Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of
SBInet Program Implementation (24-OCT-07, GAO-08-131T).
In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear,
multibillion dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element
of SBI is SBInet--the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
program responsible for developing a comprehensive border
protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g.,
fencing), and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g.,
radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). The House
Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS progress
in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides GAO's
observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet
infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has
determined the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on
its workforce needs and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP
SBI Program Management Office (PMO) has defined its human capital
goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's
observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as
program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also
conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and
visits to sites in the southwest border where SBInet deployment
is underway. GAO performed the work from April 2007 through
October 2007. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-131T
ACCNO: A77567
TITLE: Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected
Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation
DATE: 10/24/2007
SUBJECT: Border control
Border security
Command control communications systems
Communication systems
Contract administration
Cost overruns
Electronic surveillance
Fences
Homeland security
Human capital planning
Program evaluation
Program management
Schedule slippages
Systems integration
Program implementation
SBInet Program
Secure Border Initiative
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GAO-08-131T
* [1]Summary
* [2]Background
* [3]SBInet Technology Deployment Delays May Increase Schedule Ri
* [4]SBInet Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Track but May B
* [5]SBInet Impact on Border Patrol's Workforce Needs and Operati
* [6]SBI PMO Did Not Meet All of Its Staffing Goals and Has Not Y
* [7]Concluding Observations
* [8]Contacts and Acknowledgments
* [9]GAO's Mission
* [10]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [11]Order by Mail or Phone
* [12]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [13]Congressional Relations
* [14]Public Affairs
Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Management, Investigations, and
Oversight, and Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on
Homeland Security,
House of Representatives
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE
Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director
Homeland Security and Justice Issues
GAO-08-131T
Chairman Sanchez, Mr. Souder, Chairman Carney, Mr. Rogers and Members of
the Subcommittees:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss observations on selected aspects
of the Secure Border Initiative's SBInet program implementation.
Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband,
including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a
major concern. Much of the United States' 6,000 miles of international
borders with Canada and Mexico remains vulnerable to illegal entry.
Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends hundreds of
thousands of people entering the country illegally each year, several
hundreds of thousands of individuals also enter the United States
illegally and undetected. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of
the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar
program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration.
Elements of SBI will be carried out by several organizations within DHS.
One element of SBI is SBInet. Under SBInet, the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) is responsible for developing a comprehensive border
protection system.
You requested that we monitor the SBInet program and provide periodic
updates on the status of the program. My testimony today is the first in a
series of interim reports on SBInet implementation and focuses on the
following issues:
o SBInet's technology implementation;
o SBInet's infrastructure implementation;
o the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet
technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating
procedures; and
o how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO)^1 has defined
its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve
these goals.
^1The SBInet PMO is part of the CBP SBI PMO. The SBInet PMO is responsible
for overseeing all SBInet activities; for acquisition and implementation,
including establishing and meeting program goals, objectives, and
schedules; for overseeing contractor performance; and for coordinating
among DHS agencies.
To address these issues, we analyzed DHS documents, including program
schedules and status reports, and workforce data. We interviewed DHS and
CBP headquarters and field officials, including representatives of the
SBInet PMO, Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate. We also visited the Tucson and Yuma, Arizona
Border Patrol sectors^2--two sites where SBInet deployment was underway at
the time of our review. We performed our work from April 2007 through
October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. (App. I provides a detailed discussion of our scope and
methodology.)
We also have work underway to review other components of the SBInet
program. Specifically, we are conducting work for the House Committee on
Homeland Security to assess the development and deployment of SBInet's
command, control, and communications systems, and surveillance and
detection systems and expect to issue a report next year. In addition, we
are reviewing DHS's use of performance-based services acquisition, an
acquisition method structured around the results to be achieved instead of
the manner by which the service should be performed. We expect to issue a
report on this effort in January 2008.
Summary
DHS has made some progress to implement the first segment of SBInet
technology, Project 28--a $20 million project to secure 28 miles along the
southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule.
Boeing--the prime contractor that DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and
sustain systems of new surveillance and communications technology across
U.S. borders--delivered and deployed the system components (i.e., radars,
sensors, computers) to the Project 28 site in the Tucson sector on
schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months after it
was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol agents were to
begin using SBInet technology to support their activities, and CBP was to
begin its operational test and evaluation phase. According to CBP and
Boeing officials, the delays are primarily attributed to software
integration problems--such as long delays in radar information being
displayed in command centers. In September 2007, CBP officials told us
that Boeing was making progress in correcting the system integration
problems, but CBP was unable to provide us with a specific date on when
Boeing would complete the necessary corrections to make Project 28
operational. CBP reports that it is in the early stages of planning for
additional SBInet technology projects along the southwest border; however,
Boeing's delay in completing Project 28 has led CBP to extend timelines
for deploying some technology projects scheduled for calendar years 2007
and 2008. CBP reports that it has taken steps to strengthen its contract
management for this project.
^2The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors responsible for detecting,
interdicting, and apprehending those who attempt illegal entry or smuggle
people--including terrorists or contraband, including weapons of mass
destruction--across U.S. borders between official ports of entry.
Deploying SBInet's infrastructure along the southwest border is on
schedule, but meeting the SBInet program's goal to have 370 miles of
pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December
31, 2008, may prove challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its
intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007
and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates
that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus
far. In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure construction labor
costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of Defense (DOD)
military personnel. However, CBP officials report that they plan to use
commercial labor for future fencing projects. The additional cost of
commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs
suggest future deployment could be more costly than planned. Also, while
deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP officials
reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because of factors
the officials will continue to face, including conducting outreach
necessary to address border-community resistance, identifying and
completing steps necessary to comply with environmental regulations, and
addressing difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands.
The impact of SBInet on the Border Patrol's workforce's needs and
operating procedures remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not
fully identified or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border
Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from the current
projections, but until the system is fully deployed, the direction and
magnitude of the change is unknown. In addition, for the Tucson sector,
where Project 28 is being deployed, the Border Patrol is developing a plan
on how to integrate SBInet into its operating procedures. Moreover, the
delays in deploying Project 28 will require revising the SBInet's training
curriculum, and trainers and operators will be retrained.
The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its
staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that
staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide adequate
contractor oversight. In addition, the SBI PMO has not yet completed its
long-term human capital planning.
In their oral comments on a draft of this statement, DHS generally agreed
with our findings and provided clarifying information that we incorporated
as appropriate.
Background
The SBInet program is responsible for identifying and deploying an
appropriate mix of technology (e.g., sensors, cameras, radars,
communications systems, and mounted laptop computers for agent vehicles),
tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing, vehicle barriers, roads,), rapid
response capability (e.g., ability to quickly relocate operational assets
and personnel) and personnel (e.g., program staff and Border Patrol
agents) that will enable CBP agents and officers to gain effective
control^3 of U.S. borders. SBInet technology is also intended to include
the development and deployment of a common operating picture (COP) that
provides uniform data through a command center environment to Border
Patrol agents in the field and all DHS agencies and to be interoperable
with stakeholders external to DHS, such as local law enforcement. The
initial focus of SBInet is on the southwest border areas between ports of
entry^4 that CBP has designated as having the highest need for enhanced
border security because of serious vulnerabilities. Through SBInet, CBP
plans to complete a minimum of 387 miles of technology deployment across
the southwest border by December 31, 2008. Figure 1 shows the location of
select SBInet projects underway on the southwest border.
^3DHS defines effective control of U.S. borders as the ability to
consistently: (1) detect illegal entries into the United States; (2)
identify and classify these entries to determine the level of threat
involved; (3) respond to these entries; and (4) bring events to a
satisfactory law enforcement resolution.
^4At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of people and
cargo into and out of the country, while facilitating legitimate travel
and trade.
Figure 1: Select SBInet Projects Under Way on the Southwest Border
In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing Company for
3 years, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor,
Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected
SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure projects. In this way,
Boeing has extensive involvement in the SBInet program requirements
development, design, production, integration, testing, and maintenance and
support of SBInet projects. Moreover, Boeing is responsible for selecting
and managing a team of subcontractors that provide individual components
for Boeing to integrate into the SBInet system.^5 The SBInet contract is
largely performance-based--that is, CBP has set requirements for SBInet
and Boeing and CBP coordinate and collaborate to develop solutions to meet
these requirements--and designed to maximize the use of commercial
off-the-shelf technology. ^6 CBP's SBInet PMO oversees and manages the
Boeing-led SBInet contractor team. The SBInet PMO workforce includes a mix
of government and contractor support staff. The SBInet PMO reports to the
CBP SBI Program Executive Director.
CBP is executing part of SBInet activities through a series of task orders
to Boeing for individual projects. As of September 30, 2007, CBP had
awarded five task orders to Boeing for SBInet projects. These include task
orders for (1) Project 28, Boeing's pilot project and initial
implementation of SBInet technology to achieve control of 28 miles of the
border in the Tucson sector; (2) Project 37, for construction
approximately 32 miles of vehicle barriers and pedestrian fencing in the
Yuma sector along the Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR);^7 (3) Program
Management, for engineering, facilities and infrastructure, test and
evaluation, and general program management services; (4) Fence Lab, a
project to evaluate the performance and cost of deploying different types
of fences and vehicle barriers; and (5) a design task order for developing
the plans for several technology projects to be located in the Tucson,
Yuma, and El Paso sectors.
^5Boeing employs several companies as subcontractors on the SBInet
project. These companies provide Boeing with a variety of services. For
example, Boeing has used a subcontractor to install laptops into CBP
vehicles, while it has used another to develop and deploy mobile sensor
towers.
^6Commercial off-the-shelf is a term for software or hardware, generally
technology or computer products, that are available for sale, lease, or
license to the general public.
^7Project 37 consists of three phases, which when complete are to provide
control over 37 miles of border in the Yuma sector. The first two phases
focus on deployment of tactical infrastructure. The third phase will focus
on technology systems.
In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, the
SBInet PMO plans to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing
and 200 miles of vehicle barriers by December 31, 2008. Whereas pedestrian
fencing is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing the border,
vehicle barriers are other physical barriers meant to stop the entry of
vehicles. The SBInet PMO is utilizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) to contract for fencing and supporting infrastructure (such as
lights and roads), complete required environmental assessments, and
acquire necessary real estate.^8
DHS has estimated that the total cost for completing the deployment for
the southwest border--the initial focus of SBInet deployment--will be $7.6
billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. DHS has not yet reported the
estimated life cycle cost for this program, which is the total cost to the
government for a program over its full life, consisting of research and
development, operations, maintenance, and disposal costs.^9 For fiscal
year 2007, Congress appropriated about $1.2 billion for SBInet, about
which 40 percent DHS had committed or obligated as of September 30, 2007.
For fiscal year 2008, DHS has requested an additional $1 billion.^10
SBInet Technology Deployment Delays May Increase Schedule Risks
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment of
technology on the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned
schedule. Project 28 is the first opportunity for Boeing to demonstrate
that its technology system can meet SBInet performance requirements in a
real-life environment.^11 Boeing's inability thus far to resolve system
integration issues has left Project 28 incomplete more than 4 months after
its planned June 13 milestone to become operational--at which point,
Border Patrol agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support
their activities, and CBP was to begin its operational test and evaluation
phase. Boeing delivered and deployed the individual technology components
of Project 28 on schedule.^12 Nevertheless, CBP and Boeing officials
reported that Boeing has been unable to effectively integrate the
information collected from several of the newly deployed technology
components, such as sensor towers, cameras, radars, and unattended ground
sensors. Among several technical problems reported were that it was taking
too long for radar information to display in command centers and newly
deployed radars were being activated by rain, making the system unusable.
In August 2007, CBP officially notified Boeing that it would not accept
Project 28 until these and other problems were corrected. In September
2007, CBP officials told us that Boeing was making progress in correcting
the system integration problems; however, CBP was unable to provide us
with a specific date when Boeing would complete the corrections necessary
to make Project 28 operational. See figures 2 and 3 below for photographs
of SBInet technology along the southwest border.
^8The SBInet PMO contracted with Boeing Company to construct 32 miles of
fencing in the BMGR. Deployment of this fencing has been completed, and
the SBInet PMO plans to use USACE to contract for all remaining pedestrian
fencing and vehicle barriers to be deployed through December 31, 2008.
^9GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for
Supporting Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements, GAO-07-430
(Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
^10DHS and DOD appropriations bills for fiscal year 2008 that include
additional funding for border security are awaiting final action in
Congress.
^11CBP has established performance requirements for SBInet technology.
These include requirements for (1) probability of detection; (2) correctly
identifying threats; (3) apprehension; (4) system availability; and (5)
false alarm rate.
Figure 2: Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower Deployed in Tucson Sector
^12Project 28 components include: 9 mobile radar/sensor towers; 4
underground sensors, 70 small hand-held satellite phones for agents to
communicate throughout the Tucson sector; and 50 CBP agent vehicles with
secure-mounted laptop computers and communications capabilities.
Figure 3: At Left, Mounted Laptop Installed in Border Patrol Vehicle; at
Right, Project 28 Command and Control Center
The SBInet PMO reported that is in the early stages of planning for
additional SBInet technology projects along the southwest border; however,
Boeing's delay in completing Project 28 has led the PMO to change the
timeline for deploying some of these projects. In August 2007, SBInet PMO
officials told us they were revising the SBInet implementation plan to
delay interim project milestones for the first phase of SBInet technology
projects, scheduled for calendar years 2007 and 2008.^13 For example,
SBInet PMO officials said they were delaying the start dates for two
projects^14 that were to be modeled on the design used for Project 28
until after Project 28 is operational and can provide lessons learned for
planning and deploying additional SBInet technology along the southwest
border. According to the SBInet master schedule dated May 31, 2007, these
projects were to become operational in December 2007 and May 2008. Despite
these delays, SBInet PMO officials said they still expected to complete
all of the first phase of technology projects by the end of calendar year
2008. As of October 15, 2007, the SBInet PMO had not provided us with a
revised deployment schedule for this first phase.
^13The SBInet PMO plans to deploy SBInet projects in three phases. Phase
one projects are scheduled between April 2007 and December 2008; phase two
projects are scheduled between May 2008 and early 2010; and phase three
projects are scheduled to begin in May 2009.
^14The two projects are Project 37 BMGR phase three technology deployment,
and the Texas Mobile System, technology deployment for about 70 miles of
border in the El Paso sector.
CBP reports that it is taking steps to strengthen its contract management
for Project 28. For example, citing numerous milestone slippages by Boeing
during Project 28 implementation, in August 2007, CBP sought and reached
an agreement with Boeing to give it greater influence in milestone setting
and planning corrective actions on the Project 28 task order. While CBP
had selected a firm-fixed-price contract to limit cost overruns on Project
28,^15 CBP officials told us that the firm-fixed-price contract CBP used
for Project 28 had limited the government's role in directing Boeing in
its decision making process. For example, CBP and contractor officials
told us they expressed concern about the timeline for completing Project
28, but CBP chose not to modify the contract because doing so would have
made CBP responsible for costs beyond the $20 million fixed-price
contract.^16 In mid-August 2007, CBP organized a meeting with Boeing
representatives to discuss ways to improve the collaborative process, the
submission of milestones, and Boeing's plan to correct Project 28
problems. Following this meeting, CBP and Boeing initiated a Change
Control Board.^17 In mid-September representatives from Boeing's SBInet
team and its subcontractors continued to participate on this board and
vote on key issues for solving Project 28 problems. Although CBP
participates on this committee as a non-voting member, a senior SBInet
official said the government's experience on the Change Control Board had
been positive thus far. For example, the official told us that the Change
Control Board had helped improve coordination and integration with Boeing
and for suggesting changes to the subcontractor companies working on
Project 28.
^15A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to
any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in
performing the contract. This contract type places maximum risk upon the
contractor and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or
loss.
^16In April 2007, CBP and Boeing reached an agreement to modify the terms
of the Project 28 contract, increasing it to about $20.66 million. CBP
modified the contract to add several project design requirements that the
existing task order did not address.
^17The Change Control Board is a voting body that represents the interests
of program and project management by ensuring that a structured process is
used to consider proposed changes and incorporate them into a specified
release of a product.
SBInet Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Track but May Be Challenging and
More Costly than Planned
Deploying SBInet's tactical infrastructure along the southwest border is
on schedule, but meeting the SBInet program's goal to have 370 miles of
pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December
31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP set an
intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new pedestrian fencing by the
close of fiscal year 2007 and, having deployed 73 miles by this date,
achieved its goal. Table 1 summarizes CBP`s progress and plans for
tactical infrastructure deployment.
Table 1: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of September 30,
2007
Miles in Miles Total
place deployed miles
Infrastructure before through in Target for Miles remaining to
type SBInet SBInet place 12/31/08 meet 12/31/08 target
Pedestrian
fencing 78 73 151 370 219
Vehicle barriers 57 53 110 200 90
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
Costs for the 73 miles of fencing constructed in fiscal year 2007 averaged
$2.9 million per mile and ranged from $700,000 in San Luis, Arizona, to
$4.8 million per mile in Sasabe, Arizona. CBP also deployed 11 miles of
vehicle barriers and, although CBP has not yet been able to provide us
with the cost of these vehicle barriers, it projects that the average per
mile cost for the first 75 miles of barriers it deploys will be $1.5
million. Figure 4 presents examples of fencing deployed.
Figure 4: At Left, SBInet Fencing Being Deployed at Sasabe, Arizona; at
Right, SBInet Fencing Deployed at Yuma, Arizona
CBP estimates costs for the deployment of fencing in the future will be
similar to those thus far. However, according to CBP officials, costs vary
due to the type of terrain, materials used, land acquisition, who performs
the construction, and the need to meet an expedited schedule. Although CBP
estimates that the average cost of remaining fencing will be $2.8 million
per mile, actual future costs may be higher due to factors such as the
greater cost of commercial labor, higher than expected property
acquisition costs, and unforeseen costs associated with working in remote
areas. To minimize one of the many factors that add to cost, in the past
DHS has used Border Patrol agents and DOD military personnel. However, CBP
officials reported that they plan to use commercial labor for future
infrastructure projects to meet their deadlines. Of the 73 miles of
fencing completed to date, 31 were completed by DOD military personnel and
42 were constructed through commercial contracts. While the non-commercial
projects cost an average of $1.2 million per mile,^18 the commercial
projects averaged over three times more--$4 million.^19 According to CBP
officials, CBP plans to utilize exclusively commercial contracts to
complete the remaining 219 miles of fencing. If contract costs for
deployment of remaining miles are consistent with those to deploy tactical
infrastructure to date and average $4 million per mile, the total contract
cost will be $890 million, considerably more than CBP's initial estimate
of $650 million.
^18CBP's estimates of non-commercial fencing projects do not include labor
costs associated with using government personnel.
^19According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), DHS predicts
that the San Diego fence will have a total cost of $127 million for its
14-mile length when it is completed-- roughly $9 million a mile.
Construction of the first 9.5 miles of fencing cost $31 million, or
roughly $3 million a mile, while construction of the last 4.5 miles of
fencing is projected to cost $96 million, or roughly $21 million a mile.
DHS is proposing to hire private contractors to expedite the construction
of the remaining 4.5 miles of fencing; according to CRS this fact, and the
complexity of the construction, may account for part of the difference in
cost.
Although deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP
officials reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because
factors they will continue to face include conducting outreach necessary
to address border community resistance, devoting time to identify and
complete steps necessary to comply with environmental regulations,^20 and
addressing difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. As of July
2007 CBP anticipated community resistance to deployment for 130 of its 370
miles of fencing. According to community leaders, communities resist
fencing deployment for reasons including the adverse effect they
anticipate it will have on cross-border commerce and community unity. In
addition to consuming time, complying with environmental regulations, and
acquiring rights to border land can also drive up costs. Although CBP
officials state that they are proactively addressing these challenges,
these factors will continue to pose a risk to meeting deployment targets.
In an effort to identify low cost and easily deployable fencing solutions,
CBP funded a project called Fence Lab. CBP plans to try to contain costs
by utilizing the results of Fence Lab in the future. Fence Lab tested nine
fence/barrier prototypes and evaluated them based on performance criteria
such as their ability to disable a vehicle traveling at 40 miles per hour
(see fig. 5), allowing animals to migrate through them, and their
cost-effectiveness. Based on the results from the lab, SBInet has
developed three types of vehicle barriers and one pedestrian fence that
meet CBP operational requirements (see fig. 6). The pedestrian fence can
be installed onto two of these vehicle barriers to create a hybrid
pedestrian fence and vehicle barrier. CBP plans to include these solutions
in a "toolkit" of approved fences and barriers,^21 and plans to deploy
solutions from this toolkit for all remaining vehicle barriers and for 202
of 225 miles of remaining fencing. Further, CBP officials anticipate that
deploying these solutions will reduce costs because cost-effectiveness was
a criterion for their inclusion in the toolkit. SBInet officials also told
us that widely deploying a select set of vehicle barriers and fences will
lower costs through enabling it to make bulk purchases of construction and
maintenance materials.
^20Although the REAL ID Act of 2005 gives DHS the authority to waive all
legal requirements necessary to ensure expeditious construction of certain
specified barriers and roads along the southern border (Pub. L. No.
109-13, div. B, S 102, 119 Stat. 302, 306), DHS officials told us that
they only use this authority after they have pursued alternatives.
Figure 5: Fence Lab crash testing conducted in May 2007
^21 As the SBInet PMO uses testing and evaluation to identify tactical
infrastructure and technology components that effectively secure the
border, the SBInet PMO is approving them for inclusion in a master
"toolkit" of approved solutions. In addition to vehicle barriers and
fences, the toolkit will include technology components such as radars and
satellite phones as well as a list of approved vendors. In the future, the
SBInet PMO plans to choose among its toolkit components to craft border
security solutions.
Figure 6: Vehicle Barriers and Fencing Developed by Fence Lab That Meet
Performance Requirements and Are Included in SBInet's "Toolbox" of
Approved Fences and Barriers.
SBInet Impact on Border Patrol's Workforce Needs and Operating Procedures
Remains Unclear
While SBInet Program officials expect SBInet to greatly reduce the time
spent by CBP enforcement personnel in performing detection activities,^22
a full evaluation of SBInet's impact on the Border Patrol's workforce
needs has not been completed. The Border Patrol currently uses a mix of
resources including personnel, technology, infrastructure, and rapid
response capabilities to incrementally achieve its strategic goal of
establishing and maintaining operational control of the border. ^23 Each
year through its Operational Requirements Based Budget Program (ORBBP),
the Border Patrol sectors outline the amount of resources needed to
achieve a desired level of border control.^24 Border Patrol officials
state this annual planning process allows the organization to measure the
impact of each type of resource on the required number of Border Patrol
agents. A full evaluation of SBInet's impact on the Border Patrol's
workforce needs is not yet included in the ORBBP process; however, the
Border Patrol plans to incorporate information from Project 28 a few
months after it is operational.
^22SBI PMO expects SBInet to provide the capability to predict, deter,
detect, identify, classify, track, respond to, and resolve border
incursion; and the operational enhancements of SBInet will provide
efficiencies by reducing the time agents spend performing detection and
characterization activities.
^23CBP defines operational control as the ability to detect, respond, and
interdict border penetrations in areas deemed as high priority for threat
potential or other national security objectives.
According to agency officials, CBP is on track to meet its hiring goal of
6,000 new Border Patrol agents by December 2008, but after SBInet is
deployed, CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required
to meet mission needs to change from current projections, although the
direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. In addition, in June
2007, we expressed concern that deploying these new agents to the
southwest sectors coupled with the planned transfer of more experienced
agents to the northern border will create a disproportionate ratio of new
agents to supervisors within those sectors--jeopardizing the supervisors'
availability to acclimate new agents.^25 Tucson Sector officials stated
CBP is planning to hire from 650 to 700 supervisors next year. To
accommodate the additional agents, the Border Patrol has taken initial
steps to provide additional work space through constructing temporary and
permanent facilities, at a projected cost of about $550 million from
fiscal year 2007 to 2011.
The SBInet PMO expects SBInet to support day-to-day border enforcement
operations; however, analysis of the impact of SBInet technology on the
Border Patrol's operational procedures cannot be completed at this time
because agents have not been able to fully use the system as intended.
Leveraging technology is part of the National Border Patrol Strategy which
identifies the objectives, tools, and initiatives the Border Patrol uses
to maintain operational control of the borders. The Tucson sector, where
Project 28 is being deployed, is developing a plan on how to integrate
SBInet into its operating procedures. Border Patrol officials stated they
intend to re-evaluate this strategy, as SBInet technology is identified
and deployed, and as control of the border is achieved.
^24The Border Patrol defines five levels of border security ranging from
"controlled"--the highest sustainable level of control to "remote/low
activity"--the lowest level of control.
^25GAO, Border Patrol Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents,
GAO-07-997T (Washington, D.C.: June 2007).
According to agency officials, 22 trainers and 333 operators were trained
on the current Project 28 system, but because of deployment delays and
changes to the COP software, the SBInet training curriculum is to be
revised by Boeing and the government. Training is continuing during this
revision process with 24 operators being trained each week. According to
CBP officials, Border Patrol agents are receiving "hands on" training
during evening and weekend shifts at the COP workstations to familiarize
themselves with the recent changes made to the Project 28 system. However,
training is to be stopped once a stabilized version of the COP can be used
and both trainers and operators are to be retrained using the revised
curriculum. Costs associated with revising the training material and
retraining the agents are to be covered by Boeing as part of the Project
28 task order; however, the government may incur indirect costs associated
with taking agents offline for retraining.
SBI PMO Did Not Meet All of Its Staffing Goals and Has Not Yet Completed
Long-Term Human Capital Planning
The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its
staffing goal of 270 employees.^26 As of September 30, 2007, the SBI PMO
had 247 employees onboard, with 113 government employees and 134
contractor support staff. SBI PMO officials also reported that as of
October 19, 2007, they had 76 additional staff awaiting background
investigations. In addition, these officials said that a Human Capital
Management Plan has been drafted, but as of October 22, 2007, the plan had
not been approved. In February 2007, we reported that SBInet officials had
planned to finalize a human capital strategy that was to include details
on staffing and expertise needed for the program.^27 At that time, SBI and
SBInet officials expressed concern about difficulties in finding an
adequate number of staff with the required expertise to support planned
activities about staffing that shortfalls could limit government oversight
efforts. Strategic human capital planning is a key component used to
define the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve
programmatic goals and outlines ways the organization can fill gaps in
knowledge, skills, and abilities.^28 Until SBInet fully implements a
comprehensive human capital strategy, it will continue to risk not having
staff with the right skills and abilities to successfully execute the
program.
^26GAO, SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support Oversight and
Accountability, GAO-07-309 (Washington, D.C.: February 2007).
^27GAO-07-309.
^28See GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003) and GAO,
Framework for Accessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies
GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: September 2005).
Concluding Observations
Project 28 and other early technology and infrastructure projects are the
first steps on a long journey towards SBInet implementation that will
ultimately require an investment of billions of taxpayer dollars. Some of
these early projects have encountered unforeseen problems that could
affect DHS's ability to meet projected completion dates, expected costs,
and performance goals. These issues underscore the need for both DHS and
Boeing, as the prime contractor, to continue to work cooperatively to
correct the problems remaining with Project 28 and to ensure that the
SBInet PMO has adequate staff to effectively plan and oversee future
projects. These issues also underscore Congress's need to stay closely
attuned to DHS's progress in the SBInet program to make sure that
performance, schedule, and cost estimates are achieved and the nation's
border security needs are fully addressed.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to any
questions that members of the Subcommittees may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at
(202) 512-8777 or [15][email protected] . Other key contributors to this
statement were Robert E. White, Assistant Director; Rachel Beers; Jason
Berman; Katherine Davis; Jeanette Espinola; Taylor Matheson; and Sean
Seales.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the progress that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has made in implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) SBInet's
technology deployment projects, we analyzed DHS documentation, including
program schedules, project task orders, status reports, and expenditures.
We also interviewed DHS and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
headquarters and field officials, including representatives of the SBInet
Program Management Office (PMO), Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, as well as SBInet contractors.
We visited the Tucson Border Patrol sector--the site where SBInet
technology deployment was underway at the time of our review.
To determine the progress that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
made in infrastructure project implementation, we analyzed DHS
documentation, including schedules, contracts, status reports, and
expenditures. In addition, we interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters and
field officials, including representatives of the SBInet PMO, and Border
Patrol. We also interviewed officials from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the Department of the Interior. We visited the Tucson and
Yuma, Arizona Border Patrol sectors--two sites where tactical
infrastructure projects were underway at the time of our review. We did
not review the justification for infrastructure project cost estimates or
independently verify the source or validity of the cost information.
To determine the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet
technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating
procedures, we reviewed documentation of the agency's decision to hire an
additional 6,000 agents and the progress hiring these agents. We also
interviewed headquarters and field officials to track if and how CBP (1)
is hiring and training its target number of personnel, (2) it is planning
to train new agents on SBInet technology, and (3) it will incorporate the
new system into its operational procedures, and any implementation
challenges it reports facing in conducting this effort.
To determine how the SBInet PMO defined its human capital goals and
progress it has made in achieving these goals, we reviewed the office's
documentation on its hiring efforts related to SBInet, related timelines,
and compared this information with agency goals. We determined that the
workforce data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. We
also interviewed SBI and SBInet officials to identify challenges in
meeting the goals and steps taken by the agency to address those
challenges.
We performed our work from April 2007 through October 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
(440584)
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Highlights of [23]GAO-08-131T , a testimony before the subcommittee on
Management, Investigation, and Oversight, and Border, Maritime and Global
Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
October 24, 2007
SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE
Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation
In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established
the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar
program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is SBInet--the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program responsible for developing a
comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security
infrastructure (e.g., fencing), and surveillance and communication
technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones).
The House Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS progress
in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides GAO's
observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet
infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has determined
the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs
and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP SBI Program Management
Office (PMO) has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has
made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of
DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and
reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors,
and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBInet deployment is
underway. GAO performed the work from April 2007 through October 2007. DHS
generally agreed with GAO's findings.
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment of
SBInet technology across the southwest border, but it has fallen behind
its planned schedule. The SBInet contractor delivered the components
(i.e., radars, sensors and cameras) to the Project 28 site in Tucson,
Arizona on schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months
after it was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol agents
were to begin using SBInet technology to support their activities.
According to DHS, the delays are primarily due to software integration
problems. In September 2007, DHS officials said that the Project 28
contractor was making progress in correcting the problems, but DHS was
unable to specify a date when the system would be operational. Due to the
slippage in completing Project 28, DHS is revising the SBInet
implementation schedule for follow-on technology projects, but still plans
to deploy technology along 387 miles of the southwest border by December
31, 2008. DHS is also taking steps to strengthen its contract management
for Project 28.
SBInet infrastructure deployment along the southwest border is on
schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and
200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be
challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its intermediate goal to
deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007 and the average cost
per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates that deployment costs
for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus far. In the past, DHS
has minimized infrastructure construction labor costs by using Border
Patrol agents and Department of Defense military personnel. However, CBP
officials report that they plan to use commercial labor for future fencing
projects. The additional cost of commercial labor and potential unforeseen
increases in contract costs suggest future deployment could be more costly
than planned. DHS officials also reported other challenging factors they
will continue to face for infrastructure deployment, including community
resistance, environmental considerations, and difficulties in acquiring
rights to land along the border.
The impact of SBInet on CBP's workforce needs and operating procedures
remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not fully identified or
deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required
to meet mission needs to change from current projections, but until the
system is fully deployed, the direction and magnitude of the change is
unknown. For the Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, Border
Patrol officials are developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into
their operating procedures.
The SBI PMO tripled in size during fiscal year 2007, but fell short of its
staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that
staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide adequate
contractor oversight. In addition, the SBInet PMO has not yet completed
long-term human capital planning.
References
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