[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 117 (Tuesday, June 20, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 39783-39793]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-12803]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 25
[IB Docket No. 21-456; FCC 23-29; FR ID 147653]
Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non-Geostationary Orbit,
Fixed-Satellite Service Systems
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or we) revises its rules governing spectrum sharing among a
new generation of broadband satellite constellations to promote market
entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency. The Commission
adopts rules clarifying protection obligations between non-
geostationary satellite orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO FSS)
systems authorized through different processing rounds, subjects those
protections to a sunset period, and requires all NGSO FSS operators
licensed or granted market access in the United States to coordinate
with each other in good faith.
DATES: Effective July 20, 2023, except for the amendment to Sec.
25.261 in
[[Page 39784]]
amendatory instruction 4, which is delayed indefinitely. The Commission
will publish a document in the Federal Register announcing the
effective date of Sec. 25.261 in instruction 4.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Clay DeCell, 202-418-0803.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report
and Order, FCC 23-29, adopted April 20, 2023, and released April 21,
2023. The full text is available online at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-29A1.pdf. The document is also available for
inspection and copying during business hours in the FCC Reference
Center, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities, send an email to
[email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at
202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).
Procedural Matters
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires
that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and
comment rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that ``the rule will
not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.'' Accordingly, we have prepared a
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the possible
impact of the rule changes contained in this document on small
entities. The FRFA is set forth in Section IV below.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This document contains new or modified information collection
requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA),
Public Law 104-13. It will be submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for review under Section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, other
Federal agencies, and the general public will be invited to comment on
the modified information collection requirements contained in this
document.
In this document, we have assessed the effects of requiring later-
round NGSO FSS grantees to submit compatibility showings with respect
to earlier-round grantees with whom coordination has not yet been
reached. We find that doing so will serve the public interest and is
unlikely to directly affect businesses with fewer than 25 employees.
Congressional Review Act
The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget,
concurs that this rule is ``non-major'' under the Congressional Review
Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the Report and
Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
Synopsis
I. Introduction
1. In this document, we revise Commission rules governing spectrum
sharing among a new generation of broadband satellite constellations to
promote market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency
through good-faith coordination. Specifically, we adopt rules
clarifying protection obligations between non-geostationary satellite
orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO FSS) systems authorized through
different processing rounds by using a degraded throughput methodology,
and subject those protections to a sunset period. After the sunset
period, new entrants authorized in later processing rounds will share
spectrum on an equal basis with earlier-round incumbents. We also
clarify that all NGSO FSS operators licensed or granted market access
in the United States must coordinate with each other in good faith,
regardless of their processing round status, and we explain our
expectations for information sharing during this good-faith
coordination. This document will continue the Commission's efforts to
promote development and competition in broadband NGSO satellite
services made possible by the new space age.
II. Background
2. This proceeding continues the Commission's recent efforts to
update and refine its rules governing NGSO FSS systems. Constellations
of NGSO FSS satellites traveling in low- and medium-Earth orbit may
provide broadband services to industry, enterprise, and residential
customers with lower latency and wider coverage than has previously
been available via satellite. The number of applications filed in
recent years for NGSO FSS system authorizations, and the number of
satellites launched, are unprecedented.
3. Processing Round Procedure Overview. Applications for NGSO FSS
system licenses and petitions for declaratory ruling seeking U.S.
market access for non-U.S.-licensed NGSO FSS systems are considered in
groups based on filing date, under a processing round procedure.
Pursuant to the Commission's rules, a license application for ``NGSO-
like'' satellite operation, including operation of an NGSO FSS system,
that satisfies the acceptability for filing requirements is reviewed to
determine whether it is a ``competing application'' or a ``lead
application.'' A competing application is one filed in response to a
public notice initiating a processing round. Any other application is a
lead application. Competing applications are placed on public notice to
provide interested parties an opportunity to file pleadings in response
to the application. Lead applications are also placed on public notice.
The public notice for a lead application initiates a processing round,
establishes a cut-off date for competing NGSO-like satellite system
applications, and provides interested parties an opportunity to file
pleadings in response to the application.
4. The Commission reviews each application in the processing round
and all the pleadings filed in response to each application. Based upon
this review and consideration of such other matters as it may
officially notice, the Commission will grant all the applications for
which the Commission finds that the applicant is legally, technically,
and otherwise qualified, that the proposed facilities and operations
comply with all applicable rules, regulations, and policies, and that
grant of the application will serve the public interest, convenience
and necessity. The Commission will deny the other applications.
5. NGSO FSS System Spectrum Sharing Overview. The Commission has
adopted rules for spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS systems. NGSO FSS
space station applications granted with a condition to abide by these
sharing rules are exempt from frequency band segmentation procedures
that otherwise apply to applications for NGSO-like satellite operation.
Instead, NGSO FSS operators must coordinate with one another in good
faith the use of commonly authorized frequencies. If two or more NGSO
FSS satellite systems fail to complete coordination, a default
spectrum-splitting procedure applies.
6. Under the default spectrum-splitting procedure, whenever the
percentage increase in system noise temperature of an earth station
receiver, or a space station receiver for a satellite with on-board
processing, of either system, [Delta]T/T, exceeds 6% due to
interference from emissions originating in the other system in a
commonly authorized frequency band, such
[[Page 39785]]
frequency band will be divided among the affected satellite networks
(i.e., individual links) in accordance with the following: (1) Each of
n (number of) satellite networks involved must select 1/n of the
assigned spectrum available in each of these frequency bands; (2) the
affected station(s) of the respective satellite systems may operate in
only the selected (1/n) spectrum associated with its satellite system
while the [Delta]T/T of 6% threshold is exceeded; and (3) all affected
station(s) may resume operations throughout the assigned frequency
bands once the [Delta]T/T of 6% threshold is no longer exceeded. The
spectrum selection order for each satellite network is determined by
the date that the first space station in each satellite system is
launched and capable of operating in the frequency band under
consideration.
7. In the NGSO FSS Report and Order, the Commission stated that it
will ``initially limit'' sharing under the [Delta]T/T of 6% threshold
to qualified applicants in a processing round. The Commission explained
that treatment of later applicants would be case-by-case based on the
situation at the time and considering both the need to protect existing
expectations and investments and provide for additional entry, as well
as any comments filed by incumbent operators and reasoning presented by
the new applicant.
8. NPRM. The NPRM sought comment on rule changes that would clarify
the relative obligations between NGSO FSS systems approved in different
processing rounds. Specifically, the Commission proposed to limit the
existing NGSO FSS spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 to
those systems approved in the same processing round, and to require
systems approved in a later processing round to coordinate with, or
demonstrate they will protect, earlier-round systems. The Commission
invited comment on how to quantify inter-round protection and whether
it should sunset after a period of time. The Commission also proposed
to require all NGSO FSS grantees, regardless of their processing round
status, to coordinate with each other in good faith and sought comment
on specific information sharing obligations that could facilitate
operator-to-operator coordination. In response to the NPRM, seventeen
comments, fifteen reply comments, and numerous ex partes were filed.
III. Discussion
9. After review of the record, we adopt rule changes that will
promote market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency
among a new generation of broadband NGSO satellite constellations.
Specifically, we adopt three proposals in the NPRM that received broad
support: (1) limiting the default spectrum-splitting procedure in
section 25.261 to NGSO FSS systems approved in the same processing
round, before sunsetting; (2) requiring NGSO FSS systems approved in a
later processing round to coordinate with, or demonstrate they will
protect, earlier-round systems; and (3) requiring all NGSO FSS grantees
to coordinate with each other in good faith. We also address three
issues that produced a diverse record. After reviewing the proposed
options for inter-round protection, we conclude that an interference
analysis based on a degraded throughput methodology offers the most
technically promising path for NGSO FSS inter-round sharing and require
later-round systems to use such a methodology when demonstrating that
they will protect earlier-round systems. On information sharing
requirements, we clarify our expectations as to the necessary exchanges
of information that will take place as part of the universal NGSO FSS
good-faith coordination requirement we are adopting in this Order. We
also conclude that protection of earlier-round NGSO FSS systems must
ensure a stable environment for continued service and investment but
should not hinder later-round systems indefinitely. Accordingly, we
adopt a sunsetting provision. NGSO FSS systems will be entitled to
protection from systems approved in a subsequent processing round until
ten years after the first authorization or market access grant in that
subsequent processing round. After that date, all systems in both
processing rounds will be treated on an equal basis with respect to
spectrum sharing in the absence of a coordination agreement, and the
default spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 will also apply
between systems in the two rounds. Finally, we apply the rule changes
adopted in this final rule to all current NGSO FSS licensees and market
access grantees as well as pending and future applicants and
petitioners.
A. Limiting the Default Spectrum-Splitting Procedure to Systems
Approved Through the Same Processing Round, Before Sunsetting
10. In the NPRM, the Commission noted that, while it stated in the
2017 NGSO FSS Report and Order that it would ``initially limit'' the
default spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 to qualified
NGSO FSS applicants in the same processing round, there is no such
limitation in the current rule text. Nonetheless, recent NGSO FSS
system licenses and grants of market access have included a requirement
to apply the spectrum-splitting procedure only among NGSO FSS systems
approved within the same processing round. To provide greater
regulatory certainty, the Commission proposed to codify this
limitation. Doing so would eliminate general ``case-by-case''
consideration of how to treat later NGSO FSS applicants relative to
approved systems, except when considering waiver requests.
11. Commenters broadly welcome the Commission's proposal, which we
adopt to provide greater regulatory stability and predictability to
NGSO FSS operators as they deploy their initial constellations, subject
to the sunsetting provision described below. The purpose of the
Commission's recent NGSO FSS processing rounds has been to establish a
sharing environment among authorized systems to provide a measure of
certainty in lieu of adopting an open-ended requirement to accommodate
all future applicants. NGSO FSS operators have planned, invested, and
begun deploying thousands of satellites in their initial constellations
based in part on their assessment of the specific characteristics of
other participants in their processing round, which allows them to
estimate the amount of spectrum likely to be available during a
situation governed by the spectrum-splitting procedure. Limiting the
spectrum-splitting procedure to systems approved within the same
processing round is therefore an important element of regulatory
stability for NGSO FSS grantees as they deploy their initial
constellations, reflected in the licensing decisions taken under the
current, case-by-case approach. Over time, this anticipated NGSO FSS
sharing environment will change as system authorizations granted in the
same processing round are surrendered or not ultimately built out, new
entrants are approved in later processing rounds and coordinate with
existing systems, and operators' own system designs are updated for
later-generation constellations. Therefore, while we do expect that the
need for the stability and predictability offered by limiting the
default spectrum-splitting procedure to systems approved through the
same processing round will diminish over time and should be
counterbalanced with the benefits of promoting new entry, as addressed
through the sunsetting provision discussed below, we conclude that the
establishment of an initial sharing environment will
[[Page 39786]]
promote the development of NGSO FSS systems.
12. While no commenter suggests the Commission grant every new NGSO
FSS application filed after a processing round cut-off date on an equal
basis with applications filed within the processing round, some parties
nonetheless encourage the Commission to retain discretion when
considering later-filed NGSO FSS applications. We always retain such
discretion in the context of a rule waiver upon a finding of good
cause, although we expect such circumstances to be rare. We believe the
waiver standard is the appropriate threshold for considering whether an
NGSO FSS application submitted after a relevant processing round cut-
off date should be treated as if it had been filed within the
processing round window and therefore given equal access to spectrum,
through the default spectrum-splitting procedure, with timely filed
applications.
B. Protection of Earlier-Round Systems From Later-Round Systems
13. Another important element of regulatory stability for NGSO FSS
grantees is the knowledge that they will be protected from harmful
interference that might be caused by later-authorized systems. In the
NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify an inter-round protection
requirement consistent with licensing decisions. The rule would require
that, prior to commencing operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or market
access recipient must either certify that it has completed a
coordination agreement with any operational NGSO FSS system licensed or
granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round, or
demonstrate that it will not cause harmful interference to any such
system with which coordination has not been completed.
14. Commenters broadly support, and none oppose, a requirement for
later-round NGSO FSS grantees to protect earlier-round grantees, which
we adopt herein. As explained in the NPRM, the protection of an NGSO
FSS system from systems approved through a subsequent processing round
goes to the heart of the stability of interference environment the
Commission intended to create through use of the processing round
procedure. Accordingly, to clarify the obligations of later-round
grantees and to provide greater regulatory certainty, we codify a
requirement that, prior to commencing operations, an NGSO FSS licensee
or market access recipient must either submit in the International
Communications Filing System (ICFS) a certification that it has
completed a coordination agreement with any operational NGSO FSS system
licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round,
or submit for Commission approval a showing that it will not cause
harmful interference to any such system with which coordination has not
been completed. If an earlier-round system becomes operational after a
later-round system has commenced operations, the later-round licensee
or market access recipient must submit a certification of coordination
or a compatibility showing with respect to the earlier-round system no
later than 60 days after the earlier-round system commences operations
as notified under section 25.121(b) or otherwise. Notices of
commencement of operations for NGSO FSS systems subject to section
25.261 will be placed on public notice as informative to facilitate the
filing of these certifications and showings. Compatibility showings
will be placed on public notice for comment by interested parties
before action by the Commission. Further, to address the possibility
that a later-round system may need to significantly limit its
operations to protect a large, planned, earlier-round system of which
only one or a few satellites have been launched and are operating, we
will allow later-round systems to operate on an unprotected, non-
interference basis with respect to an earlier-round system after they
have submitted a required compatibility showing for the earlier-round
system and while it remains pending with the Commission. By requiring
this technical showing before operations on a non-interference basis
may begin, we will allow the affected earlier-round operator, and any
other interested parties, to provide the Commission with their views on
the sufficiency of the showing. At the same time, we guard against an
incentive for earlier-round grantees to use Commission processes to
delay service by the later-round system by vigorously opposing all
compatibility showings by grantees that have not yet completed
coordination with them.
C. Level of Protection for Earlier-Round Systems
15. The NPRM identified three principal methods, suggested by
satellite operators, by which the Commission could quantify a required
level of protection for earlier-round NGSO FSS systems from later-round
systems or otherwise ensure their compatible operations. First, the
Commission could develop and adopt an interference-to-noise (I/N)
limit. The I/N limit could incorporate a standard reference antenna
mask and standard noise temperature and specify a percentage of time
during which the limit may be exceeded. Applicants in a later
processing round could be required to demonstrate that their proposed
systems would comply with the I/N limit based on a probabilistic
analysis. Second, the Commission could adopt interference protection
criteria based upon the percentage of degraded throughput experienced
by the earlier-round NGSO FSS system. A degraded throughput method
would recognize that most, if not all, modern NGSO systems will use
adaptive coding and modulation (ACM) and may be designed to meet
performance objectives stated as either the packet error ratio or the
spectral efficiency (bit/s/Hz) as a function of carrier-to-noise ratio
(C/N). Satellite systems using ACM can maintain a satellite connection
despite signal degradation, but at lower throughput rates. Third, the
Commission could adopt a modified spectrum-splitting procedure for
inter-round sharing. Under this option, when a 6% [Delta]T/T threshold
is passed, the earlier-round system would be entitled to use 75% of the
commonly authorized spectrum and the later-round system 25% of the
available spectrum, instead of the 50%/50% split applicable to NGSO FSS
systems approved through the same processing round.
16. Commenters are divided on their preference for an I/N limit, a
degraded throughput methodology, or a modified band-splitting option.
Supporters of an I/N limit argue that it is easily administrable,
familiar to operational NGSO systems engaged in coordination, and less
susceptible to misapplication based on subjective carrier
characteristics. Commenters that favor a degraded throughput
methodology note that it takes into account the design and objectives
of modern NGSO systems, including the use of ACM. Proponents of a
modified band-splitting option argue that it would encourage both
parties to coordinate because both would have to reduce their spectrum
use when the interference trigger is reached. Several commenters
request the Commission seek further comment on the development of an
inter-round protection criteria before it is adopted, and specifically
argue that no reference values currently exist for quantifying proposed
new criteria.
17. After review of the record in response to the NPRM, we believe
that pursuing a degraded throughput approach to quantify the level of
protection for earlier-round systems from later-round systems is the
most technically promising option as it would account for the realities
of
[[Page 39787]]
modern NGSO systems and be based on a key design consideration for such
systems. As they transit through the view of an earth station, NGSO
satellites operate across a range of path distances, elevation angles,
and antenna scan angles. Atmospheric conditions, such as rain
attenuation, can also cause link degradations and outages, especially
in higher frequency bands and modern NGSO systems use ACM, uplink and
downlink power control, and network protocols to provide continuous
data services in the face of these varying environmental effects. A
degraded throughput methodology would recognize that the mechanisms
NGSO FSS systems use to tolerate signal degradation due to path-loss
changes and link outages due to weather effects, and would also provide
resilience to certain interference from other NGSO FSS systems.
Further, degraded throughput analyses submitted on the record
demonstrate that the analysis can be performed using widely available
satellite system operational information, such as contained in an ITU
filing or Commission space station application, and is not unduly
difficult to perform. With respect to the issues of potential
synchronization loss and taking into account GSO interference and
aggregate interference from multiple NGSO FSS constellations, these
will be explored through the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
can be addressed within the framework of a degraded throughput
methodology. Accordingly, we will require an NGSO FSS licensee or
market access recipient that has not yet reached a coordination
agreement with an earlier-round system to use a degraded throughput
methodology in its demonstration that it will protect earlier-round
systems.
18. In contrast, we are concerned that adopting an I/N limit for
the protection of earlier-round systems, rather than as a band-
splitting trigger for systems in the same processing round, may
overprotect earlier-round systems by not taking into account ACM and
other methods used by modern NGSO systems to tolerate certain amounts
of interference while continuing to provide reliable service to
consumers, and therefore weaken their incentives to complete
coordination with new entrants. In addition, while a 75%/25% band-
splitting procedure between earlier- and later-round systems would
provide some incentive to both parties to coordinate, this option may
not ensure the continuity of earlier-round operations with existing
customer bases if the earlier-round operator were required to reduce
its spectrum usage by 25% during an event surpassing the [Delta]T/T
threshold with a later-round system with which it has not yet found an
appropriate accommodation.
19. While we adopt a requirement to use a degraded throughput
methodology in demonstrations of compatibility with earlier-round
systems because it accounts for ACM and other techniques used by modern
NGSO systems and holds the best potential proposed on the record to
protect earlier-round systems without unduly burdening later-round
systems, we recognize that certain details of its implementation may
benefit from further comment, such as the final percentage criteria to
be used. The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is dedicated to
finalizing these issues. However until the particular issues in the
Further Notice are resolved, we conclude that using the degraded
throughput methodology as a basis for inter-round protection is more
promising than an I/N protection criteria or modified spectrum-
splitting option proposed on the record for the reasons discussed
above.
D. Good-Faith Coordination
20. Although the Commission has adopted default rules for spectrum
sharing among NGSO FSS systems, it has consistently affirmed that
coordination among NGSO FSS operators in the first instance offers the
best opportunity for efficient spectrum sharing. Accordingly, the NPRM
proposed to adopt a rule providing that the good-faith coordination
requirement applies among all NGSO FSS grantees, including those
approved through different processing rounds.
21. All commenters on this issue support the Commission's proposal
to require good-faith coordination among all NGSO FSS grantees, which
we adopt. With this requirement, we make clear that all NGSO FSS
operators approved by the Commission must engage in good faith when
discussing and accommodating the shared use of spectrum with other NGSO
FSS operators. We will review any allegations that an NGSO FSS operator
has not met the good-faith coordination requirement and may take
enforcement actions, including monetary forfeitures, modification, or
termination of the NGSO FSS authorization. We discuss expectations for
information sharing in the context of good-faith coordination below.
E. Information Sharing During Good-Faith Coordination
22. In addition to the overall need for good-faith coordination,
the Commission has emphasized that information sharing among NGSO FSS
operators is essential to their efficient use of spectrum. In the NPRM,
the Commission invited comment on whether to require sharing of certain
types of information, such as beam-pointing information, that may be
necessary for the implementation of any spectrum-sharing solution or
protection criteria between NGSO FSS systems. The NPRM also sought
comment on any practical concerns associated with such information
sharing, and how best to address any associated, potential, competitive
harms. More broadly, the Commission inquired as to whether it should
add a definition of ``good faith'' coordination in our rules and how it
may better encourage efficiency among NGSO FSS systems.
23. The record produced a variety of views regarding information
sharing requirements. Commenters generally recognize that more detailed
technical discussions may assist parties in reaching an operator-to-
operator coordination agreement, but diverge on whether the types of
information to be shared should be agreed to by the coordinating
parties, or whether the Commission should specify types of information
that must be shared in all coordination discussions. Some commenters
recommend the development of a third-party clearinghouse or industry-
run database to facilitate sharing of NGSO FSS operational information.
Commenters raise particular concern that a requirement to share real-
time beam-pointing information may be impracticable for systems that
use dynamic beam pointing and reveal confidential and proprietary
traffic trends whose competitive harm may be difficult to address by
means such as non-disclosure agreements. Some commenters argue that
information sharing requirements should be limited to operational NGSO
FSS systems, or make other proposals.
24. We decline to codify specific information sharing requirements
as part of good-faith NGSO FSS coordination at this time. As an initial
matter, we are encouraged that some first-round and second-round NGSO
FSS systems have already completed coordination agreements under the
Commission's existing regulatory framework, and this demonstrates that
systems can effectively coordinate, even absent a third-party
clearinghouse or other database to facilitate information sharing. We
expect that number will grow as systems proceed in development and
deployment. For systems approved in the same processing round, we
believe the
[[Page 39788]]
prospect of splitting spectrum under the default sharing mechanism
provides significant incentive for both parties to share the necessary
technical information to conclude an agreement that ensures beneficial
and stable access to spectrum. For systems approved in different
processing rounds, the prospect of a later-round system operating on a
non-interference basis after submitting a compatibility showing, which
can be made using publicly available information, also may provide an
incentive to the earlier-round operator to share additional technical
information to ensure its ongoing operations are in fact protected.
Beyond these incentives, we expect that certain essential NGSO
operating parameters and other information that is typically publicly
available, such as the maximum number of satellites that can provide
service simultaneously at the same location (Nco), exclusion angle to
the GSO arc, minimum earth station elevation angle, and location of
gateway earth stations, will not be withheld during good-faith
coordination. We also recognize that satellite selection information,
revealing which satellites will be transmitting in a given situation,
can be especially important to efficient spectrum sharing between
larger and smaller constellations to ensure the smaller constellation
is not unnecessarily restricted. When evaluating whether an NGSO FSS
operator has acted in good faith in refusing to provide information in
coordination, we will consider the relative benefit of the information
to the other party, which may increase if the other party is already
operational, as well as the relative competitive or other risks to
providing the information. However, coordination discussions typically
do not begin only once the two systems are operational. With respect to
sharing of real-time beam information, we note the practical
difficulties raised in the record for advanced systems with dynamically
repointable beams which, in addition to competitive concerns, may not
be overcome by use of a third-party clearinghouse or industry-run
database because introducing a third-party database between the
operator that has changed its beam pointing plans in real time could
only further delay the time until other operators receive the updated
beam pointing data, adjust their own operations to reflect these
changes, and then further de-conflict any interference issues that may
arise from the other operators having adjusted their operations which
must also be circulated via the third-party database. However, we will
monitor the progress of NGSO FSS systems as they proceed in
coordination and deployment and may revisit this issue in the future if
ongoing coordination difficulties among operational systems suggest
that more information sharing requirements are required. We note that
the potential benefits for spectrum efficiency of dynamic beam pointing
would appear to require some level of information sharing in order to
be realized by more than one system so that other operators are not
required to protect links that could be used, but are not used at a
given time. When earlier round systems do not share certain non-public
information, later round systems may have to make assumptions regarding
the operations of earlier round systems in order to plan operations and
submit a compatibility showing.
25. Beyond a general good-faith coordination requirement, and any
related information sharing requirements, OneWeb argues the Commission
should adopt a definition of ``good faith'' that mandates, inter alia,
``that both parties to the coordination agree to utilize all inherent
flexibility and capabilities in the operation of their respective
systems to avoid interference between the two systems.'' We believe
good-faith coordination places obligations on both parties to promote
spectral efficiency. OneWeb's proposed definition, however, could
disincentivize investments in more advanced, spectrally efficient
systems by requiring all those efficiencies to be used to accommodate
systems that have been built with more limited sharing capabilities. We
decline to require such a sharing outcome in all cases and therefore do
not adopt the proposed definition. As noted above, we intend to monitor
compliance with the foregoing requirements and will address the need
for further steps in light of our experience.
F. Sunsetting of Inter-Round Protection Requirement
26. In conjunction with the proposal in the NPRM to require later-
round NGSO FSS systems to protect earlier-round systems absent a
coordination agreement, the Commission also inquired as to whether this
inter-round protection requirement should sunset after a period of
time, and what protection should apply to an NGSO FSS system after any
sunsetting. We sought specific comment on how any sunset provision may
affect investment in NGSO FSS systems and ongoing operations of
earlier-round systems as well as competition and new market entry.
27. Commenters suggest a variety of sunset periods. Several oppose
any sunsetting. Some commenters also encourage a further notice of
proposed rulemaking on this issue. Proponents of sunsetting argue that
it would encourage innovation and new entry, promote coordination by
time limiting the advantages of incumbency, and is consistent with the
iterative and dynamic approach of NGSO FSS operators upgrading and
modifying their own systems. Opponents argue that any sunsetting
provision would jeopardize quality and continuity of service by
operational earlier-round systems, incentivize coordination delays by
later-round systems until after an earlier round system's priority
expires, and discourage investment by introducing regulatory
uncertainty.
28. The proposed sunset periods are: 6 years after the application
cut-off date in a processing round; 6 years after grant of the earlier-
round system; at the 6-year, 50% deployment milestone of an earlier-
round system if the milestone is not met, otherwise at the 9-year, full
deployment milestone; less than 10 years after grant of the earlier-
round system; less than the 15-year license term of the earlier-round
system; at the expiration of the 15-year license term of the earlier-
round system; 10 or 12 years after grant of the first application in a
subsequent processing round; or 15 years commencing from release of
this Order for the current Ku-/Ka-band processing rounds, and 15 years
from the first authorization or market access grant in a subsequent
processing round for future processing rounds. Commenters propose that
after the sunset period has run, both earlier- and later-round systems
would share spectrum on an equal basis under the spectrum-splitting
procedure in section 25.261.
29. After review of the record and consideration of furthering
development and competition in NGSO FSS systems, we adopt a sunset
provision of 10 years after the first grant in a subsequent processing
round. As the Commission has repeatedly stated, the purpose of the
recent NGSO FSS processing rounds has been to establish a stable
sharing environment among authorized systems. But earlier-round
advantages should not continue indefinitely.
30. We believe that the protection afforded to an earlier-round
system by a later-round system should work in concert with our
deployment milestones for NGSO systems to relieve earlier-round
grantees of the uncertainty of near-term, equal sharing with new
entrants while also giving later-round systems an equal opportunity
after they
[[Page 39789]]
have demonstrated their commitment to provide service and completed
their final deployment milestone. To accomplish these goals, the sunset
date should be tied to the date of authorization of systems in a
subsequent processing round, and define the period during which they
will be required to protect any earlier-round systems. With each new
processing round, therefore, incumbents will be ensured of a period of
time during which they will be protected by systems approved in that
processing round, and may plan to accommodate those systems as they
proceed through deployment, before the time that they will be required
to share spectrum on an equal basis in the absence of a coordination
agreement. Fixing a sunset date dependent on the authorization date of
the earlier-round system could mean that after the sunset date, any
approved later-round system would automatically be afforded equal
spectrum sharing with existing, earlier-round systems, without the same
lead time that would enable earlier-round systems to assess their
likely sharing requirements with the systems that will actually proceed
to deployment, and adjust accordingly. In addition, fixing a single
date to sunset the protection between systems in two processing rounds
simplifies the sharing expectations for all operators in both rounds.
By fixing the sunset date at 10 years after the first grant in a
subsequent processing round, many later-round systems will be near, or
have already passed, their 9-year full deployment milestone depending
on their grant date. Thus, later-round systems will be afforded equal
spectrum sharing opportunities under the spectrum-splitting procedure
once their full service constellations are operational, while earlier-
round systems will have had time to adjust to the constellations
ultimately deployed by later-round grantees. We believe this period
appropriately balances the need for stability for incumbent operations
and the possibility for new entrants to compete on an equal footing
once they have built out their systems.
31. The length of this sunset period also addresses several
concerns on the record. First, we do not expect the sunset period to
introduce significant coordination delays because the period is long
enough that a later-round grantee would not wish to operate for years,
including at near its full constellation size, without an agreement
with earlier-round grantees. Second, the iterative nature of NGSO FSS
systems, and relatively shorter lifetime of NGSO satellites when
compared to GSO satellites, undermines arguments that sunsetting would
jeopardize existing services. Rather than maintaining a fixed system
design, our experience has been that NGSO FSS operators have proposed
to modify and expand their NGSO FSS systems. As earlier-round grantees
propose to expand and update their constellations, including through
participation in subsequent processing rounds, any burden imposed by
sunsetting their inter-round protection rights should be offset by
benefits to the later-generations of their systems. Sunsetting also
will not upset existing expectations of interference protection
because, under Commission policy in effect prior to this Order, later-
round applicants were considered on a case-by-case basis as to whether
they will be entitled to share spectrum on an equal basis with earlier-
round systems--as such there was never a guarantee that earlier-round
grantees would be entitled to protection from all later-round systems.
Nor do we believe that sunsetting will discourage overall investment in
NGSO FSS systems or hamper efforts to promote broadband in underserved
areas--on the contrary, we expect that increased competition
facilitated by sunsetting inter-round protections will spur investment
and development of new systems while providing appropriate returns for
earlier-round systems initial constellations. Finally, the iterative
development of NGSO FSS systems and evolving spectrum sharing
requirements counsels in particular in favor of a sunsetting provision
in this instance, as compared to other instances where the Commission
has preferred to maintain incumbent protections indefinitely. As noted,
many earlier-round grantees have proposed updated, second-generation
systems filed in a later processing round that will enhance the
services these grantees intend to provide. Therefore, incumbents
themselves will benefit from sunsetting for their second-generation
systems. The nature of NGSO FSS systems, which must be designed to
endure changing environmental effects, also renders them more capable
of sharing spectrum than other system designs. After sunsetting,
incumbents will be subject to co-equal spectrum sharing with the new
entrants; but they will have had a significant period of time during
which to reach a coordination agreement through good faith discussions
that improves both operators' spectrum usage possibilities. Given the
dynamic nature of NGSO FSS systems and the benefits of competition and
new entry, we conclude that a 10-year sunset period beginning on the
date of the first grant in a subsequent processing round appropriately
balances the interests involved.
G. Application of Rule Changes
32. The NPRM invited comment on whether to apply all, or some, of
the rule changes adopted in this proceeding to existing grantees and
pending applicants or only to new license applications, license
modification applications, application amendments, and market access
petitions filed after the new rules go into effect.
33. Most commenters on this issue support the general applicability
of rule changes in this proceeding to existing grantees and applicants
as well as future applicants. Some argue that applying certain rule
changes to already approved systems would be onerous, as it may require
reconsideration of the design and operation of the systems.
34. We will apply all rule changes adopted in this final rule to
current NGSO FSS licensees and market access grantees, pending
applicants and petitioners, as well as future applicants and
petitioners. With respect to pending applications, applicants do not
gain any vested right merely by filing an application, and the simple
act of filing an application is not considered a ``transaction already
completed'' for purposes of this analysis. Applying our new rules and
procedures to pending space station applications will not impair the
rights any applicant had at the time it filed its application. Nor will
doing so increase an applicant's liability for past conduct. Similarly,
with respect to current NGSO FSS licensees and market access grantees,
none of the actions we take here (that is, limiting the default
spectrum-splitting procedure to NGSO FSS systems approved in the same
processing round (subject to a sunset), requiring later-round systems
to coordinate with or protect earlier-round systems, and requiring all
NGSO FSS grantees to coordinate with each other in good faith),
increase liability for past conduct, impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, or impose new duties with respect to transactions
already completed. Rather, all of these actions take effect in the
future, after the rules become effective. While some commenters claim
that some of the rule changes here, such as the sunsetting of
interference protections, upset their expectations, NGSO FSS grants
have been conditioned upon the outcome of future rulemakings and thus
licensees and grantees have been on notice that the regulatory
environment in which they are operate was subject to change. Moreover,
even under the rules in effect prior to this Order, first round systems
[[Page 39790]]
were not guaranteed protection from later round systems; rather, this
issue was to be considered on a ``case-by-case'' basis. Accordingly,
applying these rule changes to existing licenses and grants of market
access will not upset any grantee's reasonable expectations. Further,
we have crafted the sunset provision to provide incumbent NGSO FSS
grantees sufficient time to evaluate and adapt to the eventual, equal
sharing environment with systems ultimately deployed in each subsequent
processing round. Not applying the sunset provision to existing
grantees, while applying the other rule changes to them, would
substantially frustrate the purpose of sunsetting by locking in
incumbent protections that are not assured under the current, case-by-
case regime. Sunsetting the inter-round protection requirement, and
allowing later-round systems an opportunity to share spectrum on an
equal basis with earlier-round systems after the sunset period, removes
a barrier to entry and therefore promotes competition and will favor
technological innovation among earlier-round systems that facilitates
their sharing with new entrants. Whereas exempting first-round systems
from sunsetting, which includes some large constellations, would
destroy these benefits for all new entrants in second and later
processing rounds for as long as the first-round systems remain active.
H. Digital Equity and Inclusion
35. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to advance
digital equity for all, including people of color, persons with
disabilities, persons who live in rural or Tribal areas, and others who
are or have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely
affected by persistent poverty or inequality, invited comment on any
equity-related considerations and benefits (if any) that may be
associated with the proposals and issues discussed in the NPRM.
36. Commenters support the Commission's ongoing efforts to bridge
the digital divide and highlight the role of satellite services in
providing broadband access to underserved communities. They support
technology inclusive policies that ensure regulatory certainty and
spectrum access for satellite operators. We believe that the rule
amendments in this Report and Order will encourage a more stable and
competitive environment for the development of NGSO FSS systems well
suited to reaching underserved areas with new broadband capacity, and
therefore that this rulemaking will enhance digital equity and
inclusion.
I. Other Issues Raised in Comments
37. Some commenters also suggest the Commission pursue broader rule
changes regarding NGSO FSS systems to tackle a variety of issues,
including addressing orbital debris concerns, verifying NGSO compliance
with equivalent power-flux density limits for the protection of GSO
networks, revisiting the spectrum-splitting procedure in section
25.261, updated in 2017, or the NGSO milestone requirements, revised in
2015 and 2017, or taking up other suggestions not treated in the NPRM.
Other commenters caution against expanding the scope of the current
proceeding. Given the complexity and diversity of issues raised and
their differing procedural statuses, some reiterating arguments in
petitions for reconsideration or petitions for rulemaking, we decline
to create an ``omnibus'' NGSO rulemaking at this time and instead move
immediately in a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to propose to
finalize the remaining key issue raised in the NPRM.
IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
38. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as
amended, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was
incorporated in the Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non-
Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in December 2021 in this proceeding. The
Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the NPRM,
including comment on the IRFA. No comments were filed addressing the
IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the
RFA.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Final Rule
39. In recent years, the Commission has received an unprecedented
number of applications for non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO)
space station licenses, including for NGSO fixed-satellite service
(FSS) systems. Traveling closer to the Earth than a traditional GSO
satellite, low- and medium-orbit NGSO FSS satellite constellations are
capable of providing broadband services to industry, enterprise, and
residential customers with lower latency and wider coverage than was
previously available via satellite. This final rule continues to
facilitate the deployment of NGSO FSS systems capable of providing
broadband and other services on a global basis, and will promote
competition among NGSO FSS system proponents, including the market
entry of new competitors.
40. The Order amends the Commission's rules governing the treatment
of NGSO FSS systems filed in different processing rounds. In
particular, the Order adopts rules specifying that the Commission's
existing spectrum sharing mechanism for NGSO FSS systems will be
limited to those systems approved in the same processing round. The
Order also adopts a rule providing that later-round NGSO FSS systems
will have to protect earlier-round systems by using a degraded
throughput methodology. In addition, the Order adopts a sunset
provision after which earlier-round grantees and later-round grantees
will share spectrum on an equal basis under the existing spectrum
sharing mechanism for NGSO FSS systems.
B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response
to the IRFA
41. There were no comments filed that specifically addressed the
proposed rules and policies presented in the IRFA.
C. Legal Basis
42. The proposed action is authorized under sections 4(i), 7(a),
303, 308(b), and 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 154(i), 157(a), 303, 308(b), 316.
D. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business
43. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended
the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
(SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the
proposed rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not
file any comments in response to the proposed rules in this proceeding.
E. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Rules Will Apply
44. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and,
where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may
be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern''
[[Page 39791]]
under the Small Business Act. A ``small business concern'' is one
which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in
its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria
established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Below, we
describe and estimate the number of small entities that may be affected
by the adoption of the final rules.
45. Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth
station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this
industry classifies a business with $38 million or less in annual
receipts as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 firms
in this industry operated for the entire year. Of this number, 242
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. Additionally, based on
Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of
December 31, 2020, there were 71 providers that reported they were
engaged in the provision of satellite telecommunications services. Of
these providers, the Commission estimates that approximately 48
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently using the SBA's
small business size standard, a little more than half of these
providers can be considered small entities.
46. All Other Telecommunications. The ``All Other
Telecommunications'' category is comprised of establishments primarily
engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as
satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station
operation. This industry also includes establishments primarily engaged
in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities
connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of
transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications
from, satellite systems. Establishments providing internet services or
voice over internet protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied
telecommunications connections are also included in this industry. The
SBA has developed a small business size standard for ``All Other
Telecommunications,'' which consists of all such firms with annual
receipts of $35 million or less. For this category, U.S. Census Bureau
data for 2012 show that there were 1,442 firms that operated for the
entire year. Of those firms, a total of 1,400 had annual receipts of
less than $25 million and 15 firms had annual receipts of $25 million
to $49,999,999. Thus, the Commission estimates that the majority of
``All Other Telecommunications'' firms potentially affected by our
action can be considered small.
F. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
47. The final rule amends rules that are applicable to space
station operators requesting a license or authorization from the
Commission, or entities requesting that the Commission grant a request
for U.S. market access. Specifically, the final rule adopts changes to
the spectrum sharing requirements among NGSO FSS satellite systems and
requires space station licensees and market access grantees that were
authorized through a later processing round to submit a technical
demonstration that they will not cause harmful interference to space
station licensees and market access grantees that were authorized
through an earlier processing round, prior to the sunsetting period, if
the later-round grantees have not certified that they have reached a
coordination agreement with the earlier-round grantees. The technical
demonstration of compatibility between the later-round system and the
earlier-round system is based on a degraded throughput methodology that
consists of three steps. The first step is to establish a baseline of
performance. To do this, an operator models the earlier-round NGSO
system's performance without any additional interference by computing
the earlier-round NGSO system's probabilistic carrier-to-noise (C/N)
level using its published system parameters and a rain-attenuation
model. This provides the baseline: (1) the earlier-round system's time-
weighted average throughput (derived by computing the spectral
efficiency from the C/N results), and (2) the earlier-round system's
link unavailability time percentage (i.e., the percentage of time when
the earlier-round system's expected C/N will fall below its minimum
usable level). The second step is to repeat the analysis above, adding
in the effect of the later-round system's interference into the
earlier-round system. This produces a second measurement of time-
weighted average throughput and link unavailability time-percentage.
The third step is to compare these two sets of figures to measure the
effect of any additional interference. If the resulting performance
impact exceeds the permissible limits, then the later-round system must
adjust its operations to mitigate interference to a permissible level.
48. Because of the costs involved in developing and deploying an
NGSO FSS satellite constellation, we anticipate that few NGSO FSS
operators affected by this rulemaking would qualify under the
definition of ``small entity.''
G. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities
49. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant
alternatives that it has considered in developing its approach, which
may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1) the
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for
such small entities.''
50. The final rule adopts a requirement for NGSO FSS systems
authorized through a later processing round to either complete a
coordination agreement with, or submit a technical demonstration using
a degraded throughput methodology that they will not interfere with,
NGSO FSS systems authorized through an earlier processing round. The
Commission adopted this requirement to ensure that earlier-round NGSO
FSS systems will continue to have their services protected as new
entrants deploy their systems. The Commission selected a degraded
throughput methodology as the basis for the technical demonstration
because it offers the most promising technical path for protection of
earlier-round systems without unduly burdening the operations of later-
round systems. The Commission also considered use of an interference-
to-noise ratio (I/N) as a protection criteria for earlier-round
systems, or use of a modified band-splitting approach in which earlier-
round systems and later-round systems would have to operate in
different spectrum bands, with the earlier-round system entitled to
more spectrum than the later-round system, in the event that an
interference threshold is surpassed. The Commission did not adopt an I/
N protection criteria because it may unduly burden the operations of
later-round systems, and did not adopt a modified band-splitting
approach
[[Page 39792]]
because the Commission preferred a technically grounded inter-round
sharing solution. While a technical demonstration using a degraded
throughput methodology might be more burdensome to produce than a
demonstration using an I/N level, the record demonstrated the
feasibility of degraded throughput analyses and their superior ability
to model contemporary NGSO FSS systems and more precisely account for
the likelihood of harmful interference.
51. As noted above, because of the high costs typically involved in
the development of NGSO FSS constellations, we anticipate that few
small entities will be required to submit such technical
demonstrations. However, for small entities seeking to operate NGSO FSS
systems, adoption of a sunset provision combined with use of a degraded
throughput methodology will provide operators incentive to innovate and
to coordinate with other systems, which will increase spectral
efficiency and permit entities to implement newer socially-valuable
technologies.
H. Report to Congress
52. The Commission will send a copy of the Report and Order,
including the FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the
Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy
of the Report and Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the SBA. A copy of the Second Report and Order and FRFA (or
summaries thereof) will also be published in the Federal Register.
V. Ordering Clauses
53. It is ordered, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 7(a), 10, 303,
308(b), and 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 154(i), 157(a), 160, 303, 308(b), 316, that the Report and Order
is adopted, the policies, rules, and requirements discussed herein are
adopted, and Part 25 of the Commission's rules is amended as set forth
below.
54. It is further ordered that the Report and Order shall be
effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register, except
Sec. 25.261(d) which contains new or modified information collection
requirements and will be submitted for approval by the Office of
Management and Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act and shall
become effective after the Commission publishes a notice in the Federal
Register announcing such approval and the relevant effective date.
55. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center will send a
copy of the Report and Order to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration, in accordance with Section 603(a) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
56. It is further ordered that the Commission shall send a copy of
the Report and Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the
Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 25
Administrative practice and procedure, Satellites.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Final Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 25 as follows:
PART 25--SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 310, 319,
332, 605, and 721, unless otherwise noted.
0
2. Effective July 20, 2023, amend Sec. 25.151 by revising paragraphs
(a)(10) through (12) and adding paragraph (a)(13) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.151 Public notice.
(a) * * *
(10) The receipt of space station application information filed
pursuant to Sec. 25.110(b)(3)(iii);
(11) The receipt of notifications of non-routine transmission filed
pursuant to Sec. 25.140(d);
(12) The receipt of EPFD input data files from an NGSO FSS licensee
or market access recipient, submitted pursuant to Sec. 25.111(b) or
Sec. 25.146(c)(2); and
(13) The receipt of NGSO FSS compatibility showings filed pursuant
to Sec. 25.261(d).
* * * * *
0
3. Effective July 20, 2023, amend Sec. 25.261 by revising paragraph
(b) and the first sentence in paragraph (c)(1), adding reserved
paragraph (d), and adding paragraph (e) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.261 Sharing among NGSO FSS space stations.
* * * * *
(b) Coordination. NGSO FSS licensees and market access recipients
must coordinate in good faith the use of commonly authorized
frequencies regardless of their processing round status.
(c) * * *
(1) Each of n (number of) satellite networks involved that were
licensed or granted market access through the same processing round,
except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, must select 1/n of
the assigned spectrum available in each of these frequency bands. * * *
* * * * *
(d) [Reserved]
(e) Sunsetting. Ten years after the first authorization or grant of
market access in a processing round, the systems approved in that
processing round will no longer be required to protect earlier-rounds
systems, and instead will be required to share spectrum with earlier-
round systems under paragraph (c) of this section.
0
4. Delayed indefinitely, further amend Sec. 25.261 by adding paragraph
(d) and revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.261 Sharing among NGSO FSS space stations.
* * * * *
(d) Protection of earlier-round systems. Prior to commencing
operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either
certify that it has completed a coordination agreement with any
operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in
an earlier processing round, or submit for Commission approval a
compatibility showing which demonstrates by use of a degraded
throughput methodology that it will not cause harmful interference to
any such system with which coordination has not been completed. If an
earlier-round system becomes operational after a later-round system has
commenced operations, the later-round licensee or market access
recipient must submit a certification of coordination or a
compatibility showing with respect to the earlier-round system no later
than 60 days after the earlier-round system commences operations as
notified pursuant to Sec. 25.121(b) or otherwise.
(1) Compatibility showings will be placed on public notice pursuant
to Sec. 25.151(a)(13).
(2) While a compatibility showing remains pending before the
Commission, the submitting NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient
may commence operations on an unprotected, non-interference basis with
respect to the operations of the system that is the subject of the
showing.
[[Page 39793]]
(e) Sunsetting. Ten years after the first authorization or grant of
market access in a processing round, the systems approved in that
processing round will no longer be required to protect earlier-rounds
systems under paragraph (d) of this section, and instead will be
required to share spectrum with earlier-round systems under paragraph
(c) of this section.
[FR Doc. 2023-12803 Filed 6-16-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P