Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by U.S.
Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many
Missions and New Organization (08-SEP-06, GAO-06-847).
In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the
creation of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to
anticipate and counter global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has
responsibility for seven mission areas including nuclear
deterrence and integrated missile defense. GAO was asked to
determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1)
implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and
(2) defining organizational responsibilities and establishing
relationships with other Department of Defense (DOD) commands and
organizations. To assess progress, GAO compared USSTRATCOM's
efforts with lessons learned in implementing successful
organizational transformations.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-847
ACCNO: A60546
TITLE: Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by
U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many
Missions and New Organization
DATE: 09/08/2006
SUBJECT: Agency evaluation
Agency missions
Federal agency reorganization
Lessons learned
Military communication
Performance measures
Security threats
Strategic planning
Agency organizational structure
Interorganizational relations
Policies and procedures
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GAO-06-847
* Results in Brief
* Background
* USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, b
* USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing Its New Mission
* USSTRATCOM's Exercise Program Has Not Fully Integrated Suppo
* Exercise Program Must Overcome Challenges
* Long-term U.S. Joint Forces Command Support Not Fully Identi
* New USSTRATCOM Organizations Lack Adequate Direction and Cri
* USSTRATCOM Has Not Fully Implemented a Results-oriented Mana
* USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a C
* USSTRATCOM's Guidance to Its Service Components Is Not Speci
* USSTRATCOM Lacks a Coordinated, External Outreach Strategy
* Command Considers External Outreach Essential
* Outreach Efforts Lack Common Approach
* Conclusions
* Recommendations
* Matter for Congressional Consideration
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United
* USSTRATCOM's Budget Has Grown Significantly Since Its Establ
* Budget Increases Reflect New Mission Responsibilities
* USSTRATCOM Is Determining How Funding Will Be Allocated Amon
* Scope and Methodology
* Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Str
* Overall Authorized Personnel Level Has Been Relatively Stabl
* Personnel Requirements for New Organizations Are Being Met W
* USSTRATCOM Has Expanded Its Military Skill Set, but Most Pos
* Air Force and Navy Positions Predominate, but Percentage of
* Scope and Methodology
* Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
* Appendix IV: United States Strategic Command Organizations a
* Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
* Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contact
* Acknowledgments
* Order by Mail or Phone
Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
September 2006
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen
Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization
GAO-06-847
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 4
Background 7
USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, but Efforts Are
Incomplete 11
USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a Commandwide
Outreach Strategy 26
Conclusions 34
Recommendations 35
Matter for Congressional Consideration 37
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38
Appendix I GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United States
Strategic Command's Budget 43
Appendix II GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Strategic Command
Military and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level 46
Appendix III Scope and Methodology 52
Appendix IV United States Strategic Command Organizations and
Responsibilities 58
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 61
Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 66
Tables
Table 1: USSTRATCOM Historical and Projected Budgets from Fiscal Years
2003 through 2011 10
Table 2: Key Dates for Establishing and Implementing New USSTRATCOM
Mission Organizations 20
Table 3: USSTRATCOM First Principles 24
Table 4: Approved and Filled Positions at USSTRATCOM's New Mission
Organizations as of February 2006 48
Table 5: Projected Distribution of USSTRATCOM Civilian and Military
Positions in October 2007 50
Table 6: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review 57
Table 7: Key USSTRATCOM Organizations and Responsibilities 59
Figures
Figure 1: USSTRATCOM Organization 8
Figure 2: Locations of USSTRATCOM's Headquarters and Subordinate Mission
Organizations 58
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
September 8, 2006
The Honorable Terry Everett Chairman The Honorable Silvestre Reyes Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives
In 2002, following a series of high-level Department of Defense (DOD)
studies including the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture
Review, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation of
a new unified command, the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),1
to effectively and efficiently anticipate and counter the diverse and
increasingly complex global threats the United States faces for the
foreseeable future. USSTRATCOM was initially assigned responsibility for
nuclear deterrence, space, and computer network operations. The President,
in January 2003, expanded USSTRATCOM's global responsibilities and
capabilities to include global strike planning and execution; integration
of global ballistic missile defense; oversight of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and global command and control; and DOD
information operations. In January 2005, the Secretary of Defense also
assigned the command with responsibilities for integrating and
synchronizing DOD's efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction. Each
of USSTRATCOM's seven missions has a significant role in implementing
DOD's New Triad concept for transforming U.S. strategic capabilities.2 DOD
envisions that the combination of capabilities provided by these global
missions would potentially add value for the combatant commanders in
conducting operations in and across regional areas and provide the
President and Secretary of Defense with an expanded range of military
options for responding to future threats, including those involving
weapons of mass destruction.
1A previous unified command, also called U.S. Strategic Command, had been
established in 1992 and had primary responsibility for strategic nuclear
forces. The new USSTRATCOM was formed from combining the nuclear
deterrence mission of the previous command and the space and computer
network operations missions of the also disestablished U.S. Space Command.
The set of diverse global missions assigned to USSTRATCOM span multiple
levels and lines of authority, cross combatant command regional
boundaries, and intersect with various national and international
organizations. Under USSTRATCOM's most recent reorganization, which it
began implementing in late 2004, the command has assigned day-to-day
operations and management responsibility for most of its mission areas to
five new subordinate organizations.3 These new organizations are
geographically dispersed and most are aligned with key DOD agencies or
military services to provide leadership and access to their competencies,
such as the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare
partnering with the National Security Agency.
USSTRATCOM is attempting to transform its organization to better meet the
security challenges of the new century and effectively anticipate,
counter, and eliminate the emergence of unconventional threats overseas
and at home. In our prior work to identify useful practices and lessons
learned in implementing successful organizational mergers and
transformations, we found that in successful transformations,
organizations undergo a change of their cultures to become more
results-oriented, client- and customer-oriented, and collaborative in
nature. Such high-performing organizations create a culture that includes
moving from outputs to results; stovepipes to matrixes; hierarchical to
flatter and more horizontal structures; an inward to an external focus on
customers and other stakeholders; reactive behavior to proactive
approaches; hoarding knowledge to sharing knowledge; and protecting "turf"
to forming partnerships. To successfully transform, an organization must
fundamentally reexamine its processes, organizational structures, and
management approaches.4
2DOD's New Triad concept is intended to bring together nuclear and
conventional offensive strike, active and passive defense, enhanced
command and control, planning, and intelligence capabilities and a
revitalized defense infrastructure to provide the President and Secretary
of Defense with a broad array of military options to better address the
spectrum of potential opponents and contingencies that may arise in the
coming decades. We issued a report on the New Triad that discusses the
progress made by DOD in determining and allocating resources needed to
implement the concept today and in the future. See, GAO, Military
Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad
Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach, GAO-05-540
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).
3The new organizations are the Joint Functional Component Command for
Space and Global Strike; Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense; Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Joint Functional Component Command for
Network Warfare; and USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
At your request, we reviewed the progress made by USSTRATCOM in developing
and integrating its missions to provide new capabilities and expand U.S.
options for responding to global threats. Specifically, we assessed the
extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1) implementing its new
missions and assessing mission results and (2) defining organizational
responsibilities and establishing relationships with other DOD commands
and organizations.
To obtain information on USSTRATCOM's efforts to implement and assess its
new missions, define its organization, and establish relationships with
other organizations, we reviewed USSTRATCOM, DOD, Joint Staff, and
military service guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status
reports, and other pertinent documentation. We observed a major USSTRATCOM
command exercise, Global Lightning, in November 2005, at the command's
headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska; discussed the results with
participating officials; and reviewed the command's after-action report
and associated documentation. We also interviewed USSTRATCOM officials at
headquarters; subordinate mission organizations; Army, Air Force, and
Marine Corps service components; and the Navy Fleet Forces Command. In
addition, we reviewed organizational assessments prepared by think tanks,
such as LMI Government Consulting and RAND Corporation, and discussed the
assessments with their staffs to obtain their perspectives on USSTRATCOM's
approach for organizing and managing its missions. We also obtained and
analyzed information on USSTRATCOM's budget and authorized personnel data
to identify trends in acquiring the resources, staff levels, and skills
needed to implement the command's missions (see apps. I and II).
4We have issued several reports addressing best practices followed by
federal government agencies and private-sector organizations in
implementing successful mergers and transformations and building
high-performance organizations. These reports include GAO, Highlights of a
GAO Forum on High-Performing Organizations: Metrics, Means, and Mechanisms
for Achieving High Performance in the 21st Century Public Management
Environment, GAO-04-343SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004); Highlights of
a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department
of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); 21st Century Challenges: Transforming Government to
Meet Current and Emerging Challenges, GAO-05-830T (Washington, D.C.: July
13, 2005); and Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.:
July 2, 2003).
We assessed the reliability of the data used in our analyses, and
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We
conducted our review from May 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix III for a
more complete description of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief
USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions but
additional steps are needed to expand upon this progress in order to
achieve the vision and goals underlying the command's establishment. To
date, the command has made progress in developing concepts of operations;
establishing plans, guidance, and policy for its missions; and obtaining
personnel and resources needed to begin operations. For example, in
implementing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission,
the command has partnered with the Defense Intelligence Agency to improve
its access and coordination with DOD and national intelligence agencies.
In addition, to prevent and defend against intrusions into DOD's critical
information network systems, the command has recently instituted new
controls and trained system users to reduce system vulnerabilities.
However, while the command's leadership recognizes the need to build on
its progress to date and has some additional actions underway in its seven
mission areas, more comprehensive plans and actions are needed in several
areas to help the command achieve DOD's vision. First, while USSTRATCOM
has taken initial steps to include its newer missions in its training
exercises, the command has not yet fully developed a robust exercise
program that integrates the exercise support available from the U.S. Joint
Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center, whose mission includes
providing planning tools and independent observer teams to strengthen
exercises. Our prior work has shown that robust exercise programs are
important for assessing and improving mission capabilities, particularly
when multiple organizations are involved in mission execution. Second,
USSTRATCOM has established specific milestones for its mission areas to
achieve full operating capability but neither the command nor its
subordinate mission organizations have established clear criteria to use
in assessing whether mission organizations have reached full operating
capability. Third, the command has not developed a results-oriented
management approach with strategic goals and performance measures and
criteria for continuously assessing results across the command and in each
of its mission areas. Our prior work has shown that organizations
undertaking complex transformations can increase their likelihood of
success by adopting a results-oriented management approach to guide and
measure progress. Developing plans in each of these areas should better
position the command to meet two of DOD's major goals for the
command-providing combatant commanders with added value in conducting
operations and giving the President and the Secretary of Defense an
expanded set of military options for responding to future threats.
USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall
organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations
that have responsibility for daily operations. However, opportunities
exist to clarify and improve the command's relationships with subordinate
organizations and other commands. The command's new organizational
framework, while still being implemented, has led to better identification
of resources, staffing, and skills for each of USSTRATCOM's diverse
missions. Also, many of the actions the command has taken to implement its
latest reorganization-such as establishing a matrixed, horizontal
organizational structure that openly shares information-are consistent
with transformation approaches that have been used by high-performing
organizations. However, moving forward, two areas warrant additional
attention. Specifically, while USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to
its service component organizations, this guidance has not been specific
or well documented and Army, Air Force, and Navy service component
officials told us that additional guidance is needed to more clearly
define responsibilities and relationships. In addition, while the command
conducts some outreach with other combatant commands and organizations,
USSTRATCOM has not developed a commandwide strategy to effectively manage
and coordinate its external outreach activities. Because USSTRATCOM
supports or is supported by a large number of commands and organizations
in executing its diverse missions, the command considers effective
relationships and communications essential. However, providing
coordinated, consistent outreach to other DOD organizations, such as
combatant commands, has become more difficult since USSTRATCOM established
separate subordinate organizations for several of its missions. Developing
additional strategies and plans to address these two challenges should
help USSTRATCOM's service component organizations better understand their
roles and the command build more effective relationships with other
commands.
To strengthen USSTRATCOM efforts to implement its missions and establish
its most recent organizational approach, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense take seven actions; three actions that are designed
to improve the command's access to the services and resources that the
U.S. Joint Forces Command can provide to support USSTRATCOM's exercise
program and four other actions intended to (1) clarify guidance on the
criteria to be used by USSTRATCOM mission organizations in declaring full
operating capability, (2) improve evaluation of the command's longer-term
progress in its mission areas, (3) provide more complete guidance to its
service component organizations, and (4) strengthen its external
communications with other organizations and commands. DOD, in its comments
on a draft of this report, generally agreed with our three recommendations
regarding U.S. Joint Forces Command's support of USSTRATCOM's exercise
program. DOD disagreed with our four other recommendations. In its
comments, DOD stated that measures are already in place that address the
issues raised by the report. We disagree that the actions taken by
USSTRATCOM to date fulfill the intent of our recommendations and are
complete. While USSTRATCOM has taken some positive actions on these
issues, we do not believe that the command's actions go far enough in
providing a clear and transparent process for evaluating the command's
progress in implementing its mission areas, provide more complete guidance
to its mission and service component organizations, and strengthen its
external communications with other organizations and commands. For
example, while USSTRATCOM organizations routinely conduct outreach
activities to promote its missions and capabilities, we found that these
activities are often not well coordinated and consistently conducted to
achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. USSTRATCOM commander's
summary reports prepared after its two most recent Global Lightning
exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the command develop a
comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding among other
combatant commands about USSTRATCOM's capabilities. However, command
officials told us that the command does not have any current plans to
develop such a strategy. Additionally, because of the importance of the
command's new role in expanding the military options for addressing
emerging threats, we continue to believe that creation of a longer-term,
comprehensive, results-oriented management process is needed that would
improve transparency and accountability of the extent to which the command
is achieving the desired outcomes of its overall goals and objectives in
each of its mission areas. Therefore, we are now suggesting that Congress
consider requiring the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop such
a process and report to Congress on command's progress in achieving
desired outcomes. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix V and our evaluation of its comments is on page 38.
Background
USSTRATCOM's global missions provide a wide range of capabilities that are
intended to respond to a dramatically changing security environment
brought about by emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric threats to
U.S. national security. Unlike the command's nuclear deterrence and space
operations missions, the command's global strike; integrated ballistic
missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
information operations; global command and control; and combating weapons
of mass destruction missions had not been previously assigned to a unified
command. These newer missions have been performed, mostly ad hoc, by
multiple DOD organizations and the military services but did not have a
primary joint sponsor and central focus within DOD.
The command's most recent reorganization, begun in late 2004, shifted the
day-to-day planning and execution responsibility for most of its missions
from its headquarters to several new subordinate organizations. USSTRATCOM
intends that its latest organizational construct will provide greater
focus, continuity, and performance for its missions and better accommodate
the execution of the command's global responsibilities by reducing
organizational layers and enabling communication and information to flow
more easily from the most senior levels of leadership to those producing
the information. The command envisions that this new organizational
construct will reduce the cycle time for reaching and implementing
decisions for its missions, increase the effectiveness of the products and
services it provides in support of the regional combatant commands, and
provide improved access to all of the command's capabilities. USSTRATCOM,
for example, has recently established a joint space operations center,
under its Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike,
to more effectively respond to requests from regional combatant commands
for space capabilities. As shown in figure 1, the current USSTRATCOM
organization is comprised of a command headquarters, service component or
supporting commands, joint functional component commands, centers, and
task forces.
Figure 1: USSTRATCOM Organization
Notes: C2= command and control; JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command;
WMD= weapons of mass destruction.
Under the new organization, USSTRATCOM's headquarters would focus
primarily on overseeing tasks for command and control; strategic-level
integration; and advocacy, including developing strategy and plans,
managing command and control operations and support, and advocating for
mission capabilities. It also has responsibility for designating
objectives; assigning missions, tasks, forces, and resources; defining
policy and concepts; and providing direction to the command's subordinate
organizations. Additionally, USSTRATCOM headquarters has responsibility
for planning and deploying forces for the command's nuclear mission.
The reorganization created four new joint functional component commands
for (1) space and global strike; (2) integrated missile defense; (3)
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and (4) network warfare.
These commands have day-to-day responsibilities for operational and
tactical-level planning and execution and management of forces. The new
organization also includes the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Joint Information Operations Center, and Joint Task
Force for Global Network Operations that work with the command, the
unified commands, and mission partners to provide operational solutions to
mission-related problems.
The command has also geographically aligned many of its subordinate
organizations with supporting military services and Defense agencies to
leverage the expertise and resources in their respective mission areas.
For example, the command has partnered and co-located its Joint Functional
Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance with
the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Washington, D.C., area to take
advantage of the agency's capabilities and improve access and coordination
with DOD and national intelligence agencies. To further strengthen the
partnership between the organizations, the commander of the component
command is also the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In
response to intelligence information requests from the combatant
commanders, the agency would globally prioritize intelligence collection
requirements and the joint functional component command would then
prioritize and task the appropriate intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets to best meet those requirements. Appendix IV
provides additional information about the command's key mission
organizations.
Additionally, the reorganization established new command relationships
with the military services to better focus service support. USSTRATCOM
accesses capabilities from each of the services through its three service
component commands-the Army Forces Strategic Command, Air Force Forces
Strategic Command, and Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command-and the
Commander, U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command. Unlike the other services, the
Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting command rather than a designated
service component command to USSTRATCOM.5 However, Fleet Forces Command's
overarching responsibilities in supporting USSTRATCOM are consistent with
those of the other service components. Each service command acts as the
primary focal point for its respective service capabilities and has
responsibilities for ensuring that forces provided to USSTRATCOM are
organized, trained, and equipped to support the command in carrying out
its missions and providing the administrative chain of command and control
for its respective service forces.
5The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Unified Action Armed Forces, Joint
Publication 0-2, defines a service component command as a command
consisting of the service component commander and all those service
forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and
installations under the command, including the support forces that have
been assigned to a combatant command. Service component commands report
directly to the Commander, USSTRATCOM. A supporting commander, in the
context of a support command relationship, is a commander who aids,
protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and is
responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported
commander.
Because of its expanded set of missions, USSTRATCOM's budget has grown
significantly from $276.8 million of total obligation authority in
then-year dollars in fiscal year 2003 to $500.4 million in fiscal year
2006, excluding appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM
service component commands and other supporting agencies.6 The command's
annual budget is expected to increase to $551.4 million by fiscal year
2011. Table 1 details the command's historic and projected budget by major
appropriations account from fiscal years 2003 through 2011. The command's
budget is comprised mostly of operation and maintenance funding, with
lesser amounts of research and development and procurement funding
associated with programs for intelligence, information operations, network
warfare, command and control, and planning systems. Appendix I provides
more details about USSTRATCOM's budget.
Table 1: USSTRATCOM Historical and Projected Budgets from Fiscal Years
2003 through 2011
Total obligation authority in millions of then-year dollars
Fiscal year
Appropriations
account 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Operation and
Maintenance $253.2 $353.5 $408.6 $417.3 $438.6 $442.6 $457.9 $467.6 $477.6
Procurement 23.6 44.3 45.0 33.9 31.9 35.3 39.0 34.3 34.9
Research and
Development 0 8.8 36.2 49.2 51.4 37.6 34.9 38.3 38.9
Totala $276.8 $406.6 $489.9 $500.4 $521.9 $515.5 $531.8 $540.2 $551.4
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Notes: Data for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 are actual command
expenditures, data for fiscal year 2006 are funding distributions, and
data for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 are funding projections current as
of the President's budget submission for fiscal year 2006. Totals do not
include Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps military personnel
appropriations and appropriations made to USSTRATCOM service components
and supporting agencies, because these appropriations are not managed by
the command in performing its operations. aTotals may not add due to
rounding.
6Appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM service component
commands and other supporting agencies are not managed by the command in
performing its operations, and are therefore not part of the command's
annual budgets.
Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM's authorized number of military and
civilian positions7 has increased by about 300. As of October 2005, the
command's overall authorized personnel level was composed of 2,947
military and civilian positions, of which 91 percent were filled. Of the
2,947 positions, military positions comprise about 72 percent of the
positions (2,122), with the Air Force providing the largest number of
positions (1,256). Civilian positions make up the remaining 28 percent
(835). The command has begun to fill positions in its new mission
organizations from within its existing authorized personnel levels by
transferring positions from its headquarters to the new organizations over
a 3-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. The command's authorized
personnel levels are made up of a relatively few number of skills,
although the mix of military skills has changed since 2002. Additional
information about USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel levels is in appendix
II.
USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, but Efforts Are
Incomplete
USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions and has
taken a number of positive actions in each of its mission areas to prepare
or update concepts of operations, plans, guidance, and policy; identify
resources needed for mission planning and execution; and establish an
organization to more effectively manage its responsibilities and provide
the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the command's
actions are consistent with the useful practices and lessons learned with
high-performing organizations undergoing successful transformations that
we have identified in our past work. However, further steps are needed to
build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by
the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the
command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its
exercise program, USSTRATCOM has not yet fully developed a robust exercise
program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint
Forces Command, which can provide planning, training, and exercise tools.
In addition, while USSTRATCOM's leadership has provided general guidance
to its mission organizations, it has not provided specific information or
identified consistent requirements for achieving full operating capability
and most of the command's new mission organizations have not established
clear criteria for determining when they have reached this milestone.
Also, while the command has adopted some key management principles, the
command has not yet developed strategic goals and outcome-oriented
performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the command
and in each of its mission areas.
7USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel levels are defined as the number of
authorized positions for civilian and uniformed military personnel that
are funded by the services and assigned to the command.
USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing Its New Missions
Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its
new missions and has taken a wide range of positive actions to integrate
these missions into its organization, such as developing various plans,
concepts, and guidance; establishing procedures and processes; identifying
personnel and funding resources; developing new relationships; building
communication networks; and providing education, training, and exercises.
For example, the command has prepared concepts of operations for its
missions and organization, such as operations for network warfare and
global integrated missile defense, and has recently approved a concept of
operations describing the processes it will use in integrating its diverse
capabilities and providing warfighting options to regional combatant
commands. Additionally, USSTRATCOM has taken other actions, including (1)
establishing collaboration tools and processes to improve communication
for planning, execution, and evaluation among its organizations and
customers; (2) creating various processes and groups within the command to
advocate for the capabilities necessary to accomplish its missions, such
as advocating for modification of the Trident II missile to provide an
improved near-term conventional global strike capability; and (3)
upgrading and expanding its facilities, such as improvements to the
command's headquarters command center. The command has also taken actions
to demonstrate the value added of its missions for other combatant
commands and DOD organizations. For example, to implement its mission
responsibilities for preventing and defending against intrusions into
DOD's critical information network systems, the command's Joint Task Force
for Global Network Operations has recently instituted stringent use
controls and trained system users to improve security and reduce
vulnerabilities for these systems.
As its missions have matured, USSTRATCOM has also undertaken several
reorganizations to more effectively manage its responsibilities and
provide the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the
actions the command has taken to implement its latest reorganization are
consistent with the useful practices and lessons learned with
high-performing organizations undergoing successful transformations that
we have identified in our prior work, including establishing a matrixed,
horizontal organizational structure that provides a greater external focus
for its customers, forms partnerships with key organizations, and openly
shares information. As discussed earlier, its latest reorganization
intends to leverage essential competencies of associated components and
key supporting agencies and decentralize the responsibility of its
headquarters for the day-to-day planning and execution of its primary
mission areas to several interdependent mission organizations. While the
command's mission organizations differ in the extent of their maturity,
USSTRATCOM has focused considerable attention over the past year on
establishing their responsibilities, command and agency relationships, and
operational competencies, and assigning personnel to these new
organizations. Its senior leadership has also taken an active and visible
role in supporting the organizational changes underway.
USSTRATCOM's Exercise Program Has Not Fully Integrated Support Available from
the U.S. Joint Forces Command
USSTRATCOM has restructured its exercise program to better incorporate its
missions and has conducted a few training exercises involving all of its
missions and new organizations. While the command is taking steps to
address the challenges in more fully including its missions in its
exercises, it has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that
integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command's
Joint Warfighting Center, which can provide planning, training, and
exercise tools.8
Exercise Program Must Overcome Challenges
USSTRATCOM restructured its exercise program in 2003. It began
incorporating its newer missions into its exercises beginning in November
2004 and brought together all of its missions in the same exercise in its
two most recent exercises, Global Lightning in November 2005, and Global
Thunder in April 2006. Global Lightning is an annual USSTRATCOM-sponsored
command-post exercise, which involves the commander and his staff in
testing and validating the communications within and between headquarters
and simulated forces in deterring a military attack and employing forces
as directed. The annual Global Thunder exercise is the command's main
nuclear deterrence field training exercise, which uses actual forces in
training commanders, staff, and individual units at all levels of their
warfare skills. Another command-post exercise, Global Storm, is designed
to cover the command's missions that are most relevant in the early stages
of conflict, such as information operations and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. The command plans to conduct this
exercise annually depending on scheduling and resource considerations.
8The U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center assists the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commanders, and chiefs of
the services in their preparation for joint warfare both in the
conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint
doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint exercises and training. It
provides the core expertise to assist in the planning, execution, and
assessment of joint exercises and training activities.
The command faces challenges in effectively executing its exercise program
across its missions and new organizations. However, the command is taking
some actions to overcome these challenges, and some of these challenges
should lessen over time as the command's missions and organizations
mature. First, many of the command's operational concepts, directives, and
instructions used in designing and executing exercises have not yet been
approved, developed, or revised to reflect its new organization. For
example, at the time of the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, some
USSTRATCOM mission organizations were executing their processes and
procedures without the benefit of complete and approved doctrine because
several key concepts of operations for its missions, such as the concept
of operations for horizontally integrating its missions, were still in
draft form. According to USSTRATCOM officials, the command has to prepare
plans for an exercise many months in advance even if its doctrine
continues to evolve. The officials said that USSTRATCOM incorporates any
changes to doctrine and guidance as it develops its exercise plan, but
these changes are more difficult to make as the plan becomes more complete
and the exercise nears. A USSTRATCOM official told us that doctrine and
guidance should become more stable and change less frequently as the
command's missions, organization, and processes mature.
Second, several of the command's new mission organizations are still being
established, which has affected their ability to fully participate in the
command's recent exercises and identify exercise objectives. For example,
at the time of the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, the new joint
functional component commands had existed for less than 1 year, and the
Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction had been established for
only 3 months. According to the Chief of Staff for the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance component, the component was not able to
establish full connectivity during the exercise because it was still
operating out of temporary facilities. Further, the new mission
organizations were too immature, did not have staff in place, and lacked
the established processes and procedures needed to plan their own
objectives for the November 2005 exercise, according to USSTRATCOM
officials. Instead, the new organizations' exercise objectives for the
November 2005 Global Lightning exercise were established by the command's
headquarters and linked to a broader set of critical tasks and
responsibilities. Moreover, while the command's Center for Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction personnel participated extensively in the
November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, no specific exercise objectives
had been developed for the center's mission area. To begin addressing the
challenge of increasing involvement of its new organizations in exercise
development, the command has advocated the establishment of an exercise or
training group within each of its mission organizations and some groups
have been created, such as in the space and global strike and integrated
missile defense components. Additionally, in preparation for the next
Global Lightning exercise in fall 2006, the mission organizations plan to
be more involved in preparing exercise objectives for their mission areas
and intend to send their personnel to training workshops conducted by the
U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to learn how to
develop these objectives.
Third, the command has found it difficult to design an exercise that fully
covers all of its responsibilities because its missions are so diverse and
their relevancy to the exercise is dependent on the type and stage of a
particular crisis. USSTRATCOM's intent is to design its exercises so as to
integrate the unique and interdependent capabilities of its global
missions to provide a range of options throughout the various stages of a
crisis and possible conflict. For example, the command has found that some
of its missions, such as information operations, quickly become overlooked
during its exercises as events move from crisis into actual conflict.
Moreover, the command believes that its exercise program needs to place
greater emphasis on the early stages of a crisis because much of
USSTRATCOM's daily operations are conducted before and just after a crisis
has begun. To foster greater inclusion of its missions into its exercises,
the command used a series of brief, scripted training events that preceded
its first Global Lightning exercise in November 2004 to provide
opportunities to incorporate some of its missions, particularly
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. During the November 2005
Global Lightning exercise, the command incorporated a timeline that
extended from the early to the later stages of conflict to allow designers
to prepare a scenario suitable for a more complete range of the command's
missions. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, also has directed that
the annual Global Thunder exercise and other training events incorporate
multiple missions to provide additional evaluation opportunities.
Additionally, the command has designed its Global Storm exercises to
specifically focus on those missions that are most pertinent before
conflict begins.
Long-term U.S. Joint Forces Command Support Not Fully Identified
USSTRATCOM has not fully made use of the exercise support available from
the U.S. Joint Forces Command. While USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain
greater assistance from the Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting
Center to help the command address its challenges in executing a robust
exercise program, the command and the center have not reached agreement on
the extent of support the center will provide. Our past work has shown
that robust exercise programs are important for assessing and improving
mission capabilities, particularly when multiple organizations are
involved in mission execution.9 Moreover, DOD's recently issued Strategic
Plan for Transforming DOD Training10 supports an increased training focus
for many missions assigned to USSTRATCOM, including combating weapons of
mass destruction, global strike, information operations, and ballistic
missile defense.
U.S. Joint Forces Command has lead responsibility for joint force
training, and is responsible for helping combatant commanders to identify
training requirements and methods, and for assisting them with executing
exercises and other training events. As part of U.S. Joint Forces Command,
the Joint Warfighting Center provides support to combatant commands in
identifying requirements, objectives, methods, and tools for planning,
implementing, and evaluating exercises. The center trains combatant
command staff to better design exercise objectives that are clearly linked
to the command's essential tasks. It can also send independent observer
teams to an exercise to assess the command's performance and prepare
after-action reports and related assessments. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for
ensuring that DOD's joint training programs and resources are sufficient
to produce ready forces and overseeing the implementation of DOD's
training transformation strategy.
USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain greater assistance from the Joint
Warfighting Center in recent exercises. The command, for example, obtained
limited support from the center during its April 2006 Global Thunder
exercise, including teams to observe the participation and activities of
its space and global strike component. However, USSTRATCOM's requirements
have not been typically identified far enough in advance for the center to
assign staff and commit resources in providing the full range of requested
support. For example, command officials told us that USSTRATCOM sought
extensive Joint Warfighting Center support for the November 2005 Global
Lightning exercise, but the center had already committed to supporting a
U.S. Northern Command exercise that was scheduled over the same time
period. The center was able to provide USSTRATCOM indirect support, such
as providing simulated video news clippings to add context to the events
in the exercise scenario, when the command linked its Global Lightning
exercise to the U.S. Northern Command exercise.
9For example, GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons
Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005) and Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001).
10DOD, Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2006).
USSTRATCOM's relationship with the Joint Warfighting Center is still
developing. In the past, the center had a limited working relationship
with USSTRATCOM and involvement in its exercises because the command's
exercises had been largely focused on its nuclear deterrence mission,
which limited the involvement of other DOD organizations. As a result, the
center had not included the level of support for USSTRATCOM's program that
it provided to other combatant commands in its past plans. However, to
provide Joint Warfighting Center observers with access to more areas and
aspects of its exercises, including activities involving the command's
nuclear deterrence mission, USSTRATCOM is changing its security procedures
to grant center observers temporary clearances during the exercises.
The Joint Warfighting Center's recent support for USSTRATCOM's exercise
program has helped the command to better define its requirements for
future support, but these requirements continue to evolve. USSTRATCOM
officials told us that since requirements for future support from the
center have traditionally been determined from prior support experience,
the command's limited relationship with the center in the past and the
recent restructuring of the command's exercise program have not yet
provided a basis for determining the support needed from the center. The
officials said that the specific requirements for the center's assistance
would be easier to determine as more exercises with the center's
involvement are completed. According to a USSTRATCOM official, a key
exercise objective in its April 2006 Global Thunder exercise was to expose
center personnel on a limited scale to the command's exercise program. At
the same time, the command would gain exposure to the services provided by
the center. A center official told us that this type of interaction with
the center would help USSTRATCOM to better define and identify its future
requirements for center support.
Over the long term, USSTRATCOM plans to seek much greater support from the
center but has not yet fully defined its requirements. While the Joint
Warfighting Center currently supports only one of USSTRATCOM's exercises
each fiscal year, USSTRATCOM officials told us that the center has
committed to supporting both of its annual Global Lightning and Global
Thunder exercises for fiscal year 2007, including the use of observation
teams to help the command evaluate its performance. However, as of March
2006, center officials told us it was unclear how the center would adjust
its current resources to support the November 2006 Global Lightning
exercise because of the timing of that exercise and its linkage to a U.S.
Pacific Command exercise, for which the center is already planning to
provide support. In the long term, a center official told us that while
the center plans to provide greater support to USSTRATCOM, the center can
better plan and make resources available if it is provided with
well-defined requirements 3 to 5 years in advance as other commands do. As
a result, without fully providing the U.S. Joint Forces Command with
well-defined requirements to plan the necessary resources to support
USSTRATCOM's program, USSTRATCOM may not be able to receive the supported
needed to execute a robust exercise program to effectively implement its
missions.
New USSTRATCOM Organizations Lack Adequate Direction and Criteria for Declaring
Full Operating Capability
USSTRATCOM had provided overall guidance to each of its subordinate
organizations for assessing two key milestones-initial operating
capability and full operating capability-used to implement these
organizations. However, this guidance does not fully establish clear and
well-documented objectives, goals, or criteria to use in determining when
these milestones have been achieved. Our prior work shows that it is
important that organizations undergoing major transformations provide
clear and complete guidance to subordinate organizations on the
requirements and expectations for successful implementation of
organizational changes. Each of the new subordinate mission organizations
has already declared initial operating capability-the first milestone in
implementing these organizations. However, without applying specific
criteria, such as the extent to which mission organizations are staffed
and trained and their mission tasks implemented, in determining when full
operating capability-the second milestone-is achieved, the command may not
have an accurate understanding of the extent to which its mission
organizations are prepared to effectively carry out their missions.
After its most recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM issued implementation
directives that provide general guidance for establishing each of the five
new subordinate organizations. The directives broadly describe the
organizations' responsibilities, authorities, tasks, personnel and
resources requirements, and schedules for implementation. Additionally,
the command prepared an implementation plan that summarizes the
implementation directives and provides additional direction for
establishing the new subordinate organizations, including timelines and
implementation tasks. USSTRATCOM also created a reorganization management
team working group comprised of representatives from headquarters and the
new organizations to assist with and coordinate the reorganization
activities.
USSTRATCOM's implementation guidance11 calls for each new organization to
declare initial operating capability and full operating capability, which
are key milestones used to indicate the organization's progress in
implementing plans, procedures, and structures and achieving the readiness
required to perform its missions. In addition, the guidance provides some
general criteria to follow before declaring initial operating capability
or full operating capability. For example, the guidance requires that
prior to the initial operating capability milestone, each new organization
would develop a mission statement; a detailed concept of operations for
the organization to manage and execute its assigned forces and missions,
including personnel requirements; and a task hand-over plan for the
transfer of functions from headquarters. The guidance also requires formal
updates on the new organizations' progress toward achieving the milestones
during quarterly command conferences.
Table 2 shows that each of the new organizations stated that it had
achieved initial operating capability in 2005. The Joint Functional
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense achieved full operating
capability in February 2006 and the other four organizations plan to reach
this milestone between September 2006 and January 2007.
11Although the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
was established in August 2005, after the initial implementation guidance
was issued, the center followed the same implementation process as the
other four new organizations.
Table 2: Key Dates for Establishing and Implementing New USSTRATCOM
Mission Organizations
Date full
Date initial operating
operating capability
Date capability planned or
USSTRATCOM organization established achieved achieved
JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense January 2005 April 2005 February 2006
JFCC-Intelligence, January 2005 May 2005 September 2006
Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance
JFCC-Space and Global Strike January 2005 November 2005 December 2006
JFCC-Network Warfare January 2005 September 2005 January 2007
USSTRATCOM Center for Combating August 2005 December 2005 December 2006
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Notes: Dates as of June 2006. JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command.
While the implementation guidance provides general criteria for achieving
initial and full operating capability, it lacks clarity and specificity
for reaching these milestones. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has
delegated authority for establishing the new mission organizations and
decisions for declaring initial and full operating capability to the
senior leaders of these organizations. Headquarters representatives of the
reorganization management team told us that a good deal of subjectivity is
involved in deciding when each milestone has been achieved. In addition,
we found that the commander or director of each new organization has
interpreted the milestones differently when developing the organization's
approach and assessment criteria for achieving the milestones. For
example, the criteria used by each organization to determine initial
operating capability last year varied greatly among the organizations:
o The commander of the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance component declared reaching the milestone based on
such factors as the component having its deputy commander in
place, establishing the component's online Web portal that
facilitates external communication across various classified
links, and beginning its intelligence campaign planning support
for three regional combatant commands.
o The commander of the integrated missile defense component
declared reaching the milestone based on completing preparation of
several documents, for example, ballistic missile defense
emergency activation plans and a supporting plan for one of the
command's contingency plans; undertaking the process of making
operational several required functions, such as ballistic missile
defense situational awareness and operational oversight of the
ballistic missile defense command and control system; and assuming
responsibility for performing most of its directed tasks.
o The acting deputy commander of the network warfare component
told us the component declared initial operating capability on the
basis that its mission responsibilities were already being
performed by a predecessor organization that became the new
component.
o Space and global strike component officials told us that the
component based its initial operating capability decision largely
on the results of its performance in events before and during
USSTRATCOM's November 2005 Global Lightning exercise. However, the
component did not publish and make available the criteria that
would be used to evaluate the component's performance during the
exercise, according to the component's chief of staff.
Similarly, the objectives, goals, and criteria that would be used
for determining full operating capability vary among the
organizations. According to network warfare component officials,
the component plans to base its full operating capability decision
on 8 to 10 items that were explained during a briefing to
USSTRATCOM officials in early 2005, which include the component
having adequate staffing and funding; its tactics, techniques, and
procedures guidance approved; and its functions, tasks, and
authorities clearly defined. The chief of staff for the space and
global strike component told us that the component has
considerable criteria for evaluating full operating capability.
For example, several concepts of operations related to the
component's mission areas contain tasks that the component needs
to perform. Other criteria include such goals as setting up a
training program for new staff and developing a visual information
panel in its command center. However, the official said that the
component has not clearly assembled all of its criteria to make
them readily accessible to those outside the component. The
integrated missile defense component, which declared full
operating capability in February 2006, used criteria that included
the component's assuming responsibilities and tasks delineated in
the USSTRATCOM implementation directive, completing facility
construction, getting staff trained and certified, developing
approved joint mission essential tasks, and initiating reporting
of operational readiness. The component considered its full
participation in USSTRATCOM's November 2005 Global Lightning
exercise and the incorporation of the lessons learned from the
exercise into its participation in a subsequent U.S. Pacific
Command exercise as critical factors for declaring full operating
capability.
Additionally, although the target dates for declaring full
operating capability are soon approaching, some of the new
organizations have not fully developed the criteria that will be
used to assess their milestone decisions. Although the USSTRATCOM
Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction plans to achieve
the milestone in December 2006, center officials told us in
February 2006 that the center is still deciding how to define full
operating capability. Similarly, the deputy commander for the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component told us
in April 2006 that the component, which plans to reach the
milestone in September 2006, has not fully decided on the criteria
it would use because the selection of criteria has not been a high
priority among the component's implementation activities. However,
the official told us that the component needs to have its criteria
approved about 3 months before it decides to declare its milestone
achieved.
USSTRATCOM Has Not Fully Implemented a Results-oriented Management
Approach for Evaluating its Performance
USSTRATCOM has adopted some key management practices, but the
command has not yet fully developed a results-oriented management
approach for continuously assessing and benchmarking its
performance in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying
actions to improve performance. Our prior work and the work of
others show that organizations undertaking complex transformations
can increase their likelihood of success by adopting a
results-oriented management framework, which includes key
management practices and results-oriented management tools to
guide implementation efforts and progress toward achieving desired
outcomes.12 These tools and practices include establishing
long-term goals and objectives and performance measures and
criteria for assessing results and value added; strong and
inspirational leadership to set the direction, pace, and tone and
provide a clear, consistent rationale for implementing the
framework; and timelines to achieve results. While USSTRATCOM uses
different techniques to review its progress in implementing its
missions and responsibilities, these techniques do not provide the
range of quantifiable metrics and criteria needed to fully assess
the command's progress toward achieving its goals and objectives
and value added.
The command's senior leadership has taken an active role in
articulating and supporting the command's transformation, a factor
that we have identified in prior work as critical to success. The
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has addressed a variety of
audiences to discuss the need for changing the way the command is
organized in order to be more effective, and has described the
needs and reasons for change in command concepts of operations and
guidance. USSTRATCOM has also prepared guidance that assigns
responsibility and describes the processes for implementing and
integrating its missions. For example, to support its most recent
reorganization, the command has prepared a draft integrating
guidance document intended to provide a consolidated, objective
framework describing how the command is organized, as well as its
responsibilities, relationships, and processes. It also has issued
a more detailed horizontal command-and-control integration concept
of operations to identify how it brings together all of its
missions and capabilities to support national objectives. Our
prior work has shown that successfully transforming organizations
have leaders who define and articulate a compelling reason for
change; set the direction, pace, and tone for transformation; and
assign accountability for results.13
The command has also created a collection of first principles to
better align the command with national defense priorities, focus
its efforts for integrating and synchronizing its missions, and
provide advocacy for its missions as they mature. Table 3 provides
USSTRATCOM's nine principles, which include establishing a
globally focused organization built to collaborate with all
elements of national power; establishing operationally
interdependent components; and embracing effects-based operations.
The command also identified areas of emphasis that contain several
key objectives for mission support, such as (1) for combating
weapons of mass destruction, integrate and enable capabilities
across the DOD enterprise; (2) in organizing for the global fight,
embrace horizontal integration; and (3) for global force
management, optimize the employment of low-density and high-demand
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.
USSTRATCOM Has Not Fully Implemented a Results-oriented Management Approach for
Evaluating its Performance
12See GAO, Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed
to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts, GAO-06-232 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 31, 2006).
13 GAO-06-232 .
Table 3: USSTRATCOM First Principles
Principle
1. Establish a globally focused organization built to collaborate with
all elements of national power.
2. Focus USSTRATCOM headquarters on strategic-level command and
control, integration, and advocacy.
3. Conduct decentralized operational/tactical-level planning and
execution through USSTRATCOM components.
4. Establish operationally interdependent components.
5. Exploit mission-area-unique competencies in other organizations.
6. Expand partnerships across departments, academia, industry, and
allies.
7. Create a USSTRATCOM web of global capabilities with multiple entry
points.
8. Leverage the full capabilities of a global command, control,
communications, and computer architecture.
9. Embrace effects-based operations.
Source: USSTRATCOM.
However, USSTRATCOM has not yet developed clear, well-defined,
outcome-based goals and measures to indicate how the command will measure
success, track the progress it is making toward its goals, and give its
leaders critical information on which to base decisions for improving the
command's implementation efforts. While the command's first principles and
areas of emphasis provide direction for better focusing its implementation
efforts, these principles are process-oriented, tactical goals, rather
than long-term, results-oriented strategic goals and objectives that can
provide the basis for determining the command's performance and progress.
Our prior work has shown that long-term strategic goals and objectives are
important for an organization to explain the results it expects, what it
intends to accomplish, and how these goals would be assessed.
Outcome-based performance measures should be objective and results
oriented with specific target levels to meet performance goals. Measuring
performance allows organizations to track progress toward goals and
provides crucial information on which to base organizational and
management decisions.14
The command has adopted some processes and metrics to monitor its
performance and provide information on its progress in implementing its
missions; however, these processes and metrics are largely subjective and
do not provide the command with the full range of both quantitative and
qualitative outcome-based performance measures it needs to fully assess
progress in achieving its goals. Organizations use evaluation and
corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to improve
performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those goals that
were not met. In contrast, USSTRATCOM's current processes result in
largely subjective assessments and are intended to support more limited
purposes. For example, according to an official responsible for
coordinating the command's readiness reporting, the command has adapted
its readiness reporting process to include inputs from each of the
command's mission organizations and service components. The official said
that this process gives the USSTRATCOM commander access to a broad
perspective on the command's overall readiness. However, the readiness
reports resulting from the process discuss the commander's subjective
assessment of USSTRATCOM's ability to execute its missions, based on
short-term internal and external factors affecting the command's
operations. Similarly, the command's annual training assessments are
subjective evaluations, based on observations of prior training,
exercises, real-world operations, and other factors, which are used to set
priorities for future training priorities.
14 GAO-06-232 .
USSTRATCOM senior officials told us that the command has not yet
established strategic goals and outcome-based performance metrics to fully
assess the command's progress because the command is still sorting out the
implementation of its new organizational construct. Although command
officials stated they believe such metrics are needed and the command
should begin to develop them, they have not yet developed a process or
assigned responsibility for developing metrics. While the development of
such metrics will present a significant challenge due to the complex
nature of the command's missions, such an effort is needed so that the
command can assess its progress and identify areas that need further
improvement. For example USSTRATCOM officials believe they can and should
develop metrics to assess the extent to which they are efficiently
allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to
optimize the use of high-demand aircraft. Without developing strategic
goals and the full range of outcome-based performance measures, the
command will lack a process to evaluate its performance, identify areas
that may need improvement, and take corrective actions.
USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a Commandwide Outreach
Strategy
USSTRATCOM has not clarified the roles and responsibilities of its service
component organizations and lacks a commandwide outreach strategy for
enhancing its relations with other DOD organizations. Since its most
recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its
service component commands. However, the command's guidance is not always
specific and service officials believe that additional guidance from
USSTRATCOM would help to more clearly define their responsibilities,
expectations, and relationships with the command, particularly with its
new mission organizations. In addition, USSTRATCOM lacks a commandwide
strategy to effectively manage and coordinate its external outreach
activities with the large number of commands and organizations it
interacts with in executing its diverse missions. Without clear service
component guidance and a comprehensive communications strategy,
USSTRATCOM's service components will not have complete information on the
command's expectations for their support and the command may not have the
most effective approach for building relationships, promoting its
capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to other
combatant commands and organizations.
USSTRATCOM's Guidance to Its Service Components Is Not Specific
While USSTRATCOM has provided broad guidance to its service components,
Army, Navy, and Air Force component officials told us they lack specific
guidance that clarifies and provides more detailed information on their
responsibilities, requirements, expectations, and relationships with the
command and, particularly, its newer mission organizations. Our prior work
has shown that it is important for organizations undergoing significant
change to provide clear and complete guidance to their subordinate
organizations. Without clearly defined, specific guidance, it can be
difficult for the service components to effectively organize, plan, and
identify resources to provide the expected support. Moreover, the lack of
this guidance can also limit the understanding that USSTRATCOM's
headquarters and its organizations have about the components'
organizations, organizational relationships, and range of support they
provide.
USSTRATCOM has provided guidance to its service components in its concepts
of operations, orders, plans, and other documents and through meetings and
other activities between command and service component staffs, such as
conferences, videoconferences, and command exercises. Guidance and
expectations have also been provided during routine and crisis-oriented
collaborative planning15 activities among the command's organizations and
service components. However, USSTRATCOM Army component officials told us
that much of the command's overall guidance, such as USSTRATCOM's standing
operational order for its global strike mission and its overarching
concept of operations, is too general and often does not provide enough
specific information for the service components to fully understand the
command's requirements and expectations.
Our review of USSTRATCOM guidance found that key guidance lists the
overarching responsibilities for the command's service components, such as
providing support for the command's operations and planning and advocacy
activities. Some mission-specific guidance, such as the concept of
operations for the space and global strike missions, provides additional
responsibilities for each of the components that relate to a specific
mission area or organization. In particular, this concept of operations
assigns the Air Force service component responsibility for establishing an
operations center for global strike planning and execution, and for
performing day-to-day command and control of space forces assigned to the
command. In contrast, much of the remaining guidance we reviewed provided
few specific details on what is expected or required to carry out the
components' responsibilities, such as the type of military personnel
skills, planning systems, or secure communications lines that are needed
to effectively support the command.
Additionally, several guidance documents we reviewed that contain
references to the services are still in draft, such as the command's
integrating guidance, or need revision as a result of the command's recent
reorganization. For example, in 2004 the command drafted a concept for
integrating its missions that included detailed annexes describing the how
the command's service components were to monitor global events affecting
U.S. interests; analyze, evaluate, and communicate information; predict
likely consequences of military operations on U.S. and adversary forces;
and plan and execute operations in support of each of the command's
mission areas. However, according to a USSTRATCOM official the command
leadership decided not to include specific expectations for its service
components following the decision to reorganize the command and establish
the joint functional component commands in late 2004. As a result, the
command's most recently drafted guidance does not yet completely reflect
service responsibilities and expectations and unique support that may be
required to support USSTRATCOM's new organization. According to USSTRATCOM
officials, the command does not plan to provide additional formal guidance
to its service component organizations at this time.
15The use of collaborative planning intends to create an environment that
allows commanders to share planning data and generate integrated lists of
courses of action in greatly compressed time frames, making options and
recommendations readily available to the Secretary of Defense and the
President.
The relationships between the command's service components and new
subordinate mission organizations are still evolving. Army component
officials told us that USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not yet
developed a full understanding of the Army service component's
responsibilities, and as a result, USSTRATCOM's expectations may not be
consistent with the support that can be provided by the Army. For example,
the acting chief of staff for USSTRATCOM's Army service component told us
that according to the Joint Staff's Unified Action Armed Forces policy
publication,16 which clarifies all command relationships and other
authorities, the Army's service component has responsibility for providing
Army personnel with training in service-related tasks. The official told
us the USSTRATCOM command assumed that training in the use of joint
systems, such as secure communications lines operated by the USSTRATCOM
command for integrated missile defense, would be done by the service
component. However, the respective USSTRATCOM command is responsible for
providing any joint training to service personnel. The official said the
Army could provide this training if USSTRATCOM defined this requirement in
its guidance.
Army component officials also told us that the Army can better respond to
USSTRATCOM requirements when expectations are more clearly described in
guidance and related documents. For example, USSTRATCOM cited a
requirement in its draft concept of operations for a small Army detachment
to be assigned to USSTRATCOM's intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance command. The Army provided this type of detachment based on
that requirement. Similarly, the head of the Eighth Air Force's air
operations center, which is part of the USSTRATCOM Air Force service
component, told us that the component has clear guidance about its
responsibilities to provide direct support to USSTRATCOM's space and
global strike command, and therefore, has a clear understanding of what is
required to support the component. The space and global strike command has
provided information on the direct support expected from the Air Force in
its concept of operations. However, the official said the requirements and
expectations for supporting other USSTRATCOM mission organizations, such
as the Joint Functional Component Commands for Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance and Network Warfare, are not as clearly known because
USSTRATCOM has not yet provided guidance on the required Air Force support
for those organizations.
16Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint
Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2001).
According to Navy Fleet Forces Command officials, USSTRATCOM has not
provided clear and specific guidance on the command's responsibilities and
expectations, despite its unique relationship to USSTRATCOM. Officials of
the Navy Fleet Forces Command told us that the Fleet Forces Command has a
unique relationship to USSTRATCOM because it is a supporting command and
not a traditional service component. The officials said their command is
not formally assigned to and under USSTRATCOM's operational chain of
command, but rather their command provides advice to USSSTRATCOM on the
best use of Navy forces and capabilities in support of its missions. The
officials said that clear and specific guidance is necessary to provide an
understanding of their command's unique relationship to USSTRATCOM
headquarters and organizations. In March 2006, USSTRATCOM, in consultation
with the Fleet Forces Command, did issue a command instruction that
clarifies the Fleet Forces Command's relationship with USSTRATCOM and its
responsibilities, which include taking part in the command's collaborative
planning processes, participating in its exercise program, and helping
USSTRATCOM prepare its readiness review reports. However, while this
document helps to clarify the Navy component's support responsibilities,
it neither sets priorities for the Fleet Forces Command nor includes
mission-specific requirements.
According to service officials, USSTRATCOM's unique organization, complex
planning processes, and global focus are very different than more
traditionally organized combatant commands that have clearly defined
geographic areas of responsibility. In contrast to more traditional
regional combatant commands, USSTRATCOM has constructed a collaborative
planning process, which is globally focused, and involves a much broader
range of military capabilities. As this planning process continues to
evolve, the role and involvement of the service components will change.
For example, the director of the Army component's planning and exercise
group told us that USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not always
provided well-documented requirements for certain Army capabilities, which
has delayed the Army component's ability to provide the needed
capabilities to these organizations. The official told us that in the
summer of 2005 the Army component had difficulty in both staffing its
office and initially providing information operations capabilities to
support command missions because USSTRATCOM had not documented the Army
requirements for these capabilities. The Army official said that although
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has been satisfied with the Army's
support for this mission area, greater clarity about USSTRATCOM's
expectations would have helped the Army component to better identify its
authorized personnel requirements and ensure that the required Army
capabilities were more quickly available.
Unlike the other service components, however, the Marine Corps Forces
component is satisfied with the guidance that has been provided, according
to a Marine Corps component official. The official said the component does
not need additional guidance at this time because the component has a more
limited role and fewer responsibilities than the other services in
supporting USSTRATCOM and its organizations. The official said that the
Marine Corps' component of about 20 people largely serves as a conduit to
USSTRATCOM to ensure Marine Corps representation and provide inputs, when
needed, on command issues.
USSTRATCOM Lacks a Coordinated, External Outreach Strategy
While USSTRATCOM routinely conducts outreach with other combatant commands
and organizations, it lacks a common approach across the command because
it has not developed a comprehensive, commandwide outreach strategy to
effectively manage these activities. Without an outreach strategy, the
command and its organizations do not have a consistent, coordinated
approach to use in developing and expanding relationships, educating other
organizations on the command's capabilities, and providing the most
effective level of support to other commands and organizations.
In our prior work17 in identifying key practices adopted by organizations
undergoing successful transformations, we found that it is essential for
organizations to adopt a comprehensive communication strategy that reaches
out to customers and stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage them in
the organization's transformation. In particular, successfully transformed
organizations have found that by communicating information early and
often, organizations are able to build trust and increase understanding
among their stakeholders about the purpose of planned changes.
Organizations use these communication strategies to provide a common
framework for conducting consistent and coordinated outreach throughout
their organizations by clearly presenting the organization's rationale,
specific objectives, and desired outcomes of outreach efforts. These
strategies also cover the range of integrated information activities to be
implemented and clearly articulate how all the various components of the
strategy will be coordinated and managed in order to achieve the
objectives most efficiently and effectively. Additionally, outreach
strategies provide measurable criteria against which to evaluate the
outcomes of organizations' outreach efforts and determine whether any
adjustments are necessary.
17 GAO-03-669 .
Command Considers External Outreach Essential
Because USSTRATCOM supports or is supported by a large number of commands
and organizations in executing its diverse set of global missions, the
command considers its external outreach efforts essential to (1) develop
effective relationships and communications, (2) promote and educate others
about the value of its missions and capabilities, and (3) obtain
information on how the command can best support other organizations.
USSTRATCOM and its organizations regularly use a wide range of methods and
activities to promote its missions and capabilities to combatant commands,
military services, and DOD and other government organizations. These
methods and activities include conferences and symposia, exercises and
training events, senior leadership visits, exchange of liaison staff,
routine meetings, and voice and electronic communication. The command has
also established a strategic knowledge integration Web site, which is
called SKIWeb, on DOD's classified computer network to provide information
about the command and the status of its activities and allow open exchange
among its staff and other individuals with access to the network.
While USSTRATCOM officials told us that USSTRATCOM has developed good
working relationships with other combatant commands and organizations
across DOD since its establishment in 2002, they believe that the
command's missions, capabilities, and authorities are not yet fully
understood by others. The USSTRATCOM commander's summary report for its
November 2005 Global Lightning exercise states that while the command has
expended a great amount of effort in developing processes and strategies
to integrate the command's missions, the organizations it supports,
particularly other combatant commands, have a vague understanding of the
"value added" by USSTRATCOM capabilities. The report states that
USSTRATCOM's ability to provide capabilities and influence global events
are not clearly understood, nor do some other commands' headquarters
completely understand how to access that capability. For example, in
observing the Global Lightning exercise, U.S. Central Command and other
participants told us that they were unsure of value added by USSTRATCOM in
planning for global strike operations in their theater. However,
USSTRATCOM officials said USSTRATCOM brings the full range of capability
options into global strike planning, particularly nonkinetic capability
options18 such as computer network operations; other commands are just
beginning to see the potential value of these options.
Additionally, USSTRATCOM has also had to change the perceptions held by
other organizations that the command is responsible only for nuclear
deterrence, which was the case with the previous U.S. Strategic Command,
but has other essential missions that are global in scope and span all
levels of military operations. While some missions, such as nuclear
deterrence and military space, are well practiced and have established
histories and interactions with outside organizations, others, such as its
combating weapons of mass destruction and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions, are less mature and still evolving. Further, many
of USSTRATCOM authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities are still
being refined, clarified, and demonstrated to other organizations in
exercises and training events and in real-time military activities. For
example, the deputy commander of USSTRATCOM's intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance command told us that USSTRATCOM's evolving role in
providing support for decisions on allocating intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance assets is not yet clear to all of the regional
combatant commands. The official said that some combatant commands have
concerns about how USSTRATCOM responsibilities could affect their ability
to exercise operational and tactical control over any assets assigned to
their commands. According to the official, these commands do not yet
understand that USSTRATCOM's role is to provide overall management for
these assets rather than control their operational use.
Moreover, DOD commands and organizations are still getting acquainted with
USSTRATCOM's new organizational construct, particularly the new
subordinate organizations that are responsible for the day-to-day
management of several command missions. The command's new organization
does not follow the headquarters-centric model, in which information flows
vertically, that is used by other combatant commands. According to the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, horizontal flows of information and
command and control run counter to traditional military thinking, which
prefers a vertical chain of command. While the new organizational
structure has the potential to greatly expand the command's opportunities
to conduct external outreach, relationships and communication links are
still being developed or reestablished with other organizations.
18Nonkinetic capabilities are those capabilities that produce effects
without the direct use of the force or energy of moving objects, including
such means as information operations, electromagnetic radiation, and
directed energy.
Outreach Efforts Lack Common Approach
Each of the command's organizations conduct numerous outreach activities
daily, but these efforts are often not well coordinated and consistently
conducted to achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. We also
found that USSTRATCOM does not have an approach for comprehensively
collecting information on the needs and priorities of the combatant
commands and other stakeholders who use its capabilities, information
which USSTRATCOM could then use to determine how it can provide the most
effective level of support.
USSTRATCOM has recognized the need to develop a comprehensive outreach
strategy to increase understanding among other combatant commands about
the specific capabilities and contributions that the command can provide
to their operations. Both of the command's summary reports for its October
2004 and November 2005 Global Lightning exercises recommended development
of an outreach strategy for identifying USSTRATCOM capabilities for the
benefit of combatant commands and stakeholders. The November 2005 report
recommended that the strategy provide an integrated methodology for
conducting effective outreach and education of the command's capabilities.
The report also recommended (1) improving the command's SKIWeb Web site to
allow outside users to more easily identify capabilities, (2) providing
briefings and seminar support to the Defense and interagency community,
and (3) developing outreach products to provide key information about the
command. The report states that much of the understanding and credibility
of the command can be achieved though an effective outreach plan that is
focused at other commands, at the interagency level, and with the services
to demonstrate and provide understanding about its global support
capabilities. USSTRATCOM headquarters officials told us that the command
does not have any current plans to develop an outreach strategy as
recommended in each of the two exercise reports.
To provide the most effective level of support to other combatant
commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command recently developed an approach that
could serve as a best practice in identifying the priorities of the
commands it supports for inclusion in an external outreach strategy. Under
U.S. Joint Forces Command's approach, the command asks each of the other
combatant commands to provide a list of its top priorities for the type
and level of support needed from the command in the coming year. These
lists are incorporated into the command's annual plans and are used to
make adjustments in its activities and resources to best meet the needs of
its customers. During the year, the command schedules periodic updates
with staffs of the other commands to determine to what extent the command
is addressing these priorities or whether the priorities have changed. A
USSTRATCOM headquarters official responsible for coordinating the
command's priorities with the U.S. Joint Forces Command told us that
approach has been helpful for USSTRATCOM in communicating the command's
priorities for support. The official said that USSTRATCOM added to the
effectiveness of the approach by preparing a detailed matrix that
identified and ranked the command's priorities and provided contact
information for command staff.
Conclusions
USSTRATCOM has been assigned a new role in providing the President and the
Secretary of Defense with an expanded set of military options to more
effectively respond to emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric
threats to U.S. national security, including those involving weapons of
mass destruction. While the command has made progress in implementing its
global missions, its ability to strengthen implementation efforts and
ensure that its leadership has critical information on the effectiveness
of its missions and organizations will continue to be limited until it
identifies long-term support requirements for its exercise program;
establishes clear, consistent criteria for assessing the establishment of
its newest mission organizations; and fully implements a results-oriented
approach for evaluating its progress. The U.S. Joint Forces Command offers
a range of capabilities and resources for supporting command exercises.
Until it clearly identifies the long-term support it requires from the
U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Forces Command incorporates these
requirements into its plans, USSTRATCOM will continue to lack a robust
exercise program, which is essential for evaluating its capabilities and
identifying areas in need of improvement. Additionally, absent clear,
consistent guidance from the command, four new mission organizations that
have not yet achieved full operating capability are establishing their own
criteria for this milestone, which results in different understandings of
what it means to reach this milestone and how it would be evaluated.
Without establishing clear, consistent criteria at major points in
implementation, the command cannot create a foundation on which to assess
and measure the success of these organizations even after full operating
capability has been declared. Further, while the command has adopted some
elements of a results-oriented management approach, without a process that
includes criteria and benchmarks for measuring the progress toward mission
goals at all levels of its organization, the command will be limited in
its ability to adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding its mission
areas, measure the success of its efforts, and target shortfalls and gaps
and suggest corrective actions, including any needed adjustments to future
goals and milestones.
Similarly, without complete and clearly articulated expectations and
requirements, the service components will not have the information needed
to fully determine the personnel, resources, and capabilities required to
support the command and respond to its requests and tasks in a timely way.
In addition, in the absence of a commandwide communications strategy to
conduct consistent, coordinated outreach to other commands and
organizations, USSTRATCOM cannot effectively develop and expand
relationships, foster education about its capabilities, and provide the
most effective level of support to other commands and organizations.
Lastly, without incorporating into its external outreach strategy a
systematic tool to help identify the priorities of the combatant commands
and organization it supports-similar to one used by the U.S. Joint Forces
Command-USSTRATCOM is limited in its ability to fully address the
priorities for support of the other commands and organizations, improve
feedback, and identify resources needed to respond to these priorities.
Recommendations
To better determine and obtain the assistance that can be provided by the
U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center in supporting
USSTRATCOM's exercise program, we recommend the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to fully identify and
request in a timely manner the long-term services and resources required
from the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to support
the command's program and to reach agreement with the U.S. Joint Forces
Command on the support to be provided. We further recommend that the
Secretary direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, (1) in the near
term, to make any possible adjustments among the Joint Warfighting
Center's current resources to more fully support USSTRATCOM's exercise
program; and (2) in the long term, incorporate USSTRATCOM requirements for
support in the center's plans to provide the full range of assistance
necessary to help USSTRATCOM execute a robust exercise program.
To strengthen USSTRATCOM's efforts to implement its missions and provide
greater visibility of its progress, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to take the
following four actions:
o Provide clear and complete guidance to the Joint Functional
Component Commands for Space and Global Strike, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Network Warfare, and the
USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction that
clearly defines full operating capability and provides specific,
common criteria for determining what is required and how it will
be assessed. This guidance should be developed, in consultation
with these organizations, before each organization declares full
operating capability.
o Develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management process
for continuously assessing and benchmarking the command's overall
progress in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying
corrective actions to enhance the command's efforts to implement
and integrate its missions. Develop or refine performance measures
that clearly demonstrate performance results and ensure that those
measures cascade down through the command; assign clear leadership
with accountability and authority to implement and sustain the
process; and develop and ensure that goals and objectives are
clear and achievable and timelines are established. Set a specific
time frame for completing development of this process.
o Provide additional guidance to the command's service components
that clearly defines and provides more specific information about
their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and
expectations for supporting the command's headquarters and
subordinate mission organizations. Set a specific time frame for
approval of this guidance.
o Develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to
guide and coordinate USSTRATCOM's efforts to conduct outreach with
other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations to
develop effective relationships and communications, promote and
educate others about the value of its mission and capabilities,
and obtain information on how the command can best support other
commands and organizations. This strategy should include the
command's rationale, specific objectives, desired outcomes, and
strategies for conducting outreach with other commands and
organizations, and criteria against which the command can evaluate
the success of its efforts.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Given the importance of the new role assigned to USSTRATCOM by the
President and the Secretary of Defense to provide an expanded set
of military options to more effectively respond to emerging
threats to U.S. national security, Congress should consider
requiring the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop a
longer-term, comprehensive and transparent, results-oriented
management process for continuously assessing and benchmarking the
command's overall progress in achieving desired outcomes and for
identifying corrective actions to enhance the command's efforts to
effectively carry out its missions, as outlined in our
recommendation to DOD. In developing this process, the Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command, should
o develop and ensure that long-term goals and objectives are
clear and achievable and milestones and timelines for achieving
desired outcomes are established;
o develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate
performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down
through the command; and
o assign clear leadership with accountability and authority to
implement and sustain the process.
The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should set a specific time
frame for developing and implementing this process. Additionally,
the Commander should periodically report to Congress on the
command's progress in achieving desired outcomes.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DOD's Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD
generally agreed with our three recommendations regarding U.S.
Joint Forces Command's support of USSTRATCOM's exercise program.
DOD did not agree with our other four recommendations that
USSTRATCOM provide clear and complete guidance to its joint
functional component commands on achieving full operating
capability; develop a comprehensive results-oriented management
process to assess and benchmark the command's overall progress;
provide additional guidance to its service components; and develop
and implement a commandwide communications strategy. In regard to
these four recommendations, DOD commented that measures are
already in place that address the issues raised by the report. We
disagree that the actions taken by USSTRATCOM to date fulfill the
intent of our recommendations and are complete. While USSTRATCOM
has taken some positive actions on these issues, we do not believe
that the command's actions go far enough, are specific enough, or
are sufficiently transparent in improving evaluation of the
command's progress in implementing its mission areas, providing
more complete guidance to its mission and service component
organizations, and strengthening its external communications with
other organizations and commands. Therefore, we believe our
recommendations are still warranted and we have added a matter for
congressional consideration for Congress to direct the Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command, to develop and implement a longer-term
results-oriented management process for assessing the command's
overall progress and periodically reporting to Congress its
progress in achieving desired outcomes. DOD's comments are
reprinted in their entirety in appendix V and more specific
information on DOD's comments on our recommendations and our
assessment of these comments follows below.
DOD generally agreed with our recommendations regarding
USSTRATCOM's exercise program. Specifically, DOD agreed with our
recommendation that USSTRATCOM should identify and request, in a
timely manner, the long-term services and resources required from
the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to
support USSTRATCOM's exercise program. In its comments, DOD said
that while the center had provided limited exercise planning,
execution, and assessment support to USSTRATCOM, the command and
the center have steadily built a relationship over the past year
to support USSTRATCOM's seven mission areas and are jointly
solving problems that hindered the center's support in previous
USSTRATCOM exercises. The department partially agreed with our
recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the
near term make any possible adjustments among the Joint
Warfighting Center's current resources to more fully support
USSTRATCOM's program. DOD commented that the Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is
currently conducting an in-depth review of the joint training
programs to determine how it can provide better flexibility and
synergism through joint training investments. DOD agreed with our
recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the
long term, incorporate USSTRATCOM's requirements for support into
the Joint Warfighting Center's plans. DOD commented that its
current review of joint training programs intends to match, to the
greatest extent possible, joint training requirements and
resources, including the training support provided by the U.S.
Joint Forces Command. DOD also said while USSTRATCOM's
requirements must compete with other training priorities for joint
training funding, the center can better plan and make resources
available if USSTRATCOM provides the center with well-defined
requirements 3 to 5 years in advance.
DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to its joint
functional component commands that clearly defines full operating
capability and provides specific, common criteria for determining
what is required and how it will be assessed. DOD commented that
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has provided specific
guidance in the form of a tailored implementation directive that
assigns specific duties, responsibilities, tasks, and authorities
to the components. DOD also said that the Commander is continuing
to work closely with the component commanders to develop,
implement, and assess the measures of progress by which full
operating capability will be declared and will report to the
Secretary of Defense when the milestone is achieved for each
mission area. We believe that the command's tailored
implementation directives do not go far enough in providing clear
and specific criteria for assessing whether specific duties,
responsibilities, tasks, and authorities assigned to each
organization have been met. For example, during our review we
found that the components had different interpretations as to what
criteria might apply for declaring full operating capability. We
believe that it is important for USSTRATCOM and its organizations
to have a clear definition of full operating capability and the
criteria, or measures of progress, in place as early as possible,
by which the achievement of the milestone will be assessed for
each of the new mission organizations. These criteria should be
complete and readily accessible so the command and its mission
organizations will have confidence in the extent that planned
capabilities will be achieved at full operating capability. After
declaring full operating capability, each of the new organizations
will require further actions to more completely implement and
enhance their mission capabilities and responsibilities.
Establishing clear, documented criteria for assessing and
measuring success for declaring full operating capability can
provide a baseline and a sound foundation for assessing the future
progress of the organization in carrying out its mission
responsibilities.
DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM develop
a comprehensive results-oriented management process for
continually assessing and benchmarking the command's overall
progress in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying
corrective actions to enhance the command's efforts to implement
and integrate its missions. In its comments, DOD stated that a
variety of directives, including concepts of operations,
articulate the command's goals and objectives. The department also
stated that the command conducts periodic exercises, external
inspections, and in-progress reviews to help assess the command's
effectiveness in making operational the assigned mission areas and
achieving stated objectives. While these actions by USSTRATCOM may
be helpful to the command's leadership, they do not represent a
comprehensive and transparent plan for assessing progress in
achieving desired outcomes. Moreover, DOD interpreted our
recommendation as being directed at the metrics to be used by the
command's organizations in declaring full operating capability for
its missions, which are scheduled to occur by early 2007. However,
our recommendation calls for creation of a longer-term,
comprehensive, results-oriented management process that would
provide the command with a framework for continuously assessing
its future progress in achieving desired outcomes in each of its
mission areas and the command's overall goals and objectives.
Because of the importance of the command's new role in providing
expanded military options for addressing emerging threats, we
continue to believe that creation of a results-oriented management
process that establishes long-term goals and objectives,
milestones and timelines for achieving desired outcomes,
performance measures that clearly demonstrate performance results,
and clear leadership to implement and sustain the process is
needed. Therefore, we have included a matter for congressional
consideration to require the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to
develop such a process that would improve transparency and
accountability of the extent to which the command is achieving
desired outcomes in each of its mission areas.
DOD also did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to the
command's service components that clearly defines and provides
more specific information about their responsibilities,
requirements, relationships, and expectations for supporting the
command's headquarters and subordinate mission organizations. In
its comments, DOD said that the duties and responsibilities of
USSTRATCOM and its service components are documented in Joint
Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. The department also
stated that day-to-day liaison activities between the command and
the services are provided by on-site service component
representatives. While broad guidance is provided in the Joint
Staff's Unified Action Armed Forces publication on the
relationships and authorities of the military services in
supporting combatant commanders and by USSTRATCOM in various
documents, we continue to believe that additional guidance from
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to the command's service
components is needed to provide clear and specific information
about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and
expectations for supporting the command's headquarters and
subordinate mission organizations, particularly since the
components have expressed a desire for further guidance from the
command. As USSTRATCOM continues to implement its new organization
and develop capabilities in each of its mission areas, this
additional guidance can strengthen relationships with the services
by (1) providing better information for the components in
effectively organizing, planning, and identifying resources to
support the command; and (2) increasing understanding among the
command's headquarters and its organizations about the components'
organizations, organizational relationships, and the range of
support they provide.
Lastly, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM
develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to
guide and coordinate the command's efforts to conduct outreach
with other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations.
DOD commented that USSTRATCOM provides and promotes insight to all
its activities through its classified Web site; maintains a senior
officer representative at each of the combatant commands and with
the Joint Staff; and, as a supporting command, conducts continuous
liaison activities with other combatant commands. DOD also stated
that Web-based mission area training for USSTRATCOM missions is
available on the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Web site. However, as
discussed in our report, we found that while USSTRATCOM
organizations routinely conduct outreach activities to promote its
missions and capabilities, these activities are often not well
coordinated and consistently conducted to achieve the most optimal
benefit for the command. Both of USSTRATCOM commander's summary
reports prepared after its two most recent Global Lightning
exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the command develop a
comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding among
other combatant commands about the specific capabilities and
contributions that the command can provide to their operations.
The November 2005 Global Lightning report also recommended that
the strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting
effective outreach and education of the command's capabilities.
Therefore, we continue to believe that USSTRATCOM needs a
commandwide communications strategy to provide a framework to
effectively manage these activities and a common approach for
conducting consistent and coordinated outreach across the command.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Commander,
U. S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition the report will be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at
(202) 512-4402 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Staff members who made key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Janet A. St. Laurent Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United States
Strategic Command�s Budget
This appendix provides information on trends and changes we
identified in the United States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM)
historic and projected budget, from fiscal years 2003 through
2011.
USSTRATCOM�s Budget Has Grown Significantly Since Its Establishment
Since its establishment in fiscal year 2003, USSTRATCOM's budget
has grown significantly, from $276.8 million of total obligation
authority in then-year dollars to $500.4 million in fiscal year
2006, excluding military personnel funds. The command's budget
comprises mostly operation and maintenance funding, with lesser
amounts of research and development and procurement funding
associated with programs for intelligence, information operations,
network warfare, command and control, and planning systems.
Funding projections prepared to support the fiscal year 2006
President's budget submission show that USSTRATCOM's budget is
expected to decline between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, from
$521.9 million to $515.5 million, as research and development
funding is reduced. However, beginning in fiscal year 2009, the
command's budget is expected to increase each year to $551.4
million in fiscal year 2011, as operation and maintenance funding
increases by $35 million compared to the fiscal year 2008
projection. Procurement funding projections remain relatively
stable through fiscal year 2011.
USSTRATCOM officials told us that the command's budget projections
have changed since the President's fiscal year 2006 budget was
submitted. However, these changes, prepared to support the
President's fiscal year 2007 budget submission, had not been
finalized at the time our work was completed in March 2006 because
the Department of Defense (DOD) was still making adjustments to
the command's budget projections for fiscal year 2007 and
thereafter, even after the fiscal year 2007 budget was submitted.
USSTRATCOM officials expect that the command's annual budgets for
fiscal years 2007 though 2011 will be lower than the projections
prepared for the fiscal year 2006 budget submission. At the same
time, the command has been directed to allocate funding for new
activities that had not been part of the fiscal year 2006
submission, including $11 million to $13 million per year in new
total obligation authority for mission activities for combating
weapons of mass destruction and about $7 million per year for
missile defense operations.
Budget Increases Reflect New Mission Responsibilities
USSTRATCOM's budget increases have included new total obligation
authority to fund the command's new mission responsibilities. For
example, the President's fiscal year 2004 budget submission
included $78.7 million in new funding for USSTRATCOM to support
additional planning, command and control, and information
operations responsibilities that were assigned to the command
following the completion of DOD's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.1
About $50.9 million of this request was for improvements to
USSTRATCOM's command and control systems, including $25.9 million
to upgrade the USSTRATCOM command center and about $10.5 million
for a mobile command center capability. Of the remaining $27.8
million, about $13.5 million was for new information operations
activities and $14.3 million was to improve the command's planning
systems. In addition to the funding associated with the Nuclear
Posture Review, the fiscal year 2004 budget request included about
$44.5 million for USSTRATCOM to support classified programs
formerly managed by the Joint Staff and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
The fiscal year 2005 and 2006 budget requests included USSTRATCOM
funding increases associated with new missions assigned to the
command in January 2003-global strike; integrated missile defense;
command, control, computers, communications, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; and DOD information operations.
To support these new responsibilities, the fiscal year 2005 budget
request included about $61.8 million in new total obligation
authority. This amount included about $23 million in new operation
and maintenance funding, which the USSTRATCOM commander had
discretion to allocate among the command's missions, according to
a command official. According to the official, the fiscal year
2005 request also included about $15.3 million in new funding to
support activities at the Joint Information Operations Center, and
what would later become the Joint Task Force for Global Network
Operations and the Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The 2005 budget
request also included additional increases to the command's
planning and command and control systems. Similarly, the fiscal
year 2006 budget request included about $33.7 million in new
funding, mainly to support new information operations programs.
USSTRATCOM Is Determining How Funding Will Be Allocated Among Its
Missions
USSTRATCOM has recently developed an internal model to determine
how its programs will be allocated to its various mission
organizations and headquarters activities in DOD's budget and
future funding plan. According to a USSTRATCOM official, the model
is designed to help the command manage and prioritize its funding
allocations and understand the risks associated with any changes
made to its future funding plans. The command is using the model
to allocate fiscal year 2006 funding to USSTRATCOM's subordinate
organizations and headquarters divisions. According to information
provided by command officials, the largest funding allocations for
fiscal year 2006 are to support the Joint Functional Component
Command for Space and Global Strike, followed by command and
control activities performed at headquarters, including nuclear
command and control. The smallest allocations are to support the
Joint Functional Component Commands for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Integrated Missile Defense.
According to a command official, activities performed at
headquarters to support one or more mission areas accounted for
about 40 percent of the command's fiscal 2006 budget.
Scope and Methodology
To perform our analysis, we identified trends and changes in
USSTRATCOM's budget since its establishment in October 2002 by
obtaining and analyzing the command's historic, current, and
projected funding for fiscal years 2003 through 2011. We used data
prepared to support the President's fiscal year 2006 budget
request, which were the most current official data available when
we conducted and completed our work. We also discussed with
USSTRATCOM officials anticipated changes to the budget resulting
from the fiscal year 2007 President's budget request, and efforts
taken by the command to identify how its funding is allocated by
mission responsibility and subordinate organization. We took steps
to assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis,
including (1) performing electronic testing of required data
elements, (2) comparing the data to another independently prepared
data source, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable
about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for our purposes.
Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Strategic
Command Military and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level
This appendix provides information on trends and changes we
identified in the United States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM)
military and civilian authorized personnel levels1 since its
establishment in October 2002. Our analysis shows that
USSTRATCOM's overall authorized personnel level has remained
relatively stable since 2002, and that the percentage of filled
military and civilian positions has increased. The command is
transferring positions to its new mission organizations from its
headquarters organization, rather than increasing its overall
commandwide authorized personnel level. Although the command has
expanded the number of professional military skills2 of its
authorized personnel, the majority of its military positions
encompass relatively few types of skilled positions. We also
determined that while Air Force and Navy military positions
continue to make up most of USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel, the
proportion of civilian positions is increasing.
Overall Authorized Personnel Level Has Been Relatively Stable
and Percentage of Filled Positions Has Increased
USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel level has remained relatively
stable since the command's establishment in October 2002. The
command's overall authorized personnel level has increased since
that time by about 300 positions, through October 2005; however,
the command expects to have slightly fewer positions than it
started with by October 2006.
The command's authorized personnel level increased from 2,646
positions upon its establishment in October 2002 to 2,965
authorized positions by October 2004. The largest increase
occurred between October 2002 and October 2003, when the command
added 318 positions, including 291 positions to support four
additional missions-global strike; integrated missile defense;
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; and DOD information operations.
Among these 291 positions, 108 positions were transferred to
USSTRATCOM from the cruise missile support activities, which were
formerly part of U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Pacific
Command.
In October 2005, USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel decreased to
2,947 positions, a reduction of 18 positions from October 2004, as
the command transferred positions to other combatant commands to
provide expertise in integrating USSTRATCOM's global missions into
their theater operations. According to a command official, there
was no authorized personnel level increase associated with the
combating weapons of mass destruction responsibilities assigned to
the command in January 2005. A larger reduction is expected by
October 2006, mainly as a result of a planned transfer of about
340 positions currently supporting intelligence activities, which
would bring the command's authorized personnel to 2,605 positions,
which is 41 fewer than authorized when the command was
established.
USSTRATCOM's ability to fill positions has increased steadily
since the new command was established in 2002, when only 1,828, or
69 percent of the command's 2,646 authorized positions, were
initially filled. According to command officials, many of the
service members and civilians from the former U.S. Space Command,
located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, did not immediately
transfer to USSTRATCOM headquarters, located near Omaha Nebraska,
leaving many positions initially unfilled. However, as individuals
transferred to the command, the rate of filled positions increased
to 83 percent (2,467 filled positions) as of October 2003, 87
percent (2,564 filled positions) in October 2004, and 91 percent
(2,670 filled positions) in October 2005.
Personnel Requirements for New Organizations Are Being Met Within
Existing Authorization
To meet the staffing requirements for its five new mission
organizations, USSTRATCOM is transferring positions to the new
organizations from its headquarters, rather than seeking to
increase its overall personnel authorization. To minimize the cost
to the services of relocating people to fill the transferred
positions, the command is first transferring positions that either
do not need to be relocated or are not filled by service members,
and then relocating and filling the remaining positions during the
course of normal military personnel rotations. Under the command's
plan, the first 30 percent of the transferred positions were to
have been filled at each organization by September 2005, 60
percent of the positions are to be filled by September 2006, and
90 percent are to be filled by September 2007.
By February 2006 the command had approved the transfer of 793
positions to the new mission organizations. Of this number, about
444 positions (56 percent) had been filled, including about 76
percent of the 431 positions approved for the Joint Functional
Component Command for Space and Global Strike, which is co-located
with USSTRATCOM headquarters and where few positions needed to be
relocated.3 In contrast, fewer than one-third of the positions had
been filled at three of the four remaining organizations, which
are not located in the Omaha, Nebraska, area, although a command
official told us that he believes that positions at these
organizations will be close to 60 percent filled by September
2006, under current projections. To minimize the impact of not
filling positions, officials told us that the supporting services
and Defense agencies are providing the new organizations with
their own filled positions, until USSTRATCOM positions are filled.
Table 4 summarizes the status of filling positions at the new
mission organizations as of February 2006.
Table 4: Approved and Filled Positions at USSTRATCOM's New Mission
Organizations as of February 2006
Positions Positions Percentage of
USSTRATCOM organization approved filled positions filled
JFCC-Space and Global Strike 431 326 76
JFCC-Network Warfare 120 38 32
JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance 102 33 32
JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense 90 34 38
USSTRATCOM Center for Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction 50 13 26
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Notes: Data do not include contractors or positions provided by
supporting services and Defense agencies. JFCC= Joint Functional
Component Command.
USSTRATCOM Has Expanded Its Military Skill Set, but Most Positions
Remain Concentrated in Relatively Few Specialties
USSTRATCOM has expanded the number of military skills of its
authorized personnel since its establishment. As of January 2003,
3 months after it was established, USSTRATCOM's authorized
personnel included those with 241 different military skills; by
January 2006, the command added 51 skills and lost 44 skills,
leaving 248 different military skills at the command. Skills added
by the command include Navy officer positions for information
technology planning and Marine Corps officer positions for space
operations, while those dropped include Air Force maintenance
officer positions.
While USSTRATCOM has changed the composition of its skill set,
relatively few skills comprise the majority of the command's
authorized military positions. For example, as of January 2006, 33
of the command's 248 skills (13 percent) made up 1,364 of the
command's 2,094 military positions (65 percent). USSTRATCOM
officials told us that several of the most prevalent skills are
easily adaptable and capable of being performed in a broad range
of responsibilities. For example, Air Force space and missile
operations officer positions increased from 134 in 2003 to 140 in
2006, and this skill remains the largest military specialty at the
command. The command also has increased the number of positions
for Navy officers with warfare qualifications or air warfare
qualifications skill designations, Army officers skilled in space
operations, and Army officers specializing in information
operations.
Air Force and Navy Positions Predominate, but Percentage of Civilian
Positions Is Increasing
USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel are mainly composed of Air Force
and Navy positions, although the number and percentage of civilian
positions have increased since the command was established. As of
October 2005, USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel included 2,112
military and 835 civilian positions. Among the 2,112 authorized
military positions:
o 1,256 were Air Force positions (59 percent of the authorized
military positions),
o 564 were Navy positions (27 percent),
o 227 were Army positions (11 percent), and
o 65 were Marine Corps positions (3 percent).
Since the command's establishment, the number and percentage of
civilian positions relative to military positions have increased.
From October 2002 to October 2005, civilian positions increased
from 676 to 835, an increase of 26 to 28 percent of the command's
overall authorized personnel level. The command expects to
continue to increase the proportion of authorized civilian
positions, particularly at USSTRATCOM headquarters, as positions
are transferred to the new mission organizations and as a few
hundred military positions are converted to civilian positions
through October 2007. Command officials responsible for overseeing
the reorganization told us that civilians have lower turnover
rates than the military service members who regularly rotate
through the command. The command believes that lower turnover
among its civilian workforce will bring greater continuity and
stability to the headquarters' chief responsibilities, including
strategic-level planning and advocacy for new capabilities. Table
5 presents the projected distribution of the command's civilian
and military positions in October 2007.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Appendix I: ChangesComma Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to
the United States Strategic Command's Budget
USSTRATCOM's Budget Has Grown Significantly Since Its Establishment
Budget Increases Reflect New Mission Responsibilities
1DOD's December 2001 report on the results of its Nuclear Posture Review
introduced the concept of a New Triad of strategic capabilities that
include a mix of nuclear and nonnuclear strike forces; defenses, including
missile defense; and a responsive infrastructure, which are all enhanced
by an integrated and adaptive approach to intelligence, planning, and
command and control. As reflected in its expanding set of mission
responsibilities, USSTRATCOM has a significant role in implementing the
New Triad.
USSTRATCOM Is Determining How Funding Will Be Allocated Among Its Missions
Scope and Methodology
Appendix II: United Statesand Civilian Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends
in the United States Strategic Command Military and Civilian Authorized
Personnel Level
Overall Authorized Personnel Level Has Been Relatively Stable and Percentage of
Filled Positions Has Increased
1USSTRATCOM's authorized military and civilian personnel level is the
number of authorized positions for service members and civilians that are
funded by the services and assigned to the command.
2Military skills refer to personnel designations developed by each of the
military services. In this report, "skill" refers to specific Air Force
Specialty Codes, Army Areas of Concentration (officer) and Military
Occupational Specialties (warrant officer and enlisted), Navy Billet
Designator Codes (officer) and General Ratings (enlisted), and Marine
Corps Military Occupational Specialties.
Personnel Requirements for New Organizations Are Being Met Within Existing
Authorization
USSTRATCOM Has Expanded Its Military Skill Set, but Most Positions Remain
Concentrated in Relatively Few Specialties
3The space and global strike joint functional component command also has
positions assigned to other locations, including the Cheyenne Mountain
Operations Center, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and U.S. Joint Forces
Command, Norfolk, Virginia.
Air Force and Navy Positions Predominate, but Percentage of Civilian Positions
Is Increasing
Table 5: Projected Distribution of USSTRATCOM Civilian and Military
Positions in October 2007
Civilian Military Percentagecivilian Percentagemilitary
Organization positions positions positions positions
USSTRATCOM
headquarters 616 592 51 49
JFCC-Space and
Global Strike 77 354 18 82
Othera 54 217 20 80
Joint Information
Operations Center 77 124 38 62
JFCC-Network
Warfare 31 89 26 74
JFCC-Intelligence,
Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance 19 83 19 81
Joint Task Force
for Global Network
Operations 69 63 52 48
JFCC-Integrated
Missile Defense 25 65 28 72
USSTRATCOM Center
for Combating
Weapons of Mass
Destruction 18 32 36 64
Total 986 1,619 38 62
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Notes: Projections current as of February 2006. Data include both military
and civilian positions at USSTRATCOM headquarters and at other locations.
They do not include contractors at USSTRATCOM headquarters, or contractors
or positions at mission organizations that are provided by supporting
services and agencies. JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command. aIncludes
authorized personnel assigned to the National Airborne Operations Center,
Nebraska; Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, Colorado; various combined
task forces, Atlantic and Pacific cruise missile support activities;
various liaison offices; and national laboratories.
Scope and Methodology
To determine how USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel level has changed since
its establishment in 2002, we obtained and reviewed USSTRATCOM projections
and historic data that identify (1) the number of authorized civilian and
military positions assigned to USSTRATCOM, (2) the number of authorized
positions filled by individuals assigned to the command, and (3) the
professional military skills associated with the command's military
positions. The data we obtained include USSTRATCOM positions assigned to
the command's headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska, its mission
organizations, and to various other locations and assignments.4 We also
obtained the command's projections for authorized personnel levels for the
new mission organizations, and discussed these projections with officials
responsible for managing the command's authorized personnel. In our
analysis, we did not consider staff positions from organizations that are
supporting several of USSTRATCOM's mission organizations, such as the Air
Force Space Command, Eighth Air Force, Army Space and Missile Defense
Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, and Defense Information Systems Agency. The data
also do not include part-time reservists or contractors. We took steps to
assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis, including (1)
performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) comparing the
data to another independently prepared data source, and (3) interviewing
agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
4In addition to its headquarters and mission organizations, USSTRATCOM has
authorized personnel assigned with the National Airborne Operations
Center, Nebraska; Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, Colorado; various
combined task forces; Atlantic and Pacific cruise missile support
activities; liaison offices; and national laboratories.
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
To address the extent to which the United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) has made progress in implementing its new missions and
assessing mission results, we reviewed a wide range of Department of
Defense (DOD) and command documentation including USSTRATCOM guidance,
plans, directives, speeches and testimony statements, and reports;
implementation plans and directives for creating its new mission
organizations; and documentation related to DOD's implementation of its
New Triad concept to transform U.S. strategic capabilities. We also spoke
with various officials involved in the command's implementation efforts
about their roles, related plans, and actions. When possible, we met with
the command and other organizations' senior leadership to discuss and
obtain their views on various command issues, including:
o Commander, U.S. Strategic Command;
o Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance/Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency;
o Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Network
Warfare/Director, National Security Agency;
o Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense/Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command;
o Commander, Joint Task Force for Global Network
Operations/Director, Defense Information Systems Agency;
o Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction/Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
o Commander, Air Force Space Command; and
o Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has a robust exercise
program for demonstrating its capabilities, we reviewed the
command's annual training plan, which describes the command's
individual exercises, establishes an exercise schedule, and sets
expectations for the participation of the command's mission
organizations. For the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, we
reviewed the exercise plan, collection management plan,
after-action report, and final exercise report. We also observed
that exercise and discussed the exercise results with the
participants. We also reviewed the collection management plan and
the after-action report prepared for the April 2006 Global Thunder
exercise, and after-action reports prepared for the April 2005
Global Thunder, October 2004 Global Lightning, and October 2003
Global Guardian exercises. We obtained guidance from the Joint
Staff that describe the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Joint
Forces Command for supporting combatant command exercises. In
addition we held discussions with command officials from the
exercise and training branch and with other exercise observers to
obtain their views on USSTRATCOM efforts to plan and schedule its
exercises. We also met with officials from the new joint
functional component commands as well as the Joint Task Force for
Global Network Operations and the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating
Weapons Of Mass Destruction to identify challenges to more fully
including their missions in the commands exercises and assist in
our understanding of the extent to which the command's mission
organizations were able to participate in the command's exercises.
Command officials also briefed us on the evolution of the
command's exercise program since its establishment, and plans for
the future. Finally, we met with officials from the U.S. Joint
Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to determine the extent
to which they have been involved in identifying requirements,
objectives, methods, and tools for planning, implementing, and
evaluating USSTRATCOM exercises to strengthen the design and
execution of the command's exercises, such as participant training
and independent observer team support and evaluation.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM and its mission
organizations had developed criteria for assessing their progress
toward achieving full operating capability, we reviewed documents
from the command and each of the new mission organizations. These
documents included the command's implementation directives for
each new mission organization and the overarching command
reorganization implementation plan for the current reorganization.
We also reviewed briefings from each of the mission organizations
that gave status information on the organizations' efforts towards
achieving full operating capability. We held discussions with
USSTRATCOM officials who were part of the command's reorganization
management team and with the senior leadership, when possible, to
determine their roles and management approach in assisting the
mission organizations' efforts to reach full operating capability
and to obtain an understanding of what reaching full operating
capability means as a milestone in developing the new USSTRATCOM
organization. We met and held discussions with the senior staff of
each mission organization on their criteria for measuring the
organization's progress toward full operating capability.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a
results-oriented management approach to establish goals,
continually track its progress, achieve better synergy among its
missions, and gauge the results of its efforts, we reviewed key
documentation and interviewed officials to determine what steps,
if any, the command has taken to develop and follow this approach.
We reviewed relevant GAO reports1 that identified and reviewed
management approaches of other government and private sector
organizations. We used the practices and implementation steps
identified in these approaches as criteria for reviewing
USSTRATCOM documents and for discussions with command officials
about their approach to transforming the USSTRATCOM organization.
We then compared USSTRATCOM's approach against these examples of
success that we had identified in other organizations to determine
the extent to which USSTRATCOM had these elements in place.
We reviewed key USSTRATCOM documents, including its first
principles (i.e., its long-term goals) related to reporting on the
command's performance and those from its biannual readiness
reporting and its annual training assessments. We reviewed the
command's implementation plan and related directives for
establishing USSTRATCOM's joint functional component commands. We
compared these documents to implementation plans used by other
organizations, including the U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S.
Northern Command, and reorganization plans, such as the Report to
Congress on the Plan for Organizing the National Nuclear Security
Agency and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization
Plan, to determine any differences in the elements and details for
implementation that were considered in these plans and the extent
to which they had developed, used, or planned to use outcome-based
performance goals and measures.
To assess the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress
defining organizational responsibilities and establishing
relationships with other DOD commands and organizations, we
obtained and reviewed relevant documents and spoke with various
officials involved in implementing and advocating for the
command's new missions about its roles and related plans and
actions. To determine the extent to which the command has
clarified the roles and expectations of its service component
organizations, we reviewed command documentation including draft
integrating guidance, concepts of operations, orders, plans, and
other documents. We met with officials from each of the command's
service component/supporting commands and discussed the extent to
which they believed the command's guidance and expectations was
sufficiently clear about their supporting roles. We also discussed
with command officials the extent to which guidance was provided
to the service components through meetings and other activities.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a common
approach and comprehensive strategy to enhance its outreach to
numerous DOD organizations on which its success depends, we met
with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and with officials in
the command's directorate responsible for advocacy. We also met
with senior leadership in all of the subordinate mission
organizations to understand the extent to which a clear,
coordinated, and unified outreach strategy is in place and to
identify the range of methods and activities the command and its
subordinate mission organizations use to engage and promote its
missions and capabilities with combatant commands, military
services, and DOD and other government organizations. We met with
officials at the U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Northern
Command and discussed command relationships, the ways that
USSTRATCOM officials performed outreach with these organizations,
sought their viewpoint on lessons that should be learned in
communicating the command's missions and responsibilities, and
their perspectives on USSTRATCOM progress. During USSTRATCOM's
Global Lightning exercise in November 2005, we also obtained
insights from participants on the command's effectiveness at
performing its outreach activities.
We also reviewed several GAO reports2 that addressed key practices
organizations should implement during a significant reorganization
or transformation. We used the reports to identify successful
communication and outreach practices employed by other U.S. and
foreign government organizations. We reviewed the USSTRATCOM
commander's summary report for its November 2005 Global Lightning
exercise to identify any lessons learned, from participating in
the exercise with two other combatant commands, on the success of
the command's outreach efforts.
During our review, we obtained and analyzed USSTRATCOM budget and
authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring the
resources, personnel levels, and skills needed to implement the
command's missions. We took steps to assess the reliability of the
data used in these analyses, including (1) performing electronic
testing of required data elements, (2) comparing the data to other
independently prepared data sources, and (3) interviewing agency
officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. For additional
methodological details about how we performed our analyses, see
appendixes I and II. We performed our work from May 2005 through
June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
In conducting our work, we contacted officials at the command's
headquarters, service, and functional components; think-tank
organizations; and other relevant stakeholders. Table 6 provides
information on the organizations and offices contacted during our
review.
1Our prior work on organizational transformation includes GAO, Managing
for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for
Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005);
GAO-03-293SP ; GAO-03-669 ; and Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy
Needed to Address Challenges Facing the Federal Protective Service,
GAO-04-537 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004).
2See for example, GAO-03-293SP , GAO-03-669, and GAO, Defense Management:
Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD Business Operations,
GAO-05-629 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005).
Table 6: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review
Organization/office contacted
Department of Defense
o Office of the Secretary of Defense
o International Security Policy
o Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Staff Directorate
o J-1 (Manpower and Personnel)
o J-3 (Operations)
o J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy)
o Defense Information Systems Agency
o Defense Intelligence Agency
o Defense Threat Reduction Agency
o National Security Agency
USSTRATCOM subordinate functional organization
o Joint Information Operations Center
o Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations
o USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
o Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike
o Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance
o Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare
o Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
USSTRATCOM service component/supporting command
o Department of the Air Force Headquarters
o U.S. Air Force Space Command
o Eighth Air Force
o U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command
o U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
o U.S. Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command
Combatant command
o U.S. Northern Command
o U.S. Joint Forces Command
o Joint Warfighting Center
o U.S. Central Command
Other organization
o LMI Government Consulting
o RAND Corporation
Source: GAO.
Appendix IV: United States Strategic Command Organizations
and Responsibilities
The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) organization is comprised
of a command headquarters, joint functional component commands, task
forces, and centers, which are located around one of four metropolitan
areas: Omaha, Nebraska; Colorado Springs, Colorado; San Antonio, Texas;
and Washington, D.C.
Figure 2: Locations of USSTRATCOM's Headquarters and Subordinate Mission
Organizations
Note: JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons of mass
destruction.
Each of the command's organizations is supported by a primary Defense
agency or service partner organization. Table 7 shows the primary
responsibilities and related information for key USSTRATCOM organizations.
Table 7: Key USSTRATCOM Organizations and Responsibilities
USSTRATCOM organization, Primary supporting
location, and date service or agency
established Primary responsibilities partner
USSTRATCOM headquarters Responsible for exercising Service component
Offutt Air Force Base, command authority over commands, JFCCs,
Nebr. October 2002 USSTRATCOM's joint joint task forces,
functional component and centers.
commands (JFCC), task
forces, and centers and has
strategic responsibility for
integrating all of
USSTRATCOM missions of space
operations; information
operations; integrated
missile defense; global
command and control;
intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; global
strike; and strategic
deterrence, and is the lead
combatant command for
integrating and
synchronizing DOD-wide
efforts in combating weapons
of mass destruction.
JFCC-Integrated Missile Responsible for planning, The Commander, JFCC-
Defense Shreiver Air integrating, and Integrated Missile
Force Base, Colo. coordinating global missile Defense, is also the
January 2005 defense operations and Commander, U.S. Army
support. The command Space and Missile
conducts the day-to-day Defense Command
operations of assigned /Army Forces
forces and coordinates Strategic Command.
activities with associated
combatant commands, other
USSTRATCOM JFCCs, and the
Missile Defense Agency.
JFCC-Intelligence, Responsible for coordinating The Commander, JFCC-
Surveillance, and global intelligence Intelligence,
Reconnaissance Bolling collection to address DOD Surveillance, and
Air Force Base, D.C. worldwide operations and Reconnaissance, is
January 2005 national intelligence also the Director,
requirements. It will serve Defense Intelligence
as the focal point for the Agency .
planning, execution, and
assessment of the military's
global intelligence,
surveillance, and
reconnaissance operations; a
key enabler to achieving
global situational
awareness.
JFCC-Space and Global Responsible for integrating The Commander, JFCC-
Strike Offutt Air Force all elements of military Space and Global
Base, Nebr. January 2005 power to conduct, plan, and Strike, is also the
present global strike Commander, Eighth
effects and also direct the Air Force.
deliberate planning and
execution of assigned space
operation missions. For
plans not aligned with a
specific mission set, the
command is tasked to work in
close coordination with
USSTRATCOM headquarters as
the lead component
responsible for the
integration and coordination
of capabilities provided by
all other JFCCs.
JFCC-Network Warfare Responsible for facilitating The Commander,
Fort Meade, Md. January cooperative engagement with JFCC-Network
2005 other national entities in Warfare, is also the
computer network defense and Director, National
network warfare as part of Security Agency .
the global information
operations mission. This
coordinated approach to
information operations
involves two other important
supporting commands: Joint
Task Force for Global
Network Operations and Joint
Information Operations
Center.
Joint Information Responsible for integrating The Commander, Joint
Operations Centera information operations into Information
Lackland Air Force Base, military plans and Operations Center,
Tex. September 19991 operations across the is also the
spectrum of conflict. Commander, Air
Intelligence Agency.
Joint Task Force for Responsible for supporting The Commander, Joint
Global Network USSTRATCOM in defending Task Force for
Operations Arlington, DOD's information Global Network
Va. August 2005 infrastructure. This is done Operations, is also
by integrating the task the Director,
force's capabilities into Defense Information
the operations of all DOD Systems Agency.
computers, networks, and
systems used by DOD,
combatant commands,
services, and agencies.
USSTRATCOM organization, Primary supporting
location, and date service or agency
established Primary responsibilities partner
USSTRATCOM Center for Responsible for integrating Director, USSTRATCOM
Combating WMD Fort and synchronizing DOD-wide Center for Combating
Belvoir, Va. August 2005 efforts in support of the WMD, is also the
combating weapons of mass Director, Defense
destruction (WMD) mission Threat Reduction
and serves to plan, Agency.
advocate, and advise the
Commander, USSTRATCOM, on
WMD-related matters. The
center provides
recommendations to dissuade,
deter, and prevent the
acquisition, development, or
use of WMD and associated
technology. Through
collaboration with U.S. and
allied organizations, the
center leverages
around-the-clock situational
awareness of worldwide WMD
and related activities, as
well as provides day-to-day
and operational crisis
support via the operations
center. The Defense Threat
Reduction Agency provides
critical reachback and
resources to the center and
USSTRATCOM, and other
combatant commands.
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Note: JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons of mass
destruction. a The Joint Information Operations Center was assigned to the
new USSTRATCOM in October 2002.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
Now on p. 18.
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant
Director; Alissa H. Czyz; David G. Hubbell; Amanda M. Leissoo; Kevin L.
O'Neill; Roderick W. Rodgers; and Mark J. Wielgoszynski,
Analyst-in-Charge, made key contributions to this report.
(350628)
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Highlights of GAO-06-847 , a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
September 2006
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen
Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization
In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation of
the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to anticipate and counter
global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has responsibility for seven mission
areas including nuclear deterrence and integrated missile defense. GAO was
asked to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1)
implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and (2)
defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships
with other Department of Defense (DOD) commands and organizations. To
assess progress, GAO compared USSTRATCOM's efforts with lessons learned in
implementing successful organizational transformations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USSTRATCOM take actions to provide more guidance to
its mission and service component organizations, improve communications,
and evaluate mission performance. DOD agreed with some recommendations but
disagreed with others, including that it develop a results-oriented
management process. Therefore, GAO included a matter for congressional
consideration that would require DOD to develop such a process given the
importance of the role assigned to USSTRATCOM.
Since its establishment in 2002, USSTRATCOM has made progress in
implementing its new missions by taking a wide range of actions such as
developing concepts of operations for its new missions, establishing
processes and procedures, and identifying and obtaining personnel and
resources needed to begin operations. However, further steps are needed to
build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by
the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the
command's leadership recognizes the need to build on progress to date and
has some additional actions underway to expand and enhance capabilities in
its seven mission areas, GAO identified several areas in which more
specific actions are needed to help the command achieve its vision.
Specifically, the command has taken initial steps to include its new
missions in its exercise program but has not yet fully developed a robust
exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S.
Joint Forces Command, which can provide USSTRATCOM with several planning,
training, and evaluation tools. In addition, most of USSTRATCOM's new
mission organizations have not established clear criteria for determining
when they will reach full operating capability. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM
has not developed performance measures and criteria for assessing results
across the command and in each of its mission areas. GAO's prior work
examining organizational change and defense transformation shows that each
of these tools is important for transforming organizations to increase
their likelihood of success, particularly when multiple organizations are
involved in mission execution. Developing plans in each of these areas
should help the command demonstrate it can provide added value to the
combatant commanders and give the President an expanded set of military
options for responding to future threats-two key DOD goals.
USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall
organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations
that have responsibility for the daily management of operations. However,
it has not fully clarified roles and expectations of its service component
organizations and had not developed a commandwide approach for enhancing
outreach to other DOD organizations. While USSTRATCOM has provided some
guidance to its service component organizations, because this guidance has
not been specific or well documented, the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not
fully understand their expectations in providing support to the command.
In addition, while USSTRATCOM conducts some outreach with other combatant
commands and organizations, it lacks a commandwide approach to effectively
manage outreach activities. GAO has previously found that it is essential
for organizations to develop a comprehensive communication strategy that
seeks to engage customers and stakeholders. Providing additional guidance
and developing a communications strategy should help USSTRATCOM's service
component organizations to better understand their roles and enable the
command to build effective relationships with other commands.
*** End of document. ***