B-2 Bomber: Cost to Complete 20 Aircraft Is Uncertain (Letter Report,
09/08/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-217).
Problems with the technology of the B-2 Stealth bomber, including its
sophisticated radar systems and computer software, coupled with testing
delays, could push acquisition costs for 20 aircraft above the $44
billion ceiling imposed by Congress. Although the Air Force believes
that the B-2 acquisition program can be completed within the total
program cost limitation, the Air Force has not prepared documentation
describing its analysis, assumptions, and rationale for the estimate.
GAO believes that major uncertainties surround completion of the B-2
acquisition within the cost limitation. About 57 percent of the planned
flight test hours are not yet completed and testing to date has
highlighted problems that have not yet been corrected. Additional
performance problems could crop up during the remaining testing that
would boost program costs.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-217
TITLE: B-2 Bomber: Cost to Complete 20 Aircraft Is Uncertain
DATE: 09/08/94
SUBJECT: Bomber aircraft
Air Force procurement
Aircraft research
Defense cost control
Advanced weapons systems
Future budget projections
Reporting requirements
Advance appropriations
Cost effectiveness analysis
Research and development
IDENTIFIER: B-2 Aircraft
B-1B Aircraft
Joint Direct Attack Weapon
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
C-17 Aircraft
F-14D Aircraft
GPS
**************************************************************************
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO *
* report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, *
* headings, and bullets are preserved. Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are *
* identified by double and single lines. The numbers on the right end *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the page *
* numbers of the printed product. *
* *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble *
* those in the printed version. *
* *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015, *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time. *
**************************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
September 1994
B-2 BOMBER - COST TO COMPLETE 20
AIRCRAFT IS UNCERTAIN
GAO/NSIAD-94-217
B-2 Bomber
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
GPS - Global Positioning Satellite system
JDAM - Joint Direct Attack Munition
RCS - radar cross-section
RDT&E - research, development, test, and evaluation
TSSAM - Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-257642
September 8, 1994
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994 limits
how much can be spent on acquiring B-2 aircraft. The conference
report on the 1994 Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act
calls for GAO to report at regular intervals on the total B-2
acquisition costs through completion of the production program. This
is the first in a series of reports concerning B-2 acquisition costs.
Our objectives were to identify risks that remain in the program and
identify issues that could affect the Air Force's ability to complete
the acquisition of 20 operational aircraft within the cost
limitation.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The B-2 development program was initiated in 1981 and was followed by
approval in 1987 to procure B-2 aircraft concurrently with the
development and testing effort. The Air Force's early plans were to
acquire 132 operational aircraft; however, the plans were reduced in
the early 1990s to 20 operational aircraft.\1 At about the same time,
the B-2's mission emphasis was changed from being principally a
strategic bomber capable of delivering nuclear weapons to a
conventional bomber capable of delivering precision-guided munitions.
The 1994 Defense Authorization Act, in addition to reaffirming a
limit on procuring no more than 20 operational B-2 aircraft, also
limited the program acquisition costs to no more than $28,968.0
million, expressed in fiscal year 1981 constant dollars. Currently,
the same program acquisition cost limitation expressed in then-year
dollars is $44,656.0 million.
The last of the 20 operational aircraft are scheduled for delivery in
January 1998. These aircraft are required to be low observable
aircraft with sufficient range and payload capability to deliver
precision-guided conventional weapons or nuclear weapons anywhere in
the world with enhanced survivability.
Most B-2 aircraft delivered will not initially meet that requirement.
To meet the requirement, 18 of the aircraft, including 5 test
aircraft, are scheduled to undergo major modifications after their
initial delivery to the Air Force. The modifications now planned are
required partly as a consequence of producing the aircraft before the
test program uncovered problems and limitations. The modifications
are also partly necessitated by the change in the B-2's mission from
a nuclear to a conventional bomber. Planned modifications to correct
defects and incorporate full conventional and strategic capabilities
are scheduled to continue through July 2000. Appendixes I and II
include details of the planned modifications.
Although the flight test program began in July 1989, it was only 43
percent complete as of July 31, 1994, because of delays and problems
experienced earlier in the test program.
--------------------
\1 This includes 5 test aircraft and 15 production aircraft.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Significant development, testing, production, and modification
efforts are required before the 20 operational aircraft meet their
final\2 performance configuration. Through fiscal year 1994, the
Congress has appropriated $39,639.7 million, about 89 percent of the
$44,656.0 million cost limitation established. Air Force plans
indicate that the funding required to complete the program will be
spread over the next 10 fiscal years, ending in fiscal year 2004.
Air Force officials believe the total program cost limitation is
sufficient to accommodate completion of the B-2 acquisition program.
However, the Air Force has not prepared documentation describing its
analysis, assumptions, and rationale for the estimate. The lack of
the required documentation hindered our evaluation of B-2 costs.
Further, in October 1993, an independent Air Force review team
identified significant risk in sustaining and interim contractor
support costs yet to be incurred in the procurement program. The
review team noted a need for additional cost analyses and recommended
specific analyses be accomplished by the Air Force.
We believe there is uncertainty about whether the Air Force will be
able to complete B-2 acquisition within the cost limitation. About
57 percent of the planned flight test hours are not yet completed and
testing to date has identified problems that are yet to be corrected.
Additional performance problems could be discovered during the
remaining testing that would increase program acquisition costs.
Correcting problems already identified during testing and new
problems identified in the remainder of the test program could cause
additional development effort, further extension of development and
test schedules, and increased costs to further modify or correct
defects on delivered aircraft.
Much of the funding remaining to be appropriated is expected to pay
for such things as B-2 support, including support equipment, spares,
technical data, and interim contractor support. However, making an
accurate estimate of these costs requires that DOD decide on the
specific support approach for the B-2. The Congress directed that no
funds be used to establish an Air Force organic maintenance support
activity for the B-2 until the Undersecretary of Defense,
Acquisition, reviewed the infrastructure for the private sector and
Air Force depot support and maintenance of the B-2. The
Undersecretary was to report no later than May 15, 1994, about the
most efficient and cost-effective use of both public and private
facilities to support the B-2. As of July 31, 1994, DOD had not
issued its report. Until this decision is made, B-2 support costs
remain uncertain.
--------------------
\2 The final performance configuration is now defined as a block 30
aircraft with certain other planned performance improvements. See
appendix I for definitions of B-2 configurations.
SIGNIFICANT EFFORT REMAINS TO
DELIVER FULLY OPERATIONAL
AIRCRAFT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Through fiscal year 1994, the Congress has appropriated $39,639.7
million of the $44,656 million that the Air Force expects to be
needed for B-2 acquisition. Significant program efforts are required
to complete the acquisition of B-2s. The rest of the funding is to
be requested through fiscal year 2004. In addition, the contractor
must complete initial delivery of the production aircraft and modify
aircraft to the final configuration within the cost and schedule
agreed to in the current contract. In a January 1994 evaluation of
the B-2 costs, an independent Air Force cost review team identified
cost trends that indicated the Air Force needed to take actions to
ensure the program would not cost more than the congressional limit
on the B-2 program.
REMAINING B-2 EFFORT TO BE
FUNDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
The Air Force financial plan indicates that $5,016.3 million in
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement
funding is yet to be appropriated through fiscal year 2004. Table 1
shows the Air Force's current plans for the use of these remaining
appropriations.
Table 1
Planned Use of Funds to be Appropriated
for B-2 Program From Fiscal Years 1995
Through 2004
(Dollars in millions)
RDT&E funding Amount Procurement funding Amount
------------------- -------- ------------------- --------
Air vehicle $481.6 Support $1,139.5
Weapon delivery 209.5 Curtailment/ 679.5
systems closeout
Engineering/ 406.5 Spares 532.8
program management
Test and evaluation 243.1 Interim contractor 229.1
support
Support 135.0 Other government 122.2
costs
Other government 549.8 Retrofit 102.6
costs
Engineering changes 180.0 Engineering changes 5.1
============================================================
Subtotal $2,205.5 Subtotal $2,810.8
============================================================
Total $5,016.3
------------------------------------------------------------
Two major program efforts yet to be funded and executed are
identified in table 1 as support ($1,139.5 million) and interim
contractor support ($229.1 million). DOD has not yet made decisions
that are likely to affect the ultimate cost of logistics support.
For example, it must decide whether the Air Force or the contractor
will perform depot support. Until such decisions are made, estimates
of logistics support costs will remain uncertain. The fiscal year
1994 Defense Appropriations Act requires the Undersecretary of
Defense, Acquisition, to evaluate the most efficient and
cost-effective use of public and private facilities for B-2 depot
support. A report should have been submitted to the congressional
defense committees by May 15, 1994, but as of July 31, 1994, the
report had not been submitted.
The B-2 program office has not completed the cost estimate
documentation required for major defense acquisition programs. The
cost estimate documentation is to include a detailed record of the
estimating procedures and data used to develop the cost estimate.
B-2 program officials told us they have not completed the
documentation because of higher priorities within the program office.
PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT MUST BE
DELIVERED AND THEN MODIFIED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
All the production aircraft, except the last two to be delivered, are
planned to be subsequently modified. The modifications of these
aircraft are currently planned to begin in June 1996 and end in July
2000. In addition, the modification of the five test aircraft are
planned to begin in September 1995 and end in May 2000.
Aircraft are scheduled to be delivered in three different
configurations, called blocks 10, 20, and 30. The blocks are based
on capabilities planned to be demonstrated during the flight test
program. Appendix I shows the aircraft capabilities planned in each
block. Air Force officials believe the total program cost limitation
is sufficient to complete the B-2 acquisition in the block 30
configuration. Appendix II shows the detailed schedule for initial
aircraft delivery and subsequent modifications.
AIR FORCE COST REVIEW TEAM
IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT COST
RISKS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
In October 1993, the Secretary of the Air Force chartered an
independent Air Force team to review the B-2 program and determine if
it could be executed within the congressional cost limitation. The
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial
Management stated, "The Independent Cost and Executability Review
team identified significant cost risk in sustaining and material
costs for production and interim contractor support costs for
support." One element of the team's analysis showed actual sustaining
costs were on a trend to exceed the sustaining costs estimated to
complete the B-2 program. The team concluded, however, that the B-2
program could be executed within the cost limitation, provided that
B-2 program management actions are successful in changing the
existing cost performance trends of the contractor.
Because of the limited financial analysis found during its review and
the cost risks that remain, the review team recommended that the Air
Force closely monitor the remaining efforts covered by the production
contract, noting several reports that should be analyzed and
analytical procedures that should be followed. The team also
recommended that an annual program office cost estimate be prepared
and submitted with the annual B-2 budget request, which would include
a detailed analysis of the cost of items such as aircraft production
and block 20 and block 30 modifications.
The review team also pointed out that the 1994 Defense Appropriations
Act prohibits the Air Force from using funds to establish or support
any organic depot maintenance for the B-2 until DOD studies and
reports to the Congress on the support concept. The Air Force will
fund interim contractor support for interim maintenance until DOD
develops and implements a support concept. Since interim contractor
support is paid for by procurement funds that are included within the
cost limitation, delays in the DOD support decision could extend the
time period originally planned for interim contractor support. This
could increase interim contractor support costs over the Air Force's
estimate.
REMAINING DEVELOPMENT EFFORT
INCREASES POTENTIAL FOR HIGHER
COSTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
A major risk to staying within the cost limitation stems from the
fact that all the aircraft are being produced with only 43 percent of
the flight test program completed as of July 31, 1994. Flight test
results are to be used to determine the performance specifications
that both production and modified aircraft must achieve. Therefore,
until specified performance is demonstrated through the test flight
program, the extent to which any further problems will affect
development and production costs and schedules is largely unknown.
However, based on past experiences with other systems, flight testing
typically identifies problems that require financial resources to
correct.
Early flight testing of the B-2 uncovered numerous problems such as
radar cross-section (RCS) deficiencies and aft deck cracks.
Corrective actions have been identified and either have been or will
be tested in a B-2 aircraft. The flight test program is, however,
not scheduled to be completed until July 1997. As of July 1994,
performance testing of offensive and defensive avionics, precision
weapons, and range/payload is yet to be completed. Delivery of
software to integrate B-2 systems and subsystems, important to
meeting test schedules, is not expected to be completed before
December 1996. Further, some problems are being encountered with the
RCS of production aircraft. The status and plans for completing
tests in each of these areas are discussed below.
Offensive and defensive avionics. Avionics have not been fully
flight tested in the B-2. Several radar modes and defensive
avionics functions, important to the B-2 mission, are scheduled
for flight testing as late as 1997. Recent problems with the
terrain-following and terrain-avoidance functions of the radar
and signal processing capacity in Band 1 of the defensive
avionics subsystem have delayed flight testing of the radar and
defensive avionics subsystem.
Problems with the terrain-following and terrain-avoidance functions
will cause about a 1-year delay in the scheduled flight testing of
selected parts of these functions. Air Force engineers stated that
changes to the avionics software have reduced the rate of occurrence
of some of the problems. Additional software changes and flight
testing are still required to resolve all the current deficiencies.
However, Air Force officials noted that aircraft delivered in the
block 10 configuration are not required to have an effective
terrain-following and terrain-avoidance capability. Accordingly,
acceptance of block 10 aircraft will not be delayed. We are
concerned because the Air Force experienced development problems with
the B-1B terrain-following radar mode that delayed its full
capability until well after the B-1B's initial operational capability
date.
The contractor has developed software changes to avoid the conditions
causing the signal processing capacity problem with Band 1 of the
defensive avionics. This will allow the continuation of flight
testing for other defensive functions but does not resolve the signal
processing capacity problem. Air Force engineers told us they have
not determined if the problems are caused by deficiencies in the
hardware or software.
Precision weapons. The principal mission of the B-2 was changed
from nuclear to conventional bombing missions in late 1992. To
make effective use of the expensive and complex B-2 aircraft,
the Air Force planned to incorporate new conventional munitions
with precision capabilities. These new munitions, the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Tri-Service Standoff Attack
Missile (TSSAM), are planned to be the primary conventional
weapons to be used by the B-2. These weapons are still in
development, and integration flight testing is not scheduled to
begin until 1995 or later.
Range/payload. The flight testing was planned to be completed in
July 1994, but data analysis is not scheduled to be completed
until December 1994. About one-third of the test points were
completed as of April 1994. Estimated capability based on
preliminary test data show the B-2 should meet the range/payload
requirements. However, Air Force officials said the margin for
error is small for some of the specification range
requirements.\3
Integration software. The B-2 flight test schedule depends on the
delivery of the software that integrates the functions of the
various subsystems into the aircraft so it can perform as an
operational military aircraft. Critical functions that remain
to be incorporated into the test aircraft include the Global
Positioning Satellite system (GPS), TSSAM, final defensive
system, Band 4 defensive capabilities, GPS Aided Targeting
System, and JDAM. In addition, any problems identified during
flight testing must be resolved, and software updates will be
required. The remaining development integration software
versions are scheduled to be delivered to the flight test
program through December 1996. Final block 30 production
software is not scheduled to be delivered until January 20,
1997. Historically, software has been a source of development
problems that resulted in schedule delays and cost overruns.
Both the C-17 and the F-14D experienced such software
development problems.
RCS. The Air Force has done extensive testing to demonstrate
capabilities and correct serious problems identified earlier in
the test program. As of July 31, 1994, however, flight testing
of a fully configured block 30 aircraft has not been
accomplished. Flight tests to demonstrate RCS in a block 30
aircraft are scheduled to begin in late 1995 after a test
aircraft has been modified to include RCS enhancements and other
block 30 changes.
Before the Air Force accepts delivery of early production aircraft,
limited RCS acceptance testing is to be completed to determine if the
aircraft meets the block 10 acceptance criteria. The second and
third production aircraft were scheduled for delivery on March 31,
1994, and July 31, 1994, but the Air Force refused to accept delivery
because RCS performance did not meet the acceptance criteria.
Officials stated aircraft failed to meet the criteria because of a
slight change in the process used to manufacture the aircraft
tailpipe. They said the manufacturing process has been corrected and
new tailpipes have been installed and successfully tested on one of
the aircraft, bringing it into compliance with the block 10 RCS
acceptance criteria. The Air Force accepted the aircraft on August
17, 1994.
Other RCS problems resulting from the manufacturing process were
identified during the acceptance testing of the third production
aircraft and have been corrected, according to Air Force officials.
However, flight testing of the additional corrective measures has
been delayed because problems with the aircraft's environmental
control system have prevented further acceptance flight testing.
These RCS problems show how sensitive RCS is to small changes in the
aircraft or its manufacturing process and raises concerns about
production repeatability of the specified RCS.
--------------------
\3 Ten aircraft will be heavier than the specification aircraft by
about 3,000 pounds. This equates to reduced aircraft range
(unrefueled distance) of between 40 and 150 miles, depending on the
altitude of the aircraft.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force
direct the B-2 Program Office to complete the annual cost estimate
and the supporting documentation for the fiscal year 1996
President's budget and
require that office to prepare updated cost estimates and the
supporting documentation before future annual budgets are
submitted to the Congress.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
findings and stated that it would direct the Air Force to take action
on our recommendations. DOD acknowledged that significant work
remained to deliver fully operational B-2 aircraft but said that
remaining tasks are on contract and the amount of work required is
understood by the Air Force and the contractor. In addition, the Air
Force is currently monitoring the key cost elements of the B-2
program. DOD stated continued interim contractor support costs for
the B-2 remains an open issue, as they have not yet decided whether
to support the B-2 with organic or contractor maintenance. Until
this support issue is resolved, DOD states pressure will continue on
the cost cap.
Although DOD is correct in saying that most major program efforts yet
to be funded are on contract, we would point out that many are
contract options that are to be exercised as far in the future as the
year 2002. Furthermore, the B-2 development contract will be
incrementally funded for several more years. With only 43 percent of
the flight test program complete, uncertainties exist that can affect
both development and production costs. These uncertainties are
potentially of greater risk to the B-2 program because of the
extensive amount of concurrency between development and production.
DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We reviewed available documents and records and interviewed officials
at the B-2 Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the
Departments of Defense and the Air Force, Washington D.C.; and the
Northrop B-2 Division, Pico Rivera and Palmdale, California.
We performed our review from January 1994 through August 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 15 days from its issue date. At
that time, we will send copies to the Ranking Minority Members of the
Senate and House Committees on Armed Services; Subcommittees on
Defense, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations; the
Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Director of Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make
copies available to others upon request.
This report was prepared under the direction of Louis J. Rodrigues,
Director, Systems Development and Production Issues, who may be
reached on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Other contributors to this report are listed
in appendix IV.
Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
B-2 SYSTEM BLOCK CAPABILITIES
=========================================================== Appendix I
Block 30
modifications and
Capability Block 20 performance
categories Block 10 modifications improvements
------------------ ------------------ ------------------ --------------------
Mission Initial signature Band 1-3 awareness Final signature
survivability Band 4 awareness\ a
Low observable Contrail Management
System \a
Terrain following/ Visual contour Limited TF/TA Full TF/TA
terrain avoidance flying
(TF/TA)
Radar 6 radar modes 11 radar modes 19 radar modes
Navigation Stellar/inertial Global Full specification
navigation Positioning requirements
Satellite system
(GPS) \a
Fixed target Limited mark-84 Full mark-84 Full B-83/B-61 bomb
effectiveness (2,000 lb) bombs rack
and B-83 nuclear Precision-guided assembly weapons
bomb munitions Joint Direct Attack
GPS-Aided Munition\ a
Targeting System
Deployability No requirement Deployable for 14 Deployable for 30
days days
Command and Normal Air Force Secure high MILSTAR -UHF \a
control Satellite frequency
Communications
System Normal and
secure VHF/UHF
Air refueling KC-10/135 Autonomous Autonomous
directed rendezvous rendezvous
rendezvous defensive multiple on multiple
avionics JP-8
single on single
Flying qualities Limited aero Full aero
envelope Limited envelope
autopilot Full auto pilot
80 percent loads 100 percent loads
clearance clearance
Limited weapons Full weapons bay
bay door door
envelope envelope
Tactical air Radar coupled
navigation and approaches
instrument landing All weather
system approaches
Light to moderate
weather
Ground mission Unit-level mission Deployable unit
planning planning mission
planning
In-flight mission In-flight route In-flight mission In-flight mission
planning changes changes changes
Training Training systems Training systems Training systems
compatible compatible compatible
Reliability/ On aircraft -all Off aircraft -Air Off aircraft -Air
maintainability Air Force Force/interim Force/
Off aircraft - contractor contractor
limited support/ logistics
Air Force/limited contract support support or mix
interim mix
contractor support
Other Pilot vehicle
interface \a
Defensive management
system tools\a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Characteristics are planned performance improvements and are not
yet contractually definitized.
B-2 PLANNED DELIVERY AND
MODIFICATION DATES
========================================================== Appendix II
Start Complete Start Complete
----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ---------------
1 Test Sept. 1, Mar. 31, 1999
1995
2 Test Dec. 1, Feb. 28, 2000
1997
3 Test June 1, May 31, 2000
1998
4 Test Jan. 1, July 31, 1998
1997
5 Test Apr. 1, Dec. 31, 1999
1998
6 Aug. 31, Feb. 1, May 31, 1998
1994\c 1997
7 Dec. 17, Aug. 1, Dec. 31, 1997
1993 1996
8 Mar. 31, Nov. 1, Mar. 31, 1998
1994\d 1996
9 July 31, June 1, Sept. 30, 1997
1994\e 1996
10 Oct. 31, Sept. 1, Dec. 31, 1998
1994 1997
11 Jan. 31, Dec. 1, Jan. 31, Apr. 1, July 31, 1999
1995 1996 1997 1998
12 Apr. 30, Apr. 1, May 31, Mar. 1, June 30, 2000
1995 1997 1997 1999
13 Oct. 31, Aug. 1, Sept. 30, July 1, Oct. 31, 1998
1995 1996 1996 1997
14 Jan. 31, Oct. 1, Nov. 30, Feb. 1, May 31, 1999
1996 1996 1996 1998
15 Apr. 30, Feb. 1, Mar. 31, July 1, Sept. 30, 1999
1996 1997 1997 1998
16 July 31, Nov. 1, Jan. 31, 2000
1996 1998
17 Sept. 30, Jan. 1, Apr. 30, 2000
1996 1999
18 Dec. 31, May 1, 1999 July 31, 2000
1996
19 Oct. 31,
1997
20 Jan. 31,
1998
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a There is a sixth test aircraft that is not currently planned to be
modified to operational capability. (Program, therefore, has 21
total aircraft.)
\b Five test aircraft are planned to be modified and delivered to the
Air Force in block 30 configuration after flight test completion.
Ten aircraft are planned to be delivered to the Air Force in block 10
configuration. Five of these are planned to be modified to block 20
configuration. All 10 of these are planned to be modified to block
30 configuration. Three aircraft are planned to be delivered to the
Air Force in block 20 configuration and then modified to block 30
configuration. Two aircraft are planned to be delivered to the Air
Force in block 30 configuration.
\c This aircraft underwent special testing and is planned to be
delivered out of sequence.
\d Air Force acceptance of this aircraft was delayed because of RCS
problems. It was accepted on August 17, 1994.
\e Air Force acceptance of this aircraft was delayed because of RCS
problems. It is now scheduled for acceptance on September 6, 1994.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1
Robert D. Murphy
CINCINNATI REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2
Michael J. Hazard
Jeffrey T. Hunter
Brian Mullins
LOS ANGELES REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3
James F. Dinwiddie