Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty
Experienced Significant Pay Problems (20-AUG-04, GAO-04-911).
In light of GAO's November 2003 report highlighting significant
pay problems experienced by Army National Guard soldiers
mobilized to active duty in support of the global war on
terrorism and homeland security, GAO was asked to determine if
controls used to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers provided
assurance that such payments are accurate and timely. GAO's audit
used a case study approach to focus on controls over three key
areas: processes, people (human capital), and automated systems.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-911
ACCNO: A11857
TITLE:
Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty
Experienced Significant Pay Problems
DATE: 08/20/2004
SUBJECT: Accounting errors
Active duty expense allowances
Armed forces abroad
Combat pay
Financial management systems
Hazardous military-duty pay
Hostile fire pay
Internal controls
Late payments
Military pay
Military reserve personnel
Mobilization
Payroll systems
Systems evaluation
Tax exempt status
Erroneous payments
Hardship duty pay
Defense Joint Military Pay
System-Reserve Component
Total Army Personnel Database-Reserves
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GAO-04-911
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters
August 2004
MILITARY PAY
Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay
Problems
a
GAO-04-911
Highlights of GAO-04-911, a report to congressional requesters
In light of GAO's November 2003 report highlighting significant pay
problems experienced by Army National Guard soldiers mobilized to active
duty in support of the global war on terrorism and homeland security, GAO
was asked to determine if controls used to pay mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers provided assurance that such payments are accurate and timely.
GAO's audit used a case study approach to focus on controls over three key
areas: processes, people (human capital), and automated systems.
GAO is reiterating 5 previous recommendations that remain open, including
action to ensure that longer-term system improvement actions include a
complete reengineering of not only related automated systems, but also
supporting processes and human capital practices. GAO's report includes 15
new recommendations. Fourteen recommendations are directed at immediate
actions needed to address weaknesses in the processes, human capital, and
automated systems currently relied on to provide active duty pays,
allowances, and related tax benefits to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers.
GAO's other longer-term recommendation is directed at action needed to
ensure that planned automated systems address the issues identified in
this report. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-911.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202)
512-9095 or [email protected].
August 2004
MILITARY PAY
Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay
Problems
The processes and automated systems relied on to provide active duty pays,
allowances, and tax benefits to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers are so
error-prone, cumbersome, and complex that neither DOD nor, more
importantly, Army Reserve soldiers themselves, could be reasonably assured
of timely and accurate payments. Weaknesses in these areas resulted in pay
problems, including overpayments, and to a lesser extent, late and
underpayments, of soldiers' active duty pays and allowances at eight Army
Reserve case study units. Specifically, 332 of 348 soldiers (95 percent)
we audited at eight case study units that were mobilized, deployed, and
demobilized at some time during the 18-month period from August 2002
through January 2004 had at least one pay problem.
Pay Experiences at Eight Army Reserve Case Study Units
Many of the soldiers had multiple problems associated with their active
duty pays and allowances. Some of these problems lingered unresolved for
considerable lengths of time, some for over 1 year. Further, nearly all
soldiers began receiving their tax exemption benefit at least 1 month
late. These pay problems often had a profound adverse impact on individual
soldiers and their families. For example, soldiers were required to spend
considerable time, sometimes while deployed in remote, hostile
environments overseas, seeking help on pay inquiries or in correcting
errors in their active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits.
The processes in place to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers, involving
potentially hundreds of DOD, Army, and Army Reserve organizations and
thousands of personnel, were deficient with respect to (1) tracking
soldiers' pay status as they transition through their active duty tours,
(2) carrying out soldier readiness reviews, (3) after-the-fact report
reconciliation requirements, and (4) unclear procedures for applying
certain pay entitlements. With respect to human capital, weaknesses
identified at our case study units included (1) insufficient resources
allocated to key unitlevel pay administration responsibilities, (2)
inadequate training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3)
poor customer service. Several automated systems issues also contributed
to the significant pay errors, including nonintegrated systems and limited
processing capabilities.
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Case Studies Illustrate Pay Problems
Significant Weaknesses Exist in Mobilized Army Reserve Pay
Processes Human Capital Issues Affect Pay Accuracy and Timeliness
Automated Systems Deficiencies Constrain Accurate and Timely
Payments Recent Actions Should Result in Improvements Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and our Evaluation
1 2 6 17
23 34
41 48 51 52 54
Appendixes
Appendix I:
Appendix II:
Appendix III:
Appendix IV:
Appendix V:
Appendix VI:
Scope and Methodology 57
824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 62 Mobilization
Pay Problems 63 Pay Problems While Deployed 65 Pay Problems Associated
with Demobilization and Release from
Active Duty 67
965th Dental Company Seagoville, Texas 69 Mobilization Pay Problems 70 Pay
Problems While Deployed 72 Pay Problems Associated with Demobilization and
Release from
Active Duty 74
948th Forward Surgical Team, Southfield, Michigan 76 Mobilization Pay
Problems 78 Deployment Pay Problems 79 Pay Problems Associated with
Demobilization and Release from
Active Duty 80
443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland 82 Mobilization Pay
Problems 84 Pay Problems While Deployed 87 Pay Problems Associated with
Demobilization and Release from
Active Duty 89
FORSCOM Support Unit, Finksburg, Maryland 92 Mobilization Pay Problems 94
Contents
Pay Problems While Deployed 94 Pay Problems Associated with Demobilization
and Release from Active Duty 95
Appendix VII: 629th Transportation Detachment, Fort Eustis, Virginia 98
Mobilization Pay Problems 100 Pay Problems While Deployed 101 Pay Problems
Associated with Demobilization and Release from
Active Duty 103
Appendix VIII: 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment New Haven,
Connecticut 104 Mobilization Pay Problems 105 Pay Problems While Deployed
108 Pay Problems Associated with Demobilization and Release from Active
Duty 109
Appendix IX: 431st Chemical Detachment Johnstown, Pennsylvania 111
Mobilization Pay Problems 113 Pay Problems While Deployed 114 Pay Problems
Associated with Demobilization and Release from
Active Duty 116
Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Defense 117
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 124 GAO Contact 124
Acknowledgments 124
Tables Table 1:
Table 2: Table 3: Table 4: Table 5: Table 6: Table 7: Table 8: Table 9:
Active Duty Pays and Allowances Associated with Case
Study Units
Army Reserve Units Audited
Pay Problems at Eight Case Study Units
Pay Problems by Phase
Mobilization Pay Problems
Deployment Pay Problems
Demobilization Pay Problems
Pay Problems by Phase
Mobilization Pay Problems
9 18 19 63 64 65 67 70 71 73 74 77 78 79
Table 10: Deployment Pay Problems
Table 11: Demobilization Pay Problems
Table 12: Pay Problems by Phase
Table 13: Mobilization Pay Problems
Table 14: Deployment Pay Problems
Contents
Table 15: Demobilization Pay Problems
Table 16: Pay Problems by Phase
Table 17: Mobilization Pay Problems
Table 18: Deployment Pay Problems
Table 19: Demobilization Pay Problems
Table 20: Pay Problems by Phase
Table 21: Deployment Pay Problem
Table 22: Demobilization Pay Problems
81 83 84 87 90 94 95 96
Table 23: Timetable of Soldier's Attempts to Correct Problems
Related to Active Duty Entitlements
Table 24: Pay Problems by Phase
Table 25: Mobilization Pay Problems
Table 26: Deployed Pay Problems
Table 27: Demobilization Pay Problems
Table 28: Pay Problems by Phase
Table 29: Mobilization Pay Problems
Table 30: Deployment Pay Problems
Table 31: Demobilization Pay Problems
Table 32: Pay Problem by Phase
Table 33: Mobilization Pay Problems
Table 34: Deployment Pay Problems
97
99 100 102 103 105 106 108 110 112 113 114
Figures Figure 1: Three Key Phases for Active Duty Payments to Army
Reserve Soldiers 12
Figure 2: Key Systems Involved in Authorizing, Entering,
Processing, and Paying Mobilized Army Reserve Soldiers
Are Not Effectively Integrated or Interfaced 43
Figure 3: 824th Quartermaster Company's Mobilization Time
Line 62
Figure 4: 965th Dental Company's Mobilization Time Line 69
Figure 5: 948th Forward Surgical Team's Mobilization Time Line 77
Figure 6: 443rd Military Police Company's Mobilization Time
Line 83
Figure 7: FORSCOM Support Unit Soldier Time Line 93
Figure 8: 629th Transportation Company's Time Line 98
Figure 9: 3423rd Military Intelligence Company's Mobilization
Time
Line 104
112
Figure 10: 431st Chemical Detachment's Mobilization Time Line
Contents
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DJMS-RC Defense Joint Military Pay System - Reserve Component
DMO Defense Military Pay Office system
FMR Financial Management Regulation
FORSCOM Army Forces Command
PMARS Participation Management and Reporting Subsystem
RLAS Regional Level Application System
SRP Soldier Readiness Processing
TAPDB-R Total Army Personnel Database - Reserves
TRANSPROCTransition Processing System
USARC United States Army Reserve Command
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A
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548
August 20, 2004
Congressional Requesters
In November 2003, we reported1 on significant pay problems experienced by
mobilized Army National Guard soldiers, including 450 of 481 soldiers at
six case study units who had at least one pay problem associated with
their mobilization. Because of the severity of the problems identified for
mobilized Army National Guard soldiers, you asked us to examine the
accuracy and timeliness of payroll payments to mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers. Specifically, the objectives of our audit were to (1) provide an
indepth perspective on the pay experiences of mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers and (2) assess the overall design of the processes, human
capital, and automated systems relied on to provide accurate and timely
pays, allowances, and tax benefits to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers.
Our preliminary assessment of the internal control environment and the
design of key controls associated with payments to mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers indicated that the accuracy and timeliness of these payments are
highly dependent on inherently flawed processes and controls. Active duty
payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers rely on many of the same
Department of Defense (DOD) and Army policies and procedures and automated
systems used to pay mobilized Army National Guard soldiers. Further, DOD
has reported2 to Congress on major deficiencies in the delivery of
military payroll and related personnel services, including those used to
support both Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers.
Consequently, as was the case for our audit of payments to mobilized Army
National Guard soldiers, rather than statistically testing the
effectiveness of inherently flawed processes and controls, we relied
primarily on a case study approach to provide perspective on the pay
experiences of mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. We selected Army Reserve
units mobilized at some point during the period from August 2002 through
January 2004 as case studies to provide a more in-depth perspective on
Army Reserve soldiers' pay experiences and their underlying causes. Our
case studies included
1GAO, Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty
Experienced Significant Pay Problems, GAO-04-89 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
13, 2003).
2U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Defense Integrated
Military Human Resource System (Personnel and Pay), (Washington, D.C.:
June 2002).
seven Army Reserve units deployed overseas to carry out assigned combat
support missions as part of Operations Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom
and one unit activated to perform services as part of critical homeland
defense operations under Operation Noble Eagle.
We performed our work from November 2003 through June 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. The pay problems we
identified were based on a comparison of soldiers' pay records with
available supporting documentation. Our audit was intended to provide
perspective on soldiers' pay experiences and may not have identified all
pay problems at our case study units. In addition, our audit was not
designed to result in an exact determination of the pay, allowances, and
tax benefits soldiers should have received. We provided the results of our
pay analysis to Army Reserve officials for an exact determination of any
amounts owed the government or soldiers related to the mobilizations
audited. A more detailed description of the scope and methodology is
included in appendix I.
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Defense or his designee. We received written comments from the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), which are reprinted in appendix X.
Results in Brief The processes and automated systems relied on to provide
active duty payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers are so
error-prone, cumbersome, and complex that neither DOD nor, more
importantly, the Army Reserve soldiers themselves, could be reasonably
assured of timely and accurate payments. These weak processes and
automated systems resulted in a significant number of overpayments, and to
a lesser extent, late and underpayments, of soldiers' active duty pays and
allowances at the eight case study units we audited. Specifically, 332 of
348 soldiers (95 percent) at eight Army Reserve units experienced at least
one problem with the active duty pays and allowances they were entitled to
receive. Many of the soldiers experienced multiple pay problems associated
with their active duty mobilizations. Some of the pay problems soldiers
experienced often lingered unresolved for considerable lengths of time,
some for over a year. Nearly all soldiers in the seven case study units
deployed overseas had problems with their location-based pays,
particularly their hardship duty pay. In addition, while soldiers in the
seven units that were deployed overseas were entitled to receive their
pays and allowances tax free, and therefore, free of tax withholding from
pay when they first arrived intheater, few, if any, received this benefit
until at least a month after arrival.
Of the $375,000 in active duty pay and allowance problems we identified
for the Army Reserve soldiers in our case study units, the majority were
overpayments. Included in the total of 256 Army Reserve soldiers that
received an estimated $247,000 in overpayments, were several instances of
soldiers who received significant overpayments, but did not acknowledge
the receipt or set aside sufficient funds to repay these erroneous
overpayments. In these instances, the soldiers may be subject to criminal
prosecution. For example, we referred for criminal investigation one
soldier who did not mobilize with his unit, yet erroneously received over
$36,000 in active duty pays and did not report this overpayment. We also
identified 245 Army Reserve soldiers at our case study units who received
a total of about $77,000 in late payments of their active duty pays and
allowances, and 294 soldiers who were underpaid a total of about $51,000
in active duty pays and allowances.
Taken together, a considerable amount of effort by individual Army Reserve
soldiers and their families was often required to gather and complete the
required documentation to support pay entitlements, resolve pay errors,
and identify and repay debts associated with numerous pay errors. A number
of soldiers and their families told us they spent considerable time and
effort on these pay issues, sometimes while soldiers were deployed in
remote, hostile environments overseas. In particular, resolving soldier
debts resulting from erroneous overpayments was burdensome to both the
soldier and DOD. Soldiers were sometimes required to spend considerable
time and were frustrated in their efforts to determine the exact sums owed
or establish a repayment plan. Further, these overpayment debts placed an
additional labor-intensive burden on the Army and the Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS) to manually compute the exact amounts owed and
establish and monitor the recoupment of these sums from the soldiers.
These pay issues may adversely impact Army Reserve soldiers' morale, and,
ultimately, may adversely affect the Army's ability to retain these
important soldiers.
One of the primary causes of the pay problems we found was the inadequate
procedures relied on to maintain accountability over soldiers and their
associated pays, allowances, and tax benefits as they moved through their
active duty mobilization, including processing through various levels of
Army, Army Reserve, DFAS, and DOD organizations. We also found pay
problems associated with breakdowns in soldier accountability
responsibilities assigned to unit commanders and unit administrators. For
example, we found that flawed procedures for ensuring that documentation
showing that soldiers were no longer at an overseas
deployment location or on active duty (such as revoked orders or return
from active duty orders), led to many of the overpayments we identified.
Because pay personnel did not receive timely documentation on soldiers'
departure from an overseas deployment, 47 soldiers with the 824th
Quartermaster Company from North Carolina improperly received several
months of hardship duty pay, totaling about $30,000, after they left
Kuwait.
With respect to human capital, the dedicated and determined efforts of
many involved in the current operations relied on to pay mobilized Army
Reserve soldiers were handicapped by various human capital challenges,
including (1) inadequate resources to support critical unit pay
administration functions, (2) deficiencies in the training provided to key
personnel on pay entitlements and pay transaction processing requirements,
and (3) poor customer service. A sufficient number of welltrained military
pay staff is particularly crucial given the extensive, cumbersome, and
labor-intensive process requirements that have evolved to support active
duty pay to Army Reserve soldiers.
Our audits of the pay experiences of soldiers assigned to our case study
units identified instances in which unit-level pay management support
deficiencies contributed to pay errors. These unit-level pay management
deficiencies were particularly problematic for units with vacant unit
administrator positions, or where the unit administrator was deployed with
the unit in another capacity. For example, lacking an individual assigned
to carry out unit administrator duties, 9 of the 11 soldiers with the
3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment case study unit from Connecticut
erroneously received the overseas cost of living allowance instead of the
continental United States cost of living allowance for their deployment to
Fort Belvoir. We also found that inadequate training of both key unit
administrators and Army finance pay technicians led to pay errors.
Personnel in both of these key positions told us that they relied
primarily on on-the-job training when they assumed their responsibilities.
A related human capital issue-customer support for active duty pay
issues-was a recurring concern at our case study units. For example, it
took over a year, and about 20 phone calls, e-mails, and faxes, after one
Army Reserve officer contacted the Army to settle the debt resulting from
the erroneous active duty pay, allowances, and combat zone tax exclusion
benefits he received.
Several automated systems issues were also major causal factors associated
with the pay problems we identified. The labor-intensive manual entry and
reentry of pay transactions into multiple nonintegrated systems,
and further data entry required to correct pay errors and related debts,
were major contributing factors. We also found that limited automated
system processing capabilities, necessitating extensive costly manual
workarounds, and inadequate automated system edits were major factors in
this area. For example, the payroll system cannot simply stop withholding
federal taxes for soldiers deployed in designated combat zones, but
instead must first withhold the taxes and then in the following month's
pay processing, reimburse the soldier for the taxes previously withheld.
DOD has taken a number of actions, and has other actions under way, in
response to recommendations in our November 2003 Army National Guard pay
report. Our November 2003 report included both short-and longer-term
recommendations. Because active duty payments to mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers rely on many of the same procedures and automated systems used to
pay mobilized Army National Guard soldiers, many of these recommendations
and DOD's responsive actions also apply to Army Reserve active duty pays.
Many of DOD's actions directed at improving the accuracy and timeliness of
payments to both mobilized Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers
were implemented in the fall of 2003 or later. For example, in June 2004,
the Army issued a Finance Mobilization and Demobilization Standing
Operating Procedure covering pay management responsibilities and
transaction processing requirements to be followed for all Army Reserve
and Army National Guard soldiers mobilized to active duty. Because the
Army Reserve soldier pay experiences we audited ended in January 2004,
DOD's actions in response to our previous recommendations were not in
place in sufficient time to impact the soldiers' pay experiences we
audited. However, if effectively and fully implemented, many of DOD's
actions directed at our short-term recommendations should help reduce the
incidence of the types of pay problems we identified in our case studies.
Nonetheless, because five of the applicable recommendations in our Army
National Guard pay report have not yet been fully addressed, we are
reiterating these open recommendations. We are making 15 additional
recommendations to address Army Reserve-unique issues. It is imperative
that DOD act swiftly to fully implement these near-term recommendations to
realize significant reductions in the extent of Mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers' pay problems. However, even full, effective actions in response
to all near-term recommendations will not resolve the underlying causes of
the pay problems we identified. These underlying causes can only be
addressed as part of a longer term comprehensive reengineering of existing
processes, human capital practices, and automated systems. Until these
more substantive actions can be put in place, Army Reserve soldiers are
likely to continue to experience significant problems in receiving
accurate and timely active duty payments. In its comments on a draft of
this report, DOD agreed with our recommendations and outlined its actions
to address the deficiencies noted in our report.
Background The Army Reserve is a partner with the active Army and the Army
National Guard in fulfilling the country's military and contingency needs.
The Army Reserve provides nearly half of the Army's combat support
capabilities.3 The Army Reserve has approximately 2,000 units that drill
at 1,500 Army Reserve Centers located in communities spread throughout the
United States and territories. As of May 2004, the Army Reserve reported
that it had about 328,000 members in the Ready Reserve.4
During peacetime, Army Reserve units report to the United States Army
Reserve Command (USARC), located in Atlanta, Georgia, and the Chief of the
Army Reserve, located in Washington, D.C. In addition, the Army Reserve
has established Regional Readiness Commands to provide resource,
logistics, and personnel management support for Army Reserve units within
their region. When not mobilized to active duty, Army Reserve units are
required to maintain readiness at a sufficiently high level to facilitate
prompt active duty mobilization. While in a reserve status, Army Reserve
soldiers are required to attend one drill weekend each month and obtain a
minimum amount of training (usually about 2 weeks) each year. During
national emergencies, the President has the authority to mobilize the Army
Reserve to active duty status. While mobilized, Army Reserve units are
accountable to the combatant commander of the theater in which they are
assigned to operate, and ultimately, to the President.
3The Army Reserve provides combat support through its Military Police,
Chemical, and Military Intelligence units; and combat service support
through units, such as its Medical, Quartermaster (supply), and
Transportation units.
4The Ready Reserve includes about 211,000 members of the Selected Reserve
(Army Reserve soldiers participating in regularly scheduled training and
consequently most readily available for mobilization) and about another
117,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve (many of whom recently
left active duty but still have a Reserve commitment or were previously in
the Selected Reserve, but are not currently participating in any regularly
scheduled drills or training). In addition, the Army Reserve reported that
it had over 700,000 retirees in its Retired Reserve.
On September 14, 2001, the President declared a national emergency as a
result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United
States. Concurrent with this declaration, the President authorized the
Secretary of Defense to mobilize reserve troops to active duty pursuant to
10 U.S.C. Section 12302. The Secretary of Defense delegated to the
Secretary of the Army the authority to order Army Reserve soldiers to
active duty. Since September 2001, the Army has mobilized unprecedented
numbers of Army Reserve soldiers (as well as other reserve and national
guard forces) to active duty on lengthy tours. DOD reported that as of
April 2004, about 96,000 Army Reserve soldiers have been mobilized to
active duty at some point since September 2001 to carry out critical
missions.
In contrast to the Army National Guard forces that may be assigned
traditional combat roles, Army Reserve forces are generally assigned
combat support missions. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve both
include military police and intelligence units. However, while the Army
National Guard has special forces and other units that have combat mission
assignments, Army Reserve units are generally limited to combat support
mission assignments, such as supply, medical, and transportation
operations.
Army Reserve soldiers' mobilizations during the period of our audit were
also affected by two other Army actions. First, the Army issued a "stop
loss" order affecting Army Reserve soldiers in November 2002. The stop
loss order was authorized by statute5 and allows the Army to retain
soldiers in the service beyond their date of separation or retirement for
an openended period.6 Second, in November 2003, the Army extended the
orders for all mobilized Army Reserve soldiers expected to return from
active duty on December 1, 2003, for an additional year.7
There have been three major contingency operations involving mobilized
Army Reserve soldiers since September 2001: Operation Noble Eagle,
510 U.S.C. Sec. 12305.
6Those affected by the order generally cannot voluntarily retire, leave
active duty, or separate from the service as long as reserves are called
to active duty or until otherwise relieved by proper authority.
7Through this action, Army Reserve soldiers on active duty orders covering
a period of 365 days from the date of their original mobilization orders
were extended on active duty for a period of 730 days.
Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In general,
missions to provide domestic defense were funded through Operation Noble
Eagle, missions to fight terrorism outside the United States were
initially funded under Operation Enduring Freedom. More recently, missions
related to the combat in Iraq and subsequent policing operations in that
region were funded under Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, Army
Reserve soldiers participated in combat support missions in Afghanistan
that were carried out as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, whereas Army
Reserve soldiers participating in homeland security missions, such as
assisting in intelligence data analysis, were considered part of Operation
Noble Eagle.
According to Army Reserve data, approximately 45,700 Army Reserve soldiers
were activated as of April 2004. At that time, Army Reserve soldiers
accounted for about 27 percent of all mobilized DOD reserve components.8
Many of these Army Reserve soldiers were mobilized as small units,
including about 2,800 units with 10 or fewer soldiers and about 1,000
one-soldier units. The Army assigns a separate unit identification number
to each of these small groups or detachments of Army Reserve soldiers
(these units are known as derivative units). According to Army Reserve
data as of April 2004, the Army Reserve had soldiers assigned to almost
6,000 different unit numbers.
While on active duty, all Army Reserve soldiers earn various statutorily
authorized types of pays and allowances. The types and amounts of pays and
allowances that Army Reserve soldiers are eligible to receive vary
depending upon rank and length of service, dependency status, skills and
certifications acquired, duty location, and the difficulty of the
assignment. While Army Reserve soldiers mobilized to active duty may be
entitled to receive over 50 types of pays and allowances, we focused on 14
types of pays and allowances applicable to the Army Reserve units we
selected for case studies. As shown in table 1, we categorized these 14
pay and allowance types into two groups: (1) pays, including basic pay,
medical and dental and foreign language proficiency skill-based pays, and
locationbased hostile fire and hardship duty pays, and (2) allowances,
including
8Reserve components include the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Air
National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve,
and Coast Guard Reserve.
allowances for housing, subsistence, family separation, and cost of living
for the continental United States.9
Table 1: Active Duty Pays and Allowances Associated with Case Study Units
Pays Description Dollar amount
Basic pay Salary Varies depending on rank and years of service
Hazardous duty pay (jump pay) Pay for parachute jumping $150 per month
Aviation career incentive pay Pay for officers performing operational
flying Varies from $125 to $840 per month duty based on years of aviation
service
Foreign language proficiency pay Pay for specialized foreign language
skills Varies depending on proficiency but may not exceed $300 per month
Hardship duty location pay for designated Pay when assigned to duty in
specified $50, $100, or $150 per month areas locations (depending on duty
location)
Hardship duty location pay for certain places Pay to enlisted soldiers
when assigned to Varies from $8 to $22.50 per month (phase out began on
January 1, 2002) duty in specified locations depending on rank
Medical and dental pays Various special entitlements and incentives for
medical and dental professionals
Varies from $100 per month to $3,000 per month depending on medical
specialty, professional qualifications, and creditable service
Hostile fire/imminent danger pay Full pay for any portion of month when $150 per
month through September 30,
assigned to a location subject to or in proximity to hostile fire or
assigned to duty in a designated imminent danger location 2002, $225 per
month, effective October 1, 2002, through December 31, 2004.
Allowances
Basic allowance for housing Meant to offset the cost of housing when
Varies depending on location, rank, and
member does not receive governmentprovided housing
whether member has dependents
Basic allowance for subsistence Meant to offset costs for a member's
meals Varies depending on whether member is officer or enlisted
9The law makes a distinction between the terms "pays" and "allowances,"
which together make up a service member's overall compensation package.
Generally, the term pay includes basic pay, special pay, retainer pay,
incentive pay, retired pay, and equivalent pay, but does not include
allowances. 37 U.S.C. Section 101(21). DOD defines allowance as "a
monetary amount paid to an individual in lieu of furnished quarters,
subsistence, or the like." DOD Financial Management Regulation, vol. 7A,
Definitions, para. 15 (February 2001). While generally items considered as
"pay" are taxable for federal income tax purposes, except for the cost of
living allowance for the continental United States, most allowances, such
as those for housing, subsistence, and family separation, are not.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Pays Description Dollar amount
Family separation Meant to offset added housing Equivalent to monthly
allowance I expenses basic allowance for
resulting from forced separation housing for member of
from same rank without
dependents dependents
Family separation Meant to offset certain expenses $100 per month from
allowance II resulting January 1, 1998,
from forced separation from through September 30,
dependents 2002; $250 per
month effective October
1, 2002, through
December 31, 2004
Cost of living allowance in the continental Meant to provide compensation
for variations Varies depending on location, rank, years
United States in costs (other than housing) in the of service, and whether
member has continental United States dependents
Overseas housing allowance Meant to provide compensation for variations
Varies depending on location, rank, and in housing costs overseas whether
the member has dependents
Source: GAO analysis.
Several of these types of pays and allowances have multiple subcategories
of entitlement. For example, there are eight different types of basic
allowances for housing that soldiers may be entitled to receive based on
individual circumstances and documentation (including documents
establishing dependency status or court documents). In addition, Army
Reserve soldiers may be eligible for significant tax advantages associated
with their mobilization to active duty. Mobilized Army Reserve soldiers
assigned to or working in a designated combat zone are entitled to exclude
from taxable income certain types of military pays that would otherwise be
taxable.10
In addition to the complexities of determining and documenting the
specific circumstances surrounding each individual soldier's initial
active duty pay, allowance, and tax benefit entitlements, these types of
pays and benefits are further complicated because entitlements vary
depending on soldiers' locations as they move through their active duty
tours. That is, maintaining effective accountability and paying mobilized
Army Reserve soldiers as they move from location to location during their
active duty tours require extensive close coordination among a variety of
operational, personnel, finance, and pay organizations throughout DOD. Key
components requiring closely coordinated efforts in this worldwide team
are the
o mobilized soldier;
10There is no limit on the military pay exemption for enlisted Army
Reserve members, but there is an annual limit of about $76,000 for
officers.
o unit commanders and unit administrators for all mobilized Army Reserve
units;
o United States Army Reserve Pay Center located at Fort McCoy;
o Army Reserve Pay Management Division at Fort McPherson;
o 12 Army Reserve Regional Readiness Commands;
o U.S. Army Finance Command;
o personnel and finance offices at Army mobilization stations;
o Army area servicing finance offices assigned to support deployed units;
o personnel and finance offices at Army demobilization stations;
o Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) at Indianapolis, Indiana;
o DFAS at Denver, Colorado; and
o DFAS at Cleveland, Ohio.
As shown in figure 1, three key phases are associated with the pays and
allowances applicable to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers: (1)
mobilization: starting applicable active duty pays and allowances, (2)
deployment: starting and stopping applicable location-based active duty
pays while continuing other nonlocation-based active duty pay and
allowance entitlements, and (3) demobilization: stopping active duty pays
and allowances.
Figure 1: Three Key Phases for Active Duty Payments to Army Reserve Soldiers
Source: GAO.
Mobilization Phase During the initial mobilization, units receive an alert
order and begin a mobilization preparation program, Soldier Readiness
Processing (SRP). Among other things, the SRP is intended to ensure that
each soldier's financial records are in order. The initial SRP is to be
conducted by the unit's administrator at the unit's home station assisted
by personnel from the cognizant Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command or
designee. This initial SRP is to include a verification of the accuracy of
records supporting applicable active duty pays and allowances. The unit
commander, supported by the unit administrator, is responsible for
ensuring that all personnel data, such as birth certificates for
dependents or foreign language certifications, are current for all
soldiers under their command.
During this phase, the unit administrator is required to gather all
supporting documents and send the documentation to the Reserve Pay
Center at Fort McCoy. Pay technicians at the Reserve Pay Center are
responsible for entering transactions to start initiating basic pay and
allowances for mobilized Army Reserve soldiers based on the active duty
tour information that appears on a hard copy of each soldier's
mobilization order. If transactions are entered correctly and on time,
activated Army Reserve soldiers will automatically start to receive basic
pay and basic allowances for housing and subsistence based on the entered
active duty mobilization start date.
After soldiers complete their initial SRP, they travel as a unit to an
assigned active duty Army mobilization station. At the mobilization
station, mobilized Army Reserve soldiers are required to undergo a second
SRP. As part of this second SRP, finance personnel at the mobilization
station are responsible for confirming or correcting the results of the
first SRP, including obtaining the documentation necessary to support any
changes needed to the automated pay records. Pay technicians at the
various Army mobilization stations are required to promptly initiate
appropriate active duty pay and allowance transactions that were not
initiated during the first SRP. Transactions to initiate and terminate
pays for all mobilized Army Reserve soldiers entitled to receive special
medical and dental pay entitlements are entered and processed centrally at
DFAS-Indianapolis.
Deployment Phase While Army Reserve soldiers are deployed on active duty,
there are several active Army and DFAS components involved in paying them.
The Army area servicing finance office, which may be within the United
States or in a foreign country, is responsible for initiating pays earned
while the soldier is located in certain specified locations, such as
location-based pays for hostile fire and hardship duty. Pay technicians at
these area servicing finance offices are responsible for starting these
types of pays for each soldier based on documentation, such as annotated
battle rosters or flight manifests, showing when soldiers arrived at these
designated locations. Thereafter, hostile fire pay is automatically
generated each pay period until an established end-of-tour date is reached
or a pay technician manually stops the pay. In contrast, other
location-based pays, such as hardship duty pay, require manual entry of
pay transactions each month by the assigned Army area servicing finance
office.
While the designated Army area servicing finance offices have primary
responsibility for administering pay for deployed Army Reserve soldiers,
particularly starting and stopping location-based active duty pays (such
as hardship duty pay), finance personnel at the cognizant mobilization
station
or at the Reserve Pay Center can also enter certain pay-altering
transactions that occur during deployments, such as those related to a
soldier's early separation from active duty. In addition, the Reserve Pay
Center has responsibility for entering all monthly nonlocation-based,
nonautomated pay and allowance transactions, such as foreign language
proficiency pay.
Demobilization Phase Upon completion of an active duty tour, Army Reserve
soldiers normally return to the same active Army locations from which they
were mobilized for demobilization processing before returning to their
home stations. The personnel section at the demobilization station is
required to provide each soldier and the military pay technicians at the
demobilization station with a copy of the Release from Active Duty order
and a DD Form 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty.
The demobilization station military pay technicians are required to use
the date of release from active duty shown on these documents as a basis
for stopping all Army Reserve soldiers' active duty pay and allowances.
The Reserve Pay Center is responsible for discontinuing monthly input of
all nonlocation-based, nonautomated pays and allowances. If the active
Army demobilization station did not take action to stop active duty
payments for demobilized Army Reserve soldiers, or if a soldier did not
return to the demobilization station for active duty out-processing, the
responsibility for stopping active duty pays and allowances falls to the
soldier's unit or the Reserve Pay Center.
Automated Systems Environment
Paying Army Reserve soldiers is complicated by the number of
nonintegrated, automated order-writing, tactical, personnel, and pay
systems involved in authorizing, entering, and processing active duty pays
and allowances to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers during the mobilization,
deployment, and demobilization phases of their active duty tours. These
automated systems are
o the Defense Joint Military Pay System - Reserve Component (DJMS-RC)-a
DFAS-operated system used to pay reserve soldiers;
o the Defense Military Pay Office (DMO)-data input system used to enter
pay transactions for processing;
o the Army Reserve's Regional Level Application System (RLAS), including
its personnel order-writing functions;
o the Total Army Personnel Database-Reserves (TAPDB-R);
o the Army's Tactical Personnel System; and
o the Army's Transition Processing (TRANSPROC) System.
Many of these systems were originally designed for other purposes, but
have been adapted to help support payments to mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers. For example, DJMS-RC,11 a large, complex automated payroll
system application now used to pay Army and Air National Guard and Army
and Air Force Reserve soldiers, was originally designed to be used to pay
Reserve and Guard soldiers for monthly drills, short periods (30 days or
fewer) of active duty or training. DFAS has acknowledged that its current
military pay systems (including DJMS-RC) are aging, unresponsive, fragile,
and a major impediment to efficient and high-quality customer service.
DFAS has primary responsibility for developing guidance and managing
system operations for DJMS-RC. DFAS-Denver is responsible for designing,
developing, and maintaining customer requirements for all of DOD's
military pay services. Its Technical Support Office is responsible for
designing and maintaining the DJMS-RC core pay software. DFAS-Indianapolis
is the central site for oversight of all Army military pay. As such,
DFAS-Indianapolis is responsible for maintaining an estimated 1 million
Army soldier pay records, including those for Army Reserve soldiers.
DFAS-Indianapolis serves as a "gatekeeper" for DJMS-RC in that it monitors
the daily status of data uploaded to the system to ensure that all
received transactions are processed.
After manual entry of the mobilization dates from hard copies of
mobilization orders into DJMS-RC, DJMS-RC is designed to automatically
generate most active duty pay and allowance payments based on the
mobilization date, twice a month, until the stop date is entered into the
system. Without additional manual intervention, DJMS-RC will automatically
stop generating these active duty payments to Army Reserve soldiers as of
the stop date recorded in DJMS-RC. This automated edit control feature is
intended to prevent erroneous payments to soldiers beyond their authorized
end of active duty date. Because pay and
11In November 1988, the Under Secretary of the Army approved the use of
the Air Force military pay system to pay Army active and reserve soldiers.
personnel systems are not integrated, human intervention and additional
manual data entry are required when a pay or allowance error is detected
or an event occurs that requires a change in the soldier's pay-related
personnel and pay records. For example, a change in dependent status, such
as marriage or divorce; a promotion; jump pay disqualification; or being
demobilized before the active duty tour end date shown on a soldier's
original mobilization order would necessitate manual input to
appropriately change or eliminate some of the pays and allowances a
soldier would be entitled to receive.
All Army Reserve soldier pays and allowances are to be documented in the
Master Military Pay Account-the central repository for soldier pay records
in DJMS-RC. All pay-related transactions that are entered into DJMS-RC,
primarily through the DMO input application, update the Master Military
Pay Account. DMO is the DJMS-RC pay input subsystem used by the Reserve
Pay Center, active Army finance offices, and military pay
offices-including offices located at overseas locations throughout the
world-to enter transactions to initiate and stop active duty pays to
mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. DMO is used to manually enter
transactions to (1) initiate any Army Reserve soldier pay and allowances
that were not started at initial mobilization, as well as applicable
locationbased pays, such as hostile fire and hardship duty pays, (2) stop
all location-based pays when soldiers depart designated locations, and (3)
stop all active duty pays and allowances at demobilization.
In addition to DJMS-RC and DMO, the Army Reserve relies on four other
nonintegrated automated systems as a basis for authorizing active duty
pay, allowance, and related benefit entitlements to mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers:
o RLAS is operated at the Army Reserve's regional support locations and
contains multiple modules to support regional human resource, resource
management, and training operations for Army Reserve soldiers. The
personnel module within RLAS is used to process Army Reserve personnel
actions, including those that have an impact on pay, such as promotions
and discharges. Within the personnel module, there is an order-writing
sub-module used for writing and generating mobilization orders for
individual Army Reserve soldiers. Army Reserve soldier data in the
personnel module of RLAS is used by the RLAS orderwriting sub-module to
help create the individual orders for mobilized soldiers.
o TAPDB-R is the central repository for Army Reserve-wide personnel data.
Selected pay-related personnel data, such as solders' initial enrollment
in the Army Reserve, contained in Army Reserve soldiers' pay records in
DJMS-RC, are received through an automated interface with TAPDB-R.
o The Tactical Personnel System is a stand-alone Army-wide personnel
system operated by Army personnel at overseas airports where Army soldiers
first enter or leave an overseas deployment location. Hard copies of
Tactical Personnel System-generated manifests showing names and dates of
soldiers' arrivals and departures are one source of authorization for
starting or stopping Army Reserve soldiers' locationbased hostile fire
pay, hardship duty pay, and combat zone tax exclusion tax benefits.
Arriving and departing soldiers can enter data, such as name, rank, and
Social Security number, into the Tactical Personnel System from their
common access cards using a barcode scanner function.
o TRANSPROC is an Army-wide system used to track and support Army soldier
processing at mobilization and demobilization stations. TRANSPROC is used
to generate a DD Form 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active
Duty, for Army Reserve soldiers completing their active duty mobilization
tours.
Case Studies Illustrate Pay Problems
We identified significant pay problems at all eight of the Army Reserve
case study units we audited. Specifically, we identified 256 Army Reserve
soldiers who were overpaid their active duty pay and allowance
entitlements by about $247,000, 245 soldiers who received late pay and
allowance payments of about $77,000, and 294 soldiers who were underpaid
their pay and allowance entitlements by about $51,000. As discussed in the
following sections, we found that these pay problems were associated with
a series of processes, human capital issues, and automated system
deficiencies.
The Army Reserve units we audited for our case studies had various
functions, including a Quartermaster (supply), dental services,
transportation, military police, and military intelligence unit. These
units were assigned a variety of combat support missions associated with
the global war on terrorism while mobilized on active duty in and around
Iraq, Afghanistan, Qatar, and Kuwait and in support of intelligence
operations
here in the United States. The units we audited, their locations, and
information about their mobilizations are shown in table 2.
Table 2: Army Reserve Units Audited
Number of
Army Reserve Mobilization Mobilization soldiers
unit and Deployment
location station location Mission dates mobilized
824th
Quartermaster Fort Bragg, Prepared
Company - N.C. Kuwait, parachutes, 2/03 -9/03
Fort Bragg, Afghanistan, weapons, and
N.C. and aid packages
Fort Bragg
Provided
965th Dental Fort Hood, Kuwait emergency
Company - Tex. and 2/03 -6/03
Seagoville, sustaining
Tex. dental care
supporting
combat
operations
948th Forward Provided
Surgical Team Fort McCoy, emergency
- Wis. Afghanistan and 1/03 -8/03
Southfield, sustaining
Mich. medical care
supporting
combat
operations
in
Afghanistan
443rd Military Guarded
Police - Fort Lee, Iraqi
Owings Va. Iraq prisoners at 2/03 -1/04
former Camp
Mills, Md. Cropper
Prison
at Baghdad
airport
FORSCOM Served as
Support - Fort ground
Finksburg, McPherson, Qatar liaison 3/03 -5/03
officer
Md. Ga. between Army
and Air
Force combat
flight
operations
based in
Qatar
629th Tracked
Transportation Fort Eustis, Kuwait supplies in
Detachment- Va. and out 3/03 -1/04
Fort Eustis, of Kuwait
Va.
3423rd Supported
Military Fort Lee, Fort National
Intelligence Va. Belvoir, Va. Ground 12/02 -12/03
Detachment - Intelligence
New Haven, Center
Conn.
operations
431st Chemical Provided
Detachment - Fort Dix, Kuwait nuclear,
N.J. biological, 1/03 -7/03
Johnstown, Pa. and chemical
warning and
reporting
support to
military
operations
Total soldiers 348
Source: GAO analysis.
Overall, 332 of the 348 soldiers (95 percent) in our eight case study
units that were mobilized, deployed, and demobilized at some time during
the 18month period from August 2002 through January 2004 had at least one
pay problem associated with their mobilization to active duty. Many of the
soldiers had multiple pay problems associated with their active duty
mobilizations. Problems lingered unresolved for considerable lengths of
time. For example, for some soldiers, problems lingered through the entire
period of their active duty mobilization and for several months after
their active duty tours ended. Table 3 summarizes the number of Army
Reserve soldiers at each of our case study locations that had at least one
problem associated with their pays and allowances during each of the three
phases of their active duty mobilization.
Table 3: Pay Problems at Eight Case Study Units Soldiers with pay problems
Army Reserve unit Mobilization Deployment Demobilization
824th Quartermaster 11 of 68 50 of 68 13 of 68
Company, Va.
965th Dental Company, Tex. 25 of 93 86 of 93 7 of 93
948th Forward Surgical Team, 5 of 20 20 of 20 18 of 20
Mich.
443rd Military Police 67 of 121 114 of 121 17 of 121
Company, Md.
FORSCOM Support Unit, 0 of 1 1 of 1 1 of 1
Md.
629th Transportation 5 of 24 24 of 24 1 of 24
Detachment, Va.
3423rd Military Intelligence 10 of 11 10 of 11 9 of 11
Detachment, Conn.
431st Chemical Detachment, 6 of 10 10 of 10 0 of 10
Pa.
Source: GAO analysis.
We counted soldiers' pay problems as a problem only in the phase in which
the problem first occurred, even if the problems persisted into subsequent
phases. In addition, many soldiers had more than one problem associated
with their entitled pays and allowances. Further, our case study audits
reflect only the problems we identified. However, because our audits were
only intended to provide more detailed perspective on the types and causes
of any pay problems experienced by mobilized Army Reserve soldiers, rather
than an exact calculation of what soldiers should have received, we likely
did not identify all of the active duty pay and allowance problems related
to our case study units.
In addition to pay and allowance problems, while we did not attempt to
fully quantify the tax withholding and tax filing effects, we also
identified problems with timeliness and accuracy of combat zone tax
exclusion
benefits for soldiers with the seven case study units we audited that were
deployed overseas in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Qatar, or Iraq. Specifically,
while soldiers in these units were eligible to receive their pays and
allowances tax free when they first arrived in-theater, almost all failed
to receive this benefit until at least a month after arrival. Over- and
underpayment of active duty pays and allowances for soldiers deployed in
designated combat zones adversely impacted the accuracy and timeliness of
soldiers' combat zone tax exclusion benefits.
Establishing the exact amount owed and collecting overpayments of active
duty pays and allowances erroneously provided to soldiers placed an
additional administrative burden on both the individual soldiers and DOD.
Soldiers were sometimes required to spend considerable time and were
frustrated in their efforts to determine the exact sums owed or to
establish a repayment plan. For example, it took one soldier over a year
and about 20 phone calls, e-mails, and faxes to identify and resolve the
active duty overpayments and related tax benefits he received. In other
instances, we identified soldiers who received extensive improper active
duty payments, sometimes for over a year, but who may not have contacted
anyone within DOD to stop these erroneous overpayments. These soldiers
received significant overpayments, but did not acknowledge their receipt
or set aside sufficient funds to repay these erroneous overpayments. In
these instances, the soldiers may be subject to criminal prosecution. For
example, we identified a soldier who did not mobilize with his unit, yet
received over $36,000 in active duty pay and allowances for over a year.
When questioned, the soldier stated he was not aware that he had received
$36,000 in erroneous pay and could not immediately pay back all the
erroneous active duty overpayments he received. We referred this, and
other similar cases, to the Army's Criminal Investigation Division for
further investigation into whether criminal prosecution of these soldiers
may be warranted for attempting to fraudulently convert government funds
to personal use.
Further, these overpayment debts placed an additional labor-intensive
burden on the Army and DFAS. Determining the exact amounts soldiers owed
as a result of overpayments, particularly when the combat zone tax
exclusion benefits were involved, required labor-intensive efforts to
gather necessary supporting documentation (in some instances from multiple
locations) and compare these data with pay and tax withholdings, sometimes
spanning more than 1 year, to manually compute amounts owed as a result of
erroneous overpayments. In addition, DFAS was required to track and
monitor collections from soldiers against these debts. Collection
of these debts may become more difficult the longer they remain
outstanding. For example, Army auditors reported in 2003 that, to the
extent that soldiers leave the Army with outstanding debts, collection
rates are only about 40 percent.12
Examples of pay and allowance problems found through our audits of
soldiers' pay experiences at the eight case study units included the
following:
o Forty-seven soldiers deployed overseas with the 824th Quartermaster
Company from North Carolina improperly received several months of hardship
duty pay, totaling about $30,000, for several months after they left
Kuwait.
o Nine soldiers of the 824th Quartermaster Company improperly received
family separation allowance payments totaling an estimated $6,250 while
serving at Fort Bragg, their unit's home station.
o Forty-nine soldiers with the 824th Quartermaster Company did not
receive the hardship duty pay they were entitled to receive when they
arrived at their designated duty locations overseas until about 3 months
after their arrival. Subsequently, they continued to erroneously receive
hardship duty pay for 5 consecutive months after departure from their
overseas duty locations.
o Ten soldiers with the 443rd Military Police Company had problems with
their overseas housing allowance associated with their deployment in Iraq,
including five soldiers who were underpaid about $2,700 and seven who did
not receive their last allowance until more than 2 months after their
active duty tour ended.
o A soldier with the 443rd Military Police Company who demobilized from
an active duty deployment in August 2002, subsequently received erroneous
active duty payments of about $52,000 through May 2004. These erroneous
payments were not detected and stopped by DOD. The soldier contacted us to
ask for our assistance in resolving this matter.
12U.S. Army Audit Agency, Identification of Soldiers in Deserter or
Absentee Status, A-20030009-FFG (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2002).
o A soldier from the 965th Dental Company who received an emergency
evacuation from Kuwait as a result of an adverse reaction to anthrax and
antibiotic inoculations he received in preparing for his overseas
deployment, continued to receive about $2,900 in improper hostile fire and
hardship duty payments after his return from Kuwait.
o A soldier with the 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment did not
receive an estimated $3,000 in family separation allowance payments
associated with his active duty mobilization.
Further, seven of our eight units were deployed overseas during their
mobilization. Almost all the soldiers in these seven units had problems
with the timeliness of their combat zone tax exclusion benefits. All the
soldiers at our seven case study units who were deployed overseas
experienced problems with the late receipt of their combat zone tax
benefits because DJMS-RC could not simply stop withholding federal taxes,
but instead had to first withhold the taxes and then in the following
month's pay processing, reimburse the soldier the taxes previously
withheld. As a result, soldiers generally did not benefit from the tax
exemption for at least one month after their tax withholdings should have
ceased. In addition to this systemic issue, we identified other problems
associated with these benefits with respect to the soldiers at our case
study units:
o Twenty of the 20 soldiers with the 948th Forward Surgical Team waited
over 2 months after they arrived in Afghanistan to benefit from the combat
zone tax exclusion.
o It took nearly a year to identify and resolve a $1,100 overpayment
associated with one soldier's combat zone tax exclusion benefit.
o Several soldiers with Maryland's 443rd Military Police Company never
received the correct amount of reimbursement for taxes withheld, which
sometimes resulted in underwithholding taxes, and other times resulted in
overwithholding taxes.13
These pay mistakes were the source of many complaints, took considerable
time and effort to address, and were likely to have had an
13Over-and underwithholding of taxes associated with the combat zone tax
exclusion can be corrected when Army Reserve soldiers file their tax
returns if their W-2 form reflects the correct amount of taxable income.
adverse effect on soldier morale. In addition, soldiers at one of our case
study units told us that a delay in receiving their active duty pays and
allowances created financial hardship for them and their families.
Specifically, several of the unit's soldiers told us they could not pay
their bills when they were initially deployed overseas and were forced to
borrow money from friends and relatives in order to meet their financial
obligations.
We provided data on the pay problems we identified to Army Reserve
officials. For the most part, they concurred with our analysis and
reported that they have taken action to address any identified over-and
underpayments and withholdings we identified. Appendixes II through IX
provide a more detailed description of the pay experiences of the soldiers
at each of the Army Reserve case study units we audited.
Significant Weaknesses Exist in Mobilized Army Reserve Pay Processes
The pay problems we found were caused, at least in part, by design
weaknesses in the extensive, complex set of processes and procedures
relied on to provide active duty pays, allowances, and related tax
benefits to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. We identified issues with the
procedures in place for both determining eligibility and processing
related transactions of active duty pay to mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers. These process weaknesses involve not only the finance and
military pay component of the Army, Army Reserve, and DFAS, but the Army's
operational and personnel functions as well. Specifically, we found
deficiencies in processes for (1) tracking and maintaining accountability
over soldiers as they moved from location to location to carry out their
mobilization orders, (2) carrying out SRPs-primarily at the mobilization
stations, (3) distributing and reconciling key pay and personnel reports
during mobilizations, and (4) determining eligibility for the family
separation allowance associated with active duty mobilizations.
Flaws in Procedures for Tracking and Maintaining Accountability over
Soldiers throughout Mobilization
Mobilization policies and procedures did not provide the Army with
effective accountability and visibility over soldiers' locations to
provide reasonable assurance of accurate and timely payments for Army
Reserve soldiers' active duty mobilizations. Accountability breakdowns can
occur as soldiers pass through four main transitions during the course of
a typical mobilization cycle, including transitions from (1) their home
station to their designated mobilization station, (2) the mobilization
station to their assigned deployment location, (3) the deployment location
to their
demobilization station, and (4) the demobilization station back to their
home station.
Soldiers' active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits are
directly tied to being able to account for soldiers' locations during
these transitions. For example, timely data on the dates soldiers arrive
at and leave designated locations are essential for accurate and timely
hardship duty pays, allowances, and related combat zone tax exclusion
benefits. To effectively account for soldiers' movements during these
transitions, unit commanders, unit administrators, as well as individuals
assigned to personnel and finance offices across the Army Reserves, Army
mobilization stations, and in-theater Army locations must work closely and
communicate extensively to have the necessary data to pay Army Reserve
soldiers accurately and on time throughout their active duty tours.
However, we identified several critical flaws in the soldier
accountability procedures in place during the period of our audit.
Specifically, we identified flawed procedures for accountability over
soldiers' actual locations and associated pay entitlements in that (1)
soldiers received mobilization orders, but did not report for active duty
and (2) dates of soldiers' arrival at, and departure from, designated
hardship duty deployment locations were not reported. Such breakdowns in
accountability procedures resulted in erroneously starting, or delays in
starting, active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits, and
erroneously continuing these pays, allowances and benefits when soldiers
were no longer entitled to receive them.
Mobilization Station Effective procedures were not in place to monitor and
validate the
Accountability propriety of active duty payments to mobilized reservists.
We found that preventive controls for initiating and stopping active duty
payments for Army Reserve soldiers were ineffective. In addition, the
accountability controls in place at Army stations responsible for unit
mobilization and demobilization processing were not effective in detecting
any Army Reserve soldiers assigned to units passing through those
locations who were not entitled to receive active duty pays and
allowances. As a result of these control design flaws, we found several
soldiers who received up to a year of active duty payments based on issued
mobilization orders, even though the soldiers never reported for active
duty. Army officials have acknowledged that active duty payments are
increasingly vulnerable to such overpayments as a result of the Army
Reserve's November 2003 action to extend Army Reserve soldiers on active
duty at that time for another year.
When a unit is called to active duty, soldiers in the mobilized unit
receive individual mobilization orders. Processing procedures provide that
these orders be used as a basis for initiating active duty pays and
allowances to begin on the first day of active duty designated in the
individual active duty mobilization orders. The Reserve Pay Center,
located at Fort McCoy, is generally responsible for initiating active duty
pays and allowances based on the data shown on a hard copy of the
individual orders. However, the Reserve Pay Center did not receive the
data necessary to identify, on a unitby-unit basis, which soldiers
reported to the active Army mobilization stations so that this information
could be compared with a list of soldiers for that unit for whom the
Reserve Pay Center started active duty pays and allowances. In addition,
Army mobilization station finance personnel did not receive a list of
soldiers in a unit who were receiving active duty pay to compare with the
names of unit tedsol to td hi eers who actually repor mobilization
station.
At one of our case study units, the 965th Dental Company, we found that
this process flaw resulted in tens of thousands of dollars in
overpayments.
Individual Case Illustration: Flawed Soldier Location Accountability
Procedures Result in $36,000 Erroneous Active Duty Payments
A soldier assigned to the 965th Dental Company received a mobilization
order, but based on a discussion with his commander about a medical
condition, was told he would be transferred to a unit that was not
mobilizing. However, the unit commander did not provide a list of the
unit's mobilizing soldiers to the Reserve Pay Center and did not provide
any information on this soldier indicating that he would not be reporting
to the unit's mobilization station. Consequently, neither the Reserve Pay
Center nor the mobilization station personnel had any means of detecting
that a soldier had not mobilized with his unit and therefore was
improperly receiving active duty payments. As a result, the soldier's pay
was started on February 11, 2003, and continued through February 29, 2004,
resulting in more than $36,000 in overpayments. This improper active duty
pay was stopped only after we identified the error and notified Army
officials.
In another instance, the Army's inability to determine that one soldier's
actual location did not match his "paper" mobilization resulted in an
estimated $52,000 in erroneous payments.
Individual Case Illustration: Soldier Accountability Flaws Lead to
Estimated $52,000 in Erroneous Active Duty Payments
A soldier contacted GAO in March 2004 to inquire as to why he had been
receiving active duty pay for almost a year even though, according to the
soldier, he was not mobilized to active duty during that time. Subsequent
inquiry determined that, at least on paper, the soldier was transferred
from Maryland's 443rd Military Police Company to Pennsylvania's 307th
Military Police Company in February 2003, and was mobilized to active duty
with that unit on March 3, 2003. Applicable active duty pays and
allowances for the soldier were initiated based on these March 3, 2003,
orders. After the 307th Military Police Company demobilized in February
2004, the soldier's mobilization order was revoked. Nonetheless, available
pay documentation indicated the soldier continued receiving erroneous
active duty pay and allowances for basic pay, and allowances for
subsistence, housing, and family separation totaling an estimated $52,000
through May of 2004.
In addition, Army Reserve officials told us about similar cases at other
units not included in our case studies in which soldiers did not report
for active duty, but nonetheless received erroneous active duty pay for
lengthy periods. They told us they identified soldiers who received large
improper active duty payments, some of whom had received erroneous active
duty payments for over a year before they were identified and stopped, as
the following examples illustrate:
o A soldier from an Army Reserve chemical unit in South Carolina received
an individual mobilization order in February 2003, but did not mobilize
with the unit. Nonetheless, her active duty pays and allowances (a total
of over $45,000) continued until they were stopped in April 2004.
o A soldier from a Louisiana Army Reserve unit received an individual
mobilization order in January 2003. However, the unit commander determined
the soldier should not be mobilized with the unit because he had not yet
completed required training. Nonetheless, the soldier received active duty
pays and allowances totaling over $25,000 until they were stopped in March
2004.
o A soldier attached to a Puerto Rico Quartermaster Reserve unit was
mobilized in February 2003, but did not report for active duty. The
soldier continued to receive improper active duty pays and allowances
totaling about $36,000 until the payments were stopped in April 2004.
o A soldier assigned to an Illinois Reserve Military Police Company
received an individual mobilization order in December 2002. However, she
did not report to the mobilization station with her unit and her
mobilization order was revoked in January 2003. Nonetheless, the soldier
continued to receive active duty pay and allowances totaling about $24,000
until the payments were stopped in April 2004.
Army Reserve officials told us that these improper payments were not
identified through any systemic preventive accountability control process
associated with an active duty mobilization or demobilization, but rather
as a result of after the fact detective controls in place at the unit or
the Army Reserve pay center. For example, one soldier reported for a
weekend drill and the unit pay administrator attempted to enter a
transaction to pay him for weekend drill duties. However, the unit pay
administrator discovered the soldier's receipt of erroneous active duty
payments when the weekend drill pay transaction was rejected by DJMS-RC.
Army Reserve officials told us they have referred these improper payments
to the Army's Criminal Investigations Division to determine if criminal
prosecution of the soldiers involved may be warranted.
Deployment Accountability Flaws in soldier accountability procedures
associated with overseas deployment locations resulted in late, under-,
and overpayments of active duty pays, allowances, and tax benefits
associated with almost all the soldiers in our case study units. Soldiers
were generally paid late or underpaid location-based incentives upon their
initial arrival into designated hardship duty and hostile fire locations.
Subsequently, they were often overpaid these same location-based
entitlements because these payments continued, sometimes for long periods
of time, after soldiers left designated overseas locations. These failures
occurred because Army procedures in place during our audit were
ineffective in accounting for when soldiers entered into and departed from
designated hardship duty and hostile fire locations. In addition, as
discussed in a subsequent section of this report, automated systems
deficiencies also contributed to, and in some cases exacerbated,
location-based active duty pay problems.
According to DFAS procedures, Army local area servicing finance locations
are to obtain documentation showing soldier and associated arrival and
departure date information to start and stop location-based pays,
allowances, and associated tax benefits. We were told that flight manifest
lists generated through the Army's Tactical Personnel System were the
primary source documents used as a basis for entering manual transactions
to start and stop location-based pays during most of our audit period.
One of our case study units, the 443rd Military Police Company, relied on
an extraordinary, labor-intensive workaround to ensure that necessary
documentation supporting any changes in the location of the unit's
soldiers, as well as other pay-support documentation, was received by the
unit's area servicing finance office while the soldiers were deployed in
Iraq.
Individual Case Illustration: Biweekly Flights to Transmit Unit Pay
Documents
While deployed to guard Iraqi prisoners at Camp Cropper in Iraq, the unit
commander of the 443rd Military Police Company assigned a sergeant to help
address myriad pay complaints. The sergeant was deployed to Iraq as a
cook, but was assigned to assist in pay administration for the unit
because he was knowledgeable in DJMS-RC procedures and pay-support
documentation requirements and was acquainted with one of the soldiers
assigned to the unit's servicing finance office in Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.
Every 2 weeks, for about 5 months, the sergeant gathered relevant
paysupport documentation from the unit's soldiers, took a 1 hour and 15
minute flight to the Kuwait airport, and then drove an hour to the Army
finance office at Camp Arifjan. The day following the sergeant's biweekly
journey to Camp Arifjan, the sergeant worked with the Army finance
officials at Camp Arifjan to enter transactions into DMO, often for 8-12
hours, to get unit soldiers' pay entitlements started or corrected,
particularly hardship duty pay requiring manual input every month.
However, despite diligent efforts by Army local area servicing finance
officials to develop and maintain accurate lists of soldiers at the
designated deployment locations, our analysis of payments to soldiers at
our case study units indicated that this information was often not timely
or accurate. Finance officials at the Army area servicing finance offices
either did not obtain manifests (documentation showing soldier arrival and
departure dates) at all, received the documentation late (often months
after the unit's actual arrival or departure dates), or obtained manifests
listing soldiers
that should not have been included for pay purposes. For example, an Army
Reserve soldier assigned to support Air Force operations did not process
through, or have any access to, an Army location that could provide a
manifest showing his arrival date in-country to local Army area servicing
finance office officials so that they could start his location-based pays.
In this case, the soldier did not receive his location-based pays until he
returned to his demobilization station and insisted that personnel at that
location take the actions necessary to start this payment. Also, we were
told that soldiers departing from designated locations on emergency or
rest and recreation leave, who are still entitled to continue to receive
designated location-based pays while on such leave, were sometimes
erroneously included on departure manifests used as source documents to
stop active duty location-based pays.
These flawed procedures, which were relied on to account for Army Reserve
soldiers' actual locations and their related pay entitlements while
deployed, resulted in pay problems in all seven of our case study units
that deployed soldiers overseas, as the following examples illustrate:
o All 49 soldiers that deployed overseas with our 824th Quartermaster
Company case study unit were underpaid their hardship duty pay when they
first arrived in the country. Subsequently, almost all soldiers in the
unit were overpaid their hardship duty pay---most for up to 5 months-after
they left the designated location, and some continued to receive these
payments even after they were released from active duty. In total, we
identified about $30,000 in improper hardship duty payments received by
this unit's soldiers.
o Seventy-six soldiers with the 965th Dental Company received improper
hardship duty payments totaling almost $47,000 after they had left their
hardship duty location.
o Ten soldiers with the 431st Chemical Detachment received improper
hardship duty payments for 7 months after their return to their home
station.
o None of the 24 soldiers deployed with the 629th Transportation
Detachment received hardship duty pay for the months they arrived and
departed the hardship duty areas. In addition, they did not receive
hostile fire pay for almost 3 months after their arrival at their assigned
overseas deployment locations.
The debts created by overpayment of these location-based payments placed
an additional administrative burden on both the soldiers and the
department to calculate, monitor, and collect the corrected amounts.
Lack of Clear Pay Review Procedures at Mobilization Stations
Some of the pay problems we found were associated with flawed procedural
requirements for the pay support review, which is part of the SRP process
carried out at Army mobilization stations. Procedures followed by Army
mobilization station finance officials during the SRP were inconsistent
with respect to what constitutes a "thorough review" of soldiers' pay
support documentation to determine if it is current and complete and has
been entered into the DJMS-RC pay system.
Procedures followed for our 824th Quartermaster Company case study unit at
the Fort Bragg mobilization station provided that the pay support portion
of the SRP at that location consisted of finance representatives briefing
the entire unit on required pay support. Finance personnel did not meet
individually with each soldier to compare his or her pay support
documentation with on-line soldier pay data in DJMS-RC. As a result,
missing or outdated documentation required to support active duty pays and
allowances at the time of the 824th Quartermaster Company's SRP
contributed to some of the late payments we identified. For example, one
soldier with this unit who was certified as ready for mobilization as a
result of the SRP, did not receive entitled family separation allowance
payments because documentation necessary to start this allowance was not
submitted as part of the SRP process. Six months later, after the soldier
demobilized at Fort Bragg, the paperwork necessary to receive this
allowance was obtained and submitted for payment. This soldier received
about 6 months of back family separation allowance in September 2003
totaling $1,400.
We also found indications that the pay support documentation review
carried out at the Army's Fort Lee mobilization station was less than
thorough. Personnel at the Fort Lee mobilization station did not carry out
a detailed review of Master Military Pay Account records, which would have
shown that soldiers with the unit would stop receiving their entitled
housing allowances and family separation allowances because there were
incorrect end dates for these payments entered into DJMS-RC. As a result,
several soldiers from the 443rd Military Police Company had their basic
allowance for housing switched to a rate less than the soldiers were
entitled to receive and had their family separation allowance stopped for
a period during their deployment because the Fort Lee mobilization station
finance personnel did not take action necessary to extend the
end-ofeligibility dates for these two entitlements.
In contrast, pay support documentation review procedures in place as part
of the SRP at the Army's mobilization stations at Fort McCoy and Fort
Eustis provided that, in addition to a unitwide finance briefing, finance
officials at those sites were to conduct one-on-one pay support
documentation reviews with each soldier. Members of the 948th Forward
Surgical Team, who mobilized through Fort McCoy, and the 629th
Transportation Detachment, who processed through Fort Eustis, had their
pay records reviewed and compared to DJMS-RC on-line records by finance
officials during the finance portion of their SRP. We found very few
problems with either the 948th or 629th units' active duty pay
entitlements, excluding in-theater entitlements, after these units passed
through the oneon-one soldier pay documentation review as part of the SRP
at Fort McCoy and Fort Eustis.
Inadequate Processes in Place for Reconciling and Distributing Key Pay and
Personnel Reconciliation Reports
Design flaws in the procedures in place to obtain and reconcile key pay
and personnel reports impaired the Army's ability to detect improper
active duty payments. As discussed previously, we identified several cases
and the Army has also identified a number of instances in which such
improper payments continued for over a year without detection.
The reserve pay review and validation procedures for Army Reserve soldiers
were initially designed to service reservists as they perform weekend
drills, annual training, and short-term active duty mobilizations of 30
days or fewer. Correspondingly, pay and personnel reconciliation processes
in place during our audit were focused primarily on requirements for unit
commanders to reconcile data for reserve soldiers while they are in an
inactive (drilling reservist) status. However, as illustrated by the pay
problems discussed in this report, there is an equal or even greater need
to clearly establish required procedures for the review and reconciliation
of pay and related personnel data for Army Reserve soldiers mobilized on
extended active duty tours.
Specifically, with respect to the monthly review and reconciliation of two
key reports, the Pay/Personnel Mismatch Report and the Unit
Commander's Pay Management Report,14 current procedures contained in USARC
Pamphlet 37-1 provide that unit commanders are required to review the Unit
Commander's Pay Management Report for soldiers in their units on weekend
drill activities and for active duty mobilization planning activities.
However, these procedures do not clearly require unit commanders to review
this key report for Army Reserve soldiers in subsequent phases of their
active duty mobilization tours. Appendix I of USARC Pamphlet 37-1 provides
that unit pay data in the Unit Commander's Pay Management Report should be
reconciled with unit training and attendance reports, but does not require
reconciling pay data with related data on mobilized soldiers. As a result,
the unit commander at one of our case study units, the 965th Dental
Company, stated that he did not believe that a review and reconciliation
was needed. Instead, he stated he relied on the unit's soldiers to
identify any pay problems. In light of the extensive manual entry, and
nonintegrated systems currently relied on for mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers' pay, the timely and complete reconciliation of comparable pay
and personnel data in these key reports can serve as an important
detective control to identify any pay errors shortly after they have
occurred.
In addition, Army guidance does not specify how deployed units are to
receive these reports. Distribution of these reports is particularly
problematic for units deployed in remote locations overseas. As a matter
of practice, we found that for units in an inactive status, the unit's
Regional Readiness Command usually provides these reports. However, we
also found no procedural guidance in place to distribute the same reports
to unit commanders and administrators while their units are on active
duty. Unit commanders for several of our case study units stated they did
not receive these key reports while their units were deployed. Had those
reports been available and reconciled, they could have been used to
identify and correct improper active duty payments, such as the large,
erroneous active duty overpayments discussed previously.
14These reports provide summaries of pay-and personnel-related information
on soldiers in the unit.
Procedures for Applying Family Separation Allowance Eligibility
Requirements Were Not Clear
The existing procedures for applying eligibility requirements for
activated Army Reserve soldiers' family separation allowance payments were
not clear. These flawed procedural requirements for paying the family
separation allowance led to varying interpretations and pay errors for
Army Reserve soldiers at the implementing Army home stations and
mobilization stations.
DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) Volume 7A policy clearly
provides that soldiers are entitled to receive a family separation
allowance if their family does not reside near the duty station, which is
generally defined as within 50 miles.15 However, DOD procedures and the
form needed to implement this FMR policy were not clear. Implementing
guidance and DD Form 1561 (a document that must be completed to receive
the family separation allowance) do not provide for a determination that a
soldier's family does not live near the soldier's duty station.
Specifically, DD Form 1561 does not specifically require soldiers to
certify that the soldier is entitled to receive family separation
allowance benefits because (1) they live over 50 miles away from the
unit's home station and do not commute daily or (2) the soldier's
commander has certified that the soldier's required commute to the duty
station is not reasonable. We noted that in several of our case study
units, soldiers began receiving the family separation allowance while
stationed in Army installations less than 50 miles away from their
residence and without any documentation showing the unit commander's
determination that the soldier's commute, even though within 50 miles, was
nonetheless, unreasonable. For example, soldiers from the 824th
Quartermaster Company received family separation allowance payments while
stationed at their Fort Bragg home station, even though they lived within
50 miles of the base and no documentation was available showing that the
unit commander authorized an exception. In contrast, 14 soldiers with
Maryland's 443rd Military Police Company who lived over 50 miles away from
their home station, including several soldiers from Puerto Rico, did not
receive a family separation allowance as of the date of their arrival at
their home station.
15DOD's FMR defines "within a reasonable commuting distance" as within 50
miles one way, unless the soldier is commuting daily. The FMR also permits
the commander to authorize a soldier to receive FSA payments, even though
the soldier's dependents live within 50 miles of the soldier's duty
station, based on a determination that the required commute is not
reasonable.
Human Capital Issues Affect Pay Accuracy and Timeliness
Human capital weaknesses also contributed to the pay problems mobilized
Army Reserve soldiers experienced in our eight case study units. Our
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that
effective human capital practices are critical to establishing and
maintaining a strong internal control environment, including actions to
ensure that an organization has the appropriate number of employees to
carry out assigned responsibilities. Even in an operational environment
supported by a well-designed set of policies and procedures and a
worldclass integrated set of automated pay and personnel systems, an
effective human capital strategy- directed at ensuring that sufficient
numbers of people, with the appropriate knowledge and skills, are assigned
to carry out the existing extensive, complex operational requirements-is
essential. Such a human capital strategy supporting accurate and timely
active duty payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers must encompass
potentially hundreds of DOD components that are now involved in carrying
out the extensive coordination, manual intervention, and reconciliations
required to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers.
Well-trained pay-support personnel throughout various DOD components are
particularly critical given the extensive, cumbersome, and laborintensive
process requirements that have evolved to provide active duty payments to
mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. We encountered many sincere and
well-meaning Army, Army Reserve, and DFAS personnel involved in
authorizing and processing active duty payments to these soldiers. The
fact that mobilized Army Reserve soldiers received any of their entitled
active duty pays, allowances, and tax benefits accurately and on-time is
largely due to the dedication and tireless efforts of many of these
pay-support personnel to do the right thing for these mobilized Army
Reserve soldiers. However, in conjunction with our case studies, we
observed human capital weaknesses related to (1) inadequate resources
provided to support unit-level pay management, (2) inadequate pay
management training across the spectrum of pay-support personnel, and (3)
customer service breakdowns.
Inadequate Resourcing for Vacancies and turnovers in key unit
administrator positions, and the Critical Unit Administrator deployment of
unit administrators to fill other military requirements, Positions
impaired a unit's ability to carry out critical pay administration tasks
that
could have prevented or led to early detection of pay problems associated
with our case study units. In addition to pay administration
responsibilities, unit administrator duties include personnel and supply
operations. We
were told that vacancies in unit administrator positions were difficult to
fill and often remained vacant for many months because Army policy
requires the individual filling the unit administrator position to have a
dual status, which means the individual must perform duties both in the
capacity of an Army Reserve military occupation specialty as well as unit
administrator.
For example, at the 948th Forward Surgical Team, the unit administrator
position was vacant prior to and during the unit's mobilization. We were
informed that the 948th Forward Surgical Team had difficulty filling the
vacancy because of its dual status. Specifically, the unit officials
stated that this position was difficult to fill because the individual
must have a medical background to meet the dual status requirement. That
is, the person filling the position must be able to meet the unit's
mission requirements as well as have knowledge and experience performing
the personnel, payroll, and supply tasks of a unit administrator. In the
absence of a unit administrator, the unit commander assigned a sergeant
with limited knowledge of pay entitlements and DJMS-RC processing
requirements to help carry out some of the unit administrator's pay
management duties. The sergeant told us that during a 2-week period during
late April 2003, she spent about 100 hours attempting to resolve the
unit's pay problems, while concurrently carrying out her duties as a
health specialist.
Providing adequate resources to support the execution of critical pay
management responsibilities was particularly problematic for Army Reserve
soldiers that were cross-leveled (transferred) to other units and
mobilized to active duty with those units. For three of the four case
study units we audited where small groups of Army Reserve soldiers were
transferred and mobilized to active duty with another unit, we found that
these soldiers experienced pay problems that could be attributed, at least
in part, to inadequate resources to carry out critical unit-level pay
management responsibilities. For example, because he did not have any
unit-level support to assist in processing his active duty payments, a
soldier who was mobilized as a single-soldier unit did not receive any
locationbased active duty pays until he returned from Qatar.
Inadequate Pay In addition to concerns about the level of resources
provided to support
Management Training critical unit administrator positions, we identified
instances in which the lack of adequate unit administrator and finance
office personnel training on pay management duties and responsibilities
contributed to the soldiers' pay problems we identified. In addition, we
found that unit commanders did not always support these important pay
management duties. Our
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that
management should establish and maintain a positive and supportive
attitude toward internal controls and conscientious management.
Several of the individuals serving as unit administrators in our case
study units informed us that they had received limited or no formal
training covering unit administrator responsibilities and that the
training they did receive did not prepare them for mobilization issues
associated with supporting and processing active duty pays and allowances.
Unit administrators have responsibility for a variety of pay-related
actions, including working with the unit soldiers to obtain critical pay
support documentation, maintaining copies of pay support records,
providing paytransaction support documentation to the Reserve Pay Center,
and reviewing pay reports for errors. Without adequate training, unit
administrators may not be aware of these critical pay management
responsibilities.
Few unit administrators at our case study units had completed all of the
required training on active duty pay and allowance eligibility and
processing requirements. While unit administrators are required to attend
two courses (each lasting 2 weeks),16 few of the unit administrators for
our case study units took the required training at or near the time they
assumed these important pay management and other key unit administrator
duties. For example, the unit administrator at one of our case study
units, the 824th Quartermaster Company, stated she had not attended any
formal training courses, but instead received on-the-job training. Our
audit showed that she did not always effectively carry out her pay
management report review responsibilities. For example, while our audit of
unit pay reports showed she reviewed the documents, we saw no indication
she used this tool to identify and stop an overpayment of $18,000 to one
soldier in her unit. As a result, the erroneous pay was allowed to
continue for another 5 months.
At other units, we identified instances in which available documentation
indicated that unit administrators did not take timely action to submit
paysupport transactions. For example, several soldiers with the 965th
Dental Company did not receive promotion pay increases and other
entitlements
16The Army Reserve Readiness Training Center located in Fort McCoy,
Wisconsin, offers both courses. The courses, in part, cover processing
personnel and payroll transactions, maintaining personnel and payroll
data, identifying soldiers' training requirements, mobilization
procedures, and logistics.
for over 2 months because the unit administrator failed to process
necessary pay-support documentation, available at the time of the unit's
initial SRP, until the unit was already deployed on active duty. At the
443rd Military Police Company, we found the unit's finance sergeant17
assigned pay management responsibilities did not gather and submit current
documentation needed to support active duty pays and allowances, including
current documents showing soldiers' marital status and number of
dependents. As a result, soldiers from the 443rd Military Police Company
experienced over-, under-, and late payments associated with their housing
and cost of living allowances.
In addition to inadequate unit administrator training, inadequate training
of military pay technicians at Army finance offices at mobilization
stations, area servicing finance offices (for deployed soldiers), and
demobilization stations adversely affected the accuracy and timeliness of
payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. Few of the military finance
personnel responsible for processing pays and allowances at the
mobilization and demobilization stations and at the area servicing finance
offices for deployed units had formal training on DJMS-RC pay procedures.
Instead, several of the military pay technicians and supervisors we talked
to at the Army mobilization and demobilization stations told us they
relied primarily on on-the-job training to become knowledgeable in the pay
eligibility and pay transaction processing requirements for mobilized Army
Reserve soldiers. For example, military pay personnel at the Defense
Military Pay Office at Fort Eustis informed us that they did not receive
any formal training on active duty pay entitlements or DJMS-RC pay
processing before assuming their assigned responsibilities for
mobilization and demobilization pay processing. Instead, they stated they
became knowledgeable in mobilization and demobilization pay processing
procedures by processing hundreds of soldiers within 2 to 3 weeks of being
assigned these responsibilities. They also said they contacted full-time
civilians in the finance office, as well as Reserve Pay Center and DFAS
officials, by telephone for assistance.
Also, few of the Army finance personnel at overseas area servicing finance
offices were adequately trained in active duty pay entitlements and
processing procedures for mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. Specifically,
17For this unit, the unit administrator did not deploy with the unit.
Consequently, the unit's pay management responsibilities were assigned to
a finance sergeant deployed with the unit.
these key personnel with responsibility for location-based active duty
payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers deployed in Kuwait and Iraq
and surrounding areas did not receive formal training on pay eligibility
and DJMS-RC processing requirements before assuming their duties. USARC
Pamphlet 37-1 provides that an Army in-theater servicing finance office
has primary responsibility for supporting active duty payments to
mobilized Army Reserve soldiers when a reserve unit is deployed overseas.
Camp Arifjan was the Army location assigned responsibility for processing
active duty payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers deployed in Kuwait
and Iraq during 2003. Officials from the 336th Command, the Army command
with oversight responsibility for Camp Arifjan, confirmed that while
finance personnel at Camp Arifjan received training in the pay eligibility
and pay processing procedures for active duty Army soldiers, they were not
adequately trained in pay eligibility issues of Army Reserve soldiers.
We were told of instances in which Army finance personnel were unable to
help reserve soldiers resolve their pay problems. For example, the 948th
Forward Surgical Team contacted an Army finance unit located in Kandahar,
Afghanistan, to request its assistance in resolving the unit's pay
problems. However, the finance personnel at that location were unable to
help resolve the 948th Forward Surgical Team's pay problems because they
said they had not had training in this area and were not familiar with
DJMS-RC processing requirements and procedures. All 20 soldiers with the
948th Forward Surgical Team experienced pay problems associated with their
location-based payments related to their deployment in Afghanistan,
including hardship duty pay. These payments require manual entry every
month by the unit's area servicing finance office.
Further, we saw little evidence that the unit commanders of our case study
units received any training for their role in supporting their unit
administrators in these important pay management responsibilities. For
example, at one of our case study units, the 965th Dental Company, the
unit commander informed us that he did not support the review of pay
management reports because soldiers had the capability to review their pay
online and would use this capability to identify and report any pay
problems. However, as discussed previously, we identified a number of
instances in which soldiers did not identify or report that they received
thousands of dollars in improper active duty payments.
Customer Service Breakdowns
Our audit work at eight case study units identified significant soldier
concerns with both the level and quality of customer service they received
related to their active duty pays, allowances, and tax benefits. The
soldiers' concerns centered around three distinct areas: (1) the
accessibility of customer service, (2) the ability of customer service
locations to help soldiers, and (3) the treatment of soldiers requesting
assistance. Servicing soldiers and their families with pay inquiries and
problems is particularly critical in light of the error-prone processes
and limited automated system processing capabilities. Ultimately, pay
accuracy is left largely to the individual soldier.
Although there are several sources that soldiers can turn to for pay issue
resolution, soldiers at our case study units experienced problems in
accessing these sources. Sources that soldiers can contact include their
home unit, the military pay section of the cognizant RRC, the
mobilization/demobilization station, the designated active Army area
servicing finance office in-theater, the online myPay system, and the
1-888-PAY-ARMY (729-2769) toll-free number. However, mission requirements
and the distance between deployment locations and field finance offices
often impaired the soldiers' ability to utilize the in-theater customer
service centers. Also, soldiers did not always have Internet and telephone
access to use the myPay system or to contact customer service sources such
as 1888-PAY-ARMY, the home unit, or the cognizant RRC. The lack of
Internet access for deployed soldiers was particularly problematic because
it limited soldiers' access to pay, allowance, and tax benefit data
reflected in their leave and earnings statements. Lacking leave and
earnings statements, soldiers had no means to determine the propriety of
their active duty payments. For example, soldiers with the 948th Forward
Surgical Team told us that their inability to access the leave and
earnings statements adversely affected their overall morale.
Even when mobilized reservists were able to contact customer service
sources, their pay issues often continued because the office they were
instructed to contact was unable to address their inquiry or correct their
problem. In some cases, customer service sources failed to help soldiers
because they lacked an understanding of what was needed to fix the
problems. When representatives of the 948th Forward Surgical Team
contacted their parent company for help in correcting pay problems,
personnel with the parent company informed them that they could not fix
the unit's pay problems because they (incorrectly) believed that the unit
was paid through the Army's active duty Army system. Soldiers at other
units were redirected from one source to another. Soldiers were not aware
of which sources could address which types of problems, and more
significantly, the customer service sources themselves often did not know
who should correct a specific problem.
An Army Reserve major's experience illustrates the time and frustration
that was sometimes involved with soldiers' attempts to obtain customer
service for correcting errors in active duty pays, allowances, and related
tax benefits.
Individual Case Illustration: Extensive, Time-consuming Action Required to
Resolve Pay Issue
A soldier from Maryland was mobilized in March 2003 from the Army's
Individual Ready Reserve to active duty to serve as a liaison between the
Army and Air Force to help coordinate ground and air combat operations in
Iraq. After completing his 2-month active duty tour and returning to an
inactive reserve status in May 2003, he contacted Army officials to inform
them that he was continuing to receive active duty payments and
volunteered to immediately repay these erroneous overpayments. In July
2003, he wrote a check for $6,150.75 after receiving documentation showing
his debt computation. However, he continued to receive Leave and Earnings
Statements indicating that he had an outstanding debt. He contacted his
Army demobilization finance office to determine how to get the erroneous
outstanding debt removed from his pay records. After being referred by
officials at that location to various DFAS locations (including once being
told, "There is nothing more I can do for you."), he contacted us for
assistance. After DFAS recomputed the soldier's debt as a result of our
inquiry, the soldier was informed that he owed an additional $1,140.54,
because the original debt computation did not fully consider the erroneous
combat zone tax exclusion benefits he received. Overall, he spent nearly a
year after his 2-month active duty tour ended, and about 20 phone calls,
faxes, and letters in contacting at least seven different DOD
representatives at five different customer service centers to correct
active duty pay and allowance overpayments and associated combat zone tax
exclusion benefit problems.
Finally, soldiers expressed concern about the treatment they sometimes
received while attempting to obtain customer service. Soldiers felt that
certain customer service representatives did not treat soldiers requesting
assistance with respect. For example, one soldier who attempted to make
corrections to his DD Form 214, Certificate of Discharge or Release from
Active Duty, informed us that mobilization station personnel told him that
the citations and dates of service he was trying to add "didn't matter"
and that he could fix them later. Additionally, some soldiers told us that
while they raised concerns about the quality of customer service they
received with respect to their pay inquiries and concerns, they were
sometimes ignored. For example, soldiers with Connecticut's 3423rd
Military Intelligence Detachment told us that while they contacted the
local Inspector General when they believed that finance personnel at their
deployment location had both actively tried to impair the payment of their
active duty entitlements and had tried to intimidate and discourage the
unit's soldiers from seeking help elsewhere, they were not aware of any
action taken as a result of their concerns. As a result, soldiers with the
unit told us they believed they had no recourse but to accept the poor
treatment they believed they received.
Automated Systems Deficiencies Constrain Accurate and Timely Payments
Weaknesses in automated systems contributed significantly to the
underpayments, overpayments, and late payments we identified. These
weaknesses consisted of (1) nonintegrated systems with limited system
interfaces and (2) limited processing capabilities within the pay system.
The Army and DFAS rely on the same automated pay system to authorize and
process active duty payments for Army Reserve soldiers as they use for
Army National Guard soldiers. In addition, similar to the Army National
Guard, the Army Reserve's personnel and order-writing systems are not
integrated with the pay system. Consequently, many of the systems problems
experienced by mobilized Army Reserve soldiers were similar to those that
we identified in our report on pay issues associated with mobilized Army
National Guard soldiers.18
Because of the automated systems weaknesses, both Army Reserve and active
Army personnel must put forth significant manual effort to accurately
process pays and allowances for mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. Moreover,
to compensate for the lack of automated controls over the pay process,
both DFAS and the Army place substantial reliance on the review of pay
reports to identify pay errors after the fact. Part of this reliance
includes the expectation that soldiers review their own leave and earnings
statements, even though these statements do not always provide clear
explanations of all payments made. Finally, because of DJMS-RC's
18GAO-04-89.
limitations, the system cannot simply stop withholding taxes for soldiers
in designated combat zone locations. Instead, for these soldiers, the
system withholds taxes and then reimburses the soldiers the amount that
should not have been withheld at least a month after the soldiers were
first entitled to receive this benefit.
Automated Systems Are Not The key pay and personnel systems involved in
authorizing, entering, Integrated and Have Limited processing, and paying
mobilized Army Reserve soldiers are not integrated Interfaces and have
only limited interfaces. Figure 2 provides an overview of the key
systems involved in authorizing, entering, processing, and making active
duty payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers.
same source documents into multiple systems. In an effectively integrated
system, changes to personnel records automatically update related payroll
records from a single source of data input. While not as efficient as an
integrated system, an automatic personnel-to-payroll system interface can
also reduce errors caused by repetitive manual data entry into more than
one system.
Because of the lack of effective integration or interfaces19 among key
personnel and pay systems, pay-affecting data recorded in the personnel
system are not automatically updated in the pay system. Therefore,
payaffecting personnel changes recorded in the personnel system must be
reentered into the pay system from hard copies of documents, such as
soldiers' mobilization orders. We found numerous instances in which
payaffecting personnel information was not entered promptly into the pay
system, resulting in numerous pay errors.
Individual Case Illustration: Overpayment due to Lack of Integrated
Personnel and Pay Systems
A soldier assigned to an Illinois Military Police Company received a
mobilization order in December 2002 to report to Fort Dix, New Jersey.
Data from her individual mobilization order were entered into DJMS-RC and
she began receiving active duty pays and allowances based on the active
duty mobilization date shown in her mobilization order. However, her
mobilization order was revoked in early January 2003 after she was found
to be ineligible for mobilization. But, because of the lack of integration
or an effective interface between personnel and pay systems, this order
was not automatically processed in DJMS-RC to stop the soldier's active
duty pay. Consequently, the soldier was overpaid from December 2002
through May 2004. Overpayments to the soldier totaled over $24,000.
19In 1993, we reported the lack of an interface between military personnel
and pay systems as a material weakness. In response, a limited interface
was implemented in July 1997, which allows certain data in the personnel
system, TAPDB-R, to establish and update certain data in the pay system,
DJMS-RC, daily. However, this interface was established for only five data
fields--soldiers' names, Social Security numbers, soldiers' entry into the
Army, soldiers' reassignments, and soldiers' separations from military
service. As a result, this limited interface did not incorporate the data
elements needed by the payroll system to process payments for soldiers on
active duty.
We found several instances in which soldiers that were promoted while on
active duty did not receive their pay raises when they should have because
the promotion information was not promptly recorded in DJMS-RC. For
example, one Army Reserve soldier's promotion was effective on July 1,
2003. However, the soldier's promotion was not processed in the pay system
until October 2003, which delayed an increase in both his basic pay and
basic allowance for housing. The soldier finally received his promotion
pay, including back pay, in late October 2003, resulting in late payments
totaling over $2,700.
Lacking an effective interface between pay and personnel systems, DOD and
the Army must rely on after-the-fact detective controls, such as pay and
personnel system data reconciliations, to identify and correct pay errors
occurring as a result of mismatches between personnel (TAPDB-R) and pay
system (DJMS-RC) data. In this regard, the Army Reserve has an automated
reconciliation tool-the Participation Management and Reporting Subsystem
(PMARS)-to help identify data inconsistencies between pay and personnel
systems. Specifically, the Army Reserve uses PMARS to identify mismatches
of soldiers accounted for in one system and not in the other, and to
compare the systems' information on individual soldiers, such as their
ranks and dates of service. However, this tool is not effective in
identifying soldiers that are being paid for active duty while in inactive
status because TAPDB-R currently does not capture and maintain this
information.
Although TAPDB-R maintains a "deployability" code, this code does not
necessarily indicate whether or not a soldier is on active duty. If
TAPDB-R included a code that specifically identified soldiers on active
duty, then the PMARS comparison of TAPDB-R data with DJMS-RC data could
help identify those soldiers improperly receiving active duty pay.
Limited Automated Processing Capabilities
DJMS-RC was not designed to pay Army Reserve soldiers for active duty
tours longer than 30 days. According to DOD officials, requiring DJMS-RC
to process various types of pays and allowances for active duty tours that
exceed 30 days has stretched the system's automated processing
capabilities to the limit. Because of the system's limitations, the Army
and DFAS were required to make repetitive manual inputs for certain active
duty pays, such as hardship duty pay. We found many instances in which
these manual inputs resulted in payment errors. Moreover, because of the
way in which hardship duty pay was processed, mobilized Army Reserve
soldiers could not always determine whether they received all of their
entitled pays and allowances. In addition, under current processing
limitations, DJMS-RC does not process a required tax exclusion promptly
for soldiers in a combat zone, which has resulted in late payments of this
benefit for all entitled Army Reserve soldiers.
Hardship Duty Pay During our audit period, we found numerous errors in
hardship duty pay as a result of a DJMS-RC processing limitation that
required the use of a miscellaneous payment code for processing this type
of pay. Because of the use of this miscellaneous code instead of a code
specifically for hardship duty pay, this pay could not be automatically
generated on a monthly basis once a soldier's eligibility was established.
Therefore, hardship duty pay had to be manually input every month for
eligible soldiers. As previously discussed, reliance on manual processing
is more prone to payment errors than automated processing.
We found that nearly all soldiers in our case studies who were eligible
for hardship duty pay experienced problems with this pay, including late
payments, underpayments, and overpayments. For example, the 965th Dental
Company's soldiers at Seagoville, Texas, experienced both underpayments
and overpayments. Specifically, all 85 soldiers deployed to Kuwait were
underpaid a total of approximately $8,000 for hardship duty pay they were
entitled to receive during their deployment overseas. Subsequently, 76 of
the unit's soldiers were overpaid a total of almost $47,000 because they
continued to receive hardship duty payments for more than 6 months after
they had left the designated hardship duty location.
Both underpayments and overpayments, as well as late payments, of hardship
duty pay occurred largely because of the reliance on manual processing of
this pay every month. The errors often occurred because local area
servicing finance office personnel did not receive accurate or timely
documentation such as flight manifests or data from the Tactical Personnel
System indicating when soldiers arrived or left the designated hardship
duty location. As a result, finance personnel did not start these payments
on time, and did not stop these payments as of the end of the soldiers'
active duty tour date recorded in DJMS-RC.
The DJMS-RC system processing limitation that led to using the systems'
miscellaneous code to process hardship duty pay, also contributed to
overpayments of this active duty pay. That is, finance personnel
mistakenly continued to manually enter transactions to process hardship
duty pay to
soldiers beyond soldiers' end of active tour dates because DFAS had no way
of implementing a system edit that could identify and stop erroneous
hardship duty pay while permitting other types of transactions processed
using this code to continue.
Similarly, no edit was in place to prevent duplicate payments of hardship
duty pay. As a result, hardship duty pay could be entered more than once
for a soldier in a given month without detection. From our case studies,
we identified three soldiers who each received two hardship duty payments
for one month. None of these duplicate payments was identified or
collected until we submitted inquiries about these soldiers' payments to
the Reserve Pay Center. In addition, we were told that soldiers had
difficulty determining that they received duplicate hardship duty payments
because this type of payment was not clearly identified on their leave and
earnings statement.
Use of the miscellaneous payment code also made it difficult for soldiers
to understand, and determine the propriety of, some of the payments
reflected on their leave and earnings statements. Hardship duty pay and
other payments that are processed using the miscellaneous payment code are
reported on leave and earnings statements as "other credits." Furthermore,
the leave and earnings statements did not provide any additional
information about what the "other credits" were for unless pay clerks
entered additional explanations in the "remarks" section of the statement,
which they rarely did. As a result, soldiers often had no means to
determine if these types of payments were accurate.
Unit commanders told us that they relied on soldiers to identify any pay
problems based on their review of their leave and earnings statements.
However, because leave and earnings statements do not always provide
adequate information or are not available to soldiers while they are
deployed, reliance on the soldiers to identify pay errors is not an
effective control.
Combat Zone Tax Exclusion In addition to soldiers' pay problems that
occurred primarily because of the extensive use of manual processes,
soldiers also experienced systematic problems with automated payments
related to their combat zone tax exclusion, which resulted in late
payments of this benefit for all soldiers in the seven case study units
that deployed overseas. Soldiers are entitled to the combat zone tax
exclusion for any month in which the soldier performs
active service in a designated combat zone area.20 For any applicable
month, this benefit applies to the entire month, rather than being
prorated based on the number of days the soldier was in the combat zone.
However, because DJMS-RC was designed as a pay system for inactive Army
Reserve soldiers, it does not have the processing capability to suspend
withholding of federal and state income taxes applicable to pay that is
ordinarily taxable. Instead, as a workaround procedure to compensate for
this limitation, the system first improperly withholds taxes applicable to
payments made while soldiers are in a combat zone, then later reimburses
soldiers for these withheld amounts in the following month. For example,
when an Army Reserve soldier is assigned to a location where he is
entitled to receive tax-free active duty pays, DJMS-RC (improperly)
withholds taxes from at least the soldier's first one or two active duty
payments. Subsequently, during the first pay cycle of the following month,
DJMS-RC reimburses the soldier for the amount of taxes improperly withheld
during the previous month. As a result of this workaround process, all
Army Reserve soldiers who served in a combat zone received their combat
zone tax exclusion benefit at least one month late.
DJMS-RC processing limitations cause further delays in soldiers' receipt
of entitled combat zone tax benefits when soldiers arrived in a combat
zone after the midmonth cutoff, which is approximately on the 7th day of
each month. In these cases, entitlement to the tax exclusion is not
recognized until the following month, which then delays the soldier's
receipt of his combat zone tax benefit until the next month-the third
month the soldier is deployed in the combat zone. For example, members of
the 824th Quartermaster Company that deployed to Afghanistan arrived in
country on July 14, 2003, but did not receive their first combat zone tax
exclusion reimbursements until early October, almost 3 months after they
became eligible for the exclusion.
Recent Actions Should DOD and the Army have reported a number of
relatively recent positive
actions with respect to processes, human capital practices, and
automatedResult in systems that, if implemented as reported, should
improve the accuracy and Improvements timeliness of active duty pays,
allowances, and related tax benefits
2026 U.S.C. Section 112.
provided to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. The accuracy and timeliness
of payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers rely on many of the same
processes and automated systems used for payments to mobilized Army
National Guard soldiers. Consequently, actions to improve the accuracy and
timeliness of Army Reserve soldier payments are closely tied to actions
taken in response to several of the recommendations in our November 2003
Army National Guard pay report.21
Because many of DOD's actions in this area were implemented in the fall of
2003 or later, they were not in place soon enough to have had a positive
impact on mobilized Army Reserve soldiers' payments as of the January 2004
cutoff for the soldier pay data we audited. However, if implemented as
reported to us, many of DOD's actions in response to our November 2003
report recommendations should help reduce the incidence of the types of
pay problems we identified for Army National Guard soldiers as well as
those identified in the Army Reserve case study units discussed in this
report.
With respect to the process deficiencies and related recommendations, DOD
reported implementing additional procedural guidance intended to help
minimize the pay problems attributable to nonstandard or unclear
procedures. For example, in June 2004, the Army issued a comprehensive
"Finance Mobilization and Demobilization Standing Operating Procedure."
This guidance clarified pay management responsibilities and transaction
processing requirements to be followed for all Army Reserve and Army
National Guard soldiers mobilized to active duty. One of the purposes of
this guidance is to eliminate any questions regarding which DOD entity is
responsible for resolving a soldier's pay issues or questions. Further, as
of January 2004, DOD reported establishing a new procedure under which
DFAS assumed responsibility (from the Army finance offices located in
various overseas locations) for all monthly manual entry of mobilized Army
Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers' location-based hardship duty
pay.
DOD also reported completing several actions related to our previous
recommendations to improve the human capital practices related to payments
to mobilized Army soldiers. For example, the Army reported that it had
taken action to provide additional training for Army finance personnel at
overseas finance locations, mobilization and demobilization
21GAO-04-89.
stations, and for those Army finance personnel scheduled for deployment.
This training is directed at better ensuring that these personnel are
adequately trained on existing and new pay eligibility and pay processing
requirements for mobilized Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers.
DOD also reported establishing a new policy in January 2004 directed at
more clearly affixing responsibility for addressing soldiers' pay problems
or inquiries. Under this new policy, the Army National Guard established a
pay ombudsman to serve as the single focal point for ensuring coordinated,
prompt customer service on all Army National Guard soldiers' pay problems.
Thus far, DOD's reported actions have not yet addressed, and consequently
we are reiterating, our previous human capital recommendations with
respect to (1) requiring unit commanders to receive training on the
importance of adhering to requirements to carry out monthly pay management
responsibilities, and (2) modifying existing training policies and
procedures to require active Army pay and finance personnel who are
responsible for entering pay transactions for mobilized reserve component
soldiers to receive appropriate training upon assuming such duties.
With respect to automated systems, the Army and DFAS have acknowledged
serious deficiencies in the current automated systems used to pay
mobilized Army Reserve soldiers, and report that they have implemented a
number of significant improvements, particularly to reduce an estimated
67,000 manual monthly entries for hardship duty pay. For example, in
response to our recommendations in the Army National Guard report, DOD
reported taking actions to (1) automate manual monthly hardship duty pay
in April 2004, (2) eliminate the use of the miscellaneous code for
processing hardship duty pay and instead process these payments using a
unique transaction code to facilitate implementing a system edit to
identify and stop erroneous payments, (3) compare active duty release
dates in the Army's system used to generate Release From Active Duty
orders with soldiers' end of active duty tour dates shown in DJMS-RC to
identify and stop any erroneous active duty pays, and (4) increase the
reliability and timeliness of documentation used to support soldiers'
arrival at and departure from designated overseas locations.
However, DOD has not yet fully addressed, and consequently we are
reiterating two of our previous recommendations directed at interim
automated system improvements and one of our longer-term system
improvement recommendations. Specifically, we are reiterating previous
interim recommendations related to evaluating the feasibility of (1) using
the personnel-to-pay interface as a means to proactively alert pay
personnel of actions needed to start active duty pays and allowances and
(2) establishing an edit check and requiring approval before processing
any payments above a specified dollar amount.
DOD has a major system enhancement effort under way in this area-the
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS). As an interim
measure, DOD is now pursuing Forward Compatible Payroll (FCP). FCP is
intended to replace payroll systems now used to pay Army military
personnel and help eliminate several of the labor-intensive, error-prone
workarounds necessitated by current DJMS-RC processing limitations. As of
May 2004, FCP was expected to be operational for all Army Reserve soldiers
by March 2005.
We are also reiterating our previous longer term recommendation with
respect to taking action to ensure that DIMHRS and related efforts include
a complete reengineering of not only the related automated systems, but
the supporting processes and human capital practices used to pay mobilized
Army Reserve soldiers as well. Such fundamental reengineering is necessary
because, as discussed in the preceding sections, many of the pay problems
we found were associated with procedural and human capital practice
issues, as well as nonintegrated automated systems that extend beyond
existing pay system processing limitations.
Conclusions The increased operating tempo for Army Reserve and Army
National Guard active duty mobilizations has stressed the current
processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on to pay these
soldiers. The significant number of problems we identified associated with
active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits provided to
mobilized Army Reserve soldiers at eight case study locations raises
serious concerns about whether current operations can be relied on to
provide accurate and timely payments. These pay problems caused
considerable frustration, adversely affected soldiers' morale, and placed
an additional, unnecessary burden on both the soldiers and their families.
Further, if not effectively addressed, these pay problems may ultimately
have an adverse impact on Army Reserve reenlistment and retention.
Strengthening existing processes, human capital practices, and automated
systems is critical to preventing, or at minimum, promptly detecting and
correcting, the errors we identified. In this regard, DOD and the Army
have reported a number of relatively recent positive actions intended to
improve the accuracy and timeliness of active duty pays, allowances, and
related tax
benefits provided to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. DOD's completed and
planned near-term actions, if implemented as reported, should reduce the
number of pay problems. However, mobilized Army Reserve soldiers cannot be
reasonably assured of accurate and timely active duty pays, allowances,
and related tax benefits until DOD completes a reengineering of all the
processes, human capital practices, and automated systems supporting this
critical area.
Fully and effectively addressing Army Reserve soldiers' pay problems will
require priority attention and sustained, concerted, coordinated efforts
by DFAS, the Army, and the Army Reserve to build on actions taken and
planned. For these reasons, we are reaffirming two of our previous human
capital-related recommendations and three of our previous automated
systems-related recommendations from our November 2003 report on payments
to mobilized Army National Guard soldiers. However, we are also offering
15 additional recommendations identified as a result of our audit of
mobilized Army Reserve soldiers' pay experiences.
Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, in conjunction with the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), take the following 15 actions to
address the issues we found with respect to the existing processes,
personnel (human capital), and automated systems relied on to pay
activated Army Reserve soldiers.
Process:
o Establish procedures for unit commanders and unit administrators, or
other designated officials (for soldiers transferred between units), to
reconcile the names of Army Reserve soldiers receiving active duty pay
with the names of Army Reserve soldiers reporting for duty at mobilization
stations.
o Establish procedures for unit commanders and unit administrators, or
other designated officials, to provide the names and arrival dates for all
soldiers entering and exiting in-theater locations to a designated area
servicing finance office to facilitate accurate and timely payment of
intheater location-based active duty pays, allowances, and related tax
benefits.
o Establish procedures to provide demobilization stations with a list of
soldiers returning from overseas that are scheduled to arrive at the
demobilization station for outprocessing.
o Establish procedures to reconcile the names of Army Reserve soldiers
who recently demobilized with the names of Army Reserve soldiers still
receiving mobilization pay and take appropriate action to resolve any
identified pay issues.
o Clarify policy concerning "thorough" review of soldiers' pay records
upon initial mobilization to specify that finance personnel at Army
mobilization stations must conduct a one-on-one review of online pay
records for each mobilized soldier.
o Establish procedures to ensure unit commanders and unit administrators,
or other designated officials, have online access to pay management
reports, such as the Unit Commander's Pay Management Report, particularly
for mobilized units.
o Clarify DJMS-RC procedures to specifically require unit commanders,
unit administrators, or other designated officials to review and reconcile
key pay and personnel data every month, including personnel records, with
the monthly Unit Commander's Pay Management Report, for all mobilized Army
Reserve soldiers.
o Clarify and simplify procedures and forms implementing the family
separation allowance entitlement policy, particularly with respect to the
30-day waiting period and commuting distance criteria.
Human Capital:
o Take appropriate action to address the issues of inadequate resources
provided to carry out key unit administrator pay management
responsibilities identified at our case study units, particularly with
respect to (1) vacancies in unit administrator positions resulting from
the requirement for dual status unit administrators and (2) lack of pay
management support for Army Reserve soldiers transferred between units.
o Determine whether issues of inadequate resources identified at our case
study units apply to other mobilized Army Reserve units and soldiers, and
if so, take appropriate action to address any deficiencies identified.
o Evaluate the feasibility of establishing an ombudsman to serve as the
single focal point and have overall coordination responsibility and
visibility to ensure that all Army Reserve soldiers' problems and
inquiries with respect to applicable active duty pays, allowances, and
related combat zone tax exclusion benefits are promptly and fully
resolved.
Systems:
Interim Improvements to Current Automated Systems
o Evaluate the feasibility of modifying the deployability code or adding
a duty status code in TAPDB-R that can be compared with the pay status
code field in DJMS-RC to assist in identifying pay errors resulting from
discrepancies between the soldiers' duty status and pay status.
o Evaluate the feasibility of modifying DJMS-RC to suspend withholding
taxes from soldiers when they serve in designated taxexempt combat zones.
o Evaluate the feasibility of establishing a system edit to prevent
DJMS-RC from generating payments for active duty service to soldiers after
their date of demobilization from active duty.
Longer-Term Systems Action:
o Address the deficiencies noted in this report as part of the functional
requirements for the FCP and DIMHRS system development efforts currently
under way.
Agency Comments and In its written comments, DOD concurred with our
recommendations and stated its actions to address the identified
deficiencies. Specifically, DOD's
our Evaluation response outlined some actions already taken, others that
are under way, and further planned actions with respect to our
recommendations. If effectively implemented, these actions should
substantially resolve the deficiencies pointed out in our report. DOD's
comments are reprinted in appendix X.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
its date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to interested
congressional committees. We will also send copies of this report to the
Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the
Secretary of the Army; the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service; and the U.S. Army Reserve Command. We will make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs
have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202)
5129095 or [email protected] or Geoffrey Frank, Assistant Director, at (202)
5129518 or [email protected].
Gregory D. Kutz Director, Financial Management and Assurance
List of Congressional Requesters
The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Todd Platts
Chairman
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency
and Financial Management
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ed Schrock
House of Representatives
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
To obtain an understanding and assess the processes, personnel (human
capital), and systems used to provide assurance that mobilized Army
Reserve soldiers were paid accurately and on time, we reviewed applicable
laws, policies, procedures, and program guidance; observed pay processing
operations; and interviewed cognizant agency officials. The key laws,
policies, and procedures, we obtained and reviewed included
o 10 U.S.C. Section 12302;
o DOD Directive Number 1235.10, "Activation, Mobilization &
Demobilization of the Ready Reserve;"
o DOD FMR, Volume 7A, "Military Pay Policy and Procedures Active Duty and
Reserve Pay;"
o USARC Regulation 37-1, "Financial Administration: USAR Financial
Management and USAR Support;"
o USARC Pamphlet 37-1, "Defense Joint Military Pay System - Reserve
Component (DJMS-RC) Procedures Manual;"
o Army Regulation 600-8-101, "Personnel Processing (In-, Out-, Soldier
Readiness, Mobilization, and Deployment Processing);"
o the Army's Consolidated Personnel Policy Guidance for Operations Noble
Eagle and Enduring Freedom, September 2002; and
o Army Forces Command Regulations
o 500-3-3, Reserve Component Unit Commander's Handbook;
o 500-3-4, Installation Commander's Handbook; and
o 500-3-5, Demobilization Plan.
We also reviewed various Under Secretary of Defense memorandums, a
memorandum of agreement between Army and DFAS, and DFAS, Army, Army Forces
Command, and Army Reserve Command guidance applicable to pay for mobilized
reserve component soldiers. We also used the internal
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
control standards provided in the Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government.1
We applied the policies and procedures prescribed in these documents to
the observed and documented procedures and practices followed by the
various DOD components involved in providing active duty pay to Army
Reserve soldiers. We also interviewed officials from USARC, RRCs, Army
Reserve Regional Readiness Commands, Army Central Command, Army and DOD
military pay and personnel offices, Army Finance Command, DFAS, and unit
commanders and unit administrators to obtain an understanding of their
experiences in applying these policies and procedures. From these
interviews, we also obtained information on examples of recent mobilized
Army Reserve pay problems they encountered in the course of their work.
In addition, as part of our audit, we performed a review of selected edit
and validation checks in DJMS-RC. Specifically, we obtained documentation
and performed walk-throughs associated with DJMS-RC edits performed on pay
status/active duty change transactions, such as those to ensure that tour
start and stop dates matched MMPA dates and that the soldier cannot be
paid basic pay and allowances beyond the stop date that was entered into
DJMS-RC. We also obtained documentation on and performed walkthroughs of
the recently implemented personnel-to-pay system interface process, the
order writing-to-pay system interface process, and on the process for
entering mobilization information into the pay system. We did not
independently test DOD's reported edit and validation checks in DJMS-RC,
but we held interviews with officials from U.S. Army Reserve Headquarters,
Army Finance Command, and DFAS-Indianapolis to supplement our
documentation and walk-throughs.
Because our preliminary assessment determined that current operations used
to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers relied extensively on errorprone
manual entry of transactions into multiple, nonintegrated systems, we did
not statistically test current processes and controls. Instead, we used a
case study approach to provide a more detailed perspective of the nature
of any deficiencies in the three key areas of processes, people
1GAO, Standards for Internal Control in The Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington D.C.: November 1999). These standards
provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining effective
internal control and for identifying and addressing areas of greatest risk
of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
(human capital), and automated systems relied on to pay mobilized Army
Reserve soldiers. Specifically, we gathered available data and analyzed
the pay experiences of Army Reserve soldiers mobilized to and demobilized
from active duty in support of Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom,
and Iraqi Freedom during the period from August 2002 through January 2004.
We audited the pay experiences of soldiers in the following eight Army
Reserve units as case studies of the effectiveness of the processes, human
capital practices, and automated systems in place over active duty pays,
allowances, and related tax benefits:
o 824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg, N.C.
o 965th Dental Company, Seagoville, Tex.
o 948th Forward Surgical Team, Southfield, Mich.
o 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Md.
o FORSCOM Support Unit, Finksburg, Md.
o 629th Transportation Detachment, Fort Eustis, Va.
o 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment, New Haven, Conn.
o 431st Chemical Detachment, Johnstown, Pa.
From the population of Army Reserve units mobilized and demobilized
between August 2002 and January 2004, we selected units from various
specialties that represented the wide variety of missions performed by the
Army Reserve during wartime. These case studies are presented to provide a
more detailed view of the types and causes of any pay problems experienced
by these units as well as the financial impact of pay problems on
individual soldiers and their families.
We used mobilization data supplied by the Army Reserve Headquarters
Operations Center to assist us in selecting the eight units we used as our
case studies. We did not independently verify the reliability of the
Operations Center database. We used the data to select RRCs that had a
large number of activated Reserve units that had mobilized, deployed, and
returned from their tour of active duty in support of Operations Noble
Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. From the list of units
assigned to these Readiness Commands, we selected our eight case studies
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
that had a variety of deployment locations and missions, including both
overseas and continental U.S. deployments. In addition to our case
studies, during our visits to Army mobilization locations, we interviewed
small numbers of soldiers currently in the process of returning from
active duty to obtain their perspectives on their experiences with active
duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits.
We also obtained testimonial data from soldiers at several of our case
study units. We asked numerous soldiers at these units to discuss
pay-related experiences during their deployment. The information we
obtained during these interviews is presented to provide further insight
into the pay experiences of Army Reserve soldiers who were mobilized under
current military operations, but is not intended to be representative of
the views of all soldiers in their units nor of those of Army Reserve
soldiers overall.
We used DJMS-RC pay transaction extracts for the period from August 2002
through January 2004 to identify pay problems associated with our case
study units. However, we did not perform an exact calculation of the net
pay soldiers should have received in comparison with what DJMS-RC records
show they received. Rather, we used available documentation and follow-up
inquiries with cognizant personnel at the Army Reserve Command, Regional
Readiness Commands, and the Reserve Pay Center at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin,
to determine if (1) soldiers' entitled active duty pay and allowances were
received within 30 days of their initial mobilization date, (2) soldiers
were paid within 30 days of the date they became eligible for active duty
pay, allowances, and entitlements associated with their deployment
locations, and (3) soldiers stopped receiving active duty pay and
allowances as of the date of their demobilization from active duty. For
the pay problems we identified, we counted them as problems only in the
phase (mobilization, deployment, and demobilization) in which they first
occurred even if the problems persisted into other phases. For purposes of
characterizing pay and allowance problems for this report, we defined
overpayments and underpayments as those that were in excess of
(overpayment) or less than (underpayment) the entitled payment. We
considered as late payments any active duty pay or allowance paid to the
soldier over 30 days after the date on which the soldier was entitled to
receive such payments. As such, these payments were those that, although
late, addressed a previously unpaid entitlement. We used available data
through February 2004, as well as dollar amounts reported by Reserve Pay
Center officials, to determine collections against identified overpayments
through February 2004. In addition, while we did not attempt to calculate
the exact impact of any soldier's over-, under-, and late payments on
their
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
combat zone tax exclusion benefits, we did examine readily available data
to determine the extent to which our case study unit soldiers' received
their entitled combat zone tax exclusion benefits.
Our audit results only reflect problems we identified. Soldiers in our
case study units may have experienced additional pay problems that we did
not identify. Further, our work was not designed to identify, and we did
not identify, any fraudulent pay and allowances to any mobilized Army
Reserve soldiers. However, to the extent we identified any problems with
our case study unit soldiers' active duty pays, allowances, tax benefits,
and related collections, we provided documentation showing the results of
our analysis to appropriate Army Reserve officials for a complete review
of all soldier pay records to determine whether, and take appropriate
action if, additional amounts are owed to the Army Reserve soldiers or to
the government.
We briefed officials of the DOD Comptroller, Army Finance Command, Army
Reserve Command, Army Reserve Regional Readiness Commands, Army Forces
Command, and DFAS-Indianapolis on the details of our audit, including our
findings and their implications. On July 9, 2004, we requested comments on
a draft of this report. We received comments on August 11, 2004, from the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and have summarized those
comments in the section of this report entitled "Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation." DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix X. We conducted our
audit from November 2003 through June 2004 in accordance with U.S.
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II
824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Beginning on February 2, 2003, the 824th Quartermaster Company was called
to active duty for up to a year in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
A total of 68 soldiers from the 824th Quartermaster Company mobilized at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and went through in-processing at Fort Bragg's
mobilization station in the first few weeks of February. Over the next
several months, members of the unit performed their mission of rigging
parachutes for individual soldiers and large equipment drops at Fort
Bragg, in Afghanistan, and in and around Kuwait. On April 6, 2003, 44
members of the 824th Quartermaster Company deployed to Kuwait to assist in
parachute preparations. After completing their mission, the soldiers
returned to Fort Bragg 2 months later on June 19. Another 5 soldiers from
the unit deployed to Afghanistan on July 14 and performed similar
parachute rigging duties, returning to Fort Bragg on September 1, 2003.
The other 19 soldiers in the unit remained at Fort Bragg for the entire
duration of their tour of duty where they assisted in parachute rigging at
the base. Beginning on July 15, 2003, soldiers in the 824th Quartermaster
Company began to demobilize and return to their civilian jobs, and by the
end of September 2003, all but one soldier had been released from active
duty. The soldier that remained on active duty was receiving medical
treatment for injuries related to his military service. A time line of
actions associated with the unit's active duty mobilization is shown in
figure 3.
Figure 3: 824th Quartermaster Company's Mobilization Time Line
Source: GAO.
As summarized in table 4, at every stage of the unit's tour of active
duty, soldiers experienced a variety of pay problems. Fifty-eight of the
68 soldiers in the 824th Quartermaster Company experienced at least one
pay problem associated with their activation to, during, or deactivation
from
Appendix II
824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina
active duty in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Specifically, (1) we
found that 11 soldiers experienced underpayments, overpayments, or late
payments during their initial mobilization; (2) 50 soldiers experienced
underpayments, overpayments, or late payments during their tour of active
duty at Fort Bragg, in Afghanistan, and in and around Kuwait, including
intheater incentives such as hostile fire pay; and (3) 13 soldiers
experienced underpayments, overpayments, and/or late payments associated
with their demobilization, with most of the problems relating to the
continuation of active duty pay after demobilization.
Table 4: Pay Problems by Phase Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems
Mobilization 11 of 68
Deployment 50 of 68
Demobilization 13 of 68
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced pay problems in more than one phase.
The dollar amounts associated with overpayments, underpayments, and late
payments we identified were approximately $60,000, $10,000, and $3,000,
respectively. Of the overpayments we identified, about $2,000 was
subsequently collected from the unit's soldiers. Almost $18,000 of the
overpayments we identified was associated with one soldier, who continued
to receive active duty pay for more than 5 months after his discharge from
the Army.
Mobilization Pay Problems
As summarized in table 5, we found that 11 soldiers from the 824th
Quartermaster Company experienced underpayments, overpayments, or late
payments related to basic pay and associated entitlements when called to
active duty. For example, we identified several soldiers who received
their $250 per month family separation allowance even though they
performed their military duty at Fort Bragg, their home station, and were
not separated from their families as provided by the DOD FMR Volume 7A.
The soldiers were not informed by pay technicians at the unit or their
mobilization station that they were not entitled to the family separation
allowance if their home of record was within a reasonable commuting
distance, generally 50 miles, even though the soldiers were staying at
Fort Bragg.
Appendix II
824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina
Table 5: Mobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Family separation
allowance 1 0
Basic allowance
for housing 0 0
Jump pay 0 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
Prior to being mobilized, the soldiers in the 824th Quartermaster Company
attended a SRP at their unit's home station. The purpose of this review
was to ensure that all soldiers had all required administrative paperwork,
financial documents, and were physically fit for the ensuing mobilization.
Members of the 81st Regional Readiness Command and unit members of the
824th Quartermaster Company, who conducted the finance portion of the SRP,
were required to verify the soldiers' supporting financial documentation,
and, if necessary, submit transactions with the necessary supporting
documentation to the Reserve Pay Center at Fort McCoy to update the
soldiers' Master Military Pay Accounts to reflect their mobilized status.
After performing the SRP at the unit's home station, the 824th
Quartermaster Company reported to Fort Bragg, its active Army mobilization
station. Fort Bragg personnel conducted a second SRP that was intended, in
part, to verify each soldier's pay account with supporting finance
documents. However, instead of conducting the required review of each
soldier's pay record, Fort Bragg's finance personnel performed only a
perfunctory review of the soldiers' supporting documents. According to
finance personnel at Fort Bragg's mobilization station, the physical
layout of the in-processing station did not allow them to sit with each
soldier "one on one" to compare their pay account as shown in DJMS-RC with
the soldier's pay supporting documentation in real time.
The perfunctory review and oversights during the SRPs at the home station
and mobilization station allowed several soldiers to receive FSA when they
were not entitled to receive it. A review by personnel at the SRP should
have identified that the soldiers were not separated from their families
as required, and therefore they would not have signed off as approvers of
the
Appendix II
824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina
entitlement forms. A lack of adequately trained staff with enough time to
review the unit's pay forms may have caused this pay error.
Missing or noncurrent documentation required to support active duty pays
and allowances at the time of the SRP contributed to some of the late pays
and allowance payments we identified. For example, one soldier did not
receive family separation allowance payments because documentation
necessary to start this allowance was not submitted as part of the SRP
process, although the soldier was certified as ready for mobilization as a
result of the SRP. It was 6 months later, when the soldiers were
demobilizing at Fort Bragg, that the paperwork necessary to receive this
allowance was submitted to the Fort Bragg finance office. This soldier
received about 6 months of back pay in September 2003.
Pay Problems While As summarized in table 6, we identified a number of
problems associated Deployed with the unit's active duty pays and
allowances.
Table 6: Deployment Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Basic pay 2 0
Family separation
allowance 1 1
Basic allowance for
housing 1 1
Hostile fire pay 5 5
Hardship duty pay 0 49
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
During the soldiers' deployment to Afghanistan and Kuwait, they
encountered pay problems related to payments for soldiers located in
designated hardship duty locations and hostile fire zones. Most soldiers
did not receive the full amount of hardship duty pay payments while
deployed. In addition, they continued to receive their hardship duty pay
well after
Appendix II
824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina
they had returned to Fort Bragg and demobilized. All 49 soldiers deployed
overseas were incorrectly paid for either hardship duty or hostile fire
pay.
Army area servicing finance officials, who had responsibility for
initiating these entitlements, did not initiate the unit's hardship duty
pay payments until several months after the unit had arrived. The delay
resulted in the deployed soldiers being underpaid for most of their time
in the hardship duty location.
Local active Army finance officials also did not terminate payments of
hardship duty pay until 5 months after the soldiers had left the hardship
duty pay location, in most cases. This erroneous continuation of hardship
duty payments may have been the result of pay clerks continuing to
manually process these payments each month using a roster of soldiers in
the country that did not properly reflect the unit's departure from the
overseas deployment location. In addition, the DJMS-RC system processing
procedures in place at the time required that hardship duty pay be
processed using a miscellaneous payment code that could be used for a
variety of payments. The use of this miscellaneous code for hardship duty
pay precluded the system from identifying the payments as active duty pay
and therefore allowed these payments to continue after the soldiers were
demobilized. The use of the miscellaneous payment code also led to soldier
confusion because the Leave and Earning Statement did not identify the
nature of the entitlement.
In addition, soldiers who deployed to Afghanistan told us that in some
cases, they had trouble finding in-theater finance officers willing to
help them with their pay problems. The soldiers stated that when they
arrived in Afghanistan, the finance office on duty at the time was
preparing to return to the United States because its tour in the country
was ending. Several weeks passed before the transition of finance offices
was complete, and in that time the Reserve soldiers did not have any local
support that would assist them with finance problems. This gap in a
functioning supporting finance office for the deployed soldiers could only
have added to their frustration and confusion over in-theater pays.
In addition to the problems soldiers experienced related to their pay and
entitlements, they also experienced systematic problems related to their
combat zone tax exclusion benefits. All 49 of the soldiers from the 824th
Quartermaster Company who deployed overseas were eligible for this tax
benefit and all of them experienced some type of problem with their combat
zone tax exclusion. Specifically, we found that all 49 soldiers
Appendix II
824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina
received their combat zone tax exclusion late, totaling about $20,000.
Five soldiers did not receive all of the combat zone tax exclusion
benefits they were due during their deployment. Moreover, the soldiers who
deployed to Afghanistan did not have the combat zone tax exclusion applied
to their pay until nearly 3 months after they arrived in the country, and
never received their combat zone tax exclusion benefit for September 2003.
The error for the month of September caused over $1,300 of extra taxes to
be collected from these soldiers while in a combat zone.
Pay Problems Soldiers of the 824th Quartermaster Company began to
demobilize in July
2003. As summarized in table 7, during their demobilization and after
theirAssociated with release from active duty, soldiers continued to
experience pay problems. Demobilization and These problems were primarily
overpayments associated with soldiers Release from Active receiving pay
after their active duty demobilization dates.
Duty
Table 7: Demobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers who were Type of pay or allowance overpaid
Basic pay
Basic allowance for subsistence
Basic allowance for housing
Family separation allowance
Jump pay
Source: GAO analysis.
The largest pay problem related to the 824th Quartermaster Company's
demobilization involved a soldier who was put into a medical hold company.
The soldier initially mobilized with the unit in February, and was
in-processed by personnel at Fort Bragg. During the in-processing, it was
determined that the soldier had a medical condition that did not allow him
to mobilize with the unit and perform his duty. He was then transferred to
a medical holding company under the command of the Fort Bragg Garrison
Support Unit. In this unit, the soldier underwent treatment for his
condition and concluded that treatment in August 2003. On August 13, 2003,
the soldier was discharged entirely from the Army and his pay should have
stopped on that date. According to DFAS guidance, several locations can
initiate transactions to stop a soldier's pay. The primary location is the
demobilization station where the soldier receives his or her DD Form 214,
Appendix II
824th Quartermaster Company, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina
Certificate of Discharge or Release from Active Duty. As a secondary
catch, the Reserve Pay Center at Fort McCoy can also stop the soldier's
pay on his or her release date.
Although the soldier did out-process through Fort Bragg and received his
DD Form 214, personnel at the demobilization station at Fort Bragg did not
amend the soldier's pay record to cut off pay on August 13. The unit also
did not take any action to stop the soldier's pay because the soldier
should have been off of its pay records and in the pay records of the
medical hold company. This had not been done and the result was that the
medical hold company could not view the soldier's pay records but knew he
was discharged. Meanwhile, the unit could view the pay records but, under
current procedures, did not receive a copy of the DD Form 214 showing the
soldier had been discharged. Ultimately, the soldier's pay and allowances
were stopped only as a result of actions we took. Specifically, in August
2003, the soldier contacted his old unit, the 824th Quartermaster Company,
and faxed them a copy of his DD Form 214. At this point the unit had all
necessary documentation to identify the overpayment to the soldier after
his discharge date of August 13, but did not review the pay records and
identify the problem. The soldier continued to get paid until the end of
January 2004 when we identified the error, which resulted in an
overpayment of almost $18,000. Finally, after we brought the error to the
unit's attention, the unit requested that the Reserve Pay Center at Fort
McCoy stop the soldier's pay and initiate collection.
Appendix III
965th Dental Company Seagoville, Texas
On February 9, 2003, the 965th Dental Company1 was called to active duty
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom for an initial 1-year tour.2 The
unit mobilized at its home station, Seagoville, Texas, on February 11,
2003, and reported for active duty at Fort Hood, Texas, on February 14,
2003. On March 23, 2003, the 965th Dental Company deployed to Camp
Arifjan, Kuwait, to provide dental services to Army soldiers involved in
military operations in Iraq and surrounding areas. Upon completion of its
mission, the company redeployed from Kuwait to Fort Hood in two separate
groups; the first group returned on May 22, 2003, and the second on June
10, 2003. Within a few days of returning to Fort Hood, soldiers were sent
home and following end-of-tour leave were discharged from active duty. By
the end of July 2003, all but three soldiers had been released from active
duty. Two soldiers remained on active duty because they were still
receiving medical treatment for injuries sustained during their deployment
and one was still deployed overseas at the time of our review.3 A time
line of actions associated with the unit's active duty mobilization is
shown in figure 4.
Figure 4: 965th Dental Company's Mobilization Time Line
Source: GAO.
1The 965th Medical Company Dental Area Support is referred to as the 965th
Dental Company in this report.
2The 965th Dental Company is a subordinate unit of the 807th Medical
Command, which is the Army's III Corps medical brigade.
3The two soldiers were still on medical hold at the time of our review.
Appendix III
965th Dental Company Seagoville, Texas
As summarized in table 8, soldiers of the 965th Dental Company experienced
various pay problems at every stage of the unit's tour of active duty.
Overall, 89 of 93 mobilized soldiers experienced some type of pay problem
associated with their activation to, during, or deactivation from, active
duty in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Specifically, 25 soldiers
experienced underpayments, overpayments, or late payments associated with
their initial mobilization; 86 experienced underpayments, overpayments, or
late payments during their deployment to areas in and around Kuwait,
including in-theater incentives such as hostile fire pay and hardship duty
pay; and 7 soldiers experienced underpayments or overpayments associated
with their demobilization, including problems related to the continuation
of active duty pay after demobilization. One soldier received $36,000 of
active duty pay even though he never mobilized with the unit. Another
soldier incorrectly received hostile fire pay, hardship duty pay, the
family separation allowance, and the combat zone tax exclusion benefit
following his return home to recuperate from injuries sustained overseas.
Table 8: Pay Problems by Phase Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems
Mobilization 25 of 93
Deployment 86 of 93
Demobilization 7 of 93
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldier may have experienced pay problems in more than one phase.
The dollar amounts associated with overpayments, underpayments, and late
payments we identified were approximately $100,000, $16,000, and $27,000,
respectively. Of the overpayments we identified, about $400 was
subsequently collected from the soldiers prior to the time we started our
audit.
Mobilization Pay As summarized in table 9, we found that 25 soldiers from
the 965th Dental Company experienced underpayments, overpayments, or late
payments
Problems related to basic pay and associated entitlements during
mobilization processing.
Appendix III
965th Dental Company Seagoville, Texas
Table 9: Mobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Basic pay 8 0
Family separation
allowance 8 2
Basic allowance for
housing 6 2
Basic allowance for
subsistence 2 0
Special dental pay 1 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
The unit administrator conducted a premobilization SRP review during
October 2002 at the unit's home station. However, according to the unit
administrator, about 30 to 40 soldiers did not attend the SRP session
because the soldiers would have had to travel from distant locations, such
as Albuquerque, New Mexico, where they typically attended Army Reserve
inactive duty training, or for other reasons. Thus, when these soldiers
arrived at the unit's home station prior to reporting to Fort Hood, the
unit administrator quickly performed the SRP process for them at that
time. However, instead of submitting necessary changes to soldiers' pay
accounts to the Reserve Pay Center, the unit administrator waited until
the unit arrived at the Fort Hood mobilization station to submit them.
According to documentation obtained from the Reserve Pay Center, some
soldiers' documentation was not submitted until March 22, 2003, a month
after the unit was mobilized. As a result, promotion pay increases and
other entitlements were paid over 2 months late. For 3 soldiers, correct
entitlements were not received until the soldiers returned from their
overseas tour.
Delays in submitting required forms and documentation were the primary
causes for late pay and entitlements. Also, three soldiers were overpaid
pay and benefits because their active duty pay was started too early.
These minor overpayments were collected from the soldiers' pay during
demobilization out-processing. One soldier received double the amount of
basic allowance for housing, for an estimated overpayment of $6,600. In
Appendix III
965th Dental Company Seagoville, Texas
addition, the process of paying soldiers their family separation allowance
was not consistently applied for the soldiers of the 965th Dental Company.
For example, a soldier from Gulfport, Mississippi, was paid family
separation allowance during his commute to the mobilization station;
however, a soldier from Claremore, Oklahoma, was not.
The lack of accountability for deploying soldiers resulted in one unit
soldier being paid active duty pay even though the soldier never mobilized
with the unit. This soldier received orders to mobilize with the unit, but
because the soldier had a disability that prevented his serving on active
duty, the unit commander excused the soldier from mobilization. However,
although unit personnel transferred the soldier to another unit that was
not mobilizing, no one canceled the soldier's original mobilization order
in the Army Reserve personnel system, or notified the Reserve Pay Center
to stop the soldier's active duty pay. In addition, unit personnel did not
notify the Fort Hood mobilization station that this soldier had received a
mobilization order so the mobilization station could confirm that the
order had been revoked and stop pay for this soldier. Further, the soldier
receiving the unauthorized pay did not report the overpayments to the unit
to which he had been transferred. Thus, the soldier received approximately
$36,000 of active duty pay for which he was not entitled. These
overpayments continued for more than 12 months and were not identified
until we discovered them during our visit to the unit in January 2004.
During our visit to the home station, we informed the unit commander about
the soldier's overpayment and he stated that this soldier should not be
held responsible for repaying the overpayment because he believed the
soldier did nothing wrong or illegal. He also stated that he did not
review the Unit Commander's Pay Management Report because the soldiers
were able to review their pay online. It is likely that the improper
payments to this soldier would have been identified if either the unit
commander or unit administrator had monitored the unit's pay reports.4
Pay Problems While As summarized in table 10, we identified extensive
problems associated with active duty pays and allowances applicable to the
unit's overseas
Deployed deployment to Kuwait. In total, 86 soldiers experienced some type
of pay
4This soldier was still receiving pay during the time of our review. We
notified the unit administrator and after our site visit the pay was
stopped and the soldier incurred a debt balance for the total amount
overpaid.
Appendix III
965th Dental Company Seagoville, Texas
problem during the deployed phase, including one soldier who did not
deploy overseas, but received in-theatre incentives.
Table 10: Deployment Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Basic pay 0 1
Family separation 0 2
allowance
Basic allowance for 0 1
housing
Basic allowance for 0 0
subsistence
Hostile fire pay 61 9
Hardship duty pay 0 85
Special dental pay 1 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
During the unit's deployment to Kuwait, soldiers encountered pay problems
related to hardship duty pay, hostile fire pay, and the combat zone tax
exclusion, all of which are benefits eligible to soldiers when serving in
designated hardship duty locations and hostile fire zones. All 85 of the
soldiers deployed overseas were incorrectly paid for either hardship duty
pay or hostile fire pay, most of which were overpayments.
In total, 85 soldiers did not receive the full amount of their hardship
duty pay entitlement while deployed to Kuwait. These soldiers were
underpaid a total of about $8,000. In addition, 76 soldiers continued to
receive hardship duty pay payments following their return from Kuwait.
Sixty-six of these soldiers continued receiving the payments for 6 or more
months following their return home. Overpayments made to all 76 soldiers
amounted to approximately $46,500. This amount does not include the
overpayments made to soldiers involving a type of hardship duty pay that
is no longer paid to soldiers serving in Kuwait.
Appendix III
965th Dental Company Seagoville, Texas
In addition, we estimated that the combat zone tax exclusion benefit was
applied to 76 soldiers late or incorrectly. We estimated that
approximately 75 soldiers received their combat zone tax relief benefits 2
to 3 months late, which was after their deployment ended, totally $24,000.
In addition, one soldier did not receive all of the combat zone tax
exclusion benefits she was due during her deployment, resulting in an
estimated $200 underpayment, while 2 other soldiers were overpaid for a
combined overpayment of about $300.
Pay Problems Soldiers of the 965th Dental Company returned to Fort Hood in
two
different groups; the first group returned on May 22, 2003, and the
secondAssociated with group returned on June 10, 2003. As summarized in
table 11, 7 of 93 soldiers Demobilization and had problems associated with
properly stopping their active duty pays and Release from Active
allowances during their demobilization.
Duty
Table 11: Demobilization Pay Problems Type of pay or allowance
Number of soldiers who were underpaid
Number of soldiers who were overpaid
Basic pay 1
Basic allowance for subsistence 1
Basic allowance for housing 1
Family separation allowance 1
Special dental pay 3
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
Of the soldiers who experienced pay problems associated with this phase,
most had underpayments. One of the soldiers we reviewed had his active
duty pay stopped before his actual demobilization date and another
soldier's special medical pay was stopped a month early. Each soldier was
underpaid an estimated $1,200. Another soldier's active duty pay continued
past his demobilization date for an overpayment of approximately $1,400.
In addition, one soldier returned home early from deployment in May 2003
due to a medical emergency. However, his pay and entitlements were not
adjusted correctly. As a result, during his convalescence, much of which
was at his home, the soldier continued to receive hardship duty pay,
hostile fire pay, the family separation allowance, and the combat zone tax
Appendix III
965th Dental Company Seagoville, Texas
exclusion through April 2004 when we brought the overpayments to the
unit's attention.
Appendix IV
948th Forward Surgical Team, Southfield, Michigan
On January 20, 2003, the 948th Medical Detachment Forward Surgical (948th
Forward Surgical Team) was mobilized to active duty in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom for a 1-year tour.1 A total of 20 soldiers from
the 948th Forward Surgical Team, including four surgeons, mobilized at its
home station in Southfield, Michigan, and went through in-processing at
the mobilization station at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. On February 28, 2003,
the unit deployed to Afghanistan through Baghram Air Base, Afghanistan.
Most of the 20 soldiers remained in Kandahar for about 5 months. While
there, the unit provided emergency medical attention to wounded soldiers
and civilians in and around Kandahar and prepared them for evacuation to a
combat support hospital. Two surgeons from the team returned in June 2003
and a third soldier returned in July 2003 as a result of a medical
condition and was released from active duty on September 27, 2003. Sixteen
of the remaining 17 soldiers returned to Fort McCoy on August 5, 2003, for
demobilization and were released from active duty by August 29, 2003. The
948th Forward Surgical Team's commander remained in Afghanistan until
August 8, 2003, when he returned to Fort McCoy for demobilization and was
released from active duty on September 4, 2003. A time line of the unit's
movements associated with its mobilization under Operation Enduring
Freedom is shown in figure 5.
1The order mobilizing the 948th Forward Surgical Team states that
physicians and nurse anesthetists were to deploy for only 90 days in a
theater unless they voluntarily extended their tour with the approval of
the command authority.
Appendix IV
948th Forward Surgical Team, Southfield,
Michigan
Figure 5: 948th Forward Surgical Team's Mobilization Time Line
Source: GAO.
All 20 soldiers in the 948th Forward Surgical Team experienced one or more
pay problems associated with their 2003 mobilization to active duty. As
summarized in table 12, soldiers in the 948th Forward Surgical Team
experienced pay problems during all phases of their active duty
mobilization, with the majority of the problems encountered in the last
two phases. Specifically, we identified pay problems associated with (1)
basic active duty pay, special medical pays, or allowances for 5 soldiers
during the mobilization phase; (2) basic active duty pay, special medical
pays, allowances, combat zone tax exclusion, or an in-theater incentive
pay associated with the deployment phase for 20 soldiers; and (3) basic
active duty pay, special medical pays, or allowances associated with 18
soldiers' demobilization from active duty.
Table 12: Pay Problems by Phase Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems
Mobilization 5 of 20
Deployment 20 of 20
Demobilization 18 of 20
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced pay problems in more than one phase.
Appendix IV
948th Forward Surgical Team, Southfield,
Michigan
In total, the pay problems we identified resulted in estimated
overpayments of about $20,700, underpayments of about $2,000, and late
payments of about $5,600. In addition, we identified about $15,300 and
about $130 of combat zone tax exclusions that were delayed or not
refunded, respectively. Available records showed that about $2,300 of the
$20,700 in identified overpayments were subsequently collected from the
soldiers.
We were informed of several instances in which the unit's pay problems
created financial hardships for the unit's soldiers and their families.
Specifically, several of the unit's soldiers could not pay their bills
while they were deployed and were forced to borrow money from friends and
relatives in order to meet their financial obligations.
Mobilization Pay As summarized in table 13, we found that five soldiers
from the 948th Forward Surgical Team experienced underpayments,
overpayments, or late
Problems payments related to their active duty pay and allowances
associated with their initial mobilization.
Table 13: Mobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Basic pay 1 0
Basic allowance for
housing 1 0
Family separation
allowance 0 1
Special medical pay 0 2 1
Source: GAO analysis of payroll data.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
Five soldiers experienced a variety of pay problems associated with their
mobilization to active duty. For example, one physician was underpaid the
special medical pay he was entitled to receive while on active duty. In
January 2003, the physician began receiving special medical payments at a
rate lower than he was entitled to receive. In March 2003, DFAS identified
Appendix IV
948th Forward Surgical Team, Southfield,
Michigan
and corrected this error by paying the physician the correct special
medical pay. However, DFAS did not retroactively pay the physician the
correct medical pay covering the first 39 days he was on active duty.
Another soldier experienced a problem related to his basic pay. The
soldier had previously received a reduction in rank for not completing
training requirements. On February 12, 2003, the commanding officer signed
an order revoking the reduction in rank-after the unit was mobilized to
active duty, but before it was deployed to Afghanistan. The Reserve Pay
Center received the revocation order on March 7, 2003, but did not process
this personnel action until April 4, 2003, resulting in late payments
totaling an estimated $520.
Deployment Pay In late February 2003, the 948th Forward Surgical Team
left Fort McCoy and traveled to Afghanistan. While in Kandahar, the
soldiers experienced
Problems further pay problems related to hardship duty pay, hostile fire
pay, and to a lesser extent, active duty basic pay, basic allowance for
housing, family separation allowance, and special medical pays. They also
experienced problems with respect to their benefits associated with the
combat zone tax exclusion. Table 14 summarizes the pay, allowance, and tax
benefit problems that the 948th Forward Surgical Team encountered during
its deployment.
Table 14: Deployment Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive Type of pay, pay or allowance Number of soldiers
allowance, or tax within 30 days of who were Number of soldiers benefit
entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Basic pay 2 0 0
Basic allowance for
housing 2 0 0
Hostile fire pay 19 1 3
Hardship duty pay 19 2 20
Family separation
allowance 0 1 0
Special medical pay 0 0 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
Appendix IV
948th Forward Surgical Team, Southfield,
Michigan
We found that 19 of the 20 soldiers did not receive their initial hostile
fire pay of $150 for February until an average of 47 days after arriving
in Afghanistan. We also found that one soldier never received her initial
hostile fire pay for February and March totaling $300. She also never
received a retroactive hostile fire payment of $75 for February 2003.2
All 20 soldiers experienced problems with their hardship duty pay.
Nineteen of the 20 soldiers did not receive their hardship duty pay for
February 2003 until April 2003. For 13 of the 19 soldiers, their February
2003 hardship duty payment was not only late but contained an overpayment
because the payments covered a period when the soldiers were still at Fort
McCoy. Additionally, 19 soldiers continued to receive hardship duty
payments not only after they left the location for which they were
authorized to receive this pay, but for periods ranging from 1 to 5 months
following demobilization.
All 20 soldiers waited 67 days before receiving their February combat zone
tax exclusion benefit payment, which averaged $377. We also found that one
soldier was not refunded the total amount of taxes withheld while in
combat zone tax exclusion status.
Pay Problems Eighteen of 20 soldiers in the 948th Forward Surgical Team
experienced pay problems associated with their demobilization from active
duty. Seventeen
Associated with of the unit's soldiers returned to Fort McCoy in August
2003 to begin their
Demobilization and demobilization process. The other 3 left Afghanistan
and returned to Fort
Release from Active McCoy in June and July 2003. As summarized in table
15, soldiers were overpaid their active duty basic pay, certain
allowances, and special
Duty medical pays after their release from active duty, while others never
received (and were therefore underpaid) all of the family separation
allowance or special medical pays they were entitled to receive.
2Initially, the soldiers were to receive $150 as their hostile fire pay,
but in April 2003, Congress increased the amount of hostile fire pay to
$225 and made the $75 increase retroactive to October 2002. In May 2003,
DFAS implemented the hostile fire pay increase and initiated action to
disburse the $75 retroactive payments.
Appendix IV
948th Forward Surgical Team, Southfield,
Michigan
Table 15: Demobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Basic pay 0 0
Basic allowance for
housing 0 0
Basic allowance for
subsistence 0 0
Family separation
allowance 0 2
Special medical pay 0 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
We determined that 16 soldiers received 1 or more days worth of active
duty basic pay, special medical pays, or allowances after being released
from active duty. These pay problems occurred because the demobilization
station was late in entering transactions to stop pays and allowances as
of the date the soldiers were released from active duty.
Appendix V
443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
The 443rd Military Police Company, headquartered in Owings Mills,
Maryland, has been called to active duty twice since September 11, 2001.
However, only the second mobilization fell within the time period of our
case study analysis. The first mobilization (October 6, 2001, to September
2002) activated 112 soldiers to perform "secure and defend" functions at
Fort Sam Houston in support of Operation Noble Eagle.1 On February 24,
2003, 121 soldiers of the 443rd Military Police Company were mobilized
with the unit, including 76 who had returned from the deployment to Fort
Sam Houston 5 months prior to this mobilization and 25 soldiers who were
cross-leveled in from other units. These cross-leveled soldiers included
12 soldiers from Puerto Rico, 7 soldiers from Pennsylvania, 3 soldiers
from Maryland, and 1 soldier each from New Jersey, Virginia, and West
Virginia.
In support of Operation Enduring Freedom, soldiers from the 443rd Military
Police Company reported to the home station in Owings Mills for a SRP
designed to help prepare them for mobilization. They later reported to
Fort Lee, Virginia on February 27, 2003, for additional mobilization and
inprocessing procedures. After approximately 2.5 months at Fort Lee, 112
soldiers arrived in Iraq on May 15. Of the 9 remaining soldiers, 1 soldier
arrived in Iraq earlier, on May 14, 1 soldier arrived on September 16, and
7 were on medical hold at Fort Lee for the entire mobilization. While
intheater, the 443rd Military Police Company operated a prison, Camp
Cropper, located near the Baghdad airport. On December 6, 2003, 112 of the
114 soldiers who deployed to Iraq left the Middle East and returned to
Fort Lee. One of the 2 other soldiers left early-on August 17-and the
other left later-on December 14. The soldiers of the 443rd Military Police
Company began demobilizing and returning to their civilian jobs on
December 15. By January 15, 2004, all but 6 of the 121 soldiers had
demobilized; the 6 soldiers remained on active duty to receive medical
treatment at Fort Lee. A time line of actions associated with the unit's
active duty mobilization is shown in figure 6.
1This mobilization falls outside of the audit period for this report and
is therefore only considered for its impact on the second mobilization.
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
Figure 6: 443rd Military Police Company's Mobilization Time Line
Source: GAO.
As summarized in table 16, soldiers experienced a range of pay problems at
every stage of the 443rd Military Police Company's tour of active duty.
Overall, 119 of 121 soldiers who mobilized experienced some type of pay
problem associated with their activation to, during, or deactivation from
federal service in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Specifically, we
found that (1) 70 soldiers experienced underpayments, overpayments, or
late payments during their initial mobilization; (2) 114 soldiers
experienced underpayments, overpayments, or late payments during their
tour of active duty at Camp Cropper, Iraq; and (3) 17 soldiers experienced
underpayments, overpayments, or late payments during their demobilization.
Table 16: Pay Problems by Phase Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems
Mobilization 70 of 121
Deployment 114 of 121
Demobilization 17 of 121
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced pay problems in more than one phase.
The dollar amounts associated with overpayments, underpayments, and late
payments we identified were approximately $25,000, $15,000 and
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
$20,000, respectively. In addition, soldiers received late payment of
their combat zone tax exclusion benefit totaling about $33,000. Of the
overpayments we identified, about $4,000 were subsequently collected from
the unit's soldiers.
Mobilization Pay As summarized in table 17, we found that 67 soldiers
from the 443rd Military Police Company experienced overpayments,
underpayments, or late
Problems payments related to basic pay and the associated entitlements
when called to active duty.
Table 17: Mobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Type of pay or within 30 days of Number of soldiers
Number of soldiers allowance entitlement who were underpaid who were
overpaid
Basic pay 2 0
Basic allowance for
housing 20 10
Cost of living
allowance 0 0
Family separation
allowance 24 4
Overseas housing
allowance 1 2
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
Before arriving at the mobilization station, the 99th Regional Readiness
Command performed a SRP for the 443rd Military Police Company at their
home station. This review was designed to prepare soldiers for
mobilization by confirming that their financial documents and personnel
paperwork were in order, as well as verifying that the soldiers were
medically fit to mobilize. The finance portion of the SRP consisted of a
briefing that covered the different entitlements soldiers could expect to
receive and a review of how to read the soldiers' Master Military Pay
Accounts. Soldiers who found errors in their individual accounts were
supposed to notify the Regional Readiness Command's finance personnel at
the SRP, who would then process the corrections upon returning to their
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
headquarters and send the necessary documentation to Fort McCoy's Reserve
Pay Center.
Upon reporting to Fort Lee, the 443rd Military Police Company's active
Army mobilization station, the unit underwent a second SRP, as required by
Army regulations. However, despite going through two SRPs, the soldiers
still experienced various pay problems related to their mobilization.
For example, not all of the eligible soldiers in the 443rd Military Police
Company received the proper amount of family separation allowance. Many of
the unit's soldiers began receiving family separation allowance earlier
than they should have, resulting in small overpayments that totaled
approximately $550 for the unit. In addition, 15 soldiers received late
family separation allowance payments during mobilization.
In addition, the soldiers of the 443rd Military Police Company also had
difficulties in starting their basic allowance for housing entitlements
and active duty basic pay. Ten soldiers experienced overpayments and 6
soldiers experienced underpayments of their basic allowance for housing.
The 12 soldiers cross-leveled into the 443rd Military Police Company from
Puerto Rico were not entitled to the basic allowance for housing type I
during their mobilization because they were classified as overseas
soldiers. Instead, these soldiers received basic allowance for housing
type II, a cost of living allowance and an overseas housing allowance. One
soldier received an overpayment of the cost of living allowance and 2
soldiers received underpayments of their overseas housing allowance
entitlements, all of which occurred because these payments were based on
incorrect rates.
Four members of the unit experienced problems starting their active duty
basic pay. Two soldiers received a delay in their promotions, resulting in
nearly $500 in late payments. The two other soldiers had received
demotions that were not promptly entered into DJMS-RC. The first soldier's
demotion had been effective at the start of the mobilization, but the
soldier continued to receive payments at the incorrect, higher rate until
July 2003. The resulting overpayments of active duty basic pay, totaling
over $2,500, were not identified by the Reserve Pay Center until we raised
questions about them.
The second soldier, however, incurred almost $6,400 in collections when
his demotion was processed 16 months after it became effective, and
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
despite the fact that his higher rank was restored shortly thereafter. His
demotion occurred because he had been unable to attend training to
maintain his rank before being mobilized for Operation Noble Eagle in
October 2001. During this mobilization, in February 2002, Army personnel
at the 99th Regional Readiness Command generated a grade reduction order,
but the transaction was not entered into DJMS-RC until June 2003, 4 months
after the soldier's mobilization for Operation Enduring Freedom and after
his deployment to Iraq. Although his previous grade was restored in July
2003, the restoration was not retroactive, so the soldier still had to pay
back almost $6,400.
One problem that occurred during the mobilization process did not have an
immediate effect on the soldiers of the 443rd Military Police Company, but
rather later, during their deployment. In October 2003, 20 soldiers had
their basic allowance for housing switched from the regular entitlement to
the partial basic allowance for housing. In addition, another 16 soldiers
had their family separation allowance entitlements stopped. These changes
occurred because during the SRP process in February, finance personnel
failed to extend the dates of eligibility for the basic allowance for
housing and the family separation allowance to reflect the end date of the
current mobilization. Pay records showed that these 36 soldiers were
entitled to receive one of these entitlements through October 2003,
exactly 2 years after the date of the first mobilization. While the
soldiers were paid for active duty beyond the October end date of
eligibility in the system, the allowances were automatically turned off by
the system. Most of these problems were caught shortly after occurring and
were corrected by the end of the following month, resulting in about
$5,750 of late payments. However, 4 soldiers failed to have their
entitlements turned back on, resulting in total underpayments of $3,500.
Soldiers of the 443rd Military Police Company complained that finance
personnel at Fort Lee in March refused to help them and told soldiers that
they needed to contact their unit administrator to fix their problems. The
unit administrator, who did not mobilize with the unit, voluntarily went
to Fort Lee to help ensure that all of the Company's soldiers' pay issues
were addressed. However, finance personnel at Fort Lee asked him to leave
after he attempted to help resolve some of his unit's pay problems.
Despite spending over 2 months at Fort Lee, many of the pay problems that
began during mobilization were not corrected by the time the soldiers
deployed to Iraq. In fact, 52 of the 121 soldiers left the mobilization
station with unresolved pay-related problems.
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
Pay Problems While As summarized in table 18, we identified a number of
pay problems associated with active duty pays and allowances during the
443rd Military
Deployed Police Company's deployment while on active duty.
Table 18: Deployment Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive Number of Number of
pay
Type of pay or or allowance within soldiers who soldiers who
30
allowance days of entitlement were underpaid were overpaid
Basic pay 6 0
Basic allowance for
housing 5 4
Basic allowance for
subsistence 0 1
Family separation
allowance 1 0
Hardship duty pay 107 112
Hostile fire pay 1 1
Overseas housing
allowance 1 2
Cost of living
allowance 1 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
While deployed in Iraq, all of the soldiers experienced problems related
to the location-based payments-specifically, problems with hardship duty
pay, hostile fire pay, and the combat zone tax exclusion. All of the 114
soldiers deployed to Iraq with the 443rd Military Police Company
experienced some sort of overpayment, underpayment, or late payment of at
least one of these three entitlements.
Soldiers in the 443rd Military Police Company were entitled to $100 per
month for hardship duty pay for serving in Iraq. However, officials at the
Army area servicing finance office paid the first partial month's hardship
duty pay more than 2 months after it was due to 107 of the 114 soldiers
deployed to Iraq. Of the remaining 7 soldiers, 4 received hardship duty
pay on time and 3 never received the first partial month's hardship duty
pay during our audit period. Additionally, none of the 113 soldiers
remaining in Iraq during December 2003 received any hardship duty pay
payments for
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
the partial month they spent in-theater. Soldiers in the unit also
experienced assorted individual problems relating to the payment of the
hardship duty pay entitlement. For example, 1 soldier who remained on
medical hold at Fort Lee received hardship duty pay payments, totaling
over $350, despite never deploying. Two soldiers each received two
hardship duty pay payments in a given month, resulting in over $150 in
overpayments. Finally, one soldier continued to receive over $300 in
hardship duty pay payments after leaving Iraq in August 2003.
Of the 113 soldiers entitled to hostile fire pay during the deployment, 3
experienced some sort of problem with this pay. Two soldiers received
overpayments of hostile fire pay, including 1 soldier who continued to
receive hostile fire pay after he left the in-theater location and another
soldier who erroneously received $300 in hostile fire pay instead of the
correct $225 amount for 1 month. This second soldier also received part of
his May 2003 hostile fire pay 75 days after it was due. Finally, 1 other
soldier experienced a $450 underpayment of hostile fire pay because he
stopped receiving the entitlement before leaving Iraq.
Of the 114 soldiers deployed to Iraq, 112 received their first month's
combat zone tax exclusion more than 30 days after they were entitled to
it. This resulted in late payments totaling over $33,000, more than the
late payments from all other sources combined. Additionally, 3 soldiers
experienced overpayments and underpayments related to the combat zone tax
exclusion. One of these soldiers erroneously received over $250 as a
combat zone tax exclusion repayment related to a bonus payment that was
taxable. Another soldier did not receive his combat zone tax exclusion
repayment for the last 2 months of his mobilization, creating an
overwithholding of over $400.
We were unable to determine the extent to which one additional soldier in
the unit experienced problems with his combat zone tax exclusion, hardship
duty pay, and hostile fire pay during the mobilization. His DD Form 214,
Certificate of Release and Discharge from Active Duty, stated that the
soldier served with his unit in theater from May 15, 2003, to December 6,
2003. However, the soldier did not receive any of these location-based
entitlements during his tour of duty. Pay personnel at Fort McCoy stated
that his records indicate he was on convalescent leave (leave for soldiers
returning to duty after illness or injury) from May 21 to July 16, and
therefore may not have been entitled to these allowances. Pay personnel at
Fort McCoy were continuing to research this case and could
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
not tell us anything further. Without additional information, we could not
determine whether this soldier was paid correctly.
In addition, during this phase, some of the soldiers of the 443rd Military
Police Company also experienced various individual problems with active
duty basic pay, the basic allowance for housing, and the overseas housing
allowance. Because of delays in promotions, six soldiers experienced late
payments of active duty basic pay and four of these soldiers also
experienced late payments of basic allowance for housing. Other problems
included one soldier who received overpayments of the basic allowance for
housing throughout the mobilization, totaling over $850, because her
spouse was a service member who periodically went on and off duty. Two
other soldiers had their overseas housing allowance paid inconsistently
and at varying rates, creating net overpayments for both soldiers.
Pay Problems The soldiers of the 443rd Military Police Company began to
demobilize in
December 2003. As summarized in table 19, some soldiers continued
toAssociated with experience pay problems throughout their demobilization
and even after Demobilization and release from active duty. These problems
consisted primarily of differences Release from Active between the last
dates for which soldiers were paid and the dates of release
from active duty as recorded on the DD Form 214, Certificate of Release
orDuty Discharge from Active Duty.
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
Table 19: Demobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Type of pay or within 30 days of Number of soldiers
Number of soldiers allowance entitlement who were underpaid who were
overpaid
Basic pay 0 2
Basic allowance for
housing 0 3
Basic allowance for
subsistence 0 2
Hardship duty
pay 0 0
Family separation
allowance 0 0
Overseas housing
allowance 7 2
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
Of the 115 soldiers who demobilized by the end of our audit period,
including 2 who had been on medical hold, 6 soldiers were paid beyond
their date of demobilization and 2 soldiers had their pay stopped shortly
before demobilizing. The 6 soldiers paid beyond their date of
demobilization were overpaid for an average of 19 days and nearly $2,500
each. This includes 1 soldier who was overpaid for at least 68 days and
$10,500. This soldier, who demobilized in February 2004, stated that he
contacted his demobilization station, home unit, and the pay section of
the Regional Readiness Command by early April, but nevertheless continued
to be paid through April 2004. The 2 soldiers whose pays were stopped
before demobilizing were underpaid a total of almost $400.
In addition to the problems associated with the date of release from
active duty, several soldiers experienced other problems related to their
demobilization. For example, the demobilization station processed
"hardship duty pay for certain places" for 1 soldier from May 2003 to
December 2003. This type of hardship duty pay has not been authorized for
newly deployed soldiers since December 2001 and the soldier had received
his correct "hardship duty pay for designated areas" while he was deployed
in Iraq. This erroneous transaction during the soldier's out-processing
created an overpayment of approximately $150 that went undetected.
Additionally, 7 of the 12 soldiers cross-leveled into the 443rd Military
Police
Appendix V 443rd Military Police Company, Owings Mills, Maryland
Company from Puerto Rico experienced late payments of their last month's
overseas housing allowance entitlement, totaling almost $1,500.
Appendix VI
FORSCOM Support Unit, Finksburg, Maryland
A major in the Army's Individual Ready Reserve,1 who lives in Maryland,
volunteered for active duty. He received orders mobilizing him to active
duty on March 6, 2003, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The major
was activated as a separate one-person unit. Because he was mobilized from
an inactive status, he did not have a home unit. He reported to Fort
McPherson, Georgia, on March 6, 2003, where he participated in an Army
SRP. On March 9, 2003, he reported to Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada for
training. Because he was to serve as an Army liaison to the Air Force
while deployed, on March 17, 2003, he reported to Seymour Johnson Air
Force base in North Carolina, where he underwent an Air Force mobilization
inprocessing review with the Air Force's 4th Fighter Wing. He arrived in
Qatar on March 25, 2003. He was assigned to serve as an Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) Ground Liaison Officer attached to the Air Force's 379th
Expeditionary Force at the Air Force base at Doha, Qatar. As a Ground
Liaison Officer, he was responsible for a team of Army officers that
briefed Air Force pilots before every mission during the Iraqi offensive
on the latest information concerning the location of Army troops and enemy
forces. He was also responsible for providing briefings to the Air Force
general in charge of flight operations at Doha on the status and positions
of coalition ground forces. He served in this capacity until May 1, 2003,
when he left Qatar. On May 2, 2003, he underwent Air Force active duty
outprocessing with the Air Force's 4th Fighter Wing at Seymour Johnson Air
Force Base. He arrived at Fort McPherson on May 4, 2003, for
demobilization processing. He was demobilized from active duty on May 15,
2003, and returned to his home in an inactive status as a member of the
Army's Individual Ready Reserve. In August 2003, the major resigned his
commission and received an honorable discharge from the Army Reserve. Key
events associated with the major's active duty pays and allowances for his
2003 mobilization are summarized in figure 7.
1The Army's Individual Ready Reserve members do not participate in any
regularly scheduled training and are not paid for their membership in the
Ready Reserve. Each year, the Army transfers thousands of soldiers who
have completed active duty or Selected Reserve commitments to the
Individual Ready Reserve. Individual Ready Reserve soldiers can be
mobilized to active duty to help meet requirements.
Appendix VI
FORSCOM Support Unit, Finksburg,
Maryland
Figure 7: FORSCOM Support Unit Soldier Time Line
Source: GAO.
As summarized in table 20, this one-soldier unit experienced various pay
problems associated with his location-based active duty pays and
allowances that continued until well after his demobilization to
Individual Ready Reserve status. Specifically, we found that this
single-soldier unit (1) did not have any underpayments, overpayments, or
late payments during initial mobilization; (2) experienced overpayments
and late payments associated with deployment location-based pays,
allowances, and related tax benefits; and (3) continued to experience
problems with active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits for
months after his demobilization.
Appendix VI
FORSCOM Support Unit, Finksburg,
Maryland
Table 20: Pay Problems by Phase Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems
Mobilization 0 of 1
Deployment 1 of 1
Demobilization 1 of 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Pay problems associated with deployment continued through
demobilization.
The dollar amounts associated with overpayments and late payments we
identified were about $8,000 and $300, respectively. Of the overpayments
we identified, all were subsequently collected from the soldier by May 31,
2004.
Mobilization Pay Finance personnel at the soldier's mobilization station
at Fort McPherson, Georgia, started his active duty pay entitlements
associated with his initial
Problems mobilization. We did not identify any pay problems associated
with the soldier's initial mobilization to active duty.
Pay Problems While Deployed
As summarized in table 21, we identified active duty pay and combat zone
tax benefit problems associated with the soldier's assigned deployment
location while on active duty. When the soldier arrived at his assigned
active duty deployment location in Qatar on March 25, 2003, he was
entitled to receive hardship duty pay and was entitled to exempt his pay
from federal taxes while assigned to that location. However, while the
soldier went through an Air Force in-processing procedure when he arrived
in Qatar, there were no procedures in place to provide flight manifest
documentation to an Army area servicing finance office notifying it of his
arrival. Such documentation is necessary to start the soldier's hostile
fire pay and related combat zone tax exclusion benefits. Because he was
assigned to support an Air Force operation, he did not process through, or
have any access to, an Army area servicing finance office to start his
location-based pays and related tax benefits. It was not until he left
Qatar and arrived at his demobilization station at Fort McPherson that
finance personnel at that location received supporting documentation from
the soldier and took the actions necessary to process transactions for him
to receive his pay and tax benefit entitlements. Consequently, he did not
receive any of his hostile fire pay until May 21, 2003, or his related
combat
Appendix VI
FORSCOM Support Unit, Finksburg,
Maryland
zone tax exclusion benefits until June 4, 2003-after he returned from his
overseas deployment.
Table 21: Deployment Pay Problem Type of pay or allowance Type of problem
Hostile fire pay Late payment
Source: GAO analysis.
Army finance officials did not initiate the soldier's hostile fire pay and
combat zone tax exclusion benefit, which he was entitled to receive
beginning in March 2003, until officials at his demobilization station
took action to start this pay and tax benefit. The soldier was deployed to
serve as an Army liaison to an Air Force unit with an Air Force finance
office; he was unable to find anyone at or near his deployed location who
could help him get his entitled location-based pay and related tax
benefits started. Air Force finance personnel told the soldier to contact
finance personnel back in the United States at Fort McPherson to address
his pay problems. The soldier told us that while he was in Qatar he was
able to contact DFAS by email, but officials there told him there was
little they could do to help him get his location-based pays and tax
benefits started. He said that telephone calls to the United States were
difficult because of time differences and his limited access to phones to
make an overseas call.
Pay Problems The soldier left Qatar on May 1, 2003, to return to his
demobilization station
at Fort McPherson. Fort McPherson issued orders to demobilize him
fromAssociated with active duty to the Army's Individual Ready Reserve as
of May 15, 2003. As Demobilization and summarized in table 22, during his
demobilization and after his release Release from Active from active duty,
the soldier continued to experience pay problems. These
problems were overpayments associated with the soldier receiving
activeDuty duty pay after the date of his demobilization from active duty.
Appendix VI
FORSCOM Support Unit, Finksburg,
Maryland
Table 22: Demobilization Pay Problems
Type of pay or allowance Type of problem
Basic pay Overpayment
Basic allowance for subsistence Overpayment
Basic allowance for housing Overpayment
Family separation allowance Overpayment
Aviation career incentive pay Overpayment
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldier may have experienced problems with more than one type of pay
or allowance.
The soldier out-processed through Fort McPherson and received his DD Form
214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, with a release
from active duty date of May 15, 2003. However, finance personnel at the
Fort McPherson demobilization station did not take action to stop his
active duty pays and allowances as of that date. As a result, he continued
to receive active duty pays and allowances that he was not entitled to
receive for a month after his demobilization-from May 16 through June 13,
2003. In addition, he continued to receive his combat zone tax exclusion
benefits for the same period, May 16 through June 13, even though he had
not only left the combat zone, but had already demobilized from active
duty and returned home. The income tax withholdings for this period were
refunded directly to the soldier. His pay was not stopped at the end of
his active duty tour initially because finance personnel at Fort McPherson
were waiting for his hardship duty pays to "clear," but they then forgot
to stop all pays related to active duty.
This failure to stop the soldier's active duty pays and allowances on time
resulted in the soldier writing a $6,150.75 check to DFAS in an attempt to
resolve all overpayment issues associated with his mobilization. As
summarized in table 23, the soldier undertook a series of time-consuming
phone calls and faxes to Fort McPherson, DFAS-Indianapolis, DFAS-Denver,
and DFAS-Cleveland over a 13-month period to finally get his pay issues
resolved. Ultimately, the soldier's pay issues related to his March and
April 2003 active duty deployment were only identified and resolved
through the relentless efforts of the soldier and our inquiries into the
matter. With the soldier's recent $1,140.54 check to DFAS, his pay issues
with his March and April 2003 mobilization were resolved-over a year after
his deployment ended.
Appendix VI
FORSCOM Support Unit, Finksburg,
Maryland
Table 23: Timetable of Soldier's Attempts to Correct Problems Related to Active
Duty Entitlements Date Action
June 6, 2003 Based on a Leave and Earnings Statement indicating he was
continuing to receive active duty pays and allowances after he was
demobilized, the soldier sent an e-mail through his myPay online account
asking how to get these erroneous active duty payments stopped. About 2
weeks later, the soldier was told he needed to contact the pay office at
his demobilization location (Fort McPherson) to get his active duty
payments stopped.
June 30, 2003 The soldier spoke with a Fort McPherson official who
stopped his active duty payments and faxed him documentation showing he
owed $6,150.75 as a result of his active duty overpayments.
July 25, 2003 The soldier mailed a check for $6,150.75 to the
DFAS-Indianapolis address he was provided.
August 15, 2003 The soldier called Fort McPherson officials to inquire
why his Leave and Earnings Statement continued to show a debt that he'd
already repaid.
September 4, 2003 After three more phone calls to officials at Fort
McPherson, on September 4, 2003, the soldier was told that DFAS had
received his check and would adjust his account to remove the erroneous
debt.
November 3, 2003 Two months later, on November 3, 2003, after again
receiving a Leave and Earnings Statement showing an erroneous debt
balance, the soldier again called Fort McPherson. He was told, "there is
nothing more I can do for you" and advised to call 1-888-PAY-ARMY for
service.
November 3, 2003 When he called 888-PAY-ARMY, the soldier was referred to
debt collections (at 800-9620648).
November 3, 2003 The soldier called 800-962-0648 and was assured that "he
did not need to worry, because he did not appear in their debt system."
December 23, 2003 After receiving another Leave and Earnings Statement
showing an erroneous debt balance, the soldier called 888-PAY-ARMY. He was
told that only DFAS-Indianapolis could help him resolve his problem, but
the service representative would not give him a phone number to call at
that location. Instead, he was told to call Fort McPherson. The soldier
protested that an official at Fort McPherson told him that they could not
help him and that he would have to contact the number he was now calling.
Nonetheless, he was told he had to call Fort McPherson.
December 23, 2003 The soldier called Fort McPherson. He was told to fax a
copy of his canceled check showing that he repaid his active duty
overpayment and they would again try to rectify this erroneous debt.
January 5, 2004 After receiving a copy of his canceled check sent to DFAS
in July 2003, the soldier faxed a copy to Fort McPherson.
January 8, 2004 The soldier e-mailed us to ask for our assistance in
resolving this erroneous debt.
April 20, 2004 After the soldier informed Fort McPherson officials that he
contacted us about this matter, he was informed that a complete review of
his pay records and a recalculation of the payments he received showed he
owed an additional $1,140.54 associated with an erroneous combat zone tax
exclusion benefit.
May 3, 2004 The soldier wrote a check for $1,140.54 and sent it to DFAS.
Source: GAO analysis.
Appendix VII
629th Transportation Detachment, Fort Eustis, Virginia
The 629th Transportation Detachment was called to active duty in support
of Operation Enduring Freedom on March 15, 2003, for a period not to
exceed 365 days. Twenty-seven soldiers with the 629th Transportation
Detachment received orders to mobilize; but only 24 soldiers actually
deployed with the unit.1 The unit arrived at its home station, Fort
Eustis, Virginia, on March 15, 2003, where it began the SRP in-processing.
On March 18, 2003, the soldiers continued their mobilization processing at
Fort Eustis, Virginia, which was also their designated mobilization
station. The unit remained at Fort Eustis for approximately 2 months
undergoing additional in-processing and training. On May 22, 2003, the
629th Transportation Detachment was deployed to Kuwait and was assigned
responsibility for tracking supplies in and out of Army field locations in
and around Kuwait. After completing its assigned mission, the unit left
Kuwait on December 5, 2003, to return to its demobilization station. By
the end of January 2004, all of the soldiers were released from active
duty with the exception of 1 soldier who was placed on medical hold. A
time line of key actions associated with the unit's mobilization under
Operation Enduring Freedom is shown in figure 8.
Figure 8: 629th Transportation Company's Time Line
Source: GAO.
1Three soldiers did not deploy with the unit. One soldier had
documentation supporting a medical condition that made him medically unfit
for mobilization. Another soldier had his orders revoked the day after
mobilization. The third soldier was mobilized but stayed behind in a
medical hold status.
Appendix VII
629th Transportation Detachment, Fort
Eustis, Virginia
As summarized in table 24, all 24 of the deployed soldiers experienced at
least one pay problem associated with their activation to, during, and
deactivation from, active duty service in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom. Specifically, we found that (1) 5 soldiers experienced
underpayments or late payments during their initial mobilization; (2) 24
soldiers experienced underpayments, overpayments, or late payments during
their tour of active duty in and around Kuwait, including in-theater
incentives such as hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay; and (3) 1
soldier was underpaid entitled pays and allowances associated with his
demobilization.
Table 24: Pay Problems by Phase Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems
Mobilization 5 of 24
Deployment 24 of 24
Demobilization 1 of 24
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldier may have experienced pay problems in more than one phase.
In total, we identified estimated overpayments of about $3,000,
underpayments of about $2,000, and late payments of about $14,000,
associated with the pay problems we identified. Specifically, we
determined the following:
o More than half of the $3,000 in overpayments we identified was
associated with the majority of the unit's soldiers receiving an extra $75
payment of hostile fire pay during their tour of active duty in Kuwait.
o More than 70 percent of the soldiers deployed to Kuwait did not receive
hardship duty pay in the months of May and December 2003, contributing to
the underpayments of $2,000.
o An estimated $8,000 of the $14,000 in late payments we identified were
associated with two soldiers. Available pay records for one soldier show
he did not receive the correct amount of basic allowance for housing
during his active duty tour until 9 months after his mobilization date.
Another soldier did not receive the correct amount of basic pay and basic
allowance for housing until approximately 3 months after his promotion had
become effective.
Appendix VII
629th Transportation Detachment, Fort
Eustis, Virginia
Mobilization Pay Problems
As summarized in table 25, we identified several soldiers who experienced
underpayments or late payments related to basic pay and associated
entitlements associated with the mobilization phase. Most, if not all, of
these cases were likely the result of proper documentation not being
submitted promptly, resulting in some soldiers receiving delayed housing
allowances and promotions. For example, one soldier did not receive the
correct amount of basic pay and basic allowance for housing based on a
promotion that should have been effective in January 2003 but did not get
processed until 3 months later in mid-April. We found the personnel action
form was not signed until April 2003.
Table 25: Mobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Basic pay 0 1
Basic allowance
for housing 1 1
Basic allowance
for subsistence 0 0
Family separation
allowance 2 2
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldier may have experienced problems with more than one type of pay
or allowance.
Upon receipt of individual mobilization orders, the unit's soldiers
reported to their unit's home station in Fort Eustis, Virginia, where they
attended a SRP. The purpose of this SRP was to ensure that all soldiers
had all required administrative paperwork, financial documents, and were
physically fit for the ensuing mobilization. Personnel from the 99th
Regional Readiness Command sent a team who conducted the finance portion
of the SRP to verify the soldiers' supporting financial documentation. If
necessary, the 99th Regional Readiness Command team submitted transactions
with the necessary supporting documentation to the Reserve Pay Center at
Fort McCoy to update the soldiers' Master Military Pay Accounts to
correctly reflect their mobilized pay status. However, we identified
several soldiers who did not have appropriate supporting
Appendix VII
629th Transportation Detachment, Fort
Eustis, Virginia
documentation maintained in their files to justify basic allowance for
housing payments. For example, we identified 12 soldiers who received
basic allowance for housing payments for which we were unable to obtain
supporting documentation (i.e., DA Form 5960). Total basic allowance for
housing payments for those 12 soldiers amounted to over $110,000.
Additionally, we identified inconsistencies with the determinations of
soldiers' entitlements to the family separation allowance made at the
mobilization station. According to the DOD FMR Volume 7A, soldiers should
be separated from their families by more than 50 miles in order to receive
the family separation allowance. We found 10 soldiers from the 629th
Transportation Detachment, including the soldier who was placed on medical
hold, who received the family separation allowance while at their home
station and mobilization station even though that location was less than
50 miles from their home. The soldiers were never informed by pay
technicians at the unit or at their mobilization station that they were
not entitled to the family separation allowance if they were staying at
Fort Eustis but their home of record was within 50 miles, and we did not
see any documentation showing that the unit commander had approved an
exception to the mileage restriction on family separation allowance
eligibility.
Pay Problems While As summarized in table 26, we identified a number of
pay problems with five different types of active duty pays and allowances
associated with the
Deployed unit's deployment while on active duty.
Appendix VII
629th Transportation Detachment, Fort
Eustis, Virginia
Table 26: Deployed Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Basic pay 8 0
Basic allowance for
housing 3 1
Family separation
allowance 1 1
Hostile fire pay 22 1
Hardship duty pay 0 24
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced more than one type of problem with
more than one type of pay or allowance.
During the soldiers' deployment to Kuwait, all 24 of the 629th
Transportation Detachment's soldiers encountered pay problems related to
hardship duty pay and hostile fire pay. Most soldiers did not receive any
hardship duty pay during the month they arrived in-theater and the month
that they left the theater. In addition, all of the soldiers received
their combat zone tax exclusion benefit at least one month late.
Per DOD FMR Volume 7A, soldiers who perform duties in designated areas for
over 30 days are entitled to the hardship duty pay incentive. The
regulation specified the general area of Kuwait as a designated area and
provided $100 a month to all soldiers serving there. Per the same
regulation, soldiers serving in Kuwait are also entitled to hostile fire
pay of $225 per month. Both hardship duty pay and hostile fire pay should
start at the same time upon the soldier's arrival in Kuwait. In the case
of the 629th Transportation Detachment, the soldiers had their military
identification cards swiped into the Tactical Personnel System upon
landing in Kuwait to document their date of arrival. However, most of the
soldiers never received any payment for hardship duty pay in the month
that they arrived in Kuwait, nor did most receive any hardship duty pay
payment in the month that they left Kuwait. Officials at the local Army
area servicing finance office did not initiate the unit's hostile fire pay
incentive until 1 month after the soldiers arrived in theater.
Furthermore, the soldiers incorrectly received a hostile fire pay payment
of $300 during the month of June (an overpayment of $75). One of the
unit's soldiers left Kuwait earlier
Appendix VII
629th Transportation Detachment, Fort
Eustis, Virginia
than the rest of the unit, but the soldier's hardship duty pay continued
for another 6 months and his hostile fire pay continued for 1 extra month
before it was stopped.
Pay Problems Soldiers of the 629th Transportation Detachment returned to
their
demobilization station at Fort Eustis, Virginia, around December 5,
2003,Associated with and began the SRP out-processing. As summarized in
table 27, we identified Demobilization and one soldier who experienced pay
problems associated with the Release from Active demobilization phase of
his active duty tour.
Duty
Table 27: Demobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers
who did not receive
pay or allowance Number of soldiers Type of pay or within 30 days of who
were Number of soldiers allowance entitlement underpaid who were overpaid
Family separation
allowance 0 1
Source: GAO analysis.
We identified one soldier who did not receive any family separation
allowance payments during the last 3 months of active duty. This soldier's
home of record was more than 50 miles from the demobilization station in
Fort Eustis, Virginia, and he was not commuting daily. Consequently, he
should have received family separation allowance for these 3 months. Ten
other soldiers in the unit who returned to Fort Eustis and lived within
the 50-mile range of the demobilization station and did not have a
commander's exception on file received $250 per month in family separation
allowance payments until their release from active duty. By January 2004,
all mobilized soldiers, with the exception of the soldier who was on
medical hold, were released from active duty.
Appendix VIII
3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment New Haven, Connecticut
The 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment was called to active duty in
support of Operation Noble Eagle on December 3, 2002. A total of 11
soldiers from the unit were mobilized to support operations at the
Intelligence and Security Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.1 The 3423rd
Military Intelligence Detachment does not have a unit administrator during
peacetime and had no dedicated unit administrator during the mobilization.
The unit was called to active duty and reported to its mobilization
station, Fort Lee, Virginia, where the soldiers went through in-processing
during December 2002. After this processing, the unit went to the Army's
National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville, Virginia, for 1
week of additional in-processing and was then transferred to Fort Belvoir.
For the next 11 months, the unit carried out its mission to gather and
analyze intelligence information in support of U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command operations at Fort Belvoir. In November 2003, the 3423rd
Military Intelligence Detachment began to demobilize at Fort Lee and by
December 2, 2003, all but 1 soldier had been released from active duty.
The unit reported that the remaining soldier stayed on active duty at Fort
Belvoir for an additional year. A time line of key actions associated with
the unit's mobilization to active duty is shown in figure 9.
Figure 9: 3423rd Military Intelligence Company's Mobilization Time Line
Source: GAO.
As summarized in table 28, soldiers experienced a range of pay problems at
every stage of the 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment's tour of
active duty. The unit did not have a dedicated unit administrator to carry
out pay support responsibilities during its active duty mobilization.
Overall, all 11
1A 12th soldier was mobilized from June 2002 to June 2003, but was not
part of this mission.
Appendix VIII 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment New Haven, Connecticut
soldiers in the unit experienced some type of pay problem associated with
their activation to, during, or deactivation from active duty in support
of Operation Noble Eagle. Specifically, we found that (1) 10 soldiers
experienced underpayments, overpayments or late payments during their
initial mobilization; (2) 9 soldiers experienced underpayments,
overpayments, or late payments during their tour of active duty at Fort
Belvoir; and (3) 9 soldiers experienced underpayments, overpayments, or
late payments during their demobilization.
Table 28: Pay Problems by Phase
Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems
Mobilization 10 of 11
Deployment 9 of 11
Demobilization 9 of 11
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced pay problems in more than one phase.
The dollar amounts associated with the overpayments, underpayments, and
late payments we identified were about $18,500, $4,000, and $5,000,
respectively. Of the overpayments we identified, about $2,000 were
subsequently collected from the unit's soldiers as of January 31, 2004.
Mobilization Pay As summarized in table 29, we found that 10 of the 11
soldiers from the 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment experienced pay
problems related
Problems to basic pay and the associated entitlements when called to
active duty.
Appendix VIII 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment New Haven,
Connecticut
Table 29: Mobilization Pay Problems
Number of
soldiers
who received Number of Number of
Type of pay or late soldiers soldiers
allowance payments who were who were
underpaid overpaid
Basic allowance
for housing 1 1
Cost of living
allowance 8 5
Family separation
allowance 0 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced pay problems with more than one type
of pay or allowance or more than one type of problem per pay or allowance.
Before mobilization, the unit attended several SRPs put on by the 94th
Regional Readiness Command. Specifically, after September 11, 2001, the
unit received warnings that it might be called up and therefore began
attending SRPs to prepare for impending mobilization. The unit first
attended a program at the Reserve center in Waterbury, Connecticut, in
October 2001, along with several other units that were definitely
mobilizing. The soldiers attended a second SRP in November 2002. The
finance portion of the SRP consisted of a briefing that covered the
different entitlements soldiers could expect to receive and a review of
the soldiers' Master Military Pay Accounts. Upon reporting to the active
Army mobilization station at Fort Lee, the unit underwent a third SRP.
We found 10 of the 11 soldiers in the 3423rd Military Intelligence
Detachment were entitled to the continental U.S. cost of living allowance
during their mobilization at a rate based on their principal place of
residence at the time they were ordered to active duty.2 One of these 10
soldiers did not receive the entitlement during his mobilization,
resulting in a $500 underpayment. The 9 remaining soldiers erroneously
began receiving the overseas cost of living allowance rather than the
continental U.S. cost of living allowance at the beginning of the
mobilization. In April 2003, all 9 soldiers began correctly receiving
continental U.S. cost of living allowance and the entitlement was paid
retroactively in May to 8 of the
2The 11th soldier was not entitled to the continental U.S. cost of living
allowance because his principal place of residence did not qualify for a
cost of living adjustment.
Appendix VIII 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment New Haven,
Connecticut
soldiers for the period December 2002 through March 2003.3 The erroneous
payments of the overseas cost of living allowance were collected
immediately for 4 of the soldiers, while the erroneous payments for the
other 4 soldiers were only partially collected later in the mobilization.
The delay in collecting the overseas cost of living allowance for the 4
soldiers resulted in overpayments of over $3,500 that were not collected
in full by the end of the mobilization. One soldier continued to receive
the overseas cost of living allowance and the continental U.S. cost of
living allowance concurrently through August 2003, totaling more than
$2,500. DOD began to recoup these amounts in October 2003. In addition to
the overpayments and underpayments associated with overseas cost of living
allowance payments, discrepancies between the overseas and continental
U.S. cost of living allowance rates for 8 of the 9 soldiers led to over
$700 in late payments.
We also found that 9 of the 10 soldiers in the 3423rd Military
Intelligence Detachment received family separation allowance overpayments
during mobilization. Because of pay clerks' confusion regarding family
separation allowance entitlement rules, the 9 soldiers began receiving the
family separation allowance 1 to 3 days earlier than they should have,
resulting in small overpayments that totaled almost $200 for the unit.
Additionally, one soldier in the unit experienced a problem related to his
basic allowance for housing pay during mobilization. Shortly after
mobilization, the soldier's basic allowance for housing entitlement
erroneously switched from the "with dependents" rate to the "without
dependents" rate for half of December 2002 and for January through March
2003. In April 2003, the soldier was repaid basic allowance for housing at
the "with dependents" rate for January through March 2003.4 These switches
resulted in $800 in payments more than 30 days after the soldier was
entitled and almost $200 in underpayments for the period in December 2002
when the soldier did not receive basic allowance for housing at the "with
dependents" rate. Furthermore, even though the soldier was deployed from
his home in Connecticut to his active duty location at Fort Belvior in
Virginia, he did not received his family separation allowance for the
entire mobilization, creating an estimated $3,000 underpayment.
3The 9th soldier did not have his overseas cost of living adjustment
recollected and the continental U.S. cost of living adjustment paid
instead, creating a $2 underpayment.
4The basic allowance for housing previously paid under the "without
dependents" rate was recollected concurrently with the April 2003 payment.
Appendix VIII 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment New Haven, Connecticut
Pay Problems While As summarized in table 30, we identified a number of
pay problems associated with active duty pays and allowances during the
3423rd Military
Deployed Intelligence Detachment's deployment while on active duty.
Table 30: Deployment Pay Problems
Number of soldiers Type of pay or who received late Number of soldiers
Number of soldiers allowance payments who were underpaid who were overpaid
Active duty basic
pay 1 0
Basic allowance
for housing 1 0
Foreign language
proficiency pay 0 1
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced pay problems with more than one type
of pay or allowance or more than one type of problem per pay or allowance.
Two soldiers experienced individual problems with active duty basic pay,
basic allowance for housing, and foreign language proficiency pay.
Additionally, during their deployment to Fort Belvoir, the unit's soldiers
experienced pay problems related to the basic allowance for subsistence
provided to enlisted soldiers. Ten of the 11 soldiers in the unit
experienced some sort of overpayment, underpayment, or late payment
associated with their deployment.
Two soldiers experienced problems relating to various pay entitlements
during their deployment. One soldier received about $1,800 in active duty
basic pay and basic allowance for housing payments more than 30 days after
he was entitled to receive them because of a delay in processing his
promotion. Another soldier did not receive his foreign language
proficiency pay for 1 month of his deployment, creating a $100
underpayment.
While we did not count any of the unit's basic allowance for subsistence
payments as pay problems because of incomplete documentation, seven
enlisted soldiers in the unit experienced significant confusion over
whether they received their correct basic allowance for subsistence
payments. The unit's enlisted soldiers initially received the regular
basic allowance for subsistence until April 2003. At that time, all basic
allowance for subsistence amounts paid to these soldiers were collected
and a different
Appendix VIII 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment New Haven, Connecticut
basic allowance for subsistence rate, called "rations in kind not
available,"5 was retroactively paid to these soldiers. In 2003,
rations-in-kind-notavailable payments were about $20 more per month than
the regular basic allowance for subsistence.
However, finance personnel at the Intelligence and Security Command (the
unit's servicing finance office while deployed at Fort Belvoir) determined
that even though the unit was issued orders stating that housing and mess
would not be provided, the soldiers actually could eat at the Fort Belvoir
mess. This resulted in (1) a collection in May of all of the previous
rationsin-kind-not available payments to the unit's soldiers except for
payments for the initial mobilization time prior to arrival at Fort
Belvoir, and (2) a retroactive repayment of the regular basic allowance
for subsistence. Nevertheless, the enlisted soldiers continued to receive
the rations-in-kindnot-available rate from mid-May through July 2003. In
July 2003, Fort McCoy again initiated transactions to collect the
rations-in-kind-notavailable payments and instead pay regular basic
allowance for subsistence. The regular basic allowance for subsistence
then continued for the rest of the unit's mobilization, despite the fact
that in June 2003, a committee of finance personnel at Fort Belvoir
determined that it was not feasible for the soldiers to continue to use
the mess facilities at Fort Belvoir because of mission requirements and
transportation costs.
Pay Problems Associated with Demobilization and Release from Active Duty
The soldiers of the 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment began to
demobilize in November 2003. As summarized in table 31, some soldiers
continued to experience pay problems throughout their demobilization and
release from active duty.
5According to DOD FMR Volume 7A, in general, "rations in kind not
available" applies to enlisted soldiers on duty at a permanent station
where a government mess is not available or is impracticable for the
soldiers to use.
Appendix VIII 3423rd Military Intelligence Detachment New Haven,
Connecticut
Table 31: Demobilization Pay Problems
Number of soldiers Type of pay or who received late Number of soldiers
Number of soldiers allowance payments who were underpaid who were overpaid
Active duty basic
pay 0 0
Basic allowance
for housing 0 0
Basic allowance
for subsistence 0 0
Family separation
allowance 0 0
Foreign language
proficiency pay 0 0
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced pay problems with more than one type
of pay or allowance or more than one type of problem per pay or allowance.
Of the 10 soldiers who demobilized by the end of our audit period, 9
continued to receive their active duty pay and entitlements past the date
of separation from the Army. Two of the 9 overpaid soldiers continued to
receive their entitlements for 28 days past the date of demobilization,
while the remaining 7 soldiers were overpaid for 13 days. This resulted in
$14,000 in overpayments of active duty basic pay, basic allowance for
housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and where applicable, the family
separation allowance and foreign language proficiency pay.
When demobilizing through Fort Lee, the demobilization finance officials
failed to change the pay status code in DJMS-RC to stop active duty pay
for nine of the unit's soldiers. The timing of the unit's release from
active duty made it more difficult to catch and correct these concerns, as
the soldiers demobilized during the Thanksgiving holiday and a
particularly severe snowstorm. The problem was eventually caught and
corrected by the 94th Regional Readiness Command when personnel examined
the Unit Commander's Pay Management Report in January 2004. Finance
personnel at the 94th Regional Readiness Command reported that available
pay reports indicated most of the soldiers' overpayments have now been
collected from the unit's soldiers.
Appendix IX
431st Chemical Detachment Johnstown, Pennsylvania
The 431st Chemical Detachment was called to active duty in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom on January 16, 2003, for a period not to exceed
365 days. Ten soldiers who received orders to mobilize with the 431st
Chemical Detachment reported to their home station in Johnstown,
Pennsylvania, on January 16, 2003. They underwent an initial SRP at their
Johnstown home station. On January 19, 2003, they arrived at their
designated mobilization station at Fort Dix, New Jersey, where they
remained for the next month undergoing additional in-processing and
training. Approximately 1 month later, around February 22, 2003, 8 of the
10 soldiers from the 431st Chemical Detachment were deployed to Kuwait.
Two soldiers from the unit left for Kuwait 1 month later, on March 20,
2003.
The primary mission of the 431st Chemical Detachment while deployed in and
around Kuwait was to track and report nuclear, biological, or chemical
attacks so that soldiers in the area could take appropriate protective
actions. After completing their mission, all 10 soldiers in the detachment
left Kuwait on May 21, 2003. Upon returning to Fort Dix, the soldiers
began the demobilization process and stayed at Fort Dix until the end of
June 2003. For the period of July 1 through July 15, 2003, all of the
soldiers in the 431st Chemical Detachment were placed on transitional
leave. By July 15, 2003, all of the soldiers had been released from active
duty. A time line of key actions associated with the unit's mobilization
under Operation Enduring Freedom is shown in figure 10.
Appendix IX
431st Chemical Detachment Johnstown,
Pennsylvania
Figure 10: 431st Chemical Detachment's Mobilization Time Line
Source: GAO.
As summarized in table 32, all 10 of the unit's soldiers experienced some
sort of pay problem, primarily associated with the overseas deployment
phase of their active duty mobilization. Pay problems included
overpayments, underpayments, and late payments of pay entitlements and
incentives, such as family separation allowance, hostile fire pay, and
hardship duty pay associated with their initial mobilization and
deployment to Kuwait.
Table 32: Pay Problem by Phase Phase Number of soldiers with pay problems
Mobilization 2 of 10
Deployment 10 of 10
Demobilization 0 of 10
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldier may have experienced pay problems in more than one phase.
In total, we identified estimated overpayments of about $12,000,
underpayments of about $2,000, and late payments of about $1,000
associated with the pay problems we identified. Of the estimated $12,000
in
Appendix IX
431st Chemical Detachment Johnstown,
Pennsylvania
identified overpayments, we identified about $450 that was subsequently
collected. Specifically, we determined that
o 2 soldiers did not receive correct payments for up to 6 months after
their mobilization date; and
o all 10 soldiers in the unit experienced underpayments, overpayments, or
late payments associated with their tour of active duty deployment in
Kuwait, including problems with hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay.
Mobilization Pay As summarized in table 33, we identified six soldiers
with pay problems related to overpayments of family separation allowance
during the unit's
Problems initial mobilization to active duty.
Table 33: Mobilization Pay Problems Number of soldiers Number of soldiers Type
of pay or who received late who were Number of soldiers allowance payments
underpaid who were overpaid
Family separation
allowance 0 0
Source: GAO analysis.
Upon receipt of individual mobilization orders, the soldiers reported to
their unit's home station in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, where they attended
a SRP. The purpose of this SRP was to ensure that all soldiers had all
required administrative paperwork, financial documents, and were
physically fit for the ensuing mobilization. SRP finance officials were
required to verify the soldiers' supporting financial documentation and
submit transactions with the necessary supporting documentation to the
Reserve Pay Center at Fort McCoy to update the soldiers' Master Military
Pay Accounts to reflect their mobilized status.
However, we identified several soldiers who did not have appropriate
supporting documentation maintained in their files to justify their basic
allowance for housing payments. One soldier appeared to be underpaid for
the basic allowance for housing during the period that he was called to
report to his home station for active duty. During the first pay period of
his mobilization, he was paid at a lower basic allowance for housing rate.
Subsequent payments for the basic allowance for housing throughout his
Appendix IX
431st Chemical Detachment Johnstown,
Pennsylvania
tour of duty were at a higher rate. We were not able to substantiate the
higher amount through supporting documentation. The total basic allowance
for housing payments to this soldier that could not be verified amounted
to approximately $3,500.
Furthermore, we identified four other soldiers who received basic
allowance for housing payments for which we were unable to obtain
supporting documentation (i.e., DA Form 5960). Total basic allowance for
housing payments for those four soldiers amounted to approximately
$30,000.
In addition, we identified six soldiers in the 431st Chemical Detachment
who received overpayments of the family separation allowance because they
began receiving this entitlement upon reporting to their home station,
even though that location was less than 50 miles from their homes and
there was no evidence that they had an unreasonable commuting distance, as
required by DOD FMR Volume 7A. Based on these criteria, the family
separation allowance payments should not have started until the soldiers
reached their mobilization station at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The family
separation allowance overpayments to these soldiers totaled $150.
Pay Problems While As summarized in table 34, we found that during the
soldiers' deployment to Kuwait, they experienced problems related to
hardship duty pay and
Deployed hostile fire pay. In addition, all of the soldiers received their
combat zone tax exclusion benefit at least 1 month late.
Table 34: Deployment Pay Problems Number of soldiers Number of soldiers Type of
pay or who received late who were Number of soldiers allowance payments
underpaid who were overpaid
Hostile fire pay 8 0 10
Hardship duty pay 1 10 10
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Soldiers may have experienced problems with more than one type of
pay or allowance.
Most soldiers did not receive the full amount of their hardship duty pay
while deployed. Moreover, they continued to receive hardship duty pay well
after they had returned to Fort Dix and demobilized. In total, all 10
Appendix IX
431st Chemical Detachment Johnstown,
Pennsylvania
deployed soldiers were incorrectly paid for either hardship duty or
hostile fire pay.
Soldiers of the 431st Chemical Detachment who deployed overseas had their
identification cards scanned into the Tactical Personnel System upon
landing at Kuwait International Airport. However, the unit's hostile fire
payments did not start until more than 2 months after the soldiers arrived
in theater. Moreover, it took approximately 3 months from the time that
the soldiers arrived to start receiving hardship duty payments. In fact,
hardship duty payments were not processed until May 21, 2003, the same day
that the soldiers left the designated hardship duty location.
These delays resulted in the deployed soldiers being underpaid for most of
their time while serving in the hardship duty location. Furthermore,
hardship duty pay continued for another 7 months after the soldiers had
left Kuwait. As a result, the soldiers continued to receive payments of
hardship duty pay after their demobilization and release from active duty.
Also, local Army area servicing finance officials did not terminate
payments of hostile fire pay for the 2 months following the soldiers'
return to the United States. These two breakdowns in the process of paying
the correct in-theater incentives to soldiers in a timely manner resulted
in underpayments or late payments at the front end of the soldiers'
deployment and overpayments after the soldiers had returned.
In addition, the unit administrator, who also deployed with the unit,
stated that she had trouble finding anyone in the local Army area
servicing finance office in Kuwait to assist with getting the unit's
hostile fire pay started. Since the 431st Chemical Detachment was working
for the Marine Corps and was far away from the Army area servicing finance
office, the unit was given the number at Fort Doha as its supporting
finance office in Kuwait. The unit administrator made repeated telephone
attempts to contact the finance office at Fort Doha but could only reach a
recording that told her to call back later. This gap in a functioning
supporting finance office for the deployed soldiers added to their
frustration and confusion over in-theater pays.
Upon the unit's return to the U.S. in May 2003, most of the soldiers
noticed that they continued to receive an additional $100 per month for 7
additional months. However, because their Leave and Earnings Statements
were not clear as to what the payments represented, the soldiers contacted
the unit administrator for assistance. The unit administrator determined
that the payments represented erroneous hardship duty pay and tried to go
through
Appendix IX
431st Chemical Detachment Johnstown,
Pennsylvania
the unit's chain of command to get the payments stopped, but received no
response. The unit administrator also accessed the pay hotline at
888-PAY-ARMY, but was placed on hold for such a long time that she gave
up.
Pay Problems Associated with Demobilization and Release from Active Duty
All 10 soldiers of the 431st Chemical Detachment arrived at the
demobilization station at Fort Dix, New Jersey, on May 21, 2003, to begin
the SRP out-processing. The soldiers were stationed at Fort Dix for
approximately 1 month. At the end of June 2003, the soldiers returned to
their home station in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, where they spent a few days
before being placed on transitional leave for the first 2 weeks in July
2003. While on transitional leave, the soldiers continued to receive $250
per month for the family separation allowance even though they were not
separated from their families.
Appendix X
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix X
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix X
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix X
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix X
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix X
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix X
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix XI
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Geoffrey B. Frank, (202) 512-9518
Acknowledgments Staff making key contributions to this report include
James D. Berry, Amy
C. Chang, Francine M. DelVecchio, Jennifer L. Hall, Ken Hill, Kristi L.
Karls, Jason M. Kelly, Tram Le, Julia C. Matta, Jonathan T. Meyer,
Michelle Philpott, John J. Ryan, Jennifer F. Wilson, and Leonard E.
Zapata.
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