[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 161 (Monday, August 22, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51454-51463]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-18031]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-0320; NRC-2022-0156]
TMI-2 Solutions, LLC; Three Mile Island Station, Unit No. 2
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: License amendment application; opportunity to comment, request
a hearing, and to petition for leave to intervene; order imposing
procedures.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an amendment to Possession Only License (POL) No. DPR-73,
issued to TMI-2 Solutions, LLC (TMI-2 Solutions) for Three Mile Island
Station, Unit No. 2 (TMI-2). Pursuant to NRC regulations, TMI-2
Solutions proposes an amendment to the POL for TMI-2. This proposed
license amendment request (LAR), upon approval, would revise the POL
and the associated Technical Specifications (TS) to support the
transition of TMI-2 from Post Defueled Monitoring Storage (PDMS) to
that of a facility undergoing decommissioning. The proposed amendment
would revise the POL and TS to support Phase 1b and Phase 2
decommissioning activities associated with achieving the removal of all
debris material,\1\ its transfer to dry cask storage at an Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation or to a suitable waste storage area,
and the relocation of various requirements and the sealed sources TS to
the TMI-2 Decommissioning Quality Assurance Plan (DQAP). For this
amendment request, the NRC proposes to determine that it involves no
significant hazards consideration (NSHC). Because the amendment request
contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI), an
order imposes procedures to obtain access to SUNSI for contention
preparation by persons who file a hearing request or petition for leave
to intervene.
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\1\ Debris material is defined by the licensee as pieces of
spent nuclear fuel, damaged core material, and high-level waste
(collectively called, ``Debris Material'').
DATES: Submit comments by September 21, 2022. Requests for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene must be filed by October 21, 2022. Any
potential party as defined in Section 2.4 of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) who believes access to SUNSI is necessary
to respond to this notice must request document access by September 1,
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2022.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods;
however, the NRC encourages electronic comment submission through the
Federal rulemaking website:
Federal rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0156. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
Mail comments to: Office of Administration, Mail Stop:
TWFN-7-A60M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff.
For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting
comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amy Snyder, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-6822, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2022-0156 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain
publicly available information related to this action by any of the
following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0156.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select
[[Page 51455]]
``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please
contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. For the
convenience of the reader, instructions about obtaining materials
referenced in this document are provided in the ``Availability of
Documents'' section.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET), Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
B. Submitting Comments
The NRC encourages electronic comment submission through the
Federal rulemaking website (https://www.regulations.gov). Please
include Docket ID NRC-2022-0156 in your comment submission.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at
https://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions
into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove such information before making the comment submissions available
to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS.
II. Introduction
The NRC is considering issuance of an amendment to POL No. DPR-73,
issued to TMI-2 Solutions for TMI-2 located in Dauphin County,
Pennsylvania.
By letter dated February 19, 2021, as supplemented on May 5, 2021,
January 7, 2022, March 23, 2022, April 7, 2022, and May 16, 2022, TMI-2
Solutions, submitted a LAR seeking NRC review and approval of an
amendment request to the POL and Appendix A, TS, of POL No. DPR-73 for
TMI-2. In its application, TMI-2 Solutions states that the revised TMI-
2 POL and TS applicable during decommissioning are referred to as the
Decommissioning TS. This amendment, if approved, would revise the POL
and the associated TS to support the transition of TMI-2 from a PDMS
condition to that of a facility undergoing radiological decommissioning
using the DECON method pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7).
The licensee proposes to eliminate those TS that are no longer
applicable based on current plant radiological conditions and updated
safe fuel mass limits. The licensee also proposes changes to TS
limiting conditions for PDMS, definitions, surveillance requirements,
and administrative controls, as well as several license conditions.
Upon issuance, this proposed amendment will modify the 10 CFR part 50
license and the TS to support entry into DECON. TMI-2 Solutions intends
to complete decommissioning of TMI-2 and release the site by 2037,
except for an area set aside, as may be required, for debris material
storage facilities.
TMI-2 Solutions also proposes to relocate administrative controls
from Section 6, ``Administrative Controls,'' to the DQAP, and to
subsequently control them in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a) pursuant
to the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.36 and in accordance with the
recommendations, guidance, and purpose of NRC Administrative Letter 95-
06. TMI-2 Solutions proposes to relocate the content of these
administrative controls into the DQAP verbatim except for TS sectional
cross references.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the NRC will
need to make the findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, and NRC's regulations.
The NRC has made a proposed determination that the LAR involves
NSHC. Under the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' this means that operation of the facility in accordance
with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR
50.91(a), the licensee provided an analysis of the issue of NSHC. The
NRC staff reviewed this analysis and provided its preliminary
evaluation of it below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes would revise the TMI-2 POL and TS by deleting
or modifying certain portions of the TS that are no longer applicable
to TMI-2 as it transitions from PDMS to decommissioning. These changes
are consistent with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36 for the
contents of TS.
Following Phase 1a of decommissioning, TMI-2 will enter Phase 1b
and Phase 2 of decommissioning. During Phase 1b and Phase 2, major
decommissioning activities as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 will be performed.
Based on preliminarily evaluating the licensee's LAR, as supplemented,
the NRC preliminarily concludes that none of the events evaluated would
exceed the applicable limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) and that there
are no postulated accidents that can occur at the TMI-2 facility during
Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning that would result in the dose at
the site boundary exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the EPA
PAGs including such times as when the containment engineered access
equipment hatch is open. The NRC staff has requested additional
information (July 29, 2022) regarding the uncertainty in the licensee's
accident analysis so that it can complete its safety review and make a
final determination regarding NSHC.
As part of the review of the LAR, as supplemented, the NRC staff
preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions' conclusions that the
deletion of TS 3/4.1, ``Containment'', does not cause a change in
facility conditions, design function, or analysis that verifies the
ability of System Structures and Components (SSCs) to perform a design
function. During Phase 1b and Phase 2 of decommissioning, the Radiation
Protection Program and associated implementing procedures will provide
the controls necessary to manage residual contamination. Therefore, it
is reasonable to preliminarily conclude that containment will continue
to function as a contamination barrier. TMI-2 Solutions states in its
February 19, 2021, application that airborne radiation monitoring will
be provided at the engineered containment openings. Also, TMI-2
Solutions states that procedures will be used to control routine
containment access. Because TMI-2 Solutions commits to have engineered
openings in containment, the reactor building breather (vent) would no
longer provide a preferred
[[Page 51456]]
path to the atmosphere. TMI-2 Solutions states in its February 19,
2021, application that it will not take any credit for the containment
as a pressure containing boundary and therefore unfiltered leak rate
testing of the containment is no longer applicable.
Also, in its May 16, 2022, supplement, TMI-2 Solutions states that
the basic changes in the reactor building in going from PDMS to DECON
are removal of the Equipment Hatch, squaring off of the hole left from
equipment hatch removal, and installation of a barrier at the interface
between the reactor building and the outside structure. Further, TMI-2
Solutions states in its May 16, 2022, supplement that credit is being
taken for the reactor building as a passive radiological barrier to the
extent that the door between the reactor building and the outside
structure would only be open for the period of time necessary to allow
passage of material or personnel between the two structures. TMI-2
Solutions states in its May 16, 2022, supplement that during DECON,
other openings may be made in the containment structure. For openings,
TMI-2 Solutions states it will follow good ALARA practices by ensuring
that these openings will also include passive radiological barriers.
Additionally, TMI-2 Solutions explains that during normal operation,
any air flow would be into containment due to operation of the Reactor
Building Purge Exhaust System.
In its May 16, 2022, supplement, TMI-2 Solutions states that the
most limiting scenario is a reactor building fire, which is not based
on any specific event. Its main purpose is to demonstrate that even if
high efficiency particulate air [filter] (HEPA) filtration was
bypassed, the event would not exceed 100 mrem to the maximally exposed
individual, the standard for declaring a Site Area Emergency at an
operating nuclear power plant. In its May 16, 2022, supplement, TMI-2
Solutions states that it has reanalyzed the reactor building fire
scenario to demonstrate the additional margin that exists. The
calculation incorporated a more appropriate fractional airborne release
factor as used in NUREG/CR-0130.
The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the deletion of TS 3/
4.2, ``Reactor Vessel Fuel,'' does not cause a change in facility
conditions, design function, or analysis that verifies the ability of
SSCs to perform a design function and does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
TS 3/4.3, ``Crane Operations,'' prohibits loads over 50,000 lbs.
from travel over the Reactor Vessel (RV). The licensee indicates in its
NSHC (February 19, 2021, submittal) that the deletion of TS 3/4.3 does
not cause a change in facility conditions, design function, or analysis
that verifies the ability of SSCs to perform a design function. In its
February 19, 2021, LAR, TMI-2 Solutions states that PDMS TS
requirements associated with this TS are not applicable in Phase 1b and
Phase 2 of decommissioning because there are no limiting conditions for
the license. Also, TMI-2 Solutions explains in its LAR, as
supplemented, that TS 3/4.3, ``Crane Operations,'' is not relevant
because none of the four requirements in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) are
applicable, based on its evaluation provided in Section 3.1,
``Applicable Regulatory Requirement,'' of its LAR (February 19, 2022).
The NRC staff reviewed this section of the application and
preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions for the following reasons:
(1) TMI-2 does not have a reactor coolant pressure boundary; therefore,
the requirements of Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(A) are not
applicable; (2) TMI-2 is no longer licensed to operate therefore the
requirements of Criterion 2c of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(B) is not
applicable; (3) TMI-2 cranes do not provide a function required to
mitigate the effect of unanticipated occurrences such as fire; and (4)
There are no TS associated with Phase 1b or Phase 2 other than annual
effluent monitoring reporting, hence there are no limiting conditions
for operation.
In its LAR, TMI-2 Solutions states that the PDMS TS requirements
associated with TS 3/4.3 ``Crane Operations,'' are not applicable in
Phase 1b and Phase 2. TMI-2 Solutions also states that TS 3/4.3 does
not satisfy any of the four requirements established in 10 CFR
50.36(c)(2)(ii) and provides its reasons for its conclusions. Further,
TMI-2 Solutions argues, because of the above, it is not required to
have a hoisting and rigging program but has elected to develop one to
address movement of loads at TMI-2 because it will provide a high
degree of assurance that a load drop will not occur. The NRC staff
preliminarily concludes that the hoisting and rigging program will
serve the same purpose as the TS, as applicable to decommissioning.
Further, TMI-2 Solutions commits to prepare lift plans for all non-
standard lifts, as directed by the hoisting and rigging program. TMI-2
Solutions, in its LAR, as supplemented, explains that the purpose of
the hoisting and rigging program is to define the minimum requirements
for the safe operations of cranes and hoists. Also, TMI-2 Solution
indicates that the hoisting and rigging program will provide detailed
requirements for training and qualification of personnel, inspection
and maintenance of cranes or hoists, the safe use of rigging equipment
as well as direction for performing non-standard lifts to ensure that
lifting operations are performed in a safe manner. Based on its review
of the LAR, as supplemented, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees with
TMI-2 Solutions' conclusion that the use of the hoisting and rigging
program provides a defense-in-depth approach to preventing a load drop
from occurring. TMI-2 Solutions states in its LAR that crane design
features such as load cells, and travel stops will be used, as required
by the hoisting and rigging program, to ensure safe travel paths and
barriers will be provided as per the lift plan, as required, to
preclude the effects of a load drop.
TMI-2 Solutions submitted a calculation (Attachment 5 of its
February 19, 2021, submittal, as supplemented on April 7, 2022) that
assesses increasing the Safe Fuel Mass Limit (SFML) from 42 kg to
approximately 1200 kg. The analysis states that it is not credible to
have 1200 kg U in an idealized configuration for criticality to occur
during Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning. TMI-2 Solutions explains
that there are no credible operational upsets to realize the ideal
configuration. TMI-2 Solutions concludes that even if the upset
occurred, it would require fissile mass in excess of that analyzed,
which is in excess of what could occur. The NRC staff reviewed this
analysis, finds its assumptions reasonable, and therefore,
preliminarily agrees with this conclusion. Therefore, based on its
review described above, the NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the
deletion of TS 3/4.3 ``Crane Operations'' does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
TMI-2 Solutions in its LAR proposes to delete TS definitions and
rules of usage and application that will not be applicable during Phase
1b and Phase 2 decommissioning and concludes that these changes have no
impact on facility SSCs or the methods of operation of such SSCs. Based
on the NRC staff's review of the LAR, the NRC staff preliminarily
concludes that the proposed relocation of certain administrative
requirements as allowed by Administrative Letter 95-06 (Reference 6)
would not affect operating procedures or administrative controls
[[Page 51457]]
that have the function of ensuring the safe management of debris
material or decommissioning of the facility. Therefore, the NRC staff
preliminarily concludes that the proposed amendment would not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the proposed changes to
delete and/or modify the TS would not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from that previously evaluated. The
removal of the TS applicable in Phase 1a of decommissioning cannot
result in different or more adverse accidents than previously evaluated
because there are no new credible failure mechanisms, or accident
initiators not considered in the design and licensing basis for Phase
1b of decommissioning. Following Phase 1a of decommissioning, TMI-2
will enter Phase 1b and Phase 2 of decommissioning. During Phase 1b and
Phase 2, major decommissioning activities as defined in 10 CFR 50.2
will be performed. As discussed in Attachment 1 to TMI-2 Solutions' May
16, 2022, supplement, a reactor building fire has been evaluated and
determined to be the accident that could occur during decommissioning
that would maximize dose at the site boundary. TMI-2 Solutions states
that the reactor building fire is the most limiting scenario and it is
not based on any specific event. Its main purpose is to demonstrate
that even if HEPA Filtration was bypassed, the event would not exceed
100 mrem to the maximally exposed individual, the standard for
declaring a Site Area Emergency at an operating nuclear power plant. In
Attachment 2 of the May 16, 2022, supplement, TMI-2 has reanalyzed the
reactor building fire scenario to demonstrate the additional margin
that exists. TMI-2 Solutions states in its May 16, 2022, supplement
that the calculation incorporated a more appropriate fractional
airborne release factor as used in NUREG/CR-0130. TMI-2 states in its
LAR, as supplemented, that there are no postulated accidents that can
occur at the TMI-2 facility during Phase 1b or Phase 2 of
decommissioning that would result in the dose at the site boundary
exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the EPA PAGs including such
times as when the containment engineered access equipment hatch is
open. Further, the NRC staff notes that the TMI-2 Radiation Protection
Program would identify the controls that will be implemented through
procedures during decommissioning and decontamination activities
occurring inside of the reactor building.
The use of these Radiation Protection Program implementing
procedures take into account detailed work planning and execution of
the decommissioning and decontamination work and support activities,
including measures to maintain occupational dose As Low As Reasonably
Achievable and below the occupational dose limits in 10 CFR part 20
during decommissioning. TMI-2 Solutions states in its LAR, as
supplemented, that procedures associated with Phase 1b of
decommissioning will be developed to retrieve the remaining core debris
or debris material and decontaminate high radiation areas. TMI-2
Solutions also commits that it will develop appropriate procedures for
Phase 2.
The NRC staff reviewed this analysis, finds its assumptions
reasonable, and therefore, preliminarily agrees with the TMI-2
Solutions conclusion that the deletion of TS 3/4.1 ``Containment'' does
not cause a change in facility conditions, nor does it cause a change
in design function. TMI-2 Solutions notes in its application that the
function of the containment--to maintain the isolation of residual
contamination during Phase 1a decommissioning--remains unchanged. The
NRC staff preliminarily agrees that during Phase 1b and 2 of
decommissioning, the Radiation Protection Program and associated
implementing procedures will provide the controls necessary to manage
residual contamination and that the containment would continue to
function as a contamination barrier. TMI-2 Solutions states in its
application that airborne radiation monitoring will be provided at the
engineered containment openings (e.g., Equipment Hatch Opening) and
that procedures will be used to control routine containment access.
With the construction of the engineered openings in containment, the
NRC staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that the reactor
building breather (vent) no longer provides a preferred path to the
atmosphere. TMI-2 Solutions explains in its February 19, 2021,
application that no credit is taken for the containment as a pressure
containing boundary and therefore unfiltered leak rate testing of the
containment is no longer applicable.
The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the dose at the site
boundary associated with the events described in Attachment 1 to TMI-2
February 19, 2021, LAR, as supplemented on May 16, 2022, does not
exceed the requirements of 10 CFR 100.11, as well as the EPA PAGs. The
NRC staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that the deletion
of TS 3/4.1 ``Containment'' would not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated
relative to Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning.
TS 3/4.2 ``Reactor Vessel Fuel'' establishes a SFML for the PDMS
condition, which ensures that the amount of core debris that may be
removed from the RV or rearranged in the RV during PDMS does not exceed
42kg. This SFML limit is specified to ensure subcriticality even after
dual errors.
The NRC preliminarily agrees that the deletion of TS 3/4.2 does not
cause a change in facility conditions, nor does it cause a change in
design function. TMI-2 Solutions provides a calculation in Attachment 5
of its February 19, 2021, LAR, as supplemented on April 7, 2022,
stating that this calculation provides the basis to increase the SFML
from 42 kg to 1200 kg. Also, TMI-2 Solutions states that the result of
this calculation demonstrates that the entire mass of the core debris
material cannot be configured into an arrangement whereby a criticality
event is possible and that Keff could not exceed 0.95. The
NRC staff reviewed this analysis, finds its assumptions reasonable, and
therefore, preliminarily agrees with this conclusion.
Therefore, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees that the deletion of
TS 3/4.2 ``Reactor Vessel Fuel'' does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated relative to Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning.
During PDMS, loads over 50,000 lbs. are prohibited from travel over
the RV. The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the deletion of TS
3/4.3 ``Crane Operations'' would not cause a change in facility
conditions, nor does it cause a change in design function. As discussed
in Section 2 ``Detailed Description and Basis for The Changes,'' of the
February 19, 2021, submittal for Phase 1b and Phase 2 of
decommissioning, TMI-2 Solutions states it will develop a hoisting and
rigging program that addresses movement of loads at TMI-2. Also, TMI-2
Solutions explains in its LAR that this program will define the minimum
requirements for the safe operations of cranes and hoists. Also, TMI-2
explains that this program will provide detailed requirements, as
[[Page 51458]]
applicable, for training and qualification of personnel, inspection and
maintenance of cranes or hoists, the safe use of rigging equipment as
well as direction for performing non-standard lifts to ensure that
lifting operations are performed in a safe manner. TMI-2 Solutions
indicates in its February 19, 2021, application that it will develop
lift plans for all lifts as directed by the hoisting and rigging
program where a load drop or load impingement could contribute to
release or dispersal of radioactive material to the environment which
could exceed threshold for an unusual event.
The NRC staff preliminary agrees with TMI-2 Solutions statement
that the hoisting and rigging program provides a defense in depth
approach to preventing a load drop from occurring. TMI-2 Solutions
commits to use, as required by the hoisting and rigging program, crane
design features such as load cells, and travel stops, to ensure safe
travel paths. TMI-2 Solutions commits to provide barriers as required
to preclude the effects of a load drop.
A calculation has been performed by TMI-2 Solutions (Attachment 5
of the February 19, 2021, submittal and as supplemented on April 7,
2022) that assesses increasing the SFML from 42 kg to approximately
1200 kg. The analysis states that it is not credible to have 1200 kg U
in an idealized configuration for criticality to occur during Phase 1b
or Phase 2 of decommissioning and that there are no credible
operational upsets to realize the ideal configuration but even in the
event that the upset occurs, it would require fissile mass in excess of
that analyzed, which is in excess of what could occur, in addition to a
greatly reduced impurity concentration to present a criticality hazard.
Therefore, NRC preliminarily concludes that the deletion of TS 3/4.3
``Crane Operations'' does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated
relative to Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning.
The TMI-2 sealed sources are maintained at Three Mile Island
Station, Unit No. 1 (TMl-1) and managed by Constellation Energy, LLC
under a program compliant with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.39(c).
Therefore, deleting TS 3/4.4 ``Sealed Sources'' from the TMI-2 TS and
relocating the TS requirements to the DQAP, as noted in TMI-2 Solutions
January 7, 2022, supplement, does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated
relative to Phase 1b or Phase 2 decommissioning.
Based on the above, the NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the
proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident due to credible new failure mechanisms, malfunctions,
or accident initiators not considered in the licensing bases documents.
Further, the NRC preliminarily concludes that decommissioning
operations in Phase 1b and Phase 2 decommissioning are bounded by the
events described in Attachment 1 of the February 19, 2021, submittal,
as supplemented on May 16, 2022.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes would revise the TMI-2 POL and TS by deleting
or modifying certain portions of the TS that are no longer applicable
to TMI-2 as it transitions from PDMS to decommissioning. These changes
are consistent with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36 for the
contents of TS.
The Phase 1a decommissioning condition is a continuation of the
PDMS condition. No major decommissioning activities will occur in Phase
1a. During Phase 1a of decommissioning, containment isolation assures
that the containment continues to perform as a contamination barrier
preventing residual contamination from release from inside the
containment.'' TMI-2 Solutions, explains in Section 2 ``Detailed
Description and Basis for the Changes'' of its February 19, 2021,
application, as supplemented on May 16, 2022, that the radiological
consequences associated with the ``fire inside containment''
unanticipated event, does not exceed the applicable limits of 10 CFR
100.11 and the EPA PAGs.
Following Phase 1a, TMI-2 will enter Phase 1b and Phase 2 of
decommissioning. During Phase 1b, major decommissioning activities as
defined in 10 CFR 50.2 will be performed. Based on the consequences of
the postulated events in Attachment 2 of TMI-2 Solutions February 19,
2021, application, as supplemented on May 16, 2022, TMI-2 Solutions
concludes that none of the events evaluated involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
TMI-2 Solutions states in its February 19, 2021, application that
there are no postulated accidents that can occur inside of the reactor
building during Phase 1b or Phase 2 that result in the dose at the site
boundary exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the EPA PAGs
including such times as when the containment engineered access
equipment hatch is open.
TMI-2 Solutions states in its LAR, that during Phase 1a of
decommissioning, isolation assures that the containment continues to
perform as a contamination barrier preventing residual contamination
from release from inside the containment.TMI-2 states in its February
19, 2021, application, as supplemented on May 16, 2022, that there are
no postulated accidents that can occur inside of the reactor building
during Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning that result in the dose
at the site boundary exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the EPA
PAGs including such times as when the containment engineered access
equipment hatch is open. Further, the NRC staff notes that the TMI-2
Radiation Protection Program will identify the controls that will be
implemented through procedures during decommissioning and
decontamination activities occurring inside of the reactor building.
The use of these Radiation Protection Program implementing procedures
takes into account detailed work planning, and execution of the
decommissioning and decontamination work and support activities,
including measures to maintain occupational dose As Low As Reasonably
Achievable and below the occupational dose limits in 10 CFR part 20
during decommissioning. TMI-2 Solutions states in its LAR that
procedures associated with Phase 1b of decommissioning will be
developed to retrieve the remaining core debris and decontaminate high
radiation areas. TMI-2 Solutions also commits that it will develop
appropriate procedures for Phase 2.
TMI-2 Solutions concludes that the deletion of TS 3/4.1
``Containment'' does not exceed or alter a design basis or safety
limit. The function of the containment is to confine residual
radioactivity that otherwise might be released to the atmosphere during
reactor building decommissioning. The NRC staff reviewed this analysis,
finds its assumptions reasonable, and therefore, preliminarily agrees
with TMI-2 Solutions' conclusions that the deletion of TS 3/4.1
``Containment'' does not significantly reduce the margin of safety
during Phase 1b and Phase 2.
Also, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees that during Phase 1b and 2
of decommissioning, the Radiation Protection Program and associated
implementing procedures will provide the controls necessary to manage
residual contamination and that the containment would continue to
function as a contamination barrier. TMI-2
[[Page 51459]]
Solutions states in its application that airborne radiation monitoring
will be provided at the engineered containment openings (e.g.,
Equipment Hatch Opening) and that procedures will be used to control
routine containment access. With the construction of the engineered
openings in containment, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2
Solutions that the reactor building breather (vent) no longer provides
a preferred path to the atmosphere. TMI-2 Solutions explains in its
February 19, 2021, application, as supplemented on May 26, 2022, that
no credit is taken for the containment as a pressure containing
boundary, and therefore, unfiltered leak rate testing of the
containment is no longer applicable.
The NRC staff preliminarily agrees with the licensee's NHSC
conclusion in its LAR that the dose at the site boundary associated
with the events described in Attachment 1 to TMI-2 February 19, 2021,
application, as supplement on May 26, 2022, does not exceed the
requirements of 10 CFR 100.11, as well as the EPA PAGs. The NRC staff
preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that the deletion of TS 3/4.1
``Containment'' is appropriate for the reasons stated above. Therefore,
the NRC staff preliminarily concludes that deletion of TS 3/4.1
``Containment'' does not significantly reduce the margin of safety
during Phase 1b and Phase 2.
TS 3/4.2 ``Reactor Vessel Fuel'' establishes a SFML for the PDMS
condition, which ensures that the amount of core debris that may be
removed from the RV or rearranged in the RV during PDMS does not exceed
42 kg. This SFML limit is specified to ensure subcriticality even after
dual errors. TMI-2 Solutions provides a calculation in Attachment 5 of
its February 19, 2021, application, supplemented on April 7, 2022,
which it states provides the basis to increase the SFML from 42 kg to
1200 kg. TMI-2 Solutions states that the current SFML was developed
based solely on credible upper bounds for input parameters as opposed
to sample data or realistic conditions. TMI-2 Solutions based the
proposed revision to the SFML upon existing data and known conditions.
TMI-2 Solutions states that these inputs are still considered to be
reasonably and sufficiently conservative for their use in development
of the proposed 1200 kg SFML. Further, TMI-2 Solutions explains that
the derived SFML bounds the entire expected fissile mass inventory
throughout all physically separated areas within the reactor building.
TMI-2 Solutions states that the bounding fissile mass used to
produce the SFML is assembled in idealized conditions that cannot
credibly exist during decommissioning operations. TMI-2 Solutions
explains that even if the expected remaining fissile mass throughout
the building, including hold up in all piping and cubicles were to be
brought together, a criticality is not feasible. TMI-2 Solutions
indicates that there are no credible operational upsets to realize the
ideal configuration for criticality but even in the event that the
upset occurs, it would require fissile mass in excess of that analyzed,
which is in excess of what could occur. In addition, TMI-2 states that
the SFML is based on a significantly reduced impurity concentration
below that demonstrated to be present. The Keff for the new
SFML in the idealized static conditions does not exceed 0.95. The
calculation of the new SFML states that the entire mass of the core
debris material cannot be configured into an arrangement whereby a
criticality event is possible. Debris material removal operations will
involve loading 12-14 storage casks with each cask containing less than
the total SFML calculated for Phase 1b of decommissioning. The NRC
staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that the overall
subcritical nature, namely inherent elemental constituents, of the fuel
debris remaining at the TMI-2 facility today is equivalent to that
associated with the fuel debris at TMI-2 prior to defueling operations.
TMI-2 Solutions states that the presence of some intact fuel, and the
results of sampling campaigns conducted prior to defueling indicating
slight impurity gradients through the RV did not easily allow the
application of a representative fuel composition to the entirety of the
core during the development of the previous SFML. Further, TMI-2
Solutions explains that static and accident conditions analyzed after
defueling merely credited the minimum concentration of impurities to
ensure the facility was safe. In each of these scenarios, the applied
conservatisms are different. TMI-2 believes that currently, core debris
in the lower head region of the RV is most representative of what
remains in the RV at the present time. Therefore, TMI-2 Solutions
explains in its LAR that a reasonable representative impurity
concentration can be applied to the homogenized mass in development of
a new SFML for decontamination and decommissioning. NRC staff
preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that a conservative approach
to adequately represent the inherent characteristics of the remaining
fuel debris can be taken with respect to the development of an SFML for
the remaining decommissioning activities. This approach would not
necessarily be applicable for the previous defueling operations or the
related SFML developed at that time. TMI-2 Solutions indicates in its
LAR that the current SFML was conservatively derived and, coupled with
the conservatively estimated masses and the planned decommissioning
operations, provides significant and adequate margin of safety that
ensures that the potential for a criticality is not credible.
Also, TMI-2 Solutions explains in its LAR that the proposed change
would not exceed or alter the SFML design basis as presented in the
Final Safety Analysis Report and Keff for the new SFML does
not exceed 0.95.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's NSHC in its LAR for the SFML
analysis, and based on the above, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees
with the licensee's analysis and finds its assumptions reasonable.
Therefore, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions'
conclusions that the proposed amendment would not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, the NRC staff preliminarily
concludes that deletion of PDMS TS 3/4.2 ``Reactor Vessel Fuel'' does
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety during Phase
1b and Phase 2.
As part of the PDMS condition, loads over 50,000 lbs. are
prohibited from travel over the RV. TMI-2 Solutions in its LAR, states
that the deletion of TS 3/4.3 would not exceed or alter a design basis
or safety limit because there are no limiting conditions on operations.
Further TMI-2 states in its LAR that there are no SSCs that would
prevent safe shut down of the reactor. The NRC staff notes that the
reactor is no longer operating and has permanently ceased operations as
documented on February 13, 2013. As discussed in Section 2 ``Detailed
Description and Basis for The Changes,'' for Phase 1b and Phase 2 of
decommissioning, TMI-2 Solutions committed to develop a hoisting and
rigging program that addresses movement of loads at TMI-2. The purpose
of the hoisting and rigging program is to define the minimum
requirements for the safe operations of cranes and hoists. The hoisting
and rigging program would provide as applicable, detailed requirements
for training and qualification of personnel, inspection and maintenance
of cranes or hoists, the safe use of rigging equipment as well as
direction for performing non-standard lifts to ensure that lifting
operations are performed in a safe manner. TMI-2 Solutions has
[[Page 51460]]
committed in its February 19, 2021, application to develop a lift plan
for all lifts as directed by the hoisting and rigging program where a
load drop or load impingement could contribute to release or dispersal
of radioactive material to the environment could exceed the threshold
for an unusual event.
The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that implementation of the
hoisting and rigging program provides a defense in depth approach to
preventing a load drop from occurring. TMI-2 Solutions has committed to
address crane design features such as load cells, and travel stops, as
required, to ensure safe travel paths. Also, TMI-2 Solutions has
committed that it will provide barriers as required to preclude the
effects of a load drop. TMI-2 Solutions provided a calculation found in
Attachment 5 of its February 19, 2021, application that assesses
increasing the SFML from 42 kg to approximately 1200 kg. As stated in
the calculation, it is not credible to have 1200 kg U in an idealized
configuration for criticality to occur. There are no credible
operational upsets to realize the ideal configuration but even if the
upset occurs, it would require fissile mass in excess of that analyzed,
which is in excess of what could occur in addition to a greatly reduced
impurity concentration to present a criticality hazard. Therefore, the
NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the deletion of TS 3/4.3 ``Crane
Operations'' does not significantly reduce the margin of safety during
Phase 1b and Phase 2.
The TMI-2 sealed sources are maintained at TMI-1 and managed by
Constellation Energy, LLC under a program compliant with the
requirements of 10 CFR 70.39(c). Deleting TS 3/4.4 ``Sealed Sources''
from the TMI-2 TS and relocating the TS requirements to the DQAP, as
noted in TMI-2 Solutions' January 7, 2022, supplement, does not involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed changes do not affect remaining plant operations,
systems, or components supporting decommissioning activities. The
proposed changes do not result in a change in initial conditions, or in
any other parameter affecting the course of the remaining
decommissioning activity accident analysis. Therefore, the NRC
preliminarily concludes that the proposed changes do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, NRC preliminarily concludes that the proposed
amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under
the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding
of NSHC is justified.
III. Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Petition for Leave To
Intervene
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any
persons (petitioner) whose interest may be affected by any of these
actions may file a request for a hearing and petition for leave to
intervene (petition) with respect to that action. Petitions shall be
filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Agency Rules of Practice
and Procedure'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a
current copy of 10 CFR 2.309. If a petition is filed, the Commission or
a presiding officer will rule on the petition and, if appropriate, a
notice of a hearing will be issued.
Petitions must be filed no later than 60 days from the date of
publication of this notice in accordance with the filing instructions
in the ``Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)'' section of this document.
Petitions and motions for leave to file new or amended contentions that
are filed after the deadline will not be entertained absent a
determination by the presiding officer that the filing demonstrates
good cause by satisfying the three factors in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)
through (iii).
If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of NSHC, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of NSHC. The final determination will serve
to establish when the hearing is held. If the final determination is
that the amendment request involves NSHC, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing would take place after issuance of
the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment request
involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing held
would take place before the issuance of the amendment unless the
Commission finds an imminent danger to the health or safety of the
public, in which case it will issue an appropriate order or rule under
10 CFR part 2.
A State, local governmental body, Federally recognized Indian
Tribe, or designated agency thereof, may submit a petition to the
Commission to participate as a party under 10 CFR 2.309(h) no later
than 60 days from the date of publication of this notice.
Alternatively, a State, local governmental body, Federally recognized
Indian Tribe, or agency thereof may participate as a non-party under 10
CFR 2.315(c).
For information about filing a petition and about participation by
a person not a party under 10 CFR 2.315, see ADAMS Accession No.
ML20340A053 (https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20340A053) and on the NRC's public website
at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/adjudicatory/hearing.html#participate.
IV. Electronic Submissions and E-Filing
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings including
documents filed by an interested State, local governmental body,
Federally recognized Indian Tribe, or designated agency thereof that
requests to participate under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302. The E-Filing process requires
participants to submit and serve all adjudicatory documents over the
internet, or in some cases, to mail copies on electronic storage media,
unless an exemption permitting an alternative filing method, as further
discussed, is granted. Detailed guidance on electronic submissions is
located in the ``Guidance for Electronic Submissions to the NRC''
(ADAMS Accession No. ML13031A056) and on the NRC's public website at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by
telephone at 301-415-1677, to (1) request a digital identification (ID)
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign submissions and access the E-Filing
system for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a petition or
other adjudicatory document (even in instances in which the
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the proceeding if the
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on the NRC's public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/getting-started.html. After a digital ID certificate is
obtained and a docket created, the participant must submit adjudicatory
documents in Portable Document Format. Guidance on
[[Page 51461]]
submissions is available on the NRC's public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. A filing is
considered complete at the time the document is submitted through the
NRC's E-Filing system. To be timely, an electronic filing must be
submitted to the E-Filing system no later than 11:59 p.m. ET on the due
date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps
the document and sends the submitter an email confirming receipt of the
document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email that provides
access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and
any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish
to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
document on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for
and receive a digital ID certificate before adjudicatory documents are
filed to obtain access to the documents via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC's Electronic
Filing Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's
public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by
email to [email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-
7640. The NRC Electronic Filing Help Desk is available between 9:00
a.m. and 6:00 p.m., ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Participants who believe that they have good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
stating why there is good cause for not filing electronically and
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR
2.302(b)-(d). Participants filing adjudicatory documents in this manner
are responsible for serving their documents on all other participants.
Participants granted an exemption under 10 CFR 2.302(g)(2) must still
meet the electronic formatting requirement in 10 CFR 2.302(g)(1),
unless the participant also seeks and is granted an exemption from 10
CFR 2.302(g)(1).
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the
NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is publicly available at https://adams.nrc.gov/ehd, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
presiding officer. If you do not have an NRC-issued digital ID
certificate as previously described, click ``cancel'' when the link
requests certificates and you will be automatically directed to the
NRC's electronic hearing dockets where you will be able to access any
publicly available documents in a particular hearing docket.
Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information
such as social security numbers, home addresses, or personal phone
numbers in their filings unless an NRC regulation or other law requires
submission of such information. With respect to copyrighted works,
except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory
filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants
should not include copyrighted materials in their submission.
V. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through ADAMS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document description ADAMS accession No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three Mile Island, Unit 2, License ML21057A046.
Amendment Request Decommissioning
Technical Specifications, with No
Significant Hazards Consideration, dated
February 19, 2021.
21-003, Rev 00, ``Decommissioning ML21057A045 (non-public,
Radioactive Waste Handling Accident withheld pursuant to 10 CFR
Calculation For TMI-2``, dated February 2.390).
11, 2021.
Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Supplemental ML21133A263 (Package).
Information to License Amendment Request
Decommissioning Technical Specifications,
dated May 5, 2021.
License Amendment Request--Three Mile ML22013A177.
Island, Unit 2, Decommissioning Technical
Specifications, Supplemental Information,
dated January 7, 2022.
Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Supplemental ML22101A079.
Information to License Amendment Request,
Decommissioning Technical Specifications,
dated March 23, 2022.
Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Supplemental ML22101A080 (Package).
Information to License Amendment Request,
Decommissioning Technical Specifications,
dated April 7, 2022.
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 ML22138A285.
(TMl-2)--License Amendment Request--Three
Mile Island, Unit 2, Decommissioning
Technical Specifications, Response to
Questions, dated May 16, 2022.
NRC Administrative Letter 95-06, ML20101P963.
Relocation of TS Administrative Controls
Related to QA, dated March 19, 1996, and
December 12, 1995.
Camper, L.W. (NRC) to Pace, D.L. (GPU ML12349A291.
Nuclear) letter, ``Three Mile Island
Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TM1-2)--Failure
to Submit Post-Shutdown Decommissioning
Activities Report--Non-cited Violation
(Docket: 05000320),'' dated February 13,
2013.
GPU Nuclear Calculation 4440-7380-90-017, ML22138A287 (non-public,
Revision 4, ``PDMS SAR Section 8.2.5 Fire withheld pursuant to 10 CFR
Analysis Source Terms``, dated May 16, 2.390).
2022.
Requests for Addition Information for ML22210A080.
Proposed Decommissioning Tech Specs
License Amendment Request, dated July 29,
2022.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-
Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation
A. This Order contains instructions regarding how potential parties
to this proceeding may request access to documents containing SUNSI.
B. Within 10 days after publication of this notice of hearing or
opportunity for hearing, any potential party who believes access to
SUNSI is necessary to respond to this notice may request access to
SUNSI. A ``potential party'' is any person who intends to participate
as a party by demonstrating standing and filing an admissible
contention under 10 CFR 2.309. Requests for access to SUNSI submitted
later than 10 days after publication of this notice will not be
considered absent a showing of good cause for the late filing,
addressing why the request could not have been filed earlier.
C. The requestor shall submit a letter requesting permission to
access SUNSI to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff,
[[Page 51462]]
and provide a copy to the Deputy General Counsel for Licensing,
Hearings, and Enforcement, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. The expedited
delivery or courier mail address for both offices is: U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
The email addresses for the Office of the Secretary and the Office of
the General Counsel are [email protected] and
[email protected], respectively.\2\ The request must
include the following information:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ While a request for hearing or petition to intervene in this
proceeding must comply with the filing requirements of the NRC's
``E-Filing Rule,'' the initial request to access SUNSI under these
procedures should be submitted as described in this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) A description of the licensing action with a citation to this
Federal Register notice;
(2) The name and address of the potential party and a description
of the potential party's particularized interest that could be harmed
by the action identified in C.(1); and
(3) The identity of the individual or entity requesting access to
SUNSI and the requestor's basis for the need for the information in
order to meaningfully participate in this adjudicatory proceeding. In
particular, the request must explain why publicly available versions of
the information requested would not be sufficient to provide the basis
and specificity for a proffered contention.
D. Based on an evaluation of the information submitted under
paragraph C, the NRC staff will determine within 10 days of receipt of
the request whether:
(1) There is a reasonable basis to believe the petitioner is likely
to establish standing to participate in this NRC proceeding; and
(2) The requestor has established a legitimate need for access to
SUNSI.
E. If the NRC staff determines that the requestor satisfies both
D.(1) and D.(2), the NRC staff will notify the requestor in writing
that access to SUNSI has been granted. The written notification will
contain instructions on how the requestor may obtain copies of the
requested documents, and any other conditions that may apply to access
to those documents. These conditions may include, but are not limited
to, the signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement or Affidavit, or
Protective Order \3\ setting forth terms and conditions to prevent the
unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of SUNSI by each individual who
will be granted access to SUNSI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Any motion for Protective Order or draft Non-Disclosure
Affidavit or Agreement for SUNSI must be filed with the presiding
officer or the Chief Administrative Judge if the presiding officer
has not yet been designated, within 30 days of the deadline for the
receipt of the written access request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Filing of Contentions. Any contentions in these proceedings that
are based upon the information received as a result of the request made
for SUNSI must be filed by the requestor no later than 25 days after
receipt of (or access to) that information. However, if more than 25
days remain between the petitioner's receipt of (or access to) the
information and the deadline for filing all other contentions (as
established in the notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing), the
petitioner may file its SUNSI contentions by that later deadline.
G. Review of Denials of Access.
(1) If the request for access to SUNSI is denied by the NRC staff
after a determination on standing and requisite need, the NRC staff
shall immediately notify the requestor in writing, briefly stating the
reason or reasons for the denial.
(2) The requestor may challenge the NRC staff's adverse
determination by filing a challenge within 5 days of receipt of that
determination with: (a) the presiding officer designated in this
proceeding; (b) if no presiding officer has been appointed, the Chief
Administrative Judge, or if this individual is unavailable, another
administrative judge, or an Administrative Law Judge with jurisdiction
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.318(a); or (c) if another officer has been
designated to rule on information access issues, with that officer.
(3) Further appeals of decisions under this paragraph must be made
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.311.
H. Review of Grants of Access. A party other than the requestor may
challenge an NRC staff determination granting access to SUNSI whose
release would harm that party's interest independent of the proceeding.
Such a challenge must be filed within 5 days of the notification by the
NRC staff of its grant of access and must be filed with: (a) the
presiding officer designated in this proceeding; (b) if no presiding
officer has been appointed, the Chief Administrative Judge, or if this
individual is unavailable, another administrative judge, or an
Administrative Law Judge with jurisdiction pursuant to 10 CFR 2.318(a);
or (c) if another officer has been designated to rule on information
access issues, with that officer.
If challenges to the NRC staff determinations are filed, these
procedures give way to the normal process for litigating disputes
concerning access to information. The availability of interlocutory
review by the Commission of orders ruling on such NRC staff
determinations (whether granting or denying access) is governed by 10
CFR 2.311.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Requestors should note that the filing requirements of the
NRC's E-Filing Rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007, as amended at 77
FR 46562; August 3, 2012, 78 FR 34247, June 7, 2013) apply to
appeals of NRC staff determinations (because they must be served on
a presiding officer or the Commission, as applicable), but not to
the initial SUNSI request submitted to the NRC staff under these
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. The Commission expects that the NRC staff and presiding officers
(and any other reviewing officers) will consider and resolve requests
for access to SUNSI, and motions for protective orders, in a timely
fashion in order to minimize any unnecessary delays in identifying
those petitioners who have standing and who have propounded contentions
meeting the specificity and basis requirements in 10 CFR part 2. The
Attachment to this Order summarizes the general target schedule for
processing and resolving requests under these procedures.
It is so ordered.
Dated: August 17, 2022.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brooke P. Clark,
Secretary of the Commission.
Attachment 1--General Target Schedule for Processing and Resolving
Requests for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information
in This Proceeding
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Event/activity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0............................ Publication of Federal Register notice of
hearing or opportunity for hearing,
including order with instructions for
access requests.
[[Page 51463]]
10........................... Deadline for submitting requests for
access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-
Safeguards Information (SUNSI) with
information: supporting the standing of
a potential party identified by name and
address; describing the need for the
information in order for the potential
party to participate meaningfully in an
adjudicatory proceeding.
60........................... Deadline for submitting petition for
intervention containing: (i)
demonstration of standing; and (ii) all
contentions whose formulation does not
require access to SUNSI (+25 Answers to
petition for intervention; +7 petitioner/
requestor reply).
20........................... U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
staff informs the requestor of the
staff's determination whether the
request for access provides a reasonable
basis to believe standing can be
established and shows need for SUNSI.
(NRC staff also informs any party to the
proceeding whose interest independent of
the proceeding would be harmed by the
release of the information.) If NRC
staff makes the finding of need for
SUNSI and likelihood of standing, NRC
staff begins document processing
(preparation of redactions or review of
redacted documents).
25........................... If NRC staff finds no ``need'' or no
likelihood of standing, the deadline for
petitioner/requestor to file a motion
seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC
staff's denial of access; NRC staff
files copy of access determination with
the presiding officer (or Chief
Administrative Judge or other designated
officer, as appropriate). If NRC staff
finds ``need'' for SUNSI, the deadline
for any party to the proceeding whose
interest independent of the proceeding
would be harmed by the release of the
information to file a motion seeking a
ruling to reverse the NRC staff's grant
of access.
30........................... Deadline for NRC staff reply to motions
to reverse NRC staff determination(s).
40........................... (Receipt +30) If NRC staff finds standing
and need for SUNSI, deadline for NRC
staff to complete information processing
and file motion for Protective Order and
draft Non-Disclosure Agreement or
Affidavit. Deadline for applicant/
licensee to file Non-Disclosure
Agreement or Affidavit for SUNSI.
A............................ If access granted: issuance of presiding
officer or other designated officer
decision on motion for protective order
for access to sensitive information
(including schedule for providing access
and submission of contentions) or
decision reversing a final adverse
determination by the NRC staff.
A + 3........................ Deadline for filing executed Non-
Disclosure Agreements or Affidavits.
Access provided to SUNSI consistent with
decision issuing the protective order.
A + 28....................... Deadline for submission of contentions
whose development depends upon access to
SUNSI. However, if more than 25 days
remain between the petitioner's receipt
of (or access to) the information and
the deadline for filing all other
contentions (as established in the
notice of hearing or notice of
opportunity for hearing), the petitioner
may file its SUNSI contentions by that
later deadline.
A + 53....................... (Contention receipt +25) Answers to
contentions whose development depends
upon access to SUNSI.
A + 60....................... (Answer receipt +7) Petitioner/Intervenor
reply to answers.
>A + 60...................... Decision on contention admission.
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[FR Doc. 2022-18031 Filed 8-19-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P