Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have
Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined
(30-JUN-05, GAO-05-575).
After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had no army or
functioning police and, before September 11, 2001, was a haven
for international terrorists. In April 2002, the United States
and several other nations agreed to reform the five pillars of
Afghanistan's security sector--creating an Afghan army,
reconstituting the police force, establishing a working
judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the
Afghan militias. As the leader for the army pillar, the United
States has provided about $3.3 billion. For the German-led effort
to reconstitute the Afghan police, the United States has provided
over $800 million. We examined the progress made, and limitations
faced, in developing the army and police forces. We also
identified challenges that must be addressed to complete and
sustain these forces.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-575
ACCNO: A28617
TITLE: Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and
Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better
Defined
DATE: 06/30/2005
SUBJECT: Army personnel
Combat readiness
Federal aid to foreign countries
International cooperation
International relations
Law enforcement
Military forces
Military training
Police
Police training
Defense capabilities
Afghanistan
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GAO-05-575
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives
June 2005
AFGHANISTAN SECURITY
Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need
to Be Better Defined
a
GAO-05-575
[IMG]
June 2005
AFGHANISTAN SECURITY
Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need
to Be Better Defined
What GAO Found
As of March 2005, Defense had trained more than 18,300 Afghan combat
troops-over 42 percent of the army's projected total of 43,000-and
deployed them throughout the country. During 2004, the Department of
Defense significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training. However,
Defense efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat troops have
fallen behind, and efforts to establish sustaining institutions, such as a
logistics command, needed to support these troops have not kept pace.
Plans for completing these institutions are not clear.
Germany and the United States had trained more than 35,000 police as of
January 2005 and expect to meet their goal of training 62,000 police by
December 2005. However, the Department of State has just begun to address
structural problems that affect the Afghan police force. Trainees often
return to police stations where militia leaders are the principal
authority; most infrastructure needs repair, and the police do not have
sufficient equipment-from weapons to vehicles. Furthermore, limited
fieldbased mentoring has just begun although previous international police
training programs have demonstrated that such mentoring is critical for
success. Moreover, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (which oversees the
police force) requires reform and restructuring. Finally, neither State
nor Germany has developed plans specifying how much the program will cost
and when it will be completed.
Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces and
concurrent progress in the other pillars of security sector reform,
Afghanistan could again become a haven for terrorists. However,
establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly
take years and substantial resources. Available information suggests that
these programs could cost up to $7.2 billion to complete and about $600
million annually to sustain. Furthermore, the other lead nations have made
limited progress in reforming Afghan's judiciary, combating illicit
narcotics, and demobilizing the militias.
Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
U.S. Training of Afghan Combat Troops Has Outpaced Efforts to
Equip and Sustain Them Difficult Conditions Have Hampered Reconstituting
of Police and State Does Not Have an Overall Plan to Complete the Effort
Efforts to Complete and Sustain the Afghan Army and Police Face
Major Challenges Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency
Comments and Our Evaluation
1 2 4
11
19
27 33 33 34
Appendixes
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 36
Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and Police
Appendix II: by Non-U.S.
Donors 40
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 43
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice 45
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State 47
Tables Table 1: U.S. Support for the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal
Years
2002-2006 9
Table 2: Number of Afghan Police Reported Trained as of January
2005 and Training Targets for December 2005 20
Table 3: Estimated Value of Assistance Provided to Afghan Army
and Police by Non-U.S. Donors 41
Figures Figure 1: Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4:
Figure 5:
Figure 6: Figure 7: Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan
5 Afghan Army Commands and Police Training Centers 7 Kabul Military
Training Center 12 Defective Boot Purchased Locally and an Afghan Soldier
Wearing Sandals 16 Police Regional Training Center in Jalalabad-Dining
Facility and Classroom Building 22 Jalalabad Police Station 24 Heavy
Weapons Cantonment Site Outside Kabul 32
Contents
Abbreviations
State/INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs OMC-A Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan NATO North
Atlantic Treaty Organization
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A
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548
June 30, 2005
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
After more than two decades of war left Afghanistan without an army or a
functioning police force, the country became a haven for international
terrorists, including the al Qaeda terrorist group that attacked two U.S.
cities on September 11, 2001. Since ousting the Taliban regime from
Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has spent almost $3 billion to help
reconstruct this poor and ethnically divided country.1 However, pervasive
internal security threats-including terrorists, ethnic and regional
militias
commanded by powerful warlords, and a large trade in illegal narcotics-
continue to undermine efforts to rebuild Afghanistan's shattered economy,
government, and infrastructure. The United States and allied nations
maintain more than 28,000 combat and support troops in Afghanistan to
counter these threats.2
To help Afghanistan provide for its own security, the United States and
several other nations agreed at a conference in December 2002 to help
create multiethnic, professionally trained Afghan national army and police
forces.3 Donor nations also agreed to help establish a working judicial
sector, combat the narcotics trade, and demobilize Afghanistan's militias.
As leader of the effort to create the new army, the United States provided
approximately $3.3 billion during fiscal years 2002 through 2005 toward
the
goal of eventually establishing a 70,000 man force that includes 43,000
ground combat troops. The Department of Defense facilitates the training
and equipping of the Afghan army through its Combined Forces
1For a detailed discussion of efforts to reconstruct postwar Afghanistan,
see our report Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and
Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy
Needed, GAO-04-403 (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004).
2These forces include about 8,300 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
peacekeepers.
3The conference's final communique, also known as the "Bonn II" Agreement,
supports efforts started under the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 to
promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability, and respect for
human rights in Afghanistan.
Command's Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) in the
capital city of Kabul. As the largest donor for the reconstitution of the
national police, which is led by Germany, the United States provided about
$804 million during fiscal years 2002 through 2005 for police training,
equipment, and infrastructure. The Department of State oversees the U.S.
police effort through its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy
in Kabul, with assistance from the Department of Justice. In its fiscal
year 2006 budget request, the executive branch has requested nearly $60
million for the Afghan police but, according to Defense officials, no
additional funds for the Afghan army.
To review the status of U.S. efforts to strengthen Afghanistan's security,
we (1) examined the progress made, and limitations faced, by the United
States and other donor nations in building Afghanistan's national army;
(2) examined the progress made, and limitations faced, by the United
States and other donor nations in reconstituting Afghanistan's national
police forces; and (3) identified challenges that the United States, other
donor nations, and Afghanistan must address to complete and sustain the
Afghan army and police forces. To address these objectives, we reviewed
pertinent Defense and State planning, funding, and evaluation documents
for the Afghan army and police programs. We discussed these programs with
cognizant officials from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State in
Washington, D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we traveled to
Herat and Jalalabad to view Afghan army facilities and a police training
site, respectively, and to meet with cognizant U.S. and Afghan officials.
We also met with government officials from Germany and other key donor
nations. We determined that the data provided to us were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. (See app. I for a more complete
description of our scope and methodology.)
We conducted our review from January 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief The United States has made important progress in training
and deploying Afghan army combat troops but has not fully addressed
limitations that impede its progress in establishing a self-sustaining
Afghan army. Defense has established programs for recruiting and training
battalions of ethnically mixed combat troops, including a field-based
mentoring program. In 2004, as security concerns persisted, Defense
significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training, and as of March
2005 more than 42 percent of the
army's total projected combat strength of 43,000 troops was deployed in
strategic locations throughout the country. However, OMC-A's efforts to
fully equip the increasing number of combat troops being trained have
fallen behind. In addition, OMC-A's efforts to establish institutions
needed to support these troops have not kept pace with the accelerated
training program. Plans for the completion of these institutions are not
clear. Nonetheless, U.S. trainers and other military officials have stated
that Afghan combat troops generally perform well in small units, despite
some shortcomings.
Germany and the United States have made progress in training individual
Afghan policemen and policewomen but have not addressed many limitations
impeding the reconstitution of a national police force. As of January
2005, the Department of State and Germany have trained more than 35,000
police and expect to meet their goal of training 50,000 national and
highway police and 12,000 border police by December 2005. However,
trainees face difficult working conditions. They return to district police
stations that need extensive reconstruction or renovation; militia leaders
are often the principal authority; and they lack weapons, vehicles,
communications, and other equipment. In addition, the police training
includes limited field-based training and mentoring, although previous
international peacekeeping efforts showed that such mentoring is critical
to the success of police training programs. Furthermore, the Afghan
Ministry of the Interior (which oversees the police force) faces several
problems, including corruption and an outdated rank structure, that
require reform and restructuring. Finally, neither State nor Germany have
developed an overall plan specifying how or when construction tasks and
equipment purchases will be completed, how much the buildup of the police
will cost, and when the overall effort to reconstitute the police will be
finished.
The United States, other donors, and the new Afghan government face
significant challenges to establishing viable Afghan army and police
forces. Although Defense and State have not yet prepared official cost
estimates, the army and police programs could cost up to $7.2 billion to
complete and about $600 million annually to sustain. Moreover, slow
progress in resolving other Afghan security problems-the lack of an
effective judiciary, the substantial illicit narcotics industry, and the
continued presence of armed militias-threaten to undermine overall
progress made toward providing nationwide security and ensuring the
stability of the Afghan government.
We are recommending that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop
detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police
forces, including clearly defined objectives and performance measures;
milestones; funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the
results achieved. In addition, we are recommending that the Secretaries
work with the other lead nations to help ensure that progress in the other
pillars of Afghan's security reform is congruous with the progress made in
the army and police programs. In both cases, we recommend that the
Secretaries report their progress to the Congress. In commenting on a
draft of this report, the Departments of Defense and State generally
concurred with our recommendations, but both stated that appropriate
reporting mechanisms are already in place. The Department of Justice
strongly concurred in regards to the Afghan police training program and
noted that its expertise could be more effectively utilized.
Background Afghanistan, a mountainous and land-locked country in central
Asia, is one of the poorest countries in the world. More than 60 percent
of its population is illiterate. Afghanistan lacks effective nationwide
communications, banking, and transportation systems. Its estimated per
capita gross domestic product for 2003 was about $700. The International
Monetary Fund estimates that Afghan government revenues will average $387
million per year during 2005 through 2008-less than half of its projected
average annual expenditures for government salaries and operations of $879
million. Afghanistan remains dependent on other nations for support;
international assistance provided 93 percent of Afghanistan's $4.75
billion budget for 2005.
Afghanistan's economic plight is partially the result of its long history
of war and civil strife. Afghanistan's ethnically mixed population is due
to its location on historical invasion and trade routes. The Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only after waging a prolonged and
destructive war against Afghan resistance groups. Following a protracted
civil war, most of Afghanistan fell under the control of the
fundamentalist Taliban group by 1998. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan
became a haven for terrorists, and, as a result, the United States and a
coalition of its allies invaded Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.
Afghanistan's security institutions, including its national army, police,
and judiciary, collapsed or were severely damaged prior to the U.S.
occupation. During the Taliban rule the army disintegrated and was
superseded by various ethnic and regional militias. The Afghan national
police force,
which was organized as a two-track system of career officers and largely
untrained conscripts who served for 2 years, had also declined over the
past 25 years.
Afghanistan continues to face significant internal threats. Widespread
trade in opium and heroin provides drug producers and traffickers with the
resources and motivation to resist efforts to curb the illicit narcotics
industry. Taliban fighters and terrorist groups remain active in parts of
the country, and attacks on civilian reconstruction workers have prompted
some international assistance groups to leave the country. Regional
warlords maintain thousands of militia fighters who could be used to
challenge the authority of Afghanistan's new central government.
To help Afghanistan address such threats, the United States and several
other donor nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, in April 2002. At the
conference, the donors established a five-pillared security reform agenda
and designated a donor country to take the lead in reforming each pillar.
The United States volunteered to lead the army reform effort, and Germany
volunteered to lead the police reform effort (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
Army At a December 2002 conference (Bonn II) near Bonn, Germany, the
Afghan government and the donor nations agreed that the new Afghan army
should be ethnically balanced, voluntary, and consist of no more than
70,000 individuals (including all civilian and Ministry of Defense
personnel). They also agreed that the army's commands should be located in
Kabul and other geographically strategic locations. The Afghan government
and the donors did not set a deadline for the completion of the army.
Following the Bonn II conference, U.S. Defense planners, in conjunction
with Afghan officials, developed a force structure for the army that
includes (1) 43,000 ground combat troops based in Kabul and four other
cities, (2) 21,000 support staff organized in four sustaining commands
(recruiting, education and training, acquisition and logistics, and
communications and intelligence), (3) 3,000 Ministry of Defense and
general staff personnel, and (4) 3,000 air staff to provide secure
transportation for the President of Afghanistan.4 According to Defense,
the mission of the new army will include providing security for
Afghanistan's new central government and political process, replacing all
other military forces in Afghanistan, and combating terrorists and other
destructive elements in cooperation with coalition and peacekeeping
forces. As of May 2005, Defense's target date for completing the army is
the fall of 2009.
U.S. efforts to establish the army are led by Defense, with support from
State. The Defense-staffed Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan
(OMC-A) in Kabul oversees the development of the Afghan army's force
structure, decision processes, and garrisons, and provides equipment.
OMC-A works closely with Task Force Phoenix, which is a joint coalition
task force charged with training Afghan army battalions at the Kabul
Military Training Center and elsewhere in the country. The U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Central Command provide planning and other
support, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is constructing facilities
for the Afghan army's central and regional commands (see fig. 2). In
Washington, D.C., the Defense Security Cooperation Agency uses Defense and
State funds to provide financial and administrative support for OMC-A. The
agency purchases services and equipment requested by OMC-A through the
U.S. Army Security Assistance Command and transfers funds to OMC-A to
allow it to procure services and equipment from local vendors.
4As currently planned, the air wing would not be able to transport large
numbers of Afghan troops from one part of the country to another.
Figure 2: Afghan Army Commands and Police Training Centers
Army Central Corps Kabul Police Academy Army regional commands Police
regional training centers Kabul Military Training Center Police Central
Training Center
Sources: GAO analysis of Departments of Defense and State data; photos
(GAO); Map Resources (map).
Police Afghanistan's police reform process began formally in February
2002, when Germany, as the leader for this sector, convened a conference
in Berlin to discuss international support for the Afghan police.
Subsequently, donor nations agreed to establish a multiethnic,
sustainable, and countrywide 62,000-member professional police service
that is fully committed to the rule of law. The overall goal of the
program is to enhance security in the provinces and districts outside of
Kabul. They did not set a deadline for completing the police.
U.S. support for the police sector is overseen by State/INL in Washington,
D.C., and by staff at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. State has a contract with
DynCorp Aerospace Technology to train and equip the police, advise the
Ministry of Interior, and provide infrastructure assistance, including
constructing several police training centers (see fig. 2). Defense has
also provided infrastructure and equipment to police in border regions. In
addition, Germany has a training program for police officers at the Kabul
Police Academy and has convened several donors' conferences. Germany also
tracks pledges and projects implemented by various donors. Furthermore,
various donors established the United Nations' Law and Order Trust Fund
for Afghanistan to help ensure that the police are paid regularly and are
issued adequate equipment.
U.S. Support The United States has provided approximately $4.1 billion
during fiscal years 2002 through 2005 to support the Afghan army and
police force.5 In the President's budget request for fiscal year 2006, the
administration has requested an additional $58.5 million for the Afghan
police program but, according to Defense officials, no additional funds
for the Afghan army. (See table 1.)
5About $1.4 billion of this amount was provided during fiscal years 2002
through 2004, of which more than $980 million had been obligated and more
than $511 million had been expended as of January 2005. Over $1.8 billion
of this amount is part of the fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental
which was enacted into law on May 11, 2005.
Table 1: U.S. Support for the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2006
Dollars in millions
2005 2005 Supplemental 2006 Fiscal year 2002 2003 2004 (estimated)
(estimated) (proposed) Total
Afghan army
Statea $74.9 $191.4 $434.4 $421.4 $0 $0 $1,122.1
Defenseb 4.3 156.2 285.0 429.3 1,285.0 0 2,159.8
Subtotal 79.2 347.6 719.4 850.7 1,285.0 0 3,281.9
Afghan police
Statec 26.6 0 160.0 65.0 360.0 58.5 670.1
Defensed 0 0 47.0 7.8 137.3 0 192.1
Subtotal 26.6 0.0 207.0 72.8 497.3 58.5 862.2
Total $105.8 $347.6 $926.4 $923.5 $1,782.3 $58.5 $4,144.1
Source: Departments of Defense and State.
aMost of State's funds for the Afghan army come from its Foreign Military
Financing program. Foreign Military Financing funds are administered by
Defense through its Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which provides
funds, equipment, and services for the army through OMC-A. State also
supports the Afghan army through its Peace Keeping Operations program
(from which the salaries for Afghan troops are financed) and International
Military Education and Training program.
bDefense funds for the Afghan army are drawn from three principal sources:
The Afghan Freedom Support Act (P.L. 107-327), as amended, states that the
President may exercise his drawdown authorities (as authorized under
section 506 (A) (2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) by supplying
Afghanistan with defense services, articles, and education "acquired by
contract or otherwise." Under this provision, OMC-A has been given
authority to spend U.S. Army operations and maintenance funds to train and
equip the Afghan army. During fiscal years 2002 through 2004,
approximately $287 million was drawn down via such contracts by Defense.
In addition, under section 506 (A) (2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, approximately $11 million in military trucks and armored
personnel vehicles were drawn down from Defense for the Afghan army. For
more details on such drawdowns, see Foreign Assistance: Reporting of
Defense Articles and Services Provided through Drawdowns Needs to Be
Improved, GAO-02-1027 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2002).
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Defense and for the
Reconstruction Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, (P.L. 108-106), and the Defense
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2005 (P.L. 108287) authorize Defense to
use U.S. Army operations and maintenance funds for several purposes,
including training and equipping the new Afghan armed forces. Defense has
provided a total of $440 million in such funds for the Afghan army.
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending September 30,
2005, and for other purposes (P.L. 109-13) authorizes Defense to provide
up to $1.285 billion in assistance to the Afghan army. Of this amount,
$290 million will be used to reimburse the U.S. Army for costs incurred to
train, equip, and provide related assistance to the Afghan army.
cState has supported the Afghan police through programs managed by its
Bureau for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs. Of
the $160 million that State provided in 2004, $50 million was drawn from
fiscal year 2003 Emergency Response Funds.
dDefense has supported the Afghan police with counternarcotics funding
provided through its Office for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, as authorized by the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriation Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan, 2004, (P.L. 108106). Defense also drew on approximately $17
million in Commanders Emergency Response Program funds to support police
projects.
Other Donor Support
More than 40 nations and international organizations have also provided
funds, equipment, and training to support the Afghan army and police. As
of March 2005, other donors had provided about $193 million to supplement
U.S. efforts to create the Afghan army and about $246 million for
reconstituting the Afghan police. (See app. II for more information on
other donors' support for the army and police.)
Allied and multilateral forces
Pending the creation of functioning Afghan army and police forces, more
than 28,000 foreign troops operate in Afghanistan. These include about
18,000 U.S. troops, an estimated 1,900 troops from other members of the
coalition, and over 8,300 peacekeepers from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). In August 2003, NATO assumed control over the
International Security Assistance Force in response to a United Nations'
mandate to provide security in the Kabul area and to support the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. In addition, NATO's members agreed to begin
establishing provincial reconstruction teams in northern and western
Afghanistan. Although NATO has had difficulty persuading nations to
provide the resources needed for these teams, it has established seven
provincial reconstruction teams. After taking control of a team sponsored
by Germany in Kabul, NATO announced in June 2004 that it would also assume
control of four additional teams in northern Afghanistan. These teams are
sponsored by the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. British and
German officials informed us that their teams focus primarily on
reconstruction and have limited roles in providing direct security for
local Afghans and in working with the Afghan army and police. On May 31,
2005, NATO took control of two additional provincial reconstruction teams
in western Afghanistan. They are sponsored by Italy and the United States.
U.S. Training of Afghan Combat Troops Has Outpaced Efforts to Equip and
Sustain Them
Defense, with the government of Afghanistan, has established programs for
recruiting and training battalions of Afghan combat troops. OMC-A
significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training in 2004, and over
42 percent of the army's total projected combat strength of 43,000
soldiers was deployed throughout the country. However, OMC-A's efforts to
fully equip the increasing number of combat troops have fallen behind. In
addition, OMC-A's efforts to establish the institutions needed to support
these troops have not kept pace, and plans for their completion are not
clear. Despite some shortcomings, OMC-A personnel and the embedded
trainers we met with told us that Afghan combat troops have generally
performed well under U.S. supervision.
The United States Has Established Recruiting Effort
Defense, in conjunction with the government of Afghanistan, is
establishing recruiting stations in each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. To
help ensure that the army is ethnically balanced, Defense attempts to form
new battalions6 for training with volunteers drawn from Afghanistan's
major ethnic groups.7 Information provided by OMC-A indicates that the
army as a whole generally reflects the country's balance of major ethnic
groups.8
While many of those initially recruited left the army before competing
their terms, by late 2004 the army's attrition rate had dropped to 1.1
percent per month.9 While attrition appears to have abated, U.S. and
Afghan officials told us that soldiers often leave their units without
permission for as long as 2 weeks to take their pay home to their
families. The officials attributed these unauthorized absences to the lack
of an Afghan national banking
6An Afghan battalion consists of about 610 men.
7According to Defense officials, volunteers are vetted through community
elders and State. Ex-militia fighters may enlist on an individual basis,
but United Nations reports indicate that less than 2 percent had done so
as of February 2005.
8According to the U.S. government, as of January 2004, the ethnic
composition of the Afghan population was 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent
Tajik, 9 percent Hazara, 9 percent Uzbek, and 13 percent "other."
According to OMC-A, as of February 15, 2005, the ethnic composition of the
Afghan army was 49 percent Pashtun, 21 percent Tajik, 6 percent Hazara, 3
percent Uzbek, and 22 percent "other" (the total of the individual
percentages is greater than 100 percent due to rounding). Individual units
vary in their ethnic balance. According to OMC-A, at least two battalions
have no or very few Uzbek troops.
9Defense fielding plans for the army assume an attrition rate of 2 percent
per month. Soldiers absent for more than 60 days are dropped from the
army's rolls.
system and the absence of significant penalties for such absences from the
volunteer Afghan army.
Army Troops Receive Basic and Field Training
OMC-A and Task Force Phoenix have established programs for training Afghan
army troops in battalions at locations including the Kabul Military
Training Center (see fig. 3) and in the field. Battalions now receive 14
weeks of training at the center and elsewhere, including training for
officers and noncommissioned officers. According to Joint Chiefs of Staff
planners, this training includes 6 weeks of basic training, 6 weeks of
advanced individual training, and 2 weeks of collective training. The
program also includes training on human rights and the laws of war, as
well as specialized training for some troops in tank maintenance,
logistics, and medical skills. OMC-A and Task Force Phoenix officials
informed us that the Afghan army now conducts basic training classes. U.S.
officials also stated that France and the United Kingdom have helped train
Afghan army personnel.
Figure 3: Kabul Military Training Center
Source: GAO.
Training at the Center is followed by training in the field. OMC-A embeds
a team of U.S. trainers and mentors in each battalion to help achieve full
operational capability. The embedded team accompanies the battalion into
the field and provides leadership, tactical training, and logistical
support. As originally envisioned, embedded trainer teams were to include
16 U.S. officers and noncommissioned officers and remain with battalions
for 2 years.
Defense Accelerated Training
At OMC-A's recommendation, Defense accelerated its training of Afghan
combat troops throughout 2004 by more than doubling the number of
battalions in basic training at a given time. As a result, OMC-A had
deployed more than 42 percent of the army's total projected combat
strength at commands throughout the country as of March 2005. OMC-A
projects that it will complete basic training for all 43,000 combat troops
by the fall of 2007.
Defense time frames for building the Afghan army were in flux throughout
2004. As security concerns persisted, OMC-A accelerated the training and
fielding of combat troops.10 In January 2004, OMC-A increased the number
of battalions in training at one time from two to three; in May 2004, it
began training four battalions; and, as of the end of January 2005, it was
training five. These concerns also prompted Defense and the Afghan
government to change their plans for establishing the army's four regional
commands. At the beginning of 2004, they had planned to establish the four
regional commands in sequence, with the fourth command to be established
in 2006. By May 2004, Defense and the Afghan government had decided to
establish all four regional commands by the end of September 2004, with as
few as 150 troops stationed at each one.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning staff, as of March 2005,
more than 18,300 troops-over 42 percent of the army's total projected
combat strength of 43,000 men-had completed basic training. Having fully
staffed the Kabul central command with about 10,500 troops, OMC-A assigned
the remaining 7,800 troops to the four regional commands.11 It plans to
field
10The security concerns included factional unrest in Herat in March and
August 2004, as well as violence preceding Afghanistan's first-ever
democratic presidential election in October 2004.
11The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is constructing facilities at these
locations. As of January 2005, funding provided to the Corps for this
effort totaled $740 million.
combat troops to the regional commands as quickly as possible to provide
more security for Afghanistan's parliamentary elections (currently planned
for September 2005). Accordingly, it increased the number of combat troops
assigned to regional commands by more than 18 percent between February and
March 2005.
In early 2005, OMC-A projected that it would complete basic training for
the remaining 24,700 combat troops by the fall of 2007 if it continued to
train five battalions at once. However, in May 2005, OMC-A proposed
increasing the number of combat troops in the planned force structure from
43,000 to 46,000 and projected that it could train the additional 3,000
combat troops by the fall of 2007. Although OMC-A is seeking permission to
begin training six battalions at once, it has not been able to fully equip
the units already trained and faces a shortage of embedded trainers.
Afghan Army Is Experiencing Equipment Shortages
According to U.S. Defense and Afghan army personnel, Afghan army units are
experiencing equipment shortages. U.S. embedded trainers and other defense
personnel informed us that Afghan soldiers have had to cope with shortages
of useable uniforms, boots, communications gear, infantry weapons,
ammunition, and vehicles.12 Embedded trainers provided us with examples of
poorly made uniforms and boots and told us that Afghan army units must use
old and often faulty small arms and ammunition. OMC-A logistics personnel
confirmed that Afghan battalions do not have needed vehicles. Embedded
trainers told us that the equipment shortages have negatively affected the
army's effectiveness and discipline.
OMC-A is responsible for managing efforts to supply the army's rapidly
growing combat element needed equipment, but it has had difficulty
establishing requirements and complying with security assistance
procedures to fulfill those requirements. Defense Security Cooperation
Agency and U.S. Army Security Assistance Command personnel informed us
that in many cases OMC-A had not provided them with adequately prepared
requests and forecasts of future requirements in a timely manner. For
example, Defense Security Cooperation Agency staff noted that OMC-A
12One embedded trainer informed us that he has had to rely on a cell phone
that he purchased at a U.S. retail outlet to communicate with his unit
during operations.
required almost a year to establish specific requirements for a standard
light tactical vehicle to transport Afghan troops.13
OMC-A and other Defense personnel told us that several factors complicate
OMC-A's efforts to project the army's requirements and to use the defense
security assistance process. These include the numerous changes that OMC-A
made in its plans to build the army, including accelerating the number of
battalions in training and establishing the regional commands
simultaneously in 2004. OMC-A officials also noted that the involvement of
nascent Afghan army units in combat and the lack of historical data on
material usage rates further complicated their efforts to project
requirements. In addition, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Army
Security Assistance Command, and State officials in Washington, D.C., and
OMC-A officials told us that OMC-A has not had adequate numbers of
personnel trained in security assistance procedures to support its
efforts. OMC-A officials stated that OMC-A has never been staffed at more
than about 71 percent of its approved personnel level.14 They also noted
that Defense efforts to train OMC-A personnel in defense security
assistance procedures and preserve the institutional knowledge of lessons
learned from former personnel are constrained by the rotation of Air
Force, Navy, and Marine personnel from OMC-A after as few as 4 months.15
To address some shortages of needed equipment, OMC-A bought items directly
from non-U.S. vendors.16 However, it sometimes purchased faulty items
because it did not take adequate steps to ensure their quality. For
example, OMC-A purchased combat boots from regional vendors to support the
new higher basic training rate of five battalions. OMC-A
13The light tactical vehicle is essentially a modified pickup truck that
would replace four different types of vehicles now used by the army. These
vehicles were donated by the United Arab Emirates, Germany, and Greece.
OMC-A officials told us that these donations helped fill the Afghan army's
early requirement for transportation but are now complicating the army's
logistics situation.
14At the time of our work in Afghanistan, Defense had allocated OMC-A 211
military positions and 95 contractor and civilian positions.
15According to OMC-A, Air Force personnel were assigned to Afghanistan for
4 months, Navy and Marine Corps personnel for 6 months, and Army personnel
for 12 months. Defense officials in the United States informed us that Air
Force personnel may now be assigned to fill certain critical positions for
as long as 12 months.
16OMC-A requested and received offshore procurement waivers between fiscal
years 2002 and 2005 to spend up to $596 million to procure non-U.S. items
overseas.
officials told us that many boots proved to be defective because OMC-A had
given vendors too much latitude in filling their contracts. U.S. trainers
told us that Afghan troops sometimes wore sandals during operations in
mountainous, difficult terrain because their boots had failed (see fig.
4). OMC-A personnel informed us that they now use a broader array of local
vendors, set more stringent specifications, and employ Afghan civilians to
inspect the quality of locally procured goods.
Figure 4: Defective Boot Purchased Locally and an Afghan Soldier Wearing
Sandals
Defense has also experienced difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies
of serviceable Soviet-era equipment. Early in the Afghan army program,
Defense decided to equip the army with donated and salvaged Soviet weapons
and armored vehicles. It did so because (1) such equipment was widely used
by the former Afghan army and by Afghan militias and (2) several coalition
nations once allied with the former Soviet Union were willing to provide
equipment from their arsenals. However, much of the donated and salvaged
equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other
equipment. For example, Defense officials abandoned plans to use Soviet
armored personnel carriers after they determined that the vehicles had
been manufactured to differing standards depending on the country of
origin. Defense and State officials also informed us that the
demobilization of Afghan militias had yielded fewer serviceable Soviet
AK-47 assault rifles and ammunition caches than
anticipated. In response, OMC-A has cannibalized serviceable parts from
the assault rifles obtained to make usable weapons and has purchased more
weapons than originally planned. Defense and State officials informed us
that they are stepping up efforts to obtain donations of serviceable arms.
Number of Embedded Trainers Does Not Meet Needs
OMC-A's acceleration of the number of battalions in basic training has
strained its embedded trainer team program. By increasing the number of
battalions in training from four to five, OMC-A's requirement for embedded
trainers increased from about 410 to nearly 700. Because it was unable to
obtain the additional trainers from the military services in a timely
manner, Task Force Phoenix reassigned officers from other duties in
Afghanistan. It also temporarily reduced the number of embedded trainers
assigned to a battalion from 16 to 12.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff`s Afghanistan desk, another 192
trainers will be needed if OMC-A increases the number of battalions in
basic training to six. Because individuals with the skills needed to serve
as trainers are in demand in other theaters, increasing the training rate
to six battalions could require Defense to reassign U.S. personnel in
Afghanistan to serve as embedded trainers.17
OMC-A's need for more embedded trainers could further increase if it
determines that individual battalions are not yet ready to operate without
trainers. While some battalions have already operated with embedded
trainers for longer than the initially planned 2-year period, OMC-A has
not yet fully implemented recently developed criteria for assessing a
battalion's readiness to operate without trainers. As of May 2005, none of
the Afghan battalions had graduated from the embedded trainer program.
Sustaining Institutions Are Lagging and Plans for Their Completion Are Not
Clear
OMC-A's efforts to establish sustaining institutions (such as an
acquisition and logistics command) needed to support the combat troops
have not kept pace with the accelerated basic training program. The Afghan
army currently consists almost entirely of infantry forces that cannot
sustain themselves. At the beginning of 2005, Defense planners envisioned
that the
17Defense officials informed us that NATO members may contribute embedded
trainers in the future.
army would need 21,000 support personnel in four sustaining commands to
provide essential services to the army's combat elements. However, as of
March 2005, it had assigned only 1,300 personnel to the sustaining
commands. In an apparent attempt to address this shortfall, OMC-A
proposed, in May 2005, that the number of personnel assigned to these
commands be reduced from 21,000 to 14,000 and that the time frames for
completing these commands be extended from the end of 2008 to the fall of
2009.
Without fully functioning sustaining commands, the Afghan army will
continue to rely on OMC-A, embedded trainers, and other U.S. military
forces for acquisition, logistics, communications, and other key support
functions. OMC-A informed us that it would continue to sustain the Afghan
army on an interim basis to ensure the rapid introduction of Afghan army
combat units. According to Defense officials, they plan to use $210
million from the 2005 emergency supplemental to help ensure that the
sustaining commands can keep pace with the fielding of combat units.
To ensure that the Afghan army's combat elements are fully trained and
supplied and can readily communicate with one another, OMC-A would have to
recruit, train, and organize at least 12,000 individuals for the
sustaining commands. To ease the difficulty of doing so in a largely
illiterate country that has had little exposure to U.S. logistical
practices, OMC-A may recruit former militia fighters with logistics
experience. However, Defense plans for ensuring that these sustaining
commands are fully functional by the fall of 2009 are not clear. Defense
has not yet adopted plans that would guide OMC-A's efforts to complete
these commands nor have Defense planners in the United States and OMC-A
reached agreement on an overall concept of operations for the Afghan army.
Afghan Troops Said to Perform Well Despite Shortcomings
Defense officials in Afghanistan, including representatives of the U.S.
combat operations command, told us that U.S.-trained Afghan troops had
accompanied U.S. forces in operations against terrorist groups, helped
restore stability in Herat in response to riots and clashes between
militias, assisted in providing security for Afghanistan's first
democratic presidential election, and protected army infrastructure
construction sites around Afghanistan. U.S. embedded trainers we met with
near Kabul and in Herat, as well as U.S. combat officers, praised the
quality, morale, and motivation of the Afghan troops in conducting these
operations. For example, they noted the speed with which Afghan units were
able to
mobilize for transportation to Herat and their ability to quell civilian
rioters.18 The commander of OMC-A told us that coalition forces have
sought out opportunities to work with Afghan troops. According to U.S.
embedded trainers and OMC-A officials, the multiethnic Afghan army units
typically have developed good relations with Afghan citizens in different
parts of the country. None reported significant evidence of ethnic discord
within the army. However, U.S. Defense personnel informed us that Afghan
troops and officers have not yet gained significant experience in
battalion level operations. They also noted the army's command processes
are limited by the high rate of illiteracy among the troops.
Difficult Conditions Have Hampered Reconstituting of Police and State Does Not
Have an Overall Plan to Complete the Effort
Germany-the lead nation for rebuilding the Afghan police-and the United
States have trained thousands of Afghanistan police officers and patrolmen
and expect to meet training targets for end of 2005. However, many
trainees return to difficult working conditions, including police stations
where resources are inadequate and militia leaders are still the principal
authority, and they receive limited opportunities for follow-up training
or mentoring. Furthermore, Afghan's Ministry of the Interior, which
oversees the Afghan police, faces pervasive problems that require reform
or restructuring. Finally, neither State nor Germany has an overall plan
delineating what is needed to complete the rebuilding of the police
sector.
Donors Expect to Meet Police Training Targets
As of January 2005, Germany and the United States had trained more than
35,000 national, highway, and border police, and they expect to meet the
overall goal of training 62,00019 by December 2005 (see table 2). The
United States initiated its police training program in Afghanistan in 2003
because of concerns that the German training program was moving too slowly
and was concentrating on officers. Initially, the U.S. program focused on
training police patrolmen (and some women) to establish a national police
presence for the Afghan presidential elections.20 The U.S. program has
18In 2004, Afghan troops were flown to Herat on U.S. military and allied
aircraft.
19The target numbers were derived by considering the security needs and
population density of geographic areas, as well as the expected
organizational structure of the police.
20More than 20,000 police were trained before the Afghan presidential
elections in October 2004.
emphasized meeting specific training targets set by the Afghan government
in consultation with U.S. and German governments.21
Table 2: Number of Afghan Police Reported Trained as of January 2005 and
Training Targets for December 2005
Police reported
trained as of January Training target for
Afghan police rolea 2005b December 2005
National police 33,903 47,400
Highway police 220 2,600
Border police 1,151 12,000
Total 35,274 62,000
Source: State/INL data (includes German officer training data).
aNational police fill the traditional role of community law enforcement.
Highway police focus on road security outside of Kabul. Border police are
responsible for border protection and control.
bState/INL could not readily identify the numbers of officers versus
patrolmen and women by police role.
The United States employs a "train the trainer" approach. More than 800
Afghans who have completed a 3-week instructor development course conduct
the training with DynCorp advisors. The basic training consists of an
8-week course for new recruits and a 2-week program for veteran police.
Highway and border police receive 2 weeks of additional specialized
training. U.S. trainers have also developed a shortened training program
to accommodate illiterate recruits. According to State/INL and DynCorp
officials, the Afghan police trainees are generally eager to learn and
they support the idea of a national police force dedicated to the rule of
law. In addition, according to these officials, attrition rates have been
low.
Germany's chief role in rebuilding the police has been to refurbish the
Kabul Police Academy near Kabul and establish a permanent training program
there for commissioned and noncommissioned Afghan police officers.22 The
program, which began in August 2002, provides 3 years of
21The United States assumed responsibility for the border police when
Norway and Germany did not follow through on commitments to provide the
training. Norway provided some funding for the renovation of the border
police academy.
22Commissioned and noncommissioned officers constitute the police's upper
and intermediate ranks, respectively, while patrolmen are lower level.
training for officers and 1 year of training for noncommissioned officers.
According to a German Ministry of Interior official, as of January 2005,
41 officers and 2,583 noncommissioned officers had completed the full
German program, and an additional 4,880 commissioned and noncommissioned
officers had received short-term specialized training. According to this
same official, Germany plans to train an additional 4,950 commissioned and
noncommissioned officers at the Academy and the regional training centers
by December 2005.
Although the Bonn II agreement calls for a multiethnic police force, the
Afghan government, Germany, and the United States do not track the
ethnicity of police trainees. German and State officials reported that
they had received no complaints about the ethnic composition of police
units or deployments or their interaction with minority populations.
However, neither had systematically surveyed the impact of ethnicity on
police performance, relying instead on anecdotal accounts.
DynCorp completed construction of the Central Training Center for Police
in Kabul in May 2003, and in 2004 it constructed and began training at
seven regional centers across the country. (Fig. 5 shows the police
training center in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.) The Department of Justice's
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program developed
the curriculums, which include such topics as crime investigation,
operational police skills, and human rights.
Figure 5: Police Regional Training Center in Jalalabad-Dining Facility and
Classroom Building
Source: GAO.
Police Face Difficult Working Conditions
A number of difficult conditions hamper the effort to rebuild the police
in Afghanistan. Newly trained police often return to community police
stations staffed by poorly trained, illiterate conscripts or former
militia members who have little loyalty to the central government.
According to State/INL and Defense officials, many of the untrained
officers remain loyal to local militias in an environment dominated by
ethnic loyalties. Working with untrained colleagues, newly trained
policemen often find it difficult to apply the principles they learned
during training. For example, according to several DynCorp trainers, some
recently trained police were forced to give their new equipment to more
senior police and were pressured by their commanders to participate in
extorting money from truck drivers and travelers. U.S. and other donor
officials told us that many police resort to corrupt practices, in part
because their salaries are low and inconsistently paid. The Afghan
Ministry of the Interior has limited awareness over police operations
outside of Kabul and has not systematically vetted existing police staff
for human rights violations or corruption, which complicates the
ministry's efforts to support and oversee the police.
In addition, police across Afghanistan confront shortages of equipment.
According to a 2002 German government assessment, less than 10 percent of
the police had adequate equipment, and U.S. and other donor government
officials noted that the police are often outgunned by militias,
criminals, and drug traffickers because they lack adequate numbers of
weapons or ammunition supplies. According to DynCorp, the Ministry of the
Interior has approximately 36,500 serviceable rifles and pistols on hand,
mainly seized weapons. DynCorp officials estimate that the police need an
additional 48,500 side arms, 10,000 automatic rifles, and 6,250 machine
guns. Through March 2005, trainees were not receiving firearms training,
because the United States and the other donors had not yet provided
weapons and ammunition. Further, DynCorp officials estimated that the
Afghan national police have approximately 3,000 serviceable vehicles and
require an additional 7,400 vehicles. Most police do not perform routine
patrols because they lack adequate numbers of vehicles and the fuel to
operate them. State/INL officials reported that police often rely on
civilian complainants for transportation during law enforcement
investigations.
Moreover, poor infrastructure conditions hamper police work. According to
the 2002 German government assessment, approximately 80 percent of police
infrastructure was destroyed. According to a Defense estimate, varying
degrees of construction or renovation are needed for more than 800
buildings among Afghanistan's provincial police stations, district police
and border police brigade stations, and subdistrict and village level
stations.23 State/INL officials reported that criminal suspects are
sometimes detained in private residences because most police stations lack
secure holding facilities or reliable electricity and drinking water and
have only rudimentary office furniture and equipment. On our visit to a
Jalalabad police station (see fig. 6), we observed prisoners in a communal
holding facility with dirt floors and rudimentary toilet facilities. We
also noted that police manning a nearby guard tower were sleeping outside
between their shifts.
23The fiscal year 2004 supplemental provided Defense's Office for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict $73 million to support Afghan border
security, law enforcement, and counter narcotics efforts. The program was
refocused in the spring of 2004 to concentrate on police infrastructure
and capabilities in southern and southeastern Afghanistan.
Figure 6: Jalalabad Police Station
In early 2005, DynCorp deployed police trainers to the field for the first
time-12 outside of Kabul and 4 at a district headquarters in Kabul.
International peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have
shown that such training is critical to the success of similar programs.24
Field-based training and mentoring allows trainers to build on classroom
24According to officials from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, field-based training of local police by international police
trainers was key to establishing professional police forces in these
countries.
Source: GAO.
In addition, although the U.S. government recently constructed a
communication network that links the provincial headquarters with the
Ministry of Interior, police at the provincial, district, and subdistrict
levels are generally unable to communicate with police in other locations.
DynCorp officials estimate that the police need 420 base radios for
district and border stations, more than 10,400 mobile-vehicle mounted
radios, and 20,700 hand-held radios.
Limited Follow-Up Training, Mentoring, or Evaluation of Trainees
instruction and provide a more systematic basis for evaluating police
performance. Nevertheless, the German, U.S., and Afghan governments have
only limited ability to evaluate police trainees' performance after
graduation-especially in the more remote areas of Afghanistan. State/INL
officials cited the high costs, the security threat to training personnel
stationed in the field, and the difficulty of recruiting sufficient
numbers of international police as impediments to implementing a
countrywide field based program. OMC-A estimates a first-year cost for
implementing a countrywide training and mentoring program at approximately
$160 million.
Nonetheless, U.S. government and other donor officials reported overall
improvements in police performance since the training programs began and
noted that public attitudes toward the police are becoming more positive.
According to U.S. officials, police played a stabilizing role before and
during the presidential elections in October 2004. For example, according
to U.S. military personnel, police confiscated weapons and explosives in
12 separate incidents on election day in Jalalabad. However, according to
OMC-A officials, police failed to control a riot that occurred after the
Afghan government removed the provincial governor from power in Herat in
August 2004. As a result, the Afghan army was called in to restore order.
Afghan Ministry of the Interior Undergoing Reform
The Afghan Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for managing the
country's national police force, faces a number of problems that require
reform or restructuring. According to State/INL and DynCorp officials,
these problems include pervasive corruption; an outdated rank structure
overburdened with senior level officers; lack of communication and control
between central command and the regions, provinces, and districts; pay
disparity between the army and the police; and a lack of professional
standards and internal discipline. To address these problems, State
embedded 30 DynCorp advisors within the ministry at the end of 2004 and
drafted a comprehensive reform program. According to ministry and State
officials, the reform package was accepted by the Afghan Government, and
implementation has begun. The ministry adopted a new, streamlined
organizational structure to address command and control problems,
including a new rank structure with salaries commensurate with
responsibilities. The ministry also created a professional standards unit
(similar to an internal affairs unit) that is responsible for disciplining
corrupt or underachieving officers throughout the police force. DynCorp
officials stated that the operation of this unit will be critical to the
success
of the police reform effort. However, according to DynCorp officials, the
overall reform program will require more than a year to implement and will
not produce results across the country for several years.
The Ministry of the Interior has not yet reformed its police pay system.
Patrolmen generally are paid $30 to $50 per month, less than the $70 per
month new army recruits are paid and often less than day laborers can earn
on construction sites. According to DynCorp officials, patrolmen's
salaries are insufficient to support a family's living expenses and often
cause policemen to resort to corruption to augment their income. Ministry
officials told us that they are aware that low salaries are hurting the
professionalism of the police force and that they are working to institute
a new salary structure.
State and Germany Do Not Have an Overall Plan for Reconstituting the Afghan
National Police
In 2003, Germany developed a strategy paper that assessed the condition of
the police and proposed ways to reconstituting the police sector. However,
this strategy was not widely circulated and was not adopted by other
donors, including the United States; State/INL officials told us that they
could not provide us a copy of the German strategy because they did not
possess a copy themselves. According to cognizant German officials,
Germany has viewed its role as one of advising and consulting with other
donors and the Afghan government rather than as the major implementer or
funding source for the police sector.
State has not developed a plan for addressing the overall requirement of
equipping and fielding a fully functioning police force by a stated end
date. Budget estimates produced (at our request) by DynCorp provide a
partial listing of essential elements for building the police-personnel,
equipment, facilities and communication equipment-through 2006 that totals
more than $580 million. However, State has not specified how or when these
equipment purchases and construction projects will be completed; what
additional infrastructure, equipment, and training are needed; how much
the total buildup of the police will cost; and when the overall effort to
build the Afghan police will be finished.
In addition, State did not have adequate staff in Kabul to manage the
day-to day activities of the police program, hampering State's effort to
plan for and execute the rebuilding of the Afghan police. In 2003, the
U.S. Embassy in Kabul had one full-time staff member assigned to manage
the police program. When this person left to take another position with
the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, State used a series of temporary duty
staff in 2004
and 2005 to manage the program, employing one temporary staff member for
more than 6 months to manage both the Embassy's police and
counternarcotics programs.25 According to the temporary-duty official,
because of understaffing she was limited in her ability to oversee and
monitor the program, dependent on DynCorp contractors for progress reports
and management support, and unable to attend many donor and other
coordination meetings. In January 2005, to help address this problem,
State/INL established a Narcotics Affairs Section in Kabul to oversee the
U.S. police and counternarcotics programs. At the time, one full-time U.S.
direct-hire employee and one personal services contractor were assigned.
Efforts to Complete The United States, other donors, and the new Afghan
government face
significant challenges to their plans to establish viable Afghan army and
and Sustain the Afghan police forces. Completing and sustaining the army
and police will cost Army and Police Face several billion dollars over the
next decade. Moreover, slow progress in Major Challenges resolving other
Afghan security problems could undermine the prospects
for effective army and police forces.
Long-Term Costs Unclear but Likely to Be Substantial
Defense and State have not clearly defined the long-term costs of
completing the army and police programs. However, available information
suggests that these institutions could cost up to $7.2 billion to complete
and about $600 million per year to sustain.
o
Defense has not clearly defined the cost of completing the Afghan army.
However, in November 2004, OMC-A officials indicated that completing the
army could cost another $5.4 billion (in fiscal year 2005 dollars).26
Future funding would be used to fully supply the Afghan army with
equipment and vehicles; train Afghan troops; complete the regional and
sustaining commands; and provide the capability to safely transport the
Afghan president by air. However, these funds would not suffice to provide
the army with the capability to airlift large numbers of troops
25By contrast, Defense's Combined Forces Command had assigned up to 10
personnel to a law enforcement planning cell to prepare for a possible
Defense role in the police buildup.
26OMC-A officials stated that the total cost of the army program would be
at least $7 billion. The United States and other donors have already
provided approximately $1.6 billion for the army through fiscal year 2004.
from one part of the country to another. OMC-A officials told us that
adding this capability could cost as much as $3 billion.27
o
State has not clearly defined the cost of reconstituting the police.
However, our analysis of State and Defense planning documents suggest that
completing the police program could cost between $800 million and $1.8
billion.28 Most of these funds would pay for construction and equipment,
including more than $500 million to construct police stations and
buildings; about $100 million for trucks, buses, and other vehicles; and
more than $85 million to provide each patrolman a weapon, uniform,
ammunition, and related gear.
Similarly, Defense and State have not clearly defined the annual cost of
sustaining the completed army and police forces. OMC-A officials and Joint
Chiefs of Staff planners told us that sustaining the completed Afghan army
could cost at least $420 million (in 2005 dollars) annually. The majority
of these costs would be for general equipment repair, maintenance,
supplies, medical support, salaries, and food. DynCorp police planning
documents project that maintaining police force operations could cost $180
million annually (in 2005 dollars). Of this amount, about $100 million
would cover personnel costs. The rest would pay for fuel, vehicle
replacement and maintenance, ammunition, and facilities upkeep.
The United States has not committed to pay for creating and sustaining the
army and police. To date, the United States has been the major contributor
to Afghan's security sector reform, providing about 90 percent of funding
for the Afghan army and the largest share of funding for police,
judiciary, and counternarcotics efforts. At the same time, other nations
have not demonstrated the willingness to provide the funds that may be
needed to complete and sustain these forces. For example, while the United
States has provided the $277 million it pledged at a 2004 police donor
conference, as of March 2005, the other donor nations had provided only
about half of the $73 million that they pledged at the same conference.
Also, donors have provided the United Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan
27Adding a larger air wing would also require English-language training
for a greater number of Afghans if the air wing were equipped with U.S.
manufactured aircraft.
28The higher estimate includes an expanded field-based training program,
additional civilian staffing, an aviation capacity, and a doubling of the
Afghan border police from the current plan of 12,000 to 24,000.
with about $60 million of the $149 million pledged for April 2004 through
March 2005.
Slow Progress in Addressing Other Pillars Could Undermine Afghan Security
Afghanistan Lacks Effective Judicial Sector
The ability to field fully functioning Afghan army and police forces is
dependent on concurrent success in the other security sector reform
pillars. The lack of an effective judicial sector, the substantial illicit
narcotics industry, and the continued existence of armed militias
threatens to undermine overall progress toward providing nationwide
security and the stability of the Afghan government.
Establishing a working judiciary based on the rule of law is a
prerequisite for effective policing. However, according to donor
officials, few linkages exist between the judiciary and the police, and
the police have little ability to enforce judicial judgments. In addition,
judges and prosecutors are not being exposed to police training and
practices, and the police training curriculum does not include instruction
on criminal law and procedure. Moreover, according to U.S. embassy
officials, the Afghan judiciary has not yet acquired the political
authority needed to adjudicate a criminal or drug case against a
high-level political or warlord figure.
Supported by the United States, other donors, and international
organizations, Italy-the lead nation for reforming the judiciary-has
followed a three-pronged strategy: (1) developing and drafting legal
codes, (2) training judges and prosecutors, and (3) renovating the
country's physical legal infrastructure. The Italian government has
provided approximately $10 million annually to support the judicial
reform, and the United States has provided approximately $28 million for
fiscal years 2003 through 2004. However, according to Italian and U.S.
government officials, the reform program is under funded and understaffed.
Italy and the other donors have made some progress in promoting reform.
These include drafting a new criminal procedure code, training several
hundred judges, and renovating courthouses. However, these accomplishments
address only a small portion of Afghanistan's overall need for judicial
reform. Afghanistan's judicial sector is currently characterized by a
conflicting mix of civil, religious, and customary laws, with few trained
judges, prosecutors, or other justice personnel. Furthermore, its penal
system is nonfunctioning, and its buildings, official records, and
essential office equipment and furniture have been damaged extensively.
U.S. and donor officials informed us that progress in rebuilding the
judicial sector lags far behind the other security pillars and that the
Illicit Narcotics Industry Threatens GovernmentAuthority
reform effort is being undermined by systemic corruption at key national
and provincial justice institutions.
The production and trafficking of illicit narcotics poses a serious
challenge to the Afghan government's authority. According to the United
Nations, Afghanistan produces almost 90 percent of the world's illicit
opium, generating revenues equivalent to about 60 percent of Afghanistan's
gross domestic product for 2003. According to State, narcotics revenues
breed corruption at virtually all levels of the Afghan government while
providing resources to Taliban remnants, drug lords, and other terrorist
groups. Solving the narcotics problem in Afghanistan is widely seen as
critical to achieving security in Afghanistan.
The United Kingdom is leading international counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan and is trying to persuade other nations to contribute to a new
Afghan counternarcotics trust fund. From 2002 to 2004, the United States
obligated approximately $380 million and assisted the counternarcotics
efforts by training Afghan narcotics interdiction units, constructing
border and highway checkpoint facilities, and supplying operational
support and nonlethal equipment to Afghan eradication teams. For fiscal
year 2005, the United States has provided about $966 million for a
counternarcotics program that includes public information, alternative
livelihoods, law enforcement, interdiction, and eradication campaigns. The
goal of the new U.S. program is to ensure that narcotics production and
drug trade do not subvert efforts to rebuild the Afghan police and army.
Although the president of Afghanistan took several counternarcotics
initiatives at the end of 2004,29 the decree banning opium production has
been weakened by the Afghan government's lack of a transparent criminal
justice system and the underequipped, decentralized police force. The
Afghan government's eradication force and provincial forces have
undertaken only marginal crop destruction in a few locations. U.S.
officials stated that these eradication efforts have had no material
effect on the quantity of opium produced. In addition, U.S. proposals for
large-scale aerial eradication programs have been resisted by Afghan
government officials and other international donors. According to U.S.
officials, opium
29Two days after Afghanistan's December 2004 presidential inauguration,
the president of Afghanistan launched a counternarcotics campaign. The
president appointed a cabinet-level minister for counternarcotics and
created a subcabinet interagency working group that includes the Afghan
counternarcotics, interior, finance, and rural development ministries.
is being produced in record amounts in all 34 provinces, and a centrally
trained and directed Afghan counternarcotics force would likely face
significant opposition from provincial drug lords and many citizens.
Although U.S. and internationally sustained counternarcotics and security
programs could potentially reduce the amount of opium produced over time,
State officials expect that drug processing and trafficking will continue
until security is established.
Militias Have Not Been Fully Although the number of known militia fighters
has been reduced in recent
Reintegrated
months, the disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating of members of
Afghanistan's once-dominant militias is not complete. While many militias
are under the nominal authority of the Afghan Defense Ministry, they pose
a threat to the stability of the Afghan government and its ability to
extend control throughout Afghanistan. Of concern, according to Japanese
officials, is that former combatants may be attracted by the higher
salaries provided by militia leaders in the illegal narcotics industry.
To help the Afghan government disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia
fighters, donor nations established the Afghan New Beginnings Programme in
early 2003. Under the auspices of Japan and the United Nations Assistance
Mission to Afghanistan, the program oversaw the demobilization of more
than 34,000 former combatants by January 2005. The program also oversaw
the seizure or destruction of more than 90 percent of the heavy weapons
formerly controlled by militias (see fig. 7). Defense is providing
transportation for heavy weapons and is monitoring the surrender of
militias' small arms and light weapons. Also, the U.S. Agency for
International Development donated $4 million to the Afghan New Beginnings
Programme in fiscal year 2005.
Figure 7: Heavy Weapons Cantonment Site Outside Kabul
Source: GAO.
However, the program's success is not assured. According to U.S. and
Japanese government officials responsible for monitoring the
demobilization process, the total number of troops still belonging to
militias and other armed factions remains unknown.30 In addition, U.S.
troops monitoring and assisting in the disarmament process reported that
the Afghan government has collected only limited numbers of poor-quality
assault rifles and that better quality weaponry may still be held by the
former combatants and their commanders.
Former combatants have limited employment opportunities when they leave
the militias and attempt to reintegrate into society. As of January 2005,
only one reintegration center in Kabul provided vocational training to
former combatants. Although Afghanistan plans to open another seven
regional centers by early 2005, the eight centers together can retrain
only 2,000 students per year.
30Estimates of the total number of militia fighters and other armed
factions operating in Afghanistan in 2002 have ranged from 100,000 to over
1 million.
Conclusions
Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces,
international terrorists could again create a haven in Afghanistan and
jeopardize donor efforts to develop the country. However, Afghanistan
remains dependent on other nations for support-international assistance
provided over 90 percent of Afghanistan's $4.75 billion budget for 2005.
The International Monetary Fund estimates that Afghan government revenues
will average less than $400 million per year through 2008-less than half
its projected expenditures just for government salaries and operations.
The United States has provided over $4.1 billion since 2002 to help create
a new Afghan army and reconstitute Afghanistan's police force. Despite
initial progress, the United States and the other donors continue to face
numerous challenges. Although Defense has succeeded in training and
fielding thousands of Afghan combat troops, it has not been able to fully
equip them and it has lagged in establishing the institutions the Afghan
army needs to sustain itself. Similarly, while State has trained thousands
of police, it has just begun to address the structural problems that
affect the Afghan police force. In addition, neither Defense nor State has
fully addressed how and when Afghanistan will be able to sustain its
completed security forces.
Establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly
require years of effort and the investment of additional resources.
Available information suggests the army and police programs could cost up
to $7.2 billion to complete and an estimated $600 million annually to
sustain. However, Defense and State have not developed detailed plans,
performance measures, cost estimates, or milestones for completing and
sustaining these forces. Moreover, progress in the other pillars of
Afghan's security reform is critical to eventually sustaining and
maximizing the effectiveness of the Afghan army and police forces. Yet,
reform of the Afghan judiciary lags behind the other security pillars,
trafficking in illicit narcotics remains a challenge to the Afghan
government's authority, and thousands of militia fighters have not been
disarmed and reintegrated into society.
Recommendations for
Because of Afghanistan's prolonged conflict and its limited financial
resources, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State
Executive Action
develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and
police forces. The plans should include clearly defined objectives and
performance measures; milestones for achieving stated objectives; future
funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved,
including transitioning program responsibility to Afghanistan. The
Secretaries should provide this information to the Congress when the
executive branch next requests funding for the Afghan army or police
forces.
In addition, because reform in the other pillars of the Afghan security
sector-building an effective judiciary, curbing the production and
trafficking of illicit narcotics, and disarming and reintegrating militia
fighters-is critical to the success of the army and police programs, we
recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State work with the other
lead donor nations to help ensure that progress in the other pillars is
congruent with the progress made in the army and police programs. The
Secretaries should regularly report to the Congress, but no less than
annually, on the progress made in addressing these other security pillars.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State provided written comments
on a draft of this report. See appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. We
also met with cognizant officials from Defense and State to discuss their
comments and observations. Both departments provided technical comments
and updates that we incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate.
Overall, Defense, Justice, and State found the report helpful, thorough,
and accurate.
Justice characterized the Afghan police training program as extremely
important and enormously complex. It shared our concerns that more
detailed plans for the creation of a sustainable and effective Afghan
police force must be developed. Justice went on to note that its
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program is
providing critical support to the Iraqi Police Service and has assisted
other police training programs around the world, but has almost no role in
the ongoing efforts to assist the Afghan police.
Although Defense and State generally concurred with our recommendations,
both suggested that existing reporting requirements addressed the need to
report their plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and
police forces. Defense indicated that detailed plans will allow it to
effectively manage already scarce manpower and resources and should foster
deliberate and proactive long-term planning with State. State noted that
coordination efforts have characterized these programs since inception and
will continue.
We do not dispute that current law, including the Afghan Freedom Support
Act of 2002, as amended, and the fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental,
mandate a number of reports on Afghanistan. However, our analysis of past
Defense and State reporting-both internally and to the Congress- indicates
that the departments do not have detailed plans for equipping and fielding
fully functioning Afghan army and police forces by a stated end date. We
continue to believe that developing and following such plans and ensuring
concurrent progress in the other security pillars is essential to the
overall future success of the Afghan security effort. Whatever reporting
mechanisms Defense and State choose, the departments need to specify what
their objectives are and how they will assess progress, when the effort to
build the Afghan army and police will be completed, and what future
funding will be needed. In addition, in light of the Justice comments, we
encourage State to take advantage of Justice's police training expertise
in developing its detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan
police program.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees and to the Secretaries of Defense
and State. We will also make copies available to others on request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3149 or [email protected]. Key contributors to this report
were Al Huntington, Pat Dickriede, Reid Lowe, Pierre Toureille, Eve
Weisberg, and Joe Zamoyta.
David Gootnick, Director International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
To examine the progress made, and limitations faced, by the United States
and other donor nations in creating a new Afghan national army, we
reviewed documents obtained from several offices and agencies in the U.S.
Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff/J-5 (Office of
Strategic Plans and Policy's Afghanistan Desk), U.S. Central Command, the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Middle East, Asia and North Africa
division), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army Security
Assistance Command, the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, and
Task Force Phoenix. We also reviewed documents from State's Bureau of
South Asian Affairs. Our review of these documents provided us with
information concerning the program's structure, current time frames and
objectives, progress, limitations, and funding status. In addition, we met
with the following various cognizant officials to discuss the progress
made and limitations faced by the United States:
o
In Washington, D.C., we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers. At State, we met with officials from State's South Asia and
Political-Military Affairs bureaus. In Tampa, Florida, we met with
officials of the U.S. Central Command, which has military oversight for
Afghanistan.
o
We attended a meeting on the status of Afghan military construction
projects at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Transatlantic Programs
Center in Winchester, Virginia, which oversees the Corps' construction
projects in Afghanistan.
o
We attended a 3-day conference in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, where
representatives from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the U.S.
Army Security Assistance Command, and the Office of Military
Cooperation-Afghanistan discussed problems that were impeding security
assistance to the Afghan army.
In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with officials of the Combined Forces
Command, the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, and Task Force
Phoenix; U.S. embedded trainers; and the Afghan Deputy Minister of
Defense. Also in Afghanistan, we traveled to Herat, where we met with U.S.
embedded trainers, the commander of the Afghan army's regional command,
and some Afghan army troops.
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
To examine the progress made, and limitations faced, by the United States
and other donor nations in reconstituting the Afghan national police, we
reviewed relevant documents on police program planning, resources, and
implementation. We analyzed documents from State's International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs/Resource Management Office to obtain a
detailed costs and funding sources. Defense's Office of Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict provided us with planning materials on the
police-related counternarcotics program, as well as funding documents for
this program. In addition, we reviewed the U.S. curricula for Afghan
police training provided to us by the Department of Justice. We also
examined documentation from the United Nations Law and Order Trust Fund
for Afghanistan to obtain an overview of funding from non-U.S. donors. We
reviewed German government documents on the German strategy for the Afghan
police, German police program, and its funding information. We also met
with the following cognizant officials to discuss the progress made, and
limitations faced, by the United States and the other donors:
o
In Washington, D.C., we met with officials from State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs who focus on police
training and the rule of law, as well as with officials from State's South
Asia Bureau. At Justice, we spoke with officials from the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. We also met with
representatives of DynCorp Aerospace Technology-the State contractor for
the Afghan police program. At Defense, we met with officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict.
o
In New York City, we held discussions with representatives of the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations' Civilian Police Division
and with officials from the United Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan.
o
In Afghanistan, we met with U.S. embassy officials overseeing the police
training program, officials at the Afghan ministry of Interior, and
representatives of the German embassy charged with overseeing Germany's
police program. In addition, we traveled to Jalalabad to meet with DynCorp
police trainers and Afghan police personnel; we also toured a police
training facility and inspected an Afghan police station.
To identify future challenges that the United States, other donor nations,
and Afghanistan must address to complete and sustain the Afghan army
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
and police forces, we reviewed documents prepared by Defense, State, the
government of Afghanistan, foreign donor governments, and international
organizations. We also met with Defense, State, and DynCorp officials in
the United States and Afghanistan to obtain information concerning the
potential future costs of the army and police programs. In Afghanistan, we
met with officials at the embassies of Italy, the United Kingdom, and
Japan to discuss the Afghan judiciary, the Afghan narcotics problem, and
the continued presence of militia fighters, respectively. In the United
Kingdom and Germany, we met with officials from those nations' ministries
of foreign affairs and defense to discuss overall Afghan security issues.
In Belgium, we met with U.S. officials at the U.S. Mission to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels, Belgium, and with officials at
its Supreme Headquarters for Allied Powers in Europe in Mons, Belgium, to
discuss their perspectives on the challenges posed by the Afghan security
situation.
To determine the reliability of the funding data, Afghan army troop data,
and Afghan police training data obtained from Defense and State officials,
we compared multiple reports and sources and interviewed cognizant
officials regarding the controls and checks they used to compile the data.
o
To help confirm the completeness and consistency of U.S. and international
funding data, we compiled and compared data from multiple sources-Defense,
State, Justice, and other donor countries- with information from cognizant
U.S. agency officials and donor country officials in Washington, D.C., and
Afghanistan. We used a questionnaire to address the accuracy of the data;
the security of the databases used; and the limitations, if any, of the
data. We also compared the funding data to appropriations and
authorization legislation, congressional budget requests, and reports to
the Congress. Although we did not audit the funding data and are not
expressing an opinion on them, based on our examination of the documents
received and our discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded
that the funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this engagement.
o
To assess the reliability of the data regarding the number of Afghan
troops assigned to Afghan army commands, we discussed with Defense
officials how they check data from the commands and compared it with
information from embedded trainers and payroll records. To assess the
reliability of the data regarding the number of Afghan police trained, we
interviewed State officials who received data from DynCorp, Justice, and
the German Ministry of Interior to determine how they verify the data; we
also compared the various information sources provided to us.
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
However, because of the security situation in Afghanistan, we could not
independently verify or test the army and police training information at
field locations. Nevertheless, based on our assessments of the data
provided and our discussions with the cognizant officials, we concluded
that the Afghan army troop data and Afghan police training data provided
to us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
Appendix II
Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and Police by Non-U.S. Donors
Forty-one non-U.S. donors have provided approximately $439 million in
cash, equipment, and services for the Afghan army and police (see table
3). Approximately $193 million was donated to supplement U.S. efforts to
build the Afghan army, and about $246 million was provided for the Afghan
police program (see table 3). Six donors-the Czech Republic, the European
Union, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank-provided
almost 65 percent of the total donations.
o
For the Afghan army, over $52 million was donated in cash and an estimated
$141 million was donated in weapons, ammunition, vehicles, infrastructure
support, communications equipment, medical equipment, and clothing.1
o
For the Afghan police, over $120 million was donated in cash to the United
Nations' Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan,2 and an estimated $126
million was donated in equipment, construction assistance, and training.
In addition, Defense estimates that approximately $24 million of military
equipment was recovered from the demobilization of militias and other
salvaged equipment in Afghanistan.
1OMC-A and U.S. Central Command calculated the value of donated resources
and services in U.S. dollar equivalents in the year donated. These figures
do not include the value of donors' training teams or support to the Kabul
Military Training Center.
2Donors reported the monetary value of their donations to the German
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the year they provided the donations.
Appendix II
Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and
Police by Non-U.S. Donors
Table 3: Estimated Value of Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and Police
by Non-U.S. Donors
Dollars in millions
Armya Police
Donor (as of March 2005) (as of January 2005) Totals
Albania $* $0 $*
Australia 0 1
Belgium * 0 *
Bosnia 1 0
Bulgaria 17 0
Canada 2 10
China 0 2
Croatia 4 0
Czech Republic 59 0
Denmark * * *
Egypt 2 0
European Union 0 86
Finland 0 * *
France 5 20
Germany 1 68
Greece 2 0 2
Hungary 9 0 9
Iceland 1 0 1
India 10 0 10
Ireland 0 1 1
Italy * 0 *
Japan 0 20 20
Kazakhstan * 0 *
Liechtenstein 0 * *
Netherlands 0 8 8
New Zealand * 0 *
Norway 1 5 6
Pakistan 2 0 2
Poland 1 0 1
Qatar 5 0 5
Romania 8 0 8
Russia 1 0 1
Slovenia 2 0 2
Appendix II
Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and
Police by Non-U.S. Donors
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dollars in millions
Armya Police
Donor (as of March 2005) (as of January 2005) Totals
South Korea 1 0
Spain 2 0
Switzerland 1 1
United Arab Emirates 3 0
Ukraine 1 0
United Kingdom 20 2
World Bank 0 22
Other 32 0
Total $193 $246 $439
Source: GAO analysis of data from the U.S. Central Command and U.S.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Afghan army) and the German Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (Afghan police).
*Less than $500,000.
aBulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Mongolia, Romania, South Korea, and
the United Kingdom also provided military trainers to the Afghan army.
Appendix III
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix IV
Comments from the Department of Justice
Appendix IV
Comments from the Department of Justice
Appendix V
Comments from the Department of State
Appendix V
Comments from the Department of State
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