Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and
Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management
(30-SEP-04, GAO-04-890).
Conducting research and development (R&D) on technologies for
detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital
to enhancing the security of the nation's transportation system.
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress
enacted legislation to strengthen homeland security, in part by
enhancing R&D. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are the two federal
agencies with primary responsibility for transportation security.
GAO was asked to assess the transportation security R&D projects
that TSA, DHS, and other agencies have funded and assess how TSA
and DHS are managing their transportation security R&D programs
according to applicable laws and best practices.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-890
ACCNO: A12868
TITLE: Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching
and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management
DATE: 09/30/2004
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
Physical security
Terrorism
Research and development
National preparedness
Transportation safety
Best practices
Best practices methodology
Homeland security
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GAO-04-890
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters
September 2004
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY R&D
TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D
Management
a
GAO04890
September 2004
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY R&D
TSA and DHS Are Researching and
Highlights of GAO-04-890, a report to Developing Technologies, but Need to
congressional requesters.
Improve R&D Management
Conducting research and For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA and DHS funded
over 200 R&D projects development (R&D) on designed to develop
technologies for enhancing security in most modes of technologies for
detecting, transportation. In fiscal year 2003, TSA spent 81 percent of
its $21 million preventing, and mitigating terrorist transportation
security R&D budget for aviation projects, and DHS spentthreats is vital
to enhancing the about half of its $26 million for projects related to
more than one mode of
security of the nation's transportation system. Following transportation.
In fiscal year 2004, TSA continued to budget most of its $159 the
September 11, 2001, terrorist million for aviation, and DHS also budgeted
most of its $88 million for attacks, Congress enacted aviation, as shown
in the table below. According to the National Research legislation to
strengthen homeland Council, federal R&D programs should include some
basic research, but TSA security, in part by enhancing R&D. and DHS do not
appear to be funding any basic research for transportation The
Transportation Security security. TSA and DHS have not estimated
deployment dates for the vast Administration (TSA) and the majority of
their R&D projects. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of
Homeland Security Department of Transportation (DOT) and the National
Aeronautics and (DHS) are the two federal agencies Space Administration,
also funded some transportation security R&D with primary responsibility
for projects. Several members of an expert panel on transportation
security and transportation security. technology that GAO convened
believed the distribution of R&D projects by GAO was asked to assess the
transportation mode was reasonable, while others believed that aviation
has transportation security R&D been overemphasized at the expense of
maritime and land modes.
projects that TSA, DHS, and other
agencies have funded and assess TSA's and DHS's Transportation Security
R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004
how TSA and DHS are managing their transportation security R&D Dollars in
thousands TSA DHS
programs according to applicable Transportation Fiscal year Fiscal year
Fiscal year Fiscal yearlaws and best practices. mode 2003 2004 2003
(obligated)/(%) (budgeted)/(%) (obligated)/(%) (budgeted)/(%)
Aviation $17,101 (81.1) $126,487 $3,709 (14.3) $63,240 (71.9)
(79.5)
GAO is Highway 3,000
recommending Maritime 0 (0.0) 9,350 1,052 (4.1) (3.4)1,626
that TSA 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) (5.9) 3,474 (13.4) (1.8)
and DHS
improve Multimodal
their 3,819 (18.1) 22,242 (14.0) 12,630 (48.8) 20,117 (22.9)
transportation security R&D management by conducting some basic research,
completing their strategic planning and risk assessment efforts,
developing a management information system, and better coordinating with
other federal agencies and reaching out to the transportation industry.
DHS, TSA, and DOT generally agreed with the report's findings and
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-890.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Kate Siggerud at (202)
512-2834 or [email protected].
Pipeline 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Rail 169 (0.8) 1,096 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Transit 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 5,000 (19.3) 0 (0.0)
Total $21,089 $159,175 $25,865 $87,983
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: GAO analysis of TSA and DHS data.
TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best practices,
but neither agency has fully complied with the laws or implemented the
best practices. For example, neither agency has prepared a strategic plan
for R&D that contains measurable objectives. In addition, although TSA has
completed threat assessments for all modes, it has not completed
vulnerability and criticality assessments. DHS also has not completed risk
assessments of the infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, both TSA and DHS
lack complete, consolidated data for managing their R&D projects. Finally,
although TSA and DHS have made some efforts to coordinate R&D with other
federal agencies, their outreach to consider the concerns of the
transportation industry has been limited.
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
TSA, DHS, and Others Are Funding Transportation Security R&D
Projects and Experts Had Mixed Views about Some Projects TSA and DHS Have
Made Some Progress in Managing Their R&D
Programs but Have Not Yet Fully Completed Their Efforts Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
1 3 7
12
29 43 45 45
Appendixes
Appendix I:
Appendix II:
Appendix III:
Appendix IV:
Appendix V:
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 51
Industry Is Independently Developing New and Emerging
Transportation Security Technologies 54
GAO's Panel of Transportation Security and Technology
Experts 56
Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 58
GAO Comments 63
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 64
GAO Contacts 64
Staff Acknowledgments 64
Tables
Table 1: Table 2: Table 3: Table 4: Table 5:
TSA's and DHS's Transportation Security R&D Funding by
Mode, Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 4
TSA's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode,
Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 14
DHS's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode,
Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 22
DOT's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode,
Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 26
TSA's and DHS's Implementation of Statutory
Requirements and Best Practices for Managing Their R&D
Programs 30
Figures
Figure 1: Major Events in the Establishment of TSA and DHS 9 Figure 2: A
Walk-through Explosives Trace Detection Portal 16
Contents
Figure 3: Distribution of TSA's R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years
2003 and 2004 20 Figure 4: Photograph of a MANPADS 23 Figure 5: A Mobile
Search X-ray Inspection System for Detecting
Truck Bombs 24 Figure 6: Distribution of DHS's R&D Funding by Phase,
Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004 25
Abbreviations
CAPPS II Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOE Department of Energy
DOT Department of Transportation
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
MANPADS man-portable air defense systems
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
R&D research and development
TRIP Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSWG Technical Support Working Group
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.
A
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
September 30, 2004
Congressional Requesters:
Researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and mitigate
terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation's
transportation system. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, Congress enacted legislation to strengthen homeland security, in
part by enhancing research and development (R&D) for transportation
security- especially for aviation. The recent bombings of the rail system
in Madrid, Spain, have heightened concern about the security of all modes
of transportation in the United States, and concern is growing in Congress
about whether the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) and the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to counter terrorist
threats to the nation's transportation systems are proceeding fast enough
and are focused on the appropriate technologies.
To enhance the nation's transportation security, including its R&D
capabilities, in November 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, which created TSA within the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and made TSA responsible for security in all modes of
transportation (aviation, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, and transit).
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, passed a year later, established DHS;
transferred TSA and many other federal agencies to DHS; and made DHS
responsible for homeland security, including transportation security. The
act specified, however, that TSA would remain a distinct entity within DHS
until November 25, 2004. Both laws authorized funding for homeland and
transportation security R&D and established requirements for its
management, including requirements for planning and coordination, but
neither law includes deadlines for implementing these requirements. As you
requested, we are reporting on
o
the transportation security R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and other
agencies funded in fiscal year 2003 and have budgeted for in fiscal year
2004; the status of these projects; and experts' views on the
reasonableness of the distribution of these projects by mode and
o
the extent to which TSA and DHS are managing their transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and best practices
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research
Council.
In addition, we are reporting on some new and emerging technologies for
screening passengers, baggage, and cargo (see app. II). For this review,
we considered transportation security R&D to encompass the research,
development, testing, and evaluation of technologies to protect the
nation's transportation system from terrorist attacks or major crimes. The
transportation system consists largely of (1) infrastructure, such as
airports, seaports, border crossings, rail stations, transit stations,
highways, bridges, tunnels, and pipelines, and (2) vehicles, such as
aircraft, ships, ferry boats, trucks, buses, automobiles, and trains. We
refer to the key modes of transportation as aviation, highways, maritime,
pipeline, rail (passenger and freight), and transit (buses and subways).
Because TSA and DHS each has its own R&D portfolio, we discuss the two
agencies' transportation security-related R&D programs separately in this
report. When we discuss TSA's R&D portfolio, we include projects funded by
TSA's Office of Security Technologies, Office of Maritime and Land
Security, and Office of Aviation Operations. Our discussion of DHS's
transportation security R&D portfolio includes projects funded by DHS's
Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, and U.S. Secret Service.
To describe the types of transportation security R&D projects that TSA and
DHS are funding in fiscal year 2003 and plan to fund in fiscal year 2004,
we analyzed detailed information on their transportation security R&D
projects. Detailed information on the transportation security R&D projects
that TSA and DHS plan to fund in fiscal year 2005 was not yet available.
Although TSA and DHS are the primary federal agencies responsible for
conducting transportation security R&D, DOT and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) also fund some transportation security R&D
projects, and we included information on those agencies' projects in this
report. We discussed the reliability of project and budgetary information
with TSA and DHS officials and determined that the data they provided were
sufficiently reliable for us to complete our review. To determine the
extent to which TSA and DHS are managing their transportation security R&D
programs according to applicable laws and best practices, we analyzed
applicable legal requirements for TSA and DHS and best practices for
managing R&D identified by the National Academy of Sciences and the
National Research Council; analyzed documentation relating to both
agencies' programs; and interviewed TSA and DHS officials about their
strategic planning and risk management. We also interviewed TSA and DHS
officials, as well as other stakeholders, about the agencies' coordination
with other federal agencies and outreach to technology providers and the
transportation industry. To
help evaluate the reasonableness of the distribution of transportation
security R&D funding by mode and the challenges that TSA and DHS are
facing in managing their programs, we convened a panel of transportation
security and technology experts on March 2, 2004. At our request, the
National Research Council selected the experts, who were affiliated with
state transportation departments, universities, national laboratories,
private industry, and other organizations and were knowledgeable about
transportation security technologies.
We conducted our review at TSA, DHS, and DOT in Washington, D.C.; at TSA's
Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey; and at
the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Laboratories in Los Alamos, New
Mexico, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Appendix I contains detailed information
about our scope and methodology, and appendix III lists the transportation
security and technology experts who assisted us in our review. We
conducted our review from July 2003 through September 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
TSA and DHS are funding transportation security R&D projects that are
aimed at developing technologies to enhance security in most modes of
transportation. For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA funded 146
transportation security R&D projects, and DHS funded 56 projects. As shown
in table 1, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $21 million on
transportation security R&D projects and budgeted about $159 million for
fiscal year 2004. In both years, TSA spent or budgeted most of its R&D
funding for aviation security. TSA's funding for aviation security R&D
increased from about $17 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $126 million
for fiscal year 2004, partly because of an appropriation of $55 million
for air cargo security R&D. Also as shown in table 1, in fiscal year 2003,
DHS spent about $26 million on transportation security R&D projects and
budgeted about $88 million for fiscal year 2004. In contrast to TSA, in
fiscal year 2003, DHS spent almost $13 million, or about 49 percent, of
its R&D funding on projects related to more than one mode. However,
similar to TSA, for fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted the majority of its R&D
funding for aviation security, increasing the amount from about $4 million
in fiscal year 2003 to about $63 million. The majority of this increase is
for a program to develop technical countermeasures to minimize the threat
posed to commercial aircraft by shoulder-fired missiles, also known as
man-portable air defense systems.
Table 1: TSA's and DHS's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004
Dollars in thousands
TSA DHS
Fiscal year Fiscal year 2004 Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year
2003 2004
Mode (obligated) (budgeted)/(%) (obligated)/(%) (budgeted)/(%)
/(%)
Aviation $17,101 $126,487 (79.5) $3,709 (14.3) $63,240 (71.9)
(81.1)
Highway 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1,052 (4.1) 3,000 (3.4)
Maritime 0 (0.0) 9,350 (5.9) 3,474 (13.4) 1,626 (1.8)
Multimodal 3,819 (18.1) 22,242 (14.0) 12,630 (48.8) 20,117 (22.9)
Pipeline 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Rail 169 (0.8) 1,096 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Transit 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 5,000 (19.3) 0 (0.0)
Total $21,089
(100.0) $159,175 (100.0) $25,865 (100.0) $87,983 (100.0)
Source: GAO analysis of TSA and DHS data.
Note: The figures in this table represent transportation security R&D
projects funded by TSA's Office of Security Technologies. Other TSA
offices also funded several transportation security R&D projects in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004, such as Operation Safe Commerce, the Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II, and the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential program. However, TSA was not able to provide us
with funding information for these projects.
Although TSA and DHS have not decided what additional projects they will
fund in fiscal year 2005 and beyond, the President's fiscal year 2005
budget requests $154 million for TSA's R&D program and about $1 billion
for DHS's Science and Technology Directorate, which includes some
transportation security R&D.1 DOT spent $8 million in fiscal year 2003 and
has budgeted about $31 million for transportation security R&D projects
during fiscal year 2004. For example, in 2003, DOT spent about $2 million
to develop and field-test a system to track trailers containing hazardous
materials when they are not attached to a tractor; for fiscal year 2004,
it budgeted $20 million to develop a secure information network to share
air traffic control information with DHS and others. NASA did not fund any
transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003, but it has
budgeted about $18 million for aviation security R&D projects during
fiscal year 2004. Although the National Research Council has stated that
federal R&D programs should include some basic research, project
information provided by TSA and DHS did not show that any of the
transportation security R&D projects
1The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for TSA's R&D program is
for R&D in TSA's Office of Security Technologies only and does not include
R&D in other TSA offices, such as the Office of Maritime and Land Security
and the Office of Aviation Operations.
funded in fiscal year 2003 and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in
the basic research phase. TSA and DHS also have not estimated deployment
dates for the vast majority of the projects that they funded in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004. Of the 24 projects for which the two agencies were
able to estimate deployment dates, 8 are scheduled for deployment as early
as this fiscal year, and the remaining 16 are scheduled for deployment
during fiscal years 2005 to 2014. According to a TSA official, deployment
dates are not always predictable because deployment is dependent on other
factors, such as funding for purchasing and installing equipment. Several
members of our panel of transportation security and technology experts
believed that the distribution of R&D projects by transportation mode was
reasonable, while others believed that aviation has been overemphasized at
the expense of maritime and land modes. Finally, some panelists also
questioned whether some projects should be funded.
TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best practices,
but they have not fully complied with these laws or implemented best
practices. For example:
o
The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare a strategic plan that
identifies goals and includes annual measurable objectives for
coordinating the federal government's civilian efforts in developing
countermeasures to terrorist threats. Similarly, the National Research
Council has indicated that research programs should be described in
strategic and performance plans and evaluated in performance reports. TSA
and DHS have prepared strategic plans for their agencies, and TSA has
prepared a strategic plan for its R&D program, but these plans do not
contain measurable objectives for tracking the progress of projects.
According to DHS officials, the department is preparing a separate
strategic plan for its R&D program that will include more specific goals
and measurable objectives.
o
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to use risk
management principles in making its R&D funding decisions. Furthermore,
under the Homeland Security Act, DHS is required to prepare comprehensive
assessments of the vulnerabilities of the nation's key resources and
critical infrastructure sectors, which include transportation. Although
both TSA and DHS have established processes to select and prioritize R&D
projects that include risk management principles, they have not yet
completed vulnerability and criticality assessments, which we have
identified as key elements of a risk
management approach, for all modes of transportation.2 In the absence of
completed risk assessments, for example, TSA and DHS officials are using
available threat intelligence, expert judgment, and information about past
terrorist incidents to select and prioritize their R&D projects.
o
The National Research Council has emphasized the need for R&D programs to
have adequate databases that will provide managers with key project
management information. TSA's and DHS's R&D managers were not able to
provide us with complete information on all projects in their R&D
portfolios. For example, for the 146 projects that it funded in 2003 and
2004, TSA was not able to provide information on anticipated deployment
dates for 91 percent of these projects, the current phase of development
for 49 percent, and the amounts obligated and/or budgeted for 8 percent.
DHS was not able to provide information on anticipated deployment dates
for 68 percent of its projects, the current phase of development for 14
percent, and the amounts obligated and budgeted for 9 percent. Although
the National Research Council has stated that federal R&D programs should
include some basic research, project information provided by TSA and DHS
did not show that any of the transportation security R&D projects that
they funded in fiscal year 2003 and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were
in the basic research phase.
o
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Homeland Security
Act require TSA and DHS to coordinate their R&D efforts with those of
other government agencies. Similarly, the Transportation Research Board, a
division of the National Research Council, indicates that while TSA should
have its own analysis and research capability, it should also coordinate
with the transportation sector, the federal government, and the science
and technology community. Although TSA and DHS have made some efforts to
coordinate R&D with each other and with other federal agencies, their
coordination with DOT has been limited. Specifically, officials from the
modal administrations of DOT, which continue to conduct some
transportation security R&D, said that they had not provided any input
into TSA's and DHS's transportation security R&D project selections, nor
had TSA or DHS provided any input into DOT's transportation security R&D
project selections. In addition, TSA's and DHS's outreach to the
transportation industry has been limited. An air cargo association
official said that TSA contacted his
2GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,
GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).
association about the air cargo industry's security R&D needs. However,
most transportation officials we interviewed said that TSA and DHS had not
contacted them about their security R&D needs. Consequently, the
transportation industry's security R&D needs may not be adequately
reflected in TSA's and DHS's R&D portfolios.
We recognize that TSA and DHS are relatively new agencies that are
operating in a changing environment. However, until TSA and DHS prepare
R&D strategic plans with measurable objectives and complete all of their
risk assessments, Congress and other stakeholders will not have a reliable
means of assessing TSA's and DHS's progress toward achieving their R&D
goals or determining whether the millions of dollars that are being
invested in transportation security R&D projects are being spent
cost-effectively and address the highest transportation security risks. We
are recommending that TSA and DHS (1) conduct some basic research, (2)
complete their strategic planning and risk assessment efforts, (3) develop
a management information system, and (4) better coordinate with other
federal agencies and reach out to the transportation industry. We provided
TSA, DHS, and DOT with draft copies of this report for their review and
comment. DHS and TSA generally concurred with the draft report's findings
and recommendations, agreed that the recommendations are key to a
successful R&D program, and commented that they would continue to evaluate
their R&D processes in light of the report's findings and recommendations.
However, DHS believed that the report did not sufficiently recognize
recent changes that have taken place, particularly at TSA. In particular,
DHS said that TSA has made great strides in defining R&D projects and
linking them to mission needs and identified gaps. In response to these
and other technical comments that DHS provided, we have made changes to
the report as appropriate. DOT agreed with our findings and a
recommendation that to improve R&D coordination, a memorandum of agreement
that defines roles and responsibilities be developed between it and DHS.
DOT also provided some technical comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate. See appendix IV for DHS's comments and our responses.
Background
The nation's transportation system is vast and complex, consisting of
about 3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles of rail, almost
600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, over 2 million miles of pipeline, about
500 train stations, and over 5,000 public-use airports. The size of the
transportation system, which moves millions of passengers and tons of
freight every day, makes it both an attractive target for terrorists and
difficult to secure. Moreover,
transportation systems can be used as weapons themselves as was done on
September 11, 2001.
As we indicated in our June 2003 report on transportation security
challenges,3 transportation experts, state and local governments, and
industry representatives generally believe that investing in
transportation security R&D is the federal government's responsibility.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted
legislation that resulted in changes in the federal organization and
funding for transportation security R&D. In November 2001, the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act created TSA within DOT and transferred the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) aviation security R&D program to
TSA. The act also required TSA to meet a December 31, 2002, deadline for
deploying explosives detection systems to screen all checked baggage. One
year later, the Homeland Security Act created DHS and transferred TSA from
DOT to DHS. This legislation also transferred to DHS several other
agencies that conducted transportation security R&D, including the U.S.
Customs Service (now part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection) and the
U.S. Secret Service from the Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Coast
Guard from DOT.4 In addition, the Homeland Security Act extended the
deadline for deploying new checked baggage screening equipment for certain
airports to December 31, 2003, and transferred certain chemical and
biological research programs that have potential transportation security
applications from the Department of Defense and DOE to DHS. Although TSA
and DHS have their own research facilities, most of their transportation
security R&D is conducted by contractors. Figure 1 identifies major events
in the establishment of TSA and DHS.
3GAO, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).
4Under the Homeland Security Act, the Secret Service and Coast Guard
remained distinct entities within DHS. The Secret Service and Coast Guard
portfolio managers said that DHS's Science and Technology Directorate does
not direct the types of transportation security R&D projects that they
conduct.
Figure 1: Major Events in the Establishment of TSA and DHS
Sources: Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Homeland Security Act
of 2002, and DHS.
aThis deadline was extended to December 31, 2003, by the Homeland Security
Act.
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is required to
o secure all modes of transportation;
o
coordinate transportation security countermeasures with other federal
government agencies; and
o
accelerate the research, development, testing, and evaluation of
explosives detection technology for checked baggage and of new technology
to screen for threats in carry-on items and other items being loaded onto
aircraft, including cargo, and on persons.
TSA's Office of Security Technologies is responsible for the research,
development, testing, and deployment of security technology
countermeasures employed to protect the transportation system against
criminal and terrorist threats. It organizes its R&D projects according to
the different approaches through which threats can reach a target, such as
on a person; in carry-on items, vehicles, checked baggage, or cargo; or
through access points at airports or at marine ports. The Office of
Security Technologies operates the Transportation Security Laboratory,
located in Atlantic City, New Jersey, which conducts transportation
security R&D and tests products submitted by potential vendors for
compliance with TSA standards.
Although FAA's aviation security R&D program was moved to TSA and TSA has
since initiated R&D related to other modes of transportation, several DOT
administrations5 conducted transportation security R&D before TSA was
created and continue to do so. However, security is not the primary focus
of DOT's R&D programs.
The Homeland Security Act brought 22 separate federal agencies under DHS's
umbrella and provided a framework for organizing DHS into five
directorates, giving the Science and Technology Directorate responsibility
for DHS's research, development, testing, and evaluation activities and
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate responsibility for
security along the nation's borders and in all modes of transportation.
The act also requires TSA to remain a distinct entity within the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate until November 25, 2004.
Consequently, TSA's R&D program office-the Office of Security
Technologies-currently operates outside of DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate.
Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate is required to prepare risk
assessments of the nation's key resources and critical infrastructure,6
5These include the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Highway
Administration, the Federal Motor Carriers' Safety Administration, the
Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, and
the Research and Special Programs Administration.
6The Homeland Security Act refers to the USA Patriot Act for a definition
of critical infrastructure, which defines it as systems and assets that
are so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
or national public health or safety. See Pub.L. No. 107-56, S: 1016(e)
(2001).
which includes transportation. In addition, the Homeland Security Act
requires the Science and Technology Directorate to
o
coordinate with the appropriate executive branch agencies in developing
and carrying out the science and technology agenda of the department to
reduce duplication and identify unmet needs;
o
accelerate the prototyping and development of technologies to address
homeland security vulnerabilities; and
o
coordinate and integrate all research, development, demonstration,
testing, and evaluation activities of the department.
The Science and Technology Directorate's programs are organized by the
type of threat (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber,
and high explosives) or by the end-users of the technologies within and
outside of DHS (e.g., borders and transportation, critical infrastructure
protection, and emergency preparedness and response). The directorate's
four offices, as discussed below, are involved in conducting,
coordinating, or soliciting some transportation-security-related R&D
projects.
o
The Office of Programs, Plans, and Budgets establishes overall
priorities, oversees R&D activities across the Science and Technology
Directorate, and provides policy guidance for the directorate's
interactions with other DHS components. The office is organized into R&D
portfolios that are focused on various types of terrorist threats or DHS
components. The portfolios involving transportation-security related R&D
include Border and Transportation Security, High Explosives
Countermeasures, Biological and Chemical Countermeasures, Radiological and
Nuclear Countermeasures, the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service.
o
The Office of Research and Development executes research, development,
testing, and evaluation of technologies at DOE and other federal
laboratories; supports university and fellowship programs; and provides an
R&D capability dedicated to homeland security.
o
The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) serves
as the department's R&D external funding arm by
engaging industry, academia, government, and other sectors in R&D, rapid
prototyping,7 and technology transfer.
o
The Office of Systems Engineering and Development takes technologies
developed by the Office of Research and Development or HSARPA and prepares
deployment strategies to transfer technologies to federal, state, and/or
local government users.
TSA, DHS, and Others Are Funding Transportation Security R&D Projects and
Experts Had Mixed Views about Some Projects
As the primary federal agencies responsible for enhancing the security of
all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $21
million and DHS spent about $26 million on transportation security R&D
projects; for fiscal year 2004, TSA and DHS have budgeted about $159
million and $88 million, respectively. In addition, DOT spent about $8
million on transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003 and
has budgeted about $31 million for fiscal year 2004. NASA did not fund any
transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003 but has budgeted
about $18 million for aviation security R&D projects during fiscal year
2004. TSA and DHS were not able to estimate deployment dates for the vast
majority of projects that they funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
Although TSA and DHS have not decided what additional projects they will
fund in fiscal year 2005 and beyond, the President's fiscal year 2005
budget requests $154 million for TSA's R&D program and about $1 billion
for the Science and Technology Directorate, which includes some
transportation security R&D.8 Overall, members of our panel of
transportation security and technology experts had mixed views about the
reasonableness of the distribution of transportation security R&D projects
by mode and raised questions about the types of projects that were funded
and not funded by TSA and DHS.
TSA Has Used a Majority of Its R&D Funding for Aviation Security
Overall, TSA increased its funding for transportation security R&D from
$21 million in fiscal year 2003 to $159 million in fiscal year 2004, as
shown in table 2. Although TSA is responsible for addressing the security
needs of
7Rapid prototyping is a process that uses computer-aided design and
fabrication to create and build a prototype more quickly than through
traditional means.
8The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for TSA's R&D program is
for R&D in TSA's Office of Security Technologies only and does not include
R&D in other TSA offices, such as the Office of Maritime and Land Security
and the Office of Aviation Operations.
all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $17
million, or about 81 percent, of its R&D funding for projects related to
aviation security. For fiscal year 2004, TSA has budgeted about $126
million on aviation security, or about 79 percent of its R&D budget. This
increase reflects, in part, a $55 million appropriation for R&D related to
air cargo screening. According to TSA, it has spent the majority of its
R&D funding on aviation security because aviation was the greatest concern
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and because Congress
directed TSA to use R&D funding to enhance aviation security. In fiscal
year 2004, TSA increased its budget for multimodal R&D projects from about
$4 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $22 million. This increase is due,
in part, to a $5.6 million increase for the Manhattan II project9 and
about $6.4 million for development of a walk-through trace portal for
detecting explosives on aviation, maritime, and rail passengers. In fiscal
year 2004, TSA also increased its budget for rail security R&D projects
from $169,000 in fiscal year 2003 to about $1.1 million. This increase
reflects the $1.1 million that was budgeted for the Transit and Rail
Inspection Pilot (TRIP).10 TSA also increased maritime security R&D
funding from zero in fiscal year 2003 to about $9 million in fiscal year
2004; this increase is due, in part, to $3.6 million for a project to
develop equipment to screen vehicles on ferries. Finally, TSA did not
spend any money for highway, pipeline, or transit R&D projects. Several
members of our panel of transportation security and technology experts
commented that R&D for rail and transit security warrants additional
funding. Congress is considering legislation to increase funding for these
as well as other modes of transportation in fiscal year 2005. For example,
the Rail Security Act, S. 2273, which has been passed by the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, would authorize $50
million in each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for an R&D program for
improving freight and intercity passenger rail security.
9Manhattan II is TSA's long-term approach for improving checked baggage
screening systems for aviation as well as maritime and land modes. This
program seeks to achieve revolutionary improvements in detection
capability and operational efficiency in 5 to 10 years using new screening
technologies. TSA plans to award this project's first "proof of concept"
grants in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004.
10TRIP is intended to assess the feasibility of the screening of people
and their carry-on baggage traveling on U.S. trains.
Table 2: TSA's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal Years
2003 and 2004
Dollars in thousands
Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004
Mode Obligated Percent Budgeted Percent
Aviation $17,101 81.1 $126,487
Highway 0 0.0 0
Maritime 0 0.0 9,350
Multimodal 3,819 18.1 22,242
Pipeline 0 0.0 0
Rail 169 0.8 1,096
Transit 0 0.0 0
Total $21,089 100.0 $159,175 100.0
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: The figures in this table represent transportation security R&D
projects funded by TSA's Office of Security Technologies. Other TSA
offices also funded several transportation security R&D projects in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004, such as Operation Safe Commerce, the Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II, and the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential program. However, TSA was not able to provide us
with funding information for these projects.
Aviation Security R&D Projects In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA spent or
budgeted R&D funds for Funded by TSA projects in several aviation security
program areas, including the following:
o
Aviation Checked Baggage: To improve the detection capability and
operational efficiency of its current checked baggage-screening program,
TSA has both near-term (1 to 3 years) and long-term R&D programs. To date,
TSA has spent most of its checked baggage screening R&D funds on the
near-term programs. In fiscal year 2003, it obligated about $12 million,
and, for fiscal year 2004, it budgeted about $27 million for near-term
activities; whereas for long-term activities under the Manhattan II
project, it obligated $75,000 in fiscal year 2003 and has budgeted $5.6
million for fiscal year 2004. Most of the near-term activities are to
develop next-generation checked baggage screening equipment through the
Phoenix project, which is funded jointly by government and industry. As
part of the Phoenix project, in September 2003, TSA awarded $9.4 million
to enter into five cooperative agreements with private sector firms to
enhance existing systems and develop new screening technologies. For
example, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent almost $2.4 million to have a
contractor develop a new
computed tomography explosives detection system11 that is smaller and
lighter than systems currently deployed in airport lobbies. The new system
is intended to replace the systems currently placed in airport lobbies,
including both larger, heavier explosives detection systems and explosives
trace detection equipment. The smaller size of the system creates
opportunities for TSA to transfer screening operations to other locations,
such as airport check-in counters. TSA expects to certify this equipment
later this year. TSA is also working with a contractor to integrate
technologies, such as quadrupole resonance,12 with its existing explosives
detection systems to improve processing speed and detection capability and
to reduce false alarm rates and human resource requirements.
o
Aviation Checkpoint: To address the limitations of its current metal
detectors for screening passengers and of X-ray machines for screening
carry-on baggage, TSA, in fiscal year 2003, obligated about $1 million and
has budgeted $18 million for fiscal year 2004. For example, during the
summer of 2004, TSA installed and began testing explosives trace detection
portals at four airports and had scheduled to test the portal at a fifth
airport in the near future. Passengers who enter a checkpoint lane with a
trace portal machine will proceed through the metal detector while their
carry-on baggage is being screened by X-ray. Each passenger will then be
asked to step into the trace portal and to stand still for a few seconds
while several quick puffs of air are released, as shown in figure
2. The portal will analyze the air for traces of explosives as the
passenger walks through, and a computerized voice will tell the passenger
when to exit the portal.
11A computed tomography explosives detection system uses an X-ray source
that rotates around a bag, obtaining a large number of cross-sectional
images that are integrated by a computer, which displays the densities of
objects in the bag. The system automatically triggers an alarm when
objects with high densities, which are characteristic of explosives, are
detected.
12Quadrupole resonance uses radio frequency pulses to probe bags by
eliciting unique responses from explosives based on their chemical
characteristics.
Figure 2: A Walk-through Explosives Trace Detection Portal
Source: Smiths Detection.
To help focus its screening resources on the highest risk passengers, in
fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA worked to develop the Computer Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II).13 CAPPS II is intended to
identify terrorists and other high-risk individuals before they board
commercial airplanes. Originally, TSA intended to conduct a risk
assessment of each passenger using national security information,
commercial databases, and information provided by the passenger during the
reservation process-specifically, the passenger's name,
13TSA was not able to tell us how much it had obligated and budgeted for
CAPPS II in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, respectively.
date of birth, home address, and home telephone number. In our February
2004 report on CAPPS II, we found that TSA was behind schedule in testing
and developing initial increments of CAPPS II and had not yet completely
addressed other issues, including concerns about privacy and the accuracy
of the data used for CAPPS II.14 In August 2004, a DHS official said that
DHS was revising the program with an emphasis on fully protecting
passengers' privacy and civil liberties.
o Aviation Cargo: To enhance the security of the nation's air cargo
system, TSA obligated about $700,000 in fiscal year 2003 for cargo
security R&D and has budgeted about $53 million for fiscal year 2004. For
example, as part of its Air Cargo Strategic Plan, TSA plans to develop a
prescreening system to identify high-risk cargo and to work with the
appropriate stakeholders to ensure that all such cargo is inspected. To
complete its inspection of high-risk cargo, TSA has a number of R&D
projects, one of which is a project budgeted at $19.5 million for fiscal
year 2004 to research and develop equipment for the detection of threats
in containerized air cargo and mail. Under this project, TSA is
considering funding several technologies, including highpower computed
tomography and X-ray combined with pulsed fast neutron analysis.15
In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States expressed concerns about checked baggage, checkpoint,
and cargo security.16 The commission recommended that TSA and Congress
give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints
to detect explosives on passengers. The commission also stated that TSA
should (1) expedite the installation of advanced in-line baggage screening
equipment; (2) require that every passenger aircraft carrying cargo deploy
at least one hardened container to carry any suspect cargo; and (3)
intensify its efforts to identify, track, and appropriately screen
potentially dangerous cargo in both aviation and maritime modes.
14GAO, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO-04-385 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 12, 2004).
15Pulsed fast neutron analysis probes targets, using high-energy neutrons,
for the presence of explosives.
16National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: 2004).
Maritime and Land Security R&D Projects Funded by TSA
In addition to its R&D projects to enhance aviation security, in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted R&D funds for projects to
improve security for maritime and land transportation, including the
following:
o The Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot will assess the feasibility of
using emerging technologies to screen passengers and their checked baggage
and carry-on items for explosives at rail stations and aboard trains. In
May 2004, TSA completed a 30-day test to screen Amtrak and commuter rail
passengers for explosives at a Maryland train station by having them walk
through a trace detection portal that TSA is also considering for use at
airports. According to TSA officials, the test provided useful information
about customer-screening wait times, the effectiveness of screening
equipment in a non-climate-controlled environment, and the cost and impact
of using the technology for Amtrak and commuter rail operations. In
addition, in June and July 2004, TSA tested the screening of Amtrak
passengers' checked baggage for explosives at a Washington, D.C., train
station, and in July 2004, TSA tested the screening of passengers and
their carry-on items for explosives on a Connecticut commuter rail train
while the train was in motion.
o The Transportation Worker Identification Credential is intended to
establish a uniform, nationwide standard for the secure identification of
as many as 12 million public-and private-sector workers who require
unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas at airports and other
transportation facilities, such as seaports and railroad terminals. TSA
was not able to provide funding information for the program for fiscal
years 2003 and 2004. As we have previously reported, airport and seaport
officials have expressed concern about how much the program would cost and
who would pay to implement it.17 We have recently completed a separate
review that looked at pilot tests of the program at maritime ports and
expect to issue a report to the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee by September 30, 2004.
o The Conveyance Tracking Program is investigating the capability of
technologies that are or are nearly available for the secure tracking of
hazardous materials shipments by rail and truck. TSA budgeted about $1
million for this program for fiscal year 2004.
17GAO, Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security,
GAO-04-315R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2003), and Aviation Security:
Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead, GAO-03-1150T
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003).
o Operation Safe Commerce is designed to improve container supply chain
security by testing practices and commercially available technologies in
an operational environment, including technologies for tracking and
tracing containers, nonintrustive detection of threats, and sealing
containers. In June 2003, TSA awarded grants to the ports of Los Angeles
and Long Beach, California; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; and the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. TSA was not able to provide funding
information for the program for fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
TSA Spent or Budgeted Most of For our review, we classified R&D projects
according to the following four
Its R&D Funding for Projects That Are Beyond the Basic Research Phase
phases:
o Basic research includes all scientific efforts and experimentation
directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields of
physical, engineering, environmental, social, and life sciences related to
long-term national needs.
o Applied research includes all efforts directed toward the solution of
specific problems with a view toward developing and evaluating the
feasibility of proposed solutions.
o Advanced development includes all efforts directed toward projects that
have moved into the development of hardware for field experiments and
tests.
o Operational testing includes the evaluation of integrated technologies
in a realistic operating environment to assess the performance or cost
reduction potential of advanced technology.
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted the majority of its
transportation security R&D funding for projects in the last three phases
of R&D, but the agency agrees that it needs to spend more for basic
research. Figure 3 shows TSA's allocation of R&D funding by phase of R&D.
In fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about 88 percent of its $21 million budget
on applied research, advanced development, and operational testing. For
fiscal year 2004, TSA budgeted about 82 percent of its $159 million budget
for projects in those three phases. In contrast, according to project
information provided by TSA, none of the transportation security R&D
projects that it funded in fiscal year 2003 and budgeted in fiscal year
2004 were in the basic research phase. According to the National Research
Council, R&D organizations should consistently fund some basic research
because
although it typically entails higher risks, it also offers higher payoffs
than R&D in later phases. Thus far, TSA has focused its R&D efforts on
making improvements to deployed technologies and testing and evaluating
nearterm technologies, and a senior TSA official acknowledged that the
agency needs to do more basic research.
Figure 3: Distribution of TSA's R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 2003
and 2004 Percentage
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Phase of R&D
Fiscal year 2003 (obligated - $21.1 million) Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted -
$159.2 million) Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: TSA provided the R&D phase for 74 of the 146 projects that it funded
in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. TSA officials did not explain why the
information was not available on the R&D phase for the remaining 72
projects.
Basic research Applied researchAdvanced development Operational testing Multiple
phases Not specified
TSA Has Not Estimated Deployment Dates for Most of Its R&D Projects
Transferring R&D Funds to Other Programs Delayed TSA's Progress on Some
R&D Projects
Although many of TSA's projects are in later phases of development, the
agency has not estimated deployment dates for 133 of the 146 projects that
it funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. According to TSA officials,
deployment dates are not always predictable because deployment is
dependent on factors such as the manufacturing capacity of the private
sector or the availability of funds for purchasing and installing
equipment. However, we generally believe that R&D program managers should
estimate deployment dates for projects that are beyond the basic research
phase because deployment dates can serve as goals that the managers can
use to plan, budget, and track the progress of projects. For the 13
projects for which TSA had estimated deployment dates, deployment is
scheduled for fiscal years 2004 through 2014. Nine of the 13 projects are
scheduled for deployment in fiscal years 2005 or 2006, including the
Phoenix project, which is intended to enhance existing checked baggage
screening systems and develop new screening technologies. One of the
remaining 4 projects, the Manhattan II project, is scheduled for
deployment from fiscal years 2009 through 2014.
Progress on some R&D projects was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA
transferred about $61 million, more than half of its $110 million R&D
appropriation, to operational needs, such as personnel cost for screeners.
As a result, TSA delayed several key R&D projects related to checked
baggage screening, checkpoint screening, and air cargo security. For
example, TSA delayed the development of a device to detect weapons, liquid
explosives, and flammables in containers found in carry-on baggage or
passengers' effects, as well as the development and testing of a
walkthrough portal for detecting traces of explosives on passengers.
According to a TSA official, the agency does not plan to transfer R&D
funds to other programs in fiscal year 2004.
DHS Spent the Majority of Overall, DHS increased its funding for
transportation security R&D from Its Fiscal Year 2003 and about $26
million in fiscal year 2003 to about $88 million in fiscal year 2004,
Budgeted the Majority of Its as shown in table 3.18 The President's fiscal
year 2005 budget request
includes about $1 billion for the Science and Technology
Directorate,Fiscal Year 2004 which includes some transportation security
R&D. Transportation Security
R&D Funding for
Multimodal and Aviation
Projects Table 3: DHS's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode,
Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004
Dollars in thousands
Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004
Mode Obligated Percent Budgeted Percent
Aviation $3,709 14.3 $63,240
Highway 1,052 4.1 3,000
Maritime 3,474 13.4 1,626
Multimodal 12,630 48.8 20,117
Pipeline 0 0.0 0
Rail 0 0.0 0
Transit 5,000 19.3 0
Total $25,865 100.0 $87,983 100.0
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
In fiscal year 2003, DHS spent $12.6 million, or almost half, of its $26
million transportation security R&D budget for projects related to
multiple modes of transportation. For fiscal year 2004, DHS increased its
budget for multimodal projects to $20 million; this increase reflects the
costs of funding pilot programs with the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey to test radiation and nuclear detection devices. For fiscal
year 2004, DHS budgeted almost $63 million, or 72 percent of its $88
million, on aviation projects, compared with almost $4 million spent in
fiscal year 2003. This increase provides about $60 million in fiscal year
2004 funds to develop technical countermeasures to minimize the threat
posed to commercial aircraft by shoulder-fired missiles, also known as
man-portable
18Some of DHS's transportation security R&D projects are funded and
managed by DHS's Science and Technology Directorate, while others are
funded and managed by other DHS agencies, namely the Coast Guard, Customs
and Border Protection, and the Secret Service.
air defense systems (MANPADS).19 Figure 4 shows a MANPADS that could be
used to attack a commercial aircraft.
Figure 4: Photograph of a MANPADS
Source: U.S. Department of the Army.
19In our January 2004 report on DHS's effort, we found that DHS faces
significant challenges in adapting a military counter-MANPADS system to
commercial aircraft, including establishing system requirements,
developing the technology and design to a mature level, and developing
reliable cost estimates. (GAO, The Department of Homeland Security Needs
to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS
Development Program, GAO-04-341R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).)
DHS decreased its budget for transit security R&D projects from $5 million
in fiscal year 2004 to $0 in fiscal year 2004; this decrease reflects the
completion of a project to test chemical detectors in subway stations. DHS
also increased its budget for highway security R&D projects from $1
million in fiscal year 2003 to $3 million in fiscal year 2004. This
increase funds a project to research and develop technology for detecting
truck bombs. Figure 5 shows an example of a truck bomb detection system.
Figure 5: A Mobile Search X-ray Inspection System for Detecting Truck
Bombs
Source: American Science and Engineering.
In fiscal year 2003, DHS spent 25 percent and 60 percent of its $26
million transportation security R&D budget for projects in advanced
development and multiple phases, respectively, as shown in figure 6. For
fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted $61 million, or 69 percent, of its $88
million budget for advanced development, including $60 million for the
counter-MANPADS program. According to project information provided by DHS,
none of the transportation security R&D projects it funded in fiscal year
2003 and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic research
phase. Although DHS has focused its initial R&D efforts on the near-term
development and deployment of technologies, it recognizes the importance
of basic research
DHS Spent or Budgeted Most of Its R&D Funding for Projects That Are in
Advanced Development
and, according to a senior DHS official, intends to do more basic research
in fiscal year 2006 and beyond.
Figure 6: Distribution of DHS's R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 2003
and 2004 Percentage 80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Phase of R&D
Fiscal year 2003 (obligated - $25.9 million) Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted -
$88.0 million) Source: GAO analysis DHS data.
Of the 56 projects that DHS funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, DHS has
deployed technologies related to 7, has estimated deployment dates for 11,
and has not estimated deployment dates for the remaining 38. Estimated
deployment dates for the 11 projects range from fiscal years 2004 to 2007.
Basic research Applied research Advanced development Operational testing
Multiple phases Not specified
DOT and NASA Funded Some Transportation Security R&D Projects
In addition to the transportation security R&D projects funded by TSA and
DHS, DOT and NASA funded some such projects. In fiscal year 2003, DOT
spent about $8 million and has budgeted about $31 million for fiscal year
2004 on transportation security R&D, as shown in table 4. For example, in
fiscal year 2003, DOT spent about $2 million to develop and field-test a
system to track trailers containing hazardous materials when they are not
attached to a tractor; for fiscal year 2004, it budgeted $20 million to
develop a secure information network to share air traffic control
information with DHS and others.
Table 4: DOT's Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal Years
2003 and 2004
Dollars in thousands
Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004
Mode Obligated Percent Budgeted Percent
Aviation $0 0.0 $20,000
Highway 3,531 43.8 400
Maritime 0 0.0 0
Multimodal 906 11.2 7,858
Pipeline 900 11.2 412
Rail 400 5.0 400
Transit 2,325 28.8 1,694
Total $8,062 100.0 $30,764 100.0
Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.
Although NASA did not fund any transportation security R&D in fiscal year
2003, it has budgeted about $18 million for fiscal year 2004 for aviation
security R&D projects. For example, NASA budgeted about $5 million for
technologies and methods to provide accurate information so that pilots
can avoid protected airspace, continually verify identity, and prevent
unauthorized persons from gaining access to flight controls.
Experts Had Mixed Views on the Reasonableness of Distribution of
Transportation Security R&D Projects, and Some Experts Questioned Decisions
to Fund Some Projects
Members of our panel of transportation security and technology experts had
mixed views on whether the distribution of transportation security R&D
projects by mode was reasonable and raised questions about whether some
projects should be funded. According to several panelists, the
distribution of transportation security R&D projects by mode and program
area was reasonable. However, several other panelists said that aviation
has been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land modes; two
panelists felt that R&D is focused too heavily on threats that were
prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, such as airplane hijackings and
bombings; and one panelist said that the selection of projects seemed to
be inappropriately based on the most recent terrorist event or perceived
threat. While the panelists had different and sometimes conflicting views
about the reasonableness of the distribution of projects, many of them
said that project selections should be based on current risk assessments.
As explained in the next section of this report, TSA and DHS plan to
select their R&D projects on the basis of risk assessments, which have not
yet been completed for all modes of transportation.
When asked whether they thought there were any transportation security R&D
projects in the agencies' portfolios that did not merit funding, the
panelists identified several funded by TSA that they believed did not
qualify as R&D projects. For example, one panelist did not agree with
funding projects that were designed to enhance existing technologies, such
as a $30,000 project to test a prototype of a new, handheld ion mobility
spectrometry explosives trace detector. According to this panelist, at
least two very good ion mobility spectrometry handheld units can be
purchased off the shelf. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said
that TSA funded this project because the vendor demonstrated a promising
technology.
When asked if there were any important areas of transportation security
R&D that TSA and DHS were not addressing, individual panelists suggested
that the following projects be considered for future funding:
o A project for combining neutron inspection technology with traditional
transmission X-ray and backscatter X-ray technologies could enhance air
cargo security by providing a thorough look at places where
explosives might be concealed in containers.20 A ground-based system to
scan trucks carrying cargo bound for passenger aircraft, ships, and
highways could also be tested.
o A multifunctional portal that tests for metals, explosives, narcotics,
and chemicals in near real time could help to address the limitations of
current checkpoint screening equipment.
o A standard piece of luggage for testing deployed explosives detection
systems could be developed to ensure that the systems maintain acceptable
performance capabilities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS addressed several
technologies and projects, including neutron inspection technology, a
multifunctional portal project, and a project to develop a standard piece
of luggage for testing explosives detection systems. Specifically, DHS
said that TSA is looking at pulsed fast neutron analysis, a technology
that uses X-ray images in conjunction with neutron interrogation and
substance identification. According to DHS, TSA considers the development
of a multifunctional portal critical because it creates opportunities for
fusing or integrating technologies-a long-standing transportation goal.
Finally, DHS said that a standard piece of luggage had been developed to
validate the performance of two different explosives detection systems to
ensure that the systems are performing to their certification levels.
Moreover, DHS noted in its comments that TSA has two advisory
committees-the National Academy of Sciences and the Security Advisory
Panel-whose members have expertise in various modes of transportation.
20Neutron inspection techniques use neutron beams that penetrate an object
and react with concealed explosives. Traditional transmission X-ray images
create a "shadowgram" image, similar to the result of a medical X-ray,
when X-rays pass through an object and are absorbed, rather than
scattered. While transmission technology can reveal fine details such as
wires and other bomb components, the more objects or clutter in the path
of the beam, the less object differentiation is achieved. Backscatter
X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an image that highlights
organic materials such as explosives-materials that traditional
transmission-only systems can miss.
TSA and DHS Have Made Some Progress in Managing Their R&D Programs but HaveNot
Yet Fully Completed Their Efforts
TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best
practices,21 but their efforts are incomplete in the following areas:
o preparing strategic plans that contain goals and measurable objectives,
o preparing and using risk assessments to select and prioritize their R&D
projects,
o maintaining a comprehensive database of R&D projects,
o coordinating their R&D programs with those of other government
agencies,
o reaching out to transportation stakeholders to help identify R&D needs,
and
o accelerating R&D.
The Homeland Security Act also authorizes DHS to solicit R&D proposals for
security technologies from outside entities and requires DHS to integrate
the department's R&D programs. Although the laws do not contain deadlines
for TSA and DHS to complete these requirements, it is difficult to
determine, until the agencies do, whether they are making R&D investments
cost-effectively and addressing the highest transportation risks. In
commenting on their progress in managing TSA's R&D program, TSA officials
said that the agency was focusing initially on hiring new airport
screeners and meeting statutory requirements to install new screening
equipment. They further noted that a substantial transfer of R&D funds in
fiscal year 2003 delayed certain projects. DHS officials said that the
department is a start-up organization. Table 5 shows the progress TSA and
DHS have made in complying with statutory requirements and best practices
for managing their R&D programs.
21National Academy of Sciences, Evaluating Federal Research Programs:
Research and the Government Performance and Results Act (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 1999), and National Research Council, World-Class
Research and Development: Characteristics for an Army Research,
Development, and Engineering Organization
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996).
Table 5: TSA's and DHS's Implementation of Statutory Requirements and Best
Practices for Managing Their R&D Programs
Requirement/Best practice TSA's implementation DHS's implementation
The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare a strategic plan that
identifies goals and includes annual measurable objectives for
coordinating the federal government's civilian efforts in developing
countermeasures to terrorist threats. In addition, the National Academy of
Sciences indicates that research programs should be described in strategic
and performance plans.
Partial-TSA prepared strategic plans for Partial-DHS prepared a strategic
plan for the agency and its R&D program, but the the department, but the
plan does not plans did not contain goals or measurable contain measurable
objectives. DHS is in objectives. the process of preparing a strategic
plan for
its R&D program.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to use risk
management principles to make R&D decisions. The Homeland Security Act
requires DHS to prepare comprehensive risk assessments for the nation's
key resources and critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, GAO has
advocated the use of a risk management approach in responding to national
security and terrorism challenges.
Partial-According to TSA officials, threat Partial-DHS is working in a
pilot phase
assessments were completed for all modes toward preparing national
comparative risk
of transportation, but vulnerability and assessments for infrastructure
sectors with
criticality assessments have not been critical vulnerabilities.
completed.
The National Research Council indicates Partial-TSA's database of projects
does Partial-DHS's database of projects does
that R&D organizations should maintain a not provide key information on
all projects. not provide key information on all projects.
complete database of projects to help
prioritize and justify expenditures.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Partial-TSA's efforts to
coordinate with Partial-DHS's efforts to coordinate with
Act and the Homeland Security Act require other federal agencies have been
limited. other federal agencies have been limited.
TSA and DHS to coordinate their R&D
efforts with those of other government
agencies.
The Transportation Research Board Partial-TSA's efforts to reach out to
the Partial-DHS's efforts to reach out to the
indicates that R&D organizations should transportation industry have been
limited. transportation industry have been limited.
reach out to stakeholders to obtain input on
their R&D decisions.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Unable to assess because of the
absence of Unable to assess because of the absence of
Act requires TSA to accelerate R&D on measurable objectives. measurable
objectives.
aviation security technologies, and the
Homeland Security Act requires DHS to
accelerate R&D on homeland security
technologies.
The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to Not applicable. DHS is drafting an
integration plan and has integrate the department's various R&D been directed by
the Secretary of Homeland activities. Security to integrate the department's R&D
activities by 2005.
Source: GAO analysis of applicable laws, best practices, and information
provided by TSA and DHS.
Note: Analysis of implementation status is based on agency officials'
comments and our review of applicable documents and databases.
Strategic Plans for TSA's and DHS's R&D Programs Do Not Yet Contain
Measurable Objectives
The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare a strategic plan that
identifies goals and includes annual measurable objectives for
coordinating the federal government's civilian efforts in developing
countermeasures to terrorist threats. Similarly, R&D best practices
identified by the National Academy of Sciences indicate that research
programs should be described in strategic and performance plans and
evaluated in performance reports. TSA has prepared strategic plans for
both the agency22and its R&D program that contain performance goals, such
as deterring foreign and domestic terrorists and other individuals from
causing harm or disrupting the nation's transportation system. Although we
reported in January 200323 that TSA had established an initial set of 32
performance measures, none of them are contained in TSA's strategic plans
or directly pertain to R&D.
DHS has prepared a strategic plan for the department, but the plan's broad
objective-to develop technology and capabilities to detect and prevent
terrorist attacks-is not supported by more specific R&D performance goals
and measures in any program area, including transportation. A DHS official
said that the department is preparing a separate strategic plan for its
R&D program that will include more specific goals and measurable
objectives. Another DHS official said that the plan will include input
from the leaders of the Science and Technology Directorate's functional
areas, one of which is transportation. DHS has indicated that the Science
and Technology Directorate's strategic planning process includes (1)
determining strategic goals for the next 5 years, threats, and
vulnerabilities and (2) developing a list of prioritized projects for
fiscal years 2005 through 2010. In a May 2004 report on DHS's use of the
DOE national laboratories for research on technologies for detecting and
responding to nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, we recommended
that DHS complete a strategic plan for R&D.24 Until TSA and DHS prepare
R&D strategic plans with goals and measurable objectives, Congress and
other stakeholders do not have a reliable means of assessing TSA's and
DHS's progress toward achieving their R&D goals.
22As of August 2004, TSA's September 2003 strategic plan was still in
draft form.
23GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build
a Results-Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003).
24GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories
for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response
Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004).
TSA and DHS Plan to Use Risk Assessments to Prioritize and Select Their R&D
Programs, but Many Assessments Have Not Been Completed
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to use risk
management principles in making R&D funding decisions.25 The Homeland
Security Act requires DHS to establish R&D priorities for detecting,
preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks26 and
to prepare comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the
nation's key resources and critical infrastructure sectors, one of which
is transportation.27 In addition, under the Homeland Security Act, DHS's
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate is
responsible for receiving and analyzing information from multiple sources,
including local, state, and federal government agencies and private sector
entities, and integrating the information, analyses, and vulnerability
assessments to identify protective priorities.28
We have consistently advocated using a risk management approach in
responding to national security and terrorism challenges. In the context
of homeland security, risk management is a systematic and analytical
process of (1) considering the likelihood that a terrorist threat will
endanger an asset, individual, or function and (2) reducing the risk and
mitigating the consequences of an attack. In our work on homeland security
issues, we have identified threat, vulnerability, and criticality
assessments as key elements of a risk management approach.29 These
elements are defined as follows:
o A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
This assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential
threats before they materialize and is based on threat information
25Pub.L. No. 107-71, S: 112(b)(1)(B) (2001). 26Pub.L. No. 107-296, S:
302(5)(B) (2002). 27Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 201(d)(2) (2002). 28Pub.L. No.
107-296, S: 201(d)(2)-(d)(3) (2002). 29GAO-02-150T.
gathered from both the intelligence and the law enforcement communities.30
o A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited
by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.
o A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions
in terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety
and the economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which
structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from
attack.
To select and prioritize their R&D projects, TSA and DHS have established
processes that include risk management principles. According to TSA
officials, TSA has completed threat assessments for all modes of
transportation but has yet to complete vulnerability and criticality
assessments. A DHS official told us that the department has started to
conduct risk assessments of critical infrastructure sectors but does not
plan to start its assessment of the transportation sector until 2005.
Without complete risk assessments, Congress and other stakeholders are
limited in their ability to assess whether the millions of dollars that
are being invested in transportation security R&D projects are being spent
cost-effectively and to address the highest transportation security risks.
In the absence of completed risk assessments, TSA and DHS officials are
using available threat intelligence, expert judgment, congressional
mandates, mission needs, and information about past terrorist incidents to
select and prioritize their R&D projects. TSA and DHS officials said that
they obtain threat intelligence from the government's intelligence
community to help make R&D decisions. TSA officials said that TSA's Chief
Technology Officer receives daily intelligence briefings, and that the
agency is using threat information to select R&D projects but is not yet
using formal threat assessments to make those R&D decisions. In addition,
DHS's
30As we noted in our October 2001 report on risk management, while threat
assessments are a key decision support tool, it should be recognized that,
even if updated often, threat assessments might not adequately capture
emerging threats posed by some terrorist groups. No matter how much we
know about potential threats, we will never know whether we have
identified every threat or whether we have complete information even about
the threats of which we are aware. Consequently, we believe that a risk
management approach to preparing for terrorism that supplements threat
assessments with vulnerability and criticality assessments can provide
better assurance of preparedness for a terrorist attack.
Inspector General reported in March 2004 that although many Science and
Technology officials agreed on the importance of maintaining a
relationship with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate, staff below them were not actively involved in obtaining
terrorist threat information from this directorate and using the
information to help select new homeland security technologies.31
In May 2004, TSA prepared terrorist threat assessments for all modes of
transportation. In addition, in June 2004, a TSA official said that TSA is
in the process of preparing vulnerability and criticality assessments for
all modes of transportation. For example, in 2003, TSA supported the
government's strategy to reduce the threat that shoulder-fired missiles
pose to commercial aircraft by conducting vulnerability assessments at all
major airports to identify major launch sites around the airports using
information from local agencies and FAA. In addition to these assessments,
officials in DHS's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate said they were working in a pilot phase toward preparing
national comparative risk assessments with critical vulnerabilities that
would allow comparisons to be made across different infrastructure
sectors, such as transportation. The officials said the pilot program
would focus on other infrastructure sectors, such as chemical and nuclear
plants, before addressing the transportation sector, which they expected
to work on in fiscal year 2005. However, they did not know when risk
assessments would be completed for all modes of transportation.
TSA has agreed with a recommendation in our past work that it should apply
a risk management approach to strengthen security in aviation and in other
modes of transportation.32 TSA indicated that it is developing four tools,
including software, that will help assess threats, criticalities, and
vulnerabilities, and that it plans to create risk assessment models for
all modes of transportation during fiscal year 2004.33
31Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Survey of
the Science and Technology Directorate, OIG-04-24 (Washington, D.C.: March
2004).
32GAO, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for
the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).
33For an explanation of TSA's four assessment tools, see GAO, Aviation
Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges,
GAO-04-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003).
In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States also pointed out the importance of risk management and
recommended that the government identify and evaluate the transportation
assets that need to be protected; set risk-based priorities for defending
them; select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so; and
then develop a plan, a budget, and funding to implement the effort. The
plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant federal, state, and
local authorities and to private stakeholders. We agree with the
commission's recommendations and are making similar recommendations.
TSA and DHS Do Not Have Adequate Databases to Effectively Manage Their R&D
Portfolios
R&D best practices identified by the National Research Council indicate
that a research program should maintain a complete database of projects to
help prioritize and justify program expenditures. Similarly, we have
stated that an R&D program should use a management information system that
readily provides information to track the performance of projects. TSA's
and DHS's R&D managers were not able to provide us with complete
information on all projects in their R&D portfolios. For example, for the
146 projects that it funded in 2003 and 2004, TSA was not able to provide
information on anticipated deployment dates for 91 percent, the current
phase of development for 49 percent, and the amounts obligated and
budgeted for 8 percent-including 3 TSA projects, CAPPS II, the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, and Operation Safe
Commerce, that were appropriated tens of millions of dollars in both
fiscal years 2003 and 2004. For the 56 projects that it funded in 2003 and
2004, DHS was not able to provide information on anticipated deployment
dates for 68 percent, the current phase of development for 14 percent, and
the amounts obligated and budgeted for 9 percent. Although TSA's and DHS's
databases contain some information, it is scattered among several computer
files and paper documents and cannot be easily retrieved or analyzed.
Consequently, additional staff time is needed to prepare documents from
different reports, and compiling the information could result in errors
and omissions. Without accurate, complete, and timely information, TSA and
DHS managers are limited in their ability to effectively monitor their R&D
programs and ensure that R&D funds are being used to address the highest
priority transportation security risks. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DHS said that TSA had recently developed a database that will
allow it to track milestones, funding, and deployment information for
individual projects.
Coordination with Other Federal Agencies and Outreach to Transportation
Industry Associations Has Been Limited
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Homeland Security Act
require DHS to coordinate its R&D efforts with those of other government
agencies. Similarly, R&D best practices indicate that R&D organizations
should coordinate to help fill research gaps and leverage resources. In
addition, R&D best practices indicate that TSA and DHS should reach out to
stakeholders, such as the transportation industry, to identify their
security R&D needs. However, TSA's and DHS's efforts to coordinate with
other federal agencies on transportation security R&D and reach out to
transportation industry associations on the industry's security R&D needs
have been limited.
The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to coordinate with other executive
agencies in developing and carrying out the Science and Technology
Directorate's agenda to reduce duplication and identify unmet needs.34 In
addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gives TSA
responsibility for coordinating terrorism countermeasures with
"departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States
Government."35 For TSA and DHS to select the best technologies to enhance
transportation security, it is important that they have a clear
understanding of the R&D projects currently being conducted, both
internally and externally. TSA and DHS have coordinated with each other on
some of their transportation security R&D programs, such as efforts to
counter the threat posed to commercial aircraft by MANPADS; develop
technologies for detecting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
programs; and develop explosives detection systems. However, TSA and DHS
did not coordinate their R&D portfolios in fiscal year 2003. A DHS
official said that the department reviewed TSA's fiscal year 2004 R&D
portfolio. The official said that it was not DHS's intention to change
TSA's R&D portfolio but to learn what TSA was doing and to leverage
resources.
R&D best practices also emphasize the importance of coordinating R&D in
the transportation security field. A 2002 Transportation Research Board
34Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 302(13) (2002). 35Pub.L. No. 107-71, S: 101
(2001).
study36 on the role of science and technology in transportation concluded
that while TSA should have its own analysis and research capability, it
should also have the ability to draw on the "rich and varied R&D
capabilities within the transportation sector, as well as those of the
federal government and the science and technology community at large."
Furthermore, the report said that if TSA views the R&D activities of DOT's
modal agencies from a broader systems perspective, it can help fill
research gaps, monitor the progress of these activities, and observe where
additional investments might yield large benefits. A member of our
transportation security and technology panel suggested that TSA and DHS
could be more effective if they systematized and formalized their R&D
coordination efforts at the highest levels and included other
organizations, such as DOT and the Transportation Research Board of the
National Research Council.
Coordinating with DOT Coordination is limited between TSA and DOT and
between DHS and DOT, which continues to conduct some transportation
security R&D. Although DOT modal administration officials said that
limited communication was occurring between DOT and TSA and between DOT
and DHS about ongoing DOT R&D projects, none of these officials said that
TSA or DHS had provided any input about which R&D projects they should
conduct or had asked the modal administrations for input on which
transportation security R&D projects TSA and DHS should conduct. An
official from one modal administration said that TSA should consult DOT
agencies about their R&D plans because, in some cases, they have expertise
about the various transportation modes and are more aware than TSA of the
R&D needs and concerns of the transportation industry. For example, a
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) R&D official told us that FHWA has
conducted extensive research on tracking freight movement and has mapped
out the movement of freight across transportation modes. This official
said these efforts could help improve freight security. Other DOT R&D
officials expressed similar views about their R&D programs and said they
need to coordinate their security R&D programs with TSA and DHS to
leverage resources and knowledge and to avoid duplication. An official
from one DOT modal administration (the Federal Railroad Administration)
36Transportation Research Board, Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation:
The New Transportation Security Imperative, Special Report 270
(Washington, D.C.: 2002). The Transportation Research Board is a division
of the National Research Council, which serves as an independent adviser
to the federal government and others on scientific and technical issues.
Coordinating with NASA and Other Federal Agencies
Coordinating with the DOE National Laboratories
said that although TSA and DHS had no formal input into the agency's R&D
plans, all of the security-related R&D projects it had conducted since
2001 were at the request of TSA or DHS. DOT R&D officials also said that
the DOT modal administrations should continue to conduct some security R&D
because they have research personnel who are experts in various
transportation modes and could help TSA and DHS with their security R&D
efforts.
Because we found during the course of our review that NASA was also
conducting some transportation security R&D, we asked NASA officials about
the extent of coordination between NASA and TSA and between NASA and DHS.
NASA officials said that they have effective coordination with TSA on the
transportation security R&D they conduct.37 They said that TSA and NASA
coordinated on identifying the types of R&D projects that NASA should
undertake to best help meet TSA's needs. NASA officials also said that at
DHS's request, NASA provided input to the Science and Technology
Directorate during the directorate's strategic planning process. In
addition, NASA officials said that they are working with TSA on a
memorandum of agreement for their R&D programs.
TSA and DHS officials said that coordination with other agencies and R&D
organizations is occurring at the project level and that some coordination
is based on personal relationships. In discussing DHS's coordination with
other agencies in July 2004, a DHS official said that DHS relies heavily
on the Office of Science and Technology Policy, a component of the
Executive Office of the President, to coordinate R&D. He also noted that
the department was only a year old, and that as it matured, DHS would know
more about the R&D activities of other agencies.
In creating DHS, Congress intended that DHS draw on the scientific
expertise of the DOE national laboratories, which make up the world's
largest system of laboratories for advanced research in support of
national energy and defense needs. The Homeland Security Act requires DHS
to establish an Office of National Laboratories to coordinate its R&D with
that
37NASA's transportation security R&D focuses on aviation security, such as
technologies and methods to provide accurate information so that pilots
can avoid protected airspace, continually verify identity, and prevent
unauthorized persons from gaining access to flight controls.
of DOE's national laboratories.38 DHS has established this office, and in
February 2003, DHS and DOE entered into an agreement allowing DOE to
accept and perform work for DHS on an equal basis with other laboratory
work. DHS and TSA are sponsoring transportation security-related R&D at
several national laboratories, including Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,
Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory. Overall, laboratory officials told us they have
an adequate level of communication and coordination with TSA and DHS about
their ongoing R&D projects, but some officials believe TSA and DHS could
use the laboratories more as resources for transportation security R&D and
would like more information about TSA's research needs.
Reaching Out to the In a 2001 report, the Transportation Research Board
recommended that
Transportation Industry research be closely connected to its stakeholders,
such as transportation providers, to help ensure relevance and program
support.39 According to the report, stakeholders are more likely to use
the research results if they are involved in the process from the
beginning. However, most transportation industry association officials we
interviewed said that TSA and DHS have not reached out to them to obtain
information on their security R&D needs. Consequently, the transportation
industry's security R&D needs may not be adequately reflected in TSA's and
DHS's R&D portfolios.
An air cargo association official said that TSA contacted them to
participate in an air cargo security working group of the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee, a TSA-sponsored advisory group, where they
were able to discuss the air cargo industry's security R&D needs. Some
transportation association officials said that TSA and DHS should contact
them to obtain input on their research priorities to determine whether the
proposed technologies would be useful, avoid duplication of research that
they are sponsoring, and leverage resources. Officials from another
aviation association commented that, in contrast to their relationship
with TSA, they had an effective relationship with FAA. The official noted
that information-sharing and communication occurred more frequently with
FAA, partly because FAA management recognized the importance of obtaining
input from the users of FAA's services, whereas TSA and DHS
38Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 309(g) (2002).
39Transportation Research Board, The Federal Role in Highway Research and
Technology, Special Report 261 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
2001).
have not. An official from a state highway association said that although
TSA and DHS officials have participated in transportation research
projects that the Transportation Research Board is conducting for the
association, TSA and DHS have not directly contacted the association about
its security R&D needs. A TSA official said that TSA reaches out to
aviation associations and other organizations on R&D but has not
formalized this process.
TSA and DHS Have Made Efforts to Reach Out to Technology Providers, but Some
Potential Providers Have Expressed Concern about the Process
The Homeland Security Act authorizes DHS to solicit proposals to address
vulnerabilities and award grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts
with public or private entities, including businesses, federally funded
R&D centers, and universities.40 TSA and DHS have taken some actions to
use this authority, but some potential technology providers believe that
more information and communication are needed.
One way that TSA and DHS have reached out to the private sector is through
their membership in the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), a joint
program of the Departments of State and Defense that identifies,
prioritizes, and coordinates interagency R&D requirements to combat
terrorism. TSA and DHS have used TSWG to issue broad agency announcements,
which request proposals from private and/or public entities for projects
that address specific R&D needs.41 These solicitations have generated
substantial numbers of responses. For example, TSWG received more than
3,340 responses to a broad agency announcement that it issued for DHS in
May 2003 soliciting proposals for multiple homeland security R&D projects,
including a system for screening rail passengers and baggage. A DHS
official said that as DHS matures, it intends to rely less on TSWG and
more on the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA),
DHS's external funding arm.
TSA and DHS have also reached out to the private sector by linking their
Web sites to the Federal Business Opportunities Web site, which informs
potential technology providers about opportunities for conducting
40Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 307(b)(3)-(b)(4) (2002).
41A broad agency announcement is a competitive R&D contracting approach
described in the Federal Acquisition Regulation in 48 C.F.R. 35.016. Broad
agency announcements are used for the acquisition of basic and applied
research and development that fulfill requirements for scientific study,
experimentation, and demonstration and that direct advancement of
state-of-the-art technology.
homeland security R&D projects. In addition, TSA's Web site invites
potential technology providers and others to submit their ideas about
innovative security technologies that could contribute to TSA's work on
aircraft hardening, baggage and cargo screening, credentialing, physical
security, and electronic surveillance. According to TSA, it has evaluated
over 1,000 proposals submitted in response to this invitation. However,
representatives of several private companies told us of difficulties they
had experienced in trying to communicate with TSA, navigate its Web site,
obtain information about its R&D program, and understand its current
transportation security R&D priorities. For example, a company official
told us that his company was forced into guessing about TSA's long-term
R&D strategy, and that manufacturers do not want to make a large
investment in developing new technologies without knowing whether TSA will
embrace those technologies. This company official suggested that TSA
should communicate its R&D goals promptly to vendors. Similarly, some
private company representatives told us that they did not have sufficient
information about DHS's transportation security R&D priorities and
requirements to adequately respond to solicitations. In commenting on a
draft of this report, DHS noted that TSA recently established a working
group to update and improve the current Web site's discussion of
technology ideas, products, and services to make it more user-friendly and
plans to implement the improvements early next year.
HSARPA has also conducted various forms of outreach with potential
technology providers. In September 2003, for example, it conducted a
bidders' conference to discuss the release of a solicitation on detection
systems for biological and chemical countermeasures. In addition, in
November 2003, HSARPA conducted a best practices workshop that allowed
potential technology providers to comment on how DHS could best keep
industry informed about its priorities, make industry aware of agency
solicitations, and manage the relationship between industry and the
agency. The industry participants also stressed the importance of
communication between them and DHS. In addition, some participants
suggested that DHS issue early drafts of solicitations to allow industry
to gain a better understanding of DHS's needs.42 Following the workshop,
in January 2004, DHS issued a draft solicitation, for technologies to
detect radiological and nuclear materials, for industry comment before
issuing the final version.
42We are conducting a separate review of DHS's use of its R&D procurement
authorities.
TSA and DHS have used universities to conduct some of their R&D. For
example, in June 2004, TSA indicated that it had 24 grants with colleges
and universities. In addition, the Homeland Security Act requires DHS to
establish university-based centers for homeland security.43 According to
DHS, the centers will conduct multidisciplinary research on homeland
security. In November 2003, DHS announced that it had selected the
University of Southern California as its first Homeland Security Center of
Excellence.44 DHS will provide $12 million over 3 years for the university
to conduct a risk analysis on the economic consequences of terrorist
threats and events. The study will address both the targets and means of
terrorism, with an emphasis on protecting the nation's critical
infrastructure, such as transportation systems.
TSA and DHS Have Taken Steps to Accelerate Congressionally Mandated
Transportation Security Technologies
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is required to
accelerate the research, development, testing, and evaluation of, among
other things, explosives detection technology for checked baggage and new
screening technology for carry-on items and other items being loaded onto
aircraft, including cargo, and for threats carried on persons.45 The
Homeland Security Act requires DHS's HSARPA to accelerate the prototyping
and development of technologies that "would address homeland security
vulnerabilities."46 Although the Homeland Security Act authorized a $500
million acceleration fund in fiscal year 2003,47 a DHS official said that
no funds were specifically appropriated for that purpose.
Both TSA and DHS have taken steps to address congressionally mandated
requirements to accelerate security technologies, but they are operating
without goals and measurable objectives. As a result, it is difficult to
determine what progress the agencies have made toward accelerating R&D
projects. Although TSA does not yet have goals and objectives for
measuring acceleration, the agency has funded the Phoenix project, among
others, to accelerate baggage screening technologies in the near term. For
43Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 308(b)(2)(A) (2002).
44In April 2004, DHS announced that it had selected two other universities
as Homeland Security Centers of Excellence, which will focus on the
security of agricultural products.
45Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 137(a) (2002).
46Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 307(b)(3)(C) (2002).
47Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 307(c)(2) (2002).
fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted $75 million for accelerating technologies
through its Rapid Prototyping Program. For example, DHS, in coordination
with TSWG, issued a broad agency announcement in May 2003 to support the
development of technologies that can be rapidly prototyped and deployed to
the field. Furthermore, in January 2004, DHS issued a broad agency
announcement to rapidly develop detection systems for radiological and
nuclear countermeasures.
DHS Plans to Integrate the Department's R&D Programs
Although the Homeland Security Act requires TSA to remain a distinct
entity until at least November 2004,48 another provision of the Homeland
Security Act requires DHS to integrate all of the department's R&D
activities.49 Until that integration occurs, TSA and other DHS components
that conduct transportation security R&D are operating separately.
However, DHS has made some efforts to promote R&D coordination within the
department, such as holding meetings with the different components to
discuss R&D activities and preparing inventories of the DHS components'
R&D capabilities and ongoing projects. DHS officials said they are
preparing a plan to meet a directive from the Secretary of Homeland
Security to integrate the department's R&D activities by 2005.
Conclusions The nation's transportation systems, many of which are open
and accessible, are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Whether new
technologies can be researched, developed, and deployed to reduce the
vulnerability of these systems depends largely on how effectively DHS and
TSA manage their transportation security R&D programs. The National
Research Council has stated that effectively managing federal R&D programs
should include consistently funding basic research because it offers
opportunities for significant improvements in capabilities. However,
project information provided by TSA and DHS did not show that any of the
transportation security R&D projects that they funded in fiscal year 2003
and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic research phase.
While TSA and DHS recognize the importance of basic research, they are
focusing their efforts on the near-term development and deployment of
technologies.
48Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 424(a) (2002). 49Pub.L. No. 107-296, S: 302(12) (2002).
Although DHS is working toward complying with legal requirements and
implementing best practices for managing its R&D program, it is operating
without a strategic plan for its R&D program. Furthermore, although TSA
and DHS officials have said that they plan to use risk assessments to
select and prioritize R&D projects, TSA has not completed vulnerability
and criticality assessments, which are key components of risk assessments,
for all modes of transportation. In addition, DHS has not yet completed
risk assessments of the infrastructure sectors, such as transportation. As
a result, Congress does not have reasonable assurance that the hundreds of
millions of dollars that are being invested in transportation security R&D
are being spent cost-effectively to address the highest priority
transportation security risks. In addition, the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States recommended that the government
identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected;
set risk-based priorities for defending them; select the most practical
and cost-effective ways of doing so; and then develop a plan, a budget,
and funding to implement the effort.
TSA and DHS also do not have adequate databases to monitor and manage
their spending of the hundreds of millions of dollars that Congress has
appropriated for R&D. As DHS integrates its R&D programs, including TSA's,
it will be important for the department to have accurate, complete,
current, and readily accessible project information that it can use to
effectively monitor and manage its R&D portfolios.
The limited evidence of coordination between TSA and DHS that we found, as
well as between each of these agencies and other agencies such as DOT,
does not provide assurance that R&D resources are being leveraged,
research gaps are being identified and addressed, and duplication is being
avoided. In our June 2003 report on transportation security challenges, we
recommended that DHS and DOT use a mechanism such as a memorandum of
agreement to clearly delineate their respective roles and
responsibilities. DHS and DOT disagreed with this recommendation because
they believed that their roles and responsibilities were already clear.
However, we continue to believe that DHS's and DOT's roles and
responsibilities for transportation security, including their respective
security R&D programs, should be clarified because the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act gives TSA responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation but does not eliminate the DOT modal
administrations' existing statutory responsibilities for the security of
different modes of transportation.
Finally, because most transportation industry associations told us that
TSA and DHS have not contacted them about their security R&D needs, the
security R&D needs of transportation providers may not have been
adequately considered.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To support efforts by TSA and DHS to maximize the advantages offered by
basic research, help select and prioritize R&D projects, better monitor
and manage their R&D portfolios, enhance coordination with one another and
with other organizations that conduct transportation security R&D, and
improve their outreach to transportation, we are making five
recommendations. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the
Transportation Security Administration
o ensure that their transportation security R&D portfolios contain
projects in all phases of R&D, including basic research;
o complete (1) strategic plans containing measurable objectives for TSA's
and DHS's transportation security R&D programs and (2) risk
assessments-threat, vulnerability, and criticality-for all modes of
transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to help select
and prioritize R&D projects;
o develop a database that will provide accurate, complete, current, and
readily accessible project information for monitoring and managing their
R&D portfolios;
o develop a process with DOT to coordinate transportation security R&D,
such as a memorandum of agreement identifying roles and responsibilities
and designating agency liaisons, and share information on the agreed-upon
roles and responsibilities with transportation stakeholders; and
o develop a vehicle to communicate with the transportation industry to
ensure that its R&D security needs have been identified and considered.
Agency Comments and We provided TSA, DHS, and DOT with drafts of this
report for their review and comment. DHS's written comments, which
incorporated comments
Our Evaluation from TSA, are provided in appendix IV, along with our
responses to specific
points. DOT also provided comments on the draft report, which we have
incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DHS generally concurred with the report's findings and commented that the
recommendations are key to a successful R&D program and that the
department would continue to evaluate its R&D processes in light of the
report's findings and recommendations. However, DHS believed that the
report did not sufficiently recognize recent changes that have taken
place, particularly at TSA. According to DHS, TSA has made great strides
in defining R&D projects and linking them to mission needs and identified
gaps. In response to these and other technical comments that DHS provided,
we revised the report as appropriate.
DHS also provided additional perspectives on our recommendations:
o Recommendation: TSA and DHS should ensure that their transportation
security R&D portfolios contain projects in all phases of R&D, including
basic research. DHS said that TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory
currently conducts basic research and that TSA's human factors program,
Manhattan II project, and air cargo security projects include basic
research. However, information provided by TSA in July 2004 in response to
our request for data on projects, including their current phase of
research, identified no projects in the basic research phase. This
information from TSA covered the agency's R&D work on human factors,
Manhattan II, and air cargo security. In addition, a senior TSA official
said that the agency needed to do more basic research. In light of this
information from TSA, we did not change our recommendation.
o Recommendation: TSA and DHS should (1) complete strategic plans
containing measurable objectives for TSA's and DHS's transportation
security R&D programs and (2) complete risk assessments for all modes of
transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to help select
and prioritize R&D projects. DHS said that in 2004, it finalized its
strategic plan, which defined missions and goals for all of the agencies
under it, including TSA. DHS also said that the strategic plan being
developed by TSA's Office of Security Technology would include measurable
goals and milestones for R&D projects. However, DHS's strategic plan does
not specifically address transportation security R&D and neither TSA nor
DHS has completed an R&D strategic plan containing measurable objectives.
Therefore, we did not revise this recommendation.
o Recommendation: TSA and DHS should develop a database that will provide
accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible project information
for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios. DHS said that TSA had
developed a system to track R&D projects' goals and milestones,
acquisition, funding, testing, and deployment information. While such a
project tracking system could address our recommendation, TSA struggled as
recently as of August 2004 to provide us with basic information on many of
its R&D projects and, in the end, was unable to do so for a significant
number. Therefore, we retained this recommendation.
o Recommendation: TSA should develop a process with DOT to coordinate
transportation security R&D, such as a memorandum of agreement identifying
roles and responsibilities, and share this information with transportation
stakeholders. DHS said that TSA is already working with DOT to avoid
duplicative R&D efforts. In addition, DHS said that TSA would assess the
benefits associated with a memorandum of agreement with DOT to determine
whether one should be initiated. We continue to believe that a memorandum
of agreement between TSA and DHS is the proper vehicle for coordinating
R&D-not only to avoid duplication, but also to leverage resources and
identify unmet needs. Furthermore, DOT concurred with our finding that
there is room for significant improvement in coordination between DOT and
TSA and between DOT and DHS. DOT also agreed with our recommendation that
a memorandum of agreement with DHS is the appropriate vehicle for
improving the coordination of transportation security R&D.
o Recommendation: TSA and DHS should develop a vehicle to communicate
with the transportation industry to ensure that their R&D needs have been
identified and considered. DHS said that TSA does and will continue to
communicate with the transportation industry. Although DHS noted some
actions that TSA is taking to reach out to the transportation industry, as
we reported, most transportation industry officials we interviewed said
that TSA and DHS had not reached out to them to obtain information about
their transportation security R&D needs. Therefore, we did not change this
recommendation.
Finally, DHS commented on the draft report's conclusion that Congress has
no reasonable assurance that the hundreds of millions of dollars that are
being invested in transportation security R&D are being invested
costeffectively to address the highest priority transportation risks.
According to
DHS, this conclusion is contradicted by evidence contained in our report,
namely, that the report underscores the difficulties of integrating
multiple new agencies missions, resources, and approaches. However, we
believe that the report's evidence of incomplete strategic planning and
risk assessment, inadequate information management, and insufficient
coordination supports the conclusion. Given that DHS generally concurred
with all of the recommendations, which address these issues, and said they
were key to a successful R&D program, we believe that implementing them
will strengthen TSA's and DHS's ability to provide Congress with
reasonable assurance that the hundreds of millions of dollars that are
being invested in transportation security R&D are being invested
cost-effectively to address the highest priority transportation security
risks.
In its comments on the draft report, DOT said that its efforts to
coordinate research planning with DHS and TSA support our finding that
there is room for significant improvement. According to DOT, it offers
substantial transportation expertise that could provide critical input for
identifying and prioritizing the transportation security R&D agenda. DOT
also said that it is anxious to work with DHS and TSA to create a mutually
beneficial working environment that taps its transportation experience and
expertise while the department benefits from DHS's security expertise. DOT
believes that through effective interagency coordination, it could work
with DHS and TSA to ensure that important research needs are met in areas
such as critical transportation infrastructure protection, as well as in
responding to, and recovering from, a terrorist attack on the
transportation system. Finally, DOT said that coordinating R&D activities
represents an area that could benefit by being included in an annex to an
overall memorandum of agreement between DOT and DHS such as we
recommended. DOT said it fully supports the completion of a comprehensive
memorandum of agreement with DHS and is working to bring one to fruition.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 20 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to interested congressional committees and to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland
Security for the Transportation Security Administration, and the
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. We
will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. If you have any
questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at
[email protected].
Katherine Siggerud Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
List of Congressional Addressees
The Honorable John L. Mica Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives
The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert Chairman, Committee on Science House of
Representatives
The Honorable Harold Rogers Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Governmental Affairs United States Senate
The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate
Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to review (1) the transportation
security research and development (R&D) projects that the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and other agencies funded in fiscal year 2003 and have budgeted for in
fiscal year 2004; the status of these projects; and the reasonableness of
the distribution of these projects by mode and (2) the extent to which TSA
and DHS are managing their transportation security R&D programs according
to applicable laws and best practices recommended by the National Academy
of Sciences and the National Research Council.
To complete our first objective, we obtained and analyzed information from
TSA, DHS, and the Department of Transportation (DOT) on the transportation
security R&D projects that they were funding and are planning to fund.
Within DHS, in addition to TSA and the Science and Technology Directorate,
we collected this information from the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection agency, and the U.S. Secret Service, which DHS
officials identified as also conducting transportation security R&D.
Information on the transportation security R&D projects that TSA and DHS
plan to fund in fiscal year 2005 was not yet available. Because we found
during our review that DOT was continuing to conduct some transportation
security R&D, we obtained and analyzed information on the transportation
security R&D projects that it was funding in fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
At DOT, we obtained this information from the Federal Railroad
Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Highway
Administration, the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration, the
Office of Pipeline Safety, and the Research and Special Projects
Administration. Regarding their transportation security R&D projects, we
asked these agencies to provide project descriptions and information on
who was performing the research (such as private contractors or national
laboratories); their phase of research; anticipated dates of completion,
initial deployment, and deployment; and funding data for fiscal years 2003
and 2004. We then aggregated these data to determine the focus of TSA's
and DHS's transportation security projects in terms of the modes of
transportation and program areas. On the basis of interviews with TSA,
DHS, DOT, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
officials regarding how their agencies ensure that these data are complete
and accurate, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for
purposes of this report. To gain a better understanding of the types of
technologies involved in transportation security, we reviewed reports
prepared by GAO, the DOT Inspector General, the Homeland Security Research
Corporation (a private research organization), and others and attended
conferences where transportation security R&D-
Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
related technologies were discussed. To help evaluate the reasonableness
of the R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and DOT have funded in terms of the
modes of transportation and program areas addressed, we convened a meeting
of transportation security and technology experts. At our request, the
National Research Council selected the experts, who were affiliated with
state transportation departments, universities, national laboratories,
private industry, and other organizations and were knowledgeable about
transportation security technologies.
To complete our second objective, we first identified and reviewed the
laws relevant to the management of TSA's and DHS's R&D programs, including
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Homeland Security Act,
and the Government Performance and Results Act. We also identified and
reviewed best practices applicable to R&D programs identified by leading
research organizations, such as the National Research Council and the
National Academy of Sciences. In addition, we interviewed TSA and DHS
officials about their strategic planning, coordination, and R&D
acceleration efforts. We also reviewed GAO reports on TSA's strategic
planning, on DHS's interaction with the Department of Energy (DOE)
National Laboratories, on risk management principles, on implementing the
Government Performance and Results Act, and on transportation security
challenges and a DHS Inspector General report on the Science and
Technology Directorate's operations. We then compared these laws and best
practices with TSA's and DHS's management of their R&D programs. To
determine the extent to which TSA and DHS were coordinating with each
other and other federal agencies, we interviewed officials at TSA, DHS,
DOT, NASA, the Technical Support Working Group, five DOE national
laboratories that were conducting transportation security R&D for TSA or
DHS, and three universities that were conducting R&D for TSA. We visited
the national laboratories in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Los Alamos, New
Mexico, because the Oak Ridge National Laboratory was conducting more
transportation security R&D projects for TSA, and the Los Alamos National
Laboratory was conducting more transportation security projects for DHS,
compared with the other national laboratories. To determine the extent to
which TSA and DHS had outreached to the transportation industry and
potential technology providers, we interviewed officials from
transportation industry associations and attended DHS industry workshops.
In addition, we interviewed a number of members of the Homeland Security
Industries Association, an organization of homeland security technology
vendors, to obtain their views on TSA's and DHS's technology solicitation
processes and outreach efforts. The association identified the members who
chose to discuss their views with us. At our
Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
request, the transportation security and technology experts also provided
comments on TSA's and DHS's management of their R&D programs.
We conducted our review in Washington, D.C.; Arlington, Virginia; Atlantic
City, New Jersey; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Los Alamos, New Mexico, from
July 2003 through September 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Appendix II
Industry Is Independently Developing New and Emerging Transportation Security
Technologies
According to a TSA official, private industry and universities are
researching and developing several new and emerging technologies that are
applicable to transportation security, in some cases without any funding
from TSA or DHS. The official said that TSA has focused most of its R&D on
making improvements to deployed technologies and testing and evaluating
near-term technologies. However, the official stated that TSA needs to
start devoting more funding to researching and developing longterm,
high-risk, but potentially high-payoff technologies. Examples of new and
emerging technologies include the following:
o Terahertz imaging uses terahertz radiation1 to create images of
concealed objects or to reveal their chemical composition. The rays can be
directed at a person or an object from a source, with reflected rays
captured by a detection device. The Homeland Security Research Corporation
(a private research organization) reports that terahertz imaging will be
an excellent tool for screening baggage. Terahertz imaging has been used
in the laboratory to detect explosives on people through several layers of
clothing. TSA is considering funding the development of this technology
for detecting explosives in containerized air cargo.
o Nuclear resonance fluorescence imaging uses a high-intensity light
source to identify the atomic composition of a target object. Nuclear
resonance fluorescence imaging has the potential to detect explosives and
nuclear materials in baggage, trucks, and cargo containers. According to a
TSA official, TSA may fund R&D on this technology in the future.
o Microsensors are miniature devices that convert information about the
environment into an electrical form that can be read by instruments. There
are many types of microsensors, some of which have the potential to detect
explosives. In fiscal year 2003, TSA funded R&D at two national
laboratories and NASA on several different types of microsensors. A TSA
official said that several universities are currently doing work on other
types of microsensors that have potential to meet TSA's needs, but that
TSA did not fund any of this work in 2004.
1Terahertz radiation is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum between
microwave radiation and infrared radiation. With wavelengths of between 30
micrometers and 1 millimeter, it is non-ionizing and harmless to living
tissue.
Appendix II Industry Is Independently Developing New and Emerging
Transportation Security Technologies
o Automated detection algorithms are computer software that processes
data obtained by detection systems and automatically indicates the
presence of an explosive or weapon. Although TSA has funded the
development of such software for its currently deployed computed
tomography explosives detection systems, it has not yet funded the
development of such software to process images produced by emerging
detection technologies, such as X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave.2 A
TSA official believes that incorporating automated detection algorithms
could substantially reduce the operational cost of future detection
systems by reducing the need for screeners. According to this official,
TSA may fund the development of these algorithms in the future.
o Raman spectroscopy uses laser light to determine the chemical
composition of an object and can be used to screen passengers, carry-on
and checked baggage, cargo, and boarding passes for explosives.
o Nuclear magnetic resonance directs radio waves at an object that has
been placed in a magnetic field to determine the presence of explosives.
Nuclear magnetic resonance can be used to screen liquids in containers in
carry-on and checked baggage for explosives.
2Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an image that
highlights organic materials, such as explosives. Millimeter wave energy
analysis provides a 360-degree image of a person or object in order to
detect weapons and explosives.
Appendix III
GAO's Panel of Transportation Security and Technology Experts
Page 56 GAO04890 Transportation Security R&D
Commissioner Airports, Lawrence X-ray Incident Aviation
Norm Southwest Research David New Mexico Surface Human National Research Robert Northwestern Railroads, Patrick Sandia Transportation Yacov University Risk Daniel Mass Douglas Anacapa Human William -President's Infrastructure Thomas Transportation Sandra Tokyo Transportation James National Materials Eva Palisades Maritime/Land Len passenger Terry Los Alamos Toni National Materials Harry Livermore technologies, National Materials American Trucking and Daniel CRADA Committee on Infrastructure Clint Indiana Environmental Transportation response transportation Eric The and Airlines,
Name Affiliation Expertise Abramson Research policy Albright Department of transportation factors, technologies Research Board Gallamore University cybersecurity Griffin National security spectroscopy Haimes of analysis Hall Washington transit Authority Harris Sciences factors Harris Consultant Council on Protection Hartwick Consultant security Hyland Electron security Killian Research Advisory Lerner-Lam Consulting security Limmer Consultant screening Lowe National Organization Marechaux Research Transportation Advisory Martz National nondestructive Emily Research Advisory Transportation freight technologies O'Neil International Chair, Critical Protection Oster University, Cargo/Baggage Affairs Infrastructure and networks Schwartz Boeing aircraft Consultant passenger
- Chair Institute Transportation Cheryl AAI passenger Joedy Council, Transportation Laboratories technologies, Virginia Metropolitan Critical technologies Massachusetts technologies Council, Transportation Board Group technologies Laboratory Council, security Board Laboratory evaluation Ann Council, Technology Board Dan Research transportation Transportation Transportation School of Screening, Joseph Northwestern management Company technology Edmund screening
Bitner Corporation screening Cambridge Transportation policy neutron Area Transit National security National technologies Meyer National policy Murray Institute security and Research Board Public & Aviation, Schofer University on Soliday technologies
Appendix III GAO's Panel of Transportation Security and Technology Experts
(Continued From Previous Page)
Name Affiliation Expertise
Consultant Mass spectrometry, passenger
Mike Story screening
technologies
Science Applications Freight, intelligent
Joyce Wenger International transportation, traffic
Corporation modeling
Wisconsin Department of
Jeffery Western Transportation Surface Transportation - Highways
Source: National Research Council.
Note: These experts either attended the March 2, 2004, meeting or provided
written comments after reviewing information that we provided to them.
Appendix IV
Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security Appendix IV
Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 2.
See comment 2.
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
See comment 5.
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
See comment 6.
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland Security's
letter dated August 31, 2004.
GAO Comments 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
We agree with DHS that aviation security is currently the primary focus of
TSA's R&D projects, and that many aviation projects provide data that are
useful for other transportation security programs. Because these topics
were discussed in the draft report, we made no change.
DHS provided comments on three projects that members of our panel of
transportation security experts suggested should be considered for future
funding. We added this information to the report.
DHS said that the report should indicate that TSA has two advisory
committees-the National Academy of Sciences and the Security Advisory
Panel-that contain experts from various modes of transportation. We added
this information to the report.
DHS commented on a project that one of our panelist believed should not be
funded (a $30,000 project to test a prototype of a new, handheld ion
mobility spectrometry explosives trace detector) because it could be
purchased off the shelf. According to DHS, TSA funded this project because
the vendor demonstrated a promising technology. We added this comment to
our report.
We continue to believe that DHS's and TSA's R&D strategic plans should
contain measurable objectives. Similarly, the National Academy of Science
indicated that research programs should be described in strategic and
performance plans. Therefore, we made no changes to the report in response
to this comment.
DHS noted that TSA recently established a working group to update and
improve the current Web site that addresses technology ideas, products,
and services to make it more user-friendly. TSA plans to implement the
improvements early next year. We added this information to the report.
Appendix V
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] Tammy
Conquest, (202) 512-5234 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
(540068)
In addition to the individuals named above, other key contributors to this
report were Dennis Amari, Carol Anderson-Guthrie, Nancy Boardman, Gerald
Dillingham, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, David Goldstein, Brandon Haller, Bob
Homan, Dave Hooper, Andrew Huddleston, Michael Mgebroff, Claire van der
Lee, and Don Watson.
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