-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-788
TITLE: Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy
Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals
DATE: 07/11/2006
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GAO-06-788
* Report to Congressional Committees
* July 2006
* REBUILDING IRAQ
* More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S.
Goals
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* NSVI Retains Original Desired End-State, but Changing Assumptions
and Circumstances Make it Unclear How It Will Achieve These
Objectives
* Permissive Security Environment Never Materialized
* Essential Services Have Not Been Restored to Prewar Levels,
Undermining Efforts to Improve the Lives of Iraqi People
* Expected Level of Iraq and International Community Financial
Support for Iraq's Developmental Needs Have Not Yet Been Met
* The NSVI and Its Supporting Documents Do Not Address All the
Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy, thus Limiting
Its Usefulness as a Planning Tool
* Strategy Discusses Purpose and Scope, Identifies Risks and
Threats, and Discusses Desired Goals and Objectives
* U.S. Strategy Identifies Purpose and Scope
* Strategy Identifies Risks and Threats
* Strategy Discusses Goals, Objectives, and Activities
but Has Limited Discussion of Outcome-Related
Performance Measures
* Strategy Partially Address Costs, Agency Responsibilities,
and Integration
* Strategy Partially Addresses Future Costs and Resource
Requirements
* Strategy Partially Addresses U.S. Roles,
Responsibilities, and Coordination Mechanisms
* Strategy Partially Addresses Integration with Iraqi
Government and International Donors
* Dispersion of the U.S. Strategy across Many Documents Limits
Its Usefulness as a Planning Tool
* Conclusion
* Recommendation for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Scope and Methodology
* GAO's Description of the Six Characteristics of an Effective National
Strategy
* Purpose, Scope, and Methodology
* Problems, Risks, and Threats
* Goals, Objectives, Activities, and Outcome-Related Performance
Measures
* Future Costs and Resources Needed
* U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities and Coordination
Mechanism
* Strategy's Integration Among and with Other Entities
* Comments from the Department of State
* GAO Comments
* Comments from the Department of Defense
* GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* Related GAO Products
* PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* Order by Mail or Phone
Report to Congressional Committees
July 2006
REBUILDING IRAQ
More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals
Contents
Tables
Figures
July 11, 2006 Letter
Congressional Committees
In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's existing
strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in
Iraq. According to this document, prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S.
national interest because it will help win the war on terror and make
America safer, stronger, and more certain of its future. To achieve
victory, the strategy requires the United States to maintain troops in
Iraq until its objectives are achieved, adjusting the number up or down as
conditions warrant. Currently, the United States deploys about 130,000
U.S. troops in support of the Iraqi government. Between fiscal years 2003
and 2006, the U.S. government has allocated about $311 billion to support
U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including over $34
billion for reconstruction assistance alone. Moreover, the administration
has requested about an additional $51 billion to support U.S.
stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in
fiscal year 2007.1
We initiated this review under the Comptroller General's authority because
of broad based congressional interest in Iraq issues.2 This report (1)
describes the evolution of the U.S. national strategy for Iraq in response
to changing, security, reconstruction, and economic circumstances and (2)
evaluates whether the NSVI and its supporting documents include the
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. In this
report, the NSVI and its supporting documents are referred to as the U.S.
strategy for Iraq.
To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and analyzed records, reports,
and data from U.S. government and military officials in Washington, D.C.,
and Baghdad, Iraq. We also examined the reports of other oversight
entities that performed internal control and management reviews. We
assessed the strategy using the six desirable characteristics of an
effective national strategy developed in previous GAO work. For example,
GAO has used this methodology to assess and report on the administration's
strategies relating to terrorism and restructuring the Department of
Defense's (DOD) global force posture.3 National strategies with these
characteristics offer policy makers and implementing agencies a management
tool that can help ensure accountability and more effective results. The
six characteristics are (1) a clear purpose, scope, methodology; (2) a
detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy
intends to address; (3) the desired goals and objectives, and
outcome-related performance measures; (4) a description of the U.S.
resources needed to implement the strategy; (5) a clear delineation of the
U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordination;
and (6) a description of how the strategy is integrated internally among
U.S. agencies and externally with the Iraqi government and international
organizations. These six characteristics can be subdivided into 27
separate elements for more detailed assessment.
We evaluated the NSVI alone and in conjunction with seven related
classified and unclassified supporting documents that Department of State
(State) and DOD officials said encompassed the U.S. strategy: (1) the
National Security Presidential Directive 36 (May 2004), (2) Multinational
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan (August 2004), (3) the MNF-I/ U.S.
Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on Iraq (December 2005), (4) the
Multinational Corps-Iraq Operation Order 05-03 (December 2005), (5) the
National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated January 2006), (6) the
quarterly State Section 2207 reports to Congress (through April 2006),4
and (7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by the Chief of Mission
and the Commander of the MNF-I. See appendix I for a more detailed
description of our scope and methodology. See appendix II for details on
GAO's six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
The NSVI and supporting documents incorporate the same desired end-state
for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq that the
coalition established in 2003: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure
Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner
in the global war on terrorism. Since then, however, the strategy's
underlying security, reconstruction, and economic assumptions have evolved
in response to changing circumstances. First, the original plan assumed a
permissive security environment, which never materialized. An active and
increasingly lethal insurgency undermined the development of effective
Iraqi governmental institutions and delayed plans for an early transfer of
security responsibilities to the Iraqis. Second, the United States assumed
that its U.S.-funded reconstruction activities would help restore Iraq's
essential services-oil production, electricity generation, and water
treatment-to prewar levels. However, U.S. efforts to achieve this goal
have been hindered by security, management, and maintenance challenges
that undermine efforts to improve the lives of the Iraqi people. For
example, a March 2006 poll of Iraqi citizens indicated that a majority
thought Iraq was heading in the wrong direction, and growing numbers of
people believe that the security situation, the provision of electricity,
and corruption have worsened. Third, the strategy assumes that the Iraqi
government and international community will help finance Iraq's
development needs. However, Iraq has limited resources to contribute to
its own reconstruction, and while the international community has offered
some assistance, Iraq's estimated reconstruction needs vastly exceed what
has been offered to date. As a result, it is unclear how the United States
will achieve its desired end-state in Iraq given these significant changes
in the underlying assumptions.
The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the
NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully
address all the desirable characteristics of an effective national
strategy. On one hand, the strategy's purpose and scope is clear because
it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest and
central front in the war on terror. The strategy also discusses the
threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provides a comprehensive
description of U.S. political, security, and economic goals and objectives
in Iraq. However, discussion of outcome-related performance measures to
assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives is limited. The
strategy falls short in three key areas. First, it neither identifies the
current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, such as the costs of
maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity
at the provincial and national level, completing the training and
equipping of Iraqi security forces, and rebuilding critical
infrastructure, nor does it address how these efforts should take the risk
of corruption into account when assessing the costs of achieving U.S.
objectives in Iraq. Second, the strategy does not clearly identify who
will implement key aspects of the strategy or a process for resolving
conflict among the many implementing agencies, a problem identified in
prior State and other agency reviews. Third, while the strategy recognizes
the need to integrate U.S. goals and objectives with the efforts of the
international partners and the Iraqi government, it neither addresses how
their goals and objectives are to be integrated with those of the United
States, nor does it provide details on the Iraqi government's contribution
to its future financing requirements. In addition, the elements of the
strategy are dispersed among a number of supporting documents, further
limiting its usefulness as a planning and oversight tool.
To help improve the strategy's effectiveness as a planning tool and to
improve its usefulness to Congress, this report recommends that the NSC in
conjunction with the DOD and State complete the strategy by addressing all
six characteristics of an effective national strategy in a single
document. In particular, the revised strategy should address the current
costs and future military and civilian resources needed to implement the
strategy, clarify the roles and responsibilities of all U.S. government
agencies involved in reconstruction and stabilization efforts, and detail
potential Iraqi and international contributions to future military and
reconstruction needs. State and DOD did not comment on our
recommendations. In commenting on a draft of this report, State asserted
that GAO misrepresented the NSVI's purpose-to provide the public a broad
overview of the U.S. strategy in Iraq. Our analysis was not limited to the
publicly available, unclassified NSVI. With input from DOD and State, we
included in our assessment all the classified and unclassified documents
that collectively define the U.S. strategy in Iraq. Collectively, these
documents still lack all the key characteristics of an effective national
strategy. However, we refined our recommendation to focus on the need to
improve the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
Background
Prior to the fall of 2005, the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction
effort in Iraq lacked a clear, comprehensive, and integrated U.S.
strategy. State assessments and other U.S. government reports noted that
this hindered the implementation of U.S. stabilization and reconstruction
plans. A review of the U.S. mission completed in October 2005 found, among
other things, that (1) no unified strategic plan existed that effectively
integrated U.S. government political, military, and economic efforts; (2)
multiple plans in Iraq and Washington have resulted in competing
priorities and funding levels not proportional to the needs of overall
mission objectives; (3) focused leadership and clear roles are lacking
among State, DOD, and other agencies in the field and in Washington, D.C.;
and (4) a more realistic assessment of the capacity limitations of Iraqi
central and local government is needed.
The study made a series of recommendations that led to the creation of the
November 2005 NSVI, including (1) creating a single, joint civil-military
operational plan to clarify organizational leads; (2) providing better
strategic direction and more coordinated engagement with Iraqi government
and international donors; (3) establishing three mission teams to address
political, security, and economic tasks; and (4) establishing provincial
reconstruction teams to engage Iraqi leadership and foster flexible
reconstruction, local governance, and "bottom-up" economic development.
The study also called for a streamlined interagency support office in
Washington, D.C., to assist the mission's working groups and provide
needed institutional memory and continuity. In response, the
administration created the NSVI in November 2005 to reorganize U.S.
government stabilization and reconstruction efforts around three broad
tracks-political, security, and economic-and eight strategic objectives
(see table 1).
Table 1: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
Purpose Definition of Integrates U.S. Objectives
victory efforts along
three tracks
To articulate the Victory in Iraq is Political Encompasses the
President's 2003 a vital national (Isolate, Engage, following eight
statement on the interest. Build) strategic
U.S. strategy: Prevailing in Iraq objectives:
will help win the o Isolate hardened
"The United States war on terror as enemies from those 1. Defeat the
has no intention of it will make who can be won terrorists and
determining the America safer, over. neutralize the
precise form of stronger, and more insurgency.
Iraq's new certain of its o Engage those
government.... Yet future. outside the 2. Help Iraq's
we will ensure that political process security forces
one brutal dictator Victory is tied to and invite become
is not replaced by conditions on the peaceful self-reliant.
another. All Iraqis ground and defined participation.
must have a voice in in the following 3. Help Iraqis
the new government stages: o Build stable, forge a
and all citizens pluralistic, and national
must have their Short term: Steady effective national compact for
rights protected. progress fighting institutions that democratic
Rebuilding Iraq will terrorists, can protect the government.
require a sustained meeting political interests of all
commitment from many milestones, Iraqis. 4. Help Iraq
nations, including building build
our own: we will democratic Security (Clear, government
remain in Iraq as institutions, Hold, Build) capacity and
long as necessary, standing up provide
and not a day more." security forces. o Clear areas of essential
enemy control. services.
--President Bush, Medium term: Iraq
February 26, 2003 leads fight to o Hold freed areas 5. Help Iraq
defeat terrorists by ensuring they strengthen its
and provides own remain under Iraqi economy.
security, government and
constitutional Iraqi security 6. Help Iraq
government fully forces (ISF) strengthen rule
in place and is on control. of law and
its way promote civil
economically. o Build ISF and rights.
local institutions
Long term: to deliver 7. Increase
Peaceful, united, services, advance international
stable, secure, rule of law, and support for
well integrated nurture civil Iraq.
into the society.
international 8. Strengthen
community, and a Economic (Restore, public
partner in war on Reform, Build) understanding
terror. of U.S.-led
o Restore coalition
infrastructure. efforts and
public
o Reform economy. isolation of
insurgents.
o Build Iraqi
capacity to
maintain
infrastructure,
rejoin the
international
economic
community, and
improve general
welfare of all
Iraqis.
Source: NSVI, November 2005.
Overall, officials in DOD and State identified seven documents that
describe the U.S. government strategy for Iraq in addition to the NSVI.
The U.S. government uses these documents to plan, conduct, and track
different levels of the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction strategy as
follows:
o National/strategic level: The President and the NSC established the
desired end-state, goals and objectives, and the integrated approach
incorporated in the NSVI. The May 2004 NSPD 36 made State responsible for
all U.S. activities in Iraq through its Chief of Mission in Baghdad
(Ambassador), with the exception of U.S. efforts relating to security and
military operations, which would be the responsibility of DOD. The
directive also continued the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) responsibility
for all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi
security forces. MNF-I oversees the effort to rebuild the Iraqi security
forces through a subordinate command. The National Strategy for Supporting
Iraq (NSSI) serves as a management tool to match and coordinate U.S.
stabilization and reconstruction needs and priorities and provides updates
on activities associated with each strategic objective.
o Operational level: The Joint Mission Statement clarified the roles and
responsibilities between the Chief of Mission in Baghdad and the Commander
of MNF-I and established mission milestones and target dates for their
achievement. The August 2004 campaign plan elaborated and refined the
original plan for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces.5
In April 2006, Commander of the MNF-I and the Chief of Mission in Baghdad
issued a new classified Joint Campaign Plan incorporating the changes in
organization laid out in the NSVI, although some of the annexes to this
campaign plan are being reworked and were not available as of May 2006.
o Implementation and reporting level: Operations Order 05-03 incorporates
revised missions and objectives for the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I),
the MNF-I unit responsible for command and control of operations
throughout Iraq. This November 2005 order was issued in anticipation of
the New Joint Campaign Plan incorporating the NSVI's new objectives and
organizational arrangements, according to DOD officials. The campaign
plans and the operations order also established metrics for assessing
their progress in achieving MNF-I's objectives. State's 2207 reports track
mission activity and funding status by mission objective and funding
sector.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship of the NSVI and the key supporting
strategy documents.
Figure 1: NSVI and Key Supporting Documents
In addition to these documents, senior State officials stated that
Congressional Budget Justifications and publications on Iraq spending
provide additional details on the U.S. government resources, investments,
and risk management. DOD officials stated that its quarterly reports to
measure the results of its fiscal year 2005 Iraq Security and
Stabilization Fund programs in Iraq also provide information, but DOD did
not cite these reports as supporting documentation for the NSVI.
NSVI Retains Original Desired End-State, but Changing Assumptions and
Circumstances Make it Unclear How It Will Achieve These Objectives
The NSVI, issued by the NSC in November 2005, incorporates the same
desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq that first was established
by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003: a peaceful, united,
stable, secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and
a full partner in the global war on terrorism.6 Since then, however, the
strategy's underlying security, reconstruction, and economic assumptions
have changed in response to changing circumstances (see fig. 2). First,
the original plan assumed a permissive security environment that never
materialized. Second, the CPA assumed that U.S. funded reconstruction
activities would help restore Iraq's essential services to prewar levels
but has failed to achieve these goals. Third, the strategy assumes that
the international community and Iraqi government will help finance Iraq's
development needs; however, these expectations have not yet been met. As a
result, it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired
end-state in Iraq given these changes in assumptions and circumstances.
Figure 2: Evolution of the Objectives and Assumptions of U.S.
Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq
Permissive Security Environment Never Materialized
According to senior CPA and State officials, in 2003 the CPA assumed that
Iraq would have a permissive security environment. CPA expected that a
relatively small internal security force would replace the disbanded Iraqi
Army and would quickly assume responsibility for providing security from
the coalition forces. However, growing insurgent attacks led to (1) the
collapse of Iraqi forces in April 2004; (2) the delay of coalition plans
to turn responsibility for security over to the new Iraqi security forces
beginning in early 2004; and (3) the postponement of plans to draw down
U.S. troop levels below 138,000 until the end of 2005. In October 2004,
State reported to Congress that the uncertain security situation affected
all potential economic and political developments in Iraq and that
enhanced Iraqi security forces were critically needed to meet the new
threat environment. The coalition's military commander and the U.S. Chief
of Mission conducted strategic and programmatic reviews in mid-2004 and
reached similar conclusions, noting that the hostile security situation
required the creation of substantially larger Iraqi security forces with
coalition assistance.
As a result, between 2003 and 2006, the projected Iraq security force
structure doubled in size, while U.S. appropriations for support of the
Iraqi security forces more than quadrupled. CPA projected the need for a
security force of about 162,000 personnel (including about 77,000 armed
forces and National Guard troops and 85,000 police) in 2003. Current plans
call for 325,500 security personnel to be organized under coalition
direction: including completing the initial training and equipping of the
137,500 in the Iraqi Armed Forces and 188,000 police and other interior
ministry forces by the end of December 2006. U.S. assistance appropriated
for Iraqi security forces and law enforcement has grown from $3.24 billion
in January 2004 to approximately $13.7 billion in June 2006.7 As GAO
recently reported, the insurgency remains strong and resilient in 2005 and
early 2006, the intensity and lethality of attacks have been growing, and
the insurgency threatens to undermine the development of effective Iraqi
governmental institutions.8
Essential Services Have Not Been Restored to Prewar Levels, Undermining
Efforts to Improve the Lives of Iraqi People
The U.S. strategy initially assumed that its U.S.-funded reconstruction
activities would help restore Iraq's essential services-including oil
production, electricity generation, and water treatment-to prewar levels.
However, the U.S. efforts have yet to restore Iraq's essential services to
prewar levels, and efforts to achieve these goals have been hindered by
security, management, and maintenance challenges. As a result, the United
States has yet to prove that it has made a difference in the Iraqi
people's quality of life.
According to senior CPA and State officials responsible for the strategy,
the CPA's 2003 reconstruction plan assumed (1) that creating or restoring
basic essential services for the Iraqi people took priority over jobs
creation and the economy and (2) that the United States should focus its
resources on long-term infrastructure reconstruction projects because of
the expertise the United States could provide. According to the senior CPA
official tasked with developing the reconstruction plan, CPA drew up a
prioritized list of more than 2,300 construction projects in 10 sectors to
be completed in about 3 years, which were to be funded by the $18.4
billion made available in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriation
for the 2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF2).9 The U.S.
reconstruction effort focused primarily on building or restoring essential
services to prewar levels-or to a standard acceptable to and accessible by
all Iraqi citizens-over the long-term with less emphasis on more immediate
development tasks. CPA initially allocated about two-thirds of the IRRF2
funds to restore essential services in the oil, water, and electricity
sectors, while more immediate projects in democracy building, private
sector development, and the employment sector received about 3 percent.
However, the coalition's decision in November 2003 to accelerate the
return of power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government and changes in the
security situation altered these assumptions, leading the U.S.
administration to reallocate a total of $3.5 billion between January 2004
and April 2006 from the water resources and sanitation and electric
sectors to security, law enforcement, justice, and democracy building and
employment programs. For example, the mission reallocated over $555
million in IRRF2 funds to democracy programs and reallocated $105 million
to improve productivity and employment in the agriculture sector to
support the Iraqi government as it prepared for elections. A World Bank
report stated that the agriculture sector employed 18 percent of Iraq's
labor force and accounted for about 10 percent of gross domestic product
in 2004. Before this time, the United States had devoted no IRRF2
resources to the agricultural sector.
U.S. expectations about Iraq's capacity to manage and sustain its own
reconstruction efforts have not been realized and have resulted in greater
U.S. emphasis on capacity development. As reported in prior GAO reports,
the U.S. reconstruction effort has encountered difficulties in maintaining
new and rehabilitated infrastructure, resulting in some U.S.-funded
projects becoming damaged or inoperable after being turned over to the
Iraqis.10 For example, as of June 2005, U.S.-funded water and sanitation
projects representing about $52 million of approximately $200 million
spent on completed projects were inoperable or were operating at lower
than normal capacity. Recent U.S. mission assessments have noted the Iraqi
government's limited capacity to provide services to the Iraqi people due
to weak technical expertise, limitations in managers' skills and training,
and an inability to identify and articulate strategic priorities, and
other factors. As a result, the administration reallocated $170 million
for government capacity building programs and $133 million for
infrastructure operations and maintenance needs in 2005 and early 2006.
As GAO has reported previously, these challenges contributed to the
cancellation or delay of projects in the essential services sectors,
affecting U.S. efforts to achieve its targets in the oil, electricity, and
water sectors, and undermining its efforts to improve the quality of life
for the Iraqi people. A March 2006 poll of Iraqi citizens indicated that
over half the respondents thought Iraq was heading in the wrong direction.
Moreover, the poll reports that over the last year, growing numbers
believe that the security situation, the provision of electricity, the
prevalence of corruption, and the state of the economy worsened.11
Expected Level of Iraq and International Community Financial Support for
Iraq's Developmental Needs Have Not Yet Been Met
From the outset of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the U.S.
strategy assumed that the Iraqis and the international community would
help finance Iraq's developmental needs. However, these expectations have
not yet been met, and Iraq's estimated future reconstruction needs vastly
exceed what has been offered to date. According to a CPA report and senior
CPA and State officials, the 2003 CPA plan assumed that the Iraqis and the
international community would support development needs that were not
financed by the United States. For example, a CPA report assumed that
Iraqi oil revenues could help pay for reconstruction costs because it
estimated that Iraq's oil production would increase to about 2.8 to 3.0
million barrels per day (mbpd) by the end of 2004, a one-third increase
over 2002 levels, and generate about $15 billion in oil export revenue for
the year.
These expectations about Iraq's ability to contribute to and manage its
own reconstruction have not been realized in practice. U.S. agency
documents estimated Iraq's 2003 actual prewar crude oil production at 2.6
mbpd. In March 2006, State reported that oil production was about 2 mbpd.
A combination of insurgent attacks on crude oil and product pipelines,
dilapidated infrastructure, and poor operations and maintenance have
hindered domestic refining and have required Iraq to import significant
portions of liquefied petroleum gas, gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. In
addition, although the capacity for export is theoretically as high as 2.5
mbpd, export levels averaged about 1.4 mbpd in 2005. Shortfalls in
expected oil production levels and increased security spending contributed
to reductions in Iraq's own projections of how much of the budget would be
available to contribute to its own reconstruction.12 In 2005, Iraq's
government budgeted approximately $5 billion for capital expenditures, but
a senior U.S. mission official stated that they managed to spend only a
few hundred million by the end of the year. He attributed this to Iraq
ministries' lack of expertise to manage projects, write contracts, and
provide effective controls on the contracting process.
The strategy's assumptions about the need for extensive international
donor support for rebuilding Iraq's reconstruction have not significantly
changed since 2003, although the estimated cost of restoring Iraq's
infrastructure has grown significantly since October 2003. At that time, a
World Bank, United Nations, and CPA assessment initially estimated that it
would cost about $56 billion to meet reconstruction needs across a variety
of sectors in Iraq. The United States committed about $24 billion for
relief and reconstruction in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, with the
expectation the Iraqis and the international community would provide the
rest. Other foreign donors pledged about $13.6 billion to rebuild Iraq.
According to State documents, international donors have provided over $3.5
billion in the form of multilateral and bilateral grants as of April
2006.13 About $10 billion, or 70 percent, of the pledged amount is in the
form of loans, primarily from the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and Japan. As GAO has reported previously, however, Iraq
currently owes a combined $84 billion to victims of its invasion of Kuwait
and other external creditors, which may limit its capacity to assume more
debt. Moreover, Iraq's needs are greater than originally anticipated due
to severely degraded infrastructure, postconflict looting and sabotage,
and additional security costs. In the oil sector alone, Iraq will now
likely need an estimated $30 billion over the next several years to reach
and sustain an oil production capacity of 5 million barrels per day,
according to industry experts and U.S. officials. For the electricity
sector, Iraq projects that it will need $20 billion through 2010 to boost
electrical capacity, according to the Department of Energy's Energy
Information Administration. While the NSVI does not identify the magnitude
of additional financing needed, it acknowledges that there is "room for
the international community to do more."
The NSVI and Its Supporting Documents Do Not Address All the
Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy, thus Limiting Its
Usefulness as a Planning Tool
The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the
NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully
address the six desirable characteristics of effective national strategies
that GAO has identified through its prior work.14 We used these six
characteristics to evaluate the NSVI and the supporting documents that DOD
and State officials said encompassed the U.S. strategy for rebuilding and
stabilizing Iraq. As figure 3 shows, the strategy generally addresses
three of the six characteristics but only partially addresses three
others, limiting its usefulness to guide agency implementation efforts and
achieve desired results.15 Moreover, since the strategy is dispersed among
several documents instead of one, its effectiveness as a planning tool for
implementing agencies and for informing Congress about the pace, costs,
and intended results of these efforts is limited.
[This page left blank intentionally.]
Figure 3: Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO's Desirable
Characteristics of an Effective Strategy
Strategy Discusses Purpose and Scope, Identifies Risks and Threats, and
Discusses Desired Goals and Objectives
The strategy generally addresses three of the six characteristics. As
figure 3 shows, the strategy provides: (1) a clear statement of its
purpose and scope; (2) a detailed discussion of the problems the strategy
intends to address; and (3) an explanation of its goals, subordinate
objectives, and activities.
U.S. Strategy Identifies Purpose and Scope
This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of
its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. A complete
description of purpose, scope, and methodology make the document more
useful to organizations responsible for implementing the strategies, as
well as to oversight organizations such as Congress. The strategy
identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest,
identifies the risks and threats facing coalition forces, and discusses
overarching U.S. political, security, and economic objectives.
Specifically, the NSVI identifies U.S. government efforts to rebuild and
stabilize Iraq in terms of three overarching political, security, and
economic objectives and addresses the assumptions that guided its
development. For example, to help Iraq achieve the strategic goal of
forging a national compact for democratic government, the strategy's
subordinate objectives state that the United States would help promote
transparency in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government, and help build national institutions that transcend regional
and sectarian interests, among other activities. To help achieve another
strategic goal, building government capacity and providing essential
services, the strategy also states that the U.S. government is helping to
achieve this objective by rehabilitating critical infrastructure in the
fuel and electric power sectors. It is also rehabilitating schools,
providing new textbooks, computers, and materials; and training teachers
and school administrative staff. One supporting document, State's 2207
report to Congress, provides additional supporting details and data for
the specific activities and projects funded through the $18.4 billion in
fiscal year 2004 reconstruction funds.
Strategy Identifies Risks and Threats
This characteristic addresses the particular risks and threats the
strategy is directed at, as well as risk assessment of the threats to and
vulnerabilities of critical assets and operations. Specific information on
both risks and threats helps responsible parties better implement the
strategy by ensuring that priorities are clear and focused on the greatest
needs. The NSVI and the supporting documents generally address some of the
problems, risks, and threats found in Iraq. For example, the NSVI
identifies the risks posed by the insurgency and identifies three basic
types of insurgents-rejectionists, supporters of former Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein, and terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al Qaeda-and
the different actions needed to confront each one. In addition, various
supporting documents provide additional information on the threats the
Shi'ite militias present, and the corruption that could affect the Iraqi
government's ability to become self-reliant, deliver essential services,
reform its economy, strengthen rule of law, maintain nonsectarian
political institutions, and increase international support.
Strategy Discusses Goals, Objectives, and Activities but Has Limited
Discussion of Outcome-Related Performance Measures
This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to
achieve and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the
priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance measures to gauge
results. Identifying goals, objectives, and outcome-related performance
measures aids implementing parties in achieving results and enables more
effective oversight and accountability. In addition, identifying and
measuring outcome-related performance rather than output measures allow
for more accurate measurement of program results and assessment of program
effectiveness.
The strategy generally addresses goals and subordinate objectives by
identifying 8 strategic objectives (pillars), 46 subordinate objectives,
or "lines of action," and numerous project activities but only partially
addresses outcome-related performance measures. The supporting strategy
documents also provide information on how progress will be monitored and
reported. In addition, the NSVI identifies the process for monitoring and
reporting on progress via interagency working groups. It also identifies
some metrics to assess progress, such as the number of Iraqis willing to
participate in the political process, the quality and quantity of the
Iraqi units trained, and barrels of oil produced and exported. The NSVI
also notes that detailed metrics on the results of training Iraqi security
forces and improvements in the economy and infrastructure are collected
and available elsewhere but did not include them in the strategy.
Supporting documents also identify some performance measures.
The metrics the strategy uses to report progress make it difficult to
determine the impact of the U.S. reconstruction effort. We reported
previously that in the water resources and sanitation sector little was
known about how U.S. efforts were improving the amount and quality of
water reaching Iraqi households or their access to the sanitation services
because the U.S. government only tracked the number of projects
completed or under way.16 For instance, as of March 2006, Iraq has the
capacity to produce 1.1 million cubic meters of water per day, but this
level overestimates the amount of potable water reaching Iraqi households.
U.S. officials estimate that 60 percent of water treatment output is lost
due to leakage, contamination, and illegal connections. The U.S. mission
reported in December 2005 that it had developed a set of metrics to better
estimate the potential impact of U.S. water and sanitation reconstruction
efforts on Iraqi households, but acknowledges it is impossible to measure
how much water Iraqis are actually receiving or whether the water is
potable. The report notes that without the comprehensive data these key
measures would provide, mission efforts to accurately assess the impact of
U.S. reconstruction efforts on water and sanitation services are seriously
limited.
In April 2006, we reported that in the electric sector U.S. agencies
primarily reported on generation measures such as levels of added or
restored generation capacity and daily power generation of electricity;
numbers of projects completed; and average daily hours of power. However,
these data did not show (1) whether the power generated was uninterrupted
for the period specified (e.g., average number hours per day), (2) if
there were regional or geographic differences in the quantity of power
generated, or (3) how much power was reaching intended users.17 Moreover,
State's 2005 assessment of its reconstruction effort noted that the
reconstruction effort lacked measurable milestones that tied short-term
program objectives to long-term strategic goals.
Strategy Partially Address Costs, Agency Responsibilities, and Integration
As figure 3 shows, the NSVI and supporting documents only partially (1)
identify what the strategy will cost and the sources of financing; (2)
delineate the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. government agencies,
and the mechanisms for coordination; (3) describe how the strategy will be
integrated among U.S. entities, the Iraqi government, and international
organizations.
Strategy Partially Addresses Future Costs and Resource Requirements
This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost; where resources
will be targeted to achieve the end-state; and how the strategy balances
benefits, risks, and costs. Guidance on costs and resources needed using a
risk management approach helps implementing parties allocate resources
according to priorities; track costs and performance; and shift resources,
as appropriate. Such guidance also would assist Congress and the
administration in developing a more effective strategy to achieve the
desired end-state.
The strategy neither identifies the current and future costs of
implementing the strategy, nor does it identify the sources of funding
(U.S. government, international donors, or Iraqi government) needed to
achieve U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. These
costs would include the costs of maintaining U.S. military operations,
including the costs to repair and replace equipment used during these
operations, building the capacity of key national ministries and the 18
provincial governments, completing the U.S. program for training and
equipping Iraqi security forces, and restoring essential services. For
example, between fiscal years 2003 and 2006, about $311 billion was
allocated to support U.S. objectives in Iraq. Approximately $276 billion
has been provided to support U.S. military operations and forces as of
June 2006, which currently number about 130,000 troops, and over $34
billion to develop capable Iraqi security forces, restore essential
services, and rebuild Iraqi institutions. The administration has also
requested about $51 billion more for military and reconstruction
operations for fiscal year 2007: including $50 billion that the Office of
Management and Budget terms "bridge funding" to continue the global war on
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan and an additional $771 million for
reconstruction operations in Iraq.
These cost data are not included in the strategy. As a result, neither DOD
nor Congress can reliably determine the cost of the war, nor do they have
details on how the appropriated funds are being spent or historical data
useful in considering future funding needs.18 Moreover, the strategy
states that the war in Iraq yields benefits in the global war on terrorism
but does not discuss substantial financial and other costs. In addition,
GAO has previously found numerous problems in DOD's processes for
accounting for and reporting cost data for its operations in Iraq, which
constitute about 90 percent of estimated total U.S. government costs.
Given the current fiscal challenges facing the U.S. government, such an
assessment would help clarify the future costs of U.S. involvement in
Iraq.
The strategy also fails to project future costs and contributions from
non-U.S. sources. It does not address the extent to which the Iraqi
government will contribute financially to its own rebuilding effort. While
supporting documents provide some information on current spending plans
and allocations, the dispersion of this budget information across numerous
budget documents makes it difficult to analyze how the objectives of the
NSVI will be funded. For example, State's quarterly 2207 reports to
Congress describe the current status of the Iraq reconstruction funding
allocations and the status of international donations for reconstruction.
In February 2006, State issued two supplemental documents that provide
some additional information on how IRRF2 funds and fiscal year 2006 and
2007 budget appropriations were to be spent across the NSVI's three tracks
(political, security, and economic). Other supporting documents partially
address these resource issues but do not identify future resource needs.
The unclassified version of the MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission
Statement on Iraq indicates that budgetary and human capital resources
will be needed, and funding is expected from Congress and the Iraqi
government. However, it does not identify the specific amounts needed to
meet key U.S. goals. The 2207 reports discuss international donor
contribution levels and reports on the progress of projects funded with
international grants but does not relate these amounts to Iraqi
requirements.
In addition, none of the strategy documents takes into account the total
cost of Iraq's reconstruction, which will be more than originally
anticipated, due to severely degraded infrastructure, postconflict looting
and sabotage, and additional security costs. Initial assessments in 2003
identified a total of $56 billion in Iraqi reconstruction needs in various
sectors, but more recent cost estimates suggest that the oil
infrastructure and electric sectors alone will require about $50 billion
in the next several years. These funding concerns have grown as resources
have been shifted from reconstruction projects to security needs. For
example, between January 2004 and April 2006, the administration
reallocated $3.5 billion from the water resources and sanitation and
electric sectors to security; justice, public safety, and civil society;
and democracy building activities; and other programs. This contributed to
the cancellation, delay, or scaling back of water and electricity projects
and will complicate efforts to achieve the objectives for these essential
service sectors.
Although the NSVI acknowledges that rampant corruption is a challenge
threatening the success of U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts,
the strategy does not address how reconstruction efforts should take the
risk of corruption into account when assessing the costs of achieving U.S.
objectives in Iraq. For instance, IMF, the World Bank, Japan, and European
Union officials cite corruption in the oil sector as an especially serious
problem. In addition, according to State officials and reporting
documents, about 10 percent of refined fuels are diverted to the black
market, and about 30 percent of imported fuels are smuggled out of Iraq
and sold for a profit. By not addressing this risk, the strategy cannot
provide adequate guidance to implementing parties trying to assess
priorities and allocate resources.
Strategy Partially Addresses U.S. Roles, Responsibilities, and
Coordination Mechanisms
This characteristic addresses which U.S. organization will implement the
strategy and their roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for
coordinating their efforts. Addressing this characteristic fosters
coordination and enhances both implementation and accountability.
The NSVI and the supporting documents partially address the roles and
responsibilities of specific U.S. government agencies and offices and the
process for coordination. To organize U.S. efforts in Iraq, the NSVI
breaks down the political, security, and economic tracks of the strategy
into eight strategic objectives (pillars) that have lines of action
assigned to military and civilian units in Iraq. Each strategic objective
has a corresponding interagency working group to coordinate policy, review
and assess the progress, develop new proposals for action, and oversee
implementation of existing policies. National Security Presidential
Directive 36 made the Department of State responsible for nonsecurity
aspects of reconstruction and lays out key roles for the U.S. Chief of
Mission in Baghdad and CENTCOM. It directed that the Commander of CENTCOM
will, with the Chief of Mission's policy guidance, direct all U.S.
government efforts in support of training and equipping Iraq security
forces. It also established the roles for the mission's two supporting
offices: the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and the Projects and
Contracting Office.
Although the NSVI organizes the U.S. strategy along three broad tracks and
eight strategic objectives, it does not clearly identify the roles and
responsibilities of specific federal agencies for achieving these specific
objectives, or how disputes among them will be resolved. For example, GAO
found only one reference in the NSVI to the reconstruction
responsibilities of a particular U.S. government agency in Iraq when it
noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other U.S. agencies
would assist an Iraqi antimajor crimes task force in the investigation of
terrorist attacks and assassinations. Thus, it is not clear which agency
is responsible for implementing the overlapping activities listed under
the eight strategic objectives. For instance, one activity is to promote
transparency in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the
Iraqi government; however, the strategy does not indicate which agency is
responsible for implementing this activity, or who to hold accountable for
results. Moreover, little guidance is provided to assist implementing
agencies in resolving conflicts among themselves, as well as with other
entities. In our prior work, we found that delays in reconstruction
efforts sometimes resulted from lack of agreement among U.S. agencies,
contractors, and Iraqi authorities about the scope and schedule for the
work to be performed. For example, in the water resources and sanitation
sector, Iraqi and U.S. officials' disagreements over decisions to repair
or replace treatment facilities or to use brick instead of concrete have
delayed project execution.19
Strategy Partially Addresses Integration with Iraqi Government and
International Donors
This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to the
goals, objectives, and activities of other strategies, to other government
and international entities, and relevant documents from implementing
organizations. A clear relationship between the strategy and other
critical implementing documents helps agencies and other entities
understand their roles and responsibilities, foster effective
implementation, and promote accountability.
The NSVI and supporting documents partially address how the strategy
relates to other international donors and Iraqi government goals,
objectives, and activities.20 For instance, the NSVI and supporting
documents identify the need to integrate the efforts of the coalition, the
Iraqi government, and other nations but do not discuss how the U.S. goals
and objectives are integrated with the strategies, goals, and objectives
of the international donors and the Iraqi government. The NSVI does
identify Web sites where other documents can be obtained but does not
address how these documents are integrated with the NSVI.
GAO has previously reported that victory in Iraq cannot be achieved
without an integrated U.S., international, and Iraqi effort to meet the
political, security, and economic needs of the Iraqi people. However, the
strategy has only partially addressed how it relates to the objectives and
activities of Iraq and the international community and does not address
what it expects the international community or the Iraqi government to pay
to achieve future objectives. This affects the strategy's ability to
address the challenge of conducting an integrated operation dependent upon
Iraq's limited capacity to contribute to its own reconstruction. For
example, GAO has reported that Iraq's weak national and provincial
governments limit Iraq's ability to operate and sustain new and
rehabilitated infrastructure projects. This has contributed to the failure
to achieve key reconstruction goals.
Dispersion of the U.S. Strategy across Many Documents Limits Its
Usefulness as a Planning Tool
The dispersion of information across several documents limits the
strategy's overall coherence and effectiveness as a management tool for
implementing agencies and as an oversight tool for informing Congress
about the pace, costs, and results of these efforts. Since these other
documents were written by different agencies at different points in time,
the information in them is not directly comparable, which diminishes their
value. State and DOD have separately released budget requests totaling
about $121 billion to continue U.S. stabilization and reconstruction
programs through fiscal year 2007. However, these documents do not provide
an estimate or range of estimates as to what it will cost to achieve U.S.
objectives in Iraq in the short-, medium-, and long-term. In addition,
these documents further disperse information about how the government is
addressing the key elements of an effective national strategy for Iraq.
Conclusion
The November 2005 NSVI represents the results of efforts to improve the
strategic planning process for the challenging and costly U.S. mission in
Iraq. Although the NSVI is an improvement over earlier efforts, it and the
supporting documents are incomplete. The desired end-state of the U.S.
strategy has remained unchanged since 2003, but the underlying assumptions
have changed in response to changing security and economic conditions,
calling into question the likelihood of achieving the desired end-state.
Moreover, the collective strategy neither identifies U.S. or other
resources needed to implement the objectives nor does it address its
integration with the efforts and funding plans of the Iraqi government or
the international community. The formation of the new Iraqi government
provides an opportunity to the United States government to reexamine its
strategy and more closely align its efforts and objectives with those of
the Iraqi people and other donors.
The dispersion of information across the NSVI and seven supporting
documents further limits the strategy's usefulness as a tool for planning
and reporting on the costs, progress, and results of the U.S. mission in
Iraq. Since the current disparate reporting mechanisms do not provide a
comprehensive assessment of U.S. government efforts in Iraq, Congress may
lack critical information to judge U.S. progress in achieving objectives
and addressing key political, security, and economic challenges. In
addition, the strategy could be more useful to implementing agencies and
Congress if it fully addressed these characteristics in a single document.
Recommendation for Executive Action
To help improve the strategy's effectiveness as a planning tool and to
improve its usefulness to Congress, this report recommends that the
National Security Council, in conjunction with DOD and State, complete the
strategy by addressing all six characteristics of an effective national
strategy in a single document. In particular, the revised strategy should
address the current costs and future military and civilian resources
needed to implement the strategy, clarify the roles and responsibilities
of all U.S. government agencies involved in reconstruction and
stabilization efforts, and detail potential Iraqi and international
contributions to future military and reconstruction needs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the NSC and to the Departments of
Defense and State for their review and comment. We received a written
response from State that is reprinted in appendix III. State also provided
us with technical comments and suggested wording changes that we
incorporated as appropriate. DOD deferred comment to the NSC; its letter
is reprinted in appendix IV. We did not receive oral or written comments
from the NSC in response to our request.
State did not comment on our report recommendations. In commenting on a
draft of this report, State asserted that our draft report misrepresented
the NSVI's purpose-to provide the public a broad overview of the U.S.
strategy in Iraq and not to provide details available elsewhere. We
acknowledge that the purpose of the NSVI was to provide the public with an
overview of a multitiered, classified strategy and not to set forth every
detail on information readily available elsewhere. Our analysis was not
limited to the publicly available, unclassified NSVI. With input from DOD
and State, we included in our assessment all the classified and
unclassified documents that collectively define the U.S. strategy in Iraq:
(1) the National Security Presidential Directive 36 (May 2004), (2)
Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan (August 2004), (3) the
MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on Iraq (December
2005), (4) the Multinational Corps-Iraq Operation Order 05-03 (December
2005), (5) the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated January
2006), and (6) the quarterly State Section 2207 reports to Congress
(through April 2006), and (7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by
the Chief of Mission and the Commander of the MNF-I. Collectively, these
documents still lack all the key characteristics of an effective national
strategy. However, we refined our recommendation to focus on the need to
improve the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to other on request. In
addition, this report is available on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov
. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202)
512-8979 or [email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Joseph A. Christoff Director, International Affairs and Trade
List of Committees
The Honorable Mitch McConnell Chairman The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Committee on Appropriations United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate
The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar Chairman The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Foreign Relations United States
Senate
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on
Appropriations House of Representatives
The Honorable Jim Kolbe Chairman The Honorable Nita M. Lowey Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives
The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde Chairman The Honorable Tom Lantos Ranking
Minority Member Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives
Scope and MethodologyAppendix I
As part of GAO's review of reconstruction and stabilization efforts in
Iraq initiated under the Comptroller General's authority, we examined the
U.S. strategy for achieving victory in Iraq. Specifically, we (1) assess
the evolution of the U.S. national strategy for Iraq in response to
changing political, security and economic circumstances and (2) evaluate
whether the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) and
its supporting documents include the desirable characteristics of an
effective national strategy. In this report, the NSVI and its supporting
documents are referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
To describe the goals and objectives of the U.S. national strategy for
Iraq and its relationship to other existing strategy documents, we
interviewed Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), U.S. government, and
Iraqi officials, and reviewed planning and reporting documents obtained
from the former CPA; Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD), and
U.S. Agency for International Development; the U.S. mission in Baghdad;
and the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). We analyzed records, reports
and data from the Iraqi government, and from U.S. government and military
officials in Washington, D.C., and Baghdad, Iraq. We also examined the
reports of other oversight entities that performed internal control and
management reviews, including audits of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq and internal U.S. Mission Baghdad reports and briefings. We also
collected and reviewed documents from the United Nations, the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, and the Iraqi government`s National
Development Strategy for 2005-2007.
We evaluated the NSVI along with seven related classified and unclassified
supporting documents identified as having key details about the strategy
by State's Office of the Coordinator for Iraq, the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, and by DOD's Defense Reconstruction Support Office and Near
Eastern South Asian Affairs office. These included (1) the National
Security Presidential Directive 36 (May 2004), (2) the MNF-I Campaign Plan
(August 2004), (3) the MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement
on Iraq (December 2005), (4) the Multinational Corps-Iraq Operation Order
05-03 (December 2005), (5) the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq
(updated January 2006), (6) the quarterly State's 2207 reports to Congress
(January and April 2006); and (7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan
issued by the Chief of Mission and the Commander of the MNF-I. In
particular, we discussed the relationship between the NSVI, the National
Strategy for Supporting Iraq (NSSI), and the MNF-I Campaign Plan with the
Secretary of State's Special Coordinator for Iraq and his staff, National
Security Council staff, and DOD's Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Defense Reconstruction Support Office. In addition to these documents,
we also reviewed other U.S. government documents not identified as key
supporting documents by State and DOD officials but which also provide
useful information, including the fiscal year 2006 supplemental funding
request, the fiscal year 2007 budget request, and two reports issued by
State in February 2006: Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; and Advancing the President's
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: Funding Iraq's Transition to
Self-Reliance in 2006 and 2007 and Support for the Counterinsurgency
Campaign. We also reviewed DOD's periodic reports on the status of its
security and stability programs financed by the fiscal year 2005
supplemental Iraq Security and Stabilization Fund (ISSF) and DOD's report
to Congress under Section 1227 of National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109-163). Finally, we reviewed the NSVI for
consistency with the administration's National Security Strategy of the
United States of America released in March 2006.
To assess whether the NSVI contains all the desirable characteristics of
an effective national strategy, we first developed a checklist using the
six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy developed
in prior GAO work as criteria. Three analysts independently assessed two
selected strategy documents using the checklist to verify its relevance
and then convened as a panel to test their ability to apply the checklist
to the information contained in the document. The team concluded that the
checklist was relevant and appropriate for assessing the NSVI. The three
analysts independently assessed the NSVI and recorded the results on
separate checklists and then met as a panel to reconcile the differences
in their scores. A separate panel of three other analysts also
independently assessed the NSVI using the same methodology, and then the
two panels met as a group to discuss similarities and resolve differences
in their scoring. In addition, the first panel of three analysts evaluated
seven additional documents applying the same criteria in the checklist. On
the basis of these evaluations, we developed a consolidated summary of the
extent that the NSVI and the supporting documents addressed the 27
elements and six characteristics of an effective national strategy. These
results are presented in figure 3 of this report.
We gave each of the 27 elements under the six characteristics an
individual rating of either: "addresses," "partially addresses," or "does
not address." According to our methodology, a strategy "addresses" an
element of a characteristic when it explicitly cites all parts of the
element, and the document has sufficient specificity and detail. Within
our designation of "partially addresses," there is a wide variation
between a strategy that addresses most parts of an element of a
characteristic and a strategy that addresses few parts of an element of a
characteristic. A strategy "does not address" an element of a
characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any parts of
the element of that characteristic or any implicit references are either
too vague or general to be useful. See appendix II for a more detailed
description of the six characteristics. We further evaluated the six
related classified and unclassified documents that State and DOD officials
said provided key details about the strategy. Three analysts evaluated
each of these documents using the same methodology described above.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
GAO's Description of the Six Characteristics of an Effective National
Strategy Appendix II
In a prior report, GAO identified six desirable characteristics of an
effective national strategy that would enable its implementers to
effectively shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations,
and standards and that would enable federal departments and other
stakeholders to achieve the identified results.1 GAO further determined in
that report that national strategies with the six characteristics can
provide policy makers and implementing agencies with a planning tool that
can help ensure accountability and more effective results. To develop
these six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, GAO
reviewed several sources of information. First, GAO gathered statutory
requirements pertaining to national strategies, as well as legislative and
executive branch guidance. GAO also consulted the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993, general literature on strategic planning and
performance, and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the
President's Management Agenda. In addition, among other things, GAO
studied past reports and testimonies for findings and recommendations
pertaining to the desirable elements of a national strategy. Furthermore,
we consulted widely within GAO to obtain updated information on strategic
planning, integration across and between the government and its partners,
implementation, and other related subjects.
GAO developed these six desirable characteristics based on their
underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and the frequency
with which they were cited in other sources. GAO then grouped similar
items together in a logical sequence, from conception to implementation.
Table 2 provides these desirable characteristics and examples of their
elements.
Table 2: Desirable Characteristics for an Effective National Strategy
Desirable Description Examples of elements
characteristic
Purpose, scope, and Addresses why the o Principles guiding
methodology strategy was produced, development
the scope of its
coverage, and the o Impetus: e.g.,
process by which it was legislation
developed.
o Definition of key terms
o Process and methodology
to produce strategy (via
interagency task force,
private input, etc.)
Detailed discussion of Addresses the o Discussion or definition
problems, risks, and particular national of problems, causes, and
threats problems and threats at operating environment
which the strategy is
directed. o Risk assessment,
including analysis of
threat and vulnerabilities
o Quality of data:
constraints, deficiencies,
unknowns
Desired goals, Addresses what the o Overall results desired:
objectives, activities, strategy is trying to end-state
and outcome-related achieve, steps to
performance measures achieve those results, o Hierarchy of goals and
as well as the subordinate objectives
priorities, milestones,
and performance o Priorities, milestones,
measures to gauge and performance measures
results. to gauge results
o Specific performance
measures and activities to
achieve results
o Limitations on progress
indicators
Description of future Addresses what the o Resources and
costs and resources strategy will cost, the investments associated
needed sources and types of with strategy
resources and
investments needed, and o Types of resources
where resources and required
investments should be
targeted by balancing o Sources of resources
risk reductions and
costs. o Economic principles,
e.g., balancing benefits
and costs
o Resource allocation
mechanisms, such as
grants, in-kind services,
loans.
o Mandates/incentives to
spur action
o Importance of fiscal
discipline
o Linkage to other
resource documents, e.g.,
federal budget
o Risk management
principles
Delineation of U.S. Addresses who will be o Lead, support, and
government roles, implementing the partner roles and
responsibilities and strategy, what their responsibilities
coordination mechanism roles will be compared
to others, and o Accountability and
mechanisms for them to oversight framework
coordinate their
efforts. o Potential changes to
structure
o Specific coordination
processes
o Conflict resolution
mechanism
Description of Addresses how a o Integration with other
strategy's integration national strategy national strategies
among and with other relates to other (horizontal)
entities strategies' goals,
objectives, and o Integration with
activities and to relevant documents from
subordinate levels of other implementing
government and their organizations (vertical)
plans to implement the
strategy. o Implementation guidance
o Details on subordinate
strategies and plans for
implementation (e.g.,
human capital, enterprise
architecture)
Source: GAO.
The following sections provide more detail on the six desirable
characteristics.
Purpose, Scope, and Methodology
This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of
its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. For example, a
strategy should discuss the specific impetus that led to its being written
(or updated), such as statutory requirements, executive mandates, or other
events like the global war on terrorism. Furthermore, a strategy would
enhance clarity by including definitions of key, relevant terms. In
addition to describing what it is meant to do and the major functions,
mission areas, or activities it covers, a national strategy would ideally
address its methodology. For example, a strategy should discuss the
principles or theories that guided its development, the organizations or
offices that drafted the document, or working groups that were consulted
in its development.
Problems, Risks, and Threats
This characteristic addresses the particular national problems and threats
at which the strategy is directed. Specifically, this means a detailed
discussion or definition of the problems the strategy intends to address,
their causes, and operating environment. In addition, this characteristic
entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threats to and
vulnerabilities of critical assets and operations. If the details of these
analyses are classified or preliminary, an unclassified version of the
strategy should at least include a broad description of the analyses and
stress the importance of risk assessment to implementing parties. A
discussion of the quality of data available regarding this characteristic,
such as known constraints or deficiencies, would also be useful.
Goals, Objectives, Activities, and Outcome-Related Performance Measures
This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to
achieve and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the
priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At the
highest level, this could be a description of an ideal end-state, followed
by a logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, and
specific activities to achieve results. In addition, it would be helpful
if the strategy discussed the importance of implementing parties' efforts
to establish priorities, milestones, and performance measures, which help
ensure accountability. Ideally, a national strategy would set clear
desired results and priorities, specific milestones, and outcome-related
performance measures while giving implementing parties flexibility to
pursue and achieve those results within a reasonable time frame. If
significant limitations on performance measures exist, other parts of the
strategy should address plans to obtain better data or measurements, such
as national standards or indicators of preparedness.
Future Costs and Resources Needed
This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and
types of resources and investments needed, and where those resources and
investments should be targeted. Ideally, a strategy would also identify
appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources. Furthermore, a national
strategy should elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned earlier and
give guidance to implementing parties to manage their resources and
investments accordingly. It should also address the difficult, but
critical, issues about who pays and how such efforts will be funded and
sustained in the future. Furthermore, a strategy should include a
discussion of the type of resources required, such as budgetary, human
capital, information, information technology (IT), research and
development (R&D), procurement of equipment, or contract services. A
national strategy should also discuss linkages to other resource
documents, such as federal agency budgets or human capital, IT, R&D, and
acquisition strategies. Finally, a national strategy should also discuss
in greater detail how risk management will aid implementing parties in
prioritizing and allocating resources, including how this approach will
create society-wide benefits and balance these with the cost to society.
Related to this, a national strategy should discuss the economic principle
of risk-adjusted return on resources.
U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities and Coordination Mechanism
This characteristic addresses what organizations will implement the
strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for
coordinating their efforts. It helps to answer the question about who is
in charge during times of crisis and during all phases of the victory in
Iraq efforts: prevention, vulnerability reduction, and response and
recovery. This characteristic entails identifying the specific federal
departments, agencies, or offices involved, as well as the roles and
responsibilities of private and international sectors. A strategy would
ideally clarify implementing organizations' relationships in terms of
leading, supporting, and partnering. In addition, a strategy should
describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework for
accountability and oversight, such as the National Security Council,
Office of Management and Budget, Congress, or other organizations.
Furthermore, a strategy should also identify specific processes for
coordination and collaboration between sectors and organizations-and
address how any conflicts would be resolved.
Strategy's Integration Among and with Other Entities
This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to
other strategies' goals, objectives, and activities (horizontal
integration)-and to subordinate levels of government and other
organizations and their plans to implement the strategy (vertical
integration). For example, a national strategy should discuss how its
scope complements, expands upon, or overlaps with other national
strategies of the Iraqi government and other international donors.
Similarly, related strategies should highlight their common or shared
goals, subordinate objectives, and activities. In addition, a national
strategy should address its relationship with relevant documents from
implementing organizations, such as the strategic plans, annual
performance plans, or the annual performance reports the Government
Performance and Results Act requires of federal agencies. A strategy
should also discuss, as appropriate, various strategies and plans produced
by the state, local, private, or international sectors. A strategy also
should provide guidance such as the development of national standards to
link together more effectively the roles, responsibilities, and
capabilities of the implementing parties.
Comments from the Department of StateAppendix III
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter dated
June 30, 2006.
GAO Comments
1.We notified the Department of State (State) of the scope of our review.
After the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) was released in
November 2005, we focused our review on whether the new strategy and
related planning documents identified by State and the Department of
Defense (DOD) addressed the desirable characteristics of an effective
national strategy. On February 10, 2006, we met with senior State
officials from the Bureau of Near East and Asia and the office of the
Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq Affairs
to describe our plans and methodology for assessing the NSVI. State
officials acknowledged our methodology and identified the key documents
(both unclassified and classified) that, when combined with the NSVI,
served as the collective U.S. strategy for Iraq.
2.We modified figure 1 to place the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq
(NSSI) at the strategic level. However, we disagree that the NSSI links
goals to resources. In fact, State's comments note that the NSSI does not
specify the future military and civilian resources necessary for achieving
U.S. strategic objectives, and it is in the process of incorporating the
fiscal year 2006 supplemental budget into the NSSI. Until State completes
this linkage, it is difficult to assess whether the NSSI will adequately
link goals to resources.
3.We disagree with State's contention that we did not take into account
the fiscal year 2006 supplemental and the fiscal year 2007 budget requests
in our assessment of the NSVI. We evaluated these as part of our review.
Even though State officials did not include these documents among those
they identified as supporting the strategy. In addition, we reviewed other
U.S. government documents that provided useful context and information,
including two related reports issued by State in February 2006: (1)
Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund; and (2) Advancing the President's National Strategy
for Victory in Iraq : Funding Iraq's Transition to Self-Reliance in 2006
and 2007 and Support for the Counterinsurgency Campaign.
4.We acknowledge that the purpose of the NSVI was to provide the public
with an overview of a multitiered, classified strategy and not to set
forth every detail on information readily available elsewhere. Our
analysis was not limited to the publicly available, unclassified NSVI.
With input from DOD and State, we included in our assessment all the
classified and unclassified documents that collectively define the U.S.
strategy in Iraq: (1) the National Security Presidential Directive 36 (May
2004), (2) Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan (August 2004),
(3) the MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on Iraq
(December 2005), (4) the Multinational Corps-Iraq Operation Order 05-03
(December 2005), (5) the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated
January 2006), and (6) the quarterly State Section 2207 reports to
Congress (through April 2006), and (7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan
issued by the Chief of Mission and the Commander of the MNF-I.
Collectively, these documents still lack all the key characteristics of an
effective national strategy. However, we refined our recommendation to
focus on the need to improve the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
5.We disagree with State's comment that helping restore essential services
to prewar levels was not an assumption of the early U.S. reconstruction
strategy. According to the key architects of the original Coalition
Provisional Authority plan, restoring essential services to a prewar level
was a key assumption of the U.S. strategy.
6.Documents we received from State and the Department of Energy estimated
that Iraq's 2003 actual prewar crude oil production was 2.6 million
barrels per day. State did not provide any additional documentation to
support their contention. In addition, the 4,300 megawatts figure cited by
State is below the postwar peak of 5,400 megawatts and the planned U.S.
goal of 6,000 megawatts.
7.We agree that it is not possible to make definitive statements about the
number of people nationwide with access to clean drinking water during the
prewar period because reliable data did not exist. We have noted this
problem in previous reports and testimonies. This report describes U.S.
mission efforts announced in December 2005 to develop an improved set of
metrics to better estimate the potential impact of U.S. water and
sanitation reconstruction efforts on Iraqi households. We reviewed
excerpts from this reporting and included it in our report. However, State
has not complied with our request to provide us with a complete copy of
its metrics plan to better allow us to judge the results of its efforts.
8.As we have previously reported, subsidies for food, fuel, and
electricity, rising costs for security forces, and high costs to sustain
Iraq's bureaucracy limit Iraq's ability to contribute to its own
reconstruction efforts. While Iraq budgeted about $5 billion for capital
expenditures in 2005, it only provided a few hundred million dollars by
the end of the year. Accordingly, it is too early to determine if the
Iraqi government will spend the $6.2 billion it has budgeted for capital
expenditures in 2006.
9.We clarified the report to characterize the 2003 World Bank study as an
initial estimate and not a comprehensive survey. While acknowledging that
more than $56 billon will be needed to bring Iraq to a status equivalent
to other oil-producing developing nations, State does not think that
"costs" have gone up. However, recent State and Department of Energy cost
estimates show that the oil infrastructure and electric sectors alone will
require about $50 billion in the next several years. In addition, June
2006 reporting from the Department of Energy states that Iraq could need
$100 billion or more for long-term reconstruction efforts.
10.We agree that the Iraq and U.S. governments have succeeded in achieving
debt relief for Iraq from the Paris Club and commercial creditors.
However, there is a significant amount of debt remaining, amounting to $84
billion. This debt includes war reparations that Iraq owes from its
invasion of Kuwait. This remaining debt imposes a continuing financial
burden on the country.
11.We revised our report to include updated April 2006 figures.
12.We included the $30 billion estimate for the oil sector to illustrate
the significant future costs to restore a critical sector-a sector from
which Iraq derives 90 percent of its budgetary revenues. State's Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office developed these estimates. In addition,
as noted in comment 9 above, Iraq could need $100 billion or more for
long-term reconstruction, according to a June 2006 report by the
Department of Energy.
13.We agree that it is very difficult to accurately account for corruption
as a cost in achieving the overall goals for Iraq. We recognize that State
launched an anticorruption strategy in December 2005, but this strategy
was not reflected in the documents we reviewed. We included State
estimates that help describe the magnitude of the corruption problem. For
example, State reports that 10 percent of refined fuels are diverted to
the black market, and about 30 percent of imported fuels are smuggled out
of Iraq and sold for a profit.
14.The recently announced International Compact could be a useful vehicle
for better international coordination, but the details of the compact's
scope and function and linkage to the new donor coordination process have
not been specified. The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for
Iraq provides a coordination mechanism among United Nations agencies, but
its linkage to U.S.-funded projects is also unclear. More importantly, no
single document describes how the goals and projects of the United States,
Iraq, and the international community are or will be linked to achieve
maximum effectiveness and avoid duplication of effort.
Comments from the Department of DefenseAppendix IV
GAO Contact and Staff AcknowledgmentsAppendix V
Joseph A. Christoff, Director, (202) 512-8979, [email protected]
Stephen M. Lord, Assistant Director; Kelly Baumgartner; Lynn Cothern;
Jared Hermalin; B. Patrick Hickey; Rhonda Horried; Guy Lofaro; and Alper
Tunca made key contributions to this report. Terry Richardson provided
technical assistance.
Related GAO Products
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve Use of Private Security
Providers. GAO-06-865T . Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing
Challenges. GAO-06-697T . Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
United Nations: Oil for Food Program Provides Lessons for Future Sanctions
and Ongoing Reform. GAO-06-711T . Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2006.
United Nations: Lessons Learned from Oil for Food Program Indicate the
Need to Strengthen UN Internal Controls and Oversight Activities.
GAO-06-330. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges.
GAO-06-428T. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic Governance and Security
Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq. GAO-06-152C . Washington,
D.C.: October 31, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and
Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and
Sustainable Progress. GAO-06-179T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005.
Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability of Cost Data
and Provide Additional Guidance to Control Costs. GAO-05-882 . Washington,
D.C.: September 21, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections.
GAO-05-932R. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures
for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities.
GAO-05-872. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed To Improve Use of Private Security
Providers. GAO-05-737 . Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts.
GAO-05-876. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring
Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police. GAO-05-431T.
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and
Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.
United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq's Food
Security. GAO-04-880T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2004.
Contract Management: Contracting for Iraq Reconstruction and for Global
Logistics Support. GAO-04-869T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2004.
Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management
Challenges. GAO-04-605. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2004.
Iraq's Transitional Law. GAO-04-746R. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2004.
State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress
Support Foundation. GAO-04-559. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.
Recovering Iraq's Assets: Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and
Challenges. GAO-04-579T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2004.
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of
Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom. GAO-04-305R .
Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2003.
Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-03-792R. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
(320401)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-788 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-788 , a report to congressional committees
July 2006
REBUILDING IRAQ
More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals
According to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) issued by
the National Security Council (NSC), prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S.
interest because it will help win the war on terror and make America
safer, stronger, and more certain of its future.
This report (1) assesses the evolving U.S. national strategy for Iraq and
(2) evaluates whether the NSVI and its supporting documents address the
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy developed by
GAO in previous work (see fig.). In this report, the NSVI and supporting
documents are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
What GAO Recommends
To help improve the U.S. strategy's usefulness to Congress, this report
recommends that the NSC, along with Defense and State, complete the
strategy by addressing all six characteristics of an effective national
strategy in a single document.
State and DOD did not comment on GAO's recommendations. State noted that
the NSVI's purpose is to provide a broad overview. However, without
detailed information on costs and roles and responsibilities, the strategy
does not provide Congress with a clear road map for achieving victory in
Iraq.
The November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and supporting
documents incorporate the same desired end-state for U.S. stabilization and
reconstruction operations that were first established by the coalition in
2003: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the
international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.
However, it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired
end-state in Iraq given the significant changes in the assumptions underlying
the U.S. strategy. The original plan assumed a permissive security
environment. However, an increasingly lethal insurgency undermined the
development of effective Iraqi government institutions and delayed plans for
an early transfer of security responsibilities to the Iraqis. The plan also
assumed that U.S. reconstruction funds would help restore Iraq's essential
services to prewar levels, but Iraq's capacity to maintain, sustain, and
manage its rebuilt infrastructure is still being developed. Finally, the plan
assumed that the Iraqi government and the international community would help
finance Iraq's development needs, but Iraq has limited resources to contribute
to its own reconstruction, and Iraq's estimated future needs vastly exceed
what has been offered by the international community to date.
The NSVI is an improvement over previous planning efforts. However, the
NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully
address all the desirable characteristics of an effective national
strategy. On one hand, the strategy's purpose and scope is clear because
it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest and
central front in the war on terror. The strategy also generally addresses
the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provides a
comprehensive description of the desired U.S. political, security, and
economic objectives in Iraq. On the other hand, the strategy falls short
in three key areas. First, it only partially identifies the current and
future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including the costs of
maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity
at the provincial and national level, and rebuilding critical
infrastructure. Second, it only partially identifies which U.S. agencies
implement key aspects of the strategy or resolve conflicts among the many
implementing agencies. Third, it neither fully addresses how U.S. goals
and objectives will be integrated with those of the Iraqi government and
the international community, nor does it detail the Iraqi government's
anticipated contribution to its future security and reconstruction needs.
In addition, the elements of the strategy are dispersed among the NSVI and
seven supporting documents, further limiting its usefulness as a planning
and oversight tool.
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