[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 42 (Thursday, March 3, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 12254-12336]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03131]
[[Page 12253]]
Vol. 87
Thursday,
No. 42
March 3, 2022
Part III
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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10 CFR Parts 20, 26, 50, et al.
Regulatory Improvements for Production and Utilization Facilities
Transitioning to Decommissioning; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 87 , No. 42 / Thursday, March 3, 2022 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 12254]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 20, 26, 50, 51, 52, 72, 73, 140
[NRC-2015-0070]
RIN 3150-AJ59
Regulatory Improvements for Production and Utilization Facilities
Transitioning to Decommissioning
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to
amend its regulations that relate to the decommissioning of production
and utilization facilities. The NRC's goals in amending these
regulations are to maintain a safe, effective, and efficient
decommissioning process; reduce the need for license amendment requests
and exemptions from existing regulations; address other decommissioning
issues deemed relevant by the NRC; and support the NRC's Principles of
Good Regulation, including openness, clarity, and reliability. The NRC
will hold a public meeting to promote full understanding of this
proposed rule and to facilitate public comments.
DATES: Submit comments by May 17, 2022. Comments received after this
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission
is able to ensure consideration only for comments received before this
date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by the following method (unless this
document describes a different method for submitting comments on a
specific subject); however, the NRC encourages electronic comment
submission through the Federal rulemaking website:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0070. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Dawn Forder; telephone: 301-415-3407;
email: [email protected]. For technical questions contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
Email comments to: [email protected]. If you do
not receive an automatic email reply confirming receipt, then contact
us at 301-415-1677.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff.
For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting
comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel I. Doyle, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3748; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Summary
A. Need for the Regulatory Action
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations related to the
decommissioning of production and utilization facilities. The
Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with an integrated
rulemaking on nuclear power reactor decommissioning to address the
following: A graded approach to emergency preparedness (EP), lessons
learned from the licensees that have already gone through (or are
currently going through) the decommissioning process, the advisability
of requiring a licensee's post-shutdown decommissioning activities
report (PSDAR) to be approved by the NRC, the appropriateness of
maintaining the three existing options for decommissioning and the
timeframes associated with those options, the appropriate role of State
and local governments and non-governmental stakeholders in the
decommissioning process, and any other issues deemed relevant by the
NRC staff.
Compared to an operating nuclear power reactor, the risk of an
offsite radiological release is significantly lower, and the types of
possible accidents are significantly fewer, at a nuclear power reactor
that has permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the
reactor vessel. As a direct result, there is no need for the NRC to
impose new requirements in the areas identified in this rulemaking to
address safety or security concerns. Instead, the requirements in
decommissioning should be aligned with the reduction in risk that
occurs over time, while maintaining safety and security. The
decommissioning process can be improved and made more efficient, open,
and predictable by reducing the reliance on licensing actions (i.e.,
license amendment and exemption requests) that reflect this reduction
in risk to achieve a sustainable regulatory framework during
decommissioning.
The NRC has also determined that changes to the regulations are
appropriate with respect to drug and alcohol testing; cyber security;
and foreign ownership, control, or domination of a production or
utilization facility undergoing decommissioning.
In several areas, the current regulations do not distinguish
between provisions that apply to a nuclear power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and provisions that apply to an operating
nuclear power reactor. To address this, the NRC is proposing to amend
its regulations in several areas to provide a regulatory framework for
the transition from operating to decommissioning. This proposed rule is
a four-step graded approach that is commensurate with the reduction in
radiological risk at four levels of decommissioning: (1) Permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of all fuel from the
reactor vessel, (2) sufficient decay of fuel in the spent fuel pool
(SFP) such that it would not reach ignition temperature within 10 hours
under adiabatic heatup conditions (i.e., a complete loss of SFP water
inventory with no heat loss), (3) transfer of all fuel to dry storage,
and (4) removal of all fuel from the site. The graded approach is a
fundamental concept for this proposed rule.
Because the current regulatory framework for decommissioning is
adequate to protect public health and safety and the common defense and
security, many of the new requirements in this proposed rule are
alternatives to current requirements.
B. Major Provisions
Major provisions of this proposed rule include changes in the
following areas:
Emergency preparedness. This proposed rule offers an
alternative, graded approach to the current requirements for onsite and
offsite radiological emergency preparedness at a nuclear power reactor.
This approach would provide four levels of emergency planning standards
that coincide with significant milestones in decommissioning that
reflect the gradual reduction of the radiological risk during
decommissioning.
Physical security. This proposed rule would make certain
changes that would apply once a nuclear power reactor enters
decommissioning. These proposed changes would (1) permit a certified
fuel handler (CFH) to approve the temporary suspension of security
measures during certain emergency conditions or during severe weather,
(2) remove the requirement that a licensee's physical protection
program be
[[Page 12255]]
designed to prevent significant core damage, (3) remove the requirement
that a licensee must designate the reactor control room as a ``vital
area,'' and (4) replace the requirement for maintaining continuous
communications between the alarm stations and the control room with a
requirement for maintaining communications between alarm stations and
the CFH or senior on shift licensee representative, or both. This last
change would clarify the management role of the CFH in a manner that is
consistent with Sec. 50.54(y) of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR). The NRC is also proposing to revise Sec.
50.54(p) to add definitions for ``change'' and ``decrease in safeguards
effectiveness,'' as those terms apply to the process for making changes
to the security plans of licensees under 10 CFR part 50, ``Domestic
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,'' and 10 CFR part
52, ``Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' with operating, decommissioning, or decommissioned reactor
units. In addition, this proposed rule would provide an option for a
licensee to protect a general license independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI) under the physical security requirements in Sec.
73.51, ``Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste,'' for a specific license
ISFSI instead of the physical security requirements in Sec. 73.55,
``Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in
nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage,'' for a nuclear
power reactor once all spent fuel has been moved to dry storage.
Cyber security. This proposed rule would provide that the
cyber security requirements in Sec. 73.54, ``Protection of digital
computer and communication systems and networks,'' continue to apply to
a nuclear power reactor after the licensee's permanent cessation of
operations, until all the fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel
and there has been sufficient decay of the fuel in the SFP such that it
would not reach ignition temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic
heatup conditions, at which point no digital computer and
communications systems would be required to meet the criteria of Sec.
73.54. This proposed rule would also provide for the removal of the
cyber security license condition for 10 CFR part 50 nuclear power
reactor licensees after the spent fuel decay period.
Drug and alcohol testing. This proposed rule would correct
inconsistencies in the NRC's regulations for fitness-for-duty (FFD)
programs and clarify provisions regarding a nuclear power reactor
licensee's insider mitigation program (IMP).
Certified fuel handler definition and elimination of the
shift technical advisor. This proposed rule would retain the existing
definition for ``certified fuel handler'' and add an alternative that
would eliminate the need for nuclear power reactor licensees to seek
the Commission's approval of a fuel handler training program. The
proposed provision would require the training program to address the
safe conduct of decommissioning activities, safe handling and storage
of spent fuel, and appropriate response to plant emergencies. The
proposed alternative specifies that a CFH must be qualified in
accordance with a fuel handler training program that meets the same
requirements as training programs for non-licensed operators required
by Sec. 50.120, ``Training and qualification of nuclear power plant
personnel.'' This proposed rule would also clarify that a Shift
Technical Advisor (STA) is not required for decommissioning nuclear
power reactors.
Decommissioning funding assurance. This proposed rule
recommends several changes regarding decommissioning funding for
nuclear power reactors. It would modify the reporting frequency in
Sec. 50.75 to be consistent with the decommissioning funding assurance
reporting frequency for ISFSIs in Sec. 72.30(c). For ISFSI funding
reports, this proposed rule would allow licensees to combine the
reports that are required by Sec. 50.82(a)(8)(v), Sec.
50.82(a)(8)(vii), and Sec. 72.30 and remove the requirement for NRC
approval of ISFSI reports filed under Sec. 72.30(c). It also would
clarify that although the regulations establish a continuing obligation
to provide reasonable assurance of decommissioning funding, when a
licensee identifies a shortfall in the report required by Sec.
50.75(f)(1), the licensee must obtain additional financial assurance to
cover the shortfall and discuss that information in the next report. In
addition, this proposed rule would make administrative changes to
ensure consistency with Sec. 50.4, ``Written communications,''
regarding the submission of notifications and to eliminate Sec.
50.75(f)(2) because Sec. 50.75(f)(1) fully encompasses paragraph
(f)(2). Besides proposing conforming changes to 10 CFR part 52, the NRC
is asking whether the NRC should maintain identical requirements in
Sec. 52.110 and Sec. 50.82.
Offsite and onsite financial protection requirements and
indemnity agreements. This proposed rule would allow certain nuclear
power reactor licensees in decommissioning to reduce the insurance
amounts that they are required to maintain without obtaining exemptions
from the NRC's regulations.
Environmental considerations. This proposed rule would
clarify that licensees must evaluate the environmental impacts of
decommissioning and whether they are bounded by previous environmental
reviews in the PSDAR. The proposed rule would also clarify
environmental reporting requirements.
Record retention requirements. This proposed rule would
remove certain record retention requirements for structures, systems,
and components (SSCs) that no longer remain in service during
decommissioning and would remove requirements to keep multiple copies
of certain spent fuel storage records. The NRC is also asking a
specific question concerning the recordkeeping requirements for
facilities licensed under 10 CFR part 52.
Low-level waste transportation. This proposed rule would
allow a 45-day window for notification of receipt of shipments of low-
level radioactive waste (LLW). This increase from the current 20-day
notification window is based on operating experience that shows that 45
days is an appropriate amount of time for notification of LLW
shipments.
Spent fuel management planning. This proposed rule would
clarify requirements that the decommissioning documents contain
information on spent fuel management planning in accordance with the
regulatory requirements in Sec. 72.218, ``Termination of licenses.''
Backfit rule. This proposed rule would clarify how the NRC
applies Sec. 50.109, ``Backfitting,'' to nuclear power reactor
licensees in decommissioning and would make conforming changes to Sec.
72.62.
Foreign ownership, control, or domination. This proposed
rule would specify the criteria for when a facility is no longer a
production or utilization facility and that the foreign ownership,
control, or domination (FOCD) prohibition found in Sec. 50.38,
``Ineligibility of certain applicants,'' no longer applies to a person
seeking a license for such a facility.
Clarification of scope of license termination plan
requirement. This proposed rule would clarify that the requirement for
a license termination plan in Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(9) and 52.110(i)
applies only to nuclear power reactor licensees that have loaded fuel
into the reactor.
Removal of license conditions and withdrawal of orders
made redundant
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by regulation. This proposed rule would deem removed conditions imposed
upon individual licensees and withdraw NRC orders that have been
identified as having been made redundant by subsequent regulation
resulting in their requirements being generically applicable. License
conditions deemed removed would be actually removed by administrative
license amendment subsequent to the effective date of the final rule.
The NRC is interested in obtaining stakeholder input to identify
potential redundant requirements not listed in this proposed rule.
Changes for consistent treatment of holders of combined
licenses and operating licenses. The proposed rule would improve
consistency in regulatory treatment for combined license (part 52) and
operating license (part 50) holders by aligning regulatory
applicabilities for combined license holders upon submittal of the
Sec. 52.110(a) certifications with regulatory applicabilities for
operating license holders upon submittal of the Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
certifications.
C. Costs and Benefits
The NRC prepared a draft regulatory analysis to determine the
expected quantitative costs and benefits of this proposed rule, as well
as qualitative factors to be considered in the NRC's rulemaking
decision. The conclusion of the analysis is that this proposed rule
would result in net savings to production and utilization facility
licensees and the NRC. The analysis combines the costs and benefits
from the decommissioning areas of EP, physical security, cyber
security, drug and alcohol testing, CFH training, decommissioning
funding assurance, offsite and onsite financial protection requirements
and indemnity agreements, environmental considerations, records
retention, low-level waste transportation, spent fuel management
planning, application of the Backfit Rule, FOCD, and clarification of
the scope of a license termination plan. The analysis discusses the
economic impact to the nuclear industry, government, and society from
the rulemaking and associated guidance.
The draft regulatory analysis discusses the cost benefit analysis
for the various alternatives of each area of decommissioning proposed
by the NRC, and shows that the NRC's proposed rule and guidance
development is overall cost beneficial to the nuclear industry,
government, and society as shown in Table 1.
Table 1--Summary of Costs and Benefits (7% NPV)
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Benefits Costs Net benefit
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$18,315,000 $(401,000) $17,914,000
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The draft regulatory analysis also considers, in a qualitative
fashion, regulatory efficiency, public health and safety, and common
defense and security. For the regulatory efficiency aspect, this
proposed rule would enable the NRC to better maintain and administer
regulatory activities over the decommissioning process and ensure that
the requirements for decommissioning production and utilization
facilities are clear and appropriate. This proposed rule would also
continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the
public health and safety and promote the common defense and security
and protect the environment at production and utilization facility
sites that have started decommissioning.
Based on these quantitative and qualitative factors, the draft
regulatory analysis concludes that the proposed rule should be adopted.
For more information, please see the draft regulatory analysis
available at the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS) under Accession No. ML22019A132.
Table of Contents
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
B. Submitting Comments
II. Background
A. 1988 Decommissioning Rule
B. 1996 Decommissioning Rule
C. Post-1996 Final Rule Decommissioning Activity
D. Spent Fuel Pool Studies
E. Changes in Nuclear Power Reactor Decommissioning at the NRC
and Within the Nuclear Power Industry
F. Decommissioning Lessons Learned Report
G. Initiation of This Proposed Rule
H. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
I. Regulatory Basis
III. Discussion
A. Current Regulatory Process
B. Objectives of This Proposed Rule
C. Applicability
D. Applicability to NRC Licensees During Operations
E. Applicability to ISFSI-Only and Standalone ISFSI/
Decommissioned Reactor Sites
F. Graded Approach
G. Technical Basis for Graded Approach
H. Levels of Decommissioning
1. Level 1
2. Level 2
3. Level 3
4. Level 4
IV. Scope of the Proposal
A. Emergency Preparedness
1. Introduction
2. Graded Approach for Emergency Preparedness
3. Licensee Supporting Analyses
4. Post-Shutdown Emergency Plans
5. Permanently Defueled Emergency Plans
6. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation-Only Emergency
Plans
7. All Spent Fuel Removed From Site
8. Changes to Emergency Plans
9. Program Element Review Under Sec. 50.54(t)
10. Reasonable Assurance and Offsite Radiological Emergency
Preparedness
11. Clean-up of Regulations
12. Revisions to Sec. 72.32
B. Physical Security
1. Security Plans
2. Dry Cask Storage
3. Significant Core Damage
4. Vital Areas
5. Communications
6. Suspension of Security Measures
C. Cyber Security
D. Drug and Alcohol Testing
1. Scope of 10 CFR Part 26
2. Fitness-for-Duty Elements for Insider Mitigation Program
3. Criminal Penalties
E. Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of the
Shift Technical Advisor
1. Alternative Definition for Certified Fuel Handler
2. Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor
F. Decommissioning Funding Assurance
1. Clarification of Sec. 50.82(a) and Sec. 52.110(h)
2. Changes to Reporting Requirements
3. Shortfalls in Decommissioning Funding Assurance
4. Conforming Changes to 10 CFR Part 52
5. Change to 10 CFR Part 72
G. Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and
Indemnity Agreements
1. Proposed Revisions to Offsite Liability and Onsite Property
Insurance Requirements
2. Proposed Revision to Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences
Requirements
3. Proposed New Rule Language in Sec. 50.54(w)(6)
H. Environmental Considerations
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1. Clarifying Changes to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
2. Consistency Changes to 10 CFR Part 51
I. Record Retention Requirements
J. Low-Level Waste Transportation
K. Spent Fuel Management Planning
1. Requirements for the IFMP in Sec. 50.54(bb) and the PSDAR in
Sec. 50.82 and Sec. 52.110
2. Requirements in Sec. 72.218 for Termination of the General
License for Spent Fuel Storage
L. Backfit Rule
M. Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination
N. Clarification of Scope of License Termination Plan
Requirement
O. Removal of License Conditions and Withdrawal of Orders
P. Changes for Consistent Treatment of Holders of Combined
Licenses and Operating Licenses
V. Specific Requests for Comments
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
VIII. Regulatory Analysis
IX. Backfitting and Issue Finality
A. Current and Future Applicants
B. Existing Design Certifications
C. Existing Licensees
D. Backfit Analysis
1. Introduction and Background
2. Detailed Description of the Proposed Change Affecting Issue
Finality
3. Benefits: Substantial Increase in Public Health and Safety
and Common Defense and Security
4. Costs
5. Determination of Substantial Benefits Justifying Costs of the
Proposed Change Affecting Issue Finality
6. Conclusion
7. Evaluation of Factors in Sec. 50.109(c)(1) Through (9)
E. Draft Regulatory Guidance
X. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
XI. Plain Writing
XII. National Environmental Policy Act
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act
XIV. Criminal Penalties
XV. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XVI. Availability of Guidance
XVII. Public Meeting
XVIII. Availability of Documents
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0070 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain
publicly available information related to this action by any of the
following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0070.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are
provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section of this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (ET), Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
B. Submitting Comments
The NRC encourages electronic comment submission through the
Federal rulemaking website (https://www.regulations.gov). Please
include Docket ID NRC-2015-0070 in your comment submission.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at
https://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions
into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove such information before making the comment submissions available
to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS.
II. Background
Under 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52, the NRC requires current
and future holders of operating licenses and current and future holders
of combined licenses, respectively, to comply with a variety of
regulatory requirements related to decommissioning. This section
discusses previous rules that set out the NRC's requirements for
production and utilization facility decommissioning and activities that
have led to the development of this proposed rule.
A. 1988 Decommissioning Rule
On June 27, 1988, the NRC published a final rule titled, ``General
Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities'' (53 FR 24018)
(referred to herein as the ``1988 Final Rule''), which established
decommissioning requirements for various types of licensees. In this
rule, the NRC amended its regulations to provide specific requirements
for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Specifically, the final
rule established regulations on acceptable decommissioning
alternatives, planning for decommissioning, decommissioning timeliness,
assurance of the availability of funds for decommissioning, and
environmental review requirements related to decommissioning. The 1988
Final Rule amended the regulations that applied to applicants and
licensees under 10 CFR part 30, ``Rules of General Applicability to
Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material''; 10 CFR part 40, ``Domestic
Licensing of Source Material''; 10 CFR part 50; 10 CFR part 70,
``Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material''; and 10 CFR part 72,
``Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear
Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater than
Class C Waste.''
In the 1988 Final Rule, the NRC defined decommissioning as the
``removal of nuclear facilities safely from service and reduction of
residual radioactivity to a level that permits release of the property
for unrestricted use and termination of the license.'' The NRC also
stated in the 1988 Final Rule that decommissioning activities do not
include the removal and disposal of spent fuel, which is considered to
be an operational activity, or the removal and disposal of
nonradioactive structures and materials beyond that necessary to
terminate the NRC license.
The purpose of the 1988 Final Rule, in part, was to ensure that
reactor decommissioning would be carried out with minimal impact on
public and occupational health and safety and the environment. The
NRC's objective was that decommissioned facility sites would ultimately
be available for unrestricted use for any public or private purpose.
The amended regulations provided a regulatory framework for efficient
and consistent licensing actions related to decommissioning.
The NRC noted in the 1988 Final Rule that, although decommissioning
was not an imminent health and safety problem, the number and
complexity of facilities that would require decommissioning
[[Page 12258]]
was expected to increase, and inadequate or untimely consideration of
decommissioning, specifically in the areas of planning and financial
assurance, could result in significant adverse health, safety, and
environmental impacts. The 1988 Final Rule clearly states that the
licensee is responsible for the funding and completion of
decommissioning in a manner that protects public health and safety. The
NRC stated, ``With the increased number of decommissionings expected,
case-by-case procedures would make licensing difficult and increase NRC
and licensee staff resources needed for these activities'' (53 FR
24019).
The 1988 Final Rule required that, within 2 years after a licensee
permanently ceases operation of a licensed nuclear facility, the
licensee must submit a detailed decommissioning plan to the NRC for
approval along with a supplemental environmental report that addresses
environmental issues that have not already been considered. Based on
these submittals, the NRC reviewed the licensee's planned activities,
prepared a safety evaluation report and an environmental assessment
(EA), and either made a finding of no significant impact (the usual
case) or prepared an environmental impact statement. Upon approval of
the decommissioning plan, the NRC issued an order under Sec. 2.202,
``Orders,'' permitting the licensee to decommission its facility in
accordance with the approved plan. As part of the approval process for
the decommissioning plan, the public had the opportunity to request a
hearing under 10 CFR part 2, ``Agency Rules of Practice and
Procedure.'' The NRC would terminate the license once the
decommissioning process was completed and the NRC was satisfied that
the facility had been radioactively decontaminated to an unrestricted
release level under Sec. 20.1402, ``Radiological criteria for
unrestricted use.'' \1\
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\1\ License termination based upon a facility meeting the
unrestricted use criteria under Sec. 20.1402 is the most common
license termination scenario. The NRC may also terminate a facility
license under restricted conditions (Sec. 20.1403, ``Criteria for
license termination under restricted conditions'') and under
alternative criteria (Sec. 20.1404, ``Alternative criteria for
license termination'').
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If the licensee chose to place the reactor in storage and dismantle
it at a later time, the initial decommissioning plan submittal was not
required to be as detailed as a plan for prompt dismantlement. However,
before the licensee could begin dismantlement, the regulations required
that the licensee submit a detailed plan and environmental report to
the NRC for approval. Before the decommissioning plan was approved, the
licensee could not perform any major decommissioning activities. If a
licensee desired a reduction in requirements because of the permanent
cessation of operations, it had to obtain a license amendment for
possession-only status. This possession-only license amendment was
usually granted after the licensee indicated that the reactor had
permanently ceased operations and that fuel had been permanently
removed from the reactor vessel. Three examples of licensees that were
granted possession-only status are Yankee Atomic Electric Company for
the Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee Rowe) (August 5, 1992; ADAMS
Accession No. ML17283A069), Portland General Electric Company for the
Trojan Nuclear Power Plant (May 5, 1993; ADAMS Accession No.
ML18095A126), and Sacramento Municipal Utility District for the Rancho
Seco Nuclear Generating Station (March 17, 1992; ADAMS Accession No.
ML17283A071).
The 1988 Final Rule required licensees to provide assurance that,
at any time during the life of the facility through termination of the
license, adequate funds will be available to complete decommissioning.
For operating reactors, the 1988 Final Rule prescribed the required
amount of decommissioning funding in Sec. 50.75. The 1988 Final Rule
also imposed the requirement that, 5 years before license expiration or
cessation of operations, licensees must submit a preliminary
decommissioning plan containing a site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate and appropriately adjust the financial assurance mechanism. In
addition, the 1988 Final Rule required licensees to submit a
decommissioning plan, including a site-specific cost estimate for
decommissioning and a correspondingly adjusted financial assurance
mechanism, within 2 years after permanent cessation of operations. For
delayed dismantlement of a nuclear facility, the 1988 Final Rule
required licensees to submit an updated decommissioning plan with the
estimated cost covering the delay of decommissioning and to
appropriately adjust the financial assurance mechanism. Before approval
of the decommissioning plan, the 1988 Final Rule specified that
licensee use of the decommissioning funds would be determined on a
case-specific basis for premature closure, when the accrual of required
decommissioning funds may be incomplete.
B. 1996 Decommissioning Rule
On July 29, 1996, the NRC amended its regulations for reactor
decommissioning to clarify ambiguities, codify procedures that reduced
regulatory burden, provide greater flexibility, and allow for greater
public participation in the decommissioning process in a final rule
titled, ``Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors'' (61 FR 39278)
(referred to herein as the ``1996 Final Rule''). The 1996 Final Rule
made fundamental changes to nuclear power reactor decommissioning by
streamlining the process and reducing both licensee and NRC resource
expenditures while maintaining safety, protecting the environment, and
encouraging public involvement.
In the 1996 Final Rule, the NRC explained that the degree of
regulatory oversight required for a nuclear power reactor in
decommissioning is considerably less than that required for a facility
during its operating stage. During the operating stage of the reactor,
fuel in the reactor core undergoes a controlled nuclear fission
reaction that generates a high neutron flux and large amounts of heat.
Safe control of the nuclear reaction involves the use and operation of
many complex systems. First, the nuclear reaction must be carefully
controlled through neutron-absorbing mechanisms. Second, the heat
generated must be removed so that the fuel and its supporting structure
do not overheat. Third, the confining structure and ancillary systems
must be maintained and degradation caused by radiation and mechanical
and thermal stress ameliorated. Fourth, the radioactivity resulting
from the nuclear reaction in the form of direct radiation (especially
near the high neutron flux areas around the reactor vessel) and any
radiologically contaminated materials and radiological effluents
(gaseous and liquid) must be minimized and controlled. Moreover, proper
operating procedures must be established and maintained, with
appropriately trained staff to ensure that the reactor system is
properly operated and maintained, and that operating personnel minimize
their exposure to radiation when performing their duties. Finally,
emergency response procedures must be established and maintained to
protect the public in the event of an accident.
Decommissioning of a nuclear power reactor begins when the nuclear
fission reaction is stopped and the fuel (in the form of spent fuel
assemblies) is permanently removed from the reactor
[[Page 12259]]
vessel and placed in the SFP until transferred to interim storage in an
onsite ISFSI or transported offsite for storage or disposal. While the
spent fuel is still highly radioactive and generates heat caused by
radioactive decay, the fuel slowly cools as its energetic decay
products diminish. The SFP, which contains circulating water, removes
the decay heat and filters out any small radioactive contaminants
escaping the spent fuel assemblies. The SFP system is relatively simple
to operate and maintain compared to an operating nuclear power reactor.
The remainder of the facility may contain radioactive contamination in
areas that were directly impacted by reactor operation, and will be
more highly contaminated in the area of the reactor vessel. However, no
new radioactivity can be generated because the spent fuel is stored in
a configuration that precludes the nuclear fission reaction. Once the
nuclear fission process has permanently ceased and the fuel assemblies
have been removed from the reactor vessel, safety concerns for an SFP
are greatly reduced because there is no longer generation of large
amounts of heat, high neutron flux and related materials degradation,
and other related stresses that result from the functioning of an
operating reactor system.
Contaminated areas of the facility must still be controlled to
minimize radiation exposure to personnel and control the spread of
radioactive material. This situation is now similar to a contaminated
materials facility and does not require the oversight that an operating
reactor would require.
The amendments issued in the 1996 Final Rule provided licensees
with simplicity and flexibility in implementing the decommissioning
process, especially with regard to premature closure. The amendments
clarified ambiguities in the regulations existing at the time, codified
procedures and terminology that had been used in a number of specific
cases, and increased opportunities for the public to become informed
about the licensee's decommissioning activities. The amendments
established a level of NRC oversight commensurate with the level of
safety concerns expected during decommissioning activities.
Specifically, the 1996 Final Rule established or modified requirements
with regard to initial decommissioning activities, major
decommissioning activities, and license termination procedures.
With regard to initial decommissioning activities, the 1996 Final
Rule mandated that, once a licensee permanently ceases operation of the
nuclear power reactor and removes the fuel assemblies from the reactor
vessel, it could not undertake any major decommissioning activities
until it provided the public and the NRC with additional information
about the proposed decommissioning approach. The NRC required that the
licensee submit this information in the form of a PSDAR, which consists
of the licensee's proposed decommissioning activities and schedule
through license termination, a discussion of the reasons for concluding
that the environmental impacts associated with the proposed site-
specific decommissioning activities will be bounded by appropriate
previously issued environmental impact statements, and a
decommissioning cost estimate for the proposed activities. The NRC
makes the PSDAR available to the public for comment and holds a public
meeting concerning the PSDAR in the vicinity of the plant. The NRC,
however, does not approve the PSDAR and the submission of the PSDAR and
its review by the NRC does not require the licensee to request a
license amendment or any other approval.
The 1996 Final Rule also established that the licensee may not
begin performing major decommissioning activities until 90 days after
the NRC receives the PSDAR submittal and until the licensee submits the
certifications under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) that operations have permanently
ceased and that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor
vessel. The 1996 Final Rule also amended certain 10 CFR part 50
technical requirements to cover the transition of the facility from
operating to permanently shutdown status. Specifically, the 1996 Final
Rule removed the requirement for a licensee that has permanently ceased
operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel to obtain a license
amendment before proceeding with certain decommissioning activities
within established regulatory constraints (i.e., in accordance with
Sec. 50.59, ``Changes, tests and experiments''). These changes to the
decommissioning requirements increased the flexibility in the type of
actions that licensees could undertake without prior NRC approval.
With regard to major decommissioning activities, the 1996 Final
Rule implemented a major change from the 1988 Final Rule in that
nuclear power reactor licensees would no longer be required to have an
approved decommissioning plan before being permitted to perform major
decommissioning activities. The 1996 Final Rule allowed licensees to
perform activities that meet the criteria in Sec. 50.59, which the NRC
amended to include additional criteria to ensure that licensees
consider concerns specific to decommissioning. Based on NRC experience
with licensee decommissioning activities at the time, the NRC
recognized that the Sec. 50.59 process used by the licensee during
reactor operations encompassed routine activities that were similar to
those undertaken during the decommissioning process. The NRC concluded
that the licensee could use the Sec. 50.59 process to perform major
decommissioning activities if licensing conditions and the level of NRC
oversight required during reactor operations continued during
decommissioning, commensurate with the risk profile of the facility
being decommissioned. The 1996 Final Rule also required the licensee to
provide written notification to the NRC before performing any
decommissioning activity that is inconsistent with, or makes
significant schedule changes from, the actions and schedules described
in the PSDAR.
With regard to license termination, the 1996 Final Rule required
that a licensee wishing to terminate its license submit a license
termination plan for NRC approval. The approval process for the
termination plan provides for a hearing opportunity under 10 CFR part
2. The licensee must submit a supplemental environmental report that
considers new and significant environmental changes associated with
license termination activities. The 1996 Final Rule imposed an
additional requirement for the purpose of keeping the public informed.
A public meeting, similar to the one held after the PSDAR submittal,
must take place after the licensee submits its license termination plan
to the NRC.
The 1996 Final Rule continued the same degree of decommissioning
financial assurance that was previously required but provided more
flexibility by allowing licensees to have limited, early use of
decommissioning funds. The NRC presented this provision in a February
3, 1994, draft policy statement titled, ``Use of Decommissioning Trust
Funds before Decommissioning Plan Approval'' (59 FR 5216), which was
published for comment and eventually incorporated into the 1996 Final
Rule. Before issuance of the 1996 Final Rule, licensee use of these
funds was determined on a case-specific basis for prematurely shutdown
plants. However, the 1996 Final Rule eliminated the requirement for a
decommissioning plan and instead required a PSDAR submittal, which
requires a decommissioning cost estimate. The 1996 Final Rule permitted
3 percent of the decommissioning funds generically
[[Page 12260]]
required by Sec. 50.75 to be available to the licensee for
decommissioning planning purposes. Moreover, to allow the licensee to
accomplish major decommissioning activities promptly, an additional 20
percent of the generic funding amount would be made available 90 days
after the NRC had received the PSDAR if the licensee had also submitted
the certifications required by Sec. 50.82(a)(1). The use of any funds
above those amounts required the licensee to submit a site-specific
decommissioning cost estimate to the NRC prior to the use of those
funds.
C. Post-1996 Final Rule Decommissioning Activity
In a series of Commission papers issued between 1997 and 2001, the
NRC staff provided options and recommendations to the Commission to
address regulatory improvements related to nuclear power reactor
decommissioning. To consolidate these recommendations, in the Staff
Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-99-168, ``Staff Requirements--
SECY-99-168--Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated December 21, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003752190),
the Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a single,
integrated, and risk-informed decommissioning rule addressing the areas
of EP, insurance, safeguards, staffing and training, and backfitting
for decommissioning nuclear power reactors. The objective of the
rulemaking was to clarify and remove certain regulations for
decommissioning nuclear power reactors based in large part on the
reduction in radiological risk compared to operating reactors.
On June 28, 2000, the NRC staff submitted SECY-00-0145,
``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning,''
to the Commission (ADAMS Accession No. ML003721626). In this paper, the
NRC staff proposed an integrated decommissioning rulemaking plan and
requested Commission approval to proceed with developing an integrated
rulemaking for nuclear power plant decommissioning in accordance with
the recommendations detailed in the rulemaking plan. The paper
addressed the regulatory areas of EP, insurance, safeguards, staffing
and training, and backfitting for decommissioning nuclear power
reactors. The rulemaking plan was contingent on the completion of a SFP
zirconium fire risk study. The Commission responded to SECY-00-0145 in
an SRM dated September 27, 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003754381). The
Commission returned that SECY to the staff without a vote on the
rulemaking plan pending further developments in the area and requested
that the staff submit a revised paper to the Commission.
D. Spent Fuel Pool Studies
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the NRC was assessing the risk
of an SFP accident at a nuclear power reactor site in decommissioning.
Following the removal of spent fuel from the reactor, the principal
radiological risks are associated with the storage of spent fuel on
site. Generally, a few months after the reactor has been permanently
shut down and defueled, there are no possible design-basis accidents
that could result in a radiological release exceeding the limits
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early-
phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary
(EPA-400-R-92-001, ``Manual of Protective Action Guides And Protective
Actions For Nuclear Incidents,'' issued May 1992, and final revision
EPA-400/R-17/001, ``PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning
Guidance for Radiological Incidents,'' issued January 2017). The only
SFP accident scenario that might lead to a release with offsite
consequences exceeding the PAGs at a decommissioning reactor is a
zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly
unlikely, beyond-design-basis accident scenario that involves a major
loss of water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a significant heatup
of the spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding
oxidation, fire, and fuel damage. The significance of spent fuel heatup
scenarios that might result in a zirconium fire depends on the decay
heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the
probability of a zirconium fire scenario continues to decrease as a
function of the time that the decommissioning reactor has been
permanently shut down and defueled.
In the 1980s, the NRC examined the risk of an SFP accident as
Generic Safety Issue 82, ``Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel
Pools,'' because of the increased use of high-density storage racks and
laboratory studies that indicated the possibility of a zirconium fire
spreading between assemblies in an air-cooled environment (see Section
3 of NUREG-0933, ``Resolution of Generic Safety Issues,'' issued
December 2011 (available at https://www.nrc.gov/sr0933/Section%203.%20New%20Generic%20Issues/082r3.html)). The risk assessment
and cost benefit analyses developed through this effort (Section 6.2 of
NUREG-1353, ``Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue
82, `Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools,' '' issued
April 1989 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082330232)) concluded that the risk
of a severe accident in the SFP was low and appeared to meet the public
health objectives of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement (51
FR 30028; August 21, 1986) and that no new regulatory requirements were
warranted.
To support the rulemaking for decommissioning nuclear power plants
in the late 1990s, the NRC reevaluated the risk of an SFP accident. The
NRC's assessment in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool
Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' issued
February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), conservatively assumed
that if the water level in the SFP dropped below the top of the spent
fuel, an SFP zirconium fire involving all of the spent fuel would occur
and thereby bounded those conditions associated with air cooling of the
fuel (including partial draindown scenarios) and fire propagation. Even
with this conservative assumption, the study found the risk of an SFP
fire to be low and well within the Commission's safety goals.
Although NUREG-1738 did not completely rule out the possibility of
a zirconium fire, it did demonstrate that storage of spent fuel in a
high-density configuration in SFPs is safe and that the risk of
accidental release of a significant amount of radioactive material to
the environment is low. The study used simplified and sometimes
bounding assumptions and models to characterize the likelihood and
consequences of beyond-design-basis SFP accidents. Subsequent NRC
regulatory activities and studies (described in more detail in this
section) have reaffirmed the safety and security of spent fuel stored
in pools and have demonstrated that SFPs are effectively designed to
prevent accidents and minimize damage from malevolent attacks.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC
took several actions to further reduce the possibility of an SFP fire.
The NRC issued immediately effective nonpublic orders (see the cover
letter at ADAMS Accession No. ML020510637) that required licensees to
implement additional security measures, including increased patrols,
augmented security forces and capabilities, and more restrictive site-
access controls to reduce the likelihood of an SFP accident resulting
from a terrorist-initiated event. A memorandum to the Commission
[[Page 12261]]
titled, ``Documentation of Evolution of Security Requirements at
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants with Respect to Mitigation Measures for
Large Fires and Explosions,'' dated February 4, 2010 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML092990438), provides a comprehensive discussion of these actions,
some of which specifically address SFP safety and security.
New requirements to mitigate a postulated loss of SFP water
inventory were also implemented following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001; these requirements resulted in enhanced spent fuel
coolability and the potential to recover SFP water level and cooling
prior to a postulated SFP zirconium fire. Based on the implementation
of these additional strategies, the probability and, accordingly, the
risk to the public health and safety of an SFP zirconium fire scenario
has decreased and is expected to be less than previously analyzed in
NUREG-1738 and previous studies.
After the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC also addressed by
order the issue of potential aircraft impacts to the SFP by requiring
licensees to have in place mitigating strategies for large fires or
explosions at nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
provided detailed guidance in NEI 06-12, Revision 2, ``B.5.b Phase 2 &
3 Submittal Guideline,'' dated December 2006 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML070090060). The NRC found this guidance acceptable for use as
documented in NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review of
Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition,''
Section 19.4, ``Strategies and Guidance to Address Loss of Large Areas
of the Plant Due to Explosions and Fires,'' Revision 0, dated June 2015
(ADAMS Accession No. ML13316B202). The NRC's issuance of the final rule
titled, ``Power Reactor Security Requirements,'' on March 27, 2009 (74
FR 13926), made the requirements of the order generically applicable.
In that final rule, the NRC added Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) to require
licensees to develop and implement guidance and strategies to, among
other things, maintain or restore SFP cooling capability in the event
of loss of large areas of the plant resulting from fires or explosions,
which further decreases the probability of an SFP fire.
Under Sec. 50.54(hh)(2), nuclear power reactor licensees are
required to implement strategies such as those provided in NEI 06-12.
The NEI guidance specifies that portable, power independent pumping
capabilities must be able to provide at least 500 gallons per minute of
bulk water makeup to the SFP and at least 200 gallons per minute of
water spray to the SFP. Recognizing that the SFP is more susceptible to
a release when the spent fuel is in a nondispersed configuration (i.e.,
fuel assemblies with more decay heat are not dispersed among fuel
assemblies with less decay heat), the guidance also specifies that the
portable equipment should be capable of being deployed within 2 hours
for a nondispersed configuration.
Further, other organizations, such as Sandia National Laboratories
(SNL), have confirmed the effectiveness of the additional mitigation
strategies to maintain spent fuel cooling in the event that the pool is
damaged and its initial water inventory is reduced or lost entirely.
The analyses conducted by SNL (collectively referred to as the ``Sandia
studies'') are sensitive security-related information and are not
available to the public. The Sandia studies considered spent fuel
loading patterns and other aspects of a pressurized water reactor SFP
and a boiling water reactor SFP, including the role that the
circulation of air plays in the cooling of spent fuel when there is a
partial or complete loss of water. The Sandia studies indicated that
there is a significant amount of time between the initiating event
(i.e., the event that causes the SFP water level to drop) and the point
at which the spent fuel assemblies become partially or completely
uncovered. In addition, the Sandia studies indicated that for those
hypothetical conditions in which air cooling may not be effective in
preventing a zirconium fire, there is a significant amount of time
between the spent fuel becoming uncovered and the possible onset of
such a zirconium fire, thereby providing a substantial opportunity for
event mitigation. The Sandia studies, which account for relevant heat
transfer and fluid flow mechanisms, also indicated that air cooling
spent fuel could be sufficient to prevent SFP zirconium fires at a
point much earlier following fuel offload from the reactor than
previously considered in NUREG-1738.
In NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling
Water Reactor,'' issued September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365), the NRC evaluated the potential benefits of strategies
required in Sec. 50.54(hh)(2). The report explains that successful
implementation of mitigation strategies significantly reduces the
likelihood of a release from the SFP in the event of a loss of cooling
water. Additionally, the NRC found that the placement of spent fuel in
a dispersed configuration in the SFP would have a positive effect in
promoting natural circulation, which enhances air coolability and
thereby reduces the likelihood of a release from a completely drained
SFP. The NRC issued Information Notice 2014-14, ``Potential Safety
Enhancements to Spent Fuel Pool Storage,'' dated November 14, 2014
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14218A493), to all nuclear power reactor and
ISFSI licensees to inform them of the insights from NUREG-2161. This
information notice describes the benefits of storing spent fuel in more
favorable configurations, placing spent fuel in dispersed patterns
immediately after core offload, and taking action to improve mitigation
strategies.
In 2013, the NRC documented a regulatory analysis in COMSECY-13-
0030, ``Staff Evaluation and Recommendation for Japan Lessons Learned
Tier 3 Issue on Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13329A918), which considered a broad history of the NRC's oversight
of spent fuel storage and SFP operating experience (domestic and
international) and relied on information compiled in NUREG-2161. In
COMSECY-13-0030, the NRC staff concluded that SFPs are robust
structures with large safety margins and recommended to the Commission
that further regulatory actions to require the expedited transfer of
spent fuel from SFPs to dry cask storage were not warranted. The
Commission subsequently approved the staff's recommendation in SRM-
COMSECY-13-0030, dated May 23, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14143A360).
In addition, in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the
NRC implemented additional regulatory actions to further enhance
reactor and SFP safety. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued two orders:
Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable
Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679),
and Order EA-12-049, ``Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735). Order EA-12-051 required
licensees to install reliable means of remotely monitoring wide-range
SFP levels to support effective prioritization of event mitigation and
recovery actions in the event of a beyond-design--basis external event.
Although the primary purpose of the order was to ensure that operators
were not distracted by uncertainties related to SFP conditions during
the accident
[[Page 12262]]
response, the improved monitoring capabilities would help in the
diagnosis and response to potential losses of SFP integrity. Order EA-
12-049 required licensees to, among other actions, develop, implement,
and maintain guidance and strategies to maintain or restore SFP cooling
capabilities independent of normal alternating current power systems
following a beyond-design-basis external event. Further, the NRC issued
the Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events final rule on August 9,
2019 (84 FR 39684), which made these two orders generically applicable
and moved the requirements of Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) to paragraph (b)(2) of
the new Sec. 50.155, ``Mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.''
These requirements ensure that a more reliable and robust mitigation
capability is in place to address degrading conditions in SFPs
resulting from certain significant, but unlikely, events.
The additional mitigation strategies implemented after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, such as the issuance of Sec.
50.54(hh)(2) (now Sec. 50.155(b)(2)) and the NRC's review and approval
of NEI 06-12, and the issuance of Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051, made
generically applicable as Sec. 50.155(b)(1) and Sec. 50.155(e),
following the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident enhance spent fuel
coolability and the potential to recover SFP water level and cooling
before the initiation of a potential SFP zirconium fire. The Sandia
studies also confirmed the effectiveness of additional mitigation
strategies to maintain spent fuel cooling in the event that the pool is
drained. Based on this information and the implementation of additional
strategies, the probability of an SFP zirconium fire initiation in a
draindown event is expected to be less than that reported in NUREG-1738
and previous studies and therefore well within the Commission's
expressed safety goals, as described previously.
E. Changes in Nuclear Power Reactor Decommissioning at the NRC and
Within the Nuclear Power Industry
On June 4, 2001, the NRC staff submitted SECY-01-0100, ``Policy
Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency Preparedness
Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in
Spent Fuel Pools'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML011450420), to the
Commission. Before the Commission responded to SECY-01-0100, the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred. Given the security
implications of those events and the results of the NUREG-1738
zirconium fire risk study that showed the risk of an SFP fire to be low
and well within the Commission's safety goals, the NRC later redirected
its rulemaking priorities and resources to focus on programmatic
regulatory changes related to safeguards and security. In a memorandum
to the Commission titled, ``Status of Regulatory Exemptions for
Decommissioning Plants,'' dated August 16, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML030550706), the NRC staff justified this redirection in part by
observing that no additional permanent nuclear power reactor shutdowns
were anticipated in the foreseeable future and that no immediate need
existed to proceed with the decommissioning regulatory improvement work
that was planned. The NRC staff concluded that, if any additional
nuclear power reactors permanently shut down after the rulemaking
effort was suspended, establishment of the decommissioning regulatory
framework would continue to be addressed for each facility through the
license amendment and exemption processes.
Between 1998 and 2013, no nuclear power reactors permanently ceased
operation. Between 2013 and 2021, however, 12 nuclear power reactors
permanently shut down, defueled, and entered decommissioning. Notably,
in 2013, four nuclear power reactor units permanently shut down without
significant advance notice or preplanning: Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear
Generating Plant (Duke Energy Florida); Kewaunee Power Station
(Dominion Energy); and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS),
Units 2 and 3 (Southern California Edison). In addition, on December
29, 2014, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) permanently ceased
operations at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY); on October
24, 2016, the Omaha Public Power District permanently ceased operations
at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1; on September 17, 2018, Exelon
Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) permanently ceased operations at
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station; on May 31, 2019, Entergy
permanently ceased operations at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; on
September 20, 2019, Exelon permanently ceased operations at Three Mile
Island, Unit 1; on April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively,
Entergy permanently ceased operations at Indian Point Nuclear
Generating, Unit Nos. 2 and 3; and on August 10, 2020, NextEra Energy
Duane Arnold, LLC (NextEra) permanently ceased operations of Duane
Arnold Energy Center. Licensees have also announced plans for
additional near-term permanent shutdowns, including Palisades Nuclear
Plant (Entergy) and Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Pacific
Gas & Electric Co.).
Decommissioning reactor licensees and the NRC have expended
substantial resources processing licensing actions for nuclear power
reactors during their transition period to decommissioning status.
Consistent with the nuclear power reactors that permanently shut down
in the 1990s, the licensees that are currently transitioning to
decommissioning have been requesting NRC review and approval of
licensing actions, informed by the low risk of an offsite radiological
release posed by a decommissioning reactor. Specifically, the licensees
are seeking NRC approvals of exemptions from requirements and license
amendments to reflect the reduced operations and radiological risks
posed by a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor.
F. Decommissioning Lessons Learned Report
In October 2016, the NRC published the ``Power Reactor Transition
from Operations to Decommissioning: Lessons Learned Report'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML16085A029). The report documents the lessons learned by
the NRC and stakeholders associated with permanent nuclear power
reactor shutdowns during the period from 2013 to 2016. In particular,
the report focuses on the transition from reactor operations to
decommissioning for Kewaunee, Crystal River Unit 3, SONGS Units 2 and
3, and VY. The transition process includes the NRC's review and
approval of certain requests for exemptions from the NRC's regulations
and for license amendments to modify the operating reactors' licensing
bases to reflect those of decommissioning reactors. After these actions
are complete, the NRC then transfers the project management and
oversight responsibility from its Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
to its Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS). Project
management support is provided by NMSS for these decommissioning
reactors until license termination. The report also provides a number
of best practices identified from recent experience with reactor
shutdowns and the transition to decommissioning.
The report highlights some of the challenges experienced by the NRC
during the decommissioning transition licensing reviews from 2013 to
2016 and the NRC's actions to address those challenges. The report also
discusses external stakeholders' interest in the NRC's review of the
decommissioning transition licensing activities, especially
[[Page 12263]]
those associated with SONGS Units 2 and 3 and VY, as represented by
requests for hearings, public meetings, and questions to the NRC staff.
In addition to the lessons learned and best practices, the report
provides detailed project management guidance, recommendations, and
documentation of precedent related to the reviews and evaluations
specific to the types of licensing actions that the NRC expects to be
processed during the decommissioning transition period, including
oversight activities and communications. The NRC considered many of the
lessons learned and recommendations described in this report during the
development of this proposed rule.
G. Initiation of This Proposed Rule
In light of the number of licensees deciding to permanently shut
down their nuclear power reactors, the Commission directed the NRC
staff to proceed with an integrated rulemaking on nuclear power reactor
decommissioning in an SRM dated December 30, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14364A111), associated with SECY-14-0118, ``Request by Duke Energy
Florida, Inc., for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning
Requirements,'' dated October 29, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14219A444). The Commission further stated that this rulemaking should
address:
Issues discussed in SECY-00-0145 such as the graded
approach to EP;
Lessons learned from the plants that have already gone
through (or are currently going through) the decommissioning process;
The advisability of requiring a licensee's PSDAR to be
approved by the NRC;
The appropriateness of maintaining the three existing
options for decommissioning (DECON, SAFSTOR, and ENTOMB) \2\ and the
timeframes associated with those options;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Additional information about the existing options for
decommissioning is available in NUREG/BR-0521, Rev. 1,
``Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated June 2017 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML17177A253).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The appropriate role of State and local governments and
non-governmental stakeholders in the decommissioning process; and
Any other issues deemed relevant by the NRC staff.
In SECY-15-0014, ``Anticipated Schedule and Estimated Resources for
a Power Reactor Decommissioning Rulemaking,'' dated January 30, 2015
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A089, redacted), the NRC staff committed to
proceed with a rulemaking on nuclear power reactor decommissioning and
provided an anticipated schedule and estimate of the resources required
for the completion of a decommissioning rulemaking.
H. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
To begin the nuclear power reactor decommissioning rulemaking
process, the NRC published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPR) in the Federal Register on November 19, 2015 (80 FR 72358). In
the ANPR, the NRC sought public comment on specific questions and
issues with respect to possible revisions of the NRC's decommissioning
requirements. The NRC staff considered the comments received on the
ANPR in its formulation of a draft regulatory basis for further
regulatory action. Section 5 of the draft regulatory basis (ADAMS
Accession No. ML17047A413) summarizes the public comments received on
the ANPR.
I. Regulatory Basis
The NRC published the draft regulatory basis in the Federal
Register on March 15, 2017 (82 FR 13778). In the draft regulatory
basis, the NRC staff presented draft recommendations for amendments to
the NRC's regulations and guidance development to provide regulatory
improvements for nuclear power reactors transitioning to
decommissioning. The NRC requested public comment on these
recommendations and asked specific questions regarding other possible
revisions of the NRC's requirements. In addition, the NRC published a
preliminary draft regulatory analysis on May 9, 2017 (82 FR 21481). The
NRC held a public meeting from May 8-10, 2017, to discuss the draft
regulatory basis and the associated preliminary draft regulatory
analysis and issued a summary of the meeting on November 15, 2017
(ADAMS Accession No. ML17157B211).
The NRC received 40 public comment submissions on the draft
regulatory basis and preliminary draft regulatory analysis, which it
considered in its formulation of the revised regulatory basis. The NRC
published a Federal Register notice announcing the public availability
of the regulatory basis on November 27, 2017 (82 FR 55954).\3\
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\3\ At the time of publication of the regulatory basis, the
rulemaking title was ``Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors
Transitioning to Decommissioning.'' During the development of the
proposed rule, the scope of the rulemaking expanded to include all
production and utilization facilities licensed under 10 CFR parts 50
and 52. In order to reflect this change, the NRC has changed the
title of the rulemaking to ``Regulatory Improvements for Production
and Utilization Facilities Transitioning to Decommissioning.''
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III. Discussion
A. Current Regulatory Process
Decommissioning requirements for production and utilization
facilities are codified in Sec. Sec. 50.82 and 52.110. Associated
decommissioning funding requirements are codified in Sec. Sec. 50.75,
50.82, and 52.110. A nuclear power reactor licensee formally begins the
decommissioning process when it certifies its permanent cessation of
operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel under
Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a). Once the NRC dockets these
certifications, under Sec. 50.82(a)(2) or Sec. 52.110(b), the 10 CFR
part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.
Despite this withdrawal of authority to operate the reactor, a
decommissioning nuclear power plant continues to retain a license under
10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52. For this reason, the decommissioning
plant continues to be subject to many of the requirements that apply to
plants authorized to operate under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52.
Regulations that are designed to protect the public against reactor
operation related design-basis events that include conditions of normal
operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and design-basis
accidents (DBAs) are no longer applicable at a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor. For example, certain accident sequences for a nuclear
power reactor that is operating, such as loss of coolant accidents and
anticipated transients without scram, are no longer relevant to a
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor. In addition, some
regulations may not be relevant to certain SSCs because the SSCs are no
longer required to be maintained, to operate, or to mitigate certain
accidents, events, or transients, regardless of whether they are
safety-related or security-related SSCs. Other regulations, although
based on power operation of the plant, may continue to be applicable to
the permanently defueled facility for a limited time, such as the
standards for offsite radiological emergency preparedness (REP) plans
under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52. Typically, the scope of NRC
requirements can be reduced to those regulations and requirements that
primarily pertain to the safe storage of the spent fuel in the SFP, as
described in the site's final safety analysis report (FSAR).
[[Page 12264]]
Upon permanent cessation of reactor operations and removal of fuel
from the reactor vessel, the licensee is likely to submit a significant
number of licensing actions (license amendment and exemption requests)
to the NRC for review and approval based primarily on the reduced
radiological risk to public health and safety. As discussed previously
in this document, the types of potential accidents at decommissioning
reactors are fewer, and the risks of radiological releases are reduced,
when compared to those at an operating reactor. Therefore, to reflect
this reduction in risk, licensees of decommissioning reactors typically
request certain amendments to their licenses and certain exemptions
from the NRC's regulations. These licensing actions, which are
processed by the NRC during licensees' transition from operating to
decommissioning status, establish the regulatory framework for reactors
that have permanently shut down and defueled.
For non-power reactor facilities, Sec. 50.82(b) requires that the
licensee apply for license termination within two years following
permanent cessation of operation. Each application for termination of a
license must be accompanied, or preceded, by a proposed decommissioning
plan (DP). In addition to the DP required by Sec. 50.82, Sec.
50.75(f)(4) requires each licensee to submit a preliminary DP. The
preliminary DP must be submitted at or about 2 years before the
projected end of operation. In addition to the DP, Sec. 51.53(d)
requires each applicant for a license amendment approving a DP to
submit a supplement to its environmental report (ER).
The decommissioning process for non-power reactor licensees begins
with the removal of fuel as soon as possible after reactor operations
permanently cease and the shipment of the fuel offsite in accordance
with the U.S. Department of Energy, NRC, and U.S. Department of
Transportation regulations. Under some circumstances, the licensee can
apply for a possession-only license amendment under Sec. 50.90,
``Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early
site permit,'' after operations have ended and before decommissioning
starts. The possession-only license amendment limits the licensee's
authority to possessing specific nuclear material but does not
authorize its use or the operation of a nuclear facility. If granted, a
possession-only license amendment provides regulatory relief from the
license and technical specification (TS) requirements for a non-power
reactor in decommissioning. Further, the possession-only amendment
permits the licensee to retain the facility, related radioactive
byproduct material, and, in some cases, special nuclear material,
pending approval of the DP.
In addition to requesting license amendments and exemptions,
nuclear power reactor licensees can make certain changes without prior
NRC approval if the changes are permitted by an NRC regulation.
Licensees primarily use an evaluation process with criteria in Sec.
50.59 to make changes in a facility (or procedures) as described in the
FSAR (as updated), including changes to the PSDAR, without prior NRC
approval. The licensee's updated FSAR should reflect changes to the
decommissioning design-basis analyses, SSCs, and the licensee's
organizations, processes, and procedures. Licensees can also make
changes without prior NRC approval as described in Sec. 50.54(p) and
Sec. 50.54(q). In the case of non-power reactor facilities, the DP,
which is put into effect with an order, provides for accommodation of
any necessary changes in the DP and procedures through a process
similar to the one in Sec. 50.59.
The timing and implementation for some decommissioning licensing
actions rely on an approach that recognizes the reduction in
radiological risk after permanent cessation of power operation and
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. These risk reductions can be
tied to several factors, including, but not limited to: (1) Reduction
of the radiological source term after cessation of power operation and
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, (2) elapsed time after
permanent shutdown, and (3) type of long-term onsite fuel storage. The
two areas where these additional risk reductions are considered in the
early decommissioning process are EP and facility insurance and
indemnity. The NRC will not approve exemptions from EP and insurance
coverage requirements until analyses confirm that there are no DBAs
that would require protective actions for the public resulting from a
release of radioactive material with a dose exceeding the EPA's PAGs at
the exclusion area boundary. The analyses also must assess a postulated
beyond-design-basis zirconium fire scenario.
B. Objectives of This Proposed Rule
This proposed rule would amend the current requirements for
production and utilization facility licensees during decommissioning.
Experience has demonstrated that licensees for decommissioning nuclear
power reactors seek several exemptions and license amendments per site
to establish a long-term licensing basis for decommissioning. Non-power
production or utilization facility licensees typically seek license
amendments in decommissioning to change their 10 CFR part 50 operating
licenses to possession-only licenses. By issuing this rule, the NRC
would establish regulations that would maintain safety and security at
sites transitioning to decommissioning without the need to grant
specific exemptions or license amendments in certain regulatory areas.
Specifically, the decommissioning rulemaking would: (1) Propose a
regulatory regime that continues to provide reasonable assurance of
adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense
and security at decommissioning sites; (2) ensure that the requirements
for decommissioning are clear and appropriate; (3) adopt regulations to
address generic issues applicable to all decommissioning nuclear power
reactors that have historically been addressed through similarly worded
exemptions or license amendments; and (4) identify, define, and resolve
additional areas of concern related to the regulation of
decommissioning licensees under 10 CFR parts 50 and 52.
Given that the current regulatory framework regarding
decommissioning is adequate to protect public health and safety and the
common defense and security, many of the new requirements proposed by
this rulemaking are alternatives to the current requirements.
C. Applicability
This proposed rule would apply to the following categories of
license holders:
Nuclear power reactors currently licensed under 10 CFR part 50
Future nuclear power reactors licensed under 10 CFR part 50
Nuclear power reactors currently licensed under 10 CFR part 52
Future nuclear power reactors licensed under 10 CFR part 52
Non-power production or utilization facilities and fuel
reprocessing plants currently licensed under 10 CFR part 50
Future non-power production or utilization facilities and
fuel reprocessing plants licensed under 10 CFR part 50
D. Applicability to NRC Licensees During Operations
The proposed rule includes changes in three areas that would apply
to NRC licensees during operations: (1) The process to change a
licensee's security plan, (2) the timing of decommissioning
[[Page 12265]]
funding assurance reporting requirements, and (3) identification of 10
CFR 26.3, ``Scope,'' as a regulation with substantive requirements that
could result in criminal penalties if violated.
The NRC's regulations in Sec. 50.54(p) establish processes that
allow licensees to make changes to their security plans. The NRC is
proposing that all nuclear power reactor licensees making a change
under Sec. 50.54(p)(2) submit in their report of the change a summary
of any analysis that was completed to make the determination that the
change does not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the security
plan. Additionally, the NRC is proposing to revise Sec. 50.54(p) to
include definitions of the terms ``change'' and ``decrease in
safeguards effectiveness.'' The application of these definitions is
limited to use with the revised Sec. 50.54(p) and will apply to all
holders of 10 CFR part 50 operating licenses and 10 CFR part 52
combined licenses.
The proposed rule would change the timing of the decommissioning
funding assurance reporting requirements in Sec. 50.75(f)(1) to
coordinate them with the ISFSI decommissioning reporting requirements
in Sec. 72.30, ``Financial assurance and recordkeeping for
decommissioning.'' This change would convert the biennial
decommissioning funding status report required for 10 CFR part 50 and
10 CFR part 52 nuclear power reactor licensees to a triennial
decommissioning funding status report as currently required for 10 CFR
part 72 ISFSI licensees.
Current Sec. 26.3 includes a substantive requirement and
violations of this regulation should be subject to criminal penalties.
Therefore, this proposed rule would remove Sec. 26.3 from the list of
provisions that are not subject to criminal penalties if violated in
Sec. 26.825(b).
E. Applicability to ISFSI-Only and Standalone ISFSI/Decommissioned
Reactor Sites
During the public comment period for the draft regulatory basis,
the NRC received many comments on the applicability of the
decommissioning rulemaking to ``standalone ISFSI'' \4\ sites where the
associated reactor has already been decommissioned in comparison with
``ISFSI-only'' sites. As part of this rulemaking effort, the NRC
recommends standardizing the terms ``ISFSI-only'' and ``standalone
ISFSI/Decommissioned Reactor'' as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Given that the public comments referred to ``standalone
ISFSIs,'' this proposed rule uses that same terminology. However, in
accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 2690, ``Inspection Program
for Dry Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel at Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installations and for 10 CFR part 71 Transportation
Packagings,'' dated March 9, 2012, the NRC uses the term ``away-
from-reactor (AFR) ISFSI'' to refer to ``any general licensed ISFSI
where decommissioning and final survey activities related to reactor
operations are completed and the only remaining operation conducted
under the 10 CFR part 50 license is the operation of the general
licensed ISFSI.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``ISFSI-only'' sites contain nuclear power reactor
facilities that are still involved in decommissioning activities, but
the spent fuel has been completely transferred from the SFPs to dry
storage in an onsite ISFSI. For these facilities, the remaining
decommissioning activities are primarily related to remediation of any
remaining residual radioactivity at the site to meet the license
termination and decommissioning criteria in 10 CFR part 20, subpart E.
The ``ISFSI-only'' term refers to the location of the spent fuel; the
term reflects that no spent fuel is stored in the SFP, and all of the
spent fuel is in dry storage in an onsite ISFSI.
``Standalone ISFSI/Decommissioned Reactor'' sites are
those former nuclear power reactor facilities where the license
termination and decommissioning criteria in 10 CFR part 20, subpart E,
have already been met, with the exception of the ISFSI area. The
licensee's 10 CFR part 50 license for the site has been reduced to an
area that only encompasses the ISFSI facility (unless the facility
ISFSI is licensed under a 10 CFR part 72 specific license, in which
case the 10 CFR part 50 license is wholly terminated). The remaining
activities at these facilities that are regulated by the NRC are spent
fuel storage and the eventual decommissioning of the ISFSI itself, once
the spent fuel has been permanently removed from the site. A 10 CFR
part 72 specific license ISFSI is decommissioned in accordance with 10
CFR 72.54, ``Expiration and termination of licenses and decommissioning
of sites and separate buildings or outdoor areas.''
Accordingly, the proposed requirements would not apply to
standalone ISFSI/Decommissioned Reactor sites because those licensees
have already decommissioned their 10 CFR part 50 facilities and met the
decommissioning and license termination criteria in 10 CFR part 20,
subpart E, with the exception of the area encompassed by the remaining
ISFSI. The proposed requirements are consistent with the licensing
actions that the NRC has already approved for these licensees. In
addition, the proposed requirements of this rulemaking provide an
alternative to the existing decommissioning regulations and would not
impose new requirements on ISFSI-only licensees.
F. Graded Approach
As the NRC reviewed the exemption and license amendment requests
related to the recent nuclear power reactor decommissionings and noted
the growing list of future planned permanent shutdowns, as discussed in
the ``Background'' section of this document, the NRC realized that the
existing regulatory framework could and should be revised to provide
for a more efficient decommissioning process. As early as the late
1990's, the NRC contemplated an integrated rulemaking to provide an
appropriate graded approach to the decommissioning process. A graded
approach is a process by which the safety requirements and criteria
adjust during the decommissioning process commensurate with several
factors. These factors include the magnitude of any credible hazard
involved, the particular characteristics of a facility, and the balance
between radiological hazards and non-radiological hazards (e.g., fire,
flood, chemical spill) as applicable to specific points in time within
the decommissioning process. This approach would be a risk-informed
process.
Currently, no explicit regulatory provisions distinguish
requirements in several technical areas for a nuclear power reactor
that has permanently ceased operations from those for an operating
nuclear power reactor. To address this, the NRC is proposing to amend
its regulations to provide an efficient regulatory framework for the
transition to decommissioning. Under this proposed rule, the NRC would
adopt an optional graded approach for several technical areas that
provides a set of requirements commensurate with the reductions in
radiological risk at each of the following four levels of
decommissioning: (1) Permanent cessation of operations and permanent
removal of all fuel from the reactor vessel, (2) sufficient decay of
fuel in the SFP such that it would not reach ignition temperature for
the zirconium alloy cladding of the fuel within 10 hours under
adiabatic heatup conditions (i.e., a complete loss of SFP water
inventory with no heat loss), (3) transfer of all fuel to dry storage,
and (4) removal of all fuel from the site. Four technical areas of this
proposed rule (Emergency Preparedness, Physical Security, Cyber
Security, and Offsite and Onsite Insurance) use all or some of this
graded approach.
[[Page 12266]]
G. Technical Basis for Graded Approach
The NRC has approved exemptions from the emergency planning
regulations in Sec. 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and appendix E,
``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization
Facilities,'' to 10 CFR part 50 at several permanently shutdown and
defueled nuclear power reactor sites. Licensees that have been granted
EP exemptions must maintain an onsite emergency plan addressing the
classification of an emergency, notification of emergencies to licensee
personnel and offsite authorities, and coordination with designated
offsite government officials following an event declaration so that, if
needed, offsite authorities may initiate appropriate response actions.
At the appropriate points in decommissioning, the EP exemptions may
also relieve the licensee from certain requirements of Sec. 50.47 and
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 as they pertain to offsite radiological
EP, including the requirement to maintain the 10-mile plume exposure
pathway and the 50-mile ingestion pathway emergency planning zones
(EPZs). The NRC granted these exemptions based, in part, on its
determination that there are no applicable design-basis accidents at a
decommissioning licensee's facility that could result in an offsite
radiological release exceeding the limits established by the EPA's
early-phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
The NRC also relied on analyses from NUREG-1738 that showed that
emergency planning would be of marginal benefit in reducing the risk of
a beyond-design-basis zirconium fire in the SFP if the accident evolved
slowly enough to allow mitigative measures and, if necessary, to allow
offsite protective actions to be implemented without preplanning. This
conclusion was based, in part, on the assumption that it would take at
least 10 hours for spent fuel to heat up to the temperature at which
the onset of fission product release is expected during an SFP rapid
draindown event. This 10-hour period would provide a substantial amount
of time for the licensee to take onsite mitigation measures and, if
necessary, for offsite authorities to take appropriate response actions
to protect the public. To support the approval of exemptions from
portions of the EP regulations, licensees had to demonstrate through
site-specific analyses that in a draindown event at their SFP the fuel
would not reach the zirconium fuel cladding ignition temperature for at
least 10 hours under adiabatic heatup conditions.
A 10-hour timeframe has been justified in the past for similar
purposes. In the Low Power Rule (47 FR 30232; July 13, 1982), the NRC
amended its regulations to clarify that no NRC or Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) review, findings, and determinations
concerning the state or adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness were
necessary for issuance of operating licenses authorizing fuel loading
and low power operation (i.e., up to 5 percent of rated power). The NRC
determined that several factors contributed to a substantial reduction
in risk and potential accident consequences for low power testing as
compared to the higher risks in continuous full power operation. These
factors included consideration of the reduced source term, the
capability of mitigation systems, and the time scale for taking actions
to identify and mitigate an accident. Even for a postulated low-
likelihood, design-basis accident during low power operations, which
eventually results in release of fission products into the containment,
at least 10 hours would be available to allow adequate precautionary
actions to be taken to protect the public near the site.
To support a graded approach during decommissioning, the NRC
further examined the certainty and margin provided by a 10-hour
timeframe for the fuel to heat up in relation to the time for taking
mitigating actions and appropriate EP response actions. The NRC
conducted an applied research study (``Transmittal of Reports to Inform
Decommissioning Plant Rulemaking for User Need Request NSIR-2015-001,''
dated May 31, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16110A416)) with three tasks:
(1) To perform a task analysis that includes a timeline of responder
actions at representative SFP configurations to mitigate a draindown
event and determine its likelihood of success, (2) to analyze
representative spent fuel to determine the decay time necessary for the
fuel to remain below zirconium clad ignition temperature for at least
10 hours assuming adiabatic heatup conditions, and (3) to analyze the
offsite dose rate from the radionuclides released during a hypothetical
spent fuel zirconium clad ignition accident. As demonstrated in these
analyses, for many initiating events at decommissioning reactors,
mitigative actions would have a high likelihood of preventing
uncontrolled spent fuel heatup. In cases where an uncontrolled heatup
is not prevented, the heatup would be relatively slow, providing
significant time before a radiological release. In the case of a
radiological release, dose rates would be low enough such that
significant additional time is available to take offsite actions to
protect the public.
The NRC's analysis of spent fuel decay times provided information
on the time required for fuel to heat up to 900 degrees Celsius (C)
(i.e., the temperature at which the onset of fission product release is
expected for a zirconium fuel cladding fire) as a function of decay
time for both pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor
(BWR) assemblies. The analysis also included sensitivities to the mass
of the racks and the fuel configuration in the SFP. The NRC notes that
the decay periods provided for PWRs and BWRs are based on studies that
consider current operating parameters in the nuclear power industry
(e.g., fuel types, enrichment, and fuel burnup levels). Based on this
analysis, the NRC concluded that after a decay period of 10 months for
BWRs or 16 months for PWRs, beginning when the reactor permanently
shuts down, the spent fuel cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition
temperature within 10 hours after a draindown event. These decay
periods are based on an adiabatic heatup to 900 degrees C assuming the
decay heat value for the hottest assembly (as opposed to an average
assembly), a burnup of 60 gigawatt days per metric ton of heavy metal
(GWd/MTHM), and accounting for the mass of the racks. The analysis
assumption of 60 GWd/MTHM conservatively bounds current industry
burnups and enrichments for zirconium clad fuel and provides margin for
potentially higher burnup rates, up to 72 GWd/MTHM. This analysis does
not account for the additional time margin that would be provided if
additional cooling mechanisms were available or would be provided by a
more favorable SFP configuration such that the heat load is more
uniformly distributed.
The NRC's analysis of dose rates shows that even in the event of a
beyond-design-basis accident leading to a rapid draindown of the SFP
and subsequent zirconium fire, there would be additional time margin on
the order of several hours beyond the 10-hour heatup time during which
protective actions could be taken to protect the public before the dose
levels associated with EPA PAGs would be exceeded offsite.
In addition to the analyses performed by the NRC to support this
rulemaking, as discussed in the ``Background'' section of this
document, the conclusions of NUREG-2161 and NUREG-1738 support the
technical
[[Page 12267]]
basis for a graded approach during decommissioning as they provide
insight into the risk of an offsite release and the effectiveness of
mitigation measures.
In NUREG-2161, the NRC considered various spent fuel
cooling mechanisms and additional heat from oxidation. Because previous
studies found that earthquakes present the dominant risk for SFPs, this
analysis considered a severe earthquake with ground motion stronger
than the maximum earthquake reasonably expected to occur for the
reference plant, which would challenge the SFP integrity. The study
considered two spent fuel configurations: High-density and low-density
loading. The study also analyzed two cases for each scenario: One that
credited the mitigation measures of Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) (i.e., the
strategies to maintain or restore SFP cooling in the event of a loss of
large areas of the plant as a result of fire or explosion), and one in
which those measures were not used or were unsuccessful. The study
results showed that successful mitigation reduces the likelihood of a
release and that the likelihood of a release was equally low for both
high- and low-density loading in the SFP. The study found that a
release is not expected to occur at the nuclear power reactor site
studied for at least 72 hours following a beyond-design-basis seismic
event that occurs more than 60 days after shutdown.
In NUREG-1738, the NRC presented the results of its
evaluation of the potential accident risk for an SFP at a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor in the United States. NUREG-1738
identified a zirconium cladding fire resulting from a substantial loss
of water from the SFP as the only postulated scenario at a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor that could result in a
significant radiological release. While highly unlikely, the
consequences of such an accident could lead to an offsite dose in
excess of the EPA PAGs. Based on spent fuel storage design
characteristics and operating practices considered in the analysis, the
scenarios that lead to this condition have very low probabilities of
occurrence. Accordingly, these scenarios are considered to be beyond
the facility's design basis. Furthermore, as the spent fuel ages, the
generation of decay heat decreases. After a certain amount of time, the
overall risk of a zirconium fire becomes extremely low because of: (1)
The large amount of time available for preventive and mitigating
actions and (2) the increased probability that the decay heat will be
low enough that the fuel will be air-coolable in the post-event
configuration.
H. Levels of Decommissioning
Using the aforementioned analyses as its technical basis, the NRC
is proposing to amend its regulations to provide an efficient
regulatory framework during decommissioning using a graded approach in
several technical areas. This graded approach is commensurate with the
reductions in radiological risk at four levels of decommissioning:
(Level 1) permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of
all fuel from the reactor vessel, (Level 2) sufficient decay of fuel in
the SFP such that it would not reach ignition temperature within 10
hours under adiabatic heatup conditions, (Level 3) transfer of all
spent fuel to dry storage, and (Level 4) removal of all fuel from the
site. These levels are discussed further as follows:
1. Level 1
Licensees in Level 1 include nuclear power reactor licensees that
have docketed certifications of permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel pursuant to Sec.
50.82, ``Termination of license,'' or Sec. 52.110, ``Termination of
license.'' In this level, a decommissioning nuclear power reactor is
defueled and permanently shut down, but the spent fuel in the SFP is
still susceptible to a zirconium fuel cladding fire within 10 hours
under adiabatic heatup conditions.
2. Level 2
In Level 2, the reactor is defueled and permanently shut down, and
spent fuel in the SFP has decayed and cooled sufficiently such that it
cannot heat up to the zirconium cladding ignition temperature within 10
hours under adiabatic conditions. The NRC has determined that this
condition is reached after spent fuel has decayed for a minimum of
either 10 months for a BWR or 16 months for a PWR or an alternative
site-specific timeframe to be approved by the NRC. The decay period
could begin when the fuel is still in the reactor vessel but the
reactor has permanently ceased operations. In order to verify that a
licensee has met the condition, the NRC would rely upon the date of
permanent cessation of operation provided by a licensee under Sec.
50.4(b)(8) or Sec. 52.3(b)(8), updated as necessary under Sec. 50.9
or Sec. 52.6, both entitled ``Completeness and accuracy of
information.'' Because the identified date of permanent cessation of
operations would determine transition from Level 1 to Level 2, the NRC
would consider a change in the planned date initially certified to the
NRC for permanent cessation of operations to the actual date as
information ``having a significant implication for public health and
safety or common defense and security'' under Sec. 50.9 or Sec. 52.6.
At this point, the site may also possess a radioactive inventory of
liquid radiological waste, radioactive reactor components, and
contaminated structural materials. The radioactive inventory may
change, depending on the licensee's proposed shutdown activities and
schedule.
3. Level 3
In Level 3, all spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is in dry cask storage
pursuant to the terms and conditions of a license granted under 10 CFR
part 72, including the general license issued in Sec. 72.210. However,
the licensee may still hold a 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license,
and the site may contain a radioactive inventory of liquid radiological
waste, radioactive reactor components, and contaminated structural
materials.
4. Level 4
At this point in the facility's life cycle, all SNF has been
removed from the site. The site may possess a radioactive inventory of
liquid radiological waste, radioactive reactor components, and
contaminated structural materials. The radioactive inventory during
this configuration may change, depending on the licensee's proposed
decommissioning activities and schedule.
As a facility transitions from being operational to having all SNF
in dry cask storage, the proposed rule's regulatory requirements are
graded to provide for reasonable assurance of the health and safety of
the public commensurate with the risk profile of the facility. Table 2
summarizes the proposed changes to decommissioning requirements in the
technical areas that use aspects of this graded approach.
[[Page 12268]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP03MR22.000
IV. Scope of the Proposal
This rulemaking proposes revising requirements in 16 technical
areas.
A. Emergency Preparedness
1. Introduction
In 1978, an NRC and EPA task force established the planning basis
for EP for nuclear power reactor accidents in NUREG-0396, ``Planning
Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological
Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power
Plants'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML051390356). This guidance provides a
basis for offsite radiological EP efforts for large light-water nuclear
power reactor facilities. In NUREG-0396, the task force determined that
no single accident sequence should be identified as a planning basis
and chose to provide recommendations in terms of the consequences and
characteristics of accidents that would be important in determining the
extent of the planning effort. The task force concluded that the EP
planning basis requires consideration of a spectrum of accidents,
informed by probability considerations. The scope of the planning
effort was based on three key planning elements: (1) The distance to
which planning for the initiation of predetermined protective actions
is warranted, (2) the time-dependent characteristics of potential
releases and exposures, and (3) the kinds of radioactive materials that
can potentially be released to the environment. The risk-informed
planning basis for EP, established in NUREG-0396, was endorsed for use
in the NRC's policy statement, ``Planning Basis for Emergency Responses
to Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents,'' dated October 23, 1979 (44 FR
61123). This planning basis results in emergency plans that are
effective, regardless of the accident probability.
The rationale in NUREG-0396 and the planning basis elements can
also be applied to light water nuclear power reactors in
decommissioning to scope the planning effort. The NRC applied the
NUREG-0396 methodology (i.e., consideration of a spectrum of accident
consequences and the three key planning elements) to establish a graded
approach to EP for decommissioning nuclear power reactors that
maintains public health and safety. As discussed in NUREG-0396, no
single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for
which to plan because each accident could have different consequences,
both in nature and degree. Further, the range of possible selections
for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of
requiring no planning at all, because significant offsite radiological
accident consequences are unlikely to occur to planning for the worst
possible accident regardless of its extremely low likelihood.
Fundamentally, the spectrum of possible accidents is significantly
smaller and the risk of an offsite radiological release is
significantly lower at a nuclear power facility that has permanently
shut down
[[Page 12269]]
and removed fuel from the reactor vessel than at an operating nuclear
power reactor. All such accidents would be associated with hazards
based on the storage of spent fuel, either in the SFP or in dry cask
storage, until its permanent removal from the site. In NUREG-1738, the
NRC found that the event sequences important to risk at decommissioning
sites are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP
assessments, this is an important difference relative to operating
nuclear power reactors, where typically a large number of different
sequences make significant contributions to risk.
Although the NRC considered the full spectrum of accidents
applicable to a decommissioning nuclear power reactor, the number of
events that can have significant offsite consequences is greatly
reduced, and the events are dominated by the zirconium fire scenario--a
postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis accident that
involves a major loss of water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a
significant heatup of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial
zirconium cladding oxidation, fire, and fuel damage. The guidance in
NUREG-0396 states that while it is not appropriate to develop specific
plans for the most severe and most improbable events, the
characteristics of these events should be considered ``in judging
whether emergency plans based primarily on smaller accidents can be
expanded to cope with larger events.'' This approach provides
reasonable assurance that capabilities exist to minimize the impacts of
even the most severe events. Consistent with this guidance, the NRC
considered the potential impacts of a zirconium fire, even with the
assurance that mitigating strategies are in place to prevent an offsite
release from occurring for this highly unlikely beyond-design-basis
event.
In addition to the three analyses performed by the NRC to support
this rulemaking (ADAMS Accession No. ML16110A416), the NRC has
previously conducted SFP studies, including NUREG-2161 and NUREG-1738,
the conclusions of which support the technical basis for a graded
approach to EP. Overall, these analyses: (1) Demonstrate that a period
of 10 hours provides sufficient time to implement mitigation measures
for design-basis events at decommissioning sites, (2) provide a
conservative basis for a spent fuel decay time beyond which the fuel in
the SFP can reasonably be expected to take longer than 10 hours to heat
up to ignition temperature, and (3) provide additional understanding of
the amount of time available for taking action in response to beyond-
design-basis events, including the margin of time that offsite agencies
have to decide upon and initiate actions to protect public health and
safety. The NRC applied these analyses and the considerations from
previous studies of SFP risk to the planning basis elements from NUREG-
0396 to develop the proposed regulations for EP at various levels
during decommissioning.
2. Graded Approach for Emergency Preparedness
A graded approach to EP has a longstanding regulatory history. The
16 planning standards for operating reactors, outlined in Sec.
50.47(b), and the associated evaluation criteria in NUREG-0654/FEMA-
REP-1, Revision 1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of
Nuclear Power Plants,'' issued November 1980 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML040420012) or Revision 2 issued December 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19347D139), are one part of a continuum of planning standards for
radiological EP. The regulations in Sec. 50.47(c)(2) for case-by-case
EPZ size determinations; the EP regulations for research and test
reactors and other non-power production or utilization facilities, fuel
cycle facilities, and ISFSIs; and the EP considerations for small
modular reactors and other new technologies (see the Proposed Rule for
``Emergency Preparedness for Small Modular Reactors and Other New
Technologies'' (85 FR 28436 and 85 FR 32308)), are also part of a
graded approach to EP that is commensurate with the relative
radiological risk, source term, and potential hazards, among other
considerations.
Consistent with the concept of a graded approach, the NRC is
proposing four levels of emergency planning standards that coincide
with the same milestones as the graded approach:
Post-Shutdown Emergency Plan (PSEP) (Level 1)
Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) (Level 2)
ISFSI-Only Emergency Plan (IOEP) (Level 3)
No emergency planning (Level 4)
In developing this proposed rule, the NRC considered the
appropriateness of the EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR
part 72 for decommissioning sites, including those requirements that
have historically been addressed in approved exemptions and those that
have not. The proposed planning standards within the levels are based
on the current set of operating reactor EP standards informed by the
analyses and considerations supporting a graded approach to EP as
previously described, as well as public comments on the ANPR and on the
draft regulatory basis for this rulemaking. The NRC also considered the
criteria of safety, implementation costs, efficiency, transparency,
flexibility, and responsiveness. The following discussion describes the
proposed graded approach to EP.
Post-Shutdown Emergency Plan
For a decommissioning site, once all the fuel is in the SFP, the
spectrum of accidents that can have significant offsite consequences is
greatly reduced and is dominated by the highly unlikely occurrence of a
zirconium fire. The primary consideration for the planning basis for a
PSEP is the potential consequences and timing of this narrow spectrum
of accidents in relation to the time needed to initiate protective
actions.
From a regulatory perspective, the purpose of a PSEP is to provide
a transition period to ensure that an appropriate level of EP is
maintained onsite and offsite to respond to applicable DBAs and to
ensure a prompt response to the highly unlikely rapid draindown of the
SFP and subsequent zirconium fire and release occurring in less than 10
hours. A nuclear power reactor licensee would be permitted to
transition to a PSEP after the NRC's docketing of the licensee's
certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel pursuant to Sec. Sec. 50.82 or
52.110. The NRC anticipates that licensees will maintain a PSEP from
the date that the NRC dockets the licensee's certifications of
permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from
the reactor vessel, until the spent fuel has decayed for a period of at
least 10 months (for BWRs) or 16 months (for PWRs) from the date of
permanent cessation of operations, unless a different period is
justified. During this time, the licensee would be relieved of the
regulatory burden of requirements that are not needed to support an
appropriate level of EP as preparations are made to implement a PDEP.
The PSEP is a transition period for both onsite and offsite emergency
planning in which the regulatory requirements for periodic updates,
reviews, and audits that were necessary to support operating reactor EP
programs should not interfere with efforts to establish an appropriate
level of EP for a PDEP. The NRC does not intend for many significant
changes to
[[Page 12270]]
occur to the emergency plan while the PSEP is used.
Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan
For plants that have permanently shut down and defueled, the
proposed EP approach is based primarily on conditions that: (1) A
postulated radiological release would not exceed the EPA early-phase
PAGs at the exclusion area boundary for DBAs applicable to a
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor, and (2) sufficient time
would exist to implement mitigative actions in response to a postulated
zirconium fire beyond-design-basis accident scenario in the SFP and, if
warranted, for offsite officials to initiate appropriate response
actions using all-hazards planning to protect public health and safety.
Because of the additional time available to take mitigative actions
and, if necessary, to initiate protective actions, many requirements
applicable under an operating reactor emergency plan or a PSEP would
not be required to protect public health and safety and, therefore,
would not be applicable to licensees with sufficiently decayed spent
fuel under a PDEP.
The NRC is proposing two regulatory alternatives to specify when
the transition to a PDEP may occur: (1) After a specified amount of
spent fuel decay time that starts from the date of permanent cessation
of operations, or (2) after an alternative timeframe based on a site-
specific analysis that shows that the fuel in the SFP cannot heat up to
zirconium fuel cladding ignition temperature (900 degrees C) within 10
hours under adiabatic conditions. In either case, a licensee would be
permitted to transition to a PDEP only after the NRC's docketing of the
licensee's certifications of permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel pursuant to Sec.
50.82 or Sec. 52.110. This proposed rule specifies an acceptable decay
time to remove the requirement for licensees to provide a site-specific
analysis. Licensees are provided the option to submit a site-specific
analysis proposing an alternative decay period, but such an analysis
would be subject to NRC review and approval before a transition to a
PDEP.
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation-Only Emergency Plan
The third level of decommissioning under the proposed rule would
occur when all spent fuel is removed from the SFP and placed in dry
cask storage. At this point, the licensee would have an ISFSI-only
emergency plan, or IOEP. A licensee with all of its spent fuel in dry
cask storage that terminates its 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52
license must first obtain a specific 10 CFR part 72 license.
Accordingly, the licensee would then transition to the EP requirements
for dry cask storage in Sec. 72.32, ``Emergency Plan.'' A licensee
maintaining its 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license may opt to
change its EP program to align it with the requirements of Sec. 72.32
once all spent fuel is transferred to dry cask storage. These two
categories of licensees (i.e., 10 CFR part 72 specific licensees and 10
CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 licensees with ISFSIs licensed under the
10 CFR part 72 general license) would be permitted to adopt an IOEP,
consistent with the EP requirements that currently exist under Sec.
72.32(a).
All Spent Fuel Removed From Site
This proposed rule would allow a licensee to terminate its EP
program once all the spent fuel has been permanently removed from the
site, because the site no longer poses any risk of a radiological
release from the spent fuel.
3. Licensee Supporting Analyses
Decommissioning nuclear power reactor licensees submitting requests
for exemptions under Sec. 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' from EP
regulations have performed a series of supporting analyses for NRC
review, as described in NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, ``Interim Staff Guidance:
Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML14106A057). To support the exemption
requests, these analyses must demonstrate that: (1) Any radiological
release for applicable DBAs (e.g., fuel handling accident in the spent
fuel storage facility, waste gas system release, and cask handling
accident if the cask handling system is not licensed as single-failure-
proof) would not exceed the limits of EPA PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary, and (2) mitigation strategies and guidelines exist to provide
an integrated response capability for beyond-design-basis events. In
addition, licensees are required to demonstrate that, in the event of a
complete loss of SFP water inventory with no heat loss (adiabatic
heatup), a period of at least 10 hours would be available from the time
all cooling is lost until any zirconium fuel cladding temperature
reaches 900 degrees C.
Under this proposed rule, the NRC would not require licensees to
submit these analyses to the NRC for review and approval (separately
from existing NRC oversight processes described later in this document)
or to certify that these analyses have been completed to support a
change between EP levels. The NRC anticipates that a licensee would
analyze applicable DBAs using the process under Sec. 50.59 and reflect
the analysis in the licensee's updated FSAR. The NRC expects that
licensees have developed and maintained mitigation strategies for
beyond-design-basis events as required by NRC Order EA-12-049. For the
heatup analysis, the NRC has already performed analyses of
representative PWR and BWR spent fuel to determine the decay time
necessary for the fuel to remain below clad ignition temperature for at
least 10 hours assuming adiabatic heatup conditions. These analyses
contain numerous conservatisms, such that the decay times specified in
the rule would bound the decay time required for plants with fuel
assemblies from the final offload to the spent fuel pool with burnup
less than 72 GWd/MTHM and zirconium cladding to attain the 10-hour
criterion. This particular analysis supports a transition to PDEP
requirements, as previously described. The NRC is proposing an option
to allow licensees to develop their own site-specific analysis for this
transition time; however, licensees would need to submit such analyses
to the NRC for review and approval. This proposed rule details that
process.
The following sections describe the proposed EP planning standards
and requirements for each graded level of EP (i.e., PSEP, PDEP, and
IOEP) under proposed Sec. Sec. 50.54(q) and 50.200, ``Power reactor
decommissioning emergency plans.'' The NRC is issuing draft Regulatory
Guide (DG) DG-1346, ``Emergency Planning for Decommissioning Nuclear
Power Reactors'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML21347A046), for public comment
with this proposed rule that includes guidance on one method acceptable
to the NRC for complying with these proposed requirements. This
regulatory guide will supersede NSIR/DPR-ISG-02 upon publication of the
final rule. This proposed rule contains a risk-informed, consequence-
oriented, graded approach to EP for decommissioning sites that
maintains the defense-in-depth philosophy and provides reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency.
4. Post-Shutdown Emergency Plans
The NRC is proposing in Sec. 50.54(q)(7) that a licensee can
transition to a PSEP after the NRC's docketing of the licensee's
certifications of permanent
[[Page 12271]]
cessation of operations and permanent removal of all fuel from the
reactor vessel pursuant to Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a). A PSEP
provides a transition period from the EP requirements for an operating
reactor to the PDEP requirements under proposed Sec. 50.200(b) and
(c). The NRC is proposing regulations under new Sec. 50.200(a) that
would clarify how the planning standards in Sec. 50.47(b) and
requirements in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to a nuclear power
reactor licensee's PSEP.
PSEP Staffing and Emergency Response Organization
Currently, the following regulations govern the staffing of the
emergency response organization (ERO):
Section 50.47(b)(1), which states, in part, ``Primary
responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility . . .
have been assigned . . . and each principal response organization has
staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous
basis.''
Section 50.47(b)(2), which states, in part, ``[A]dequate
staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key
functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of
response capabilities is available. . . .''
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.A, which
states, in part, ``The organization for coping with radiological
emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities,
responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's
emergency organization. . . .''
This proposed rule would allow a licensee transitioning to a PSEP
to revisit staffing levels and the staffing analysis for the ERO
performed under paragraph IV.A.9 of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 to
align staffing with the reduced spectrum of credible accidents for a
permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor facility. The
proposed requirement in Sec. 50.200(a) would acknowledge that the
spectrum of credible accidents requiring a response from the ERO at a
facility that is permanently shutdown and defueled is reduced as
compared to that for an operating plant. The principal public safety
concern involves the potential radiological risks associated with the
storage of spent fuel on site in the SFP. For example, the reactor,
reactor coolant system, and reactor support systems are no longer in
operation and have no function related to the storage of spent fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents involving a failure or malfunction of
these systems are no longer applicable. As such, certain ERO positions
and emergency functions as detailed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision
2, Table B-1, ``Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing and
Augmentation Plan,'' may not be applicable or necessary under a PSEP.
Commensurate with the reduced spectrum of credible accidents, proposed
Sec. 50.200(a) would allow licensees to change ERO staffing levels
required by existing Sec. 50.47(b)(2) within their PSEPs. Reductions
in facility staffing may be made as long as the facility operates with
no loss of necessary EP functions and the reductions have no impact on
the formal offsite radiological emergency response plans that are in
effect. In conjunction with this proposed rule, the NRC is issuing for
public comment DG-1346, which provides guidance on ERO capabilities to
be maintained at facilities with PSEPs when reducing staffing levels.
PSEP Emergency Action Levels
Currently, appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.C requires
licensees to develop a set of emergency action levels (EALs) based not
only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but also on
readings from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency,
such as the pressure in containment and the response of the emergency
core cooling system. This proposed rule would allow licensees
transitioning to a PSEP to revise EALs consistent with the profile of a
permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor. Proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(8)(iii) would state that changes to EALs resulting from
changes in plant conditions due to the transition to decommissioning
would not be reductions in effectiveness provided that the evaluation
under Sec. 50.54(q)(3) demonstrates that the changes do not reduce the
capability of the licensee to take timely and appropriate protective
actions. Given the defueled nature of facilities in decommissioning,
EALs associated with nuclear power reactor operations (e.g., reactor
vessel water level, core temperature, and containment radiation levels)
and EALs for mitigation systems not associated with the SFP would no
longer contain applicable initiating conditions. Containment parameters
do not indicate the conditions relevant to EP at a defueled facility,
and emergency core cooling systems would no longer be required. Other
indications such as SFP level or temperature can be used at sites that
have spent fuel in the SFPs. Consistent with existing requirements,
licensees transitioning to a PSEP would still be required to maintain a
set of EALs based on onsite radiation monitoring information and in-
plant conditions and instrumentation applicable to EP for a defueled
reactor.
Guidance document NEI 99-01, Revision 6, ``Development of Emergency
Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12326A805), provides EALs for non-passive operating nuclear power
reactors, permanently defueled reactors, and ISFSIs. The NRC found NEI
99-01, Revision 6, acceptable for use in a letter dated March 28, 2013
(ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). To accompany this proposed rule, the
NRC drafted guidance in Attachment 1 of Appendix A in DG-1346, for how
a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor facility
could make a partial EAL scheme change. Notwithstanding the proposed
changes to Sec. 50.54(q), a licensee desiring to change its entire EAL
scheme must receive prior NRC approval in accordance with appendix E to
10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.B.2.
PSEP Evacuation Time Estimate Studies
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.3 requires licensees to
use evacuation time estimates (ETEs) in the formulation of protective
action recommendations (PARs) and to provide the ETEs to State and
local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective
action strategies. Licensees must update ETEs on a periodic basis in
accordance with the requirements in Sec. 50.47(b)(10) and appendix E
to 10 CFR part 50, paragraphs IV.4, IV.5, and IV.6. The periodicity of
these updates together with time needed to develop and implement the
resulting protective action strategies may exceed the expected
transition period covered by PSEPs. Therefore, the NRC is proposing to
add a new paragraph IV.8 to appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 to clarify
that the ETE requirements of paragraphs IV.4, IV.5, and IV.6 would no
longer be applicable to licensees after permanent cessation of
operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel.
Existing ETE analyses would remain effective within the emergency plan
until no longer required for licensees with PDEPs.
Under proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii), a licensee transitioning to a
PSEP would need to maintain a PSEP from the date that the NRC dockets
the licensee's certifications of permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, until the spent fuel
has decayed for a period of at least 10 months (for BWRs) or 16 months
(for PWRs) from the date of permanent cessation of operations for
[[Page 12272]]
burnups less than 72 GWd/MTHM, unless an alternative spent fuel decay
period is proposed by the licensee and approved by the NRC. For fuel
with burnups greater than 72 GWd/MTHM or non-zirconium cladding, an
alternative spent fuel decay period would be proposed by the licensee
for approval by the NRC under Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii). Updates to the ETE
during this level of decommissioning would provide limited benefit for
the enhancement of protective action strategies or offsite evacuation
planning. Even if the criteria for updating the ETE analysis were met
within the timeframe for a PSEP, updating an ETE report may take
several months of analysis. After the ETE is updated, the regulations
in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.6 require an additional
180 days before an updated ETE can be used to inform PARs and offsite
protective action strategies. The additional time and effort needed to
develop and implement a revised protective action strategy may exceed
the time that a facility would spend with a PSEP before transitioning
to a PDEP. Based on the NRC's review of submitted ETEs, population
changes within a period comparable to the post-shutdown timeframe are
unlikely to impact ETEs enough to affect the formulation of protective
action strategies. In addition, because licensees with PDEPs would not
be required to have preplanned PARs to provide for a prompt response to
a radiological emergency, updates to the ETE post-shutdown would
provide no significant benefit.
PSEP Annual Dissemination of Public Information
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.D.2 currently requires
licensees to make an annual dissemination of basic emergency planning
information to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
Section II.G of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 2, contains criteria
for the information that should be included in the annual dissemination
of public information, including educational information on radiation,
points of contact, protective measures, and information for special
needs populations. The NRC is not proposing changes related to the
requirement for an annual dissemination of public information for a
PSEP because the change in the plant's operating status and the ensuing
changes to the EP program would be appropriate information to
communicate to the public. However, consistent with the removal of
regulatory standards for offsite radiological emergency plans for
decommissioning sites (including the removal of EPZ requirements) as
discussed later in this document, licensees with PDEPs would not be
required to provide annual disseminations of information to the public.
In DG-1346, the NRC provides guidance on one method acceptable to the
NRC for a final dissemination of information to the public for
licensees with PSEPs.
PSEP Hostile Action
In the 2011 final rule, ``Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness
Regulations'' (76 FR 72559; November 23, 2011) (2011 EP Final Rule),
the NRC amended its regulations to include enhancements to EP in
response to a hostile action event. Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50,
paragraph IV.A.7 defines ``hostile action'' as an act directed toward a
nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent
force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the
licensee to achieve an end. Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph
IV.B.1 requires nuclear power reactor licensees to have EALs for
hostile action, paragraph IV.E.8.d requires nuclear power reactor
licensees to have alternative facilities that would be accessible even
if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action for the
staging of ERO personnel, paragraph IV.l requires nuclear power reactor
licensees to develop protective actions to protect onsite personnel
during hostile action, and paragraph IV.F.2.c.4 and paragraph IV.F.2.i
require nuclear power reactor licensees to have hostile action
scenarios in drills and exercises. These EP requirements related to
hostile action are separate and distinct from the physical protection
regulations in 10 CFR part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and
Materials.''
The NRC is proposing to maintain EP requirements related to hostile
action for nuclear power reactor licensees transitioning to a PSEP.
Spent fuel at a nuclear power reactor facility that has a PSEP has not
yet undergone a significant period of decay, necessitating the
maintenance of formal offsite radiological emergency planning. The
potential consequences and timing of an accident are the primary
considerations for the EP planning basis at nuclear power reactor
facilities transitioning to a PSEP. Although NUREG-1738 did not
evaluate the potential consequences of a sabotage event that could
directly cause offsite fission production dispersion, the NRC did study
the potential consequences of the zirconium fire event at different
spent fuel decay times. Within the timeframe proposed for nuclear power
reactor facilities transitioning to a PSEP, the study in NUREG-1738
shows that decay time is significant when considering short-term
radiological consequences. Additionally, maintaining EP requirements
related to hostile action during this transitional (and time-limited)
level of decommissioning would help both the licensee and offsite
response organizations (OROs) avoid immediate significant changes to
the onsite and offsite emergency plans.
PSEP Drills and Exercises
Current regulations in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F
and Sec. 50.47(b)(14) include requirements for periodic drills and
exercises for nuclear power reactor licensees. Proposed paragraph
IV.F.2.k would require licensees to follow the biennial exercise
requirements of appendix E, paragraph IV.F.2 once the NRC dockets the
licensee's certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a). After the NRC dockets this certification, exercise scenarios
would be reduced commensurate with the permanent cessation of
operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel to
reflect a smaller suite of potential accident scenarios.
Current regulations in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph
IV.F.2.c require that offsite radiological emergency plans for each
site be exercised biennially with full participation by each offsite
authority having a role under the radiological emergency plan. Proposed
paragraph IV.F.2.k would provide that biennial exercises of offsite
emergency plans would be required after the NRC dockets a licensee's
certifications under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) until
transition to a PDEP.
However, a licensee that conducts a full participation biennial
exercise just prior to the NRC docketing the licensee's certifications
required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) may not be required
to conduct another exercise before transitioning to a PDEP. If an
exercise is conducted as part of the 8-year exercise cycle, as required
under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F.2.j, after the NRC
dockets the licensee's certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
or Sec. 52.110(a), but prior to transitioning to a PDEP, the scenario
would reflect actual plant conditions.
PSEP Emergency Response Data Systems
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, section VI, ``Emergency Response Data
System,'' outlines a set of system, testing, and
[[Page 12273]]
implementation requirements for the emergency response data system
(ERDS). These systems transmit near-real-time electronic data directly
between the licensee's onsite computer system and the NRC Operations
Center. Nuclear power facilities that are shutdown permanently or
indefinitely are currently not required to provide hardware to
interface with the NRC receiving system under appendix E to 10 CFR part
50, paragraph VI.2, and the NRC is not proposing any regulatory changes
to section VI beyond minor corrections (see ``Clean-up of Regulations''
section in this document). Under Sec. 50.72, ``Immediate notification
requirements for operating nuclear power reactors,'' licensees with
PSEPs would maintain a capability to provide meteorological,
radiological, and SFP data (e.g., level, flow, and temperature data) to
the NRC within a reasonable timeframe following an event.
5. Permanently Defueled Emergency Plans
Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii) describes the timeframe after which
a licensee would be permitted to transition to a PDEP. As discussed in
the ``Technical Basis for Graded Approach'' section of this document,
the NRC concluded that after a decay period of 10 months (for BWRs) or
16 months (for PWRs), the spent fuel cannot reasonably heat up to the
zirconium fuel cladding ignition temperature within 10 hours.
Therefore, the NRC is proposing that a licensee can transition to a
PDEP after the NRC's docketing of the licensee's certifications of
permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of all fuel
from the reactor vessel pursuant to Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a)
and when at least 10 months (for BWR) or 16 months (for PWR) have
elapsed since the date of permanent cessation of operations.
Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii) would also allow licensees to submit
an analysis for NRC approval demonstrating that an alternative spent
fuel decay period would ensure that spent fuel would not heat up to 900
degrees C in less than 10 hours under adiabatic conditions. Under the
proposed rule, licensees would be required to submit this analysis
under Sec. 50.90 and the analysis would need to be approved by the NRC
in order for a licensee to transition to a PDEP in less than 10 months
(for a BWR) or 16 months (for a PWR). While the NRC's research
conducted to inform this proposed rule supports a required decay period
of 10 months (for BWRs) or 16 months (for PWRs), it is possible that a
licensee may be able to demonstrate, based on site-specific conditions,
that a shorter decay period would still ensure that spent fuel cannot
reasonably heat up to the zirconium fuel cladding ignition temperature
within 10 hours; therefore, the NRC is allowing for the flexibility to
submit an alternative decay period under proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(7)(ii). The NRC is issuing DG-1346 for public comment in
conjunction with this proposed rule; DG-1346 provides one method
acceptable to the NRC for conducting the spent fuel heatup analysis.
As demonstrated in the results of the NRC's task analysis of
mitigation actions, ``A Human Reliability Analysis of the Spent Fuel in
the Spent Fuel Pool of Decommissioning Nuclear Plants'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML16110A432), a period of 10 hours will provide
sufficient time for plant staff to implement mitigation strategies to
prevent spent fuel heatup damage. Additionally, as noted in the NRC's
analysis, ``Offsite Dose Accumulation Rates Following a Hypothetical
Spent Fuel Pool Accident'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML16110A430), even in
the event of a highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident leading to
a rapid draindown of the SFP and subsequent zirconium fire, there may
be an additional time margin of several hours beyond the 10-hour heatup
time during which protective actions can be taken to protect the public
before the dose levels associated with EPA PAGs would be exceeded
offsite. Because of the additional time available to take mitigation
actions and, if necessary, to initiate protective actions, many
requirements applicable to licensees with PSEPs would not be applicable
to licensees with sufficiently decayed spent fuel (i.e., licensees with
PDEPs). The following discussion addresses the planning standards under
proposed Sec. 50.200(b) and requirements under proposed Sec.
50.200(c) that would be necessary to adequately protect public health
and safety at facilities with PDEPs. The proposed requirements for
facilities with PDEPs are consistent with the guidance contained in
NSIR/DPR-ISG-02.
Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans
Currently, Sec. 50.47(b) applies to both onsite and offsite
radiological emergency response plans, and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50
includes requirements for emergency plans to address offsite emergency
response capabilities (e.g., public alert and notification systems,
offsite PAR development, ETEs, and exercises of offsite emergency
plans). Under this proposed rule, NRC planning standards would no
longer be applied to offsite radiological emergency response plans for
plants with PDEPs.
In its review of several exemption requests, the NRC concluded that
as long as a period of at least 10 hours is available to implement
mitigation measures or initiate appropriate response actions offsite,
formal offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part
50, are not necessary for permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear
power reactor licensees with a PDEP. In a hypothetical SFP accident
scenario, 10 hours is a conservative estimate of the amount of time
available to implement mitigation measures or to take other appropriate
response actions. The 10 hours assumes that the spent fuel begins to
heat up immediately after the initiating event occurs and does not
include the expected amount of time it would take for water to drain
from the pool. A beyond-design-basis accident that results in the water
draining from the pool (whether a full or partial draindown) would
likely take much longer than 10 hours because of the robust
construction of the SFP and the large volume of water in the SFP,
delaying the onset of heatup. Additionally, 10 hours is a conservative
period of time during which preplanned mitigation measures to provide
makeup water or spray to the SFP can be implemented reliably before the
onset of a zirconium cladding ignition.
If a release is projected to occur, 10 hours would be sufficient
time for licensees to notify offsite agencies and for these agencies to
initiate appropriate action to protect public health and safety. The
NRC concludes that 10 hours provides ample time to take appropriate
actions without the extensive preplanning and other requirements of the
EP framework for operating plants, and, therefore, regulatory standards
for offsite radiological emergency plans would no longer be necessary
for the adequate protection of public health and safety. Licensees with
PDEPs would still maintain a variety of onsite capabilities that may be
available to support OROs in EP and response, including radiological
training; regular coordination with OROs; radiological assessment
capabilities; memoranda of understanding for firefighting, law
enforcement, and ambulance/medical services; and the ability to make
PARs upon request. For licensees with PDEPs, no action would be
expected or required from State or local government organizations in
response to an event at a decommissioning site other than firefighting,
law enforcement, and ambulance/medical services. Requirements for
licensees to maintain agreements for these services also exist
[[Page 12274]]
outside of radiological EP, including the requirement for licensees to
maintain a fire protection plan in Sec. 50.48, ``Fire protection,''
and physical security requirements in 10 CFR part 73. Since the
requirements of Sec. 50.47(b) continue to apply to offsite
radiological emergency plans during decommissioning, the NRC is
proposing to add Sec. 50.47(f) to clarify when the 16 planning
standards in Sec. 50.47(b) no longer apply to offsite radiological
emergency plans.
PDEP Staffing and Emergency Response Organization
Currently, Sec. 50.47(b)(1) and (2) and paragraph IV.A of appendix
E to 10 CFR part 50 require licensees to maintain adequate staffing for
initial and augmented response in the case of an emergency and to
describe ERO responsibilities in their emergency plans. Further,
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.A.9 requires licensees to
conduct a detailed staffing analysis demonstrating that on-shift
personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not
assigned responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of
their assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.
Proposed Sec. 50.200(b)(1), (b)(2), and (c)(1)(i) would include
similar staffing requirements for licensees with PDEPs, with the
exception of changes made to reflect the small staffing levels required
at a decommissioning facility and the removal of formal offsite
radiological emergency response requirements for licensees with PDEPs.
For example, licensees with PDEPs would not have to comply with the
requirement under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.A.3 to
augment the ERO with staff from licensee headquarters. Because of the
much lower risk and much slower progression of events as compared to
operating plants, decommissioning sites typically have a level of
emergency response that does not require response by headquarters
personnel. Licensees would not have to identify State and/or local
officials responsible for protective actions, as currently required
under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.A.8 because offsite
emergency measures are limited to onsite support provided by local
police, fire departments, and ambulance and hospital services, as
appropriate. Proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(i) would require licensees
with PDEPs to include in their emergency plans plant staff emergency
assignments.
In addition, the staffing analysis required under appendix E to 10
CFR part 50, paragraph IV.A.9 would no longer apply to licensees with
PDEPs. In the 2011 EP Final Rule, the NRC concluded that the staffing
analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees
because of the small staffing levels required for those facilities. For
this same reason, licensees with PDEPs would no longer be required to
perform this analysis under the proposed rule.
As licensees transition to a PDEP, staffing levels may be reduced
but must remain commensurate with the need to safely store spent fuel
at the facility in a manner that is protective of public health and
safety. The NRC is issuing DG-1346 for public comment in conjunction
with this proposed rule; DG-1346 provides guidance on ERO staffing
levels for a PDEP. Licensees with PDEPs would need to be able to
augment on-shift capabilities within two hours after declaration of an
emergency. The augmented staff would need to include engineering
capability appropriate for SFP accident mitigation, but may otherwise
be reduced.
Currently, a licensee is required to maintain staffing levels at
its technical support center (TSC), operational support center (OSC),
and emergency operations facility (EOF). In accordance with NUREG-0696,
``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML051390358), a TSC is an onsite facility located close
to the control room that provides plant management and technical
support to the reactor operating personnel located in the control room
during emergency conditions; the OSC is an onsite area separate from
the control room and the TSC where licensee operations support
personnel will assemble in an emergency; and an EOF is an offsite
support facility for the management of overall licensee emergency
response (including coordination with Federal, State, and local
officials), coordination of radiological and environmental assessments,
and determination of recommended public protective actions. Because of
the low probability of DBAs or other credible events that would be
expected to exceed the EPA PAGs offsite and the available time to
implement mitigation measures consistent with plant conditions and, if
necessary, to initiate response actions, licensees with PDEPs would not
need to maintain the TSC, OSC, and EOF designated staff or dedicated
offsite dose assessment field teams.
PDEP Emergency Classification Levels and Emergency Action Levels
Currently, Sec. 50.47(b)(4) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50,
paragraphs IV.B and IV.C specify the EAL and emergency classification
level (ECL) requirements for operating reactors. Similar to Sec.
50.47(b)(4), the proposed PDEP planning standard under Sec.
50.200(b)(4) would require licensees with PDEPs to establish a standard
ECL and EAL scheme, the bases of which would include facility system
and effluent parameters. The NRC is proposing EAL and ECL requirements
for licensees with PDEPs that are analogous to appendix E to 10 CFR
part 50, paragraphs IV.B and IV.C with the exceptions of the
requirements to base EALs on offsite monitoring information and the
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 paragraph IV.B.1 requirement to include
hostile action-based EALs. Because licensees with PDEPs would not be
required to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency response
plans and ``hostile action'' does not apply (see discussion in ``PDEP
Hostile Action'' and ``Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans''
sections in this document), these requirements are no longer relevant
to these facilities. However, EALs for security-based events would
still be required.
Under proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(ii)(A), licensees with PDEPs
would continue to be required to describe in their emergency plans the
EALs that are used as a criterion for determining the need for
notification and participation of governmental agencies and the EALs
that are used for determining when and what protective measures should
be considered within the site boundary to protect public health and
safety. In addition, licensees with PDEPs would be required to review
EALs with State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.
Under proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(iii)(A), licensees with PDEPs would
continue to be required to describe in their emergency plans the
spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or
activating of the total emergency organization, the communication steps
to be taken to alert or activate personnel, EALs for notification of
offsite agencies, and the existence of a message authentication scheme.
Under proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(ii)(B), a licensee desiring to make
an EAL scheme change as part of the PDEP must follow the requirements
of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.B.2.
For facilities with PDEPs, proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(iii)(A)
would specify that only the ECLs of Notification of Unusual Event and
Alert would apply (and not the ECLs of Site Area Emergency and General
Emergency, which apply to operating reactors). For these facilities,
the probability of a condition reaching the level above an emergency
[[Page 12275]]
classification of Alert is very low. In the event of an accident at a
facility with a PDEP, time will be available to implement mitigation
measures consistent with plant conditions. As stated in NUREG-1738,
small SFP leaks or loss of cooling scenarios evolve very slowly and
generally leave many days for recovery efforts. Offsite radiation
monitoring would be performed as the need arises. Because of the low
probability of DBAs or other credible events that would reasonably be
expected to exceed the EPA PAGs and the available time to implement
mitigation measures consistent with plant conditions and, if necessary,
to initiate appropriate response actions offsite, facilities with PDEPs
would not require declarations of Site Area Emergency and General
Emergency and the associated offsite radiation monitoring systems. The
results from the NRC's analyses previously discussed support this
conclusion.
Consistent with the discussion on PSEPs, EALs for nuclear power
reactor operations (e.g., reactor vessel water level, core temperature,
and containment radiation levels) and EALs related to mitigation
systems not associated with the SFP would no longer be applicable for
facilities with PDEPs. The NRC is issuing DG-1346 for public comment in
conjunction with this proposed rule; DG-1346 provides one method
acceptable to the NRC for EALs for facilities with PDEPs. As discussed
previously, proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(8)(iii) describes requirements for
decommissioning licensees to conduct reduction in effectiveness
determinations for EAL schemes.
PDEP Emergency Assessment, Classification, and Declaration
Currently, appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.C.2 requires
licensees to maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare
an emergency condition within 15 minutes. A decommissioning nuclear
power reactor has a low likelihood of a design-basis accident or other
credible event resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite
protective measures, and the event progression is much slower compared
to that for operating reactors. For these reasons, under this proposed
rule licensees with PDEPs would not be required to assess, classify,
and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. Instead, the NRC
is proposing under Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(iii)(B) that licensees with PDEPs
must document and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and
declare an emergency condition as soon as possible and within 60
minutes after the availability of indications that an EAL has been
exceeded and must promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as
possible following identification of the appropriate ECL. Similar to
the requirements in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.C,
proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(iii)(B) would clarify that PDEP licensees
must not treat the timeframe as a grace period or delay the
implementation of response actions. The 60-minute timeframe is
commensurate with the slower progression of a credible event resulting
in a radiological release requiring offsite protective measures (see
discussion of the timeframe for potential releases and mitigation
actions at decommissioning sites in the section ``Permanently Defueled
Emergency Plans'' in this document).
PDEP Notification Requirement to State and Local Governmental Agencies
Currently, appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.D.3 requires
licensees to have the capability to notify OROs of an emergency
declaration within 15 minutes. Under proposed Sec.
50.200(c)(1)(iv)(B), licensees with PDEPs would be required to promptly
notify State and local governmental agencies and to make this
notification as soon as possible and within 60 minutes after declaring
an emergency. The NRC's research and analysis shows that licensees with
PDEPs would have sufficient time to implement mitigation measures
consistent with plant conditions and, if necessary, for OROs to
initiate protective actions offsite. Notifying OROs as soon as possible
and within 60 minutes after declaring an emergency would not
significantly impact the time available for OROs to initiate
appropriate response actions.
PDEP Public Alert and Notification Systems
Currently, appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.D.3 requires
licensees to demonstrate that appropriate governmental authorities have
the capability to make a decision on alerting and notifying the public
promptly on being informed of an emergency condition. Because of the
low probability of DBAs or other credible events that would be expected
to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs offsite and the available time for
event mitigation, under this proposed rule, the public alert and
notification system specified in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50,
paragraph IV.D.3 would not be required for licensees with PDEPs.
Similarly, exercises of this system, as required under appendix E to 10
CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F.2, would no longer be required for
licensees with PDEPs. As previously discussed, licensees with PDEPs
would still be required to maintain the capability to notify
responsible State and local governmental agencies within 60 minutes
after declaring an emergency, and, based on research and analysis
showing that there would be at least 10 hours prior to a zirconium fuel
cladding fire for licensees with PDEPs, sufficient time would be
available for appropriate governmental authorities to inform the public
and initiate protective actions, if necessary. Such actions would be
within the capabilities of offsite response organizations and would be
similar to actions required for other hazards that do not require a
dedicated hazard-specific offsite response capability as is the case
for operating reactors.
PDEP Emergency Planning Zones
Currently, Sec. 50.47(b) and (c)(2) require licensees to conduct
emergency planning for both the shorter-term plume exposure pathway EPZ
(generally 10 miles) and the longer-term ingestion exposure pathway EPZ
(generally 50 miles). Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 contains additional
emergency planning requirements for these two types of EPZs. However,
the maintenance of the plume exposure pathway and ingestion exposure
pathway EPZs for licensees with PDEPs is not warranted because of the
low probability of DBAs or other credible events that would be expected
to exceed the EPA PAGs off site and the available time to implement
mitigation measures. Additionally, if necessary, sufficient time would
be available for OROs to initiate appropriate response actions even for
a highly unlikely severe accident. Therefore, consistent with the NRC's
determination to not require the establishment of formal offsite
radiological emergency response plans for licensees with PDEPs, the NRC
is proposing to eliminate the requirements that EPZs be maintained for
licensees with PDEPs. In other words, the plume exposure pathway EPZ
for licensees with PDEPs does not exceed the site area boundary.
Consequently, the planning standards for PDEPs under proposed Sec.
50.200(b) and the requirements under proposed Sec. 50.200(c) do not
include references to the EPZs.
The NRC is also proposing to add a new paragraph (f) to Sec. 50.47
that would clarify that the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b) do not
apply to offsite radiological emergency response plans if the
licensee's emergency plan is not required to meet these planning
standards or if the plume exposure
[[Page 12276]]
pathway EPZ does not exceed the site area boundary.
PDEP Offsite Radiological Protective Action Recommendations
Currently, Sec. 50.47(b) requires licensees to develop a range of
protective actions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency
workers and the public and to give consideration to evacuation,
sheltering, and the use of potassium iodide. Licensees also must
develop and put in place guidelines for the choice of protective
actions during an emergency and develop protective actions for the
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. Proposed Sec. 50.200(b)(10) would
require licensees with PDEPs to continue to develop a range of
protective actions for emergency workers and the public but, consistent
with the removal of regulatory standards for offsite radiological EP
for these licensees, would not reference specific offsite protective
actions or pre-planned activities for the public in the EPZs. The
proposed requirement would call for protective actions directed at
emergency workers who may have to respond to the decommissioning site
for firefighting, law enforcement, and ambulance/medical services and
members of the public present within the owner-controlled area during a
radiological emergency.
For licensees with PDEPs, pre-planned offsite protective actions to
ensure a prompt response to a radiological emergency on site are not
necessary given the time available for OROs to initiate appropriate
response actions. Although the likelihood is low for events that would
result in doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to the public beyond the
owner-controlled area boundary based on the permanently shutdown and
defueled status of the reactor, the proposed rule would require
licensees with PDEPs to determine the magnitude of and continually
assess the impact of a radiological release under proposed Sec.
50.200(c)(1)(ii)(A), and, if a release is occurring, the licensee would
be required to communicate that information to offsite authorities as
soon as possible for their consideration in taking appropriate response
actions under proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(iv)(B).
In 2001, the NRC revised its EP regulations through the
``Consideration of Potassium Iodide in Emergency Plans'' (66 FR 5427;
January 19, 2001) final rule to include the consideration of potassium
iodide as a protective measure for the general public to supplement
sheltering and evacuation in the unlikely event of a severe nuclear
power plant accident with an offsite radioactive plume that would
include radioactive iodine. For licensees with PDEPs, in addition to
not needing pre-planned protective action strategies, the iodine in the
spent fuel has decayed sufficiently such that there is no need to
consider a supplemental potassium iodide program to counteract the
effects of radioactive iodine on the thyroid.
PDEP Evacuation Time Estimate Studies
Currently, licensees are required to develop and update ETEs in
accordance with the requirements in Sec. 50.47(b) and appendix E to 10
CFR part 50, paragraph IV.3. Paragraph IV.3 requires licensees to use
ETEs in the formulation of PARs and to provide ETEs to State and local
governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective
action strategies. Because of the low probability of DBAs or other
credible events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs
offsite and the available time for event mitigation, as well as the
minimal expected offsite response required, the proposed rule would not
require licensees with PDEPs to maintain ETEs (see section ``PSEP
Evacuation Time Estimate Studies'' in this document for additional
discussion regarding the need for ETEs post-shutdown).
PDEP Emergency Facilities and Equipment
Currently, appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.E requires
licensees to maintain and describe adequate provisions for emergency
facilities and equipment, including equipment at the site for personnel
monitoring, equipment for radiological assessment, facilities and
supplies for decontaminating onsite individuals, first aid facilities
and medical supplies, arrangements for qualified medical service
providers and the transportation of contaminated injured individuals,
and arrangements for the treatment of individuals injured in support of
licensed activities. Decommissioning licensees have not received
exemptions or license amendments for these requirements to date, and
the NRC has determined that licensees with PSEPs and PDEPs would still
need to maintain these capabilities under proposed Sec.
50.200(c)(1)(v). Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph VI.E.8 further
includes emergency response facility requirements for a TSC, OSC, and
EOF.
For licensees with PDEPs, there is no longer a need for separate,
dedicated facilities. The functions of the control room, TSC, OSC, and
EOF could be combined into one or more locations while still adequately
protecting public health and safety. Proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(v)(H)
would require licensees with PDEPs to establish a facility from which
effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised
during an emergency. Because of the low probability of DBAs or other
credible events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs
offsite and the available time for event mitigation, the significantly
reduced staff, and the minimal expected response required, offsite
response would not be required at an EOF. Onsite actions may be
directed from the control room or other location, without the
requirements imposed on a TSC or EOF. Proposed Sec. 50.200(b)(3) would
remove reference to the EOF as a location for response. Additionally,
under this proposed rule, a separate OSC would no longer be required to
meet its original purpose of an assembly area for plant logistical
support during an emergency. The OSC function could be incorporated
into another facility. The NRC is issuing DG-1346 for public comment in
conjunction with this proposed rule; DG-1346 provides one acceptable
method for meeting the proposed emergency response facility
requirements for PDEPs.
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.E.9 addresses
requirements for emergency communications systems, plans, and
arrangements, including communications with OROs and between the
control room, TSC, and EOF. Proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(v)(I) would
require licensees with PDEPs to continue to maintain an onsite and an
offsite communications system with backup power and communication plans
with arrangements for emergencies. These arrangements would need to
include provisions for communications with contiguous State and local
governments, Federal emergency response organizations, NRC
Headquarters, and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations
Center. Because licensees with PDEPs may combine emergency response
facilities, the current requirements for communication between
emergency response facilities would not apply to these licensees. Under
the proposed rule, communications with State and local emergency
operations centers would be maintained to allow coordination of
assistance onsite if required.
PDEP Hostile Action
Under this proposed rule, hostile action requirements would not
apply to licensees with PDEPs. The definition of ``hostile action'' in
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.A.7 applies
[[Page 12277]]
here to the capability of implementing EP during hostile action events.
However, in the statement of considerations (SOC) for the 2011 EP Final
Rule, the NRC excluded non-power reactors from the definition of
``hostile action'' because a non-power reactor as defined in Sec.
50.2, ``Definitions,'' is not a nuclear power plant, and a regulatory
basis had not been developed to support the inclusion of non-power
reactors in the definition of ``hostile action.'' A licensee with a
PDEP would be similar to a non-power reactor in that both have a low
likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases
requiring response actions offsite. Additionally, regardless of how a
disruption to the SFP cooling occurs, the spent fuel would take longer
than 10 hours to heat up to ignition temperature, providing adequate
time to coordinate a response between the ERO and law enforcement
officials. As such, licensees with PDEPs would not fall within the
scope of ``hostile action,'' and enhancements to EP in response to
hostile action, such as alternative facilities for the staging of ERO
personnel, protection of onsite personnel, and challenging drills and
exercises involving hostile action, would not be warranted.
Although this rationale justifies the exclusion of licensees with
PDEPs from the definition of ``hostile action'' and its related
requirements (including conducting hostile action exercises) as they
apply to EP, elements for security-based events would still be
maintained for these facilities, including EALs for security-based
events. Under the proposed rule, licensees with PDEPs would be required
to identify ORO resources that would respond to a security event, and
the assistance licensees expect from those resources would be
maintained in PDEPs. For physical security, the objective for these
facilities relates to protection of the spent fuel against sabotage. A
level of security commensurate with the consequences of a sabotage
event is required and is evaluated on a site-specific basis. The
severity of the consequences declines as fuel ages and thereby removes
over time the underlying concern that a sabotage attack, under the
current definition, could cause offsite radiological consequences.
PDEP Drills and Exercises
Section 50.47(b)(14) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph
IV.F provide training and drill and exercise requirements for nuclear
power reactor licensees. Consistent with the language of Sec.
50.47(b)(14), the proposed PDEP planning standard under Sec.
50.200(b)(14) would require licensees with PDEPs to conduct periodic
exercises to evaluate major portions of emergency response
capabilities, to conduct periodic drills to develop and maintain key
skills, and to correct deficiencies identified as a result of exercises
and drills. The NRC is proposing new drill and exercise requirements
for licensees with PDEPs under Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(vi) that differ from
the existing requirements under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph
IV.F to account for changes in principal functional areas, offsite
radiological emergency response requirements, offsite PAR requirements,
and the spectrum of possible accidents.
Similar to the requirements in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50,
paragraph IV.F.1, proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(vi)(A) would require
licensees with PDEPs to describe in their emergency plan provisions for
the training of employees, exercising the emergency plan by conducting
periodic drills, and including other individuals in training and drills
when those individuals may provide assistance in the event of a
radiological emergency. Under the proposed rule, the emergency plan
would be required to describe the training to be provided to several
categories of emergency personnel, with the exception of licensees'
headquarters support personnel. Headquarters support personnel would no
longer be required to augment the ERO for licensees with PDEPs.
Licensees with PDEPs would need to continue to make available a
radiological orientation training program for local services personnel
expected to provide support onsite. Because of the time available to
coordinate offsite agency notification to the public, licensees with
PDEPs would not be required to provide radiological orientation
training to local news media persons. Similar to the requirements in
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F.2, proposed Sec.
50.200(c)(1)(vi)(B) would require licensees with PDEPs to continue to
describe provisions for the conduct of EP exercises that test the
adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods,
test emergency equipment and communications networks, and ensure
emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties.
Licensees with PDEPs would not be required to test the public alert and
notification system during their exercises because the system would no
longer be required, as discussed previously in this document.
Proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(vi)(B)(1) and (2) would require
licensees with PDEPs to conduct an exercise within two years of the
last exercise of the onsite emergency plan conducted under paragraph
IV.F.2.b of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 and to continue to conduct
subsequent biennial exercises of onsite emergency plans. Licensees with
PDEPs would need to continue to conduct drills during the intervals
between biennial exercises involving a combination of principal
functional areas. The principal functional areas of emergency response
for licensees with PDEPs would include all of the areas currently
listed under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F.2.b, with the
exception of protective action development and protective action
decision making (see discussion on protective action recommendations in
the section ``PDEP Offsite Radiological Protective Action
Recommendations'' in this document).
Similar to the requirements in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50,
paragraph IV.F.2.f, proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(vi)(B)(4) would require
licensees with PDEPs to conduct remedial exercises if the emergency
plan is not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise. Like
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F.2.g, proposed Sec.
50.200(c)(1)(vi)(B)(5) would require licensees with PDEPs to provide
for formal critiques of exercises, drills, and training that provide
performance opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key
skills and to correct weaknesses or deficiencies identified in a
critique.
Proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(vi)(B)(6) would require licensees with
PDEPs to continue to use drills and exercise scenarios that provide
reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result from
preconditioning of participants and that emphasize coordination among
onsite and offsite response organizations. Unlike the current
requirements under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraphs IV.F.2.b,
IV.F.2.i, and IV.F.2.j, licensees with PDEPs would not be required to
submit exercise scenarios 60 days before use in an exercise,
demonstrate that exercise scenarios include a wide spectrum of
radiological releases and events, or vary exercise scenarios across an
eight calendar year exercise cycle to allow for the demonstration of
responses to specified scenario elements, respectively. These
requirements would no longer apply due to the limited types of events
that could occur. The previously routine progression to a General
Emergency, or even a Site Area Emergency, in nuclear power reactor site
scenarios is not applicable for licensees with PDEPs.
[[Page 12278]]
The NRC is issuing DG-1346 for public comment in conjunction with
this proposed rule; DG-1346 provides one method acceptable to the NRC
for licensees with PDEPs to comply with the proposed drill and exercise
requirements.
PDEP Offsite Response Organization Participation in Drills and
Exercises
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F and Sec. 50.47(b)(14)
include requirements for periodic EP drills and exercises for
licensees. Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraphs IV.F.2.c and
IV.F.2.d requires offsite radiological emergency plans for each site to
be exercised biennially with full participation by offsite authorities
having a role under the radiological response plan. Appendix E to 10
CFR part 50, paragraphs IV.F.2.f and IV.F.2.h address State and local
participation in remedial exercises and refusal of State and local
governments to participate. Because no action is required from State
and local government organizations in response to events other than
firefighting, law enforcement, and ambulance/medical services, the
requirements related to ORO participation in radiological drills and
exercises would no longer be applicable to licensees with PDEPs.
Proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(vi)(B) would remove the requirement to
exercise offsite emergency plans once the NRC has docketed the
licensee's certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a) and the licensee elects under Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii) to
transition to a PDEP. For facilities that are located either on the
same site or on adjacent contiguous sites to reactors that continue to
operate, the offsite emergency plans would continue to be exercised as
required under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.2.f, until
all reactors at the site cease operation and transition to a PDEP.
Similar to the requirements under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50,
paragraph IV.2.f.e, under proposed Sec. 50.200(c)(1)(vi)(B)(3), a
licensee with a PDEP would be required to enable any State or local
government to participate in the licensee's drills and exercises when
requested.
6. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation-Only Emergency Plans
In order to transition to an IOEP, the NRC is proposing under Sec.
50.54(q)(7)(iii) that licensees must have all spent fuel in dry cask
storage. Licensees with an IOEP must follow and maintain the
effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in Sec.
72.32(a).
Licensees with 10 CFR part 72 specific licenses or under the 10 CFR
part 72 general license may hold an IOEP. A licensee with all of its
spent fuel in dry cask storage that terminates its 10 CFR part 50 or 10
CFR part 52 license must first obtain a 10 CFR part 72 specific license
before transitioning to the EP requirements already provided in Sec.
72.32(a). A licensee maintaining its 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52
license, and thus its 10 CFR part 72 general license authorized under
Sec. 72.210, ``General license issued,'' may opt to change its EP
program to align it with the requirements of Sec. 72.32 once all spent
fuel is transferred to dry cask storage. In addition, licensees under
the 10 CFR part 72 general license would need to continue to comply
with all applicable 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52 requirements
until the 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license is terminated
consistent with Sec. 50.82 or Sec. 52.110, respectively.
Under proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(iii), a licensee may choose not to
comply with the EP requirements under Sec. 72.32 and may instead
maintain a PSEP or PDEP. Licensees with dry cask storage must ensure
that the emergency plan includes an appropriate EAL scheme.
The NRC is issuing DG-1346 for public comment in conjunction with
this proposed rule; DG-1346 provides guidance on transitioning to and
maintaining an IOEP.
7. All Spent Fuel Removed From Site
During the fourth level of decommissioning, the proposed rule would
allow a licensee to terminate its EP program under proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(7)(iv) or proposed Sec. 72.44(f). Once all spent fuel has
been permanently removed from the site, the site no longer poses any
risk of a radiological release. The licensee must then continue to
follow its PSDAR submitted under Sec. 50.82 until decommissioning is
completed.
8. Changes to Emergency Plans
Existing Sec. 50.54(q)(2) requires nuclear power reactor licensees
to follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that
meets the planning standards in Sec. 50.47(b) and the requirements in
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50. In addition, Sec. 50.54(q)(3) contains
the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to its
emergency plan without prior application to and approval by the NRC,
provided that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan
and that the plan, as changed, continues to meet the standards in Sec.
50.47(b) and the requirements in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50. The NRC
is proposing to add several new paragraphs that, similar to Sec.
50.54(q)(2) and (3), would reference the requirements that emergency
plans for decommissioning nuclear power reactors must meet and the
process for making these plan changes. In particular, proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(7) would reference the applicable emergency plan requirements
after the NRC dockets a licensee's certifications under Sec.
50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a), and proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(8) would
stipulate the conditions under which decommissioning nuclear power
reactor licensees may make changes to their emergency plans without
prior approval by the NRC. The NRC also would revise Sec. 50.54(q)(1)
to clarify that the definitions in paragraph (q) apply to only
paragraph (q).
The existing change process under Sec. 50.54(q) does not establish
whether a proposed change would impact the agency's determination that
there is reasonable assurance that a licensee can and will take
adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency;
the change process establishes only whether the licensee has the
authority to implement the proposed change without prior NRC approval.
The change process uses the characteristic ``reduction in
effectiveness'' to exclude from the requirement to seek prior NRC
approval those changes that would likely not reduce the effectiveness
of the licensee's emergency plan. Because these changes would not
reduce the effectiveness of the plan, the NRC expects that the changes
should not have an impact on the agency's reasonable assurance
determination. A licensee's determination that a proposed change would
reduce the effectiveness of the emergency plan does not mean that the
licensee could not or would not implement adequate protective measures
to protect public health and safety in the event of a radiological
accident, but only that prior NRC review is required to evaluate the
impact of the change on the reasonable assurance determination. As part
of routine oversight, the NRC screens emergency plan changes, including
EAL changes, and reviews a sample of changes documented in reports
submitted under Sec. 50.54(q)(5) that could potentially reduce
effectiveness. These reviews do not constitute the NRC's approval of
the plan changes, and all such changes remain subject to future
inspection and enforcement actions. The NRC documents its approval of
plan changes under Sec. 50.54(q)(4) in its decisions to grant license
amendment requests.
[[Page 12279]]
The licensee cannot properly evaluate a proposed change to the
emergency plan if it has not considered the basis for the NRC's
approval of the original plan or the basis for any subsequent changes
to the plan--whether those changes were approved by the NRC or
implemented by the licensee without prior NRC approval under Sec.
50.54(q). Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.219, Revision 1, ``Guidance on Making
Changes to Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power Reactors'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML16061A104), describes a method that the NRC considers
acceptable to implement the requirements in Sec. 50.54(q) as they
relate to EP and specifically to making changes to emergency response
plans. As provided in RG 1.219, the licensee should consider its
licensing basis to inform a Sec. 50.54(q) evaluation, and,
principally, applicable regulatory requirements, which are binding on
the licensee unless the NRC explicitly exempts the licensee from them.
The NRC is issuing DG-1346 for public comment in conjunction with this
proposed rule to provide guidance for decommissioning nuclear power
reactors in evaluating changes to emergency plans under proposed Sec.
50.54(q).
The change process is meant to ensure that emergency plans are
maintained up to date and that the level of planning does not fall
below the standards to which the licensee has committed. The
regulations in Sec. 50.54(q) define ``reduction in effectiveness'' as
a change in an emergency plan that results in reducing the licensee's
capability to perform an emergency planning function in the event of a
radiological emergency. ``Emergency planning function'' is currently
defined as a capability or resource necessary to prepare for, and
respond to, a radiological emergency, as established in the planning
standards of Sec. 50.47(b) and the elements of appendix E to 10 CFR
part 50, section IV. The NRC is proposing to remove the references to
the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part
50 from this definition because this proposed rule would establish
alternative emergency planning standards under proposed Sec. 50.200,
and the NRC does not consider the references essential to the
definition.
When the NRC considers exemptions from EP requirements for a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor licensee, the NRC considers
whether there are special circumstances present as defined in Sec.
50.12(a)(2). In particular, the NRC determines whether application of
the EP regulations for which exemptions are under consideration in the
particular circumstances would not serve their underlying purpose or
are not necessary to achieve their underlying purpose, which is to
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and
will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Once the NRC
grants a licensee exemptions from EP requirements, the exempted
regulations no longer apply to the licensee. The licensee may need to
submit a separate license amendment request if the planned changes
conflict with an element of the current licensing basis. If not, the
licensee need not submit a separate license amendment request for NRC
approval of the emergency plan changes unless the plan changes go
beyond those resulting from the exemptions granted. The NRC intends
that this proposed rule would establish clear regulatory requirements
for EP, reducing the need to request certain exemptions. As such, the
NRC is proposing to add Sec. 50.54(q)(8) to establish the process for:
(1) Transitions from one decommissioning level's EP planning standards
and requirements to the next level's EP planning standards and
requirements, and (2) changes to emergency plans within a
decommissioning level.
In considering a graded approach to EP, the NRC recognizes that a
transition between the EP planning standards and requirements of each
decommissioning level is not equivalent to making changes to the
emergency plan within a level. The transition between the EP planning
standards and requirements of each decommissioning level is
fundamentally a licensee's commitment to a different set of EP
standards and associated emergency planning functions, and the change
process should facilitate this transition.
For transitions from one decommissioning level to the next, the NRC
would require licensees to establish emergency plans that meet the EP
planning standards and requirements of the next level. The transition
is optional, and a licensee that maintains its current level of
emergency planning would satisfy the requirements of the next level;
however, doing so would mean maintaining emergency planning functions
above the commensurate level of planning for the risk involved. Under
the proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(8), a licensee would be able to make
changes to the emergency plan to commit to the EP planning standards
and requirements of the next decommissioning level (i.e., PSEP, PDEP,
or IOEP) using the Sec. 50.54(q)(3) change process, but would only
need to consider whether the changes meet the next level's planning
standards and requirements. Licensees making changes to their emergency
plans to commit to the EP planning standards and requirements of a
decommissioning level would not be required to determine if the changes
are reductions in effectiveness. Instead, the NRC would have already
made this determination through its issuance of the regulations
promulgating the EP planning standards and requirements of the
decommissioning levels. The NRC's proposed regulatory approach to
transitions between EP decommissioning levels does not go beyond the
authority currently granted to licensees to make changes to their
emergency plan under Sec. 50.54(q)(3). Additionally, any change to the
emergency plan that is not made to comply with the EP planning
standards and requirements of the next decommissioning level would
require a licensee to make a determination as to whether the change
would be a reduction in effectiveness.
After the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the NRC issued a
final rule (45 FR 55402; August 19, 1980) (1980 EP Final Rule) that
included Sec. 50.54(u), which required licensees to upgrade their
emergency plans to meet the then-new planning standards of Sec.
50.47(b) and requirements in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 and to submit
those plans to the NRC. In the 2011 EP Final Rule, the NRC removed and
reserved Sec. 50.54(u). The NRC's proposed approach to transitions
between EP planning standards and requirements of decommissioning
levels is analogous to the approach taken by the NRC when the 16 EP
planning standards went into effect in 1980 (see ``Reasonable Assurance
and Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness'' section in this
document). Under this approach, the NRC would not be relinquishing its
oversight authority, as some commenters on the ANPR and draft
regulatory basis supposed. As proposed, Sec. 50.54(q)(8)(i) would
require initial emergency plan changes made to transition between EP
decommissioning levels to be submitted to the NRC at least 60 days
prior to implementation, and emergency plans would remain subject to
future inspection and enforcement. The proposed submittal is not
intended to be a licensing action. It would provide a current copy of
the emergency plan to the NRC prior to implementation in support of
future inspection activities. This submittal would provide an
opportunity for the NRC to assure that the licensee maintains the
effectiveness of its emergency plan. Subsequent emergency plan changes
would need to follow the
[[Page 12280]]
existing change control process under Sec. 50.54(q)(3) and (4).
Hearing rights would not attach to transitions between EP
decommissioning levels; however, the public has the opportunity to
comment on the graded EP planning standards and requirements themselves
in response to this proposed rule and the drafts of the supporting
guidance documents. In addition, all emergency plan changes submitted
under Sec. 50.54(q)(5) and proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(8) would be
publicly available.
In addition to the general requirements in proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(8)(i) governing transitions between EP decommissioning levels,
proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(8) would address changes specific to SSCs and
EALs. Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(8)(ii) would specify that, for SSCs that
are no longer needed to provide support for an emergency planning
function (as defined under proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(iii)), a licensee
may make a determination under Sec. 50.54(q)(3) that emergency plan
changes are not a reduction in effectiveness if the updated FSAR
demonstrates that these SSCs are no longer required to be in service
due to the decommissioning status of the facility. Proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(8)(iii) would state that changes to EALs based on plant
conditions that are not physically achievable or instrumentation that
is no longer in service due to the transition to decommissioning are
not reductions in effectiveness provided that a Sec. 50.54(q)(3)
evaluation demonstrates that the change does not reduce the capability
of taking timely and appropriate protective actions. The NRC is
proposing these requirements to provide clarity on Sec. 50.54(q)(3)
evaluations and alleviate the burden on licensees from submitting
emergency plan changes that result from SSCs and instrumentation that
are no longer required to be in service due to decommissioning.
After the implementation of a PSEP, PDEP, or IOEP, licensees would
be required by proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(i) to continue to follow and
maintain the effectiveness of the plan and by proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(8)(i)-(iii) to comply with the change process described under
existing Sec. 50.54(q)(3) and (q)(4). Therefore, licensees would be
allowed to make changes to these emergency plans without prior
application to and approval by the NRC, provided that the changes would
not reduce the effectiveness of the plan and that the plan, as changed,
would continue to meet the EP planning standards and requirements for
the applicable decommissioning level. Current Sec. 50.54(q)(5) would
require decommissioning licensees to submit to the NRC a report of each
such change within 30 days after the change is put into effect. And,
consistent with current requirements, decommissioning licensees would
have to submit changes that would reduce the effectiveness of the plan
for prior NRC review and approval in accordance with Sec. 50.54(q)(4)
so that the NRC could make the requisite reasonable assurance
determination. For subsequent emergency plan changes once all fuel is
in dry cask storage (i.e., for changes to an IOEP), proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(8)(i) would allow licensees to follow the change process under
Sec. 72.44(f).
The proposed amendments to the regulatory change process are
necessary because:
The regulation in existing Sec. 50.54(q)(2), which
provides that a licensee must follow and maintain the effectiveness of
the emergency plan, should continue to apply in order to ensure that
emergency plans are followed and kept up to date.
The existing Sec. 50.54(q) change process and the
associated regulatory guidance currently do not address how a licensee
could change its emergency plans to comply with the emergency plan
standards as the licensee transitions to each level of decommissioning.
This proposed rule would allow the NRC to maintain,
through a regulatory change process, reasonable assurance that a
licensee can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of
a radiological emergency.
The proposed amendments to Sec. 50.54(q), and related regulatory
guidance, would ensure that licensees would maintain the effectiveness
of the emergency plans. Emergency plans that comply with the proposed
graded EP planning standards and requirements would continue to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Any plan that did not
meet these standards and requirements and, if applicable, the reduction
in effectiveness criterion, would be subject to inspection and
enforcement actions. The proposed approaches to transitioning between
EP decommissioning levels and to making emergency plan changes within
decommissioning levels would provide an efficient and effective
regulatory change process and would promote consistent and predictable
implementation and enforcement.
9. Program Element Review Under Sec. 50.54(t)
Under current Sec. 50.54(t), licensees must conduct reviews of EP
program elements either: (1) At intervals not to exceed 12 months or
(2) as necessary, based on an assessment by the licensee against
performance indicators and as soon as reasonably practicable after a
change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that
potentially could adversely affect EP. If a licensee chooses the second
option, it must still review all program elements at least once every
24 months. For several reasons, the proposed rule would provide
decommissioning licensees with an alternative approach to reviewing EP
program elements.
First, the NRC expects licensees to remain in the first level of
decommissioning (i.e., with a PSEP) for less than 24 months, and the
scope of a PSEP is largely unchanged from the scope of an operating
reactor's emergency plan. Conversely, the second level of
decommissioning (i.e., licensees with a PDEP) will involve more
significant changes, and the NRC anticipates that licensees would
remain in the second level of decommissioning for a longer period of
time. Therefore, in order to support program continuity and minimize
changes during the transition to a PDEP, the NRC is proposing to amend
Sec. 50.54(t) such that, starting after licensees enter the second
level of decommissioning, licensees would be able to conduct program
element reviews under Sec. 50.54(t) at intervals not to exceed 24
months (rather than 12 months) without conducting an assessment against
performance indicators. The NRC is proposing to add new Sec.
50.54(t)(3) to remove the requirement to conduct periodic EP program
element reviews once all fuel is in dry cask storage (i.e., the third/
IOEP level of decommissioning), consistent with the EP requirements for
ISFSIs under 10 CFR part 72.
10. Reasonable Assurance and Offsite Radiological Emergency
Preparedness
The regulations in Sec. Sec. 50.47 and 50.54, ``Conditions of
licenses,'' prescribe how the NRC will make licensing decisions or take
appropriate enforcement actions by using findings of reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken to
protect public health and safety in the event of a radiological
emergency. Every 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license includes as a
condition of the license the requirements of Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(ii) and
(s)(3) regarding findings and determinations of reasonable assurance.
[[Page 12281]]
The NRC has the authority and responsibility to make licensing findings
on the overall adequacy of onsite and offsite emergency planning and
preparedness. Commensurate with the NRC's responsibility to make such
findings, the NRC has the authority to collect, review, and evaluate
any information it needs to support its findings on EP. If available,
the NRC must consider FEMA findings and determinations regarding the
status of offsite EP. The relationship between the NRC and FEMA
concerning findings of reasonable assurance of offsite EP is based on
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA); the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; the NRC Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1980, the NRC's regulations; a memorandum of understanding
between the two agencies (``Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regarding Radiological Emergency
Response, Planning, and Preparedness'') first established in 1980 and
last updated in 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15344A371); and case law
(e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 856 F.2d 378, 382 (1st Cir.
1988); State of Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. NRC, 868 F.2d 810, 815-16
(6th Cir. 1989)).
Not all licensing decisions involving EP require findings and
determinations on the adequacy of offsite plans. In the EP regulations
for research and test reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and ISFSIs,
there are no regulatory standards or requirements for offsite
radiological emergency plans. As such, FEMA findings and determinations
are not needed to support NRC licensing decisions for such facilities.
The absence of NRC regulatory standards for offsite radiological EP at
those facilities does not imply that offsite emergency planning, in
general, is not adequate to protect the public health and safety. In
addition, the support provided by offsite organizations does not
automatically necessitate the need for findings and determinations. In
the Low Power Rule (47 FR 30232; July 13, 1982), the NRC concluded that
findings and determinations on the state of offsite EP were not needed
to support issuance of a license for fuel loading and low-power testing
because there was sufficient time (at least 10 hours) in which to take
action to protect the public in even the worst-case accident.
Additionally, the NRC has concluded in its review of several EP
exemption requests for permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power
reactor licensees that formal offsite radiological emergency plans are
not necessary after the spent fuel in the SFP has sufficiently decayed
such that it would not reach zirconium fuel cladding ignition
temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic heatup conditions. As a
result, continued consultation with FEMA regarding the adequacy of the
offsite plans was also no longer necessary.
For decommissioning nuclear power reactors, the NRC is proposing
that if regulatory standards for offsite radiological EP are not
required, then findings and determinations on the adequacy of offsite
plans would not be needed in order for the NRC to make determinations
regarding reasonable assurance under Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(ii). Therefore,
the NRC is proposing changes to Sec. 50.54(s)(3) to clarify that FEMA
findings and determinations are only necessary when the NRC's planning
standards apply to offsite radiological emergency response plans.
Additionally, the NRC staff is proposing to add a new Sec. 50.47(f) to
clarify when the 16 planning standards apply to offsite radiological
emergency plans. A licensee must follow and maintain the effectiveness
of its emergency plan if the NRC is to continue to find, under Sec.
50.54(s)(2)(ii), that there is reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency, and Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(ii) would continue to
apply to licensees as a condition of the license during
decommissioning.
In 1979, the NRC predicated the rationale for the EP proposed rule
(44 FR 75167; December 19, 1979) on the Commission's considered
judgment in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island. At the
time, the Commission concluded that it must be in a position to know
that offsite governmental plans had been reviewed and found adequate.
However, the Commission also noted that the proposed rule was
considered an interim upgrade of NRC emergency planning regulations
based on past experience, and that further changes to emergency
planning regulations may be proposed as more experience is gained. The
NRC viewed the 1979 proposed rule as a first step in improving
emergency planning.
The NRC recognizes the experience gained from implementing its
regulations and also that significant advances in emergency planning
have occurred over the decades following the accident at Three Mile
Island. In particular, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, led
to the establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and
lessons learned from disasters such as Hurricane Katrina have resulted
in a national effort to prepare for and respond to all hazards and
disasters. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, ``Management of
Domestic Incidents'' (February 28, 2003), and Presidential Policy
Directive (PPD)-8, ``National Preparedness'' (issued March 30, 2011),
established national initiatives for a common approach to preparedness
and response. These initiatives include the National Incident
Management System, National Preparedness Goal, Core Capabilities,
National Preparedness System, National Planning Frameworks, and the
development of comprehensive preparedness guides and exercise
methodologies.
The PPD-8 directed the development of a national preparedness goal
that identifies the core capabilities necessary for preparedness and a
national preparedness system to guide activities that will enable the
nation to achieve the goal. Core capabilities are intended to help
coordinate and unify efforts, improve training and exercise programs,
promote innovation, and ensure that the administrative, finance, and
logistics systems are in place to support these capabilities. The PPD-8
is aimed at facilitating an integrated, all-of-nation, capabilities-
based approach to preparedness, under the assumption that national
preparedness is the shared responsibility of the ``whole community,''
which includes all levels of government, the private and nonprofit
sectors, and individual citizens. Acknowledging the national
preparedness goal, the NRC maintains the sole legal authority to
establish any regulations it deems necessary to ensure the adequate
protection of public health and safety from radiological events.
For a decommissioning site, the licensee, as part of the whole
community, will maintain radiological EP capabilities. Only in the
highly unlikely event of a zirconium fire--in which mitigation actions
were not successful--would there be a potential need to initiate
response actions offsite. But unlike the EP planning basis for an
operating reactor, within a few months of cessation of operations,
there is no longer a potential need to provide for prompt protective
actions in the event of an accident. Additionally, protective actions
such as evacuation are not unique to radiological events and occur in
response to other unique hazards such as chemical spills, fires, and
natural disasters, and are often initiated without any pre-planning. In
NUREG-0396, the NRC states that ``It has been, and continues to be the
Federal position
[[Page 12282]]
that it is possible (but exceedingly improbable) that accidents could
occur calling for additional resources beyond those that are identified
in specific emergency plans developed to support specific individual
nuclear facilities. Further, the NRC and Federal position has been and
continues to be, that as in other disaster situations, additional
resources would be mobilized by State and Federal agencies.''
State and local governments are responsible for the protection of
public health and safety (including at industrial sites like
decommissioning reactors), and the NRC has high confidence in the
ability of OROs to implement appropriate response actions when
necessary. This confidence is further strengthened by the NRC's
recognition of national-level efforts, in which the NRC participates,
to improve the state of emergency planning at all levels of government
and within the whole community. Consequently, for facilities licensed
by the NRC where radiological hazards are unlikely to have an offsite
impact, the risk posed by the remaining low-level hazard is somewhat
analogous to that posed by non-nuclear hazards (e.g., train derailments
or oil spills) that are addressed by all-hazards planning and not by a
separate radiological emergency plan. In such conditions, there is
reasonable assurance that appropriate response actions can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency, without the need for
regulatory standards for offsite radiological emergency response plans
and the associated FEMA findings and determinations that offsite plans
are adequate and can be implemented.
11. Clean-Up of Regulations
The NRC is proposing to remove obsolete dates for certain one-time
actions that were required as part of the 2011 EP Final Rule and other
obsolete dates. These actions are complete, and the requirements are no
longer binding on any current licensee. The dates of requirements
proposed to be removed are:
(1) Section 50.54(s)(2)(ii), which allows the NRC to shut down
nuclear power reactors that did not provide reasonable assurance that
adequate protective measures would be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency after April 1, 1981. There is no longer a need
for the date requirement of this provision because any future
determinations made under Sec. 50.54(s) will be after April 1, 1981.
The NRC is proposing to delete ``after April 1, 1981'' and retain the
remainder of the provision.
(2) Paragraph 6 of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, section I, which
was used to promulgate specific compliance dates for the Tennessee
Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant that was under construction at
the time of the 2011 EP Final Rule. Because the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
is now operational and subject to all current requirements for
operating reactors, the NRC is proposing to delete this provision.
(3) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.4, which required
nuclear power licensees to develop an ETE analysis using decennial data
published within 365 days of the later date of the most recent
decennial data or December 23, 2011. There is no longer a need for the
date requirement of this provision because the date has expired. The
NRC is proposing to delete ``of the later of the date of'' and ``or
December 23, 2011'' from this provision.
(4) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.A.7, which required
licensees to identify and describe the expected assistance from
appropriate local, State, and Federal agencies during an emergency,
including a hostile act, by June 23, 2014. The NRC is proposing to
delete ``by June 23, 2014'' from this provision because the date has
expired.
(5) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.A.9, which required
licensees to conduct a detailed analysis by December 24, 2012,
demonstrating that on-shift personnel are not assigned responsibilities
that would prevent the timely performance of assigned functions in the
emergency plan. The NRC is proposing to delete ``By December 24, 2012''
from this provision because the date has expired.
(6) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.B.1, which required
licensees, by June 20, 2012, to establish EALs that include hostile
action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. There is no
longer a need for the date requirement of this provision because the
date has expired. The NRC is proposing to remove ``By June 20, 2012''
and retain the remainder of the provision.
(7) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.C.2, which required
licensees, by June 20, 2012, to establish and maintain capability to
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes
after indications that an EAL had been exceeded. There is no longer a
need for the date requirement of this provision as the date has
expired. The NRC is proposing to delete ``By June 20, 2012'' and retain
the remainder of the provision.
(8) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph D.4, which included
compliance periods for the backup alert and notification capability
requirements under appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph D.3,
including a final deadline of June 22, 2015. The NRC is proposing to
remove this paragraph because the dates in the paragraph have expired,
and any future applicants required to comply with appendix E to 10 CFR
part 50 would be required to comply with the requirements of appendix E
to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph D.3.
(9) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.E.8.c, which
required licensees' EOFs to have the capabilities required under the
section by June 20, 2012. Because the date requirement of this
provision has expired, the NRC is proposing to delete ``By June 20,
2012'' from this provision.
(10) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.E.8.d, which
required licensees to identify an alternative facility that would be
accessible in the event of hostile action by December 23, 2014, with
the exception of the capability for staging ERO personnel at the
alternative facility and communications capabilities with emergency
responses facilities, which had to be implemented by June 20, 2012.
There is no longer a need for the date requirements of this provision
as the dates have expired. The NRC is proposing to delete the deadlines
for the implementation of this provision.
(11) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F.2.d, which
required licensees to fully participate in one hostile action by
December 31, 2015. Because the date requirement of this provision has
expired, the NRC is proposing to delete ``and should fully participate
in one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015'' from this
provision.
(12) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.F.2.j, which
required licensees to conduct a hostile action exercise for each of
their sites no later than December 31, 2015. Because the date
requirement of this provision has expired, the NRC is proposing to
delete the requirement from this provision.
(13) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph IV.I, which required
licensees, by June 20, 2012, to provide a range of protective actions
to protect onsite personnel during hostile action. Because the date
requirement of this provision has expired, the NRC is proposing to
delete ``By June 20, 2012'' from this provision.
(14) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph VI.4.a, which required
licensees to develop and submit an ERDS implementation plan to the NRC
by October 28, 1991. There is no longer
[[Page 12283]]
a need for the date requirement of this provision because the date has
expired. The NRC is proposing to delete ``by October 28, 1991'' from
this provision.
(15) Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph VI.4.d, which required
licensees to complete the implementation of the ERDS by February 13,
1993, or before escalation to full power, whichever comes later. There
is no longer a need for the date requirement of this provision because
the date has expired. The NRC is proposing to delete ``by February 13,
1993, or'' and ``whichever comes later'' from this provision and to
continue to require licensees to submit an ERDS implementation plan to
NRC before escalation to full power.
The NRC is proposing to eliminate these completed one-time
requirements in the interest of regulatory clarity. Eliminating these
requirements would not relax any currently effective regulatory
requirement or cause any regulatory burden for current or future
licensees or applicants.
12. Revisions to Sec. 72.32
The NRC proposes to amend Sec. 72.32(a) to address the
applicability of that provision's requirement that an application for a
specific license ISFSI must include an emergency plan that includes the
information in Sec. 72.32(a)(1) through (16). The proposed amendment
would clarify that the requirement applies when the proposed ISFSI
would not be located on the site or within the exclusion area of a
nuclear power reactor licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. A nuclear
power reactor licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52 could be under
construction, operating, or in decommissioning. The proposed revisions
would consolidate the current language and remove redundancies by using
standardized language consistent with other amendments in this proposed
rule.
The NRC proposes to amend Sec. 72.32(c) to clarify that the
nuclear power reactor referenced in that provision need not be
authorized to operate for the ISFSI licensee to use the emergency plan
requirements in Sec. 50.47 to meet the requirements of Sec. 72.32.
Currently, Sec. 72.32(c) applies to ISFSI licensees located on the
site or within the exclusion area of a nuclear power reactor that is
licensed to operate. Because a nuclear power reactor licensee is not
authorized to operate once the NRC dockets the certifications required
under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a), Sec. 72.32(c) could be
read not to apply to an ISFSI licensee at a decommissioning reactor
site. However, the current language of Sec. 72.32 allows an ISFSI
licensee with a reactor emergency plan to use that emergency plan to
meet the applicable requirements for an ISFSI emergency plan.
Therefore, the proposed rule would clarify that, when the nuclear power
reactor is under construction, operating, or in decommissioning, the
ISFSI licensee could rely on the emergency plan requirements in
appendix E to part 50 of this chapter and 10 CFR 50.47(b), or the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.200(a) or 10 CFR 50.200(b), to meet the
requirements of Sec. 72.32.
B. Physical Security
The NRC's regulations governing physical security at a nuclear
power reactor typically do not distinguish between an operating nuclear
power reactor and a nuclear power reactor that is in a decommissioning
status. However, the security risk profile presented by a
decommissioning reactor decreases significantly from that of an
operating nuclear power reactor due to the reduction in the number of
target sets \5\ and the reduced consequences of radiological sabotage.
The radiological consequences of a security event decrease as reactors
transition through each of the following four levels of
decommissioning: (1) Permanent cessation of operations and permanent
removal of all fuel from the reactor vessel, (2) sufficient decay of
fuel in the SFP such that it would not reach the zirconium fuel
cladding ignition temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic heatup
conditions, (3) transfer of all fuel to dry storage, and (4) removal of
all fuel from the site. Decommissioning nuclear power reactor licensees
have sought NRC approval of exemptions from, license amendments for,
and alternative measures to, certain physical security regulatory
requirements because of the reduction in the number of target sets and
the reduced consequences of radiological sabotage as the nuclear power
reactor site transitions through these levels. The NRC is proposing
options to allow nuclear power reactor licensees to make certain
commonly-requested changes to their physical security plans based on
these decommissioning levels without requesting exemptions, alternative
measures, or license amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ A target set is the minimum combination of equipment or
operator actions which, if all are prevented from performing their
intended safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would
likely result in radiological sabotage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Security Plans
Upon the cessation of operations and removal of all fuel from the
reactor vessel, licensees typically seek to modify their security plans
to reflect changes in site conditions. The NRC's regulations in Sec.
50.54(p) establish processes that allow licensees to make changes to
their security plans. Section 50.54(p)(1) requires licensees to seek
NRC review and approval of any changes that result in a decrease in
safeguards effectiveness of their security plans. Section 50.54(p)(2)
allows licensees to make changes to their security plans without prior
NRC approval provided that the changes do not decrease the safeguards
effectiveness of the plan.
The current regulations do not define the term ``decrease in
safeguards effectiveness'' nor do they include examples of the types of
changes that would constitute a decrease in safeguards effectiveness.
Additionally, there is no definition of the term ``change.'' This lack
of clear definitions has resulted in difficulties for licensees
implementing security plan changes. For example, some licensees have
implemented changes under Sec. 50.54(p)(2) that the NRC later
determined decreased the safeguards effectiveness of their security
plan. Similarly, some licensees have unnecessarily requested NRC review
and approval of changes that did not decrease the safeguards
effectiveness of their security plan.
The NRC is proposing to revise Sec. 50.54(p) to include
definitions of the terms ``change'' and ``decrease in safeguards
effectiveness.'' The application of these definitions would be limited
to the revised Sec. 50.54(p) and would apply to all 10 CFR part 50 and
10 CFR part 52 licensees with operating, decommissioning, and/or
decommissioned reactor units. The term ``change'' would be defined in a
new Sec. 50.54(p)(1)(i) to mean an action that results in a
modification of, addition to, or removal from, the licensee's security
plans. The term ``decrease in safeguards effectiveness'' would be
defined in a new Sec. 50.54(p)(1)(ii) to mean a change or series of
changes to an element or component of the security plans referenced in
Sec. 50.54(p)(2) that reduces or eliminates the licensee's ability to
perform or maintain the capabilities established in Sec.
73.55(b)(3)(i) without compensating changes to other security plan
elements or components.
Currently, decommissioning (and operating) reactor licensees use
the Sec. 50.54(p)(2) process to implement changes that they have
determined do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of their
security plans. The Sec. 50.54(p)(2) process requires that licensees
submit a report of these
[[Page 12284]]
changes to the NRC. In addition to a description of these changes,
reactor licensees have typically included in their report supplemental
information demonstrating that such changes do not constitute a
decrease in safeguards effectiveness. The submittal of this
supplemental information in the reports has been voluntary. The NRC's
practice is to review these reports to confirm that the licensee
properly concluded that the changes would not decrease the safeguards
effectiveness of their Commission-approved security plan. The submittal
of supplemental information in the reports allows the NRC to verify in
a timely manner that the change does not result in a decrease in the
safeguards effectiveness of the plan. Without this supplemental
information, the NRC could only make this determination through the
inspection process. The NRC is proposing to require that reactor
licensees include with the required Sec. 50.54(p)(2) report a summary
of the analysis performed to determine that the change does not
decrease safeguards effectiveness of the security plan. The summary
must be sufficient to demonstrate that the change does not decrease the
safeguards effectiveness of the plan.
2. Dry Cask Storage
An ISFSI located at a nuclear power reactor site is typically
licensed under a general license issued pursuant to subpart K of 10 CFR
part 72. Under a general license, licensees are required to protect the
SNF in the ISFSI in accordance with the physical security requirements
in Sec. 73.55, ``Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage,''
with the additional conditions and exceptions noted in Sec. 72.212,
``Conditions of general license issued under Sec. 72.210.'' The NRC
also licenses certain ISFSIs under a 10 CFR part 72 specific license.
Consistent with Sec. 72.180, ``Physical protection plan,'' licensees
holding a specific license are required to protect the SNF in the ISFSI
in accordance with the physical security requirements in Sec. 73.51,
``Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent nuclear fuel
and high-level radioactive waste.'' Although the physical security
requirements that apply to general license ISFSIs and specific license
ISFSIs provide equivalent levels of protection, there are differences.
For instance, Sec. 73.55 requires licensees to ensure they maintain
the capability to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats.
Section 73.51 requires licensees to detect and assess threats and
communicate with an appropriate response organization. The additional
requirements in Sec. 73.55 that support interdiction and
neutralization of threats is only one example of differences that lead
to licensee requests for exemptions once all fuel has been placed in
dry cask storage.
As stated at the beginning of this section, decommissioning
reactors typically transition through four distinct levels during
decommissioning. Many decommissioning licensees have submitted license
amendment requests, requests for exemptions, and requests for approval
of alternative measures to remove Sec. 73.55 physical security
requirements that are no longer applicable once the licensee enters the
third decommissioning level when all SNF has been moved to a dry cask
storage system.
The need for license amendments, exemptions, and approvals of
alternative measures imposes a regulatory burden upon both licensees
and the NRC. Accordingly, the NRC is proposing that once all SNF has
been placed in dry cask storage, licensees may elect to follow the
proposed Sec. 72.212(b)(9)(vii) and protect a general license ISFSI in
accordance with the physical security requirements in Sec. 73.51. The
applicability section of Sec. 73.51 would also be amended to reflect
this change. A licensee would be able to use the process established in
the revised and renumbered Sec. 50.54(p)(3) to make this change and
submit its revised physical security plan to the NRC. These security
plans would have to continue to address the applicable security-related
orders associated with an ISFSI that are conditions of the license. The
NRC is also proposing conforming changes to Sec. 72.13,
``Applicability,'' to reflect the requirements that would apply to a
licensee that elects to follow the proposed Sec. 72.212(b)(9)(vii).
3. Significant Core Damage
The prevention of significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage
is a general performance objective of the reactor licensee physical
protection program required by Sec. 73.55. During the first level of
decommissioning, when the NRC has docketed a licensee's certifications
that the reactor has permanently ceased operating and all fuel has been
removed from the reactor vessel and placed in the SFP, there is no
longer fuel in the core and therefore the risk to public health and
safety from significant core damage has been removed. This reduced risk
allows licensees to eliminate requirements to protect against
significant core damage or train security and operational personnel to
protect and respond to core damage events.
The NRC is proposing that a licensee of a decommissioning nuclear
power reactor no longer be required to meet the requirement in Sec.
73.55(b)(3) to protect against significant core damage once the NRC has
docketed a licensee's certifications that the reactor has permanently
ceased operating and all fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel.
The requirement in Sec. 73.55(b)(3) to protect against spent fuel
sabotage remains in effect as long as spent fuel remains in the spent
fuel pool.
4. Vital Areas
A vital area (VA) is defined in Sec. 73.2, ``Definitions,'' as any
area that contains vital equipment. Under Sec. 73.2, vital equipment
means any equipment, system, device, or material, the failure,
destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger
public health and safety by exposure to radiation. The NRC also
considers the equipment or systems that would be required to function
to protect public health and safety following such a failure,
destruction, or release to be vital. There are specific physical
security requirements for the protection of VAs and vital equipment.
The current regulation in Sec. 73.55(e)(9)(v) specifies that the
reactor control room shall be considered a VA.
The role of the reactor control room at an operating plant, as
described in Criterion 19, ``Control room,'' of appendix A, ``General
Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' to 10 CFR part 50, is to
provide a protected space from which actions can be taken to operate
the nuclear power plant safely without interruption under normal or
accident conditions. For a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear
power reactor, the vital equipment associated with operating the
reactor vessel is no longer needed. The remaining vital equipment
(e.g., associated with SFP cooling) may no longer be needed or may be
relocated to a VA separate from the reactor control room. Once a
reactor has permanently ceased operations, the need for a reactor
control room is eliminated if all of the vital equipment is removed and
if the area does not serve as the VA boundary for other VAs. The
proposed rule would revise Sec. 73.55(e)(9)(v) to provide that a
licensee of a decommissioning nuclear power reactor would no longer
need to designate the reactor control room as a VA if it does not
otherwise meet the definition of a VA in Sec. 73.2.
[[Page 12285]]
5. Communications
Currently Sec. 73.55(j)(4)(ii) requires continuous and redundant
communications between the reactor control room and the central alarm
station (CAS). Once a nuclear power reactor has permanently ceased
operations, a licensee may no longer have a reactor control room or a
licensed senior operator present in a reactor control room. Therefore,
it would not be feasible for a licensee of a decommissioning nuclear
power reactor to comply with the current regulatory requirement.
Licensees typically request an exemption from this requirement and
request that the CAS be allowed to establish continuous and redundant
communications with the senior on-site licensee representative.
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 73.55(j) to require continuous
and redundant communications be maintained between the CAS and the CFH
or senior on-shift licensee representative once the reactor has ceased
operations and the licensee no longer has licensed senior operators in
the control room. The intention of this change is to allow licensees
flexibility in maintaining communications with one or both of these
individuals.
Communication requirements will continue to include all the
conditions currently required: Continuous communication capability with
onsite and offsite resources; radio or microwave transmitted two-way
voice communication, in addition to conventional telephone service,
between the alarm stations and local law enforcement authorities; and
alternative communication measures in place in areas where
communication could be interrupted or cannot be maintained.
6. Suspension of Security Measures
Current regulations in Sec. 73.55(p) allow for the suspension of
security measures in an emergency or during severe weather. A senior
licensed operator must approve the suspension of security measures.
Once a nuclear power reactor has entered decommissioning status and all
fuel has been removed from the reactor, there may no longer be a
licensed senior operator on site. Therefore, it may not be feasible for
a licensee of a decommissioning nuclear power reactor to implement this
requirement in the event of an emergency or severe weather.
The NRC is proposing to amend the requirements in Sec. 73.55(p) to
allow a CFH to suspend security measures in the event of an emergency
or severe weather once the reactor has shutdown and all fuel has been
removed from the reactor core.
These proposed changes to Sec. 73.55(p) would be consistent with
the existing regulations in Sec. 50.54(x) and (y) that govern
approvals for reasonable actions that a licensee may take to depart
from a license condition or a technical specification in an emergency.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 50.54(y), licensee actions
permitted by Sec. 50.54(x) must be approved (at a minimum) by a
licensed senior operator or, at a decommissioning nuclear power reactor
after submittal of the certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
or Sec. 52.110(a), by either a licensed senior operator or a CFH,
before taking the action.
C. Cyber Security
The NRC is proposing to update cyber security requirements in Sec.
73.54, ``Protection of digital computer and communication systems and
networks'' for nuclear power reactor licensees. This update would
clarify the cyber security requirements applicable to a nuclear power
reactor during each stage of the decommissioning process.
As stated in Sec. 73.54, applicants and licensees must provide
high assurance that their digital computer and communication systems
and networks associated with safety and important-to-safety, security,
and emergency preparedness (SSEP) functions are adequately protected
against cyber attacks, up to and including the design basis threat
described in Sec. 73.1, ``Purpose and scope.'' To accomplish this,
each holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license under 10 CFR
part 50 has submitted a cyber security plan (CSP) to the NRC that has
been approved by the NRC. Further, each combined license (COL)
applicant is required to submit its CSP as part of its COL application
for review and approval. Each approved CSP is referenced in a license
condition in each 10 CFR part 50 license, and this license condition
requires a licensee to maintain its CSP until the license is terminated
or the license condition is removed by license amendment. A COL holder
does not have an equivalent cyber security license condition.
The cyber security requirements in Sec. 73.54 apply to licensees
currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant. Once the NRC has
docketed a licensee's Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a)
certifications, that licensee is no longer authorized to operate a
nuclear power plant. Therefore, the requirements in Sec. 73.54 would
no longer apply to such a licensee. However, each 10 CFR part 50
licensee has a license condition requiring the licensee to maintain its
CSP, and this license condition remains in effect during
decommissioning. A COL holder, without the license condition, is not
required to maintain its CSP when it begins decommissioning.
Although a licensee that has submitted its Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or
Sec. 52.110(a) certifications is no longer operating, such a licensee
may still have fuel recently removed from the reactor vessel in its
SFP. As discussed in the ``Technical Basis for Graded Approach''
section of this document, if the spent fuel in the SFP has not
sufficiently decayed, there is a risk that the spent fuel could heat up
to clad ignition temperature and lead to a zirconium fire for
postulated draindown scenarios in a timeframe that is too short to
reliably implement mitigation measures or to take other appropriate
response actions.
As discussed in the ``Technical Basis for Graded Approach'' section
of this document, in Level 2 there is little chance that the spent fuel
in the SFP could heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours.
Accordingly, the NRC is proposing that the cyber security requirements
in Sec. 73.54 continue to apply to licensees through Level 1. This
continuation of the cyber security requirements would ensure that a
compromise of digital systems cannot adversely impact the effective
operation of the licensees' physical security programs and emergency
preparedness functions prior to the time at which the spent fuel cannot
reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours after a
draindown event. Although the cyber security requirements would
continue to apply through Level 1, the number of critical digital
assets would decrease as systems are removed from service, which in
turn reduces the number of critical digital assets that must be
protected by the CSP.
To clarify the applicability of the cyber security rule to
decommissioning nuclear power reactor licensees, the NRC is proposing
to add two paragraphs to Sec. 73.54. A new Sec. 73.54(i) would state
that the requirements of Sec. 73.54 will remain in effect until: (1)
The NRC has docketed the licensee's Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a) certifications, and (2) at least 10 months for a BWR or 16
months for a PWR have elapsed since the date of permanent cessation of
operations or an NRC-approved alternative to the 10 or 16 month spent
fuel decay period, submitted under proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii)(A) or
(B), has elapsed. A new Sec. 73.54(j) would state that, after both
requirements of Sec. 73.54(i) have been met, the licensee's license
[[Page 12286]]
condition that requires implementation and maintenance of a cyber
security plan would be removed from the license. The NRC is also
proposing the removal of the introductory paragraph of Sec. 73.54 in
its entirety and revising the language of Sec. 73.54(a), (b), and (c).
These are conforming changes to clarify that the applicability of Sec.
73.54 is not limited to ``operating'' reactors (i.e., that Sec. 73.54
would still be applicable after the NRC has docketed a licensee's Sec.
50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) certifications), to remove language that
is no longer needed concerning the initial submission of cyber security
plans by existing licensees, and to add clarifying language to Sec.
73.54(b) and (c). Further, the NRC is proposing a change to Sec.
73.55(c)(6), which requires the licensee to establish, maintain, and
implement a cyber security plan. This is a conforming change to reflect
the scenario in which a decommissioning nuclear power reactor licensee
is no longer required to maintain a cyber security plan (i.e., the NRC
has docketed the certifications of permanent cessation of operations
and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, and the fuel in
the SFP has sufficiently decayed), but is still required to comply with
Sec. 73.55(c).
The proposed revision to Sec. 73.54(a) would not constitute
backfitting for 10 CFR part 50 licensees. The proposed revision would
constitute a change affecting the issue finality of COL holders;
extending the requirement to maintain a CSP during decommissioning
would be a new requirement imposed on COL holders. The NRC's proposed
backfit analysis is located in the ``Backfitting and Issue Finality''
section of this document.
D. Drug and Alcohol Testing
1. Scope of 10 CFR Part 26
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 26.3, ``Scope,'' to correct an
inconsistency within Sec. 26.3(a) where the FFD requirements in 10 CFR
part 26 apply differently to 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52
licensees with decommissioning nuclear power reactors. The Sec.
26.3(a) provision lists those licensees that are required to comply
with designated subparts of 10 CFR part 26, including licensees who are
authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor under Sec. 50.57 and
holders of a combined license under 10 CFR part 52 after the Commission
has made the finding under Sec. 52.103(g). In accordance with this
requirement, 10 CFR part 26 does not apply to a holder of a nuclear
power reactor license issued under 10 CFR part 50 that is no longer
authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor because the NRC has
docketed the certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) (i.e., a
decommissioning 10 CFR part 50 nuclear power reactor licensee).
However, 10 CFR part 26 continues to apply to holders of combined
licenses issued under 10 CFR part 52 throughout decommissioning.
Therefore, there is an inconsistency in the application of FFD
requirements to nuclear power reactor licensees during decommissioning.
The NRC has determined that there is no technical basis for this
inconsistency. In the 1989 10 CFR part 26 final rule (54 FR 24468; June
7, 1989) (1989 FFD Final Rule), the Commission explained that the
intent of that rule was to address the potential for worker impairment
of any kind, including substance abuse that could affect the safe
operation of nuclear power plants. The emphasis throughout the 1989 FFD
Final Rule is that the rule is necessary to promote public health and
safety when the plant is operational. The wording for 10 CFR part 52
licensees described in the scope of the 2008 10 CFR part 26 final rule
(73 FR 16966; March 31, 2008) (2008 FFD Final Rule), specifically Sec.
26.3(a), was an oversight. The emphasis of the 1989 FFD final rule that
FFD need only apply to operating 10 CFR part 50 sites should be the
same for 10 CFR part 52 licensees. Due to the decreased risk to public
health and safety during decommissioning, 10 CFR part 26 should not
apply to these licensees during decommissioning.
Therefore, the NRC proposes to clarify that 10 CFR part 26 does not
apply to 10 CFR part 52 licensees once the NRC has docketed their Sec.
52.110(a) certifications. Section 26.3(a) of the proposed rule would
specify that each holder of an operating license for a nuclear power
reactor under 10 CFR part 50 and each holder of a COL under 10 CFR part
52 for which the Commission has made the finding under Sec. 52.103(g)
must comply with the requirements of 10 CFR part 26, except for subpart
K of 10 CFR part 26, until the NRC's docketing of the license holder's
certifications described in Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a).
For clarity, the NRC proposes to divide the current paragraph of
Sec. 26.3(a) into two paragraphs. Paragraph (a)(1) would retain the
requirement in the second sentence of current Sec. 26.3(a) to state
the deadline by which licensees must implement their FFD program.
Paragraph (a)(2) would retain the requirement in the first sentence of
current Sec. 26.3(a) that these licensees must comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR part 26, except subpart K, but clarify that this
requirement ends when the NRC dockets the licensee's Sec. Sec.
50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a) certifications.
2. Fitness-for-Duty Elements for Insider Mitigation Program
Under Sec. 73.55(b)(9), a licensee is required to establish,
maintain, and implement an IMP to monitor the initial and continuing
trustworthiness and reliability of individuals granted unescorted
access authorization (UAA) or unescorted access (UA) to a protected
area (PA) or vital area (VA).
Section 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B) requires that an IMP must contain
elements of an FFD program described in 10 CFR part 26. However, the
regulations do not identify which FFD program elements must be included
in the IMP. Section 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B)(1) and (2) of this proposed rule
would amend Sec. 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B) to establish an appropriate set of
FFD provisions to be incorporated into the IMP of operating and
decommissioning 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52 licensees to provide
reasonable assurance that individuals granted UAA or UA to the PA or VA
are trustworthy and reliable.
Section 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B)(1) of this proposed rule would clarify
Sec. 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B) that licensees implementing 10 CFR part 26,
regardless of whether they are required to do so, are in compliance
with Sec. 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B). A licensee's full 10 CFR part 26 FFD
program (i.e., an FFD program that complies with all applicable 10 CFR
part 26 requirements) would contain FFD elements appropriate for
inclusion in the licensee's IMP. This would apply to both operating and
decommissioning licensees.
Section 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B)(2)(i) and (ii) of this proposed rule
describes the minimum 10 CFR part 26 elements necessary for a 10 CFR
part 50 and 10 CFR part 52 decommissioning licensee's IMP. Section
73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B)(2)(i) of the proposed rule states that individuals
who have unescorted access to the VAs at a decommissioning site,
perform certified fuel handler functions (i.e., individuals covered by
Sec. 50.2) prior to all spent nuclear fuel at a site being placed in
dry cask storage, perform security--related functions (i.e.,
individuals covered by Sec. 26.4(a)(5)), or administer the drug
testing program (i.e., individuals covered by Sec. 26.4(g)) are
subject to the requirements in 10 CFR part 26 except for subparts I and
K. Individuals who have fuel handler certifications are essential to
the safe movement of spent nuclear fuel. Individuals who have security-
related responsibilities or perform work around the spent fuel pool may
have knowledge
[[Page 12287]]
of value to an adversary. In addition, security personnel generally
carry weapons on site and would pose a significant challenge to site
security if they were to perform as an active insider during an attack.
Testing of individuals who administer a drug testing program is viewed
as essential to the integrity of the program.
Proposed Sec. 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B)(2)(ii) states that individuals
who have UA to the protected area, but do not perform certified fuel
handling or security-related functions or administer the drug testing
program would still be subject to pre-access and for-cause testing
(Sec. 26.31(c)(1) and (2)) and behavior observation (Sec. 26.33), but
would not be subject to random testing (Sec. 26.31(c)(5)). The NRC
proposes to relax these requirements because while the reactor is in
decommissioning the potential contribution of certain personnel to
support an adversary as an insider is greatly reduced. Individuals who
do not have any security-related responsibilities or regular SFP area
UA will have less potential contribution as an insider threat.
The NRC has determined that the FFD elements necessary for an IMP
under this proposed rule are commensurate with the hazard and potential
event consequences associated with a facility's operational status.
Section 73.55(b)(3) states that the physical protection program must be
designed to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
Operating nuclear power reactor facilities contain many target sets
located throughout the PA of potential interest to an adversary seeking
to affect core damage or spent fuel sabotage, thus anyone who has UAA
or UA to the PA could contribute significantly to an adversary.
The hazard and potential event consequences associated with
decommissioning facilities significantly decrease in comparison to
those associated with the operating facilities. During decommissioning,
the SFP becomes the primary focus of the licensee's obligation to
protect against the radiological sabotage design basis threat, as it
becomes the location where all spent fuel is located when a nuclear
power reactor is no longer operating and prior to transitioning to an
ISFSI. With this perspective, this proposed rule tailors applicability
of the FFD elements commensurate with the duties and access of
personnel who have been granted UAA and maintain UA to the PA or VA.
3. Criminal Penalties
The NRC proposes to amend the criminal penalties section of 10 CFR
part 26 by including Sec. 26.3 within Sec. 26.825(a). Existing Sec.
26.825(a) applies the NRC's authority under the AEA to impose criminal
penalties for willful violations of, attempts to violate, or
conspiracies to violate NRC regulations. Section 26.825(b) lists Sec.
26.3 as one of the 10 CFR part 26 provisions that is excluded from
Sec. 26.825(a). In general, the criminal penalties sections of NRC
regulations apply to substantive requirements, and administrative or
procedural regulatory provisions are excluded from criminal penalties
sections. The current Sec. 26.3 is entitled ``Scope'' and identifies
which entities are within the scope of 10 CFR part 26. Scoping
provisions typically do not contain substantive requirements, which may
explain why Sec. 26.825(b) includes Sec. 26.3. However, the current
Sec. 26.3(a) not only describes the entities that are subject to the
requirements of 10 CFR part 26 but also includes a substantive
requirement for certain entities to comply with requirements in 10 CFR
part 26 by a specific deadline. This requirement was added to Sec.
26.3(a) in the 2008 FFD Final Rule, but Sec. 26.825(b) was not updated
to reflect this change, which was an oversight. This proposed rule
would not change the substantive requirement in Sec. 26.3(a). Because
proposed Sec. 26.3(a) would continue to impose a substantive
requirement, the NRC proposes to remove Sec. 26.3 from Sec.
26.825(b), thereby including Sec. 26.3 in Sec. 26.825(a).
E. Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of the Shift
Technical Advisor
The NRC is proposing two revisions to its regulations. The first
change would be to amend the definition of a CFH in Sec. 50.2 to
provide an alternative that would eliminate the need for licensees to
seek NRC approval for fuel handler training programs by adding a
provision that requires the training program to address the safe
conduct of decommissioning activities, safe handling and storage of
spent fuel, and appropriate response to plant emergencies, and
specifies that a CFH must be qualified in accordance with a fuel
handler training program that meets the same requirements as training
programs for non-licensed operators required by Sec. 50.120. This
proposal would provide consistency in the regulatory treatment of the
training programs for non-licensed operators (which do not require NRC
approval) and fuel handler training programs to qualify a non-licensed
operator as a CFH (which do require NRC approval). The second change
would clarify that an STA is not required for decommissioning reactors.
These changes would provide clarity to the CFH's responsibilities and
functions and the role of an STA by codifying current licensing
practices. This proposed rule would also clarify the management role of
the CFH in a manner that is consistent with Sec. 50.54(y) as discussed
in section ``B. Physical Security'' in this document.
1. Alternative Definition for Certified Fuel Handler
The current definition of a CFH in Sec. 50.2 does not specify what
is in an NRC-approved fuel training program. Licensees have submitted
requests for the approval of CFH training and retraining programs in
connection with their decommissioning. After receiving NRC approval of
a CFH training program, the licensee typically submits a license
amendment request to propose changes to the Administrative Controls
section of its Technical Specifications (TS) to include a CFH, among
other applicable changes based on the approval of the CFH training
program.
For example, on May 12, 2014, the NRC approved the Shift Manager/
Certified Fuel Handler training program for Kewaunee Power Station
(ADAMS Accessions No. ML14104A046). The NRC's safety evaluation
supporting approval of the CFH training program used criteria that
focused on whether the licensee trained CFHs on the following three
objectives: (1) Safe conduct of decommissioning activities; (2) safe
handling and storage of spent fuel; and (3) appropriate response to
plant emergencies. These three objectives have subsequently been the
basis for other NRC approvals of CFH training programs for licensees
entering or planning to enter the decommissioning process: Entergy for
VY (ADAMS Accession No. ML14162A209); Exelon for Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generation Station, Clinton Power Station, and Quad Cities Nuclear
Power Station (ADAMS Accession No. ML16222A787); and Entergy for
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (ADAMS Accession No. ML16259A347).
In the safety evaluations for those approved CFH training programs,
the NRC discusses the 1996 Final Rule and its role in the development
of the objectives for an acceptable CFH training program. The NRC
recognized that the risks posed at decommissioning reactors are
significantly less than those posed by operating reactors. The NRC
noted specifically that:
While the spent fuel is still highly radioactive and
generates heat caused by radioactive decay, no neutron flux is
[[Page 12288]]
generated and the fuel slowly cools as its energetic decay products
diminish.
The systems required for maintaining the spent fuel in the
spent fuel pool as well as the operations required to contain the
remaining residual contamination in the facility and spent fuel pool
are relatively simple.
Because the spent fuel is stored in a configuration that
precludes a nuclear fission reaction, no generation of new
radioactivity can occur and the potential for consequences that could
result from an inadvertent nuclear reaction are highly unlikely.
Because of the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the systems
needed for safe storage of the spent fuel, the NRC explained in the
1996 Final Rule that the degree of regulatory oversight required for a
nuclear power reactor during its decommissioning stage is considerably
less than that required for the facility during its operating stage. In
the 1995 decommissioning proposed rule (60 FR 37374; July 20, 1995),
the NRC provided insights as to the responsibilities of the proposed
new position of the CFH. Specifically, the NRC stated that a CFH is an
individual who has the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate
plant conditions and make judgments about emergency action decisions
necessary to protect the public health and safety.
In addition to using the three objectives to evaluate the fuel
handler training programs for licensees entering or planning to enter
decommissioning, the NRC applied the criteria in Sec. 50.120,
``Training and qualification of nuclear power plant personnel,'' and
assessed the proposed fuel handler training programs against the
elements of a systems approach to training (SAT) as defined in Sec.
55.4, ``Definitions.'' Section 50.120 identifies individuals required
to be subject to an SAT, including non-licensed operators such as CFHs,
and necessary elements for training programs. These elements include
the requirement to periodically evaluate and revise the training
program, as appropriate, to reflect changes to the facility (e.g.,
decommissioning), procedures, regulations, and quality assurance
requirements.
Because it has developed succinct criteria to approve fuel handler
training programs, the NRC proposes to include this criterion in its
regulations as an alternative definition of a CFH to eliminate the need
for licensees to submit requests for NRC approval of CFH training
programs. Specifically, the NRC would codify current approval practices
by amending Sec. 50.2 to add the three broad-scope objectives as
responsibilities for which a CFH must be trained: (1) Safe conduct of
decommissioning activities; (2) safe handling and storage of spent
fuel; and (3) appropriate response to plant emergencies. In addition,
the CFH would have to qualify in accordance with a fuel handler
training program that meets the same requirements as training programs
for non-licensed operators required by Sec. 50.120. Should a licensee
not exercise the alternative definition, it would need to submit a
request for approval of a fuel handler training program.
2. Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor
The STA is a position identified in licensees' TSs. The STA
provides engineering expertise in the diagnosis of complex problems
with SSCs during reactor operation. Once a licensee enters the
decommissioning process, the STA function is no longer needed. The
current regulations do not address the acceptability of discontinuing
the STA position for a decommissioning reactor. Licensees have been
removing the STA position and replacing that position with a CFH in
their TSs through license amendments (see Duke Energy Florida for
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14097A145); Exelon for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (ADAMS
Accession No. ML16235A413); and Entergy for VY (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14217A072)). The NRC proposes to revise a footnote to the table
titled ``Minimum Requirements Per Shift for On-Site Staffing of Nuclear
Power Units by Operators and Senior Operators Licensed Under 10 CFR
part 55'' in Sec. 50.54(m)(2)(i) to state that an STA is not required
upon the NRC's docketing of the license holder's certifications
required under Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a).
F. Decommissioning Funding Assurance
The NRC proposes to amend its regulations to modify decommissioning
funding reporting requirements, clarify decommissioning funding
assurance requirements, and eliminate duplicative regulations.
1. Clarification of Sec. 50.82(a) and Sec. 52.110(h)
The NRC is proposing to amend the regulations in Sec.
50.82(a)(8)(i)(A) and Sec. 52.110(h)(1)(i) to remove the term
``legitimate.'' This term does not add any substance to the regulations
and is potentially confusing. The intent of the regulation is to ensure
that expenses fall within the NRC definition of decommission. Whether
an expense falls within the definition of decommission would continue
to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the licensee when
considering whether to make a withdrawal from the decommissioning trust
fund. Since this term is non-substantive, its removal would not change
any of the existing requirements regarding the use of decommissioning
funds.
2. Changes to Reporting Requirements
In the ``Financial Assurance Requirements for Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Reactors'' final rule (63 FR 50465; September 22, 1998),
the NRC added the provisions currently in Sec. 50.75(f)(1) and (2)
that require each nuclear power reactor licensee to file a report with
the NRC on the status of its decommissioning funding for each reactor
that it owns, by March 31st of every odd-numbered year or annually for
plants that are within five years of their projected end of operation.
This report must specify: (1) The amount of decommissioning funds
estimated to be required pursuant to Sec. 50.75(b) and (c); (2) the
amount of decommissioning funds accumulated to the end of the calendar
year preceding the date of the report; (3) a schedule of the annual
amounts remaining to be collected; (4) the assumptions used regarding
rates of escalation in decommissioning costs, rates of earnings on
decommissioning funds, and rates of other factors used in funding
projections; (5) any contracts upon which the licensee is relying; (6)
any modifications occurring to a licensee's current method of providing
financial assurance since the last submitted report; and (7) any
material changes to trust agreements.
The NRC is proposing to change the reporting frequency in Sec.
50.75(f)(1) to coordinate the reporting frequency with the ISFSI
decommissioning reporting frequency in Sec. 72.30. This change would
convert the biennial decommissioning funding status report required for
10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52 nuclear power reactor licensees to a
triennial decommissioning funding status report as currently is
required for 10 CFR part 72 ISFSI licensees. This revision would not
change the annual reporting frequency for a reactor licensee that is
within 5 years of its projected end of operations, whether that
projection is based on the license's expiration date or on a premature
shutdown, and would not change the annual reporting frequency for a
reactor that has permanently ceased operations. Also, the change in
reporting frequency would not relieve the licensee from calculating
annual adjustments as
[[Page 12289]]
required under Sec. 50.75(a)(2) and would not affect the Table of
Minimum Amounts in Sec. 50.75(c) or its escalation factors. Therefore,
a licensee would be required to continue to monitor its decommissioning
funding on an annual basis but instead of reporting at least once every
2 years to the NRC, it would report at least once every 3 years.
Since 1999, the NRC's regulations have mandated that licensees
report to the NRC the status of their decommissioning funding. Under
Sec. 50.75(f)(1), the biennial decommissioning funding status report
requires the disclosure of seven items, including the balance of the
decommissioning trust fund as of December 31st of the prior year. The
NRC conducted spot checks of licensee records related to this
information. The NRC did not identify any major discrepancies related
to this information, as explained in SECY-15-0005 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14210A554), dated January 15, 2015. Therefore, the NRC has confidence
that changing from a biennial to a triennial reporting frequency will
not subject the public to any additional risks associated with
decommissioning funding assurance. In addition, even with a triennial
reporting frequency, there would be ample time to resolve any
decommissioning funding issue. Furthermore, the proposed revision does
not change the requirement for more frequent reporting as a licensee
approaches the permanent cessation of operations and while the licensee
is in decommissioning or the requirement for a site-specific
decommissioning cost estimate during this period.
The NRC proposes a rule change in Sec. 50.75(h) in order to be
consistent with the requirements of Sec. 50.4. Specifically,
notifications would be sent directly to the Document Control Desk, and
not to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or Director,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, as applicable. This
change would provide one consistent location for licensees to docket
all notifications to the NRC.
The NRC proposes to delete Sec. 50.75(f)(2). The language of
existing Sec. 50.75(f)(1) fully encompasses the language of paragraph
(f)(2), and, therefore, paragraph (f)(2) is unnecessary and potentially
confusing. By removing paragraph (f)(2) the NRC would not be removing
the requirement on licensees to continue submitting decommissioning
funding assurance status reports. Existing paragraphs (f)(3) through
(5) would be redesignated as paragraphs (f)(2) through (4).
3. Shortfalls in Decommissioning Funding Assurance
The requirement in Sec. 50.75 that the licensee provide reasonable
assurance that sufficient funds will be available for radiological
decommissioning is a continuing obligation. However, economic factors
can cause the amount of a licensee's financial assurance to fall below
the amount required (either by the NRC minimum formula in Sec.
50.75(c), or by a licensee's site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate), thereby creating a shortfall. The regulations do not
explicitly discuss what to do when a licensee faces a funding
shortfall, regardless of its cause. Instead, the NRC addressed the
scenario in its guidance in RG 1.159, ``Assuring the Availability of
Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML003740066). This guidance provides that non-rate-regulated licensees
should make up shortfalls in decommissioning funding within 2 years and
electric utility licensees within 5 years.
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations in Sec. 50.75(f)(1)
to clarify that, although the regulations establish a continuing
obligation to provide reasonable assurance of decommissioning funding,
when a licensee identifies a shortfall in the report required by Sec.
50.75(f)(1), the licensee must identify additional financial assurance
to cover the shortfall in the next report. Specifically, the proposed
rule would require licensees to remedy shortfalls before permanent
cessation of operations consistent with the methods identified in Sec.
50.75(e) in the next Sec. 50.75(f) report. The proposed rule would
clarify the expectations for how reasonable assurance of funds will be
available for the decommissioning process. For electric utilities that
currently submit biennial reports but correct their shortfalls within 5
years, the NRC proposes that they would submit their decommissioning
funding status reports triennially and explain in their reports how
they plan to correct any existing shortfall. Electric utilities should
continue to correct shortfalls within 5 years as explained in RG 1.159.
For non-rate-regulated licensees that currently submit biennial reports
and should correct shortfalls within a 2 year period, the NRC proposes
that they correct any shortfalls within the 3 year reporting period.
The NRC proposes to clarify the last sentence of current Sec.
50.75(f)(1) to reduce the number of clauses and enhance readability.
The NRC proposes to revise Sec. 50.82(a)(9)(ii)(F) to require
licensees to identify the specific sources of funds for ``remaining
decommissioning costs,'' including sources of funds for license
termination, spent fuel management, and ISFSI decommissioning.
4. Conforming Changes to 10 CFR Part 52
The NRC proposes to revise Sec. 52.110 to make the same changes
proposed in Sec. 50.82 for the reasons previously discussed and for
consistency. In addition, the NRC proposes to add paragraphs (h)(5)
through (h)(7) with site-specific decommissioning cost estimate
reporting requirements that are identical to the requirements in Sec.
50.82(a)(8)(v) through (vii). Consistent with proposed Sec.
52.110(h)(7), a report on irradiated fuel should only be submitted if
irradiated fuel is on site.
5. Change to 10 CFR Part 72
The NRC proposes to revise Sec. 72.30 so that the submittals
subsequent to the initial decommissioning funding plan would no longer
require NRC approval. The NRC found little benefit in approving
subsequent decommissioning funding plans for ISFSIs because the
financial assurance mechanisms employed are very similar to those used
for nuclear power reactors. The experience to date is that
decommissioning funding plans have not changed substantively because of
the passive nature of the ISFSI design, the static nature of ISFSI
operations after loading, and the fact that there are no liquids or
liquid effluents present in dry cask storage facilities. In addition,
the NRC expects that the frequency of events that could potentially
impact the decommissioning funding plan (i.e., due to spills, facility
modifications, or changes in possession limits that are cited in Sec.
72.30(c)) would continue to be low. However, if they were to occur, it
is important that these events be factored into the cost of
decommissioning. This change would make the processes under Sec.
72.30(c) more efficient and less burdensome to the licensee and the
NRC, while still maintaining reasonable assurance of adequate funding
for the decommissioning of ISFSIs.
G. Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity
Agreements
The NRC proposes to amend its financial protection regulations
under 10 CFR part 140, ``Financial Protection Requirements and
Indemnity Agreements,'' and Sec. 50.54(w) to address instances where a
decommissioning reactor licensee may not need to maintain its full
amounts of offsite liability insurance and onsite property insurance.
Reductions in insurance
[[Page 12290]]
amounts may be warranted commensurate with the reduction in probability
of an incident at a reactor in decommissioning and also a reduction in
the offsite and onsite consequences from this event. The proposed
financial protection requirements would codify the approach currently
used by the NRC to approve exemptions from the financial protection
requirements for decommissioning 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52
nuclear power reactor licensees. The proposed changes would also
increase efficiency and transparency in this area by clarifying the
requirements for financial protection of decommissioning plants,
providing for regulatory certainty, and reducing regulatory burden
without affecting public health and safety. Specifically, these
proposed requirements would represent a graded approach, including the
criteria to be considered, where the financial protection requirements
for decommissioning sites are adjusted commensurate with the level of
risk posed at two stages of the decommissioning process.
Proposed revisions to 10 CFR part 140 and Sec. 50.54(w) would also
address other regulatory topics including, for example, the
applicability of procedures regarding extraordinary nuclear occurrences
and a proposed new notification requirement for licensees when they
make changes to the amount of onsite insurance.
1. Proposed Revisions to Offsite Liability and Onsite Property
Insurance Requirements
The NRC proposes to allow 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52 nuclear
power reactor licensees in decommissioning to reduce the offsite
liability and onsite property insurance amounts that they are required
to maintain under Sec. Sec. 140.11 and 50.54(w), respectively, without
obtaining exemptions from the NRC's regulations. Instead, as proposed
under Sec. Sec. 140.11(a)(5) and 50.54(w)(5), once certain criteria
are satisfied, licensees could reduce their financial protection to the
amounts in Level 2 in Table 3:
Table 3--Two-Step Graded Approach
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reactor site Offsite requirement Onsite requirement (Sec.
Level description (Sec. 140.11) 50.54(w))
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........................... Operating or $450 million; $1.06 billion.
Permanently Ceased participation in the
Operations and industry retrospective
Permanently Defueled. rating plan.
2........................... Sufficiently Decayed $100 million; $50 million.
Fuel; >=1,000 gallons withdrawal from the
of radioactive waste. industry retrospective
rating plan.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Licensees in Level 1 of the graded approach would be required to
maintain the full amounts of offsite liability and onsite property
insurance currently required in Sec. Sec. 140.11(a)(4) and 50.54(w),
respectively, until the probability of a zirconium fuel cladding fire
in the spent fuel pool is minimized. Maintaining the full level of
insurance recognizes the potential for liability insurance claims
following an accident of this type and the need for available resources
to clean up the site.
The transition to Level 2 financial protection amounts for
licensees would be optional and could occur after the passage of a
specified amount of time (i.e., 10 months for BWRs or 16 months for
PWRs, beginning on the date of permanent cessation of operations, plus
the NRC's docketing of the certifications required by Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
or Sec. 52.110(a) or after the lapse of an NRC-approved alternative
time period to the 10 or 16 month spent fuel decay period that is
submitted under Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii)(A) or (B)). For the latter
option, licensees would need to submit an analysis that demonstrates a
reduced risk of a zirconium fuel cladding fire in the SFP. The
reduction in the financial protection amounts as identified in Table 3
(i.e., $100 million in offsite liability insurance and withdrawal from
the industry retrospective rating plan) was modeled on the offsite
liability claims experience from the accident at Three Mile Island Unit
2 as documented in SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection Required of
Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML12257A628). SECY-93-127 provides a reasonable basis for
using the Three Mile Island Unit 2 experience as a model for
determining the appropriate liability insurance coverage level for a
permanently shutdown reactor that has completed its respective spent
fuel cooling period. Additionally, as documented in SECY-93-127, the
reduced onsite financial protection amount in Table 3 (i.e., $50
million in onsite property insurance coverage) was modeled on the
potential onsite cleanup costs from a radiological incident involving
the rupture of a large liquid radioactive waste storage tank (~450,000
gallons) containing slightly radioactive water. This event was selected
as conceivable and a bounding scenario having negligible radiological
consequences offsite.
The spent fuel heat-up analysis performed by the licensee for
purposes of reducing its insurance amounts to those in Level 2 could be
the same analysis that the licensee performs to relax the offsite
emergency planning requirements under proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii)(A)
or (B). The transition to Level 2 would prompt the licensee to notify
the NRC under Sec. 140.15(e) of a material change in financial
protection--a reduction in offsite primary financial protection from
$450 million to $100 million and withdrawal from the industry
retrospective rating plan. The NRC proposes a conforming change to
Sec. 50.54(w) for a similar notification of a material change to
onsite property insurance amounts.
The NRC is also proposing to periodically adjust the offsite and
onsite financial protection amounts for decommissioned reactors to
account for inflation. These adjustments would be in accordance with
the aggregate percentage change in the Consumer Price Index and
performed at intervals that coincide with the inflation adjustments for
the retrospective premium under Section 170t of the AEA.
2. Proposed Revision to Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences Requirements
The NRC proposes to amend its regulations in Sec. 140.81, ``Scope
and purpose,'' to clarify the applicability of the requirements for an
Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO) to reactors in decommissioning.
Under Sections 11 and 170 of the AEA, and NRC regulations at subpart E,
``Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences,'' to 10 CFR part 140, the NRC is
authorized to make a determination as to whether an event at a
production or utilization facility causing a discharge or dispersal of
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material that has resulted or
will result in substantial damages to offsite members of the public or
property is an
[[Page 12291]]
ENO. An event will qualify as an ENO if the NRC determines that the
criteria in Sec. 140.84, ``Criterion I--Substantial discharge of
radioactive material or substantial radiation levels offsite,'' and
Sec. 140.85, ``Criterion II--Substantial damages to persons offsite or
property offsite,'' have been met.
The NRC recognizes that the radiological consequences resulting
from an accident at a decommissioning reactor in Level 1 can be similar
to those from an accident at an operating reactor. As presented in
NUREG-1738, in the timeframe beginning immediately after the reactor is
defueled and the fuel is placed in the SFP, the radiological
consequences of a zirconium fire may be comparable to those from
operating reactor postulated severe accidents. The existing potential
consequences from a zirconium fire, until the fuel in the SFP has
sufficiently decayed, provides the basis for the NRC's proposal to
amend its regulations to include plants in decommissioning within the
scope of Sec. 140.81.
3. Proposed New Rule Language in Sec. 50.54(w)(6)
The NRC proposes to amend Sec. 50.54(w) to require a prompt
notification to the Commission of any material change in proof of
onsite property insurance filed with the Commission under 10 CFR part
50. Specifically, the transition to Level 2 as proposed by the NRC
would prompt the licensee to notify the NRC under Sec. 50.54(w)(6) of
a reduction in onsite property insurance from $1.06 billion to $50
million. This proposed amendment to Sec. 50.54(w)(6) would be a
conforming change, for consistency, with the existing offsite financial
protection requirements under Sec. 140.15(e).
H. Environmental Considerations
1. Clarifying Changes to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
A nuclear power reactor licensee's transition from operating to
decommissioning status does not involve an agency action that would
trigger NRC responsibilities under environmental statutes, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), or the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). However, Sec.
50.82(a)(4)(i) (for nuclear power reactors licensed under 10 CFR part
50) and Sec. 52.110(d)(1) (for nuclear power reactors licensed under
10 CFR part 52) require that PSDARs provide the reasons for concluding
that appropriate previously issued environmental impact statements
(EIS) will bound the environmental impacts associated with site-
specific decommissioning activities. After the PSDAR is submitted, the
licensee must remain in compliance with Sec. 50.82(a)(6)(ii) or Sec.
52.110(f)(2), as applicable. These regulations state that licensees may
not perform any decommissioning activities, as defined in Sec. 50.2,
that result in significant environmental impacts not previously
reviewed. As explained in the 1996 Final Rule, the requirement in Sec.
50.82(a)(6)(ii) functions as a prohibition against the licensee
performing a decommissioning activity that would result in a
significant impact ``not previously reviewed'' (61 FR 39283, 39286, and
39291; July 29, 1996). The NRC may develop updates to IMC 2561,
``Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program,'' and the related
Inspection Procedure (IP) 71801, ``Decommissioning Performance and
Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors,'' dated August 11,
1997, to provide guidance on inspections for compliance with Sec.
50.82(a)(6)(ii) or Sec. 52.110(f)(2) with respect to environmental
reviews.
In certain circumstances, licensees may be unable to satisfy the
requirement that licensees conclude in the PSDAR that all environmental
impacts associated with site-specific decommissioning activities will
be bounded by previous EISs. For example, NUREG-0586, Supplement 1,
Volumes 1 and 2, ``Generic Environmental Impact Statement on
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Regarding the Decommissioning of
Nuclear Power Reactors'' (Decommissioning GEIS) (ADAMS Accession No.
ML023470327), identified several resource areas that were not
generically resolved. If the EISs previously prepared for the
construction and initial operation of the plant, for license renewal,
or for another licensing action did not include site-specific analyses
for those resource areas not generically resolved under the
Decommissioning GEIS, then the licensee would be unable to make the
determination in the PSDAR that all impacts will be bounded. Therefore,
the licensee would have to either change its planned decommissioning
activities so that the impacts would be bounded or submit and have
approved a license amendment request or an exemption request to satisfy
Sec. 50.82(a)(4)(i) or Sec. 52.110(d)(1) prior to conducting the
subject decommissioning activity.
The NRC proposes to change the PSDAR requirements in Sec.
50.82(a)(4)(i) and Sec. 52.110(d)(1) to require that licensees provide
the basis for determining whether the environmental impacts from site-
specific decommissioning activities are bounded by previous
environmental reviews. This proposed rule change would clarify that
licensees, at the PSDAR stage, are required to evaluate the
environmental impacts and provide in the PSDAR the basis for whether
the proposed decommissioning activities are bounded by previously
issued, site-specific or generic environmental reviews. Given that some
decommissioning activities will occur well in the future, licensees
might not be able to make the definitive conclusion that impacts will
be bounded at the PSDAR stage. Therefore, the proposed change would
provide licensees flexibility to address any unbounded environmental
impacts closer to, but still prior to, the decommissioning activity
being undertaken that could cause the unbounded impact. In that case,
the licensee should identify in the PSDAR the decommissioning
activities that are not bounded by previous environmental reviews and
will be addressed in the future. This proposed change would be
consistent with the purpose of the PSDAR, as noted in RG 1.185,
Revision 1, ``Standard Format and Content for Post-Shutdown
Decommissioning Activities Report'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML13140A038),
as a mechanism for NRC oversight because it would alert the NRC to any
potentially unbounded environmental impacts associated with planned
site-specific decommissioning activities. If a licensee were to
consider a proposed decommissioning activity that would otherwise be
prohibited by Sec. 50.82(a)(6)(ii) or Sec. 52.110(f)(2), then prior
to undertaking that activity, the licensee could submit a request for a
license amendment or an exemption request, decide not to perform the
proposed activity, or modify the proposed activity so that the
unbounded environmental impact does not occur. If the licensee chose to
submit a license amendment or exemption request, then the request would
trigger NRC responsibilities under environmental statutes. In addition,
prior to performing a decommissioning activity that is inconsistent
with the PSDAR but permitted by Sec. 50.59, the licensee must notify
the NRC in writing, with a copy to the affected States, in accordance
with Sec. 50.82(a)(7). This Sec. 50.82(a)(7) requirement is in the
current regulation and would not be changed in this proposed rule.
The NRC also proposes to change the Sec. 50.82(a)(4)(i) and Sec.
52.110(d)(1) regulations to allow licensees to use appropriate
federally issued environmental review documents prepared in compliance
with NEPA,
[[Page 12292]]
ESA, NHPA, or other environmental statutes instead of only EISs. One
reason for replacing the phrase ``previously issued environmental
impact statements'' with ``federally issued environmental review
documents'' is the NRC can, in many instances, satisfy its NEPA
compliance obligations by the preparation of an environmental
assessment or through a categorical exclusion finding rather than
preparing an EIS. A second reason is that this change allows licensees
to use a wider range of documents that address various resources.
Examples of appropriate federally issued environmental review documents
include environmental assessments prepared for license amendments such
as extended power uprates; documents prepared during Section 7
consultations under the ESA such as biological opinions and biological
assessments; or programmatic agreements prepared through Section 106
consultations under the NHPA to resolve impacts to historic properties.
Environmental review documents prepared by other Federal agencies could
also be used if they were relevant to the impacts associated with the
site-specific decommissioning activities.
The regulations in Sec. 50.82(a)(6)(ii) and Sec. 52.110(f)(2)
prohibit a licensee from undertaking a decommissioning activity that
would result in a significant environmental impact not previously
reviewed. The NRC is also proposing to change Sec. 50.82(a)(6)(ii) and
Sec. 52.110(f)(2) to clarify that the previous review of any
potentially significant environmental impact must be bounded by
appropriate federally issued environmental review documents prepared in
compliance with NEPA, ESA, NHPA, or other environmental statutes. In
this regard, the determination of significance should be made in terms
of the appropriate federal environmental resource protection statute.
For example, if a proposed decommissioning activity were likely to
result in a potential adverse effect upon a historic property, as the
term ``adverse effect'' is described in the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation regulation, 36 CFR 800.5, ``Typical classes of
action,'' then that potential adverse effect would most likely be
equivalent to a potential significant impact under Sec.
50.82(a)(6)(ii) or Sec. 52.110(f)(2). Similarly, for species listed
under the ESA, the equivalent threshold would be a proposed
decommissioning activity that could result in a ``take,'' as that term
is defined in 16 U.S.C. 1532(19), of any listed species at the time of
the proposed decommissioning activity.
These proposed changes would reduce the regulatory burden on the
licensee by removing the duplicative requirement to address unbounded
environmental impacts at the PSDAR stage. Instead, licensees would only
prepare an environmental report or provide other information as
requested by the NRC under Sec. 51.41, ``Requirement to submit
environmental information,'' before performing any decommissioning
activity that is likely to result in a significant impact not
previously bounded.
2. Consistency Changes to 10 CFR Part 51
Currently, Sec. 51.53(d) requires that an applicant for a license
amendment authorizing decommissioning activities for a production or
utilization facility either for unrestricted use or continuing use
restrictions submit an environmental report. The regulation at Sec.
51.95(d) states that the NRC will prepare a supplemental EIS or an
environmental assessment in connection with an amendment of a license
to authorize decommissioning activities.
The 1996 Final Rule eliminated the requirement for nuclear power
reactor licensees to seek NRC authorization for decommissioning.
Therefore, there was no need for licensees to submit a license
amendment or to prepare and submit a supporting environmental report,
and thus no federal action that would require the NRC to prepare a NEPA
document. In response to the 1995 decommissioning proposed rule,
commenters suggested that revisions should be made to then-Sec. 51.53,
``Supplement to environmental report,'' and then-Sec. 51.95,
``Supplement to final environmental impact statement,'' to reflect the
rule change. However, the NRC at that time decided not to amend the 10
CFR part 51 regulations because non-power reactor facilities were still
required to submit a decommissioning plan.
The NRC proposes to revise 10 CFR part 51 to reflect the changes
made in the 1996 Final Rule that nuclear power reactor licensees are
not required to submit license amendment requests for authorization to
perform decommissioning activities. In Sec. 51.53(d), the NRC is
proposing to remove language referencing an amendment for authorizing
decommissioning activities and the requirement to prepare an
environmental report for nuclear power reactors only. In Sec.
51.95(d), the NRC is similarly proposing to remove language referencing
an amendment for authorizing decommissioning activities. The NRC
further proposes to revise Sec. 51.95(d) to indicate that the NRC
would prepare the necessary NEPA document upon the submittal of a
license amendment requesting approval of a license termination plan.
The NRC also proposes to add a cross-reference to Sec. 52.110 in Sec.
51.53, ``Postconstruction environmental reports,'' as reactors licensed
under 10 CFR part 52 will perform decommissioning under Sec. 52.110,
not Sec. 50.82.
The NRC is not proposing to make any changes in 10 CFR part 51 that
would impact non-power production or utilization facilities (e.g.,
research and test reactors) or fuel reprocessing plants. Non-power
production or utilization facility and fuel reprocessing plant
licensees must continue to submit a license amendment requesting
approval for a decommissioning plan and to prepare and submit the
appropriate supporting environmental report, and the NRC would continue
to prepare the appropriate NEPA documentation.
I. Record Retention Requirements
The NRC's regulations require nuclear power reactor licensees to
retain the records associated with certain SSCs until the license is
terminated and sometimes require that these records be kept in
duplicate. To decrease the burden associated with long-term record
storage and increase the overall efficiency of the decommissioning
process, licensees that are transitioning to decommissioning frequently
request exemptions from these requirements. Although this approach
continues to meet the underlying purpose of the recordkeeping
regulations, the process of preparing, submitting, and reviewing
exemptions from the record retention requirements is not an efficient
use of NRC or licensee resources given the fact that the subject
records are no longer needed to support any NRC-regulated function. In
addition, maintaining the current regulations with respect to record
retention during decommissioning can create a situation wherein the
facilities used to store records are ready to be dismantled in support
of site decommissioning before the necessary exemptions can be
processed. The NRC proposes to resolve these issues by amending its
regulations in this rulemaking.
The recordkeeping requirements at issue include the following:
Criterion XVII, ``Quality Assurance Records,'' of appendix
B, ``Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel
Reprocessing Plants,'' to 10 CFR part 50 requires licensees to retain
certain records consistent with
[[Page 12293]]
regulatory requirements for a duration established by the licensees.
Sections 50.59(d)(3) and 52.63(b)(2) require licensees to
maintain certain records until termination of a license issued under 10
CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52.
Section 50.71(c) requires licensees to maintain certain
records consistent with various elements of the NRC regulations,
facility TSs, and other licensing basis documents.
Section 72.72(d) requires licensees to duplicate certain
records of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste and store them
in a separate location sufficiently remote from the original records so
that a single event would not destroy both sets.
Licensees that have previously requested exemptions from these
requirements used the justification that, when the SSCs associated with
these records are removed from service and the licensing basis
documents, the SSCs will no longer serve any NRC-regulated function.
Therefore, it would no longer be necessary to retain the records. In
addition, several licensees requesting an exemption from the
requirements of Sec. 72.72(d) used the justification that they will
store the ISFSI spent fuel records using the same procedures and
processes used for the facility spent fuel (and other) records, which
are typically stored in accordance with the NRC-approved quality
assurance program (QAP).
The NRC granted the previous record retention exemptions based on a
finding of reasonable assurance that the licensee would continue to
meet the underlying purpose of the recordkeeping regulations, which is
to establish the minimum retention periods necessary for the NRC to
ensure compliance with the safety and health aspects of the nuclear
environment and for the NRC to accomplish its mission to protect the
public health and safety. In ``Retention Periods for Records; Final
Rule'' (53 FR 19240; May 27, 1988), the Commission explained that
requiring licensees to maintain adequate records assists the NRC in
judging compliance and noncompliance, to act on possible noncompliance,
and to examine facts as necessary following any incident. Because the
SSCs that were safety-related or important to safety during reactor
operations or operation of the SFP are removed from the licensing
basis, and subsequently removed from the plant during the
decommissioning process, the records associated with those SSCs are no
longer required to achieve the purpose of the recordkeeping and record
retention regulations.
Records associated with SSCs that maintain compliance with
requirements or that protect public health and safety during the
decommissioning process have been excluded from these exemptions.
Examples include those SSCs associated with programmatic controls
pertaining to residual radioactivity, security, and quality assurance
(QA), and those SSCs associated with spent fuel assemblies or the SFP
(while assemblies are still in the pool) and ISFSIs. These exemptions
do not affect the record retention requirements of Sec. 50.75 or any
other requirements of 10 CFR part 50 that apply to decommissioning.
Based on these exemptions, the NRC proposes to change the
recordkeeping and record retention requirements such that once the NRC
dockets a licensee's notifications of permanent cessation of operation
and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel under Sec.
50.82(a)(2) or Sec. 52.110(a), licensees can then eliminate records
associated with SSCs that no longer serve any NRC-regulated function.
The NRC would allow this record disposal as long as appropriate change
mechanisms, such as the Sec. 50.59 evaluation process or NRC-approved
TS changes, are used to assess the removal of those records to
determine that elimination of the records would have no adverse impact
on public health and safety.
The records that would be subject to removal are associated with
SSCs that had been important to safety during reactor operation or
operation of the SFP, but that are no longer capable of causing an
event, incident, or condition that would adversely impact public health
and safety, as evidenced by their appropriate removal from the
licensing basis documents. Since the SSCs no longer have the potential
to cause these scenarios, it is reasonable to conclude that the records
associated with these SSCs would not reasonably be necessary to assist
the NRC in determining compliance, taking action on possible
noncompliance, and examining facts following an incident. Therefore,
retention of such records would not serve the underlying purpose of the
recordkeeping regulations.
The NRC proposes to make the following four changes to the
recordkeeping and record retention requirements and regulatory guidance
to enhance the efficiency of the decommissioning regulations:
1. Clarify in RG 1.184, ``Decommissioning of Nuclear Power
Reactors,'' that the requirements in appendix B to 10 CFR part 50,
Criterion XVII, concerning record retention, such as duration,
location, and assigned responsibility, continue to be met with the
recommended changes to the recordkeeping and record retention
requirements.
2. Amend Sec. 50.71(c) to specify that licensees for which the NRC
has docketed the certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or
Sec. 52.110(a) are not required to retain records associated with SSCs
that have been removed from service using an NRC-approved change
process. However, Sec. 50.71(c) would require licensees to retain
records important to decommissioning as specified under Sec. 50.75(g).
3. Amend Sec. Sec. 50.59(d)(3) and 52.63(b)(2) to clarify that
records of changes in the facility must be maintained until the
termination of the license except for records associated with SSCs
removed from service using an NRC-approved change process after the NRC
has docketed the certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or
Sec. 52.110(a).
4. Amend Sec. 72.72(d) to allow that records of spent fuel, high-
level radioactive waste, and reactor-related greater than Class C
(GTCC) waste containing special nuclear material no longer be kept in
duplicate, as long as the licensee can demonstrate that it will store
the records in the same manner as it would for other QA records using a
single storage facility subject to the same procedures and processes
outlined in an NRC-approved QAP.
In most cases, an NRC-approved QAP involves document storage
requirements that meet American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
standard N45 2.91974, ``Requirements for Collection, Storage, and
Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records,'' which specifies, in part,
the design requirements for use in the construction of record storage
facilities when the use of a single storage facility is desired. In
approving the associated QAP, the NRC typically approves the single
facility location used for the storage and maintenance of QA records at
the facility, and the licensee typically affirms in the QAP that the
record storage facility was constructed and is being maintained to meet
the requirements of the NRC-approved QAP.
Records for an ISFSI at a specific facility are typically
classified as QA records and include all documents and records
associated with the operation, maintenance, installation, repair, and
modification of SSCs covered by the QAP. An ISFSI's records also
include historical records that have been gathered and collected during
plant and ISFSI operations. These records are either required in
support of the dry cask storage systems used at the ISFSI
[[Page 12294]]
or for ultimate shipment of the fuel to a Federal repository. The QAP
typically allows the storage of QA records, including ISFSI records, to
be done in accordance with ANSI N45 2.9-1974 in a single storage
facility designed and maintained to minimize the risk of damage from
adverse conditions.
The retention of records required by Sec. 50.59(d)(3); Sec.
52.63(b)(2); Sec. 50.71(c); and appendix B to 10 CFR part 50,
Criterion XVII provides assurance that records associated with SSCs
will be captured, indexed, and stored in an environmentally suitable
and retrievable condition. Although licensees retain the records
required by their license as the plant transitions from operating
conditions to a fully decommissioned state, plant dismantlement
obviates the regulatory need for maintenance of most records. As the
SSCs already removed from the licensing basis are subsequently
dismantled and the need for the associated records is, on a practical
basis, eliminated, the proposed rule changes would allow disposal of
the records associated with SSCs and historical activities that are no
longer relevant and thereby eliminate the associated regulatory and
economic burdens of creating alternative storage locations, relocating
records, or retaining irrelevant records. The proposed recordkeeping
and record retention changes only expedite the schedule for disposition
of the specified records. Considering the content of these records,
their elimination on an advanced timetable has no reasonable potential
of presenting any undue risk to public health and safety. In addition,
upon dismantlement of the affected SSCs, the records have no functional
purpose relative to maintaining the safe operation of the SSCs,
maintaining conditions that would affect the ongoing health and safety
of workers or the public, or informing decisions related to nuclear
safety and security.
In addition, the proposed change to the portion of Sec. 72.72(d)
to eliminate the requirement for ISFSI licensees to keep a duplicate
set of records for spent fuel in storage, would continue to meet the
recordkeeping requirements of appendix B to 10 CFR part 50 and other
applicable 10 CFR part 72 requirements for the storage and maintenance
of spent fuel records in accordance with an NRC-approved QAP.
Specifically, Sec. 72.140(d) states that a QA program that the NRC has
approved as meeting the applicable requirements of appendix B to 10 CFR
part 50, will be accepted as satisfying the requirements of Sec.
72.140(b) for establishing an ISFSI QA program. However, the licensee
must also meet the recordkeeping provisions of Sec. 72.174, ``Quality
assurance records.'' In addition, the proposed rule change would not
affect the record content, retrievability, or retention requirements
specified in Sec. 72.72, ``Material balance, inventory, and records
requirements for stored materials,'' or Sec. 72.174, such that the
licensee will continue to meet all other applicable recordkeeping
requirements for the ISFSI and associated special nuclear materials.
In proposing these rule changes, the NRC determined that the
process and procedures used to store the ISFSI records (i.e., in
accordance with the QAP at a facility designed for protection against
degradation mechanisms such as fire, humidity, and condensation) would
help ensure that the licensee will adequately maintain the required
spent fuel information. Therefore, changes to the duplicate record
requirement of Sec. 72.72(d) would not affect public health and
safety. In addition, allowing the ISFSI spent fuel records to be stored
in the same manner as that of other QA records for the nuclear facility
would provide for greater efficiency in the storage of all records once
the facility enters the final stages of decommissioning, where only the
ISFSI facility would remain after license termination.
J. Low-Level Waste Transportation
Paragraph III.E of appendix G, ``Requirements for Transfers of Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Intended for Disposal at Licensed Land Disposal
Facilities and Manifests,'' to 10 CFR part 20, ``Standards for
Protection Against Radiation,'' contains requirements for
investigating, tracing, and reporting shipments of low-level
radioactive waste (LLW) if the shipper \6\ has not received
notification of receipt within 20 days after transfer. In addition,
paragraph III.E requires the shipper to report such missing shipments
to the NRC. Licensees, primarily those that are involved in the
decommissioning process, frequently request an exemption from the
requirement related to the 20-day receipt notification window. The NRC
proposes to amend this requirement to extend the receipt notification
window because such an extension would provide licensees with
flexibility while not impacting public health and safety or the common
defense and security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Paragraph III.E of appendix G to 10 CFR part 20 uses the
term ``shipper,'' which the regulation defines to mean ``the
licensed entity (i.e., the waste generator, waste collector, or
waste processor) who offers low-level radioactive waste for
transportation, typically consigning this type of waste to a
licensed waste collector, waste processor, or land disposal facility
operator.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Licensees that have previously been granted these exemptions
typically requested extension of the investigation notification window
to 45 days using the justification that operating experience indicates
that, while the 20-day receipt notification window is adequate for
waste shipments by truck, waste shipments using other modes of shipment
such as rail, barge, or mixed-mode shipments, such as combinations of
truck and rail, barge and rail, and barge and truck shipments, may take
more than 20 days to reach their destination due to delays in the route
that are outside the shipper's control (e.g., rail cars in switchyards
waiting to be included in a complete train to the disposal facility).
The NRC granted the previous transportation investigation requirement
exemptions based on a finding of reasonable assurance that the shipper
would continue to meet the underlying purpose of the LLW transportation
regulations--to require the shipper to investigate, trace, and report
radioactive shipments that have not reached their destination, as
scheduled, for unknown reasons.
Under the current regulations, the shipper must investigate, trace,
and report to the NRC any shipments of LLW for which the shipper has
not received a notification of receipt within 20 days after transfer
unless the shipper receives an exemption from the 20-day receipt
notification requirement. The NRC has found that exempting licensees
from this requirement does not undermine public health and safety, nor
does it increase any security risk. Further, the preparation and
submission of the exemption request, and its review, evaluation, and
approval by the NRC, are not efficient uses of NRC or licensee
resources. Specifically, the NRC notes that allowing the receipt
notification to be made past 20 days would not impact public health,
safety, or security even if the LLW transportation package was situated
in a publicly accessible area and waiting for continuing transport to
the waste disposal site because: (1) Individuals in the vicinity of the
LLW transportation package would receive no additional radiological
dose above background levels resulting from the disposal container; and
(2) the LLW would remain secured in the transportation package until
the package can be delivered to the waste disposal site. The NRC also
notes that, for LLW waste shipments, most shippers will use an
electronic data tracking system interchange or similar tracking systems
that allow the carrier to monitor the
[[Page 12295]]
progress of the shipments daily. Because of the oversight and
monitoring of radioactive waste shipments throughout the journey from
the nuclear facility to the disposal site, the loss, misdirection, or
diversion of a shipment without the knowledge of the carrier or the
shipper is unlikely.
Therefore, the NRC proposes to change the requirement for the
investigation, tracing, and reporting timeframe for LLW transportation
to extend the receipt notification window to 45 days after the shipper
transfers LLW from a licensed facility to a disposal site. This change
would continue to meet the underlying purpose of appendix G to 10 CFR
part 20, paragraph III.E, which requires the shipper to investigate,
trace, and report LLW shipments that have not reached their
destination, as scheduled, for unknown reasons. Furthermore, extending
the time period for notification of receipt to 45 days before requiring
investigation, tracing, and reporting, would maintain a reasonable
upper limit on shipment duration if a breakdown of normal tracking
systems were to occur, based on operating experience.
In addition, the NRC proposes correcting a typographical error in
the current version of appendix G to 10 CFR part 20, paragraph III.E.
Specifically, that paragraph states that LLW shipments must ``be
investigated by the shipper if the shipper has not received
notification or receipt within 20 days after transfer . . .'' (emphasis
added). The ``or'' should be an ``of,'' consistent with the subsequent
discussions in 10 CFR part 20 regarding notifications of receipt and
the associated exemptions granted in this area. Therefore, the NRC
proposes correcting this error as part of this proposed rule for
consistency and clarity within 10 CFR part 20.
K. Spent Fuel Management Planning
The regulation in Sec. 72.218(a) states that the Sec. 50.54(bb)
spent fuel management program (i.e., the irradiated fuel management
plan or IFMP) must include a plan for removing from the reactor site
the spent fuel stored under the 10 CFR part 72 general license. The
IFMP must show how the spent fuel will be managed before starting to
decommission systems and components needed for moving, unloading, and
shipping this spent fuel. Section 72.218(b) requires that an
application for termination of a reactor operating license submitted
under Sec. 50.82 or Sec. 52.110 must also describe how the spent fuel
stored under the 10 CFR part 72 general license will be removed from
the reactor site. Although Sec. 72.218 states what information the
Sec. 50.54(bb) IFMP and the Sec. 50.82 and Sec. 52.110 application
for termination of a reactor operating license must include, the
regulations in Sec. Sec. 50.54(bb), 50.82, and 52.110 do not contain
this information.
As Sec. Sec. 50.54(bb), 50.82, and 52.110 do not reflect or
otherwise reference the provisions in Sec. 72.218, this causes
regulatory uncertainty. The NRC proposes to clarify and align the
regulations in Sec. Sec. 50.54(bb), 50.82, 52.110, and 72.218 to
provide regulatory clarity and enhance overall regulatory transparency
and openness regarding decommissioning and spent fuel management
planning.
1. Requirements for the IFMP in Sec. 50.54(bb) and the PSDAR in Sec.
50.82 and Sec. 52.110
The PSDAR and IFMP are planning documents for decommissioning and
spent fuel management, respectively. The current requirements for the
timing of the submittal of the PSDAR and IFMP are similar, as the NRC's
regulations recognize that a licensee's ability to plan properly and
safely for decommissioning is closely related to the licensee's ability
to manage its spent fuel. Actions to manage spent fuel include
activities taken prior to and subsequent to decommissioning. Therefore,
a licensee's spent fuel management plans and its decommissioning plans
should be consistent.
Because Sec. 50.54(bb) already addresses the topic of spent fuel
management planning, the NRC proposes including the Sec. 72.218
provisions in Sec. 50.54(bb) to clarify that the Sec. 50.54(bb) IFMP
must be submitted by the licensee and approved by the NRC before the
licensee starts to decommission SSCs needed for moving, unloading, and
shipping the spent fuel. Additionally, the NRC proposes that the IFMP
must be submitted prior to or within 2 years following permanent
cessation of operations.
The NRC proposes to further restructure Sec. 50.54(bb) to clarify
that the IFMP addresses both the safety and financial aspects of
managing spent fuel. The IFMP would describe the licensee's planned
actions for managing spent fuel, how those actions would be consistent
with the NRC requirements for possession of spent fuel, and any actions
related to spent fuel management that would require amendments to the
license or certificate of compliance or exemptions from applicable
regulations, which is consistent with the current rule language. The
IFMP would also describe the projected cost of managing spent fuel and
how the licensee would provide funding for the management of the spent
fuel, until title to, and possession of, the spent fuel is transferred
to the Department of Energy (DOE), which is also consistent with the
current rule language. The regulation in Sec. 50.54(bb) would also
continue to require licensees to retain a copy of the IFMP as a record,
and the NRC proposes to clarify that the IFMP must be retained until
termination of the 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license.
The NRC proposes to clarify the current IFMP approval process and
the Sec. 50.54(bb) provisions regarding preliminary approval and final
NRC review of the IFMP as part of any proceeding for continued
licensing under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 72. With regard to the
NRC's final review of the IFMP ``as part of any proceeding for
continued licensing under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 72,'' these
proceedings no longer exist as they did when Sec. 50.54(bb) was first
promulgated in 1984. In the 1984 Final Rule, the Commission discussed
the ``proceeding for continued licensing under part 50'' as the pre-
1996 reactor decommissioning process, where licensees were required to
submit a license amendment request for approval of the decommissioning
plan and to change the license from an operating license to a
possession-only license before licensees could begin decommissioning.
The NRC noted in the 1984 Final Rule that the IFMP would become part of
the conditions of an amended 10 CFR part 50 license for a shutdown
reactor facility. After the 1996 rulemaking, the NRC no longer requires
submittal of a license amendment when a reactor ceases operations, and
thus, there is no longer a ``proceeding for continued licensing under
part 50'' for the NRC to review and approve the IFMP.
The 1984 Final Rule discusses the ``proceeding for continued
licensing under part 72'' as the application for, and NRC issuance of,
a 10 CFR part 72 specific license for storage of spent fuel in an
ISFSI. The 1984 issuance of Sec. 50.54(bb) preceded the general
license ISFSI provisions, which were added to 10 CFR part 72 in 1990.
Regarding the 10 CFR part 72 general license, storage of spent fuel in
a general license ISFSI is authorized by operation of law via Sec.
72.210, so there is no NRC ``licensing proceeding'' or approval needed
for the 10 CFR part 72 general license. As most reactor licensees use
the 10 CFR part 72 general license for storage of spent fuel in an
ISFSI, there would be no ``proceeding for continued licensing under
part 72'' for the NRC to review
[[Page 12296]]
and approve the IFMP. Therefore, the NRC proposes to require submittal
of the IFMP to the NRC as a license amendment request. The NRC also
proposes to require licensees to submit to the NRC any changes to the
IFMP as an application for an amendment to its license.
2. Requirements in Sec. 72.218 for Termination of the General License
for Spent Fuel Storage
Because the current spent fuel management planning provisions of
Sec. 72.218 are initiated by reactor shutdown and are related to
reactor decommissioning, the requirements fit best in 10 CFR part 50
and are not necessarily needed in 10 CFR part 72. Therefore, as the NRC
proposes adding the spent fuel management provisions from Sec. 72.218
into Sec. 50.54(bb), the NRC also proposes deleting those provisions
from Sec. 72.218. In addition, the NRC proposes revising Sec. 72.218
to address requirements related to termination of the 10 CFR part 72
general license, as the current title of Sec. 72.218, ``Termination of
licenses,'' suggests.
The 10 CFR part 72 general license is issued to 10 CFR part 50 or
10 CFR part 52 licensees, per the regulation in Sec. 72.210. It
follows that the 10 CFR part 72 general license would terminate
coincident with the termination of the 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52
license. In addition, since the general license ISFSI is part of the 10
CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 licensed site, decommissioning of the
general license ISFSI would follow the reactor decommissioning process
in Sec. 50.82 or Sec. 52.110, respectively. This approach would also
be consistent with the NRC's approach to ISFSI decommissioning funding
as discussed in the ``Decommissioning Funding Assurance'' section of
this document.
However, to provide regulatory clarity between 10 CFR parts 50, 52,
and 72 in terms of decommissioning and termination of the 10 CFR part
72 general license, the NRC proposes to revise Sec. 72.218 to include
the following provisions: (1) The general license ISFSI must be
decommissioned consistent with the requirements in Sec. 50.82 or Sec.
52.110; and (2) the general license is terminated upon termination of
the 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license. This proposed change
would provide regulatory clarity among 10 CFR parts 50, 52, and 72 in
terms of decommissioning and termination of the 10 CFR part 72 general
license, analogous to the provision in Sec. 72.210 that ties the
issuance of the 10 CFR part 72 general license to the existence of the
10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license.
L. Backfit Rule
For nuclear power reactor licensees, the NRC's backfitting
provisions are located in Sec. 50.109, ``Backfitting,'' and the issue
finality provisions are in 10 CFR part 52 (hereinafter collectively
referred to as the ``Backfit Rule''). The language of the Backfit Rule
clearly applies to a licensee designing, constructing, or operating a
nuclear power facility. For example, Sec. 50.109(a)(1) defines
``backfitting'' to mean changes to, among other things, the procedures
or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility.
The application of the Backfit Rule to decommissioning plants is not as
clear. In SECY-98-253, ``Applicability of Plant-Specific Backfit
Requirements to Plants Undergoing Decommissioning,'' dated November 4,
1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML992870107), the NRC staff presented the
Commission with a list of reasons underlying this uncertainty:
The Backfit Rule has no end point when the rule no longer
applies, ``thereby implying that backfit protection continues into
decommissioning and up to the point of license termination.''
The term ``operate'' could reasonably be interpreted as
including activities to decommission the reactor.
The Backfit Rule was developed when the decommissioning of
plants was not an active area of regulatory concern.
The Backfit Rule's definition of ``backfitting'' uses
terms associated with the design, construction, and operation of a
facility rather than with its decommissioning, although the staff noted
in SECY-98-253 that ``prior to the 1996 decommissioning rule, the
Commission regarded decommissioning as a phase of the plant's life
cycle which is different from the operational phase.''
Two of the factors used in evaluating a backfit--costs of
construction delay/facility downtime, and changes in plant/operational
complexity--are targeted to power operation and are ``conceptually
inappropriate in evaluating the impacts of a backfit on a
decommissioning plant.''
The SOC for the 1970 (35 FR 5317; March 31, 1970), 1985
(50 FR 38097; September 20, 1985), and 1988 (53 FR 20603; June 6, 1988)
final Backfit Rules did not discuss any aspect of decommissioning,
focusing instead on construction and operation.
Proposed changes to decommissioning requirements usually
focused on relaxing a requirement or on whether a requirement
applicable to an operating reactor continued to be applicable to a
decommissioning plant. Thus, ``the notion of a `substantial increase'
in protection to public health and safety from a backfit does not
appear to be particularly useful [in decommissioning].''
The 1996 Final Rule did not directly respond to questions
from the public on the applicability of the Backfit Rule to a
decommissioning plant.
Over the years, the NRC has tried to clarify the applicability of
the Backfit Rule to nuclear power reactor licensees in decommissioning.
In SECY-98-253, the NRC staff requested Commission approval to amend
Sec. 50.109, among other regulations, so that the Backfit Rule would
clearly apply to licensees in decommissioning. In that paper, the NRC
staff also proposed that, until the rulemaking was finished, the staff
would apply the Backfit Rule to plants undergoing decommissioning ``to
the extent practical.''
In the February 12, 1999, SRM for SECY-98-253 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML003753746), the Commission approved development of a Backfit Rule for
plants undergoing decommissioning. The Commission directed the NRC
staff to continue to apply the then-current Backfit Rule to plants
undergoing decommissioning until issuance of the final rule. The
Commission directed the staff to develop a rulemaking plan, which the
staff transmitted to the Commission in SECY-00-0145. In SECY-00-0145,
the NRC staff proposed, among other decommissioning-related amendments
to its regulations, amendments to Sec. 50.109 to show clearly that the
Backfit Rule applies during decommissioning and to remove factors that
are not applicable to nuclear power plants in decommissioning. As
explained in the section titled ``Actions Leading to this 2018 Proposed
Rule'' in this document, the NRC ultimately did not conduct that
rulemaking. Therefore, the NRC has continued to apply the Backfit Rule
to licensee facilities undergoing decommissioning to the extent
practical.
In addition to the Commission direction to clarify the application
of the Backfit Rule for decommissioning nuclear power reactor
licensees, the NRC's regulatory framework also supports application of
the Backfit Rule to nuclear power reactor licensees in decommissioning.
Under sections 101 and 103a. of the AEA (42 U.S.C. 2131 and 2133a.),
the NRC's issuance of a nuclear power reactor operating license under
10 CFR part 50 or a combined license under 10 CFR part 52 grants the
[[Page 12297]]
holder a license to, among other things, own, possess, and operate a
``production facility'' or ``utilization facility,'' as those terms are
defined in section 11 of the AEA. Once the licensee under 10 CFR part
50 or 10 CFR part 52 submits its certifications of permanent cessation
of reactor operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel and the NRC dockets those certifications, the licensee is no
longer authorized to operate the reactor under Sec. 50.82(a)(2) or
Sec. 52.110(b), respectively. The license is no longer an ``operating
license'' for the reactor because the licensee is not operating a
production or utilization facility pursuant to sections 101 and 103a.
of the AEA. Instead, as described in Sec. 50.51(b) for 10 CFR part 50
licenses and Sec. 52.109, ``Continuation of combined license,'' for 10
CFR part 52 combined licenses, when the reactor has permanently ceased
operations, the license continues in effect beyond the expiration date
and authorizes ownership and possession of the facility until the
Commission terminates the license. Thus, when the licensee is no longer
authorized to operate the reactor, it retains its possession and
ownership authority under its 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 facility
license.
Although a decommissioning licensee's license no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor because the licensee is not operating a
production or utilization facility, the licensee still must ``operate''
certain SSCs at the site. Under Sec. 50.51(b) (with a similar
requirement in Sec. 52.109 for combined license holders), when the
licensee has only a possession and ownership license for the reactor,
the licensee must not only decommission and decontaminate the facility,
but also continue to maintain the facility, including storing,
controlling and maintaining the spent fuel in a safe condition.
Therefore, nuclear power reactor licensees store, control, and maintain
spent fuel after permanent cessation of reactor operations through the
``operation'' of an SFP and ISFSI.
Although Sec. 50.109(a)(1) defines ``backfitting'' as changes to,
among other things, the procedures or organization required to design,
construct, or operate a facility, indicating that the Backfit Rule
applies only to a holder of a license to ``operate a facility,'' the
language of Sec. 50.51(b) shows that ``operating a facility'' can be
interpreted to mean more than just operating a reactor. This is
supported by the Commission direction in the SRM for SECY-98-253 that
the NRC staff develop a Backfit Rule for plants undergoing
decommissioning (i.e., when the licensee no longer operates a reactor)
and continue to apply the then-current Backfit Rule to plants
undergoing decommissioning until issuance of the final rule. Thus, the
Backfit Rule still applies to a licensee that has a license to only
possess and own a facility. For a facility in decommissioning, the
phrase ``operate a facility'' in Sec. 50.109(a)(1) is read to
encompass operating the SFP and associated SSCs necessary for
compliance with Sec. 50.51(b).
As the Commission and the NRC staff recognized in the 1990s,
certain provisions of the Backfit Rule do not clearly apply to nuclear
power reactor licensees in decommissioning. In this proposed rule, the
NRC proposes to complete the process begun two decades ago to clarify
the application of the Backfit Rule to nuclear power reactor licensees
in decommissioning.
The NRC proposes to amend Sec. 50.109 so that nuclear power
reactor licensees, which have had their Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a) certifications docketed by the NRC, are the subject of
similar backfitting provisions as they were during their operating
phase. A new backfitting provision for licensees in decommissioning
would eliminate any confusion with the meaning of the words ``operate a
facility'' in Sec. 50.109(a)(1), as compared to other uses of the term
``operate'' in 10 CFR Chapter I.
The NRC would make other revisions to Sec. 50.109. To make the
section easier to read, the NRC proposes to insert paragraph headings.
The NRC would remove current Sec. 50.109(b) regarding backfits imposed
prior to October 21, 1985, because the language is obsolete and no
longer needed. In the current Sec. 50.109(a)(6), the NRC proposes to
insert a sentence explaining that a documented evaluation, which is
used by the NRC to justify not performing a backfit analysis, must
include a consideration of the costs of imposing the backfit if the
basis for backfitting is bringing a facility into compliance with a
license or the rules or orders of the Commission, or into conformance
with the licensee's written commitments.
Further, the NRC proposes to make conforming changes to Sec. 72.62
to clarify that the corresponding backfit regulations in part 72 apply
during the decommissioning of an ISFSI or a Monitored Retrievable
Storage facility subject to those provisions.
M. Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to address the
circumstances when a facility licensed under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR
part 52 no longer meets the definition of a utilization facility or a
production facility. The AEA has certain requirements specific to
utilization or production facilities. By clarifying when a 10 CFR part
50 or 10 CFR part 52 licensed facility is no longer a utilization or a
production facility, the NRC can then specify whether these AEA
requirements still apply to the licensee for that facility. For
instance, the AEA prohibits the issuance of a license for a utilization
or a production facility to an entity that the Commission knows or has
reason to believe is foreign owned, controlled, or dominated. The
Commission's regulations that implement this prohibition, however, are
unclear as to when a facility undergoing decommissioning is no longer a
utilization or a production facility. Given this uncertainty, licensees
have requested exemptions from Sec. 50.38, ``Ineligibility of certain
applicants,'' to transfer 10 CFR part 50 licenses for facilities that
no longer meet the definition of utilization facility. The NRC proposes
to amend its regulations to clarify when a facility licensed under 10
CFR part 50 or part 52 is not considered a production or utilization
facility and therefore, the FOCD prohibition no longer applies.
The NRC's regulations in 10 CFR parts 50 and 52 provide for the
issuance of a 10 CFR part 50 license for a utilization or a production
facility and a 10 CFR part 52 license for a utilization facility. The
AEA defines ``utilization facility'' as:
(1) Any equipment or device, except an atomic weapon, determined
by rule of the Commission to be capable of making use of special
nuclear material in such quantity as to be of significance to the
common defense and security, or in such manner as to affect the
health and safety of the public, or peculiarly adapted for making
use of atomic energy in such quantity as to be of significance to
the common defense and security, or in such manner as to affect the
health and safety of the public; or (2) any important component part
especially designed for such equipment or device as determined by
the Commission.
The AEA defines ``production facility,'' in part, as:
(1) Any equipment or device determined by rule of the Commission
to be capable of the production of special nuclear material in such
quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and
security, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of
the public; or (2) any important component part especially designed
for such equipment or device as determined by the Commission.
As authorized by the AEA, the Commission has a rule defining
utilization facility and production
[[Page 12298]]
facility. In Sec. 50.2, a utilization facility is defined as either
(1) any nuclear reactor other than one designed or used primarily for
the formation of plutonium or U-233; or (2) an accelerator-driven
subcritical operating assembly used for the irradiation of materials
containing special nuclear material and described in the application
for the SHINE Medical Isotope Production Facility. A production
facility is defined as a nuclear reactor designed or used primarily for
the formation of plutonium or uranium-233; with certain exceptions not
relevant here, a facility designed or used for the separation of the
isotopes of plutonium; or, with certain exceptions not relevant here, a
facility designed or used for the processing of irradiated materials
containing special nuclear material.
NRC case law provides insight as to when a facility licensed under
10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 is no longer a utilization or a
production facility. In LBP-84-33, Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm.
H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 20 NRC 765 (1984), an Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board granted the licensee's motion to withdraw
its application for a 10 CFR part 50 operating license for a nuclear
power reactor, despite the fact that the facility was almost completely
built. One of the conditions for granting the motion was that the
nuclear steam supply system be modified to prevent the facility's
operation as a utilization facility. The Board determined that because
a utilization facility under the AEA is a facility that is capable of
making use of special nuclear material, the facility must be modified
to eliminate that capability for it to no longer be categorized as a
utilization facility. The Board observed that this can be achieved, for
example, by severing and welding caps on main feedwater lines and main
steam lines and removing the fuel and the control rod drive mechanisms.
The NRC proposes to add to its regulations language similar to the
Zimmer decision to establish the criteria for when a facility licensed
under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 no longer meets the statutory or
regulatory definition of a utilization or a production facility (i.e.,
is no longer capable of making use of special nuclear material or of
the production of special nuclear material, separation of the isotopes
of plutonium, or processing of irradiated materials containing special
nuclear material (hereinafter collectively referred to as production-
facility activities)). The first criterion is that the facility must
not be legally authorized to operate. The second criterion is the
physical modification of the licensed facility to be incapable of
making use of special nuclear material and of production-facility
activities, without significant facility alterations necessary to
restore the capability to make use of special nuclear material or to
engage in production-facility activities. When a utilization facility
is physically modified to be incapable of making use of special nuclear
material, it is no longer designed or used to sustain nuclear fission
in a self-supporting chain reaction.
Sections 50.82(a)(2) and 52.110(b) already provide for the first
criterion for nuclear power reactor licensees--that the facility is no
longer legally authorized to operate. Sections 50.82(a)(2) and
52.110(b) state, respectively, that a 10 CFR part 50 license and a 10
CFR part 52 license no longer authorize operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel once the NRC
has docketed the certifications for permanent cessation of operations
and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, or when a final
legally effective order to permanently cease operations has come into
effect. The NRC would amend these regulations to add the second
criterion--that the facility licensed under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR
part 52 is no longer a utilization facility once the licensee modifies
the facility to be incapable of making use of special nuclear material
without significant facility alterations.
Because the NRC's regulations do not state when a non-power
production or utilization facility or fuel reprocessing plant licensee
is no longer authorized to operate (other than at license termination),
the NRC proposes to amend Sec. 50.82(b) to add the criteria for when a
non-power production or utilization facility or fuel reprocessing plant
is no longer a production or utilization facility. The NRC would
renumber current paragraph (b)(6) in Sec. 50.82 as paragraph (b)(8)
and add new paragraphs (b)(6) and (b)(7). New paragraph (b)(6) would
provide that a non-power production or utilization facility or fuel
reprocessing plant is not legally capable of operating when the NRC
removes the licensee's authority to operate the facility through a
license amendment. The NRC can remove a non-power production or
utilization facility or fuel reprocessing plant licensee's authority to
operate by issuing a possession-only license amendment or by approving
the licensee's decommissioning plan through a license amendment, either
of which would explicitly remove the licensee's authority to operate.
Licensees typically request a possession-only license amendment first
and then submit a decommissioning plan via a second license amendment
request. This proposed rule would offer licensees the option to request
only one licensing action--the decommissioning plan license amendment--
that also would address the licensee's operating authority, rendering a
separate ``possession-only license amendment'' unnecessary. To address
those instances when the licensee is still operating the facility when
the licensee submits its decommissioning plan license amendment
request, the decommissioning plan license amendment would itself
identify the date on which the authority to operate is removed.
The NRC would also include in new Sec. 50.82(b)(6) the second
criterion for when the non-power production or utilization facility or
fuel reprocessing plant is no longer a production or a utilization
facility (i.e., once the licensee modifies the facility to be incapable
of production-facility activities and making use of special nuclear
material without significant facility alterations).
The NRC would add new Sec. 50.82(b)(7) and amend Sec. 50.82(a)(2)
and Sec. 52.110(b) to affirm the continuation of the NRC's statutory
authority over the existing 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license
after the performance of decommissioning activities that lead to the
licensed facility no longer meeting the definition of a utilization or
a production facility. This facility transition occurs with every
licensee during decommissioning: Eventually, the facility will be
dismantled to the point where it is incapable of making use of special
nuclear material or of production-facility activities without
significant facility alterations.
Although the facility licensed under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part
52 may no longer be a utilization or a production facility, the NRC
maintains the authority to regulate the existing 10 CFR part 50 or 52
license. A 10 CFR part 50 operating license for a production or
utilization facility is issued under AEA sections 103 or 104, and a 10
CFR part 52 combined license for a utilization facility is issued under
AEA sections 103 and 185b. That license may contain authorities beyond
those governed by 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. Under Sec. 50.52, ``Combining
licenses,'' the Commission may combine in a single license the
activities that would otherwise be licensed under separate licenses.
Accordingly, a typical 10 CFR part 50 or 52 nuclear power reactor
license also
[[Page 12299]]
includes in a single license the authority under 10 CFR parts 30, 40,
and 70 of the NRC's regulations to perform activities or possess
materials authorized by those parts. Parts 30, 40, and 70 of 10 CFR are
authorized by sections 81, 63, and 53 of the AEA and concern the
licensing of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials,
respectively. A typical 10 CFR part 50 non-power production or
utilization facility license also includes the authority under 10 CFR
parts 30 and 70 of the NRC's regulations to perform activities or
possess materials authorized by those parts. When the facility is no
longer a production or utilization facility, the NRC maintains the
authority to regulate the facility and the 10 CFR part 50 or 52 license
under a combination of AEA sections 53, 63, 81, and 161. Sections
50.51(b) and 52.109 of the NRC's regulations also establish that the 10
CFR part 50 or 52 license continues in effect until the NRC terminates
the license, notwithstanding the fact that at some point in time during
the dismantlement required for license termination, the licensed
facility will be disassembled to such an extent that it no longer
satisfies the definition of a utilization or a production facility.
Therefore, the NRC would amend Sec. 50.82(a)(2), Sec. 50.82(b), and
Sec. 52.110(b) to explicitly cite these statutory provisions as the
basis for its retention of the authority to regulate the existing 10
CFR parts 50 or 52 facility. The NRC proposes to make conforming
changes to the authority citations for 10 CFR parts 50 and 52 to add
sections 53, 63, and 81 of the AEA.
The NRC proposes to amend Sec. 50.82(a)(2), Sec. 50.82(b), and
Sec. 52.110(b) to state which requirements apply to the existing 10
CFR part 50 or 52 license after the licensed facility is no longer a
utilization or a production facility. As provided by section 161b of
the AEA, the Commission is authorized to establish by regulation such
standards to govern the possession and use of special nuclear material,
source material, and byproduct material as the Commission may deem
necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to
protect health or to minimize danger to life or property. Consistent
with this statutory authority, the proposed amendments to Sec.
50.82(a)(2), Sec. 50.82(b), and Sec. 52.110(b) will make clear that,
after the facility licensed under 10 CFR part 50 or 52 is no longer a
utilization or a production facility and until the termination of the
10 CFR part 50 license pursuant to Sec. 50.82(a)(11) or Sec.
50.82(b)(8) or the 10 CFR part 52 license pursuant to Sec. 52.110(k),
the NRC regulations applicable to utilization or production facilities
will continue to apply to the holder of the 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR
part 52 license, as applicable, unless those regulations explicitly
state otherwise. These proposed amendments would enable a licensee to
maintain reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the common
defense and security and the public health and safety by requiring the
licensee to continue to comply with those regulations applicable to
utilization or production facilities, as applicable to that licensee,
unless stated otherwise.
The NRC has identified that Sec. 50.38 should not apply to a
facility that is no longer a utilization or a production facility.
Specifically, the AEA prohibits the issuance of a license for a
utilization or a production facility to an entity that the Commission
knows or has reason to believe is foreign owned, controlled, or
dominated. However, since the FOCD prohibition only applies to a
utilization or production facility, it would not apply once a 10 CFR
part 50 or part 52 facility is no longer a utilization or a production
facility. Therefore, the NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.38 such
that its prohibition on transferring a license to an entity that the
Commission knows or has reason to believe is owned, controlled, or
dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government,
is not applicable if the license is a 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52
license for a facility that no longer meets the definition of a
utilization or a production facility.
Section 50.80 governs the transfers of 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR
part 52 licenses for production and utilization facilities. It requires
the written consent of the NRC before the transfer of a production or
utilization facility. This section also requires applicants for a
license transfer to provide the same identifying, technical, and
financial information that an initial license applicant is required to
provide under Sec. Sec. 50.33 and 50.34. In particular, Sec. 50.33
requires an application to state the citizenship of the applicant.
Under Sec. 50.38, the applicant is ineligible to apply for and obtain
a license if it is a foreign entity.
Section 50.38 implements sections 103 and 104 of the AEA, which
provide in part that a license for a utilization or production facility
may not be issued to an alien or any corporation or other entity if the
Commission knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled, or
dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government.
Since sections 103 and 104 of the AEA apply to utilization and
production facilities, the NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.38 to
clarify that this prohibition does not apply to a person, corporation,
or other entity seeking a license for a facility that is no longer a
utilization or a production facility, as would be provided under
revised Sec. 50.82(a)(2), Sec. 50.82(b)(6), or Sec. 52.110(b).
The proposed amendment to Sec. 50.38 would maintain the common
defense and security and public health and safety because, even though
Sec. 50.38 would not prohibit the transfer to foreign entities of 10
CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52 licenses for facilities that do not meet
the definition of utilization or production facility, other regulations
ensure that such transfers would not be inimical to the common defense
and security or to the health and safety of the public. For instance,
Sec. 50.80(c) states that the Commission will approve an application
for the transfer of a license if the Commission determines that the
proposed transferee is qualified to be the holder of the license and
that the transfer of the license is otherwise consistent with
applicable provisions of law, regulations, and orders issued by the
Commission. In turn, under Sec. 50.57 or Sec. 52.97, the Commission
may issue a 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license, respectively,
only if the Commission finds that the issuance of the license will not
be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and
safety of the public.
The proposed amendment to Sec. 50.38 is consistent with how the
NRC analyzed requests for exemptions from Sec. 50.38 for Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Station, Haddam Neck Plant, and Yankee Nuclear Power
Station (78 FR 58571; September 24, 2013). Specifically, the NRC
granted those exemptions because the reactor facilities had been
dismantled and removed such that only ISFSIs remained on site; an
ISFSI, whether licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 72, is not capable of
making use of special nuclear material; and the AEA definition of a
utilization facility does not include ISFSIs. The NRC found that the
foreign ownership, control, or domination prohibition did not apply to
ISFSIs and, thus, did not preclude the NRC from granting the
exemptions.
The NRC is also proposing to amend Sec. Sec. 50.1, 50.51, 52.0,
and 52.109 in light of the proposed amendments to Sec. Sec. 50.38,
50.82, and 52.110. The proposed amendments would make clear that the
regulations in 10 CFR part 50, and the similar regulations in 10 CFR
part 52, provide not only for the licensing of utilization and
production facilities, but also for their decommissioning and the
termination of their associated licenses. These changes
[[Page 12300]]
are clarifications; 10 CFR part 50 has included decommissioning and
license termination since 1961 (``Creditors' Rights; and Transfer,
Surrender, and Termination of Licenses,'' 26 FR 9546; October 10,
1961). The NRC proposes to delete the language in Sec. Sec. 50.51 and
52.109 that discusses what 10 CFR parts 50 and 52 licenses authorize in
lieu of the more complete discussion provided in the proposed
amendments to Sec. 50.82(a)(2), Sec. 50.82(b)(6) and (7), and Sec.
52.110(b).
The NRC is proposing to add a specific definition for ``non-power
production or utilization facility'' to Sec. 50.2 to establish a term
that is flexible enough to capture all non-power facilities licensed
under Sec. 50.22, ``Class 103 licensees; for commercial and industrial
facilities,'' and Sec. 50.21(a) or (c), except fuel reprocessing
facilities. This proposed rule would address inconsistencies in
definitions and terminology associated with non-power production and
utilization facilities in Sec. 50.2 that result in challenges in
determining the applicability of the regulations. Fuel reprocessing
plants would be excluded from the definition because the consequences
associated with the hazards at a fuel reprocessing plant would likely
exceed those anticipated at the facilities within the ``non-power
production or utilization facility'' definition, thereby affecting the
applicability of the ``non-power production or utilization facility''
term.
The only NRC-licensed fuel reprocessing plant is the Western New
York Nuclear Service Center. The technical specifications of its NRC
license are currently suspended by license amendment. Under the West
Valley Demonstration Project Act, Public Law 96-368, 94 Stat. 1347
(codified as a note to 42 U.S.C. 2021a), the Department of Energy (DOE)
is currently decommissioning portions of the plant. The NRC licensee,
the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, will
complete the decommissioning work after DOE has completed its work.
There is currently no application for another fuel reprocessing plant
and the NRC does not anticipate any application in the foreseeable
future.
The NRC proposes to revise the introductory text of Sec. 50.82(b)
to replace the term ``non-power reactor licensees'' with ``non-power
production or utilization facility licensees and fuel reprocessing
plants'' to ensure that all non-power facilities licensed under Sec.
50.22 or Sec. 50.21(a) or (c) are subject to the relevant termination
and decommissioning regulations.
N. Clarification of Scope of License Termination Plan Requirement
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to clarify that the
requirement for a license termination plan in Sec. 50.82(a)(9) and
Sec. 52.110(i) applies only to nuclear power reactor licensees that
commenced operation. This clarification is being proposed in response
to apparent confusion among combined license holders that have sought
to surrender their licenses before operation. By letter dated November
1, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17311A143), Duke Energy Florida informed
the NRC that it would seek termination of the 10 CFR part 52 combined
licenses for Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 and would submit a
license termination plan in accordance with Sec. 52.110(i).
Subsequently, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) submitted a
letter dated December 27, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17361A088),
seeking withdrawal of the 10 CFR part 52 combined licenses for Virgil
C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3. The SCE&G request neither
cited Sec. 52.110 nor indicated that it would submit a license
termination plan. Instead, SCE&G cited the Commission's final ``Policy
Statement on Deferred Plants'' (52 FR 38077; October 14, 1987) (Policy
Statement) to support its request for NRC approval to withdraw its
combined licenses. The Policy Statement addresses holders of
construction permits that defer or terminate plant construction. The
Policy Statement provides that a permit holder can request to withdraw
its permit and does not cite to the license termination provisions in
10 CFR part 50. The Policy Statement was issued prior to the
promulgation of 10 CFR part 52 and has not been updated since, but
there is nothing to prevent holders of a combined license from
following the applicable parts of the Policy Statement while continuing
to comply with the Commission's regulations and the terms and
conditions of the combined license.
The requirement for a license termination plan in Sec. 52.110(i)
does not apply to plants that have not begun operating. While Sec.
52.110(i) does refer to ``[a]ll power reactor licensees,'' the
regulatory history and context indicates that Sec. 52.110 as a whole
applies only to plants that have started operation:
The organization of Sec. 52.110 generally follows the
license termination process for an operating plant, from permanent
cessation of operations to permanent removal of fuel to decommissioning
activities to license termination. The requirement for a license
termination plan should be understood in this context.
The vast majority of the requirements in Sec. 52.110
(including Sec. 52.110(i)) either explicitly refer to, or make sense
only in the context of, a plant that has operated and is undergoing
decommissioning.
The ``[a]ll power reactor licensees'' language also
appears in Sec. 50.82(a)(9), the 10 CFR part 50 analogue to Sec.
52.110(i). But the NRC does not apply the similar requirements in Sec.
50.82 to holders of construction permits even though construction
permits fall within the definition of ``License'' in Sec. 50.2. For
example, the following construction permit terminations do not cite or
otherwise address Sec. 50.82: ``Washington Public Power Supply System,
Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 3; Order Revoking Construction Permit
No. CPPR-154'' (64 FR 4725; January 29, 1999); ``Bellefonte Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2--Withdrawal of Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-122
for Unit 1 and CPPR-123 for Unit 2'' (September 14, 2006) (ADAMS
Accession No. ML061810505); and ``Energy Northwest Nuclear Project No.
1--Termination of Construction Permit CPPR-134'' (February 8, 2007)
(ADAMS Accession No. ML070220011). And the rule issuing the ``[a]ll
power reactor licensees'' language in Sec. 50.82(a)(9)--the 1996 Final
Rule--was directed at holders of operating licenses, not construction
permits.
According to the final rule issuing Sec. 52.110,
``Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants''
(72 FR 49351; August 28, 2007), Sec. 52.110 and its companion
regulation Sec. 52.109 were intended to be analogous to the
requirements in Sec. 50.51 and Sec. 50.82 for permanent shutdown of a
nuclear power plant, its decommissioning, and the termination of the
operating license.
For these reasons, Sec. 52.110 is best understood to apply only to
plants that began operation. However, to avoid confusion over the
license termination plan requirement, the NRC proposes to amend Sec.
52.110(i) so that it explicitly applies only to ``power reactor
licensees that have loaded fuel into the reactor.'' As stated in the
``Final Procedures for Conducting Hearings on Conformance With the
Acceptance Criteria in Combined Licenses'' (81 FR 43266; July 1, 2016),
the NRC has historically understood operation as beginning with the
loading of fuel into the reactor. Therefore, Sec. 52.110(i) would
apply to 10 CFR part 52 nuclear power reactor licensees that have begun
to load fuel into the reactor.
[[Page 12301]]
A conforming change is also proposed in Sec. 50.82(a)(9) to
clarify that the requirement in that provision--that all 10 CFR part 50
nuclear power reactor licensees must submit an application for
termination of license--applies to only those 10 CFR part 50 nuclear
power reactor licensees that have loaded fuel into the reactor.
O. Removal of License Conditions and Withdrawal of Orders
The NRC is proposing to withdraw orders and remove license
conditions that are substantively redundant with provisions in 10 CFR.
Although NRC orders generally provide for their relaxation or
rescission on a licensee-specific basis, use of that process would be
an inefficient and unnecessary administrative burden on licensees and
the NRC--with no impact on public health and safety--when a subsequent
rule replaces the orders in their entirety for all applicable
licensees. Therefore, the NRC is proposing to find that good cause is
shown to rescind Order EA-06-137, ``Order Modifying Licenses'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML061600076), concerning mitigation strategies for large
fires or explosions at nuclear power plants. This order was issued to
certain licensees who received Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim
Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML020510635), which required licensees to take specific interim
compensatory measures, including mitigation strategies for large fires
or explosions at nuclear power plants, in light of the then-high-level
threat environment. Order EA-06-137 required that licensees to
incorporate key mitigation strategies for large fires or explosions
into their security plans. The requirement that these strategies be
incorporated in security plans was subsequently relaxed by letter dated
August 28, 2006, which permitted licensees to consent to having their
licenses amended to incorporate a license condition on the subject.
Several licensees had these license conditions imposed by
administrative license amendment (e.g., ``Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,
Units 1, 2, and 3--Conforming License Amendments To Incorporate the
Mitigation Strategies Required by Section B.5.b. of Commission Order
EA-02-026 and the Radiological Protection Mitigation Strategies
Required by Commission Order EA-06-137,'' dated August 16, 2007). In
its Power Reactor Security Requirements final rule, the NRC established
in Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) a regulation that provides a performance-based
requirement that encompasses the mitigation strategies required under
Order EA-06-137 and its associated license condition. The Mitigation of
Beyond-Design-Basis Events rule subsequently moved Sec. 50.54(hh)(2)
to Sec. 50.155(b)(3). As a result, neither Order EA-06-137 nor the
license condition is necessary. Accordingly, the NRC proposes finding
that good cause is shown to rescind Order EA-06-137 for each licensee
that received the order. In addition, because Sec. 50.155(b)(3)
provides the same requirements as the license condition associated with
Order EA-06-0137, the NRC proposes deeming the license condition
removed from each applicable nuclear power reactor license.
Order EA-02-026 included a section, numbered B.5.b, in its
attachment 2, requiring mitigation strategies for large fires or
explosions at nuclear power plants. Extensive interactions among the
NRC, industry, and licensees refined the strategies required by the
order. In 2007, the NRC issued to all then-operating nuclear power
reactor licensees an administrative license amendment (e.g., ``Calvert
Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2--Conforming License
Amendments to Incorporate the Mitigation Strategies Required by Section
B.5.b. of Commission Order EA-02-026,'' dated July 11, 2007),
containing a license condition entitled, ``Mitigation Strategy License
Condition,'' which required licensees to use 14 mitigation strategies.
In the Power Reactor Security Requirements final rule, the NRC
established in Sec. Sec. 50.54(hh), 50.34(i), and 52.80(d) regulations
that made the requirements of Order EA-02-026 generically applicable to
nuclear power reactor licensees and applicants. In the Power Reactor
Security Requirements final rule, the Commission explained that
operating nuclear power reactor licensees already had procedures in
place that complied with the new Sec. 50.54(hh)(2). Licensees used the
same implementation guidance to comply with the Mitigation Strategy
License Condition as they used to comply with Sec. 50.54(hh)(2);
consequently, compliance with Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) is sufficient to
comply with the Mitigation Strategy License Condition. Subsequently,
the NRC rescinded Order EA-02-026, section B.5.b by letter dated
November 28, 2011, based on the fact that the regulations encompassed
the order requirements. Because licensees comply with both the
regulations and Mitigation Strategy License Condition via the same
guidance, such that the former Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) requirements
encompass the license condition requirements, the NRC proposes
concluding that Sec. 50.155(b)(3) fully replaces the requirements that
exist in the Mitigation Strategy License Condition and deeming that the
Mitigation Strategy License Conditions imposed in 2007 are removed from
the licenses for those licensees that received that license condition.
As discussed in section I.C., ``Cyber Security,'' of this document,
the NRC imposed a license condition referencing the approved CSP in
each 10 CFR part 50 license in the course of review and approval of the
CSP. This proposed rule would remove that license condition once
sufficient time has passed since the permanent removal of fuel from the
reactor vessel.
Because this proposed rule would remove certain license conditions
without actually amending the associated licenses, the NRC would issue
by letter an administrative license amendment to each applicable
licensee that would remove the relevant license condition(s) from that
licensee's license and include revised license pages.
P. Changes for Consistent Treatment of Holders of Combined Licenses and
Operating Licenses
The NRC proposes to revise Sec. 50.36(c)(6), Sec. 50.44(b), Sec.
50.46(a)(1)(i), Sec. 50.48(f), Sec. 50.54(y), Sec. 50.60(a), Sec.
50.61(b)(1), Sec. 50.62(a), Sec. 50.71(e)(4), and 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix I, Section IV.C., to provide consistent treatment for COL
(Part 52) and operating license (Part 50) holders. These changes have
the purpose of aligning regulatory applicabilities for COL holders upon
submittal of the Sec. 52.110(a) certifications with regulatory
applicabilities for operating license holders upon submittal of the
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) certifications. In each section listed, the NRC would
insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following each instance of ``Sec.
50.82(a)(1).''
The NRC proposes to revise incorrect references to Sec. 52.110 in
Sec. 50.49(a), Sec. 50.54(o), Sec. 50.65(a)(1), and Sec. 52.110(e)
by replacing ``Sec. 52.110(a)(1)'' with ``Sec. 52.110(a).'' The NRC
proposes to insert a reference to Sec. 52.110 following an existing
reference to Sec. 50.82 in Sec. 50.54(w)(4)(ii), Sec.
50.54(w)(4)(iii), Sec. 50.75(e)(1)(ii)(B), Sec. 50.75(e)(1)(v), Sec.
50.75(h)(1)(iv), and Sec. 50.75(h)(2). The NRC proposes to remove the
words ``under this part'' from Sec. 50.54(w) introductory text because
paragraph (w) is also applicable to holders of combined licenses issued
under 10 CFR part 52 as stated in the introductory text for Sec.
50.54. Finally, the NRC proposes to revise an incorrect reference in
[[Page 12302]]
Sec. 50.59(b) by replacing ``Sec. 50.110'' with ``Sec. 52.110(a).''
V. Specific Requests for Comments
The NRC is seeking public comments on this proposed rule. The
agency is particularly interested in comments and supporting rationale
from the public on the following:
PSDAR Approval: The current decommissioning regulations
establish that once a licensee permanently ceases operation of the
nuclear power reactor, it cannot undertake any major decommissioning
activities until it provides the public and the NRC with additional
information. The NRC requires that the licensee submit this information
in the form of a PSDAR, which consists of the licensee's proposed
decommissioning activities and schedule through license termination, a
discussion of the reasons for concluding that the proposed activities
will be bounded by existing analyses of environmental impacts, and a
site-specific cost estimate for the proposed activities. The PSDAR is
made available to the public for comment and is subject to NRC review
(but not approval). Additionally, the current decommissioning
regulations prohibit, at any time, the performance of any
decommissioning activity that may result in significant environmental
impacts not previously reviewed. Under this regulatory framework,
licensees are not required to have an NRC-approved decommissioning
plan; instead, 90 days after the NRC has received the licensee's PSDAR,
licensees may perform, under 10 CFR 50.59, those major decommissioning
activities that are bounded by existing environmental analyses.
Therefore, no site-specific NEPA review is required and there is no
hearing opportunity under 10 CFR part 2 before these decommissioning
activities begin. To perform decommissioning activities that are not
bounded by existing environmental analyses, however, a licensee would
have to submit a request for a license amendment or an exemption
request, which would trigger a site-specific NEPA review and hearing
opportunity under 10 CFR part 2. Additionally, at least two years
before termination of the license, the licensee must submit an
application for termination of license and a license termination plan,
which must be approved by the NRC. The requirement to approve the
license termination plan also triggers a site-specific NEPA review and
hearing opportunity under 10 CFR part 2.
As part of the development of the proposed rule, the NRC staff
evaluated whether the NRC should explicitly approve each licensee's
PSDAR before allowing major decommissioning activities to begin. The
staff concluded that based on lessons learned and experience, there is
currently no indication that requiring approval of a PSDAR has any
substantial impact on the public health and safety. However, the NRC is
gathering additional feedback from the public.
As part of this rulemaking, should the NRC require approval of the
PSDAR, a site-specific environmental review, and hearing opportunity
before a licensee undertakes any decommissioning activity? Other than
NRC review and approval of the PSDAR, are there other activities that
could help to increase transparency and public trust in the NRC
regulatory framework for decommissioning? Should the rule provide a
role for the states or local governments in the process? What should
that role be? What are the advantages or disadvantages of various
roles? Please provide an explanation for your response.
Timeframe for Decommissioning: For nuclear power reactor
licensees, 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) and 10 CFR 52.110(c) state that
decommissioning must be completed within 60 years of permanent
cessation of operations. In this proposed rule, the NRC is not
proposing changes to the decommissioning timeframe requirements.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring prompt
decontamination rather than allowing up to 60 years to decommission a
site? As part of its review of a PSDAR, what are the advantages and
disadvantages of NRC evaluating and making a decision about the
timeframe for decommissioning on a site-specific basis?
Emergency Planning: As discussed in the ``Technical Basis
for the Graded Approach'' and ``Emergency Preparedness'' sections of
this document, although the spectrum of credible accidents and
operational events requiring an emergency response is reduced at a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor as compared to that for an
operating nuclear power reactor, reliable emergency preparedness
functions are still required to ensure public health and safety in the
event of a zirconium fire scenario.
The NRC has concluded that dry cask storage and spent fuel pools
are both very safe. What are the advantages and disadvantages of
requiring dedicated radiological emergency planning, including a 10-
mile EPZ, until all spent nuclear fuel at a site is removed from the
spent fuel pool and placed in dry cask storage? Is there additional
information the NRC should consider in evaluating whether all-hazards
planning would be as effective as dedicated radiological emergency
planning?
The NRC has determined that 10 hours would be a sufficient amount
of time for an emergency response to a spent fuel pool accident based
on an all-hazards plan. Is there additional information the NRC should
consider in evaluating this issue?
Emergency Response Data Systems: Nuclear power facilities
that are shutdown permanently or indefinitely are currently not
required to maintain ERDS. These systems transmit near-real-time
electronic data between the licensee's onsite computer system and the
NRC Operation Center. Licensees in Level 1 would maintain a capability
to provide meteorological, radiological, and spent fuel pool data to
the NRC within a reasonable timeframe following an event. What are the
advantages and disadvantages of requiring nuclear power plant licensees
to maintain those aspects of ERDS until all spent fuel is removed from
the pool?
Cyber Security: The proposed rule applies cyber security
requirements to Level 1 plants. However, a licensee in Level 2 would
not be required to maintain a cyber security plan because the NRC has
determined that there is little chance that the spent fuel in the SFP
could heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours. What are
the advantages and disadvantages of extending cyber security
requirements to shutdown nuclear power plants until all spent fuel is
transferred to dry cask storage?
Insurance: The proposed rule would allow nuclear power
reactor licensees in decommissioning to reduce the offsite liability
and onsite property insurance amounts that they are required to
maintain once a plant enters Level 2. The transition to Level 2
financial protection amounts would be optional for licensees and they
would have to submit an analysis that demonstrates a reduced risk of a
zirconium fuel cladding fire in the SFP. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of requiring the existing level of insurance to be
maintained until all spent fuel is in dry cask storage (Level 3)?
Financial Assurance: Pursuant to Sec. 50.75, ``Reporting
and recordkeeping for decommissioning planning,'' specifically
paragraph (b)(1), nuclear power reactor licensees and applicants must
certify that reasonable assurance for radiological decommissioning
funding has been (for licensees) or will be (for applicants) provided
in an amount that may be more, but not less,
[[Page 12303]]
than the generic amount provided by the Commission's regulations (i.e.,
the table of minimum amounts under Sec. 50.75(c)). Alternatively,
under Sec. 50.75(b)(4), the certified amount of funding may be based
on a site-specific cost estimate for decommissioning the facility.
The current table of minimum amounts (also referred to as the
minimum decommissioning formula) has not been updated for over 30
years. The NRC is considering updates to the generic decommissioning
funding formula to make it more reflective of current cost
considerations.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of updating the formula
to reflect recent data and to cover all estimated radiological
decommissioning costs rather than the bulk of the costs?
Site-Specific Cost Analysis: Currently, licensees can use
either the generic amount under 10 CFR 50.75(c) or a site-specific cost
estimate under 10 CFR 50.75(b)(4) to determine the certified amount of
radiological decommissioning funding. As provided in 10 CFR
50.82(a)(8)(ii) and 10 CFR 52.110(h)(2), a licensee may withdraw funds
from the decommissioning trust fund up to a cumulative total of 3
percent of the generic amount calculated under 10 CFR 50.75(c) for
decommissioning planning purposes at any time without prior
notification to the NRC. After submittal of the certifications of
permanent shutdown and fuel removal required under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)
and 10 CFR 52.110(a) and commencing 90 days after the NRC has received
the PSDAR, the licensee may use up to an additional 20 percent of the
decommissioning funds prescribed in 10 CFR 50.75(c) for decommissioning
purposes. The licensee is prohibited from using the remaining 77
percent of the generic decommissioning funds until a site-specific
decommissioning cost estimate is submitted to the NRC. Requirements in
10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(iii) and 10 CFR 52.110(h)(3) establish that a
licensee shall provide a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate
within 2 years following permanent cessation of operations. If the
estimate of costs provided with the PSDAR is a site-specific cost
estimate, this requirement can be satisfied with the PSDAR submittal.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring a full site
investigation and characterization at the time of shutdown? What are
the advantages and disadvantages of eliminating the formula and
requiring a site-specific cost estimate during operations?
Decommissioning Trust Fund: Under the NRC's existing
regulations and this proposed rule, the amounts set aside for
radiological decommissioning should not be used for the maintenance and
storage of spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or for the design or
construction of spent fuel dry storage facilities, or for other
activities not directly related to the long-term storage, radiological
decontamination or dismantlement of the facility, or decontamination of
the site.
Should the NRC's regulations allow decommissioning trust fund
assets to be used for spent fuel management if (1) there is a projected
surplus in the fund based on a comparison to the expected costs
identified in a site-specific cost estimate and (2) the assets are
returned to the fund within an established period of time? What are the
advantages and disadvantages of allowing decommissioning trust fund
assets to be used for those purposes? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of allowing decommissioning trust fund assets to be used
for non-radiological site restoration prior to the completion of
radiological decommissioning?
Timing of Decommissioning Funding Assurance Reporting:
This proposed rule would change the timing of the decommissioning
funding assurance reporting requirements in Sec. 50.75(f)(1) to
coordinate them with the ISFSI decommissioning reporting requirements
in Sec. 72.30. Under this proposed rule, operating reactors would be
permitted to submit decommissioning funding status reports triennially
instead of biennially.
What are the advantages and disadvantages to extending the
reporting frequency from two years to three years? Does this change
affect the risk of insufficient decommissioning funding? Please provide
an explanation for your response.
Backfit Rule: For nuclear power reactor licensees, the
NRC's backfitting provisions are located in Sec. 50.109,
``Backfitting,'' and the issue finality provisions are in 10CFRpart52
(the ``Backfit Rule''). The language of the Backfit Rule clearly
applies to a licensee designing, constructing, or operating a nuclear
power facility. For example, Sec. 50.109(a)(1) defines ``backfitting''
to mean changes to, among other things, the procedures or organization
required to design, construct, or operate a facility.
This proposed rule states that the Backfit Rule applies to
decommissioning nuclear power plants. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of applying the Backfit Rule to decommissioning nuclear
power plants?
Exemptions: As stated in this proposed rule, one of the
goals of amending these regulations is to reduce the need for
regulatory exemptions. 10 CFR 50.12 states that the Commission may
grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in 10 CFR
part 50 if the request will not present an undue risk to the public
health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and
security. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the current 10
CFR 50.12 approach to decommissioning-related exemptions? What standard
should the NRC apply in determining whether to grant exemptions from
the new or amended regulations? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of providing an opportunity for the public to weigh in on
such exemption requests? Are there other process changes the NRC should
consider in determining whether to grant exemptions from the new or
amended regulations?
Applicability: Section III of this document provides a
discussion of the applicability of this proposed rule. Specifically,
there is a discussion for the applicability to NRC licensees during
operations and to ISFSI-Only and Standalone ISFSI/Decommissioned
Reactor Sites. Permanently shutdown nuclear power plants will be at
different stages of decommissioning when the new decommissioning
regulations become effective and will have previously received varying
regulatory exemptions.
Can you foresee any implementation issues with the proposed rule as
it is currently written? For any new or amended requirement included in
this proposed rule, how should the requirement apply to sites currently
in different stages of decommissioning?
Insurance for Specific License ISFSI: A 10 CFR part 50 or
10 CFR part 52 nuclear power reactor licensee with a 10 CFR part 72
general license ISFSI at the reactor site is subject to the financial
protection requirements under 10 CFR part 140, whereas a specific
license ISFSI under 10 CFR part 72 is not. In SECY-04-0176, ``Exemption
Requests to Reduce Liability Insurance Coverage for Decommissioning
Reactors after Transfer of all Spent Fuel from a Spent Fuel Pool to Dry
Cask Storage,'' dated September 29, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML040850518), the NRC staff noted that general license ISFSIs subject
to the requirements under 10 CFR part 72 were also subject to the
requirements of a 10 CFR part 50 license and by virtue of this license,
they are required to maintain some level of
[[Page 12304]]
liability insurance under section 170, ``Indemnification and Limitation
of Liability,'' of the AEA (known as the Price-Anderson Act) and the
NRC's implementing regulations at 10 CFR part 140. Further, the NRC
staff acknowledged that there was little technical difference between a
general license ISFSI and a specific license ISFSI.
The NRC recognizes that as a reactor site is decommissioned,
eventually all that remains of the 10 CFR part 50 or part 52 licensed
site is a general license ISFSI under 10 CFR part 72, which is
essentially the same as a specific license ISFSI under 10 CFR part 72.
Considering that 10 CFR part 72 specific license ISFSIs have no
financial protection requirements, should the NRC address the disparity
between specific license and general license ISFSIs as a part of this
rulemaking? Please provide an explanation for your response.
Recordkeeping Requirements for Facilities Licensed under
10 CFR part 52: The current appendices in 10 CFR part 52 contain
section X, ``Records and Reporting,'' for all of the certified designs
codified in 10 CFR part 52. Section X requires, in part, that all
departures from the certified design be recorded and those records kept
throughout the term of the license. However, as part of this
rulemaking, the NRC is proposing to change the record retention
requirements for nuclear power reactors in the decommissioning process
such that they no longer need to retain certain records associated with
SSCs that are no longer in service or necessary to keep the plant in a
safe condition. The NRC is considering making conforming changes to
section X of the applicable appendices to 10 CFR part 52 to allow this
change to apply to records of departures from the certified design as
well as the associated SSCs. Given the already existing change control
procedures in the appendices to 10 CFR part 52, as well as the
significant changes in recordkeeping technology since the NRC's record
retention requirements were introduced (i.e., digital media instead of
paper copies), should additional changes be made to the 10 CFR part 52
appendices as a part of this rulemaking, and would such changes be
beneficial to 10 CFR part 52 licensees or add efficiency to the
decommissioning process for these facilities? Please provide an
explanation for your response.
Identical Requirements under Sec. 50.82 and Sec. 52.110:
As part of this rulemaking, the NRC proposes to revise Sec. 52.110 to
make the same changes proposed in Sec. 50.82 for the reasons
previously discussed and for consistency. The NRC also proposes to add
paragraphs (h)(5) through (h)(7) to Sec. 52.110 with site-specific
decommissioning cost estimate reporting requirements that are identical
to the requirements in Sec. 50.82(a)(8)(v) through (vii). Given that
the decommissioning financial assurance requirements in Sec. 52.110
are identical to the requirements in Sec. 50.82, should the NRC
consider removing the specific requirements from Sec. 52.110(f)-(h)
and instead add a reference in Sec. 52.110 to the identical
regulations in Sec. 50.82(a)(6)-(8)? Are there any other provisions in
Sec. 52.110 that the NRC should consider removing and replacing with a
reference to an identical requirement in Sec. 50.82 (e.g., the
decommissioning requirements under Sec. 52.110(c)-(e))? Please provide
an explanation for your response.
Removal of License Conditions and Withdrawal of Orders:
This rulemaking seeks to improve regulatory efficiency by removing
license conditions and withdrawing an order for which substantively
identical requirements have been imposed by rulemaking. This would
avoid the future administrative expenditures by licensees and the NRC
to accomplish the removal of these requirements on a license-specific
basis through a generic regulatory action either upon the effective
date of the final rule or when conditions permit the removal during the
decommissioning process. The NRC has identified certain orders that
were issued following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001,
license conditions regarding these orders, and license conditions
regarding cyber security implementation as having substantively
identical requirements made generically applicable through rulemaking.
Because these license-specific requirements are duplicative with other
generic requirements, the NRC concludes there would be no reduction in
safety. Please provide any comments you may have on rescinding Order
EA-06-137 and the related license conditions. As part of this
rulemaking, are there other license-specific requirements in license
conditions or orders that have substantively identical generic
requirements that should be addressed in this rulemaking? Please
provide an explanation for your response.
Spent Fuel Management Planning: Section IV.K of this
document discusses spent fuel management planning in the Sec.
50.54(bb) regulation. The Sec. 50.54(bb) current rule language
requires NRC preliminary approval and final review, as part of any
proceeding for continued licensing under part 50 or part 72, of the
IFMP. The discussion in Section IV.K points out that the proceedings
for continued licensing under part 50 or part 72 no longer exist.
Therefore, the proposed rule includes language intended to clarify the
current IFMP approval process by requiring submittal of the IFMP for
NRC review and approval by license amendment. What, if any, challenges
do you foresee with implementing this part of the proposed rule? Please
provide an explanation for your response.
The Sec. 50.54(bb) current rule language requires licensees to
notify the NRC of any significant changes to the IFMP. As discussed in
section IV.K, the NRC proposes to revise this requirement to require
licensees to submit to the NRC any changes to the IFMP as an
application for an amendment to its license. The NRC is also
considering replacing the notification requirement with a change
control provision to specify what changes a licensee can make to the
IFMP without NRC approval. Examples of change control provisions in the
current NRC regulations include Sec. 50.54(a) for quality assurance
programs and Sec. 50.54(q) for emergency plans. If the NRC includes a
similar change control provision in Sec. 50.54(bb), what should the
safety and environmental criteria be for determining whether a licensee
could make a change to its IFMP without seeking NRC approval? For
example, the NRC could permit changes that are not considered to be
reductions in the commitments, including (1) changes to the planned
actions for managing spent fuel that result in an addition of one or
more SSCs that the licensee relies on for irradiated fuel management,
and (2) changes to the projected cost or funding for managing
irradiated fuel that is already included in the report required by 10
CFR 50.82(a)(8)(vii) or 10 CFR 52.110(h)(7). Should the NRC also
include recordkeeping and reporting provisions for a licensee to retain
a record of each change to the IFMP made without prior NRC approval and
submit a report to the NRC of those changes? If so, what should be the
timeframe for the records to be retained and the timeframe for
reporting to the NRC after the change is made, taking into
consideration the estimated frequency of performing IFMP changes?
Please provide an explanation for your response.
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
The following paragraphs describe the specific changes proposed by
this rulemaking.
[[Page 12305]]
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 20, Requirements for Transfers of Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Intended for Disposal at Licensed Land Disposal
Facilities and Manifests
In section III, paragraph E.1., this proposed rule would remove the
word ``or'' and add in its place the word ``of'' and it would also
remove the phrase ``20 days'', and add in its place the phrase ``45
days''.
Section 26.3 Scope
In Sec. 26.3, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (a) by
subdividing it into two subparagraphs, (a)(1) and (2), to include the
NRC's docketing of a license holder's certifications required under
Sec. Sec. 50.82 and 52.110(a).
Section 26.825 Criminal Penalties
In Sec. 26.825, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (b) to
remove the number ``26.3'' from the list of regulations in 10 CFR part
26 that are excluded from Sec. 26.825(a).
Section 50.1 Basis, Purpose, and Procedures Applicable
In Sec. 50.1, this proposed rule would add language clarifying
that the regulations in 10 CFR part 50 provide for the licensing of
production and utilization facilities through the termination of the
associated 10 CFR part 50 licenses.
Section 50.2 Definitions
In Sec. 50.2, this proposed rule would retain the existing
definition of certified fuel handler and add an alternative definition
for the purposes explained elsewhere in this document. This proposed
rule also would add a definition for a non-power production or
utilization facility.
Section 50.36 Technical Specifications
In Sec. 50.36, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (c)(6) to
insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
Section 50.38 Ineligibility of Certain Applicants
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 50.38 by including the
current text as paragraph (a) and by adding paragraph (b) to state that
the prohibition in paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to a
person, corporation, or other entity seeking a license for a facility
that is not a production or utilization facility.
Section 50.44 Combustible Gas Control for Nuclear Power Reactors
In Sec. 50.44, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (b) to
insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
Section 50.46 Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems
for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants
In Sec. 50.46, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (a)(1)(i)
to insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
Section 50.47 Emergency Plans
This proposed rule would make conforming changes to paragraph (b)
in Sec. 50.47 and would add paragraph (f) denoting when the planning
standards for offsite emergency plans in paragraph (b) of this section
do not apply.
Section 50.48 Fire Protection
In Sec. 50.48, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (f) to
insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
Section 50.49 Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment
Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants
In Sec. 50.49, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (a) by
replacing ``Sec. 52.110(a)(1)'' with ``Sec. 52.110(a).''
Section 50.51 Continuation of License
In Sec. 50.51, this proposed rule would remove the phrase, ``to
authorize ownership and possession of the production or utilization
facility,'' for reasons discussed elsewhere in this document.
Section 50.54 Conditions of Licenses
In Sec. 50.54, this proposed rule would revise footnote 2 to the
table in paragraph (m)(2)(i) to indicate when a Shift Technical Advisor
is not required. Paragraph (o) would be revised by replacing
``52.110(a)(1)'' with ``52.110(a).'' The NRC also would revise Sec.
50.54(p) to include the definitions for change and decrease in
safeguards effectiveness for use in paragraph (p), would revise and
redesignate existing paragraphs (p)(1) and (2) as (p)(2) and (3), would
redesignate paragraphs (p)(3) and (4) as paragraphs (p)(5) and (6), and
would add new paragraphs (p)(1) and (4). A portion of the existing text
in paragraphs (p)(1) and (2) would be used to create new paragraph
(p)(4).
This proposed rule would revise: Paragraph (q)(1) to clarify that
the definitions are for use in paragraph (q), paragraph (q)(1)(iii) to
remove the reference to appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, paragraph (q)(2)
to add clarification to the applicability, paragraph (q)(3) to add
applicable emergency planning requirements, paragraphs (q)(4) and (5)
to remove the phrase ``after February 21, 2012,'' and add new
paragraphs (q)(7) and (8) to add the requirements for licensees after
the NRC dockets their certifications required for decommissioning under
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a).
Paragraph (s)(2)(ii) would be revised by removing the phrase
``after April 1, 1981,'' and paragraph (s)(3) would be revised by
adding clarification at the beginning of the sentence that if the
standards apply to offsite radiological response plans then the NRC
will base its findings on a review of FEMA findings and determinations.
Paragraph (t) would be revised by replacing ``.'' with ``or'' in
the second sentence of paragraph (t)(1)(ii), adding new subparagraph
(t)(1)(iii) to clarify the interval at which the licensee's emergency
preparedness plan must be reviewed after the NRC has docketed the
certifications required for decommissioning, and by adding new
paragraph (t)(3) to state that the review requirement is no longer
required once all fuel is in dry cask storage.
Paragraph (w) would be revised by removing the words ``under this
part'' from the introductory text, adding a reference to Sec. 52.110
in paragraphs (w)(4)(ii) and (w)(4)(iii), and adding new paragraphs
(w)(5) and (6) to include the financial protection requirements for
production or utilization facilities undergoing decommissioning.
Paragraph (y) would be revised to insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)''
following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
Paragraph (bb) would be revised by restructuring the paragraph and
revising the requirements of an irradiated fuel management plan.
Section 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments
In Sec. 50.59, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (b) to
correct a reference to Sec. 52.110(a). It would also revise paragraph
(d)(3) to include the exception for when the records of changes
requirement in paragraph (d)(3) applies.
Section 50.60 Acceptance Criteria for Fracture Prevention Measures for
Lightwater Nuclear Power Reactors for Normal Operation
In Sec. 50.60, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (a) to
insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
Section 50.61 Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against
Pressurized Thermal Shock Events
In Sec. 50.61, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (b)(1) to
insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
[[Page 12306]]
Section 50.62 Requirements for Reduction of Risk From Anticipated
Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Events for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear
Power Plants
In Sec. 50.62, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (a) to
insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
Section 50.65 Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants
In Sec. 50.65, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (a)(1) by
replacing ``Sec. 52.110(a)(1)'' with ``Sec. 52.110(a).''
Section 50.71 Maintenance of Records, Making of Reports
In Sec. 50.71, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (c) by
including the current text as paragraph (c)(1) and it would add new
paragraph (c)(2) to add records requirements for licensees for whom the
NRC has docketed the certifications required for decommissioning.
Paragraph (e)(4) would be revised to insert ``or Sec. 52.110(a)''
following ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1).''
Section 50.75 Reporting and Recordkeeping for Decommissioning Planning
In Sec. 50.75, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (a) by
clarifying the availability of funds to decommission a facility as
defined in Sec. 50.2.
Paragraph (b)(1) would be revised by replacing ``financial'' with
``reasonable'' assurance and other conforming changes; paragraph (b)(3)
would be revised by removing the phrase ``as acceptable to the NRC''
from the end of the paragraph; paragraph (b)(4) would be revised to
include a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate and the second
sentence of current paragraph (b)(4) would be moved to become a new
paragraph (b)(5).
Paragraph (e)(1) would be revised to include the term ``reasonable
assurance of funds to decommission,'' and paragraphs (e)(1)(i) and (ii)
would be revised to include the description of ``decommissioning cost''
before the word estimate throughout each paragraph. Paragraphs
(e)(1)(ii)(B) and (e)(1)(v) would be revised to add a reference to
Sec. 52.110.
Paragraph (f) would be amended by revising (f)(1) to include the
requirement for a report to include information regarding any potential
decommissioning shortfall, it would be further amended by removing
paragraph (f)(2) and redesignating (f)(3) through (5) as (f)(2) through
(4) with minor revisions.
Paragraphs (h)(1)(iii) and (iv) and (h)(2) would be revised to
remove the reference to three office directors within the NRC for the
submission of written notice of the intention to make a payment or
disbursement of funds and replace it with the Document Control Desk.
Paragraphs (h)(1)(iv) and (h)(2) would be revised to add a reference to
Sec. 52.110.
Section 50.82 Termination of License
In Sec. 50.82, this proposed rule would revise paragraph (a)(2) to
provide clarification as to when a licensed nuclear power reactor is no
longer considered to be a utilization facility. It also would revise
paragraph (a)(4)(i) to clarify that licensees provide the basis for
whether the environmental impacts from site-specific decommissioning
activities are bounded by federally issued environmental review
documents. The phrase ``including the projected cost of managing
irradiated fuel'' would be removed at the end of the last sentence.
Paragraph (a)(4)(ii) would be revised to include the requirement for
the NRC to include the irradiated fuel management plan in the notice of
the receipt of the PSDAR in the Federal Register and to allow the
public to comment.
Paragraph (a)(6)(ii) would be revised to provide clarification.
Paragraph (a)(8)(i)(A) would be revised to remove the words
``legitimate decommissioning'' and to replace the word
``decommissioning'' with ``decommission.'' Paragraph (a)(8)(ii) would
be revised to clarify paragraph (c) to Sec. 50.75 is where the
specified amount is located.
Paragraph (a)(8)(v) would be revised to spell out the acronym DCE,
decommissioning cost estimate, and to include the ability for the
licensee to combine the reporting requirements of 10 CFR part 72, Sec.
50.82(a)(8)(v), and Sec. 50.82(a)(8)(vii).
Paragraph (a)(8)(vii) would be revised to spell out the acronym
DCE, decommissioning cost estimate.
Paragraph (a)(9) would be revised to clarify that all nuclear power
reactors that have loaded fuel into the reactor must submit an
application for termination of a license and paragraph (a)(9)(ii)(F)
would be revised to include the requirement to identify funding sources
for license termination, spent fuel management, and ISFSI
decommissioning.
The introductory text of paragraph (b) would be revised to replace
the term ``non-power reactor licensees'' with ``non-power production or
utilization facilities and fuel reprocessing plants.''
Paragraph (b)(6) would be redesignated as (b)(8) and new paragraphs
(b)(6) and (7) would be added to include the criteria for when a non-
power production or utilization facility or fuel reprocessing plant
licensed under 10 CFR part 50 is no longer considered a production or
utilization facility.
Section 50.109 Backfitting
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 50.109 in its entirety to
provide backfitting provisions for reactors both before and during
decommissioning and to require that a documented evaluation for a
modification necessary to bring a facility into compliance with a
license or the rules or orders of the Commission, or into conformance
with the licensee's written commitments, must include a consideration
of the costs of imposing the modification.
Section 50.155 Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events
This proposed rule would add new paragraphs (h)(6), (h)(7) and
(h)(8) that would deem removed certain license conditions and withdraw
certain orders made redundant by regulations imposing substantively
identical requirements.
Section 50.200 Power Reactor Decommissioning Emergency Plans
This proposed rule would add new Sec. 50.200 that would contain
alternate emergency preparedness requirements for nuclear power reactor
facilities in decommissioning.
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities
This proposed rule would revise section I. Introduction of appendix
E to 10 CFR part 50 by removing paragraph 6.
Section IV. Content of Emergency Plans of appendix E to 10 CFR part
50 would be revised by removing from paragraph 4 the phrases ``of the
later of the date'' and ``or December 23, 2011,'' from the first
sentence; new paragraph 8 would be added to inform licensees that the
requirements of paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this section are no longer
required once the NRC dockets the licensee's certifications required
for decommissioning; paragraphs A.7., A.9., B.1., C.2., E.8.c., and I.
would all be revised by removing the ``by date'' phrases; paragraph
D.4. would be removed; the last sentence of paragraph E.8.d. would be
removed; in paragraph F.2.d., the end of the 3rd sentence beginning
with the word ``and'' would be removed; paragraph F.2.j(v) would be
[[Page 12307]]
removed and reserved; and new paragraph F.2.k would be added to require
licensees to follow the biennial exercise requirements in paragraph F.2
of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 after the NRC dockets the
certifications required for decommissioning.
This proposed rule would revise section VI. Emergency Response Data
System of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 by removing the date in
paragraph 4.a. and the date in paragraph 4.d., also in paragraph 4.d.
it would remove the phrase ``, whichever comes later'' from the first
sentence.
Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, Numerical Guides for Design Objectives
and Limiting Conditions for Operation To Meet the Criterion ``As Low as
Is Reasonably Achievable'' for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-
Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents
This proposed rule would revise section IV.C of appendix I to 10
CFR part 50 by inserting ``or Sec. 52.110(a)'' following ``Sec.
50.82(a)(1).''
Section 51.53 Postconstruction Environmental Reports
This proposed rule would revise the first sentence in paragraph (d)
to include applicants for a license amendment approving an irradiated
fuel management plan under Sec. 50.54(bb). The proposed rule would
also add references to Sec. 50.82 and Sec. 52.110 after ``license
termination plan.''
Section 51.95 Postconstruction Environmental Impact Statements
This proposed rule would revise the first sentence in paragraph (d)
to refer to an amendment approving an irradiated fuel management plan
under Sec. 50.54(bb), the license termination plan under Sec. 50.82
or Sec. 52.110, or a decommissioning plan under Sec. 50.82.
Section 52.0 Scope
In Sec. 52.0, this proposed rule would add language clarifying
that the regulations in 10 CFR part 52 remain effective through the
termination of the associated 10 CFR part 52 licenses.
Section 52.63 Finality of Standard Design Certifications
This proposed rule would revise paragraph (b)(2) by removing the
last sentence and by adding new paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (ii) regarding
the recordkeeping and retention requirements for departures from the
design of a facility.
Section 52.109 Continuation of Combined License
In Sec. 52.109, this proposed rule would remove the phrase, ``to
authorize ownership and possession of the production or utilization
facility,'' for reasons discussed elsewhere in this document.
Section 52.110 Termination of License
This proposed rule would revise paragraph (b) as paragraph (b)(1)
and would add paragraph (b)(2) to provide clarification as to when a
facility licensed under 10 CFR part 52 is no longer considered to be a
production or utilization facility. Paragraph (d)(1) would be revised
to clarify that licensees provide the basis for whether the
environmental impacts from site-specific decommissioning activities are
bounded by federally issued environmental review documents, and the
phrase ``site-specific decommissioning cost estimate'' would be added
at the end of the last sentence. Paragraph (d)(2) would be revised to
include the requirement for the NRC to include the irradiated fuel
management plan in the notice of the receipt of the PSDAR in the
Federal Register and to allow the public to comment.
Paragraph (e) would be revised by replacing ``Sec. 52.110(a)(1)''
with ``Sec. 52.110(a).''
Paragraph (f)(2) would be revised to clarify the decommissioning
activities licensees shall not perform. Paragraph (h)(1)(i) would be
revised to remove the phrase ``legitimate decommissioning,'' paragraph
(h)(2) would be revised to include a more specific regulatory
reference, and paragraphs (h)(5) through (8) would be added with
requirements for the submission of financial status reports. Paragraph
(i) would be revised to clarify that all nuclear power reactor
licensees that have loaded fuel into the reactor must submit an
application for termination of a license. Paragraph (i)(2)(vi) would be
revised to include identification of sources of funds for license
termination, spent fuel management, and ISFSI decommissioning, as
applicable.
Section 72.13 Applicability
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 72.13 by adding a new
paragraph (e) to incorporate conforming changes to match technical
changes elsewhere in the rule.
Section 72.30 Financial Assurance and Recordkeeping for Decommissioning
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 72.30 by removing the second
sentence in paragraph (c). The proposed revisions would create new
paragraphs (b)(1) through(3) and redesignate the existing paragraphs
(b)(1) through(6) as new (b)(3)(i) through(vi).
Section 72.32 Emergency Plan
In Sec. 72.32, this proposed rule would clarify that the
requirement for having an emergency plan applies when the proposed
ISFSI would not be located on the site or within the exclusion area of
a nuclear power reactor licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. The
proposed revisions would consolidate the current language and remove
redundancies by using standardized language consistent with other
proposed rule provisions.
Section 72.44 License Conditions
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 72.44 by adding a sentence to
paragraph (f) to indicate that licensees need not comply with the
requirements of paragraph (f) once all spent fuel has been removed from
the site.
Section 72.62 Backfitting
This proposed rule would revise paragraph (a)(2) to clarify that
the backfitting provisions under this part continue to apply during
decommissioning.
Section 72.72 Material Balance, Inventory, and Records Requirements for
Stored Material
This proposed rule would revise paragraph (d) by breaking it into
three paragraphs. The last sentence of the current paragraph (d) would
become paragraph (d)(3). New text is proposed for paragraph (d)(2) and
minor revisions are proposed for paragraph (d)(1).
Section 72.212 Conditions of General License Issued Under Sec. 72.210
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 72.212 by adding new
paragraphs (b)(9)(vii)(A) and (B) regarding the protection of spent
fuel after the NRC dockets the decommissioning certifications.
Paragraph (b)(9)(vii)(A) would allow a licensee to voluntarily provide
for physical protection of the spent fuel under Subpart H of this part
and Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. Paragraph (b)(9)(vii)(B) would require
a licensee who elects to provide physical protection under Subpart H of
this part and Sec. 73.51 of this chapter to notify the NRC of this
decision using the provisions of Sec. 50.54(p)(2).
Section 72.218 Termination of License
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 72.218 by revising paragraphs
(a) and (b) and removing paragraph (c). Paragraph (a) is revised to
reference the decommissioning requirements in
[[Page 12308]]
Sec. 50.82 or Sec. 52.110 that apply to the general license and
paragraph (b) is revised to state when the general license is
considered terminated.
Section 73.51 Requirements for the Physical Protection of Stored Spent
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 73.51 by removing text from
paragraph (a), (a)(1), (a)(2), and adding new paragraph (a)(3).
Paragraph (a)(3) would be added to require notification to the NRC
under the provisions of Sec. 72.212(b)(9)(vii) of this chapter by a
licensee who elects to provide physical protection under Subpart H of
10 CFR part 72.
Section 73.54 Protection of Digital Computer and Communications Systems
and Networks
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 73.54 by removing the
introductory text of the section and revising the introductory text of
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), and adding new paragraphs (i), and (j).
The introductory text of paragraph (a) would be revised to capture that
the rule applies during operation and decommissioning. Minor edits
would be made to paragraphs (b) and (c). Paragraph (i) states that the
requirements of Sec. 73.54 no longer apply once the criteria in (i)(1)
and (2) are met. Paragraph (j) provides for the removal of the cyber
security license condition.
Section 73.55 Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 73.55 by clarifying in
paragraph (b)(3) that a licensee's physical protection program must be
designed to prevent significant core damage until the NRC dockets the
certifications required for decommissioning.
New paragraphs (b)(9)(ii)(B)(1), (2), (2)(i), and (2)(ii) would be
added to provide additional clarification for licensees implementing
fitness for duty programs.
Paragraph (c)(6) would be revised by replacing the text beginning
with the words ``that describes'' through the end of the sentence with
the phrase, ``in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.54 of
this part.''
Paragraph (e)(9)(v)(A) would be revised to provide clarification
for when the reactor control room would not be considered a vital area.
Paragraph (j)(4)(ii) would be revised to include a system for
communication with certified fuel handlers if the NRC had docketed the
certifications required for decommissioning.
Paragraph (p)(1)(i) and (ii) would be revised to allow a certified
fuel handler or a licensed senior operator to approve the suspension of
security measures if the NRC has docketed the certifications required
for decommissioning.
Section 140.11 Amounts of Financial Protection Required for Certain
Reactors
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 140.11 by adding new
paragraphs (a)(5), (a)(5)(i) and (ii) and by redesignating paragraph
(b) as paragraph (c) and adding new paragraph (b) that would provide
the requirements for the amounts of financial protection required for
reactors in decommissioning.
Section 140.81 Scope and Purpose
This proposed rule would revise Sec. 140.81 by clarifying the
scope of who is subject to the requirements in this section and to
further clarify that this section no longer applies once a licensee
meets the requirements of Sec. 140.11(a)(5)(i) and (ii).
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.
605(b), the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. This proposed rule affects only the licensing and operation
of nuclear production and utilization facilities. The companies that
own these plants do not fall within the scope of the definition of
``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the
size standards established by the NRC (Sec. 2.810).
VIII. Regulatory Analysis
The NRC has prepared a draft regulatory analysis for this proposed
rule. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives
considered by the NRC. The NRC requests public comment on the draft
regulatory analysis. The draft regulatory analysis is available as
indicated in the ``Availability of Documents'' section of this
document. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as
indicated under the ADDRESSES section of this document.
IX. Backfitting and Issue Finality
The NRC's backfitting provisions for holders of construction
permits and operating licenses appear in Sec. 50.109, ``Backfitting.''
Issue finality provisions (analogous to the backfitting provisions in
Sec. 50.109) for applicants and holders of combined licenses are
located in Sec. 52.83, ``Finality of referenced NRC approvals; partial
initial decision on site suitability,'' and Sec. 52.98, ``Finality of
combined licenses; information requests.'' This section describes the
backfitting and issue finality implications of the draft guidance
documents described in section XVI, ``Availability of Guidance,'' in
this document and this proposed rule as applied to applicants and
holders of pertinent NRC approvals. As stated in section III,
``Discussion,'' in this document, the proposed changes to 10 CFR part
72 would not impose requirements on ISFSI-only licensees. Accordingly,
the proposed rule would not constitute ``backfitting'' as that term is
defined in Sec. 72.62, ``Backfitting.''
A. Current and Future Applicants
Applicants and potential applicants (for licenses, permits, and
regulatory approvals such as design certifications) are not, with
certain exceptions, the subject of either the 10 CFR part 50
backfitting provisions or any issue finality provisions under 10 CFR
part 52. The backfitting and issue finality regulations include
language delineating when those provisions begin; in general, they
begin after the issuance of a license, permit, or approval (e.g., Sec.
50.109(a)(1)(iii), Sec. 52.98(a)). Furthermore, neither the 10 CFR
part 50 backfitting provisions nor the issue finality provisions under
10 CFR part 52--with certain exclusions discussed below--were intended
to apply to every NRC action that substantially changes the
expectations of current and future applicants, and applicants have no
reasonable expectation that future requirements will not change
(``Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined
Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants; Final Rule,'' 54 FR 15372, at 15385-
15386; April 18, 1989).
The exceptions to this general principle are applicable whenever a
combined license applicant references a 10 CFR part 52 license (e.g.,
an early site permit) or NRC regulatory approval (e.g., a design
certification rule) with specified issue finality provisions. The
issues that are resolved in an early site permit or a design
certification and accorded issue finality do not include
decommissioning matters that are the subject of this proposed rule and
draft guidance, and the proposed rule and draft guidance do not contain
design requirements. Therefore, the proposed rule and draft guidance
would not affect the issue finality accorded early site permits and
design certifications. For the same reasons, the issue finality
provision applicable to combined license applicants (Sec. 52.83) would
not
[[Page 12309]]
apply to a combined license applicant referencing either an early site
permit or a design certification with respect to compliance with this
rule.
B. Existing Design Certifications
The issues that are resolved in a design certification and accorded
issue finality do not include decommissioning matters that are the
subject of this proposed rule and draft guidance. Because the
decommissioning matters that are the subject of this proposed rule and
draft guidance are limited to nuclear power reactor decommissioning,
they would not be applied to existing or future design certifications.
C. Existing Licensees
Section IV.A of this document describes a proposed alternative
approach to the current requirements for radiological emergency
preparedness at a nuclear power reactor. The proposed addition of 10
CFR 50.200 would not constitute backfitting or affect the issue
finality of a COL because the proposed change would provide a voluntary
alternative set of requirements. Backfitting is defined in Sec.
50.109(a)(1) as, in relevant part, a modification of or addition to the
systems, structures, or components (SSCs) or design of a facility, or
the procedures or organization required to design, construct, or
operate a facility, which results from a new or amended provision in
the Commission's regulations. This proposed rule would not require
holders of operating licenses and COLs to use the alternative emergency
preparedness requirements, so the proposed change would not result in a
modification or addition that would be backfitting or affect the issue
finality of a COL.
Section IV.A of this document also describes other proposed changes
related to emergency preparedness. The NRC would revise Sec. 50.47 to
add a paragraph (f) to explain when the planning standards of Sec.
50.47(b) would no longer apply. Removing a requirement would not create
a new requirement or amend a requirement because amending means the
requirement still exists in some form. Without creating or amending a
regulation, this proposed change would not meet the definition of
``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL.
The proposed changes to Sec. 50.54(q) would be made to allow a
licensee using the emergency preparedness framework of 10 CFR 50.200 to
also use Sec. 50.54(q). The proposed changes would not require a
licensee to use the Sec. 50.54(q) emergency plan change process or
result in a modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a
facility or the procedures or organization required to design,
construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would
not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality
of a COL.
The proposed change to Sec. 50.54(s)(3) would clarify that FEMA
findings and determinations are only necessary when the NRC's planning
standards apply to offsite radiological emergency response plans. These
changes to the NRC's and FEMA's review of emergency plans would not
result in a modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a
facility or the procedures or organization required to design,
construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would
not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality
of a COL.
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.54(t) so licensees in
decommissioning would be able to conduct emergency preparedness program
element reviews at intervals not to exceed 24 months (rather than the
current requirement of 12 months) without conducting an assessment
against performance indicators. This proposed change would not
constitute backfitting or affect the issue finality of a COL because
the proposed change would provide a voluntary alternative requirement.
The NRC would add new Sec. 50.54(t)(3) to remove the requirement
to conduct periodic emergency preparedness program element reviews once
all fuel is in dry cask storage. This proposed change would not meet
the definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL
because the NRC would be removing a requirement.
The addition of a new paragraph IV.8 to appendix E to 10 CFR part
50 would clarify that the evacuation time estimate requirements of
paragraphs IV.4, IV.5, and IV.6 would no longer be applicable to
licensees after permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal
of fuel from the reactor vessel. This proposed change would not meet
the definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL
because the NRC would be removing a requirement.
The NRC would add a new paragraph k to part 50, appendix E, section
IV.F.2 to state that licensees in decommissioning need to follow the
biennial exercise requirements of section IV.F.2. This is the current
requirement for these licensees, so this change to the regulations
would not change a requirement. Therefore, the proposed change would
not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality
of a COL.
The NRC is proposing to remove obsolete dates for certain one-time
actions that were required as part of the 2011 emergency preparedness
final rule and other obsolete dates. These actions are complete, and
the requirements are no longer binding on any current licensee. These
proposed changes would not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or
affect the issue finality of a COL because the NRC would be removing a
requirement.
The proposed changes to 72.32(a) would clarify the emergency plan
requirements for an applicant of a specific license under 10 CFR part
72. As discussed in section IX.A. of this document, applicants such as
this one are outside the scope of the 10 CFR part 50 backfitting
provisions and issue finality provisions.
The proposed changes to 72.32(c) would clarify that the ISFSI
licensee can rely on its 10 CFR part 50 emergency plan to meet the
requirements of Sec. 72.32 when the nuclear power reactor is under
construction, operating, or in decommissioning. Other provisions of
Sec. 72.32 allow an ISFSI licensee with a reactor emergency plan to
use that emergency plan to meet the applicable requirements for an
ISFSI emergency plan. Therefore, this clarification would not meet the
definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL
because it would not result in a modification of or addition to SSCs or
the design of a facility or the procedures or organization required to
design, construct, or operate a facility.
Section IV.B of this document describes proposed changes to
physical security requirements. The NRC would permit a certified fuel
handler to approve the temporary suspension of security measures once
the reactor has shut down and all fuel has been removed from the
reactor core. This proposed change would not constitute backfitting or
affect the issue finality of a COL because the proposed change would
provide a voluntary alternative requirement.
The proposed changes to Sec. 50.54(p) would add definitions of
``change'' and ``decrease in safeguard effectiveness'' and require that
reactor licensees include with the required Sec. 50.54(p)(2) report a
summary of the analysis performed to determine that the change does not
decrease safeguards effectiveness of the security plan. The proposed
changes would not require a licensee to use the Sec. 50.54(p) security
plan change process unless the licensee voluntarily seeks to change its
security plan and would not result in a modification of or addition to
SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures
[[Page 12310]]
or organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility.
Therefore, the proposed changes would not meet the definition of
``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL.
The NRC would provide an option that, once all spent nuclear fuel
has been placed in dry cask storage, licensees could protect a general
license ISFSI under Sec. 73.51 instead of Sec. 73.55. This proposed
change would not constitute backfitting or affect the issue finality of
a COL because the proposed change would provide a voluntary alternative
requirement.
Current Sec. 73.55(b)(3) requires that a licensee's physical
protection program be designed to prevent significant core damage. The
NRC would remove this requirement once the NRC has docketed the
licensee's certifications that its reactor has permanently ceased
operating and all fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. This
proposed change would not constitute backfitting or affect the issue
finality of a COL. The issue finality provision for COLs located in
Sec. 52.98 provides, in relevant part, that the Commission may not
modify, add, or delete any term or condition of a COL except in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 50.109. Under Sec. 50.109,
removing a requirement as proposed with Sec. 73.55(b)(3) is not
backfitting because removing a requirement does not create a new
requirement and does not amend a requirement because amending means the
requirement still exists in some form.
The proposed change to Sec. 73.55(e)(9)(v) would remove the
requirement that a licensee must designate the reactor control room as
a ``vital area'' if the NRC has docketed the licensee's certifications
that the reactor has permanently ceased operating and all fuel has been
removed from the reactor vessel, and the licensee has documented that
all vital equipment has been removed from the control room and the
control room does not serve as the vital area boundary for other vital
areas. This proposed change would not constitute backfitting or affect
the issue finality of a COL because the proposed change would be a
voluntary alternative requirement. Even if a licensee submitted and the
NRC docketed the certifications that the reactor has permanently ceased
operating and all fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel, the
licensee could still designate the reactor control room as a vital
area. If not all of the vital equipment has been removed from the
control room or the control room still serves as the vital area
boundary for other vital areas, then the licensee would not be required
to, and in fact could not, document that all vital equipment has been
removed from the control room or the control room does not serve as the
vital area boundary for other vital areas, respectively.
The NRC would revise Sec. 73.55(j)(4)(ii) to provide an
alternative to the requirement for maintaining continuous
communications between the alarm stations and the control room with a
requirement for maintaining communications between alarm stations and
the CFH or senior on shift licensee representative, once a licensee
submits and the NRC dockets the certifications that the reactor has
permanently ceased operating and all fuel has been removed from the
reactor vessel. This proposed change would relax the requirement for
these licensees. However, a licensee in decommissioning could maintain
its control room such that its continuous communication system still
communicates between the alarm stations and the control room. In this
situation, the control room could redirect communications from the
alarm stations to the certified fuel handler or the senior on-shift
licensee representative as appropriate. Thus, a licensee could continue
to comply with the current requirement to maintain continuous
communications between the alarm stations and the control room and
still satisfy the proposed rule. This makes the relaxation non-
mandatory and, as explained in MD 8.4, non-mandatory relaxations of
regulations generally do not meet the definition of ``backfitting.''
This proposed change would provide the voluntary relaxation of a
current requirement and, thus, not constitute backfitting or affect the
issue finality of a COL.
Section IV.C of this document describes proposed changes to cyber
security requirements. The NRC would revise Sec. 73.54 so the cyber
security requirements in Sec. 73.54 continue to apply to licensees
through Level 1 of decommissioning. Each 10 CFR part 50 licensee has a
license condition requiring the licensee to maintain its cyber security
plan, and this license condition remains in effect during
decommissioning. If the NRC issues an operating license for a nuclear
power reactor before this final rule goes into effect, then the NRC can
include a license condition similar to those issued to current holders
of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors. Thus, this proposed
change would not constitute backfitting for 10 CFR part 50 licensees.
A COL holder without the license condition is currently not
required to maintain its cyber security plan when it begins
decommissioning. The proposed revision to Sec. 73.54 would constitute
a change affecting the issue finality accorded these COL holders
because extending the requirement to maintain a cyber security plan
during decommissioning would modify the terms and conditions of a COL.
Under Sec. 52.98, the NRC must apply the provisions of Sec. 50.109 to
the proposed change. The proposed change would constitute backfitting
under Sec. 50.109. The NRC's backfit analysis justifying this
backfitting action is presented in section IX.D of this document. If
the NRC issues a COL before this final rule goes into effect, then the
NRC can include a license condition similar to those issued to current
holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors.
Section IV.D of this document describes proposed changes to fitness
for duty requirements. The NRC proposes to amend Sec. 26.3(a) so the
requirements of 10 CFR part 26 would not apply to COL holders once the
NRC has docketed their Sec. 52.110(a) certifications. This proposed
change would not affect the issue finality of a COL because the NRC
would be removing a requirement.
The proposed changes to Sec. 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B) would provide
minimum requirements for the fitness for duty elements of operating and
decommissioning 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52 licensees' insider
mitigation programs. These licensees are already required to comply
with the insider mitigation program requirements of Sec. 73.55(b)(9),
so the proposed rule changes would clarify existing requirements and
would not constitute backfitting or affect the issue finality of a COL.
The NRC proposes to amend the criminal penalties section of 10 CFR
part 26 by including Sec. 26.3 within Sec. 26.825(a) by removing
Sec. 26.3 from Sec. 26.825(b). This proposed change would not revise
Sec. 26.3 in any way. Enabling the NRC to impose criminal penalties
for willful violations of, attempts to violate, or conspiracies to
violate Sec. 26.3 would not result in a modification of or addition to
SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or organization
required to design, construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the
proposed change would not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or
affect the issue finality of a COL.
Section IV.E of this document describes proposed changes to the
``certified fuel handler'' definition and the elimination of the shift
technical advisor. The NRC proposes to amend Sec. 50.2 to provide an
alternative definition of ``certified fuel handler'' to eliminate the
need for licensees to submit requests for NRC approval of
[[Page 12311]]
CFH training programs. This proposed change would not constitute
backfitting or affect the issue finality of a COL because the proposed
change would provide a voluntary alternative to submitting a request
for approval of a fuel handler training program.
The proposed change to Sec. 50.54(m)(2)(i) to state that a shift
technical advisor is not required upon the NRC's docketing of the
license holder's certifications required under Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
or 52.110(a) would not result in a modification of or addition to SSCs
or the design of a facility or the procedures or organization required
to design, construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed
change would not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the
issue finality of a COL.
Section IV.F of this document describes proposed changes to the
NRC's decommissioning funding assurance requirements. The proposed
change to Sec. 50.75(f)(1) would modify the reporting frequency for
reactor decommissioning funding reports from at least once every 2
years to at least once every 3 years. This reporting requirement would
not result in a modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a
facility or the procedures or organization required to design,
construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed change would
not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality
of a COL.
The NRC would revise Sec. 50.75(h) to require certain
notifications be sent directly to the NRC's Document Control Desk and
not to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or Director,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, as applicable. This
reporting requirement would not result in a modification of or addition
to SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or organization
required to design, construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the
proposed change would not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or
affect the issue finality of a COL.
The NRC proposes to delete Sec. 50.75(f)(2). The language of
existing Sec. 50.75(f)(1) fully encompasses the language of paragraph
(f)(2), and, therefore, paragraph (f)(2) is unnecessary and potentially
confusing. This change would not result in a modification of or
addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or
organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility.
Therefore, the proposed change would not meet the definition of
``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL.
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations in Sec. 50.75(f)(1)
to clarify that when a licensee identifies a shortfall in the
decommissioning funding report required by Sec. 50.75(f)(1), the
licensee must identify additional financial assurance to cover the
shortfall in the next report. Licensees are already required to provide
reasonable assurance of decommissioning funding on an ongoing basis.
The proposed change would not change this obligation; the proposed rule
would clarify how reasonable assurance of funds will be available for
the decommissioning process. This change would not result in a
modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the
procedures or organization required to design, construct, or operate a
facility. Therefore, the proposed change would not meet the definition
of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL.
The proposed change to Sec. 50.82(a)(9)(ii)(F) would require
licensees to identify the specific sources of funds for ``remaining
decommissioning costs,'' including sources of funds for license
termination, spent fuel management, and ISFSI decommissioning. This
reporting requirement would not result in a modification of or addition
to SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or organization
required to design, construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the
proposed change would not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or
affect the issue finality of a COL.
The NRC would revise Sec. 50.82(a)(8)(v) to allow licensees to
combine the reports that are required by Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(8)(v),
50.82(a)(8)(vii) and 72.30(c). This proposed change would not
constitute backfitting or affect the issue finality of a COL because
the proposed change would provide a voluntary alternative requirement.
The NRC proposes to revise Sec. 52.110 to make the same changes
proposed in Sec. 50.82. For the reasons previously discussed, these
proposed changes would not affect the issue finality of a COL. The NRC
also proposes to add to Sec. 52.110 paragraphs (h)(5) through (h)(7)
with site-specific decommissioning cost estimate reporting requirements
that are identical to the requirements in Sec. 50.82(a)(8)(v) through
(vii). These reporting requirements would not result in a modification
of or addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or
organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility.
Therefore, the proposed changes would not meet the definition of
``backfitting'' and, under Sec. 52.98, would not affect the issue
finality of a COL.
The NRC proposes to revise Sec. 72.30 so that the submittals
subsequent to the initial decommissioning funding plan would no longer
require NRC approval. This proposed change would not meet the
definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL
because the NRC would be removing a requirement.
The proposed changes to Sec. 72.30(b) would clarify the
requirements for an applicant for a specific licensee and a holder of a
general license to submit decommissioning funding plans for NRC review
and approval. The current requirement requires applicants and holders
of licenses under 10 CFR part 72 to submit decommissioning funding
plans for NRC review and approval. These changes would not change any
substantive requirement and would not result in a modification of or
addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or
organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility.
Accordingly, these proposed changes would not constitute backfitting or
affect the issue finality of a COL.
Section IV.G of this document describes proposed changes to the
NRC's onsite and offsite financial protection requirements and
indemnity agreements. These changes would include revisions to the
following regulations: Sec. Sec. 140.11(a)(5) and 50.54(w)(5), to
allow nuclear power reactor licensees in decommissioning to reduce the
offsite liability and onsite property insurance amounts, respectively,
that they are required to maintain; Sec. 140.81, to include plants in
decommissioning within the scope of Sec. 140.81, thereby clarifying
the applicability of the requirements for an Extraordinary Nuclear
Occurrence ENO to reactors in decommissioning; and Sec. 50.54(w), to
require a prompt notification to the Commission of any material change
in proof of onsite property insurance filed with the Commission under
10 CFR part 50.
Changes to 10 CFR part 140 are not subject to the 10 CFR part 50
backfitting provisions and the issue finality provisions in 10 CFR part
52 because the Price-Anderson Act requires licensees to have offsite
financial protection. Even if they were subject to the 10 CFR part 50
backfitting provisions and the issue finality provisions in 10 CFR part
52, the proposed changes would not result in a modification of or
addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or
organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility.
Therefore, the proposed changes would not meet the definition of
``backfitting'' and would not affect the issue finality of a COL.
Similarly, the onsite insurance requirements in Sec. 50.54(w) do
not fall within the purview of the 10 CFR part
[[Page 12312]]
50 backfitting provisions or the issue finality provisions in 10 CFR
part 52. In the backfitting discussion for the 1987 final rule,
``Changes in Property Insurance Requirements for NRC Licensed Nuclear
Power Plants'' (52 FR 28963, 28972; August 5, 1987), the Commission
stated that requiring an increase in property damage insurance does not
meet the definition of ``backfitting.'' The Commission took similar
positions on backfitting in subsequent rulemakings to amend Sec.
50.54(w) (e.g., 54 FR 11163, March 17, 1989; 55 FR 12163, April 2,
1990).
Section IV.H of this document describes proposed changes to the
requirements concerning consideration of environmental effects of
decommissioning activities. The NRC proposes to change Sec.
50.82(a)(4)(i) and Sec. 52.110(d)(1) to require that licensees provide
the basis for determining whether the environmental impacts of
decommissioning activities are bounded by previous environmental
reviews and include a description in the PSDAR of any activities that
will not be bounded. These reporting requirements would not result in a
modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the
procedures or organization required to design, construct, or operate a
facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would not meet the definition
of ``backfitting'' and would not affect the issue finality of a COL.
The NRC also proposes to change Sec. 50.82(a)(4)(i) and Sec.
52.110(d)(1) to allow licensees to use appropriate federally issued
environmental review documents prepared in compliance with NEPA, ESA,
NHPA, or other environmental statutes instead of only environmental
impact statements. These reporting requirements would not result in a
modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the
procedures or organization required to design, construct, or operate a
facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would not meet the definition
of ``backfitting'' and would not affect the issue finality of a COL.
The NRC would change Sec. 50.82(a)(6)(ii) and Sec. 52.110(f)(2)
to clarify that the previous review of any potentially significant
environmental impact must be bounded by appropriate federally issued
environmental review documents prepared in compliance with NEPA, ESA,
NHPA, or other environmental statutes. These reporting requirements
would not result in a modification of or addition to SSCs or the design
of a facility or the procedures or organization required to design,
construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would
not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' and would not affect the
issue finality of a COL.
The NRC proposes to revise 10 CFR part 51 to reflect the changes
made in the 1996 Final Rule that nuclear power reactor licensees are
not required to submit license amendment requests for authorization to
perform decommissioning activities. These changes would not change any
substantive requirement and would not result in a modification of or
addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or
organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility.
Accordingly, these proposed changes would not constitute backfitting or
affect the issue finality of a COL.
Section IV.I of this document describes proposed changes to record
retention requirements. These changes would eliminate certain
recordkeeping requirements and the requirement to keep certain
duplicate records. These recordkeeping changes would not result in a
modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or the
procedures or organization required to design, construct, or operate a
facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would not meet the definition
of ``backfitting'' and would not affect the issue finality of a COL.
The proposed changes also would not meet the definition of
``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL because the NRC
would be removing these requirements.
Section IV.J of this document describes proposed changes to low-
level radioactive waste transportation requirements. The NRC would
revise Paragraph III.E of appendix G to 10 CFR part 20 to increase from
20 days to 45 days the window of time for notification of receipt of
shipments of low-level waste before a shipper would be required to
investigate, trace, and report to the NRC any shipments of low-level
waste for which the shipper has not received a notification of receipt.
This proposed change would relax the requirement. However, a shipper
could still investigate, trace, and report shipments of low-level waste
if the shipper has not received notification of receipt within 20 days.
Thus, a shipper could continue to comply with the current 20-day
requirement and still satisfy the proposed rule. This makes the
relaxation non-mandatory and, as explained in MD 8.4, non-mandatory
relaxations of regulations generally do not meet the definition of
``backfitting.'' This proposed change would provide the voluntary
relaxation of a current requirement and, thus, not constitute
backfitting or affect the issue finality of a COL.
Section IV.K of this document describes proposed changes to spent
fuel management requirements. The NRC would revise Sec. Sec. 50.54(bb)
and 72.218 to clarify the contents of an irradiated fuel management
plan, which licensees are already required to submit to the NRC for
approval. This clarification of a reporting requirement would not
result in a modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a
facility or the procedures or organization required to design,
construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would
not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' and would not affect the
issue finality of a COL.
The NRC proposes to change Sec. 72.218 to remove spent fuel
management provisions that the NRC would move to Sec. 50.54(bb) and
clarify provisions concerning termination of part 72 general licenses.
The proposed changes would not result in a modification of or addition
to SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or organization
required to design, construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the
proposed changes would not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' and
would not affect the issue finality of a COL.
Section IV.L of this document describes proposed changes to the
NRC's backfitting provisions in 10 CFR part 50 and part 72. The NRC
proposes to change Sec. 50.109 to clarify application of the 10 CFR
part 50 backfitting provisions to NRC actions constituting backfitting
or affecting the issue finality of nuclear power reactor licensees in
decommissioning. The NRC also would revise Sec. 50.109 to require a
documented evaluation to include a consideration of the costs of
imposing the backfit if the basis for backfitting is bringing a
facility into compliance with a license or the rules or orders of the
Commission, or into conformance with the licensee's written
commitments. The proposed change to Sec. 72.62 would clarify that the
backfit regulations in part 72 apply during the decommissioning of an
independent spent fuel storage installation or a monitored retrievable
storage facility. The proposed changes to backfitting provisions would
be changes to requirements imposed on the NRC, not on a licensee, so
the proposed changes would be outside the scope of backfitting and
issue finality.
Section IV.M of this document describes proposed changes to the
NRC's regulations related to foreign ownership, control, or domination
of a production or utilization facility. The NRC would revise Sec.
50.38 to clarify when a facility licensed under 10 CFR
[[Page 12313]]
part 50 or part 52 is not considered a production or utilization
facility and, therefore, the foreign ownership, control, or domination
prohibition no longer applies. The proposed changes would not result in
a modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or
the procedures or organization required to design, construct, or
operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would not meet the
definition of ``backfitting'' and would not affect the issue finality
of a COL.
The NRC also would amend Sec. 50.82(b) to add the criteria for
when a non-power production or utilization facility or fuel
reprocessing plant is no longer a production or utilization facility.
The only part 50 licensees considered within the scope of the part 50
backfitting provision are nuclear power reactor licensees. Further, the
proposed changes would not result in a modification of or addition to
SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or organization
required to design, construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the
proposed changes would not meet the definition of ``backfitting.''
The NRC would revise Sec. 50.82(a) and (b) and Sec. 52.110(b) to
affirm the continuation of the NRC's statutory authority over the
existing 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license, and to state which
regulations would still apply to the licensee, after the performance of
decommissioning activities that lead to the licensed facility no longer
meeting the definition of a utilization or a production facility. The
proposed changes would not result in a modification of or addition to
SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or organization
required to design, construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the
proposed changes would not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' and
would not affect the issue finality of a COL.
In light of the proposed amendments to Sec. Sec. 50.38, 50.82, and
52.110, the NRC would amend Sec. Sec. 50.1, 50.51, 52.0, and 52.109 to
clarify that the regulations in 10 CFR part 50, and the similar
regulations in 10 CFR part 52, provide not only for the licensing of
utilization and production facilities, but also for their
decommissioning and the termination of their associated licenses. The
proposed changes would not result in a modification of or addition to
SSCs or the design of a facility or the procedures or organization
required to design, construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the
proposed changes would not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' and
would not affect the issue finality of a COL.
The NRC is proposing to add a definition for ``non-power production
or utilization facility'' to Sec. 50.2 that captures all non-power
facilities licensed under Sec. 50.22 and Sec. 50.21(a) or (c), except
fuel reprocessing facilities. The only part 50 licensees considered
within the scope of the part 50 backfitting provision are nuclear power
reactor licensees. Further, the proposed definition would not result in
a modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a facility or
the procedures or organization required to design, construct, or
operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed changes would not meet the
definition of ``backfitting.''
Section IV.N of this document describes proposed changes to license
termination plan requirements. The NRC would revise Sec. 50.82(a)(9)
and Sec. 52.110(i) to clarify that only nuclear power reactor
licensees that have loaded fuel into their reactors must submit license
termination plans. The proposed change would not change this
requirement; the proposed rule would only clarify that nuclear power
reactor licensees that have not loaded fuel into their reactors would
not need to submit license termination plans. This change would not
result in a modification of or addition to SSCs or the design of a
facility or the procedures or organization required to design,
construct, or operate a facility. Therefore, the proposed change would
not meet the definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality
of a COL.
Section IV.O of this document describes the proposed removal of
license conditions and withdrawal of orders. These changes would not
change any substantive requirement because the license conditions and
orders are substantively redundant with NRC regulations issued after
the license conditions and orders were issued. Because the NRC would
not change a requirement, the proposed changes would not meet the
definition of ``backfitting'' or affect the issue finality of a COL.
D. Backfit Analysis
1. Introduction and Background
As part of this proposed rule, the NRC is proposing a modification
to the cyber security requirements in Sec. 73.54. This proposed rule
would ensure that these requirements continue to apply to nuclear power
reactor licensees that have submitted their Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a) certifications until such time that all spent fuel in the SFP
has sufficiently decayed (i.e., at least 10 months for BWRs and 16
months for PWRs after the date of permanent cessation of operations, or
an NRC-approved alternative spent fuel decay period).
This amendment would likely constitute a change affecting issue
finality for 10 CFR part 52 COL holders, as defined in Sec. 52.98.
These licensees are not currently required to maintain their cyber
security programs past the date that they are no longer authorized to
operate the reactor. If the proposal to require these licensees to
maintain their cyber security program into the decommissioning phase
would extend the duration that a COL holder would be required to
maintain a cyber security program, then that extension would constitute
a new or changed requirement for that licensee and, thus, affect that
COL's issue finality.
2. Detailed Description of the Proposed Change Affecting Issue Finality
The NRC sets forth the current cyber security requirements for
nuclear power reactors in Sec. 73.54. The NRC established these
requirements as part of the 2009 Power Reactor Security Requirements
final rule. The preamble to Sec. 73.54 states, in part, that by
November 23, 2009, each nuclear power reactor licensee ``currently
licensed to operate'' must submit to the NRC a cyber security plan
(CSP) for review and approval. The preamble further states that the
requirements in Sec. 73.54 are applicable to current ``applicants for
an operating license or combined license'' and mandates such applicants
to amend their applications to include a CSP. In addition, every 10 CFR
part 50 license for a nuclear power reactor that was operating in 2009
contains a license condition to have and maintain a Commission-approved
CSP. These license conditions were issued when the NRC approved each
licensee's CSP that was submitted to the NRC as required by the Power
Reactor Security Requirements final rule. The Tennessee Valley
Authority's 10 CFR part 50 operating license for Watts Bar Nuclear
Plant, Unit 2, issued in 2015, also contains a license condition to
have and maintain a CSP.
As an initial step in the decommissioning process, a nuclear power
reactor licensee must submit written certifications that it has decided
to permanently cease operations and has permanently removed all fuel
from its reactor vessel, in accordance with Sec. 50.82(a)(1)(i) and
(ii) for nuclear power reactor licensees under 10 CFR part 50, or Sec.
52.110(a)(1) and (2) for 10 CFR part 52 combined license holders. As
stated in Sec. 50.82(a)(2) and Sec. 52.110(b), upon the NRC's
docketing of these certifications, the license no longer
[[Page 12314]]
authorizes operation of the reactor or the placement or retention of
fuel in the reactor vessel. In a December 5, 2016 memorandum to the
Commission, the NRC staff explained that Sec. 73.54 no longer applies
to nuclear power reactor licensees once they have submitted, and the
NRC has docketed, these certifications.
As discussed in the ``Technical Basis for Graded Approach'' section
of this document, the NRC has concluded that after 10 months for BWRs
and 16 months for PWRs, the spent fuel in the SFP will have decayed and
cooled sufficiently such that the fuel cannot heat up to clad ignition
temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic conditions. The NRC has
determined that until the fuel has decayed and cooled sufficiently,
nuclear power reactor licensees must maintain reasonable assurance that
their critical digital assets remain protected against cyber attacks.
As such, this proposed rule would modify the cyber security
requirements in Sec. 73.54 to ensure that they continue to apply to
licensees of decommissioning nuclear power reactors until the spent
fuel has decayed and cooled sufficiently (either through the
application of a 10 month (BWR) or 16 month (PWR) decay period or an
NRC-approved site-specific decay period). This proposed rule would also
remove the CSP license condition from the 10 CFR part 50 licenses at
the applicable 10 or 16 month interval.
This proposed rule would not constitute backfitting for currently
operating or recently shutdown 10 CFR part 50 reactor licensees. Their
CSP license condition remains in effect until the termination of the
license or the NRC removes the condition from the license (e.g., if the
licensee submits a license amendment request and the NRC approves it).
The NRC has determined that the requirements of the CSP license
conditions are not necessary after the spent fuel in the SFP has
sufficiently cooled. The proposed rule would codify, during Level 1 of
decommissioning, the already-imposed requirements of the CSP license
conditions. These requirements would continue to provide adequate
protection of the public health and safety and common defense and
security and continue to support the effective operation of licensees'
security and emergency preparedness programs during the time when a
draindown scenario can credibly lead to a zirconium fire. (See sections
3 and 4 of this backfit analysis for additional cost/benefit
discussion.) Therefore, this proposed rule would not impact these
licensees' overall requirement to maintain a cyber security program,
but would instead enable the automatic removal of cyber security
requirements once fuel in the SFP has sufficiently cooled. Thus, the
decommissioning rulemaking would not impose a new or changed
requirement as the licensees are already implementing the requirement
as part of their cyber security program license conditions.
Conversely, this rulemaking would constitute a change affecting the
issue finality for 10 CFR part 52 COL holders. Each currently approved
COL includes a license condition to provide the NRC with the licensee's
Operational Program Implementation Schedule. The operational programs
(which include development and implementation of a security program,
including a cyber security program) are requirements in the regulations
and not separately identified as license conditions. As a result, a COL
does not require the licensee to maintain the cyber security program
throughout the duration of its license. COL holders are currently
required to maintain a program only as long as Sec. 73.54 is
applicable to them. Because Sec. 73.54 no longer applies to the
licensee once it is not authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor,
and a nuclear power reactor licensee is not authorized to operate a
nuclear power reactor during decommissioning, COL holders are not
required to maintain their CSP during decommissioning. This proposed
rule, which would require licensees to maintain their cyber security
program for 10 months (BWR) or 16 months (PWR) beyond the date of
permanent cessation of operations (or for an NRC-approved alternative
spent fuel decay period) could extend the duration over which a COL
holder would be required to maintain a cyber security program. That
extension would constitute a new or changed requirement for that
licensee.
Under Sec. 52.98, the Commission cannot modify any term or
condition of an issued combined license except in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 52.103 or Sec. 50.109, as applicable. This
proposed rule's amendment of the cyber security requirements would
constitute a change affecting the issue finality of the COLs issued at
the time of the final rule's effective date. The provisions of Sec.
52.103 do not apply to this proposed rule, so the NRC must show that
the amendment would meet the requirements of Sec. 50.109 to justify
proceeding with this amendment. Because none of the exceptions to the
requirement to prepare a backfit analysis in Sec. 50.109(a)(4) applies
to this rulemaking, Sec. 50.109(a)(3) requires the NRC to prepare a
backfit analysis that demonstrates that the proposed amendment would
result in a substantial increase in the overall protection of the
public health and safety or the common defense and security, and that
the direct and indirect costs of implementation are justified in view
of this increased protection.
3. Benefits: Substantial Increase in Public Health and Safety and
Common Defense and Security
The NRC identified qualitative (non-quantifiable) benefits that
would occur if the proposed change affecting issue finality were
implemented.
The NRC identified two qualitative benefits to the common defense
and security and public health and safety that would be realized if the
proposed rule is implemented. Specifically, the NRC finds that
extending the duration over which the licensee must maintain cyber
security requirements would:
Constitute a substantial increase in protection to common
defense and security by ensuring that a compromise of digital systems
cannot adversely impact the effective operation of licensees' physical
security programs; and
Constitute a substantial increase in public health and safety
by ensuring that a compromise of digital systems cannot adversely
impact the effective operation of emergency preparedness systems in the
event of a zirconium fire scenario.
Effective Operation of Physical Security Program
The NRC has previously determined that attacks on the SFP are
credible and have the potential to lead to an unacceptable impact to
common defense and security. Specifically, a physical attack by either
an external force or malicious insiders could directly lead to a
draindown scenario and subsequent zirconium fire.
As established in Sec. 73.54, cyber security is an essential
element of a licensee's physical security program that enables the
licensee to effectively protect its site against the design basis
threat of radiological sabotage defined in Sec. 73.1, in accordance
with Sec. 73.55(b). Specifically, a physical attack that is augmented
with a coincident cyber attack would, in many cases, have a higher
chance of success over a purely physical attack. Thus, although there
is no cyber attack that can directly lead to a draindown scenario, a
cyber attack can be combined with a physical attack on the SFP to
improve the physical attack's likelihood of success.
Given a facility without adequate cyber security controls in place,
several
[[Page 12315]]
mechanisms exist that could improve the effectiveness of a physical
attack on the SFP. For example, a cyber attack could aid a physical
assault on the SFP by an external attacker by:
Disabling perimeter detection to delay or prevent onsite
response to the physical assault prior to the attacker gaining entry to
the SFP
disrupting onsite and offsite security-related communication
to reduce the effectiveness of the licensee's response to the physical
assault
disabling access control doors and gates to enable the
attacker expedited physical access to the SFP
In addition, inadequate cyber security controls on facilities'
access control systems could enable an attacker to inject information
into a licensee's access control system in a manner that would allow
unauthorized individuals to obtain unescorted access into the protected
or vital areas of the facility. This could allow one or more attackers
direct access to the SFP, which could then be exploited to sabotage the
SFP in a manner that would result in a draindown scenario.
This factor, combined with the severity of the consequences of a
draindown scenario and subsequent zirconium fire that could result from
a successful physical attack, demonstrates that maintaining cyber
security requirements during the period when a draindown scenario could
reasonably result in a zirconium fire (i.e., prior to the fuel in the
SFP sufficiently cooling) represents a substantial increase in
security.
Effective Operation of Emergency Preparedness Systems
As discussed in the ``Technical Basis for the Graded Approach'' and
``Emergency Preparedness'' sections of this document, although the
spectrum of credible accidents and operational events requiring an
emergency response is reduced at a decommissioning nuclear power
reactor as compared to that for an operating nuclear power reactor,
reliable emergency preparedness functions are still required to ensure
public health and safety in the event of a zirconium fire scenario.
As established in Sec. 73.54, cyber security is an essential
element of a licensee's physical security program that, in part,
ensures that a compromise of digital systems cannot adversely impact
emergency preparedness functions. For example, in the event of a
zirconium fire scenario, the licensee's cyber security program prevents
a cyber attack from adversely impacting the ability to:
Notify state, local, and Federal personnel of the emergency
Request and communicate with offsite support
Assess and classify the emergency conditions
Disseminate information to the public during an emergency
Conduct a radiological accident assessment
The NRC has determined that this factor demonstrates that
maintaining cyber security requirements to ensure that a compromise of
digital systems cannot adversely impact the operation of emergency
preparedness functions until the time in which a SFP draindown would
likely be mitigated prior to a zirconium fire scenario (i.e., once the
fuel in the SFP has sufficiently cooled) represents a substantial
increase in public health and safety.
4. Costs
The NRC identified quantitative costs (i.e., costs that are
amenable to quantitative evaluation) that would be incurred if the
proposed change affecting issue finality were implemented.
Based on a review of feedback received during recent inspections of
the full implementation of licensees' cyber security programs, the NRC
estimates that the cost to implement a cyber security program for a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor is approximately $300,000 per
site per year. As previously stated, this proposed change affecting
issue finality would extend the duration that a licensee must maintain
its cyber security program for 10 (BWR) or 16 (PWR) months. Thus, the
cost associated with this extension is approximately $250,000 (BWR) or
$400,000 (PWR).
COLs have been issued at a total of 3 sites that utilize BWR units,
and 4 sites that utilize PWR units. Assuming that all units are
constructed and the per-site costs from the previous paragraph, the
total cost associated with this proposed change affecting issue
finality if all reactors entered decommissioning today would be
approximately $2.35 million. If it is assumed that all sites with units
licensed under 10 CFR part 52 decommission their reactors 40 years
after the effective date of the final rule, with a discount rate of 7
percent, then the total, combined cost for all affected licensees
associated with this proposed change affecting issue finality would be
approximately $157,000. Due to the potential that some of these
facilities may not be constructed or that some licensees may have
voluntarily chosen to maintain their cyber security programs during
this timeframe, this estimate is expected to be an upper bound.
5. Determination of Substantial Benefits Justifying Costs of the
Proposed Change Affecting Issue Finality
The NRC finds that the proposed change affecting issue finality
would provide a substantial increase in protection to public health and
safety and common defense and security for current 10 CFR part 52 COL
holders by ensuring that a compromise of digital systems cannot
adversely impact the effective operation of licensees' security and
emergency preparedness programs during the time when a draindown
scenario can credibly lead to a zirconium fire. The NRC finds that this
substantial increase would justify the $157,000 in costs that would
accrue to the licensees.
6. Conclusion
On the basis of this analysis, the NRC determines that the change
affecting issue finality resulting from the cyber security portion of
this proposed rule would be justified under Sec. 50.109(a)(3).
7. Evaluation of Factors in Sec. 50.109(c)(1) Through (9)
In performing this analysis, the NRC considered the nine factors in
Sec. 50.109(c), as follows:
Statement of the Specific Objectives That the Backfit Is Designed To
Achieve
The two objectives for the cyber security portion of the
``Regulatory Improvements for Production and Utilization Facilities
Transitioning to Decommissioning'' rulemaking are:
To ensure the effectiveness of the physical protection program
during the period over which a SFP draindown could realistically result
in a zirconium fire scenario; and
To ensure the effectiveness of emergency preparedness
functions during the period over which a SFP draindown may not be
mitigatable prior to the draindown resulting in a zirconium fire
Note that the change affecting issue finality is only applicable to
nuclear power reactors licensed under 10 CFR part 52 as of the
effective date of the final rule.
General Description of the Activity That Will Be Required by the
Licensee or Applicant in Order To Complete the Backfit
The NRC is proposing a modification to the cyber security
requirements in Sec. 73.54 to ensure that these requirements continue
to apply to
[[Page 12316]]
licensees of decommissioning nuclear power reactors until such time
that all spent fuel in the SFP has sufficiently decayed (i.e., 10
months for BWRs and 16 months for PWRs since the date of permanent
cessation of operations, or an NRC-approved alternative spent fuel
decay period). The change affecting issue finality is only applicable
to nuclear power reactors currently licensed under 10 CFR part 52 as of
the effective date of the final rule.
Potential Change in the Risk to the Public From the Accidental Off-Site
Release of Radioactive Material
The rulemaking is intended to reduce risk of offsite releases as a
result of breaches in security at nuclear power plants, and to ensure
the functionality of emergency preparedness functions in the case of a
zirconium fire scenario. However, the reduction in risk to the public
from offsite releases of radioactive materials has not been fully
quantified because there is insufficient information and modeling to
support such quantification.
Potential Impact on Radiological Exposure of Facility Employees
The rulemaking would provide added assurance that nuclear industry
workers are not subjected to unnecessary radiological exposures as the
result of a breach in security that causes a zirconium fire leading to
a release of radiation that security personnel are exposed to as the
result of their response activities. Further, the rulemaking would
ensure that emergency preparedness functions, including evacuation
procedures, are not adversely impacted by a cyber attack during the
period when a draindown scenario could reasonably result in a zirconium
fire, thus ensuring that nuclear industry workers are not subjected to
unnecessary radiological exposures in the case of a zirconium fire
scenario.
Installation and Continuing Costs Associated With the Backfit,
Including the Cost of Facility Downtime or the Cost of Construction
Delay
The backfit analysis to support the change affecting issue finality
resulting from this proposed rule includes the NRC's estimate of the
total costs for maintaining a licensee's cyber security program until
the fuel in the SFP has sufficiently cooled to adequately ensure that a
SFP draindown does not result in a zirconium fire scenario. The
estimated one-time industry net cost associated with the change
affecting issue finality would be approximately $157,000.
The Potential Safety Impact of Changes in Plant or Operational
Complexity, Including the Relationship to Final and Existing Regulatory
Requirements
The cyber security portion of this proposed rule would not impose
any requirements beyond those in place while the nuclear power reactor
is operational. As such, this rule is not expected to have an effect on
facility complexity.
The Estimated Resource Burden on the NRC Associated With the Backfit
and the Availability of Such Resources
The rulemaking may result in a minor increase in the expenditure of
agency resources, due to the potential for cyber security inspections
to be conducted after the licensee has ceased operations and before
fuel in the SFP has sufficiently cooled.
The Potential Impact of Differences in Facility Type, Design or Age on
the Relevancy and Practicality of the Backfit
The specific cost of this rulemaking to a facility does vary,
depending on whether the facility utilizes BWR or PWR reactors. This is
due to time required for fuel in the SFP to sufficiently cool for each
type of reactor. Further, since the change affecting issue finality is
only applicable to reactors licensed under 10 CFR part 52, the specific
cost also depends on the percentage of reactors licensed under 10 CFR
part 52 at the licensee's facility.
Whether the Backfit is Interim or Final and, if Interim, the
Justification for Imposing the Backfit on an Interim Basis
The change affecting issue finality would be final.
E. Draft Regulatory Guidance
As described in Section XVI, ``Availability of Guidance,'' in this
document, the NRC is issuing four draft regulatory guides (DGs) that,
if finalized, would provide guidance on the methods acceptable to the
NRC for complying with aspects of this proposed rule. The DGs would
apply to all current holders of operating licenses under 10 CFR part 50
and COLs under 10 CFR part 52. Issuance of the DGs in final form would
not constitute backfitting under Sec. 50.109 and would not otherwise
constitute a change affecting issue finality under 10 CFR part 52. As
discussed in the ``Implementation'' section of each DG, the NRC has no
current intention to impose the DGs on current holders of an operating
license or COL.
For the same reasons provided under ``Current and Future
Applicants'' that explain why the proposed rule does not constitute
backfitting or a change affecting issue finality for applicants,
applying the DGs to applications for operating licenses or COLs would
not constitute backfitting as defined in Sec. 50.109 and would not
otherwise constitute a change affecting issue finality under 10 CFR
part 52.
X. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
The NRC is following its Cumulative Effects of Regulation (CER)
process by engaging extensively with external stakeholders throughout
this rulemaking and related regulatory activities. Public involvement
has included: (1) The publication of an ANPR for public comment (80 FR
72358) on November 19, 2015, to inform the NRC's efforts in drafting a
proposed rule regulatory basis to address issues associated with
nuclear power reactor decommissioning; (2) holding a public meeting on
December 9, 2015, to afford external stakeholders an opportunity to ask
the NRC staff clarifying questions regarding the ANPR; (3) the
publication of the draft regulatory basis for public comment (82 FR
13778) on March 15, 2017; (4) the publication of a preliminary draft of
the regulatory analysis for public comment (82 FR 21481) on May 9,
2017; and (5) holding a public meeting on May 8-10, 2017, to facilitate
public comments on the development of the final regulatory basis and
regulatory analysis.
Another opportunity for comment is being provided to the public
with this proposed rule. The NRC will be issuing the draft implementing
guidance with this proposed rule to support more informed external
stakeholder feedback. Further, the NRC will continue to hold public
meetings throughout the rulemaking process. Section XVI, ``Availability
of Guidance,'' of this document describes how the public can access the
draft implementing guidance for which the NRC seeks external
stakeholder feedback.
Finally, the NRC is requesting CER feedback on the following
questions:
1. In light of any current or projected CER challenges, does the
proposed rule's effective date provide sufficient time to implement the
new proposed requirements, including changes to programs, procedures,
and facilities?
2. If CER challenges currently exist or are expected, what should
be done to address them? For example, if more time is required for
implementation of the new requirements, what period of time is
sufficient?
3. Do other (NRC or other agency) regulatory actions (e.g., orders,
generic communications, license amendment requests, inspection findings
of a generic nature) influence the
[[Page 12317]]
implementation of the proposed rule's requirements?
4. Are there unintended consequences? Does the proposed rule create
conditions that would be contrary to the proposed rule's purpose and
objectives? If so, what are the unintended consequences, and how should
they be addressed?
5. Please comment on the NRC's cost and benefit estimates in the
draft regulatory analysis that supports the proposed rule. The draft
regulatory analysis is available as indicated in the ``Availability of
Documents'' section of this document.
XI. Plain Writing
The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274) requires Federal
agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized
manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the
Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain
Language in Government Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR
31885). The NRC requests comment on this document with respect to the
clarity and effectiveness of the language used.
XII. National Environmental Policy Act
This proposed rule includes some actions that are of the types
described in Sec. 51.22(c). The NRC has previously determined that
these types of actions do not have a significant impact on the
environment and has categorically excluded them from the requirement to
prepare an environmental analysis. Specifically, the NRC has determined
that some amendments in this proposed rule are the types of actions
described in the Sec. 51.22(c) exclusions noted in Table 4.
Accordingly, the NRC has not developed an environmental impact
statement or an environmental assessment for these portions of the
proposed rule.
Table 4--Application of 10 CFR 51.22 Categorical Exclusions to the
Proposed Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applicable 10 CFR 51.22
Regulation paragraph
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR part 26........................... (c)(1), (c)(3).
10 CFR 50.2.............................. (c)(2), (c)(3).
10 CFR 50.54(bb)......................... (c)(3).
10 CFR 50.59(d).......................... (c)(3).
10 CFR 50.71(c).......................... (c)(3).
10 CFR 50.75(f).......................... (c)(3).
Elimination of 10 CFR 50.75(f)(2)........ (c)(2).
10 CFR 50.82(a).......................... (c)(2), (c)(3).
10 CFR 50.109............................ (c)(2).
10 CFR part 50, appendix A............... (c)(3).
10 CFR part 20, appendix G............... (c)(3).
10 CFR 51.53............................. (c)(3).
10 CFR 51.95............................. (c)(3).
10 CFR 52.63............................. (c)(3).
10 CFR 52.110............................ (c)(2).
10 CFR 72.72............................. (c)(3).
10 CFR 72.218............................ (c)(3).
10 CFR part 140.......................... (c)(1).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Draft Finding of No Significant Impacts
The NRC has prepared a draft environmental assessment (EA) for the
portions of this proposed rule not categorically excluded under Sec.
51.22. The draft EA is available in ADAMS at Accession No. ML22019A140.
The NRC prepared the draft EA to determine environmental impacts of the
proposed action: A rulemaking to update the NRC's regulations related
to production and utilization facilities transitioning to
decommissioning. Based on the draft EA, the NRC concludes that this
proposed rule would not have significant environmental impacts because
the changes would be administrative or procedural in nature and would
have no nexus to the physical environment or would have no significant
impact on the environment. Therefore, this proposed rule does not
warrant preparation of an environmental impact statement. Accordingly,
the NRC has determined that a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)
is appropriate.
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act
This proposed rule contains new or amended collections of
information subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3501-21). This proposed rule has been submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget for review and approval of the information
collections.
Type of submission, new or revision: Revision.
The title of the information collection: Regulatory Improvements
for Production and Utilization Facilities Transitioning to
Decommissioning, Proposed Rule.
The form number if applicable: Not applicable.
How often the collection is required or requested: Annually and on
occasion.
Who will be required or asked to respond: Production and
utilization facility licensees.
An estimate of the number of annual responses: 102 (1 response for
10 CFR part 20, 0 responses for 10 CFR part 26, 97 responses for 10 CFR
part 50, 0 responses for 10 CFR part 52, 1 response for 10 CFR part 72,
and 3 responses for 10 CFR part 73).
The estimated number of annual respondents: 62 (1 respondent for 10
CFR part 20, 0 respondents for 10 CFR part 26, 62 respondents for 10
CFR part 50, 0 respondents for 10 CFR part 52, 20 respondents for 10
CFR part 72, and 1 respondent for 10 CFR part 73).
An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to comply
with the information collection requirement or request: -3,658 (-77.5
hours for 10 CFR part 20, 0 hours for 10 CFR part 26, -3,114.5 hours
for 10 CFR part 50, 0 hours for 10 CFR part 52, -436 hours for 10 CFR
part 72, and -30 hours for 10 CFR part 73).
Abstract: The proposed rule would result in changes in
recordkeeping and reporting burden relative to existing rules by
creating a regulatory framework for production and utilization facility
licensees transitioning to decommissioning and amending existing
regulations that relate to the decommissioning of production and
utilization facilities. Decommissioning nuclear power reactor licensees
and the NRC have expended substantial resources processing licensing
actions for nuclear power reactors during their transition period to
decommissioning status. Licensees that are currently transitioning to
decommissioning have been requesting NRC review and approval of
licensing actions, informed by the low risk of an offsite radiological
release posed by a decommissioning reactor. Specifically, the licensees
are seeking NRC approval of exemptions and license amendments to revise
requirements to reflect the reduced operations and risks posed by a
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor. The proposed rule would, on
balance, reduce the paperwork burden imposed on production and
utilization facility licensees transitioning to decommissioning by
establishing a graded approach to the requirements imposed on these
facilities. A graded approach would adjust the level of analysis,
documentation, and actions necessary to comply with safety requirements
and criteria commensurate with several factors, including magnitude of
any credible hazard involved, and the balance between radiological and
non-radiological hazards as applicable to the level within the
decommissioning process. The NRC expects that these proposed changes
would enhance the efficiency of the decommissioning process and reduce
the overall burden on licensees.
[[Page 12318]]
The NRC is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the
information collections contained in this proposed rule and on the
following issues:
1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the
information will have practical utility?
2. Is the estimate of the burden of the proposed information
collection accurate?
3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the proposed information collection on
respondents be minimized, including the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information technology?
A copy of the OMB clearance package and proposed rule is available
in ADAMS under Accession No. ML18039A192 or can be obtained free of
charge by contacting the NRC's Public Document Room reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected].
You may obtain information and comment submissions related to the OMB
clearance package by searching on https://www.regulations.gov under
Docket ID NRC-2015-0070.
You may submit comments on any aspect of these proposed information
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the
above issues, by the following methods:
Federal rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0070.
Mail comments to: FOIA, Library, and Information
Collections Branch, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Mail Stop:
T6-A10M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001
or to the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (3150-0014, -0146, -0011, -0151, -0132, -0002), Attn: Desk
Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW,
Washington, DC 20503; email: [email protected].
Submit comments by April 4, 2022. Comments received after this date
will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC staff is
able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before
this date.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting
or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
XIV. Criminal Penalties
For the purposes of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (AEA), the NRC is issuing this proposed rule that would
amend or add Sec. Sec. 26.3, 50.47, 50.54, 50.59, 50.71, 50.75, 50.82,
50.200, 52.110, 72.30, 72.72, 72.212, 72.218, 73.51, 73.54, 73.55, and
140.11 as well as appendix G to 10 CFR part 20, appendix A to 10 CFR
part 50, and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, under one or more of
Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. Willful violations of these
provisions would be subject to criminal enforcement. Criminal penalties
as they apply to regulations in 10 CFR parts 20, 26, 50, 52, 72, 73 and
140 are discussed in Sec. Sec. 20.2402, 26.825, 50.111, 52.303, 72.86,
73.81 and 140.89.
XV. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995,
Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies unless the use of such a standard is inconsistent with
applicable law or otherwise impractical. In this proposed rule, the NRC
would revise regulations associated with decommissioning in 10 CFR
parts 20, 26, 50, 51, 52, 72, 73, and 140. This action would not
constitute the establishment of a standard that contains generally
applicable requirements.
XVI. Availability of Guidance
The NRC is issuing for comment four draft regulatory guides to
support the implementation of the proposed requirements in this
proposed rule, as well as to support other recommendations made in the
supporting regulatory bases regarding areas where the decommissioning
guidance could be improved or enhanced. You may access information and
comment submissions related to the Draft Guides (DGs) by searching on
https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2015-0070. You may
submit comments on this draft guidance by the methods outlined in the
ADDRESSES section of this document.
1. The DG-1346, ``Emergency Planning for Decommissioning Nuclear
Power Reactors'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML21347A046), is a new regulatory
guide.
2. The DG-1347, ``Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors,''
(ADAMS Accession No. ML21347A080), would be Revision 2 to the existing
Regulatory Guide 1.184.
3. The DG-1348, ``Assuring the Availability of Funds for
Decommissioning Production or Utilization Facilities,'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML21347A081), would be Revision 2 to the existing
Regulatory Guide 1.159.
4. The DG-1349, ``Standard Format and Content for Post-Shutdown
Decommissioning Activities Report,'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML21347A138),
would be Revision 2 to the existing Regulatory Guide 1.185.
XVII. Public Meeting
The NRC will conduct a public meeting on this proposed rule for the
purpose of describing this proposed rule to the public and facilitating
development of public comments on this proposed rule.
The NRC will publish a notice of the location, time, and agenda of
the meeting in the Federal Register, on Regulations.gov, and on the
NRC's public meeting website at least 10 calendar days before the
meeting. Stakeholders should monitor the NRC's public meeting website
for information about the public meeting at: https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/index.cfm.
XVIII. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as
indicated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAMS accession No./
Document web link/ Federal
Register citation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Rule Documents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Draft Regulatory Analysis....................... ML22019A132.
Draft Environmental Assessment and FONSI........ ML22019A140.
Draft Information Collection Analysis........... ML18039A192.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 12319]]
Draft Regulatory Guidance Documents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1346, ``Emergency ML21347A046.
Planning for Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Reactors''.
Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1347, ML21347A080.
``Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors''.
Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1348, ``Assuring the ML21347A081.
Availability of Funds for Decommissioning
Production or Utilization Facilities''.
Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1349, ``Standard ML21347A138.
Format and Content for Post-Shutdown
Decommissioning Activities Report''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other References
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Termination of Construction Permit CPPR-134,''
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COMSECY-13-0030, ``Staff Evaluation and ML13329A918.
Recommendation for Japan Lessons Learned Tier 3
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Documentation of Evolution of Security ML092990438.
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Draft Regulatory Basis for Public Comment-- ML17047A413.
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Power Reactor Sites,'' dated October 25, 2000.
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31, 1984.
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Periods for Records; Final Rule,'' dated May
27, 1988.
Federal Register notice--Final Rule, ``Revision 53 FR 20603.
of Backfitting Process for Power Reactors,''
dated June 6, 1988.
[[Page 12320]]
Federal Register notice--Final Rule, ``Revision 50 FR 38097.
of Backfitting Process for Power Reactors,''
dated September 20, 1985.
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``Planning Basis for Emergency Responses to
Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents,'' dated
October 23, 1979.
Federal Register notice--Policy Statement, 51 FR 30028.
``Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear
Power Plants; Policy Statement; Correction and
Republication,'' dated August 21, 1986.
Federal Register notice--Preliminary Draft 82 FR 21481.
Regulatory Analysis, ``Regulatory Improvements
for Power Reactors Transitioning to
Decommissioning,'' dated May 9, 2017.
Federal Register notice--Proposed Rule, 60 FR 37374.
``Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors,''
dated July 20, 1995.
Federal Register notice--Proposed Rule, 44 FR 75167.
``Emergency Planning,'' dated December 19, 1979.
Federal Register notice--Proposed Rule, 85 FR 28436.
``Emergency Preparedness for Small Modular
Reactors and Other New Technologies,'' dated
May 12, 2020.
Federal Register notice--Correction to Proposed 85 FR 32308.
Rule, ``Emergency Preparedness for Small
Modular Reactors and Other New Technologies,''
dated May 29, 2020.
Federal Register notice--Regulatory Basis, 82 FR 55954.
``Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors
Transitioning to Decommissioning,'' dated
November 27, 2017.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, https://www.dhs.gov/
``Management of Domestic Incidents'' dated publication/homeland-
February 28, 2003. security-presidential-
directive-5.
IMC 2561, ``Decommissioning Power Reactor ML031270502.
Inspection Program''.
Information Notice 2014-14, ``Potential Safety ML14218A493.
Enhancements to Spent Fuel Pool Storage,''
dated November 14, 2014.
Inspection Procedure (IP) 71801, https://www.nrc.gov/
``Decommissioning Performance and Status Review reading-rm/doc-
at Permanently Shutdown Reactors,'' dated collections/insp-
August 11, 1997. manual/inspection-
procedure/
ip71801.pdf.
Issuance of Amendment No. 142 to Facility ML17283A069.
Operating License No. DPR-3--Yankee Nuclear
Power Station (Rowe) (TAC No. M83024),dated
August 5, 1992.
Issuance of Amendment No. 190 for Facility ML18095A126.
Operating License No. NPF-1 to Possession-Only
License for Trojan Nuclear Plant (TAC No.
M85647), dated May 5, 1993.
Management Directive 8.4, ``Management of ML18093B087.
Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue Finality,
and Information Requests,'' dated September 20,
2019.
Memorandum, ``Cyber Security Requirements for ML16172A284.
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
December 5, 2016.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the ML15344A371.
Department of Homeland Security/Federal
Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Regarding Radiological
Emergency Response, Planning, and Preparedness,
dated December 7, 2015.
NEI 99-01, Revision 6, ``Development of ML12326A805.
Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive
Reactors,'' issued November 2012.
NEI 06-12, Revision 2, ``B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 ML070090060.
Submittal Guideline,'' dated December 2006.
NEI 10-04, Revision 2, ``Identifying Systems and ML12180A081.
Assets Subject to the Cyber Security Rule,''
issued July 2012.
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-07, Rev. 1, 10 ML083440158.
CFR 50.75 Reporting and Recordkeeping for
Decommissioning Planning, dated January 8, 2009.
NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, ``Interim Staff Guidance-- ML113010523.
Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated November 20, 2011.
NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, ``Interim Staff Guidance: ML14106A057.
Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
May 11, 2015.
NUREG/BR-0314, Rev. 4, ``Protecting Our ML15232A263.
Nation,'' dated August 2015.
NUREG/BR-0521, Rev. 1, ``Decommissioning Nuclear ML17177A253.
Power Plants,'' dated June 2017.
NUREG-0396, ``Planning Basis for the Development ML051390356.
of State and Local Government Radiological
Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light
Water Nuclear Power Plants,'' December 1978.
NUREG-0586, Supplement 1, Volumes 1 and 2, ML023470327.
``Generic Environmental Impact Statement on
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities:
Regarding the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power
Reactors''.
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, ``Criteria ML040420012.
for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in
Support of Nuclear Power Plants,'' issued
November 1980.
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 2, ``Criteria ML19347D139.
for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in
Support of Nuclear Power Plants: Final
Report,'' issued December 2019.
NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for Emergency ML051390358.
Response Facilities''.
NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the ML13316B202.
Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear
Power Plants: LWR Edition,'' Section 19.4,
``Strategies and Guidance to Address Loss of
Large Areas of the Plant Due to Explosions and
Fires,'' Revision 0, dated June 2015.
NUREG-0933, ``Resolution of Generic Safety https://www.nrc.gov/
Issues,'' issued December 2011. sr0933/.
NUREG-1353, ``Regulatory Analysis for the ML082330232.
Resolution of Generic Issue 82, `Beyond Design
Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools,' '' issued
April 1989.
NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool ML010430066.
Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants,'' issued February 2001.
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond- ML14255A365.
Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent
Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
Reactor,'' issued September 2014.
Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim Safeguards ML020510637 (letter).
and Security Compensatory Measures,'' dated ML020510635 (order).
February 25, 2002.
Order EA-06-137, ``Order Modifying Licenses,'' ML061600076.
dated June 20, 2006.
[[Page 12321]]
Order EA-12-049, ``Order Modifying Licenses with ML12054A735.
Regard to Requirements for Mitigation
Strategies for Beyond-Design[dash]Basis
External Events,'' dated March 12, 2012.
Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with ML12054A679.
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation'' dated March 12, 2012.
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``National Preparedness'' issued March 30, 2011. presidential-policy-
directive-8-national-
preparedness.
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Amendment ML17283A071.
No. 117 for Facility Operating License No. DPR-
54 to Possession Only License (TAC No. M76825).
RG 1.101, Revision 0, ``Emergency Planning for ML13350A291.
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated November 1975.
RG 1.185, Revision 1, ``Standard Format and ML13140A038.
Content for Post-Shutdown Decommissioning
Activities Report,'' dated June 2013.
RG 1.219, Revision 1, ``Guidance on Making ML16061A104.
Changes to Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power
Reactors,'' dated July 2016.
SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection Required of ML12257A628.
Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993.
SECY-98-253, ``Applicability of Plant-Specific ML992870107.
Backfit Requirements to Plants Undergoing
Decommissioning,'' dated November 4, 1998.
SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for ML003721626.
Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning,'' dated
June 28, 2000.
SECY-01-0100, ``Policy Issues Related to ML011450420.
Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel
Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001.
SECY-04-0176, ``Exemption Requests to Reduce ML040850518.
Liability Insurance Coverage for
Decommissioning Reactors after Transfer of all
Spent Fuel from a Spent Fuel Pool to Dry Cask
Storage,'' dated September 29, 2004.
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Inc., for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements,'' dated October 29, 2014.
SECY-15-0005, ``Recommendation to Sunset to ML14210A554.
Decommissioning Trust Fund Spot-Check
Program,'' dated January 15, 2015.
SECY-15-0014, ``Anticipated Schedule and ML15082A089.
Estimated Resources for a Power Reactor
Decommissioning Rulemaking,'' dated January 30,
2015--Redacted.
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Beyond-Design-Basis Events,'' dated December
15, 2016.
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Findings of the 2019 Decommissioning Funding
Status Reports from Operating and
Decommissioning Power Reactor Licensees,''
dated December 31, 2019.
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Recommendation for Japan Lessons-Learned Tier 3
Issue on Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel,''
dated May 23, 2014.
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Beyond-Design-Basis Events,'' dated January 24,
2019.
SRM-SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection Required ML003760936.
of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power plants
during Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993.
SRM-SECY-99-168, ``Staff Requirements--SECY-99- ML003752190.
168--Improving Decommissioning Regulations for
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated December 21, 1999.
SRM-SECY-00-0145, ``Staff Requirements--SECY-00- ML003754381.
0145--Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear
Power Plant Decommissioning,'' dated September
27, 2000.
SRM-SECY-14-0118, ``Request by Duke Energy ML14364A111.
Florida, Inc., for Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements,'' dated
October 29, 2014.
Summary of Public Meeting May 8-10, 2017, ML17157B211.
Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors
Transitioning to Decommissioning Rulemaking
dated November 15, 2017.
Technical Evaluation for the Endorsement of NEI ML12346A463.
99-01, Revision 6, dated March 28, 2013.
Transmittal of Reports to Inform Decommissioning ML16110A416.
Plant Rulemaking for User Need Request NSIR-
2015-001, dated May 31, 2016.
V.C. Summer, Units 2 and 3--Request for ML17361A088.
Withdrawal of COLs, dated December 27, 2017.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout the development of this rule, the NRC may post documents
related to this rule, including public comments, on the Federal
rulemaking website at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-
2015-0070.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 20
Byproduct material, Criminal penalties, Hazardous waste, Licensed
material, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Occupational safety and health, Packaging and containers,
Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Source material, Special nuclear material, Waste
treatment and disposal.
10 CFR Part 26
Administrative practice and procedure, Alcohol abuse, Alcohol
testing, Appeals, Chemical testing, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Employee
assistance programs, Fitness for duty, Management actions, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Privacy, Protection of information,
Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
10 CFR Part 50
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,
Classified information, Criminal penalties, Education, Emergency
planning, Fire prevention, Fire protection, Incorporation by reference,
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors,
Penalties, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Whistleblowing.
[[Page 12322]]
10 CFR Part 51
Administrative practice and procedure, Environmental impact
statements, Hazardous waste, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
10 CFR Part 52
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Combined license,
Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees, Incorporation by
reference, Inspection, Issue finality, Limited work authorization,
Nuclear power plants and reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment,
Prototype, Reactor siting criteria, Redress of site, Penalties,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Standard design, Standard
design certification.
10 CFR Part 72
Administrative practice and procedure, Hazardous waste, Indians,
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear energy, Penalties, Radiation
protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security
measures, Spent fuel, Whistleblowing.
10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Exports, Hazardous materials transportation,
Imports, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials,
Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
10 CFR Part 140
Criminal penalties, Extraordinary nuclear occurrence, Insurance,
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants
and reactors, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is proposing
to amend 10 CFR parts 20, 26, 50, 51, 52, 72, 73, and 140 as follows:
PART 20--STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION
0
1. The authority citation for part 20 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 53, 63, 65, 81,
103, 104, 161, 170H, 182, 186, 223, 234, 274, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2014,
2073, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2133, 2134, 2201, 2210h, 2232, 2236, 2273,
2282, 2021, 2297f), Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201,
202 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842); Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, sec. 2 (42 U.S.C. 2021b); 44 U.S.C. 3504
note.
Appendix G to Part 20 [Amended]
0
2. In appendix G to part 20, amend paragraph E.1. of section III by:
0
a. Removing the word ``or'' and adding in its place the word ``of'';
and
0
b. Removing the phrase ``20 days'' and adding in its place the phrase,
``45 days''.
PART 26--FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS
0
3. The authority citation for part 26 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 103, 104, 107,
161, 223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2133, 2134, 2137, 2201, 2273,
2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42
U.S.C. 5841, 5842); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
0
4. Amend Sec. 26.3, by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 26.3 Scope.
(a)(1) Each holder of an operating license for a nuclear power
reactor under part 50 of this chapter that receives the license after
March 31, 2008, and holders of a combined license under part 52 of this
chapter after the Commission has made the finding under Sec. 52.103(g)
of this chapter must implement the FFD program before the receipt of
special nuclear material in the form of fuel assemblies.
(2) Each holder of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor
under part 50 of this chapter and each holder of a combined license
under part 52 of this chapter for which the Commission has made the
finding under Sec. 52.103(g) of this chapter must comply with the
requirements of this part, except for subpart K of this part, until the
NRC's docketing of the license holder's certifications required under
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter.
* * * * *
Sec. 26.825 [Amended]
0
5. In Sec. 26.825(b), remove ``26.3''.
PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
0
6. Revise the authority citation for part 50 to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 53, 63, 81,
101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 122, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183,
184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2073, 2093, 2113,
2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2138, 2152, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231,
2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, sec. 306
(42 U.S.C. 10226); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4332); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note; Sec. 109, Pub. L. 96-295, 94
Stat. 783.
0
7. Revise Sec. 50.1 to read as follows:
Sec. 50.1 Basis, purpose, and procedures applicable.
The regulations in this part are promulgated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (68 Stat. 919), and Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974 (88 Stat. 1242), to provide for the licensing of production and
utilization facilities through the termination of the associated 10 CFR
part 50 licenses. This part also gives notice to all persons who
knowingly provide to any licensee, applicant, contractor, or
subcontractor, components, equipment, materials, or other goods or
services, that relate to a licensee's or applicant's activities subject
to this part, that they may be individually subject to NRC enforcement
action for violation of Sec. 50.5.
0
8. In Sec. 50.2, revise the definition for Certified fuel handler and
add a definition for Non-power production or utilization facility in
alphabetical order to read as follows:
Sec. 50.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
Certified fuel handler means, for a nuclear power reactor facility,
either
(1) A non-licensed operator who has qualified in accordance with a
fuel handler training program approved by the Commission; or
(2) A non-licensed operator who meets the following criteria:
(i) Has qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training
program that meets the same requirements as training programs for non-
licensed operators required by Sec. 50.120, and
(ii) Is responsible for decisions on:
(A) Safe conduct of decommissioning activities;
(B) Safe handling and storage of spent fuel; and
(C) Appropriate response to plant emergencies.
* * * * *
Non-power production or utilization facility means a non-power
reactor, testing facility, or other production or utilization facility,
licensed under Sec. 50.21(a), Sec. 50.21(c), or Sec. 50.22, that is
not a nuclear power reactor or fuel reprocessing plant.
* * * * *
Sec. 50.36 [Amended]
0
9. In Sec. 50.36(c)(6), add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter''
after ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''.
0
10. Revise Sec. 50.38 to read as follows:
[[Page 12323]]
Sec. 50.38 Ineligibility of certain applicants.
(a) Any person who is a citizen, national, or agent of a foreign
country, or any corporation, or other entity which the Commission knows
or has reason to believe is owned, controlled, or dominated by an
alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government, shall be
ineligible to apply for and obtain a license.
(b) The prohibition of paragraph (a) of this section does not apply
to a person, corporation, or other entity seeking a license for a
facility that meets the criteria of Sec. 50.82(a)(2)(ii), Sec.
50.82(b)(6), or Sec. 52.110(b)(2) of this chapter.
Sec. 50.44 [Amended]
0
11. In Sec. 50.44(b) introductory text, add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of
this chapter'' after ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''.
Sec. 50.46 [Amended]
0
12. In Sec. 50.46(a)(1)(i), add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter''
after ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''.
0
13. In Sec. 50.47, revise paragraph (b) introductory text and add
paragraph (f) to read as follows:
Sec. 50.47 Emergency plans.
* * * * *
(b) The onsite and, except as provided in paragraphs (d) and (f) of
this section, offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power
reactors must meet the following standards:
* * * * *
(f) The planning standards of paragraph (b) of this section do not
apply to offsite radiological emergency response plans if the
licensee's emergency plan is not required to meet these planning
standards or if the plume exposure pathway EPZ does not extend beyond
the site boundary.
Sec. 50.48 [Amended]
0
14. In Sec. 50.48(f) introductory text, add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of
this chapter'' after ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''.
Sec. 50.49 [Amended]
0
15. In Sec. 50.49(a), remove ``Sec. 52.110(a)(1)'' and add in its
place ``Sec. 52.110(a)''.
Sec. 50.51 [Amended]
0
16. In Sec. 50.51, in paragraph (b) introductory text, remove the
words ``to authorize ownership and possession of the production or
utilization facility,''.
0
17. In Sec. 50.54:
0
a. Amend paragraph (m)(2)(i) by:
0
i. Designating the table;
0
ii. Revising the heading of the newly designated table; and
0
iii. Revising footnote 2 to the table;
0
b. In paragraph (o), remove ``52.110(a)(1)'' and add in its place
``52.110(a)'';
0
c. Redesignate paragraphs (p)(3) and (4) as paragraphs (p)(5) and (6);
0
d. Redesignate paragraphs (p)(1) and (2) as paragraphs (p)(2) and (3)
and revise newly redesignated paragraphs (p)(2) and (3);
0
e. Add new paragraph (p) introductory text and paragraphs (p)(1) and
(4);
0
f. Revise paragraphs (q)(1) introductory text and (q)(1)(iii) and
(q)(2) and (3);
0
g. Remove the words ``after February 21, 2012'' wherever they appear in
paragraphs (q)(4) and (5); and
0
h. Add paragraphs (q)(7) and (8);
0
i. Remove the words ``after April 1, 1981,'' in paragraph (s)(2)(ii);
0
j. In paragraph (s)(3), remove the words ``The NRC'' and add in their
place the words ``If the planning standards for radiological emergency
preparedness apply to offsite radiological emergency response plans,
the NRC'';
0
k. In paragraph (t)(1)(ii), remove the period from the second sentence
and add in its place the word ``or,'';
0
l. Add paragraphs (t)(1)(iii) and (t)(3);
0
m. In paragraph (w) introductory text, remove the words ``under this
part'';
0
n. In paragraphs (w)(4)(ii) and (iii), add the words ``or Sec. 52.110
of this chapter'' after the words ``Sec. 50.82'' wherever they appear;
0
o. Add paragraphs (w)(5) and (6);
0
p. In paragraph (y), add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter'' after
``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''; and
0
q. Revise paragraph (bb).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
* * * * *
(m) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) * * *
Table 1 to paragraph (m)(2)(i)--Minimum Requirements \1\ Per Shift
for On-Site Staffing of Nuclear Power Units by Operators and Senior
Operators Licensed Under 10 CFR part 55
* * * * *
\1\ Temporary deviations from the numbers required by this table
shall be in accordance with criteria established in the unit's
technical specifications.
\2\ For the purpose of this table, a nuclear power unit is
considered to be operating when it is in a mode other than cold
shutdown or refueling as defined by the unit's technical
specifications. A Shift Technical Advisor is not required upon the
NRC's docketing of the license holder's certifications required
under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter.
* * * * *
(p) Security plans--(1) Definitions for the purpose of this
paragraph, (p):
(i) Change means an action that results in modification of,
addition to, or removal from, the licensee's security plans. All
changes are subject to the provisions of this section except where the
applicable regulations establish specific criteria for accomplishing a
particular change.
(ii) Decrease in safeguards effectiveness means a change or series
of changes to an element or component of the security plans referenced
in paragraph (p)(2) of this section that reduces or eliminates the
licensee's ability to perform or maintain the capabilities set forth in
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(i) of this chapter without compensating changes to
other security plan elements or components.
(2) The licensee may not make a change which would decrease the
effectiveness of a physical security plan, or guard training and
qualification plan, or cyber security plan prepared under Sec.
50.34(c) or Sec. 52.79(a) of this chapter, or part 73 of this chapter,
or of the first four categories of information (Background, Generic
Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, Responsibility Matrix) contained
in a licensee safeguards contingency plan prepared under Sec. 50.34(d)
or Sec. 52.79(a) of this chapter, or part 73 of this chapter, as
applicable, without prior approval of the Commission. A licensee
desiring to make such a change shall submit an application for
amendment to the licensee's license under Sec. 50.90.
(3) The licensee may make changes to the security plans referenced
in paragraph (p)(2) of this section, without prior Commission approval
if the changes do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the
plan. The licensee shall maintain records of changes to the plans made
without prior Commission approval for a period of 3 years from the date
of the change, and shall submit, as specified in Sec. 50.4 or Sec.
52.3 of this chapter, a report containing a description of each change
within 2 months after the change is made. The licensee shall include a
summary of the analysis completed to determine that the change does not
decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan.
(4) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency
plan procedures in accordance with appendix C of part 73 of this
chapter for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the
Responsibility Matrix of the safeguards contingency plan. Prior to the
safeguards contingency plan being put into effect, the licensee shall
have:
[[Page 12324]]
(i) All safeguards capabilities specified in the safeguards
contingency plan available and functional;
(ii) Detailed procedures developed according to appendix C to part
73 of this chapter available at the licensee's site; and
(iii) All appropriate personnel trained to respond to safeguards
incidents as outlined in the plan and specified in the detailed
procedures.
* * * * *
(q) Emergency plans--(1) Definitions for the purpose of this
paragraph (q):
* * * * *
(iii) Emergency planning function means a capability or resource
necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency.
* * * * *
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (q)(7) of this section, a
holder of a license under this part, or a combined license under part
52 of this chapter after the Commission makes the finding under Sec.
52.103(g) of this chapter, shall follow and maintain the effectiveness
of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in appendix E to this
part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards
of Sec. 50.47(b).
(3) The licensee may make changes to its emergency plan without NRC
approval only if the licensee performs and retains an analysis
demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the
plan and the plan, as changed, continues to meet the applicable
requirements in appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor
licensees, the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b), or the applicable
requirements of Sec. 50.200 or Sec. 72.32 of this chapter.
* * * * *
(7) Upon the NRC's docketing of the nuclear power reactor
licensee's certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a) of this chapter:
(i) Licensees must follow and maintain the effectiveness of an
emergency plan that meets the requirements of Sec. 50.200(a) or
paragraph (q)(2) of this section.
(ii) If the fuel assembly with the highest burnup from the final
offload that is transferred to the spent fuel pool has a burnup of less
than or equal to 72 gigawatt days per metric ton of heavy metal (GWd/
MTHM) and has zirconium cladding, then after at least 10 months (for a
boiling water reactor) or 16 months (for a pressurized water reactor)
have elapsed since the date of permanent cessation of operations,
licensees must follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency
plan that meets the planning standards of Sec. 50.200(b) and the
requirements in Sec. 50.200(c) or paragraph (q)(7)(i) of this section.
(A) In lieu of the 10- or 16-month spent fuel decay period in
paragraph (q)(7)(ii) of this section, a licensee may submit under Sec.
50.90 a request for NRC approval of an alternative spent fuel decay
period.
(B) If the fuel assembly with the highest burnup transferred to the
spent fuel pool at the time of shutdown exceeds a burnup of 72 GWd/MTHM
or does not have zirconium cladding, then the licensee must submit
under Sec. 50.90 a request for NRC approval of an alternative spent
fuel decay period.
(C) In support of the request submitted in paragraph (q)(7)(ii)(A)
or (B) of this section, the licensee must include an analysis
demonstrating that the alternative spent fuel decay period ensures that
the spent fuel would not heat up to 900 [deg]C in less than 10 hours
under adiabatic heatup conditions.
(iii) When all the spent fuel is in dry cask storage, licensees
must follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that
meets the standards in Sec. 72.32(a)(1) through (16) of this chapter,
or paragraph (q)(7)(ii) of this section.
(iv) Licensees need not comply with the requirements of this
section when all spent fuel has been removed from the site.
(8) The following provisions apply to emergency plan changes to be
implemented after the NRC's docketing of the nuclear power reactor
licensee's certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a) of this chapter:
(i) Initial plan changes made under paragraph (q)(3) of this
section to comply with the requirements of Sec. 50.200 or Sec.
72.32(a) of this chapter as permitted by paragraph (q)(7)(i), (ii), or
(iii) of this section are not reductions in effectiveness of the plan
and do not need to be submitted to the NRC for prior approval. These
plan changes must be submitted to the NRC at least 60 days prior to
implementation, as specified in Sec. 50.4. Subsequent plan changes
must be made under paragraph (q)(3) or (4) of this section, or
licensees may follow the change process under Sec. 72.44(f) of this
chapter if the emergency plan meets the requirements in Sec. 72.32(a)
of this chapter.
(ii) For structures, systems, and components that are no longer
needed to provide support for an emergency planning function as defined
in paragraph (q)(1)(iii) of this section, licensees may make a
determination under paragraph (q)(3) of this section that changes to
the emergency plan related to these structures, systems, and components
are not reductions in effectiveness if the Final Safety Analysis Report
demonstrates that these structures, systems, and components are no
longer required to be in service due to the decommissioning status of
the facility.
(iii) Changes to emergency action levels based on plant conditions
that are not physically achievable or instrumentation that is no longer
in service due to the decommissioning status of the facility, are not
reductions in effectiveness provided that the evaluation under
paragraph (q)(3) of this section demonstrates that these changes do not
reduce the capability of the emergency plan to take timely and
appropriate protective actions.
* * * * *
(t) * * *
(1) * * *
(iii) At intervals not to exceed 24 months after the first required
element review following transition to an emergency plan that meets the
requirements of Sec. 50.200(b).
* * * * *
(3) The review of the emergency preparedness program elements is no
longer required once all fuel is in dry cask storage.
* * * * *
(w) * * *
(5) Each power reactor licensee for a production or utilization
facility of the type described in Sec. 50.21(b) or Sec. 50.22 shall
have and maintain financial protection in an amount of at least
$50,000,000 for each reactor station site:
(i) For which the NRC has docketed the certifications required
under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter; and
(ii) For which at least 10 months (for a boiling water reactor) or
16 months (for a pressurized water reactor) have elapsed since the date
of permanent cessation of operations if the fuel meets the criteria of
Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii), or for which an NRC-approved alternative to the
10- or 16-month spent fuel decay period, submitted under Sec.
50.54(q)(7)(ii)(A) or (B), has elapsed.
(6) The licensee shall promptly notify the Commission of any
material change in the insurance or other financial security
information reported to the Commission under paragraph (w)(3) of this
section.
* * * * *
(bb) Irradiated Fuel Management Plan (1) Prior to or within 2 years
following permanent cessation of operations, the licensee must submit
an irradiated fuel management plan (IFMP) to the NRC as
[[Page 12325]]
an application for an amendment to its license. Licensees may not start
to decommission structures, systems, and components needed for moving,
unloading, and shipping the irradiated fuel until after the NRC
approves the IFMP.
(2) The IFMP must contain a discussion of the licensee's planned
actions for managing irradiated fuel and how those actions will be
consistent with NRC requirements for licensed possession of irradiated
fuel until title to, and possession of, the irradiated fuel is
transferred to the Secretary of Energy.
(3) If any planned actions for managing irradiated fuel would
require exemptions from applicable regulations or amendments to the
licensee's license issued under this part or part 52 or 72 of this
chapter or the certificate of compliance issued under part 72 of this
chapter being used by the licensee, then the licensee shall identify
them in the IFMP and state that these requests have been or will be
made to the NRC.
(4) The IFMP must contain the projected cost of managing irradiated
fuel and discuss how the licensee will provide funding for the
management of the irradiated fuel following permanent cessation of
operations until title to, and possession of, the irradiated fuel is
transferred to the Secretary of Energy.
(5) Licensees shall submit to the NRC any changes to the IFMP as an
application for an amendment to its license.
(6) The licensee shall retain a copy of the IFMP as a record until
termination of the operating license issued under this part or combined
license issued under part 52 of this chapter.
* * * * *
0
18. In Sec. 50.59:
0
a. In paragraph (b), remove ``Sec. 50.110'' and add in its place
``Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter''; and
0
b. Revise paragraph (d)(3) to read as follows:
Sec. 50.59 Changes, tests and experiments.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(3) Except as specified in Sec. 50.71(c)(2), the records of
changes in the facility must be maintained until the termination of an
operating license issued under this part, a combined license issued
under part 52 of this chapter, or a renewed license issued under part
54 of this chapter. Records of changes in procedures and records of
tests and experiments must be maintained for a period of 5 years.
Sec. 50.60 [Amended]
0
19. In Sec. 50.60(a), add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter'' after
``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''.
Sec. 50.61 [Amended]
0
20. In Sec. 50.61(b)(1), add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter''
after ``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''.
Sec. 50.62 [Amended]
0
21. In Sec. 50.62(a), add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter'' after
``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''.
Sec. 50.65 [Amended]
0
22. In Sec. 50.65(a)(1), remove ``52.110(a)(1)'' and add in its place
``52.110(a)''.
0
23. In Sec. 50.71, revise paragraphs (c) and (e)(4) to read as
follows:
Sec. 50.71 Maintenance of records, making of reports.
* * * * *
(c)(1) Records that are required by the regulations in this part or
part 52 of this chapter, by license condition, or by technical
specifications must be retained for the period specified by the
appropriate regulation, license condition, or technical specification.
If a retention period is not otherwise specified, these records must be
retained until the Commission terminates the facility license, except
as specified in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, or, in the case of an
early site permit, until the permit expires.
(2) Licensees for which the NRC has docketed the certifications
required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter are
not required to retain records associated with structures, systems, and
components that have been permanently removed from service under the
NRC license using an NRC-approved change process. Licensees shall
continue to retain records as specified under Sec. 50.75(g).
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(4) Subsequent revisions must be filed annually or 6 months after
each refueling outage provided the interval between successive updates
does not exceed 24 months. The revisions must reflect all changes up to
a maximum of 6 months prior to the date of filling. For nuclear power
reactor facilities that have submitted the certifications required by
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a), subsequent revisions must be
filed every 24 months.
* * * * *
0
24. In Sec. 50.75:
0
a. Revise the first sentence in paragraph (a);
0
b. Revise paragraphs (b)(1), (3), and (4) and add paragraph (b)(5);
0
c. Revise paragraph (e)(1) introductory text;
0
d. In paragraph (e)(1)(i):
0
i. Remove the phrase ``formulas in Sec. 50.75(c)'' and add in its
place the phrase ``table of minimum amounts in paragraph (c)'';
0
ii. Remove the phrase ``site-specific estimate'' wherever it appears
and add in its place the phrase ``site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate'';
0
e. In paragraph (e)(1)(ii) introductory text, remove the phrase ``site-
specific estimate'' wherever it appears and add in its place the phrase
``site-specific decommissioning cost estimate'';
0
f. In paragraph (e)(1)(ii)(B), add ``or Sec. 52.110 of this chapter''
after ``50.82 of this part'';
0
g. In paragraph (e)(1)(v), add ``or Sec. 52.110 of this chapter''
after ``or Sec. 50.82'';
0
h. Amend paragraph (f) by:
0
i. Revising paragraph (f)(1);
0
ii. Removing paragraph (f)(2);
0
iii. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(3) through (5) as (f)(2) through (4);
and
0
iv. Revising newly redesignated paragraph (f)(2) and paragraph (f)(3)
introductory text;
0
i. In paragraphs (h)(1)(iii) and (iv), remove the words ``Director,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or Director, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, as applicable,'' wherever they appear
in the first sentence of each paragraph and add in their place the
words, ``Document Control Desk as specified in Sec. 50.4''.
0
j. In paragraph (h)(1)(iv), add ``or Sec. 52.110(h) of this chapter''
after ``Sec. 50.82(a)(8)'' wherever it appears.
0
k. In paragraph (h)(2), remove the words ``given the Director, Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or Director, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, as applicable,'' wherever they appear and add in
their place, the words, ``given to the Document Control Desk as
specified in Sec. 50.4''.
0
l. In paragraph (h)(2), add ``or Sec. 52.110(h) of this chapter''
after ``Sec. 50.82(a)(8)'' wherever it appears.
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 50.75 Reporting and recordkeeping for decommissioning planning.
(a) This section establishes requirements for indicating to NRC how
a licensee will provide reasonable assurance that funds will be
available to decommission the facility, as defined in Sec. 50.2. * * *
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) For an applicant for or holder of an operating license under
this part, the report must contain a certification that reasonable
assurance that funds will be available to decommission will be (for a
license applicant), or has been (for a license holder), provided in an
amount which may be more, but not less, than
[[Page 12326]]
the amount stated in the table of minimum amounts in paragraph (c)(1)
of this section, adjusted using a rate at least equal to that stated in
paragraph (c)(2) of this section. For an applicant for a combined
license under subpart C of part 52 of this chapter, the report must
contain a certification that reasonable assurance of funds to
decommission will be provided no later than 30 days after the
Commission publishes notice in the Federal Register under Sec.
52.103(a) of this chapter in an amount which may be more, but not less,
than the amount stated in the table of minimum amounts in paragraph
(c)(1) of this section, adjusted using a rate at least equal to that
stated in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
* * * * *
(3) The amount must be covered by one or more of the methods
described in paragraph (e) of this section.
(4) The amount stated in the applicant's or licensee's
certification may be based on a site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate for decommissioning the facility. The site-specific
decommissioning cost estimate may be more, but not less, than the
amount stated in the table of minimum amounts in paragraph (c)(1) of
this section, adjusted using a rate at least equal to that stated in
paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
(5) As part of the certification, a copy of the financial
instrument obtained to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (e) of
this section must be submitted to NRC; provided, however, that an
applicant for or holder of a combined license need not obtain such
financial instrument or submit a copy to the Commission except as
provided in paragraph (e)(3) of this section.
* * * * *
(e)(1) Reasonable assurance of funds to decommission is to be
provided by the following methods:
* * * * *
(f)(1) Each power reactor licensee shall report, on a calendar-year
basis, to the NRC by March 31, 2023, and at least once every 3 years
thereafter on the status of its decommissioning funding provided by the
financial assurance methods described in paragraph (e)(1) of this
section for each reactor or part of a reactor that it owns. However,
each holder of a combined license under part 52 of this chapter need
not begin reporting until the date that the Commission has made the
finding under Sec. 52.103(g) of this chapter. The information in this
report must include, at a minimum, the amount of decommissioning funds
estimated to be required pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section; the amount of decommissioning funds accumulated to the end of
the calendar year preceding the date of the report; a schedule of the
annual amounts remaining to be collected; the assumptions used
regarding rates of escalation in decommissioning costs, rates of
earnings on decommissioning funds, and rates of other factors used in
funding projections; any contracts upon which the licensee is relying
pursuant to paragraph (e)(1)(v) of this section; any modifications
occurring to a licensee's current method of providing financial
assurance since the last submitted report; and any material changes to
trust agreements. If any of the preceding items is not applicable, the
licensee should so state in its report. If the projected balance of any
decommissioning funds does not cover the estimated cost of
decommissioning, the licensee must include additional financial
assurance to cover the shortfall by the time the next report is due.
Once a licensee has determined that it is within 5 years of permanent
cessation of operations, or if it is involved in a merger or an
acquisition, it shall submit this report annually. Once the plant has
permanently ceased operations, the reporting requirements of Sec.
50.82(a)(8)(v) (for 10 CFR part 50 licensees) or Sec. 52.110(h)(5) of
this chapter (for 10 CFR part 52 licensees) shall apply.
(2) Each power reactor licensee shall at or about 5 years prior to
the projected end of operations submit a preliminary site-specific
decommissioning cost estimate which includes an up-to-date assessment
of the major factors that could affect the cost to decommission.
(3) Each non-power reactor licensee shall at or about 2 years prior
to the projected end of operations submit a preliminary decommissioning
plan containing a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate and an
up-to-date assessment of the major factors that could affect planning
for decommissioning. Factors to be considered in submitting this
preliminary decommissioning plan information include--
* * * * *
0
25. In Sec. 50.82:
0
a. Revise paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6)(ii), (a)(8)(i)(A),
(a)(8)(ii), (a)(8)(v) introductory text and (a)(8)(vii) introductory
text;
0
b. Revise paragraphs (a)(9) introductory text and (a)(9)(ii)(F);
0
c. Revise paragraph (b) introductory text; and
0
d. Redesignate paragraph (b)(6) as (b)(8) and add new paragraphs (b)(6)
and (7).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 50.82 Termination of license.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(2)(i) Upon the NRC's docketing of the licensee's certifications
required under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, or when a final
legally effective order to permanently cease operations has come into
effect, the 10 CFR part 50 license no longer authorizes operation of
the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor
vessel.
(ii) The facility licensed under this part is no longer a
utilization facility once the licensee meets the criteria of paragraph
(a)(2)(i) of this section and modifies the facility to be incapable of
making use of special nuclear material without significant facility
alterations necessary to restore the capability to make use of special
nuclear material. The NRC maintains the authority to regulate the 10
CFR part 50 license with respect to the possession of special nuclear
material, source material, and byproduct material under sections 53,
63, 81, and 161 of the Act, as applicable. Until the termination of the
10 CFR part 50 license under paragraph (a)(11) of this section, the
regulations of this chapter applicable to a utilization facility
continue to apply to the holder of the license unless the regulations
explicitly state otherwise.
* * * * *
(4)(i) Prior to or within 2 years following permanent cessation of
operations, the licensee shall submit a post-shutdown decommissioning
activities report (PSDAR) to the NRC, and a copy to the affected
State(s). The PSDAR must contain a description of the planned
decommissioning activities along with a schedule for their
accomplishment, a discussion whether the environmental impacts
associated with site-specific decommissioning activities will be
bounded by appropriate federally issued environmental review documents,
a description of any decommissioning activities whose environmental
impacts will not be so bounded and will be evaluated prior to the
performance of the activities, and a site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate, including the projected cost of managing irradiated fuel.
(ii) The NRC shall publish a notice in the Federal Register
acknowledging the receipt of the PSDAR and the availability for public
comment of the PSDAR. The NRC shall also schedule a public meeting in
the vicinity of the licensee's facility upon receipt of the PSDAR. The
NRC shall include a notice
[[Page 12327]]
in a forum, such as local newspapers, that is readily accessible to
individuals in the vicinity of the site, and in the Federal Register
notice required by this paragraph, announcing the date, time and
location of the meeting, along with a brief description of the purpose
of the meeting.
* * * * *
(6) * * *
(ii) Result in significant environmental impacts not bounded by
appropriate federally issued environmental review documents; or
* * * * *
(8) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) The withdrawals are for expenses for activities consistent with
the definition of decommission in Sec. 50.2;
* * * * *
(ii) Initially, 3 percent of the generic amount specified in Sec.
50.75(c) may be used for decommissioning planning. For licensees that
have submitted the certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) and
commencing 90 days after the NRC has received the PSDAR, an additional
20 percent may be used. A site-specific decommissioning cost estimate
must be submitted to the NRC prior to the licensee using any funding in
excess of these amounts.
* * * * *
(v) After submitting its site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate required by paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section, and until the
licensee has completed its final radiation survey and demonstrated that
residual radioactivity has been reduced to a level that permits
termination of its license, the licensee must annually submit to the
NRC, by March 31, a financial assurance status report. The report may
combine the reporting requirements of Sec. 72.30 of this chapter and
Sec. 50.82(a)(8)(vii). The report must include the following
information, current through the end of the previous calendar year:
* * * * *
(vii) After submitting its site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate required by paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section, if spent fuel
is on site, the licensee must annually submit to the NRC, by March 31,
a report on the status of its funding for managing irradiated fuel. The
report must include the following information, current through the end
of the previous calendar year:
* * * * *
(9) All power reactor licensees that have loaded fuel into the
reactor must submit an application for termination of license. The
application for termination of license must be accompanied or preceded
by a license termination plan to be submitted for NRC approval.
* * * * *
(ii) * * *
(F) An updated site-specific estimate of remaining decommissioning
costs and identification of sources of funds for license termination,
spent fuel management, and ISFSI decommissioning, as applicable;
* * * * *
(b) For non-power production or utilization facilities and fuel
reprocessing plants--
* * * * *
(6) The facility licensed under this part is no longer a production
or utilization facility once the following criteria are met:
(i) The NRC removes the licensee's authority to operate the
facility through a license amendment; and
(ii) The licensee modifies the facility to be incapable of the
production of special nuclear material, separation of the isotopes of
plutonium, processing of irradiated materials containing special
nuclear material, or making use of special nuclear material, without
significant facility alterations necessary to restore the capability to
produce special nuclear material, separate the isotopes of plutonium,
process irradiated materials containing special nuclear material, or
make use of special nuclear material.
(7) For a facility licensed under this part that is no longer a
production or utilization facility under paragraph (b)(6) of this
section, the NRC maintains the authority to regulate the 10 CFR part 50
license with respect to the possession of special nuclear material,
source material, and byproduct material under sections 53, 63, 81, and
161 of the Act, as applicable. Until the termination of the 10 CFR part
50 license under paragraph (b)(8) of this section, the regulations of
this chapter applicable to a non-power production or utilization
facility or fuel reprocessing plant continue to apply to the holder of
the license unless the regulations explicitly state otherwise.
* * * * *
0
26. Revise Sec. 50.109 to read as follows:
Sec. 50.109 Backfitting.
(a) Backfitting for nuclear power reactor licensees prior to
decommissioning. (1)(i) Definition. Backfitting is defined as the
modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or
design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license
for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design,
construct or operate a facility; any of which may result from a new or
amended provision in the Commission's regulations or the imposition of
a regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission's regulations
that is either new or different from a previously applicable staff
position after:
(A) The date of issuance of the construction permit for the
facility for facilities having construction permits issued after
October 21, 1985;
(B) Six (6) months before the date of docketing of the operating
license application for the facility for facilities having construction
permits issued before October 21, 1985;
(C) The date of issuance of the operating license for the facility
for facilities having operating licenses;
(D) The date of issuance of the design approval under subpart E of
part 52 of this chapter;
(E) The date of issuance of a manufacturing license under subpart F
of part 52 of this chapter;
(F) The date of issuance of the first construction permit issued
for a duplicate design under appendix N to this part; or
(G) The date of issuance of a combined license under subpart C of
part 52 of this chapter, provided that if the combined license
references an early site permit, the provisions in Sec. 52.39 of this
chapter apply with respect to the site characteristics, design
parameters, and terms and conditions specified in the early site
permit. If the combined license references a standard design
certification rule under subpart B of 10 CFR part 52, the provisions in
Sec. 52.63 of this chapter apply with respect to the design matters
resolved in the standard design certification rule, provided however,
that if any specific backfitting limitations are included in a
referenced design certification rule, those limitations shall govern.
If the combined license references a standard design approval under
subpart E of 10 CFR part 52, the provisions in Sec. 52.145 of this
chapter apply with respect to the design matters resolved in the
standard design approval. If the combined license uses a reactor
manufactured under a manufacturing license under subpart F of 10 CFR
part 52, the provisions of Sec. 52.171 of this chapter apply with
respect to matters resolved in the manufacturing license proceeding.
(ii) Proposed backfitting. Except as provided in paragraph
(a)(1)(iv) of this section, the Commission shall require a systematic
and documented analysis pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section
for backfits which it seeks to impose.
(iii) Backfit analysis. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(iv)
of this
[[Page 12328]]
section, the Commission shall require the backfitting of a facility
only when it determines, based on the analysis described in paragraph
(a)(2) of this section, that there is a substantial increase in the
overall protection of the public health and safety or the common
defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct
and indirect costs of implementation for that facility are justified in
view of this increased protection.
(iv) Exceptions. The provisions of paragraphs (a)(1)(ii) and (iii)
of this section are inapplicable and, therefore, backfit analysis is
not required and the standards in paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section
do not apply where the Commission or staff, as appropriate, finds and
declares, with appropriated documented evaluation for its finding,
either:
(A) That a modification is necessary to bring a facility into
compliance with a license or the rules or orders of the Commission, or
into conformance with written commitments by the licensee; or
(B) That regulatory action is necessary to ensure that the facility
provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the public and
is in accord with the common defense and security; or
(C) That the regulatory action involves defining or redefining what
level of protection to the public health and safety or common defense
and security should be regarded as adequate.
(v) Mandatory backfitting. The Commission shall always require the
backfitting of a facility if it determines that such regulatory action
is necessary to ensure that the facility provides adequate protection
to the health and safety of the public and is in accord with the common
defense and security.
(vi) Documented evaluation. The documented evaluation required by
paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section shall include a statement of the
objectives of and reasons for the modification and the basis for
invoking the exception. If immediately effective regulatory action is
required, then the documented evaluation may follow rather than precede
the regulatory action. The documented evaluation required by paragraph
(a)(1)(iv)(A) of this section must include a consideration of the costs
of imposing the modification.
(vii) Implementation. If there are two or more ways to achieve
compliance with a license or the rules or orders of the Commission, or
with written licensee commitments, or there are two or more ways to
reach a level of protection which is adequate, then ordinarily the
applicant or licensee is free to choose the way which best suits its
purposes. However, should it be necessary or appropriate for the
Commission to prescribe a specific way to comply with its requirements
or to achieve adequate protection, then cost may be a factor in
selecting the way, provided that the objective of compliance or
adequate protection is met.
(2) Backfit analysis factors. In reaching the determination
required by paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section, the Commission will
consider how the backfit should be scheduled in light of other ongoing
regulatory activities at the facility and, in addition, will consider
information available concerning any of the following factors as may be
appropriate and any other information relevant and material to the
proposed backfit:
(i) Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed backfit
is designed to achieve;
(ii) General description of the activity that would be required by
the licensee or applicant in order to complete the backfit;
(iii) Potential change in the risk to the public from the
accidental off-site release of radioactive material;
(iv) Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility
employees;
(v) Installation and continuing costs associated with the backfit,
including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction
delay;
(vi) The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational
complexity, including the relationship to proposed and existing
regulatory requirements;
(vii) The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the
proposed backfit and the availability of such resources;
(viii) The potential impact of differences in facility type, design
or age on the relevancy and practicality of the proposed backfit;
(ix) Whether the proposed backfit is interim or final and, if
interim, the justification for imposing the proposed backfit on an
interim basis.
(3) Impact on licensing actions. No licensing action will be
withheld during the pendency of backfit analyses required by the
Commission's rules.
(b) Backfitting for decommissioning nuclear power reactor
licensees.
(1) Definition. Backfitting is defined as the modification of or
addition to systems, structures, or components in use after permanent
cessation of operations and certification of permanent removal of fuel
from the reactor vessel has been docketed as required under Sec.
50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter, or the design of the
licensee's facility, or the procedures or organization required to
decommission the facility, any of which may result from a new or
amended provision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a
regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is
either new or different from a previously applicable staff position,
after the date of issuance of the operating license issued under this
part or combined license issued under subpart C of part 52 of this
chapter.
(2) Proposed backfits. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(4) of
this section, the Commission shall require a systematic and documented
analysis pursuant to paragraph (b)(8) of this section for backfits that
it seeks to impose.
(3) Backfit analysis. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(4) of
this section, the Commission shall require the backfitting of a
facility only when it determines, based on the analysis described in
paragraph (b)(8) of this section, that there is a substantial increase
in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common
defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct
and indirect costs of implementation for that facility are justified in
view of this increased protection.
(4) Exceptions. The provisions of paragraphs (b)(2) and (3) of this
section are inapplicable and, therefore, backfit analysis is not
required and the standards in paragraph (b)(3) of this section do not
apply where the Commission or staff, as appropriate, finds and
declares, with appropriated documented evaluation for its finding,
either:
(i) That a modification is necessary to bring a facility into
compliance with a license or the rules or orders of the Commission, or
into conformance with written commitments by the licensee;
(ii) That regulatory action is necessary to ensure that the
facility provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the
public and is in accord with the common defense and security; or
(iii) That the regulatory action involves defining or redefining
what level of protection to the public health and safety or common
defense and security should be regarded as adequate.
(5) Mandatory backfitting. The Commission shall always require the
backfitting of a facility if it determines that such regulatory action
is necessary to ensure that the facility provides adequate protection
to the health and safety of the public and is in accord with the common
defense and security.
[[Page 12329]]
(6) Documented evaluation. The documented evaluation required by
paragraph (b)(4) of this section shall include a statement of the
objectives of and reasons for the modification and the basis for
invoking the exception. If immediately effective regulatory action is
required, then the documented evaluation may follow rather than precede
the regulatory action. The documented evaluation required by paragraph
(b)(4)(i) of this section must include a consideration of the costs of
imposing the modification.
(7) Implementation. If there are two or more ways to achieve
compliance with a license or the rules or orders of the Commission, or
with written licensee commitments, or there are two or more ways to
reach a level of protection that is adequate, then ordinarily the
licensee is free to choose the way that best suits its purposes.
However, should it be necessary or appropriate for the Commission to
prescribe a specific way to comply with its requirements or to achieve
adequate protection, then cost may be a factor in selecting the way,
provided that the objective of compliance or adequate protection is
met.
(8) Backfit analysis factors. In reaching the determination
required by paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the Commission will
consider how the backfit should be scheduled in light of other ongoing
regulatory activities at the facility and, in addition, will consider
information available concerning any of the following factors as may be
appropriate and any other information relevant and material to the
proposed backfit:
(i) Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed backfit
is designed to achieve;
(ii) General description of the activity that would be required by
the licensee in order to complete the backfit;
(iii) Potential change in the risk to the public from the
accidental off-site release of radioactive material;
(iv) Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility
employees;
(v) Installation and continuing costs associated with the backfit,
including the cost of decommissioning delay;
(vi) The potential safety impact of changes in major
decommissioning activities, including the relationship to proposed and
existing regulatory requirements;
(vii) The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the
proposed backfit and the availability of such resources;
(viii) The potential impact of differences in facility type and the
percentage of decommissioning completed on the relevancy and
practicality of the proposed backfit; and
(ix) Whether the proposed backfit is interim or final and, if
interim, the justification for imposing the proposed backfit on an
interim basis.
(9) Impact on licensing actions. No licensing action will be
withheld during the pendency of backfit analyses required by the
Commission's rules.
(c) Responsibility for implementation. The Executive Director for
Operations shall be responsible for implementation of this section, and
all analyses required by this section shall be approved by the
Executive Director for Operations or his designee.
0
27. In Sec. 50.155, add paragraphs (h)(6), (7), and (8) to read as
follows:
Sec. 50.155 Mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
* * * * *
(h) * * *
(6) On [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], Order EA-06-137, ``Order
Modifying Licenses,'' is rescinded for each licensee that was issued
Order EA-06-137.
(7) On [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], the Mitigation
Strategies License Condition is deemed removed from the power reactor
license of each licensee subject to this section.
(8) On [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], the license condition
associated with Order EA-06-137 is deemed removed from the power
reactor license of each applicable licensee subject to this section.
* * * * *
0
28. Add Sec. 50.200 to read as follows:
Sec. 50.200 Power reactor decommissioning emergency plans.
(a) Post-shutdown emergency plans (PSEP). If the licensee elects in
Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(i) to comply with this section, then the licensee's
onsite emergency response plans must meet the planning standards of
Sec. 50.47(b) and the requirements in appendix E to this part. For a
PSEP, emergency response organization (ERO) staffing required by Sec.
50.47(b)(2) and appendix E to this part may be commensurate with a
reduced spectrum of credible accidents for a permanently shutdown and
defueled power reactor facility.
(b) Permanently defueled emergency plans (PDEP). If the licensee
elects in Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii) to comply with this section, then the
licensee's onsite emergency response plans must meet the requirements
in paragraph (c) of this section and the following planning standards:
(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear
facility licensee and by State and local organizations have been
assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting
organizations have been specifically established, and each principal
response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial
response on a continuous basis.
(2) On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency
response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide
initial facility accident response in key functional areas is
maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities
is available, and the interfaces among various onsite response
activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
(3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance
resources have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting
the planned response have been identified.
(4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme,
the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is
in use by the nuclear facility licensee.
(5) Procedures have been established for notification, by the
licensee, of State and local response organizations and for
notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content
of initial and followup messages to response organizations has been
established.
(6) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal
response organizations to emergency personnel.
(7) The principal points of contact with the news media for
dissemination of information during an emergency are established in
advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to
the public are established.
(8) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the
emergency response are provided and maintained.
(9) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and
monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency
condition are in use.
(10) A range of protective actions has been developed for emergency
workers and the public.
(11) Means for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency
are established for emergency workers.
(12) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated
injured individuals.
(13) General plans for recovery and reentry are developed.
(14) Periodic exercises will be conducted to evaluate major
portions of emergency response capabilities,
[[Page 12330]]
periodic drills will be conducted to develop and maintain key skills,
and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills will be
corrected.
(15) Radiological emergency response training is provided to those
who may be called on to assist in an emergency.
(16) Responsibilities for plan development and review and for
distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are
properly trained.
(c) Content of emergency plans. (1) Emergency plans must contain,
but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate
compliance with the elements set forth in this paragraph, i.e.,
organization for coping with radiological emergencies, assessment
actions, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures,
emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency
preparedness, and recovery.
(i) Organization. (A) The organization for coping with radiological
emergencies must be described, including definition of authorities,
responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's
emergency organization and the means for notification of such
individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following
must be included:
(1) A description of the normal plant organization.
(2) A description of the onsite ERO with a detailed discussion of:
(i) Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the individual(s)
who will take charge during an emergency;
(ii) Plant staff emergency assignments;
(iii) Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite
emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of
information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and
implementing offsite emergency measures.
(3) Identification, by position and function to be performed, of
persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for
making dose projections, and a description of how these projections
will be made and the results transmitted to State and local
authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities.
(4) A description of the local offsite services to be provided in
support of the licensee's emergency organization.
(5) Identification of assistance expected from appropriate State,
local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with
emergencies, including an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or
its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy
equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an
end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns,
explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver
destructive force.
(B) [Reserved]
(ii) Assessment actions. (A) The means to be used for determining
the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the
release of radioactive materials must be described, including emergency
action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need
for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the
Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels
that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective
measures should be considered within the site boundary to protect
health and safety. The emergency action levels must be based on in-
plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite monitoring.
Emergency action levels must be reviewed with the State and local
governmental authorities on an annual basis.
(B) A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action level
scheme must submit an application for an amendment to its license and
receive NRC approval before implementing the change. Licensees must
follow the change process in Sec. 50.54(q) for all other emergency
action level changes.
(iii) Activation of emergency organization. (A) The entire spectrum
of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating of
progressively larger segments of the total emergency organization must
be described. The communication steps to be taken to alert or activate
emergency personnel under each class of emergency must be described.
Emergency action levels, based not only on onsite radiation monitoring
information but also on readings from a number of sensors that indicate
a potential emergency for notification of offsite agencies, must be
described. The existence, but not the details, of a message
authentication scheme must be noted for such agencies. The emergency
classes defined must include:
(1) Notification of unusual events; and
(2) Alert.
(B) Licensees must establish and maintain the capability to assess,
classify, and declare an emergency condition as soon as possible and
within 60 minutes after the availability of indications to plant
operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and must
promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following
identification of the appropriate emergency classification level.
Licensees must not construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt
to restore plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due
to an emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees must not
construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response
actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public health
and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not deny the
State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures
necessary to protect the public health and safety.
(iv) Notification procedures. (A) Administrative and physical means
for notifying local, State, and Federal officials and agencies must be
described. This description must include identification of the State
and local government agencies.
(B) A licensee must have the capability to notify responsible State
and local governmental agencies as soon as possible and within 60
minutes after declaring an emergency.
(v) Emergency facilities and equipment. Adequate provisions must be
made and described for emergency facilities and equipment, including:
(A) Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;
(B) Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for continuously
assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the
environment;
(C) Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of
onsite individuals;
(D) Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate
emergency first aid treatment;
(E) Arrangements for medical service providers qualified to handle
radiological emergencies onsite;
(F) Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured
individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment
facilities outside the site boundary;
(G) Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support of
licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside the
site boundary;
(H) A licensee facility from which effective direction can be given
and effective control can be exercised during an emergency;
(I) At least one onsite and one offsite communications system; each
system must have a backup power source. All communication plans must
have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and alternates for
those in charge
[[Page 12331]]
at both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup
means of communication. Where consistent with the function of the
governmental agency, these arrangements will include:
(1) Provision for communications with contiguous State and local
governments. Such communications must be tested monthly.
(2) Provision for communications with Federal emergency response
organizations. Such communications systems must be tested annually.
(3) Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC
Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center
from the facility. Such communications must be tested monthly.
(vi) Training. (A) The training program must provide for:
(1) The training of employees and exercising, by periodic drills,
of emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee are
familiar with their specific emergency response duties, and
(2) The participation in the training and drills by other persons
whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological
emergency. The plan must include a description of specialized initial
training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the
following categories of emergency personnel:
(i) Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency
organization;
(ii) Personnel responsible for accident assessment;
(iii) Radiological monitoring teams;
(iv) Fire control teams (fire brigades);
(v) Repair and damage control teams;
(vi) First aid and rescue teams;
(vii) Medical support personnel; and
(viii) Security personnel.
(3) In addition, a radiological orientation training program must
be made available to local services personnel, such as local emergency
services and local law enforcement personnel.
(B) The plan must describe provisions for the conduct of emergency
preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises must test the adequacy of
timing and content of implementing procedures and methods, test
emergency equipment and communications networks, and ensure that
emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Use of site-specific simulators or computers is acceptable
for any exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Within two years of the last exercise of the onsite emergency
plan performed under section IV.F.2.b of appendix E to this part, each
licensee must conduct an exercise of its onsite emergency plan.
(2) Each licensee at each site must conduct a subsequent exercise
of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. In addition, the licensee
must take actions necessary to ensure that adequate emergency response
capabilities are maintained during the interval between biennial
exercises by conducting drills, including at least one drill involving
a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the
licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal
functional areas of emergency response include activities such as
management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment,
event classification, notification of offsite authorities, assessment
of the onsite impact of radiological releases, system repair, and
mitigative action implementation. During these drills, activation of
all of the licensee's emergency response facilities is not necessary,
licensees have the opportunity to consider accident management
strategies, supervised instruction is permitted, operating staff in all
participating facilities have the opportunity to resolve problems
(success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills
may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives.
(3) Each licensee shall enable any State or local government to
participate in the licensee's drills and exercises when requested by
such State or local government.
(4) Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is
not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that NRC
cannot:
(i) Find reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency; or
(ii) Determine that the ERO has maintained key skills specific to
emergency response.
(5) All exercises, drills, and training that provide performance
opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills must
provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak or deficient
areas that need correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are
identified in a critique of exercises, drills, or training must be
corrected.
(6) Each licensee shall use drill and exercise scenarios that
provide reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not
result from preconditioning of participants. Exercise and drill
scenarios as appropriate must emphasize coordination among onsite and
offsite response organizations.
(vii) Maintaining emergency preparedness. (A) Provisions to be
employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its implementing
procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are maintained up to
date must be described.
(B) [Reserved]
(viii) Recovery. (A) Criteria to be used to determine when,
following an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate
must be described.
(B) [Reserved]
(2) [Reserved]
* * * * *
0
29. Amend appendix E to part 50 by:
0
a. Removing paragraph I.6;
0
b. In paragraph IV.4, removing the words ``of the later of the date''
and ``or December 23, 2011,'';
0
c. Adding paragraph IV.8;
0
d. In paragraph IV.A.7, removing the words, ``By June 23, 2014,
identification'' and adding in their place the word,
``Identification'';
0
e. In paragraph IV.A.9, removing the words, ``By December 24, 2012,
for'' and adding in their place the word, ``For'';
0
f. In paragraph IV.B.1, removing the words, ``By June 20, 2012, for''
and adding in their place the word, ``For'';
0
g. In paragraph IV.C.2, removing the words, ``By June 20, 2012,
nuclear'' and adding in their place the word, ``Nuclear'';
0
h. In paragraph IV.E.8.c introductory text, removing the words, ``By
June 20, 2012, for'' and adding in their place the word, ``For'';
0
i. In paragraph IV.E.8.d, removing the last sentence;
0
j. In paragraph IV.F.2.d removing the words ``and should fully
participate in one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015'';
0
k. Removing and reserving paragraph IV.F.2.j(v);
0
l. Adding paragraph IV.F.2.k;
0
m. In paragraph IV.I, removing the words, ``By June 20, 2012, for'' and
adding in their place the word, ``For'';
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Appendix E to Part 50--Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities
* * * * *
IV. * * *
8. A nuclear power reactor licensee is not subject to the
requirements of paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this section once the NRC
dockets the licensee's certifications required under Sec.
50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter.
* * * * *
F. * * *
2. * * *
[[Page 12332]]
k. For each nuclear reactor for which the NRC has docketed the
certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a)
of this chapter, the nuclear reactor's licensee must follow the
biennial exercise requirements of paragraph 2 of this section.
* * * * *
Appendix I to Part 50 [Amended]
0
30. In section IV.C, add ``or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter'' after
``Sec. 50.82(a)(1)''.
PART 51--ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATIONS FOR DOMESTIC
LICENSING AND RELATED REGULATORY FUNCTIONS
0
31. The authority citation for part 51 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 161, 193 (42 U.S.C.
2201, 2243) Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42
U.S.C. 5841, 5842); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4332, 4334, 4335); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, sec.
144(f), 121, 135, 141, 148 (42 U.S.C. 10134(f), 10141, 10155, 10161,
10168); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Sec. 51.53 [Amended]
0
32. In Sec. 51.53, in paragraph (d), remove the words ``Each applicant
for a license amendment authorizing decommissioning activities for a
production or utilization facility either for unrestricted use or based
on continuing use restrictions applicable to the site; and each
applicant for a license amendment approving a license termination plan
or decommissioning plan under Sec. 50.82 of this chapter'' and add in
their place the words ``Each applicant for a license amendment
approving an irradiated fuel management plan under Sec. 50.54(bb) of
this chapter; each applicant for a license amendment approving a
license termination plan under Sec. 50.82 of this chapter or Sec.
52.110 of this chapter or a decommissioning plan under Sec. 50.82 of
this chapter''.
Sec. 51.95 [Amended]
0
33. In Sec. 51.95, in paragraph (d) remove the words ``of an operating
or combined license authorizing decommissioning activities at a
production or utilization facility covered by Sec. 51.20,'' and add in
their place the words ``approving an irradiated fuel management plan
under Sec. 50.54(bb) of this chapter, or the amendment approving a
license termination plan under Sec. 50.82 of this chapter or Sec.
52.110 of this chapter or a decommissioning plan under Sec. 50.82 of
this chapter''.
PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS
0
34. Revise the authority citation for part 52 to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 63, 81, 103,
104, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 223, 234 (42
U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2113, 2133, 2134, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232,
2233, 2235, 2236, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851);
44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
0
35. In Sec. 52.0, revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 52.0 Scope; applicability of 10 CFR Chapter I provisions.
(a) This part governs the issuance of early site permits, standard
design certifications, combined licenses, standard design approvals,
and manufacturing licenses for nuclear power facilities licensed under
Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat.
919), and Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (88 Stat.
1242) through the termination of the associated 10 CFR part 52
licenses. This part also gives notice to all persons who knowingly
provide to any holder of or applicant for an approval, certification,
permit, or license, or to a contractor, subcontractor, or consultant of
any of them, components, equipment, materials, or other goods or
services that relate to the activities of a holder of or applicant for
an approval, certification, permit, or license, subject to this part,
that they may be individually subject to NRC enforcement action for
violation of the provisions in Sec. 52.4.
* * * * *
0
36. In Sec. 52.63, revise paragraph (b)(2) to read as follows:
Sec. 52.63 Finality of standard design certifications.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) Subject to Sec. 50.59 of this chapter, a licensee who
references a design certification rule may make departures from the
design of the nuclear power facility, without prior Commission
approval, unless the proposed departure involves a change to the design
as described in the rule certifying the design.
(i) The licensee shall maintain records of all departures from the
design of the facility and these records must be maintained and
available for audit until the date of termination of the license.
(ii) Licensees for which the NRC has docketed the certifications
required under Sec. 52.110(a) are not required to retain records of
departures from the design of the facility associated solely with
structures, systems, and components that have been permanently removed
from service using an NRC-approved change process.
* * * * *
Sec. 52.109 [Amended]
0
37. In Sec. 52.109, remove the words ``to authorize ownership and
possession of the production or utilization facility,''.
0
38. In Sec. 52.110, revise paragraphs (b), (d), (e), (f)(2),
(h)(1)(i), and (h)(2), add paragraphs (h)(5) through (7), and revise
paragraph (i) introductory text and paragraph (i)(2)(vi) to read as
follows:
Sec. 52.110 Termination of license.
* * * * *
(b)(1) Upon the NRC's docketing of the licensee's certifications
required under paragraph (a) of this section, or when a final legally
effective order to permanently cease operations has come into effect,
the 10 CFR part 52 license no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel.
(2) The facility licensed under this part is no longer a
utilization facility once the licensee meets the criteria of paragraph
(b)(1) of this section and modifies the facility to be incapable of
making use of special nuclear material without significant facility
alterations necessary to restore the capability to make use of special
nuclear material. The NRC maintains the authority to regulate the 10
CFR part 52 license with respect to the possession of special nuclear
material, source material, and byproduct material under sections 53,
63, 81, and 161 of the Act, as applicable. Until the termination of the
10 CFR part 52 license under paragraph (k) of this section, the
regulations of this chapter applicable to a utilization facility
continue to apply to the holder of the license unless the regulations
explicitly state otherwise.
* * * * *
(d)(1) Prior to or within 2 years following permanent cessation of
operations, the licensee shall submit a post-shutdown decommissioning
activities report (PSDAR) to the NRC, and a copy to the affected
State(s). The PSDAR must contain a description of the planned
decommissioning activities along with a schedule for their
accomplishment, a discussion whether the environmental impacts
associated with site-specific decommissioning activities will be
bounded by appropriate federally issued environmental review documents,
a description of any decommissioning activities whose environmental
impacts
[[Page 12333]]
will not be so bounded and will be evaluated prior to the performance
of the activities, and a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate,
including the projected cost of managing irradiated fuel.
(2) The NRC shall notice in the Federal Register the receipt of the
PSDAR and the availability for public comment of the PSDAR. The NRC
shall also schedule a public meeting in the vicinity of the licensee's
facility upon receipt of the PSDAR. The NRC shall include a notice in a
forum, such as local newspapers, that is readily accessible to
individuals in the vicinity of the site, and in the Federal Register
notice required by this paragraph (d)(2), announcing the date, time and
location of the meeting, along with a brief description of the purpose
of the meeting.
(e) Licensees shall not perform any major decommissioning
activities, as defined in Sec. 50.2 of this chapter, until 90 days
after the NRC has received the licensee's PSDAR submittal and until
certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, as required under Sec.
52.110(a), have been submitted.
(f) * * *
(2) Result in significant environmental impacts not bounded by
appropriate federally issued environmental review documents; or
* * * * *
(h) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) The withdrawals are for expenses for activities consistent with
the definition of decommission in Sec. 52.1;
* * * * *
(2) Initially, 3 percent of the generic amount specified in Sec.
50.75(c) of this chapter may be used for decommissioning planning. For
licensees that have submitted the certifications required under
paragraph (a) of this section and commencing 90 days after the NRC has
received the PSDAR, an additional 20 percent may be used. A site-
specific decommissioning cost estimate must be submitted to the NRC
before the licensee may use any funding in excess of these amounts.
* * * * *
(5) After submitting its site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate required by paragraph (d)(1) of this section, and until the
licensee has completed its final radiation survey and demonstrated that
residual radioactivity has been reduced to a level that permits
termination of its license, the licensee must annually submit to the
NRC, by March 31, a financial assurance status report. The report may
combine the reporting requirements of Sec. 72.30 of this chapter and
Sec. 52.110(h)(7). The report must include the following information,
current through the end of the previous calendar year:
(i) The amount spent on decommissioning, both cumulative and over
the previous calendar year, the remaining balance of any
decommissioning funds, and the amount provided by other financial
assurance methods being relied upon;
(ii) An estimate of the costs to complete decommissioning,
reflecting any difference between actual and estimated costs for work
performed during the year, and the decommissioning criteria upon which
the estimate is based;
(iii) Any modifications occurring to a licensee's current method of
providing financial assurance since the last submitted report; and
(iv) Any material changes to trust agreements or financial
assurance contracts.
(6) If the sum of the balance of any remaining decommissioning
funds, plus earnings on such funds calculated at not greater than a 2
percent real rate of return, together with the amount provided by other
financial assurance methods being relied upon, does not cover the
estimated cost to complete the decommissioning, the financial assurance
status report must include additional financial assurance to cover the
estimated cost of completion.
(7) After submitting its site-specific decommissioning cost
estimate required by paragraph (d)(1) of this section, if spent fuel is
on site, the licensee must annually submit to the NRC, by March 31, a
report on the status of its funding for managing irradiated fuel. The
report must include the following information, current through the end
of the previous calendar year:
(i) The amount of funds accumulated to cover the cost of managing
the irradiated fuel;
(ii) The projected cost of managing irradiated fuel until title to
the fuel and possession of the fuel is transferred to the Secretary of
Energy; and
(iii) If the funds accumulated do not cover the projected cost, a
plan to obtain additional funds to cover the cost.
(i) All power reactor licensees that have loaded fuel into the
reactor must submit an application for termination of license. The
application for termination of license must be accompanied or preceded
by a license termination plan to be submitted for NRC approval.
* * * * *
(2) * * *
(vi) An updated site-specific estimate of remaining decommissioning
costs and identification of sources of funds for license termination,
spent fuel management, and ISFSI decommissioning, as applicable;
* * * * *
PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND REACTOR-
RELATED GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE
0
39. The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63,
65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 223, 234, 274 (42
U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2210e,
2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2273, 2282, 2021); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(42 U.S.C. 4332); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 117(a),
132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 141, 145(g), 148, 218(a) (42 U.S.C.
10137(a), 10152, 10153, 10154, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10165(g), 10168,
10198(a)); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
0
40. In Sec. 72.13, add paragraph (e) to read as follows:
Sec. 72.13 Applicability.
* * * * *
(e) The following sections apply to activities associated with a
general license, where the licensee has elected to provide for physical
protection of the spent fuel in accordance with Sec.
72.212(b)(9)(vii)(A): Sec. 72.1; Sec. 72.2(a)(1), (b), (c), and (e);
Sec. Sec. 72.3 through 72.6(c)(1); Sec. Sec. 72.7 through Sec.
72.13(a) and (e); Sec. 72.30(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f); Sec.
72.32(c) and (d); Sec. 72.44(b) and (f); Sec. 72.48; Sec. 72.50(a);
Sec. 72.52(a), (b), (d), and (e); Sec. 72.60; Sec. 72.62; Sec. Sec.
72.72 through 72.80(f); Sec. Sec. 72.82 through 72.86; Sec. Sec.
72.104 through 72.106; Sec. Sec. 72.122 through 72.126; Sec. Sec.
72.140 through 72.176; Sec. Sec. 72.180 through 72.186; Sec. 72.190;
Sec. 72.194; Sec. Sec. 72.210 through 72.220; and Sec. 72.240(a).
0
41. In Sec. 72.30, revise paragraph (b) and paragraph (c) introductory
text to read as follows:
Sec. 72.30 Financial assurance and recordkeeping for decommissioning.
* * * * *
(b)(1) Each applicant for a specific license under this part must
submit, as part of its application, a decommissioning funding plan for
NRC review and approval.
(2) Each holder of a general license under this part must submit,
prior to the
[[Page 12334]]
initial storage of spent fuel under Sec. 72.212(a)(3), a
decommissioning funding plan for NRC review and approval.
(3) The decommissioning funding plans required by paragraphs (b)(1)
and (2) of this section must contain:
(i) Information on how reasonable assurance will be provided that
funds will be available to decommission the ISFSI or MRS.
(ii) A detailed cost estimate for decommissioning, in an amount
reflecting:
(A) The cost of an independent contractor to perform all
decommissioning activities;
(B) An adequate contingency factor; and
(C) The cost of meeting the Sec. 20.1402 of this chapter criteria
for unrestricted use, provided that, if the applicant or licensee can
demonstrate its ability to meet the provisions of Sec. 20.1403 of this
chapter, the cost estimate may be based on meeting the Sec. 20.1403
criteria.
(iii) Identification of and justification for using the key
assumptions contained in the decommissioning cost estimate.
(iv) A description of the method of assuring funds for
decommissioning from paragraph (e) of this section, including means for
adjusting cost estimates and associated funding levels periodically
over the life of the facility.
(v) The volume of onsite subsurface material containing residual
radioactivity that will require remediation to meet the criteria for
license termination.
(vi) A certification that financial assurance for decommissioning
has been provided in the amount of the cost estimate for
decommissioning.
(c) At the time of license renewal and at intervals not to exceed 3
years, the decommissioning funding plan must be resubmitted with
adjustments as necessary to account for changes in costs and the extent
of contamination. The decommissioning funding plan must update the
information submitted with the original or prior plan and must
specifically consider the effect of the following events on
decommissioning costs:
* * * * *
0
42. In Sec. 72.32, revise paragraphs (a) introductory text and (c) to
read as follows:
Sec. 72.32 Emergency Plan.
(a) Each application for an ISFSI that is licensed under this part
which is not located on the site or within the exclusion area, as
defined in 10 CFR part 100, of a nuclear power reactor licensed under
part 50 of this chapter or part 52 of this chapter must be accompanied
by an Emergency Plan that includes the following information:
* * * * *
(c) For an ISFSI that is located on the site or within the
exclusion area, as defined in 10 CFR part 100, of a nuclear power
reactor licensed under parts 50 or 52 of this chapter, an emergency
plan that meets the requirements in appendix E to part 50 of this
chapter and Sec. 50.47(b) of this chapter, or the requirements of 10
CFR 50.200(a) or 10 CFR 50.200(b) shall be deemed to satisfy the
requirements of this section.
0
43. In Sec. 72.44, revise paragraph (f) to read as follows:
Sec. 72.44 License conditions.
* * * * *
(f) A licensee shall follow and maintain in effect an emergency
plan that is approved by the Commission. The licensee may make changes
to the approved plan without Commission approval only if such changes
do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan. Within six months after
any change is made, the licensee shall submit, in accordance with Sec.
72.4, a report containing a description of any changes made in the plan
addressed to Director, Division of Fuel Management, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office shown in appendix D
to part 20 of this chapter. Proposed changes that decrease the
effectiveness of the approved emergency plan must not be implemented
unless the licensee has received prior approval of such changes from
the Commission. Licensees need not comply with the requirements of this
paragraph when all spent fuel has been removed from the site.
0
44. In Sec. 72.62, revise paragraph (a)(2) to read as follows:
Sec. 72.62 Backfitting.
(a) * * *
(2) Procedures or organization required to operate or decommission
an ISFSI or MRS.
* * * * *
0
45. In Sec. 72.72, revise paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 72.72 Material balance, inventory, and records requirements for
stored materials.
* * * * *
(d)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section,
records of spent fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and reactor-
related GTCC waste containing special nuclear material meeting the
requirements in paragraph (a) of this section must be kept in
duplicate. The duplicate set of records must be kept at a separate
location sufficiently remote from the original records that a single
event would not destroy both sets of records.
(2) A single copy of the records described in paragraph (d)(1) of
this section may be maintained in a single storage facility provided
the facility meets the requirements of an NRC-approved quality
assurance program for the storage of records.
(3) Records of spent fuel or reactor-related GTCC waste containing
special nuclear material transferred out of an ISFSI or records of
spent fuel, high-level radioactive waste, or reactor-related GTCC waste
containing special nuclear material transferred out of an MRS must be
preserved for a period of five years after the date of transfer.
0
46. In Sec. 72.212, add paragraph (b)(9)(vii) to read as follows:
Sec. 72.212 Conditions of general license issued under Sec. 72.210.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(9) * * *
(vii)(A) Upon NRC docketing of the certifications required under
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter,
and when all spent fuel has been placed in dry cask storage at the
facility, the licensee may, as an alternative to the requirements of
Sec. 72.212(b)(9)(i) through (vi), provide for physical protection of
the spent fuel under subpart H of this part and Sec. 73.51 of this
chapter.
(B) A licensee who elects to provide physical protection under
subpart H of this part and Sec. 73.51 of this chapter will submit
their physical security plan to the NRC under Sec. 50.54(p) of this
chapter.
* * * * *
0
47. Revise Sec. 72.218 to read as follows:
Sec. 72.218 Termination of licenses.
(a) Upon removal of the spent fuel stored under this general
license from the reactor site, the licensee must decommission the ISFSI
consistent with requirements in Sec. 50.82 of this chapter or Sec.
52.110 of this chapter, as applicable.
(b) The general license under this part is terminated upon
termination of the 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52 license under Sec.
50.82(a)(11) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(k) of this chapter,
respectively.
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
0
48. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 147, 149, 161,
170D, 170E, 170H,
[[Page 12335]]
170I, 223, 229, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2210d,
2210e, 2210h, 2210i, 2273, 2278a, 2282, 2297f); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842);
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155,
10161); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Section 73.37(b)(2) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295,
94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
0
49. In Sec. 73.51, revise paragraphs (a) introductory text, (a)(1)
introductory text, and (a)(2) and add paragraph (a)(3) to read as
follows:
Sec. 73.51 Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 73.20,
Sec. 73.50, or Sec. 73.67, the physical protection requirements of
this section apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste:
(1) Under a specific license issued pursuant to part 72 of this
chapter:
* * * * *
(2) At a geologic repository operations area (GROA) licensed
pursuant to part 60 or 63 of this chapter; or
(3) Under a general license issued pursuant to part 72 of this
chapter and upon the NRC's docketing of the certifications required
under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this
chapter, when all spent fuel has been placed in dry cask storage at the
facility, and notification has been made to the NRC under the
provisions of Sec. 72.212(b)(9)(vii) of this chapter.
* * * * *
0
50. In Sec. 73.54, remove the introductory text, revise the paragraph
(a) introductory text, paragraph (b) introductory text, and paragraph
(c) introductory text, and add paragraphs (i) and (j) to read as
follows:
Sec. 73.54 Protection of digital computer and communication systems
and networks.
(a) Each holder of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor
under part 50 of this chapter and each holder of a combined license
under part 52 of this chapter for which the Commission has made the
finding under Sec. 52.103(g) of this chapter shall provide high
assurance that its digital computer and communication systems and
networks are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and
including the design basis threat as described in Sec. 73.1.
* * * * *
(b) To accomplish the objectives in paragraph (a) of this section,
the licensee shall:
* * * * *
(c) The licensee's cyber security program must be designed to:
* * * * *
(i) The requirements of this section no longer apply once the
following criteria are satisfied:
(1) The NRC has docketed the licensee's certifications required
under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this
chapter; and
(2) At least 10 months (for a boiling water reactor) or at least 16
months (for a pressurized water reactor) have elapsed since the date of
permanent cessation of operations if the fuel meets the criteria of
Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii) of this chapter, or an NRC-approved alternative
spent fuel decay period, submitted under Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii)(A) or
(B) of this chapter, has elapsed.
(j) Removal of cyber security license condition. The cyber security
plan license condition, which requires the licensee to fully implement
and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber
security plan including changes made pursuant to the authority of Sec.
50.90 of this chapter and Sec. 50.54(p) of this chapter, is removed
from the license once the conditions in paragraph (i) of this section
are satisfied.
0
51. In Sec. 73.55:
0
a. Revise paragraph (b)(3) introductory text;
0
b. Add paragraphs (b)(9)(ii)(B)(1) and (2);
0
c. Revise paragraphs (c)(6), (e)(9)(v)(A), (j)(4)(ii), and (p)(1)(i)
and (ii).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) The physical protection program must be designed to prevent
significant core damage until the NRC has docketed the certifications
required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of
this chapter. The physical protection program must also be designed to
prevent spent fuel sabotage. Specifically, the program must:
* * * * *
(9) * * *
(ii) * * *
(B) * * *
(1) Licensees who are implementing 10 CFR part 26, regardless of
whether they are required to do so, are in compliance with paragraph
(b)(9)(ii)(B) of this section.
(2) Licensees, upon the NRC's docketing of their certifications
required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of
this chapter, will be in compliance with paragraph (b)(9)(ii)(B) of
this section by implementing the following:
(i) A fitness for duty program in which individuals who maintain
unescorted access authorization and have unescorted access to a vital
area, individuals who perform certified fuel handler duties under Sec.
50.2 of this chapter prior to all spent nuclear fuel at a site being
placed in dry cask storage, individuals who perform the duties under
Sec. 26.4(a)(5) of this chapter, and individuals who perform duties
under Sec. 26.4(g) of this chapter, are subject to the requirements in
10 CFR part 26 except for subparts I and K; and
(ii) A fitness for duty program in which those individuals who
maintain unescorted access authorization and have unescorted access to
the protected area who are not included in paragraph
(b)(9)(ii)(B)(2)(i) of this section, are subject to the requirements of
Sec. Sec. 26.31(c)(1) and (2) and 26.33 of this chapter.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(6) Cyber Security Plan. The licensee shall establish, maintain,
and implement a Cyber Security Plan in accordance with the requirements
of Sec. 73.54. The licensee no longer needs to maintain and implement
its Cyber Security Plan once the criteria in Sec. 73.54(i) have been
satisfied.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(9) * * *
(v) * * *
(A) The reactor control room, unless the licensee has submitted and
the NRC has docketed the certifications required under Sec.
50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter, and the
licensee has documented that all vital equipment has been removed from
the control room and the control room does not serve as the vital area
boundary for other vital areas;
* * * * *
(j) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) A system for communication with the control room, or, if the
NRC has docketed the certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of
this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter, a system for
communication with the certified fuel handler or the senior on-shift
licensee representative responsible for overall safety and security of
the permanently shutdown and defueled facility.
* * * * *
(p) * * *
(1) * * *
[[Page 12336]]
(i) In accordance with Sec. 50.54(x) and (y) of this chapter, the
licensee may suspend any security measures under this section in an
emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public
health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and
technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent
protection is immediately apparent. This suspension of security
measures must be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator,
or, if the certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this
chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter have been docketed by the
NRC, by either a licensed senior operator or a certified fuel handler,
before taking this action.
(ii) During severe weather when the suspension of affected security
measures is immediately needed to protect the personal health and
safety of security force personnel and no other immediately apparent
action consistent with the license conditions and technical
specifications can provide adequate or equivalent protection. This
suspension of security measures must be approved, as a minimum, by a
licensed senior operator, or, if the certifications required under
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter
have been docketed by the NRC, by either a licensed senior operator or
a certified fuel handler, with input from the security supervisor or
manager, before taking this action.
* * * * *
PART 140--FINANCIAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS AND INDEMNITY
AGREEMENTS
0
52. The authority citation for part 140 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 161, 170, 223, 234
(42 U.S.C. 2201, 2210, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
0
53. In Sec. 140.11, add paragraph (a)(5), redesignate paragraph (b) as
paragraph (c), revise newly redesignated paragraph (c), and add new
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 140.11 Amounts of financial protection for certain reactors.
(a) * * *
(5) In the amount of at least $100,000,000, for each nuclear
reactor:
(i) For which the NRC has docketed the certifications required
under Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec. 52.110(a) of this
chapter, and
(ii) For which at least 10 months (for a boiling water reactor) or
16 months (for a pressurized water reactor) have elapsed since the date
of permanent cessation of operations if the fuel meets the criteria of
Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii) of this chapter, or for which an NRC-approved
alternative to the 10- or 16-month spent fuel decay period, submitted
under Sec. 50.54(q)(7)(ii)(A) or (B) of this chapter, has elapsed.
(b) Secondary financial protection (in the form of private
liability insurance available under an industry retrospective rating
plan providing for deferred premium charges) will no longer be required
once the criteria in Sec. 140.11(a)(5)(i) and (ii) have been met.
(c) In any case where two or more nuclear reactors at the same
location are licensed under parts 50, 52, or 54 of this chapter, the
total financial protection required of the licensee for all such
reactors (excluding any applicable secondary financial protection) is
the highest amount which would otherwise be required for any one of
those reactors; provided, that such financial protection covers all
reactors at the location.
0
54. In Sec. 140.81, revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 140.81 Scope and purpose.
(a) Scope. This subpart applies to applicants for and holders of
operating licenses issued under part 50 of this chapter, combined
licenses issued under part 52 of this chapter, or renewed licenses
issued under part 54 of this chapter, authorizing operation of
production facilities and utilization facilities, and to other persons
indemnified with respect to such facilities. This subpart shall cease
to apply to licensees under part 50, part 52, and part 54 of this
chapter once the licensee satisfies the criteria in Sec.
140.11(a)(5)(i) and (ii).
* * * * *
Dated: February 9, 2022.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2022-03131 Filed 3-2-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P