Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by
Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges (09-NOV-06,
GAO-07-9).
In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between
rebel groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab
militias, known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced
about 2 million Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million
others that they require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S.
government has provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and
supported African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) efforts to
fulfill a peace support mandate. This report reviews (1) U.S.
humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur and the challenges
that have been encountered and (2) African Union efforts to
fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these
efforts.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-07-9
ACCNO: A63207
TITLE: Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring
Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges
DATE: 11/09/2006
SUBJECT: Aid to refugees
Federal aid to foreign countries
Genocide
Human rights violations
International cooperation
International food programs
International organizations
International relations
Military forces
Nonprofit organizations
Peacekeeping forces
Policy evaluation
Program evaluation
Refugees
Risk assessment
Human rights
African Union Mission in Sudan
Sudan
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GAO-07-9
* [1]Report to Congressional Requesters
* [2]November 2006
* [3]DARFUR CRISIS
* [4]Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing
Violence and Operational Challenges
* [5]Contents
* [6]Results in Brief
* [7]Background
* [8]Sudan's North-South War
* [9]Conflict in Darfur
* [10]African Union Mission in Sudan
* [11]U.S. and UN Policy Responses to the Darfur Conflict
* [12]International Response to Darfur Humanitarian Crisis
* [13]United States Primarily Contributed Food Aid; Meanwhile,
Assistance Provision Grew and Other Conditions Improved
* [14]United States Provided Nearly $1 Billion in Assistance,
Partly through Supplemental Appropriations
* [15]U.S. Assistance Focused on Food Aid
* [16]U.S. Assistance Addressed Range of Other Needs
* [17]Provision of Assistance Grew and Health Indicators
Improved, but Risk Remains
* [18]Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and
Oversight
* [19]Insecurity in Darfur Has Limited Mobility and Access of
Humanitarian Staff
* [20]Sudan Government and Rebel Groups Have Restricted NGO
and UN Staff Movements
* [21]Timing of 2006 U.S. Funding Impacted Humanitarian
Operations in Darfur
* [22]Oversight of Assistance Was Limited by Reduced Staff and
Incomplete Reporting
* [23]Difficulties Existed in Ensuring that U.S. Assistance
Was Used as Intended
* [24]African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some
Actions Have Been Incomplete or Inconsistent
* [25]AMIS Is Seen as Having Made Important Contribution
* [26]AMIS Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some actions
Have Been Incomplete or Inconsistent
* [27]AMIS Has Monitored Cease-fire Compliance, but
Monitoring Has Been Incomplete
* [28]Confidence-Building and Security-Improvement
Efforts Have Been Sporadic
* [29]AMIS Has Provided Patrols and Escorts but Has
Not Prevented All Attacks or Provided All Needed
Protection
* [30]AMIS Has Intervened to Prevent Violence in
Some Cases but Not in Others
* [31]AMIS Has Collaborated with Sudanese Police,
but Relations Have Been Difficult
* [32]U.S. and Other External Donors Have Supported African
Union's Efforts to Fulfill Its Mandate
* [33]U.S. Government Has Funded AMIS Camps
* [34]Other International Donors Have Provided Cash,
Goods, and Services
* [35]Numerous Factors Have Complicated AMIS Efforts
* [36]Inadequacies in Management, Organization, and Capacity
Have Hampered AMIS Deployment
* [37]Inadequate and Inconsistent Management
* [38]Lack of Coordination
* [39]Limited Capacity
* [40]Small Size of AMIS Force Has Limited Its Ability to
Patrol and Protect
* [41]Constrained and Inefficiently Allocated Resources Have
Restricted AMIS Operations
* [42]AMIS Has Had Limited Information on, and Cooperation
from, Parties to the Conflict
* [43]UN and NATO Offers of Assistance Have Not Been Acted On;
Meanwhile, Violence in Darfur Continues
* [44]Conclusions
* [45]Recommendation
* [46]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [47]Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* [48]Timeline of Darfur Events
* [49]Evolution of AMIS
* [50]NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. Nonfood Assistance Funding
during Fiscal Years 2004-2006
* [51]Comments from the Department of State
* [52]GAO Comments
* [53]Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
* [54]GAO Comments
* [55]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [56]Bibliography
* [57]Published Reviews of AMIS Operations
* [58]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf
* [59]Order by Mail or Phone
* [60]restrictedd079cover.pdf
* [61]Report to Congressional Requesters
* [62]November 2006
* [63]DARFUR CRISIS
* [64]Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by
Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges
* [65]cov1&2.pdf
* [66]Report to Congressional Requesters
* [67]November 2006
* [68]DARFUR CRISIS
* [69]Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by
Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges
Contents
Table
Figures
November 9, 2006Letter
The Honorable Tom Lantos Ranking Minority Member Committee on
International Relations House of Representatives
The Honorable Mike DeWine The Honorable Richard J. Durbin United States
Senate
In 2003, violent conflict broke out in the Darfur region of western Sudan
when rebel groups, believing that the region was marginalized by the
Sudanese government, led attacks against the government. In response, the
government armed and supported local Arab tribal militias, commonly known
as the Janjaweed, to defeat the rebels. Attacks on the civilian population
by these militias, sometimes in conjunction with the Sudanese armed
forces, have resulted in the deaths of many thousands. These attacks have
also displaced approximately 1.85 million people within Darfur--internally
displaced persons (IDP)--most of whom now live in camps in Darfur and have
affected an additional 1.91 million Darfur residents (affected residents)
so that they now require humanitarian assistance.^1 In addition, the
attacks have forced about 220,000 Darfur refugees to take shelter in
Chad.^2
Since fiscal year 2004, the United States has provided humanitarian
assistance to Darfur through various implementing partners--international
nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and United Nations (UN) agencies--with
funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
Department of State (State). Over the same period, the U.S. government,
through State contracts with two private sector firms, provided funding
for building and maintaining 32 camps throughout Darfur for African Union
forces involved in monitoring a 2004 cease-fire agreement.^3 Since May
2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has deployed more than
7,000 personnel (comprising military observers, protection force troops,
and civilian police) throughout Darfur on a peace support mission to
respond to a three-part mandate: (1) monitor compliance with the
cease-fire agreement, which was signed in April 2004 by the three parties
to the conflict; (2) assist in "confidence building"; and (3) contribute
to improving the region's security environment. AMIS's mandate will expire
on December 31, 2006, and a UN peacekeeping mission is currently under
consideration. Meanwhile, a peace agreement signed by the government of
Sudan and one rebel group in May 2006 gives AMIS new responsibilities,
such as verifying disarmament of the Janjaweed and monitoring
demilitarized zones around IDP camps.
We were asked to review and assess, among other things, U.S. assistance in
Darfur aimed at promoting health, peace, and security in Sudan. This
report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help relieve
the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that USAID and its implementing
partners have encountered, (3) the African Union's efforts to fulfill its
peace support mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the
implementation of this mandate.^4
To answer our first two objectives, we reviewed all USAID Darfur grants
and cooperative agreements with UN agencies and NGOs for fiscal years 2004
to 2005 and the first 8 months of fiscal year 2006; UN humanitarian
information profiles for Darfur; and international standards for
humanitarian assistance. To answer our third and fourth objectives, we
reviewed State contracts, task orders, and expenditure information as well
as documents prepared by the African Union, State, and a key U.S.
contractor. For all four objectives, we discussed U.S. assistance with
appropriate Sudanese, USAID, State, and Department of Defense (DOD)
officials and advocacy groups in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials
in New York, NY. Further, we interviewed appropriate U.S., European Union,
Sudanese, UN, NGO, African Union, and contractor officials in Khartoum,
Sudan, and in the northern and southern Darfur states. We also visited
seven IDP camps and discussed events in Darfur with IDPs, including the
leaders of those communities. Although we reviewed data on U.S.
humanitarian assistance to Darfur refugees in Chad, we did not assess this
assistance in detail. Finally, we visited eight African Union camps within
North and South Darfur and met with officials at African Union
headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (See app. I for a detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology.) We conducted our work from
September 2005 to November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided nearly $1
billion in humanitarian assistance for Darfur, with over $275 million of
this amount provided through supplemental legislation that augmented
initial funding levels.^5 USAID provided more than 68 percent of the total
assistance as food aid, primarily by providing commodities to the UN World
Food Program and to the International Committee of the Red Cross. U.S.
assistance to Darfur has also supported other vital needs, such as water
and sanitation, shelter, and primary health care services. Since 2004,
NGOs and UN agencies increased their presence in Darfur by several
thousand staff and made significant progress in increasing the number of
IDPs and affected residents receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and
mortality rates in Darfur dropped between 2004 and 2005, a trend that U.S.
and other officials attributed in part to international humanitarian
assistance efforts.
NGOs and UN agencies implementing humanitarian activities and programs in
Darfur have faced three key challenges in providing humanitarian
assistance. First, continued insecurity, such as attacks on NGOs and UN
agencies and banditry of aid convoys, has made it difficult for
humanitarian agencies to provide assistance throughout the region. Second,
NGOs' and UN agencies' efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance have
been constrained by Sudanese government restrictions on access to IDP
communities. Third, according to NGO and UN agency officials, the timing
of U.S. funding in fiscal years 2006, as well as delays in funding from
other international donors, hampered the provision of humanitarian
assistance for 2006. For example, because more than half of U.S. food aid
funding was not provided until late in fiscal year 2006, the UN World Food
Program cut Darfur food rations to half the minimum daily requirement in
May 2006; as of October 2006, the ration had not been fully restored. In
addition, USAID's oversight of U.S. humanitarian assistance has been
limited by a reduction of USAID program staff in Darfur since
2004--despite growing numbers of NGO and UN humanitarian staff and
displaced and affected Darfurians--as well as incomplete reporting by
implementing NGOs.
Although the African Union has taken positive actions to fulfill its
mandate, some of these actions have been incomplete or inconsistent.
According to U.S. and other officials, AMIS is viewed as having lessened
large-scale violence in the region through the deterrent effect of its
presence. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement--the first
part of the AMIS mandate--AMIS military observers in Darfur have actively
investigated alleged cease-fire agreement violations and have identified
numerous violations since 2004. However, the resulting reports have not
been consistently reviewed at higher levels according to established
procedure or made publicly available to identify parties who are violating
the agreement. To build confidence and to improve security--the second and
third parts of the mandate--AMIS troops have taken actions such as
conducting patrols and escorting IDP women foraging for firewood outside
IDP camps, to protect them from violent attacks. AMIS troops have also
intervened to stop impending violence against civilians; however, AMIS has
not intervened in other instances where attacks were imminent. Further,
AMIS civilian police have worked with Sudanese police to improve law
enforcement, although they have encountered difficulties, such as an
inability to obtain information regarding Sudanese police activities. To
support AMIS's efforts to fulfill the mandate, the U.S. government, via
private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through
September 2006, primarily to build and maintain the 32 camps that house
AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to State sources. Meanwhile,
other international donors, such the European Union, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), supported
AMIS with funding, goods, and services.
Numerous factors have been identified by African Union or U.S. government
officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS's difficulties in meeting
its mandate in Darfur. These challenges include
oinadequacies in AMIS's management, organization, and capacity;
othe relatively small size of the AMIS force responsible for monitoring
and patrolling Darfur;
oconstrained and inefficiently allocated AMIS resources; and
oa lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to
the conflict.
The challenges AMIS has faced have been magnified by the new
responsibilities assigned to AMIS in the May 2006 peace agreement, such as
the requirement to verify the eventual disarmament of the Janjaweed by the
Sudanese government. As AMIS has faced challenges, the U.S. government and
other parties have supported a transition of AMIS's responsibilities to a
UN peacekeeping operation when AMIS's mandate expires at the end of
December 2006. However, as of October 2006, the Sudanese government had
rejected the proposed transition. In June 2006, following a NATO offer,
the African Union formally requested assistance from NATO in, among other
things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations; however,
according to a State official, African Union headquarters had taken no
further action to pursue this review as of August 2006. Meanwhile,
insecurity and violence have continued in Darfur.
In this report, we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission to ensure that an assessment
of AMIS operations is conducted so that "lessons learned" can be used to
strengthen future African Union peace support planning and operations and
future donor assistance can be provided in a manner that will minimize the
difficulties experienced by AMIS.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense
as well as USAID. We received comment letters from the Department of State
and USAID. The Department of State supported our recommendation and noted
that the report presents a balanced and accurate picture of the situation
in Darfur. The department also suggested that the report provide
additional details or characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS,
issues. We incorporated such information into the report as appropriate.
See appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and our response.
USAID commented that in general, it found the report to be a comprehensive
assessment of USAID's involvement in Darfur but felt that we should
include additional information in our discussions of areas such as
staffing levels and grant monitoring. We made adjustments as appropriate.
See appendix VI for a reproduction of USAID's letter and our response. DOD
provided no comments on the draft report.
Background
Sudan is the largest country in Africa (see fig. 1), and its population,
estimated at about 40 million, is one of the continent's most diverse.
Sudan's population comprises two distinct major cultures, Arab and black
African, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal subdivisions and language
groups. More than half of Sudan's population lives in the northern states,
which make up most of Sudan and include the majority of the urban centers;
most residents of this area are Arabic-speaking Muslims. Residents of the
southern region, which has a predominantly rural, subsistence economy,
practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although some are
Christian. The South contains many tribal groups and many more languages
than are used in the North. Darfur is another distinct region of Sudan,
located in the west, and was an independent sultanate for most of the
period between 1600 and 1916, when the British captured it and
incorporated it into the Sudanese state. Darfur's population is
predominantly Muslim.
Figure 1: Map of Sudan
Sudan's North-South War
For most of its existence since gaining independence from Britain and
Egypt in 1956, Sudan has endured civil war rooted in cultural and
religious divides. The North, which has traditionally controlled the
country, has sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam,
whereas non-Muslims and other groups in the South have sought, among other
things, greater autonomy. After 17 years of war, from 1955 to 1972, the
government signed a peace agreement that granted the South a measure of
autonomy. However, civil war began again in 1983, when the President of
Sudan declared Arabic the South's official language, transferred control
of Southern armed forces to the central government, and, later that year,
announced that traditional Islamic punishments drawn from Shari'a (Islamic
law) would be incorporated into the penal code. The South's rebellion was
orchestrated by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In
1989, the conflict intensified when an Islamic army faction, led by
General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, led a coup of the government and installed
the National Islamic Front.^6
In 2001 President Bush named former Senator John Danforth as his
Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan, assigning him to explore a U.S.
role in ending the civil war and enhance the delivery of humanitarian aid
to Sudan's affected population. On January 9, 2005, the Sudanese
government and the SPLM/A signed a set of agreements called the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, providing for a new constitution and new
arrangements for power sharing, wealth sharing, and security applicable
throughout Sudan. On July 9, 2005, Bashir assumed the presidency under the
new arrangements, with the SPLM/A Chairman assuming the office of First
Vice President. In 2011, Southern Sudan will hold a vote to determine
whether to become independent. To assist in implementing the peace
agreement, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS), which currently has a force of more than 7,000.^7
Conflict in Darfur
While the North-South agreement was nearing completion, a rebellion broke
out in Darfur, located in western Sudan with an estimated preconflict
population of about 6 million (see fig. 2).^8
Figure 2: Darfur Preconflict Population Density Map
The South's success motivated rebel groups in Darfur to fight for a
similar outcome. In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police
stations and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur (see
fig. 3 for an interactive timeline of key events associated with Darfur
and app. II for a related description of events). In El Fasher, the rebel
groups destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed several Sudanese
soldiers, and kidnapped a Sudanese general. After the government armed and
supported local tribal and Arab militias--the Janjaweed^9--fighting
between the rebel groups and the Sudan military and Janjaweed intensified
during late 2003.^10 The principal rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),
represent agrarian farmers who are black African Muslims.^11 The SLM/A has
recently split into two factions--one faction, with the larger military
force, led by Minni Minawi and the other led by Abdulwahid El Nour.
Figure 3: Timeline of Darfur Events, January 2003-October 2006
In addition to disrupting the lives of almost 4 million Darfurians,
Janjaweed and Sudanese government attacks in Darfur have resulted in many
thousands of deaths.^12 The Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire was signed
by the Sudanese government, the SLM/A and the JEM on April 8, 2004, in
N'Djamena, Chad. In signing the agreement, the parties agreed to accept an
automatically renewable cessation of hostilities; to refrain from any
military action and any reconnaissance operations; to refrain from any act
of violence or any other abuse on civilian populations; to ensure
humanitarian access; and to establish a Ceasefire Commission to monitor
the agreement, along with a Joint Commission to which the Ceasefire
Commission would report. The African Union was to monitor cease-fire
compliance. Peace negotiations continued under African Union auspices with
Chadian participation, and additional interim agreements were also
reached. However, after a relatively calm 2005, cease-fire violations and
violent incidents reportedly began to increase in the final months of that
year and into 2006.
On May 5, 2006, the government of Sudan and the Minawi faction of the
SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, establishing agreements in key
areas such as power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements.
oPower sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates the position of Senior
Assistant to the President--the fourth-highest position in the Sudanese
government--appointed by the President from a list of nominees provided by
the rebel movements. The Senior Assistant to the President will also serve
as Chairperson of the newly created Transitional Darfur Regional
Authority, which is responsible for the implementation of the agreement
and coordination among the three states of Darfur. Further, a referendum
will be held by July 2010 to allow Darfurians to decide whether to
establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single government or to retain
the existing three regions.^13
oWealth sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates a Darfur
Reconstruction and Development Fund to collect and disburse funds for the
resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of internally and
externally displaced persons. The government of Sudan will contribute $300
million to the fund in 2006 and at least $200 million annually in 2007 and
2008. Further, the government of Sudan will place $30 million in a fund
for monetary compensation for those negatively affected by the conflict in
Darfur.
oSecurity arrangements. The Darfur Peace Agreement calls for the
verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government by
mid-October 2006.^14 This disarmament must be verified by the African
Union before rebel groups undertake their own disarmament and
demobilization. Demilitarized zones are to be established around IDP camps
and humanitarian assistance corridors, into which rebel forces and the
Sudanese military cannot enter, and buffer zones are to be established in
the areas of the most intense conflict. Rebel group forces will be
integrated into the Sudanese military and police: 4,000 former combatants
will be integrated into the armed forces; 1,000 former combatants will be
integrated into the police; and 3,000 will be supported through education
and training programs.
The UN estimates that displaced and affected persons are located in more
than 300 locations, including camps and other gatherings, with populations
up to 90,000 people. Figure 4 shows the camp dispersion and estimated
population at many of the camps throughout Darfur, as of October 2005.
Figure 4: Darfur IDP Camps Dispersion and Estimated Affected Population,
October 2005
African Union Mission in Sudan
Since 2004, the African Union has been responsible for peace support
operations in Darfur through AMIS.^15 Subsequent to its establishment of
an African Union observer mission in Darfur in May 2004,^16 the African
Union Peace and Security Council established a specific mandate for AMIS
in October 2004 (see app. III for a discussion of the evolution of
AMIS).^17 AMIS's mandate has three components:
oTo monitor and observe compliance with the April 2004 humanitarian
cease-fire agreement and all such agreements in the future;
oTo assist in the process of confidence building; and
oTo contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian
relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes,
in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all parties
with the April 2004 cease-fire agreement and to contribute to the
improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur.
Regarding the first component of the mandate, per the terms of the
cease-fire agreement, related agreements, and African Union Peace and
Security Council guidance, military observers were to investigate and
report on allegations of ceasefire violations, with a protection force
presence as needed. Final investigation reports, prepared by the Ceasefire
Commission headquartered in El Fasher, Darfur, were to be submitted to the
Joint Commission. The Joint Commission was mandated to make
consensus-based decisions on matters brought before it by the Ceasefire
Commission. According to a senior African Union official, the Joint
Commission was to submit Ceasefire Commission reports to African Union
headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for appropriate action. (Fig. 5
illustrates the established process for investigating, and reporting on,
cease-fire agreement violations.)
Figure 5: Process for Monitoring Cease-fire Agreement Compliance
The council determined that AMIS would, in the framework of its mandate,
"protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the
immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood
that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of
the government of Sudan."^18 The council also determined that AMIS would
have, in addition to military observers and protection force troops,
civilian police, to monitor the actions of Sudanese police and interact
with IDPs and civilians, as well as appropriate civilian personnel. The
AMIS force authorized and deployed in Darfur to execute its mandate has
grown incrementally over time from several hundred personnel in 2004 to
7,271 personnel (military observers, protection force troops, and civilian
police) deployed as of April 30, 2006. Numerous studies by the African
Union, the UN, and others reviewing the performance of AMIS have been
conducted that discuss the operations of this effort undertaken by the
newly created African Union (see the bibliography for a listing of these
reviews).
The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement establishes several new
responsibilities for AMIS, such as verifying the eventual disarmament of
the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government. The 2006 agreement also
designates AMIS as responsible for actions such as designing and running
awareness programs in Darfur to ensure that local communities and others
understand, among other things, the AMIS mandate; patrolling and
monitoring demilitarized zones around IDP camps; patrolling buffer zones
established in areas of the most intense conflict; and developing and
monitoring implementation of a plan for the regulation of nomadic
migration along historic migration routes.
U.S. and UN Policy Responses to the Darfur Conflict
The U.S. government has been active in addressing the Darfur conflict.^19
After the conflict began, senior State officials traveled to Sudan on a
half-dozen occasions, stressing the need to end the violence. On July 22,
2004, the U.S. House and the Senate each passed separate resolutions
citing events in Darfur as acts of genocide.^20 Further, on September 9,
2004, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S.
Secretary of State announced that "genocide" had been committed in Darfur,
and noted that the Sudanese government had supported the Janjaweed,
directly and indirectly, as they carried out a "scorched earth"
policy toward the rebels and the African civilian population in Darfur.^21
In a press release the same day, President Bush stated that genocide was
occurring and requested the UN to investigate events in Darfur, as the
Secretary of State had also done. On October 13, 2006, President Bush
signed into law the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, which
imposes sanctions against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity; supports measures for the protection of
civilians and humanitarian operations; and supports peace efforts in
Darfur.
Although the UN has not identified the events in Darfur as genocide, it
has repeatedly expressed concern over the continuing violence. In July
2004, the UN, with the government of Sudan, issued a communique
emphasizing a commitment to facilitating humanitarian assistance to the
region and establishing a commitment by the Sudanese government to disarm
the Janjaweed. In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted a
resolution stating that the UN Secretary-General should "rapidly establish
an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate
reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights
law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of
genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such
violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held
accountable."^22 In January 2005, the UN issued a report stating that "the
Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to
crimes under international law."^23 The report concluded that a policy of
genocide had not been pursued but noted that "the crimes against humanity
and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious
and heinous than genocide."
The UN Security Council has also adopted resolutions establishing a travel
ban and asset freeze for those determined to impede the peace process or
violate human rights^24 and referring the situation in Darfur to the
prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the
government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict to cooperate
with the court.^25 Further, in creating UNMIS to support implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the council requested the UN
Secretary-General to report to the council on options for the mission to
reinforce the effort to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate
assistance to AMIS.
International Response to Darfur Humanitarian Crisis
Large-scale international humanitarian response to the displacement in
Darfur did not begin until fiscal year 2004. In October 2003, USAID's
Office of Food for Peace began to contribute food aid to the UN World Food
Program for distribution in Darfur and USAID set an internal goal of
meeting at least 50 percent of Sudan's food aid needs as assessed by the
World Food Program. In addition, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance established a Disaster Assistance Response Team in Darfur to
respond to the humanitarian needs of the population affected by the
conflict once the cease-fire agreement was signed. The United States was
the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur in fiscal years
2004 to 2006, providing approximately 47 percent of all humanitarian
assistance to the region (the UN has reported $1.9 billion in total
pledges and obligations of assistance from all donors).^26 The European
Union and the United Kingdom provided the largest amounts of assistance
pledged or obligated by other international donors. Figure 6 shows the
percentages of total humanitarian assistance pledged or obligated for
Darfur by international donors.
Figure 6: Total Humanitarian Assistance Pledged or Obligated for Darfur by
International Donors, as of June 1, 2006
United States Primarily Contributed Food Aid; Meanwhile, Assistance
Provision Grew and Other Conditions Improved
In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided almost $1
billion for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur. More than 68
percent of the U.S. obligations as of September 30, 2006, supplied food
aid in the form of commodities provided to the UN World Food Program and
the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, the United
States provided assistance to meet a range of nonfood needs, such as
health care and water. During this period, humanitarian access and
coverage for IDPs and affected residents of Darfur improved significantly.
In addition, IDP malnutrition and mortality rates decreased over time, a
trend that U.S., UN, and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian
assistance.
United States Provided Nearly $1 Billion in Assistance, Partly through
Supplemental Appropriations
U.S. obligations for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur totaled
approximately $996 million in fiscal years 2004 through 2006 (see fig. 7).
From 2004 to 2005, obligations for food and nonfood assistance increased
from about $186 million to $444 million, or by 58 percent. In fiscal year
2006, obligations decreased to about $366 million, or by 18 percent. Funds
provided in supplemental appropriations accounted for about $71
million--16 percent of the total--in 2005^27 and $205 million--56 percent
of the total--in 2006.^28
Figure 7: U.S. Obligations for Food and Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to
Darfur by Fiscal Year, Including Supplemental Appropriations
U.S. Assistance Focused on Food Aid
For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, USAID provided $681 million (over 68
percent) as food aid for Darfur--approximately $113 million in 2004, $324
million in 2005, and $243 million in 2006 (see table 1).
Table 1: U.S. Food Aid to Darfur in Metric Tons (MT) and Millions of
Dollars in Fiscal Years 2004-2006
Dollars in
millions
2004^a 2005^b 2006 Total
Aid provided MT Dollar MT Dollar MT Dollar MT Dollar
to amount amount amount amount
UN World Food 118,400 $112.9 369,170 $318.2 308,140 $227.4 795,710 $658.5
Program
International 0 $0 7,710 $6.3 19,770 $16.5 27,480 $22.8
Committee of
the Red Cross
Total 118,400 $112.9 376,880 $324.5 327,910 $243.9 823,190 $681.3
Source: USAID Food For Peace.
^aIncludes commodities and funds approved for non-Darfur programs but
transferred to Darfur at the beginning of the crisis in 2003. USAID did
not transfer funds to the International Committee of the Red Cross in
2004.
^bIncludes Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust contribution of 200,000 MT
valued at $172 million. Fiscal years 2004 and 2006 did not include such
contributions.
Note: The dollar amount of the food aid includes the cost of the
commodities; ocean and air freight; and internal transport, storage, and
handling.
As table 1 shows, after rising from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005,
U.S. food aid funding for Darfur decreased from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal
year 2006 by approximately 25 percent and the quantity of food provided
decreased by almost 13 percent.^29 The UN World Food Program planned
assistance to Sudan also fell by more than 16 percent between calendar
years 2005 and 2006,^30 while the food aid component of planned assistance
decreased by 29 percent.^31 According to World Food Program and USAID
officials, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, USAID supplied at least half of
the 2005 and 2006 food aid assistance requested for Sudan by the UN World
Food Program. A World Food Program official in Washington, D.C., stated
that the U.S. government provided essential food aid contributions in
fiscal year 2006 and that the reduction in the level of U.S. funding did
not negatively impact the food situation in Darfur.
USAID Food for Peace obligated aid for Darfur for fiscal years 2004
through 2006, primarily for commodities intended to meet minimum
nutritional requirements, to the UN World Food Program and the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
oObligations to the UN World Food Program. As table 1 shows, USAID Food
for Peace obligated $658.6 million for commodities, including
transportation and other shipping costs, to the World Food Program to
address emergency food needs in Darfur in fiscal years 2004 through
2006.^32 According to a USAID official, this assistance included
commodities previously allocated for assistance to southern Sudan, which
Food for Peace and the World Food Program reallocated to respond to the
emergency situation in Darfur before the official emergency program began.
World Food Program officials said that U.S. food aid funding allowed the
program to preposition food in various storage facilities in Darfur,
enabling the program to avoid costly air drops. World Food Program
officials indicated that prepositioning food helps avoid shortfalls during
rainy seasons resulting from the typical 6-month time lag between
confirmation and distribution of food aid donations.
oObligations to the Red Cross. USAID Food for Peace obligated $22.8
million for commodities to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
This assistance was intended particularly for rural village residents who
had not been displaced by the ongoing conflict and whose needs had not
been addressed by other agencies in the region.
During our field work in Darfur, we visited World Food Program warehouses
outside Nyala, in South Darfur, built to expedite the distribution of food
aid during the rainy season; we observed local staff repackaging U.S.
wheat from bags that were damaged in transit to the storage facility in
Nyala (see fig. 8).
Figure 8: U.S. Commodities at a World Food Program Storage Facility in
South Darfur
Additionally, we witnessed NGOs distributing rations in Zam Zam IDP camp
(although the funds and commodities are transferred to the UN World Food
Program, NGOs operating in Darfur distribute the rations in IDP camps),
where U.S.-provided sorghum, vegetable oil, lentils, and wheat were
distributed as part of the monthly rations (see fig. 9).
Figure 9: Food Distribution in Zam Zam IDP Camp in North Darfur
U.S. Assistance Addressed Range of Other Needs
In addition to providing food aid, as of September 30, 2006, the United
States had obligated approximately $315 million for other humanitarian
assistance in a range of sectors, including shelter, water and sanitation,
health care, and nutrition. This assistance was provided through USAID's
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives
as
well as State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.^33 The U.S.
government has provided nonfood assistance to the affected residents of
Darfur through 31 NGOs and 10 UN agencies, which implement programs and
activities to aid the people of Darfur (see app. IV for a list of NGOs and
UN agencies that received U.S. nonfood assistance funding for fiscal years
2004 to 2006). Of this assistance, the largest amounts have been obligated
for health care, water and sanitation, logistics, protection, and food
security/agriculture (see fig. 10).^34
Figure 10: U.S. Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to Darfur in Fiscal Years
2004-2006 by Sector
Note: "Other sectors" includes information management, rehabilitation,
capacity building, monitoring/evaluation, staff salaries, stockpiles,
travel, and disaster assistance programs.
Health. The United States obligated $57.4 million for the health sector,
supporting activities such as medical clinics, immunizations, and maternal
health care. We visited five NGO-operated health clinics in Darfur IDP
camps. These clinics, which served between 110 to 1,200 IDPs per day,
provided basic medical examinations, referring serious illnesses to
Sudanese hospitals. The clinics also provided vaccinations, reproductive
health services for pregnant women, and medical services for victims of
gender-based violence (see fig. 11).
Figure 11: Health Clinic in Al Salaam IDP Camp in North Darfur
Water and sanitation. The United States provided about $53.5 million for
water and sanitation activities, which consisted of building and
rehabilitating wells, installing hand pumps and latrines, and conducting
hygiene programs. According to NGO officials, the Kalma camp water
facilities we visited served approximately 45,000 IDPs and dispensed
approximately 18 liters of chlorinated water per person per day (above the
Sphere standard of 15 liters)^35 to provide for IDPs' personal needs and
to allow them to water their animals. According to NGO officials, in Abu
Shouk camp, a water tank and hand pumps provided 13.5 liters of water per
person per day (see fig. 12).
Figure 12: Water Pump in Abu Shouk IDP Camp in North Darfur
Protection and income-generation activities. The United States provided
about $28.6 million for protection activities and $9.1 million for
income-generation activities, which USAID and NGO officials indicated
helped protect women and girls by minimizing their exposure to violence.
We observed women building fuel-efficient stoves, which, by requiring less
wood, are intended to reduce the frequency of women's wood-collecting
forays outside the camp and, thus, their vulnerability to attacks (see
fig. 13). We also observed IDPs preparing goods that could be
sold--including making baskets and other goods, preparing fresh pasta, and
sewing garments--to provide sources of income that would reduce their need
to go outside the camps to earn money. Literacy and educational training
was also provided to IDPs in camps in conjunction with income-generation
and protection activities.
Figure 13: Income Generation and Protection Activities in Various IDP
Camps
Provision of Assistance Grew and Health Indicators Improved, but Risk
Remains
Since fiscal year 2004, when the United States and other international
donors began providing humanitarian assistance, the numbers of
humanitarian organizations and staff have grown, and the amount of
humanitarian assistance and the coverage for IDPs and affected residents
have increased. Also, since 2004, malnutrition and mortality rates among
IDPs and affected residents have diminished.
oIncreased presence of humanitarian organizations. According to UN and NGO
officials, U.S. assistance contributed to growth in the number of
humanitarian organizations and staff in Darfur. UN humanitarian profiles
show that from April 2004 to July 2006, the number of international and
national humanitarian aid workers in Darfur expanded from 202 to about
13,500 staff of 84 NGOs and 13 UN agencies.^36 NGO and UN officials in
Darfur indicated that the U.S. contribution was essential to their
operations, in some cases making up the totality of their budget, and that
they would be unable to provide services inside and outside the camps
without U.S. funding.
oIncrease coverage for affected residents and IDPs. Each aid sector in
Darfur provided humanitarian assistance to increasing numbers of affected
residents or IDPs between April 2004 and July 2006 (see fig. 14). The
total affected population receiving assistance such as food, water, and
health care increased, although substantial numbers of affected persons
did not receive assistance, especially in inaccessible areas, owing to
continued security concerns. In addition, after August 2005, the
percentage of the targeted population receiving such assistance began to
decrease, according to the UN, as continued conflict and insecurity in
Darfur limited access to, and distribution of, humanitarian aid.
Figure 14: Affected Population Compared with Recipients of Humanitarian
Assistance, April 2004-July 2006
NGOs and UN agencies reported that assistance provided only to IDPs also
expanded.^37 For example, the number of IDPs receiving sanitation
assistance increased more than sixtyfold, from about 21,000 IDPs in April
2004 to more than 1.4 million IDPs in July 2006.
oReduced malnutrition and mortality rates. Since 2004, malnutrition rates
recorded in Darfur have decreased significantly. A UN World Food Program
survey in Darfur showed that malnutrition rates were significantly lower
in 2005 than in 2004. In addition, although nutrition among IDPs in Darfur
remains precarious, UN nutritional reports show improvement since 2004 and
attribute the improvement partly to external assistance and large-scale
food aid. According to UN Emergency Food Security and Nutrition
Assessments, the prevalence of global acute malnutrition in Darfur was
reported at 11.9 percent in March of 2006, a significant decrease from the
21.8 percent reported in October 2004.^38
Furthermore, several mortality surveys have concluded that mortality rates
in Darfur decreased from 2004 to 2005. For example, surveys conducted by
the World Health Organization and Medecins Sans Frontieres (also known as
Doctors Without Borders) reported mortality rates ranging between 1.5 to
9.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day in 2004. In September 2005, the UN
World Food Program reported that the crude mortality rate in Darfur had
dropped below the emergency threshold of 1 death per 10,000 persons per
day, as defined by Sphere.^39 Humanitarian assistance provided for Darfur
by the United States and other international donors has been cited as
contributing to improved mortality rates in Darfur. Experts and NGO, UN,
and U.S. officials noted that other factors, such as reduced violence, can
also contribute to a decrease in mortality rates.
Despite the efforts of the humanitarian organizations to increase the
numbers of people receiving humanitarian assistance, as well as provide
assistance to help reduce malnutrition and mortality rates, the situation
in Darfur remains precarious. Continued insecurity restricts humanitarian
organizations' access to IDPs and affected residents of Darfur. In
addition, NGO and UN officials indicated that mortality and malnutrition
rates would likely rise above emergency levels if necessary funding were
not continued.
Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and Oversight
Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, entities
delivering U.S. humanitarian assistance to affected residents and IDPs
have faced numerous challenges. Continued insecurity in the region has
limited the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to access parts of Darfur and
reach all affected residents and IDPs. In addition, the Sudanese
government and rebel groups have placed restrictions and requirements on
NGOs that have severely limited the NGO staffs' ability to travel to and
in Darfur and to provide services to affected residents and IDPs. Further,
the late timing of U.S. funding in 2006 initially limited the operations
of NGOs and UN agencies and threatened to force some reduction in services
in Darfur. Meanwhile, the large size of Darfur and the large quantity of
U.S. humanitarian assistance have challenged USAID's ability to ensure
accountability for the assistance provided. In addition, targeting of
humanitarian assistance for IDPs is complicated by the difficulty of
counting and managing the numbers of people who receive assistance and
their use of the goods provided.
Insecurity in Darfur Has Limited Mobility and Access of Humanitarian Staff
The frequent violence and continued conflict within all three Darfur
states have negatively impacted the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to
provide humanitarian assistance within Darfur. Attacks on, and harassment
of, humanitarian staff, as well as banditry and theft of humanitarian
convoys, have increased throughout Darfur since the beginning of the
humanitarian response; and according to the UN, violence, sexual abuse,
and displacement have dramatically increased since May 2006.
NGO, UN, and U.S. personnel have been injured, abducted, and killed in
attacks against the humanitarian community, and humanitarian staff have
regularly reported harassment from Sudanese government officials.
According to UN and USAID reports, UN and NGO humanitarian staff were
attacked and harassed with increasing frequency in 2005, and NGO staff
members were attacked and abducted. In several instances, drivers and
other humanitarian staff were abducted or killed during attacks on
humanitarian aid convoys. USAID reported more than 200 incidents of
harassment, arrest, or attack against UN, NGO, or AMIS personnel in 2005.
USAID and the UN also reported that increasing violence had resulted in
the deaths of nine humanitarian staff in July 2006--more than the number
of staff killed in the past 2 years. Further, in August 2006, the UN
reported that attacks against humanitarian staff were at a record high.
In addition, banditry and looting of NGO convoys occur with regularity,
according to UN and USAID reports. USAID reported and some UN officials
confirmed the theft of vehicles, cash, food, and other humanitarian aid.
However, many NGO and UN officials told us that the banditry has mainly
resulted in the theft of communications equipment and cash, rather than
the humanitarian aid in the convoy. A World Food Program official
estimated that less than 1 percent of total food aid in Darfur was lost to
banditry, but that the incidents typically resulted in the theft of petty
cash, fuel, or the trucks carrying the World Food Program supplies.
Furthermore, humanitarian access to affected residents and IDPs has been
curtailed as a result of continued conflict, especially in rural areas.
USAID, NGO, and UN officials in Darfur stated that the lack of security
has forced humanitarian organizations to limit access to insecure areas.
For example, in response to continued attacks and insecurity in West
Darfur, in January 2006, the UN Department of Security and Safety
announced the withdrawal of UN staff from most of West Darfur for 2
months, and USAID also removed its staff from West Darfur. (Although UN
access was restricted, some NGOs did not evacuate the area and were able
to continue operations.) According to USAID, the situation dramatically
curtailed the ability of organizations to access the affected residents
and IDP population in the area and to implement life-saving programs in
West Darfur. Additionally, the UN reported that, as a result of
significant insecurity in North Darfur, approximately 460,000 Darfurians
were cut off from emergency food aid in July 2006, and in August 2006,
355,000 Darfurians remained blocked from receiving food aid. According to
the UN, as of August 2006, humanitarian aid organizations' access to IDPs
and affected residents in Darfur was at its lowest levels since 2003, and
areas of inaccessibility were expanding. Meanwhile, an estimated 50,000
people were displaced between June and August 2006.
Sudan Government and Rebel Groups Have Restricted NGO and UN Staff
Movements
The government of Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the rebel groups have
hindered the humanitarian community from accessing affected residents and
IDPs in Darfur. According to UN and NGO officials and USAID, as well as UN
reports, the government of Sudan has restricted access to Darfur for NGOs
and UN agencies since the initial international humanitarian response by
delaying or denying visas and travel permits. NGO officials noted that
issuance of visas for staff is often delayed or denied without
explanation. In addition, according to NGO officials, although the
government of Sudan requires NGO officials to purchase travel permits for
all travel within Darfur, government police and other authorities do not
always accept the permits and often deny access to NGO staff. According to
USAID officials, in September 2006, the government of Sudan restricted
movement of U.S. government personnel to within 25 miles of the
presidential palace in Khartoum, which has forced USAID to remove all
personnel from Darfur. This travel ban remained in place as of October 20,
2006. Rebel groups also place requirements on NGOs that delay
transportation of humanitarian aid or services into rebel-controlled
areas. For example, NGO and UN officials stated that they must contact
numerous rebel leaders to safely transport humanitarian aid into a
rebel-controlled area.
Sudanese government officials in Darfur deny NGO and UN officials
allegations that the government restricts access and travel in Darfur and
insist that the government attempts to help NGOs and UN agencies provide
assistance to the people of Darfur. However, USAID, NGO and UN officials
indicated that although the Sudanese government has an official policy of
cooperation with humanitarian assistance in Darfur, the government's
actions have severely limited humanitarian assistance within the region.
Timing of 2006 U.S. Funding Impacted Humanitarian Operations in Darfur
Delayed provision of more than half of U.S. humanitarian aid for 2006
limited NGO and UN agency partners' ability to supply needed food
assistance and negatively affected their ability to plan for nonfood
assistance. The initial U.S. appropriation for fiscal year 2006 supplied
approximately 44 percent of the total U.S. humanitarian aid funding for
Darfur in fiscal year 2006. With the passage of the supplemental
appropriation on June 15, 2006--9 months into the fiscal year--total U.S.
food and nonfood assistance for 2006 reached the intended levels,
including meeting at least half of the World Food Program's appeal for
Sudan. However, because NGOs and UN agencies in Darfur did not receive the
funds until late in the fiscal year, they were forced to reduce food
rations and temporarily interrupt some humanitarian aid services.
oImpact on food assistance. The provision of approximately 56 percent of
2006 U.S. food aid funding late in the fiscal year made it difficult for
the UN World Food Program to distribute supplies throughout Darfur in a
timely fashion. In particular, because of the 6-month lag between
confirmation and distribution of donations, the delay made it difficult
for the program to preposition food prior to the rainy season, according
to a World Food Program official. Owing in part to this delay, the program
announced in April 2006 that, beginning in May, it would reduce rations in
Darfur to half the minimum daily requirement (from 2,100 calories to as
few as 1,050 calories per day) to extend limited food stocks. In response,
the Sudanese government donated sorghum, and the President of the United
States directed USAID to ship emergency food stockpiles to Darfur, raising
the rations to 84 percent (1,770 kilocalories) of the daily requirement
for Darfurians receiving food aid. In June, the cereal component of the
ration was fully restored. However, as of October 2006, the World Food
Program continued to face gaps in food aid, and, according to program
officials, it planned to maintain the 84 percent ration through the end of
the calendar year.
According to a World Food Program official in Khartoum, if the current
level of funding had been available earlier in the year, the ration cuts
could have been avoided entirely. A USAID official told us that, although
the reduction in 2006 U.S. funding did not significantly decrease the food
aid contribution for Darfur, the delay of $137 million (56 percent) of the
2006 U.S. food aid funding until late in the fiscal year negatively
affected the food situation in Darfur earlier in the year. This outcome
aligns with previous GAO findings that lack of sufficient, timely
donations contributed to food aid shortfalls in other emergency
situations.^40
oImpact on nonfood assistance. The delay of U.S. nonfood humanitarian
assistance, as well as a reduction in funding from other international
donors, led NGO and UN officials to anticipate a negative impact on
nonfood humanitarian operations in Darfur. In February 2006, these
officials told us that the initial U.S. funding for the year had been less
than planned for and needed to ensure continued levels of assistance to
Darfur's affected residents and IDPs. As a result of the funding delays,
the NGO officials said, their organizations would be forced to make cuts
in the services and programs they provided or to reduce their humanitarian
aid staff in Darfur. For example, one NGO official indicated that the
reduction in funding had forced the organization to downsize its health
program and to transfer responsibility for the clinics to the Sudanese
government. Several NGO and UN officials also indicated that without
additional funds, key indicators such as the malnutrition and mortality
rates, which had improved in 2005, would likely rise again above emergency
levels. USAID officials told us in October 2006 that after receiving the
supplemental funding, USAID's partners had been able to restore
humanitarian programs in Darfur to their previous levels and coverage.
Oversight of Assistance Was Limited by Reduced Staff and Incomplete
Reporting
USAID's ability to provide oversight and measure the impact of U.S.
humanitarian assistance in Darfur has been limited by reductions in its
staff who could directly monitor U.S. assistance or ensure that
implementing partners fulfilled reporting requirements.
From April 2004 to July 2006, as NGO and UN humanitarian staff in Darfur
significantly increased--from 202 to 13,500--USAID's staff in Darfur
decreased. During the first 2 years of the conflict, USAID staff ranged
between 10 and 20 personnel; within the last 9 months, that number has
been reduced to 6 to 8 USAID personnel. USAID officials believe that the
remaining number of USAID personnel is adequate to oversee the
implementation of U.S. humanitarian assistance and USAID grant agreements,
among other responsibilities.^41 USAID officials indicated that other,
external factors, such as UN and U.S. Embassy security requirements and
restrictions imposed by the government of Sudan, limit the number of staff
in Darfur. In addition, USAID officials indicated that they visited camps
and communicated with NGO and UN agency officials regularly to discuss
operations and difficulties and to assist in delivering humanitarian
assistance. However, USAID officials told us that owing to limited time
and staff in Darfur, security restrictions throughout the region, the size
of Darfur, and the scale of U.S. assistance provided, they could not
monitor compliance with all of the grant agreement indicators at locations
in Darfur that were targeted for assistance.
Furthermore, required NGO reporting has been incomplete. As a result,
USAID lacks information to evaluate NGO operations, monitor their
performance, and measure the impact of the assistance provided.^42
According to USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Guidelines
for Proposals and Reporting, NGOs must submit proposals outlining the
indicators and outcomes expected from the humanitarian activities and
services provided for with U.S. funds. Each grant agreement also specifies
that 90 days after the agreement's expiration, the NGO must submit a final
report that includes the cumulative achievements and a comparison of
actual accomplishments against the goals, objectives, indicators, and
targets established for the agreement. Examples of indicators used by NGOs
in proposals include, for example, the crude mortality rate in the target
population or the number of latrines constructed. However, we found that 6
of 15 final reports that NGOs were required to submit by June 1, 2006, had
not been submitted to USAID. Moreover, most of the reports that NGOs
submitted did not include all required information.
USAID's Darfur Program Manager stated that because officials maintain
constant communication with NGOs and conduct evaluations of activities in
Darfur, the agency is aware of implementing partners' accomplishments, or
lack thereof, in Darfur, despite the incompleteness of most NGO reports.
However, the reports and indicators are essential in monitoring and
evaluating humanitarian operations, given that USAID staff are often
constrained by limited access due to insecurity and violence throughout
Darfur. In response to our observations USAID acknowledged the importance
of obtaining required reports and has taken efforts to ensure reporting
compliance from its NGO partners. As a result, USAID reported that in July
2006 it received all quarterly reports from current NGO partners.
Difficulties Existed in Ensuring that U.S. Assistance Was Used as Intended
Challenges in accurately counting the populations of IDP camps have made
it difficult for NGOs and UN agencies to ensure that all U.S. humanitarian
assistance was provided to the intended recipients. In addition, some IDPs
used humanitarian assistance for purposes other than those for which it
was intended.
oIn part because the IDP camps' large size makes it difficult to control
who receives assistance, some assistance has been distributed to
recipients other than those targeted. For example, UN humanitarian
profiles show that between December 2004 and October 2005, IDPs in Kalma
camp, the largest camp in Darfur, were estimated at between 103,000 and
163,000. The World Food Program distributed food aid for IDPs based on
these estimates. Prior to October 2005, several efforts to count the
actual number of IDPs in Kalma camp were determined to be invalid because
of problems with the counts and an inability to stop non-IDPs from
participating. An October 2005 count was completed by more than 400 staff
from six NGOs, with help from USAID staff, and with assistance from
Sudanese government troops--who surrounded the camp to stop non-IDPs from
entering--and AMIS civilian police, who provided security inside the camp.
On October 4, 2005, a count of 87,000 was declared accurate, approximately
70,000 IDPs less than the previous estimate. According to a USAID
official, residents from the nearby state capital of Nyala had previously
received improper food distributions at the camp. According to USAID,
without accurate counts of camp populations, the humanitarian community
struggles to distribute food aid appropriately to the populations with the
greatest need.
oNot all resources and assistance are being used as intended, although
USAID and NGO officials indicated that this is typical of any emergency
situation, especially one of this size and duration. For example, in Abu
Shouk camp, we observed IDPs using treated drinking water to make bricks,
either for their own shelters or for sale on the market. According to a UN
official, IDPs in the camp used approximately 30 percent of available
water in the camp to make bricks and, as a result, 8 of the 30 water pumps
in Abu Shouk dried up.
African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have
Been Incomplete or Inconsistent
Although the African Union's peace support operation has reportedly
contributed to a reduction of large-scale violence in Darfur, AMIS's
actions to fulfill its mandate in Darfur have been taken in an incomplete
or inconsistent manner. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire
agreement, the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in
Darfur have actively investigated alleged cease-fire agreement violations.
However, the resulting reports have not been reviewed according to
established procedure or widely publicized to identify parties who have
violated the agreement. To build confidence and to improve security, the
second and third components of its mandate, AMIS troops have taken actions
such as conducting patrols and escorting IDP women who leave camps to
forage for firewood. In addition, AMIS troops have intervened to stop
impending violence against civilians and provided escorts for NGO convoys
in some instances, although AMIS has not intervened in other instances.
Further, the AMIS civilian police are working with Sudanese police to
improve law enforcement, but the civilian police have encountered
difficulties with the Sudanese authorities. To support AMIS's efforts to
meet its mandate, the U.S. government provided about $280 million from
June 2004 through September 2006, according to State, primarily to build
and maintain the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur.
AMIS Is Seen as Having Made Important Contribution
AMIS is viewed by many as having made an important contribution in Darfur.
U.S. and other officials cite AMIS as responsible for decreasing
large-scale violence simply by the deterrent effect of its presence in the
region. State officials have emphasized that AMIS participants have a
strong desire to be effective and make the AMIS initiative work and that
the presence of AMIS's patrols has had a positive impact. Further, a
senior UN official told us that AMIS "jumped into Darfur" with few
resources in a genuine attempt to "put out this fire" and that AMIS's
presence has had a notable impact. Further, State and UN officials noted
that AMIS forces were deployed to Darfur quickly in comparison with other
international peacekeeping missions.
AMIS Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have Been
Incomplete or Inconsistent
AMIS has taken a number of positive actions in Darfur in response to its
mandate to (1) monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, (2)
assist in confidence building, and (3) contribute to improving
security.^43 However, some of these actions have been executed in an
incomplete or inconsistent manner, limiting the extent to which AMIS has
been able to fulfill its mandate.
AMIS Has Monitored Cease-fire Compliance, but Monitoring Has Been
Incomplete
To address the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in
Darfur investigated and identified a number of violations of the 2004
cease-fire agreement. However, the Joint Commission has not consistently
reviewed the resulting Ceasefire Commission investigation reports.
Further, the publicly available record of recent cease-fire violation
investigations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish how many
total cease-fire violations have been identified by the Ceasefire
Commission since its creation in 2004 and which parties have been
responsible for recent cease-fire agreement violations.
Ceasefire Commission reports provide specific information regarding
violations.^44 The commission found that all three parties to the conflict
had committed violations, many of which occurred in South Darfur. Of the
80 allegations of cease-fire agreement violations that we reviewed,^45 the
Ceasefire Commission was unable to make a determination in 30 instances,
often because an outside party (such as the Janjaweed) had allegedly
committed the violation. These cases involved acts such as the killing of
numerous civilians at a time and attacks on villages. In several cases,
the Sudanese government was accused of fighting alongside the Janjaweed.
In three of the cases we reviewed, the Ceasefire Commission determined
that no violation had occurred. For the remaining 47 allegations of
cease-fire agreement violations, the Ceasefire Commission found 54
violations.^46
oSudanese government. The commission found that the Sudanese government
had committed 27 cease-fire agreement violations. Among these violations,
9 involved civilian deaths; 10 involved village attacks; 7 involved
attacks, harassment, or intimidation of civilians; and 7 involved Sudanese
troop movements into new territory without proper notification to the
Ceasefire Commission.
oSLM/A. The commission found that the SLM/A had committed 25 cease-fire
agreement violations. Among these violations, six involved attacks on
Sudanese facilities (e.g., military camps, police stations, convoys);
seven involved abductions of civilians, local political representatives,
or Sudanese government personnel; two involved village attacks; and two
involved civilian deaths.
oJEM. The commission found that the JEM had committed two cease-fire
agreement violations, both of which involved attacks on Sudanese
facilities.
The Ceasefire Commission's recommendations in the reports vary from
general to specific. General recommendations include urging the parties to
the conflict to adhere to the cease-fire agreement; reminding them that
they are required to give the commission prior notice of any
administrative troop movements; and requesting party leaders to educate
their members about the provisions of the agreement. More specific
recommendations include those recommending that the Sudanese government
disarm, neutralize, or restrain the Janjaweed and that SLM/A stop looting,
or return looted goods, and release those whom it had abducted. In reports
issued after November 2004, the Ceasefire Commission frequently appealed
to the Joint Commission to become more involved in various aspects of the
monitoring process.
However, although the reports provide detailed information regarding
parties that violated the cease-fire agreement and the nature of the
violations, African Union and U.S. officials told us that the Joint
Commission had not met regularly, had been ineffective in reviewing
reports, and had no means of forcing the violating parties to take action
based on report results. Further, although the Joint Commission has
condemned cease-fire violations by the parties to the conflict and asked
all parties to end all attacks, a DOD official noted that officials at
African Union headquarters were not pushing the Joint Commission to review
or approve Ceasefire Commission reports.
African Union and U.S. officials emphasized that because the reports are
available on the African Union's Web site and publicly identify violators
of the cease-fire agreement, the reports pressure the parties to the
conflict to improve compliance with the agreement. The officials viewed
this transparency and resulting pressure as a central benefit of the
reports. However, we found that the public record of investigated
cease-fire violations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish the
total number of alleged or confirmed violations and to identify all
responsible parties. For example, we were unable to open 37 of the 116
Ceasefire Commission reports listed as available on the African Union's
Web site. Further, we were unable to locate any reports subsequent to
September 2005 to validate other claims regarding violations. For example,
no Ceasefire Commission reports are publicly available to substantiate or
refute a January 2006 report, which was prepared by the Chairperson of the
African Union Commission and submitted to the Peace and Security Council,
stating that cease-fire violations had escalated since October 2005 and
that some of the most serious violations had occurred since that time.^47
Confidence-Building and Security-Improvement Efforts Have Been Sporadic
To fulfill the second and third components of the mandate, AMIS forces
have provided patrols and escorts for IDPs, NGOs, and U.S. contractor
staff; intervened to prevent violence; and collaborated with Sudanese
government police. However, in some instances, AMIS patrols and escorts
have not been able to prevent attacks or to provide needed services; AMIS
forces have not intervened consistently to prevent violence; and AMIS
civilian police have had difficult relations with the Sudanese police.
AMIS Has Provided Patrols and Escorts but Has Not Prevented All Attacks or
Provided All Needed Protection
To build confidence among affected residents and IDPs and create a more
secure environment, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting
patrols and providing escorts for vulnerable groups. However, AMIS escorts
and the escorted groups have sometimes encountered violent attacks, and
AMIS has had insufficient resources to provide all needed escort services.
oPatrols. AMIS officials at several AMIS camps we visited told us that
AMIS military observers or civilian police try to conduct about two
patrols each day, for example, to make AMIS's presence known and to
interact positively with local communities, collect information, or
investigate an alleged cease-fire agreement violation. We accompanied one
confidence-building patrol near the North Darfur town of Kabkabiya; AMIS
military observers interviewed local residents and a community leader to
identify any problems that required AMIS attention. (See fig. 15.)
Figure 15: AMIS Confidence-Building Patrol Near Kabkabiya in North Darfur
oEscorts. To further build confidence and improve security, AMIS troops
have also provided escorts for groups of women foraging for firewood
outside IDP camps. According to African Union and U.S. officials, the
presence of AMIS troops has prevented these groups from being attacked. We
accompanied an AMIS escort of a group of women as they walked more than 9
miles outside the town of Kass in South Darfur to find firewood for the
next several days. Escorted by AMIS protection force troops and civilian
police, as well as Sudanese government police, the 79 women went about
their activities freely and without incident (see fig. 16). AMIS officials
also told us that they have escorted NGO convoys to prevent theft and
banditry.
Figure 16: AMIS Firewood Patrol Near Kass in South Darfur
However, in several instances, AMIS troops or those being escorted have
been threatened or killed. For example, several people were killed in
rebel attacks on convoys, including four Nigerian soldiers and two local
contractor staff in October 2005.^48 In July 2006, 32 AMIS soldiers
escorting a fuel convoy in North Darfur were abducted by one SLM/A
faction; although the soldiers were eventually released, two fuel tanker
drivers, the fuel tankers, and four AMIS vehicles were not released at
that time. According to a senior U.S. contracting official working in
Darfur, the drivers and tankers were released in October 2006, and the
vehicles have not been returned. According to a December 2005 African
Union-led assessment of AMIS (with participation from the UN, European
Union, and United States), such incidents "undermine the Mission's
credibility in the eyes of civilians and embolden those who may target
AMIS."^49 Further, a UN official emphasized that AMIS's ability to provide
services such as firewood escorts is limited and that AMIS cannot begin to
cover all instances where such escorts would be useful.
AMIS Has Intervened to Prevent Violence in Some Cases but Not in Others
AMIS troops have also intervened to protect civilians under imminent
threat of violence, as directed by the African Union mandate. For example,
according to the December 2005 assessment of AMIS, AMIS troops were
deployed to Zalingei in West Darfur to prevent retaliation against IDPs
when there was heightened tension following the kidnapping of civilians by
the SLM/A. Another AMIS deployment to Muhajariya halted a Sudanese
military advance on the town that could have resulted in the substantial
displacement of IDPs. In addition, following attacks on the town of Labado
in South Darfur in late 2004, a deployment of AMIS troops in January 2005
deterred further attacks and led to the return of many town residents, who
began to repair their homes and rebuild their lives.^50
However, in other instances, AMIS has not intervened to prevent violence.
For example, according to UN and U.S. documentation, AMIS did not maintain
a regular presence around Mershing and its surroundings in South Darfur
despite concerns about security in the area and repeated requests from the
international community for a continuous AMIS presence. Ultimately, armed
militia attacks resulted in the death of several IDPs and subsequent
displacement in early 2006.^51 In addition, an NGO official told us that
AMIS was slow in responding to requests for assistance from NGOs caught in
a battle between SLM/A and Sudanese government forces in the Jebel Marra
area; however, AMIS did help evacuate NGO staff from the area 24 hours
after the conflict began. According to an AMIS commander, although AMIS
has taken preemptive action to stop attacks or skirmishes, the territory
is too large for AMIS to be able prevent such violence overall.
AMIS Has Collaborated with Sudanese Police, but Relations Have Been
Difficult
AMIS has worked with the Sudanese police to improve security,^52 but some
of its relations with the Sudanese police have been problematic. AMIS
civilian police officers reported to us that they were working to ensure
that the Sudanese police are acting on cases provided by the AMIS civilian
police.^53 AMIS civilian police also noted that, where appropriate, they
have encouraged the use of village councils to resolve disputes, rather
than referring every case to the Sudanese authorities.
However, some AMIS civilian police officers reported that relations with
the Sudanese police had at times been difficult. AMIS civilian police
officers told us that Sudanese police had been slow to act on cases
provided by AMIS, that these cases often do not result in convictions or
adequate punishment, and that it can be difficult to obtain information
from the Sudanese police regarding the status of referred cases. In
addition, AMIS civilian police mentioned that Sudanese police have at
times perpetrated violent acts against citizens of Darfur and AMIS police.
Moreover, the civilian police have had difficulty gaining access to some
areas that are controlled by rebel groups and lack an official Sudanese
police presence.
Further, the limited and misunderstood role of AMIS's civilian police
frustrated IDPs and NGO staff, who expressed the view that these police
provided limited useful services. IDPs and NGOs told us that they did not
understand why civilian police did not get involved when problems arose.
Their frustration was heightened by the fact that civilian police have
visible stations adjacent to IDP camps.^54 AMIS and UN officials also
noted that because the civilian police are unarmed, they require AMIS
protection force escorts, which are not always available.
U.S. and Other External Donors Have Supported African Union's Efforts to
Fulfill Its Mandate
The United States has supported AMIS primarily by funding the construction
and maintenance of AMIS camps in Darfur by a contractor, PAE Government
Services, Inc. (PAE). Other international donors have provided funding or
goods and services to support AMIS's peacekeeping operations.^55
U.S. Government Has Funded AMIS Camps
To support AMIS's efforts to carry out its mandate, the U.S. government
expended about $240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and obligated
another $40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and maintain
the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to a
State official who tracks this funding.^56 African Union and U.S.
officials told us that camp sites were chosen to be near population
centers and known conflict areas. State contracted with PAE to build and
maintain the camps as well as to maintain AMIS vehicles and communication
equipment (see fig. 17).^57 PAE is also maintaining armored personnel
carriers provided by Canada; the Canadian government has provided State
with more than $20 million for fiscal year 2006 for this purpose. Finally,
PAE is responsible for hiring, housing, and compensating U.S. military
observers (referred to by State officials in Darfur as "U.S.
representatives" owing to their range of contributions to AMIS beyond
observing activities).^58 Although 16 U.S. military observers are
authorized, only 11 were on the ground in Darfur during our February 2006
visit.^59
Figure 17: AMIS Camps
Construction of the 32 camps, between June 2004 and December 2005,
involved a number of challenges. According to a senior PAE official in
Darfur, key costs associated with building the camps included supplying
generators and, particularly as construction was beginning, transporting
supplies and equipment via aircraft. Construction of the camps, which
together can house 9,300 people,^60 was complicated by the difficulty of
finding international staff willing to come to Darfur and local staff
possessing adequate skills. In addition, the remote locations of camp
sites, combined with the inadequate condition of roads throughout the
region, made it difficult to transport building supplies to the sites; PAE
officials told us that in some cases, supplies were transported across
insecure areas via donkeys. Further, the various augmentations of AMIS
over time (including the introduction of the civilian police component)
had to be incorporated into preexisting building plans. Moreover, the
relatively small size of some of the land parcels provided by the
government of Sudan made it difficult for PAE to, for example, construct
sufficient perimeter protection around camps. Other sites provided by the
government are in vulnerable locations; for instance, PAE officials
identified one camp that was built in a natural "bowl," making protection
problematic, although steps were recently taken to relocate portions of
this camp.
According to PAE and State officials, PAE's current costs for maintaining
the camps, as well as AMIS communications equipment and vehicles, are
about $7.8 million per month.^61 PAE faces additional challenges in
maintaining AMIS facilities, with the provision of water a key difficulty.
According to a PAE situation report dated May 5, 2006, there are
significant concerns regarding the provision of an uninterrupted supply of
water to several AMIS camps.^62 In some cases, unprotected water bore
holes have been sabotaged. In the past, PAE also experienced the theft of
jet fuel. A PAE official noted that other environmental challenges to
maintaining the camps include heat, ultraviolet rays, and sand.
Other International Donors Have Provided Cash, Goods, and Services
The European Union, also a key AMIS donor, has provided about $200 million
as direct budget support for AMIS operational costs such as per diem^63
and food, according to a State official. Many other donor contributions
have been "in kind"--that is, goods and services rather than direct
funding. For example, the Canadian government loaned AMIS 25 helicopters
and 105 armored personnel carriers; the British government provided
vehicles and ground fuel; the Dutch government provided communications
equipment; and the Norwegian government is building civilian police
stations near IDP camps.^64 Further, since October 2004, the UN has
provided assistance to AMIS via a technical assistance cell working in
Addis Ababa and funded by the UN Mission in Sudan. According to an
official in the cell, it has provided services such as technical support
(including an August 2005 UN-led exercise to prepare AMIS for troop
deployments and identify areas where capacity building was required) and
training (such as arranging training for military observers and bringing a
financial officer to African Union headquarters for 3 months to assist
with financial management). NATO has also provided training for AMIS
personnel and has assisted with troop rotation efforts.^65
Numerous Factors Have Complicated AMIS Efforts
Numerous factors have been identified by AMIS and U.S. government
officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS's difficulties in meeting
its mandate. These factors include inadequacies in management,
organization, and capacity; a relatively small force; resources that have
been constrained or inefficiently allocated; and a lack of information
regarding, and cooperation from, parties to the conflict.^66 As AMIS has
faced operational and other challenges, the UN has approved a UN
peacekeeping operation in Darfur when AMIS's mandate expires; however, as
of October 2006, the Sudanese government had rejected the proposal. In
June 2006, following a NATO offer, the African Union formally requested
assistance from NATO in, among other things, identifying lessons learned
from AMIS operations; however, according to a State official, African
Union headquarters had taken no further action to pursue this review as of
August 2006. Meanwhile, instability and violence have continued in Darfur.
Inadequacies in Management, Organization, and Capacity Have Hampered AMIS
Deployment
AMIS has reportedly experienced numerous difficulties in its management,
organization, and capacity that have limited its ability to carry out its
mandate.
Inadequate and Inconsistent Management
Regarding AMIS management, U.S., UN, and other sources have commonly
expressed the view that AMIS's command and control has been inadequate and
confused.^67 A UN-led assessment of AMIS in August 2005 stated, "The
evolution of the mission has been such that it has depended on individual
components conducting their own planning rather than tackling problems
from a mission perspective. This has led to considerable disparity between
components, duplication of effort, and the potential for planning at cross
purposes."^68 A State official emphasized that AMIS has had no clear lines
of authority between Addis Ababa, El Fasher, and the field and that a lack
of coordination has made a rapid response to crisis situations
problematic. A Refugees International study reported that "AMIS has
suffered from language and cultural barriers between officers from various
countries, confusion in procedures, limited future planning, and
ineffective communications systems. Much of this stems from lack of
peacekeeping experience."^69 The Brookings Institution-University of Bern
study also stated that AMIS command and control had been slow and
cumbersome and that "[t]he unwieldy bureaucracy at African Union
headquarters hampered all aspects of deployment; there is no institutional
expertise for peace operations yet in the [African Union]."^70
Moreover, AMIS leadership has demonstrated inconsistency in interpreting
the AMIS mandate, creating confusion among AMIS troops and civilians and
limiting its protection of civilians within its capabilities.^71 AMIS
leadership's willingness to take certain actions to meet the mandate--for
example, to protect civilians--has varied throughout Darfur, as already
noted. State officials have observed that AMIS's willingness to actively
protect Darfur residents to the extent provided for in the mandate has
been "uneven." A U.S. official we met with in Sudan noted that in some
cases, the degree to which AMIS's mandate was robustly interpreted seemed
to depend on leadership personalities.^72
Lack of Coordination
According to the December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS,
"military and police mission components are not operating in a
sufficiently joint and coordinated manner."^73 The Brookings
Institution--University of Bern study noted a similar problem, stating
that the civilian police "rely on the AMIS protection force for their
movements, but they are not currently integrated into military planning
structures."^74 Many parties, including U.S. and UN officials, have called
for the creation of a joint operations center that would serve as the
focal point for the coordination and integration of AMIS military and
civilian police operations; however, such a unit has not yet been created.
On the other hand, a joint logistics operations center has been
established to improve the logistical coordination of the AMIS
components.^75
Limited Capacity
African Union, U.S., and other sources have identified problems with the
capacity and experience of African Union and AMIS as a key factor
negatively affecting AMIS performance. According to the Brookings
Institution-University of Bern study, "For many commanders, this African
Union mission is their first operational experience."^76 Troops are also
viewed as having limited experience. For example, according to a Human
Rights Watch report, "[African Union] troop-contributing countries have
sometimes struggled to identify and deploy properly trained staff
officers, particularly those with appropriate language skills.... Most
troop-contributing countries have previously contributed to UN missions
that were often western-led operations, thus leaving the [African Union]
troops with limited operational experience above the tactical level."^77
An African Union official and a U.S. official noted separately that,
although AMIS has training standards, little is done to verify that AMIS
troops arriving in Darfur have received appropriate training. Further,
according to the Brookings Institution-University of Bern study, the
quality of AMIS police is not adequate, with limited screening prior to
deployment to Darfur.^78
Small Size of AMIS Force Has Limited Its Ability to Patrol and Protect
The AMIS force, with its 7,271 personnel, has been characterized as a
relatively small contingent that cannot effectively monitor and patrol all
of Darfur, an area almost the size of France with a punishing environment
(however, some regions in Darfur, such as the far north, are largely
unpopulated [see fig. 2]).^79 According to State officials, the small size
of the force has limited AMIS's ability to patrol such a large, difficult
region and sufficiently interact with residents and other parties in
Darfur. Further, according to a Refugees International report, "AMIS
doesn't have enough troops to sufficiently protect itself, let alone
protect displaced civilians and humanitarian organizations."^80 In
addition, an International Crisis Group document stated in July 2005 that
as many as 15,000 troops were needed in Darfur to protect villages and
IDPs, provide security for humanitarian
operations, and neutralize militias.^81 The December 2005 African
Union-Led Joint Assessment of AMIS reported that the absence of an
authorized battalion had a significant operational impact and
overstretched existing personnel.^82
Constrained and Inefficiently Allocated Resources Have Restricted AMIS
Operations
African Union and other parties have stated that AMIS does not have
sufficient resources, including equipment and translators, to conduct the
activities necessary to fulfill its mandate.^83 A senior African Union
official told us that AMIS's reliance on outside donors has resulted in a
lack of control for the mission because basic operational elements, such
as facilities, logistics, and funding rest in the hands of other parties.
According to January 2006 African Union documentation, the African Union
has not been able to provide critical resources, such as vehicles and
communications equipment, in a timely fashion; as a result, AMIS has
functioned with about half of the needed logistical capacity. U.S.
officials have countered that the African Union has at times been slow to
respond to offers of assistance or to prioritize resource needs. During
some periods, donor support for AMIS has been less than what the African
Union had expected, with African Union documentation stating that a lack
of funds has been a major constraint.
According to African Union officials, a lack of resources such as vehicles
and long-range communications equipment has complicated AMIS operations.
For example, one AMIS commander told us that AMIS has inadequate
transportation equipment^84 and communications equipment, as well as a
lack of night vision equipment. AMIS officials whom we interviewed
expressed their concern that the lack of adequate communications equipment
limited their ability to interact with different camps in the region.
Further, an AMIS civilian police official noted that the civilian police
often receive less equipment than the military component of AMIS, which
has resulted in situations such as the need to rely on military
colleagues' equipment to communicate with their civilian police
colleagues. One AMIS commander also noted that AMIS required more
printers, computers, and photocopiers. However, a DOD official noted that
until AMIS makes the most efficient use of its current resources, such as
vehicles and communications equipment, it is unclear whether more
resources are needed.^85 Further, the December 2005 African Union-led
report on AMIS notes that, where civilian police matters are concerned,
equipment is both insufficient and incorrectly distributed.^86
A lack of translators who can facilitate discussions between AMIS and the
residents of Darfur has also been repeatedly cited as a central problem
hindering AMIS's ability to monitor compliance with the cease-fire
agreement or build confidence. According to an official from the African
Union's Darfur Integrated Task Force, AMIS needs about 200 interpreters;
however, as of February 2006, AMIS had only about 70 interpreters. The
lack of interpreters has been attributed to the difficulty in finding
people who speak both Arabic and English. One U.S. military observer told
us that many uneducated people in Darfur speak only their tribal language,
further complicating AMIS's ability to ensure effective communication. In
addition, we were told that at times, AMIS patrols used representatives of
the parties to the conflict as translators, which meant that AMIS
officials could not verify that translators were conducting the interview
in an objective fashion, asking the required questions, or reporting
responses accurately. In one example provided by an AMIS civilian police
official in El Daein in South Darfur, an SLM/A translator stated that a
woman had said she was "helped" in a particular instance, when in fact she
had stated that she had been violently attacked. Someone within the
investigative team was able to discern that this mistake had been made and
communicate it to the rest of the team. IDPs also voiced frustration over
the lack of civilian police translators able to communicate with IDPs and
respond to IDPs reporting violence in the camps.
AMIS Has Had Limited Information on, and Cooperation from, Parties to the
Conflict
Several analyses of AMIS have commented on its lack of capacity to collect
needed intelligence regarding the situation in Darfur. The International
Crisis Group has noted that "AMIS does not have an intelligence apparatus
or collection capacity and does not actively analyze or disseminate
intelligence." The Brookings Institution-University of Bern study further
stressed that "[g]ood intelligence is vital in Darfur, yet AMIS's capacity
to gather, analyze and act on information has been very weak."^87
According to a former U.S. military observer to AMIS, "The African Union
does not understand the importance of having an `intelligence cell' and of
having good information on the command structure, for example, of the
Janjaweed." The December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS
emphasized, "If AMIS operations are to be effective, the use of
intelligence is essential," and further noted that the lack of
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination seriously reduces the
effectiveness and focus of operations.^88
The December 2005 African Union-led assessment also noted:
U.S. and UN officials emphasized an instance where the government of Sudan
detained the 105 Canadian armored personnel carriers at the border and
released them only after intense external pressure. A U.S. embassy
official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, noted that Dutch communications
equipment had been in Khartoum customs for months, demonstrating how the
Sudanese government can obstruct, rather than facilitate, AMIS operations.
In addition, all parties to the conflict--the Sudanese government, the
SLM/A, and the JEM--have been cited several times for violating the 2004
cease-fire agreement. Representatives of these parties to Ceasefire
Commission investigations, particularly the Sudanese government, routinely
file objections to final report conclusions. According to an International
Crisis Group report, "AMIS was born out of the N'djamena agreement [2004
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement], which lacked a true enforcement
mechanism and was based on the assumption of compliance and goodwill by
the parties. International pressure on those parties to respect their
commitments has been ineffective, thus undermining the [African Union]
mission."^90
UN and NATO Offers of Assistance Have Not Been Acted On; Meanwhile,
Violence in Darfur Continues
While AMIS has faced challenges in Darfur, the UN and NATO have offered to
assist the African Union in, respectively, supplying a peacekeeping force
when AMIS's mandate expires at the end of December 2006 and identifying
lessons learned from AMIS operations. The U.S. government and other
parties have supported the proposed transition of AMIS responsibilities to
a UN peacekeeping operation. In January 2006, the African Union's Peace
and Security Council officially declared its approval, in principle, for
the transition of AMIS to a UN operation.^91 In March, the council
reaffirmed this position, and in May it declared that "concrete steps
should be taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping
operation."^92 The UN Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution
endorsing this African Union decision to transition AMIS to a UN
peacekeeping operation and emphasizing that a UN operation would have, to
the extent possible, a strong African participation and character.^93 In
August 2006, the UN
Security Council adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS's mandate and
calling for an UNMIS deployment to Darfur.^94
According to a State official, a UN operation would be expected to build
on AMIS efforts. Some portion of troops already participating in AMIS
would be "bluehatted"--that is, could transition to UNMIS. According to a
State official, under this scenario, the UN mission would have a unified
command for the entire operation, with separate commanders for UNMIS
efforts in southern Sudan and Darfur. According to the Department of State
fiscal year 2007 budget request and a State official, this UN effort in
Sudan would cost the U.S. government about $442 million in fiscal year
2007; a State official roughly estimated that the Darfur portion of this
operation would cost the United States between $160 million and $180
million for the year.^95
As of October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to a
UN force in Darfur. However, in October the Sudanese president expressed
support for a September offer by the UN Secretary-General to provide
assistance to AMIS. The UN assistance package consists of equipment and
personnel dedicated to supporting AMIS in the following ways: logistical
and material support, military staff support, advisory support to civilian
police, and other staff support in the areas of assistance in implementing
the Darfur Peace Agreement, public information, mine action, and
humanitarian coordination.
In addition, in June 2006, following an offer by NATO, the Chairperson of
the African Union Commission requested that NATO provide, among other
things, assistance in reviewing AMIS operations in Darfur to identify
"lessons learned," which could help the African Union better execute any
future peace support efforts. However, a State official reported that,
although the Chairperson of the African Union Commission formally accepted
NATO's offer of this assistance, as of August 2006, the African Union
headquarters had taken no further action to pursue the review.^96 Such
reviews are typically conducted after peacekeeping operations are
completed; for example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation's Best
Practices Section undertakes such reviews following UN peacekeeping
efforts.^97
Meanwhile, instability and violence continued in Darfur, furthering calls
for UN involvement. According to a report prepared by the Chairperson of
the African Union Commission, as of May 2006, "the region has continued to
witness persistent insecurity, with ceasefire violations, banditry
activities, hijacking of vehicles, attacks on villages and killing of
unarmed civilians by the various parties, particularly the janjaweed." One
NGO reported 200 sexual assaults around Kalma camp in South Darfur within
5 weeks during the summer of 2006 and the African Union reported that two
AMIS soldiers were killed in mid-August. In August 2006, the environment
in Darfur remained insecure, with attacks and displacement continuing and,
during some periods, worsening over time. State has noted that the
Sudanese government offensive that began in August 2006 against parties
that did not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the
ability of AMIS to conduct operations, the African Union's ability to
implement the agreement, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. A senior
State official reported that "Darfur is on the verge of a dangerous
downward spiral. The parties are rearming and repositioning to renew their
fighting." The level of acceptance of the peace agreement overall in
Darfur is uncertain, owing to a general lack of information throughout the
population regarding the terms of the agreement as well as concern over
the fact that the smaller SLM/A faction and the JEM declined to sign the
deal. UN officials have warned that continued militia attacks on IDPs are
affecting implementation of the peace agreement and emphasized that
successful implementation of the agreement is key to peace in Darfur, in
the Sudan, and in the wider region. In September 2006, an African Union
Peace and Security Council communique noted that "the security situation
remains volatile and continues to deteriorate even further in some parts
of Darfur, consequently worsening the humanitarian and human rights
situation, and the current build-up of forces by all the parties poses
further risks and challenges to the peace efforts." On September 19, 2006,
the U.S. President named former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as a
Presidential Special Envoy to lead U.S. efforts to resolve outstanding
disputes in Darfur.
Conclusions
As the primary donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur, the United
States has provided essential aid for the people of Darfur and improved
the health and livelihood of IDPs and affected residents. Without U.S.
assistance, the humanitarian organizations responding to the crisis would
likely have been incapable of providing coverage to many of the affected
population. The U.S. contribution to building and maintaining all AMIS
facilities has also been essential, along with other donor assistance, to
AMIS's ability to pursue its mandate. As insecurity continues in Darfur,
such support may be required well into the future.
At the same time, delayed humanitarian assistance has hindered NGO and UN
operations, jeopardizing these USAID partners' ability to provide services
to affected and IDP communities needed to maintain improved levels of
health. Further, continued resistance and lack of cooperation from the
government of Sudan, as well as continued insecurity and conflict within
Darfur, have made it nearly impossible for humanitarian organizations to
provide consistent and complete coverage to the affected residents and
IDPs throughout Darfur. Although USAID has taken steps to ensure more
complete reporting, the limitations in its oversight of U.S. assistance
have made it difficult to accurately determine the impact of U.S.
humanitarian assistance. The fact that the violence in Darfur has not
abated, and has even worsened in some instances, indicates the region's
need for continued assistance.
Although AMIS is seen as having contributed, through its presence in
Darfur, to decreasing large-scale violence, its fulfillment of its mandate
has been limited by the incompleteness or inconsistency of some of its
actions--such as efforts to protect civilians--in addition to numerous
operational challenges. Some of these challenges--for example, AMIS's
small size, its resources constraints, and the lack of cooperation from
the parties to the conflict--have remained beyond its control. However,
other challenges, such as AMIS's inadequate management, organization, and
capacity, may stem from the African Union's lack of experience with peace
support efforts. At the same time, the ongoing and increasing violence in
Darfur, as well as AMIS's added responsibilities under the May 2006 peace
agreement, make it likely that the challenges AMIS has faced will
intensify. The proffered NATO assistance in reviewing AMIS operations---a
typical "lessons learned" activity following a peacekeeping
initiative--could provide a useful critical analysis of these challenges
and their root causes. The resulting insights could assist the African
Union in strengthening AMIS, if its mandate is renewed, as well as in
planning and executing any future peace support efforts. Absent a stronger
AMIS or intervention by another international party such as the UN, the
conflict in Darfur could continue indefinitely to disrupt and destroy the
lives of Darfurians.
Recommendation
We recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the Chairperson of the
African Union Commission to ensure that an appropriate body, such as NATO,
provide assistance for an assessment of AMIS operations to identify the
key challenges AMIS has faced and the reasons for those challenges. Such a
"lessons learned" assessment would provide information necessary to allow
(1) the African Union to strengthen its future peace support planning and
operations and (2) the donor community to support future African Union
peace support efforts in a manner that could minimize difficulties such as
those encountered by AMIS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense
as well as USAID. We received written comments from the Department of
State and USAID. The Department of State supported our recommendation and
noted that the report presents a balanced and accurate picture of the
situation in Darfur. The department also suggested that the report provide
additional details or characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS,
issues. For example, State suggested that the report should (1) emphasize
the speed with which AMIS forces were deployed to Darfur and (2) note that
the Sudanese government's offensive against parties that did not sign the
Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to
conduct operations. We incorporated such information into the report as
appropriate. See appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and our
response. USAID commented that in general, it found the report to be a
comprehensive assessment of USAID's involvement in Darfur but said that we
should include additional information in our discussions of areas such as
the number of USAID staff working in Darfur and the variety of efforts
used by the agency to monitor grants. Specifically, USAID stated that our
reference to reduced staff in Darfur was incomplete and felt that our
discussion of incomplete reporting did not highlight other monitoring
efforts, such as site visits and meetings with NGOs. We made adjustments
as appropriate. See appendix VI for a reproduction of USAID's letter and
our response. DOD provided no comments on the draft report.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director
of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator, relevant congressional
committees, and other interested parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3149 or at [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. Other contacts and major contributors are listed
in appendix VII.
David Gootnick, Director
International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help
relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have
encountered, (3) the African Union's efforts to fulfill its peace support
mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation of this
mandate.
We collected data on international contributions (in dollar amounts) for
Darfur provided by the UN Resource Tracking Service from September 2003
through June 2006. The amounts provided by the UN contain both amounts
committed and amounts pledged for Darfur by international donors. We did
not include pledges and commitments from international donors that support
the refugees located in Chad, because we did not review U.S. obligations
to refugees in Chad. We made this decision because (1) security
restrictions and conflict in the area prevented us from observing
U.S.-funded activities in Chad and (2) the support for refugees in Chad
was small in comparison with assistance provided to Darfur. We determined
that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of broadly
comparing the United States' contributions with those of other
international donors. We noted several limitations in the data, notably,
that the data include verbal pledges that were self-reported to the UN
Resource Tracking System by the donors. According to a UN official, the
data may exceed other, similar UN data on donor contributions, because
they include verbal pledges that have not been formally submitted to and
verified by UN sources. Furthermore, we were unable to determine the
reliability of financial records and the dollar amounts reportedly pledged
by donors.
To review U.S. funding of humanitarian assistance--our first objective--we
collected and reviewed U.S. obligations data for assistance for Darfur
from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition
Initiatives, and Office of Food for Peace, as well as The Department of
State (State) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. To assess the
reliability of these data, we interviewed State and USAID officials
regarding their methods for managing and tracking the obligation data, and
we compared these data with the amounts listed in State's and USAID's
agreements with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and UN agencies.
According to a USAID official, expenditure data for the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance are not tracked in the office's reporting system, but
the data are reconciled on a daily basis and include any amounts that may
have been de-obligated. A USAID Food for Peace official also indicated
that the office's tracking system is also reconciled on a regular basis.
Therefore, we concluded that the data we collected on obligations from
each agency are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reviewing U.S.
humanitarian assistance for Darfur from October 1, 2003, through September
30, 2006.
To review the activities and programs undertaken with U.S. humanitarian
assistance, we reviewed USAID grant agreements. We interviewed USAID and
State officials in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials located in
New York who were involved in humanitarian assistance for Darfur. In
February 2006, we traveled to Khartoum and Darfur, Sudan, to examine the
activities supported by U.S. humanitarian assistance. In Khartoum we met
with U.S. implementing partners from NGOs and UN agencies, as well as an
official from the government of Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In
addition, we visited seven camps for internally displaced persons
(IDP)--Abu Shouk, Al Salaam, El Serif, Kalma, Kass, Otash, and Zam
Zam--located in North and South Darfur to observe activities and programs
implemented with U.S. funds. We observed a variety of programs and
activities supported by U.S. assistance, including food distribution,
medical clinics, clean water and sanitation facilities, income-generation
activities, provision of shelter materials, and nutritional feeding
centers. We spoke with officials from the NGOs and UN agencies
implementing these activities programs in Darfur. We also spoke with IDPs
in the camps to obtain their perspectives on the provision of humanitarian
assistance in the camps. Restrictions placed on our travel by the State
Regional Security Officer in Khartoum because of security concerns limited
the area in which we traveled and observed NGO and UN operations in
Darfur.
To examine the results of the humanitarian assistance activities, we
reviewed the 15 final reports submitted by NGOs to USAID's Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance. We reviewed the original NGO proposals to
identify the indictors used to identify performance, and we also reviewed
USAID guidance for reporting. We compared the indicators included in the
original proposals to the reported indicators in each final report and
identified the indicators that were absent from the final reports. We
interviewed USAID officials to identify USAID's efforts to monitor and
evaluate NGO and UN activities in Darfur as well as efforts to motivate
NGOs to submit final reports. We also reviewed the Office of Food for
Peace performance review questionnaires submitted by implementing partners
providing food aid for Darfur. In addition, we spoke with an official from
the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives to discuss an ongoing program
review. We also reviewed UN Humanitarian Profile reports that provide an
overview of humanitarian assistance from April 2004 to July 2006. These
reports were also used to identify the IDP and affected resident
population in Darfur, by month. According to UN officials and the
profiles, NGOs and UN agencies operating throughout Darfur submitted the
information from the reports to the UN on a monthly basis until January
2006, and now submit it quarterly. Although the data contained in the
reports are self-reported, UN officials indicated that they confirm data
to the extent possible and update the data each month. Furthermore, the UN
Humanitarian Profiles are the only source of information regarding the
total number of IDPs and affected residents in Darfur and the number of
IDPs receiving assistance in each sector. We determined that the
population data and the data regarding the population receiving assistance
were reliable for the purposes of presenting a general overview of
assistance in Darfur.
To determine the obstacles and challenges facing NGOs and UN agencies--our
second objective--we reviewed UN and USAID reports and cables discussing
humanitarian operations and problems in Darfur. We interviewed USAID, UN,
and NGO officials in Darfur to discuss the challenges they face in
implementing assistance program and activities in Darfur. We also met with
officials from the Sudan government Humanitarian Assistance Committee to
discuss the obstacles and concerns of NGOs and UN officials operating in
Darfur and obtain the perspective and input of the Sudan government
regarding these issues.
In order to identify African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) efforts and the
operational challenges AMIS has faced--our third and fourth objectives--as
well as resources available to AMIS to pursue its mandate, we used
numerous African Union sources. We reviewed African Union Peace and
Security Council communiques, as well as reports prepared by the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission that were submitted to the
council. We also reviewed African Union-led reviews of AMIS, conducted in
March and December 2005, as well as a UN-led assessment of AMIS
performance conducted in August of that year. In February 2006, we met
with AMIS leadership (military and civilian police) at AMIS headquarters
in El Fasher and the following AMIS group sites in North and South
Darfur--Zam Zam, Kabkabiya, Sarif Umra, Um Kadada, Nyala, Kass and El
Daein--where we discussed the AMIS mandate and AMIS activities at each
location. We also discussed AMIS efforts with the U.S. representative to
the African Union-led Ceasefire Commission, as well as U.S.
representatives (military observers) in four locations. We were unable to
travel to AMIS sites in West Darfur owing to security concerns. At African
Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, we met with senior African
Union officials, including the Commissioner for the African Union's Peace
and Security Council and the head of the Darfur Integrated Task Force in
February 2006. To assess reports prepared by the AMIS Ceasefire
Commission, we analyzed the contents of all publicly available reports
from the African Union's Web site, [72]www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm
.
We also discussed the African Union's initiative in Darfur and external
donor efforts with officials from the Departments of State (in Washington,
D.C.; Khartoum and El Fasher, Sudan; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) and
Defense (DOD). At State headquarters in Washington, we discussed the
situation in Darfur and AMIS efforts with the following bureaus and
offices: Administration, African Affairs; International Organization
Affairs; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Population, Refugees, and
Migration; and War Crimes Issues. At DOD, we met with the staff from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, we reviewed UN Security
Council resolutions, UN reports that addressed the situation in Darfur,
and a UN August 2005 report that assessed AMIS operations. We met with
officials from the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.
We also met with European Union and UN officials at African Union
headquarters in Addis Ababa. In addition, we met with officials from, and
reviewed reports prepared by, expert and advocacy groups such as the
International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and Refugees
International. Finally, we met with Sudanese government officials in
Khartoum and Washington, D.C.
To review the U.S. government's support for AMIS, we discussed this
support with officials from the African Union and Departments of State and
Defense. To identify contractor activities, we reviewed the contract
documentation defining the terms for tasks performed by PAE Government
Services, Inc., (PAE) in Darfur. Further, we reviewed PAE weekly situation
reports, describing events related to camp construction and maintenance
and submitted to State, and met with officials from PAE in Washington,
D.C., and North and South Darfur. We also discussed PAE's efforts with an
official who was working on contract in Darfur as State's Contracting
Officer's Technical Representative. PAE and State officials accompanied us
on our visit to AMIS camps, providing tours of each AMIS site, as well as
to the logistics operating base in El Fasher and the forward operating
base in Nyala, explaining the process for constructing and maintaining
AMIS facilities. We determined that data obtained from PAE were
sufficiently reliable for inclusion in our report. To identify the amount
of U.S. funding that has been provided to construct and maintain AMIS
camps, we spoke with State officials from the African Affairs and
Administration bureaus. In particular, we had detailed discussions with a
key official from the African Affairs Bureau who provided information on
funding, provided by fiscal year, and the funding source. The official
prepared a calculation of U.S. funding for PAE efforts independently. All
figures addressing State funding to support AMIS provided in the report
are attributed to this State official and were not independently verified.
However, after discussions with multiple State officials knowledgeable
about State support for PAE who cited the State official as a key source
within State for this information, combined with a review of State's
information by PAE officials, we have determined that the funding
information provided is sufficiently reliable for inclusion in our report
with appropriate attribution. We discussed oversight regarding this
funding with State officials in Darfur and Washington.
We conducted our work from September 2005 to November 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II
Timeline of Darfur Events
Source: GAO.
Appendix III
Evolution of AMIS
The African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) evolved as the African Union has
authorized the incremental deployment of thousands of personnel to carry
out its responsibilities in Darfur. In May 2004, after three parties
signed the April 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement, the African
Union's Peace and Security Council authorized an observer mission to
Darfur.^1 This mission began operations in June 2004 with 60 military
observers and 300 protection force soldiers as well as observers from the
Sudanese parties. In July, the Peace and Security Council called for a
comprehensive plan to enhance the effectiveness of the mission, including
the possibility of transforming the mission into a full-fledged
peacekeeping mission to ensure the effective implementation of the
cease-fire agreement.^2 In October 2004, in conjunction with the issuance
of an African Union report that discussed the status of the mission and
described the situation in Darfur,^3 the council decided to enhance AMIS
to a total of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel
(military observers and protection force troops), among them 450
observers; up to 815 civilian police personnel (the first time that a
civilian police component was formally established); and appropriate
civilian personnel.^4
The African Union Peace and Security Council provided AMIS II with the
following specific mandate for its peace support efforts: (1) to monitor
and observe compliance with the 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement;
(2) to assist in the process of confidence building; and (3) to contribute
to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and,
beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, and to
contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur.
In working to meet this mandate, the council decided that AMIS II would,
among other tasks, "protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent
threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it
being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the
responsibility of the government of Sudan."
In early 2005, the African Union decided to augment AMIS once again. In
April 2005, the Peace and Security Council authorized increasing the size
of AMIS to 6,171 military personnel, in addition to an appropriate
civilian component, including up to 1,560 civilian police personnel (for a
total of more than 7,700).^5 This further expansion is referred to as AMIS
II-E. These AMIS personnel operate throughout eight sectors in Darfur that
have been established to help organize AMIS efforts. A Darfur Integrated
Task Force was established at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, to assist with planning, force generation, procurement and
logistics, and administrative support and to interact with AMIS donors.
The African Union did not call for an AMIS civilian police presence until
AMIS operations were well under way. The civilian police component was
added to AMIS in October 2004 to, according to a senior UN official,
further the "rule of law" by working with Sudanese police. The European
Union was a strong proponent of a civilian police component, and European
Union officials told us that the civilian police gave European Union
member states the opportunity to play a direct role in AMIS by providing
police staff. Specifically, the role of the civilian police is, among
other things, to establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police,
observe and report on Sudanese police service delivery, and monitor the
security of IDPs.
As of April 30, 2006, AMIS had 7,271 personnel in Darfur (755 military
observers, 5,086 soldiers/protection force, and 1,430 civilian police).^6
According to a UN official, AMIS deployed its troops much faster than the
UN could have done (although UN efforts have higher standards regarding
aspects of deployment such as required troop skills and equipment). The
majority of AMIS soldiers have come from Rwanda and Nigeria, with
additional troops from Senegal, Gambia, and South Africa.^7 Military
observers from more than 20 countries (numerous African countries and the
United States, the European Union, and the three parties to the conflict)
and civilian police are participating in AMIS. The total number of the
AMIS force deployed in Darfur is far less than the authorized AMIS size of
more than 7,700--according to African Union sources, primarily because
expected South African troops were never fully deployed to Darfur.
In January 2006, the African Union's Peace and Security Council officially
declared its approval, in principle, for the transition of AMIS to a UN
operation.^8 In March, the council reaffirmed this position, and in May it
declared that "concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition
from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation."^9 The UN Security Council
subsequently adopted a resolution commending AMIS's role in reducing
large-scale, organized violence in Darfur; endorsing this African Union
decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation; and stressing
that a UN operation would have, to the extent possible, a strong African
participation and character.^10 In August 2006, the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS's mandate and calling for an UNMIS
deployment to Darfur.^11 The mandate of AMIS expires on December 31, 2006.
Appendix IV
NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. Nonfood Assistance Funding during
Fiscal Years 2004-2006
Source: USAID and State.
Appendix V
Comments from the Department of State
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter dated
October 2, 2006.
GAO Comments
1.We have added the U.S. contribution of training and equipping Rwandan
and Nigerian battalions through the African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to footnote 65.
2.We have added State's perspective regarding the quick deployment of AMIS
troops, as well as a similar view expressed by a senior UN official
working in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
3.The report's discussion of rebel group control over humanitarian access
reflects the views of UN and NGO officials. Further, the report cites
banditry and looting, as well as more violent acts, such as attacks and
the killing of humanitarian workers.
4.Owing to scope and time limitations, our review of specific AMIS
operations did not cover the period subsequent to the signing of the
Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. However, we have added State's point
regarding Sudanese government actions against parties that did not sign
the agreement.
5.As noted above, our review did not assess AMIS operations subsequent to
the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, although we have
identified instances of violence against the AMIS civilian police since
that time, such as (1) the burning of a civilian police station and three
vehicles by IDPs in Hassahisa IDP camp at Zalengei and (2) the killing of
a civilian police language assistant and the attack of eight civilian
police officers by IDPs in Kalma IDP camp at Nyala. Such incidents appear
contrary to the portrayal of the relationship between the civilian police
and IDPs provided here by State.
6.The report states that the improvements in mortality in Darfur have been
attributed, in part, to the humanitarian assistance provide by the United
States.
7.We have added this point to footnote 5.
Appendix VI
Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
Following are GAO's comments on USAID's letter dated October 17, 2006.
GAO Comments
1.The current number of USAID staff in Darfur has been reduced from as
many as 20 people to the current number of 6 staff in Darfur, although the
crisis in Darfur has resulted in increased number of IDPs and affected
residents that require assistance and a greater number of NGOs and UN
agencies operating in Darfur. We understand that USAID does not always
have control over staffing decisions and is sometimes limited by staff
ceilings set by State. However, we believe that in the absence of complete
reporting by NGOs, a reduction in USAID staff, complicated by the current
inability of these staff to work in Darfur, affects USAID's ability to
provide comprehensive oversight of U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance in
Darfur.
2.We determined that 6 of the 15 required final reports were not submitted
by USAID partners and that most of the reports did not provide all
required information. The lack of required reporting prevented USAID from
fully monitoring NGO performance and measuring the impact of U.S.
humanitarian assistance to Darfur. However, we report additional USAID
monitoring and evaluation efforts, such as regular communication with
NGOs, performed by USAID in Darfur. In addition, we note that such efforts
can be limited by issues identified in our report such as travel
restrictions imposed by the Sudanese government and continuing insecurity
throughout the region. We also have added information to the report noting
recent USAID efforts to collect reports from its implementing partners
that reportedly resulted in 100 percent compliance with quarterly
reporting requirements in July 2006. USAID's recent emphasis on collecting
required reports may improve its ability to conduct oversight of
U.S.-funded humanitarian operations in Darfur.
3.In late October, we identified a UN humanitarian profile for July 1,
2006, that had become available to the public. This document stated that
the number of IDPs stood at 1.85 million as of July 1, 2006.
Appendix VII
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the person named above, Emil Friberg, (Assistant Director),
Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Leslie Holen, Theresa Lo, Reid Lowe,
Grace Lui, John F. Miller, and Chhandasi Pandya made key contributions to
this report.
Bibliography
Published Reviews of AMIS Operations
[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10 - 20 December 2005.
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), MAPEX Exercise AMIS Renaissance
After Action Review, August 2005.
The [African Union] Assessment Mission to Darfur, Sudan 10-22 March 2005:
Report of the Joint Assessment Team.
Human Rights Watch, "Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change, The African
Union
Mission in Sudan," January 2006 (available at
[73]http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106 ).
International Crisis Group, "The [African Union]'s Mission in Darfur:
Bridging the Gaps," Africa Briefing No. 28, July 2005 (available at
[74]http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547 ).
International Crisis Group, "The [European Union]/[African Union]
Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination," Africa Report No.
99, October 2005 (available at
[75]http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766 ).
Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein, "No Power to Protect: The African
Union Mission in Sudan," Refugees International, November 2005 (available
at
[76]http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222
).
William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis, "Protecting Two Million Internally
Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur,"
Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on
Internal Displacement, November 2005 (available at
[77]http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm ).
(320375)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-9 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact David Gootnick at 202 512-3149 or
[email protected].
Highlights of [79]GAO-07-9 , a report to congressional requesters
November 2006
DARFUR CRISIS
Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and
Operational Challenges
In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel groups,
government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, known as the
Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million Darfurians and has
so affected over 1.9 million others that they require assistance. Since
October 2003, the U.S. government has provided humanitarian assistance in
Darfur and supported African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) efforts to
fulfill a peace support mandate. This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian
assistance provided to Darfur and the challenges that have been
encountered and (2) African Union efforts to fulfill its mandate and
challenges that have affected these efforts.
[80]What GAO Recommends
This report recommends that the Secretary of State encourage the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission to ensure that a "lessons
learned" assessment of AMIS operations is conducted in order to (1)
strengthen future African Union peace support planning and operations and
(2) optimize future donor assistance. The Department of State supports
this recommendation.
The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to
Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September
2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food
aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and
sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian
organizations have made significant progress in increasing the number of
people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality
rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other officials attribute
in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. However, USAID and the
entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance have encountered several
challenges that have hampered delivery of, or accountability for,
humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges include continued
insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government restrictions on access to
communities in need; the timing of funding; and an incapacity to ensure
monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-funded programs.
U.S. Food Aid in South Darfur; AMIS Troops in North Darfur
AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its mandate,
although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. For example,
to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement--one mandate
component--AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and identified
numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not consistently
reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available to identify
those violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via private
contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September
2006 tobuild and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur, according to
the Department of State. Numerous challenges have been identified by
African Union or U.S. officials, among others, as negatively affecting
AMIS's efforts in Darfur. These challenges include inadequacies in AMIS's
organization, management, and capacity, such as inconsistent
interpretation of the AMIS mandate; its relatively small forces; limited
or poorly allocated resources; and a lack of intelligence regarding, and
cooperation from, the parties to the conflict. A transition from AMIS to a
UN peacekeeping operation is being considered, although the Sudanese
government has rejected such a transition. A possible NATO-assisted review
of AMIS operations has not been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and
violence continue in Darfur.
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Report to Congressional Requesters
November 2006
DARFUR CRISIS
Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and
Operational Challenges
References
Visible links
72. http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm
73. http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106
74. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547
75. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766
76. http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222
77. http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm
79. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-9
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