Issues Related to Navy Battleships (13-DEC-05, GAO-06-279R).
Until World War II U.S. Navy battleships provided an impressive
show of force and outgunned and outmaneuvered their ocean-going
enemies. From World War II until the Persian Gulf War in 1991,
the Navy's Iowa class battleships provided Naval Surface Fire
Support capabilities with their 16-inch guns. Naval Surface Fire
Support, together with land- and air-based components, makes up
the joint "fires triad", which is used to support Marine Corps
amphibious assault operations. The last Iowa class battleship was
decommissioned in 1992. In 1996, congressional authorizers became
concerned that the Navy would not be able to produce a
replacement Naval Surface Fire Support capability comparable to
the battleships until well into the twenty-first century and
directed the Secretary of the Navy to restore at least two Iowa
class battleships to the naval vessel registry until the
Secretary of the Navy certified that a capability had been
developed equal to or greater than that provided by the
battleships. Two Iowa class battleships--the U.S.S. Wisconsin and
the U.S.S. Iowa--remain on the naval vessel registry in inactive
status. Both ships are considered "in reserve", meaning they are
being retained for reactivation in case of full mobilization or
future need. Since 1995 we have reported several times on the
status of battleships and their role in meeting future Naval
Surface Fire Support requirements. In November 2004, we reported
that the Navy and Marine Corps had only recently begun the
process to establish validated Naval Surface Fire Support
requirements that address the overall capabilities needed, that
the cost and schedule for reactivating and modernizing two Iowa
class battleships had not been fully developed, and that fielding
of a replacement Naval Surface Fire Support capability has been
delayed. An issue confronting Congress in finalizing the National
Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2006 is whether or not
to allow the two remaining battleships to be removed from the
naval registry and be donated. Decision makers have at least
three alternatives to removing the two remaining battleships from
the naval vessel registry. The Navy could (1) sustain the
battleships in inactive status; (2) reactivate the battleships to
their original warfighting capabilities, with some improvements
to bring them up to current ship standards for habitability and
interoperability; or (3) modernize the battleships, their fire
support capabilities, and other supporting capabilities
significantly beyond their original capabilities. Congress
requested that we review requirements for fire support and
whether or not these requirements could be met with Navy
battleships. We agreed to focus our work on two objectives.
Specifically, we identified (1) mission requirements established
by the Department of Defense (DOD) for fire support to
expeditionary operations and how DOD officials view these needs
and the ability of the battleships and current and planned
capabilities to meet these requirements, and (2) cost factors
that should be considered in evaluating whether to sustain,
reactivate, modernize or delist the battleships.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-279R
ACCNO: A43178
TITLE: Issues Related to Navy Battleships
DATE: 12/13/2005
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Military forces
Military vessels
Naval procurement
Naval warfare
Weapons systems
Agency missions
Cost analysis
Life cycle costs
Cost estimates
DD(X) Destroyer
U.S.S. Iowa
U.S.S. Wisconsin
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GAO-06-279R
* Issues Related to Navy Battleships
* Observations
* New capabilities being developed will enhance DOD's joint
fires capabilities for expeditionary warfare, but some gaps
will remain
* DOD officials believe risk associated with current and
planned capabilities is acceptable if programs are
implemented as planned
* Analysis of battleship alternatives would need to consider
many types of cost
* Agency Comments
* Enclosure I
* PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* Order by Mail or Phone
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
December 13, 2005
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection
Forces Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
Subject: Issues Related to Navy Battleships
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Until World War II U.S. Navy battleships provided an impressive show of
force and outgunned and outmaneuvered their ocean-going enemies. From
World War II until the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Navy's Iowa class
battleships provided Naval Surface Fire Support capabilities with their
16-inch guns. Naval Surface Fire Support, together with land- and
air-based components, makes up the joint "fires triad", which is used to
support Marine Corps amphibious assault operations. The last Iowa class
battleship was decommissioned in 1992. In 1996, congressional authorizers
became concerned that the Navy would not be able to produce a replacement
Naval Surface Fire Support capability comparable to the battleships until
well into the twenty-first century and directed the Secretary of the Navy
to restore at least two Iowa class battleships to the naval vessel
registry until the Secretary of the Navy certified that a capability had
been developed equal to or greater than that provided by the battleships.1
Two Iowa class battleships--the U.S.S. Wisconsin and the U.S.S.
Iowa--remain on the naval vessel registry in inactive status. Both ships
are considered "in reserve", meaning they are being retained for
reactivation in case of full mobilization or future need.
Since 1995 we have reported several times on the status of battleships and
their role in meeting future Naval Surface Fire Support requirements.2 In
November 2004, we reported that the Navy and Marine Corps had only
recently begun the process to establish validated Naval Surface Fire
Support requirements that address the overall capabilities needed, that
the cost and schedule for reactivating and modernizing two
1
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-106, Sec. 1011, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-450, at 835 (1996).
2
U.S. General Accounting Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Evaluation of the
Navy's 1999 Naval Surface Fire Support Assessment, GAO/NSIAD-99-225
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 1999); FORCE STRUCTURE: Navy Is Complying
with Battleship Readiness Requirements, GAO/NSIAD-99-62 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 12, 1999); DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Naval Surface Fire Support Program
Plans and Costs, GAO/NSIAD-99-91 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1999);
PROGRAM STATUS: Naval Surface Fire Support, GAO/NSIAD-97-179R (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 6, 1997).
Iowa class battleships had not been fully developed, and that fielding of
a replacement Naval Surface Fire Support capability has been delayed.3
An issue confronting Congress in finalizing the National Defense
Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2006 is whether or not to allow the two
remaining battleships to be removed from the naval registry and be
donated. Decision makers have at least three alternatives to removing the
two remaining battleships from the naval vessel registry. The Navy could
(1) sustain the battleships in inactive status; (2) reactivate the
battleships to their original warfighting capabilities, with some
improvements to bring them up to current ship standards for habitability
and interoperability; or (3) modernize the battleships, their fire support
capabilities, and other supporting capabilities significantly beyond their
original capabilities.
You requested that we review requirements for fire support and whether or
not these requirements could be met with Navy battleships. We agreed to
focus our work on two objectives. Specifically, we identified (1) mission
requirements established by the Department of Defense (DOD) for fire
support to expeditionary operations and how DOD officials view these needs
and the ability of the battleships and current and planned capabilities to
meet these requirements, and (2) cost factors that should be considered in
evaluating whether to sustain, reactivate, modernize or delist the
battleships. On November 10, 2005, we provided you with a briefing on our
observations regarding battleships and fire support issues. This letter
summarizes our observations and transmits the briefing slides as
requested. (See enclosure I.)
To determine DOD requirements for fire support for expeditionary
operations in the littorals, we reviewed DOD requirements documents and
identified current and planned capabilities. We also held discussions with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Chief,
Naval Operations, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Navy's
Inactive Ships Management Office, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command to
obtain their views on existing and planned joint fires capabilities, the
adequacy of these plans, and the ability of battleships to perform the
fire support mission. In addition, we obtained combatant command views on
the sufficiency of DOD fire support capabilities to carry out operational
plans from officials at the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific
Command. We also toured the battleship U.S.S. Wisconsin to observe its
current condition. While on board, we discussed the ship's maintenance
schedule, inspection procedures, annual funding, and cost factors for
options to sustain, reactivate, and modernize the battleships. We also
discussed these issues with Navy officials and determined whether they
have completed any recent analysis on the cost of reactivating or
modernizing the battleships. We did not assess the cost-effectiveness of
options to reactivate or upgrade battleships because the Navy has not
determined what enhancements would be required for these options or
developed cost estimates. We performed our work from July through October
2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information on Options for Naval
Surface Fire Support, GAO-05-39R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2004).
Observations
DOD is in the process of reviewing a draft joint fires requirements
document for expeditionary operations in the littorals4 which was
developed primarily by the Marine Corps in May 2005. The draft
requirements document shows that planned capabilities will help to
mitigate existing gaps in joint fires capabilities if programs such as the
advanced gun system for the new DD(X) destroyer and the extended-range
munitions for existing DDG destroyers are implemented as currently
planned. However, current and planned DOD capabilities for joint fires
will not fully meet DOD's needs because they will not provide sufficient
capabilities such as engaging moving targets in restricted weather
conditions or providing a sufficient quantity of fires over a short period
of time. DOD officials believe that although some gaps in joint fires
capabilities exist now and will continue to exist in the future, the risk
associated with these gaps is acceptable and will not significantly affect
the combatant commanders' ability to execute war plans. Moreover, they do
not believe that keeping or modernizing battleships would be cost
effective nor would the modernized battleships significantly reduce the
risk in comparison with other planned capabilities that DOD is funding.
While the Navy maintains annual costs to sustain these battleships, the
Navy has not developed any specific cost estimates for reactivating
battleships to their original warfighting capabilities or for modernizing
them beyond these capabilities. Numerous cost factors would have to be
considered to assess such options including the cost of personnel to
operate the ship, materials and labor to improve operating systems and
habitability, and restoration or improvement of munitions and their
delivery systems. Moreover, the capabilities and costs of reactivating or
upgrading battleships would need to be compared to those of other ongoing
DOD programs to enhance fire support capabilities such as the DD(X)
program. Our prior work has shown that decisions on acquisition
alternatives should be based on analyses of total ownership costs during a
system's lifecycle, which include the costs to research, develop, acquire,
own, and operate systems.5
DOD is reviewing joint requirements for fire support for expeditionary
operations in the littorals
Since May 2005 when the Marine Corps Combat Development Command submitted
a draft requirements document for Joint Staff review, Naval Surface Fire
Support requirements have become part of joint fires requirements and are
currently being reviewed by DOD. 6 Joint fires include a system of weapons
delivered from two or more components--aircraft, ships/submarines, and
ground assets--toward a common objective. In order to comply with DOD's
new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, the
Joint Staff directed the Marine Corps to submit the draft Initial
Capabilities Document to determine joint fires requirements in support of
4
The littoral includes an area extending from a transition point from open
ocean, e.g., the sea base, to more constrictive and shallower waters, to
the shore, and onward to those inland areas that can be attacked,
supported and defended from the sea.
5
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Best Practices: Setting
Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems' Total Ownership
Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C. Feb. 11, 2003).
6
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Initial Capabilities Document for
Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals, May
31, 2005.
expeditionary operations in coastal areas. The Initial Capabilities
Document identified four gaps in existing and planned joint fires
capabilities: (1) integrated joint command and control are not
well-defined, (2) existing and future acquisition systems do not provide
sufficient capability to engage moving targets under restricted weather
conditions,.(3) existing and future acquisition systems do not provide
sufficient capability to limit collateral damage, and (4) existing and
planned systems do not deliver a sufficient volume of fires on multiple
targets simultaneously or over a short period of time. The draft document
is in the process of being reviewed by subject matter experts within DOD.
Prior to the development of this joint requirements document, the Marine
Corps had established requirements in a document titled "Naval Surface
Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare" in March
2002. This document established specific near-term, mid-term and far-term
requirements for factors such as system response time, accuracy and
precision, and range.
New capabilities being developed will enhance DOD's joint fires
capabilities for expeditionary warfare, but some gaps will remain
Current capabilities to provide joint fires in support of expeditionary
operations in the littorals include the 5-inch 54- or 62-caliber guns for
the DDG destroyers and cruisers with 5-inch 54-caliber guns. The two
battleships in inactive reserve, if reactivated, would provide 16-inch
50-caliber guns. Other joint fires capabilities include tactical aviation,
surface-to-surface rocket systems, and Army and Marine Corps 105
millimeter and 155 millimeter artillery. Planned capabilities such as
weapons systems and/or ships currently under development are expected to
largely meet near- and mid-term requirements and partially mitigate
multiple capabilities gaps if implemented as planned. Planned capabilities
include the DD(X) destroyers with an advanced gun system firing long range
land attack projectiles. Another planned capability is extended-range
guided munitions for existing DDG destroyers. The DDG with extended-range
guided munitions largely meets near- and mid-term Naval Surface Fire
Support requirements, while the DD(X) meets mid-term requirements and may
meet far-term requirements depending on the ultimate range of the
projectiles. However, neither of these capabilities may be available until
early next decade. As we have reported, both the DD(X) and extended-range
guided munitions programs have experienced some technical and funding
challenges.7 In addition, neither current nor planned Naval Surface Fire
Support capabilities fully mitigate joint fires gaps identified in the
Initial Capabilities Document such as the ability to engage moving targets
in restricted weather conditions and the ability to provide a sufficient
quantity of fires over a short period of time. However, the DD(X) with the
advanced gun system could mitigate those gaps and the DDG firing
extended-range guided munitions somewhat addresses them. Land- and
air-based systems, such as long-range bombers, may also help to mitigate
these gaps.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Progress and
Challenges Facing the DD(X) Surface Combatant Program, GAO-05-924T
(Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005; U.S. Government Accountability Office,
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-05-301 (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005).
DOD officials believe risk associated with current and planned
capabilities is acceptable if programs are implemented as planned
DOD officials believe the level of risk associated with current fire
support capabilities is acceptable given that other joint capabilities
such as tactical aviation and long-range bombers could also contribute to
providing joint fires to support theater commanders' war plans. For
example, combatant command representatives told us they would be able to
execute war plans with acceptable risk using current fires support
capabilities. Also, DOD officials from the joint staff, combatant
commands, Navy, and Marine Corps do not believe that reactivating
battleships would be cost effective nor would the modernized battleships
significantly reduce those risks or provide the best means to meet
long-term joint fires capability requirements. Navy officials stated that
the battleships would be expensive to operate, have munitions that lack
accuracy, and are manpower intensive. Both Navy and Marine Corps officials
stated that planned capabilities, including the DD(X) destroyers with the
advanced gun system firing long-range land attack projectiles and
extended-range guided munitions for existing DDGs, will help to mitigate
existing joint fires gaps if executed as planned. However, Marine Corps
officials support purchasing a larger number of DD(X) ships than are
included in current Navy plans.
Analysis of battleship alternatives would need to consider many types of
costs
Decision makers have at least three alternatives to removing the two
remaining battleships from the naval vessel registry. The Navy could (1)
sustain the battleships in inactive status; (2) reactivate the battleships
to their original warfighting capabilities, with some improvements to
bring them up to current ship standards for habitability and
interoperability; or (3) modernize the battleships, their fire support
capabilities, and other supporting capabilities significantly beyond their
original capabilities. In addition to weighing the military capabilities
associated with these alternatives, numerous cost factors would need to be
considered for each option including the extent to which DOD would incur
costs for
o mechanical and/or technological systems such as the propulsion system
or communications systems;
o weapons and munitions such as fire control systems and ordnance and
propellant safety; and
o personnel to operate the battleships (e.g., military personnel or
contractor support), and training required to operate the various
types of systems.
However, the capabilities and costs associated with these options would
also need to be weighed and compared to those of DOD's other programs to
enhance fire support capabilities, such as the DD(X) program with the
advanced gun system and extended-range guided munitions for existing DDGs.
Moreover, our past work has shown that an effective comparison of costs
should focus on total ownership costs during a system's lifecycle. Total
ownership costs include estimated operations and support cost in addition
to research, development and procurement costs. The cost of a ship's crew
is generally the single largest expense incurred over a ship's lifecycle.8
U.S. Government Accountability Office, MILITARY PERSONNEL: Navy Actions
Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total Ownership Costs,
GAO-03-520 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2003).
Cost factors involved in sustaining the battleships in inactive ship
status include the cost of contractor support to maintain the ships for
such things as preservation painting, interior dehumidification, and
maintaining the fire and flood alarm systems. The Navy currently incurs
expenses of about $1.5 million per year to sustain both battleships in
inactive status. Of this amount, about $1 million covers additional annual
preservation maintenance and ongoing paint preservation work on the
Wisconsin. The ships are inspected twice a year to document electrical,
safety, hull and general ship conditions. In addition, the deck of the
Iowa must be repaired to ensure its safety. According to Navy officials,
this would cost about $1.6 million spread over two fiscal years.
Costs to reactivate the battleships to their original warfighting
capabilities with some enhancements for habitability and interoperability
would include costs to bring the battleships up to current ship standards.
For example, the Navy would have to replace the analog communications
system with digital systems so that they will be interoperable with other
ships; improve the propulsion system, and update chemical and biological
protection capabilities, and improve personnel habitability with additions
such as sit-up berthing and accommodations for women at sea. Moreover,
Navy officials estimate they would need about 1,500 military personnel to
operate a reactivated battleship. The fire control system would need to be
improved and the propellant powder bags for the 16-inch guns, stored off
the ships, would need to be replaced due to age and deterioration. In
addition, the damaged number two gun turret on the Iowa would need to be
repaired.
Cost factors that would need to be considered to modernize and reactivate
the battleships beyond their original warfighting capabilities could
include replacing the propulsion system with a gas turbine system and
developing guided munitions that could be launched from the battleships.
Ultimately, the costs and time to modernize and reactivate the battleships
would depend upon the specific missions and capabilities desired. However,
in addition to the cost of more modern munitions, numerous enhancements to
upgrade communications, the ship's deck, mechanics, chemical biological
protection capabilities, living quarters, and other systems would also be
required.
Agency Comments
We received technical comments from DOD which we incorporated as
appropriate.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]. Contact information for our
offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the
last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Richard
Payne, Susan Ditto, David Marroni, Brian Mateja, Donna Rogers, and Malvern
Saavedra.
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Enclosure
Objectives
o Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) requirements and how DOD officials
view these needs and the battleships' ability to perform the mission
o Cost factors that should be considered in evaluating whether to
sustain, reactivate, and/or modernize battleships
2
Scope & Methodology
o Reviewed NSFS requirements and subsequent Joint Fires gapsidentified
by Draft Initial Capabilities Document
o Reviewed current and programmed capabilities
* Obtained DOD officials' views from
o Office of Secretary of Defense
o Joint Staff
o Office of the Chief, Naval Operations (N76-Surface Warfare)
o Marine Corps Combat Development Command
o Navy Inactive Ships Program Office
o U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Central Command
o Toured battleship USS Wisconsin to observe current condition
3
GAO Observations
o NSFS requirements have been subsumed in Joint Fires Draft Initial
Capabilities Document (as of May 2005)
o Current capabilities do not fully meet NSFS or Joint Fires
requirements
o Programmed capabilities are expected to partially mitigate multiple
capabilities gaps if implemented as planned
o DOD officials believe level of risk is acceptable given other Joint
Fires capabilities and that battleships will not reduce risk
o Numerous cost factors would need to be addressed to sustain,
reactivate, or modernize battleships; however, the Navy maintains only
costs to sustain the battleships in inactive ship status
4
Requirements: Key Naval Surface Fire Support Documents
o Marine Corps' "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" (1996)
o Marine Corps' "Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare" (March 2002)
o "Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support of
Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals" (draft May 2005)
5
Requirements: Marine Corps' "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" (1996)
o Operational concepts drive fire support requirements that can be met
only by complementary, overlapping, and redundant fire support
systems: aviation, naval surface, and ground-based fires
o Naval surface weapons will provide long-range, accurate fires from
over the horizon, supporting maneuver units with high-volume,
suppressive, neutralizing, and destructive fires
o Fire support will be capable of providing a range of effects
appropriate for the situation
6
Requirements: Marine Corps' "Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare" (2002)
Requirement Near Term Mid Term Far Term
(2004-2005) (2006-2009) (2010-2019)
System Response1 2.5 minutes or 2.5 minutes or 2.5 minutes or
less less less
Range2 41-63 nautical 63-97 nautical >= 97 nautical
miles miles miles
Accuracy/ 50 meters-desired 50 meters-desired 50 meters-desired
Precision3 threshold 20 threshold 20 threshold 20
meters-optimum meters-optimum meters-optimum
threshold threshold threshold
Target 50-63 nautical 63-97 nautical >= 97 nautical
Acquisition4 miles miles miles
Source: Marine Corps' Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
ition includes detection, location, tracking,
identification, and battle damage assessment.
7
Requirements: "Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support of
Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals" (2005-Draft)
Marine Corps requirements now captured in this draft document. Document
identifies four Joint Fires capabilities gaps:
* Joint environment-Integrated Fires command and control is not well
* defined
o Weather restrictions-Existing and future target acquisition systems
do not provide sufficient capability to engage moving targets under
restricted weather conditions
o Collateral damage-Existing and future target acquisition systems do
not provide sufficient capability to engage targets when friendly forces
are in close contact or when causing collateral damage is a concern
o Fires volume-Insufficiency in existing capability to deliver a large
quantity of fires on multiple targets simultaneously or over a short
period of time
8
Requirements: Current Joint Fires Capabilities
o Ships
o 30 DDGs with 5" 54-caliber guns
Currently use
o 15 DDGs with 5" 62-caliber guns
same munitions
o 22 Cruisers with two 5" 54-caliber guns
o 2 Battleships (Iowa and Wisconsin) with nine 16" 50-caliber guns. In
inactive status; would require time and incur cost to reactivate
o Joint Fires Capabilities
o Tactical aviation
o Surface-to-surface rocket systems (HIMARS, MLRS, ATACMS, Tactical
Tomahawks)
o Artillery: 105 mm & 155 mm-Army and Marine Corps
9
Requirements: Comparison of Current Capabilities- 5-inch guns and 16-inch
guns
Near Term Requirement1 5-inch gun with 16-inch gun with
(2004-2005) current munitions standard round2
System Response 1 to 3 minutes 2 to 5 minutes after
first
2.5 minutes or less shot to adjust fire
Range 13 nautical miles 24 nautical miles
41-63 nautical miles
Accuracy/Precision 150 meters over or Up to 900 meters long
short; or
50 meters left or short; up to 400
50 meters-desired threshold right at meters left
20 meters-optimum threshold maximum range or right at maximum
range
Target Acquisition Not solely a ship Not solely a ship
function function
50-63 nautical miles
Sources: Marine Corps' Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Naval Gunfire Spotter Handbook (1991),
Letter of Promulgation for Naval Gunfire Spotters Handbook (1990), Fleet
Marine Force Manual (1991), and Navy officials
1Even if reactivated, the battleships and their16-inch guns would not be
available to support near-or mid-term requirements. 2Battleship
capabilities are based on technologies that existed on the ships at
deactivation (1992). There are proposals to improve technologies that
could extend range and accuracy, but such proposals are not part of DOD
plans for joint fires.
10
Requirements: Programmed Capabilities
o For DD(X) and its munitions
o Estimated cost: $3.3 billion for first ship, less for subsequent ships
* Initial Operational Capability 2014 (as of Nov. 23, 2005); Full
Fielding
* has yet to be determined
o Navy's fiscal year 2006-2011 Future Years Defense Plan identifies
funding for one ship per year from fiscal years 2007 to 2011 for a total
of 5 ships; as of Dec. 1, 2005, Navy plans to build 8-12 DD(X)
* Advanced Gun System (AGS) -155 mm gun system designed for
* DD(X); uses Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP)
o DD(X) will provide responsive fires in support of forces ashore and
pre-planned fires as well as Counter-Battery capability
o For DDG and its munitions
* Extended Range Munitions (ERM) -long range and precise global
* positioning system targeting capability
o Under development since 1996; Initial Operational Capability 2011
11
Requirements: Comparison of Marine Corps' Requirements to DDG and DD(X)
Programmed Capability and Munitions Goals
Near Term Mid Term Long Term DDG with
Requirement Requirement Requirement 5"62-caliber DD(X) with AGS
(2004-2005) (2006-2009) (2010-2019) gun firing firing LRLAP
Requirement ERM
System 2.5 minutes 2.5 minutes 2.5 minutes 2.5 minutes 1 to 2.5
Response or less or less or less minutes
41-63 63-97 >= 97 63 nautical 83 nautical
Range nautical nautical nautical miles miles1
miles miles miles
50 meter 50 meter 50 meter
desired desired desired
Accuracy/ threshold threshold threshold GPS; 10-20
Precision 20 meter 20 meter 20 meter meters GPS-Classified
optimum optimum optimum
threshold threshold threshold
Target 50-63 63-97 >= 97 Not Solely a Not Solely a
Acquisition nautical nautical nautical Ship Ship Function
miles miles miles Function
Sources: Marine Corps' Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Navy officials
1LRLAP has successfully demonstrated in testing to 63 nautical miles. The
DD(X) requirement threshold range is 63 nautical miles with an objective
range of 100 nautical miles.
12
Requirements: Ability of Current and Programmed Capabilities and
Battleships to Mitigate Joint Fires Capabilities Gaps
Current Joint Fires DDG with 5" gun BB with 16" DDG with DD(X) with
Capabilities Gaps1 firing current gun firing 5"62-caliber AGS firing
munitions standard gun firing ERM LRLAP
round
Joint Environment Does Not Does Not Does Not Partially
Mitigate Mitigate Mitigate Mitigates2
Weather Partially Partially Partially Partially
Restrictions Mitigates Mitigates Mitigates Mitigates
Collateral Damage Does Not Does Not Partially Partially
Mitigate Mitigate Mitigates Mitigates
Partially Partially
Fires Volume Mitigates Mitigates Partially Partially
(within range) (within Mitigates Mitigates
range)
Sources: Marine Corps and Navy officials
1As identified in the draft "Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires
in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals" 2No single system
fully mitigates a joint fires gap; at least two independent capabilities
would be needed to fully mitigate gaps
13
Requirements: OSD, Joint Staff, Navy, and Marine Corps Officials' Views on
Urgency to Provide Joint Fires Capabilities
DOD officials generally stated current capabilities are adequate with an
acceptable level of risk and that battleships will not reduce existing
joint fires gaps
o OSD Position
* Interim measures are adequate to meet current requirements with
* acceptable risk
* Does not consider reactivating and modernizing battleships as cost-
* effective; would not result in reduced risk in current Joint Fires
gaps
o Advanced Gun System will provide Joint Fires capabilities that could
not
be accomplished effectively by 16-inch guns on reactivated battleships;
new precision round could be built for 16-inch gun but would not be
available until after AGS is deployed
o Joint Staff Position (J8)
o Identified and emerging capability gaps are being addressed to an
acceptable level of risk with current Joint Fires capability; planned
programs will further mitigate capability gaps and risk
14
Requirements: OSD, Joint Staff, Navy, and Marine Corps Officials' Views on
Urgency to Provide Joint Fires Capabilities (cont.)
* Navy Position (CNO-OPNAV N76)
o Recognizes need to provide Joint Fires capabilities but
believes level of risk is acceptable; plans to analyze
alternatives such as extended range munitions and long range
land attack projectiles to address capabilities gaps
o Does not support reactivation of battleships because the
battleships will not fully address gaps identified in Initial
Capabilities Document
* Marine Corps Position (MROC)
o Need 24 DD(X) to fully support a major combat operation within
desired timeframes; could accomplish mission with fewer than
24 ships at risk of added time to operation and hitting fewer
targets
o Supports Navy efforts to delist battleships because
battleships will not meet long-term Joint Fires capability
requirements
15
Requirements: Combatant Command Views on Urgency to Provide Joint Fires
Capabilities
o Current NSFS capabilities sufficient for Joint Fires requirements
o Commands able to carry out OPLANS with current Joint Fires
capabilities
o Capability is the key, ship platform does not matter
16
Enclosure I
Cost Factors: To Sustain, Reactivate, and/or Modernize Battleships
Decision makers have three alternatives to delisting the two battleships:
1) Sustain battleships in current inactive ship status 2) Reactivate
battleships to current ship standards 3) Modernize battleships Each
alternative has different cost factors
17
Cost Factors: To Sustain, Reactivate, and/or Modernize Battleships
Sustain Reactivate Current
Cost factors Inactive ship ship standards Modernize
status
Mechanical/ Repair Iowa's Repair Iowa's Deck Repair Iowa's Deck
Deck
Technological Repair Iowa's gun Repair Iowa's gun
turret turret
Maintain Improve Propulsion Replace Propulsion
Propulsion System System with Gas
System Turbine
Maintain C4I Replace C4I analog Replace C4I analog
with digital Improve with digital Improve
Chem/Bio Protection Chem/Bio Protection
Improve Personnel Improve Personnel
Habitability Habitability
Personnel Contractor Military Manning Military Manning
Support
Military Training Military Training
Weapons/ Existing stocks Improve Fire Control Improve Fire Control
and
Munitions spares Ordnance Ordnance
Propellant Propellant
Develop guided
munitions
18
Page16 GAO-06-279R
Cost Factors: To Sustain, Reactivate, and/or Modernize Battleships
o Navy has been spending $250,000 per ship, per year to sustain two
battleships in inactive ship status
o Regardless of decision to sustain, reactivate, or modernize, the deck
of the Iowa will need to be repaired at a cost of about $1.34 million
unless it is delisted
o Navy has not developed plans or cost estimates to reactivate or
modernize battleships
19
(350730)
*** End of document. ***