Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternatives to Incineration (Letter Report, 03/18/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-123). The most feasible technological alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons are in the initial stages of development and are more than a decade away from becoming fully operational. It is unlikely that any of these technologies will be ready in time to destroy the entire U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by the December 2204 deadline. Any of these alternative technologies could not, by itself, dispose of an entire chemical weapon. As a result, multiple technologies would have to be developed and tested. Because the alternative technologies are in the earliest stages of development, cost estimates are either nonexistent or unreliable. Similarly, their performance cannot be compared with that of incineration. GAO did, however, identify advantages and disadvantages to each technology. This report also discusses the operational safety of the Army's incineration facility on Johnston Atoll and the cryofracture process, which involves soaking munitions in liquid oxygen to make them brittle. The munitions are then crushed in a large hydraulic press before being incinerated. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies, by David R. Warren, Associate Director for Defense Management and NASA Issues, before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control, and Defense Intelligence, Senate Committee on Armed Services. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-159, Apr. 26, 1994 (23 pages). --------------------------- Indexing Terms ----------------------------- REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-123 TITLE: Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternatives to Incineration DATE: 03/18/94 SUBJECT: Chemical warfare Property disposal Army facilities Waste disposal Munitions Environmental impact statements Systems evaluation Cost analysis Technology transfer Research and development IDENTIFIER: Anniston (AL) Army Chemical Munitions Stockpile Disposal Program Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System GB Nerve Gas VX Nerve Gas Mustard Gas Aberdeen (MD) Pine Bluff (AR) Tooele (UT) Rocky Mountain Arsenal (CO) Chemical Weapons Convention ************************************************************************** * This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO * * report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, * * headings, and bullets are preserved. 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We are unable to accept electronic orders * * for printed documents at this time. * ************************************************************************** Cover ================================================================ COVER Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives March 1994 CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION - ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVES TO INCINERATION GAO/NSIAD-94-123 Chemical Weapons Destruction Abbreviations =============================================================== ABBREV EPA - Environmental Protection Agency NRC - National Research Council Letter =============================================================== LETTER B-256519 March 18, 1994 The Honorable Mike Synar, Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: As requested, we have reviewed selected technological disposal processes that may be alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons. Specifically, we evaluated the development status of these alternative technologies with respect to meeting the legal deadlines for destroying the chemical weapons stockpile, the cost of the technologies, and their performance characteristics compared to incineration. RESULTS IN BRIEF ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1 The alternative disposal technologies identified as most likely to be feasible are in the initial stages of development and over a decade away from full-rate operations. It is unlikely that any of these technologies will reach maturity in time to destroy the entire U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by the congressionally mandated deadline of December 31, 2004. A recent National Research Council (NRC) report, Recommendations for the Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions, advocates concurrent development (beginning operations before completing development, testing, and evaluation) of neutralization and one of three other combinations of alternative technologies for use in destroying bulk agent at two storage sites. The report also indicates that this approach may achieve full-rate operations by the congressional deadline. However, experience with concurrent development in the government arena shows that it carries certain inherent risks--especially when complex or novel technologies are involved--in terms of technical performance, permit delays, testing delays, and increased cost. We are concerned about counting on concurrency resulting in an alternative to the current incineration technology. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has stated that any alternative technology would have to undergo the same type of rigorous analysis and evaluation that the chemical weapons incineration process has gone through--a process that has required at least 9 years. Because these technologies are in the earliest stages of development, cost estimates are either nonexistent or unreliable. Similarly, their performance compared with incineration cannot be determined yet. If development of these technologies began this year, and concurrent development was not used, it could take until about 2007 to 2011 before they could be used to begin destroying the chemical weapons stockpile. These dates are based on NRC estimates that include such factors as research, development, design, testing, and permitting. Each alternative technology has certain disadvantages that must be overcome. In addition, any one of these technologies would not be sufficient, by itself, to dispose of an entire chemical weapon. For example, a given alternative technology might destroy the chemical agent but not destroy or decontaminate the body of the munition. This means multiple alternative technologies would be necessary, which could result in considerable program delays and additional costs. EPA has testified that the Army's current disposal program fully complies with or surpasses EPA requirements for environmental and public health protection. The incinerator at the Army's Johnston Atoll facility is meeting EPA incineration emissions standards. Its emissions are continuously monitored for chemical agent release, and its destruction and removal efficiency is significantly higher than that of commercial hazardous waste incinerators. While the Johnston Atoll facility has had mechanical and training problems, which have slowed its destruction rates, there have been no reported problems associated with destroying the chemical agent within EPA requirements. BACKGROUND ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2 The Army is the custodian of the United States' 25,000-ton stockpile of unitary chemical weapons, currently stored at eight sites in the United States and at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. (App. I shows the storage locations in the continental United States.) The weapons include projectiles, mines, and rockets that contain three types of lethal chemical agents: GB, VX, and H. GB and VX are nerve agents that disrupt the nervous system and usually cause death. The H series of agents, commonly called mustard, blister the skin and can lead to death with exposure to large doses. Chemical agents are also stored in bulk containers. From 1970 through 1976, the Army destroyed chemical weapons and agents by incineration and neutralization at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado. However, the neutralization technology proved to have several drawbacks, and the Army began searching for an alternative technology. In 1979, the Army built a prototype high-temperature baseline incineration facility at Tooele, Utah. (See the glossary for a definition of baseline incineration.) The Army chose baseline incineration in 1981 as the best and safest method for destroying chemical weapons. In 1984, NRC endorsed this choice. In 1985, the Army began construction of a fully integrated baseline incineration facility at Johnston Atoll. Today, the Johnston Atoll facility is close to reaching full-rate operations. A second high-temperature incineration plant at Tooele, Utah, is undergoing systemization testing, and the Army expects it to begin disposal operations by 1995. The Army plans to build seven more facilities at the other chemical weapons storage sites in the continental United States. The fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 102-484) requires that the Department of Defense destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons and agents by December 31, 2004. Previous legislation had established earlier deadlines. In January 1993, the United States signed the United Nations-sponsored Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty that is intended to prohibit the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. If the treaty is ratified by the U.S. Senate, the deadline for destroying the stockpile could be as early as 2005.\1 The treaty also includes a provision for a 5-year extension, which would extend the deadline to about 2010. Leaders of the Russian Federation have indicated they will ask for the extension. Since the Army established its program in 1988, about $1.5 billion has been expended. Currently, the total program life-cycle cost is projected to be $8.6 billion through 2004, which is an increase of 406 percent from the original estimate. (Apps. II and III contain additional cost data.) The Army has testified that program costs could continue to rise over the life of the program for any of the following possible reasons: design changes, permit delays, more stringent regulatory requirements imposed by the states or federal government, schedule extensions, and additional costs of plant closures and dismantling. Army studies state that the risks posed by continued chemical weapon storage, while very small, far exceed the risk of disposal. For example, a MITRE Corporation report, entitled Assessment of the U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Integrity and Risk Analysis (July 1993), states that the condition of the stockpile can be expected to degrade with time, increasing the risks posed by continued storage. The greatest risk from the chemical weapons stockpile is to communities located near the storage sites. The number of people within about 6 miles of various chemical weapons storage sites ranges from 101 in Tooele, Utah, to 44,054 in Aberdeen, Maryland. Public opposition to incineration has come from several citizens groups, states, and environmental organizations. They have raised concerns about incineration because of questions about adverse health effects, such as birth defects, respiratory diseases, neurological damage, and cancer. The linkage between these health problems and incineration is still being researched and debated. For example, dioxins and furans have been linked to cancer and other long-term health problems.\2 As a result of growing opposition to incineration, Congress, in the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization Act, directed the Army to submit a report on potential technological alternatives to chemical weapons incineration. Congress also directed the Army to utilize studies by NRC in preparing the report. In June 1993, NRC published its first report, entitled Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions. A second NRC study, Recommendations for the Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions, was published in February 1994. The Army is scheduled to provide its required report to Congress 60 days after this second NRC report. The Army's report must include: an analysis of the NRC's reports and recommendations; a comparison of the baseline disassembly and incineration process with each alternative technology recommended by NRC in terms of safety, environmental protection, and cost effectiveness; and the date the alternative technology will be ready for full-rate destruction and demilitarization operations. -------------------- \1 The Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force 180 days after the 65th signatory country has ratified the treaty, but no earlier than January 1995. Signatory countries will have 10 years from the date the treaty enters into force to comply. \2 Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Related to Environmental Permitting and Testing Experience (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-43, June 16, 1992). ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES ARE MANY YEARS AWAY FROM MATURITY ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3 The alternative technologies we reviewed would require at least 13 years--until 2007--to proceed sequentially through all stages of development and reach maturity. For example, two technologies often mentioned as feasible alternatives to incineration--steam gasification and plasma arc pyrolysis--are at the conceptual design stage of development, according to several authoritative sources. It is estimated either of these alternatives would take about 13 to 16.5 years to reach full-rate operations capacity. Table 1 shows how long it would take eight alternative technologies to reach maturity. The table also lists the companies developing these technologies. (See app. IV for information on the advantages and disadvantages of each technology.) Table 2 summarizes the various stages involved from development through systemization for an alternative disposal technology and the estimated time required for each stage. Table 1 Estimated Year for Alternative Disposal Technologies to Reach Full-Rate Operations Estimated year to reach full-rate Companies and organizations Technology operations\a involved in development ------------- ------------- ------------------------------ Molten salt 2007 to 2008 Rockwell International, Canoga oxidation Park, Calif. Fluidized 2007 to 2008 Chemical Waste Management, bed oxidation Inc., Geneva, Ill. Molten metal 2007 to 2008 Molten Metal Technologies, pyrolysis Cambridge, Mass.; Elkem Technology, Oslo, Norway Plasma arc 2007 to 2011 Plasma Energy Applied pyrolysis Technology, Inc., Huntsville, Ala. Steam 2007 to 2011 Synthetica Technologies, Inc., gasification Richmond, Calif. Wet air 2007 to 2008 Zimpro Passavant Environmental oxidation Systems, Inc., Rothschild, Wisc. 2007 to 2008 General Atomics, San Diego, Supercritical Calif.; MODAR, Inc., Natick, water Mass.; Modell Development, oxidation Inc., Framingham, Mass. Chemical 2007 to 2008 Highly Filled Materials neutralizatio Institute, Stevens Institute n of Technology, Hoboken, N.J.; Toxco, Inc., Claremont, Calif.; Bovar Corp., Houston, Tex. ------------------------------------------------------------ \a GAO estimates are based upon the stage of development each technology has reached, as determined by NRC. The estimates assume (1) 1994 as the starting year and (2) a sequential rather than concurrent development approach. Table 2 Time Estimates for Alternative Technologies to Complete Stages of Development Stage of development Estimated years required ----------------------------- ----------------------------- Laboratory data development 1 to 2 Conceptual design 0.5 Pilot plant 4.5 to 6 Demonstration 3 Design, construction, and 5 systemization ============================================================ Total 14 to 16.5 ------------------------------------------------------------ Note: The time estimates assume a sequential development approach. Source: NRC. NRC, in its February 1994 report, stated that the time estimates for various research and development efforts could be reduced if they were performed concurrently. For example, the full-scale demonstration plant could be built while work at the pilot plant was still under way. NRC acknowledged that there would be some financial risk in this approach, but stated that some alternatives, given sound management and sufficient funding, could be developed and demonstrated in as little as 5 to 7 years. NRC recommended consideration of the following alternative technology combinations, all based upon neutralization at the chemical weapons storage sites at Edgewood, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana: neutralization followed by incineration; neutralization followed by wet air oxidation, followed by biological oxidation; neutralization followed by supercritical water oxidation; and neutralization followed by biological treatment. We have some concerns about using a concurrent development approach. Specifically, a concurrent schedule may not be possible because of constraints such as (1) lengthy mandatory EPA reviews and analysis of technical performance, (2) the need to demonstrate the technology to show it meets EPA standards for protecting public health and the environment, and (3) state permitting. Furthermore, a concurrent development approach does not seem consistent with the sequential development approach that has been used by the Army in developing the baseline incineration process for use at the Johnston Atoll and Tooele, Utah, facilities. Baseline incineration has faced rigorous, lengthy testing and permitting to ensure technical performance and compliance with EPA requirements. EPA points out that any alternative technology would have to undergo the same type of demanding testing, analysis, and evaluation that the baseline incineration process did--which took many years. The failure of a given technology in a full-scale test is conceivable. The Office of Technology Assessment has concluded that it is also possible that alternative technologies may not prove to be any better or may even prove to be worse than incineration. Moreover, the development of multiple technologies could significantly add to the cost of the disposal program if development problems and delays were encountered. In the past the Army has underestimated the amount of time it would take state regulatory agencies to review and approve environmental permit applications. For example, although Army schedules have generally allowed 2 years for the processing of permit applications, state officials told us that the total time required to process permits for the Anniston and Pine Bluff facilities will likely exceed 3 years.\3 -------------------- \3 Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule, and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan. 21, 1993). COST ESTIMATES OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES ARE UNAVAILABLE OR PRELIMINARY ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4 According to industry officials, in the initial stages of research and development of a complex technology, there are too many unknown factors to be able to make reliable cost estimates. NRC conducted a nation-wide search for companies involved in developing alternative disposal technologies, but 70 percent of the companies responding to the NRC solicitation for information did not offer any cost data. The cost estimates that were furnished were characterized as very rough and could be considered only partial at that time. The following are examples of the cost data furnished: One company reported that its demonstration model and test program would cost an estimated $1.8 million. A pilot plant had an estimated equipment cost of $3 million, with an operating cost of $7,500 per 1,000 kilograms. Another company stated that operations and maintenance costs ranged from $1 to $10 per 1,000 gallons and other capital costs were $2.5 million to $10 million depending upon capacity. We attempted to obtain more detailed and complete cost estimates, but companies were reluctant to provide them. The companies told us that they could not furnish reliable cost estimates until they had researched and developed their processes through the pilot plant stage, which would be years away. Army officials told us the federal government would most likely have to pay for the development costs of the alternative disposal technologies. MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES WOULD BE NEEDED ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5 None of the potential alternative technologies we reviewed would alone be able to render the entire weapon--chemical agent, explosive, metal parts, and dunnage--unusable and decontaminated, as required by the Chemical Weapons Convention. In contrast, baseline incineration will destroy the entire weapon by itself. (See table 3.) Table 3 Destruction Capabilities of Baseline Incineration and Alternative Technologies Chemical Explosives/ Metal Technology agent? propellants? parts? Dunnage? ---------------- -------- ------------ -------- -------- Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes incineration Molten salt Yes Yes No No oxidation Fluidized bed Yes Yes No No oxidation Molten metal Yes Yes Yes No pyrolysis Plasma arc Yes No No No pyrolysis Steam Yes No No No gasification Wet air Yes Yes No No oxidation Supercritical Yes Yes No No water oxidation Chemical Yes No No No neutralization ------------------------------------------------------------ According to NRC, multiple alternative technologies would be needed to destroy the weapons. NRC provided the following example to illustrate how multiple technologies would need to be combined: chemical hydrolysis might be used to detoxify the chemical agent drained from the munitions; the product of this process might then be oxidized by supercritical water oxidation; the effluent of this step might require further treatment, for example, in a catalytic oxidizer, before release to the environment; and still other alternative technologies would be required to destroy or detoxify agent residue in the remainder of the munition, and destroy or decontaminate the explosive and dunnage. Another possible option to destroying or decontaminating the remainder of the munition is to use incineration in place of other alternative technologies. JOHNSTON ATOLL INCINERATION FACILITY MEETS EPA STANDARDS ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6 The Army has stated that while it is destroying the stockpile, its primary concern is the protection of the health and safety of the workers, the public, and the environment. After the Army conducted operational verification tests at the Johnston Atoll facility from 1990 through 1993, independent oversight contractors--for both EPA and the Army--concluded in their reports that the baseline incineration equipment generally operated safely and within environmental rules and regulations. One problem the Johnston Atoll facility did experience was some schedule slippage because of maintenance downtime. This was due to technical and mechanical problems with various equipment and the need for more training of certain personnel.\4 These problems did not affect the Army's ability to destroy or decontaminate chemical weapons within EPA's standards--just the rate at which destruction occurred. (For additional information on baseline incineration, see app. V.) EPA's Deputy Director, Office of Solid Waste, has testified before Congress that the Army's disposal program fully complies with or surpasses EPA requirements for environmental and public health protection. It is EPA's position that the Johnston Atoll liquid incinerator has the cleanest organic emissions of any incinerator in the United States. We are reviewing operations of the incineration facility at Johnston Atoll and will be reporting our findings in the future. The liquid incinerator's extremely high temperature--above 2,550 degrees Fahrenheit--results in a destruction and removal efficiency of chemical agent that is 1,000 times higher than that of a same-sized commercial hazardous waste incinerator. Destruction and removal efficiency refers to the extent to which the principal organic hazardous constituent--in this case chemical agent--is destroyed. Commercial incinerators, which generally do not operate at temperatures greater than 1,800 degrees, typically achieve a destruction and removal efficiency of about 99.997 percent, whereas Johnston Atoll's liquid incinerator has achieved an efficiency of 99.9999997 percent.\5 In addition, according to EPA, the incineration facility is continuously monitored for chemical agent release, even when it is not running. Recently, two alterations to the baseline incineration process have been considered--charcoal filter beds or a hold, test, and release system. In February 1994, NRC recommended the study of activated charcoal filter beds as an addition to the baseline incineration process. The Army and EPA also endorse the addition of charcoal filter beds to baseline incineration because it would further eliminate the risk of toxic air emissions, and perhaps bring about greater public confidence. However, these organizations do not consider the hold, test, and release system attractive because of its size, complexity, and cost. (See app. VI for the advantages and disadvantages of these two alterations.) Army officials estimated that the destruction of the chemical weapon stockpile will be completed by 2003. This estimate does not reflect (1) the actual destruction rates achieved during the operational verification testing at the Johnston Atoll facility or (2) unknown problems obtaining environmental permits from the states. -------------------- \4 Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Cost, Schedule, and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan. 21, 1993). \5 For example, if 1 ton of material is fed into an incinerator that achieves a destruction and removal efficiency of 99.997 percent, 0.06 pounds remain undestroyed. However, if the same amount is fed into an incinerator with a destruction and removal efficiency of 99.9999997 percent, only 0.000006 pounds remain undestroyed. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7 We conducted our work at (1) the Departments of Defense and the Army, Washington, D.C.; (2) U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency, Edgewood, Maryland; (3) National Research Council, Washington, D.C.; (4) Environmental Protection Agency and other federal agencies, Washington, D.C.; and (5) companies identified by NRC as being involved in the development of alternative technologies. We did not seek to identify all the companies that were involved in developing these technologies. Instead, we relied upon information companies sent to NRC and data we gathered in interviewing selected companies. The scope of our review included evaluation of the technology involved in the Army's baseline incineration process, but not a review of the weapons disassembly process. Also, our scope did not include mechanical changes--such as cryofracture--to the incineration process. Cost estimate data was largely based upon information provided by 34 companies to NRC in June 1992. We also met with officials of two companies and asked for up-to-date cost estimate information. However, they were unable to provide additional cost data because they needed more time to develop their technology before they could provide reliable cost estimates. We were told by knowledgeable industry officials that reliable cost information would not be available in the early stages of research and development. We also interviewed concerned citizens, representatives of environmental groups, and state officials. We gathered and analyzed data, including correspondence, agency documents, laws and regulations, computerized data bases, previous GAO reports, and reports by other government agencies, environmental groups, NRC, and private companies. We performed our review from December 1992 through December 1993 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As requested, we did not obtain written agency comments on this report. However, we discussed our findings with Defense and Army officials and have included their comments where appropriate. These officials generally agreed with the information presented in this report. ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1 Unless you announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it for 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; and other interested parties. We will also provide copies to others upon request. Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. Sincerely yours, Donna M. Heivilin Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues CHEMICAL WEAPON STORAGE LOCATIONS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES =========================================================== Appendix I (See figure in printed edition.) COST INFORMATION ON THE ARMY'S INCINERATION PROGRAM ========================================================== Appendix II Table II.1 Army's Estimated Life-Cycle Costs for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (Dollars in billions) Life- Dollar Percent Cumulative Cummulativ cycle cost increas increas dollar e percent Year\a estimate e e increase increase ------ ---------- ------- ------- ---------- ---------- 1985 $1.7 1986 2.0 $0.3 18 $0.3 18 1988 3.4 1.4 70 1.7 100 1991 6.5 3.1 91 4.8 282 1992 7.9 1.4 22 6.2 365 1993 8.6 0.7 9 6.9 406 ------------------------------------------------------------ \a The Army did not calculate life-cycle cost estimates in 1987, 1989, and 1990. Figure II.1: Growth in the Estimated Life-Cycle Costs (See figure in printed edition.) Source: GAO analysis of Army data. CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL PROGRAM FUNDING, 1988-2004 ========================================================= Appendix III (See figure in printed edition.) Note: Funding levels for fiscal years 1988 through 1993 are actual; funding levels for fiscal years 1994 through 2004 are planned. Source: GAO analysis of Army budget data. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SELECTED ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES ========================================================== Appendix IV To compile information on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative technologies, we interviewed various knowledgeable people and analyzed numerous sources of information. Some of the major sources were: (1) Recommendations for the Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions (NRC, Feb. 4, 1994); (2) Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions (NRC, June 10, 1993); (3) Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies (Office of Technology Assessment, July 1992); (4) Alternative Technologies for the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: An Information Document (Greenpeace International, May 24, 1991); (5) briefings, reports, and information from companies identified by NRC as being involved in the development of alternative technologies; (6) data and information we gathered from companies involved in the development of alternative technologies; (7) interviews, reports, and testimony by the Army; and (8) our previous reports. The advantages and disadvantages listed in this appendix are not intended to be all-inclusive. Description of technology Advantages Disadvantages -------------------- ---------------------------- ---------------------------- Molten salt --A private company, using --The possibility of oxidation: Combines Army personnel, has superheated vapor explosions chemical and thermal considerable laboratory is a safety hazard. treatment. Wastes experience and expertise, and oxygen are fed testing with small amounts --During tests on mustard into a bath of of mustard agent and dunnage agent, small amounts of molten caustic salt- since 1950. nitric oxides, organically -usually sodium bound chlorine, and traces carbonate or a --No mustard was detected in of hydrocarbons were found mixture of sodium gas emissions, and in gas emissions, which and potassium destruction and removal could adversely impact the carbonate. The efficiency was very high. environment. wastes are oxidized, typically producing --The salts removed from the emissions of carbon molten salt bath will dioxide, water, contain all the normal salts nitrogen, and produced by incineration oxygen; ash and soot (sodium fluoride, chloride, are retained in the sulfate, etc.). The total melt. Salt can later volume will exceed that of be removed for incineration because of disposal unreacted material from the or for processing salt bath. These salts are and recycling. all soluble and will have to be treated as toxic waste in a landfill. --The long-term mechanical operability of the molten salt oxidation reactor has not been demonstrated, and problems may occur. Fluidized bed --Proven technology in --Difficult to achieve combustion: Uses civilian hazardous waste desired destruction and fluidized, granular incinerators. removal efficiency for solid as heat chemical agents. transfer medium. For --Allows rapid start-up and chemical agent shutdown of feed stream, destruction, solid increasing safety. of choice would be aluminum oxide or --Use of slurry reduces calcium oxide. The concern for explosion when material is kept destroying propellants and suspended by gas explosives. flow, which is primarily air. Molten metal --Molten metal furnace could --Gases from the furnace pyrolysis: Involves combine functions of three would likely be very dirty, use of metals, such of the incinerators used in containing soot from the as copper, iron, or the current technology. metal pyrolysis and possibly cobalt, at 3,000 some slag particulate degrees Fahrenheit, matter. Separate purifier to decompose organic unit would be needed to compounds like clean gas before it is chemical agent. released. --Gases from the furnace are combustible organic materials which must be burned in a separate afterburner or furnace. Plasma arc --Short start-up and --The arc furnaces produce a pyrolysis: Involves shutdown times, increasing combustible gas that would passing an electric safety. require a secondary burner current through a and gas clean-up system just low-pressure as with normal incineration. airstream to split chemical agent into --Costly labor-intensive its atomic elements operations. in a thermal plasma field at a very high temperature, e.g. 10,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Steam gasification: --May be operated as a --Another technology would Organic materials closed-loop system; waste be required because the are treated with streams are stored until products of the process super-heated steam chemical analysis would require further under reducing establishes their oxidation. conditions to suitability for disposal. produce simple --Possible air leakage could organic molecules. lead to fires. Also known as reformation. --Chemical agents would be particularly difficult to handle because of their large content of elements such as fluorine and phosphorous (in GB), nitrogen and phosphorous (in VX), and chlorine (in mustard). A large development effort is probable. --Requires significant costly energy usage. --Suitable cooling should be used to safely remove heat of reaction. Wet air oxidation: --Approximately 200 --High operating pressure Based on principle municipal and hazardous could result in potentially that organic waste plants use this dangerous chemical agent compounds can be technology worldwide. leaks. oxidized slowly at temperatures that --An effective way of --A major containment are low compared oxidizing organic matter in structure would be needed, with normal dilute aqueous solution. adding greatly to capital combustion Thus, it could be costs and construction temperatures particularly useful for the times. (e.g. 572 degrees case where agent is first Fahrenheit versus chemically detoxified, --The liquid product will 3,632 resulting in an aqueous contain appreciable degrees Fahrenheit). solution requiring further concentrations of organic The oxidation is oxidation. compounds such as acetic carried out at high acid; while they are non- pressure, e.g. 1,000 --It has been tested with a toxic, they will require per number of insecticides, and further treatment before square inch, in the fungicides having chemical release of the water to the presence of water. compositions that resemble environment. those of chemical weapons. --Gas emissions contain appreciable concentrations of volatile organic compounds and will require additional treatment before release to the atmosphere. --Corrosion is a concern, possibly affecting structural integrity of the facility. Supercritical water --The aim of supercritical --High operating pressure oxidation: Involves water oxidation is to have could result in potentially mixing chemical complete oxidation, with no dangerous leaks. agents with water products of incomplete that has been combustion --Because feedstock may only pressurized and remain in solution. contain a maximum of 20 heated to a point at percent agent, the amount of which organic --Liquid effluent may be liquid wastes is greatly compounds become collected and analyzed, then increased. soluble. (Above 705 recycled if found harmful degrees Fahrenheit, to the environment. --A major containment and a pressure above structure would be needed, 221 atmospheres, or --A private company has adding greatly to capital 3,205 pounds per experience testing the costs and construction square inch.) technology with dilute times. Solution is solutions of GB and VX nerve oxidized at an agents, and it achieved a --Problems with corrosion of elevated very high destruction and parts and salt formation temperature, removal efficiency using a inside reactor chamber may producing carbon laboratory-sized reactor. adversely affect facility dioxide and operations. inorganic --It would be particularly acids and salts. useful with a feed consisting of products from a previous detoxification step; the detoxified material would be in dilute aqueous solution, the form required for supercritical water oxidation. Chemical --Army has experience in --The products of the neutralization: chemically neutralizing GB process are not suitable for Involves mixing nerve agent. The Canadians release to the environment, chemical agents with have recent experience in they must be oxidized to other substances to neutralizing small amounts final stable materials that form less toxic of nerve are suitable for release. compounds. An agents GA, GB, and VX, and example of this the --By-products of the process process is chemical agent lewisite. are extremely variable, hydrolysis--the which can cause problematic breakdown --Because no appreciable emissions. of a chemical agent exhaust by water. gases are released, there is --Process is slow compared no need for to incineration. a complex pollution abatement system. --Mustard agent and VX are hard to neutralize; other --Would produce smaller technologies may be amounts of gaseous necessary for disposal. effluents. --Because feedstock may only --Low operating pressure contain a maximum of 20 reduces risk percent agent (for VX and of potentially dangerous mustard), the amount of leakage. liquid wastes is greatly increased. --Avoids formation of dioxins, furans, --The time required to and other undesirable develop a neutralization- products from chlorinated based process for use at any compounds because of low specific site may be 3 to 5 operating temperature. years longer than for baseline incineration. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BASELINE INCINERATION =========================================================== Appendix V Description of technology Advantages Disadvantages -------------------- ---------------------------- ---------------------------- Baseline --Can destroy or --Many health effects are incineration: decontaminate the still unknown. Over 17,000 An engineering entire munition, so no other papers on dioxins have been process that employs technologies published without settling thermal are needed. controversies about human decomposition via health effects. thermal oxidation at --Is the only fully high temperature to developed process to dispose --Complex pollution destroy the organic of chemical weapons. abatement systems needed to portion of the waste remove particulates and acid and reduce volume. --Substantial design and gases. operational experience Chemical weapons are exists. --Combustion problems could drained of chemical increase emission of agent and --Has been used by the products of incomplete disassembled, then United States, United combustion. component parts are Kingdom, Canada, and Russia sent to one of four as --Many citizens and incinerators: a means of disposing of environmental groups believe (1) agent is pumped chemical there are risks to the from holding tanks weapons. public and the environment. to a liquid incinerator, (2) --Has been thoroughly tested --Visible exhaust plume from casings are with all chemical agents. stack could be decontaminated in a misinterpreted by public as metal parts furnace, --Thus far has fully hazardous pollutants. (3) explosives and complied with or surpassed propellants are EPA requirements for burned in environmental and public a deactivation health furnace, and (4) protection. packing materials are burned in a --Capable of a high degree dunnage incinerator. of destruction--has Each furnace demonstrated destruction and possesses its own removal efficiency of pollution abatement 99.9999997 percent with system, all of which nerve agent. lead to a common exhaust stack. --Can decontaminate metal parts to a level where they can be sold to the public as scrap. --Process is irreversible, thus satisfying terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF POSSIBLE ALTERATIONS TO BASELINE INCINERATION ========================================================== Appendix VI Description of process Advantages Disadvantages -------------------- ---------------------------- ---------------------------- Charcoal filter --The addition of filters --About $200 to $300 million beds: could instill a greater would be added to the A bank of several level of public confidence, program's estimated life- activated charcoal as it would virtually cycle cost. filters would be eliminate the risk of toxic added to the end of air emissions. --Incinerator exhaust gases the baseline must be cooled and incineration --Carbon filtration has been dehumidified to a process. The filters used successfully in both temperature and humidity would catch any Germany and Italy. similar to building particulates, ventilation conditions to products of --A similar filter system is ensure effective incomplete already used filtration. combustion, or on the ventilation system at chemical agent that the Army's Johnston Atoll --Cooled exhaust gases will might make it facility and would be used generate additional through the at all subsequent facilities wastewater to be managed. pollution abatement in the continental united system. States --Care must be taken to avoid fires; temperatures --Such a system is must be carefully monitored commercially available and and controlled. would require minimal testing. --Poor removal efficiency due to leakage around or --Gas cooling and through the carbon beds. condensation would eliminate visible exhaust plume. --Loss of adsorption capacity if water contacts --Should greatly reduce the charcoal. false alarms from exhaust monitors. Hold, test, and --The addition of a hold, --Cost for capability to release: test, and release system hold emissions for 8 hours Involves collecting could instill a greater is estimated at $250 million incinerator level of public confidence, per site, adding about $2.25 emissions in several as it would virtually billion to the program's large collapsible eliminate the risk of toxic estimated life-cycle cost. holding tanks. Once air emissions. To more thoroughly analyze filled, a tank's emissions, they must be held contents would be --Holding tanks are for 48 to 72 hours, analyzed for toxic commercially available. resulting in at least a six- substances. If safe, fold cost increase. the tank would be --Gas cooling and emptied to the condensation would eliminate --Incinerators would require atmosphere. If not, visible exhaust plume. substantial engineering then the tank's redesign for treatment of contents would be contaminated emissions. recycled through the afterburner. --This process is not being used on any incinerator in the world. --Liquid would condense within the tank once the emissions cool, which also must be analyzed and managed in a wastewater treatment system. --If emissions are found to be contaminated, then both the tank and its contents must be decontaminated. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT ========================================================= Appendix VII NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, WASHINGTON, D.C. David R. Warren, Associate Director John R. Henderson, Assistant Director David W. Rowan, Evaluator-in-Charge Diane Blake Harper, Evaluator David F. Keefer, Evaluator Thomas W. Gosling, Editor GLOSSARY ============================================================ Chapter 0 AFTERBURNER -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.1 A device for burning unburned or partially burned compounds in exhaust. AQUEOUS -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.2 Made from, with, or by water. BASELINE INCINERATION -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.3 A high-temperature incineration process involving a disassembly procedure that breaks down munitions into their component part. Once disassembled, the chemical agent and the munition components are burned separately in four furnaces. COMBUSTION -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.4 An act or instance of burning; a chemical process (as an oxidation) accompanied by the evolution of heat. CONVENTION -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.5 A treaty. CRYOFRACTURE -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.6 An experimental munitions disassembly technique through which a chemical munition is frozen in liquid nitrogen and crushed to pieces in a hydraulic press; the pieces are then incinerated. Cryofracture is only visualized as a munitions disassembly process and is not considered an alternative to incineration. DECONTAMINATION -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.7 The process of decreasing the amount of chemical agent on any person, object, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating, or removing the agent. DESTRUCTION AND REMOVAL EFFICIENCY -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.8 The extent to which a chemical agent or other hazardous material is destroyed, expressed as a percentage. DETOXIFY -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.9 To remove a poison or toxin, or the effect of such. DIOXINS (DIBENZO-P-DIOXINS) ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.10 Organic compounds that are sometimes created as a result of incomplete combustion or the recombination of exhaust products from the burning of mixtures containing certain chlorinated organic compounds. DUNNAGE ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.11 Shipping and packaging material for munitions. EFFLUENT ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.12 Waste material discharged into the environment. FLUIDIZED ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.13 Suspended in a rapidly moving stream of gas or vapor to induce flowing motion of the whole for enhancing a chemical or physical reaction. FURANS (DIBENZOFURANS) ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.14 Organic compounds that are sometimes created as a result of incomplete combustion or the recombination of exhaust products from the burning of mixtures containing certain chlorinated organic compounds. HYDROLYSIS ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.15 A name given to a group of chemical reactions where two or more chemicals, in water, react together to form a salt as one of the products; a type of chemical neutralization. INCINERATION ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.16 Another word for combustion. NEUTRALIZATION ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.17 The act of altering the chemical, physical, and toxicological properties to render the chemical agent ineffective for use as intended. OXIDATION ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.18 The process of combining with oxygen; to dehydrogenate, especially by the action of oxygen. Combustion is the most common oxidation process. PARTICULATE ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.19 A substance composed of or relating to minute separate particles. PLASMA ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.20 A substance that exhibits some properties of a gas but differs from a gas in being a good conductor of electricity. PRODUCTS OF INCOMPLETE COMBUSTION ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.21 Compounds that result from all types of combustion where there is incomplete mixing, insufficient time in the incinerator, or insufficiently high temperature. These compounds are generated in very small amounts. PYROLYSIS ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.22 A chemical change brought about by the action of heat in the absence of oxygen. REDUCING ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.23 To deoxidize; to combine with or subject to the action of hydrogen. SALTS ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.24 Solid compounds produced during a chemical neutralization reaction; any of numerous compounds that result from replacement of part or all of the acid hydrogen of an acid by a metal or a group acting like a metal. SLURRY ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.25 A watery mixture of insoluble matter. SOLUBLE ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.26 Capable of being dissolved. SYSTEMIZATION ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.27 The period when the individual systems of a disposal facility are tested as an integrated system and training and simulant munitions are processed through the system. It also includes the comprehensive certification of all workers and pre-operation checks by government officials. UNITARY ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.28 A munition containing only one chemical, that being a lethal agent. VOLATILE ------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:0.29 Readily vaporizable at a relatively low temperature.