using tank
cars not conforming with the improved performance specifications,
and would put relatively limited strain on system velocity and
capacity compared to Option 1. The cost benefit analysis supports
this compromise order.

Nevertheless, relatively few commenters expressed support for
Option 2 as proposed in the NPRM. Comparatively, there was much wider
support for Option 1 and Option 3 as proposed in the NPRM, with
different groups of commenters expressing their respective support for
each.
Regarding the NPRM's 30-mph speed limit, some commenters were in
support, echoing the rationale that reduced speeds enhance the safety
profile of conventional braking systems. Other commenters thought that
the 30-mph speed limit should be adopted, but asserted that it would be
more appropriate to make it a requirement for all tank cars that did
not meet or exceed the standards of Specification DOT-117. Different
commenters asked that the

[[Page 26687]]

tank cars without enhanced braking systems be required to travel at
speeds under 30 mph, such as 20 mph or 18 mph. Multiple concerned
citizens asked that a 30-mph speed limit be required for all HHFTs,
irrespective of their braking systems.
Some commenters were opposed to the 30-mph speed limit. These
commenters either opposed speed restrictions in general or they
supported higher or less restrictive speed limits. For many rail users
and operators and other stakeholders, the 30-mph speed limit appeared
to be unnecessary in light of the 50-mph maximum speed limit and the
40-mph speed limit in HTUAs, which have already gained support as
voluntary speed restrictions for certain tank cars transporting crude
oil. Further, multiple commenters pointed out that some of the enhanced
braking systems proposed in the NPRM--namely, two-way EOT devices and
DP braking systems--are already widely adopted by industry. If two-way
EOT devices and DP braking systems are already widely adopted, the 30-
mph speed limit would not be generally applicable to HHFTs, unless the
30-mph speed limit also required HHFTs to equip and/or operate ECP
braking systems. For more information regarding ECP braking systems,
please see the Braking Section of the final rule.
In addition to the aforementioned comments, PHMSA received other
comments in relation to speed restrictions. These comments have been
grouped together where appropriate and paraphrased.
Response to Comments Related to Speed Restrictions
As a safety organization, PHMSA works to reduce the safety risks
inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce by
all modes of transportation, and in this rulemaking, has focused its
efforts on the safety of the transportation of large quantities of
Class 3 flammable liquids by rail. To demonstrate that speed
restrictions relate directly to safety risks, PHMSA has provided data
to demonstrate the relationship between speeds, kinetic energy, tank
car punctures in a derailment, and subsequent releases of hazardous
material into the environment (See RIA). As a result of the Sharma
modeling, PHMSA agrees with the commenters' concerns that derailments
and releases of hazardous material could have adverse impacts on public
safety and the environment and has proposed to reduce safety risks
through the implementation of speed restrictions.
In addition to demonstrating that its proposed speed restrictions
will benefit public safety, PHMSA must evaluate the impact of its
regulations on diverse stakeholders. In some cases, PHMSA is required
by law to conduct and publish a cost/benefit analysis, among other
legal requirements. Therefore, while some of the proposed speed
restrictions are more restrictive and may lead to greater safety
benefits than others, PHMSA must consider concurrently the cost of
implementing each proposed speed restriction and evaluate the net
effect on a diverse set of stakeholders. PHMSA must also consider the
costs and benefits to the various stakeholders of alternatives. As
such, the costs imposed on industry and society at large by the
proposed speed restrictions are an important factor in our regulatory
analysis and decision-making.
PHMSA believes that an overly restrictive speed limit would present
costs that outweigh benefits, and this was echoed by many commenters.
These commenters expressed the outlook that the proposed speed
restrictions would present significant new costs, caused primarily by
substantial negative effects on rail network fluidity. As a result of
its understanding of commodity flows and rail network fluidity, PHMSA
agrees that speed restrictions could result in: An increase in the
number of tank cars needed to ensure consistent delivery service due to
increases in transit or ``turn'' times; increased congestion; slower or
less predictable delivery times for some products transported by rail,
including crude oil, ethanol, and agricultural commodities; slower
passenger or commuter rail service; and increased costs to shippers and
carriers. Moreover, if an overly restrictive speed limit were codified
in the final rule, the negative effect on network fluidity could become
an indefinite burden on carriers, shippers, rail passengers, and other
stakeholders, since adding capacity to the rail network would likely be
costly, time-intensive, and in some cases not feasible.
Therefore, if the proposed speed restrictions were to significantly
hinder rail network fluidity, PHMSA believes that some diversion of
crude oil and ethanol transport to highways could occur. Given
substantial rail-to-truck diversions, the proposed speed restrictions
might also lead to increased safety risks in the wider transportation
system, especially the highway transportation system, which could in
turn result in increased highway accidents involving Class 3 flammable
liquids and increased costs related to responding to or mitigating
highway accidents. In other words, the proposed speed restrictions
could shift safety risks from rail transportation to highway
transportation. PHMSA has taken this into consideration and generally
agrees with this line of reasoning as presented by commenters.
Many concerned citizens and local communities stated that rural
areas or small towns should have the same speed restrictions and safety
protections as highly populated areas. This is a valid statement, which
PHMSA considered. However, in terms of potential injuries and
fatalities, PHMSA believes that the damages from a derailment in a
densely populated area are more likely to be catastrophic, than damages
from a derailment in a less densely populated area. Further, the
application of speed restrictions to densely populated areas is less
costly because only a small portion of the rail network is located
within the limits of these areas and railroad operating practices
already account for other kinds of restrictions, e.g., railway
crossings and signals, in urban areas.
PHMSA determined that there is a trade-off between the safety
benefits of the proposed speed restrictions and the costs incurred by
rail network operators and users, including offerors, tank car
manufacturers, tank car-related businesses, rail carriers, rail
passengers, and consumers of products transported by rail. PHMSA found
that the proposed speed restriction that offers the greatest safety
benefits is also the most costly; conversely, the least costly speed
restriction offers the least safety benefits.
To further refine this analysis, PHMSA has focused its attention on
identifying the proposed speed restriction that confers the greatest
amount of benefit per dollar of cost. PHMSA has determined that Option
3 confers the greatest amount of benefits per dollar of costs, which
lends support for the implementation of a 40-mph speed limit in HTUAs.
See the Final RIA for detailed cost and benefit figures.
Accordingly, PHMSA has decided not to apply the 40-mph speed limit
to all areas (Option 1) because this would be overly restrictive and
highly costly to a variety of stakeholders, and it confers the least
benefits per dollar of costs. PHMSA has also taken into consideration
the fact that Option 2 has a lower benefit-cost ratio than Option 3,
which lends further support for Option 3 and raises concerns about
Option 2.
Regarding Option 2, PHMSA agrees with some of the commenters'
concerns and acknowledges some of the potential problems presented by
Option 2's geographical standard, ``an area [. . .]

[[Page 26688]]

that has a population of more than 100,000 people.'' Specifically,
PHMSA recognizes that the size of a population does not always relate
to the proximity of a population to a potential railway accident.
Proximity may be a better indicator of potential damages or harm in the
event of a derailment. PHMSA also recognizes that the threshold of
100,000 people may present difficulties for purposes of compliance and
enforcement. Further, PHMSA reiterates that the implementation of
Option 2 would be more costly and confers fewer benefits per unit of
costs than Option 3. This cost/benefit analysis, the problems presented
regarding the geographical standard of Option 2, and the general lack
of commenter support for Option 2 as proposed, have led PHMSA to not
elect to codify Option 2 in the Final Rule.
Regarding Option 3, PHMSA believes that the implementation of
Option 3 would yield significant safety benefits, especially in the
nation's most populated areas where derailments are more likely to be
catastrophic. PHMSA also believes that the costs of implementing Option
3 are justified. PHMSA is confident that the geographical standard,
HTUAs, is practical and well-defined and thus, would be understood for
compliance and enforcement purposes. Namely, the HTUA designation has
been codified since 2008 in 49 CFR Section 1580.3. In addition, PHMSA
recognizes the importance of industry cooperation to date on the issue
of a 40-mph speed limit in HTUAs. For these reasons, PHMSA is electing
to adopt Option 3, a 40-mph speed limit for HHFTs in HTUAs.
PHMSA must also conduct its final rulemaking with due consideration
to the scope of its proposed rulemaking. Some of the commenters
suggested alternative, more restrictive speed limits that were
significantly lower than the speed limits proposed in the NPRM. These
speed limits cannot be adopted because PHMSA must codify regulations in
its Final Rule that are reasonably aligned with what PHMSA has proposed
in previous stages of the rulemaking in order to afford the public and
interested parties an opportunity to comment on the agency's proposed
actions.
Other commenters suggested alternative lower speed limits that are
approximate or comparable to the proposed speed restrictions. For
example, the City of Chicago suggested a 35-mph speed limit in HTUAs.
These alternative lower speed limits that were approximate or
comparable to the speed restrictions proposed in the NPRM were duly
considered, but PHMSA is not electing to adopt them. PHMSA was not
provided with sufficient data to demonstrate concretely that any one
alternative lower speed limit would be superior to the speed
restrictions proposed in the NPRM. These commenters either did not
disclose how a given damage reduction estimate was formulated, or their
suggestion for an alternative speed limit lacked an empirical basis.
The BLET and other commenters have stated that additional accident
modeling could be conducted at different speeds, such as 30 mph. PHMSA
believes additional accident modeling could help determine if
alternative lower speed limits would reduce the severity of an accident
more effectively than the proposed speed restrictions. In response to
this and other comments about the costs and benefit calculations
related to speed, further modeling was conducted from speeds of 30 mph
through 50 mph (See table 22).
In contrast to alternative lower or more restrictive speed limits,
some commenters suggested a different, less restrictive alternative:
PHMSA should not impose new speed restrictions at all. For example,
Biggs Appraisal Service has stated, ``The railroads have speed limits
on every section of track that they operate. [. . .] Why put additional
restrictions on the railroads when they already have systems in place
that work?'' Regarding this point, PHMSA recognizes that there are FRA
regulations in place pertaining to speed restrictions and track
classes, and some railroads have voluntarily chosen to implement speed
restrictions. However, the FRA regulations relate to track classes and
do not address the specific risks of HHFTs, and the voluntary speed
restrictions in place do not carry the weight of law. PHMSA believes
that the increased number of derailments and accidents in recent years
has demonstrated that the speed limit systems in place require
enhancements, such as the proposed speed restrictions. Accident
modeling data has shown that reducing speeds from 50 mph to 40 mph is
an effective way to reduce safety risks, namely the number of punctures
that occur in a derailment. To implement no speed restriction at all
would require a deliberate decision to forego certain safety benefits.
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed an additional speed restriction of 30
mph for tank cars that are not equipped and operated with either a two-
way EOT device or a DP system. Furthermore, the NPRM proposed
requirements for certain tank cars to be equipped with ECP braking
systems. These proposals and related comments are discussed in the
``Advanced Brake Signal Propagation'' section below.
Various commenters expressed concerns for the environment and
thought speed restrictions should be applicable in environmentally
sensitive areas, such as in the vicinity of water resources or
navigable waterways. In response, PHMSA affirms that our organizational
mission includes protecting the environment from the risks of
transporting hazardous materials in commerce. PHMSA acknowledges the
importance of environmental concerns and that speed restrictions may be
an effective way to protect the environment from releases of hazardous
material. Releases of hazardous materials in a derailment could have
significant adverse impacts in these areas. Further, these areas might
not be highly populated or part of a designated HTUA and consequently,
might not be protected by the proposed speed restrictions.
Citizens Acting for Rail Safety (CARS) suggested using the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s definition of ``environmentally
sensitive areas'' or using a pipeline safety definition, which pertains
to ``areas that are unusually sensitive to environmental damage.''
PHMSA believes these sources might provide a sound basis for defining
an environmentally sensitive area, or similar areas, in order to extend
the use of speed restrictions and offer specific protections to the
environment. However, under 49 CFR 172.820, routing analyses are
required of railroads carrying certain hazardous materials. The final
rule will codify these same routing requirements for railroads
transporting Class 3 flammable liquids in a HHFT. By performing a
routing analysis, railroads transporting flammable liquids in a HHFT
will be required by the HMR to consider, among other things,
``environmentally sensitive or significant areas,'' and they must base
their routing selection on the analysis. PHMSA believes this is
ultimately a more effective approach to reducing risks to
environmentally sensitive areas than the promulgation of speed
restrictions that are specific to those areas. Further, in the NPRM,
PHMSA did not propose a definition for the designation of
environmentally sensitive areas nor did it propose to base speed
restrictions on environmental criteria. PHMSA believes it would be
outside the scope of this rulemaking to require lower speeds in these
areas.
PHMSA would like to respond to other comments related to speed
restrictions enumerated below.

[[Page 26689]]

1. Speed Restrictions Should Be Harmonized
PHMSA has cooperated and will continue to cooperate with Transport
Canada and other appropriate international bodies. PHMSA seeks to
harmonize the proposed operational controls whenever it is feasible and
justified. As of April 23, 2014, Canada issued an Emergency Directive
that established a 50-mph maximum speed limit for certain trains
carrying ``Dangerous Goods,'' which is comparable to the 50-mph maximum
speed limit established through the cooperation of the Department and
AAR. These actions demonstrate that PHMSA and Transport Canada have
already achieved harmonization in some respects.
Nevertheless, speed restrictions do not necessarily need to be
harmonized between Canada and the U.S. In the final rule, PHMSA is
implementing a geographical standard for speed restrictions that is
specific to U.S. geography. Also, train speeds can be adjusted fairly
easily, and differences in speed limits between localities in the U.S.
and Canada would not present an undue burden on locomotive operators.
Harmonization of speed restrictions is not essential.
2. Speed Restrictions Should Only Apply to Tank Cars Carrying Certain
Hazardous Material(s); or Alternatively, to the Rail Transport of All
Hazardous Materials
PHMSA typically uses the hazardous materials classes (Hazard
Classes 1 through 9) to distinguish the risks of different hazardous
materials. In recent years, increased crude oil and ethanol production
have presented increased risks to the rail transportation system, but
other types of flammable liquids could present similar risks. By
defining a HHFT as a train with a continuous block of 20 or more tank
cars or a total of 35 or more tank cars containing a Class 3 flammable
liquid, we address the specific risks of increasing crude oil and
ethanol production while also anticipating the potential for future
risks presented by the increased production or transport of other Class
3 flammable liquids.
PHMSA disagrees with commenters who suggested that the proposed
speed restrictions only apply to crude oil, or alternatively, only to
crude oil and ethanol. PHMSA believes that Class 3 flammable liquids
present similar risks and as such, basing the proposed speed
restrictions on a given hazardous material's classification as Class 3
would be a comprehensive and responsive approach to mitigate these
risks.
Comments suggesting that proposed speed restrictions should apply
to the transport of all hazardous materials by rail were considered.
However, PHMSA did not propose this in the NPRM, and this suggestion
cannot be adopted in the Final Rule due to concerns that it is not
reasonably aligned with what has been proposed. Moreover, the
operational controls addressed in this rule, including speed
restrictions, are aimed at reducing the risk and consequences of
incidents involving rail shipments of Class 3 flammable liquids. The
analyses, data, and relevant factors considered in developing this rule
are specific to these materials. Information has not been provided to
support expanding these restrictions to all hazardous materials or to
justify the associated negative impacts on rail fluidity and costs.
3. PHMSA Lacked Important Data That Could Be Used To Estimate Costs or
Benefits Pertinent to Speed Restrictions and/or More Cost/Benefit
Analysis Should Be Conducted
Various commenters have identified factors that contribute to costs
or benefits that PHMSA has not included in its cost/benefit analysis.
PHMSA published a Draft RIA alongside the proposed rule to address the
requirements of Executive Order 12866, to explain the basis of its
cost/benefit analysis, and also to encourage stakeholder discussion of
cost/benefit analyses pertinent to this rulemaking. Since the NPRM,
PHMSA has improved upon its cost/benefit analyses and has published a
final regulatory impact analysis in conjunction with the final rule
based on comments received and data provided.
4. Speed Limits Should Apply to Trains Consisting of ``Enhanced'' Tank
Cars, as Well as to Trains With One or More Tank Cars That Are Not
``Enhanced''
An ``enhanced'' tank car is one that meets or exceeds the retrofit
standards or the standards set forth by Specification DOT-117.
Specification DOT-117 tank cars and retrofitted tank cars have advanced
technology and present less safety risks to the rail transportation
system, the public, and the environment than ``legacy'' Specification
DOT 111 tank cars. In addition, PHMSA believes that there should be
incentives for tank car owners and lessors to retrofit or upgrade their
fleet of tank cars. By retrofitting or upgrading their tank cars, a
carrier can transport their tank cars at speeds above the proposed
speed restrictions, and this could advantageously shorten transit times
for offerors and carriers with retrofitted tank cars.
5. Speed Restrictions Could Be Lessened Over Time If Technology
Improves
Technological improvements are oftentimes the ``triggering'' or
``initiating'' event for a new rulemaking or some other regulatory
action. PHMSA agrees that there is a possibility that speed
restrictions could be reduced or eliminated amid significant
technological improvements in the rail transportation industry.
6. Speed Limits Should Apply Only to Specific Configurations and/or a
Specific Number of Tank Cars, Such as a Continuous Block of 20 or More
Tank Cars
PHMSA agrees with this point of view. Based on commenter feedback,
we have revised the NPRM's proposed HHFT definition to comprise trains
with a continuous block of 20 or more tank cars or trains with a total
of 35 or more tank cars carrying Class 3 flammable liquids. In doing
so, PHMSA seeks to address higher risk unit train configurations. In
other words, PHMSA seeks to regulate trains that transport a
substantial number of Class 3 flammable liquid-carrying tank cars while
avoiding unwarranted regulation of trains that transport smaller
quantities of flammable liquids in a ``manifest'' train. For additional
information regarding the scope of the Final Rule, please refer to the
section describing the definition of an HHFT.
7. Speed Limits Should Be Based on Track Conditions, Classes, or
Quality/Integrity.
While track conditions and quality are an important part of rail
safety, PHMSA believes that creating a system of speed restrictions
based on these track factors is not warranted at this time. PHMSA did
not propose in the NPRM to base speed limits on these factors. The
commenters did not provide sufficient data to show how and to what
degree new speed restrictions would relate to track conditions or
quality. The commenters did not propose any specific system for the
implementation of speed restrictions based on track conditions or
quality.
Further, FRA regulations codified in 49 CFR part 213--Track Safety
Standards already enforce a system of speed limits based on track
classes. One commenter stated that the aforementioned FRA regulations
render the NPRM's speed restrictions ``redundant.'' On this point,
PHMSA disagrees because the proposed speed restrictions are specific to
the risks of

[[Page 26690]]

Class 3 flammable liquids and the type, number, and configuration of
tank cars in a train. The proposed speed restrictions offer additional
safety benefits.
Also, the Final Rule extends the routing requirements of Sec.
172.820 to the transport of Class 3 flammable liquids by rail in HHFTs.
Under these routing requirements, railroads transporting HHFTs will be
required to consider ``track type, class, and maintenance schedule''
and ``track grade and curvature,'' among other factors, in their choice
of routes. Railroads moving HHFTs must base their routing decision on
this analysis, effectively taking into consideration the potential
problems presented by track conditions, classes, or quality.
One commenter stated that a 30-mph speed limit should be in place
for the segments of track that are in use for passenger service. Trains
in freight rail service and passenger rail service share significant
portions of the nation's rail infrastructure, so implementing this
suggestion would be overly restrictive.
8. The Proposed Speed Limits Are Based on Inadequate Geographical
Standards
PHMSA considered different geographical standards in its
development of the proposed speed restrictions, and commenters offered
various alternative geographical standards, including references to
Bureau of the Census criteria or data for urban areas. However, the
commenters did not submit an accompanying cost/benefit analysis of the
alternative geographical standards, and these alternatives in many
cases were not adequately elaborated so that PHMSA could analyze
whether or not they would be superior to the proposed speed
restrictions.
The NTSB proposed the ``potential impact radius'' (PIR) model as an
alternative geographical standard. NTSB likened PIR to an approach used
by PHMSA's gas pipeline regulations. PIR might be an effective
geographical standard for pipeline safety, but it is not clear if this
standard would also be suitable for rail transportation safety. Rail
transport involves a wider variety of commodities and amounts
transported, which presents a wider variety of risks that are mode-
specific. On this basis, PHMSA does not believe that PIR would be
better than the geographical standards proposed in the NPRM.
Furthermore, PHMSA believes that the HTUA designation is in fact
responsive to the need for greater protections in the areas that
present the greatest risks or ``potential impact.''
One commenter stated that the HTUA designation is ``irrelevant'' in
the context of reducing rail safety risks, as it was designed for the
identification of terrorist targets. PHMSA disagrees. The HTUA
designation is also applicable to the reduction of rail safety risks
because it encompasses many areas that, if they were involved in a
derailment, could result in widespread damages. The likelihood that a
derailment would result in catastrophic damages is greater in HTUAs
than most other areas. A different commenter criticized Option 3 and
the HTUA designation because it was seen as overly restrictive and
includes ``dozens of areas.'' PHMSA disagrees on the basis that only
approximately 7% of the rail network is located within the limits of
HTUAs.
Regarding alternative geographical standards, PHMSA affirms that
there are costs involved in creating new regulatory standards,
potential issues with implementation and clarity, and benefits involved
in consistencies between federal regulations. In this respect, the HTUA
designation would be easier, more effective, and clearer to implement
in accordance with a 40-mph speed limit because it has been codified
since 2008 in Title 49, CFR. Accordingly, rail network users and
operators already have a compliance history with this regulation.
Conversely, rail network operators are not familiar with PIR and other
alternative geographical criteria, and there would be a particular cost
attached to introducing novel geographical criteria.
9. Slow Rail Operations Have Already Affected U.S. Ethanol Production
by Limiting the Amount of Ethanol That Can Be Transported by Rail, and
the Proposed Speed Restrictions Will Negatively Impact Ethanol
Transport
According to the Michigan Agri-Business Association, the Michigan
Farm Bureau, and businesses in the ethanol industry, slow rail service
has already impacted the ability of ethanol producers to effectively
ship and deliver ethanol to consumers. To that effect, Homeland Energy
Solutions has stated that the presently slow rail service has been
difficult to overcome and additional speed restrictions applicable to
ethanol transport will further hinder the industry, potentially causing
some producers to shut down.
In response, PHMSA asserts there are many factors that might be
slowing existing rail operations. Reduced speed is only one factor that
might result in slow rail service. For example, the contributing
factors of poor rail service might include the rapid increase in the
production and transport of crude oil and subsequent displacement of
other commodities in the rail system. In such a case, poor service
could not necessarily be attributed to PHMSA's proposed speed
restrictions. Nevertheless, PHMSA is also concerned with the impact of
the proposed speed restrictions on rail network fluidity, and seeks to
limit their potential negative effects.
The AAR proposed and implemented voluntary speed restrictions to
mitigate the risks of crude oil transport. Thus far, these voluntary
speed restrictions have not been applicable to ethanol transport by
rail. When considering additional speed restrictions, PHMSA looks at
cost/benefit analysis from a holistic perspective and does not give any
one industry or stakeholder a preference in its analysis. PHMSA seeks
to extend the safety benefits of the proposed speed restrictions to the
transport of all Class 3 flammable liquids, including ethanol, as well
as limit the negative effect of these speed restrictions on overall
rail network fluidity and the costs borne by all industry participants,
including ethanol producers.
PHMSA acknowledges that, after the final rule takes effect, the
adopted speed restrictions will have a direct impact on ethanol
producers and carriers. There will be an increase in burden or costs to
shippers and carriers of ethanol if, prior to the rulemaking, they had
moved ethanol above 50 mph. Union Pacific has stated, ``Freight trains
often operate at speeds between 50 mph and 70 mph.'' Thus, freight
trains could have moved ethanol above 50 mph prior to the rulemaking.
Nevertheless, commenters did not adequately relate to what degree
the 50-mph maximum speed limit would decrease the actual operating
speeds of HHFTs carrying ethanol. Overall, fewer commenters expressed
concerns about the 50-mph speed limit than about the three 40-mph speed
limits. In addition, industry cooperation with the Department has
already established 50 mph as a maximum speed limit for certain trains.
In Canada, Transport Canada issued an Emergency Directive in April 2014
requiring all companies to not operate a ``Key Train'' at speeds that
exceed 50 mph. For these reasons, it is PHMSA's understanding that the
50-mph maximum speed limit is a common industry practice and
implementing this speed limit would not drastically change the maximum
speeds at which most trains carrying hazardous materials, including
ethanol, operate.
In addition to the 50-mph maximum speed limit, ethanol shippers and
carriers are directly affected by the 40-mph speed limit in HTUAs as a
result

[[Page 26691]]

of the final rule. As with the 50-mph maximum speed limit, however, it
is not clear to what extent HHFTs carrying ethanol would be affected.
BNSF has indicated that rail speeds through population centers of
100,000 or more, which would also include all HTUAs, are already ``at
or below 40 mph.'' This suggests the costs impacts of the 40-mph speed
limit in HTUAs would be minimal.
For other carriers or entities within the ethanol industry, Option
3 might introduce new costs to them, but PHMSA believes the costs are
justified by additional safety benefits. Since Option 3 refers to a 40-
mph speed limit in HTUAs, only a small portion of the rail network--
around 7% of the nation's track--will be affected by this new speed
restriction. On balance, Option 3 is the least costly of the three
speed options proposed and concentrates its protections in the areas
where a derailment is most likely to be catastrophic and safety
benefits are greatest. The ability to limit the cost impacts of the
proposed speed restrictions on industry, including ethanol shippers,
carriers, and others, has lent support to PHMSA's decision to implement
Option 3. PHMSA believes the new costs to ethanol industry participants
are limited and justifiable.
PHMSA does not intend to unjustifiably introduce costs into the
operations of stakeholders, especially those who qualify as small
businesses or small entities. For this reason, and in compliance with
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612), PHMSA must
conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis addressing the rulemaking's
economic impact given that the rulemaking is likely to ``have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' The rulemaking's RFA demonstrates that the impact to small
entities as a result of this rulemaking will be limited and should not
cause any small entities to cease operations. Please refer to the RFA
section for additional explanation of the final rule's impact on small
entities.
10. Voluntary Speed Restrictions Are Sufficient and Should Not Be
Codified; or Voluntary Speed Restrictions Are Insufficient and Should
Be Codified
PHMSA believes the speed restrictions should be codified.
Recommended practices, such as voluntary speed restrictions, do not
carry the weight of law. Recommended practices do not provide legal
recourse in the event a railroad moves an HHFT at speeds exceeding
voluntary speed restrictions thus increasing the likelihood of
catastrophic damage in a train accident. Further, without the
codification of these requirements, the speed restrictions could be
lifted altogether in a premature manner, increasing safety risks.
Codifying the speed restrictions will ensure that the safety benefits
of speed restrictions are realized indefinitely and cannot be
prematurely lifted without the appropriate procedural requirements.
Further, this codification allows PHMSA and FRA to ensure compliance by
exercising oversight and taking appropriate enforcement actions.
11. Speed Restrictions Could Have Unintended Consequences, Such as
Increased Delays to Vehicles Stopped at Railroad Crossings or Carriers
Choosing Not To Configure a 20th Tank Car in Order To Avoid Speed
Restrictions
Regarding increased delays to vehicles stopped at railroad
crossings, commenters did not provide specific data regarding the time
or cost burden of this kind of delay. PHMSA recognizes this could be a
consequence of the proposed speed restrictions, but is unable at this
time to quantify the time burden or cost of increased vehicle delays at
railroad crossings. PHMSA expects the cost of these delays would not be
substantial.
Regarding train configurations and the proposed speed restrictions,
PHMSA seeks to limit the implementation of speed restrictions to train
consists with a substantial number of tank cars carrying Class 3
flammable liquids. In practical terms, PHMSA seeks to limit the effect
of the proposed speed restrictions so that ``manifest'' trains would
not be regulated to the same degree as a unit train of Class 3
flammable liquid.
PHMSA has revised its definition of an HHFT in response to
commenter feedback on typical train configurations involving Class 3
flammable liquids, including crude oil and ethanol. The revised
definition would allow rail carriers to configure up to 34 tank cars
carrying flammable liquids so long as there are not 20 or more tank
cars in a continuous block. A train that distributes hazmat-carrying
tank cars (i.e., configures them to limit the size of continuous
blocks) in a consist would most likely pose a lower risk than a train
with continuous blocks of cars containing hazmat. Moreover, the
threshold of 35 or more total tank cars prevents a rail carrier from
being able to transport an essentially unrestrained quantity of Class 3
flammable liquid tank cars by continually and purposefully avoiding the
configuration of a 20th tank car in a continuous block. As such, the
revised HHFT definition will limit the impact of the proposed speed
restrictions on ``manifest'' trains.
12. Speed Restrictions Will Influence Externalities, Such as Noise
Disturbances
PHMSA agrees that the proposed speed restrictions might result in
externalities, such as reduced noise disturbances. PHMSA has taken into
consideration the most significant externalities that would result from
this rulemaking. PHMSA's review of the comments, analysis of costs and
benefits, and coordination between regulatory, economic, and technical
subject matter experts has facilitated a critical evaluation of the
NPRM's proposed speed restrictions.
The following table summarizes the NPRM's proposed speed
restrictions and presents some of PHMSA's analysis as to whether or not
a given speed restriction would be an effective regulation.

Table 24--Analysis of Speed Restrictions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NPRM's proposed speed
restrictions Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1: 40-mph speed limit in Option 1 was the most restrictive of
all areas. the three 40-mph speed limits
proposed. Option 1 was the most
costly and confers the least
benefits per dollar of costs. Also,
the costs presented by Option 1
significantly outweighed the
benefits of Option 1 in PHMSA's
cost/benefit analysis, even when
using the highest value in the
benefit range to evaluate Option
1's net effect. Further, PHMSA
believes the effect of Option 1 on
rail network fluidity could be
substantial.
Option 2: 40-mph speed limit in Commenters stated that Option 2's
areas with more than 100,000 geographical standard is inadequate
people. and unworkable. There was
relatively little explicit support
for Option 2 among commenters.
Option 2 confers significantly less
benefits per unit of costs than
Option 3.

[[Page 26692]]

Option 3: 40-mph speed limit in Option 3 would yield significant
High-Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs). safety benefits, particularly in
the nation's densely populated
areas, which present an increased
likelihood of the occurrence of a
catastrophic event. Likewise,
Option 3 confers the most safety
benefits per unit of costs. In
addition, the geographical
designation of High-Threat Urban
Area (HTUA) is workable, defined,
and codified in Part 1580 in Title
49 CFR.
50-mph maximum speed limit for The 50-mph maximum speed limit for
HHFTs. HHFTs does not introduce new costs
to stakeholders that offer or ship
crude oil. A 50-mph speed limit for
HHFTs is in line with widely
adopted practices due to trade
association and industry
cooperation with regulatory bodies.
It is also considerably harmonized
with Transport Canada's April 2014
Emergency Directive.
30-mph speed limit for HHFTs The 30-mph speed limit for HHFTs
without enhanced braking systems. without a two-way EOT device or DP
braking systems would not be
generally applicable, provided that
HHFTs are in compliance with the
requirements for the use of these
enhanced braking systems in the
Final Rule. Speed limits pertinent
to the use of ECP braking systems
are discussed in the Braking
Section of the Final Rule.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusion
In the final rule, PHMSA and FRA are adopting requirements for
speed restrictions for HHFTs. Specifically, this rulemaking adds a new
Sec. 174.310 to Part 174--Carriage by Rail. Section 174.310(a)(2)
establishes a 50-mph maximum speed restriction for HHFTs. In addition,
Sec. 174.310(a)(2) establishes a 40-mph speed limit for HHFTs within
the limits of high-threat urban areas (HTUAs) as defined in 49 CFR
1580.3, unless all tank cars containing a Class 3 flammable liquid meet
or exceed the retrofit standards, the performance standard, or the
standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank car provided in Part 179,
Subpart D of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). The 40-mph
speed limit for HHFTs within the limits of HTUAs is in line with Option
3 proposed in the NPRM.
In addition as discussed previously on April 17, 2015 FRA issued
Emergency Order 30 to require that certain trains transporting large
amounts of Class 3 flammable liquid through certain highly-populated
areas adhere to a maximum authorized operating speed limit.\63\ Under
Emergency Order 30, an HHFT with at least one DOT-111 tank car
(including those built in accordance with CPC-1232 loaded with a Class
3 flammable liquid) must not exceed 40 mph in HTUAs as defined in 49
CFR 1580.3. As this final rulemaking does not become effective for 60
days from publication FRA believes the restrictions in Emergency Order
30 will address an emergency situation while avoiding other safety
impacts and harm to interstate commerce and the flow of necessary goods
to the citizens of the United States. FRA and DOT will continue to
evaluate whether additional action with regard to train speeds is
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\63\ See http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_2DA43BA3704E57F1958957625273D89A29FF0B00/filename/EO_30_FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Advanced Brake Signal Propagation Systems

Since the passage of the First Safety Appliance Act of March 2,
1893, freight train operations in the U.S. have traditionally relied on
air brakes to slow and stop a train.\64\ This conventional air brake
system has proven to be reliable, but it has drawbacks. When a train is
long and heavy, as is typically the case in the context of an HHFT, a
conventional air brake system can easily take over one-half mile to
bring a train to a stop, even with the emergency brakes applied.
Moreover, the length of a train will significantly affect the time it
takes for the conventional air brakes to apply to the entire consist.
It can take a number of seconds for the air brake system to function as
air is removed from the system to engage the brakes, beginning with the
cars nearest to the locomotive and working towards the rear of the
train. For example, in a 100-car train it could take up to 16 seconds
as the brakes fully apply sequentially from front-to-back. This lag in
air brake application time from the front to the back of the train also
can result in significant in-train buff and draft forces. These in-
train forces can lead to wheel damage (e.g. slid flat spots) and can
negatively impact rail integrity as these flat spots create a vertical
impact force (``pounding'') on the rails. These are major contributing
factors to derailments. In-train forces resulting from the application
of conventional air brakes also can directly contribute to derailments,
particularly in emergency situations, as freight cars can be forcefully
bunched together when the train is brought to a stop quickly. These
forces may also be amplified by the longitudinal slosh effect of a
liquid lading, such as crude oil or ethanol. Such factors have led
PHMSA and FRA to consider advanced brake signal propagation systems as
a way to improve safety in the transportation of Class 3 flammable
liquids by rail, particularly with respect to longer trains
transporting 70 or more tank cars loaded with Class 3 flammable
liquids. These more advanced systems have the capability to stop trains
more quickly and reduce the number of braking induced derailments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\64\ The conventional air brake system was invented by George
Westinghouse in approximately 1869. It relies on air pressure to
apply and release the air brakes on each car in a train's consist.
There is an air brake line that connects each car to an air source
provided by the locomotive. When the air brakes are in the release
position, the locomotive is providing air pressure to prevent the
air brakes from applying. When air pressure is reduced in the system
during a service application, the air brakes will apply. (Note:
There are also handbrakes on each car and each locomotive and an
independent brake on each locomotive. Handbrakes are not activated
by a train's air brakes system. Independent brakes may be applied
and released separately from the train's air brake system.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Types of Brake Signal Propagation Systems Considered in the NPRM
Brake signal propagation systems are interconnected arrangements of
braking components that operate together to slow or stop a train.
Compared to conventional air brakes, these systems can reduce the
number of cars impacted (e.g., derailed or punctured), can dissipate
the kinetic energy associated with train accidents, and in some
instances can prevent an accident from occurring through accident
avoidance. In the NPRM, PHMSA and FRA considered three advanced brake
signal propagation systems that would contribute to the safe
transportation of Class 3 flammable liquids when transported in bulk by
rail: Two-way end-of-train (EOT) devices, distributed power (DP)
systems, and electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking systems.
Two-way EOT devices include two pieces of equipment linked by radio
that initiate an emergency brake application

[[Page 26693]]

command from the front unit located in the controlling (``lead'')
locomotive, which then activates the emergency air valve at the rear of
the train within one second. The rear unit of the device sends an
acknowledgment message to the front unit immediately upon receipt of an
emergency brake application command. A two-way EOT device is slightly
more effective than conventional air brakes because the rear cars
receive the emergency brake command more quickly in an engineer induced
emergency brake application.
DP systems use multiple locomotives positioned at strategic
locations within the train consist (often at the rear of the train) to
provide additional power and train control in certain operations. For
instance, a DP system may be used to provide power while climbing a
steep incline and to control the movement of the train as it crests the
incline and begins its downward descent. The DP system works through
the control of the rearward locomotives by command signals originating
at the lead locomotive and transmitted to the remote (rearward)
locomotives. DP systems are a mature technology and are in widespread
use on Class I railroads, particularly those operating west of the
Mississippi River. While distributed power technically is not a braking
system, the additional power source in or at the rear of the train
consist can provide enhanced braking for a train.
ECP brake systems simultaneously send an electronic braking command
to all equipped cars in the train, reducing the time before a car's
pneumatic brakes are engaged compared to conventional air brakes. They
can be installed as an overlay to a conventional air brake system or
replace it altogether; however, FRA regulations do require that ECP
brake systems be interoperable pursuant to the AAR S-4200 standard,
which allows for interchange among the Class I railroads. 49 CFR
232.603. The modeling performed for the NPRM by Sharma & Associates
suggested that ECP brakes could reduce the severity of an accident when
emergency braking is applied by 36 percent (meaning that 36 percent
fewer cars would be expected to puncture in the event of a derailment
of a 100 car train) compared to conventional air brakes.\65\ Additional
modeling (discussed in detail below) conducted after the NPRM, supports
the finding that ECP brakes reduce the probability of punctures in the
event of a derailment, although the updated modeling determined that
ECP brakes provide an approximate safety benefit of 26-30 percent in
terms of reduced probability of tank car punctures. PHMSA and FRA
conducted additional analysis of the results provided in the updated
analysis and determined that ECP brakes were almost 20 percent more
effective than a two-way EOT device or DP unit when weighted based on
the quantity of product spilled in a derailment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\65\ The estimates for ECP braking systems in the NPRM have been
revised based on updated modeling from Sharma & Associates. See
``Letter Report: Objective Evaluation of Risk Reduction from Tank
Car Design & Operations Improvement--Extended Study,'' Sharma &
Associates, March 2015. The final rule relies on the updated
modeling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The simultaneous application of ECP brakes on all cars in a train
also significantly improves train handling by substantially reducing
stopping distances as well as buff and draft forces within the train,
which under certain conditions can result in a derailment. Because ECP
brakes do not rely on changes in air pressure passing from car to car,
there are no delays related to the depletion and recharging of a
train's air brake system. These factors provide railroads with the
ability to decrease congestion or to increase volume by running longer
trains closer together.\66\ Further, under current FRA regulations,
trains relying on ECP brakes are allowed to run for longer distances
between brake inspections (up to 3,500 miles), which decreases the time
equipment spends out of service. See ``ECP Efficiencies'' discussion in
the RIA. FRA's existing regulations also permit significant flexibility
related to the handling of cars with inoperative brakes due to the fact
that ECP braking systems allow train crews to electronically monitor
the effectiveness of the brakes on each individual car in a train and
provide real-time information on the performance of the entire braking
system of the train.\67\ ECP braking system technology also reduces the
wear and tear on brake system components and can reduce fuel
consumption. The combination of all these factors allows for more
efficient operations, which results in ECP-equipped trains having
higher utilization rates. These efficiencies are addressed in detail in
the RIA, which is included in the docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\66\ PHMSA and FRA recognize that the outer length of trains
will ultimately governed by structural factors, such as the length
sidings.
\67\ A train equipped with ECP brakes may depart its initial
terminal with 95 percent operative brakes, whereas a train equipped
with conventional air brakes must have 100 percent operative brakes
at departure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because U.S. railroads have traditionally relied on conventional
air brakes, existing tank cars and locomotives (to a lesser extent)
have not been built with ECP brake technology installed. All cars in a
train, as well as locomotives, must be equipped with wiring to allow
the brake system to be relayed through the entire train before the
train can operate in ECP brake mode.\68\ As a result, an ECP brake
system is not efficient in a situation where a substantial number of
cars are not equipped to handle ECP brakes. This aligns with the
experiences learned from the operation of ECP-equipped trains by BNSF
Railway (BNSF) and Norfolk Southern Railway (NS), which indicate that
ECP braking technology can be implemented most effectively on unit
trains that tend to be kept in dedicated service (i.e. primarily used
in unit trains that are essentially transporting a single commodity,
such as crude oil). Applying ECP brake systems in this manner has been
demonstrated to be successful both domestically and internationally as
discussed in further detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\68\ This wiring could be used to by-pass a car or locomotive if
it were not equipped with ECP brakes. However, the train must have a
minimum of 95 percent effective brakes. See 49 CFR 232.609.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Public Comments to the Brake System Proposal in the NPRM
Given the increased risks associated with an accident involving
HHFTs, we specifically requested comments in the September 6, 2013,
ANPRM on the use of advanced brake signal propagation systems to reduce
the number of cars and energy associated with derailments. Based on
comments to the ANPRM and the FRA simulation data described above, in
the August 1, 2014, NPRM we proposed to require that each HHFT be
equipped with an enhanced brake signal propagation system (i.e.,
equipped with more than just conventional air brakes) along with an
implementation schedule that would minimize the impacts on rail
carriers. Specifically, subject to one exception, we proposed to
require the following:
HHFTs are to be equipped with a two-way EOT device as
defined in 49 CFR 232.5 or a DP system as defined in 49 CFR 229.5, by
October 1, 2015.
After October 1, 2015, a tank car manufactured in
accordance with proposed Sec. 179.202 or Sec. 179.202-11 for use in a
HHFT must be equipped with ECP brakes.
After October 1, 2015, HHFTs comprised entirely of tank
cars manufactured in accordance with proposed Sec. 179.202 and Sec.
179.202-11 (for Tank Car Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA Designed Car,
only), except for required buffer cars, must be operated in ECP brake
mode as defined by 49 CFR 232.5.

[[Page 26694]]

To reduce the burden on small carriers that may not have the
capital available to install new braking systems, we proposed an
exception. If a rail carrier does not comply with the proposed braking
requirements above, we proposed that the carrier may continue to
operate HHFTs at speeds not to exceed 30 mph. Additionally, we sought
specific comment on the capacity of tank car and locomotive
manufacturing and retrofit facilities to install advanced brake signal
propagation systems, estimated costs of ECP braking systems,
alternative simulations or modeling data to validate the results of the
FRA commissioned analysis, and the interaction of safety and
environmental benefits when coupled with speed restrictions or enhanced
tank car standards. The table below details the types and amounts of
commenters on the braking proposals.

Table 25--Commenter Composition: Braking Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenter type Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization............................. 100,738
Individuals............................................. 8,622
Industry stakeholders................................... 217
Government organizations or representatives............. 19
---------------
Totals................................................ 109,596
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Most of the commenters support the proposed requirements for
enhanced braking systems beyond conventional air brakes on HHFTs. Of
those commenters who identified the braking issue in their response,
approximately 98 percent of signatories specifically supported
mandating ECP brakes for HHFTs. Whereas, two percent of signatories
opposed specifically mandating ECP brakes for HHFTs in favor of two-way
EOT devices, DP systems, any enhanced braking, or no enhanced braking.
Environmental groups, concerned public, other governmental
organizations, Indian tribes, local governments, towns and cities, NGOs
and trade associations were among the main groups supporting the
mandating of ECP brakes for HHFTs. It should be noted that while 98
percent of signatories supported ECP brakes, these commenters largely
did not provide additional data supporting the proposal in the NPRM.
Some concerned public commenters supported expanding the braking
proposal to require that all tank cars transporting hazardous materials
be equipped with ECP brakes. In an online write-in campaign, over 3,000
public commenters state: ``[t]hree levels of brakes for tank car
standards are offered but ALL tank cars carrying hazardous materials
should be equipped with the highest level of brakes and brake signaling
systems.''
Other concerned public, Congressional, Indian tribes and
environmental group commenters expressed support for ECP brakes as
proposed in the NPRM. Most stated generally that they were in favor of
the most stringent and advanced brakes available for HHFTs. The
Regional Tribal Operations Committee commented that the final rule must
``require state-of-the art braking systems for crude-by-rail trains to
protect the public in the face of what the [NTSB] has called
`unacceptable public risks.'' Cost was not generally discussed by those
commenters who supported ECP brakes, and cost did not appear to be a
deciding factor in selection of a braking option for the commenters who
supported use of ECP braking systems. Specifically, these commenters
desired the tank car braking enhancements that would result in the
greatest improvements in safety for those in proximity to the rail
network as well as for environmentally sensitive areas along such
routes.
Commenters such as environmental groups and state agencies
supported ECP braking based on the modeling data provided by PHMSA and
FRA. The Center for Biological Diversity, in its comment with almost
23,000 signatories, stated:

Given that the ECP system would only reduce the potential for
tank car punctures by 36%, it is unconscionable to allow the option
of a potentially cheaper distributed power system, which would only
reduce accident severity by 18%. . . . Given the imminent hazard
that HHFTs pose to human health and the environment, the most
effective brake system that has been shown to be readily available
for these trains must be employed, and PHMSA must not offer a choice
that would drastically increase the severity of accidents.

Clean Water Action supports ECP brakes in their comment stating
``[t]o slow HHFTs[,] all rail cars should be equipped with the [ECP]
brake system whose effectiveness has been shown to be 36%.'' It also
comments that, ``[e]ven though industry believes the ECP adds
significant time and cost investment and the benefits will not be
realized for months or years in the future, the technology seems to
offer significant benefits such as real time monitoring, reduced wear
and tear on the brake system, and fuel savings.'' Clean Water Action
further noted that, ``[i]t would have been encouraging for the industry
to embrace a proven technology rather than to suggest ECP offers
marginal benefits,'' particularly when the increased effectiveness of
DP systems is only 18 percent. The California Public Utilities
Commission and California Governor's Office of Emergency Services in
their joint comment also noted that the 2006 study, ``ECP Brake System
for Freight Service: Final Report,'' \69\ identifies a number of
benefits related to the implementation of ECP braking including:
reduced stopping distances up to 70 percent, reduction in undesired
emergency brake applications, improved train handling, and reduced fuel
consumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\69\ FRA, ``ECP Brake System for Freight Service: Final
Report,'' Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006, http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L02964.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additionally, some commenters noted that EOT devices or DP systems
are already the base standard for industry and expressed concerns that
codifying the requirement to equip one of those two systems would not
increase safety in any significant manner. The BLET stated in its
comment that, ``. . . the EOT requirement already exists in 49 CFR
232.407.'' As a result, it contended that the proposed EOT device
``requirement was picked simply to have no economic impact on railroads
because they were already complying with this rule.'' The BLET noted
that, ``achieving cost savings is a worthy goal,'' but urged that ``it
cannot be a goal that comes at the risk of providing no additional
safety benefits by preservation of the status quo.'' Further, the BLET
contended that, ``[t]he use of distributed power is also currently
being done for business purposes of being able to run longer, heavier
trains due to more locomotive tractive effort provided at the rear or
within a train.''
The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division (BMWED)
and the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS) in their joint comment
support ECP braking if the requirement also includes a restoration of
the 1,000-1,500 mile interval for brake and mechanical inspections to
be performed by a qualified inspector.
Concerned public, shippers, trade associations, other governmental
organizations, and rail carriers were the main groups commenting in
opposition to ECP brakes for HHFTs in favor of two-way EOT devices, DP
systems, any enhanced braking or no enhanced braking. While these
commenters represented a small minority of the overall number of
signatories who identified braking systems in their response, several
of these commenters provided cost analyses or brake system
effectiveness data to compare against

[[Page 26695]]

the data presented by PHMSA and FRA under the NPRM.
Comments on ECP Effectiveness
Prior to publication of the August 1, 2014, NPRM, FRA conducted
simulations using the Train Energy & Dynamics Simulator (TEDS) program
developed by Sharma & Associates to demonstrate the increased
effectiveness of ECP brakes compared to conventional brakes, EOT
devices, and DP systems. The simulations were conducted to better
understand the effect on energy dissipation and stopping distance of
different brake signal propagation systems. The results of these
simulations suggested that advanced brake signal propagation systems,
especially ECP brake systems, decrease brake signal propagation time(s)
and decreased kinetic energy of a train in a derailment compared to the
conventional air brake system. Many commenters in opposition to ECP
brakes challenged PHMSA and FRA's effectiveness claims in the NPRM.
AAR challenged the modeling done by Sharma & Associates based on
several factors. It states that the number of simulations was too
limited and conducted on trains of 80 cars or less.\70\ AAR's
Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) undertook its own
modeling of the effect of ECP brakes, with an independent review by
Applied Research Associates. According to AAR, the TTCI modeling
considered additional factors that are not in the Sharma & Associates
modeling. These include the force applied to cars past the point of
derailment, potential for derailment to occur at different points on a
train, and the variability in a train's response to different types of
derailment. Using the Aliceville, AL, derailment as a proxy, TTCI
concludes that the energy of the derailment would have been decreased
by 12 percent had ECP brakes been used instead of the distributed power
in use on that train. Utilizing simulated speeds of 30, 35, 40, 45, and
50 mph, respectively, as well as multiple advanced brake systems--such
as conventional brakes with two-way EOT and head-end devices \71\ and
distributed power (rear, middle of the train, and buried 2/3)--TTCI's
modeling suggests that a train using ECP brakes is 10.5-13.3 percent
more effective as measured by the decrease in kinetic energy during the
derailment, with a decrease in the number of cars expected to be
derailed at 1.2-1.6 cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\70\ The initial round of simulations were, in fact, 80 car
trains. For the final rule 100, 80, 50 and 20 car trains were
modeled.
\71\ A head-end device (also known as front-of-train unit or
front unit) is placed in the locomotive. It receives data from the
EOT device that is placed on the rear car of the train. In two-way
EOT systems, the head-end device is able to initiate emergency
braking at the rear of the train within one second. See 49 CFR
232.403 and 405.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While these figures do tend to show that ECP brakes are more
effective than DP systems, the figures developed by TTCI are indeed
lower than those presented in the Sharma & Associates modeling.
However, it is unclear what brake ratio TTCI used in its modeling.\72\
The current maximum allowable brake ratio for conventional braking is
10-11 percent, depending on the car. The modeling for conventional
braking that was done by Sharma & Associates used a simulated brake
ratio of ten percent. Because the in-train forces are greatly reduced
when using ECP brakes, AAR guidelines allow for a higher brake ratio
for ECP brakes than conventional brakes. The maximum brake ratio for
ECP brakes is about 13 percent. This should translate into shorter
stopping distances and decreased energy in the event of a derailment
for trains equipped with ECP braking systems, but it is not evident
from the information provided by AAR whether TTCI accounted for the
higher allowable brake ratio in its modeling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\72\ The braking ratio is the relation of the braking force to
the weight of the car or locomotive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additionally, while TTCI ``reproduces'' certain recorded stopping
distances in derailments, it does not actually simulate a derailment.
Instead, the TTCI model simply calculates the energy dissipation as a
train is slowed to stop when a blocking force is applied. The blocking
force is intended to act as a surrogate for the force applied by the
cars in a derailment, but this is a poor corollary to a derailment
outcome because energy dissipation by itself is insufficient to
quantify damages. It does not take into account other factors, such as
location of impact and size of impactors that are of equal importance
to energy. Therefore, we question the exactness of TTCI's results with
respect to modeling the effectiveness of ECP brakes.
AAR also suggests that the conditional probability of release (CPR;
the probability of a release if a tank car is in an accident), will
also depend on the specific tank car specification selected by PHMSA.
For example, if the CPR is five percent that means there will only be a
five percent chance of a release from the 1.2 to 1.6 cars derailing due
to the absence of ECP brakes, everything else being equal.
Union Pacific concluded that multiple remote trains (i.e. DP
systems) have essentially the same stopping performance as ECP brakes,
and that it makes little difference whether the brake commands are
delivered within 2.5 seconds (using ECP) or within four seconds (using
DP). Even though the delay in braking commands with ECP and DP can be
as much as 4-5 seconds (a result of the difference in build-up time for
the brake cylinder pressure), the difference in stop distance is
``virtually unnoticeable.'' Based on its 2009 testing, Union Pacific
concluded that braking and train handling were virtually as good with
DP systems as the ECP test train. Moreover, Union Pacific found that
increasing its use of distributed power resulted in benefits nearly
identical to using ECP braking, without the significant operating
issues created by ECP brake systems. Specifically, it states that there
are considerable compatibility and reliability issues with ECP brakes
that make them a less effective option, such as power failures as well
as hardware and software issues.
Honeywell Performance Materials and Technologies commented in
opposition of ECP braking based on how ECP brake systems operate
stating, ``the new design is not compatible with present fleet braking
systems'' and ``[i]t is our understanding that all cars, including the
locomotive, in a train would need to be equipped with the ECP brakes to
be effective.'' Concerns that all cars in a train must be equipped with
ECP brakes in order for the system to function was echoed by other
commenters in opposition of ECP brakes. Bridger commented that ``cars
equipped with ECP brakes cannot be intermixed with cars equipped with
conventional airbrakes. Thus, any tank cars set out en-route for
defects will be difficult to move to destination. This will slow the
cycle times on the cars and may also add operational costs for the
railroads in having to make special movements to `rescue' stranded ECP
equipped cars.''
BNSF submitted that the benefits of ECP brakes--in the context of
avoiding the spillage or ignition of flammable liquids moved by rail--
do not come close to justifying the costs, complexity and lost
productivity that would result from an ECP brake requirement,
especially when compared to realizing the benefits from a DP system,
which is proven technology. BNSF goes on to state that a train equipped
with ECP brakes, on average, would have approximately two fewer cars
per train derail than a similar train equipped with DP. BNSF has
experience with ECP brakes on unit trains in a captive, closed-loop
environment. What BNSF has found is that the ECP braking equipment is
more expensive to maintain, requires specialized skills and

[[Page 26696]]

shopping capabilities, and has not ever, in BNSF's experience, been
successfully applied outside of a limited, closed-loop environment.
BNSF goes on to say that while crude and ethanol make up five percent
of its shipments they travel on 70 percent of the BNSF network. This
will result in training and repair needs across a majority of their
network for a commodity that is only a small fraction of their freight
shipments.
Comments on Availability and Cost
The Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), BNSF and
Plains Marketing, LP opposed ECP brakes noting that there are only two
known manufacturers of ECP brakes, and that all current sales are
overseas. BNSF noted that the systems of the two manufacturers (New
York Air Brake and Wabtec) are not believed to be interoperable. In
addition, these manufacturers do not currently produce ECP brake
components in sufficient volumes to handle this regulatory requirement.
Amsted Rail stated that there are only six trains currently operating
with ECP brakes in the United States.
AAR, Greenbrier, Amsted Rail, the National Grain & Feed
Association, RSI and AFPM provided cost estimates per tank car for ECP
brakes ranging from $5,300 to $15,000--above the PHMSA estimate of
$3,000 for new construction and $5,000 for retrofits.
AAR, Bridger and AFPM provided cost estimates per locomotive for
ECP brakes ranging from $20,000 to $88,000--in contrast to the PHMSA
estimate of $79,000. These commenters also indicated that PHMSA
underestimated the size of the affected locomotive fleet.
AAR commented that 9,849 carmen, 27,143 engineers, and 41,015
conductors would need training--above the PHMSA estimate of 4,500
engineers and 4,500 conductors. The majority of commenters in
opposition to ECP brakes stated that the cost of equipping the system
is too high. Additionally, many were concerned that the installation
process and overlay of these braking systems is too complex. PHMSA and
FRA discuss the cost-benefit analysis of ECP braking in further depth
in the RIA.
Comments on Integration of ECP Brake Systems with Positive Train
Control
Many commenters both in support of and opposition to ECP brakes
mentioned positive train control (PTC) in their comments. PTC is a set
of highly advanced technologies designed to automatically stop or slow
a train before certain types of accidents occur. PTC is designed to
prevent train-to-train collisions, derailments caused by excessive
speed, unauthorized incursions by trains onto sections of track where
maintenance activities are taking place, and movement of a train
through a track switch left in the wrong position.\73\ The Rail Safety
Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008 mandated an end of 2015 deadline to
implement PTC across 70,000 miles of the rail network.\74\ See
``Positive Train Control Systems,'' 75 FR 2598 (January 15, 2010), FRA
Docket No. FRA-2008-0132; for further information.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\73\ https://www.aar.org/policy/positive-train-control.
\74\ Public Law 110-432--Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008,
https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L03588.
\75\ http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-01-15/pdf/E9-31362.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BNSF commented that ECP brake implementation would require a re-
write of the PTC algorithm, which would then need to go through the FRA
approval process. Furthermore, physical and logical interfaces between
ECP brake and PTC equipment would have to be designed and tested. BNSF
is not currently aware of any adverse interactions between the two
systems. Additionally, it commented that rail shop capacity is already
strained due to the PTC mandate, and would be further congested by a
requirement for ECP brakes.
Analysis of the Final Rule Requirements Related to Advanced Brake
Propagation Systems
This final rule requires all HHFTs operating in excess of 30 mph to
have enhanced braking systems. The type of enhanced brake system that a
railroad will be required to use is based on a refined approach that
allows PHMSA and FRA to implement real brake system safety improvements
by taking into consideration the amount of Class 3 flammable liquids
being transported by a train as well as the type of operation that the
train uses to transport Class 3 flammable liquids. At a baseline level,
any train that contains a continuous block of 20 or more loaded tank
cars or a total of at least 35 loaded tank cars throughout the train
consist containing Class 3 flammable liquids must have in place, at a
minimum, a functioning two-way EOT device or a DP system to assist in
braking. Based on FRA analysis and modeling by Sharma & Associates
conducted in March 2015, it is expected that a two-way EOT device or DP
locomotive at the rear of a train can reduce the number of cars
punctured by 13-16 percent compared to conventional air brakes.
However, with longer, heavier trains it is necessary to factor in train
control issues. Therefore, PHMSA and FRA have specific braking
requirements for trains that are transporting 70 or more loaded tank
cars of Class 3 flammable liquids at speeds in excess of 30 mph. These
requirements are intended to further enhance safety based on the
operations conducted for longer, heavier trains.
Any high-hazard flammable unit train (HHFUT) operating in excess of
30 mph must have a functioning ECP brake system that complies with the
requirements of 49 CFR part 232, subpart G. PHMSA and FRA define an
HHFUT as a single train consisting 70 or more tank cars loaded with
Class 3 flammable liquids. This definition is intended to capture those
operations where tank cars and locomotives are primarily used in
captive service trains that are transporting large quantities of Class
3 flammable liquids (such as crude oil and ethanol) and are running in
a continuous loop. The ECP braking requirement goes into effect as of
January 1, 2021 for any HHFUT transporting one or more loaded tank car
of a Packing Group I flammable liquid, and goes into effect as of May
1, 2023 for all other HHFUTs.
While PHMSA and FRA are establishing a requirement to implement ECP
brake systems for certain operations, we recognize that the railroad
industry may develop a new brake system technology or an upgrade to
existing technology that is not addressed in 49 CFR part 232, subparts
E (for two-way EOTs) and G (for ECP braking systems). This rulemaking
is not intended to ``lock in'' the status quo with respect to ECP brake
systems as the only form of brake system that can be used on unit
trains operating in excess of 30 mph while transporting 70 or more
loaded tank cars of flammable liquids. In the event that a new
technology is developed, railroads should apply to FRA to obtain
special approval for the technology pursuant to part 232, subpart F.
Finally, PHMSA and FRA believe that it makes practical sense to
except trains operating at speeds not exceeding 30 mph from the
requirements related to HHFUTs. This enables shortline and regional
railroads and railroads without the capital necessary to equip unit
trains with ECP brakes or that choose not to equip their trains with
these systems to continue transporting Class 3 flammable liquids,
albeit at slower speeds in order to protect public safety and the
environment. It also is important to note that such railroads will be
required to transport Class 3 flammable liquids in

[[Page 26697]]

tank cars that comply with the new standards.
Effectiveness of ECP Brake Systems
ECP braking is a proven technology that is a reliable and effective
way to slow and stop a train, and to prevent accidents from occurring,
while also allowing for more efficient operations. ECP brakes have been
used in North American railroad operations since at least 1998. PHMSA
and FRA recognize that there have been hurdles in the deployment of ECP
brakes. However, the technology has continued to improve since 1998 and
carriers are in a better position now to ensure that ECP brakes are
successfully implemented. The railroad industry has effectively
addressed crosstalk and interoperability issues and has updated AAR
Standard S-4200 accordingly. We expect that concerns related to
maintenance and repair issues that arise during normal operations will
be resolved through adequate training of operating crews and
maintenance personnel, which has been factored into the cost of this
rule.\76\ These issues are discussed in detail in the ``Reliability and
Technological Readiness'' section of the RIA, which has been added to
the docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\76\ PHMSA and FRA estimates that railroads will need to train
approximately 51,500 employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

There are currently six unit coal trains being operated with ECP
brake systems in the U.S. These began as waiver test trains; however,
all but one are now in regular revenue service. NS began operating unit
coal trains using ECP braking systems in 2007,\77\ and it is currently
operating five ECP-equipped unit coal trains. These trains presently
make trips from coal mines in Southwestern Pennsylvania to the Keystone
Generating Station near Shelocta, PA (two 100-car or more trains;
approximately 350 miles round-trip) and to a generating station near
Blairsville, PA. NS also operates unit coal trains originating in the
mines of Southwest Virginia that transport coal to a power plant in
Clover, VA (approximately 700 miles round-trip).\78\ Additionally, in
2014, NS began operating a unit coal train with BNSF providing
operating crews while the train operates over BNSF's rail line that
travels between the Powder River Basin and Macon, GA. BNSF,
independently, has operated a 135-car ECP-equipped unit coal train
since 2008 that travels approximately 3,060 miles round-trip from the
Powder River Basin to Palos, AL.\79\ PHMSA and FRA are unaware of any
accidents or incidents (such as a derailment) along these routes to
date that could be attributed to operational issues with ECP brakes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\77\ ECP Brake Implementation on Norfolk Southern, presentation
to RSAC, October 25, 2007, https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/20071025.php.
\78\ Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Rulemaking,
presentation to RSAC, February 20, 2008, https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/20080220.php.
\79\ BNSF Operates Southern Company Coal Train Equipped with
New-Generation Braking System, 25 January, 2008, https://www.bnsf.com/media/news/articles/2008/01/2008-01-25a.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Some commenters have noted that there has not been widespread
adoption of ECP brakes in the U.S. There are a number of factors that
contribute to this. First, the positive train control (PTC) requirement
diverted significant capital (financial and human) toward signal
systems at a time when those resources might have otherwise been
directed at ECP brakes. Second, it has been difficult to implement ECP
brakes outside of a limited type of service in part because they are
not compatible with the conventional air brakes (this is particularly
true stand-alone systems, which are less expensive). This means that
ECP brakes would only be used on unit trains that are in captured
service and both the car owner and the railroad agree on its use.
Further, the limited usage contributes to unfamiliarity with the
technology and likely contributes to many of the operational and
maintenance difficulties expressed by railroads in their comments.
Third, there are market inefficiencies that have limited implementation
of ECP brakes. ECP brakes are most likely to be implemented on a
voluntary basis where owner of ECP-equipped cars has control over a
seamless operation of unit trains from the originating location to the
delivery location, such as what is found in Australia or South Africa.
In the U.S. most cars owners have little incentive install ECP brakes
because they tend to bear most of the upfront cost of installing the
braking system, while most of the benefits (such as decreased fuel
consumption) are realized by a separate entity, the operating railroad.
Notwithstanding, car owners might still have an incentive to install
ECP brakes if they were to realize greater utilization due to less
inspections. However, FRA understands that railroads effectively
eliminated the incentive to install ECP brakes by treating such cars as
being in premium service, resulting in higher cost per use.
AAR contends that most of the benefits from ECP brakes, such as
more efficient fuel consumption and reduced wheel wear, are currently
realized through the widespread use of dynamic braking. PHMSA and FRA
did not address this issue in the NPRM and it was not raised until
after the close of the comment period.\80\ While dynamic braking does
provide an alternative to pneumatic brakes for slowing a train in non-
emergency situation and allows a train to operate more efficiently,
trains that use dynamic braking and not ECP brakes do not get business
benefits from ECP brakes. AAR analyzed data from a small number of
trips of ECP-equipped trains and found that 89 percent of the time that
the train was braking, it was not using ECP brakes in whole or in part.
AAR, therefore, estimated that 85 percent of the fuel and wheel savings
benefits are currently realized through use of dynamic brakes. PHMSA
and FRA accept that the fuel and wheel savings should be reduced to
account for the use of dynamic braking, but the reduction should be
smaller than 85 percent. The ability to use ECP brakes in conjunction
with dynamic brakes further improves fuel efficiency by as much as five
percent above dynamic braking alone, depending on the routes and
railroad practices. For instance, Canadian Pacific achieved a fuel
savings of 5.4 percent when ECP brakes were used along with dynamic
brakes during testing in Golden, British Columbia, on a route that has
particularly advantageous terrain for maximizing the fuel benefits
associated with ECP braking.\81\ Because not all terrain will be as
advantageous as this test region, PHMSA and FRA have reduced the
estimated fuel efficiency benefits by 50 percent, corresponding to a
fuel improvement rate of 2.5 percent on top of dynamic braking.
However, this estimate is conservative and likely understates the fuel
efficiency benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\80\ AAR gave a presentation on dynamic braking during meetings
with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office
of Management and Budget held under Executive Order 12,866.
\81\ Wachs, K., Aronian, A., Bell, S. Electronically-Controlled
Pneumatic (ECP) Brake Experience at Canadian Pacific. Proceedings
from the 2011 International Heavy Haul Conference, Calgary AB, 2011,
available at http://www.ihha.net/IHA/uploads/assets/fin00258.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA and FRA also accept that benefits related to wheel savings
should be reduced to account for the use of dynamic braking, but that
they should be reduced by less than 85 percent suggested by AAR.
Railroads will continue to experience brake induced wheel wear where
pneumatic brakes are used, but if the railroads rely on dynamic braking
they will face a cost not considered in other parts of the analysis,
increased rail wear, with an attendant increased risk of broken rail
accidents and increased track maintenance costs. PHMSA and FRA estimate
that the use of dynamic braking

[[Page 26698]]

in conjunction with ECP brakes would reduce the dynamic brake induced
rail wear by at least 25 percent based on Canadian Pacific's
experience.\82\ Further, in spite of initial increases in thermal
mechanical shelling due to heavy ``experimenting'' by train crews
during the familiarization phase, Canadian Pacific found a four percent
improvement in average wheel life.\83\ Once operations ``settle in,''
improvements in wheel life may reach ten percent, thus reducing the
estimated wheel wear benefit by 75 percent instead of the 85 percent
estimated by AAR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\82\ Wachs, K., p. 4
\83\ Wachs, K., p 6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Although PHMSA and FRA agree with those commenters who support ECP
braking on unit trains, we disagree with the suggestion from the BMWED
and BRS that FRA should restore the 1,000-1,500 mile interval
requirement for brake/mechanical inspections. The 3,500 mile interval
has a proven record of safety in the seven years of operations on the
NS and BNSF railroads. The use of real-time equipment health monitoring
capabilities on ECP-equipped trains is an effective safety tool that
justifies the extended inspection intervals. Allowing for longer
distances between inspection stoppages provides a benefit to railroads
without decreasing safety by keeping safe equipment in-service for
longer periods of time (each brake test and mechanical inspection can
take from two to eight hours to complete and may delay a train even
longer depending on available personnel and scheduling). As of October
2014, NS initiated train operations under a 5,000 mile inspection
waiver to test the effectiveness of a longer inspection interval on the
unit coal train that it runs with BNSF in a loop between the Powder
River Basin and Macon, GA.
ECP brake systems based on the AAR S-4200 standard also have been
exported successfully for use in Canada, Australia, and South Africa.
As an example, the Quebec Cartier Mining Railway (QCM) in Quebec,
Canada began using ECP-equipped trains in 1998.\84\ The use of ECP
brake systems has allowed QCM to experience a 5.7 percent reduction in
fuel usage and a 15 percent increase in throughput capacity.\85\ As
noted above, a report on an ECP-equipped Canadian Pacific train found
that the railroad achieved a fuel savings of 5.4 percent from ECP
brakes during testing in Golden, British Columbia. The Australian
experience also is instructive because, in contrast to the experience
in the U.S., a number of railroads in that country have voluntarily
invested heavily in ECP brakes.\86\ Australian railroads have been
using ECP brakes on a portion of its fleet for over a decade,\87\ and
they currently operate more than 28,000 cars in ECP brake mode. The
types of trains that Australian railroads have equipped with ECP brakes
share many similarities to HHFUTs in the U.S. Both fleets operate in
heavy haul service, stay in extend blocks, and transport commodities
that are a substantial source of revenue for the railroad. These
Australia railroads have adopted ECP brakes based on expected business
benefits (e.g. heavier, longer trains), but have found that ECP brakes
allow for shorter stopping distances and real time monitoring, which
makes them safer than conventional brakes. These issues are discussed
in detail in the ``Australian Experience'' section of the RIA, which is
part of the docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\84\ ``Stop that train!'' March 1, 2009, http://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation/mass-transit/stop-that-train.
\85\ ``Quebec Cartier pioneers safer, more efficient railroad
brakes,'' Canadian Mining Journal, December 12, 2006, accessed 12-
22-2004 at http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/news/quebec-cartier-pioneers-safer-more-efficient-railroad-brakes/1000208809/?&er=NAhttp://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/1713).
\86\ South Africa is another strong adopter of ECP brakes, with
about 7,000 railcars equipped with ECP brake technology. It is
similar to Australia in that ECP brakes are being used in heavy haul
coal service where the trains operate in a continuous loop and the
railroads own their own railcars for this service.
\87\ ``The ECP Brake--Now it's Arrived, What's the Consensus?,''
Sismey, B. and Day, L., Presented to the Conference on Railway
Excellence, 2014, Adelaide, Australia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

By setting the HHFUT threshold at 70 tank cars of flammable
liquids, we expect to maximize the benefits of ECP brakes on the higher
risk trains whose tank cars are primarily in dedicated service, while
reducing the implementation challenges that would be caused by
requiring ECP brakes for any train meeting the definition of an HHFT.
By focusing the ECP brake system requirements on trains over the 70-car
threshold that travel in excess of 30 mph, we ensure that trains with
the greatest associated risk (based on volume of product) will be
equipped with the advanced brake signal propagation system that has the
highest known effectiveness in reducing the kinetic energy of a train
during a derailment. This will reduce the number of cars derailed and
punctured. We base our decision on estimates related to an average 100-
car unit train transporting Class 3 flammable liquids. FRA and PHMSA's
modeling shows the risk posed by a 100-car ECP-equipped unit train made
up of DOT-117 tank cars, traveling at 50 mph is approximately the same
as a 64-car train of the same cars traveling at the same speed
operating with a two-way EOT device. We have established a baseline
cut-off at 70 cars in an effort to maximize the return on investment
for ECP brakes, by capturing only those trains transporting Class 3
flammable liquids in dedicated service.
In the NPRM, PHMSA and FRA relied on data produced by Sharma &
Associates that showed a 36 percent effectiveness rate of ECP brakes
over conventional air brakes, as expressed in the probable number of
cars punctured. In March 2015, Sharma & Associates performed additional
modeling that takes into account the comments received after
publication of the NPRM and additional accident information provided by
FRA. See ``Letter Report: Objective Evaluation of Risk Reduction from
Tank Car Design & Operations Improvement--Extended Study,'' Sharma &
Associates, March 2015. This updated, purpose-built model from Sharma &
Associates supports the view that ECP brakes provide a substantial
safety benefit in emergency braking situations compared to conventional
air brakes, two-way EOT devices, and DP systems. While a comprehensive
discussion of effectiveness rates is provided in the March 2015 Letter
Report (which has been added to the docket) and the RIA, some
highlights are provided below.
Puncture hazards result from a variety of factors, including
operating conditions, speed of the train, and the type of tank car
involved, which can make it difficult to objectively quantify the
overall safety improvement that ECP brakes provide. The updated model
provided by Sharma & Associates encapsulates a variety of factors in an
effort to assess the real-world impact of the various braking
alternatives considered in the NPRM. The Sharma model is validated by
the general agreement between the actual number of tank cars punctured
in 22 hazardous material derailments provided by FRA and those
predicted by the model.
The March 2015 Letter Report from Sharma & Associates used the most
probable number of tank cars punctured to evaluate the benefits of the
tank car enhancements, brake systems, and speed. The derailment
scenarios were simulated for a 100-car train at different speeds with
the first car subjected to a brief lateral force to initiate the
derailment. At the point of derailment, Sharma & Associates applied a
retarding force to all of the cars in the train that was equivalent to
an emergency brake application. For a train with

[[Page 26699]]

conventional air brakes, Sharma & Associates modeled a brake initiation
propagated from the front (point of derailment or ``POD'') to the rear
of the train. For a train with a two-way EOT device or a DP locomotive
at the rear of the train, the emergency brake signal propagation was
initiated at both ends of the train. For a train with ECP brakes, the
model had all cars simultaneously receiving the braking signal with a
brake ratio of 12 percent. As reflected in the table below, for DOT-117
and DOT-117R type tank cars, the ECP braking system was consistently
the top performer in terms of the most likely number of cars punctured,
while two-way EOT devices and DP systems with a locomotive at the rear
consistently out-performed conventional air brake systems.

Table 26--Most Likely Number of Punctures: 100-Car Train, With POD at Head End
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conventional 2-way EOT (DP:
Tank type Speed, mph brakes lead + rear) ECP Brakes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7/16\-inch TC128, 11 gauge jacket, \1/2\-inch 30 4.7 3.9 3.3
full-height head shield........................
40 8.0 7.1 5.3
50 12.2 9.8 9.1
\9/16\-inch TC128, 11 gauge jacket, \1/2\-inch 30 3.8 3.2 2.6
full-height head shield........................
40 6.6 5.9 4.3
50 10.2 8.2 7.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on the analysis in the 2015 Letter Report from Sharma &
Associates, PHMSA and FRA believe that ECP brakes, in isolation, can be
expected to reduce the number of cars punctured by up to 30 percent
when compared to conventional air brake systems (with a minimal
variation based on train speed), while a two-way EOT device or DP
locomotive at the rear of the train is projected to reduce the number
of cars punctured by up to 16 percent. These numbers are reflected in
the table below, for DOT-117 and DOT-117R type tank cars.

Table 27--Risk Improvement Due to Braking With POD at Head End
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 Cars behind POD Most likely number of punctures % Improvement due to brakes only
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2-way EOT 2-way EOT
Tank type Speed, mph Conventional (DP: lead + ECP brakes Conventional (DP: lead + ECP brakes
brakes rear) brakes rear)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7/16\-inch TC128, 11 gauge jacket, \1/2\-inch full-height 30 4.7 3.9 3.3 0 17 30
head shield............................................... 40 8.0 7.1 5.3 0 11 34
50 12.2 9.8 9.1 0 20 25
\9/16\-inch TC128, 11 gauge jacket, \1/2\-inch full-height 30 3.8 3.2 2.6 0 16 32
head shield............................................... 40 6.6 5.9 4.3 0 11 35
50 10.2 8.2 7.6 0 20 25
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average................................................ ........... ............ ........... ........... ............ 16 30
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sharma modeling indicates the ECP brake system always provides an
advantage over the conventional air brake system in terms of likely
number of tank cars punctured. This is true regardless of the location
of the derailment within the train because the brakes are being applied
to each car in the train at the same time. However, a number of
commenters suggested that the scenarios modeled by Sharma & Associates
may overstate the effectiveness of ECP brake systems because its model
focused on measuring derailments at the front of a train. As a result,
FRA conducted further analysis based on the simulations of derailments
at different points in the train. FRA's simulations considered
derailments at locations with 100, 80, 50, and 20 cars trailing the
point of derailment. A polynomial fit of the resulting derailment and
puncture results data from the simulations enabled FRA to evaluate the
results of a derailment at any location in the train through
interpolation and extrapolation. The results of the evaluation
indicated that POD does impact the estimated number of cars punctured
for any of the simulated brake systems, including a reduction in the
estimated number of cars punctured for trains operated in ECP brake
mode. This is expected given that if a derailment occurs at the 50th
car in a train rather than the first car in the train, there are fewer
cars to derail after the POD. However, in every simulation, the likely
number of cars punctured on a train that uses ECP braking to effectuate
an emergency stop was lower than the likely number of cars punctured on
a train that uses a two-way EOT device or DP system with the locomotive
at the rear to effectuate the same emergency stop. See Tables 29 and
30.

Table 28--Most Likely Number of Punctures: 100-Car Train, With POD Distributed Throughout Train
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conventional 2-way EOT (DP:
Tank type Speed, mph brakes lead + rear) ECP brakes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7/16\-inch TC128, 11 gauge jacket, \1/2\-inch 30 3.4 2.8 2.6
full-height head shield........................

[[Page 26700]]

40 6.8 6.2 4.65
50 9.3 7.92 7.2
\9/16\-inch TC128, 11 gauge jacket, \1/2\-inch 30 2.8 2.4 2.2
full-height head shield........................ 40 5.6 5.1 3.8
50 7.8 6.6 6.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 29--Risk Improvement Due to Braking, With POD Distributed Throughout the Train
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 Cars behind POD Most likely number of punctures % Improvement due to brakes only
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2-way EOT 2-way EOT
Tank type Speed, mph Conventional (DP: lead + ECP brakes Conventional (DP: lead + ECP brakes
brakes rear) brakes rear)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7/16\-inch TC128, 11 gauge jacket, \1/2\-inch full-height 30 3.4 2.8 2.6 0 18 24
head shield............................................... ........... 6.8 6.2 4.65 0 9 31
50 9.3 7.92 7.2 0 15 23
\9/16\-inch TC128, 11 gauge jacket, \1/2\-inch full-height 30 2.8 2.4 2.2 0 14 21
head shield............................................... 40 5.6 5.1 3.8 0 9 32
50 7.8 6.6 6.0 0 15 23
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average................................................ ........... ............ ........... ........... ............ 13 26
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Using this information, PHMSA and FRA conducted further analysis of
the data. We estimated effectiveness at 30, 40, and 50 mph, and took a
weighted average of those results based on severity, using information
about the quantity of product released that is in the historical
record. PHMSA and FRA assigned historical derailments under 35 mph to
the 30 mph effectiveness rate, assigning derailments between 35 and 45
mph to the 40 mph effectiveness rate, and assigning derailments over 45
mph to the 50 mph effectiveness rate. This analysis is reflected in
Table 30, below.

Table 30--Effectiveness Rate of ECP Brakes Weighted by Volume of Product Spilled in a Derailment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ECP
Share of effectiveness Cumulative
Number of Total spill total rate at 30, effectiveness
incidents volume volume (%) 40, 50 mph rate (%)
(%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below 34 mph............................... 33 798,433 22.8 20.10 4.6
35-44 mph.................................. 8 1488350 49.2 25.80 12.7
45 mph and above........................... 5 980180 28 8.60 2.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................. 46 3499656 100 ............. 19.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because the effectiveness rates are lower at 30 mph and at 50 mph than
they are at 40 mph, this process would result in an effectiveness rate
of about 20 percent, which signifies the benefit of ECP brakes compared
to two-way EOT devices or DP systems, when weighted by severity using
the amount of product spilled in a derailment.

As there were comments related to placing a DP locomotive in the
middle of the train, approximately two-thirds from the front (i.e. DP
\2/3\), PHMSA and FRA also looked into this configuration. It found
that ECP brakes also outperformed the DP \2/3\ option. See Figure 3.
This analysis is addressed more fully in the RIA.

[[Page 26701]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.003

The results of the simulations in the March 2015 Letter Report from
Sharma & Associates and the FRA analysis of the data show that advanced
brake signal propagation systems reduce the rates of puncture in
derailing tank cars relative to a conventional air brake system, with
ECP brake systems demonstrating the best overall performance. The risk
reduction benefits for ECP brake systems are most pronounced for long
trains. As trains become shorter, the differences in puncture rates
become diminished between ECP brakes and two-EOT devices or DP systems
with a locomotive at the rear because of the limited time needed to
initiate emergency braking. Thus, additional requirements for advanced
brake signal propagation systems are feasible for addressing risks
related to HHFTs, and ECP brake systems are particularly appropriate
for HHFUTs. A full explanation of the benefits calculation can be found
in the RIA.
Availability and Costs of ECP Brake Systems
In the RIA for this final rule, PHMSA and FRA revised the
assumptions made for the August 1, 2014, NPRM, including the following:
Increased the estimate on the per car cost of installing ECP brakes,
reduced the number of tank cars required to be equipped with ECP
brakes, increased the number of locomotives required to be equipped
with ECP brakes, and reduced the per locomotive cost for ECP-equipped
locomotives.
Many of the commenters noted that our estimate for retrofitting a
tank car with ECP brakes was low. In the NPRM, we estimated that the
cost to implement the ECP brake system requirements would range between
$3,000 and $5,000 per car. PHMSA and FRA now believe that the
appropriate cost estimate is between $7,000 and $8,000. For our
analysis we used $7,633 per car, which is based on the estimated number
of new and retrofit cars that will need to have ECP brakes applied. Our
updated cost estimate is for an overlay system and includes the cost of
maintenance for the system.
For the NPRM, PHMSA and FRA determined that all of the tank cars in
the fleet would need to be equipped with ECP brakes. To reduce the
costs and for the purposes of this final rule, we have assumed that
only tank cars that are part of unit trains carrying Class 3 flammable
liquids would need ECP brakes, as they are the only train consists that
would be required to operate with an ECP braking system. Thus, over a
calculated 20-year period, we reduced the number of tank cars needing
ECP brakes from more than 130,000 to 60,231.
Many of the commenters also noted that we were not equipping enough
locomotives with ECP brakes in our cost estimates. In the NPRM, we
estimated that 900 locomotives would need to be equipped with ECP
brakes. For the purposes of the final rule, this number was increased
to 2,532. This number was derived based on the determination that there
would be approximately 633 HHFUTs on the U.S. rail network at peak
crude oil production. PHMSA and FRA estimated that there would be an
average of three locomotives per unit train and included a 25 percent
spare ratio to account for locomotives that are out-of-service or
potentially diverted to other uses. AAR suggested that the entire Class
I locomotive fleet would need to be ECP-equipped, but with our revised
estimates, which consider the number of locomotives needed operate 633
HHFUTs, we feel that AAR significantly overstates the number of
locomotives that need to be ECP-equipped.
In the NPRM, we also assumed that all of the locomotives would be
retrofitted with ECP brakes at a cost of $80,000 per locomotive. The
rail industry currently purchases around 1,000 new locomotives every
year due to retirements of older locomotives and growth in rail
transport demand. PHMSA and FRA assume that new locomotives will be
ordered with ECP

[[Page 26702]]

brakes, which reduces the costs to an incremental amount of to $40,000
per locomotive, after the base cost of electronic brake equipment (such
as CCB-II or Fastbrake).\88\ We also include additional costs such as
battery replacement, cable replacement, and additional jumper cables to
allow a locomotive not equipped with ECP brakes to assist in operating
an ECP-equipped train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\88\ CCB II and Fastbrake are the commercially available base
brake equipment offered by New York Air Brake and Wabtec
respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regarding the availability of ECP brakes, both known manufacturers
of ECP systems (New York Air Brake and Wabtec) provided comments to the
NPRM. Neither expressed the concern that they would be unable to
manufacture the amount of components necessary to meet any regulatory
requirements as other commenters claim. Regarding comments raising
concerns about the interoperability of ECP braking systems from the two
manufacturers, PHMSA and FRA believe that newly built systems will be
built to the updated industry standard, AAR S-4200, which requires full
compatibility (interoperability) of ECP braking systems in accordance
with 49 CFR 232.603.
Implementation Schedule
Railroads are required to operate an HHFT with either a two-way EOT
device or a DP system immediately once the final rule becomes
effective. There are two deadlines for the implementation of the
requirements pertaining to HHFUTs. The first requires that trains
meeting the definition of an HHFUT comprised of at least one tank car
loaded with a Packing Group I flammable liquid be operated with an ECP
braking system by January 1, 2021, when traveling in excess of 30 mph.
The second requires that all other trains meeting the definition of an
HHFUT (i.e. those trains not transporting one or more tank car loaded
with a Packing Group I flammable liquid) be operated with an ECP
braking system by May 1, 2023, when traveling in excess of 30 mph. We
believe a dual phase-in period is a practical timeline for effective
implementation of the ECP braking system requirement, and it ensures
that ECP braking systems will be installed to cover the expected peak
year of crude oil production. This schedule takes into account feedback
received during the comment period and estimates related to the
retrofit schedule for DOT-117R tank cars.
ECP brake systems have not been installed on a widespread basis
throughout the U.S. fleet of locomotives and rail cars. As discussed
above, NS and BNSF have used ECP brakes on six unit coal trains, but
U.S. railroads have not used ECP brake systems in conjunction with unit
trains transporting flammable liquids, such as crude oil and ethanol.
FRA and PHMSA estimate that there will be 633 HHFUTs on the U.S. rail
network at peak crude oil production, and the railroad industry will
need 2,532 locomotives and 60,231 tank cars to be ECP-equipped in order
to comply with the ECP braking requirements. We revised our estimates
from the NPRM based on comments received that manufacturers will
produce approximately new 1,000 locomotives per year and more than
11,000 tank cars per year could be fitted with ECP brakes (with
approximately one third of those being new car construction and two
thirds of those being retrofits on existing tank cars). By establishing
the dual implementation schedule for ECP brake systems, we are
providing the railroads and manufacturers of locomotives and tank cars
with the ability to establish a realistic schedule to equip the
locomotives and tank cars with ECP brake systems in a timely and
efficient manner. However, there is a possibility that as railroads
amass ECP-equipped trains, some trains will be run in ECP brake mode in
advance of the deadline. The expectation is that railroads will have
incentives to put ECP-equipped trains in service once acquired to take
advantage of the business benefits related to operating in ECP brake
mode (e.g., reduced fuel consumption, longer inspection intervals,
etc.).
Training for ECP Brake Systems
Although there is not a specific training requirement in this final
rule, FRA and PHMSA recognize that the implementation of ECP brake
systems will require training for operating employees and inspection
personnel that perform service on trains equipped with ECP brakes. The
substantive training requirements for each railroad employee or
contractor are addressed in 49 CFR 232.605. We expect that railroads
will comply with the ECP braking system training requirements in Sec.
232.605 to ensure that applicable railroad personnel have the knowledge
and skill necessary to perform service related to ECP braking systems.
In the NPRM, we assumed that 9,000 employees would need to be
trained on ECP brake systems. After a review of comments, we increased
the estimate of additional people that need to be trained on ECP brake
systems to about 51,500 employees based on a percentage of ton mileage.
This includes carmen who had not been considered in the training
calculations in the NPRM. Also, in the NPRM, we assumed a two-week
training period; however, based on FRA participation in ECP brake
training experience, we determined that the number of hours needed to
trains these employees would be substantially less. Carmen that are not
involved in performing single car tests can be trained in a one-day
formal training session and a week of intermittent on the job training.
Single car test users will need an additional half-day of formal
training and an additional week of on the job training.
Implementing ECP Brake Systems With PTC Technology
ECP brake technology provides separate safety benefits not captured
in FRA's PTC regulations. PTC-preventable overspeed derailments may
occur because of an inadequate or improperly functioning brake system,
but accidents involving brake failure were never counted among PTC-
preventable accidents. Only one accident in the group of accidents
reviewed by PHMSA and FRA for this rulemaking, at Rockford, IL, had the
potential to have been prevented by PTC technology, and then only if
ancillary features were adopted. In that accident, a flash flood caused
the track's base to wash away. Railroad procedures require trains be
warned of flash flood threats, which usually leads to a speed
restriction. It is not a requirement of the PTC regulations, but if a
railroad had its PTC system in place and the speed restriction warning
was automated, it would have restricted the train's speed, making it
likely the crew would have been able to stop in half the range of
vision.
Although ECP braking systems typically are directed at different
types of incidents than those that are PTC-preventable, PHMSA and FRA
do believe that the use of ECP brakes coupled with the implementation
of PTC technology could result in significant safety benefits. Trains
equipped with electronics throughout the train consist will be able to
use that electronic network as a platform for future safety
innovations, such as hand brake and hatch sensors.
While commenters such as BNSF raised concerns, PHMSA and FRA do not
believe that the implementation of the ECP brake system requirement
will necessitate a rewrite of braking algorithms on HHFUTs operating
over PTC routes. We do recognize that using ECP brakes systems will
allow for real-time equipment health monitoring and

[[Page 26703]]

higher permitted braking ratios. A railroad may find it beneficial to
create a more efficient algorithm than is possible with conventionally
braked trains in order to implement some of these ECP brake system
benefits into its PTC system. The more efficient algorithm could allow
for increased fluidity and more throughputs over railroad routes on
ECP-equipped trains. If a railroad decided to edit its braking
algorithms to account for the advanced braking capabilities of ECP
brake systems on PTC routes, such changes likely would be considered
``safety critical'' modifications requiring FRA approval. See 49 CFR
236.1021. However, given that the ECP brake requirements for HHFUTs do
not go into effect until January 1, 2021 at the earliest, railroads
will have sufficient time to make desired edits to braking algorithms
and submit any necessary requests for approval to FRA. Therefore, PHMSA
and FRA do not view the editing of braking algorithms as an impediment
to accomplishing the requirements of this rulemaking or complying with
FRA's PTC regulations.
Conclusion
Based on the above discussion, a new section Sec. 174.310(a)(3) is
being created to adopt new braking requirements for HHFTs.
Specifically, this provision requires that a HHFT (as defined in Sec.
171.8) must be equipped and operated with a two-way EOT device or DP
system. Heightened braking requirements are being adopted to cover
trains that transport 70 or more tank cars of flammable liquids while
operating over 30 mph. Unit trains that meet this threshold must be
equipped with ECP brakes and must be operated in ECP brake mode based
on a dual implementation schedule. The first requires that trains
meeting the definition of an HHFUT comprised of at least one tank car
loaded with a Packing Group I material be operated with an
electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking system after January
1, 2021. The second requires that all other trains meeting the
definition of an HHFUT be operated with an ECP braking system after May
1, 2023.
PHMSA and FRA have made regulatory decisions within this final rule
based upon the best currently available data and information. PHMSA and
FRA are confident that ECP implementation can be accomplished by the
compliance date adopted in this final rule. However, PHMSA and FRA will
continue to gather and analyze additional data. Executive Order 13610
urges agencies to conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to
examine whether they remain justified and whether they should be
modified or streamlined in light of changed circumstances, including
the rise of new technologies. Consistent with its obligations under
E.O. 13610, Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens, PHMSA and FRA
will retrospectively review all relevant provisions in this final rule,
including industry progress toward ECP implementation.

E. Classification

In its recommendation, R-14-6, the NTSB recognized the importance
of requiring ``shippers to sufficiently test and document the physical
and chemical characteristics of hazardous materials to ensure the
proper classification, packaging, and record-keeping of products
offered in transportation.'' PHMSA supports NTSB's recommendation. As
discussed previously, PHMSA and FRA audits of crude oil facilities
indicated the classification of crude oil transported by rail was often
based solely on a generic Safety Data Sheet (SDS). PHMSA believes that
establishing documentation and criteria for classification sampling and
testing frequency will increase consistency and accuracy of the data
and improve confidence in package selection, hazard communication, and
ultimately safety in the transportation of hazardous materials.
Considering the challenges posed by materials with variable composition
and potentially variable properties, such as crude oil, providing
criteria for sampling and testing a critical first-step in safe
transportation.
Given the responsibility on the offeror to properly classify
materials,\89\ PHMSA proposed a new regulatory requirement in this
area. The NPRM proposed to add a new Sec. 173.41 that would explicitly
require a sampling and testing program for mined gases and liquids,
including crude oil. Under the proposed new Sec. 173.41(a), this
program would be required to address the following key elements that
are designed to ensure proper classification and characterization of
crude oil:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\89\ Under 49 CFR 173.22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Frequency of sampling and testing to account for
appreciable variability of the material, including the time,
temperature, means of extraction (including any use of a chemical),\90\
and location of extraction;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\90\ This accounting for the method of extraction would not
require disclosure of confidential information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sampling at various points along the supply chain to
understand the variability of the material during transportation;
Sampling methods that ensure a representative sample of
the entire mixture, as packaged, is collected;
Testing methods to enable complete analysis,
classification, and characterization of the material under the HMR;
Statistical justification for sample frequencies;
Duplicate samples for quality assurance purposes; and
Criteria for modifying the sampling and testing program.
This proposal would also add a Sec. 173.41(b), linking the
shipper's certification requirements, as prescribed in Sec. 172.204,
to this sampling and testing program for mined gases and liquids.
In addition, the proposed Sec. 173.41(c) would require that the
sampling and testing program be documented in writing and retained
while the program remains in effect. The proposed section requires the
sampling and testing program must be reviewed and revised and/or
updated as necessary to reflect changing circumstances. The most recent
version of the sampling and testing program, must be made available to
the employees who are responsible for implementing it. When the
sampling and testing program is updated or revised, all employees
responsible for implementing it must be notified and all copies of the
sampling and testing program must be maintained as of the date of the
most recent version.
PHMSA further proposed to add a new Sec. 173.41(d) that would
mandate that each person required to develop and implement a sampling
and testing program maintain a copy of the sampling and testing program
documentation (or an electronic file thereof) that is accessible at, or
through, its principal place of business and must make the
documentation available upon request, at a reasonable time and
location, to an authorized official of DOT.
In response to the proposed requirements for a sampling and testing
program, we received a number of comments representing approximately
65,200 signatories. The majority of these signatories were part of
write-in campaigns for environmental groups. Below is a table detailing
the types and amounts of commenters on the classification plan
proposal.

[[Page 26704]]

Table 31--Commenter Composition: Classification Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenter type Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization............................. 62,045
Individuals............................................. 3,098
Industry stakeholders................................... 23
Government organizations or representatives............. 29
---------------
Totals.............................................. 65,195
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Most industry stakeholders were either content with the measures
currently in place to classify mined gases or liquids or supported use
of API RP 3000.\91\ However, other commenters believed both the current
and proposed regulations were insufficient. Environmental groups, the
NTSB, local, tribal or state government organizations, and individuals
felt that the DOT should clarify and expand the proposed requirements.
Specifically, commenters addressed: The need for enhanced
classification; use of the term ``characterization;'' inclusion of
specific materials in the testing and sampling program; variability of
mined liquids and gases; applicability and ``sampling along the supply
chain''; sampling methodology and documentation; incorporation and use
of API RP 3000 standards; specific testing methodology; and
applicability of testing requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\91\ This recommend practice went through a public comment
period in order to be designated as an American National Standard.
The standard addresses the proper classification of crude oil for
rail transportation and quantity measurement for overfill prevention
when loading crude oil into rail tank cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Industry stakeholders questioned the need for regulatory amendments
expanding the existing classification requirements. Several industry
stakeholders stated that there is no justification for creating
additional classification requirements because misclassification has
had no role in the derailments or impact on safety. Specifically Exxon
Mobil stated that Bakken crude oil is not different from other light
crudes and is correctly classified. It referenced API modeling, which
has indicated that Bakken crude will behave similarly to other crudes
in a fire. AFPM further stated that the ``only misclassification''
PHMSA found during investigations was incorrect packing group on
shipping papers for cargo tank motor vehicles, but crude oil was
otherwise communicated and packaged appropriately. PHMSA received
support for implementing an enhanced classification and
characterization from a wide range of commenters including local
governments, safety organizations, and individual citizens among
others. Many comments in support of the rulemaking highlighted the
importance of proper classification for emergency responders.
Although the classification of crude oil has not caused
derailments, we disagree that expanding existing classification
requirements will not impact transportation safety. In this rulemaking,
PHMSA is proposing new or amended requirements as part of a
comprehensive approach to improving the safe transportation of
flammable liquids by rail. This includes ensuring that proper
packaging, operational controls, and hazard communication requirements
are met, all of which are important to mitigate the negative effects of
derailment, and are determined by classification. As discussed
previously, PHMSA and FRA audits of crude oil facilities indicated the
classification of crude oil transported by rail was often based solely
on a Safety Data Sheet (SDS). While the classification of manufactured
products is generally well understood and consistent, unrefined
petroleum-based products potentially have significant variability in
their properties as a function of time, location, method of extraction,
temperature at time of extraction, and the type and extent of
conditioning or processing of the material. Unrefined petroleum-based
products refers to hazardous hydrocarbons that are extracted from the
earth and have not yet been refined. These products may undergo initial
processing such as for the removal of water and light gases, and which
may undergo further processing, but have not gone through a quality
assurance/quality control process such that the properties of the
product being offered for transportation are known and consistent. As
such, we believe it is necessary to require development and adherence
to a consistent and comprehensive sampling and testing program, and to
provide oversight for such a program.
Several commenters indicated that the term ``characterization'' was
not defined, unnecessary, or requires clarification. This term was used
in the March 6, 2014 Emergency Order regarding classification to
highlight the comprehensive nature of the existing requirements. DGAC,
API and other commenters stated that the term ``characterization'' is
not used elsewhere in the regulations and is confusing. Industry
stakeholders also expressed concern that the types of testing required
for characterization was unclear. Local and other government
representatives, environmental groups, individuals, and others
supported use of the term ``characterization.''
As used in the NPRM and March 6, 2014 Emergency Order, the term
characterization was intended to convey the comprehensive nature of the
offeror's responsibility to fully classify and describe their material
in accordance with Parts 172 and 173. This includes identifying
additional properties of the hazardous material which are not specified
by the proper shipping name, but are necessary to meet packaging
requirements in Part 173. We agree that the current classification
requirements as required by Sec. 173.22 encompasses the requirement to
fully describe the material, including considering all appropriate
hazard classes, selecting the correct packing group, selecting the most
appropriate proper shipping name, and obtaining complete information to
follow all packaging instructions. However, we disagree that hazard
class testing is sufficient to provide the information necessary to
comply with Sec. 173.22. Therefore, we are clarifying the sampling and
testing program to include a requirement to ``identify properties
relevant to the selection of packaging through testing or other
appropriate means,'' in place of using the term ``characterization.''
This provides greater specificity and clarity to the purpose and type
of testing required.
Several commenters addressed the inclusion of specific materials in
the sampling and testing program requirements, with some commenters
preferring broader applicability and some narrower. Comments ranged
from supporting expanding the applicability of classification sampling
and documentation requirement to all hazardous materials, clarifying
the definition of ``mined liquids and gases'' to specify inclusion of
hazardous byproducts and wastes or materials derived from hydraulic
fracking or other methods of extraction, and limiting the applicability
of the definition to only include petroleum crude oil. Commenters on
both sides were concerned that the phrase ``mined liquids and gases''
did not clearly specify which materials were covered by the rulemaking.
Trade Associations such as API, AFPM and DGAC stated that the term
``mined liquids and gases'' is ``not used by the petroleum industry.''
Other commenters questioned which specific materials met the definition
of ``mined liquids and gases.''
We disagree with NTSB's request to expand the sampling and testing
program to all hazardous materials.

[[Page 26705]]

PHMSA does not believe there is sufficient justification to expand the
rule to all hazardous materials or manufactured liquids such as
ethanol. The intent of the sampling and testing plan is to address
materials that have inherent variability of properties. Further, we did
not propose to expand the applicability beyond mined liquids and gases.
We disagree with commenters who suggested the sampling and testing
program should be expanded to address all other byproducts or wastes
created by the extraction process of all mined liquids and gases,
including byproducts or wastes created by the hydraulic fracturing of
natural gas. The HMR already requires classification of all hazardous
materials before transportation and compliance with all packaging
requirements. Commenters did not provide sufficient data to justify
expanding costs and recordkeeping for a sampling and testing program to
these additional materials.
We also disagree with commenters who suggested the testing and
sampling requirements should be limited to only petroleum crude oil. As
stated previously, the extraction process and initial conditioning of
petroleum crude oil may include the production of other unrefined
petroleum-based products, which may have variable properties that must
be identified.
We agree with commenters that state the phrase `mined liquids and
gases' needs further clarification. As proposed, the term ``mined
liquids and gases'' referred to liquids and gases extracted from the
earth through methods such as wells, drilling, or hydraulic fracturing.
While the term ``mined liquids and gases'' was proposed in the
rulemaking, the RIA only included offerors related to the production
and extraction of petroleum liquids, liquefied petroleum gases
(including propane), and natural gases when measuring affected
entities. No data was provided by commenters to justify benefits from
expanding the definition beyond petroleum liquids, liquefied petroleum
gases, and natural gases extracted from the earth. This list includes
both unrefined and refined petroleum-based products. However, unrefined
products have the greatest potential for variability of chemical and
physical properties. The properties of refined petroleum-based products
shipped from extraction sites are consistent. Therefore, we are
clarifying the scope of this section to apply to unrefined petroleum
based products. Specifying ``unrefined petroleum-based products''
refers to hazardous hydrocarbons that are extracted from the earth and
have not yet been refined. This includes petroleum-based liquid and gas
wastes and byproducts, such as condensates, which exhibit variability.
Furthermore, use of the term ``unrefined'' provides greater
clarification to the other requirements of the testing and sampling
program. Therefore, specifying unrefined petroleum-based products
clarifies the identification of mined liquids and gases with variable
properties intended by the NPRM, without creating an undue burden.
Some commenters addressed the question in the NPRM asking for
information on the variability within a region. API identified several
factors that affect variability, not addressed in the NPRM, such as,
``stability of petroleum crude oil to be loaded, single source vs.
multiple sources, type of tank car loading facility, changes in crude
oil production characteristics.'' It further stated that the
requirement to include factors affecting variability in Sec.
173.41(a)(1) describe the materials in the form they are extracted from
the ground, but not the form they are shipped. Similarly, API and other
commenters express concern that the requirement in Sec. 173.41(a)(3)
to sample material ``as packaged'' suggests that sampling may only be
performed after the crude oil has been loaded into a transport vehicle.
We agree with API, that the intent of these requirements is to
capture factors that may contribute to variability of the material as
offered for transportation. We are clarifying Sec. 173.41(a)(1) to
specify that the program must account for ``any appreciable variability
of the material'' with a list of recommended factors. This provides
offerors the flexibility to identify the factors contributing to
variability in their specific operation. We are also amending Sec.
173.41(a)(3) to replace ``as packaged'' with ``as offered'' to clarify
that the sampling may occur before the crude oil has been loaded into a
transport vehicle.
Commenters expressed interest in clarifying the responsibility for
development and execution of the sampling and testing program. For
example, one consultant stated, ``the term `offeror' and sampling
program requirements are too broad to effectively determine who is
ultimately responsible for compliance.'' Individuals and environmental
groups suggested specifying that ``each operator'' or ``custody
transfer point'' should be responsible for complying with the sampling
and testing program. Industry stakeholders, including AFPM, recommended
``less prescriptive mandates'' for the sampling program and suggested
duplicate sampling provided an undue burden. Commenters also suggested
providing statistical justification for sample frequencies was an undue
burden, or that the provision should be delayed to allow time for
compliance. Public and environmental groups supported more detailed
mandates to ensure uniformity, thoroughness, and clarity. While some
commenters supported certification requirements, others recommended
removing the requirement or modifying the language. Commenters on both
sides agreed the requirement to sample ``along the supply chain'' is
not sufficiently clear, and should be clarified.
The one area where the concerned public, environmental groups, and
industry stakeholders agreed was that API RP 3000 should be adopted or
permitted as a method of compliance with the proposed requirements. API
further described that many requirements in the proposed paragraph
Sec. 173.41(a)(1) would align with API RP 3000 requirements, if
clarifications were made. API provided detailed recommendations for
amending the requirements in Sec. 173.41. In addition to areas
mentioned elsewhere in the comment summary, API recommended changing
the requirement for ``statistical justification'' to ``quality control
justification'' to allow other equivalent methods for quality control,
changing the requirement for duplicate sampling to allow other
equivalent methods, and removing the requirement to specify criteria
for changing the program.
We disagree that the responsibility for compliance with the program
is unclear. It is the responsibility of the offeror to certify
compliance with the sampling and testing program. The term ``offeror''
is used throughout the regulations to specify applicability for
transportation functions and is defined under ``person who offers'' in
Sec. 171.8. In response to comments stating that ``sampling along the
supply chain'' is unclear, we are clarifying this language. The intent
of this provision is to require sampling both before the product is
initially offered and when changes that may affect the properties of
the material occur (i.e., mixing of the material from multiple
sources).
We disagree the other requirements of the program are unnecessary,
unclear, or overly burdensome, as each provision is designed to ensure
adequate sampling and testing to address the unique characteristics and
variability of the properties of these materials. Moreover, these
requirements align with and provide greater specificity regarding
existing regulations requiring proper classification. However, we also
agree

[[Page 26706]]

with API that an equivalent level of safety and quality control
intended by the requirements for ``duplicate sampling'' and
``statistical justification'' can be reached through other measures.
Therefore, we are adopting ``quality control measures for sampling
frequencies,'' in place of ``statistical justification.'' We are also
adding ``or equivalent measures for quality assurance'' to the
requirement for ``duplicate sampling.''
Finally, we are not adopting API RP 3000 as a requirement at this
time. As indicated in the NPRM, we did not contemplate or propose
adopting API RP 3000 in the NPRM, as it had not yet been finalized.
Furthermore, the boiling point test specified in the API RP 3000 does
not align with the requirements currently authorized in the HMR.
Shippers must continue to use the testing methods for classification of
flammable liquids outlined in Sec. 173.120 and flammable gases in
Sec. 173.115. However, API RP 3000 is otherwise consistent with the
sampling program requirements in paragraph 173.41(a)(1)-(6) and may be
used to satisfy these adopted sampling provisions. Furthermore,
voluntary use of API RP 3000 provides guidance for compliance with
these provisions, but still allows flexibility for meeting requirements
through other methods.
Comments regarding the specific testing methodology ranged from
specifying more limited sampling and testing program requirements to
mandating a more robust, detailed sampling and testing program. Local
and state governments, environmental groups, and individuals
recommended mandating who performs testing (e.g., requiring third-party
oversight of testing program or specifying tests could only be
performed by third party without financial interest in company).
Commenters also recommended requiring dissemination of test results to
third parties such as DOT, local governments, emergency responders, or
the public. Industry stakeholders recommended limiting testing to
flashpoint and boiling point determination. Other commenters
recommended mandating specific, additional tests. Commenters expressed
particular interest in either mandating that vapor pressure be tested
or clarifying that it is never required for flammable liquids.
Requiring third-party oversight of testing program or specifying
tests could only be performed by third party without financial interest
in company is not necessary as PHMSA and FRA will already have
oversight of the sampling and testing program requirements for
unrefined petroleum-based products. As part of the requirements adopted
in this rule, each person required to develop a sampling and testing
program make the documentation available upon request to an authorized
official of the Department of Transportation. This provides sufficient
oversight and will ensure that offerors are complying with the
requirements. Should an offeror not comply, PHMSA and FRA officials
will be able to take enforcement action. In addition, requiring
dissemination of test results to third parties is not necessary as the
emergency response guidebook already provides information on the
hazards of specific materials and through the routing requirements,
fusion centers can provide a mechanism for authorized individuals to
acquire information about the amount of those materials transported.
PHMSA did not propose requiring third-party involvement with
testing or submitting test results to a third party in the NPRM and, as
such, is not adopting any such requirements. PHMSA did not propose
regulatory changes to classification test procedures, and as such, is
not adopting any such requirements. Furthermore, in the NPRM, PHMSA
stated that we are not proposing a requirement for the retention of
test results.
PHMSA requested comments on the role of vapor pressure in
classifying flammable liquids and selecting packagings, as well as
whether vapor pressure thresholds should be established. Under existing
requirements and those proposed in this final rule, shippers must
select all appropriate tests for the changing factors appropriate to
the location and nature of their activities, and follow requirements
under Sec. 173.115 relating to vapor pressure when applicable.
Individuals, government organizations, and environmental groups such as
Delaware Riverkeeper Network supported mandating vapor pressure testing
to increase safety and accuracy. Environmental groups and offeror
Quantum Energy also suggested packaging selection should be based on
vapor pressure. Industry stakeholders, such as the Dangerous Goods
Advisory Council (DGAC) and AFPM stated vapor pressure testing was
unnecessary.
PHMSA did not propose any other specific changes related to vapor
pressure in the NPRM and, as such, is not adopting any such
requirements. We appreciate the comments received on this issue and
will consider them in any future action.
PHMSA has continued its testing and sampling activities and refined
the collection methods. As mentioned previously, PHMSA has purchased
closed syringe-style cylinders and is collecting samples using these
cylinders. Utilizing these types of cylinders minimizes the opportunity
for any dissolved gases to be lost during collection, thus providing
increased accuracy. In addition, PHMSA has taken samples at other shale
play locations around the United States to compare their
characteristics to that of crude oil from the Bakken region. PHMSA
continues to examine the role of vapor pressure in the proper
classification of crude oils and other flammable liquids. Further we
continue to explore collaborative research opportunities examining the
classification of flammable liquids. Any specific regulatory changes
related to vapor pressure would consider further research and be
handled in a future rulemaking.
Furthermore, since the publication of the NPRM, the North Dakota
Industrial Commission issued Oil Conditioning Order No. 25417, which
requires operators of Bakken crude oil produced in the state of North
Dakota to separate the gaseous and light hydrocarbons from all Bakken
crude oil that is to be transported. The order also prohibits blending
of Bakken crude oil with specific materials.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\92\ https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/Approved-or25417.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA appreciates any action that improves the safe transportation
of crude oil or other hazardous material. As with any hazardous
material put into transportation by any mode, safety is our top
priority, and we will continue to conduct inspections or bring
enforcement actions to assure that shippers comply with their
responsibilities to properly characterize, classify, and package crude
oil regardless of how it is treated prior to transport. We also
continue to work with various stakeholders, including other government
agencies such as the Department of Energy, to understand best practices
for testing and classifying crude oil. See also Section VI ``Crude Oil
Treatment'' for additional discussion on this issue.
This comprehensive rule seeks to improve the safety of bulk
shipment of all flammable liquids across all packing groups, and is not
limited to Bakken crude. The enhanced tank car standards and
operational controls for high-hazard flammable trains are not directly
impacted by the order recently imposed in North Dakota. Any specific
regulatory changes related to treatment of crude oil would consider
further research and be handled in a separate action.

[[Page 26707]]

Commenters suggested other changes affecting the applicability of
the sampling and testing program. AFPM recommended addressing
``exemptions'' or ``less prescriptive alternatives.'' Some trade
associations suggested exempting materials from requirements for the
classification program when transported in DOT-117s. Other commenters
suggested exempting petroleum crude oil from the sampling requirements
when assigned to packing group I or when crude oil is pre-treated.
Commenters also recommended changes to the packing group assignment and
classification process for Class 3. Environmental groups recommended
requiring either Bakken crude oil or all petroleum crude oil to be
classified as Packing Group I. Industry stakeholders agreed that crude
oil should be permitted to be classified as packing group III. AAR
recommended prohibiting use of the combustible liquid reclassification
criteria for petroleum crude oil. Government representatives,
environmental groups and individuals suggested prohibiting the use of
Packing Group III for Class 3 flammable liquids.
In the NPRM, PHMSA asked how to provide flexibility and relax the
sampling and testing requirements for offerors who voluntarily use the
safest packaging and equipment replacement standards. However, we did
not propose exemptions from the sampling and testing program or changes
to the assignment of packing groups for petroleum crude oil or in the
NPRM and, as such, is not adopting any such requirements. The current
hazard classification criteria are sufficient for assigning packing
group when proper sampling and testing occurs. We disagree that pre-
treatment of crude oil, use of DOT-117 tank cars, or other exemptions
discussed by commenters adequately ensures the safest packaging and
equipment replacement standards to justify opting out of the sampling
and testing requirements for the materials adopted by this rulemaking.
Furthermore, these exemptions do not provide an equivalent level of
safety for identifying properties to ensure compliance with packaging
requirements in Part 173. The sampling and testing program is important
to accurately classify these materials for transportation and fully
comply with the packaging and operational controls in the HMR.
Therefore, we are not limiting the assignment of packaging group for
petroleum crude oil, or providing exceptions to the sampling and
testing program for applicable materials.
Conclusion
Based on the justification above, PHMSA is adopting the proposed
standardized sampling and testing program requirements for unrefined
petroleum-based products with changes intended to clarify the intent of
requirements. This sampling and testing program requirements for
unrefined petroleum-based products will be codified in the new Sec.
173.41. We are not incorporating API RP 3000 by reference. However,
shippers may still use API RP 3000 as a voluntary way to comply with
the newly adopted sampling requirements. It should be noted that all of
the testing provisions of API RP 3000 do not align with the
requirements in the HMR. As the testing provisions were not proposed to
be modified, shippers must continue to use the testing methods for
classification of flammable liquids outlined in Sec. 173.120 and
flammable gases in Sec. 173.115. It should be noted that PHMSA may
consider the adoption of the non-codified testing provisions of API RP
3000 in a future rulemaking.

F. Routing

PHMSA proposed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM, in Sec. 174.310(a)(1),
to modify the rail routing requirements specified in Sec. 172.820 to
apply to any HHFT. The routing requirements discussed in the NPRM
reflect the practices recommended by the NTSB in recommendation R-14-4,
and are in widespread use across the rail industry for security-
sensitive hazardous materials (such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia).
As a result, rail carriers would be required to assess available routes
using, at a minimum, the 27 factors listed in Appendix D to Part 172
(hereafter referred to as Appendix D) of the HMR to determine the
safest, most secure routes for security-sensitive hazardous materials.
Additionally, the requirements of Sec. 172.820(g) require rail
carriers to establish a point of contact with state and/or regional
fusion centers who coordinate with state, local, and tribal officials
on security issues as well as state, local, and tribal officials that
may be affected by a rail carrier's routing decisions and who directly
contact the railroad to discuss routing decisions. This requirement
will in essence capture threshold notification requirements for HHFTs
as discussed in further detail in the next section.
In response to the proposed amendments to routing, we received
comments representing approximately 87,359 signatories. An overwhelming
majority of commenters expressed support for additional routing
requirements for HHFTs. The majority of commenters supported the
amendment as proposed in the NPRM; however, some commenters supported
the expansion of the routing requirements beyond what was in the NPRM.
Some industry commenters expressed opposition to additional routing
requirements for HHFTs. Commenters also took the opportunity to
identify other issues related to routing beyond the proposal to require
rail carriers who transport HHFTs to perform routing assessments. Below
is a table detailing the types and amounts of commenters on the routing
proposal.

Table 32--Commenter Composition: Routing Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenter type Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization............................. 85,017
Individuals............................................. 2,292
Industry stakeholders................................... 20
Government organizations or representatives............. 30
---------------
Totals................................................ 87,359
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commenters who either supported the proposal in the NPRM or the
expansion of the proposal in the NPRM were primarily concerned members
of the public, environmental groups, tribal communities, local
governments, and Congressional representatives. Commenters in support,
such as Congressman Michael E. Capuano, recognized the value of
expanding the scope of the route planning regulations to include
routing HHFTs away from dense population centers and environmentally
sensitive areas, stating, ``I fully support requiring HHFT carriers to
perform a routing risk analysis and then select their route based on
the findings of that analysis.''
Additionally, the NTSB commented, ``we believe that the proposed
rule, if implemented, would satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation
R-14-4,'' which urges an expansion of the route planning requirements
to include trains transporting flammable liquids.
The Prairie Island Indian Community provided a specific example of
a community that could be directly affected by the implementation of
the routing requirements. They noted that their community is home to
``hundreds of tribal member residents, potentially thousands of
visitors and employees at the Treasure Island Resort and Casino, a dry
cask storage facility currently hosting 988 metric tons of spent
nuclear fuel, an operating nuclear power plant with two reactors and
approximately

[[Page 26708]]

635 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel in the fuel pool.'' They noted
that ``if ever there was a case for rail routing risk assessment, this
is it.'' With this, the Prairie Island Indian Community provided their
support for implementing routing requirements for HHFTs.
Some commenters proposed expanding upon the existing risk factors
listed in appendix D. Recommended expansions to appendix D included a
factor to avoid routes that pass through areas that experience a high
density of commuters at peak times. Additionally, environmental groups
and concerned public urged considering a route's proximity to
watersheds and water supplies. Environmental advocate Scenic Hudson,
Inc. commented that the route assessment should include avoiding
National Parks and other historical landmarks, such as those identified
by the National Trust for Historic Preservation or designated as
National Heritage Areas by Congress.
PHMSA and FRA recognize the assertion by some commenters that the
list of 27 risk factors in appendix D should be expanded to address
various additional specific risk factors. These comments are beyond the
scope of this rulemaking. In the NPRM, PHMSA and FRA did not propose
revisions to appendix D, nor did we solicit comments on revising the
current list of risk factors in appendix D. However, given the number
of concerns raised by commenters on this particular issue, PHMSA and
FRA believe it is important to clarify that the 27 factors currently
listed in appendix D are inclusive of the more specific factors that
several commenters suggested adding to the list. For example,
``watersheds'' are expected to be considered under risk factor number
13 in appendix D entitled ``environmentally sensitive or significant
areas'', and ``national landmarks'' are expected to be considered in
risk factor number 12 entitled ``proximity to iconic targets.'' Also,
it is important to emphasize that, in addition to numerous other
factors, a route assessment must address venues along a route
(stations, events, places of congregation), areas of high consequence,
population density, and the presence of passenger traffic along a
route. Hence, the concerns raised by commenters, while beyond the scope
of this rulemaking, are generally already addressed by the risk factors
in appendix D.
Commenters also expressed concerns regarding the risk analysis done
by rail carriers and how that information is used, shared or evaluated.
Many commenters shared concern that routing choices by carriers are not
disclosed to the public and are kept secret. Some commenters also
supported increased oversight of routing analyses, either through
evaluation by a third party or governmental entities.
These route analysis and selection requirements exist for the
transportation of security-sensitive materials, such as poisonous-by-
inhalation materials, certain explosives and certain radioactive
materials. As such, information about the analyses and routes of
shipments should only be released to those with a need-to-know, in
order to maintain confidentiality for both business and security
purposes. In accordance with voluntary practices and existing
requirements, including the Secretary's May 7, 2014 Emergency Order
(Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067), routing information is shared with
appropriate state, local, and Tribal authorities.
Furthermore, as Sec. 172.820(e) states, rail carriers must
restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability of information
contained in all route review and selection decision documentation
(including, but not limited to, comparative analyses, charts, graphics
or rail system maps) to covered persons with a need-to-know, as
described in 49 U.S.C. Parts 15 and 1520, which govern the protection
of sensitive security information. DOT provides oversight for route
analysis, selection and updating. As Sec. 172.820(e) provides, rail
carriers must maintain all route review and selection documentation,
which DOT may review in the course of its regulatory and enforcement
authority. Specifically, FRA personnel oversee compliance with routing
regulations by completion of regular security audits of Class I and
shortline railroads (Class II and III). Part of the security audit
involves review of route selection documentation to ensure that the
selection was completed, documented, and considered the appropriate
risk factors specified in appendix D to part 172.
Additionally, PHMSA and FRA received comments that supported
allowing an ``opt out'' for communities to choose not to allow HHFTs to
be transported through their areas. Additionally, King County, WA
voiced support for the proposed requirements, but urged the use of the
information gathered from the route analyses to identify critical
infrastructure needs along a route such as additional crossing gates,
signals and track integrity to avoid collision and derailment.
PHMSA believes these comments are outside the scope of the
requirements proposed in the NPRM. PHMSA did not propose any provisions
for communities to make unilateral decisions to disallow HHFT
shipments, and such a requirement may call into question issues of
preemption. Also, local government crude by rail prohibitions could
have detrimental impacts on the fluidity of the entire national rail
network, including passenger service. With respect to the use of route
analysis information for the purpose of improving infrastructure, PHMSA
and FRA believe that by expanding the routing requirements to HHFTs,
more routes will be analyzed, and infrastructure needs will be
identified by the railroads as an indirect benefit. However, codifying
the use of this information for purposes beyond route analysis and
selection was not proposed and is outside the scope of this rulemaking.
Commenters who opposed additional routing requirements for HHFTs
include trade associations, rail carriers and rail-carrier related
businesses. While these commenters represented a minority of those who
responded to routing proposals from the NPRM, concerns and issues were
raised. The AAR, the Institute for Policy Integrity and the Illinois
Commerce Commission (ICC) state that PHMSA needs to be aware of the
implications of expanding the additional routing requirements to HHFTs.
These commenters assert that such an expansion will narrow the routes
over which HHFTs may operate and will force HHFTs to travel the same
lines thus causing distributional effects on the network. AAR stated
that network fluidity would be negatively impacted by clogging certain
routes. In addition, the ICC stated that the AAR and ASLRRA have put in
place voluntary agreements with the Department to mitigate the
consequences of an incident, should one occur, and that those are
sufficient. A concerned public commenter noted that the number of
factors a route analysis should be narrowed from 27 to 5-7.
PHMSA and FRA disagree with comments in opposition to expanding
routing requirements to rail carriers transporting HHFTs. We believe
that any effects on the network that negatively impact fluidity or
distributional effects will be minor compared to the safety benefits of
the proposed requirements. Commenters who expressed concern regarding
the negative impact that applying routing requirements to HHFTs would
have on the rail network did not provide data to support their claims.
Additionally, comments implying a strain on the network caused by
increased operational requirements focused on

[[Page 26709]]

speed restrictions proposed in the NPRM. A route selection performed in
accordance with Sec. 172.820(e) does not expressly prohibit a carrier
from selecting a particular route. Instead, carriers must use their
analysis to select the practicable route posing the least overall
safety and security risk. Carriers may also choose to install or
activate mitigating measures to address any of the safety and security
risks found. Additionally, rail carriers must identify and analyze
practicable alternative routes over which it has authority to operate
if such an alternate route exists. Furthermore, in accordance with
Appendix D, carriers are required to assess a number of factors that
would generally be representative of potential network strains or
congestion, including assessment of ``rail traffic density'' and ``trip
length for route.''
Also, as required by Sec. 172.820(g), a carrier transporting an
HHFT will be required to establish a point of contact with a State or
regional fusion center, which have been established to coordinate with
state, local and tribal officials on security issues. Additionally, a
carrier transporting an HHFT will be required to establish a point of
contact with state, local, and tribal officials in jurisdictions that
may be affected by a rail carrier's routing decisions and who directly
contact the railroad to discuss routing decisions. In turn, state,
local, and tribal officials can use this to inform local emergency
responders along routes traveled by HHFTs. By limiting the routes HHFTs
travel on, it will allow resources for emergency response capabilities
to be focused on heavily trafficked routes while minimizing risk to
vulnerabilities adjacent to the rail network. PHMSA and FRA believe
that this will further bolster the ability for state and local
officials to respond to rail related incidents while furthering
communication between the railroads and state and local governments and
the availability of this information to first responders through
established emergency communication networks, such as fusion centers.
Conclusion
Based on the above justification, PHMSA and FRA are modifying the
rail routing requirements specified in Sec. 172.820 to apply to any
HHFT, as the term is defined in this final rule (Sec. 171.8; See
discussion in HHFT section). We estimate the cost impact to be
approximately $15 million, as Class 1 railroads have already been
required to perform these analyses for materials already subject to
routing requirements (poisonous-by-inhalation, certain explosives, and
certain radioactive materials). Therefore, the cost impact is primarily
limited to shortline and regional railroads (Class 2 and Class 3). We
anticipate this to be a minimal burden on shortline railroads, as they
typically operate a single route and therefore would lack alternative
routes to analyze. It should be noted that ASLRRA did not comment on
this specific proposal.
The amendments in this final rulemaking relating to rail routing
will require rail carriers transporting an HHFT to: (1) Conduct an
annual route analysis considering, at a minimum, 27 risk factors listed
in Appendix D prior to route selection; and (2) identify a point of
contact for routing issues, and who to directly contact the railroad to
discuss routing decisions, and provide this information to state and/or
regional fusion centers and state, local, and tribal officials in
jurisdictions that may be affected by a rail carrier's routing
decisions. In addition, PHMSA and FRA believe that the requirement for
rail carriers to establish fusion center contacts will address the need
for notification requirements, as discussed in further detail in the
``Notification'' section below. By not adopting the separate
notification requirements proposed in the NPRM and instead relying on
the expansion of the existing route analysis and consultation
requirements of Sec. 172.820, to include HHFTs, we are focusing on the
overall hazardous materials regulatory scheme.

G. Notification

On May 7, 2014, DOT issued an Emergency Order (``the Order'')
requiring each railroad transporting one million gallons or more of
Bakken crude oil in a single train in commerce within the U.S. to
provide certain information in writing to the State Emergency Response
Commissions (SERCs) for each state in which it operates such a train.
The notification made under the Order must include estimated
frequencies of affected trains transporting Bakken crude oil through
each county in the state, the routes over which it is transported, a
description of the petroleum crude oil and applicable emergency
response information, and contact information for at least one
responsible party at the host railroads. In addition, the Order
required that railroads provide copies of notifications made to each
SERC to FRA upon request and to update the notifications when Bakken
crude oil traffic materially changes within a particular county or
state (a material change consists of 25 percent or greater difference
from the estimate conveyed to a state in the current notification). DOT
issued the Order under the Secretary's authority to stop imminent
hazards at 49 U.S.C. 5121(d). The Order was issued in response to the
crude oil railroad accidents previously described, and it is in effect
until DOT rescinds the Order or a final rule codifies requirements and
supplants the requirements in the Order.
In the August 1, 2014, NPRM, PHMSA proposed to codify and clarify
the requirements of the Order and requested public comment on the
various parts of the proposal. As also previously discussed, there have
been several significant train accidents involving crude oil in the
U.S. and Canada over the past several years, resulting in deaths,
injuries, and property and environmental damage. These accidents have
demonstrated the need for improved awareness of communities and first
responders of train movements carrying large quantities of hazardous
materials through their communities, and thus being prepared for any
necessary emergency response.
In the August 1, 2014, NPRM, PHMSA specifically proposed to add a
new section (Sec. 174.310), ``Requirements for the operation of high-
hazard flammable trains,'' to subpart G of part 174. We proposed
notification requirements in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Unlike
many other requirements in the August 1, 2014 NPRM the notification
requirements were specific to a single train that contains one million
gallons or more of UN 1267, Petroleum crude oil, Class 3, as described
by Sec. 172.101 of this subchapter and sourced from the Bakken shale
formation in the Williston Basin (North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Montana in the United States, or Saskatchewan or Manitoba in Canada).
As proposed rail carriers operating trains that transport these
materials in this amount would be required to within 30 days of the
effective date of the final rule to provide notification to the SERC or
other appropriate state delegated entities in which it operates within
30 days of the effective date of the final rule. Information required
to be shared with SERCs or other appropriate state delegated entity
would include the following:
A reasonable estimate of the number of affected trains
that are expected to travel, per week, through each county within the
State;
The routes over which the affected trains will be
transported;
A description of the petroleum crude oil and applicable
emergency response information required by subparts C and G of part 172
of this subchapter; and,

[[Page 26710]]

At least one point of contact at the railroad (including
name, title, phone number and address) responsible for serving as the
point of contact for the State Emergency Response Commission and
relevant emergency responders related to the railroad's transportation
of affected trains.
In addition, as proposed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM, railroads
would be required to update notifications prior to making any material
changes in the estimated volumes or frequencies of trains traveling
through a county and provide copies to FRA upon request. In response to
the proposed notification requirement for rail shipments of crude oil,
we received a number of comments representing approximately 99,856
signatories.

Table 33--Commenter Composition: Notification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenter type Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization............................. 90,869
Individuals............................................. 8,888
Industry stakeholders................................... 22
Government organizations or representatives............. 77
---------------
Totals................................................ 99,856
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Overall, the vast majority of commenters support PHMSA's efforts to
establish some level of notification requirements for the operation of
trains carrying crude oil as proposed in 49 CFR 174.310(a)(2). However,
they are divided on certain aspects of the proposed notification to
SERCs of petroleum crude oil train transportation. The overwhelming
majority of commenters suggested a lower threshold to trigger the
notification requirements. In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed a threshold of
one million gallons for a single train containing UN1267, Petroleum
crude oil, Class III, sourced from the Bakken region. With near
unanimity, commenters believe the one million gallons threshold is too
high and the idea of limiting it to just Bakken crude oil was too
narrow (e.g., include all crude oils from all areas, or include all
Class III flammable liquids). In general, comments fell into one of
four categories related to proposed notification requirements: (1)
Defining threshold requirements that trigger notification; (2)
notification applicability and emergency response; (3) public
dissemination/sensitive information; and 4) defining commodity type for
notification purposes. These comments are discussed in further detail
below.
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed regulations consistent with the Order
(i.e., trains transporting one million gallons or more of Bakken crude
oil). Assuming that 29,000-gallons of crude oil are contained in each
tank car, approximately 35 tank cars in a train would trigger the
notification requirement. For purposes of the Order, DOT had previously
assumed that this was a reasonable threshold when considering that the
major incidents described in the NPRM all involved trains consisting of
more than 70 tank car tanks carrying petroleum crude oil, or well above
the threshold of one million gallons. The threshold in the Order was
based on a Federal Water Pollution Control Act mandate for regulations
requiring a comprehensive spill response plan to be prepared by an
owner or operator of an onshore facility.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\93\ See 40 CFR 112.20. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, directs the President,
at section 311(j)(1)(C) (33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(1)(C)) and section
311(j)(5) (33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)), respectively, to issue regulations
``establishing procedures, methods, and equipment and other
requirements for equipment to prevent discharges of oil and
hazardous substances from vessels and from onshore facilities and
offshore facilities, and to contain such discharges.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Again, the majority of commenters who expressed their viewpoints
regarding the proposed notification requirements asked for PHMSA to
lower the threshold and therefore expand the applicability of
notification requirements. For example, the NTSB commented that ``[a]
threshold of one million gallons (approximately 35 tank car loads) is
significantly above a reasonable risk threshold and should be lower. At
a minimum the threshold should be set no higher than the value of an
HHFT (20 cars).'' These proposals were echoed by the environmental
groups, congressional interest, the concerned public, and in particular
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority and Division of Emergency
Management. Other commenters such as Flat Head Lakers suggested an even
lower threshold; for example, ``[t]he threshold for this reporting
requirement should be 35,000 gallons per train; the amount carried by
one tank car, rather than one million gallons.'' To further illustrate
the point, some commenters such as Powder River Basin wanted the
notification threshold reduced even more by stating ``[w]e ask DOT to
broaden its advance notification requirements to include all trains
transporting any quantity of Class III (flammable liquid) material.''
Finally, the Wasatch Clean Air Coalition suggested the lowest threshold
possible, stating ``SERCs should be notified of residue'' when crude
oil trains are passing through their States. We received only one
opposing comment that the requirements were too strict from AFPM, which
said ``SERC notifications should be tied to shipments of crude oil or
ethanol in `unit trains,' meaning trains that have 75 cars or more
shipping crude oil or ethanol.'' This viewpoint is significantly
greater than the one million gallons trigger proposed in the NPRM.
DOT agrees with the majority of commenters who believe the one
million gallons threshold for triggering the notification requirements
is too lenient. As previously noted, the order required ``each railroad
transporting one million gallons or more of Bakken crude oil in a
single train in commerce within the U.S. provide certain information in
writing to SERCs for each state in which it operates such a train.''
After careful consideration of the comments and after discussions
within PHMSA and FRA, we believe that using the definition of the HHFT
for notification applicability is a more conservative approach for
affecting safer rail transportation of flammable liquid material, and
it is a more consistent approach because it aligns with the proposed
changes to other operational requirements, including routing.
Furthermore, the routing requirements adopted in this final rule
reflect the substance of NTSB Safety Recommendation R-14-4, and are in
widespread use across the rail industry for security-sensitive
hazardous materials (such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia).
Each state is required to have a SERC under the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). 42 U.S.C. 11001(a).
The EPCRA is intended to help local entities plan for emergencies
involving hazardous substances.\94\ Generally, SERCs are responsible
for supervising and coordinating with the local emergency planning
committees (LEPC) in states, and are best situated to convey
information regarding hazardous materials shipments to LEPCs and state
and local emergency response agencies. At the time of the issuance of
the Order, DOT determined that SERCs were the most appropriate
recipient of written notifications regarding the trains transporting
large quantities of Bakken crude oil. After issuance of the Order, the
railroads requested that the fusion centers be permitted as an
appropriate point of contact to satisfy notification requirements.
Railroads already share information with fusion centers under

[[Page 26711]]

existing Sec. 172.820 of the HMR, PHMSA's regulation governing
additional planning requirements for transportation by rail of certain
hazardous materials and thus many have an established relationship with
these entities. DOT had also received inquiries regarding the Order's
implications for Tribal Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs). TERCs
have the same responsibilities as SERCs, with the Chief Executive
Office of the Tribe appointing the TERC.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\94\ http://www2.epa.gov/epcra.
\95\ http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-08/documents/epcra_fact_sheet.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to this request and other questions regarding the
order, DOT issued a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) guidance document
to address these inquiries.\96\ In that document, DOT explained that if
a State agrees it would be advantageous for the information required by
the Order to be shared with a fusion center or other State agency
involved with emergency response planning and/or preparedness, as
opposed to the SERC, a railroad may share the required information with
that agency instead of the SERC. DOT also explained that railroads were
not required to make notification under the Order to TERCs, but,
rather, that DOT would be reaching out to Tribal leaders to inform them
that TERCs could coordinate with the appropriate SERC in a state for
access to data supplied under the Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\96\ http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L05237.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed requirements for notification to SERCs
consistent with the notification language of the Order (i.e., trains
transporting one million gallons or more of Bakken crude oil).
Notification made under the Order had to include estimated frequencies
of affected trains in each county in the state, their routes, a product
description and emergency response information, and contact
information.
Commenters had varied opinions regarding who the appropriate
recipient of this information should be (e.g. SERCs, fusion centers,
emergency responders, etc.). For example, the NTSB stated that DOT
should ``codify Safety Recommendation R-14-14, which recommends that
PHMSA require railroads transporting hazardous materials through
communities to provide emergency responders and local and state
emergency planning committees with current commodity flow data and
assist with development of emergency operations and response plans.''
The NTSB further stated that DOT should ``codify Safety Recommendation
R-14-19, which recommends that PHMSA require railroads transporting
hazardous materials to develop, implement, and periodically evaluate a
public education program similar to 49 CFR 192.616 and 195.440 for the
communities along railroad hazardous materials routes.''
Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club commented that ``rail
operators carrying volatile crude in any amount must be required to
notify states and emergency responders of the crude compositions,
quantities, and frequency of transport; and that this information must
be made available to the public.'' Some commenters wanted the
notification applicability expanded greatly, and Delaware Riverkeeper
Network noted that SERCs should be ``notified of sampling and testing
results, and that those results should be made available to the general
public, SERCs, the DOT, fusion centers, Tribal emergency responders,
and local [emergency responders] ERs.'' Numerous commenters also stated
that they believed ``local emergency responders should be provided with
information about all hazmat traveling through their jurisdictions,''
including villages, towns, and cities. Some commenters also provided
general support for notification requirements described in AAR Circular
No. OT-55-N,\97\ which contains the recommended railroad operating
practices for transportation of hazardous materials. Finally, the
Prairie Island Indian Community touched on the issue of including TERCs
in that ``unfortunately there was no mention of notifying Tribal
Emergency Response Commissions (TERC). Indian tribes have the same
responsibilities and obligations under the Emergency Preparedness and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) passed by Congress in 1986. EPCRA
established requirements for federal, state and local governments,
Indian tribes, and industry regarding emergency planning and Community
Right-to-Know reporting on hazardous and toxic chemicals. The Community
Right-to-Know provisions were meant to increase public knowledge and
access to information on chemicals at individual facilities, their
uses, and releases into the environment.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\97\ http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-
0082-0009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

DOT agrees with the general scope of the commenters who suggested
making more information available for first responders and emergency
planners, but we disagree on the best method to disseminate the
information to the members of this community. As previously noted, the
Order required ``each railroad transporting one million gallons or more
of Bakken crude oil in a single train in commerce within the U.S.
provide certain information in writing to the SERCs for each state in
which it operates such a train.'' While we proposed the same language
in the NPRM as it related to setting up the notification requirements
and the SERCs, after careful review of the comments and discussions
within PHMSA and FRA, we believe that using the definition of the HHFT
for notification applicability and emergency response is appropriate.
This will align it with the proposed changes to the Sec. 172.820
requirements, and since those will be expanded to apply to HHFTs, the
notification requirements in paragraph (g) of Sec. 172.820 will now
cover all flammable liquids transported in an HHFT, including crude oil
and ethanol. The expansion of the routing requirements and deferring to
the reporting requirements therein, as adopted in this final rule,
reflect the NTSB recommendation R-14-4, and enable industry to make use
of current practices for security-sensitive hazardous materials (such
as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia).
After issuance of the Order, railroads were concerned that certain
routing and traffic information about crude oil transport required to
be provided to SERCs would be made available to the public under
individual states' ``Sunshine'' laws. DOT engaged in discussions with
railroads and invited states to participate to address this valid
concern, and the FAQ document was the outcome of those discussions. As
is explained in the aforementioned FAQ document, DOT preferred that
this information be kept confidential, and acknowledged that railroads
may have an appropriate claim that this information constitutes
confidential business information, but that such claims may differ by
state depending on each state's applicable laws. DOT also encouraged
the railroads to work with states to find the most appropriate means
for sharing this information (including fusion centers or other
mechanisms that may have established confidentiality protocols).
However, the Order and DOT's subsequent guidance did not require nor
clarify that states sign confidentiality agreements to receive this
information, and did not designate or clarify that the information
could be considered Sensitive Security Information (SSI) under the
procedures governing such information at 49 CFR part 15. DOT
understands that despite confidentiality concerns, railroads are
complying with the requirements of the

[[Page 26712]]

Order and have provided the required information to States.
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed notification requirements consistent
with the Order. However, we did not include any specific language
regarding public access to sensitive information requirements, but we
did ask readers to comment on two questions: (1) Whether PHMSA should
place restrictions in the HMR on the disclosure of the notification
information provided to SERCs or to another state or local government
entity; and (2) Whether such information should be deemed SSI, and the
reasons indicating why such a determination is appropriate, considering
safety, security, and the public's interest in this information.
Commenters had varying opinions on this issue. A concerned member
of the public indicated, ``I do NOT recommend that the public be
informed of train schedules due to terrorism concerns,'' while others
asserted, ``I support the community's right to know,'' and ``residents
within the zone around train routes that could be affected need to know
what's going through their communities and over their water supplies,
where it will pass and when, in order to make decisions about personal
exposure.'' Environmental groups including Earthjustice, Forest Ethics,
Sierra Club, NRDC, and Oil Change International commented, ``[t]here
should be no restrictions on the disclosure of information provided to
SERCs or other emergency responders.'' The NTSB stated, ``[c]lassifying
route information about hazardous materials as SSI would unreasonably
restrict the public's access to information that is important to
safety. While the general public may not require detailed information
such as: Numbers, dates, and times -- people should know if they live
or work near a hazardous materials route.''
Certain industry groups, like the AFPM, suggested that ``PHMSA
should clarify that SERC notifications are sensitive security
information exempt from state Freedom of Information Acts and sunshine
laws.'' As for rail carriers, many of them supported Great Northern
Midstream's assertion that ``disclosing private information in the
public domain with respect to origination and destination, shipper
designation or otherwise, introduces the potential for act of terrorism
with no corresponding benefit from such disclosure.'' It went on to say
that PHMSA must ``mandate to preempt state law requiring notification
to any party other than emergency response (i.e., no public
dissemination).'' Petroleum storage and distribution services companies
like Plains Marketing said that while it ``recognize[s] that providing
this information allows local first responders to better prepare to
respond to accidents, we do caution PHMSA that providing this
information could be in conflict with confidentiality requirements, and
that PHMSA should ensure that the disclosure is limited to only
emergency responders and related agencies.'' Other government groups,
like the National Association of SARA Title III said, ``rail carriers
may designate the information being provided as a trade secret or as
security sensitive, but may not demand that the SERCs or other
recipients sign nondisclosure agreements.'' However, concerned public
commenter K. Denise Rucker Krepp, former MARAD Chief Counsel and former
Senior Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security
Committee, said:

The Department of Transportation cannot limit the sharing of
information to State Emergency Response Commissions to trains
containing more than one million gallons of Bakken crude oil.
Railroad carriers are required by the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act, Public Law 110-53) to
share all routing and cargo shipment information with state, local,
and tribal authorities. Section 1512 of the 9/11 Act requires
railroad carriers to conduct vulnerability assessments and draft
security plans. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
required to review these assessments and plans in consultation with
public safety and law enforcement officials. DHS can't properly
consult with these officials if they don't know what is being
transported through their jurisdiction. Similarly, DHS can't seek
input from state and local officials if they don't know the routes
by which the goods are being transported.

Finally, Senators Wyden, Merkley, Boxer, and Feinstein stated,
``[b]ecause railroads provide crude oil routes online, reporting
information to emergency responders (with no limits on `information
sharing') should not pose additional security concern.''
DOT agrees with the commenters that this is a difficult and complex
issue, and widespread access to security sensitive information could be
used for criminal purposes when it comes to crude oil by rail
transportation. For example, the FBI and the federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives are participating in a vandalism
investigation of a November 2014 incident in Vivian, S.D., where a two-
foot piece of the rail line was blown up using the explosive
tannerite.\98\ As discussed before, DOT prefers that this information
be kept confidential for security reasons, and acknowledges that
railroads may have an appropriate claim that this information
constitutes confidential business information, but that such claims may
differ by state depending on each state's applicable laws. DOT has also
encouraged the railroads to work with states to find the most
appropriate means for sharing this information (including fusion
centers or other mechanisms that may have established confidentiality
protocols). After careful review of the comments and after discussions
within PHMSA and FRA, we believe that adopting the notification (and
information sharing) process associated with the additional planning
requirements under Sec. 172.820 is the best approach. Under this
approach, the transportation of crude oil by rail (or any other
flammable liquid carried as part of a HHFT) can: (1) Avoid the negative
security and business implications of widespread public disclosure of
routing and volume data; and (2) preserve the intent of the Order to
enhance information sharing with emergency responders by utilizing
fusion centers as they have established protocols for communicating
with emergency responders on hazmat rail issues as indicated in the
following passage from the Frequently Asked Questions on DOT's May 7,
2014 Emergency Order Regarding Notification to Communities of Bakken
Crude Oil Shipments: \99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\98\ ``Railroad Vandalism in South Dakota Under Investigation,''
http://www.ksfy.com/home/headlines/Railroad-vandalism-in-South-Dakota-under-investigation-285018691.html.
\99\ http://www.fra.dot.gov/Elib/Document/3873.

Fusion Centers are established on a State and regional basis,
with one of their purposes being to share emergency response
information. Railroads currently routinely share data on their
shipments with Fusion Centers. Given that railroads and Fusion
Centers have already established protocols for sharing information
under existing confidentiality agreements, in some situations, there
might be advantages to States and railroads in utilizing Fusion
Centers instead of SERCs for the sharing of information required by
this EO. DOT also noted that there is an existing mechanism for
Tribal Nations to interact with the Fusion Centers through the
State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating
Council. Similarly, DOT recognizes that individual States may have
an agency other than the SERC or Fusion Center that is more directly
involved in emergency response planning and preparedness than either
the SERC or Fusion Center.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\100\ http://www.fra.dot.gov/Elib/Document/3873.

Expansion of the routing requirements in this final rule addresses
the NTSB's recommendation R-14-4 and are in widespread use across the
rail industry

[[Page 26713]]

for security-sensitive hazardous materials (such as chlorine and
anhydrous ammonia). Additionally, AAR Circular OT-55-N outlines a
procedure whereby a community may request a list of the types and
volumes of hazardous materials that are transported through the
community so that emergency responders can plan and prepare.
In addition, on January 27, 2015, AAR's Safety and Operations
Management Committee approved changes to OT-55 (AAR Circular No. OT-55-
O), and those changes became effective January 27, 2015, and superseded
OT-55-N, which was previously issued August 5, 2013. AAR's OT-55-O
revised the Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response
Implementation (TRANSCAER[supreg]) program listed in Section V. Section
V states that ``railroads will assist in implementing TRANSCAER, a
system-wide community outreach program to improve community awareness,
emergency planning and incident response for the transportation of
hazardous materials.'' Specifically, the key revised text of OT-55-O
``[u]pon written request, AAR members will provide bona fide emergency
response agencies or planning groups with specific commodity flow
information covering all hazardous commodities transported through the
community for a 12 month period in rank order.''
The request must be made using the form included as Appendix 3 by
an official emergency response or planning group with a cover letter on
appropriate letterhead bearing an authorized signature. The form
reflects the fact that the railroad industry considers this information
to be restricted information of a security sensitive nature and that
the recipient of the information must agree to release the information
only to bona fide emergency response planning and response
organizations and not distribute the information publicly in whole or
in part without the individual railroad's express written permission.
It should be noted that commercial requirements change over time, and
it is possible that a hazardous materials transported tomorrow might
not be included in the specific commodity flow information provided
upon request, since that information was not available at the time the
list was provided.
In summary, Section V is now revised to require ``all hazardous
commodities transported through the community for a 12 month period in
rank order'' instead of just the top 25 commodities. In addition,
Section V was inserted with a 12 month period, which will help
emergency response agencies or planning groups in planning for a whole
year.
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed regulatory text consistent with the
Order which specified notification of information regarding the
transportation specific to Bakken crude oil. With regard to singling
out Bakken crude oil from crude oil extracted from other geographic
locations, DOT acknowledges that under the current shipping paper
requirements there is no distinction between Bakken crude oil and crude
oil sourced from other locations. This may present compliance and
enforcement difficulties, particularly with regard to downstream
transportation of Bakken crude oil by railroads after interchange(s)
with an originating or subsequent rail carrier. Previously, DOT
explained in the FAQs document that railroads and offerors should work
together to develop a means for identifying Bakken crude oil prior to
transport, such as a designating a Standard Transportation Commodity
Code (STCC) that would identify crude oil by its geographic source. DOT
also stated that for purposes of compliance with the Order, crude oil
tendered to railroads for transportation from any facility directly
located within the Williston Basin (North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Montana in the United States, or Saskatchewan or Manitoba in Canada) is
Bakken crude oil.
In the NPRM, PHMSA solicited comments surrounding commodity type,
and if the applicability of notification requirements should be
expanded to include threshold quantities of all petroleum crude oils or
all HHFTs (versus only trains transporting threshold quantities of
Bakken crude oil), and even commodity types (e.g., ethanol, etc.).
Commenters generally stated that crude oil sourced from the Bakken
shale formation should not be the only determining factor of commodity
type for notification purposes. Congressman Michael Capuano stated that
he ``supports carrier notification for both Bakken crude oil and
ethanol shipments.'' Environmental groups, like Powder River Basin,
have the view that ``any quantity of Class III (flammable liquid)
material, including combustible liquids'' should be included, ``not
just Bakken crude oil.'' Trade associations, like the Independent
Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), assert that it ``do[es] not
support any distinction between Bakken crude and other oil types.'' The
NTSB echoed these opinions and said, ``SERC notification requirements
should extend to ethanol due to similar risks in a pool fire to crude
oil,'' and that ``SERC notification requirements should extend to crude
oil sourced from other regions, not just the Bakken formation, since
Bakken crude is not significantly different from other crude oil or
flammable liquids.'' Local communities, cities, and towns were
consistent in their belief as expressed by the City and County of
Denver that ``notification requirement should be extended to apply to
all HHFTs, not only those transporting Bakken petroleum crude oil.''
NGO's like the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) thought that
``all crude oil and ethanol should be included'' and that ``NFPA has
not found any reference to similar requirements on notification of
SERCs regarding ethanol train transportation. This seems to be an
omission in this proposed rulemaking and NFPA questions whether there
should be a companion requirement that applies specifically to
ethanol.'' Rail carriers believe, as expressed by Continental
Resources, Inc., that ``all petroleum crude oil'' should be included,
and that there is ``no significant difference between Bakken and other
crude. Also, [we] do not support a separate STC code for Bakken.''
DOT agrees with comments that Bakken crude oil should not be the
determining factor (with respect to a commodity type) for notification
requirements. As previously noted, the Order required ``each railroad
transporting one million gallons or more of Bakken crude oil in a
single train in commerce within the U.S. provide certain information in
writing to the SERCs for each state in which it operates such a
train.'' Although we were consistent with this instruction in the NPRM,
we now agree with the vast majority of commenters that applicability
should be broadened to include more commodity types and/or source
locations of crude oil. This final rule invokes the notification
requirements for HHFT. This aligns it with the proposed changes to the
Sec. 172.820 requirements which also will now apply to HHFTs, and
thus, the associated notification requirements in paragraph (g) of
Sec. 172.820 will now cover more than crude oil sourced from the
Bakken formation and more commodity types (e.g., ethanol).
Conclusion
Based on the above discussion, PHMSA and FRA are removing the
notification requirement language proposed in the NPRM under Sec.
174.310(a)(2) and is instead using as a substitute the contact
information

[[Page 26714]]

language requirement that is already part of the additional planning
requirements for transportation by rail found in Sec. 172.820 of the
HMR that now applies to HHFTs. As provided in Sec. 172.820(g), each
HHFT must identify a point of contact (including the name, title, phone
number and email address) related to routing of materials identified in
Sec. 172.820 in its security plan and provide this information to: (1)
State and/or regional fusion centers (established to coordinate with
state, local and tribal officials on security issues and which are
located within the area encompassed by the rail carrier's system); and
(2) State, local, and tribal officials in jurisdictions that may be
affected by a rail carrier's routing decisions and who directly contact
the railroad to discuss routing decisions.
Not adopting the separate notification requirements proposed in the
NPRM and instead relying on the expansion of the existing route
analysis and consultation requirements of Sec. 172.820 to include
HHFTs would allow this change to function within the overall hazardous
materials regulatory scheme. This provides for consistency of
notification requirements for rail carriers transporting material
subject to routing requirements, i.e., trains carrying: (1) More than
2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) in a single carload of a Division 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3
explosive; (2) a quantity of a material poisonous by inhalation in a
single bulk packaging; (3) a highway route-controlled quantity of a
Class 7 (radioactive) material; and now (4) Class 3 flammable liquid as
part of a high-hazard flammable train (as defined in Sec. 171.8).
Specifically, a single train carrying 20 or more carloads of a Class
III flammable liquid in a continuous block or a single train carrying
35 or more tank cars of a Class III flammable liquid across the train
consist will have to comply with the additional planning requirements
for transportation by rail in Sec. 172.820.

VIII. Section by Section Review

Section 171.7

The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15
U.S.C. 272) directs agencies to use voluntary consensus standards in
lieu of government-unique standards except where inconsistent with law
or otherwise impractical. Section 171.7 lists all standards
incorporated by reference into the HMR and informational materials not
requiring incorporation by reference. The informational materials not
requiring incorporation by reference are noted throughout the HMR and
provide best practices and additional safety measures that while not
mandatory, may enhance safety and compliance. In this final rule, we
are redesignating paragraphs (k)(2) through (k)(4) as (k)(3) through
(k)(5) and adding a new paragraph (k)(2) to incorporate by reference
the AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section C--III,
Specifications for Tank Cars, Specification M-1002 (AAR Specifications
for Tank Cars), Appendix E, Design Details implemented April 2010.

Section 171.8

Section 171.8 provides definitions and abbreviations used within
the HMR. In this final rule, we are adding a new definition for high-
hazard flammable train meaning, a single train transporting 20 or more
loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or
a single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3
flammable liquid throughout the train consist. In addition, in this
final rule, we are adding a new definition for high-hazard flammable
unit train meaning a single train transporting 70 or more loaded tank
cars containing Class 3 flammable liquid.

Section 172.820

Section 172.820 prescribes additional safety and security planning
requirements for transportation by rail. Paragraph (a) of this section
provides the applicability for when a rail carrier must comply with the
requirements of this section. In this final rule, we are revising Sec.
172.820(a) to add a new applicability requiring that any rail carrier
transporting an HHFT (as defined in Sec. 171.8) must comply with the
additional safety and security planning requirements for transportation
by rail.
Paragraph (b) of this section requires rail carriers compile
commodity data to inform their route analyses. PHMSA is revising this
paragraph to account for rail carriers' initial analysis and require
that commodity data be compiled no later than 90 days after the end of
the calendar year; and that in 2016, the data must be compiled by March
31. In addition, this section requires the initial data cover six
months, from July 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015. For their initial
analysis, rail carriers are only required to collect data from the six-
month period described in this section, additional data may be
included, but is not required by this final rule. In this final rule we
are providing rail carriers the option to use data for all of 2015 in
conducting their initial route analyses. Regardless if six or 12 months
of data are used, a rail carrier's initial route analysis and selection
process must be completed by March 31, 2016. For subsequent route
analyses, commodity data from the entire previous calendar year (i.e.
12 months) must be used. PHMSA will amend the HMR in a future action to
remove the transitional provision.

Section 173.41

In this final rule, we are adding a new section 173.41 prescribing
a sampling and testing program for unrefined petroleum-based products.
This section specifies what must be included in a sampling and testing
program in paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) of this section requires
shippers to certify that unrefined petroleum-based products are offered
in accordance with this subchapter, to include the requirements
prescribed in paragraph (a). Paragraph (c) provides the requirements
for documentation, retention, review and dissemination of the sampling
and testing program. Finally, paragraph (d) of this section states that
each person required to develop a sampling and testing program make the
documentation available upon request to an authorized official of the
Department of Transportation.

Section 173.241

Section 173.241 prescribes the bulk packaging requirements for
certain low hazard liquids and solid materials which pose a moderate
risk. Paragraph (a) provides which specifications of rail tank cars may
be used to transport hazardous materials when directed to this section
by Column (8C) of the Sec. 172.101 HMT. In this final rule, we are
revising paragraph (a) to add an authorization for DOT Specification
117 tank cars and to prohibit the use of DOT Specification 111 tank
cars for Class 3 (flammable liquids) in Packing Group III in HHFT
service, after May 2025. Additionally, we are authorizing the
retrofitting of DOT Specification 111 tank cars to allow their use
after May 2025 provided they meet the requirements of the DOT-117R
specification or the DOT-117P performance standard as specified.
Finally, the section notes that conforming retrofitted tank cars are to
be marked ``DOT-117R'' and conforming performance standard tank cars
are to be marked ``DOT-117P.''

Section 173.242

Section 173.242 prescribes the bulk packaging requirements for
certain medium hazard liquids and solids, including solids with dual
hazards. Paragraph (a) provides which specifications of rail tank cars
may be

[[Page 26715]]

used to transport hazardous materials when directed to this section by
Column (8C) of the Sec. 172.101 HMT. In this final rule, we are
revising paragraph (a) to add an authorization for DOT Specification
117 tank cars and to prohibit the use of DOT Specification 111 tank
cars for Class 3 (flammable liquids) in Packing Group II and III, in
HHFT service, after the dates in the following table unless they meet
the performance standard DOT-117P or are retrofitted to meet the
requirements of the DOT-117R specification as specified:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 111 built to the
DOT 111 not CPC-1232 industry
Packing group authorized after standard not
authorized after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
II.......................... May 1, 2023 (non- July 1, 2023 (non-
jacketed and jacketed) May 1,
jacketed). 2025 (jacketed).
III......................... May 1, 2025......... May 1, 2025.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the section notes that conforming retrofitted tank cars are to
be marked ``DOT-117R'' and conforming performance standard tank cars
are to be marked ``DOT-117P.''

Section 173.243

Section 173.243 prescribes the bulk packaging requirements for
certain high-hazard liquids and dual hazard materials which pose a
moderate risk. Paragraph (a) provides which specifications of rail cars
may be used to transport hazardous materials when directed to this
section by Column (8C) of the Sec. 172.101 HMT. In this final rule, we
are revising paragraph (a) to add an authorization for DOT
Specification 117 tank cars and to prohibit the use of DOT
Specification 111 tank cars for Class 3 (flammable liquids) in Packing
Group I, in HHFT service, after the dates in the following table unless
they are retrofitted to meet the performance standard DOT-117P or the
requirements of the DOT-117R specification as specified:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 111 built to the
DOT 111 not CPC-1232 industry
Packing group authorized after standard not
authorized after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I........................... January 1, 2017 (non- April 1, 2020 (non-
jacketed report jacketed).
trigger). May 1, 2025
January 1, 2018 (non- (jacketed).
jacketed).
March 1, 2018
(jacketed).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the section notes that conforming retrofitted tank cars are to
be marked ``DOT-117R'' and conforming performance standard tank cars
are to be marked ``DOT-117P.''

Section 174.310

In this final rule, we are adding a new section 174.310 prescribing
requirements for the operation of HHFTs. A rail carrier must comply
with these additional requirements if they operate an HHFT (as defined
in Sec. 171.8). Paragraph (a)(1) requires that any rail carrier
operating an HHFT is subject to the additional safety and security
planning requirements in Sec. 172.820 (i.e. routing). Additionally,
Paragraph (a)(2) requires that all trains are limited to a maximum
speed of 50 mph. The train is further limited to a maximum speed of 40
mph while that train travels within the limits of high-threat urban
areas (HTUAs) as defined in Sec. 1580.3 of this title, unless all tank
cars containing a Class 3 flammable liquid meet or exceed the retrofit
standard DOT Specification 117R, the DOT Specification 117P performance
standards, or the standard for the DOT Specification 117 tank car.
Paragraph (a)(3) requires HHFTs and HHFUTs must also be equipped with
advanced brake signal propagation systems as specified. Paragraph
(a)(4) states this new section also requires that a tank car
manufactured for use in a HHFT must meet DOT Specification 117, or 117P
in part 179, subpart D of this subchapter or an authorized tank
specification as specified in part 173, subpart F of this subchapter.
Finally, Paragraph (a)(5) requires owners of Non-Jacketed DOT-111 tank
cars in PG I service in an HHFT, who are unable to meet the January 1,
2017 retrofit deadline specified in Sec. 173.243 (a)(1) to submit a
report by March 1, 2017 to Department of Transportation. The report
must include information regarding the retrofitting progress.

Section 179.200

The heading for Sec. 179.200 is revised to include the DOT-117
specification.

Section 179.200-1

The heading for Sec. 179.200-1 is revised by stating that tank
cars built under the DOT-117 specification must meet the applicable
requirements of Sec. Sec. 179.200, 179.201, and 179.202.

Section 179.202-1

Section 179.202-1 prescribes the applicability of the DOT-117 tank
car standards and specifies that each tank built under such
specification must conform to the general requirements of Sec. 179.200
and the prescriptive standards in Sec. Sec. 179.202-1 through 179.202-
11, or the performance standard requirements of Sec. 179.202-12.

Section 179.202-3

Section 179.202-3 authorizes a DOT-117 tank car to be loaded to a
gross weight on rail of up to 286,000 pounds (129,727 kg) upon approval
by the Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA). This section also provides a reference to Sec.
179.13 which provides authorization for a gross weight on rail of up to
286,000 pounds (129,727 kg).

Section 179.202-4

Section 179.202-4 specifies that the wall thickness after forming
of the tank shell and heads on a DOT-117 tank car must be, at a
minimum, \9/16\ of an inch of AAR TC-128 Grade B normalized steel.
Although not proposed in the NPRM, in this final rule, we are also
authorizing \5/8\ of an inch of ASTM A 516-70 in accordance with Sec.
179.200-7(b) that is currently allowed by the HMR. Both grades of steel
must be normalized.

Section 179.202-5

Section 179.202-5 specifies that the DOT-117 specification tank car
must have a tank head puncture resistance system constructed in
conformance with the requirements in Sec. 179.16(c). Additionally, the
section specifies the tank car must be equipped with full height head
shields with a minimum thickness of \1/2\ inch.

Section 179.202-6

Section 179.202-6 specifies that the DOT-117 specification tank car
must be equipped with a thermal protection system. The thermal
protection system

[[Page 26716]]

must conform to the performance standard in Sec. 179.18 and include a
reclosing PRD in accordance with Sec. 173.31 of this subchapter.

Section 179.202-7

Section 179.202-7 specifies that the thermal protection system on a
DOT-117 specification tank car must be covered with a metal jacket of a
thickness not less than 11 gauge A 1011 steel or equivalent and flashed
around all openings to be weather tight. It also requires that a
protective coating be applied to the exterior surface of a carbon steel
tank and the inside surface of a carbon steel jacket.

Section 179.202-8

Section 179.202-8 prescribes minimum standards for bottom outlet
handle protection on a DOT-117 specification tank car. In this final
rule, we are requiring that if the tank car is equipped with a bottom
outlet, the handle must be removed prior to train movement or be
designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.

Section 179.202-9

Section 179.202-9 prescribes the top fittings protection standard
for DOT-117 specification tank cars. In this final rule, we are
adopting as proposed, to incorporate by reference in Sec. 171.7,
Appendix E 10.2.1 of the 2010 version of the AAR Manual of Standards
and Recommended Practices, Section C--Part III, Specifications for Tank
Cars, Specification M-1002, (AAR Specifications for Tank Cars). Thus, a
DOT-117 specification tank car must be equipped with top fittings
protection in accordance with the incorporated standard.

Section 179.102-10

Section 179.102-10 prescribes ECP braking construction standards
for DOT-117 specification tank cars. Specifically, paragraph (a)
requires by January 1, 2021, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, comprised of at least
one tank car loaded with a Packing Group I material must ensure the
train meets the ECP braking capability requirements. In addition
paragraph (b) requires by May 1, 2023, each rail carrier operating a
high-hazard flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, and not
described in paragraph (a) of this section, must ensure the train meets
the ECP braking capability requirements. Finally, paragraph (c) permits
alternate brake systems to be submitted for approval through the
processes and procedures outlined in 49 CFR part 232, subpart F.

Section 179.202-11

A table is provided in Sec. 179.202-11 to indicate the individual
specification requirements for a DOT-117 specification tank car.

Section 179.202-12

Section 179.202-12 provides an optional performance standard that a
DOT-117 specification tank car may be manufactured to and is designated
and marked as ``DOT-117P.'' Paragraph (a) describes the approval
process for the design, testing, and modeling results that must be
reviewed and approved by the Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety/Chief Safety Officer of the FRA. Paragraph (b) describes the
approval process to operate at 286,000 gross rail load (GRL). Paragraph
(c) specifies that a DOT-117P specification tank car must be equipped
with a tank-head puncture-resistance system in accordance with the
performance standard in Sec. 179.18. Paragraph (d) specifies that a
DOT-117P specification tank car must be equipped with a thermal
protection system. The thermal protection system must be designed in
accordance with the performance standard in Sec. 179.18 and include a
reclosing PRD conforming to Sec. 173.31 of this subchapter. Paragraph
(e) specifies that if the tank car is equipped with a bottom outlet,
the handle must be removed prior to train movement or be designed with
protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended actuation during
train accident scenarios. Paragraph (f) specifies that the tank car
tank must be equipped with top fittings protection conforming to AAR
Specifications Tank Cars, appendix E paragraph 10.2.1. Paragraph (g)
prescribes ECP braking construction standards for DOT-117P
specification tank cars. Specifically, paragraph (g)(1) requires by
January 1, 2021, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard flammable
unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, comprised of at least one tank
car loaded with a Packing Group I material must ensure the train meets
the ECP braking capability requirements. In addition paragraph (g)(2)
requires by May 1, 2023 each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, not described in
paragraph (g)(1) of this section must ensure the train meets the ECP
braking capability requirements. Finally, paragraph (g)(3) permits
alternate brake systems to be submitted for approval through the
processes and procedures outlined in 49 CFR part 232, subpart F.

Section 179.202-13

Section 179.202-13 prescribes the retrofit standards for existing
non-pressure tank cars. Non-pressure tank cars retrofitted to meet the
standards prescribed in this section are designated and marked ``DOT-
117R.'' Paragraph (a) prescribes the applicability of the DOT-117R tank
car standards and specifies that each tank retrofitted under such
specification must conform to the general requirements of Sec. 179.200
and the retrofit standards in this section, or the performance standard
requirements of Sec. 179.202-12. Paragraph (b) authorizes a DOT-117
tank car to be loaded to a gross weight on rail of up to 286,000 pounds
(129,727 kg) upon approval by the Associate Administrator for Safety,
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Paragraph (c) requires that the
original construction provided a wall thickness after forming of the
tank shell and heads at a minimum of \7/16\ of an inch, and constructed
with steel authorized by the HMR at the time of construction. Paragraph
(d) specifies that the DOT-117R specification tank car must have a tank
head puncture resistance system constructed in conformance with Sec.
179.16(c). Additionally, the section specifies the tank car must be
equipped with full height head shields with a minimum thickness of \1/
2\ inch. Paragraph (e) specifies that the DOT-117R specification tank
car must be equipped with a thermal protection system. The thermal
protection system must conform to the performance standard in Sec.
179.18 and include a reclosing PRD in accordance with Sec. 173.31 of
this subchapter. Paragraph (f) specifies that the DOT-117R
specification tank car must be covered with a metal jacket of a
thickness not less than 11 gauge A 1011 steel or equivalent and flashed
around all openings to be weather tight. It also requires that a
protective coating be applied to the exterior surface of a carbon steel
tank and the inside surface of a carbon steel jacket. Paragraph (g)
prescribes minimum standards for bottom outlet handle protection on a
DOT-117R specification tank car. In this final rule, we are requiring
that if the tank car is equipped with a bottom outlet, the handle must
be removed prior to train movement or be designed with protection
safety system(s) to prevent unintended actuation during train accident
scenarios. Paragraph (h) authorizes existing tank car tanks to rely on
any top fittings protection installed at the time of original
manufacture. Paragraph (i) prescribes ECP braking construction
standards for DOT-117R

[[Page 26717]]

specification tank cars. Specifically, paragraph (i)(1) requires by
January 1, 2021, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard flammable
unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, comprised of at least one tank
car loaded with a Packing Group I material must ensure the train meets
the ECP braking capability requirements. In addition paragraph (i)(2)
requires by May 1, 2023 each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, not described in
paragraph (i)(1) of this section must ensure the train meets the ECP
braking capability requirements. Finally, paragraph (i)(3) permits
alternate brake systems to be submitted for approval through the
processes and procedures outlined in 49 CFR part 232, subpart F.

IX. Impact of Adopted Regulation on Existing Emergency Orders

As previously mentioned Emergency Order authority is granted to the
Department and permits the Department to take action on safety issues
that constitute an imminent hazard to the safe transportation of
hazardous materials. Railroad transportation of hazardous materials in
commerce is subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Transportation (Secretary), including the authority to impose
emergency restrictions, prohibitions, recalls, or out-of-service
orders, without notice or an opportunity for hearing, to the extent
necessary to abate the imminent hazard. 49 U.S.C. 5121(d). Therefore an
emergency order can be issued if the Secretary has found that an unsafe
condition or an unsafe practice is causing or otherwise constitutes an
imminent hazard to the safe transportation of hazardous materials.
Currently the Department has four emergency orders in affect that
are relevant to rail shipment of large quantities of flammable liquids.
Below we will discuss those orders and how the amendments adopted in
this rulemaking affect those Emergency Orders. Emergency Orders remain
in effect until the Secretary determines that an imminent hazard no
longer exits or a change in applicable statute or Federal regulation
occurs that supersedes the requirements of the Order, in which case the
Secretary will issue a Rescission Order.

Emergency Order 28

Emergency Order 28 was issued on August 7, 2013 and addressed
safety issues related to securement of certain hazardous materials
trains. Specifically, this order requires trains with (1) Five or more
tank carloads of any one or any combination of materials poisonous by
inhalation as defined in Title 49 CFR 171.8, and including anhydrous
ammonia (UN1005) and ammonia solutions (UN3318); or (2) 20 rail
carloads or intermodal portable tank loads of any one or any
combination of materials listed in (1) above, or, any Division 2.1
flammable gas, Class 3 flammable liquid or combustible liquid, Class
1.1 or 1.2 explosive,\101\ or hazardous substance listed in 49 CFR
173.31(f)(2). To see the specific provisions of this emergency order
see the August 7, 2013, Federal Register (78 FR 48218).\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\101\ Should have read ``Division'' instead of ``Class.''
\102\ See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-08-07/pdf/2013-19215.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While this final rulemaking does not address train securement, on
August 9, 2014, FRA published an NPRM that proposed amendments to the
brake system safety standards for freight and other non-passenger
trains and equipment to strengthen the requirements relating to the
securement of unattended equipment. Specifically, FRA proposed to
codify many of the requirements already included in emergency order 28.
FRA proposed to amend existing regulations to include additional
securement requirements for unattended equipment, primarily for trains
transporting poisonous by inhalation hazardous materials or large
volumes of Division 2.1 (flammable gases), Class 3 (flammable or
combustible liquids, including crude oil and ethanol), and Class 1.1 or
1.2 (explosives) hazardous materials. For these trains, FRA also
proposed additional communication requirements relating to job
briefings and securement verification. Finally, FRA proposed to require
all locomotives left unattended outside of a yard to be equipped with
an operative exterior locking mechanism. Attendance on trains would be
required on equipment not capable of being secured in accordance with
the proposed and existing requirements.
As this final rulemaking does not address train securement
emergency order 28 remains currently unaffected. The upcoming final
rule in response to comments from FRA's August 9, 2014 NPRM that
proposed amendments to the brake system safety standards for freight
and other non-passenger trains and equipment to strengthen the
requirements relating to the securement of unattended equipment will
address the status of emergency order 28 upon adoption.

DOT-OST-2014-0025

This emergency order was published on February 25, 2014.
Subsequently a revised and amended emergency order was published on
March 6, 2014. This emergency order required those who offer crude oil
for transportation by rail to ensure that the product is properly
tested and classified in accordance with Federal safety regulations.
Further the EO required that all rail shipments of crude oil are
properly classed as a flammable liquid in Packing Group (PG) III
material be treated as a PG I or II material, until further notice. The
Amended Emergency Order also authorized PG III materials to be
described as PG III for the purposes of hazard communication.
The primary intent of this emergency order was to address unsafe
practices related to the classification and packaging of petroleum
crude oil. Misclassification is one of the most dangerous mistakes to
be made when dealing with hazardous materials because proper
classification is the critical first step in determining how to
package, handle, communicate about, and safely transport hazardous
materials. Misclassification may indicate larger problems with company
management, oversight, and quality control. Petroleum crude oil may
contain dissolved gases or other unanticipated hazardous constituents,
may exhibit corrosive properties and also may exhibit toxic properties.
In this rulemaking we have adopted requirements for a testing and
sampling program to ensure better classification and characterization
of unrefined petroleum-based products. As part of this requirement the
HMR now require an offeror to prepare a written sampling and testing
program for unrefined petroleum-based products. This program must
address: (1) A frequency of sampling and testing that accounts for any
appreciable variability of the material (2) Sampling prior to the
initial offering of the material for transportation and when changes
that may affect the properties of the material occur; (3) Sampling
methods that ensures a representative sample of the entire mixture, as
offered, is collected; (4) Testing methods that enable classification
of the material under the HMR; (5) Quality control measures for sample
frequencies; (6) Duplicate samples or equivalent measures for quality
assurance; (7) Criteria for modifying the sampling and testing program;
(8) Testing or other appropriate methods used to identify properties of
the mixture relevant to packaging requirements.

[[Page 26718]]

Furthermore the offeror is required to certify that program is in
place, document the testing and sampling program, and make program
information available to DOT personnel, upon request. The primary
intent of this requirement is of address unsafe practices related to
the classification and packaging of mined products.
As the March 6, 2014 emergency order and the requirements adopted
in this rulemaking related to classification and characterization
address the same safety issue the March 6, 2014 emergency order is no
longer necessary. Therefore the requirements adopted in this rule
supersede the March 6, 2014 emergency order and make it no longer
necessary once the rule becomes effective.

DOT-OST-2014-0067

This emergency order was published on May 7, 2014. This emergency
order required all railroads that operate trains containing one million
gallons of Bakken crude oil to notify SERCs about the operation of
these trains through their States. Specifically, this notification
should identify each county, or a particular state or commonwealth's
equivalent jurisdiction (e.g., Louisiana parishes, Alaska boroughs,
Virginia independent cities), in the state through which the trains
will operate.
The primary intent of this emergency order was to eliminate unsafe
conditions and practices that create an imminent hazard to public
health and safety and the environment. Specifically, this emergency
order was designed to inform communities of large volumes of crude oil
transported by rail through their areas and to provide information to
better prepare emergency responders for accidents involving large
volumes of crude oil.
In this rulemaking we have adopted notification requirements for
large volumes of crude oil transported by rail. These requirements were
designed to codify the requirements of the May 7, 2014 EO. While some
amendments to the original proposal are made, the requirements adopted
in this rulemaking align with the intent of the May 7, 2014 emergency
order.
As the May 7, 2014 emergency order and the requirements adopted in
this rulemaking related to notification address the same safety issue,
the May 7, 2014 emergency order is no longer necessary. Therefore the
requirements adopted in this rule supersede the May 7, 2014 emergency
order and make it no longer necessary once the information sharing
portion of the routing requirements come into full force. Therefore
this emergency order will remain in effect until March 31, 2016.
FRA Emergency Order No. 30
FRA Emergency Order No. 30 (``Emergency Order 30'' or ``order'')
was issued on April 27, 2015 and mandated that trains affected by this
order not exceed 40 miles per hour (mph) in high-threat urban areas
(HTUAs) as defined in 49 CFR part 1580. Under the order, an affected
train is one that contains: 1) 20 or more loaded tank cars in a
continuous block, or 35 or more loaded tank cars, of Class 3 flammable
liquid; and, 2) at least one DOT Specification 111 (DOT-111) tank car
(including those built in accordance with Association of American
Railroads (AAR) Casualty Prevention Circular 1232 (CPC-1232)) loaded
with a Class 3 flammable liquid. FRA determined at that time that
public safety compelled the issuance of Emergency Order 30 due to the
recent railroad accidents involving trains transporting petroleum crude
oil and ethanol and the increasing reliance on railroads to transport
voluminous amounts of these flammable liquids in recent years. For more
information regarding this order, see the April 27, 2015, publication
in the Federal Register (80 FR 23321).
The final rule will implement speed restrictions for HHFTs,
including a maximum operating speed of 40 mph for HHFTs in HTUAs, with
an effective date of July 7, 2015. As such, the final rule affects the
same population of tank cars as defined above and codifies the same
speed restriction that was implemented through Emergency Order 30.
Thus, the final rule replaces Emergency Order 30 upon the effective
date of the final rule.

X. Regulatory Review and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 13610
and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This final rule is considered an economically significant
regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), because it has
an expected annual impact of more than $100 million. The final rule is
considered a significant regulatory action under the Regulatory
Policies and Procedures order issued by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). PHMSA prepared a
Regulatory Impact Analysis addressing the economic impact of this final
rule, and placed it in the docket for this rulemaking.
Executive Orders 12866 (``Regulatory Planning and Review'') and
13563 (``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review'') require agencies
to regulate in the ``most cost-effective manner,'' to make a ``reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs,'' and to develop regulations that ``impose the least burden on
society.'' Executive Order 13610, issued May 10, 2012, urges agencies
to conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to examine whether
they remain justified and whether they should be modified or
streamlined in light of changed circumstances, including the rise of
new technologies. DOT believes that streamlined and clear regulations
are important to ensure compliance with important safety regulations.
As such DOT has developed a plan detailing how such reviews are
conducted.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\103\ Department of Transportation's plan for retrospective
regulatory reviews is available: http://www.dot.gov/regulations/dot-retrospective-reviews-rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additionally, Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13610 require
agencies to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation.
Accordingly, PHMSA invited public comment twice (the September 6, 2013,
ANPRM and August 1, 2014, NPRM) on these considerations, including any
cost or benefit figures or factors, alternative approaches, and
relevant scientific, technical and economic data. These comments aided
PHMSA and FRA in the evaluation of the proposed requirements. PHMSA and
FRA have since revised our evaluation and analysis to address the
public comments received.
Flammable liquids include a wide variety of chemical products. In
accordance with this action, Class 3 (Flammable liquids) are subject to
the provisions contained in this final rule when shipped in a HHFT.
Class 3 (Combustible liquids) are not subject to the provisions of the
final rule (e.g., diesel fuel). Some materials like crude oil display a
wide range of flash points and as such may not be subject to the
provisions in all cases. In other cases, a flammable liquid may be
mixed with a non-hazardous material to the point that the flash point
is within the range of a Combustible liquid and would not be subject to
the provisions of this final rule (e.g., dilute solutions of alcohol).
Approximately 68% of the flammable liquids transported by rail are
comprised of crude oil, ethanol, and petrochemical or petroleum
refinery products. Further, ethanol and crude oil

[[Page 26719]]

comprise approximately 65% of the flammable liquids transported by
rail.
Crude Oil Transport by Rail
The U.S. is now the global leader in crude oil production growth.
With a growing domestic supply, rail transportation, in particular, has
emerged as a flexible alternative to transportation by pipeline or
vessel. The volume of crude oil carried by rail increased 423 percent
between 2011 and 2012.^{104 105} In 2013, as the number of rail
carloads of crude oil surpassed 400,000.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\104\ See U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: Background and
Issues for Congress; http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf.
\105\ See Table 9 of EIA refinery report http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/.
\106\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Bakken region of the Williston basin is now producing over one
million barrels of oil per day \107\, most of which is transported by
rail. The U.S. Energy Information Administration's ``Annual Survey of
Domestic Oil and Gas Reserves'' reports that in addition to North
Dakota's Bakken region, the shale plays in reserves in North America
are extensive.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\107\ Information regarding oil and gas production is available
at the following URL: http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/#tabs-summary-2.
\108\ EIA ``U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves,
2013,'' available at: http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/pdf/uscrudeoil.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Expansion in oil production has led to increasing volumes of
product transported to refineries. Traditionally, pipelines and
oceangoing tankers have delivered the vast majority of crude oil to
U.S. refineries, accounting for approximately 93 percent of total
receipts (in barrels) in 2012. Although other modes of transportation--
rail, barge, and truck--have accounted for a relatively minor portion
of crude oil shipments, volumes have been rising very rapidly. With a
growing domestic supply, rail transportation, in particular, has
emerged as a flexible alternative to transportation by pipeline or
vessel. The transportation of large volumes of flammable liquids by
poses a risk to life, property, and the environment. The volume of
flammable liquids shipped by rail unit trains has been increasing
rapidly since 2006, representing a growing risk. Figure 1 (restated
here) provides the Average weekly U.S. rail carloads of crude oil and
petroleum products from 2006 through 2014. The figure below visually
demonstrates the considerable increase in crude oil and petroleum
shipments by rail.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\109\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Rail deliveries of
U.S. oil continue to increase in 2014, (August 28, 2014) available
at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17751.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.004

[[Page 26720]]

Figure 4 shows the recent strong growth in crude oil production in
the U.S., as well as growth in the number of rail carloads shipped.
Figure 4 also shows forecasted domestic crude oil production from the
Energy Information Administration (EIA) and PHMSA's projected strong
demand for the rail shipment of crude oil.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.005

Sources and Notes: Originating Carloads for 2000-2013 obtained from the
Surface Transportation Board waybill sample. Forecasts of overall
domestic crude oil production and carload figures from 2014-2034 are
taken from the report prepared by the Brattle Group on behalf of RSI
[Table 14]. Production figures were derived from the EIA domestic crude
production from 2014 Annual Energy Outlook then converted to carloads.

[[Page 26721]]

Rail accidents involving crude oil have risen along with the
increase in crude oil production and rail shipments of crude oil.
Figure 5 shows this rise.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.006

Sources and Notes: Originating Carloads for 2000-2013 obtained from the
Surface Transportation Board waybill sample 2014 originating carloads is
an estimate based on EIA production forecast. Incident counts are from
the PHMSA and FRA Incident Report Databases.

Based on these train accidents, the projected continued growth of
domestic crude oil production, and the growing number of train
accidents involving crude oil, PHMSA concludes that the potential for a
train accident involving crude oil has increased, which has raised the
likelihood of a catastrophic train accident that would cause
substantial damage to life, property, and the environment.

[[Page 26722]]

Ethanol Transport by Rail
In the last ten years, the production of ethanol has increased
dramatically due to the demand for ethanol-blend fuels. U.S. production
of ethanol was 14.3 billion gallons in 2014.\110\ Ethanol is largely
shipped from production facilities by rail and is now the largest
volume hazardous material shipped by rail. Large volumes of ethanol are
commonly shipped by unit trains, up to 3.2 million gallons, and the
larger barges can transport up to 2.5 million gallons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\110\ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration : ``January
2015 Monthly Energy Review. U.S. Energy Information Administration
``January 2015 Monthly Energy Review'' Annual Data: www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/browser/xls.cfm?tbl=T10.03&freq=m.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ethanol is a flammable colorless liquid; a polar solvent that is
completely miscible in water. It is heavier than air, and has a wider
flammable range than gasoline, with a Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) to an
Upper Explosive Limit (UEL) range of 3.3% to 19%. The flash point for
pure ethanol is 55 [deg]F, and for denatured ethanol it can be much
lower depending on the amount of denaturant used. Ethanol is still
considered a flammable liquid in solutions as dilute as 20%, with a
flash point of 97 [deg]F. At colder temperatures (below about 51
[deg]F), the vapor pressure of ethanol is outside the flammable range.
Ethanol is shipped with a flammable liquids placard and North American
1987 designation.\111\ As shown in the Figure 6, EIA projects strong
demand for ethanol in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\111\ Large Volume Ethanol Spills--Environmental Impacts and
Response Options, MassDEP, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/dfs/emergencyresponse/special-ops/ethanol-spill-impacts-and-response-7-11.pdf.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.007

Sources and Notes: Originating Carloads for 2000-2013 were obtained from
the Surface Transportation Board Waybill sample. Forecasts of overall
domestic ethanol production are obtained from the EIA. The carload
forecast from 2014-2034 is based on production using Excel's Forecast
function using an estimated linear trend of historic ethanol carloads
based on historic production.

According to a June 2012 white paper by the AAR, U.S. ethanol
production has increased considerably during the last 10 years and has
generated similar growth in the transportation of ethanol by rail.
Between 2001 and 2012, the number of rail carloads of ethanol increased
by 650 percent. Similarly the number of rail carloads of crude oil has
also exponentially increased. Unfortunately, this growth in rail
traffic has been accompanied by an increase in the number of rail
accidents involving ethanol and crude oil. Figure 7 below plots the
total number of rail accidents involving ethanol during the last 13
years compared to the total carloads of ethanol. The left axis shows
the total number of rail derailments and the right axis shows total
carloads shipped.

[[Page 26723]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08MY15.008

Summary of Regulatory Changes
In the final RIA PHMSA and FRA analyzed the impacts associated with
a system-wide, comprehensive final rule that addresses the risk
associated with the transportation of flammable liquids in HHFTs. Final
rule provisions include:
Routing Requirements
Tank Car Specifications;
Speed Restrictions;
Advanced Brake Signal Propagation Systems; and
Classification of Unrefined Petroleum-based Products.
This approach is designed to mitigate damages of rail accidents
involving flammable materials, though some provisions could also
prevent accidents. The RIA discusses, consistent with this final rule,
five requirement areas. Although we analyze the effects of individual
requirements separately, this final rule is a system-wide approach
covering all requirement areas.
PHMSA received over 3,200 public comments representing over 182,000
signatories in response to the August 1, 2014 NPRM and initial RIA.
This final rule has been revised in response to the comments received
and the final RIA has been revised to align with the changes made to
the final rule. Specifically, the RIA explains adjustments to the
methodology used to estimate the benefits and costs resulting from the
final rule.
The analysis shows that expected damages based on the historical
safety record are expected to exceed $4.1 billion (undiscounted) and
that damages from high-consequence events could reach $12.6 billion
(undiscounted) over a 20-year period in the absence of the rule.
The revised RIA is in the docket and supports the amendments made
in this final rule. Table 4 (restated here) shows the costs and
benefits by affected section and rule provision over a 20-year period,
discounted at a 7% rate. Table 4 (restated here) also shows an
explanation of the comprehensive benefits and costs (i.e., the combined
effects of individual provisions), and the estimated benefits, costs,
and net benefits of each amendment.
Please also note that, given the uncertainty associated with the
risks of HHFT shipments, Table 4 (restated here) contains a range of
benefits estimates. The low-end of the range of estimated benefits
estimates risk from 2015 to 2034 based on the U.S. safety record for
crude oil and ethanol from 2006 to 2013, adjusting for the projected
increase in shipment volume over the next 20 years. The upper end of
the range of estimated benefits is the 95th percentile from a Monte
Carlo simulation.

Table 4--20 Year Costs and Benefits by Stand-Alone Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \112\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected section \113\ Provision Benefits (7%) Costs (7%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR 172.820....................... Rail Routing +......... Cost effective if $8.8 million.
routing were to reduce
risk of an incident by
0.41%.
49 CFR 173.41........................ Classification Plan.... Cost effective if this $18.9 million.
requirement reduces
risk by 1.29%.

[[Page 26724]]

49 CFR 174.310....................... Speed Restriction: 40 $56 million-$242 $180 million.
mph speed limit in million **.
HTUA *.
Advanced Brake Signal $470.3 million-$1,114 $492 million.
Propagation Systems. million **.
49 CFR part 179...................... Existing Tank Car $426 million--$1,706 $1,747 million.
Retrofit/Retirement. million **.
New Car Construction... $23.9 million-$97.4 $34.8 million.
million **.
-------------------------------------------------
Cumulative Total................. ....................... $912 million-$2,905 $2,482 million.
million **.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``*'' indicates voluntary compliance regarding crude oil trains in high-threat urban areas (HTUA).
``+'' indicates voluntary actions that will be taken by shippers and railroads.
``**'' Indicates that the low end of the benefits range is based solely on lower consequence events, while the
high end of the range includes benefits from mitigating high consequence events.

B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-4, 2
U.S.C. 1531) (UMRA) requires each agency to prepare a written statement
for any proposed or final rule that includes a ``Federal mandate that
may result in the expenditure by State, local, and Native American
Indian tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector,
of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year.'' The value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for
inflation to 2012 levels, is $151 million. This final rule will not
impose enforceable duties on State, local, or Native American Indian
tribal governments. UMRA was designed to ensure that Congress and
Executive Branch agencies consider the impact of legislation and
regulations on States, local governments, and tribal governments, and
the private sector. With respect to States and localities, UMRA was an
important step in recognizing State and local governments as partners
in our intergovernmental system, rather than mere entities to be
regulated or extensions of the Federal government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\112\ All costs and benefits are in millions over 20 years, and
are discounted to present value using a seven percent rate and
rounded.
\113\ All affected sections of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) are in Title 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As described in greater detail throughout this document, the final
rule is a system-wide, comprehensive approach consistent with the risks
posed by high-hazard flammable materials transported by rail.
Specifically, requirements address: (1) Proper classification and
characterization, (2) operational controls to lessen the likelihood and
consequences of train accidents and (3) tank car integrity. The RIA
discusses, consistent with this final rule, five requirement areas:
Rail Routing, Enhanced Tank Car Standards, Speed Restrictions, Braking,
and Classification of unrefined petroleum-based products.
The final rule would result in costs to the private sector that
exceed $151 million in any one year and those costs and benefits
associated with this rulemaking have been discussed under paragraph A,
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 13610 and
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, of this section. In addition,
the RIA provides a detailed analysis of the public sector costs
associated with the proposed requirements. The RIA is available in the
public docket for this rulemaking. PHMSA invites comments on these
considerations, including any unfunded mandates related to this
rulemaking.

C. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

Executive Order 13132 requires agencies to assure meaningful and
timely input by state and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that may have ``substantial direct effects on the
states, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.''
This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles
and criteria contained in Executive Orders 13132 (``Federalism''). The
amendments in the final rule will not have any direct effect on the
states, or their political subdivisions; it will not impose any
compliance costs; and it will not affect the relationships between the
national government and the states, or political subdivisions, or the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government.
Several of the issues addressed in this final rule are subject to
our preemption authority, i.e., classification, packaging, and rail
routing. In regard to rail routing, for example, in a March 25, 2003
final rule (68 FR 14509), we concluded that the specifics of routing
rail shipments of hazardous materials preempts all states, their
political subdivisions, and Indian tribes from prescribing or
restricting routes for rail shipments of hazardous materials, under
Federal hazardous material transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5125) and the
Federal Rail Safety Act (49 U.S.C. 20106). We would expect the same
preemptive effect as a result of this rulemaking, and thus, the
consultation and funding requirements of Executive Orders 13132 and
13175 do not apply. Nonetheless, we invited state and local governments
with an interest in this rulemaking to comment on any effect that
proposed requirements could have on them, if adopted.
We received comments from state and local governments representing
approximately 200 signatories. State and local governments unanimously
supported the goal of this rulemaking to enhance safety of rail
transportation for flammable liquids. Many local and state governments
acknowledged the preemption authority of the federal government. Local
and state governments also provided comments on specific proposals in
the NPRM, which are discussed in the ``Summary and Discussion of
Comments'' portion of this rulemaking. Therefore, the amendments in the
final rule will not have any direct effect on the states, or their
political subdivisions; it will not impose any compliance costs; and it
will not affect the relationships between the national government and
the states, or political subdivisions, or the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.

D. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian
Tribal Governments

Executive Order (E.O.) 13175 (``Consultation and Coordination with
Indian Tribal Governments'') requires

[[Page 26725]]

agencies to assure meaningful and timely input from Indian tribal
government representatives in the development of rules that
significantly or uniquely affect Indian communities. In complying with
this E.O., agencies must determine whether a proposed rulemaking has
tribal implications, which include any rulemaking that imposes
``substantial direct effects'' on one or more Indian communities, on
the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, or
on the distribution of power between the Federal Government and Indian
tribes. Further, to the extent practicable and permitted by law,
agencies cannot promulgate two types of rules unless they meet certain
conditions. The two types of rules are: (1) Rules with tribal
implications, substantial direct compliance costs on Indian tribal
governments that are not required by statute; and (2) rules with tribal
implications that preempt tribal law.
PHMSA analyzed this final rule in accordance with the principles
and criteria prescribed in E.O. 13175. As a result, PHMSA has
determined that this rulemaking does not significantly or uniquely
affect tribes, and does not impose substantial direct effects or
compliance costs on such governments. Moreover, under Federal hazardous
material transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5125) and the Federal Rail
Safety Act (49 U.S.C. 20106), the federal government has a superseding
preemption with regard to hazardous materials regulation and railroad
safety. Therefore, the funding and consultation requirements of E.O.
13175 do not apply, and a tribal summary impact statement is not
required.
We received approximately 6 comments from tribal governments
addressing the NPRM. All the comments from Indian tribal governments
addressed concerns about the environmental, economic, and safety
impacts of crude oil train derailments in tribal lands. In general,
comments from Indian tribal governments provided support for specific
proposals in the NPRM or suggested stricter measures than proposed. For
example, multiple tribal governments supported the 40-mph speed limit
in all areas or recommended that speed restrictions be slower than
proposed. Some comments submitted by Indian tribal governments provided
recommendations that were beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
In the August 1, 2014 NPRM preceding this rulemaking, PHMSA asked
for comment on the possible impacts of the notification requirements on
Tribal Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs) or other tribal
institutions. Overall, Indian tribal governments supported enhanced
notification requirements on the basis that tribal governments or local
communities have the right-to-know about hazardous materials shipments
within their jurisdictions. We also received several comments from
environmental groups and individuals that supported notification to
TERCS or other tribal authorities. However, as stated in the ``Summary
and Discussion of Comments'' PHMSA believes adopting the notification
(and information sharing) requirements under Sec. 172.820 for HHFTs
constitutes a better approach than adopting the notification
requirements proposed in the NPRM. Section 172.820 requires
notification to Fusion Centers, which includes an existing mechanism
for Tribal Nations to interact with the Fusion Centers through the
State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council.
Please refer to the aforementioned ``Summary and Discussion of
Comments'' section for additional summary and discussion related to the
notification issue.
Based upon on the discussion of comments throughout this rule,
including those of Indian Tribal Governments, and the corresponding
analysis of those comments, PHMSA and FRA are confident we have been
responsive to the concerns of all our stakeholders including Indian
Tribal Governments. As previously stated, we expect that several issues
addressed in this final rule are subject to federal preemption
authority, i.e., classification, packaging, and rail routing.
Furthermore, this rulemaking does not significantly or uniquely affect
Indian tribal governments, and it does not impose substantial direct
effects or compliance costs on such governments.
Other NPRM proposals that were discussed within the comments
submitted by Indian tribal governments do not uniquely affect Indian
tribal governments and were addressed by a wide variety of commenters.
PHMSA has discussed these proposals in the appropriate comment
summaries found in other sections of this rulemaking.
E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Policies
and Procedures
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and Executive
Order 13272 require a review of proposed and final rules to assess
their impacts on small entities. An agency must prepare an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) unless it determines and
certifies that a rule, if promulgated, would not have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small entities. During the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) stage, PHMSA and FRA had not determined
whether the proposed rule would have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. Therefore, PHMSA published an
IRFA to aid the public in commenting on the potential small business
impacts of the proposals in the NPRM. All interested parties were
invited to submit data and information regarding the potential economic
impact that would result from adoption of the proposals in the NPRM.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act also requires an agency to conduct a
final regulatory flexibility assessment (FRFA) unless it determines and
certifies that a rule is not expected to have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities. PHMSA is not able to certify that
the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. PHMSA and FRA received comments
and data from several commenters on the IRFA, and that information was
used to make this determination. Therefore, PHMSA is publishing this
FRFA that discusses the requirement areas of this final rule and
provides the rationale the agencies used for assessing what impacts
will be borne by small entities. PHMSA considered comments received in
the public comment process when making a determination in the FRFA.
This FRFA was developed in accordance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
(1) A succinct statement of the need for and objectives of the
rule.
PHMSA and FRA are promulgating the final rule in response to recent
train accidents involving the derailment of HHFTs. Shipments of large
volumes of flammable liquids pose a significant risk to life, property,
and the environment. For example, on December 30, 2013, a train
carrying crude oil derailed and ignited near Casselton, North Dakota,
prompting authorities to issue a voluntary evacuation of the city and
surrounding area. On November 8, 2013, a train carrying crude oil to
the Gulf Coast from North Dakota derailed in Alabama, spilling crude
oil in a nearby wetland and igniting into flames. On July 6, 2013, a
catastrophic railroad accident occurred in Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec,
Canada when an unattended freight train containing hazardous materials
rolled down a descending grade and subsequently derailed. The
derailment resulted in a fire and multiple energetic ruptures of tank
cars, which, along with other effects of the accident, caused the
confirmed death of 47 people. In addition, this derailment

[[Page 26726]]

caused extensive damage to the town center, clean-up costs, and the
evacuation of approximately 2,000 people from the surrounding area.
Although this regulatory action would not prevent such accidents
involving unattended trains, the Lac-M[eacute]gantic incident
demonstrates that very large economic losses occur with catastrophic
derailments. PHMSA is taking this regulatory action to minimize the
risks the damages of catastrophic accidents in the United States.
In this final rule, PHMSA and FRA are adopting revisions to the HMR
to ensure that the rail requirements address the risks posed by the
transportation on railroads of HHFTs. This rulemaking addresses risks
in three areas: (1) Proper classification and characterization of the
product being transported, (2) operational controls to decrease the
likelihood and consequences of train accidents, and (3) tank car
integrity to decrease the consequences of train accidents. Promulgating
this rulemaking in these areas is consistent with the goals of the HMR:
(1) To ensure that hazardous materials are packaged and handled safely
and securely during transportation; (2) to provide effective
communication to transportation workers and emergency responders of the
hazardous materials being transferred; and (3) to minimize the
consequences of an incident should one occur.
(2) A summary of the significant issues raised by the public
comments in response to the IRFA, a summary of the assessment of the
agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made to the
proposed rule as a result of such comments.
For an extensive review of the comments raised please see the
preamble discussion for this rule. The only issue raised in direct
response to the IRFA itself was the number of entities that would be
affected. Bridger, LLC expressed the concern that the use of
``offerors'' and ``railroads'' excluded entities such as bulk
terminals. The following section provides a detailed estimate of the
number of entities affected. Commenters also questioned the number of
small railroads that would be affected. ASLRRA commented that 160 small
railroads would be affected, not 64 as estimated in the IRFA. To the
extent those railroads would be affected, as discussed below, the only
impact would be the cost of conducting the required routing analysis
and some rerouting.
(3) A description and an estimate of the number of small entities
to which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such estimate
is available.
The universe of the entities considered in an FRFA generally
includes only those small entities that can reasonably expect to be
directly regulated by the regulatory action. Small railroads and
offerors are the types of small entities potentially affected by this
final rule.
A ``small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) as having the same
meaning as ``small business concern'' under section 3 of the Small
Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is
independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of
operation. Title 49 U.S.C. 601(4) likewise includes within the
definition of small entities non-profit enterprises that are
independently owned and operated, and are not dominant in their field
of operation.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates in its size
standards that the largest a ``for-profit'' railroad business firm may
be, and still be classified as a small entity, is 1,500 employees for
``line haul operating railroads'' and 500 employees for ``switching and
terminal establishments.'' Additionally, 5 U.S.C. 601(5) defines as
small entities governments of cities, counties, towns, townships,
villages, school districts, or special districts with populations less
than 50,000.
Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small
entities in consultation with SBA and in conjunction with public
comment. Pursuant to that authority, FRA has published a final
Statement of Agency Policy that formally establishes small entities or
small businesses as being railroads, contractors, and hazardous
materials offerors that meet the revenue requirements of a Class III
railroad as set forth in 49 CFR 1201.1-1, which is $20 million or less
in inflation-adjusted annual revenues, and commuter railroads or small
governmental jurisdictions that serve populations of 50,000 or less.
See 68 FR 24891 (May 9, 2003) (codified as appendix C to 49 CFR part
209). The $20 million limit is based on the Surface Transportation
Board's revenue threshold for a Class III railroad. Railroad revenue is
adjusted for inflation by applying a revenue deflator formula in
accordance with 49 CFR 1201.1-1. This definition is what PHMSA is using
for the rulemaking.
Railroads
Not all small railroads would be required to comply with the
provisions of this rule. Most of the approximately 738 small railroads
that operate in the United States do not transport hazardous materials.
Based on comments from ASLRRA, the rule could potentially affect 160
small railroads because they transport flammable liquids in HHFTs.
Therefore, this final rule would impact 22 percent of the universe of
738 small railroads.
Offerors
Almost all hazardous materials tank cars, including those cars that
transport crude oil, ethanol, and other flammable liquids, are owned or
leased by offerors. The adopted requirements for a testing and sampling
program will directly affect shippers as they will now be required to
create a document with a sampling and testing program for unrefined
petroleum-based products. In addition, some of the other provisions in
this rulemaking may indirectly affect offerors. DOT believes that a
majority, if not all, of these offerors are large entities. DOT used
data from the DOT/PHMSA Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS)
database to screen for offerors that may be small entities.
In analyzing the NPRM, from the DOT/PHMSA HMIS database and from
industry sources, DOT found 731 small offerors that might be impacted.
Based on further information available on the companies' Web sites, all
other offerors appeared to be subsidiaries of large businesses. Also,
in analyzing the NPRM, PHMSA found that out of these 731, only 297
owned tank cars that would be affected. All the other 434 offerors
either did not own tank cars or have tank cars that would not be
affected by the final rule. Additionally, no small offerors commented
on PHMSA's ANPRM or NPRM for this proceeding. In both the ANPRM and the
NPRM, PHMSA invited commenters to bring forth information that might
assist it in assessing the number of small offerors that may be
economically impacted by the requirement set forth in the proposed rule
for development of the FRFA, but received no comments.
In reviewing SBA guidance for compliance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, PHMSA determined that the appropriate standard for
determining whether a small entity is impacted by the final rule is not
whether the entity owns an affected tank car, but whether the entity is
required to provide a tank car that conforms to the final rule when it
loads the product. No entity, other the shipper loading the product, is
required to provide a tank car that conforms to the final rule. Thus an
entity leasing a tank car to load it is impacted as much as an entity
owning a tank car to load it.

[[Page 26727]]

In addition, offerors of unrefined petroleum-based products may be
subject to the newly adopted sampling and testing plan for all modes of
transportation. The DOT/PHMSA HMIS database lists 1,568 entities
described using NAICS 424710 for ``Petroleum Bulk Stations and
Terminals.'' Of these, 1,444, or 92.09 percent are small entities. In
addition, offerors of unrefined petroleum-based products may also
include additional entities. The DOT/PHMSA HMIS database lists 186
entities described using NAICS 211111 for ``Crude Petroleum and Natural
Gas Extraction.'' Of these, 122 are small entities. The DOT/PHMSA HMIS
database lists 58 entities described using NAICS 211112 for ``Natural
Gas Liquid Extraction.'' Of these, 34 are small entities. It is
impossible to tell from the database if an entity has been recorded
multiple times because of a name change or other corporate
reorganization, such as a merger or acquisition. Likewise, entities
that have ceased business may remain on the list. The important number
is the percentage of entities, as both small entities and large
entities may either have multiple listings or have ceased business. For
purposes of this analysis, PHMSA assumes that half of the 1,444 small
entities recorded in the database, or 722 small entities, are actually
in business and affected by the final rule. In the analysis below,
assuming a smaller number of entities results in a larger impact per
entity, and is therefore more conservative.
(4) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the
classes of small entities that will be subject to the requirement and
the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report
or record.
For a thorough presentation of cost estimates, please refer to the
RIA, which has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
This rulemaking has requirements in three areas that address the
potential risks: (1) Proper classification and characterization of the
product being transported, (2) operational controls to decrease the
likelihood of accidents, and (3) tank car integrity. Requirements for
braking, speed restrictions, and tank car production would not impact
any small entities. Most small railroads affected by this rule do not
operate at speeds higher than those imposed for speed restrictions or
travel long distances over which the reduced speed would cause a
significant economic impact. Any small railroad that operates at speeds
30 mph or less would also not be impacted by the braking requirement.
Additionally, in a February 12, 2014, letter to the Secretary, ASLRRA
announced that it recommended to its members to voluntarily operate
unit trains of crude oil at a top speed of no more than 25 mph on all
routes.
PHMSA and FRA believe that offerors may see modest increases in
their lease rates as a result of enhanced tank car standards. PHMSA and
FRA recognize that new tank car standards could potentially increase
the rate charged to lessees since tank cars will cost more to construct
and tank cars owners will seek similar returns on their investments.
Given competition among suppliers of tank cars, the rates charged will
be the prevailing market rate, and there will be a tendency for this
rate to decrease as the supply of enhanced tank cars increases over
time due to new manufacturing and effective retrofitting practices. To
that effect, the implementation timeline has been specifically designed
to incorporate industry data on the current manufacturing and retrofit
capacity and to minimize short run supply impacts that may increase
rates before the supply of enhanced tank cars expands.
Further, commenters have noted that lease rates have gone up in
recent years. PHMSA and FRA believe, and commenters have confirmed,
that the primary driver of recent increases in lease rates is due to
the growth of the transport of crude oil by rail. In other words,
increased demand for tank cars capable of carrying crude oil, relative
to their supply, is responsible for most of the increase in lease
rates. Once this regulation is promulgated and the industry has
certainty on the new car standard for moving high volume flammable
liquid shipments, we believe the industry will ramp up construction and
lease rates will decrease. Additionally, also in the February 12th
letter to the Secretary, the ASLRRA noted that it will support and
encourage the development of new tank car standards including, but not
limited to, adoption of a 9/16-inch tank car shell.
Section 174.310(a)(3) would expand hazardous materials route
planning and selection requirements for railroads. This would include
HHFTs transporting flammable materials and, where technically feasible,
require rerouting to avoid transportation of such hazardous materials
through populated and other sensitive areas. Approximately 160 short
line and regional railroads carry crude oil and ethanol in train
consists large enough that they would potentially be affected by this
rule. While PHMSA and FRA believe this number may be an overestimation
of the number of affected small entities affected this figure was used
in the FRFA as a conservative estimate.
The NPRM stated that the affected Class III railroads are already
compliant with the routing requirements established by HM-232E (71 FR
76834), and there were no comments on this statement. In general, at
the time that rule was promulgated, it was assumed that the small
railroads impacted, due to their limited size, would, on average, have
no more than two primary routes to analyze. Thus, the potential lack of
an alternative route to consider would minimize the impact of this
requirement. Because the distance covered by the small railroads'
routes is likely contained within a limited geographic region, the
hours estimated for analyses are fewer than those estimated for the
larger railroads. Further, because the industry associations have
developed simplified forms for the routing analysis for use by small
railroads, and because small railroads usually have a very limited
number of routing choices, the level of skill required to complete the
routing analysis for a small railroad is much lower than would be
required on a larger railroad.
Finally, this final rule will also require any offeror who offers a
hazardous material for transportation to develop, implement, and update
its sampling and testing programs related to classification and
characterization of the hazardous material if it is an unrefined
petroleum-based product. PHMSA believes that there would be an initial
cost for each offeror of approximately $3,200 for the first year, and
additional costs of $800 annually thereafter. PHMSA believes that this
section would not significantly burden any of these small entities.
PHMSA estimates the total cost to each small railroad to be $8,715
in the first year and $3,637 for subsequent years, with costs growing
with increases in real wages.\114\ Based on small railroads' annual
operating revenues, these costs are not significant. Small railroads'
annual operating revenues range from $3 million to $20 million.
Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue averaged
approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One percent of
average annual revenue per small railroad is $47,000. Thus, the costs
associated with this rule amount to

[[Page 26728]]

significantly less than one percent of the railroad's annual operating
revenue. PHMSA realizes that some small railroads will have lower
annual revenue than $4.7 million. However, PHMSA is confident that this
estimate of total cost per small railroad provides a good
representation of the cost applicable to small railroads, in general.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\114\ Costs per railroad are derived in the RIA, with line costs
for all Class III railroads divided by the 160 railroads affected.
Those costs were $1,394,476 for Year 1, and $581,991 for Year 2.
Values for subsequent years are increased for anticipated increases
in real wages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In conclusion, PHMSA believes that although some small railroads
will be directly impacted, they will not be impacted significantly as
the impact will amount to significantly less than one percent of an
average small railroad's annual operating revenue. Information
available indicates that none of the offerors will be significantly
affected by the burdens of the rule. Therefore, these requirements will
likely not have a significant economic impact on any small entities'
operations. In the NPRM, PHMSA had sought information and comments from
the industry that might assist in quantifying the number of small
offerors who may be economically impacted by the requirements set forth
in the proposed rule, but did not receive any comments.
(5) A description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the
significant adverse economic impact on small entities consistent with
the objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative
adopted in the final rule, and why each of the other significant
alternatives to the rule considered by the agency was rejected.
PHMSA re-evaluated and re-defined ``High-Hazard Flammable Train''
to minimize the significant adverse economic impact on small entities.
This definition served as the basis for many of the requirements in the
NPRM and in this final rule. Be revising this definition we have
narrowed the scope of the rulemaking to more appropriately focus on the
risks of the transport of large volumes of flammable liquids by rail.
This narrowing of the scope also limits the impact on small entities.
We believe the new definition excludes the inclusion of manifest trains
(which could represent a larger portion of smaller railroads) from the
requirements of this rule.
Specifically, PHMSA and FRA revised the definition from ``20 or
more tank cars in a train loaded with a flammable liquid'' to ``a
continuous block of 20 or more tank cars or 35 or more cars dispersed
through a train loaded with a flammable liquid'' based on public
comment.
PHMSA and FRA did not intend the NPRM proposed definition to
include lower risk manifest trains and had crafted the definition with
the idea of capturing the higher risk bulk shipments seen in unit
trains. Based on FRA modeling and analysis, 20 tank cars in a
continuous block loaded with a flammable liquid and 35 tank cars or
more total dispersed throughout a train loaded with a flammable liquid
display consistent characteristics as to the number of tank cars likely
to be breached in a derailment. See ``Definition of High-Hazard
Flammable Train'' section of this rule for a description of the
modeling. The operating railroads commented that this threshold will
exclude lower risk manifest trains and focus on higher risk unit
trains. It should be noted that commenters also suggested this
threshold, as it would eliminate the inclusion of most manifest trains
and focus on unit trains.
In addition to the above change that effects the entire rulemaking
action, PHMSA is addressing six requirements areas in this final rule,
and believes it is appropriate to address the impacts on small entities
separately for each requirement area.
1. Requirement Area 1--Rail Routing
Adopted Action
PHMSA and FRA are requiring rail carriers develop and implement a
plan that will result in the use of a safer and more secure route for
certain trains transporting an HHFT. This may appear more burdensome
than it will be, because FRA has helped to develop tools to facilitate
analysis of routing, working with both the AAR and ASLRRA, ensuring
that the tool will be readily available to small railroads. To assist
railroads with evaluating primary and alternative routes for origin-
destination pairs, the U.S. Department of Transportation awarded the
Railroad Research Foundation (RRF), a non-profit affiliate of AAR, a
Railroad Safety Technology Grant for a risk management tool that will
help with the analysis of the 27 factors required in analyzing rail
routing. The grant provided $1.54 million for enhancement and ongoing
implementation of the Rail Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS).
RCRMS was developed for railroads with alternative routing and is
therefore not effective for smaller or Class II/III railroads with
limited route or no alternative routes. These railroads were
responsible for developing their own analysis and documentation.
Accordingly the Hazmat Transportation Analytical Risk Model (H-TRAM)
model was developed as a result of an FRA Grant provided to RRF on
behalf of ASLRRA. More recently, FRA funded an independent verification
and validation of the model.
The rail routing requirements specified in Sec. 172.820 are being
modified to apply to any HHFT, as the term is defined in this final
rule (Sec. 171.8; See discussion in HHFT section). Rail carriers would
be required to assess available routes using, at a minimum, the 27
factors listed in Appendix D to Part 172 of the HMR to determine the
safest, most secure routes for security-sensitive hazardous materials.
Additionally, the requirements of Sec. 172.820(g) require rail
carriers to establish a point of contact with state and/or regional
Fusion Centers who coordinate with state, local and tribal officials on
security issues as well as state, local, and tribal officials that may
be affected by a rail carrier's routing decisions and who directly
contact the railroad to discuss routing decisions.
To assist railroads with evaluating primary and alternative routes
for origin-destination (OD) pairs, the U.S. Department of
Transportation awarded the Railroad Research Foundation (RRF), a non-
profit affiliate of the AAR, a Railroad Safety Technology Grant for a
risk management tool that will help with the analysis of the 27 minimum
factors to consider. The grant provided $1.54 million for enhancement
and ongoing implementation of the Rail Corridor Risk Management System
(RCRMS). RCRMS was developed for railroads with alternative routing and
is, therefore, not effective for smaller or Class II or Class III
railroads with limited or no alternative routes. These railroads were
responsible for developing their own analysis and documentation.
Accordingly, the Hazmat Transportation Analytical Risk Model (H-TRAM)
was developed through an FRA Grant provided to RRF on behalf of the
ASLRRA. Most recently, FRA funded an independent verification and
validation of the model.
Determination of Need
There has long been considerable public and Congressional interest
in the safe and secure rail routing of security-sensitive hazardous
materials. In 2008, PHMSA, in coordination with FRA and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), issued a final rule
requiring, among other things, that rail carriers compile annual data
on certain shipments of explosive, toxic by inhalation (TIH or PIH),
and Class 7 (radioactive) materials; use the data to analyze safety and
security risks along rail routes where those materials are transported;
assess alternative routing options; and make routing decisions

[[Page 26729]]

based on those assessments, 73 FR 20752. These requirements were
codified at 49 CFR 172.820.
The 2008 rule also requires rail carriers transporting ``security
sensitive materials'' to select the safest and most secure route to be
used in transporting those materials, based on the carrier's analysis
of the safety and security risks on primary and alternate
transportation routes over which the carrier has authority to operate.
The NTSB report of January 23, 2014, stated that at a minimum, the
route assessments, alternative route analysis, and route selection
requirements should be extended to key trains transporting large
volumes of flammable liquid (NTSB Recommendation R-14-4). Additionally,
in their comment on the NPRM, NTSB stated that the proposal to subject
carriers transporting HHFTs to the routing requirements in 172.820
would satisfy the intent of R-14-4.
Although Class I rail carriers committed to voluntarily apply
routing requirements to trains carrying 20 carloads or more of crude
oil as a result of the Secretary's Call-to-Action:
The voluntary actions do not extend beyond Class I
railroads;
The voluntary actions do not apply to all HHFTs;
The proposed routing requirements would have provided a
check on higher risk routes or companies; and
The routing requirements would ensure that rail carriers
continue their voluntary actions in the future.

Alternatives Considered

Alternative 1: No Action Alternative--Status Quo
Route planning and route selection provisions currently required
for explosive, PIH, or Class 7 (radioactive) materials are not required
for HHFTs. If the rule is not adopted, railroads would not be required
to conduct route risk analysis nor are they required to reroute
shipments over lower-risk routes. Specific identified criteria for the
route and alternate route analyses may not be uniformly considered by
all railroads, and written analyses of primary and alternate routes
including safety and security risks would not be required. While the
railroads are expected to continue voluntarily implementing these
measures for crude oil, they have not made a similar commitment for
ethanol trains (though PHMSA believes some of them may do so). The
costs to society, the government, and the rail industry of an accident
involving large shipments of flammable liquid are high. If no action is
taken, the threat of catastrophic accidents in large populated areas or
other sensitive environments will continue. This option would not
result in any modification of Sec. 172.820 to include HHFTs. PHMSA and
FRA are not considering this alternative.
Alternative 2: Apply Routing to HHFTs
This alternative, adopted in the final rule, applies safety and
security routing assessments and rerouting to HHFTs. Railroads would be
required to assess current routing of these trains as well as practical
alternative routes. Railroads would have to choose the lowest risk
practical route to move HHFTs. This alternative focuses the routing
requirements on the flammable liquid shipments that pose the greatest
risk to public safety. Additionally, the final rule requires rail
carriers to establish a point of contact with (1) state and/or regional
Fusion Centers who coordinate with state, local and tribal officials on
security issues and (2) state, local, and tribal officials that may be
affected by a rail carrier's routing decisions and who directly contact
the railroad to discuss routing decisions.
This alternative requires railroads to balance these factors to
identify the route that poses the lower risk. As such, they may, in
certain cases, choose a route that eliminates exposure in areas with
high population densities but poses a risk for more frequent events in
areas with very low densities. In other cases the risk of derailment
may be so low along a section of track that, even though it runs
through a densely populated area, it poses the lowest total risk when
severity and likelihood are considered. Glickman's estimate of safety
improvements achievable by routing changes is based on an examination
of how routing might vary as a rail carrier applies progressively
heavier weights on various safety factors.\115\ In practice, it is
impossible to know how much weight rail carriers will give to safety
when making routing decisions. As noted above, based on past routing
plans submitted by rail carriers to FRA for approval, application of
the routing requirements resulted in modest changes to company routing
decisions. It is therefore unclear to what extent these requirements
would improve safety. However, PHMSA believes applying these routing
requirements to HHFTs would result in a net positive safety benefit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\115\ Glickman, Theodore S. Erkut, Efhan, and Zschocke, Mark S.
2007. The cost and risk impacts of rerouting railroad shipments of
hazardous materials. Accident Analysis and Prevention. 39. 1015-
1025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on the determination of need, minimal cost of implementation
and a vast majority of commenters supporting the proposal, PHMSA and
FRA have chosen this alternative. It should be noted that the
definition of HHFT has been narrowed to a train carrying 20 or more
loaded tank cars in a continuous block or 35 or more loaded tank cars
throughout the train consist loaded with flammable liquids (see above
for discussion on HHFTs). PHMSA and FRA anticipate that this will
lessen the impact on small businesses such as short line and regional
railroads by eliminating a large percentage of manifest or mixed
freight trains.
Impact on Small Entities
The costs of this alternative are discussed in great detail in the
RIA. The total burden on small railroads over 20 years, for 160 small
railroads affected, the cost, discounted at 7 percent. will be
$7,236,778. The average cost per small railroad will be $45,230 over 20
years, discounted at 7 percent.
2. Requirement Area 2--Tank Car
Adopted Action
In this final rule, we are adopting requirements for new tank cars
constructed after October 1, 2015, used to transport Class 3 flammable
liquids in an HHFT to meet either the prescriptive standards for the
DOT Specification 117 tank car (consistent with Option 2 of the NPRM
except for the braking component) or the performance standards for the
DOT Specification 117P tank car. Other authorized tank specification as
specified in part 173, subpart F will also be permitted however,
manufacture of a DOT specification 111 tank car for use in an HHFT is
prohibited. In this final rule, we are also adopting retrofit
requirements for existing tank cars in accordance with proposed Option
3 from the NPRM (excluding top fittings protection and steel grade). If
existing cars do not meet the retrofit standard, they will not be
authorized use in HHFT service after a packing group and tank car
specification-based implementation timeline. This in effect would adopt
different constructions standards for new and retrofitted cars used in
an HHFT.
Tank cars built to the new standards as adopted in this final rule
will be designated ``DOT Specification 117.'' In addition, we are
adopting a performance standard for the design and construction of new
tank cars or retrofitting of existing tank cars equivalent to the
prescriptive DOT Specification 117 standards. Thus, a new or
retrofitted tank car meeting the performance criteria will be
designated as ``DOT

[[Page 26730]]

Specification 117P.'' Additionally, we are adopting a retrofit standard
for existing tank cars meeting the DOT Specification 111 or CPC-1232
standard. A retrofitted tank car meeting the prescriptive standard will
be designated as ``DOT Specification 117R.'' Please see ``Tank Car
Specification'' portion of this rulemaking for further detail.
Determination of Need
Under the HMR, the offeror (shipper) must select a packaging that
is suitable for the properties of the material. The DOT Specification
111 tank car is one of several cars authorized by the HMR for the rail
transportation of many hazardous materials. The DOT Specification 111
tank car, which can be jacketed or unjacketed, is used for the almost
all of crude oil and ethanol service by rail.
The alternatives proposed in the August 1, 2014 NPRM were intended
to address the survivability of a tank car and to mitigate the damages
of rail accidents far superior to those of the current DOT
Specification 111 tank car. Specifically, the alternatives incorporate
several enhancements to increase tank head and shell puncture
resistance; thermal protection to survive a pool fire environment; and
improved top fitting and bottom outlet protection during a derailment.
These improvements are consistent with several NTSB safety
recommendations. Under all alternatives, the proposed system of design
enhancements would reduce the consequences of a derailment of tank cars
transporting flammable liquids in an HHFT. There will be fewer tank car
punctures, fewer releases from service equipment (top and bottom
fittings), and delayed release of flammable liquid from the tank cars
through pressure relief devices and thermal protection systems.
Alternatives Considered
On August 1, 2014, PHMSA, in consultation with the FRA, issued an
NPRM in response to comments submitted as a result of an ANPRM. In the
NPRM, we proposed three alternatives for newly manufactured tank cars
to address the risks associated with the rail transportation of Class 3
flammable liquids in HHFTs. In this final rule, PHMSA considered the
three tank car options and the status quo to address this emerging risk
and they are as follows:
No-Action Alternative
This alternative would continue to authorize the use of the non-
jacketed and jacketed DOT Specification 111 tank cars, including
upgraded CPC-1232 non-jacketed and jacketed tank cars, for the
transportation of crude oil and ethanol. This alternative imposes no
benefits or costs to society as it would require no change to the
current crude oil and ethanol tank car packaging.
Option 1: PHMSA and FRA Designed Tank Car
This alternative would mandate that newly manufactured and existing
tank cars used for flammable liquids in a HHFT meet the Option 1
prescriptive or performance standard after a certain date in accordance
with the following:
286,000 lb. GRL tank car that is designed and constructed
in accordance with AAR Standard 286;
Wall thickness after forming of the tank shell and heads
must be a minimum of \9/16\-inch constructed from TC-128 Grade B,
normalized steel;
Thermal protection system in accordance with Sec. 179.18,
including a reclosing pressure relief device;
Minimum 11-gauge jacket constructed from A1011 steel or
equivalent. The jacket must be weather-tight as required in Sec.
179.200-4;
Full-height, \1/2\-inch thick head shield meeting the
requirements of Sec. 179.16(c)(1);
Bottom outlet handle removed or designed to prevent
unintended actuation during a train accident;
ECP brakes; and
Roll-over protection (i.e., tank car would be equipped
with a top fittings protection system and nozzle capable of sustaining,
without failure, a rollover accident at a speed of 9 mph, in which the
rolling protective housing strikes a stationary surface assumed to be
flat, level, and rigid and the speed is determined as a linear
velocity, measured at the geometric center of the loaded tank car as a
transverse vector) (not applicable to existing tank cars).
This alternative achieves the highest safety enhancements of any of
the options considered, and thus is expected to yield the highest
benefit to safety and the environment. It also has the highest cost of
any of the three tank car alternatives.
Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank Car (Selected for New Tank Car Construction)
The second alternative considered is described as the AAR 2014 car.
This proposed standard was based on the AAR's updated new tank car
standard, and approximately 5,000 of these new cars have been ordered
by BNSF Rail Corporation.
As proposed in the NPRM, the Option 2 car would be required for
both newly manufactured tank cars and existing tank cars used for
flammable liquids in a HHFT. Tank cars could meet either the
prescriptive or an equivalent performance standard. Under this
alternative, tank cars have most of the safety features as the Option 1
tank car, including the same increase in shell thickness, but lack TIH
top fittings protection and ECP brake equipment. In essence, examining
these cars side by side in the following analysis provides a de facto
comparison of the costs and benefits of equipping HHFTs with ECP
braking.
This alternative provides the second highest benefits and the
second highest costs of the three tank car options. This option was
selected for new constructions (See braking section for discussion on
braking required).
Option 3: Enhanced Jacketed CPC-1232 Tank Car (Selected as Retrofit
Standard)
The third alternative considered is an enhanced, jacketed CPC-1232
tank car. It also has the same improvements made to the bottom outlet
handle and pressure relieve valve as the Option 1 and Option 2 tank
cars. This standard is the new tank car configuration PHMSA believes
would have been built for HHFT service in the absence of regulation,
based on commitments from two of the largest rail car manufacturers/
leasers.
As proposed, the Option 3 car would be required for both newly
manufactured tank cars and existing tank cars used for flammable
liquids in a HHFT. Tank cars must meet either the prescriptive or
performance standard in accordance with the proposed phase-out
schedule. Because the industry has committed to building Enhanced
Jacketed CPC-1232 standard tank cars for HHFT service, this alternative
would not impose higher costs for newly manufactured tank cars. It
would, however, impose costs associated with retrofitting older DOT
Specification 111 tank cars to the new prescriptive or performance
standard.
This alternative tank car design car has all of the safety features
of the Option 2 car, except that it has \1/8\-inch less shell
thickness. Additionally, this tank car has most of the safety features
of the Option 1 tank car, but it also has \1/8\-inch less shell
thickness, does not have ECP brakes, and does not have TIH top fittings
protection.
Although this tank car design is a substantial safety improvement
over the current DOT Specification 111 tank car, it does not achieve
the same level of safety as the first two mandated alternatives
considered. It is, however, the least costly alternative considered.
This option was selected for retrofitting

[[Page 26731]]

existing tank cars (See braking section for discussion on braking
required).
Impact on Small Entities
All small shippers will be directly impacted by this requirement,
as the shipper is the regulated entity that must provide the packaging
for shipping, in this case, the tank cars. It does not matter whether
the small shipper owns the tank cars or leases them. The burden of the
rulemaking and therefore the cost of tank cars will be imposed on the
shippers, either through purchase costs, retrofit costs, or through
higher lease payments. The estimated cost per tank car is a good
estimate of the final cost to the shippers. A lease transaction only
changes the method by which a shipper pays for the tank cars.
As noted above, small shippers are about 92 percent of all
shippers. PHMSA assumes that small shippers on average ship half as
much as the average shipper. Therefore, for this analysis, PHMSA
estimates that small shippers ship 46 percent, half of 92 percent of
the affected hazardous materials, and PHMSA assumes that they use the
same percentage of tank cars, and therefore incur as a group, the same
percentage of the total costs estimated in the economic analysis for
retrofit of all tank cars. PHMSA's RIA cost estimate for the Final Rule
tank car mandate is $1.78 billion discounted at 7 percent, and $2.27
billion discounted at 3 percent. The total burden on small shippers
will therefore be 46 percent of that, or $0.819 billion discounted at 7
percent, and $1.04 billion discounted at 3 percent. The average cost
per small shipper would be $0.819 billion discounted at 7 percent, and
$1.04 billion discounted at 3 percent divided by 722 shippers, which
yields costs per small shipper of $1.134 million discounted at 7
percent, and $1.672 million discounted at 3 percent. However, PHMSA
believes that small shippers can pass on those costs to other parties
in the supply chain, because all shippers face the same cost
constraints. PHMSA believes this is not a substantial burden on any
affected entity.
3. Requirement Area 3--Speed Restrictions
Adopted Action
PHMSA is requiring a 50-mph maximum speed limit for HHFTs in all
areas. This action aligns with existing operational requirements
imposed by AAR Circular No. OT-55-N. PHMSA expects there will be no
costs associated with a speed restriction of 50 mph, as this action
codifies current industry best practices. As such, PHMSA does not
believe the 50-mph maximum speed limit for HHFTs will affect small
entities, including small offerors and small railroads that qualify as
small businesses. Small railroads (Class II and Class III railroads)
customarily do not operate at speeds in excess of 50 mph, so the impact
of reducing the maximum speed of HHFTs to 50 mph is expected to be
minimal and potentially costless.
In further support of this view, PHMSA refers to a February 12,
2014 letter to the Secretary from the American Short Line and Regional
Railroad Association (ASLRRA). In this letter, ASLRRA announced that
they would recommend a 25-mph speed limit for unit trains carrying
crude oil on all routes. Thus, small railroads will not be burdened by
the 50-mph speed limit provided they are adhering to ASLRRA's
recommended speed restriction.
PHMSA is also requiring a 40-mph speed limit for HHFTs within the
limits of a High Threat Urban Area (HTUA), unless all tank cars
containing flammable liquids meet or exceed the retrofit standards or
the standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank car. Similar to the
aforementioned 50-mph speed limit, the 40-mph speed limit for HHFTs in
HTUAs is also generally consistent with voluntary commitments made by
AAR ``Railroad Subscribers'' as a result of recent cooperation with the
Department. Further, given ASLRRA's additional recommendation of a 25-
mph speed limit for certain short line and regional trains carrying
crude oil, small railroads should not be burdened by the 40-mph speed
limit in HTUAs. PHMSA believes that most small railroads are adhering
to ASLRRA's recommendation.
Determination of Need
Speed is a factor that contributes to derailments. Speed can
influence the probability of an accident, as it may allow for a brake
application to stop the train before a collision. Speed also increases
the kinetic energy of a train resulting in a greater possibility of the
tank cars being punctured in the event of a derailment. As more tank
cars are punctured in a derailment, the likelihood and severity of
releases of hazardous materials into the environment increases.
Conversely, lower speeds reduce kinetic energy, reducing the
possibility of puncture in a derailment, which in turn reduces the
severity of hazardous material releases into the environment.
The growth in the production and transport of crude oil and ethanol
in recent years has been accompanied by an increase in the number of
rail derailments involving crude oil and ethanol. Given the projected
continued growth of domestic crude oil and ethanol production and
transport, and the growing number of train accidents involving crude
oil and ethanol, PHMSA concludes that the potential for future severe
train accidents involving HHFTs has increased substantially. As our
organizational mission, PHMSA seeks to improve the safety of the
transportation of hazardous materials in commerce, which includes
reducing the incidence and severity of train derailments involving
hazardous materials. Therefore, PHMSA has adopted certain speed
restrictions as a way to lessen damages that would occur in the event
of a derailment and to improve the overall safety of rail
transportation of large quantities of Class 3 flammable liquids.
Alternatives Considered
PHMSA considered a range of alternatives relative to the adopted
speed restrictions. Namely, PHMSA considered; the ``no action''
alternative, the various speed restrictions proposed in the NPRM, and
different speed restrictions proposed by commenters.
Alternative 1: No Action Alternative--Status Quo
The ``no action'' alternative is the choice to uphold the status
quo and forego new regulation related to speed restrictions. It is
equivalent to the current regulatory environment absent this
rulemaking. There is reason to believe that the ``no action''
alternative has some merit. Chiefly, trade associations and the
industry at-large have made significant efforts to improve railroad
safety, including the issuance of voluntary or recommended speed
restrictions. If voluntary speed restrictions were indistinguishable to
the adopted speed restrictions, and small railroads perfectly and
uniformly adhered to these voluntary speed restrictions, PHMSA might
not need to codify the adopted speed restrictions. However, these
voluntary or recommended speed restrictions are inferior to the
codified adopted speed restrictions in that they do not carry the
weight of law. Further, PHMSA was not provided with sufficient evidence
to show that 100 percent of small railroads were adhering to the
voluntary or recommended speed restrictions. PHMSA has assumed that
this kind of adherence is occurring, but cannot certify it. Moreover,
the adopted speed restrictions are not indistinguishable to the
voluntary ones. The voluntary speed restrictions apply to ``Key Crude
Oil Trains,'' or similar trains, whereas PHMSA has expanded the scope
of the

[[Page 26732]]

rule to include different Class 3 flammable liquids and different high-
risk train configurations. Thus, the ``no action'' alternative is not
the best course of action.
Alternative 2: 40-mph Speed Limits for HHFTs in all Areas
The 40-mph speed limits for HHFTs in all areas. This is option 1 in
the NPRM. In this alternative, all HHFTs are limited to a maximum speed
of 40 mph, unless all tank cars meet or exceed the performance
standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank car.
Alternative 3: 40-mph Speed Limit for HHFTs in Populations of More Than
100,000 People
The 40-mph speed limits for areas with populations of more than
100,000 people alternative is option 2 in the NPRM. In this
alternative, all HHFTs--unless all tank cars containing flammable
liquids meet or exceed the standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank
car--are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph while operating in an
area that has a population of more than 100,000 people.
Alternative 4: 40-mph Speed Limits for HHFTs in HTUAs
The 40-mph speed limits for HHFTs in HTUA. This is option 3 in the
NPRM. In this alternative, all HHFTs--unless all tank cars containing
flammable liquids meet or exceed the standards for the DOT
Specification 117 tank car--are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph
while the train travels within the geographical limits of HTUAs. This
was the most cost effective option proposed in the rulemaking.
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed three 40-mph speed limits, including
the adopted 40-mph speed limit in HTUAs, as well as two other 40-mph
speed limits applicable to all areas and to areas with ``a population
of more than 100,000 people.'' Thus, PHMSA's consideration of
alternatives was publicly stated at the NPRM stage, and PHMSA afforded
the public an opportunity to comment on the validity and expected
impacts of these proposed speed limits. In the NPRM, the 40-mph speed
limit in HTUAs was cited as Option 3, and the 40-mph speed limit in all
areas and the 40-mph speed limit in any area with a population of more
than 100,000 people were cited as Option 1 and Option 2, respectively.
Option 1 and Option 2 were not adopted for a variety of reasons
that affect small and large entities alike. Option 1 and Option 2 are
not as cost-effective and would be burdensome and overly restrictive
relative to the 40-mph speed limit in HTUAs (Option 3). This sentiment
was echoed by many commenters, including ASLRRA. According to PHMSA's
cost/benefit analysis and commenter input, PHMSA has reason to believe
that the implementation of Option 1 and Option 2 would create an
unjustifiable burden on small entities, as well as on large railroads
and offerors, and thus are not practical alternatives for small
entities. Please refer to the Final RIA, as well as other sections of
the rulemaking, for further summary and discussion of the NPRM's
proposed 40-mph speed limits.
PHMSA is confident that the adopted speed restrictions--a 40-mph
speed limit in HTUAs and a 50-mph speed limit for all HHFTs--constitute
the best course of action and small carriers will be able to comply
without undue burden. In fact, PHMSA expects that the adopted speed
restrictions will impose only limited costs on small entities and will
yield more safety benefits per unit of cost than other alternatives
over time. ASLRRA's recommendation of a 25-mph speed limit to member
railroads lends concrete support to this outlook.
Alternative 5--Speed Restrictions Based on Other Geographical Criteria
In addition to the alternatives proposed in the NPRM, various
commenters offered alternatives that could be applied to small
entities, such as small rail carriers. Various commenters suggested
that PHMSA align the speed restrictions with different geographical
criteria. Nevertheless, ASLRRA and AAR did not suggest that different
geographical criteria be applied specifically to small rail carriers.
On the contrary, ASLRRA's recommended 25-mph speed restriction
specifically applied to short lines and regional rail lines carrying
crude oil as a ``unit'' on all routes. Thus, PHMSA does not believe
that different geographical criteria would be a practical alternative
for small entities.
Impact on Small Entities
Most small railroads affected by this rule do not operate at speeds
higher than the speed restrictions required or travel long distances
over which the reduced speed would cause a significant impact.
Additionally, in a February 12, 2014, letter to the Secretary, ASLRRA
announced that they recommend to their members to voluntarily operate
unit trains of crude oil at a top speed of no more than 25 mph on all
routes.
The only small railroads that are likely to be affected by the
speed restrictions are those that have relatively short mileage
connecting two or more larger railroads, and that may operate at speeds
higher than 30 mph. Those railroads do not originate HHFT, but let the
larger railroads operate HHFTs over their track. Therefore there will
be no speed restrictions imposed on these small railroads, only larger
railroads operating over the small railroads' track.
The only Class III railroad which both has Class 4 or higher track
(speeds above 40 mph) and also hauls crude oil or ethanol is also a
commuter railroad serving a large city, and therefore not a small
entity. Thus, the speed restrictions will not result in any net impact
on small entities.
4. Requirement Area 4--Braking
Adopted Action
PHMSA and FRA are requiring that rail carriers transporting certain
quantities of flammable liquids to equip trains with advanced braking
systems. Specifically, this final rule requires all HHFTs operating in
excess of 30 mph to have enhanced braking systems. At a baseline level,
any train that contains a continuous block of 20 or more loaded tank
cars or a total of at least 35 loaded tank cars throughout the train
consist containing Class 3 flammable liquids (an HHFT) must have in
place, at a minimum, a functioning two-way EOT device or a DP system to
assist in braking.
With longer, heavier trains it is necessary to factor in train
control issues. Therefore, PHMSA and FRA have specific braking
requirements for trains that are transporting 70 or more loaded tank
cars of Class 3 flammable liquids (referred to as high-hazard flammable
trains or ``HHFUTs'') at speeds in excess of 30 mph. By January 1,
2021, any HHFUT transporting one or more tank car loaded with a Packing
Group I flammable liquid will be required operate using an ECP brake
system that complies with the requirements of 49 CFR part 232, subpart
G. All other HHFUTs must be equipped with operative ECP brake systems
by May 1, 2023, when traveling in excess of 30 mph.
Determination of Need
Braking systems reduce kinetic energy and therefore help prevent
and mitigate the effects of train accidents. Since the First Safety
Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, freight train operations in the U.S.
have traditionally relied on air brakes to slow and stop a train. This
conventional air brake system has proven to be reliable, but it has
drawbacks. When a train is long and heavy, as is typically the case in
the context of an HHFT, a conventional air brake system can easily take
over one-half mile to bring a train

[[Page 26733]]

to a stop, even with the emergency brakes applied. Moreover, the length
of a train will significantly affect the time it takes for the
conventional air brakes to apply to the entire consist. It can take a
number of seconds for the air brake system to function as air is
removed from the system to engage the brakes, beginning with the cars
nearest to the locomotive and working towards the rear of the train.
For example, in a 100-car train it could take up to 16 seconds as the
brakes fully apply sequentially from front-to-back. This lag in air
brake application time from the front to the back of the train also can
result in significant in-train buff and draft forces. These in-train
forces can lead to wheel damage (e.g. slid flat spots) and can
negatively impact rail integrity as these flat spots create a vertical
impact force (``pounding'') on the rails. These are major contributing
factors to derailments. In-train forces resulting from the application
of conventional air brakes also can directly contribute to derailments,
particularly in emergency situations, as freight cars can be forcefully
bunched together when the train is brought to a stop quickly. These
forces may also be amplified by the longitudinal slosh effect of a
liquid lading, such as crude oil or ethanol. Such factors have led
PHMSA and FRA to consider advanced brake signal propagation systems as
a way to improve safety in the transportation of Class 3 flammable
liquids by rail, particularly with respect to longer trains
transporting 70 or more tank cars loaded with Class 3 flammable
liquids. These more advanced systems have the capability to stop trains
more quickly and reduce the number of braking-induced derailments.
Alternatives Considered
Alternative 1: No Action Alternative--Status Quo
If the braking requirements were not adopted, the damages estimated
in the absence of this rulemaking would not be reduced, where possible,
by advanced braking options. This alternative would also impose no
costs. This alternative would also not codify voluntary agreements
between the Class I railroads and the Department for Key Crude Oil
trains. While those voluntary agreements would remain in place, it
would not expand the requirements for advanced braking to other trains
transporting flammable liquids that have been identified as high risk,
nor would it include a requirement for ECP braking systems. PHMSA and
FRA have not chosen this alternative.
Alternative 2: Two-Way End of Train Devices or Distributed Power
Alternative 2 would require each HHFT to be equipped and operated
with either a two-way EOT device, as defined in 49 CFR 232.5 of this
title, or DP, as defined in 49 CFR 229.5 of this title. This
alternative would not mandate a requirement for ECP braking systems.
Additionally, this alternative is closest to the voluntary agreements
differing in that it applies to HHFTs and not a Key Crude Oil train.
PHMSA and FRA believe this alternative would result in decrease in the
number of tank cars punctured in a derailment by 13-16% compared to
conventional braking systems. This alternative was considered but was
not chosen.
Alternative 3 (Applicable to Tank Car Option 1 Only): Alternative 2,
Plus ECP on All Newly Constructed and Retrofitted DOT Specification 117
Cars
This is the alternative proposed in the NPRM. Alternative 3 would
require an HHFT to be equipped and operated with either a two-way EOT
device, as defined in 49 CFR 232.5 of this title, or DP, as defined in
49 CFR 229.5 of this title. Additionally, a tank car manufactured in
accordance with proposed Sec. 179.202 or Sec. 179.202-11 for use in a
HHFT would be equipped with ECP brakes. HHFTs comprised entirely of
tank cars manufactured in accordance with proposed Sec. 179.202 and
Sec. 179.202-11 (for Tank Car Option 1 the PHMSA and FRA Designed Car,
only), except for required buffer cars, would be operated in ECP brake
mode as defined by 49 CFR 232.5. To reduce the burden on small carriers
that may not have the capital available to install new braking systems,
we proposed an exception. If a rail carrier does not comply with the
proposed braking requirements above, we proposed that the carrier may
continue to operate HHFTs at speeds not to exceed 30 mph.
Alternative 4: Tiered Braking Requirements Based on HHFTs and HHFUTs
(Selected Alternative)
This alternative would require that rail carriers transporting
certain quantities of flammable liquids to equip trains with advanced
braking systems. Specifically, this alternative would require all HHFTs
operating in excess of 30 mph to have enhanced braking systems. At a
baseline level, any train that contains a continuous block of 20 or
more loaded tank cars or a total of at least 35 loaded tank cars
throughout the train consist containing Class 3 flammable liquids (an
HHFT) must have in place, at a minimum, a functioning two-way EOT
device or a DP system to assist in braking.
With longer, heavier trains it is necessary to factor in train
control issues. Therefore, this alternative would require specific
braking requirements for trains that are transporting 70 or more loaded
tank cars of Class 3 flammable liquids at speeds in excess of 30 mph.
Under this alternative, by January 1, 2021, any high-hazard flammable
unit train (HHFUT) containing one or more tank cars loaded with a
Packing Group I flammable liquid, operating in excess of 30 mph must
have a functioning ECP brake system that complies with the requirements
of 49 CFR part 232, subpart G. Whereas all other HHFUTs must be
equipped with operative ECP brake systems by May 1, 2023, when
traveling in excess of 30 mph. This was the selected option.
Impacts on Small Entities
Most small railroads affected by this rule do not operate at speeds
higher than the speed restrictions required or travel long distances
over which the reduced speed would cause a significant impact. Any
small railroad that operates at speeds 30 mph or less would also not be
impacted by the braking requirement. Additionally, in a February 12,
2014, letter to the Secretary, ASLRRA announced that they recommend to
their members to voluntarily operate unit trains of crude oil at a top
speed of no more than 25 mph on all routes.
ASLRRA commented to the docket that small railroads often operate
older locomotives, and that retrofitting those locomotives to work with
ECP brakes would be cost-prohibitive. PHMSA believes that the railroads
that have the older locomotives hauling HHFTs are the same railroads
that would not be adversely impacted by operating trains at speeds of
30 mph or less.
The only small railroads that are likely to be affected by the
braking requirements are those that have relatively short mileage
connecting two or more larger railroads, and that may operate at speeds
higher than 30 mph. Those railroads do not originate HHFT, but let the
larger railroads operate HHFTs over their track. PHMSA believes that
all HHFTs from larger railroads will be assembled so that locomotives
and cars with ECP brakes are kept together, so there will be no speed
restrictions imposed. Thus, the speed restrictions will not result in
any net impact on small entities.

[[Page 26734]]

5. Requirement Area 5--Classification of Unrefined Petroleum-Based
Products
Adopted Action
The final rule requires any offeror of unrefined petroleum-based
products for transportation to develop, implement, and update a
sampling and testing program related to the classification and
identification of properties for packaging selection of these materials
(see ``Summary and Discussion of Public Comments'' for plan details).
PHMSA believes that there would be an initial cost for each offeror of
approximately $3,002 for the first year, and additional costs of $810
annually thereafter, for a total value, discounted at 7 percent over 20
years, of $10,514. PHMSA believes that this adopted section will not
significantly burden any of these small entities.
Determination of Need
The offeror's responsibility to classify and describe a hazardous
material is a key requirement under the HMR. Improper classification
and failure to identify applicable material properties can have
significant negative impacts on transportation safety. Proper
classification is necessary ensure proper packaging, operational
controls, and hazard communication requirements are met, all of which
are important to mitigate the negative effects of a train derailment or
other hazardous materials incident.
While the classification of manufactured products is generally well
understood and consistent, unrefined petroleum-based products
potentially have significant variability in their properties as a
function of history, location, method of extraction, temperature at
time of extraction, and the type and extent of conditioning or
processing of the material. Manufactured goods and refined products, by
definition, are at the other end of the spectrum from unrefined or raw
materials. This means that the physical and chemical properties are
more predictable as they are pure substances or well-studied mixtures.
PHMSA and FRA audits of crude oil loading facilities, prior to the
issuance of the February 26, 2014. Emergency Restriction/Prohibition
Order, indicated that the classification of crude oil being transported
by rail was often based solely on a Safety Data Sheet (SDS). The
information is generic, providing basic data and ranges of values for a
limited number of material properties. In these instances, it is likely
no validation of the information is performed at an interval that would
allow for detection of variability in material properties.
Alternatives Considered
Alternative 1: No Action Alternative--Status Quo
The industry would continue the status quo and sample the material
based on the existing classification and characterization methods. Rail
derailment and other accidents involving shipments of crude oil or
other unrefined petroleum-based products that have been improperly
classified may create potential risks for emergency responders. If
PHMSA had adopted alternative 1, then there would be no added costs or
benefits to the rule.
Alternative 2: Require Sampling and Testing Program for Mined Liquids
and Gases as Proposed in NPRM
Under this alternative, PHMSA would require a documented sampling
and testing plan for shippers of these mined gases and liquids in
transportation. This plan would enable PHMSA and shippers of this
commodity to more easily ascertain the specific classification and
characteristics of the commodity and help to minimize potential risks
when responding to a derailment and accident. Offerors would also
certify that program is in place, document the testing and sampling
program, and make program information available to DOT personnel, upon
request.
This option was proposed in rulemaking, but only offerors
petroleum-based products (i.e. petroleum crude oil, liquefied petroleum
gas, and natural gas) were analyzed for the IRFA and in the draft RIA.
Commenters did not provide sufficient data to justify expanding the
definition beyond petroleum-based products. A detailed analysis of this
option is provided in the final RIA,, but it is not adopted in this
final rule.
Alternative 3: Require Sampling and Testing Program for Unrefined
Petroleum Based Products.
This is the alternative adopted in this rulemaking. Under this
alternative, PHMSA requires a documented sampling and testing plan for
offerors of unrefined petroleum-based products in transportation. This
plan will enable PHMSA and shippers of this commodity to more easily
ascertain the specific classification and properties of the commodity
and help to minimize potential risks when responding to a derailment or
other accident. Offerors must also certify that program is in place,
document the testing and sampling program, and make program information
available to DOT personnel, upon request.
This revised definition narrows the scope of affected offerors from
those offering all ``mined liquids and gases'' to only ``unrefined
petroleum-based products.'' While the savings from the proposed
definitions are not quantified, the clarification ensures that
additional offerors will not be inadvertently impacted.
Impact on Small Entities
PHMSA believes that there would be an initial cost for each offeror
of approximately $3,002 for the first year, and additional costs of
$810 annually thereafter, for a total value, discounted at 7 percent
over 20 years, of $10,514. PHMSA believes that this adopted section
will not significantly burden any of these small entities.
6. Requirement Area 6--Notification
Adopted Action
On May 7, 2014, DOT issued an Emergency Order \116\ (``the Order'')
requiring each railroad transporting one million gallons or more of
Bakken crude oil in a single train in commerce within the U.S. to
provide certain information in writing to the SERCs for each state in
which it operates such a train. The notification made under the Order
included estimated frequencies of affected trains transporting Bakken
crude oil through each county in the state, the routes over which it is
transported, a description of the petroleum crude oil and applicable
emergency response information, and contact information for at least
one responsible party at the host railroads. In addition, the Order
required that railroads provide copies of notifications made to each
SERC to FRA upon request and to update the notifications when Bakken
crude oil traffic materially changes within a particular county or
state (a material change consists of 25 percent or greater difference
from the estimate conveyed to a state in the current notification). In
the August 1, 2014 NPRM, PHMSA proposed to codify and clarify the
requirements of the Order and requested public comment on the various
parts of the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\116\ Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067 (Order).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

After careful consideration of the comments and after discussions
within PHMSA and FRA, we believe that for the final rule using the
definition of the HHFT for notification applicability is a more
conservative approach for affecting safer rail transportation of
flammable liquid material; and is a more consistent approach because it
aligns with the changes to other operational requirements, including
routing.

[[Page 26735]]

The primary intent of the Order was to eliminate unsafe conditions
and practices that create an imminent hazard to public health and
safety and the environment. Specifically, the Order was designed to
inform communities of large volumes of crude oil transported by rail
through their areas and to provide information to better prepare
emergency responders for accidents involving large volumes of crude
oil. DOT issued the Order under the Secretary's authority to stop
imminent hazards at 49 U.S.C. 5121(d). The Order was issued in response
to the crude oil railroad accidents previously described, and it is in
effect until DOT rescinds the Order or a final rule codifies
requirements and supplants the requirements in the Order.
The adopted action is that DOT is removing the notification
requirement language proposed in the NPRM and is instead using as a
substitute the contact information language requirement that is already
part of the additional planning requirements for transportation by rail
found in Sec. 172.820 of the HMR that now applies to HHFTs. As
provided in Sec. 172.820(g), each HHFT must identify a point of
contact (including the name, title, phone number and email address)
related to routing of materials identified in Sec. 172.820 in its
security plan and provide this information to: (1) State and/or
regional Fusion Centers (established to coordinate with state, local
and tribal officials on security issues and which are located within
the area encompassed by the rail carrier's system); and (2) State,
local, and tribal officials in jurisdictions that may be affected by a
rail carrier's routing decisions and who directly contact the railroad
to discuss routing decisions.
Determination of Need
Recent accidents have demonstrated the need for action in the form
of additional communication between railroads and emergency responders
to ensure that the emergency responders are aware of train movements
carrying large quantities of flammable liquid through their communities
in order to better prepare emergency responders for accident response.
Alternatives Considered
Alternative 1: No Action Alternative--Status Quo
This alternative would maintain implementation of the Order issued
on May 7, 2014. PHMSA estimated there are essentially no new costs
associated with this alternative, and thus no burdens on small
entities, because rail carriers are already subject to the Order.
Alternative 2: Utilizing Rail Routing POC for HHFTs
This alternative utilizes the contact information language
requirement that is already part of the additional planning
requirements for transportation by rail found in Sec. 172.820 of the
HMR. As provided in Sec. 172.820(g), each HHFT must identify a point
of contact (including the name, title, phone number and email address)
related to routing of materials identified in Sec. 172.820 in its
security plan and provide this information to: (1) State and/or
regional Fusion Centers (established to coordinate with state, local
and tribal officials on security issues and which are located within
the area encompassed by the rail carrier's system); and (2) State,
local, and tribal officials in jurisdictions that may be affected by a
rail carrier's routing decisions and who directly contact the railroad
to discuss routing decisions.
This is the favored alternative since it adds no additional cost
and provides for consistency of notification requirements for rail
carriers transporting material subject to routing requirements, i.e.
trains carrying: (1) More than 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) in a single
carload of a Division 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3 explosive; (2) a quantity of a
material poisonous by inhalation in a single bulk packaging; (3) a
highway route-controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) material;
and now (4) Class 3 flammable liquid as part of a high-hazard flammable
train (as defined in Sec. 171.8). This option also addresses security
sensitive and business related confidentiality issues that many
comments addressed.
Alternative 3: Rescinding Emergency Order With No Corresponding
Regulatory Change
This alternative effectively would return to the status quo prior
to the publication of the emergency order. This EO was designed to
inform communities of large volumes of crude oil transported by rail
through their areas and to provide information to better prepare
emergency responders for accidents involving large volumes of crude
oil. As the primary intent of this EO was to eliminate unsafe
conditions and practices that created an imminent hazard to public
health and safety and the environment removal of this order without a
corresponding action to reduce the risk is not acceptable and thus not
selected.
Impacted on Small Entities
Small entities affected by this provision have been providing
notification for crude oil shipments under the Emergency Order. As the
notification utilizes the contact information language requirement that
is already part of the additional planning requirements for
transportation by rail found in Sec. 172.820 of the HMR the impact on
the small entities is included in the routing impacts. For a discussion
of those impacts see the routing section of the FRFA.
7. Total Burden on Small Entities
Small Offerors Other Than Shippers
There will be no burden on small offerors that are not shippers,
except those who must classify mined liquids and gases. Those small
entities will face a total cost, discounted at 7 percent over 20 years,
of $10,514 per small entity.
Small Shippers
The total impact per small shipper, before considering market
forces, discounted at 7 percent over twenty years, will be $1.134
million discounted at 7 percent, and $1.672 million discounted at 3
percent, the costs of upgrading tank cars. However, PHMSA believes that
small shippers can pass on those costs to other parties in the supply
chain, because all shippers face the same cost constraints.
Small Railroads
The total impact per small railroad, discounted at 7 percent over
twenty years, will be $45,230, the cost of routing analysis.
PHMSA has identified no additional significant alternative to this
final rule that meets the agency's objective in promulgating this rule,
and that would further reduce the economic impact of the rulemaking on
small entities.

F. Paperwork Reduction Act

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no person is required to
respond to an information collection unless it has been approved by OMB
and displays a valid OMB control number. Section 1320.8(d) of Title 5
of the CFR requires that PHMSA provide interested members of the public
and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information and
recordkeeping requests. In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, PHMSA requested a
new information collection from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under OMB Control No. 2137-0628 entitled ``Flammable Hazardous
Materials by Rail Transportation.'' PHMSA stated

[[Page 26736]]

that the NPRM may result in an increase in annual burden and costs
under OMB Control No. 2137-0628 due to proposed requirements pertaining
to the creation of a sampling and testing program for mined gas or
liquid and rail routing for HHFTs, routing requirements for rail
operators, and the reporting of incidents that may occur from HFFTs.
In the NPRM, we requested comment on whether PHMSA should require
reporting of data on the total damages that occur as a result of train
accidents involving releases of hazardous material, including damages
related to fatalities, injuries, property damage, environmental damage
and clean-up costs, loss of business and other economic activity, and
evacuation-related costs. Currently, PHMSA only collects some of this
information, and data verification is inconsistent. Further, we
requested comments on whether PHMSA should require reporting on every
car carrying hazardous material that derails, whether that car loses
product or not. Such reporting would assist PHMSA in assessing the
effectiveness of different kinds of cars in containing the hazardous
materials that they carry. In response to the NPRM, PHMSA received
general comments from the following individuals related to information
collection:
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)
The AFPM commented that the criteria for modifying the sampling and
testing program and what it seeks to address is vague. It adds that
this will be another unnecessary paperwork requirement with no
corresponding benefit. The AFPM survey and other studies confirm that
Bakken Crude oils are correctly classified. They maintain that
identification of flammable liquids by geographic, regional, or even a
particular country of origin serves no known purpose except to impose
unnecessary paperwork requirements.
We disagree that expanding existing classification requirements
will not impact transportation safety. PHMSA and FRA audits of crude
oil facilities indicated the classification of crude oil transported by
rail was often based solely on a SDS. While the classification of
manufactured products is generally well-understood and consistent,
unrefined petroleum-based products potentially have significant
variability in their properties as a function of time, location, method
of extraction, temperature at time of extraction, and the type and
extent of conditioning or processing of the material. As such, we feel
it is necessary to require development and adherence to a consistent
and comprehensive sampling and testing program, and to provide
oversight for such a program.
Waterkeeper Alliance
The Waterkeeper Alliance noted that according to the proposed
regulations, the new sampling and testing program must be ``documented
in writing and retained while it remains in effect.'' Specifically,
PHMSA is requiring that offerors keep on hand the most recent versions
of the program documentation, provide that version to employees
responsible for conducting the testing, and provide documentation to
the DOT upon request. Waterkeeper recommended that PHMSA should, at a
minimum, require that this information be submitted to FRA (and the
public, upon request) and be kept on hand with the railroad or offeror
so that responsible packaging decisions can be made based on that data.
PHMSA did not propose requiring third-party involvement with
testing or submitting test results to a third party in the NPRM and, as
such, is not adopting any such requirements. PHMSA did not propose
regulatory changes to classification test procedures, and as such, is
not adopting any such requirements. Furthermore, in the NPRM, PHMSA
stated that we are not proposing a requirement for the retention of
test results.
Bridger LLC
In the August 1, 2014 NPRM, PHMSA posed the question, ``PHMSA
assumes no unjacketed tank cars would be in PG I service in 2015 and
2016, in the absence of this rule. Does this assumption match the
expected service of unjacketed tank cars?'' Bridger firmly answered no,
and in its comments asserted, ``Bridger note[d] that PHMSA assumes no
non-jacketed tank cars would be in PG I service in 2015 and 2016, in
the absence of this rule. Bridger adds that, ``PHMSA is under a
mistaken belief that railcar manufacturers have stopped marketing
railcars that are not Enhanced CPC-1232 railcars.'' Further, Bridger
LLC stated that ``before PHMSA makes this key assumption regarding the
rule, it should require the railcar manufacturers to provide accurate
data and information regarding its marketing and manufacturing
activities, issuing an information collection notice if necessary.''
Based on the substantive public comment received in response to the
NPRM, in this final rule, PHMSA is confident its revised assumptions
regarding fleet composition and new and existing outstanding tank car
order configurations precludes the need to prepare an information
collection notice.
George Washington University
The George Washington University urged PHMSA to be consistent with
the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act, and with the text of
its proposal. The George Washington University added PHMSA should
commit to collecting the information needed to measure the rule's
success.
Sampling and Testing Plans
In the NPRM PHMSA used data from the Hazmat Intelligence Portal
from June 2014. For the Final Rule PHMSA pulled updated data from
November 2014 and now estimates that there will be approximately 1,804
respondents up from 1,538, based on a review of relevant active
registrations on the PHMSA Hazmat Intelligence Portal, each developing
an average of one sampling and testing plan each year. First year
hourly burden is estimated at 40 hours per response, or 72,160 burden
hours; hourly burden for each subsequent year is estimated at 10 hours
per response, or 18,040 burden hours. PHMSA assumes a Chemical Engineer
is the labor category most appropriate to describe sampling
methodologies, testing protocols, and present test results. The mean
hourly wage for a Chemical Engineer was $45.56 in 2014, according to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We inflate this wage by 60 percent to
account for fringe benefits and overhead of $27.94 per hour, for a
total weighted hourly wage of $75.05. At an average hourly cost of
$75.05 per hour, first year burden cost for this proposed requirement
is estimated at $5,415,605.00; burden cost for each subsequent year is
estimated at $1,353,902.00.
Routing--Collection by Line Segment
PHMSA estimates that there will be approximately 170 respondents
(10 for Class II Railroads; 160 for Class III Railroads) each
submitting an average of one routing collection response each year, and
each subsequent year. Hourly burden is assumed to be 40 hours per
response, or 6,800 burden hours each year. PHMSA used a labor rate that
combines two employee groups listed in the Bureau of Labor Statistics
May 2012 Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates:
NAICS 482000--Rail Transportation occupational code 11-0000
``Management Occupations'' and occupation code 43-6011 ``Executive
Secretaries and Executive Administrative Assistants.'' A combination of
these two groups will

[[Page 26737]]

probably be utilized to perform the requirements in this proposed rule.
The average annual wages for these groups are $100,820 and $54,520
respectively. The resulting average hourly wage rate, including a 60
percent increase to account for overhead and fringe benefits, is
$62.25. At an average hourly cost of $62.25 per hour, burden cost for
the first year and each subsequent year is estimated at $423,300.00.
Routing Security Analysis
For the first year, PHMSA estimates that there will be
approximately 170 respondents (10 for Class II Railroads; 160 for Class
III Railroads). Class II Railroads are expected to submit 170 routing
security analysis responses per year, based on the number of feasible
alternate routes to consider after future possible network changes,
with each response taking approximately 80 hours each, or 4,000 hours.
At an average hourly cost of $62.25 per hour, first year burden cost
for Class II Railroads is estimated at $249,000.00. Class III Railroads
are expected to submit 320 routing security analysis responses per
year, with each response taking approximately 40 hours, or 12,800
hours. At an average hourly cost of $62.25 per hour, first year burden
cost for Class III Railroads is estimated at $796,800.00. Railroads
will also be required to provide an alternate routing security
analysis. Class II Railroads are expected to submit 40 routing security
analysis responses per year, based on the number of feasible alternate
routes to consider after future possible network changes, with each
response taking approximately 120 hours each, or 4,800 hours. At an
average hourly cost of $62.25 per hour, first year burden cost for
Class II Railroads is estimated at $298,800.00. Class III Railroads are
expected to submit 160 alternate routing security analysis responses
per year, with each response taking approximately 20 hours, or 3,200
hours. At an average hourly cost of $62.25 per hour, first year burden
cost for Class III Railroads is estimated at $199,200.00.
PHMSA assumes that new route analyses are necessary each year based
on changes in commodity flow, but that after the first year's route
analyses are completed, analyses performed on the same routes in
subsequent years will take less time. For each subsequent year, PHMSA
estimates that there will be approximately 170 respondents (10 for
Class II Railroads; 160 for Class III Railroads). Class II Railroads
are expected to submit 50 routing security analysis responses per year,
with each response taking approximately 16 hours each, or 800 hours. At
an average hourly cost of $62.95 per hour, subsequent year burden cost
for Class II Railroads is estimated at $49,800.00. Class III Railroads
are expected to submit 320 routing security analysis responses per
year, with each response taking approximately 8 hours, or 2,560 hours.
At an average hourly cost of $62.95 per hour, first year burden cost
for Class III Railroads is estimated at $159,360.00. Railroads will
also be required to provide an alternate routing security analysis. For
each subsequent year, PHMSA estimates that there will be approximately
170 respondents (10 for Class II Railroads; 160 for Class III
Railroads). Class II Railroads are expected to submit 40 routing
alternate security analysis responses per year, with each response
taking approximately 12 hours each, or 480 hours. At an average hourly
cost of $62.95 per hour, subsequent year burden cost for Class II
Railroads is estimated at $29,800.00. Class III Railroads are expected
to submit 160 alternate routing security analysis responses per year,
with each response taking approximately 2 hours, or 320 hours. At an
average hourly cost of $62.95 per hour, first year burden cost for
Class III Railroads is estimated at $19,920.00.
Incident Reporting
PHMSA estimates there will be 289 incidents over 20 years, for an
average of 15 incidents per year, involving the derailment and release
of crude oil/ethanol. Each report would be submitted by a single
respondent and would take approximately 2 additional hours to submit
per response, compared to the current requirements. At an average
hourly cost of $62.95 per hour, burden cost is estimated at $1,825.55.
We do not currently have sufficient data to estimate the number of
respondents and responses that would be required if PHMSA extended
incident reporting requirements to derailments not involving a product
release.
Total
We estimate that the total information collection and recordkeeping
burden for the requirements as specified in this final rule will be as
follows:
OMB No. 2137-0628, ``Flammable Hazardous Materials by Rail
Transportation'' First Year Annual Burden:
Total Annual Number of Respondents: 1,989.
Total Annual Responses: 2,559.
Total Annual Burden Hours: 103,789.
Total Annual Burden Cost: $7,384,533.55.
Subsequent Year Burden:
Total Annual Number of Respondents: 1,989.
Total Annual Responses: 2,559.
Total Annual Burden Hours: 29,029.
Total Annual Burden Cost: $2,037,988.
Requests for a copy of this information collection should be
directed to Steven Andrews or T. Glenn Foster, Office of Hazardous
Materials Standards (PHH-12), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001,
Telephone (202) 366-8553.

G. Environmental Assessment

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.
4321-4375), requires that Federal agencies analyze the environmental
impacts of proposed actions. If an agency does not anticipate that a
proposed action will have a significant impact on the environment, the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations provide for the
preparation of an environmental assessment (EA) to determine whether a
proposed action has significant effects and therefore requires an
environmental impact statement or finding of no significant impact
(FONSI). The EA must include discussions of (1) the need for the
proposed action, (2) alternatives to the proposed action as required by
NEPA section 102(2)(E), (3) the environmental impacts of the proposed
action and alternatives, and (4) the agencies and persons consulted (40
CFR 1508.9(b)).
This Final EA includes responses to public comments received on the
EA in the NPRM. One change in the Final EA is the addition of an
alternative in response to various comments for expedited DOT
Specification 111 (DOT-111) tank car usage discontinuance,
``Alternative of 2018 Removal of DOT-111 Tank Cars from Service.''
PHMSA has likewise not carried the ``ANPRM Alternative,'' found in the
NPRM draft EA, forward in this Final EA. This is because the ANPRM
included several actions that are not within the scope of this
rulemaking. As discussed below, PHMSA considered, but eliminated from
detailed consideration, an immediate removal of DOT-111 tank cars.
Lastly, this Final EA now also includes additional data and
calculations to support discussions.
1. Need for the Proposal
The purpose of this rulemaking is to address serious safety and
environmental concerns revealed by recent train accidents involving
high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs). This final rule is designed to
lessen the

[[Page 26738]]

frequency and consequences of train accidents involving the
unintentional release flammable liquids from HHFTs. The purpose of the
regulations for enhanced tank car standards and operational controls
for high-hazard flammable trains is to prevent spills by keeping
flammable liquids, including crude oil and ethanol, in rail tank cars
and mitigating the severity of incidents should they occur.
U.S. crude oil production has risen sharply in recent years, with
much of the increased output moving by rail. In 2008, U.S. Class I
railroads originated 9,500 carloads of crude oil. In 2013, the number
of rail carloads of crude oil surpassed 400,000. The Association of
American Railroads (AAR) reported 229,798 carloads in the first half of
2014. In 2013, there were over 290,000 carloads of ethanol originated
in the United States. This data suggests an increasing need to
transport flammable liquids by rail.
The growing reliance on trains to transport large volumes of
flammable liquids, particularly crude oil and ethanol, under the
current regulatory framework, poses a risk to life, property, and the
environment. These risks of HHFTs have been highlighted by the recent
derailments of trains carrying crude oil in Casselton, North Dakota;
Aliceville, Alabama; Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada and Mount
Carbon, West Virginia and recent derailments of trains carrying ethanol
in Arcadia, Ohio and Cherry Valley, Illinois. This rule also addresses
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations
regarding accurate classification, enhanced tank car integrity, rail
routing, and oversight.
2. Alternatives
In developing this rule, PHMSA considered the following
alternatives:
No Action Alternative
In the no action alternative, PHMSA would not issue a final rule,
and the current regulatory standards would remain in effect. This would
allow for the indefinite continued use of the DOT-111 tank cars to
transport crude oil and ethanol.
In addition, the no action alternative would result in no new
operational controls. Specifically, a classification and sampling plan
would not be adopted. Selection of the no action alternative would not
include mandates to sample and test materials, and carriers/offerors
might engage or continue to engage in the practice of using inaccurate
safety data sheets (SDSs) to classify their products. HHFT carriers
also would not be required to consider the 27 safety and security
factors to determine routing. Moreover, if PHMSA selected the no action
alternative, the requirement to communicate with state and/or regional
fusion centers about routing decisions would not take effect, and
information would not be as easily available to authorized
personnel.\117\ If PHMSA selected the no action alternative, no new
speed restrictions would take effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\117\ Fusion centers serve as first responder emergency
communication networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, no action would continue the status quo with regard to
braking systems. The final rule proposes a two-tiered, cost-effective
and risk-based solution to reduce the number of cars and energy
associated with train accidents. Without action, the current braking
systems would continue to be used and the highest-risk train sets
(larger HHFTs) would continue using the same braking systems.
Selected Alternative
The selected alternative, which was originally discussed in the
draft EA, and is more fully discussed in the preamble has a phase-out
schedule depicted in Table EA1 below. The amendments included in this
alternative are more fully addressed in the preamble and regulatory
text sections of this final rule. However, they generally include:
New defined term of ``High-hazard flammable train;''
Rail routing requirements as specified in Part 172,
Subpart I of the HMR;
Sampling and testing program designed to ensure proper
classification and characterization of unrefined petroleum-based
products;
Phase in requirements for updated braking devices and
braking systems;
Speed restrictions for rail cars that do not meet the
safer DOT-117 standard; and
Phase-out DOT-111 cars in HHFTs and require DOT-117 for
such HHFTs, as follows.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\118\ The preferred alternative in the NPRM included a
compliance deadline of October 1, 2017, for PG I service, October 1,
2018, for PG I service, and October 1, 2020, for PG III service.

Table EA1--Timeline for Continued Use of DOT Specification 111 (DOT-111)
Tanks for Use in HHFTs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tank car type/service Retrofit deadline
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in (January 1, 2017 *).
PG I service. January 1, 2018.
Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG I March 1, 2018.
service.
Non-Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in April 1, 2020.
PG I service.
Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in May 1, 2023.
PG II service.
Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG II May 1, 2023.
service.
Non-Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in July 1, 2023.
PG II service.
Jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars in PG I May 1, 2025.
and PG II service ** and all
remaining tank cars carrying PG
III materials in an HHFT (pressure
relief valve and valve handles).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The January 1, 2017 date would trigger a retrofit reporting
requirement, and tank car owners of affected cars would have to report
to DOT the number of tank cars that they own that have been
retrofitted, and the number that have not yet been retrofitted.
** We anticipate these will be spread out throughout the 120 months and
the retrofits will take place during normal requalification and
maintenance schedule, which will likely result in fleet being retrofit
sooner.

Alternative of 2018 Removal of DOT-111 Tank Cars From Service
This alternative includes the same amendments as the selected
alternative above, but would discontinue the use DOT-111 cars in HHFTs
on a more accelerated schedule than the selected alternative.
Specifically, for the purposes of analyzing this alternative in the
environmental assessment, the retrofit deadlines for Non Jacketed DOT-
111 tank cars in PG I service, Non Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG II
service, and Jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in PG I and PG II service would
all be expedited to meet a deadline of October 1, 2018 (41 months). In
this environmental assessment and its

[[Page 26739]]

analysis, all references to an expedited phase-out of DOT-111 tank cars
by 2018 refer to this specific population of DOT-111 tank cars in PG I
and PG II service only.
Alternatives Considered but Not Carried Forward
PHMSA received a range of comments asking that it consider an
immediate ban or other expedited discontinuance of all DOT-111 tank
cars for crude and ethanol transport. PHMSA considered the impacts of
immediately banning the use of the DOT-111 tank car in HHFTs. However,
PHMSA concluded in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA) included in
this rulemaking that an immediate ban of the DOT-111 tank car is not a
reasonable alternative because the rail industry could not replace rail
cars immediately and would not be able to immediately switch to other
transportation modes. This would cause supply chain disruptions,
increased shipping costs, and increased reliance on trucks to make up
for lost transport capacity. This increased reliance on trucks could
have detrimental environmental and safety implications. As such, PHMSA
concluded that a ban by 2016 would be impractical. Therefore, PHMSA
more fully examined the impacts of a schedule that would phase out the
use of all DOT-111 tank cars in PG I and PG II service by 2018, which
is more aggressive than the selected alternative.
3. Environmental Impacts of the Selected Action and Alternatives No-
Action Alternative:
If PHMSA were to select the no-action alternative, current
regulations would remain in place, and no new provisions would be
added. However, the safety and environmental threats that result from
the increasing use of HHFTs would not be addressed. The existing threat
of derailment and resulting fire, as exhibited in serious accidents
like Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, which resulted in 47 fatalities, and
Aliceville, Alabama, where we estimate that 630,000 gallons of crude
oil entered navigable waters, destroying a several acres of wetlands
and forest, would continue. Clean-up is ongoing for both of these
accidents. For more information on safety and environmental risks,
please see the RIA.
As noted in the Final Rule, NTSB has identified these tank cars as
vulnerable to puncture. No action would allow for the long term
continuation of transportation of flammable liquids by rail in large
volumes in the DOT-111 tank car. In addition, if no action were taken
PHMSA would not adopt the DOT-117 tank car standard for new
construction. This would lead to market uncertainty and leave important
safety benefits unrealized.
If PHMSA selected the no action alternative, the safety benefits of
the sampling program would not be realized. These requirements are
intended to ensure the proper safety precautions are applied to each
carload. Without these protections, first responders could face greater
challenges in responding to incidents, and their efforts could be less
effective at mitigating the impacts of a release.
Selection of the no action alternative would also not include
requirements to share routing selection information with state
authorities and/or fusion centers. This requirement is intended to aid
first responders to best respond to incidents to mitigate the effects
of a release.
If PHMSA selected the no action alternative, speed restrictions
would not take effect. Speed restrictions decrease the kinetic energy
involved in accidents and are intended to decrease the amount of
hazardous materials released when a derailment or incident occurs.
Similarly, the no action alternative would not include the safety
benefits of more advanced braking systems to reduce the likelihood or
severity of derailments.
Selected Alternative
In considering the various alternatives, PHMSA analyzed the
following potential environmental impacts of each amendment in the
selected alternative.
The extension of the existing rail routing requirements in 49 CFR
172.820 to include HHFTs will require that rail carriers consider
safety and security risk factors such as population density along the
route; environmentally-sensitive or significant areas; venues along the
route (stations, events, places of congregation); emergency response
capability along the route; etc., when analyzing and selecting routes
for those trains. Use of routes that are less sensitive could mitigate
the safety and environmental consequences of a train accident and
release, were one to occur. It is possible that this requirement and
consideration of the listed risk factors could cause rail carriers to
choose routes that are less direct, potentially increasing the emission
of greenhouse gases and other air pollutants. PHMSA, however, concluded
that the reduction in risk to sensitive areas outweighs a slight
increase in greenhouse gases. Furthermore, consideration of emergency
response capabilities along the route could result in better
environmental mitigation in the event of a release. The purpose of
environmental mitigation is to decrease impacts to environmental media
such as air and water.
Next, the requirement for offerors to develop sampling and testing
plans is intended to ensure that unrefined petroleum products are
properly characterized to ensure that: (1) The proper regulatory
requirements are applied to each shipment to minimize the risk of
incident, (2) first responders have accurate information in the event
of a train accident, and (3) the characteristics of the material are
known and fully considered so that offerers and carriers are aware of
and can mitigate potential threats to the integrity of rail tank cars.
PHMSA believes that this provision will reduce the risk of release of
these materials.
PHMSA has calculated in the RIA that braking and speed
restrictions, especially for older DOT-111 tank cars, will reduce the
likelihood of train accidents that result in the release of flammable
liquids. PHMSA has also shown that the braking requirements could
improve fuel efficiency, thereby reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The
effective use of braking on a freight train can result in some accident
avoidance. In addition, the effective use of braking on a freight train
can potentially lessen the consequences of an accident by diminishing
in-train forces, kinetic energy, etc., which can reduce the likelihood
of a tank car being punctured and decrease the likelihood of a
derailment. Lessening the likelihood of derailments translates into a
reduction in the probability of releases into the environment.
These benefits are amplified when a train operates in ECP brake
mode, particularly as train length increases to 70 or more cars. The
system-wide implementation of ECP brakes on high-hazard flammable unit
trains also will potentially improve the efficiency of the rail system
by permitting trains to run closer together because of the improved
performance of the brake system. The final rule cites business benefits
related to operating in ECP brake mode (e.g., reduced fuel consumption,
longer inspection intervals, real time diagnostics, greater control
stopping and starting etc.) Additionally, system-wide implementation of
ECP brakes will improve the efficiency of the rail system by permitting
trains to run closer together because of the improved performance of
the brake system.
PHMSA concluded that the phasing-out of DOT-111 tank cars in HHFTs
will reduce risk of release because of the improved integrity and
safety features of the DOT-117. The DOT-117 will provide bottom outlet
protection and a

[[Page 26740]]

high capacity pressure relief valve. To improve integrity and puncture
resistance of the tank, DOT-117 has a full-height \1/2\ inch minimum
thickness head shield, an 11-gauge jacket, and a \9/16\ inch shell.
This is a significant improvement compared to the existing DOT-111,
which has no head shield, or jacket requirement and is constructed with
a \7/16\ inch thick shell.
The DOT-117 tank car must have a thermal protection system, capable
of surviving a 100-minute pool fire after a train accident. The 100-
minute survivability period is intended to provide emergency responders
time to assess an accident, establish perimeters, and evacuate the
public as needed. This thermal protection is critical in limiting human
health risks to the public and first responders and limiting
environmental damage in the event of a train accident. The introduction
of the new DOT-117, along with the phase-out of the DOT-111 used in
HHFTs will result in the manufacturing of some new tank cars to replace
retirements and to accommodate new investment. PHMSA recognizes that
performed a quantitative analysis the newer tank cars are heavier such
that their transport will result in somewhat greater use of fuel and in
turn greater release of air pollutants, including carbon dioxide.
However, PHMSA has discussed in the RIA that the increased integrity of
the tank cars, designed to reduce the risk of release of high-hazard
flammable materials to the environment, causing air and likely water
pollution, positively outweighs a relatively small increase in air
pollution.
While the nature of the phase-out is intended to minimize the
unintended impacts of an accelerated phase-out, increased manufacture
of replacement rail tank cars could nevertheless result in greater
short-term release of greenhouse gases and use of resources needed to
make the new tank cars, such as steel. PHMSA, however, concluded that
these possible temporary increases are far outweighed by the increased
safety and integrity of each railcar and each train and the decreased
risk of release of crude oil and ethanol to the environment. The phase
out of older tank cars will not create a solid waste burden on the
environment because they will be recycled. Any environmental burdens
will be limited to energy inputs and pollutants from the recycling and
manufacture processes, which we do not expect to be significant since
in the absence of this rule, the same number of tank cars would
eventually be built. The only difference under this rule is that the
same number of tank cars will be built to the new standard.
Alternative of 2018 Removal of DOT-111 Tank Cars From Crude Oil and
Ethanol Service
If PHMSA were to select the provisions of this additional Final EA
alternative, we recognize that some safety and environmental risks
could be reduced in the short-term. For example, due to improved
integrity of new tank cars, such as puncture resistance and thermal
protection, rail incidents would be less likely to result in release of
crude oil or ethanol to the environment. Also, the releases that still
occurred would likely be smaller in volume. These avoided or decreased
release amounts would avoid increased water, soil, and air pollution.
PHMSA recognizes that derailment of HHFTs has resulted in water, soil,
and air pollution. Such releases also pose risk to human health and
public safety.
PHMSA examined and performed a quantitative analysis of a 2018
phase-out alternative in this Final EA, which includes an expedited
phase out of all DOT-111s in PG I and PG II service. PHMSA used this
alternative, which requires removal from service of all DOT-111 tank
cars for transport of crude oil and ethanol by the end of 2018, as a
quantitative baseline. In its analysis of the full impacts of removal
of DOT-111 tank cars by the end of 2018, PHMSA found disadvantages to
this alternative. As explained more specifically in Appendix A, the
transportation capacity lost to the retirement of the DOT-111 tank cars
would likely cause crude and ethanol transportation to be shifted to
truck/highway transportation (i.e. ``modal shift''). Trucks already
figure prominently into the supply chains for both crude \119\ and
ethanol,\120\ although so far there has been limited evidence of large
scale long-haul shipments of crude oil from wells to refineries.\121\ A
shortage of rail tank cars would make highway transportation a more
viable option for long-haul transportation. Highway transportation is
more polluting both in terms of air pollutants and hazardous materials
released due to incidents. Furthermore, highway transportation has
higher fatality and injury rates. PHMSA's analysis concluded that a
2018 removal of the DOT-111s would cause increased air pollutant
emissions in 2019, for both rail and truck modes of transportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\119\ See: Davies, Phil (2013). ``Busting bottlenecks in the
Bakken.'' Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/busting-bottlenecks-in-the-bakken. Over 70 percent of crude oil in North Dakota is
shipped to a pipeline or rail terminal by truck.
\120\ See: Bevil, Kris (2011). ``By Train, By Truck, or By Boat:
How Ethanol Moves and Where it's Going.'' Ethanol Producer Magazine.
The percentage of ethanol moved by long-haul truck is believed to be
20 percent.
\121\ See: Sheppard, David, and Nichols, Bruce (2011).
``Insight: Oil Convoy Blues: Trucking Game Foils Crude Traders.''
New York: Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/14/us-cushing-trucks-idUSTRE 79D0OP 20111014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Furthermore, PHMSA had to consider the costs of such a drastic
regulatory change to industry, energy production, and the public.
Comments submitted by industry indicated that costs imposed by a 2018
complete removal of the entire DOT 111 fleet would be prohibitive and
that such an action would potentially disrupt supply, which could
affect the public in the form of higher energy prices. Further, such a
sudden removal would greatly constrain the capacity of manufacture and
repair required for other tank cars, potentially resulting in shortages
for transport of other commodities.
PHMSA weighed the benefit of reductions in releases from rail
accidents that would result from the 2018 removal of DOT-111 tank cars
against increased air pollution and highway accidents, often resulting
in releases, that would result from a temporary modal shift, along with
extremely high cost to industry and the public, and the other
regulatory provisions in this rulemaking that are also aimed at
reducing derailments and releases. Upon consideration of all these
factors, PHMSA recognizes the need to upgrade the rail car fleet, but
found that a targeted phase-out of the DOT-111 tank cars was the most
prudent and protective approach.
4. Discussion of Environmental Impacts in Response to Comments
PHMSA received various comments on this rulemaking. Some commented
directly on the NPRM EA, while others commented more generally on the
rule while focusing their comments on environmental matters. We have
tried to address both types of comments here.
Rail Capacity/Modal Shift/Rail Tank Car Phase-Out
The RSI's comments suggested that PHMSA's proposed retrofit
schedule could result in modal shift. RSI suggested that from 2015-
2025, over-the-road trucks needed to replace railcar capacity would
emit 6.41 million more tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) than the
railcars would have had they been permitted to remain in service. PHMSA
received similar comments from Archer Daniels Midland (ADM).

[[Page 26741]]

The selected alternative considers comments submitted by the RSI
with regard to the retrofit capacity of rail yards and the build
capacity of tank car manufacturers. PHMSA has carefully considered
retrofit and build capacity, and concluded that its selected
alternative will not result in any shift to highway transportation due
to shortages of compliant tank cars. PHMSA agrees that shifting
transportation to highway would increase emissions and the risk of
incidents due to higher rates of highway traffic incidents than rail
incidents. However, under this final rule, as explained in more detail
below, PHMSA concluded that there will not be any losses of capacity
from retrofits or excessive retirements of tank cars that will lead to
a backlog of new tank car orders (such a backlog would represent lost
rail car capacity that would require more shipments by truck), and thus
no modal shift will occur under the final rule; the final rule was
carefully drafted to avoid modal shift.
Nonetheless, in order to better address comments received in
response to the NPRM (relating to environmental matters) and NPRM EA,
PHMSA simulated the impact of a schedule in which DOT-111 tank cars in
PG I and PG II service would be phased out by 2018, which was proposed
in the NPRM and supported by some environmental organizations. The full
details of this analysis are provided in Appendix A. Such a scenario
would lead to increased retirements and unplanned new orders of tank
cars. Initially, these new orders plus existing planned orders would
exceed the build capacity of rail car manufacturers. Because crude oil
and ethanol producers would still need to move their products, the lack
of suitable tank cars would likely result in modal shift from rail
transportation to highway transportation, which would result in greater
air pollution. The backlog of orders would be eliminated after 2019,
which would result in a shift back to rail, eliminating related
increased emissions. Under the selected alternative, a mode shift does
not occur. Table EA2 provides PHMSA's analysis of increased emissions
resulting from a 2018 phase-out of DOT-111 tank cars. As stated
previously, due to increased modal shifts that would be necessitated,
we expect magnified pollution and negative safety effects for phase-
outs prior to 2018.

Table EA2--Excess Emissions of Criteria Air Pollutants and Carbon Dioxide Under 2018 Phase-Out Schedule of DOT-
111 Tank Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hydrocarbons
(HC, including Carbon Oxides of Particulate Carbon
Year/tons volatile for monoxide (CO) nitrogen matter (PM) dioxide (CO2)
truck) (NOX)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015......................... 0 0 0 0 0
2016......................... 0 0 0 0 0
2017......................... 0 0 0 0 0
2018......................... 0 0 0 0 0
2019......................... 2,584 9,931 34,633 1,571 4,759,930
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RSI cites analyses prepared for them by the Brattle Group (a
consulting firm specializing in economic analysis) estimating that
replacing lost rail capacity in 2017 with truck transportation for
crude oil and ethanol shipments in North America would require
approximately 20,000 trucks carrying over 370,000 truckloads on North
American highways. In 2018, the year in which the loss of capacity
would be fully felt, RSI further cites the Brattle Group, indicating
that replacement transportation would require approximately 70,000
trucks carrying almost 1.6 million loads and that over the road (OTR)
truckers spilled 58 percent more total liquid hazardous material from
2002-2009 than railroads per year and per billion ton-miles. AAR has
also expressed concern that, ``[t]he result would be the diversion of
traffic off the rail network and onto less safe and less
environmentally friendly modes of transportation.'' AAR also commented
that rail is an environmentally superior form of transportation.
PHMSA's calculations for increased emissions were lower than those
provided by RSI. In particular, PHMSA's selected alternative would
result in no shift to highway transportation. PHMSA's analysis also
does not concur with RSI that the less stringent phase-out schedule in
the selected alternative would lead to 6.41 million additional tons of
CO2 emissions. PHMSA disagrees with RSI's projections for
the number of additional trucks needed to account for lost DOT-111
capacity. PHMSA's analysis indicates that 20,000 additional trucks
(i.e., the amount cited by RSI as required to replace lost rail
capacity in 2017) would be capable of handling about half of all the
crude and ethanol shipped in DOT-111 tank cars in a given year.\122\
Moreover 70,000 trucks (i.e., the amount cited by RSI as required to
replace lost rail capacity in 2018) could handle 123,375 ton miles of
crude and ethanol, or almost all of the total crude and ethanol ton
miles Brattle provided for 2014.\123\ Given these facts, PHMSA
calculates that RSI overestimates the number of additional trucks
needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\122\ If one assumes that a semi-truck/tank-trailer and semi-
truck/trailer combinations are both able to haul about 47,000 pounds
of cargo 150,000 miles per year, divided by 2 to account for empty
return trips, or 1.76 million ton-miles per year. Currently, about
96.5 percent (just over 40,000 million ton miles) of ethanol
transported by rail is in DOT-111 tank cars, and 29 percent of crude
oil (or about 30,000 million ton miles) by rail is in DOT-111 tanks
cars. An additional 20,000 trucks could handle 35,250 million ton
miles (1.76 million x 20,000) of hazardous material, and 70,000
trucks could handle 123,375 million ton miles (1.76 million x
70,000) of hazardous material.
\123\ Brattle concludes 85,062 million ton miles of crude oil in
2014 and 46,243 million ton miles of ethanol. PHMSA concludes that
70,000 trucks would be able to transport 94 percent of that volume.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD), Clean Water Action,
Delaware River Keeper, Earthjustice, Environment New Jersey, and Powder
River Basin Resource Council have all expressed concern about the
integrity of the DOT-111 tank cars and propose that these cars be
removed from service immediately, as opposed to PHMSA's planned phase-
out.\124\ As discussed above, PHMSA recognizes commenters' concerns
regarding DOT-111 phase-out schedule, but PHMSA deemed this option to
be impractical because of negative impacts from modal shift, including
increased incidents resulting in release of hazardous materials and
increased fatalities, as illustrated in Tables EA3 and EA4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\124\ The Friends of the Gorge and the Adirondack Mountain Club
were co-commenters with CBD.

[[Page 26742]]

Table EA3--Additional Hazardous Material Incidents and Releases From
Modal Shift
[2018 DOT-111 Tank Car Phase-Out Scenario]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Year Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015.......................................... 2015 2015
2016.......................................... 2016 2016
2017.......................................... 2017 2017
2018.......................................... 2018 2018
2019.......................................... 2019 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table EA4--Additional Fatalities and Injuries From Mode Shift
[2018 DOT-111 Tank Car Phase-Out Scenario]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Fatalities Injuries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015.......................................... 0.00 0.00
2016.......................................... 0.00 0.00
2017.......................................... 0.00 0.00
2018.......................................... 0.00 0.00
2019.......................................... 94.68 2,359.83
------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA expects additional air emissions, spills and fatalities in
2019 as a result of the shift to highway transportation. Our analyses
indicate that the amendments in this final rule will actually realize
much greater savings in these areas over the long-term. The RIA
prepared for this final rule examines a period from 2015 to 2034, but
benefits would continue to accrue beyond this analysis period. We have
therefore decided that it is not prudent to modify the regulation in
response to these comments.
NEPA Requirements
The CBD and ADM commented that an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS), as opposed to an EA, is required under NEPA. PHMSA determined
that an EA was appropriate to determine whether to prepare an EIS or a
FONSI. An EIS is necessary when a proposed action will have significant
environmental impacts. At the outset, PHMSA performed a NEPA best
practice environmental checklist analysis for this rulemaking,
examining all facets of the environment that could potentially be
impacted. This rulemaking does not authorize and will not result in new
construction of rail infrastructure or new transportation of hazardous
materials. These factors, which impact the environment, are already in
existence and are ongoing. Since the primary purpose and function of
the rulemaking is to decrease the already existing risk of releases of
crude oil and ethanol, the rulemaking does not result in any
significant new environmental impacts. Based on the analysis completed
for this EA, PHMSA does not agree that this rulemaking could result in
significant environmental impacts that would require the preparation of
an EIS, and therefore PHMSA intends to issue a FONSI.
The CBD noted in its comments that PHMSA should initiate an
Endangered Species Act consultation with FWS/NMFS in order to fully
assess areas where HHFTs have the potential to impact listed species
and critical habitat. As stated above, the intent of this rule is to
prevent releases of hazardous chemicals to the environment. This
rulemaking is not authorizing any new impacts to protected species or
habitats, as rail transportation of hazardous materials and high-hazard
flammable material is ongoing and rail infrastructure already exists.
Increased regulation of ongoing transportation of hazardous materials
will not jeopardize continued existence of any species and will not
result in the destruction of habitat. Therefore, no consultation is
required. While the routing provisions included in this rulemaking
could alter the routes HHFTs take, the ``Rail Risk Analysis Factors''
that rail operators must consider in selecting routes include the
consideration of ``environmentally sensitive and significant areas.''
See Appendix D to Part 172. Therefore, PHMSA concluded that improved
routing selection and the eventual universal use of safer tank cars
will result in a reduction in risk to endangered species.
Riverkeeper 2266 stated its concerns regarding potential oil spills
entering the Hudson River. Riverkeeper asserted that the
characteristics of the River would make cleanup especially difficult
and complicated. Riverkeeper 2266 also commented that spills could hurt
the tourist-based economy, wildlife, and riverfront communities.
Lastly, Riverkeeper 2266 and others expressed concerns that PHMSA's new
safety standards only apply to trains of 20 cars or more with Class 3
flammable liquids, even though devastating effects to the environment
could also occur for trains with 19 or fewer cars.
In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to define HHFT to mean a single train
carrying 20 or more carloads of a Class 3 flammable liquid. This
definition aligns with the definition of ``Key Train'' in OT-55N. Many
commenters raised concerns regarding the ambiguity of this definition
as it would be applied to crude oil and ethanol trains and suggested
that this definition would inadvertently include manifest trains that
did not pose as high a risk as unit trains. PHMSA subsequently revised
the definition of HHFT to ``20 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3
flammable liquid in a continuous block or a single train carrying 35 or
more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid throughout the
train.'' While the point regarding the potential environmental impacts
associated the transport 19 or less tank cars of flammable liquid cars
is valid, the focus of the final rule is on trains in which the
flammable liquid cars are concentrated in large blocks.
Environmental Justice and Other Environmental Factors
Commenters, such as ADM, Clean Water Action Pennsylvania, and
Earthjustice commented that an Environmental Justice (EJ) assessment
should be included in the EA. Earthjustice's \125\ comments alleged
that low income and minority communities would face double the impact
of other communities because many occur within one-mile blast zones of
train tracks subject to this rulemaking. Both Earthjustice and Clean
Water Action (Pennsylvania) also commented that PHMSA should have
performed a complete EJ assessment for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\125\ Forest Ethics, Sierra Club, NRDC and Oil Change
International were co-commenters with Earthjustice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This rulemaking has no role in the siting of already existing
railroad lines. This rulemaking also does not authorize new hazardous
materials transportation; these activities are ongoing. The purpose of
the rulemaking is to decrease the risk of release of crude oil and
ethanol. PHMSA has calculated in the RIA that consideration of the Rail
Risk Analysis Factors will reduce risk of release in general,
especially in densely populated areas, as railroad operators will now
be required to consider population density, places of congregation, and
presence of passenger traffic, among other factors to encourage
selection of the most prudent routes. PHMSA, therefore, does not agree
that there is potential for this rulemaking to have a disparate impact
on low income or minority populations. Consideration of the Rail Risk
Analysis Factors will reduce risk of release in densely populated areas
where low income and minority populations are likely to be located.
This rulemaking also has no impact on historic preservation or
wetlands and floodplains because it does not authorize any new
construction. It is also not reasonable that this rulemaking would
indirectly or cumulatively result in new construction. It simply
attempts to make existing hazardous materials

[[Page 26743]]

transportation safer for the environment and public safety.
5. Agencies Consulted
PHMSA worked closely with the FRA, EPA, and DHS/TSA in the
development of this final rulemaking for technical and policy guidance.
PHMSA also considered the views expressed in comments to the ANPRM and
NPRM submitted by members of the public, state and local governments,
and industry.
6. Conclusion
The provisions of this rule build on current regulatory
requirements to enhance the transportation safety and security of
shipments of hazardous materials transported by rail, thereby reducing
the risks of release of crude oil and ethanol and consequent
environmental damage. PHMSA has calculated that this rulemaking will
decrease current risk of release of crude oil and ethanol to the
environment. Therefore, PHMSA finds that there are no significant
environmental impacts associated with this final rule.

Appendix A

Environmental Assessment Supporting Calculations

PHMSA performed calculations to analyze the additional air
emissions, hazardous materials incidents, quantity of hazardous
material spilled, fatalities, and injuries from two options to
phase-out DOT-111 rail tanks cars. As discussed, PHMSA calculated
these impacts to be minimal for the selected alternative because no
shift to highway transportation is anticipated.

Selected Alternative

The schedule for retrofitting DOT-111 and CPC-1232 tank cars and
mandating use of tank cars that comply with the new standards is not
expected to reduce tank car capacity for shipping crude and ethanol.
Consequently, the deleterious effects of shipments being shifted to
highway transportation on trucks will be avoided. The new tank car
standards and other provisions of the rule are expected to reduce
the risk of hazardous materials incidents, and the severity of those
incidents that do occur. As discussed under ``Selected alternative''
in Section 3 of the Final EA, this alternative is anticipated to
provide positive benefits for the environment and safety.

2018 Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars Alternative

The alternative of prohibiting use of all DOT-111 tank cars in
2018 is the scenario that PHMSA staff could envision as physically
possible that would both (a) negatively impact railroads and
shippers' ability to continue transport of crude oil and ethanol by
rail and (b) have the greatest chance of resulting in modal shift.
PHMSA calculates that a modal shift resulting from a decrease in the
number of tank cars authorized to transport flammable liquids,
notably crude oil and ethanol, would have significant deleterious
effects on safety and the environment. The evaluation of this
scenario assumes that there will be a sufficient number of trucks
and drivers to handle the additional volume of crude oil and
ethanol. Because it is unclear whether this additional trucking
capacity would actually be available, these results can be
considered an upper limit on potential environmental impacts.
Per ton-mile of transportation, cargo tank motor vehicles
(CTMVs) emit significantly higher levels of volatile organic
compounds, non-volatile hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, oxides of
nitrogen, carbon dioxide, and particulate matter than freight rail.
In addition, the fatality and injury rate per ton-mile from
accidents is significantly higher than from freight rail. In
estimating the size of this modal shift, PHMSA employs several key
assumptions.
1. There are approximately 33,000 DOT-111 tank cars in service
that transport high-hazard flammable material.
2. Rail tank car manufacturers have an annual build capacity of
roughly 24,000 cars.\126\ Manufacturers will not permanently
increase capacity to deal with short-run spikes in demand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\126\ RSI concluded that over 21,000 new deliveries of CPC-1232
tank cars will occur in 2014. In addition, over 600 new jacketed
DOT-111s were delivered in the first quarter of 2014. Based on these
two figures, PHMSA has concluded that build capacity is at least
24,000 cars per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Under this alternative, a total phase-out of DOT-111s would
occur by the end of 2018. Shippers would find alternative methods to
transport their products to account for any of the 33,000 DOT-111s
not replaced by this time.
4. Shippers or carriers will spread out replacing/removing from
service DOT-111 tank cars over time.
Please see the RIA prepared for this rule for additional
information on these assumptions.
Based on these assumptions, PHMSA estimated that at the end of
2018, there would be a backlog of 12,239 DOT-111 tank cars that
would not meet the retrofit deadline, but that these would be
replaced by new, compliant tank cars by the end of 2019. In the
meantime, their carrying capacity would shift to CTMVs. The capacity
and backlog of tank cars is presented in the table below.

Table EA5--DOT-111 Replacement Schedule, 2018 Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Backlog of DOT-
Year Initial DOT- Actual DOT-111s 111s replaced
111s replaced
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015...................................................... 32,831 0 32,831
2016...................................................... 0 4,413 28,418
2017...................................................... 0 7,941 20,477
2018...................................................... 0 8,238 12,239
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table EA 6 below shows the relative amounts of emissions in grams
per ton-mile for freight rail and CTMV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\127\ Kruse, C. J., Protopapas, A., and Olson, L. (2012). A
Modal Comparison of Domestic Freight Transportation Effects on the
General Public: 2001-2009. Arlington, VA: National Waterways
Foundation. Retrieved from http://nationalwaterwaysfoundation.org/study/FinalReportTTI.pdf.

Table EA6--Emission Rates by Mode, Grams per Million Ton Miles,\127\ 2018 Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HC (VOC for
Mode/Pollutant truck) CO NOX PM CO2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad*....................... 0.018201 0.055600 0.353600 0.010251 21.140000
Truck*.......................... 0.100000 0.370000 1.450000 0.060000 171.830000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 26744]]

PHMSA concluded that 47,000 million ton miles of ethanol would
be transported per year by rail between 2015 and 2018, and that
about 108,000 million ton miles of crude oil will be transported on
average per year. PHMSA concluded that about 96 percent of ethanol
transported by rail is currently shipped in DOT-111 tank cars, and
that about 29 percent of crude oil transported by rail is shipped in
these tank cars. Assuming these proportions in the hypothetical
scenario, DOT-111s would be used to transport about 45,300 million
ton miles of ethanol (96% x 47,000) and 31,500 million ton miles of
crude oil (29% x 108,000). All told, about 76,869 million ton miles
of crude and ethanol would be shipped in DOT-111 tank cars on
average per year, and each of the 32,831 DOT-111 tank cars in crude
and ethanol service would handle on average 1.7 million ton miles
per year. That is, the loss of each individual DOT-111 tank car
would require a shift of 1.7 million ton miles of crude or ethanol
per rail tank car to another mode.
Rail car manufacturers have excess capacity for replacing some,
but not all, of older DOT-111s. The backlog presented by a complete
DOT-111 phase out by 2018 translates into lost DOT-111 rail-car
capacity that would have to be handled by CTMVs. Table EA7 equates
the lost capacity to ton-miles shifted to CTMV. It is important to
note that these are the maximum amounts of ton-miles that could be
shifted to truck. These amounts will be constrained by the
availability of trucks and drivers to handle these additional
loads.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\128\ An estimate of the number of trucks needed can be
calculated using the following assumptions and parameters:
1. A standard semi-truck weighs 20,000 pounds, a tank trailer
weighs about 13,000 pounds, and the maximum gross vehicle weight
rating for a tractor-trailer is 80,000 pounds. Each truck can
transport up to 47,000 pounds of ethanol or crude oil.
2. A fully utilized tractor trailer travels up to 500 miles per
day for up to 300 days per year, or a total of 150,000 miles per
year.
3. Trucks will make return trips empty, so their maximum annual
transport capacity is halved.
A typical semi-truck/tank-trailer combination can transport up
to 1.7652 million ((((47,000 x 150,000) / 2,000) / 2) / 1,000,000)
ton miles of crude or ethanol per year. A mode shift of 15,200
million ton miles would require an additional 8,861 trucks. This is
a relatively small addition to the current number of such vehicle
combinations currently operating. PHMSA concluded that the
availability of trucks is unlikely to constrain the amount of crude
oil and ethanol that could be shifted to highway transportation.

Table EA7--Ton-Miles of Crude and Ethanol Shifted to CTMV, 2018 Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent DOT-
111 ton miles Total DOT-111 DOT-111 ton-
Year shifted to ton miles miles shifted
CTMV to CTMV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016............................................................ 0.0 76,869 0
2017............................................................ 0.0 76,869 0
2018............................................................ 0.0 76,869 0
2019............................................................ 37.28 76,869 28,655.75
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA applied the ton-miles shifted to CTMV presented in Table
EA7 to the emissions per ton-mile presented in Table EA6 to
calculate the additional emissions that result from constraining
rail car capacity by an expedited 2018 retirement schedule for DOT-
111s.

Table EA8--Additional Tons of Emissions From Mode Shift, 2018 Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HC (VOC for
Year/Tons truck) CO NOX PM CO2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015............................ 0 0 0 0 0
2016............................ 0 0 0 0 0
2017............................ 0 0 0 0 0
2018............................ 0 0 0 0 0
2019............................ 2,584 9,931 34,633 1,571 4,759,930
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHMSA examined the additional hazardous material incidents and
quantities of hazardous material released that could occur from a
mode shift to CTMVs. Table EA9 below presents the spill rates and
gallons of hazardous material released per million ton miles by rail
and highway modes.

Table EA9--Hazardous Materials Incident and Spill Rates per Million Ton-
Miles, 2018 Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number gallons
Number spills/ spilled/
Mode million ton- million ton-
miles miles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad................................ 0.000339 4.889386
Truck................................... 0.001371 10.411803
Difference.............................. 0.001032 5.522417
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Multiplying the annual the ton-miles (the ``Percent DOT-111 Ton-
Miles Shifted to CTMV'' column) presented in Table EA7 by the
``difference'' row for hazardous material incident and release rates
in Table EA9 yields the additional number of hazardous material
incidents and quantity of hazardous material incident released,
which are presented in Table EA10. PHMSA concluded that a shift to
truck for transporting crude oil and ethanol that would have been
transported in DOT-111 tank cars would lead to nearly 30 additional
hazardous material incidents and over 158,000 additional gallons of
hazardous material per incident released in 2019.

[[Page 26745]]

Table EA10--Anticipated Additional Hazardous Material Incidents and
Releases From Mode Shift, 2018 Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Spills Gallons
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015.................................... 0 0
2016.................................... 0 0
2017.................................... 0 0
2018.................................... 0 0
2019.................................... 29.57 158,249
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lastly, PHMSA examined the additional transportation fatalities,
and injuries that could occur from a mode shift to CTMVs. Table EA11
presents accident, fatality, and injury rates per million ton mile
for rail and CTMV.

Table EA11--Additional Accident, Injury, and Fatality Rates per Million
Ton Miles by Mode,\129\ 2018 Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Additional
Mode fatalities injuries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad................................ 0.000525 0.005183
Truck................................... 0.003829 0.087534
Difference.............................. 0.003304 0.082351
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Multiplying the ton-miles presented in Table EA7 (the ``Percent
DOT-111 Ton-Miles Shifted to CTMV'' column) by the ``difference''
row for fatality and injury rates in Table EA11 yields the
anticipated additional number of fatalities and injuries from truck
transportation instead of rail transportation, which are presented
in Table EA12. PHMSA concluded that a shift to truck for
transporting crude oil and ethanol that would have been transported
in DOT-111 tank cars would lead to nearly 95 additional deaths and
about 2,300 additional injuries in 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\129\ Kruse, C. J., Protopapas, A., and Olson, L. (2012). A
Modal Comparison of Domestic Freight Transportation Effects on the
General Public: 2001-2009. Arlington, VA: National Waterways
Foundation. Retrieved from http://nationalwaterwaysfoundation.org/study/FinalReportTTI.pdf

Table EA12--Additional Fatalities and Injuries From Modal Shift, 2018
Phase-Out of DOT-111 Tank Cars
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Fatalities Injuries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015.................................... 0 0
2016.................................... 0 0
2017.................................... 0 0
2018.................................... 0 0
2019.................................... 94.68 2,359.83
------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Privacy Act

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the
public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these
comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.

I. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis

Under Executive Order 13609, agencies must consider whether the
impacts associated with significant variations between domestic and
international regulatory approaches are unnecessary or may impair the
ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally.
In meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues, regulatory approaches developed
through international cooperation can provide equivalent protection to
standards developed independently while also minimizing unnecessary
differences.
Similarly, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-39), as
amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Public Law 103-465),
prohibits Federal agencies from establishing any standards or engaging
in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. For purposes of these requirements,
Federal agencies may participate in the establishment of international
standards, so long as the standards have a legitimate domestic
objective, such as providing for safety, and do not operate to exclude
imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
PHMSA participates in the establishment of international standards
in order to protect the safety of the American public, and we have
assessed the effects of the proposed rule to ensure that it does not
cause unnecessary obstacles to foreign trade. Accordingly, this
rulemaking is consistent with Executive Order 13609 and PHMSA's
obligations under the Trade Agreement Act, as amended.
For further discussion on the impacts of harmonization see the
``Harmonization'' portion of ``Miscellaneous Relevant Comments''
Section of this rulemaking.

J. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking

This final rule is published under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
5103(b), which authorizes the Secretary of

[[Page 26746]]

Transportation to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation,
including security, of hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate,
and foreign commerce.'' The amendments in this rule address safety and
security vulnerabilities regarding the transportation of hazardous
materials in commerce.

K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in
April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of
this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the
Unified Agenda.

L. Executive Order 13211

Executive Order 13211 requires Federal agencies to prepare a
Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' 66
FR 28355, May 22, 2001. Under the Executive Order, a ``significant
energy action'' is defined as any action by an agency (normally
published in the Federal Register) that promulgates, or is expected to
lead to the promulgation of, a final rule or regulation (including a
notice of inquiry, advance NPRM, and NPRM) that (1)(i) is a significant
regulatory action under Executive Order 12866 or any successor order
and (ii) is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy; or (2) is designated by the
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a
significant energy action.
PHMSA has evaluated this action in accordance with Executive Order
13211. See the environmental assessment section for a more thorough
discussion of environmental impacts and the supply, distribution, or
use of energy. PHMSA has determined that this action will not have a
significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy. Consequently, PHMSA has determined that this regulatory action
is not a ``significant energy action'' within the meaning of Executive
Order 13211.

XI. Regulatory Text

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 171

Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste,
Imports, Incorporation by reference, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

49 CFR Part 172

Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste, Labeling,
Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Security measures.

49 CFR Part 173

Hazardous materials transportation, Packaging and containers,
Radioactive materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Uranium.

49 CFR part 174

Hazardous materials transportation, Rail carriers, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

49 CFR Part 179

Hazardous materials transportation, Incorporation by reference,
Railroad safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Final Rule

In consideration of the foregoing, we are amending title 49,
chapter I, subchapter C, as follows:

PART 171--GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 171 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; Pub. L. 101-410 section
4 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Pub. L. 104-121, sections 212-213; Pub. L.
104-134, section 31001; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
2. In 171.7, redesignate paragraphs (k)(2) through (4) as (k)(3)
through (5) and add new paragraph (k)(2) to read as follows:

Sec. 171.7 Reference material.

* * * * *
(k) * * *
(2) AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section C--
III, Specifications for Tank Cars, Specification M-1002 (AAR
Specifications for Tank Cars), Appendix E, Design Details, implemented
April 2010; into Sec. Sec. 179.202-9, and 179.202-12(f).
* * * * *

0
3. In Sec. 171.8 definitions of ``High-hazard flammable train'' and
``High-hazard flammable unit train'' are added in alphabetical order to
read as follows:

Sec. 171.8 Definitions.

* * * * *
High-hazard flammable train (HHFT) means a single train
transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid
in a continuous block or a single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank
cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid throughout the train consist.
High-hazard flammable unit train (HHFUT) means a single train
transporting 70 or more loaded tank cars containing Class 3 flammable
liquid.
* * * * *

PART 172--HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION, TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY PLANS

0
4. The authority citation for part 172 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 44701; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
5. In Sec. 172.820:
0
a. In paragraph (a)(2), remove the word ``or'' from the end;
0
b. In paragraph (a)(3), remove the period and add ``; or'' to the end;
and
0
c. Add paragraphs (a)(4) and (b)(1)(i) and (ii).
The additions read as follows:

Sec. 172.820 Additional planning requirements for transportation by
rail.

(a) * * *
(4) A high-hazard flammable train (HHFT) as defined in Sec. 171.8
of this subchapter.
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) A rail carrier subject to additional planning requirements of
this section based on paragraph (a)(4) of this section, must complete
the initial process by March 31, 2016, using data for the six month
period from July 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015; or
(ii) A rail carrier subject to additional planning requirements of
this section based on paragraph (a)(4) of this section, must complete
the initial process by March 31, 2016, using data for all of 2015,
provided the rail carrier indicates in their initial analysis that it
has chosen this option.
* * * * *

PART 173--SHIPPERS--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND
PACKAGINGS

0
6. The authority citation for part 173 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
7. Section 173.41 is added to subpart B to read as follows:

Sec. 173.41 Sampling and testing program for unrefined petroleum-
based products.

(a) General. Unrefined petroleum-based products offered for

[[Page 26747]]

transportation must be properly classed and described as prescribed in
Sec. 173.22, in accordance with a sampling and testing program, which
specifies at a minimum:
(1) A frequency of sampling and testing that accounts for any
appreciable variability of the material (e.g., history, temperature,
method of extraction [including chemical use], location of extraction,
time of year, length of time between shipments);
(2) Sampling prior to the initial offering of the material for
transportation and when changes that may affect the properties of the
material occur (i.e., mixing of the material from multiple sources, or
further processing and then subsequent transportation);
(3) Sampling methods that ensure a representative sample of the
entire mixture, as offered, is collected;
(4) Testing methods that enable classification of the material
under the HMR;
(5) Quality control measures for sample frequencies;
(6) Duplicate sampling methods or equivalent measures for quality
assurance;
(7) Criteria for modifying the sampling and testing program; and
(8) Testing or other appropriate methods used to identify
properties of the mixture relevant to packaging requirements (e.g.,
compatibility with packaging, identifying specific gravity for filling
packages).
(b) Certification. Each person who offers a hazardous material for
transportation shall certify, as prescribed by Sec. 172.204 of this
subchapter, that the material is offered for transportation in
accordance with this subchapter, including the requirements prescribed
by paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) Documentation, retention, review, and dissemination of program.
The sampling and testing program must be documented in writing (i.e.
hardcopy or electronic file thereof) and must be retained for as long
as the sampling and testing program remains in effect, or a minimum of
one year. The sampling and testing program must be reviewed at least
annually and revised and/or updated as necessary to reflect changed
circumstances. The most recent version of the sampling and testing
program must be available to the employees who are responsible for
implementing it. When the sampling and testing program is updated or
revised, all employees responsible for implementing it must be
notified, and the most recent version must be made available.
(d) Access by DOT to program documentation. Each person required to
develop and implement a sampling and testing program must maintain a
copy of the sampling and testing program documentation (or an
electronic file thereof) that is accessible at, or through, its
principal place of business, and must make the documentation available
upon request at a reasonable time and location to an authorized
official of the Department of Transportation.

0
8. In Sec. 173.241, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.241 Bulk packagings for certain low-hazard liquid and solid
materials.

* * * * *
(a) Rail cars: Class DOT 103, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115,
117, or 120 tank car tanks; Class 106 or 110 multi-unit tank car tanks;
and AAR Class 203W, 206W, and 211W tank car tanks. Additional
operational requirements apply to high-hazard flammable trains (see
Sec. 171.8 of this subchapter) as prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this
subchapter. Except as otherwise provided in this section, DOT
Specification 111 tank cars and DOT Specification 111 tank cars built
to the CPC-1232 industry standard are no longer authorized to transport
Class 3 (flammable liquids) in Packing Group III, for use in high-
hazard flammable train service, unless retrofitted to the DOT
Specification 117R retrofit standards or the DOT Specification 117P
performance standards provided in part 179, subpart D of this
subchapter.
(1) DOT Specification 111 tank cars and DOT Specification 111 tank
cars built to the CPC-1232 industry standard are no longer authorized
for use in high-hazard flammable train service unless retrofitted prior
to the dates in the following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 111 built to the
DOT 111 not CPC-1232 not
Packing group authorized on or authorized on or
after after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
III......................... May 1, 2025......... May 1, 2025.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Conforming retrofitted tank cars are to be marked ``DOT-117R.''
(3) Conforming performance standard tank cars are to be marked
``DOT-117P.''
* * * * *
0
9. In Sec. 173.242, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.242 Bulk packagings for certain medium hazard liquids and
solids, including solids with dual hazards.

* * * * *
(a) Rail cars: Class DOT 103, 104, 105, 109, 111, 111, 112, 114,
115, 117, or 120 tank car tanks; Class 106 or 110 multi-unit tank car
tanks and AAR Class 206W tank car tanks. Additional operational
requirements apply to high-hazard flammable trains (see Sec. 171.8 of
this subchapter) as prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this subchapter.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, DOT Specification 111
tank cars and DOT Specification 111 tank cars built to the CPC-1232
industry standard are no longer authorized to transport Class 3
(flammable liquids) in Packing Group II and III, for use in high-hazard
flammable train service, unless retrofitted to the DOT Specification
117R retrofit standards, or the DOT Specification 117P performance
standards provided in part 179, subpart D of this subchapter.
(1) DOT Specification 111 tank cars and DOT Specification 111 tank
cars built to the CPC-1232 industry standard are no longer authorized
for use in high-hazard flammable train service unless retrofitted prior
to the dates in the following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 111 built to the
DOT 111 not CPC-1232 industry
Packing group authorized on or standard not
after authorized on or
after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
II.......................... May 1, 2023 July, 1 2023 (non-
(jacketed and non- jacketed).
jacketed). May 1, 2025
(jacketed).
III......................... May 1, 2025......... May 1, 2025.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 26748]]

(2) Conforming retrofitted tank cars are to be marked ``DOT-117R.''
(3) Conforming performance standard tank cars are to be marked
``DOT-117P.''
* * * * *
0
10. In Sec. 173.243, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.243 Bulk packaging for certain high-hazard liquids and dual-
hazard materials that pose a moderate hazard.

* * * * *
(a) Rail cars: Class DOT 103, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115,
117, or 120 fusion-welded tank car tanks; and Class 106 or 110 multi-
unit tank car tanks. Additional operational requirements apply to high-
hazard flammable trains (see Sec. 171.8 of this subchapter) as
prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this subchapter. Except as otherwise
provided in this section, DOT Specification 111 tank cars and DOT
Specification 111 tank cars built to the CPC-1232 industry standard are
no longer authorized to transport Class 3 (flammable liquids) in
Packing Group I, for use in high-hazard flammable train service, unless
retrofitted to the DOT Specification 117R retrofit standards or the DOT
Specification 117P performance standards provided in part 179, subpart
D of this subchapter.
(1) DOT Specification 111 tank cars and DOT Specification 111 tank
cars built to the CPC-1232 industry standard are no longer authorized
for use in high-hazard flammable train service unless retrofitted prior
to the dates in the following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 111 built to the
DOT 111 not CPC-1232 industry
Packing group authorized on or standard not
after authorized on or
after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I........................... January 1, 2017 (non- April 1, 2020 (non-
jacketed report jacketed).
trigger). May 1, 2025
(jacketed).
January 1, 2018 (non-
jacketed).
March 1, 2018
(jacketed).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Conforming retrofitted tank cars are to be marked ``DOT-117R.''
(3) Conforming performance standard tank cars are to be marked
``DOT-117P.''
* * * * *

PART 174--CARRIAGE BY RAIL

0
11. The authority citation for part 174 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
12. Section 174.310 is added to subpart G to read as follows:

Sec. 174.310 Requirements for the operation of high-hazard flammable
trains.

(a) Applicability. Each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable train (as defined in Sec. 171.8 of this subchapter) must
comply with each of the following additional safety requirements with
respect to each high-hazard flammable train that it operates:
(1) Routing. The additional planning requirements for
transportation by rail in accordance with part 172, subpart I of this
subchapter;
(2) Speed restrictions. All trains are limited to a maximum speed
of 50 mph. The train is further limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph
while that train travels within the limits of high-threat urban areas
(HTUAs) as defined in Sec. 1580.3 of this title, unless all tank cars
containing a Class 3 flammable liquid meet or exceed the DOT
Specification 117 standards, the DOT Specification 117P performance
standards, or the DOT Specification 117R retrofit standards provided in
part 179, subpart D of this subchapter.
(3) Braking. (i) Each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable train (as defined in Sec. 171.8 of this subchapter)
operating at a speed in excess of 30 mph must ensure the train is
equipped and operated with either a two-way end-of-train (EOT) device,
as defined in 49 CFR 232.5, or a distributed power (DP) system, as
defined in 49 CFR 229.5.
(ii) By January 1, 2021, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train (HHFUT) comprised of at least one tank car loaded
with a Packing Group I material, at a speed exceeding 30 mph must
ensure the train is equipped with ECP brakes that meet the requirements
of 49 CFR part 232, subpart G, except for buffer cars, and must be
operated in ECP brake mode as established in 49 CFR part 232, subpart
G.
(iii) By May 1, 2023, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train (HHFUT) not described in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of
this section, at a speed exceeding 30 mph must ensure the train is
equipped with ECP brakes that meet the requirements of 49 CFR part 232,
subpart G, except for buffer cars, and must be operated in ECP brake
mode as established in 49 CFR part 232, subpart G.
(iv) Each buffer car in an high-hazard flammable unit train that is
not equipped with ECP brakes will be counted in determining the
percentage of cars with effective and operative brakes during the
operation of the train, as required under 49 CFR 232.609.
(v) Alternate brake systems may be submitted for approval through
the processes and procedures outlined in 49 CFR part 232, subpart F.
(4) New tank cars. After October 1, 2015, tank cars manufactured
for use in a HHFT must meet:
(i) DOT Specification 117, or 117P performance standard in part
179, subpart D of this subchapter; or
(ii) An authorized tank specification as specified in part 173,
subpart F of this subchapter.
(5) Retrofit reporting Owners of non-jacketed DOT-111 tank cars in
PG I service in an HHFT, who are unable to meet the January 1, 2017,
retrofit deadline specified in Sec. 173.243 (a)(1) are required to
submit a report by March 1, 2017, to Department of Transportation. A
group representing owners may submit a consolidated report to the
Department of Transportation in lieu of individual reports from each
tank car owner. The report must include the following information
regarding the retrofitting progress:
(i) The total number of tank cars retrofitted to meet the DOT-117R
specification;
(ii) The total number of tank cars built or retrofitted to meet the
DOT-117P specification;
(iii) The total number of DOT-111 tank cars (including those built
to CPC-1232 industry standard) that have not been modified;
(iv) The total number of tank cars built to meet the DOT-117
specification; and
(v) The total number of tank cars built or retrofitted to a DOT-
117, 117R or 117P specification that are ECP brake ready or ECP brake
equipped.
(vi) Entities required to submit a report under this paragraph
shall submit subsequent follow-up reports containing the information
identified in this paragraph within 60 days of being notified by PHMSA
and FRA.
(b) [Reserved]

[[Page 26749]]

PART 179--SPECIFICATIONS FOR TANK CARS

0
13. The authority citation for part 179 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

Subpart D-Specifications for Non-Pressure Tank Car Tanks (Classes
DOT-111AW, 115AW, and 117AW)

0
14. The heading for subpart D is revised to read as set forth above.

0
15. The heading for Sec. 179.200 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 179.200 General specifications applicable to non-pressure tank
car tanks (Class DOT-111, DOT-117).

* * * * *
0
16. The heading for Sec. 179.200-1 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 179.200-1 Tank built under these specifications must meet the
applicable requirements in this part.

* * * * *

0
17. Sections 179.202 and 179.202-1 are added to read as follows:

Sec. 179.202 Individual specification requirements applicable to DOT-
117 tank car tanks.

Sec. 179.202-1 Applicability.

Each tank built under these specifications must conform to the
general requirements of Sec. 179.200 and the prescriptive standards in
Sec. Sec. 179.202-1 through 179.202-11, or the performance standard
requirements of Sec. 179.202-12.

0
18. Sections 179.202-3 through Sec. 179.202-13 are added to read as
follows:

Sec. 179.202-3 Approval to operate at 286,000 gross rail load (GRL).

A tank car may be loaded to a gross weight on rail of up to 286,000
pounds (129,727 kg) upon approval by the Associate Administrator for
Safety, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). See Sec. 179.13.

Sec. 179.202-4 Thickness of plates.

The wall thickness after the forming of the tank shell and heads
must be, at a minimum, 9/16 of an inch AAR TC-128 Grade B, normalized
steel, in accordance with Sec. 179.200-7(b).

Sec. 179.202-5 Tank head puncture resistance system.

The DOT-117 specification tank car must have a tank head puncture
resistance system in conformance with Sec. 179.16(c). The full height
head shields must have a minimum thickness of \1/2\ inch.

Sec. 179.202-6 Thermal protection system.

The DOT-117 specification tank car must have a thermal protection
system. The thermal protection system must conform to Sec. 179.18 and
include a reclosing pressure relief device in accordance with Sec.
173.31 of this subchapter.

Sec. 179.202-7 Jackets.

The entire thermal protection system must be covered with a metal
jacket of a thickness not less than 11 gauge A1011 steel or equivalent;
and flashed around all openings so as to be weather tight. A protective
coating must be applied to the exterior surface of a carbon steel tank
and the inside surface of a carbon steel jacket.

Sec. 179.202-8 Bottom outlets.

If the tank car is equipped with a bottom outlet, the handle must
be removed prior to train movement or be designed with protection
safety system(s) to prevent unintended actuation during train accident
scenarios.

Sec. 179.202-9 Top fittings protection.

The tank car tank must be equipped with top fittings protection
conforming to AAR Specifications for Tank Cars, appendix E paragraph
10.2.1 (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this subchapter).

Sec. 179.102-10 ECP brakes.

(a) By January 1, 2021, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, comprised of at least
one tank car loaded with a Packing Group I material must ensure the
train meets the ECP braking capability requirements as prescribed in
Sec. 174.310 of this subchapter.
(b) By May 1, 2023, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, not described in
paragraph (a) of this section must ensure the train meets the ECP
braking capability requirements as prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this
subchapter.
(c) Alternate brake systems may be submitted for approval through
the processes and procedures outlined in 49 CFR part 232, subpart F.

Sec. 179.202-11 Individual specification requirements.

In addition to Sec. 179.200, the individual specification
requirements are as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum plate
DOT specification Insulation Bursting thickness Test pressure Bottom outlet
pressure (psig) (Inches) (psig)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
117A100W................................. Optional.................... 500 9/16 100 Optional.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 179.202-12 Performance standard requirements.

(a) Approval. Design, testing, and modeling results must be
reviewed and approved by the Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety/Chief Safety Officer, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA),
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC 20590.
(b) Approval to operate at 286,000 gross rail load (GRL). In
addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, a tank
car may be loaded to a gross weight on rail of up to 286,000 pounds
(129,727 kg) upon approval by the Associate Administrator for Safety,
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). See Sec. 179.13.
(c) Puncture resistance. (1) Minimum side impact speed: 12 mph when
impacted at the longitudinal and vertical center of the shell by a
rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of 286,000 pounds.
(2) Minimum head impact speed: 18 mph when impacted at the center
of the head by a rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of
286,000 pounds.
(d) Thermal protection systems. The tank car must be equipped with
a thermal protection system. The thermal protection system must be
equivalent to the performance standard prescribed in Sec. 179.18 and
include a reclosing pressure relief device in accordance with Sec.
173.31 of this subchapter.
(e) Bottom outlet. If the tank car is equipped with a bottom
outlet, the handle must be removed prior to train movement or be
designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.
(f) Top fittings protection. The tank car tank must be equipped
with top fittings protection conforming to AAR Specifications for Tank
Cars, appendix E paragraph 10.2.1 (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this
subchapter).

[[Page 26750]]

(g) ECP brakes. (1) By January 1, 2021, each rail carrier operating
a high-hazard flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, comprised
of at least one tank car loaded with a Packing Group I material must
ensure the train meets the ECP braking capability requirements as
prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this subchapter.
(2) By May 1, 2023, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, not described in
paragraph (g)(1) of this section must ensure the train meets the ECP
braking capability requirements as prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this
subchapter.
(3) Alternate brake systems may be submitted for approval through
the processes and procedures outlined in 49 CFR part 232, subpart F.

Sec. 179.202-13 Retrofit standard requirements (DOT-117R).

(a) Applicability. Each tank retrofit under these specifications
must conform to the general requirements of Sec. 179.200 and the
prescriptive standards in Sec. 179.202-13, or the performance standard
requirements of Sec. 179.202-12.
(b) Approval to operate at 286,000 gross rail load (GRL). A tank
car may be loaded to a gross weight on rail of up to 286,000 pounds
(129,727 kg) upon approval by the Associate Administrator for Safety,
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). See Sec. 179.13.
(c) Thickness of plates. The wall thickness after forming of the
tank shell and heads must be, at a minimum, 7/16 of an inch, and
constructed with steel authorized by the HMR at the time of
construction.
(d) Tank head puncture resistance system. The DOT-117R
specification tank car must have a tank head puncture resistance system
in conformance with Sec. 179.16(c). The full height head shields must
have a minimum thickness of \1/2\ inch.
(e) Thermal protection system. The DOT-117R specification tank car
must have a thermal protection system. The thermal protection system
must conform to Sec. 179.18 and include a reclosing pressure relief
device in accordance with Sec. 173.31 of this subchapter.
(f) Jackets. The entire thermal protection system must be covered
with a metal jacket of a thickness not less than 11 gauge A1011 steel
or equivalent; and flashed around all openings so as to be weather
tight. The exterior surface of a carbon steel tank and the inside
surface of a carbon steel jacket must be given a protective coating.
(g) Bottom outlets. If the tank car is equipped with a bottom
outlet, the handle must be removed prior to train movement or be
designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.
(h) Top fittings protection. Existing tank car tanks may continue
to rely on the equipment installed at the time of manufacture.
(i) ECP brakes. (1) By January 1, 2021, each rail carrier operating
a high-hazard flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, comprised
of at least one tank car loaded with a Packing Group I material must
ensure the train meets the ECP braking capability requirements as
prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this subchapter.
(2) By May 1, 2023, each rail carrier operating a high-hazard
flammable unit train as defined in Sec. 171.8, not described in
paragraph (i)(1) of this section must ensure the train meets the ECP
braking capability requirements as prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this
subchapter.
(3) Alternate brake systems may be submitted for approval through
the processes and procedures outlined in 49 CFR part 232, subpart F.

Issued in Washington, DC on May 1, 2015, under the authority of
49 U.S.C. 5103(b).
Anthony R. Foxx,
Secretary of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2015-10670 Filed 5-7-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P