[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 171 (Thursday, September 3, 2015)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 53266-53272]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-21834]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 51
[Docket Nos. PRM-51-29; NRC-2012-0215]
Rescinding Spent Fuel Pool Exclusion Regulations
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a
petition for rulemaking (PRM), PRM-51-29, submitted by the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts (the Commonwealth or the petitioner). The petitioner
requested that, in light of information gained from the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident, the NRC rescind its regulations that make a generic
determination that spent fuel pool storage does not have a significant
environmental impact for nuclear power plant license renewal actions.
The NRC is denying the petition because the NRC finds no basis to
consider a rulemaking to revise such regulations.
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-51-29, is closed
on September 3, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0215 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may
obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of
the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0215. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are
provided in Section IV, Availability of Documents.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jenny Tobin, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-2328; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. The Petition
II. Reasons for Denial
III. Conclusion
IV. Availability of Documents
I. The Petition
On June 2, 2011, before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(ASLB), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Office of the Attorney
General, Environmental Protection Division, requested a waiver of the
NRC's generic determination regarding spent fuel pool (SFP) storage
impacts in the Pilgrim nuclear power plant (NPP) license renewal
proceeding. The petitioner also requested that, if the ASLB rejected
the Commonwealth's waiver, then the NRC should consider the waiver
request to be a PRM. Specifically, the petitioner requested that the
NRC's regulations in Sec. 51.71(d) \1\ of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) and table B-1 \2\ in appendix B to subpart
A of 10 CFR part 51 be revised because these regulations, according to
the petitioner, incorrectly
[[Page 53267]]
``generically classify the environmental impacts of high-density pool
storage of spent fuel as insignificant and thereby permit their
exclusion from consideration in environmental impact statements (EISs)
for renewal of nuclear power plant operating licenses.''
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\1\ 10 CFR 51.71 is entitled, ``Draft environmental impact
statement- contents''; Sec. 51.71(d) describes the analysis
required to be included in the draft EIS. For license renewal, the
draft supplemental EIS (1) relies on supporting information in
NUREG-1437, ``Generic Environmental Impact Statement [GEIS] for
License Renewal of Nuclear Plants,'' for generic issues and (2)
provides an analysis for the site-specific issues.
\2\ Table B-1 is entitled, ``Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues
for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants,'' and is the
codification of the GEIS. In table B-1, generic issues are
designated as ``Category 1'' issues and site-specific issues are
designated as ``Category 2'' issues.
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The petitioner asserted that the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
provides ``new and significant'' information that would affect the
NRC's impact analysis for SFPs in license renewal. The petitioner
contends that this event provides the justification for its request
that the NRC revise 10 CFR 51.71(d) and table B-1 in appendix B to
subpart A of 10 CFR part 51. The petitioner made the following three
claims:
1. The impacts from the onsite storage of spent fuel are
understated in NUREG-1437, ``Generic Environmental Impact Statement
[GEIS] for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants,'' because the Fukushima
Dai-ichi event indicates that the probability-weighted consequences of
a spent fuel pool accident are greater than what was considered in the
GEIS.
2. The impacts from the onsite storage of spent fuel are
understated in the license renewal GEIS analysis because the mitigation
measures implemented at NPPs after the September 11, 2001 (9/11),
terrorist attacks will not effectively mitigate the impacts of SFP
accidents, given the new information gained from the Fukushima accident
along with the NRC's policy of imposing secrecy on the mitigation
measures, and the mitigation measures were improperly relied upon in
the denial of PRM-51-10.\3\
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\3\ The request presented in the petition is essentially
identical to the request presented in another PRM submitted by the
Commonwealth on August 25, 2006, PRM-51-10 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML081890124) (although the basis for the request in each case is
unique). The State of California also submitted a petition, PRM-51-
12, in 2007 that was nearly identical to PRM-51-10. The NRC denied
PRM-51-10 and PRM-51-12 on August 8, 2008 (73 FR 46204). The NRC's
denials of these two petitions were upheld. New York v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 589 F.3d 551 (2nd Cir. 2009). The arguments
presented in support of PRM-51-10 are similar to those presented in
support of this petition.
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3. The license renewal GEIS impact analysis must address spent fuel
storage impacts on a site-specific, rather than generic basis.
On December 13, 2011, the ASLB denied the Commonwealth's waiver
petition (LBP-11-35). On March 8, 2012, in Memorandum and Order CLI-12-
06, the Commission affirmed the ASLB's denial of the waiver request and
granted the Commonwealth's alternative request that its waiver request
be treated as a PRM; the petition was referred to the NRC staff. The
NRC assigned the petition Docket No. PRM-51-29. The NRC published a
notice of receipt of the petition in the Federal Register (FR) on
December 19, 2012 (77 FR 75065), and supplemented the notice on
December 31, 2012 (77 FR 76952). The NRC did not request public comment
on the petition because sufficient information was available for the
NRC staff to form a technical opinion regarding the merits of the
petition, which is similar to the Commonwealth's previous petition
(PRM-51-10).
For the purposes of this review, the issues that the petitioner
raised about the Pilgrim NPP licensing proceeding were considered
generically, to the extent practicable. Other statements concerning the
Pilgrim NPP license renewal proceeding, including those concerns
related to the risk of severe reactor accidents, are beyond the scope
of this PRM.
II. Reasons for Denial
The NRC complies with Section 102(2) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) in its consideration of NPP license renewal
applications through the implementation of its environmental protection
regulations in 10 CFR part 51. In accordance with 10 CFR 51.95(c), the
NRC relies upon its environmental impact statement, NUREG-1437,
``Generic Environmental Impact Statement [GEIS] for License Renewal of
Nuclear Plants,'' as the basis for environmental reviews of NPP license
renewal actions. The NRC published the GEIS in May 1996 (1996 GEIS) and
then revised and updated it in June 2013 (2013 GEIS).\4\ The GEIS
reflects lessons learned and knowledge gained during previous license
renewal environmental reviews and describes the potential environmental
impacts of renewing the operating license of a NPP for up to an
additional 20 years. The findings of the GEIS have been codified into
table B-1, ``Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues for License Renewal of
Nuclear Power Plants,'' in appendix B to subpart A of 10 CFR part
51.\5\
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\4\ The NRC's regulations in 10 CFR 51.95(c) require, for the
consideration of potential environmental impacts of renewing a NPP's
operating license under 10 CFR part 54, that the NRC prepare an
environmental impact statement, which is a supplement to the 2013
GEIS. At the time the petition was filed in 2011, 10 CFR 51.95(c)
referred to the initial 1996 GEIS. The NRC published a notice of
issuance for the updated 2013 GEIS on June 20, 2013 (78 FR 37325).
\5\ See Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 100-
01, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983) (upholds use of generic environmental
analyses) and Massachusetts v. NRC, 708 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2013)
(``the Supreme Court has held that the NRC is permitted to make
generic determinations to meet its NEPA obligations'').
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The NRC classifies the license renewal issues described in the GEIS
as either generic or site-specific. Generic issues (i.e., environmental
impacts common to all nuclear power plants) are addressed in the GEIS.
Site-specific issues are addressed initially by the license renewal
applicant (i.e., a nuclear power plant licensee seeking a renewal of
its operating license under the NRC's license renewal regulations in 10
CFR part 54) in its environmental report, which is required by 10 CFR
51.45, and then by the NRC in a supplemental environmental impact
statement (SEIS) prepared for each license renewal application. The
plant-specific SEIS and the GEIS, together, constitute the NRC's NEPA
analysis for any given NPP license renewal action. In table B-1, the
``Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel'' issue has been classified as a
Category 1, or generic, issue with an impact level finding of
``small.'' The ``Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel'' finding states
``[t]he expected increase in the volume of spent fuel from an
additional 20 years of operation can be safely accommodated onsite
during the license renewal term with small environmental effects
through dry or pool storage at all plants.'' The designation of an
issue as a Category 1 (generic resolution) issue in the GEIS does not
mean that potential impacts cannot be considered in a license renewal
SEIS. If there are changes in plant operating parameters or new and
significant information pertinent to an evaluation of impacts, these
are considered during preparation of plant-specific supplements to the
NRC's license renewal GEIS.
Under 10 CFR part 51, neither the applicant's environmental report
nor the NRC's SEIS is required to address issues previously resolved
generically, as set forth in the GEIS and table B-1, absent new and
significant information. Section 51.92(a)(2) requires a supplement to
an EIS if there is new and significant information relevant to
environmental concerns and bearing on the license renewal or its
impacts. The NRC standard for the evaluation of ``new and significant''
information is that the information must present ``a seriously
different picture of the environmental impact of the proposed project
from what was previously envisioned.'' \6\ Therefore, to be
[[Page 53268]]
``significant,'' any information must lead to a conclusion seriously
different than that currently set forth in the GEIS.\7\
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\6\ Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri (Callaway
Plant, Unit 2), et al, CLI-11-05, 74 NRC 141, 167-68 (2011) quoting
Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-22, 50 NRC 3, 14 (1999) (alteration in
the original) (supporting citations omitted) (``To merit this
additional review, information must be both `new' and `significant,'
and it must bear on the proposed action or its impacts. As we have
explained, `[t]he new information must present a seriously different
picture of the environmental impact of the proposed project from
what was previously envisioned'.''); see also Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1987) (alteration added)
(supporting citations omitted) (``In making its determination
whether to supplement an existing EIS because of new information,
the [United States Army, Corps of Engineers] should consider `the
extent to which the new information presents a picture of the likely
environmental consequences associated with the proposed action not
envisioned by the original EIS'.''); Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir.1984) (supplementation required where new
information ``provides a seriously different picture of the
environmental landscape.'').
\7\ See Regulatory Guide 4.2, Supplement 1, Preparation of
Supplemental Environmental Reports for Applications to Renew Nuclear
Power Plant Operating Licenses, Chapter 5 (September 2000), and
Revision 1 published June 20, 2013 (78 FR 37324).
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The petitioner claimed that the Fukushima nuclear accident,
including possible damage to the SFP, provides new and significant
information that requires the NRC to reconsider its impact findings in
the license renewal GEIS. With respect to the March 2011 Fukushima
accident, a Japanese government report, issued in June 2011, found that
the Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit 4 spent fuel pool, the one believed to
have sustained the most serious damage, actually remained ``nearly
undamaged.'' \8\ The report noted that visual inspections found no
water leaks or serious damage to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.
Additionally, on April 25, 2014, the NRC issued a report entitled,
``NRC Overview of the Structural Integrity of the Spent Fuel Pool at
Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit 4.'' The results indicated that the structural
integrity of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool was sound.
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\8\ See ``Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial
Conference on Nuclear Safety-The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations,'' IV-91. English version available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/iaea_houkokusho_e.html,
last visited on July 15, 2015.
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With respect to the Fukushima event, the Commission has taken
action to mitigate beyond design basis external events, including
imposing new requirements to develop mitigating strategies for beyond
design basis external events, to install hardened severe accident
capable vents for boiling water reactors with Mark I and II
containments, to install reliable SFP water level instrumentation, to
re-evaluate seismic and flooding hazards, and to enhance emergency
preparedness capabilities.\9\
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\9\ Order EA-12-051, ``NRC Order on Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation,'' dated March 12, 2012; Order EA-12-049, ``NRC
Order on Mitigating Strategies,'' dated March 12, 2012; Order EA-13-
109, ``NRC Order on Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents,'' dated
June 6, 2013; 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters were issued on March 12, 2012,
to NPP licensees for seismic/flooding re-evaluations and assessing
emergency response capabilities.
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The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP in Japan led to
additional questions about the safe storage of spent fuel and whether
the NRC should require the expedited transfer of spent fuel from spent
fuel pools to dry cask storage at nuclear power plants in the United
States. This issue was identified by the NRC staff subsequent to the
``Near-Term Task Force [NTTF] Review of Insights from the Fukushima
Dai-ichi Accident'' report. At the time this issue was identified, the
NRC staff recognized that further study was needed to determine if
regulatory action was warranted. On October 9, 2013, the NRC released a
report, NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling
Water Reactor'' (the ``Spent Fuel Pool Study''). Additionally, the NRC
conducted a regulatory analysis in COMSECY-13-0030, ``Staff Evaluation
and Recommendation for Japan Lessons Learned Tier 3 Issue on Expedited
Transfer of Spent Fuel,'' dated November 12, 2013. This study and the
regulatory analysis concluded that SFPs are very robust structures with
large safety margins, and that regulatory actions to reduce the amount
of fuel in the spent fuel pool were not warranted. The Commission
subsequently concluded in SRM-COMSECY-13-0030, issued on May 23, 2014,
that further regulatory action need not be pursued in light of the low
risk of accident for SFP storage.
As will be discussed in more detail in response to Issues 1 and 2,
the event at Fukushima Dai-ichi does not provide any new and
significant information that would have materially altered the
conclusions in the GEIS, or in its underlying assumptions.\10\
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\10\ While the ASLB and Commission were principally concerned
with the petitioner's claims regarding reactor accidents, not SFP
accidents (both were held to be out of scope of the Pilgrim NPP
license renewal process), the condition of the SFP at Fukushima Dai-
ichi, Unit 4, did not support the petitioner's position that impacts
from the earthquake constituted new and significant information. In
LBP-11-35, the ASLB observed that the event at Fukushima did not
demonstrate new and significant information in the Pilgrim NPP
license renewal proceeding.
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In the petition, the Commonwealth raises three principal arguments;
each is summarized and evaluated in the subsequent discussion.
Issue 1: The Petitioner Asserts That the Impacts From the Onsite
Storage of Spent Fuel Are Understated in the License Renewal GEIS
Analysis Because the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Event Indicates That the
Probability-Weighted Consequences of a Spent Fuel Pool Accident Are
Greater Than What Was Considered in the GEIS
The petitioner argued that the Fukushima event provided new and
significant information challenging the generic conclusions in the
license renewal GEIS. Specifically, the petitioner claimed that ``the
Fukushima accident shows . . . there is a substantial conditional
probability of a pool fire during or following a reactor accident'' and
that ``[t]his relationship between a pool fire and a core melt accident
is not addressed in the License Renewal GEIS'' or the denial of PRM 51-
10 (73 FR 46204; August 8, 2008).\11\ Further, the petitioner
referenced a report by Dr. Gordon Thompson, ``New and Significant
Information from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident in the Context of
Future Operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant'' (the ``Thompson
Report''), to support its argument that the GEIS understates the
probability and impacts of an SFP accident.
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\11\ PRM at 27.
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NRC Response to Issue 1
The evaluation of the environmental impacts of the onsite storage
of spent nuclear fuel during the license renewal term, including
potential spent fuel pool accidents, was documented in the 1996 GEIS
and reaffirmed in the 2013 GEIS. Based on this evaluation, the ``Onsite
storage of spent nuclear fuel'' NEPA issue in table B-1 has been
classified as a Category 1 issue, or as a generic issue, with a
probability-weighted impact level finding of ``small.'' \12\
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\12\ For most table B-1 NEPA issues, the NRC determined whether
the impacts of license renewal would have a small, moderate, or
large environmental impact. The statements of consideration for the
June 20, 2013, rulemaking note that ``[a] small impact means that
the environmental effects are not detectable, or are so minor that
they would neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important
attribute of the resource. A moderate impact means that the
environmental effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not
destabilize, important attributes of the resource. A large impact
means that the environmental effects would be clearly noticeable and
would be sufficient to destabilize important attributes of the
resource'' (78 FR 37285).
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First, the petitioners' assertion that the Fukushima event revealed
a previously unconsidered aspect of spent fuel storage is incorrect. In
response to PRM-51-10, the Commission rejected a similar argument
regarding the probability ``that a severe accident at the
[[Page 53269]]
adjacent reactor would result in a SFP zirconium fire.'' \13\ The
Commission noted that a series of unlikely events must occur for a
severe reactor accident to lead to a spent fuel pool fire, including
the accident itself, ``[c]ontainment failure or bypass,'' ``[l]oss of
SFP cooling,'' ``[e]xtreme radiation levels precluding personnel
access,'' ``[i]nability to restart cooling or makeup systems due to
extreme radiation doses,'' ``[l]oss of most or all pool water through
evaporation,'' and ``[i]nitiation of a zirconium fire in the SFP.''
\14\ As a result, the Commission concluded that ``the probability of a
SFP zirconium fire due to a severe reactor accident and subsequent
containment failure would be well below the Petitioners' 2E-5 per year
estimate.'' \15\ The agency cited the denial of the PRM in the 2013
update to the GEIS.\16\ Therefore, the Commission has previously
considered the probability of a severe reactor accident causing a spent
fuel pool fire and found it to be low. Petitioners have not
demonstrated how information regarding the Fukushima accident provides
a seriously different picture of this issue.
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\13\ 73 FR at 46210.
\14\ Id.
\15\ Id.
\16\ 2013 GEIS at E-38.
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Moreover, the NRC has completed several studies of SFP safety,
including NUREG-1353, ``Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of
Generic Issue 82, `Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel
Pools';'' NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident
Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants;'' and NUREG-2161,
``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the
Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling-Water Reactor.'' These
studies have all concluded that SFPs continue to provide adequate
protection of public health and safety and are consistent with the
findings in the 2013 GEIS that onsite storage of spent fuel during the
license renewal term would have a small impact on the environment.
On September 19, 2014, the Commission published the ``continued
storage'' final rule (formerly known as the ``waste confidence rule,''
79 FR 56238) and its associated generic environmental impact statement
(NUREG-2157, ``Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel''), amending 10 CFR 51.23 to revise the
generic determination on the environmental impacts of continued storage
of spent nuclear fuel beyond the licensed life for operation of a
reactor. The final rule also makes conforming changes to the ``Onsite
storage of spent nuclear fuel'' issue finding under the ``Waste
Management'' section in table B-1 in appendix B to subpart A of 10 CFR
part 51. The final rule revises the finding to address both the impacts
of onsite storage during the license renewal term and adds generic
determinations of the environmental impacts of continued storage of
spent nuclear fuel beyond a reactor's licensed life (i.e., those
impacts that could occur as a result of the storage of spent nuclear
fuel at at-reactor or away-from-reactor sites after a reactor has
permanently shut down and until a permanent repository becomes
available). The continued storage final rule affirms that the
environmental impacts from the onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel,
including potential spent fuel pool accidents, are small during the
short-term storage timeframe (i.e., 60 years of continued storage after
permanent shut down, after which the continued storage rule assumes
that spent fuel will be moved to dry storage). This finding is
consistent with the finding of the license renewal GEIS. Further, the
Commission stated in the final rule that the direct and indirect
environmental impacts of continued storage can be analyzed generically
and that the impact determinations are not expected to differ from
those that would result from individual site-specific reviews for the
continued storage period. In reaching this result, the agency responded
to a comment that suggested that the underlying analyses did not
appropriately account for the possibility of a severe reactor accident
leading to a spent fuel pool accident.\17\ The NRC disagreed with this
comment, in part, based on the conservative aspects of the agency's
previous studies of SFP accidents.\18\
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\17\ NUREG-2161 at D-438 to D-440.
\18\ Id.
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As previously discussed, a report issued by the Japanese government
in June 2011 found that the SFP at Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit 4, the SFP
which presented the highest safety concern among the SFPs, remained
nearly undamaged. This report notes that from the analysis of nuclides
in the water extracted from the spent fuel pool, it appears that no
extensive damage occurred to the fuel rods. No serious damage to the
pool, including water leaks, was found from visual inspections of the
pool's condition. Additionally, on April 25, 2014, the NRC issued a
report entitled, ``NRC Overview of the Structural Integrity of the
Spent Fuel Pool at Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit 4.'' The results indicated
that the structural integrity of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool was sound.
Consequently, the petitioners have not shown that the Fukushima event
constitutes new and significant information regarding the probability
of a SFP fire. For the reasons discussed previously, the PRM does not
provide a seriously different picture of the agency's previous analyses
of a spent fuel pool accident, which have all concluded that despite
the potential for large consequences of a severe spent fuel pool
accident, the probability-weighted consequences are small due to the
low probability of such an event.
Issue 2: The Petitioner Asserts That the Impacts From the Onsite
Storage of Spent Fuel Are Understated in the License Renewal GEIS
Analysis Because the Mitigation Measures Implemented After the
September 11, 2001 (9/11), Terrorist Attacks Will Not Effectively
Mitigate the Impacts of SFP Accidents, Given the New Information Gained
From the Fukushima Accident Along With the NRC's Policy of Imposing
Secrecy on the Mitigation Measures, and the Mitigation Measures Were
Improperly Relied Upon in the Denial of PRM-51-10 (73 FR 46204)
The petitioner claimed that information about the Fukushima
accident undermines the following two conclusions from the Commission's
denial of PRM-51-10 (73 FR 46204; August 8, 2008): (1) Post-9/11
mitigation measures relied upon by the NRC would permit recovery of
lost water from spent fuel pools, and (2) the NRC's policy of imposing
secrecy on these mitigation measures would not impair their
effectiveness. With regard to the first claim, the petitioner argued
that lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event undermine the
Commission's reliance on post-9/11 mitigation measures that enable
recovery of lost water from SFPs to prevent the onset of fire or other
accidents, and that therefore, the Commission's denial of PRM-51-10
must be reconsidered. With regard to the second claim, the petitioner
referenced statements in a declaration provided by Dr. Gordon Thompson
that the ``NRC's excessive secrecy degrades the licensee's capability
to mitigate an accident.'' The petitioner asserted that by keeping the
post-9/11 mitigation measures secret, ``the NRC also raises the risk
that first-responders from the surrounding community, who may be called
upon to assist in the implementation of [the mitigation measures], will
not have sufficient understanding of them to implement them
effectively.''
[[Page 53270]]
The petitioner's 2006 petition (PRM-51-10) requested changes to the
Commission's generic findings regarding the environmental impacts from
onsite spent fuel pool storage during the license renewal period of an
operating NPP. In its denial (73 FR 46204; August 8, 2008), the NRC
noted that spent fuel pools are ``massive, extremely-robust structures
designed to safely contain the spent fuel discharged from a nuclear
reactor under a variety of normal, off-normal, and hypothetical
accident conditions (e.g., loss of electrical power, floods,
earthquakes, or tornadoes).''
The petitioner asserted that the Fukushima accident demonstrates
that the conclusions in the denial of PRM-51-10 were incorrect, and
that in light of the new information about the Fukushima event, the NRC
should reevaluate its impact analysis in the license renewal GEIS
because the new information undermines the staff's position that the
post-9/11 mitigation measures would prevent the onset of a spent fuel
pool fire following an attack or other severe accident by permitting
recovery of lost water.
NRC Response to Issue 2
The petitioner's fundamental claim is that new and significant
information from the Fukushima accident undermines the conclusions the
Commission reached in denying PRM-51-10. As previously discussed, a
report issued by the Japanese government in June 2011 found that the
SFP at Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit 4, which presented the most safety
concern, remained nearly undamaged. This report notes that no extensive
damage in the fuel rods appears to have occurred, based on an analysis
of SFP water. No serious damage to the pool, including water leaks, was
found from visual inspections of the pool's condition. Additionally, on
April 25, 2014, the NRC issued a report entitled, ``NRC Overview of the
Structural Integrity of the Spent Fuel Pool at Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit
4.'' The results indicated that the structural integrity of the Unit 4
spent fuel pool was sound.
As the Commission noted in its 2008 denial of PRM-51-10, and as
demonstrated by NUREG-1738 and subsequent SFP studies: (1) Spent fuel
pools are robust structures capable of withstanding numerous hazards,
(2) additional mitigation strategies are available to maintain cooling
in the event of an incident that results in a loss of cooling water,
and (3) the risk of SFP accidents is very low. Indeed, subsequent
studies, such as NUREG-2161, conclude that spent fuel risks at the
reference plant are very low. The Spent Fuel Pool Study also found that
for the specific reference plant and earthquake analyzed, SFPs are
likely to withstand severe earthquakes without leaking.
The NRC's regulatory approach for maintaining the safety and
security of power reactors, and therefore SFPs, is based upon robust
designs that are coupled with a strategic triad of preventive/
protective systems, mitigative systems, and emergency-preparedness and
response. Licensees develop protective strategies in order to meet the
NRC design-basis threat. As noted in the Commission's denial of PRM-51-
10 and PRM-51-12 (73 FR 46204), studies conducted by Sandia National
Laboratories also confirmed the effectiveness of additional mitigation
strategies to maintain spent fuel cooling in the event the pool is
drained and its initial water inventory is reduced or lost entirely.
Based on this more recent information, and the implementation of
additional strategies following September 11, 2001, the probability,
and accordingly, the risk, of a SFP zirconium fire initiation is
expected to be less than reported in NUREG-1738 and previous studies.
Taken as a whole, these systems, personnel, and procedures provide
reasonable assurance that public health and safety, the environment,
and the common defense and security will be adequately protected.
In addition, following the Fukushima Dai-ichi event, the NRC issued
Order EA-12-049, which requires, in part, that licensees establish
plans and procedures associated with restoring and maintaining SFP
cooling capability following a beyond-design-basis external event.
These enhancements will provide additional capability for mitigating
events that result in SFP draining, beyond those already required.
Therefore, as discussed previously, the NRC does not simply rely on the
post September 11, 2001, mitigating strategies to conclude the
probability of an SFP accident is small. Rather, the NRC relies on the
robust nature of the SFPs, the low probability of a SFP fire, and other
mitigating measures, as well. Moreover, petitioners concede that
measures to add water were ultimately successful at Fukushima, and
observations to date have not revealed any cladding damage.\19\
Consequently, the petitioner's information in PRM-51-29 regarding the
effectiveness of measures does not present a seriously different
picture of this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ COMSECY-13-0030 at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The petitioner also asserted that treating the mitigation measures
as sensitive information impacts their effectiveness. Certain aspects
of the enhancements are security-related and not publicly available,
but in general include the following: (1) Significant reinforcement of
the defense capabilities for nuclear facilities; (2) better control of
sensitive information; (3) enhancements in emergency preparedness to
further strengthen the NRC's nuclear facility security program; and (4)
implementation of mitigating strategies to deal with postulated events
potentially causing loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions
or fires, including those that an aircraft impact might create. These
measures are outlined in greater detail in a memorandum to the
Commission entitled, ``Documentation of Evolution of Security
Requirements at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants with Respect to
Mitigation Measures for Large Fires and Explosions,'' dated February 4,
2010.
Plant-specific mitigation strategies are designated as security
related information in accordance with the Commission's guidance in
SECY-04-0191, ``Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information
Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure.'' However,
there is publicly-available, industry-developed guidance on
implementing these requirements. Specifically, the NRC endorsed NEI 06-
12, ``B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline,'' in a letter from the NRC
to NEI dated December 22, 2006. The NRC found NEI-06-12 is a generally
acceptable means for licensees to meet the NRC's requirements
associated with mitigating potential loss of large areas due to fires
or explosions, as explained in SECY-11-0125, ``Issuance of Bulletin
2011-01, `Mitigating Strategies'.'' Therefore, the agency has made
sufficient information available to the public regarding mitigation
strategies. Moreover, petitioners have not alleged that the measures
used to restore cooling to the SFPs during the Fukushima accident were
developed under similar secret conditions or indicated how any such
secrecy hindered the effectiveness of those measures.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ E.g., Thompson Report at 21-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the petitioner has not provided new and significant
information about the 9/11 mitigation measures with respect to the
effectiveness of the measures to provide water to the SFPs, there is no
need to supplement the GEIS.
[[Page 53271]]
Issue 3: The License Renewal GEIS Impact Analysis Must Address Spent
Fuel Storage Impacts on a Site-Specific, Rather Than Generic Basis
The petitioner asserted that the NRC's generic findings in table B-
1 in appendix B to subpart A of 10 CFR part 51 with respect to the
Category 1 onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel issue would not be
supportable where the Fukushima accident otherwise demonstrates that
the environmental impacts could be significant and argued that these
impacts must be evaluated on a plant-specific Category 2 basis. The
petitioner specifically argued that the NRC has not considered the new
information previously presented by the petitioner in PRM-51-10 that
contradicts the NRC's conclusions regarding the environmental impacts
of the onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel.
NRC Response to Issue 3
Spent fuel storage impacts during the license renewal term were
evaluated in the 1996 GEIS. The NRC staff concluded that the impacts
would be small for all plants and, therefore, the onsite storage of
spent fuel during the license renewal term was designated a Category 1
issue. Specifically, the Commission concluded in the 1996 GEIS that
continued storage of existing spent fuel and storage of spent fuel
generated during the license renewal term can be accomplished safely
and without significant environmental impacts, and that radiation doses
will be well within regulatory limits. The 2013 update to the GEIS
confirmed the 1996 evaluation.
Further, the Commission affirmed the treatment of SFP storage
impacts as Category 1 in 2008 upon denying the two petitions for
rulemaking (PRM-51-10 and PRM-51-12). The two petitions requested that
the NRC initiate a rulemaking concerning the environmental impacts of
the high-density storage of spent nuclear fuel in SFPs. The two
petitions asserted that ``new and significant information'' shows that
the NRC incorrectly characterized the environmental impacts of high-
density spent fuel storage as ``insignificant'' in the 1996 GEIS for
the renewal of nuclear power plant licenses. Specifically, the
petitioner at that time asserted that spent fuel stored in high-density
SFPs is more vulnerable to a zirconium fire than the NRC concluded in
its analysis in the 1996 GEIS. On August 8, 2008, the Commission denied
the petitions, stating:
Based upon its review of the petitions, the NRC has determined
that the studies upon which the Petitioners rely do not constitute
new and significant information. The NRC has further determined that
its findings related to the storage of spent nuclear fuel in pools,
as set forth in NUREG-1437 and in Table B-1, of Appendix B to
Subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, remain valid. Thus, the NRC has met and
continues to meet its obligations under NEPA. For the reasons
discussed previously, the Commission denies PRM-51-10 and PRM-51-12.
Likewise here, because the impacts from SFP storage have been
consistently demonstrated to be small and because the events in Japan
do not challenge the NRC's assumptions or conclusions as to the
applicability of its generic impact determination for spent fuel
storage during license renewal, the NRC has determined that the
petitioner's assertions do not present an adequate basis for the NRC to
forego using a generic environmental analysis.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons described in Section II of this document, the NRC
is denying the petition under 10 CFR 2.803. The petitioner did not
present any information that would contradict conclusions reached by
the Commission when it established or updated the license renewal rule,
nor did the petitioner provide new and significant information to
demonstrate that sufficient reason exists to revise the current
regulations. The NRC elected not to request public comments on PRM-51-
29 because it had sufficient information to make a determination.
The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant have and
will continue to inform improvements to the NRC's regulation of nuclear
energy. Building upon the conclusions of the NTTF, the NRC is actively
implementing significant enhancements through orders, rulemaking, and
other regulatory initiatives. With regard to the petitioner's arguments
that the events in Japan demonstrate that post-9/11 enhancements that
enable the recovery of lost cooling water in SFPs will be ineffective,
the petitioner did not provide sufficient information to support this
claim, especially in light of the Commission's experiences and other
studies noted previously.
Therefore, the NRC denies the petitioner's request to revise
regulations that make generic determinations about the environmental
impacts of onsite spent fuel storage in license renewal environmental
reviews.
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons as indicated. For more information on accessing
ADAMS, see the ADDRESSES section of this document.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAMS Accession Number/
Document Federal Register Citation/
URL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLI-11-05, Union Electric Company d/b/a http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
Ameren Missouri (Callaway Plant, Unit 2), rm/doc-collections/
September 9, 2011. commission/orders/2011/
2011-05cli.pdf.
CLI-99-22, Hydro Resources, Inc., July 23, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
1999. rm/doc-collections/
commission/orders/1999/
1999-022cli.pdf.
COMSECY-13-0030, ``Staff Evaluation and ML13329A918.
Recommendation for Japan Lessons Learned
Tier 3 Issue on Expedited Transfer of
Spent Fuel,'' November 12, 2013.
Declaration of Dr. Gordon R. Thompson in ML111530345.
Support of Commonwealth of Massachusetts'
Contention and Related Petitions and
Motions, June 1, 2011.
Documentation of Evolution of Security ML092990438.
Requirements at Commercial Nuclear Power
Plants with Respect to Mitigation Measures
for Large Fires and Explosions, February
4, 2010.
Federal Register notice--Continued Storage 79 FR 56238.
of Spent Nuclear Fuel, September 19, 2014.
Federal Register notice--Environmental 61 FR 28467.
Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant
Operating Licenses Final Rule, June 5,
1996.
Federal Register notice--License Renewal of 78 FR 37325.
Nuclear Power Plants; Generic
Environmental Impact Statement and
Standard Review Plans for Environmental
Reviews, Issuance of NUREG-1437 and NUREG-
1555, June 20, 2013.
Federal Register notice--PRM-51-10, NRC 73 FR 46204.
denial of Petition for Rulemaking, August
8, 2008.
Federal Register notice--PRM-51-29, 77 FR 75065.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Notice of
Receipt, December 19, 2012.
[[Page 53272]]
Federal Register notice--PRM-51-29, 77 FR 76952.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Supplemental Information, December 31,
2012.
Federal Register notice--Revisions to 78 FR 37282.
Environmental Review of Renewal of Nuclear
Power Plant Operating Licenses Final Rule,
June 20, 2013.
Generic Environmental Impact Statement for ML13107A023.
License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-
1437, Revision 1 (Volumes 1-3), June 21,
2013.
LBP-11-35, Memorandum and Order, denial of ML11332A152.
waiver in Pilgrim adjudicatory proceeding,
December 13, 2011.
NEI 06-12, ``B.5.b Phases 2 & 3 Submittal ML070090060.
Guideline, Revision 2,'' Project 689,
December 14, 2006.
NRC Overview of the Structural Integrity of ML14111A099.
the Spent Fuel Pool at Fukushima Dai-ichi,
Unit 4, April 25, 2014.
NUREG-1353, ``Regulatory Analysis for the ML082330232.
Resolution of Generic Issue 82, `Beyond
Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel
Pools,' '' April 30, 1989.
NUREG-1437, ``Generic Environmental Impact ML13107A023.
Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear
Plants'' (2013 GEIS), June 20, 2013.
NUREG-1437, ``Generic Environmental Impact ML040690705, ML040690738.
Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear
Plants'' (1996 GEIS; Volumes 1 and 2), May
31, 1996.
NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel ML010430066.
Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants,'' S102686, February
28, 2001.
NUREG-2157, ``Generic Environmental Impact ML14196A105, ML14196A107.
Statement for Continued Storage of Spent
Nuclear Fuel''.
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond- ML14255A365.
Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the
Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling-
Water Reactor'' (Spent Fuel Pool Study),
October 9, 2013.
Order EA-12-049, NRC Order on Mitigating ML12054A735.
Strategies, March 12, 2012.
Order EA-12-051, NRC Order on Spent Fuel ML12056A044.
Pool Instrumentation, March 12, 2012.
Order EA-13-109, NRC Order on Severe ML13143A321.
Accident Capable Hardened Vents, June 6,
2013.
PRM-51-10, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, ML062640409.
August 25, 2006.
PRM-51-29, from Mathew Brock, Commonwealth ML12254A005.
Of Mass. Petition for Waiver of C.F.R.
Part 51 Subpart A, Appendix B or In
Alternative Petition For Rulemaking to
Rescind Regulations Excluding
Consideration Of Spent Fuel Storage
Impacts, June 2, 2011.
Regulatory Guide 4.2, Supplement 1, ML13067A354.
Revision 1, ``Preparation of Environmental
Reports for Nuclear Power Plant License
Renewal Applications,'' June 20, 2013.
Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA http://www.kantei.go.jp/
Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety-- foreign/kan/topics/201106/
The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear iaea_houkokusho_e.html.
Power Stations, June 2011.
Sandia Letter Report, Revision 2, ML120970086.
Mitigation of Spent Fuel Pool Loss-of-
Coolant Inventory Accidents And Extension
of Reference Plant Analyses to Other Spent
Fuel Pools, November 30, 2006.
Sandia Report: MELCOR 1.8.5 Separate Effect ML062290362.
Analysis of Spent Fuel Assembly Accident
Response, June 30, 2003.
SECY-04-0191, ``Withholding Sensitive ML042310663.
Unclassified Information Concerning
Nuclear Power Reactors From Public
Disclosure,'' October 19, 2004.
SECY-11-0125, ``Issuance of Bulletin 2011- ML111250360.
01, ``Mitigating Strategies,'' September
12, 2011.
SRM-COMSECY-13-0030, Staff Evaluation and ML14143A360.
Recommendation for Japan Lessons-Learned
Tier 3 Issue on Expedited Transfer of
Spent Fuel, May 23, 2014.
The Thompson Report, ``New And Significant ML12094A183.
Information From The Fukushima Daiichi
Accident In The Context Of Future
Operation Of The Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Plant,'' June 1, 2011.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of August, 2015.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2015-21834 Filed 9-2-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P