Army National Guard: Officer Candidate Training Should Be Consolidated at One Site (Letter Report, 03/22/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-1). The Defense Department funds more than 50 schools to produce officers for the Army National Guard. GAO reviewed the operations of these schools to determine whether the Army National Guard could meet its officer needs more effectively and economically. This report discusses the (1) numbers of officers being produced by the various National Guard commissioning sources, particularly the state officer candidate schools; (2) recent consolidation of portions of the state officer candidate school programs; and (3) potential for increasing economies through further consolidation. --------------------------- Indexing Terms ----------------------------- REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-1 TITLE: Army National Guard: Officer Candidate Training Should Be Consolidated at One Site DATE: 03/22/94 SUBJECT: Armed forces reserve training Military training Military officers Army personnel Education or training costs Military cost control Federal agency reorganization Military reserve personnel Centralization Cost effectiveness analysis IDENTIFIER: Georgia Reserve Officer Training Corps Nebraska Alaska Wyoming Arkansas Maine Virginia ************************************************************************** * This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO * * report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, * * headings, and bullets are preserved. Major divisions and subdivisions * * of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are * * identified by double and single lines. The numbers on the right end * * of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the * * document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the page * * numbers of the printed product. * * * * No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure * * captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble * * those in the printed version. * * * * A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document * * Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your * * request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015, * * Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders * * for printed documents at this time. * ************************************************************************** Cover ================================================================ COVER Report to the Secretary of Defense March 1994 ARMY NATIONAL GUARD - OFFICER CANDIDATE TRAINING SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED AT ONE SITE GAO/NSIAD-94-1 Army National Guard Abbreviations =============================================================== ABBREV ARNG - Army National Guard DOD - Department of Defense OCS - officer candidate school ROTC - Reserve Officers Training Corps Letter =============================================================== LETTER B-255109 March 22, 1994 The Honorable William J. Perry Secretary of Defense Dear Mr. Secretary: The Department of Defense (DOD) funds the operation of over 50 schools to produce officers for the Army National Guard (ARNG). We reviewed the operations of these schools to determine if the ARNG could meet its officer needs more effectively and economically. We examined the (1) numbers of officers being produced by the various ARNG commissioning sources, particularly the state officer candidate schools (OCS); (2) recent consolidation of portions of the state OCS programs; and (3) potential for increasing economies through further consolidation. BACKGROUND ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1 The ARNG exists in all 50 states plus the District of Columbia and the trust territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The National Guard has both a state and a federal mission. In peacetime, the National Guard performs a variety of state support roles such as riot control, disaster relief, and drug interdiction, in addition to training for their wartime mission. In wartime, the National Guard can be mobilized and called to active duty for extended periods of time. The ARNG operates OCS programs in conjunction with state military academies in 52 states and territories. Currently, all but Guam and the Virgin Islands offer the OCS course as a part of their state military academy curriculum. The cost of operating the OCS programs is supported primarily with federal dollars. The state OCS program lasts approximately 1 year and is taught in three phases. Phase 1, conducted in a 2-week annual summer training period, focuses on individual- and squad-level skills. Phase 2 continues a mix of individual- and squad-level training at a frequency of 1 weekend per month. Phase 3 is conducted during the next summer's 2-week annual training period, and emphasizes platoon-level training. At the end of the phase 3 training, individuals are eligible to be commissioned in the ARNG. Other sources of newly commissioned ARNG officers include the federal OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia; the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC); and direct appointments (which are primarily professional personnel such as doctors, lawyers, and chaplains). Fort Benning is the only active Army site offering OCS training, and offers two OCS courses--the regular active duty 14-week course and a reserve component course, which is 10 weeks in duration.\1 From 1981 through 1992, an average of 44.4 percent of initial accessions were from the state OCSs, 41.7 percent were ROTC graduates, 4.4 percent received officer training at Fort Benning, and 9.5 percent received direct appointments. In addition to these commissioning programs, the ARNG also gets officers from those leaving active duty. -------------------- \1 We were told those attending the 10-week class spend more hours per week in training activities, some of the physical training aspects are shortened, and some optional training activities are omitted. All Army commissioning programs, active and reserve, are required to meet the standards established in the Military Qualifications Standards-1 manual, regardless of the length of the training. RESULTS IN BRIEF ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2 ARNG officer requirements and the number of officers commissioned through the state OCS program have declined by one-third since 1988 and could decline further. The ARNG has begun consolidation of phases 1 and 3 of the states' officer training. However, this will not reduce the number of schools in operation. Consolidation of ARNG commissioning training at a single site would offer additional opportunities to enhance the quality of the program and cut costs by closing the state programs. In response to congressional direction, the Army considered, but rejected, the feasibility of requiring all officer candidates to attend the OCS program at Fort Benning. Its conclusion was based on the following assumptions: (1) Fort Benning does not have sufficient capacity to train the ARNG candidates, (2) candidates would not be willing to attend a centralized program, and (3) the quality of the consolidated program would not be superior to the state programs. We believe the Army did not have sufficient basis to reject the feasibility of the consolidation approach because the first two assumptions were not sound and the third assumption is untestable because the Army does not capture data on the quality of the various OCS programs. However, available evidence suggests that a centralized OCS program for the ARNG would provide equal or higher quality commissioning training at a lower cost. NUMBER OF OFFICERS PRODUCED BY ARNG OCS PROGRAM HAS DECLINED ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3 The number of ARNG graduates of the state OCS program declined from almost 1,900 to less than 1,200 between 1988 and 1993, as shown in figure 1. Figure 1: State OCS Graduates, 1988-93 (See figure in printed edition.) With the overall decline in OCS graduates, the size of the graduating classes in individual state schools has likewise declined. Table 1 shows how the class sizes of the state academies have decreased over the past 5 years. In 1988, California and New York graduated 143 and 128 ARNG officers, respectively. By 1992, the highest number to graduate from any one school was California, with 70 graduates; Nevada graduated 3, while Alaska and the District of Columbia did not operate a class that year. Table 1 Size of State OCS Classes Based on the Number of ARNG Graduates 1988-92 11- 26- 51- 76- Year 1-10 25 50 75 100 101+ Total ----------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ===== 1988 8 15 15 11 1 2 52 1989 9 24 10 7 1 2 53 1990 7 22 19 2 2 0 52 1991 7 24 16 3 2 0 52 1992 10 22 15 3 0 0 50 ------------------------------------------------------------ Despite the steady decline in the number of candidates, the number of classes during 1988 to 1992 has remained fairly constant. Overall, the typical state OCS program is fairly small. In fact, 64 percent of the state OCS classes graduated fewer than 26 candidates in 1992. The ARNG's need for new officers from its OCSs has been decreasing, due to (1) cuts in military forces; (2) new officers commissioned via the ROTC; and (3) the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992, which established an objective of increasing the percentage of qualified prior active-duty officers in the ARNG to 65 percent by September 30, 1997. Anticipating an annual need for 1,500 to 2,100 lieutenants through 1996, the ARNG plans for state academies and the federal OCS together to provide one-third of that number, with ROTC and active-duty sources each providing another third. Of the OCS third, federal OCS will train 35 percent (175 to 245) and the state academies will train the remaining 65 percent (325 to 455 students). This will represent a significant reduction from the nearly 1,200 candidates who graduated from state academies in 1992. ARNG IS CONSOLIDATING PARTS OF STATE OCS PROGRAM ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4 To maintain training quality as the number of students decline, ARNG academy officials have begun some consolidation of the annual training periods (phases 1 and 3). In 1993, 43 states consolidated at least one of their annual training periods. Phase 1 training was conducted at 31 locations and phase 3 at 20 locations during 1993. By 1995, the ARNG plans to conduct phase 1 training at only five locations and phase 3 training at only two locations. Phase 2, however, would continue to be taught over a year during weekend drills at the individual state OCS academies. According to ARNG officials, consolidation of phase 1 and phase 3 provides the following advantages: A sufficient number of candidates is needed to provide realistic platoon-level training. We were told that 40 to 50 students are needed to provide 4 full squads for this training, although some officials believe that 24 students organized into 3 skeletally-staffed squads is sufficient. Even using this lesser number as a criterion, in 1992 only 20 of the states had enough students to provide realistic training. All active and reserve component Army officer candidates would receive the same training. Several states are also considering consolidation of phase 2 (weekend) training, which is considered highly desirable for those adjacent states having too few students to conduct realistic and economical training. In 1993, for example, Alaska and Wyoming offered a consolidated, shortened training period of 6 weeks--2 weeks of phase 1 were taught in a consolidated session in Nebraska, then a 2-week phase 2 was held in Alaska, followed by a 2-week phase 3 in Washington. Six-week training periods are not new to Alaska's ARNG academy; for years, the OCS there offered its program in one 6-week period. According to Alaska ARNG officials, a 6-week training program fits the seasonal nature of Alaskan life styles, has been accredited, and meets all the standards required of such schools. A SINGLE TRAINING SITE COULD ENHANCE QUALITY AND LOWER COSTS ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5 The ARNG's consolidation efforts offer some advantages over the current training. However, consolidating all phases of ARNG training into a 10-week course at a single site could result in even higher-quality training and more cost savings. One-site training would ensure that all ARNG officer candidates receive the same level and quality of training. A full-time faculty and staff would provide continuity of training and counseling. The quality of instructors could be more easily assessed at a single location. Additionally, one-site training would allow greater realism in training. Consecutive or uninterrupted training could also minimize refresher training currently needed in the one drill weekend per month training. In fact, the Air National Guard trains its officer candidates this way. All of its candidates are trained at one site--the Air National Guard Academy of Military Science--in a 6-week officer training program. Consolidated training could also reduce the attrition rate for the officer candidate schools. We found that centralized courses, such as the National Guard OCS program offered by the Air Force and the federal OCS program at Fort Benning, have experienced lower attrition rates than the state academies. ARNG now averages a 38-percent attrition rate; in comparison, ARNG officer candidates attending the federal OCS have averaged a 27-percent attrition rate. The Air National Guard Academy has experienced only a 2-percent attrition rate over the last 3 years. Training all ARNG officers at a single site offers the opportunity for significant savings with regard to personnel. However, because neither National Guard headquarters nor the individual states track personnel costs associated with the OCS programs, it is difficult to estimate the amount of such savings with precision. At the four states we visited (Alaska, Arkansas, Maine, and Virginia), we constructed estimates of annual personnel costs ranging from $54,000 to $155,000, averaging approximately $102,000. Assuming each of the 52 OCS programs incurred the average personnel cost, the total personnel costs for operating OCS would be approximately $5.3 million. We believe this is a conservative estimate, as we did not visit any of the larger schools. The limitations on the cost data are discussed in greater detail in our scope and methodology section. Officials at the federal OCS program at Fort Benning told us that they currently produce approximately 400 graduates with a full-time staff of 38. If the number of OCS candidates were increased to Fort Benning's full capacity of 1,200--enough to train both active and ARNG candidates--program officials said they would need 24 more fulltime personnel. These personnel would cost about $1.4 million a year. If all state OCS candidates were trained at Fort Benning the cost savings could be about $3.9 million a year, depending on how many positions were eliminated at the state academies. Eliminating the state OCS programs would not entail closing any installations or facilities, since the OCS schools are a relatively small part of the state ARNG military training programs. Neither National Guard headquarters nor the individual states track travel expenses associated specifically with the ARNG OCS programs. While sending all officer candidates to a single site would likely require more travel expenses than the state programs have been incurring, centralized training could still save money if the travel cost experiences at the state academies we visited are indicative of total savings. While training all officer candidates at a single site would require all academies to transport their candidates to that location, candidates would only have to be transported one time to complete the OCS course. In fact, many states have already begun transporting their candidates to out-of-state training and anticipate doing it more under the planned interstate consolidations of phases 1 and 3 in the future. For example, as a result of the summer training consolidations, 22 academies incurred transportation expenses to send their officer candidates to one phase of training conducted in another state. Another 14 academies incurred transportation expenses to send candidates out of state for 2 phases. Plans for further summer training consolidation will result in most of the state academies having to transport their candidates twice to training conducted outside of their resident state. In addition, requiring all candidates to attend a single site will eliminate the in-state transportation expenses incurred during the phase 2 (weekend drill) training. Currently, several states are incurring travel expenses to get their officer candidates to the weekend drill periods of phase 2 training. Candidates attached to local ARNG units receive travel and per diem allowances for weekend drills. The states differ in deciding whether candidates should be attached to the academy or left with their home units, so some states pay travel expenses while others do not. In one of the four states we visited, phase 2 travel costs involved in commissioning an officer were as high as $26,000. The phase 2 travel expenses would not be required for any officer candidates attending the 10-week consolidated training at a single site. ARMY REJECTED FORT BENNING FOR ONE-SITE CONSOLIDATION BUT DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6 Consolidating the ARNG OCS programs is not a new idea. Section 527 of the fiscal years 1992 and 1993 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 102-190) required the Army to evaluate the desirability of requiring all ARNG personnel seeking a commission through OCS to attend the OCS at Fort Benning. This requirement was prompted by a concern over variance in quality of the state-administered OCS courses. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) reported in March 1993 that "... the Army believes the current system strikes a reasonable balance between quality, available resources, field requirements, and the needs of RC [Reserve Component] soldiers." The Army based its conclusions on three assumptions: (1) ARNG-OCS needs would exceed the capacity of Fort Benning and therefore require significant investment in additional facilities, (2) sufficient qualified candidates would not be willing to attend OCS at Fort Benning, and (3) there was no evidence that Fort Benning's program produced a better officer. We believe that the first two assumptions are unsound. While the third assumption is untestable due to the lack of data comparing alternative commissioning programs, available evidence suggests that a consolidated program would be of equal or greater quality to the individual programs. FORT BENNING HAS THE CAPACITY TO TRAIN GUARD OFFICERS ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1 The Army report stated that eliminating the state OCS program and expanding either the federal OCS or the OCS-Reserve Component course would require a significant expenditure of resources. Officials who conducted the Army study told us their conclusion was based on the assumption that Fort Benning currently had the capacity to produce only 350 officers annually and that Fort Benning would be required to construct additional facilities to train all the OCS candidates. Our review, however, indicates that this is not the case. Currently, Fort Benning offers 4 regular classes and 1 reserve component class annually, producing about 400 new lieutenants. As shown in figure 2, Fort Benning previously produced between 1,000 and 1,400 graduates per year during most of the 1980s. However, as of February 1993, the Army plans to produce a maximum of only 450 OCS officers annually through 1998. The projected OCS production consists of 300 for the active component, 100 for the National Guard, and 50 for the Army Reserves. Figure 2: Number of Fort Benning OCS Graduates, 1981-92 (See figure in printed edition.) Officials at Fort Benning said current facilities can produce 1,200 officers annually without overlapping classes or the need to construct new facilities. With a capacity of 1,200 and the ARNG need for 500 to 700 OCS officers annually, it appears that the current facilities at Fort Benning would accommodate the needs of both the active Army and the ARNG. ARMY SURVEY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD EXPERIENCE INDICATE CANDIDATES WOULD ATTEND A CENTRALIZED OCS ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.2 ARNG officials stated that a number of their candidates would not attend a 6- to 10-week centralized OCS program because of job or family commitments. The Army report stated that ". . . [I]t is not clear that there would be enough qualified officers for the National Guard if attendance at Federal OCS were required." However, the evidence indicates that this concern is overstated. Available data indicated that centralizing ARNG commissioning training would not have a great impact on recruitment of officer candidates. An Army survey of state officer candidates,\2 administered in April 1992, indicated that over 60 percent of the candidates would have attended the 10- or 14-week federal OCS if required, while only 17 percent said they would not become officers if Fort Benning were the only option. Eighteen percent were undecided, and 5 percent said they would choose ROTC as a commissioning source. Additionally, Air National Guard officials stated that they have had no difficulty in obtaining candidates for their 6-week centralized officer training program. While the past experience of Air National Guard officials and the opinions of current officer candidates may not be directly applicable to future ARNG officer candidates, we believe that, with the significant reduction in officer requirements, the ARNG will not have difficulty attracting officer candidates if the training is conducted at Fort Benning. -------------------- \2 Survey prepared by Army Personnel Survey Office, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavior and Social Sciences. NO EVIDENCE ON THE QUALITY OF OFFICERS PRODUCED BY DIFFERENT OFFICER ACCESSION PROGRAMS ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.3 The Army report stated that "[T]here is no convincing evidence that the Federal OCS program produces an officer superior in quality to the other programs." However, Army officials responsible for the report told us they were not able to measure quality of officers produced at either the state academies or Fort Benning. The Army has a core curriculum that all commissioning programs, including the Military Academy, ROTC, and the OCSs, must follow to ensure that all new officers meet the Army's minimum qualifications. While each ARNG academy maintains a standard program of instruction and tests, neither the Army nor the states have assessed the performance of academy graduates as officers. In an earlier review we found a similar situation for all newly commissioned officers, and we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to develop a means to routinely evaluate the effectiveness of the various commissioning programs and the quality of the graduates that they produce.\3 This project is to be implemented for the active services by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Each ARNG academy operates independently, with policy and funding provided by the National Guard Bureau. Each undergoes annual accreditation reviews by the U.S. Army Forces Command, but these are merely checklist assessments of candidate selection, instruction, facilities, and availability of applicable regulations. The states we visited also use several internal quality assurance checks, but these are not standardized and rely primarily on the discretion of the state. The Army is planning to accredit each academy under a new program in the future, but details on this program were unavailable at the time of our review. -------------------- \3 Officer Commissioning Programs: More Oversight and Coordination Needed (GAO/NSIAD-93-37, Nov. 6, 1992). RECOMMENDATION ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7 To make the ARNG officer production system more cost-effective, especially in light of ongoing force reductions, we recommend that you direct the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to transition toward using the officer candidate school at Fort Benning, Georgia, to train new ARNG officers rather than using the individual state academies. A staged transition, such as closing the smaller academies first, could be used to capture reliable personnel and travel cost data to provide a more conclusive assessment of cost-effectiveness. Since closing state OCS academies would not involve closing down installations or facilities, there is little potential risk in moving quickly. AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8 DOD did not agree with our recommendation. It argued that (1) the state ARNG OCS programs will have to produce more of the officers by 1997, (2) our estimates of cost savings at a single, consolidated site appear to be inflated, and (3) centralized training would have a negative impact on the ability to recruit officer candidates. DOD comments are reprinted in appendix I. DOD built its argument on the need for more state OCS-trained ARNG officers by 1997 by assuming that ROTC and active duty transfers combined would provide only 700 to 800 of the total need, in contrast to the 500 to 700 officers from each of those sources that we cite. We based our numbers on the latest available projections prepared by the ARNG Readiness Center. The Readiness Center has projected the need for state OCS-trained officer accessions to decrease from 925 in fiscal year 1993, to 828 in 1994, to 750 in 1995, and to 700 in 1996 and 1997, based on a total need of about 2,100 to 2,300 ARNG officer accessions per year. These ARNG-prepared projections of the number of graduates needed from the state OCS programs are well below the 1,150 to 1,450 per year cited by DOD and they are within the capacity of the Fort Benning OCS program to produce. DOD's assumption also ignores the Readiness Reform Act's goal of increasing the percentage of National Guard officers who have prior active duty service, which should prompt more vigorous ARNG recruitment efforts among those officers leaving the active military. In addition, over the 12-year period from fiscal year 1981 through 1992, ROTC programs provided over 14,000 ARNG officers, or an average of nearly 1,200 per year--well in excess of the 500 to 700 projected to be needed annually from that source in the future. DOD's statement that only 700 to 800 new officers could be expected from ROTC and active duty transfers combined is at odds with this experience. DOD's concern about our cost estimates centered on the need to pay per diem expenses to candidates if they attended a consolidated training site. According to military travel regulations, this would amount to just $2 per day (or $140 for a 10-week program). If 1,000 candidates attended the training each year, per diem costs would be only $140,000 annually--and projected savings could still be over $3.7 million per year. DOD also stated that candidates attending phase 2 training do not receive any travel pay or per diem. However, we found that some states do in fact pay travel and per diem during phase 2 training. DOD also stated that a consolidated training site would result in up to 40 percent of potential officer candidates foregoing joining the ARNG because of conflicts with employment and education programs. The source cited for that figure was the same survey conducted by the Army Research Institute that we referred to in our report. DOD arrived at its 40 percent estimate by adding the 17 percent who said they would not become officers (if the Fort Benning program were the only option), the 5 percent who said they would choose ROTC instead of Fort Benning, and the 18 percent who, although having the option to say they would not become ARNG officers, only indicated they were undecided. We can see no rationale for necessarily assuming that the additional 23 percent that DOD included would not join the ARNG. In addition, DOD stressed that a change to a single-site program would be particularly risky because the ARNG was already experiencing a shortage of approximately 3,250 captains. This is an incomplete depiction of the situation and overstates the risk. During the same period in which the DOD cites the shortage of captains, the ARNG also had about 3,450 more lieutenants than authorized and, overall, the ARNG had an excess of officers in the company grade ranks (second lieutenant through captain). We continue to believe that available data suggests that consideration of officer candidate training at Fort Benning would meet the ARNG's needs at lower cost than individual state schools. We also maintain that a staged transition toward a single site consolidation would provide more conclusive data while minimizing risk. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9 We reviewed guidance and regulations on the ARNG's commissioning sources, interviewed ARNG and Air National Guard officials, and obtained data at the ARNG headquarters and OCS programs in Alaska, Arkansas, Maine, and Virginia. These states were judgmentally selected on the basis of program size and geographical distribution. We had originally selected six state academies, two each from programs identified by ARNG authorities as small, medium, and large in size. However, after visiting four of these states, we determined that none collected adequate cost information and that continuing further with this methodology was not likely to be productive. We therefore focused the remainder of our fieldwork on reviewing the results of the consolidated OCS programs. We had also intended to gather cost and program quality data from all the other state and territory programs through a pro-forma data collection instrument, but the absence of such information would have made this option unworkable. The cost estimates we were able to construct for the four academies we visited were based on state ARNG estimates of which personnel were involved in the OCS program and how much of their time the OCS program consumed. We visited the consolidated phase 3 training at Fort Lewis, Washington, and interviewed representatives from the nine participating states. In addition, we interviewed Army officials from headquarters, the Training and Doctrine Command, and Fort Benning. We also interviewed Air Force and Air National Guard officials at headquarters, the Air National Guard Academy, and the four states we visited. We performed our review between July 1992 and December 1993 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1 We are sending copies of this report to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations (Defense Subcommittee) and Armed Services, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations no later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report. Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors are listed in appendix II. Sincerely yours, Mark E. Gebicke Director Military Operations and Capabilities Issues (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ============================================================== Letter (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT ========================================================== Appendix II NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, WASHINGTON, D.C. -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1 Norm Rabkin, Associate Director William E. Beusse, Assistant Director NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2 Dudley C. Roache, Jr., Regional Management Representative Cora M. Bowman, Evaluator-in-Charge Sharon L. Reid, Evaluator