Army Corps of Engineers: History of the Lake Pontchartrain and
Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (09-NOV-05, GAO-06-244T).
The greatest natural threat posed to the New Orleans area is from
hurricane-induced storm surges, waves, and rainfalls. A hurricane
surge that can inundate coastal lowlands is the most destructive
characteristic of hurricanes and accounts for most of the lives
lost from hurricanes. Hurricane surge heights along the Gulf and
Atlantic coasts can exceed 20 feet. The effects of Hurricane
Katrina flooded a large part of New Orleans and breeched the
levees that are part of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
Lake Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Project. This project, first authorized in 1965, was designed to
protect the lowlands in the Lake Pontchartrain tidal basin from
flooding by hurricane-induced sea surges and rainfall. GAO is
providing information on (1) the purpose and history of the Lake
Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Project and (2) funding of the project. GAO is not making any
recommendations in this testimony.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-244T
ACCNO: A41258
TITLE: Army Corps of Engineers: History of the Lake
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project
DATE: 11/09/2005
SUBJECT: Construction costs
Cost analysis
Disaster planning
Flood control
Hurricanes
Natural disasters
Program evaluation
Cost estimates
Hurricane Katrina
Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection
Project
New Orleans (LA)
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GAO-06-244T
Testimony
Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST
Wednesday, November 9, 2005
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
History of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vincinity Hurricane Protection
Project
Statement of Anu Mittal, Director Natural Resources and Environment
GAO-06-244T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) Lake Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Project. This project, first authorized in 1965, was designed
to protect the lowlands in the Lake Pontchartrain tidal basin within the
greater New Orleans metropolitan area from flooding by hurricane-induced
sea surges and rainfall. As you know, the effects of Hurricane Katrina
breeched the levees that are part of this project and flooded a large part
of New Orleans. In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the purpose and
history of the project and (2) funding of the project. This statement is
based on GAO's past reports on the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity,
Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project and on the Corps' flood control
efforts in general, which we updated as necessary.1
In summary, the Lake Pontchartrain hurricane project was designed to
protect areas around the lake from flooding caused by a storm surge or
rainfall associated with a standard project hurricane, which is roughly
the same as what is now classified as a fast moving Category 3 hurricane.
The project, when designed in the mid-1960s, was expected to take about 13
years to complete and cost about $85 million. Over the years, the project
has undergone some significant design changes as a result of a successful
court challenge, local opposition to certain aspects of the proposed
design, and changed Corps thinking about the most cost-effective approach.
None of these changes, however, affected the level of protection provided
to New Orleans because the alternative design selected was expected to
provide the same level of protection. As of early 2005, the project was
not expected to be completed until 2015-nearly 50 years after it was first
authorized-and cost about $738 million, much of the cost increase is due
to inflation over the years and changes to the scope and design of the
project. In recent years, questions have been raised about the ability of
the project to protect the New Orleans area from hurricanes greater than
Category 3. This issue was only beginning to be studied by the Corps when
Hurricane Katrina hit the area in August 2005.
1GAO, Cost, Schedule, And Performance Problems Of The Lake Pontchartrain
And Vicinity, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project, GAO/PSAD-76-161
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 1976); GAO, Improved Planning Needed By The
Corps Of Engineers To Resolve Environmental, Technical, And Financial
Issues On The Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project,
GAO/MASAD-82-39 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 1982); and GAO, Army Corps of
Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project,
GAO-05-1050T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2005).
Background
Since its founding in 1718, the city of New Orleans and its surrounding
areas have been subject to numerous floods from the Mississippi River and
hurricanes. The greater New Orleans metropolitan area, composed of
Orleans, Jefferson, St. Charles, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany parishes,
sits in the tidal lowlands of Lake Pontchartrain and is bordered generally
on its southern side by the Mississippi River. Lake Pontchartrain is a
tidal basin about 640 square miles in area that connects with the Gulf of
Mexico through Lake Borgne and the Mississippi Sound.
While the area has historically experienced many river floods, a series of
levees and other flood control structures built over the years were
expected to greatly reduce that threat. The greatest natural threat posed
to the New Orleans area continues to be from hurricane-induced storm
surges, waves, and rainfalls. Several hurricanes have struck the area over
the years including Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969,
and Hurricane Lili in 2002. The hurricane surge that can inundate coastal
lowlands is the most destructive characteristic of hurricanes and accounts
for most of the lives lost from hurricanes. Hurricane surge heights along
the Gulf and Atlantic coasts can range up to 20 feet or more and there is
growing concern that continuing losses of coastal wetlands and settlement
of land in New Orleans has made the area more vulnerable to such storms.
Because of such threats, a series of control structures, concrete
floodwalls, and levees, was proposed for the area along Lake Pontchartrain
in the 1960s.
Purpose and History of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Flood Control Project
Congress first authorized construction of the Lake Pontchartrain and
Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act
of 19652 to provide hurricane protection to areas around the lake in the
parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and St. Charles. Although
federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort with
the federal government paying 70 percent of the costs and the state and
local interests paying 30 percent. The Corps was responsible for project
design and construction and local interests were responsible for
maintenance of levees and flood controls. The original project design,
known as the barrier plan, included a series of levees along the
lakefront, concrete floodwalls along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal,
and control structures, including barriers and flood control gates located
at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur Pass areas. These structures were
intended to prevent storm surges from entering Lake Pontchartrain and
overflowing the levees along the lakefront. The original lakefront levees
were planned to be from 9.3 feet to 13.5 feet high depending on the
topography of the area directly in front of the levees.
2Pub. L. No. 89-298, S: 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077.
This project plan was selected over another alternative, known as the
high-level plan, which excluded the barriers and flood control gates at
the Rigolets and Chef Menteur Pass complexes and instead employed higher
levees ranging from 16 feet to 18.5 feet high along the lakefront to
prevent storm surges from inundating the protected areas. In the 1960s,
the barrier plan was favored because it was believed to be less expensive
and quicker to construct. As explained later in my statement, this
decision was reversed in the mid-1980s. The cost estimate for the original
project was $85 million (in 1961 dollars) and the estimated completion
date was 1978.
Figure 1: Flood Protection Control Levees In and Around New Orleans, LA.
The original project designs were developed to combat a hurricane that
might strike the coastal Louisiana region once in 200-300 years. The basis
for this was the standard project hurricane developed by the Corps with
the assistance of the United States Weather Bureau (now the National
Weather Service). The model was intended to represent the most severe
meteorological conditions considered reasonably characteristic for that
region. The model projected a storm roughly equivalent to a fast-moving
Category 3 hurricane. A Category 3 hurricane has winds of 111-130 miles
per hour and can be expected to cause some structural damage from winds
and flooding near the coast from the storm surge and inland from rains.
Even before construction began on the project, it became evident that some
changes to the project plan were needed. Based on updated Weather Bureau
data on the severity of hurricanes, the Corps determined that the levees
along the three main drainage canals, that drain water from New Orleans
into Lake Pontchartrain, would need to be raised to protect against storm
surges from the lake. The need for this additional work became apparent
when Hurricane Betsy flooded portions of the city in September 1965.
During the first 17 years of construction on the barrier plan, the Corps
continued to face project delays and cost increases due to design changes
caused by technical issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges, and
local opposition to various aspects of the project. For example,
foundation problems were encountered during construction of levees and
floodwalls which increased construction time; delays were also encountered
in obtaining rights-of-ways from local interests who did not agree with
all portions of the plan. By 1981, cost estimates had grown to $757
million for the barrier plan, not including the cost of any needed work
along the drainage canals, and project completion had slipped to 2008. At
that time, about $171 million had been made available to the project and
the project was considered about 50 percent complete, mostly for the
lakefront levees which were at least partially constructed in all areas
and capable of providing some flood protection although from a smaller
hurricane than that envisioned in the plan.
More importantly during the 1970s, some features of the barrier plan were
facing significant opposition from environmentalists and local groups who
were concerned about environmental damages to the lake as well as
inadequate protection from some aspects of the project. The threat of
litigation by environmentalists delayed the project and local opposition
to building the control complexes at Rigolets and Chef Menteur had the
potential to seriously reduce the overall protection provided by the
project. This opposition culminated in a December 1977 court decision3
that enjoined the Corps from constructing the barrier complexes, and
certain other parts of the project until a revised environmental impact
statement was prepared and accepted. After the court order, the Corps
decided to change course and completed a project reevaluation report and
prepared a draft revised Environmental Impact Statement in the mid-1980s
that recommended abandoning the barrier plan and shifting to the
high-level plan originally considered in the early 1960s. Local sponsors
executed new agreements to assure their share of the non-federal
contribution to the revised project. The level of protection provided to
New Orleans was not expected to change because the high-level design was
expected to provide the same level of protection as the original barrier
design.
3Save Our Wetlands v. Rush, Civ. A. No. 75-3710 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 1977).
As of 2005, the project as constructed or being constructed included about
125 miles of levees and the following major features:
o New levee north of Highway U.S. 61 from the Bonnet Carre
Spillway East Guide Levee to the Jefferson-St. Charles Parish
boundary
o Floodwall along the Jefferson-St. Charles Parish boundary
o Enlarged levee along the Jefferson Parish lakefront
o Enlarged levee along the Orleans Parish lakefront
o Levees, floodwalls, and flood proofed bridges along the 17th
Street, Orleans Avenue and London Avenue drainage canals
o Levees from the New Orleans lakefront to the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway
o Enlarged levees along the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the
Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet
o New levee around the Chalmette area.
The project also includes a mitigation dike on the west shore of
Lake Pontchartrain.
The pre-Katrina estimated cost of construction for the completed
project was $738 million with the federal share being $528 million
and the local share $210 million. The estimated completion date as
of May 2005 for the whole project was 2015. Prior to Katrina, the
project was estimated to be from 60-90 percent complete in
different areas. The work in Orleans Parish was estimated to be 90
percent complete with some work remaining for bridge replacement
along the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue drainage canals. The
floodwalls along the canals, where the recent breaches occurred,
were complete. Jefferson Parish work was estimated to be 70
percent complete with work continuing on flood proofing the
Hammond Highway bridge over 17th Street and two lakefront levee
enlargements. Estimated completion for that work was 2010. In the
Chalmette area work was estimated to be 90 percent complete with
some levee enlargement work and floodwall work remaining. In St.
Charles Parish work was 60 percent complete with some gaps still
remaining in the levees. Closure of these gaps had been scheduled
to be completed by September 2005.
Post Katrina, four investigation teams sponsored by the American
Society of Civil Engineers, the Corps, the state of Louisiana, and
the National Science Foundation, began gathering forensic data to
determine what caused the levee breaches in New Orleans.
Preliminary reports from these teams indicate that they found a
number of different mechanisms that caused failures in the levee
system, including scour erosion caused by overtopping, seepage,
soil failure, and internal erosion (also known as piping). On
November 4, 2005, the Corps told us that it was too soon to
determine whether the change in project design had any impact on
the levee breaches that occurred in New Orleans, and the agency is
still in the process of assessing whether the change in the
project design had any impact on the breaches. However, the
investigations necessary to address this question are not planned
to be conducted by the Corps as part of its ongoing examination of
the performance of the existing project. Instead these
investigations would be included in future analyses of any
modifications to the existing hurricane protection system.
Federal allocations for the project totaled $458 million as of the
enactment of the fiscal year 2005 federal appropriation. This
represents 87 percent of the Federal government's responsibility
of $528 million with about $70 million remaining to complete the
project in 2015. Over the last 10 fiscal years (1996-2005),
federal appropriations have totaled about $128.6 million and Corps
reprogramming actions resulted in another $13 million being made
available to the project. During that time, appropriations have
generally declined from about $15-20 million annually in the
earlier years to about $5-7 million in the last three fiscal
years. While this may not be unusual given the state of completion
of the project, the Corps' project fact sheet from May 2005 noted
that the President's Budget request for fiscal years 2005 and 2006
and the appropriated amount for fiscal year 2005 were insufficient
to fund new construction contracts. Among the construction efforts
that could not be funded according to the Corps were the
following:
o Levee enlargements in all four parishes
o Pumping station flood protection in Orleans Parish
o Floodgates and a floodwall in St. Charles Parish
o Bridge replacement in Orleans Parish.
The Corps had also stated that it could spend $20 million in
fiscal year 2006 on the project if the funds were available. The
Corps noted that several levees had settled and needed to be
raised to provide the design-level of protection. For the last few
years, the project generally received the amount of funds
appropriated to it and was not adversely affected by any Corps
reprogramming actions.
In recent years, questions have been raised about the ability of
the project to withstand larger hurricanes than it was designed
for such as a Category 4 or 5, or even a slow-moving Category 3
hurricane that lingered over the area and produced higher levels
of rainfall. Along this line, the Corps completed in 2002 a
reconnaissance or pre-feasibility study on whether to strengthen
hurricane protection along the Louisiana coast. A full feasibility
study was estimated to take at least five years to complete and
cost about $8 million. In March 2005, the Corps reported that it
was allocating $79,000 to complete a management plan for the
feasibility study and a cost-share agreement with local sponsors.
The President's fiscal year 2006 budget request did not include
any funds for the feasibility project.
In closing, the Lake Pontchartrain hurricane project has been
under construction for nearly 40 years, much longer than
originally envisioned and at much greater cost, although much of
that can be attributed to inflation over these years, and the
project is still not complete. Whether the state of completion of
the project or the change in design played a role in the flooding
of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 is
still to be determined as are issues related to whether a project
designed to protect against Category 4 or 5 hurricanes would or
could have prevented this catastrophe.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony. We would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
For further information on this testimony, please contact Anu
Mittal at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Individuals making
contributions to this testimony included Ed Zadjura, Ken Lightner,
Omari Norman.
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Highlights of GAO-06-244T, a testimony before the Committee on Environment
and Public Works, U.S. Senate
November 2005
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
History of the Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project
transparent illustrator graphic
The greatest natural threat posed to the New Orleans area is from
hurricane-induced storm surges, waves, and rainfalls. A hurricane surge
that can inundate coastal lowlands is the most destructive characteristic
of hurricanes and accounts for most of the lives lost from hurricanes.
Hurricane surge heights along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts can exceed 20
feet. The effects of hurricane Katrina flooded a large part of New Orleans
and breeched the levees that are part of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) Lake Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Project. This project, first authorized in 1965, was designed to protect
the lowlands in the Lake Pontchartrain tidal basin from flooding by
hurricane-induced sea surges and rainfall.
GAO is providing information on (1) the purpose and history of the Lake
Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project and
(2) funding of the project.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony.
Congress first authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana
Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965. The project
was to construct a series of control structures, concrete floodwalls, and
levees to provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain.
The project, when designed, was expected to take about 13 years to
complete and cost about $85 million. Although federally authorized, it was
a joint federal, state, and local effort.
The original project designs were developed based on the equivalent of
what is now called a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane that might strike
the coastal Louisiana region once in 200-300 years. As GAO reported in
1976 and 1982, since the beginning of the project, the Corps has
encountered project delays and cost increases due to design changes caused
by technical issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges, and local
opposition to portions of the project. As a result, in 1982, project costs
had grown to $757 million and the expected completion date had slipped to
2008. In the mid-1980s, the Corps shifted to an alternative project
design; however, this change did not affect the level of protection
provided to New Orleans because the alternative design selected was
expected to provide the same level of protection as the original design.
When Hurricane Katrina struck, the project, including about 125 miles of
levees, was estimated to be from 60-90 percent complete in different areas
with an estimated completion date for the whole project of 2015. The
floodwalls along the drainage canals that were breached were complete when
the hurricane hit.
The pre-Katrina estimated cost of construction for the completed project
was $738 million with the federal share being $528 million and the local
share $210 million. Federal allocations for the project were $458 million
as of the enactment of the fiscal year 2005 federal appropriation. This
represents 87 percent of the federal government's responsibility of $528
million with about $70 million remaining to complete the project. Over the
last 10 fiscal years (1996-2005), federal appropriations have totaled
about $128.6 million and Corps reprogramming actions resulted in another
$13 million being made available to the project. During that time,
appropriations have generally declined from about $15-20 million annually
in the earlier years to about $5-7 million in the last three fiscal years.
While this may not be unusual given the state of completion of the
project, the Corps' project fact sheet from May 2005 noted that the
President's budget request for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and the
appropriated amount for fiscal year 2005 were insufficient to fund new
construction contracts. The Corps had also stated that it could spend $20
million in fiscal year 2006 on the project if the funds were available.
The Corps noted that several levees had settled and needed to be raised to
provide the level of protection intended by the design.
*** End of document. ***