[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 249 (Friday, December 29, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 90208-90212]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28777]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286; NRC-2023-0175]
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2,
LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Energy Center;
Exemption
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC,
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, to reduce the minimum coverage limit
for onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million
for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3,
collectively referred to as the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC).
DATES: The exemption was issued on November 14, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0175 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0175. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information
Contact section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-8534, email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: December 26, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC,
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit
Nos. 1, 2, and 3; Exemption
I. Background
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased
generation on October 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1
reactor vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, the Commission) issued an order approving the safe-
storage condition of IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued Amendment No. 52 to
IP1's provisional operating license, which changed the expiration date
of the provisional license to be consistent with that of the Indian
Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2) facility license at that
time. Pursuant to title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
section 50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer authorizes operation of
the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor
vessel. There is no IP1 spent fuel in wet storage at the Indian Point
Energy Center (IPEC) site; IP1 spent fuel is stored onsite in dry cask
storage at the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
By letter dated February 8, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System Accession No. ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Indian
Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC
licensees at that time, collectively, Entergy) certified to the NRC
that they planned to permanently cease power operations at IP2 and
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 2020, and
April 30, 2021, respectively. By letters dated May 12, 2020, and May
11, 2021 (ML20133J902 and ML21131A157), Entergy certified to the NRC
that power operations permanently ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30,
2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the same letters, Entergy
certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the IP2
and IP3 reactor vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 spent fuel pools
(SFPs) as of May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively.
Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessels, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed
facility licenses for IP2 and IP3 (Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64,
respectively) no longer authorize operation of the reactors or
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessels. The facility
is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent)
nuclear fuel. At the time of the exemption request described below,
spent fuel was stored onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the SFPs
and in a dry cask ISFSI.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 18, 2022 (ML22077A132), Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), one of the licensees of IPEC
and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec International
(Holtec), requested an exemption on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2,
LLC (a licensee of IP1 and IP2, referred to as Holtec IP2) and Holtec
Indian Point 3, LLC (a licensee of IP3, and referred to as Holtec IP3),
from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) concerning onsite liability
insurance. HDI, Holtec IP2, and Holtec IP3 are hereafter collectively
referred to as the licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of onsite
[[Page 90209]]
property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for IPEC.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires licensees to have and
maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor(s) and reactor site in the event of an
accident. The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or
whatever amount of insurance is generally available from private
sources (whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no
longer authorized at IPEC, there are no events that would require the
stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly, the
risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite
contamination at IPEC is also much lower than the risk of such an event
at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption
from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage insurance
from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the reduced risk
of an incident at the permanently shutdown and defueled IPEC site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission may,
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative,
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the
exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to
public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and
security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2
accident out of concern that licensees may be unable to financially
cover onsite cleanup costs in the event of a major nuclear accident.
The specified $1.06 billion coverage amount requirement was developed
based on an analysis of an accident at a nuclear reactor operating at
power, resulting in a large fission product release and requiring
significant resource expenditures to stabilize the reactor and
ultimately decontaminate and cleanup the site.
These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were
derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive material from
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor
is very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In
an operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor
coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at IPEC
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessels, such
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor vessels,
RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate and have no function
related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated
accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactors, RCS, or
supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption
request dated March 18, 2022, the licensee discussed both design-basis
and beyond design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the
SFPs. The licensee determined that there are no possible design-basis
events at IPEC that could result in an offsite radiological release
exceeding the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of 1
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a way
to demonstrate that any possible radiological releases would be minimal
and would not require precautionary protective actions (e.g.,
sheltering in place or evacuation). The NRC staff evaluated the
radiological consequences associated with various decommissioning
activities and the design basis accidents at IPEC, in consideration of
the permanently shutdown and defueled condition. The possible design-
basis accident scenarios at IPEC have greatly reduced radiological
consequences. Based on its review, the NRC staff concluded that no
reasonably conceivable design-basis accident exists that could cause an
offsite release greater than the EPA PAGs.
The only incident that has the potential to lead to a significant
radiological release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire
in the SFP. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly
unlikely, beyond design-basis accident scenario that involves loss of
water inventory from the SFP resulting in a significant heat up of the
spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation
and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is
related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to
decrease as a function of the time since IPEC has been permanently shut
down.
The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite
financial protection, based on this analysis of the zirconium fire
risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements
for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10
CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ML15062A483), the NRC staff
recommended changes to the power reactor financial protection
regulations that would allow licensees to lower onsite insurance levels
to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel stored in the SFP can
be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum to SECY-96-256,
dated January 28, 1997 (ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC
staff's recommendation that, among other things, would allow
permanently shutdown power reactor licensees to reduce commercial
onsite property damage insurance coverage to $50 million when the
licensee was able to demonstrate the technical criterion that the spent
fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Station, published in the Federal Register (FR) on January 19,
1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the FR on
December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station, published in
the FR on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638); Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear
Generation Plant, published in the FR on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100);
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, published in the FR on
December 28, 2018 (83 FR 67365); Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,
published in the FR on January 14, 2020 (85 FR 2153); Three Mile Island
Nuclear Station, Unit 1, published in the FR on March 26, 2021 (86 FR
16241); and the Duane Arnold Energy Center, published in the FR on May
18, 2021 (86 FR 26946)). These prior exemptions were based on these
licensees demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent
with the technical criterion discussed above.
In its March 18, 2022, request, the licensee compared the IPEC fuel
storage parameters with those used in NRC generic evaluations of fuel
cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment
of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR
[[Page 90210]]
[Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ML082260098). The analysis described in
NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural air circulation would adequately
cool fuel in the representative PWR.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ML003721626 and
ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff discussed additional
information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at decommissioning
reactors and associated implications for onsite property damage
insurance. Providing an analysis of when the spent fuel stored in the
SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure that can be used to
demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium fire is exceedingly
low.
In their letter dated March 18, 2022, HDI stated, and the NRC staff
confirmed, that the bounding analyses for the IP2 and IP3 SFPs for
beyond design basis events demonstrate that 15 months after shutdown of
IP3 a minimum of 10 hours is available before the fuel cladding
temperature of the hottest fuel assembly in either SFP reaches
900[deg]C with a complete loss of SFP water inventory. This analysis,
``Holtec Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculation Methodology Topical
Report, Revision 2,'' dated December 22, 2021 (ML21357A005 [non-
public]), was submitted by HDI in support of a request for exemptions
from certain emergency planning requirements, dated December 22, 2021
(ML21356B693). HDI provided further information in Enclosure 1,
``Indian Point Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up
Calculations,'' to HDI's supplemental letter dated February 1, 2022
(ML22032A117).
As stated in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool
Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February
2001 (ML010430066), 900[deg]C is an acceptable temperature to use for
assessing the onset of fission product release, where the SFP is
drained and air cooling is not possible; at least 10 hours would be
available from the time spent fuel cooling is lost until the hottest
fuel assembly reaches a temperature of 900[deg]C. The 10-hour
criterion, conservatively, does not consider the time to uncover the
fuel and assumes instantaneous loss of cooling to the fuel. The 10-hour
time period is also not intended to represent the time that it would
take to repair all key safety systems or to repair a large SFP breach.
The 10-hour criterion is a conservative period of time in which pre-
planned mitigation measures to provide makeup water or spray to the SFP
can be reliably implemented before the onset of a zirconium cladding
ignition. In addition, in the unlikely event that a release is
projected to occur, 10 hours would provide sufficient time for offsite
agencies, if deemed warranted, to take appropriate action to protect
the health and safety of the public.
In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-22-0102, the NRC
staff assessed the HDI accident analyses associated with the
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shutdown and
defueled IPEC after 15 months of fuel decay. For the highly unlikely
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory
is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff found that there will
be a minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might
occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions,
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would
progress to a zirconium fire is deemed not credible.
Based on the evaluation in SECY-96-256, as well as analysis done by
HDI and verified by the NRC staff, the NRC staff determined $50 million
to be an adequate level of onsite property damage insurance for a
decommissioning reactor once the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer
susceptible to a zirconium fire. However, the NRC staff has postulated
that there is still a potential for other radiological incidents at a
decommissioning reactor that could result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC staff
cited the rupture of a large, contaminated liquid storage tank
(~450,000 gallons) causing soil contamination and potential groundwater
contamination as the costliest postulated event to decontaminate and
remediate (other than an SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large
liquid radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to
have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million.
Therefore, the NRC staff determined that the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be consistent
with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in
SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste tank at the IPEC site, should such an event occur.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in onsite property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million
is consistent with SECY-96-256 and subsequent insurance considerations
resulting from additional zirconium fire risks as discussed in SECY-00-
0145 and SECY-01-0100, as well as NUREG/CR-6451 and NUREG-1738. In
addition, the NRC staff notes that similar exemptions have been granted
to other permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors, upon
demonstration that the criterion of the zirconium fire risks from the
irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible concern. The NRC
staff concluded that 15 months after the permanent shutdown date of IP3
of April 30, 2021, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have
elapsed at IPEC to decrease the probability of an onsite radiological
release from a postulated zirconium fire accident to negligible levels.
In addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a
level of $50 million is consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup
costs for the recovery from the rupture of a large liquid radwaste
storage tank.
The NRC staff also notes that in accordance with letters submitted
by HDI on February 15, 2023, and October 16, 2023 (ML23046A102 and
ML23289A158), all the spent fuel from the IP2 and IP3 SFPs has been
transferred to dry storage within the ISFSI. As such, an initiating
event that would threaten SFP integrity is no longer applicable.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow the
licensee to reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property
damage insurance. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when the exemptions
are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256.
Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 15 months after the permanent
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time
will have
[[Page 90211]]
elapsed at IPEC to decrease the probability of an onsite and offsite
radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident to
negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce
onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with the
maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture of a
large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, based on
its review of the licensee's exemption request as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption
is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety
The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for
IPEC are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating.
However, IPEC permanently ceased power operations on October 31, 1974,
April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3,
respectively), and permanently defueled as of January 1976, May 12,
2020, and May 11, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively). The
permanent cessation of operations and defueled status of the facility
results in a significant reduction in the number and severity of
potential accidents and, correspondingly, a significant reduction in
the potential for and severity of onsite property damage. The proposed
reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does not impact
the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The proposed
level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the reduced
consequences of potential nuclear accidents at IPEC. Therefore, the NRC
staff concludes that granting the requested exemption will not present
an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely
affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect
special nuclear material. Physical security measures at IPEC are not
affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption
is consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
regulation.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize
reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site
decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a
significant amount of radiological material. Since IPEC permanently
ceased power operations on October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and April
30, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively), and permanently
defueled as of January 1976, May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021 (For IP1,
IP2, and IP3, respectively), it is no longer possible for the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents or other credible
events at IPEC to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion
area boundary. The licensee has evaluated the consequences of highly
unlikely, beyond-design-basis conditions involving a loss of coolant
from the SFP. The analyses show that 15 months after the permanent
cessation of power operations, the likelihood of such an event leading
to a large radiological release is negligible. The NRC staff's
evaluation of the licensee's analyses confirms this conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the
IPEC site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the
permanently shutdown and defueled IPEC reactors.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by
others similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary and
commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the
site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in
excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR, ``Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,'' is a categorical exclusion provided that: (i)
there is no significant hazards consideration; (ii) there is no
significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts
of any effluents that may be released offsite; (iii) there is no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no significant construction impact;
(v) there is no significant increase in the potential for or
consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements
from which an exemption is sought involve surety, insurance, or
indemnity requirements.
As the Director of the Division of Decommissioning, Uranium
Recovery, and Waste Programs in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, I have determined that approval of the exemption
request involves no significant hazards
[[Page 90212]]
consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,''
because reducing the licensee's onsite property damage insurance for
IPEC does not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of IPEC or site activities. Accordingly,
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with
construction so there is no significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential
amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the
site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for,
or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The
requirement for onsite property damage insurance involves surety,
insurance, and indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25),
``Criterion for categorical exclusion; identification of licensing and
regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or otherwise not
requiring environmental review,'' no environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present as set
forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an exemption
from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for IPEC. IPEC permanently
ceased power operations on October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and April
30, 2021, for IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively. The exemption from 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) permits IPEC to reduce the minimum required onsite
property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million 15 months
after permanent cessation of power operations, which was August 1,
2022. Because this period has already elapsed, the exemption is
effective upon issuance.
Dated: November 14, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jane Marshall,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023-28777 Filed 12-28-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P