Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents (23-FEB-06,
GAO-06-467T).
This testimony discusses the challenges of effective emergency
preparedness for, response to, and recovery from major
emergencies, including catastrophic incidents. Effective
emergency preparedness and response for major events requires the
coordinated planning and actions of multiple players from
multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels
of government as well as nongovernmental entities. Effective
emergency preparedness and response requires putting aside
parochialism and working together prior to and after an emergency
incident. September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the context of
emergency management preparedness in the United States, including
federal involvement in preparedness and response. The biggest
challenge in emergency preparedness is getting effective
cooperation in planning, exercises, and capability assessment and
building across first responder disciplines and intergovernmental
lines. DHS has developed several policy documents designed to
define the federal government's role in supporting state and
local first responders in emergencies, implement a uniform
incident command structure across the nation, and identify
performance standards that can be used in assessing state and
local first responder capabilities. Realistic exercises are a key
component of testing and assessing emergency plans and first
responder capabilities, and the Hurricane PAM planning exercise
demonstrated their value. With regard to the status of emergency
preparedness across the nation, we know relatively little about
how states and localities (1) finance their efforts in this area,
(2) have used their federal funds, and (3) are assessing the
effectiveness with which they spend those funds. Katrina has
raised a host of questions about the nation's readiness to
respond effectively to catastrophic emergencies. Effective
emergency preparedness is a task that is never done, but requires
continuing commitment and leadership because circumstances change
and continuing trade-offs because we will never have the funds to
do everything we might like to do.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-467T
ACCNO: A47677
TITLE: Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and
Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents
DATE: 02/23/2006
SUBJECT: Disaster planning
Disaster recovery
Emergency preparedness
First responders
Homeland security
Hurricane Katrina
Interagency relations
Intergovernmental relations
Local governments
Municipal governments
Natural disasters
State governments
Strategic planning
Terrorism
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-467T
United States Government Accountability Office
Testimony
GAO
Before the Little Hoover Commission, State of California
For Release on Delivery EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
Expected at 9:00 a.m. PST
Thursday, February 23, 2006
RESPONSE
Some Issues and Challenges Associated with
Major Emergency Incidents
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr.,
Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues
On March 3, 2006, this testimony was reposted to the Web because of two
corrections made to the electronic version. The first correction occurs on
page 12, where the word "not" has been added. The sentence should say,
"The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command system and
structure..." The second correction occurs on page 13, where the word
"Performance" has been replaced with the word "Preparedness" so that
"National Performance Goal" becomes "National Preparedness Goal."
GAO-06-467T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission,
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the challenges of
effective emergency preparedness for, response to, and recovery from major
emergencies, including catastrophic events. Effective emergency
preparedness and response for major events requires the coordinated
planning and actions of multiple players from multiple first responder
disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as
nongovernmental entities. Effective emergency preparedness and response
requires putting aside parochialism and working together prior to and
after an emergency event. As one participant in responding to Katrina put
it, the aftermath of a major disaster is no time to be exchanging business
cards.
September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the context of emergency
management preparedness in the United States, including federal
involvement in preparedness and response. The biggest challenge in
emergency preparedness is getting effective cooperation in planning,
exercises, and capability assessment and building across first responder
disciplines and intergovernmental lines. DHS has developed several policy
documents designed to define the federal government's role in supporting
state and local first responders in emergencies, implement a uniform
incident command structure across the nation, and identify performance
standards that can be used in assessing state and local first responder
capabilities. Realistic exercises are a key component of testing and
assessing emergency plans and first responder capabilities, and the
Hurricane PAM planning exercise demonstrated their value. With regard to
the status of emergency preparedness across the nation, we know relatively
little about how states and localities (1) finance their efforts in this
area, (2) have used their federal funds, and (3) are assessing the
effectiveness with which they spend those funds. Katrina has raised a host
of questions about the nation's readiness to respond effectively to
catastrophic emergencies. Effective emergency preparedness is a task that
is never done, but requires continuing commitment and leadership because
circumstances change and continuing trade-offs because we will never have
the funds to do everything we might like to do.
September 11, 2001 Changed the Context of Emergency Preparedness
Prior to September 11, 2001, emergency preparedness and response had
primarily been the responsibility of state and local governments and had
focused principally on emergencies resulting from nature, such as fires,
floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, or accidental acts of man, not acts
of terrorism. The federal government's role in supporting emergency
preparedness and management prior to September 11 was limited primarily to
providing resources before large-scale disasters like floods, hurricanes,
and earthquakes, and response and recovery assistance after such
disasters. However, after September 11 and the concern it engendered about
the need to be prepared to prevent, mitigate, and respond to acts of
terrorism, the extent of the federal government's financial support for
state and local government emergency preparedness and response grew
enormously, with about $11 billion in grants distributed from fiscal years
2002 through 2005. At the same time the federal government has been
developing guidance and standards for state and local first responders in
the areas of incident management and capabilities and tying certain
requirements to the award of grants.
The nation's emergency managers and first responders have lead
responsibilities for carrying out emergency management efforts. First
responders have traditionally been thought of as police, fire fighters,
emergency medical personnel, and others who are among the first on the
scene of an emergency. However, since September 11, 2001, the definition
of first responder has been broadened to include those, such as public
health and hospital personnel, who may not be on the scene, but are
essential in supporting effective response and recovery operations.1 The
role of first responders is to prevent where possible, protect against,
1
First responders have traditionally been thought of as local fire, police,
and emergency medical personnel who respond to events such as fires,
floods, traffic or rail accidents, and hazardous materials spills. As a
result of the increased concerns about bioterrorism and other potential
terrorist attacks, the definition of first responders has been broadened.
Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act defined emergency response
providers as including "Federal, State, and local emergency public safety,
law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital
emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities."
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296 S: 2, 116. Stat.2135,
2140 (codified at 6 U.S.C. S: 101(6). Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8 defined the term "first responder" as "individuals who in the
early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and
preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including
emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101),as well as emergency management,
public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support
personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support
services during prevention, response, and recovery operations."
respond to, and assist in the recovery from emergency events. First
responders are trained and equipped to arrive at the scene of an emergency
and take immediate action. Examples include entering the scene of the
event and assessing the situation, setting up a command center,
establishing safe and secure perimeters around the event site, evacuating
those within or near the site, tending to the injured and dead,
transporting them to medical care centers or morgues, rerouting traffic,
helping to restore public utilities, and clearing debris.
Last year, GAO issued a special report on 21st Century Challenges,
examining the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook, the nation's
ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American Society, and the
future role of the federal government. Among the issues discussed was
homeland security.2 In our report we identified the following illustrative
challenges and questions for examining emergency preparedness and response
in the nation:
o Defining an acceptable, achievable (within budget constraints) level
of risk. The nation can never be completely safe; total security is an
unachievable goal. Therefore, the issue becomes what is an acceptable
level of risk to guide homeland security strategies and investments,
particularly federal funding? What criteria should be used to target
federal and state funding for homeland security in order to maximize
results and mitigate risk within available resource levels?
o What should be the role of federal, state, and local governments in
identifying risks-from nature or man-in individual states and
localities and establishing standards for the equipment, skills, and
capacities that first responders need?
o Are existing incentives sufficient to support private sector
protection of critical infrastructure the private sector owns, and
what changes might be necessary?
o What is the most viable way to approach homeland security results
management and accountability? What are the appropriate goals and who
is accountable for the many components of homeland security when many
partners and functions and disciplines are involved? How can these
actors be held accountable and by whom?
GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (W ashington, D.C.: February 2005).
Page 3 GAO-06-467T
o What costs should be borne by federal, state, and local governments or
the private sector in preparing for, responding to, and recovery from
disasters large and small-whether the acts of nature or the deliberate
or accidental acts of man?
o To what extent and how should the federal government encourage and
foster a role for regional or multistate entities in emergency
planning and response?
These issues are enormously complex and represent a major challenge for
all levels of government. But the experience of Hurricane Katrina
illustrated why it is important to tackle these difficult issues. Katrina
was a catastrophe of historic proportions in both its geographic
scope-about 90,000 square miles-and its destruction. Its impact on
individuals and communities was horrific. Katrina highlighted the
limitations of our current capacity to respond effectively to catastrophic
events-those of unusual severity that almost immediately overwhelm state
and local response capacities. 3 Katrina gives us an opportunity to learn
from what went well and what did not go so well and improve our ability to
respond to future catastrophic disasters.
It is generally accepted that emergency preparedness and response should
be characterized by measurable goals and effective efforts to identify key
gaps between those goals and current capabilities, with a clear plan for
closing those gaps and, once achieved, sustaining desired levels of
preparedness and response capabilities and performance. The basic goal of
emergency preparedness for a major emergency is that first responders
should be able to respond swiftly with well-planned, well-coordinated, and
effective actions that save lives and property, mitigate the effects of
the disaster, and set the stage for a quick, effective recovery. In a
major event, coordinated, effective actions are required among responders
from different local jurisdictions, levels of government, and
nongovernmental entities, such as the Red Cross.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and
act on the answers to four basic, but hardly simple, questions with regard
to emergency preparedness and response:
Events need not be catastrophic for the federal government to provide
assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, or to provide coordination under the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 and the National Response Plan.
Page 4 GAO-06-467T
at basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions, and the data
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better
information and a sense of what needs to be done for some types of major
emergency events than others. For some natural disasters, such as regional
wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and therefore a better
basis on which to assess preparation and response efforts and identify
gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with
earthquakes, and Florida has experience with hurricanes. However, no one
in the nation has experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty
bomb detonated in a major city. Nor is there any recent experience with a
pandemic that spreads to thousands of people rapidly across the nation,
although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience.
Planning and assistance has largely been focused on single jurisdictions
and their immediately adjacent neighbors. However, well-documented
problems with first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate
at the site of an incident and the potential for large scale natural and
terrorist disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first
responders should be focusing their planning and preparation on a regional
and multi-governmental basis.
The area of interoperable communications is illustrative of the general
challenge of identifying requirements, current gaps in the ability to meet
those requirements and assess success in closing those gaps, and doing
this on a multi-jurisdictional basis. We identified three principal
challenges to improving interoperable communications for first
responders:4
o clearly identifying and defining the problem;
GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental
Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable
Communications, GAO-04-470 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004).
Page 5 GAO-06-467T
o establishing national interoperability performance goals and standards
that balance nationwide standards with the flexibility to address
differences in state, regional, and local needs and conditions; and
o defining the roles of federal, state, and local governments and other
entities in addressing interoperable needs.
The first, and most formidable, challenge in establishing effective
interoperable communications is defining the problem and establishing
interoperability requirements. This requires addressing the following
questions: Who needs to communicate what (voice and/or data) with whom,
when, for what purpose, under what conditions? Public safety officials
generally recognize that effective interoperable communications is the
ability to talk with whom you want, when you want, when authorized, but
not the ability to talk with everyone all of the time. Various reports,
including ours, have identified a number of barriers to achieving
interoperable public safety wire communications, including incompatible
and aging equipment, limited equipment standards, and fragmented planning
and collaboration. However, perhaps the fundamental barrier has been and
is the lack of effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and
intergovernmental planning. The needed technology flows from a clear
statement of communications needs and plans that cross jurisdictional
lines. No one first responder group or governmental agency can
successfully "fix" the interoperable communications problems that face our
nation.
The capabilities needed vary with the severity and scope of the event. In
a "normal" daily event, such as a freeway accident, the first responders
who need to communicate may be limited to those in a single jurisdiction
or immediately adjacent jurisdictions. However, in a catastrophic event,
effective interoperable communications among responders is vastly more
complicated because the response involves responders from the federal
government-civilian and military-and, as happened after Katrina,
responders from various state and local governments who arrived to provide
help under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) among
states. These responders generally bring their own communications
technology that may or may not be compatible with those of the responders
in the affected area. Even if the technology were compatible, it may be
difficult to know because responders from different jurisdictions may use
different names for the same communications frequencies. To address this
issue, we recommended that a nationwide
DHS Activities to Identify What Needs to Be Done to Promote Emergency
Preparedness Capabilities of First Responders
database of all interoperable communications frequencies, and a common
nomenclature for those frequencies, be established.
Katrina reminded us that in a catastrophic event, most forms of
communication may be severely limited or simply destroyed-land lines, cell
phone towers, satellite phone lines (which quickly became saturated). So
even if all responders had had the technology to communicate with one
another, they would have found it difficult to do so because transmission
towers and other key supporting infrastructure were not functioning. The
more comprehensive the interoperable communications capabilities we seek
to build, the more difficult it is to reach agreement among the many
players on how to do so and the more expensive it is to buy and deploy the
needed technology. And an always contentious issue is who will pay for the
technology-purchase, training, maintenance, and updating.
Effective preparation and response requires clear planning, a clear
understanding of expected roles and responsibilities, and performance
standards that can be used to measure the gap between what is and what
should be. It also requires identifying the essential capabilities whose
development should be a priority, and capabilities that are useful, but
not as critical to successful response and mitigation in a major
emergency. What is critical may cut across different types of events
(e.g., incident command and communications) or may be unique to a specific
type of event (e.g., defusing an explosive device).
DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives to promote the further
development of the all-hazards emergency preparedness capabilities of
first responders. These include the development of the (1) National
Response Plan (what needs to be done to manage a nationally significant
incident, focusing on the role of federal agencies); (2) National Incident
Management System (NIMS), a command and management process to be used with
the National Response Plan during an emergency event (how to do what needs
to be done); and (3) National Preparedness Goal (NPG), which identifies
critical tasks and capabilities (how well it should be done).
The National Response Plan's (NRP) stated purpose is to "establish a
comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident
management across a spectrum of activities including prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery." It is designed to provide the
framework for federal interaction with state, local, and tribal
governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations. The
Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended,
established the process for states to request a presidential disaster
declaration in order to respond to and recover from events that exceed
state and local capabilities and resources. Under the NRP and the Stafford
Act,5 the role of the federal government is principally to support state
and local response activities. A key organizational principle of the NRP
is that "incidents are typically managed at the lowest possible
geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level." An "incident of
national significance" triggers federal support under the NRP; a second
"catastrophic incident" trigger allows for accelerated federal support.
All catastrophic incidents are incidents of national significance, but not
vice-versa. The basic assumption of the federal government as supplement
to state and local first responders was challenged by Katrina, which (1)
destroyed key communications infrastructure; (2) overwhelmed state and
local response capacity, in many cases crippling their ability to perform
their anticipated roles as initial on-site responders; and (3) destroyed
the homes and affected the families of first responders, reducing their
capacity to respond. Katrina almost completely destroyed the basic
structure and operations of some local governments as well as their
business and economic bases.
The NRP defines a catastrophic incident as:
"any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national
morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident could result
in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost
immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal,
and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly
interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an
extent that national security could be threatened. All catastrophic
incidents are Incidents of National Significance. These factors drive the
urgency for coordinated national planning to ensure accelerated
Federal/national assistance." 6
5
The Stafford Act is the short title for the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended.
6
The NRP includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which applies to a subset
of incidents of national significance meeting the NRP's definition of a
"catastrophic incident:" The annex does not apply unless the Secretary of
Homeland Security designates the incident as "catastrophic," which did not
occur during Hurricane Katrina.
Page 8 GAO-06-467T
Exactly what this means for federal, state, and local response has been
the subject of recent congressional hearings on Katrina and the recently
issued report by the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina.7
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 required the adoption of NIMS
by all federal departments and agencies and that federal preparedness
grants be dependent upon NIMS compliance by the recipients. NIMS is
designed as the nation's incident management system. The intent of NIMS is
to establish a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and
organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative
emergency event management at all levels. The idea is that if state and
local firsts responders implement NIMS in their daily response activities,
they will have a common terminology and understanding of incident
management that will foster a swift and effective response when emergency
responders from a variety of levels of government and locations must come
together to respond to a major incident. As we noted in our report on
interoperable communications, such communications are but one important
component of an effective incident command planning and operations
structure.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 required DHS to coordinate the
development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal "to
establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately
balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks and
largescale natural or accidental disasters with the resources required to
prevent, respond to, and recover from them." The goal was also to include
readiness metrics and standards for preparedness assessments and
strategies and a system for assessing the nation's overall preparedness to
respond to major events. To implement the directive, DHS developed the
National Preparedness Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios,8 12 of
7A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
(Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2006).
The 15 scenarios were: (1) improvised nuclear device attack, (2) aerosol
anthrax attack,
(3)
pandemic influenza, (4) biological attack with plague, (5)
chemical attack with blister agent, (6) chemical attack with toxic
chemical agent, (7) chemical attack with nerve agent,
(8)
chemical attack resulting in chlorine tank explosion, (9) major
earthquake, (10) major hurricane, (11) radiological attack with
dispersal device, (12) improvised explosive device attack, (13)
biological attack with food contamination, (14) biological attack
with foreign animal disease (foot and mouth disease), and (15)
cyber attack.
which were terrorist related,9 whose purpose was to form the basis for
identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of
emergency events. Some state and local officials and experts have
questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for preparedness
planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and the emphasis on
terrorist scenarios (12 of 15). The scenarios focused on the consequences
that first responders would have to address. According to DHS's National
Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate
the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for
which the nation needs to be prepared. Using the scenarios, and in
consultation with federal, state, and local emergency response
stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600 discrete tasks, of which
300 were identified as critical tasks. DHS then identified 36 target
capabilities to provide guidance to federal, state, and local first
responders on the capabilities they need to develop and maintain. That
list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised draft list of 37
capabilities in December 2005 (see appendix I). Because no single
jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform every task, possession
of a target capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local
resources, ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some
combination of the two. However, DHS is still in the process of developing
goals, requirements, and metrics for these capabilities; and DHS is
reassessing both the National Response Plan and the National Preparedness
Goal in light of the Hurricane Katrina experience. Prior to Katrina, DHS
had established seven priorities for enhancing national first responder
preparedness:
o implementation of NRP and NIMS;
o implementation of the Interim National Infrastructure Protection
Plan;10
o expanding regional cooperation;
o strengthening capabilities in interoperable communications;
o strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration;
o strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis; and
o strengthening capabilities in detection and response for chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons.
9
According to DHS officials, there was less concern about planning for
natural disasters because there is a tremendous amount of experience,
actuarial data, geographical and seasonal patterns, and other information
that is not available in the context of terrorism.
10
The goal of the plan, issued in draft in November 2005, is to enhance
protection of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources to
prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts
by terrorists to "destroy, incapacitate, or exploit" them.
Page 10 GAO-06-467T
Those seven priorities are incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006
homeland security grant guidance. The guidance also adds an eighth
priority that emphasizes emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
With almost any skill and capability, experience and practice enhance
The Critical
proficiency. For first responders, exercises-particularly for the type or
Importance of magnitude of events for which there is little actual
experience-are essential for developing skills and identifying what works
well and what
Realistic Exercises
needs further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly and
After-Action catastrophic incidents, by definition require the coordinated
actions of personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels
of
government, plus nonprofit organizations and the private sector. It is
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective interdisciplinary,
intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in developing the
coordination and skills needed for effective response.
Following are some illustrative tasks needed to prepare for and respond to
a major emergency incident that could be tested with realistic exercises:
Preparation:
o assessing potential needs, marshalling key resources, and moving
property and people out of harm's way prior to the actual event (where
predictable or where there is forewarning),
Response
o obtaining and communicating accurate situational data for evaluating
and coordinating appropriate response during and after the event;
o leadership: effectively blending (1) active involvement of top
leadership in unified incident command and control with (2)
decentralized decision making authority that encourages innovative
approaches to effective response;
o clearly understood roles and responsibilities prior to and in response
to the event;
o effective communication and coordination; and
o the ability to identify, draw on, and effectively deploy resources
from other governmental, nonprofit, and private entities for effective
response
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be involved
in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest and realistic
assessments that result in action plans that are implemented. In addition
to relevant first responders, exercise participants should include,
depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors,
and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for such
things as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation or ask
for federal assistance. The Hurricane PAM exercise of 2004 was essentially
a detailed planning exercise that was highly realistic and involved a wide
variety of federal, state, and local first responders and officials.
Although action plans based on this exercise were still being developed
and implemented when Katrina hit, the exercise proved to be remarkably
prescient in identifying the challenges presented if a major hurricane hit
New Orleans and resulted in flooding the city.
The importance of post-exercise assessments is illustrated by a November
2005 report by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector
General on the April 2005 Top Officials 3 Exercise (TOPOFF3) which noted
that the exercise highlighted at all levels of government a fundamental
lack of understanding regarding the principles and protocols set forth in
the NRP and NIMS.11 For example, the report cited confusion over the
different roles and responsibilities performed by the Principal Federal
Officer (PFO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The PFO is
designated by the DHS Secretary to act as the Secretary's local
representative in overseeing and executing the incident management
responsibilities under HSPD-5 for incidents of national significance. The
PFO does not direct or replace the incident command system and structure,
and does not have direct authority over the senior law enforcement
officials, the FCO, or other federal and state officials. The FCO is
designated by the President and manages federal resources and support
activities in response to disasters and emergencies declared by the
President. The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of
federal disaster assistance and programs to the affected state, the
private sector, and individual victims. The FCO also has authority under
the Stafford Act to request and direct federal departments and agencies to
use their authorities and resources in support of state and local response
and recovery efforts.
DHS Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise,
OIG-06-07 (Washington, D.C.: November 2005).
Page 12 GAO-06-467T
Our Knowledge of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities Is
Limited
In addition to confusion over the respective roles and authority of the
PFO and FCO, the report noted that the exercise highlighted problems
regarding the designation of a PFO and the lack of guidance on training
and certification standards for PFO support personnel. The report
recommended that DHS continue to train and exercise the NRP and NIMS at
all levels of government and develop operating procedures that clearly
define individual and organizational roles and responsibilities under the
NRP.
In the last several years, the federal government has awarded some $11
billion in grants to federal, state, and local authorities to improve
emergency preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities. What is
remarkable about the whole area of emergency preparedness and homeland
security is how little we know about how states and localities
(1)
finance their efforts in this area, (2) have used their federal
funds, and
(3)
are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds.
The National Capital Region (NCR) is the only area in the nation that has
a statutorily designated regional coordinator.12 In our review of
emergency preparedness in the NCR, we noted that a coordinated, targeted,
and complementary use of federal homeland security grant funds was
important in the NCR-as it is in all areas of the nation. The findings
from our work on the NCR are relevant to all multiagency,
multijurisdictional efforts to assess and improve emergency preparedness
and response capabilities.
In May 2004, we reported that the NCR faced three interrelated challenges:
the lack of (1) preparedness standards (which the National Preparedness
Goal was designed to address); (2) a coordinated regionwide plan for
establishing first responder performance goals, needs, and priorities, and
assessing the benefits of expenditures in enhancing first responder
capabilities; and (3) a readily available, reliable source of data on the
funds available to first responders in the NCR and their use.13 Without
the
12
The NCR is composed of the District of Columbia and surrounding
jurisdictions in the states of Maryland and Virginia.
13
GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the
National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and
Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 ( Washington, D.C.: May 2004); and Homeland
Security: Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency
Preparedness in the National Capital Region, GAO-05-889T ( Washington,
D.C.: July 14, 2005).
Page 13 GAO-06-467T
standards, a regionwide plan, and data on spending, we noted, it is
extremely difficult to determine whether NCR first responders have the
ability to respond to threats and emergencies with well-planned,
wellcoordinated, and effective efforts that involve a variety of first
responder disciplines from NCR jurisdictions. To the extent that the NCR
had coordinated the use of federal grant funds, it had focused on funds
available through the Urban Area Security Initiative grants. We noted that
it was important to have information on all grant funds available to NCR
jurisdictions and their use if the NCR was to effectively leverage
regional funds and avoid unnecessary duplication. As we observed, the
fragmented nature of the multiple federal grants available to first
responders-some awarded to states, some to localities, some directly to
first responder agencies-may make it more difficult to collect and
maintain regionwide data on the grant funds received and the use of those
funds. Our previous work suggests that this fragmentation in federal
grants may reinforce state and local fragmentation and can also make it
more difficult to coordinate and use those multiple sources of funds to
achieve specific objectives.14
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant guidance
for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants is that eligible
recipients must provide an "investment justification" with their grant
application. States must use this justification to outline the
implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to
achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and Capability
Enhancement Plan. These plans are multiyear global program management
plans for the entire state homeland security program that look beyond
federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The justifications
must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland security grant
program, including all UASI funding, any base formula allocations for the
State Homeland Security Program and the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program, and all formula allocations under the Metropolitan
Medical Response System and Citizen Corps Program. In the guidance DHS
notes that it will use a peer review process to evaluate grant
applications on the basis of the effectiveness of a state's plan to
address the priorities it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall
risk.
GAO, Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to Better Meet
Outstanding Needs, GAO-03-1146T (Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2003).
Page 14 GAO-06-467T
Catastrophic Events
On February 1, 206, GAO issued its preliminary observations regarding the
preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.15 Catastrophic events
are different in the severity of the damage, number of persons affected,
and the scale of preparation and response required. They quickly overwhelm
or incapacitate local and/or state response capabilities, thus requiring
coordinated assistance from outside the affected area. Thus, the response
and recovery capabilities needed during a catastrophic event differ
significantly from those required to respond to and recover from a "normal
disaster." Key capabilities such as emergency communications, continuity
of essential government services, and logistics and distribution systems
underpin citizen safety and security and may be severely affected. Katrina
basically destroyed state and local communications capabilities, severely
affecting timely, accurate damage assessments in the wake of Katrina.
Whether the catastrophic event comes without warning or there is some
prior notice, such as a hurricane, it is essential that the leadership
roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for responding to such an
event be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to
facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing
for and in the early hours and days after the event. Streamlining,
simplifying, and expediting decision making must quickly replace "business
as usual." Yet at the same time, uncoordinated initiatives by well-meaning
persons or groups can actually hinder effective response, as was the case
following Katrina.
Katrina raised a number of questions about the nation's ability to respond
effectively to catastrophic events-even one with several days warning. GAO
has underway work on a number of issues related to the preparation,
response, recovery, and reconstruction efforts related to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. We are examining what went well and why and what did not
go well and why, and what our findings suggest for any specific changes
that may be needed.
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that
Observations requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of
many
15
GAO, Statement of Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary
Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006).
Page 15 GAO-06-467T
stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of
government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no "silver bullet,"
no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires
continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances
change and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to
do.
The basic steps are easy to state but extremely difficult to complete:
o develop a strategic plan with clear goals, objectives, and milestones;
o develop performance goals that can be used to set desired performance
baselines
o collect and analyze relevant and reliable data;
o assess the results of analyzing those data against performance goals
to guide priority setting;
o take action based on those results; and
o monitor the effectiveness of actions taken to achieve the designated
performance goals.
It is important to identify the specific types of capabilities, such as
incident command and control, with broad application across emergencies
arising from "all-hazards," and those that are unique to particular types
of emergency events. The priority to be given to the development of
specific, "unique" capabilities should be tied to an assessment of the
risk that those capabilities will be needed. In California, for example,
it is not a question of if, but when, a major earthquake will strike the
state. There is general consensus that the nation is at risk of an
infectious pandemic at some point, and California has just issued a draft
plan for preparing and responding to such an event. On the other hand,
assessing specific terrorist risks is more difficult.
As the nation assesses the lessons of Katrina, we must incorporate those
lessons in assessing state and local emergency management plans, amend
those plans as appropriate, and reflect those changes in planned
expenditures and exercises. This effort requires clear priorities, hard
choices, and objective assessments of current plans and capabilities.
Failure to address these difficult tasks directly and effectively will
result in preparedness and response efforts that are less effective than
they should and can be.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions the Commission Members may have.
Appendix I: DHS's Target Capabilities List 2.0 (Draft) as of December 2005
Common Target Planning
Capabilities Communications
Risk management
Community preparedness and participation
Prevent Mission Area Information gathering and recognition of indicators
and warnings Intelligence analysis and production Intelligence/information
sharing and dissemination Law enforcement investigation and operations
CBRNE detection
Protect Mission Area Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) Food and
agriculture safety and defense Epidemiological surveillance and
investigation Public health laboratory testing
Respond Mission Area
Onsite incident management Emergency operations center management Critical
resource logistics and distribution Volunteer management and donations
Responder safety and health Public safety and security response Animal
health emergency support Environmental health Explosive device response
operations Firefighting operations/support WMD/hazardous materials
response and decontamination Citizen Protection: evacuation and/or
in-place protection Isolation and quarantine Urban search and rescue
Emergency public information and warning Triage and pre-hospital treatment
Medical surge Medical supplies management and distribution Mass
prophylaxis Mass prophylaxis appendix Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and
related services) Fatality management
Recover Mission Area Structural damage and mitigation assessment
Restoration of lifelines Economic and community recovery
(440493)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts GAO
Reports and newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its
Web site. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [email protected]
Federal Programs Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202)
512-7470
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Relations
Washington, D.C. 20548
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800
Public Affairs
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
PRINTED ON
RECYCLED PAPER
*** End of document. ***