[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 151 (Monday, August 8, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48203-48211]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-16949]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 05000184; EA-21-148; NRC-2022-0150]
Confirmatory Order Modifying License of National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Center for Neutron Research
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Confirmatory Order; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing a
Confirmatory Order to the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Center for Neutron Research, as a result of a successful
alternative dispute resolution mediation session. The commitments
outlined in the
[[Page 48204]]
Confirmatory Order were made as a part of a settlement agreement
concerning violations of NRC requirements related to an event involving
the exceedance of a safety limit for fuel cladding temperature.
DATES: The Confirmatory Order became effective on August 1, 2022.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2022-0150 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0150. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information
Contact section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The Confirmatory Order Modifying
License of National Institute of Standards and Technology, Center for
Neutron Research, is available in ADAMS under Accession No.
ML22206A213.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET), Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Jones, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
telephone: 301-415-9525, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the Order is attached.
Dated: August 3, 2022.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tania Mart[iacute]nez Navedo,
Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement.
Attachment--Confirmatory Order
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
In the Matter of
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Center for Neutron Research
U.S. Department of Commerce
Docket No.: 05000184
License No.: TR-5
EA-21-148
CONFIRMATORY ORDER MODIFYING LICENSE
EFFECTIVE UPON ISSUANCE
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Center
for Neutron Research (NCNR or licensee), U.S. Department of Commerce
(DOC) is the holder of License No. TR-5, issued by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to Part 50 of Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). NIST refers to the
larger National Institute of Standards and Technology organization
while NCNR refers specifically to the licensee and operator of the
National Bureau of Standards Test Reactor (NBSR or reactor). The
license authorizes the operation of the NBSR in accordance with
conditions specified therein. The facility is located on the NIST
campus in Gaithersburg, Maryland.
This Confirmatory Order (CO) is the result of an agreement reached
during an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session
conducted on May 10, 2022, May 19, 2022, and June 2, 2022, to address
seven apparent violations.
II
The NBSR is a heavy-water (D2O)-moderated-and-cooled, enriched-
fuel, tank-type reactor designed to operate at 20 megawatts thermal
(MW(t)) power. The facility operates continuously during a 7-week
operational cycle that consists of approximately 38 days of operation,
followed by 10-day refueling and maintenance outages.
On December 20, 2020, operators shut down the reactor for a
refueling outage. During the refueling outage on January 4, 2021, fuel
elements were shuffled within the reactor vessel during day shift.
After the fuel elements were placed in each core position, height
verification was performed using a height gauge to ensure that the fuel
elements were fully latched in the lower grid plate. Following the
February 3, 2021, event discussed below, the NRC inspectors reviewed
video footage of the placement of fuel element S-1175 in the J-7 core
position and determined that the fuel element was initially latched
after placement. However, the inspectors observed that operators had
difficulty lowering the tool to fuel element S-1175 during the
subsequent height verification. Performance of this height verification
likely contributed to fuel element S-1175 becoming unlatched. Further,
the inspectors observed that the operators improperly performed the
latch verification rotation checks on the evening shift. Through post-
event interviews and observation of the video footage of the refueling
and latch verification evolutions, the inspectors determined that fuel
element S-1175 was likely not fully latched in the J-7 core position at
the end of fuel handling operations on January 4, 2021.
On February 3, 2021, following the refueling outage, NCNR reactor
operators were performing a normal reactor startup when the reactor
automatically shut down in response to indications of high confinement
exhaust stack radiation. Once the reactor was placed in a safe
condition, all personnel evacuated the control room and reactor
confinement. The reactor was then monitored by operators from the
remote Emergency Control Station. NCNR subsequently declared an alert
in accordance with the facility emergency plan and procedures. During
the event, six NCNR reactor personnel became externally contaminated
and were monitored for internal exposure to radioactive materials.
Following the event, NCNR personnel performed environmental monitoring
at the confinement exhaust stack and at the 400-meter emergency
planning site boundary, which is located within the fence line of the
NIST Gaithersburg campus. Environmental sampling for radioactive
material releases, as well as radiological surveys, confirmed that
release amounts were a small fraction of the alert and notification of
unusual event criteria in the emergency procedures, which led to event
termination by NCNR later that day.
On March 2, 2021, NCNR submitted a related event notification (EN
55120) to inform the NRC that it had violated the fuel cladding
temperature safety limit for damaged fuel element S-1175. During
subsequent visual inspection activities where NCNR moved fuel elements
from the reactor core to the fuel storage pool, the NRC inspectors
observed melted material deposited on the lower grid plate. The
inspectors also observed that the damaged fuel element
[[Page 48205]]
S-1175 nozzle was almost completely blocked by melted material. The
inspectors noted that additional tests would need to be performed to
determine the exact composition of the melted material. The damaged
fuel element S-1175 is currently in a container located within the fuel
storage pool awaiting shipment for further analysis. The licensee has
contracted with Framatome to clean up the reactor vessel and remove the
melted material from the lower grid plate, vessel, and primary piping.
Framatome is assisting with various operations during this recovery.
On March 16, 2022, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization
Facilities, issued a special inspection report to the licensee. The
inspection report included the following seven apparent violations,
five of which NCNR identified in its own review and reported to NRC
staff:
1. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 2.1, ``Safety
Limit,'' which states that the reactor fuel cladding temperature shall
not exceed 842 [deg]F (420 [deg]C) for any operating conditions of
power and flow. The NRC inspectors observed once-molten material in and
around the fuel element nozzle of element S-1175 in the J-7 grid
position indicating that the licensee exceeded the fuel temperature
safety limit.
2. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 3.1.3, ``Core
Configuration,'' which states that ``[t]he reactor shall not operate
unless all grid positions are filled with full length fuel elements or
thimbles, except during subcritical and critical startup testing with
natural convection flow.'' The NRC inspectors observed that the fuel
element S-1175 was not latched, was raised approximately 3-4 inches
above the upper grid plate, and was angled out of its proper position,
causing it to rest on the lower grid plate surface.
3. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4,
``Procedures,'' which states, in part, that ``[w]ritten procedures
shall be prepared, reviewed and approved prior to initiating any of the
activities listed in this section [including] . . . [f]uel loading,
unloading, and fuel movement within the reactor vessel.'' The NRC
inspectors determined that the procedure for fuel handling activities
was not suitable for the circumstances and did not contain necessary
information to ensure that the fuel elements were latched prior to
startup. As a result, the inspectors determined that the fuel handling
procedure was inadequate to ensure that the fuel element in question
was latched during refueling activities on January 4, 2021.
4. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4,
``Procedures,'' which states, in part, that ``[w]ritten procedures
shall be prepared, reviewed and approved prior to initiating any of the
activities listed in this section [including] . . . [s]tartup,
operation, and shutdown of the reactor.'' The reactor startup procedure
instructs the operators to monitor for abnormal fluctuations or
oscillations on nuclear channel indications. However, the NRC
inspectors found that the procedure does not provide amplifying
guidance for operators to use when conducting this monitoring.
5. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4,
``Procedures,'' which states, in part, that ``[w]ritten procedures
shall be prepared, reviewed and approved prior to initiating any of the
activities listed in this section [including] . . . [i]mplementation of
required plans such as emergency or security plans.'' The NRC
inspectors determined that NCNR emergency response procedures were not
suitable for the circumstances and caused NCNR to unnecessarily
(although still within the required timeframe) delay their response to
the event.
6. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 3.9.2.1, ``Fuel
Handling; Within the Reactor Vessel,'' which states that ``[f]ollowing
handling of fuel within the reactor vessel, the reactor shall not be
operated until all fuel elements that have been handled are inspected
to determine that they are locked in their proper positions in the core
grid structure. This shall be accomplished by one of the following
methods: (1) Elevation check of the fuel element with main pump flow.
(2) Rotational check of the element head in the latching direction
only. (3) Visual inspection of the fuel element head or latching bar.''
The NRC inspectors determined that NCNR operators failed to implement
one of the methods required by the technical specifications to ensure
that fuel element S-1175 was adequately latched.
7. Apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.59, ``Changes, tests and
experiments,'' paragraph (c)(1), which states, in part, that a licensee
may make changes in the facility without obtaining a license amendment
only if a change to the technical specifications is not required. The
NRC inspectors determined that NCNR made changes to the refueling
tooling that should have required a change to the technical
specifications because dimensional differences of the new tooling
invalidated the capability of operators to verify that a fuel element
was adequately latched.
For the seven apparent violations, the NRC offered NCNR an
opportunity to (1) attend a pre-decisional enforcement conference or
(2) to participate in an ADR mediation session to resolve this concern.
In response to the NRC's offer, NCNR requested the use of the NRC's ADR
process to resolve the seven apparent violations. On May 10, 2022, the
NRC and NCNR conducted an ADR session mediated by a professional
mediator, arranged through Cornell University's Scheinman Institute on
Conflict Resolution. The ADR process is one in which a neutral
mediator, with no decision-making authority, assists the parties in
reaching an agreement to resolve any differences regarding the dispute.
This CO is issued pursuant to the agreement reached as a result of the
full-day mediation session that occurred on May 10, 2022, and two
subsequent virtual meetings that occurred on May 17, 2022, and June 2,
2022. The NRC and NCNR signed the agreement in principle (AIP) for the
mediation session on June 3, 2022.
III
NCNR and the NRC reached a preliminary settlement agreement during
mediations. The elements of the agreement included (1) corrective
actions completed by NCNR, (2) corrective actions planned by NCNR, (3)
additional agreed upon future actions by NCNR, and (4) general
provisions. Additionally, the NRC and NCNR agreed that the apparent
violations described in Section II of this Order were violations of
regulatory requirements. The NRC and NCNR agreed that the safety
significance of these violations is normally characterized at Severity
Level 1 in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. Additionally,
the NRC concluded that a civil penalty of up to $432,000 would normally
be proposed for this violation, as assessed in accordance with the
civil penalty assessment process discussed in Section 2.3.4 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy. However, due to the robust nature of corrective
actions taken and planned by NCNR as documented in Sections III and V,
the NRC determined that waiving a civil penalty is appropriate in this
case.
The parties agreed in the AIP to refine the language of the AIP to
reflect the appropriate level of detail when included in Section III of
the CO. The following is the refined language:
1. Based on a review of the incident, NCNR completed corrective
actions and enhancements to preclude recurrence of
[[Page 48206]]
the violation, including but not limited to the following:
a. NIST/NCNR Safety Culture
i. NCNR staff secured additional funds for the Nuclear Safety
Culture Improvement Program (NSCIP), with additional funds included in
current budget proposals.
ii. NCNR staff has drafted the NSCIP program documents addressing
problem identification and resolution, root cause investigations,
training, procedures, and oversight. These will be used to develop a
request for proposals to assist the NCNR in program development and
implementation.
iii. NCNR has identified comparable reactor facilities for purposes
of benchmarking various safety culture programs, with in-person visits
planned or completed. Results from these benchmarking visits will be
used to inform further development of the NSCIP.
iv. NCNR staff reevaluated the root cause analysis with an emphasis
on nuclear safety culture and is using this evaluation to develop the
NSCIP plan.
b. Management
i. NCNR leadership has engaged the NIST Director and Department of
Commerce leadership for oversight and secured additional funding for
corrective actions (including additional operations personnel) and
reactor recovery and clean-up.
ii. NCNR currently staffs four rotating shifts during normal
operation and is challenged to complete additional work such as
training, employee development, and emergent maintenance. NCNR
leadership has initiated hiring actions to establish a fifth operating
shift dedicated to training and maintenance.
iii. Elevated Enterprise Risk Management of NCNR to institutional
(NIST) level through the chartered NIST Enterprise Risk Management
Council. The Council, which includes NIST Senior Executives, identifies
NIST enterprise-level risks, tracks those risks and their impacts, and
reviews risk mitigation progress and strategy.
iv. NCNR leadership appointed a permanent Chief of Reactor
Operations to provide more continuity and stability.
v. NCNR hired a new Chief of the Aging Reactor Management (ARM)
program. This position will provide oversight of communications between
engineering and operations to help ensure that identified issues are
resolved.
vi. NCNR confirmed or updated management Performance Plans to
ensure that expectations for procedure use and adherence with
consequences for failure to follow required procedures is part of
employee reviews.
vii. Licensee staff including Reactor Operations and Engineering
leadership took part in safety culture training given by NCNR staff
experienced in safety culture training. The training covered the
following topics:
1. Human Performance Tools
2. Procedure Use and Adherence
3. Procedure Writing and Routing Guides
4. SharePoint Use
5. Procedure Theory
6. Hazard Review
7. Risk Assessment
8. Mitigation Actions
9. Pre-Job Brief and Post-Job Critique
viii. NCNR conducted leadership training for reactor supervisors.
The training was led by the Chief of Reactor Operations and included
the following modules of leadership training for the Commerce Learning
Center:
1. Accountable Leadership
2. Influencing and Persuading Others
3. Becoming an Emotionally Intelligent Leader
4. Networking to Improve Leadership Effectiveness
5. New Leadership Transitions
6. Leading Others through Conflict
c. Corrective Action Program
i. NCNR implemented ``Safety Good Catch/Good Idea'' program to
incentivize staff to identify, raise, and address safety concerns in
April 2021.
ii. Established Safety Evaluation Committee (SEC) subcommittee to
track and oversee corrective actions.
iii. Established the Engineering Change Management Program to
provide an administrative gate for 50.59 screening and execution for
facility and procedure modifications.
d. Procedures
i. NCNR modified Administrative Requirement (AR) 5.0, ``Procedure
Use and Adherence,'' which guides conduct of operations, to strengthen
the oversight role supervisors must play and to require that all
personnel be trained. The required procedure use and adherence training
has been completed.
ii. Drafted and approved AR 5.1, ``Procedure Writer's Guide,''
related to procedure writing, which includes addressing improvements to
writing quality.
iii. Identified procedures that will be updated according to new
guidance in AR 5.1 prior to reactor startup.
iv. Updated procedure standards to comply with PPA AP-907-005,
``Procedure Writers' Manual.''
v. Implemented AR 1.1, ``Human Performance Tools,'' related to
improving training on a continuous basis.
vi. Modified Operating Instruction (OI) 1.1, ``Reactor Startup,''
to provide detailed guidance on evaluation of abnormal fluctuations in
nuclear instrumentation.
e. Technical
i. NCNR conducted 40 hours of proficiency training for all
Operations Staff, emphasizing the importance of latching and procedural
compliance.
ii. Established proficiency requirements for operators performing
fuel handling, including core loading, shuffle, rotational latch
checks, and visual latch checks.
iii. Created Emergency Instructions (EI) 3.8, ``Recovery
Operations,'' and 3.9 ``Confinement Re-entry,'' to provide detailed
guidance on building reoccupation. In addition, EI 0.4, ``Control Room
Evacuation,'' and EI 0.5, ``Post-evacuation Checklist,'' were created
to include an evacuation checklist required to be used during an
evacuation to ensure confinement is safe for operator re-entry.
iv. Performed Latch Improvement Safety Analysis to document that
improved latching and latch check processes provide adequate defense
against unlatching.
v. Assessed the efficacy of all tools used in refueling to
determine whether improvements are needed and concluded that, given the
discontinuation of height checks, the tools are adequate to meet all
new refueling and latch check requirements.
vi. Conducted analysis as to whether no-flow height checks should
be continued and concluded that the equipment does not support height
checks with sufficient precision; height-related latch checks are no
longer prescribed.
vii. Reinstituted requirement for latch checks prior to final pump
restart and modified OI 2.1.1, ``Startup of the Primary System for
Criticality,'' and OI 1.1.0, ``Reactor Startup Checklist.''
viii. Instituted a required rotation latch check, performed by a
second individual and modified OI 6.1, ``Fueling and Defueling.''
ix. Instituted a redundant Technical Specifications required method
of visual checks (using a digital camera plus image analysis software)
and modified Operating Instruction (OI) 6.1.
x. Verified that the index plate is consistently positioned by the
use of alignment pins and that rotational fiduciary marks are clear to
ensure fuel
[[Page 48207]]
movement evolutions are performed properly.
xi. Modified OI 6.1 series and OI 1.1A CL to ensure that there will
be no tool contact with fuel head following final visual latch
verification prior to reactor startup.
xii. Submitted License Amendment Request to NRC to modify Technical
Specification 3.9.2.1 to require latch verification through both
mechanical rotational and visual methods.
2. Based on a review of the incident, NCNR plans to complete
additional corrective actions, including but not limited to the
following:
a. Management Systems
i. Conduct regular briefings of NIST and DOC leadership regarding
the progress of operational safety and corrective actions, and review
of safety culture.
ii. Participate in Enterprise Risk Management reviews twice a year
to assess elevated risk impact of NCNR for NIST.
iii. Develop and implement a change management framework to
evaluate sufficiency of existing change management processes and
identify gaps and areas for improvement.
iv. Develop a system for knowledge and skills management in the
presence of personnel attrition.
v. Develop a plan for involving staff in continuous improvement of
reactor operations, through participation in a preventive action
program that encourages and rewards proactive efforts to improve
quality, safety, and efficiency of operations.
vi. Hire a Deputy Chief of Reactor Operations to provide additional
oversight and consistent leadership.
vii. Increase management engagement by implementing AR 5.4,
``Observation Program,'' which details requirements for management and
others to perform observations with documentation of findings and
suggested improvements.
viii. Define requirements for qualification as Crew Chief and
implement Crew Chief leadership and development training.
b. Qualification and Training
i. Develop a technical training program for robust qualification
and training of supervisors, operators, and candidates for: moving and
handling fuel; proficiency checks on key refueling tasks; and
proficiency checks for core loading, shuffle, rotational latch checks
and visual latch checks. The program will include training materials
(e.g., qualification cards) and practical experience with the use of
the fuel handling stand, reflecting stated learning objectives.
ii. Provide consistent and structured training and immediate and
continual feedback to Non-Licensed Operators (NLO) during on-the-job
training to ensure comprehension of performance expectations.
iii. Develop consistent standard by which all supervisors evaluate
qualifications.
iv. Develop a continuous formal operator training program to
provide ongoing training through rotating assignments of operators to a
``fifth shift'' dedicated to training, procedure development, and
maintenance.
v. Implement mandatory oversight training for supervisors.
vi. Require additional training in leadership training and reactor
supervisor leadership training.
vii. Conduct proficiency training prior to all future refueling
events.
c. Procedures
i. Rewrite Operating Instruction (OI) series 6.1, ``Fueling and
Defueling,'' and OI 6.2, ``Operation of the Fuel Transfer System,'' to
capture detail of fuel and latch movements to align with training.
ii. Revise procedures necessary prior to any reactor restart to be
consistent with INPO 11-003, ``Guideline for Excellence in Procedure
and Work Instruction Use and Adherence,'' and conducted training on
procedure protocols.
iii. Complete revision to procedures required for startup.
iv. Design, test, and install noise gates on selected nuclear
instrumentation channels to alert operator of abnormal signal in
progress.
d. Event Response
i. Develop guidelines that outline methods for making measurements,
interpreting results, performing calculations, and making dose
projections (e.g., dose projections that are used as basis for 10
radiological protective action recommendations and those used to
upgrade and downgrade emergency classes).
ii. Develop a process to communicate and track deficiencies in
emergency drills and exercises identified during follow-up critiques;
ensure corrective and preventive actions are assigned appropriately and
tracked for timely resolution.
iii. Implement an ethernet-based data display for the emergency
control station, post-reactor startup to improve remote monitoring and
control capabilities.
3. Based on NCNR's review of the incident and NRC's concerns with
respect to precluding recurrence of the violation, NCNR agrees to
implement corrective actions and enhancements in the following areas:
a. Communications
b. Nuclear safety program assessments to include:
i. Nuclear safety culture assessment
ii. Nuclear program assessment(s)
iii. Problem Identification and Resolution program
iv. Employee concerns
v. Safety Culture Monitoring Panel
c. Training
d. Procedures
e. Benchmarking
f. Employee engagement
g. Leadership accountability
h. Technical issues
4. Based on the completed and planned actions described above, and
the commitments described in Section V of this Order, the NRC agrees to
reduce the civil penalty to $0, refrain from issuing a cited notice of
violation, and not pursue any further enforcement action based on the
seven apparent violations identified in the NRC's March 16, 2022,
letter.
5. The NRC will consider the Confirmatory Order an escalated
enforcement action with respect to any future enforcement actions.
6. On July 21, 2022, NCNR consented to the issuance of this
Confirmatory Order with the requirements, as described in Section V
below. NCNR further agreed that this Confirmatory Order is to be
effective upon issuance, the agreement memorialized in this
Confirmatory Order settles the matter between the parties, and that the
licensee has waived its right to a hearing.
IV
Any decision of the NRC to approve restart under 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)
would be informed by but not solely reliant upon this CO.
I find that the actions completed by NCNR, as described in Section
III above, combined with the commitments as set forth in Section V are
acceptable and necessary, and conclude that with these completed
actions and commitments the public health and safety are reasonably
assured. In view of the foregoing, I have determined that public health
and safety require that NCNR's commitments be confirmed by this Order.
Based on the above and NCNR's consent, this Confirmatory Order is
effective upon issuance.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 104b, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and
186 of
[[Page 48208]]
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR part 50 as applicable, it is
hereby ordered, effective upon issuance, that license No. TR-5 is
modified as follows:
1. Communications
a. Within 3 months of issuance of the Confirmatory Order, the NIST
Director will issue a statement to NIST employees communicating the
specific strategy to improve NCNR's nuclear safety culture. The
communication will include (1) a summary regarding the Nuclear Safety
Culture Improvement Program, (2) the NRC's concerns expressed in its
Special Inspection Report, (3) specific lessons learned from previously
applied corrective actions, and (4) corrective actions both taken and
planned. At least 30 days prior to issuing the statement, NIST will
provide the statement for NRC staff review. Within 15 days of receiving
the statement, the NRC staff will provide feedback to NIST. NIST will
incorporate NRC staff feedback and notify the NRC when the statement is
issued.
b. Within 2 months of the NIST Director's statement, the NCNR
Director will hold an all-hands meeting with NCNR employees for
management to discuss the importance of the above communication. NCNR
will require and document attendance for the all-hands meeting and
maintain that documentation in the NCNR employees training records.
2. Nuclear Safety Program Assessments
a. Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment
i. Within 6 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will hire a third-
party, independent nuclear consultant (consultant) to conduct an
independent third-party nuclear safety culture assessment. The contract
will specify that the consultant will assist NCNR in the implementation
of the recommendations and corrective actions identified in the
assessment to prevent recurrence of the February 3, 2021, event or
similar events at the NBSR.
ii. Prior to issuance of the Request for Quotations, NCNR will
include criteria equivalent to the those described in Section
03.02.c.1, c.2, and c.3 of Inspection Procedure 95003, ``Supplemental
Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded
Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs or One Red Input,'' dated June 7,
2022, to ensure a consultant with the appropriate qualifications is
identified.
iii. Within 6 months of contract award to the consultant, NCNR will
submit a copy of the safety assessment report and NCNR's written
response to the assessment report to the NRC. NCNR's written response
will either address how it will implement the recommendations and
corrective actions of the assessment report, including a proposed
timeline; or provide an explanation and justification for why the
recommendation(s) and corrective action(s) will not be implemented.
iv. Within 2 months of submitting the assessment report to the NRC,
the NCNR Director shall issue written and verbal communications
providing the results of the assessment, recommendations, and
corrective actions to the NCNR staff. At least 30 days prior to issuing
the written communication, NCNR will provide the statement for NRC
staff review. Within 15 days of receiving the statement, the NRC staff
will provide feedback to NCNR staff. NCNR will notify the NRC when the
statement is issued.
v. The assessment will include employee surveys, the review of
anonymous reports, and contractor-conducted interviews and focus groups
to assess the effectiveness of the programs.
vi. NCNR will ensure this consultant is provided with all necessary
materials, reports, and access to personnel to complete its assessment.
The reports shall include the NRC special inspection report dated March
16, 2022, future NRC inspections reports regarding the February 3,
2021, event, and NCNR safety evaluation committee and safety assessment
committee (SEC/SAC) reports.
vii. Within 12 months of completing the initial assessment, the
consultant will perform a second assessment to ensure the
sustainability and effectiveness of the corrective actions within the
identified areas. Within 30 days of receiving the report, NCNR will
submit a copy of the second assessment report to the NRC.
viii. Within 12 months of completing the second assessment, the
consultant will conduct a third assessment to ensure long term
sustainability and effectiveness of the identified recommendations and
corrective actions. Within 30 days of receiving the report, NCNR will
submit a copy of the third assessment report to the NRC.
b. Nuclear Program Assessment(s)
i. Within 12 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will hire one
or more third-party, independent nuclear consultant(s) to conduct an
independent third-party assessment(s) and notify the NRC of the
timeline for the completion of the assessment(s). The contract will
specify that the nuclear consultant(s) will assist NCNR in the
implementation of the recommendations and corrective actions identified
in the assessment(s) to prevent recurrence of the February 3, 2021,
event or similar events at the NBSR. The consultant's (or consultants')
assessment(s) will include recommended corrective actions in the
following areas:
1. Problem Identification and Resolution
2. Event Root Cause
3. Training
4. Procedures
5. Safety Assessment Committee
6. Safety Evaluation Committee independence and effective oversight
ii. Within 3 months of issuance of the assessment report(s) (or
within 3 months of the issuance of the last report, if multiple
contracts are awarded), NCNR will submit a copy of the safety
assessment report(s) and NCNR's written response to the assessment
report(s) to the NRC. NCNR's written response will either address how
it will implement the recommendations and corrective actions of the
assessment report(s), including a proposed timeline; or provide an
explanation and justification for why the recommendation(s) and
corrective action(s) will not be implemented.
iii. Within 2 months of submitting the assessment report(s) to the
NRC, the NCNR Director shall issue written and verbal communications
providing the results of the assessment, recommendations, and
corrective actions to the NCNR staff. At least 30 days prior to issuing
the written communication, NCNR will provide the statement for NRC
staff review. Within 15 days of receiving the statement, the NRC staff
will provide feedback to NCNR staff. NCNR will notify the NRC when the
statement is issued.
iv. NCNR will ensure this consultant is provided with all necessary
materials and access to personnel to complete its assessment, including
NRC inspection reports, SEC/SAC reports, and the interim and final
special inspection reports.
c. Problem Identification and Resolution Program
i. By September 30, 2022, NCNR will develop an Observation program
with program goals to provide for periodic management oversight of
procedures and procedure adherence.
ii. By September 30, 2022, NCNR will develop a System Review Team
program with program goals of reviewing system changes, including but
not limited to components and procedures, and generating reports for
the Aging Reactor Management review.
[[Page 48209]]
iii. By October 31, 2022, NCNR will develop and implement the Level
3 Corrective Action Program.
iv. By December 31, 2022, NCNR will develop and implement the Level
2 Corrective Action Program.
v. By March 31, 2023, NCNR will develop and implement the Level 1
Corrective Action Program.
vi. Within 1 month of program finalization, NCNR will submit
program documentation to the NRC for review and comment.
vii. Within 3 months of NRC comment, NCNR will incorporate NRC
staff feedback.
viii. The NCNR will maintain these programs to track, trend, and
correct failures and deficiencies to prevent recurrence.
d. Employee Concerns
i. Within 6 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will develop a
formal program for NCNR employees to raise concerns. The program will
describe and include methods to address the following types of
concerns:
1. anonymous employee concerns
2. employee protection
3. nuclear safety culture
4. chilling effect
ii. Within 1 month of program development, NCNR will submit program
documentation to the NRC for review and comment.
iii. Within 2 months of NRC comment, NCNR will incorporate NRC
staff feedback and implement and maintain the program.
e. Safety Culture Monitoring Panel
i. Within 9 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will develop a
formal program to monitor the nuclear safety culture informed by the
elements of NEI 09-07, ``Fostering a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture,''
Revision 1.
ii. Within 1 month of program development, NCNR will submit program
documentation to the NRC for review and comment.
iii. Within 2 months of NRC comment, NCNR will incorporate NRC
staff feedback and implement and maintain the program.
3. Training
In addition to the recommendations and corrective actions related
to training identified during the above assessment (see Provision
2.b.i):
a. Prior to any restart, NCNR will conduct training of all licensed
operators on the performance of fuel loading and latch checking
procedures in accordance with ANSI/ANS-15.4-2016, ``American National
Standard Selection and Training of Personnel for Research Reactors.''
NCNR will maintain records of training completion for all licensed
operators.
b. Within 3 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will modify its
requalification plan to specify that every ``reactor operating test or
evaluation'' portion of NCNR licensed operator requalification training
must include ``other reactivity tasks including fuel movements,
insertion and removal of experiments, and rod exchange or movements
without power change'' as one of the five tasks selected from Section
5.4 (as specified in Section 6.2.5) of ANSI/ANS-15.4-2016, ``American
National Standard Selection and Training of Personnel for Research
Reactors.''
4. Procedures
a. Prior to any restart, NCNR will develop, implement, and maintain
a written procedure that covers procedural use and adherence in
accordance with the most recent version of INPO 11-003, ``Guideline for
Excellence in Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence.''
b. Procedures referenced in paragraph 1.d of Section III of this CO
will be subject to inspection prior to any restart.
c. Within 30 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will develop,
implement, and maintain all procedures involving reactor operations
activities in accordance with the most recent version of PPA AP-907-
005, ``Procedure Writers' Manual.''
5. Benchmarking
a. Starting 12 months after CO issuance, NCNR will benchmark one
program (e.g., training, procedure process, corrective action program,
configuration control/change management etc.) each calendar year, to
include site visits and observations at another facility. Because NCNR
is much larger in both thermal output and staffing than most research
and test reactors (RTRs) and operates at a cadence similar to
commercial power reactors, NCNR will not solely benchmark RTRs.
Conversely, the NCNR is a much smaller organization than a commercial
power reactor, so NCNR will also not solely benchmark power reactors.
NCNR shall be strategic when deciding the appropriate facility to
benchmark, selecting a facility with a program commensurate to the one
NCNR is benchmarking. NCNR should also consider input from the nuclear
consultants identified in Provisions 2.a and 2.b on the appropriate
facility programs to benchmark (i.e., a commercial power reactor's
safety culture program; Advanced Test Reactor's problem identification
and resolution program, etc.). Furthermore, benchmarking shall include
multiple levels of NCNR staff and shall not be limited to NCNR senior
management. NCNR will document this activity, observations, and
decisions regarding changes to NCNR's programs.
b. For 3 years following issuance of the CO, at least one NCNR
staff member shall attend 2 of the following relevant industry
conferences per calendar year:
i. National Organization of Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR)
ii. National Association of Employee Concerns Professionals (NAECP)
iii. NRC's Regulatory Information Conference (RIC)
iv. American Nuclear Society (ANS)
v. Department of Energy (DOE), if applicable
6. Employee Engagement
Within 6 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will establish and
maintain a rewards and recognition program to encourage employees to
raise concerns and will incorporate a safety recognition program into
the performance evaluation process. The program will include the
following:
a. encourage informal recognition of safety achievements;
b. establish a formal recognition program with tangible rewards;
c. encourage the staff to seek advice and to proceed with caution;
d. communicate expectations and ensure that safety correspondence
such as near misses, good catches, operating experience, and safety
flash communications are developed and communicated to the workforce.
7. Leadership Accountability
a. Within 12 months of consultant contract award, NCNR will provide
the NRC with documentation of any revisions to the Safety Evaluation
Committee charter as informed by the nuclear consultant(s) selected
under item 2.b.
b. Within 12 months of the contract award discussed in Provision
2.b, NCNR will conduct training for all senior leaders, with support of
the nuclear consultant selected under Provision 2.b, and which will
include training on NUREG-2165, ``Safety Culture Common Language''
(INPO 12-012, ``Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture,'' Revision
1). NCNR will incorporate this leadership training into an annual
required safety culture refresher training for senior leaders.
c. By the beginning of fiscal year 2023, NCNR will develop and
maintain performance appraisal assessment
[[Page 48210]]
criteria for periodic annual evaluations of NCNR supervisors and
managers to assess their performance regarding nuclear safety culture.
d. Within 12 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will present at
a publicly attended annual conference (such as TRTR, NAECP, ANS). If
asked by the NRC, NCNR will also present at the RIC. The presentation
will address the cause of the February 3, 2021, event and corrective
actions taken by NCNR and will include a discussion of the NRC's
findings. Two months prior to the conference, NCNR will submit the
presentation to the NRC for review and comment, and NCNR will
incorporate any comments from the NRC staff into the final
presentation.
e. Within 3 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will provide a
timeline to address staffing challenges to the NRC for review.
8. Technical Issues
a. Within 3 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will provide an
assessment of options to replace NCNR's reliance upon administrative
controls/actions to ensure that fuel assemblies are adequately latched.
b. Within 6 months of any restart of regular reactor operations
(defined as the return to 24 hour/day operations at 20 MW), NCNR will
implement the condition-based monitoring systems for nuclear
instrumentation that could provide a very early warning to control room
operators of mechanical anomalies during reactor startup.
c. Within 12 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will develop an
engineered solution to automatically secure carbon dioxide following a
major SCRAM. NCNR will implement the proposed solution using the
appropriate regulatory process or provide the NRC with an engineering
analysis that includes a justification for not implementing a design
change.
d. Within 12 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will provide an
assessment of the configuration management process and how it is
incorporated with problem identification and resolution processes.
9. Upon completion of the terms of items of the CO, NCNR will
provide the NRC with a letter discussing its basis for concluding that
the requirements of this Order have been adequately implemented.
In the event of the transfer of the license of NCNR to another
entity, the terms and conditions set forth hereunder shall continue to
apply to the new entity and accordingly survive any transfer of
ownership or license.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax,
rescind, or withdraw any of the above conditions upon demonstration by
NCNR or its successors of good cause.
VI
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR 2.309, any person
adversely affected by this CO, other than NIST/NCNR, may request a
hearing within 30 calendar days of the date of issuance of this CO.
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the
time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made
in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of
good cause for the extension.
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene (petition), any
motion or other document filed in the proceeding prior to the
submission of a petition, and documents filed by interested
governmental entities that request to participate under 10 CFR
2.315(c), must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72
FR 49139; August 28, 2007, as amended at 77 FR 46562; August 3, 2012).
The E-Filing process requires participants to submit and serve all
adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some cases to mail
copies on electronic storage media. Detailed guidance on making
electronic submissions may be found in the Guidance for Electronic
Submissions to the NRC and on the NRC website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. Participants may not submit paper copies of
their filings unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the
procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by
telephone at 301-415-1677, to (1) request a digital identification (ID)
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign submissions and access the E-Filing
system for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a petition or
other adjudicatory document (even in instances in which the
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic
docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on the NRC's public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/getting-started.html. Once a participant has obtained a
digital ID certificate and a docket has been created, the participant
can then submit adjudicatory documents. Submissions must be in Portable
Document Format (PDF). Additional guidance on PDF submissions is
available on the NRC's public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. A filing is considered complete at the
time the document is submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
document on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for
and receive a digital ID certificate before adjudicatory documents are
filed so that they can obtain access to the documents via the E-Filing
system.
A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC's Electronic
Filing Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's
public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by
email to [email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-
7640. The NRC Electronic Filing Help Desk is available between 9 a.m.
and 6 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government
holidays.
Participants who believe that they have good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
stating why there is good cause for not filing electronically and
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by (1) first class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear
[[Page 48211]]
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking
and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited
delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications
Staff. Participants filing adjudicatory documents in this manner are
responsible for serving the document on all other participants. Filing
is considered complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in
the mail, or by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service
upon depositing the document with the provider of the service. A
presiding officer, having granted an exemption request from using E-
Filing, may require a participant or party to use E-Filing if the
presiding officer subsequently determines that the reason for granting
the exemption from use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
https://adams.nrc.gov/ehd, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
Commission or the presiding officer. If you do not have an NRC-issued
digital ID certificate as described above, click ``cancel'' when the
link requests certificates and you will be automatically directed to
the NRC's electronic hearing dockets where you will be able to access
any publicly available documents in a particular hearing docket.
Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information,
such as social security numbers, home addresses, or personal phone
numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law
requires submission of such information. For example, in some
instances, individuals provide home addresses in order to demonstrate
proximity to a facility or site. With respect to copyrighted works,
except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory
filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are
requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission.
The Commission will issue a notice or order granting or denying a
petition, designating the issues for any hearing that will be held, and
designating the Presiding Officer. A notice granting a hearing will be
published in the Federal Register and served on the parties to the
hearing.
If a person (other than NIST/NCNR) requests a hearing, that person
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is
adversely affected by this CO and shall address the criteria set forth
in 10 CFR 2.309(d) and (f). If a hearing is requested by a person whose
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an order
designating the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this CO
should be sustained.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section V above shall be final 30 days from the date of
this CO without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time
for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in
Section V shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing
request has not been received.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated this 1st day of August 2022.
Mark D. Lombard,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2022-16949 Filed 8-5-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P