National Nuclear Security Administration: Security and Management
Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA Act
(31-JAN-07, GAO-07-428T).
During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced
difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and
responsibility that contributed to security problems at the
nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems
with major projects. In response, Congress created the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a separately organized
agency within DOE under Title 32 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA Act. Since its
creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems,
such as unauthorized access to NNSA computer systems, and cost
and schedule overruns on major projects, such as the National
Ignition Facility. GAO was asked to review the extent to which
NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories
and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise
its organizational structure. In January 2007, GAO issued a
report--National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional
Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear
Programs, (GAO-07-36)--that addressed these matters. To carry out
its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and
budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and
interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-428T
ACCNO: A65428
TITLE: National Nuclear Security Administration: Security and
Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA
Act
DATE: 01/31/2007
SUBJECT: Agency evaluation
Computer security
Cyber security
Laboratories
Nuclear facility security
Physical security
Planning programming budgeting
Program management
Risk assessment
Safeguards
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GAO-07-428T
* [1]Background
* [2]Additional Action Needed to Improve NNSA's Security Program
* [3]DOE and NNSA Have Not Yet Fully Determined How NNSA Should O
* [4]Several Management Issues Need to be Resolved for NNSA to Be
* [5]GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
* [6]Related GAO Products
* [7]Order by Mail or Phone
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST
Wednesday, January 31, 2007
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Security and Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the
NNSA Act
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment
GAO-07-428T
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the actions the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a separately organized
agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)--has taken to improve the
security and management of the nation's nuclear programs. Specifically, my
remarks are based on the report we are issuing today--National Nuclear
Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management
of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, which was prepared at the request of
this Subcommittee.1
During the late 1990s, DOE experienced management difficulties with its
nuclear weapons programs that contributed to security problems at the
nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and significant cost overruns on
major projects. According to a June 1999 report by the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (the Board), DOE's management of the nuclear
weapons laboratories, while representing "science at its best," also
embodied "security at its worst" because of "organizational disarray,
managerial neglect, and ...a culture of arrogance." The Board urged the
Congress to create a new organization that, whether established as an
independent agency or a semi-autonomous entity within DOE, would have a
clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines
of authority and accountability. Responding to the Board's
recommendations, the Congress created the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA Act.2
The NNSA Act established NNSA as a "separately organized agency" within
DOE and made NNSA responsible for the management and security of the
nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor
programs. The NNSA Act established the position of DOE Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security, who was also designated as the Administrator of NNSA.
The Secretary of Energy and the Deputy Secretary of Energy were allowed to
establish policy for NNSA and to give direction to NNSA through the
Administrator; however, other DOE employees were prohibited from directing
the activities of individual NNSA employees. Finally, the NNSA Act
required that, among other things, NNSA develop a planning, programming,
and budgeting process in order to ensure that the administration operated
under sound financial management principles.
1 [8]GAO-07-36 .
2Pub. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512, 953 (1999).
Since its inception, however, NNSA has continued to experience both
security and management problems. For example, with respect to security,
in 2003 we found that NNSA had not fully defined the roles and
responsibilities of officials in its security program and that NNSA had
shortfalls in security staff at the site offices that oversee its
contractors. In addition, two NNSA studies commissioned in July 2003 found
ongoing problems with NNSA's security program, including weaknesses in its
security culture, organization, and staffing and training. Finally, DOE's
Office of Inspector General found security problems with NNSA's
contractors, including improprieties in the testing of the officers who
protect NNSA's sites and weaknesses in NNSA's cyber security program. With
respect to the management of major projects, the National Ignition
Facility and the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility--two
major facilities needed to support NNSA's nuclear weapons
programs--experienced major delays and cost overruns because of problems
with project management and are still not complete.
In this context, you asked us to evaluate the extent to which NNSA has
taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2)
improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure.
To carry out our objectives, we reviewed the NNSA Act; and NNSA and DOE
policies, plans and budgets; and interviewed current and former NNSA and
DOE officials. We also used reports on NNSA's security efforts prepared by
GAO, the DOE Inspector General, and outside groups, such as a 2005 report
on security commissioned by NNSA. Finally, we collected and analyzed
security performance ratings developed by DOE's Office of Health, Safety
and Security and NNSA site offices, from fiscal years 1996 through 2005.
We used these performance ratings because there was wide agreement among
NNSA and DOE security officials that these ratings represented the best
available information on the overall performance of NNSA's safeguards and
security program. We conducted the work for our report from March 2005
through January 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards, which included an assessment of data reliability and
internal controls.
In summary:
Producing a well-organized and effective agency out of what was widely
considered a dysfunctional enterprise has been a considerable challenge.
In some areas, NNSA can be viewed as a success. Most notably, through its
internal reorganization efforts, NNSA has addressed some past problems by
better delineating lines of authority and improving communication and has
made important progress in establishing critical management systems,
especially in the development of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Evaluation (PPBE) process. However, important problems remain with respect
to security, the Administration's relationship with DOE, and project,
program and financial management.
Regarding security, NNSA still cannot demonstrate that all of its security
program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, we
found weaknesses with physical security at several NNSA sites, including
the Nevada Test Site, Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National
Security Complex, and weaknesses throughout NNSA in the cyber security
area. Four factors have contributed to problems with NNSA's security
program. Specifically, we found
o a lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction
for security;
o security personnel staffing shortages at the NNSA site offices
that oversee NNSA's contractors;
o inadequate training resources and opportunities for site office
security staff; and
o incomplete security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA's
security program.
With respect to NNSA's relationship to DOE, we found that almost 7
years after its creation, NNSA and DOE still have not fully agreed
on how NNSA should function within the department as a separately
organized agency. This lack of agreement has resulted in
organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations.
In our view, DOE and NNSA need to take a more active approach to
clearly defining DOE and NNSA's working relationships and
determining how conflicts will be resolved. While there have been
continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it as
a separate agency, we do not believe that such drastic change is
necessary to produce an organization that can provide effective
oversight of the nation's nuclear weapons complex.
Finally, while NNSA has taken several actions to improve its
management practices, including developing a PPBE process, we also
identified several areas where management weaknesses remain.
Specifically, NNSA has not developed a project management policy,
implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts,
and fully shared project management lessons learned between its
sites. In addition, NNSA has not identified all of its program
managers and trained them to a certified level of competency.
Finally, NNSA has not established an independent analysis unit to
(1) review program budget proposals, (2) confirm cost estimates,
and (3) analyze budget alternatives.
In order to improve the management of NNSA and its ability to
oversee the nuclear weapons complex , in our report to you, we
made a series of recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and
the Administrator, NNSA to (1) improve NNSA's security oversight
program; (2) clearly define NNSA's status as a separately
organized agency within DOE; and (3) improve project and program
management, and the agency's planning, programming, budgeting, and
evaluation process. In its comments on our report, NNSA generally
agreed with the report and its corresponding recommendations. NNSA
noted that it considers the agency to be a success but
acknowledged that there was considerable work yet to be
accomplished.
Background
NNSA operates three national laboratories that design nuclear
weapons--Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California; Los
Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico; and the Sandia National
Laboratories, New Mexico and California; and four nuclear weapons
production sites--the Pantex Plant, Texas; the Y-12 National
Security Complex, Tennessee; the Kansas City Plant, Missouri; and
parts of the Savannah River Site, South Carolina; as well as the
Nevada Test Site.
To implement its programs, NNSA received about $9.1 billion for
fiscal year 2006, including almost $6.4 billion for its nuclear
weapons activities, about $1.6 billion for its defense nuclear
nonproliferation programs, and about $782 million for the Naval
Reactors program. NNSA's appropriation also included about $766
million to provide security at its sites. NNSA requested over $9.3
billion for fiscal year 2007, including $6.4 billion for its
nuclear weapons activities, $1.7 billion for its defense nuclear
nonproliferation programs, and $795 million for the Naval Reactors
program. According to NNSA's Future Years Nuclear Security Program
plan, between fiscal years 2007 and 2011, NNSA is proposing to
spend almost $48.5 billion on its nuclear weapons, nuclear
nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.
As noted earlier, for several years before NNSA was established,
external studies found problems with the organization and
operation of what is now NNSA's principal organization--DOE's
Office of Defense Programs. These studies cited continuing
problems in the areas of overall management, organization,
priority setting, and maintenance of a viable infrastructure and
workforce. Most influential in the creation of NNSA was the study
conducted by a Special Investigative Panel of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Prepared in response to a
series of security problems, including public access to classified
documents at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Board found
that DOE was a dysfunctional bureaucracy incapable of reforming
itself and that reorganization was clearly warranted to resolve
security and counterintelligence problems. As noted earlier, the
Board urged the Congress to create a new organization that,
whether established as an independent agency or a semi-autonomous
entity within DOE, should have a clear mission, streamlined
bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of authority and
accountability. To correct the problems identified by the Board
and others, in 1999, the Congress created the NNSA.
For the last several years, we have monitored NNSA's actions to
implement the NNSA Act for this Subcommittee and the Special
Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization, House
Armed Services Committee. For example, in April 2001, we testified
that NNSA's efforts to establish a new organization looked
promising. However, we highlighted the need for NNSA to clearly
define the roles and responsibilities of headquarters and field
staff and to establish clear lines of authority between NNSA and
its contractors, among other things. In May 2001, NNSA announced
plans to reorganize its headquarters operations. In December 2001,
however, we found that NNSA's plans for the headquarters
reorganization did not contain a clear definition of the roles and
responsibilities of the headquarters organizational units.
In addition to reorganizing its headquarters, in February 2002,
NNSA proposed reorganizing its entire operation to solve
important, long-standing issues. In February 2002, we testified
that, with the proposed new organizational structure, resolution
of NNSA's long-standing organizational issues appeared to be
within its grasp. However, we noted that NNSA's lack of a
long-term strategic approach to ensuring a well-managed workforce
precluded it from identifying its current and future human capital
needs, including the size of the workforce; its deployment across
the organization; and the knowledge, skills, and capabilities
needed to fulfill its mission. In December 2002, the Administrator
of NNSA implemented the proposed reorganization.
Our May 2003 report on the management of NNSA's security program
identified similar concerns about NNSA's security organization and
management. Specifically, we found that NNSA (1) had not fully
defined clear roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and
site security operations and (2) had shortfalls at its site
offices in the total number of staff and in expertise, which could
make it more difficult for the site offices to effectively oversee
security activities. We therefore concluded that NNSA could not be
assured that its contractors were working to maximum advantage to
protect critical facilities and material from individuals seeking
to inflict damage.
Finally, in June 2004, we found that NNSA's reorganization had
addressed some past problems by better delineating lines of
authority and improving communication. However, we also found that
NNSA's reorganization had not ensured that the agency had
sufficient staff with the right skills in the right places because
it had downsized its federal workforce by about 17 percent without
first determining the critical skills and capabilities needed to
meet its mission and program goals.
Additional Action Needed to Improve NNSA�s Security Program
Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters
security organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its
security program objectives are being met at all of its sites.
Specifically, we found that the results of internal and
independent security oversight assessments have identified
weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including
the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the
Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security
throughout NNSA. The following factors have contributed to this
situation:
o Lack of consistent leadership and direction for its security
activities. For several years, the NNSA headquarters security
organization experienced turnover in the position of Chief of the
Office of Defense Nuclear Security. Specifically, four individuals
have occupied the position since NNSA's creation, often in an
acting capacity. In addition, these chiefs have reported to
different levels within the organization. The current Chief is a
permanent appointee, reporting directly to the NNSA administrator,
and he has taken a number of steps to develop an effective
headquarters security organization.
o Security personnel staffing shortages at site offices. Having
sufficient staff to oversee the security programs of its
contractors continues to be a problem. For example, since NNSA
became operational, key site offices, such as the Los Alamos Site
Office, have experienced staffing shortfalls. As a result, sites
are limited in their ability to effectively oversee contractors'
security activities.
o Lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site
office security staff. NNSA has not implemented a training program
that provides NNSA federal security officials with the skills
needed to effectively oversee contractor security programs. In
addition, NNSA site offices often do not have all the resources
needed to meet training needs. For example, according to site
office officials, the Los Alamos Site Office did not receive
training funds for fiscal year 2006 and the Nevada Site Office
received a minimal training budget for its security staff.
o Lack of data to gauge program effectiveness. NNSA does not have
complete data for tracking security deficiencies identified by
security oversight reviews and, as a result, does not have
information regarding the overall effectiveness of its safeguards
and security program. NNSA officials told us that while they
believe security across the weapons complex has improved, NNSA
does not have sufficient data to support this assertion. In
addition, NNSA has not implemented a formal process for sharing
best practices or lessons learned to guide security improvements.
While best practices and lessons learned have been communicated
informally, a formal process could help ensure that previously
identified security deficiencies, such as the retrieval of badges
from terminated employees at one NNSA site, are reviewed and
corrected as necessary at other NNSA field locations.
DOE and NNSA Have Not Yet Fully Determined How NNSA Should Operate
as a Separately Organized Agency within DOE
While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its
internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with
establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized
agency within the department. Several factors have contributed to
this situation. First, DOE and NNSA did not have a useful model to
follow for establishing a separately organized agency in DOE. The
Board's June 1999 report suggested several federal agencies, such
as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the
Department of Commerce, which could be used as a model for NNSA.
However, we found that none of the officials from these agencies
considered their agency to be separately organized or believed
that their agency's operational methods were transferable to NNSA.
Second, DOE's January 2000 implementation plan, which was required
by the NNSA Act, did not define how NNSA would operate as a
separately organized agency within DOE. Instead reflecting the
opposition of the then DOE senior leadership to the creation of
NNSA, the implementation plan "dual-hatted" virtually every
significant statutory position in NNSA with DOE officials,
including the Director of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
Counterintelligence and General Counsel. As we testified in April
2001, this practice caused considerable concern about NNSA's
ability to function with the independence envisioned in the NNSA
Act. Dual-hatting was subsequently forbidden by an amendment to
the NNSA Act.3
As a result, although some NNSA programs have set up procedures
for interacting with DOE, other programs have not, resulting in
organizational conflict. For example, DOE made a commitment to
issuing NNSA-specific acquisition procedures in its January 2000
implementation plan for NNSA, but it has not done so. According to
DOE Office of General Counsel officials, the department
subsequently determined that NNSA-specific procedures were
inconsistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the NNSA
Act, and the January 2000 implementation plan. According to both
DOE and NNSA officials, since 2004 the department has blocked
NNSA's efforts to issue its own acquisition regulations. As a
result, according to NNSA officials, NNSA has had to issue a
series of deviations to the DOE acquisition regulations to carry
out NNSA acquisition policies in areas such as negotiating a more
effective contract fee arrangement and awarding additional years
to a contract's term.
Even where formal procedures have been developed, interpersonal
disagreements have hindered effective cooperation. Most notable in
this regard has been the longstanding conflict between NNSA and
DOE counterintelligence offices. Specifically, as our report
documents, NNSA and DOE counterintelligence officials have
disagreed over (1) the scope and direction of the
counterintelligence program, (2) their ability to jointly direct
staff in the headquarters counterintelligence program offices, (3)
the allocation of counterintelligence resources, (4)
counterintelligence policymaking and (5) their roles and
responsibilities in handling specific counterintelligence
matters--in particular with regard to the department's handling of
the well-publicized mid-2005 intrusion into an unclassified NNSA
computer system and removal of the names and social security
numbers of 1,502 individuals working for NNSA. Subsequently, the
Congress amended the NNSA Act to consolidate the
counterintelligence programs of DOE and NNSA under the Department
of Energy.
3Pub. L. 106-398, S 3157, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-468 (2000) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. S 2410).
In this environment, concerns about NNSA's organizational status
have persisted. Most notably, a January 2006 report by the Defense
Science Board called for the removal of NNSA from DOE and the
creation of a new, independent National Nuclear Weapons Agency.
However, former senior DOE and NNSA officials with whom we spoke
generally did not favor removing NNSA from DOE.
Several Management Issues Need to be Resolved for NNSA to Become
Fully Effective
In addition to identifying the underlying issue of NNSA's
relationship to DOE, we identified the following four other
management areas where additional NNSA actions could strengthen
its ability to manage the nuclear weapons complex if it took
further action.
o Human capital. NNSA has made progress in developing a human
capital strategy. However, DOE and NNSA have not conducted a
systematic, detailed analysis of how many staff NNSA needs in
relation to DOE. As a result, we identified areas where potential
staff imbalances have affected NNSA's ability to operate
separately from DOE. For example, NNSA's Office of General Counsel
has 35 attorneys, including the General Counsel, to provide NNSA
legal analysis, while the rest of DOE has 277 attorneys. According
to NNSA's General Counsel, his office would need 15 to 20
additional attorneys to fully handle NNSA's legal workload with
minimal assistance from DOE. Currently, NNSA relies on DOE's
Office of General Counsel to perform a significant portion of its
legal work.
o Project management. While both DOE and NNSA have initiated
efforts to improve project management, NNSA reported in November
2006 that about 16 percent of NNSA projects were at risk of
breaching their cost baseline, schedule baseline or both. We
identified seven areas for improvement that would foster a
stronger culture for effective project management. For example,
DOE's Project Assessment and Reporting System--a Web-based system
for keeping DOE senior managers apprised of the performance of
projects costing more than $5 million--does not include four major
NNSA projects, estimated to cost over $100 million each.
Consequently, these projects do not receive the senior management
oversight that can be provided through that system.
o Program management. NNSA program managers are responsible for
completing a set of activities by employing a working knowledge of
such diverse areas as contracting, budgeting, and engineering.
Recognizing the important role of program managers, NNSA has taken
several actions, such as developing a program management policy.
However, NNSA has yet to identify all of its program managers or
train them to a certified level of competency. Indeed, DOE's most
recent performance and accountability report for fiscal year 2006
showed that NNSA fully met only about 52 percent of its program
goals while the rest of DOE achieved about a 79-percent success
rate.
o Financial management. NNSA has made significant progress in
implementing its PPBE process over the last 4 years, as mandated
by the NNSA Act. However, several areas of improvement still have
not been fully addressed. For example, NNSA has issued policy
letters on PPBE, but some of these letters are still in draft form
because, in part, NNSA is waiting to obtain DOE's views on certain
matters. In addition, NNSA's PPBE mechanism for centralized
resource allocation relies on collegial decision making among
senior NNSA managers, with the Administrator resolving disputes
and deciding on the final resource allocation. However, the
Administrator does not have an independent group to review program
proposals, confirm cost estimates, and analyze alternatives.
According to a 2003 DOE Inspector General report, most senior
managers believe that such an analytical group would be of value.
While NNSA has taken some action in this direction, it is not
clear when such a group will be established.
As discussed earlier, while there have been continuing calls for
removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it a separate agency, we
do not believe that such drastic change is necessary to produce an
organization that can provide effective oversight of the nation's
nuclear weapons complex. Rather, we believe NNSA can provide
comprehensive oversight of the operation and security of the
nation's nuclear weapons programs by addressing a variety of
lingering, often unrelated, but important management issues. These
issues include providing sufficient, qualified staff to conduct
program and operational oversight, especially in the security
area, and developing and implementing improvements needed to
support effective project, program, and financial management.
Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
For further information on this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this statement. James Noel, Assistant
Director; Robert Baney; Preston Heard and Jonathan Ban made key
contributions to this testimony.
Related GAO Products
Department of Energy: Views on DOE's Plan to Establish the
National Nuclear Security Administration, [10]GAO/T-RCED-00-113
(Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2000).
Department of Energy: Views on the Progress of the National
Nuclear Security Administration in Implementing Title 32,
[11]GAO-01-602T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2001).
NNSA Management: Progress in the Implementation of Title 32,
[12]GAO-02-93R (Washington, D.C.: Dec.12, 2001).
Department of Energy: NNSA Restructuring and Progress in
Implementing Title 32, [13]GAO-02-451T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26,
2002).
GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards
and Security Program, [14]GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30,
2003).
National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure
and Workforce Planning Issues Remain As NNSA Conducts Downsizing,
[15]GAO-04-545 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004).
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Highlights of [23]GAO-07-428T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
January 31, 2007
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Security and Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the
NNSA Act
During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced
difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and responsibility
that contributed to security problems at the nation's nuclear weapons
laboratories and management problems with major projects. In response,
Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a
separately organized agency within DOE under Title 32 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA Act. Since its
creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as
unauthorized access to NNSA computer systems, and cost and schedule
overruns on major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility.
GAO was asked to review the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1)
improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its
management practices and revise its organizational structure. In January
2007, GAO issued a report--National Nuclear Security Administration:
Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear
Programs, (GAO-07-36)--that addressed these matters.
To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and
budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and
interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials.
While NNSA has better delineated lines of authority and improved
communication through a reorganization and has made progress in
establishing critical management systems, especially in the development of
its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process, important
weaknesses remain with respect to security; the Administration's
relationship with DOE; and project, program and financial management.
Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security
organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program
objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, GAO identified
weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including the
Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National
Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security throughout NNSA. Four
factors have contributed to these problems: (1) lack of consistent NNSA
headquarters leadership and direction for security; (2) security personnel
staffing shortages at NNSA site offices; (3) lack of adequate training
resources and opportunities for site office security staff; and (4)
incomplete security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA's security
program.
While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal
operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with agreeing on how
NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the
department. This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational
conflicts that have inhibited effective operations. While there have been
continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it as a
separate agency, GAO does not believe that such drastic change is
necessary to provide effective oversight of the nuclear weapons complex.
Rather, DOE and NNSA need to clearly define their working relationships
and determine how conflicts will be resolved.
Finally, GAO identified several other management weaknesses where
additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the nuclear
weapons complex. For example, among other things, NNSA has not (1)
implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts; (2)
identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified
level of competency; and (3) established an independent analysis unit to
review program budget proposals and analyze budget alternatives.
In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy
and the Administrator of NNSA to (1) improve NNSA's security oversight
program; (2) clearly define NNSA's status as a separately organized agency
within DOE; and (3) improve project and program management, and the
Administration's planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation process.
NNSA generally agreed with the report and its recommendations. NNSA
considered the agency a success but acknowledged there was considerable
work yet to be accomplished.
References
Visible links
8. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-36
9. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07428t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
10. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-RCED-00-113
11. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-602T
12. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-93R
13. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-451T
14. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-471
15. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-545
16. http://www.gao.gov/
17. http://www.gao.gov/
18. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
19. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07428t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
20. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07428t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
21. file:///home/webmaster/infomgt/d07428t.htm#mailto:[email protected]
22. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-428T
23. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-428T
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