Force Structure: Options for Enhancing the Navy's Attack
Submarine Force (14-NOV-01, GAO-02-97).
Maintaining a capable, appropriately sized submarine force is an
integral part of the United States' strategy for deterring, and,
if necessary, conducting wartime operations. Since the end of the
Cold War, significant changes in the strategic environment have
led the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce the size of its
submarine force. DOD developed four options to a carry out the
reduction: (1) refueling four SSN-688 attack submarines, (2)
refueling four SSN-688 attack submarines and, upon reaching the
end of their operational life after 10-12 years, replacing them
with four new Virginia-class attack submarines, (3) refueling and
converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs, and (4) refueling four
SSN-688 attack submarines and converting two Trident SSBNs to
SSGNs. All four options help to reverse a projected decline in
attack submarine force levels below the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Attack Submarine Study's minimum requirement of
55, but vary considerably in terms of the number of years they
allow DOD to meet this goal. Both the refueled SSN-688s and SSGNs
would be capable of performing a variety of peacetime and wartime
missions, but they differ in the extent to which they can perform
these missions. Converting four Trident ballistic missile
submarines to SSGNs is more cost-effective than the other options
in providing overseas presence.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-97
ACCNO: A02451
TITLE: Force Structure: Options for Enhancing the Navy's Attack
Submarine Force
DATE: 11/14/2001
SUBJECT: Nuclear armed submarines
Ballistic missiles
Military operations
Trident Submarine
Los Angeles Class Attack Submarine
SSN-688 Submarine
Tomahawk Cruise Missile
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Testimony. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-02-97
A
Report to the Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on Armed Services, U. S.
Senate
November 2001 FORCE STRUCTURE Options for Enhancing the Navy?s Attack
Submarine Force
GAO- 02- 97
a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
Page i GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure Letter 1
Results in Brief 3 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 5 Scope and
Methodology 5
Briefing Section I Background 8
Briefing Section II Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels 20
Briefing Section III Comparison of Mission Capabilities and Transformational
Potential 30
Briefing Section IV Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness 76
Briefing Section V Summary 80
Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 83 GAO Comments 85
Appendix II Organizations and Offices Contacted 86
Table
Table 1: Net Present Value Operational Life- Cycle Cost for Submarine Force
Options 4 Contents
Page ii GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense SEAL Sea- Air- Land (naval special forces team
member) SOF Special Operations Forces SSBN Nuclear- Powered Ballistic
Missile Submarine SSGN Nuclear- Powered Guided Missile Submarine SSN
Nuclear- Powered Attack Submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
Page 1 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
November 14, 2001 The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy Chairman The Honorable
Jeff Sessions Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on
Armed Services United States Senate
Maintaining a capable, appropriately sized submarine force is an integral
part of the United States? strategy for deterring, and, if necessary,
conducting wartime operations. Since the end of the Cold War, significant
changes in the strategic environment have led the Department of Defense
(DOD) to reduce the size of its submarine force. The United States has two
types of submarines, both of which are nuclear- powered: attack submarines
(SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Attack submarines are part of
the conventional forces and have capabilities in several mission areas
including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, undersea warfare,
strike warfare, and special operations warfare. Ballistic missile submarines
are part of the strategic forces and are capable of launching strategic
nuclear weapons upon short notice. The Trident ballistic missile submarine
force consists of 18 Ohio- class (SSBN- 726) submarines. 1 DOD has
determined that it only needs 14 Trident SSBNs to meet future requirements
for strategic weapons and developed plans in the 1990s to retire 4 of its 18
Trident SSBNs during fiscal years 2003- 2004. 2
In the 1990s, DOD also decided to retire several attack submarines by 2003
because of lower submarine force structure requirements. Most of DOD?s
current force of 55 nuclear- powered attack submarines are part of the Los
Angeles- class (SSN- 688). 3 DOD?s plan would have reduced attack
1 The first ship of the class, the U. S. S. Ohio, was commissioned in 1981.
Trident submarines take their name from the Trident ballistic missiles they
carry. 2 Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile Submarines
(SSBNs) to NuclearPowered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs), Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Final Report, June 1999.
3 There are currently 51 Los Angeles- class submarines in the force. The
first of the class, U. S. S. Los Angeles, was commissioned in 1976.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
submarine force levels to about 50. However, in 1999, a Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff study concluded that a force structure below 55 attack
submarines in 2015 and 62 attack submarines in 2025 would leave regional
military commanders- in- chief with insufficient capability to respond to
urgent critical demands. 4 To avoid the force falling below 55 with
scheduled retirements, DOD began considering options to increase attack
submarine force levels. Specifically, DOD evaluated and estimated the cost
of (1) refueling SSN- 688 class submarines and (2) refueling and converting
four Trident submarines scheduled for inactivation in fiscal years 2003-
2004. The Trident submarines were to be converted to guided missile
submarines (known as SSGN) to carry conventional Tomahawk landattack
missiles and special operations forces.
This report summarizes and updates our analyses of submarine force options
provided in briefings to your staff in June and July 2001. We evaluated
options for enhancing the attack submarine force to maintain a minimum of 55
attack submarines through 2035. To address your request, we assessed the
following options:
refueling four SSN- 688 attack submarines;
refueling four SSN- 688 attack submarines and, upon reaching the end of
their operational life after 10- 12 years, replacing them with four new
Virginia- class attack submarines; 5
refueling and converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs; and
refueling four SSN- 688 attack submarines and converting two Trident SSBNs
to SSGNs.
Our objectives were to determine how these options compare in terms of their
(1) effects on DOD?s ability to maintain at least 55 attack submarines
through fiscal year 2035, (2) capabilities to perform peacetime and wartime
missions, including their relative contributions to the Navy?s strike
mission, and their transformational potential, 6 and (3) operational
4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Attack Submarine Study, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, November 1999. 5 The Virginia- class attack submarine, formerly
called the New Attack Submarine, is the Navy?s newest class of attack
submarines. The scheduled commissioning for the first ship in the class is
in 2004.
6 Transformation is a process of change that involves developing new
operational concepts, experimenting to determine which ones work and which
do not, and implementing those that do.
Page 3 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
life- cycle costs 7 and cost- effectiveness. To assess the options? effects
on DOD?s projected submarine force structure through fiscal year 2035, we
used the Navy?s current force structure and long- range shipbuilding plans
as a baseline. The documents reflect plans to deliver 18 new Virginia- class
attack submarines by fiscal year 2016. Our analysis did not include an
assessment of the basis for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
study?s conclusion that DOD will require a minimum of 55 attack submarines
in the future. Rather, at your request, we focused on assessing options for
helping DOD to achieve this level of capability. Because each option
provides certain advantages, the weight attached to each advantage is often
subjective, and we did not assess the capabilities of other DOD weapon
systems, we have not drawn a conclusion about which option is best.
All four options help to reverse a projected decline in attack submarine
force levels below the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Attack
Submarine Study?s minimum requirement of 55, but they vary considerably in
terms of the number of years they allow DOD to meet this goal. Refueling
four SSN- 688s and replacing them with four additional Virginia- class
attack submarines once their service life expires would provide a force
level of at least 55 submarines for 32 of the 34 years during fiscal years
2002- 2035. Refueling and converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would
provide a force of 55 submarines for 28 years. Refueling four SSN- 688s and
converting two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would provide a force of 55 submarines
for 27 years. Finally, refueling four SSN- 688s without plans to replace
them with additional Virginia- class submarines would allow DOD to meet its
goal of 55 submarines for 24 of 34 years.
Both the refueled SSN- 688s and SSGNs would be capable of performing a
variety of peacetime and wartime missions, but they differ in the extent to
which they can perform these missions. Refueled SSN- 688s would have
somewhat better capabilities than SSGNs to conduct intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; support aircraft carrier battle groups;
and perform undersea and surface warfare. However, SSGNs would have
significantly better capabilities to strike targets ashore and conduct
special operations. An SSGN would provide significantly more presence
7 Operational life- cycle costs include estimated acquisition, operations,
maintenance and personnel costs during the options? projected operational
service life. Results in Brief
Page 4 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
days 8 per year than a refueled SSN- 688- 242 days versus 73 days- because
SSGNs would have two crews per submarine. These crews would be rotated
during the middle of planned deployments and, on average, would allow the
SSGNs to accrue more presence days than a refueled SSN- 688. Finally, SSGNs
would also provide a superior capability to support the Navy?s
transformation plans because their large size and longer service life could
support new technologies and weapons and because their stealth capability
should help them survive and operate in a high- threat environment.
The operational life- cycle costs and cost- effectiveness of the four
options also differ significantly. As table 1 shows, the net present value 9
life- cycle cost of the four options ranges from $1.8 billion for refueling
four SSN- 688s to $6.6 billion to refuel four SSN- 688s and to replace them
with four Virginia- class submarines upon their retirement after 10- 12
years.
Table 1: Net Present Value Operational Life- Cycle Cost for Submarine Force
Options
Dollars in billions
Option Option description Fiscal year 2001 dollars
Net present
value
1 Refuel four SSN- 688s $2.2 $1.8 2 Refuel four SSN- 688s and buy four
Virginia- class replacements 7.6 6. 6
3 Convert four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs 6.6 4. 8 4 Refuel four SSN- 688s and
convert two Trident
SSBNs to SSGNs 5.6 4. 2 Source: GAO analysis.
Converting four Trident ballistic missile submarines to SSGNs is more cost-
effective than the other options in providing overseas presence. This
option?s cost per presence day is $234,000- the lowest of any option. In
contrast, refueling four SSN- 688s and converting two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs
would cost $311,000 per day; refueling four SSN- 688s would cost
8 By presence days, we mean the number of days during a year either type of
submarine could spend deployed to overseas theaters. Presence days do not
include time in the submarines? homeport or in transit to the overseas
theaters.
9 Present value analysis converts costs occurring at different times to a
common unit of measurement by recognizing the time value of money.
Page 5 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
about $555, 000 per presence day; and refueling four SSN- 688s and replacing
them with four new Virginia- class submarines would cost $1.1 million per
day. Converting four Trident submarines to SSGNs would also provide a
significantly more cost- effective capability to launch Tomahawk missiles
and provide special operations units than the other options.
DOD's written comments on a draft of this report are included as appendix I.
The Department generally agreed with the report but noted that our cost-
effectiveness comparison did not account for platform replacement costs in
all four options or across the same number of years. As described in our
methodology section, we had to use different periods of analysis to match
the differing operational lifespans of the two submarines. Each option
provides benefits over different periods thereby making direct comparisons
difficult. However, to make the options more comparable, we included an
option that buys four Virginia- class submarines to replace refueled SSN-
688 submarines once they reach the end of their useful life. By adding the
depreciated acquisition costs and the operating and support costs for the
first 10- 12 years of the replacement submarines to the costs associated
with the refueled SSN- 688s, this option becomes more directly comparable to
the costs associated with the 20- 22 year life of the SSGN. We did not
assess options that would involve replacing SSGNs after 22 years because DOD
has not developed any requirements or cost estimates for their replacement.
DOD also noted that appropriate metrics would need to be developed for all
mission areas to fully assess SSN- 688 and SSGNs across a broad set of
missions. Our report notes that the Navy lacks suitable metrics for missions
such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Moreover, we agree
that it would be helpful if it developed such metrics.
To identify how the proposed options would affect the Navy?s submarine force
structure during fiscal years 2002- 2035, we met with Navy officials and
obtained pertinent documents concerning the Navy?s currently planned
submarine force structure for that period and options it has under
consideration for increasing that structure. We then applied those and
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology
Page 6 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
other options 10 to the currently planned force structure to determine the
effect of each over the 34- year period. We did not assess the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Attack Submarine Study?s evaluation that the Navy
needs a minimum of 55 attack submarines to meet critical demands. We
evaluated submarine force options through 2035 because the attack
submarine?s notional life- cycle is very long: an 8- year procurement period
11 followed by 33 years of operational service life.
To determine how the options to refuel SSN- 688 attack submarines or to
convert Trident SSBNs to SSGNs compared in terms of mission capabilities, we
met with joint command and Navy officials. Appendix II includes a list of
the organizations we contacted. We discussed the various missions in which
the submarines would be engaged and the capabilities of the refueled SSN-
688s and the SSGNs in performing those missions with those officials. In
addition, we analyzed information the officials provided to determine each
option?s contribution to performing those missions. We also compared the
number of presence days each option would provide. We compared the
respective capabilities of each type of submarine with surface combatants in
carrying Tomahawk land attack missiles and the contributions each would make
to peacetime and wartime operations. We also toured SSN- 688 and Trident
submarines to obtain a better understanding of their capabilities and, in
the case of Tridents, how they would be modified to accommodate special
forces and Tomahawk Land Attack missiles. To assess the submarines?
respective transformational potential we met with defense and industry
officials and reviewed several reports on their potential contributions to
transformation and experimentation. We also observed the employment of SSGNs
in a major wargame that evaluates new operational concepts.
To determine the options? life- cycle costs and compare their cost-
effectiveness, we met with Navy officials and obtained estimated
procurement, operations, maintenance, and personnel costs for the options?
respective time periods. We then determined the cost for each
10 Since the refueled SSN- 688s would have a service life of about 12 years
after refueling, we added an option of acquiring and operating four
additional Virginia- class (SSN- 774) submarines in order to have a time
period comparable to the SSGN?s 20- 22 year service life. We included 10- 12
years of Virginia- class acquisition and operating and support costs in this
option.
11 The procurement period includes 2 years for the advance procurement of
long- lead items and 6 years of construction. The procurement decision is
normally preceded by a 2- year budget cycle.
Page 7 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
option by fiscal year, converted the costs into fiscal year 2001 dollars,
and calculated each option?s net present value using a real discount rate.
Because alternative choices are being compared, we included, as appropriate,
the cost of decommissioning submarines not chosen for further service. 12 We
also combined the results of our cost and other analyses to derive a cost
per presence day, cost per Tomahawk presence day, and cost per Special
Operations Forces platoon presence day for each option.
We conducted our review between January 2001 and August 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the
Navy; the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management
and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make copies available to
others on request. The report will also be available on GAO?s Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512- 5140
or by e- mail at schusterc@ gao. gov. Major contributors to this report are
Janet St. Laurent, Roderick W. Rodgers, Tim F. Stone, Suzanne K. Wren, Mary
Jo LaCasse, Charles Perdue, and Susan Woodward.
Carol R. Schuster Director Defense Capabilities and Management
12 For example, if the four SSN- 688s were refueled, DOD would incur the
cost of decommissioning four Trident SSBNs in addition to the cost of the
SSN refueling program. Conversely, if the Trident SSBNs are refueled and
converted, DOD would need to fund decommissioning the four SSN- 688s.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 8 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The end of the Cold War led to significant changes in both the Navy?s
nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and nuclear- powered
attack submarine (SSN) forces. During the Cold War, the ballistic missile
submarine?s basic mission was to remain hidden at sea to deter a nuclear
attack on the United States. For this mission, the Navy procured 18 Ohio-
class (SSBN- 726) submarines, also referred to as Trident ballistic Briefing
Section I: Background
Briefing Section I: Background Page 9 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
missile submarines. In 1994, DOD?s Nuclear Posture Review 1 concluded that 4
of the 18 Trident SSBNs were no longer needed to support the strategic
nuclear mission. Consequently, DOD decided to inactivate rather than refuel
the vessels in fiscal years 2003- 2004.
The primary stated Cold War mission of the nuclear- powered attack submarine
force was to perform anti- submarine warfare missions against the former
Soviet submarine force. 2 To accomplish this mission the force peaked at a
Cold War high of 98 nuclear- powered attack submarines at the end of fiscal
year 1987 3 with the procurement of 62 Los Angeles- class SSN- 688
submarines in the 1970s and 1980s. Following the Cold War, the Navy began to
increase emphasis on missions that contribute to United States military
operations in littoral (near- shore) areas against regional adversaries
other than Russia. This led DOD to revise its attack submarine force level
goals downward a number of times throughout the 1990s.
In 1997, DOD?s Quadrennial Defense Review 4 established a tentative force-
level goal of 50 attack submarines but required a reevaluation of peacetime
requirements. The Deputy Secretary of Defense subsequently directed the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine DOD?s attack submarine
requirements in 2015 and 2025. In December 1999, the Chairman?s study
concluded that a force structure below 55 attack submarines in 2015 and 62
attack submarines in 2025 would leave regional military commanders- in-
chief with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands. The
study also concluded that 68 attack submarines in 2015 and 76 attack
submarines in 2025, were required to meet other high priority but less
critical demands. In April 2000, the DOD?s Defense Planning Guidance
authorized a force of up to 55 submarines taking into account the
contributions to conducting attack missions that would be provided by
converting up to four Trident SSBNs to an SSGN configuration or refueling
selected SSN- 688s.
1 The Nuclear Posture Review, undertaken in 1993, assessed policy, doctrine,
force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure,
safety, security, and arms control issues.
2 Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for Congress,
Congressional Research Service, June 2000. 3 Ship Forces of the U. S. Navy -
Historical Force Levels, Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Requirements
& Assessments), Department of the Navy. 4 The Quadrennial Defense Review is
a legislatively mandated review of military strategy and the force structure
best suited to implement the strategy.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 10 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section I: Background Page 11 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
We analyzed options one and three because they were the primary options DOD
was considering when we began our review. Because option 1 would only
provide 10- 12 years of operational service life after refueling in contrast
to the SSGN?s 20- 22 years of operations, we included a second option that
replaces these four refueled SSN- 688s at the end of their service lives
with four new Virginia- class submarines. We developed a fourth option that
refuels four SSN- 688s and converts two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 12 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 13 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The SSGNs would be much larger vessels than the refueled SSN- 688s and, as a
result, could carry more Tomahawk missiles and Special Operations Forces
personnel and equipment. The SSN- 688s proposed for refueling are early
vessels in the Los Angeles- class and were not equipped with the Vertical
Launch System for Tomahawk missiles as were later submarines in the class.
As a result, the number of Tomahawk missiles the refueled SSN- 688
submarines can carry is limited to what can be carried in the torpedo room
and the torpedo tubes. Moreover, this space must also accommodate other
weapons, further limiting the number of Tomahawks that can be carried. The
refueled SSN- 688s would not be modified to carry either dry deck shelters 5
or Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems. 6 Additionally, because of its limited
interior space, a refueled SSN- 688 would be able to embark only a limited
number of Special Operations Forces personnel for a short period of time.
The two types of submarines would use different concepts for crewing. The
SSGNs would retain the dual- crewing concept of the Trident SSBNs where each
SSGN would have two complete crews assigned. The crews would be rotated half
way through each deployment as well as when the submarines are in refit.
While one crew serves aboard the submarine, the other trains at shore- based
facilities. This would allow the SSGN to be operated more intensely than a
submarine with a single crew and extends the time the SSGN could remain
overseas. The refueled SSN- 688s would have only a single crew, as do the
Navy?s other attack submarines.
5 The dry deck shelter is a deck- mounted cylindrical shelter large enough
to house a SEAL Delivery Vehicle or a complement of rubber raiding craft.
The shelter allows the submarine to launch and recover Special Operations
Forces while submerged. The SEAL Delivery Vehicle is a small submersible
that can carry six Special Operations Forces personnel up to 35 nautical
miles from the submarine.
6 The Advanced SEAL Delivery System is a submersible with a range of 125
nautical miles that can carry up to eight Special Operations Forces
personnel and their equipment.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 14 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Navy.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 15 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The SSGNs would retain the Trident SSBNs? 24 missile tubes. However, in a
maximum strike configuration, the SSGN would carry a total of 154 Tomahawk
missiles because 22 of the tubes would be adapted to carrying up to 7
missiles per tube. The remaining two tubes would be permanently configured
to support Special Operations Forces personnel and equipment and would not
be able to carry Tomahawk missiles.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 16 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Navy.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 17 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
To support Special Operations Forces, 2 of the Trident SSBNs? 24 missile
tubes would be permanently converted to lockin/ lockout chambers. 7 Special
Operations Forces personnel could leave from and return to the submarine
while it is submerged through these chambers. Up to eight people could pass
through each chamber at a time.
Those two tubes would also serve as the attachment points for the dry deck
shelter and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System. The SSGN could carry two dry
deck shelters or, potentially, two Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems or one of
each. Additionally, when conducting Special Operations Forces missions, up
to eight of the missile tubes could be reconfigured to stow Special
Operations Forces equipment- leaving the submarine with a capacity for 98
Tomahawk missiles.
7 According to Navy officials, because of budgetary and long- lead
production considerations, only one lockin/ lockout chamber may be installed
in each of the first two SSGNs.
Briefing Section I: Background Page 18 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section I: Background Page 19 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Although it is not yet in force, the START II treaty will limit the United
States to no more than 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads- of which no more
than 1,750 may be attributed to submarine- launched ballistic missiles-
after December 31, 2007. 8
The Navy has proposed two variants for the converting Trident SSBNs to SSGNs
each of which has different implications under the terms of the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II). Under the START accountable
variant, the warheads that the Trident strategic nuclear missiles originally
carried aboard the submarines would still count against the United States?
START I/ II limits because the missile tubes on the submarines would only be
modified, not removed. Under the START compliant variant, the submarines
would not count against the warhead limits because the original missile
tubes designed for the Trident missiles would be removed and smaller tubes
incapable of launching any strategic missiles would be installed. 9
The Navy?s analysis has primarily focused on the accountable variant due to
cost and schedule considerations. This variant?s cost is lower (about 50
percent less than the compliant version according to the Navy?s original
estimates). Additionally, Navy officials said that insufficient time remains
to plan for and acquire the long- lead time material that would be needed to
modify the first two Ohio- class Trident SSBNs to a START- compliant SSGN
before those submarines must be refueled.
The current administration is considering changes in United States nuclear/
strategic policy that could reduce the number of warheads the United States
deems necessary to maintain a strong nuclear posture. These changes could
reduce concerns over the conversions of the Trident SSBNs to SSGNs.
8 It is Defense?s policy that weapons system programs address pending arms
control issues. 9 The protocol on procedures governing conversions and
eliminations of the START I treaty delineates the elimination procedures.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 20 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 21 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The baseline force shown in this figure reflects the number of submarines
included in DOD?s 2002 amended budget and DOD?s long- range shipbuilding
plan 10 but does not include any of submarines associated with the four
options we analyzed. 11 Unless DOD proceeds with one of these options, it
would not have 55 submarines in the force for 19 of 34 years from fiscal
years 2002- 2035. As noted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that a force
structure below this level would not meet requirements.
10 Report on Naval Vessel Force Structure Requirements, Department of
Defense, June 2000. 11 The baseline does not include (1) one SSN- 688
refueling and two Trident SSBN to SSGNs conversions that are included in the
President?s fiscal year 2002 budget request; (2) three SSN- 688s that could
be refueled in fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005; and, (3) two additional
Trident SSBNs that have been identified for potential conversion to SSGNs.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 22 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 23 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Refueling four SSN- 688s would enable the Navy to maintain a force level of
55 submarines for 24 of 34 years in the 2002- 2035 time frame. In fiscal
years 2017- 2020 and fiscal years 2027- 2030, the force level would fall
below 55 submarines because refueled SSN- 688s would have exhausted their
useful hull life, and other attack submarines would have reached the end of
their useful hull or nuclear reactor core lives.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 24 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 25 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
This option (1) provides four refueled SSN- 688s and (2) upon their
retirement (10- 12 years after refueling they reach their 33- year hull
life), replaces them with four Virginia- class submarines. These four
submarines are in addition to the Virginia- class submarines included in
DOD?s planned force. The option assumes that the Navy would procure
additional submarines upon the retirement of the refueled SSN- 688s in order
to sustain future force levels. It would enable the Navy to maintain a
minimum of 55 submarines in 32 of 34 years during the 2002- 2035 time frame-
significantly longer than the SSN- 688 refueling option alone.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 26 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 27 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Converting four Trident SSBNs 12 into SSGNs would enable the Navy to sustain
a force of at least 55 attack submarines for 28 of 34 years during 2002-
2035. This option would not keep pace with planned attack submarine
retirements leading to a force of less than 55 submarines during fiscal
years 2002- 2003 and fiscal years 2027- 2030.
12 With their 42- year service life, Trident SSBNs could, if refueled,
overhauled, and converted to a conventional SSGN configuration, remain in
service until 2023- 2026.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 28 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels
Page 29 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Option 4 would enhance the force by refueling four SSN- 688s and funding
conversion of two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs. This option would enable the Navy
to sustain a force of at least 55 attack submarines for 27 of 34 years
during 2002- 2035. Funding for the conversion of two additional Trident
SSBNs to SSGNs is on the Navy?s fiscal year 2002 unfunded priorities list.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 30 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: GAO?s analysis.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 31 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
We compared the capabilities of the refueled SSN- 688 and SSGN options in
seven mission areas and on their transformational potential. We selected
these capabilities because they comprise the primary roles for both the SSN-
688 and SSGN, according to Navy officials. We also assessed the submarines?
transformational potential. To address specific questions raised by the
Subcommittee about Navy capabilities to conduct strike operations, we also
compared the respective capabilities of each type of submarine with surface
combatants in carrying Tomahawk missiles.
The refueled SSN- 688 and SSGN differ in many respects and have different
strengths. While these platforms can perform many of the same missions, they
would not be viewed as interchangeable and would be assigned different
peacetime and warfighting roles. The refueled SSN- 688s would be assigned
traditional nuclear attack submarine type missions: intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; undersea and surface warfare; and battle
group support. SSGN missions would emphasize providing a forward presence of
large volume precision strike and Special Operations Forces. In addition,
the amount of space available on the SSGN would allow for experimentation
with new technologies and concepts and for fielding transformational
capabilities in the future.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 32 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 33 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
In strike warfare, Navy aircraft and ships attack targets ashore. The
Tomahawk missile is a principal strike weapon that submarines, cruisers, and
destroyers employ. 1 However, these ships also carry other weapons for other
warfare tasks and those weapons compete with the Tomahawk missiles for
launcher/ magazine space aboard the ships. For example, in addition to
Tomahawk missiles, submarines carry torpedoes and mines while cruisers and
destroyers carry surface to air missiles.
Compared to the refueled SSN- 688s, the SSGNs would provide a superior
warfare capability as strike platforms because they would carry more
Tomahawk missiles. Depending on the amount and type of special operations
equipment carried, an SSGN could carry from 98 to 154 Tomahawk missiles
while a refueled SSN- 688 could carry no more than 26- all of which must be
launched through the submarine?s four torpedo tubes- and would typically
carry fewer.
SSGNs would also have another advantage in that they could fire all their
Tomahawk missiles in one salvo or launch operation. According to Navy
officials, doing so can preserve the element of surprise, eliminate the
opportunity for the targets to move, and allow a vessel to rapidly attack
multiple targets. But, because a refueled SSN- 688 launches its Tomahawks
from its torpedo tubes, its salvo size is limited to the number of its
torpedo tubes- four.
1 Modern U. S. Navy guided missile cruisers are multi- mission surface
combatants capable of supporting carrier battle groups, amphibious forces,
or of operating independently and as flagships of surface action groups. The
cruisers are equipped with Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles giving them
additional long range strike mission capability. Destroyers and guided
missile destroyers operate in support of carrier battle groups, surface
action groups, amphibious groups and replenishment groups. Destroyers
primarily perform anti- submarine warfare duty while guided missile
destroyers are multi- mission surface combatants. The addition of the
Tomahawk capable vertical launch system to many
Spruance- class destroyers has greatly expanded the role of the destroyer in
strike warfare. The Navy is planning a new destroyer, the Zumwalt- class
Land Attack Destroyer, that will carry Tomahawks and other missiles.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 34 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
As a strike warfare platform, an SSGN and a refueled SSN- 688 would have
several advantages compared to cruisers and destroyers. Because of its
covertness when operating submerged, a potential adversary would not be
alerted to an SSGN?s or a refueled SSN- 688?s presence. Additionally, as
adversaries become increasingly capable of detecting and attacking U. S.
surface ships, an SSGN or a refueled SSN- 688 would be less vulnerable to
enemy attack than would surface ships.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 35 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
In addition, converting Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would free up launcher space
on other vessels for carrying out other missions. For example, other
submarines could carry more torpedoes and cruisers and destroyers could
carry more surface- to- air missiles. Also, with an SSGN present, these
other vessels, unencumbered by the strike mission, would be able to
concentrate on other tasks such as conducting intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance operations or maritime intercept operations.
SSGNs would also carry many more Tomahawks than either cruisers or
destroyers. Based on notional loads- the mix and number of weapons a vessel
carries that is used for planning purposes 2 -one SSGN can carry as many
Tomahawks as three to four cruisers and/ or destroyers.
However, officials told us that unless Tomahawk missile inventories are
increased the full benefits from the proposed SSGN conversions may not be
realized. They stated that DOD?s low inventory of Tomahawk missiles is more
important to address than the number and capacities of the available
Tomahawk launch vessels. Precision- guided munitions top a list of unfunded
priorities created by the commander- in- chiefs of the Atlantic and Pacific
Fleets. The Navy currently plans to use existing Tomahawk missiles for the
SSGNs. It plans to remove most torpedo tube- launched Tomahawks from all
submarines to load the SSGNs. These shortfalls will persist under DOD?s
current budget plans. Moreover, while service officials have not expressed
any concerns about a shortage of vessels available to launch Tomahawk
missiles, they have expressed concerns over the current Tomahawk inventory
shortfalls to include their ability to carryout war plans.
They also pointed out that concentrating more missiles on fewer launch
vessels could limit a commander?s flexibility in employing the missiles.
Additionally, with fewer launch vessels, the impact of a single maintenance
failure would be greater.
2 In our analysis, we used the same notional loads for surface ships that
the Navy uses in its ordnance requirements determination process. We used
Navy proposed loads for the submarines. Those proposed loads assume that
most torpedo- launched Tomahawk missiles will be withdrawn from all attack
submarines.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 36 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 37 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
From a fleetwide perspective, the effect of the options on the Navy?s
overall Tomahawk capability would be small. In analyzing Tomahawk
capability, we used launcher capability for Navy surface ships and
submarines, adjusted for notional weapons loads used by the Navy. Based on
notional loads 3 and the number and composition of ships expected to be in
the fleet in 2010, 4 fleetwide Tomahawk capability would only increase by
about 2 percent if the four SSN- 688s were refueled. The four SSGNs would
increase fleet- wide Tomahawk capability by about 2 percent. The increase
from converting two SSGNs and refueling the four SSN- 688s would also be
about 2 percent.
Overall, submarines- those attack submarines equipped with the Vertical
Launch System and four SSGNs- would comprise about 25 percent of the fleet-
wide notional load capability in 2010- about the same percentage as in the
current fleet.
3 Our analysis assumes that most torpedo tube- launched Tomahawks are
withdrawn from all attack submarines if four Trident SSBNs are converted to
SSGNs according to current Navy plans. If only two Trident SSBNs are
converted, about half the torpedo tube- launched Tomahawks would be
withdrawn. SSN- 688s with the Vertical Launch System will still carry
Tomahawks.
4 Our analysis was based on a planned force of 135 ships and submarines.
Because its design has not been definitized, we did not include any DD- 21s
in our analysis.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 38 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 39 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Our analysis shows that an SSGN with a full Tomahawk strike load (154
missiles) would increase the Tomahawk missiles available in a theater during
peacetime by about 64 percent over the number that would be available in a
notional carrier battle group alone. If the SSGN was configured to provide a
maximum special operations forces capability, 5 the number of available
Tomahawks would increase by about 38 percent.
5 The SSGN would carry 98 Tomahawk missiles in this configuration because
the special operations forces equipment would displace up to 56 missiles.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 40 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 41 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
A force of four SSGNs would make a substantial initial Tomahawk contribution
to a major theater war, but its contribution would decrease as the war
progresses. As a ?survivable? strike weapon, 6 Tomahawks would be heavily
engaged in a conflict?s opening stages, primarily attacking and degrading
the adversary?s air defense system, thus reducing the risk of loss of U. S.
manned strike aircraft. However, Tomahawk?s role would diminish as the war
progresses because the targets would become more suitable for attack by
manned strike aircraft.
If, at the beginning of a conflict, one carrier battle group 7 and one SSGN
with a maximum strike load of Tomahawk missiles were present in the theater,
we estimate that the SSGN would provide about 44 percent of the total
Tomahawks available. If warning was sufficient to allow a second SSGN 8 to
deploy to the region before the conflict started, the two SSGNs would carry
about 56 per cent of the total number of Tomahawks available to the theater
commander when the conflict started.
As the war progresses, additional U. S. forces would flow into the theater.
These forces would include several additional carrier battle groups and
could include a third SSGN (in the maximum strike configuration). That SSGN
would carry about 21 percent of the Tomahawks the additional forces would
bring into the theater. 9
6 The Air Force?s B- 2 bomber and F- 117 fighter are also ?survivable?
strike weapons. 7 Our analysis is based on the same notional carrier battle
group we used earlier- two guided missile cruisers, two guided missile
destroyers, and two VLS- equipped SSN- 688 submarines.
8 We assumed the second SSGN would be configured for special operations
forces operations and, thus, would have a load of 98 Tomahawk missiles. 9
This assumes that the ships and submarines initially engaged do not
replenish their original Tomahawk loads after firing all their missiles and
does not take in to account the missiles on other Tomahawk- capable ships
and submarines that may be in the theater.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 42 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 43 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
A two SSGN force?s contribution to a major theater war would be less
substantial than that of a four- SSGN force- both in the initial phase and
as additional forces flow into the theater. A maximum strike configured SSGN
operating with a carrier battle group would still provide about 44 percent
of the total Tomahawk missiles available at the beginning of the conflict.
But with only two SSGNs in the force, it would be less likely that a second
SSGN, in either a strike or Special Operations Forces configuration, would
be able to deploy to the region by the start of the conflict. Thus, either
fewer Tomahawks would be available for the initial strikes of the conflict
or other vessels would have to be tasked to carry the Tomahawks that a
second SSGN would have carried.
Assuming that the second SSGN deploying to the theater with the additional
carrier battle groups would be configured for special operations forces, it
would carry about 15 percent of the Tomahawks the additional forces would
bring into the theater. 10
10 This assumes the theater commander wanted one SSGN configured for strike
and the other configured for special operations.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 44 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 45 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
United States special operations forces operate in hostile, denied, or
politically sensitive areas to conduct a range of special operations, such
as seizing and destroying weapons of mass destruction and striking targets
deep within enemy areas. To conduct these operations, special forces are
inserted into an area by fixed- wing aircraft, helicopter, surface craft, or
submarines; however, only submarines provide a highly clandestine insertion
platform that can remain on station for weeks at a time.
The SSGN would provide special operations forces capability superior to that
of the refueled SSN- 688s. The SSGN?s larger space for special operations
forces personnel, mission planning, physical fitness, and equipment storage
would enable special operations forces to remain on station for about 90 or
more days as opposed to the 14 days provided by a refueled SSN- 688.
Because of their limited remaining hull life and technical considerations
with the older submarines, Navy officials told us the refueled SSN- 688s
would not be modified to carry dry deck shelters or Advanced SEAL Delivery
Systems and they would only provide a marginal special operations forces
capability. Furthermore, the refueled SSN- 688s would be the older ones of
their class, with limited available space for upgrades, older combat
systems, and greater acoustic signature.
The SSGN would provide the only option to replace the dual dry deck shelter
capability lost with the inactivation of the U. S. S. Kamehameha in October
2001. 11 Dual host capability provides a long endurance, stealthy, mobile
operating base for conducting multiple special operations forces missions
over an extended period of time. Although a limited number of SSN- 688
submarines have been modified to carry one dry deck shelter or Advanced SEAL
Delivery System, a DOD study notes that an SSGN with two Advanced SEAL
Delivery Systems could conduct 50 percent more missions than two SSNs with a
single Advanced SEAL Delivery System. 12
11 The U. S. S. Kamehameha is a ballistic missile submarine that has been
modified to carry two dry deck shelters and special operations forces. 12
Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
to Nuclear- Powered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs), Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Final Report, March 1999.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 46 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Navy.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 47 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
In converting to the SSGN design, the Trident SSBN would be modified to
carry two dry deck shelters, two Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems, 13 or one
of each. The dry deck shelter is a large steel structure attached to the
outside of specially configured submarines. It can be used to transport and
launch a SEAL Delivery Vehicle or to lockout special operations forces
personnel. The SEAL Delivery Vehicle is a small, wet, battery- powered
submarine that is stowed in, and launched from the dry deck shelter. It
operates in shallow waters near the coastline. The SEAL Delivery Vehicle is
termed a wet submarine since the interior, containing the crew and cargo, is
fully flooded during submerged operations. Crew and passengers wear scuba
gear or use the SEAL Delivery Vehicle?s auxiliary life support system during
transit. Because SEALS are exposed to the water, they have limited endurance
while in the SEAL Delivery Vehicle.
The Advanced SEAL Delivery System is a small dry battery powered submarine
that can clandestinely insert special operations forces. The Advanced SEAL
Delivery System will eliminate diver exposure to water temperatures during
transit; have significantly greater range, operating depth, and loiter
capabilities; and carry more special operations forces than the SEAL
Delivery Vehicle. Currently, the Advanced SEAL Delivery System is undergoing
testing.
13 Further tests must be conducted before a final decision can be made to
provide the SSGNs with a dual- Advanced SEAL Delivery System capability.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 48 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 49 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The SSGN?s special operations forces capabilities exceed those of the
refueled SSN- 688s on every measure of mission effectiveness. Special
Operations Command officials stated that these older SSNs are not expected
to be used for special operations forces operations because they will not be
modified to carry either a dry deck shelter or Advanced SEAL Delivery
System. They could, however, embark one special operations forces platoon of
16 personnel in a crisis for 14 days. In contrast, the SSGN would normally
carry 66 special operations forces personnel for about 90 days and could
surge to 102 for short periods of time, if needed. The SSGNs extended
endurance would allow them to conduct multiple special operations forces
missions. The SSGNs would be equipped with up to two 9- man lock- out
chambers 14 while the SSNs would only possess an escape trunk that can be
used by two to three personnel at a time without their specialized
equipment. The SSNs would lack dedicated mission readiness facilities such
as: crew berthing, physical fitness, and mission planning space crucial to
sustaining special operations forces for extended periods of time.
14 The chamber has capacity for nine people but one person is an operator.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 50 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 51 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Submarines provide a critical intelligence- gathering capability unavailable
through other national assets. With their multiple sensors, submarines can
monitor events in the air, on the surface, or subsurface littoral areas and
can collect a wide variety of intelligence data, including acoustic,
signals, visual, and environmental information. Submarines also serve as a
?force- multiplier,? by alerting other assets to high interest events. Since
submarines can operate in areas inaccessible to other platforms or systems,
they can intercept signals of crucial importance to unfolding international
events. Moreover, a submarine?s ability to loiter for extended periods of
time allows it to collect vital information without alerting adversaries to
modify their behavior.
According to Navy officials, the refueled SSN- 688 would be a more capable
intelligence collection platform than the SSGN. The refueled SSN- 688 would
have better acoustic and signals intelligence capability to identify the
sound signatures of other submarines and to direct, intercept, and determine
the bearing of communications. The refueled SSN- 688s would also have the
low- band sensors for close- in missions that the SSGN would not have. The
refueled SSNs and SSGNs would have an equal ability to be upgraded to
observe visual phenomenon such as tests above the sea?s surface that would
otherwise elude national systems and to use sonar to image the ocean floor,
identify mines, and conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
Navy officials further stated that although the SSGN would not be as capable
an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform as the refueled
SSN- 688s, it would remain extremely quiet and would have an inherent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. The SSGN could be
called upon to perform certain intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions, as was the converted ballistic missile submarine U.
S. S. Kamehameha. Because of its size, the SSGNs? antennas and modularity 15
would be superior to the refueled SSN- 688s. As such, the SSGN would have a
better capability to share data than the refueled SSN- 688 and to accept new
and improved technology and sensors. However, the SSGN would have less
capability to perform acoustic and signals intelligence gathering.
15 Modular construction uses standardized units or dimensions for flexible
use. Use of modular design techniques, open architecture, and commercial
off- the- shelf components permits rapid, less expensive modernization of
submarines.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 52 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 53 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Undersea Warfare includes detecting and destroying enemy submarines
(antisubmarine warfare) and laying and countering enemy mines (mine
warfare). According to Navy officials, the refueled SSN- 688s would provide
a greater undersea warfare capability than the SSGNs because they would have
a better acoustic sensor suite and they would be able to carry more than
twice the number of torpedoes as an SSGN; 16 however, the SSGNs? size,
flexibility, and growth volume make them ideal platforms for new initiatives
in undersea warfare. Crews of the SSN- 688s and SSGNs would be trained to
the same undersea warfare standard, but, according to Navy officials,
undersea warfare would be a primary mission for the refueled SSNs and a
secondary mission for the SSGNs.
The refueled SSN- 688s? sensors for identifying other submarines and for
intercepting communications and determining their bearing would be slightly
better than those on the SSGNs. According to Navy officials, the Navy has a
limited number of mines and equipment necessary to allow submarines and
other ships to lay them; however, because of this shortage, SSNs are not
typically configured to conduct these operations. Although the SSGN could be
modified to lay mines, the Navy does not plan to use it to do this. The SSGN
would not be able to carry as many mines as the refueled SSN- 688 due to its
smaller torpedo room. Even though the Navy does not plan to use the SSGN for
mine warfare missions, it has the potential for launching unmanned
underwater vehicles, which are stored and launched from a submarine?s
missile tubes. These vehicles would allow submarines to covertly detect and
report dangerous mine areas without risk to other naval forces. The SSGNs
would have more available space than the refueled SSN- 688s for using this
technology.
16 Depending on their mission, submarines deploy with a mix of torpedoes,
Tomahawk cruise missiles, and mines. Torpedoes are the Navy?s principal
weapons for destroying enemy submarines.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 54 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 55 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Surface Warfare involves detecting and destroying enemy surface ships. To
detect and destroy surface ships, submarines are equipped with advanced
sensors and weapon systems. According to Navy officials, the refueled SSN-
688 and the SSGN would have similar sensors, but the refueled SSN- 688 would
have a larger torpedo room and would be able to carry twice as many
torpedoes as the SSGN. While the crews of the refueled SSN- 688s and SSGNs
would be trained to the same standard, Surface Warfare would be a primary
mission for the refueled SSN- 688s and a secondary mission for the SSGNs.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 56 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 57 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
A carrier battle group is a combat formation of ships and aircraft formed to
provide a balanced force that would be capable of dealing with a variety of
threats. The collective capabilities of the battle group would allow it to
carry out tasks such as supporting peacetime presence requirements,
maintaining control of designated airspace areas, and projecting power
ashore. Carrier battle groups are comprised of similar types of ships,
typically including an aircraft carrier, two guided missile cruisers, a
guided missile destroyer, a frigate, two attack submarines, and a supply
ship.
Battle group support operations are a primary nuclear- powered attack
submarine mission, and two typically deploy with each battle group. Refueled
SSN- 688s would provide protection, surveillance, and intelligence support
to the battle group and their torpedoes contribute to the battle group?s
defense against enemy submarines and surface ships. In addition, the speed
of the SSN- 688s is more comparable to the speed of the carrier battle
group.
The SSGNs would not routinely be used to provide continuous battle group
support. While the SSGN would have many of the necessary capabilities to
conduct these operations, Navy officials told us that the SSGN would be
employed as a ?theater asset? reporting directly to the regional commander
in chief and not in direct support of the battle group commander. Moreover,
the SSGN would not routinely be scheduled to deploy with carrier battle
groups but instead would remain on deployment for extended periods.
Further, with its massive load of Tomahawk missiles and special operations
forces personnel, the SSGN is best suited to perform strike and special
forces missions. As such, officials stated that it would not be prudent to
place its large weapons load at risk in conducting battle group support
operations for which it is not ideally suited.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 58 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The extent to which submarines would actually be forward deployed in a
theater of operations is referred to as ?presence.? Forward presence
activities include mission operations (e. g., intelligence gathering,
surveillance, and missile patrols), engagements and exercises with U. S. and
multinational units, maintenance performed while forwardly deployed, port
visits, and inter- and intra- theater transits.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 59 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
While either refueling four SSN- 688s or refueling and converting four
Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would add four submarines to the fleet, the options
do not provide equal forward presence capability. The dual crewing of the
Trident force would enable four SSGNs to provide more forward presence than
four refueled SSN- 688s. 17 A DOD analysis concluded that 8- 10 single- crew
ships (such as the SSN- 688s being considered for refueling) would be
required to provide the same level of forward presence capability as four
dual crewed SSGNs. 18
According to an analysis performed for the Navy, a fleet of four SSGNs could
provide on average a total 2.65 submarines deployed in three theaters and
the flexibility to surge from theater to theater. 19 In contrast, four
refueled SSN- 688s would provide less than one submarine forwardly deployed.
The Navy has not fully analyzed the forward presence coverage that a force
of two SSGNs would provide. However, officials note that two ships can only
provide continuous presence in one theater and that employing only two SSGNs
reduces schedule flexibility. In addition, the two SSGN option would reduce
the availability of the SSGN to free up other naval forces such as
destroyers and attack submarines for higher priority missions such as
theater ballistic missile defense, anti- air warfare, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and sea control. Furthermore, officials
told us that it would make economic and logistical sense to base a force of
two SSGNs in one homeport rather than a homeport on each U. S. coast.
However, basing two SSGNs on a single coast would mean that either the
Pacific or European theaters would not routinely reap the deployment
benefits of the SSGN.
17 The SSGN?s concept of operations is a preliminary estimate based on the
Trident SSBN and attack submarine historical deployment structures and
maintenance patterns, the Trident submarine?s high deployment tempo and
extended deployments demonstrated in a series of strategic submarine
exercised called Submarine Continuity of Operations. For further
information, see Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile
Submarines (SSBNs) to Nuclear- Powered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs),
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Final Report, June 1999.
18 Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile Submarines
(SSBNs) to Nuclear- Powered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs), Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Final Report, March 1999.
19 Trident SSGN Marginal Utility Analysis: 2010 Peacetime Presence, Center
for Naval Analyses, March 2001.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 60 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 61 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The SSGN?s presence capabilities exceed those of the SSN- 688s proposed for
refueling. Each SSGN would provide 242 presence days per year for a total of
968 days for a force of four SSGNs. In contrast, a refueled SSN- 688 would
provide only 73 presence days per year or 292 presence days for a force of
four SSNs.
As noted earlier, the SSGN would provide vastly greater Tomahawk presence
days with an average of 334 Tomahawks per day in- theater for a four SSGN
force. 20 In contrast, four refueled SSN- 688s would only provide an average
of 10 Tomahawks per day in- theater at any given time.
Similarly, four SSGNs would provide an average of 14 special operations
forces platoons in- theater. In contrast, refueled SSN- 688s could surge up
to one platoon for a limited duration.
20 This assumes a load of 98 and 154 Tomahawk missiles in the special
operations and maximum strike configurations, respectively.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 62 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 63 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
In December 1999, the Chairman?s study concluded that a force structure
below 55 attack submarines in 2015 and 62 attack submarines in 2025 would
leave regional military commanders- in- chief with insufficient capability
to respond to urgent crucial demands. A force of 55 attack submarines
provides just over 4,000 days of presence in overseas theaters each year (an
attack submarine provides 73 presence days annually) and 62 attack
submarines would provide about 4,500 presence days. The study also concluded
that 68 attack submarines in 2015 and 76 in 2025, were required to meet
other high priority but less critical demands. These force levels would
equate to 5,000 and 5,500 presence days, respectively. 21
Our review did not evaluate the validity of the study?s force structure
recommendations, although we did examine the extent to which the proposed
options would help DOD achieve the lower of these goals established by this
study.
Without additional submarines the baseline force would not meet attack
submarine presence day goals for 19 years between 2002 and 2035.
21 We rounded presence days to the nearest hundred.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 64 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 65 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Of the proposed options, refueling four SSN- 688s contributes the least
toward meeting DOD?s presence day goals. This option helps DOD to achieve
its presence day goals for 9 additional years (from 2004 to 2012) above that
provided by the baseline force. However, DOD would still be unable to meet
its presence day goals for 10 years between 2002 and 2035.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 66 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 67 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Refueling four SSN- 688s and replacing them with Virginia- class submarines
helps DOD achieve its presence day force structure goals for 17 additional
years over that provided by the baseline force. DOD would be unable to meet
its presence day goals in only 2002- 2003. This is the only option that
would have no presence day gaps between 2004- 2035.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 68 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 69 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Of the proposed options, converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs contributes
the most presence days and helps DOD achieve its presence day goal for 14
additional years over that provided by the baseline force. With the four
SSGN option, DOD would fall short of its presence day goal for only 5 years
(between fiscal year 2002 and 2035).
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 70 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 71 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Option 4 would enhance the submarine force by refueling four SSN- 688s and
converting two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs. This option helps DOD achieve its
presence day goals for 13 additional years over that provided by the
baseline force. However, DOD would fall short of its presence day goal for 6
years (fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and fiscal years 2027 to 2030).
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 72 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 73 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
One goal of naval transformation efforts is to counter challenges expected
in the future. One of the challenges facing the Navy is the use of anti-
access or area denial strategies by potential adversaries. Such strategies
aim to deny U. S. forces access to the ports, airfields, bases, and near-
shore sea areas they depend on to conduct military operations. Systems
intended to counter U. S. naval forces in littoral areas could include
advanced diesel- electric submarines, mines, anti- ship cruise missiles,
air- defense systems, and potentially, weapons of mass destruction. Defense
analysts 22 envision that undersea platforms that can penetrate these areas
do not require forward basing agreements and would be of increased value in
the future. The Navy?s current submarine transformation efforts include a
project on ideas for expanding the number and variety of weapons and sensors
carried by Navy attack submarines.
Transformation advocates have identified the SSGN as having transformational
potential while the refueled SSN- 688s would provide no new capabilities and
have limited remaining hull life and available volume for upgrades. As a
quiet, self- sustaining undersea platform, the SSGN could penetrate the
littoral battlespace and counter area denial tactics. The large size and
stability of the SSGN would allow for modifications to enable
experimentation with future concepts and such potentially transformational
capabilities.
Officials noted, however, that a two SSGN class would provide less
flexibility than the four- ship class to conduct joint experimentation,
transformational concept development and special operations forces
operations while at the same time attempting to provide any significant
amount of forward presence.
22 A Strategy for a Long Peace, Kosiak, Krepinevich, and Vickers, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2001.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 74 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Transformation advocates have long identified the SSGN as having
transformational potential. In 1996, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments identified the SSGN as a promising alternative for the Navy?s
?restructuring efforts.? 23 In 1997, the National Defense Panel, created by
Congress to review the 1997 QDR and assess force alternatives, recommended
that the Navy look closely at converting Trident SSBNs to
23 A Navy for a New Era, Krepinevich, Andrew, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, May 1996.
Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
Transformational Potential
Page 75 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
alternative missions. 24 In 1998, The Defense Science Board Study ?Joint
Operational Superiority in the 21st Century? also endorsed the SSGN concept.
In addition, Congress has had continuing interest in the SSGN concept and
has provided funding for studies and initial design work.
The continuing interest in the SSGN concept by transformation advocates
stems from the SSGN?s transformational features. First, the SSGN?s stealth
would be advantageous to survival in the crowded near shore waters where the
Navy expects to operate in the 21st century. The SSGN would be able to
operate covertly near enemy coasts undetected for weeks or months, if
necessary. Second, its speed, mobility, and range combined with large,
flexible payloads would enable it to respond to a variety of developing
world events. Third, because submarines do not require extensive logistics
support to operate forwardly they would not be dependent on vulnerable
forward bases or surface assets. Fourth, the SSGN?s precision- guided
Tomahawk missiles would reach distant targets about 1,000 miles away,
providing extensive strike capability into areas denied other U. S. forces.
Furthermore, it would have the potential to carry follow- on weapons such as
unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles, improved communications and other new
technologies to counter emerging threats. Fifth, the Navy has made a concept
known as network centric warfare the centerpiece of its efforts to transform
its forces. 25 With its improved communications, large antennas for sharing
data and the ability to network with other naval and joint warfighting
elements the SSGN would further contribute to the Navy?s vision for network
centric warfare. Sixth, the SSGNs combination of stealth, intelligence
gathering, and special operations capability would enable it to conduct its
own unique forms of information warfare. And finally, war games and
experimentation with the SSGN show its potential for using a mix of
shortreaction strike weapons and enhanced intelligence collection
capabilities to counter the challenge of mobile targets.
24 Report of the National Defense Panel: Transforming Defense and National
Security in the 21st Century, Odeen, Philip A., et al., December 1997. 25
Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and Focused
(GAO- 01- 853, Aug. 2001).
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness
Page 76 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
To compare the operational life- cycle cost of the options, we obtained
estimated procurement, operations, maintenance, and personnel costs;
determined the funds needed in each fiscal year for each option; converted
the costs into fiscal year 2001 dollars; and calculated each option?s net
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options?
Life- Cycle Costs and Cost- Effectiveness
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness
Page 77 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
present value. 1 Because alternative choices are being compared we included
the cost of decommissionings that are a consequence of that choice. For
example, if the choice is to refuel SSN- 688s, DOD would incur the cost of
decommissioning four Trident SSBNs (about $425 million) in addition to the
cost of the SSN- 688 refueling program. On the other hand, if the choice
were to refuel and convert Trident SSBNs, DOD would need to spend about $200
million to decommission four SSN- 688s.
Each of the force structure options provides benefits over different time
periods making direct comparisons difficult. Refueling of SSN- 688s covers a
period of 10 to 12 years of operational service whereas converting Trident
SSBNs into SSGNs covers a period of 20 to 22 years of operational service.
Because the SSN- 688 refueling option does not sustain force level goals of
55 submarines beyond 2016 we considered a third option that buys Virginia-
class submarine replacements for decommissioning refueled SSN- 688s.
Virginia- class submarines have a 6- year construction period preceded by 2
years of advanced procurement of long- lead equipment (mostly propulsion-
related equipment), for a total procurement cycle of 8 years for each ship.
The net effect of this construction cycle is that the expenditure of
procurement funds for replacement submarines begins 2 to 4 years after each
SSN- 688 is refueled. In order to make the time period for replacement
program option comparable to the 20- to 22- year time period for Trident
SSGNs, our analysis includes the 10 to 12 years provided by the refueled
SSN- 688s and the first 10 to 12 years of service life for the Virginia-
class submarines. Because the Virginia- class submarines are estimated to
have a useful service life of 33 years, we subtract the remaining value of
its 21 to 23 years of unused service life from the initial investment cost
using a depreciation analysis. We also included the Virginia- class
submarine operating and support costs for the first 10 to 12 years.
Since the costs were converted to fiscal 2001 dollars, we used a real
discount rate (Treasury borrowing rate minus forecasted inflation) in
calculating the net present value.
1 Because investment alternatives normally incur different costs over
different time streams, it is our policy to compare the alternatives on an
equal economic basis using a technique called present value analysis. This
analysis, by recognizing the time value of money, converts costs occurring
at different times to a common unit of measurement, is predicated on the
theory that costs incurred in the future are worth less than costs incurred
today. Present value analysis also provides a means to transform a stream of
costs to a single number so it can be compared to another.
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness
Page 78 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness
Page 79 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Cost- effectiveness analysis seeks to find the least costly alternative for
achieving a given program or policy result. We evaluated the
costeffectiveness of the submarine force options in three program areas: (1)
submarine presence days, (2) Tomahawk presence days, and (3) special
operations forces presence days. Each of these metrics is measurable and are
primary missions of the proposed SSGN. Suitable metrics for other missions,
such as battle group support and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, were unavailable. The cost of a presence day was determined
by dividing the option?s net present value by the total presence days
provided by that option. Each deployed Tomahawk counts as a Tomahawk
presence day as does each special operations forces platoon presence day.
Converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs is the most cost- effective
alternative for providing presence days and in supporting the Tomahawk
strike and special operations forces missions. The two key factors affecting
the cost- effectiveness measures are the SSGN?s (1) extended deployment
periods and (2) massive payload capacities. The SSGN achieves its presence
days superior ?return on investment? by employing two crews and rotating
these crews while the ship is forwardly deployed. An SSGN is estimated to be
able to spend 66 percent of its time forward deployed per year compared to
20 percent for a refueled SSN- 688.
Notwithstanding the SSGN?s superior cost- effectiveness in the three mission
areas we evaluated, the refueled SSN- 688s would provide valuable mission
support in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
undersea warfare, and carrier battle group support.
Briefing Section V: Summary Page 80 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section V: Summary
Briefing Section V: Summary Page 81 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Briefing Section V: Summary Page 82 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 83 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Note: Draft report was submitted as GAO- 01- 115. GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.
See comment 3. See comment 2.
See comment 1.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 84 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
See comment 4.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 85 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
The following is our response to the Department of Defense?s (DOD) letter
dated September 18, 2001.
1. DOD's comments restates the requirements discussed on page 9. 2. DOD's
comment restates our finding in the Results in Brief, on page 3. 3. See our
response in the Agency Comments section of the letter on
page 5. 4. We agree with Defense?s comment that the SSGN would substantially
enhance in- theater Tomahawk presence. Our comparison- which is based on the
notional Tomahawk loads the Navy uses in its ordnance requirements
determination process and not on budget constrained peacetime actual loads-
shows that an SSGN?s presence in a theater substantially enhances the
Tomahawk presence. GAO Comments
Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted
Page 86 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
Department of Defense Office of the Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics
Defense Intelligence Agency The Joint Staff
Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate Chief of Naval
Operations
Submarine Warfare Division Surface Warfare Division Resources, Requirements
& Assessments Division Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Research, Development and Acquisition
Naval Sea Systems Command Nuclear Propulsion Directorate Program Executive
Officer, Submarines
Virginia- class Program Management Office Trident Conversion (SSGN) Project
Team Strategic Systems Programs Office of Naval Intelligence Other
Organizations
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Congressional Budget Office
Appendix II: Organizations and Offices
Contacted Washington, D. C., Area
Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted
Page 87 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
U. S. Joint Forces Command U. S. Atlantic Fleet
Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet Naval Special Warfare SEAL Delivery Vehicle
Team TWO
U. S. Central Command U. S. Naval Forces Central Command U. S. Fifth Fleet
(Bahrain via video conference) U. S. Special Operations Command
Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay Submarine Group 10
Submarine Squadron 16 Trident Refit Facility Trident Training Facility U. S.
S. Rhode Island (SSBN- 740) (Blue)
Naval War College Naval Undersea Warfare Center
Naval Special Warfare Command U. S. Pacific Command
Cruise Missile Support Activity Norfolk, Virginia, Area
Tampa, Florida, Area Kings Bay, Georgia, Area
Newport, Rhode Island, Area
San Diego, California, Area Honolulu, Hawaii, Area
Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted
Page 88 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure
U. S. Pacific Fleet Special Operations Command, Pacific Fleet Submarine
Force, Pacific Fleet U. S. S. Kamehameha (SSN- 642) U. S. S. Buffalo (SSN-
715) Naval Special Warfare SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE
Advanced SEAL Delivery System U. S. European Command
U. S. Naval Forces Europe Other Contacts
(350033)
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to
support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help
improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal
programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other
assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO?s commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents is through the
Internet. GAO?s Web site (www. gao. gov) contains abstracts and full- text
files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older
products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents
using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their
entirety, including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as ?Today?s Reports,? on its Web
site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files. To
have GAO E- mail this list to you every afternoon, go to our home page and
complete the easy- to- use electronic order form found under ?To Order GAO
Products.?
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, D. C. 20013
To order by phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000 TDD: (301) 413- 0006 Fax: (202)
258- 4066
GAO Building Room 1100, 700 4th Street, NW (corner of 4th and G Streets, NW)
Washington, D. C. 20013
Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm, E- mail:
fraudnet@ gao. gov, or 1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system).
Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512- 4800 U. S.
General Accounting Office, 441 G. Street NW, Room 7149, Washington, D. C.
20548 GAO?s Mission
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
Order by Mail or Phone Visit GAO?s Document Distribution Center
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Public Affairs
*** End of document. ***