Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning
for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq (10-SEP-08, GAO-08-930).
The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, a process the
Department of Defense (DOD) refers to as "reposturing," will be a
massive and expensive effort. As of March 2008, for example,
there were about 173,000 pieces of equipment in Iraq, worth about
$16.5 billion, that will need to be returned to the United
States. The redeployment process following Operation Desert Storm
in 1991, a much shorter war, lasted at least 14 months. DOD
guidance emphasizes the importance of early planning for this
redeployment process. GAO performed this work under the
Comptroller General's Authority. GAO examined the (1) status of
logistical planning for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq and
associated assumptions and (2) extent to which DOD established
roles and responsibilities for managing and executing retrograde
from Iraq. GAO also identified issues that DOD will need to
consider in its reposture planning. GAO reviewed documents and
interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the
United States and Kuwait.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-930
ACCNO: A84112
TITLE: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD
Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq
DATE: 09/10/2008
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Defense cost control
Defense operations
Equipment inventories
Equipment management
Federal property
Government owned equipment
Iraq War and reconstruction
Logistics
Military bases
Military forces
Military inventories
Military materiel
Military policies
Military withdrawal
National defense operations
Program evaluation
Program management
Property
Protective equipment
Reporting requirements
Strategic planning
Supply chain management
Program implementation
Desert Storm
DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
Iraq
Kuwait
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GAO-08-930
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2008:
Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces
from Iraq:
Operational Iraqi Freedom:
GAO-08-930:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-930, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, a process the Department of
Defense (DOD) refers to as �reposturing,� will be a massive and
expensive effort. As of March 2008, for example, there were about
173,000 pieces of equipment in Iraq, worth about $16.5 billion, that
will need to be returned to the United States. The redeployment process
following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a much shorter war, lasted at
least 14 months. DOD guidance emphasizes the importance of early
planning for this redeployment process.
GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General�s Authority. GAO
examined the (1) status of logistical planning for reposturing U.S.
forces from Iraq and associated assumptions and (2) extent to which DOD
established roles and responsibilities for managing and executing
retrograde from Iraq. GAO also identified issues that DOD will need to
consider in its reposture planning. GAO reviewed documents and
interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the United
States and Kuwait.
What GAO Found:
While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq is yet to be
determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in
fall 2007, and DOD began coordinating these individual planning efforts
in May 2008 to develop a logistical framework based on three key
assumptions. The result of this planning was an order published by
Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) that contained the process for
reposturing units, materiel, and equipment and established working
groups to continue the planning and seek solutions to emerging
challenges. DOD�s three key assumptions are: (1) any reposturing
initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments
of conditions on the ground; (2) there will be sufficient lead time to
refine reposture plans once an order with a specific timetable and
force posture in Iraq is issued; and (3) the reposturing of forces will
be deliberate and gradual, predicated on a 180-day process for units
leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no more than 2.5 brigades� worth
of equipment and materiel out of Iraq each month.
While efforts have been made to synchronize planning for reposturing,
DOD, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the military services have not
yet clearly established all of the roles and responsibilities for
managing and executing the retrograde of materiel and equipment from
Iraq. Although CENTCOM has designated U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) as
executive agent for synchronizing retrograde of materiel and equipment
from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified or coordinated
structure exists to account for the roles of the variety of teams and
units engaged in retrograde operations. Until recently ARCENT did not
have operational control over the two units responsible for
retrograding the bulk of equipment in Iraq.
We identified the following nine issues that DOD should consider as it
develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq:
(1) agreed-upon guidance for environmental cleanup and the disposition
of property, which could affect the time and cost of closing bases in
Iraq; (2) guidance and plans for the reposturing of contractors from
Iraq; (3) accountability and disposition of contractor-managed
government-owned property; (4) the possibility of restrictive
conditions on the use of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring
countries; (5) availability of power-washing equipment and stands,
called wash racks, and the number of customs inspectors in Kuwait; (6)
capacity of military transports and convoy security assets, including
limits on the main supply route; (7) increased demand for access to
mental health care providers; (8) infrastructure requirements of
returning units; and (9) requirements for training and equipment reset
to restore readiness. DOD has begun to address these issues.
While the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008
directs DOD to brief the congressional defense committees on certain
issues related to reposturing, DOD is not required to provide the
specific information identified in our report. We believe that without
more specific reporting from DOD, Congress may not be able to
effectively exercise its oversight responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to clarify the
chain of command over logistical operations for retrograde of equipment
and materiel. Also, Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to
report specific details on the status of reposturing plans and how it
intends to mitigate issues such as those we identify. DOD generally
concurred with our recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-930]. For more
information, contact William M. Solis at 202-512-8365 or [email protected]
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Planning Efforts, Begun in Fall 2007 and Coordinated in 2008, Are
Predicated on Three Key Assumptions:
Executive Agent for Retrograde of Materiel and Equipment Lacks
Necessary Authority:
Issues That DOD Needs to Consider in Its Reposture Planning:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Department of Defense Classes of Supply:
Appendix IV: Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams:
Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure Throughput Model:
Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping Excess Theater Provided
Equipment:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq 180-day Template:
Table 2: Planning Scenarios for Sustained Deployment and Redeployment:
Table 3: Key Planning Factors for Sustained Deployment and
Redeployment, by Unit Type:
Figures:
Figure 1: Select Installations in Iraq and Key Logistics Activities in
Kuwait:
Figure 2: MNF-I Process for Disposing of Contractor-Managed Government-
Owned Property:
Figure 3: Bradley Fighting Vehicles at Wash Racks:
Figure 4: HMMWV on Wash Rack:
Figure 5: Process for Retrograding Class VII Theater Provided
Equipment:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 10, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a 100-hour war during which
U.S. forces advanced approximately 190 miles into Iraq, it took some 14
months to redeploy most of the deployed materiel and equipment out of
the theater. Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, and since
that time the United States has maintained a sizeable presence in Iraq,
rotating forces into and out of the country in support of ongoing
operations. As of April 26, 2008, there were approximately 149,400
Department of Defense (DOD) contractors and, as of July 1, 2008,
approximately 147,400 U.S. troops deployed in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. DOD officials reported that these forces were located on
approximately 311 installations, matured during 5 years of operations,
with some installations more than 500 miles from Kuwait. Most of the
equipment used by U.S. troops in Iraq--approximately 80 percent
according to DOD officials--is theater provided equipment, which is a
pool of permanent stay behind equipment consisting of specific line
items of modified table of organization and equipment property, issued
Army prepositioned stocks, and items purchased specifically for
Operation Iraqi Freedom that remains in Iraq. Although much of this
equipment has remained in Iraq as units rotate in and out, significant
amounts will be brought back to the United States if and when there is
a decrease in the size of U.S. forces in Iraq. As of March 2008, this
pool of theater provided equipment totaled approximately 173,000 major
end items such as High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)
and Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles, worth approximately
$16.5 billion. The retrograde process for returning these equipment
items to the United States will be a massive and expensive effort.
In January 2007, the president announced he would temporarily increase,
or "surge," the U.S. force level in Iraq by an additional 5 brigades,
bringing the total number of brigade combat teams in Iraq to
20.[Footnote 1] The brigades were in place by June 2007 and began
withdrawing in September 2007. In his April 2008 Report to Congress on
the Situation in Iraq the commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I),
recommended that the drawdown from 20 to 15 brigade combat teams
continue and that, upon the withdrawal of the last of these combat
teams in July 2008, MNF-I undertake a 45-day period of consolidation
and evaluation. At the end of that period, MNF-I would commence a
process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and, over
time, determine when it could make a recommendation for further
reductions. In July 2008, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff stated that, based on what he observed during a recent trip to
Iraq, he expects to be able to recommend further troop reductions to
the President and Secretary of Defense in the fall of 2008. In
addition, in June 2008 GAO also issued its own assessment of progress
in Iraq and called for a new strategy given the changing
conditions.[Footnote 2] Finally, the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 (as amended by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008) requires the President to report to the
Congress quarterly on U.S. policy and military operations in Iraq,
including, to the extent practical, (1) an assessment of the levels of
U.S. Armed Forces required in Iraq for the 6-month period following the
date of the report, the missions to be undertaken by the Armed Forces
in Iraq for such period, and the incremental costs or savings of any
proposed changes to such levels or missions; and (2) a description of
the range of conditions that could prompt changes to the levels of U.S.
Armed Forces required in Iraq for the 6-month period following the date
of the report or the missions to be undertaken by the Armed Forces in
Iraq for such period, including the status of planning for such changes
to the levels or missions of the Armed Forces in Iraq. Not later than
30 days after submission of each subsequent report, appropriate senior
DOD officials are required to brief the congressional committees on
these same matters.[Footnote 3]
While we have been monitoring the full range of challenges that DOD
would likely face, both in Iraq and here in the United States, as it
begins to draw down its forces in Iraq, this report is focused on the
logistical organizations and processes that would support a drawdown
from Iraq or, as DOD officials call it, a "reposturing" effort,
especially the retrograde of materiel and equipment.[Footnote 4] Our
analysis indicated that the redeployment of military personnel,
although important, was not as complex, resource intensive, or time
consuming.[Footnote 5] Because of the complexity of the issues and
broad congressional interest and requests, we have been assessing DOD's
planning for the reposturing effort since August 2007, under the
authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own
initiative. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the
extent to which logistical planning for the reposturing of U.S. forces
from Iraq has begun and the assumptions upon which it is based, and (2)
DOD has established roles and responsibilities for managing and
executing the retrograde of materiel and equipment from Iraq. In
addition, we identified several issues that DOD will need to consider
as it develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces from
Iraq.
To determine what planning has been done regarding the potential
reposturing of forces from Iraq and upon what assumptions DOD has based
its plans, we reviewed relevant documents, to include command briefings
and in-progress reviews, orders, and staff analyses that we obtained
from several DOD organizations including U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), MNF-I, and U.S. Army Central (ARCENT).[Footnote 6] We also
interviewed officials who were directly involved in the logistical
planning efforts to determine the status and scope of these efforts. We
also traveled to Kuwait in May 2008 and met with DOD officials from a
variety of organizations who participated in a logistical summit held
at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. We also obtained copies of the briefings and
the logistical reposturing order that resulted from this summit. Based
on these discussions as well as the documents we obtained, we were able
to determine the assumptions upon which the planning effort was based.
To determine the extent to which DOD has established roles and
responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel
and equipment from Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed briefings, e-mail
correspondence, orders, joint and Army doctrine, relevant sections of
the U.S. Code, and other data obtained from DOD organizations in both
the United States and Kuwait. These officials provided us with
information about the way the retrograde process is supposed to work as
well as any challenges they have encountered. While in Kuwait, we also
visited locations at which various aspects of the redeployment and
retrograde process are performed and spoke with local commanders and on-
site supervisors about their experiences and challenges.
During the course of this engagement we identified several issues that
DOD will need to consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for
reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. We identified these issues by
reviewing our past work as well as documents we obtained from various
defense commands and activities, including staff analyses, briefings,
orders, doctrinal publications, and relevant laws and regulations. The
officials we spoke with included commanders and staff officers who had
direct knowledge of the issues we identified. Moreover, we visited
several locations in both the United States and Kuwait where the issues
we identified would have an impact and, while there, we discussed the
possible ramifications of these issues with local DOD officials.
We conducted our audit from August 2007 through August 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I includes more
detailed information on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq has yet to be
determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in
fall 2007, and in May 2008 DOD began coordinating these individual
planning efforts to develop a logistical framework based on three key
assumptions. According to DOD officials, initial planning efforts were
uncoordinated because the three organizations undertaking them--the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Army Materiel Command(AMC), and
Headquarters, Department of the Army--conducted their planning effort
on their own initiative and with little input from CENTCOM and MNF-I,
the commands overseeing operations in Iraq. By late 2007, however, a
move began to synchronize and coordinate the efforts of DOD
organizations engaged in planning for a reposturing of U.S. forces in
Iraq. This culminated in a May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait, and resulted in an order published by MNF-I that contained the
process for the redeployment of units and retrograde of materiel and
equipment. The order also established a working group chartered to
continue the planning with an eye toward seeking solutions to
challenges, including several of the challenges we discuss later in
this report. DOD's planning efforts to date have been based on the
following three key assumptions:
* any reposturing initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of
State assessments of conditions on the ground;
* there will be sufficient lead time to refine reposture plans once an
order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued;
and:
* the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated
on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no
more than 2.5 brigades' worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq
each month.
Although efforts have begun to synchronize planning for reposturing,
DOD, CENTCOM, and the military services have not clearly established
roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of
materiel and equipment from Iraq. Joint doctrine states that unity of
command must be maintained through an unambiguous chain of command,
well-defined relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities
and authorities. However, although CENTCOM has designated an executive
agent for the synchronization of the retrograde of materiel and
equipment from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified or
coordinated structure exists to account for the role of a variety of
teams and units engaged in retrograde operations, such as the
disposition of excess property and maintaining accountability of major
end items like tanks and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWV). This results in confusion and a lack of clarity on the ways
those teams should be utilized. In addition, while the Army has
designated ARCENT as its lead element for retrograde of Army material
and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT had no direct
command authority over the two Army units responsible for the
retrograde of the bulk of materiel and equipment in Iraq, a situation
that resulted in inefficiency and significant amounts of materiel and
equipment in Kuwait sitting idle and awaiting disposition instructions.
Finally, another example of this lack of unity of command is that data
systems used during the retrograde process are incompatible. Although a
fix for this data system incompatibility has been identified, the fix
has not yet been implemented.
We identified several other issues that will affect the development of
plans for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. Specifically, based on our
discussion with DOD officials and analysis of planning efforts to date,
the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD's redeployment of equipment and
people will depend on the extent to which it develops plans that
address and include:
* guidance for the management of hazardous materials and waste and the
disposition of property, which could affect the time and cost of
closing installations in Iraq;
* guidance and plans for reposturing of contractors from Iraq;
* accountability and disposition of contractor-managed government-
owned property;
* the possibility of restrictive conditions on the use of facilities in
Kuwait and other neighboring countries;
* availability of wash racks and the number of customs inspectors in
Kuwait;
* capacity of military owned and operated transports and convoy
security assets, including limits on the main supply route;
* increased demand for access to mental health care providers;
* infrastructure requirements of returning units; and:
* requirements for training and equipment reset to restore readiness.
DOD has begun to address these issues. For example, it is addressing
the accountability of contractor-managed property and increasing the
number of mental health providers. The National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires DOD to brief the congressional
defense committees on certain matters that were to be addressed, to the
extent practicable, in the President's report. These matters include an
assessment of U.S. force levels required in Iraq, the missions they
will undertake in Iraq, the incremental costs or savings of any
proposed changes to such levels or missions, and a description of the
range of conditions that could prompt changes to the levels of U.S.
forces required in Iraq, including the status of planning for such
changes to the levels or missions of U.S. forces in Iraq. However,
certain issues we have identified above are not specifically covered by
this requirement. [Footnote 7] We believe that more specific reporting
from DOD on these issues and DOD's mitigation plans related to these
issues will enable Congress to better exercise effective oversight of
DOD's plans.
In light of our observations, to ensure that DOD can efficiently and
effectively retrograde its materiel and equipment from Iraq, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM
and the military departments, take steps to clarify a unified or
coordinated chain of command over logistical operations in support of
the retrograde effort. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the military departments, correct the
incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain
visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in-transit.
Further, to enhance its ability to exercise its oversight
responsibilities, Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to modify
its briefings submitted in accordance with the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to include specific details on
the status of its reposturing planning and how it intends to mitigate
issues such as those we identified in this report.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the second
recommendation. The department also provided a number of general
comments and technical comments that we considered and incorporated, as
appropriate. The department's comments and our evaluation of those
comments are discussed in detail in a later section of this report. A
complete copy of DOD's written comments, including the department's
general and technical comments and our evaluation of each of those
comments, is included in appendix II.
Background:
According to DOD officials, U.S. forces in Iraq will not be "drawn
down" but rather "repostured." MNF-I defines "resposture operations," a
non-doctrinal term, as "the realignment of forces, basing, and
resources to adjust to changes in the operating environment."[Footnote
8] Joint doctrine, as outlined in DOD's joint publications for both
operations and planning emphasizes the importance of end-state planning
and planning for the termination of combat operations. Inherent in
DOD's reposture planning is the concept of redeployment, which joint
doctrine defines as "the transfer of forces and materiel to support
another joint force commander's operational requirements, or to return
personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization
stations for reintegration and/or out-processing."[Footnote 9]
Associated with redeployment is another non-doctrinal concept--
retrograde.[Footnote 10] As of May 2008 there was no agreed-upon
definition for retrograde as it applies to reposture planning. However,
according to some of the proposed definitions the term generally refers
to the evacuation of materiel and equipment from Iraq. Moreover, our
analysis of DOD documents indicates that the terms "retrograde" and
"redeployment" are often used interchangeably. For clarity we use the
term "redeployment" to refer to the movement of units (including a
unit's complement of personnel, equipment, and materiel) and
"retrograde" when referring to the movement of materiel and equipment.
Our analysis of previous GAO reports and testimonies on Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm indicated that retrograde of materiel
and equipment would consume the most time and resources throughout the
reposturing effort.[Footnote 11] Since the 1990s, we have identified
DOD's supply chain management as a high-risk area, because DOD has been
unable to consistently meet its goal of delivering the "right items to
the right places at the right time." Since 1991, we have issued a
number of reports highlighting weaknesses in DOD's supply chain
management throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and
Operation Iraqi Freedom.[Footnote 12]
The logistics infrastructure that supports the redeployment and
retrograde effort in the Iraqi theater of operations is large and
complex, consisting of military organizations that operate in both Iraq
and Kuwait, and it is through Kuwait's three seaports and two airports
that the vast majority of U.S. forces, materiel, and equipment flow out
of the theater of operations. Moreover, there are myriad logistics
organizations in both Iraq and Kuwait that also support these
operations, including elements CENTCOM, U.S. Transportation Command,
DLA, ARCENT, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, AMC, U.S. Marine
Corps Central Command, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Air
Forces Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command Central.
In this report we examine certain components of the logistics
infrastructure that support the redeployment and retrograde effort as
well as certain aspects of the redeployment and retrograde processes.
To properly frame this discussion, however, it is necessary to have
some sense of the size of the force in Iraq and the logistics
activities in Kuwait that support the redeployment and retrograde of
this force. (Figure 1 shows the locations of select installations in
Iraq and key logistics activities in Kuwait.) For example, although
public discussion of the size of the U.S. force in Iraq generally
emphasizes the number of brigade combat teams, according to DOD
officials as of May 2008 there were the equivalent of 47 brigades'
worth of materiel and equipment in Iraq spread over some 311
installations of varying size. The majority of this materiel and
equipment, some 80 percent according to DOD officials, is theater
provided equipment, approximately 582,000 pieces of equipment worth
about $15.5 billion. Theater provided equipment is permanent stay
behind equipment consisting of specific line items of modified table of
organization and equipment property, issued Army prepositioned stocks,
and items purchased specifically for Operations Iraqi Freedom that
remain in Iraq. The 582,000 pieces of equipment include all the
accountable line items on the property books for the theater provided
equipment such as up-armored HMMWVs, Mine Resistant Armored Program
Vehicles, other wheeled and tracked vehicles, generators, body armor,
and technologies used to counter improvised explosive devices. In
addition, as of summer 2007 there were more than 60,000 materiel
containers in Iraq and over 127,000 short-tons of ammunition in Iraq
and Kuwait.
Figure 1: Select Installations in Iraq and Key Logistics Activities in
Kuwait:
This figure is a map of select installations in Iraq and key logistics
activities in Kuwait.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, Art Explosion, and GAO analysis of Stats and Stripes and
DOD data.
[End of figure]
Planning Efforts, Begun in Fall 2007 and Coordinated in 2008, Are
Predicated on Three Key Assumptions:
While various individual defense commands began planning for the
reposturing of postsurge forces from Iraq in the fall of 2007, those
planning efforts were not coordinated until May 2008 and were based on
three key assumptions. At the outset these planning efforts were
uncoordinated and lacked a joint perspective. However, in late 2007, an
effort was begun to synchronize the planning efforts of various DOD
organizations as they related to reposture operations in the Iraqi
theater of operations. The result of this effort was a series of
logistics synchronization conferences as well as MNF-I's publication of
a logistics reposture order in May 2008.
Reposture Planning Began Fall 2007 but Initial Efforts Were
Uncoordinated:
In the fall of 2007 three DOD organizations--AMC, DLA, and
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)--began separate planning
initiatives designed to deal with issues relating to the retrograde of
materiel and equipment from Iraq. As part of their planning processes,
each of the three organizations established working groups or forums
for subordinate entities to communicate about issues arising from their
planning. Despite working on the same broad set of issues, however,
there was little coordination among the three organizations. Moreover
both CENTCOM, the combatant command whose area of responsibility
includes Iraq and Kuwait, and MNF-I, the headquarters responsible for
operations in Iraq, provided little input and guidance to these
efforts.
Army Materiel Command officials told us that they issued a warning
order on September 6, 2007, directing its subordinate units to be
prepared to develop plans in support of the transition from current
operations to the reduction of forces in Iraq. The warning order
established a biweekly video teleconference, which first met on
September 14, 2007, as a forum for all AMC units and staff to discuss
upcoming requirements in support of Iraqi theater reposturing efforts.
Moreover, the command also stood up a Theater Drawdown Working Group.
The original intent of this working group was to conduct a mission
analysis of what it would take to redeploy multiple brigade combat
teams quickly; however, by November 2007 the working group became an
umbrella organization that synchronized AMC's various planning efforts
in support of a reposturing of forces from Iraq. Among the issues AMC
and its subordinate organizations explored were the capacities of its
depots, the disposition of excess equipment in the Iraqi theater of
operations, additional resources that might be required in theater
based on the pace of the unit redeployments, rebuilding Army
Prepositioned Stocks in theater, AMC capabilities in theater to support
the reposturing effort, identifying what AMC support was required for
reducing the number of installations in theater, and identifying the
need for changes in contracts or additional funding.
According to Defense Logistics Agency officials, their agency
established a Retrograde Task Force in September 2007 when it became
clear that DOD was looking at the reposturing of forces in
Iraq.[Footnote 13] The mission of the Retrograde Task Force was to plan
and coordinate the execution of DLA actions in support of retrograde
operations from Operation Iraqi Freedom. It was also to develop an
integrated support plan for those operations by December 2007. The
Retrograde Task Force canvassed DLA's customers--such as the military
services, CENTCOM, and ARCENT--to gather data on their respective roles
and responsibilities for a reposturing effort and conducted a mission
analysis to coordinate and anticipate future DLA actions and identify
gaps and seams in the overall retrograde effort.
Headquarters, Department of the Army issued its guidance for the
retrograde of materiel from the CENTCOM area of responsibilities on
October 23, 2007. HQDA designated ARCENT as the Army's "lead element
for retrograde" of Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR,
but also stated that AMC is "responsible for executing HQDA retrograde
policy." The order provided a set of business rules--by class of
supply[Footnote 14]--that all Army units, commands, and agencies
involved in the retrograde process in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility were to follow. It also provided disposition
instructions for these classes of supply. Finally, the order also
established a monthly video teleconference, hosted by the HQDA, G-4
(Logistics), to provide a forum in which issues and obstacles affecting
retrograde operations could be discussed.
Although these DOD organizations made efforts to synchronize their
planning--for example, both AMC and DLA participated in Headquarters,
Department of the Army's monthly video teleconferences and DLA
identified Service headquarters as "external links" to its Retrograde
Task Force--there was, according to DOD officials, little coordination
among the separate retrograde planning efforts. In particular, while
AMC and HQDA focused solely on the retrograde of Army materiel and
equipment, other DOD officials felt a joint approach headed by either
the Joint Staff or CENTCOM was required. Moreover, CENTCOM and MNF-I
provided little guidance; according to officials from CENTCOM, they
were waiting on input from MNF-I while according to officials
representing MNF-I, all discussion of reposturing was "close hold" in
that headquarters until after the MNF-I commander's congressional
testimony in April 2008.
Reposture Planning Coordinated by May 2008:
The synchronization of planning efforts by various defense commands for
reposturing of post-surge forces began in late 2007, but was not
coordinated until May 2008. According to DOD officials, by late 2007 it
had become clear that not only were the various reposturing planning
efforts uncoordinated and lacking a joint focus, but the perspectives
of organizations in the United States differed from those of
organizations in the Iraqi theater of operations. To rectify this,
senior DLA officials met with their counterparts in CENTCOM and MNF-I
to discuss means by which reposture planning could be better
coordinated and more inclusive. Recognizing the added value of a more
inclusive and coordinated planning effort, CENTCOM and MNF-I officials
invited DLA to embed members of its Retrograde Task Force inside
logistics organizations in Kuwait and Iraq. This action established an
in-theater planning cell embedded in the organizations involved with
logistical planning for reposturing within the Iraqi theater of
operations. These organizations included MNF-I, Multi-National Corps,
Iraq, ARCENT, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, the CENTCOM
Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, and the 401st and 402nd
Army Field Support Brigades.
As a result of these efforts, coordination among DOD organizations
involved in redeployment and retrograde planning increased. For
example, when representatives from DLA arrived in Iraq and Kuwait they
discovered that CENTCOM and ARCENT were holding separate retrograde
video teleconferences; these were eventually merged into one joint
video teleconference. In addition, although the major focus had been on
Army retrograde processes because the Army has the largest ground
presence in the theater, once a coordinated reposture planning effort
was undertaken other services got involved in the redeployment and
retrograde planning process as well.
The end result of the increased coordination and synchronized planning
among the organizations involved with reposture planning for Iraq was a
logistics summit held at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, from May 4-9, 2008. At
this summit the logistics processes for the retrograde of all classes
of supply were synchronized, discussions about what to do with
contractor-acquired, government-owned property were held, and general
and flag officers were briefed. Representatives from CENTCOM, U.S.
Transportation Command, DLA, MNF-I, MNC-I, ARCENT, the 1st Theater
Sustainment Command, HQDA, and the Navy, Marine Corps, Special
Operations, and Air Force component commands in theater attended the
summit. Based on the summit, MNF-I finalized and published its
overarching guidance for logistics reposturing operation on May 28,
2008. This order defined retrograde disposition processes for each
class of supply within the Iraqi theater of operations, codified a 180-
day unit redeployment template, and addressed basing.[Footnote 15]
Moreover, the order also established a Logistics Reposture Working
Group[Footnote 16] and assigned the group three key tasks:
* Analyze the allocation of resources available to execute the
logistics reposturing processes to identify potential shortfalls and to
address synchronization issues between various operational and
strategic entities.
* Review limitations, constraints, and risks associated with the
logistics reposturing processes and develop mitigation measures.
* Review after action report issues from unit redeployments and base
reposturing in order to identify policy and procedural gaps and
inconsistencies.
Assumptions Guiding Reposture Planning:
Based on GAO analysis as well as discussion with DOD officials, both
the May 2008 conference and the subsequent logistics reposture order
were based on three assumptions. The first is that any reposturing
initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments
of conditions of the ground. The second is that there will be
sufficient lead time to refine the plans for reposturing once an order
with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued. The
third is that the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual,
predicated on a 180-day redeployment template for units leaving Iraq
and a model that states the theater logistics infrastructure can
sustain the deployment and redeployment of no more than a total of five
brigades' worth of equipment and materiel in and out of Iraq, per
month.
The MNF-I 180-day template, summarized in table 1, details the actions
U.S. Army and Marine Corps units must complete 180 days prior to the
unit's available-to-load date.[Footnote 17] Twenty-two total
organizations-17 separate theater entities plus 5 additional property
and retrograde support teams-participate in this process.[Footnote 18]
Table 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq 180-day Template:
Number of days before departure: 180 to 160;
Actions: ID types of equipment, request disposition and plan
coordination with all retrograde teams.
Number of days before departure: 150 to 100;
Actions: Finalize any early reset plans, set deployment timeline.
Number of days before departure: 100 to 80;
Actions: Disposition instructions issued, request and authorize
donation authority.
Number of days before departure: 80 to 60;
Actions: Schedule strategic transportation.
Number of days before departure: 60 to 40;
Actions: Order containers, dispose of excess supplies, develop detailed
movement plan, schedule wash racks.
Number of days before departure: 40 to 20;
Actions: Move excess vehicles, validate movement of people.
Number of days before departure: 20 to 0;
Actions: Complete customs and agriculture inspections, move equipment
from wash racks to sterile yard to marshaling yard to pier to ship.
Source: GAO analysis based on MNF-I FRAGO 08-232.
[End of table]
In addition to the 180-day redeployment template, logistics planners in
the Iraqi theater of operation assume the theater's logistics
infrastructure can sustain a flow of approximately 2.5 brigades' worth
of materiel and equipment into and out of Iraq each month based on a
rate-of-flow model they have created. (See appendix V for a more
detailed discussion of this model). This model takes into consideration
historical property book data, the number of convoys that can be run
each month, and the average time it takes a unit to clean its equipment
and clear customs in Kuwait. However, according to DOD officials and
GAO analysis, while this rate-of-flow model may be a useful planning
tool, it should not be used to predict how long it would take to
retrograde all the equipment and materiel in Iraq. One reason for this
is the actual amount of equipment and materiel with which any one
brigade will redeploy varies and these amounts directly affect the
number of convoys required to move the unit and the amount of time it
will take the unit to clean its equipment before it can be retrograded.
For example, during the summer of 2008 the average heavy brigade combat
team redeployed with significantly less equipment and materiel than
projected in the model because the unit used a large amount of theater
provided equipment that remained in Iraq when it redeployed. Moreover,
GAO has identified several issues, explained in detail later in this
report, that may affect both the volume and pace at which materiel and
equipment can flow through the retrograde pipeline. Several of these
issues are not currently accounted for by the model.
Executive Agent for Retrograde of Materiel and Equipment Lacks
Necessary Authority:
Despite recent initiatives to synchronize and coordinate the planning
efforts of DOD organizations with regard to the reposturing of forces
from Iraq, clear roles and responsibilities with regard to managing and
executing the redeployment and retrograde process have not yet been
established. According to joint doctrine, "unity of command must be
maintained through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined
command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and
authorities."[Footnote 19] Combatant commanders exercise "authoritative
direction over logistics," and may organize logistics resources within
theater according to operational needs.[Footnote 20] CENTCOM's
retrograde order designates an executive agent for the synchronization
of retrograde operations in Iraq. At the same time, because each
military department has unique authorities and roles, including the
requirement to provide logistical support to its own assigned forces,
CENTCOM efforts to establish a truly unified command structure with
respect to logistics may be complicated.[Footnote 21] With no unified
or coordinated structure to account for the roles of the theater
property and retrograde support teams that assist units with the
retrograde of material and equipment, there is confusion and a lack of
clarity about how these teams should be utilized. In addition, while
the Army has designated ARCENT as its lead element for retrograde of
Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT
did not have direct command authority over the two Army units in the
theater responsible for retrograding the vast bulk of the equipment in
Iraq. Because of this the retrograde process was inefficient and
resulted in significant amounts of theater provided equipment sitting
idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. Finally, based on GAO
analysis, a significant manifestation of the lack of unity of command
over the retrograde process is the use of incompatible data systems.
Although a fix for this incompatibility has been identified, the
implementation of the fix has not been enforced.
No Single Organization Has Authority over Theater Property and
Retrograde Support Teams:
No single organization has command authority over all of the theater
property and retrograde support teams that facilitate the redeployment
and retrograde process. According to ARCENT, the lack of unity of
command over these teams makes their use unclear and confusing. There
are 10 theater property and retrograde support teams that assist units
with redeployment and the retrograde of material and
equipment.[Footnote 22] ARCENT has tactical control authority over only
2 of these teams, the Mobile Redistribution Team and the Redistribution
Property Assistance Team.[Footnote 23] The Mobile Redistribution Team
assists redeploying units with identifying, documenting, and providing
disposition instructions for excess supplies and repair parts in order
to reintegrate required supplies into the distribution pipeline. The
Redistribution Property Assistance Team is focused primarily on
accountability, turn-in, and retrograde of theater provided equipment.
Of the remaining 8 theater property and retrograde support teams, 2
report to AMC, 2 report to MNC-I, and 1 each report to U.S.
Transportation Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command, DLA, and the Marine Corps Logistics Command. Each of these 8
teams also provides redeploying units with essential services and
expertise. For example, the Joint Redeployment Support Team, which
reports to U.S. Transportation Command, has the mission of supplying
customs, disposition, hazardous material, and transportation expertise
to redeploying units and is to enable in-transit visibility over a
unit's materiel and equipment from its forward operating base to the
unit's home station or to an identified depot. Another team, the
Inventory Property Assistance Team, reports to MNC-I. The Inventory
Property Assistance Team's mission is to track material and equipment
shortages and excesses for units in Iraq and, when a unit is
redeploying, provide instructions for either the redistribution or
retrograde of that unit's material and equipment. It has the added
mission of conducting inventories during the closure of forward
operating bases, conducting the transfer of government-furnished
equipment,[Footnote 24] and conducting inventories of "found" equipment
containers in Iraq. ARCENT has proposed a command structure within MNF-
I and MNC-I to coordinate command and control over the assistance teams
in order to better synchronize retrograde efforts in the theater, but
as of May 2008 this structure has not been adopted. As a result,
according to ARCENT, the use of the various teams during the retrograde
process is both unclear and confusing.
Until Recently No Theater Logistical Organization Had Command Authority
over Units Responsible for the Retrograde of Most Equipment in Theater:
Until recently, there was no single theater logistical organization
with command authority over the two units responsible for retrograding
theater provided equipment, which accounts for 80 percent of the
equipment in Iraq. As a result significant amounts of theater provided
equipment were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition
instructions. The two units responsible for retrograding theater
provided equipment are the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in Iraq and
the 401st Army Field Support Brigade in Kuwait. Together, these field
support brigades relieve redeploying units of accountability for
theater provided equipment, arrange for its transportation from Iraq to
Kuwait, and process the equipment through the wash racks, customs, and
on to its designated destination. According to emerging Army doctrine
(currently in draft), when Army field support brigades are deployed in
support of a contingency mission to an operational theater and when
directed by higher authority, they will fall under the operational
control of a theater or expeditionary sustainment command.[Footnote 25]
According to joint doctrine,[Footnote 26] a theater sustainment command
is the logistics command and control element assigned to the Army
Service Component Command and is the single Army logistics headquarters
in a theater of operations. Theater sustainment commands may also
employ one or more expeditionary sustainment commands to aid them with
command and control.
Prior to June 2008 in the Iraqi theater of operations, neither ARCENT-
-CENTCOM's Army Service Component Command and Army's designated lead
element for retrograde operations in the theater--nor ARCENT's
subordinate theater and expeditionary sustainment commands had any
direct command authority over the 401st or 402nd Army Field Support
Brigades. Instead, higher headquarters for both the field support
brigades was the Army Sustainment Command located at Rock Island
Arsenal, Illinois.[Footnote 27] This command relationship appeared to
be inconsistent with emerging Army doctrine and Joint doctrine, and
HQDA had apparently denied ARCENT authority over all Army organizations
in the CENTCOM AOR that support the retrograde process, including the
401st and 402nd. In an effort to provide some in-theater oversight for
the retrograde process, AMC has designated the ARCENT G-4 as the
commander, Army Materiel Command, southwest Asia (AMC-SWA). However,
like ARCENT and its theater and expeditionary sustainment commands,
this commander had no direct command authority over the field support
brigades whose actions he is charged to synchronize and oversee.
Moreover, he did not have a staff to assist him in his duties aside
from a chief of staff. According to CENTCOM officials, in June 2008
CENTCOM designated ARCENT as having operational control over the 401ST
Army Field Support Brigade and the 402ND Army Field Support Brigade.
While CENTCOM's action may result in changes in the retrograde process
for transferring theater provided equipment from Iraq to Kuwait, we
have not yet evaluated the effect of this change.
Before this change occurred, the lack of unity of command made the
process for transferring theater provided equipment from Iraq to Kuwait
inefficient and resulted in significant amounts of this equipment
sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. This was
because the headquarters with the authority to coordinate the theater
provided equipment retrograde process (Army Sustainment Command) lacked
visibility over the process while the headquarters with visibility over
the process (AMC-SWA) lacked the command authority and the staff to
coordinate the actions of the field support brigades that execute the
process. For example, on May 16, 2008, 177 pieces of theater provided
equipment rolling stock[Footnote 28] that were no longer needed in
theater were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions,
some since March 2008. Army Sustainment Command took no actions to
rectify this situation and the commanding general, AMC-SWA, who is also
the ARCENT G-4, did not have authority to direct that action be taken.
Instead, he used his personal contacts with DOD officials in the United
States to obtain the needed disposition instructions. Despite these
actions, however, problems persisted with the retrograde process. For
example, a DOD official in Kuwait provided documentation showing that
over 2,100 non-rolling stock items of theater provided equipment--
including such items as 120mm mortars, gun mounts, radio sets, and
generators--were also sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition
instructions.
Logistical Organizations Have Not Enforced or Lack the Authority to
Enforce Improvements to the Retrograde Process:
One significant manifestation of the lack of unity of command is that
logistical organizations have not enforced or lack the authority to
enforce improvements to a retrograde process that is slow and does not
maintain in-transit visibility. ASC has identified a solution to the
problem and ordered its implementation, but it has not enforced its
order despite having the authority to do so. Until recently, ARCENT
lacked the necessary authority over the field support brigades to
enforce Army Sustainment Command's solution. As a result, significant
stores of TPE that are no longer needed in theater are sitting idle in
Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions.
Retrograde Process for Certain Theater Provided Equipment Is Slow and
Does Not Maintain In-Transit Visibility:
The current process for retrograding theater provided equipment no
longer needed in Iraq is lengthy and does not maintain in-transit
visibility.[Footnote 29] This is caused by the frequent manual
manipulation of data. According to DOD's Supply Chain Materiel
Management Regulation, all DOD components shall structure their
materiel management to provide responsive, consistent, and reliable
support to the warfighter (customer) during peacetime and war using DOD
standard data systems that provide timely, accurate in-transit asset
information.[Footnote 30]
Currently, when theater provided equipment moves to Kuwait the 401st
Army Field Support Brigade undertakes two concurrent manual processes
to establish accountability and visibility for the equipment.
Accountability is established by manually entering equipment data into
one system, while a second manual entry is made in a different system
to provide visibility over each item by serial number. The visibility
system, however, is a nonstandard Army information system. DOD guidance
states that the DOD components should execute a supply chain strategy
that promotes the use of shared common data and that wherever possible,
adopt commercial data exchange and user interface standards and
procedures while ensuring interoperability.
Once accountability and visibility over theater provided equipment has
been established, personnel from the 401st Army Field Support Brigade
request disposition instructions. This labor-intensive manual process
involves sending spreadsheets populated with equipment data from Kuwait
to Army Sustainment Command headquarters in Rock Island, Illinois, and
then on to the specific Life Cycle Management Command[Footnote 31]
responsible for each particular item, which, in turn, sends disposition
instructions back through this chain to the 401st. This process can
take months because of the manual workarounds used to pass and
manipulate the data.
While equipment can be shipped once disposition instructions are
received in Kuwait, in-transit visibility of the equipment is
temporarily lost during shipment because the process used to direct
shipment of the equipment--called Inter-Depot Transfer--bypasses the
Global Transportation Network, DOD's system for providing near real-
time in-transit visibility information. This lack of in-transit
visibility is contrary to current DOD guidance that requires timely,
accurate in-transit asset information be available to all users and
logistics managers and in a standard format adequate to satisfy needs.
The 401st Army Field Support Brigade uses another manual process to
compensate for this lack of in-transit visibility by coordinating with
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command elements at Kuwaiti ports
in order to obtain final load manifests for each vessel. The manifest
is forwarded to item managers in the United States so they can prepare
to receive the equipment; however, manifest information does not reach
the brigade until 24 to 48 hours after a vessel sets sail.
Army Sustainment Command has stated that "the current process used�to
manage and obtain disposition is slow and cumbersome with a high
potential to be overwhelmed if reposturing is accelerated." In addition
to the more than 2,100 pieces of nonrolling stock TPE awaiting
dispositions instructions cited above--some reportedly for years--a DOD
official stated that in the past rolling stock has been sitting idle in
Kuwait for anywhere from 3 to 9 months.
Logistical Organizations Have Not Enforced or Lack the Authority to
Enforce Compliance with Orders to Implement Improvements to the
Retrograde Process:
Although Army Sustainment Command has issued an order outlining changes
to the retrograde process that corrects the problems we have
identified, neither of the field support brigades in the Iraqi theater
of operations have followed it. In April 2008, Army Sustainment Command
issued an order directing the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support
Brigades to use Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced transactions to
transfer equipment between Iraq and Kuwait in order to maintain
accountability and visibility.[Footnote 32] Moreover, the order
directed that disposition instructions for all theater provided
equipment not required in theater should be requested through the
Standard Army Retail Supply System.[Footnote 33] According to a DOD
official this will allow the automated request of disposition
instructions, thereby reducing the time necessary to receive the
instructions. Moreover, the system will provide data to the Global
Transportation Network, thereby improving in-transit visibility over
equipment. However, for reasons that were not made clear, this order
has not been implemented and Army Sustainment Command has not compelled
the field support brigades to comply.
In January 2008, ARCENT, as the lead agent for retrograde, requested
that Headquarters, Department of the Army delegate to ARCENT more
authority over the retrograde process. Specifically, according to
ARCENT officials, ARCENT requested that it be given authority to
determine and issue disposition instructions and that it be given
authority to direct all Army organizations in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility that support the retrograde process. As of May 2008,
ARCENT had not received these authorities. Until recently, ARCENT had
no authority to direct the field support brigades to comply with Army
Sustainment Command's order to fix the data incompatibility problem in
theater. While CENTCOM's action designating ARCENT as having
operational control over the support brigades may result in changes in
the disposition instruction process, we have not yet evaluated the
effect of this command change.
Issues That DOD Needs to Consider in Its Reposture Planning:
We identified nine issues that will affect the development of plans for
reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. These nine issues are discussed, in
detail, in the following sections. Although the pace and overall extent
of a potential reposturing are uncertain, DOD has begun to address
these issues. While DOD officials are not required to report specific
information about these nine issues or possible mitigation plans
related to these issues, as part of the briefings they are required to
provide to the congressional defense committees,[Footnote 34] we
believe that without more specific reporting from DOD, Congress may not
be able to effectively exercise oversight responsibilities of DOD's
plans.
Time and Cost Estimates for Base Closures in Iraq:
According to ARCENT officials, closing or handing over U.S.
installations in Iraq will be time-consuming and costly, although time
and costs are difficult to estimate without a bilateral agreement
addressing base closures. As of May 31, 2008, 311 U.S. installations in
Iraq will have to be closed or turned over to the Iraqis during a
reposturing effort, depending on the scope of U.S. reposturing.
According to ARCENT officials, experience has shown it takes 1 to 2
months to close the smallest platoon-or company-size installations,
which contain between 16 and 200 combat soldiers or marines. However,
Multi-National Corps-Iraq has never closed an installation the size of
complex installations such as Balad Air Force Base, which contains
approximately 24,000 inhabitants and has matured over 5 years, making
accurate predictions about the time it will take to close them
difficult. ARCENT officials estimate it could take longer than 18
months to close a base of that size, likening the process to shutting
down and moving a small U.S. city.
According to DOD officials, time and costs are difficult to estimate
without an agreement between the United States and Iraq on base
closure, especially with regard to guidance of the management of
hazardous materials and waste and the transfer of personal
property.[Footnote 35] ARCENT officials stated that both issues are
traditionally addressed in Status of Forces Agreements; however, as of
July 18, 2008, the United States and Iraq do not have such an
agreement.[Footnote 36] Hence, although CENTCOM guidance states that
the base commander is responsible for the removal or remediation of all
hazardous materials and waste, ARCENT officials stated that base
commanders do not know to what extent they must remediate the waste,
and therefore may have difficulty estimating the time and cost of
cleaning installations. In addition, according to ARCENT officials,
absent an agreement with Iraq on the disposition of personal property,
"all bunkers, trenches, fighting positions, and force protection
barriers� will be removed" in accordance with CENTCOM policy.
ARCENT officials asserted that, absent a bilateral agreement with Iraq
addressing the base closure or hand-over process, the U.S. will have to
negotiate the terms of closure for each base individually, which could
potentially slow the base closing process. For example, ARCENT
officials noted that since the owners or lessees of the land on which
the installations currently reside include the Iraqi Ministries of
Interior, Defense, and Justice, and other Iraqi national government
entities as well as private individuals, property transfers would be
complicated and time consuming. Moreover, ARCENT officials stated that
in the absence of a bilateral agreement that provides guidance for the
management of hazardous waste and materials, it is normal practice to
follow the established guidelines for this management, which generally
are more stringent and therefore potentially more costly and time
consuming.
Uncertainties Regarding Plans for Contractors:
From late 2007 through July 2008, planning for the reposturing of U.S.
forces in Iraq did not include a theater-wide plan for the reposturing
of contractors. According to MNF-I's May 2008 logistics reposture
order, logistics planners were to coordinate with the Defense
Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) to identify contractual issues
associated with logistics reposture operations. But as of June 2008,
DCMA officials stated that they were not aware of a theater-wide plan
for the reposturing of contractors. In fact, according to DOD
officials, CENTCOM contracting planners did not begin participating in
planning for the reposturing operations until July 2008.
While there is no theater-wide plan, since May 2008 Army LOGCAP
officials have been participating in theater-wide logistics reposturing
planning. Reposture planning for LOGCAP is significant, given that it
is the largest logistical support contract in Iraq. According to a DOD
official, examples of such participation include LOGCAP personnel
attending a series of logistics conferences held at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait in May 2008, working with logistics reposture planning teams in
MNF-I and MNC-I, and participating in the Logistics Reposture Working
Group. However, according to a DOD official responsible for
coordinating LOGCAP planning efforts with reposturing planning efforts,
challenges remain in the planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP
contractor personnel. For instance, decisions about reposturing of
these contractors are often made before requirements have been clearly
identified and DOD officials responsible for planning the reposturing
of these contractors do not receive timely and accurate information
from the customers or units using these contracts.
Accountability and Disposition of Contractor-Managed Government-Owned
Property:
Maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S.
government property under the control of contractors may present
challenges to reposturing from Iraq. According to Defense Contract
Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of
contractor-managed government-owned property[Footnote 37] in Iraq.
According to the same officials, the largest portion of all contractor-
managed government-owned property in Iraq, $3.37 billion, falls under
the LOGCAP, an Army program to provide contracted resources to support
U.S. contingency operations. Examples of LOGCAP equipment include
laundry and bath facilities, food service, sanitation, housing,
maintenance, transportation, construction, and power generation and
distribution. According to Defense Contract Management Agency
officials, non-LOGCAP contractor-managed government-owned property
falls into four main categories. These are the Air Force Contract
Augmentation Program, selective programs under DOD's Joint Contracting
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, programs run by the Gulf Region Division of
the Army Corps of Engineers, and hundreds of smaller programs run by
individual U.S. government agencies. Defense Contract Management Agency
officials reported that property in these four categories includes, but
is not limited to, plant equipment and materiel to support various
reconstruction efforts like the Iraqi Department of Public Works.
Several DOD organizations have already begun planning for the
disposition of excess contractor-managed government-owned property from
Iraq.[Footnote 38] For example, in October 2007, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness increased the
donation threshold for all excess U.S.-owned personal property in Iraq
from $5,000 to $10,000[Footnote 39] and delegated this donation
authority to MNF-I. According to DOD officials, in June 2008, the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel readiness
increased the authority to transfer (formerly known as donation
authority) for all U.S.-owned excess personal property in Iraq from
$10,000 to $15,000. In addition, in 2007 the Army published guidelines
for the retrograde of contractor-acquired government-owned property
from CENTCOM's area of responsibility.[Footnote 40] The Army followed
this up in December 2007 with a business case analysis of the effective
disposition of contractor-acquired government-owned property and a
conference in May 2008 during which it updated and developed polices
and processes for maintaining accountability over this
property.[Footnote 41] The Army's analysis indicates that approximately
85 percent of all contractor-acquired government-owned property in Iraq
should be transferred,[Footnote 42] sold, or scrapped in Iraq once it
is declared excess,[Footnote 43] while the remaining 15 percent can be
sold or reused elsewhere. Finally, in its Logistics Reposture Guidance,
MNF-I established policies and procedures for disposing of contractor-
managed government-owned property in Iraq. This process is shown in
figure 2 below.
Figure 2: MNF-I Process for Disposing of Contractor-Managed Government-
Owned Property:
This figure is a flowchart illustrating the MNF-I process for disposing
of contractor-managed government-owned property.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of figure]
Despite the above efforts, however, three challenges exist to
maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of
contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. The first
challenge is determining the original or fair-market value of
contractor-managed government-owned property and determining any
security restrictions on its disposition. According to MNF-I, the
failure to sort and identify U.S. government materiel in Iraq has
already resulted in the retrograding of items that are unserviceable,
are still needed in theater, or are uneconomical to retrograde.
Moreover, according to the Department of the Army's business case
analysis, the LOGCAP property book kept by the prime contractor had
numerous omissions, and many items were not properly listed, creating
doubt about the inventory's accuracy. Without accurate accountability
of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq, the U.S.
government may fail to realize all possible financial and practical
gains from this property.
The second challenge facing DOD, according to Defense Contract
Management Agency officials, is the time-consuming and labor-intensive
task of accounting for and determining the disposition of contractor-
managed government-owned property. According to MNF-I, before
contractor-managed government-owned property can be disposed of it must
be transferred from the contractor's records to a military unit's
property book. However, officials from the Defense Contracting
Management Agency stated that contractors and government officials must
perform a joint inventory of all property before it is transferred.
Defense Contract Management Agency officials assert that completing
this inventory will require planning, travel to storage locations, and
the physical staging of property for easier counting, all of which are
time consuming. Moreover, the same officials stated that security
concerns have previously hindered their ability to travel to all
inventory locations. According to AMC, if the security situation
inhibits contractors from moving equipment, the contractors can abandon
the equipment to U.S. forces that will then be responsible for its
disposition. Defense Contract Management Agency officials stated that
without adequate time and resources to plan and execute a thorough
inventory of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq, the
risks of losing accountability over this property will increase.
The third challenge is that DLA may not have sufficient data to
adequately plan capacity needs at the Defense Reutilization and
Marketing Offices in theater.[Footnote 44] MNF-I policy states that
contractor-managed government-owned property that is excess to
government requirements, and is not donated to the Iraqi government,
will be disposed of at DLA facilities. To prepare for this, DLA
officials attached to MNF-I told us they spent 3 months performing a
detailed analysis of how much equipment will end up at these facilities
in theater. Despite these efforts, however, there are six factors that
may affect DLA's ability to accumulate sufficient data to adequately
plan capacity needs at DLA's disposal facilities.
* LOGCAP inventory accuracy. A Department of the Army business case
analysis stated that problems with the LOGCAP property book created
doubt about the inventory's accuracy. While according to an Army
official the LOGCAP prime contractor is currently performing an
inventory of all of its property in Iraq, the process is adding new
items to their property books, making older property estimates
outdated.
* Lack of property disposal estimates. According to DOD officials, MNF-
I requested but never received the services' estimates of what they
anticipate sending to the disposal facilities.
* Lack of property book data. According to DOD officials, MNF-I did not
receive property books from the Army Corps of Engineers and only
received partial information from the Air Force Contract Augmentation
Program.
* Lack of visibility over non-DOD property. According to Defense
Contract Management Agency officials, it is difficult to determine how
much equipment is managed by contractors under the hundreds of smaller
programs run by individual U.S. government agencies.
* Lack of individual item accountability. According to DOD officials,
many of the systems used to account for contractor-managed government-
owned property only track types of items, but not necessarily the
individual items themselves, making detailed estimates difficult.
* Insufficient training. According to DOD officials, some retrograde
process teams sent to aid redeploying units have not had sufficient
training, causing them to send unnecessary property to disposal
facilities.
DLA has implemented other initiatives to mitigate and prepare for
increased operations at the disposal facilities. For example, DLA
fielded individuals to accompany a key retrograde assistance team to
prevent unnecessary equipment from ending up at these facilities and,
according to DLA officials, in one instance they successfully rerouted
194 of 200 containers, reducing the chance of double-handling this
property. However, without a comprehensive picture of all property in
theater, DLA may not be able to fully prepare its disposal facilities
for the contractor-managed government-owned property that will flow to
them, particularly in the event of a full-scale reposturing.
Use of Facilities in Kuwait and Other Neighboring Countries:
The pace at which units can be redeployed and equipment and materiel
retrograded as part of any reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq would
be governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring countries as
well as restrictions on the use of those facilities. According to DOD
officials, Kuwait is the main point of exit for all personnel,
equipment, and materiel in Iraq. At present there are three U.S. bases
and five Kuwait facilities that the United States is using to support
operations in Iraq, including retrograde and redeployment operations.
The U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement governs the use of these
facilities. According to DOD officials, any reposturing effort must
take into consideration the terms of the Defense Cooperation Agreement
and ongoing negotiations related to that agreement, particularly given
that in their view, the government of Kuwait desires to limit the size
of the U.S. footprint in Kuwait. DOD has explored alternative routes
and ports through which to redeploy units and retrograde equipment and
material but these, too, are constrained because of capacity and other
considerations. For example, in February 2008 the Marine Corps began
testing the feasibility of using an alternate port in the region for
redeployment and retrograde operations.[Footnote 45] However, Marine
Corps officials stated that though the tests have been successful, at
present the country in which that port is located only allows the
transport of containerized cargo through its territory and will not
permit U.S. military security detachments to escort the cargo. As a
result of these restrictions, Marine Corps officials reported they
could retrograde only 20 to 30 percent of their nonsensitive materiel
and equipment in Iraq through this port. ARCENT officials are also
studying the feasibility of using two other alternate ports in the
region. However, according to ARCENT documents, one port has limited
utility as a retrograde port because the shallow draft of the harbor
makes its unsuitable for larger ships, the port's facilities are in
need of significant renovation, and local security at the port is
questionable. The third port is limited to containerized cargo as well
as being limited by the amount of cargo traffic that can travel along
the port's approach roads.
Availability of Wash Racks and Customs Personnel:
Limits on the availability of wash racks in Kuwait and a limited number
of customs inspectors comprise another constraint on the pace at which
retrograde operations can be effected. Prior to returning to the United
States all materiel and equipment must be cleaned to U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) standards. These standards are outlined in The Armed
Forces Pest Management Board Technical Guide No. 31, which states that
"USDA inspection standards only allow a thin film of road dust on
vehicles and equipment arriving at the CONUS [continental United
States] final port of entry," which DOD officials interpret to mean
that materiel and equipment cannot have even a "pinchable" amount of
dirt. To meet these standards of cleanliness, DOD officials stated that
all vehicles returning to the United States are pressure washed. This
involves, first, removing the vehicle's secondary equipment and any add-
on armor. Next, the vehicle moves to a wash rack where the pressure
washing occurs. For larger vehicles, such as tanks, Bradley Fighting
Vehicles, and M88 recovery vehicles this can take anywhere from 40 to
80 hours (larger vehicles must also have their engines removed and the
engine compartment cleaned as well). Smaller vehicles, such as HMMWVs,
take anywhere from 4 to 8 hours.
At present there are 211 wash racks available for use by U.S. forces in
Kuwait, 81 at Camp Arifjan and another 130 at Kuwait Naval
Base.[Footnote 46] According to DOD officials, the wash racks at Camp
Arifjan operate 24 hours a day. However, wash rack operations at Kuwait
Naval Base are subject to occasional work stoppages and other
restrictions. For example, when ammunition is being loaded or unloaded
at the naval base, wash rack operations there are suspended for safety
reasons. According to DOD officials, at present this only occurs for 6
days each quarter, but if the retrograde of ammunition were accelerated
this could occur more often. Moreover, theater provided equipment,
which is washed by contracted third-country nationals, cannot be washed
at Kuwait Naval Base because of security concerns. And of the 130 wash
racks at the naval base, only 100 are useable for the cleaning of
equipment because the remaining 30 lack the necessary filters that
separate contaminates from the wash water.
Figure 3: Bradley Fighting Vehicles at Wash Racks:
This figure is a photograph of Bradley fighting vehicles on wash racks.
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: HMMWV on Wash Rack:
This figure is a photograph of HMMWV on a wash rack.
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
After being washed, vehicles are inspected by military personnel who
have been specially trained and certified by the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Agency. These customs inspectors ensure that before
any vehicle or piece of equipment is placed in a sterile lot, the last
stop before it boards transport for return to the United States, it
meets USDA standards of cleanliness. In Kuwait, these trained
inspectors are provided by the U.S. Navy. Navy officials have stated
that at present there is no shortage of trained and certified customs
inspectors in Kuwait given the current throughput of retrograding
material and equipment. However, other DOD officials have noted that
were the pace of retrograde increased, more customs inspectors would be
necessary. They also stated that absent an increase in the number of
inspectors, otherwise clean vehicles would be delayed from entering the
sterile lot and would therefore require additional cleaning to meet
customs standards of cleanliness. In turn, this could cause a backlog
of vehicles and materiel in Kuwait.
Availability of Transportation and Security Assets and Route
Restrictions:
The availability in theater of military owned and operated heavy
equipment transports and convoy security assets, combined with limits
on the primary supply route, could inhibit the flow of materiel out of
Iraq. According to DOD officials, two types of heavy equipment
transports (HET) support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of
operations: commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored
military transports with military crews. Both types of transport are
used to haul vehicles like tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and HMMWVs
over long distances.[Footnote 47] They also carry containers.
According to DOD officials, there are sufficient quantities of civilian
HETs in the Iraqi theater of operations. However, one factor affecting
the frequency with which convoys can be mounted is the availability of
military HETs and convoy security assets. According to officials from
the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, most convoys comprise both
civilian and military HETs, with the latter being interspersed
throughout the convoy to facilitate control and security. Any increase
in the number of civilian HETs without a corresponding increase in the
number of military HETs, they maintain, increases the risk of
accidents. However, DOD officials have reported shortages of military
HETs in theater. In addition, officials from the 1st Theater
Sustainment Command stated that each convoy is accompanied by a mounted
security detachment. According to ARCENT officials, the availability of
these convoy security assets could also inhibit the flow of materiel
out of Iraq by decreasing the frequency with which convoys can be
mounted.
One other factor that could inhibit the rate by which units can be
redeployed and material and equipment retrograded out of Iraq into
Kuwait is the capacity of the primary supply route. Prior to May 2007,
U.S. convoys used a six-lane concrete highway. However, according to
III Corps officials, the government of Kuwait funded the construction
of an alternate route that opened in May 2007. These officials
explained that the new route is not wide enough to handle two-way HET
traffic and is deteriorating. III Corps officials stated that, because
of this, the flow of convoys north and south along the newer route must
be staggered, which further limits the number and frequency of
retrograde convoys. Moreover, according to DOD officials under all but
the most extreme reposturing scenarios, substantial numbers of convoys
will need to continue flowing north to resupply Coalition forces in
Iraq.
Home Station Issues:
During our visits to units and installations in the United States as
well as conversations with DOD officials, we became aware of several
issues that could challenge units once they have returned to their home
stations. Although these issues need to be explored further, they are
included in this report because of their potential impact. These issues
are:
* A lack of sufficient numbers of mental health professionals to care
for returning service members and their families. According to Army
officials and GAO analysis there is already a deficiency in the number
of mental health providers given the rise in the number of mental
health problems being reported by service members and their families.
The Army has already taken steps to meet this challenge through hiring
and contracting for additional mental health care professionals to meet
the rising demand, but they report that there remains a dearth of
qualified mental health professionals to provide the requisite care for
service members and their families.
* A lack of sufficient infrastructure. According to Army officials
there is already insufficient infrastructure such as barracks,
administrative and headquarters buildings, motor pools, and maintenance
and training areas on several installations. This is due to the "Grow
the Army" initiative which has increased the number of brigade combat
teams in the Army since the beginning of the war in Iraq. As a result,
some installations have more Army units assigned to them than there are
facilities to support. Currently, the Army is able to mitigate this
challenge because a certain number of units are always deployed. This
allows the Army to use the same facilities for more than one unit.
However, installation management officials are concerned that in the
event of a major reposturing of units out of Iraq and the concomitant
return of Army units to their home stations there will not be enough
room to accommodate all of the equipment, unit headquarters staff, and
soldiers stationed at an installation.
* Needed future investments in training and equipment. According to
recent testimony by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army,
resetting the force so that it is capable of "full spectrum operations"
will require substantial future investments in time, money, and
resources. This point was underscored for us during discussions with
officials from the 1st Cavalry Division that had recently returned from
Iraq. They told us that it would not be until 6 to 9 months after
returning from Iraq that their brigade combat teams would have the
necessary equipment with which to train.
Lastly, though DOD is not required to report on the specific issues we
identify in this report or possible mitigation plans related to these
issues as part of the briefings they are required to provide to the
congressional defense committees, we believe that without such specific
information Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its
oversight responsibilities and stewardship over DOD.
Conclusions:
Although DOD began in May 2008 to coordinate its planning for the
reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq among its various relevant
commands and organizations, it has not adequately delineated roles and
responsibilities for the execution of the associated retrograde
process. Specifically, although CENTCOM has designated an executive
agent for the synchronization of retrograde operations in the theater,
no unified or coordinated chain of command exists to account for the
roles played by a variety of teams engaged in retrograde operations. In
addition, while the Army has designated ARCENT as its lead element for
retrograde of Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until
recently ARCENT had no command authority over the two Army units
responsible for the retrograde of the bulk of material and equipment in
Iraq. Instead, there are a variety of organizations, some in theater
and others in the United States, that exercise influence over the
retrograde process, either directly or through subordinate
organizations in the Iraqi theater of operations. The resulting lack of
a unified or coordinated command structure is not only inconsistent
with joint doctrine, but also increases confusion and causes
inefficiencies in the retrograde process and inhibits the adoption of
identified mitigation initiatives.
In addition, we identified several other issues that DOD will need to
consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S.
forces from Iraq to support future U.S objectives and strategy. While
DOD has begun to address these issues, none of them have been fully
addressed. Moreover, because Congress will have a role in funding and
overseeing the reposturing effort, it is important that the Congress be
informed of these issues since they will likely affect DOD's overall
reposturing costs and execution. While DOD is required to brief the
congressional defense committees on certain issues related to
reposturing, it is not required to provide the specific information
identified in our report. We believe that without such information,
Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its oversight
responsibilities and assess the extent to which DOD's plans are
effective, efficient, and well-coordinated.
Recommendations:
To ensure that DOD can efficiently and effectively retrograde its
materiel and equipment from Iraq, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments,
take steps to clarify the chain of command over logistical operations
in support of the retrograde effort. These steps should address not
only the Army field support brigades but also the theater property and
retrograde support teams. We also recommend that the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the military departments, correct the
incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain
visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
To enhance its ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities,
Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to include in its briefings
submitted in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, specific details on the status of its reposturing
planning and how it intends to mitigate specific reposturing issues,
including those we identified in this report, as well as other
challenges the department envisions as it proceeds with its reposturing
efforts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with our two recommendations. Specifically, the department partially
concurred with our first recommendation and fully concurred with our
second recommendation. DOD also commented that from the time we began
this review to the completion of our data collection, the operational
environment in theater has changed, processes have been modified, and
actions have been taken to mitigate the concerns identified in our
draft report. We recognize in our report that the operational
environment has changed over time and that DOD has recently modified
some processes and taken actions to enhance its planning for the
reposturing of forces from Iraq. However, as discussed below, we
continue to believe that DOD needs to take additional actions to
implement our recommendations and improve the efficiency of its
retrograde process.
In response to our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, take steps
to clarify the chain of command over logistical operations in support
of the retrograde effort, DOD stated that the current retrograde
command and control achieves unity of effort and is producing positive
results. DOD further commented that CENTCOM has designated the U.S.
Army Central Command (ARCENT) as the executive agent for the retrograde
process, and that ARCENT also has operational control of the two Army
Field Sustainment Brigades we discuss in the report. DOD believes that
the established liaison and supporting/supported relationships by
retrograde support teams are achieving unity of effort in retrograding
theater property through the regular Logistics Reposture Working Groups
where collaboration and coordination occur. DOD further commented that,
for a longer term solution, CENTCOM is taking steps to refine and
solidify a theater logistics command and control structure from its
current construct to a Joint Task Force Theater Logistics Command under
the CENTCOM Commander. DOD stated that its plan for this new command is
phased, conditions-based, and its execution will be coordinated within
the overall theater posture process with appropriate DOD agencies and
the military services. We support DOD's and CENTCOM's long-term plan to
refine and solidify its command and control structure for managing and
executing the retrograde process. In addition, we are aware that
subsequent to completing our audit work in Kuwait and drafting our
report, CENTCOM refined the logistical command and control structure by
placing the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades under the
operational control of the commanding general, Army Materiel Command,
Southwest Asia. Although we have not had the opportunity to evaluate
the effect of this new command arrangement, we believe it to be a
significant step toward the attainment of unity of command over the
theater provided equipment retrograde process. However, CENTCOM has not
implemented a similar action with regard to the command and control of
the ten theater property and retrograde support teams that facilitate
the redeployment and retrograde processes. According to ARCENT, this
lack of unity of command over these teams makes their roles and
responsibilities as they relate to the retrograde of equipment and
materiel unclear and confusing. As a result, we continue to believe
that DOD, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments,
needs to immediately address the current confusion and lack of clarity
regarding the command and control of the various commands and support
teams that support the retrograde operations in Iraq and Kuwait.
DOD fully concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary
of Defense, in consultation with the military departments, correct the
incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain
visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit. DOD
commented that it is actively assessing various data systems used to
maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while in transit.
DOD also provided a number of general and technical comments which we
have incorporated in the report as appropriate. A complete copy of
DOD's written comments, including the department's general and
technical comments and our evaluation of each of those comments, is
included in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also
make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected].
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who
made key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix VII.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
Subcommittee on Defense:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
Subcommittee on Defense:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
begun logistical planning for the reposturing of forces from Iraq and
upon what assumptions it based its plans, we reviewed relevant
briefings, orders, and staff analyses relating to the logistical
planning effort and discussed the effort with DOD officials who were
directly involved. We met with many of these individuals several times
over the course of this engagement either in person, telephonically, or
by video teleconference. As a result, we were able to obtain updated
information that allowed us to discuss the means by which the
logistical planning effort evolved over time. We also obtained copies
of the briefings presented during the May 2008 logistical summit held
at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, as well as a copy of the logistical
reposturing order that resulted from that summit, and met with many of
the senior DOD officials who participated in that summit. The documents
we obtained and officials we spoke with were from U.S. Transportation
Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Central Command; Multinational
Force-Iraq; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel Command,;
Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps;
U.S. Army Central at both Fort McPherson, Georgia, and Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central; U.S. Army Forces
Command; Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; Headquarters, III
Corps; and the 1st Theater Support Command.
To determine the extent to which DOD has established roles and
responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel
and equipment from Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed documents from and
interviewed officials in the organizations that were either directly
responsible for the retrograde process or that negotiated the process.
We also reviewed relevant DOD regulations and joint and Army doctrine
publications. To determine how the retrograde process was actually
executed we obtained documents and interviewed officials from
Multinational Force-Iraq; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel
Command, to include the commanding general, Army Material Command,
Southwest Asia; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Army Central at both Fort McPherson, Georgia,
and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central;
Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; the 1st Theater Support
Command; and the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades. To gain
insight on the experience of units that had passed through the
retrograde process we obtained documents and interviewed officials from
III Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, both at Fort Hood, Texas, and
the II Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
During the course of this engagement we became aware of several
challenges that could have an impact on the resposturing of U.S. forces
from Iraq and have included a discussion of these challenges in this
report in order to provide Congress with information it needs to
effectively carry out its oversight functions. We based our discussion
of those issues on documents we obtained and interviews with officials
from Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, Marine Corps;
U.S. Central Command; U.S. Transportation Command; U.S. Joint Forces
Command; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel Command; III Corps
and Fort Hood, Texas; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central;
Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; U.S. Army Central at both
Fort McPherson, Georgia, and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and 1st Theater
Support Command.
We have also provided in this report several challenges facing units
once they have returned to their home stations. As with the challenges
above, we became aware of these issues during the course of our
engagement. Although these issues need to be explored further, they are
included in this report because of the impact they could have on the
morale and welfare of service members and their families and the
potential costs and challenges associated with rebuilding unit
readiness. We became aware of these issues following discussions with
officials from U.S. Army Forces Command; Assistant Chief of Staff for
Installation Management; U.S. Army Medical Command; U.S. Army
Installation Management Command; the U.S. Army Surgeon General's
Office; III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas; the 1st Cavalry Division; and
Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force.
From the fall of 2007 through the spring of 2008, we also made several
attempts to visit Iraq to speak with officials from Multinational Force-
Iraq, Multinational Corps-Iraq, and various organizations involved with
the logistical aspects of reposturing. But for reasons that are not
entirely clear, DOD stated that it was unable to accommodate these
visits. However, we were able to mitigate our inability to visit Iraq
by:
* interviewing officials with knowledge of the logistical aspects of
reposturing who had recently returned from tours on the MNF-I or MNC-I
staffs;
* visiting Headquarters, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, after it
returned from its block leave following its return from Iraq, where III
Corps served as Headquarters, Multinational Corps-Iraq;
* interviewing officials from organizations stationed in Iraq who were
in Kuwait during our visit to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and:
* submitting lists of questions through U.S. Central Command for
organizations in Iraq.
Although we were not always able to obtain full answers to our list of
questions, based on our analysis of the information we were able to
obtain we determined that we had sufficient information to substantiate
our findings.
We conducted our audit from August 2007 through August 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2400 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2400:
International Security Affairs:
Mr. William A. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 3, 2008:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-08-930, "Operation Iraqi
Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DoD Planning for Reposturing of U.S.
Forces from Iraq," dated August 8, 2008 (GAO Code 351092).
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report and your
effort to enhance the retrograde process from Iraq. From the period
that GAO began its research until its data collection concluded, the
operational environment in theater has changed, processes have been
modified and set, and actions have been taken to mitigate the concerns
identified in the draft report. Below are the Department's comments on
the draft report's recommendations.
Recommendation 1: To ensure that DoD can efficiently and effectively
retrograde its materiel and equipment from Iraq, GAO recommends that
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) and the military departments, take steps to clarify the
chain of command over logistical operations in support of the
retrograde effort. These steps should address both the theater property
and retrograde support teams and the Army field support brigades.
DoD Response: Partially concur. The current retrograde command and
control achieves unity of effort and is producing positive results.
USCENTCOM has designated U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) as the executive
agent for retrograde process. ARCENT also has operational control
(OPCON) of the two Army Field Sustainment Brigades of concern in the
draft report. Established liaison and supporting/supported
relationships by retrograde support teams are achieving unity of effort
in retrograding theater property through regular Logistics Reposture
Working Groups where collaboration and coordination occur.
For a longer term solution, USCENTCOM is also taking steps to refine
and solidify a theater logistics command and control structure from its
current construct to a Joint Task Force Theater Logistics Command under
the CENTCOM Commander. The plan is phased, conditions-based, and its
execution will be coordinated within the overall theater posture
process with appropriate DoD agencies and the Services.
Recommendation 2: GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the military departments, correct the incompatibility
weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain visibility over
equipment and materiel while they are in transit.
DoD Response: Concur. DoD acknowledges the focus of this draft report
has been on Army systems. DoD is actively assessing various data
systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while
in transit. Attached are additional detailed comments and corrections.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher C. Straub:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East:
Attachments:
As stated.
Draft GAO Report �Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed To Enhance DOD
Planning For Reposturing Of U.S. Forces From Iraq,� Dated August 8,
2008:
GAO CODE 351092/GAO-08-930:
General Comments On The Draft Report:
* Current retrograde efforts. As of August 2008, during fiscal year
2008, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) has retrograded over 7,000 major end
items back to CONUS. U.S. Marine Central is also successfully
retrograding end items for reset. Defense Logistic Agency (DLA),
through Defense Reutilization and Market Services in theater, has
disposed of 175 million pounds of scrap metal. Through its
transportation priority program, U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) has saved the Army over 40% in shipping costs by using
empty cargo aircraft backhaul capability.
See comment 1.
* Chain of command for logistics operations in support of retrograde.
Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) has not been assigned from
USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM has designated ARCENT as the executive agent for
logistics reposture/retrograde. In the Iraqi theater, MultiNational
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) has established processes and procedures for
addressing theater logistics issues. These lines of operations include
basing, unit redeployment, and materiel disposition. Unity of effort is
accomplished by working groups that have been established to
collaborate and coordinate with joint stakeholders and partners.
(Services, USCENTCOM, DLA, USTRANSCOM). For example, both MNF-I and
MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) have established Logistics Reposture
Working Groups. They are enduring forums that meet regularly with all
the key logistics organizations in Iraq and Kuwait to address
respective strategic, operational, and theater level logistics issues.
Two of the key documents are the MNF-I FRAGO 08-232 and draft MNC-I
FRAGO that establish redeployment timelines.
See comment 2.
* Retrograde Support Teams are specifically addressed within these unit
redeployment timelines. Each of the assistance teams have specific
missions based on guidance and direction from parent commands and from
operational commands in theater. Each assistance team is synchronized
within the redeployment timeline and brings its own set of expertise to
facilitate in retrograde and reposture efforts.
See comment 3.
* Theater Property and Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) - The
majority of equipment is organizational and will retrograde as a unit
responsibility. Army Materiel Command�s (AMC) forward Field Support
Brigades are responsible for retrograde of excess theater provided
equipment and assuming control of organizational equipment directed for
sustainment-level reset.
See comment 4.
* In transit visibility of materiel - For Army systems, AMC, with its
subordinate commands and the various headquarters in theater, is
actively working to establish a Reposturing Common Operating Picture
(RCOP) to mitigate the cited incompatibility weaknesses in the various
data systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel
while in transit. While significant challenges in this process remain,
AMC has already identified system interfaces to be used. Moreover, a
RCOP Working Group will meet regularly to establish the necessary
systems interfaces and address procedures used for accountability,
transportation scheduling and documentation, and equipment in-transit
visibility. In addition to these efforts, USCENTCOM J4 has joined with
JFCOM J9 to identify distribution/in-transit visibility requirements,
processes and capability gaps to the Joint Staff J4 to support the
development of in-transit visibility capabilities for Joint Logistics
Organizations within Global Combat Support System � Joint (GCSS-J).
See comment 5.
1. Highlight Page, second paragraph. We recommend rewording of the
first four lines of this paragraph to more accurately portray what has
occurred since May 2008. As noted from page 15, the draft clearly
states representatives from throughout the logistics community and
theater met as a result of the increased coordination and synchronized
planning, and the outcome was the MNF-I publication of its overarching
guidance for the logistics reposturing.
See comment 6.
2. Pages 1, 7, 10, 11, 13, 19, 25, 26, 33. There are several references
to �bases� throughout the report, especially linked to the number 311.
This does not accurately characterize the force laydown in Iraq. The
word �bases� should be replaced by �locations� in most cases to reflect
the true nature of the places used by U.S. forces.
See comment 7.
3. Page 1. The draft report states, �as of July 2008, this pool of
theater provided equipment totaled approximately 582,000 individual
pieces worth about $15.5 billion.� Army G8 reports that, for Class VII
items in Iraq only, a property book pull from the end of March 2008,
used in a J8/OSD Study, found 173,000 items (Class VII only) worth
approximately $16.5 billion.
See comment 8.
4. Page 2. Recommend deletion of the sentence: �In addition, in June
2008, GAO also issued an assessment of progress in Iraq and called for
DOD and the DOS to develop an updated strategy given the changing
conditions.� This sentence is not relevant to the GAO�s objectives for
this engagement, and the referenced GAO report�s conclusions were
rebutted by DoD.
See comment 9.
5. Pages 1-3. Discussions regarding the National Defense Authorization
Act for 2008 appear as a distraction from the draft report and its
overall conclusions.
See comment 10.
6. Page 5. First paragraph, please add: �Army Headquarters G-4 began
hosting retrograde video teleconferences (VTCs) in June 2006 and moved
to monthly VTCs in August 2007. The purpose of the VTCs was to
synchronize retrograde planning efforts. DLA and AMC participated in
the VTCs. Starting in October 2007, Army Headquarters G-4 expanded the
Retrograde Task Force to include OSD, Joint Staff, Air Force, Marine
Corps, USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and USTRANSCOM, NG, and OCAR.
See comment 11.
7. Page 7. Concerning capacity of military transports and convoy
security assets and limits on the main supply route, we partially
concur. We concur with the draft GAO report that sufficient commercial
heavy equipment transports (HET) assets exists in theater to augment
military HET assets for redeployment operations. Additionally, other
transports such as flatbeds and lowboys, can move all but the heaviest
equipment, reducing the need for HET transports. However, we partially
concur with the statement regarding limits on convoy security assets.
While convoy security requirements stretch resources, approved
commercial security firms can be contracted to provide additional
security teams that can be used for sustainment missions, freeing up
military escort teams to support redeployment. Additionally the
military has an active program that eliminates the requirement to
provide security for low priority materials, thereby freeing up more
military escort teams. If necessary, military units can provide
security for their own assets as they redeploy. We concur with the GAO
statement regarding insufficiency of mass redeployments through Kuwait,
and DoD is actively engaged in increasing the availability and capacity
of redeployment of assets through alternative ports in Jordan and
Turkey, as well as Iraq�s own major port, Umm Qasr. Efforts are also
underway to make greater use of the Iraq railroad and Iraqi
Transportation Network, which will have the potential to move
significant amounts of cargo to points near redeployment ports.
See comment 12.
8. Page 7, 37-38. Concerning the increased demand for access to mental
healthcare providers, the draft GAO report states, �According to Army
officials and GAO analysis, there is already a shortfall in the number
of mental health providers given the rise in the number of mental
health problems being reported by service members and their families.�
We concur and note: MNF-I CJ1/4/8 Surgeon is following established
procedures to ensure all service members take Post Deployment Health
Assessments 30 days prior to redeploying. Service members are required
to take another Post Deployment Health Assessment 90-120 days after
returning to CONUS and home station. These surveys are essential to
monitor mental health throughout DoD. In addition, teams of mental
health professionals conduct surveys in theater to keep commanders
apprised on issues of mental health.
See comment 13.
9. Page 12. The report states that �Despite working on the same broad
set of issues, however, there was little coordination and communication
among the three organizations. Moreover, both USCENTCOM, the combatant
command whose area of responsibility includes Iraq and Kuwait, and MNF-
I, the headquarters responsible for operations in Iraq, provided little
input and guidance to these planning efforts.� Recommend delete above
statement and change statement to read: �The coordination was
maintained at an informal liaison level.� The Army Sustainment Command
(ASC) liaison officer at USCENTCOM J4 worked with ASC and USCENTCOM J4
to prepare the command for future reposture/retrograde efforts in July
and August 2007. This assisted in preparing AMC�s warning order.
See comment 14.
10. Page 15. Recommend adding the following: �The MNF-I Logistics
Reposture Working Group is an enduring forum with all the key logistics
organizations in the Iraq and Kuwait theater. It meets monthly and
addresses strategic, operational, and theater level logistics issues.
It assigns Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs) or Operational
Planning Teams to develop solutions to logistics related issues.�
See comment 15.
11. Page 15. The MNF-I FRAGO on Logistics Reposture Guidance not only
addresses Materiel Disposition and Unit Redeployment, but also
addresses basing. Recommend adding the following: �Basing options
include a base�s closure, a transfer to the Government of Iraq, or a
�shrink and share� of a base where both Iraqis and Coalition forces
collocate in a landlord-tenant relationship.�
See comment 16.
12. Page 17. Regarding unity of command, although the command and
control is not a text book joint doctrinal command and control system,
it is the theater process by which units have redeployed successfully
since the beginning of OIF. It requires constant management, interface,
and decision making across all levels of logistics. Deliberate/advance
planning, communication via liaison officers, and collaboration are all
essential to making the process function.
See comment 17.
13. Pages 6-7. We recommend deleting the footnote attached to the
standards for environmental management and guidance for the disposition
of property. Additionally, MNF-I has procedures in place regarding
environmental management and base closure/return.
See comment 18.
14. Page 6-7. In addition, MNF-I, working with MNC-I, has a base
closure/return plan in place that has been used successfully in the
past and is currently being refined as we engage more with the GoI on
closures/returns and property transfers (real property and personal
property). A Combined Basing Board is now in the planning phases and
will involve the Iraqi Government for decisions on base
closures/return/property transfers once a site has been nominated by
Coalition forces to close/return. MNF-I, in conjunction with MNC-I, is
working to limit the current environmental management requirement.
Although time and cost of environmental management will be difficult to
assess, progress is being made to reduce this. Examples include:
See comment 19.
- There are 17 operational incinerators in Iraq, with 23 under
construction or funded, which will reduce cost/time of burn pit
management.
- MNF-I anticipated a $54 million contract award date of September 1,
2008 for five Hazardous Waste Disposal Centers, which will also reduce
cost/time of environmental management.
15. Summary, 3rd paragraph. Delete �agreed upon standards for
environmental cleanup and�
See comment 20.
16. Page 7. 1st bullet. Delete �standards for environmental cleanup
and.�
See comment 21.
17. Page 7. Delete footnote 7.
See comment 22.
18. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence. Delete �environmental
clean up and.�
See comment 23.
19. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 2nd sentence. Delete �both issues are�
and insert �this issue is.�
See comment 24.
20. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete the fourth sentence.
See comment 25.
21. Page 27, 1st paragraph. Delete the last sentence (beginning with
�Moreover�).
See comment 26.
22. Comment on Environmental Remediation (Comments 13-21 above). The
draft report makes several assertions, both directly and by
implication, relating to environmental remediation that are not
accurate. The statements are also conclusory without supporting
information. It is the longstanding policy of the Department of Defense
that it does not engage in environmental remediation for the purpose of
returning an installation to the host nation. Likewise, it is the
longstanding policy of the Department of Defense that it does not
engage in environmental remediation after return of an installation,
other than in very limited circumstances where the remediation effort
began prior to the decision to return and is already underway. See,
e.g., DoD Instruction 4715.8, Environmental Remediation for DoD
Activities Overseas, and DoD Instruction 4165.69, Realignment of DoD
Sites Overseas.
It is relatively rare that a Status of Forces Agreement addresses the
issue of environmental remediation and, without exception, none provide
�standards� for such remediation. This is consistent with the
Department�s policy that such remediation will not be conducted by the
United States, other than pursuant to DoDI 4715.8. The issue of
environmental remediation at installations outside the United States
has been the subject of negotiations at numerous locations. To the
extent that the United States �pays� for such remediation after return,
it is through the mechanism of reducing the residual value payment to
reflect the cost of cleanup. Since the residual value payment reflects
the current value, it is perfectly consistent with standard real estate
assessment practice to consider the cost of any required environmental
remediation as a deduction from total value. In fact, the requirements
of DoDI 4165.69 to perform a baseline survey is designed to facilitate
an informed discussion of the residual value in relation to any
required environmental remediation.
The Department of Defense conducts environmental remediation at its
locations outside of the United States for the purpose of protecting
our personnel (and visitors) located on our installations. Such
remediation is not conducted to comply with, e.g., the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, which
has no extraterritorial application. Such remediation is only conducted
to address known imminent and substantial endangerments. What
constitutes a known imminent and substantial endangerment is wholly
dependent on the specific factual situation and is not amenable to the
setting of general �standards� as is the case in the United States.
Unless the United States has agreed to be bound by host nation law,
which has not happened in the area of environmental remediation, there
is no legal �standard� to be applied for purposes of environmental
remediation of installations being used by United States forces.
It should also be noted that it is not uncommon for United States
forces to be stationed on real property that is already contaminated by
prior users. Such contamination frequently is discovered only after
occupancy, particularly with regard to locations occupied during combat
operations where there is rarely time or resources to conduct an
environmental survey.
These comments should not be read as asserting that the Department
expects to simply abandon hazardous materials when departing a site in
a foreign location. It is also longstanding Departmental policy to
handle hazardous materials and waste in a manner that conforms to
practice in the United States, to the extent feasible given the
circumstances. For instance, a site should not have solid waste
(refuse) scattered around and, to the extent it does, the waste should
be cleaned up prior to departure. Hazardous materials should be
retrograded. Hazardous wastes should be disposed of by proper disposal
or treatment when generated. These are standard practices required by
existing policy and procedures.
The draft report�s assertions regarding establishing standards for
environmental remediation are based on flawed assumptions and a
misunderstanding of Department policy and practices worldwide.
23. Comment on Environmental Management. Change �environmental cleanup�
and �cleanup� wherever they appear to �environmental management� and
�management� as the case may be. The situations being addressed, e.g.,
reducing burn pit volume by use of incinerators, is a management
function, not cleanup function. Cleanup would be removal of
contamination such as a chemical plume under the surface. Proper
disposition of waste in a burn pit is actually an environmental
management function (�compliance� function). To avoid possible
misunderstanding, the term �cleanup� should only be used when referring
to remediation, not to disposing of waste.
See comment 28.
24. Page 11. Delete �FOB McKenzie�. It has been closed.
See comment 29.
25. Page 18. Regarding assistance teams, each of the assistance teams
have specific missions based on guidance and direction from parent
commands and from operational commands here in theater. Each assistance
team is synchronized within the redeployment timeline and brings its
own set of expertise to facilitate in retrograde and reposture efforts
at specific dates.
See comment 30.
26. Page 18-19. Regarding base closure, MNF-I is in the process of
establishing a Combined Basing Plan and Process. An Operational
Planning Team will conduct a mission analysis to close, transfer, or
share Coalition forces bases, and integrate and collaborate their
efforts with the Government of Iraq.
See comment 31.
27. Page 18, 19, 51. Change Redistribution Property Accountability
Teams to Retrograde Property Assistance Teams (RPAT).
See comment 32.
28. Page 18. Delete. �No single organization has authority over Theater
Property and Retrograde Support Teams.� Replace with: �AMC has
Authority over Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams.� The
402nd AFSB under the Army Sustainment Command/AMC is the C2 for all
RPATs in Iraq. They also control RFATs (Redistribution Fly-away
Assistance Teams), which remotely go where a permanent RPAT site is not
located.
See comment 33.
29. Page 20. Delete: �No Theater Logistical Organization has Command
Authority over Units Responsible for the Retrograde of Most Equipment
in Theater.� Replace with: �AMC has Command Authority over most units
responsible for the retrograde of equipment in Theater.� The 402nd AFSB
is responsible for retrograde in Iraq and the 401st AFSB is responsible
for retrograde in Kuwait. All of these units fall under AMC/ASC and the
AMC Forward Commanding General is also the ARCENT/CFLCC C4.
See comment 34.
30. Page 19. The report states �For example, the Joint Redeployment
Support Team, which reports to U.S. Transportation Command, has the
mission of supplying customs, disposition, hazardous material, and
transportation expertise to redeploying units and is to enable in-
transit visibility over a unit�s materiel and equipment from its FOB to
the unit�s home station or to an identified depot.� Comment: This
statement implies that the JRST is executing its mission in the Iraq
Theater of Operations. The concept of using JRSTs has not been executed
because the capability already exists in theater with the Deployment
Support Brigade. We recommend deleting this sentence.
See comment 35.
31. Pages 22-25. The section titled �Logistical Organizations Have Not
Enforced or Lack the Authority to Enforce Improvements to the
Retrograde Process (to include Appendix VI)� is not accurate. Recommend
the entire section and Appendix be deleted from the GAO report. The
correct automation flow is attached.
See comment 36.
* All items retrograded from Iraq have Radio Frequency Identification
Device (RFID) tags attached; RFID tags provide in-transit visibility
via an in transit visibility (ITV) system. The accountable record and
visibility system used for this process is Standard Depot System (SDS),
which is a standard wholesale system used by the Army. USCENTCOM�s RFID
database can view the exact location of any item with an attached RFID
tag at any time.
* The description of the process in this section of the GAO report is
incorrect. Below is the correct process for accountability and
visibility from the war fighter to AMC:
- Unit creates Army Reset Management Tool (ARMT) plan in Logistics
Information Warehouse (LIW) nominating equipment for RESET.
- Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) sends ARMT data electronically to
life cycle management command (LCMC) for decision and disposition
(DISPO).
- If equipment meets RESET criteria, LCMC enters what depot to ship to.
- Equipment is electronically transferred from PBUSE (Property Book
Unit Supply Enhanced) to AWRDS (Army War Reserve Deployment System) via
interface.
- AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for SDS electronically via interface.
- Site generates Excel spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain
Inter-Depot Transfer (IDT) from Iraq to Kuwait.
- Upon receipt of IDT, it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID
Tag.
* SDS is a standard accountability system as is Standard Army Retail
Supply System (SARSS), and neither system tracks by serial number
except for weapons and sensitive items. The Army War Reserve Deployment
System (AWRDS) is used to track the serial number in tandem with SDS.
AWRDS has automated interfaces with SDS, the wholesale system, and
PBUSE (Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced) the retail system.
* AWRDS creates the document needed to provide the LCMC with a list of
items that require disposition. SARSS can produce an automated request
for disposition, but it still requires manual intervention by the LCMC
item managers to provide disposition. The reason this is manual is the
LCMC must determine where to send items for repair-based on available
work load. This process takes 72 stateside work hours to complete.
* There is no loss of visibility of items being shipped out of Kuwait
because the Global Transportation Network (GTN) has visibility of the
RFID tags that are installed on all equipment. The IDT creates an
automated Pre-Positioned Materiel Receipt Document (PMRD) on the
gaining depot�s SDS.
* Although the 401st AFSB obtains the shipping manifest, it is not
required because all of the information on the items is available
through GTN.
* The OPORD addressed in this section was published and released on 18
Apr 08 without proper coordination. Upon receipt of the OPORD, the
401st AFSB, 402nd AFSB, and LOGSA Commanders raised numerous concerns
with using SARSS. During a teleconference between ASC and the
commanders, the decision was made to put the OPORD on hold until a
decision by the ASC commanding general (CG) could be made. The ASC CG
tasked ASC Field Support to work jointly with LOGSA, AMC, LCMC�s, 401st
AFSB, and 402nd AFSB to review the proposed processes and resolve the
concerns. On 23 Jul 08 a decision was made by the ASC CG to continue to
use SDS and AWRDS, and a FRAGO was published to the OPORD.
32. Page 23, 4th paragraph. We recommend rewording of this paragraph
for clarity. In addition, that fact that the manifest does not reach
the 401st until 24-48 hours after sail really is not an issue since the
motor vessel will take at least three weeks to reach CONUS, leaving
time for the CONUS teams to prepare to receive the materiel.
See comment 37.
33. Pages 25-6, final paragraph, 1st sentence. Insert a period after
�costly� and strike the rest of the sentence.
See comment 38.
34. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence. Insert a period after
�estimate� and strike the rest of the sentence.
See comment 39.
35. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete the second sentence.
See comment 40.
36. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete �absent an agreement with Iraq
on the disposition of personal property� and substitute therefore
�absent a legal basis for turnover and agreement by Iraq to take
possession.�
See comment 41.
37. Page 26, final paragraph. Delete the first sentence.
See comment 42.
38. Page 26, final paragraph, 2nd sentence. Delete �For example.�
See comment 43.
39. Comments on SOFA (Comments 33-38 above). The draft report makes
several assertions, both directly and by implication, relating to what
is typically addressed in status of forces agreements (SOFA), and
regarding what will or should be contained in a bilateral agreement
with Iraq. The statements are inaccurate and misleading. SOFAs are the
product of bilateral negotiations. Therefore, no two are the same, nor
do any two contain the same provisions. In particular, �base closures�
are not typically addressed in a SOFA (or related access agreement). A
�typical� SOFA (or access agreement) might address the following: 1)
DoD access to government-owned property, 2) DoD authorization to make
improvements to such property, 3) DoD�s obligation to return the
property, once no longer needed,; and, 4) consultation with the host
nation at the time such property is returned regarding compensation for
the residual value of any DoD-funded improvements to the property. It
is relatively rare that a SOFA (or access agreement) will address in
any detail the issue of �base closure� or estimates of costs of such
closures or property returns. It also is noteworthy that SOFAs (and
access agreements) are typically negotiated during peace time, and
before DoD has any sizable presence and/or has been granted use of
government property in the host nation. Bilateral agreements with Iraq
are currently under negotiation. It would be inappropriate to speculate
what might or should be in those agreements in this report. Finally,
there is no legal requirement for �an agreement with Iraq on the
disposition of personal property.�
See comment 44.
See comment 45.
40. Page 27. Regarding, �Joint doctrine states that detailed planning
should be done for contracting support and contractor integration to
ensure that contractor support is fully integrated and on par with
forces planning. Such planning should identify sources of supplies and
services from civilian sources and integrate them with operational
requirements,� we partially concur with this statement. Joint doctrine
regarding contract support and contractor integration is insufficient.
The Joint Staff J4 is presently addressing this issue by developing
Joint Publication 4-10 (Joint Operational Contract Support), which
combatant commands, to include USCENTCOM, reviewed and commented on.
This joint publication, when released, will present new doctrinal
concepts that provide much improved guidance for integrating contract
support and management of contractors into military plans. DoD
contracting personnel generally are not planners, and DoD lacks
sufficient operational contract support planners to ensure contract
support and contractor integration is effectively represented in plans.
In December 2007, OSD began to address this issue by providing joint
operational contract support planners (JOCSPs) to each of the combatant
commands, including USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM has two JOCSPs that are
reviewing concept plans (CONPLANS) and preparing Annex W�s (Contract
Support Integration Plan). In fact, USCENTCOM JOCSPs have been tasked
by the Joint Staff J4 to develop an Annex W planning template for all
of DoD�s combatant commands. This template will eventually be
incorporated into JOPES and future editions of the JP 4-10 by the Joint
Staff. Recommend changing statement to read as: �Previous joint
doctrine did not effectively provide guidance regarding contract
support and contractor integration. However, DoD is addressing this
with Joint Publication 4-10 (Joint Operational Contract Support). DoD
contracting personnel are generally not experienced planners and
combatant commands did not effectively integrate contract support and
contractor integration into military plans. However, OSD recently
addressed this issue by providing combatant commands with Joint
Operational Contract Support Planners (JOCSPs). JOCSPs are developing
contractor support integration plans and contractor management plans,
and integrating them into the combatant commands plans.�
41. Page 28-33. Regarding guidance and plans for reposture of
contractors from Iraq, the draft GAO report states �As of July 2008,
reposture planning did not include a theater-wide plan for the
reposture of approximately 149,400 contractors in Iraq, more than half
of whom (58%) were U.S. citizens or third country nationals. Reposture
planning for LOGCAP is significant, given that it is the largest
logistical support contract in Iraq. However, challenges remain in the
planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP contractor personnel.� We
partially concur and provide the following:
* The LOGCAP contractor (KBR) has base closing Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP) that will follow MNF-I and MNC-I base closure planning
and includes plans for contractor personnel. KBR�s SOP has been
developed from previous base closings and updated with lessons learned.
* For planning integration, LOGCAP forward Liaison office (LNO)
maintains a military officer at the Colonel level who focuses on MNF-I
reposture planning groups; there is also a LNO in MNC-I C4 who
facilitates theater reposture planning.
* For accountability, the LOGCAP contractor force protection issue is
calculated throughout the reposture process as troop strengths are
phased from the base.
See comment 46.
42. Concerning accountability and disposition of contractor managed
government owned property, GAO states �According to DOD officials, the
largest portion of all CMGO property in Iraq, $3.37 billion (96%) falls
under LOGCAP. The Army�s analysis indicates that approximately 85% of
all CMGO property in Iraq will be transferred, sold, or scrapped in
Iraq when U.S. forces reposture, while the remaining 15% can be sold or
reused elsewhere. Three challenges remain: the need to determine FMV of
CMGO and resolving any security restrictions, the time consuming &
labor intensive task of accounting for and determining disposition of
CMGO - transfer from contractor to military records, joint inventories,
and DLA may not have sufficient data to adequately plan capacity at
theater DRMOs).� We concur and provide the following: MNF-I FRAGO 08-
232 published in May 08 includes CMGO property in its materiel
disposition process, a CMGO FRAGO and MNC-I C4 FRAGO provides
amplifying guidance on CMGO property, and while accountability of
property is an on-going issue, progress is being made in improving the
process and identifying excess materiel and equipment for reposture.
DLA is also conducting on-site surveys of its four DRMO sites in Iraq,
and it is included in the deliberate planning with reference to base
closure and transfer.
See comment 47.
43. Page 29. Recommend adding the following sentences in quotes as an
update to donation threshold authority. Several DoD organizations have
already begun planning for the disposition of excess contractor-managed
property from Iraq. For example, in October 2007, DoD increased the
donation threshold for all excess U.S. owned personal property in Iraq
from $5,000 to $10,000 and delegated this donation authority to MNF-I.
Add the following: �In June 2008, DoD (DUSD, Logistics and Materiel
Readiness) increased the authority to transfer (formerly known as
donation authority) for all U.S.-owned excess personal property in Iraq
from $10,000 to $15,000. This DoD memo is a tiered authority which
provides commanders greater flexibility and more decision-making
capability at their respective levels.�
See comment 48.
44. Page 30, Figure 2. Recommend that the arrow labeled �sale� and
pointed to �DRMS� be deleted. If an item is slated for sale or
prepositioned stock, the sale will not cause the item to go the DRMS.
See comment 49.
45. Page 30, Figure 2. If an �over $5000� item is not needed by
military or contractors globally, there is an arrow showing it going to
DRMS. However, the policy provides that before such an item would go to
DRMS, an attempt will be made to donate the item to the Government of
Iraq. This step needs to be included and shown in Figure 2.
See comment 50.
Figure:
This figure illustrates a DOD proposed change to figure 2.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
46. Page 30, Figure 2. Recommend that the box labeled �MNC-I determines
others� needs in theater� should be rewritten to state �MNF-I/MNC-I
team determines others� needs in theater.�
See comment 51.
47. Page 31. The report states that �DoD officials assert that
completing this inventory will require planning, travel to storage
locations, and physically staging the property for easier counting,
which is time consuming.� However, the policy assumes that the
inventory will take place where the property is and that property will
not be moved and stored solely to enable inventory and counting
actions. The policy does not envision movement and storage for counting
and, in fact, specifies a streamlined process (i.e. early donations of
low value items) to aid in minimizing time requirements. We partially
concur that, in general, the task will be time consuming and labor
intensive even without the additional movement and storage being
asserted. While a move for counting may on occasion be necessary,
depending on the number of days allowed to clear a base, it is expected
to be the exception and not the rule.
See comment 52.
48. Page 53, paragraph 1. Entire statement is inaccurate: Please see
attached slides. Below is the process for accountability and visibility
from the War Fighter to AMC:
1. Unit creates ARMT (Army Reset Management Tool) plan in Logistics
Information Warehouse (LIW) nominating equipment for RESET.
2. Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) sends ARMT data electronically to
the Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) for decision and disposition.
3. If Equipment meets RESET criteria LCMC enters what depot to ship to.
4. Equipment is transferred from PBUSE (Property Book Unit Supply
Enhanced) electronically to AWRDS (Army War Reserve Deployment System)
via interface.
5. AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for Standard Depot System (SDS)
electronically via interface.
6. Site generates Excel Spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain IDT
Inter Depot Transfer) from Iraq to Kuwait.
7. Upon receipt of IDT it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID
Tag.
SDS is a standard accountability system, as is SARSS, and neither
system tracks by serial number except for weapons and sensitive items.
AWRDS is used to track the serial number in tandem with SDS. AWRDS has
automated interfaces with SDS, the wholesale system, and PBUSE
(Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced), the retail system.
See comment 53.
49. Page 54, paragraph 1. The AWRDS creates the document needed to
provide the LCMC with a list of items that require disposition. SARSS
can produce an automated request for disposition, but it still requires
manual intervention by the LCMC item managers to provide disposition.
The reason this is manual is the LCMC must determine where to send
items for repair based on available work load. This process takes 72
stateside work hours to complete.
See comment 54.
50. Page 54, paragraph 2. Visibility over the items being shipped out
of Kuwait is never lost, as the Global Transportation Network has
visibility of the RFID tags that are installed on all equipment. The
IDT (Inter-Depot-Transfer) creates an automated PMRD (Pre-Positioned
Materiel Receipt Document) on the gaining depots SDS.
See comment 55.
51. Page 54, paragraph 3. Although the 401st AFSB obtains the shipping
manifest, this is not required, as all of the information on the items
is available through GTN.
See comment 56.
52. As a general comment, the Department has an exiting data sharing
strategy (DoD Directive 8320.02, December 2, 2004) that provides policy
responsibility to implement data sharing throughout the Department of
Defense. Communities of interest, which have cross cutting data sharing
interests, should be established when there is a need and should be
used to implement viable solutions for data sharing strategies and
solutions for their functional areas.
See comment 57.
Figure: Retrograde Process Flow Using SDS/AWRDS:
This figure is a DOD flowchart showing retrograde process flow using
SDS/AWRDS.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Retrograde Process Flow as Designed(Continued):
1. Unit creates ARMT plan in LIW nominating equipment for RESET.
2. LOGSA sends ARMT data electronically to LCMC for decision and DISPO.
3. If Equipment meets RESET criteria LCMC enters what depot to ship to.
4. Equipment is transferred from PBUSE electronically to AWRDS via
interface.
5. AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for SDS electronically via
interface.
6. Site generates Excel Spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtainIDT
Inter Depot Transfer) from Iraq to Kuwait.7.Upon receipt of IDT it is
processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID Tag.
GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments:
Comment 1: We recognize DOD's retrograde efforts as of August 2008. No
change required.
Comment 2: We are aware that subsequent to completing our audit work in
Kuwait and drafting our report, CENTCOM refined the logistical command
and control structure in June 2008 by placing the 401st and 402nd Army
Field Support Brigades under the operational control of the commanding
general, Army Materiel Command, Southwest Asia. Although we have not
had the opportunity to evaluate the effect of this new command
arrangement, we believe it to be a significant step toward the
attainment of unity of command over the theater provided equipment
retrograde process. However, CENTCOM has not implemented a similar
action with regard to the command and control of the eight of the ten
theater property and retrograde support teams that facilitate the
redeployment and retrograde processes. According to ARCENT, this lack
of unity of command over these teams makes their roles and
responsibilities as they relate to the retrograde of equipment and
materiel unclear and confusing. As a result, we continue to believe
that DOD, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments,
needs to immediately address the current confusion and lack of clarity
regarding the command and control of the various commands and teams
that support the retrograde operations in Iraq and Kuwait.
Comment 3: As we discussed in this report, five of the ten theater
property and retrograde support teams assist units during the
redeployment and retrograde process and in our report we briefly
outline some of the actions for which they provide assistance in
accordance with MNF-I's 180-day redeployment template (see table 1 of
this report and the accompanying narrative). In addition, we provide
more detail on each of the team's missions and higher headquarters in
appendix IV of this report. No change required.
Comment 4: DOD commented that "The majority of equipment is
organizational and will retrograde as a unit responsibility." However,
according to DOD officials we interviewed during this engagement, and
who have direct oversight over the property books, the majority of
equipment in Iraq, some 80 percent, is theater provided equipment. No
change required.
Comment 5: We recognize DOD is making efforts to improve In-transit
visibility of materiel. No change required.
Comment 6: See comment 2. No change required.
Comment 7: Except where required for purposes of clarity and accuracy
we have substituted the word "installation" or "installations" for
"base" or "location."
Comment 8: Based upon subsequent analysis and communication with
subject matter experts, we updated the information in this paragraph to
reflect new data.
Comment 9: Although DOD disagreed with GAO's recommendation in the
report in question, the intent of this reference is to provide for the
reader a broader context in which the present report should be
considered.
Comment 10: The purpose of the discussion regarding the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 is to provide background
information about DOD's reporting requirements and to demonstrate that,
given the challenges to reposturing outlined in this report, Congress
might elect to modify those reporting requirements.
Comment 11: During the course of this engagement we met with
representatives from a variety of organizations in order to determine
the extent to which DOD has begun its logistical planning for the
reposturing of forces from Iraq (see appendix I, scope and
methodology). Although it is possible that some preliminary discussions
regarding reposturing, redeployment, or retrograde operations may have
occurred prior to the time outlined in this report, based on our
meetings with DOD officials, the documents they provided us, and our
analysis we determined that planning for the reposturing of post-surge
forces from Iraq began in the fall of 2007 and that those planning
efforts were not coordinated until May 2008. No change required.
Comment 12: According to Army officials responsible for planning and
executing convoy operations in Iraq and Kuwait, the number of HETs,
convoy security assets, and crews to operate these assets were factors
that limit the number of convoys that can be run given standard
operating procedures current as of June 2008. The existence of
potential mitigation strategies-such as using private security
contractors, eliminating the requirement to provide security for low
priority materials, and military units providing their own security-
does not change the fact that the factors we outlined in this report
remain limiting factors. No change required.
Comment 13: We recognize DOD's interests to increase mental health
surveillance for returning service members. No change required.
Comment 14: We met with representatives from a variety of organizations
several times over the course of this engagement either in person,
telephonically, or by video teleconference (see appendix I, scope and
methodology). As a result, we were able to obtain updated information
that allowed us to discuss the means by which the logistical planning
effort evolved over time. Based on these interviews and the information
and documents we obtained during these meetings, our analysis indicates
that despite working on the same broad set of issues, until late 2007
there was little coordination among Army Materiel Command, the Defense
Logistics Agency, and Headquarters, Department of the Army. Moreover,
according to CENTCOM officials, with whom we met in February 2008,
they, too, were waiting on input from MNF-I, and, according to
officials representing MNF-I, all discussion of reposturing was "close
hold" in that headquarters until after the MNF-I commander's
congressional testimony in April 2008.
Comment 15: To provide more details and context to the discussion, we
changed the text to incorporate DOD's additional information.
Comment 16: See comment 15.
Comment 17: We agree that the logistical command and control
arrangement is not a text book joint doctrinal command and control
system. However, based on our analysis of joint doctrine and
information obtained from officials in the organizations that were
either directly responsible for the retrograde process or that
negotiated the process, we determined that the resulting lack of a
unified or coordinated command structure is not only inconsistent with
joint doctrine, it also increases confusion and causes inefficiencies
in the retrograde process and inhibits the adoption of identified
mitigation initiatives. No change required.
Comment 18: For purposes of clarity, we deleted the footnote. As
discussed in this report, CENTCOM has procedures in place regarding
environmental management and property disposition during base closure/
return. Furthermore, as we explain in this report, according to DOD
officials responsible for executing environmental management and base
closure/return in Iraq, these officials had not, as of May 2008,
received guidance detailed enough to predict the time and cost
requirements of executing the environmental management and property
disposition tasks that may be associated with base closure/return. See
also comment 27.
Comment 19: See comment 18.
Comment 20: We believe that DOD comments 20 and 21 are duplicate
comments, no change required; see comment 21.
Comment 21: We changed "standards" to "guidance." See comment 27.
Comment 22: As DOD suggested, we deleted the footnote. See comment 18.
Comment 23: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
statements made by ARCENT officials responsible for planning the
potential environmental management of installations in Iraq that may be
closed as a result of reposturing. No change required.
Comment 24: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
statements made by ARCENT officials responsible for planning for both
the potential disposition of personal property located on installations
in Iraq and the potential environmental management of these
installations. No change required.
Comment 25: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the
potential disposition of personal property located on installations in
Iraq.
Comment 26: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the
potential environmental management of installations in Iraq. No change
required.
Comment 27: We disagree with DOD's comments that we made incorrect
assertions about environmental remediation, that we made flawed
assumptions regarding remediation, or that we have a misunderstanding
of the department's policies and practices. GAO is not making specific
assertions regarding these issues. Rather, we are reporting that, as of
May 2008, Army officials responsible for planning for logistical
reposturing operations were considering these issues and that these
considerations affected their planning. The information in this section
accurately reflects May 2008 statements made by the Army officials
responsible for both planning and executing environmental remediation
operations in Iraq.
Moreover, according to CENTCOM guidance all hazardous material and
waste is to be removed or remediated from installations in Iraq used by
U.S. forces. In May 2008, ARCENT officials responsible for planning the
potential environmental management of installations in Iraq stated that
they had not received sufficiently specific guidance from their higher
headquarters with regard to environmental remediation on installations
in Iraq that may be closed as a result of reposturing. While they
expected such guidance to be part of a future bilateral agreement
between the U.S. and Iraq, the only guidance they could use for current
planning purposes was the set of standards used in the U.S. for similar
types of remediation practices. These officials explained that, in the
absence of such guidance guidance, it is common practice to use such
U.S. standards when planning and executing environmental remediation of
foreign installations used by U.S. forces. This explanation is
confirmed by DOD's comment that "It is also longstanding Departmental
policy to handle hazardous materials and waste in a manner that
conforms to practice in the United States, to the extent feasible given
the circumstances." These Army officials also explained that until they
received such guidance on environmental remediation, they may have
difficulty estimating the time and cost of cleaning these
installations. In another comment on this report, DOD concurs, stating
that the "time and cost of environmental management [of installations
in Iraq] will be difficult to assess."
In regard to language used in the report, we have changed some terms
for the purposes of clarity. We have changed "standards" to "guidance"
and "status of forces agreements" to "bilateral agreements," where
appropriate.
Comment 28: We changed "environmental cleanup" and "cleanup" to
"management," where appropriate. See comment 27.
Comment 29: We updated figure 1 accordingly.
Comment 30: See comment 3.
Comment 31: See comment 18.
Comment 32: According to Annex D of MNF-I FRAGO 08-232, summary
attached as Appendix IV of this report, RPAT(s) stands for
Redistribution Property Assistance Team(s). No change required.
Comment 33: DOD maintains that Army Materiel Command has authority over
theater property and retrograde support teams and lists one such team
for which this is the case. We agree that AMC exercises command
authority over two of these teams. However, according to documents
obtained from ARCENT and MNF-I, there are ten such teams and command
authority over these teams is distributed among various organizations
(see appendix IV of this report). No change required.
Comment 34: See comment 2.
Comment 35: DOD contends that our statement about the Joint
Redeployment Support Team implies that the team is executing its
mission in the Iraqi theater of operations and that the concept of
using this team has not been executed because the capability already
exists in theater with the Deployment Support Brigade. However, in a
briefing given during the May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait, ARCENT listed the Joint Redeployment Support Team as a team
available to assist units and commanders with redeployment and
retrograde of materiel and equipment, despite the fact that at the time
of the briefing the team had not yet been sourced with personnel. In
addition, in its Logistics Reposture Guidance (MNF-I FRAGO 08-232) MNF-
I makes specific mention of the use of this team as it relates to
redeployment and retrograde operations and delineates the specific
mission for which this team is responsible (see appendix IV). In
neither case is there any mention of the Deployment Support Brigade
undertaking the mission outlined for the Joint Redeployment Support
Team. No change required.
Comment 36: GAO has recently reported that DOD's Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) system is an emerging technology and continues to
experience many implementation challenges. While not the focus of this
report, DOD continues to experience issues with rates of error in the
reading of RFID tags even while mandating the increased use of the
tags. However, at this time, GAO does not believe that RFID is a
reliable means for ensuring visibility over in-transit equipment and
materiel.
We also recognize DOD's efforts to improve the in-transit visibility of
supplies. Yet, the description of the retrograde process for theater
provided equipment contained in this report is based on GAO's site
visit to Kuwait in May 2008. The description was validated by the
responsible subject matter experts at the 401st Army Field Support
Brigade as accurately depicting the systems used to manage the
equipment as well as the difficulties encountered during shipment. In
addition, official emails and tracking documents indicated that
significant amounts of equipment were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting
disposition instructions. Moreover, in DOD's official comments to this
report, they concur with our recommendation to correct the
incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain
visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit. DOD's
general comments indicate that the process has changed and they
provided us with a map of their proposed process as well as the July
23, 2008, order directing the use of Standard Depot System and Army War
Reserve Deployment System to resolve issues with maintaining
accountability and visibility and reducing the time for disposition
instructions. However, this order will not be implemented until 8
September, 2008 and we have not yet been able to evaluate the
effectiveness of the new process. No changes required.
Comment 37: See comment 36.
Comment 38: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
statements made by Army officials responsible for both planning and
executing installation hand-over operations. No change required.
Comment 39: According to CENTCOM policy, all bunkers, trenches,
fighting positions, and force protection barriers are considered to be
personal property and will be removed from installations. Additionally,
in May 2008, DOD officials responsible for planning for the potential
disposition of such property located on installations in Iraq stated
that while they expected more specific guidance on the disposition of
personal property to be part of a future bilateral agreement between
the U.S. and Iraq, the only guidance they could use for current
planning purposes was CENTCOM's policy. These DOD officials also
explained that until they received more specific guidance on the
disposition of such personal property, they may have difficulty
estimating the time and cost of disposition. See also comment 27. No
change required.
Comment 40: See comment 27.
Comment 41: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the
disposition of personal property from installations. No change
required.
Comment 42: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for both the
potential disposition of personal property located on installations in
Iraq and the potential environmental remediation on these
installations. No change required.
Comment 43: See comment 42.
Comment 44: See comment 24. In addition, with regard to the discussion
of bilateral agreements, our report accurately reflects May 2008
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for both the
potential disposition of personal property located on installations in
Iraq and the potential environmental remediation on these
installations. Moreover, GAO is not speculating on the potential
existence or contents of any bilateral agreement(s) between the U.S.
and Iraq, or any potential legal requirement for such an agreement.
Rather, we are reporting that, as of May 2008, Army officials
responsible for planning for logistical reposturing operations were
considering that such an agreement(s) may exist in the future and that
these considerations affected their planning. No change required.
Comment 45: We concur with DOD's assessment that CENTCOM did not
effectively integrate contract support and contractor integration into
its planning efforts for the logistics of reposturing. We also
acknowledge that developing Joint Publication 4-10 and providing
combatant commands with Joint Operational Contract Support Planners
(JOCSPs) indicate potential progress in addressing the current
challenges that CENTCOM faces in regard to effectively integrating
contract support and contractor integration into its planning efforts.
However, GAO has investigated neither the potential implementation of 4-
10 nor the activities of CENTCOM's JOCSPs and thus cannot assess
whether progress has been made in this area, or adopt the text
suggested by CENTCOM. It is important to note that the paragraph DOD
cites in this comment has changed due to subsequent communication
between GAO and DOD subject matter experts. However, there is no change
required in response to DOD's comment.
Comment 46: It is important to note that the paragraph DOD quotes in
its comment has changed due to subsequent communication between GAO and
DOD subject matter experts. However, we have three responses to this
DOD comment. First, KBR is the LOGCAP contractor. Thus, while a KBR
base-closure SOP may be useful in LOGCAP reposturing planning, its
existence does not address the lack of theater-wide reposturing
planning. The later is CENTCOM's responsibility, not KBR's. Second, the
LOGCAP program has had these two positions involved in reposturing
planning since the Spring of 2008. While this coordination is
facilitating LOGCAP reposturing planning, the challenges explained in
our report existed despite this coordination. Third, our report did not
address the specific issue of contractor force protection and so we
cannot assess the significance of such a calculation. There is no
change required in response to DOD's comment.
Comment 47: We acknowledge DOD's concurrence. No change required.
Comment 48: Based upon additional information provided by DOD, we added
the first sentence. However, we were not able to assess whether the
memo is a "tiered authority which provides commanders greater
flexibility and more decision making capability at their respective
levels." We therefore did not add the second sentence.
Comment 49: For clarity purposes, we changed figure 2.
Comment 50: See comment 49.
Comment 51: See comment 49.
Comment 52: In this sentence, "travel" refers to officials traveling to
sites in order to complete inventories, not to the travel of property.
No change required.
Comment 53: See comment 36. No change required.
Comment 54: See comment 36. No change required.
Comment 55: See comment 36. No change required.
Comment 56: See comment 36. No change required.
Comment 57: We recognize DOD's existing data sharing strategy provides
policy responsibility to implement data sharing through the department.
No change required.
[End of section]
Appendix III Department of Defense Classes of Supply:
Class of Supply: Class I;
Name: Subsistence;
Explanation: Class I is subsistence materiel ranging from military-
specification rations to commercial food items.
Class of Supply: Class II;
Name: Clothing, Individual Equipment, and Tools;
Explanation: Class II is composed of organizational clothing and
individual equipment, such as tentage and individual weapons;
consumable items such as tools and administrative and housekeeping
supplies; and industrial supplies such as cable, rope, screws, and
bolts.
Class of Supply: Class III;
Name: Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL);
Explanation: Class III Includes bulk and packaged POL; hydraulic and
insulating oils, preservatives, bulk chemical products, coolants,
deicing and antifreeze compounds, and components and additives of such
products; and liquid and compressed gases, natural gas, coal, and
electricity. Bulk fuel, the major Class III commodity, is propulsion
fuel for aircraft, ships, and vehicles.
Class of Supply: Class IV;
Name: Construction Materiel;
Explanation: Class IV includes all construction raw materials and
fortification and barrier items such as lumber, wire, and sandbags.
Class of Supply: Class V;
Name: Ammunition;
Explanation: Class V materiel consists of munitions of all types;
bullets and projectiles, bombs, explosives, land mines, fuses,
detonators, pyrotechnics, propellants, and their associated items.
Class of Supply: Class VI;
Name: Personal Demand Items;
Explanation: Class VI materiel includes various nonmilitary health,
comfort, and recreational items procured and managed by the Service
exchanges, as well as Service morale, welfare, and recreation
organizations.
Class of Supply: Class VII;
Name: Major End Items;
Explanation: Class VII is composed of major war fighting equipment that
constitutes the combat forces. Class VII includes ships, aircraft,
missiles, tanks, launchers, and vehicles that are normally procured by
the individual Service acquisition commands as part of major
acquisition programs.
Class of Supply: Class VIII;
Name: Medical Materiel;
Explanation: Class VIII consists of pharmaceutical, medical and
surgical supplies and materiel, and medical equipment, including
medical-specific repair parts, medical gases, blood, and blood
products.
Class of Supply: Class IX;
Name: Repair Parts;
Explanation: Class IX includes all repair parts, except medical
equipment parts.
Class of Supply: Class X;
Name: Materiel for Nonmilitary Programs;
Explanation: Class X items support nonmilitary programs such as
economic and agricultural development, civic action, and various relief
and education programs. Class X also includes any items that are not
included under other classes.
Source: Joint Publication 4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams:
Team: Materiel Redistribution Team (MRT);
Mission: Conducts identification, documentation, and coordinates
disposition and movement of excess class II, III(P), IV, VIII, and IX;
Higher HQ and C2: Direct Support to 316th Expeditionary Support
Command; under tactical control of ARCENT through Task Force 586*.
Team: Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT);
Mission: Facilitates the expedient turn-in of all excess Class VII
Theater Provided Equipment (TPE), improves property accountability, and
enables asset visibility of the received equipment;
Higher HQ and C2: Direct Support to 402nd Army Field Support Brigade;
under tactical control of ARCENT through Task Force 586*.
Team: Defense Remediation Team (DRT);
Mission: Assists units in sorting and creating documentation for
property during shipment and turn-in to a Defense Reutilization
Marketing Office;
Higher HQ and C2: Defense Logistics Agency through the Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Services Officer-in-Charge - Iraq.
Team: Deployment and Distribution Support Team (DDST);
Mission: Provides units in Iraq with Unit Movement Officer refresher
course. Assists in building movement plans for organizational and RESET
equipment, hazardous material documentation, blocking and bracing, and
container safety inspections;
Higher HQ and C2: Surface Deployment and Distribution Command through
the 840th Deployment Distribution Support Battalion.
Team: Joint Redeployment Support Team (JRST);
Mission: Facilitates the return of forces in order to reset combat
capability for future operations. Combines and synchronizes the efforts
of the other support teams to prepare accurate Joint Planning and
Execution System data;
Higher HQ and C2: U.S. Transportation Command.
Team: Inventory Property Assistance Team (IPAT);
Mission: Tracks shortages and excess. Manages and maintains "virtual
warehouses." Provides redistribution instructions and tracks
redistribution; tracks operational needs statement, joint urgent
operational needs statements and solutions for them;
Higher HQ and C2: Multi-National Corps-Iraq.
Team: Organizational Property Assistance Team (OPAT);
Mission: Coordinates for redistribution and facilitates the transfer of
Department of the Army G3 (Operations) designated TPE and manages
Category V listing published by DA;
Higher HQ and C2: Theater Property Book Officer (2nd Battalion, 402nd
Army Field Support Brigade).
Team: Reset Team;
Mission: Provides unit training on Department of the Army/Army Materiel
Command RESET program and Automated RESET Management Tool;
Higher HQ and C2: Army Material Command through the Army Sustainment
Command and the 2nd Battalion, 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in
Iraq.
Team: Reset Fly Away Team (RFAT);
Mission: Expedites RESET planning and shipping of Life Cycle Management
Command specific priority RESET equipment;
Higher HQ and C2: Army Material Command through the Army Sustainment
Command and the 2nd Battalion, 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in
Iraq.
Team: Marine LOGCOM Retrograde Team (LRT);
Mission: Receives, stores, and prepares for shipment and redistributes
excess principle end items to fill home station equipment shortfalls or
to depots to be repaired for further redistribution to the operating
forces;
Higher HQ and C2: Marine Corps Logistics Command (Forward).
Source: GAO analysis of Multi-National Forces-Iraq data.
[A] The MRTs and RPATs have a complex command. Both of these teams are
sourced with Air Force Personnel under Task Force 586, an Air Force
headquarters. However, both teams are under the tactical control of
ARCENT, which exercises that tactical control through Task Force 586.
Moreover, because the RPAT is in direct support to the 402nd Army Field
Support Brigade in Iraq, Army Materiel Command also has some control
over this asset which it exercises through its subordinate command,
Army Sustainment Command.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure Throughput Model:
Department of Defense (DOD) officials have developed a model that
approximates the volume of equipment and materiel that can flow through
the Iraqi theater of operations logistics infrastructure and the rate
at which that infrastructure can sustain this flow.[Footnote 48] In
summary, the model states the theater logistics infrastructure can
sustain the deployment and redeployment of no more than a total of five
brigades' worth of equipment and materiel in and out of Iraq per month.
Specifically, DOD has modeled two scenarios (see table 2, below). In
the first, the deployment and retrograde of TPE and unit equipment and
materiel are prioritized. In the second scenario, the deployment and
retrograde of TPE and unit equipment and materiel are balanced with the
retrograde of non-unit stocks, such as containers of supplies. In both
scenarios, the 1st Theater Support Command can sustain the delivery of
a certain amount of Class I (food, water) and Class III-B (packaged
petroleum products such as motor oil) to forces in Iraq.
Table 2: Planning Scenarios for Sustained Deployment and Redeployment:
Support logistics activity: Sustainment of Forces in Iraq;
Scenario one[A]: 7 sustainment convoys to and returning from Iraq, per
day;
Scenario Two[B]: 7 sustainment convoys to and returning from Iraq, per
day.
Support logistics activity: Deploying Unit Equipment, Materiel;
Scenario one[A]: 2.5 brigade equivalents,;
per month;
Scenario Two[B]: 2.0 brigade equivalents,; per month.
Support logistics activity: Redeploying TPE, or Unit Equipment,
Materiel;
Scenario one[A]: 2.5 brigade equivalents,; per month;
Scenario Two[B]: 2.0 brigade equivalents,; per month.
Support logistics activity: Redeploying Non-Unit Theater Stocks;
Scenario one[A]: None;
Scenario Two[B]: 1.0 brigade equivalent, per month.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Scenario one prioritizes the simultaneous deploy/redeploy flow of
theater provided equipment, unit equipment, and materiel.
[B] Scenario two balances the simultaneous deploy/redeploy flow of
theater provide equipment, unit equipment, and materiel with non-unit
theater stocks.
[End of table]
According to DOD officials and documents, the model is based on three
types of brigades: heavy or Stryker brigade combat teams (HBCT/SBCT);
infantry brigade combat teams (IBCT); and separate brigades (BDE SEP).
For each brigade type DOD planners compiled unit property book data,
added an additional 20 percent to the equipment totals to account for
theater provided equipment, and then used the resulting brigade types
in detailed planning for key phases of the redeployment and retrograde
process such as convoy and wash rack operations. According to DOD
officials, in this manner they were able to approximate the
redeployment and retrograde requirements and time frames for each type
brigade. For example, the model assumes that a heavy or Stryker brigade
combat team has almost twice the number of vehicles found in a separate
brigade, and thus, requires almost 25 percent more convoys to
retrograde these vehicles and almost double the amount of time on the
wash racks.
Table 3: Key Planning Factors for Sustained Deployment and
Redeployment, by Unit Type:
Planning factors;
Unit type: HBCT / SBCT;
IBCT;
BDE SEP.
Vehicles in Unit;
Unit type: 1,600; 1,240; 830.
TEU (containers) in unit; Unit type: 170; 220; 270.
Convoy packages; Unit type: 46; 42; 37.
Wash rack days; Unit type: 7; 5.5; 4.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
According to DOD officials, the predictive power of the rate-of-flow
model is limited, and thus, it should not be used to calculate the
minimum amount of time required to redeploy the total amount of
equipment currently in Iraq. They explained that while the model
assumes units are redeploying with a full set of equipment, the actual
amount of equipment and materiel that needs to be transported, cleaned,
inspected, and loaded onto ships will vary with each unit moving
through the system. This means that in any given period of time, the
actual amount of equipment and materiel being redeployed may be
different than the amounts assumed in the model. For example, according
to DOD officials, in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 the theater
logistical infrastructure was able to deploy an average of two brigades
into Iraq and redeploy an average of three brigades out of Iraq each
month. In addition, DOD officials have stated that during a period
lasting about 1 month--from late November 2008 to early January 2009--
four units will redeploy. They explained that this is possible because
two of the units are leaving Iraq with only containers and the other
two are redeploying with relatively little of their own equipment,
having used mostly TPE while in theater. These two examples indicate
that while the theater throughput model may provide planners with an
estimate of the theater's deployment and redeployment/retrograde
capacity, the model should not be used to predict the number of actual
units that can redeploy during any 1 month period.
Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping Excess Theater Provided
Equipment:
The current process for retrograding certain excess theater provided
equipment (TPE) from Iraq is lengthy and does not maintain in-transit
visibility. This is caused by the frequent manual manipulation of data.
According to Department of Defense's (DOS's) Supply Chain Materiel
Management Regulation, all DOD components shall structure their
materiel management to provide responsive, consistent, and reliable
support to the warfighter (customer) during peacetime and war.[Footnote
49] In addition, DOD components are required to implement material
management functions using commercial, off-the-shelf items or DOD
standard data systems, as well as ensure timely, accurate in-transit
asset information and maintain visibility and accountability over items
in the pipeline.[Footnote 50] Moreover, DOD components should implement
and maintain supply chain material management systems to provide a
timely and complete process.[Footnote 51]
Figure 5 below describes the physical and data networks for Class VII
TPE--including manual data transfers and key organizations--involved in
the process.
Figure 5: Process for Retrograding Class VII Theater Provided
Equipment:
This figure is a flowchart showing the process for retrograding class
VII theater provided equipment.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Currently, when Class VII theater provided equipment is transferred
from the owning unit to one of the Retrograde Property Assistance
Teams[Footnote 52] supporting the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade
(AFSB) in Iraq, the accountability data for the equipment are
transferred from the unit to the 402nd AFSB using the Army's Property
Book Unit Supply Enhanced system[Footnote 53] as shown in figure 5.
Once the equipment moves to Kuwait, however, the 401st AFSB, which
receives the equipment, must undertake two concurrent manual processes
to establish accountability and visibility for the equipment.
Accountability is established by manually entering equipment data into
the Standard Depot System (SDS). However, SDS tracks equipment by the
total number of items, not individual serial numbers. Hence a second
manual entry is made into the Army War Reserve Depot System (AWRDS) to
provide visibility over each item by serial number. AWRDS--a non-
standard Army information management system--was originally designed to
provide visibility over Army pre-positioned equipment sets, but it has
been modified to support SDS.[Footnote 54] This is contrary to DOD
guidance that accountability and visibility should be established using
standard data systems that share data.
Once accountability and visibility over the theater provided equipment
have been established, brigade personnel request disposition
instructions. This labor-intensive manual process involves sending
spreadsheets populated with equipment data from Kuwait to Army
Sustainment Command headquarters in Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and
then on to the specific Life Cycle Management Commands[Footnote 55]
responsible for each particular item who, in turn, send disposition
instructions back through this chain to the 401st AFSB. This process
can take months or years because of the manual workarounds used to pass
and manipulate the data.
Once disposition instructions are received in Kuwait, equipment can be
shipped; however in-transit visibility of the equipment is temporarily
lost. When disposition instructions for a certain item of TPE are
received, that item drops from the AWRDS database and uses a process
called Inter-Depot Transfer to manage shipment of that item. By
dropping the item from AWRDS, however, the 401st AFSB loses visibility
over the item, because Inter-Depot Transfers are not entered into the
Global Transportation Network, DOD's system for providing near real-
time in-transit visibility information. This lack of in-transit
visibility is contrary to current DOD guidelines to maintain timely,
accurate visibility over items in the distribution pipeline.
The 401st AFSB uses another manual process to compensate for this by
coordinating with Surface Deployment and Distribution Command elements
at Kuwaiti ports in order to obtain final load manifests for each
vessel. The manifest is then forwarded to the appropriate Life Cycle
Management Command in the United States so that item managers there can
prepare for the receipt of the equipment; however this information does
not reach the 401st AFSB until 24 to 48 hours after a vessel sets sail.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, David A. Schmitt, Assistant
Director; Guy A. Lofaro, Analyst in Charge; John Lee; Katherine Lenane;
Gregory Marchand; John J. Marzullo; Tristan T. To; Christopher Turner;
Cheryl Weissman, and Kristy Williams made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This figure includes Army brigade combat teams and equivalent
Marine Corps organizations.
[2] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report:
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, GAO-08-837 (Washington, D.C.:
June 23, 2008).
[3] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, � 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, � 1223
(2008)).
[4] We focused our review primarily on the Army because it has the
largest logistical footprint in Iraq. The majority of units, materiel,
and equipment in the Iraqi theater belong to the Army with relatively
few additional services' units, materiel, and equipment. Marine Corps
officials told us that the Marines will use Army logistics systems and
pipeline to enter and exit the Iraqi theater. In addition, DOD
officials have stated that the Air force and Navy have negligible
logistical footprints in Iraq.
[5] Discussion with DOD officials in Kuwait indicated that the capacity
of the base infrastructure in Kuwait to temporarily house and out-
process personnel could be rapidly expanded with 30 days notice.
Moreover, during unit redeployments the majority of personnel from each
redeploying unit are quickly moved to the United States, leaving only a
small stay-behind detachment to manage the retrograde of unit
equipment.
[6] For a listing of all the organizations visited during the course of
this engagement see app. I.
[7] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, � 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, � 1223
(2008)).
[8] Annex E to MNF-I FRAGO 08-232, Logistics Reposture Guidance (May
28, 2008).
[9] Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms (May 30, 2008).
[10] The terms "retrograde movement," "retrograde operation," and
"retrograde personnel" are doctrinal terms defined in JP 1-02. However,
these definitions do not apply to the way in which the term
"retrograde" is being used by logistics planners with regard to the
reposture planning.
[11] See GAO Operation Desert Storm: DOD's Funding Actions Relating to
Leftover Inventories, GAO/NSIAD-93-143FS (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26,
1993); Materiel Disposal: Alleged Improper Disposition and Destruction
of Serviceable Materiel and Supplies in Saudi Arabia, GAO/NSIAD-93-139R
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 1993); Operation Desert Storm: Lack of
Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment, GAO/NSIAD-92-258
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992); and Desert Shield/Storm Logistics:
Observations by U.S. Military Personnel, GAO/NSIAD-92-26 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 13, 1991).
[12] See GAO, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Reports and Testimonies:
1991-93, GAO/NSIAD-94-134W (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1994); Defense
Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics
Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); and Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve
the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future
Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[13] According to DLA officials, although organization of the
Retrograde Task Force began in late summer 2007, the Retrograde Task
Force was not officially active until September 10, 2007.
[14] DOD classes of supply, and what is included in each class of
supply, are laid out in app. III of this report.
[15] Basing options include a base's closure, a transfer to the
government of Iraq, or a "shrink and share" of a base where both Iraqis
and Coalition forces collocate in a landlord-tenant relationship.
[16] The Logistics Reposture Working Group is an enduring forum with
all key legistics organizations in the Iraq and Kuwait theater. It
meets monthly and addresses strategic, operational, and theater-level
logistics issues. It assigns Offices of Primary Responsibility or
Operational Planning Teams to develop solutions to logistics-related
issues.
[17] The available-to-load date is the period of time in which a unit's
materiel and equipment is ready to be loaded at a sea or airport.
[18] See App. IV for a list of the support teams and their higher
headquarters.
[19] Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States, IV-19 (May 14, 2007).
[20] Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, V-2 (July 18, 2008).
[21] Joint Publication 4-0 notes that "the joint logistician will
rarely have unity of joint logistics command, and subsequently control
of joint logistics is more challenging."
[22] See App. IV for a complete list of the theater property and
retrograde support teams.
[23] ARCENT has tactical control over Task Force 586, which is the
headquarters that controls these units. This allows ARCENT to control
and direct these assets through Task Force 586. However, Army Materiel
Command also exercises some control over the RPAT because the RPAT
supports the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade, over which AMC has
command authority through its subordinate command, Army Sustainment
Command.
[24] Government-furnished equipment is equipment provided to a
contractor for use in fulfilling the terms of a contract. This
equipment is maintained by the contractor and returned to the
government at the contract's conclusion and/or termination.
[25] FM 4-93.41, Army Field Support Brigade Operations, Initial Draft,
(May 1, 2008).
[26] JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 18, 2008).
[27] Army Sustainment Command is a subordinate organization to Army
Materiel Command and is responsible for field support, materiel
management, contingency contracting, and Army pre-positioned stocks.
[28] Class VII Items are further divided into rolling stock and
nonrolling stock. Rolling stock includes wheeled vehicles, tracked
combat vehicles, wheeled/tracked construction equipment, trailers,
semitrailers, and standard trailer-mounted equipment such as
generators. Nonrolling stock includes all class VII items not
classified as rolling stock.
[29] A detailed explanation of the systems and organization involved in
this process is contained in App.VI.
[30] See DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation Chapter 1, DOD
4140.1-R, � C1.3.1.1; � C1.3.1, � C1.3.2 and � C5.8, (May 23, 2003).
[31] The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands,
each of which is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are:
Aviation and Missile, Chemical Materials Agency, Communications-
Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tank-automotive &
Armaments Command.
[32] Army Sustainment Command Operations Order 30-08, Retrograde of
Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) (Apr. 18, 2008).
[33] The Standard Army Retail Supply System is a Combat Service Support
peacetime and wartime logistics Standard Army Management Information
System that (1) performs the supply functions of ordering, receiving,
storing, and issuing supplies; (2) supports supply management functions
such as excess disposition and redistribution; and (3) offers improved
communications and advanced automation functionality. One of its
benefits is providing asset visibility at the Brigade Combat Team,
Corps, theater, and national levels.
[34] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, � 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, � 1223
(2008)).
[35] MNF-I defines personal property as any property than can be moved
and reused without significant refurbishment or degradation from its
intended purpose. Personal property includes government property (those
items owned by services and components) and items owned by individuals.
Examples include re-locatable buildings, window air conditioning units
(not to include split air conditioning unit), generators, desks,
chairs, computers, office supplies, cots, foot lockers, and clothing.
[36] As of July 18, 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments were still
negotiating the terms of their bilateral agreement, although the exact
nature of the agreement was still being negotiated.
[37] For simplicity, we use the term contractor-managed government-
owned property to incorporate all items which the contractor manages
expressly to perform under the contract, including items given to the
contractor by the government (government-furnished equipment), or
acquired/fabricated by the contractor.
[38] Excess contractor-managed government-owned property is a subset of
foreign excess personal property, which is defined as U.S.-owned
personal property located outside of the United States that is excess
to government needs.
[39] The October 2007 memo increasing donation authority to $10,000
updated an August 4, 2006, DOD memo based on the Defense Reutilization
and Marketing Service's cost-benefit analysis dated June 9, 2006, which
estimated the cost at which care and handling of an item exceeds the
proceeds from its sale.
[40] Headquarter, Department of the Army, HQDA Materiel Retrograde
Policy; (October 23, 2007).
[41] According to an Army official, this analysis included property
acquired/fabricated by the contractor, but not government-furnished
equipment. Consequently, the analysis included much, but not all
contractor-managed government-owned property.
[42] The property can be transferred to other military units or
contractors in theater, the government of Iraq, or other military units
or contractors around the world.
[43] The Army's analysis considers this property to be (1) uneconomical
to return to the United States or (2) prohibited from return to the
United States given policy, regulations, or agreements.
[44] DLA runs four Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices in Iraq
and one in Kuwait, which are responsible for disposing of surplus DOD
property through reutilization, transfer, donation, and sale. The sale
of this surplus property is accomplished by awarding contracts to
vendors that in turn resell the property.
[45] The Marines have previously used this alternate port to resupply
its forces in western Iraq.
[46] DOD officials stated that an additional 20 wash racks should be
operational at Camp Buehring by August 2008; we were not able to
confirm this.
[47] According to DOD officials, although it is possible to self-deploy
vehicles from Iraq to Kuwait (i.e., drive them out under their own
power), the resulting wear and tear on a vehicle makes this an
unattractive alternative. Hence, when possible, vehicles are
transported out of Iraq on heavy equipment transports.
[48] GAO did not verify the accuracy of this model.
[49] DOD 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation
Chapter 1, � C1.3.1.1, (May 23, 2003).
[50] See DOD 4140.1-R, � C1.3.1, � C1.3.2 and � C5.8.
[51] See DOD 4140.1-R, � C7.1.
[52] The Retrograde Property Assistance Teams (RPATs) facilitate the
expedient turn-in of all excess Class VII, theater provided equipment
(TPE), improve property accountability, and enable asset visibility of
the received equipment. RPATs operate at six permanent locations
throughout the theater Area of Operations (AO) to accomplish this
mission.
[53] Army documents stated that the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced
is the Army's Web-based property accountability system that provides
real-time total asset visibility throughout all levels of Army
management and secures transfers to the Standard Army Retail Supply
System. Additionally, it is a Standard Army Information Management
System.
[54] Army documents state that Standard Army Management Information
Systems provide a seamless and inoperable network of logistics systems
using integrated communication tools.
[55] The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands,
each of which is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are:
Aviation and Missile, Chemical Materials Agency, Communications-
Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tank-automotive &
Armaments Command.
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