[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 228 (Tuesday, November 26, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 93199-93220]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-27349]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 571
[Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021]
RIN 2127-AM37
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Automatic Emergency
Braking Systems for Light Vehicles
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions for reconsideration.
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SUMMARY: This document grants parts of petitions for reconsideration of
a May 9, 2024, final rule that adopted Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 127, ``Automatic Emergency Braking for Light
Vehicles,'' which requires automatic emergency braking (AEB),
pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB), and forward collision
warning (FCW) systems on all new light vehicles. This final rule
clarifies requirements applicable to FCW visual signals and audio
signals, corrects an error in the test scenario for obstructed
pedestrian crossing the road, and removes superfluous language from the
performance test requirement for lead vehicle AEB. This notice denies
other requests in the petitions. This document also denies a petition
for reconsideration, which is treated as a petition for rulemaking
because it was received more than 45 days after publication of the
rule.
DATES:
Effective: January 27, 2025.
Compliance date: Compliance with FMVSS No. 127 and related
regulations, as amended in this rule, is required for all vehicles by
September 1, 2029. However, vehicles produced by small-volume
manufacturers, final-stage manufacturers, and alterers must be equipped
with a compliant AEB system by September 1, 2030.
Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions for reconsideration of
this final action must be received not later than January 10, 2025.
ADDRESSES: Correspondence related to this rule, including petitions for
[[Page 93200]]
reconsideration and comments, should refer to the docket number set
forth above (NHTSA-2023-0021) and be submitted to the Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE, Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues: Mr. Markus
Price, Office of Crash Avoidance Standards, Telephone: (202) 366-1810,
Facsimile: (202) 366-7002. For legal issues: Mr. Eli Wachtel, Office of
the Chief Counsel, Telephone: (202) 366-2992, Facsimile: (202) 366-
3820. The mailing address for these officials is: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington,
DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background and Executive Summary
II. Petitions for Reconsideration Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. No Contact
B. Multiple Trials
C. Equipment Requirement
D. Unlimited Preconditioning and Test Runs
E. Malfunction Indicator Lamp
F. Deactivation
G. Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test Correction
H. FCW Auditory Signal
I. FCW Visual Signal
J. Cost Estimates
K. Brake Pedal Robot
L. Manual Transmission
M. Small-Volume Manufacturers
III. Petition for Rulemaking Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. Include V2X
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
V. Regulatory Text
I. Background and Executive Summary
In November 2021, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), enacted
as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Pub. L. 117-58), was
signed into law. BIL directed the Secretary of Transportation to
promulgate a rule to establish minimum performance standards with
respect to crash avoidance technology and to require that all passenger
motor vehicles manufactured for sale in the United States be equipped
with forward collision warning (FCW) and automatic emergency braking
(AEB) systems that alert the driver if a collision is imminent and
automatically apply the brakes if the driver fails to do so.
In accordance with BIL, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) (88 FR 38632) in June 2023, followed by a final rule
(89 FR 39686) in May 2024, establishing FMVSS No. 127, ``Automatic
Emergency Braking Systems for Light Vehicles.'' This FMVSS requires
AEB, including pedestrian AEB (PAEB), systems on light vehicles. In
addition to the mandate in BIL, the final rule was also issued under
the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 (Safety Act). Under 49 U.S.C. chapter 301, the Secretary of
Transportation is responsible for prescribing motor vehicle safety
standards that are practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety,
and are stated in objective terms. The responsibility for promulgation
of FMVSSs is delegated to NHTSA.
The final rule includes four requirements for AEB systems for both
lead vehicles and pedestrians. First, there is an equipment requirement
that vehicles have an FCW system that provides an auditory and visual
signal to the driver of an impending collision with a lead vehicle or a
pedestrian. The system must operate at any forward speed greater than
10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) for a warning
involving a lead vehicle, at any forward speed greater than 10 km/h
(6.2 mph) and less than 73 km/h (45.3 mph) for a warning involving a
pedestrian. Similarly, the final rule includes an equipment requirement
that light vehicles have an AEB system that applies the brakes
automatically when a collision with a lead vehicle or pedestrian is
imminent. The system must operate at any forward speed that is greater
than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) for AEB
involving a lead vehicle, and at any forward speed greater than 10 km/h
(6.2 mph) and less than 73 km/h (45.3 mph) for PAEB.
Second, the AEB system is required to prevent the vehicle from
colliding with the lead vehicle or pedestrian test devices when tested
according to the standard's test procedures. These track test
procedures have defined parameters, including travel speeds up to 100
km/h (62.2 mph), that ensure that AEB systems prevent crashes in a
controlled testing environment.
Third, the final rule includes two false activation tests.
Finally, the final rule requires that a vehicle must detect AEB
system malfunctions, including performance degradation caused solely by
sensor obstructions, and notify the driver of any malfunction that
causes the AEB system not to meet the minimum proposed performance
requirements. If the system detects a malfunction, or if the system
adjusts its performance such that it will not meet the requirements of
the finalized standard, the system must provide the vehicle operator
with a telltale notification.
The final rule applies to vehicles manufactured on or after
September 1, 2029. An additional year is provided for small-volume
manufacturers.
Petitions for Reconsideration Received
NHTSA regulations allow any interested person to petition the
Administrator for reconsideration of a rule. Under NHTSA's regulations,
petitions for reconsideration must provide an explanation why
compliance with the rule is not practicable, is unreasonable, or is not
in the public interest. Additionally, petitions must be received within
45 days of the publication of the final rule. Untimely petitions for
reconsideration are considered to be petitions for rulemaking. The
Administrator may consolidate petitions relating to the same rule.\1\
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\1\ 49 CFR 553.35, 553.37.
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NHTSA received petitions for reconsideration from the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation (the Alliance),\2\ Toyota Motor North America
(Toyota),\3\ Volkswagen Group of America (Volkswagen),\4\ and Scuderia
Cameron Glickenhaus, LLC (Glickenhaus).\5\ NHTSA also received a letter
from Hyundai Motor Group (Hyundai), styled as a ``supplemental
comment,'' that provides its perspective on FMVSS No. 127, which we
have considered in this response to the petitions for
reconsideration.\6\ NHTSA also received a petition from Autotalks that
NHTSA is treating as a petition for rulemaking because it was received
more than 45 days after publication of the final rule.\7\ The petitions
requested a variety of amendments to FMVSS No. 127. These, and NHTSA's
reasoning and response to each petitioned-for item, are summarized
below and discussed in detail in the respective sections of the
preamble of this notice.
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\2\ Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-
0021-1071.
\3\ Toyota Motor North America, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1074.
\4\ Volkswagen Group of America, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-
1073.
\5\ Scuderia Cameron Glickenhaus, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-
1078.
\6\ Hyundai Motor Group, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1072.
\7\ Autotalks, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1075.
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Summary of Responses to the Petitions for Reconsideration
In response to these petitions, NHTSA is granting in part and
denying in part. The changes made to FMVSS No. 127 are summarized as
follows.
[[Page 93201]]
FMVSS No. 127 contains an equipment requirement that AEB
systems activate the service brakes when a collision is imminent and
that they operate under certain conditions. It also contains a
performance test requirement for lead vehicle AEB that contains similar
language. Petitioners requested definitions for the terms ``operate''
and ``imminent.'' NHTSA is amending the language in the performance
test requirement to remove refence to ``imminent'' from the performance
test requirement for lead vehicle AEB, to clarify that the performance
test does not evaluate AEB activation timing. NHTSA is not providing a
definition for ``operate'' because the definition of ``automatic
emergency braking system'' in the final rule sufficiently describes how
an AEB system operates. NHTSA is not providing a definition for
``imminent'' because the term is used consistent with its plain
meaning.
FMVSS No. 127 contains a test scenario that, when tested
with very narrow vehicles at the extreme of the tolerances allowed by
the test condition, resulted in a stringency beyond that intended by
NHTSA. This final rule amends the test scenario to ensure the correct
level of stringency.
FMVSS No. 127 contains specifications for the FCW visual
signal location. Petitioners requested additional clarity. This final
rule amends the regulatory text to clarify these specifications.
FMVSS No. 127 contains requirements for the FCW audio
signal, including that in-vehicle audio must be suppressed when the FCW
auditory signal is presented. Petitioners expressed several concerns
about the clarity and objectivity of these requirements as well as test
conditions. This final rule clarifies these requirements by stating the
location of the microphone, additional vehicle conditions under which
testing will occur, and amending the definitions to simplify the
requirement for suppression.
This rule also denies the petitions with regards to several other
requested amendments. These are as follows. For the items for which
petitioners restate arguments made during the comment period for FMVSS
No. 127, the reasons given for denial are the same as those stated in
the final rule.
The performance requirement for both lead vehicle and
pedestrian AEB testing is collision avoidance (referred to throughout
the final rule and this document as ``no contact''). Petitioners
requested relaxation of this requirement to allow contact at low
speeds, specifically requesting 10 km/h (6.2 mph). NHTSA is rejecting
this request because the no contact requirement is practicable and
meets the need for safety.
Petitioners requested that multiple test runs be allowed
to achieve the no contact performance requirement (for example, that
vehicles must pass on 5 out of 7 test runs) to account for variability.
Petitioners noted that FMVSS No. 135, which regulates light vehicle
brake systems, allows multiple test runs to meet some of the
performance requirements. NHTSA is rejecting this request because FMVSS
No. 127 testing is distinct from FMVSS No. 135 testing such that not
allowing multiple test runs in FMVSS No. 127 is practicable and meets
the need for safety.
FMVSS No. 127 test scenarios state that the vehicle can be
driven for any amount of time. Additionally, it does not place a cap on
the number of tests that could be run on any given subject vehicle.
Petitioners expressed concern that this standard would allow excessive
driving or testing of vehicles to wear out components such that they
can no longer meet the performance required by the standard. NHTSA
finds further specification is unnecessary because the test does not
evaluate the endurance or durability of wear parts and will not be used
in such a manner.
FMVSS No. 127 requires that vehicles illuminate a
malfunction identification lamp (MIL) upon detection of a malfunction
or if the AEB system adjusts its performance such that it is below the
performance required by the standard. Petitioners requested additional
specificity regarding the terminology in this requirement as well as a
test procedure. NHTSA is rejecting this request because the requirement
meets the Safety Act as written.
FMVSS No. 127 does not permit installation of a manual
control with the sole purpose of deactivating the AEB system. It does
contain a provision allowing automatic deactivation in certain
situations. Petitioners requested permission to install a manual
deactivation control, as well as modifications to the automatic
deactivation provision. NHTSA is rejecting this request because the
final rule already addresses petitioners' concerns.
Petitioners stated that NHTSA did not fully consider costs
associated with compliance. No change is needed in response to this
request because the final rule fully considered the costs associated
with compliance.
Volkswagen requested additional specifications for the
brake pedal robot used in testing with manual brake application. NHTSA
is rejecting this request for the reasons stated in the May 9, 2024
final rule.
Petitioner Glickenhaus requested the AEB requirements not
be applicable to vehicles with manual transmission. NHTSA is rejecting
this request because vehicles equipped with manual transmissions and
AEB are widely available.
Petitioner Glickenhaus requested additional flexibility
for very small volume manufacturers. NHTSA is rejecting this request
because AEB systems are available for purchase and, in the case that a
manufacturer is unable to acquire systems, the exemption processes in
the Safety Act may provide relief.
II. Petitions for Reconsideration Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. No Contact
The final rule requires that, when tested according to the
procedures therein, the subject vehicle not collide with the test
device (vehicle test device or pedestrian mannequin). The test data,
discussed at length in the final rule, demonstrates that this
requirement is practicable. A tested vehicle was able to meet the
performance requirements in the final rule and recent NHTSA testing
revealed significant improvement throughout much of the fleet in a
relatively short time. These facts show that compliance by 2029 is
practicable.
In the final rule we also emphasized that practicability must be
viewed from the perspective that under the Safety Act, NHTSA has the
authority to issue standards that are technology-forcing.\8\ That is,
NHTSA is empowered under the Safety Act to issue safety standards that
``impel automobile manufacturers to develop and apply new technology to
the task of improving the safety design of automobiles as readily as
possible'' such that they ``require improvements in existing technology
or which require the development of new technology, and is not limited
to issuing standards based solely on devices already fully developed.''
\9\ NHTSA acknowledged that the final rule is technology-forcing, but
emphasized that the standard is practicable and no single current
vehicle must meet every requirement for an FMVSS to be considered
practicable under the Safety Act.
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\8\ Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir.
1972) (Chrysler).
\9\ Id. at 671, 673.
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Petitioners requested reconsideration on two broad grounds: first
that the no-contact requirement is not practicable,
[[Page 93202]]
and second that it does not meet the need for safety.
1. Practicability and Test Data
a. PAEB and AEB Test Data
The Alliance stated that NHTSA has not demonstrated that the no
contact requirement is practicable for the fleet. Other than the
simulation data for the obstructed pedestrian crossing road scenario,
the Alliance did not present any new data or analysis regarding the
practicability of requiring collision avoidance in AEB compliance
testing that the agency had not previously considered.\10\ The Alliance
noted that the final rule states that NHTSA agrees with the IIHS's
comment to the NPRM that some current AEB systems are already
completely avoiding collisions under the proposed AEB testing. The
Alliance added, however, that IIHS did not test any vehicles at speeds
faster than 70 km/h (43.5 mph), and only three out of the six tested
vehicles could avoid the lead vehicle target in all of the test runs.
It also stated that NHTSA conceded that no vehicle in its 2020 AEB
research was able to meet all the performance requirements of the final
rule for lead vehicle and PAEB systems. It also pointed out that for
lead vehicle AEB systems, NHTSA's MY 2023 research showed that only one
vehicle could avoid contact in each test speed and scenario, but even
that vehicle did not avoid contact on every test run at the most
stringent condition. The Alliance argued that a single vehicle's
ability to meet the required tests some of the time does not support
NHTSA's conclusion that the no-contact requirement is practicable. The
Alliance also stated that the vehicles used in NHTSA's 2023 testing
don't support the final rule because those vehicles were designed only
to meet the performance levels stated in the 2016 voluntary
commitment.\11\
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\10\ The obstructed pedestrian crossing road scenario is
discussed in detail in Section II.G, ``Obstructed Pedestrian
Crossing Test Correction,'' of this notice.
\11\ In March 2016, NHTSA and the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety (IIHS) announced a commitment by 20 manufacturers
representing more than 99 percent of the U.S. light vehicle market
to include low-speed AEB as a standard feature on nearly all new
light vehicles not later than September 1, 2022. As part of this
voluntary commitment, manufacturers are including both FCW and a
crash imminent braking (CIB) system that reduces a vehicle's speed
in certain rear-end crash-imminent test conditions.
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The Alliance stated the agency's analysis of test data demonstrate
variation in performance that was not accounted for in the final rule.
The Alliance stated that the final rule did not consider whether
variability between vehicles or testing locations would make compliance
more challenging by dictating the design margin that manufacturers need
to meet to comply with the requirement. The Alliance reasoned that
NHTSA's evaluation (in the FRIA) of the variability in time-to-
collision (TTC) at brake activation demonstrates that this variability
is meaningful and demonstrates variation in performance. The Alliance
noted that NHTSA research that was conducted with three vehicles at the
speed range from 16 km/h (9.9 mph) to 40 km/h (24.9 mph) showed a
variation of at least 0.15 seconds in TTC at brake activation.
Agency Analysis
The test data demonstrates that the rule is practicable. In its
petition, the Alliance acknowledged that NHTSA had considered all
available information and test results from the agency's research and
studies conducted by stakeholders such as IIHS. It also acknowledged
that a tested vehicle was able to meet the performance requirements,
despite not being designed to meet the requirements of the final rule.
Additionally, the vehicle that was able to meet the requirements had a
sales price below the market average, indicating that the requirements
could be met without expensive new technologies.
NHTSA's recent testing also marked significant progress compared to
its earlier research from 2020. The positive trend in AEB technology
was further supported by IIHS, which highlighted substantial
improvements between the 2023 and 2024 model years in the stationary
lead vehicle test at 70 km/h (43.5 mph).\12\ Notably, the percentage of
vehicles avoiding the target in all test runs increased from 10 percent
to 56 percent. These data all show that meeting the requirements of
this rule by September 2029 is practicable.\13\
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\12\ NHTSA-2023-0021-1076.
\13\ Additionally, in the final rule we emphasized several other
reasons that inform the practicability of selecting a no contact
requirement over a requirement that allows contacts, such as testing
repeatability and costs associated with replacing or repairing test
vehicles and test devices.
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Additionally, the Alliance's framing of vehicle and test location
variability and our FRIA estimates is unconvincing. Variability between
vehicles in the same model line and year (vehicle-to-vehicle
variability) is determined by the manufacturer, subject to the
requirement that every vehicle it sells meet the minimum safety
performance. NHTSA has no reason to believe that the vehicles we tested
had superior performance to other vehicles in the same model line and
year. Also, vehicle-to-vehicle variability is a consideration for all
FMVSS, and the Alliance provided no information to indicate that there
is an issue unique to AEB. Additionally, variation in brake activation
timing between manufacturers is contemplated by the structure of the
rule. The final rule does not dictate brake activation timing, brake
force, or any other aspects of AEB performance other than that the
subject vehicle not make contact with the test device.
Regarding variability across test locations, FMVSS No. 127
specifies all the needed conditions to inform manufacturers of how we
will test. These conditions were proposed in the NPRM, and commenters
did not raise conditions that were not included that would affect test
outcomes. Finally, the variability analysis in the FRIA is our attempt
to connect the idealized test conditions to the real world when
conducting benefits analyses. NHTSA understands that in the real world
there will be variability that cannot be tested in an efficient way
through an FMVSS, which informs our benefits calculations. However,
such analysis should not be used to determine the types of results
achievable in an idealized testing environment. For these reasons,
NHTSA will not grant reconsideration.
b. FMVSS No. 135 Test Data
The Alliance stated that the final rule improperly relied on the
agency's evaluation of FMVSS No. 135 test results, which showed that
braking performance of nearly all tested vehicles was much better than
what the FMVSS requires. The Alliance stated that the evaluation
reflects that manufacturers build compliance margins into their design
for FMVSS compliance and does not support the agency's conclusion that
the no-contact requirement is practicable. Furthermore, the Alliance
stated that test results from FMVSS No. 135 testing are not comparable
to AEB performance because the final rule requires performance from
both the service brakes and a perception system, whereas FMVSS No. 135
evaluates only service brake performance. Also, the Alliance stated
that the maneuvers in FMVSS No. 135 tests are conducted with a human
driver putting muscular effort into the brake pedal. In contrast, there
is no human input when testing the AEB system.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA's use of FMVSS No. 135 test results was justified. As an
initial matter, those results were not the primary results upon which
the agency
[[Page 93203]]
determined that the requirements are practicable. They were used
largely to show that the braking performance needed to meet the
requirements in the final rule is present in the current fleet without
the need for changes, especially with regard to heavier vehicles for
which there were limitations on available test data. The results
indicated that the brake performance of most vehicles surpasses the
performance requirements set by FMVSS No. 135. While the results of
these tests might not show exactly how the braking systems will perform
under automatic actuation that does not involve human muscular inputs,
they do demonstrate that braking performance is more than sufficient to
permit compliance with the final rule. Indeed, we do not need to rely
on FMVSS No. 135 test data to demonstrate actuation performance because
AEB systems currently on the road and tested by NHTSA actuate the
service brakes without human driver inputs and demonstrate the
performance needed to meet FMVSS No. 127. Therefore, we disagree with
the Alliance's contention that the final rule misused the FMVSS No. 135
test results.
c. Test Speeds and Headway
Toyota, Volkswagen, and the Alliance expressed concern regarding
the practicability of high maximum test speeds and no contact. The
Alliance stated that NHTSA's data illustrate the difficulties in
complying with the decelerating lead vehicle test with both the lead
and subject vehicles traveling at 50 mph (80 km/h) at any headway
between 12 and 40 meters (S7.5.1(a), S7.5.2(b)(2), S7.5.3(a) and
S7.5.3(d) of the final rule). To address this issue, the Alliance
petitioned NHTSA to consider reducing the maximum test speed for the
AEB and PAEB requirements and adjust the headway requirements. The
Alliance claimed that the 2023 additional AEB research in the final
rule evaluated only the test condition with a 12-meter headway and did
not provide any test data to support the lead vehicle decelerating test
with headways greater than 12 meters.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not reducing the maximum test speeds or adjusting the
headway requirements for the test scenarios. Petitioners' requests for
test speed reduction were addressed in the final rule, and headways
above 12 meters are practicable.
Regarding test speeds, NHTSA's 2023 research showed multiple
vehicles avoided contact on most tests regardless of scenario and test
speed.\14\ Further, one vehicle avoided contact on all lead vehicle AEB
and PAEB tests except on three of the five lead vehicle decelerating
tests, where it impacted the lead vehicle at approximately 5 km/h or
less. \15\ That vehicles not designed to meet the standard are already
capable of doing so demonstrates that the performance test requirements
are practicable.
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\14\ NHTSA's 2023 Light Vehicle Automatic Emergency Braking
Research Test Summary, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1066; NHTSA's 2023
Light Vehicle Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking Research Test
Summary, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1068.
\15\ The low impact speeds on the system that did not avoid
contact on all trials suggests that slight tuning of that AEB to the
requirements of FMVSS No. 127 is needed to meet the standard.
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Regarding headway for the lead vehicle decelerating test, the
headway ranges selected are consistent with those used by Euro NCAP and
NHTSA incorporated the test ranges for speed and headways to ensure AEB
system robustness under a range of situations. NHTSA tested 2022 model
year vehicles with headways of 40 m with and without manual brake
application at 50 km/h and 80 km/h, and with a lead vehicle
deceleration of 0.4 g and 0.5 g.\16\ During that testing, multiple
vehicles avoided contact in almost all lead vehicle decelerating test
scenarios and one vehicle avoided contact in all scenarios.
Additionally, the shorter headway tests are generally more stringent
than tests with larger headways. In our 2023 testing, one vehicle
tested by NHTSA avoided contact in the 80 km/h lead vehicle
deceleration test in all trials with a 12 m headway, and another
vehicle avoided contact on 2 out of 5 runs,\17\ suggesting that
avoiding contact under less stringent test conditions is practicable.
Based on our test data, the requirements are practicable and will not
be adjusted.
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\16\ NHTSA's 2022 Light Vehicle Automatic Emergency Braking
Research Test Summary, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-0005.
\17\ NHTSA's 2023 Light Vehicle Automatic Emergency Braking
Research Test Summary, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1066.
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2. Meet the Need for Safety
Petitioners requested reconsideration of the no contact
requirement, stating that it could lead to unintended consequences such
as increased false positives and a rise in rear-end collisions. A false
positive describes AEB system brake applications in circumstances where
there is no crash-imminent situation, such as braking in the absence of
a true obstacle.
a. Sufficiency of Analysis of False Positives
The Alliance stated that NHTSA has not adequately considered
whether meeting the no-contact performance requirement will generate
false positives and that NHTSA ``should have attempted to quantify this
risk'' and assessed why those disbenefits are reasonable to accept. The
Alliance suggested that a false positive in FMVSS-compliant AEB
vehicles could induce rear-end collisions with vehicles that are not
equipped with rule-compliant AEB systems. The Alliance's petition
included simulation data indicating that a vehicle complying with the
final rule must respond within 0.35 seconds to avoid contact in one of
the obstructed pedestrian crossing situations, which it argues is
beyond the reaction ability of human drivers that may be behind these
vehicles. It claimed that this discrepancy will likely result in a
rear-end crash. Furthermore, according to the Alliance, increases in
relative speed may heighten the likelihood of false positives due to
the need for earlier prediction and intervention. The Alliance stated
that NHTSA acknowledged that false positives could generate problems
with public acceptance of AEB technology. It also stated that NHTSA
dismissed this concern in the final rule without demonstrating that the
final rule's requirements will not significantly impact the rate of
false positives, and without understanding that the final rule demands
effectively different systems from those currently installed in
vehicles. The Alliance did not suggest any specific alternative.
Toyota claimed that the requirements in the final rule will likely
lead to an increase in false positives and can create driving behavior
that neither the driver of the subject vehicle nor the drivers of
surrounding vehicles will find natural or predictable, resulting in
safety disbenefits. It stated that due to high maximum testable speeds,
AEB will need to activate earlier to avoid a collision, and while a
system can be designed to better account for curves in the road or
parked cars, systems cannot be designed to predict what drivers in lead
vehicles intend to do. Regarding PAEB, Volkswagen claimed that because
pedestrians may change their travel path to avoid a collision
themselves, AEB activations that initiate early to avoid a potential
collision will result in rear end collisions with the stopping vehicle.
Agency Response
Petitioners' statements were largely speculative. In support of
these
[[Page 93204]]
arguments, they did not present any new data or analysis beyond what
the agency had already considered.\18\ Petitioners have failed to
provide data demonstrating the likelihood of an increase in false
positives or the magnitude of the increase, nor is NHTSA aware of any
source of such data.
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\18\ Petitioner's simulation data provided regarding the
obstructed pedestrian crossing test is discussed in Section G.
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Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Safety Act,
NHTSA's obligation is not to eliminate uncertainty. Courts have
repeatedly emphasized that the agency's job is to acknowledge
uncertainty, explain the available evidence, and offer a ``rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'' \19\ In
coming to its determination, NHTSA dealt with each of the principal
uncertainties and resolved them to the degree possible. In some cases,
the requisite decisions were necessarily based on imperfect data and
were inherently judgmental or predictive in part. The obligation to
make such decisions and resolve such uncertainties is an integral part
of NHTSA's mandate under the Safety Act and the APA. Our determination
under the Safety Act, which was based on several factors including the
available test data, was that collision avoidance was practicable and
that any risk of increased false positives and rear collisions did not
outweigh the benefits of the rule. Therefore, considering the data
available and applying our expert judgment about the unquantifiable
aspects of the rule, we selected the option that best meets the need
for safety.
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\19\ In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51-52 (1983), the
Court recognized that ``[i]t is not infrequent that the available
data does not settle a regulatory issue and the agency must then
exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on
the record to a policy conclusion. Recognizing that policymaking in
a complex society must account for uncertainty, however, does not
imply that it is sufficient for an agency to merely recite the terms
`substantial uncertainty' as a justification for its actions.'' See
also Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251, 1261-62 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
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NHTSA acknowledged the uncertainties and explained our reasoning
throughout the rulemaking effort. In the FRIA, we noted that there is
insufficient data to quantify the frequency and dynamics of false
positive scenarios.\20\ We explained that the analysis had limitations
regarding crash scenarios and parameters beyond those reflected in
testing. We recognized from our testing that performance is variable
and false positives do occur on current systems. However, this
uncertainty, on its own, does not demonstrate that false positives
would become more frequent under the final rule.
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\20\ Light Vehicle AEB FRIA, Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1069, at
252 (FRIA).
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We also explained that it is not possible to anticipate an
exhaustive list of other possible real-world scenarios that systems
would face and continually repeat testing to establish a robust
estimate of the frequency of false positive occurrence. Based on this
reasoning and test results, the analysis in the FRIA considered false
positive rates to be the same under the final rule as they are in the
current fleet. These false positives are therefore included in the
analysis, but do not contribute to costs or benefits in the rule. The
FRIA acknowledged that removing that assumption would reduce the
magnitude of the estimated safety impacts. However, as the estimated
benefits from the final rule are 17 to 21 times greater than the costs,
it is unlikely that disbenefits from incremental false positives
resulting in an increase in rear-end crashes would render the rule not
cost-beneficial.
Despite these limitations, we nonetheless considered the problem
qualitatively and addressed it to the extent possible. We emphasized
that because market penetration of AEB is very high, incremental
disbenefits resulting from all applicable vehicles having rule-
compliant lead vehicle AEB would be insignificant.\21\ We also
emphasized our belief that false positives would not occur in well-
designed AEB systems, especially with the integration of supplemental
technologies. These technologies can include providing sufficient
redundancy or continuously receiving and updating information regarding
a vehicle or pedestrian as the vehicle approaches.
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\21\ FRIA at 252. Petitioners argue that this analysis is
unconvincing because of the timeline of fleet turnover. However, the
moment of 100 percent fleet adoption is not the only relevant
timeline. Table 218 in the FRIA shows cumulative exposure by year.
By year 6, we anticipate that 50 percent of the fleet will have
rule-compliant AEB such that concerns about additional rear-ends
derived from false activations will be significantly abated.
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Additionally, we did not simply disregard risks of false
activations due to the speculative nature of the risks. We incorporated
two false positive testing scenarios to establish a minimum level of
system functionality in avoiding such events. We noted that, while
certainly not comprehensive, we selected these scenarios because we
believe they represent the most common scenarios systems will encounter
and they address known engineering challenges for existing AEB
systems.\22\
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\22\ 89 FR 39686, at 39732; FRIA at 47.
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Furthermore, we also emphasized many possible benefits from the
rule that the analysis also could not quantify. These include safety
benefits associated with crash scenarios and parameters outside of
those reflected in agency testing, safety benefits from avoiding
secondary crashes, safety benefits from preventing or mitigating
crashes with other vulnerable road users or animals, and property
damage and traffic congestion avoided.\23\
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\23\ FRIA at 47.
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In contrast, the petitioners simply asserted speculative
disbenefits based on theoretical scenarios. The Alliance, for example,
presented simulation data to support the possibility of rear-end
collisions that could occur if a vehicle has a false positive with a
human driver behind it, but it did not provide any evidence that the
false positive events themselves would occur in greater frequency or
severity under the final rule compared to no requirement or an
alternative requirement.\24\ Additionally, Volkswagen asserts that ``no
contact'' ``will undoubtably lead to higher false positive rates'' in
scenarios in which a pedestrian changes their travel path following the
onset of braking, and Toyota made a similar claim with regards to lead
vehicle AEB.\25\ When considering the balance of costs and benefits,
petitioners seek to place greater weight on speculative and
unquantifiable disbenefits without considering the added benefits which
may also be obtained. These assertions are insufficient to demonstrate
that the speculative disbenefits outweigh the benefits of a no contact
requirement. Without sufficient information to fully quantify either,
it is not unreasonable for NHTSA, in its expert judgment and in
consideration of the Safety Act's
[[Page 93205]]
focus on safety, to select the option that maximizes possible safety
benefits.
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\24\ We also disagree with the petitioners' conclusions about
these hypothetical scenarios. If the driver of the following vehicle
maintains the safe distance required by law, a collision with the
rule-compliant subject vehicle would not occur. Additionally, as we
noted in the final rule, if an AEB activation of the subject vehicle
leads to a collision with the following vehicle in a true positive
situation, we believe that the AEB activation effectively reduces
the likelihood of multiple collisions in a single crash. The AEB
system would prevent the subject vehicle from colliding with an
obstacle--whether another vehicle or a pedestrian--in its path.
\25\ Nothing in the final rule prevents systems from relaxing
braking once an imminent collision is no longer present or from
designing AEB systems with algorithms that suppress AEB activations
in certain circumstances such as after a substantial steering input
or the application of additional throttle. However, when tested
according to the procedures specified in the rule, the system must
operate to avoid a collision.
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b. Defect Authority
The Alliance stated that it is insufficient for NHTSA to address
false positives through the agency's safety defect authority. The
Alliance stated that false positives are an unwanted side effect,
similar to an issue experienced with early higher-powered airbag
technology, which NHTSA needs to address through rulemaking to amend
the performance requirements rather than through recalls. The Alliance
argued that after the new FMVSS, ``[i]t is not sufficient, or fair,''
to continue to ``address `false positives' through [NHTSA's] safety
defect authority.'' This argument primarily stemmed from the Alliance's
claim that, due to current limitations in AEB technology, increasing
the sensitivity of an AEB system to meet the performance requirements
of the new FMVSS would increase the likelihood that the AEB system
would also erroneously detect obstacles where none exist.
Agency Analysis
The Alliance's arguments do not support reconsideration of the
final rule for several reasons.
First, the variability of false positive scenarios lends itself to
the more individualized review of real-world operation that the defects
process allows. As we noted, the final rule included two false
activation test scenarios, but these are not comprehensive for
eliminating susceptibility to false activations.\26\ The best forum for
such an individualized review is NHTSA's defects authority, which can
accommodate investigations that consider the reasonableness of the
potential safety risks in light of all of the facts and circumstances.
In contrast, an FMVSS sets a static performance requirement for all
systems. Therefore, the defects authority is an appropriate avenue for
addressing false positive events.
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\26\ 89 FR 39686, at 39732.
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Second, there is an established precedent of both NHTSA and
manufacturers addressing false positive AEB events through safety
recalls. In the past, vehicle manufacturers have filed recalls based on
the safety risk that, for example, has been described as ``[i]f the AEB
system unexpectedly activates while driving, the risk of a rear-end
collision from a following vehicle may increase.'' \27\ Likewise, NHTSA
has undertaken multiple defect investigations of potential safety risks
arising from false activations of AEB systems.\28\ The public has
similarly raised concerns about the safety risks associated with AEB
false activations, requesting NHTSA apply its safety defect authority
to the issue.\29\ This established practice demonstrates that using the
defects authority to address false positives has been effective and
workable, and the Alliance does not explain why it will not continue to
be under the final rule.
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\27\ See, e.g., Tesla, Part 573 Safety Recall Report, No. 21V-
846, Unexpected Activation of Automatic Emergency Brake, available
at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2021/RCLRPT-21V846-7836.PDF.
\28\ See, e.g., NHTSA, Opening Resume: Engineering Analysis EA
24-002, Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking, available at
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-EA24002-11766P1.pdf;
NHTSA, Opening Resume: Preliminary Evaluation PE 24-008, Inadvertent
Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-PE24008-10868.pdf; NHTSA, Opening Resume:
Preliminary Evaluation 24-013, Inadvertent Automatic Emergency
Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-PE24013-12241.pdf; NHTSA, Opening Resume: Preliminary Evaluation 23-
017, Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2023/INOA-PE23017-10785.pdf.
\29\ See, e.g., NHTSA, Opening Resume: DP 19-001, Defect
Petition for False Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2019/INOA-DP19001-5499.PDF. NHTSA also
often receives customer complaints regarding the issue through
Vehicle Owner Questionnaire submissions.
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Third, the Alliance's petition suggests that current technical
limits in AEB equipment, such as sensor range or definition, would make
it unfair for NHTSA to act on safety risks that were a byproduct of
manufacturer efforts to meet the performance requirements of the new
FMVSS. However, in striving to protect the public, the Safety Act
requires manufacturers to remedy all unreasonable safety risks in their
vehicles, regardless of the reason for their origin. A manufacturer's
good intention is not a defense to a recall.\30\
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\30\ See 49 U.S.C. 30116 et seq.; 49 U.S.C. 30102; see also 49
U.S.C. 30118 (establishing that general recall notification
responsibilities apply to all defects and is not based on design
intent).
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Fourth, the false positive risks that petitioners raise are
speculative. No petitioner or commenter has identified an aspect of the
new FMVSS that will cause future defects related to false positives. At
most, the Alliance has identified challenges with existing AEB
technology that could lead some manufacturers to inadvertently be
imprecise or overinclusive when calibrating the sensitivity of their
AEB systems to meet the new FMVSS. The Alliance has not suggested that
these errors in implementation would be impossible to eliminate or
mitigate once they became apparent.
Finally, the Alliance's example of early, ``high-powered'' air bags
is an inapt analogy. Early versions of air bags deployed with a fixed
amount of force that posed a risk of injury to occupants. These risks
were not an occasional byproduct of those air bags but were inherent to
the forces generated when those air bags deployed as quickly as needed
to meet the performance requirements of the original air bag FMVSS. As
air bag technology improved, air bags became capable of modulating the
force of their deployment to limit the injurious potential of their
inflation. When updating the FMVSS to require advanced air bags, NHTSA
noted that ``the fact that we are requiring manufacturers to provide
improved air bags in new vehicles does not mean that earlier vehicles
that do not meet the new requirements have a safety-related defect.''
\31\ By contrast, an AEB false positive (such as braking in the absence
of a true obstacle) is not a behavior required by the final rule.
Rather, it is at most an accidental engineering failure from trying to
design an AEB system with sufficient sensitivity to meet the
performance standard. In fact, AEB false positives are more like the
safety defects posed by air bag inflator ruptures. These occur when, in
an effort to design air bag systems capable of meeting the intense
inflation demands of the FMVSS, engineering failures cause ruptures
which project debris. In the same way, even assuming the Alliance is
correct that the performance demands of the final rule may sometimes
result in faulty AEB system designs that are susceptible to false
positives, those false positives are a failure in the implementation of
the AEB system, not an inherent performance characteristic of the
standard.
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\31\ 65 FR 30680, 30705 (May 12, 2000). The same approach is
true for FMVSS No. 127: the fact that vehicles manufactured before
the new FMVSS takes affect may have AEB systems that do not meet the
new standards (or perhaps do not have AEB at all) does not mean
those earlier vehicles have safety-related defects simply because
they do not meet the new standards.
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For these reasons, no reconsideration is needed on this issue.
c. Comparison to a Standard That Allows Low-Speed Contact
To address false positive risks and practicability concerns,
Volkswagen and Toyota petitioned for the consideration of allowing a
low-speed contact, such as up to 10 km/h (6.2 mph).\32\ They present
two justifications. First, they make a novel assertion, not raised
during the NPRM comment period, that NHTSA implicitly accepts contacts
under 10 km/h because the final rule does not
[[Page 93206]]
require AEB systems to operate at speeds 10 km/h and below. Second,
Toyota claims that NHTSA's analysis did not establish how no contact
meets the need for safety in comparison to low-speed contact
alternatives.\33\
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\32\ Hyundai also discussed this issue in its letter.
\33\ Hyundai, in its letter, argued that a 10 km/h minimum
allowable collision speed would preserve the safety benefits of the
rule because contacts under that speed are unlikely to result in
serious injuries or fatalities. One comment discussed in the final
rule stated similarly. 89 FR 39686, 39272.
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Agency Analysis
Petitioners' arguments do not support reconsideration of the final
rule. As an initial matter, NHTSA's analysis fully considered this
issue and the relevant alternatives in the rulemaking. In the NPRM, we
sought comment on alternatives to the no contact requirement,
specifically regarding allowing low-speed contact in on-track testing
for both PAEB and lead vehicle. We received extensive comment both in
support of and against allowing contact at low speeds. In the final
rule, the agency disagreed that a low-speed approach fully resolved the
safety problem, emphasizing that no contact provides maximum safety
benefits and aligns with the Safety Act. We reiterated that striking a
person with a vehicle is unacceptable at any speed under any
conditions, and the analysis in our FRIA supports that conclusion. We
believe the data and analysis in the final rule and the FRIA
demonstrate the safety basis upon which ``no contact'' was selected
over low-speed alternatives. Therefore, we are not amending the final
rule on these bases. However, as petitioners have presented a new
framing of the argument regarding the 10 km/h (6.2 mph) activation
threshold, we take this opportunity to highlight the data and analysis
that supports the final rule to respond to the points raised by
petitioners.
Petitioners present a false equivalency between the activation
threshold and contact speeds. Activation of an AEB system while moving
below 10 km/h is a different scenario from continuing to move at up to
10 km/h after an activation has already occurred. The impact speed is
part of the in-operation performance of the system. That is, once an
AEB system detects an imminent collision with a vehicle or pedestrian,
we anticipate that the systems will remain active as long as the
imminent collision risk persists. The AEB minimum activation speed, on
the other hand, is selected as a design specification. Petitioners
attempted to conflate these circumstances, which is unpersuasive.
Additionally, the activation threshold exists to ensure
practicability, not because no safety concerns exist below that
speed.\34\ When discussing PAEB testing in the NPRM, for example, we
noted that the lower bound was chosen based on a tentative conclusion,
corroborated by our 2020 testing and testing on vehicles from model
years 2021 and 2022, that PAEB systems may not offer consistent
performance at speeds below 16 km/h (9.9 mph) and that 10 km/h (6.2
mph) is consistent with Euro NCAP's testing lower bound.
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\34\ We have been consistent in our belief that collisions under
10 km/h present a safety risk. In the NPRM, we noted that ``not
requiring PAEB to be active below 10 km/h (6.2 mph) should not be
construed to preclude making the AEB system active, if possible, at
speeds below 10 km/h (6.2 mph). In fact, the agency anticipates that
manufacturers will make the system available at the lowest
practicable speed.'' 88 FR 38632, at 38667.
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In addition to those stated in prior notices, there are several
other reasons for the practicability concerns that justify a
distinction between 10 km/h as an activation threshold and as a maximum
contact speed in testing. First, at speeds below 10 km/h, the driver
has more time to re-engage and apply the brakes to avoid the collision
without AEB intervention. Second, AEB systems can have difficulty
operating in very tight spaces and at low speeds such as in crowded
parking garages, where manoeuvres at low speed may need to occur in
crash-imminent scenarios. Third, certain vehicles to which the
regulation applies may need to push objects while operating at low
speeds. Finally, our testing and data collection showed both that no
systems operated at speeds under 5 km/h (3.1 mph), and that some
vehicles that performed well in high-speed testing did not operate
under 10 km/h (6.2 mph).\35\ These data suggest design challenges
specific to low-speed operation. NHTSA considered these factors and
determined that it was practicable to require only that systems operate
above 10 km/h. Therefore, the activation threshold and whether to allow
an impact speed have distinct considerations that justify different
approaches.
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\35\ NHTSA-2023-0021-0005, Table 3.
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Furthermore, no contact better meets the need for safety in
comparison to a regulation that allows low-speed contact. The data and
analysis in the FRIA show that allowing for contact, at any speed,
results in less safety benefits than are achieved by the final rule. In
analyzing the capabilities of AEB technology, at least one vehicle
tested was able to meet the no contact requirement in each scenario.
Therefore, the benefits in the FRIA represent the level of safety
associated with the best performer.\36\ The injury risk curves in the
FRIA represent the likelihood of injury based on impact speed. In
general, the likelihood of injury, and more severe injuries or
fatalities, increases with respect to contact speed. And, although
there are limits to the precision of the conclusion that can be drawn
due to data limitations, the injury risk curves show that allowing for
contact at any speed results in less safety benefits than are achieved
by the best performer. NHTSA's analysis therefore fully considered this
issue.
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\36\ This ties the benefits calculations directly to a vehicle's
observed test performance. In contrast, fully calculating the
benefits of a standard that allowed contact would require adjusting
the best performer away from the test data. This would involve
assumptions about best performance under the rule that are not tied
to observed performance and reduce the accuracy of the benefits
calculations.
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The PAEB data clearly show that a low-speed contact alternative
would achieve substantially less safety than no contact.\37\ Even at
the lowest impact speeds of 0-5 mph, there is a 75 percent chance of
minor injury, 4 percent chance of a moderate severity injury, and a 1
percent chance serious injury or worse. Furthermore, at even the next
impact speed group, there is a non-zero probability of a fatality.\38\
NHTSA considered these risks in deciding that no contact in PAEB
testing meets the need for safety.
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\37\ Injury risk data used in this paragraph is presented in the
FRIA, Table 131. The table and this data are rounded to the nearest
hundredth. The true figures are as follows: at a maximum contact
speed of 5 mph, approximately 0.4 percent of collisions would result
in fatality, 75 percent would result in minor injury, 4 percent in
moderate injury, and 0.7 percent in serious injury. These
descriptions correspond to the maximum abbreviated injury scale
(MAIS) categories, described on pages 238-239 of the FRIA. Minor
injuries can include non-superficial injuries, including those with
long term effects such as whiplash, and moderate injuries include a
fractured sternum.
\38\ Petitioners suggested allowing contact at up to 10 km/h,
which would correspond to a roughly 6 mph impact speed. The data in
the FRIA is organized by miles-per-hour, so for this response we
discussed injuries in the impact speed range closest to but below
this figure, which is 0-5 mph.
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By applying these percentages to the PAEB data across the injury
severity categories in the estimated benefits of the final rule, we
find significant benefits to a no contact standard.\39\
[[Page 93207]]
Allowing contact at low speeds would lead to 2,192 additional minor
injuries, 31 moderate injuries, 3 serious injuries, and 1 fatality
annually. Monetized, this change results in $179.1 million
comprehensive economic benefits lost, or 4.9 percent of the PAEB
benefits generated by the final rule.\40\ This is a sizable impact, and
one that NHTSA considers meaningful. Indeed, $179.1 million of
comprehensive economic benefits is larger than those of many entire
safety rules we issue.
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\39\ Although this discussion is new analysis in response to the
petitions for reconsideration, we note that this analysis uses only
data already in the FRIA and uses no proprietary statistical
methods. In the FRIA, PAEB is considered in crossing path and along
path scenarios. For along path scenarios, we assume that all
pedestrian impacts would be avoided under a no contact requirement,
so allowing contact would distribute those incidents that would have
been avoided across each injury severity category by the percentage
of injuries associated with each severity at the selected contact
speed. For crossing path scenarios, even under a no contact
requirement there are situations in which pedestrians enter the path
of the vehicle with insufficient time for detection and braking to
avoid the collision. Therefore, the expected effect of allowing
contact should account for a reduced number of both avoided and
mitigated injuries.
\40\ Performing the same analysis as used in this paragraph on
contacts up to 10 mph yields additional lost benefits of only 0.7
percent. This result suggests that most of the safety benefits lost
from a low-speed contact option are lost in the contact allowance.
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For lead vehicle AEB, the low-speed injury data in the FRIA has
more limitations than that for PAEB. The relatively small number of
severe injuries that occur in rear-end collisions at low speeds
compared to those that occur in high speed collisions causes
implausible analytical results that limit the precision of the
conclusions that can be drawn about the exact level of safety benefit
obtained at low impact speeds. Nonetheless, the available data
demonstrate that benefits would be lost with a contact standard and the
general magnitude of those lost benefits.
The injury data in the FRIA show that allowing contact at any speed
reduces the safety benefits.\41\ At a relative contact speed of 10 mph
(the difference between striking vehicle speed and struck vehicle
speed), the probability of minor injury increases to 21.9 percent,
moderate injuries to 0.9 percent, serious injuries to 0.7 percent, and
even 0.1 percent chance of a fatality. In fact, even at a relative
contact speed of just 1 mph (contact at 2 mph), there is a 3.5 percent
chance of minor injury and a 0.4 percent chance each of moderate and
serious injuries. The FRIA contains an example calculation to show how
these figures are derived and factor into NHTSA's benefits
analysis.\42\
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\41\ FRIA, Table 108.
\42\ FRIA at 761 (the example begins on p. 763). Note that it
appears some of the values in FRIA Table 317, which summarizes input
parameters, appear to be incorrect. Table 317 stated that the TTC
Duration(s) were 2.01 for each FCW scenario. The correct values are
as follows: Status quo (SQ) Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS) of 2.01, SQ
Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM) of 2.09, SQ Lead Vehicle Decelerating
(LVD) of 2.14, Best performer (BP) LVS of 2.06, BP LVM of 2.12, and
BP LVD of 2.23.
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The data and analysis in the FRIA show that while low-speed
collisions are less likely to result in severe or fatal injuries,
reducing the number of injuries that are less severe can carry large
safety benefits due to the large volume of those injuries. As the final
rule states, between 2016 and 2019, there were an average of 1.75
million rear-end crashes annually (and nearly 55,000 frontal crashes
with a pedestrian). Even small changes in injury risk can have sizable
impacts across that volume of collisions.\43\ Additionally, even
injuries classified as less severe in the data cause serious harm, and
these injuries, such as whiplash, can carry long-term effects. In the
final rule, the agency concluded that although the data is limited, it
plainly indicates that a no contact standard achieves greater safety
benefits than a standard that allows contact.
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\43\ FRIA, Tables 225 and 251. Note that these crash estimates
were not used to estimate benefits. The target population used to
estimate benefits for lead vehicle AEB and PAEB included several
filters to best reflect the real-world crashes that corresponded
with the test scenarios and conditions.
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In contrast to the data collection and analyses done by NHTSA,
petitioners suggest that NHTSA should prioritize speculative
disbenefits from false positives over the demonstrable safety benefits
that a no contact requirement achieves. Petitioners did not provide any
new information or data that was not already considered by the agency
during the development of the final rule in response to public comments
suggesting that a low-speed alternative would better meet the need for
safety. Nor did they provide, at any stage in the rulemaking,
compelling information regarding the increase in false positives that
they fear or evidence that a no contact requirement will result in such
an increase while allowing a 10 km/h (6.2 mph) contact speed would not.
Although we recognized that there are unquantifiable aspects, NHTSA was
well within its responsibilities to consider this risk but to weight
more heavily the demonstrable safety benefits achievable by a no
contact requirement. The Safety Act entrusts NHTSA with this
responsibility and to exercise its judgment, and we did so. Therefore,
no reconsideration is necessary, and we deny the request for
reconsideration to allow low-speed contact.
B. Multiple Trials
The final rule requires that the test vehicle meet the performance
test requirements in any test run and does not allow multiple test runs
in which the vehicle is only required to meet the required performance
in a percentage of the runs. Petitioners requested that the standard be
amended to incorporate multiple test runs to allow a vehicle to meet
the performance requirement in some but not all runs, and provided
several reasons discussed below.
1. Comparison to FMVSS No. 135 and Forms of Variability
Petitioners argued that the final rule did not account for the
variabilities in testing. They requested FMVSS No. 127 be amended to be
similar to FMVSS No. 135, which allows for compliance to be determined
based on multiple test runs. Petitioners suggested several variations,
including passing 5 out of 7 runs (which is similar to NCAP), passing 3
out of 5 runs, and a requirement that if the vehicle fails the first
run it must pass three subsequent runs.\44\
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\44\ The Alliance also noted that, if NHTSA provides sufficient
relief regarding the no contact requirement, then this relief may
not be necessary.
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The Alliance stated that existing braking standards, specifically
FMVSS No. 135, acknowledge the inherent variability in vehicle braking
systems that make it unreasonable to evaluate performance based on a
single test run. The Alliance suggested that since AEB is a braking
system, it has these variations, which raise practicability concerns
when a test requirement does not allow for multiple test trials. These
variations derive from both foundational braking mechanisms and
additional variability from sensing and perception responses.
Therefore, the Alliance argued that NHTSA failed to recognize that
FMVSS No. 127 deviates from its established practice of permitting
multiple test runs for braking standards. Moreover, it claims that
NHTSA did not provide any explanation in the final rule for departing
from this longstanding precedent.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA received comment on and fully considered the issue of
multiple trials during the rulemaking. The arguments raised in the
petitions do not justify allowing multiple test trials.
That multiple test runs are used in FMVSS No. 135 does not mean
that multiple test runs are necessary for FMSS No. 127. There is a
critical difference between FMVSS No. 135 and FMVSS No. 127 that
justifies a different approach.\45\ The purpose of FMVSS No.
[[Page 93208]]
135 is to ensure safe braking performance, and its testing is designed
to test braking performance of the vehicle.\46\ It uses multiple test
runs to account for the variability in the ability of the human test
driver to maximize the braking capabilities of the vehicle. The agency
published the first NPRM for what would become FMVSS No. 135 in 1985.
In that NPRM, the agency stated that ``[t]he purpose of specifying
multiple stops is to enable test drivers to achieve a vehicle's best
performance.'' \47\ That preamble further stated that it normally took
test drivers three or four stops to achieve the best possible braking
performance. NHTSA has also rejected incorporation of multiple test
runs into the standard for the ``hot stop'' test because NHTSA found in
its testing that the human test drivers were capable of achieving the
needed performance for the test, and the test needed to occur while the
brakes were at temperature.\48\ Additionally, in FMVSS No. 126, an
example of a standard where NHTSA found a single test run to be
sufficient, the sine-with-dwell test provides for only one test run at
each steering-wheel amplitude and rotation direction combination.
Further, in the final rule establishing FMVSS No. 136, ``Electronic
stability control systems for heavy vehicles,'' NHTSA stated that FMVSS
No. 136 allows multiple attempts to maintain the lane for J-turn
testing to ensure that the ESC system activates before the vehicle
becomes unstable instead of imposing a requirement that it activate
prior to instability to ``account for driver variability and possible
driver error in conducting the manoeuvre. Absent driver error, we do
not expect any vehicle equipped with current-generation ESC systems to
leave the lane during any J-turn test.'' \49\ These examples make clear
that a standard that permits multiple test trials is justified where
testing may be affected by variability in a human test driver's ability
to apply a full brake application. It may be the case that, because it
allows multiple test trials to accommodate human test drivers, FMVSS
No. 135 accommodates the other forms of test variability cited by
petitioners. However, this result is an ancillary effect of the
standard's design, not its purpose.
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\45\ Not all the tests in FMVSS No. 135 use multiple trials.
Those that do include: S7.5. Cold effectiveness; S7.6. High speed
effectiveness, S7.7. Stops with Engine Off, S7.8. Antilock
functional failure, S7.9. Variable brake proportioning system
functional failure, and S7.11. Brake power unit or brake power
assist unit inoperative (System depleted). These afford up to six
test runs to achieve the required performance.
\46\ 49 CFR 571.135, S2.
\47\ 50 FR 19751.
\48\ 60 FR 6431.
\49\ 80 FR 36050.
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In contrast to FMVSS No. 135, the test procedures in FMVSS No. 127
test the AEB system and do not use human test drivers to actuate the
brakes. Even for tests that include manual brake application, the test
procedure specifies use of a braking robot and the performance
specifications on how the brake must be actuated for the test. No
variability from human operation contributes to test outcomes in FMVSS
No. 127.
Indeed, the Alliance, in attempting to argue that FMVSS No. 135
test results are not informative of AEB system performance,
acknowledged this distinction is meaningful. It claimed that test
conditions in FMVSS No.'s 135 and 127 ``are fundamentally different
such that FMVSS No. 135 results are not indicative of AEB performance''
because tests conducted under FMVSS No. 135 are ``conducted with a
human driver putting muscular effort into the brake pedal.'' \50\ This
distinction justifies NHTSA's decision not to use multiple test runs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ In making this argument, the Alliance is suggesting that
NHTSA cannot rely on FMVSS No. 135 tests to show the practicability
of the no contact requirement because these tests will have superior
braking performance to FMVSS No. 127 tests due to added muscular
effort from the driver. This claim is discussed in the ``no
contact'' section, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Specific Forms of Variability Raised by Petitioners
Petitioners cited several forms of variability that they argue
justify multiple test runs or render the standard impracticably
stringent. The Alliance, for example, cited wear and tear of pedestrian
test dummies, design of pedestrian test dummies, and headlamp aim as
aspects specific to AEB system performance that can impact testing. It
also emphasized track conditions that contribute to stopping distance
variability, such as the age and degradation of the asphalt since it
was last resurfaced, the type of aggregate used on the test track, and
other variables. The Alliance also noted that compliance tests are
conducted at any number of test tracks throughout the United States,
which the Alliance claimed further amplifies variability of the test by
contributing their own unique characteristics. It also noted ambient
environmental effects such as cloud cover (or intermittent cloud
cover), dust, debris, pollen effects, recent rainfall, and noise
factors. It also stated that the road surface friction decreases as the
road surface temperature increases, and provided a figure that shows
road surface friction around 0.98 at a temperature of 2 degrees C and
decreasing to around 0.92 at 50 degrees C, and that these variations in
ambient conditions can translate into about 8-10 feet (2.5-3m) or more
variation in absolute stopping distance on a given test surface. It
also raised vehicle conditions, such as tire burnish, brake burnish,
brake wear and brake bleed, which amplify these environmental effects.
The Alliance stated that these factors (ambient conditions, vehicle
conditions, and track conditions) support the reason why FMVSS No. 135
accommodates outcome variability by using multiple trials, justify
using multiple trials, or justify a change in the no contact
requirement.
The Alliance stated that NHTSA's data demonstrate the challenges of
avoiding contact in every test that result from their cited
variability. The Alliance emphasized that no test scenario showed that
all tested vehicles could meet the performance requirements for lead
vehicle AEB on every test run. Starting at 64 km/h (40 mph), fewer than
half of the tested vehicle met the performance requirements in all the
test trials. The Alliance further stated that, while the research
conducted tests only up to 72 km/h (45 mph), at which only two models
avoided contact, the standard requires compliance with lead vehicle AEB
test at speeds up to 100 km/h (62 mph) without demonstrating the
feasibility and practicability at those higher speeds. It also
referenced PAEB testing, for which at the lowest tested speed (16 km/h
(9.9 mph)), vehicles failed in over 25 percent of the test runs. At
speeds of 65 km/h (40.4 mph) in dark conditions, the Alliance stated
that no tested vehicle could comply with the requirements 100 percent
of the time. The Alliance reasoned, therefore, that NHTSA's test data
indicates that most vehicles do not meet the standard's requirements,
and the agency has not provided any analysis demonstrating why these
data or other information prove the practicability of avoiding contact
on every test run.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA disagrees that the types of variability raised by petitioners
make the rule impracticable or justify multiple test runs.
First, several of these types of variability would not be resolved
if FMVSS No. 127 allowed multiple test runs. For example, test track
conditions, headlamp aim, and the differences between the pedestrian
test device and real pedestrians, which do contribute to variability in
AEB system performance, do not contribute to variability in performance
across multiple test runs in the same place with the same test devices.
The test track is relatively consistent across runs. Differences in the
pedestrian test device and a real pedestrian may contribute to variable
[[Page 93209]]
performance between the real world and the test track, but it does not
contribute to variability across multiple runs with the same test
device. Therefore, allowing multiple runs would not resolve these
concerns.
Additionally, other variabilities raised by petitioners are
resolved by other aspects of the FMVSS. The test conditions, including
temperature range, are generally consistent with those of existing
FMVSSs, such as FMVSS No. 135, which have proven effective over time in
resolving many issues raised by petitioners, such as concerns with
thermal effects on the surface friction of the test track.
Additionally, the test procedures state that headlamps will be aimed
per manufacturers' instructions and that testing will not occur during
periods of precipitation or when visibility is affected by fog, smoke,
ash, or particulates, which resolves many concerns regarding AEB system
performance variability.\51\ The Alliance's concerns about the test
dummies are also unfounded. Dummy wear and tear will not contribute to
test performance variability because the test procedures specify the
conditions for the test devices used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ The Alliance also petitioned for more specificity regarding
``visibility'' in the test condition. We provided a thorough
discussion of this requirement and the reasons for not providing
additional specificity in the NPRM and final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Alliance's discussion regarding vehicle and test track
variability is not persuasive because it relies on studies conducted
with test vehicles not specifically designed to meet the requirements
of the final rule. We anticipate the variability between vehicles
designed to comply with an FMVSS will be relatively small and will
depend on the compliance margins set by manufacturers according to
their risk acceptance strategies.
Regarding petitioners' claims that the current state of AEB
technology means that multiple test runs are necessary for the standard
to be practicable, we note that in the agency's 2023 research one
tested vehicle was able to avoid contact on most runs, which marked
significant progress compared to the 2020 testing. This and other
improvements in AEB technology over time support the conclusions made
in the final rule that these requirements are practicable within the
allowed lead time. Under the Safety Act, the agency is empowered to
issue safety standards that require advancements in existing technology
or require development of new technology.\52\ Given the developmental
trajectory, the agency does not find arguments based around the
performance of existing AEB systems to be a persuasive argument for
multiple trials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Chrysler, supra footnote 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. System Maturity
The Alliance stated that the final rule claimed that multiple
trials are not necessary for mature systems. It argued that NHTSA
incorrectly assumed that AEB technologies are mature, in part because
AEB systems introduced under the 2016 voluntary commitment were not
designed to meet the performance requirements of the final rule. The
Alliance also referenced the FRIA--which stated that because many AEB
systems do not meet the rule's requirements there will be significant
benefits to the new rule-compliant AEB systems--to argue that the
agency cannot consider an existing AEB system installed under the 2016
commitment to be mature while simultaneously claiming significant
benefits from the new systems required by the final rule. The Alliance
also stated that rule-compliant AEB systems should be considered new or
in development. It concluded that therefore these systems are not
mature and should be allowed to demonstrate compliance through multiple
test trials.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded by the Alliance's reframing of the issue. The
fact that a current system can meet the requirements of the standard
shows that the technology is mature--vehicles on the road today have
the requisite technology to comply with the rule. The benefits
estimates assess the improvements in outcomes generated when the entire
fleet becomes compliant in comparison to the status quo baseline. As we
explained in the FRIA, the status quo baseline is the average
performance of the vehicles included in NHTSA's testing. Therefore, the
benefits claimed are representative of mature systems being required
throughout the fleet.
Therefore, no reconsideration is needed. NHTSA denies the petitions
for reconsideration regarding multiple trials and will not adjust the
final rule to incorporate multiple test trials.
C. Equipment Requirement
The final rule includes an equipment requirement that light
vehicles have an AEB system that applies the brakes automatically at
any forward speed that is greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less than
145 km/h (90.1 mph) when a collision with a lead vehicle is imminent,
and at any forward speed greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less than
73 km/h (45.3 mph) when a collision with a pedestrian is imminent. It
also includes a performance test requirement that, when tested
according to the procedures in the rule, the subject vehicle provides a
forward collision warning and subsequently applies the service brakes
automatically when a collision with a lead vehicle is imminent such
that the subject vehicle does not collide with the lead vehicle.
The Alliance stated that the final rule lacks objectivity because
NHTSA has not established performance requirements for the equipment
required by final rule. It notes that while the rule requires the lead
vehicle AEB and PAEB systems to operate at speeds up to 145 km/h (90.1
mph) and 73 km/h (45.3 mph) respectively, it does not define the term
``operate,'' Additionally, the Alliance argues, although the preamble
to the final rule indicated that the systems would apply brakes when a
collision is imminent, NHTSA did not define an imminent crash. To
address these concerns, the Alliance requested a supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) proposing objective performance
requirements, including specifying what it means to ``operate'' the
equipment and defining when a crash is ``imminent.''
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not incorporating definitions for ``operate'' or
``imminent'' and is not incorporating a test procedure. However, NHTSA
is making one clarifying edit to remove reference to ``imminent'' in
the performance test requirement for lead vehicle AEB.
NHTSA does not believe that it is necessary to provide a definition
of or test procedures for the term ``operate'' in the regulatory text
because the final rule's definition of AEB clarifies how an AEB system
operates. FMVSS No. 127 defines ``Automatic Emergency Braking'' as ``a
system that detects an imminent collision with vehicles, objects, and
road users in or near the path of a vehicle and automatically controls
the vehicle's service brakes to avoid or mitigate the collision.'' The
definition of FCW provides similar clarity regarding FCW operation.
Additionally, the requirement that these systems ``operate'' is
explicitly tied to the test conditions in S6, Test Conditions, of FMVSS
No. 127. In considering the meaning of ``operate'' in the context of
the performance requirements applicable to AEB systems, the final rule
provides sufficient clarity that manufacturers can certify with
reasonable care that their systems ``operate'' in the circumstances
[[Page 93210]]
required by the final rule. Therefore, no definition is needed.
Regarding the definition of ``imminent'' as used in the equipment
requirements, no regulatory definition is needed. Certainly, not all of
the terms in a regulation must be explicitly defined. Here, the term
``imminent'' comes from the regulatory mandate in BIL.\53\ In BIL,
Congress chose not to define the term, and we interpret this provision
of BIL to use the plain meaning of the word ``imminent.'' \54\
Manufacturers may refer to the plain meaning when certifying their
vehicles to the equipment requirements.\55\ Additionally, the term is
sufficiently clear in context, and its meaning is discernable from
close review of the performance requirements and test procedures in the
rule, such as the set of testable ranges specified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ 49 U.S.C. 30129 note.
\54\ Miriam-Webster defines ``imminent'' as ``ready to take
place; happening soon.'' https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imminent?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (accessed
on 8/28/24). For an analogous determination, see 81 FR 85478,
Vehicle Defect Reporting Requirements. In this NPRM, we specified a
location that is ``accessible'' for an information label pursuant to
the section 31306 of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st
Century Act. We noted that while the statute did not explicitly
require us or the manufacturer to determine the location, selecting
a standardized location would best serve the purpose of the statute
by facilitating repeated consumer access to the information. We also
referenced the dictionary definition of the term ``accessible.''
\55\ See, e.g., Ard v. O'Malley, 110 F.4th 613, 617 (4th Cir.
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, we are making a clarifying change to the performance test
requirement. In its petition, the Alliance appears to conflate
equipment requirements and performance requirements. The final rule and
NPRM distinguished between them and explained how the equipment
requirement supplements the performance requirement.\56\ The equipment
requirement, explicitly mandated in BIL, does not have an associated
performance test and compliance with it is not evaluated based on
performance testing. On the other hand, compliance with the performance
requirements is evaluated through the performance testing laid out in
the final rule. Critically, these tests do not evaluate the activation
timing of the AEB or FCW systems (other than that FCW should not
activate after AEB). Rather, the performance criterion is contact with
the test device (for AEB) and whether FCW activated. We therefore left
to manufacturers the discretion to determine when to apply the brakes
and provide the FCW, so long as their determination is not clearly
erroneous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ 88 FR at 36832, at 38655; see also 72 FR 17235, 17299 (Apr.
6, 2007) (discussing the understeer requirement in FMVSS No. 126).
The NPRM also explained how we might approach information gathering
and enforcement of this requirement. The final rule also discussed
NHTSA's authorities regarding equipment requirements in response to
comment regarding activation speed. 89 FR 39686, 39712-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To resolve any confusion, we are amending the performance test
requirement for lead vehicle AEB in S5.1.3 to remove the phrase ``when
a collision with a lead vehicle is imminent.'' The purpose of this
change is to clarify the distinction between the performance
requirements and equipment requirements in FMVSS No. 127 and does not
substantively alter the requirements as described in the preamble. In
fact, because NHTSA's testing will not evaluate AEB and FCW timing, and
the test scenarios themselves create crash-imminent scenarios, this
language was superfluous in the performance test requirement. This
change also aligns the text of S5.1.3 with the performance test
criteria for PAEB (S5.2.3), which does not contain that phrase.
Although the preamble of the final rule explained this approach, the
change discussed here makes it clear in the regulatory text. Finally,
following the change, the term ``imminent'' only remains in the
equipment requirement. Therefore, no performance test procedure is
needed to evaluate compliance.
Therefore, we are amending FMVSS No. 127 to resolve confusion in
the requirements. However, we are denying the petitions for
reconsideration regarding issuing an SNPRM to establish a test
procedure for equipment requirements or providing a definition for
``operate'' and ``imminent.''
D. Unlimited Preconditioning and Test Runs
The final rule does not explicitly place a limit on the amount of
pretest driving a vehicle may undergo and it does not place a maximum
limit on the number of test runs a vehicle may be put through.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Specifically, test procedures state that prior to the test
the subject vehicle is driven at any speed, in any direction, on any
road surface, for any amount of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Alliance requested reconsideration, arguing that unlimited
pretest driving of a subject vehicle is inconsistent with repeatable,
objective test procedures. It also argued that the agency could accrue
thousands of miles on the test vehicle, degrading the tires and other
wear components, before running the compliance test. Petitioners
expressed concern that manufacturers would have no way to predict what
the agency's pretest driving scenarios will do to the subject vehicle,
making it impossible to certify compliance. Similarly, it stated that,
under the test procedures as written, a vehicle can be tested unlimited
times until one failed test trial occurs, in which case the vehicle
would be non-compliant.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is not granting reconsideration on this issue for two
reasons. First, the purpose of FMVSS No. 127 testing is not to be an
endurance or durability test, but a test of as-new hardware. This
purpose is apparent in the structure of the rule compared with several
other FMVSSs. When there are endurance and/or wear requirements in the
FMVSSs, these requirements are apparent (i.e., they are titled
``durability'' or ``endurance'' tests) or are specifically written to
indicate minimum required durability limits.\58\ For example, FMVSS No.
106 contains a water absorption and whip resistance requirement, which
identifies both the length of time the hose sample will be submerged
under water, and how long the hose sample will be flexed.\59\ There are
numerous other examples in FMVSS No. 106 and other FMVSSs of this style
of endurance testing that establishes a minimum durability performance.
FMVSS No. 127 contains no such provisions. It was not written to, and
is not intended to, set endurance or wear limits on the base equipment
making up the AEB system. Instead, FMVSS No. 127 is intended to ensure
a minimum level of performance of AEB systems. The only expected wear
on the components is what is necessary for establishing a repeatable
test, which is specified in the test procedures (i.e., brake
burnishing). In the event that wear and tear result in an apparent non-
compliance during agency testing, the agency would not consider these
tests valid. The Agency has demonstrated, through decades of testing,
the competency to determine if wear is the source of an apparent non-
compliance, be it by conducting additional testing, disassembly and
visual inspection, and other similar methods. Finally, any specific
limits on preconditioning driving time or test runs would be
[[Page 93211]]
arbitrary. Therefore, given that that FMVSS No. 127 does not establish
an endurance or durability test, NHTSA determined it is not necessary
to specify such limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ See, e.g., FMVSS No. 108, S14.9.3.6, Turn signal flasher
durability test; FMVSS No. 111, S5.5.7, Durability and S14.3,
Durability test procedures; FMVSS No. 139, S6.3 Tire Endurance; and
FMVSS No. 209, S4.2(d) and S5.1(d), which establish a test for the
resistance of seat belt webbing to abrasion.
\59\ S5.3.7, Water absorption and whip resistance (``A hydraulic
brake hose assembly, after immersion in water for 70 hours (S6.5),
shall not rupture when run continuously on a flexing machine for 35
hours (S6.3).'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, manufacturers misunderstand the purpose of the pretest
conditioning language. The initial conditions contained in S6, S7, S8,
and S9, are written to prevent designing the AEB system to sense
specific pre-conditions of the test. They are not intended to enable
the agency to conduct durability testing. For instance, petitioners
expressed concern that the standard states that the agency will drive
the vehicle in any direction for any amount of time prior to the start
of the test. However, additional conditions listed in S6 state that
consumable fluids (including fuel), or battery charge for electric
vehicles, will be between 5 and 100 percent. Additionally, the
initialization conditions state that the vehicle will be driven at a
speed of 10 km/h or higher for at least one minute prior to testing and
subsequently the starting system is not cycled off prior to testing.
Because the starting system is cycled off during fuelling, these
conditions provide a practical and realistic limit on the amount of
time the agency can drive the vehicle during preconditioning prior to
any single test. Therefore, petitioners' concerns regarding ``unlimited
pretest driving'' are misplaced.
As such, reconsideration is unnecessary to resolve petitioners'
concerns. Therefore, NHTSA declines to amend the final rule on this
issue.
E. Malfunction Indicator Lamp
The final rule requires that vehicles must detect AEB system
malfunctions and notify the driver of any malfunction that causes the
AEB system not to meet the minimum proposed performance requirements.
The Alliance and Volkswagen stated that the requirement that the
malfunction indicator lamp (MIL) illuminate under all malfunction
conditions, including sensor degradation, and under all possible
conditions of ``adjustments in performance'' lacks objectivity and
practicability. The Alliance petitioned NHTSA to issue an SNPRM that
would define each malfunction requiring MIL illumination and include an
associated test procedure. It did not provide any additional data or
analysis beyond what has already been considered in comments to the
NPRM.
The Alliance noted that while the requirement for activating a MIL
in the event of a malfunction in an AEB system is consistent with other
FMVSSs, the final rule neither explicitly defines malfunction nor
provides the associated test procedures. Several petitioners requested
an objective definition of ``malfunction.'' The Alliance pointed out
that FMVSS No. 135 specifies conditions for MIL activation, and FMVSS
No. 138 provides malfunction conditions and test procedure for the tire
pressure monitoring system. In contrast, it stated, ``malfunction'' in
FMVSS No. 127 is not defined and could include sensor degradation,
which exceeds typical MIL illumination requirements in the FMVSSs. It
stated that without a clear definition, manufacturers may determine a
malfunction at their discretion and adjust AEB performance to any
performance level, including complete deactivation, that does not meet
the requirements of the final rule. The Alliance stated that if its
interpretation is correct, the standard should clearly specify the
allowance to adjust AEB systems, including complete deactivation,
during a defined malfunction state.
Additionally, the Alliance stated that NHTSA did not establish an
objective test procedure for automatically detecting system changes
that may affect AEB performance. The Alliance stated that the
requirement to detect vehicle owner's modifications that could render
the AEB system non-compliant is boundless and lacks specific, objective
performance criteria and test procedures, unlike other FMVSSs. For
example, FMVSS No. 138 provides specific test procedures where the MIL
must illuminate when an incompatible tire is installed. In contrast,
the final rule does not limit or specify the types of owner
modifications that may trigger MIL illumination, making it unreasonable
to expect manufacturers to anticipate and develop detection strategies
for every possible modification scenario. It stated that, as a result,
the MIL requirement is not objective.
Toyota petitioned for reconsideration of MIL requirements and
incorporated the Alliance's petition into its own. Additionally, Toyota
provided a description of its understanding of the malfunction
requirements. It read the requirements to allow discretion to the
manufacturer to design a malfunction detection feature--including what
elements to monitor and what is considered a malfunction. It also
stated that if a malfunction is identified, the standard permits the
manufacturer, at its discretion, to adjust the performance of the
vehicle such that it will not meet the requirements specified in
paragraphs S5.1, S5.2, or S5.3, including completely deactivating the
AEB system, and illuminate the telltale. It said it understood the
agency's intent to be that manufacturers must design vehicles with a
malfunction detection feature, and that the vehicle must display a
telltale when a malfunction is detected and allow the vehicle to adjust
the performance of the AEB system or deactivate it in response to
malfunctions.
Toyota agreed with NHTSA that malfunctions should be detected based
on the system design. Toyota argued that if the AEB system cannot be
deactivated in cases of performance degradation, such as from sensor
misalignment, it could result in false-positive activations potentially
creating safety disbenefits. However, it nonetheless argued that the
malfunction detection requirements are unclear and requested
reconsideration. It noted that NHTSA had rejected suggested language
from Bosch regarding malfunction detection on the basis that it was not
workable for an FMVSS and lacked objectivity.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA will not adjust the malfunction detection requirements. NHTSA
considered comments on malfunction detection in the final rule.
Petitioners broadly expressed confusion about the term ``malfunction''
and about what conditions the indicator lamp must illuminate. However,
Toyota, in its petition, correctly summarized the requirements,
indicating that it understood the requirement as written. Nonetheless,
we respond to certain issues raised in the petitions to clarify our
intent.
Toyota is correct that, when a malfunction is detected, the system
is permitted to reduce functionality and it must show the telltale. The
intent behind the requirement is for systems to self-diagnose issues
that cause them to perform at a level below that required by the FMVSS,
adjust performance as the system determines is appropriate, and alert
the operator. In contrast to how petitioners describe the requirement,
the standard does not require AEB systems to detect all possible
conditions (or owner modifications) that could reduce functionality.
Rather it requires the system to be able to make detections regarding
malfunctions and conditions that cause performance degradations, allows
the system to adjust performance if it makes such a detection, and
requires the system to alert the operator if such an adjustment is
made.
As is customary with NHTSA's standards, the laboratory compliance
[[Page 93212]]
test procedures will specify how NHTSA intends to run its compliance
test regarding illumination of a malfunction telltale. However, NHTSA
is not specifying these in the regulation. The conditions under which
the malfunction lamp are required to illuminate are sufficiently
defined in the FMVSS, which is enough information for manufacturers to
certify to the requirement. Although NHTSA is also not specifying in
the regulatory text how an internal malfunction is generated, test
procedures for MIL requirements typically involve creating an obvious
failure condition, such as disconnecting the power source to the
system, and determining if the MIL illuminates.
NHTSA will not specify instances of ``malfunction.'' NHTSA received
and fully considered comment on this issue. The range of possible
malfunctions is sufficiently broad that such an approach would be
unlikely to meet the need for safety because it would omit many
possible malfunctions from the MIL requirement. As Toyota stated, what
constitutes a malfunction is specific to the design of each AEB system,
and manufacturers are best positioned to determine when a circumstance
exists that causes performance to be impeded.
Furthermore, petitioners are incorrect when they state that the MIL
requirement is not objective or practicable because the term
``malfunction'' is not given a regulatory definition. The MIL
requirement in FMVSS No. 127 is stated in objective terms. It ties the
requirement to illuminate the MIL upon performance adjustment to the
performance requirements for AEB systems. These performance
requirements are stated in objective terms. The MIL requirement is
therefore also stated in objective terms.
Finally, the Alliance attempts to reference the MIL requirement in
FMVSS No. 138 as a contrasting example of a MIL requirement that is
objective. However, FMVSS No. 138, like FMVSS No. 127, does not provide
an explicit definition of ``malfunction,'' instead applying the
performance requirement ``to a malfunction that affects the generation
or transmission of control or response signals.'' \60\ The approach
undertaken in FMVSS No. 127 is analogous: it specifies the AEB system
performance requirements, stated in objective terms, as the relevant
comparison. Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is
denying the petitions for reconsideration on this issue and is not
changing the MIL requirements from those stated in FMVSS No. 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ 49 CFR 571.138.
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F. Deactivation
The final rule includes an explicit prohibition against
manufacturers installing a control designed for the sole purpose of
deactivation of the AEB system, except in certain cases relating to law
enforcement. The final rule does, however, allow for controls that have
the ancillary effect of deactivating the AEB system, such as during
low-range four-wheel drive configurations, when the driver selects
``tow mode,'' or when another vehicle system is activated that will
have a negative ancillary impact on AEB operation. It also allows for
automatic deactivation in the malfunction circumstances described in
the previous section.
1. Manual Deactivation
The Alliance and Volkswagen petitioned NHTSA to allow manual
deactivation of the AEB system. Petitioners pointed out scenarios in
which they state that AEB operation can be inappropriate or potentially
hazardous. These include racetrack usage, off-road driving that
requires manoeuvring around obstacles, off-road driving without low
range or gear options, road infrastructure causing false positives,
support vehicles for cycling races, and similar situations or dynamic
driving events involving interactions with other vehicles. The Alliance
also raised several scenarios where vehicles are used on public roads
but under non-normal conditions, such as during parades, car shows, or
sport events where vehicles are operated in close proximity to
pedestrians and other vehicles. Petitioners stated that the automatic
deactivation provision is inadequate to address these scenarios. The
Alliance noted that, since AEB systems might not automatically
differentiate between tracks or parking lots and public roads, they
could potentially intervene during dynamic driving manoeuvres,
disrupting the driver and posing a risk to nearby vehicles. Moreover,
the Alliance noted concerns about the ``automatic deactivation only''
approach for installed equipment, using snowplows as an example,
stating that the final rule does not cover all potentially unsafe
scenarios. For instance, installing equipment like a roof-mounted
kayak, canoe, or ski rack with parts overhanging the front windshield
could cause sensors to detect shapes that might not lead to a
malfunction but could inadvertently trigger AEB operation. Thus, it
requested that drivers have the ability to disable AEB systems to
resolve these circumstances.
The Alliance also requested expansion of the language in S5.4.3 of
the final rule, which applies only to vehicles operating in a low-range
four-wheel drive configuration, to include certain modern vehicle
configurations, like those with all-wheel drive system without a
transfer case or electrical vehicles using only electric motors or a
combination of combustion-driven axles and electric motors, which may
not have a low-range system but are still capable of off-road
operations. Thus, the Alliance argued, NHTSA should broaden the
applicability of S5.4.3 to include vehicles operating in any off-road
mode or mode designated to the driver as appropriate for low-speed off-
road operations.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA will not adjust the requirements regarding deactivation.
NHTSA received and considered comments on automatic and manual
deactivation of AEB systems. After consideration of those comments,
NHTSA determined that allowing automatic deactivation pursuant to the
circumstances in S5.4.2.2 would be practicable and most effectively
meet the need for safety because it allows for controls that have the
ancillary effect of deactivating the AEB while preventing installation
of a control with the sole purpose of enabling driver disablement of
AEB systems. NHTSA believes that the current regulatory text, which
allows AEB deactivation ``when another vehicle system is activated that
will have a negative ancillary impact on AEB operation,'' is
sufficiently broad to encompass the vehicle types that the Alliance
raises. Furthermore, the purpose of S5.4.3 is to exempt vehicles that
have four-wheel drive modes, selected by mechanical controls that
cannot be automatically reset electrically, from the requirement that
any AEB deactivation be reset by the ignition cycle. For other vehicles
(such as those with all-wheel drive), the agency expects that AEB will
reactivate when the vehicle is in a drive mode that allows for AEB
activation, and when the vehicle's ignition/power is cycled on/off.
Petitioners' stated concerns about operation of vehicles with no
manual AEB deactivation in unusual circumstances do not justify
reconsideration. As we discussed in the final rule regarding front-
mounted equipment, a well-designed AEB system will be able to detect
and automatically deactivate to accommodate roof-mounted equipment such
as kayaks or
[[Page 93213]]
ski racks that may overhang the front windshield. We are also
unpersuaded by requests that the final rule allow manual deactivation
to account for various racing or track scenarios. The allowance in
S5.4.2.2 provides relief for some of these vehicles. Additionally, our
requirements apply to motor vehicles, which the Safety Act defines as a
vehicle ``manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and
highways.'' \61\ Therefore, if a manufacturer chooses to produce a
racing vehicle designed for use on public roads it must meet the
minimum safety requirements. The fact that it may be used in a racing
environment does not in and of itself justify a manual deactivation
feature. Manufacturers may design racing vehicles not for use on public
roads that do not meet the FMVSS.
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\61\ 49 U.S.C. 30102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. UNECE Regulation No. 152
Volkswagen and the Alliance requested reconsideration of the
agency's decision to disallow a manual deactivation feature based on
data submitted by Volkswagen. Petitioners stated that data collected in
Europe showed that, among a fleet of over 30,000 UNECE Regulation No.
152 compliant vehicles which collectively took more than 12 million
trips, only 0.2 percent of the vehicles deactivated their AEB systems
more than 10 times. According to petitioners, this data indicates that
less than 0.005 percent of all trips involved AEB deactivation and that
while drivers did use the manual deactivation feature, they did so very
rarely. Thus, they argued that allowing the manual deactivation
feature, with appropriate multi-step procedures to prevent inadvertent
deactivation, would not significantly diminish the overall benefits of
AEB systems.
Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded that the data provided by Volkswagen
demonstrates that NHTSA should adopt the approach taken by UNECE
Regulation No. 152. Generally, the driving environment (road and lane
design, etc.) and driver habits in the United States differ
substantially from those in Europe, and there is also significant
variation within European nations. These differences may result in
differences in how drivers interact with AEB technology. The
petitioners did not present evidence that data from the European market
accurately represents driver behaviour in the U.S. market. In view of
the safety concerns expressed in the final rule and by commenters,
harmonization alone is an insufficient justification for allowing a
control to deactivate the AEB system. As a result, we will not adopt
the UNECE Regulation No. 152 approach.
Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petitions for reconsideration regarding amending the automatic
deactivation provision or the restriction on installing a manual
deactivation control.
G. Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test Correction
The final rule contains a test scenario in which an obstructed
pedestrian enters the path of the vehicle from the right.
In its petition for reconsideration, the Alliance argued this
performance test requirement demonstrates that the final rule is
impracticable. The Alliance asked NHTSA to reduce the maximum test
speed and align the headways more closely with the results of NHTSA's
testing.
The Alliance provided a case study of a narrow vehicle avoiding
contact with the test mannequin using the boundary conditions specified
in the rule and realistic vehicle stopping dynamics (a peak braking
acceleration of 0.9 g and an initial braking rate of 3 g/s). The
Alliance stated in its analysis that, when using nominal tolerances on
the location of the vehicle test device relative to the subject vehicle
positioning, the vehicle with a width of 1570 mm (61.8 in) had
approximately 0.35 seconds to identify the crossing pedestrian and
begin braking. However, in its analysis, when that same subject vehicle
was at the maximum distance away from the intended travel path, and the
vehicle test device was located as close to the side of the subject
vehicle, only 0.15 seconds were available to react to the crossing
mannequin. The Alliance stated that a response time of 0.15 seconds is
beyond the capabilities of any AEB system and is not practicable.
Agency Analysis
Agency calculations confirmed the issue raised by the Alliance
regarding the perception time in obstructed pedestrian testing at the
maximum allowable test tolerances. However, the agency does not agree
that this finding is an indication of the standard's fundamental
impracticability. Therefore, NHTSA is amending the requirement to align
with the intent of the scenario to ensure that the specified tolerances
do not result in an unintentionally stringent test.
The final rule specified that subject vehicles would nominally be a
meter away from the side of the vehicle test device when performing
obstructed pedestrian testing. As the Alliance highlighted, the
tolerance of the subject vehicle relative to the intended travel path
(+/- 0.15 m), and the tolerance of the vehicle test device relative to
the side of the subject vehicle (+/- 0.1 m) could add up such that the
minimum distance could be 0.75 m instead of the intended 1 m. The
reduction of the intended distance between the vehicle and the
pedestrian mannequin by 25 percent has a significant impact on how much
time the system has to determine whether to initiate braking.
Additionally, as the Alliance highlighted, because we were primarily
determining the vehicle test device location relative to the side of
the subject vehicle, the narrower the vehicle, the less time that
vehicle has to perceive the obstructed pedestrian and decide to begin
braking. For narrower vehicles, this scenario renders the test more
stringent than NHTSA intended.
To address the issue, the agency is adjusting how the tolerances
are defined in S8.3.3, so that at most, the vehicle test device is not
less than 1.0 m away from the 0 percent overlap point (the right side
of the vehicle). For vehicles up to 2.05 m (79.5 in) wide, which is a
majority of passenger cars, the left side of the vehicle test device
will be no less than 2.2 m away from the intended travel path. This
standard places the left side of the vehicle test device at least 1.15
m away from the right side of the subject vehicle, which accounts for
the +/- 0.15 m lateral tolerance of the subject vehicle relative to the
intended travel path prior to braking. To make sure testing is
consistent, and to make sure that testing stringency does not increase
for vehicles wider than 2.05 m (79.5 in), the left side of the vehicle
test device will be no less than 1.15 m away from the subject vehicle.
Therefore, NHTSA is amending the specifications for the obstructed
pedestrian crossing test.
H. FCW Auditory Signal
1. FCW Auditory Signal Requirements
The final rule requires the FCW auditory signal to have a high
fundamental frequency of at least 800 Hz, a tempo in the range of 6-12
pulses per second, and a duty cycle in the range of 0.25-0.95, and a
minimum intensity of 15-30 dB above the masked threshold.
The Alliance stated that the requirements related to the auditory
signal lack specificity and were therefore not objective. The Alliance
stated that the threshold sound level largely depends on the ambient
noise at
[[Page 93214]]
a given moment in time and conditions such as vehicle speed and engine,
tire/road, and wind noise. It concluded that for the requirement to be
objective, NHTSA must clearly define several key characteristics,
including the test conditions under which both the ambient noise and
the masked threshold are measured as well as the methodology to measure
and compute the sound level of the FCW warning and the noise separation
amount (i.e., 5 dB). The Alliance also stated that there may need to be
exceptions for high ambient noise conditions, such as convertibles with
an open top.
Volkswagen similarly commented that additional information relating
to compliance testing is needed such as details of the means and
conditions for measuring the reference noise level to which the
regulation will compare the FCW auditory signal and inquired whether
the vehicle's windows would be open and/or HVAC system would be active
during the testing. The Alliance, as part of its comments regarding the
audio suppression requirement (the remainder of which are discussed in
the next subsection), also requested additional conditions regarding
the ``masked threshold'' and how it will be assessed. Volkswagen also
questioned the meaning of ``quietest level'' in the masked threshold
definition and how to measure it. It further asked whether masked
threshold would be determined based on a person with normal hearing or
impaired hearing.
Agency Analysis
In response to petitions, NHTSA is incorporating additional
description of the conditions in which the FCW auditory requirements
must be met, detailing the location of the sound measurement device,
and replacing ``masked threshold'' with ``average noise level inside
the vehicle.'' We are incorporating them to ensure clarity and to
facilitate compliance.
We are adding several specifications to the FCW auditory
requirement. First, that the auditory signal requirements must be met
at the highest SV test speed (which is 100 km/h). Second, we are
specifying that the audio requirements are met with all vehicle
openings closed. This language is intended to clarify for certifying
entities that during the test, openings such as the windows, doors,
hood, rear hatch, and trunk will be closed, as will convertible tops.
Third, the provision now states that all subject vehicle sound-
producing systems or functions are set to off, other than those
necessary for performing testing under the rule. This language is
intended to describe systems such as the HVAC, windshield wipers, and
turn signals, which produce noise that may impact measurement of sound
inside the vehicle, but which are not necessary for testing. These
additions provide significant clarity regarding the conditions under
which the signal will be measured. The FMVSS already states that FCW
must operate under the conditions in S6, which includes items that may
impact the in-vehicle sound environment, such as the environmental
conditions, road conditions, subject vehicle conditions, and equipment.
Therefore, those conditions will not be further specified.
NHTSA is also incorporating the intended sound measurement
location, adjacent to a 50th percentile male driver's right ear tragion
point. This point is identified in the anthropometric data from a
NHTSA-sponsored study of the dimensions of 50th percentile male drivers
seated with a 25-degree seatback angle (``Anthropometry of Motor
Vehicle Occupants'').\62\ The tragion is an anthropometric point
situated in the notch just above the tragus of the ear and is located
614 mm vertically above the H point (hip location of a driver in the
driver seating position), 185 mm aft of the H point, and 83 mm to the
right of the H point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ This report is the same as the one used as a basis for eye
midpoint location set in FMVSS No. 111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are also simplifying the baseline sound level against which the
FCW auditory signal intensity is compared by replacing the term
``masked threshold'' with ``average noise level inside the vehicle.''
We are also incorporating a description of how that level will be
determined: by measuring the noise level inside the vehicle over a 5-
second period under the conditions described above. This change
resolves items raised by petitioners regarding defining additional
aspects of the ``masked threshold'' as well as Volkswagen's petition
regarding the hearing ability of the reference driver by simplifying
the measurement to focus solely on the noise level inside the vehicle.
Therefore, NHTSA is incorporating these three changes to clarify
the requirements applicable to the FCW auditory warning.
2. In-Vehicle Audio Suppression Requirement
The final rule required that in-vehicle audio that is not related
to a safety purpose or safety system (i.e., entertainment and other
audio content not related to or essential for safe performance of the
driving task) must be muted, or reduced in volume to within 5 dB of the
masked threshold during presentation of the FCW auditory signal.
The Alliance requested reconsideration of the requirement. The
Alliance and Volkswagen stated that the requirement lacked objectivity
and a corresponding test procedure. The Alliance requested that NHTSA
eliminate the requirement or issue an SNPRM proposing to define the
audio sources that must be suppressed and ``safety purpose or safety
system'' sounds that are not required to be suppressed. It also asked
NHTSA to propose performance requirements defining the threshold for
when the audio suppression must begin, with an associated test
procedure. Finally, the Alliance argued that NHTSA did not adequately
consider consumer satisfaction concerns with the suppression
requirement and that consumers may be unaccustomed to it, believing
their audio is not working or seeking to disable the audio suppression
feature.
a. Types of Sounds that Must be Suppressed
The Alliance stated that the phrase ``not related to a safety
purpose or a safety system'' contains undefined terms that are not
explained except with a parenthetical reference to entertainment. The
Alliance, in its petition, noted that audio suppression systems cannot
distinguish between certain content that may or may not have a safety
purpose: for example, a radio broadcast of a talk show host versus a
radio broadcast of an emergency weather alert. It noted that the
language may result in suppression of broadcasts of FEMA's Integrated
Public Alert and Warning System, which the Alliance noted was
established by Executive Order 13407 to ensure that the public has
access to critical alerts about weather and other emergencies.
Petitioners also requested that NHTSA provide definitions indicating
which audio sources must be suppressed and which do not. The Alliance
mentioned examples for which it was not sure whether the suppression
requirement would apply, such as the HVAC, defroster, seat belt
reminder alarms, intelligent speeding assist indicators, and road
departure alerts.
Agency Analysis
In response to this petition, NHTSA is amending the language to
clarify that the requirement is to suppress audio not related to a
crash avoidance warning. The intent of the requirement was to ensure
that auditory signals unrelated to the vehicle's crash avoidance
response in an imminent crash avoidance
[[Page 93215]]
scenario would not interfere with the driver's perception of the FCW
and thereby hinder their opportunity to intervene and avoid a crash.
Given that petitioners' concerns appear to be regarding vagueness,
NHTSA is clarifying the requirement to reference a more specific set of
audio signals that should not be suppressed: in-vehicle audio that is
``not related to a crash avoidance system warning.'' \63\ NHTSA is also
removing the explanatory parenthetical associated with ``safety purpose
or safety system,'' as it is no longer applicable. This change also
resolves concerns with systems being able to distinguish between
regular and emergency broadcasts, because emergency broadcasts are not
related to a crash avoidance system warning and would therefore need to
be suppressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ The examples used by the petitioners, including ``seat belt
reminder alarms,'' ``intelligent speeding assist indicators,'' and
``road departure alerts,'' should be evaluated by the manufacturer
based on their propensity to assist a driver in avoiding a crash.
While NHTSA could have chosen to state that, for example, audio from
systems other than ``Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS)''
should be muted, the term ``ADAS'' has only been in use for
approximately a decade and may describe a broader array of alerts
than is appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the Alliance's question whether a vehicle's HVAC system
and window defrosting system should be considered in-vehicle audio,
they should not. In-vehicle audio is to be understood to refer to
auditory signals and content produced or transmitted by the vehicle for
the purpose of communicating information, entertainment, or other
purpose not related to or essential for safe performance of the driving
task. Although the regulation does not define ``audio,'' NHTSA's
understanding of the term is consistent with its plain meaning. For
example, Webster's dictionary defines the noun, ``audio,'' to refer to
``an audio signal.'' \64\ Cambridge Dictionary defines the noun
``audio'' to mean ``a sound recording, or recorded sound.'' \65\ These
definitions suggest ``audio'' to refer to purposeful sounds emitted to
communicate or provide some form of information (including
entertainment). Noise stemming from the operation of HVAC systems or
windshield defrosters would not be considered ``in-vehicle audio.'' On
the other hand, auditory navigation instructions are considered audio
and are subject to the suppression prevision. Therefore, the regulation
is clear as written.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/audio (accessed
7/29/2024).
\65\ https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/audio
(accessed 7/29/2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The arguments regarding consumer acceptance are not persuasive. An
FCW alert is only required in a crash-imminent scenario, and the muting
of in-vehicle audio would be accompanied by the FCW audio signal. In
such a crash-imminent scenario, it is not evident that the muting of
in-vehicle audio would be of any concern to a driver.
Additionally, in responding to this petition, NHTSA examined 15
model year 2016-2024 light vehicle models from 12 manufacturers to
determine whether in-vehicle audio muting during FCW presentation was
employed. Of 15 models examined, 11 models from 10 manufacturers were
found to mute in-vehicle audio during FCW presentation. A twelfth
vehicle (2022 Hyundai Tucson) reduced the volume of in-vehicle audio
during FCW presentation. Three models did not appear to mute or reduce
the volume of in-vehicle audio during FCW presentation (2022 Honda
Odyssey, 2023 Nissan Pathfinder, and 2022 Subaru Outback). Aside from
in-vehicle audio suppression during FCW, in-vehicle audio suppression
under other circumstances is already present vehicles today as well.
For example, some current vehicles mute in-vehicle audio while the
vehicle's transmission is in reverse gear. Audio sources in the vehicle
can also be muted by apps on a phone connected to the vehicle, such as
the Ring app (camera motion notifications will mute vehicle audio
sources) and the Waze navigation app, which mutes vehicle audio sources
while audio route instructions and other app-based verbal information
is provided. Given the ubiquity of suppression of in-vehicle audio
during FCW presentation, as well as other vehicle features and phone
apps that suppress the vehicle's entertainment system and other in-
vehicle audio, the petitioner's contention that customers will find the
required audio suppression during FCW presentation to be unfamiliar and
cause dissatisfaction is not compelling.
b. FCW Presentation and Suppression Timing
The Alliance stated that the suppression requirement is not
objective because it lacks a definition of ``presentation,'' and
information regarding when the FCW must present or when suppression of
in-vehicle audio must occur (such as whether it must occur immediately
upon FCW presentation or within a specified period of time). It noted
that NCAP, IIHS, and European procedures all contain a TTC value for
when the FCW must present. Volkswagen and the Alliance also petitioned
regarding the lack of an objective test methodology for the suppression
requirement.
Agency Analysis
Petitioners' arguments do not justify reconsideration on this
issue. NHTSA is not incorporating a specified timing at which the FCW
signal's onset must occur, a definition of ``presentation,'' or a
regulatory test procedure for evaluating the suppression requirement.
FCW is required without an associated timing requirement because there
is no regulatory safety need to require FCW at for any particular
amount of time prior to automatic braking. Therefore, the FMVSS gives
manufacturers flexibility in determining the timing of the FCW
presentation for their vehicles.
NHTSA will also not provide a definition of ``presentation''
because the plain meaning of the term and its use in context is not
vague or unclear.\66\ The term is used only once in the regulatory text
to describe the suppression requirement. Additionally, ``FCW onset'' is
defined as the first moment in time when a forward collision warning is
provided. In understanding the meaning of ``presentation,''
manufacturers may consider viewing ``FCW onset'' as the moment at which
``presentation'' begins, and that ``presentation'' encompasses the
entire time that the audible signal is active. Additionally, given the
short, approximately 1-2 second duration of most FCW auditory signals,
any delay in suppressing other audio content could hinder the driver's
ability to perceive the warning. As such, onset of the muting of in-
vehicle audio should be simultaneous with the onset of the FCW auditory
signal. There is no reason to believe, and petitioners did not suggest,
that AEB systems are incapable of sending concurrent commands to
initiate both FCW presentation and muting of in-vehicle audio or that
response times for sending commands to initiate the FCW and the
suppression would be different. Therefore, NHTSA does not expect
substantial delay in suppression.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ For example, Cambridge Dictionary defines ``presentation''
as a noun meaning ``the act of giving or showing something, or the
way in which something is given or shown.'' https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/presentation
(accessed 7/31/2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding a test procedure, the changes in this rule resolve many
of the questions petitioners had regarding vehicle state and sound
measurement such that manufacturers have clear guidance on the
suppression requirement. Therefore, no additional test procedure will
be added. However,
[[Page 93216]]
for clarity below we describe straightforward and readily apparent
steps we expect to take in evaluating the requirement.
NHTSA anticipates recording and evaluating audio data during the
performance of the test scenario including the activation of FCW, and
manufacturers may reasonably certify to the suppression requirement by
using any of the required test scenarios while audio content subject to
the muting requirement is playing (e.g., music). The first opportunity
to measure the muted or reduced audio level would be during the period
after the first FCW auditory signal pulse and before the start of the
second pulse. Sound level would be recorded beginning some time before
the onset of FCW and through the end of FCW presentation. Recorded
audio data would be analyzed to extract sound level (in dB) values
during the FCW pulse and the period between the first and second FCW
auditory signal pulse. The sound level between pulses would be analyzed
to demonstrate that the sound level had been reduced to the required
level of within 5 dB of the average noise level inside the vehicle.
For these reasons, no reconsideration is needed on this issue.
I. FCW Visual Signal
The final rule states that the FCW visual signal must be located
within an ellipse that extends 18 degrees vertically and 10 degrees
horizontally of the driver forward line of sight based on the forward-
looking eye midpoint (Mf) as described in S14.1.5. of FMVSS No. 111. It
also requires that the signal include the crash pictorial symbol in SAE
J2400 and that the visual signal be red and steady burning.
Both the Alliance and Volkswagen stated that the requirements are
insufficient to be objective or for evaluating compliance and requested
several revisions to the rule. The Alliance requested that NHTSA issue
an SNPRM to propose performance requirements and test procedures.
In response to the petitions, NHTSA has determined that
reconsideration is warranted on some of the items and is making changes
to the regulatory text to ensure clarity in the requirements. However,
comment was sought on these issues in the NPRM, and NHTSA has
determined that no additional opportunity for comment is necessary, as
explained in section IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices.\67\
Therefore, NHTSA will not issue an SNPRM, and is finalizing the changes
herein.
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\67\ Pursuant to 49 CFR 553.37, and in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
553, the Administrator has the discretion to make a final decision
or seek further comment when reconsidering a rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. FCW Visual Signal Size
In its petition, the Alliance stated that the FCW visual signal
requirements do not define the size of the FCW symbol.
NHTSA is not incorporating a size requirement for the FCW visual
signal because there is no need for such a requirement. Not specifying
a minimum or maximum FCW visual signal size provides manufacturers some
flexibility in how the symbol is implemented for their system.
2. Dimensions of the FCW Visual Signal Location Elliptical Area
Volkswagen requested clarification of the regulatory language
regarding the required location of the FCW visual signal. Volkswagen
noted that S5.1.1(b)(1) of the regulation states that ``[t]he visual
signal must be located within an ellipse that extends 18 degrees
vertically . . . of the driver forward line of sight,'' but that it is
not clear whether this language means 18 degrees or 9 degrees from the driver's line of sight.
NHTSA grants reconsideration on this issue and is amending the
regulation to provide clarity. The regulatory language was intended to
specify an elliptical cone extending 18 degrees vertically
and 10 degrees horizontally from the driver's line of
sight. Therefore, a plus-minus sign will be added.
3. Clarify Whether the FCW Visual Signal Needs To Be Fully Within the
Ellipse
Volkswagen stated that the requirements were unclear as to whether
the entire FCW visual icon or only a portion of it must be located
within the bounds of the elliptical cone.
Reconsideration is justified on this issue. NHTSA intended the
regulation to require that the required FCW symbol must be presented
fully within the defined elliptical area and is updating the regulatory
text to reflect this intent. NHTSA is incorporating the word ``symbol''
after ``visual signal'' in the S5.1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the symbol
is what must be located within the specified area. If a manufacturer
chooses to provide any additional visual warning components (e.g.,
illuminating the perimeter of the instrument panel, or surrounding the
symbol with an illuminated, color-shaded shape), the additional
components are not required to be located within the specified
elliptical area.
4. Reference to FMVSS No. 111
The Alliance and Volkswagen stated that S5.1.1(b) of the final rule
requires the visual signal to be located in an ellipse formed around
the forward-looking eye midpoint of the driver ``as described in
S14.1.5 of FMVSS No. 111'' but does not specify the driver seat
position and seat back angle or the steering wheel adjustment like
FMVSS No. 111 does.
Reconsideration is justified on this issue. Although explicitly
stating these details is not essential because to accurately locate the
driver eye midpoint ``test reference point'' as defined in FMVSS No.
111 S14.1.5 it is necessary to follow the ``Driver Seat Positioning''
specifications in S14.1.2.5, NHTSA is changing the regulatory text for
clarity to refer to S14 of FMVSS No. 111 instead of only S14.1.5. This
change incorporates the relevant information from FMVSS No. 111.
J. Cost Estimates
The Alliance argued that the agency did not adequately consider the
costs of the requirements, including consideration of the disbenefits
that might be induced by the new standard. It requested that NHTSA
revise its cost assessment to consider more realistic assessments of
the hardware additions and other changes that will be required by the
final rule, as well as identify and quantify the disbenefits in terms
of increased rear-end collisions and other crashes that will be induced
by the final rule, at least for several more years. In its petition,
the Alliance argued that the conclusions in the FRIA are not based on
the rulemaking record or on the facts in the market and led NHTSA to
substantially underestimate the costs of compliance with the new
standard. Based on a survey of its members, the Alliance stated that
the additional costs to make current systems compliant range from $200
per vehicle on the low end to $4,200 per vehicle on the high end. The
Alliance also claimed that NHTSA mischaracterized a meeting NHTSA had
with Robert Bosch LLC (Bosch) regarding the percentage of vehicles in
the fleet that may need hardware improvements.
Volkswagen stated the cost analysis as reported in the FRIA does
not represent the true cost of the final rule. For example, Volkswagen
argued, the requirements of the final rule cannot be reasonably met
with existing vacuum brake systems, and the PAEB requirements under
conditions of darkness may necessitate infrared cameras. It stated that
NHTSA did not
[[Page 93217]]
account for the costs for additional hardware in its analysis.
Agency Analysis
The Alliance and Volkswagen's claims that the final rule did not
adequately consider costs in improvements in AEB technology are
mistaken. The Alliance's cost estimates are not correct estimates of
the cost of compliance with the final rule because they include the
cost of including head-up display (HUD) and lidar, neither of which are
required to meet the requirements and account for a large portion of
that higher estimate.
Additionally, the final rule fully considered the cost concerns
raised by petitioners. NHTSA sought and received comment regarding
hardware costs. Comments did not indicate the incremental cost
associated with additional hardware commenters believed was necessary
to achieve the requirements or the percentage of new light vehicles
that they believe would require additional hardware. Nevertheless, the
cost analysis in the FRIA accounted for a small number of new light
vehicles that may need additional hardware for their existing AEB
systems, such as an additional camera or radar, by including the
incremental cost of adding radar to five percent of new light
vehicles.\68\ The Alliance disputed the 5 percent figure, noting that
the information NHTSA received from Bosch suggests larger improvements
are needed, and NHTSA received a letter from Bosch clarifying the
figure.\69\ NHTSA appreciates Bosch's clarification. However, even if
NHTSA accepts for the sake of argument that the incremental cost
estimate undercounts that percentage of new light vehicles that need
additional improvements in computing power or sensing technologies,
NHTSA's analysis fully considered these costs because the FRIA also
included a sensitivity analysis.\70\ The sensitivity analysis found
that even in the case that 50 percent of new light vehicles would need
to add radar to their current hardware and all new light vehicles
needed a software upgrade, the final rule would remain highly net
beneficial. The FRIA also includes a breakeven analysis that estimates
the per-vehicle cost at which net benefits would be zero. Therefore,
NHTSA's cost and benefits estimates for AEB system hardware and
software were sufficient to support the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ One possible result of this assumption is that the cost
analysis may in fact overestimate those incremental hardware costs
because some vehicle manufacturers may add an additional camera at a
lower cost than radar.
\69\ Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021-1077. The letter states that the
5 percent figure ``is a significant misunderstanding and/or
mischaracterization of the information provided by Bosch'' and that
Bosch was describing only a rough estimate of the share of Bosch-
supplied AEB systems in the U.S. market that are mono-camera. Bosch
also emphasized, both in the presentation given to NHTSA and in its
comments on the NPRM, that certain models may require significant
hardware updates such as improved sensors as well as computing power
and/or improved brake systems.
\70\ The sensitivity analysis in the FRIA for hardware
considered the case in which 10, 20, or 50 percent of new light
vehicles would need either an additional camera or radar to meet the
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA's analysis also considered comments and the available data
regarding whether the final rule would necessitate improvements in
vehicles' foundational braking system and found that it would not. The
agency found that vehicles subject to the final rule would already be
equipped with brakes that give them the braking capabilities to meet
the performance requirements specified in the final rule.\71\ The FRIA
discussed a summary of the braking test results from FMVSS No. 135
testing.\72\ In all cases, vehicles covered by the final rule exceed
the minimum requirements of the braking standards. The results further
indicate that baseline vehicles already have the braking capabilities
necessary to meet the minimum requirements for AEB. Additionally, NHTSA
believes that the most cost-effective way (lowest cost option) for
manufacturers to meet the requirements of FMVSS No. 127 is through
tunning and calibration of the AEB systems rather than through
increased braking capacity or additional brake hardware such as
electro-hydraulic brake actuators. As NHTSA's analysis focuses on the
lowest cost option that is estimated to be capable of meeting the final
rule and the lowest cost option does not necessitate increased braking
capacity, the costs incurred by increasing the foundational braking
system were not considered. That being said, the agency provides
flexibility in how manufacturers construct their AEB systems to meet
the requirements and they may well choose to include brakes with
increased capabilities. At any rate, the breakeven and sensitivity
analyses demonstrate that even with significant per-vehicle hardware
costs beyond those estimated in the FRIA, the final rule would remain
cost-beneficial.
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\71\ FRIA at 40.
\72\ FRIA, Table 267. The Alliance's stated concerns with the
relevance of this test data are discussed in Section II.A.1.b
``FMVSS No. 135 Test Data'' of this notice.
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Lastly, petitioners simultaneously claim that the final rule is
impracticable but also that the requirements can only be met if certain
hardware improvements are made. Given that the final rule would be
economically practicable even with sizable increases in compliance
costs, these statements are contradictory. Indeed, petitioners' claims
regarding cost support the notion that the final rule is practicable by
acknowledging the availability of technologies that can enable vehicles
to meet the requirements.
Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petitions for reconsideration regarding NHTSA's cost estimates.
K. Brake Pedal Robot
The final rule specified how the brake pedal force is applied
during testing conducted with manual brake application. It left to the
manufacturer the discretion to select the braking method that NHTSA
will use when NHTSA tests the manufacturer's vehicles.
Volkswagen requested reconsideration of the decision not to provide
specifications for the brake pedal robot used in the manual braking
tests. It stated that differences in test equipment between the
agency's test contractors and the vehicle manufacturer could lead to
inconsistencies in performance.
NHTSA received comments on this issue (including from Volkswagen)
and responded to them in the final rule. NHTSA clarified that the rule
does not require use of a specified braking robot. The final rule
specifies the brake pedal force application during testing, leaving it
to the manufacturer's discretion to select the braking method for
NHTSA's testing of its vehicles. The specification is sufficient to
ensure test repeatability, especially given manufacturers' lengthy
experience with braking robots in AEB testing. Since the petitioner did
not present any new information that would warrant reconsidering the
agency's prior conclusion, no reconsideration is necessary, and we are
denying the petition for reconsideration regarding the brake pedal
robot specifications.
L. Manual Transmission
Glickenhaus petitioned NHTSA to reconsider and amend the standard
to only require FCW (i.e., not AEB) for vehicles with manual
transmission. Glickenhaus stated that substantial slowing or stopping
from highway speeds in a vehicle with a manual transmission will stall
the vehicle without manually shifting or engaging the clutch. It stated
that sudden unnecessary braking caused by the final rule will cause a
vehicle with a manual
[[Page 93218]]
transmission to stall, thereby reducing the functionality of the
brakes. A stalled vehicle, Glickenhaus stated, can create an
unreasonable risk if the vehicle is on the highway and cannot move out
of the way. Further, Glickenhaus stated that NHTSA's existing standards
have a precedent of differentiating requirements and testing procedures
for manual transmissions from those for automatic transmissions where
the technology requires. Glickenhaus provided examples of those
standards and what it stated are the relevant sections. Additionally,
Glickenhaus stated that one FMVSS testing facility it works with
confirmed that whenever it runs AEB tests on any vehicle with an
automatic transmission,\73\ the vehicle always stalls. Glickenhaus also
stated that its manual gearbox supplier confirmed that will always be
the case, and that this stalling could damage the drivetrain.
Glickenhaus further stated that NHTSA recognizes that vehicle stalling,
especially when unexpected at highway speeds, is a ``substantial''
hazard. Glickenhaus also stated that drivers using manual transmissions
are more likely to be paying closer attention to the road than drivers
of vehicles with cruise control, or any level of ``self driving''
vehicle functionality. Glickenhaus's petition stated that requiring
only FCW for manual transmissions could increase safety by warning
drivers while allowing them to place the vehicle into neutral or press
the clutch to avoid stalling while braking.
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\73\ In its petition, Petitioner may have intended to state
``manual'' instead of ``automatic'' here. Regardless, our response
to the petitioned-for request is the same.
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Agency Analysis
NHTSA is unpersuaded that the technical limitations of AEB with
manual transmission vehicles justifies excluding them from the AEB
requirement. Our review of the fleet shows that AEB technology already
exists for manual transmissions. Therefore, no reconsideration is
needed.
There are many light vehicles sold in the US which still offer
manual transmission as an option or standard.\74\ Several vehicles
equipped with manual transmissions, such as the 2024 Honda Civic Type
R,\75\ 2024 Ford Bronco \76\ and 2024 Nissan Z,\77\ also come with AEB
and PAEB as a standard feature. Due to the wide availability of
technology from various suppliers with AEB and manual transmissions,
NHTSA is not persuaded that only manual application of the clutch can
prevent a stall.
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\74\ https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g20734564/manual-transmission-cars/ (accessed August 26, 2024); https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g15379070/manual-transmission-suv/
(accessed August 26, 2024).
\75\ https://automobiles.honda.com/civic-type-r# (accessed
August 26, 2024).
\76\ https://www.ford.com/suvs/bronco/compare-models/?gnav=footer-shop (accessed August 26, 2024).
\77\ https://www.nissanusa.com/vehicles/sports-cars/nissan-z/specs-trims.html, accessed August 26, 2024.
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NHTSA is also unpersuaded that drivers of manual transmission
vehicles are more engaged such that excluding them from the AEB
requirement would be justified. As noted in the final rule, the timing
of AEB and PAEB events do not always allow sufficient time for the
driver to react and apply the brakes when a FCW is presented,
regardless of the level of driver engagement.
Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is denying the
petition for reconsideration regarding requiring only FCW for vehicles
with a manual transmission.
M. Small-Volume Manufacturers
The final rule did not alter requirements for small-volume
manufacturers but allowed an additional year for compliance for small-
volume manufacturers.
Glickenhaus, which produces around 30 vehicles annually subject to
the final rule, petitioned for reconsideration of the requirements for
small-volume manufacturers, stating that the standard would cause
substantial financial hardship. Glickenhaus stated it had contacted
Tier 1 suppliers about AEB systems and was informed that the hardware
for these systems is typically developed by larger manufacturers, and
there is not a baseline set of hardware and software available for
Glickenhaus to develop an AEB system for its very low volume vehicles.
It noted that developing AEB hardware takes years, and the software
calibration requires millions of miles of driving. Glickenhaus claims
it cannot produce enough cars and drive them long enough to gather the
necessary data to create compliant hardware and software for its very
low volume vehicles. Therefore, according to Glickenhaus, unless Tier 1
suppliers develop starting packages for small-volume manufacturers, it
would be impossible to develop a rule compliant AEB system within the
lead time provided.
Glickenhaus further emphasized the challenges of software
development, vehicle testing, and calibration miles, which it considers
nearly impossible to achieve within the given timeframe, even with an
additional year. It argued out that some manufacturers have spent over
20 years developing and testing AEB systems, and that the costs of
developing software and hardware for a driving automation system,
including AEB functions, can exceed $ 10 billion annually--figures that
the petitioner cannot manage.
Agency Analysis
The agency initially proposed that the requirements would not apply
to small-volume manufacturers until one year after the compliance date
set for other manufacturers. NHTSA received more than 1,000 comments on
the NPRM, including input from sensor developers that indicated that
the technologies required to meet the standard are already
available.\78\ In the final rule, the agency provided additional lead
time for all manufacturers and continued to provide small-volume
manufacturers an additional year beyond other manufacturers. Given the
comments we received and the availability of these systems, we expect
that small-volume manufacturers will be able to source rule-compliant
AEB systems for their vehicles from existing technologies without
incurring undue expenses in research and development.\79\
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\78\ 89 FR 39686, 39727.
\79\ Id. at 39726-27, 39729, 39737.
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However, we acknowledge that there could be specific situations in
which it may be particularly challenging for small-volume manufacturers
to source systems. Without additional technical information regarding
why Tier 1 suppliers could not provide AEB systems to the petitioner,
we cannot provide further analysis regarding their circumstances.
However, if the petitioner believes that the standard will cause
substantial financial hardship and it has attempted to comply with the
standard in good faith, it may be able to seek a temporary exemption
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30113 and 49 CFR part 555, subject to a
determination that an exemption is consistent with the public interest.
Therefore, no reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is denying
Glickenhaus's petition for reconsideration of the requirements for
small-volume manufacturers.
III. Petition for Rulemaking Received by NHTSA and Analysis
A. Include V2X
In addition to the petitions for reconsideration discussed above,
NHTSA also received a petition from Autotalks on June 26, 2024.
Pursuant to 49 CFR 553.35, petitions for reconsideration must be
received ``not later than 45 days after publication of
[[Page 93219]]
the rule in the Federal Register.'' Additionally, the regulation states
that ``[p]etitions filed after that time will be considered as
petitions filed under Part 552 of this chapter.'' \80\ Part 552 governs
petitions for rulemaking. Although Autotalks's petition requested
revision of the final rule, given that Autotalks's petition was
received by NHTSA more than 45 days after publication of the final
rule, NHTSA will treat that petition as a petition for rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ 49 CFR 553.35(a).
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Pursuant to Part 552, when deciding on a petition for rulemaking
the agency conducts a technical review of the petition, which may
consist of an analysis of the material submitted, together with
information already in possession of the agency. In deciding whether to
grant or deny a petition, the agency considers this technical review as
well as appropriate factors, which include, among others, allocation of
agency resources and agency priorities.
In its petition, Autotalks requests incorporating a V2X transmitter
to the lead vehicle and activating it during the lead deceleration test
with a 12-meter gap (Table 1 to S7.1). Autotalks argues that this
requirement will allow the tested vehicle to use V2X to complement its
sensors. Autotalks provides technical information regarding the
capabilities and availability of V2X technology.
1. NHTSA's Consideration of the Petition and Decision
NHTSA has conducted an analysis of Autotalks's petition and, after
careful consideration, has decided to deny the petition and will not
initiate rulemaking proposing to require the installation and use of a
V2X transmitter in lead vehicle deceleration AEB testing with 12-meter
headway, for the reason stated below.
In November 2023, NHTSA withdrew a proposed rule which had proposed
to establish a new FMVSS mandating V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle)
communication technology in all new light vehicles.\81\ After reviewing
comments on the NPRM, NHTSA determined that, although V2V and V2X
technologies may improve safety and offer innovative services to
consumers, significant analysis would be needed before determining
whether a new V2V standard is appropriate, and, if so, what that
standard would encompass. NHTSA's position has not changed since then
and Autotalks has not provided information to change that position.
Therefore, NHTSA will not initiate a rulemaking to require V2X
technologies in AEB systems as a result of this petition. As we stated
in the November 2023 withdrawal notice, NHTSA will continue to monitor
the development of this technology for possible future vehicle safety
applications.
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\81\ 88 FR 80685.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Conclusion
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 30162 and 49 CFR part 552, the
petition for rulemaking from Autotalks is denied.
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
This rule is a non-significant rule for purposes of Executive Order
(E.O.) 12886, as supplemented by E.O. 13563 and amended by E.O. 14094,
and will not impose any significant costs or have impacts beyond those
analyzed in the final rule published on May 9, 2024.\82\ DOT has
determined that the regulatory analyses conducted for the May 9, 2024
final rule remain applicable to this action. DOT makes these statements
on the basis that this final rule makes technical or clarifying changes
to FMVSS No. 127 as established in the May 9, 2024 final rule. In
addition, this final rule is not expected to impact the estimated costs
and benefits detailed in the final regulatory impact analysis included
in the docket listed in beginning of the final rule published on May 9,
2024.
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\82\ 89 FR 39686.
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NHTSA finds it has good cause to make these changes without notice
and comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 U.S.C.
551, et seq.). Section 553(b)(B) of the APA provides that, when an
agency for good cause finds that notice and public procedure are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest, the
agency may issue a rule without providing notice and an opportunity for
public comment. The May 2024 final rule is the product of an extensive
administrative record with opportunity for public comment on the issues
discussed in this final rule. The changes in this final rule are made
in response to petitions for reconsideration submitted to NHTSA in
response to and docketed in the record of the May 2024 final rule in
accordance with 49 CFR 553.35 and 49 CFR 553.37.\83\ In response to
those petitions, NHTSA makes only clarifying changes to the May 2024
final rule to align the regulatory text with the explanatory material
in the preamble of that final rule.
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\83\ These regulations grant to the Administrator the authority,
consistent with 5 U.S.C. 553b(B), to issue a final decision in
response to petitions for reconsideration without further
proceedings or with opportunity for further comment as the
Administrator deems appropriate.
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Specifically, NHTSA removes the term ``imminent'' from the
performance test requirement. This change resolves a point of confusion
expressed by petitioners and aligns the regulatory text with the intent
of the May 2024 rule as expressed in the preamble by clarifying that
the performance test does not evaluate AEB activation timing. NHTSA
also amends a test scenario in FMVSS No. 127 highlighted by petitioners
that, when tested with very narrow vehicles at the extreme of the
tolerances allowed by the test condition, resulted in a stringency
beyond that intended by NHTSA. NHTSA makes that amendment to ensure the
correct level of stringency. Petitioners also requested clarification
of the specifications in FMVSS No. 127 for the FCW visual signal
location. NHTSA amends the regulatory text to clarify these
specifications. Petitioners also expressed concerns about the clarity
and objectivity of the requirements and test conditions in FMVSS No.
127 for the FCW audio signal. NHTSA clarifies these requirements by
stating the location of the microphone and additional vehicle
conditions under which testing will occur, as well as amending the
definitions to simplify the requirement for suppression.
Given the above, NHTSA finds that additional comment on the changes
herein made in response to petitions for reconsideration of the May
2024 final rule is unnecessary.
Congressional Review Act
The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et. seq., as added by
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,
generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency
promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy
of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller
General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing
this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S.
House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United
States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register. This
rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a
major rule.
V. Regulatory Text
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571
Motor vehicles, Motor vehicle safety, Rubber and rubber products.
[[Page 93220]]
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA is amending 49 CFR part
571 as set forth below.
PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
0
1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117 and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95.
0
2. Section 571.127 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the definition of ``masked threshold'' from S4;
0
b. Revising S5.1.1(a)(3) and (4), S5.1.1(b)(2), S5.1.3. and S8.3.3(g).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 571.127 Standard No. 127; Automatic emergency braking systems
for light vehicles.
* * * * *
S5.1.1. * * *
(a) * * *
(3) The auditory signal as measured adjacent to a 50th percentile
male driver's right ear (tragion) must have an intensity of 15-30 dB
above the average noise level inside the vehicle when measured over a
5-second period under the range of test conditions specified in S6, at
100 km/h, with all vehicle openings closed, and all subject vehicle
audio and sound-producing systems or functions that are not necessary
for performing tests pursuant to the conditions in S6 and the
procedures in S7, S8, S9 of this standard set to off.
(4) In-vehicle audio that is not related to a crash avoidance
system warning must be muted, or reduced in volume during presentation
of the FCW auditory signal to within 5 dB of the average noise level
inside the vehicle (as measured in S5.1.1(a)(3)), for the duration of
the first between-pulse period of the FCW auditory signal under the
range of test conditions specified in S6, at 100 km/h, with all vehicle
openings closed, and all subject vehicle audio and sound-producing
systems or functions that are not necessary for performing tests
pursuant to the conditions in S6 and the procedures in S7, S8, S9 of
this standard set to off.
(b) * * *
(1) The visual signal symbol must be located within an ellipse that
extends 18 degrees vertically and 10 degrees
horizontally of the driver forward line of sight based on the forward-
looking eye midpoint (Mf) as described in S14 of 49 CFR
571.111.
* * * * *
S5.1.3. Performance test requirements. The vehicle must provide a
forward collision warning and subsequently apply the service brakes
automatically such that the subject vehicle does not collide with the
lead vehicle when tested using the procedures in S7 under the
conditions specified in S6. The forward collision warning is not
required if adaptive cruise control is engaged.
* * * * *
S8.3.3. * * *
* * * * *
(g) Two vehicle test devices are secured in stationary positions
parallel to the intended travel path. The two vehicle test devices face
the same direction as the intended travel path. One vehicle test device
is directly behind the other separated by 1.0 0.1 m. The
frontmost plane of the vehicle test device furthermost from the subject
vehicle is located 1.0 0.1 m from the parallel contact
plane (to the subject vehicle's frontmost plane) on the pedestrian test
mannequin. The left side of each vehicle test device is no less than
2.2 m to the right of the vertical plane through the intended travel
path. The left side of each vehicle test device is no less than 1.15 m
to the right of the vertical plane parallel to the plane through the
intended travel path tangent to the 0 percent overlap point.
* * * * *
Issued in Washington, DC, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.95 and 49 CFR Part 501.
Jack Danielson,
Executive Director.
[FR Doc. 2024-27349 Filed 11-25-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P