Truck Safety: Share the Road Safely Pilot Initiative Showed
Promise, but the Program's Future Success Is Uncertain
(08-SEP-06, GAO-06-916).
In 2004, over 5,000 people died on our nation's roads in crashes
involving large trucks. The Department of Transportation's (DOT)
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) operates
truck safety programs, including Share the Road Safely (STRS),
which has a goal to improve driving behavior around large trucks.
At congressional direction, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) assumed responsibility for funding STRS in
2004, but returned STRS to FMCSA in 2006. The current
transportation authorization bill requested GAO to update its
2003 evaluation of STRS. This report (1) describes the STRS
initiatives DOT has implemented since 2003 and their design, (2)
reviews evaluations of STRS initiatives, and (3) assesses DOT's
plans for the future of STRS. GAO interviewed DOT and state
officials, and reviewed program plans and evaluations.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-916
ACCNO: A60485
TITLE: Truck Safety: Share the Road Safely Pilot Initiative
Showed Promise, but the Program's Future Success Is Uncertain
DATE: 09/08/2006
SUBJECT: Driver education
Education program evaluation
Federal law
Highway safety
Law enforcement
Program evaluation
Public roads or highways
Traffic accidents
Transportation safety
Pilot programs
Click It or Ticket Program
DOT Large Truck Crash Causation Project
DOT Share the Road Safely Program
Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks
Project
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GAO-06-916
* Report to Congressional Committees
* September 2006
* TRUCK SAFETY
* Share the Road Safely Pilot Initiative Showed Promise, but the
Program's Future Success Is Uncertain
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* During 2004 and 2005, the Share the Road Safely Program Funded a
Reasonably Designed Education and Enforcement Pilot in Washington
State
* DOT Helped Establish and Operate an Aggressive Driving Pilot
Initiative in Washington State
* FMCSA Sought to Learn How to Operate a High- Visibility Law
Enforcement Campaign
* Pilot Generally Conformed to the Proven High-Visibility Law
Enforcement Campaign Model with Some Variation, but Dealt
with More Complex Issues
* Previous STRS Initiatives Were Not Funded under NHTSA
* Evaluation of TACT Demonstrated Positive Results and Was
Generally Well- Designed
* TACT Improved Driver Behavior and Public Awareness
* The Evaluation of TACT Was Generally Well- Designed and
Links Results to Its Intended Goal of Crash Reduction
* TACT Is Better Designed to Successfully Reach Agency Goals
Than Past STRS Initiatives
* FMCSA Plans Expanded Development of High- Visibility Law
Enforcement Campaigns Similar to TACT, but Lacks a Clear Strategy
and Expertise
* FMCSA Plans to Implement More TACT-Like Initiatives but Has
Yet to Articulate Its Strategy
* FMCSA's Ability to Manage Future Initiatives Is Unclear and
NHTSA's Role Is Still Evolving
* FMCSA's Short-term Plans Focus on Initiatives That Do Not
Include Enforcement and That Have Not Been Shown to Be
Effective
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments
* Scope And Methodology
* TACT's Implementation of the Click It or Ticket Model
* Description of TACT Methodology for Analyzing Video Footage of Driver
Behavior
* Staff Acknowledgments
Report to Congressional Committees
September 2006
TRUCK SAFETY
Share the Road Safely Pilot Initiative Showed Promise, but the Program's
Future Success Is Uncertain
Contents
Table
Figures
September 8, 2006Letter
The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Co-Chairman Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United
States Senate
The Honorable Don Young Chairman The Honorable James L. Oberstar Ranking
Democratic Member Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of
Representatives
In 2004, over 42,000 people died on our nation's roads. About 12 percent
(5,190) of these fatalities occurred in collisions involving large
commercial trucks, in which many more occupants were killed in the other
vehicles than in the trucks. Furthermore, large-truck traffic has
increased significantly (33 percent) from 1994 through 2004. This trend
seems likely to continue as the Transportation Research Board estimates
that truck traffic will increase by 3.5 percent annually.1 However,
according to the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Large Truck Crash
Causation Study,2 passenger-vehicle drivers were responsible for the
majority of these large commercial truck crashes. The study found that
specific passenger-vehicle driver behaviors, such as driving too fast for
road conditions and making illegal maneuvers, contributed significantly to
crashes involving large commercial trucks.
Within DOT, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is
responsible for improving the safety of commercial-vehicle operations,
which include interstate truck and motor coach (bus) companies, while the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has a mission to
reduce deaths, injuries, and economic losses resulting from motor vehicle
crashes. FMCSA has set a safety goal to reduce the rate of fatalities from
an estimated 2.81 per 100 million truck-miles traveled in 1996 to no more
than 1.65 by the end of 2008. In 2004, the fatality rate for truck-related
crashes was 2.3 per 100 million truck-miles traveled. To work toward its
2008 goal, FMCSA leads enforcement efforts such as working with and
providing grants to states to enforce Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations. In addition, FMCSA operates several education and outreach
programs. Share the Road Safely (STRS) is one such program that aims to
support FMCSA's goal by educating and changing the driving behavior of
both passenger-vehicle and truck drivers so that they may interact safely
with one another on the road.3 NHTSA sets and enforces safety standards
for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment and provides grants to
states to improve passenger-vehicle driver safety.
In recent years, we raised concerns about FMCSA's education and outreach
efforts. In 2003, we reported that STRS lacked a clear program strategy
and included activities that were only tenuously linked to program goals.4
We also reported that FMCSA had not recently evaluated the program's
effectiveness. Consequently, we recommended that DOT ensure that STRS
initiatives are directly linked to the program's goals, and that DOT
establish a systematic process for evaluating the program's effectiveness.
We also suggested that FMCSA apply strategies used by other parts of DOT,
such as NHTSA, to its evaluations of STRS. In fiscal year 2004, Congress
transferred funding for the program to NHTSA, an agency that sets and
enforces safety standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment
and provides grants to states to improve passenger-vehicle driver safety.
Additionally, the Conference Report accompanying the DOT appropriations
act for fiscal year 2004 indicates the conferees wanted NHTSA and FMCSA to
apply lessons learned from NHTSA's experience with high-visibility law
enforcement campaigns to STRS to educate drivers on how to drive safely
around large trucks. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)-which
authorized the federal surface transportation programs for highways,
highway safety, and transit between 2005 and 2009-annually provided $3
million to NHTSA and $1 million to FMCSA for administering education and
outreach activities associated with commercial-vehicle safety, such as
STRS. The Conference Report accompanying the DOT appropriations act for
fiscal year 2006, however, indicates that the conferees allocated the
entire $4 million for education and outreach activities associated with
commercial-vehicle safety to FMCSA, including $500,000 for STRS
initiatives.
SAFETEA-LU also asked us to update our 2003 evaluation of STRS to
determine if the program has achieved reductions in the number and
severity of commercial motor vehicle crashes, including reductions in the
number of deaths and the severity of injuries sustained in these crashes.
To update our 2003 STRS report and assess the impact of the program on the
interaction between large commercial trucks and passenger vehicles, we (1)
describe what STRS initiatives DOT has implemented since 2003 and assess
whether its initiatives are reasonably designed; (2) review the results of
DOT evaluations of STRS initiatives and assess the evaluation methods; and
(3) assess DOT's plans for the future of STRS initiatives.
To determine how STRS has changed since 2003 and whether the design of its
initiatives is reasonable, we interviewed DOT officials and reviewed
agency documents. Additionally, we interviewed FMCSA, NHTSA, and local
officials involved in the operation of the STRS pilot initiative in
Washington State and reviewed related program documents. We examined the
design of the Washington State pilot to determine how it compares with
other initiatives intended to modify driver behavior, and whether the
pilot's activities links to agency goals. We did not assess the design of
other STRS initiatives because they were not funded in 2004 and 2005, and
we reported on these initiatives in our 2003 report. To determine what the
evaluation of STRS pilot initiative showed, we reviewed evaluation plans
and evaluation results and spoke with DOT and state officials responsible
for conducting the evaluation. We also compared DOT's evaluation approach
with accepted evaluation methods. Although SAFETEA-LU asked us to
determine if STRS achieved reductions in the number of deaths and the
severity of injuries sustained in commercial-vehicle crashes, DOT's
evaluation did not assess these outcomes because the number of fatalities
and injuries on DOT's study corridors were too low to reliably measure any
appreciable change. Therefore, we did not discuss in this report STRS's
impact on specific numbers of fatalities and injuries. To assess DOT's
future plans for STRS, we interviewed program administrators at DOT and
reviewed provided budget and planning documents. We also compared the
planned initiatives (1) with high-visibility law enforcement campaign
models, shown to change behavior by prior research, to assess their
implementation and (2) with the initiatives described in our prior report
to see how they have evolved. We conducted our review from October 2005
through July 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Appendix I provides additional details of our scope
and methodology.
Results in Brief
During fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the Share the Road Safely program
funded one initiative that focused primarily on trying to reduce
aggressive driving5 behavior associated with car and truck crashes in
Washington State. We found that this initiative was reasonably designed,
and that it for the most part followed a model that combines education
with enforcement activities. The Washington Traffic Safety Commission was
the lead agency on this pilot initiative, known as Ticketing Aggressive
Cars and Trucks (TACT), with NHTSA providing significant implementation
assistance and approximately $565,000 in funding. FMCSA developed initial
plans for a multistate education and enforcement project, and after
Congress provided STRS funds to NHTSA, FMCSA worked with NHTSA and
Washington State. FMCSA also provided assistance for TACT that included
initial crash analyses, reviews of project plans, and $100,000 in grants
for enforcement. TACT centered on two, 2-week high-visibility law
enforcement waves in July and September, 2005, along with outreach
efforts, such as television news coverage and radio advertisements, to
inform motorists of the dangers of aggressive driving and of the program's
initiatives. TACT planning documents state that the pilot was a
high-visibility law enforcement campaign patterned on the Selective
Traffic Enforcement Program (STEP) model, which combines educational and
enforcement activities and has been shown by prior research to be more
effective at changing driver behavior than education alone. NHTSA's Click
It or Ticket safety belt campaign6 is an example of a successful
high-visibility law enforcement campaign that is based on the STEP model.
Our analysis of TACT's implementation shows that it conformed to the
high-visibility law enforcement campaign used in NHTSA's Click It or
Ticket campaign, with a couple of exceptions. For instance, the Click It
or Ticket model calls for television advertising, which TACT did not use
because of its limited funding. Furthermore, although TACT was similar to
other high-visibility law enforcement campaigns, it dealt with more
complex issues. For example, Washington has no one specific law against
aggressive driving, so officials had to ensure that the courts would
cooperate with TACT's enforcement efforts. By contrast, Washington's laws
specifically require safety belt use; therefore, enforcement during Click
It or Ticket campaigns is more straightforward. To support the transfer of
knowledge about implementing high-visibility law enforcement campaigns
from NHTSA to FMCSA, the Conference Report accompanying the DOT
appropriations act for fiscal year 2005 expressed the conferees'
expectation that FMCSA would detail one staff member to serve as a liaison
to NHTSA. In response, FMCSA hired a liaison who came aboard after the
completion of TACT's last enforcement wave. Finally, other initiatives,
such as educational brochures, that were a part of STRS in our 2003 review
were not funded in 2004 and 2005, but FMCSA continued to disseminate
available education and outreach materials.
DOT and Washington State officials conducted an evaluation of TACT that
demonstrated the pilot's success in reducing aggressive driver behavior
and found that the initiative had an acceptable experimental design for
making this determination. Officials found reductions in the rates and
seriousness of unsafe driving acts when they analyzed video footage of
driver behavior before and after the pilot. Specifically, the rate of
unsafe driving acts per hour was cut almost in half. Additionally, surveys
of motorists demonstrated that TACT's message of leaving more space around
trucks successfully reached its target audience. Furthermore, we found
that the evaluation was well-designed. It compared intervention groups
that received educational and enforcement efforts with comparison groups
that did not. This comparison enabled program administrators to attribute
any positive changes in driver behavior to TACT initiatives. TACT's
evaluation design represents a positive step toward meeting our 2003
recommendation that DOT establish a systematic process for evaluating the
effectiveness of STRS. Although the TACT evaluation did not provide data
regarding the impact of the pilot on the number of crashes in the
corridors because those numbers were too low to assess, the evaluation
relied on intermediate measures such as improved driver behavior, which
should logically result in decreased crashes, injuries, and fatalities. In
addition, by combining education and enforcement, the pilot was better
designed to reach agency goals of improving driver behavior to reduce
fatalities than past STRS initiatives that were focused solely on
educating motorists on how trucks and cars should drive around each other,
thereby making progress toward meeting our 2003 recommendation that STRS
initiatives link to STRS goals.
Given the success of the TACT initiative in improving driver behavior,
FMCSA is encouraging states to adopt TACT-like initiatives; however, the
extent to which FMCSA will be able to successfully develop and implement
these initiatives is uncertain. Furthermore, FMCSA's STRS plans for fiscal
year 2006 focus on initiatives that are strictly educational, which
research has shown are more limited in their ability to improve driver
behavior than educational initiatives linked with enforcement. However,
FMCSA plans to evaluate the impact of these educational activities. FMCSA
officials stated that by fiscal year 2009, they plan a nationwide rollout
of initiatives, like TACT, that rely on education and enforcement to
address poor driver behavior around commercial trucks. In the interim,
FMCSA is contracting with Pennsylvania to conduct another TACT pilot,
using primarily Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) grants and
state funding. FMCSA has recently set up a transition team of FMCSA and
NHTSA staff to help develop a plan for achieving its 2009 goal and to
resolve issues such as identifying a funding source for a nationwide
program. In addition, FMCSA's limited experience in implementing such
initiatives raises concerns about its ability to develop and implement a
nationwide program. For example, FMCSA has few people dedicated to
education and outreach programs, and some officials commented that the
agency lacks NHTSA's experience overseeing the implementation of behavior
modification initiatives. Also, one of these officials, the FMCSA liaison
to NHTSA, missed opportunities for learning about the operation of TACT
and other high-visibility law enforcement campaigns because of the time it
took to fill the position. Furthermore, although FMCSA announced that
states could apply for MCSAP funds to use for TACT-like initiatives, it
did not provide guidance on how to proceed, and applications for these
funds in 2006 were due before the evaluation of TACT was completed.
Finally, FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its $500,000 fiscal year
2006 STRS funds on enhancing its Web site and sending brochures and other
informational materials to commercial- and passenger-vehicle
drivers-initiatives that are strictly educational. However, research has
shown that the ability of educational initiatives such as these to improve
driver behavior is more limited than when education is linked with
enforcement. After we discussed our findings with FMCSA, officials decided
to ask its contractor to evaluate these initiatives in fiscal year 2006, a
year earlier than planned, with an expected evaluation report completed by
fiscal year 2007. However, FMCSA has yet to identify specific performance
goals and measures.
We have concerns about the ability of the STRS initiatives to continue to
improve driver behavior, given FMCSA's limited staff, experience, and
systematic plans for expanding high-visibility law enforcement campaigns
and its focus on educational initiatives. Therefore, we are recommending
that DOT continue to develop a comprehensive strategy to describe how it
will achieve its goal of implementing TACT nationwide, and how STRS
initiatives will contribute to this goal. We also recommend that the
agency complete and execute plans to evaluate STRS outreach activities
that are purely educational and discontinue activities where no impact can
be demonstrated. Lastly, we recommend that DOT monitor whether FMCSA has
sufficient staff and institutional experience to successfully develop and
implement future high-visibility law enforcement campaigns, and, if it
does not, determine how to use existing expertise within DOT to focus on
and support STRS initiatives that combine education and enforcement. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOT officials generally agreed with
our recommendations. The officials also clarified and updated information,
such as the status of their evaluations, and provided technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate.
Background
The occupants of other vehicles are several times more likely to die in
crashes involving large commercial trucks than the occupants of the
trucks.7 From 1995 through 2004, there were 51,791 people killed in
large-truck crashes. Of this total, 40,438 were occupants of other
vehicles, while 7,131 were the occupants of large trucks and 4,222 were
nonmotorists, such as pedestrians. Figure 1 shows the number of
passenger-vehicle and large-truck occupants killed in collisions involving
large trucks from 1995 through 2004, according to NHTSA's Fatality
Analysis Reporting System. 8
Figure 1: Number of Vehicle Occupants Killed in Large-Truck Crashes, by
Vehicle Type (1995-2004)
The Large Truck Crash Causation Study found behavior by drivers of
passenger vehicles and trucks responsible for the majority of these
large-truck crashes. In a large majority of crashes involving a single
truck and a single passenger vehicle, driver behavior was deemed a
critical reason for the crash-about 88 percent when the critical reason
was assigned to the truck and about 89 percent when assigned to the
passenger vehicle. The remaining critical reasons are primarily related to
the vehicle and environment. The Large Truck Crash Causation Study lists
driving too fast for road conditions, making illegal maneuvers, and
driving under work pressure as factors contributing to crashes between
large trucks and passenger vehicles, but the study does not list a
specific factor for aggressive driving.
FMCSA's education and outreach activities represent a small portion of its
total efforts to reduce fatalities caused by collisions involving large
commercial vehicles. FMCSA, established in 2000 as a separate
administration under DOT by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of
1999, is responsible for improving the safety of commercial-vehicle
operations on the nation's highways. The agency's overall goal is to
reduce the rate of fatalities resulting from collisions involving large
commercial trucks from the 1996 rate of 2.8 fatalities per 100 million
truck miles traveled to 1.65 by 2008. FMCSA carries out its mission
primarily through regulatory and enforcement programs, including
developing and enforcing Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations,
administering MCSAP grants to states, and leading enforcement actions
against operators who violate regulations. FMCSA also undertakes education
and outreach activities, such as posting on its Web site regulations
pertaining to the licensing of commercial drivers or the transporting of
hazardous materials, and is also allocated funding for specific education
and outreach programs. In fiscal year 2006, education and outreach funding
accounted for about $4 million of FMCSA's over $490 million budget. Also
in fiscal year 2006, FMCSA plans to use education and outreach funding for
activities supporting its Safety Belt program, which targeted
commercial-vehicle drivers; public outreach on hiring motor coach
services; and consumer outreach on using household goods movers, among
other programs.
STRS is one education and outreach program intended to help reduce the
number of crashes involving large commercial vehicles. FMCSA assumed
responsibility for the program in 2000, when Congress established FMCSA.
STRS targeted all highway users and sought to modify driver behavior by
increasing their awareness of the inherent dangers of driving in and
around large commercial vehicles. STRS attempted to increase drivers'
awareness of these dangers through a variety of channels, such as
publishing informational literature, developing material for driver's
education courses, and issuing public service announcements. Additionally,
FMCSA partnered with public and private organizations nationwide to
promote the STRS mission. One of these partners, the American Trucking
Association, now operates its own independent Share the Road program that
seeks to educate the public through outreach and media events held in
cities across the nation.
In 2003, the House Report accompanying the DOT appropriations act asked
GAO to evaluate the effectiveness of the STRS initiatives. Our report
found that some STRS initiatives did not clearly link to the program's
goals, and that evaluations of the program did not fully measure its
outcomes. Our review also noted that research shows that attempts to
modify driver behavior are more effective when educational activities are
combined with enforcement efforts. Subsequently, we recommended that DOT
ensure that STRS initiatives directly link with the program's goals, and
that DOT establish a systematic process for evaluating the effectiveness
of the program. We also suggested that FMCSA could apply strategies used
by other parts of DOT, such as NHTSA, to its evaluations of STRS. Such
strategies include measuring targeted knowledge, attitude, and behavior
changes before and after program exposure to assess change.
For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, Congress transferred funding for STRS from
FMCSA to NHTSA, with FMCSA retaining a supporting role. In the Conference
Report accompanying the DOT appropriations act for fiscal year 2004, the
conferees asked NHTSA to work with FMCSA to educate the motoring public on
how to share the road safely with commercial motor vehicles. The
appropriation asked NHTSA and FMCSA to apply lessons learned from NHTSA's
experience in high-visibility law enforcement campaigns to STRS
initiatives to educate drivers on how to drive safety around large trucks.
NHTSA operates a number of programs intended to promote safe behavior by
passenger-vehicle drivers. One such program is Click It or Ticket, which
evaluations have shown to be effective at increasing safety belt use by
combining extensive paid and earned media9 coverage and high-visibility
law enforcement waves. Furthermore, the Conference Report accompanying the
DOT appropriations act for fiscal year 2005 expressed the conferees' view
that FMCSA should assign a staff member to NHTSA to act as a liaison for
STRS. FMCSA officials told us that the rationale for establishing this
liaison position was to transfer knowledge to FMCSA on the operation of
education and enforcement campaigns.
NHTSA's Click It or Ticket program is a high-visibility law enforcement
campaign that is based on the STEP model. According to NHTSA officials,
STEP is a model that the enforcement community uses to announce, usually
through press releases, some increase in enforcement of some violation or
identified problem area, such as not wearing a safety belt. Over time,
this model has become more sophisticated to include more and better
targeted media campaigns to announce enforcement. These media campaigns
should include both extensive (1) earned media that include news coverage
and (2) paid media, such as radio and television advertising, to explain
the problem the program is trying to address and the stepped up
enforcement. NHTSA officials refer to this more sophisticated version of a
STEP model as a high-visibility law enforcement campaign.
During 2004 and 2005, the Share the Road Safely Program Funded a
Reasonably Designed Education and Enforcement Pilot in Washington State
During 2004 and 2005, NHTSA funded the Share the Road Safely program and
implemented an aggressive driving pilot initiative in Washington State.
Known as Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT), it combined
education and law enforcement activities in an effort to reduce aggressive
driving between passenger vehicles and trucks. Another objective of the
pilot was for NHTSA to show FMCSA staff how to operate similar initiatives
in the future. TACT generally conformed to the proven high-visibility law
enforcement model, although it dealt with more complex issues than
previous high-visibility law enforcement campaigns. TACT's design and
implementation linked to the STRS goal of changing driver behavior,
whereas past STRS initiatives sometimes did not link to goals or were not
designed to maximize the potential for success. In addition, Congress
requested FMCSA to use a liaison to facilitate the transfer of knowledge
about high-visibility law enforcement campaigns from NHTSA to FMCSA.
Lastly, educational initiatives that were a part of STRS in 2003 were
pursued by FMCSA, although not funded under NHTSA in 2004 and 2005.
DOT Helped Establish and Operate an Aggressive Driving Pilot Initiative in
Washington State
According to DOT officials, Share the Road Safely program funding has
supported an aggressive driving pilot initiative in Washington State
starting in 2004. In 2004, DOT selected Washington State for the pilot
initiative and signed a cooperative agreement with the Washington Traffic
Safety Commission. The pilot, known as TACT, combined high-visibility law
enforcement waves with education and outreach activities in an effort to
reduce aggressive driving between passenger-vehicle and large-truck
drivers. TACT focused on four interstate highway corridors, each covering
a distance of approximately 25 miles. (See fig. 2.) Two intervention
corridors in the western part of the state received media messages and 2
weeks of increased, high-visibility law enforcement waves in July and
September, 2005, while two comparison corridors did not. During these
waves, law enforcement officers patrolled the intervention corridors in
marked and unmarked patrol cars, in state patrol aerial units when weather
permitted, and from the cabs of semitrucks to target unsafe driving around
large trucks.
Figure 2: TACT Intervention and Comparison Corridors in Washington State
The TACT pilot initiative used paid radio advertising and earned media,
such as local news coverage, to inform the targeted audience of the
dangers of aggressive driving related to trucks and to announce that law
enforcement officers would issue tickets for such behavior. TACT's radio
advertisement was aired over 6,000 times during the course of the
enforcement waves, and eight local television stations dedicated coverage
to the pilot. Figure 3 shows an example of the earned media coverage.
Figure 3: Television News Coverage Used for TACT
DOT officials said they selected Washington State to participate in this
pilot because of the state's experience with other related safety
initiatives, its accurate fatality and crash database, and its strong
relationships with key stakeholders. TACT built upon a previous STEP model
campaign, Step Up and R.I.D.E.,10 which operated in Washington for several
years. In the Step Up and R.I.D.E. program, Washington partnered with the
local trucking industry to periodically place police officers in
commercial vehicles to identify and issue citations to drivers observed
committing offenses. DOT officials also stated that Washington has shown
itself capable of successfully implementing and evaluating a
high-visibility law enforcement campaign-specifically its Click It or
Ticket campaign, which in 2002 increased safety belt use from about 80
percent to 95 percent. Additionally, DOT cited Washington as having good
data on crashes and fatalities. In a 2005 report, we also recognized that
Washington has very good cooperation among state agencies involved in
crash data collection and reporting, and a strong relationship with its
FMCSA division office.11 Finally, according to DOT officials, a particular
strength of Washington is that the Washington Traffic Safety Commission,
the lead organization in implementing the TACT initiative, comprises
multiple state agencies, including all of the agencies that are
participating in TACT, thus setting the stage for easy coordination and
cooperation among participating agencies.
Federal, state, and local organizations participated in and contributed
about $892,000 for the planning and operation of TACT. A steering
committee led by the Washington Traffic Safety Commission planned and
administered the pilot project. Other partners on the steering committee
included the Washington DOT, the Washington State Patrol, the Association
of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, and the Washington Trucking Association.
Officials on the steering committee believed having all of these groups
involved in developing the pilot was important to the successful
implementation of the pilot. The Washington Traffic Safety Commission also
contributed $118,000 to the pilot for project management and
communications. Local and state police made officers available for the
enforcement waves, and the Washington Trucking Association worked with
trucking companies to provide decoy trucks and drivers. NHTSA provided
considerable assistance in developing and implementing the initiative and
supplied the majority of TACT's funding, awarding $497,000 in fiscal year
2004 and an additional $68,000 for evaluation activities in fiscal year
2005. Congress also provided NHTSA with an additional $99,000 for the TACT
initiative in fiscal year 2005. FMCSA did TACT's initial planning and
provided ongoing assistance, including reviewing plans. It also provided
$100,000 in fiscal year 2005 for TACT's enforcement efforts through
MCSAP.12
FMCSA Sought to Learn How to Operate a High-Visibility Law Enforcement
Campaign
DOT officials told us that a goal for FMCSA in the TACT initiative was to
gain institutional knowledge on the operation of high-visibility law
enforcement campaigns, such as Click It or Ticket. These campaigns combine
education and outreach activities with high-visibility law enforcement to
bring about a change in driver behavior. Our 2003 report stated that
highway safety experts agree that attempts to modify behavior are more
effective when educational and enforcement efforts are used together.
However, the STRS initiatives we identified in our 2003 report were purely
educational.13 The report added that FMCSA could improve STRS by drawing
from NHTSA's considerable experience with high-visibility law enforcement
campaigns like Click It or Ticket, which has been widely considered
effective in increasing the rate of safety belt use. Furthermore, a NHTSA
evaluation report found that 10 states that used the Click It or Ticket
model had significantly greater increases in safety belt use compared with
states that attempted to increase safety belt use through other
initiatives. TACT offered FMCSA an opportunity to learn from NHTSA's
experience with high-visibility law enforcement campaigns and learn how to
develop similar aggressive driving initiatives in other states. To further
ensure this transfer of knowledge as requested by conferees in the
Conference Report accompanying its 2005 appropriations act, FMCSA hired
and detailed a staff member to NHTSA to act as a communications liaison
for STRS. The liaison was involved in some facets of TACT, including
meeting with its steering committee and preparing briefings on the pilot.
According to DOT officials, however, the liaison came aboard after the
completion of the last enforcement wave-later in this report, we discuss
this matter further in relation to the future of STRS initiatives.
Pilot Generally Conformed to the Proven High-Visibility Law Enforcement
Campaign Model with Some Variation, but Dealt with More Complex Issues
Our analysis of TACT's design and implementation shows that it generally
conformed to the high-visibility law enforcement campaign model as
intended, but varied in a few aspects. Specifically, TACT was modeled
after NHTSA's Click It or Ticket campaign. In modeling Click It or
Ticket's approach, officials in the TACT program collected data before and
after its enforcement waves to identify behavior changes; it had highly
visible enforcement on each day of its enforcement waves; and it had used
both paid and earned media to publicize its enforcement.
TACT did deviate from the Click It or Ticket model in two ways. First, the
pilot did not use paid television advertising. Washington State officials
explained that this was because of the program's limited budget. While
evaluations of Click It or Ticket show that radio advertisements were
effective in reaching the motoring public, radio is not as effective a
medium as television. Second, the media for the TACT pilot described the
enforcement campaign as zero tolerance as prescribed by the Click It or
Ticket model, and enforcement was stepped up; however, law enforcement
officers participating in TACT issued warnings instead of citations in 28
percent of the traffic stops. NHTSA officials explained that law
enforcement officers always have discretion on whether to issue citations,
and what is more important is that the public perceive an increase in law
enforcement. Furthermore, they explained there is no research about the
most effective level of citation tickets. See appendix II for a detailed
comparison of TACT's implementation of the Click It or Ticket model.
Although TACT is based on the high-visibility law enforcement campaign
model, it deals with more complex issues than previous initiatives. In the
case of Click It or Ticket, law enforcement is simply checking for safety
belt use. With TACT, there are a number of behaviors that may constitute
aggressive driving, including tailgating, speeding, and unsafe merging.
These multiple factors also made it more difficult to develop a primary
message for TACT to communicate to the public. TACT administrators, for
example, determined that they had to choose a primary behavioral
theme-leaving more space around trucks-to communicate to motorists,
although obeying the speed limit and staying out of a truck's blind spots
also are important and were secondary themes. See figure 4 for a depiction
of TACT's selected message. This message was posted on 16 highway signs in
the intervention corridors. Additionally, TACT was more difficult to
institute from a legal standpoint. Washington has a primary safety belt
law, meaning that officers can pull over drivers solely for not wearing
their safety belts. In the case of TACT, however, Washington has no single
aggressive driving law. Washington State officials told us they had to
ensure that courts would be willing to enforce the tickets because police
officers issued citations for violations under a number of laws.
Figure 4: TACT Highway Sign
Previous STRS Initiatives Were Not Funded under NHTSA
In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, STRS did not fund initiatives that were a
part of the program in 2003. All STRS funds in fiscal years 2004 and 2005
were directed to the TACT pilot. According to FMCSA officials, however,
they continued to disseminate education and outreach materials. For
instance, the No-Zone campaign-a major initiative of STRS-was not funded
during this period.14 FMCSA did, however, keep No-Zone information
available on its Web site and responded to requests for educational
material. For example, according to FMCSA officials, during this period
they distributed over 200,000 copies of the No-Zone brochure through
venues such as conferences and industry events. Also prior to TACT, FMCSA
developed a curriculum for teaching students about sharing the road with
trucks. FMCSA completed work on the curriculum and produced a video for
the course, and it distributed the materials during fiscal years 2004 and
2005, including 1,500 copies of the video.
Evaluation of TACT Demonstrated Positive Results and Was Generally
Well-Designed
DOT and Washington State officials conducted an evaluation of TACT that
demonstrated the initiative's success and was generally well-designed.
Specifically, analysis of videotaped driver behavior showed reductions in
aggressive driving, and targeted motorists reported significant exposure
to the initiative's message. Additionally, the evaluation followed
accepted experimental design principles by comparing changes on two
intervention highway corridors, which were exposed to the initiative's
message and enforcement, with changes on two comparison highway corridors,
which were not exposed to the message. This experimental setup enabled
program administrators to attribute positive changes in driver behavior to
TACT initiatives. The evaluation did not assess changes in crashes, but
increased driver awareness and improved driver behavior should logically
lead to reduced crashes, injuries, and fatalities. Also, TACT's design of
combining education outreach with law enforcement better lent itself to
reaching STRS goals than previous initiatives that were purely
educational.
TACT Improved Driver Behavior and Public Awareness
The TACT evaluation demonstrated that the initiative was able to produce
improvements in driver behavior. TACT evaluated changes in driver behavior
by recording video footage of drivers in the four corridors and using
three groups of reviewers-police officers, truck drivers, and Washington
Traffic Safety Commission staff-to rate the seriousness of any unsafe
driving acts. (See app. III for a more detailed explanation of how this
video footage was analyzed.) This analysis found that the rate of unsafe
driving acts per observation hour was nearly cut in half, from 5.80 to
3.05, for the intervention corridors, as compared with a slight decrease,
from 4.03 to 3.92, for the comparison corridor. When controlled for the
preenforcement rates, these data represent a 46 percent decrease in unsafe
driving in the intervention corridors. The comparison corridors also had
1.85 times as many violations per hour than the intervention corridors
when the data are controlled for the corridors' respective violation rates
prior to enforcement. (Fig. 5 shows the rate of violations per observation
hour.) Also, analysis of driver behavior in the intervention corridors
found that crash risk decreased and driver behavior was less illegal and
less intimidating, among other things.
Figure 5: Rate of Violations per Observation Hour
The TACT initiative improved driver behavior by successfully reaching its
intended audience. TACT evaluators demonstrated this by using a survey to
measure the extent to which the initiative changed the awareness of the
target audience. In each of the four communities selected for the project,
TACT administrators distributed surveys to the public at driver licensing
offices both before and after the enforcement waves. For example, the
percentage of respondents on the intervention corridors that reported
general exposure to media about giving trucks more space nearly
quadrupled, from about 18 to 67 percent. These data contrast with data for
the comparison corridors, where the percentage only increased from about
17 to 20 percent. (Fig. 6 shows the percentages of respondents that
reported hearing or seeing TACT-related media outreach.) Additionally, the
evaluation found significant increases in the percentages of respondents
on the intervention corridors that specifically reported hearing the radio
message and seeing the TACT road sign, television, and newspaper messages.
Furthermore, surveys of drivers also showed a significant increase in
drivers reporting that they leave more space when passing trucks (the
intended behavioral change theme of the project) from about 16 to 24
percent for the intervention corridors as compared with a slight increase
from about 15 to 16 percent for the comparison corridors.
Figure 6: Percentages of Survey Respondents That Saw or Heard Media about
Giving Trucks More Space
The Evaluation of TACT Was Generally Well-Designed and Links Results to
Its Intended Goal of Crash Reduction
We found that the evaluation of TACT was generally well-designed, since it
appropriately used an experimental design to attribute outcomes to TACT's
initiatives. An experimental design permits researchers to attribute
outcomes to the effects of the program and rule out other influences.
Often with this kind of evaluation design, the participants in the
intervention group are exposed to the initiative, while similar
participants in the comparison group are unexposed. Aside from the
initiative, participants experience the same influences. That is, they
face conditions that are alike during the same period. More specifically,
the evaluation of the TACT initiative exposed drivers in the intervention
corridors to paid and earned media and high-visibility law enforcement
waves, while simultaneously leaving unexposed comparable drivers in
similar comparison corridors. Then the evaluation compared outcomes in the
two groups. This procedure was repeated in two additional corridors to
make sure that any detected differences in outcomes were not unique to the
first two corridors. Our 2003 review of STRS recommended that DOT
establish a systematic process for evaluating the effectiveness of the
program. Therefore, the evaluation of TACT's methodology represents a
positive step toward meeting our 2003 recommendation.
The evaluation report concludes that the initiative was a success, but it
did not report on TACT's effect on the long-term results of the
initiative, such as the impact on the number of crashes, despite earlier
plans to do so. Both TACT implementation plans and a NHTSA official stated
that the evaluation would assess the impact of the initiative on the
number of crashes in the intervention corridors. However, as the
evaluation report states, it is difficult to determine changes in crashes
given the low number of crashes in Washington State; therefore,
intermediate measures for evaluating the initiative had to be relied upon.
NHTSA officials stated that although the evaluation was unable to report
on long-term results, the program's finding of improved driver behavior
around trucks would logically indicate an expected decrease in
truck-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities. Furthermore, NHTSA does
not evaluate individual Click It or Ticket campaigns, which are considered
to successfully modify behavior, for their effect on long-term results
such as fatality reduction.15 Figure 7 shows how TACT linked short-term
results (such as awareness and knowledge of the dangers of driving around
trucks) and intermediate results (such as changed driver behavior around
trucks) to the long-term results of fewer truck-related crashes, injuries,
and fatalities.
Figure 7: Expected Program Model Logic Results of TACT Initiative
TACT Is Better Designed to Successfully Reach Agency Goals Than Past STRS
Initiatives
The design of TACT provided a better opportunity for successfully reaching
desired results and goals than past STRS initiatives. Our 2003 report on
STRS found that some of FMCSA's education and outreach initiatives were
not directly connected to agency goals and recommended that future
initiatives be so connected. While program initiatives that exclusively
rely on education and outreach, such as distributing informational
pamphlets or advertising, can increase awareness and encourage the
intended behaviors, thereby linking to a program's goals, attempts to
modify the behaviors of drivers are more effective when educational
initiatives are combined with enforcement. This conclusion is supported by
the evaluation of past initiatives to change driver behavior, particularly
of efforts to increase safety belt use.16 For example, a 2002 study by
NHTSA included data from Texas, which showed that while the baseline
percentage of individuals wearing safety belts (80 percent) increased
slightly with advertising alone, the combination of advertising and
enforcement caused the number to increase another 6 percent. TACT's use of
media, road signs, and other educational outreach tools therefore directly
linked to the STRS goal of decreasing unsafe driver behavior around
commercial vehicles by truck drivers and passenger-vehicle drivers, and
incorporating high-visibility law enforcement increased the initiative's
potential for successfully reaching that goal. In effect, TACT represents
a positive step toward meeting our 2003 recommendation that STRS
initiatives clearly link to STRS goals.
FMCSA Plans Expanded Development of High-Visibility Law Enforcement
Campaigns Similar to TACT, but Lacks a Clear Strategy and Expertise
Following the success of TACT in Washington State, FMCSA is developing
plans encouraging states to adopt similar initiatives in other states;
however, its strategy for expanding TACT and its ability to manage these
initiatives remain unknown. FMCSA officials stated that they plan a
nationwide rollout of initiatives similar to TACT by 2009, and that in the
interim, they are currently developing another TACT pilot in Pennsylvania.
FMCSA, however, has yet to articulate a strategy for expanding TACT into a
nationwide program or to identify funding. Additionally, FMCSA's ability
to administer future TACT initiatives is uncertain, since FMCSA has
limited experience with high-visibility law enforcement campaigns.
Finally, FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its STRS funds on
initiatives that are purely educational, even though little information is
available to show that these activities will improve driver behavior and
contribute to reducing fatalities.
FMCSA Plans to Implement More TACT-Like Initiatives but Has Yet to
Articulate Its Strategy
FMCSA plans to expand initiatives similar to TACT to new states and,
eventually, nationwide. FMCSA officials stated that they plan to issue a
Federal Register notice in fiscal year 2008 before rolling out TACT on a
nationwide basis in 2009. In the interim, FMCSA is currently developing
plans to implement another TACT pilot in Pennsylvania, using primarily
MCSAP grants and state funds. There, FMCSA will contract with the
Pennsylvania State Police to develop and operate a high-visibility law
enforcement campaign in at least two intervention corridors and two
comparison corridors in an area with a high concentration of
commercial-vehicle fatalities and crashes. Pennsylvania will also be
responsible for evaluating its pilot. Agency officials anticipate this
pilot taking 18 months to complete. FMCSA also plans to conduct two
additional pilots in fiscal
year 2007, but has not yet identified states.17 Additionally, FMCSA issued
a Federal Register notice in March 2006 stating that states could use
MCSAP High Priority grants18 to comply with provisions of SAFETEA-LU that
require states to conduct comprehensive and highly visible traffic
enforcement and commercial-vehicle safety inspection programs in high-risk
locations and areas. FMCSA added that these initiatives could be similar
to TACT.
FMCSA officials stated that they will develop guidance for states to
follow, but gaps remain in their strategy for expanding TACT nationwide.
Agency documents state that the Washington State TACT pilot and the future
Pennsylvania initiative will form the foundation of a best practices guide
to share with states. However, FMCSA has yet to articulate how it will
expand TACT from several planned pilot initiatives in 2007 to a nationwide
program 2 years later, or how this expansion will be funded. Additionally,
although FMCSA enabled states to apply for MCSAP High Priority grants to
develop initiatives similar to TACT, FMCSA did not provide states with the
guidance to do so. Applications for these funds were due before the
Washington TACT evaluation report was published; therefore, states seeking
to begin similar initiatives needed to design their own initiatives
without the benefit of Washington's experience. Finally, FMCSA officials
stated that no state applied for a fiscal year 2006 grant before the
application deadline in the Federal Register; however, FMCSA will accept
applications until the end of fiscal year 2006 or until the available
funds are awarded.
Although FMCSA has plans for a nationwide expansion of TACT, the majority
of FMCSA's STRS funds will be spent on other activities. Program planning
documents state that FMCSA has decided to transition STRS to focus on
developing initiatives similar to TACT in other states, but FMCSA plans to
invest just $150,000 of its $500,000 fiscal year 2006 STRS budget to do
this.19 FMCSA officials told us that STRS funds would pay for the
evaluation component of this initiative, and FMCSA will supplement
activities with MCSAP funds. The $150,000 fiscal year 2006 STRS investment
in these future initiatives is significantly less than the approximately
$664,000 in STRS funds provided solely to TACT in fiscal years 2004 and
2005.
FMCSA's Ability to Manage Future Initiatives Is Unclear and NHTSA's Role
Is Still Evolving
FMCSA's ability to administer future high-visibility law enforcement
campaigns and NHTSA's role in future STRS initiatives are unclear. As we
previously mentioned, a goal of the TACT pilot was for FMCSA to learn
about the operation of high-visibility enforcement programs from NHTSA,
and to support this goal, FMCSA detailed a liaison to NHTSA following
congressional direction. FMCSA, however, missed valuable opportunities for
learning because of the time it took to fill the position, since the
liaison came aboard late in the TACT program and returned to FMCSA before
NHTSA conducted its annual Click It or Ticket enforcement campaign.20
After discussing our findings with FMCSA officials, they clarified that
other FMCSA staff participated in TACT and knowledge transfer was not
limited to the liaison.
Furthermore, NHTSA's participation in future STRS activities is still
evolving. As we previously mentioned, SAFETEA-LU authorized $3 million to
NHTSA and $1 million annually to FMCSA for administering education and
outreach activities associated with commercial-vehicle safety for the
4-year period from 2006 through 2009. However, the Conference Report
accompanying the DOT appropriations act for fiscal year 2006 indicates
that the conferees did not fund the amounts authorized. Instead, they
funded $4 million to FMCSA alone for these purposes. Given its limited
experiences with programs designed to modify driver behavior, however,
FMCSA's plans call for continuing cooperation with NHTSA in future
aggressive driving programs. For example, staff in FMCSA's Washington
Divisional Office told us that their agency lacks NHTSA's experience with
initiatives that change driver behavior and does not have staff with a
background in the area, especially at the division office level. This is
important because TACT's evaluation report states that having an
experienced evaluation team that can develop and implement a comprehensive
evaluation design was critical to the success of the project. As we
previously mentioned, NHTSA has experience in operating successful
campaigns to increase safe behavior by motorists. Additionally, FMCSA has
only a small number of staff dedicated to its education and outreach
programs. NHTSA staff with whom we spoke initially stated that the
agency's involvement will end with the issuance of the TACT program
evaluation report. Currently, however, NHTSA staff said they will provide
FMCSA with general assistance, and FMCSA has formed a transition team to
help ensure that the necessary expertise will be available to future
initiatives. NHTSA officials added that specific experience with
behavioral issues is not required to replicate the TACT initiative. They
said that a program plan, a media plan, an enforcement plan, and an
evaluation plan are required.
FMCSA's Short-term Plans Focus on Initiatives That Do Not Include
Enforcement and That Have Not Been Shown to Be Effective
FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its 2006 STRS funds on updating the
STRS Web site and producing outreach materials. These funds will be spent
on initiatives that have limited potential for reducing fatalities and
provide limited opportunities for evaluation, representing a return to an
earlier era of STRS. FMCSA will spend $200,000 in updating its Web site,
$100,000 on education and outreach materials promoting sharing the road,
and $50,000 on printing. FMCSA plans to update its Web site with
information on preventing aggressive driving, which will include
Spanish-language content. The Web site also will include a user survey to
gauge satisfaction and will be able to ask up to five questions about a
user's knowledge of STRS initiatives. Currently, FMCSA can only collect
information on the number of visits to the Web site. In addition, FMCSA
plans to distribute education and outreach materials promoting sharing the
road. These initiatives were not financially supported during fiscal years
2004 and 2005, when NHTSA had responsibility for STRS. As we previously
stated, purely educational initiatives may conceptually link to FMCSA's
goal of reducing accidents and fatalities, but initiatives such as TACT
have a better potential to improve driver behavior by incorporating local
enforcement efforts with educational outreach. Figure 8 shows four
categories of FMCSA's planned STRS spending in fiscal year 2006. Table 1
lists FMCSA's planned outreach activities within two of these categories.
Figure 8: Planned STRS Funding for Fiscal Year 2006
Table 1: Planned STRS Outreach Activities for Fiscal Year 2006
STRS initiatives Activities
Web site enhancements Incorporate information on Washington State TACT
into the Web site, including radio advertisements.
Develop and post press releases, radio scripts, and
radio public service announcements that states can
use to raise awareness about driving safely near
trucks.
Implement a customer satisfaction survey on the STRS
Web site.
Update the No-Zone Web page.
Outreach materials Revise and distribute the brochures entitled the
Professional Driver (for truck drivers) and the
Smart Driver (for car drivers). Place Spanish
versions on the STRS Web site.
Develop a script for a public service announcement
that states can use to support TACT communication
efforts.
Distribute STRS radio spots to be aired in the 10
states with the highest truck crash, injury, and
fatality rates.
Update and disseminate model training curriculum for
teaching students about sharing the road with
commercial motor vehicles.
Update No-Zone campaign materials.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA documents.
It is unclear if evaluations of these planned STRS education and outreach
activities will provide meaningful insight into their effectiveness. FMCSA
officials told us that they hired a contractor to develop evaluations of
STRS education and outreach activities, but plans to evaluate the impact
of these activities on fatality and injury rates have yet to be developed.
This contractor will be required to (1) develop an evaluation study that
gathers baseline data and (2) assess whether the education and outreach
materials and activities reached the intended audience, changed attitudes
and behaviors, and helped the program meet its safety goals. However, in
discussing these plans, a NHTSA official told us that it will be difficult
to measure the impact of educational materials on driver behavior.
Furthermore, in our 2003 report, we stated that previous evaluations of
STRS activities shed little light on their short-term, intermediate, and
long-term outcomes. This was due, in part, to FMCSA's heavy reliance on
self-reported data and to FMCSA's not establishing a baseline of driver
behavior and knowledge before the program started. By contrast, TACT's
evaluation visually assessed driver behavior before and after motorists
received education and enforcement. If FMCSA cannot evaluate the effect of
these activities on driver behavior, then the planned activities may
represent a return to the practices that we questioned in our 2003 report.
Conclusions
The TACT initiative represented a significant departure from previous STRS
initiatives and, by following the high-visibility law enforcement campaign
model, incorporated program elements that experts believe are most
effective in changing driver behavior. Its systematic evaluation and clear
link to agency goals were important steps toward addressing concerns with
STRS that we raised in the past. Furthermore, the positive results shown
by the TACT evaluation and the ongoing problem of crashes between trucks
and passenger vehicles demonstrate that there is merit in further
developing and implementing high-visibility law enforcement campaigns
similar to TACT. FMCSA's plans for future aggressive driving initiatives
are still evolving, but the agency is currently developing a second pilot
in Pennsylvania and has a goal of rolling out TACT-like initiatives
nationwide in 2009. However, FMCSA has yet to develop a clear strategy
describing how it will expand initiatives similar to TACT from a series of
pilots into a nationwide program or to describe how these programs will be
funded.
Furthermore, some of FMCSA's plans for addressing unsafe driving do not
focus on expanding education and enforcement initiatives such as TACT.
Instead, FMCSA has chosen to spend the majority of its fiscal year 2006
STRS funds on initiatives that are purely educational, which safety
experts agree are less effective than when educational outreach is
combined with enforcement. Because FMCSA has not identified a cohesive
strategy to expand TACT and not focused on proven approaches such as
high-visibility law enforcement campaigns, it is unclear how FMCSA's STRS
initiatives will contribute to FMCSA's goal of expanding TACT and reducing
crashes and fatalities.
Finally, there are doubts about FMCSA's ability to ensure the success of
STRS in the future. Although funding responsibility for STRS returned to
FMCSA in 2006 and FMCSA participated in the initial planning for TACT,
NHTSA and the Washington Traffic Safety Commission significantly supported
TACT's implementation and evaluation. Additionally, FMCSA may have missed
valuable opportunities to learn about the operation of TACT and other
similar programs because its involvement was limited by not being able to
use its legislatively mandated liaison to the fullest extent possible.
DOT, through staff from both NHTSA and FMCSA, demonstrated that it has the
ability to develop state initiatives that change driver behavior around
trucks by successfully implementing TACT. Even so, it is uncertain that
DOT will effectively use these resources in the future, given that the
relationship between NHTSA and FMCSA is still evolving and that FMCSA has
limited staff and experience in administering high-visibility law
enforcement campaigns.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Share the Road Safely program continues to improve
driver behavior around commercial vehicles, thereby potentially reducing
fatalities, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Administrators of the appropriate agencies to take the following three
steps:
o develop a comprehensive strategy describing how FMCSA will implement and
fund an expansion of TACT-like initiatives from several pilots into a
nationwide program and detail how STRS initiatives contribute to this
goal;
o complete and execute plans to evaluate STRS outreach activities that are
purely educational and discontinue activities with no demonstrable impact
on behavior; and
o monitor whether FMCSA has sufficient staff and expertise to successfully
develop and administer future high-visibility law enforcement campaigns,
and, if it does not, determine the best methods for DOT to use its
resources and expertise to modify driver behavior and address the problem
of aggressive driving around trucks.
Agency Comments
We provided DOT with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT
officials, including FMCSA's Outreach Division Chief and NHTSA's
Behavioral Technology Research Chief, provided oral and written comments
and generally agreed with our recommendations. These FMCSA and NHTSA
officials clarified FMCSA's role in developing initial plans for an
education and enforcement project after we issued our 2003 report and
before Congress provided NHTSA with Share the Road Safely funding. FMCSA
officials also provided additional information on, and documentation of, a
contract to develop an evaluation of FMCSA's education and outreach
programs, including Share the Road Safely educational initiatives.
Finally, the officials provided information on a team of FMCSA and NHTSA
staff established in May 2006 to assist FMCSA with the expansion of TACT
as fiscal responsibility for STRS transitions from NHTSA to FMCSA. We
incorporated this information as well as technical comments throughout the
report as appropriate.
We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees,
the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at h ttp://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] . Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Katherine Siggerud Director, Physical Infrastructure
Appendix I
Scope And Methodology
To address our first objective and describe what the Department of
Transportation (DOT) has done with the Share the Road Safely (STRS)
program since 2003, we interviewed DOT officials to determine the changes
made in the program since May 2003. Additionally, we interviewed officials
from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Washington State
Traffic Safety Commission to report on the implementation and
administration of Washington State's Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks
(TACT) pilot project. To determine whether the design of TACT was
reasonable, we reviewed TACT programming documentation to determine if the
design of the program links program initiatives to goals and if the design
follows the high-visibility law enforcement campaign model for behavior
change. We did not assess the design of other STRS initiatives because
they were not actively funded in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and because
we reported on these activities in our 2003 report.1
To address our second objective-to determine what DOT evaluations have
shown and whether the methods were acceptable-we reviewed evaluation
results and analyzed evaluation plans to determine if short-term,
intermediate, and long-term outcomes were measured and if external factors
were considered and controlled for in the assessment. We reviewed and
summarized the results of the Washington State pilot evaluation and
determined if program initiatives linked to agency goals. In addition, we
reviewed the evaluation results to determine if the evaluation illustrates
that the pilot met its criteria for success. Due to the nature of the TACT
program, we could not determine in this report whether the Share the Road
Safely program achieved reductions in the number of deaths and severity of
injuries as requested by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Specifically,
SAFETEA-LU asked us to update our prior evaluation of STRS to determine if
the program has achieved reductions in the number and severity of
commercial-vehicle crashes, including reductions in the number of deaths
and the severity of injuries sustained in these crashes. NHTSA officials,
however, told us that the evaluation did not assess these long-term
results because the numbers of injuries and fatalities on the pilot's
intervention corridors were too low to reliably measure any appreciable
change. Therefore, we did not discuss in this report the program's impact
on specific numbers of fatalities and injuries.
To assess DOT's plans for the future of STRS, we interviewed program
administrators at DOT and reviewed relevant budget and planning documents
to determine DOT's direction for STRS. We interviewed the FMCSA staff
member assigned to transfer knowledge about administering high-visibility
law enforcement campaigns from NHTSA to FMCSA to assess the staff member's
ability to accomplish this task. We also compared the design of future
FMCSA initiatives with findings we listed in previous reports on programs
designed to modify driver behavior and increase a program's effectiveness
at reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities associated with commercial
vehicles.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through July 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II
TACT's Implementation of the Click It or Ticket Model
Source: GAO analysis of DOT documents.
Legend:
check mark = Followed Click It or Ticket criteria
X = Did not follow Click It or Ticket criteria
aAdvertisements coincided with rush-hour, but television advertisement was
not used.
bWarnings were issued to about 28 percent of all violators.
Appendix III
Description of TACT Methodology for Analyzing Video Footage of Driver
Behavior
To determine whether driver behavior changed, TACT administrators measured
the incidence and rates of unsafe driver behavior in the vicinity of
commercial vehicles. Washington State Police troopers collected these data
by videotaping traffic from unmarked cars. Troopers drove behind
commercial vehicles and provided narration indicating the type of behavior
observed each time an unsafe act was seen. Unsafe behaviors included
making unsafe lane changes, cutting in front of a truck, following another
vehicle too closely, engaging in unsafe merging, and speeding. Troopers
also provided narration detailing whether they would issue citations for
driving violations. Later, 99 video clips were randomly selected and shown
to three sets of reviewers consisting of police officers, truck drivers,
and Washington Traffic Safety Commission employees. Reviewers filled out a
score sheet for each video clip indicating how dangerous they believed the
driver behavior was and whether it deserved a citation. Evaluators
quantified these responses to generate a score indicating the seriousness
of the unsafe driving act.
Staff Acknowledgments
Appendix IV
GAO Contact
Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-2834, s [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
Catherine Colwell, Assistant Director, and Samer Abbas, Analyst-in-Charge,
managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects
of the work. Daniel Concepcion also made significant contributions to all
aspects of this report. In addition, Joel Grossman assisted in our
assessment of the TACT initiative's design and evaluation. Tamera Dorland
provided writing assistance, Bert Japikse provided legal support, and
Joshua Ormond and Theresa Perkins assisted with graphics.
(542072)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-916 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-916 , a report to congressional committees
September 2006
TRUCK SAFETY
Share the Road Safely Pilot Initiative Showed Promise, but the Program's
Future Success Is Uncertain
In 2004, over 5,000 people died on our nation's roads in crashes involving
large trucks. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) operates truck safety programs,
including Share the Road Safely (STRS), which has a goal to improve
driving behavior around large trucks. At congressional direction, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) assumed
responsibility for funding STRS in 2004, but returned STRS to FMCSA in
2006. The current transportation authorization bill requested GAO to
update its 2003 evaluation of STRS. This report (1) describes the STRS
initiatives DOT has implemented since 2003 and their design, (2) reviews
evaluations of STRS initiatives, and (3) assesses DOT's plans for the
future of STRS. GAO interviewed DOT and state officials, and reviewed
program plans and evaluations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation develop a strategy for
expanding TACT-like initiatives, and determine the best method for using
DOT's resources and expertise to modify driver behavior. DOT officials
clarified and updated information in a draft of this report and generally
agreed with the recommendations.
During 2004 and 2005, Share the Road Safely funding was used to implement
one initiative, a pilot in Washington State that focused on aggressive
driving behaviors near or by large trucks. Known as Ticketing Aggressive
Cars and Trucks (TACT), it combined education, such as highway message
signs, and high-visibility law enforcement to reduce aggressive driving.
TACT received about $892,000 in federal and state funds. TACT was
generally modeled on successful behavior modification programs, including
Click It or Ticket (a program to encourage safety belt use), but was more
complex to implement than past initiatives since many behaviors constitute
aggressive driving and Washington State lacked a single aggressive driving
law. In addition, NHTSA sought to demonstrate to FMCSA staff how to
operate similar initiatives in the future. To this end, FMCSA sent a
liaison to NHTSA as requested by Congress. Lastly, initiatives that were a
part of STRS in 2003 were still pursued by FMCSA, but were not funded.
DOT and Washington State officials conducted an evaluation of TACT that
demonstrated that the initiative was successful and well-designed. The
evaluation found that TACT significantly reduced the number and severity
of unsafe driving acts near or by trucks. While the evaluation did not
assess changes in crashes, improved driver behavior should logically lead
to fewer crashes, injuries, and fatalities. GAO found that TACT's design
of combining education with law enforcement better lent itself to reaching
agency goals of fatality reduction than previous STRS initiatives that
were purely educational.
FMCSA plans to expand development of new TACT-like initiatives, but lacks
resources and experience to do so. In addition, FMCSA plans to spend most
of its 2006 STRS funds on educational initiatives, which lack information
showing whether they improve driver behavior. In terms of TACT expansion,
FMCSA is currently developing a TACT-like pilot in Pennsylvania and plans
to roll out initiatives similar to TACT nationally by 2009. FMCSA,
however, has few people dedicated to education and outreach and lacks
NHTSA's experience with behavior modification initiatives. While FMCSA
designated a liaison to learn about TACT-like initiatives, GAO continues
to have con-cerns about FMCSA's limited experience with these initiatives.
NHTSA has considerable experience with such initiatives, but its role in
STRS is still evolving. Finally, FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its
fiscal year 2006 STRS funds on initiatives that do not have evaluations
showing their impacts.
Highway Message Sign and Law Enforcement Used in the Washington State
Pilot Initiative
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