Air Force Fighters: More Reliance on Reserves Increases the Need to Know
Their Capabilities (Chapter Report, 05/09/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-86).
In response to reductions in active-duty forces, the Pentagon will
likely turn to reserve fighter wings to make up the difference in air
power; however, these units generally have older, less capable aircraft
and pilots who have been trained less rigorously. More reliance on
reserve forces as part of a smaller total force increases the risk that
forces will be unable to deploy promptly and accomplish the same range
of missions as active forces. The degree of risk will depend on how
rapidly hostilities escalate; the enemy's capability; and the reserve
force's availability, equipment status, and level of training. Congress
may want to have the Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force
Reserve discuss how they intend to minimize the risks from increased
reliance on reserve forces. Also, Congress, when debating the
appropriate mix of reserve and active fighter forces and requirements
for 20 fighter wing equivalents responding to two major regional
contingencies, should also consider asking the Air Force to provide
indicators of relative capability.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-86
TITLE: Air Force Fighters: More Reliance on Reserves Increases the
Need to Know Their Capabilities
DATE: 05/09/94
SUBJECT: Fighter aircraft
Armed forces reserves
Defense contingency planning
Military training
Combat readiness
Flight crews
Flight training
Air warfare
Air Force reservists
Tactical air forces
IDENTIFIER: JCS Status of Resources and Training System
A-10 Aircraft
F-16 Aircraft
F-4G Aircraft
Desert Storm
Desert Shield
F-15A/B Aircraft
F-15C Aircraft
F-15D Aircraft
JCS National Military Strategy
North Korea
Iraq
Iran
DOD Operation Provide Comfort II
Air National Guard Long Range Plan
Turkey
Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for
Night Program
LANTIRN
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
May 1994
AIR FORCE FIGHTERS - MORE RELIANCE
ON RESERVES INCREASES THE NEED TO
KNOW THEIR CAPABILITIES
GAO/NSIAD-94-86
Air Force Fighters
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
FWE - fighter wing equivalent
GAO - General Accounting Office
MRC - major regional contingency
SORTS - Status of Resources and Training System
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-255905
May 9, 1994
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
This report discusses the relative capabilities of active and reserve
Air Force fighter forces and the adequacy of current reporting
mechanisms to identify differences between those forces. The
information in this report should be useful to Congress in its
deliberations on appropriate roles and missions for those forces,
particularly as the size of the total fighter force declines and a
larger share of some capabilities shifts to the reserves.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense
and the Air Force, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested
parties on request.
Please call me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III.
Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
In response to the changing national security threat and decreasing
defense budgets, the Secretary of Defense recommended in October
1993, as part of the Bottom-Up Review, that the Air Force's fighter
wing equivalent force\1 be reduced to 20 by 1999. Because most of
the reduction would be in the active force, GAO initiated this review
to assess the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve (the reserve
force's) capability for more rapid and direct involvement in future
conflicts and the differences between active and reserve fighter
forces' capabilities as indicated by Air Force assessments.
--------------------
\1 A fighter wing equivalent is generally comprised of 72 combat
aircraft.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Until recently, the Air Force expected to meet most contingencies,
with the exception of a global war, with active forces. In the late
1980s, the Air Force focused on defeating the Soviet threat with over
38 fighter wing equivalents, one-third of which were in the reserve
forces. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and growing fiscal
constraints, the Department of Defense (DOD) directed the Air Force
in 1990 to reduce to
26 fighter wing equivalents by 1995 primarily by eliminating more
costly active forces. According to the Bottom-Up Review, the Air
Force is to reduce to 20 fighter wing equivalents (13 active and 7
reserve) by 1999.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The reserve force's fighter aircraft units are generally less capable
in terms of their aircraft, level of training, and availability than
corresponding active fighter aircraft units. Since the projection of
forces is now a crucial element of the U.S. military strategy, more
reliance on reserve forces as part of a smaller total force increases
the risk that forces will be unable to deploy in a timely manner and
accomplish the same range of missions as active forces. The degree
of risk depends on how rapidly hostilities escalate; the enemy's
capability; and the reserve forces' availability, equipment status,
and level of training.
Reserve force fighter aircraft will likely be more rapidly and
directly used in future regional conflicts and peacetime operations.
For example, winning one major regional conflict is estimated to
require 10 fighter wing equivalents, which equals nearly half the
active fighters based overseas plus almost all of the active fighters
based in the United States. The Air Force is unlikely to use only
active fighter forces in response to a major contingency because only
reserve forces would be available if a second conflict were to
emerge. Additionally, the Air Force has already called upon the
reserve forces to participate in peacetime operations, such as
Operation Provide Comfort II in Southwest Asia. Increased use of
these forces for peacetime operations will also require more funds
and reduce their cost advantage over active forces.
The capability of reserve fighter forces to deploy and fight upon
arrival is unclear because current Air Force indicators do not
uniformly assess the relative capabilities of reserve and active
units. The Air Force's Status of Resources and Training System
(SORTS) and other assessments indicate reserve forces are as prepared
as active forces to meet future contingencies; however, several
factors that these assessments do not measure could affect decisions
about crises response, missions, and training. For example, reserve
fighter force units generally have (1) older, fewer, and less capable
aircraft; (2) lower pilot combat capability ratings, and train for
fewer types of missions; and (3) fewer joint training opportunities.
In addition, reserve forces have limitations on their availability
and need more time to train before they deploy.
GAO'S ANALYSIS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
FORCE REDUCTIONS INCREASE
RELIANCE ON THE RESERVES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Active forces are assigned forward presence, crisis response, and
contingency roles because of the length of deployments and the need
for a quick response with fully trained, highly ready, and initially
self-sufficient forces. Reserve forces were considered a less costly
way to assist and augment active units if needed. However, as the
fighter force is reduced, primarily by eliminating active aircraft,
and fewer active units are based overseas, the Air Force will depend
more on reserve forces.
By 1995, under a proposed 26-wing force, the Air Force was expected
to consist of 9 active and 11 reserve force fighter wing equivalents
based in the United States and approximately 6 active fighter wing
equivalents based overseas. Reserve forces were expected to operate
half of the A-10s designated for Army close air support, most of the
Air Force's multirole F-16s, and many of the Air Force's F-4Gs and
F-15s. Of the 20 fighter wing equivalent force proposed by the
Secretary of Defense for 1999, 5 to 6 fighter wing equivalents might
be based overseas and 7 to 8 active and 7 reserve force fighter wing
equivalents could be based in the United States.
To provide the estimated 10 fighter wing equivalents considered
necessary to win a major regional conflict, the Air Force will likely
rely more on reserve forces. During Operation Desert Storm, the Air
Force deployed eight fighter wing equivalents from the United States
along with more than two fighter wing equivalents from its overseas
bases to the Persian Gulf area. Approximately one of these fighter
wing equivalents was from the reserve forces, and it deployed 1 month
before the war began. If the United States becomes involved in a
similar-sized conflict after the force draws down to 20 fighter
wings, deploying nearly half of the 5 to 6 active fighter wing
equivalents based overseas and almost all of the 7 to 8 active
fighter wing equivalents based in the United States would be a risk
due to the possibility of a second contingency. The alternative
would be to increase reserve force involvement. For example, on the
basis of the types of aircraft used during Operation Desert Storm,
the reserve forces would have to deploy all of their A-10s and F-4Gs
and perhaps some F-16s to a similar-sized conflict.
Peacetime operational demands on the reserve forces may also
increase. Because these forces may operate nearly half of the
U.S.-based fighters by 1999, the Air Force recognized that they could
also be increasingly called on to perform peacetime operations.
Additionally, the Bottom-Up Review recognized that reserve force
fighters would occasionally need to rotate overseas to help reduce
demands on the active forces. Air Force Reserve fighters have
already performed a 45-day rotation in Turkey, and the Air National
Guard's F-4Gs are planning to deploy to support commitments to
Southwest Asia. Additionally, the Air National Guard has offered up
to 25 percent of its fighters for 30-day deployments.
Reserve forces, however, will require additional funding to carry out
their increased responsibilities. For example, the Air National
Guard estimates that deploying 6 reserve force fighters overseas for
60 days and 18 others for 45 days could cost over $7 million.
Therefore, such activities, if frequent or extensive, could
significantly reduce the approximately $70 million per year operating
cost advantage of reserve force fighter wing equivalents.
ASSESSMENTS DO NOT REVEAL
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTIVE
AND RESERVE FORCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
SORTS measures the number of personnel, their training levels, and
the availability and condition of equipment. However, that system
and other such indicators do not always uniformly measure the
relative capability of the active and reserve forces. Therefore,
even though the active and reserve forces' equipment and training
status appear equivalent on the basis of the assessments, reserve
forces are generally not as capable as their active counterparts.
The reserve forces have older, fewer, and less capable aircraft.
Most of these aircraft lack important technology improvements, such
as night navigation and targeting, electronic countermeasures, and
some weapon capabilities. Reserve forces fly less, maintain lower
pilot combat capability ratings, and are assigned fewer missions than
active forces. Reserve force units generally train for only one
theater, whereas active units train for virtually all missions and
theater commanders. In addition, reserve forces participate less
frequently in joint and overseas exercises than active forces. For
example, their participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises has
averaged once every 8.5 years compared to every 2.2 years for active
units.
Additionally, there are constraints to accessing reserve force units.
By law, members of the reserve forces voluntarily participate in
peacetime deployments unless there is a presidential call-up. The
voluntary tours are generally up to 30 days. However, Air National
Guard leaders do not encourage individuals in the fighter forces to
volunteer because they want to maintain the entire squadron's
capability.
Reserve forces may also take more time to deploy fully trained.
Reserve force personnel have up to 72 hours to mobilize their unit
and may take about 14 to 21 days to be fully trained before
deployment. Active fighter forces are generally expected to be fully
capable and able to deploy as a fully trained force on extremely
short notice (i.e., 1 day).
MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
Since the Air Force's reserve forces will be increasingly relied on
to fulfill an early combat role, Congress may wish to consider having
the Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve discuss how
they intend to minimize the risks from increased reliance on reserve
fighter forces in terms of their relative availability and time
needed to deploy, ability to undertake a broader range of missions,
and training opportunities. Also, Congress, when debating the
appropriate mix of reserve and active fighter forces and requirements
for 20 fighter wing equivalents responding to two major regional
contingencies, may also wish to consider requesting that the Air
Force provide relevant indicators of relative capability.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
DOD partially concurred with the issues discussed, but did not concur
with the recommendation in a draft of this report to develop a
uniform measurement system that identifies the (1) relative
capabilities of active and reserve forces, (2) risks associated with
their differences, and (3) reserve units most capable of combat and
peacetime operations. DOD partially concurred with a proposed matter
for congressional consideration suggesting Congress consider having
the Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve
discuss their relative capabilities, how they intend to minimize the
risks arising from increased reliance on reserve fighter forces in
terms of the reserves' availability, time needed to deploy, and
training opportunities, and the ability of the reserves to undertake
a broader range of missions (see app. II). DOD noted that, as it
continues to downsize and restructure, active and reserve forces need
to be ready to accomplish their assigned missions and that SORTS
accurately assessed the ability of these forces to do so. Therefore,
a uniform measurement system that would identify relative
capabilities, risks associated with their differences, and the
reserve units most capable of combat and peacetime operations is
unnecessary.
GAO continues to believe the differences between active and reserve
fighter force capabilities and additional risks associated with
increased reliance on the reserve forces are not as apparent or well
understood as DOD concluded. As highlighted in this report and DOD's
comments on the draft, differences in aircraft, equipment, and
training are not clearly evident. However, in light of DOD's
concern, GAO deleted the recommendation in the draft report. It was
not GAO's intention that another, separate system be developed, but
that the current reporting systems be adapted to clearly show
relative differences and capabilities. Nevertheless, as an
alternative, GAO broadened the matter for congressional consideration
in the draft report to suggest that Congress may wish to consider
requesting the Air Force provide relevant indicators of relative
capabilities, as it debates appropriate roles and missions for active
and reserve forces.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve were formed under
10 U.S.C. 261 to provide trained units and qualified personnel for
active duty when more military units are needed for national security
than are in the active force. The respective roles of the active and
reserve forces were further defined in 1970, when the Secretary of
Defense proposed the "total force concept" for manning, equipping,
and employing National Guard and Reserve forces. Two tenets in the
policy were that reserve forces should be the primary augmentation to
active forces and that the use of all forces (active, reserve,
civilian, and allied) should be integrated.
In 1973, the Secretary of Defense implemented the total force policy,
which integrated the active, National Guard, and Reserve forces into
one force. Subsequent Secretaries of Defense also endorsed the
policy along with the expectations that the reserve forces be fully
manned, well trained, well equipped, and capable of rapid
mobilization and integration into active forces in times of national
emergency.
Recognizing the role of the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve,
and active force as part of the total force, the Air Force's
regulations state it is essential these forces be staffed, trained,
and equipped with the resources required to meet their wartime
tasking. Therefore, the Air Force is ultimately responsible for
ensuring that the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve fighters
are ready to function effectively when mobilized.
RECENT ASSESSMENTS TO ADDRESS
THE APPROPRIATE ACTIVE/RESERVE
FORCE MIX
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the appropriate mix
of active and reserve forces in the total force. In the National
Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Congress
directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to report on how well
reserve and active forces are being integrated into a total force.
However, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees found that
the DOD report issued in December 1990\1
and reflected in the fiscal year 1992 defense budget proposal was
inadequate in addressing reserve force roles and missions because it
did not address reserve taskings and personnel levels. As a result,
Congress, as part of the National Defense Authorization Acts for
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, specified that another study be conducted
by a federally funded research and development center independent of
the military departments. That report, Assessing the Structure and
Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the
Secretary of Defense, which was issued by the RAND National Defense
Research Institute in December 1992, identified and evaluated
alternative force mixes and structures by considering the
requirements for future military missions and constraints on reserve
forces meeting them.
In February 1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a
report, Roles, Mission, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the
United States, in accordance with the requirements of the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The
Secretary of Defense's October 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review
also addressed roles, missions, and expectations for reserve force
fighters. Both reports considered reserve forces essential to the
implementation of the defense strategy. The Secretary's report
suggested making better use of the reserve forces by adapting them to
new requirements, assigning them new missions, and funding them
consistent with expectations for their use during a crisis or war.
Contributing to this debate was the use and effectiveness of the
reserve forces during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Air
Force Reserve volunteers from the Air Mobility Command were relied on
from the first day of deployment in August 1990 and flew 42 percent
of the missions that month.\2 However, reserve force's fighter units
were not used as significantly, deploying in December 1990 and
comprising only about 10 percent of the Air Force fighters in the
Persian Gulf.
--------------------
\1 Total Force Policy Report to the Congress, DOD, December 1990.
\2 Desert Shield/Storm: Air Mobility Command's Achievements and
Lessons for the Future (GAO/NSIAD-93-40, Jan. 25, 1993).
THE NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY AND
RESULTING REDUCTIONS IN THE
TOTAL FORCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the basis for planning the
size and content of U.S. forces. Instead of planning for global
war, containing the spread of communism, and deterring Soviet
aggression, the defense strategy now focuses on responding to
regional crises and fielding forces in concert with allies capable of
winning two major regional conflicts that occur nearly
simultaneously.
Recognizing the changing dangers and domestic fiscal constraints, the
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Air Force's budget
could decline from $104 billion in 1990 to $72 billion by 1997.\3
This decrease would reduce the number of fighter wing equivalents
(FWE) from approximately 38 in 1988 to over 26 by the end of 1995.
If the results of the Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up Review are
implemented, this force would be further reduced to 20 FWEs by 1999.
An estimate of the budget to support these forces, however, has not
been provided by the administration.
As shown in table 1.1, most of the reduction would be in the active
fighter aircraft force. One reason for not proportionally reducing
reserve forces is that they are less expensive to maintain than
active forces. The September 1992 Congressional Budget Office
report, for example, estimated that operating a reserve F-16 FWE for
1 year costs almost $70 million less than its active counterpart.
Table 1.1
Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalents,
Fiscal Years 1988-99
Fighter forces 1988 1995 1999
------------------------------------ ------ ------ ------
Air National Guard 9 8 6
Air Force Reserve 3 3 1
Active 26 15 13
============================================================
Total 38 26 20
------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
\3 Structuring U.S. Forces After the Cold War: Costs and Effects of
Increased Reliance on the Reserves, Congressional Budget Office,
September 1992.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
We initiated this review to assess the reserve forces' capability for
more rapid and direct involvement in future conflicts and the
differences in active and reserve fighter forces' capabilities. To
assess the potential for increased reliance on reserve fighter
forces, we compared the base force described in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff National Military Strategy with Operation Desert Storm data and
other war scenarios used in the Congressional Budget Office's
September 1992 study, Structuring U.S. Forces After the Cold War:
Costs and Effects of Increased Reliance on the Reserves; the RAND
National Defense Research Institute's December 1992 assessment,
Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces:
Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, and its 1993 assessment,
The New Calculus, Analyzing Airpower's Changing Role in Joint Theater
Campaigns; the Secretary of Defense's October 1993 Bottom-Up Review;
and other studies.
We compiled information on the relative status of active and reserve
forces from the Air Force's Status of Resources and Training System
(SORTS); training, logistics, aircraft capability, and mission data;
and after-action and other reports. However, we did not verify the
accuracy of the data in these reports.
We interviewed officials and reviewed information at the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Air
Force Headquarters, and National Guard Bureau, all in Washington,
D.C.; and Air Force Reserve Headquarters, Robins Air Force Base,
Georgia; Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia; Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews Air Force
Base, Maryland;
9th Air Force and 363rd Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, South
Carolina; 169th Fighter Group, McEntire Air National Guard Base,
South Carolina; 10th Air Force Headquarters, Bergstrom Air Force
Base, Texas; 46th Fighter Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base,
Louisiana; and 301st Fighter Wing, Carswell Air Force Base, Texas.
We performed our review from June 1992 to November 1993 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
FORCE REDUCTIONS INCREASE RELIANCE
ON THE RESERVES
============================================================ Chapter 2
The Air Force's increasing reliance on air reserve fighter forces to
accomplish national military objectives will challenge the reserves'
augmentation role to active forces as described in the Joint Chiefs
of Staff's National Military Strategy. The possibility of responding
to two major regional conflicts and national interests other than war
with fewer active and total fighter forces will likely result in the
reserve forces being used more rapidly and directly in contingency
and peace operations. Also, because the reserve forces' lower cost
compared to active forces is primarily based on their lower level of
peacetime activity, more peacetime operations could require
additional funds and thereby reduce their cost differential.
THE CURRENT STRATEGY REGARDS
THE RESERVES AS AUGMENTING
FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
The current Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy
presents how the military is expected to be used against the
uncertain dangers facing the United States. To respond decisively to
future regional conflicts with potential adversaries such as North
Korea, Iraq, and Iran, the strategy states the United States will
depend on the strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence,
crisis response, and reconstitution of fighting units. It further
states that the projection of power through forward presence and
crisis response with sufficient strength to defeat any aggressor is
crucial and that active forces are expected to be predominantly used
for this purpose. The strategy primarily emphasizes the role of the
active forces because they are fully trained, highly ready forces
that are rapidly deployable and initially self-sufficient for
responding to spontaneous, unpredictable crises.
If these crises become larger or more protracted, the strategy states
that the United States should increasingly rely on reserve forces.
Air National Guard leaders reinforce this relationship, citing that
in the initial stages of a contingency "shooters" (i.e., combatants)
should be available in the active forces and those reserve fighter
units called up if the crisis escalates or becomes prolonged.
However, the strategy also acknowledges that certain reserve
capabilities, such as airlift (of which more than 50 percent is in
the reserve force), must be able to deploy and augment responding
active units.
A SMALLER FIGHTER FORCE WILL
LIKELY RELY MORE ON RESERVE
FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The Air Force's future fighter force will depend more on reserve
forces to meet national objectives because active units alone may not
be sufficient. Figure 2.1 shows the past and possible future size
and mix of active and reserve air fighter forces compared with the
Air Force's fighter forces in Operation Desert Storm and for one
major regional contingency (MRC), as envisioned by the Secretary of
Defense's Bottom-Up Review.
Figure 2.1: Comparison of Air
Force Fighters
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Historically, an average of 10 FWEs were employed in the three major
post-World War II conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. This is the
same size force considered necessary to win one MRC. During
Operation Desert Storm, for example, the Air Force deployed about
eight FWEs from the United States and more than two FWEs from
overseas bases to the Persian Gulf. Only one of these FWEs was from
the reserve forces. By the end of 1999, if the United States were to
become involved in a similar conflict, the Air Force would unlikely
be able to deploy half of its five to six active FWEs based overseas
and virtually all seven to eight active FWEs in the United States
because of the possibility of a second contingency. Therefore, the
Air Force would have to rely more quickly and significantly on the
reserve forces.
SOME RESERVE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
WILL BE MORE LIKELY NEEDED THAN
OTHERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
Because of the Air Force's increased reliance on reserve forces,
possible demands on specific aircraft types are particularly
important to anticipate because some types of fighters could be
almost totally committed to a future conflict similar to the Persian
Gulf War. Figures 2.2 through 2.5 show comparisons of the F-16,
A-10, F-4G, and F-15 A/B/C/D aircraft operated by the reserve forces
in 1990, during Operation Desert Storm, and projected for 1995 and
1999.
Figure 2.2: Comparison of the
F-16 Force
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: The F-16 is the Air Force's predominant multirole fighter for
air-to-ground and air-to-air combat.
Figure 2.3: Comparison of the
A-10 Force
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: The A-10 is generally designated to provide close air support
to the Army.
Figure 2.4: Comparison of the
F-4G Force
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: The F-4G destroys enemy air defenses. It was considered vital
to successful air strikes during the Gulf War.
Figure 2.5: Comparison of the
F-15 A/B/C/D Force
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure 2.2 shows that there will be a sufficient number of F-16s in
the active fighter force to meet requirements similar to those of the
Gulf War. However, by 1995, when the F-16 will constitute the
majority of the Air Force's fighter capability, over one-half will be
in the reserve forces. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that virtually all
A-10 and F-4G reserve forces would be needed to meet a future Gulf
War-type operation. Figure 2.5 shows that there will be an ample
number of F-15A/B/C/Ds in the future active fighter force to meet a
Gulf War-sized air superiority requirement.
In 1990, the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Force Mix for the Air
National Guard concluded that, due to the total force policy, the
Guard was receiving more pressure to accept expanded and new missions
and units as well as mirror the Air Force in peacetime availability
and wartime performance. The 1993 Air National Guard Long-Range Plan
acknowledges that Guard forces must be available to meet the Air
Force's needs. For example, in the early stages of a contingency,
Guard fighter pilots may need to volunteer before a presidential
call-up to fly aircraft, such as the F-4G to suppress enemy air
defenses.
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PEACETIME
EXPERIENCES AND INITIATIVES
RECOGNIZE INCREASING DEMANDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
Since the reserve forces own a significant portion of the fighter
aircraft, the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force's Air Combat
Command, and the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve expect
their fighters will be called on to perform peacetime contingency
operations and help support overseas rotations of active forces.
Guard leaders acknowledge that Air National Guard fighter forces will
need to be organized, trained, and equipped to respond quickly and
capably to any crisis. The Bottom-Up Review also announced that
reserve forces would undertake occasional short-duration peacetime
fighter deployments overseas to help reduce demands on active
personnel. To demonstrate their commitment, reserve forces have
supported the Air Force by meeting overseas rotation needs, and they
anticipate giving similar support in the future.
In November 1992, one Air Force Reserve fighter squadron deployed six
F-16s to Turkey for 45 days. The squadron flew combat air patrol and
reconnaissance missions in support of Operation Provide Comfort II,
the United Nations directive to enforce a no-fly zone in Northern
Iraq. Even though all members of the fighter group volunteered to
deploy for the entire 45-day period, three teams of pilots and other
personnel rotated every 2 weeks to allow maximum participation.
An Air National Guard unit volunteered to deploy F-4Gs and personnel
to Southwest Asia during the last 6 months of fiscal year 1994 to
replace active F-4Gs. This unit is able to support this effort
because it possesses half of the less than one FWE of the Air Force's
F-4Gs, and approximately 44 percent of its pilots are full-time
personnel compared to about 32 percent in most Air National Guard
units.
In 1993, the Air National Guard leadership briefed commanders on the
availability of its forces to meet peacetime forward presence or
contingency operational requirements. Because major commands may not
be aware of the reserve fighter force's capabilities and, as a
result, may be reluctant to consider them as a peacetime operational
option, Guard leaders have been offering up to 25 percent of its
forces for 30 days with a response time of 72 hours.
MEETING HIGHER EXPECTATIONS MAY
REQUIRE MORE OPERATING FUNDS
FOR RESERVE FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
Increasing reliance on reserve fighter forces will decrease their
cost advantage. In 1992, the Congressional Budget Office estimated
that a Guard F-16 FWE costs approximately $300 million per year to
operate and support compared with about $370 million for an active
F-16 FWE. However, expectations for the reserve forces are
increasing. For example, although it did not cite the amount of
additional funding needed, a recent Air National Guard assessment of
inhibitors stated that the Air National Guard lacked sufficient
fighter flying hours, maintenance personnel, and air crew workdays to
support the operating tempo demanded by today's missions and newer,
more capable aircraft.
In addition, reserve forces will need more resources to train and
meet an increased pace of operations so they can be used during
peacetime to supplement or replace active forces. Resources would be
needed for increased travel, per diem expenses, increased flying
hours, and airlift operating and support costs. For example, the Air
National Guard recently estimated that sending 6 fighters overseas
for 60 days and 18 more fighters to another overseas location for 45
days would cost over $7 million. Approximately $5 million would be
for the additional military personnel, and operating and maintenance
costs related to fighter aircraft; the remainder would be for airlift
and tankers. Depending on how frequently reserve forces are
utilized, increased operations could significantly reduce the
approximately $70 million per FWE annual operating cost advantage the
reserves have over active forces.
AIR FORCE ASSESSMENTS DO NOT
REVEAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTIVE
AND RESERVE FIGHTERS
============================================================ Chapter 3
Systems, such SORTS, were not designed to identify differences that
exist between active and reserve forces' capabilities. Further,
there is no objective and uniform system for assessing and reporting
unit capabilities. SORTS, logistics, inspection, and safety reports
being collected by the Air Force and reserves describe the training,
personnel, and equipment status, but they do not measure the relative
capabilities of active and reserve fighter forces. In addition,
reserve forces are accessed and deployed differently, and some of
these differences may limit reliance on reserve forces.
ACTIVE AND RESERVE AIR FIGHTER
FORCES DO NOT REPORT AGAINST
THE SAME STANDARDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Active and reserve units are required to report their ability to
perform assigned wartime missions through SORTS. Units are to use
one of six categories (see app. I) to report on the status of their
personnel, equipment on hand, equipment condition, and training. In
addition, unit commanders can assign a subjective rating based on
their opinion of the units' abilities. According to SORTS guidance,
the National Military Command uses this system to make command
decisions, assign resources and missions, and monitor resources and
training in peacetime. The SORTS documents we reviewed showed that
Air Force active and reserve units are comparably able to perform
their assigned missions. However, this information should not be
used to conclude they are equally capable. For example, F-15 and
F-16 reserve units generally have older and fewer aircraft that are
less capable than active forces. In addition, although reserve force
pilots, in many cases, are more experienced, they fly fewer hours,
thus sustaining lower pilot combat capability ratings; have fewer
assigned missions; and participate in fewer joint training exercises.
Some differences in aircraft may be eliminated as the active force is
further reduced and newer model aircraft are reassigned to the
reserve force.
RESERVE UNITS HAVE OLDER,
FEWER, AND LESS CAPABLE
FIGHTERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
Although SORTS indicates that active and reserve forces' equipment
are comparably able to perform their assigned missions, there are
differences in the age, number, and technology of their assigned
aircraft. For example, reserve units' F-15s and F-16s are generally
earlier models (A/Bs vs. C/Ds) and are on average nearly twice as
old, as shown in table 3.1. The Air Force considers it appropriate
for the reserve forces to report at high status levels if their less
modern aircraft can still perform assigned missions.
Table 3.1
Comparison of Active and Reserve
Fighters, Fiscal Year 1993
Average Average
Mode Percent age Percent age
Aircraft l of fleet (years) of fleet (years)
-------------- ---- -------- -------- -------- --------
F-15 A/ 6 19 100 19
B 94 10 0 0
C/
D
F-16 A/ 0 N/A 47 11
B 100 4 53 6
C/
D
------------------------------------------------------------
Generally, reserve squadrons are also assigned 18 aircraft compared
with 24 aircraft in active squadrons. Therefore, to deploy an FWE,
the reserves must mobilize four squadrons, whereas the active must
mobilize only three squadrons. Also, to report at the highest level,
between 75 and 100 percent of the aircraft must be ready to perform
assigned missions. Our assessment of SORTS data on selected active
and reserve units revealed that the reserve forces were more
frequently at the lower end of this aircraft availability range. In
comparison, active units were at the higher end of the availability
range.
Additionally, the peacetime mission capability standards (i.e.,
whether the aircraft can meet at least one wartime mission) are lower
for most reserve aircraft. According to the Air Force, this
disparity reflects the reserve forces' part-time maintenance
capability. After full mobilization, however, DOD expects reserve
mission capability rates most likely will be the same as active
units. Table 3.2 shows the percent of aircraft considered mission
capable for active and reserve force F-15s and F-16s.
Table 3.2
F-16 and F-15 Mission-Capable Standards
(Figures in percent)
Air Air
Mode Active National Force
Aircraft l force Guard Reserve
------------------------- ---- ------ --------- --------
F-16 C/D 85 76 80-85
F-16 A/B N/A 70 70
F-15 C/D 83 N/A N/A
F-15 A/B 83 70 N/A
------------------------------------------------------------
Many reserve squadron aircraft do not have the latest technology
found on active squadron aircraft. For example, unlike active force
F-15 C/Ds, reserve force F-15 A/Bs that have not gone through a
multistage improvement program lack (1) upgraded radar, which would
have improved their target detection, identification, and tracking;
(2) upgraded central computers with radar display improvements, which
would have enhanced the pilots' awareness of tactical situations; (3)
launch capability for the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile,
which will limit their air-to-air combat capability relative to the
F-15C; (4) tactical electronic warfare upgrades, which would have
enabled them to detect and jam the latest threat radars, although not
as well as the improved F-15 C/Ds; or (5) chaff and flare dispensers,
which would have enhanced their defense against enemy weapons. Also,
most of the reserve forces' F-16s do not have the Low Altitude
Targeting Infra-Red Night system, which would have allowed them to
navigate and acquire targets at night or launch capability for
weapons such as the HARM Missile.
Air National Guard officials reported that units did not have the
necessary protective equipment to conduct their wartime missions
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For example, one
Air National Guard F-16 unit did not have authorized electronic
countermeasure pods or related support equipment. Therefore, the
squadron's deployment was delayed because the equipment had to arrive
from other active and reserve units, pilots had to be trained, and
maintenance personnel had to be provided from other units. Guard
officials also said their F-15s were not mobilized for Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm because they lacked chaff and flare
dispensing and other capabilities to be provided by an improvement
program.
Specifically, in one instance, we found that 96 percent of an active
unit's
24 authorized F-15 C/D aircraft were mission available and 93 percent
of that unit's pilots were considered proficient in the unit's and
unit commander's specialized mission assignment (combat capability
level B, which is discussed in the next section). In comparison,
only 70 percent of an Air National Guard unit's 18 authorized F-15A
aircraft were mission available, and only 32 percent of that unit's
pilots were at that level of mission proficiency.
In another instance, we found active units in which 100 percent of
their
24 authorized F-16 C/D aircraft were available to perform their
assigned mission and 100 percent of the units' pilots were proficient
at their assigned mission and commander's specialized mission (combat
capability level B). In comparison, only 89 percent of an Air
National Guard unit's
18 authorized F-16A aircraft were available to perform their assigned
mission, and 29 percent of the unit's pilots were at that level of
mission proficiency.
According to an Air National Guard report, during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, SORTS did not accurately reflect the status
of items, such as war repair supply kit levels, or report upgrades to
aircraft and weapon systems. The report further stated that higher
headquarters did not have all data needed to make command decisions.
The Air Force and the reserves are now beginning to compile other
data for their fighter units that may indicate their capability. For
example, the Air National Guard is beginning to develop data on
recent deployments, inspection history, manning levels, special
capabilities, and the safety record of the units. Also, the Air
Combat Command has been tracking data on the experience of personnel,
accuracy of weapons delivery, and amount of flying since October 1991
as quality performance measures. In addition, active and reserve
forces are monitoring maintenance indicators.
RESERVE PILOTS FLY LESS AND
ARE ASSIGNED FEWER MISSION
TASKINGS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
Although reserve and active squadrons may report high levels of pilot
training, the amount of flying they do and their mission
qualifications and taskings are significantly different. Reserve
force pilots are generally prior active duty Air Force personnel and,
as a result, many have greater overall flying experience than many of
their active counterparts. They also can fly less to achieve the
same capability rating as active duty pilots. However, even with the
reduced flying requirement, fewer reserve force pilots achieve the
higher capability ratings.
The Air Force uses a Graduated Combat Capability scale that reflects
the number and type of flights pilots should accomplish to
demonstrate their ability to perform assigned wartime taskings.
Depending on the level of experience, reserve pilots can fly from 16
to 37 percent less to attain comparable combat capability
qualifications as active pilots. Table 3.3 shows the number of
flights for active and reserve F-15 and F-16 pilots.
Table 3.3
F-15 and F-16 Training Flights Required
Every 6 Months to Demonstrate Graduated
Combat Capability
Level of pilot
experience Active Reserve Active Reserve Active Reserve
-------------------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
F-15 inexperienced 43 36 58 45 83 60
F-16 inexperienced 48 36 70 45 92 60
F-15 experienced 37 30 48 38 70 50
F-16 experienced 42 30 60 38 78 50
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Level A pilots are proficient in employing the primary
operational capabilities of the weapon systems worldwide. Level B
pilots are proficient in level A and in specific unit taskings and
unit commander's specialized tasking. Level C pilots are qualified
and proficient to meet all tasks associated with the full operational
capability of the weapon system.
Despite the lesser flying requirements to demonstrate level B and
level C capabilities, not as many reserve pilots attain those
capabilities as their active counterparts. For example, according to
Air Combat Command reports, 82 percent of F-15 pilots and 71 percent
of F-16 pilots in active squadrons are achieving level B training,
whereas the Air National Guard reports about 47 percent of its F-15
pilots and 48 percent of its F-16 pilots are trained to level B or
higher.
The Air National Guard and RAND note that reserve force pilots will
need additional training to ensure their proficiency before
deployment. RAND reported this additional training might take 14 to
21 days once a reserve unit is mobilized.
Active units train to support virtually all theater commanders,
whereas reserve units generally support only one. Additionally,
active units generally maintain qualification in more mission areas.
For example, active pilots in F-16 squadrons are generally proficient
in five of seven air-to-air and air-to-ground mission areas such as
defensive counter air, nuclear warfare tactics, close air support,
and air interdiction. In contrast, the pilots in Air National Guard
and Air Force Reserve units, on average, are responsible for only
about three of these mission areas.
Even though upgrading or updating reserve aircraft could narrow the
differences between active and reserve forces' capabilities and
mission areas, Air National Guard officials have expressed concern
that unless the amount of flying time is increased, their pilots
cannot train at the level demanded by today's taskings and the newer,
more capable aircraft. In addition, the amount of flying and
training time required is also a concern of the Air National Guard as
it assesses whether to take on new roles and missions. The Air
National Guard considers the training requirements for full-time
versus the traditional part-time reservist in its analysis of Air
Force missions suitable for reserve forces and cites a ratio of 25
percent full-time to 75 percent part-time as desirable. According to
RAND, reserve force units average 25 percent full-time personnel, who
are either technicians under the administration of the State
Adjutants General or reservists on full-time duty to support the
unit. The remainder of the unit is comprised of part-time reservists
required to attend at least 15 days of annual training and 48 unit
training assemblies each fiscal year. Therefore, missions requiring
initial training in excess of 45 days or continuous training in
excess of 97 days a year are not recommended for traditional guard
aircrews.
RESERVES PARTICIPATE LESS
FREQUENTLY IN OVERSEAS AND
JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3
The current National Military Strategy stresses the importance of
training with allies to build relationships, develop standard
operating procedures, and demonstrate commitment to both friends and
aggressors. In addition, the Reserve Forces Policy Board and Air
National Guard acknowledge that overseas and joint training
opportunities enhance capabilities and mobilization. Furthermore,
these organizations stated that the reserves needed to increase their
participation in this type of training.
The Reserve Forces Policy Board believes that overseas training
provides some of the most effective training opportunities for
reservists because it allows them to practice actual mobilization and
deployment plans and gain experience in flying over foreign land.
Joint training provides opportunities for different military services
to work together and increase commanders' and staffs' experience with
other services to enhance mobilization and planning. However, in a
1987-90 assessment of reserve and active forces' participation in
joint training, the Air Force determined that reserve units
participate significantly less frequently. Table 3.4 shows the
average amount of time between active and reserve forces'
participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff directed exercises, Flag
exercises,\1 and Checkered Flag exercises.\2
Table 3.4
Average Yearly Intervals for Active and
Reserve Forces' Participation in
Exercises
Exercises Active Reserves
-------------------------------------- -------- ----------
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2.2 8.5
Flag 1.4 14.0
Checkered Flag 5.0 7.7
------------------------------------------------------------
The length of travel (usually 2 weeks) limits the reserves'
participation in joint and flag training. According to a study of
Red Flag training for F-16 reserve pilots, most of those
participating in this training are full-time reservists. The 2-week
attendance requirement for Red Flag exercises limits part-time
reservists' participation because the training becomes more difficult
and builds on earlier lessons throughout the 2-week period.
--------------------
\1 Flag exercises consist of Red Flag exercises, which are sponsored
by the Air Combat Command and provide training in a simulated combat
environment; Maple Flag exercises, which are sponsored by Canada and
are similar to Red Flag exercises; and Green Flag exercises, which
are sponsored by the Air Combat Command and provide aircrews with
training in a simulated electromagnetic threat environment and
planning staff experience for becoming senior officers.
\2 Checkered Flag exercises train units to operate from assigned
deployment locations.
RESERVE FIGHTER PILOTS ARE LESS
AVAILABLE AND TAKE LONGER TO
DEPLOY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
Unlike active fighter squadrons, which can be called on to deploy
within extremely short notice (i.e., 1 day) to meet combat
emergencies, the Air Force must initially rely on reservists to
volunteer until they are officially called up. Once mobilized, the
reserves generally have up to 72 hours to report to their unit and
additional training time as necessary to be mission ready before
deployment.
The reserve call-up process also imposes legal limitations on the
number of personnel and duration of active duty. The President has
authority under 10 U.S.C. 673(b) to call up reservists for 90 days
with an additional 90-day extension and activate reservists who
volunteer for active duty. However, that authority is limited to
activating reserve forces to augment active forces for any
operational mission other than war or national emergency.
Air National Guard leaders do not advocate volunteerism for personnel
in fighter units, even though it does for airlift, air refueling, and
communication units. The Guard asserts that, because fighters
operate in force packages, the need for unit integrity to ensure
optimum, effective employment generally overrides the desire for
early involvement. However, even the Air Force's Air Mobility
Command experienced some difficulty with the extent and duration of
reserve volunteerism during Operation Desert Shield: some units had
critical personnel vacancies because many reservists had volunteered
before their units were officially activated.\3
--------------------
\3 Desert Shield/Storm: Air Mobility Command's Achievements and
Lessons for the Future (GAO/NSIAD-93-40, Jan. 25, 1993).
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
In the absence of a uniform capability measurement system, the Air
Force is collecting information from numerous sources on the status
of its active and reserve forces. However, these sources do not
always use the same standards to indicate reserve and active forces'
capabilities and reveal their differences. Even though the Air Force
and Office of Secretary of Defense decision makers may be generally
aware of these differences and able to quickly resolve some, a clear
understanding of the impact of each difference is necessary to avoid
placing more demands on the reserves' capabilities than is warranted.
For example, updating reserve aircraft could narrow the gap in
capability and the mission tasking, but the risks associated with the
differences in mission tasking, training time, training status,
access to joint training, access to reservists, and their deployment
time are not easily identified and resolved. Furthermore, these
differences need to be clearly understood by Congress as additional
roles and missions are transferred to the reserves.
MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
Since the Air Force reserve forces will be increasingly relied on to
fulfill an early combat role, Congress may wish to consider having
the Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve discuss how
they intend to minimize the risks from increased reliance on reserve
fighter forces in terms of their relative availability and time
needed to deploy, capability, ability to undertake a broader range of
missions, and training opportunities. Also, Congress, when debating
the appropriate mix of reserve and active fighter forces and
requirements for 20 FWEs and responding to two MRCs, may also wish to
consider requesting that the Air Force provide relevant indicators of
relative capability.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
DOD partially concurred with the issues discussed in a draft of this
report, but did not concur with the recommendation that the Air Force
develop a uniform measurement system that identifies the relative
capabilities of reserve and active units, risks associated with those
differences, and reserve units most capable of combat and peacetime
operations. DOD partially concurred with a matter for congressional
consideration that suggested Congress consider having the Air Force,
the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve discuss how they
intend to minimize risks arising from increased reliance on reserve
fighter forces in terms of their availability, time needed to deploy,
capability, ability to undertake a broader range of missions, and
training opportunities. In light of DOD's comments, we deleted the
recommendation, but expanded the matter for congressional
consideration to provide Congress an option of requiring such
information from the Air Force, if needed, as they debate the
appropriate mix of active and reserve forces and the roles and
missions assigned to those forces. DOD's comments appear in appendix
II.
Concerning specific issues discussed in the report, DOD commented
that the Bottom-Up Review validated 20 FWEs and 100 bombers as a
portion of the force required to win two MRCs and that the reserve
forces (Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves) were a critical
part of the force meeting that commitment. DOD further stated that
as it continues to downsize and restructure and the services evaluate
requirements for active and reserve components, both active and
reserve forces need to be ready to accomplish their assigned mission.
In addition, DOD believed that SORTS data indicated the air reserve
fighter forces were very capable of meeting the taskings and missions
called for and that additional analyses for reporting of the relative
status and capabilities of active and reserve fighter forces was
unnecessary.
We believe there are differences between active and reserve fighter
force capabilities and additional risks associated with increased
reliance on the reserve forces as the size of the Air Force is
reduced and roles and missions are reassigned. As DOD pointed out,
for example, the SORTS system could identify that an active fighter
unit and reserve fighter unit were both highly capable of performing
their assigned combat missions. However, we do not think that it is
readily apparent that the reserve forces' ability is being measured
against fewer missions and that they have older aircraft, different
types of equipment, less annual training, and significantly less
joint overseas training opportunities than their active counterparts.
As the Air Force and DOD assess how to prepare to engage in two
nearly simultaneous MRCs, meet peacetime operational requirements
with a smaller force, and stay within affordability limitations, the
relative capability of reserve fighter forces will likely become
increasingly important to Congress and others. DOD acknowledged that
reserve forces possess older and less capable fighter aircraft than
the active force. Consequently, even when these reserve units are
maintained at equally high readiness levels, their mission
versatility and combat capability within a given mission will
generally be less than that of active units equipped with more
advanced aircraft. For these reasons, we do not believe that the
differences and increased risks are as apparent or well understood as
DOD concludes.
DOD agreed that the lower operating cost advantage of the air reserve
force was due primarily to its significantly lower peacetime
operations tempo and part-time nature. However, DOD only partially
concurred with our conclusion that higher utilization of reserve
forces might require more operating funds. In DOD's view, the cost
of using reserve forces in support of active missions does not reduce
their cost advantage because the cost of utilizing reserve forces,
such as the additional personnel and flying hour costs cited by DOD,
are absorbed by funds initially allocated to active forces. We
believe that if the Air Force uses funds that were originally
intended for active forces to support increased use of reserve forces
in peacetime, the cost advantage of reserve forces versus active
forces is narrowed.
Regarding our finding that reserve force pilots flying less than
active pilots, DOD noted that the Air Combat Command reviewed and
approved the training requirements and that reserve pilots could take
advantage of their greater experience to remain qualified with fewer
flying hours and still meet their mission tasking. However,
according to the Air Combat Command, the experience level of reserve
force pilots is not a determining factor in proposing their levels of
training. Instead, the level of training proposed for reserve versus
active pilots is determined by the missions assigned, response time,
and event requirements derived from a detailed analysis of taskings,
historical data, and several studies.
CATEGORY DEFINITIONS USED IN THE
STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING
SYSTEM
=========================================================== Appendix I
C-1: Unit possesses required resources and is trained to perform its
assigned mission.
C-2: Unit possesses resources and training necessary to perform the
bulk of its wartime mission.
C-3: Unit possesses resources and training necessary to perform
major portions of its wartime mission.
C-4: Unit requires additional resources or training to perform its
wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it could undertake
portions of its wartime mission with resources on hand.
C-5: Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource action and is
not prepared to perform its wartime mission.
C-6: Unit has measured resource areas designated as not applicable
by the service.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
and pp. 14-15.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
22, and 28.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
and 22-25.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
Richard J. Herley, Project Director
NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
Richard G. Payne, Project Manager
Jeffrey L. Overton, Jr., Deputy Project Manager
Carleen C. Bennett, Evaluator
Patricia W. Lentini, Computer Programmer/Analyst
ATLANTA REGIONAL OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
Alphonse R. Davis, Regional Management Representative
Beverly J. Brooks Hall, Deputy Project Manager
Maria Storts, Evaluator