
February 1995

PEACE OPERATIONS

Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities



**National Security and
International Affairs Division**

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February 13, 1995

Congressional Committees

This report provides information drawn from the work we have done on peace operations at the request of various Committees and individual Members of Congress. It covers (1) the cost and funding of peace operations, (2) the effectiveness of United Nations (U.N.) operations, (3) U.S. policy and efforts to strengthen U.N. capabilities, and (4) the impact of peace operations on the U.S. military. On February 3, 1995, we briefed staff from multiple Committees on these issues.

In reviewing issues concerning U.N. and U.S. peace operations over the past several years, we have done extensive work in the United States and at various peace operation locales, including Bosnia, Cambodia, and Northern Iraq. We spoke with U.N. officials at these operations and with representatives of the warring parties. We have also discussed peace operations extensively with officials throughout the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State, the United Nations, private organizations, and U.S. military units that have participated in peace operations. Finally, we have reviewed U.S. government, U.N, and private organization reports and documents concerning peace operations. A list of issued GAO products related to peace operations is at the back of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix I. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis Issues, on (202) 512-3504 regarding DOD aspects of peace operations and Joseph Kelley, Director-in-Charge, International Affairs Issues, on (202) 512-4128 regarding the Department of State and U.N. aspects.



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Contents

Letter		1
Briefing Section I		6
Background	Types of Operations	6
	U.S. Policy Framework	8
	U.N.-Led Operations	10
	Non U.N.-Led Operations	12
Briefing Section II		14
Cost and Funding	What Kind of Costs Are Involved?	14
	Who Incurs Costs?	16
	How Are Peace Operations Funded?	18
	U.N. Pays Some U.S. Costs	20
Briefing Section III		22
Effectiveness of U.N. Operations	Findings	22
	Findings	24
Briefing Section IV		26
U.S. Policy and Response	PDD-25	26
	U.S. Actions to Strengthen U.N. Capacity	28
	U.N. Reform Efforts	30
Briefing Section V		32
U.S. Military Participation	Participating U. S. Forces	32
	Impact on U.S. Forces	34
	Impact on Regional Conflicts	36
Appendix I		38
Major Contributors to This Report		
Related GAO Products		40

Contents

Abbreviations

DOD	Department of Defense
MRC	major regional conflict
MFO	Multinational Force Observers
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Background

GAO Types of Operations

- Peace operations
 - Preventive deployment
 - Peacekeeping
 - Peace enforcement
- Humanitarian operations

Execution of operations

- U.N.-led
 - Non-U.N.-led but U.N.-authorized
 - Independent of U.N.
-

Peace operations use military assets to help maintain or restore international peace. Peace operations cover three types of actions—preventive deployment, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Preventive deployment is defined as the use of military assets to prevent conflict from breaking out. An example of preventive deployment is Operation Able Sentry, where U.S. troops are stationed in Macedonia to deter fighting from spreading into that country from the former

Yugoslavia. Peacekeeping is a military operation designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of a cease-fire or other similar agreement. Peacekeeping is undertaken with the consent of all major parties to the dispute. Both preventive deployment and peacekeeping are authorized under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which specifies peaceful means to resolve disputes.

Peace enforcement is the use of military force or the threat of force to compel countries to comply with international sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peace enforcement, such as the operation in Somalia, is authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which specifies forceful action to deal with international crises.

Humanitarian operations involve the use of military assets to relieve human misery and suffering. Humanitarian operations, such as DOD's Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, do not attempt to directly resolve disputes or support a peace settlement.

These operations can be U.N.-led, that is, planned, paid for, and implemented by the United Nations. They can also be authorized by the U.N. Security Council and thus U.N.-sanctioned, but without U.N. participation, such as the U.S.-led coalition in Haiti. Or they may be completely independent of U.N. sanction or participation, such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai.

GAO U.S. Policy Framework

- U.N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended
 - Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1994 and 1995
 - PDD-25
 - National Security Revitalization Act/Peace Powers Act (Proposed)
-

Two acts of Congress and Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) provide a basis for U.S. participation in U.N. peace operations. The U.N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended, states that a maximum of 1,000 U.S. armed forces personnel can be detailed to the United Nations in noncombat roles to help peacefully resolve disputes. The act also authorizes the President to negotiate agreements with the Security Council, subject to the approval of Congress, to provide armed forces to

the United Nations acting under Chapter VII to maintain international peace and security.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 limits appropriations for the U.S.-assessed contribution for U.N. peacekeeping to 25 percent of the operations' costs, as of fiscal year 1996.¹ It further requires the President to consult with Congress each month on the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations, provide quarterly and annual reports on peacekeeping, and notify Congress 15 days prior to providing assistance to the United Nations for peacekeeping.

PDD-25, issued by the President in May 1994, sets U.S. policy regarding U.S. participation in peace operations. It sets forth factors the United States will consider before deciding to participate in peace operations and states that U.S. troops will not be placed under U.N. command, but may be placed under U.N. operational control for a prescribed operation.

On January 4, 1995, the National Security Revitalization Act (HR7) was introduced in the House of Representatives, and the Peace Powers Act (S5) was introduced in the Senate of the United States. This legislation, if enacted, would build on the existing policy framework. It would clarify certain reporting requirements, require the President to certify that placing U.S. troops under the command or operational control of a U.N. commander is necessary to protect U.S. security interests, and provide a credit against the U.S. peacekeeping assessment for certain DOD expenditures in support of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

¹Currently the U.S. peacekeeping assessment is 31.7 percent of peacekeeping costs, but the United States pays 30.4 percent, reflecting an informal agreement.

GAO U.N.-Led Operations

	<u>Missions</u>
Peacekeeping	13
Enforcement	4
U.N. peacekeeping troops	64,000
Range of troops	17 to 40,000

Briefing Section I
Background

As of February 1995, there were 17 active U.N.-led peace operations. Thirteen were peacekeeping operations and four authorized the use of force. A total of 64,000 U.N. troops, police, and military observers were assigned to these 17 missions. Seventeen of these personnel were deployed to the U.N. Observer Mission in Tajikistan, and 40,000 were deployed to the U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia.

GAO Non-U.N.-Led Operations

	<u>Missions</u>	<u>U.S. participation</u>
U.N. authorized	10	Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, N. Iraq, Rwanda, Southwest Asia, Somalia
Independent of U.N.	3	MFO (Sinai)

Briefing Section I
Background

At the end of 1994, there were 13 non-U.N.-led peace operations. Ten operations were undertaken in support of U.N. Security Council resolutions; of those, the United States participated in eight. The two operations the United States did not participate in were the South Ossetia-Georgia Force and the CIS Collective Force in Tajikistan, both in the former Soviet Union. Three operations were independent of the United Nations—the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group, and the Moldova Force. The United States participates only in the MFO.

Cost and Funding

GAO What Kind of Costs Are Involved?

- Incremental

DOD reports only incremental costs

- Total
-

Two broad cost categories are associated with peace operations—incremental and total. DOD reports the incremental costs of its participation in peace operations. As defined by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) for use during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, incremental costs are those costs that would not have been incurred except for the operation. DOD is still using this definition.

We have reported that when considering the cost of operations it should be recognized that DOD's financial systems cannot reliably determine costs. The services do not have the systems in place to capture actual incremental costs. Only the total obligations are captured by the accounting systems. The services use various management information systems to identify incremental obligations and to estimate costs. Obligational data are generated by individual military units that report them up the chain of command. In our work on several operations, a limited review of obligations documents showed that these actions were directly related to the operation.

Total costs are difficult to quantify because many assumptions have to be made concerning the allocation of costs. For example, the Marine Corps brought equipment to Somalia valued at almost \$100 million. This equipment was purchased over a period of years and has a long useful life. To determine total costs DOD would have to decide how much of the value of that equipment to charge against the operation.

GAO Who Incurs Costs?

- DOD—logistics, transportation, troops
 - State Department—U.N. peacekeeping assessments, refugee assistance
 - USAID—humanitarian aid
 - Other agencies
-

DOD, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and a host of other agencies—including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury—have participated to some extent in peace operations.

Of these agencies, DOD has the most incremental costs for peace operations. For fiscal year 1994, it reported incremental costs of \$1.9 billion. The most costly operations were those in Somalia (\$528 million),

Haiti (\$371 million), and in and around Iraq (\$425 million). For fiscal year 1995, DOD estimates that it will incur incremental costs of \$2.6 billion for all contingency operations, including operations in Haiti (\$592 million), in and around Iraq (\$579 million), and Bosnia (\$312 million). Our preliminary estimate is that peace operations-related incremental costs are about \$2.1 billion of that amount. The remainder, which we have not characterized as a peace operation, is associated with Operation Vigilant Warrior, the U.S. response to Iraqi troop movements near the Kuwait border. DOD incurs incremental costs to transport troops, equipment, and supplies and to sustain the military forces in the field, among other things.

The Department of State has the next highest amount for peace operations. The bulk of State's costs are for the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping assessments. In fiscal year 1994, the State Department paid \$1.1 billion towards the U.S. assessed contribution for peacekeeping. State also incurs costs for additional voluntary peace operation contributions and for refugee programs.

The Agency for International Development's costs for humanitarian aid exceed \$100 million. Other agencies' costs range from several hundred thousand to several million dollars, some of which are reimbursed by DOD or State. At the request of the House Budget Committee, we are developing data on estimated fiscal year 1995 costs for all U.S. agencies participating in peace operations.

GAO How Are Peace Operations Funded?

- State, AID, Agriculture use annual appropriations
 - DOD uses different funding mechanisms
 - Emergency supplemental appropriations sometimes provided
-

Most agencies budget for and receive annual appropriations to fund their participation in peace operations. Each year, the Congress appropriates funds for the State Department for the anticipated U.S. share of assessments for U.N. peace operations, for U.S. voluntary contributions for U.N. operations, and for refugee programs. The Congress has also at times provided emergency supplemental appropriations for the State Department to cover unanticipated U.N. peacekeeping assessments. The U.S. Agency for International Development receives annual appropriations

for humanitarian aid, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture receives annual appropriations for food programs, as authorized by P.L. 480.

DOD does not budget for the cost of military operations or contingencies. It budgets to be ready to conduct such operations. When the services have to conduct these operations, the planned budget execution cycle is necessarily disrupted. DOD must then absorb the costs of these operations within its existing appropriation or seek supplemental appropriations.

DOD has funded operations in different ways. In fiscal year 1993, to pay for the cost of operations in Somalia, DOD asked for and received a supplemental that reprogrammed \$750 million from other areas within its budget but provided no new funds. In fiscal year 1994, DOD received two emergency supplementals: one for \$1.2 billion in February 1994 and one for \$299 million in September 1994. These supplementals covered most of DOD's incremental costs for peace operations; the remainder of the costs were absorbed within its existing appropriations. DOD recently requested a \$2.6 billion emergency supplemental to cover estimated costs for fiscal year 1995.

The way peace operations are funded has important implications. If the funds come from existing appropriations, spending plans are disrupted because funding for other planned activities has to be reduced. Additional resources received through supplemental legislation would not have this same impact, but such legislation could be subject to the discretionary spending limits of the Budget Enforcement Act unless designated as emergency funding. If emergency supplemental legislation appropriates additional resources to fund an operation, the budget deficit will increase, since emergency appropriations cause an increase in the spending caps established by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 for that fiscal year. If additional resources are appropriated but not marked as emergency, they would be subject to the discretionary spending limits in the Budget Enforcement Act, which could mean that the amount of budget authority available for other discretionary spending could be reduced.

GAO U.N. Pays Some U.S. Costs

- DOD supplies goods and services at U.N. request; U.N. pays DOD
- U.N. reimburses DOD for troops and equipment only if under U.N. command

For peace operations, the United Nations needs to fill planned and unexpected requirements for equipment and services. To do this, the United Nations uses Letters of Assist, specific agreements that define a requirement, the delivery and payment terms, and other necessary information. DOD has provided the United Nations such items as armored personnel carriers, maps, and transport services through these agreements and has been reimbursed for this support. U.S. support provided through

these agreements is authorized by section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

In return for participating in specific U.N.-led peace operations, the United Nations reimburses member nations for the costs they incur when fielding troops and equipment. The United Nations uses a fixed rate of payment for all troops serving in U.N.-led operations. These rates are \$988 per person per month for regular infantry, \$1,279 per person per month for specialists, and an additional \$70 per person per month for wear and tear on personal clothing, gear, and weapon. The United Nations also reimburses member nations for the value of the equipment participating troops are requested to bring with them to the operation.

The United States will not be reimbursed for the deployment of troops and equipment to an operation that is not U.N.-led. For example, during the U.N. operation in Somalia, DOD provided 2,900 logistics troops to the U.N. force. DOD also had about 1,100 troops under U.S. command in Somalia as a quick reaction force to assist U.N. troops. The United Nations reimbursed DOD for the 2,900 logistics troops and their equipment, but not for the 1,100 combat troops in the quick reaction force.

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations

GAO Findings

- Limited effectiveness in
Complex missions
Peace enforcement
- Structural limits
Leadership
Command and control
Deployment/personnel

The United Nations has had limited effectiveness carrying out complex missions such as the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and operations that entail the use of force, such as the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and U.N. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).² In Cambodia, for example, UNTAC held a successful election, but national reconciliation was fragile because the force did not disarm the

²Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia (April 13, 1994, NSIAD 94-156BR); U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions (December 29, 1993, NSIAD 93-15)

combatants, ensure human rights were respected, or ensure that the government acted impartially. In Bosnia, U.N. operations fell short of carrying out many objectives. Aid convoys were delayed and obstructed on a daily basis. In the safe areas, human rights were violated and many civilians were killed.

These operations took place in hostile environments. However, several weaknesses of the United Nations limit its ability to effectively undertake such large and ambitious operations. These include weaknesses in leadership, command and control, and logistics. In Bosnia, for example, weaknesses in overall leadership and coordination hindered consistent assertive action to deliver aid and protect Bosnians. The operation lacked central authority to set policies and integrate humanitarian objectives with supporting military activities. All three operations illustrate the limits in U.N. command and coordination. There was limited coordination of military and civilian activities in UNTAC, partly due to fragmentation in planning. UNTAC's large multinational force carried out orders inconsistently. In UNOSOM II, command and control sometimes broke down during operations and troop contingents carried out actions independently of U.N. command. In Bosnia, command and control problems prevented UNPROFOR from deploying troop contingents to areas where assistance was desperately needed.

The United Nations is ill-equipped to plan, logistically support, and deploy personnel to large missions. For example, operational plans for UNTAC were not fully prepared before deployment, supplies and equipment arrived long after deployment, and military and civilian peacekeepers were late in deploying for both UNTAC and UNOSOM II.

GAO Findings

- More effective at
 - Observation/monitoring
 - Facilitating elections
 - Coordinating multinational action
- Enabling factors
 - Limited scope
 - Standardized approach

The United Nations has effectively observed and monitored peace processes, supervised elections, and authorized multilateral action. U.N. operations monitor cease-fires in such locations as the Arab-Israeli border following the war of 1948; Cyprus; and Liberia. And U.N. military observers work unarmed in the former Yugoslavia and Liberia. In Cambodia, UNTAC conducted over 1,000 investigations of cease-fire violations. The United Nations has also supervised elections in Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique. In Cambodia, the U.N. electoral unit

organized a nationwide voter education campaign, registered nearly 5 million Cambodians, and supervised a staff of over 50,000 during the election. The U.N. Security Council also authorizes multinational actions to address international disputes. Multinational coalitions for Somalia, Haiti, and Desert Storm in Iraq were authorized by the U.N. Security Council.

Several factors enable the United Nations to carry out these actions. First, the actions are limited in scope. Observation and monitoring, for example, involves reporting on the situation through on-the-ground visual inspection. Some observer missions have used as few as 17 personnel. Elections are usually one component of a larger operation, and the objective is clear—hold the election. Standard approaches are also used in conducting these actions. The primary action of over 15 U.N. peace operations has been the observation and monitoring of cease-fires, dating back to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in 1948. Elections are supported by the electoral unit, which specializes in planning elections. For Cambodia, the electoral unit wrote a plan for developing electoral laws, registering voters, and administering the election. The plan, completed 18 months prior to the election, provided the blueprint used for the election.

U.S. Policy and Response

GAO PDD-25

- Sets factors considered for U.S. approval and participation
 - Provides for shared responsibility
 - Strengthens U.N. capacity
-

PDD-25 provides policy guidance for U.S. support of and involvement in peace operations. This guidance outlines factors to be considered by the United States before deciding to participate or support a new U.N. peace operation or renewing long-standing peace operations. Under the policy, the United States participates in peace operations that are in the national interest. Other factors to be considered include whether missions have clear objectives, adequate financing, and an end date for involvement of U.S. troops. As part of our ongoing review of the effectiveness of peace

operations, we are focusing on the impact of PDD-25. Before the President approved the directive in May 1994, elements of it were considered in deciding to participate in earlier peace operations. But the first full implementation of PDD-25 was in Rwanda. Our evaluation of the decision to participate in Rwanda indicated that the U.S. agencies closely scrutinized operations against the factors outlined in PDD-25 before committing to support the mission.

In addition to providing guidance, the directive calls for strengthening the U.N. capacity to manage peace missions. Our past reports on Somalia and Cambodia, for example, have detailed deficiencies in logistics, deployment, and staffing that need to be corrected.

GAO U.S. Action to Strengthen U.N.
Capacity

- DOD planners detailed
- Logistics staff provided
- Interagency task forces established

PDD-25 recommends steps to improve the capabilities of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and thus provide for effective and efficient peace operations. U.S. agencies have assisted in making these improvements. For example, DOD has detailed military officers, sealift and airlift planners, and budget experts to U.N. headquarters to improve planning and preparation for new and ongoing operations. The Joint Staff sponsored a logistics working group comprised of 10 U.S. military logistics

experts who produced a manual of recommendations for further enhancement of logistics operations at the United Nations.

In May 1994, DOD commissioned the Defense Information Systems to study the communication and information needs of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The study recommends the establishment of a modern communications architecture that will allow the United Nations to save money on communications costs, to capture data—financial, military or other—at any point from the field to the headquarters, and to integrate its communication with systems used by the United States and other nations that contribute to peacekeeping operations.

In addition to the support provided in the areas above, U.S. interagency working groups have been closely monitoring and developing strategies to improve ongoing U.N. operations.

GAO U.N. Reform Efforts

- Security Council involvement enhanced
 - Planning division strengthened
 - New logistics base planned
 - Situation center operational
 - Intelligence architecture set up
-

The United Nations has instituted or is implementing a number of reforms. Many of these reforms were a direct result of U.S efforts to strengthen the U.N. capacity to manage peace operations. For example, as a result of PDD-25, the U.N. Security Council is more closely reviewing its decisions to enter into international crises and has adopted many of the same PDD-25 factors for consideration before making a decision.

The United Nations has also begun strengthening its planning capability. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations created a separate planning unit, now headed by a Major General from a member state, and obtained additional staff. The planning unit prepares plans for individual missions, civilian police, and demining and intends to provide peacekeeping training. Our ongoing work will report on the results of the planning unit.

The U.N. reforms include the establishment of a new logistics center to be established in Brindisi, Italy, where materials and equipment left over from previous peace missions, such as those in El Salvador and Cambodia, will be refurbished and reused. Also, in March 1994, a 24-hour Situation Center was created. During a visit, we noted that the center quickly provides up-to-date information on troop locations and bottlenecks in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, compared to similar DOD activities, preciseness was lacking in some areas.

U.S. Military Participation

GAO Participating U.S. Forces

- Tactical and airlift aircraft
 - Carrier and amphibious forces
 - Infantry/mechanized infantry
 - Military police
 - Special operations forces, logistics, and C3I
-

U.S. military forces have participated in peace operations for almost 50 years, with limited numbers of personnel. However, as the number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased in the past several years, the nature and extent of U.S. participation have changed markedly. Recently, the United States has used much larger numbers of combat and support forces to respond to events in a number of locations.

U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical aircraft have provided a variety of capabilities to peace operations, such as suppression of enemy air defenses, close air support, air-to-ground weapons delivery, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control. Forces providing such capabilities have participated in operations such as Deny Flight (Bosnia), Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), and Southern Watch (Southern Iraq). Air Force C-130 and C-141 airlift aircraft have delivered humanitarian relief for operations such as Provide Promise (Bosnia) and Support Hope (Rwanda).

Navy Carrier Battle Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units/Amphibious Ready Groups are the naval units of choice for peace operations. They include an array of multipurpose, forward-deployed forces, including aircraft carriers and supporting airwings, surface combatants, amphibious ships, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft. Naval forces have supported peace and humanitarian operations off the coast of Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Haiti, and Cuba.

Forces from the Army's 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division have participated in peace operations such as Restore and Continue Hope (Somalia), Able Sentry (Macedonia), and Uphold Democracy (Haiti).

Peace operations tend to rely heavily on support forces. Military police, special operations, logistics, and command, control, and communications forces from all the services have provided unique capabilities for peace operations. Few other nations have this range of capabilities, and these U.S. forces have been used extensively in most peace operations in which the United States has participated.

GAO Impact on U.S. Forces

- Strain on certain support forces and specialized capabilities
 - Increased operational tempo and consecutive deployments
 - Reduced combat training time
 - Increased reliance on reserves
-

Peace operations have stressed certain key military capabilities, few of which are in the active component. These include (1) certain Army support forces, such as quartermaster, transportation, engineering, and special operations units, and (2) Air Force specialized aircraft, such as the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System, and the F-4G Wild Weasel, which is used for lethal suppression of enemy radars. These forces are being used

in an increasing number of peace operations, most of which have required a sustained presence.

Peace operations have provided U.S. military forces with valuable experience, for example, in joint and coalition operations. For some units, these operations provide excellent training in the same missions they would perform in a war. However, the increased number of these operations and their extended nature have resulted in (1) an increased number of days spent away from home bases exceeding recommended standards; (2) consecutive deployments; (3) missed training; (4) increased maintenance on systems and equipment; and (5) cannibalization of aircraft.

Because of the increasing number of peace operations, aircrews associated with certain specialized aircraft are exceeding the 120-day maximum time on temporary duty recommended by the Air Force's Air Combat Command. For example, personnel assigned to the only F-4G squadron in the active component averaged approximately 145 days on temporary duty in 1994, and some individuals exceeded 180 days.

The extent to which a unit's combat capabilities are affected by participating in peace operations depends on several factors, including the length of participation and the mission performed. According to Air Force and Navy officials, aircrews can lose proficiency in some combat skills through prolonged participation in peace operations because the missions may not require the entire breadth of combat capabilities. Skills not practiced could include, for example, night and low-level flight operations, night intercept maneuvers, and other air combat maneuvers.

To cope with the increased tempo of operations, the military has relied on and most likely will continue to rely on reserve forces, primarily volunteers. In some cases, reserves have been needed to meet mission requirements that active forces were unable to fulfill. In other cases, reserve volunteers have provided operational relief to active forces that had been continuously participating in these operations.

GAO Impact on Regional Conflicts

- U.S. participation could impede timely response to regional conflicts
- Certain forces designated for peace operations would be needed in a regional conflict
- Disengagement and redeployemnet could be difficult

Extended participation in multiple and/or large-scale peace operations could impact the ability of some forces to respond in a timely manner to major regional conflicts (MRC). This is because certain active component support units and specialized Air Force aircraft used for these operations would also be needed initially in an MRC. Contrary to the DOD bottom-up review's assumption, it could be difficult to quickly disengage these assets from a peace operation and redeploy them to an MRC.

First, some of the forces needed in the early days of an MRC, such as port handlers, air and sea movement control personnel, and petroleum handlers, would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation. During the Somalia peace operation, for example, the Army used 100 percent of some of the contingency forces that would be needed in the first 30 days of an MRC. Had an MRC begun then, immediate access to reserve component forces would have been necessary. The Army recognizes this challenge and is addressing the issue as part of the ongoing Total Army Analysis 2003.

Second, airlift assets would have to pick up personnel and equipment from the peace operation. Redeployment of ground personnel and equipment from a peace operation could be difficult because the already limited number of airlift assets flying from the United States to the MRC would have to be provided to pick up personnel and equipment from the peace operation.

Finally, some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to an MRC. For example, once 10th Mountain Division personnel returned from Somalia, it took approximately 3 to 6 months to bring some units' skills back to a level acceptable for combat operations, according to Division officials. The extensive use of certain equipment, combined with the effects of harsh environments in certain peace operations, has required that the equipment undergo extensive maintenance before it can be used again. Also, equipment and supplies off-loaded from prepositioned ships for use in a peace operation, as was the case in Somalia, would not be immediately available for use in an MRC.

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Related GAO Products

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