[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 27 (Tuesday, February 11, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9305-9308]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-02455]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
Kirill Gordei, 500 NE 12th Ave. #706, Hallandale Beach, FL 33009;
Apelsin Logistics Inc., 500 NE 12th Ave. #706, Hallandale Beach, FL
33009;
FC Marakanda 7777 LLC, Obod MFI, Temur A Street 65, Yangiulskiy Region,
Tashkent, Uzbekistan;
Alinda Chemical Trade Company LTD a/k/a/Alinda, Kuskovskaya Street 20A,
Entrance B, Office 409, Moscow, Russia 111141;
Element Uluslararasi Nakliyat Ve Lojistick Tic. LTD, Sehit Polis Fethi
Sekin Caddesi no:4, Novus Tower Kat:28 D:281-282, Bayrakli, Izmir
35530, T[uuml]rkiye;
[[Page 9306]]
Astec Astronomy FZCO, Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Building A1, IFZA
Property FZCO, Dubai, UAE;
And
Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Building A2, IFZY Business Park DDP, Dubai,
UAE;
AvioChem a/k/a/Avio Chem Doo a/k/a/Avio Star a/k/a AvioNet, Aerodrom
Beograd 59, 111271 Surcin, Serbia
Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (``EAR'' or ``the
Regulations''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and Security (``BIS''), U.S.
Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Enforcement
(``OEE''), has requested the issuance of an Order temporarily denying,
for a period of 180 days, the export privileges under the Regulations
of: Kirill Gordei (``Gordei''), Apelsin Logistics Inc. (``Apelsin''),
FC Marakanda 7777 LLC (``Marakanda''), Alinda Chemical Trade Company
LTD (``Alinda''), Element Uluslararasi Nakliyat Ve Lojistick Tic. LTD
(``Element''), Astec Astronomy FZCO (``Astec''), and AvioChem
(collectively, the ``Respondents''). OEE's request and related
information indicate that these parties are located at the respective
addresses listed on the caption page of this order. The OEE
investigation has shown that Gordei, through his Florida-based freight
forwarding company Apelsin, has facilitated the transshipment of U.S.-
origin goods to Russia by communicating with parties in Russia and
T[uuml]rkiye to instruct them on how to circumvent U.S. export
controls, falsifying shipping documentation, and utilizing freight
forwarders located abroad in order to transship items to Russia.
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\1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730
through 774 (2025), were originally issued pursuant to the Export
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''),
which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive
Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as
extended by successive Presidential Notices, continued the
Regulations in effect under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August
13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA'').
While section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except
for three sections which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of
ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules,
regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made
or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant
to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August
13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until
modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action
undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover,
section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary
denial orders.
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I. Legal Standard
Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.''
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A
``[l]ack of information establishing the precise time a violation may
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.'' Id.
II. OEE's Request for a Temporary Denial Order (``TDO'')
The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian
Federation's (``Russia's'') further invasion of Ukraine by implementing
a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict
Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to
sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily
target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are
intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs,
atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's
strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage.
As of February 24, 2022, any item classified under any Export
Classification Control Number (``ECCN'') in Categories 3 through 9 of
the Commerce Control List (``CCL'') required a license to be exported
or reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8,
2022, the license requirements for Russia were expanded to cover all
items on the CCL. See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These rules were
codified in title 15 CFR 746.8, which state, ``a license is required,
excluding deemed exports and deemed reexports, to export, reexport, or
transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or Belarus any item subject
to the EAR and specified in any Export Control Classification Number
(ECCN) on the CCL.''
BIS has imposed additional license requirements for exports,
reexports and transfers to or within Russia of any items subject to the
EAR that were identified under certain Schedule B or Harmonized Tariff
Schedule 6 (``HTS'') numbers under Supplement No. 4 to Part 746--
Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to Sec.
746.5(a)(1)(ii).\2\ HTS codes take their first six digits from the
corresponding Harmonized System (``HS'') code, a standardized numerical
method of classifying traded products used by customs authorities
around the world.
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\2\ See, e.g., 87 FR 12856 (March 8, 2022).
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In its request, OEE presented evidence indicating that the
Respondents seek to procure various U.S.-origin commodities, including
items classified as ECCNs 3A999.b and 9A991, and transship them to
Russia without seeking the required authorization from BIS, contrary to
the requirements in the Regulations.
A. Mass Spectrometer Export
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the resultant
implementation of BIS export controls affecting the Russian aviation
industry, several of the Respondents engaged in a scheme to export a
Mass Spectrometer, classified under ECCN 3A999.b and under 6-digit HTS
code 902781, from the United States to Russia without the required
license from BIS.\3\
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\3\ See 15 CFR 746.8(a)(1), (a)(5).
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OEE has presented evidence that on or about August 4, 2023, Gordei,
who at all relevant times was the President of Apelsin, was provided
falsified shipping documents from an individual associated with Alinda
(hereinafter ``Individual 1'') for the purposes of shipping the Mass
Spectrometer to Russia. The Mass Spectrometer was purchased from a U.S.
company located in California (hereinafter ``U.S. Company 1'') by
Marakanda. Individual 1 informed Gordei that this type of item requires
a BIS export license to Russia otherwise it would be detained by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (``CBP''). Moreover, Individual 1
instructed Gordei that U.S. Company 1 should not be reflected in the
documents and instead provided Gordei with at least two sets of
falsified shipping documentation, including false commercial invoices
reflecting two different, unrelated, U.S. companies as the sellers.
These documents also reflected that the Mass Spectrometer would be
shipped to Element, in T[uuml]rkiye.
On or about August 21, 2023, through on or about August 25, 2023,
Gordei
[[Page 9307]]
arranged the transshipment of the Mass Spectrometer from Element in
T[uuml]rkiye to a company operating in Moscow, Russia. After informing
Element that the ``real'' ultimate consignee for the shipment was
located in Moscow, Russia, Gordei provided Element with the falsified
shipping documentation, and confirmed to Individual 1 that Element
agreed to transship the item to the consignee located in Moscow. This
consignee was listed at the same address as Alinda and likely served as
front or fictitious name for Alinda.
Gordei and Apelsin then directed a U.S.-based freight forwarder to
file Electronic Export Information using the falsified documents. These
documents falsely stated that Marakanda in Uzbekistan was the ultimate
consignee, with the shipment to be routed initially to Element in
T[uuml]rkiye. On or about August 28, 2023, Element sent an email to
Gordei advising him that the estimated departure date of the Mass
Spectrometer from T[uuml]rkiye to Russia was going to be August 29,
2023, and attached an air waybill issued by a Russian airline. Customs
data obtained by OEE indicates that the items were imported into Russia
on or about September 13, 2023.
B. Further Transshipment to Russia
OEE provided evidence that Gordei, Apelsin, and Element were also
involved in further attempts to transship items to Russia, frequently
using falsified shipping documents. On or about September 14, 2023, OEE
special agents detained an ocean shipment destined to the U.A.E. that
contained three (3) consolidated shipments consisting of diesel engine
parts and agriculture tractor parts. Gordei and Apelsin arranged for
the shipment of these items through a U.S. freight forwarder. OEE
determined that this shipment was ultimately destined to a company
located in Moscow, Russia, and that the shipment required a license
from BIS for export to Russia because the items were EAR99 but
classified by an HTS code that appears on Supplement no. 4 to Part 746
of the EAR.\4\
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\4\ See 15 CFR 746.8(a)(5).
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Additionally, on or about March 14, 2024, OEE special agents
detained a shipment of five items identified as an antenna, coupling,
valve, motor, and gauge at the Port of Atlanta. Gordei and Apelsin
arranged for the shipment to be exported using a U.S. freight forwarder
based in Miami, Florida. The shipping documentation listed Element, in
T[uuml]rkiye, as the ultimate consignee, and an unrelated U.S. company
as the seller (``U.S. Company 2''). U.S. Company 2 confirmed to OEE
agents that the shipping documentation, including a commercial invoice,
had been falsified and the items were not sold by U.S. Company 2. The
shipment was ultimately seized by CBP under suspicion of violations of
export control laws.
C. Shipment Involving Apelsin, Astec, and AvioChem
On or about May 29, 2024, CBP detained an additional shipment
containing a fire detection harness classified under ECCN 9A991, which
required a license for export to Russia. In the shipment's EEI, Apelsin
was listed as the freight forwarder, while Astec in Dubai, U.A.E. was
listed as the ultimate consignee. Investigation by OEE revealed Astec
has previously sourced other aircraft parts from companies located in
the United States, and that quotes for these items came from an
individual associated with Astec and AvioChem, in Belgrade, Serbia. A
separate individual associated with Astec confirmed to OEE that
AvioChem and Astec are related companies, and OEE's investigation
indicated that AvioChem and Astec share ownership and management.
AvioChem is currently sanctioned by the United Kingdom for, inter alia,
its involvement in the Russian Transport Sector.\5\ According to
customs data obtained by OEE, Astec is a supplier to S7 Engineering
LLC, which is an arm of Siberian Airlines, d/b/a S7 Airlines. Siberian
Airlines is subject to a BIS TDO through December 13, 2025.\6\ S7
Engineering LLC is also listed on the Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons list (SDN list) pursuant to Executive Order
14024.\7\
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\5\ See UK Sanctions List Search, available at https://search-uk-sanctionslist.service.gov.uk/designations/RUS2035/Entity.
\6\ 89 FR 100952 (Dec. 13, 2024).
\7\ See Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Responding to
Two Years of Russia's Full-Scale War on Ukraine and Navalny's Death
(February 23, 2024), https://www.state.gov/imposing-measures-in-response-to-navalnys-death-and-two-years-of-russias-full-scale-war-against-ukraine/.
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D. Risk of Imminent Violation
Since the implementation of enhanced licensing requirements imposed
on exports to Russia on February 24, 2022, OEE has investigated eight
(8) exports or attempted exports worth approximately $1.2 million
involving the Respondents that were either suspected to be destined to
Russia or imported into Russia. Because Gordei and Apelsin usually hire
a separate, unrelated, freight forwarder in the U.S. to handle the
exportation of goods, Apelsin does not appear on the EEI filing as a
party to the transaction, which obfuscates Gordei's and Apelsin's
export history. Gordei and Apelsin also provide falsified documents to
these U.S. freight forwarders, while knowingly arranging the
transshipment of the items to Russia once exported. It is therefore
OEE's belief that Apelsin and Gordei are likely involved in violations
of the EAR additional to those detailed herein. This belief is
supported by customs data from both the U.S. and Russia demonstrating
the Respondents as exporters and consignees of numerous shipments
destined to Russia.
On April 23, 2024, Gordei, the President of Apelsin, was indicted
in the District of Massachusetts and charged with one count of
conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371), one count of violation of the Export
Control Reform Act (ECRA) (50 U.S.C. 4819(a)(1)), and one count of
smuggling (18 U.S.C. 554(a)). Gordei has been released pre-trial. Given
the conduct detailed in OEE's request, including Gordei's and Apelsin's
deliberate obfuscation of involvement in the transshipment of items to
Russia, it is OEE's belief that despite Gordei's arrest, he and
Apelsin, and the remaining respondents who are located abroad, continue
to present an imminent risk of violation of the EAR.
III. Findings
Under the applicable standard set forth in section 766.24 of the
Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the
evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the
Respondents have acted in violation of the Regulations; that such
violations have been significant and deliberate; and that given the
foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation, there is a
likelihood of imminent violations. Therefore, the TDO is necessary in
the public interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations
and to give notice to companies and individuals in the United States
and abroad that they should avoid dealing with the Respondents, in
connection with export and reexport transactions involving items
subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity
subject to the Regulations.
IV. Order
It is therefore ordered:
First, that Kirill Gordei, with an address at 500 NE 12th Ave.
#706, Hallandale Beach, FL 33009; Apelsin Logistics Inc., with an
address at 500 NE 12th Ave. #706, Hallandale Beach, FL 33009; FC
Marakanda 7777 LLC, with an address at Obod MFI, Temur A Street
[[Page 9308]]
65, Yangiulskiy Region, Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Alinda Chemical Trade
Company LTD, a/k/a/Alinda, with an address at Kuskovskaya Street 20A
Entrance B, Office 409, Moscow, Russia 111141; Element Uluslararasi
Nakliyat Ve Lojistick Tic. LTD, with an address at Sehit Polis Fethi
Sekin Caddesi no:4, Novus Tower Kat:28 D:281-282, Bayrakli, Izmir 35530
T[uuml]rkiye; Astec Astronomy FZCO, with an address at Dubai Silicon
Oasis, DDP, Building A1 IFZA Property FZCO, Dubai, UAE, and an address
at Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Building A2 IFZY Business Park DDP, Dubai,
UAE; and AvioChem, a/k/a/Avio Chem Doo, a/k/a/Avio Star, a/k/a AvioNet,
with an address at Aerodrom Beograd 59, 111271 Surcin, Serbia; and when
acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or
employees (each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied
Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in
any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be
exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly
related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control
document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to
safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2)
of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the
EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS
pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly
related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of
the Respondents any item subject to the EAR except directly related to
safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2)
of the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by the Respondents of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing or other support activities
related to a transaction whereby the Respondents acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly
related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from the Respondents of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly
related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
D. Obtain from the Respondents in the United States any item
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except
directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to
section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by the Respondents, or service any item,
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by the
Respondents if such service involves the use of any item subject to the
EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except
directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to
section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph,
servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or
testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to Respondents by ownership, control,
position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the
conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions
of this Order.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(e) of the EAR,
the Respondents may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full
written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be
opposed by the Respondents as provided in section 766.24(d), by filing
a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days
before the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided to the Respondents and shall
be published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
180 days.
Dated: February 6, 2025.
Kevin J. Kurland,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2025-02455 Filed 2-10-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P