Railroad Bridges and Tunnels: Federal Role in Providing Safety
Oversight and Freight Infrastructure Investment Could Be Better
Targeted (06-AUG-07, GAO-07-770).
Freight railroads account for over 40 percent (by weight) of the
nation's freight on a privately owned network that was largely
built almost 100 years ago and includes over 76,000 railroad
bridges and over 800 tunnels. As requested, GAO provides
information on this infrastructure, addressing (1) the
information that is available on the condition of railroad
bridges and tunnels and on their contribution to railroad
congestion, (2) the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge
and tunnel safety, (3) the current uses of public funds for
railroad infrastructure investments, and (4) criteria and a
framework for guiding any future federal role in freight
infrastructure investments. GAO reviewed federal bridge safety
guidelines and reports, conducted site visits, and interviewed
federal, state, railroad, and other officials.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-770
ACCNO: A73932
TITLE: Railroad Bridges and Tunnels: Federal Role in Providing
Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure Investment Could Be
Better Targeted
DATE: 08/06/2007
SUBJECT: Federal aid for transportation
Federal aid to railroads
Federal funds
Freight trains
Freight transportation
Inspection
Public key infrastructure
Railroad accidents
Railroad bridges
Railroad industry
Railroad regulation
Railroad safety
Railroad tunnels
Safety regulation
Safety standards
Executive agency oversight
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GAO-07-770
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Little Information Is Publicly Available on Bridge and Tunne
* [4]Railroads Collect and Maintain Information on the Condition
* [5]The Federal Government Does Not Have Comprehensive Data on t
* [6]Railroad Bridges and Tunnels Are Aging but Are Not Generally
* [7]Railroads Use Condition and Congestion Information with Othe
* [8]The Federal Role in Overseeing Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Sa
* [9]Federal Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Efforts Are Limite
* [10]Federal Enforcement of Bridge and Tunnel Structural Safety I
* [11]FRA Is Not Using a Systematic, Consistent, Risk-Based Method
* [12]Federal Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are T
* [13]Federal Funding for Freight Railroad Infrastructure Is Not G
* [14]Some State Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Ar
* [15]Public-Private Partnerships Have Supported Some Freight Rail
* [16]Growing Freight Congestion and Demands May Challenge the Fed
* [17]Examining Critical Questions and Implementing a Framework Th
* [18]GAO's Critical Questions and Framework Could Guide Future Fe
* [19]Goals of a Future Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastruc
* [20]Public and Private Stakeholder Roles for Future Involvement
* [21]Future Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure Invest
* [22]Conclusions
* [23]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [24]Agency Comments
* [25]GAO Contact
* [26]Staff Acknowledgments
* [27]GAO's Mission
* [28]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [29]Order by Mail or Phone
* [30]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [31]Congressional Relations
* [32]Public Affairs
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
August 2007
RAILROAD BRIDGES AND TUNNELS
Federal Role in Providing Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure
Investment Could Be Better Targeted
GAO-07-770
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 6
Little Information Is Publicly Available on Bridge and Tunnel Conditions
and Congestion, Although Major Railroads Collect, Maintain, and Use This
Information to Prioritize Investments 11
The Federal Role in Overseeing Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Is
Limited 21
Federal Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Typically Not
Targeted to Maximize National Benefits, Whereas Some State and Private
Investments Are Strategically Targeted 29
Federal Funding for Freight Railroad Infrastructure Is Not Guided by a
National Freight Strategy and Is Generally Not Targeted to Maximize
National Benefits 29
Examining Critical Questions and Implementing a Framework That Identifies
Goals, Stakeholder Roles, Revenue Sources, and Funding Mechanisms Could
Guide a Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments 41
Conclusions 49
Recommendations for Executive Action 51
Agency Comments 51
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 53
Appendix II Examples of Bridge and Tunnel Maintenance, Component and
Structural Replacement Costs on Selected Railroads 58
Appendix III Considerations of Funding Sources and Mechanisms Available
for Federal Funding of Freight-Related Infrastructure 59
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 63
Related GAO Products 64
Tables
Table 1: Examples of Federal Funding Mechanisms That Support Freight
Railroad Infrastructure 30
Table 2: GAO's Critical Factors and Questions for Determining the
Appropriateness of a Federal Role in Freight-Related Transportation 42
Table 3: Three Components of GAO's Framework Applied to Federal
Involvement in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments 43
Table 4: Names and Headquarters Locations of Entities Contacted 55
Figures
Figure 1: Annual Train-Miles per Track-Mile for Class I Railroads, 1978 to
2004 7
Figure 2: Class I Railroad Annual Ton-Miles per Route-Mile Owned 8
Figure 3: Howard Street Tunnel (Baltimore, Maryland) West entrance (left)
and East entrance 18
Figure 4: Range of Railroad Infrastructure Improvement Costs (Dollars in
thousands per linear foot) 20
Figure 5: Structural Failure of a Bridge in Mississippi 25
Figure 6: Barge Navigating through the Narrow Channel of a Moveable
Railroad Bridge Eligible for Truman-Hobbs Funding on the Mississippi River
in Iowa 31
Figure 7: Kansas City Flyovers 37
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
Abbreviations
AAR Association of American Railroads
AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
ASLRRA American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CREATE Chicago Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency program
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOT Department of Transportation
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
RIF Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing
STRACNET Strategic Rail Corridor Network
TSA Transportation Security Administration
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
August 6, 2007
The Honorable James L. Oberstar
Chairman
The Honorable John L. Mica
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
House of Representatives
Freight railroads have been an important part of the U.S. transportation
network for over 150 years and account for over 40 percent of the
ton-miles1 of the intercity freight transported in the United States. Much
of the current U.S. freight railroad network was originally built by
private corporations in the late 1800s and early 1900s and is still
privately owned, including most of the nation's over 76,000 railroad
bridges and over 800 railroad tunnels. While many parts of the railroad
infrastructure, such as signals and track, have been replaced and
upgraded, bridges and tunnels, which are the single most expensive
railroad infrastructure components, have not been replaced and are still
being used, some long after their originally predicted useful life. In the
future, however, with projected increases in railroad traffic and further
aging, these expensive components may need replacement, presenting funding
challenges to private railroads.
This report responds to your request for information on issues related to
bridges and tunnels on the national freight railroad network.
Specifically, this report addresses the following questions:
1A ton-mile is a standard industry measure that represents 1 ton of
freight transported 1 mile.
(1) What information is available on the condition of railroad bridges and
tunnels and on the contribution of this infrastructure to railroad network
congestion?
(2) What is the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel
safety?
(3) How are public funds currently used for freight railroad
infrastructure capital investments, including those for bridges and
tunnels?
(4) What criteria and framework could be used to guide the future federal
role, if any, in freight-related capital investments, including those for
railroad bridges and tunnels?
Our overall approach to addressing these topics was to (1) review federal
legislation, regulations, and guidance; transportation planning
literature; and forecasts of future freight railroad demand and capacity
from private railroads, public agencies, and industry organizations; (2)
interview a wide variety of representatives; and (3) review pertinent
documentation from railroads of various sizes; federal, regional, state,
and local governments; and industry groups. In particular, we interviewed
representatives from six Class I railroads, two Class II railroads, and
nine Class III railroads.2 At the federal and state levels, we interviewed
officials from six federal agencies that have some relationship dealing
with railroad bridges and tunnels on the freight railroad
network--including officials in the Department of Transportation's (DOT)
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), which has primary responsibility
for overseeing the safety of the nation's freight railroad network--as
well as officials in nine state DOTs. We selected the railroads and the
state and local government agencies for interviews to include a cross
section of characteristics, including geographic diversity, the presence
of noteworthy public-private partnerships between the railroads and
government agencies, and state DOTs that actively participated in planning
or funding railroad infrastructure projects. We conducted our review from
June 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. See appendix I for further details about
our scope and methodology.
2For 2006, the Surface Transportation Board, a bipartisan, independent
adjudicatory agency administratively housed within DOT responsible for
resolving railroad rate issues, has defined Class I railroads as railroads
earning adjusted annual operating revenues of $319.3 million or more.
Class II railroads are those earning between $25.5 million and $319.3
million, and Class III railroads are those earning less than $25.5
million. The scope of this report covers freight railroads of all classes.
Results in Brief
Little information is publicly available on the condition of railroad
bridges and tunnels, and on their contribution to congestion, but private
freight railroads collect and maintain this information to varying degrees
and use it to set investment priorities. This information will be
increasingly important to the railroads as the demand for freight
transportation grows, aggravating existing freight railroad congestion
problems and further straining the railroads' infrastructure, which
includes aging and expensive bridges and tunnels. Class I freight
railroads collect and maintain detailed information on the condition of
their bridges and tunnels--including inspection reports, condition
information, structural ratings, design drawings, and maintenance and
repair histories--and on the extent to which these structures contribute
to network congestion. Class II and III railroads vary in the amount of
information they collect and maintain on their bridges and tunnels, with
some maintaining the same level of detailed information as the Class I
railroads and others lacking the information needed to produce a complete
list of their bridges, having no maintenance records, and keeping
inaccurate or incomplete records of inspection, according to our review of
FRA records. Freight railroads of all classes view condition and
congestion information as proprietary and share it with the federal
government selectively; and the government plays a limited role in
collecting such information because there are no FRA regulations governing
railroad bridges and tunnels. Furthermore, according to FRA's Chief
Structural Engineer, the expense of collecting and maintaining the
information may not be justified by the potential safety benefits. While
most bridges and tunnels are not the main cause of freight railroad
congestion, some structures are chokepoints and do constrain capacity. For
example, opening a movable bridge operated by a Class I railroad over the
Mississippi River for more than an hour during peak periods can delay that
railroad's traffic all the way to the West Coast. Freight railroads use
bridge and tunnel condition and network congestion information, along with
other information, to set investment priorities to generate the greatest
private return on their investment. According to several Class I railroad
representatives, railroad bridge replacement typically has a lower rate of
return on investment, making it more likely that railroads would invest in
other enhancements before rehabilitation or replacement of railroad
bridges.
The federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel safety is
limited because FRA has determined that railroads responsible for bridges
and tunnels are sufficiently ensuring these structures' stability.
Historically, FRA track personnel have provided bridge and tunnel safety
oversight. Under the authority originally granted by the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970, FRA has the authority to enforce railroad safety; and
in the 1970s and early 1980s, FRA had considered issuing bridge safety
regulations. However, FRA determined that railroads were already
inspecting bridges using industry standards. As a result, in 1995 FRA
decided to issue guidelines instead of regulations to guide railroad
bridge management programs, and hired bridge specialists to make
observations about bridge and tunnel conditions under these guidelines. If
FRA identifies a structural concern, it attempts to work cooperatively
with the railroad and takes enforcement action only if there is an
immediate concern for safety. Other federal agencies, including the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard, also have limited roles in
railroad bridge and tunnel safety related to their particular missions.
FRA bridge specialists have conducted safety surveys of all seven Class I
railroads' bridge management programs and assessed those programs using
FRA guidelines. These specialists also conduct 25 to 35 safety surveys per
year of Class II and III railroads, covering a small portion of the
nation's 549 Class II and III railroads. The specialists use their own
criteria to select these railroads. FRA has not established a systematic,
consistent risk-based methodology for selecting the Class II and III
railroads for bridge safety surveys; and as a result, FRA may not be
targeting those whose bridges or tunnels are most likely to present safety
risks. We are therefore recommending that FRA implement such a methodology
for selecting Class II and III railroads for bridge safety surveys. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOT and FRA officials agreed with
the need for a consistent, risk-based selection methodology; and FRA
officials noted that it had already begun to implement our recommendation.
Public funds may currently be used for a variety of capital investments in
freight railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels, but
federal investments are typically not targeted to maximize national public
benefits, whereas some state and public-private partnership investments
are strategically targeted to achieve specific state, local, and private
benefits. Overall, the current federal investment in freight railroad
infrastructure is small compared with the railroads' own investment. For
example, in calendar year 2006, Class I, II, and III railroads invested an
estimated $9 billion in freight railroad infrastructure while the federal
government provided an estimated $263 million during fiscal year 2006. A
number of federal agencies make federal funding available for
freight-related infrastructure projects through different funding
mechanisms to achieve certain transportation goals. However, the extent to
which these mechanisms have been used for freight railroad infrastructure
is generally limited, and much of the funding has gone for projects that
primarily benefit localities or regions, such as railroad-highway grade
crossing improvements or infrastructure improvements for Class II and III
railroads, rather than projects that would maximize national public
benefits, such as capacity-enhancing improvements to bridges and tunnels
on major freight routes. DOT has taken an important step toward targeting
federal freight-related transportation investments by issuing a draft
Framework for a National Freight Policy;3 however, the objectives of this
framework are not always clear, and the document does not explicitly
identify criteria for federal investment, opportunities to incentivize
more private investment, or opportunities to leverage private and other
public funds to add freight transportation capacity. At the state level,
some states target investments in freight railroad infrastructure to
produce various state and local benefits. For example, the Kansas DOT
administers a loan program for short line4 railroads in the state that
haul locally produced agricultural products. Public-private partnerships
have also facilitated investments designed to produce both public and
private benefits. Although the current federal investment in freight
railroad infrastructure is relatively small, growing congestion--resulting
from the aging of the nation's freight transportation infrastructure and
projected increases in demand for freight transportation--is expected to
spur calls for a greater federal role in freight transportation,
especially greater federal funding for freight-related infrastructure such
as expensive railroad bridges and tunnels that constrain capacity on key
freight routes. Federal funding is, however, constrained by the nation's
long-term fiscal imbalance; and, as we have reported, federal funding
mechanisms favor truck and marine transport over railroad transport and
distort competition in freight transportation.
In our past work reexamining the federal role in transportation and other
policy areas, we identified a number of critical factors and
questions--involving the relevance and purpose of the federal role,
performance measurement, targeting of benefits, affordability, and cost
effectiveness--that could be used as criteria to examine the future
federal role in freight-related transportation investments, including
investments in railroad bridges and tunnels.5 These factors underscore the
need for a federal role that promotes equitable, mode-neutral investments
of scarce federal funds in projects designed to achieve national goals and
produce national benefits. While DOT's draft Framework represents an
important step toward determining the federal role in freight
transportation, it lacks several components that we have identified as key
to such an approach, including setting national goals for federal
investment in freight-related infrastructure across all modes; clearly
defining federal and other stakeholder roles; and identifying
cost-effective revenue sources and funding mechanisms that can be applied
to maximize the national benefits of federal investments.6 Accordingly, we
are recommending that DOT ensure that its draft Framework includes clear
national goals, establishes roles, and identifies funding mechanisms for
federal freight-related infrastructure investments, including freight
railroad investments. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOT
officials said they are considering this recommendation.
3DOT, Framework for a National Freight Policy (Draft), (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 10, 2006).
4According to the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association
(ASLRRA), short line railroads are generally Class III railroads that are
less than 350 miles long or provide switching and/or terminal services.
Background
Currently, seven Class I railroads own and maintain over 61,000 bridges
and over 800 tunnels, and 40 Class II and 509 Class III railroads own and
maintain over 15,000 bridges.7 According to FRA documents, in 2002, the
U.S. railroad network contained approximately one bridge for every 1.4
miles of track. Class I railroads operate on approximately 70 percent of
the total route miles in the United States and generate 90 percent of
total railroad revenues. Class II and III railroads also play a critical
role in the national freight railroad network, serving as feeders to Class
I main lines. According to the American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association (ASLRRA), Class II and III railroads handle one out of every
four carloads moved on the U.S. freight railroad system.
5GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, [33]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005) and GAO,
Intercity Passenger Rail: National Policy and Strategies Needed to
Maximize Public Benefits from Federal Expenditures, [34]GAO-07-15
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
6 [35]GAO-07-15 . GAO, Intermodal Transportation: Potential Strategies
Would Redefine Federal Role in Developing Airport Intermodal Capabilities,
[36]GAO-05-727 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2005), pp. 26-27; and GAO,
Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for
Infrastructure Investments, [37]GAO-02-1033 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2002), p. 17.
7ASLRRA does not maintain a precise count of the number of tunnels on
Class II and III railroads. The association's General Superintendent of
Safety and Operating Practices estimates that there are at least 30
tunnels of or over 100 feet in length on these railroads.
Between 1978 and 2004, railroad traffic on Class I railroads increased
dramatically while the number of railroad track miles decreased, as
evidenced by an increase in the ratio of train-miles to track-miles (see
fig. 1).8 In addition, freight volumes increased, as evidenced by a 105
percent increase in ton-miles per route-mile9 since 1990, from 8.63
million in 1990 to 17.70 million in 2005 (see fig. 2). These changes have
focused more and heavier traffic over fewer core lines, thereby increasing
both the strain on and the importance of key bridges and tunnels, such as
those over the Mississippi River and underneath Baltimore.
Figure 1: Annual Train-Miles per Track-Mile for Class I Railroads, 1978 to
2004
8A track-mile is equivalent to 1 mile of track, which includes main track,
yard tracks, and sidings. A train-mile refers to a train traveling a
distance of 1 mile.
9A route-mile is the measure of 1 mile of aggregate roadway, which
excludes yard tracks and sidings, and does not consider that a mile of
roadway may include parallel tracks.
Figure 2: Class I Railroad Annual Ton-Miles per Route-Mile Owned
Bridges and tunnels on the freight railroad network are aging and are
susceptible to a variety of conditions that may cause wear or
deterioration. Railroad bridges are constructed from timber, steel,
masonry or concrete, or a combination of these materials. According to an
FRA bridge survey completed in 1993, more than half of the nation's
railroad bridges were built before 1920.10 This survey, which FRA's Chief
Structural Engineer told us is largely applicable today, found that 36
percent of railroad bridges were made of timber, 32 percent of steel, and
20 percent of masonry; the remaining 12 percent of bridges were not
identified by bridge type. Increased weight and traffic can cause fatigue
in timber and steel bridges. Timber bridges are also susceptible to decay
from weather and insects, and steel bridges near salt water may be
susceptible to high rates of corrosion. Masonry bridges are more
vulnerable to the effects of time and nature than to the weight of
traffic, but reinforced concrete bridges are susceptible to the effects of
traffic loads. According to FRA, from 1998 through 2006 a total of 22
train accidents, involving one injury and no fatalities, were attributed
to bridge structural failures. The most recent fatality resulting from a
bridge structural failure occurred in 1957. Likewise, very few major
railroad tunnels have been built within the last 50 years, according to
FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, although some have undergone maintenance
or capacity expansion in recent years. Some tunnels are driven directly
through rock; some are lined with brick or stone masonry, concrete, or
timber; and many tunnels include two or more types of construction.
Tunnels do not take stress from train traffic in the same way that bridges
do, but they are susceptible to drainage issues, and timber-lined tunnels
are particularly susceptible to fires. According to FRA, from 1982 through
2006 there were five reportable train accidents whose cause could have
been related to the tunnel structure. One of these accidents resulted in
two injuries, and none of the accidents resulted in a fatality.
10FRA survey results were reported in DOT, Office of Inspector General,
Audit Report: FRA's Interim Statement of Policy on the Safety of Railroad
Bridges, TR-1999-077 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 1999).
Many railroad bridges and tunnels were designed to have long useful
life-spans, but were built for use by different types of trains. Until
recent years, stress from locomotives and cars did not exceed the original
design loads for bridges. For example, steel bridges built between 1895
and 1916 were engineered for steam locomotives that inflicted greater
stress on bridges than today's locomotives. However, because of their
increased weight, freight cars are approaching the design load limits of
older bridges. Railcar weight standards have increased from 263,000 pounds
to 286,000 pounds, and some cars now weigh as much as 315,000 pounds;
however, approximately 45 percent of Class II and III railroad lines are
not equipped with track capable of handling 286,000 pound cars, according
to ASLRRA. In addition, freight cars have increased in height as increased
intermodal freight traffic has led to double-stacking intermodal
containers on railroad cars. Some bridges and tunnels do not have the
clearance needed to accommodate these double-stack intermodal trains.
The majority of the freight railroad network is privately owned, and
federal economic regulation of freight railroads has decreased since the
federal government deregulated the railroad industry in 1980. All seven
Class I railroads are privately owned, and according to ASLRRA,
approximately 95 percent of Class II and III railroads are privately
owned, with the rest owned by government entities. Private railroads have
an incentive to maintain their infrastructure in order to maintain
business operations, and most railroads privately finance their
infrastructure maintenance and improvement projects.
Railroads invest large amounts in fixed assets such as track, signals,
bridges, and tunnels. The Association of American Railroads (AAR)
estimates that in calendar year 2006 Class I railroads alone invested over
$8 billion in "capital commitments," that is, expenditures for capital
projects and operating leases. Compared with other industries, railroads
invest a higher percentage of revenue in their infrastructure. For
example, in 2000, the average U.S. manufacturer spent 3.7 percent of
revenue on capital spending, while railroads spent 17.8 percent--almost
five times as much, according to an analysis of U.S. Census data prepared
by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO).11 As railroads take steps to increase their capacity--by
increasing the size or weight of railroad cars or by adding track--some of
their bridges and tunnels may require alterations. A bridge's
configuration and condition dictates weight restrictions, and most bridges
and tunnels cannot accommodate the additional track, if needed, without
replacement or significant reconstruction. Similarly, the dimensions of
some bridges and tunnels restrict railroad car height and width. Because
bridges and tunnels are the most expensive pieces of railroad
infrastructure, with replacement and construction costs ranging from 11 to
550 times as much per linear foot as regular track, capacity expansion
projects involving bridge and tunnel work require significant capital
investment.
While the freight railroad industry is projected to grow substantially
with expected increases in freight traffic, the industry's ability to fund
this projected growth, including making needed capital infrastructure
investments in railroad bridges and tunnels, is largely uncertain. For
private companies seeking to maximize returns to stakeholders, railroad
investment poses a substantial risk. A railroad contemplating an
infrastructure investment must be confident that the market demand for
that infrastructure will hold up for 30 to 50 years. Furthermore, while
railroads own and maintain their own infrastructure, some other modes of
transportation, such as the trucking and maritime barge industries, use
infrastructure that is owned and maintained by the government, providing
them with a competitive price advantage over railroads. We have previously
reported that railroad investment is critical to freight mobility and
economic growth, and investments in railroad projects can produce public
benefits, such as (1) reducing highway congestion, (2) strengthening
intermodal connections and the efficiency of the publicly owned
transportation system, and (3) enhancing public safety and the
environment.12 (See the list of related GAO products at the end of this
report.) However, even when the public benefits of freight projects may be
sufficient to warrant public funding, federal funding mechanisms may not
be well tailored to freight projects. Whereas freight projects are
frequently intermodal, most federal funding mechanisms are focused on one
mode. In addition, freight projects generate private benefits, raising
questions about whether and how to provide public support for them.
11AASHTO, Transportation--Invest in America: Freight-Rail Bottom Line
Report, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16, 2003).
Little Information Is Publicly Available on Bridge and Tunnel Conditions and
Congestion, Although Major Railroads Collect, Maintain, and Use This Information
to Prioritize Investments
Major railroads13 collect and maintain detailed information on the
condition of their bridges and tunnels and on the extent to which these
structures contribute to network congestion, but less is known about how
much information Class II and III railroads collect. Freight railroads
generally consider this information proprietary, citing concerns over
security and liability, and they selectively share bridge and tunnel
information with the government. Meanwhile, the federal government plays a
limited role in collecting information on railroad bridges and tunnels
because they are privately owned and maintained. In addition, FRA has no
regulations or standards for railroad bridges and tunnels; and, in FRA's
view, the safety benefits that might accrue from collecting and
maintaining information on their condition would not justify the expense.
Various other federal agencies collect some information on railroad
bridges and tunnels that pertain to their mission. While most bridges and
tunnels are not the main cause of freight railroad congestion, some
structures are chokepoints and do constrain capacity. Freight railroads
set maintenance and investment priorities by considering bridge and tunnel
information, together with comparable information on other components of
their network infrastructure, and identify those repairs and improvements
that will improve safety, provide the highest return on investment, and
increase capacity. A bridge or tunnel is likely to cost more to
repair--and much more to replace--than other components of railroad
infrastructure networks, such as track or signals. As a result, railroads
of all classes are more likely to invest in other components sooner and to
consider extensive bridge or tunnel repair or replacement as one of their
last investment options.
12GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [38]GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
31, 2007), pp. 18-19.
13Major railroads refers to Class I railroads.
Railroads Collect and Maintain Information on the Condition of Their Bridges and
Tunnels to Varying Degrees
Class I railroads, which own over 75 percent of U.S. railroad bridges and
over 800 tunnels, maintain detailed information on the condition of their
bridges and tunnels and generally have the resources to invest in a robust
maintenance and inspection regime; however, less is known about the
information Class II and III railroads collect on bridge and tunnel
conditions, according to FRA's Chief Structural Engineer. Officials from
five of six Class I railroads with whom we spoke said they maintain bridge
and tunnel information electronically in databases--including data on
location, age, and other characteristics of the structures; inspection
reports; condition information, maintenance histories, design drawings or
construction documents; and other pertinent information.14 While Class I
railroad bridge departments vary in size, these departments all have
in-house bridge inspectors, engineers, and maintenance-of-way crews that
conduct inspections, carry out maintenance and repair activities, and may
also design and construct bridges. Class I railroads use in-house bridge
inspectors to conduct inspections at least once a year on all bridges and
tunnels to monitor safety and assess current conditions.15 For example,
one Class I railroad we interviewed has over 100 personnel dedicated to
bridge inspections on their network.
According to the limited data we have, Class II and III railroads collect
and maintain less information on their bridges and tunnels, and the
reliability of the data collected may be poor. Based on our discussions
with two Class II and nine Class III railroads, and on the documentation
of 43 bridge safety surveys of Class II and III railroads that FRA
completed from January 2004 through March 2007,16 Class II and III
railroads collect less information on the condition of their bridges and
tunnels, generally contract out bridge and tunnel inspection and repair
work, and have less in-house bridge expertise. For example, 18 of the 43
Class II and III railroads reviewed by FRA since January 2004 could not
produce some critical documentation related to the safety of their
bridges, including past bridge inspection reports, design documents, or
complete bridge inventories. Furthermore, only 16 of 43 Class II and III
railroads, surveyed by the FRA inspect their bridges at least once a year.
Also, according to FRA officials, many Class II and III railroads lack the
in-house bridge expertise to conduct their own bridge inspections and rely
instead on outside consultants. For example, according to the 43 FRA
bridge safety surveys of Class II and III railroads, 26 of the railroads
contracted out bridge inspections, 7 did not conduct bridge inspections, 4
did not mention who conducted the railroad's bridge inspections, 4
conducted inspections in-house, 1 had an informal inspection arrangement,
and 1 was found to have no bridges. In addition, 8 bridge safety surveys
provided to us by FRA either found inconsistencies between bridge
inspection reports and actual bridge conditions or found insufficient
detail in inspection reports.
14Officials with whom we spoke from the other Class I railroad said the
railroad is converting its paper inspection materials to an online
database.
15Some Class I railroads inspect a subset of bridges and tunnels more
frequently--based on condition, structure type, bridge type, age, or
traffic levels--such as requiring an inspection every 6 months for timber
trestle bridges and pin-connected steel bridges, because of their
increased potential for deterioration.
16FRA officials told us that they conduct, on average, about 25 to 35
bridge safety surveys per year of Class II and III railroads, but they
retained documentation on only 43 completed bridge safety surveys of Class
II and III railroads that they conducted from January 2004 to March 2007.
One Class III railroad representative with whom we spoke stated that the
true condition of that railroad's bridges, all of which were built by
railroads not in existence today, is unknown because the railroad does not
have design or construction documents, lacks past maintenance and
inspection records, and has never conducted a complete engineering study
to determine its bridges' load-carrying capacity. FRA officials stated
that, based on the limited data they have, they believe that some Class
III railroads do not have the training or experience needed to recognize
critical structural deficiencies or even understand the severity and
urgency of identified bridge or tunnel defects. However, FRA officials
also stated that some Class II and III railroads have very good bridge
management practices because they use qualified outside consultants to
perform safety and inspection processes.
The Federal Government Does Not Have Comprehensive Data on the Nation's Railroad
Bridges and Tunnels
The federal government's efforts to collect data on railroad bridges and
tunnels are limited in scope, and the data are not updated regularly. FRA
collects railroad traffic information and maintains geographic data on
U.S. freight railroad lines; however, this information does not show the
location of bridges or tunnels on these routes. FRA maintains records of
railroad accident and incident reports, some involving bridges and
tunnels, dating back to 1982, but the information collected is limited to
accident descriptions, repair costs, structure locations, and information
about the train, crew, and track involved in the accidents and does not
show bridge or tunnel condition, age, structure type, or design documents.
In addition, as part of the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement
Financing (RRIF) loan application process,17 FRA's Office of Railroad
Development hires independent engineering firms to verify the condition of
the infrastructure and the feasibility of proposed infrastructure
improvements. These assessments may provide detailed information on
specific railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels; however,
the data are limited to the projects submitted in the RRIF loan
application process. Furthermore, while FRA collects and updates data on
track defects from its track inspections, it collects less information on
bridges and tunnels, because the FRA has regulations detailing track
standards but only guidelines for bridges.
Although FRA has authority to obtain records related to the safety of
railroad operations, including those involving bridges and tunnels, FRA
officials expressed concern about the agency becoming a repository for
railroad bridge and tunnel data. In addition, FRA's Chief Structural
Engineer stated that the expense of collecting and maintaining a
comprehensive railroad bridge and tunnel inventory could not be justified
from a safety standpoint because railroads already maintain inventories of
their own bridges and tunnels, which FRA officials review.
No comprehensive inventory exists on the nation's railroad bridges and
tunnels; however, through unrelated initiatives over the years, FRA has
obtained some information on bridges and tunnels, although, in some cases,
this information has not been updated regularly. For example, in 1993, FRA
compiled a list of railroad bridges over navigable waterways based on data
from the U.S. Coast Guard. However, the list has not been regularly
updated. Other federal agencies collect some information on railroad
infrastructure as it pertains to their mission, but this information is
not comprehensive or exclusive to railroad structures. This information is
mainly collected by Department of Defense (DOD), DHS, TSA, the Coast
Guard, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Environmental Protection
Agency and centers on either security or construction permitting
functions.
17The RRIF program was established by the Transportation Equity Act for
the 21st Century (TEA-21) and amended by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users. Under this
program, FRA is authorized to provide direct loans and loan guarantees for
the acquisition, improvement, or rehabilitation of intermodal or railroad
equipment or facilities, including track, rail, bridges, yards, and
buildings.
Railroad Bridges and Tunnels Are Aging but Are Not Generally the Main Cause of
Freight Railroad Congestion, Although Some Are Chokepoints
While railroad bridges and tunnels are aging, their condition is not the
main cause of freight railroad congestion; however, some critical bridges
and tunnels are chokepoints on the freight railroad network.18 According
to FRA officials and railroad representatives with whom we spoke, many of
these structures are reaching or have exceeded their originally estimated
useful life. For example, an FRA bridge survey completed in 1993 found
that more than half of the nation's railroad bridges were built before
1920 and, according to FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, very few railroad
tunnels have been built within the last 50 years. As a bridge ages, it
undergoes natural deterioration, including corrosion, and weather-related
stresses. In addition, fatigue may occur in some components of older
bridges because of stress resulting from repeated heavy freight train
operations. FRA's Chief Structural Engineer told us that, as bridges and
other components of railroad infrastructure age and their condition
worsens, the railroads may need to increase their investment in
inspection, maintenance, and replacement to keep existing railroad lines
serviceable. One Class I railroad representative said his railroad has a
growing inventory of about 300 to 400 older bridges that are deteriorating
and therefore need additional inspections and assessments. Quantifying the
future maintenance and replacement needs of the freight railroad network
is difficult, since private railroads do not make information on the
condition of railroad bridges and tunnels publicly available because of
concerns over sharing proprietary information and losing competitive
advantage. However, the American Society of Civil Engineers gave railroad
infrastructure a "C-" grade in its 2005 assessment of the nation's
infrastructure, noting that limited capacity on the freight railroad
network has created significant chokepoints and delays.19
Although officials at a few railroads with whom we spoke expressed some
concerns about the effect of aging bridges on congestion, they were more
concerned about the effect of increased train traffic on congestion.
Demand for freight railroad capacity has increased over the last decade
with some Class I railroads reaching record traffic levels, especially in
ethanol, coal, and intermodal traffic. The demand for such capacity is
expected to continue increasing. For example, the DOT has projected a 55
percent increase in freight railroad traffic from 2000 to 2020. Increased
train traffic places additional stress on existing infrastructure,
especially railroad bridges; requires capacity expansion investments in
rolling stock, infrastructure, and personnel; and increases congestion on
the railroad network.
18A chokepoint is a place where there is recurring congestion or delay.
19American Society of Civil Engineers, 2005 Report Card for America's
Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: 2005).
Class I railroads consider congestion a networkwide problem whereas
officials of the Class II and III railroads with whom we spoke said they
generally experience congestion around crossings, yards, and interchanges
with Class I railroads. Although officials from four of the nine Class II
and III railroads with whom we spoke said they currently experience
congestion on their entire networks, generally, those railroads were more
concerned about upgrading existing infrastructure to handle the heavier
railcars and longer trains being demanded by Class I railroads than they
were with increasing capacity. The American Short Line and Regional
Railroad Association estimates that out of the 48,000 miles of track owned
by Class II and III railroads, 20,000 to 25,000 miles need to be upgraded
to handle the heavier railcars that are becoming the industry standard.
ASLRRA estimated these upgrades would cost $7 billion to $11 billion.
Officials at seven of the nine Class II and III railroads with whom we
spoke said the railroads had completed or needed to complete track or
bridge upgrades to accommodate heavier railcars.
Several factors contribute to congestion on freight railroad networks,
including grade crossings and passenger trains, both of which can decrease
freight railroad capacity and cause freight train delays. Bridges or
tunnels may also cause network congestion. For example, single-track
bridges and tunnels constrain capacity on double-track lines, as do low
clearances that do not accommodate double-stack intermodal trains, bridges
that open for marine traffic,20 and other structural characteristics such
as sharp curves and steep grades that require slower train speeds.
Deteriorated bridge and tunnel conditions can also contribute to
congestion by requiring reduced train speeds, closures, and increased time
out of service for maintenance. Where repairs or improvements to bridges
and tunnels may not be financially viable or sufficiently profitable,
railroads may institute slow orders or shut down lines and reroute
traffic. In some cases, especially for Class III railroads, a bridge or
tunnel closure can isolate a shipper and cripple a railroad's entire
network.
2033 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Part 117. Railroad bridges over navigable waterways are
required by law to open for marine traffic.
Although FRA officials estimated that 10 percent or less of freight
railroad congestion is attributable to capacity constraints caused by
railroad bridges and tunnels, railroad officials whom we spoke with
identified some key bridges and tunnels as chokepoints on their networks.
For example, one chokepoint is a moveable bridge that is one of only a few
bridges across the Mississippi River owned by a Class I railroad.
According to railroad officials, during peak periods, the bridge must open
up to 15 times per day for river traffic while accommodating between 65
and 70 trains per day. Each opening for river traffic generally takes an
average of 25 to 30 minutes, although the bridge is sometimes open for
more than an hour, causing train delays as far as the West Coast. In
addition, this bridge is closed for routine maintenance for over an hour
several times a week. Another chokepoint is the 1.7 mile Howard Street
Tunnel (see fig. 3), constructed in 1895 under downtown Baltimore,
Maryland, which is the largest and most expensive obstacle to transporting
double-stack railcars from Baltimore to Chicago. The tunnel regularly
causes passenger and freight train delays in the Baltimore area and beyond
because it is a single-track tunnel with insufficient clearance for
double- stack railcars on a double-track main line. Grades in and curves
near the Howard Street tunnel also contribute to congestion, constraining
freight traffic to 25 miles per hour through the tunnel. In addition,
during a fire in the tunnel in 2001, freight traffic was rerouted,
resulting in 18- to 36-hour delays.
Figure 3: Howard Street Tunnel (Baltimore, Maryland) West entrance (left)
and East entrance
Railroads Use Condition and Congestion Information with Other Information to
Prioritize Investment, Including Projects Designed to Address Deterioration and
Congestion
Freight railroad officials with whom we spoke consider information on
bridge and tunnel conditions and congestion, along with information on
demand, cost, and other factors, to set infrastructure maintenance and
investment priorities. According to all of the Class I railroad officials
with whom we spoke, maintaining or increasing safety is one of their
highest investment priorities, along with return on investment. Hence,
most Class I railroad officials with whom we spoke said the railroads
consider immediate safety concerns first, ongoing maintenance and asset
replacement next, and capacity expansion last when prioritizing bridge and
tunnel projects.
Bridge and tunnel rehabilitation or replacement is expensive, and the
costs are highly variable, depending on the complexity of the structure's
design, the length and location of the structure, the construction
materials, and the type of replacement structure. The cost of replacing a
bridge can range from $600,000 for a small timber trestle bridge on a
lightly trafficked Class III railroad line to $100 million to replace a
large steel bridge with a 2,500-foot moveable span located on a Class I
railroad's main line. See appendix II for more examples of railroad bridge
and tunnel costs. Because replacement costs are high, railroads prefer to
use asset extension programs and replace components rather than replacing
entire structures to address deterioration and extend the useful life of
their bridges and tunnels. Often, an individual component of a bridge may
deteriorate faster than other components; therefore, replacing the
component could significantly extend the life of the entire bridge.
Bridge and tunnel replacement is typically one of the last options
railroads choose to address infrastructure deterioration and mitigate
congestion. Railroads typically try to improve their processes before
enhancing infrastructure to mitigate congestion. Process improvements and
other strategies generally cost less and are more cost effective than
infrastructure enhancements. Class I railroads have used a number of
process improvements to mitigate congestion, including updating their
operating plans to reflect changes in business volume and traffic mix,
increasing train lengths and the number of fully loaded cars per train,
double-stacking trains, decreasing car cycle times, increasing service,
hiring more train crews, and using pricing strategies to shape demand.
When process improvements can no longer reduce congestion, railroads use
infrastructure enhancements to expand the capacity of their networks.
Infrastructure enhancements include adding sidings or track, expanding
yards and terminals, upgrading signal systems, and rehabilitating or
replacing bridges and tunnels. Per linear foot, bridge and tunnel
replacement costs more than other infrastructure improvements, as shown in
figure 4. Moreover, according to several Class I railroad representatives
with whom we spoke, bridge replacement typically has a lower return on
investment than other infrastructure improvements. Consequently, railroads
invest in other enhancements before rehabilitating or replacing bridges.
Figure 4: Range of Railroad Infrastructure Improvement Costs (Dollars in
thousands per linear foot)
aGenerally timber bridges are not being replaced with another timber
bridge, but rather they are being replaced by either culverts or bridges
with concrete and steel components. The low-end example represents a
timber bridge replaced by a culvert and the high-end example represents a
timber bridge replaced by a steel and concrete structure.
While bridge and tunnel work is expensive for all freight railroads,
railroads vary in their ability to make these investments. Class I
railroads generally have more resources than Class II and III railroads to
invest in bridge and tunnel inspection, maintenance, rehabilitation, and
replacement. According to AAR, in 2006, the seven Class I railroads spent
an average of $1.2 billion each for capital investments, while all the
Class II and III railroads surveyed by ASLRRA spent an average of over
$795,000 each in 2004. Class II and, to a greater extent, Class III
railroads face challenges in funding bridge and tunnel rehabilitation or
replacement efforts because they may have limited funds, lack in-house
bridge and tunnel expertise, and own bridges and tunnels purchased from
Class I railroads on lines that those railroads had disinvested in. When
repairs or improvements to bridges or tunnels are not financially feasible
for Class II or III railroads, the railroads may instead modify their
operations--by, for example, reducing train speeds over bridges or in
tunnels. According to ASLRRA, some railroads may even stop operating on
routes when bridge or tunnel repairs are both unavoidable and
unaffordable. As a result, according to FRA officials, fewer serious
problems are found on bridges and in tunnels owned by Class I railroads
than on bridges or in tunnels owned by smaller railroads. Nonetheless, in
response to several accidents caused by bridge failures, near accidents
involving bridges, and results from its bridge safety surveys, FRA is
developing a formal rail safety advisory on railroad bridges, to be
released in late 2007, that will urge all railroads to increase their
attention on bridge safety and bridge management programs.
The Federal Role in Overseeing Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Is Limited
Freight railroads are responsible for the structural safety of their
bridges and tunnels; moreover, the federal government does not regulate
railroad bridge and tunnel inspection requirements or conditions. In 1995,
after determining that railroads were already inspecting bridges according
to detailed industry standards, FRA decided to issue advisory guidelines
for railroad bridge management instead of regulations. Because FRA has
general authority over railroad infrastructure safety, it may make
observations of and assess bridge and tunnel conditions, but it does not
routinely inspect these structures to monitor their condition. FRA bridge
specialists may make observations while investigating complaints,
following up on track inspectors' concerns, and conducting bridge safety
surveys. If an FRA bridge specialist determines that there is a safety
problem, FRA attempts to work cooperatively with the railroad to correct
the problem rather than shut down the railroad's operations. FRA has taken
enforcement action to protect public safety when there is a documented
problem of immediate concern over a structure's stability. Other federal
agencies also have limited roles in railroad bridge and tunnel safety.
FRA's bridge safety oversight has evolved; however, bridge specialists
individually apply different criteria in their selection of railroads for
bridge safety surveys. FRA has not established a systematic, consistent
risk-based approach to selecting Class II and III railroads for bridge
safety surveys. As a result, FRA may not be selecting the railroads whose
bridges or tunnels are most likely to present safety issues.
Federal Railroad Bridge and Tunnel Safety Efforts Are Limited Because FRA Has
Determined That Railroads Are Sufficiently Ensuring Structural Stability
Historically, the federal role in railroad bridge and tunnel safety has
been narrow. The federal government does not routinely inspect railroad
bridges or tunnels and does not regulate their condition. After a highway
bridge collapsed in 1967, Congress debated instituting bridge inspection
standards that would apply to railroad bridges, but railroads were already
inspecting their bridges according to their established industry
standards. In 1968, Congress required national inspection standards for
highway bridges; however, current law does not regulate railroad bridge
conditions or establish inspection standards. Under the authority
originally granted to it by the Railroad Safety Act of 197021 to issue
safety regulations as necessary, from 1975 to 1981 FRA considered
establishing bridge safety regulations based on industry standards created
by the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance of Way Association.
However, according to FRA, these standards are actually recommendations
for a thorough bridge management program, including very detailed
specifications for particular types of bridges, rather than minimum
inspection standards. In light of the industry's detailed safety standards
and the low frequency of accidents caused by structural conditions on
bridges or in tunnels, FRA determined that regulating bridge or tunnel
structural conditions or requiring inspections would not be cost-effective
to FRA when considering the cost of implementation and enforcement.
Additionally, while establishing minimum standards might improve some
railroads' structural management policies and procedures, it could also
influence some railroads to reduce the frequency or effectiveness of their
inspections.
FRA observes and assesses bridge and tunnel conditions, but does not
inspect these structures to regulate their condition. Although FRA does
not regulate bridge and tunnel conditions, it does regulate track
conditions, and it uses track inspectors, as well as bridge specialists,
to identify potential bridge and tunnel safety issues. Historically, FRA
track personnel have overseen bridge and tunnel safety.22 Under the
authority originally granted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970,
an FRA track inspector may take action to address a structural concern
identified on a bridge or in a tunnel, such as a visible crack in a steel
beam, to ensure the safety of the public and railroad employees.
Additionally, in 1992, FRA's Office of Safety established the position of
Bridge Engineer (currently filled by FRA's Chief Structural Engineer) to
assist track personnel in identifying and resolving issues of bridge
structural integrity and to oversee standards regulating the safety of
railroad bridge workers.23 After completing a bridge survey in 1993, FRA
concluded that most railroads were inspecting bridges to a higher standard
than would be required by any FRA-issued minimum standards, which prompted
FRA to issue guidelines for bridge management rather than regulations. In
1995, FRA began implementing these guidelines as part of its Bridge Safety
Assurance Program. FRA has hired five full-time bridge specialists since
2000 to implement this program.24 These specialists provide expertise to
track personnel and work with them to relieve some of the track
personnel's inspection workload related to railroad structures as well as
carry out other activities to promote bridge safety. Besides the Chief
Structural Engineer, the program now includes one bridge specialist at FRA
headquarters25 and four bridge specialists in the field. Each field bridge
specialist is responsible for all of the passenger and freight railroad
infrastructure in two FRA regions and one or two Class I railroads (whose
infrastructure usually spans multiple FRA regions). In addition to
addressing bridge structural concerns, FRA bridge specialists address
tunnel structural concerns. However, FRA's involvement in tunnels is not
as extensive as its involvement in bridges, since bridges are more
affected by stress from trains moving over them than tunnels are from
trains moving through them.26 In addition, there are many more railroad
bridges in the United States than there are tunnels.
21The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 has been codified at 49 U.S.C.
Chapter 201. Applicable civil and criminal penalties are found at 49
U.S.C. Chapter 213.
22Prior to 1981, regional track engineers oversaw bridges and tunnels, but
by 1982 FRA had reclassified these employees as safety specialists.
Engineering qualifications are not required for this revised role, and
incoming safety specialists sometimes lacked the bridge and tunnel
knowledge of the previous regional track engineers.
2349 C.F.R. SS214.101-214.117. Bridge worker safety regulations include
provisions such as requirements for railroads to provide personal
protective equipment and for railroad workers to use fall protection
systems when necessary.
24FRA also has a position for a second Structural Engineer in the Office
of Safety Headquarters. The position has been vacant for several months,
and FRA is presently recruiting a successor.
25The bridge specialist at FRA headquarters is not assigned to particular
railroads or regions. The specialist works with field specialists on
larger investigations that require two or more persons. The specialist
also coordinates complaint investigations and other issues that come
through FRA headquarters, and conducts training for bridge specialists and
FRA track and signal inspectors.
26The forces caused by the weight and movement of a train through a tunnel
are distributed through the supporting bedrock or stable ground. By
contrast, individual bridge components experience direct stress from a
passing train. Therefore, bridges are more subject to degradation from
heavier loads than are tunnels.
In observing bridge conditions, FRA bridge specialists use FRA advisory
guidelines for railroad bridge management programs.27 These guidelines
recommend, among other things, that organizations responsible for the
safety of a bridge ensure that a qualified engineer determines the
weight-bearing capability of a bridge; collect bridge design,
construction, maintenance, and repair records; and have a competent
inspector periodically inspect structures. The guidelines do not pertain
to tunnels or other types of structures on railroad property. FRA
encourages, but does not require, that railroads comply with these
guidelines because the railroads are responsible for inspecting,
maintaining, and ensuring the safety of bridges and tunnels that carry
their track. However, when a bridge or tunnel owner fails to resolve a
structural problem, FRA can use legal means, including emergency orders,
to ensure safety.28
Federal Enforcement of Bridge and Tunnel Structural Safety Is Primarily Limited
to Addressing Immediate Safety Concerns
FRA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the safety
and structural integrity of railroad bridges and tunnels. FRA bridge
specialists perform both enforcement and nonregulatory activities aimed at
ensuring the safety of railroad structures. Other federal agencies have
more limited roles in railroad bridge and tunnel safety related to their
particular missions.
FRA bridge specialists play a number of roles29 intended to promote bridge
and tunnel safety, most of which involve responding to identified safety
issues. One of their principal roles is to alert FRA's Chief Structural
Engineer when they encounter an immediate bridge or tunnel safety concern
so that an emergency order may be issued if necessary. These safety
concerns may be identified in response to a track inspector's findings, in
response to an accident or a complaint, or through independent observation
of a railroad's bridges or tunnels. Each bridge specialist has numerous
safety responsibilities as part of the Bridge Safety Assurance Program. In
particular, the FRA bridge specialists are involved in the following
activities:
27FRA's bridge inspection guidelines, issued in 2000, can be found in the
Statement of Agency Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges 49 C.F.R.
S213, app. C.
2849 C.F.R. SS216.21 - 216.27.
29FRA bridge specialists also have the authority to enforce FRA track
safety standards and bridge worker safety regulations.
o Enforcement. If a bridge specialist notices a track defect on or
near a bridge or tunnel, the specialist typically first recommends
remedial actions, such as a reduction in train speeds over the
affected track segment. If conditions warrant, the FRA
Administrator may issue an emergency order. However, FRA prefers
to seek cooperative solutions with railroads and has issued only
three emergency orders for bridges and none for tunnels since
1970.
o Accident Investigation. When an accident occurs on a bridge or
in a tunnel, one or more bridge specialists may conduct an on-site
investigation. In the case of a bridge or tunnel structural
failure, the bridge specialist may identify the individual
component that caused the failure, although the entire structure
may need to be replaced after the accident (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: Structural Failure of a Bridge in Mississippi
o Complaint Investigation. Bridge specialists are responsible for
addressing and investigating almost all formal complaints
concerning bridges and tunnels filed by the general public,
Members of Congress, and railroad employees. According to FRA,
most formal bridge complaints from the public are related to
aesthetic issues rather than the stability or safety of a
structure. Bridge specialists may also conduct structural
evaluations in response to concerns identified by FRA track
personnel or as part of a complaint investigation.
o Monitoring Compliance Agreements. In response to systemic safety
concerns that FRA identifies on a railroad through the bridge
specialists' or track personnel's activities, FRA may work with
the railroad to implement a compliance agreement to improve safety
across the entire railroad. FRA often initiates a compliance
agreement to avoid issuing an emergency order for the railroad to
cease operations on a bridge. FRA has found that compliance
agreements can be an effective tool to address systemic weaknesses
in a railroad's bridge management practices, while emergency
orders usually address serious safety problems on specific bridge
structures.
o Training. At FRA conferences, the bridge specialists teach FRA
track inspectors about bridge conditions. This training supports
communication between FRA track staff and bridge specialists and
is designed to increase the number of FRA personnel that can
detect immediate safety concerns on bridges.
o Conducting Bridge Safety Surveys. During a bridge safety survey,
a bridge specialist interviews railroad bridge staff and uses FRA
guidelines as criteria for reviewing a railroad's bridge
management policies, procedures, and records. After reviewing the
railroad's records and policies, the bridge specialist observes a
sample of the railroad's bridges and compares the results of the
sample observation with the railroad's bridge inspection reports
to determine the inspection reports' reliability. The bridge
specialist documents the findings and follows up with the railroad
to document any necessary repairs to structures or improvements to
bridge management procedures.
Besides FRA, several federal agencies have responsibilities related to
railroad bridges and tunnels in areas such as security and clearance for
maritime traffic. Within DHS, TSA has issued freight railroad security
action items in cooperation with the railroad industry, but compliance
with these action items is voluntary. Much as FRA monitors compliance with
its guidelines, TSA security inspectors assess a railroad's compliance
with TSA's action items and may make recommendations if the railroad does
not comply with certain items. Additionally, TSA issued a proposed rule in
December 2006 that would require freight railroads and other
transportation entities to allow TSA and DHS to enter, inspect, and test
property, facilities, and records relevant to railroad security. Also
within DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for overseeing all bridges
over navigable waterways and for assessing obstructions to maritime
traffic. The Coast Guard regulates movable bridge schedules and prescribes
bridge lighting for navigational safety. Within the DOD, the
Transportation Engineering Agency designates STRACNET, a network of
railroad lines that form the minimum railroad network required to meet the
transportation needs of the military. The Transportation Engineering
Agency does not directly oversee the condition of bridges or tunnels on
this network.
FRA Is Not Using a Systematic, Consistent, Risk-Based Methodology to Target
Bridge Safety Surveys to Class II and III Railroads
FRA's field bridge specialists monitor bridges and tunnels in a large area
and have not been able to assess the bridge policies or the bridges and
tunnels of many of the Class II or Class III railroads in the specialists'
assigned areas. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the railroads share
information on the condition of their bridges and tunnels with the federal
government selectively. As a result, the structural conditions of some
bridges and tunnels and the practices used to inspect and maintain them,
particularly on Class III railroads, are largely unknown to the federal
government. According to ASLRRA, there are 549 Class II and III railroads
in the United States. Although FRA has conducted bridge safety surveys on
all of the Class I railroads, FRA officials estimate that they have
conducted, on average, approximately 25 to 35 bridge safety surveys per
year on Class II and III railroads since the introduction of the field
bridge specialists in 2004. As we mentioned earlier, our analysis of FRA's
completed bridge safety surveys during this period showed that some of the
surveyed Class II and III railroads had sound bridge management practices
and records, but most did not. The limited number of bridge safety surveys
that the FRA bridge specialists have been able to accomplish relative to
the number of Class II and III railroads could indicate potential bridge
and tunnel safety concerns on railroads that FRA has not surveyed.
According to FRA, the goal of the Bridge Safety Assurance Program is not
to monitor all railroads, but rather to identify railroads whose bridge
management policies and bridge conditions may lead to safety threats.
However, the FRA bridge specialists do not select Class II and III
railroads for bridge safety surveys using a consistent methodology based
on a comprehensive, prioritized assessment of safety issues that could
focus FRA's inspection and enforcement resources on those railroads that
could have the greatest safety risks. Each field bridge specialist uses
individually developed criteria, based on personal experience and other
available information--such as whether a railroad's bridges carry
passenger traffic--to help identify Class II and III railroads as
candidates for bridge safety surveys. This is in contrast to how FRA
implements its National Inspection Plan to target inspections of other
railroad safety areas. This plan provides guidance to each FRA regional
office on how its inspectors should divide their work, by railroad and by
state, on the basis of trend analyses of available accident, inspection,
and other data. Before implementing this plan, FRA had a less structured,
less consistent, and less data driven approach to planning inspections,
under which each region prepared its own inspection plan, on the basis of
judgments and available data. The use of data was not consistent from
region to region, and individual inspectors had greater discretion to
select sites for inspection using their own knowledge of their inspection
territories.
In our previous work, we have noted that risk management can help to
improve safety by systematically identifying and assessing risks
associated with various safety hazards, prioritizing them so that
resources may be allocated to address the highest risk first, and ensuring
that the most appropriate alternatives to prevent or mitigate the effects
of hazards are designed and implemented.30 FRA's safety oversight role in
other areas, such as operating practices and track, includes inspections
that focus on compliance with minimum standards; however, these
inspections do not attempt to determine how well railroads are managing
safety risks on their systems. In contrast, by examining how railroads
manage safety risks during its bridge safety surveys, FRA is, in part,
addressing risk-management issues, even though it has not established a
systematic, risk-based methodology to select Class II and III railroads
that may need additional oversight. For example, one bridge specialist is
contacting all Class III railroads in one region to obtain specific
information on their bridge management policies, such as whether a
railroad has regular inspections by a qualified civil engineer and how the
railroad records and uses the bridge inspection data, to better identify
railroads for bridge safety surveys. Additionally, FRA's Chief Structural
Engineer is considering a research project that would use new technology
to measure the stress trains inflict on timber bridges. If this project
were implemented, FRA would analyze stress data that might indicate bridge
problems and a need for monitoring problematic bridges.
30GAO, Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking Steps to
Better Target Its Oversight, but Assessment of Results Is Needed to
Determine Impact, [39]GAO-07-149 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007), p. 35.
Federal Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Typically Not
Targeted to Maximize National Benefits, Whereas Some State and Private
Investments Are Strategically Targeted
Federal, state, and local governments make limited investments in freight
railroad infrastructure, including bridges and tunnels, in an effort to
enhance the public benefits associated with freight and passenger
transportation. However, federal investments in all modes of
freight-related infrastructure are not aligned with a national freight
policy or with a strategic federal freight transportation plan. DOT has
developed a draft Framework for a National Freight Policy, but it lacks a
strategic federal component that specifies federal goals, roles, and
revenue sources and funding mechanisms. In contrast, some states structure
their investments in freight railroad infrastructure to produce public
benefits at the state and local levels, and some public-private
partnerships have facilitated investments designed to produce public and
private benefits. Freight congestion and demand are expected to increase,
and given the highly constrained fiscal environment, the federal
government may be challenged to increase the efficiency of the national
multimodal freight transportation system.
Federal Funding for Freight Railroad Infrastructure Is Not Guided by a National
Freight Strategy and Is Generally Not Targeted to Maximize National Benefits
While the private sector is largely responsible for investing in the
freight railroad infrastructure that it owns and maintains--an estimated
$9 billion during calendar year 2006--the federal government invests some
public funds in this infrastructure as well--an estimated $263 million
during fiscal year 2006. The federal government funds freight railroad
infrastructure investments through the General Fund and the Highway Trust
Fund, and funding mechanisms include loans, grants (such as formula grants
and legislative earmarks), and tax expenditures (such as tax credits).
However, these funding mechanisms are (1) targeted toward individual
transportation modes and address different transportation safety and
economic issues, (2) are administered by different agencies that have
different missions, and (3) are not coordinated by a strategic federal
multimodal freight transportation policy to maximize specific national
public freight transportation benefits31 (see table 1). For example, in
accordance with its mission to protect maritime economic interests, the
U.S. Coast Guard administers the Truman-Hobbs program to alter railroad
and highway bridges that obstruct maritime traffic (see fig. 6).32 While
this program can enhance maritime, railroad, and highway freight mobility,
it is targeted toward maritime traffic and is not coordinated with other
DOT freight mobility investments.
31Potential public benefits of public investment in freight railroad
transportation include supporting economic development, enhancing
transportation system efficiency, improving mobility and decreasing
congestion, improving the environment and air quality, and enhancing
safety and security. On a national scale, these benefits could accrue to
regions of national interest whose freight flows impact multiple states,
large urban areas, and international gateways.
Table 1: Examples of Federal Funding Mechanisms That Support Freight
Railroad Infrastructure
Funding Revenue
mechanism source Example Federal agency
Loan General Fund RRIF loans can be used by FRA
railroads, state and local
governments, and other
entities to finance certain
activities such as track and
bridge rehabilitation.
Granta General Fund The Truman-Hobbs program U.S. Coast Guard
funds the alteration of
railroad and highway bridges
that are deemed hazards to
maritime navigation.
Highway Legislative earmarks have Federal Highway
Trust Fund been used to fund federally Administration
designated Projects of
National and Regional
Significance that include
railroad components, such as
the Heartland Corridor
Project, which will increase
tunnel clearances to
accommodate double-stacked
trains.
Tax expenditure General Fund The Railroad Track Internal Revenue
revenue Maintenance Credit is Service
forgone available to Class II and
III railroads for 50 percent
of their qualified track
maintenance expenses during
a taxable year.
Source: GAO analysis of programmatic and fiscal year 2006 financial data
from FHWA, FRA, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Joint Committee on Taxation.
aExamples of other federal grant programs that also fund, to some extent,
freight railroad infrastructure investments include High Priority
Projects, Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality, Transportation
Improvements, Public Lands Highways, and Railway-Highway Crossings
(Section 130).
3233 C.F.R. SS116.01. Alterations may include structural changes,
replacement, or removal of a bridge.
Figure 6: Barge Navigating through the Narrow Channel of a Moveable
Railroad Bridge Eligible for Truman-Hobbs Funding on the Mississippi River
in Iowa
Today's federal investments in freight railroad infrastructure are not
guided by a clear federal freight strategy. In 2006, DOT attempted to move
beyond the traditional modal approach to freight transportation by
developing a draft Framework for a National Freight Policy, which, among
other things, incorporates some previously established federal freight
railroad infrastructure funding mechanisms. Although this draft Framework
represents an important step toward developing a national intermodal
freight transportation policy, it does not go far enough, in our view,
toward delineating a clear federal role and strategy for carrying out that
policy. DOT describes its draft Framework as a living document and
emphasizes that the nation's freight transportation challenges are of such
a nature and magnitude that governments at all levels and the private
sector must work together to address them. We agree, and we note that as
the draft Framework evolves, DOT and other stakeholders will have an
opportunity to clarify their respective freight strategies.
As we have reported, the federal approach to a given transportation
strategy should include clearly and consistently defined goals, roles,
revenue sources, and funding mechanisms to ensure that federal investments
in the nation's intermodal freight transportation infrastructure will
maximize national public benefits.33 DOT's draft Framework sets forth some
"objectives" for freight transportation, together with strategies and
tactics for achieving them; acknowledges that a variety of public and
private stakeholders play important roles in freight transportation; and
identifies some funding mechanisms and other tools that the federal
government can use to support freight infrastructure. However, in some
instances, these objectives are vague, and federal and other stakeholders'
roles and funding mechanisms are not clearly and consistently defined. For
example, one DOT draft Framework objective is to "add physical capacity to
the freight transportation system in places where investment makes
economic sense," with supporting strategies and tactics that include
focusing on facilitating regionally based solutions for freight gateways
and projects of national or regional significance and utilizing and
promoting new and expanded financing tools, such as RRIF, to incentivize
private sector investment. To implement this objective, DOT would need to
define "economic sense" and develop criteria--as the draft Framework
says--to identify specific freight gateways and projects of national or
regional significance; and determine whether federal revenues should be
used to help subsidize any project components and, if so, which federal
funding mechanisms would be most appropriate.
As we have also reported, federal investments should be directed to
maximize national public benefits. Allocating benefits and their costs
among beneficiaries is difficult34 and may be subject to interpretation.
Hence, it will be important for DOT to define national benefits and to
establish criteria for determining whether federal investments are
warranted. DOT's draft Framework suggests, but does not explicitly
identify as such, certain criteria for federal investment, such as a
project's national or regional significance, opportunities to incentivize
more private investment in transportation infrastructure, and
opportunities to leverage private and other public funds to add freight
transportation capacity.
Without a federal freight strategy, the existing federal freight funding
mechanisms are not designed to maximize national public benefits. For
example, although all railroads may apply for RRIF loans, the only freight
railroads that have been awarded loans have been Class II and III
railroads, whose operations tend to be more regional and local. Also, the
Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Section 130 grant program mainly
benefits localities by improving or eliminating railroad-highway grade
crossings and the public safety benefits of the program are more local
than national. Benefits from the Truman-Hobbs program's investments
directly accrue primarily to private maritime shipping and secondarily to
railroad companies by improving each mode's infrastructure, thereby
enhancing the efficiency of freight transportation. On the other hand,
depending on the project, legislative earmarks can generate public and
private benefits that could be national, regional, and local in scope;
however, these projects do not compete for funding against other
alternatives. For example, through the Projects of National and Regional
Significance program, Congress earmarked funds to support the Chicago
Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency (CREATE) project, which
is mainly designed to reduce railroad congestion in the nation's largest
railroad hub35--the effects of which, among other things, could improve
the mobility of the national freight railroad network, improve local
commuter railroad service, and reduce railroad-highway grade crossing
hazards and congestion. Finally, Class II and III railroads can use the
Railroad Track Maintenance Credit--a tax credit--to offset capital
investment expenditures, but as previously stated, individual Class II and
III railroad operations tend to benefit the private and local sectors more
than the nation as a whole.
33 [40]GAO-02-1033 , p. 17 and [41]GAO-07-15 , p. 90.
34GAO, Highway and Transit Investments: Options for Improving Information
on Projects' Benefits and Costs and Increasing Accountability for Results,
[42]GAO-05-172 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2005).
Some State Investments in Freight Railroad Infrastructure Are Targeted to
Achieve State and Local Benefits
In contrast to the federal government, some states that invest in freight
railroads administer various goal-oriented and criteria-based programs
that are funded through a mixture of state and federal resources
specifically to produce anticipated state and local benefits. Some states
have been helping short line railroads maintain track in their
jurisdictions for almost 20 years. For example, the Tennessee DOT provides
approximately $8 million in grants annually to 18 of 20 Class III
railroads in the state to fund track and bridge work, including bridge
inspections and rehabilitation projects. As we have previously reported,
governments at all levels--including states--have increasingly been
providing support for freight railroad improvement projects that offer
potential public benefits, and over 30 states have published freight plans
that describe their goals and approach to freight-related investments.36
The scope of state-administered freight railroad programs includes
railroad infrastructure improvements, construction of intermodal
facilities, elimination of public railroad-highway grade crossings, and
inspection of bridges. For example, the Pennsylvania DOT administers a
matching grant program--funded at $10.5 million as of October 2006--to
support freight railroad maintenance and construction costs; and eligible
recipients include freight railroads, transportation organizations,
municipalities, municipal authorities, and other eligible users of freight
railroad infrastructure.
35One-third of all freight railroad traffic in the United States
originates, terminates, or passes through the Chicago area.
Officials from three of the nine state DOTs whom we interviewed are
developing and implementing multimodal freight policies. However, such
initiatives may be limited by state and federal funding criteria that
restrict most state transportation spending to highway infrastructure. As
we have reported, efforts to improve freight mobility are hampered by the
highly compartmentalized structure and funding of federal transportation
programs--often by transportation mode--that gives state and local
transportation agencies little incentive to systematically compare the
trade-offs between investing in different transportation alternatives to
meet mobility needs because funding is tied to certain programs or types
of projects.37 Officials from several state agencies and oversight
organizations whom we interviewed stated that funding available for
freight projects, regardless of mode, would be more useful than
"stovepiped" funding that would be available only for investment in
certain transportation modes.
Officials at six of the state agencies and oversight organizations whom we
interviewed administer freight railroad programs that have identified
programmatic goals, eligibility criteria, and funding sources aimed at
generating state and local benefits. For example, officials from the
Kansas DOT told us that the goals of its loan program for local and
regional railroads are to improve railroad lines, enhance railroads'
customer service to shippers, limit the number of trucks on highways, and
increase state and local economic vitality by transporting local
agricultural products. While officials from some state agencies that we
interviewed acknowledged that public benefits are difficult to quantify
for any public investments, six state agencies and oversight organizations
we interviewed were trying to quantify them. For example, the Kansas DOT
sponsored a study which found that the short line railroad system saves
the state an estimated $49 million annually in pavement damage costs.
36GAO, Freight Railroads: Industry Health Has Improved, but Concerns about
Competition and Capacity Should Be Addressed, [43]GAO-07-94 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 6, 2006), p. 59.
37For example, while passenger and freight travel occurs on all modes,
federal funding and planning requirements focus largely on highways and
transit, making it difficult for freight projects to be integrated into
the transportation system. See GAO, Freight Transportation: Short Sea
Shipping Option Shows Importance of Systematic Approach to Public
Investment Decisions, [44]GAO-05-768 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005), p.
35.
The scope of state freight railroad programs may be either broad,
including infrastructure investments of all kinds for railroads of all
sizes, or narrow, focusing on eligible projects and award recipients. For
example, the Pennsylvania DOT has two broad grant programs for freight
railroads and shippers, both of which may be used to fund maintenance and
new construction projects. In contrast, the Tennessee DOT makes funds
available specifically to Class III railroads by allocating funds for
track and bridge rehabilitation. State freight railroad initiatives have
supported investments in track rehabilitation and other infrastructure
improvements, railroad acquisition and line preservation assistance,
intermodal facility construction and increased industrial access to
railroads, and road and railroad-highway crossing safety enhancements.
Some of the state entities we interviewed reported using a number of
funding mechanisms for their freight railroad programs. Specifically, 6 of
the 12 said they provide grants and long-term below-market rate loans, and
one state reported issuing tax-exempt bonds. Some of these states require
that entities applying for loans or grants secure matching funds. States
fund freight railroad programs through state general funds, user fees,
federal Section 130 and other grants, and other sources. Some states have
taken an innovative approach to funding freight railroad infrastructure.
For example, Tennessee created a user-fee based Transportation Equity Fund
to support investments in nonhighway infrastructure, including short line
freight railroad track and bridge rehabilitation. The fund is financed
through the revenue from state sales taxes on diesel fuel paid by
railroad, air, and water transportation modes; and the portion available
for the Tennessee Short Line Railroad Rehabilitation Track and Bridge
grant program is typically $7 million to $8 million annually. The
program's purpose is to preserve freight railroad service and thereby
contribute to the state's economic development. Construction grants are
funded at a 90 percent state and 10 percent local (nonstate) matching
share. Each grant can be matched with in-kind work, cash contributions or
both.
Public-Private Partnerships Have Supported Some Freight Railroad Investments
Designed to Produce Both Public and Private Benefits
States, localities, and railroads have used public-private partnerships as
a strategic approach to develop freight-related transportation solutions
that benefit both sectors.38 In using this approach to resolve freight
issues, public and private participants of the partnerships we reviewed
identified common goals, individual roles, and funding sources and
mechanisms, which have affected partnership outcomes. In some cases, these
partnerships have supported railroad bridge and tunnel projects. A
well-structured partnership balances the various strengths, limitations,
and respective contributions of both the public sector--federal, state,
local, and regional--and private sector participants in order to secure
specific public and private freight-related benefits.
Both the public and the private sectors have initiated freight railroad
public-private partnerships. For example, according to AASHTO
representatives we interviewed, in 2002 the Delaware DOT approached a
Class I railroad to reopen the Shellpot Bridge, which had been out of
service since 1994. The state associated the abandonment of this bridge
with increased congestion on the Northeast Corridor and saw it as a threat
to the competitiveness of the Port of Wilmington in attracting freight
traffic. The state and the railroad jointly developed the project's goals,
roles, and funding mechanisms. The state agreed to finance the
approximately $13.5 million cost of restoring the bridge by contributing
$5 million in state grant appropriations and funding the remainder by
issuing tax-exempt bonds. The railroad agreed to compensate the state over
a 20-year period by paying a fee for each train car that uses the bridge.
In another public-private partnership, members of the Kansas City Terminal
Railway Company39and their project designer approached the state of
Missouri and the Unified Government of Kansas City/Wyandotte County,
Kansas, to propose assisting in financing the construction of two flyovers
and the rehabilitation of a bridge. The purpose of these three
infrastructure improvement projects was to separate freight trains from
different railroads at several points where they came together to form
what amounted to four-way stops for trains in the Kansas City region and
caused a significant chokepoint on the U.S. freight railroad network (see
fig. 7). The railroads had already determined the goals of their proposed
public-private partnership and came to the bargaining table with proposed
roles and funding mechanisms. The railroads acknowledged that they could
pursue the project using strictly private market resources; however, a
wholly private project would have taken longer to complete. The state and
county saw value in relieving their communities of the grade-crossing
congestion this chokepoint caused, determined the project risk was
acceptable, and each agreed to issue tax-exempt bonds that totaled over
$190 million, which will be repaid by the railroads through user fees. In
both the Delaware and Kansas City cases, the entities that initiated the
partnership brought well-defined goals, identified stakeholder roles, and
guaranteed a set amount of funding to the public-private partnership over
a period of years.
38For purposes of this report, a public-private partnership is a strategy
that public and private entities mutually agree to use to implement a
specific freight railroad project or group of projects. Some
representatives of state DOTs and railroads told us that they consider any
investment that is supported by public and private funds, such as a grade
crossing or siding project, to be a public-private partnership.
39The Kansas City Terminal Railway Company is made up of four Class I and
one Class II railroads that meet in Kansas City, Missouri.
Figure 7: Kansas City Flyovers
Public-private partnerships can make funds available and define goals and
roles for all stakeholders for large, expensive freight railroad projects
when it is difficult for a public or private entity to fund the entire
project on its own, or when a project is not part of a railroad's
strategic plan, but would be beneficial to a locality's or a region's
quality of life. For example, public and private players bring various
strengths and limitations to the partnerships. The private sector often
can bring a more global view of freight needs to the project planning
process, help identify and implement projects, contribute significant
funds, and promote efficient use of infrastructure. The public sector can
offer various public financing tools, such as low-interest loans and
private activity bonds,40 to create incentives for private investments in
freight railroads that would not otherwise be made and to generate
anticipated public benefits.
Public-private partnerships also present certain challenges. As we heard
from both public and private freight railroad stakeholders, the extent to
which the public sector can engage the private sector, identify
anticipated public benefits from railroad investments, and provide funding
that is commensurate with those benefits, affects partnership outcomes.
Our past work has shown that an integral part of public-private
partnerships is ensuring that sound analytical approaches are being
applied locally and meaningful data are available, not only to evaluate
and prioritize infrastructure investments but also to determine whether
public support is justified in light of a wide array of social and
economic costs and benefits.41 Moreover, as private entities that own most
of the nation's railroad infrastructure, freight railroads typically have
not worked with the public sector because of concerns about the
requirements and regulations associated with federal funding.42 These
railroads need to be convinced that a proposed infrastructure project will
yield financial returns for the company. Still another challenge is to
reconcile the lengthy planning and construction time associated with
public infrastructure projects with the shorter planning and investment
horizons of private companies.
40Qualified private activity bonds are tax-exempt bonds issued by a state
or local government, the proceeds of which are used for a defined
qualified purpose by an entity other than the government issuing the
bonds.
41GAO, Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning and
Financing Limitations, [45]GAO-04-165 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003),
p. 5.
42GAO, Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment Decisions,
[46]GAO-04-744 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004), p. 32.
Growing Freight Congestion and Demands May Challenge the Federal Government to
Strategically Invest Limited Funds to Maximize National Public Benefits
Overcoming congestion and improving mobility is one of the biggest
transportation challenges facing the nation. Congestion increases delays
and creates economic losses that cost Americans roughly $200 billion a
year, according to DOT estimates.43 As we have previously reported,
increases in freight traffic on all modes over the next 10 to 15 years are
expected to put greater strain on ports, highways, airports, and
railroads.44 In addition, we have found that this increase in freight
transportation demand seems to be particularly acute on highways, since
trucks transport over 70 percent of all freight tonnage nationally and
freight truck traffic on urban highways more than doubled from 1993
through 2001. The increased congestion, coupled with long lead times for
completing infrastructure projects (5 to 15 years), may put pressure on
all stakeholders, including the federal government, to find other more
effective investments to increase freight mobility.
Increasing the capacity of the nation's freight railroad network could be
one way to meet future growth in freight transportation demand. However,
as mentioned previously, aging railroad bridges and tunnels present
physical constraints to meeting this projected increased demand for
freight railroad transportation on key routes, thereby constraining
capacity. For example, as we previously mentioned, 100-year-old bridges
and tunnels that are currently in use--such as the moveable bridge over
the Mississippi River and the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore--create
chokepoints on the freight railroad network due to their operating
conditions or outdated design. Currently, freight railroads are investing
billions of dollars in freight railroad infrastructure to increase
capacity, but because they invest in projects that will maintain or
increase safety or provide the highest return on its investment, other
investments may take priority over their most expensive pieces of
infrastructure, bridges and tunnels. In addition, we have found that the
railroads' long-term ability to meet the projected growth in demand for
freight railroad transportation is uncertain, which may increase pressure
for public investment in private railroad infrastructure.
As we have previously reported, Congress is likely to receive further
requests for funding and face additional decisions about how to invest in
the nation's freight railroad infrastructure.45 However, Congress's
ability to respond to these requests may be limited by (1) federal funding
constraints and increased demand for infrastructure investment in other
transportation modes, (2) differences in federal funding for different
transportation modes, and (3) the lack of a strategic federal freight
transportation plan to guide federal investments in freight transportation
infrastructure.
43GAO, Performance and Accountability: Transportation Challenges Facing
Congress and the DOT, [47]GAO-07-545T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007), p.
7.
44 [48]GAO-07-545T , p. 11.
Revenue from current federal transportation sources may not be
sustainable. Because revenue from traditional transportation funding
mechanisms such as the Highway Trust Fund may not keep pace with the
increase in transportation demand, we designated transportation financing
as a high-risk area in January 2007.46 The recently enacted transportation
funding authorization, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act - A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), is expected
to outstrip the growth in trust fund receipts. As a result, the Department
of the Treasury and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are forecasting
that the trust fund balance will steadily decline and be negative by the
end of fiscal year 2011. In addition, the nation's long-term fiscal
challenges will constrain decision makers' ability to use other funding
mechanisms, such as grants and tax expenditures, for transportation needs.
Differences in federal funding for different transportation modes have
created a competitive disadvantage for freight railroads. Because the
federal government has an interest in an efficient national freight
transportation system, the federal role in freight transportation needs to
recognize that the freight transportation system encompasses many modes
that operate in a competitive marketplace and are owned, funded, and
operated by both the private and the public sectors. However, current
federal transportation policy treats each freight transportation mode
differently, thereby creating competitive advantages for some modes over
others. For example, trucking companies and barges use infrastructure that
is owned and maintained by the government, while railroads use
infrastructure that they pay taxes on, own, and maintain. Trucking and
barge companies pay fees and taxes for the government-funded
infrastructure they use, but their payments generally do not cover the
costs they impose on highways and waterways. The federal subsidy that
makes up the difference between the government's costs and users' payments
gives trucking and barge companies a competitive advantage over the
railroads.47 CBO has observed that if all modes do not pay their full
costs, the result is inefficient use of roads and waterways and greater
government spending than otherwise would be necessary if capacity
investments are made in anticipation of demand that does not occur.
45 [49]GAO-07-94 , p. 5.
46 [50]GAO-07-310 , p. 16.
Examining Critical Questions and Implementing a Framework That Identifies Goals,
Stakeholder Roles, Revenue Sources, and Funding Mechanisms Could Guide a Federal
Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments
As noted earlier in this report, the federal government lacks a strategic
freight transportation plan to guide its involvement in freight-related
capital infrastructure investments. DOT's draft Framework for a National
Freight Policy represents an initial step toward such a plan, but it
assumes a federal role without indicating whether federal involvement is
appropriate or, when appropriate, what the goals of federal investment
should be, what specific roles the federal government and other
stakeholders should play, and what federal revenue sources and funding
mechanisms should be used to support freight-related investments. As we
have previously reported, critical factors and questions can be used as
criteria for determining the appropriateness of a federal role and a
framework with components that we believe would be helpful in guiding any
future federal freight-related investments. Implementing this GAO
framework would include setting national goals for federal investment in
freight-related infrastructure, clearly defining federal and other
stakeholder roles, and identifying sustainable revenue sources and
cost-effective funding mechanisms that can be applied to maximize the
national public benefits of federal investments.
GAO's Critical Questions and Framework Could Guide Future Federal Investment in
Freight-Related Infrastructure
In light of the federal government's long-term fiscal imbalance, it is
important for federal policy makers to determine how the federal
government can support efficient, mode-neutral, transparent, and
sustainable investments in freight-related infrastructure. In our report
on 21st century challenges facing the federal government, we defined
critical factors and questions that are useful as criteria for determining
the appropriate federal role in a government program, policy, function, or
activity.48 These critical factors and questions are designed to address
the legislative basis for a program, its purpose and continued relevance,
its effectiveness in achieving goals and outcomes, its efficiency and
targeting, its affordability and sustainability, and its management. The
factors and questions can be used as criteria for determining the
appropriateness of federal involvement in freight-related transportation,
including freight railroad projects, as shown in table 2.
47 [51]GAO-07-94 , p. 62.
Table 2: GAO's Critical Factors and Questions for Determining the
Appropriateness of a Federal Role in Freight-Related Transportation
Factors Questions
Relevance and purpose of Are some freight transportation issues of
the federal role nationwide interest? If so, is a federal role
warranted based on the likely failure of private
markets or state and local governments to address
underlying freight problems or concerns? Does
current federal involvement in freight
infrastructure encourage or discourage the
private and other public sectors from investing
their own resources to address the problem?
Measuring success Do current federal funding mechanisms and
programs for freight-related infrastructure have
outcome-based performance measures and are all
applicable costs and benefits considered?
Targeting benefits Are current funding mechanisms for
freight-related infrastructure targeted to
generate national benefits in areas with the
greatest needs and the least capacity to meet
those needs?
Affordability and cost Do current revenue sources and funding mechanisms
effectiveness for federal freight-related infrastructure
encourage state and local governments and the
private sector to invest their own resources? Are
these revenue sources sustainable and are the
funding mechanisms affordable in the long term?
Do these funding mechanisms use the most
cost-effective or net beneficial approaches when
compared with other tools and program designs?
Source: GAO.
If federal policy makers determine that there is an appropriate role for
the federal government in freight infrastructure investments, including
those related to railroads, the implementation of that role should have
several components. From our past work on transportation investment--in
such areas as intercity passenger rail, intermodal transportation, and
marine transportation--we have defined a systematic framework that can
also guide the implementation of any future federal role in
freight-related infrastructure investments.49 Our framework's components
include setting national goals, establishing clear stakeholder roles, and
providing sustainable funding (see table 3).
48GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, [52]GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005), p. 14.
49See [53]GAO-07-15 , p. 90; [54]GAO-05-727 , pp. 26-27; and
[55]GAO-02-1033 , p. 17.
Table 3: Three Components of GAO's Framework Applied to Federal
Involvement in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments
Component Description
Set national goals. These goals, which would establish what
federal participation in the freight
transportation system is designed to
accomplish, should be specific, measurable,
achievable, and outcome-based.
Establish and clearly define The federal government is one of many
stakeholder roles, stakeholders involved in freight-related
especially the federal role investments, including those involving
relative to the roles of freight railroads. Others include state and
state and local governments local governments, port authorities,
and private railroads. shippers, and the railroads themselves. Given
the broad range of beneficiaries, it is
important to gain consensus on what the
transportation system is to achieve and to
help ensure that the federal role does not
negatively affect the participation or role
of other stakeholders.
Determine which revenue This component can help expand the ability to
sources and funding provide funding resources and to promote
mechanisms will maximize the cost-sharing responsibilities. Given the
impact of any federal current budgetary environment and the
expenditures and investment. long-range fiscal challenges confronting the
nation, federal funding for future
freight-related transportation projects,
including those involving freight railroads,
will require a high level of justification
and should be prioritized to maximize
national public benefits.
Source: GAO.
In conjunction with GAO's framework, it would also be important to
evaluate freight investments periodically to determine the extent to which
expected benefits are being realized. Evaluations also create
opportunities for periodically reexamining established goals, stakeholder
roles, and funding approaches, and provide a basis for modifying them as
necessary.50 In addition, evaluations help to ensure accountability and
provide incentives for achieving results. Encouraging or requiring the
identification of all project costs and of all parties who will bear the
costs can help ensure that the costs are apportioned among all
stakeholders equitably.51 Leading private and public organizations that we
have studied in the past have stressed the importance of developing
performance measures and then linking investment decisions and their
expected outcomes to overall strategic goals and objectives.52
50 [56]GAO-07-15 , p. 90.
51One commonly used definition of the term "equitable" is the principle
that beneficiaries should pay for project costs, commensurate with the
benefits they receive from projects. However, in some cases, the combined
private and public benefits may substantially exceed the combined costs.
For example, if the cost of a project is $100 million, and private
benefits are $80 million and public benefits are $80 million, then in this
case, an equitable public sharing of the cost could be 80 percent private
and 20 percent public, which would not displace private investments that
would have occurred in the absence of public funding. See [57]GAO-05-768 ,
p. 31.
Goals of a Future Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investment
Should Be Structured to Maximize National Benefits
The first component of GAO's framework for guiding the federal role in
freight-related infrastructure investment is a set of clearly defined
national goals.53 Such goals can help chart a clear direction, establish
priorities among competing demands, and specify the desired results of any
federal investment. Since many stakeholders are involved in the freight
transportation system, the achievement of national goals for the system
hinges on the federal government's ability to forge effective partnerships
with nonfederal entities. Decision makers need to balance national goals
with the unique needs and interests of all nonfederal stakeholders in
order to leverage the resources and capabilities of state and local
governments and the private sector. National goals should be structured in
a way that allows for reliably estimating and comparing national public
benefits and national public costs. As we have previously reported,54
quantifying public benefits can be difficult, yet an effort should be made
to determine that the anticipated public benefits are sufficient to
justify the proposed levels of public investment.55 For example, at the
state level, the Pennsylvania DOT evaluates and justifies freight railroad
investments, in part, by estimating the wear and tear imposed by trucks on
highways.
The primary goal of federal investments in freight infrastructure should
be to maximize the national public benefits of the investments. One way to
focus these goals could be through federally designated Projects of
National and Regional Significance, a program that has been designed to
address critical national economic and transportation needs and has funded
highway and railroad infrastructure projects. For example, one goal could
be to improve intermodal freight mobility--which encompasses air,
railroad, water, and highway facilities and infrastructure--at designated
ports of national significance that serve multistate regions and/or large
populations.
52 [58]GAO-07-15 , p. 90.
53GAO, Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for
Infrastructure Investments, [59]GAO-02-1033 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2002), p. 18.
54 [60]GAO-04-744 , p. 22.
55 [61]GAO-04-165 , p. 40.
Federal policy makers and other stakeholders could define their respective
roles in many different ways once the goals for the federal role in
freight transportation infrastructure have been established. However, the
key elements in defining the federal and other stakeholder roles would be
to create incentives for collaboration, secure benefits, and promote
equity for all stakeholders, both public and private, that invest in
freight-related infrastructure projects. Defining these elements is
especially important for the federal role in freight railroad
infrastructure investments because, while most of that infrastructure is
privately owned, investments to improve safety and increase capacity may
benefit stakeholders at all levels (national, regional, state, local and
private sector).
Public and Private Stakeholder Roles for Future Involvement in Freight-Related
Infrastructure Investments Should Be Clearly Defined
In our prior work, we have found that, in defining stakeholder roles, it
is important to match capabilities and resources with appropriate goals.56
This is important for federal participation because other stakeholders may
want to emphasize other priorities and use federal funds in ways that may
not achieve national public benefits. This can happen if other
stakeholders seek to (1) transfer a previously local function to the
federal arena or (2) use federal funds to reduce their traditional levels
of commitment. One aim of federal participation in infrastructure
investments is to promote or supplement expenditures that would not occur
without federal funding--to avoid substituting federal funding for funding
that would otherwise have been provided by private or other public
investors.57
Further refinements to DOT's draft Framework could help to define
stakeholder roles in two ways, first by acknowledging that the interests
of federal, state, and local entities may compete, and second by
recognizing where public and private sector interests meet and diverge.
When the federal government invests in freight railroad infrastructure, it
could justify its involvement by establishing criteria for projects that
(1) are based on national freight goals, (2) are designed to capture
national freight transportation benefits, and (3) direct funds to state,
local, and private entities that would spend the funds in accordance with
the national goals. For example, the federal government might justify its
investment in a project that had national goals of improving interstate
freight mobility, reducing pollution and congestion, and enhancing safety
on a multistate railroad and highway transportation corridor. In contrast,
states and localities seek public benefits that accrue within their
jurisdictions, such as improved automobile safety at grade crossings and
reduced air pollution within a regional attainment area, and are able to
channel state, local, and discretionary federal funds accordingly. When
examining public versus private interests, public stakeholders must
recognize that railroads are privately owned and invest resources to
maximize shareholder returns and enhance the efficiency and capacity of
their operations. Some railroad infrastructure projects have spillover
effects that produce public benefits, such as more efficient goods
movement. Yet other railroad infrastructure projects that could benefit
the public do not meet railroads' internal return-on-investment criteria,
and therefore the railroads would not invest in them, and the public would
not realize the benefits.
56 [62]GAO-02-1033 , p. 22.
57Ibid.
One possible way of defining stakeholder roles could be through
public-private partnerships. As we have stated earlier, public-private
partnerships create a forum for bringing diverse stakeholders together
around an issue of mutual interest to determine how best to share
resources, identify stakeholder responsibilities, and achieve public and
private benefits. Encouraging public-private partnerships to provide
efficient solutions to freight transportation needs could increase the
likelihood that the most worthwhile improvements would be implemented and
that projects would be operated and maintained efficiently.58 One example
of a public-private partnership that addresses various private and public
stakeholder interests in railroad infrastructure is the CREATE project in
the Chicago area. The drive to make significant investments in the Chicago
area's railroad infrastructure came from public and private railroad
stakeholders because of their concern over the heavy railroad congestion
in that area.59 Under the CREATE project, stakeholders established
individual roles that included owning and managing specific projects and
assuming joint financial obligations. The railroads initially invested
$100 million to begin addressing their interests, the federal government
has added $100 million by designating CREATE as a Project of National or
Regional Significance, and the state of Illinois and the city of Chicago
have pledged $100 million and $30 million, respectively, to begin
addressing passenger railroad projects. CREATE stakeholders also plan to
leverage other federal, state, and private funds over the lifetime of the
project. The Alameda Corridor Program in the Los Angeles area provides
another example of how effective partnering allowed the capabilities of
the various stakeholders to be more fully utilized. Called the Alameda
Corridor because of the street it parallels, the program created a
20-mile, $2.4 billion railroad express line connecting the ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach to the transcontinental railroad network east of
downtown Los Angeles. The express line eliminates approximately 200
street-level railroad crossings, relieving congestion and improving
freight mobility for cargo. This project made substantial use of local
stakeholders' ability to raise funds. While the federal government
participated in the cost, its share was about 20 percent of the total. In
addition, about 80 percent of the federal assistance is in the form of a
loan rather than a grant.
58 [63]GAO-05-768 , p. 31.
59The Chicago area is the largest railroad hub in the nation, with
one-third of all railroad traffic originating, terminating, or passing
through the area.
Future Federal Role in Freight-Related Infrastructure Investments Should Meet
Federal Goals While Recognizing Federal Financial Constraints
A well-designed and strategic national freight transportation policy--of
which there is a federal component--can help encourage investment by other
public and private stakeholders and maximize the application of limited
federal dollars for freight-related infrastructure.60 While it is
important to ensure that such a policy promotes federal investments in
freight infrastructure that generate national public benefits, especially
when those investments are in privately owned and operated freight
railroad infrastructure, it is also important to note that any federal
investments will face federal financial constraints. Although federal
investments could be crucial to securing the national public benefits of
certain freight-related infrastructure projects that would not otherwise
proceed, the scarcity of federal funds puts a premium on justifying and
targeting the use of federal funds for these projects to address critical
needs and maximize benefits.
As we have previously reported, determining the scope of government
involvement in transportation investments entails three major steps: (1)
determining that the project is worthwhile by applying a rigorous
cost-benefit analysis or similar study; (2) justifying government
involvement on the basis of known criteria; and (3) deciding on the level
of public subsidy consistent with local, state, regional, or national
interests and benefits.61 Currently, most federal freight investments come
from the fiscally constrained General Fund and Highway Trust Fund; and
typically these investments are not subject to a thorough benefit-cost
analysis or to the consistent application of project criteria, nor are
they funded with the assurance that the funding provided by public and
private beneficiaries is commensurate with the benefits these parties
receive.
60 [64]GAO-02-1033 , p. 22.
61 [65]GAO-04-165 , p. 42.
Federal investments in freight infrastructure must be justified and meet
objective criteria to maximize the impact of federal funds. Justifying
government involvement in freight infrastructure projects involves
identifying and quantifying project costs and public and private benefits,
and having clear guidelines specifying the conditions under which public
involvement is warranted. Given constraints on federal, state, and local
funding, we have advocated that public entities implement project
justification tools such as benefit-cost analysis to better assess
proposed transportation investments and accordingly target limited
funds.62 Results-oriented assessments can be used to determine what is
needed to obtain specific national outcomes.63 In October 2006, we
recommended that DOT, as it continues to draft the Framework for a
National Freight Policy, consider strategies to create a level playing
field for all freight modes and recognize the highly constrained federal
fiscal environment by developing mechanisms to assess and maximize public
benefits from federally financed freight transportation investments.64
Furthermore, as we testified in March 2007, the federal government should
make ensuring accountability for results, as well as maximizing benefits,
high priorities in deciding on federal investments in transportation
infrastructure.65 Unfortunately, we have found that formal analyses are
not often used in deciding among alternative projects, evaluations of
outcomes are not typically conducted, and the evaluations that are done
show that projects often do not produce anticipated outcomes. The public
sector faces many challenges in quantifying national, regional, state, and
local benefits, while railroads are more able to determine the monetary
and operational benefits of proposed infrastructure projects and can
invest accordingly. For example, railroads can assess how much each hour
of train delay costs them, but public entities cannot easily quantify the
environmental benefits of faster freight railroad transport and less truck
traffic.66 Representatives of three state DOTs we interviewed acknowledged
the difficulty of quantifying public benefits, which may make it difficult
to judiciously allocate scarce transportation funds to those projects that
may accrue the highest public benefits.
62 [66]GAO-07-94 , pp. 61 and 63.
63 [67]GAO-02-1033 , pp. 19-20.
64 [68]GAO-07-94 , p. 62.
65 [69]GAO-07-545T , p. 14.
66In an attempt to address this issue, in March 2005, DOT publicly
released the Intermodal Transportation and Inventory Cost software model
that enables users to identify the effects of traffic diverted from trucks
to railroads.
According to the Transportation Research Board (TRB), public support for
freight infrastructure projects must be established on a
project-by-project basis to determine if a project produces certain
benefits, such as reductions in the external costs of transportation,
efficiencies in the transportation system beyond those recognized by the
private sector, or improvements in public safety.67 TRB stated that if
government involvement cannot be justified on one of these grounds, the
private sector should undertake the project. One federal program that
awards funds using project justification criteria is the Federal Transit
Administration's discretionary New Starts program. This program is the
federal government's primary source of funds for capital investment in
locally planned, implemented, and operated transit. Potential New Starts
projects must meet certain project justification criteria (e.g., mobility
improvements and operating efficiencies) and demonstrate adequate local
financial support (e.g., the ability of the sponsoring agency to fund the
operation and maintenance of the entire system once the project is built).
A comparable approach could be designed so that freight railroad
infrastructure investments--proposed by state or local governments,
private railroads, or public-private partnerships--meet appropriate
project justification criteria, demonstrate public and private support,
and provide the lowest cost to the federal government. Different funding
mechanisms and revenue sources could also be used to implement any future
federal role in freight infrastructure investments. See appendix III for a
more complete discussion of these revenue sources and funding mechanisms.
Conclusions
Projected increases in freight transportation demand will likely increase
the importance of the nation's freight railroad infrastructure. Bridges
and tunnels are critical and expensive parts of infrastructure. Because
most of the freight railroad network is privately owned, the railroads
have a keen financial interest in maintaining and investing in their
bridges and tunnels. The federal role in overseeing the public safety of
these structures, and in funding improvements to them, has been limited.
67According to TRB, external costs are borne by nonshippers or the general
public. Examples of external costs include health and other damages caused
by air pollution; noise generated by trucks, towboats, and locomotives;
and the traffic delays and congestion that an additional truck or barge
imposes on other users of roadways and waterways. See Transportation
Research Board, Special Report 252: Policy Options for Intermodal Freight
Transportation (Washington, D.C.: 1998) and Transportation Research Board,
Special Report 271: Freight Capacity for the 21st Century (Washington,
D.C.: 2002).
Concerning the safety area, we have found in our prior work that a
risk-management approach to oversight of companies' overall management of
safety risks provides an additional assurance of safety in conjunction
with inspections. FRA has adopted this risk-management approach in
applying its guidelines for bridge management during its bridge safety
surveys of individual railroads. However, a more consistent and systematic
approach in selecting railroads for bridge safety surveys based on data
about railroads' bridge management programs, such as whether or not the
railroads have regular inspections by a qualified civil engineer and how
they record and use that bridge inspection data, could enhance the
effectiveness of the FRA's limited resources available for bridge and
tunnel safety. This approach could help target FRA's limited bridge
inspection resources toward railroads that present the greatest safety
risk, especially numerous short lines that may have more deteriorated
infrastructure and less technical and financial resources to maintain
their bridges and tunnels.
With respect to the federal role in freight-related infrastructure,
including railroad bridges and tunnels, the federal approach to such
investments needs to be better structured to maximize achieving national
public benefits such as increased freight mobility, reduced congestion,
and improved environmental quality. Although the current federal structure
of loans, credits, and grants administered by different agencies with
different missions from disparate funding sources may attain some national
public benefits, that structure is not guided by a national freight
strategy and may miss opportunities for an even higher return of national
public benefits for federal expenditures. DOT has taken a first step in
the direction of articulating such a strategy by developing its Framework
for a National Freight Policy, but we believe that the agency needs to go
further in developing a true national freight transportation strategy that
can help organize and unify the current structure to achieve that higher
return. Our past work on public investments in transportation has found
that such a strategy should focus on national freight transportation
related goals, involve all public and private stakeholders, and distribute
costs equitably across all public and private beneficiaries.
Recommendations for Executive Action
o To enhance the effectiveness of its bridge and tunnel safety
oversight function, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation direct the Administrator of the Federal Railroad
Administration to devise a systematic, consistent, risk-based
methodology for selecting railroads for its bridge safety surveys
to ensure that it includes railroads that are at higher risk of
not following the FRA's bridge safety guidelines and of having
bridge and tunnel safety issues.
o To help better focus limited federal resources, we recommend
that the Secretary of Transportation ensure that its draft
Framework for a National Freight Policy :
o includes clear national goals for federal
involvement in freight- related infrastructure
investments across all modes, including freight
railroad investments;
o establishes and clearly defines roles for all
public and private stakeholders; and
o identifies funding mechanisms for federal
freight-related infrastructure investments, including
freight railroad investments, which provide the
highest return in national public benefits for
limited federal expenditures.
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment prior to
finalizing the report. DOT and FRA officials--including FRA's Associate
Administrator for Safety-- generally agreed with the information in this
report, and they provided technical clarifications, which we have
incorporated in this report as appropriate. These officials agreed with
the recommendation related to the methodology for selecting railroads for
bridge safety surveys and said that they are already taking steps to
implement it, and DOT officials said that they would consider the
recommendation concerning changes to DOT's draft Framework for a National
Freight Policy.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the
appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of
Transportation. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
Site at [70]http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-2834 or [71][email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
JayEtta Z. Hecker
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what information is maintained by railroads on the condition
of their bridges and tunnels, and the contribution of this infrastructure
to congestion, we reviewed documentation from railroads on bridge and
tunnel data management policies, inspection procedures, sample inspection
reports, and capital improvement plans. We also determined the federal
role in collecting and reporting information on railroad bridges and
tunnels by interviewing officials from federal agencies, state agencies,
freight railroads, and industry associations (see table 4), and by
reviewing bridge and tunnel data collected and maintained by these federal
agencies. To determine to what extent bridges and tunnels contribute to
freight railroad congestion, we reviewed literature on freight railroad
congestion, railroad corridor plans, and freight demand studies to
identify current levels of freight railroad congestion, major factors
contributing to congestion, and proposed solutions. We also interviewed
representatives from industry associations and railroads to understand how
this information is used, what challenges railroads face in maintaining
and replacing railroad bridges and tunnels, and what strategies railroads
use to enhance capacity and alleviate congestion. We did not independently
verify the accuracy of public or private bridge and tunnel condition
information, inspection reports, or congestion information. In addition,
we did not independently assess the conditions of bridges and tunnels.
To identify the federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel
safety, we reviewed public laws and interviewed officials from the public
agencies and railroads listed in table 4. In particular, we discussed the
Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) structural safety oversight role
with FRA's Chief Structural Engineer, all five FRA bridge specialists, and
one FRA regional track specialist, and asked railroads about their
interactions with FRA. We reviewed examples of FRA's bridge safety survey
documentation to determine the content of these surveys and what actions
FRA takes after assessing a railroad's bridge conditions. We also
accompanied an FRA bridge specialist on a bridge safety survey and other
informal bridge and tunnel observations. We reviewed examples of FRA
emergency orders, compliance agreements, and structural observation
reports to determine how FRA enforces its oversight role. Because there
are more bridges than tunnels in the United States and because FRA has
established a policy on bridge safety, we reviewed more information on
railroad bridges than on tunnels. Moreover, because we used FRA's records
to understand FRA processes and actions, we did not independently verify
the reliability of the data in this sample of FRA's observation records.
To determine how public funds are currently used for railroad
infrastructure investments, including those for bridges and tunnels, we
interviewed the entities included in table 4 and synthesized relevant
information from these entities, as well as from the Federal Highway
Administration and the Joint Committee on Taxation. We did not
independently verify the accuracy of the self-reported cost information
provided by the railroads, public agencies, and professional associations.
We reviewed Department of Transportation's (DOT) draft Framework for a
National Freight Policy. We also analyzed pertinent legislation and
analyzed and synthesized relevant information from our reports and other
ongoing work.
To determine what criteria and framework could be used to guide the future
federal role in freight-related infrastructure investments, including
those for railroad bridges and tunnels, we relied extensively on
perspectives gained from our past work in transportation and
infrastructure systems and federal investment strategies. We also reviewed
DOT's Draft Framework for a National Freight Policy. We used our prior
work and conventional economic reasoning to identify key considerations
regarding possible revenue sources and funding mechanisms for federal
government support for freight-related infrastructure investment and to
evaluate potential revenue sources and funding mechanisms on the basis of
those considerations.
In addressing all of our objectives, we conducted five site visits to
o observe the conditions of selected bridges and tunnels on Class
I, II, and III railroads;
o understand maintenance and deterioration issues inherent in
different geographies and structure types;
o interview railroad and state agency personnel who manage,
inspect, and maintain these structures;
o interview railroad operations personnel who monitor traffic
capacity and congestion and finance personnel who determine
capital investment priorities and allocations; and
o meet with state and local transportation agency officials.
For a complete list of all entities interviewed, including those
interviewed as part of our site visits, see table 4. We selected our site
visit locations--Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C.; Illinois and
Iowa; Kansas and Missouri; Ohio and West Virginia; and Oregon--based on
geographic distribution and the presence of large and small railroads,
private-public partnership stakeholders, and state DOTs involved in
freight railroad or large freight railroad public-private partnerships.
In addition to interviews conducted as part of our site visits, we
interviewed representatives from the six largest Class I freight railroads
in the United States;1 Amtrak; industry associations; federal, state, and
local transportation officials; and federal agencies involved with
collecting information on, overseeing, or providing funding for railroad
bridges and tunnels. We also interviewed additional state agencies based
on their involvement in railroad bridge and tunnel oversight, freight
railroad funding, or major freight railroad public-private partnerships.
Table 4 lists the names and locations of all railroads; federal, state,
and local agencies; industry associations; and transportation,
engineering, and academic experts we interviewed as part of our review.
Table 4: Names and Headquarters Locations of Entities Contacted
Name Headquarters location
Class I freight railroads
BNSF Railway Companya Fort Worth, TX
Canadian National Railwaya Montreal, Quebec
CSX Transportationa Jacksonville, FL
Kansas City Southern Railwaya Kansas City, MO
Norfolk Southerna Norfolk, VA
Union Pacific Railroad Companya Omaha, NE
Class I passenger railroads
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)a Washington, D.C.
Class II freight railroads
Iowa Interstate Railroada Cedar Rapids, IA
Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway Co.a Brewster, OH
Class III freight railroads
Albany and Eastern Railroad Companya Lebanon, OR
Belt Railway Company of Chicagoa Bedford Park, IL
Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railway Co. (CRANDIC)a Cedar Rapids, IA
Iowa Northern Railway Companya Cedar Rapids, IA
Kansas City Terminal Railway Co.a Kansas City, KS
Ohio Central Railroad Companya Coshocton, OH
Port of Tillamook Bay Railroada Tillamook, OR
SEMO Port Railroada Scott City, MO
Watco Companies, Inc.a Pittsburg, KS
Federal agencies
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Defense Surface Deployment and Newport News, VA
Distribution Command: Transportation Engineering
Agency
U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security United States Washington, D.C.
Coast Guard Transportation Security Administration
Washington, D.C.
Arlington, VA
U.S. DOT Washington, D.C.
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Railroad Administration
Office of Safety and Compliancea Office of Railroad
Development Office of Policy and Program Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D.C.
State agencies and oversight organizations
Illinois DOTa Springfield, IL
Kansas DOTa Topeka, KS
Louisiana DOT and Development Baton Rouge, LA
Maryland DOTa Hanover, MD
Missouri DOTa Jefferson City, MO
Ohio DOTa Columbus, OH
Ohio Rail Development Commissiona Columbus, OH
Oregon DOTa Salem, OR
Pennsylvania DOT Harrisburg, PA
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission Harrisburg, PA
Public Utilities Commission of Ohioa Columbus, OH
Tennessee DOT Nashville, TN
Local agencies
Chicago DOTa Chicago, IL
Columbus Regional Airport Authoritya Columbus, OH
Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas Kansas City, KS
City, Kansasa
Industry associations
The American Association of State Highway and Washington, D.C.
Transportation Officials
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Washington, D.C.
Association
The Association of American Railroads Washington, D.C.
Transportation, engineering, and academic experts
Dr. Kazuya Kawamura, University of Illinois at Chicago, IL
Chicago
National Academy of Railroad Sciencesa Overland Park, KS
TranSystemsa Kansas City, MO
URS Corporationa San Francisco, CA
Source: GAO.
aIndicates representatives were included in a site-visit.
1We did not interview Canadian Pacific, whose railroad lines in the United
States comprise the smallest Class I freight railroad.
Appendix II: Examples of Bridge and Tunnel Maintenance, Component and
Structural Replacement Costs on Selected Railroads
Bridge type Description of work Cost estimates
Maintenance
Bridge ties Replacing a bridge tie $450 per tie
Moveable steel bridge Moveable bridge annual maintenance $50,000 to $1
million
Component replacement
or repair
Timber bridge Replaced several timber components $40,000 to
$50,000
Timber bridge Replacing timber approach span $239,000
Timber bridge Replacing timber substructure and $3 - $3.5 million
deck with steel and concrete
components
Concrete bridge Concrete bridge pier replacement $225,000
Concrete bridge Abutment replacement $75,000
Concrete bridge Replacing stone arches with $50,000
culverts
Steel bridge Upgrade steel to handle $100,000
286,000-lbs. railcars
Moveable steel bridge Replacement of several steel $1 million
components
Moveable steel bridge Fender system replacement caused $200,000 to
by barge strike $600,000
Tunnel Replacing timber lining in tunnel $800,000
with concrete lining
Tunnel Upgrading ventilation system $3.5 million
Tunnel Opening or "day-lighting" tunnel $3 million
Replacement
Timber bridge Timber bridge replacement $600,000 to
$700,000
Steel bridge Steel bridge replacement $22 - $44 million
Moveable steel bridge Moveable swing span replacement $25 - $40 million
Moveable steel bridge Replacement of a moveable swing $100 million
span bridge with a lift span
bridge
Source: GAO analysis of interviews with railroad officials.
Appendix III: Considerations of Funding Sources and Mechanisms Available
for Federal Funding of Freight-Related Infrastructure
Different funding mechanisms and revenue sources can be used to implement
any future federal role in freight infrastructure investments. Two main
revenue sources are available to the federal government in financing
freight infrastructure investments: (1) general revenue, which comes
primarily from broad-based personal and business income taxes and (2)
beneficiary financing revenue (such as user fees or fuel taxes), which
comes from taxes or fees assessed to specific groups that would benefit
from the federal investment. Revenue from both of these sources could be
used to increase investment in freight railroad infrastructure beyond the
level that the railroads would provide without federal support. We note,
however, that all revenue sources do have opportunity costs, that is, the
costs of any benefits forgone from alternative investments that could have
been made with that revenue.
As discussed earlier in this report, the federal government currently uses
three main funding mechanisms to support freight railroad infrastructure:
grants, loans, and tax credits.1 Each funding mechanism has its own
advantages and limitations, but some implications would apply to each. For
example, while the three mechanisms may make federal subsidies available
for freight infrastructure investments, they may not necessarily increase
the total amount of funding provided for those investments. Instead, these
subsidies might result in the substitution of federal funds for the
railroads' own funds for investments that they would have made themselves,
even without federal support. Revenue sources and potential funding
mechanisms need to be evaluated in terms of several key
considerations--including equity, sustainability, and efficiency for
revenue sources, and efficiency and transparency for funding
mechanisms--as discussed below.
o Equity - Equity is often assessed according to two principles:
the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle. Equity
occurs according to the benefit principle when those who pay for a
service are the same as those who benefit from the service. Under
the ability-to-pay principle, those who are more capable of
bearing the burden of taxes or fees pay more in taxes and fees
than those with less ability to pay, and a tax or fee structure is
generally considered more equitable if that is the case. The use
of general revenues is most equitable according to the benefit
principle when the benefits are diffused across all taxpayers.
Benefit financing sources (per-container or per-railroad-car fees
or commodity-specific taxes) can be a more equitable funding
source when the benefits are more focused on a locality or set of
users and it is possible to collect the additional revenues from
beneficiaries through higher fees or taxes. Either approach could
be consistent with the ability-to-pay principle depending on how
the revenue source is structured. A combination of beneficiary
financing, federal general revenue, and local matching funds could
also be used to enhance equity in order to link the amount of
payment for an infrastructure investment to the anticipated amount
of private, national, and local benefits gained, although these
benefits may be hard to quantify.
1Tax credits are reductions in tax liabilities based on preferential
provisions of the tax code, resulting in forgone tax revenue for the
federal government.
o Sustainability - Sustainability can be defined as the ability of
a revenue source to maintain a given level of federal expenditure
for an investment over time. Technological change or inflation
could affect the sustainability of some beneficiary financing
revenue sources by influencing revenue levels or their purchasing
power. But these sources can be more sustainable if they have the
flexibility to respond to reductions in demand or consumption and
can be indexed to inflation or otherwise periodically adjusted.
The sustainability of general revenue could be affected by the
federal government's long-term structural fiscal imbalance.
o Efficiency - Efficiency implications exist for both the choice
of revenue source and the choice of funding mechanism. For revenue
sources, efficiency can be assessed based on the impact of
economic behavioral changes likely to result from use of each
source and by how much accountability2 is provided. Using general
revenue rather than beneficiary financing revenue sources is
likely to cause smaller behavioral changes than using beneficiary
financing. Beneficiary financing is likely to cause larger
behavioral changes in raising a given amount of revenue because
the impacts of a revenue increase would be more concentrated in a
geographic location (for example, a user fee assessed for using a
specific bridge or other structure) or on a group of beneficiaries
(for example, a diesel fuel tax assessed only on railroads).
However, these behavioral changes can have either negative or
positive consequences on economic efficiency, such that in
different circumstances increasing revenues from either funding
source could be less efficient or more inefficient. In terms of
accountability, the efficiency of a revenue source can be enhanced
by collecting funds from the groups that are benefiting from
federal investments in freight infrastructure. For funding
mechanisms, efficiency can be defined as the amount of benefit
gained for the amount of federal resources provided. Grants may
generally be more efficient than loans in that their
administrative costs may be lower. For tax credits, efficiency--or
the benefits gained for the forgone tax revenue--is both difficult
to calculate and difficult to control, because private firms often
control the use of the credited funds rather than the government.
Therefore, the government may have less opportunity to direct the
funds toward generating specified national public benefits than it
does for grants or loans.3 To increase the efficiency of grants,
maintenance of effort provisions4 could be incorporated to
decrease the likelihood that the funding provided through them
will be substituted for other funds, rather than combined with
other funds to increase the total investment. Although tax credits
do not involve outlays of federal funds, they do have analogous
costs in forgone tax revenue that would have to be considered in
evaluating their efficiency.
2Accountability can be defined as ensuring that the beneficiaries of a
service pay the full social cost of that service. Although this concept is
similar to the benefit principle for assessing equity, in discussing the
effects of accountability on efficiency, we are concerned with the
accountability it provides rather than the fairness. For example, if the
beneficiaries do not pay the full social cost of a benefit, they may seek
to have more of the service provided by the government even when the
additional amounts of that service cost more than their actual value to
provide.
o Transparency - Transparency can be defined as the extent to
which the costs of federal infrastructure investments are visible
when using a funding mechanism. The commitment of federal
resources is visible if there is a direct appropriation for a
federal grant or loan program. With a grant or a loan, the federal
government can readily demonstrate how much money was invested in
what infrastructure. These funding mechanisms can also be guided
by objective, transparent criteria in conjunction with
congressional control over annual funding levels. With tax credits
for railroad infrastructure investment, however, it is less
visible how much the investment is costing the government through
forgone revenue, and it is harder for Congress to make trade-offs
with other discretionary spending programs.
3In some cases, the government controls the allocation of funds for
certain tax credits. For example, officials from the Department of the
Treasury (and a group of external reviewers) review and score New Markets
Tax Credit applications and then make specific allocations of the Credit
itself to qualified applicants. See GAO, Tax Policy: New Markets Tax
Credit Appears to Increase Investment by Investors in Low-Income
Communities, but Opportunities Exist to Better Monitor Compliance,
[95]GAO-07-296 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007) p. 7.
4Maintenance of effort provisions would require the entity receiving the
grant to maintain a certain level of spending over the duration of the
grant in order to receive the grant.
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
JayEtta Z. Hecker, (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Rita Grieco (Assistant
Director); Jay Cherlow; Steve Cohen; Elizabeth Eisenstadt; Alana
Finley; Greg Hanna; Carol Henn; Bert Japikse; Richard Jorgenson;
Denise McCabe; Elizabeth McNally; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Josh
Ormond; Laura Shumway; Ryan Siegel; and James Wozny made key
contributions to this report.
Related GAO Products
Performance and Accountability: Transportation Challenges Facing
the Congress and the DOT. [72]GAO-07-545T . Washington, D.C.:
March 6, 2007.
High Risk Series: An Update. [73]GAO-07-310 . Washington, D.C.:
January 2007.
Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking Steps
to Better Target Its Oversight, but Assessment of Results Is
Needed to Determine Impact. [74]GAO-07-149 . Washington, D.C.:
January 26, 2007.
Intercity Passenger Rail: National Policy and Strategies Needed to
Maximize Public Benefits from Federal Expenditures. [75]GAO-07-15
. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006.
Freight Railroads: Industry Health Has Improved, but Concerns
about Competition and Capacity Should Be Addressed. [76]GAO-07-94
. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2006.
Government Performance and Accountability: Tax Expenditures
Represent a Substantial Federal Commitment and Need to Be
Reexamined. [77]GAO-05-690 . Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005.
Freight Transportation: Short Sea Shipping Option Shows Importance
of Systematic Approach to Public Investment Decisions.
[78]GAO-05-768 . Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government. [79]GAO-05-325SP . Washington, D.C.: February 2005.
Highway and Transit Investments: Options for Improving Information
on Projects' Benefits and Costs and Increasing Accountability for
Results. [80]GAO-05-172 . Washington, D.C.: January 24, 2005.
Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment Decisions.
[81]GAO-04-744 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning and
Financing Limitations. [82]GAO-04-165 . Washington, D.C.: December
19, 2003.
Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for
Infrastructure Investments. [83]GAO-02-1033 . Washington, D.C.:
September 9, 2002.
Surface and Maritime Transportation: Developing Strategies for
Enhancing Mobility: A National Challenge. [84]GAO-02-775 .
Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.
U.S. Infrastructure: Funding Trends and Federal Agencies'
Investment Estimates. [85]GAO-01-986T . Washington, D.C.: July 23,
2001.
Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision Making.
[86]GAO/AIMD-99-32 . Washington, D.C.: December 1998.
Federal Budget: Choosing Public Investment Programs.
[87]GAO/AIMD-93-25 . Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993.
Railroad Competitiveness: Federal Laws and Policies Affect
Railroad Competitiveness. [88]GAO/RCED-92-16 . Washington, D.C.:
November 5, 1991.
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(544124)
[96]www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-770 .
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Highlights of [97]GAO-07-770 , a report to congressional requesters
August 2007
RAILROAD BRIDGES AND TUNNELS
Federal Role in Providing Safety Oversight and Freight Infrastructure
Investment Could Be Better Targeted
Freight railroads account for over 40 percent (by weight) of the nation's
freight on a privately owned network that was largely built almost 100
years ago and includes over 76,000 railroad bridges and over 800 tunnels.
As requested, GAO provides information on this infrastructure, addressing
(1) the information that is available on the condition of railroad bridges
and tunnels and on their contribution to railroad congestion, (2) the
federal role in overseeing railroad bridge and tunnel safety, (3) the
current uses of public funds for railroad infrastructure investments, and
(4) criteria and a framework for guiding any future federal role in
freight infrastructure investments. GAO reviewed federal bridge safety
guidelines and reports, conducted site visits, and interviewed federal,
state, railroad, and other officials.
[98]What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT (1) develop a systematic, risk-based methodology
for selecting railroads for bridge safety surveys and (2) ensure that its
Framework for a National Freight Policy identifies national goals,
stakeholder roles, and funding mechanisms and revenue sources to maximize
the national public benefits of federal freight infrastructure
investments. DOT agreed with the first recommendation and said that it
would consider the second recommendation.
Little information is publicly available on the condition of railroad
bridges and tunnels and on their contribution to congestion because the
railroads consider this information proprietary and share it with the
federal government selectively. Major (Class I) railroads maintain
detailed repair and inspection information, while other (Class II and III)
railroads vary, from keeping detailed records, to lacking basic condition
information. Despite their age, bridges and tunnels are not the main cause
of congestion, although some do constrain capacity. Because bridge and
tunnel work is costly, railroads typically make other investments to
improve mobility first.
The federal role in overseeing the safety of railroad bridges and tunnels
is limited because FRA has determined that most railroads are sufficiently
ensuring safe conditions. FRA has issued bridge management guidelines,
makes structural observations, and may take enforcement actions to address
structural problems. However, FRA bridge specialists use their own, not a
systematic, consistent, risk-based, methodology to select smaller
railroads for safety surveys and therefore may not target the greatest
safety threats.
Federal funds are used to meet many different goals, but are not invested
under any comprehensive national freight strategy, nor are the public
benefits they generate aligned with any such strategy. Some state
investments are structured to produce state and local economic and safety
benefits, and public-private partnerships have facilitated investments
designed to produce public and private benefits.
GAO has identified critical questions that can serve as criteria for
reexamining the federal role in freight investments--including railroad
bridge and tunnel investments--and a framework for implementing that role
that includes identifying national goals, clarifying stakeholder roles,
and ensuring that revenue sources and funding mechanisms achieve maximum
national public benefits. The Department of Transportation's draft
Framework for a National Freight Policy takes a step forward, but more is
needed to guide the implementation of a federal role in freight
transportation investments.
FRA Bridge Safety Survey and Double-Stack Train in Modified Tunnel
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