Occupational Safety and Health: Changes Needed in the Combined
Federal-State Approach (Chapter Report, 02/28/94, GAO/HEHS-94-10).
In September 1991, 25 workers died and more than 50 others were injured
in a fire at a North Carolina chicken processing plant, in large part
because the fire doors had been locked. The plant had never been
inspected by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or
by the state. OSHA's oversight of state-run safety and health programs
continues to be plagued by substantial weaknesses. OSHA still has
little information about the outcomes and effectiveness of either its
own program or state programs. Other shortcomings include inadequate
measures of program activities and no specific program activity goals,
no requirement for states to do internal audits or self-assessments that
would allow OSHA to consider these results in its evaluations, and a
lack of follow-up procedures for ensuring that states correct problems
in programs that OSHA has flagged. Some states have adopted unique
program features that OSHA does not have. These include requiring
comprehensive worksite safety and health programs and using
worksite-specific injury and illness data. Two other state program
features warrant further OSHA analysis to determine whether they should
be added to OSHA law: (1) coverage of state and local government workers
and (2) shutdown authority in imminent danger situations.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: HEHS-94-10
TITLE: Occupational Safety and Health: Changes Needed in the
Combined Federal-State Approach
DATE: 02/28/94
SUBJECT: Occupational health standards
Occupational health/safety programs
Occupational safety
Federal/state relations
State programs
Grants to states
Law enforcement
Data collection operations
Proposed legislation
Safety regulation
IDENTIFIER: BLS Annual Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Survey
Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act
OSHA Voluntary Protection Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
February 1994
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH -
CHANGES NEEDED
IN THE COMBINED
FEDERAL-STATE APPROACH
GAO/HEHS-94-10
Occupational Safety and Health
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
BLS - Bureau of Labor Statistics
OIG - Office of the Inspector General
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-247492
February 28, 1994
The Honorable William D. Ford
Chairman, Committee on Education
and Labor
House of Representatives
The Honorable William F. Goodling
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Education and Labor
House of Representatives
In response to your request, this report provides information on the
weaknesses in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
(OSHA) oversight process, the unique features of OSHA and state
programs, and the results of OSHA's special evaluations of 21
state-operated safety and health programs during fiscal year 1992.
The report also includes recommendations to the Secretary of Labor
for improving the combined federal-state safety and health approach.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Labor, the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, and other interested parties. Copies also will be
made available to others on request.
This report was prepared under the direction of Linda G. Morra,
Director, Education and Employment Issues, who may be reached on
(202) 512-7014 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major
contributors are listed in appendix VIII.
Janet L. Shikles
Assistant Comptroller General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
In September 1991, 25 workers were killed and over 50 others were
injured in a fire at a North Carolina chicken processing plant,
primarily because the fire doors had been locked. Because the plant
had never been inspected by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) or by the state--which was operating its own
safety and health program under approval of OSHA--congressional
attention focused on whether the incident indicated a need for
changes in OSHA and state-operated safety and health programs.
The Chairman and Ranking Republican Member of the House Committee on
Education and Labor asked GAO to examine ways in which the combined
federal and state approach to ensuring workplace safety and health
can be improved. Their specific questions were as follows:
How adequate is OSHA's oversight, including its "special"
evaluations,\1 of state-operated safety and health programs?
What safety and health program features warrant further
consideration for broader use?
--------------------
\1 During fiscal year 1992, OSHA conducted special and follow-up
evaluations of 21 state programs with responsibility for both
private- and public-sector (state and local government) employees.
These evaluations resulted from questions raised in a September 12,
1991, hearing before the House Committee on Education and Labor.
After that year, OSHA resumed its routine monitoring and evaluation.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 establishes a joint
federal-state approach to workplace safety and health (with
exceptions for certain transportation and mining operations). It
authorizes states to operate their own safety and health programs,
but it gives the Department of Labor responsibility for approving
state programs and monitoring their performance to make sure they
remain "at least as effective" as the program operated by the Labor
Department. The Secretary of Labor established OSHA to carry out the
federal enforcement role.
The act authorizes federal grants to the states to cover up to half
of a state's total program cost. In fiscal year 1993, $67
million--about 23 percent of OSHA's $288 million appropriation--went
to state programs. Twenty-one state programs cover both the private-
sector and state and local government employees;\2 two other states
(New York and Connecticut) have programs for only state and local
employees. (See fig. 1.) OSHA covers private-sector employees in 29
states.
The act also requires the Secretary of Labor to collect statistics on
injuries and illnesses in the workplace. These data serve multiple
purposes, including targeting inspections and focusing on education
and training programs. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects
injury and illness data from a sample of employers and provides
summary information, by industry, to OSHA and the public. Because of
confidentiality constraints, BLS does not give OSHA access to
worksite-level data.
In 1988, GAO identified ways to improve OSHA's routine monitoring and
evaluation process and recommended that OSHA (1) establish desired
performance levels for state programs and (2) require states to
develop and implement plans for evaluating the impact of their
programs. In 1989, the Department of Labor's Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) issued a report that included similar recommendations
for improving OSHA's oversight process.\3 OSHA agreed to conduct a
comprehensive review of its monitoring and evaluation process and to
take action to address our concerns and those of the OIG by September
30, 1991. As of January 1994, however, OSHA had made little progress
in revising the process. (See app. II.)
GAO also previously examined the differences between OSHA and state
programs, although those reviews were not as comprehensive as this
study. OSHA continues to move forward in addressing GAO's concerns
and options for improvement. Two task forces are currently working
on policies and procedures for improving OSHA's oversight, but no
final decisions had been made by January 1994.
--------------------
\2 Our study was limited to these 21 states that exercise enforcement
authority in both the public and private sectors.
\3 OSHA's Monitoring of State Programs, Final Report No.
05-88-003-10-105, Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector
General (Jan. 30, 1989).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
OSHA's oversight of state-operated safety and health programs
continues to have substantial weaknesses. One of the fundamental
weaknesses is that OSHA has little information about the outcomes and
effectiveness of either its own program or state programs.
Basically, OSHA measures 115 program activities, such as the number
of inspections conducted; its oversight approach assumes that states
must use activities similar to its own in order to be equally
effective. OSHA makes this assumption despite the fact that OSHA and
the states have conducted few evaluation studies to determine which
specific program features are effective. While OSHA is considering
placing more emphasis on doing assessments of program outcomes, it
has not yet done so.
Several other weaknesses that GAO and the OIG identified some 5 years
ago remain in OSHA's routine evaluation of state programs: (1)
inadequate measures of program activities and no specific program
activity goals, (2) no requirement for states to conduct internal
audits or self-assessments that would allow OSHA to consider these
results in its evaluations, and (3) a lack of follow-up procedures
for ensuring that states correct problems in program areas identified
by OSHA as unacceptable.\4
Some improvements did occur in the way OSHA assessed the state
programs during its special evaluations. However, OSHA did not adopt
these improved practices in its routine evaluations of state programs
that resumed in 1992.
With the authority provided under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, some states have developed unique program features that OSHA
does not have. Two features adopted by several states (and supported
by empirical studies that warrant the consideration of OSHA and other
states) are (1) a requirement for comprehensive worksite safety and
health programs and (2) the use of worksite-specific injury and
illness data. Two other program features have also been adopted by
several states and supported by previous GAO studies, but they need
OSHA's further analysis to determine whether legislation should be
amended to add them to OSHA law: (1) coverage of state and local
government employees and (2) shutdown authority in imminent danger
situations.
--------------------
\4 OSHA considers a state program unacceptable in a given program
activity area when its performance is not equivalent to OSHA's
performance in a given fiscal year. For example, during OSHA's
special evaluations any state that cited serious violations more than
20 percent below OSHA's performance (65 percent of total violations
cited) was subject to further review.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
OSHA'S OVERSIGHT OF
STATE-OPERATED PROGRAMS HAS
SUBSTANTIAL WEAKNESSES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
The most fundamental weakness in OSHA's oversight of state programs
is that it has little information with which to judge whether a
program has achieved desired outcomes or results. Rather, to assess
state programs, OSHA measures their program activities: for example,
standards adopted, inspections conducted, violations cited, or
penalties levied. OSHA has not performed the program evaluations
that could enable it to determine which policies, procedures, or
standards can achieve specific outcomes. Further, OSHA does not set
specific program activity goals but instead assesses states'
performance relative to its own performance during the subject year.
Since OSHA's performance can vary from one year to another, states in
effect are asked to meet a "moving performance target."
Other weaknesses remain in OSHA's monitoring and evaluation of state
programs, as GAO has previously reported. OSHA (1) neither sets
priorities nor identifies key program activity measures but treats
all 115 measures as equally important; (2) does not require states to
conduct annual internal audits or require OSHA to consider the
results in its evaluations; and (3) lacks follow-up procedures for
ensuring that states correct problems in program areas identified by
OSHA as unacceptable.
In conducting its special evaluations, OSHA made significant
improvements. First, OSHA reduced the number of activity measures it
used and established some priorities among the remaining ones. (OSHA
officials are now proposing to reduce routine program activity
measures from 115 to 48 by September 1994.) Second, OSHA required the
states to correct or substantially improve problems identified in the
special evaluations as a condition for continued approval of their
state programs. However, OSHA resumed its routine evaluations in
1992 but has not yet incorporated these improvements.
STATES HAVE ADDITIONAL
UNIQUE PROGRAM FEATURES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Although state program procedures are generally similar to those of
OSHA, some states have developed additional program features that are
different from those of OSHA. GAO identified two particularly
noteworthy program features found in several states.
First, nine states require comprehensive worksite safety and health
programs. GAO proposed in a 1992 report\5 that the Congress
consider passing legislation that would require high- risk
employers to have these programs. Since that report was issued,
two of these nine states passed legislation requiring such
programs.
Second, 14 states use worksite-specific injury and illness data.
The states' experience using data from workers' compensation
programs, as well as empirical studies done by GAO and other
researchers, indicates that using worksite-specific data, as
well as industry averages, could improve OSHA's inspection
targeting, education and training efforts, and evaluations of
program effectiveness. These data will be more useful when OSHA
completes the quality assurance program it is now developing.
The program will improve the accuracy of employers' injury and
illness records and, as GAO previously recommended, will
incorporate improved procedures for inspectors to verify the
accuracy of employers' records.
Historically, BLS officials have not shared worksite-specific data
with OSHA because the data are collected by BLS under strict
confidentiality pledges. On October 21, 1993, however, officials at
OSHA and BLS signed an agreement acknowledging OSHA's need to obtain
worksite-specific data from employers. The two agencies are
currently working on ways for each to obtain the data without
compromising the independence and confidentiality of the data-
collection process.
In addition, GAO noted that some states have greater statutory
authority than OSHA does to take immediate action in imminent danger
situations. However, GAO could not determine the appropriate data
source to show how often these situations occur and the consequences
of this limitation on OSHA's authority.
All state-operated programs differ from OSHA in that they cover state
and local government employees, while OSHA is prohibited by law from
doing so. As a result, an estimated 7.3 million state and local
public employees in 27 states are not protected by federal safety and
health statute or regulations. GAO did not determine what coverage
these employees may have from other sources, such as state workers'
compensation programs or private insurers.
--------------------
\5 Occupational Safety and Health: Worksite Safety and Health
Programs Show Promise (GAO/HRD-92-68, May 19, 1992).
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
To improve OSHA's oversight of state programs and the federal-state
approach to workplace safety and health, GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Labor require the Assistant Secretary for Occupational
Safety and Health to
emphasize measures of program outcome and evaluations of the
effectiveness of specific program features as it assesses both
its own activities and those of the state-operated programs (see
ch. 2);
revise OSHA's state program monitoring and evaluation approach by
(1) developing a set of improved performance measures, (2)
setting performance goals and eliminating the "moving target"
performance criteria, (3) requiring states to conduct annual
internal audits, and (4) establishing more effective procedures
to obtain state corrective action on significant issues (see ch.
2); and
assess the need for legislative change to (1) extend OSHA's
coverage to state and local government employees in states
without OSHA-approved safety and health programs and (2) give
OSHA greater authority to protect workers in imminent danger
situations (see ch. 3).
GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Labor require the Assistant
Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to (1) develop
procedures for OSHA to obtain worksite-specific injury and illness
data from employers and (2) implement its procedures for ensuring
that employers accurately record occupational injuries and illnesses.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
The Secretary of Labor agreed with the majority of GAO's findings,
conclusions, and recommendations. (See app. VII.) OSHA agreed to
(1) set improved outcome measures and goals to better assess its own
activities and those of state programs, (2) establish requirements
for states to conduct annual self-assessments and submit corrective
action plans, and (3) review the issues of extending coverage to
state and local government employees and providing additional
authority to inspectors in imminent danger situations. Both OSHA and
BLS agreed that procedures are needed to obtain worksite-specific
data from employers. OSHA officials also agreed that procedures are
needed to ensure the accuracy of the records at the worksite.
OSHA officials, however, disagreed with our recommendations to
eliminate the moving target criteria when assessing states'
performance standards. GAO believes that OSHA needs to reconsider
options for eliminating the moving target criteria and setting more
outcome measures and goals. Eliminating the moving target criteria
will enable OSHA to more accurately measure a state's performance in
a given program activity area and provide a better assessment of
states' overall efforts in improving safety and health in the
workplace.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 sets out the joint
federal-state approach to ensure workplace safety and health.\1
This law authorizes states to operate their own safety and health
programs, but it gives the Department of Labor responsibility for
approving state programs and monitoring states' performance to make
sure they remain "at least as effective" as the federal program. The
Secretary of Labor established OSHA to carry out the federal
enforcement role.
Section 23(g) of the act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to make
grants to the states to assist them in administering and enforcing
occupational safety and health programs that have been approved by
OSHA. The federal share may not exceed 50 percent of the total cost
of a state program. In fiscal year 1993, OSHA allocated $67 million,
or 23 percent, of its $288 million operating budget to state
programs.
Currently, 21 states and 2 territories (Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands) operate programs for both private sector and state and local
government employees.\2 The 21 states are responsible for enforcing
safety and health laws that cover about 45 million employees. Two
other states (New York and Connecticut) have programs for only state
and local government employees; OSHA provides protections for workers
in the private sector. OSHA has given final approval to 13 of the 21
state programs and has "operational status agreements" (which we
define below) with the other 8 states\3 . (See fig. 1.1.)
Figure 1.1: Distribution of
OSHA and State Enforcement
Authority
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\1 The act covers most workplaces; exceptions are principally for
certain transportation and mining operations.
\2 Our study was limited to the 21 states that exercise enforcement
authority in both the public and private sectors.
\3 The eight states without final approval are California, Michigan,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.
OSHA'S STATE CERTIFICATION AND
APPROVAL PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
OSHA has established three stages in the state program approval
process. During the first stage, initial approval, OSHA continues to
have enforcement responsibility, while the state develops a detailed
plan to implement its operating policies and procedures. OSHA
requires the state to submit a detailed plan that describes how it
will ensure workers' safety and health through (1) appropriate
legislation, standard-setting, and enforcement procedures; (2)
adequate funding, safety and health training, and education programs;
and (3) an adequate number of competent enforcement personnel
(referred to as compliance officers or inspectors). Within 3 years
of approval, a state must accomplish the developmental goals outlined
in its plan.
Second, when a state appears capable of independently enforcing
standards and has operated its program for almost 1 year, OSHA may
enter into an operational status agreement with the state. During
this transition period, OSHA suspends federal enforcement in all or
certain activities covered by the state program.
Third, OSHA grants final approval once a state meets its compliance
inspector staffing levels and OSHA decides, on the basis of actual
operations, that the state program has established standards and
provides protections as effective as those provided by OSHA's
program. When OSHA gives a state final approval, OSHA relinquishes
its right to concurrent enforcement. OSHA, however, continues some
enforcement efforts in the state for workers not covered by the state
program, such as maritime and federal workers.
When OSHA concludes that state standards or operations are not as
effective as its own, OSHA can (l) increase its level of concurrent
enforcement within the state or (2) withdraw the state's authority to
operate its program and take over that responsibility. In 1991, OSHA
increased its level of concurrent enforcement in North Carolina and
began the steps necessary to withdraw program approval; however, OSHA
later determined that program withdrawal was not warranted. In
contrast, state-initiated actions taken to withdraw a state program
have created significant difficulties for OSHA because of the
additional demand on its resources.\4
--------------------
\4 See, for example, our testimony on the effect on other OSHA
activities of the California governor's temporary withdrawal of funds
to operate that state program in 1987. (OSHA's Resumption of Private
Sector Enforcement Activities in California, GAO/T-HRD-88-19, June
20, 1988.)
OSHA'S OVERSIGHT PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
OSHA monitors and evaluates all state safety and health programs at
least annually. OSHA's monitoring and evaluation program is directed
by its Directorate of Federal-State Operations in Washington, D.C.
This office develops the policies and procedures for approving,
monitoring, and evaluating state programs. OSHA's regional and area
offices perform most of the direct monitoring and evaluation of state
programs. The Office of Management Data Systems, within the
Directorate of Administrative Programs, has primary responsibility
for processing federal OSHA and state program performance data into
its management information system and distributing the reports.
The two main features of OSHA's routine state monitoring and
evaluation process are (1) collection and comparative analysis of
data in computerized state program activity measures reports and (2)
an annual evaluation of each state, which considers these statistical
analyses as well as other information, such as special studies and
observations made while accompanying state compliance officers on
inspections.
OSHA relies primarily on comparisons of a given year's statistical
data about its own program activities with comparable data from state
programs. For its annual evaluations, OSHA assesses states on 115
activity measures in 10 major program areas. Generally, OSHA
considers a state performance unacceptable when program activity in a
given area falls more than 20 percent above or below the national
average performance for OSHA.\5 For some measures, however, OSHA has
established absolute standards for state activities. For example,
states are expected to have 80 percent of their allocated safety
compliance officer positions filled.
In addition to comparing program statistics, OSHA reviews case files
and meets with state officials quarterly to discuss state performance
that differs from that of OSHA. OSHA then conducts additional
inquiries, for example accompanying state inspectors on inspections
and doing on-site monitoring of the state program office. The latter
could involve investigating citizens' complaints about the state
program, standards development, budget expenditures, and state
legislative provisions and other enforcement activities reported by
the state that might affect its performance.
OSHA then prepares an annual evaluation report for each state program
that summarizes the statistical analysis and other information to
determine whether the state activities and operations are "as
effective as" OSHA's program. These reports include (1) an analysis
of program areas where OSHA considers state program performance
unacceptable, (2) an overall evaluation of state program performance,
and (3) recommendations to improve performance. OSHA gives the
reports to state program officials and, upon request, to the public.
OSHA's oversight policy requires each state with unacceptable
performance to respond in writing to OSHA's recommendations.
Quarterly and annually, OSHA's regional and area office staff conduct
follow-up reviews to assess whether the state has implemented the
recommendations to correct problems and improve state performance.
In addition to its regular oversight process, OSHA conducted a set of
one-time special and follow-up evaluations of state-operated safety
and health programs' performance. The special evaluations were
conducted between October 1991 and January 1992 because of questions
raised in a hearing before the House Committee on Education and Labor
in September 1991.\6 Generally, these OSHA evaluations resulted in
two reports: (1) a report given to each state and announced in a
press release in January 1992 and (2) a follow-up report, released in
October 1992, assessing each state's actions to correct deficiencies
noted in the special evaluation reports. OSHA issued separate, more
detailed reports in January 1992, April 1992, and March 1993, for the
North Carolina program. (We discuss and compare OSHA's routine
oversight activities and the special evaluations in ch. 2.) Since
that time, however, OSHA has returned to the routine procedures.
--------------------
\5 OSHA conducts further reviews when state performance in a given
program activity area is not equivalent to that of OSHA before
concluding that a state's performance is acceptable or unacceptable.
\6 Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act, and the
Fire at the Imperial Food Products Plant in Hamlet, North Carolina:
Hearing Before the House Committee on Education and Labor, First
Session (Sept. 12, 1991).
OCCUPATIONAL INJURY AND ILLNESS
DATA
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Department of
Labor to collect statistics on injuries and illnesses in the
workplace. Within the Labor Department, OSHA defines what
information all employers must maintain at their worksites in a log
(OSHA 200). Labor has given responsibility for collecting injury and
illness data to its Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which, using a
sampling approach, conducts an Annual Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses Survey. In most states, state-operated safety and health
programs or state unemployment agencies collect the data from
employers and supply it to BLS; BLS collects the data directly in the
remaining states. Based on this survey, BLS reports the nation's
work-related injuries and illnesses in aggregate, by industry sector
under the standard industrial classification of industries. OSHA
uses these aggregated data to target manufacturing sectors with high
injury rates for inspection.
BLS confidentiality policies prohibit providing injury and illness
data on specific worksites if these data would allow identification
of the worksite. These rules of confidentiality are not imposed by
federal law, but negotiated by BLS with state agencies and survey
respondents in an effort to gain industry's cooperation in conducting
the survey. OSHA obtains specific injury and illness data for only
those worksites that it has inspected.
CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
The Congress is now considering legislation, the Comprehensive
Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act (H.R. 1280 and S. 575),
that would significantly change the way OSHA and the states ensure
workplace safety and health in this country. Some major provisions
would (1) extend OSHA coverage to include state and local government
employees, (2) require employers to develop and implement
comprehensive safety and health programs, (3) increase protection for
workers in imminent danger situations, (4) require employers to
immediately abate serious workplace safety and health hazards, and
(5) modify the procedures for withdrawing OSHA's approval of state
programs.
To address the concerns of the Congress and further improve its
oversight process, OSHA established two task forces. The first task
force was established in April 1993 to assess the need for
administrative or legislative change in several policy areas. In
addition, OSHA convened a second task force in June 1993--as part of
the new administration's "Reinventing Government" efforts--to explore
new and creative ways to improve its effectiveness. The issues under
consideration include use of worksite-level injury and illness data,
authority in imminent danger situations, development of program
outcome measures, and coverage of state and local government
employees. In September 1993, the first task force provided several
options for improving the occupational safety and health law to the
Secretary of Labor, but as of January 1994, the second task force had
made no final decisions.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5
To answer the Committee's questions about OSHA's oversight procedures
and ways to improve both federal and state programs, we analyzed
federal and state occupational safety and health program policies and
procedures. We surveyed program officials in all 21 states with
enforcement responsibility in the private sector. (See app. I for
the questionnaire results.) We determined state legal requirements by
interviewing appropriate officials and examining documents they
provided. We did not directly examine all relevant state laws. We
obtained information about OSHA's policies and procedures from
interviews with agency officials and from documents, including
previous GAO reports. We also obtained the views of OSHA officials
and state representatives about ways to improve the federal-state
approach to ensuring workplace safety and health.
We reviewed OSHA's 1990 routine and special monitoring procedures and
resulting reports. In doing so, we did not validate the data used by
OSHA. We also did not fully assess OSHA's proposed revisions to its
routine monitoring and evaluation system because they were still
under review by OSHA and state program officials. We conducted our
audit between October 1991 and November 1993 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
OSHA'S OVERSIGHT OF STATE-OPERATED
SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS HAS
SUBSTANTIAL WEAKNESSES
============================================================ Chapter 2
OSHA's oversight of state-operated safety and health programs has
substantial weaknesses. Both the routine evaluations and the special
evaluations are flawed by OSHA's limited information about the
outcomes and effectiveness of its own program and state programs.
Because OSHA has little information about program outcomes and the
effectiveness of its own program and state programs, OSHA's
monitoring and evaluation approach requires states to use criteria
equivalent to its own in order to be considered equally effective.
Other weaknesses in OSHA's oversight process that we and the OIG
identified are (1) inadequate measures of program activities and (2)
the absence of a requirement that states conduct annual internal
audits of their programs.\1 The OIG also identified a third weakness:
ineffective procedures to require and confirm state corrective
actions. While OSHA has made some attempts at revising its oversight
approach, these changes had not been implemented as of January 1994.
(See app. II.) The special evaluations conducted in fiscal year 1992
showed some improvements by reducing the number of program activity
measures and establishing priorities for measures and requirements
for follow-up. As a result, OSHA officials agreed to reduce routine
program activity measures from 115 to 48, but final implementation is
not expected before September 30, 1994.
--------------------
\1 OSHA's Monitoring and Evaluations of State Programs
(GAO/T-HRD-88-13, Apr. 20, 1988), OSHA's Monitoring of State
Programs, Final Report No. 05-89-029-10-105, Department of Labor,
Office of the Inspector General (Jan. 30, 1989), and Labor Issues
(GAO/OGC-93-19TR, Dec. 1992).
LACK OF EMPHASIS ON PROGRAM
OUTCOMES AND EFFECTIVENESS
STUDIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
A substantial weakness in both the routine and special evaluations is
OSHA's emphasis on program activities, without similar emphasis on
program outcomes. OSHA has considerable information about its
program activities, such as the number of inspections performed, but
it has much less data about its outcomes, such as the number of
workplace hazards or rates of workplace injuries, or the outcomes of
state programs. For this reason, OSHA focuses almost exclusively on
program activities rather than on program outcomes in both its
statutorily-required annual report to the Congress and the
performance measures it uses in monitoring and evaluating state
programs.
OSHA recognizes that injury and illness statistics from the BLS
Annual Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, alone, do not
support conclusions about program outcomes for itself or the
states.\2 For example, in the special evaluations, each state was
compared with OSHA's 5-year average lost workday injury rate.\3 If a
state's increase was more than 10 percent above OSHA's 11.8 percent
increase for the period, OSHA would conduct additional inquiries.
Although 10 of the 21 states exceeded the OSHA increase by more than
10 percent, OSHA concluded that factors other than program
performance could plausibly account for the difference. Examples
included (1) improved reporting of injuries as a result of stronger
enforcement; (2) increased employment, bringing less experienced
workers into the workforce; and (3) increased employment in
especially hazardous industries, such as construction.
Although little information has been developed on the overall
effectiveness of federal and state programs, OSHA has taken some
steps to better understand this issue by establishing the Office of
Program Evaluation within its Directorate of Policy. In fiscal year
1992, OSHA's Office of Program Evaluation identified 10 potential
studies for approved funding. OSHA funded four of these studies,
three of which have been completed.
In addition, the Office of Program Evaluation has completed studies
that include (l) examination of the petrochemical industry's
management of safety and health for contract workers and (2) the
effectiveness of OSHA's hazard communication standard. Two ongoing
studies address the impact of (l) comprehensive worksite safety and
health programs and (2) using workers' compensation data to target
enforcement efforts. The study using workers' compensation data is
under way in the state of Maine, where OSHA has targeted the "Top Two
Hundred" employers (based on state workers' compensation claims) to
further assess the value of worksite-specific data.
Our review also found a few examples of state-conducted effectiveness
studies. For example, a recent study funded by the Michigan
occupational safety and health program focused on the potential
benefit to OSHA's inspection targeting strategy of using
worksite-specific data. The study concluded that OSHA indeed would
benefit from access to worksite-specific data in targeting or in
other interventions designed to improve occupational safety and
health performance. (See ch. 3 for more details about these
studies.)
As discussed in chapter 1, OSHA established two task forces to
further improve its oversight process. The first task force was
established in April 1993 to assess the need for administrative or
legislative changes to the Occupational Safety and Health Act in the
several policy areas. In addition, OSHA convened a second task force
in June 1993--as part of the new administration's "Reinventing
Government" efforts--to explore ways to improve the effectiveness of
OSHA. In September 1993, the first task force provided several
options for improving the occupational safety and health law to the
Secretary of Labor, but, as of January 1994, the second task force
had made no final decisions.
We recognize the difficulty that OSHA faces in developing meaningful
measures of program outcomes and conducting program effectiveness
studies. But we believe that OSHA, faced with limited resources,
needs better information about the effects of its policies and
procedures to make more informed decisions and program improvements.
--------------------
\2 Several researchers have pointed out the difficulty in using a
simple change in the number, severity, or rate of injuries and
illnesses as a measure of program outcome or effectiveness. See, for
example, John W. Ruser, "Workers' Compensation and Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses," Journal of Labor Economics 9(4), pp.
325-350, and Robert S. Smith, "Have OSHA and Workers' Compensation
Made the Workplace Safer?" in Research Frontiers in Industrial
Relations and Human Resources, David Lewin, Olivia S. Mitchell,
Peter D. Sherer, eds. (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research
Association.)
\3 The lost workday injury rate is the average number of injuries
that required days away from work or restricted work activity per 100
full-time workers per year.
INADEQUATE MEASURES TO ACCESS
STATE PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The program activity measures OSHA uses and the comparisons it makes
with them provide insufficient information about state program
activities because OSHA (1) uses a large number of measures and
identifies no priorities among them and (2) compares them primarily
to the "moving target" of OSHA's most recent performance.
OSHA uses 115 program activity measures in its routine evaluations,
with no priorities identified. Although the measures are grouped
into program areas, none of the areas or individual measures are
identified as essential or most important for a state's performance
to be acceptable. There is no minimum or maximum number of measures
or areas in which a state must be acceptable in order to retain
OSHA's approval for it to continue to operate.
As we have previously noted, OSHA generally compares state
performance for a given period with its own performance for the same
period even though OSHA's performance fluctuates from one period to
another. As a result, states are constantly aiming at "moving
targets." For example, in the special evaluations, states were
expected to meet OSHA's complaint backlog performance level, which
worsened by 300 percent over a 6-month period. As a result, the
performance of two states was initially considered unacceptable but
would have been considered acceptable if compared with OSHA's
performance 6 months later.
We previously recommended that, where feasible, performance levels
should be specified in advance as performance goals, for both OSHA
and the states. Further, some state officials suggested that a
better assessment of performance would be to (1) compare a state
program with statistics on OSHA's performance in similar states or
(2) compare state programs located in the same OSHA region.
NO REQUIREMENT FOR STATES TO
CONDUCT INTERNAL AUDITS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
In 1988, OSHA agreed with us and the OIG that states should conduct
annual internal audits of their own programs and that the results of
these audits should be among the factors OSHA considers when it
evaluates state programs. As shown in appendix II, OSHA and state
program officials have worked on developing draft guidelines for an
internal audit requirement but have not yet reached agreement. In
this process, they are attempting to integrate the internal
performance audits with other monitoring and evaluation procedures to
minimize duplication of effort. Because these guidelines were still
being developed as of January 1994, we were unable to assess their
adequacy.
States generally agree with the concept of requiring
self-assessments, or internal audits. They believe this would
improve their awareness of program weaknesses and assist them in
correcting problems. Some state officials, however, believe that
OSHA should (1) identify the minimum criteria for states to use in
developing and conducting internal audits, (2) supplement states'
staffing and funding to conduct the internal audits, and (3) exempt
those states that already have legislative requirements for annual
internal audits from having to do an additional self-assessment.
INADEQUATE PROCEDURES TO ENSURE
THAT STATES CORRECT PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
Under its routine monitoring approach, OSHA recommends changes it
believes states should make, but does little to ensure corrective
actions are taken by the states. States are responsible only to
"respond" to OSHA's recommendations. As with the measures
themselves, OSHA does not prioritize its recommendations, nor does it
require specific information on state corrective actions.
Both the 1989 OIG study and this review identified cases where states
did not implement OSHA's recommended corrective actions. For
example, we found that 11 of 21 states evaluated by OSHA in 1991 had
not responded to OSHA's 1990 recommendations. In addition, 6 of the
11 states had not responded to recommendations made in previous OSHA
evaluations.
A federal-state task force OSHA established in 1990 to recommend
changes to the monitoring and evaluation procedures (described in
more detail in app. II) is currently considering whether to require
states to submit written action plans regarding OSHA recommendations.
Some state officials believe OSHA should consider requiring plans
only for follow-up in priority program areas.
SPECIAL EVALUATIONS WERE IN
SOME WAYS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER
ROUTINE EVALUATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
In its special evaluations, OSHA made important program improvements.
First, as we recommended in 1988 testimony,\4 OSHA established a set
of priority program areas. The priority areas were (1) timely
adoption of safety and health standards, (2) inspector staffing
levels, (3) adoption of OSHA's fiscal year 1991 700 percent penalty
increase, (4) abatement confirmation, and (5) inspectors'
right-of-entry to worksites. Several differences between the special
and routine evaluations, including the ones we consider most
significant, are shown in table 2.1
Table 2.1
Differences Between OSHA's Routine and
Special Evaluations
Routine
Evaluations Special Evaluations
------------------ ------------------ --------------------
Program priority None 5
areas\a
Performance 115 36
measures\a
Follow-up\a At next scheduled Required 6 months
OSHA evaluation after evaluation
(about every 12
months)
Timeframes for Staggered over the All states evaluated
conducting fiscal year between October 1991
evaluation and January 1992
Coverage Comprehensive Primarily focused on
review but limited enforcement issues,
coverage of unique but included
program features information on
unique program
features
Casefile reviews Less extensive More extensive
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Significant differences in OSHA's special evaluation process.
Second, OSHA reduced the number of program activity measures from 115
to 36. As shown in table 2.2., of the 36 measures, 12 were not
included in OSHA's routine evaluations. (See app. III for a
description of the comparison measures.) OSHA officials have agreed
to reduce its routine program activity measures from 115 to 48, but
final implementation of these measures is not expected before
September 30, 1994.
Table 2.2
Comparison of Program Activity Measures
Used in OSHA's Routine and Special
Evaluations
Routine Special
Program area evaluation evaluation
------------------------------------ ---------- ----------
Safety and health standards
Adoption of standards 4 1
Variances from standards 2 0
Staffing 9 6
Enforcement
Private sector 29 21
Public sector 17 1
Investigation of discrimination 4 1
complaints
Review of contested cases 6 2
Voluntary compliance
Consultation program 27 1
Education and training 5 0
Funding 0 2
Program administration 10 0
Program results 2 1
============================================================
Total 115 36
------------------------------------------------------------
Third, OSHA conducted follow-up evaluations to ensure that states
corrected problems that it had identified as a condition for
continued approval of their programs. States were generally given 5
months after submitting their action plans to make corrections. With
North Carolina, however, OSHA's approach was somewhat different. For
example, OSHA exercised close scrutiny and periodic monitoring over
several months in North Carolina but required no specific action plan
of the state. To ensure that states made corrective actions, OSHA
subsequently conducted follow-up evaluations to determine if state
performance had improved. OSHA's follow-up evaluations may have had
a positive impact on states' performance. (See app. IV for a more
detailed discussion of the results of the special evaluations
conducted in fiscal year 1992.) State action may also have been
influenced, however, by OSHA's release of the results of the
evaluations and follow-up studies to the public.
Although not yet issued in January 1994, OSHA's revised monitoring
and procedures manual did at that time include requirements for
states to submit corrective action plans for unacceptable performance
in specific program activity areas. OSHA officials said they plan to
issue the revised policies and procedures manual by September 30,
1994.
--------------------
\4 OSHA's Monitoring and Evaluations of State Programs
(GAO/T-HRD-88-13, Apr. 20, 1988).
STATE OFFICIALS' OPINIONS ABOUT
OSHA'S OVERSIGHT PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6
ROUTINE EVALUATIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:6.0.1
State officials described OSHA's routine monitoring and evaluation
procedures in generally favorable terms. Of the 21 officials, 16
said the fiscal year 1990 evaluation and monitoring produced a
"mostly accurate" picture of the effectiveness of their state
programs. They identified several areas that they considered to be
strengths of the routine monitoring and evaluation process: (1)
quarterly assessments conducted by OSHA's field staff, which enabled
states to address potential deficiencies prior to the issuance of
OSHA's annual evaluations; (2) cooperative working relationships
developed over time between OSHA and the states; and (3)
comprehensive coverage.
However, state officials expressed the greatest dissatisfaction with
the program activity measures and OSHA's use of the moving target
performance process. In addition, several state officials believe
that OSHA's system focuses on identifying differences between OSHA
and states' performance and not on eliminating or preventing
workplace safety and health hazards. Other concerns were the lack of
experience and training of OSHA's monitoring staff and the lack of
completeness and accuracy of the data OSHA uses.
SPECIAL EVALUATIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:6.0.2
Although state program officials identified some advantages of the
special evaluations, they were generally more critical of OSHA's
special evaluations than of the routine evaluations. Program
officials from nine states said the special evaluations produced a
less accurate picture of the effectiveness of their programs than the
routine evaluations did in fiscal year 1990. In addition, 11 of the
21 state officials also said the special evaluations took "far more
time and effort" on the part of the states. (See app. I for the
survey form we used and a summary of the responses.)
Figure 2.1 summarizes officials' responses to questions about how
OSHA conducted the special evaluations. The most negative
assessments were on the validity of the activity measures as
indicators of a program's effectiveness and the report to the
Congress.
Figure 2.1: State Officials'
Opinions About OSHA's Special
Evaluations
(See figure in printed
edition.)
\a Two states did not respond in this area.
Program officials reiterated their concern about the activity
measures and the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the data OSHA
used. Eleven of the 21 officials identified measures they believe
OSHA should have used either in addition to or in lieu of the ones
used in the special evaluations. Some of the measures suggested by
state officials were (1) percentage of employers inspected each year,
(2) number of other-than-serious violations per inspection, and (3)
time frame for doing inspections.
On the positive side, state officials generally believed that OSHA's
final assessments were more timely and, unlike the routine
evaluations, provided more emphasis on unique safety and health
approaches. Most state officials also viewed OSHA's decision to use
fewer performance measures to assess states as a positive step.
CONCLUSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7
OSHA's process for providing oversight of state-operated safety and
health programs, although currently undergoing change, has
substantial weaknesses. OSHA's special "one-time" evaluations made
some improvements in the procedures used to assess state programs'
performance, but these one-time improvements, even if fully
implemented, will not address the more substantial weaknesses
previously identified by us and the OIG.
We support OSHA's incorporating the more significant changes made in
the special evaluations of state programs, including establishing
priorities, reducing the number of performance measures for assessing
states' overall performance, and requiring corrective action plans.
However, we believe that OSHA's oversight process could be further
enhanced by focusing more on program outcomes and conducting
evaluations of the effectiveness of its own program policies and
procedures and those of state programs as well. OSHA could, for
example, do more assessments of its effectiveness in decreasing
occupational injuries and illnesses in the workplace.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:8
To more effectively carry out the department's statutory
responsibility for oversight of state programs, we recommend that the
Secretary of Labor require the Assistant Secretary for Occupational
Safety and Health to
emphasize measures of program outcome and evaluations of the
effectiveness of specific program features as it assesses both
its own activities and those of the state-operated programs, and
revise OSHA's state program monitoring and evaluation approach by
(1) developing a set of outcome measures, (2) setting outcome
goals and eliminating the "moving target" criteria, (3)
requiring states to conduct internal audits, and (4)
establishing more effective procedures to obtain state
corrective action on significant issues.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:9
OSHA officials agreed with our recommendation for emphasizing
measures of program outcome and evaluation in assessing its own
activities and those of state-operated safety and health programs.
In fact, OSHA and state officials are developing their fiscal year
1994 program goals--in the areas of enforcement, consultation, and
training--with an emphasis on maximizing the impact on workplace
safety and health hazards.
Although OSHA officials agreed to implement a performance measurement
system that uses better measures to more effectively evaluate and
monitor the performance of state-operated safety and health programs,
they disagreed with our recommendation for eliminating the "moving
target" criteria. OSHA officials stated that because (1) they
continually seek to refine and improve the program's effectiveness
and (2) states are required to implement these improvements, they
cannot eliminate the "moving target" criteria and that "some level of
activity measurement will continue to be necessary."
We recognize that standards are not static but must be refined over
time, and that states must continually update their programs.
However, we also believe that further improvements can be made in the
establishment of outcome measures and goals, to replace activity
measures, that will eliminate the "moving target" aspect of OSHA's
current oversight program.
OSHA officials agreed with our recommendation that would require
states to conduct annual internal audits and establish more effective
procedures to obtain state corrective actions. These procedures are
included in OSHA's revised monitoring and evaluation procedures
manual, which OSHA expects to fully implement in fiscal year 1994.
STATE-OPERATED SAFETY AND HEALTH
PROGRAMS HAVE SOME UNIQUE FEATURES
============================================================ Chapter 3
OSHA and state-operated safety and health programs pursue generally
similar approaches to improving workplace safety and health.
However, all state-administered programs differ from OSHA in that
they cover state and local government employees, while OSHA does not.
In addition, some states have exercised their statutory flexibility
to develop additional program features that OSHA does not have.\1
Five program features found in some states but not in OSHA are (l)
requirements for comprehensive worksite safety and health programs,
(2) use of worksite-specific injury and illness data to target
inspections and education and training activities, (3) added
protections in imminent danger situations, (4) extending coverage to
state and local government employees, and (5) employer funding for
the program. We believe the first two of these--worksite safety and
health programs and worksite-specific data--are options for OSHA and
other states. Two others--added protections in imminent danger
situations and extending coverage to state and local government
employees--may warrant further study by OSHA and states that
currently have no program. Some state officials also believe the
direct tie between employers and program funding encourages employers
to reduce worksite safety and health hazards, and this approach could
be used by other states to minimize reliance on state appropriations.
--------------------
\1 Generally, OSHA does not object if states design supplemental
features for their programs as long as a state's overall program
meets minimal OSHA requirements. As described in chapter 1, we based
our understanding of state laws on information provided by OSHA and
state officials, not our analysis of all state laws.
REQUIRED COMPREHENSIVE WORKSITE
SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
OSHA encourages, but does not require, employers to implement
comprehensive worksite safety and health programs, including employee
involvement in developing and operating such programs. In contrast,
nine state-operated programs mandate written safety and health
programs for some or all employers. As we previously reported,\2 we
believe that worksite safety and health program requirements show
promise for adoption by OSHA or other states.
OSHA encourages the use of comprehensive worksite safety and health
programs through a variety of mechanisms including its consultation
program, the Voluntary Protection Program, and the negotiation of
settlement agreements. OSHA requires employers to develop written
safety plans addressing specific hazards through standards, such as
those addressing information to workers about chemical hazards
(hazard communication), process safety management, and the control of
hazardous energy sources (lockout/tagout). As we recommended, OSHA
has initiated a study assessing the effectiveness of worksite
programs and expects a final report by September 30, 1994.
As of February 1993, nine states had legislative requirements for
worksite safety and health programs for some or all employers.\3
(See table 3.1 for a list of these states and app. V for more
details about which employers must comply with program requirements.)
These comprehensive programs, in general, require the employer to
inspect the worksite for known or potential hazards and develop
written plans to abate, to the extent possible, these hazards. All
nine states require that, where employers are required to have a
program, employees must be involved in some way in the development
and implementation of the programs. Six of the nine states require
this involvement to be through joint labor-management safety and
health committees. In addition to these nine states, other states
require worksite programs and committees through provisions in their
workers' compensation program. For example, the Minnesota workers'
compensation statute requires all employers with more than 25
employees and certain small high-risk employers to establish joint
safety and health committees.
Table 3.1
States' Requirements for Employers to
Have Comprehensive Worksite Safety and
Health Programs and Committees
All Some All Some
employer employer employer employer
State s s s s
-------------------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Alaska X X
Arizona
California X
Hawaii X
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota X
Nevada\a X X
New Mexico
North Carolina X X
Oregon X X
South Carolina
Tennessee X X
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington X X
Wyoming \
============================================================
Total 4 5 1 5
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Nevada has not enforced this requirement pending clarification of
important coverage issues by the state legislature.
In our 1992 report, we concluded that safety and health programs can
have positive effects on safety and health at the worksite. In that
report we (l) suggested that the Congress consider passing
legislation that would require high-risk employers to have
comprehensive safety and health programs and (2) recommended that
OSHA use evaluation studies to identify the employers that should be
required to have these programs. Officials in states requiring such
programs believe they result in more efficient inspections and better
use of scarce state resources. In addition, they believe that such
programs contribute to the reduction of injuries and illnesses and
workers' compensation costs.
--------------------
\2 Occupational Safety and Health: Worksite Safety and Health
Programs Show Promise (GAO/HRD-92-68, May 19, 1992), and Occupational
Safety and Health: Options for Improving Safety and Health in the
Workplace (GAO/HRD-90-66BR, Aug. 24, 1990).
\3 One state, Nevada, has had legislation requiring these programs
since 1991 but is not yet enforcing the requirement pending
clarification of important coverage issues by its state legislature.
WORKSITE-LEVEL INJURY AND
ILLNESS DATA FOR TARGETING
INSPECTIONS AND DIRECTING
EDUCATION EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
In contrast with OSHA, which has data on occupational injuries and
illnesses primarily at the industry level, many states use
worksite-level data to target their inspections and education and
training efforts to the most hazardous worksites. The experience in
these states, as well as the results of several empirical studies,
lead us to believe that using worksite-specific data in addition to
industry-aggregated data could improve OSHA's inspection targeting,
education and training efforts, and evaluations of program impact.
STATE USE OF INJURY AND
ILLNESS DATA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
In using injury and illness data in their inspection activities, the
difference between OSHA and many of the states (14 of the 21) is in
how they select worksites for targeted inspections. OSHA and the
states generally have similar inspection priorities, as follows: (1)
imminent danger situations, (2) fatalities and catastrophes, (3)
formal complaints, (4) referrals, and (5) targeted inspections. For
targeted inspections, OSHA uses industrywide data to identify
high-hazard industries and attempts to inspect all employers within
those industries, regardless of their individual record of injuries
and illnesses or previous violations.\4 In contrast, the 14 states
shown in table 3.2 are able to target some or all of their inspection
efforts directly to worksites where hazardous conditions exist
because of their access to worksite-level data, primarily from
workers' compensation files.
Although all 14 states use worksite-specific data, they use the data
in different ways. Four of the 14 states--Hawaii, Michigan, Utah,
and Washington--rely almost exclusively on worksite-level data. For
example, Washington's system establishes a targeted pool of employers
within each industry based on a variety of data including workers'
compensation claims history, inspection or consultation visits, risk
class, size, and nature and types of claims.
Table 3.2
States That Use Worksite-Specific Injury
and Illness Data to Target Inspections
and Employers With Training and
Education Needs
Education and
State Inspections training needs
------------------------------ ------------ --------------
Alaska X X
Arizona\ X
California
Hawaii X X
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Maryland X
Michigan X X
Minnesota X
Nevada
New Mexico
North Carolina X
Oregon X X
South Carolina
Tennessee X X
Utah X X
Vermont X X
Virginia X X
Washington X X
Wyoming X
============================================================
Total 14 9
------------------------------------------------------------
Ten states use both worksite-specific data and OSHA's high-hazard
industry lists, but they use the information in different ways. Two
of these states, Minnesota and Oregon, develop their inspection
targeting list using worksite-specific data, then refer to OSHA's
list of high-hazard industries to supplement that information. For
example, Minnesota targets (1) worksites with high numbers of cases
of lost workdays due to injuries and (2) employers with larger
estimates of expected lost workdays. Oregon targets employers with
disabling claim rates that exceed the state average rate; it gives
the highest priority to worksites with the most workers' compensation
claims and serious violations. A third state, Arizona, has a pilot
program under way in which about half of its targeted inspections are
based on the number of workers' compensation claims while the
remainder are based on OSHA's list of high-hazard industries.
The seven remaining states--Alaska, Maryland, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming--refer to OSHA's list of
high-hazard industries, then target specific employers within these
industries based on workers' compensation data. For example,
Maryland refers to OSHA's list of high-hazard industries and updates
its list with information from the state employers' first reports of
injury, while Wyoming identifies employers with a specific number of
workers' compensation claims filed in the prior year.
As table 3.2 shows, 9 of the 21 states also use worksite-specific
data to target their education and training efforts. For example,
Michigan identifies employers in high-hazard industries and conducts
customized training programs to reduce and eliminate workplace
injuries and illnesses. Some states target training based on the
repeated incidence of certain types of injuries. For example,
Vermont uses workers' compensation data to identify employers with
high rates of ergonomic-related injuries and targets them for
training programs.
--------------------
\4 For safety inspections, OSHA uses average lost workday injury and
illness rates from the BLS Annual Survey of Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses to identify the high-hazard manufacturing industries. For
health inspections, OSHA ranks industries on a national basis
according to the number of serious health violations found during
previous OSHA inspections.
NEED FOR WORKSITE-SPECIFIC
DATA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
We agree with program officials in these 14 states, OSHA, and BLS who
have expressed their belief that access to worksite-specific data
improves the safety and health program. Several research studies
also support that belief.
State program directors believe that their access to
worksite-specific data has provided them with multiple benefits.
These include the ability to (1) target inspections to high-hazard
worksites and employers and (2) identify the need for and target
education and training programs. Most importantly, they believe it
allows them to reallocate scarce resources where they are most
needed.
OSHA officials believe that worksite-specific data would help them
target inspections and educational efforts; they also believe it
would help them evaluate the impact of their programs. To further
assess the value of worksite-specific data, OSHA has undertaken a
joint project with the state of Maine using worksite-specific data to
target enforcement efforts to high-hazard employers. Using workers'
compensation data, OSHA has targeted the "Top Two Hundred"
high-hazard employers based on their workers' compensation claims.
These 200 high-hazard firms comprise about 1 percent of the employers
in Maine but account for about 30 percent of the state's employment
and 45 percent of the claims under the state's workers' compensation
system. In comparing this list of 200 employers with the high-hazard
list the regional office would have used for its routine targeting
effort, OSHA found that its industry-based list included fewer than
10 percent of the top 200 employers identified using the workers'
compensation data. In addition, OSHA's regional administrator
responsible for the Top 200 program told us that an added benefit of
this program is that inspectors are able to determine likely problems
at the worksite prior to a site visit. Based on these data,
inspectors can develop information and assistance packages for the
employers to help them devise hazard abatement plans for their
worksites and employees.
Further, in March 1993, OSHA issued a draft directive to improve the
accuracy of employers' records at the worksite that includes records
verification through employee interviews and reviews of additional
information. OSHA expects to issue this directive in final by March
1995.
Several research studies support the value of worksite-specific data.
For example, we did an analysis in 1988 that compared results of
about 2,700 inspections in fiscal years 1985, 1986, and 1987; it
found that the number of serious violations per inspection was more
closely related to an employer's lost workday injury rate than to
whether the employer was in a low-hazard or high-hazard industry.\5
More recently, a study\6 examining workers' compensation claims, lost
workday cases, and other measures of injury experience found a
substantial degree of persistence in injury and disability
performance across time at the worksite level. Past injury
experience at the worksite was the single most useful predictor of
current injury and disability performance--having more explanatory
power than industry and employment level. A major conclusion of the
study was that "it is obvious that OSHA would benefit from access to
establishment-level data in targeting inspections, or other
interventions designed to improve occupational safety and health
performance."
In another approach to this issue, researchers used data on over
6,000 worksites inspected by OSHA to compare the impact on injury
rates of different kinds of OSHA inspections.\7 One comparison
involved inspections (1) done in response to a worker complaint and
(2) targeted based on OSHA's usual industry-level data, but found to
be at worksites with a higher-than-average injury rate over the
previous 3 years. They found that inspections at worksites with high
injury rates led to a 22-percent reduction in injury rate in the 3
years after an inspection compared with a 14-percent reduction after
a complaint inspection.\8 A conclusion of the study was that the
effectiveness of OSHA's inspections would be improved if it could
target them on the basis of worksite-level injury data.
Historically, BLS officials have been constrained in their ability to
share worksite-specific data with OSHA to improve its inspection
targeting and education and training efforts. On October 21, 1993,
however, officials at OSHA and BLS reached agreement that information
collected by BLS in its Annual Survey of Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses does not provide an effective basis for OSHA to target
inspections at individual establishments. Both agencies agreed that
the survey data are inappropriate for identifying individual
high-hazard employers because the survey gathers data from only a
sample of establishments for inspection by OSHA. As a result, OSHA
and BLS are working together to develop procedures and policies to
obtain these data without compromising the independence and
confidentiality of the data collection process.
Because the law already gives the Secretary of Labor authority to
collect injury and illness data from employers, no statutory change
is needed for OSHA to obtain worksite-specific data. However, the
Secretary would have to decide how best to coordinate OSHA's data
needs with the current BLS survey approach. We discuss options for
OSHA to obtain these data in appendix VI. One problem common to both
options we discuss is the risk that employers may underreport
injuries and illnesses if they know OSHA is collecting or has access
to data about their worksites. As we discussed earlier, OSHA's draft
directive, when implemented, will provide several ways of verifying
occupational injury and illness records and, subsequently, reduce the
likelihood of employers underreporting occupational injuries and
illnesses. Obtaining worksite-specific data would increase the need
for OSHA to have a successful combination of education and
enforcement to prevent underreporting.
--------------------
\5 The results of this analysis were later published in a GAO
report--Occupational Safety and Health: Options for Improving Safety
and Health in the Workplace (GAO/HRD-90-66BR, Aug. 24, 1990), p.
29.
\6 H. Allan Hunt, "Analysis of Persistence in Employer Injury
Rates," W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (Mar. 1993),
p. v.
\7 Wayne B. Gray and John T. Scholz, "How Effective Are Complaint
Inspections?" Report submitted to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, June 24, 1992.
\8 In worksites targeted on the basis of OSHA's usual criteria and
found to have below-average injury rates in previous years, the
injury rates went up 9 percent in the subsequent 3 years after the
inspector's visit. Comparison of the impact is complicated, however,
by the fact that these worksites did not receive a full inspection.
(During the period of these inspections, OSHA's policy was to conduct
a "records check only," that is, to leave the worksite without a full
inspection, if records at the worksite showed below-average injury
rates.)
SHUTDOWN AUTHORITY IN IMMINENT
DANGER SITUATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
An imminent danger situation is one in which worksite conditions or
practices present a danger that could reasonably be expected to cause
death or serious physical harm immediately or before the danger can
be eliminated through the usual enforcement procedures. Ten of the
21 state safety and health programs have the authority to shut down
operations or areas of a worksite if an employer refuses to remove
the hazard. OSHA and other states lack this authority, but we had
too little information about the consequences of this lack of
authority to determine how important it would be for OSHA or state
programs to have it.
OSHA does not have shutdown authority during an imminent danger
situation. If an employer refuses to correct such a situation
immediately, an OSHA inspector must obtain injunctive relief, such as
a temporary restraining order from the appropriate District Court, to
shut down all operations or the specific areas of the worksite where
imminent danger exists. In contrast, the 10 state programs shown in
table 3.3 have authority to shut down worksite operations without
pursuing actions through the courts. In 7 of the 10 states, the
inspector has the authority to shutdown worksite operations. In the
remaining three states--Michigan, Nevada, and Vermont--supervisory
approval is required prior to shutdown in imminent danger situations.
For example, the Nevada Administrator may issue an emergency order to
cease operations based on the inspector's recommendation.
Table 3.3
States With Shutdown Authority in
Imminent Danger Situations
Shutdown
State authority
-------------------------------------------- --------------
Alaska X
Arizona
California X
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky X
Maryland
Michigan X
Minnesota X
Nevada X
New Mexico
North Carolina
Oregon X
South Carolina
Tennessee X
Utah
Vermont X
Virginia
Washington X
Wyoming
============================================================
Total 10
------------------------------------------------------------
State officials believe this increased authority allows them to
provide more immediate protection to ensure workers' safety. In a
1992 report\9 , we noted the advantages, cited by program officials,
of inspectors' authority to shut down operations. For example, this
authority often results in the employer correcting a serious hazard
immediately, an Alaska official told us, because the employer knows
the inspector can stop the operation. Without this authority, worker
protection is delayed while an inspector seeks a court order.
We were unable to identify an appropriate source of data to show how
often inspectors identify imminent danger situations, how quickly
inspectors are able to convince employers to shut down operations or
remove the dangers, or how quickly inspectors can get a court order
to shut down a dangerous operation. As part of its review of reform
legislation, OSHA plans to study whether inspectors need additional
authority in imminent danger situations.
--------------------
\9 Occupational Safety and Health: Options to Improve
Hazard-Abatement Procedures in the Workplace (GAO/HRD-92-105, May 12,
1992).
COVERAGE OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
All state-operated programs differ from OSHA in that they cover state
and local government employees, while OSHA is prohibited by law from
doing so. As a result, an estimated 7.3 million state and local
public employees in 27 states are not protected by federal safety and
health statutes or regulations. We did not determine what coverage
these employees may have from other sources, such as state workers'
compensation programs or private insurers. OSHA officials told us
that part of their review of OSHA reform legislation will include a
study to determine the coverage these employees may have from other
sources.
PROGRAM FUNDING TIED TO
EMPLOYER ASSESSMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
OSHA is funded by an annual appropriation from the Congress, with
which it funds up to 50 percent of the costs to operate state
programs. In contrast, nine states fund all or part of the state
share of their operating costs through assessments that are based, in
part, on employers' records of occupational injuries and illnesses or
safety and health violations. These state officials believe the
direct tie between employers and program funding encourages employers
to reduce safety and health hazards; and this approach minimizes
reliance on state appropriations to fund state safety and health
programs. Because of the complexity involved in OSHA's negotiating
funding arrangements separately in each state, however, we do not
recommend that OSHA adopt this approach. Still, it is an option
other states may wish to consider to fund their portion of the safety
and health program.
As shown in table 3.4, seven states fund the entire portion of their
safety and health programs from employer assessments, and two states
fund only their education and training components through these
assessments.
Table 3.4
States That Fund Their Programs Through
Employer Assessments
Only education and
Entire state training
portion funded activities funded
through through
State assessments assessments
-------------------- ------------------ ------------------
Alaska
Arizona X
California
Hawaii
Indiana X
Iowa
Kentucky X
Maryland
Michigan X
Minnesota X
Nevada X
New Mexico
North Carolina
Oregon X
South Carolina
Tennessee X
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington X
Wyoming
============================================================
Total 7 2
------------------------------------------------------------
Of the seven states that fund the entire portion of their program
through employer assessments, five assess (1) employers who are
self-insured and (2) private insurance carriers. Four of those five
states--Arizona, Kentucky, Oregon, and Tennessee--assess a surcharge
to private insurers and self-insured employers based on workers'
compensation premiums. For example, Kentucky assesses a 23.3 percent
surcharge on the workers' compensation premiums paid to all insurance
carriers and self-insured employers. The fifth state, Minnesota,
assesses a surcharge to private insurance carriers and self-insured
employers based on workers' compensation paid claims during the
previous year.
The funding approaches in Washington and Nevada differ from these
other states. In Washington, the state-operated workers'
compensation program funds the safety and health program from a
portion of workers' compensation premiums paid by employers and
assessments collected from self-insurers. Nevada relies primarily on
payroll assessments charged to all employers, regardless of workers'
compensation or injury and illness history. This program is also
funded, in part, by employers' penalties assessed for workplace
violations and by licensing fees. Two states, Indiana and Michigan,
fund only the education and training activities of their safety and
health programs from an assessment based on workers' compensation
paid claims.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
OSHA and state-operated safety and health programs share similar
approaches based on the statutory requirement that states be at least
as effective as OSHA. However, certain components of state programs
differ from OSHA as a result of state initiatives to improve their
programs. These initiatives, based on OSHA and state program
officials' opinions and research, appear to have a positive impact on
workplace safety and health and some warrant further consideration
and study by OSHA and other states.
State requirements for employers to develop and implement
comprehensive worksite safety and health programs and committees have
reportedly resulted in numerous benefits including (l) better use of
limited inspection resources, (2) improved injury and illness rates
at the worksite level, and (3) improved financial performance for
some companies. Those companies implementing safety and health
committees have reported improved productivity and employee morale.
State access to worksite-specific data has produced multiple benefits
for state-operated safety and health programs, including (l) better
targeting of inspections and education and training programs to the
most hazardous worksites and (2) more efficient use of limited
inspection and training resources. We agree with program officials
in 14 states and OSHA that access to worksite-specific data could
improve the safety and health program. However, along with gaining
access to worksite-specific data, OSHA needs to take additional steps
to ensure that these data are being accurately recorded and reported
by the employer.
In cases of imminent danger, giving inspectors authority to shut down
operations helps ensure the protection of workers until employers
take corrective action. This authority serves as an incentive to
abate hazards in the workplace. Giving OSHA jurisdiction for state
and local government workers could ensure some 7 million workers
safety and health protection and respond to concerns that other
federal agencies with jurisdiction are not covering. These two
program features, although adopted in several states, may warrant
further study by OSHA and other states to assess whether they should
be adopted.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7
We recommend that the Secretary of Labor require the Assistant
Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to (l) develop
procedures for OSHA to obtain worksite-specific injury and illness
data from employers, and (2) implement its procedures for ensuring
that employers accurately record occupational injuries and illnesses.
To determine what, if any, changes are needed regarding coverage for
state and local government employees and protections for workers in
imminent danger situations, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor
require the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to
assess the need for change to (l) extend OSHA's coverage to state and
local government employees in states without OSHA-approved safety and
health programs and (2) give OSHA greater authority to protect
workers in imminent danger situations.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:8
Both OSHA and BLS officials agree that procedures are needed for OSHA
to obtain worksite-specific data from employers. On October 21,
1993, OSHA and BLS reached agreement that worksite-specific data is
needed to enhance OSHA's targeting of inspections to the most
hazardous employers and its education and training efforts. We
believe that along with gaining access to these data, however, OSHA
needs to address the related issues of (l) developing the specific
procedures for obtaining worksite-specific data and (2) ensuring the
accuracy of the records at the worksite. In addition, OSHA officials
agreed that procedures are needed to ensure the accuracy of the
records at the worksite.
OSHA officials agreed to further review the issues of extending
coverage to state and local government employees and providing
additional authority to inspectors in imminent danger situations
during their consideration of the OSHA reform legislation.
SURVEY OF STATE OFFICIALS ON
OSHA'S MONITORING AND EVALUATION
PROCESS AND THE COMBINED
FEDERAL-STATE APPROACH
=========================================================== Appendix I
Through a questionnaire, we surveyed state officials in the 21 states
that have responsibility for private-sector occupational safety and
health programs to (l) obtain their opinions about OSHA's routine and
"special" evaluations of state programs and (2) collect information
about the way the states ensure workers' safety and health. State
officials completed our questionnaire between July and August 1992.
In addition, we followed up with the state officials in February 1993
to confirm information about their state programs.
Our questionnaire had two parts. Part I consisted of a mail-out
questionnaire containing closed-ended and open-ended questions about
OSHA's routine and special monitoring and evaluation process. Part
II provided a description of each state's safety and health program
which we developed from information received from OSHA's Office of
State Programs and other sources. We then surveyed state officials
by telephone to (1) confirm information we had provided in part II;
(2) collect, as necessary, supplementary program information; and (3)
identify program components or features that differed from the OSHA
program and, in the officials' opinions, were particularly noteworthy
or successful.
All of the 21 states responded to our survey. The questionnaire with
summaries of responses to closed-ended questions is shown as follows.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
OSHA ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO
PRIOR GAO AND OIG RECOMMENDATIONS
========================================================== Appendix II
About 5 years after GAO and the Department of Labor's Office of the
Inspector General issued studies identifying significant weaknesses
in OSHA's performance measurement system\1 , OSHA has taken mostly
interim steps to address the recommendations of the OIG and GAO.
--------------------
\1 OSHA's Monitoring and Evaluations of State Programs
(GAO/T-HRD-88-13, Apr. 20, 1988), and OSHA's Monitoring of State
Programs, Final Report No. 05-89-029-10-105 (Jan. 30, 1989).
OSHA HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS
IN RESPONDING TO GAO
RECOMMENDATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
The 1988 GAO study included recommendations that OSHA (l) establish
desired performance levels for use by state programs, (2) require
states to develop quality assurance programs and internal program
audits, and (3) help states develop and implement plans for
evaluating the impact of their programs. As shown in table II.1
below, OSHA has made little progress to address the major weaknesses
we identified.
Table II.1
Status of OSHA Actions Taken in Response
to GAO's 1988 Study Recommendations
Recommendation Agency response(s) Agency action(s)
------------------------- ------------------------- --------------------------
OSHA should establish OSHA agreed to establish OSHA agreed to incorporate
performance levels for specific performance some specific performance
use by state programs and levels where they are levels based on federal
consider providing provided in OSHA policy, OSHA policy in its
incentives for states to but disagreed with (routine) evaluations as
attain them. providing incentives for of June 1988; first
states to attain. included them in its
special evaluations.
OSHA should require that OSHA agreed to consider An OSHA task force
states establish quality requiring states to submitted four draft
assurance programs and implement internal audit proposals to require
conduct periodic review programs. states to develop and
of these efforts. conduct annual assessments
of their safety and health
programs (September 1990,
January 1993, February
1993, and August 1993).
OSHA should work with the OSHA agreed to develop OSHA issued a memorandum
states to implement plans policy requiring regional to its regional directors
to evaluate their offices to evaluate and requiring them to obtain
programs' impact on report on impact studies information on state-
workers' safety and performed by state directed impact studies
health. program officials. and include the results in
state evaluations (January
1990). OSHA's national
office, as of February
1993, received no
information on these
state-directed studies.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1990, OSHA organized a federal-state task force to conduct a
comprehensive review of its monitoring and evaluation system. The
task force, representing both state and federal officials, comprised
five task groups responsible for developing a conceptual framework to
revise OSHA's routine monitoring and evaluation system. The task
force was also responsible for incorporating changes that would
address the system weaknesses in OSHA's performance measurement
system and oversight role.
OSHA, in early 1990, took additional actions to (l) clarify basic
monitoring principles and performance activity measures, (2)
incorporate OSHA enforcement policies as criteria in a few
performance activity measures, (3) require states to use state and
other computerized reports to help verify state databases and daily
program operations, (4) develop draft guidelines for states to
conduct annual internal program audits of their safety and health
programs, and (5) encourage field staff to gather and distribute
information about state-directed efforts to conduct impact
assessments of their programs.
Although OSHA has taken some interim actions, many proposals of the
five task groups remain incomplete, and others await further review
and comments of the OSHA field staff. Three of the five task groups
submitted their proposals for revision in April 1991, recommending
that OSHA (l) streamline its program activities measures, (2)
incorporate grant-based monitoring, and (3) assess the adequacy of
states' internal audit procedures as part of OSHA's evaluation of
states' performance. In February 1993, a fourth task group,
responsible for recommending changes to OSHA's monitoring policies
and procedures (including guidelines for internal audits), submitted
its third draft proposal for review and comment by OSHA's national
office and field staff. The fourth task group also issued a fourth
draft in August 1993. As of January 1994, OSHA had acted on only one
of the four proposals of the four task groups: OSHA officials agreed
to reduce the number of program activity measures used to assess
state programs' performance from 115 to 48, but this decision had not
been implemented in January 1994. In addition, the fifth task group,
responsible for revising the occupational injury and illness activity
measures, had not submitted a report for OSHA's review and comment.
OSHA HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS
IN ITS RESPONSE TO THE OIG
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
OSHA has also made little progress to correct weaknesses in its
monitoring policies and procedures identified in a 1989 report by the
OIG. As of January 1994, OSHA had fully implemented only one of the
OIG recommendations: to require uniform data collection of states
through their participation in OSHA's data information system.
Recommendations not implemented by OSHA included requirements for (1)
improvements in data use and reporting quality, (2) onsite reviews of
critical enforcement program activities, (3) improved tracking and
follow-up procedures, and (4) strengthened internal audits of
regional and area office monitoring activities. OSHA headquarters
officials plan to respond to the remaining OIG recommendations once
the revisions to its routine monitoring and evaluation system are
completed. OSHA's Director of the Office of State Programs and a
task force representative told us that higher priorities and limited
staff and funds have delayed any further actions in this area;
however, OSHA expects to complete all revisions to its routine
monitoring and evaluation system by September 30, 1994.
OSHA PERFORMANCE MEASURES USED IN
THE SPECIAL EVALUATIONS
========================================================= Appendix III
Absolute
performance
Follow- level
Category Measure Initial up (percent)
------------------ ------------------------ --------- -------- -------------
Safety & Health 1. Percent of five
Standards standards adopted 100\a
within
6 months after OSHA
promulgation
Compliance 2 & 3. Percent of
Staffing Levels benchmark positions 100\b
allocated 100\b
Safety
Health
4 & 5. Percent of 80\a
allocated compliance 75\a
positions filled
Safety
Health
84,322\c 84,322\c
6 & 7. Number of 127,463\c r>
covered workers (public 127,463\
and private) for every cr>
inspector
Safety
Health
Enforcement/ 8 & 9. Number of
productivity inspections for every
compliance officer 66.5\d 39.5\d
Safety 23.2\d 14.1\d
Health
10 & 11. Number of
inspections for every .60\d .31\d
1,000 covered workers .16\d .09\d
Safety
Health
Targeting 12 & 13. Total percent
of programmed targeted
inspections 47.4\e 55.2\e
(construction and 14.3\e 20.4\e
nonconstruction)
Safety
Health
72.5\e 61.6\e
14 & 15. Total percent 76.6\e 63.5\e
of programmed targeted
inspections not in
compliance
Safety
Health 65.6\e 68.4\e
76.4\e 71.7\e
16 & 17. Total percent
of programmed targeted
inspections
(nonconstruction) in
high-hazard industries
Safety
Health
Right-of-entry 18. Percent of cases
where entry was 94.7\e 88.4\e
obtained after initial
denial
Complaints 19. Percent of valid
complaints in backlog 5.7\f 17.1\f
status at end of period
Identify/cite 20 & 21. Average number
hazards of violations for every
not-in-compliance 4.6\e 5.0\e
inspection 5.6\e 7.0\e
Safety
Health
64.2\e 66.5\e
22 & 23. Average 57.2\e 62.2\e
percent of serious
violations Safety\e
Safety Safety\e: :
Health 64.1 66.5
1.7 .5
24 & 25. Average 2.4 2.1
percent of serious, 68.2 69.1
willful, repeat, and Health\e
combined violations Health\e: :
Safety 57.2 62.2
Health 2.3 .6
1.9 2.0
61.4 64.8
Abatement 26. Percent of not-in-
compliance inspections 6.2\e 4.1\e
resulting in follow-
up
90\a
27. Percent of case
files where abatement
evidence was adequate
and timely
Penalties 28. Average initial Safety\g
penalties for serious, Safety\g: :
willful, and repeat $670 $1,105
violations 16,090 25,938
Safety 2,184 4,084
Health
Health\g
Health\g: :
$702 $1,208
8,888 15,406
1,862 4,795
Public sector 29. Percent of total
inspections in the 3-17\h
public sector
Review 30. Percent of contested 82.7\e 77.1\e
violations upheld
52.2\e 48.3\e
31. Percent of penalty
retained in settlement
agreement after
employer contest
Discrimination 32. Percent of
discrimination cases in 35\i
backlog at the end of
the fiscal year
Funding 33. Percent of past 3
years when state was
able to match federal
funding
34. Percent of funds
reverted to OSHA over
past 3 years
(deobligated and
lapsed)
Voluntary 35. Percent of total
compliance funds allocated to
voluntary compliance 5-15\j
activity (consultation,
training, and education
activities)
Injury rates 36. Percent of change in
the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' Lost 11.8\k 11.8\k
Workday Injury Rate
(over the past 5 years)
Seven-Fold Penalty Enactment of OSHA's Yes
seven-fold penalty
increase
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Words in boldface type are the five priority program areas.
New performance measures used in only the special evaluations are
shown in italics.
\a Further Review Level (FRL): not less than this amount.
\b FRL: not less than this amount, except for states without final
approval, for which comparison is 80 percent.
\c FRL: not above federal level.
\d FRL: no more than 20 percent above or below federal level.
\e FRL: no more than 20 percent below federal level.
\f FRL: no more than 20 percent above federal level.
\g FRL: no more than 20 percent below federal level for four of the
six items.
\h FRL: not outside this range.
\i FRL: not more than this amount.
\j FRL: not outside this range for states with final approval; for
others, acceptable range is between 10 and 20 percent.
\k FRL: no more than 10 percent above federal OSHA's level.
RESULTS OF OSHA'S SPECIAL AND
FOLLOW-UP EVALUATIONS OF STATE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
PROGRAMS
========================================================== Appendix IV
Between October 1991 and January 1992, OSHA conducted special
evaluations of all 21 states that have responsibility for workers'
safety and health in both the public and private sector. OSHA then
conducted follow-up evaluations during August 1992 to assess states'
progress in correcting performance considered unacceptable, with the
intention of withdrawing approval from any state program not
providing adequate safety and health protections.
In October 1992, OSHA released its final follow-up evaluation
reports.\1 As your Committee requested, a summary of OSHA's
conclusions (at the time of the special and the follow-up
evaluations) regarding the states' performance and our observations
follow.
--------------------
\1 OSHA released its final conclusions about the North Carolina
occupational safety and health program on March 30, 1993.
OSHA'S SPECIAL AND FOLLOW-UP
EVALUATIONS OF STATE PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1
In the special evaluations of state programs--the most recent
evaluation reports available for all states at the time of our
review--OSHA considered all 21 states unacceptable in one or more of
the areas assessed. In the follow-up to the evaluations, OSHA found
substantial improvement in state performance but still found at least
one area of unacceptable performance in 19 states. Seven of those
states had performance that OSHA still considered unacceptable in one
or more of the five areas identified by OSHA as high priority, but
OSHA did not withdraw approval for any state to continue operating
its own program.
OSHA'S ASSESSMENT OF STATES'
PERFORMANCE IN PRIORITY PROGRAM
AREAS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2
As we discussed in chapter 2, OSHA identified five priority program
areas in its special evaluations: (l) adoption of safety and health
standards within 6 months after OSHA promulgated them, (2) adequate
compliance officer (inspector) staffing levels\2 , (3) adoption of
the 700 percent penalty increase mandated by the Congress in 1990 and
implemented by OSHA in March 1991, (4) adequate (complete) and timely
evidence that employers abated hazards for which they had been cited,
and (5) procedures for right-of-entry. As figure IV.1 shows, OSHA
initially considered 20 of the 21 states, all except South Carolina,
to be unacceptable in one or more of the priority areas.
Figure IV.1: Areas in Which
OSHA Concluded State
Performance Was Unacceptable in
Special and Follow-up
Evaluations--Five Priority
Areas
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The area in which the most states (16 of the 21) were unacceptable
was abatement evidence. As appendix III, which lists the specific
measures used to assess performance in each area, shows, a state
could be unacceptable in this area either because it conducted 20
percent fewer follow-up inspections to confirm abatement than OSHA
did or because fewer than 90 percent of the case files examined
showed adequate and timely evidence of abatement. It was a
comparison with a 90-percent standard for adequacy in the case files,
which was used for the first time in the special evaluations, that
caused most states to be considered unacceptable.\3
In the follow-up evaluations 6 months later, OSHA concluded that 13
of the 20 states had resolved program inadequacies. In the seven
states where OSHA still found state performance unacceptable, (l) all
seven\4 states lacked adequate and timely procedures for verification
of abatement or follow-up inspections, (2) three states were below
their required compliance inspector staffing levels, and (3) one
state had not adopted OSHA standards within 6 months of OSHA's date
of issuance. Regarding the timely adoption of federal standards, 11
of the 12 states completely met OSHA's requirement, even though 10 of
the 11 had been unacceptable in the fiscal year 1990 evaluations as
well. For example, California enacted a provision to enforce the
federal standard if an equivalent state standard were not adopted
within 6 months. Michigan, the only state still considered
unacceptable, had initiated action that, when fully implemented, will
bring its process into compliance.
--------------------
\2 To comply with a court order, OSHA requires states to maintain the
number of safety and health inspectors considered necessary to
operate a "fully effective" program. This number, called the
"benchmark," is based on a formula that considers data such as the
number of inspections, average number of workers at each worksite in
each industry, and percentage of inspector hours spent conducting
different types of inspections. Using the formula on state-specific
data generates the benchmark level of safety and health inspectors
for that state.
\3 For further discussion of the way OSHA confirms abatement, and our
criticism of its policies, see Occupational Safety and Health: OSHA
Policy Changes Needed to Confirm That Employers Abate Serious Hazards
(GAO/HRD-91-35, May 8, 1991).
\4 GAO reported this number during OSHA oversight hearings (October
20, 1993) as six states lacking adequate and timely procedures for
verification of abatement or follow-up inspection, but OSHA
headquarters officials later concluded that the performance of one
other state--Vermont--also remained unacceptable at the follow-up
evaluation.
OSHA'S ASSESSMENT OF STATES'
PERFORMANCE IN NONPRIORITY
PROGRAM AREAS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3
In addition to the 5 priority areas, OSHA also assessed states'
performance in 11 other areas, usually comparing them with comparable
statistics for OSHA in the same time period. OSHA initially
considered all states unacceptable in one or more of these areas.
Most of the states were acceptable in the areas of program funding,
funds spent to encourage voluntary compliance, and review of
contested cases. OSHA found that 10 states had shown a greater
5-year increase in injury rates than OSHA had, but, as discussed in
chapter 2, concluded that there were reasons other than the program
itself that generally explained the discrepancy. In addition, OSHA
could not assess improvement on that measure at the follow-up because
of the short time interval. Table IV.2 shows state performance in
the other seven areas.
Figure IV.2: Areas in Which
OSHA Concluded State
Performance Was Unacceptable in
Special and Follow-up
Evaluations--7 of the 11
Nonpriority Areas
(See figure in printed
edition.)
At the time of the follow-up evaluations, three states--Iowa, Oregon,
and Virginia--had completely resolved the problems identified by
OSHA; OSHA continued to consider the other 18 states unacceptable in
one or more of the same program areas. The three nonpriority areas
in which the most states continued to be considered unacceptable were
(l) procedures for classifying violations and issuing citations, (2)
productivity (number of inspections for each compliance inspector and
per 1,000 covered workers, taking into consideration as well the
number of violations cited for each inspection), and (3) procedures
for targeting inspections. In addition, 10 of the 21 states had
occupational injury rates that OSHA considered unacceptable.
CLASSIFYING VIOLATIONS AND
ISSUING CITATIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:3.1
In the special evaluations, OSHA compared states' performance in this
area with its average performance of citing 64.2 percent of its total
safety and 57.2 percent of its total health violations as serious.\5
States' performance was expected to be no more than 20 percent below
OSHA's performance in each category, that is, OSHA expected a state's
performance to be no lower than 51.4 percent for safety violations
and 45.8 percent for health violations.
Nineteen of the 21 states did not meet OSHA's performance levels in
the average percentage of violations classified as serious. In the
follow-up evaluations, all but four states--Iowa, Maryland, Oregon,
and Virginia--continued to perform at levels OSHA considered
unacceptable. For example, at the time of the special evaluations,
the Tennessee safety and health program classified 26 percent safety
and 28 percent health violations as serious. At the time of OSHA's
follow-up evaluation, Tennessee continued to fall short of OSHA's
performance (which was then 67 percent for serious safety and 62
percent for serious health) by classifying 30 percent of its safety
and 40 percent of its health violations as serious.
State officials identified several factors as reasons for differences
in the percentage of total violations cited as serious. Some of
these were differences in inspection procedures: (1) different
procedures used in citing violations, (2) the experience of
compliance inspectors, and (3) more frequent inspections of
worksites, which might lead to fewer serious violations being found.
Others, however, reflect differences in the worksites, not in the
inspection procedures; examples are smaller size of employers and
industry mix.
OSHA officials believe that classifying a low percentage of total
violations as serious is one indication that a state may be operating
an ineffective safety and health program. Further, OSHA's Director
of the Office of State Programs told us that numbers and percentages
of violations are merely indicators that lead to further analysis of
a state's actual practice of classifying violations. It is worth
noting, however, that there have been significant increases over time
in the number of serious violations OSHA has cited. A 1993
Department of Labor study\6 of the trends in OSHA's enforcement data
points out, for example, that 2 percent of all violations were
serious in fiscal year 1976, compared with about 62 percent in fiscal
year 1991.
--------------------
\5 OSHA defines a serious violation as a condition (accident or
injury) that could most likely cause death or serious physical harm
from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes
that have been adopted or are in use in a workplace.
\6 Frederic B. Siskind, "Twenty Years of OSHA Federal Enforcement
Data: A Review and Explanation of the Major Trends," U.S.
Department of Labor/Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1993), pp. 12-14.
PRODUCTIVITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:3.2
As measures of productivity, OSHA uses the average number of
inspections conducted per safety and health compliance inspector for
each 1,000 covered workers, but it combines that measure with another
one (average number of violations cited during inspections in which
there were some violations) to draw its conclusion about whether a
state's performance is acceptable. (See app. III for more details
on the measures.)
It was the number of inspections for each compliance inspector,
combined with the violations cited, that led OSHA to conclude that 10
states were unacceptable at the time of the special evaluation and 7
remained unacceptable at the follow-up. OSHA considered a state
unacceptable if its numbers differed too much from OSHA's statistics.
(OSHA, at the time of its special assessments, averaged 67 safety and
23 health inspections for each compliance inspector compared with a
state average of 118 safety and 40 health inspections a year for each
compliance inspector during the same period.) For example, at the
follow-up evaluations, OSHA found that seven states conducted more
inspections for each compliance inspector than OSHA but found fewer
violations than OSHA. As a result, OSHA considered the performance
in these seven states unacceptable.
State program officials maintained, however, that there were
reasonable explanations for their performance. For example, the
Wyoming compliance inspectors performed more safety inspections and
over twice as many health inspections as OSHA, but the state
inspectors identified and issued citations for fewer violations
during their inspections. A state program official explained that
the large number of smaller employers--approximately 80 percent of
the employers have fewer than 10 employees--allows each state
compliance inspector to do considerably more inspections than each
OSHA compliance inspector. At the same time, one would not expect a
smaller worksite with fewer employees to have as many violations as a
larger one.
PROCEDURES FOR TARGETING
INSPECTIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:3.3
Another program area in which states remained unacceptable during
OSHA's follow-up evaluations was the use of inspection targeting
procedures. At the time of OSHA's follow-up, five of eight states
were still considered unacceptable in their inspection targeting
procedures. States conducted fewer targeted inspections than OSHA
and those that were done were not targeted to the high-hazard
industries identified by OSHA. For example, the California program
was considered unacceptable in its inspection targeting approach
because they did too many inspections of complaints and accidents
compared with OSHA. The California program conducted 61 (5.9 percent
of total targeted) safety and 4 (11.8 percent of total targeted)
health inspections of high-hazard industries compared with OSHA's
1,034 (65.6 percent of total targeted) safety and 34 (67.9 percent of
total targeted) health inspections. Although the state's procedures
for inspection targeting comply with OSHA's priorities for inspection
of worksites, the California Labor Code requires certain additional
investigations, for example, investigation of accidents, that are not
required of OSHA by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. OSHA's
major concern is that many high-hazard employers and industries in
California are not being inspected because their employees do not
file complaints. OSHA has concluded that the state's inspection
targeting system does not adequately protect employees in high-hazard
industries.
OSHA also considered the New Mexico program to be unacceptable in the
percentage of programmed inspections conducted in the high-hazard
manufacturing industry. The manufacturing industry, however,
accounts for only 8.2 percent of the jobs in New Mexico compared with
20 percent of the jobs nationwide. New Mexico has a higher
concentration of construction than manufacturing worksites.
REQUIRED COMPREHENSIVE WORKSITE
SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS AND
COMMITTEES
=========================================================== Appendix V
As of February 1993, nine states had legislative requirements for
some or all employers to have worksite safety and health programs,
and six states also required them to have safety and health
committees. This is an increase from the six states with required
programs and three states with required committees that we reported
in May 1992. Table V.1 summarizes state employer requirements for
comprehensive worksite safety and health programs and committees.
Table V.1
State Requirements for Comprehensive
Worksite Safety and Health Programs and
Committees
Labor-management
State/(date of law) Programs committees
------------------------- ------------------------- --------------------------
Alaska (1973) All employers Employers in pulp, paper,
and paperboard mill
industries
California (1989) All employers None, but state encourages
all employers to have them
Hawaii (1982) All employers None
Minnesota (1990) Employers with specific None
injury and illness
rates\a
Nevada (1991, but not yet Employers with specific Employers with specific
enforced) injury and illness injury and illness rates\b
rates\b
North Carolina (1992) Employers with 11 or more Employers with 11 or more
workers and specific workers and specific
workers' compensation workers' compensation
experience\c experience\c
Oregon (1991) Employers with 11 or more Employers with 11 or more
employees and high-risk employees and high-risk
employers with 10 or employers with 10 or fewer
fewer employees\d employees\d
Tennessee (1993) Employers with specific Employers with specific
workers' compensation workers' compensation
experience\e experience\e
Washington (1960) All employers All employers\f
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Employers in industries with lost workday injury rates or injury
and illness rates (or both) at or above the state average for all
industries.
\b Employers with injury and illness incidence rates in the top 25
percent in the state for that industry. However, Nevada has not
enforced its requirement pending the state's clarification of
legislative intent.
\c Employers with experience rates (factor for calculating workers'
compensation premiums) of 1.5 or more.
\d High-risk employers are defined by their workers' compensation
premium rates or lost workday incidence rates.
\e Employers, including those self-insured, with experience rates in
the top 25 percent of all covered employers.
\f Employers with 10 or fewer employees may have foreman-crew
meetings that address the required committee responsibilities.
OSHA'S OPTIONS FOR OBTAINING
WORKSITE-SPECIFIC INJURY AND
ILLNESS DATA
========================================================== Appendix VI
Two kinds of worksite-specific injury and illness data that OSHA
might use are (l) workers' compensation records and (2) employer
records required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. For the
most part, states are relying on workers' compensation data or other
private insurer data for their worksite-specific targeting. Although
these data may be adequate for state purposes, they would be
inadequate for OSHA to develop a nationwide targeting system because
of the variations from state to state in workers' compensation
coverage and confidentiality rules. For example, reportable injury
definitions and reporting time frames can vary significantly from one
state to another--21 states require that all injuries occurring on
the job be reported, while other states require that injuries
resulting in 1 or more lost workdays be reported.\1 Thus, the only
nationally consistent source of worksite-specific data available to
OSHA is the OSHA log (OSHA 200) and supplemental records. OSHA
regulations require all employers to maintain this log documenting
recordable injuries and illnesses.
--------------------
\1 See Child Labor: Work Permit and Death and Injury Reporting
Systems in Selected States (GAO/HRD-92-44FS, Mar. 16, 1992).
OPTIONS FOR COLLECTING
WORKSITE-SPECIFIC DATA FROM
REQUIRED EMPLOYERS' RECORDS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:1
If OSHA is to target its resources based on worksite-specific data,
it has two options: (1) devise a procedure to share
employer-specific data with BLS or (2) collect OSHA log data directly
from employers. Any decision regarding the best way to obtain such
data will rest on an analysis of the costs and benefits associated
with each option.
OSHA could obtain data from the BLS annual survey in a variety of
ways. For example, OSHA could obtain the data directly from BLS or
from the state agencies collecting this data for BLS. In either
case, BLS would have to modify or eliminate its confidentiality
requirement. In addition, although the survey covers most
high-hazard worksites with 100 or more employees, some changes to the
BLS sample would be required. For example, OSHA officials have
estimated that if they were to use data for manufacturing firms with
100 or more employees, 10,000 to 15,000 more employers would have to
be added to the current BLS survey.
An alternative would be to have employers send their survey data to
OSHA where it could be processed and forwarded to BLS. Both the Mine
Safety and Health Administration, part of the Department of Labor,
and the Federal Railroad Administration have negotiated a similar
arrangement with BLS ensuring their access to worksite-specific data.
By collecting and processing these data themselves and then
forwarding it to BLS, they are able to access the worksite-specific
information prior to its becoming confidential. To do this, OSHA
would have to implement and operate a data processing system similar
to that operated by the state collection agencies under the current
system.
Alternatively, employers could be required to send their survey data
to the state agencies, BLS, and OSHA. This would avoid the problem
of confidentiality, which comes into play when the data reach the
state agencies. However, this alternative would cause extra burden
to employers, and require OSHA to implement and operate a duplicative
data processing system, as mentioned above. A slight change to this
alternative would be for OSHA to collect information from high-hazard
employers, while BLS continues to collect information for its survey.
This would also require duplicative data processing systems and
increased burden on employers, many of whom would be required to
respond to two separate surveys.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VII
COMMENTS FROM THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
========================================================== Appendix VI
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
======================================================== Appendix VIII
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN
SERVICES DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Lawrence J. Horinko, Assistant Director, (202) 512-7001
Carlotta C. Joyner, Assistant Director
Linda W. Stokes, Evaluator-in-Charge
Clarita Mrena, Assistant Director (Design and Data Analysis Group)
Ann McDermott, Publishing Advisor
Milton Ram�rez, Evaluator
PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL OFFICE
Margaret A. McGregor, Issue Area Manager
Carolyn Alessi, Evaluator
Laura Petty, Evaluator
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
======================================================== Appendix VIII
Occupational Safety and Health: Differences Between Program in the
United States and Canada (GAO/HRD-94-15FS, Dec. 6, 1993).
Occupational Safety and Health: Changes Needed in the Combined
Federal-State Approach (GAO/T-HRD-94-3, Oct. 20, 1993).
Occupational Safety and Health: Uneven Protections Provided to
Congressional Employees (GAO/HRD-93-1, Oct. 2, 1992).
Occupational Safety and Health: Improvements Needed in OSHA's
Monitoring of Federal Agencies' Programs (GAO/HRD-92-97, Aug. 28,
1992).
Occupational Safety and Health: Worksite Safety and Health Programs
Show Promise (GAO/HRD-92-68, May 19, 1992).
Occupational Safety and Health: Options to Improve Hazard-Abatement
Procedures in the Workplace (GAO/HRD-92-105, May 12, 1992).
Occupational Safety and Health: Penalties for Violations Are Well
Below Maximum Allowable Penalties (GAO/HRD-92-48, Apr. 6, 1992).
Occupational Safety and Health: OSHA Action Needed to Improve
Compliance With Hazard Communication Standard (GAO/HRD-92-8, Nov.
26, 1991).
Managing Workplace Safety and Health in the Petrochemical Industry
(GAO/T-HRD-92-1, Oct. 2, 1991)
Occupational Safety and Health: OSHA Policy Changes Needed to
Confirm That Employers Abate Serious Hazards (GAO/HRD-91-35, May 8,
1991).
Occupational Safety and Health: Inspectors' Opinions on Improving
OSHA Effectiveness (GAO/HRD-91-9FS, Nov. 14, 1990).
Occupational Safety and Health: Options for Improving Safety and
Health in the Workplace (GAO/HRD-90-66BR, Aug. 24, 1990).
Occupational Safety and Health: Assuring Accuracy in Employer Injury
and Illness Records (GAO/HRD-89-23, Dec. 30, 1988).
OSHA's Monitoring and Evaluation of State Programs (GAO/T-HRD-88-13,
Apr. 20, 1988).