Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy,
Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action
to Meet the New Design Basis Threat (15-JUL-05, GAO-05-611).
A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE)
site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating
effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the
Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which
is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy
research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear
material. A heavily armed paramilitary force equipped with such
items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to
examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting
DOE's existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and
ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the
terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis
threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-611
ACCNO: A30097
TITLE: Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt,
Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat
DATE: 07/15/2005
SUBJECT: Combat readiness
Counterterrorism
Emergency preparedness
Homeland security
Nuclear facility security
Nuclear weapons
Physical security
Standards
Strategic forces
Terrorism
Terrorists
Nuclear materials
******************************************************************
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GAO-05-611
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters
July 2005
NUCLEAR SECURITY
DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Needs to
Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat
a
GAO-05-611
[IMG]
July 2005
NUCLEAR SECURITY
DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Needs to
Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat
What GAO Found
Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear
material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements.
Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply
with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and
equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required
training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some
weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE
protective forces to defend their sites. For example, despite the
importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo
simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force
exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force
officers to participate in these exercises, nor does it require sites to
track individual participation. In another example, GAO found that
protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems
with their radio communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of
the 105 protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always
have dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual
473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that
improvements were under way.
To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in
the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they
will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include
transforming its current protective force into an "elite force"-modeled on
U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies to
reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating
and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites to
reduce security costs, and creating a sound ESE management structure that
has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE offices
that have weapons-grade nuclear material. However, because these
initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of
development and will require significant commitment of resources and
coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 2008 October DBT
implementation deadline is uncertain.
DOE Protective Force Member
Source: DOE.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE
Readiness Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices
Exist
DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated Actions
to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
1 3 6
12
21 30 30 31
Appendixes
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 33 Appendix II: Comments from the
Department of Energy 36 Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments 40
Tables Table 1: DOE/ESE Category I Special Nuclear Material Sites 8
Table 2: DOE/ESE Relevant Program Offices and Fiscal Year 2006
Funding Requests for Security 8
Table 3: ESE Protective Force Deployment 10
Figure Figure 1: DOE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request
Contents
Abbreviations
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DBT design basis threat
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
EM Environmental Management
ESE Energy, Science and Environment, DOE's Office of the Under
Secretary for NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
A
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548
July 15, 2005
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Charles F. Grassley
United States Senate
The Department of Energy (DOE) has long recognized that a successful
terrorist attack on a site containing the material used in nuclear
weapons,
such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, could have devastating
consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. The risks
associated with these materials, which in specified forms and quantities
are
referred to as Category I special nuclear material, vary but include theft
for
use in an illegal nuclear weapon; the creation of improvised nuclear
devices capable of producing a nuclear yield; and the creation of
so-called
"dirty bombs," in which conventional explosives are used to disperse
radioactive material.
Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, an
effective safeguards and security program is essential. For many years, a
key component for DOE security programs has been the development of
the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the
potential size and capabilities of adversary forces. DOE issued its
current
DBT in October 2004 in response to recommendations in our April 2004
report,1 congressional criticism, and a new review of intelligence data.
The
October 2004 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites than
had
previous DBTs. Consequently, DOE is not requiring full compliance until
October 2008 in order to allow its sites adequate time to implement
measures to defeat this larger terrorist threat. Private contractors, who
operate DOE's facilities, counter the terrorist threat contained in the
DBT
with a multifaceted protective system. While specific measures vary from
site to site, a key universal component of DOE's protective system is a
heavily armed protective force equipped with such items as automatic
1See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before
It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 27, 2004).
weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and chemical protective gear.
The following two major organizations in DOE are responsible for securing
Category I special nuclear material:
o The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately
organized agency within DOE, is responsible for the nation's nuclear
weapons programs and manages six sites that contain Category I special
nuclear material.
o DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment
(ESE) is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research,
basic physical science research, and environmental cleanup and manages
five sites that collectively contain substantial quantities of Category I
special nuclear material.
We reported on security at NNSA sites in May 2003 and April 2004.2 We
found that NNSA needed to improve the management of its safeguards and
security program and that while some action had been taken in response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, additional action was needed
to ensure that DOE's sites were adequately prepared to defend themselves.
Since the attacks of September 11, DOE has focused on the security of its
NNSA sites more than it has on its ESE sites.3 Consequently, you asked us
to determine for the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear
material (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's
existing readiness requirements and (2) what actions DOE and ESE will need
to take to successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat
identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE's implementation deadline of
October 2008.
To determine the extent to which protective forces at ESE sites are
meeting existing DOE readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies and
other pertinent literature about the factors that affect the readiness of
forces, such as military forces, that are like those defending ESE sites.
We
2See GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and
Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003) and
GAO-04-623.
3For example, DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
examined five NNSA sites and only a single ESE site in a recent review.
See Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of
Energy Protective Force Management and Capabilities (U) (Washington, D.C.:
June 28, 2004).
conducted structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers at
the five ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear material. While
the responses from these interviews are not projectable to the entire
universe of ESE protective force officers, we did speak to about 10
percent of the total protective forces at the five sites. Even though not
projectable, we randomly selected protective force officers to interview
at each site in order to help assure their independence from the views of
site management. We asked the officers questions designed to determine
their readiness to defend the sites, including questions about their
morale, training, and equipment. We also reviewed the training records of
the 105 officers to determine if key elements of their training complied
with existing DOE training requirements. In particular, we reviewed
selected firearms and physical fitness qualifications to determine if
these officers complied with existing DOE requirements and regulations.
Finally, we reviewed the equipment used by ESE protective forces to
determine if it met current DOE requirements. Further details on our
interview procedures and random selection methods are found in the scope
and methodology appendix at the end of this report.
To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully
defend against the new threat identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE's
implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the October 2004 DBT
and associated guidance documents. We discussed the October 2004 DBT with
officials in DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and
with officials in ESE's Offices of Environmental Management; Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology; and Science. Finally, where available, we
reviewed documents prepared by ESE officials on how they plan to comply
with the October 2004 DBT. Appendix I presents a detailed description of
our scope and methodology. We performed our work between March 2004 and
July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing
Category I special nuclear material generally meet existing DOE readiness
requirements. However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could
adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their
sites. With respect to current readiness, 102 of the 105 officers we
interviewed stated that they believed that they and their fellow officers
understood what was expected of them if the site were attacked by a
terrorist group. Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated themselves as
highly ready to defend their site while 20 officers rated themselves as
somewhat or moderately ready. Supporting
their views, we found that the five ESE sites we visited had the required
training programs, facilities, and equipment, and that the 105 protective
force members whose records we reviewed generally complied with existing
DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and
equipment standardization. However, we did identify some weaknesses. For
example, despite the importance of training exercises in which protective
forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists
(force-on-force exercises), DOE does not have a requirement for individual
protective force officers to participate in these exercises or a
requirement that sites track the individual officers' participation. While
84 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed stated they had
participated in a force-on-force exercise, only 46 of the 84 protective
force officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they had
participated in were either realistic or somewhat realistic. Additionally,
protective force officers often told us that they did not have frequent
and realistic tactical training. In another example, 66 of the 105
protective force officers, at all five of the ESE sites, stated that they
did not always have dependable radio communications. However, according to
DOE Manual 473.2-2 Protective Force Program Manual, the radios protective
force officers use must be capable of intelligible two-way communications.
Site security officials stated that improvements were under way and would
be completed this year. Finally, some ESE sites currently do not have the
protective force capabilities found at NNSA sites with similar special
nuclear material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA
sites with Category I special nuclear material currently operate armored
vehicles. However, only one ESE site with Category I special nuclear
material equipped protective forces with such vehicles at the time of our
review.
To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in
the 2004 DBT by 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they need to
take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the
transformation of its current protective force into an elite force, the
development and deployment of new security technologies, the consolidation
and elimination of special nuclear material, and organizational
improvements within ESE's security program. However, because these
initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of
development and will require significant commitment of resources and
coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 2008 DBT
implementation deadline is uncertain. Specifically, the status of these
initiatives is as follows:
o Elite forces. DOE officials, and 85 of the 105 protective force
officers we interviewed, now believe that the way DOE sites, including ESE
sites,
currently train their contractor-operated protective forces will not be
adequate to defeat the much larger terrorist threat contained in the
October 2004 DBT. In response, the department has proposed the development
of an elite force that would be patterned after the U. S. military's
Special Forces and might eventually be converted from a
contractor-operated force into a federal force. However, this proposal is
only in the conceptual phase, and completing this effort by the 2008 DBT
implementation deadline is unlikely.
o New security technologies. DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness
and survivability of its protective forces by developing and deploying new
security technologies. It believes technologies can reduce the risk to
protective forces in case of an attack and can provide additional response
time to meet and defeat an attack. Sixteen of the 105 protective forces we
interviewed generally supported this view and said they needed enhanced
detection technologies that would allow them to detect adversaries at much
greater ranges than is currently possible at most sites. However, a senior
DOE official recently conceded that the department has not yet taken the
formal steps necessary to coordinate investment in emerging security
technologies and that the role of technology in helping sites meet the new
threats contained in the 2004 DBT by the department's deadline of October
2008 is uncertain.
o Consolidation and elimination of materials. ESE's current strategy to
meet the October 2008 deadline relies heavily on the consolidation and
elimination of special nuclear material between and among ESE sites. For
example, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology plans to
down-blend special nuclear material and extract medically useful isotopes
at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory-an Office of Science site. This
action would eliminate most of the security concerns surrounding the
material. Neither program office, however, has been able to formally agree
on its share of additional security costs, which have increased
significantly because of the new DBT. In addition, neither ESE nor DOE has
developed a comprehensive, departmentwide plan to achieve the needed
cooperation and agreement among the sites and program offices to
consolidate special nuclear material as we recommended last year in our
April 2004 report. In the absence of a comprehensive plan, completing most
of these consolidation activities by the October 2008 DBT implementation
deadline is unlikely.
o Organizational improvements. The ESE headquarters security organization
is not well suited to meet the challenges associated with
implementing the 2004 DBT. Specifically, there is no centralized security
organization within the Office of the Under Secretary, ESE. The individual
who serves as the Acting ESE Security Director has been detailed to the
Office by DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and
has no programmatic authority or staff. This lack of authority limits the
Director's ability to facilitate ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such
issues as material down-blending at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and
material consolidation at other ESE sites.
In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new
terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making five
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy to track and increase
protective force officer participation in force-on-force training
exercises, correct weaknesses with protective force officers' equipment,
coordinate implementation of DOE's various efforts designed to meet the
2004 DBT, and create a more effective ESE security organization.
We provided DOE with a copy of our report for review and comment. DOE
concurred with the report, accepted our recommendations, and provided an
update on actions it anticipated taking to address our recommendations.
While we believe that most of DOE's anticipated actions will be responsive
to our recommendations, we are concerned about DOE's response to our
recommendation that it develop a departmentwide, multiyear implementation
plan for meeting the 2004 DBT requirements. Specifically, in responding to
this recommendation, DOE cited only individual efforts to address the
development of an elite force, the deployment of enhanced security
technologies, and the consolidation of special nuclear material, not the
development of a comprehensive plan. While each of these efforts is
important, we continue to believe that DOE cannot be successful in meeting
the requirements of the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 without
an integrated effort that is built around a comprehensive plan.
Background The Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and
Environment comprises nine program offices, including the Offices of
Environmental Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and
Science and accounts for about 57 percent of DOE's fiscal year 2006 budget
request (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: DOE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request Dollars in millions $673
Balance of DOE
NNSA
ESE
Source: DOE.
ESE has five sites that collectively have substantial quantities of
Category I special nuclear material. (See table 1.) For fiscal year 2006,
DOE requested over $300 million for security at these five sites. This
represents about 70% of the entire security budget request for ESE. (See
table 2.) Contractors operate all of these sites.
Table 1: DOE/ESE Category I Special Nuclear Material Sites
Responsible program Site Location
office
Office of Environmental Savannah River Site Aiken, South
Management Carolina
Office of Environmental Hanford Site Richland,
Management Washington
Office of Nuclear Idaho National Engineering
Energy, and Idaho Falls,
Science and Technology Environmental Laboratory Idaho
Office of Nuclear Argonne National
Energy, Laboratory-West Idaho Falls,
Science and Technology Idaho
Office of Science Oak Ridge National
Laboratory Oak Ridge,
Tennessee
Source: GAO.
Note: The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known as
the Idaho National Laboratory, in February 2005. In addition, federal
oversight of the Idaho National Laboratory has been consolidated at DOE's
Idaho Operations Office. Previously, DOE's Chicago Operations Office
oversaw Argonne National Laboratory-West.
Table 2: DOE/ESE Relevant Program Offices and Fiscal Year 2006 Funding
Requests for Security
Dollars in millions
Program office
Total budget request
Total security request
Security as a percentage of total budget request
Office of Environmental
Management $6,505 $287 4%
Office of Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology 511 75 15%
Office of Science $3,463 $74 2%
Source: DOE.
Within DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, DOE's
Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies to guide
the department's safeguards and security programs. DOE's overall security
policy is contained in DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program,
which was originally approved in 1995. The key component of DOE's approach
to security is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the
characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. A classified
companion document, the Adversary Capabilities List, provides additional
information on terrorist capabilities and equipment. The DBT
has been traditionally based on a classified, multiagency intelligence
community assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the
Postulated Threat. The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most
demanding threat contained in the DBT.
DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted
protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all
protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a defense-in-depth
concept that includes the following:
o a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting
intruders;
o physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;
o numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers,
vehicle inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;
o operational security procedures, such as a "two person" rule that
prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear material;
and
o hardened facilities and vaults.
Each site also has a heavily armed protective force that is often equipped
with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor,
and chemical protective gear. These protective forces comprise Security
Police Officers that are classified into three groups: Security Police
Officer-I, Security Police Officer-II, and Security Police Officer-III.
Security Police Officer-Is are only assigned to fixed, armed posts.
Generally, very few of these officers are used at ESE sites because of the
limited roles they can fill. Security Police Officer-IIs generally are
assigned to posts such as access control booths, or to foot or vehicle
patrols. Finally, Security Police Officers-IIIs are responsible for
operations such as hostage rescue and the recapture and recovery of
special nuclear material. According to federal regulations, Security
Police Officers-IIIs have more demanding physical fitness and training
standards than Security Police Officers-Is or Security Police
Officers-IIs. At the ESE sites we visited, protective forces work for
private contractors and are unionized. The number of qualified Security
Police Officers-IIs and Security Police Officers-IIIs at ESE sites is
shown in table 3.
Table 3: ESE Protective Force Deployment DOE site Security Police Officers (II
and III)
Savannah River Site 551
Hanford Site 241
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory 149
Argonne National Laboratory-West
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Total 1,040
Source: DOE.
Protective force duties and requirements, such as physical fitness
standards, are explained in detail in DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force
Program Manual, as well as in DOE regulations (10 C.F.R. pt. 1046,
Physical Protection of Security Interests). DOE issued the current
Protective Force Program Manual in June 2000. Although protective forces
are expected to comply with the duties and requirements established in DOE
policies, deviations from these policies are allowed as long as certain
approval and notification criteria are met. Following are the three types
of deviations:
o Variances: Variances are approved conditions that technically vary from
DOE security requirements but afford equivalent levels of protection.
o Waivers: Waivers are approved nonstandard conditions that deviate from
DOE security requirements that, if uncompensated, would create a potential
security vulnerability. As such, waivers require implementation of what
DOE calls compensatory measures. Compensatory measures could include
deploying additional protective forces or curtailing operations until the
asset can be better protected.
o Exceptions: Exceptions are approved deviations from DOE security
requirements that create a safeguards and security vulnerability.
Exceptions are approved only when correction of the condition is not
feasible, and compensatory measures are inadequate.
In addition to complying with these security requirements, DOE protective
systems, including protective forces, also must meet performance
standards. For example, DOE sites are required to demonstrate that their
protective systems are capable of defending special nuclear material
against terrorist forces identified in the DBT. The performance of
protective systems is formally and regularly examined through
vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is a systematic
evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative techniques are
applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective protection of
specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct such
assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such as
U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and
force-on-force exercises, in which the site's protective forces undergo
simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. In addition to their use
in evaluating the effectiveness of physical protection strategies, DOE
believes force-on-force exercises are the most realistic representation of
adversary attacks that can be used to train protective forces.
Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its
contractors are complying with DOE's safeguards and security policies,
including protective force duties and requirements, and that its systems
are performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments
and are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. In addition to
routine oversight, DOE orders require field offices to comprehensively
survey contractors' operations for safeguards and security every year.
DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance provides
yet another check through its comprehensive inspection program. This
office performs comprehensive inspections roughly every 18 months at each
DOE site that has specified quantities of Category I special nuclear
material. All deficiencies (findings) identified during surveys and
inspections require the contractors to take corrective action.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE security policies
have been under almost constant reexamination and have undergone
considerable change. For example, the department's security polices have
been undergoing a streamlining process for nearly 2 years. In addition, as
we pointed out in our April 2004 report, DOE worked for almost 2 years to
develop and issue a new DBT. When DOE issued its first post-September 11
DBT in May 2003, we recommended that DOE reexamine it because, among other
things, it contained a terrorist threat that was less than the threat
identified in the intelligence community's Postulated Threat. DOE agreed
to reexamine the 2003 DBT and issued a revised and more demanding DBT in
October 2004. The October 2004 DBT significantly increased the terrorist
threat to DOE facilities and required enhanced protection strategies for
DOE facilities. Under the new DBT, sites with Category I special nuclear
material will not have to be fully prepared to defend their sites against
the
terrorist threat contained in the new 2004 DBT until October 2008. By July
29, 2005, DOE sites will have to forward 2004 DBT implementation plans to
the Deputy Secretary of Energy and, within 3 months, begin submitting
quarterly DBT implementation reports. At the time of our review, cost
estimates were still preliminary, but security officials at ESE sites said
that they may require collectively an additional $384-$584 million over
the next several years in order for all ESE sites with Category I special
nuclear material to meet the 2004 DBT.
Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness
Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist
We found that the majority of the 105 protective force members we
interviewed at ESE sites generally believe that they currently are ready
to perform their mission of protecting the site's special nuclear
material. Consistent with that belief, the five ESE sites we visited had
the required training programs, facilities, and equipment, and the 105
protective force members whose records we reviewed were generally meeting
the readiness requirements contained in the DOE orders and federal
regulations. However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could
adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their
sites. These include protective force officers' lack of regular
participation in force-on-force exercises; the frequency and quality of
training opportunities; the lack of dependable communications systems; and
insufficient protective gear, including protective body armor and chemical
protective gear, and the lack of armored vehicles.
Protective Force Officers Are Confident in Their Current Overall Readiness
Readiness is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as the ability of
forces to deploy quickly and to accomplish specific goals and missions. In
particular, DOD believes that a ready force should possess a sufficient
number of experienced, trained, and properly equipped personnel. Through
realistic and comprehensive training, these personnel are forged into a
cohesive unit that can perform its tasks even under extreme conditions.
DOE orders and federal regulations establish the framework for ensuring
that DOE protective forces are ready to perform their mission.
ESE protective force officers generally believe that they are ready to
perform their mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers we
interviewed stated that they believed that they, and their fellow
officers, understood what was expected of them should the site be attacked
by a terrorist group. Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated the readiness
of their site's protective force as high, while 20 officers rated their
protective force as somewhat or
moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority of the officers (16
of 105) we interviewed rated the readiness of their force to defend their
sites as low. Two officers were uncertain of their forces' readiness, and
two did not respond to the question.
In addition, the majority of officers we interviewed believed they and the
protective force officers with whom they worked on a regular basis formed
a cohesive unit that would be able to perform their most essential mission
of protecting special nuclear material. Specifically, of the 105 officers
we interviewed,
o 86 reported that they were satisfied with their jobs,
o 73 reported that their morale was high or at least moderately high,
o 91 reported that protective force officers had developed the necessary
teamwork to defend the site against a terrorist attack,
o 84 officers responded that they had a high degree of confidence in
their fellow officers in the event of a terrorist attack, and
o 88 reported that their fellow officers would be willing to risk their
lives in defense of their site.
ESE Protective Forces Generally Meet the DOE Training and Equipment
Requirements We Reviewed
Firearms Proficiency
As called for in DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is
achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Each of the five
sites we visited had formally approved annual training plans. Each site
generally had the training facilities, such as firearms ranges,
classrooms, computer terminals, and exercise equipment, which enabled them
to meet their current DOE and federal training requirements. Furthermore,
each site maintained computerized databases for tracking individual
protective force officers' compliance with training requirements. To
determine if these programs and facilities were being used to implement
the DOE requirements and federal regulations, we focused on three key
areas-firearms proficiency, physical fitness, and protective force officer
equipment.
DOE's Protective Force Program Manual states that protective force
officers must demonstrate their proficiency with the weapons that are
assigned to them every 6 months. According to the training records of the
105 protective force officers we interviewed, 79 had met this proficiency
requirement with their primary weapon, the M-4 or M-16 semiautomatic
rifle. Of the 26 officers who had not met this requirement within the 6
month time frame, 11 officers were all located at one site with 8 of the
11 officers not meeting the requirement until 2 to 5 months after the
required time. According to an official at this site, 7 of the 8 officers
could not complete the requirement in a timely fashion because the site's
firing range was closed for the investigation of an accidental weapon
discharge that had resulted in an injury to a protective force officer.
Although the DOE Protective Force Program Manual provides guidance that
allows for off-site training to meet requirements, officials noted that a
stand-down of all firearms training prevented training requirements from
being met. We determined that 2 of the 26 officers did not complete the
requirement for medical reasons. We were not given reasons why the
remaining officers did not meet the requirement.
Physical Fitness Under DOE regulations,4 protective force personnel
employed by DOE contractors who are authorized to carry firearms must meet
a minimum standard for physical fitness every 12 months. There are two
standards for such personnel-Offensive Combative and Defensive Combative.
All Security Police Officer-IIIs, which include DOE special response team
members, must meet the Offensive Combative standard which requires a
1-mile run in no more than 8 minutes 30 seconds and a 40-yard
prone-to-running dash in no more than 8 seconds. All other protective
officers authorized to carry firearms must meet the Defensive Combative
standard, which requires a one-half mile run in no more than 4 minutes 40
seconds and a 40-yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 8.5 seconds.
According to the training records of the 105 protective force officers we
reviewed, 103 of the 105 protective force officers had met the standard
required by federal regulation for their position. Two officers who did
not meet the requirement were on medical restriction. The records for
another officer showed him as having met the requirement, but additional
records provided by the site showed the officer had completed the run in a
time that exceeded the standard. Site officials could not provide an
explanation for this discrepancy.
410 C.F.R. pt. 1046, subpt. B, app. A.
Protective Officer Equipment DOE's Protective Force Program Manual sets a
number of requirements for protective force equipment. Among these
requirements are the following:
o Minimum standard duty equipment. All Security Police Officers are
required to carry a minimum set of equipment, including a portable radio,
a handgun, and an intermediate force weapon such as a baton. In addition,
a mask to protect against a chemical attack must be carried or available
to them. All Security Police Officer-IIs and Security Police Officer-IIIs
must also have access to personal protective body armor.
o Firearms serviceability. Firearms must be kept serviceable at all times
and must be inspected by a DOE-certified armorer at least twice a year to
ensure serviceability. All DOE sites with armed protective force personnel
are required to have the services of a certified armorer who is
responsible for inspecting, maintaining, and repairing firearms.
o Firearms inventories. Issued firearms must be inventoried at the
beginning of each shift, and an inventory of all firearms in storage must
be conducted weekly. A complete inventory of all firearms must be
conducted on a monthly basis.
o Appropriate equipment to counter the DBT. In line with DOE's
performance standards, DOE protective forces equipment must be tailored to
counter adversaries identified in the DBT. To this end, sites employ a
variety of equipment including automatic weapons, night vision equipment,
and body armor.
In most cases, each site's protective forces carried or had access to the
required minimum standard duty equipment. Most sites demonstrated that
they had access to certified armorers, and each site maintained the
required firearms maintenance, inspection, and inventory records, often
kept in a detailed computerized database. We did not, however, conduct a
detailed inspection of these records nor did we conduct an independent
inventory of each site's firearms.5 The appropriate policies and
procedures were also in place for the inventory of firearms. In addition,
some sites have substantially increased their protective forces weaponry
since September 11, 2001, or have plans to further enhance these
capabilities to meet the 2004 DBT. For example, one site provided us with
a list of upgrades since September 11, 2001, including new M-4 carbines,
grenade launchers, Barrett .50 caliber rifles, armor piercing ammunition,
chemical and biological protection suits, and decontamination kits, as
well as additional units that use specially trained dogs (K-9 units) and
portable X-ray machines to detect explosives.
Some Weaknesses in ESE Site Protective Force Practices Exist
Performance Testing and Training
While protective forces at ESE sites are generally meeting current DOE
requirements, we identified some weaknesses in ESE protective force
practices that could adversely affect the current readiness of ESE
protective forces to defend their sites. These include protective force
officers' lack of regular participation in force-on-force exercises; the
frequency and quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable
communications systems; and insufficient protective gear, including
protective body armor and chemical protective gear, and the lack of
armored vehicles.
According to DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, performance tests are
used to evaluate and verify the effectiveness of protective force programs
and to provide needed training. Performance tests can also identify
protective systems requiring improvements, validate implemented
improvements, and motivate protective force personnel. A force-on-force
exercise is one type of performance test during which the protective force
engages in a simulated battle against a mock adversary force, employing
the weapons, equipment, and methodologies postulated in the DBT. DOE
believes that force-on-force exercises are a valuable training tool for
protective force officers. Consequently, DOE policy requires that
force-on-force exercises must be held at least once per year at sites that
5Recent firearms inventories by the DOE-Inspector General have uncovered
some problems with DOE and NNSA firearms inventories. For examples, see
the following DOE-Inspector General Reports: Inspection Report: Inspection
of Selected Office of Security and Emergency Operations Firearms
Inventories, DOE/IG-0517, August 2001; Inspection Report: Inspection of
Firearms Internal Controls at Los Alamos National Laboratory, DOE/IG-0587,
February 2003; Inspection Report: Firearms Internal Controls at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, DOE/IG-0621, September 2003.
possess Category I quantities of special nuclear material or Category II
quantities that can be rolled up to Category I quantities.
We asked protective force members whether they had participated in
force-on-force exercises during their service at their site and when they
most recently had participated. Eighty-four of the 105 protective force
officers we interviewed reported that they had participated in a
force-on-force exercise, but 8 reported they had never participated during
their service at the site, and 13 did not respond to this question. Of the
84 protective force officers that had participated,
o 60 reported participating within 12 months of the interview,
o 10 had participated within the last 2 to 5 years,
o one had participated 13 years ago,
o one could not remember the last force-on-force he had participated in,
and
o 12 did not respond to the question.
We were unable to verify whether protective force officers' recollections
were accurate because DOE sites are not required to track individual
participation in force-on-force exercises. However, DOE's Office of
Security and Safety Performance Assurance 2004 review of protective forces
found that the average protective force officer is only likely to
participate in a force-on-force exercise once every 4 to 6 years. DOE's
Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has concluded that
this frequency is not adequate for the training of protective forces.
DOE's 2004 protective force review also found that the frequency, quality,
and rigor of performance tests and training exercises vary widely
throughout the complex. Our interviews of protective force officers and
protective force managers produced a similar result. For example, we asked
protective force members whether they believed the force-on-force
exercises they participated in were realistic and challenging. Only 23 of
the 84 protective force officers that had participated in these exercises
believed they were realistic while 23 stated they were somewhat realistic.
In contrast, 38 officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they
had participated in were not realistic. Twenty officers did not respond to
the question. In addition, 33 of the 84 protective force officers reported
that
safety considerations interfered with the realism of the force-on-force
exercises with some protective force officers stating that they were
limited in the tactics they could employ. For example, some protective
force officers stated that they were not allowed to run up stairwells,
climb fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles. Some
protective force officers at one site reported that for safety reasons
they were no longer allowed to deploy on the roof of a facility although
this position provided a significant advantage over adversaries
approaching the facility. Some contractor protective force managers agreed
that safety requirements limited the kind of realistic force-on-force
training and other forms of realistic training that are needed to ensure
effective protective force performance.
More broadly, most of the 105 protective force officers reported some
negative attitudes about the training they had received. Specifically, 85
of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed identified a number of
deficiencies with their training, especially regarding the frequency and
quality of firearms and tactical training. The following deficiencies were
identified:
o 43 protective force officers reported that there was a lack of adequate
firearms training, with 13 officers noting that the only training they had
was when they went to satisfy the semiannual DOE qualification
requirements. Some officers also reported that they did not have first
priority at firing ranges because other local or federal law enforcement
agencies were using them.
o 42 protective force members, including 16 officers who are members of
special response teams, reported that tactical training
opportunities-where protective force officers move, shoot, and communicate
as a unit-at their respective sites were very limited. A review of the
standard DOE training curricula for Security Police Officer-IIs showed
that these officers currently receive very little tactical training.
Communications Equipment According to DOE's Protective Force Program
Manual, protective force officers must have the capability to communicate
information among themselves. The radios these officers use must be
capable of two-way communications, provide intelligible voice
communications, and be readily available in sufficient numbers to equip
protective force personnel. In addition, a sufficient number of batteries
must be available and maintained
in a charged condition to support routine, emergency, and response
operations.
Protective force officers at all five of the sites we visited reported
problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, 66 of the
105 protective force officers reported that they did not always have
dependable radio communications, with 23 officers identifying sporadic
battery life, and 29 officers reporting poor reception at some locations
on site as the two most significant problems. In addition, some of the
protective force officers believed that radio communications were not
sufficient to support their operations and could not be relied on to
transfer information between officers if a terrorist attack occurred. Site
security officials at two sites acknowledged that efforts were under way
to improve radio communications equipment. In addition, some security
officials said other forms of communications, such as telephones, cellular
telephones, and pagers, were provided for protective forces to ensure that
they could communicate effectively.
Protective Body Armor DOE's Protective Force Program Manual requires that
Security Police Officer-IIs and -IIIs wear body armor or that body armor
be stationed in a way that allows them to quickly put it on to respond to
an attack without negatively impacting response times. At one site, we
found that most Security Police Officer-IIs had not been issued protective
body armor because the site had requested and received in July 2003 a
waiver to deviate from the requirement to equip all Security Police
Officer-IIs with body armor. The waiver was sought for a number of
reasons, including the (1) increased potential for heat-related injuries
while wearing body armor during warm weather, (2) increased equipment load
that armor would place on protective force members, (3) costs of acquiring
the necessary quantity of body armor and the subsequent replacement costs,
and (4) associated risks of not providing all Security Police Officer-IIs
with body armor could be mitigated by using cover provided at the site by
natural and man-made barriers. According to a site security official, this
waiver is currently being reviewed because of the increased threat
contained in the 2004 DBT.
Special Response Team Security Police Officer-IIIs serve on special
response teams responsible for
Capabilities offensive operations, such as hostage rescue and the
recapture and recovery of special nuclear material. Special response teams
are often assigned unique equipment, including specially encrypted radios;
body armor that provides increased levels of protection; special suits
that enable officers to operate and fight in chemically contaminated
environments;
special vehicles, including armored vehicles; submachine guns; light
machine guns; grenade launchers; and precision rifles, such as Remington
700 rifles and Barrett .50 caliber rifles. These response teams are also
issued breaching tools to allow them to reenter facilities to which
terrorists may have gained access.
Each site with Category I special nuclear material must have a special
response team capability available on a continuous basis. However, one ESE
site does not have this capability and, instead, relies on another
organization, through a formal memorandum of understanding, to provide a
special response team. This arrangement, however, has not been
comprehensively performance tested, as called for in the memorandum of
understanding. Site officials state that they will soon conduct the first
comprehensive performance test of this memorandum of understanding.
Chemical Protective Gear DOE's Protective Force Program Manual specifies
that all Security Police Officer-II and -IIIs be provided, at a minimum,
with protective masks that provide for nuclear, chemical, and biological
protection. Other additional chemical protective gear and procedures are
delegated to the sites. At the four sites with special response teams, we
found that the teams all had special suits that allowed them to operate
and fight in environments that might be chemically contaminated. For
Security Police Officer-IIs, chemical protective equipment and
expectations for fighting in chemically contaminated environments varied.
For example, two sites provided additional protective equipment for their
Security Police Officer-IIs and expected them to fight in such
environments. Another site did not provide additional equipment, but
expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to evacuate along with other site
workers. Finally, the one site that did not have a special response team
expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to fight in chemically
contaminated environments. However, the site provided no additional
protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty issue
long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks.
Protective Force Vehicles DOE's Protective Force Program Manual requires
that protective force vehicles exhibit a degree of reliability
commensurate with their intended functions and enhance the efficiency,
speed, and safety of routine and emergency duties under all expected
weather conditions. Vehicles must be maintained in serviceable condition,
with preventive maintenance performed at intervals that meet or exceed the
manufacturer recommendations.
Nearly half (14 of 30) of the protective force officers we interviewed at
two sites reported that patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical
condition, and not suitable for pursuit and recovery missions. Some
reported maintenance as a significant problem, with one officer observing
that more vehicles were in the shop than on patrol. Some protective force
officers also reported that door handles on patrol vehicles did not work,
which made it difficult for them to enter and exit the vehicles. A site
security official told us that they had never had problems with the
physical condition or maintenance of patrol vehicles, but did note that
they had experienced difficulties in acquiring new vehicles.
We also found that ESE sites currently do not have the same level of
vehicle protection as NNSA sites that also have Category I special nuclear
material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites with
Category I special nuclear material currently operate armored vehicles.
However, only one of the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear
material operated armored vehicles at the time of our review. One other
ESE site was planning to purchase armored vehicles.
DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated Actions to
Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008
To successfully defend against the much larger terrorist threat contained
in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they
need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the
transformation of current protective forces into an "elite force," the
development and deployment of new security technologies, the consolidation
and elimination of special nuclear material, and organizational
improvements within ESE's security program. However, because these
initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of
development and will require significant commitment of resources and
coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the October 2008 DBT
implementation deadline is uncertain.
DOE Proposes Creating an "Elite Force" to Protect Its Sites in the New
Threat Environment
DOE officials believe that the way its sites, including those sites
managed by ESE, currently train their contractor-operated protective
forces will not be adequate to defeat the terrorist threat contained in
the 2004 DBT. This view is shared by most protective force officers (74
out of 105) and their contractor protective force managers who report that
they are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat the new
threats contained in the 2004 DBT. In response, DOE has proposed the
development of an "elite force" that would be patterned after the U. S.
military's Special Forces.
However, creating this elite force is a complex undertaking and will be a
challenge to fully realize by the October 2008 implementation deadline.
Even before the issuance of the 2004 DBT, DOE had become concerned about
protective force preparedness because of intense demands placed on
protective forces following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The
need to increase security at DOE sites as rapidly as possible following
the 2001 attacks meant that DOE protective forces worked extensive
overtime. DOE's Inspector General, DOE's Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance, and GAO reported on the potential for large amounts
of protective force overtime to increase fatigue, reduce readiness, and
reduce training opportunities for protective forces.6
In recognition of this situation, in September 2003, the Secretary of
Energy directed DOE's Office of Performance Assurance and Independent
Assessment, now a part of the Office Security and Safety Performance
Assurance, to conduct a special review to determine the effectiveness of
the management of protective forces and protective force capabilities.
This classified review, which was issued in June 2004 and covered five
NNSA sites and one ESE site, found that the current organization and
tactics of DOE protective forces need improvement to deal with possible
terrorist threats. Historically, DOE protective forces had been more
concerned with a broad range of industrial security and order-keeping
functions than with preparation to conduct a defensive battle against a
paramilitary attacker, as is described in the 2004 DBT. The June 2004
review recommended a shift to an aggressive military-like, small-unit,
tactical defense posture, which included enhanced tactical training
standards to allow protective forces to move, shoot, and communicate
effectively as a unit in a combat environment. The review also recommended
more frequent, realistic, and rigorous force-on-force performance testing
and training for the department's protective forces.
Based on this review, the Secretary of Energy proposed transforming DOE's
protective force that safeguards special nuclear material into an "elite
force" with training and capabilities similar to the military's Special
Forces units. Subsequently, in June 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Energy
6Audit Report: Management of the Department's Protective Forces,
DOE/IG-0602, Department of Energy Office of Inspector General, June 2003;
Department of Energy Protective Force Management and Capabilities (U),
Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, (Washington, D.C.:
June 28, 2004); GAO-04-623.
directed the formation of a Protective Forces Working Group to formally
review missions, standards, and current protective force status as the
basis for developing recommendations on policy, training, and equipment
that, if enacted, could serve as the basis for creating an elite force.
This working group consisted of representatives from DOE's Office of
Security and Safety Performance Assurance, NNSA, and ESE's Office of
Environmental Management. In August 2004, the working group recommended a
set of near-term actions that could be used to elevate protective force
capabilities. These included instituting more demanding medical and
physical fitness standards, increasing tactical training, and reorganizing
protective forces into tactically cohesive units. In October 2004, the
working group also recommended considering federalizing DOE protective
forces as a long-term option. In January 2005, the Deputy Secretary of
Energy endorsed the report's findings and directed that implementation
actions begin.
Most protective force officers we interviewed generally support some of
the ideas embodied in the elite force concept. Specifically, most
protective force officers (74 out of 105) at the ESE sites we visited
reported that they are not at all confident in their current ability to
defeat the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT. In particular, some
protective force officers believed that they would be outgunned and
overwhelmed by the terrorist force identified in the 2004 DBT. In
addition, some feared they could be surprised by a large terrorist force
because of the sites' security strategy and the physical layout of their
sites. Some sites are already responding to the elite force concept by
increasing tactical training, and others plan to institute "training
relief shifts," which will increase the amount of time protective force
officers have available for uninterrupted training. Some sites also have
ambitious plans for constructing new facilities to enable increased
tactical training.
Nevertheless, despite broad support and some sites' progress, DOE's
proposal for an elite force remains largely in the conceptual phase. DOE
has developed a preliminary draft implementation plan that lays out
high-level milestones and key activities, but this plan has not been
formally approved by the Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance. The draft implementation plan recognizes that DOE will have to
undertake and complete a number of complex tasks in order to develop the
elite force envisioned. For example, DOE will have to revise its existing
protective forces policies to incorporate, among other things, the
increased training standards that are needed to create an elite force.
This may be a time-consuming effort.
As we reported in April 2004, the DOE policy process emphasizes developing
consensus through a laborious review and comment process by program
offices. We found that this policy process contributed to the nearly 2
years it took the department to develop DOE's first post-September 11,
2001, DBT. Likewise, DOE has been working on a streamlined overall
security policy for nearly 2 years. Once this streamlined policy is
formally issued, now scheduled for summer 2005, DOE's draft implementation
plans for an elite force call for the new policy to immediately undergo
revision to incorporate elements of the elite force concept. DOE's Office
of Security has not yet identified a time frame for completing these
actions. In addition, DOE officials believe that broader DOE policies will
have to be revised. For example, DOE security officials, as well as
contractor protective force managers, see some DOE health and safety
policies and practices as an impediment because they do not allow the kind
of realistic and physically demanding training that is required for an
elite force. According to these officials, revising these policies will
require broad, high-level support within DOE. Furthermore, some DOE
protective force requirements, such as medical, physical fitness, and
training standards are mandated by DOE regulations. Changing these
regulations, according to a DOE security official, would require DOE to
follow rule-making procedures. All these protective force policies and
regulations, as well as broader DOE policies are contained in collective
bargaining agreements between protective force unions and protective force
contractors and in protective force contracts, which also will need to be
modified to create the kind of elite force that DOE believes is necessary
to defeat the 2004 DBT.
Some site security officials recognize that they will have to carefully
craft transition plans for currently employed protective force officers
who may not be able to meet the new standards required for an elite force.
Some of these officials have expressed concern about the ability of some
protective force officers to meet more rigorous physical and training
standards that are likely to be part of an elite force. DOE field security
officials and contractor protective force managers likewise have expressed
concern about finding ways for less capable protective force officers to
move into different roles or retire from service with a sense of dignity.
Because all the protective forces at the five ESE sites we visited
operated, at the time, under separate contracts and separate collective
bargaining agreements, there is no uniform benefit or retirement plan for
protective forces, and these benefits, according to one contractor
security official, differ considerably among sites. Some contractor
protective force managers recognized that they needed such mechanisms as
early retirement
incentives and more attractive retirement packages to make the effective
transition to an elite force. They believed, however, that they would not
be able to provide these mechanisms, most of which are quite expensive,
without DOE's help. Officials from the one protective force contractor,
which had a placement and income protection program for protective force
officers who could no longer meet existing DOE requirements, said that
payouts from the program have far exceeded contributions and that the
program will have to be restructured in the near future.
Given these complexities, DOE security officials recently told us that
implementing all the measures associated with the elite force concept will
take about 5 years to complete. With this time line, the development of
the elite force will be under way by the new DBT's implementation deadline
of October 2008, but the full benefit of an elite force, according to
DOE's own preliminary plans, will not be realized until fiscal year 2010.
DOE Believes Security Technologies Can Improve the Effectiveness of
Protective Forces
DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness and survivability of its
protective forces through the development and deployment of new security
technologies. The department believes technologies can reduce the risk to
protective forces in case of an attack and provide additional response
time to meet and defeat an attack. Many of the ESE sites we visited
currently possess some advanced security technology. For example, all
sites operate central alarm stations that often integrate hundreds of
alarms and dozens of sensors, such as video cameras and infrared and
microwave detection systems, as well as redundant communications systems.
Some sites also have thermal imaging sensors, which can detect adversaries
at long ranges and in all types of weather. Some of these sensors have
data links that allow the information to be rapidly shared. One site
deploys classified devices that can immobilize or delay the movement of an
adversary.
DOE officials believe that additional technology can further enhance site
security. The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance is
assisting sites in identifying and deploying existing technologies to
enhance protection systems, principally through the following programs:
o Technology and Systems Development Program. DOE has funded this program
for many years, although funding has been reduced in recent years.
Specifically, DOE provided over $20 million for this program in fiscal
year 2004. However, DOE only requested $14.5 million for this program in
fiscal year 2006-about 1 percent of the entire DOE security program
budget. Moreover, the program has had only limited success in
developing technologies that can actually be deployed. The Director of
DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance recently stated
that DOE has not yet taken the formal steps necessary to coordinate
investment in emerging security technologies to ensure they are deployed
at DOE sites in a timely manner.
o Site Assistance Visit Program. Immediately after the issuance of the
2004 DBT, DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
embarked on site assistance visits-a targeted effort to encourage the use
of technologies that could offset the more costly manpower-intensive
approaches needed to meet the more demanding requirements of the DBT.
These site assistance visits focus on new and emerging security
technologies. Each site visit lasts approximately 2 weeks and consists of
exercises and simulations designed to evaluate each site's preliminary
plans for meeting the new DBT and to demonstrate how technologies can
assist in countering the 2004 DBT in a cost-effective manner. DOE
conducted these visits between October 2004 and April 2005. Four of the
five ESE sites we examined have received these visits. DOE's Office of
Security and Safety Performance Assurance completed the final report on
the results of the site assistance visits in May 2005. DOE plans to use
the results of these visits to help justify its fiscal year 2007 budget.
Even before the site assistance visits, ESE sites were actively
considering advanced security technologies. For example, at least two ESE
sites are considering installing automatic weapons that can be operated
from remote, secure locations-known as remotely operated weapons systems
within DOE. A few ESE protective forces also supported this push toward
technology, especially technology that allows more timely detection of
adversaries. Specifically, 16 of the 105 protective force officers we
interviewed said they needed enhanced detection technologies that would
allow adversaries to be detected and engaged at much greater ranges than
is currently possible at most sites.
ESE's Strategy for Meeting ESE's current strategy for meeting the October
2008 deadline for the New DBT Relies Heavily compliance with the 2004 DBT
relies heavily on the consolidation and on the Consolidation of
elimination of special nuclear materials between and among other ESE
sites. At all five of the ESE sites with Category I special nuclear
material,
Special Nuclear Materials material consolidation and elimination are
important goals for the site and the responsible DOE program office and
are inextricably tied to security plans. However, neither ESE nor DOE has
developed a comprehensive,
departmentwide plan to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement among
the sites and program offices to consolidate special nuclear material, as
we recommended in our April 2004 report. In the absence of such a
comprehensive, coordinated plan, completing some of these significant
activities by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely. In
particular:
o Savannah River Site. Currently, special nuclear material is stored in
three separate, widely dispersed areas at the Savannah River Site-an
Office of Environmental Management (EM) site. In November 2004, EM
directed the site to consolidate all its current and future storage of
Category I special nuclear material into a single area by fiscal year
2007. This consolidation will free up over 100 protective force officers
who currently guard facilities at the sites' two other areas. It will also
allow for a substantially increased protective force presence at the
single remaining area and could save the site over $100 million in
expected costs to implement measures to defend the site against the 2004
DBT.
o Hanford Site. Hanford, another EM site, had plans to transfer most of
its special nuclear material to the Savannah River Site by the end of
fiscal year 2006. However, a number of factors threaten to delay this
transfer of material. These factors include (1) NNSA's Office of Secure
Transportation's shipping and load restrictions on transporting special
nuclear material across the United States, (2) the Savannah River Site's
inability to store some of Hanford's special nuclear material in its
present configuration, and (3) the Savannah River Site's current lack of
facilities to permanently dispose of Hanford's special nuclear material.
Faced with these challenges, EM decided in February 2005 to postpone
shipping material from Hanford until these issues could be resolved.
Hanford had begun planning for such a contingency, but the site will now
have to expend additional funds of about $85 million annually to protect
these materials against the 2004 DBT.
o Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and Argonne
National Laboratory-West. 7 Managed by the Office of Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory had removed-by NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation-its
currently known Category I special nuclear material
7The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known as the
Idaho National Laboratory, in February 2005.
from its single Category I storage facility in May 2005. Removal will
allow a substantial number of its protective forces to transfer to the
nearby Argonne National Laboratory-West site, which has a continuing
Category I special nuclear material mission. These additional protective
forces will be critical to helping the site meet the 2004 DBT. However, a
recent DOE site assistance visit suggested that several other facilities
at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory may have
some previously unrecognized Category I special nuclear material. Site
security officials report that they are trying to resolve these issues
with DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. If any of
these other Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
facilities do have Category I special nuclear material, they will require
additional protection, which could severely damage the current DBT
implementation plans for both Idaho sites. In addition, because of its
remote location, the robust design of some of its facilities, its large
protective force, and extensive training facilities, the Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory is now being evaluated as a
potential future consolidation location for NNSA Category I special
nuclear material.
o Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, an Office
of Science Site, plans to eliminate its Category I special material.
Current plans call for down-blending this material in place to less
attractive forms and for extracting medically useful isotopes that may
help treat certain forms of cancer. The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science
and Technology is responsible for this down-blending program. However, the
costs for this program have risen steeply, even without the additional
security costs of the meeting the 2004 DBT. In addition, the Office of
Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and the Office of Science have not
formally agreed on which program office will bear the brunt of the
estimated $53 million annual security costs required to meet the
implementation deadline for the 2004 DBT. If these issues can be resolved,
down-blending operations are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009 and to
be completed in fiscal year 2012. If down-blending operations do not take
place, Oak Ridge National Laboratory will face high additional security
costs-approaching an additional $43 million each year, according to
preliminary site estimates-as long as the material remains on-site.
ESE's Headquarters Security Organization Is Not Well Suited to Meet the
Challenges of the 2004 DBT
ESE's current organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges
associated with implementing the 2004 DBT. First, ESE lacks a formally
appointed senior security advisor or a centralized security organization.
In contrast, NNSA has such a position. Specifically, Title 32 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which created
NNSA, established the position of Chief, Defense Nuclear Security, to
serve as the primary security advisor to the NNSA Administrator. The Chief
is responsible for the development and implementation of NNSA security
programs, including the physical security for all NNSA facilities. Over
the past several years, ESE has recognized the need for such a position
and has sought to fill the security advisor role through the use of
employees temporarily detailed from other organizations. For example,
beginning in 2004, a detailee from the Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance has served as the Acting Director for ESE Security.
The current acting director was preceded by a visiting White House Fellow.
However, the position of the Director for ESE Security has no programmatic
authority or staff. This lack of authority limits the director's ability
to help facilitate ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such issues as material
down-blending at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and material consolidation
at other ESE sites.
Second, ESE does not have a consolidated headquarters security office. In
April 2005, the recently confirmed ESE Under Secretary stated that ESE was
composed of "institutional `stovepipes'" and that this structure has
hampered strategic management within ESE. ESE has explored creating a
consolidated headquarters security office, but each of the three program
offices we examined continues to maintain its own headquarters security
offices. These offices, however, are organized and staffed differently.
For example, the Office of Environmental Management's headquarters
security office has more than 17 professional security personnel on staff.
In contrast, the headquarters offices of Science and of Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology each have only one and two security professionals
on staff, respectively. For the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and
Technology this situation is problematic because its security
responsibilities are increasing with the consolidation of two of its sites
into the Idaho National Laboratory and with the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory's down-blending program. Indeed, safeguards and security
funding is a much larger percentage of the Office of Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology's total budget-$75 million out of a total fiscal
year 2006 budget request of $511 million, about 15 percent-than it is for
either the Office of Science or the Office of Environmental Management. As
a result, according to the EM Security Director and Acting Director, ESE
security, the Environmental Management security office provides informal
support to the other ESE programs offices, including the Offices of
Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and Science.
Conclusions Successfully defending against the increased terrorist threat
contained in the 2004 DBT will require a significant coordinated effort by
DOE, ESE, and the ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear
material. While ESE sites are not required to meet the requirements of the
2004 DBT until October 2008, we believe that ESE needs to take action to
correct weaknesses with its current training and equipment practices.
Addressing these issues will put ESE protective forces in a better
position to defend their sites, in the short run, while DOE and ESE press
ahead on the broader initiatives, such as the elite force concept and
materials consolidation that they believe will be necessary to meet the
requirements of the 2004 DBT. While we support DOE's and ESE's broader
initiatives, we believe that these initiatives cannot be successfully
implemented without a more strategic approach. Such an approach will need
to include a comprehensive plan for all of the initiatives DOE and ESE are
considering and will need to be supported by a sound ESE management
structure that has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all
ESE program offices that have Category I special nuclear material.
Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new
terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making the following
five recommendations to the Secretary of Energy:
o Develop a requirement for individual protective force officer
participation in force-on-force exercises.
o Require that sites track protective force member participation in
force-on-force exercises.
o Take immediate action to correct weaknesses in protective force
equipment at ESE sites by providing the following where needed:
o dependable radio communications,
o body armor,
o chemical protective gear,
o special response team capabilities, and
o vehicles that provide enhanced protection for protective forces.
o Develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced
implementation plan for meeting the new 2004 DBT requirements that
includes detailed plans for
o the creation of an elite force through the revision of existing DOE
protective force policies and practices,
o the development and deployment of enhanced security technologies, and
o the transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials.
o Require the Under Secretary, ESE, to establish a security organization
to oversee the development, implementation, and coordination of ESE, and
broader DOE efforts, to meet the 2004 DBT.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided DOE with a copy of this report for review and comment. DOE
stated that it concurred with the report and accepted our recommendations.
In that context, DOE provided an update on the actions it anticipated
would address our recommendations. While we believe that most of DOE's
anticipated actions will be responsive to our recommendations, we are
concerned about DOE's response to our recommendation that it develop a
departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced implementation plan for meeting
the 2004 DBT requirements. Specifically, in responding to this
recommendation, DOE cited only individual efforts to address the
development of an elite force, the deployment of enhanced security
technologies, and the consolidation of special nuclear material, not the
development of a comprehensive plan. While each of these efforts is
important, as we demonstrated in our report, the success of these efforts
requires close coordination across numerous DOE, ESE, as well as NNSA
organizations. We continue to believe that DOE cannot be successful in
meeting the requirements of the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008
without an integrated effort that is built around a comprehensive plan.
DOE also provided three additional technical changes
that we have incorporated. DOE's letter commenting on our draft report is
presented in appendix II.
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who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Gene Aloise Director, Natural Resources
and Environment
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
To obtain an overall perspective on how protective forces are prepared to
defend Department of Energy (DOE) sites, we reviewed relevant literature
focusing on Special Nuclear Materials, DOE's protective forces, and
reports by DOE's Inspector General, as well as previous GAO reports. We
conducted multiple rounds of interviews with DOE headquarters officials
and conducted document reviews. We also met with DOE and protective force
officials at five sites under the oversight of DOE's Office of the Under
Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,
Argonne National Laboratory-West, the Savannah River Site, and the Hanford
Site.
To determine the extent to which protective forces at Office of the Under
Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment sites are meeting DOE's
existing readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies to determine
current requirements. We also reviewed pertinent literature about the
factors that affect the readiness of military forces. We conducted
structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers at the five
ESE sites. We took several steps to ensure that we selected protective
force officers independently and interviewed protective force officers
with varying levels of experience. We interviewed a nonprobability sample
of protective force officers from all five ESE sites.1 Even though we are
not generalizing to the population as a whole, at each site we randomly
selected the protective force officers to interview. Random selection
protects against selection bias and helps assure that the officers we
interviewed were independent of site management. Specifically, we obtained
a complete roster of all protective force officers at each site, which
included the name, position, area assignment, and length of service for
each protective force officer and identified the dates and potential time
slots for the interviews during our site visits. We submitted modified
rosters to the security contractor with the potential interview time
slots, and the contractor resubmitted this roster with the availability of
each protective force officer. We then stratified protective force
officers by position, rank, and length of service and assigned them random
numbers from a random number table. We also assigned random numbers, in
sequence from the random number table, to protective force officers at
each site, eliminating random numbers to ensure that no random number
1Results from a nonprobability sample cannot be used to make inferences
about a population because in such a sample some elements of the
population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being
selected as part of the sample.
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
was ever used twice. The random numbers assigned to protective force
officers were placed in chronological order and officers were selected
based on the lowest random number assigned, their availability during the
prescribed time slots, position, area assignment, and length of service.
Lastly, we informed the security contractor at each site of those
protective force officers we wished to interview prior to our site visit.
The structured interviews were administered by two-person teams to
Security Police Officer-IIs and Security Police Officer-IIIs. We asked the
officers questions designed to determine their readiness to defend the
sites, including questions about their morale, training, and equipment. We
also reviewed the training records and physical fitness qualifications of
the 105 officers to determine if key elements of their training complied
with existing DOE training requirements. In particular, we reviewed
selected firearms and physical fitness qualifications to determine if
these officers complied with existing DOE requirements and federal
regulations.
Finally, we reviewed the equipment ESE protective forces use to determine
if it met current DOE requirements. For example, we reviewed the minimum
standard duty equipment that was employed at each site. We also checked to
ensure that most sites' armorers were certified as required by DOE and,
for most sites, we inspected armories, inspection records, as well as
firearms inventory procedures. Finally, we reviewed the types of equipment
that some sites are evaluating and/or planning to purchase.
To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully
defend against the new threat identified in the 2004 DBT by DOE's
implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the 2004 DBT and
associated guidance documents. We discussed the 2004 DBT with officials in
DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and with
officials in ESE's Offices of Environmental Management; Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology; and Science. Where available, we reviewed
documents prepared by ESE and contractor officials on how they plan to
comply with the 2004 DBT. We discussed DOE's initiative to transform its
current protective force into an elite force with DOE's Office of Security
and Safety Performance Assurance and security officials at all five of the
ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material. We also discussed site
assistance visits and their concentration on security technology with DOE
security officials. Furthermore, we reviewed recent DOE congressional
testimony on the role of security technology and reviewed the relevant
portion of the fiscal year 2006 DOE budget submission. In addition, we
discussed plans for special nuclear material consolidation with ESE
program security officials and site security officials. Finally, we
discussed
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
ESE's security organization with DOE's Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance, ESE's Acting Security Director, and ESE program
security offices. We also reviewed congressional testimony given by the
Under Secretary of Energy at his recent confirmation hearing.
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix III
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841
Staff In addition to the individual named above, Don Cowan, Joyce Evans,
Doreen Feldman, Jonathan Gill, Preston Heard, James Noel, Joe Oliver, and
Acknowledgments Carol Hernstadt Shulman made key contributions to this
report.
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