[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 121 (Monday, June 26, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 41295-41308]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-13071]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 25 and 121
[Docket No.: FAA-2022-0772; Amdt. Nos. 25-150 and 121-389]
RIN 2120-AL59
Installation and Operation of Flightdeck Installed Physical
Secondary Barriers on Transport Category Airplanes in Part 121 Service
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This final rule implements a mandate in the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 by requiring that certain airplanes used to
conduct domestic, flag, or supplemental passenger-carrying operations
have installed a physical secondary barrier that protects the
flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion when the flightdeck door is
opened.
[[Page 41296]]
DATES: Effective August 25, 2023.
ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking
documents and other information related to this final rule, see
``Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action, contact Dan Jacquet, AIR-626, Human-Machine Interface
Section, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation Division,
Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 2200
South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone (206) 231-3208;
email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Executive Summary
This final rule implements \1\ section 336 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 by requiring the installation and use of an
installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) that will be deployed
(closed and locked) whenever the flightdeck door is opened while the
airplane is in flight. This final rule affects operators conducting
passenger-carrying operations under title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (14 CFR), part 121, with transport category airplanes
operating in the United States by requiring the operators to use the
IPSB, when installed, as part of their procedures for opening the
flightdeck door. Affected operators must comply with this rule when
operating transport category airplanes manufactured two years after the
effective date of this final rule.
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\1\ The FAA determined that an informal rulemaking proceeding
under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act is appropriate
to prospectively apply these requirements on certain newly-
manufactured airplanes.
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In this final rule, the FAA estimates costs of $35,000 for the
purchase and installation of an IPSB. After the addition of training
and other costs, the present value costs for this rule are $236.5
million ($20.3 million annualized) at a 7 percent discount rate and
$505 million ($29 million annualized) at a 3 percent discount rate.
When the flightdeck door must be opened for lavatory breaks, meal
service, or crew changes, the flightdeck could be vulnerable to attack.
The benefit of this rule, requiring installation and use of IPSBs on
airplanes in part 121 service, is to slow such an attack long enough so
that an open flightdeck door can be closed and locked before an
attacker could reach the flightdeck.
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). Subtitle I, section 106,
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's
authority.
This rulemaking is issued under the authority described in Subtitle
VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General Requirements.''
Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations and
minimum standards for the design and performance of aircraft that the
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This
regulation is within the scope of that authority.
In addition, section 336, ``Secondary Cockpit Barriers,'' of the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Public Law 115-254 (Oct. 5, 2018),
directs the Administrator of the FAA to issue an order requiring
installation of a secondary flightdeck barrier on ``each new aircraft
that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air carrier in the
United States operating under the provisions of part 121 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations.''
III. Background
A. History
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA adopted
standards for flightdeck security in January 2002 by adding 14 CFR
25.795 and amending 14 CFR 121.313.\2\ Those amendments were intended
to make the flightdeck resistant to forcible intrusion and small
firearms, and prevent unauthorized entry into the flightdeck. These
requirements were based on International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) standards,\3\ and the recommendations of the Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee (ARAC) \4\ Design for Security Harmonization Working
Group. ARAC included representatives of aircraft owners and operators,
airmen and flight crewmembers, airports, aircraft maintenance
providers, aircraft manufacturers, public citizen and passenger groups,
training providers, and labor organizations.
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\2\ Security Considerations in the Design of the Flightdeck on
Transport Category Airplanes, 67 FR 2117 (January 15, 2002).
\3\ Adopted by Amendment 97 to Annex 8 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation on March 12, 1997.
\4\ See ARAC-ICAO Amendment 97 to Annex 8 and Resistance to
Intrusion Complete File (Design for Security HWG, TAE), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/342.
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Even a strong and secure flightdeck door, however, must
occasionally open to accommodate necessary activities such as lavatory
breaks and meal service. Between the time of opening and closing the
flightdeck door (door transition), the open flightdeck has some degree
of vulnerability to attack. Such an attack could happen quickly, and
leave insufficient time for the cabin crew to react.
Therefore, in 2007, the FAA promulgated requirements \5\ to address
the security of the flightdeck when the flightdeck door was opened,
however briefly. Specifically, the FAA adopted Sec. Sec. 121.584,
``Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck door,'' and
121.587, ``Closing and locking of flightcrew compartment door,'' to
require that the flightdeck door be locked when the airplane is in
operation, unless it is necessary to open it to permit access by
authorized persons, and require compliance with FAA-approved procedures
for opening the door.
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\5\ Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting
Systems (72 FR 45629; August 15, 2007).
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As a result of these new requirements, air carriers and type design
holders developed various methods and designs, including the use of
crewmembers and equipment and, in limited cases, IPSBs,\6\ to help
secure the flightdeck during the period when the flightdeck door was
open during flight. To provide guidance and recommendations for these
different methods and designs, RTCA, Inc. (RTCA),\7\ formed a committee
to develop recommended procedures and standards for airplane secondary
barriers. In 2011, RTCA produced DO-329, ``Aircraft Secondary Barriers
and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures.'' DO-329 describes
various means of addressing the times when the flightdeck door must be
opened. In this context, these means can be combinations of people,
procedures and/or equipment. The document does not recommend one of
these means over another, but provides advice on the use of each one to
meet the objective of a secure flightdeck. Subsequently and based on
the RTCA's report, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-110,
``Aircraft Secondary Barriers and
[[Page 41297]]
Alternate Flight Deck Security Procedures,'' in 2015. That AC
references various means of compliance with Sec. 121.584(a)(1), which
prohibits the flightdeck door from being unlocked during flight unless
the operator has an approved procedure and visual device to verify that
the area outside the flightdeck door is secure.
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\6\ Relatively few such IPSBs were installed, relative to the
total number of airplanes in scheduled service, and most have since
been removed. The FAA is not aware of the reasons for removal. In
addition, the FAA has no data regarding whether those varying
installations would have met the requirements of this proposal.
\7\ RTCA was formerly the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics and an Advisory Committee to the FAA.
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B. Congressional Mandate
On October 5, 2018, Congress enacted the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018 (the ``Act''). Section 336 of the Act required the FAA to issue an
order requiring installation of a secondary flightdeck barrier on each
new aircraft that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air
carrier in the United States operating under provisions of part 121.
C. ARAC Report
On June 20, 2019, to facilitate the implementation of the mandate
in section 336 to require secondary barriers on certain aircraft, the
FAA tasked ARAC \8\ to recommend standards for IPSB. The ARAC formed
the Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Working Group (the ``Working Group''),
under the Transport Airplane and Engine Subcommittee, to carry out the
tasks. The Working Group included representatives from manufacturers,
air carriers, and pilot and flight attendant unions. On February 27,
2020, the Working Group submitted its ``Recommendation Report to
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee for Implementation of Section
336 of Public Law 115-254'' (the ``Report'') \9\ to ARAC. ARAC accepted
the Report in March of 2020 and forwarded it to the FAA.\10\ The Report
contained 21 recommendations, most of which were by consensus.\11\ This
final rule incorporates those consensus recommendations.
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\8\ See Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Tasking Notice (June 20,
2019), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=3943.
\9\ See Flightdeck Secondary Barriers Working Group Report,
available in the docket for this rulemaking and at www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=4342.
\10\ See Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Meeting
(June 18, 2020), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ARAC%20June%202020%20Meeting%20Packet.pdf.
\11\ As discussed in section II.C of the NPRM for this
rulemaking (87 FR 46892).
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D. Summary of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and Final Rule
This rulemaking finalizes the NPRM published August 1, 2022, which
proposed to implement section 336 of the Act by requiring that certain
airplanes used to conduct passenger-carrying operations under 14 CFR
part 121 (i.e., domestic, flag, or supplemental) have an IPSB that
protects the flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion when the flightdeck
door is opened (87 FR 46892).
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that the IPSB must resist intrusion,
provide line-of-sight visibility to allow crewmember situational
awareness of the area between the passenger cabin and the entry to the
flightdeck, and meet certain physical standards (i.e., design standards
in new Sec. 25.795(a)(4)), but still allow for necessary crewmember
activities.
The proposed rulemaking would affect operators conducting
passenger-carrying operations under part 121 with transport category
airplanes. The NPRM proposed that operators would be required to
incorporate the use of an installed IPSB into their flightdeck door
opening procedures and require crewmembers to deploy the IPSB before
opening the flightdeck door. The FAA proposed that the rule would apply
to operation of transport category airplanes manufactured two years
after the effective date of a final rule.
This rule adopts the proposal with limited changes to clarify the
applicability of the part 25 design requirements for IPSBs to airplanes
required by operating rules to have IPSBs, and to clarify that the
requirement for part 121 operators' airplanes to be equipped with IPSB
applies only to passenger-carrying transport category airplanes. The
final rule also includes the ``line of sight'' design requirement as a
part 25 design requirement, rather than an operating rule.
E. General Overview of Public Comments
The FAA received comments from 31 commenters, including Airlines
for America (A4A); Association of Flight Attendants-Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO (AFA-CWA); Aerospace Industries Association
(AIA); Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA); Airbus
Commercial Aircraft (Airbus); National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil
(ANAC); Allied Pilots Association (APA); The Boeing Company (Boeing);
Coalition of Airline Pilots Association (CAPA); Cabin Ops Safety Risk
Management, LLC (Cabin Ops); Embraer S. A. (Embraer); International
Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations-Cabin Safety
Working Group (ICCAIA-CSWG); Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB);
Regional Airline Association (RAA); Southwest Airlines Pilots
Association (SWAPA); Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA); the
Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD); United Airlines, Inc.
(United); and several individuals.
Commenters generally supported the implementation of an IPSB in
transport category airplanes but submitted requests for additional
modifications. These requests generally address the following:
compliance time; international harmonization; applicability; retrofit
of IPSBs onto the existing fleet; part 129 airplanes; crew staffing and
training concerns; changes to the ``reach through'' requirement;
requests that the FAA clarify whether a malfunctioning IPSB would
prevent the airplane's operation; questions regarding whether operators
need to upgrade equipment and procedures that provide information to
the flightdeck; and the cost and benefit evaluation.
In addition, the commenters addressed the draft ACs that
accompanied the NPRM, as well as requests for specific details
pertaining to compliance. The FAA's responses to these comments can be
found at the Dynamic Regulatory System (drs.faa.gov), along with the
finalized ACs.
IV. Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule
A. Compliance Time
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend Sec. 121.313 by requiring
part 121 operators to have an IPSB on transport category airplanes
manufactured two years after the effective date of the final rule.
ALPA, APA, CAPA, SWAPA, and TTD recommended that the compliance
period should be reduced, so that the rule applies to airplanes
manufactured one year (12 months) after the effective date of this
final rule. They stated that doing so would align with the intent of
Congress, and the text of the legislation, which mandated the FAA to
issue an order by October 5, 2019. These commenters reasoned that a
one-year compliance period would be enough, because manufacturers and
airlines were provided with sufficient notice of the substance and
urgency of the requirement when the legislation mandated in 2018 that
the FAA issue an order within a year, and when ARAC issued the Report
in 2020. These commenters further stated that aircraft manufacturers
should already have preparations substantially underway to facilitate
the installation of IPSB on newly-manufactured aircraft. There has
[[Page 41298]]
been voluntary industry movement toward designing and implementing IPSB
since 2003 (two major airlines \12\ voluntarily installed IPSB on more
than a hundred of their aircraft, and two aircraft manufacturers \13\
had previously offered IPSB as standard equipment on newly-manufactured
aircraft), so some manufacturers already possess procedures to
implement IPSB installation. Additionally, a consensus-based technical
standard exists in an RTCA document; \14\ the industry has had access
to the ARAC recommendations addressing implementation of the
legislation for more than two years; and the FAA also published draft
ACs that provided recommended standards and procedures.
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\12\ Delta Air Lines and United.
\13\ Airbus and Boeing.
\14\ DO-329, ``Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative
Flight Deck Security Procedures,'' discussed in the NPRM.
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In contrast, A4A, AIA, Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, the ICCAIA-CSWG,
and RAA recommended that the FAA increase the compliance period to
three years (36 months) after the effective date of the final rule.
Airbus stated that, because the requirements would impact many aircraft
types and cabin interior configurations, the industry would be required
to develop many IPSBs, each with unique type design criteria in
parallel, resulting in the need for significant resources from original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), the supplier community, and the FAA to
review and certify these unique designs. These commenters pointed out
that, because the proposed requirements and the draft ACs provided
performance-based requirements, additional time would be needed to
derive specific design criteria to comply with the requirements. These
commenters then provided general overviews of the steps required to
develop, certify, test, manufacture, and install a new IPSB; to train
crew and maintenance staff; and, to establish the necessary supply
chain--the completion of which would necessitate more than two years.
A4A stated that a 2-year implementation timeframe could only be
possible if IPSBs are ``plug-and-play'' installations with already-
existing parts. Boeing further pointed out that the industry is
experiencing additional manufacturing delays due to the COVID-19
pandemic. In addition, these commenters reiterated a study \15\ cited
in the Report that predicted three years would be required to fully
design and implement IPSB on newly-manufactured aircraft. Embraer and
the ICCAIA-CSWG also stated that design holders and applicants would
not be able to begin their compliance efforts until the FAA publishes
its final rule.
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\15\ ``Secondary Cockpit Barriers OEM Working Group--Position on
Proposed Secondary Barriers Installation for 14 CFR part 121
Aircrafts'' (June 13, 2019).
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Embraer also pointed to a DOT NPRM, published in January 2020, as
support for a three-year compliance time. This NPRM \16\ would require
carriers flying single-aisle aircraft to make changes to their lavatory
on new aircraft to better accommodate the needs of disabled passengers.
Embraer stated this NPRM proposed changes similar in complexity to the
installation of an IPSB, yet DOT had proposed a three-year compliance
date after the publication of the final rule to provide the time
necessary for equipment and airplane manufacturers to make required
changes to the interiors of their airplane and obtain the appropriate
regulatory approvals for those changes. TCCA commented that two years
seems optimistic to design, certify, and implement IPSB installation.
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\16\ Accessible Lavatories on Single-Aisle Aircraft: Part 1
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 85 FR 27 (2020). The changes proposed
in the NPRM included such additions as grab bars, lavatory faucets
with tactile information on temperature, attendant call buttons, and
a modification to the lavatory door.
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In summary, arguments for shortening the compliance time are mainly
based on the mandate in the legislation, and the amount of time that
has passed since then. Arguments for extending the compliance time
point to the engineering challenges for different aircraft types, and
to the fact that, until a final rule is enacted, manufacturers do not
have criteria on which to base designs.
The FAA notes that two years is more time than was given for the
mandatory retrofit of reinforced flightdeck doors. Also, equipment and
airplane manufacturers are starting from a position of greater
experience and design understanding, than existed when the flightdeck
door requirements were enacted. Conversely, it is true that final
design and manufacturing is not feasible until the final standards are
adopted. This makes a one-year compliance time unrealistic. As was
discussed in the NPRM, the FAA also considered--in proposing the two-
year compliance time the variety of competing concerns and arguments
that were presented during the ARAC activity, and the resulting
recommendations for either 18- or 36-month compliance times, all as
memorialized in the Report. Given the foregoing, the FAA continues to
determine that a two-year compliance time, as proposed by the NPRM, is
appropriate.
In a related comment, United stated that, because the FAA proposed
to place the compliance deadline in part 121, the burden to comply with
proposed Sec. 121.313 would fall upon air carriers, when air carriers
do not control the timeline for design and approval of new IPSB
designs. United recommended the compliance deadline be placed in 14 CFR
part 25, which would create incentives for part 25 applicants to
complete their designs and demonstrate compliance in a timely manner.
The FAA's regulatory approach in this rulemaking is consistent with
other, similar rulemakings requiring updates to the existing fleet.\17\
In addition, since the requirement only applies to certain operations,
i.e., part 121, a generalized requirement in part 25 would not be
appropriate. Ensuring that operators change their procedures to comply
with Sec. 121.584 require changes to part 121, and so adding the
requirement to part 25 would not relieve operators from the burden of
compliance. Therefore, consistent with the proposal, the applicability
of the requirement for IPSB is provided in part 121.
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\17\ See, e.g., Amendment 121-289, Improved Flammability
Standards for Materials Used in the Interiors of Transport Category
Airplane Cabins (52 FR 5422); Amendment 121-301, Improved
Flammability Standards for Thermal/Acoustic Insulation Materials
Used in Transport Category Airplanes (68 FR 45045); and Amendment
121-306, Miscellaneous Cabin Safety Changes (69 FR 62777). All of
these regulations required physical design changes to newly-
manufactured airplanes, using a two-year compliance time.
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B. International Harmonization
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend Sec. 121.313 by adding
paragraph (l) that would require the installation of an IPSB ``that
provides line-of-sight visibility between the flight door and the
cabin'' for aircraft under part 121 operations.
ANAC submitted regulatory text that would move this line-of-sight
specification from proposed Sec. 121.313(l) to a new Sec.
25.795(a)(4)(vi). ANAC cited section III.A.4 of the NPRM preamble,
which stated that the visibility requirement would be evaluated during
certification. ANAC reasoned that part 25 design standards would be a
more appropriate part for the visibility requirement, and would also
allow foreign countries to comply even if they do not have an
equivalent operating rule requiring the installation of an IPSB.
The FAA agrees that the line-of-sight provision is more appropriate
as a part 25 design standard in Sec. 25.795 for the reasons the
commenter provided.
[[Page 41299]]
Therefore, the final rule regulatory text reflects this approach.
In the NPRM, proposed Sec. 25.795(a)(4) stated that an IPSB must
be installed to resist intrusion into the flightdeck whenever the
flightdeck door is opened. ANAC recommended that the FAA rewrite this
requirement as, ``[i]f an installed physical secondary barrier is
installed, it shall resist intrusion into the flightdeck whenever the
flightdeck is opened.'' ANAC stated that, because Brazil and several
other countries adopt part 25 for harmonization purposes, the proposed
rule would make the IPSB mandatory for these countries when neither
ANAC, nor ICAO, has identified IPSB as a security problem. ANAC
recommended that the IPSB mandate be better fitted in the operating
regulations of each country.
The FAA agrees with the commenter's reasoning and has clarified the
final rule by including the clause, ``if required by the operating
rules'' to Sec. 25.795(a)(4) in the final rule.
C. Exclusion of All-Cargo and Private-Use Airplanes
Consistent with section 336 of the Act, the FAA intended for the
proposed requirements for IPSB to apply only to transport-category
airplanes used in passenger-carrying operations under part 121.
A4A and Embraer recommended revising the regulatory text to specify
that the requirements exclude all-cargo airplanes, such as by
explicitly stating that airplanes used solely to transport cargo would
not be required to comply with the proposed mandate for IPSB in Sec.
121.313 by adding the words ``of passenger air carriers'' in proposed
Sec. 121.313(l). These commenters believed Congress, and ARAC, clearly
intended to exclude all-cargo air carriers.
The FAA agrees with the commenters' rationale regarding the
potential confusion in the proposed regulatory text regarding all-cargo
airplanes, and adds the term ``passenger-carrying'' in Sec. 121.313(l)
to specify the requirements will apply to passenger-carrying transport
category airplanes only, excluding all-cargo airplanes. This change
aligns with the text of section 336, which specified ``passenger air
carriers.''
Airbus also requested that the rule except ``private use
transportation'' from compliance with proposed Sec. 25.795(a)(4),
because private use aircraft are usually configured with a cabin that
cannot accommodate IPSB installation, and usually contain a low number
of occupants who will be familiar with the aircraft. Airbus recommended
that Sec. 25.795(e), ``Exceptions,'' be amended accordingly.
The FAA does not agree with Airbus' request. As previously
discussed, in the final rule, Sec. 25.795(a)(4) references only those
airplanes required by operating rules to have a flightdeck door. The
only operating rule that requires an IPSB falls under part 121, and
part 121 does not apply to private-use operations. Therefore, no change
to proposed Sec. 25.795(e) is needed and Sec. 25.795(e) is finalized
as proposed.
D. Requests That the FAA Mandate Retrofit
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to apply the requirement for an IPSB
only to new airplanes that are manufactured two years after the
effective date of the final rule. The NPRM did not include a proposed
retrofit requirement for those airplanes manufactured prior to that
effective date.
ALPA, CAPA, APA, SWAPA, TTD, and an individual requested that the
FAA extend the requirement for an IPSB to all aircraft conducting
operations under part 121, including older airplanes, rather than to
just newly-manufactured airplanes operating under part 121 as proposed.
These commenters stated that not requiring an IPSB in existing aircraft
under part 121 operations would become a known security vulnerability.
These commenters stated that extending the requirements to the existing
part 121 fleet would align with the intent of Congress in mandating an
IPSB order be published by October 2019, because doing so would account
for the many airplanes that have been manufactured without IPSB
installation since that date. Additionally, JCAB, recognizing that the
proposed regulations did not have a retrofit requirement, requested
that the FAA provide how it evaluated the risks to already-manufactured
aircraft.
A4A and United supported the implementation of the IPSB
requirements to newly-manufactured aircraft only, as proposed in the
NPRM, and stated that a retrofit requirement would not be warranted
because current measures remain effective in addressing safety and
security concerns. However, rather than being applicable to newly-
manufactured aircraft operating under part 121, these commenters
recommended that these requirements instead be applicable to newly
type-certificated aircraft operating under part 121. A4A stated that
application to all newly type-certificated aircraft would be supported
by relevant data and the current multi-layered security environment for
commercial aviation, including on-board security procedures. A4A and
United further cited concerns that application to all newly-
manufactured aircraft would result in non-commonality issues within
their fleets, as well as increased cost burdens in training and
maintenance.
Section 336 was explicit in mandating the FAA to require
installation of IPSB on each newly manufactured aircraft. The purpose
of this rulemaking is to implement the congressional mandate of IPSB on
such aircraft.
In addition, a mandated retrofit is outside the scope of this final
rule and would require an independent rulemaking action to implement.
The FAA continues to monitor threats to aviation security in
conjunction with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
other agencies. Should additional flightdeck security measures be
deemed necessary, the FAA may propose additional rulemaking.
Similarly, the FAA also does not agree with the suggestion to make
the requirements of this rule applicable only to newly-type
certificated airplanes, because doing so would not meet the mandate
from Congress. The legislation was explicit in that it mandates the FAA
to require installation of IPSB on each new aircraft.
The FAA notes that it, and other U.S. Government agencies, use a
variety of tools to continuously assess potential risks to aviation
safety and security.
E. Requests To Include Airplanes Operating Under Part 129
In the NPRM, the FAA did not propose to apply the requirement for
IPSB to airplanes operating under part 129.
ALPA, APA, CAPA, SWAPA, and TTD requested that the requirements be
extended to any aircraft operating under part 129 within the United
States, and to part 129 air carriers who operate solely outside the
United States but with aircraft registered in the United States. These
commenters stated that this extension would follow the same rationale
that resulted in the FAA extending the requirement to install hardened
flightdeck doors from part 121 to part 129. They reasoned that, while
the FAA is bound by the minimum requirements of the legislation in
publishing an IPSB requirement, the FAA is not constrained by the
legislation when exercising its general Title 49 statutory powers to
regulate aviation safety in the public interest, and therefore could
establish additional IPSB requirements beyond those expressly required
by Congress.
[[Page 41300]]
As previously noted, the purpose of this final rule is to implement
section 336 of the Act, which limited the applicability of the mandate
for IPSB to airplanes manufactured for delivery to passenger air
carriers operating under part 121. Moreover, as noted in the NPRM,
there currently is no international standards organization, such as
ICAO, proposing an IPSB; nor are other civil aviation authorities
mandating, or proposing to mandate, an IPSB.
Moreover, extending these requirements to part 129 was not proposed
in the NPRM, and is therefore out of scope for this final rule.
Accordingly, here is no change and the rule is adopted as proposed in
this matter.
F. Crewmember Staffing and Training Concerns
Several commenters sought changes to the proposal to address
crewmember staffing and training. In the NPRM, the FAA did not propose
any requirements regarding crewmember staffing or training.
AFA-CWA and Cabin Ops recommended the FAA add a crew staffing
requirement to this rule, by increasing the required number of flight
attendants from one to two, for airplanes with 19 to 50 passenger
seats. Currently, for airplanes with a passenger capacity from 19 to
50, only one flight attendant is required.\18\ These commenters stated
that when the flightdeck door is opened to allow a flightcrew member to
leave the flightdeck--for example, to use the lavatory--no crewmember
is in the cabin for the period of time that the flightcrew member is
away, because the lone flight attendant must enter the flightdeck. They
suggest that having a second, required cabin crewmember would maintain
at least one crewmember in the cabin.
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\18\ See Sec. 121.391, ``Flight attendants.''
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Cabin Ops also questioned whether the FAA should still require two
persons to be on the flightdeck during times where a pilot leaves the
flightdeck. The commenter stated that this was not realistic, and
suggested that the FAA state in regulations and policy that each
passenger air carrier should be required to conduct a safety risk
assessment when applying the operational procedures to small regional
aircraft.
In contrast, RAA stated that implementation of IPSB would provide
an additional layer of security, whereas requiring two flight attendant
represents increased long-term costs for certain small air carriers.
The FAA does not agree with the recommendation to increase flight
attendant staffing, nor with Cabin Ops' suggestion that an IPSB is
incompatible with the requirement for two persons on the flightdeck at
all times.\19\ Historically, aircraft with a seating capacity of 20 to
50 passengers have successfully and safely operated with one flight
attendant. The FAA currently has no data to support mandating two
flight attendants on these aircraft. In addition, the installation of
an IPSB will isolate the flightdeck door from the cabin in times when
it must open. Finally, adding a new crew requirement is outside the
scope of the NPRM. The FAA expects that each air carrier, in accordance
with part 5, will use its approved processes within its Safety
Management System (SMS) \20\ to identify and control risks identified
in its operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See, e.g., 14 CFR 121.313(g), 121.547, and 121.587.
\20\ See AC 120-92, ``Safety Management System for Aviation
Service Providers.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TTD requested the rule require training on IPSBs for flight
attendants.
The FAA does not agree that a specific training requirement is
necessary for this rule. When new equipment is installed on an
aircraft, Sec. 121.421, ``Flight attendants: Initial and transition
ground training,'' requires flight attendants to be trained on that
equipment.
Finally, JCAB, noting the importance of the IPSB only being
deployed for a short length of time, asked that such be specified in
the operating manual.
Given that the purpose of an IPSB is to slow a security threat so
that the flightdeck door can be closed, the FAA does not agree that
specifying a maximum duration that the IPSB can be deployed is
necessary.
G. Requests To Exclude Smaller Transport Category Airplanes
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to apply the IPSB requirement to all
transport-category airplanes that are required to have a flightdeck
door, regardless of the airplane's size. The FAA also asked for
comment, including supporting data, regarding whether aircraft used for
flights of shorter distance or duration should be excluded from the
requirement, due to the decreased likelihood of the flightdeck door
being opened during such flights.
In response, Embraer, the ICCAIA-CSWG, and RAA asked the FAA to
consider excluding from the final rule smaller transport category
airplanes with flights of shorter duration. APA, Embraer, and RAA also
supported excluding smaller transport category airplanes from this
final rule, regardless of the flight duration.
The ICCAIA-CSWG and Embraer, stated that, although short duration
flights can be associated with any size of airplane, short flights are
to be expected with smaller transport category airplanes, which have a
more limited maximum flight duration. These commenters also stated that
smaller transport category airplanes have confined interior spaces,
with lavatories, galleys, and wardrobes located close to the
flightdeck, leaving a very small space for changes to aircraft design.
Finally, these commenters stated the design challenges created by the
proposed IPSB requirement due to increases in cost and weight, would be
more significant for smaller transport category airplanes as compared
to the larger airplanes.
A4A, Embraer, and the ICCAIA-CSWG stated that on smaller transport
category airplanes, the combination of an Improvised Non-Installed
Secondary Barrier (INSB) with procedures and crewmembers training would
provide appropriate protection during flightdeck door transition.
In contrast, ALPA, APA, CAPA, and AFA-CWA agreed with the FAA that
there was no obvious design parameter, such as passenger capacity or
airplane gross weight, which correlated with short flights.
Prior to publication of the NPRM, the FAA tasked ARAC to provide
information that could be applied to determine if a certain size of
aircraft could be exempted from the requirement to have an IPSB. ARAC
did not provide a recommendation on that topic. The NPRM included a
similar request for information; however, no specific data or proposed
criteria were submitted. Accordingly, while commenters made a number of
assertions regarding design challenges, neither the commenters nor ARAC
provided data to support a change to the proposal to account for
aircraft size or flight duration.
H. Reach-Through Requirement
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec. 25.795(a)(4)(iv) that the
IPSB must prevent a person from reaching through it and touching the
flightdeck door.
Airbus, Boeing, and the ICCAIA-CSWG recommended that the FAA change
the phrase ``touching the flightdeck door'' to incorporate different
words, including ``grasping,'' ``blocking,'' and ``grabbing'' the
flightdeck door. They argued that such changes would be more inclusive
of the
[[Page 41301]]
ways a person can touch a flightdeck door.
The FAA does not agree that the suggested words are more inclusive.
Any of the proposed words would need to be defined, whereas the word
``touch'' is well-understood and more conservative than the recommended
words. As such, Sec. 25.795(a)(4)(iv) will remain as proposed in the
final rule.
TCCA asked the FAA if it will mandate be a minimum distance between
the IPSB and the flightdeck door.
The FAA declines to impose a specified minimum distance between the
IPSB and the flightdeck door, because the requirements of this rule are
performance-based.
I. Master Minimum Equipment List
In the NPRM, the FAA did not propose any requirements regarding the
IPSB and the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL).\21\
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\21\ See Sec. 121.628, ``Inoperable instruments and
equipment.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A4A, Boeing, TCCA, and United commented that the FAA should allow
operators Minimum Equipment List (MEL) relief should the IPSB
malfunction or become inoperable. They suggested that passenger air
carriers should be allowed to temporarily operate aircraft with an
inoperable IPSB. These commenters also suggested that the final rule
ensure that operators be able to obtain MEL relief for inoperable
IPSBs. A4A and United also suggested that in addition to providing MEL
relief in the final rule, that the FAA should issue an MMEL Policy
Letter that allows for aircraft operation with an inoperative IPSB.
For purposes of the airplane's potential deferral under its MEL or
MMEL, and its continued compliance with Sec. 121.584(a), the FAA does
not consider an IPSB to be ``essential for safe operations under all
operating conditions,'' in accordance with Sec. 121.628(b)(1).
Therefore, the IPSB may be included in an operator's MEL. Finally, in
accordance with existing processes, the FAA will evaluate whether an
MMEL Policy Letter is necessary.
J. Adequacy of Current Devices and Procedures
In the NPRM, the FAA intended proposed Sec. 121.584(a)(3) to
prohibit an operator from unlocking or opening the flightdeck door
during flight unless there was an approved audio procedure and an
approved visual device to verify that the IPSB, if an IPSB is required
to be installed, has been deployed.
Embraer and the ICCAIA-CSWG raised concerns that this requirement
could be interpreted as requiring the flightcrew to see--from the
flightdeck--that the IPSB is installed, whereas some aircraft
configurations may render it impossible to see from the flightdeck that
the IPSB is deployed.\22\ These commenters stated that, if proposed
Sec. 121.584(a)(3) were interpreted too strictly, it would require
operators to install a system inside the flightdeck to inform the
flightcrew that the IPSB is deployed, thus creating an unnecessary
burden for those aircraft configurations. These commenters stated that
this was not recommended in the Report, nor were the costs of a new
visual system accounted for in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Embraer and the ICCAIA-CSWG used the word ``installed,''
but the FAA infers that they meant ``deployed.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing commented that the FAA should have emphasized in the NPRM
that compliance with proposed Sec. 121.584(a)(3) can be satisfied with
audio and visual devices present in current airplanes and associated
crew procedures, without the need for additional flightdeck indications
such as an electronic flightdeck indication that the IPSB is deployed.
As explained in the NPRM, the FAA proposed Sec. 121.584(a)(3) to
make sure that, if an IPSB is installed, it is deployed any time the
flightdeck door is opened during flight. However, this rule does not
require the installation of any specific system inside the flightdeck
to inform the flight crew that the IPSB is deployed and secured.
Operators will work with their FAA oversight office to develop
procedures for opening the flightdeck door for different aircraft
configurations. The FAA anticipates that operators will continue to
utilize various methods similar to their current approved procedures
regarding the opening of the flightdeck door (e.g., audio and visual
devices present in current airplanes and associated procedures).
K. Cost and Benefit Evaluation
The FAA provided a Preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment for the
proposed requirements in the NPRM. A4A stated that the FAA should have
considered, in its cost-benefit analysis, the technical difficulties
and the on-going cost implications for the requirement to maintain and
operate aircraft with functional IPSB. A4A cited the challenges of
redesigning interiors on smaller aircraft with space, monument \23\
limitations, and potential maintenance issues for IPSB due to their
moving parts, and significant training costs for crewmembers who must
work across a fleet with mixed IPSB equipage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Functional units such as galleys, lavatories, are called
``monuments.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA recognizes the technical difficulties of installing IPSBs
on some smaller airplanes, which might increase costs. The FAA relied
on the ARAC's $35,000 per airplane estimate, which included the entire
range of affected airplane models, so the FAA's estimate of the overall
fleet remains valid. The FAA also estimates that training costs per
employee for a simple device such as an IPSB is very low (training time
of approximately 30 minutes). Once an employee is trained on a
particular IPSB model, the FAA does not believe there will be
significant training costs for training on additional models, due to
their similarity of function.
RAA suggested that the FAA consider excluding operators of short
duration flights from the final rule as a means to reduce economic
burdens on small entities. The commenter cited the Report which
recognized that, for short flights, the flightdeck door may be less
likely to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not provide the
intended benefit. The commenter also referenced a DOT NPRM \24\
regarding accessible lavatories on single-aisle aircraft applicable to
single-aisle aircraft with 125 or more passenger seats, because DOT
tentatively recognized that aircraft with fewer than 125 seats tend to
be shorter-haul aircraft, with shorter flight times, where it may not
be cost-beneficial to require interior improvements to lavatories, and
the commenter extended this rationale to the flightdeck door. The FAA
addresses this comment in the section titled ``Regulatory Flexibility
Act,'' under the subsection titled ``Significant Issues Raised in
Public Comments.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Ibid, 85 FR 27 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM preamble section titled ``Proposed Exception from
Incompatible Regulations,'' the FAA proposed that, during its
certification of the IPSB installation, the requirements of Sec.
25.365 would not apply to IPSBs in the deployed configuration.
TCCA stated that the proposed regulation was not incompatible with
the provisions of Sec. 25.365, ``Pressurized compartment loads.'' TCCA
questioned the utility of the expense of building a decompression-
resistant IPSB when the Report estimated the probability of
decompression to be 10-\9\ when the IPSB is deployed. If the
FAA's intention was to grant exemption from Sec. 25.365 when an IPSB
is deployed, then TCCA recommended that the FAA justify that intention
based on a cost-benefit argument instead of incompatibility,
[[Page 41302]]
and also specify the estimated cost differential of a decompression-
resistant IPSB.
The FAA agrees that ``compatibility'' may not be the most accurate
term to describe how the FAA makes compliance findings with Sec.
25.365 when the IPSB is deployed. A better term is ``applicability.''
As noted in the NPRM, the FAA has long considered that Sec. 25.365
does not apply to interior features that have transient configurations
(such as a lavatory door) when a door is open. Because deployment of
the IPSB is also transient, the FAA has determined that Sec. 25.365 is
not applicable to the IPSB when deployed. However, should IPSB designs
be proposed that are intended to remain in place, Sec. 25.365 would be
applicable.
Airbus recommended that the FAA increase its estimated cost for
each IPSB unit from $35,000 to $50,000, because if the cost included
recurrent and non-recurrent costs, then it should cover development
expenses (i.e., engineering costs, stress and analysis, certification
testing and witnessing, different prototypes for different aircraft
configurations) and supplier development costs.
The FAA does not agree with this recommendation. The cost analysis
in the regulatory evaluation for the proposed rule included the $9
million nonrecurring engineering costs estimated by ARAC. That estimate
would have included all costs that Airbus characterizes as development
costs, and includes assumed up-front costs for initial aircraft design,
partial design reuse for remaining models, and unique installations for
each aircraft model.
In the NPRM, the FAA divided total losses ($35.7 billion) by 50-
year cumulative present value costs ($236.5 million) to derive an
annual probability of an attempted attack of 0.66 percent. An
individual commenter stated that this calculation was not correct, that
dividing a loss by a 50-year cost did not yield an annual probability,
but 0.66 percent spread over many years. The commenter suggested that
the correct calculation to assess the break-even annual probability of
an attempted attack would be to divide total losses ($35.7 billion) by
annualized costs ($20.3 million), leading to a probability of an
attempted attack of 0.057 percent per year.
The FAA does not agree with the suggestion that the break-even
analysis is incorrect. An annual probability of 0.66 percent translates
to one successful attack every 151 years (1/151 = 0.0066 or 0.66
percent). The commenter, in his own comment, stated that ``even if
there were only one terrorist hijacking attack in one hundred and fifty
years (annual attack probability of 0.7 percent) . . ., secondary
barriers are cost effective.'' The FAA points out that this 0.7 percent
estimate is effectively identical to the FAA's estimate of 0.66
percent.
In addition, the individual commenter took exception to the FAA
characterization, in the Regulatory Impact Analysis section of the
NPRM, of the commenter's quantification of benefits in the Briefing
Note (Stewart and Mueller, 2019) \25\ as ``problematic.'' The commenter
stated that any quantifiable risk involves some subjectivity and
uncertainty in predicting rates of disruption for security measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Mark G. Stewart & John Mueller, ``Security Risk and Cost-
Benefit Assessment of Secondary Flight Deck Barriers,'' Centre for
Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, The University of
Newcastle, Australia (2019), nova.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/
manager/Repository/uon:35881.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The statement may be true, but that does not preclude the FAA from
determining that the subjectivity and uncertainty is so great as to
make accurate estimates problematic; for example, the airport
disruption rate for airport checkpoint screening of 15 percent
estimated in the Briefing Note compared to a disruption rate of 50
percent estimated by other researchers.
Another individual also stated this rule would have no possible
break-even benefit, given the finding of the RIA that the annual
probability of an attempted breach of the flight compartment door is
0.66 percent while costing travelers $236.5 million per year. Using
worldwide data for commercial flights, the commenter suggested that the
annual probability of a 9/11-type terrorist attack implied by the
break-even analysis was orders of magnitude too high.
The FAA notes that $236.5 million is not the yearly cost of the
rule; rather, it is the total present value cost of the rule over the
49-year estimation period, from 2023 to 2072. Table 1 of the regulatory
evaluation shows this, and also shows that the corresponding annualized
cost is $20.7 million (at a 7 percent discount rate). In addition, the
FAA does not agree with the use of all commercial flights worldwide as
basis for consideration. A 9/11-type attack would likely require
hijacking of a large transport category airplane. Moreover, the focus
of the proposed rule and the regulatory analysis is necessarily on
transport category airplanes taking off and landing in the United
States. Accordingly, the commenter's use of all commercial flights
worldwide, including flights with non-transport category aircraft,
leads to estimates of excessively low probabilities.
L. Miscellaneous
TCCA and an individual expressed concern that deployment of the
IPSB would signal that the flightdeck door was about to be opened,
which might have a negative impact on security. TCCA noted that
providing some visual obscuration might address this concern, but could
conflict with the line-of-sight requirement.
The FAA notes that current procedures for opening the flightdeck
door could also provide a similar signal. In that vein, the IPSB
enhances flightdeck security, since this rule mandates that the
flightdeck door will not be unlocked or opened until after the IPSB is
deployed.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed static load requirements in Sec.
25.795(a)(4) for the IPSB when it is deployed. Airbus requested more
details on how and where to apply the requested load on the IPSB.
The FAA notes that the load must be applied at ``the most critical
location,'' and that this requirement is performance-based. The
applicant for a design approval of an IPSB will have to define the
critical locations for the load. However, the FAA provided draft
guidance for applicants on this topic in AC 25.795-10, ``Installation
of Physical Secondary Barriers for Transport Category Airplanes,''
which is in the docket for this rulemaking. This AC states that
critical locations should include the IPSB center and the IPSB latch
area. This AC will be finalized with the publication of this rule.
TCCA asked whether the aircraft size and weight criteria from Sec.
25.795(b) would be applicable to the proposed Sec. 25.795(b)(4).
The aircraft size and weight criteria in paragraph (b) of Sec.
25.795 are not relevant to the flight deck door requirements of
paragraph (a); and, as this rule adds design requirements for IPSB to
paragraph (a), the aircraft size and weight criteria in paragraph (b)
continue to be inapplicable.
Embraer recommended an edit to the NPRM preamble, under the section
titled ``Proposed exception from incompatible regulations,'' regarding
a sentence which stated that, because the proposed rule would not
require that the IPSB be deployed during taxi, takeoff, and landing,
the amount of time that the IPSB is deployed should be ``very brief in
comparison to the duration of the flight.'' Embraer recommended that
the sentence should
[[Page 41303]]
end at ``very brief'' to give flexibility for the operator to define,
according to its operating procedures, the amount of time that the IPSB
is deployed.
The FAA confirms that it was the agency's intent to convey that
operators have flexibility to define the amount of time that the IPSB
is deployed.
Three individuals commented that a modular, lightweight, non-porous
device would be the fastest and most cost-effective way to install a
barrier on existing airplanes.
The FAA notes that the requirements in this final rule are
performance-based standards, allowing for various designs.
An individual commenter recommended the FAA require that both the
main flightdeck door and the IPSB not be able to be opened at the same
time.
This recommendation would likely involve significant design
complexity, and cause delay while the FAA conducts additional risk
analysis. The FAA has not included this recommendation in the final
rule.
V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Federal agencies consider impacts of regulatory actions under a
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive
Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563, as amended by Executive Order
14094 (``Modernizing Regulatory Review''), direct that each Federal
agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354)
requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes
on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39)
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing
U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with
base year of 1995). The current threshold after adjustment for
inflation is $177,000,000 using the most current (2022) Implicit Price
Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product. This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA's analysis of the impacts of the final rule. The FAA
provides a detailed Regulatory Impact Analysis in the docket of this
rulemaking.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA determined that this final
rule (1) has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is an economically
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866; (3) will not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities; (4) will not create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and
(5) will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or tribal
governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold
identified above. These analyses are summarized below.
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
1. Benefits
During many flights, the flightdeck door must be opened for
lavatory breaks, meal service, rest periods, crew changes, etc. During
the time of door transition, the open flightdeck has some degree of
vulnerability to attack. During these openings, an attack on the
flightdeck could happen quickly; this could leave insufficient time for
passengers and cabin crew to react. However, there have been no
breaches of a flightdeck since the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.
The purpose and functional benefit of IPSBs, which Congress
directed the FAA to require by mandate, is to enhance the flightdeck
security procedures of Sec. 121.584 by slowing the time by which an
unauthorized person could reach the flightdeck by at least the time
required to open and reclose the flightdeck door.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Report, pp. 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Briefing Note \27\ (Stewart and Mueller, 2019) provided to the
ARAC Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Working Group by one of the members,
applied an engineering technique--reliability analysis--to the TSA's
``Layers of Security'' \28\ to estimate the benefits of secondary
barriers in reducing the vulnerability of the U.S. commercial fleet to
a 9/11-like terrorist attack. This approach requires estimates of
``disruption rates'' for the various TSA layers of security and also
requires an estimate of the probability of a 9/11-like terrorist
attack. Estimates of security layer disruption rates are very difficult
to make and, accordingly, are highly uncertain. For example, Stewart
and Mueller estimate a disruption rate of 15% for the TSA Airport
Checkpoint Screening security layer, whereas Martonosi and Barrett \29\
estimate the disruption rate to be 50%. Estimating the probability of a
9/11-like terrorist attack is also difficult since there has been only
one such event. Consequently, estimating quantified benefits of the
IPSB requirements is problematic. Accordingly, the FAA does not endorse
the analysis or conclusions of this Briefing Note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Mark G. Stewart & John Mueller, ``Security Risk and Cost-
Benefit Assessment of Secondary Flight Deck Barriers,'' Centre for
Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, The University of
Newcastle, Australia (2019), nova.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/
manager/Repository/uon:35881.
\28\ ``Inside Look: TSA Layers of Security,'' www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/08/01/inside-look-tsa-layers-security.
\29\ Susan E. Martonosi & Arnold Barnett. 2006. ``How Effective
is Security Screening of Airline passengers?,'' Interfaces 36(6):
545, 550.
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However, based on estimates of costs of the 9/11 attacks, the FAA
has conducted a break-even analysis. An authoritative study \30\ of the
costs to New York City of the 9/11 attacks provides an estimate of
$26.6 billion in physical capital and short-term earnings losses,\31\
which amounts to $38.86 billion in 2021 dollars.\32\ What remains is to
estimate the cost of the 2,763 lives lost in the 9/11 attacks. Using
DOT's $11.8 million dollar estimate of the Value of Statistical Life
(VSL),\33\ that loss is $32.60 billion, which added to the physical
capital and earnings losses, makes the total New York City costs to be
$71.46 billion. The FAA estimates the cost of a single-airplane 9/11-
type attack (and the value of an averted attack) to be half that at
$35.73 billion. The break-even analysis estimates what the annual
probability of a single-airplane 9/11-type attack must be in order for
the final rule to break even, i.e., for the benefits of the final rule
to be equal to its costs. Dividing the $236.5 million cost \34\ of the
proposed rule by the $35.7 billion averted attack value yields the
breakeven annual probability of an attack to be 0.66%. Multiplying
[[Page 41304]]
this calculated breakeven probability of attack times the $35.7 billion
averted attack value necessarily returns the $236.5 million break-even
expected value of averting an attack. Such a breakeven analysis
implicitly assumes that the proposed rule is completely effective.
Thus, here the final rule breaks even, under the assumptions that the
probability of an attempted attack is 0.66% per year and that the rule
will be 100% effective in thwarting any such attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Rapaport. 2002.
``Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York
City,'' Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 8:2
(November).
\31\ $21.6 bn in physical capital losses plus the $5 bn average
of $3.6-$6.4 bn in short-term earnings losses.
\32\ $26.6 bn inflated by ratio of 2021 and 2002 GDP Price
Deflators. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, ``Table 1.1.4
Price Indexes for GDP.'' Click ``Modify'' icon and refresh table
with first and last years of period.
\33\ U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Transportation
Policy. ``Departmental Guidance on the Value of a Statistical
Life,'' www.dot.gov/policy/transportation-policy/economy. Effective
Date: March 24, 2022.
\34\ Assumes 7% discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Costs
The FAA uses the cost estimate of $35,000 provided by the Report
for the purchase and installation of an IPSB. Training costs for pilots
and flight attendants are estimated using training hours from the
Report and the opportunity costs of pilots and flight attendants
estimated from annual hourly wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Costs are estimated in two stages. First-stage costs are calculated for
the 25-year period, 2023-2047, during which the fleet operating under
part 121 gradually becomes fully equipped with IPSBs. Second-stage
costs are calculated to include in the analysis a full 25-year airplane
life cycle (2048-2072) for which the entire part 121 fleet is equipped
with IPSBs.
(a) Stage One Costs
The FAA estimates the rule will begin to apply to new airplanes
operating under part 121 by the end of 2023. The FAA uses its Aerospace
Forecast 2020-2040 to estimate the annual increase in the passenger
fleet operating under part 121.\35\ The sum of the forecast increase in
the fleet and the number of retirements determines the annual increase
in new airplanes operating under part 121 and therefore the annual
number of IPSBs that will be installed in airplanes destined for part
121 operations. Annual retirements are estimated assuming a retirement
rate (3.57%) that is consistent with the 2020-2040 forecast of the
number of airplanes in part 121 operations. A similar analysis is done
to determine the IPSB training costs of pilots and flight attendants,
except that training costs apply to current as well as future pilots
and flight attendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ FAA Forecast FY 2020-2040, Table 21: ``US Mainline Air
Carriers--Passenger Jet Aircraft,'' & Table 25: ``Regional Air
Carriers--Passenger Aircraft.'' Since some regional air carriers
operate under part 135 as well as part 121, the estimate of
airplanes operating under part 121 is improved by excluding
airplanes with less than 20 passenger seats. Estimates for the
period 2040-2047 are made assuming the growth rate (1.74%) implied
by the FAA part 121 airplane numbers for 2030 and 2040.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Stage Two Costs
As previously noted, second-stage costs are calculated in order to
include a full 25-year airplane life cycle (2048-2072) for which the
entire part 121 fleet is equipped with IPSBs. For this second stage,
the FAA is well beyond the terminal date of the FAA forecast and,
accordingly, assumes a constant growth rate for the part 121 fleet. The
constant growth rates for pilots and flight attendants are as before.
(c) Other Potential Costs
Stewart and Mueller also discuss potential added risks associated
with IPSBs, including, for example, that crew vigilance and
responsiveness might be reduced in the presence of an IPSB. The FAA
notes that it does not find significant downsides to the installation
of the ISPBs if all other relevant regulations are complied with.
(d) Total Costs of the Rule
Table 1 summarizes the total costs of the rule by combining stage
one and stage two costs. At a 7 percent discount rate, the present
value total costs of this rule are $236.5 million with annualized costs
at $20.3 million. At a 3 percent discount rate, the present value total
costs of this rule are $505.0 million with annualized costs at $ 29.0
million.
Table 1--Total Costs of Secondary Barriers Rule
[$ millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present value Annualized Present value Annualized
costs (7%) costs (7%) costs (3%) costs (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023-2047..................................... $186.0 $16.0 $296.5 $17.0
2048-2072..................................... 50.4 4.3 208.6 12.0
2023-2072..................................... 236.5 20.3 505.0 29.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Present values discounted to 2021 at 7% and 3% discount rates.
\2\ Columns may not sum to totals due to rounding.
3. Discussion of Alternatives
(a) Alternative 1--Extending the Rule To Include Foreign Carriers
Operating Under Part 129 \36\
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\36\ Part 129 governs foreign operators who operate either
within the United States, or who operate solely outside the United
States, but with airplanes registered in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At this time, neither other civil aviation authorities nor ICAO
have identified secondary barriers as a security priority. Therefore,
extending the IPSB requirement to foreign air carriers would be without
the agreement of other civil aviation authorities. After the events of
September 11, 2001, the FAA did apply the hardened flightdeck door
requirement to foreign air carriers, but the need for hardened
flightdeck doors was recognized internationally and the FAA's standards
were reflected in the requirements of most other countries. The FAA
estimates that by the time IPSBs are fully adopted by part 121
operators, 35% of part 121 and part 129 operating commercial passenger
aircraft will not have an IPSB.
(b) Alternative 2--Exempting the Rule for Short Duration Flights
ARAC recognized that, for short flights, the flightdeck door may
not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not provide the
intended benefit. However, ARAC was unable to identify any airplane
design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane gross weight
that correlates with short flights. Also, the range of all the airplane
models that will be affected by this rule exceeds the maximum flight
length at which opening the flightdeck door is unlikely. Therefore,
this rule does not address an airplane's size or range, or duration of
flight.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, Public Law 96-354, 94
Stat. 1164 (5 U.S.C. 601-612), as amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat.
857, Mar. 29, 1996) and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Pub. L.
111-240, 124 Stat. 2504, Sept. 27, 2010), requires Federal agencies to
consider the effects of the
[[Page 41305]]
regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to
minimize any significant economic impact. The term ``small entities''
comprises small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are
independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields,
and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000.
The FAA published an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
in the proposed rule to aid the public in commenting on the potential
impacts to small entities. The FAA considered the public comments in
developing the final rule and this Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (FRFA). An FRFA must contain the following:
(1) A statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule;
(2) A statement of the significant issues raised by the public
comments in response to the IRFA, a statement of the assessment of the
agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made in the
proposed rule as a result of such comments;
(3) The response of the agency to any comments filed by the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA) in
response to the proposed rule, and a detailed statement of any change
made to the proposed rule in the final rule as a result of the
comments;
(4) A description of and an estimate of the number of small
entities to which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such
estimate is available;
(5) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the
classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and
the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report
or record; and
(6) A description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the
stated objectives of applicable statues, including a statement of the
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative
adopted in the final rule and why each of the other significant
alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect the
impact on small entities was rejected.
1. Need for and Objectives of the Rule
This rule is needed to satisfy the requirements of section 336 of
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. This law requires that the FAA
issue an order for the installation of Secondary Cockpit Barriers on
each new airplane that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air
carrier in the United States operating under part 121.
2. Significant Issues Raised in Public Comments
No issues were raised in direct response to the IRFA. However, in
comments to the NPRM, some commenters suggested that the FAA consider
excluding smaller transport category airplanes from the IPSB
requirement as small transports typically have a limited flight
duration. As recognized by the ARAC, for short flights the flightdeck
door may not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not
provide the intended benefit. Two commenters stated that on smaller
airplanes, a combination of an Improvised Non-Installed Secondary
Barrier (INSB) and establishment of procedures and crewmembers training
would provide appropriate protection during flightdeck door transition.
Some commenters also stated that smaller transport category aircraft
have confined interior spaces with lavatories, galleys, and wardrobes
close to the flightdeck, leaving a very small space for changes to
aircraft design. These commenters also stated that the design
challenges created by the IPSB rule, due to increases in cost and
weight, are more significant for smaller transport category airplanes
as compared to larger transports. RAA specifically suggested that the
FAA consider excluding operators of short duration flights from the
final rule as a means to reduce economic burdens on small entities.
References to cost impacts on small transport airplanes are
relevant here to the extent that they are operated by small operators.
Excluding small operators from the rule is infeasible because no
operator would designate airplanes for short flights only and even if
they did, the FAA could not be assured that they would not be used for
longer flights where an IPSB could be safety-enhancing. The magnitude
of the economic impact on small entities is estimated in section 5
below. Even though the FAA makes a very conservative estimate there by
assuming immediate installation of IPSBs, at $35,000 apiece, on a 2%
revenue criterion, the FAA shows the economic impact to be
insignificant, ranging from 0.06% to 1.13% of revenues for small
operators. If $35,000 is deemed too low because confined space
significantly raises the IPSB cost for small operators, that estimate
can be stress tested by doubling the IPSB cost estimate to $70,000.
This test increases the range of economic impact from 0.12% to 2.26%.
With just 2 of the 11 operators for which the FAA has data showing an
impact just over 2%, the FAA still finds an insignificant impact on a
substantial number of operators.
3. Responses to SBA Comments
The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA has not filed any
comments in response to the proposed rule.
4. Small Entities to Which the Rule Will Apply
The RFA defines small entities as small businesses, small
governmental jurisdictions, or small organizations. In 5 U.S.C. 601(3),
the RFA defines ``small business'' to have the same meaning as ``small
business concern'' under section 3 of the Small Business Act. The Small
Business Act authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to
define ``small business'' by issuing regulations.
SBA has established size standards for various types of economic
activities, or industries, under the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS).\37\ These size standards generally
define small businesses based on the number of employees or annual
receipts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards
(2019). www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS has classified certificate holders operating under part 121
in either NAICS 481111, Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation or NAICS
481211, Nonscheduled Chartered Passenger Air Transportation, or both.
Since the size standard for either industry is the same at 1,500
employees, it is of no concern in which of the two industries they are
classified.
In the regulatory impact analysis for this rulemaking, a total of
43 operators operating under part 121 were identified in the FAA's
National Vital Information Subsystem (NVIS) data base. Table 2 lists 23
of these operators identified in this study as having less than 1,500
employees and therefore potentially subject to consideration under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. Twelve of these operators were identified
as small based on airline employment data (Table 2, col. 3) from the
DOT Bureau of Transportation Statistics.\38\ The remaining eleven
operators were identified as having less than 1,500 total employees on
the basis of their numbers of operations and maintenance employees
(also from the NVIS database). One of the small operators, Piedmont
Airlines, was excluded from the regulatory flexibility analysis as it
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Airlines. Since the remaining
22 small
[[Page 41306]]
operators are more than 50% of the part 21 operator population, the FAA
estimates that a substantial number of small firms are affected by this
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Transtats.bts.gov.
Table 2--Data for Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of Secondary Barriers Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All ops IPSB
emp No. emp Flt No. 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Avg rev IPSB cost/
Part 121 operator name (NVIS (BTS attendants Pilots aircraft $ mn $ mn $ mn $ mn $ mn 2015 - cost ($ avg rev Notes
data) data) 2019 000) (%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AERODYNAMICS INC.............................. 37 ....... 10 15 2 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 70 ....... Operation certificate terminated
Oct. 2020.
AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES LLC.................... 1,120 ....... 289 571 67 536 443 248 ..... ..... 409 2,345 0.57 .................................
CARIBBEAN SUN AIRLINES INC.................... 104 158 51 20 7 ..... ..... 34 37 38 27 245 0.90 Doing business as World Atlantic
Airlines.
CHAMPLAIN ENTERPRISES INC..................... 713 ....... 170 330 37 ..... 115 135 ..... ..... 122 1,295 1.06 Operates mainly through
subsidiary CommutAir, which
operates as United Express.
COMPASS AIRLINES LLC.......................... 1,299 1,438 469 531 48 177 235 236 241 228 223 1,680 0.75 Shut down due to Covid.
CORVUS AIRLINES INC........................... 156 ....... 29 61 10 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 350 ....... Bankrupt July 2020.
EASTERN AIRLINES LLC.......................... 146 196 88 30 8 ..... 56 28 ..... ..... 42 280 0.67 .................................
ELITE AIRWAYS LLC............................. 139 130 40 43 13 ..... ..... ..... 134 117 126 455 0.36 .................................
EMPIRE AIRLINES INC........................... 332 ....... 14 134 60 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 2,100 ....... .................................
GOJET AIRLINES LLC............................ 918 977 292 487 43 204 227 238 257 265 238 1,505 0.63 Trans States Holding WOS.
GULF AND CARIBBEAN CARGO INC.................. 79 122 0 41 19 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 665 ....... .................................
HILLWOOD AIRWAYS, LLC......................... 49 35 14 9 2 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 70 ....... .................................
KAISERAIR INC................................. 94 68 15 38 7 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 245 ....... .................................
KEY LIME AIR CORPORATION...................... 123 ....... 9 38 35 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 1,225 ....... .................................
MIAMI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC................... 249 351 131 67 6 108 105 119 118 112 112 210 0.19 Liquidated May 2020.
OMNI AIR INTERNATIONAL LLC.................... 758 1,045 302 246 14 360 336 358 493 541 418 490 0.12 .................................
PENINSULA AVIATION SERVICES INC............... 80 ....... 18 17 6 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 210 ....... Saudi Arabian A/C refueling.
PIEDMONT AIRLINES INC......................... 1,096 ....... 231 530 60 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 2,100 ....... WOS of American Airlines.
SEABORNE VIRGIN ISLAND INC.................... 96 ....... 17 29 7 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 245 ....... Subsidiary of Silver Airways.
SIERRA PACIFIC AIRLINES INC................... 43 35 12 11 2 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 70 ....... .................................
SILVER AIRWAYS LLC............................ 355 ....... 56 142 26 119 ..... ..... ..... 42 80 910 1.13 .................................
TEM ENTERPRISES............................... 21 25 5 5 1 55 97 81 ..... 2 59 35 0.06 Doing business as Xtra Airways.
TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC..................... 1,116 ....... 244 464 48 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....... 1,680 ....... Planned shutdown accelerated due
to Covid.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements
Since the IPSB rule applies to only new airplanes entering the
fleet, the analysis assumes that each operator's current fleet is
replaced immediately even though the fleet airplanes generally will be
replaced only when they are retired. Though airplanes could be retired
any time over the next 25 years depending on the age of the airplane,
the analysis assumes immediate replacement to ensure that the economic
impact is not underestimated. The regulatory impact analysis assumes
that the average retirement age of transport category airplanes is 25
years.
The economic impact is assessed using 11 of the 22 small operators
for which revenue data is available from Cirium's (formerly
FlightGlobal) FlightFleets Analyzer. The analysis uses average revenue
for the five-year period 2015-2019. Revenue figures for the 11
operators are available for an average of 3.45 years. For an operator,
the economic impact is measured as the estimated $35,000 cost of an
FAA-certified IPSB times number of airplanes, as a percentage of the
average revenue. The number of airplanes is from the SPAS database as
of January 9, 2020. The regulatory impact analysis also considers
training costs for flight attendants and pilots, but these costs are
not included here as they have a trivial effect on the results.
As Table 2 shows, the economic impact ranges from 0.06% and 1.13%
of
[[Page 41307]]
sales, which averages to 0.60%. On a 2% criterion that the economic
impact is significant only if cost is at least 2% of a small firm's
annual revenues, there is no significant economic impact for any small
firm. On a 1% criterion, the economic impact is barely significant for
just 2 of the 11 firms for which data is available. Bearing in mind
that these estimates are very conservative, the FAA concludes that
there is not a significant impact on a substantial number of small
firms.
6. Significant Alternatives Considered
The FAA evaluated alternatives to this rulemaking that could
minimize impacts on small entities. The FAA identified only alternative
2 of its regulatory impact analysis as potentially minimizing such
impacts. Specifically, the FAA considered exempting short duration
flights from the rule as a means of reducing economic impacts on small
entities. ARAC recognized that, for short flights, the flightdeck door
may not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not provide the
intended benefit. However, ARAC was unable to identify any airplane
design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane gross weight
that sufficiently correlates with short flights. Also, the range of all
the airplane models that will be affected by the rule exceeds the
maximum flight length at which opening the flightdeck door is unlikely.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and
has determined that it will have a legitimate domestic objective, in
that it will increase the safety of the United States from terrorist
attacks on U.S.-operated airplanes. This rule would not operate in a
manner as to directly affect foreign trade and, therefore, would have
little or no effect on foreign trade.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $177.0 million in lieu of $100
million.
This rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act do not
apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there will be no new requirement for information collection associated
with this rule.
F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable.
The FAA has determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices that correspond to these regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
In accordance with the provisions of regulations issued by the
Council on Environmental Quality (40 CFR parts 1500 through 1508), FAA
Order 1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically excluded
from preparation of an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact
Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined this final rule
action qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph
5-6.6(d) because no significant impacts to the environment are expected
from publication of this final rule and it involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
VI. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order (E.O.) 13132, Federalism. The FAA has
determined that this action will not have a substantial direct effect
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the various levels of government, and, therefore, will not have
federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination With Indian
Tribal Governments
Consistent with Executive Order 13175, Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,\39\ and FAA Order 1210.20,
American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Consultation Policy and
Procedures,\40\ the FAA ensures that Federally Recognized Tribes
(Tribes) are given the opportunity to provide meaningful and timely
input regarding proposed Federal actions that have the potential to
have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the
relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on
the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes; or to affect uniquely or significantly
their respective Tribes. At this point, the FAA has not identified any
unique or significant effects, environmental or otherwise, on tribes
resulting from this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ 65 FR 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
\40\ FAA Order No. 1210.20 (Jan. 28, 2004), available at
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/1210.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this final rule under E.O. 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The FAA has determined that it is
not a ``significant energy action'' under the Executive order and is
not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.
D. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to
[[Page 41308]]
reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements. The FAA has analyzed this action under the policies and
agency responsibilities of Executive Order 13609, and has determined
that this action will have no effect on international regulatory
cooperation.
VII. Additional Information
A. Electronic Access and Filing
A copy of the NPRM, all comments received, this final rule, and all
background material may be viewed online at www.regulations.gov using
the docket number listed above. Electronic retrieval help and
guidelines are available on the website. It is available 24 hours each
day, 365 days each year. An electronic copy of this document may also
be downloaded from the Office of the Federal Register's website at
www.federalregister.gov and the Government Publishing Office's website
at www.govinfo.gov. A copy may also be found at the FAA's Regulations
and Policies website at www.faa.gov/regulations_policies.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this
rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in developing this final rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed in
the electronic docket for this rulemaking.
B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this
document may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under
the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the
preamble. To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety,
Charter flights, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Safety, Transportation.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and
44704; Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat 3281 (49 U.S.C. 44903 note).
0
2. In Sec. 25.795, add paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.795 Security considerations.
(a) * * *
(4) If required by the operating rules of this chapter, an
installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) must be installed to resist
intrusion into the flightdeck whenever the flightdeck door is opened.
When deployed, the IPSB must:
(i) Resist a 250 pound (1113 Newtons) static load in the direction
of the passenger cabin applied at the most critical locations on the
IPSB;
(ii) Resist a 600 pound (2669 Newtons) static load in the direction
of the flightdeck applied at the most critical locations on the IPSB;
(iii) Delay a person attempting to access the flightdeck by at
least the time required for a crewmember to open and reclose the
flightdeck door, but no less than 5 seconds;
(iv) Prevent a person from reaching through and touching the
flightdeck door;
(v) Allow for necessary crewmember activities; and
(vi) Provide line-of-sight visibility between the flightdeck door
and the cabin.
* * * * *
PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40103, 40113, 40119,
41706, 42301 preceding note added by Pub. L. 112-95, sec. 412, 126
Stat. 89, 44101, 44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-
44717, 44722, 44729, 44732; 46105; Pub. L. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2348
(49 U.S.C. 44701 note); Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 62 (49 U.S.C.
44732 note); Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186 (49 U.S.C. 44701 note).
0
4. In Sec. 121.313, add paragraph (l) to read as follows:
Sec. 121.313 Miscellaneous equipment.
* * * * *
(l) For airplanes required by paragraph (f) of this section to have
a door between the passenger and pilot or crew rest compartments, and
for passenger-carrying transport category airplanes that have a door
installed between the pilot compartment and any other occupied
compartment, that were manufactured after August 25, 2025, an installed
physical secondary barrier (IPSB) that meets the requirements of Sec.
25.795(a)(4) of this chapter in effect on August 25, 2023.
0
5. In Sec. 121.584, add paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows:
Sec. 121.584 Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck
door.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(3) If the airplane is in flight, any installed physical secondary
barrier (IPSB) required by Sec. 121.313(l) has been deployed; and
* * * * *
Issued under authority provided by Public Law 115-254, 49 U.S.C.
106(f) and 44701(a) in Washington, DC, on June 14, 2023.
Polly Trottenberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-13071 Filed 6-23-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P