[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 249 (Friday, December 29, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 90212-90216]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28778]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286; NRC-2022-0223]
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2,
LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Nuclear Energy
Center; Exemption
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued
exemptions in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC,
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, to reduce certain emergency planning
(EP) requirements. The exemptions eliminate the requirements to
maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan and reduce
the scope of onsite EP activities at the Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, collectively referred to as the
Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC), based on the reduced risks of
accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on November 1, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2022-0223 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0223. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information
Contact section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-8534; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: December 26, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC,
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit
Nos. 1, 2, and 3; Exemption
I. Background
Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Units 1, 2, and 3, are
decommissioning power reactors located on approximately 239 acres of
land on the east bank of the Hudson River at the Village of Buchanan in
upper Westchester County, New York. The
[[Page 90213]]
licensee, Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), is the
holder of IPEC Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-5, DPR-26, and DFP-
64. The licenses provide, among other things, that the facility is
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or
hereafter in effect.
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased
generation on October 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1
reactor vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the NRC issued an order
approving the safe-storage condition of IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued
Amendment No. 52 to IP1's provisional operating license that changed
the license's expiration date to be consistent with that of the Indian
Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2) license at that time.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the
reactor vessel. HDI states that there is no IP1 spent fuel in wet
storage at the IPEC site; IP1 spent fuel is stored onsite in dry cask
storage in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
By letter dated February 8, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17044A004),
Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point
3, LLC (the IPEC licensees at that time, collectively, ``Entergy'')
certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at IP2 and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3)
by April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. By letters dated
May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021 (ML20113J902 and ML21131A157,
respectively), Entergy certified to the NRC that power operations
permanently ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 2020, and April 30,
2021, respectively. In the same letters, Entergy certified to the NRC
that the fuel was permanently removed from the IP2 and IP3 reactor
vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 spent fuel pools (SFPs) as of May
12, 2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively.
Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel, as specified in title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating
license for IPEC (Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64) no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the
reactor vessel. The facility is still authorized to possess, and store
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored
onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the SFPs and in a dry cask
ISFSI.
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports (USARs) for operating power reactors involve failures
or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at IPEC and the permanent removal of the
fuel from the reactor vessels, many accidents are no longer possible.
The reactors, reactor coolant system (RCS), and supporting systems are
no longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of
the irradiated fuel. Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) provisions
for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactors, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a
power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning
status of the facility, HDI must obtain exemptions from those EP
regulations. Only then can HDI modify the IPEC Emergency Plan to
reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of IPEC.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693), revised February
1, 2022 (ML22033A348), HDI requested exemptions from certain EP
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 for IPEC. Specifically, HDI requested
exemptions from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding
onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear power
reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require
establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway EP zones for
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, which establish the elements that comprise
the content of emergency plans. In a letter dated February 1, 2022
(ML22032A017), HDI provided responses to the NRC staff's requests for
additional information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions.
The information provided by HDI included justifications for each
exemption requested. The exemptions requested by HDI would eliminate
the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency
plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under
the requirements of 44 CFR, ``Emergency Management and Assistance,''
part 350, ``Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological
Emergency Plans and Preparedness,'' and reduce the scope of onsite EP
activities at IPEC. HDI stated that application of all the standards
and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E are not needed for adequate emergency response
capability, based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite
radiological consequences of accidents still possible at the
permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared to an operating
facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for a highly
unlikely beyond-design-basis accident that could challenge the safe
storage of spent fuel at IPEC, provisions exist for offsite agencies to
take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan
(CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to protect the health and
safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an
emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and Maintaining Emergency
Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the
foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United
States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-
informed planning and decision-making and helps planners at all levels
of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-
hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use
in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards
planning.
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50 when: (1) the exemptions
[[Page 90214]]
are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health
or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and
(2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are
present. These special circumstances include, among other things, that
the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor.
However, current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power
reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological
release from credible emergency accident scenarios is significantly
reduced. The reduced risk is largely the result of the low frequency of
credible events that could challenge the SFP structure, and the reduced
decay heat and reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory due to decay.
The NRC's NUREG/CR- 6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of
Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
August 31, 1997 (ML082260098) and NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of
Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated February 28, 2001 (ML010430066), confirmed that for
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors bounded by the
assumptions and conditions in the reports, the risk of offsite
radiological release is significantly less than that for an operating
power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by HDI, have
been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions from
certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's demonstration that:
(1) the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents would not
exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary, and
(2) in the unlikely event of a beyond- design-basis accident resulting
in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the
SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating
actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite
protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and
safety of the public. Based on prior exemption requests, the NRC has
generally approved such exemptions when the site-specific analysis
demonstrates that there is sufficient time following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory until the onset of fuel damage to implement onsite
mitigation of the loss of SFP coolant inventory and if necessary, to
implement offsite protective actions. In prior exemptions, sufficient
time was demonstrated if the time exceeded 10 hours from the loss of
coolant until the fuel temperature would be expected to reach 900
degrees Celsius ([deg]C), assuming no air cooling.
With respect to design-basis-accidents at IPEC, the licensee
provided analysis demonstrating that 15 months following permanent
cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences of the
only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite
radiological release (a fuel handling accident in the Reactor Building,
where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at
the exclusion area boundary. With respect to beyond-design-basis
accidents at IPEC, HDI analyzed a beyond-design-basis accident
involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, where adequate fuel
handling building air exchange with the environment and air cooling of
the stored fuel was available. HDI's analysis demonstrated that, as of
10 hours, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to
keep the fuel within safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel
cladding damage or offsite radiological release.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a)
will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment
of the HDI EP exemptions is described in SECY-22-0102 dated November
18, 2022 (ML22231A160). The Commission approved the NRC staff's
recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff requirements
memorandum to SECY-22-0102, dated October 24, 2023 (ML23297A027).
Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by HDI and the NRC
staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-22-0102.
The staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the
specific EP exemptions requested by HDI are provided in the NRC staff's
safety evaluation dated November 1, 2023 (ML23067A082)
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV, which would allow HDI to revise the IPEC Emergency Plan to
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's
proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the
exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, HDI provided analyses that show the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore,
formal offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part
50 will no longer be needed for protection of the public beyond the
exclusion area boundary, based on the radiological consequences of
design-basis accidents still possible at IPEC.
Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 concludes that the
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events.
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to the
operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different
sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738,
relaxation of offsite EP requirements, under 10 CFR part 50, a few
months after shutdown resulted in
[[Page 90215]]
only a small change in risk. The report further concludes that the
change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small
because the overall risk is low, and because even under current EP
requirements for operating power reactors, EP was judged to have
marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the severe earthquake
event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops
(for which offsite radiological emergency plans are expected to be more
effective) are too low in likelihood to have a significant impact on
risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and to
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present an undue risk
to the public health and safety.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by HDI only involve EP requirements under
10 CFR part 50 and will allow HDI to revise the IPEC Emergency Plan to
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. Physical security measures at IPEC are not affected by the
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite
EP activities at IPEC will not adversely affect HDI's ability to
physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material.
Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common
defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway EP zones for nuclear power plants, and to ensure that
licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite radiological emergency
plans. The standards and requirements in these regulations were
developed by considering the risks associated with operation of a
nuclear power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These risks
include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite radiological
dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section Ill of this document, because
IPEC Units 1, 2, and 3 are permanently shutdown and defueled, there
will no longer be a risk of a significant offsite radiological release
from a design-basis accident exceeding early phase PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary, and the risk of a significant offsite
radiological release from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly
reduced when compared to the risk at an operating power reactor. In a
letter dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693), revised February 1, 2022
(ML22033A348), the licensee provided analyses to demonstrate that the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents at IPEC will not
exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. The
NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at IPEC by comparing the
generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific
conditions at IPEC; and has determined that the risk values in NUREG-
1738 bound the risks presented by IPEC.
In addition, the significant decay of short-lived radionuclides
that has occurred since shutdown of IPEC provides assurance in other
ways. As indicated by the results of research conducted for NUREG-1738
and more recently, for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-
Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I
Boiling Water Reactor'' (ML14255A365), while other consequences can be
extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little
potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite
radiological EP requirements were relaxed. HDI's analysis of a beyond-
design-basis accident involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory,
where adequate fuel handling building air exchange with the environment
and air cooling of the stored fuel is available, shows that as of 10
hours, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep
the fuel within safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel
cladding damage or offsite radiological release.
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be
unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heat up of
the spent fuel. HDI's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident
shows that 15 months after shutdown, a minimum of 10 hours would be
available between the time the fuel is initially uncovered (at which
time adiabatic heat up is conservatively assumed to begin), until the
fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F)
(900[deg]C), which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding
oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release.
This analysis conservatively does not include the period of time from
the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all
cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified HDI's analyses and its calculations. The
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested
exemptions to HDI, there is no design- basis accident that will result
in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event of a beyond-
design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss
of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer, because all Units at
IPEC have been shutdown for well over 15 months, there will be a
minimum of 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur
and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating
actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a
radiological release were projected to occur under this unlikely
scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours are available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly
reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff
concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the
HDI-requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours are
available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant
conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement
protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite
radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not
necessary at permanently shut down and defueled power reactors.
Additionally, in HDI's letters to the NRC dated December 22, 2021,
and February 2, 2022, HDI described the SFP makeup strategies that
could be used in
[[Page 90216]]
the event of a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple
strategies for providing makeup water to the SFP include: using
existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy
between IP2 and IP3 that relies on installed Primary Water Storage
Tank, fire water inside the SFP buildings, and fire water using a
temporary diesel pump from outside of the SFP buildings; or an external
strategy that uses portable pumps to initiate makeup flow into the SFPs
through a standpipe and standard fire hoses routed to the SFPs or to a
spray nozzle. These strategies will continue to be required as License
Condition 2(N), ``Mitigation Strategy License Condition'' and 2(AC),
``Mitigation Strategy License Condition'' for Units 2 and 3
respectively. Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-
basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide
multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or spray water to the SFP
before the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.
Because of the length of time, it would take for the fuel to heat up,
there are 10 hours available to respond to any draindown event that
might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup or
providing spray to the IP2 or IP3 SFPs.
For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that HDI's
requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of the
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, and satisfies the special
circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced
risk of offsite radiological consequences associated with the
permanently shutdown and defueled state of the IPEC facility. The staff
further concludes that the exemptions granted by this action will
maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at IPEC and
provide reasonable assurance that adequate offsite protective measures,
if needed, can and will be taken by State and local government agencies
using a CEMP approach, in the highly unlikely event of a radiological
emergency at the IPEC facility. Since the underlying purposes of the
rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the
elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal
offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction in the scope of
the onsite EP activities at IPEC, the special circumstances required by
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of these exemptions will not have a significant
effect on the quality of the human environment, as discussed in the NRC
staff's Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
published on October 31, 2023 (88 FR 74536).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), that HDI's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
22-0102, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants HDI exemptions from certain EP requirements of
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the staff's safety
evaluation dated November 1, 2023 (ML23067A082). The exemptions are
effective upon issuance.
Dated: November 1, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jane Marshall, Director,
Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety, and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023-28778 Filed 12-28-23; 8:45 am]
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