[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 56 (Tuesday, March 25, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13658-13661]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-04960]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2025-0018]
Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Safety Management System
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin.
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SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to promote the
implementation of a pipeline safety management system (PSMS) by
regulated pipeline owners and operators.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joseph Yoon by phone at 202-819-1547
or by email at joseph.yoon@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PSMS provides a proactive and systematic
approach to risk management of complex processes across the pipeline
organization to operate safely and to improve safety performance. PSMS
also provides a scalable framework for pipeline operators of varying
size, scope, and level of PSMS implementation maturity. PHMSA
encourages pipeline operators to develop and to implement PSMS
programs, using a framework such as the one detailed in American
Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 1173: Pipeline
Safety Management Systems (API RP 1173). The framework should define
the elements for identifying, managing, and reducing risks throughout
the pipeline life cycle. Issuance of this advisory bulletin is
consistent with section 205 of the Protecting our Infrastructure of
Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2020 (Pub. L. 116-
260),\1\ which directs the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to
``promote'' the implementation of pipeline safety management systems by
pipeline operators. It also addresses the National Transportation
Safety Board's (NTSB) Safety Recommendation P-24-002.
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\1\ See 49 U.S.C. 60103 note.
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I. Background
A safety management system (SMS) is an organization-wide approach
to managing safety risk through systematic procedures, practices, and
policies. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) defines SMS as a
``formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk
and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes
systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of
safety risk.'' \2\ In the pipeline community, SMS is similarly
described as a ``systematic approach to managing safety, including the
structures, policies, and procedures an organization uses to direct and
control its activities.'' \3\
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\2\ FAA Order 8000.369C, Safety Management System, (June 24,
2020), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/Order_8000.369C.pdf.
\3\ Pipeline SMS Industry Team, Introduction to Pipeline SMS
Implementation, Book 2: What is a Pipeline SMS?, https://pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/DM2018-045-Pipeline-SMS-Book-2_PRINT-READY_CMYK_062119_Branding-Updates.pdf.
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NTSB has long advocated for PSMS implementation by the pipeline
industry. After investigating two serious accidents in 2010, NTSB found
that pipeline safety would be enhanced if pipeline companies
implemented SMSs. The first accident occurred on July 25, 2010, when a
30-inch pipeline ruptured in Marshall, Michigan, resulting in the
estimated release of 840,000 gallons of crude oil into the Kalamazoo
River. The second accident occurred on September 9, 2010, when a
natural gas transmission pipeline ruptured in San Bruno, California,
killing eight people, injuring many more, and destroying 38 homes.
[[Page 13659]]
NTSB issued Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-12/01 following its
investigation of the former accident.\4\ In discussing the benefits of
applying SMS to pipeline systems, NTSB stated:
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\4\ NTSB, PAR-12/01, Enbridge Incorporated Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Rupture and Release, Marshall, Michigan, July 25, 2010,
(July 10, 2012), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR1201.pdf.
In recent years, several transportation modes have implemented
SMSs to enhance the safety of their operations, and the NTSB has
consistently supported these activities. The NTSB has advocated the
implementation of SMSs in transportation systems by elevating SMSs
to its Most Wanted List. However, the NTSB has not called for an SMS
in pipeline operations. This Marshall accident and the 2010 pipeline
accident in San Bruno, California, indicate that SMSs are needed to
enhance the safety of pipeline operations.
Both the San Bruno accident and the Marshall accident involved
errors at the management and operator levels in both pipeline
integrity and control center operations. The delays in recognizing
and responding to the pipeline rupture and the deficiencies in
control center team performance were prominent aspects of both
accidents. . . .
The evidence from this accident and from the San Bruno accident
indicates that company oversight of pipeline control center
management and operator performance was deficient. In both cases,
pipeline ruptures were inadequately identified and delays in
identifying and responding to the leaks exacerbated the consequences
of the initial pipeline ruptures.
Therefore, the NTSB conclude[d] that pipeline safety would be
enhanced if pipeline companies implemented SMSs.\5\
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\5\ NTSB, PAR-12/01, at 116-117.
Having reached these conclusions, NTSB issued Safety Recommendation
P-12-17 advising API to ``facilitate the development of a safety
management system standard specific to the pipeline industry that is
similar in scope to [API's] Recommended Practice 750, Management of
Process Hazards.'' API responded by forming a multi-stakeholder work
group, including PHMSA representatives, to develop a PSMS recommended
practice, and that effort ultimately led to the issuance of API RP 1173
(1st edition) on July 8, 2015.
In response to API RP 1173, the pipeline industry formed a PSMS
Industry Team (PSMS Team) to educate stakeholders and to enhance safe
pipeline operations through the implementation and use of PSMSs.\6\ The
PSMS Team developed various tools that pipeline operators could use as
guidelines to assist in planning, developing, and implementing PSMSs.
Since the issuance of API RP 1173 in 2015, PHMSA, States, various
industry associations, and other stakeholders have encouraged voluntary
implementation of PSMS across the pipeline industry. In its 2023 Annual
Report, the PSMS Team indicated that nearly 85 percent of total
pipeline industry mileage is covered by PSMS.\7\ Information obtained
from a 2023 PHMSA voluntary information collection to determine how
many gas distribution operators are implementing PSMSs indicated that
about 86 percent of all gas distribution pipeline mileage is operated
by companies that have begun implementing PSMSs voluntarily.\8\
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\6\ Pipeline SMS Industry Team, 2016 Liquids Pipeline SMS Annual
Report (2016), https://pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/API-Pipeline-SMS-Annual-Report-2016.pdf.
\7\ Pipeline SMS Industry Team, Pipeline SMS 2023 Annual Report,
at 7 (July 1, 2024), https://pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2023-Pipeline-SMS-Annual-Report.pdf.
\8\ See PHMSA, Report to Congress--Implementation of Safety
Management Systems by Gas Distribution Pipeline Operators (Aug. 2,
2024), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/report-congress-implementation-safety-management-systems-gas-distribution-pipeline-operators.
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In January 2024, NTSB issued Safety Recommendation P-24-002 to
PHMSA in response to a pipeline release that occurred on October 1,
2021, in San Pedro Bay in California. In that safety recommendation,
NTSB advised PHMSA to ``[i]ssue an advisory bulletin to all Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration-regulated pipeline owners
and operators, promoting the benefits of pipeline safety management
systems and asking them to develop and implement such a system based on
American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 1173.'' \9\ NTSB
stated that ``the implementation of a robust PSMS program would have
helped'' the operator of the ruptured pipeline ``comply with
regulations, ensure employees were following company procedures, and
better prepare personnel to respond and react to the conditions found
during this release.'' \10\ NTSB concluded that had a PSMS been in
place, the operator ``may have further evaluated their operations,
identified continuous improvement opportunities, and better positioned
their staff to respond and react to a leak.'' \11\
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\9\ NTSB, MIR-24-01, Anchor Strike of Underwater Pipeline and
Eventual Crude Oil Release, San Pedro Bay, Near Huntington Beach,
California, October 1, 2021, (Jan. 2, 2024), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MIR2401.pdf.
\10\ NTSB, MIR-24-01, at 84.
\11\ NTSB, MIR-24-01, at 84.
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In July 2024, NTSB issued a Safety Alert, ``Pipeline Safety
Management Systems: Vital for the Safe Operation of Pipelines.'' \12\
In that safety alert, NTSB noted it found that: (1) ``pipeline safety
would be enhanced if companies implemented [PSMS];'' (2) ``[a]lthough
PSMS have been adopted by operators representing 85 percent of industry
pipeline mileage, many operators, particularly smaller operators, have
not yet adopted PSMS;'' (3) ``[t]he pipeline industry continues to have
accidents that could have been prevented or the consequences more
effectively mitigated had risks been more thoroughly identified and
addressed;'' and (4) ``[w]ithout full commitment from the pipeline
industry to implement and mature PSMS, pipeline accidents will continue
to occur and the industry will not be able to meet their goal of zero
accidents, fatalities, and serious injuries.'' \13\
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\12\ NTSB, SA-095, Pipeline Safety Management Systems: Vital for
the Safe Operations of Pipelines (July 2024), https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/safety-alerts/Documents/SA-095.pdf.
\13\ NTSB, SA-095 at 1.
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NTSB further noted that pipeline operators can: (1) ``[i]mplement a
robust PSMS as described in API RP 1173. API RP 1173 Pipeline Safety
Management System requirements provide guidance for operators to
establish a system to continuously track and improve safety''; (2)
``[f]or those who have incorporated PSMS into their practices, continue
to improve operations and training. Pipeline operators with PSMS cannot
be complacent. One of the hallmarks of a good PSMS is that it
continuously evolves and improves safety programs''; (3) ``[s]upport
revisions to API RP 1173 and other guidance as it is developed to
include small operators and contractors in their efforts to establish a
PSMS. According to the 2022 Pipeline SMS Annual Report, `Last year also
featured important initiatives to support small operator and contractor
implementation of RP 1173 along their journey of continuous improvement
and the combined vision of One Industry, One Team, One Mission,
Pipeline Safety' ''; and (4) ``[w]ith a PSMS, operators can ensure
pipelines are designed, constructed, operated, and maintained in a way
that complies with more than the minimum safety standards found in
regulations. Experience has shown that using a PSMS can be effective
and result in significant reductions of serious pipeline accidents each
year.'' \14\
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\14\ NTSB, SA-095 at 2-3.
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Section 205 of the PIPES Act of 2020 directed the Secretary to
submit to Congress a report describing the progress of gas distribution
pipeline operators with respect to implementation of API RP 1173 and
the feasibility of natural gas distribution
[[Page 13660]]
system operators implementing PSMS based on the size of the operator.
Section 205 further directed the Secretary and the State authorities
with a certification in effect to promote and to assess pipeline safety
management system frameworks developed by operators of natural gas
distribution systems. PHMSA is delegated with carrying out this
mandate.
PHMSA submitted that report to Congress on August 2, 2024. The
report concluded, among other things, that:
With respect to [gas distribution] operators whose leadership
have demonstrated a tangible commitment to implementing a PSMS,
there is a clear trend for larger operator's PSMS efforts to be
reported as ``on-track,'' which accounts for roughly two-thirds of
the largest category of operators. However, more than one-half of
the smallest category of operators reported that their PSMS efforts
best fit the ``stalled'' characterization. Based on the data
[collected by PHMSA from the operators to prepare the report] . . .
small operators are much less likely to implement a PSMS than large
operators. . . . Although the API RP 1173 framework is intended to
be scalable for pipeline operators of varying size and scope, and
the essential elements of the framework apply to organizations of
any size or sophistication, it appears that very small operators
need additional guidance to realize the benefits of implementing a
PSMS. PHMSA recommend[ed] that the American Gas Association and the
American Public Gas Association continue to promote the
implementation of a PSMS and provide guidance to their members,
particularly the smaller operators to assist them in realizing the
value of implementing a PSMS program. PHMSA will continue to work
with its state partners to promote PSMS implementation by all
operators. PHMSA will also continue participating on API's task
group reviewing the current API RP 1173 to develop a revision that
provides additional guidance to smaller operators, enabling them to
implement a size-scaled PSMS program.\15\
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\15\ PHMSA, Report to Congress--Implementation of Safety
Management Systems by Gas Distribution Pipeline Operators (Aug. 2,
2024), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/report-congress-implementation-safety-management-systems-gas-distribution-pipeline-operators.
Major pipeline accidents with serious consequences are rare in this
country; but, when they occur, they are generally because of an
alignment of weaknesses or failures across multiple activities. To
manage the safety of complex processes involved in the design,
installation, operation, and maintenance throughout the life cycle of a
pipeline, coordinated actions to address multiple dynamic activities
and circumstances are required. PSMS, coupled with a strong safety
culture, enables operators to identify and to analyze hazards
proactively and to manage the associated risks to prevent harm to
people and the environment, and, ultimately, to reach both PHMSA's and
the industry's goal of zero incidents.
PHMSA believes that it is in the best interest of safety that
operators build and maintain a strong safety culture. A pipeline
operator's culture comprises, among other things, the everyday
attitudes, values, norms, and beliefs with respect to risk, safety, and
environmental protection shared throughout the organization by leaders
and employees of all levels. Operators can continuously strengthen
their safety culture by establishing safety as a core value and, more
importantly, through their everyday actions. Maintaining a strong
safety culture requires operators to address safety issues proactively,
and to understand and to address threats against the operator's safety
culture, such as complacency, fear of reprisal, overconfidence, and
normalization of deviance. Implementing a well-designed PSMS
strengthens an operator's safety culture. Each element of PSMS supports
safety culture and the culture feeds back into PSMS in a continuous
process. This results in a strong and positive safety culture, an
increasingly mature PSMS, and enhanced pipeline safety. Building and
nurturing a strong safety culture helps achieve the best safety
outcomes. API RP 1173 provides several examples of a positive safety
culture that should be considered by all operators.\16\
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\16\ API RP 1173: Pipeline Safety Management Systems, at xi, 7,
8, 10, 16, and 21 (First ed., reaffirmed April 2023).
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PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to help promote the
benefits of PSMS more broadly, and to encourage regulated pipeline
owners and operators to implement PSMS based on API RP 1173 voluntarily
as part of their efforts to build and to maintain a strong safety
culture that improves the safety performance of their systems.\17\
Guidance and advisory bulletins are not rules; are not meant to bind
the public in any way; and do not assign duties, create legally
enforceable rights, or impose new obligations that are not otherwise
contained in regulations.
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\17\ PHMSA also notes that the current NTSB Chair has supported
the voluntary adoption of PSMS by the owners and operators of PHMSA-
regulated pipelines. Statement of Jennifer Homendy, Panel at 2024
Pipeline Safety Trust Conference (Nov. 21, 2024), 24:19 to 29:44 and
36:15-36:30, available at https://youtu.be/OdlbjKZMYAY?si=Va_hlyvqRpGhsl8G.
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II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2025-01)
To: Owners and Operators of Regulated Pipelines.
Subject: Pipeline Safety Management System.
Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to promote and to
encourage regulated pipeline owners and operators in developing and
implementing a pipeline safety management system (PSMS) based on a
framework such as the one detailed in the American Petroleum
Institute's (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 1173: Pipeline Safety
Management Systems (API RP 1173). This is consistent with section 205
of the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety
Act of 2020 (Pub. L. 116-260),\18\ which directed the Secretary of
Transportation to ``promote'' the implementation of pipeline safety
management systems by pipeline operators, and the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Safety Recommendation P-24-002.
This advisory bulletin promotes the implementation of PSMSs to improve
the safety performance of the Nation's pipeline system continually to
protect the public from the risks associated with pipelines.
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\18\ See 49 U.S.C. 60103 note.
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The contents of this advisory bulletin do not have the force and
effect of law. They are not meant to bind operators nor the public in
any way.
API RP 1173 provides a PSMS framework that builds upon an
operator's existing practices with particular emphasis on proactively
looking for safety gaps, encouraging the non-punitive reporting of
safety issues, and promptly responding to those issues. API RP 1173
emphasizes clarifying the safety roles and responsibilities of
leadership, top management, and employees at all levels throughout the
operator's organization, including contractor support. PSMS,
underpinned by a strong safety culture, makes safety programs and
processes more effective to help prevent pipeline accidents.
The 10 essential elements of PSMSs outlined in API RP 1173, and the
principles underlying them, apply to operators of any size and
complexity. The complexity of a pipeline operator's PSMS program should
be appropriate for the size of their operations and the risks their
systems pose to the public and environment.
PHMSA encourages the voluntary adoption of PSMS based on a
framework such as the one detailed in API RP 1173, as PHMSA believes
developing and implementing PSMS would be an effective way to enhance
pipeline safety systematically. PHMSA shares NTSB's view that a
voluntarily adopted PSMS program can ensure pipelines are designed,
constructed, operated, and maintained in a way that complies with
[[Page 13661]]
more than just the minimum safety standards found in regulations.
For the reasons noted herein, PHMSA strongly encourages regulated
pipeline owners and operators to take the following actions to
strengthen their pipeline safety programs:
Implement a PSMS program and ensure that the program
covers all essential elements of an effective PSMS, such as those in
API RP 1173.
Ensure the PSMS program continuously evolves and improves.
Maintain a positive safety culture that continually
promotes diligence throughout the operator's organization and addresses
issues that can erode the safety culture.
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 19, 2025, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Linda Daugherty,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2025-04960 Filed 3-24-25; 8:45 am]
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