[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 242 (Thursday, December 17, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78776-78788]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-31808]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-271; NRC-2015-0111]
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting
exemptions in response to a request from Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc. (ENO or the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP)
requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the requirements to
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and reduce the
scope of the onsite EP activities at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station (VY), based on the reduced risks of accidents that could result
in an offsite radiological release at the decommissioning nuclear power
reactor. Provisions would still exist for offsite agencies to take
protective actions, using a comprehensive emergency management plan
(CEMP) to protect public health and safety, if protective actions were
needed in the event of a very unlikely accident that could challenge
the safe storage of spent fuel.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0111 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0111. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each
[[Page 78777]]
document referenced (if that document is available in ADAMS) is
provided the first time that a document is referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Kim, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-4125; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The VY facility is a decommissioning power reactor located in the
town of Vernon, Windham County, Vermont. The licensee, ENO, is the
holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for VY. The
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to
all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in
effect.
By letter dated January 12, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15013A426),
ENO submitted, to the NRC, a certification in accordance with sections
50.82(a)(1)(i) and 50.82(a)(1)(ii) of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), indicating that it had permanently ceased power
operations at VY and had permanently defueled the VY reactor vessel,
respectively. The licensee has not operated the VY plant since December
29, 2014. As a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, and pursuant
to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), ENO is no longer authorized to operate the VY
reactor or emplace fuel into the VY reactor vessel, but is still
authorized to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel at the site.
Irradiated fuel is currently stored onsite at VY in a spent fuel pool
(SFP) and in an independent spent fuel storage installation.
During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water
through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the
reactor by generating steam. The steam system, operating at high
temperatures and pressures, transfers this heat to the main turbine
generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios
postulated in the updated safety analysis reports for operating power
reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems, which could
affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most severe
postulated accidents, would involve the release of large quantities of
fission products. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at
VY and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such
accidents are no longer possible. The reactor, RCS, steam system,
turbine generator, and supporting systems are no longer in operation
and have no function related to the storage of the spent fuel.
Therefore, EP provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, steam system, turbine generator, or
supporting systems are no longer applicable.
Since VY is permanently shutdown and defueled, the only design
basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological
release at VY is the fuel handling accident (FHA). Analysis performed
by ENO showed that 17 days after shutdown, the radiological consequence
of the FHA would not exceed the limits established by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guidelines
(PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. Based on the time that VY has
been permanently shutdown (approximately 11 months), there is no longer
any possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis
accident that could exceed the EPA PAGs.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed
all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory
provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is
permanently shut down and defueled from those for a reactor that is
authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements that are
no longer necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility,
ENO must obtain exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then can ENO
modify the VY emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk associated
with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of VY.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14080A141),
``Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E,'' ENO requested exemptions from certain EP requirements
of 10 CFR part 50 for VY. More specifically, ENO requested exemptions
from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and
offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear power reactors; from
certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment
of plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, which establish the elements that make up
the content of emergency plans. In letters dated August 29, 2014 and
October 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML14246A176, and ML14297A159,
respectively), ENO provided responses to the NRC staff's requests for
additional information concerning the proposed exemptions.
The information provided by ENO included justifications for each
exemption requested. The exemptions requested by ENO would eliminate
the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency
plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under
the requirements of 44 CFR part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite EP
activities. The licensee stated that the application of all of the
standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10
CFR part 50, appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response
capability, based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite
radiological consequences of accidents still possible at the
permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared to an operating
facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for a very unlikely
accident that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at VY,
provisions exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions using
a CEMP under the National Preparedness System to protect the health and
safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an
emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and Maintaining Emergency
Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the
foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United
States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-
informed planning and decision-making and helps planners at all levels
of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-
hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use
in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be
[[Page 78778]]
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards
planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule.
As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel
is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are
significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However,
current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release
from a credible emergency accident scenario is reduced. The reduced
risk is largely the result of the low frequency of credible events that
could challenge the SFP structure, and the reduced decay heat and
reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory due to decay. The NRC's
NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR
[Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently
Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 31, 1997 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML082260098) and NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool
Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February
28, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors that are bounded by
the assumptions and conditions in the reports, the risk of offsite
radiological release is significantly less than that for an operating
power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by ENO, have
been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled
status. Specifically, for previous permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors, the basis for the NRC staff's approval of the
exemptions from certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's
demonstration that: (1) The radiological consequences of design-basis
accidents would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) PAGs at the exclusion area boundary, and (2)
in the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a
loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP,
there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions,
and if needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite protective
actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the
public.
With respect to design-basis accidents at VY, the licensee provided
analysis demonstrating that 17 days following permanent shutdown, the
radiological consequences of the only remaining design-basis accident
with potential for offsite radiological release (the FHA) will not
exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
Therefore, because VY has been permanently shutdown for approximately
11 months, there is no longer any design-basis accident that would
warrant an offsite radiological emergency plan meeting the requirements
of 10 CFR Part 50.
With respect to beyond design-basis accidents at VY, the licensee
analyzed a drain down of the spent fuel pool water that would
effectively impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates
that at 15.4 months after shutdown, there would be at least 10 hours
after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting fuel
assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900
degrees Celsius, the temperature used to assess the potential onset of
fission product release. The analysis conservatively assumed the heat
up time starts when the spent fuel pool has been completely drained,
although it is likely that site personnel will start to respond to an
incident when drain down starts. The analysis also does not consider
the period of time from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water
inventory until cooling is lost.
Based on precedent exemptions, the site-specific analysis should
show that there is sufficient time following a loss of SFP coolant
inventory until the onset of fuel damage to implement onsite mitigation
of the loss of SFP coolant inventory and if necessary, to implement
offsite protective actions. To meet this criterion, the staff accepted,
in precedent exemptions, that the time should exceed 10 hours from the
loss of coolant until the fuel temperature reaches 900 degrees Celsius
([deg]C), assuming no air cooling.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a)
are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of
the ENO EP exemptions is described in SECY-14-0125, ``Request by
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements,'' dated November 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14227A711). The Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to
grant the exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-14-
0125, dated March 2, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15061A516).
Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by ENO and the NRC
staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-14-0125
and summarized in a table at the end of this document. The staff's
detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP
exemptions, requested by ENO, are provided in the NRC staff's safety
evaluation, which is enclosed in an NRC letter dated December 10, 2015
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15180A054).
A. Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV, which would allow ENO to revise the VY Emergency Plan to
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station.
As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may,
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative,
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by
law.
[[Page 78779]]
B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
ENO provided analyses that show the radiological consequences of
design-basis accidents will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at
the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, formal offsite radiological
emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 50 are no longer needed for
protection of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents that are still
possible at VY.
Although very unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-basis
accident that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the
event sequences important to risk, at permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors, are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events.
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to
operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different
sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738,
relaxation of offsite EP requirements, under 10 CFR part 50, a few
months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The
report further concludes that the change in risk, due to relaxation of
offsite EP requirements, is small because the overall risk is low, and
because even under current EP requirements for operating power
reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation
effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All
other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological
emergency plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in
likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and to
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present an undue risk
to the public health and safety.
C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by ENO only involve EP requirements under
10 CFR part 50 and will allow ENO to revise the VY Emergency Plan to
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. Physical security measures at VY are not affected by the
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite
EP activities at VY will not adversely affect ENO's ability to
physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material.
Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common
defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purposes of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, are to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these
regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with the
operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These
risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite
radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III of this document, because VY
is permanently shutdown and defueled, there is no longer a risk of
offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident; and the risk
of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-
basis accident is greatly reduced, when compared to the risk at an
operating power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks
at VY, by comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in
NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions at VY; and has determined that
the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented by VY. As
indicated by the results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738 and
more recently, for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-
Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I
Boiling Water Reactor'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), while other
consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant
decay time have little potential to cause offsite early fatalities,
even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements were relaxed.
The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident involving a
complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic heatup
analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows that
within 15.4 months after shutdown, the time for the limiting fuel
assembly to reach 900 degrees Celsius is 10 hours after the assemblies
have been uncovered.
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might
occur, involves the very unlikely event where the SFP drains in such a
way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be
unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heatup of
the spent fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis
accident shows that within 15.4 months after shutdown, more than 10
hours would be available between the time the fuel is initially
uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is conservatively assumed to
begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 degrees
Fahrenheit (900 degrees C), which is the temperature associated with
rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant
radiological release. This analysis conservatively does not include the
period of time from the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water
inventory until all cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified ENO's analyses and its calculations. The
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested
exemptions to ENO, there is no design-basis accident that will result
in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis
accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat
removal via all modes of heat transfer, there will be well over 10
hours available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore,
at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore
a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release
were projected to occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10
hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to
implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the
health and safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours are available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly
reaches the zirconium rapid
[[Page 78780]]
oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously
granted exemptions, as it does with the ENO-requested EP exemptions,
that if a minimum of 10 hours are available to initiate mitigative
actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then
formal offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part
50, are not necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactors.
Additionally, in its letter to the NRC dated March 14, 2014, ENO
described the SFP makeup strategies that could be used in the event of
a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple strategies for
providing makeup water to the SFP include: Using existing plant systems
for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on installed
fire water pumps (one motor-driven and one diesel-driven) and service
water; or an external strategy that uses an engine-driven emergency
makeup pump to provide makeup to the SFP from the Cooling Tower No. 2
deep basin. ENO further provides that designated on-shift staff is
trained to implement such strategies and they have plans in place to
mitigate the consequences of an event involving a catastrophic loss-of-
water inventory concurrently from the VY SFP. ENO will maintain its
License Condition 3.N, ``Mitigation Strategy License Condition,'' for
VY. This license condition requires VY to maintain its SFP inventory
makeup strategies as discussed above. Considering the very low
probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these
diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth and time to provide
additional makeup or spray water to the SFP before the onset of any
postulated offsite radiological release.
For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff concludes that
application of certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, as summarized in the table
at the end of this document, is not necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of these regulations and, therefore, satisfies the special
circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). The staff further concludes
that the exemptions granted by this action will maintain an acceptable
level of emergency preparedness at VY and provide reasonable assurance
that adequate offsite protective measures, if needed, can and will be
taken by State and local government agencies using a CEMP approach, in
the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at the VY facility.
Since the underlying purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue
to be achieved, even with the elimination of the requirements under 10
CFR part 50 to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and
the reduction in the scope of the onsite EP activities at VY, the
special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment, as discussed in the NRC
staff's Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact,
which was published on August 10, 2015 (80 FR 47960).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), that ENO's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end
of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk
to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants ENO exemptions from certain EP
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, as discussed and evaluated, in detail, in
the staff's safety evaluation dated December 10, 2015. The exemptions
are effective as of April 15, 2016.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of December, 2015.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
George A. Wilson,
Deputy Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Table of Exemptions Granted to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 50.47
10 CFR 50.47(b). The U.S. Nuclear In the Statement of
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is Considerations (SOC) for the
granting exemption from portions of final rule for emergency
the rule language that would otherwise planning (EP) requirements for
require offsite emergency response independent spent fuel storage
plans. installations (ISFSIs) and for
monitor retrievable storage
(MRS) facilities (60 FR 32430;
June 22, 1995), the Commission
responded to comments
concerning offsite EP for
ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded
that, ``the offsite
consequences of potential
accidents at an ISFSI or an
MRS would not warrant
establishing Emergency
Planning Zones.''
[[Page 78781]]
In a nuclear power reactor's
permanently defueled state,
the accident risks are more
similar to an ISFSI or an MRS
than an operating nuclear
power plant. The EP program
would be similar to that
required for an ISFSI under
section 72.32(a) of Title 10
of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) when fuel
stored in the spent fuel pool
(SFP) has more than 5 years of
decay time and would not
change substantially when all
the fuel is transferred from
the SFP to an onsite ISFSI.
Exemptions from offsite EP
requirements have previously
been approved when the site-
specific analyses show that at
least 10 hours are available
from a partial drain-down
event where cooling of the
spent fuel is not effective
until the hottest fuel
assembly reaches the zirconium
ignition temperature of 900
degrees Celsius ([deg]C). The
technical basis that underlies
the approval of the exemption
request is based partly on the
analysis of a time period in
which spent fuel stored in the
SFP is unlikely to reach the
zirconium ignition temperature
in less than 10 hours. This
time period is based on a
heatup calculation, which uses
several simplifying
assumptions. Some of these
assumptions are conservative
(adiabatic conditions), while
others are non-conservative
(no oxidation below 900
[deg]C). Weighing the
conservatisms and non-
conservatisms, the NRC staff
judges that this calculation
reasonably represents
conditions that may occur in
the event of an SFP accident.
The NRC staff concluded that if
10 hours were available to
initiate mitigative actions,
or if needed, offsite
protective actions using a
comprehensive emergency
management plan (CEMP), formal
offsite radiological emergency
plans are not necessary for
these permanently defueled
nuclear power reactor
licensees.
As supported by the licensee's
SFP analysis, the NRC staff
believes an exemption from the
requirements for formal
offsite radiological emergency
plans is justified for a
zirconium fire scenario,
considering the low likelihood
of this event together with
time available to take
mitigative or protective
actions between the initiating
event and before the onset of
a postulated fire.
The Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc. (ENO or the licensee)
analysis has demonstrated that
17 days after shutdown the
radiological consequences of
design-basis-accidents (DBAs)
will not exceed the limits of
the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA's)
Protective Action Guides
(PAGs) at the exclusion area
boundary. This analysis also
shows that 15.4 months after
shutdown for an unlikely event
of a beyond-DBA where the
hottest fuel assembly
adiabatic heatup occurs, 10
hours are available to take
mitigative or, if needed,
offsite protective actions,
using a CEMP from the time the
fuel is uncovered until it
reaches the auto-ignition
temperature of 900 [deg]C.
ENO furnished information
concerning its SFP inventory
makeup strategies. Several
sources of makeup to the pool
are available, such as the
service water (SW) system,
which has redundant pumping
capability and power supplies
to ensure alternative fuel
pool makeup function. The SW
system runs continuously, thus
allowing for constant
monitoring. Additionally,
there are electric-driven and
diesel-driven fire pumps that
can supply makeup water to the
SFP via the SW system or the
fire water system. All sources
discussed above take suction
from the Connecticut River.
The Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Station (VY) also has an
engine-driven emergency makeup
pump capable of taking suction
from the Cooling Tower No. 2
deep basin to provide an
alternate source of makeup
water to the SFP.
ENO further provides that
designated on-shift staff is
trained to implement such
strategies and they have plans
in place to mitigate the
consequences of an event
involving a catastrophic loss-
of-water inventory
concurrently from the VY SFP.
ENO will maintain its License
Condition 3.N, ``Mitigation
Strategy License Condition,''
for VY. This license condition
requires VY to maintain its
SFP inventory makeup
strategies as discussed above.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1). The NRC is granting Refer to basis for 10 CFR
exemption from portions of the rule 50.47(b).
language that would otherwise require
the need for Emergency Planning Zones
(EPZs).
[[Page 78782]]
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). The NRC is granting Decommissioning power reactors
exemption from portions of the rule present a low likelihood of
language that would otherwise require any credible accident
the need for an emergency operations resulting in a radiological
facility (EOF). release together with the time
available to take mitigative
or, if needed, offsite
protective actions using a
CEMP between the initiating
event and before the onset of
a postulated fire. As such, an
EOF would not be required. The
``nuclear island,'' control
room, or other onsite location
can provide for the
communication and coordination
with offsite organizations for
the level of support required.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC is granting Decommissioning power reactors
exemption from portions of the rule present a low likelihood of
language that would otherwise require any credible accident
reference to formal offsite resulting in a radiological
radiological emergency response plans. release together with the time
available to take mitigative
or, if needed, offsite
protective actions using a
CEMP between the initiating
event and before the onset of
a postulated fire. As such,
formal offsite radiological
emergency response plans are
not required.
The Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) document NEI 99-01,
``Development of Emergency
Action Levels for Non-Passive
Reactors'' (Revision 6), was
found to be an acceptable
method for development of
emergency action levels (EALs)
and was endorsed by the NRC in
a letter dated March 28, 2013
(ADAMS Accession No.
ML12346A463). NEI 99-01
provides EALs for non-passive
operating nuclear power
reactors, permanently defueled
reactors and ISFSIs.
The ENO requested a license
amendment to revise its EAL
scheme to NEI 99-01, Revision
6 in a letter dated June 12,
2014, ``Vermont Yankee
Permanently Defueled Emergency
Plan and Emergency Action
Level Scheme'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML14168A302).
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5). The NRC is granting Refer to basis for 10 CFR
exemption from portions of the rule 50.47(b).
language that would otherwise require
early notification of the public and a
means to provide instructions to the
public within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6). The NRC is granting Refer to basis for 10 CFR
exemption from portions of the rule 50.47(b).
language that would otherwise require
prompt communications with the public.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7). The NRC is granting Refer to basis for 10 CFR
exemption from portions of the rule 50.47(b).
language that would otherwise require
information to be made available to
the public on a periodic basis about
how they will be notified and what
their initial protective actions
should be.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). The NRC is granting Refer to basis for 10 CFR
exemption from portions of the rule 50.47(b).
language that would otherwise require
the capability for monitoring offsite
consequences.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The NRC is In the unlikely event of a SFP
granting exemption from portions of accident, the iodine isotopes,
the rule language that would reduce which contribute to an offsite
the range of protective actions dose from an operating reactor
developed for emergency workers and accident, are not present, so
the public. Consideration of potassium iodide distribution
evacuation, sheltering, or the use of would no longer serve as an
potassium iodide will no longer be effective or necessary
necessary. Evacuation time estimates supplemental protective
(ETEs) will no longer need to be action.
developed or updated. Protective In the SOC for the final rule
actions for the ingestion exposure for EP requirements for ISFSIs
pathway EPZ will not need to be and for MRS facilities (60 FR
developed. 32430), the Commission
responded to comments
concerning site-specific EP
that includes evacuation of
surrounding population for an
ISFSI not at a reactor site,
and concluded, ``The
Commission does not agree that
as a general matter emergency
plans for an ISFSI must
include evacuation planning.''
The Commission also concluded
that, ``the offsite
consequences of potential
accidents at an ISFSI or an
MRS would not warrant
establishing Emergency
Planning Zones.'' (60 FR
32435).
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2). The NRC is granting Refer to basis for 10 CFR
exemption from portions of the rule 50.47(b)(10).
language that would otherwise require
the establishment of a 10-mile radius
plume exposure pathway EPZ and a 50-
mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ.
[[Page 78783]]
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section The EP rule published in the
IV.1. The NRC is granting exemption Federal Register (76 FR 72560;
from portions of the rule language November 23, 2011) amended
that would otherwise require onsite certain requirements in 10 CFR
protective actions during hostile part 50. Among the changes,
action. the definition of ``hostile
action'' was added as an act
directed toward a nuclear
power plant or its personnel.
This definition is based on
the definition of ``hostile
action'' provided in NRC
Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency
Preparedness and Response
Actions for Security-Based
Events,'' dated July 18, 2005
(ADAMS Accession No.
ML051740058). NRC Bulletin
2005-02 is not applicable to
nuclear power reactors that
have permanently ceased
operations and have certified
that fuel has been removed
from the reactor vessel. ENO
certified that it had
permanently ceased operations
at VY and that all fuel had
been removed from the reactor
vessel. Therefore, the
enhancements for hostile
actions required by the 2011
EP Final Rule are not
necessary for VY in its
permanently shutdown and
defueled status.
Additionally, the NRC excluded
non-power reactors from the
definition of ``hostile
action'' at the time of the
2011 rulemaking because, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-
power reactor is not
considered a nuclear power
reactor and a regulatory basis
had not been developed to
support the inclusion of non-
power reactors in the
definition of ``hostile
action.'' Similarly, a
decommissioning power reactor
or ISFSI is not a ``nuclear
reactor,'' as defined in the
NRC's regulations. Like a non-
power reactor, a
decommissioning power reactor
also has a lower likelihood of
a credible accident resulting
in radiological releases
requiring offsite protective
measures, than does an
operating reactor.
Although this analysis provides
a justification for exempting
VY from ``hostile action''
related requirements, some EP
requirements for security-
based events are maintained.
The classification of security-
based events, notification of
offsite authorities and
coordination with offsite
agencies under a CEMP concept
are still required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR
IV.2. The NRC is granting exemption 50.47(b)(10).
from portions of the rule language
concerning the evacuation time
analyses within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ for the licensee's initial
application.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.3. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section IV.2.
from portions of the rule language
that would otherwise require use of
NRC-approved ETEs and updates to State
and local governments when developing
protective action strategies.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.4. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section IV.2.
from portions of the rule language
that would otherwise require licensees
to update ETEs based on the most
recent census data and submit the ETE
analysis to the NRC prior to providing
it to State and local governments for
developing protective action
strategies.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.5. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section IV.2.
from portions of the rule language
that would otherwise require licensees
to estimate the EPZ permanent resident
population changes once a year between
decennial censuses.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.6. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section IV.2.
from portions of the rule language
that would otherwise require the
licensee to submit an updated ETE
analysis to the NRC based on changes
in the resident population that result
in exceeding specific evacuation time
increase criteria.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Based on the permanently
IV.A.1. The NRC is granting exemption shutdown and defueled status
from the word ``operating'' in the of the VY reactor, a
requirement to describe the normal decommissioning reactor is not
plant organization. authorized to operate under 10
CFR 50.82(a). Because the
licensee cannot operate the
reactor, the licensee does not
have a ``plant operating
organization.''
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section The number of staff at
IV.A.3. The NRC is granting exemption decommissioning sites is
from the requirement to describe the generally small but is
licensee's headquarters personnel sent commensurate with the need to
to the site to augment the onsite safely store spent fuel at the
emergency response organization. facility, in a manner that is
protective of public health
and safety. Decommissioning
sites typically have a level
of emergency response that
does not require response by
the licensee's headquarters
personnel.
[[Page 78784]]
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Although the likelihood of
IV.A.4. The NRC is granting exemption events that would result in
from portions of the rule language doses in excess of the EPA
that would otherwise require the PAGs to the public beyond the
licensee to identify a position and exclusion area boundary is
function within its organization, extremely low based on the
which will carry the responsibility permanently shutdown and
for making offsite dose projections. defueled status of the
reactor, the licensee is still
required to determine if a
radiological release is
occurring. If a release is
occurring, then the licensee
staff should promptly
communicate that information
to offsite authorities for
their consideration. The
offsite organizations are
responsible for deciding what,
if any, protective actions
should be taken based on a
CEMP.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section VY has performed an on-shift
IV.A.5. The NRC is granting exemption staffing analysis, addressing
from the requirement for the licensee SFP mitigating strategies,
to identify individuals with special including review of collateral
qualifications, both licensee duties. The specific event
employees and non-employees, for scenario utilized for the
coping with emergencies. staffing analysis involves a
catastrophic loss-of-water
inventory in the SFP.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.A.7. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section IV.1.
from portions of the rule language
that would otherwise require a
description of the assistance expected
from State, local, and Federal
agencies for coping with a hostile
action.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Offsite emergency measures are
IV.A.8. The NRC is granting exemption limited to support provided by
from the requirement to identify the local police, fire
State and local officials for ordering departments, and ambulance and
protective actions and evacuations. hospital services, as
appropriate. Due to the low
probability of DBAs or other
credible events to exceed the
EPA PAGs, protective actions
such as evacuation should not
be required, but could be
implemented at the discretion
of offsite authorities using a
CEMP.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section The duties of the on-shift
IV.A.9. The NRC is granting exemption personnel at a decommissioning
from the requirement for the licensee reactor facility are not as
to provide an analysis demonstrating complicated and diverse as
that on-shift personnel are not those for an operating power
assigned responsibilities that would reactor. Responsibilities
prevent performance of their assigned should be well defined in the
emergency plan functions. emergency plan and procedures,
regularly tested through
drills and exercises audited
and inspected by the licensee
and the NRC.
The NRC staff considered the
similarity between the
staffing levels at a
permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor and staffing
levels at an operating power
reactor site. The minimal
systems and equipment needed
to maintain the spent nuclear
fuel in the SFP or in a dry
cask storage system in a safe
condition require minimal
personnel and is governed by
Technical Specifications. In
the EP final rule published in
the Federal Register (76 FR
72560; November 23, 2011), the
NRC concluded that the
staffing analysis requirement
was not necessary for non-
power reactor licensees due to
the small staffing levels
required to operate the
facility.
The NRC staff also examined the
actions required to mitigate
the very low probability of
beyond-design-basis events for
the SFP. In a letter dated
April 24, 2014, ``Technical
Specification Proposed Changes
No. 309, Defueled Technical
Specifications and Revised
License Conditions for
Permanently Defueled
Condition--Supplement 1''
(ADAMS Accession No.
ML14119A101), ENO withdrew the
proposed changes to the
Mitigating Strategies License
Condition 3.N. This license
condition requires VY to
maintain its SFP inventory
makeup strategies as discussed
above.
VY has performed an on-shift
staffing analysis, addressing
SFP mitigating strategies,
including review of collateral
duties. The specific event
scenario utilized for the
staffing analysis involves a
catastrophic loss-of-water
inventory in the SFP.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
part 50, appendix E, section
IV.1.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section NEI 99-01 was found to be an
IV.B.1. The NRC is granting exemption acceptable method for the
from portions of the rule language development of EALs. No
that would otherwise require offsite offsite protective actions are
EALs and offsite protective measures anticipated to be necessary,
and associate offsite monitoring for so classification above the
the emergency conditions. alert level is no longer
In addition, the NRC is granting required, which is consistent
exemption from portions of the rule with ISFSI facilities.
language that would otherwise require As discussed previously, ENO
EALs based on hostile action.. requested a license amendment
to revise its EAL scheme to
NEI 99-01, Revision 6, in a
letter dated June 12, 2014,
``Vermont Yankee Permanently
Defueled Emergency Plan and
Emergency Action Level
Scheme'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14168A302). Before ENO can
amend its EAL scheme to
reflect the risk commensurate
with power reactor that has
been permanently shut down and
defueled, ENO needs an
exemption from the requirement
for the site area emergency
and general emergency
classifications.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
part 50, appendix E, section
IV.1.
[[Page 78785]]
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Containment parameters do not
IV.C.1. The NRC is granting exemption provide an indication of the
from portions of the rule language conditions at a defueled
that would otherwise require EALs facility and emergency core
based on operating reactor concerns, cooling systems are no longer
such as offsite radiation monitoring, required. Other indications,
pressure in containment, and the such as SFP level or
response of the emergency core cooling temperature, can be used at
system. site where there is spent fuel
In addition, the NRC is striking in the SFP.
language that would otherwise require In the SOC for the final rule
offsite EALs of a site area emergency for EP requirements for ISFSIs
and a general emergency.. and for MRS facilities (60 FR
32430), the Commission
responded to comments
concerning a general emergency
at an ISFSI and MRS, and
concluded that, ``. . . an
essential element of a General
Emergency is that a release
can be reasonably expected to
exceed EPA PAGs exposure
levels off site for more than
the immediate site area.''
The probability of a condition
at a defueled facility
reaching the level above an
emergency classification of
alert is very low. In the
event of an accident at a
defueled facility that meets
the conditions for exemption
from formal EP requirements,
there will be available time
for event mitigation and, if
necessary, implementation of
offsite protective actions
using a CEMP.
NEI 99-01 was found to be an
acceptable method for
development of EALs. No
offsite protective actions are
anticipated to be necessary,
so classification above the
alert level is no longer
required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section In the EP rule published in the
IV.C.2. The NRC is granting exemption November 23, 2011, Federal
from portions of the rule language Register (76 FR 72560),
that would otherwise require the nuclear power reactor
licensee to assess, classify, and licensees were required to
declare an emergency condition within assess, classify and declare
15 minutes. an emergency condition within
15 minutes. Non-power reactors
do not have the same potential
impact on public health and
safety as do power reactors,
and as such, non-power reactor
licensees do not require
complex offsite emergency
response activities and are
not required to assess,
classify and declare an
emergency condition within 15
minutes. An SFP and an ISFSI
are also not nuclear power
reactors, as defined in the
NRC's regulations and do not
have the same potential impact
on public health and safety,
as do power reactors. A
decommissioning power reactor
has a low likelihood of a
credible accident resulting in
radiological releases
requiring offsite protective
measures. For these reasons,
the NRC staff concludes that a
decommissioning power reactor
should not be required to
assess, classify and declare
an emergency condition within
15 minutes.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR
IV.D.1. The NRC is granting exemption 50.47(b) and 10 CFR
from portions of the rule language 50.47(b)(10).
that would otherwise require the
licensee to reach agreement with
local, State, and Federal officials
and agencies for prompt notification
of protective measures or evacuations.
In addition, the NRC is granting
exemption from identifying the
associated titles of officials to be
notified for each agency within the
EPZs.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.D.2. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section
from the requirement for the licensee IV.D.1.
to annually disseminate general
information on EP and evacuations
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
In addition, the NRC is granting
exemption for the need for signage or
other measures to address transient
populations in the event of an
accident.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section While the capability needs to
IV.D.3. The NRC is granting exemption exist for the notification of
from portions of the rule language offsite government agencies
that would otherwise require the within a specified time
licensee to have the capability to period, previous exemptions
make notifications to State and local have allowed for extending the
government agencies within 15 minutes State and local government
of declaring an emergency. agencies' notification time up
to 60 minutes, based on the
site-specific justification
provided.
ENO's license amendment request
to approve its Permanently
Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP)
dated June 12, 2014, (ADAMS
Accession No. ML14168A302),
provides that VY will make
notifications to the State of
Vermont within 60 minutes of
declaration of an event.
Considering the very low
probability of beyond-design-
basis events affecting the
SFP, and with the time
available to initiate
mitigative actions consistent
with plant conditions or, if
needed, for offsite
authorities to implement
appropriate protective
measures using a CEMP (all-
hazards) approach between the
loss of both water and air
cooling to the spent fuel and
the onset of a postulated
zirconium cladding fire,
formal offsite radiological
response plans are not needed.
Therefore, decommissioning
reactors are not required to
notify State and local
governmental agencies within
15 minutes. For similar
reasons, the requirement for
alerting and providing prompt
instructions to the public
within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ using an alert and
notification system is not
required.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b) and 10 CFR
50.47(b)(10).
[[Page 78786]]
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.D.4. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section IV.D.3
from the requirement for the licensee regarding the alert and
to obtain U.S. Federal Emergency notification system
Management Agency (FEMA) approval of requirements.
its backup alert and notification
capability.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Due to the low probability of
IV.E.8.a.(i). The NRC is granting DBAs or other credible events
exemption from portions of the rule to exceed the EPA PAGs at the
language that would otherwise require site boundary, the available
the licensee to have an onsite time for event mitigation at a
technical support center (TSC) and EOF. decommissioning power reactor
and, if needed, to implement
offsite protective actions
using a CEMP, an EOF would not
be required to support offsite
agency response. In addition,
an onsite TSC with part 50,
appendix E requirements would
not be needed. ENO proposes in
its PDEP that onsite actions
would be directed from the
control room.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section NUREG-0696, ``Functional
IV.E.8.a.(ii). The NRC is granting Criteria for Emergency
exemption from portions of the rule Response Facilities,''
language that would otherwise require provides that the OSC is an
the licensee to have an onsite onsite area separate from the
operational support center (OSC). control room and the TSC,
where licensee operations
support personnel will
assemble in an emergency. For
a decommissioning power
reactor, an OSC is no longer
required to meet its original
purpose of an assembly area
for plant logistical support
during an emergency. The OSC
function can be incorporated
into the control room, as
proposed by ENO.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR
IV.E.8.b. and subpart sections 50.47(b)(3).
IV.E.8.b.(1)-E.8.b.(5). The NRC is
granting exemption from the
requirements related to an offsite EOF
location, space and size,
communications capability, access to
plant data and radiological
information, and access to copying and
office supplies.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR
E.8.c. and sections IV E.8.c.(1)- 50.47(b)(3).
E.8.c.(3). The NRC is granting
exemption from the requirements to
have an EOF with the capabilities to
obtain and display plant data and
radiological information; the
capability to analyze technical
information and provide briefings; and
the capability to support events
occurring at more than one site (if
the emergency operations center
supports more than one site).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
E.8.d. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section IV.1
from the requirements to have an regarding hostile action.
alternate facility that would be
accessible even if the site is under
threat of or experiencing hostile
action, to function as a staging area
for augmentation of emergency response
staff.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR
IV.E.8.e. The NRC is granting 50.47(b)(3).
exemption from the requirement
regarding the need for the licensee to
comply with paragraph 8.b of this
section.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR
IV.E.9.a. The NRC is granting 50.47(b) and 10 CFR
exemption from portions of the rule 50.47(b)(10).
language that would otherwise require The State and the local
the licensee to have communications governments in which the
with contiguous State and local nuclear facility is located
governments that are within the plume need to be informed of events
exposure pathway EPZ (which is no and emergencies, therefore,
longer required by the exemption lines of communication are
granted to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)). required to be maintained.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Because of the low probability
IV.E.9.c. The NRC is granting of DBAs or other credible
exemption from the requirements for events that would be expected
communication and testing provisions to exceed the EPA PAGs and the
between the control room, the onsite available time for event
TSC, State/local emergency operations mitigation and, if needed,
centers, and field assessment teams. implementation of offsite
protective actions using a
CEMP, there is no need for the
TSC, EOF, or offsite field
assessment teams.
Also refer to justification for
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).
Communication with State and
local emergency operations
centers is maintained to
coordinate assistance on site
if required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section The functions of the control
IV.E.9.d. The NRC is granting room, EOF, TSC, and OSC may be
exemption from portions of the rule combined into one or more
language that would otherwise require locations at a permanently
provisions for communications from the shutdown and defueled facility
control room, onsite TSC, and EOF with due to its smaller facility
NRC Headquarters and appropriate staff and the greatly reduced
Regional Operations Center. required interaction with
State and local emergency
response facilities, as
compared to an operating
reactor.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
[[Page 78787]]
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Decommissioning power reactor
IV.F.1. and section IV F.1.viii. The sites typically have a level
NRC is granting exemption from of emergency response that
portions of the rule language that does not require additional
would otherwise require the licensee response by the licensee's
to provide training and drills for the headquarters personnel.
licensee's headquarters personnel, Therefore, the NRC staff
Civil Defense personnel, or local news considers exempting licensee's
media. headquarters personnel from
training requirements to be
reasonable.
Due to the low probability of
DBAs or other credible events
to exceed the EPA PAGs,
offsite emergency measures are
limited to support provided by
local police, fire
departments, and ambulance and
hospital services, as
appropriate. Local news media
personnel no longer need
radiological orientation
training since they will not
be called upon to support the
formal Joint Information
Center. The term ``Civil
Defense'' is no longer
commonly used; references to
this term in the examples
provided in the regulation
are, therefore, not needed.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Because of the low probability
IV.F.2. The NRC is granting exemption of DBAs or other credible
from portions of the rule language events that would be expected
that would otherwise require testing to exceed the limits of EPA
of a public alert and notification PAGs and the available time
system. for event mitigation and, if
necessary, offsite protective
actions from a CEMP, the
public alert and notification
system will not be used and,
therefore, requires no
testing.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Due to the low probability of
IV.F.2.a. and sections IV.F.2.a.(i) DBAs or other credible events
through IV.F.2.a.(iii). The NRC is that would be expected to
granting exemption from the exceed the limits of EPA PAGs,
requirements for full participation the available time for event
exercises and the submittal of the mitigation and, if necessary,
associated exercise scenarios to the implementation of offsite
NRC. protective actions using a
CEMP, no formal offsite
radiological response plans
are required. Therefore, the
need for the licensee to
exercise onsite and offsite
plans with full participation
by each offsite authority
having a role under the
radiological response plan is
not required.
The intent of submitting
exercise scenarios at an
operating power reactor site
is to check that licensees
utilize different scenarios in
order to prevent the
preconditioning of responders
at power reactors. For
decommissioning power reactor
sites, there are limited
events that could occur and,
as such, the previously
routine progression to general
emergency in an operating
power reactor site scenario is
not applicable.
The licensee would be exempt
from 10 CFR part 50, appendix
E, section IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii)
because the licensee would be
exempt from the umbrella
provision of 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV.F.2.a.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.F.2.b. The NRC is granting 50, appendix E, section
exemption from portions of the rule IV.F.2.a.
language that would otherwise require The low probability of DBAs or
the licensee to submit scenarios for other credible events that
its biennial exercises of its onsite would exceed the EPA PAGs, the
emergency plan. In addition, the NRC available time for event
is granting exemption from portions of mitigation and, if necessary,
the rule language that requires implementation of offsite
assessment of offsite releases, protective actions using a
protective action decision making, and CEMP, render a TSC, OSC, and
references to the TSC, OSC, and EOF. EOF unnecessary. The principal
functions required by
regulation can be performed at
an onsite location that does
not meet the requirements of
the TSC, OSC or EOF.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.F.2.c. and sections IV F.2.c.(1) 50, appendix E, section
through F.2.c.(5). The NRC is granting IV.F.2.a.
exemption from the requirements
regarding the need for the licensee to
exercise offsite plans biennially with
full participation by each offsite
authority having a role under the
radiological response plan. The NRC is
also granting exemptions from the
conditions for conducting these
exercises (including hostile action
exercises) if two different licensees
have facilities on the same site or on
adjacent, contiguous sites, or share
most of the elements defining
co[dash]located licensees.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.F.2.d. The NRC is granting 50, appendix E, section IV.2.
exemption from the requirements to
obtain State participation in an
ingestion pathway exercise and a
hostile action exercise, with each
State that has responsibilities, at
least once per exercise cycle.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.F.2.e. The NRC is granting 50, appendix E, section IV.2.
exemption from portions of the rule
language that would otherwise require
the licensee to allow participation
exercise in licensee drills by any
State and local government in the
plume exposure pathway EPZ when
requested.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section FEMA is responsible for
IV.F.2.f. The NRC is granting evaluating the adequacy of
exemption from portions of the rule offsite response during an
language that would otherwise require exercise. Because the NRC is
FEMA to consult with the NRC on granting exemptions from the
remedial exercises. The NRC is requirements regarding the
granting exemption from portions of need for the licensee to
the rule language that discuss the exercise onsite and offsite
extent of State and local plans with full participation
participation in remedial exercises. by each offsite authority
having a role under the
radiological response plan,
FEMA will no longer evaluate
the adequacy of offsite
response during remedial or
other exercises.
[[Page 78788]]
No action is expected from
State or local government
organizations in response to
an event at a decommissioning
power reactor site other than
firefighting, law enforcement
and ambulance/medical services
support. A memorandum of
understanding should be in
place for those services.
Offsite response organizations
will continue to take actions
on a comprehensive EP basis to
protect the health and safety
of the public as they would at
any other industrial site.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Due to the low probability of
IV.F.2.i. The NRC is granting DBAs or other credible events
exemption from portions of the rule to exceed the EPA PAGs, the
language that would otherwise require available time for event
the licensee to drill and exercise mitigation and, if needed,
scenarios that include a wide spectrum implementation of offsite
of radiological release events and protective actions using a
hostile action. CEMP, the previously routine
progression to general
emergency in power reactor
site scenarios is not
applicable to a
decommissioning site.
Therefore, the licensee is not
expected to demonstrate
response to a wide spectrum of
events.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
part 50, appendix E, section
IV.1 regarding hostile action.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.F.2.j. The NRC is granting 50, appendix E, section
exemption from the requirements IV.F.2.
regarding the need for the licensee's
emergency response organization to
demonstrate proficiency in key skills
in the principal functional areas of
emergency response.
In addition, the NRC is granting
exemption during an eight calendar
year exercise cycle, from
demonstrating proficiency in the key
skills necessary to respond to such
scenarios as hostile actions,
unplanned minimal radiological
release, and scenarios involving rapid
escalation to a site area emergency or
general emergency.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section Refer to basis for 10 CFR part
IV.I. The NRC is granting exemption 50, appendix E, section
from the requirements regarding the IV.E.8.d.
need for the licensee to develop a
range of protective actions for onsite
personnel during hostile actions.
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[FR Doc. 2015-31808 Filed 12-16-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P