Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector-Specific Plans'
Coverage of Key Cyber Security Elements Varies (31-OCT-07,
GAO-08-64T).
The nation's critical infrastructure sectors--such as banking and
finance, information technology, and public health--rely on
computerized information and systems to provide services to the
public. To fulfill the requirement for a comprehensive plan,
including cyber aspects, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) issued a national plan in June 2006 for the sectors to use
as a road map to enhance the protection of critical
infrastructure. Lead federal agencies, referred to as
sector-specific agencies, are responsible for coordinating
critical infrastructure protection efforts such as the
development of plans that are specific to each sector. GAO was
asked to summarize a report being released today that identifies
the extent to which the sector plans addressed key aspects of
cyber security, including cyber assets, key vulnerabilities,
vulnerability reduction efforts, and recovery plans. In the
report, GAO analyzed each sector-specific plan against criteria
that were developed on the basis of DHS guidance.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-64T
ACCNO: A77802
TITLE: Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector-Specific
Plans' Coverage of Key Cyber Security Elements Varies
DATE: 10/31/2007
SUBJECT: Command and control systems
Computer systems
Critical infrastructure
Cyber security
Energy
Evaluation criteria
Homeland security
Information infrastructure
Information security
Information technology
Public health
Risk assessment
Risk management
Strategic planning
System security plans
Transportation
Security standards
National Infrastructure Protection Plan
******************************************************************
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GAO-08-64T
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before Congressional Subcommittees:
Committee on Homeland Security:
U.S. House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, October 31, 2007:
Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Sector-Specific Plans' Coverage of Key Cyber Security Elements Varies:
Statement of David A. Powner:
Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
GAO-08-64T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-64T, a testimony before congressional
subcommittees, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The nation's critical infrastructure sectors�such as banking and
finance, information technology, and public health�rely on computerized
information and systems to provide services to the public. To fulfill
the requirement for a comprehensive plan, including cyber aspects, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a national plan in June
2006 for the sectors to use as a road map to enhance the protection of
critical infrastructure. Lead federal agencies, referred to as sector-
specific agencies, are responsible for coordinating critical
infrastructure protection efforts such as the development of plans that
are specific to each sector. GAO was asked to summarize a report being
released today that identifies the extent to which the sector plans
addressed key aspects of cyber security, including cyber assets, key
vulnerabilities, vulnerability reduction efforts, and recovery plans.
In the report, GAO analyzed each sector-specific plan against criteria
that were developed on the basis of DHS guidance.
What GAO Found:
The extent to which the sectors addressed aspects of cyber security in
their sector-specific plans varied; none of the plans fully addressed
all 30 cyber security-related criteria. Several sector plans�including
the information technology and telecommunications sectors�fully
addressed many of the criteria, while others�such as agriculture and
food and commercial facilities�were less comprehensive. The following
figure summarizes the extent to which each plan addressed the 30
criteria.
Graph: Comprehensiveness of Sector-Specific Plans:
This figure is a vertical stacked bar graph, depicting seventeen
sectors on the horizontal axis in three categories: comprehensive,
somewhat comprehensive, and less comprehensive. The vertical axis of
the graph represents number of criteria, from 0 to 30. All bars meet
the total of 30 criteria, through a stacking of fully addressed,
partially addressed and not addressed. The following is an
approximation of the number of criteria represented in the graph by
sectors:
Information technology: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 28;
Partially addressed: 2;
Not addressed: 0.
Telecommunications: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 27;
Partially addressed: 3;
Not addressed: 0.
Public health: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 27;
Partially addressed: 1;
Not addressed: 2.
Energy: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 24;
Partially addressed: 3;
Not addressed: 3.
Government facilities: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 24;
Partially addressed: 3;
Not addressed: 3.
Nuclear reactors: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 23;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 1.
Water: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 23;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 1.
Chemical: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 23;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 1.
Dams: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 23;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 1.
Transportation: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 22;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 2.
Emergency services: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 22;
Partially addressed: 4;
Not addressed: 4.
Postal and shipping: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 21;
Partially addressed: 8;
Not addressed: 1.
Banking and finance: Somewhat comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 19;
Partially addressed: 7;
Not addressed: 4.
Defense industrial base: Somewhat comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 18;
Partially addressed: 5;
Not addressed: 7.
National monuments: Somewhat comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 17;
Partially addressed: 8;
Not addressed: 5.
Agriculture and food: Less comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 10;
Partially addressed: 10;
Not addressed: 10.
Commercial facilities: Less comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 8;
Partially addressed: 12;
Not addressed: 10.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of graph]
What GAO Recommends:
In its report, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security
request that, by September 2008, the sector-specific agencies develop
plans that fully address all of the cyber-related criteria. In written
comments on a draft of the report, DHS concurred with GAO�s
recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-64T]. For more information, contact David
Powner at (202) 512-9286 or [email protected].
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman, Madame Chairwoman, and Members of the Subcommittees:
Thank you for the opportunity to join in today's hearing to discuss
transitioning critical infrastructure protection sector-specific plans
into action. Because the nation's critical infrastructure relies
extensively on computerized information systems and electronic data to
maintain the nation's security, economy, and public health and safety,
the security of those systems and information is essential. To help
address critical infrastructure protection, federal policy has
established a framework for public-and private-sector
partnerships.[Footnote 1] It has also identified 17 critical
infrastructure sectors that are largely owned and operated by the
private sector, including banking and finance, information technology,
telecommunications, energy, and public health and healthcare.
Federal policy requires the development of a national plan by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to outline national goals,
objectives, milestones, and key initiatives as well as the development
of individual critical infrastructure sector plans--referred to as
sector-specific plans--to outline how a sector's public and private
stakeholders will implement the national plan. Lead federal agencies,
referred to as sector-specific agencies (including DHS, Department of
the Treasury, and the Department of Health and Human Services), are
responsible for coordinating critical infrastructure protection efforts
with the public and private stakeholders in their respective sectors.
DHS issued a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in June
2006 to be used as a road map for how DHS and other relevant
stakeholders are to use risk management principles to prioritize
protection activities within and across the sectors in an integrated,
coordinated fashion. NIPP requires each of the lead federal agencies
associated with the 17 critical infrastructure sectors to develop
sector-specific plans to address how the sectors' stakeholders would
implement the national plan and how they would improve the security of
their assets, systems, networks, and functions. These plans are to,
among other things, describe how the sector will identify and
prioritize its critical assets, including cyber assets, and define
approaches the sector will take to assess risks and develop programs to
protect those assets. DHS announced the release of the 17 sector plans
on May 21, 2007.
As requested, our testimony today will summarize our report being
released today on the cyber security aspects of the critical
infrastructure protection sector-specific plans.[Footnote 2] In the
report, we analyzed each sector-specific plan against 30 criteria that
we developed based on DHS guidance. The 30 criteria are shown in
appendix I. The report contains a detailed overview of the scope and
methodology we used. The work on which this testimony is based was
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
The extent to which the sectors addressed key aspects of cyber security
in their sector-specific plans varied; none of the plans fully
addressed all 30 cyber security-related criteria. Several plans--
including those from the information technology and telecommunications
sectors--fully addressed many of the criteria, while others--such as
those from the agriculture and food and commercial facilities sectors-
-were not as comprehensive. In addition to the varying degrees with
which the sector-specific plans covered aspects of cyber security, the
plans as a whole addressed certain criteria more comprehensively than
they did others. For example, all 17 plans fully addressed the
criterion to identify a sector governance structure for research and
development, while only 7 plans fully addressed the process for
identifying the consequences of cyber attacks. Further, only 3 plans
fully addressed the criterion to describe incentives used to encourage
voluntary performance of risk assessments.
The varying degrees to which each plan addressed the cyber security-
related criteria can be attributed in part to the varying levels of
maturity of the different sectors: that is, sectors where stakeholders
had more experience working together on critical infrastructure issues
generally had more comprehensive and complete plans than those in which
their stakeholders had less prior experience working together. Without
comprehensive plans, certain sectors may not be effectively
identifying, prioritizing, and protecting the cyber aspects of their
critical infrastructure protection efforts. For example, with most
sectors lacking a process for identifying the consequences of cyber
attacks against their assets, our nation's sectors could be ill-
prepared to respond properly to a cyber attack.
To assist the sectors in securing their cyber infrastructure, we made a
recommendation in our report to the Secretary of Homeland Security to
request that by September 2008, the sector-specific agencies' plans
address the cyber-related criteria that have not been fully addressed.
In written comments on a draft of the report, DHS concurred with our
recommendation.
Background:
Our nation's critical infrastructures--such as banking and finance,
information technology, telecommunications, energy, and public health
and healthcare--rely extensively on computerized information systems
and electronic data to carry out their missions. The security of these
systems and data, referred to as cyber critical infrastructure
protection, is essential to preventing disruptions in critical
operations, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure of sensitive
information. Due in part to the importance of and increasing reliance
on these electronic systems, we designated cyber critical
infrastructure protection, in conjunction with protecting the federal
government's information systems, as a high risk area in 2003. In
January 2005 and 2007, we identified cyber critical infrastructure
protection as a high-risk area because of the continuing concern about
risks to information systems from escalating and emerging threats; the
ease of obtaining and using hacking tools; the steady advance in the
sophistication of attack technology; and the emergence of new and more
destructive attacks.
As the focal point for critical infrastructure protection, DHS has many
cyber security-related roles and responsibilities that are called for
in law and policy. In May 2005, we identified 13 key cyber security
responsibilities (see table 1).[Footnote 3] These responsibilities are
described in more detail in appendix II.
Table 1: DHS Key Cyber Security Responsibilities:
1. Develop a comprehensive national plan for critical infrastructure
protection, including cyber security.
2. Develop partnerships and coordinate with other federal agencies,
state and local governments, and the private sector.
3. Improve and enhance public/private information sharing involving
cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.
4. Develop and enhance national cyber analysis and warning
capabilities.
5. Provide and coordinate incident response and recovery planning
efforts.
6. Identify and assess cyber threats and vulnerabilities.
7. Support efforts to reduce cyber threats and vulnerabilities.
8. Promote and support research and development efforts to strengthen
cyber space security.
9. Promote awareness and outreach.
10. Foster training and certification.
11. Enhance federal, state, and local government cyber security.
12. Strengthen international cyber space security.
13. Integrate cyber security with national security.
Source: GAO analysis of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7, and the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace.
[End of table]
In May 2005, we reported that while DHS had initiated multiple efforts
to fulfill its responsibilities, it had not fully addressed any of the
13 responsibilities.[Footnote 4] For example, the department
established the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team as a
public/private partnership to make cyber security a coordinated
national effort and it established forums to build greater trust and
information sharing among federal officials who have information
security responsibilities and law enforcement entities. However, DHS
had not yet developed national cyber threat and vulnerability
assessments or government/industry contingency recovery plans for cyber
security. In September 2006, we testified that DHS had made progress on
its responsibilities, but that none had been completely
addressed.[Footnote 5]
One of DHS's key cyber security responsibilities is the development of
a comprehensive national plan for securing both the physical and cyber
aspects of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United
States. The plan is to outline national strategies, activities, and
milestones for protecting critical infrastructures. To fulfill this
responsibility, in June 2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP) to guide how DHS and other relevant stakeholders
are to use risk management principles to prioritize protection
activities within and across the sectors in an integrated, coordinated
fashion. NIPP requires each of the lead federal agencies associated
with the 17 critical infrastructure sectors to develop sector-specific
plans to address how the sectors' stakeholders would implement the
national plan and how they would improve the security of their assets,
systems, networks, and functions. As part of these efforts, DHS
provided guidance to the sectors for developing their sector-specific
plans, including guidance on cyber aspects.
To strengthen DHS's ability to implement its cyber security
responsibilities and to resolve underlying challenges, we have made
about 25 recommendations over the last several years. These
recommendations focus on the need to (1) conduct threat and
vulnerability assessments, (2) develop a strategic analysis and warning
capability for identifying potential cyber attacks, (3) protect
infrastructure control systems, (4) enhance public/private information
sharing, and (5) facilitate recovery planning, including recovery of
the Internet in case of a major disruption. For example, in May 2005,
we recommended, among other things, that DHS prioritize key cyber
security responsibilities, including: performing a national cyber
threat assessment and facilitating sector cyber vulnerability
assessments. DHS has made varying levels of progress on many of these
recommendations; however, additional efforts are needed to fully
address them. Regarding the protection of infrastructure control
systems, we issued a report on September 10, 2007, and testified on
October 17, 2007, before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, House Committee on Homeland
Security. In the report, we made a recommendation that DHS develop a
strategy for coordinating control systems security efforts and enhance
information sharing with control systems stakeholders.[Footnote 6]
Collectively, our recommendations provide a high-level road map for the
agency to use in improving our nation's cyber security posture.
Sector-Specific Plans' Coverage of Key Cyber Security Elements Varies:
In May 2007, DHS announced the release of 17 sector-specific plans to
fulfill the NIPP requirement for individual sector plans. The extent to
which the sectors addressed aspects of cyber security in their plans
varied; none of the plans fully addressed all 30 cyber security-related
criteria. Several plans--including those from the information
technology and telecommunications sectors--fully addressed many of the
criteria, while others--such as agriculture and food and commercial
facilities--were less comprehensive. Figure 1 summarizes the extent to
which each plan addressed the 30 criteria.
Figure 1: Comprehensiveness of Sector-Specific Plans:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical stacked bar graph, depicting seventeen
sectors on the horizontal axis in three categories: comprehensive,
somewhat comprehensive, and less comprehensive. The vertical axis of
the graph represents number of criteria, from 0 to 30. All bars meet
the total of 30 criteria, through a stacking of fully addressed,
partially addressed and not addressed. The following is an
approximation of the number of criteria represented in the graph by
sectors:
Information technology: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 28;
Partially addressed: 2;
Not addressed: 0.
Telecommunications: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 27;
Partially addressed: 3;
Not addressed: 0.
Public health: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 27;
Partially addressed: 1;
Not addressed: 2.
Energy: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 24;
Partially addressed: 3;
Not addressed: 3.
Government facilities: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 24;
Partially addressed: 3;
Not addressed: 3.
Nuclear reactors: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 23;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 1.
Water: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 23;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 1.
Chemical: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 23;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 1.
Dams: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 23;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 1.
Transportation: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 22;
Partially addressed: 6;
Not addressed: 2.
Emergency services: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 22;
Partially addressed: 4;
Not addressed: 4.
Postal and shipping: Comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 21;
Partially addressed: 8;
Not addressed: 1.
Banking and finance: Somewhat comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 19;
Partially addressed: 7;
Not addressed: 4.
Defense industrial base: Somewhat comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 18;
Partially addressed: 5;
Not addressed: 7.
National monuments: Somewhat comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 17;
Partially addressed: 8;
Not addressed: 5.
Agriculture and food: Less comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 10;
Partially addressed: 10;
Not addressed: 10.
Commercial facilities: Less comprehensive;
Fully addressed: 8;
Partially addressed: 12;
Not addressed: 10.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of figure]
In addition to the variations in the extent to which the plans covered
aspects of cyber security, there was also variance among the plans in
the extent to which certain criteria were addressed. For example, all
plans fully addressed (1) identifying a sector governance structure for
research and development, (2) describing how the sector- specific
agency intends to manage its NIPP responsibilities; and (3) describing
the sector's coordinating mechanisms and structures. Also, at least 15
of the plans fully addressed (1) characterizing the sector's
infrastructure, including the cyber reliance, (2) identifying
stakeholder relationships for securing cyber assets, (3) describing a
process for updating, reporting, budgeting, and training, and (4)
describing a process for cyber-related information sharing. However,
fewer than half of the plans fully addressed: (1) describing a process
to identify potential consequences of cyber attacks, (2) describing any
incentives used to encourage voluntary performance of risk assessments,
(3) developing and using cyber metrics to measure progress, and (4)
identifying existing cyber-related projects that support goals and
identify gaps.
The varying degrees to which each plan addressed the cyber security-
related criteria can be attributed in part to the varying levels of
maturity of the different sectors. According to DHS officials, the
sectors that have been working together longer on critical
infrastructure issues generally have developed more comprehensive and
complete plans than the sectors with stakeholders that had not
previously worked together. For example, the plan for the energy sector
was among those categorized as most comprehensive: the chemical sector
had worked with DHS to improve the cyber component in its plans and it
included most of the key information required for each plan element.
Furthermore, the limited amount of time to complete the plans--6
months--was a factor for those sectors that had not previously been
working together on critical infrastructure issues and were thus less
mature.
DHS acknowledges the shortcomings we identified in the plans. Officials
stated that the sector-specific plans represent only the early efforts
by the sectors to develop their respective plans and anticipate that
the plans will improve over time. Nevertheless, until the plans fully
address key cyber elements, certain sectors may not be prepared to
respond to a cyber attack against our critical infrastructure. As the
plans are updated, it will be important that DHS work with the sector
representatives to ensure that the areas not sufficiently addressed are
covered. Otherwise, the plans will remain incomplete and sector efforts
will not be sufficient to enhance the protection of their computer-
reliant assets.
To assist the sectors in securing their cyber infrastructure, we
recommended in our report that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection and the
Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications to request
that by September 2008, the sector-specific agencies' plans address the
cyber-related criteria that were not fully addressed. In written
comments on a draft of the report, DHS's Director, Departmental GAO/OIG
Liaison, concurred with our recommendation. In addition, he stated that
DHS is currently working on an action plan to assist sectors in
addressing cyber security issues not adequately addressed in the
initial sector-specific plans.
In summary, without comprehensive plans, certain sectors may not be
effectively identifying, prioritizing, and protecting the cyber aspects
of their critical infrastructure. For example, with most sectors
lacking a process for identifying the consequences of cyber attacks
against their assets, our nation's sectors could be ill- prepared to
respond properly to a cyber attack. In addition, without comprehensive
plans, DHS cannot adequately identify where it and the rest of the
federal government can most effectively assist in enhancing the
security of the nation's critical infrastructures that are largely
owned and operated by the private sector.
Ultimately, our nation needs to move beyond the planning stages of
securing our critical infrastructures and public and private sector
owners and operators of our nation's critical infrastructure need to
effectively implement these plans. Implementation of these plans is
more likely if DHS can successfully fulfill its role as a focal point
for critical infrastructure protection. To accomplish this, DHS needs
to address its 13 key responsibilities and our previous
recommendations. For example, if DHS enhanced national cyber analysis
and warning capabilities and provided assessments of cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, it would be viewed as providing a valuable service to
critical infrastructure owners, thus improving our nation's ability to
prepare for, respond to, and prevent major cyber attacks from occurring.
Mr. Chairman and Madame Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I
would be happy to answer any questions at this time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,
please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at [email protected].
Other key contributors to this testimony include Scott Borre, Michael
Gilmore, Nancy Glover, Barbarol James, and Eric Winter.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Cyber Security Criteria:
Section 1: Sector Profile and Goals:
* Characterizes cyber aspects;
* Identifies stakeholder relationships for securing cyber assets.
Section 2: Identify Assets, Systems, Networks, and Functions:
* Describes process to identify cyber assets, functions, or elements;
* Describes process to identify cyber dependencies/independences.
Section 3: Assess Risks:
* Describes how the risk assessment process addresses cyber elements;
* Describes a screening process for cyber aspects;
* Describes methodology to identify potential consequences of cyber
attacks;
* Describes methodology for vulnerability assessments of cyber aspects;
* Describes methodology for threat analyses of cyber aspects;
* Describes incentives to encourage voluntary vulnerability
assessments.
Section 4: Prioritizing Infrastructure:
* Identifies entity responsible for prioritization of cyber aspects;
* Describes criteria and basis for prioritization of cyber aspects.
Section 5: Develop and Implement Protective Programs:
* Describes process to develop long-term protective plans for cyber
aspects;
* Describes process to identify specific cyber-related program needs;
* Identifies programs to deter, respond, and recover from cyber attack;
* Addresses implementation and maintenance of protective programs.
Section 6: Measure Progress:
* Ensures that integration of cyber metrics is part of measurement
process;
* Describes how cyber metrics will be reported to DHS;
* Includes developing and using cyber metrics to measure progress;
* Describes how to use metrics to guide future cyber projects.
Section 7: Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and Development:
* Describes how technology developments are related to the sector�s
cyber goals;
* Describes process to identify cyber security technology requirements;
* Describes process to solicit information on ongoing cyber research
and development initiatives;
* Identifies existing cyber-related projects that support goals and
identifies gaps;
* Identifies research and development governance structure.
Section 8: Managing Sector-Specific Agency Responsibilities:
* Describes sector-specific agency�s management of NIPP
responsibilities;
* Describes process for updating, reporting, budgeting, and training;
* Describes sector�s coordination structure;
* Describes process for investment priorities;
* Describes process for cyber-related information sharing.
Source: GAO analysis based on DHS guidance.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Thirteen DHS Cyber Security Responsibilities:
Critical infrastructure protection responsibilities with a cyber
element:
1. Develop a national plan for critical infrastructure protection that
includes cyber security;
DHS Responsibilities: Develop a comprehensive national plan for
securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United
States, including information technology and telecommunications systems
(including satellites) and the physical and technological assets that
support such systems. This plan is to outline national strategies,
activities, and milestones for protecting critical infrastructures.
Critical infrastructure protection responsibilities with a cyber
element:
2. Develop partnerships and coordinate with other federal agencies,
state and local governments, and the private sector;
DHS Responsibilities: Foster and develop public/private partnerships
with and among other federal agencies, state and local governments, the
private sector, and others. DHS is to serve as the focal point for the
security of cyber space.
Critical infrastructure protection responsibilities with a cyber
element:
3. Improve and enhance public/private information sharing involving
cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities;
DHS Responsibilities: Improve and enhance information sharing with and
among other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private
sector, and others through improved partnerships and collaboration,
including encouraging information sharing and analysis mechanisms. DHS
is to improve sharing of information on cyber attacks, threats, and
vulnerabilities.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
4. Develop and enhance national cyber analysis and warning
capabilities;
DHS Responsibilities: Provide cyber analysis and warnings, enhance
analytical capabilities, and develop a national indications and
warnings architecture to identify precursors to attacks.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
5. Provide and coordinate incident response and recovery planning
efforts;
DHS Responsibilities: Provide crisis management in response to threats
to or attacks on critical information systems. This entails
coordinating efforts for incident response, recovery planning,
exercising cyber security continuity plans for federal systems,
planning for recovery of Internet functions, and assisting
infrastructure stakeholders with cyber-related emergency recovery
plans.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
6. Identify and assess cyber threats and vulnerabilities;
DHS Responsibilities: Lead efforts by the public and private sectors to
conduct a national cyber threat assessment, to conduct or facilitate
vulnerability assessments of sectors, and to identify cross-sector
interdependencies.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
7. Support efforts to reduce cyber threats and vulnerabilities;
DHS Responsibilities: Lead and support efforts by the public and
private sectors to reduce threats and vulnerabilities. Threat reduction
involves working with the law enforcement community to investigate and
prosecute cyberspace threats. Vulnerability reduction involves
identifying and remediating vulnerabilities in existing software and
systems.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
8. Promote and support research and development efforts to strengthen
cyber space security;
DHS Responsibilities: Collaborate and coordinate with members of
academia, industry, and government to optimize cyber security-related
research and development efforts to reduce vulnerabilities through the
adoption of more secure technologies.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
9. Promote awareness and outreach;
DHS Responsibilities: Establish a comprehensive national awareness
program to promote efforts to strengthen cyber security throughout
government and the private sector, including the home user.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
10. Foster training and certification;
DHS Responsibilities: Improve cyber security-related education,
training, and certification opportunities.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
11. Enhance federal, state, and local government cyber security;
DHS Responsibilities: Partner with federal, state, and local
governments in efforts to strengthen the cyber security of the nation�s
critical information infrastructure to assist in the deterrence,
prevention, preemption of, and response to terrorist attacks against
the United States.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
12. Strengthen international cyberspace security;
DHS Responsibilities: Work in conjunction with other federal agencies,
international organizations, and industry in efforts to promote
strengthened cyber security on a global basis.
Responsibilities related to the cyber space strategy's five priorities:
13. Integrate cyber security with national security;
DHS Responsibilities: Coordinate and integrate applicable national
preparedness goals with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
Source: GAO analysis of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7, and the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003). Department of Homeland Security,
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
[2] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector-Specific Plans'
Coverage of Key Cyber Security Elements Varies, GAO-08-113 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007).
[3] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland
Security Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities,
GAO-05-434 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005).
[4] GAO-05-434.
[5] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to
Enhance Cybersecurity, GAO-06-1087T (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 13, 2006).
[6] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multiple Efforts to Secure
Control Systems Are Under Way, but More Remains to Be Done, GAO-07-1036
(Washington, D.C.: Sept.10, 2007) and Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems Are Under Way,
but Challenges Remain, GAO-08-119T, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2007).
[End of section]
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