State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for
Overseas Posts Can Be Improved (19-OCT-07, GAO-08-23).
Since 1988, the Department of State (State) has ordered over 270
evacuations from overseas posts due to civil strife, terrorist
incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and
disease outbreaks. To prepare for evacuation, overseas posts rely
on a variety of guidance, plans, and training, such as Emergency
Action Plans (EAP). GAO was asked to assess State's (1) guidance
and plans to prepare for evacuation, (2) training and exercises
to prepare post staff for crisis, and (3) efforts to collect,
analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned into guidance
and training. GAO examined State and Department of Defense (DOD)
documents, spoke with State and DOD officials, conducted a survey
of 243 overseas posts, and completed 22 structured interviews
with State personnel.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-23
ACCNO: A77448
TITLE: State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations
for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved
DATE: 10/19/2007
SUBJECT: Americans abroad
Emergency management
Emergency preparedness
Emergency response
Emergency response personnel
Emergency response plans
Emergency response procedures
Employee training
Evacuation
Foreign governments
Interagency relations
International cooperation
Lessons learned
Policy evaluation
Program evaluation
Strategic planning
Evacuation of civilians
Policies and procedures
Program coordination
Program implementation
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GAO-08-23
* [1]Results in Brief
* [2]Background
* [3]Evacuations Occur in Response to Diverse Crises and Differ C
* [4]State Has Tools for Warning American Citizens and Provides V
* [5]A Number of State Units Are Involved in Planning for and Imp
* [6]Deficiencies in State's Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post E
* [7]State's Emergency Planning Handbook Has Limited Usefulness i
* [8]State Is Not Comprehensively Reviewing and Updating Emergenc
* [9]Estimates of American Citizens in Countries Abroad Are Frequ
* [10]State and DOD's Memorandum of Agreement to Prepare for Large
* [11]There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provi
* [12]Insufficient EAC Training and Drills Can Hurt Posts' Readine
* [13]Crisis Management Exercises Considered Useful but Could Be M
* [14]Regular Input from Staff with Evacuation Experience Could Im
* [15]State Beginning to Implement New Training Tools
* [16]State's Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, an
* [17]Most Posts Did Not Complete an After Action Report Following
* [18]Evacuation After Action Reports Lack a Standard Format
* [19]After Action Reports Could Include Staffing and Morale Lesso
* [20]State Has No Systematic Mechanism to Analyze and Incorporate
* [21]Post Staff Have Limited Institutional Knowledge of Earlier E
* [22]Conclusions
* [23]Recommendations for Executive Action
* [24]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* [25]Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* [26]Appendix II: Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 u
* [27]Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
* [28]GAO Comments
* [29]Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
* [30]GAO Comments
* [31]Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [32]GAO Contact
* [33]Staff Acknowledgments
* [34]Order by Mail or Phone
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
October 2007
STATE DEPARTMENT
Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved
GAO-08-23
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 6
Deficiencies in State's Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post Efforts to
Prepare for a Possible Evacuation 14
There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provides to Post
Staff 20
State's Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, and Incorporate
Lessons Learned Constrains Preparation for Evacuation 27
Conclusions 32
Recommendations for Executive Action 32
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36
Appendix II Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 under Authorized
and Ordered Departure Authority 40
Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 41
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 53
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 57
Figures
Figure 1: State Overseas Posts Evacuated by Country from March 2002 to
August 2007 7
Figure 2: State Department Units Involved in Implementing the Authorized
or Ordered Departure of Staff and Dependents 11
Figure 3: Most Likely Threats to Occur at Post Identified in Survey
Results 16
Abbreviations
CLO Community Liaison officer
CME crisis management exercise
DOD Department of Defense
DVD digital video disc
EAC Emergency Action Committee
EAP Emergency Action Plan
EPH Emergency Planning Handbook
FAQ frequently asked question
FSI Foreign Service Institute
MOA memorandum of agreement
SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome
State Department of State
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wish to reproduce this material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
October 19, 2007
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
The Honorable Thelma Drake
House of Representatives
The Department of State (State) operates overseas posts^1 all over the
world, some in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-prone regions where threats
against post staff, dependents, or private American citizens can result in
State-ordered evacuations. Evacuations can occur in response to various
types of crises, including civil strife, terrorist incidents, natural
disasters, conventional war threats, and disease outbreaks. They can range
from the more common and relatively simple departures of post staff and
dependents on regularly scheduled commercial flights to the more rare,
complex, and massive sea and air lift of thousands of American citizens on
U.S. government-chartered and U.S. military ships and planes. According to
State officials, since 1988, State has ordered more than 270 evacuations
from overseas posts. Based on a survey we conducted, 1 in 5 overseas posts
reported they had experienced some type of evacuation of post staff and
dependents in the past 5 years.
To plan and prepare for possible evacuation, overseas posts rely on a
variety of guidance, plans, and training. Emergency Action Committees
(EAC) at overseas posts are responsible for assisting the ambassador in
planning and preparing for crises, including the possible evacuation of
post staff, dependents, and American citizens, with support from State
offices in Washington, D.C. State's primary guidance is the Emergency
Planning Handbook (EPH), which contains policies and procedures for crisis
management, including planning, preparing for, and conducting evacuations.
In addition, all posts are required to create and annually update an
Emergency Action Plan (EAP) that includes planning for potential,
post-specific emergencies, using the EPH as a guide. State's Foreign
Service Institute (FSI) trains overseas-bound staff in crisis management
and conducts crisis management exercises (CME) at all overseas posts every
1 to 2-1/2 years to improve crisis preparedness.
^1Overseas posts are State-operated U.S. embassies and consulates in other
countries.
Due to your concerns regarding threats against overseas posts that have
resulted in evacuations, we reviewed State's efforts to plan, prepare for,
and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens.
In this report, we (1) assess State's guidance and plans to prepare for
possible evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens; (2)
assess the training, drills, and exercises used to prepare staff at
overseas posts for crises, including possible evacuation; and (3) evaluate
State's efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons learned from
previous evacuations into modifications of guidance and training. As part
of this review, we collected information on State's and the Department of
Defense's (DOD) efforts to evacuate American citizens from Lebanon in July
2006. To address questions specifically about the Lebanon evacuation, we
briefed members of your staff on April 30, 2007, and issued a separate
report on the Lebanon evacuation in June 2007.^2
To meet these three objectives, we examined State and DOD documents
related to evacuation planning, preparations, training, and execution. We
spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and traveled to
Cyprus, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, where we met with State and DOD
officials responsible for planning and implementing evacuations, including
the July 2006 evacuation from Lebanon. In addition, we conducted a survey
of all 243 EACs at State's overseas posts; 86 percent of these committees
responded to our survey.^3 We requested that the post's EAC members
collectively complete the survey.^4 We also conducted 22 structured
interviews with State employees who had experienced a variety of
evacuation-related events over the last 5 years. We performed our work
from June 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Appendix I provides a more detailed
description of our scope and methodology.
^2GAO, State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens
from Lebanon, [35]GAO-07-893R (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007).
^3Survey questions, results, and number of respondents per question are
presented in an electronic-supplement to this report, which may be
accessed at [36]GAO-08-24sp . Survey percentages reported do not include
nonresponses to each question in our survey.
^4Survey responses collectively completed by State overseas posts' EAC
members will hereafter be presented as "Posts reported that... ."
Results in Brief
In recent years, State has conducted numerous evacuations--most notably
the safe evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens and family members
from Lebanon. State provides a variety of guidance and training to prepare
overseas staff for managing evacuations of post staff, dependents, and
American citizens. However, we found that State guidance and plans to
prepare for possible evacuation of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens could be improved. First, although the EPH is State's primary
guidance, posts reported it was too generic, voluminous, and not
particularly useful in preparing for the possibility of evacuation. For
example, one post reported that the EPH had too much generic boilerplate
language and another indicated the EPH was large and not user-friendly.
Second, while all posts are required to review and update their EAPs once
a year, we found almost 40 percent of posts surveyed had not updated their
EAP in 18 months or longer. Without EAPs that are reviewed and updated on
a timely basis, posts' planning and preparedness for crisis situations,
including evacuations, can be impaired. Third, State requires posts to
produce estimates of the number of private American citizens in country;
however, more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was,
at best, only somewhat accurate. State officials told us these estimates,
called F-77 reports, were best guesses and not based on a particular
methodology. Lastly, when State requires DOD assistance with a large-scale
evacuation, the two departments rely on a memorandum of agreement (MOA);
but we found weaknesses in the agreement that could limit State's and
DOD's ability to quickly and effectively work together during a crisis,
such as not addressing the logistical capabilities and limitations of each
department, and not referencing contact lists to expedite practical
communications between State and DOD personnel in a crisis.
State provides crisis management training to post staff--including
instruction for EAC members, CMEs conducted at each post, and classroom
training for overseas-bound staff at FSI's U.S. campus. However, we found
gaps in this training as it relates to preparing for evacuations. For
example, while the EPH states that a "robust training program" for
overseas staff "is essential for emergency preparedness," over one-quarter
of posts reported that EAC members have not received training necessary to
meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. As a result, EAC members
may not be fully prepared to make decisions in a crisis. Specifically,
officials from several posts reported that newer staff have not received
training for their roles on the EAC. For example, one post noted that the
frequent turnover at unaccompanied posts, where staff serve for only 1
year, means that EAC members at these posts need training to make them
better equipped to work as a team. Although CMEs are widely recognized as
an important tool, post staff told us that the exercises should be more
practical and reflect scenarios that are more likely to occur at the post.
Finally, FSI's crisis management training for overseas-bound staff covers
a variety of topics, including evacuation, through various training
methods. However, regular input from staff with evacuation experience
could improve this training. State is beginning to implement new training
tools, such as recent workshops on hurricane-related evacuations, that
feature colleagues with evacuation experience and allow for more relevant,
frequent, and inclusive training.
State's preparations for evacuation are constrained by the lack of a
systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons learned
from previous evacuations. Most posts did not complete a required after
action report following an evacuation, and there is no State entity to
ensure their production. Almost 60 percent of posts that have had an
evacuation in the past 5 years reported that they did not produce such a
report. State has no standardized format for after action reports, and
these reports could include staffing and morale lessons learned. When
posts do submit after action reports, State has no formal review process
to analyze and incorporate lessons learned from these reports into
guidance and training. Although State has distributed some cables and
other documents on lessons learned from evacuations on an ad hoc basis,
these documents are sometimes vague and can be overlooked by posts. We
also found post staff have limited institutional memory of prior
evacuations, particularly at unaccompanied posts, which reinforces the
need for a process that captures, analyzes, and disseminates lessons
learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of
evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens from overseas
posts, we recommend the Secretary of State
o designate an entity within State to (1) ensure that EAPs are
prepared annually, (2) ensure that posts generate standardized
evacuation after action reports with lessons learned, and (3)
systematically collect and analyze these reports to assess State's
performance and recommend modifications to State guidance, plans,
training, and exercises, if necessary;
o direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for
that particular country;
o review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members
to meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning
and preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for
improving training, particularly for less experienced EAC members;
and
o strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing
them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the
post into exercise scenarios.
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management
of large-scale evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens from overseas posts when State requires DOD assistance,
we recommend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
o review the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments) to
ensure it expedites practical communication and coordination
between the two departments before and during a large-scale
evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
We received written comments on a draft of this report from State
and DOD, which are reprinted in appendixes III and IV. State
concurred with our recommendations that the Secretary of State
improve the F-77 process, review training for EAC members, and
strengthen CMEs.
State partially concurred with our recommendation that the
Secretary of State designate an entity within State to ensure that
EAPs are prepared annually. In its response, State said that it
was already taking actions to address this part of the
recommendation. State concurred with the rest of the
recommendation.
DOD and State partially concurred with the recommendation in our
draft report that State and DOD review their MOA. While DOD and
State agreed on the need to review the MOA, both departments said
that the current coordination structure was working well. In
addition, DOD expressed concern that our recommendation could
hinder DOD's ability to conduct military operations. In response,
we modified the recommendation to clarify that the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense review the MOA (and its
amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
coordination between the two departments before and during a
large-scale evacuation.
We also received technical comments from State, which we have
incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
Background
Evacuations occur in response to diverse crises and differ
considerably in scope, size, and complexity; large-scale
evacuations of American citizens are rare. To pre-empt the need
for or, if necessary, facilitate, evacuations of American
citizens, State has tools for warning American citizens about
potential crises. It also provides varying degrees of assistance
to Americans wishing to leave a country. A number of State units,
including the affected post, are involved in planning for and
implementing an evacuation, which typically takes the form of an
authorized or ordered departure of staff and dependents; State
ends a departure of post staff and dependents by terminating the
authorization or order.
Evacuations Occur in Response to Diverse Crises and Differ
Considerably in Scope, Size, and Complexity
State evacuates staff, dependents, or private American citizens in
response to various crises, including civil strife, terrorist
incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and
disease outbreaks. For example, according to information compiled
by State,^5 of the 89 evacuations over the past 5 years, almost
half were clustered in the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan (see
fig. 1). Twenty-three of these evacuations were due to the
impending U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003; the remaining
evacuations in the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan were due
primarily to terrorist threats or attacks. Ten other evacuations
in Southeast Asia resulted from the outbreak of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the spring of 2003, and nine in the
Caribbean were due to hurricanes. During 2006 and 2007, State
evacuated 11 posts for various reasons, including civil unrest,
elections that could lead to civil unrest, a coup attempt, a U.S.
embassy bombing, a hurricane, and war.^6
^5State's FSI compiled these records on an informal basis to provide
context for its crisis management training.
^6See app. II for a timeline showing authorized and ordered departures by
year since 1988.
Figure 1: State Overseas Posts Evacuated by Country from March 2002 to
August 2007
^aNumber of times one or more posts in the same country were evacuated
simultaneously (e.g., State evacuated all posts in Turkey in March 2003).
Evacuations differ considerably in scope, size, and complexity and can
involve (1) authorized departure of post staff and dependents, (2) ordered
departure of post staff and dependents, or (3) assisted departure of
American citizens.^7 When authorizing departure, State grants permission
to nonemergency post staff and all dependents to voluntarily depart the
country at U.S. government expense. In contrast, when State orders
departure, State directs nonemergency post staff and all dependents to
leave the country. The number and type of post staff and dependents
actually departing a country can vary greatly depending on the size of the
post, the nature of the crisis, and the type of departure. For example,
evacuations can range from massive, complex events like the safe
extraction of almost 15,000 Americans and family members from Lebanon in
the summer of 2006, to the relatively small-scale evacuation from Conakry,
Guinea, in February 2007 during a period of civil strife. The latter
involved flying a few dozen people (dependents of embassy staff, State
employees temporarily deployed to the embassy, and private American
citizens) to a nearby city in another West African country, where U.S.
embassy personnel assisted the evacuees in obtaining commercial flights
back to the United States or an alternate approved safe haven.
While authorized departures and ordered departures of post staff and
dependents typically occur several times a year, according to State and
DOD officials large-scale evacuations of private American citizens are
rare.^8 Based on the information State compiled, the department has
implemented 271 authorized and ordered departures from overseas posts
since 1988. According to the results of our survey, approximately 20
percent of posts reported that they had experienced an authorized
departure within the past 5 years, and about 10 percent reported
experiencing an ordered departure within this period.
State Has Tools for Warning American Citizens and Provides Varying Degrees of
Assistance to Americans Wishing to Leave a Country
State has several tools for helping American citizens during crises
overseas, including evacuation. These tools include (1) travel warnings,
(2) registration and warden systems, and (3) varying degrees of assistance
to Americans wishing to leave a country. State issues travel warnings to
urge Americans considering trips abroad to stay away from potentially
dangerous areas. For example, as of July 2007, State had current travel
warnings for 27 countries. The reasons for these warnings include the
threat of terrorism, civil strife, violent crime, and targeted attacks
against U.S. citizens. Almost 45 percent of posts reported that State has
issued a travel warning for their country within the past 5 years.^9
7"Evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens" will be
used interchangeably with "authorized or ordered departure of post staff
and dependents, and assisted departure of American citizens."
^8Even less frequently, State will close a post after evacuating all staff
and dependents. The last time this occurred was Embassy Bangui, Central
African Republic, in November 2002.
State also encourages, but cannot require, U.S. citizens to register with
the department when traveling abroad.^10 According to State officials,
this allows State to have better information on the number and location of
American citizens in a country should a crisis arise. In the event of a
crisis, wardens--which consist of business contacts, hotel
representatives, nongovernmental organization officials, or other
individuals connected to communities of Americans in the country who have
agreed to serve as a liaison between the post and the parties they have
agreed to contact--forward messages from the post to these parties. These
messages, often conveyed via phone trees in the past but now typically
sent via mass e-mails, text messages, or faxes, contain information about
potential security threats or urgent directives such as where and when to
gather in the event of an evacuation. Almost three-quarters of posts
reported issuing a threat or security warning within the past 5 years.
Although State cannot order American citizens to leave a country due to a
crisis, State officials said they provide varying degrees of assistance to
Americans wishing to leave. State officials told us American citizens
typically leave on commercially available flights; the U.S. government
does not generally arrange transportation for departing American citizens.
State sometimes assists by creating greater availability of commercial
transport, such as by requesting U.S. flag carriers to schedule more
flights. Infrequently, when commercial transportation is not available,
State officials contract transportation for American citizens.^11 More
serious crises may require the assistance of DOD; according to data
compiled by State, DOD has provided assistance on only four occasions in
the past 5 years. For example, during a period of civil unrest in a
Caribbean country in 2004, DOD provided military assistance to help
embassy personnel and their families depart the country. On very rare
occasions, large numbers of American citizens depart the country on U.S.
government-contracted and U.S. military transportation.^12
^9A list of current travel warnings issued by State can be found at State's
Web site, [37]http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html .
^10According to statistics compiled by the Commerce Department's Bureau of
Travel and Tourism, U.S. citizen overseas air travel is increasing. U.S.
citizen overseas air travel rose over 50 percent from 1996 to 2006, from
19,786,300 to 29,947,055 U.S. citizen departures, excluding travel to
Canada and Mexico.
^11Pursuant to statutory requirement, State has a mechanism for seeking
reimbursement from American citizens for commercial transportation costs
associated with an evacuation. State evacuates U.S. citizens from overseas
locations according to 22 U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(A), which authorizes
expenditures from the department's appropriation for Emergencies in the
Diplomatic or Consular Service (the "K Fund") for "the evacuation when
their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster of
(i) United States Government employees and their dependents; and (ii)
private United States citizens or third-country nationals, on a
reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable... ."
A Number of State Units Are Involved in Planning for and Implementing
Evacuations
A number of State units are involved in planning for and implementing the
authorized or ordered departure of staff and dependents and assisting
American citizens who wish to leave (see fig. 2). In Washington, D.C.,
State headquarters provides guidance and training to prepare for
evacuations. A Crisis Management Support unit coordinates crisis response
with other State units and U.S. government agencies, supports taskforces
that assist posts in handling crises, and trains headquarters staff in
evacuation procedures and policy. Several State bureaus also are involved
in preparations for possible evacuations and implementing evacuations.
These include the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which generates emergency
guidance and oversees planning for crises; the Bureau of Human Resources,
which includes a Family Liaison Office that assists evacuated spouses and
dependents; the Consular Affairs Bureau, which responds to the needs of
American citizens abroad; and the Bureau of Administration, which is
responsible for chartering flights or other transportation out of the
country, if needed. In addition, FSI in Arlington, Virginia, provides
training for staff before they leave for their first overseas post or
rotate to a new post, and conducts periodic CME training at each post.^13
^12During the summer of 2006 evacuation from Lebanon, State suspended its
policy of collecting promissory notes from evacuees regarding
reimbursement for evacuation-related costs; State officials said they
viewed this policy as a potential hurdle in the evacuation process due to
the significant potential danger associated with the situation on the
ground in Lebanon.
^13According to State guidance, CMEs are to be conducted annually at
1-year tour of duty posts, and every 2 to 2-1/2 years at other posts.
Figure 2: State Department Units Involved in Implementing the Authorized
or Ordered Departure of Staff and Dependents
Overseas, posts also are responsible for preparing for crises, including a
potential evacuation of staff, dependents, and private American citizens
in the country. For example, the post's EAC develops an EAP to prepare for
crises; the plan includes trip wires that can be used to determine when to
authorize or order the departure of staff and dependents. Each post also
prepares an estimate of the number and location of private American
citizens present in the country and practices responding to crises that
could lead to an evacuation through CMEs and other drills.
During a crisis, the ambassador can request that State headquarters
approve a departure of post staff and their families and is expected to
recommend post evacuations on a timely basis when circumstances warrant
it.^14 These evacuations may be approved "when it is of national interest
to require the departure of some or all employees and/or their eligible
family members, or if there is imminent danger to the life of the employee
or the lives of the immediate family of the employee." The formal decision
on evacuating post staff and dependents is made by the Under Secretary for
Management in an Action Memorandum. The decision is communicated to the
relevant overseas post via an approval cable, or if necessary, by other
means. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which is responsible for
providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy, also plays a role in this decision.
Beyond security concerns, other factors such as staff morale or political
considerations can affect an ambassador's decision regarding whether to
request evacuation of post staff and dependents. For example, according to
State officials, an ambassador may be reluctant to disrupt the lives of
staff and their families, particularly those staff who would have to
remove their children from school. The officials also said an ambassador
may be hesitant to authorize or order people to leave due to concern that
a drawdown of staff and dependents could send a signal to the host country
that the United States no longer considers the country safe for its
employees and their families. Former and current State officials noted
that these factors can sometimes create tension between State headquarters
in Washington, D.C., which often is focused primarily on security concerns
and therefore in favor of evacuation, and leadership at post, which may be
more reluctant to initiate an evacuation.
While a post is in evacuation status, there is generally a change in the
composition of staff and an increased workload, both of which can affect
staff morale. Some staff, whom the ambassador^15 considers critical for
addressing the crisis, assisting American citizens in the crisis, or
keeping the post up and running, remain at the post. In addition, non-U.S.
staff also generally remain at the post. These staff, referred to as
locally employed staff, are typically from the country in which the post
is located, although they can also be from third countries.^16 Locally
employed staff range from professional office staff to drivers,
groundskeepers, and others. These remaining U.S. and local staff are often
joined by U.S. government officials from State and other agencies who are
sent to the post temporarily to help manage the crisis. The changed work
environment, including the absence of family members, the crisis-related
workload that can involve long hours, and the addition of new co-workers
can affect staff morale both positively and negatively. According to State
officials, the crisis atmosphere can create a special bond among the
remaining post staff. In addition, these staff may feel freer to dedicate
more time to their work knowing they will not be neglecting their
families, who also are safely removed. On the other hand, State officials
said that staff remaining at the post can experience extreme stress and
feel isolated without the support of their families.
^14Pursuant to the President's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission,
the ambassador is responsible for protecting all U.S. government personnel
on official duty abroad, other than those under the protection of a
U.S.-area military commander or on the staff of an international
organization, and their accompanying dependents.
^15Decisions regarding staff drawdowns at individual posts are made by the
chief of mission at the post. The chief of mission at an embassy is the
ambassador; the chief of mission at a consulate is the charge d'affairs or
the principal officer.
When the ambassador, in consultation with State officials at headquarters,
determines that it is safe for departed staff and families to return to a
post, the Under Secretary for Management concludes an authorized or
ordered departure by terminating the authorization or order. If an
authorized or ordered departure is not terminated within 6 months, the
post switches to "unaccompanied" status. Since such posts have experienced
prolonged crises, State deems them more dangerous and Foreign Service
officers rotate there for just 1 year instead of the more typical 2 to 4
years. Unaccompanied status means that there are restrictions on whether
spouses, children, or any other dependents can stay at the post. There can
be several gradations of unaccompanied status. For example, Abidjan, Cote
D'Ivoire, is currently a partially unaccompanied post, where spouses and
preschool-aged children are allowed; however, State does not consider the
post safe enough for school-aged children who generally travel to and from
school and other activities on their own. A post can continue on
unaccompanied status for some time. Three posts in one Persian Gulf
country were placed on ordered departure in April 2004 and switched to
unaccompanied status in August 2004; all three remain unaccompanied as of
April 2007.
^16For example, many locally employed staff at U.S. posts in Saudi Arabia
are not Saudi nationals.
Deficiencies in State's Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post Efforts to Prepare
for a Possible Evacuation
Deficiencies in State's guidance and plans can hinder post efforts to
prepare for a possible evacuation of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens. State's primary crisis management guidance, the EPH, has limited
usefulness in preparing overseas posts for evacuation. In addition, posts
are not comprehensively reviewing and updating their EAPs in order to plan
and prepare for potential evacuation. Post-produced estimates of American
citizens in country are frequently inaccurate best guesses, and weaknesses
in a State and DOD MOA need to be corrected to prepare for large-scale
evacuations.
State's Emergency Planning Handbook Has Limited Usefulness in Preparing Overseas
Posts for Possible Evacuation
The EPH contains State's emergency policies and procedures and is State's
primary crisis management guidance. State officials said the EPH was
revised in November 2005 to minimize boilerplate language and simplify its
presentation. However, we found in our survey conducted from January 2007
to April 2007 that posts do not consider the EPH particularly useful in
preparing for the possibility of evacuation. In our survey to posts' EACs,
we asked respondents to rate the usefulness of eight resources a post
could use to prepare for the possibility of evacuation.^17 Among these
eight resources, posts rated the EPH last in terms of being "very useful"
in preparing for the possibility of evacuation. Almost 60 percent of
respondents rated the EPH, at best, only "somewhat useful" in preparing
for the possibility of evacuation.^18
In addition, a number of State officials reported that the EPH, which is
hundreds of pages long, was too generic, formulaic, and voluminous, all of
which inhibits its usefulness in preparing for possible evacuation. For
example, one post reported that the EPH had too much boilerplate language,
which concealed important information, and another reported that the EPH
was a large, unwieldy document with no easy index and information that was
not easy to access. One senior State official told us that the EPH was not
helpful during a major evacuation because it was quickly rendered
irrelevant by fast-moving events.
^17We asked posts to rate the usefulness (very, somewhat, not very, not at
all) of the following resources in preparing for the possibility of
evacuation: (1) Emergency Planning Handbook; (2) Emergency Action Plan;
(3) Emergency Action Plan checklists; (4) crisis management exercises; (5)
other crisis management training; (6) F-77 Report of Potential Evacuees;
(7) advice from colleagues who have experienced evacuations; (8) input
from local staff on situations in country, including previous evacuations;
(9) the Transfer and Evacuation Management System; (10) the Crisis
Management Support "Heads Up" package, and (11) Other. The last three
options were removed from the analysis because these three options
received a large number of "no basis to judge" or non-responses in our
survey.
^18In rating the usefulness of the EPH in preparing for the possibility of
evacuation, 31 percent of respondents said it was "very useful," 50
percent said it was "somewhat useful," 7 percent said it was "not very
useful," 2 percent said it was "not at all useful," and 10 percent said
they had "no basis to judge."
Moreover, the EPH is missing some elements that could be useful to prepare
for the possibility of large-scale evacuation of American citizens. For
example, while the EPH provides guidance on communicating with the media
in various crisis situations, we found it has no specific guidance for
addressing the public through the media during a mass evacuation of
American citizens from a war zone. In addition, it does not contain
guidance, such as lessons learned, best practices, or tips from
experienced consular officers, on producing accurate estimates of the
number of American citizens in country for F-77 reports.
The handbook is also a post's principal reference for preparing and
revising its EAP. However, over half of posts reported that the EPH was,
at best, only "somewhat useful" in developing the post's EAP. For example,
some posts reported that the EPH is too general and cumbersome to use to
develop an EAP.
State Is Not Comprehensively Reviewing and Updating Emergency Action Plans
Posts are required to create and periodically update an EAP that includes
planning for crises and "trip wires" used to determine when to authorize
post staff and dependants to leave, order them to leave, close down the
post, or initiate the evacuation of American citizens.^19 According to
State guidance, all posts are required to conduct a comprehensive review
and update of their EAPs once a year. However, we found almost 40 percent
of posts who gave a date reported that it has been 18 months or longer
since they most recently updated their EAP. When EAPs are not
comprehensively reviewed and updated on a timely basis, important
logistical information that is critical during an evacuation may not be
available to post. For example, State officials told us that updated
contact lists of local government officials in an EAP are particularly
important for the Consular Section at post in the event that American
citizens need assistance to evacuate from a country.
^19State has recently instituted an electronic system to facilitate the
drafting of EAPs, and many posts are currently using the system.
Moreover, some posts have not updated trip wires in their EAPs to cover
likely threats. According to State officials, each post is required to
develop trip wires (an event such as the closure of the main road from an
embassy to a country's only airport) that can trigger a post response
(such as evacuation of post staff and dependents). Posts reported that (1)
protest and demonstrations, (2) natural disasters, and (3) terrorism are
the top three most likely threats at their posts. Figure 3 illustrates
posts' responses to the survey question, "Which three of the following
threats are the most likely to occur at your post?"
Figure 3: Most Likely Threats to Occur at Post Identified in Survey
Results
However, almost 25 percent of posts reported that they do not know whether
their trip wires cover likely threats or, at best, their trip wires leave
some likely threats unaddressed. Trip wires in a post's EAP need to be
reviewed and updated to ensure that likely threats at post are covered.
In addition, State guidance encourages posts to plan and coordinate with
other foreign missions during crises, such as evacuations. However, almost
60 percent of posts reported that they do not have standing arrangements
with foreign missions on evacuation planning and coordination or do not
know if such arrangements are in place.^20 The importance of working with
other foreign missions in planning, preparing, and coordinating an
evacuation was highlighted by the July 2006 evacuation from Lebanon. State
officials said that good coordination with other foreign missions was an
important contributor to the success of the evacuation. Close coordination
and communication with other foreign missions can also be important for
smaller evacuations. For example, a State official reported that during an
evacuation of about 400 American citizens from West Africa in 2004, the
post extensively coordinated and communicated with foreign missions
because all American citizens were evacuated on foreign
government-arranged aircraft.
Estimates of American Citizens in Countries Abroad Are Frequently Inaccurate and
Not Based on a Particular Methodology
State's estimates of the number of American citizens in countries abroad
are frequently inaccurate. Posts are supposed to provide an estimation of
the number of private American citizens in a country in F-77 reports,
based in part on traveler registration. These reports play a central role
in State and DOD's planning for and conducting evacuations of American
citizens. However, we found that more than three-quarters of posts
reported that the last F-77 at post was, at best, only somewhat accurate
in its estimation of the American citizen population. In addition, of
those posts able to provide an estimate of the nature of the inaccuracies,
over two-thirds reported that the F-77 report tends to underestimate the
American citizen population.
Several factors may complicate the estimation of American citizens in
country. First, according to State officials, countries can experience
wide fluctuations in their American citizen populations at certain times
of the year (such as the summer tourist season, religious festivals, or
pilgrimages) and it can be challenging to estimate the location of
American citizens in country. Second, State encourages American citizens
to register with the department whenever they travel internationally, and
State relies on registration numbers to generate estimates of American
citizens in country. However, State officials said that American citizens
often do not register and cannot be compelled to register. Third, State
officials also said it is difficult to estimate the number of dual
nationals. For example, according to a State official, there are a number
of Saudis in Saudi Arabia who were born in the United States when their
parents were studying or traveling abroad. These Saudis are eligible for
U.S. citizenship and may choose to obtain U.S. passports at any time,
depending on the situation in their country.
^20In commenting on a draft of this report, State said standing
arrangements with other foreign missions are impractical in many
situations because State's first priority is assisting U.S. citizens.
According to our survey, 26 percent of posts reported that, during the
last 2 years, they had discussions with other foreign missions on at least
a quarterly basis regarding emergency evacuation planning and
coordination.
In addition, State officials said sometimes dual nationals with passports
are not captured in any U.S. citizen entry data received from the host
government. Dual nationals may use their non-American passports to enter
foreign countries to avoid host country-imposed fees or to maintain a
non-American profile in country. Even when a post can make estimates of
the number of dual nationals in country, it can be difficult to predict
when and if they would evacuate from a country. Dual nationals often have
close ties with friends and relatives in country, which can influence
their decision on when to evacuate.
According to State officials, the estimates posts produce in the F-77 are
best guesses and not based on a particular methodology. Based on our
review of F-77 reports, the reports typically do not contain the source
data used to generate estimates or explanations from consular officers on
how they used these data to generate estimates. Considering the
complications of producing accurate estimates of American citizens in
country, consular officers need to document the processes and data sources
used to produce their estimates. If processes and data sources used were
documented, consular officers would have an understanding of how prior
estimates were generated using available information. According to a State
official, State is in the process of updating the instructions for
producing F-77 reports to include frequently asked questions (FAQ) on
preparing estimates of American citizens. However, in our review of the
FAQs, we found only basic guidance with little detail on how to produce
estimates or how to address the complexities of estimating a diverse and
changing American citizen population overseas.
In addition to the above challenges to producing an accurate estimate,
some posts are not updating their F-77 reports on a timely basis.
According to State guidance, posts are to submit F-77 reports annually.
However, over one-quarter of posts reported that their F-77 was updated 18
months or longer ago or that they do not know when the F-77 was updated.
The F-77 plays a central role in evacuation and other crisis management
planning and provides the figures that State and DOD rely on when planning
for and conducting evacuations of American citizens. If the F-77 reports
are not updated on a timely basis, State and DOD risk planning and
preparing for evacuations with out-of-date information.
State and DOD's Memorandum of Agreement to Prepare for Large-scale Evacuation
Has Weaknesses
When State requires assistance with a large-scale evacuation (e.g., during
the 2006 evacuation from Lebanon), it may request help from DOD. Guidance
for coordination between State and DOD is included in an MOA^21 meant to
define the roles and responsibilities of each agency in implementing such
large-scale evacuations. According to the MOA, State is responsible for
the protection and evacuation of all U.S. citizens abroad and is generally
responsible for evacuating U.S. citizens. However, State may request
assistance from DOD to support an evacuation. Once DOD assistance has been
requested, DOD is responsible for conducting military operations to
support the evacuation in consultation with the U.S. ambassador. During an
evacuation, the MOA calls for coordination between State and DOD through a
liaison group responsible for evacuation planning and implementation.
However, we found weaknesses in the MOA (and its amendments) that could
reduce State and DOD's ability to quickly and effectively work together
during a crisis. The MOA does not address the logistical capabilities and
limitations of each department, such as DOD's substantial capability to
contract and track large volumes of aircraft and ships. In addition,
unlike EAPs at post, the MOA does not reference contact lists (which could
be updated on a regular basis) that could expedite practical
communications between State and DOD personnel in a crisis. Moreover, a
majority of posts reported that they have had little or no training or
preparations for a potential large-scale evacuation with DOD.^22 Since
large-scale DOD-assisted evacuations occur infrequently and posts have
minimal training with DOD for such evacuations, explicit guidance between
State and DOD is needed to speed communication and coordination between
the departments. The lack of readily available, hands-on information
needed to quickly arrange logistics could limit State and DOD's ability to
quickly coordinate and collaborate during a large-scale evacuation.
^21"Memorandum of Agreement Between The Departments of State and Defense
on the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals and
Designated Other Persons From Threatened Areas Overseas," last updated
July 1998.
^22According to State officials, DOD conducts its own mock embassy
evacuation training exercises. On an ad hoc basis, DOD asks State staff
from Washington, D.C., to role play as embassy staff during the exercises.
However, this U.S.-based training is for DOD units tasked to carry out
such operations and is not typically conducted with overseas posts.
For example, as we reported previously,^23 weaknesses in the MOA and other
factors, such as State and DOD having different institutional cultures and
systems, resulted in miscommunication between State and DOD and possible
delays in chartering ships and planes to evacuate American citizens from
Lebanon in July 2006.^24 A State official in charge of logistics said
State personnel did not know DOD's chain of command, and it took time to
determine whom to contact at DOD for transportation logistics. State
officials found a DOD organization chart online, but it did not have names
and contact information. Consequently, State may have lost time during the
evacuation trying to determine whom to contact within DOD.
There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provides to Post Staff
While State provides general crisis management training to overseas-bound
staff, there are gaps in this training as it relates to preparing for and
implementing evacuations. For example, insufficient EAC training and
infrequent drills can hurt posts' readiness to act in the event of an
evacuation. In addition, while CMEs are recognized as useful, posts
reported that they could be more relevant and practical. Further, FSI
crisis management training at its campus in Arlington, Virginia, for new
and returning Foreign Service officers covers a variety of topics,
including evacuation, and uses a variety of tools; however, it does not
regularly include input from colleagues with evacuation experience. State
is beginning to implement new training tools that allow for more relevant,
frequent, and inclusive training.
Insufficient EAC Training and Drills Can Hurt Posts' Readiness for Evacuations
As mentioned earlier, EAC members at overseas posts are responsible for
assisting the ambassador in planning and preparing for crises, including
possible evacuation. Almost 90 percent of posts reported that the EAC has
enough staff to meet its assigned emergency responsibilities. According to
the EPH, a "robust training program" for staff manning overseas posts "is
essential for emergency preparedness," including possible evacuation.^25
Despite this guidance, we found that insufficient training of EAC members,
coupled with infrequent drills for post staff, can hurt posts' readiness
to act in the event of an evacuation. The EAC is required to conduct at
least one tabletop exercise^26 per year to ensure that all members
understand their roles and responsibilities, are familiar with the EAP,
and to identify out-of-date or flawed information in it. However, we found
that EAC members at several posts are not receiving the training needed to
be prepared to assist the ambassador in the event of an evacuation or
other crisis.
^23 [38]GAO-07-893R .
^24For example, officials at both agencies noted that State and DOD speak
different "languages," which made it difficult for State to communicate
its needs and the urgency of the crisis to DOD. In addition, State
consular and DOD officials in Lebanon and Cyprus used data systems with
different classification levels, which inhibited the exchange of important
logistical information.
^25EPH, 12 FAH-1 H-761.
About 24 percent of posts reported that EAC members are only somewhat
aware or not aware of their responsibilities and need to make more
preparations for evacuation under the EAP. For example, officials from
several posts reported that newer staff have not received training
necessary to meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. EAC members
at one post reported that their newer EAC colleagues are not familiar with
retrieving and using evacuation-related information in the EAP and could
use more training in this area. Over 75 percent of posts reported that EAC
members receive training or rehearse their assigned emergency action
functions on the EAC at most once a year, if at all. One post reported
that no formal training of EAC members or tabletop exercises have been
conducted at the post since April 2003. Even when exercises are conducted,
not all EAC members are fully engaged. For example, a Regional Security
Officer who has led several training exercises stated that there is little
participation from other EAC members and as a result, they are not
prepared to make decisions in a crisis. He added that other EAC members
should be prepared to make such decisions because the regional security
officer often is engaged in specific tasks during crises and does not make
all the decisions related to addressing them.
In addition, over one-quarter of posts reported that EAC members have not
received training necessary to meet their assigned emergency
responsibilities. For example, one post noted that the frequent turnover
at unaccompanied posts, where staff serve for only 1 year, means that EAC
members at these posts need training to make them better equipped to work
as a team. Another post suggested that EAC members should be better
trained on how to coordinate crisis response with U.S. government agencies
other than State. A third post, which had received a large influx of
temporary duty staff to assist with the evacuation of American citizens
from Lebanon in the summer of 2006, commented that its human resource
officer needs training in coordinating temporary duty staffing. Without
such training, posts trying to address the needs of temporary staff and
deploy them where they would be most useful risk diverting resources from
the evacuation effort itself.
^26A tabletop exercise is a simulation in which an event, like a crisis
that could lead to an evacuation, is discussed along with possible
reactions to the event.
The EAC also is tasked with preparing and conducting briefings, drills,
exercises, and other crisis preparedness functions for the post as a
whole.^27 For example, the EAC is supposed to conduct drills that test the
post's emergency notification system and the consular warden system, which
is used to notify American citizens in the country in the event of a
crisis. However, over 40 percent of posts reported that they had never
used drills or exercises to test parts of their EAP related to drawing
down post staff and dependents, and almost half of posts reported that
they had never used drills or exercises to test parts of their EAP related
to evacuation of private American citizens. In addition, even though the
EPH recommends that posts consider involving host country response
services in the training and drills conducted, less than a third of posts
reported that host government officials have participated in evacuation
drills or exercises to test the post's EAP.^28
Crisis Management Exercises Considered Useful but Could Be More Relevant to
Posts
While CMEs are widely recognized as an important tool, they could be made
more relevant to posts. CMEs are simulations meant to prepare staff at
overseas posts for handling crises, including evacuations. According to
the EPH, these exercises are supposed to be conducted at each post every 2
to 2-1/2 years, and every year at 1-year (unaccompanied) posts. FSI
designs the exercise scenarios and hires contractors to conduct them at
the posts. FSI officials said the training typically lasts 2 days,
starting with an overview of the EPH and EAP followed by several crisis
simulations for all post staff on the first day and continuing on the
second day with longer and more involved simulations for EAC members. Over
70 percent of posts reported that they have used these exercises to refine
their EAP, and more than three-quarters of this group reported that the
exercise was very or extremely useful in doing so. Staff from a few posts
characterized the exercises as realistic and timely, and FSI officials
cited several instances in which the exercises improved crisis
preparedness in a concrete manner, such as by prompting post staff to
identify a location for their alternate command center.
^27According to the EPH (12 FAH-1 H-231), "Responsibilities of the EAC
include ... drills, exercises and other crisis preparedness functions (see
12 FAH-1 H-244 and 12 FAH-1 H-700) and ... ensuring mission-wide
familiarity with the EAP and representative participation in its
preparation process."
^28Almost three-quarters of posts have identified and contacted local
government officials, such as airport and seaport officials, who might
help facilitate the evacuation of large numbers of American citizens.
Further, 65 posts, or 31 percent of posts responding to our survey,
indicated that such officials would be both "extremely" or "very" willing
and "extremely" or "very" able to help facilitate the evacuation of large
numbers of American citizens. However, a majority of these posts reported
that they did not include local government officials in evacuation drills
or exercises to test the post's EAP.
State guidance directs that scenarios in CMEs be post-specific and drafted
with post input. However, staff from some posts described the exercises
either as not practical or relevant, too long, tying up too many
resources, or "too far-fetched." For example, staff at one post said the
exercises focused on a catastrophic but unlikely scenario, such as a
weapons of mass destruction attack, rather than smaller-scale, more likely
events, such as an ordinary bomb blast. Staff at another post pointed out
that such catastrophic scenarios are inappropriate because they involve
post staff making decisions that would normally be made at a much higher
level in Washington, D.C. The Defense Attache at this post said it would
be helpful if after action reports were collected on crises that have
actually occurred, and if CMEs could be designed to simulate those
scenarios. The post's management counselor added that FSI should do a
better job of gathering ideas on how to improve CMEs, and that one way to
make the exercises more realistic would be to have the post's more
experienced staff develop them and the more junior staff run through them.
This would allow the junior staff to prepare for possible crises, during
which they may have to fill in for more senior colleagues who may be
absent. Some post staff reported that more practical, frequent, and less
formal, hands-on exercises would be helpful, for example, "so people can
learn who does what, and when."
Staff at one post cited examples of shorter, more practical exercises, or
"mini CMEs," lasting only a few hours each that they had found useful. For
example, these included an exercise focused on bird flu, which preceded an
actual case of bird flu in the country, and one in which they practiced
text messaging their colleagues to warn of a car bomb at the embassy so
people would know not to go back to the building after returning from
lunch. Staff at this post also have used their crisis management training
time to discuss lessons learned after an event. The event in this case was
a large-scale evacuation of American citizens, during which this post
served as a temporary safe haven for the evacuees. In a cable describing
this CME, the ambassador wrote that it "enabled us to `Monday-morning
quarterback' our recent experiences while they were still fresh in our
collective minds, and before transfer season robbed us of considerable
institutional knowledge." He also said that the exercise allowed EAC
members to consider lessons learned and "allowed the crisis management
trainer to hear firsthand many of the difficulties overcome, which are
details that often slip through the cracks in the final wrap-up versions
of after action reports."
According to a State document on evacuations, locally employed staff
should be involved in all stages of emergency planning. The EPH also
encourages posts to include locally employed staff in crisis management
training. Further, a majority of posts reported that input from local
staff is "very useful" in preparing for the possibility of an evacuation.
A number of State officials with evacuation-related experience said that
these staff, who generally remain at the post during a crisis, often at
great risk to themselves, have played critical roles during evacuations
because of their contacts with the host government and fluency in the
local language. According to FSI, local staff are included in the first
day of crisis management training.
Regular Input from Staff with Evacuation Experience Could Improve FSI Crisis
Management Training
Crisis management training at FSI in Arlington, Virginia, for new and
returning overseas staff covers a variety of topics. However, those
portions of the training we attended,^29 which covered evacuation-related
information, were limited to tabletop exercises and ad hoc input from
participants who happen to have experienced evacuations or other crises.
FSI trains State and other U.S.-government staff for their postings
overseas. It provides courses for new Foreign Service officers about to be
sent to their first post and for more experienced staff rotating to new
posts. It also provides courses targeted to specific positions, such as
ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission, or Community Liaison officers
(CLO).^30 All these courses have crisis management segments, which last
anywhere from a few hours to a few days, and cover evacuation-related
information, including a brief description of the EPH, EAP, EAC, the
warden system, and the post's obligations to private American citizens,
among other evacuation-related information. As a result, all staff receive
some training to prepare for possible evacuation before being sent
overseas. The training we attended included lectures accompanied by
PowerPoint presentations. Two of the three course segments we attended
also included tabletop exercises with hypothetical crisis scenarios
involving escalating trip wires and role playing as part of a mock EAC.
^29We attended crisis management segments for three courses: the general
course for experienced State and other U.S. government staff about to
rotate to new posts, one for new Foreign Service officers, and one for
CLOs.
^30CLOs who work in conjunction with State's Family Liaison Office
typically are employee spouses who are paid to address the needs of family
members at an overseas post and ensure the cohesiveness and morale of the
post community, such as by planning social events. CLOs are responsible
for addressing families' practical and emotional needs during an
authorized or ordered departure and typically leave the post with
families.
While the material presented in the courses provided some useful
information, such as descriptions of the EPH, EAP, and EAC, some of the
most practical, as well as engaging, parts of these course
segments--comments from participants who happened to have been through
evacuations--were included by chance rather than being formally
incorporated into the program. For example, a participant in one class who
had been evacuated twice from Jakarta, Indonesia provided much more
specific information than the instructor was able to provide regarding the
importance of contact information for evacuating family members. Fifty
percent more posts rated advice from experienced colleagues as "very
useful" in preparing for the possibility of evacuations compared to the
number that rated crisis management training at FSI "very useful." Given
this finding, FSI crisis management training could be improved by
incorporating guest speakers who have been through evacuations (either as
evacuees, critical staff remaining at post, or temporary staff sent to
help with the crisis). A consular official at the embassy in Beirut who
worked through the 2006 evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon told
us such training would be valuable and she would like to contribute to it.
State Beginning to Implement New Training Tools
State is beginning to implement training tools through which staff with
evacuation experience can share their insights with colleagues, and it is
experimenting with new mechanisms to allow more frequent and inclusive
training. For example, the Consular Affairs Bureau recently conducted two
workshops in the aftermath of Hurricanes Wilma and Katrina that featured
staff with experience evacuating American citizens from hurricanes. In
addition to State employees, the first hurricane workshop included
officials from other U.S. government agencies, the private sector, and
other entities, so participants could learn what the roles of these
entities were in the evacuations and discuss any challenges in
coordination.^31 The second workshop primarily included State employees
but was conducted via videoconference, which allowed local staff from
affected posts to participate. According to the Director of Consular
Affairs' Office of American Citizen Services, these staff are especially
valuable because they tend to remain at a post much longer than rotating
U.S. staff and therefore have long institutional memories and a wealth of
experience. The Consular Affairs Bureau also is in the process of
developing training based on lessons learned from staff involved in the
2006 evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon.^32
FSI is beginning to use new tools as well, including conducting some
exercises via videoconference. For example, it has used videoconferencing
to conduct exercises tailored to specific upcoming, potentially
crisis-prone events, such as major sporting events held in overseas
cities. It also has conducted videoconference-based exercises from hubs in
several countries that have allowed staff from outlying posts to
participate without having to travel to the training location. While posts
in some developing countries may lack the needed infrastructure to
participate in videoconferencing and differing time zones can create
scheduling problems, this technology can allow for more frequent,
on-demand exercises with greater participation from staff at all posts as
well as locally employed staff. In addition, a State official involved in
training said FSI would consider other options for improving CMEs,
including possibly reevaluating their 2-day structure and introducing
online training.
^31In addition to Consular Affairs staff, participants included staff from
affected posts in Mexico and the Caribbean, and related State regional and
functional units such as the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau and Crisis
Management Support; officials from other U.S. government agencies such as
DOD, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Federal
Aviation Administration; private industry representatives from the travel,
airline, cruise, and other industries; international organizations (the
Pan American Health Organization); and foreign government officials whose
citizens had also been stranded by the hurricanes.
^32State previously produced a digital video disc (DVD) ("Crisis
Response") and a video ("Lives on Hold") that share lessons learned by
former Ambassador Prudence Bushnell and other State officials in the
aftermath of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings and crises, including
evacuations, at other posts.
State's Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, and Incorporate
Lessons Learned Constrains Preparation for Evacuation
State lacks a systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate
lessons learned from previous evacuations, which constrains posts' efforts
to prepare and plan for future evacuations. The majority of posts do not
complete after action reports detailing lessons learned following an
evacuation, and there is no State entity responsible for ensuring their
production. Evacuation-related after action reports do not have a
standardized format, and these reports could include lessons learned on
recurring staff and morale issues. State has no systematic mechanism to
ensure lessons learned included in after action reports are analyzed and
incorporated into modifications of training and guidance. Although State
headquarters has disseminated some ad hoc guidance based on lessons
learned from prior evacuations, the guidance is sometimes vague and may be
overlooked by posts due to the high volume of material they receive. Post
staff have limited institutional knowledge of earlier evacuations, which
points to a need for a more comprehensive process that captures and
disseminates lessons learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.
Most Posts Did Not Complete an After Action Report Following an Evacuation, and
There Is No State Entity to Ensure Its Production
Following an authorized or ordered departure, posts are required to
complete an after action report that includes lessons learned.
Furthermore, State guidance for cables terminating authorized or ordered
departure directs that posts submit an after action report within 15 days.
Despite this explicit guidance, almost 60 percent of posts that have
experienced an authorized or ordered departure in the past 5 years
reported that they have not produced an after action report. As a result,
State does not have the opportunity to assess most posts' evacuation
experiences. It is therefore difficult for State to determine common
themes or trends among evacuations. There may also be similarities among
posts that do produce after action reports that would not be truly
representative of post evacuations as a whole.
According to State officials, there is no single entity at State
responsible for ensuring that posts produce after action reports following
an evacuation. We were told of specific cases where valuable lessons were
learned during a recent post evacuation, but this information remained
generally unknown because State has not systematically collected after
action reports. For example, one evacuation was due to civil unrest where
several hundred Americans were evacuated from an African country. The
official told us the warden system collapsed during the crisis; wardens
either fled the violence, could not get to their phone lists, or could not
charge their cell phones and make calls. The post had purchased a computer
program that allowed it to send text messages over cell phones en masse.
The official said this capability was critical to getting messages out to
American citizens, and the system undoubtedly saved lives. The official
further stated that the ability to text message is crucial in a crisis and
should be a standard tool for assisting American citizens. While some
posts also are implementing this communication tool, the lessons learned
from using this technology during an actual crisis may have been lost
because the official did not report the lessons learned to State
headquarters. In another example, a post in Asia went to authorized
departure during the SARS epidemic. An official who served at the post
during the epidemic said that before the event, there had not been much
thought on how posts would deal with a worldwide epidemic, but the
experience increased the post's preparedness for such an event. However,
the official said the post did not produce an after action report
detailing lessons learned during this event.
Evacuation After Action Reports Lack a Standard Format
Though required after action reports are to include lessons learned,
policies to be clarified, resource needs, training needs, and an
assessment of host government actions, their lack of a standard template
may cause key information to be missed and make the information hard to
use and assess. We reviewed about a dozen after action reports and found
that while they were well-organized and presented information in a logical
manner, they generally varied in style and presentation. For example, some
after action reports we reviewed presented information as a narrative, in
which the author described the event and reported observations. Other
after action reports we reviewed presented information on what went well,
followed by what could be improved or recommendations for action. A single
post also may produce multiple reports from different State entities at
that post, such as one report for lessons learned by Consular Affairs and
another report from the management officer. The lack of a standard
template that highlights key information to guide posts in their reporting
makes it possible that posts may omit important information. For example,
an ambassador at a post involved in a recent evacuation noted that many
challenges posts encounter during evacuation are not included in after
action reports.
After Action Reports Could Include Staffing and Morale Lessons Learned
State's guidance to posts does not include providing lessons learned in
response to recurring staffing and morale issues, such as the process of
deciding whom to evacuate and what happens at a post after nonemergency
staff and family members have left. Problems involving staff and morale
can occur at posts during evacuations and may affect the ability of posts
to effectively carry out operations during and after a crisis.
According to State officials, a challenge during evacuations is
determining which personnel will be designated as "emergency" and required
to stay at post and which staff will be designated "nonemergency" and told
to leave.^33 There often are tensions over who leaves and who stays. For
example, some post staff have appealed their designation as "nonemergency"
in the hope of staying. While certain senior and security-related
positions would likely be designated "emergency" positions in any
situation, one State official said that decisions regarding emergency
personnel are often made based on individual employees' ability to handle
crises or their family situation rather than their position.^34 As a
result, making these decisions and communicating them to employees often
requires considerable skill and tact. State officials said that decisions
regarding the reasons for evacuations are sometimes not transparent, and a
State official said post staff can be suspicious of why certain personnel
were designated to leave. The State official said staff may be concerned
that an evacuation is really an attempt to "right size" a post. After
action reports could provide lessons learned on how to improve personnel
decisions in order to minimize damage to staff morale and allow the post
to function smoothly both during the crisis and when the departing staff
return.
Locally employed staff at two posts and one State official said another
concern is that local staff, who are generally from the host country or a
third country and typically remain at a post during an evacuation, may be
nervous over job security, since their supervisors are leaving the post.
They also may be unprepared for carrying out their duties in the absence
of a familiar supervisor. A State document to posts recommends posts
address local staff supervision issues before departure and establish a
clear chain of command for remaining personnel. However, a State official
said post staff who are evacuated often do not explain to local staff who
they will report to or what their new responsibilities will be. In
addition, State officials said that local staff may fear for their
personal safety during a crisis, after nonemergency staff and dependents
depart. A State official and a State document emphasized that it is
important to keep local staff as informed as possible about an unfolding
crisis, what actions the post is taking and why, and what their roles
should be. After action reports could provide lessons learned on how to
best keep local staff informed about an unfolding crisis and what their
new roles will be when nonemergency staff and dependents leave.
^33The EPH provides no specific definition of "emergency" or
"nonemergency" staff or positions, but states that "if an authorized or
ordered departure is necessary, post must plan to keep a sufficient amount
of staff available at post to maintain certain operating functions...."
(12 FAH-1 H-222 Drawdown Staffing). These functions include security and
logistics; communications with State personnel in Washington, D.C.; U.S.
citizen and other consular services; communication of U.S. foreign policy;
and public affairs.
^34For example, single parents in a key role will likely need to leave
with their children.
Further, two State officials with extensive overseas experience told us
that after nonemergency staff and dependents leave the post, the role of
the CLO, who is responsible for addressing staff morale and related
issues, remains important. However, the CLO typically departs the post
with family members. These officials said post morale can drop
substantially when family members depart and staff can suffer burnout,
working exceedingly long hours. A State document to posts recommends that
posts retain as many CLO functions as possible after nonemergency staff
and dependents have left. After action reports could provide lessons
learned on the role of the CLO in maintaining staff morale and could
include best practices, such as the designation of a temporary or backup
CLO after the CLO departs.
State Has No Systematic Mechanism to Analyze and Incorporate Evacuation Lessons
Learned
State has no systematic mechanism to ensure lessons learned from after
action reports are analyzed and incorporated into modifications of State
training and guidance. According to State officials, there is no entity at
State responsible for systematically reviewing and analyzing the
evacuation lessons learned contained in after action reports, and no
entity responsible for determining whether modifications to State
evacuation guidance and training are necessary. As a result, lessons
learned from evacuation-related events are not being comprehensively
analyzed, and lessons learned are not systematically incorporated into
guidance and training. Under the current system, the majority of posts
reported they have not received, or do not know if they received, written
guidance from State headquarters on earlier evacuations.
Although State headquarters has disseminated some ad hoc guidance based on
lessons learned from evacuated posts, the guidance can be overlooked and
is sometimes vague. State headquarters issued two lessons-learned cables
to all posts following the evacuation of almost 15,000 American citizens
from Lebanon in the summer of 2006.^35 State also has issued cables on
lessons learned from evacuations related to hurricanes and avian flu.
However, the current system involves distributing cables on lessons
learned together with numerous cables on other subjects, and posts easily
can overlook these important lessons due to the volume of cables received.
In addition, cables do not always include actions posts should take to
prepare for evacuation. As a result, the lessons from these sources can be
inconsistent and vague.
^35These two cables also were posted to the State Crisis Management Web
site.
Post Staff Have Limited Institutional Knowledge of Earlier Evacuations
Posts reported that advice from colleagues experienced in evacuations is
one of the most useful tools in preparing for evacuations. However,
State's policy of changing staff assignments at overseas posts every 1 to
3 years limits the knowledge gained from evacuations, since staff who
experienced an evacuation at a post soon move on. The most frequent
rotations occur at unaccompanied posts, which are often in dangerous and
unstable areas. According to State officials, staff at unaccompanied posts
often are less experienced than other posts, and staff generally change
every year. Additionally, midlevel positions at many hardship posts^36
continue to be staffed by junior officers who lack experience and have
minimal guidance.
According to State officials, the number of positions at unaccompanied
posts is at its highest level in history. State officials said less
experienced staff can be stationed at unaccompanied posts for several
reasons; they have less seniority in State's posting process, they often
do not have families and are less affected by unaccompanied status, or
they may seek out placements at unaccompanied posts because such postings
may enhance their career development. For example, State recently made
service in a hardship post a prerequisite for promotion to the senior
Foreign Service. This may result in a trend toward less experienced
personnel serving shorter terms at unaccompanied posts that could be
vulnerable to future crises and potential evacuations. Since post staff
have limited institutional memory of prior evacuations, particularly at
unaccompanied posts, it is important to have a process that captures and
disseminates lessons learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.
^36State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S.
government provides differential pay incentives of an additional 5 percent
to 35 percent of base salary, depending on the severity or difficulty of
the conditions, to encourage employees to bid on assignments to these
posts and compensate them for the hardships they encounter.
Conclusions
State's diplomatic mission requires its staff and dependents to work in
posts all over the world, including in unstable, dangerous, or
crisis-prone regions from which staff and dependents might have to be
evacuated. In recent years, evacuations have occurred on a regular
basis--over the past 5 years, State has authorized or ordered the
evacuation of an average of one overseas post every 3 weeks. Private
American citizens also are present in increasing numbers all over the
world, sometimes in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-prone regions where
they might need evacuation assistance. To meet these challenges, State has
made a concerted effort to prepare staff to manage the wide variety of
crises they might face. For example, State has developed crisis management
guidance, plans, and training such as the EPH, EAP, and instruction in
Washington, D.C., and at post. State also has been proactive in seeking to
improve its ability to prepare for and implement evacuations.
However, while we found no major adverse impacts, we did find deficiencies
in State's guidance and plans and gaps in its training to plan, prepare
for, and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens. In addition, State lacks a systematic process to collect,
analyze, and incorporate lessons learned from previous evacuations. As a
result, State misses opportunities to assess its performance and make
modifications to improve its evacuation guidance and training. Further,
the memorandum of agreement governing State and DOD's division of
responsibility has weaknesses that could hamper communication and
cooperation between the two departments. State should improve its
planning, preparations for, and management of evacuations through updating
its guidance and plans and improving the training for overseas staff with
emergency responsibilities. With thousands of U.S. government personnel
and their families working at U.S. posts and ever-increasing air travel of
private American citizens living and traveling overseas, evacuations will
continue, and large-scale operations such as the evacuation of American
citizens from Lebanon could happen again.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of
evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens from overseas
posts, we recommend the Secretary of State
o designate an entity within State to (1) ensure that EAPs are
prepared annually, (2) ensure that posts generate standardized
evacuation after action reports with lessons learned, and (3)
systematically collect and analyze these reports to assess State's
performance and recommend modifications to State guidance, plans,
training, and exercises, if necessary;
o direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for
that particular country;
o review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members
to meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning
and preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for
improving training, particularly for less experienced EAC members;
and
o strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing
them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the
post into exercise scenarios.
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management
of large-scale evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens from overseas posts when State requires DOD assistance,
we recommend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
o review the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments) to
ensure it expedites practical communication and coordination
between the two departments before and during a large-scale
evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report and our survey results to the
Secretaries of State and Defense for their review and comment. We
received written comments from the Departments of State and
Defense that are reprinted in appendixes III and IV. State
concurred with three of our five recommendations and partially
concurred with two. State also provided us with technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD partially
concurred with the recommendation regarding the MOA between State
and DOD (and its amendments), which was the only recommendation
relevant to DOD, and did not comment on any other aspect of the
report.
Specifically, State concurred with our recommendations that the
Secretary of State
o direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for
that particular country;
o review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members
to meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning
and preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for
improving training, particularly for less experienced EAC members;
and
o strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing
them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the
post into exercise scenarios.
State partially concurred with our recommendation that the
Secretary of State designate an entity within State to ensure that
EAPs are prepared annually. In its response, State said that this
task is already covered under existing State regulations and added
that the department is currently deploying a new software
application that should facilitate keeping EAPs up to date. While
we welcome these efforts, it is not clear that they are adequate
to ensure that EAPs are updated on an annual basis. State
concurred with the rest of this recommendation, which asks the
Secretary of State to designate a central entity to ensure that
posts generate standardized evacuation after action reports with
lessons learned and systematically collect and analyze these
reports to assess State's performance and recommend modifications
to State guidance, plans, training, and exercises, if necessary.
Both State and DOD partially concurred with our recommendation
regarding the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments).
While both agencies agreed to review the document, they
misunderstood part of our recommendation. We did not recommend
that a contact list be added to the MOA. Furthermore, State and
DOD said they believed existing interagency communication channels
are adequate for managing and implementing large-scale
evacuations. In addition, DOD expressed concern that explicitly
specifying general capabilities and limitations in the MOA could
adversely affect ongoing military operations. In response, we have
modified the recommendation to clarify that the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense review the MOA (and its amendments)
to ensure it expedites practical communication and coordination
between the two departments before and during a large-scale
evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
State also questioned whether the survey results, as we presented
them in our report, accurately reflect posts' assessment of the
usefulness of existing crisis planning resources and whether
survey results contradict anecdotal comments/criticisms regarding
FSI training. We obtained a high response rate to our survey of
overseas posts; the survey results are a statistically valid
reflection of posts' views on the guidance and training available
to plan and prepare for potential evacuation. The survey results
and findings derived from them are both factually correct and
methodologically valid. The survey was developed based on a review
of State documentation and interviews with State officials and was
reviewed with State officials from Crisis Management Support,
Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security, and the regional bureaus.
Survey methodology experts at GAO were directly involved in the
collection, analysis, and review of survey results, as well as the
findings and conclusions derived from those results.
We are sending copies of this report to interested Congressional
Committees and to the Secretaries of State and Defense. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please
contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or [39][email protected] .
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO
staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix
V.
Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the Department of State's (State) efforts to plan,
prepare for, and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and
American citizens from overseas posts, we (1) assessed State's
guidance and plans to prepare for possible evacuations of post
staff, dependents, and American citizens; (2) assessed the
training, drills, and exercises used to prepare staff at overseas
posts for crises, including possible evacuation; and (3) evaluated
State's efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons
learned from previous evacuations into modifications of guidance
and training. We employed several methodologies to address these
three objectives. We conducted a survey of all Emergency Action
Committees (EAC) at State embassies and consulates worldwide. In
addition, we conducted structured interviews with State employees
who had experienced a variety of evacuation-related events over
the last 5 years.^1 We also examined State and Department of
Defense (DOD) documents regarding efforts to plan, prepare for,
and manage evacuations. We met with State and DOD officials
overseas in Cyprus, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia; in Washington,
D.C.; and at U.S. Transportation Command headquarters at Scott Air
Force Base in Illinois.
As part of our efforts to collect information on all three
objectives, we conducted a survey of all 243 EACs at State
embassies and consulates (posts) worldwide.^2 EACs are responsible
for crisis management at post and therefore are best qualified to
discuss crisis management activities, including preparing for and
implementing evacuations. The survey consisted of 49 questions
covering a range of topics on how posts plan, prepare for, and
implement evacuations, as well as how lessons learned are
reported. The survey was sent to the principal officer at each
post (typically the deputy chief of mission or consul general). We
requested that the survey be completed collectively by members of
the post's EAC, and completed surveys were intended to reflect the
views of the EAC as a whole. We received 210 completed surveys,
for an overall response rate of 86 percent. State posts are
divided into six different geographical bureaus. The Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs had the highest response rate for
any geographical bureau at 92 percent, and the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs had the lowest response rate at 73 percent.^3 The
survey was distributed by the heads of the State regional bureaus
to posts under their supervision via e-mail as a Word attachment
on January 30, 2007, and recipients were requested to complete the
survey within 2 weeks. On February 15, 2007, the regional bureaus
sent targeted e-mail reminders to posts that had not yet
responded. We contacted all remaining posts that had not yet
responded by telephone, starting on February 28, 2007. Completed
surveys were accepted until April 4, 2007.
^1These events included authorized departure, authorized departure that became
an ordered departure, ordered departure only, evacuation of American citizens,
or serving at a post that was a transit point for one of the above events.
^2The survey was not sent to small posts that do not have an EAC.
The survey was developed based on a review of State documentation
and interviews with State officials. We conducted face-to-face
pretests with two former State regional security officers as well
as two current State officials who had recently served on an EAC.
We also reviewed the survey in a meeting with State officials from
Crisis Management Support, Consular Affairs, Resource Management,
Human Resources, Diplomatic Security, and the regional bureaus. We
conducted the review and pretests to make sure that (1) the
questions were clear and unambiguous, (2) terminology was used
correctly, (3) the survey did not place an undue burden on agency
officials, (4) the information could feasibly be obtained, and (5)
the survey was comprehensive and unbiased. We made changes to the
content and format of the survey after the meeting with State
officials and after each of the four pretests, based on comments
received.
The majority of questions in the survey were close ended, which
allowed us to develop statistics that are representative of the
entire universe of Emergency Action Committees. The survey also
allowed for some open-ended responses. Commentary from open-ended
questions is reflected in the body of the report, but is not
summarized statistically. Survey percentages reported do not
include nonresponses to each question in our survey. Of responses
analyzed in this report, there were relatively few nonresponses to
individual questions. Survey questions, results, and number of
respondents per question are presented in an electronic
supplement, which may be accessed at GAO-08-24SP.
We conducted 22 structured interviews, via e-mail and in person,
with State personnel who had served on an EAC and experienced a
draw down or evacuation within the last 5 years. Eighteen
responded to our e-mail with the structured interview questions.
We also conducted four structured interviews in person. The
purpose of the structured interview was to collect detailed
qualitative information related to evacuations through open-ended
questions, such as training, guidance, policies, implementation,
morale, and lessons learned. We pretested the structured interview
in-person with two State officials currently serving on an EAC who
had experienced at least one evacuation. We made changes to the
content and format of the structured interview based on comments
from the pretests.
^3Posts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not respond to our survey. Given the ongoing
political and security situations in both countries, State officials told us it
would not be feasible for these posts to complete our survey.
To identify candidates for structured interviews, we sent a brief
questionnaire, along with the survey, to all 243 EACs. The
questionnaire and survey were pretested at the same time to check
for clarity and usefulness. We made changes to the content and
format of the questionnaire based on comments we received. We
received approximately 100 completed questionnaires with
respondents indicating a willingness to participate in a
structured interview via e-mail. We reviewed the completed
questionnaires and selected interview candidates in order to
obtain a wide variety of experiences. All six State geographical
bureaus were represented in the structured interviews. Structured
interview respondents had experienced many different crisis
situations, including natural disasters, disease epidemics, war
threats, and civil unrest. The respondents had experienced
authorized departure, ordered departure, assisting private
American citizens in evacuations, serving as a transit point for
evacuees, departing posts during evacuations, and traveling to
posts to serve as temporary employees while the post was in
evacuation status. The respondents held different positions at
posts; such as ambassador, deputy chief of mission, regional
security officer, management officer, Consular Affairs chief,
public affairs officer, general services officer, U.S. Agency for
International Aid country director, and Peace Corps country
director.
To review State and DOD's planning, preparation for, and managing
of evacuations, we examined State and DOD documents, including
State's Emergency Planning Handbook, numerous post Emergency
Action Plans, several post-produced F-77 reports of potential
evacuees, the Memorandum of Agreement between State and DOD on the
Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals and
Designated other Persons from Threatened Areas Overseas, and
various other State cables and documents related to evacuations,
including situation reports, lessons-learned cables, and other
documents discussing lessons learned.
In the United States, we met with numerous State and DOD officials
to assess how State and DOD plan, prepare for, and manage
evacuations. In Washington, we met with the Under Secretary of
State for Management; the Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs and other officials from the Consular Affairs
Bureau; officials from State's regional bureaus; and from State's
bureaus of diplomatic security, administration, resource
management, and political military affairs. We also met with
Crisis Management Support officials, who support State taskforces
during a crisis and train staff in evacuation policy and
procedures, and toured State's Operations Center, where taskforces
are located. In addition, we met with officials from State's
Foreign Service Institute, which conducts crisis management
training.
To review how State and DOD implement staff draw downs and
evacuations of American citizens, and make observations on these
agencies' successes and challenges in doing so, we traveled to
Lebanon, Cyprus, and Saudi Arabia, where we met with U.S. embassy
and host country officials involved in staff draw downs and
evacuations. State officials in Lebanon and Cyprus implemented one
of the largest evacuations of American citizens in U.S. history.
The consulate in Jeddah and the embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
have each experienced three evacuations in the past 5 years.
To assess how State interacts with DOD during DOD-assisted
evacuations or draw downs, we met with DOD officials in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
the U.S. Transportation Command's Military Sealift Command. We
also traveled to Scott Air Force Base in Illinois to meet with
officials at U.S. Transportation Command headquarters and its Air
Mobility Command. In addition, we spoke by telephone with Central
Command officials in Tampa, Florida.
We performed our work from June 2006 to July 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 under
Authorized and Ordered Departure Authority^a
^aIn 1991, 1998, and 2003, the most frequent reasons for posts
evacuated under authorized and ordered departure authority are
listed.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
October 2, 2007:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "State
Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can
Be Improved," GAO Job Code 320428.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Mark
Libby, Crisis Management Coordinator, Office of the Executive
Secretariat, Crisis Management Support at (202) 647-7640.
Sincerely,
Signed by: Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO � David Maurer:
S/ES � Dan Smith:
State/OIG � Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved
(GAO-08-23; GAO Code 320428):
Summary and Comment:
Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to
comment on GAO's draft report "Evacuation Planning and Preparations for
Overseas Posts Can Be Improved. "
The Department of State has built a strong record over many years in
managing crises overseas that threaten U.S. embassies, personnel,
citizens and interests. The GAO report notes that State has organized
temporary reductions in staff (often accomplished through voluntary
departures) or evacuations of U.S. personnel, dependents and private
American citizens over 260 times in the past twenty years alone. The
vast majority of those operations involved countries with limited
infrastructure beset by instability or violence, or suffering from a
natural disaster. Statistics alone cannot capture the enormous variety
in conditions experienced by official and private Americans overseas or
the wide range of possible scenarios to which the Department must be
prepared to respond. Advance planning and preparation, central subjects
of this report, are hallmarks of the Department's approach to crisis
management. So are flexibility and innovation needed to deal with
circumstances that do not fit the plan.
The Department's success in this regard reflects its determination to
improve continuously its crisis management performance and training. It
is strongly committed to learning from actual experience in order to
better prepare for future crises. Toward this end, the Department
welcomes the GAO review of crisis planning and preparation, and notes
that the Department has already undertaken many of the measures that
the GAO endorses. These include strengthened and sustained crisis
management training, efforts to develop and disseminate more
systematically lessons learned from crisis response and evacuations,
including better use of after-action reports, and development of best
practices that can be shared widely among posts.
Much of GAO's report focuses on basic planning and resources available
to all embassies, and the Department appreciates GAO's efforts to
review these planning efforts. This focus, while valid, perhaps
overlooked key components of the Department's overall preparedness for
crises and evacuations, including the process through which the
Department and specific posts collaborate intensively in:
* evaluating possible risks;
* refining a mission's generic planning;
* identifying mission crisis managers' key duties specific to that
crisis; and
* prioritizing required actions to respond safely and efficiently.
The Department is committed to supporting, including through
evacuations, U.S. personnel and private citizens in every country. It
believes every mission must have a base level of preparedness. But it
also understands that U.S. embassies and personnel operate in wildly
divergent threat environments. The most intense focus of its crisis
management planning and preparation is therefore on those missions
facing the greatest threats.
In handling these high-threat situations, moreover, the ongoing
dialogue between the Department and posts is critical to our success in
responding to situations that often escalate quickly and take
unexpected turns. Preparation and planning are vitally important, but
so is the ability to monitor conditions and adapt appropriately to ever-
changing circumstances.
Planning and Preparation
With regard to the basic crisis-management guidance that State provides
to overseas posts, the Department appreciates the GAO report's
observations and recommendations, but notes an apparent contradiction
between the report's suggestion, incorrect in our view, that Department
guidance to posts is too long, laden with "boilerplate" language, and
the report's recommendation that State provide additional, more
comprehensive guidance on specific aspects of crisis management to the
field. The Department notes that there is a fine balance between giving
our overseas missions the support they need and overburdening them with
additional guidance or reporting requirements. The wide range of
geographical, political, and other factors with which each post must
contend, moreover, means that no "one-size-fits-all" approach to crisis
preparation is appropriate. Instead, Department training and
contingency planning resources are designed to provide missions with a
toolbox from which they can develop plans that realistically reflect
their particular operating environments. The Department is nonetheless
committed to ensuring that crisis management training and other tools
used by posts for emergency planning (such as the Emergency Planning
Handbook and Emergency Action Plans) are as useful, relevant, and fresh
as possible. (See comment 1)
The Department partially concurs with the recommendation that it
designate an entity within State to ensure Emergency Action Plans
(EAPs) are prepared annually. Chiefs of Mission are already Charged
under 12 FAH 1 to "oversee the efforts of post personnel to prepare for
crises." The Department is currently deploying a new software
application (the Crisis and Emergency Planning Application - CEPA),
which will ensure wider participation and further familiarize employees
with Post's Emergency Action Plans. It will also help Emergency Action
Committee members at post better understand their roles in a crisis
situation -- and allow experienced staff at post to record useful
evacuation-related information and tips for their successors'
consideration. The Department believes this will largely address the
concerns behind the GAO's recommendation regarding preparation of EAPs.
The Department notes, however, that the conclusions drawn in some
sections of the GAO draft report regarding these basic planning tools
are at variance with the actual survey data collected by GAO about the
usefulness of existing crisis planning resources. On page 15, for
example, the report states that most posts feel the Emergency Planning
Handbook (EPH) is of only limited usefulness in preparing for an
evacuation. Yet the raw survey data shows that a solid 81% of
respondents view the EPH as either "somewhat" or "very" useful �
perhaps because the EPH includes guidance (such as checklists for
planning evacuation routes, establishing helicopter landing zones, and
identifying evacuation assembly areas) crucial to posts as they draw up
the EAPs that will guide them in an actual crisis. EAP checklists, EAPs
themselves, and crisis management exercises received even higher marks
for usefulness in preparing for an evacuation (90%, 87%, and 87%,
respectively). GAO's raw survey data indicates that nearly three-
quarters of posts reported using Crisis Management Exercises (CMEs) to
refine their EAPs, elements of which over 85% of respondents report
rehearsing at least once yearly. Most respondents report that their
EAPs address the likeliest threats at their post, including terrorism,
natural disaster, and civil unrest. (See comments 2, 3, and 4)
In addition, the Department's EPH and individual posts' EAPs address
contingencies (such as building fires, bomb threats, and certain health
emergencies) that might involve responses other than evacuation. Much
of the additional "volume" and "boilerplate language" identified by
survey respondents provides guidance to posts on how to plan for these
sorts of emergencies � and, while less useful for evacuation planning
per se, the Department believes that this guidance is still important
to include in the EPH.
The Department also notes that the draft report's discussion of F-77
reports on American citizens in consular districts overseas (pages 18-
20) incorrectly implies it would be possible for posts to generate a
definitive number of Americans in any given country at any given
moment. The draft states that the Department "encourages but does not
require" U.S. citizens to register while overseas, implying that this
might be a policy decision or a question of resource allocation. In
fact, the Department cannot require or compel American citizens to
register while overseas. Because of this, consular officials must rely
on a range of other indicators to arrive at their F-77 estimates. These
indicators vary from country to country, depending on the unique
circumstances of each consular district, and therefore do not lend
themselves to the sort of standardized methodology the draft report
seems to recommend. The Department nonetheless feels that the
statistics in these F-77 reports, which are based on consular officers'
first-hand knowledge of the situations in their host countries,
represent the best possible estimates given the reality of overseas
operations. (See comments 5 and 6)
The Department concurs with the recommendation that it direct Posts to
complete the narrative sections in the F-77 report and is investigating
ways to implement the report's recommendation.
The GAO report criticized the lack of a "particular methodology" in
estimating the number of Americans in country. While it did not offer
suggestions on how the Department can reach more definitive estimates,
the report did recommend that posts document processes and data sources
in the F-77 report. When generating the F-77, many posts already use
the "comments" field to describe how they have estimated the number of
Americans present in their consular districts. These comments are
accessible to any reader on the Department's sensitive-but-unclassified
intranet website. The Department will explore modification of this
software application to make data entry in the comments field mandatory
� and require posts to use this field to identify their particular data
sources and methodology as they update their F-77s.
Crisis Management Exercises and Training:
The Department concurs with the recommendations that the Department
review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members, and
that posts play a greater role in planning CMEs, but notes that this is
an existing and ongoing process carried out by FSI, in conjunction with
posts.
The overwhelmingly positive response and high marks given to FSI in the
GAO's comprehensive survey often contradict anecdotal
comments/criticisms regarding FSI training contained in the report.
These positive survey results reflect the views of the Department: that
our training is effectively preparing our people for the challenges
that they will face throughout their careers. (See comment 7)
While the Department is never "satisfied" with it training efforts � as
evidenced by our continual review and updating of the FSI curriculum,
including examining the possibility of distance learning programs for
EAC members � we would note GAO's survey reported 74% of the
respondents answered "Yes" to the question of whether EAC members have
received training necessary to meet their assigned emergency
responsibilities (question 11). (See comment 8)
The FSI role is to prepare Department and other US Government employees
for the full range of potential contingencies. In some countries the
stability of the society, economy, and political situation weighs
heavily against the possibility of a mass evacuation of American
citizens or a drawdown of our posts. Posts in these countries face a
far greater likelihood of other contingencies: terrorism, mass casualty
events (e.g., a plane crash), demonstrations near the embassy, etc.
Including evacuation training in all of our exercises�including posts
where evacuation is improbable�would not be the best use of training
time and resources. Conversely, in selected major transportation hubs,
an exercise that includes the receipt of evacuees from other posts is
certainly a viable scenario to include in crisis management exercises.
Our mission in Germany is not a likely candidate for evacuation, but
the Consulate General in Frankfurt, located at a major transit point
for international air travel, has received evacuees in the past from
other countries and posts. FSI has included such scenarios in its
training of many of those posts.
With regard to the design of CMEs, FSI trainers always coordinate post-
specific scenario development, working with each individual post
through the designated point of contact. The FSI trainer also requests
that members of the Emergency Action Committee be contacted for their
input. FSI seeks to incorporate post-preferred scenarios to the extent
possible into the actual crisis management exercise.
Regarding GAO's finding that crisis management exercises could be more
relevant to posts, the statistics provided in the report indicate that
the overwhelming majority of posts (72%) found they have used exercises
to refine their EAP and 76% of this group reported the exercise was
very or extremely useful in doing so (results of question 26 of the GAO
survey). (See comment 9)
Integrating Lessons Learned with Training and Planning Mechanisms:
The Department concurs with the recommendation that the Department
establish additional procedures to ensure that EAPs are updated, after
action reports are collected and that lessons learned are applied.
State has begun to implement procedures that will address GAO's
recommendation that the Department systematically capture and integrate
lessons learned in future crisis planning. The Department is already
implementing GAO's two recommendations regarding crisis management
training and crisis management exercises by constantly reviewing the
content and presentation of training modules and CMEs to ensure that
they are relevant and that they incorporate lessons learned from
previous evacuations. (See comment 10)
After-action reports are currently requested by the Executive Secretary
in the same memo that authorizes the establishment of a crisis
management task force. They are also requested by the Under Secretary
for Management in the cable s/he issues to terminate a post's
authorized or ordered departure status. In the future, the Executive
Secretariat will follow up these requests by tasking the lead regional
bureau to draft an after-action report that will incorporate lessons
learned by domestic players and the overseas post(s) involved. The
Executive Secretariat will work with the bureaus concerned to ensure
the after-action report is comprehensive, useful, and prepared on a
reasonable deadline -- and will archive the report for easy on-line
access in the future.
Once an after-action report is received, the Executive Secretariat's
Crisis Management Staff will follow up with the relevant bureaus and
offices within State (including the Bureau of Consular Affairs,
Diplomatic Security, the concerned regional bureau[s], the Foreign
Service Institute, representatives from the Under Secretary for
Management's office, the Family Liaison Office, and other regional and
functional bureaus as appropriate) to ensure consideration and
implementation, both domestically and at posts overseas, of crisis-
management and training lessons learned. As appropriate, the Executive
Secretariat will disseminate lessons learned to counterparts in other
agencies.
Coordination with the Department of Defense:
The Department partially concurs with the recommendation regarding
review of the State DOD Memorandum of Agreement and will continue to
review the MOA with DOD, but does not believe that it requires revision
at the present time.
The Department notes that although the GAO's draft report suggests
there may be a need to strengthen the State-Defense Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), there is little specific information about how the MOA
could be improved. With decades of experience managing successful
evacuations with DoD, the State Department feels that the two agencies
in fact have a clear idea of each other's capabilities and
organizational cultures. The standing contact list recommended by GAO
would not be a useful addition to the MOA since personnel in both
Departments regularly rotate duty stations and such a list would
quickly become obsolete. (See comment 11)
The Department notes there are already several more useful channels of
communication between State and DOD, including: consultation through
the interagency Washington Liaison Group; the Military Advisor
permanently stationed in State's 24-hour Operations Center; eighteen
military officers currently serving in the Department's Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs; and the State Department Political Advisors
detailed to the military's various combatant commands. These personnel
are experts who are in frequent contact with each other, and who
regularly play key roles in State-Defense coordination of evacuation-
related issues. Frequent contacts continue at other levels, as well.
For example, following the summer 2006 Lebanon evacuation,
representatives of State's Office of Logistics Management
traveled to USTRANSCOM headquarters to meet with their counterparts.
The Department of State plans future such visits to TRANSCOM to
maintain a positive working relationship and open communication
channels. Furthermore, both Departments have 24-hour watches � such as
State's Operations Center and Political Military Action Team (PMAT) and
DOD's National Military Command Center � that are also in frequent and
regular contact with each other, especially during crises.
The Department will ensure, through our ongoing training, that
personnel involved in crisis response understand the highly-effective
channels of interagency communication already available � and are aware
of the central coordination role the Executive Secretariat plays in
State's communications with DOD and other agencies.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State letter
dated October 2, 2007.
GAO Comments:
1. State notes an "apparent contradiction" between our reference to
lengthy and cumbersome State guidance and a recommendation that State
"provide additional, more comprehensive guidance on specific aspects of
crisis management to the field." Our report contains no such
recommendation. According to the audit work we conducted, as detailed
in appendix I, we found the Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) to be
both "too generic" and "voluminous," as well as lacking in information
useful in preparing for and implementing a large-scale evacuation of
American citizens.
2. We disagree with State's assertion that some of the conclusions in
this report are at variance with the actual survey data collected by
GAO about the usefulness of existing crisis planning resources. The
survey results and findings derived from them are both factually
correct and methodologically valid. Survey methodology experts at GAO
were directly involved in the collection, analysis, and review of
survey results, as well as the findings and conclusions derived from
those results.
3. State has mischaracterized our statement. In our report, we stated
that, based on survey results, posts do not consider the EPH
particularly useful in preparing for the possibility of evacuation.
Half of overseas posts rated the EPH as "somewhat useful" in preparing
for an evacuation. This, along with the 9 percent who said the EPH was
"not very useful" or "not at all useful," as well as comments by a
number of State officials that it was too generic, formulaic, and
voluminous, indicate that while the EPH is of some utility, there is a
definite opportunity to improve the EPH when it comes to helping posts
prepare for an evacuation.
4. State has attempted to reinterpret our survey results by combining
the responses for "somewhat useful" and "very useful" for various
tools; this obscures the point that the EPH could be improved. Please
see the analysis as detailed in comment 3 above.
5. We did not imply that it would be possible for posts to generate a
definitive number of Americans in any given country at any given
moment; we understand that the F-77 is an estimate of American citizens
and estimates vary in terms of accuracy. We reported that more than
three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only
somewhat accurate in its estimation of the American citizen population.
6. We have modified the text in the report to reflect that State cannot
require American citizens to register with the department.
7. We disagree with State's assertion that our survey data contradict
anecdotal comments/criticisms regarding FSI training and that the
survey results are "positive." In our report, the survey results and
findings derived from them are both factually correct and
methodologically valid. We obtained a high response rate to our survey
of Emergency Action Committees (EAC) at overseas posts; the survey
results are a statistically valid reflection of posts' views on the
guidance and training available to plan and prepare for potential
evacuation.
8. We agree that 74 percent of the respondents answered "yes" to the
question of whether EAC members have received training necessary to
meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. However, the responses
to our survey came from EACs, whose members are responsible for
assisting the ambassador in planning and preparing for crisis,
including possible evacuation. We are concerned that more than a
quarter of EACs have reported that their members have not received
training necessary to meet their emergency responsibilities;
insufficient training for EAC members can hurt posts' readiness to act
in the event of evacuation.
9. We agree that crisis management exercises (CME) are generally
considered useful; in our report we have identified areas where CMEs
can be improved, such as by having posts play a greater role in
designing them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at
the post into exercise scenarios.
10. While we appreciate State's concurrence with establishing
additional procedures to ensure that Emergency Action Plans (EAP) are
updated, we did not make a separate recommendation to this effect. This
is a misstatement of the first part of our first recommendation, which
asks the Secretary of State to designate an entity within State to
ensure EAPs are prepared annually.
11. We did not recommend that a standing contact list be added to the
memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD. In addition, we
have modified our recommendation to clarify that State and DOD should
review the MOA (and its amendments) to ensure it expedites practical
communication and coordination between the two departments before and
during a large-scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding
logistical capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Global Security Affairs:
2900 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2900:
October 2, 2007:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-08-23, 'State Department: Evacuation Planning and
Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved,' dated August 30, 2007
(GAO Code 320428).
The draft report contains several recommendations, one of which is
addressed to the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The
GAO recommends the two departments review the memorandum of agreement
on overseas noncombatant evacuations and focus that review on two
areas. DoD partially concurs in that recommendation with explicatory
comments enclosed with this letter.
The Department has no comment on the draft report, which assesses
Department of State programs, planning, and preparations for overseas
evacuations.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Benkert:
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated August 30, 2007:
GAO-08-23 (GAO CODE 320428):
"State Department: Evacuation Planning And Preparations For Overseas
Posts Can Be Improved:"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Gao Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense: review the Memorandum of Agreement between
State and DoD (and its amendments) to ensure it addresses the general
capabilities and limitations of each department, as well as ways to
expedite practical communication and coordination between the two
departments before and during a large-scale evacuation. (Page 36/GAO
Draft Report)
DOD Response: Partially concur.
GAO report 08-23 assesses Department of State programs, planning, and
preparations for overseas evacuations. Noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO) are included among the types of evacuations the report
addresses. As the report notes, DoD does not participate in the large
majority of State-ordered or authorized evacuations, but it does
participate in NEOs at the request of the State Department.
DoD and State signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) on NEOs several
years ago. Because the MOA is almost 10 years old, DoD agrees it would
be useful to review it. We will approach State to initiate a review by
November 2007. However, DoD does not agree that the MOA should include
a list of general capabilities or a contact list for the following
reasons. (See comment 1)
The MOA's procedures are designed to facilitate communication between
the agencies. It established the Washington Liaison Group (WLG),
regional liaison groups, and other interagency working groups as the
mechanisms to coordinate DoD's and State's NEO activities, logistics,
and information sharing. Those groups work very well responding to
requirements and including appropriate DoD support elements as needed.
The WLG is the point of contact for DoD on all NEO matters. The WLG
itself is augmented by the crisis management staffs of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. OSD recently established
a focal point for global crisis management activities within the office
of the ASD-Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs. This office
serves as the entry point into DoD for the interagency during crisis
operations, such as NEOs. It collaborates closely with the Joint Staff
and shares information with State Department's operations center,
facilitating contact among the required subject matter experts. OSD's
crisis management staff maintains contact and responsibilities lists
across the organization. Thus, the required experts within the
organization can be identified according to the circumstances and
contacted rapidly, while minimizing confusion and duplication of tasks.
This approach is more enduring, more responsive, and less confusing
during a crisis.
The MOA covers DoD's roles, responsibilities and authorities for
noncombatant evacuations. It also contains a "Checklist for Increased
Interagency Coordination in Crisis/Evacuation Situations" as appendix
one, which sets up interagency processes that are used by the NEO-
related interagency working groups. Those procedures in tandem with the
WLG and other groups are well-established and work very well responding
to requirements. DoD makes every effort to respond quickly to identify
support requirements. Support capabilities will depend on the
operational environment in which the NEO will be conducted.
Capabilities and limitations should be identified during "Mission
Analysis" by the operational commander when a NEO is imminent.
Including a list of general capabilities and limitations has a high
risk of unwitting, adverse affects on ongoing operations and
operational planning if there are attempts to secure listed DoD
capabilities independent of military operations. Section E
"Responsibility for Military Operations" of the MOA further elucidates
and addresses that concern. Finally, DoD is willing to consider
participating in NEO training at State's Foreign Service Institute.
(See comment 2)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense letter
dated October 2, 2007.
GAO Comments:
1. We did not recommend that a contact list be added to the memorandum
of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD. In addition, we have modified
our recommendation to clarify that State and DOD should review the MOA
(and its amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
coordination between the two departments before and during a large-
scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
capabilities and limitations of each department (such as capabilities
to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
1. We have modified our recommendation to address DOD's concern that
explicitly specifying general capabilities and limitations in the MOA
could adversely affect ongoing military operations. The intent of the
recommendation is to have State and DOD review the MOA (and its
amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
coordination between the two departments before and during a large-
scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
capabilities and limitations of each department.
[End of section]
References
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or [email protected]:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant
Director; Ian Ferguson; Jonathan Fremont; Kay Halpern; Catherine
Hurley; Monica Wolford; and Joe Carney made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
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