Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development (19-APR-07,
GAO-07-596T).
As operations overseas continue, the Department of Defense (DOD)
is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide valuable information
in support of military operations. While the 2006 Quadrennial
Review emphasized the need for the ISR community to improve the
integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to make
significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future.
Congress has been interested in DOD's approach for managing and
integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems. This
testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAO's
ongoing work regarding (1) the status of DOD initiatives intended
to improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and
challenges DOD faces in implementing its initiatives, (2) DOD's
approach to managing current ISR assets to support military
operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in
development and the potential for synergies between them. GAO's
ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials
at relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central
Command operations, and review of 12 airborne ISR development
programs.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-596T
ACCNO: A66766
TITLE: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing
Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems
Development
DATE: 04/19/2007
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Defense procurement
Electronic surveillance
Investment planning
Military intelligence
Military research and development
Program evaluation
Requirements definition
Strategic planning
Systems integration
Air Force E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and
Control Aircraft
EP-3 Aircraft
Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
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GAO-07-596T
* [1]Summary
* [2]Background
* [3]DOD Is Undertaking Important Initiatives, But the Extent to
* [4]ISR Integration Roadmap
* [5]Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management
* [6]Future GAO Work Will Continue to Focus on DOD's Approach for
* [7]DOD Lacks Adequate Visibility and Metrics to Optimize ISR As
* [8]DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking ISR Does Not Consid
* [9]DOD Lacks Metrics and Feedback for Systematically Tracking t
* [10]ISR Development Programs Have Opportunities for Greater Syne
* [11]Opportunities Exist for Greater Collaboration across the Ser
* [12]Successful Collaboration on Fire Scout
* [13]Opportunity to Collaborate on Broad Area Maritime
Surveillan
* [14]Collaboration Slow to Happen on Warrior and Predator
* [15]Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That
* [16]Cost, Schedule, and Performance Status of Airborne ISR Progr
* [17]Impact of Delays on Legacy Systems
* [18]Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)
* [19]Global Hawk
* [20]Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
* [21]Related GAO Products
* [22]GAO's Mission
* [23]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [24]Order by Mail or Phone
* [25]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [26]Congressional Relations
* [27]Public Affairs
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Thursday, April 19, 2007
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for
New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development
Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues
Sharon L. Pickup
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues
Michael J. Sullivan
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Issues
GAO-07-596T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to discuss GAO's work for this Subcommittee
on the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and acquisition of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, including unmanned
aircraft systems. As you know, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) activities are central to ongoing military
operations. Effective ISR can provide early warning of enemy threats and
precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military forces to increase
effectiveness, coordination, and lethality. Battlefield commanders rank
the need for ISR systems and the information they produce as high on their
priority lists, a fact that is reflected in DOD's planned investment in
ISR. The demand for ISR assets at every level of command is growing, and
DOD is making investments in a number of ISR systems, including unmanned
aircraft systems, manned platforms, and space-borne, maritime, and
terrestrial systems. Although the United States has significant ISR
capabilities, their effectiveness has been hampered by gaps in
capabilities, growing competition for assets, unavailability when needed,
and systems that do not fully complement one another. The 2001 and 2006
Quadrennial Defense Reviews emphasized the increasingly important role
intelligence capabilities--including manned and unmanned airborne and
space capabilities--play in supporting military operations and
acknowledged that the ISR community as a whole must move toward a
collaborative enterprise to achieve more responsive support for civilian
decision makers and commanders engaged in planning and executing
operations. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review also called for a shift
from military service-focused acquisition systems and concepts of
operation to a more joint approach to acquiring and employing defense
assets. Further, as GAO has emphasized, resources for investments in ISR
capabilities are likely to be constrained by the fiscal challenges of the
federal budget.
Since we testified before this Subcommittee last year on one component of
DOD's ISR enterprise--unmanned aircraft systems--demand for ISR support
has continued to grow, and DOD is planning to invest in new systems with
expanded and new capabilities. Meanwhile, growing out of the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review's recommendations, DOD has undertaken a number
of studies designed to determine future ISR requirements and established a
new organization to help integrate current assets to improve its processes
for supporting combat operations. In addition, DOD has updated its ISR
Integration Roadmap. Today, you asked us to discuss our preliminary
observations on DOD's management of ISR requirements, distribution of
current assets, and planned acquisitions based on ongoing work we are
conducting for this Subcommittee. Specifically, we will highlight (1) the
status of DOD initiatives aimed at improving the management and
integration of ISR requirements and challenges the department faces in
implementing the initiatives, (2) DOD's approach to managing current ISR
assets to support military operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR
programs in development and the potential for synergies between them. We
will be continuing our work on the management of ISR requirements, the
support of ISR assets for combat operations, and the acquisition of ISR
capabilities, and we plan to issue reports based on this work later this
year.
To understand the status of initiatives within DOD to improve the
management and integration of ISR requirements, we analyzed DOD's ISR
Integration Roadmap and updates. We also reviewed documentation on ISR
requirements generation and validation that we obtained from DOD's Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System as well as previous
studies related to DOD's management of ISR assets. In addition, we
discussed DOD's ISR capabilities management initiatives and challenges
with senior officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence; the Joint Staff; the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board; the National Security Space Office; the Air Force; the
Army; the Navy; the U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component
Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; the U.S.
Central Command; the U.S. Special Operations Command; and the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
To assess the effectiveness of DOD's approach to managing current ISR
assets in support of ongoing combat operations, we interviewed officials
and reviewed documentation from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning
Task Force within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of the
military services; U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air Force
component commands; the Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and other organizations.
We also reviewed documentation and interviewed officials at U.S. Central
Command, Central Command Air Forces, and the Combined Air Operations
Center to better understand how ISR assets are assigned to specific
missions. To understand how requests for ISR support are generated and
satisfied at the tactical level, we spoke with units who recently returned
from, or are currently supporting, ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan as well as units within the services such as the Marine Corps'
Tactical Fusion Center that are involved in determining if tactical assets
are available to satisfy those requests or if the requests need to be
forwarded for theater-level support. To understand DOD's ongoing efforts
to study its process for tasking ISR assets, we reviewed documentation and
interviewed an official from the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board.
Additionally, we discussed the use of unmanned aircraft systems in
military operations with U.S. Central Command officials and units who
recently returned or are currently supporting operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
To assess the status of selected ISR programs and the potential for
synergies between them, we obtained and analyzed programmatic and budget
documents for each of the systems we reviewed. We also discussed the
status of each program with officials at the program office level and with
officials from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, we discussed
the potential for synergies among programs with officials from the Joint
Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
We conducted our ongoing work from June 2006 to April 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary
DOD has taken some important first steps to formulate a strategy for
improving the integration of future ISR requirements--the development of
its ISR Integration Roadmap and the inclusion of ISR systems across DOD in
a test case for the joint capability portfolio management concept. In
response to a statutory requirement, DOD developed the ISR Integration
Roadmap to guide the development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities.
Our preliminary work has shown, however, that while DOD's ISR Integration
Roadmap sets out some strategic objectives, such as attaining global
persistent surveillance, it does not clearly (1) identify future ISR
requirements and how DOD plans to achieve them, (2) identify funding
priorities, or (3) establish mechanisms to ensure that services'
investment plans reflect the overall strategy and to measure DOD's
progress toward strategic goals for the ISR enterprise. The ISR
Integration Roadmap also does not define requirements for global
persistent surveillance, clarify what ISR requirements are already filled,
identify critical gaps as areas for future focus, or otherwise represent
an enterprise-level architecture of what the ISR enterprise is to be.
DOD's second initiative is its application of the joint capability
portfolio management concept to ISR systems across DOD as a test of the
concept. Through the capability portfolio management concept, DOD seeks to
develop and manage ISR capabilities across the entire department --rather
than by military service or individual program--and by doing so, enable
interoperability of future capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps.
While implementation of the portfolio management concept is in its early
stages, our preliminary assessment identified challenges. For example, the
portfolio managers do not currently have the authority to direct services'
investments in ISR capabilities, and DOD leadership is monitoring the
portfolio management test cases to determine whether such authority is
needed. Therefore, the extent to which the services will change their
investment plans to adopt suggestions from portfolio managers to maximize
the effectiveness of the overall enterprise is not clear. In addition, DOD
has undertaken some data-driven analyses of the capabilities and costs of
different systems that could provide portfolio managers with a basis for
making trade-offs among competing investment options. We identified some
limitations to the analysis that DOD performed. Still, if expanded to be
more comprehensive and integrated, this analytical approach could inform
portfolio managers and decision makers and enable DOD to develop and field
the ISR capabilities that most efficiently and effectively fill gaps and
reduce redundancies.
DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets, including unmanned
aircraft systems, limits its ability to optimize the use of these assets.
While the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), which is charged with
recommending to the Secretary of Defense how theater-level assets should
be allocated to support operational requirements of combatant commanders,
has visibility into the DOD ISR programs supporting theater-level
requirements, it does not currently have visibility into all ISR assets.
JFCC-ISR is working to increase its knowledge of these assets so that it
can consider all assets in the allocation process. Similarly, during
ongoing operations, the commander responsible for planning, coordinating,
and monitoring joint air operations does not currently have visibility
over how tactical assets are being tasked, which could result in
unnecessary duplicative taskings and limit DOD's ability to leverage all
available ISR assets. In addition, DOD lacks sufficient metrics and
feedback for evaluating the performance of its ISR assets. DOD currently
assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the
number of targets planned versus the number collected against. DOD
officials acknowledge more needs to be done and there is an ongoing effort
within DOD to develop improved metrics and identify qualitative as well as
quantitative ISR metrics, but progress has been limited and no milestones
have been established. Further, although DOD guidance calls for an
evaluation of the effectiveness of ISR support in meeting warfighter
requirements, DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not
consistently occurring, due mainly to the fast pace of operations in
theater. Without sufficient visibility over the full range of available
ISR assets and feedback and metrics for evaluating ISR missions, DOD may
not be in the best position to validate the true demand for ISR assets,
ensure it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or acquire new systems
that best support warfighting needs.
The services are not required to jointly develop new weapon systems but
can attain economies and efficiencies when this happens. Short of a joint
development program, there are still opportunities for similar weapon
systems being developed by different services to gain synergies that can
result in providing new capabilities to the warfighter more efficiently
and affordably. We have identified development programs where program
managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and
where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly stovepiped
solutions that are redundant. Additionally, of the 13 airborne ISR
programs that we reviewed, most have encountered either cost growth or
schedule delays. These problems are typically the result of not following
a knowledge-based approach to weapon system development as provided for in
DOD policy. In some cases, the resultant delay in delivering the new
capability to the warfighter has led to unplanned investments to keep
legacy systems relevant and operational until the new capability is
finally delivered.
Background
The term "intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance," or "ISR,"
encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation of
sensors and assets that collect, process, and disseminate data in support
of current and future military operations. Intelligence data can take many
forms, including optical, radar, or infrared images or electronic signals.
This data can come from a variety of sources, including surveillance and
reconnaissance systems ranging from satellites, to manned aircraft like
the U-2, unmanned aircraft systems like the Air Force's Global Hawk and
Predator and the Army's Hunter, to other ground, air, sea, or space-based
equipment, to human intelligence teams. DOD ISR activities support the
missions of the Department of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence, as well as the missions of other government agencies. ISR
activities directly support current and future operations and military
forces rely on the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence
in the planning and conduct of their operations and activities.
Many defense organizations play a role in identifying ISR requirements,
managing current assets, and developing new capabilities. DOD established
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to coordinate
policy and strategic oversight of defense intelligence, security, and
counterintelligence to meet combatant commander requirements. Other
defense intelligence agencies, such as the National Security Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency have key roles in supporting defense and national security
missions.
Combatant commanders may identify their needs for ISR capabilities to
support their missions through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
For example, the U.S. Central Command is charged with identifying the ISR
capabilities required to support his theater of operations. Generally, the
individual military services or other DOD agencies are responsible for
managing the acquisition of new DOD ISR systems.
In 2003, DOD altered its unified command plan to give the U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) responsibility for planning, integrating, and
coordinating ISR in support of strategic and global operations. To execute
this responsibility, USSTRATCOM established the Joint Functional Component
Command-ISR in March 2005 and designated the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency as the commander. The Joint Functional Component
Command-ISR is charged with developing strategies for distributing, or
allocating, existing ISR assets among combatant commanders and ensuring
the integration and synchronization of DOD, national, and allied ISR
capabilities and collection efforts. In the case of ongoing operations,
the Joint Force Air Component Commander generally tasks theater-level ISR
assets made available for support of the Joint Force Commander's
operational objectives.
Implemented in 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) is DOD's principal process for identifying, assessing, and
prioritizing proposals to improve existing capabilities and develop new
capabilities. The JCIDS process is designed to facilitate coordination
among DOD components in assessing proposals for new capabilities to ensure
that they enable joint forces to meet the full range of military
operations and challenges. Under the JCIDS collaborative review process,
proposals for new intelligence capabilities that support DOD or national
intelligence requirements must be reviewed by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, which consists of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and a four-star officer designated by each of the military
services. Eight Functional Capabilities Boards assist the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council in evaluating proposals and making
recommendations on approval.^1 The Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board (BA/FCB) is responsible for reviewing proposals to
develop and acquire new ISR capabilities.
^1The other Functional Capabilities Boards are Command and Control,
Focused Logistics, Force Management, Force Protection, Force Application,
Net-Centric, and Joint Training.
Under section 426 of title 10 of the U.S. Code, DOD is required to
establish an ISR Integration Council to serve as a forum for the services
and the defense intelligence agencies to discuss their ISR integration
efforts in order to ensure unity of effort and preclude unnecessary
duplication of effort. Led by the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence, the council is statutorily made up of senior intelligence
officers from each of the armed services and U.S. Special Operations
Command, the directors of the defense intelligence agencies, and the Joint
Staff Director for Operations.^2 DOD is also required under section 426 to
develop a comprehensive plan--known as the ISR Integration Roadmap--to
guide the development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities from 2004
through 2018. DOD published the first iteration of the ISR Integration
Roadmap in May 2005 and updated the Roadmap in January 2007. The details
of the ISR Integration Roadmap are classified, but the management issues
and initiatives it contains are not classified.
DOD Is Undertaking Important Initiatives, But the Extent to Which These Will
Guide Future Investments to Achieve Better Integration of ISR Assets Is Not
Clear
Over the past few years, DOD has taken some important steps to enable it
to take a department-wide view of ISR capabilities. These steps are
important in DOD's efforts to formulate a strategy for meeting future ISR
requirements in a more integrated manner by considering how existing and
future assets will fit together to provide needed information to support
combatant commanders and national decision makers. Specifically, DOD has
developed and is updating a statutorily required ISR Integration Roadmap
that charts current programs and has begun testing portfolio management
principles to manage the requirements for future ISR capabilities.
However, these two initiatives are in the early stages of implementation
and have some limitations, and it is unclear whether these initiatives
will be enough to improve integration of DOD ISR assets and guide DOD ISR
investment decisions.
ISR Integration Roadmap
DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap is a noteworthy step for DOD in examining
the ISR capabilities that DOD currently has available and in development,
although the Roadmap does not represent a comprehensive vision for the ISR
enterprise or define strategy to guide future investments. First published
in May 2005 in response to a statutory requirement and updated in January
2007, DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap comprises a catalogue of detailed
information on all the ISR assets being used and developed across DOD,
including ISR capabilities related to collection, communication,
exploitation, and analysis. DOD's recent update took the ISR Integration
Roadmap a step farther than its 2005 version because it incorporated
information from the QDR and the National Intelligence Strategy. For
example, the updated version includes a list of the ISR-related QDR
decisions aimed at achieving future joint force characteristics and
building on progress to date, such as increasing investment in unmanned
aircraft systems and balancing air- and space-borne ISR capabilities. In
addition, the recent ISR Integration Roadmap included changes in funding
and ISR program information driven by the fiscal year 2007 President's
Budget.
^2 The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has voluntarily
expanded membership of the council to include representatives of several
additional Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense offices, a
representative of U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Commander of U.S.
Strategic Command.
We believe that, given the vast scope of ISR capabilities, which operate
in a variety of mediums and encompass a range of intelligence disciplines,
the ISR Integration Roadmap represents a significant step toward providing
DOD leadership and the Congress with the information needed to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of current ISR capabilities. However, while the
Roadmap sets out some strategic goals objectives for the defense ISR
enterprise,^3 such as recapitalizing ISR capabilities, it does not yet
constitute an enterprise-level architecture or represent an investment
strategy. The Roadmap does not clearly show how the ISR systems--existing
and future--will fit together in a vision for common architecture to most
efficiently meet priority ISR requirements or provide a basis for making
trade-offs among competing programs. Specifically, the Roadmap does not
(1) identify overall ISR requirements and how DOD plans to achieve them,
(2) identify funding priorities, and (3) establish mechanisms to enforce
an investment strategy or measure progress. Moreover, the Roadmap does not
clarify what requirements for future ISR systems are already filled, or
possibly saturated, identify the critical capability gaps that need to be
filled by future systems, or identify focus areas for future requirements.
For example, although the Roadmap sets the objective of attaining global
persistent surveillance,^4 it has not yet defined the requirements for
persistent surveillance or how to use current assets to attain it. We have
previously testified on the need for better planning for other ISR-related
development programs. For example, DOD has continued to request funding to
support the services' plans to develop new unmanned aircraft system
capabilities in the absence of overall plans to guide development and
investment decisions. DOD officials acknowledged that the ISR Integration
Roadmap has limitations and said that these limitations will be addressed
in future revisions. As the department moves forward with its ISR
Integration Roadmap, we believe it could provide a basis for DOD to
determine the mix of future capabilities that provides the best value with
regard to their place in an overarching ISR architecture.
^3 The Defense ISR Enterprise consists of the intelligence components of
DOD operating cohesively to fulfill the Secretary of Defense's obligation
to meet DOD's intelligence needs and a significant set of government-wide
intelligence needs (as tasked by the Director of National Intelligence.)
Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management
DOD is attempting to better manage the requirements for future ISR
capabilities across DOD by applying a joint capability portfolio
management concept to ISR assets. In September 2006, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense decided to bring ISR systems across DOD together into a
capability portfolio as part of a test case for the joint capability
portfolio management concept. The capability portfolio containing these
ISR systems is known as the battlespace awareness capability portfolio,
and it is one of the four test cases for exploring this management
concept.^5 The intent of the ISR portfolio management test case is to
enable DOD to develop and manage ISR capabilities across the entire
department--rather than by military service or individual program--and by
doing so, to improve the interoperability of future capabilities, minimize
capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the lead office for
battlespace awareness capability portfolio management. The ISR Integration
Council acts as the governance body for the ISR portfolio management
effort. In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence works
closely with the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board,^6
which is a Joint Staff organization that provides analytic support for the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council's discussions and decisions on ISR
capability needs, joint concepts, and programmatic issues.
^4 DOD defines persistent surveillance as the integrated management of a
diverse set of collection and processing capabilities, operated to detect
and understand the activity of interest with sufficient sensor dwell,
revisit rate, and required quality to expeditiously assess adversary
actions, predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an adversary, and
assess results of U.S./coalition actions.
^5 Under this concept, a group of military capabilities, such as ISR
capabilities, is managed as a joint portfolio rather than separately by
each service. The other test cases are Joint Command and Control, Joint
Net-Centric Operations, and Joint Logistics.
Battlespace awareness capability managers reviewed and prioritized ISR
assets to inform budget development for the first time with the fiscal
year 2008 budget, and the portfolio management concept is still being
tested. Therefore, it is too early to assess its effectiveness in
integrating ISR programs to meet future requirements. However, our
preliminary work has shown that the concept faces implementation
challenges, among them clarifying the responsibilities and authorities of
the capability portfolio managers in relation to the services in order to
make trade-offs among competing service priorities. For example, the ISR
Integration Council held discussions on service resource allocation
decisions in an effort to achieve consensus among the services, combatant
commanders, and other stakeholders. The Council proposed recommendations
for rebalancing the services' investments in their respective ISR
portfolios during the fiscal year 2008 budget. However, the ISR
Integration Council did not have the authority to compel services to
change their budget plans. According to defense officials, there were some
disagreements between the ISR Integration Council's recommendations and
the services on funding levels for ISR systems. These issues were elevated
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for final decision. DOD leaders are
monitoring the implementation of the capability portfolio test cases to
determine whether portfolio managers should have the authority to direct
changes to service plans. However, without authority to direct the
military services to adopt any of its suggestions, it is unclear the
extent to which the ISR Integration Council can influence service plans.
The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board is charged with
reviewing service proposals for new ISR capabilities and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence assists in this effort. The
documentation that the board reviews provides analysis of the capability
required and includes cost information related to the proposed approach
for generating the capability. However, it is not clear to what extent
these proposals are based on a comprehensive analysis that includes data
on cost/performance evaluations and consideration of national-level
capabilities.
^6 The principal members of the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board are representatives from the services, the combatant
commands, the Joint Staff, OUSD(AT&L), the Director, PA&E, and
OASD(NII)/DOD Chief Information Officer.
Our preliminary work identified an example of the kind of data-driven
analysis of alternative investment strategies that we believe could be
useful to battlespace awareness capability portfolio managers for
analyzing competing ISR programs and developing an investment strategy for
the future. In 2004, the National Security Space Office^7 completed a
limited architecture analysis of ISR assets using cost and performance
data. Specifically, the National Security Space Office analyzed how much
additional ISR capability would be provided by various ISR system mixes
for given levels of additional investment. The intent of the study was to
provide insight into the most efficient mix of current and planned ISR
systems. While the analysis was a useful demonstration of an approach to
inform decision makers, it had several limitations. For example, the
analysis did not include all national and tactical ISR systems, mainly
focusing on space and air. The analysis also assumed that the additional
infrastructure needed to support integration of information from
additional ISR systems would be available, while the costs associated with
such additional infrastructure, which are difficult to estimate, were not
included in the analysis. Further, the analysis was limited in that it
only considered ISR capabilities for levels of increased investment, not
for levels of decreased investment; thus, it did not consider what the
most efficient mix of ISR systems would be if limited resources forced
decision makers to decrease funding for ISR programs. Moreover, the
analysis represented a one-time effort and has not been repeated. Still,
we believe that, if expanded to be more comprehensive and integrated, this
type of data-driven analytical approach could inform decision makers on
the implications of various options for providing the most effective mix
of ISR capabilities that DOD can afford. Without an enterprise-level
architecture and an ongoing and comprehensive data-driven analysis of the
most efficient solutions, it is not clear to us how DOD can be assured
that it is developing and fielding the ISR capabilities that most
efficiently and effectively fill gaps and reduce redundancies.
^7 The National Security Space Office (NSSO) falls under the office of
DOD's Executive Agent for Space--the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Its
mission is to provide unity of effort and strategic focus to national
security space issues. The mission of the NSSO's ISR Functional
Integration Office, which conducted this analysis, is to create and
sustain the nation's integrated ISR architecture to provide a basis for
informed decision making across the national security enterprise.
Future GAO Work Will Continue to Focus on DOD's Approach for Developing ISR
Capabilities
While our preliminary work has focused on the new processes that DOD has
established to address what it has acknowledged are weaknesses in its
planning for integrated future capabilities, our future work will
investigate DOD's processes for integrating requirements and developing an
investment strategy. Among the issues that we plan to address are the
extent to which:
o DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap, or other DOD initiatives,
establish a framework for developing an overarching joint ISR
architecture and an investment strategy;
o DOD's review processes enable it to identify gaps and
redundancies in ISR requirements; and
o DOD has considered comprehensive analyses of new ISR
capabilities, to include consideration of all available ISR assets
and cost/performance evaluations.
DOD Lacks Adequate Visibility and Metrics to Optimize ISR Assets
Given the substantial investment DOD is making in ISR assets and the
increasing demand for them, effective management of these assets has
become critical. Currently, DOD's approach to allocation and tasking do
not provide full visibility for managing its current ISR assets. Although
DOD has established a process for allocating available ISR assets to the
combatant commanders to meet theater needs, including unmanned aircraft
systems, it does not have visibility over all ISR assets, which would
improve its ability to allocate assets. Additionally, DOD's process for
tasking ISR assets does not currently allow for visibility at all levels
into how ISR assets are being used on a daily basis. Furthermore, DOD does
not have metrics and feedback for systematically measuring the
effectiveness of ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance
evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the
demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is optimizing the use of existing
assets, and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs.
DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking ISR Does Not Consider All ISR Assets
DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available ISR
assets to the combatant commanders to meet theater-level needs, including
unmanned aircraft systems. That process is managed by USSTRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command-ISR (JFCC-ISR), which is tasked with making
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate ISR
resources for theater use across the combatant commands. Once ISR assets
have been allocated, those assets are available to the theater commanders
to be assigned, or tasked, against specific requests for ISR support, in
support of ongoing operations.
JFCC-ISR's ability to fulfill its mission of integrating DOD, national and
allied partner ISR capabilities to support the warfighter depends on the
extent to which it has awareness and visibility over all ISR assets
including DOD, national and allied. However, although the JFCC-ISR has
been assigned the mission of integrating national and DOD ISR
capabilities, it does not currently have visibility into all assets that
could be brought to bear to support combatant commanders' needs.
Currently, JFCC-ISR has visibility into DOD ISR assets available to
support theater-level requirements, but does not have the same level of
visibility into other ISR assets such as national and allied. According to
JFCC-ISR officials, although they are working to develop better visibility
over all ISR assets by working with other defense and national
intelligence agencies, they lack full visibility into these ISR assets.
JFCC-ISR officials estimate it has 80-90 percent visibility into DOD ISR
assets but does not have the same level of visibility into other ISR
assets available to support theater-level requirements. Without an
approach to its allocation process that allows visibility over all ISR
capabilities and access to all relevant information, it is not clear to us
that the JFCC-ISR has the tools it needs in order to fulfill its mission,
in particular to leverage all available ISR assets and to optimize the
effectiveness of those assets.
Greater visibility of assets is also needed during ongoing operations to
improve DOD's process for tasking, or assigning ISR assets to specific
missions. Specifically, greater visibility of assets is needed at the
theater level. The theater combatant commander's Joint Force Air Component
Commander is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint
air operations to focus the impact of air capabilities and for assuring
their effective and efficient use in achieving the combatant commander's
objectives. However, while the Air Component Commander has visibility into
how all theater-level ISR assets, like the Air Force's Predator, are being
used, it does not currently have visibility into how ISR assets, embedded
in and controlled by tactical units, such as the Army's Hunter, are being
used on a daily basis. Greater visibility is also needed at the tactical
level to allow units a greater awareness of where other ISR assets,
including both theater-level and those assets embedded in other units, are
operating and what they are being used to do. Our preliminary work shows
that as a result of this lack of visibility, the potential exists for
unnecessary duplication, or multiple ISR aircraft to be tasked to operate
in the same area and against the same requirement. However, some level of
duplication may be necessary when driven by system capabilities and
mission requirements. Our work has also shown that by leveraging the
capabilities of different ISR assets using techniques such as
cross-cueing,^8 the Air Component Commander has been able to use the
different types of capabilities brought by different theater-level manned
and unmanned assets to maximize the intelligence collected. For example, a
manned Joint Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance system
could be used to sense movement in an area and then an unmanned system
such as a Predator could be called in to collect imagery to confirm
suspected activity. With greater visibility at all levels into the tasking
of all ISR assets, including those tactical assets controlled by the
military services, there is an opportunity for DOD to gain greater
synergies and optimize the use of its ISR assets, reduce the potential for
unnecessary duplicative taskings, and determine whether additional
perceived demand for these assets is well-founded. This visibility would
also allow tactical units, when appropriate,^9 to leverage other assets
operating in their area to maximize the information captured and avoid
unnecessary duplicative taskings. Without this visibility, DOD is not
likely to optimize the capability offered by these assets or achieve the
joint approach to employing its ISR assets called for in the Quadrennial
Defense Review.
DOD Lacks Metrics and Feedback for Systematically Tracking the Effectiveness of
Its ISR Missions
The growing demand for ISR assets is an indication of their value in
supporting combat forces, but DOD does not have sufficient metrics for
evaluating the effectiveness of ISR missions and is not getting consistent
feedback on whether the warfighters' needs were met. For example, DOD
currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such
as the number of targets planned versus the number collected against. We
recommended in a December 2005 report that DOD ensure its performance
measurement system measures how effectively unmanned aircraft systems
perform their missions, identify performance indicator information that
needs to be collected, and systematically collect identified performance
information.^10 DOD officials acknowledged shortcomings of its metrics,
and DOD is developing qualitative as well as quantitative ISR metrics, but
progress has been limited and no milestones have been established.
Additionally, although DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of how
effective ISR support is in meeting the warfighters' requirements, DOD
officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring
mainly because of the fast pace of operations in theater. For example,
while there is real-time communication among unmanned aircraft system
operators, requesters, and intelligence personnel during an operation to
ensure that the needed information is captured, and agency officials
indicate this communication is beneficial to providing real-time feedback,
there is little to no feedback after the operation to determine whether
the warfighters' needs were met by the ISR mission. Without developing
metrics and systematically gathering feedback that enables it to assess
the extent to which ISR missions are successful in supporting warfighter
needs, DOD is not in a position to validate the true demand for ISR
assets, determine whether it is allocating and tasking its ISR assets in
the most effective manner, or acquire new systems that best support
warfighting needs.
^8 Cross-cueing is the collaborative effort of utilizing capabilities
offered by multiple ISR platforms to fulfill a mission.
^9 Some missions, such as special operations, are classified and it is not
always appropriate to share specifics of the missions.
^10 GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, [28]GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005).
ISR Development Programs Have Opportunities for Greater Synergies and Have
Experienced Some Cost and Schedule Growth That Impact Legacy Systems
Without a comprehensive and integrated approach to managing current ISR
assets and balancing demands for the ISR capabilities required for the
future, some of DOD's current ISR acquisitions are not benefiting from
collaboration among the services that could save time and money. Among the
ISR acquisition programs we reviewed, we found specific cases where the
military services' successful collaboration resulted in savings of time
and resources. We also found cases where more collaboration is needed to
provide greater efficiencies in developing more affordable new systems to
close gaps in capabilities. Most of the 13 airborne ISR programs that we
reviewed have experienced some cost and/or schedule growth. One program
experienced significant cost growth and 9 programs have experienced
schedule delays that range from 2 months to 60 months. These problems were
caused largely by acquisition strategies that failed to capture sufficient
knowledge about the product technologies and design before committing to
the development or demonstration of a new system. Resultant delays in the
delivery of some new systems have required DOD to make investments in
legacy systems in order to keep them relevant and operational until they
can be replaced by new systems.
Opportunities Exist for Greater Collaboration across the Services' ISR Programs
While the Office of Secretary of Defense has historically endorsed the
concept of joint acquisitions because of the potential synergies and
resultant benefits, the military services have not always embraced joint
acquisitions and often prefer separately managed programs to satisfy their
individual needs. As a result, opportunities to gain efficiencies through
common engineering, design, and manufacturing efforts are not presented
when a new acquisition program begins. However, we found the military
services sometimes initiate collaborative approaches on their own to
achieve some of the economies and efficiencies of a joint program. In one
case, we also found the services resisted seeking synergies that could
benefit both programs and lead to potential savings in development and
procurement costs. The following three examples illustrate programs that
are collaborating, have taken initial steps to begin collaborating, and
have resisted collaborating. The ultimate extent of collaboration as well
as outcomes of these programs still remains to be seen.
Successful Collaboration on Fire Scout
The Army began developing its Future Combat Systems--a family of systems
that included a vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aircraft system
called Fire Scout--in 2000. Program managers from the Army Fire Scout
contacted their counterparts in the Navy Fire Scout program to share
information and see if there could be any synergies between the two
programs. This was done on their own initiative as acquisition policy does
not require joint or collaborative programs. Army and Navy officials met
several times to discuss configuration, performance requirements, testing,
support, and other issues. Initially the requirements for the two systems
were quite different. The Army's unmanned aircraft system had four blades
and a larger engine, while Navy's system had three rotor blades and a
smaller engine. After discussions, the Navy decided to switch to the
Army's configuration. The Army is buying common components, such as the
air vehicle and flight components, under the Navy contract.
An Army program management official estimated that the savings to the Army
in research and development alone would be about $200 million. As both
programs mature, the official believes additional synergies and savings
could be realized through contract price breaks on quantities and shared
test assets, such as air vehicles, support equipment, and test components.
Jointly acquiring common hardware under one contract will also reduce
procurement administrative lead time and permit common design, tooling,
and testing. Finally, future payload development such as communications,
sensors, and data links could be procured jointly.
Opportunity to Collaborate on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
The Navy identified a mission need for a broad area maritime and littoral
ISR capability in 2000. Based on a 2002 analysis of alternatives, the Navy
decided to pursue a manned platform Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)
with an unmanned adjunct, the BAMS. The Navy subsequently performed an
analysis of alternatives for the BAMS program, which identified several
potential alternatives; foremost among them was the Global Hawk system. As
a risk reduction effort, the Navy funded the Global Hawk Maritime
Demonstration program in 2003. Working through the existing Air Force
contract, the Navy procured two Global Hawk unmanned aircraft and
associated ground controls and equipment. The demonstration program was
expected to leverage the existing Global Hawk system to develop tactics,
training, and techniques for maritime mission applications.
The BAMS program is at a critical juncture. It released a request for
proposals in February 2007 and plans to proceed with system development
and demonstration in October 2007. If the Global Hawk (or another existing
system like the Air Force Reaper) is selected, there are opportunities for
the Navy to work with the Air Force and take advantage of its knowledge on
the existing platform. By adopting the collaborative techniques used by
the Fire Scout officials, the Navy could leverage knowledge early in the
acquisition process and avoid or reduce costs for design, new tooling, and
manufacturing, and streamline contracting and acquisition processes.
Collaboration Slow to Happen on Warrior and Predator
In contrast to the Fire Scout experience, the Air Force and Army
repeatedly resisted collaborating on their Predator and Warrior unmanned
aircraft programs. The Air Force's Predator is a legacy program that has
been operational since 1995. Its persistent surveillance/full motion video
capability continues to be a valued asset to the warfighter. When the Army
began in 2001 to define requirements for the Warrior, a system similar to
the Predator, it did not explore potential synergies and efficiencies with
the Air Force program. Both the Air Force and the Joint Staff responsible
for reviewing Warrior's requirements and acquisition documentation raised
concerns about duplication of an existing capability. Despite these
concerns, the Army did not perform an analysis of alternatives, citing the
urgent need of battlefield commanders for this capability.^11 The Army
awarded a separate development contract to the same contractor producing
the Predator.
^11 The Army asserted that its need was urgent and it could not get
sufficient support from Predator because of the system's limited assets.
Responding to direction from the Quadrennial Defense Review and the
Secretary of Defense, the Army and Air Force agreed to consider
cooperating on the acquisition of the two systems in January 2006.
However, the effort has stalled because the services have different
concepts of operation and requirements. For example, the Army does not
agree with the Air Force's requirement for rated pilots. The Air Force and
the Army are currently working to identify program synergies in a phased
approach. Initially, the Air Force will acquire two of the more modern
Warrior airframes and test them. Later, the services will compare their
requirements for ground control stations and automated takeoff and
landing. Finally, the Army and Air Force plan to compare concepts of
operation and training requirements for additional synergies. However, so
far the Army has coordinated the proposed approach through the Vice Chief
of Staff level, but the agreement has not yet been approved by the
Department of Army. The Air Force is still working to resolve comments and
concerns at lower organizational levels. If this stalls, these programs
could be more costly and redundant.
Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That Have Led to Cost
Growth, Delays, and Additional Investments in Legacy Systems
Nearly all of the 13 airborne ISR programs^12 we reviewed have experienced
changes in cost or schedule. This can be attributed to a variety of
causes. Many programs began development without a solid business case or a
realistic acquisition strategy. As a result of the schedule delays in some
programs, the services will have to make investments in legacy systems to
keep them in the inventory longer than planned. These investments
represent opportunity costs that could have been used for other needs
within DOD.
Cost, Schedule, and Performance Status of Airborne ISR Programs
Programs must build a business case that provides demonstrated evidence
that (1) the warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with the
chosen concept, and (2) the concept can be developed and produced within
existing resources--technologies, design, funding, and time. Establishing
a business case calls for a realistic assessment of risks and costs; doing
otherwise undermines the intent of the business case and invites failure.
Once the business case is done, programs must develop a realistic
acquisition strategy, which requires having critical program knowledge at
key points in the acquisition. This includes knowledge about technology
maturity, system design, and manufacturing and production processes. DOD's
acquisition policy endorses this knowledge-based approach to acquisition.
This policy includes strategies to reduce technology, integration, design,
manufacturing, and production risks.
^12 These 13 programs are post Milestone A and are in technology
development or systems development and demonstration. A project enters
technology development at Milestone A, when the decision maker has
approved the technology development strategy. The purpose of this phase of
development is to reduce technology risk and to determine the appropriate
set of technologies to be integrated into a full system.
Table 1 summarizes ISR programs that have encountered problems either in
development or as they prepared to begin the system development and
demonstration phase of an acquisition program.^13 Results of these
problems included cost and schedule growth, program restructuring,
cancellation, and unplanned investments in the legacy systems that were
being replaced.
Table 1: Causes and Impacts of Cost and Schedule Growth
System Problem encountered Impact
E-10A Uncertain need and Program cancelled.
immature technology
Aerial Common Sensor Requirements and design Development stopped; program
changes being restructured; schedule
delayed 60 months; and
increased investments in
legacy systems.
Global Hawk Concurrent acquisition; Cost growth (261 percent in
immature technology; and development); schedule
requirements and design delayed 36 months; program
changes restructured; potential
increased investments in
legacy system.
Reaper Concurrent acquisition Cost growth (13 percent in
and immature technology development) and schedule
delayed 7 months.
BAMS Immature technology Schedule delayed 39 months.
MMA Immature technology None to date.
Army Fire Scout Acquisition dependent on Schedule delayed 22 months.
another major
acquisition program
(Future Combat Systems)
Navy Fire Scout Acquisition dependent on Schedule delayed 3 months.
another major
acquisition program
(Littoral Combat Ship)
Space Radar Immature technology and Cost growth (18 percent in
requirements change development); schedule
delayed 8 months; and
program restructured.
Multi-Platform Radar Acquisition strategy and Requirements changed and
Technology Insertion funding dependent on program restructured.
Program other major acquisition
programs (E-10A
cancelled and Global
Hawk continues)
Warrior Concurrent acquisition Cost growth (21 percent in
strategy and immature development); schedule
technology delayed 9 months.
Airborne Signals Immature technology and Schedule delayed 2 months.
Intelligence Payload design
(sensor)
^13 The EPX, the Navy's replacement for its EP-3, is not included in the
table because it is a new program as of February 2007 and has not had a
cost increase or schedule delay.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Impact of Delays on Legacy Systems
Following are detailed examples of programs that failed to either develop
a good business case or an executable acquisition strategy and that had
problems. The outcome was that the services either had to or may have to
make additional investments in the legacy systems to keep them relevant
and in the operational inventory until the new system has completed
development and is fielded.
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)
The Army's termination of the ACS system development and demonstration
contract could have significant schedule, cost, and performance impacts on
three legacy systems in the ISR portfolio--the Army's Guardrail Common
Sensor (GRCS) and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL), and the Navy's EP-3.
The Army and the Navy had planned a phased approach to field the ACS and
retire the legacy systems from the inventory with a minimal investment in
maintaining legacy systems. Delays in ACS development will now require the
Army and Navy to make investments in the legacy systems at the same time
that they develop new replacement systems. In addition, any delay in
either the development of new systems or modification of legacy systems
could result in an ISR capability gap on the battlefield.
o The GRCS and ARL were to be replaced by ACS beginning in fiscal
year 2009. Since the termination of the ACS development contract,
the ACS program has reverted to a predevelopment stage as the Army
restructures the program. ACS is scheduled to restart system
development and demonstration in 2009, 5 years later than the
initial development decision. Although the Army has not
established a new date for initial operating capacity, that date
is also likely to slip by 5 years to fiscal year 2014. The cost to
keep GRCS and ARL mission equipment viable and the platforms
airworthy is estimated to be $562 million between fiscal years
2008 and 2013. Without these improvements, the systems will not
remain capable against modern threats which could result in a gap
in ISR capabilities on the battlefield. In addition, the airframes
could not continue to fly during this time frame without some
structural modifications.
o The Navy had planned to replace its EP-3 with ACS and begin
fielding the new system in fiscal year 2012. After the Army
terminated the ACS development contract, the Navy considered
staying with the Army in its development effort. However,
according to Navy officials, the Chief of Naval Operations
directed the Navy to proceed with a separate development effort,
designated the EPX. The Navy now plans to proceed with system
development and demonstration in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2010. The Navy has not established a date to begin fielding the
new system, but that is not likely to take place before 2017. This
translates into a 5-year slip in retiring the oldest EP-3 systems
and will make modifications to those systems necessary so that
they can remain in the field until the Navy achieves full
operating capacity for its EPX. The Navy plans to invest $823
million between fiscal years 2008 and 2013 to modify the EP-3.
Global Hawk
The Air Force plans to replace the U-2 with the Global Hawk but delays in
the Global Hawk program have contributed to the need to keep the U-2 in
the inventory longer than anticipated. In December 2005, the Air Force had
planned to begin retiring the U-2 in fiscal year 2007 and complete the
retirement by fiscal year 2012. Although the next configuration of the
Global Hawk (with limited signals intelligence capability) is scheduled
for delivery in fiscal year 2009, it will not have the same capability as
the U-2. The version of the Global Hawk that is planned to include a more
robust signals intelligence capability is scheduled to begin deliveries in
2012. The Air Force is now developing a plan to fully retire the U-2s a
year later in 2013 and at a slower rate than the 2005 plan. There are no
funds in the budget beyond fiscal year 2006 but the Air Force intends to
fund projects necessary to keep the U-2 capable.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to
answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
For future questions about this statement, please contact Davi D'Agostino
at (202) 512-5431, Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619, or Michael Sullivan at
(202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations
and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other
individuals making key contributions to this statement include Margaret
Morgan, Patricia Lentini, Michael Hazard, Assistant Directors; Gabrielle
A. Carrington, Susan Tindall, Dayna Foster, Catherine H. Brown, Frank
Cristinzio, LaShawnda Lindsey, Elisha Matvay, Rae Ann Sapp, Michael Aiken,
and Grace Coleman.
Related GAO Products
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies
Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T. Washington, D.C.:
April 6, 2006.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can
Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-0395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9,
2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in
Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49.
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Changes in E-10A Acquisition Strategy Needed before
Development Starts. GAO-05-273. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy
Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks, GAO-05-6. Washington, D.C.: November
5, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Greater Use of Knowledge-Based Concepts Would Reduce
Risks in Developing New Signals Intelligence Aircraft, GAO-04-939
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington. D.C.: March 17, 2004.
Signals Intelligence: DOD Should Consider Joint Replacement of Aging
Aircraft. GAO-02-401. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002.
(350883)
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Highlights of [36]GAO-07-596T , testimony before the Subcommittee on Air
and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
April 19, 2007
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for
New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development
As operations overseas continue, DOD is experiencing a growing demand for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide
valuable information in support of military operations. While the 2006
Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community to improve
the integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to make
significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future. Congress has
been interested in DOD's approach for managing and integrating existing
assets while acquiring new systems.
This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAO's ongoing
work regarding (1) the status of DOD initiatives intended to improve the
management and integration of ISR requirements and challenges DOD faces in
implementing its initiatives, (2) DOD's approach to managing current ISR
assets to support military operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR
programs in development and the potential for synergies between them.
GAO's ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials at
relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central Command
operations, and review of 13 airborne ISR development programs.
DOD's important first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the
integration of future ISR requirements include developing an ISR
Integration Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its joint
capability portfolio management concept. DOD developed a statutorily
required ISR Roadmap that catalogues current ISR capabilities. GAO's
preliminary work, however, has shown that the Roadmap does not (1)
identify future requirements, (2) identify funding priorities, or (3)
measure progress. Also, the Roadmap does not yet clarify what ISR
requirements are already filled or possibly saturated, identify critical
gaps for future focus, or define requirements for meeting the goal of
global persistent surveillance. DOD's second initiative to improve the
integration of the services' ISR programs is assigning management of ISR
issues as a test case of its joint capability portfolio management
concept. The intent of the test case is to explore whether managing groups
of ISR capabilities across DOD will enable interoperability of future
capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. Although in its early
stages, GAO identified challenges, such as the extent to which the
services will adopt suggestions from portfolio managers.
DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets limits its ability to
optimize its use of these assets. U. S. Strategic Command is charged with
making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate
to combatant commanders theater-level assets used to support operational
requirements. While it has visibility into the major ISR programs
supporting theater-level requirements, it does not currently have
visibility into all ISR assets. Also, the commander responsible for
ongoing joint air operations does not currently have visibility over how
tactical assets are being tasked. Nor do tactical units have visibility
into how theater-level and ISR assets embedded in other units are being
tasked. Further, DOD lacks metrics and feedback to evaluate its ISR
missions. Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does
not have all the information it needs to validate the demand for ISR
assets, to optimize the capability offered by these assets, to achieve a
joint approach to employing its ISR assets, and to acquire new systems
that best support warfighting needs.
Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the
development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more
efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the
warfighter. We have identified development programs where program managers
and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and where
less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions.
Additionally, most of the 13 airborne ISR development programs that we
reviewed had either cost growth or schedule delays. These problems
resulted from not following a knowledge-based approach to weapon system
development as provided for in Defense policy. In some cases, delay in
delivering new systems to the warfighter led to unplanned investments to
keep legacy systems relevant.
References
Visible links
28. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-49
36. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-596T
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