Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver
Program (22-NOV-02, GAO-03-38).
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S.
Congress, the administration, law enforcement officials, and the
public have questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in
protecting national security. Some have voiced concern that
terrorists or other criminals may exploit one of these
programs--the Visa Waiver Program--to enter the United States.
The program enables citizens of 28 participating countries to
travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days
or less without first obtaining a visa. It was created, in part,
to promote the effective use of government resources and to
facilitate international travel without threatening U.S.
security. GAO was asked to review the Visa Waiver Program,
including the process for assessing countries' eligibility to
participate in the program. GAO was also asked to determine the
implications--specifically those affecting national security,
foreign relations, tourism, and State Department resources--of
eliminating the program. GAO analysts traveled to several visa
waiver countries, including Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and
Uruguay, as well as to Argentina, whose participation in the
program was recently revoked.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-38
ACCNO: A05567
TITLE: Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa
Waiver Program
DATE: 11/22/2002
SUBJECT: Immigration and naturalization law
Immigration or emigration
Program evaluation
Program management
Waivers
Passports
National preparedness
Law enforcement
Counterterrorism
Dept. of State Border Security Program
European Union
INS Visa Waiver Pilot Program
Operation Enduring Freedom
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-38
A
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives
November 2002 BORDER SECURITY Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver
Program
GAO- 03- 38
Letter 1 Results in Brief 3 Background 4 Recent Legislative Requirements
Could Affect Countries* Participation in the Visa Waiver Program 7
Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program Are Uncertain 16
Eliminating the Program Would Increase the Need for State Department
Resources 23 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28
Appendixes
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 31
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice 35 GAO Comments 38
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State 39 GAO Comments 43
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 44 GAO Contacts 44
Acknowledgments 44
Table Table 1: Visa Waiver Countries, by Year of Admission and Number of
Arrivals in 2000 6 Figures Figure 1: Visa Waiver Program Nomination
Process 9
Figure 2: U. S. Arrivals from Visa Waiver Countries as Share of Total
International Arrivals, 1992* 2000 22 Figure 3: Estimates of State
Department*s Initial Costs if the Visa
Waiver Program Were Eliminated 25 Figure 4: Estimates of State
Department*s Annual Recurring Costs
if the Visa Waiver Program Were Eliminated 26
Abbreviations
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau
of Investigation INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
Lett er
November 22, 2002 The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee
on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee on Government
Reform House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
U. S. Congress, the administration, law enforcement officials, and the
public have questioned the effectiveness of U. S. visa programs in
protecting national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or
other criminals may exploit one of these programs* the Visa Waiver
Program* to enter the United
States. The Visa Waiver Program, established in 1986, enables citizens of
28 participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or
business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa from U. S.
embassies and consulates abroad. 1 Persons traveling to the United States
under the program must have a valid passport issued by the participating
country and be a citizen of that country. According to the program*s
legislative history, Congress created the program, in part, to promote the
effective use of government resources and to facilitate international
travel without threatening U. S. security. Immigration and Naturalization
Service data show more than 16 million admissions into the United States
under the Visa Waiver Program for each of the past 3 years. To assist in
the subcommittee*s oversight of U. S. visa policies and practices, you
asked us to review the Visa Waiver Program. In this report we describe (1)
the process that the Departments of Justice and State established to
assess countries* eligibility to participate in the program, including the
implications of changes in the law since September 11, 2001, that affect
the
process and (2) the major implications of eliminating the program, 1 The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99- 603) created the
Visa Waiver Program as a pilot in 1986. It became a permanent program in
2000 under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (P. L. 106- 396, Oct. 30,
2000). The program applies only to temporary visitors traveling to the
United States for business or pleasure for 90 days or less. Persons
traveling to the United States for other purposes, for example, to study
or to work, are required to have a visa.
specifically implications affecting national security, foreign relations,
tourism, and State Department resources. You also asked us to assess how
the visa process operated prior to September 11, 2001, and what changes
have occurred since then to strengthen the process as a screen against
terrorists. That assessment is contained in our report Border Security:
Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool. 2 To
describe the process for assessing countries* eligibility to participate
in the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws establishing the program,
relevant congressional reports, regulations and agency protocols governing
the program, Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports,
and other relevant documents. To assess the implications of eliminating
the program as regards U. S. national security and U. S. foreign
relations, we visited U. S. embassies in Argentina, Belgium, Italy,
Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay, and we met with officials of the Departments
of State and Justice, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We selected five of these
countries because
they were the first countries whose participation in the program was being
evaluated by the Departments of Justice and State. We selected the sixth
country, Spain, to provide a perspective on countries that had not been
evaluated. To assess the economic importance and implications of
international tourism, we reviewed official travel data for 1991* 2001 and
a
2002 report commissioned by the Department of Commerce. To estimate the
costs that the Department of State would incur if the Visa Waiver Program
were eliminated, we developed a model using Department of State
workload and staffing data and information on biometrics. 3 (See app. I
for a more detailed description of our scope and methodology.)
At the time of the publication of this report, the House of
Representatives and the Senate had passed similar versions of a bill to
establish a new Department of Homeland Security. Under these bills, visa
policy- making authority would be transferred to the new department, while
the administration of visas would be retained by the Department of State.
Some of the issues addressed in this report may become the responsibility
of this new department.
2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be
Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO- 03- 132NI (Washington, D. C.:
Oct. 21, 2002). 3 Biometrics can be used to verify identity by measuring
and analyzing physical characteristics such as fingerprints, irises and
retinas, and facial geometry.
Results in Brief The Departments of Justice and State have established
processes for determining, on the basis of the Visa Waiver Program*s
statutory criteria,
whether a country is eligible to participate in the program. These
processes are intended to ensure that countries meet certain criteria for
nomination for, and continued participation in, the program. These
criteria include a low refusal rate for a country*s citizens who apply for
U. S. nonimmigrant visitor visas. In assessing a country, the Departments
of Justice and State
also look at its political and economic stability and the security of its
process for issuing passports. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
recently assessed five countries and submitted its reports to the Attorney
General, who will decide whether the countries will continue to
participate in the program. The Attorney General can immediately terminate
a country*s participation in the program if an emergency occurs that
threatens U. S. interests. The Attorney General removed Argentina from the
program in February 2002 because of concerns that the economic crisis in
that country could lead to increased illegal immigration into the United
States. Laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
affect a country*s qualifications for participating in the Visa Waiver
Program; for example, one of the new laws requires participating countries
to issue passports that contain biometric identifiers, such as
fingerprints. However,
it is unclear whether these requirements will be fully implemented by the
deadlines called for in the law. The implications for U. S. national
security of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program are difficult to
determine, but eliminating the program could affect U. S. relations with
other countries, U. S. tourism, and State Department resources abroad. The
U. S. government has not systematically collected data on how frequently
potential terrorists and other criminals
have entered the United States under the program. Anecdotal information
indicates that such persons have entered the United States under the Visa
Waiver Program as well as with valid U. S. visas. As a result, U. S.
government officials expressed different opinions about the effect of the
program on U. S. national security. They agreed that the visa screening
process could serve as an additional tool to screen out terrorists but
only to the extent that State had the necessary overseas resources,
including
relevant timely information on potential terrorists and sufficient staff
and facilities to interview all or most visa applicants. They said that if
current visa waiver travelers were required to apply for visas and State*s
current resource levels were not increased, consular officers would be
inundated with paperwork for routine and low- risk cases and would become
less effective and alert in dealing with cases needing additional
scrutiny. The
decision to eliminate the program could negatively affect U. S. relations
with participating countries, could discourage some business and tourism
in the United States, and would increase the need for State Department
resources. For example, if the program were eliminated, we estimated that
the department*s initial costs to process the additional workload would
likely range between $739 million and $1.28 billion and that annual
recurring costs would likely range between $522 million and $810 million.
It could take 2 to 4 years or longer to put the necessary people and
facilities in place to handle the increased workload, according to State
officials. The Justice and State Departments provided written comments on
a draft
of this report. The Justice Department expressed concern that we had
underestimated its ability to meet certain requirements of recent border
security laws. For example, it does not anticipate significant delays in
the
incorporation of standardized, machine- verifiable biometrics in the
national passports of Visa Waiver Program countries. However, information
from the State Department as of October 2002 shows that only three Visa
Waiver Program countries stated that they would have a biometrics passport
program by October 2004. Therefore, we remain concerned that the
requirements will not be implemented in the time frame that the law
defines. The State Department wrote that in general it agreed with our
findings. However, it raised some concerns about whether we had considered
the U. S. border inspection process when discussing the implications of
eliminating the Visa Waiver Program on U. S. national security. We
acknowledge the importance of the inspection process for aliens seeking to
enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with
visas. We have added a discussion of the inspection process to the report.
In addition, both we and the Justice Department Inspector General have
work under way that will provide a more thorough
assessment of the border inspection process. Background According to the
program*s legislative history, 4 the Visa Waiver Pilot
Program was created, in part, to improve U. S. foreign relations and to
promote effective use of State Department* s resources. It was also
intended to facilitate international travel, without posing a threat to
the welfare or security of the United States, and thereby to increase the
4 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Report of the Committee on
the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 99- 132 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 28,
1985); Report of House Judiciary Committee, Report No. 99- 682( I)
(Washington, D. C.: August 1986).
number of foreign travelers to the United States. In addition, according
to a statement by President Clinton, 5 the program allowed the State
Department to reallocate scarce department resources from the issuing of
visas in lowrisk countries to higher priority needs such as visa screening
in high- fraud areas. The law that created the Visa Waiver Pilot Program
required that before implementing the program, the Attorney General
establish an automated arrival and departure tracking system (see page 15
for a discussion of this system). The law also required that the Attorney
General produce a special arrival and departure form for travelers seeking
to enter the United States under the program, which was made permanent in
2000.
Persons traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program must
have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a
national of that country;
be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor; have
their identity checked at the U. S. port of entry against an automated
electronic database containing information about the inadmissibility of
aliens, to uncover any grounds on which the alien may be inadmissible to
the United States, with no such ground found;
have been determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
at the U. S. port of entry to represent no threat to the welfare, health,
safety, or security of the United States;
have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the
program (e. g., stayed in the United States for 90 days or less); if
entering by air or sea, possess a round- trip transportation ticket issued
by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U. S. government to
participate in the program and must have arrived in the United States
aboard such a carrier; and
if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile
abroad to which he or she intends to return.
5 Statement by the President: Signing of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program
Act (The White House, Oct. 30, 2000).
In addition, the applicant must present a completed and signed visa waiver
arrival and departure form on which he or she waives the right to a
hearing, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, if INS
denies the applicant entry into the United States. All foreign visitors,
whether they have visas 6 or are seeking to enter the United States under
the Visa Waiver Program, undergo inspections conducted by INS inspectors
at U. S. airports and seaports. These inspections are intended to ensure
that only
admissible persons enter the United States. The INS inspectors observe the
applicant, examine his or her passport, and check his or her name against
an automated database that contains information regarding the
admissibility of aliens. Table 1 lists the visa waiver countries, the year
each country entered the program, and the numbers of arrivals to the
United States under the program in 2000.
Table 1: Visa Waiver Countries, by Year of Admission and Number of
Arrivals in 2000 Country Year of admission Number of arrivals
Japan 1988 5, 061, 377 United Kingdom 1988 4, 703, 008 France 1989 1, 087,
087 Germany 1989 1, 786, 045 Italy 1989 612, 357 Netherlands 1989 553, 297
Sweden 1989 321, 881 Switzerland 1989 395, 031 Andorra 1991 1, 235 Austria
1991 175, 533 Belgium 1991 249, 957 Denmark 1991 149, 211 Finland 1991 93,
649 Iceland 1991 27, 682 Liechtenstein 1991 2, 011
6 The visa application process does not guarantee admission into the
United States. Rather, it can result in permission to apply to enter the
United States. The ultimate authority to admit or deny a person permission
to enter the United States rests with the INS inspector.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Country Year of admission Number of arrivals
Luxembourg 1991 16, 385 Monaco 1991 5, 622 New Zealand 1991 172, 012
Norway 1991 147, 540 San Marino 1991 0 Spain 1991 361, 177 Brunei 1993 1,
230 Ireland 1995 285, 697 Argentina a 1996 533, 936 Australia 1996 539,
559 Slovenia 1997 14, 886 Portugal 1999 86, 333 Singapore 1999 136, 439
Uruguay 1999 69, 607
Tot al 17, 589, 784
a The U. S. Attorney General removed Argentina from the program in
February 2002. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce.
Recent Legislative The Visa Waiver Program Act includes criteria that a
country must fulfill to
Requirements Could be eligible for nomination for, and continued
participation in, the program.
Justice and State have established a draft protocol based on these
criteria Affect Countries* that spells out the procedures that the
agencies must follow in nominating Participation in the
a country and for assessing participating countries to ensure that they
Visa Waiver Program
continue to pose a low risk to U. S. security. The Attorney General, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, may also immediately terminate a
country*s participation in the Visa Waiver Program in the event of an
emergency that threatens U. S. law enforcement or security interests.
Legislation enacted after September 11, 2001, added more requirements for
countries to remain eligible to participate in the program, but full,
timely implementation of these requirements is uncertain.
Nomination Process To comply with laws intended to ensure that countries*
participation in the Assesses Countries* Visa Waiver Program does not
threaten U. S. security and interests, the
Eligibility to Join the Departments of State and Justice have established
a draft protocol that Program spells out procedures to assess countries*
eligibility to be admitted to the program. The procedures are
comprehensive and cover a variety of
security concerns, including patterns of passport and visa fraud,
assessments of terrorism within the country, and assessments of law
enforcement practices. An Interagency Working Group comprising
representatives from Justice, including the INS, and from State, including
the Bureau of Consular Affairs, developed the protocol. Although the
protocol is in draft, the agencies have used it to assess some countries*
eligibility. (See fig. 1.)
Figure 1: Visa Waiver Program Nomination Process
State notifies Justice that it intends to nominate a country that has met
the three following qualifications:
has a refusal rate of less than 3 percent for its citizens who apply for
nonimmigrant visas
can supply machine- readable passports to its citizens or is in the
process of developing such passports
Justice components, including the
offers visa- free travel for U. S. citizens law enforcement agencies (i.
e.,
INS and FBI), Criminal Division, State provides Justice with information
on the nominee country, including
and Office of Intelligence Policy
patterns of passport fraud, visa fraud, and visa abuse over the past 5
years; and Review, review and comment
assessment of terrorism within the country or outside the country by the
country*s nationals; and on the prenomination. Justice
evaluation of the impact of the country*s participation on U. S.
national security and law may request comment from any enforcement.
other law enforcement agency. INS leads team of representatives from
interested agencies to visit the country. Team reviews
country*s political, social, and economic conditions; State submits
formal
security of the country*s passport and national identity written
nomination
Does Justice documents;
to the Attorney raise
General.
N o
objections?
country*s border controls, and immigration and nationality laws;
country*s law enforcement policies and practices; and
other relevant matters.
Y Ye es s
INS prepares written evaluation and preliminary Interagency Working
recommendation on country ry*s qualification. Group submits
State and Justice review and comment on evaluation. recommendation to
End of process the At Attorney General.
Attorney General, in consultation with Secretary
of State, submits report to appropriate congressional committees on
nominee*s
qualification. Does the Attorney General,
Attorney General formally admits country into the program.
in consultation
State and Justice amend Federal Register r to reflect Yes Y
with the Secretary of
Noo
State, admit the country End of process
country*s participation.
into the Visa Waiver Program?
Source: Interagency Protocol P lfIl for Implementation ifhVi of the Visa
Waiver Program (draft).
As shown in figure 1, State initiates the process of adding countries to
the program by advising Justice of its intent to nominate a country for
inclusion in the program. State may nominate a country only after it has
determined that the country
has a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for its citizens who apply for
U. S. nonimmigrant visitor visas (ranging from less than 2 percent to less
than 3 percent depending on the years assessed),
has the ability to supply machine- readable passports to its citizens or
is in the process of developing such passports, 7 and
offers visa- free travel for U. S. citizens and nationals. 8 The
protocol requires State to provide Justice with information on the
nominated country, including
patterns of passport fraud, visa fraud, and visa abuse over the past 5
years; assessments of terrorism within or outside the country by the
country*s nationals; and
evaluations of the impact of the country*s participation on U. S.
national security and law enforcement.
Various Justice components* including the law enforcement agencies (for
example, INS and the FBI), Criminal Division, and Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review* review the nomination, focusing on the effect that the
country*s inclusion would have on U. S. law enforcement and national
security. If no clearly disqualifying objections are raised during this
review, the Secretary of State submits a formal written nomination to the
Attorney General. After a country*s formal nomination, INS leads a team of
representatives from interested agencies to visit the nominated country.
The team reviews the country*s
7 A machine- readable travel document is one that contains mandatory
visual data and a separate mandatory data summary in a format that can be
read by a machine. 8 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 as
amended, (P. L. 99- 603).
political, social, and economic conditions;
security over its passport and national identity documents; border
controls; and
immigration and nationality laws, law enforcement policies and
practices, and other matters relevant to law enforcement, immigration, and
national security. On the basis of the review and site visit, the
Interagency Working Group
submits a recommendation to the Attorney General, who, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, then decides whether to admit the country to
the program. Evaluation Process The protocol includes an evaluation
process, similar to the nomination Assesses Country*s
process, for periodically assessing the effect on U. S. law enforcement
and Continued Participation
security interests of each country*s continued participation in the Visa
Waiver Program. 9 INS is primarily responsible for these evaluations. It
obtains information from a number of other agencies, including State and
intelligence agencies, and other components of Justice. These evaluations
assess the status of factors reviewed during the nomination process,
including whether the rate at which visa waiver applicants are refused
entry at U. S. ports of entry exceeds specific numerical targets;
demographic, economic, political, and social trends in the program
countries; the security of the country*s procedures for issuing
passports; and
legal issues, including how foreign nationals acquire citizenship, law
enforcement considerations, national security (including information on
terrorism), and other matters.
9 The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (P. L. 106- 396) required the
evaluations every 5 years. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act (P. L 107- 173, May 14, 2002) increased the frequency of the
evaluations to every 2 years.
The areas evaluated involve more qualitative than quantitative
assessments. For example, INS examines the security of processes for
issuing passports but uses no quantitative criteria in assessing the
process. However, the protocol does allow the Attorney General, in
determining a country*s risk level, to consider quantifiable data. Such
data may include comparisons between the denial rates of persons
presenting passports purported to have been lawfully issued by a
particular visa waiver country and the denial rates of individuals
traveling from the same country with nonimmigrant visas.
INS has completed the assessments of five countries: Argentina, Belgium,
Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia. The assessment of Uruguay is still pending.
INS selected the countries for assessment on the basis of specific
security concerns. For example, INS selected Argentina because of the
economic crisis and political instability in the country; the Attorney
General
subsequently removed Argentina from the program because of those problems.
INS selected Belgium because of repeated thefts of blank Belgian
passports. INS accelerated the scheduling of the evaluations after the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. However, although INS
completed the field visits to the countries in December 2001, it did not
send the finalized reports with recommendations to Justice until September
2002. The next step in the evaluation process is for the Attorney General,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, to decide whether each
country should remain in the program or its participation should be
terminated.
Attorney General May The Attorney General, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, may also Immediately Terminate a immediately terminate
a country*s participation in the Visa Waiver Program Country*s
Participation
in the event of an emergency that threatens U. S. law enforcement or
security interests. The law defines emergencies as
the overthrow of a democratically elected government;
war (including undeclared war, civil war, or other military activity) in
the program country;
a severe breakdown in law and order affecting a significant portion of
the program country*s territory;
a severe economic collapse in the program country; or
any other extraordinary event in the program country that threatens the
law enforcement or security interests of the United States.
On February 20, 2002, the Attorney General used this emergency provision
to remove Argentina from the Visa Waiver Program because of the country*s
economic crisis, which had raised concerns that the number of Argentines
illegally immigrating to the United States would increase. INS
had reported an increase in the number of Argentine nationals attempting
to remain illegally in the United States after their 90- day period of
admission had expired. Recent Laws Affect Process
Laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affect the
for Assessing Eligibility, but process for determining countries*
eligibility to participate in the Visa Full, Timely Implementation Waiver
Program. These laws cover passport requirements for visa waiver Uncertain
countries and reemphasize the requirement for the Attorney General to
establish a system to monitor peoples* entry into and exit from the United
States. However, it is unclear whether Justice and State will fully
implement these requirements by the deadlines called for under U. S. law.
First, regarding passports, the October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act advanced to
October 1, 2003, 10 the deadline for the requirement that travelers from
participating countries wishing to enter the United States under the Visa
Waiver Program must submit a machine- readable passport. 11 Subsequently,
the May 2002 Enhanced Border Security Act stated that to remain in the
program, a visa waiver country must certify, by October 26, 2004, that it
has a program to issue tamper- resistant, machine- readable passports that
contain biometric and document authentication identifiers. With the
exception of Switzerland and San Marino, 12 all participating countries
are issuing machine- readable passports, but none issue passports that
have biometric identifiers, according to State. Some State and law
enforcement
10 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (P.
L. 107- 56). The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act originally stated that
on or after October 1, 2007, an alien applying for admission under the
Visa Waiver Program must have a valid machine- readable passport that
satisfies the internationally accepted standard for machine- readability.
11 The Secretary of State may waive this requirement if the country is
making a good- faith effort to issue machine- readable passports to its
citizens and has taken appropriate measures to protect against misuse of
its passports that are not machine- readable.
12 Switzerland and San Marino plan to begin issuing machine- readable
passports in 2003.
officials in Europe and the United States questioned whether countries
participating in the Visa Waiver Program would be able to certify by
October 2004 that they can issue passports with acceptable biometric
identifiers* particularly since there is not yet an international standard
for biometric identifiers. The Act required that the biometric identifiers
comply with standards established by the International Civil Aviation
Organization. Representatives of several countries, including the United
States, Visa Waiver Program participating countries, and members of the
European Union (EU), have met to work toward developing recommendations on
minimum standards for the application of biometrics in procedures and
documents by the spring of 2003. However, responding to a State inquiry to
visa waiver countries about their plans to issue
passports with biometric identifiers, only 3 of 17 countries had said as
of October 2002 that they would meet the deadline. State plans to
incorporate this information into a report to the Congress on the status
of countries* efforts to include biometric identifiers in their passports.
State officials also told us that in response to the U. S. requirement,
European countries
might require U. S. passports to have biometric identifiers. For the
system to be effective in increasing U. S. national security, INS will
need to install machines capable of reading the biometric identifiers at
each U. S. port of entry, of which there are about 390. However, until
countries decide which biometrics they will include in their passport, INS
may have a difficult time ensuring that all ports will have machines that
can read the various biometric identifiers by October 2004.
Additionally, the Enhanced Border Security Act conditioned participation
in the Visa Waiver Program on a country*s timely reporting of its stolen
blank passports to the United States. INS has described problems with
countries* timely reporting of stolen blank passports, and the Justice
Inspector General concluded that INS does not have a mechanism to provide
systematic, consistent, and timely information about missing passports to
its inspectors. 13 A State official testified that although this
requirement probably will not apply to countries until they are certified
for
13 U. S. Department of Justice, Follow- up Report on the Visa Waiver
Program (Washington, D. C.: December 2001).
continued participation in the program, State is discussing this
requirement with all countries. 14
Finally, INS has not yet developed an automated nonimmigrant entry* exit
control system to screen and monitor the arrival and departure of foreign
visitors entering the United States as temporary visitors. Congress has
passed several laws requiring the Attorney General to implement such a
system and has extended the implementation deadline several times. For
example, the 1986 law creating the Visa Waiver Pilot Program required, as
a condition of implementing the program, that an automated nonimmigrant
entry* exit control system to monitor aliens using the program be
established. 15 The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act reiterated the
requirement, directing that the system be implemented no later than 2001.
16 INS decided to use an existing automated border inspections system in
conjunction with its arrival* departure system to meet this requirement.
The arrival* departure system includes passenger information
electronically transmitted by air and sea carriers that have an agreement
with INS to transport aliens to the United States. INS began using this
system on October 1, 2002. An INS official recently testified that this
new initiative implements the requirements that had been set forth in the
Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000. 17 Also, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 required an
entry* exit system that covered all nonimmigrant visitors, not solely
those traveling under the Visa Waiver Program. 18 This act required the
Attorney General to develop an automated entry* exit system within 2 years
of the law*s enactment to collect a record of departure for
every alien departing the United States and match the record of departure
with the record of the alien*s arrival in the United States. Subsequently,
14 See Statement of Steven Edson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Visas, Oct. 9, 2002.
15 P. L. 99- 603. 16 P. L. 106- 396. 17 The next step involving electronic
manifests will occur on January 1, 2003, when air and sea carriers will be
required to transmit electronic arrival and departure data for all
arriving and departing passengers, including new data elements, which will
aid in the identification of mala fide travelers. See Statement of Michael
Cronin, Assistant Commissioner for
Inspections, INS, Oct. 9, 2002. 18 P. L. 104- 208.
Congress extended the deadline to implement the system at all U. S. ports
of entry to December 31, 2005. After the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the effectiveness of monitoring nonimmigrant visitors came under
additional scrutiny, as authorities considered how to identify and locate
terrorists who might be in the United States. As a result, new laws have
again directed the Attorney General to establish an integrated entry* exit
system. 19 INS and other agencies, including the U. S. Customs Service,
State,
and the Transportation Security Agency, are working together to develop
the system. According to Justice, INS has established a multiagency task
force to coordinate all activity associated with the establishment of the
entry* exit system. The systems established as part of the Visa Waiver
Program, as well as a system launched on September 11, 2002, to collect
fingerprints and a photograph from a specific population, are the first
step in the development of the entry* exit system.
Implications of The implications for U. S. national security of
eliminating the program are Eliminating the Visa
uncertain; however, eliminating the program could negatively affect U. S.
relations with participating country governments, impede tourism to the
Waiver Program Are
United States, and increase the need for State personnel and facilities
Uncertain
overseas. According to the program*s legislative history, Congress
established the program, in part, to facilitate travel by citizens from
countries that the Attorney General and Secretary of State determined to
pose low risk to U. S. national security. Data showing the extent to which
the program has been exploited are limited, and U. S. government officials
expressed differing opinions about the effect of the program on U. S.
national security.
Implications for National The implications for U. S. national security of
eliminating the Visa Waiver Security Are Unclear Program are not clear.
While Justice has not systematically collected data on how frequently
potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States,
anecdotal information indicates that such individuals have entered the
United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with
valid U. S. visas. State Department and U. S. law enforcement officials*
opinions varied on the effect of the Visa Waiver Program on U. S. national
19 The USA PATRIOT Act directed the Attorney General, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, to fully implement such a system as expeditiously
as possible. More recently, the Enhanced Border Security Act set forth
technology standards to be used in the development and implementation of
the system.
security. Some law enforcement agency officials said that the Visa Waiver
Program negatively affects U. S. national security and that eliminating
the program and requiring visas from current visa waiver travelers would
increase national security. Other officials from Justice and State
asserted that unless the current visa- screening process is improved, for
example, by increased information sharing among U. S. agencies, the effect
of the program on U. S. national security is not certain.
Limited Data Available to Show Justice has not systematically collected
data on the extent to which
Extent to Which the Program Is terrorists and other criminals have entered
the United States under the Visa Exploited Waiver Program or committed
crimes while in the country. The FBI operates a nationwide information
system dedicated to serving and supporting local, state, and federal
criminal justice agencies. This system contains 17 databases with
information on, among other things, stolen articles, foreign fugitives,
gangs and terrorist members, and wanted persons. However, crime statistics
collected by the FBI do not capture the
criminals* immigration status. Also, the data that INS collects on aliens
it has removed from the United States for committing crimes include some
information on aliens* immigration status. According to INS data, 204
(about 0.3 percent) of the 69,580 criminals removed from the United States
during fiscal year 2002 entered under the Visa Waiver Program. The Drug
Enforcement Agency maintains information on domestic drug arrests by
country that shows the arrestees* country of nationality but not their
immigration status. While Justice has not systematically collected data on
how frequently potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the
United States, anecdotal information indicates that such persons have
entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with a
valid U. S. visa. For example, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national whom
the United States indicted as a co- conspirator in the attacks of
September 11, 2001, entered
the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, and the 19 individuals
who carried out the attacks entered with valid U. S. visas. U. S. law
enforcement and State officials in Washington, D. C., and at posts
overseas expressed different opinions about the effect of the Visa Waiver
Program on U. S. national security. Some INS and other law enforcement
agency officials said that the Visa Waiver Program can facilitate illegal
entry into the United States by inadmissible aliens, including terrorists
and
other criminals, because under the program such individuals avoid the
screening that consular officers usually perform on visa applicants
abroad. The lack of consular screening makes the program attractive to
inadmissible aliens, according to INS officials. Aliens traveling to the
United States under the Visa Waiver Program are first screened when INS
inspectors interview them for admission at the U. S. port of entry. These
inspectors have little time to screen each person entering the United
States, according to a report by the Justice Department*s Office of
Inspector General. INS inspectors reported that terrorists and criminals
who were intercepted had attempted to enter the United States under the
Visa Waiver
Program* rather than applying for a U. S. visa abroad* because they
believed it would give them a greater chance of entering the country. 20
Some officials in Washington, D. C., and at the U. S. embassies in
Argentina
and Uruguay said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program would increase
national security, because the visa- screening process is an additional
tool to deter terrorists from entering the United States. One Justice
official stated that the Visa Waiver Program is clearly a vulnerability
and that eliminating the program would increase national security, but at
a high cost in terms of the effect on State resources and U. S. tourism.
Other law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D. C., and at the
U. S. embassies in Belgium, Italy, and Spain questioned whether
eliminating the Visa Waiver Program and requiring visas would increase
national security. They agreed that the visa- screening process could
serve as an additional tool to screen out terrorists but only to the
extent that State had the necessary overseas resources, including relevant
information on potential terrorists and sufficient staff and facilities to
interview all or most visa applicants. They said that if current visa
waiver travelers were
required to apply for visas and State*s current resource levels were not
increased, consular officers would be inundated with paperwork for routine
and low- risk cases and would become less effective and alert in dealing
with cases needing additional scrutiny. The officials emphasized
that better, timely information and improved data sharing on inadmissible
aliens among U. S. law enforcement, border control, and intelligence
agencies are essential to improving U. S. national security.
20 U. S. Department of Justice, The Potential for Fraud and INS*s Efforts
to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (Washington, D. C.:
March 1999).
Eliminating the Program U. S. officials, including those from State as
well as from some law Could Affect U. S. Relations
enforcement agencies, said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could
with Participating Country
have negative implications for U. S. relations with governments of
Governments
participating countries and could impair their cooperation in efforts to
combat terrorism. Some allies are cooperating significantly in matters
ranging from providing military personnel and access to air bases to
support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to freezing terrorists*
financial assets. Examples are as follows: Visa waiver countries have
provided political and military support to Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan and to the International Security Assistance Force, which is
to help the new Afghan Interim
Authority provide security and stability in Kabul. The United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Germany, Australia, Japan, and other visa waiver countries
partnered with the United States in military operations to expel the
Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan, according to government reports. 21
EU member states vigorously supported U. S. efforts in the United
Nations to adopt strong resolutions against terrorism and U. S. efforts to
persuade third countries to resist terrorism. 22 Visa waiver countries
have also increased their law enforcement efforts. The EU strengthened
member states* ability to take action against terrorists and their
supporters* including freezing their assets. 23 The EU reported that
between September 11, 2001, and June 3, 2002, about $100 million of assets
belonging to persons and entities sponsoring terrorist
21 See U. S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: Coalition Contributions to
the War on Terrorism (Arlington, Virginia: 2002); U. S. Department of
State, Patterns of Global Terrorism- 2001 (Washington, D. C.: 2002); and
U. K. Coalition Information Centre, Campaign Against Terrorism: A
Coalition Update (London, England: 2002). 22 The 15 member states of the
European Union are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 23 See European Union Common Positions
2001/ 930/ CFSP (Dec. 27, 2001) on combating terrorism, 2001/ 931/ CFSP
(Dec. 27, 2001) on the application of specific measures to combat
terrorism, and 2002/ 462/ CFSP (June 17, 2002) updating Common Position
2001/ 931/ CFSP.
actions was frozen throughout the EU. 24 Since September 11, 2001,
authorities in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom have arrested supporters of al Qaeda and other extremist groups.
Also, according to State, Italian authorities arrested the leader of the
group suspected of plotting to bomb the U. S. embassy in Rome.
The government of Singapore detained 13 members of a terrorist group in
December 2001, thereby disrupting a plot to bomb the U. S. embassy there.
Some U. S. embassy and law enforcement agency officials expressed
concern that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could lessen countries*
cooperation in military and law enforcement operations related to the
global coalition against terrorism. Participating countries may see their
loss of visa waiver status as a sign that the United States views them as
untrustworthy* more as security risks than as allies.
If the United States decides to eliminate visa waiver status for
participating countries, those countries* governments could begin
requiring Americans to obtain visas before visiting their countries. For
example, if the United States requires a national from an EU member
country to obtain a visa before entering the United States for 90 days or
less, the EU may institute a
provisional requirement that U. S. citizens obtain a visa before entering
any of the EU member countries. 25 Thereafter, if the U. S. visa policy
continues, the EU Council may amend regulations to make the visa
requirement permanent. Eliminating the Program As previously mentioned,
Congress created the Visa Waiver Program, in
Could Affect U. S. Tourism part, to facilitate international travel and
thereby increase the number of foreign travelers to the United States. A
large proportion of international 24 See European Union, EU Response to 11
September: European Commission Action (Brussels, Belgium: June 2002).
Also, on May 3, 2002, the EU and the United States took coordinated
actions against the assets of several terrorist groups and individuals,
according to a U. S. Treasury official. See statement of Jimmy Gurule,
Under Secretary for Enforcement, U. S. Department of the Treasury, before
the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, May 8, 2002. 25 Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/
2001, Council of the European Union, Mar. 15, 2001. The United States
requires Greek nationals to obtain visas when visiting the United States
for 90 days or less. However, the EU has not required U. S. citizens to
have visas to visit EU countries, because Greece has not contested or
notified the EU of the requirement, according to a U. S. government
official.
tourists to the United States comes from Visa Waiver Program countries.
From 1991 to 2000, in terms of both the number of travelers and dollars
spent, tourism from visa waiver countries 26 accounted for more than half
of the overseas visitor market. Visa waiver travelers generally spend more
than other international travelers, and their spending helps to balance
the U. S. trade accounts. Because of direct and indirect economic
contributions from visa waiver travel, elimination of the Visa Waiver
Program is a
concern for the travel and tourism industry. One study commissioned by the
Department of Commerce in 2002 estimated that discontinuation of the Visa
Waiver Program will cost the U. S. economy more than $28 billion in
tourism exports from 2003 to 2007.
Travelers from visa waiver countries to the United States totaled
approximately 17. 6 million in 2000 and 14.7 million in 2001, according to
the Commerce Department. 27 As a share of total international arrivals, 28
travelers from visa waiver countries grew from 25 percent in 1992 to 35
percent in 2000 (see fig. 2). 29 Excluding arrivals from Canada and
Mexico,
the share of overseas arrivals from visa waiver countries has averaged 68
percent in the last 5 years. 26 Excluding Canada and Mexico. 27 Not all
arrivals from visa waiver countries enter the United States under the
program. According to the Department of Commerce, however, 97 percent of
all international arrivals are for stays of 90 days or less for vacation
or business purposes, both of which qualify
under the Visa Waiver Program. 28 The INS estimated that there were more
than 500 million border crossings into the United States in fiscal year
2001, the majority originating from Mexico or Canada. Data on
international arrivals in this report exclude entries of same- day
travelers as defined by the Department of Transportation, such as those
from Mexico or Canada.
29 However, the number of arrivals in 2001 was lower than in 2000 owing to
the events of September 11.
Figure 2: U. S. Arrivals from Visa Waiver Countries as Share of Total
International Arrivals, 1992* 2000
Using data from Commerce and the Travel Industry Association of America,
we calculated that in 2000, travelers from visa waiver countries spent an
estimated $39.6 billion in the United States, accounting for 57
percent of overseas tourist spending. Average spending per traveler from
visa waiver countries in 2000 was $2, 253, compared with $1,274 per
traveler for other international tourists to the United States. A range of
estimates from Commerce, the Travel Industry Association of America, and
the World Travel and Tourism Council indicate that visa waiver travelers*
direct and indirect spending within the United States added between $75
billion and $102 billion to the U. S. gross domestic product in 2000. 30
According to the Travel Industry Association of America, international
tourism provides more than one million U. S. jobs, of which more than 60
percent are located in Florida, California, New York, and Hawaii. The
association also
estimates that in 2001, U. S. spending generated from international
tourism contributed $16 billion in tax revenues. The Department of
Commerce commissioned a study in 2002 on the economic effect of the Visa
Waiver Program and estimated that, over a
30 These agencies estimate that every dollar spent directly by a traveler
in the United States translates into $1. 89 to $2. 33 for the U. S.
economy.
5- year period, eliminating the program could result in a loss of 3
million visitors, $28 billion in tourism exports, and 475, 000 jobs. 31
The estimates of this study, together with anecdotal information, support
the likelihood of a negative effect on tourism. According to the Travel
Industry Association of
America, the Visa Waiver Program enhances the competitiveness of the U. S.
market as an international destination and elimination of the program
could divert tourists to other destinations that do not require a visa for
entry. Foreign Commercial Service Officers in Belgium and Spain reported
visas to be a significant impediment to travel demand. State officials
agreed that visas are an impediment to both tourist and business travel
and added
that any additional requirements, such as the collection of biometric
indicators, could further discourage travel to the United States. The
World Travel and Tourism Council and the World Tourism Organization also
view visa requirements as an important factor in determining levels of
tourism. Eliminating the
Should the Congress decide to require visas from current visa waiver
Program Would travelers, State would require more resources, such as
personnel and facilities overseas, to handle the resulting increased visa
processing and Increase the Need for
biometric collection workload. State estimates that if the individuals now
State Department
traveling under the Visa Waiver Program were required to obtain visas, the
Resources
number of applications would rise by 14 million. We estimated that State*s
initial costs to process the additional workload would likely range
between $739 million and $1.28 billion, and annual recurring costs would
likely range between $522 million and $810 million. 32 The ranges of our
cost
estimates are large because they reflect the uncertainty of key variables
in our cost estimating model, such as costs for consular personnel, space,
and 31 These results are based on a limited econometric estimation and a
comparison of simulated effects from elimination of the Visa Waiver
Program with their baseline tourism forecast, which we have not verified.
32 Any initial and recurring costs estimated for an increased workload of
14 million applications are in addition to State*s costs for the estimated
visa and biometric processing workload for the current 10. 3 million
applications, including student visa applications. We estimated that
additional initial and recurring costs for consular operating personnel
and
space to collect a single type of biometric, such as fingerprints, would
be approximately $412 million and $201 million, respectively, for the
current 10. 3 million applications. See U. S. General Accounting Office,
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO- 03- 174.
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 15, 2002).
supplies; 33 the percentage of visa applicants that State interviews; and
the method by which State collects biometrics. Given this uncertainty,
actual costs could vary significantly.
To estimate the costs of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, we created a
cost model that included information on a number of variables such as
workload and staffing data (e. g., personnel and facility costs) from
State*s Bureau of Consular Affairs and the time and costs involved in
collecting biometrics. We used our model to forecast a range for both
additional initial and recurring costs. Consistent with State assumptions,
we assumed a *low* interview rate of 10 percent (about 1.4 million
applicants) and a *high* interview rate of 95 percent (about 13.3 million
applicants). (See
app. I for more details of our methodology and assumptions.) Figure 3
shows estimated initial costs to State if the Visa Waiver Program were
eliminated. These costs include elements such as hiring, training, and
moving new consular personnel; installing additional equipment to collect
and store biometrics; and building or renovating facilities in all visa
waiver posts.
33 For example, additional security procedures, such as restrictions on
the role of Foreign Service national employees, and further increases in
management oversight could increase the number of Foreign Service officers
needed to adjudicate visas.
Figure 3: Estimates of State Department*s Initial Costs if the Visa Waiver
Program Were Eliminated
We estimated that if State were to interview 10 percent of all visa
applicants, initial costs would likely range from $739 million to $821
million. If State were to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants,
initial costs would likely range from $1.12 billion to $1. 28 billion.
Figure 4 shows annual recurring costs, which include elements such as
consular personnel salaries, biometric hardware and software maintenance,
facility leasing and maintenance, and supplies.
Figure 4: Estimates of State Department*s Annual Recurring Costs if the
Visa Waiver Program Were Eliminated
If State were to interview 10 percent of all visa applicants, recurring
costs would likely range from $522 million to $587 million. If State were
to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants, recurring costs would
likely range from $723 million to $810 million. For fiscal year 2003,
State requested $3.36 billion for ongoing operations related to diplomatic
and
consular programs, including the operation of all overseas facilities. It
could take at least 2 to 4 years to put the necessary people and
facilities in place to handle the increased workload, according to State
officials. Using State*s staffing and workload assumptions, we estimated
that the department would need, in addition to the approximately 840
Foreign Service officers who are currently overseas, more than 350
additional Foreign Service officers to handle the extra nonimmigrant visa
workload if
required to interview 10 percent of all applicants and more than 800
additional officers if required to interview 95 percent of all applicants.
According to consular officials, hiring Foreign Service officers and
training them for general Foreign Service and languages could take a year
or more. It could take several months to hire Foreign Service nationals,
depending
on the availability of qualified candidates and their ability to pass the
security background check. In cases where a significant number of new
consular staff were added and new facilities were acquired, posts might
also need to employ administrative staff such as human resource
managers, post security guards, and additional facilities management and
maintenance staff. 34 A portion of the initial and recurring costs shown
in figures 3 and 4 would
be used for new or renovated facilities that the post would need in order
to process an increased number of nonimmigrant visa applications. In some
countries, including but not limited to Belgium, France, Italy, Slovenia,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, State would need additional work and
waiting room space to process applications; this could involve acquiring
new facilities or reopening and renovating additional posts for the
nonimmigrant visa workload. 35 For example, in Italy, State officials said
that they would need to renovate or reopen facilities in Naples, Sicily,
Rome, Milan, and Florence. In some U. S. embassies, such as those in
Slovenia and Uruguay, available space would have to be adapted for
processing the additional workload. Identifying, procuring, and fitting
out lease space can take 24 to 48 months, on average, according to State
officials. State officials in most countries we visited and analysts in
Washington said that until they acquired additional space for handling
nonimmigrant visas, there would be long lines of visa applicants waiting
outside the current posts, posing a potential security threat for both the
applicants and U. S. embassy officials. Also, if additional space was
acquired in unsecured buildings separate from the embassy, personnel
working in such buildings would be put at risk until the space was
upgraded for security. A U. S. ambassador pointed out that acquiring
additional space for visas would 34 Costs to employ additional
administrative staff were not included in our cost estimates.
35 State consolidated some of its posts in visa waiver countries in the
1990s in response to budget constraints and shifting objectives in the
post* Cold War era. For example, in Italy, State closed consulates in
Palermo in January 1994 and Genoa in June 1993.
conflict with the department*s efforts to consolidate Americans into joint
space to improve their security and protect them.
Although revenues from the surcharge for machine- readable visas would not
cover the additional initial costs related to the elimination of the Visa
Waiver Program, State could cover additional recurring costs over time. 36
To pay for the costs associated with the processing and issuing of
machinereadable
visas and with State*s Border Security Program, State currently charges
applicants a $65 fee each time they apply for a machine- readable visa. 37
On November 1, 2002, State increased the fee to $100 to compensate for
increases in the actual cost of providing visa service. State officials
have not determined how they will fund the costs of collecting biometrics.
The options they have discussed include requesting an appropriation from
the Congress, passing the cost to the visa applicant, or a combination of
the two. Agency Comments and
The Justice Department and the State Department provided written Our
Evaluation
comments on a draft of our report. These comments, along with our
responses to specific points, are reprinted in appendixes II and III.
Justice expressed optimism that the requirements of recent border security
laws will be met. Specifically, Justice stated that it does not anticipate
significant delays in the incorporation of standardized, machine-
verifiable
biometrics in the national passports of most Visa Waiver Program
countries. We continue to believe, however, that some countries may be
unable to add biometrics to their passports by the 2004 deadline. Our
assessment is based on the statements of U. S. State Department and law
enforcement officials as well as the responses from several Visa Waiver
Program countries concerning their ability to issue passports with
biometrics.
Justice also stated that our discussion of the entry* exit system leaves
the impression that implementation of the system is not moving forward. We
36 The additional machine- readable visa fees collected for 14 million
applicants at the current rate of $65 would be $910 million. According to
State, the fee will increase to $100 beginning November 1, 2002, resulting
in total estimated collections of $1.4 billion.
37 The machine- readable visa and border crossing card application fees
pay for all costs associated with processing and issuing the visas and the
cards. See Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 60, March 28, 2002.
acknowledge that INS is taking steps to implement the system, and we have
added information on INS*s progress to the report. However, the report
points also out that an entry* exit system covering all nonimmigrant
travelers to the United States has been required since 1996.
State generally concurred with the report and stated that our comments on
the Visa Waiver Program are in keeping with its assessment of the
implications and costs resulting from a blanket suspension of the program.
However, State expressed concern that the report did not discuss the
border inspection process at the U. S. port of entry as an alternative
solution to the visa application process to address perceived weaknesses
in
the program. We acknowledge the importance of the inspection process for
aliens seeking to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as
well as with visas. We have added a discussion of the inspection process
to the report. The Justice Department Inspector General and GAO have work
under way that will provide a more thorough assessment of the border
inspection process. We are sending copies of this report to interested
congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
the Commissioner of the INS, and the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security. We will make copies available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512- 4128. Additional GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments
are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours, Jess Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendi Appendi xes x I
Scope and Methodology To describe the process for assessing countries*
eligibility to participate in the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws
establishing the program, relevant congressional reports, regulations and
agency protocols governing the program, Department of Justice Office of
Inspector General reports, and other relevant documents. To assess steps
being taken to increase the requirements for the program and enhance U. S.
border security, we reviewed recent laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act and
the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Departments of State
and Justice reports, and recent GAO reports.
To describe U. S. national security issues related to the Visa Waiver
Program, we reviewed Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data on
terrorists who entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as
well as with valid visas. We reviewed State, INS, Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) data and databases
on inadmissible aliens, the immigration status of criminals, the number of
aliens refused entry to the United States, and the reasons aliens were
refused entry. We also examined Justice officials* testimony before
Congress, the President*s National Strategy for Homeland Security, and
GAO*s report Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool. Given the limited amount of data addressing this
issue, we interviewed officials from State, including the Bureaus of
Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, and Justice, including the INS,
FBI, and DEA in the United States and in Argentina, Belgium, Italy,
Slovenia, Spain,
and Uruguay. We selected five of these countries because they were the
first countries whose participation in the program was being evaluated by
the Departments of Justice and State. We selected the sixth country,
Spain,
to provide a perspective on countries that had not been evaluated. We
discussed with U. S. officials their views about whether eliminating the
Visa Waiver Program would increase U. S. national security. To describe
the importance of the Visa Waiver Program to U. S. relations with other
countries, we reviewed government reports, including the U. S. Department
of Defense*s Fact Sheet: International Contributions to the War Against
Terrorism, the State Department*s Patterns of Global Terrorism* 2001, and
the U. K. Coalition Information Centre*s Campaign Against Terrorism: A
Coalition Update. We reviewed European Union documents, including European
Council positions and regulations. We also interviewed officials from the
Departments of State, including the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and
Diplomatic Security, and Justice, including the INS, FBI, and DEA in the
United States and in Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and
Uruguay. We discussed with them whether eliminating
countries* participation in the Visa Waiver Program could affect U. S.
relations with those countries and, if so, what the effects might be.
Because of the sensitivity of the issues, in four of the six countries,
the State Department requested that we not meet with representatives from
other countries* governments or chambers of commerce. We met with the
governments of Argentina and Uruguay and with the American Chamber of
Commerce in Argentina. To determine whether requiring citizens of visa
waiver countries to obtain
visas would affect their decision to travel to the United States, we
examined the existing economic literature on tourism and interviewed
industry experts. We interviewed officials from State, Foreign Commercial
Service Officers in overseas posts, the Department of Commerce*s Office of
Travel and Tourism Industries, the Travel Industry Association of America,
the World Travel and Tourism Council, and the World Tourism Organization.
To determine the contribution of travel from visa waiver countries to the
U. S. economy, we reviewed official travel data for 1991*
2001 from Commerce, a 2002 study from Commerce, and data from the Travel
Industry Association of America and the World Travel and Tourism Council.
To determine the potential effects that requiring visas and biometrics
from current visa waiver travelers would have on State*s resources, we
created a cost estimating model using workload and staffing data from
State*s Bureau of Consular Affairs and information on the time and costs
involved in collecting biometrics. Such information included analogies to
the
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, averages of
biometric vendor costs, expert opinions from the field of biometrics, and
cost estimates developed by the International Biometrics Group. We
conducted a simulation that varied the cost estimating model approximately
1,000 times with information on variables such as personnel and facility
costs to forecast a range for both initial and recurring costs. During our
simulation, costs fell below the top of the shaded areas in
Figures 3 and 4 in the report 90 percent of the time, while costs fell
below the bottom of the shaded areas only 10 percent of the time. In other
words, 80 percent of the times we varied our simulation, costs fell within
our reported ranges. We chose to report large ranges of cost estimates to
reflect the uncertainty of key variables in our cost estimating model,
such as costs for consular personnel, space, and supplies; the percentage
of visa applicants that State interviews; and the method by which State
collects
biometrics. 38 We based our estimates on the following assumptions:
All costs were expressed in constant fiscal 2002 dollars.
The amount of additional visa applications for current visa waiver
travelers would remain about 14 million per year. 39
Cost estimates provided to us by State, such as Foreign Service national
salaries and leasing and maintenance fees, could vary by about 10 percent,
barring unforeseen circumstances.
The ratio of Foreign Service nationals needed to assist each Foreign
Service officer with nonimmigrant visa processing is 2. 5 to 1 but can
vary between 2 and 4 to 1. Under a *low interview* scenario, State would
interview 10 percent of all visa applicants and, under a *high interview*
scenario, State would
interview 95 percent of all visa applicants. Estimates are based on a 4-
minute interview. 40 Consular officers would capture four flat
fingerprints from each visa applicant at the embassy or consulate and
would store the biometric
data in a separate memory storage card from the visa. 41
Resources would be in place at all visa- issuing posts to collect
biometrics for the current 10.3 million visa applications. 38 See GAO- 03-
174 for a detailed description on different scenarios in which biometrics
could be collected and the costs that each scenario would entail; also see
that report for the assumptions used in estimating the initial and annual
recurring costs of each scenario. We chose to use the scenario for
fingerprint recognition. Finally, see the report for more specific details
of the assumptions used to estimate costs involved with collecting
fingerprints.
39 The number of visa waiver travelers who would apply for visas is highly
variable and is based on many factors, including the economy and personal
preferences. We did not vary this number in our analysis. 40 Interview
length could vary with new security screening parameters in place, which
could require interviews of 15 minutes or longer. We did not vary
interview length in our analysis. 41 This assumption is not the
recommendation of the State Department for implementation of biometrics in
the visa process.
Some Foreign Service nationals would spend time both processing visa
applications and collecting biometrics.
Visa applicants whom State must interview would visit the embassy to be
interviewed and have their biometrics collected on the same day. We also
met with consular officials at the U. S. consulate in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, to determine the effect that the elimination of the Visa Waiver
Program had on their staff and facility levels. Similarly, we met with
consular officials in U. S. consulates in Brussels, Belgium; Rome, Italy;
Ljubljana, Slovenia; Madrid, Spain; and Montevideo, Uruguay, to determine
how the elimination of the Visa Waiver Program would affect their
resources.
We performed our work from February 2002 through August 2002, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendi x II
Comments from the Department of Justice Note: GAO comments supplementing
those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
See comment 1. See comment 2.
See comment 2.
The following are GAO*s comments on the Department of Justice*s letter
dated November 4, 2002. GAO Comments 1. Justice stated that it does not
anticipate significant delays in the incorporation of standardized,
machine- verifiable biometrics in the national passports of most Visa
Waiver Program countries. We believe
that some countries may not be able to establish programs to issue the
passports by the 2004 deadline. Our assessment is based on the statements
of U. S. State Department and law enforcement officials in Europe and the
United States. Moreover, our concern is supported by
additional information that we subsequently obtained from the State
Department. As of October 2002, State found that only 3 of the 17
countries discussing their plans for issuing biometric passports would
meet the deadline. Most of the respondents stated that they did not know
if they would meet the deadline. Some of these respondents cited the lack
of an international standard as a reason for the uncertainty.
2. Justice also commented that our discussion of the entry* exit system
leaves the impression that implementation of the system is not moving
forward. We acknowledge that INS has implemented systems, as of October 1,
2002, to fulfill the requirement for an automated system to monitor the
entry and exit of aliens under the Visa Waiver Program. We have added this
information to the report. However, we note that there
have been delays in implementing the entry* exit system for Visa Waiver
Program travelers. Implementation of such a system has been required since
1986. However, the report also points out that an entry* exit system
covering all nonimmigrant travelers to the United States has been required
since 1996. Moreover, the Justice Inspector General has reported that
completion of the entire entry* exit system will take
several years. 42 42 U. S. Department of Justice, Follow- up Report on INS
Efforts to Improve the Control of Nonimmigrant Overstays (Washington, D.
C.: April 2002).
Appendi x II I Comments from the Department of State Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 2.
The following are GAO*s comments on the Department of State*s letter dated
November 7, 2002.
GAO Comments 1. State commented that the discussion of Zacarias Moussaoui
should include more details. We do not believe additional details are
necessary. We discussed Moussaoui and the 19 individuals who carried out
the attacks of September 11, 2001, merely as examples of anecdotal
evidence about terrorists entering the United States under the Visa Waiver
Program and with visas.
2. State commented that the draft report did not provide detailed
information on the border inspection process. State also commented that
the draft report overemphasizes the visa application as a solution to
perceived weaknesses of the Visa Waver Program and overlooks the
possibility that these weaknesses could be resolved through changes in
border inspection procedures or other means. We acknowledge the
importance of the inspection process for aliens seeking to enter the
United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with visas. We have
added a discussion of the inspection process to the report. The
Justice Department Inspector General and GAO are conducting more thorough
assessments of the border inspection process.
Appendi x V I GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Cheryl
Goodman (202) 512- 6571 La Verne Tharpes (202) 512- 5961 Acknowledgments
In addition to the persons named above, Lyric Clark, Kendall Schafer,
Bruce Kutnick, Mary Moutsos, and Reid Lowe made key contributions to this
report.
(320101)
a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
To ensure that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program pose a
low risk to U. S. national interests, the Departments of Justice and State
verify each country*s political and economic stability and the security of
its passport issuance process. However, laws passed since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, affect the processes for determining
eligibility for the program. The new laws expand passport requirements for
visa waiver countries and call for a system to monitor visitors* movement
into and out of the United States. Whether these requirements will be
implemented by the specified deadlines remains uncertain.
The implications for U. S. national security of eliminating the Visa
Waiver Program are difficult to determine. It is clear, however, that
eliminating the program could affect U. S. relations with other countries,
U. S. tourism, and State Department resources abroad.
Although the Departments of Justice and State generally agreed with our
report, Justice was concerned that GAO did not fully take into account its
progress in meeting certain requirements. State questioned whether GAO
considered the border inspection process when discussing the national
security implications of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.
Countries Participating in the Visa Waiver Program
Note: Map is not drawn to scale. It is for illustrative purposes only.
BORDER SECURITY
Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ GAO- 03- 38. To view the full report, including
the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information,
contact Jess Ford (202) 512- 4128 or fordj@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO-
03- 38, a report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives.
November 2002
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U. S. Congress, the
administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have questioned
the effectiveness of U. S. visa programs in protecting national security.
Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other criminals may exploit
one of these programs* the Visa Waiver Program* to enter the United
States. The program enables citizens of 28 participating countries to
travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less
without first obtaining a visa. It was created, in part, to promote the
effective use of government resources and to facilitate international
travel without threatening U. S. security.
GAO was asked to review the Visa Waiver Program, including the process for
assessing countries* eligibility to participate in the program. GAO was
also asked to determine the implications* specifically those affecting
national security, foreign relations, tourism, and State Department
resources* of eliminating the program. GAO analysts traveled to several
visa waiver countries, including Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and
Uruguay, as well as to Argentina, whose participation in the program was
recently revoked.
Page i GAO- 03- 38 Visa Waiver Program
Contents
Contents Page ii GAO- 03- 38 Visa Waiver Program
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Appendix I
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
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Appendix I Scope and Methodology
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Appendix I Scope and Methodology
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Appendix II
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Justice
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Appendix II Comments from the Department of Justice
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Appendix II Comments from the Department of Justice
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Appendix III
Appendix III Comments from the Department of State
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Appendix III Comments from the Department of State
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Appendix III Comments from the Department of State
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Appendix IV
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