Inspectors General: Comparison of Ways Law Enforcement Authority Is Granted (22-MAY-02, GAO-02-437). At federal offices of inspectors general (IG), criminal investigators can make warrantless arrests, obtain and execute search warrants, and carry firearms. Because IGs lack permanent statutory law enforcement authority, most presidentially appointed IGs have to request temporary deputation from the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, presidentially appointed IGs at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, and Department of the Treasury possess permanent statutory law enforcement authority and do not need to obtain DOJ's approval. IG criminal investigators who are deputized do not differ in terms of their scope of law enforcement authority, supervision, and training from their counterparts who have statutory law enforcement authority. Deputized IGs receive additional oversight over their law enforcement authority. Fifteen of the 23 deputized IGs report that statutory authority would improve their criminal investigative practices and enhance their recognition as fully authorized officers in the law enforcement community. DOJ is now considering its position on ways to provide law enforcement authority to deputized IGs. -------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- REPORTNUM: GAO-02-437 ACCNO: A02904 TITLE: Inspectors General: Comparison of Ways Law Enforcement Authority Is Granted DATE: 05/22/2002 SUBJECT: Criminal procedure Law enforcement Inspectors general Cost analysis Investigations into federal agencies Comparative analysis ****************************************************************** ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a ** ** GAO Product. ** ** ** ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although ** ** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but ** ** may not resemble those in the printed version. ** ** ** ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when ** ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed ** ** document's contents. ** ** ** ****************************************************************** GAO-02-437 Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives United States General Accounting Office GAO May 2002 INSPECTORS GENERAL Comparison of Ways Law Enforcement Authority Is Granted GAO- 02- 437 Page i GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Scope and Methodology 6 Statutory and Deputized IGs? Law Enforcement Authority is Similar, but Differences Exist in Oversight Requirements 7 Views of Deputized IGs and Other Federal Officials on Both Methods 9 No Significant Cost or Savings Would Result from Switching Deputized IGs to Statutory Authority 10 Conclusions 11 Agency Comments 11 Appendix I IG Offices That Have Made Annual Deputation Requests and Received Law Enforcement Authority 15 Departments 15 Agencies 15 Appendix II Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices 16 Appendix III Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency 23 Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Justice 26 Table Table 1: Deputized IGs? Law Enforcement Results Reported to DOJ from 1998 through 2000 8 Contents Page ii GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Abbreviations CBO Congressional Budget Office DOD Department of Defense DOJ Department of Justice FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation GSA General Services Administration HHS Department of Health and Human Services IG Inspectors General MOU memorandum of understanding OMB Office of Management and Budget OPM Office of Personnel Management PCIE President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration USDA U. S. Department of Agriculture USMS U. S. Marshals Service Page 1 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General May 22, 2002 The Honorable Dan Burton Chairman, Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: As a part of their responsibilities federal inspectors general (IGs) offices conduct criminal investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse in federal departments and programs. IG criminal investigators exercise law enforcement authority to make warrantless arrests, obtain and execute warrants, and carry firearms. Because IGs generally do not possess permanent statutory law enforcement authority, most presidentially appointed IGs have to request temporary deputation from the Department of Justice (DOJ). 1 However, three presidentially appointed IGs 2 -U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Defense (DOD), and Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)- possess permanent statutory law enforcement authority and do not need to obtain DOJ?s approval. This report responds to your request that we identify the similarities and differences between providing statutory authority and deputation to presidentially appointed IGs. Specifically, you asked us to compare the statutory authority and deputation in terms of the scope of law enforcement authority granted to the IG criminal investigators, amount of supervision and training of criminal investigators, and the extent of oversight required; 1 Deputation is the process through which some criminal investigators derive their law enforcement authority. DOJ?s U. S. Marshals Service is authorized to deputize selected persons to perform the functions of a deputy U. S. Marshal whenever considered appropriate. 2 These three presidentially appointed IGs have what has been referred to as full statutory law enforcement authority, giving their investigators the ability to, in general, make certain arrests, carry firearms, and execute search warrants. For this report, references to ?statutory authority? are used to refer to certain common characteristics of these three presidentially appointed IGs identified to us as having statutory law enforcement authority comparable to the law enforcement authority granted to the deputized IGs. United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548 Page 2 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General obtain the views of (1) IGs using deputation (deputized IGs) regarding whether statutory authority would improve their investigative practices or impact their current jurisdictions; and (2) other federal officials, including DOJ and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), regarding statutory authority and deputation; estimate the cost implications if legislation were enacted to grant statutory authority to those IGs who do not possess such law enforcement authority. To address these areas, we interviewed officials from various federal departments and agencies, including USDA, DOD, and DOJ, the FBI, and the U. S. Marshals Service (USMS), TIGTA, and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); Congressional Budget Office (CBO), General Services Administration (GSA), OMB, and Office of Personnel Management (OPM). We compared and analyzed information to determine similarities and differences associated with statutory authority and deputation. To obtain the views about specific aspects of law enforcement authority, we surveyed and received responses from all 23 deputized IGs. We reviewed CBO?s cost analysis to determine the costs involved in switching from deputation to statutory authority. We found that IG criminal investigators who are deputized do not significantly differ in terms of their scope of law enforcement authority, supervision, and training from their counterparts who have statutory law enforcement authority. We also found that deputized IGs receive additional oversight over their law enforcement authority. For example, deputized IGs must renew their law enforcement authority every 3 years and involve the FBI when initiating certain criminal investigations and other sensitive investigations. 3 In responding to our questionnaire, 15 of the 23 deputized IGs reported that having statutory authority would improve their criminal investigative practices to at least some extent and 9 of these reported that statutory authority would improve their investigative practices to a great or very great extent. Three deputized IGs said it would enhance their recognition as fully authorized officers in the law enforcement community. DOJ said it is currently considering its position on ways to provide law enforcement 3 As of January 2001, deputized IGs renewed their law enforcement authority for a 3- year period, rather than annually. Results in Brief Page 3 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General authority to deputized IGs. OMB deferred the matter for DOJ?s consideration. Deputized IGs and other federal agencies including the CBO stated that granting statutory law enforcement authority to IGs who are currently deputized would have no significant effect on federal costs since it would involve replacing one system of review and oversight with another. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the President?s Council on Integrity & Efficiency 4 (PCIE) and DOJ. The PCIE disagreed with our report message. The PCIE generally disagreed with the methodology we used for our work and with some of the conclusions they believe the report was making in regard to the impacts of using one form of law enforcement authority over another. The PCIE questioned our methodology, which compared temporary deputation with permanent statutory law enforcement authority. They stated that we should have compared deputized IGs to the provisions in the legislation (S. 3144) proposed in the last Congress rather than provisions that authorize the three IGs who have statutory law enforcement authority-- DOD, USDA, and TIGTA. The PCIE stated that the bill (S. 3144) was the only bona fide standard to compare against because it reflected the actual statutory authority that the deputized IGs were seeking. We compared deputation with the provisions of statutes that grant law enforcement authority to IGs in DOD, USDA, and TIGTA because these are the ways that IGs currently receive law enforcement authority. Importantly, the bill that the IGs referred to did not pass, and because provisions in any future legislation are subject to change, we did not believe it was appropriate to use provisions of S. 3144 in the comparison. The PCIE stated that they disagree with the draft report?s conclusion that unless significant cost savings can be associated with permanent statutory law enforcement authority, the current temporary deputation system should be retained. Our report does not state or imply such a conclusion. It accurately summarizes the information the IGs and other federal agencies, such as CBO, told us would be the cost impact of switching from 4 The council is an interagency council comprised principally of presidentially appointed and Senate- confirmed IGs, which currently operates under Executive Order No. 12805 to coordinate and enhance the work of the IGs. Page 4 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General deputation to statutory law enforcement authority. The PCIE also stated that the report incorrectly concluded that the deputation process offers greater oversight and better professional standards than permanent statutory law enforcement authority. The report reaches no such conclusion. The report states that the current deputation process involved increased oversight, such as requiring deputized IGs to renew their law enforcement authority every 3 years with DOJ. The report does not conclude that one process is better than the other. The PCIE also stated that the deputation renewal process caused an administrative burden for USMS. Our work did not support such a conclusion. The USMS told us that the deputation process has improved and that renewing deputized IG?s law enforcement authority was the easiest task of their deputation workload. DOJ neither agreed nor disagreed with our draft report. DOJ requested that our report state that DOJ has not yet taken a position on providing law enforcement authority through either statute or deputation and that the issue is under review within the Administration. Officials from PCIE and DOJ also provided technical comments that we incorporated into the report as appropriate. The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, among other things, identified specific federal departments and agencies that are required to have IGs appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 5 The act also requires each such IG to appoint an assistant inspector general for investigations to supervise the performance of investigative activities, including criminal investigations, relating to their agencies? programs and operations. Although presidentially appointed IGs have the authority to conduct criminal investigations, the IGs have not been granted across- the- board statutory law enforcement authority. 6 However, as the role of the presidentially appointed IGs in active investigations of criminal activity expanded, so too did their requests for deputation seeking the authority to make warrantless arrests, obtain and execute warrants, and carry firearms 5 Inspector General Act of 1978 (Public Law 95- 452), as amended, (codified at 5 U. S. C. App. 3 ). 6 IGs do, however, have the across- the- board power to, for example, issue subpoenas for the production of information and documents, among other things, in the performance of their investigations. Background Page 5 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General to reduce requests for assistance from other law enforcement personnel in dangerous situations. Subsequently, 23 presidentially appointed IGs? criminal investigators received law enforcement authority through caseby- case deputation granted by the USMS. Under this process, the presidentially appointed IGs applied for deputation for each criminal investigator in each case where the need was anticipated. Upon completion of the case, the deputation and its accompanying law enforcement authority expired, and the process would start over again. In 1995, in an effort to reduce paperwork and excessive delays, certain presidentially appointed IGs began receiving 1- year deputation law enforcement authority for criminal investigators. 7 Appendix I provides a list of the 23 deputized IGs who requested and received annual deputation. As of January 2001, these deputized IGs renew their law enforcement authority for a 3- year period, rather than annually. This process includes (1) requesting temporary law enforcement authority and obtaining approval from DOJ, (2) submitting a formal deputation application to DOJ, and (3) taking an oath. Deputized IGs? criminal investigators must also adhere to the terms and conditions disclosed in a DOJ memorandum of understanding (MOU). The MOU is designed to provide DOJ guidance and oversight of IG criminal investigator training and conduct of criminal investigations. Although not passed, proposed legislation (S. 3144) was introduced during the 106th Congress, which would have, among other things, provided criminal investigators in specified IG offices (see appendix I) with certain statutory law enforcement authorities. Under this bill, deputized IGs would (1) no longer be required to renew their law enforcement authority through the USMS; and (2) obtain a statutory basis for carrying firearms, making certain types of warrantless arrests, and executing warrants. In addition, the bill contained provisions for oversight over the IGs. The bill, for example, provided for ?peer reviews? of IGs by other IGs. 8 (The results of such reviews would have been forwarded to the applicable IG 7 The departments of Labor, Housing and Urban Development, State, and Transportation; Veterans Affairs, Social Security Administration, and the Small Business Administration were originally selected for the deputation pilot program. 8 Although the bill was not enacted into law, the PCIE Investigations Committee prepared a draft Guide for Conducting Qualitative Assessment Reviews for the Investigative Operations of the IGs and is conducting a nine- month pilot field- test to finalize the guide. The pilot test is scheduled to end on April 30, 2002. Page 6 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General and the Attorney General) and required DOJ?s continued oversight of IGs? activities, such as involving the FBI when initiating certain criminal investigations. In addition, the Attorney General would have the authority, under certain conditions, to rescind or suspend such law enforcement authority of these IGs. To compare the similarities and differences between providing statutory authority and deputation, we examined MOUs, federal statutes, operating manuals, and other pertinent documents between the two groups of IGs. We also interviewed officials involved with the deputation program and/ or related efforts to obtain statutory authority for the deputized IGs. This included officials in Washington, D. C., from the USMS, FBI, DOJ?s Criminal Division, OMB, and selected presidentially appointed IGs with deputation- HHS, GSA, DOJ IG, OPM, and the PCIE. In addition, we identified and interviewed three presidentially appointed IGs- USDA, DOD, TIGTA 9 -having statutory authority comparable to the law enforcement authority granted to deputized IGs. We obtained perspectives and relevant documents related to their use of law enforcement authority. We compared the scope of law enforcement authority, supervision, and training of IG criminal investigators for both methods. To obtain views of deputized IGs on whether statutory authority would improve their investigative practices or impact their current jurisdictions, we surveyed and received responses from all 23 deputized IGs (see app. II for the questionnaire). 10 To identify the cost and any savings that might result by switching from deputation to statutory authority, we reviewed congressional hearing documents and the CBO cost analysis associated with a recent legislative proposal. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOJ, OMB, CBO, and selected IGs to obtain applicable cost and savings information. 9 Statutory law enforcement authority is exercised by these IGs either through specific statutory grants to the IGs or delegations by the agency head. To illustrate, USDA IG was granted statutory law enforcement authority in 1981 (P. L. 97- 98) and TIGTA IG was granted statutory law enforcement authority in 1998 (P. L. 105- 206). DOD IG was granted certain statutory law enforcement authorities in 1997 (P. L. 105- 85) but has the authority to carry firearms under delegation from the Secretary of Defense (10 U. S. C. 1585). 10 Prior to distributing the survey questionnaire, we pretested it with the deputized IGs from HHS and GSA and made revisions accordingly. Scope and Methodology Page 7 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General We performed our work from May 2001 through May 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Regardless of the origin of law enforcement authority- either through statutory authority or deputation, IGs? scope of law enforcement authority, supervision, and training are similar. However, differences exist in the level of DOJ?s oversight given to the deputized IGs by DOJ. Whether under statute or deputation, IGs? law enforcement authority is similar. Our comparative analysis revealed that IGs have comparable duties, practices, and standards regarding their (1) scope of law enforcement authority to make warrantless arrests, obtain and execute warrants, and carry firearms; (2) supervision of criminal investigators, which generally provides for day- to- day oversight by an agency official such as a special agent- in- charge; and (3) training standards. For example, IG criminal investigators with statutory authority and IG criminal investigators with deputation train together at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center located in Glynco, Georgia. The facility provides both groups the same basic training curriculum in matters such as firearms, search and seizure, and arrest procedures as well as criminal investigator- specialized training. We found differences in the level of DOJ oversight for IGs who are deputized by DOJ. Deputized IGs must renew their law enforcement authority every 3 years, while IGs with statutory authority do not have this requirement. DOJ established a process for granting and renewing deputation that allows its deputy attorney general, Criminal Division, FBI, and the USMS to review certain aspects of deputized IGs activities. The purpose of this process is to determine whether deputized IGs continue to meet standards for (1) keeping firearms skills current, (2) providing adequate training, and (3) coordinating with federal prosecutors and other federal law enforcement agencies. Statutory and Deputized IGs? Law Enforcement Authority is Similar, but Differences Exist in Oversight Requirements Similarities Differences Page 8 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General As part of DOJ?s deputation process, deputized IGs are required to report to DOJ annually on the results they achieved, as a condition for renewing their deputation. Table 1 summarizes the results achieved with deputation from 1998 through 2000 that we identified from deputized IG responses to our survey. 11 Table 1: Deputized IGs? Law Enforcement Results Reported to DOJ from 1998 through 2000 Types of activity a Total Arrests 4,762 Searches 1,298 Protection of witness 576 Dangerous surveillance of investigative subjects 11,445 Temporary custody of federal prisoners (outside controlled environment) 1,086 Dangerous interviews 16,389 Support for undercover operations 4,561 Restraining orders 73 Dangerous subpoena service 3, 791 Assisting in electronic surveillance 8, 502 a The results exclude two deputized IGs, because the data were not provided by types of activity. Both DOJ and FBI officials told us that the reporting requirement is being re- evaluated, and DOJ said that it is outdated and no longer used as a condition for renewing deputized IGs? law enforcement authority. Furthermore, DOJ said that no deputized IG has been denied its deputation renewal request. In addition, deputized IGs are required to notify the FBI when initiating certain criminal investigations as well as work jointly with the FBI on certain other sensitive investigations. 12 The three presidentially appointed IGs with statutory authority do not have a specific statutory requirement to coordinate their investigations with the FBI. DOJ requires deputized IGs 11 The 3- year period (1998 through 2000) for which we requested information might not have been applicable to each deputized IG based on the MOU date they entered USMS?s deputation program. Also, DOJ?s IG did not provide us with reporting results, citing that it submits the agency?s annual reports directly to the deputy attorney general rather than to the Criminal Division. 12 Deputized IGs must further consult with federal prosecutors before proceeding with an investigation to ensure that an allegation, if proven, would be prosecuted. Page 9 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General and the FBI to provide each other written notification involving areas of concurrent jurisdiction. The FBI has jurisdiction in all matters involving fraud against the federal government and jointly shares this jurisdiction with the deputized IGs in matters of fraud against each IG?s agency. DOJ also requires the FBI or another federal law enforcement agency to assist the deputized IGs when conducting specific types of sensitive investigations, such as court- ordered electronic surveillance. 13 According to the FBI, the purpose of these requirements is to provide oversight in order to (1) place limits on the authority of the deputized IGs? criminal investigators, and (2) help ensure compliance with applicable DOJ guidelines, and (3) address law enforcement coordination procedures for deputized IGs when conducting their criminal investigations. As requested, we obtained views of deputized IGs and other federal officials on certain matters related to statutory authority and deputation. We found that deputized IGs prefer statutory authority to deputation and most believed statutory authority would improve their investigative practices at least to some extent. Most deputized IGs also reported that statutory authority would have little impact on their current statutory jurisdictions. Other federal officials generally believed that the current deputation process has improved. DOJ has not yet settled on its position on providing law enforcement authority to deputized IGs under either method. OMB deferred the matter for DOJ?s consideration. Fifteen of the 23 deputized IGs reported that having statutory authority would improve their criminal investigative practices to at least some extent and 9 of these reported that statutory authority would improve their investigative practices to a great or very great extent. Three of these believed that practices would be improved because statutory authority would enhance their investigators status as fully authorized officers in the law enforcement community. Further, 20 of the 23 deputized IGs reported that granting statutory authority would change their current jurisdiction of authority to little or no extent. 13 DOJ defines this category of cases to be any case involving the interception of communications pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 2510 et seq., electronic surveillance using closed circuit television in situations where a warrant is required, or any other courtordered electronic surveillance. Views of Deputized IGs and Other Federal Officials on Both Methods Deputized IGs? Views on Certain Matters Related to Statutory Authority Page 10 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General In July 2000, DOJ and OMB testified at congressional hearings in favor of a legislative proposal that would have granted statutory authority to specified IG offices. However, the issue is currently under review within the Administration, and DOJ has not yet settled on its position as of May 2002. FBI officials we interviewed said that the deputation process is a much better system of conferring law enforcement authority to the IGs because it provides greater flexibility for DOJ and appropriately places oversight responsibilities at the Attorney General level. The Attorney General has the authority to delegate these responsibilities to Justice entities including DOJ?s Criminal Division, FBI and USMS. The Attorney General has delegated this authority to USMS. Although the FBI reported no significant problems of abuse or misconduct from the deputized IGs, they continue to believe that deputation enables DOJ to ensure coordination in matters of concurrent jurisdiction. In responding to our questionnaire, OMB indicated that the issue of whether deputized IGs should be switched from deputation to statutory authority was a matter that DOJ would have to consider. Officials with DOJ?s Criminal Division, FBI, and USMS generally agree that recent improvements, including extending the deputation renewal cycle from 1 to 3 years, will ease the processing burden. Most deputized IGs believed no significant cost or savings would derive from conferring statutory authority to them. Eighteen of the 23 deputized IGs reported that no significant cost would be associated with switching them from deputation to statutory authority. The remaining 5 deputized IGs reported that some savings would be likely by eliminating administrative responsibilities associated with preparing, processing, and reviewing deputation requests and annual reports. USMS officials told us that about 2,000 of the approximately 7,500 deputations they authorize each year are for IG criminal investigators. This number will be cut by onethird in 2004 when renewals will be done every 3 years. However, USMS currently invests less than 4 staff years in its deputation responsibilities, so the overall impact on USMS?s deputation process would be minimal. USMS would be able to reduce its workload (reviewing deputation requests) by about 27 percent annually. However, beginning in January 2004, USMS will begin renewing IGs? deputation on a 3- year cycle. Officials at DOJ concurred that the cost and any savings associated with switching from deputation to statutory authority would be minimal. Other Federal Officials? Views on Statutory and Deputation Law Enforcement Authority No Significant Cost or Savings Would Result from Switching Deputized IGs to Statutory Authority Page 11 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General In addition, the CBO provided a cost estimate for a proposed bill (S. 3144) during the 106th Congress that would have granted statutory authority to specified IG offices. Because the bill would have codified powers already exercised by deputized IGs, and replaced one system of review and oversight with another, CBO estimated that implementing it would have no significant effect on federal costs. CBO told us that any costs would be less than $500,000. However, CBO told us they did not consider the potential cost related to peer review. The vice chair of the President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency 14 said at hearings that a legislative proposal to grant permanent statutory law enforcement authority to deputized IGs would have carried with it no additional costs, in part because the deputized IGs? criminal investigators already (1) exercised law enforcement authority through deputation, (2) trained as criminal investigators, and (3) participated in the federal law enforcement retirement system. Officials at OMB and CBO agreed with this cost assessment. With the exception of DOJ?s imposed oversight requirements, we could not identify any other significant differences relating to law enforcement authority between the three IGs with statutory authority and the 23 deputized IGs. To some extent, DOJ has eased its requirements by extending the deputation renewal cycle from 1 to 3 years. In addition, DOJ concedes that its requirement for annual reports from deputized IGs has become outdated, and DOJ is reassessing the need for the requirement. Some deputized IGs believe that their status would be enhanced if they were statutorily authorized. We received comments on a draft of this report from the PCIE (which presents the views of the IG community), and DOJ. The PCIE?s March 18, 2002, comments and DOJ?s March 25, 2002, comments are in appendixes III and IV, respectively. The PCIE disagreed with our report message. DOJ neither agreed nor disagreed with our report. Officials from these organizations also provided technical comments, which were incorporated into the report as appropriate. 14 The vice- chair of the council, accompanied by the chairpersons of the council?s Legislation Committee and the Investigation Committee, testified regarding legislative proposals and issues relevant to the operations of the inspectors general, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Congress, (2000). Conclusions Agency Comments Page 12 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General The PCIE felt that GAO should have focused on determining which means of providing law enforcement authority to IGs would foster the most effective investigative process. We were not requested to address this issue and therefore it was not within the scope of our work. We did however survey all 23 IGs and obtained their views on providing law enforcement authority (see our survey results on p. 8). The PCIE disagreed with our methodology comparing presidentially appointed IGs? deputation with statutory law enforcement authority. They stated that we should have compared deputized IGs? law enforcement authority to S. 3144 rather than the statutes that granted law enforcement authority to IGs at DOD, USDA, and TIGTA. The PCIE stated that S. 3144?s provisions included, among other things, the statutory law enforcement authority that they are seeking. Because legislative proposals, including proposals from a previous session of Congress, are subject to change, we do not believe it is appropriate to use S. 3144 as the basis of comparison. Moreover, based on our analysis, law enforcement authority- the authority to carry firearms, make certain arrests, and execute warrants- proposed under S. 3144 is essentially the same as granted by statute to IGs at DOD, USDA, and TIGTA. In addition, the PCIE claimed that the deputation renewal process caused an administrative burden on USMS. Our work did not support such a conclusion. The USMS told us that the deputation process has improved and that renewing deputized IGs? law enforcement authority was the easiest task of their deputation workload. The PCIE stated that the draft report seems to assume that, unless significant cost savings can be associated with permanent statutory law enforcement authority, temporary deputation should be retained. The PCIE said that it is a misperception that a decision on permanent statutory law enforcement authority for all IGs should be driven by cost considerations. We did not conclude or imply that significant cost savings should be a determining factor in deciding whether to switch deputized IGs to permanent statutory law enforcement authority. Rather, deputized IGs and other federal agencies including the CBO said that minimal costs or savings would result from switching from deputation to statutory authority. We were specifically asked by Congress to answer this question. The PCIE also said that as part of its oversight mechanisms, the proposed bill (S. 3144) would have established a peer review process among deputized IGs. The PCIE said there are no known administrative burdens associated with this approach and its implementation would not increase federal expenditures. While the operational procedures of the peer review are not known, undoubtedly any review system would have some level of PCIE Page 13 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General administrative burden and costs. For example, the PCIE?s draft peer review guidelines-? Guide for Conducting Qualitative Assessment Reviews of the Investigative Operations of Offices of Inspector General,? among other things, recommends reviewing samples of IG criminal investigators? training and basic qualification records as well as closed investigative files to ensure adherence to professional law enforcement standards. According to the PCIE, depending on the size of the IG agency or level of detail of the review, a peer review cycle could take up to 120 days. The staff resources and activities related to scheduling, conducting, and reporting results of 23 IGs? ?peer reviews? would incur time and costs. On May 3, 2002 the PCIE provided further comments on our draft report. The PCIE continued to disagree with our draft report for the basic reasons stated in their earlier comments. Also, the PCIE requested that we defer issuance of the final report until we obtain and incorporate DOJ?s current views. The PCIE said it had become aware that DOJ was close to making a decision and was optimistic that this decision will support a grant of statutory law enforcement authority to the deputized IGs. On May 7, 2002, DOJ told us that the matter is still under review within the administration with no estimated date of completion. As a result, we do not feel that it is appropriate to delay the report issuance. The PCIE also provided technical comments, which were incorporated into the report as appropriate. DOJ neither agreed nor disagreed with our draft report. DOJ requested that our report state that DOJ has not settled on a position on providing law enforcement authority through either statute or deputation and that the issue is under review within the Administration. We incorporated DOJ?s suggestion into the report. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the acting assistant attorney general for administration; director, Office of Management and Budget; director, Congressional Budget Office; and the vice chairman, President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. We will also make copies available to others upon request. This report will also be available on GAO?s home page at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me or Weldon McPhail at (202) 512- 8777. Other key contributors to this report DOJ Page 14 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General were Clarence Tull, Veronica Mayhand, Lou V. B. Smith, David Alexander, and Geoffrey Hamilton. Sincerely yours, Paul L. Jones Director, Justice Issues Appendix I: IG Offices That Have Made Annual Deputation Requests and Received Law Enforcement Authority Page 15 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General This appendix lists the 23 presidentially appointed inspectors general (IGs) who have been granted deputation through calendar year 2000 for their respective criminal investigators by the Department of Justice. Department of Commerce Department of Education Department of Energy Department of Health and Human Services Department of Housing and Urban Development Department of Interior Department of Justice Department of Labor Department of State Department of Transportation Department of the Treasury Department of Veterans Affairs Agency for International Development Environmental Protection Agency Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Federal Emergency Management Agency General Services Administration National Aeronautics and Space Administration Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Personnel Management Railroad Retirement Board Small Business Administration Social Security Administration Appendix I: IG Offices That Have Made Annual Deputation Requests and Received Law Enforcement Authority Departments Agencies Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices Page 16 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices Page 17 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices Page 18 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices Page 19 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices Page 20 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices Page 21 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized IG Offices Page 22 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix III: Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency Page 23 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix III: Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency Appendix III: Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency Page 24 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix III: Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency Page 25 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice Page 26 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice (440051) The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 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