Military Training: Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's
Investment in the Joint National Training Capability (11-AUG-06,
GAO-06-802).
The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training
Transformation Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces
deploying to their theaters have had experience operating
jointly. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint National
Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which accounts for 84
percent of the $2 billion the department plans to invest by 2011
to provide a persistent global network that will increase the
level of joint training. GAO assessed the extent to which (1)
JNTC has improved the ability of the services and combatant
commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve components are
benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint Forces
Command has developed an accreditation process to facilitate
program goals. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and
analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents. GAO also reviewed and
analyzed 5 of 16 events selected in 2005 as JNTC training events,
and observed 2 of those events firsthand.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-802
ACCNO: A58559
TITLE: Military Training: Management Actions Needed to Enhance
DOD's Investment in the Joint National Training Capability
DATE: 08/11/2006
SUBJECT: Armed forces reserve training
Armed forces reserves
Certification and accreditation
Evaluation criteria
Military training
Program evaluation
Standards
Performance measures
Joint forces
Program goals or objectives
DOD Joint National Training Capability
DOD Training Transformation Program
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-802
* Results in Brief
* Background
* DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiat
* DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiat
* Indications Are That the JNTC Initiative Has Begun to Improv
* Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but
* Reserve Units Have Participated in JNTC Training Events
* Joint Forces Command Has Not Established a Working Relations
* JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Pr
* Joint Forces Command Has Begun an Accreditation Process
* JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasiz
* Accreditation Process Has No Mechanism to Ensure Recurring U
* No National Guard Training Programs Have Been Considered for
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* GAO's Mission
* Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* Order by Mail or Phone
* To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* Congressional Relations
* Public Affairs
* GAO's Mission
* Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* Order by Mail or Phone
* To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* Congressional Relations
* Public Affairs
GAO
August 2006
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives
MILITARY TRAINING
Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint
National Training Capability
GAO-06-802
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 6
DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on
Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements 9
Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint Forces
Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves' Unique Training Needs 18
JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to New
and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities, or
Include the National Guard 22
Conclusions 30
Recommendations for Executive Action 30
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 37
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41
Related GAO Products 42
Tables
Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined 13
Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in Joint
Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005 15
Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for
Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006 26
Table 4: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment 36
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
JNTC Joint National Training Capability
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
August 11, 2006
The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Effective joint operations are fundamental to the ability of the U.S.
military to decisively defeat its adversaries, and the Secretary of
Defense has stated that in the new and evolving security environment,
"Achieving jointness in wartime requires building jointness in peacetime."
In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,1 Department of Defense
(DOD) leadership emphasized that meeting the challenges of an uncertain
security environment would require transformations in education and
training. The Defense Planning Guidance 2003-2007 directed the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to work with the
services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant
Commander of the Joint Forces Command to develop a plan for transforming
military training that would better enable joint force operations.
Consequently, the department created the Training Transformation Program,
which is focused on providing dynamic, capabilities-based education and
training for DOD in support of national security requirements across the
full spectrum of service (active and reserve components), joint,
interagency, intergovernmental (state and local), and multinational
operations. The ultimate goal of DOD's training transformation is to
provide combatant commanders with better-prepared individuals, units,
staffs, and organizations that are aligned with their joint operational
needs.
DOD plans to invest almost $2 billion in the Training Transformation
Program by 2011. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint Forces
Command's Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which
accounts for 84 percent of the department's planned spending. The primary
goal of the initiative is to provide a persistent global network of live,
virtual, and constructive capabilities2 that will enhance the level of
joint training in existing service and combatant command training
programs. The JNTC initiative is expected to enhance the joint operational
environment by providing more specific guidance on conducting joint
mission essential tasks,3 creating a persistent joint communication
network to support joint training with more virtual and constructive
capability, and accrediting training programs to ensure the appropriate
joint environment exists. The initiative expects to have established a
global network of accredited joint training programs across the services
and combatant commands by 2010.
1 The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressionally imposed DOD effort
to be conducted every 4 years to set defense strategy and goals.
You asked us to review the JNTC initiative's implementation. Specifically,
we assessed (1) the extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the
ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly, (2) the
extent to which the reserve components are benefiting from the JNTC
initiative, and (3) the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has
developed an accreditation process to facilitate program goals.
To address the above objectives, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC
documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 revised
Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC initiative
strategic plan. We reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 combatant command and
service training events that were selected in 2005 as JNTC training
events. Our analysis evaluated a number of attributes for each of these
training events to determine the extent to which the JNTC initiative
enhanced their joint training capability. Additionally, we observed two of
the selected events firsthand to obtain a real-time assessment of the past
and planned evolution of the exercises and feedback from exercise
participants, including the planners, on the extent of joint training. We
also met with key officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Staff, as well as officials from the combatant commands and
service organizations that are affected by the JNTC initiative.
Additionally, we examined the extent to which the reserve components
participated in selected training events enhanced by the JNTC initiative
and formal collaboration mechanisms, as well as the development and
initial implementation of the JNTC initiative's accreditation process. We
also interviewed key National Guard and reserve component officials to
further evaluate the benefits that the reserve components derive from the
JNTC initiative. We discussed our methods and assumptions with agency
officials to obtain their input, and we also assessed the quality of
information and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
2 "Live training" refers to live simulations involving real people
operating real systems in a live environment. "Virtual training" involves
virtual simulations using real people operating simulated systems.
"Constructive training" refers to simulated people operating simulated
systems, often referred to as war games.
3 Joint mission essential tasks are tasks selected by a joint force
commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the
common, universal language.
Results in Brief
DOD does not know the extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the
services' and combatant commands' ability to train jointly because it has
not yet assessed the program's impact. Our analysis of five service and
combatant command training events selected to be enhanced by the JNTC
initiative provided some indications of potential improvements in joint
training. However, the department's first assessment of the Training
Transformation Program in 2005 did not include an evaluation of the
collective impact of the JNTC initiative on joint training because the
initiative is still early in its implementation. Instead, the department
has established a basic framework for measuring the performance of joint
training in future assessments. However, the department has not finalized
a plan for its 2007 training transformation assessment that includes
metrics, processes it will employ, and time frames for obtaining data. Our
prior work has stressed the importance of performance metrics that set up
time frames and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program's
implementation. The department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
also emphasizes that to ensure the department's objectives are being met,
each organization is accountable for measuring performance and delivering
results that support the departmentwide strategy. Furthermore, the
Training Transformation Plan requires periodic reviews to measure the
impact of training transformation initiatives, including the JNTC
initiative, on joint training. The training events we analyzed from fiscal
year 2005 provided indications of improved joint training, such as more
joint objectives than the prior year's exercises and more participation by
other services. For example, one Air Force exercise we reviewed focused on
achieving service-specific objectives before being enhanced by the JNTC
initiative. Since then, these objectives were modified to include some
joint training objectives. However, without a strategy that clearly
identifies how the department's next training transformation assessment
will evaluate the impact the JNTC initiative is having on military joint
training, the department will not be in a position to know whether the
money invested in the initiative will produce the desired results or
maximize the benefit for the investment. To support the efforts of the
Joint Forces Command to enhance the level of joint training, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to fully develop a strategy for the next training
transformation assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC
initiative's implementation on joint training, including time frames,
outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and responsibilities, and
outcomes. DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated it is taking
actions to implement it.
Through the participation of selected units and individuals in
JNTC-enhanced events, the reserve components have benefited from the JNTC
initiative, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have
not been fully considered because Joint Forces Command has not established
an ongoing working relationship with them. According to Joint Forces
Command officials, the command has not established a liaison position for
any of the reserve components and has not included the reserve components
in working groups and planning sessions, as it has done with the active
service components and the combatant commands. According to service and
reserve officials, the initiative's process action teams, which are
responsible for joint program coordination, are composed of
representatives from the services and combatant commands but do not
receive input from any of the reserve components. The Training
Transformation Strategic Plan recognizes that the reserve components face
several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be
considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through
implementation. For example, compared to active duty service members,
reservists and National Guard members generally have less time to train,
less access to current technologies, and an additional responsibility to
conduct joint domestic missions related to homeland defense. Until the
Joint Forces Command incorporates the reserve components more fully into
the JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have limited
ability to enhance their joint training skills. To increase the benefits
of joint training programs for the reserve components, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Forces Command to establish
liaison officers for the reserve components and include representatives
from the reserve components as active participants in JNTC initiative
working groups and planning sessions. DOD partially concurred with this
recommendation, agreeing a liaison position was needed for the National
Guard, but that the current service liaison structure was adequate to
represent the other reserve components. We continue to believe that the
entire reserve component would benefit if they had a more active voice in
JNTC working groups and planning sessions.
The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process for accrediting
active service and combatant command training programs to facilitate the
goals of the JNTC initiative, but it has not emphasized new and emerging
missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will continue
to be incorporated into future training rotations after programs complete
initial accreditation, or accredited any National Guard-specific training
programs. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that
training transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission areas,
such as irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations, combating
weapons of mass destruction, and information operations. The JNTC
accreditation process is intended to ensure that all units participating
in joint training, regardless of location, experience a recurring,
consistent, realistic training environment. The Joint Forces Command has
allowed active services and combatant commands to nominate specific joint
tasks within their existing training programs to be accredited. During
fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command conditionally accredited joint
tasks in 4 training programs and plans to grant accreditation to tasks in
as many as 23 additional programs during 2006. However, the Joint Forces
Command's nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit
service and combatant commander training programs that will improve
proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Currently, in some
instances, nominations for accreditation are based on the services' needs
to enhance joint training for the maximum number of participants. In
addition, the Joint Forces Command plans to reaccredit programs every 3
years, but the command has not established standards or a process for
reaccreditation that would ensure that service and combatant command
training programs continuously incorporate and expand upon previously
accredited joint training tasks. Further, no training programs specific to
the National Guard are currently being considered for accreditation by the
Joint Forces Command because there is no mechanism in place for nominating
them. For example, the National Guard has approached the Joint Forces
Command to accredit its Vigilant Guard exercise program outside the normal
nomination process because there is not a mechanism in place that allows
the National Guard to nominate programs. Currently, this request is being
discussed by Joint Forces Command and National Guard leadership. Until the
department establishes nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards,
JNTC events may not reflect DOD's training priorities and the services and
combatant commands may not continually incorporate JNTC enhancements into
future rotations of their training exercises. Additionally, until Joint
Forces Command incorporates the National Guard into the accreditation
process, the National Guard training programs may not be able to take full
advantage of JNTC resources, such as participation from other components,
access to new technologies and modeling, and training environments that
realistically portray overseas and domestic joint operations. To support
the efforts of the Joint Forces Command to enhance the level of joint
training and to increase the benefits of joint training programs for the
reserve components, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to (1) establish
guidelines for the services and combatant commands to follow when
nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect the importance
of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by DOD's 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report; (2) establish reaccreditation standards and
criteria that will ensure that a recurring, consistent, realistic joint
training environment exists for all units participating in future
rotations of accredited joint training programs; and (3) expand the
accreditation process to include National Guard training programs. DOD
agreed with these recommendations and is planning actions to implement
them.
Background
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall
responsibility for the Training Transformation Program and, through the
use of the Training Transformation Executive Steering Group and the
Training Transformation Senior Advisory Group, oversees the execution of
three capabilities or initiatives: JNTC, the Joint Knowledge Development
and Distribution Capability, and the Joint Assessment and Enabling
Capability. According to the 2006 Training Transformation Implementation
Plan,4 these 3 initiatives are designed to prepare individuals, units, and
staff for the new strategic environment and to provide enabling tools and
processes to carry out joint missions. Specifically:
o The JNTC, focusing on collective training, is expected to
prepare forces by providing units and command staff with
integrated live, virtual, and constructive training environments.
This initiative would add enhanced service and combatant command
training that emphasizes jointness and enables global training and
mission rehearsal in support of combatant command operations.
o The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability,
which focuses on individual training, is intended to prepare
future decision makers and leaders to better understand joint
operations and the common operational picture, as well as to
respond innovatively to adversaries. It develops and distributes
joint knowledge via a dynamic, global-knowledge network that
provides immediate access to joint education and training
resources.
o The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability is expected to
assist leaders in assessing the value of transformational training
initiatives to individuals, organizations, and processes, and to
link the impact of the Training Transformation Program to
combatant commanders' readiness requirements. This initiative is
also supposed to provide the processes and tools to continuously
improve joint training.
4 Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan, 2006
- 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
The JNTC initiative, the leading initiative for training transformation,
is managed by a Joint Management Office within the Joint Forces Command's
Joint Trainer Directorate. This Joint Management Office, which was
established in 2003, manages the operational, technical and program
resources necessary to implement the initiative. The Joint Management
Office coordinates its management efforts of the initiative with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense through senior and executive advisory
groups. The overall purpose of the JNTC initiative is to provide a
persistent capability to combatant command and service training programs
to create an appropriate, realistic joint operating environment within
their existing training activities. To accomplish this, DOD plans to spend
about $1.5 billion on the JNTC initiative through fiscal year 2011, or 84
percent of training transformation total funding. The JNTC initiative was
deemed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness to be
operationally capable in October 2004-indicating that the initial
infrastructure of networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint
environment of training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005,
16 combatant command and service training events were selected by the
Joint Forces Command to enhance their joint training environment through
the JNTC initiative.
The JNTC initiative includes several key efforts to enhance the joint
training environment of combatant commands and services. These efforts
include the following:
o Development of joint task articles. This is an effort to
enhance the level of details associated with joint mission
essential tasks that are identified by the combatant commands as
critical to joint operations, and to provide joint trainers
specific guidance for developing exercises and other joint
training activities. These task articles are a set of processes,
procedures, or actions that address critical horizontal (actions
between services) and vertical (actions between a service and a
higher joint force command) elements of interoperability for
specific joint mission essential tasks. Currently, the JNTC
initiative has developed 156 approved articles and has 88 under
various stages of development.
o Joint training and experimentation network. The joint network
is intended to be a large-capacity communications network that
will provide persistent support to joint training exercises,
service stand-alone events, exercise preparation and rehearsal,
experimentation, evaluation of advanced training technologies, and
evaluation of new warfighting concepts. The network, when
complete, will enable the Joint Forces Command to use live,
virtual, and constructive simulations in concert to enhance the
joint training environment for combatant commands and services. By
the end of fiscal year 2005, the joint network had been expanded
to 33 sites, including one in Hawaii and one in Germany.
o Accreditation and certification programs. The JNTC
accreditation program works toward ensuring that combatant command
and service joint training programs include the appropriate joint
environment for the joint tasks being trained. Accreditation is
program-centric, whereby entire service and combatant command
training programs are evaluated and accredited for training
selected joint tasks in a joint environment that meets specific
joint standards or conditions. The intent of this effort is to
establish a process that ensures delivery of a recurring,
consistent, realistic training environment for all units
participating in joint training, regardless of the locations from
which they are participating. The Joint Forces Command accredited
4 training programs during fiscal year 2005 and is expecting to
accredit 23 more programs during 2006. JNTC's certification effort
concurrently ensures that the technical aspects of the training
programs-the sites and the systems comprising the training
infrastructure, networks, and ranges-support the accredited
training program.
The JNTC initiative, now 1 year after being deemed initially operational
capable, is expected to reach full operational capability in 2010 when it
will provide a global joint training network that allows live, virtual,
and constructive participation by services, combatant commands, and
coalition and interagency partners in accredited training programs.
DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training
Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements
The full extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of
the services and combatant commands to train jointly is not clear because
DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of the JNTC initiative efforts on
joint training or developed a strategy for conducting such an assessment.
Based on our examination of 5 of the 16 fiscal year 2005 exercises that
the Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC
initiative, we found indications that the JNTC initiative has begun to
improve joint training. Examples we found include increases in the use of
joint objectives and increases in participation by other services. Without
a comprehensive assessment of the JNTC initiative's enhancement of joint
training programs, DOD has no assurance that its investment in the
initiative will produce the desired results.
DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training
Programs
DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of JNTC efforts on joint
training; therefore both the overall impact the JNTC initiative is having
on joint training programs and the extent to which it is achieving the
program's goals are unclear. The Training Transformation Implementation
Plan does not include a requirement for the JNTC Joint Management Office
to assess whether the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the
services and combatant commands to train jointly. The JNTC Joint
Management Office receives feedback through working with the services and
combatant commands, but no formal evaluation of JNTC efforts has been
conducted. The individual services and combatant commanders are aware of
JNTC enhancements to their specific training programs and resulting
improvements and are documenting some of these enhancements in after
action reports and lessons learned reports. For example, the Navy's
preliminary assessment of its Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint 05-2
exercise stated that the value added through rapid delivery and improved
interoperability and repeatability of the Fleet Synthetic training
capability and the joint network will save operating costs while providing
quality joint and coalition training to the warfighter. Additionally, as a
result of a lesson learned during Terminal Fury 05, JNTC funds were used
to develop an analytical tool that enabled analysts to search through
recorded exercise model data and replay selected training exercises, which
helped explain to the exercise control group and the training audience how
and why a particular event occurred. However, these types of reports do
not provide an overall assessment of the collective impact JNTC efforts
are having on joint training.
DOD's most recent assessment of its training transformation efforts,
conducted by the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability in support of
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
is known as the training transformation block assessment. This block
assessment, conducted for the first time in 2005, is the primary mechanism
for providing feedback to senior DOD leadership on how well DOD is meeting
its training transformation goals. The block assessment is to provide an
assessment every 2 years that measures, guides, and evaluates the progress
of the training transformation initiatives, including the JNTC initiative.
These evaluations are intended by DOD to be an innovative use of
performance assessment tools, techniques, and policies, using well-defined
metrics to provide a feedback capability to the leadership. Additionally,
DOD recently announced its plans to conduct a Joint Training Program
Review during mid-2006 to examine training transformation efforts and to
realign these efforts with the recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report
and program strategic guidance.
Our prior work,5 the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and DOD's
Training Transformation Implementation Plan emphasize the importance of
establishing performance metrics that set up time frames and measurable
outcomes to gauge the success of a program implementation. GAO's Human
Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic Training Programs and Development
Efforts in the Federal Government emphasizes the importance of using
program performance information to assess the progress that training and
development programs make toward achieving results. The guide states that
agencies should keep in mind that they need to collect data corresponding
to established training objectives throughout the implementation process
to refine and continually improve, deliver, and enhance learning.
Furthermore, the guide asserts that it is important for agencies to
develop and use outcome-oriented performance measures to ensure
accountability and to assess progress toward achieving results aligned
with the agencies' missions and goals. The Quadrennial Defense Review
Report emphasizes that each initiative is accountable for measuring
performance and delivering results that support the departmentwide
strategy. DOD's Training Transformation Implementation Plan requires
periodic reviews to assess the success of its Training Transformation
Program. According to the plan, every 2 years, a formal program assessment
should be conducted to measure the impact of training transformation
initiatives on joint force readiness. The results of those assessments are
intended to help leaders decide strategy modifications and subsequent
investments.
5 GAO, Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic Training Programs and
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington,
D.C.: March 2004).
DOD's initial 2005 training transformation block assessment did not
evaluate the JNTC initiative's collective impact on joint training.
According to DOD officials, this assessment was not expected to provide a
comprehensive evaluation of the JNTC initiative's impact on joint training
because the initiative is still early in its implementation. Instead, it
served as a baseline or framework for identifying joint training
measurements for future assessments, and provided a status of the JNTC
initiative's efforts implemented to date. However, the 2005 assessment did
not address training efficiency measured by specific cost, schedule, and
outcome-oriented performance metrics. Specifically, the 2005 assessment
highlighted some progress: (1) the JNTC initiative is providing more joint
training through accreditation and certification; (2) combatant command
joint mission essential tasks are addressed in events and integrated into
training objectives for each event; and (3) rapidly configurable,
persistent training networks, such as the Joint Training and
Experimentation Network, are a current reality and are being improved.
However, the 2005 Training Transformation Assessment Report noted that
because of a wide variation of joint training activities, the task of
developing metrics that supported effective assessment and corresponding
program status progress was unduly complicated.
The 2005 block assessment did identify 10 metrics DOD is considering for
its future assessments, such as the 2007 block assessment. These metrics
include the percentage of combatant command joint mission essential tasks
trained in the joint exercise; the number of programs accredited and
certified; and the number of participants using JNTC resources. However,
many of these metrics are output oriented and not outcome performance
measures, which are necessary to gauge the success of program
implementation. Additionally, one of the block assessment's
recommendations is to institutionalize a process to develop metrics for
training transformation exercises for use in future assessments. However,
it has not finalized its plans for which metrics are to be assessed or
identified the time frames and processes it will employ for obtaining
data. Because DOD has not finalized its metrics or identified a process to
collect the data, training transformation officials stated that it may be
difficult to show the impact of JNTC efforts on joint training even in the
2007 block assessment. Without a comprehensive assessment of JNTC's
enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has no assurance that the
money invested in the JNTC initiative will produce the desired results of
providing combatant commanders with better prepared forces aligned with
their joint operational needs or maximize the benefit for DOD's
investment.
Indications Are That the JNTC Initiative Has Begun to Improve Joint Training
Even though DOD has yet to assess the overall impact of the JNTC
initiative on joint training, our analysis found indications of potential
improvements, such as events that include more joint objectives and allow
for more joint participation.
According to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction,6 joint
training is defined as "Military training based on joint doctrine or joint
tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint
staff to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed
necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions.
Joint training involves forces of two or more Military Departments
interacting with a combatant commander or subordinate joint force
commander; involves joint forces and/or joint staffs; and is conducted
using joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures."
Based on this definition, we selected several attributes to evaluate the
effect the JNTC initiative had on joint training. Specifically, we
determined whether selected JNTC events conducted in 2005 reflected the
following:
o increased use of joint training objectives,
o increased use of joint task articles,
o increased involvement of other services,
o increased use of virtual and constructive training
capabilities, and
o persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC
initiative.
DOD officials reviewed the attributes listed above and agreed their use
was appropriate in evaluating the effect of the JNTC initiative on joint
training.
We analyzed 5 of 16 exercises conducted in fiscal year 2005 that the Joint
Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC initiative.
Table 1 describes the exercises selected for our analysis.
6 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01C, Joint Training
Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States.
Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined
Exercise Description
Terminal Fury Terminal Fury is a combatant command exercise
designed to train and evaluate the staff of the
Pacific Command Headquarters and one of its joint
task forces in conducting crisis action planning.
The exercise makes extensive use of constructive
models. The only live participants in the
exercise are the staff of the Pacific Command
Headquarters and the staff of the Joint Task
Force.
Air Warrior I Air Warrior I is a live exercise designed to
train aircrews and ground personnel in the
planning and execution of close air support. The
Air Force's aircraft deploy to and operate from
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada . The Air Force
ground units involved in coordinating the close
air support attacks deploy to and operate with
their associated Army units at Fort Irwin,
California .
Fleet Synthetic Training Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint is a virtual and
- Joint constructive exercise designed to develop and
maintain warfighting proficiency of naval units
through tactical exercises conducted by ships
while they are in port. It uses shore-based and
ship-embedded simulation, stimulation systems,
and distribution networks to conduct the
exercise.
National Training Center The Army conducts several live exercises each
year at the National Training Center that are
designed to prepare brigade combat teams for
operations. While historically these exercises
have involved armored tank units clashing in the
desert, over the past 3 years training has
changed to meet the demands of ongoing operations
in Operation Iraq Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom. The National Training Center is located
at Fort Irwin, California, and the Army holds the
exercises in conjunction with the Air Force's Air
Warrior I exercises. (See above.)
Marine Corps Weapons and The Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor
Tactics Instructors Course is a graduate level course of instruction,
Course which is required for the Marine Corps' aviation
squadron weapons and tactics instructors. The
7-week class involves academics, a flight phase,
and live exercises. The course is taught at the
Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona.
Source: DOD.
Enhancements to the exercises brought about by the JNTC initiative were
many and varied. Some of the improvements purchased with JNTC funds7
included radios, aircraft instrument pods, threat emitters that imitated
ground base enemy radar, and cruise missile simulators. The Air Force used
JNTC funds to help establish an Air Support Operations Center that
improved the realism of the Air Warrior I exercise by including real-world
joint operational organizations. The Joint Forces Command also used JNTC
funds to make improvements in computer models used in the Terminal Fury
exercise. Aircraft, including former Russian aircraft, were obtained with
JNTC funds to act as opposing forces in the Weapons and Tactics Instructor
course. JNTC funds were also used to hire personnel and place them at
service and combatant command headquarters to assist in improving the
joint environment of existing exercises. Finally, the joint network is
supported and funded by JNTC funds, allowing a large number of simulators
and constructive models from around the country to connect and interact in
support of training programs.
7 JNTC funds were distributed between the Joint Forces Command and the
services. These funds were channeled through the Operations and
Maintenance; Other Procurement; and Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation appropriations.
To analyze the exercises, we developed a comparative analysis8 based on
the attributes discussed above. This practice allowed us to determine the
measure of change in attributes for each selected training exercise prior
to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained and reviewed exercise
documentation, such as exercise planning documents and after action
reports for selected exercises to determine the measure of change in the
exercise based on our attributes. Our analysis revealed indications that
some joint training improvements were made in each of the exercises we
assessed. Table 2 summarizes the results of our analysis.
8 A cost analysis was not done because the data needed were not readily
available. Specifically, the JNTC funds resided in different
appropriations; the source of cost information was spread over a number of
organizations; and some fixed costs, such as installation of the joint
network, sustainment of the joint network, and maintenance of existing
exercise infrastructure, represented a number of exercises and other
activities.
Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in Joint
Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005
Fleet Weapons and
Synthetic National Tactics
Terminal Air Training Training Instructor
Furya Warrior I -Joint Center Course
Increased use of joint X X X X
training objectives
Increased use of joint X X
task articles
Increased involvement of X X X X
other services
Increased use of virtual X X X
and constructive
training capabilities
Persistent capabilities X X X X X
added to exercises
funded by the JNTC
initiative
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information and documents.
Note: An X indicates where the JNTC initiative has improved the joint
training to some degree.
a Terminal Fury is a historical joint combatant command exercise;
therefore the level of increase in its joint training environment was not
as apparent as it was for service exercises.
Our analysis of the five exercises and discussions held with exercise
planners at two of these exercises revealed several key areas in which
indications exist that the JNTC initiative has begun to improve joint
training.
o Increased use of joint training objectives. Our analysis found
that for four of the five exercise events we reviewed, the
services increased the number of joint training objectives to
which they trained. For example, prior to being enhanced by the
JNTC initiative, Air Warrior I's exercise objectives were
determined by the squadron commanders and were focused on
achieving service-specific objectives. After JNTC,
service-specific training objectives were modified to include some
joint training objectives, such as conducting a joint, live-fire
event within a realistic combat scenario and employing real-time
joint and combined fires. In another exercise, according to the
exercise planner, JNTC efforts enabled the Navy Fleet Synthetic
Training - Joint exercise to include Army and Air Force units in
its exercise. Through the participation of the Army and Air Force
units, the Navy began including joint interoperability training
objectives in exercise planning documents for both Navy Fleet
Synthetic Training - Joint 05-2 and 06-1. The National Training
Center's primary focus, both before and after the JNTC initiative,
has been on accomplishing service-specific training objectives.
However, after the JNTC initiative's involvement, the National
Training Center has added some joint and interoperability tasks in
its exercises, although these tasks are subordinate to the
service-specific training objectives. Prior to the JNTC
initiative, the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course
trained to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, which had
some joint aspects. After JNTC designation, the Marine Corps
continued to train to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation,
but it began using several joint tactical tasks and joint training
objectives in the exercise.
o Increased use of joint task articles. The Air Force and the
Navy used joint task articles in enhancing their Air Warrior I and
Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint exercises. Joint task articles
detail the integrated tasks and steps necessary to provide a
specific warfighting capability to a joint force commander and are
based on the joint mission essential tasks. Air Force officials
compared the task article for close air support with current
practices at Air Warrior I and identified deficiencies in the
procedures used during these exercises prior to 2005. Steps were
then taken to correct the deficiencies which included adding an
Air Support Operations Center. Consequently, Air Warrior I
exercises are now conducted more in line with close air support
joint doctrine. The Navy also made extensive use of the task
articles in preparing for its accreditation review.
o Increased involvement of other services. Four of the five
exercises we examined showed that participation had expanded to
include more services when compared to years before the JNTC
enhancements were included. The fifth exercise was a combatant
command exercise that was already joint and did not show an
increase in the participation of other services as a result of
JNTC efforts. Joint training requires the involvement of two or
more services; therefore the JNTC initiative used a variety of
means, such as additional funding and the Joint Training and
Experimentation Network, to increase the participation of other
services in an exercise. As a result, Navy and Marine air units
and the staff of the Commander, Third Fleet, participated in the
National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises in 2005. Army and
Air Force units participated in the Navy's Fleet Synthetic
Training - Joint in 2005 and 2006. A NATO Airborne Warning and
Control aircraft joined the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics
Instructor course exercise in 2005, and a similar unit from the
United Kingdom plans to participate in 2006.
o Increased use of virtual and constructive training
capabilities. Our analysis showed that key virtual and
constructive training capabilities made possible by the use of the
Joint Training and Experimentation Network have had a positive
impact on three of the five exercises we examined. The joint
network is a persistent, rapidly reconfigurable communications
network that connects multiple training sites. According to Navy
training exercise planners, the joint network is what allowed the
Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint exercises to include Army and Air
Force simulators to participate in the exercise. For example, we
observed during a recent Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint
exercise, Army and Navy operators, using virtual and constructive
capabilities, track an incoming missile attack and coordinate a
joint response. Without the joint network, the Fleet Synthetic
Training - Joint exercises would likely have remained solely a
Navy exercise. According to Terminal Fury exercise planners, the
joint network improved Terminal Fury by increasing the capacity to
include a larger number of constructive models in the exercise.
For example, Tactical Simulation is a very large intelligence
model used to simulate the entire spectrum of intelligence
operations. Prior to the joint network, the Tactical Simulation
model was not included in the exercise because the model was too
large to transport to Hawaii. The joint network provided the means
to connect the Tactical Simulation model to the exercise from its
home station in the continental United States. In addition,
Terminal Fury participants are spread out over a wide area,
including several sites in Hawaii and the continental United
States. According to Terminal Fury exercise planners, two tools
made possible by the joint network, Video Teleconferencing and
Voice Over Internet Protocol, provided the means by which these
geographically separated sites could coordinate the execution of
the exercise. Finally, according to a Marine Corps official, the
joint network has aided the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics
Instructor Course in developing exercise scenarios, executing the
exercise, and connecting a virtual Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to the
exercise.
o Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC
initiative. All five exercises reviewed received enhancements that
will continue to benefit these exercises into the future. Each
exercise received a persistent link to the joint network and
embedded Support Element staff hired to assist service and
combatant command headquarters in adding joint capabilities to
their exercises. In addition, the Air Force received radios and
aircraft instrument pods for Air Warrior I, computer model
improvements were made for Terminal Fury, and the National
Training Center received surrogate weapons for its opposing force.
All these persistent capabilities were procured with JNTC funds.
In addition to the improvements noted above, we also found that the JNTC
initiative has reduced some of the travel and transportation costs
associated with one of the five exercises we examined. Specifically, a
number of the constructive models used in the Terminal Fury exercise are
based in the continental United States. In prior years, the hardware and
supporting personnel would have to travel to Hawaii to participate in the
exercise. Since the joint network connected these models to the exercise
from their home stations, there was no need to move the hardware and
support staff to Hawaii for the exercise.
Finally, there are a number of JNTC efforts under way to further improve
joint training. For example, in future iterations of the National Training
Center/Air Warrior I exercise, the Air Force would like to use the joint
network to include a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
aircraft simulator to create a realistic joint environment. Due to their
limited number and the high demand for these aircraft, the planes are not
always available to participate in the exercises. The joint network will
allow the use of these aircraft simulators in the National Training
Center/Air Warrior I exercise by having them participate virtually from
their home stations. In addition to increasing the availability of these
aircraft virtually in future exercises, the joint network will also reduce
the travel, transportation, and fuel costs of deploying and using the
actual aircraft in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises.
Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint Forces
Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves' Unique Training Needs
Reserve component members have benefited from JNTC-enhanced training
events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have not
been fully considered because the Joint Forces Command has not established
an ongoing working relationship with them.
Reserve Units Have Participated in JNTC Training Events
Members of the reserve components have potentially benefited from
JNTC-enhanced training when they participate in active service- and
combatant command-sponsored combat training programs enhanced by the JNTC
initiative, such as predeployment and mission rehearsal exercise programs.
For example, based on our analysis of five training events enhanced by the
JNTC initiative, reserve and guard units and individuals have participated
to a limited extent in all but one of the five events. Specifically, Air
National Guard personnel participated in a fiscal year 2005 Air Warrior I
exercise, Army reservists participated in a fiscal year 2005 National
Training Center exercise, Navy reservists participated in a fiscal year
2005 Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint exercise, and Marine Corps reservists
participated in a fiscal year 2006 Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course
exercise. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs
officials stated that reserve participation in many of these events
occurred, in part, because active duty units were unavailable to fully
participate and reserve units were asked to fill in. According to JNTC and
service officials, reserves participating in these events may benefit from
many of the same JNTC enhancements to the joint training environment as do
active forces. To date, Joint Forces Command officials said they have
relied on active service components and combatant commands to involve the
reserve components in JNTC-enhanced training.
Joint Forces Command Has Not Established a Working Relationship with the Reserve
Components
In an effort to develop and manage active service and combatant command
training programs, the Joint Forces Command has developed formal
coordination mechanisms, including liaison officers, planning conferences,
and process action teams that involve numerous participants from various
organizations within the active service and combatant commands, but these
coordination mechanisms do not include reserve personnel. For example, the
Joint Forces Command has established on-site liaison officer positions to
serve as the active service representative on a daily basis to communicate
with the JNTC officials and aid in the development of the business and
operational processes related to the JNTC initiative. Currently, all
liaison officer positions include representatives from the active services
with no representatives from the reserve components. According to Joint
Forces Command officials and service liaison officers, these active
service liaison officers primarily represent their respective active
service components' needs and issues and do not specifically communicate
the needs of the reserve component to Joint Forces Command officials.
Active services and combatant command personnel also regularly attend
planning conferences to organize upcoming training exercises. These
meetings occur periodically throughout the initial, middle, and final
planning stages of an exercise, and to date, the Joint Forces Command has
not reached out specifically to the reserve components to include them in
these planning conferences. The Joint Forces Command has also established
nine process action teams organized by functional areas in operations,
technical, and program management to discuss JNTC implementation and
development. These process action teams perform a vast array of
responsibilities, such as
o developing JNTC event requirements and timelines;
o defining required operational capabilities in order to fully
coordinate live, virtual, and constructive opposition forces into
joint training;
o defining technical goals for data systems that will enable
joint distributed training;
o selecting advanced training technologies to ensure integration
of live, virtual, and constructive components into a seamless
joint training environment; and
o developing all JNTC budget and program activities.
According to Joint Forces Command officials, the reserve components are
not formally invited to participate in these process action teams.
DOD guidance regarding reserve components and joint training requires full
integration of the reserve components into every aspect and each stage of
the overall process in developing a joint training initiative. For
example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report specifically
highlights the need for joint training to include the reserve components
in ensuring the readiness of the total force. In addition, the Training
Transformation Strategic Plan identifies that the reserve components face
several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be
considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through
implementation. Further, the 2005 training transformation block assessment
calls for including the reserve components' training in transformation
training events. Specifically, the assessment states that the reserve
components (1) should participate in training transformation events in
order to integrate the reserve component with the active component and (2)
may have special needs for training, and training events should be
tailored to meet these needs.
During discussions with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Reserve Affairs, officials, they noted the following unique reserve
training circumstances that should be considered when developing the JNTC
enhancements:
o Geography. Since members of the National Guard and reserves are
often not physically located at their respective home duty
stations, the scheduling of training is more complex.
o Limited training time. Reservists are constrained to 39
training days per year. Only if a reservist is activated or
volunteers can he/she exceed this limitation.
o Competing requirements. Reservists must complete training
requirements similar to the active core training requirements,
such as general military training and physical training, as well
as satisfying any other reserve requirements. Reservists must also
consider and manage their civilian careers along with their
military obligations.
o Limited training assets. Resources, such as classrooms and
computer simulation systems and networks for joint training (such
as those that enable live, virtual, and constructive
participation), are not readily available to National Guard
members and reservists.
o Lack of training predictability. Since reserve components are
currently not included in the scheduling of joint training events,
planning for joint training opportunities is much more difficult
and erratic.
Along with these unique training requirements, National Guard Bureau
officials stated that some of the National Guard's missions, such as
homeland defense and responding to natural disasters, should be included
as a part of the JNTC initiative that currently are not.
As a result of the absence of formal reserve component representation in
the development of the JNTC initiative, the unique characteristics of the
reserve component have not been incorporated into the initiative's
development of joint training requirements. According to Joint Forces
Command officials, the inclusion of unique reserve component training
needs into the JNTC initiative is a long-term goal. To date, there has
been no specific effort made by the Joint Forces Command to develop joint
tasks or technical enhancements associated with the needs and missions of
the reserve components.
The JNTC initiative's priority remains on active services and combatant
commands, as the development of joint tasks and technical enhancements has
been primarily for existing active service and combatant command training
programs. According to Joint Forces Command officials, the process for the
development of joint articles has involved the active services and
combatant commands and focused on developing tasks for combat missions,
such as close air support, joint force targeting, and joint fires.
Although reserve members deploying to overseas operations are expected to
perform these combat tasks as appropriate, Joint Forces Command officials
have stated that the development of joint articles has not significantly
focused on tasks unique to the reserve components, such as disaster relief
and homeland defense. Further, the reserve components were not included in
the team responsible for the development of joint articles. Additionally,
the development of the Joint Training and Experimentation Network has
established permanent capability throughout the continental United States
at active service and combatant command facilities. The joint network has
been coordinated with existing active training networks, such as the
Navy's Continuous Training Environment, according to Navy officials, and
the Air Force's Distributed Mission Operations Center. According to Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials,
interfaces with reserve and guard networks have not yet occurred. The
continued lack of focus on the joint training needs of the reserve
components will limit their ability to enhance their joint training
skills.
JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to New and
Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities, or Include the
National Guard
The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process of accrediting
training programs and joint tasks to facilitate the JNTC goals. However,
the command has not (1) placed priority on accrediting training programs
related to new and emerging missions, as highlighted in the most recent
Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) taken steps to ensure that
accredited joint training will continue to occur after initial
accreditation; and (3) accredited any National Guard-specific training
programs.
Joint Forces Command Has Begun an Accreditation Process
In fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began a process of
accrediting active services' and combatant commands' training programs on
specific joint tasks, in an effort to facilitate the goals of the JNTC
initiative. The intent of the accreditation process is to validate that
the training programs can provide the training audience, regardless of
location, with a recurring, consistent, realistic environment for the
joint tasks being trained. An accreditation review is not an inspection or
a report card, but can be compared to accrediting a university, where
individual courses of instruction are officially approved.9 Initially, the
JNTC initiative used an event-centric approach that focused on enhancing
single designated training events. Starting in fiscal year 2005, the Joint
Forces Command began employing a program-centric approach that focused on
establishing permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all
rotations of active service and combatant command training programs.
Previously, the event-centric approach only provided a limited number of
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with an opportunity to experience a
JNTC-enhanced joint training event. Specifically, one rotation of the
Navy's Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint exercise would have been enhanced
by the JNTC initiative, and the one event would have incorporated enhanced
joint capabilities. However, in the program-centric approach, the number
of training opportunities using JNTC enhancements significantly increases.
Now, every rotation of the Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint exercise has
the opportunity to include enhanced joint training.
The accreditation process involves several steps, beginning with the
nomination process and ending with the Joint Forces Command's
recommendation. The key steps of the accreditation process are summarized
below:
o The Joint Forces Command sends a message to the active services
and combatant commands, requesting that they nominate training
programs and joint tasks to be accredited.
o Once the active services and combatant commands submit their
training programs for nomination, the Joint Forces Command reviews
and selects these programs, and consolidates and prioritizes a
master schedule of those nominated programs to include joint tasks
to be performed by each program.
o To familiarize the active services and combatant commands with
the accreditation process, the Joint Forces Command's
Accreditation Review Team develops a Web site for each training
program and provides training for the services and combatant
commands.
o The Joint Forces Command schedules site visits with cognizant
active service and combatant command officials to perform its
accreditation review.
o The Joint Forces Command team conducts the review and makes a
recommendation to the Commander, who will grant the appropriate
level of accreditation status to that training program on specific
joint tasks, in the final accreditation report.10
9 Similar to the accrediting of a university, a training program is
accredited, not the training audience. As the accrediting agency, the
Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center ensures that the training
program has the required resources and addresses key elements to provide
quality joint training to the training audience.
JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasize Priorities
Identified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
Although the Joint Forces Command has begun its accreditation process to
facilitate the JNTC goals, it has not emphasized nominating training
programs that place a priority on new and emerging missions as stressed in
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. These new and emerging mission
areas include irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations,
combating weapons of mass destruction, and information operations, which
may emphasize additional skill sets than offensive combat operations, such
as cultural awareness training and coordination with other agencies. In
the past nomination cycles, there has been no guidance that provides
criteria for nominating training programs and joint tasks. In lieu of
established nomination guidance, we found that the active services
nominated training programs based on several reasons. For example, Army
and Marine Corps officials told us they selected programs based on their
need to enhance joint tasks for the maximum number of participants. The
Navy nominated programs based on their ability to provide joint and
coalition training. The Air Force nominated programs based on their
perceived gains from adding jointness to the training environment. While
there have been no specific nomination criteria, the Joint Forces Command
has established criteria it uses for selecting programs once nominated.
These criteria focus on (1) programs that address critical joint training
issues that are affecting warfighting capabilities; (2) the mission of
organizations that will receive joint training; (3) programs that provide
predeployment training; and (4) joint throughput, or the number of
multi-service and joint units that can be trained on required joint
training. These criteria do not emphasize skill sets required for new and
emerging mission areas.
Currently, the Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing
guidance for future use that will provide criteria for nominating
programs. These criteria ask active services and combatant commands to
nominate programs that have the following traits: (1) primary training
audience composed of units or staff; (2) established system for providing
training feedback; (3) established training cadre and/or exercise control
structure; and (4) realistic threat portrayal (i.e., opposing forces)
within the training programs. Additionally, it provides nomination
criteria for accrediting the joint tasks within the program. The criteria
requires that the joint tasks (1) come from the Universal Joint Task
List11 or the latest approved list of joint tasks, and (2) fall within the
normal core competencies and normal training environment of the nominated
training programs. Although the Joint Forces Command has proposed
nomination guidance, its draft guidance still has not emphasized the need
to accredit tasks within active service and combatant command training
programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas.
Until DOD establishes such nomination guidance, new and emerging missions
will not be given priority in the accreditation process and thus be able
to incorporate the JNTC enhancements.
10 When the Joint Forces Command considers a training program for
accreditation, it assesses the program and determines if it merits being
fully accredited, conditionally accredited, or not qualified to be
accredited.
By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command had conditionally
accredited joint tasks in 4 programs and plans to grant accreditation to
joint tasks in as many as 23 additional programs by the end of 2006. Most
of these training programs focus primarily on traditional combat missions.
For example, the Navy's Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint program has been
conditionally accredited on seven joint tasks, including developing and
sharing intelligence, conducting joint fires, conducting air and missile
defense operations, and conducting defensive counter air operations.
Additionally, the Joint Forces Command anticipates that the active
services and combatant commands will nominate 3 or 4 additional programs
for accreditation in 2007. Table 3 shows the total nominated programs,
including the 4 programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005 and
the 23 programs planned to be accredited for 2006.
11 The Universal Joint Task List is a menu of capabilities that may be
selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission.
Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for
Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006
Active service/combatant command Training program
Army Battle Command Training Programa
Joint Readiness Training Center
National Training Center
Combat Maneuver Training Center
Air Force Blue Flaga
Air Warrior I
Air Warrior II
Virtual Flag
Red Flag
Cope Thunder
Warrior Prep Center (nominated by
European Command)
Navy Fleet Synthetic Training - Jointa
Joint Task Force Exercise
Marine Corps Marine Aviation Weapons Training Squadron
1
Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff
Training Program
Marine Air Ground Task Force Training
Center
Mountain Warfare Training Center
Joint Forces Command Unified Endeavor Mission Rehearsal
Programa
Pacific Command Pacific Command Joint Task Force Training
Program
Central Command Internal Look
Northern Command Ardent Sentry
European Command Joint Training Requirements and Exercise
Division
Warrior Prep Center
Strategic Command Strategic Command Training Program
Special Operations Command Able Warrior/Able Focus
Southern Command Southern Command Joint Exercise Program
Transportation Command Turbo Challenge
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation.
aIndicate training programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005
by Joint Forces Command.
Accreditation Process Has No Mechanism to Ensure Recurring Use of JNTC
Capabilities
The Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that accredited
joint training will consistently reoccur in active service and combatant
command training programs. As previously noted, the intent of the
accreditation process is to ensure that all units participating in joint
training, regardless of location, experience a recurring, consistent,
realistic joint environment. In addition, DOD has directed the services to
conduct joint training to the maximum extent possible in accredited
exercises. As previously noted, in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces
Command began to transition its JNTC initiative from an event-centric
approach to a broader program-centric approach, focusing on establishing
permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all rotations of
training events, not just a single designated training event.
However, the Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that joint
tasks previously accredited will consistently be incorporated in future
service and combatant commander training events. According to DOD
officials, the services and combatant commands should participate in the
accreditation process in order to obtain JNTC funding for their nominated
training programs. However, according to a Joint Forces Command official,
the command cannot require the services and combatant commands to train to
the joint tasks that have been accredited. Service officials we spoke with
stated that currently there are no consequences for them not continuing to
include accredited joint tasks in future training rotations. While service
officials recognized the value of training to accredited joint tasks, they
also recognized that there are competing demands for their time and
resources that may preclude them from training to joint tasks. Situations
that compete for their time and resources include service-specific unit
training requirements, shortage of training funds, and the deployment of
personnel and equipment to overseas operations. While the Joint Forces
Command provides financial contributions to the services to help offset
the costs associated with incorporating the JNTC enhancements, it is not
clear if the JNTC initiative's financial contributions are significant
enough to function as leverage to encourage the repeated training of
accredited joint tasks. For example, an Army official stated that the Army
has budgeted $640 million to support its combat training centers in fiscal
year 2006, and that the Joint Forces Command's support for the Army's
combat training centers amounts to $11.6 million.
The Joint Forces Command is taking a proactive step to help support the
active services and combatant commands in embedding JNTC enhancements in
their training programs. It is hiring Support Elements-JNTC
representatives placed permanently at service and combatant command
training programs-to help ensure that the program officials implement the
JNTC initiative by creating a supporting relationship between
organizations. Additionally, the Support Elements are to assist program
officials with joint training planning and executions at their locations
and ensure that standards are maintained in accreditation reviews.
However, according to JNTC officials, these individuals alone may not be
able to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to occur.
Furthermore, it is too early to determine if the services will continue to
include joint tasks on a regular basis, since the Joint Forces Command
only began the accreditation process in 2005 and only recently established
positions to be filled by Support Element representatives.
The Joint Force Commander plans to reaccredit training programs every 3
years but has not established criteria for their reaccreditation process
that would ensure that services and combatant commanders continue to
incorporate and expand on previously accredited joint tasks. According to
the JNTC Accreditation Concept of Operations, a reaccreditation process
will be used to reaffirm accredited status upon expiration (following 3
years) or determine the status of a training program that has undergone
such significant change that the existing program is considerably
different from the program that last received accreditation status.
However, this concept of operations does not address what standard of
training needs to be accomplished or what level of accredited tasks should
be trained to receive reaccreditation. Without providing adequate
reaccreditation guidance, the Joint Forces Command may risk not
accomplishing the intent of JNTC's accreditation efforts. Moreover, until
DOD establishes standards for reaccrediting training programs that ensure
the consistent incorporation of JNTC enhancement in future training
rotations, DOD risks not maximizing its investment in the JNTC initiative.
No National Guard Training Programs Have Been Considered for JNTC Accreditation
DOD encourages the integration of the reserve components into joint
training. Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
reinforces the need for joint training to include the reserve components
in ensuring the readiness of the total force, and a DOD directive on
military training12 says that to the maximum extent possible, all
components shall conduct joint training in accredited events. Our analysis
found that the National Guard has developed joint training exercise
programs dealing with missions involving homeland defense and security.
However, no National Guard training programs have currently been
considered for JNTC accreditation. Joint Forces Command officials stated
they have not placed a priority on involving the National Guard in the
JNTC accreditation process, and incorporating the National Guard into the
JNTC initiative is still a long-term goal for the Joint Forces Command.
The Joint Forces Command has not sent request messages seeking nominations
for joint training accreditation to the National Guard as it has done for
the active services and combatant commands. In addition, we found that the
Joint Forces Command has not established a process for nominating and
accrediting National Guard-specific training programs.
12 Department of Defense Directive, 1322.18, Military Training.
The National Guard Bureau has approached the Joint Forces Command about
considering the Vigilant Guard training program-a series of training
exercises that will further enhance the preparedness of the National Guard
to perform roles and responsibilities related to homeland defense and
defense support to civil authorities-for the JNTC accreditation process.
The training program involves 4 to 6 states per event with a focus on the
training and coordination of the newly established state joint force
headquarters and state joint task forces. Vigilant Guard provides the
National Guard the opportunity to execute core joint tasks, such as (1)
acquire and communicate operational-level information and maintain status;
(2) establish, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters; and (3)
provide theater support to other DOD and government agencies. However,
National Guard officials stated that Vigilant Guard has not yet been
considered for accreditation by the Joint Forces Command.
National Guard Bureau officials have also recently discussed with the
Joint Forces Command officials the potential for linking the National
Guard's GuardNet network to JNTC's joint network. GuardNet is a network
for delivering telecommunications services to National Guard users in 54
U.S. states and territories, providing persistent connectivity. It
consolidates video and data functions to support simulation, training,
mobilization command and control, and computer emergency response, in
addition to operational missions assigned to the National Guard. These
telecommunications capabilities have helped to reduce stress on the
National Guard force by decreasing personnel travel and increasing home
station time available for training. To date, National Guard officials
stated that GuardNet has not been integrated into JNTC's joint network
design. Although Joint Forces Command and National Guard officials have
had meetings regarding the inclusion of both Vigilant Guard and GuardNet
into the JNTC joint network, National Guard Bureau officials stated that
no action has yet been taken. Without specific JNTC-accredited training
programs and linkages with JNTC's joint network, National Guard training
programs may not be able to take full advantage of JNTC resources, such as
participation from other components, access to new technologies and
modeling, and training environments that realistically portray overseas
and domestic joint operations.
Conclusions
In the new security environment, U.S. forces are conducting significantly
more complex operations requiring increased joint interoperability among
participants in the theater and on the battlefield. DOD's JNTC initiative
is designed to help the services and combatant commands meet these
challenges. Without thoroughly assessing the progress of the Joint Forces
Command's training transformation efforts, DOD does not know the value
added to the readiness of services and combatant commands resulting from
the significant investment of resources devoted to the JNTC initiative.
Furthermore, recent domestic events and ongoing overseas operations have
placed extremely high demands on the reserve components, which play a
critical role in executing our national defense strategy. Once mobilized,
reservists and National Guard members operate in the same joint
environment as active service members. Unless the reserve components
receive the training necessary to allow them to operate seamlessly in this
environment, reservists may be unprepared to face the full range of
responsibilities they are called upon to perform both at home and abroad.
Until the Joint Forces Command embraces the reserve components,
incorporating their unique training needs into the development of the JNTC
initiative's joint training enhancements, the reserve and the National
Guard forces will not be able to take full advantage of the enhanced joint
training offered through this initiative. Additionally, without clear
criteria to guide the accreditation and reaccreditation process, DOD will
have no assurance that the joint training initiative reflects DOD's
training priorities on new and emerging threats or that the services and
combatant commands will continually take advantage of the resources and
capabilities provided by the JNTC initiative. Without consistently
training its forces in a recurring, realistic, joint operating
environment, DOD will lack assurance that forces deployed to its theaters
will have the necessary skills to operate effectively in today's complex,
multinational, interagency operations. Also, without incorporating the
National Guard into the accreditation process, DOD has no assurance that
the National Guard will experience realistic overseas and domestic joint
operational training environments portrayed by JNTC enhancements.
Furthermore, DOD needs to address the issues highlighted above in order to
ensure that the joint training benefits from its $1.5 billion investment
in the JNTC initiative are being optimized.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To further enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the
benefits of the JNTC initiative for the reserve components, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:
o direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to fully develop a strategy for the next training
transformation assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the
JNTC initiative's implementation on joint training, including time
frames, outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and
responsibilities, and outcomes;
o direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers
for the reserve components and include representatives from the
reserve components as active participants in JNTC working groups
and planning sessions;
o direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to establish guidelines for the services and combatant
commands to follow when nominating programs for future
accreditation that reflect the importance of new and emerging
missions, as emphasized by DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report;
o direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that
will ensure that a recurring, consistent, realistic joint training
environment exists for all units participating in accredited joint
training programs; and
o direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to expand the accreditation process to include National
Guard training programs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with four
recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation to
establish reserve liaisons. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II.
Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department
develop a strategy for evaluating the overall impact of the JNTC
initiative as part of its 2007 training transformation assessment. DOD
stated that it is in the process of developing a plan for its 2007
assessment that will include detailed metrics and roles and
responsibilities and will address the impact of transformation initiatives
on DOD-wide training.
DOD also agreed with our recommendations to (1) establish guidelines that
emphasize the need for the services and combatant commands to consider new
and emerging issues when nominating programs for accreditation, (2)
establish reaccreditation standards and criteria, and (3) expand the
accreditation process to include National Guard training programs. DOD
stated that its accreditation guidance will be refined to include
consideration of new and emerging missions during the next phase of
accreditation reviews. Additionally, DOD stated that the Joint Forces
Command will ensure that the accreditation concept of operations is
strengthened to include specific reaccreditation standards. Further, DOD
stated it will add National Guard training programs with the appropriate
joint environment to the accreditation nomination list. Moreover, it noted
that the JNTC Joint Management Office is actively discussing this action
with National Guard leadership to develop a plan for inclusion of National
Guard joint training programs.
Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Joint
Forces Command establish liaison officers for the reserve components and
include reserve component representatives as participants in JNTC working
groups and planning sessions. The department agreed it should establish
liaison officers for the National Guard and include Guard representatives
as participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions. However, DOD
stated that the joint training requirements of the other reserve
components are adequately addressed through the current service liaison
officer structure within JNTC and the assigned reserve Joint Warfighting
Center. DOD's approach would require that the Army, Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corp reserves continue to voice their training needs indirectly
through their respective service headquarters rather than through direct
participation. However, as discussed in this report, Training
Transformation documents and officials from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense's Office of Reserve Affairs have recognized that the reserve
components have some unique training requirements and that these
requirements have yet to receive priority in the Joint Forces Command's
JNTC initiative. We continue to believe that all reserve components would
benefit if the Joint Forces Command would establish liaison officers for
both the National Guard and the service reserve components and include
them as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions
to allow them to voice their unique training needs and enhance their
awareness of new developments and opportunities in joint training.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander
of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected] . Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed
in appendix III.
Janet A. St. Laurent, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Joint National Training Capability
(JNTC) initiative has improved the ability of the services and combatant
commands to train jointly, we analyzed 5 of the 16 training exercises
selected by the Joint Forces Command to incorporate JNTC enhancements in
fiscal year 2005. We reviewed relevant exercise planning documents
pertaining to the exercises and JNTC enhancements. We also discussed the
impact of the JNTC initiative with a variety of officials in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, combatant commands, and
Joint Chiefs of Staff who were involved in this effort. Additionally, we
discussed our methods, the attributes to be assessed, and the information
collected with agency officials and determined that they were sufficiently
reliable for our purposes. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be
used to make inferences about a population, because some elements of the
population have no chance of being selected. Specifically, we did the
following:
o To select the five exercises, we reviewed the descriptions and
training profiles provided by JNTC initiative officials, and in
consultation with these officials, we identified one event
selected by the Joint Forces Command to be enhanced by the JNTC
initiative from each of the military services and one sponsored by
a combatant command.
o To analyze the exercises, we identified attributes that would
allow us to quantitatively discern the differences in selected
exercises prior to their JNTC designation and afterwards. We then
developed a detailed data collection instrument to precisely and
consistently gather attribute information for comparative
analysis. Our analysis of these attributes allowed us to determine
the measure of change in a selected fiscal year 2005 training
exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained and
reviewed exercise documentation, such as exercise planning
documents, and after action reports for selected exercises to
determine the measure of change in the exercises based on our
attributes.
o To augment our documentation review of the JNTC initiative's
impact on existing service and combatant exercises, we met with
service, combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss their
perspectives on the overall value added to joint training by the
JNTC initiative. We then visited and observed 2 of the 5 exercises
to obtain a real-time assessment of the past and planned evolution
of the exercises and feedback from exercise participants,
including the planners.
To determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had assessed the full
impact of the JNTC effort on joint training through its first training
transformation assessment, we reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC
documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 revised
Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2005 Training
Transformation Assessment Report, and the JNTC initiative's strategic
plan. Additionally, we met with Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials directly involved in conducting the training transformation
assessment to discuss the methodology for the current assessment and plans
for future assessments.
To determine the extent to which the reserve components are benefiting
from the JNTC initiative, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC
documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006
revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report, and the JNTC strategic and implementation plans, to
identify program guidance on the inclusion of the reserve components in
training transformation initiatives and assess the level of coordination
established between the JNTC initiative and the reserve components. We
also examined the extent to which the reserve components participated in
JNTC current events and formal collaboration mechanisms to further
evaluate the effectiveness of the program to benefit the reserve
components. Additionally, we conducted interviews with key reserve,
National Guard, Office of the Secretary of Defense, service, and JNTC
representatives to discuss the overall impact of the JNTC initiative on
the reserve components.
To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has developed an
accreditation process that facilitates program goals, we obtained and
reviewed key accreditation documentation, such as the Accreditation
Concept of Operations, JNTC accreditation program briefing slides, the
draft accreditation handbook and DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report. We also reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents,
including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 revised Training
Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC strategic plan, to
identify program guidance and critical milestones. Additionally, we
reviewed selected training programs' JNTC accreditation reports. To
augment our documentation review, we met with service, combatant command,
and JNTC officials to discuss the status and intent of the accreditation
process. Specifically, we inquired about the status of the accreditation
effort, the nomination process, and the reaccreditation process. We also
examined to what extent the reserve components participated in the JNTC
initiative's accreditation process. Table 4 lists the organizations and
locations we visited during the course of this review.
Table 4: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment
Organization Locations
Army Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Training,
Collective Training Division, Washington, D.C.
Army National Guard, Readiness Center, Arlington,
Virginia
Air Force Headquarters Air Force, Joint Exercises and Training
Innovation, Washington, D.C.
Air Combat Command, Joint Training and Exercise
Directorate, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
Marine Corps Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education
Command, Quantico, Virginia
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Ranges and Fleet
Training Branch, Arlington, Virginia
Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
Tactical Training Group, Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia
USS McFaul, (DDG-74), Norfolk, Virginia
National Guard National Guard Bureau, Alexandria, Virginia
Joint organizations Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve
Affairs, Washington D.C.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and
Training Policy and Programs, Washington, D.C.
- Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability Joint
Management Office, Alexandria, Virginia
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
- Operational Plans and Joint Force Development
Directorate, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
- Joint National Training Capability Joint Management
Office, Suffolk, Virginia
- Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting
Center, Suffolk, Virginia
U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii
- Headquarters, Joint Training Directorate, Camp
Smith,
Hawaii
U.S. Pacific Air Force, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
U.S. Pacific Fleet, Makalapa Compound, Hawaii
Headquarters, Joint Task Force 519, Hawaii
Source: GAO.
We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director;
Fred Harrison; Joe Faley; Bonita Anderson; Angela Watson; Yong Song; Kevin
Keith; Susan Ditto; and Rebecca Shea also made major contributions to this
report.
Related GAO Products
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not
Well-Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid. GAO-06-211
. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2006.
Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training
and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements.
GAO-06-193 . Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T . Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.
Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve
Personnel and Equipment Shortages. GAO-05-660 . Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2005.
Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform
Joint Training. GAO-05-548 . Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management
Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities. GAO-05-70 . Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish
Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers.
GAO-05-8 . Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Military Education: DOD Needs to Develop Performance Goals and Metrics for
Advanced Distributed Learning in Professional Military Education.
GAO-04-873 . Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and
Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T . Washington, D.C.:
April 29, 2004.
Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development
Efforts in the Federal Government. GAO-04-546G . Washington, D.C.: March
2004.
Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could
Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program.
GAO-03-1026 . Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003.
Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air
Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505 . Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2003.
Military Transformation: Progress and Challenges for DOD's Advanced
Distributed Learning Programs. GAO-03-393 . Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2003.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint
Experimentation Program. GAO-02-856 . Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2002.
Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in
Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525 . Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army
Division Training. GAO-01-902 . Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped, but Training and
Readiness Reporting Problems Remain. GAO-01-27 . Washington, D.C.:
November 14, 2000.
Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but
Challenges Remain. GAO/NSAID-00-162 . Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2000.
Army National Guard: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but Personnel and
Workload Are Problems. GAO/NSAID-00-114 . Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2000.
(350724)
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: [email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington,
D.C. 20548
Public Affairs
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington,
D.C. 20548
GAO's Mission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: [email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Congressional Relations
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 Washington,
D.C. 20548
Public Affairs
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington,
D.C. 20548
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-802 .
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click\
on the link above.
For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-802 , a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
August 2006
MILITARY TRAINING
Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint
National Training Capability
The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training Transformation
Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces deploying to their
theaters have had experience operating jointly. The centerpiece of this
effort is the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which
accounts for 84 percent of the $2 billion the department plans to invest
by 2011 to provide a persistent global network that will increase the
level of joint training.
GAO assessed the extent to which (1) JNTC has improved the ability of the
services and combatant commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve
components are benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint
Forces Command has developed an accreditation process to facilitate
program goals. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed key
DOD and JNTC documents. GAO also reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 events
selected in 2005 as JNTC training events, and observed 2 of those events
firsthand.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take a number of actions to
further enhance the quality of joint training for active and reserve
components. In response to a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed
with GAO's recommendations.
The extent to which the JNTC initiative is improving joint training
overall is unclear because DOD has not yet assessed the program's results;
however, GAO's review of five JNTC-enhanced training events found
indications of some joint training improvements. Prior GAO work and the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report have stressed the importance of
performance metrics to gauge program success. While DOD's initial training
transformation assessment set a basic framework for measuring future
program performance, DOD has not developed a strategy to evaluate the
overall impact of the JNTC initiative that includes metrics, time frames,
and processes for gathering data. Without such a plan, DOD will not know
whether the money invested in the initiative will produce desired results
or maximize the benefit for the investment.
Reserve units have participated in JNTC training events, but the unique
training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered
because Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working
relationship with them. The Training Transformation Strategic Plan
recognizes that the reserve components face unique training requirements
and circumstances that must be considered. However, the command has not
established a liaison position for any of the reserve components and has
not included the reserve components in working groups and planning
sessions, as it has done with the active service components and the
combatant commands. Until the command incorporates the reserves more fully
into the JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have
limited ability to enhance their joint training skills.
The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop an accreditation process to
facilitate the JNTC initiative's goals, but it has not emphasized new and
emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will
continue in future training rotations, or incorporated the National Guard.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that training
transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission areas, such as
irregular warfare and combating weapons of mass destruction. The Joint
Forces Command has allowed services and combatant commands to nominate
existing training programs to be accredited, but these programs may not
reflect the priorities established in the Quadrennial Defense Review
Report because nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit
programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas.
Further, no training programs specific to the National Guard are currently
being considered for accreditation. Until the department establishes
nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards and includes the
National Guard in the accreditation process, JNTC events may not reflect
DOD's training priorities, the services may not continually incorporate
JNTC enhancements into their training exercises, and the National Guard
will continue to have limited ability to enhance its joint training
skills.
*** End of document. ***