[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 52 (Wednesday, March 19, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12800-12803]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-04528]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 72-1036, 50-220, and 50-410; NRC-2025-0030]


Constellation Energy Generation, LLC; Nine Mile Point Nuclear 
Station; Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Exemption

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an 
exemption to Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, permitting Nine Mile 
Point Nuclear Station (NMP) Units 1 and 2 to use the Holtec HI-STORM 
Flood/Wind (FW) Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) Storage System, including 
the use of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask during loading and transport 
operations, at the NMP independent spent fuel storage installation, for 
six MPC-89, in a near-term loading campaign beginning in May 2025, 
where the terms, conditions, and specifications in Certificate of 
Compliance No. 1032, Amendment No. 3, Revision 0, are not met.

DATES: The exemption was issued on March 12, 2025.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2025-0030 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2025-0030. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Bridget Curran; 
telephone: 301-415-1003; email: Bridget.Curran@nrc.gov. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, 
or by email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for 
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the 
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
     NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an 
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
PDR.Resource@nrc.gov or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8 
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Yen-Ju Chen, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555; telephone: 301-415-1018; email: Yen-Ju.Chen@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: March 13, 2025.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Thomas Boyce,
Acting Chief, Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch, Division of 
Fuel Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety, and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket Nos. 72-1036, 50-220, and 50-410

Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station 
Units 1 and 2; Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

I. Background

    Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (CEG) is the holder of 
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69, which 
authorize operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP) 
Units 1 and 2 in Scriba, New York, pursuant to part 50 of title 10 
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Domestic Licensing of 
Production and Utilization Facilities.'' The licenses provide, among 
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, 
regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) now or hereafter in effect.
    Consistent with 10 CFR part 72, subpart K, ``General License for 
Storage of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites,'' a general license is 
issued for the storage of spent fuel in an independent spent fuel 
storage installation (ISFSI) at power reactor sites to persons 
authorized to possess or operate nuclear power reactors under 10 CFR 
part 50. CEG is authorized to operate nuclear power reactors under 
10 CFR part 50 and holds a 10 CFR part 72 general license for 
storage of spent fuel at the NMP ISFSI. Under the terms of the 
general license, CEG stores spent fuel at its

[[Page 12801]]

NMP ISFSI using the HI-STORM Flood/Wind (FW) Multi-Purpose Canister 
(MPC) Storage System in accordance with Certificate of Compliance 
(CoC) No. 1032, Amendment No. 3, Revision No. 0.

II. Request/Action

    By a letter dated January 22, 2025 (Agency-wide Documents Access 
and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number No. ML25022A240), and 
as supplemented on February 4, 2025 (ML25036A335), CEG requested an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), 
72.212(b)(3), 72.212(b)(5)(i), 72.212(b)(11), and 72.214 that 
require NMP to comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications 
of CoC No. 1032, Amendment No. 3, Revision No. 0 (ML17214A039). If 
approved, CEG's exemption request would accordingly allow NMP to 
load six MPC-89 at the NMP ISFSI site in a near-term loading 
campaign beginning in May 2025, in the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage 
System, including the use of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask (HI-TRAC) 
during loading and transport operations, where the terms, 
conditions, and specifications in CoC No. 1032, Amendment No. 3, 
Revision No. 0, are not met.
    Before using a CoC, general licensees are required to perform a 
site-specific evaluation to establish that, once loaded with spent 
fuel, the cask will conform to the terms, conditions, and 
specifications of the CoC, including following the NRC-approved 
final safety analysis report (FSAR) methodology. CEG currently uses 
the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System under CoC No. 1032, Amendment No. 
3, Revision No. 0, for dry storage of spent nuclear fuel in MPC-89 
at the NMP ISFSI. The HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System CoC provides 
the requirements, conditions, and operating limits necessary for use 
of the system to store spent fuel. One of the operating limits 
established in the CoC involves potential tornado-generated missile 
impacts. The HI-STORM FW FSAR table 2.2.5 evaluates a generic set of 
tornado-generated missile impacts (ML19177A171). CEG discovered that 
NMP's site-specific analysis performed to demonstrate protection of 
the loaded MPC-89, while in the HI-TRAC, against tornado-generated 
missiles was not performed consistent with the NRC-approved method 
of evaluation in the FSAR. Contrary to CEG's site-specific analysis, 
the NRC-approved evaluation in the FSAR does not take credit for the 
missile resistance offered by the HI-TRAC water jacket shell, and 
assumes that the small and intermediate missiles will penetrate the 
water jacket shell with no energy loss.
    Therefore, CEG requests this exemption to allow it to conduct 
the planned loading and transport operations of the six MPC-89 in 
the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System at NMP ISFSI beginning in May 
2025, even though, because of the different tornado-generated 
missile analysis of the HI-TRAC in NMP's site specific review, the 
terms, conditions, and specifications of the CoC will not be met.

III. Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the 
regulations of 10 CFR part 72 as it determines are authorized by law 
and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and 
security and are otherwise in the public interest.

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    This exemption would allow CEG to use the HI-STORM FW MPC 
Storage System, including the use of the HI-TRAC during loading and 
transport operations, for six MPC-89 at its NMP ISFSI, beginning in 
May 2025, where the terms, conditions, and specifications in CoC No. 
1032, Amendment No. 3, Revision No. 0, are not met. CEG is 
requesting an exemption from the provisions in 10 CFR part 72 that 
require the licensee to comply with the terms, conditions, and 
specifications of the CoC for the approved cask model it uses. 
Section 72.7 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 72. This authority to grant exemptions 
is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and is 
not otherwise inconsistent with the NRC's regulations or other 
applicable laws. Additionally, no other law prohibits the activities 
that would be authorized by the exemption. Therefore, the NRC 
concludes that there is no statutory prohibition on the issuance of 
the requested exemption, and the NRC is authorized to grant the 
exemption by law.

B. The Exemption Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common 
Defense and Security

    CEG is requesting an exemption to use the HI-STORM FW MPC 
Storage System, including the use of the HI-TRAC during loading and 
transport operations for six MPC-89 at the NMP ISFSI, beginning in 
May 2025, where the terms, conditions, and specifications in CoC No. 
1032, Amendment No. 3, Revision No. 0, are not met. In support of 
its exemption request, CEG asserts that issuance of the exemption 
would not endanger life or property because the evaluation of NMP's 
postulated tornado-generated missiles demonstrates that all FSAR 
acceptance criteria are met. According to CEG, the site-specific 
analysis follows the same mathematical approach as the generic 
approach in the FSAR but takes credit for the additional resistance 
provided by the HI-TRAC water jacket shell. Additionally, CEG notes 
that the water jacket shell is an Important-to-Safety (ITS) 
component and meets all the criteria as analyzed. Therefore, CEG 
contends the site-specific analysis, although different from the 
FSAR methodology, demonstrates that the loading and transport 
operations of the system using the HI-TRAC provides adequate 
protection against NMP's design basis tornado-generated missiles. As 
such, according to CEG, the proposed exemption does not endanger 
life or property or the common defense and security.
    The NRC staff reviewed the requested exemption and determined 
that the request does not change the fundamental design, components, 
or safety features of the storage system. The NRC staff evaluated 
the applicable potential safety impacts of granting the exemption to 
assess the potential for any danger to life or property or the 
common defense and security. Specifically, the NRC staff reviewed 
the applicant's structural, confinement, thermal, criticality, 
shielding, and radiation protection evaluations for the proposed 
exemption.
    Structural and Confinement Review for the Requested Exemption: 
The staff noted that this exemption does not involve any change to 
the physical design or construction of the HI-STORM FW overpack, HI-
TRAC, or MPC-89, nor to any operating procedures. Instead, the 
exemption is to allow the use of the CoC system despite the 
different methodology used by NMP regarding the tornado-generated 
missile impact analysis than that approved by the NRC and reflected 
in the CoC FSAR. Therefore, the staff's structural review focused on 
the analysis and methodology followed to demonstrate that the design 
of the MPC-89 and the HI-TRAC can withstand the governing site-
specific tornado-generated missile impact without impairing their 
capability to perform their intended functions. The MPC and the HI-
TRAC are deemed to perform their intended design functions if the 
following performance objectives, as described in FSAR section 3.1.2 
(ML19177A171), can be satisfied:
    (i) The postulated tornado-generated missiles do not compromise 
the integrity of the MPC confinement boundary while the MPC is 
contained within the HI-TRAC.
    (ii) No geometry changes occur under the postulated tornado-
generated missiles impact during handling conditions that may 
preclude ready retrievability of the contained MPC.
    (iii) The radiation shielding remains properly positioned under 
all applicable handling service conditions for the HI-TRAC.
    In general, the above performance objectives are deemed to be 
satisfied for the MPC and the HI-TRAC if (1) the missile does not 
penetrate the inner shell of the HI-TRAC, MPC or MPC lid, and does 
not breach the confinement boundary, (2) the stresses (stress 
intensities or strains, as applicable) calculated by the appropriate 
structural analyses are less than the allowable defined in FSAR 
subsection 3.1.2.3, and (3) the geometry change in the HI-TRAC, if 
any, after any event of structural consequence to the transfer cask, 
does not preclude ready retrievability of the contained MPC.
    The HI-TRAC body consists of two main layers: a water jacket 
layer and a lead shield layer. Each layer is contained within 
different steel shells: the water jacket shell (outermost shell of 
HI-TRAC), the outer shell of the lead shield layer (between the 
water jacket layer and a lead shield layer), and the inner shell 
(innermost shell of the lead shield layer and the HI-TRAC). The 
proprietary Holtec Report HI-2135869, ``Site-Specific Tornado 
Missile Analysis for HI-STORM FW System,'' Revision No. 10, 
generically addresses the HI-TRAC structural responses due to 
bounding site-specific small and intermediate tornado-generated 
missile strikes, except for the governing tornado-generated missile 
for NMP, which is a 4-inch

[[Page 12802]]

x 12-inch x 12-foot-long wooden plank with an impact velocity of 288 
miles per hour (mph). In support of this exemption request, Holtec's 
``HI-STORM FW Calculation Package to Support Exemptions'' (NMP site-
specific analysis, ML25021A244) further analyzed the governing site-
specific wooden plank missile using the same energy balance approach 
and assumptions relating to the missile behavior and kinetic energy 
as other evaluated tornado-generated missiles, with the exception of 
the credit given in the analysis for the resistance provided by the 
HI-TRAC water jacket shell. Based on this analysis, CEG concluded 
that the HI-TRAC inner shell is not penetrated and is sufficient to 
absorb the remaining kinetic energy of the wooden plank. Therefore, 
CEG concludes that the site-specific governing tornado-generated 
missile does not penetrate the MPC-89 confinement boundary, and no 
significant deformation of the HI-TRAC is expected that would 
prevent the MPC-89 from being retrieved or maintaining shielding 
effectiveness.
    The staff reviewed the sizes, mass, and velocities of the site-
specific tornado-generated missiles analyzed in the NMP site-
specific analysis and verified that the analyzed tornado-generated 
missiles bound the design basis tornado-generated missile spectrum 
specified in table 3.5-21 of the NMP updated safety analysis report 
(ML24291A165). The staff's independent analysis of the missile 
penetration by the wooden plank concluded that a greater margin of 
safety is available for the inner shell penetration than the one 
calculated in the NMP site-specific analysis. Furthermore, based on 
the review of the NMP site-specific analysis, the staff finds that 
the missile penetration depth by the wooden plank in the MPC lid 
remains less than the minimum thickness of the MPC closure lid. 
Additionally, the calculated global stress intensities for the HI-
TRAC shell due to the missile strike satisfy American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 
Division 1, Subsection NF, Level D limits, as specified in HI-STORM 
FW FSAR section 3.1.2.3. Therefore, in the event of a tornado-
generated missile impact from the wooden plank analyzed, damage to 
the cask or canister that compromise confinement boundary, global 
plastic deformation in the cask shell, or ovaling of the cask inner 
cavity, is not anticipated, and will not affect the overall 
shielding effectiveness of the cask and the retrievability of the 
MPC. The staff also noted that the analysis results are conservative 
since they assume that the wooden plank is rigid, and no kinetic 
energy dissipation is being credited due to deformation of the 
wooden plank when it strikes the HI-TRAC at high velocity.
    Based on the staff's review of the analysis provided for the 
exemption request, the staff finds the proposed methodology used for 
the NMP site-specific missile penetration analysis acceptable and 
concludes that the site-specific analysis demonstrates that the MPC 
and HI-TRAC can withstand the governing site-specific tornado-
generated missile impact without compromising their ability to 
perform their intended safety functions at NMP.
    Thermal Review for the Requested Exemption: The thermal 
consequences of a complete loss of water due to rupture of the HI-
TRAC water jacket from a tornado-generated missile has been analyzed 
in FSAR sections 4.6 and 12.2.6.2 (ML19177A171). It demonstrates 
that the consequences are within the short-term fuel cladding and 
material temperature limits. The revised analysis with credit for 
the HI-TRAC water jacket shell demonstrates that the FSAR acceptance 
criteria continue to be met, and a complete loss of water continues 
to be bounding for the thermal evaluation. Therefore, no further 
thermal evaluation is required to support this exemption request.
    Criticality and Shielding Review for the Requested Exemption: A 
complete loss of water due to rupture of the HI-TRAC water jacket 
from a tornado-generated missile has been analyzed for shielding and 
no effect on criticality control features as stated in FSAR section 
12.2.6.2 (ML19177A171). The revised analysis with credit for the HI-
TRAC water jacket shell demonstrates that the FSAR acceptance 
criteria continue to be met, and a complete loss of water continues 
to be bounding for the shielding evaluation. Therefore, no further 
criticality and shielding review is required to support this 
exemption request.
    Radiation Protection Review for the Requested Exemption: There 
is no degradation in confinement capabilities of the MPC when inside 
of the HI-TRAC. The local dose rates of a complete loss of water due 
to rupture of the HI-TRAC water jacket from a tornado-generated 
missile has been analyzed in FSAR chapter 5 (ML19177A171). The 
revised analysis with credit for the HI-TRAC water jacket shell 
demonstrates that the FSAR acceptance criteria continue to be met, 
and a complete loss of water continues to be bounding for radiation 
protection. The necessary compensatory measures continue to be 
valid. Therefore, no further radiation protection review is required 
to support this exemption request.
    Conclusion: Based on staff's analysis of the structural and 
confinement review, and the otherwise bounding nature of the FSAR's 
analysis in other areas, the NRC staff has concluded that under the 
requested exemption, the storage system will continue to meet the 
safety requirements of 10 CFR part 72 and the offsite dose limits of 
10 CFR part 20 and, therefore, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security.

C. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest

    The proposed exemption would allow CEG to use the HI-STORM FW 
MPC Storage System, including the use of the HI-TRAC solely during 
loading and transport operations for six MPC-89 at the NMP ISFSI, 
beginning in May 2025, even though NMP's tornado-generated missile 
analysis of HI-TRAC, which takes credit for the water jacket shell, 
is not part of the NRC-approved CoC No. 1032, Amendment No. 3, 
Revision No. 0 and corresponding FSAR. According to CEG, the 
exemption is in the public interest because being unable to load 
fuel into dry storage in the future loading campaign would impact 
CEG's ability to offload fuel from the NMP reactor, consequently 
impacting continued safe reactor operation.
    CEG states that not being able to use the HI-STORM FW MPC 
Storage System, including the use of the HI-TRAC during loading and 
transport operations for six MPC-89 at the NMP ISFSI in the May 2025 
loading campaign, would impact its ability to effectively manage the 
margin to full core discharge capacity (FCDC) in the NMP Units 1 and 
2 spent fuel pools (SFP). The low FCDC margin makes it difficult to 
stage a complete reload batch of fuel in the SFPs in preparation for 
outages and presents a potential reactivity management risk to fuel 
handling operations during pre- and post-outage activities. In 
addition, according to CEG, a crowded spent fuel pool would 
challenge the decay heat removal demand of the pool and increase the 
likelihood of a loss of fuel pool cooling event and a fuel handling 
accident. Furthermore, CEG contends that NMP planned the cask 
loading campaign years in advance based on availability of the 
specialized work force and equipment that is shared throughout the 
CEG fleet. These specialty resources support competing activities 
and priorities, including fuel pool cleanouts and refueling outages. 
Therefore, CEG asserts that the available windows to complete the 
cask loading campaigns are limited, and any delays would have a 
cascading impact on other scheduled specialized activities.
    For the reasons described by CEG in the exemption request, the 
NRC agrees that it is in the public interest to grant the exemption. 
If the exemption is not granted, in order to comply with the CoC, 
CEG would have to keep spent fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is 
not permitted to use the HI-TRAC during loading and transport 
operations for six MPC-89 at the NMP ISFSI for the loading campaign 
beginning in May 2025, thus impacting NMP's ability to effectively 
manage the FCDC margin. Moreover, should spent fuel pool capacity be 
reached, the ability to refuel the operating reactor unit is 
challenged, thus potentially impacting continued reactor operations.
    Therefore, the staff concludes that approving the exemption is 
in the public interest.

Environmental Consideration

    The NRC staff also considered whether there would be any 
significant environmental impacts associated with the exemption. For 
this proposed action, the NRC staff performed an environmental 
assessment pursuant to 10 CFR 51.30. The environmental assessment 
concluded that the proposed action would not significantly impact 
the quality of the human environment. The NRC staff concluded that 
the proposed action would not result in any changes in the types or 
amounts of any radiological or non-radiological effluents that may 
be released offsite, and there would be no significant increase in 
occupational or public radiation exposure because of the proposed 
action. The environmental assessment and the finding of no 
significant impact was published on March 10, 2025 (90 FR 11628).

[[Page 12803]]

IV. Conclusion

    Based on these considerations, the NRC has determined that, 
pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, the exemption is authorized by law, will 
not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, 
and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the NRC grants 
CEG an exemption from the requirements of Sec. Sec.  72.212(a)(2), 
72.212(b)(3), 72.212(b)(5)(i), 72.212(b)(11), and 72.214 solely with 
respect to the planned loading and transport operations for six MPC-
89 at NMP ISFSI for the loading campaign beginning in May 2025.
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated: March 12, 2025.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

/RA/

Tom Boyce,

Acting Chief, Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch, Division 
of Fuel Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety, and 
Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 2025-04528 Filed 3-18-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P