

GAO

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House of Representatives

January 2007

RESERVE FORCES

Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness





Highlights of [GAO-07-60](#), a report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has reduced equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the same time it faces an expanded array of threats at home. The massive state-led, federally funded response to Hurricane Katrina illustrates the Guard's important role in responding to the effects of large-scale, multistate events as well as the difficulty of working with multiple state and federal agencies. To address congressional interest in the Guard's domestic preparedness, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Guard's domestic equipment requirements have been identified, (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) measures and reports to Congress the equipment readiness of non-deployed Guard forces for domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions address the Guard's domestic equipping challenges. GAO examined the National Guard's plans and equipment status and included case studies in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends updating the National Guard Bureau's charter and civil support regulation and improved reporting of the Guard's domestic readiness. DOD partially agreed to report on plans to assess domestic readiness but disagreed with our other recommendations. GAO reiterates the need for changes in matters for congressional consideration.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.

RESERVE FORCES

Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness

What GAO Found

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale terrorist events and natural disasters have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would have roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated their plans. The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 catastrophic scenarios to guide federal and state governments in planning their response activities. While DOD is responsible for equipping the Guard for its federal missions and states plan for the National Guard's activities within their borders, neither is comprehensively planning for the Guard's role in responding to events like the national planning scenarios that may involve more than one state and be federally funded. Such planning has not been completed primarily because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating planning for the Guard's role in large-scale events. As a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces. The bureau has facilitated some limited interstate planning for multistate events, although neither its charter nor its civil support regulation identifies this activity as its responsibility. Until the bureau's charter and its civil support regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for multistate events, such planning for the National Guard's role in these events may remain incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as efficiently and effectively as possible.

DOD does not routinely measure or report to Congress the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions. DOD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual National Guard equipping report to Congress address warfighting readiness but do not address the Guard's domestic missions. While DOD has recognized the need for greater visibility over the Guard's domestic capabilities, its process and measures for assessing the Guard's domestic readiness have not yet been fully defined. Until DOD reaches agreement on a specific approach for measuring readiness for domestic missions and requirements are defined, it will remain unclear whether the Guard is equipped to respond effectively to the consequences of a large-scale terrorist attack or natural disaster.

DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment challenges but the extent to which these actions will improve the Guard's domestic capabilities is uncertain because DOD has not finalized specific plans to implement and fund several initiatives. Some officials in case study states expressed concerns about the adequacy of equipment for nondeployed units under current Army plans. For example, until the Army defines the types and amounts of equipment that nondeployed Army National Guard units can expect to retain on hand within the United States, National Guard officials in the states may be hampered in their ability to plan and train for responding to large-scale domestic events.

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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

January 26, 2007

The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
and International Relations
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The global security environment has changed significantly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the nation now faces adversaries who are committed to attacking American interests both overseas and at home. The National Guard with its dual federal and state roles has been in demand to meet both evolving overseas operations and emerging homeland security¹ requirements. Since the launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War II. At the same time, the Guard's domestic missions have expanded from routine duties, such as responding to hurricanes and forest fires, to include activities such as flying armed air patrols over U.S. cities, providing radar coverage for the continental United States, protecting critical infrastructure against terrorist threats, and securing U.S. borders.

Multiple state and federal agencies have roles in planning the response to the broad range of domestic events to which the National Guard may be called with the federal government providing more than 90 percent of the Guard's funding. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for

¹According to the Office of Homeland Security's *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: July 2002), homeland security is a broad term that encompasses efforts to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks as well as respond to an attack that might occur. DOD refers to its contributions to the overall homeland security efforts it expects to lead as "homeland defense" and activities DOD will perform in support of efforts led by other federal, state, or local agencies as "defense support of civil authorities."

planning for the Guard's use and the services for equipping its units for federal missions performed under the command of the President. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has been established to supervise DOD's homeland defense activities and the U.S. Northern Command is responsible for planning, organizing, and executing DOD's civil support missions within the continental United States. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for developing a system to integrate federal, state, and local domestic emergency response and provides grants to the states to build their emergency response capabilities. Also at the federal level, the President's Homeland Security Council² provides strategic guidance on terrorism prevention and has developed 15 national planning scenarios to guide federal, state, and local planning for catastrophic events (see app. I). States are responsible for planning for National Guard missions performed under the command of the governors. National Guard units are generally expected to perform their state missions using the equipment DOD has provided for federal missions. However, the National Guard's equipment inventories in the United States have significantly decreased because of overseas operations, particularly in the Army National Guard, at a time when the nation faces an increasing array of threats at home.

We have previously reported that the high pace of operations has caused a strain on the Army National Guard's equipment inventories that could be used for domestic missions and that planning for the military's response to large-scale, catastrophic events is not complete. In October 2005, we reported that nondeployed Army National Guard units had only about one-third of the equipment they needed for their overseas missions.³ We also reported on the National Guard's response to help manage the consequences of Hurricane Katrina, a large-scale catastrophic event.⁴ Over 50,000 National Guard members from all 50 states were activated to assist in the Katrina response effort, demonstrating the pivotal role National Guard forces play in responding to large-scale, multistate events. However,

²The Homeland Security Council is composed of cabinet-level officials and coordinates homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies.

³GAO, *Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives*, [GAO-06-111](#) (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005).

⁴GAO, *Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters*, [GAO-06-643](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).

we noted a number of serious deficiencies in planning for such events on the federal and state levels. Two significant shortfalls of DOD's pre-Katrina planning were that (1) the capabilities DOD could be called upon to provide had not been assessed and (2) planning did not fully address the division of tasks between National Guard resources under the governors' control and federal resources under presidential control. DOD is now considering steps to address some of the deficiencies identified in Hurricane Katrina lessons learned reports. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report.

Because of the National Guard's important role in homeland security, you asked us to assess whether the National Guard has the equipment it needs to train and maintain readiness for the full range of its domestic missions. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) the National Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions have been identified using an analytically based process, (2) DOD measures and reports to Congress the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions address the National Guard's domestic equipment challenges.

To determine the extent to which the National Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions have been identified using an analytically based process, we reviewed the status of requirements planning for National Guard forces. We also conducted case studies in four states—California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia—which face a range of homeland security threats to understand the status of the National Guard's equipment and state planning efforts for the National Guard's state missions. We also met with U.S. Northern Command, National Guard Bureau, and Department of Homeland Security officials to discuss planning processes for the Guard's missions. To assess the extent to which DOD measures and reports on the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions, we reviewed documentation on DOD's readiness reporting systems and its annual report to Congress on National Guard equipping, analyzed the inventory status of equipment items determined by the Army National Guard as having a high value for domestic missions, reviewed state assessments of domestic capability shortfalls, and discussed these issues with state National Guard officials in four case study states. Further, we reviewed documentation on DOD, Army, Air Force, and National Guard Bureau actions to address National Guard equipping challenges to determine the extent to which they were derived from approved requirements and focused on high-priority needs. We conducted our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards and determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix II.

Results in Brief

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to perform its domestic missions have not been fully identified using an analytically based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate natural disasters and terrorist attacks, because states and federal agencies have not completed an integrated set of plans identifying the capabilities the National Guard would be expected to provide in response to events like those described in the Homeland Security Council's 15 national planning scenarios. The Department of Homeland Security, through the National Response Plan, has established a framework for federal, state, and local agencies to use in planning for domestic emergencies. While DOD is developing plans for the use of federal military forces in domestic missions, it assumes that the National Guard will respond to large-scale, multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina under the command of the governors and therefore does not prepare plans for the Guard's use in those types of events. States plan for the National Guard's use in the missions they will lead within their borders, such as responding to wildfires and floods. However, neither the states nor DOD have comprehensively planned and identified requirements for the National Guard's role in responding to events such as the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios that may involve more than one state and be federally funded. Such planning has not been completed in part because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating state planning across borders for the Guard's role in large-scale events. As the response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated, the National Guard Bureau can play a significant role in facilitating National Guard support among states. As the liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states' National Guard forces, the bureau is well positioned to facilitate interstate planning for the use of National Guard forces in large-scale, multistate events. However, neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities specifically defines a role for it in working with the states to facilitate the kind of comprehensive, pre-event planning that is needed for a coordinated, efficient, and effective response to large-scale, multistate events. Moreover, neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities has been updated to reflect the post-September 11, 2001, security environment, including the bureau's role with respect to new organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and the U.S. Northern Command. Unless the National

Guard Bureau's charter and regulation on military support to civil authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland security issues the National Guard faces, the extent to which the National Guard Bureau will continue or expand its efforts to assist states with planning for and responding to these events will likely remain uneven. As a result, planning that fully identifies the Guard's requirements for domestic missions and is integrated with plans for using other military and civilian forces is likely to remain incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond to domestic events, such as those described in the national planning scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as possible. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to (1) revise the National Guard Bureau's charter to clearly define its roles in facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale, multistate events, such as those contained in the national planning scenarios, and monitoring the Guard's status to perform those missions, and (2) update the National Guard's civil support regulation. We are also recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with DOD, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other civilian authorities, to facilitate and coordinate interstate National Guard planning to identify the capabilities and equipment the National Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, consistent with the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios and state and federal plans.

DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or report this information to Congress. The Secretary of Defense is required by law to establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system with which DOD can measure in an objective, accurate and timely manner the military's capability to carry out the National Security Strategy, defense planning guidance, and the National Military Strategy. Until recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard could perform its typical state missions with the equipment it had on hand for its federal missions. However, the equipment demands for overseas operations have decreased the supply of equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units, particularly in the Army National Guard. DOD has recognized the need to have more visibility over the capability that the National Guard has for its domestic missions and has begun to collect data on units' preparedness; however, these efforts are not yet fully mature. DOD is implementing a new readiness reporting system that will include readiness information on the Guard's federally funded state-led missions, but this system is not fully operational and it is not clear how equipment readiness will be assessed

without fully identified domestic mission requirements. The National Guard Bureau has developed a database to collect domestic capability assessments from the states, but in the absence of fully identified requirements for domestic missions the system relies on the subjective assessments of state National Guard officials and does not provide detailed information on National Guard equipping for large-scale, multistate events. Our analysis of these data found that a majority of state National Guard leaders assessed the capability of resources within their states to respond to typical state missions as adequate, although the Army National Guard has shortages of some equipment, such as generators and trucks, which could be useful for domestic events. In addition, National Guard officials in states we visited expressed concerns about whether they would have enough equipment to respond to large-scale natural or manmade disasters such as Hurricane Katrina or those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. Until DOD's efforts to improve its readiness measures and reports are mature, decision makers will lack information on whether the National Guard has the equipment it needs to respond effectively to the consequences of a large-scale, multistate event. Further, Congress will have limited information making it more difficult to mitigate risks and prioritize investments for the Guard's missions. We are recommending actions intended to improve congressional visibility over DOD's efforts to assess the readiness of National Guard forces for their domestic missions. In addition, we are suggesting for congressional consideration the revision of the annual *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report* requirements to include an assessment of the Guard's equipping preparedness to provide support to civil authorities, the risks to those missions associated with any shortfalls, and mitigation strategies and investment priorities.

DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment challenges; however, it is not clear how these initiatives will affect the Guard's preparedness for domestic missions since some of the initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and specific plans are still being developed. DOD plans to procure additional Army National Guard and Air National Guard equipment, such as trucks and communications gear, using \$900 million that Congress provided in the 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. In addition, the National Guard Bureau has begun implementing several initiatives, such as establishing joint force headquarters within each state and expanding chemical and biological response capabilities. However, these initiatives were recently approved by DOD and have not yet been included in DOD's Future Years Defense Program. The Army has also budgeted \$21 billion for fiscal years 2005 through 2011 to modernize the Army National Guard and augment its

equipment inventory. However, this equipment may be deployed to meet overseas demands and the Army has not specified how much equipment will remain in the United States to be available for domestic missions because it has not finalized plans for allocating equipment to nondeployed units under its new cyclical readiness and deployment model. In the absence of a specific plan that outlines how Army National Guard equipment will be allocated among nondeployed units, state National Guards may be hampered in their ability to plan for responding to large-scale domestic events. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets.

In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to report to Congress on its plans for assessing National Guard domestic readiness, but disagreed with our recommendations to update the National Guard Bureau's charter and civil support regulation for the new security environment, to direct the National Guard Bureau to facilitate and coordinate interstate planning for the use of Guard forces in large-scale, multistate events, and for the Army to provide a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline equipment sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units. DOD stated that the National Guard Bureau's existing charter authorizes a planning role for the bureau for large-scale, multistate events. However, because we found that planning for multistate events is currently uneven and the charter does not clearly define the bureau's role in planning, we believe that clarifying the language in the charter to highlight the importance of these activities would improve preparedness for such emergencies. Further, DOD stated that it did not see a need to update its civil support regulation and that it is not appropriate for the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other federal agencies because this is the responsibility, if required, of the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders and would infringe on the authority of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and the governors. Our recommendation was not intended to designate the National Guard Bureau as the DOD entity to coordinate with other federal agencies or infringe on the governor's role in coordination with federal agencies. However, the current regulation does not specifically address how coordination with organizations established since September 11, 2001, should occur or how new planning tools should be used, and we believe that updating the regulation is an important step in strengthening pre-event planning and minimizing confusion about the use of National Guard forces. DOD further stated in its comments that it does not see a need for a report to Congress on the Army's plans to equip nondeployed

Army National Guard units, and it did not specify any actions the department would take to measure and report to Congress on the National Guard's equipment readiness for domestic missions. We continue to believe that the actions we recommend are important to improve interstate planning and visibility of National Guard readiness for domestic missions. Therefore, we are suggesting that Congress consider amending the statute prescribing the National Guard Bureau's charter to include coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events such as those contained in the national planning scenarios and requiring DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation to reflect this change. In addition, to provide information on what equipment will be available for the National Guard's domestic missions under the Army's force generation model, we are also suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to include in the 2009 *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report* a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline equipment sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units. DOD's comments and our evaluation are discussed in detail in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section of this report.

Background

The National Guard performs a range of domestic and overseas missions in its dual roles as a federal reserve of the Army and Air Force and as a state militia. DOD is responsible for planning and equipping the National Guard for its federal missions conducted under the command and control of the President. Within DOD, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense⁵ supervises DOD's homeland activities, including the execution of domestic military missions and military support to U.S. civil authorities, and develops policies, conducts analyses, provides advice, and makes recommendations for these activities to the Under Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is also the DOD office responsible for coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security. While the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense supervises DOD's homeland activities, U.S. Northern Command is the unified military command responsible for planning, organizing, and executing DOD's homeland defense and federal military support to civil authorities'

⁵The office was established by the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 902 (2002).

missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters.⁶

The services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping military forces, including the National Guard. The Army and the Air Force have different strategies for structuring and providing resources for their Guard components that reflect each service's planned use and available resources. Using DOD planning guidance, Army National Guard units are provided varying levels of equipment according to their unit's priority for resources, which generally increases as a unit nears availability for overseas deployment. Prior to the beginning of current overseas operations, the majority of the Army National Guard's combat forces were supplied with 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment. Our prior work (see Related GAO Products) has shown that in order to fully equip units deploying overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army National Guard had to transfer large quantities of items from nondeployed units, which depleted the inventories of equipment available for the Guard's domestic missions. In addition, operational requirements to leave equipment overseas for follow-on forces and DOD's lack of approved plans to replace these items have further compounded the Army National Guard's equipment shortages and threaten its ability to maintain readiness for future missions. In contrast, the Air National Guard has been integrated into the Air Force's operational force and is maintained at readiness levels comparable to its active component counterparts. This approach enables the Air National Guard units to be ready to deploy on short notice and its units have not been as negatively affected by recent overseas operations as Army National Guard units.

As a state militia, the National Guard responds to domestic events under the command and control of a state governor. When not participating in DOD's federal missions, National Guard members and equipment are available to their respective state governors to perform state missions, such as responding to emergencies, disasters, civil disturbances, and other events authorized by state laws. National Guard state-unique equipment requirements are funded by the state. In some circumstances, National Guard personnel can also perform duty under state control that is

⁶U.S. Pacific Command has homeland defense and civil support responsibilities for Hawaii and the U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean.

federally funded.⁷ Since September 11, 2001, the President has authorized federal funding for several National Guard domestic missions conducted under the command of the governors, such as providing security at the nation’s airports in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, assisting the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and providing security along the southwest border in 2006. Table 1 compares some differences—including differences in command and control responsibility, where the National Guard has been deployed, and how the National Guard was funded—in its different state and federal roles.

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles

	State role		Federal role
	State funded	Federally funded	Federally funded
Command and control entity	Governor	Governor	President
Mobilization authorities used	In accordance with state law	Title 32 (32 U.S.C 502(f))	Various Title 10 authorities
Where deployed	In accordance with state law	United States	Worldwide
Mission types	In accordance with state law	Training and other federally authorized missions	Overseas training and as assigned after mobilization
Examples of domestic missions	Forest fires, floods, civil disturbances	Post-9/11 airport security, Hurricane Katrina, southwest border security	Air sovereignty, missile defense, guarding DOD infrastructure
Support law enforcement activities	Yes	Yes	As limited by Posse Comitatus ^a

Source: GAO analysis.

^aThe 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, prohibits the direct use of federal military troops for domestic civilian law enforcement except where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. This act applies to the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, which are reserve components of the armed forces under 10 U.S.C. §10101.

Although it is equipped by the Army and the Air Force for its federal role, the National Guard can use its equipment and capabilities, such as airlift,

⁷National Guard members train for their federal missions under state control with federal funding. Federal laws also authorize federal funding for some other state-controlled missions, such as the National Guard’s counterdrug support operations and weapons of mass destruction civil support teams.

transportation, engineering, communications, logistics, medical, maintenance, and security capabilities, to support state and local officials in its domestic role. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard supported response and recovery operations in a number of ways. Among other activities, National Guard units performed helicopter search-and-rescue missions, augmented security efforts, supplied satellite phone communications, and provided humanitarian and medical treatment for victims of the disaster. The National Guard also can provide capabilities for responding to domestic weapons of mass destruction events, such as detection, assessment, and decontamination capabilities.

In its domestic role, the National Guard works with the multiple state and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects of homeland security. The National Guard works with state emergency management agencies to provide military support to state civilian authorities. In addition, the states have entered into mutual assistance agreements to provide cross-border assistance, including National Guard forces, when an event exceeds a state's capacity to respond. The National Guard Bureau, established by statute⁸ as a joint bureau of the Army and the Air Force, is responsible for the administration of the National Guard, including participating with Army and Air Force staff in developing and coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication between the Army and the Air Force and the National Guard in the several states. The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force are directed by statute to jointly develop and prescribe a charter for the National Guard Bureau that sets out the bureau's responsibilities.⁹ The Chief of the National Guard Bureau has overall responsibility for the National Guard's military support to civil authorities programs. As was demonstrated in the response to Hurricane Katrina, during civil support missions the National Guard Bureau provides policy guidance and facilitates National Guard assistance to the executing adjutants general who lead National Guard forces within the states under the command and control of the governors. National Guard forces also have some federal domestic missions, such as air and missile defense activities, that are federally funded and conducted under the command of the President.

⁸10 U.S.C. §10501.

⁹10 U.S.C. §10503.

Also at the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council both have responsibilities that could affect the National Guard's domestic role. The Department of Homeland Security, which was established in 2002¹⁰ to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism and to prevent terrorist attacks as well as respond to attacks that might occur, is the lead federal agency responsible for preventing, preparing for, and responding to a wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies. In December 2004, the department issued the National Response Plan,¹¹ which provides a framework for federal, state, and local agencies to use in planning for domestic emergencies. To assist in integrating state and federal responses to domestic emergencies, the Homeland Security Council developed 15 national planning scenarios in 2004 whose purpose was to form the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state, and local first responders may have to address and are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergencies for which the nation needs to be prepared. The 15 scenarios include a wide range of terrorist attacks involving nuclear, biological, and chemical agents, as well as catastrophic natural disasters, such as an earthquake or hurricane, and a large-scale cyber attack. These scenarios are described in further detail in appendix I.

National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions Not Fully Identified

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to perform domestic missions have not been fully identified using an analytically based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate natural disasters and terrorist attacks, because state and federal agencies have not completed an integrated set of plans identifying the capabilities the National Guard would be expected to provide in response to events like those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. DOD is developing plans for the use of federal military forces in domestic missions, but assumes the National Guard will respond to large-scale, multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina under the command of the governors. States plan for the National Guard's use in missions within their borders, but have only planned to a limited extent for the Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events such as those described in the Homeland

¹⁰The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101 (2002).

¹¹The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the Department of Homeland Security to consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into a single integrated and coordinated national response plan.

Security Council's national planning scenarios. While neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its civil support regulation explicitly defines its role in working to facilitate comprehensive and integrated planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, the bureau has taken steps to facilitate limited interstate planning for potential domestic events like hurricanes, wildfires, and an influenza pandemic. However, without a formal mechanism to facilitate the development of comprehensive plans for the National Guard's role in large-scale, multistate events, such plans are unlikely to be developed. As a result, the National Guard may not be prepared to respond to large-scale, multistate events as efficiently and effectively as possible.

DOD and State Planning for the National Guard's Use in Domestic Missions Is Incomplete

The multiple state and federal agencies likely to be involved in the response to a large-scale, multistate event are a factor that complicates planning for how the National Guard should be used and equipped to respond to domestic events, particularly for events such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. DOD, Department of Homeland Security, and National Guard documents, as well as our prior work on Hurricane Katrina, indicate that comprehensive pre-event planning that is coordinated and integrated to take into account the roles of federal and state responders, including the National Guard, is a key step in facilitating an effective, efficient, and well-coordinated response to unexpected domestic emergencies. As was illustrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the response to large-scale, multistate events may involve a combination of state and local civilian authorities; National Guard forces from across the nation operating in state status; federal civilian agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and federal military forces, such as active duty Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces operating under the command of the President. However, the number of state and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects of emergency response combined with their divided and decentralized planning responsibilities complicate the task of comprehensive planning and identification of the equipment the National Guard would need for the full range of potential domestic missions. National Guard assistance to civil authorities is normally provided when an event is so severe and widespread that local and state governments are overwhelmed and civil resources are exhausted. As a result, in order to identify the capabilities the Guard will be expected to provide for domestic response efforts, state National Guard plans must be integrated with other responders' plans and account for the contributions expected to be made by civil authorities as well as federal military forces.

DOD plans for the domestic use of federal military forces—which may include National Guard units in federal status—in the homeland defense missions it leads, such as air defense of the United States and missile defense, and the federal military support it provides to civil authorities as a result of natural or man-made disasters. The department, through the U.S. Northern Command, is currently developing a group of plans to address homeland defense missions and the missions federal forces may undertake in support of civilian authorities. However, DOD assumes that National Guard forces will respond to most domestic events, including large-scale, multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina and those described in the Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios, under the command of the governors. Therefore, the department does not plan for the types of Guard units or establish equipment requirements for the National Guard’s use under state control in responding to these types of events. Moreover, a DOD directive prohibits the procurement of equipment exclusively for providing support to civilian authorities in civil emergencies unless specifically directed by the Secretary of Defense.¹² Consistent with this directive, DOD’s 2005 *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* states that DOD will continue to rely on forces with both warfighting and domestic mission capabilities for consequence management and other defense support of civil authorities.¹³

States are responsible for preparing and maintaining emergency plans for the employment of the National Guard in response to civil disturbances; natural, man-made, or technological disasters; and other potential emergencies within their borders, such as wildfires and floods. In responding to such events, states generally have relied on the equipment that DOD has provided to their National Guard units for their federal missions. The degree to which states have developed plans for the use of National Guard forces and identified equipment requirements for the range of the National Guard’s missions, including large-scale, multistate events, varies. A recent Department of Homeland Security review of state emergency operations plans, which are the basis for state National Guard plans, found that a majority of state plans and planning processes are not

¹²DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, par. 4.4.8.2 (Jan. 15, 1993). DOD is developing a new directive for defense support to civil authorities that will supersede several existing directives, including its current military support to civil authorities directive.

¹³Two exceptions to this are the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (a dedicated command and control element) and the National Guard’s weapons of mass destruction civil support teams.

fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic events.¹⁴ According to the report, many state plans are created in isolation and are insufficiently detailed, and the states do not conduct adequate collaborative planning as a part of normal preparedness efforts. Further, the report asserted that the lack of specificity and poorly defined resource requirements in state plans would hinder the timely identification, deployment, and employment of equipment, personnel, and other resources to support emergency response efforts.

States have not completed the comprehensive and integrated planning necessary to identify National Guard requirements for responding to large-scale events that may involve more than one state and be federally funded, such as the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios, for a number of reasons, including limited state National Guard planning resources and the lack of a formal mechanism to facilitate planning across state borders for the Guard's role in these events. In some of the states we visited, National Guard officials stated that their planning resources are limited, and this affects their ability to develop detailed, integrated plans for the Guard's use in domestic events. For example, the West Virginia National Guard had a single planning officer who was tasked with other duties, while California National Guard officials stated they lacked funding for full-time planners. States must work with each other to conduct planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events and have done so to a limited extent for events like hurricanes and wildfires. In some cases, states have used mutual assistance agreements to supplement their National Guard forces when such events occur. However, there is no formal mechanism to facilitate comprehensive interstate planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale domestic events that is integrated with the plans of the multiple federal and state agencies expected to be involved in response efforts. In the absence of such a mechanism, planning is likely to remain incomplete and the Guard's full equipment requirements for domestic missions will remain unknown.

¹⁴Department of Homeland Security, *Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report* (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). The report presents the results of reviews and assessments of the status of state emergency operations plans as well as the emergency operations plans of 75 of the nation's largest urban areas. For the purposes of this report, we have focused on report findings as they relate to state emergency operations plans.

**National Guard Bureau
Charter and Civil Support
Regulation Do Not Clearly
Define National Guard
Bureau's Role in
Facilitating
Comprehensive Planning
for the Guard's Domestic
Roles**

While the National Guard Bureau is charged with performing a liaison function between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, neither its charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities specifically defines its role in working with the states to facilitate comprehensive and integrated planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios.

The National Guard Bureau's charter, signed by the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force in 1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard Bureau responsibility for facilitating and supporting the training of members and units of the National Guard to meet state requirements, as well as responsibility for facilitating and coordinating with the Departments of the Army and the Air Force on the use of National Guard personnel and resources for several functions, including natural disasters and military support to civil authorities.¹⁵ The National Guard Bureau's regulation on military support to civil authorities, last updated in 1996, describes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's overall responsibility for National Guard civil support programs and for issuing planning guidance on the National Guard's role in providing military support to civil authorities. The regulation also provides guidance to the states on preparing emergency plans for the use of National Guard forces in a civil support role, including coordination for external assistance beyond state capabilities.¹⁶ In its role as a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states and territories on National Guard issues, the National Guard Bureau played a significant role in facilitating Guard support among states during Hurricane Katrina. For example, the bureau acted as a conduit for communicating requirements for assistance in Louisiana and Mississippi to state National Guard leaders in the rest of the country.

In line with these existing roles, the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for the use of National Guard forces in large-scale, multistate events. However, neither the bureau's charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities specifically defines a role for it in working with the states to facilitate comprehensive and integrated pre-event planning for the use of National Guard forces in

¹⁵Army Regulation 130-5/Air Force Mission Directive 10, Organization and Functions of National Guard Bureau (Jan. 30, 2002). The National Guard Bureau Charter, dated September 1, 1995, is contained within this regulation.

¹⁶National Guard Regulation 500-1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Feb. 1, 1996).

responding to large-scale, multistate events. Moreover, neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities has been updated to reflect the post-September 11, 2001, security environment or how the state National Guards and the National Guard Bureau will work with new organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern Command in facilitating planning for the National Guard's response to domestic events. In addition, the bureau's regulation on military support to civil authorities does not provide guidance on how the National Guard state leadership and the National Guard Bureau should use the new planning tools that have been developed since 2001, to facilitate national preparedness, such as the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios.

In the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for facilitating state planning, the National Guard Bureau has taken some steps to facilitate limited interstate planning for the use of National Guard forces and equipment in large-scale, multistate events. For example, according to state and National Guard Bureau officials, during the past year the National Guard Bureau has helped facilitate a conference of southeastern states to discuss how those states can cooperate and share equipment in response to a hurricane as well as a similar conference of western states to address response efforts for the wildfire season. The National Guard Bureau has also facilitated state planning for the Guard's role in an influenza pandemic, and is coordinating the development of state National Guard plans to support U.S. Northern Command's new homeland defense plan and providing general planning guidance. While we believe these are positive steps, they do not provide the comprehensive and integrated planning that would help identify the specific equipment the National Guard would need to respond to the types of events described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. Unless the National Guard Bureau's charter and its regulation on military support to civil authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland security issues the National Guard faces and the roles the bureau will play in facilitating state planning for and the Guard's response to large-scale, multistate events, the extent to which the National Guard Bureau will continue or expand its efforts to assist states with planning for and responding to large-scale, multistate events will likely remain uneven. As a result, comprehensive planning that fully identifies equipment requirements for the National Guard's use in domestic missions and is integrated with plans for using other military and civilian forces may remain incomplete.

DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard Preparedness for Domestic Missions, but Efforts Are Not Yet Complete

DOD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual report to Congress on National Guard equipment provide information about the National Guard's readiness for its warfighting missions, but do not include reporting on its preparedness for its domestic missions. While DOD is taking steps to better assess the National Guard's preparedness for its domestic missions, these efforts are not yet complete and are limited by the lack of fully identified requirements for the Guard's domestic missions. Although DOD cannot quantify the degree to which the National Guard has the equipment it needs to respond to domestic missions, our analyses of the limited data collected by the department and the National Guard Bureau on the National Guard's capability for domestic missions found that most state National Guard leaders assessed their forces' capability as adequate to respond to typical state missions. National Guard officials in the four states we visited expressed views that were consistent with our analyses, but some officials expressed concern about whether they have sufficient equipment to respond to large-scale, multistate events. Until the National Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions are fully identified and DOD collects and reports information that compares equipment on hand to those requirements, the department cannot provide Congress with detailed information on the National Guard's equipment status for its domestic missions, and decision makers lack information to both assess whether the National Guard is appropriately equipped to respond to a large-scale domestic event and to target resources to assist the National Guard in mitigating any shortfalls.

Current Readiness Assessments and Reports on National Guard Equipment Do Not Address Domestic Mission Requirements

The Secretary of Defense is required by law to establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system for DOD to use to measure in an objective, accurate and timely manner the military's capability to carry out the National Security Strategy, defense planning guidance, and the National Military Strategy.¹⁷ The Secretary is required to measure the capability of military units to conduct their assigned warfighting missions, identify any critical warfighting deficiencies in those units' capabilities, and measure the risk those shortfalls pose to the units' ability to carry out their federal warfighting missions. DOD's legacy readiness reporting system—the Global Status of Resources and Training System—contains data that enable DOD to assess the capability of National Guard forces to carry out their warfighting missions. However, the system does not contain data that would enable DOD to assess the preparedness of National Guard forces

¹⁷10 U.S.C. § 117.

for domestic civil support missions, including the extent to which those forces have the equipment they need, because DOD's focus is on its units' readiness to perform their warfighting missions.

The Secretary of Defense is also required to submit an annual report to Congress on the equipment the National Guard and reserve components have and how DOD plans to meet the wartime equipment requirements of its reserve components.¹⁸ The report, known as the *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report*, is required to include

- recommendations on the type and quantity of major equipment items that should be in the National Guard's and the reserves' inventory;¹⁹
- a list of each type of major equipment item required by the National Guard and reserves, indicating their full requirement for warfighting missions and the amount of that equipment in the inventory, as well as a separate list of deployable and nondeployable substitute equipment for that item; and
- a narrative explaining the Secretary of Defense's plan to fill warfighting requirements for each type of major equipment.

DOD is not currently required to include in the report information on the adequacy of the equipment that nondeployed National Guard forces have available to perform the full range of their domestic missions. Without this information, the report provides Congress with limited information to help it prioritize investments for the full range of National Guard missions, warfighting and domestic. The readiness of units for these two different types of missions might vary widely. For example, a National Guard armor unit might not have the tanks it requires to successfully perform its warfighting mission and therefore be assessed as not ready in the Global Status of Resources and Training System, but still have adequate equipment to provide support to civil authorities for a domestic event like a hurricane. Conversely, a National Guard unit may be assessed as ready for its warfighting missions but not have the equipment, such as trucks,

¹⁸10 U.S.C. § 10541.

¹⁹Specifically, the language in the statute refers to equipment requirements for the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve of each component of the armed forces, including the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. The Selected Reserve includes individual mobilization augmentees—individuals who train regularly, for pay, with active component units—as well as members who participate in regular training as members of National Guard and Reserve units.

generators, communications gear, and engineering equipment, needed for its domestic missions. Until recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard could perform its typical state missions with the equipment it had on hand for its federal missions. However, some Guard units, particularly in the Army National Guard, may be less ready for domestic missions than they were 2 or 3 years ago because, as we have previously reported, large quantities of equipment have been sent overseas to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, decreasing the supply of equipment available to nondeployed units.

Some Efforts Are Under Way to Better Assess National Guard Preparedness for Domestic Missions

DOD has recognized the need to have greater visibility over the National Guard's capabilities for domestic missions and has begun taking steps to assess the Guard's preparedness for those missions. In a September 2005 memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense called for improved visibility over the readiness of National Guard forces operating in state status with federal funds. To achieve this improved visibility, DOD has decided to include information on the National Guard's readiness to perform both its federal warfighting missions and its state-led, federally funded missions in the department's new Defense Readiness Reporting System.²⁰ Additionally, the National Guard Bureau has developed the Joint Capabilities Database as a mechanism to collect information on state capabilities, including those of the National Guard, to respond to domestic events. Both efforts are being implemented and refined, but the lack of requirements for the full range of the National Guard's domestic missions limits their usefulness as a basis for identifying shortfalls and targeting future equipment investments.

DOD's new readiness reporting system, which will replace the Global Status of Resources and Training System, is expected to be fully operational by the end of fiscal year 2007. In contrast to the Global Status of Resources and Training System, which focuses on resource levels, the new system reports on assessed mission capabilities. Commanders will use their military judgment to assess readiness based on unit performance as well as the availability of resources, such as personnel and equipment. The system will also contain measures describing the status of major equipment items, including the quantities of those items units require for their missions, the equipment units are authorized to have, and the

²⁰The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for overseeing the fielding of the Defense Readiness Reporting System.

equipment they have on hand, as well as its condition and location. DOD officials plan to use that information to identify equipment deficiencies.

DOD has directed National Guard units to report in the Defense Readiness Reporting System on their capabilities to perform state-led but federally funded domestic missions, such as border security. As a step toward assessing these capabilities, the National Guard Bureau has begun to identify the essential tasks that National Guard forces need to be capable of performing for their domestic roles and missions. For example, the bureau is developing lists of essential tasks for state joint force headquarters, state joint task forces, and weapons of mass destruction civil support teams. Commanders will use these task lists to assess the readiness of their units to perform assigned domestic missions, such as counterdrug operations and hurricane response. However, in the absence of equipment requirements based on events like those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios to include in the Defense Readiness Reporting System, the system may not enable DOD or the states to fully assess whether nondeployed National Guard forces have an appropriate amount of equipment to respond to those missions.

In addition to the information that will be available in the Defense Readiness Reporting System, the National Guard Bureau has developed a database that captures information on state capabilities to support domestic missions. This unclassified database, introduced in 2005 and called the Joint Capabilities Database, is a voluntary reporting by the states' National Guard leaders to identify capability gaps in each state and help the states and the National Guard Bureau develop appropriate mitigation strategies. The database compiles subjective assessments from state National Guard leaders on whether their states have sufficient capabilities in their Army National Guard and Air National Guard units to effectively respond to state missions. In reporting on their state's capabilities for domestic missions, state National Guard leaders assess whether their Army National Guard and Air National Guard units collectively can provide adequate amounts of 10 core capabilities the National Guard Bureau has identified as being essential to supporting domestic missions. Table 2 lists these capabilities and provides examples of the type of tasks they represent.

Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard Bureau as Essential to Support Domestic Missions

Core capability	Examples of tasks associated with core capability
Aviation/airlift	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide aircraft to transport personnel and cargo during times of emergency • Provide aircraft to facilitate reconnaissance, command and control, and communications during emergencies • Support first responders using air assets
Engineering	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide engineer units to assist local and state agencies in debris removal; construction of roads, bridges, and emergency housing; search and rescue; water purification and distribution; and power generation
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain a certified civil support team • Identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive agents and substances • Assess consequences, advise responders, and assist with requests for more support
Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish and maintain interoperable communications with local, state, and federal agencies, and volunteer organizations as necessary for domestic missions
Command and control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate a Joint Operations Center to process information and serve as a focal point for the National Guard response • Provide reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for arriving forces • Coordinate and act as a liaison with state and federal agencies
Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan for and provide sustainment support to civil authorities to ensure continuity of operations • Rapidly deploy and monitor movement and placement of forces and equipment during support operations • Sustain deployed forces
Medical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support civilian emergency medical system during mass casualty operations • Assist the public health system in distributing and administering vaccines and antidotes to the public
Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure equipment is available for state missions • Sustain equipment during all phases of state missions
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a military force capable of assisting civil law enforcement agencies in maintaining law and order • Provide security to critical infrastructure
Transportation (surface)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deploy the force and support first responders using ground transportation assets • Provide transportation assets to remove civilian personnel from affected areas and move supplies

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data.

State National Guard leaders are asked to assess the adequacy of their state’s capabilities for two levels of events: (1) state missions that have been routinely conducted by the Army National Guard and Air National Guard in the past 10 years and (2) larger, nonroutine events that are expected to rapidly overwhelm state assets and require immediate external National Guard or federal assistance. State National Guard leaders’ subjective assessments are to be based on the state’s unique needs

for National Guard capabilities as described in its emergency response plan and consider factors such as equipment on hand, training, and unit availability, although the assessments do not provide detailed information on the status of National Guard equipment. State National Guard leaders rate a capability as adequate if they think their National Guard units possess the resources and assets necessary to accomplish their missions; they rate a capability as inadequate if they do not think their National Guard units possess the resources and assets required to complete the mission without external assistance and explain the reasons why the capability is rated as inadequate. The National Guard Bureau has requested that state National Guards submit new assessments quarterly or when events change their capability assessment.

Data Indicate the Majority of State National Guards Have Capability for Typical Missions, but Shortages Exist and Concerns Remain about Ability to Respond to Large-Scale, Multistate Events

Without analytically based equipment requirements for the National Guard's domestic missions to compare against the National Guard's current inventory of available equipment, we could not determine the extent to which nondeployed National Guard forces have the equipment they need to perform their full range of domestic missions. However, we collected and examined information from two sources—the National Guard Bureau's Joint Capabilities Database and an Army National Guard equipment inventory—as rough substitute measures of the adequacy of National Guard equipping for domestic missions. To supplement this information, we visited four states—California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia—and discussed the capabilities, including equipment, that would be available within the states for their typical missions as well as large-scale, multistate events.

National Guard Capability to Respond to Typical State Missions

Our analysis indicated that the majority of states report having the National Guard capabilities they need to respond to typical state missions; however, some states and territories report capability shortfalls in one or more areas.²¹ As of July 2006, 34 of the 54 states and territories (63 percent) reported having adequate amounts of all 10 core domestic mission capabilities for responding to typical state missions.²² Of the 20 states and territories (37 percent) that reported an inadequate capability,

²¹We did not analyze state assessments in the Joint Capabilities Database of their National Guard capabilities for responding to larger, nonroutine events because National Guard Bureau officials did not consider these data to be fully mature at the time of our audit.

²²The Joint Capabilities Database includes assessments from all 50 states as well as Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

13 reported being inadequate in only one capability, and 4 reported being inadequate in two capabilities. Table 3 shows the number and percentage of states and territories reporting either adequate or inadequate for each of the National Guard Bureau's core domestic mission capabilities. Aviation; engineering; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive capabilities were most frequently reported by state National Guards as being inadequate for responding to typical state missions. Most states and territories that rated their chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive capability as inadequate did so because their weapons of mass destruction civil support teams had not been certified or were in the process of being established.²³ For all other capabilities, the deployment of units was the most common reason state National Guard leaders gave for rating a capability as inadequate.

²³ Civil support teams are designed to support civil authorities in the event of a domestic weapons of mass destruction event by identifying weapons of mass destruction agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. There are 55 civil support teams—two in California and one in every other state as well as Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. Thirty-six of these teams had been certified as fully capable as of May 2006; the remaining 19 will be certified by the end of fiscal year 2007.

Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National Guards Reporting Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to Respond to Typical State Missions

	Adequate capability, number and (percentage)	Inadequate capability, number and (percentage)
Aviation	46 (85)	8 (15)
Engineering	48 (89)	6 (11)
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive	43 (80)	11 (20)
Communications	52 (96)	2 (4)
Command and control	54 (100)	0 (0)
Logistics	54 (100)	0 (0)
Medical	52 (96)	2 (4)
Maintenance	53 (98)	1 (2)
Security	53 (98)	1 (2)
Transportation	53 (98)	1 (2)

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data in the Joint Capabilities Database as of July 2006.

Note: Typical state missions are those missions that have routinely been conducted by the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of each individual state or territory in the past 10 years. State National Guard leader assessments consider factors such as equipment on hand, training, and unit availability.

Equipment Available for Warfighting and Domestic Missions

We also used the Army National Guard’s equipment inventory to determine the extent to which the Army National Guard has particular types of equipment, referred to as dual-use items, which units are authorized for their warfighting missions but could be highly useful in responding to domestic events. In 2005, the Army National Guard, in coordination with the Army and the National Guard Bureau, used military judgment and historical experience to identify more than 300 of these dual-use items. The list of equipment the Army National Guard identified includes types of trucks, generators, radios, medical gear, and engineering equipment.

Our analysis of the Army National Guard’s equipment inventory as of November 2006 showed that nondeployed Army National Guard forces had less dual-use equipment overall than they were authorized and small available quantities of some specific types of dual-use equipment. However, since requirements have not been fully identified for the amount of equipment National Guard units need to respond to domestic events like those described in the Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios, the extent to which amounts of equipment authorized for warfighting meet or exceed domestic requirements is unknown. According to Army National Guard officials, having the full amount of equipment

authorized for their warfighting missions would leave their units well positioned to respond effectively to domestic events.


As of November 2006, nondeployed Army National Guard forces nationwide had about 64 percent of the total amount of dual-use equipment they are authorized to have based on their warfighting missions.²⁴ However, inventory levels of the different types of dual-use equipment varied widely, from 0 to 100 percent.²⁵ The average inventory level by type of equipment was roughly 42 percent nationwide.²⁶ As figure 1 illustrates, the average inventory level of dual-use equipment items also varied by state and territory, from under 40 percent in New Mexico, Washington, D.C., and Virginia to more than 60 percent in Georgia and Colorado. On average, states and territories had about 50 percent of their authorized inventory of dual-use equipment available for domestic missions.

²⁴This figure includes substitute equipment authorized by Army regulation. Army Regulation 700-138, Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability (Feb. 26, 2004), defines substitute items as items authorized for issue instead of authorized standard items when the authorized standard items are not available for issue to the unit.

²⁵At the time of our analysis, the Army National Guard had identified a total of 342 types of dual-use equipment. Of these, 319 had available data and were included in our analysis.

²⁶The Army National Guard has over 90 percent of its authorized amount of 19 types of dual-use equipment. For some of these types of equipment, such as rifles, the Guard is authorized large numbers of individual items. These large numbers of individual items make up nearly half of the Guard's inventory of dual-use equipment. When these large numbers are included in the Guard's inventory, the overall percentage of equipment available is greater than the average of many of the other types of equipment.

Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, Including Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army National Guard Forces as of November 3, 2006



Sources: GAO Analysis of Army National Guard Data; Copyright © Corel Corp. All rights reserved; MapArt (map).

Percentages of dual-use equipment available to nondeployed Army National Guard units vary significantly by equipment type. Table 4 provides examples of some of the dual-use equipment items for which the national inventory is at 15 percent or less of the authorized amount for

warfighting missions, including substitute items. Items at 15 percent or less of their authorized amount include types of trucks, generators, communications equipment, and chemical protective gear.

Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment Items where the National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less of the Amount Authorized for Warfighting Missions, Including Substitutes

	Number of items authorized	Percentage available to nondeployed forces
Chemical biological protective shelter	168	0
Radio set (AN/PRC-148 urban version)	468	0
Dump truck (MTV W/E)	733	0
Diesel generator set (28 volt)	267	2
Navigation set: GPS receiver	25,382	5
Electromagnetic radiation meter (ME-513/U)	33	9
Thermal sight (AN/PAS-13A)	7,647	9
High mobility cargo trailer (3/4 ton)	5,656	9
Satellite communications terminal (AN/TSC-154)	40	10
Expanded capacity HMMWV (4x4, W/E, M1113) ^a	2,591	15

Source: GAO analysis of Army National Guard data as of November 2006.

Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number.

^aA high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle is a type of utility truck.

However, without clearly defined requirements for the National Guard’s domestic missions based on events like those described in the Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios, there is no benchmark to judge how many of these items Army National Guard units need to effectively respond. Amounts required for domestic missions may differ significantly from the amounts required for the National Guard’s warfighting missions. For example, a nondeployed National Guard force in a state may have only a small percentage of the amount of a type of truck required for its warfighting missions, reflecting a shortfall. However, it may still have enough of that type of truck to perform its domestic missions, or may have other types of trucks it could use.

National Guard officials in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia generally expressed the opinion that, while stressed by overseas operations, their forces have the capability and equipment to address typical state missions. For example, New Jersey National Guard officials

said their units had enough equipment to respond to all state missions that took place during the peak of the state National Guard's overseas deployments in 2004. Officials noted that nondeployed Army National Guard units continue to face equipment shortages caused by the need to transfer significant quantities of equipment to units deploying overseas.²⁷ While reduced equipment levels caused by overseas operations complicated its response, the New Jersey National Guard adapted and used the equipment it had available to effectively respond to its missions. National Guard officials in California, Florida, and West Virginia expressed similar levels of confidence in their forces' ability to respond to typical state missions using currently available equipment. However, some state National Guard officials expressed concerns about whether they would have enough equipment to respond to large-scale events similar to Hurricane Katrina or those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios.

DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard Equipment Challenges, but Long-term Effect on Domestic Preparedness Is Unclear

We have previously reported that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have significantly decreased the amount of equipment available to nondeployed Guard units to respond to domestic events. Moreover, the Guard's experience with Hurricane Katrina helped to illustrate the types of equipment that are valuable in responding to domestic disasters. In response to these events, DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment challenges and improve the Guard's preparedness for both overseas and domestic missions. However, the long-term effect of these initiatives is unclear because some initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and specific plans are still being developed. For example, the Army plans to procure additional equipment for National Guard units during the next few years but has not clearly defined how much equipment will be available for nondeployed units.

²⁷GAO-06-111.

DOD Is Procuring Items and Transforming Units to Increase National Guard's Equipment Readiness

To improve the equipment readiness of National Guard units, DOD has several initiatives under way. For example, DOD plans to use \$900 million Congress provided in the 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act²⁸ to procure equipment for the Army National Guard and Air National Guard that are useful for both warfighting and domestic missions, such as communications gear, tactical vehicles, trucks, and engineering equipment. In addition, DOD also plans to use \$290 million Congress provided in the 2007 Department of Defense Appropriations Act to procure additional National Guard and Reserve equipment.²⁹

The National Guard Bureau has also begun implementing four initiatives intended to improve coordination and training of nondeployed National Guard units for domestic missions. These four initiatives, which involve both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, include establishing (1) a joint force headquarters in each state and territory to provide military command and control capabilities; (2) 12 National Guard teams trained and equipped to deploy within 6 hours to respond to domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incidents;³⁰ (3) 10 detachments—one for each Federal Emergency Management region—trained and equipped to conduct mission assessments of defense industrial-base critical infrastructure; and (4) at least one joint interagency training capability to provide training to National Guard personnel on domestic missions. To date, the National Guard Bureau has funded these initiatives on a yearly basis by reprogramming funds, but it has submitted formal proposals to DOD to

²⁸Title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148 (2005) provided \$1 billion for National Guard and Reserve equipment. The conference report accompanying that act specified that of the \$1 billion, \$700 million should go to the Army National Guard and \$200 million should go to the Air National Guard. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-359, at 483 (2005).

²⁹Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289 (2006). The conference report accompanying the act states that the conferees intend for \$150 million of the \$290 million to go toward equipping the National Guard. In addition, the conferees directed that \$2.94 billion of procurement funds provided in Title IX of the act shall be available for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, and that \$500 million of these funds should be used specifically to meet the 10 core capabilities identified by the National Guard Bureau as essential to support domestic missions. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-676, at 223, 372 (2006).


³⁰Section 412 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163 (2006), authorized end strengths for reserves on active duty in support of the reserves. In the accompanying conference report, the conferees specified that the end strength would include five additional teams. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at 687 (2005).

incorporate the initiatives into DOD's departmentwide programming and budgeting process. At the time of our report, DOD had formally approved the joint force headquarters and the establishment of 12 National Guard chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident response teams. Formal approval from DOD means that these two initiatives were approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which approves all new DOD requirements, and may now compete to be included in DOD's Future Years Defense Program. However, because DOD's priority remains its overseas warfighting mission, the extent to which these domestically focused initiatives will be funded remains uncertain.

Army Plans for Balancing Equipment for Deployed and Nondeployed National Guard Units Are Not Well Defined

The Army has budgeted approximately \$21 billion for fiscal years 2005 through 2011 to modernize the Army National Guard and augment its equipment inventory. These funds are intended to facilitate the Army National Guard's conversion to modular brigades as well as to help fill long-standing equipment shortages. According to Army officials, items procured will be standard warfighting equipment and may be deployed to meet overseas demands and therefore may not always be available for domestic missions. The Army plans to manage all of its equipment for the active and reserve units using a new cyclical readiness and deployment model for its forces, including Army National Guard forces, which has implications for the National Guard's readiness for its homeland missions. Under this model, Army National Guard units will have access to three types of equipment sets over time as they prepare for possible deployment once every 6 years: (1) a baseline set that would vary by unit type and assigned mission; (2) a training set that would include more of the equipment units would need to be ready for deployment; and (3) a deployment set that would include all equipment needed for deployment, including theater-specific equipment and equipment from Army prepositioned stock. Figure 2 illustrates the movement of units through the reset and train, ready, and available phases of the force generation model.

Figure 2: The Army's Proposed Force Generation Model



Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Note: The Army's force generation model proposes that Army National Guard units will be available for deployment 1 year in every 6 years.

Army plans call for the baseline set to provide Army National Guard units in the reset/train pool, at a minimum, the equipment they would need for their domestic missions. As of September 2006, the Army was still developing proposals for what would be included in each of the three equipment sets. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the risks or the ability of units in the earlier stages of the cycle to respond to unforeseen domestic crises, such as large-scale natural disasters or terrorist attacks. Although the Army has worked with the Army National Guard to identify warfighting equipment that is highly useful for domestic missions, it is not clear whether nondeployed Army National Guard units will have sufficient quantities of such equipment during the early phases of the Army's force generation model to respond effectively to their domestic missions. State National Guard officials in California and Florida expressed concerns that their Army National Guard units will not have enough equipment for their domestic missions during the first 3 years of the Army's new force generation model, which is when units' equipment levels would be at their lowest. The Army has taken some temporary actions to mitigate this concern. In preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, the Army directed the temporary transfer of equipment such as trucks, night vision goggles, and floodlights from active Army units to Army National Guard units in the coastal states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. However, these states' Army National

Guard units were expected to return this equipment no later than the end of the 180-day loan period. Moreover, until the Army makes decisions as to what equipment should be included in the baseline equipment set for nondeployed Army National Guard units, National Guard officials in the states may be hampered in their ability to plan and respond to large-scale, multistate events.

Conclusions

With the challenging nature of the new security environment and potential for large-scale, multistate events depicted in the national planning scenarios, the nation expects the National Guard to be prepared to provide an efficient and effective response to domestic events. Without a designated agency to serve as a mechanism to facilitate interstate planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale, multistate events, the National Guard may lack plans that are complete and integrated with other DOD, state, and federal plans so that risks are identified and mitigated efficiently. Currently, the National Guard Bureau has facilitated limited multistate planning, but comprehensive planning that identifies equipment requirements and is integrated with plans for using civilian and federal military forces may remain incomplete unless the bureau's charter and civil support regulation are updated to reflect this facilitation role. As a result, the National Guard may not be prepared to respond to domestic events, particularly large-scale, multistate events such as those described in the national planning scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as possible.

DOD's current readiness measures and reports do not provide a rigorous assessment of the extent to which the National Guard's nondeployed units have the equipment they need to respond to the full range of their domestic missions. While DOD has begun to collect data on the readiness of nondeployed National Guard units using proxy measures and subjective assessments of military commanders, this effort is not fully mature and faces limitations. Without validated requirements for the types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs for domestic missions, it will be difficult to measure units' preparedness for those missions. Until DOD's efforts to improve its measures and reports are mature and the Guard's required capabilities are better defined and tracked, decision makers will lack information on whether the Guard has the equipment it needs to respond effectively to large-scale, multistate events. Moreover, Congress and federal and state decision makers will have limited information with which to mitigate risks and prioritize investments for the National Guard's missions.

While DOD is taking steps to address the Army National Guard's and the Air National Guard's equipment challenges, the effectiveness of these initiatives to improve the National Guard's domestic preparedness is not clear. Moreover, unless DOD, in coordination with other federal and state agencies that will be involved in responding to large-scale events such as the national planning scenarios, defines the requirements for nondeployed National Guard forces, there is no benchmark with which to assess the effectiveness of the initiatives. In addition, because the Army has not yet defined the amount and types of equipment that will be available to nondeployed Army National Guard units, state and federal agencies lack information they could use to plan to respond to domestic emergencies. Specifically, they lack information on whether the Army National Guard will have sufficient quantities of equipment during the early phases of the Army's force generation model to respond effectively to domestic missions. Until the Army makes decisions as to what equipment nondeployed Army National Guard forces can expect to have on hand, it will remain unclear whether the National Guard has the equipment it needs to successfully perform its domestic missions, including responding to large-scale, multistate events.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:

- Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to add clarifying language to the National Guard Bureau's charter to clearly define its roles in coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those contained in the national planning scenarios, and monitoring the Guard's status to perform these missions.
- Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to update the National Guard Bureau's 1996 civil support regulation to reflect the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for large-scale, multistate events. The regulation should also be updated to formalize procedures for coordination with organizations that have been established since the regulation was last updated, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern Command, as well as for the use of new planning tools like the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios.

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- Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with DOD, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other civilian authorities, to take actions to facilitate and coordinate interstate National Guard planning to identify the capabilities, including equipment, the National Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, consistent with the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios and state and federal plans.
 - Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to submit a report to Congress on DOD's plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions in response to natural disasters or terrorist events. This report should include
 - DOD's progress to date in incorporating these missions into the Defense Readiness Reporting System;
 - the specific missions for which National Guard units will report their readiness; and
 - the standards, including any equipment measures, given to National Guard unit commanders to consider when making their readiness assessments for these missions.
 - Direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. Specifically, the plan should include
 - a timeline for defining the requirements of nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets,
 - the analytical basis and domestic mission requirements used to determine the equipment required in the baseline set,
 - readiness standards and measures that will be used to track the status of the baseline equipment sets, and
 - the Army's plan for funding and filling baseline equipment sets.

Matters for Congressional Consideration

Congress should consider amending the statute prescribing the National Guard Bureau's charter to require language clarifying the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those contained in the national planning scenarios, and require DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation to reflect the clarification in the charter.

In addition, to ensure that it is kept informed of the National Guard's equipment status for its domestic missions, Congress should consider revising the statutory requirement for the annual *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report* to include an assessment of (1) the Guard's equipping preparedness to provide support to civil authorities, particularly for large-scale, multistate events; (2) the risks to those missions associated with any equipment shortfalls; and (3) mitigation strategies and investment priorities. Further, to provide information on what equipment will be available for the National Guard's domestic missions under the Army's force generation model, Congress should consider requiring the department to include in the 2009 *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report* a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline equipment sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written comments on a draft of this report. The department partially agreed with our recommendation that the department report to Congress on DOD's plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions in response to natural disasters or terrorist events. The department disagreed with our recommendations that (1) the National Guard Bureau's charter be revised to include language clarifying the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, (2) the National Guard Bureau's 1996 civil support regulation be updated to reflect the change to the National Guard Bureau's charter and to establish procedures for state National Guards and the National Guard Bureau to use to coordinate with new organizations and for using new planning tools, (3) the National Guard Bureau take actions to facilitate interstate Guard planning to identify capabilities the National Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, and (4) the Secretary of the Army develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. As we discussed in our report, state planning for the Guard's role in catastrophic events contained in the national planning scenarios has not

been consistent or thorough. We continue to believe that the actions we recommend are important to improve interstate planning and visibility of the National Guard's readiness for domestic missions. Therefore, we have included these actions as matters for congressional consideration. Specifically, Congress should consider (1) amending the statute prescribing the National Guard Bureau's charter to include coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those contained in the national planning scenarios, (2) requiring DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation to implement this change, and (3) in addition to requiring DOD to report on the National Guard's equipment readiness for domestic missions, require DOD to submit the Army's plans and funding strategy for providing equipment to nondeployed Army National Guard forces for domestic missions in its 2009 *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report*.

In its written comments on a draft of this report, the department stated that our recommendation to change the National Guard Bureau's charter is not needed because the current charter already authorizes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating state planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events. As our report discusses in detail, the charter, signed by the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force in 1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard Bureau responsibility for facilitating and supporting the training of members and units of the National Guard to meet state requirements as well as responsibility for facilitating and coordinating with the Departments of the Army and the Air Force the use of National Guard personnel and resources for several functions, including natural disasters and military support to civil authorities. Despite the fact that the department believes that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has a key role in coordinating and facilitating state planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, the charter does not contain language specifically defining this role. Since the charter was last updated, the security environment in which the National Guard operates has changed significantly, with the National Guard now being used extensively for overseas military operations while needing to remain prepared for additional threats at home. Furthermore, new planning tools, such as the National Response Plan and the national planning scenarios, have been developed to guide federal, state, and local planning for large-scale domestic emergencies. As the response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated, there is a need for detailed planning for the Guard's use in large-scale natural or man-made domestic emergencies. As we discussed in this report, planning for the National Guard's use in responding to events such

as the national planning scenarios is currently uneven. Although this interstate planning role is not clearly defined in its charter, the National Guard Bureau has taken some steps to perform this role to a limited extent. Our recommendation to add clarifying language to the National Guard Bureau's charter to clearly define the bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating multistate planning is intended to highlight the importance of these activities so that the National Guard is prepared to respond to multistate events as efficiently and effectively as possible. We continue to believe that this role is important and that making this activity an explicit responsibility of the National Guard Bureau would further the goal of facilitating multistate planning and would increase the states' and the nation's capability to respond to large-scale incidents. Therefore, we have included as a matter for congressional consideration amending the statute prescribing the National Guard Bureau's charter to include language clarifying this role.

The department also disagreed with our recommendation that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should update the National Guard Bureau's 1996 civil support regulation to include the National Guard Bureau's role in facilitating interstate planning and to address the creation of new organizations and planning tools. In its comments, the department raised two major concerns. First, the department asserted that the direction to update the regulation should come from the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force. Therefore, we have modified our report to direct the recommendation to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to update the regulation. Second, the department also commented that it is not appropriate for the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other federal agencies because this is the responsibility, if required, of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders—in the case of homeland missions, U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Pacific Command—and would infringe on the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense over homeland activities. We understand the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders with regard to coordinating with federal agencies, and we understand that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has authority over the department's homeland defense activities and responsibility for representing DOD on homeland defense-related matters in the interagency environment and for coordinating federal military support to civil authorities. Further, we agree with the comment that governors have responsibility for the coordination and use of National Guard forces in state status and that the governors could coordinate with federal agencies if necessary. Our recommendation was not intended to designate the National Guard Bureau as the DOD

entity to coordinate with other federal agencies or to infringe on the governors' role in coordination with federal agencies. Our intent was to recommend that the National Guard's civil support regulation be updated in order to more accurately reflect the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, and to formalize procedures for state and National Guard Bureau coordination with organizations established since September 11, 2001 and for the use of new planning tools. We have changed the language of our recommendation in the final report accordingly. Since September 11, 2001, many changes have occurred in the security environment, including the creation of entities such as the Department of Homeland Security as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command within DOD. Planning tools have also been created, including the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios. The National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation sets out the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's overall responsibility for civil support programs and for issuing planning guidance on the National Guard's role in providing military support to civil authorities, and provides guidance to the states on preparing emergency plans for the use of National Guard forces in a civil support role, including coordination for assistance beyond state capabilities. This regulation, last updated in 1996, pre-dates the changes to the security environment and does not specifically address how coordination with these organizations should occur or how these planning tools should be used. The changed security environment since September 11, 2001, has increased the need for federal, state, and local authorities to work together to enhance preparedness. As the response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated, the nation relies on the National Guard to respond to the effects of large-scale, multistate emergencies and the National Guard Bureau can play a significant role in facilitating Guard support among the states when such an event takes place. The Katrina response also showed that there is a lack of pre-event planning and understanding among federal and state responders about the type of assistance and capabilities that the National Guard can provide. Updating the regulation is an important step to minimize confusion about how the bureau and state Guard forces should work with organizations and planning tools established since September 11, 2001, how coordination of planning efforts for the Guard's use among federal, state, and local authorities should take place, and where the accountability for coordination lies. The National Guard Bureau's position as a channel of communication between the states and the Army and Air Force makes it uniquely positioned to facilitate interstate planning for events that may require support from multiple states or across state boundaries; we agree

with the department that it does play a key role in this capacity. We continue to believe that updating the National Guard Bureau's regulation to reflect changes to the security environment and to clarify how the state National Guards and the National Guard Bureau will work with new organizations and use national planning tools to strengthen pre-event planning for large-scale, multistate events is needed. Therefore, we have included as a matter for congressional consideration a requirement for the department to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation.

In its comments, the department also disagreed that the National Guard Bureau should take actions to facilitate and coordinate state National Guard planning to identify capabilities the Guard would need to respond to multistate events and asserted that the responsibility for overall supervision of homeland defense activities within DOD resides with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. First, while we understand that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is in charge of federal defense support to civilian authorities, the Assistant Secretary is not charged with planning for National Guard activities that will likely be conducted under the command and control of the state governor. We are not recommending that the National Guard Bureau undertake the responsibilities of the state governors, but rather provide a facilitating and coordinating function between states for those events that may involve the use of National Guard forces from multiple states. Second, in its comments, DOD said that the overall supervision of homeland defense activities within DOD is a function that should remain with a civilian official rather than a military officer. We agree and are not recommending that the National Guard Bureau supervise either federal or state-led forces but rather that the bureau facilitate and coordinate interstate planning for domestic emergencies that involve Guard forces from multiple states and which may be federally funded. Third, in its comments, DOD also stated that training and equipping the National Guard is the responsibility of the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. As we stated in this report, DOD is responsible for planning for DOD's federal missions and training and equipping the National Guard for these missions. As mentioned, training for the Guard's federal missions is also federally funded. We did not recommend changes to the responsibilities for training and equipping the National Guard. Rather, our recommendation is directed to improving interstate planning for the use of National Guard forces for large-scale domestic events in their state roles that are likely to be federally funded. As DOD acknowledges in its comments on our first recommendation, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, plays a key role in coordinating and facilitating state-level planning for the employment of National Guard forces to meet large-scale

disasters. We agree with this assessment and therefore continue to believe that the National Guard Bureau is well-positioned to facilitate planning and promote cooperation in identifying regional and national assets needed for response efforts so that decision makers can prioritize investments to mitigate risks. This recommendation is consistent with a recommendation we made in our previous report examining the response to Hurricane Katrina with which the department agreed. In that report, we recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should work with the state governors and state Guards to identify capabilities the National Guard will likely provide for homeland security missions and make that information available to other organizations with federal military support to civil authorities planning responsibilities.³¹ We have raised as a matter for congressional consideration amending the statute that prescribes the National Guard Bureau's charter to include this interstate planning role.


DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness submit a report to Congress on DOD's plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions. DOD agreed that readiness reporting and tracking is critical to ensuring the execution of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, but commented that this includes the readiness to perform domestic missions of all 10 military components, not just the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. We agree that readiness reporting and tracking are critical and recognize that all 10 military components may participate in homeland defense and civil support missions; however, the scope of our review was limited to the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. Moreover, in recognition that the National Guard has a unique role in domestic response, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness' guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System specifically directed the National Guard to include assessments of its readiness for state-led, federally-funded missions in the new readiness reporting system. This information on the National Guard's domestic readiness would be useful to Congress as it deliberates improvements to national preparedness. As a result, we continue to believe that the department should report to Congress on the status of efforts to measure National Guard readiness for domestic missions.

³¹ [GAO-06-643](#).

DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that the Army should develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. The department asserted that such a report would be unnecessary because Reserve component requirements are evaluated and prioritized within the department's budget process and presented to Congress as part of the department's overall budget. We did not recommend changes to the department's budgeting process. Rather, our recommendation that the Army provide Congress a separate report on nondeployed forces' equipment is based on the fact that Congress does not have visibility over the effects of the recent high use of National Guard equipment for overseas operations and the risks that depleted domestic equipment inventories pose to the National Guard's ability to respond to domestic missions. Because nondeployed National Guard forces rely on the equipment they have on hand to respond to domestic events, the equipment they can expect to have available at all times is of primary importance to the state National Guard's ability to plan for their domestic missions. Therefore, we continue to believe the Congress should be informed of the specifics of the department's plans, including timelines and funding strategies, to enable it to consider current and future risks against proposed investments. As a result, we have included as a matter for congressional consideration a requirement for the department to include in the 2009 *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report* the Army's plan and funding strategy for providing equipment for nondeployed Army National Guard units.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at <http://www.gao.gov>.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Janet A. St. Laurent". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "J".

Janet A. St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios

The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 national planning scenarios, whose purpose is to form the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state, and local first responders will have to address and are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic events for which the nation needs to be prepared. Table 5 summarizes the 15 scenarios that have been developed to assess the emergency response and preparedness capabilities of federal, state, local, and tribal governments as well as the private sector and describes their projected consequences. These scenarios have not been developed to identify events that are likely to occur; instead, they facilitate efforts by all government agencies to assess the full range of needs that might be required if events similar to these scenarios take place.

Table 5: Homeland Security Council’s National Planning Scenarios and Summary Descriptions

Threat	Description summary	Projected consequences ^a
Nuclear detonation	Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear device in a large city	450,000 or more evacuees, 3,000 square miles contaminated, and hundreds of billions of dollars in economic impact
Biological attack	Terrorists spray anthrax spores in a city using a concealed spray device	13,000 fatalities and injuries, extensive contamination, and billions of dollars in economic impact
Biological disease outbreak—pandemic influenza	Natural outbreak of pandemic influenza that begins in China and spreads to other countries	87,000 fatalities, 300,000 hospitalizations, and \$70 billion to \$160 billion impact
Biological attack—plague	Terrorists release pneumonic plague into three areas of a large city	2,500 fatalities, 7,000 injuries, millions of dollars in economic impact, and possible evacuations
Chemical attack—blister agent	Terrorists spray a combination of blister agents into a crowded football stadium	150 fatalities, 70,000 hospitalized, more than 100,000 persons evacuated, and \$500 million in economic impact
Chemical attack—toxic industrial chemicals	Terrorists use grenades and explosive devices at petroleum facilities	350 fatalities, 1,000 hospitalizations, 50 percent of facility damaged, and up to 700,000 persons evacuated
Chemical attack—nerve agent	Terrorists spray Sarin into the ventilation system of three commercial buildings in a city	6,000 fatalities in buildings, 350 injuries downwind, evacuation of unknown number of people, and \$300 million in economic impact
Chemical attack—chlorine tank explosion	Terrorists use explosives to release a large quantity of chlorine gas	17,500 fatalities, 100,000 hospitalizations, up to 70,000 persons evacuated, and contamination at site and waterways
Natural disaster—major earthquake	A 7.2 magnitude earthquake occurs in a major metropolitan area	1,400 fatalities, 100,000 hospitalizations, 150,000 buildings destroyed, and hundreds of billions of dollars in economic impact
Natural disaster—major hurricane	Category 5 hurricane strikes a major city	1,000 fatalities, 5,000 hospitalizations, 1 million people evacuated, and millions of dollars in economic impact
Radiological attack— radiological dispersal device (RDD)	Terrorists detonate “dirty bombs” in three cities in close proximity	180 fatalities, 20,000 detectible contaminations in each city, and billions of dollars in economic impact
Explosives attack—bombing using improvised explosive devise (IED)	Terrorists detonate IEDs in a sports arena, use suicide bombers in a public transit concourse, and in a parking facility	100 fatalities, 450 hospitalizations, local economic impact, and minimal evacuations
Biological attack—food contamination	Terrorists contaminate food with anthrax in processing facilities	300 fatalities, 400 hospitalizations, and millions of dollars in economic impact
Biological attack—Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease)	Terrorists infect livestock at specific locations	No casualties, huge loss of livestock, and hundred of millions of dollars in economic impact
Cyber attack	Terrorists conduct cyber attacks on U.S. financial infrastructure	No casualties, millions of dollars in economic impact

Source: Congressional Research Service.

^aThese hypothetical results are among those presented in the scenarios. They are intended to be illustrative to use in identifying the types of situations responding units should be prepared to address.

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Northern Command, Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Air Force North (previously First Air Force), the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security. We also developed case studies of four states: California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia. These states were selected because they had an average to high number of disaster declarations in the last 53 years, are geographically dispersed across the United States, reported varying levels of National Guard domestic response capability, faced a range of homeland security risks, and were involved in National Guard Bureau domestic capability initiatives.

To identify the extent to which the National Guard's equipment requirements for its full range of domestic missions have been identified, we reviewed domestic operational planning documents, including the Department of Defense's (DOD) Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army Campaign Plan, planning documents provided by case study states, and the National Response Plan. We supplemented this information by interviewing officials in DOD, U.S. Northern Command, the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Homeland Security, and our case study states to review their planning processes for the full range of the National Guard's domestic mission. In each case study state, we reviewed plans for the use of National Guard forces and assessed the extent to which they addressed the national planning scenarios and the extent to which these plans identified specific equipment requirements. We also discussed with state National Guard leaders processes for planning and coordinating with multiple state and federal agencies and challenges to planning for large-scale, multistate emergencies. We did not review case study state budget documents to independently verify the level of planning resources available to their state National Guards.

To assess the extent to which DOD measures and reports on the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for the full range of their domestic missions, we reviewed documentation on DOD's readiness reporting system, the Global Status of Resources and Training System, as well as the new system DOD plans to have fully operational in late 2007, the Defense Readiness Reporting System. We also analyzed data, reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials about the National Guard Bureau's state capability tracking system, the Joint Capabilities Database. Specifically, using data from the National Guard's Joint

Capabilities Database, we determined the number of states that reported adequate capabilities for typical state missions, the capabilities most frequently reported as inadequate, and the reasons why. In addition, using Army National Guard data on equipment useful for both warfighting and domestic missions, we compared the amount of equipment available for Army National Guard forces by state and item against the amount they are authorized for warfighting missions. Further, we examined DOD's annual report to Congress on National Guard equipping, the *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report*.

To determine the extent to which DOD is taking actions to address the National Guard's domestic equipment challenges, we reviewed and analyzed information about steps being taken to enhance the National Guard's capabilities and increase equipment for nondeployed National Guard units. Information we reviewed included DOD appropriations documents, Army budget information, and National Guard Bureau change request packages. Further, we reviewed and analyzed relevant DOD, Army, Air Force, and National Guard equipping strategies and policies and discussed the impact of the Army transformation plans on nondeployed forces. We also reviewed Army documentation on plans for implementing its force generation model to determine the extent to which the plans define equipment available to nondeployed Army National Guard units for domestic missions.

We conducted our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they ensured their own data reliability and reviewed their data collection methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and when applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and reliability.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

DEC 18 2006


Ms. Janet St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, Northwest
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Ms. St. Laurent:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report, "RESERVE FORCES: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness", dated November 21, 2006, (GAO Code 350768/GAO-07-60).

The Department appreciates the insightful and thorough approach that your team has taken with this important issue. The National Guard plays a critical role in performing both federal and state missions, and we are taking positive steps to address equipment challenges to ensure our soldiers are the very best equipped and trained. Thank you for the opportunity to provide the enclosed comments.

The point of contact for this office is Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Burke, OASD/RA, at 703-693-4207.

Sincerely,

Thomas F. Hall



GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED NOVEMBER 21, 2006
GAO CODE 350768/GAO-07-60

“RESERVE FORCES: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment
Requirements and Readiness”

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS
TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to revise the National Guard Bureau’s charter to clearly define its roles in coordinating and facilitating state planning for the National Guard’s use in large-scale, multistate events such as those contained in the national planning scenarios and monitoring the Guard’s status to perform these missions.

DOD RESPONSE: Non-concur. This function is already authorized in the existing Charter, as signed by the two Service Secretaries. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, although not in command of Army or Air National Guard forces, does play a key role in coordinating and facilitating state-level planning for the employment of National Guard forces to meet large-scale domestic disasters.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to update the National Guard Bureau’s civil support regulation to reflect both the National Guard Bureau’s role in coordinating and facilitating state planning for large-scale, multistate events and coordinating with new organizations that have been established since the regulation was last updated in 1996, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern Command, as well as new planning tools like the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios.

DOD RESPONSE: Non-concur. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau does not work for the Secretary of Defense, but for the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force. Therefore, it is appropriate that any direction to update the National Guard Bureau’s civil support regulation will come directly from them.

It is not appropriate for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other Federal agencies. This is the responsibility, if required, of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders. Further, this infringes on the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense over the homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense under 10 U.S.C. 138(b)(3). It would also infringe on the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense’s responsibility to represent the Department of Defense on homeland matters, including defense support to civil authorities, in dealings with the Executive Office of the President, the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal departments and agencies, and State and local authorities.

If National Guard forces are used to respond to a natural disaster or provide support to civil authorities in a Federal status, the National Guard Bureau should continue to be the channel of communications as currently prescribed in its charter. This is working well and need not be changed. If National Guard forces are used in a State duty status, the coordination of the use of those forces would be the responsibility of the governor of the State, not the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the governor could coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security, if other federal agencies are involved.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in coordination with DoD, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other civilian authorities, to take actions to facilitate and coordinate state National Guard planning to identify the capabilities, including equipment, the National Guard would need nationally to respond to large-scale, multistate events, consistent with the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios and state and federal plans.

DOD RESPONSE: Non-concur. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau plays a key role in coordinating National Guard domestic disaster response. However, by law, the responsibility for overall supervision of Homeland Defense activities within the Department of Defense resides with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. As written, the recommendation would infringe upon the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense's responsibility regarding defense support to civil authorities. This function should remain with a civilian official rather than a military officer, especially here at home. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau already coordinates with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the Assistant Secretary carries out his responsibilities.

Also, by law, the responsibility for training and equipping the National Guard resides with the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force. These responsibilities should not be split depending upon the type of activity that the National Guard might perform.

These functions should remain with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and the Secretaries of the respective Military Department, in consultation with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to submit a report to Congress on DoD's plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions in response to natural disasters or terrorist events. This report should include:

- DoD's progress to date in incorporating these missions into the Defense Readiness Reporting System;
- The specific missions on which National Guard units will report their readiness; and,
- The standards, including any equipment measures, given to National Guard unit commanders to consider when making their readiness assessments for these missions.

DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. Readiness reporting and tracking is critical to ensuring the execution of the Department's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. This includes the readiness to perform domestic missions by all ten military components, not just the Army and Air National Guard.

RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. Specifically, the plan should include:

- A timeline for defining the requirements of nondeployed Army National Guard baseline sets;
- The analytical basis and domestic mission requirements used to determine the equipment required in the baseline set;
- Readiness standards and measures that will be used to track the status of the baseline equipment sets; and
- The Army's plan for funding and filling baseline equipment sets.

DOD RESPONSE: Non-concur. Another report to Congress is deemed to be unnecessary. The National Guard's needs and requirements are presented, debated, validated and prioritized right along with all organizations in the Department. All of the Reserve components (RCs), including the National Guard, are integrated into their respective parent Service's Planning Programming and Budgeting process. The Services all utilize a layered resource review process, with various boards and panels that rigorously prioritize funding requirements from the lower to the higher levels, so that in the end, those requirements deemed highest priority are funded above those deemed of lesser priority. At the start of the process, each RC is given a portion of the parent Service's top-line to fund their programs; such as, pay and allowances, recruiting, training, and equipping. Many requirements compete for funding within each RC's budget, and when the RC's estimates are completed, they are forwarded to their parent Service for review and integration with Service-wide priorities.

The Services' proposals, including the RCs, are then provided to OSD for analysis and balancing across the Defense Department. During this phase, OSD reviews each Service's estimates, prioritizes with other DoD requirements to ensure that the Defense Department's highest priorities are resourced, and coordinates with OMB. The end product presented to the Congress is one that specifically integrates the Reserve components, has been reviewed at many levels, usually multiple times, and represents the Department's best judgment of the resources needed to accomplish DoD's assigned overall mission.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Alissa Czyz; Matthew Dove; Paul Gvoth; Nicole Harms; Catherine Humphries; David Marroni; Kenneth Patton; Jerome Sandau; Jay Smale; and Suzanne Wren made major contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: Related Products

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges. [GAO-06-1109T](#). Washington D.C.: September 21, 2006.

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [GAO-06-618](#). Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans. [GAO-06-745](#). Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but Accountability Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and Focused Departmentwide. [GAO-06-1042](#) Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006.

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. [GAO-06-498](#). Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [GAO-06-643](#). Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. [GAO-06-467T](#). Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2006.

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined. [GAO-06-170T](#). Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.

Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives. [GAO-06-111](#). Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2005.

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. [GAO-05-926](#). Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005.

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [GAO-05-652](#). Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2005.

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. [GAO-05-21](#). Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. [GAO-04-670T](#). Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions. [GAO-03-670](#). Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.

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