Military Capabilities: Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to Enhance Joint
Military Training (Chapter Report, 07/06/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-109).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of
the Department of Defense's (DOD) joint training activities, focusing on
the: (1) scope of DOD joint training activities; and (2) actions taken
and additional actions needed to improve joint training.
GAO found that: (1) inadequate Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) oversight has
perpetuated limited joint training of U.S. forces; (2) most joint
training exercises are conducted to maintain U.S. access or presence in
a region, promote regional stability, or foster relations with foreign
military forces; (3) although these objectives are important, they have
taken precedence over joint military training activities; (4) the JCS
Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7) has failed to
critically review planned exercises to ensure that they emphasize joint
training and to correct past problems, develop meaningful standards for
evaluating exercises, or monitor enough exercises to ensure that
training problems are identified and corrected; (5) J-7 needs to take a
stronger coordinating role for joint training, since several entities
have responsibility for joint training activities, but its staffing
level is not sufficient for it to conduct all its oversight tasks; (6)
it would not be practical to shift the J-7 coordinating role to either
the Joint Warfighting Center or the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM); and
(7) the Secretary of Defense and JCS have taken steps to improve joint
training, such as developing uniform policy guidance and strengthening
the roles of the Joint Warfighting Center and USACOM, but other units
have reservations about new USACOM training strategies.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-109
TITLE: Military Capabilities: Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to
Enhance Joint Military Training
DATE: 07/06/95
SUBJECT: Military training
Combat readiness
Defense contingency planning
Military forces
Interagency relations
Military intervention
Armed forces abroad
Training utilization
Military operations
Operations analysis
IDENTIFIER: Desert Shield
Desert Storm
DOD Operation Restore Hope
Somalia
JCS Exercise Program
DOD REFORGER Exercise
**************************************************************************
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO *
* report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, *
* headings, and bullets are preserved. Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are *
* identified by double and single lines. The numbers on the right end *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the page *
* numbers of the printed product. *
* *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble *
* those in the printed version. *
* *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015, *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time. *
**************************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
July 1995
MILITARY CAPABILITIES - STRONGER
JOINT STAFF ROLE NEEDED TO ENHANCE
JOINT MILITARY TRAINING
GAO/NSIAD-95-109
Military Capabilities
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CINC - Commander in Chief
CJCS - Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
DOD - Department of Defense
GAO - General Accounting Office
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
USACOM - U.S. Atlantic Command
RAP - Remedial Action Project
REFORGER - Return of Forces to Germany
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-256469
July 6, 1995
The Honorable Robert K. Dornan
Chairman
The Honorable Owen B. Pickett
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman
Chairman
The Honorable Norman Sisisky
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Readiness
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
This report responds to a request that we review the effectiveness of
the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of joint training
activities. We found that, although some actions have been taken to
improve joint training, DOD has not taken the full range of actions
needed to correct long-standing program weaknesses.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations and
Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Secretary of Defense; the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget and other interested parties. Copies will also
be made available to others on request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you have any questions. The
major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Today, U.S. military strategy emphasizes that air, land, sea, and
special operations forces must be capable of working together in
large-scale combat and noncombat operations. The major regional
conflict represented by Operation Desert Storm, the humanitarian
relief efforts in Rwanda and Somalia, and the operation to restore
democracy in Haiti illustrate the diverse missions U.S. forces can
expect to perform.
Because U.S. forces must be adequately prepared for joint
operations, the former Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members,
Subcommittees on Military Forces and Personnel and Readiness, House
Committee on Armed Services (now the Committee on National Security),
asked GAO to determine (1) the scope of the Department of Defense's
(DOD) joint training activities, (2) the effectiveness of the
management of these activities, and (3) the actions that have been
taken and any additional actions needed to improve joint training.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Although the program has multiple purposes, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise Program is the primary method DOD
uses to train its forces and staff for joint operations. In fiscal
year 1994, the regional commanders in chief (CINC) conducted about
200 live and computer-simulated military exercises under this
program. Some exercises are conducted primarily to train U.S.
forces for joint operations, while others are done for different
reasons, such as to gain U.S. access to a region or foster
relationships between U.S. military forces and those of other
nations.
Responsibilities for joint training are divided among various DOD
entities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
provides overall policy and program review of all military training
programs. Two entities of the Chairman's Joint Staff have key roles.
First, the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7)
is the Joint Staff's focal point for joint training and, as such,
monitors and coordinates the joint training activities of CINCs,
formulates joint training policies, and advises the Secretary of
Defense on joint training priorities. Second, the Joint Warfighting
Center assesses existing joint doctrine, establishes the need for new
doctrine, and helps the regional CINCs develop training programs for
their overseas forces.
The U.S. Atlantic Command trains most U.S.-based forces and provides
the other regional CINCs with forces for joint operations and
exercises as needed. Each of the regional CINCs determines joint
training requirements and then plans, conducts, and evaluates joint
exercises in its respective areas of operation. The services train
their forces in basic service skills and provide forces to the CINCs
for use in their joint exercises.
GAO reviewed DOD's joint training in 1979 and 1985 and found both
times that program effectiveness was impaired by inadequate Joint
Staff oversight.\1
--------------------
\1 Improving the Effectiveness of Joint Military Exercises--An
Important Tool for Military Readiness (GAO/LCD-80-2, Dec. 11, 1979)
and Management of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program Has Been
Strengthened but More Needs to be Done (GAO/NSIAD-85-46, Mar. 5,
1985).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
Although the CJCS Exercise Program is the primary means to train U.S.
forces for joint operations, inadequate Joint Staff oversight has led
to perpetuating a program that provides U.S. forces with little
joint training. The vast majority of the exercises was conducted for
reasons other than to provide joint training. These reasons were to
maintain U.S. access or presence in a region or to foster relations
with foreign military forces. Although these objectives are
important, they have taken precedence over training U.S. forces for
joint operations.
The J-7 has not provided the strong leadership needed to ensure that
the full range of program management tasks required for an effective
joint training program are carried out and coordinated. It has not
(1) critically reviewed planned exercises to ensure that the program
provides joint training benefits to the fullest extent possible, (2)
ensured that problems surfacing in the exercises are identified and
addressed, or (3) monitored enough exercises to gain first-hand
knowledge of the problems. The diffusion of responsibilities among
several entities heightens the importance of a stronger J-7
coordinating role for joint training.
The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have recently taken
steps aimed at improving joint training. Notably, they have
strengthened the roles of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the Joint
Warfighting Center. However, other CINCs have voiced concerns about
the U.S. Atlantic Command's new joint training program and
operational strategy and appear reluctant to use the Joint
Warfighting Center's technical assistance. A stronger J-7 role is
needed to ensure that these concerns are adequately addressed if more
uniformity in joint training is to be achieved and if the U.S.
Atlantic Command's new strategy is to effectively prepare U.S.
forces for joint operations.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
CJCS EXERCISES PROVIDE
LITTLE JOINT TRAINING
OPPORTUNITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
In 1994, DOD spent over $400 million to conduct over 200 exercises
under the CJCS Exercise Program, yet less than one-third of the
exercises had joint training as their primary focus. The major
reason for the small number of joint training exercises being
conducted was that the program's other objectives--gaining access to
foreign seaports and airstrips, showing a U.S. military presence in
a region, and enhancing military-to-military relationships--have
taken precedence over those related to joint training. Of 121
exercises conducted by the commanders of the Central, European, and
Pacific theaters in fiscal year 1994, GAO found that 73 percent of
the exercises were designed to meet objectives such as a show of U.S.
military presence in a region. Only 27 percent of the 121 exercises
were designed to train forces or commanders for joint operations.
Moreover, almost 60 percent of the exercises involved only a single
service and should not be characterized as joint.
A Joint Staff working group, which reviewed the CJCS Exercise Program
in late 1994, had similar findings. It found that only 17 percent of
the exercises had joint training of U.S. forces as their primary
focus.
STRONGER J-7 OVERSIGHT ROLE
IS NEEDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Inadequate oversight by the J-7 has been a major factor contributing
to the limited amount of joint training being conducted for U.S.
forces. The J-7 has not reviewed the CINCs' planned exercises to
ensure that they provide joint training benefits or that they focus
on correcting past problems.
The process for analyzing exercise results is also flawed. The J-7
has relied on CINCs to evaluate their own joint exercises, but has
not implemented meaningful standards to guide their evaluations. The
J-7 has not been aware of some problems because it has conducted few
independent exercise evaluations: it only evaluated 4 of the 200
exercises conducted in fiscal year 1994. Moreover, the J-7 has
permitted remedial action projects, which are aimed at correcting
identified problems, to be closed before their corrective actions
were tested in joint exercises. As a result of these deficiencies,
not all serious problems have been reported and those that were
reported have frequently recurred.
DOD HAS TAKEN STEPS TO
IMPROVE JOINT TRAINING, BUT
STRONGER CONSENSUS ON
APPROACH IS NEEDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
In recent years, numerous actions have been taken aimed at improving
joint training. For example, the Secretary of Defense, upon the
recommendation of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
increased the joint training and operational responsibilities of the
U.S. Atlantic Command. The Joint Staff has also developed and
issued numerous joint doctrinal publications and additional joint
policy guidance. It has also increased the capabilities of its Joint
Warfighting Center to provide technical assistance to CINCs in
planning and evaluating their joint training programs.
The U.S. Atlantic Command has developed a field training program for
U.S.-based forces; a simulated training program for U.S.-based
commanders, which began in 1995; and a new joint force deployment
strategy for the regional CINCs' use. In fiscal year 1995, the Joint
Warfighting Center plans to provide technical assistance to the CINCs
on
11 exercises and to assess 30 joint doctrinal publications.
Despite these efforts, additional actions are needed to ensure that
the full benefits of recent changes are achieved. For example, other
CINCs were concerned about accepting forces trained by the U.S.
Atlantic Command due to the differences in tactics, terrain, and
procedures. They were also concerned that the Command, in focusing
its training on U.S.-based officers as joint task force commanders,
was targeting the wrong audience. They said they would select
commanders from their own theaters, not from U.S.-based forces.
Other CINCs were also skeptical about the soundness of the U.S.
Atlantic Command's new joint force strategy, which requires
integrating forces from the individual services in nontraditional
ways. They questioned whether these force packages would provide the
necessary military capabilities. They also feared that problems
would arise since there may be insufficient time to train these
forces with others in the theater before an operation began.
Finally, although Joint Warfighting Center officials believe that
their technical assistance will help make the regional CINCs' joint
training programs more uniform, some CINCs doubted that they would
use this assistance since they considered themselves able to develop
their own programs. Two CINCs said they had their own simulated
training capability, and therefore, did not need such assistance from
the Center. On this latter point, GAO noted that DOD was proceeding
to develop two simulation centers in the Tidewater, Virginia,
area--one at the U.S. Atlantic Command and one at the Joint
Warfighting Center--despite questions about possible duplication.\2
No consensus on any of these matters had been reached at the time of
GAO's review.
--------------------
\2 This potential overlap was the subject of a GAO inquiry to the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Simulation Training (GAO/NSIAD-94-249R,
Aug. 18, 1994).
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the
Chairman, JCS, improve oversight of joint training activities by
ensuring that a full range of specific management actions related to
joint training are taken by the appropriate DOD entities. It also
recommends that the Secretary and Chairman seek a stronger consensus
among CINCs with respect to the U.S. Atlantic Command's new joint
training and force deployment strategies. GAO's specific
recommendations are included in chapters 3 and 4.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
DOD agreed with many of GAO's findings, but did not agree to take the
full range of actions GAO recommended. Its position was that (1) the
level of joint training exercises being conducted was adequate to
achieve proficiency in joint operations, (2) current Joint Staff
oversight of joint training would continue but not be increased, and
(3) the concerns of the CINCs about the new joint training and
operational strategies had been addressed. GAO continues to believe
that the problems that have hindered joint training in the past are
likely to recur without increased program oversight by the Joint
Staff.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have conducted
numerous joint operations. These operations have involved a wide
range of military missions, such as the Persian Gulf War;
humanitarian relief missions in Rwanda and Somalia; response to
natural disasters, such as Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki; and the
deployment to restore the government of Haiti. However, after-action
analyses of these events have continued to identify many weaknesses
in U.S. forces' capability to effectively operate together as a
joint force, suggesting the need for increased joint training. Joint
training uses joint doctrine to prepare joint forces and staffs to
respond to the operational requirements of the regional commanders in
chief (CINC).
The services have historically emphasized the need to train their
various components together to ensure that their tactics are
synchronized. However, the complexity of current joint operations,
which often involve the integration of diverse land, sea, and air
assets from all military services, makes joint training even more
essential to the effective execution of joint military operations.
In addition, U.S. military forces have been substantially
reduced--from a total of 3.3 million personnel in fiscal year 1989 to
2.7 million personnel in fiscal year 1994. The Department of Defense
(DOD) plans to further reduce its forces to 2.4 million personnel by
the end of fiscal year 1997.
Another significant change is that most military personnel will now
be stationed in the United States. In the past, large combinations
of forward-based forces responded to meet the operational
requirements of the regional CINCs. With a smaller, predominantly
U.S.-based force, CINCs are highly dependent on forces being deployed
from the United States to provide operational support. Future
operations will increasingly be joint, and U.S.-based forces will
need to train together to provide the needed joint force capability
to the CINCs. Finally, given the much smaller force, the services
may have to integrate their forces in new ways, such as the
deployment of Army forces aboard a Navy aircraft carrier in Haiti.
Joint training is essential if such innovations are to succeed.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR JOINT
TRAINING IS DIVIDED AMONG
SEVERAL DOD ORGANIZATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433),
defines the responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CINCs, and
individual military services for joint training. DOD and Joint Staff
policies have further defined their respective roles as follows:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is
responsible for providing overall policy and program review for
all military training programs. For joint training, this office
has confined its oversight to reviews of funding requests for
planned exercises.
The Joint Staff is responsible for joint training. Its
responsibilities include (1) providing for the integration of
combatant forces into an efficient team of land, naval, and air
forces; (2) developing joint doctrine and joint training
policies; (3) advising the Secretary of Defense on joint
training priorities; (4) overseeing CINC activities; (5)
establishing a uniform system for evaluating joint training and
assisting CINCs in conducting assessments; and (6) designating a
Joint Staff focal point to monitor and coordinate joint training
policies with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CINCs, and
the services.
CINCs are responsible for (1) determining joint training
requirements for forces within their areas of operation; (2)
developing training plans; and (3) directing all aspects of
joint training, including the conduct and evaluation of joint
exercises.
The services are responsible for training their forces in basic
service skills, such as infantry, armor, and aviation, so that
they can be integrated with forces from the other services, when
needed, in joint exercises and operations.
In defining specific responsibilities for his Joint Staff, the
Chairman designated the Operational Plans and Interoperability
Directorate (J-7) as the joint training focal point. The Chairman
also assigned certain responsibilities for joint training to the
Joint Warfighting Center.\1 These include (1) assessing joint
training doctrine and establishing the need for new doctrine, (2)
helping CINCs design and evaluate their joint exercises, (3)
assisting CINCs in training their forces using computer simulations,
and (4) arranging for the services to provide personnel to serve as
opposition forces in CINC exercises.
In a Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces
of the United States, issued in February 1993, the Chairman, JCS,
noted the need to improve training for joint operations. The report
stated that, as U.S. forces decline, "it is more important than ever
that the remaining forces are trained to operate jointly. U.S.
military strategy requires forces that are highly skilled, rapidly
deliverable, and fully capable of operating effectively as a joint
team immediately upon arrival."
To achieve these objectives, the Chairman recommended that U.S.-based
forces assigned to the Army's Forces Command, the Navy's Atlantic
Fleet, the Air Combat Command, and Marine Forces Atlantic be combined
under a single joint command--the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM).
The Chairman also recommended that USACOM be responsible for the
joint training of these forces and for deploying them in response to
military crises, U.N. peacekeeping operations, and natural
disasters. In October 1993, the Secretary of Defense assigned these
added responsibilities to USACOM.\2 With the overall reduction in
U.S. military forces and return of some forces that were formerly
stationed abroad to the United States, USACOM now commands about 2
million military personnel--more than 75 percent of all U.S. forces.
Table 1.1 summarizes the major activities performed by the DOD
entities involved in joint training. These activities stem from
title 10 responsibilities as implemented by DOD and Joint Staff
policies.
Table 1.1
Joint Training Activities of DOD
Entities
Joint training Other
activity OSD\a J-7 JWFC USACOM CINCs Services
-------------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
Planning
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Determining X X
joint training
needs
Establishing X X
and
implementing
joint training
policy
Planning joint X X
exercises
Providing X
technical
assistance in
exercise
design
Conducting exercises and providing resources
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conducting X X
joint
exercises
Providing X
forces and
equipment
Providing X X X
opposition
forces
Funding X
transportation
Funding X
operational
costs
Providing X X
computer
simulation
training for
CINC forces
overseas
Providing X X
computer
simulation
training for
U.S.-based
forces
Evaluating
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conducting X X
assessments of
performance
during
exercises
Conducting X X
independent
assessments of
CINC exercises
Documenting X X X X
joint problems
Correcting X X X X
joint problems
Performing X X
program
oversight
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Office of the Secretary of Defense.
--------------------
\1 The Joint Warfighting Center was established in 1993. Although it
is organizationally an entity under the J-7, its commander reports
directly to the Chairman, JCS.
\2 USACOM also retained its former responsibilities as a warfighting
CINC responsible for the defense of the continental United States and
Canada.
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
EXERCISE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED TO
MEET JOINT TRAINING AND OTHER
NEEDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise Program is
the primary method used to train forces and staff for joint
operations. The joint training objectives of this program, which
began in the early 1960s, include (1) preparing U.S. forces to
conduct war and other lesser operations; (2) helping the Chairman,
JCS assess the readiness of the CINCs' forces; and (3) validating the
adequacy of joint doctrine, strategies, tactics, material, and
forces. Besides these joint training objectives, the program is also
used for other purposes, such as to support military objectives
resulting from U.S. treaty obligations with other nations, support
regional security by demonstrating the capability of U.S. military
forces, or foster relationships between U.S. military forces and
those of foreign nations. Under the program, approximately 200
exercises are conducted annually throughout the world. The regional
CINCs plan and conduct the actual exercises, which consist of both
live and simulated exercises aimed at training forces in joint
operations. These range from a show of force in a region to
operations that would be associated with a major regional conflict.
The J-7 directorate apportions available airlift and sealift
transportation funding among the various exercises and pays these
costs out of funds designated for the exercise program. The services
absorb the operating costs associated with their participation in the
exercises and do not report these costs to the J-7. There is no
separate appropriation specifically for the CJCS Exercise Program.
According to a J-7 budget official, funding for the program is
included in two budget accounts: (1) Operation and Maintenance,
Defense-Wide [Agencies] and (2) Military Construction, Defense-Wide
[Agencies]. The official said that because there are no separate
budget line items for this program, the J-7 does not know precisely
how much it costs. The official estimated that it cost $420 million
in fiscal year 1994 to conduct joint exercises, about 75 percent of
which was the cost of transporting forces and equipment to and from
the exercises. However, the official emphasized that this should be
considered only a rough estimate of the program's cost.
OUR PRIOR REVIEWS NOTED
WEAKNESSES IN JOINT STAFF
PROGRAM OVERSIGHT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
We conducted two prior reviews of the CJCS Exercise Program in 1979
and 1985 and in both instances pointed to the need for stronger Joint
Staff program oversight.\3 We noted that DOD could not be assured
that the program was effectively training forces for joint operations
due to a complex and fragmented management system with insufficient
oversight by the Joint Staff. In both instances, we recommended that
the Joint Staff assume a stronger management role and, specifically,
that it critically evaluate planned exercises.
--------------------
\3 Improving the Effectiveness of Joint Military Exercises--An
Important Tool for Military Readiness (GAO/LCD-80-2, Dec. 11, 1979)
and Management of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program Has Been
Strengthened But More Needs to Be Done (GAO/NSIAD-85-46, Mar. 5,
1985).
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
The former Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on
Military Forces and Personnel and Readiness, House Committee on Armed
Services (now the Committee on National Security), requested that we
provide a current assessment of DOD's joint training program. Our
objectives were to determine (1) the scope of DOD's joint training
activities, (2) the effectiveness of the management of these
activities, and (3) the actions that have been taken and any
additional actions needed to improve joint training.
To determine the scope of DOD's joint training program, we gathered
information on the CJCS Exercise Program and analyzed the exercises
conducted by the Central, European, and Pacific combatant commands
under this program. These three commands conducted 65 percent of the
joint exercises held in fiscal year 1994. We examined the exercises
conducted in fiscal year 1994 and those planned for fiscal year 1995
to determine whether the three commands included tasks in their
exercise plans to deploy forces as a joint task force or train
commanders and staffs in joint operations. J-7 and CINC officials
identified these two criteria as critical in training forces for
joint operations and agreed that this was an appropriate basis for
assessing the joint training value of the exercises. We did not
analyze whether these planned tasks were actually performed. To
confirm our analyses, we provided summaries of our work to the CINCs'
staffs.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the management of joint training
activities, we identified the roles and responsibilities associated
with joint training by reviewing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, prior legislation, and Office of
the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff guidance. We also discussed
joint training responsibilities with officials in the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint
Staff's J-7 directorate and Joint Warfighting Center, and CINC
training and operations officials. To assess what problems have
recurred in joint training exercises and operations and how these
problems were addressed, we analyzed information in the Joint
Universal Lessons Learned System and J-7's Remedial Action Project
Status Report for 10 recent joint exercises and operations, including
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
To determine what actions have been taken to improve joint training
and what further actions might be needed, we collected documentation
on actions taken by USACOM, the Joint Staff's J-7 directorate and
Joint Warfighting Center, and CINCs and discussed these changes with
appropriate officials. In particular, we examined recent initiatives
to improve management and emerging issues and concerns stemming from
USACOM's recent changes in joint training strategy.
We conducted our work from October 1993 to December 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
CJCS EXERCISE PROGRAM HAS PROVIDED
MARGINAL JOINT TRAINING BENEFITS
============================================================ Chapter 2
A key training principle is for U.S. forces to train as they will
fight. Because current U.S. military strategy is based on forces
operating together as joint teams, Joint Staff training guidance
emphasizes the need for the services to train jointly. The CJCS
Exercise Program is the primary method used to train forces and
commanders for joint operations. However, this program has multiple
objectives and, in reviewing the exercises conducted by three CINCs
in 1994 and those planned for 1995, we found that nearly 75 percent
did not have joint training objectives. Instead of training forces
and commanders for joint operations, the majority of the exercises
were conducted for other reasons, such as maintaining U.S. access or
presence in a region. More than half of the exercises involved only
a single service. A recent Joint Staff Working Group review of this
program identified findings similar to ours.
MAJORITY OF CJCS EXERCISES DO
NOT HAVE JOINT TRAINING
OBJECTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Hundreds of exercises have been conducted under the CJCS Exercise
Program. However, the majority of the exercises provided little
joint training value for U.S. forces because they (1) were designed
to meet nontraining objectives or (2) involved only a single service.
MOST CJCS EXERCISES ARE HELD
TO ACHIEVE PRESENCE OR
ACCESS OBJECTIVES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
Exercises included in the CJCS Exercise Program are conducted for
several reasons. Although some exercises are conducted to train
forces and commanders in joint operations, the vast majority are
carried out to gain or maintain U.S. access or presence to seaports
and airstrips, promote regional stability by a show of U.S. military
forces, or foster relationships with other nations' military forces
(hereafter referred to as presence or access exercises). As such,
these exercises do not have joint training objectives and,
accordingly, many involve only a single military service. For
example, U.S. participation in some CJCS exercises involves only a
single Navy ship.
In contrast, exercises designed to train joint forces involve
assembling units from two or more services so that they can perform
joint tasks. Examples of such joint tasks include attacking enemy
targets with air, naval, or ground cannons, rockets, and missiles;
conducting deceptive tasks to give the enemy a false picture of
reality; and constructing obstacles to delay the enemy.
J-7 training guidance specifies that a critical element of effective
joint operations is a well-trained staff that is proficient in the
various tasks required. Exercises designed to train commanders and
staff in joint operations consist of such tasks as forming a joint
staff to plan the operation; conducting command and control
procedures; and collecting, disseminating, and analyzing intelligence
data. During the course of our work, J-7 and CINC officials also
stressed the importance of a highly trained joint task force staff to
successful joint operations.
Although it is important to accomplish both training and other
objectives, we found the vast majority of the exercises conducted by
the U.S. Central, European, and Pacific Commands for fiscal year
1994 and planned for fiscal year 1995 were designed to demonstrate
presence or access rather than to provide joint training for U.S.
forces. In 1994, 88 of 121 exercises (73 percent) conducted by the 3
CINCs were done for reasons other than for joint training. Of the
remaining 33 exercises designed to provide joint training, 20
deployed a joint task force. Figure 2.1 shows a breakdown of the
exercises conducted by the Central, European, and Pacific Commands in
fiscal year 1994.
Figure 2.1: Breakdown of
Exercises Conducted by the
Central, European, and Pacific
Commands in Fiscal Year 1994 by
Major Purpose
(See figure in printed
edition.)
For fiscal year 1995, 113 of the 150 exercises (75 percent) planned
by these CINCs were to be carried out for presence or access
purposes. Similarly, despite the importance of training commanders
and staff to conduct joint operations, CINC exercises have provided
relatively few such training opportunities. Of the 33 exercises
conducted in 1994 that provided joint training, 13 exercises trained
commanders and their staff in joint operations. Of 37 joint training
exercises planned for fiscal year 1995,
19 will provide joint staff training.
The lack of adequately trained joint task force staffs has hindered
the effectiveness of exercises and operations since 1987. For
example, Joint Universal Lessons Learned reports from Reforger
exercises in 1987, 1988, and 1992; and Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm in 1990-91; and Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992-93 noted
that joint task force staffs were not adequately trained prior to
deployment to the theaters of operation, thereby hindering
operational effectiveness. The problem had not been corrected at the
time we completed our fieldwork in December 1994, although efforts
are underway to improve joint task force training.
(See ch. 4).
In reviewing these same exercises conducted by the Central, European,
and Pacific Commands in 1994, we also found that about 60 percent of
them involved only a single service, as shown in figure 2.2.
Although included in the CJCS Exercise Program, such exercises could
hardly be classified as joint.
Figure 2.2: Breakdown of
Single and Multiservice
Exercises Conducted by the
Central, European, and Pacific
Commands in Fiscal Year 1994
(See figure in printed
edition.)
MOST EXERCISES DO NOT PROVIDE
CHALLENGING TRAINING FOR U.S.
FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
J-7 and CINC officials offered two main reasons to explain why so
little joint training has been done. First, the objectives of
gaining access to seaports and airstrips, maintaining presence in
regions, and fostering relations with foreign nations' forces have
taken precedence over training U.S. forces for joint operations.
Second, because foreign forces have varying levels of operational
capability, the complexity of tasks included in exercises with these
forces must frequently be matched to the capabilities of the foreign
forces rather than the capabilities of U.S. forces. In some
regions, foreign forces are simply not prepared to participate in
large-scale joint exercises, according to the officials.
In a September 1994 speech before the Association of the U.S. Army's
Institute of Land Warfare, the Chairman, JCS, commented on the status
of joint training exercises and the need for improvements. The
Chairman noted that joint doctrine was not being used in the training
exercises and that the quality of the training had frequently
embarrassed him. He added that current joint exercises reminded him
of the types of exercises the services had engaged in many years ago.
RECENT JOINT STAFF REVIEW
SURFACED SIMILAR FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
Based on concerns of the Chairman, JCS, that the exercise program
might not be providing efficient and effective training despite a
growing number of exercises in the program, a Joint Staff working
group initiated a review of the exercise program in October 1994.\1
The review covered the exercises conducted by the five geographical
CINCs--USACOM, and the Central, European, Pacific, and Southern
Commands--and the five functional CINCs--the North American Air
Defense, Space, Strategic, Special Operations, and Transportation
Commands.
During the first phase of the study, which was conducted from October
through December 1994, the working group analyzed the purpose of the
exercises and the type of training they provided. Similar to our
findings, the review showed that most exercises were being held
primarily for presence or access purposes or other nontraining
purposes, rather than for joint training. Of the 174 program
exercises planned for fiscal year 1995 by the 5 geographical CINCs,
the review showed that only 17 percent of the exercises had joint
training as their primary focus.\2 The working group made the
following recommendations to the Joint Staff:
Stem the increase in the number of exercises.
Assess the impact of treaty and politically arranged exercises on
joint operations training.
Continue to review the joint exercise program to ensure that the
exercises support operational plans and cancel or revise those
exercises not meeting this objective.
Review the process for evaluating joint exercises to ensure that
CINCs design exercises that address prior lessons learned.
The Joint Staff had planned to conduct a second phase of the study,
which would implement the recommendations of the first phase.
However, J-7 and USACOM officials told us the Chairman was not
satisfied with the depth of the first phase. It now appears that a
more detailed review of the program will be made before the
recommendations are implemented.
--------------------
\1 The working group consisted of representatives from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, J-7, and services.
\2 In commenting on our report, DOD stated that over 88 percent of
the fiscal year 1995 exercises would use joint forces in the
execution of the National Military Strategy. It should be noted that
the majority of these exercises are done for presence or access
reasons and do not have joint training as their primary focus.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
DOD concurred with our findings regarding the percentages of
exercises in the CJCS Exercise Program devoted to joint training.
However, it disagreed that the reason for the small number of joint
exercises was that other program objectives had taken precedence over
those related to joint training. DOD maintained that the number of
exercises conducted in 1994 was adequate to meet joint training
needs.
We found no basis to support DOD's assertion. During our fieldwork,
J-7 and CINC officials acknowledged that no formal analyses had been
conducted to determine the number of joint exercises needed to
achieve proficiency in joint operations. In contrast to DOD's
assessment that the current level of joint training is adequate, the
May 1995 report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
Forces concluded that joint training was not being done well and
needed more emphasis.\3
--------------------
\3 Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces (May 24, 1995).
STRONGER JOINT STAFF OVERSIGHT
NEEDED TO IMPROVE JOINT TRAINING
============================================================ Chapter 3
Inadequate oversight by the Joint Staff's J-7 directorate has been a
major factor contributing to the limited amount of joint training
being done under the CJCS Exercise Program. Although 10 U.S.C.
gives the regional CINCs responsibility for conducting joint
training, the J-7 has been designated as the focal point for
overseeing the CINCs' joint training activities. Despite this
oversight responsibility, the J-7 directorate has not conducted the
range of activities that this responsibility entails. For example,
it has not
critically evaluated the content of CINC-developed joint exercise
plans on a routine basis to ensure that their exercises provide
beneficial training and address past problems,
developed meaningful standards to assist CINCs in evaluating their
exercises, or
conducted a sufficient number of independent exercise evaluations
to ensure that problems are identified and addressed.
The diffusion of responsibilities among several DOD entities
heightens the importance of a stronger J-7 coordinating role.
THE J-7 STAFF HAS NOT
CRITICALLY REVIEWED THE CONTENT
OF CINC TRAINING PLANS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Although the Joint Staff has taken some limited actions based on our
prior recommendations, many of the problems we noted 16 years ago
have continued. For example, instead of independently analyzing the
planned CINC exercises as we recommended, the Joint Staff assigned
this responsibility to CINCs. The J-7 staff, which has oversight
responsibility for joint training, has limited its reviews of CINC
training plans to (1) evaluating the CINCs' need for
transportation--airlift and sealift--and other resources, such as
ammunition, fuel, and equipment, to conduct the exercises and (2)
ensuring that these needs were met.
J-7 officials said that they have not routinely reviewed the content
of the exercises because CINCs are in a better position to determine
their training needs and design joint exercises. However, as our
analysis showed, this system has permitted a large number of
exercises to be conducted that provide marginal joint training
opportunities for U.S. forces. Following our 1979 report, the Joint
Staff issued guidance requiring CINCs to submit detailed descriptions
of their training objectives. However, by 1985, we were once again
reporting that because of insufficient oversight by the Joint Staff,
CINCs were either not submitting the required information or
providing general information that was not helpful in assessing the
merits of the exercises.
Similarly, as previously noted, until the Joint Staff reviewed the
exercise program in the fall of 1994, it had little knowledge of how
much the program provided in the way of joint training experiences.
This was the first critical review that the Joint Staff had conducted
of the program. Although our position has been that these reviews
should be routinely conducted, the Joint Staff views its assessment
of the exercise program as a special effort that will terminate in
1995.
THE J-7 STAFF HAS NOT
ENSURED THAT PAST PROBLEMS
WERE ADDRESSED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
Because the J-7 staff has not routinely or critically reviewed CINC
training plans, it also has no assurance that actions taken to
address past problems have, in fact, corrected them. Under its
Remedial Action Project (RAP) program, the J-7 staff identifies
problems and has the appropriate organization try to correct the
problems. For example, the Joint Warfighting Center would be charged
with correcting problems stemming from weaknesses in joint doctrine.
In fiscal year 1994, the J-7 began using its Joint Universal Lessons
Learned System to prepare annual summaries of problems identified in
joint exercises and operations; CINCs then are to use these summaries
to plan future exercise tasks. Although J-7's efforts to identify
and correct problems are steps in the right direction, its failure to
review the CINCs' planned exercises prevents it from ensuring that
common problems identified in the past are tested or that actions
taken to correct them are effective.
Once the J-7 staff is satisfied that a designated entity has taken a
corrective action, it closes the RAP item and considers the problem
to be corrected. Joint Staff guidance states that the most common
method to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions is through
joint exercises. However, such testing is not required, and the J-7
permits RAP items to be closed through other means, such as
conducting a study of the action taken or performing some other type
of evaluation.
CINC officials said that they seldom test whether prior problems have
been corrected in their exercises because (1) the Joint Staff has not
required them to do so and (2) they had insufficient time to analyze
past problems before planning future exercises. One CINC training
official stated that joint exercises consist merely of accomplishing
events rather than training and that problems identified during prior
exercises may be "lessons recorded" but not necessarily "lessons
learned." The views of this official reflect a systemic problem in
planning joint exercises that surfaced in a 1990 joint exercise. The
lessons learned report noted the following:
"Players generally had no awareness of Joint Universal Lessons
Learned or Remedial Action Projects from previous exercises.
The apparent absence of continuity or long-term perspective on
the part of exercise planners and players tends to cause
repetitious [lessons learned items] and a lack of focus of
exercise objectives."
Despite the report's recommendation, the Joint Staff has not required
that exercise objectives be focused on RAP items from previous
exercises. The lack of a requirement may contribute to the fact that
problems in joint operations have tended to recur. For example,
those conducting the first phase of the Joint Staff working group
exercise review reported that lessons learned from prior exercises
had not been sufficiently analyzed. They noted that inadequate
training of joint force commanders was cited as a key problem in
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and the Somalia relief
effort. Yet, our review showed that less than 15 percent of the
exercises conducted in fiscal year 1994 and those planned for fiscal
year 1995 would focus on training joint task force commanders.\1
Although the Joint Staff is attempting several solutions to improve
proficiency in joint operations, such as USACOM's new joint training
strategies, it has not increased the number of exercises to test the
effectiveness of these efforts.
--------------------
\1 \1 The Joint Staff working group's study of the CJCS Exercise
Program did not analyze the amount of training devoted to joint task
force commanders. However, the study showed that 17 percent of all
the exercises planned for fiscal year 1995 would provide joint
training.
OBJECTIVE STANDARDS TO MEASURE
JOINT EXERCISE RESULTS HAVE NOT
BEEN SET
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
The Chairman, JCS, delegated responsibility for evaluating joint
exercises to the regional CINCs. After completing the exercises,
CINCs must report whether they achieved the training objectives. The
J-7 staff uses the CINCs' evaluation reports to determine what
actions are needed to address joint training problems. However, the
J-7 staff has not provided CINCs with any objective standards to
evaluate joint exercises. As a result, CINC evaluations tend to be
subjective and do not critically assess their forces' readiness for
joint operations.
In 1993, the Joint Staff developed a list of common joint tasks for
CINCs to use in planning joint exercises and operations. However,
these tasks were broad--for example, deploying joint forces and
employing theater strategic firepower. Joint Staff training guidance
cites the importance of linking these broad joint tasks to more
specific performance standards to assess how well the tasks are
performed. Although it has issued some general guidance on setting
the standards, the Joint Staff has let CINCs develop these standards.
J-7 officials provided examples of the types of objective standards
that CINCs could use to measure force deployment and firepower tasks.
Standards for force deployment could include whether the correct
types of forces were deployed and whether they arrived at their
theater of operations on time. Training standards for strategic
firepower could assess whether the proper amount of firepower was
available, how quickly it was delivered, and how long it could be
sustained.
The problem of assessing exercises without clearly defined standards
was noted in a 1992 report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned
based on its observations of U.S. Army forces that participated in
the Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) joint exercise. The
training objectives for Army units were to
exercise corps land/air battle staff in a mobile environment,
train brigade through corps battle staffs,
exercise and understand emerging North Atlantic Treaty Organization
strategy,
train multinational corps in command and control procedures, and
reduce the burden on the host country.
In assessing the results of the exercise, the Center noted the
following:
"The majority of exercise objectives did not have measurable,
objective standards associated with them; rather the exercise
objectives were subjective in nature. The majority of exercise
objectives in REFORGER 92 could be easily accomplished solely as
a function of time and posture of units (i.e., all unit players
participate from 26 SEP to
9 OCT). . . . None of these exercise objectives can be
measured in a negative manner. Since no accompanying standards
were included, automatic success was achieved through these
objectives. As long as all REFORGER player units participated
from [the] start of the exercise to [the] end of the exercise,
all of the Army objectives were met. This is . . . hardly a
fair and objective measure of success."
The Center recommended that large exercises not be planned or
conducted without measurable training objectives. A Center official
who wrote the report told us that he briefed U.S. Army officials on
his findings and recommended actions in an after-action meeting to
discuss exercise results. He also prepared a lessons learned report
for submission to the Joint Staff. However, Army officials did not
submit the report to the J-7 directorate.
J-7 and CINC officials told us that the situation described in the
Center's 1992 report continues to exist. CINCs often set subjective
standards and consider training objectives to be met if forces merely
participate in exercises and perform their assigned tasks. Without
measurable standards, exercise evaluations are of little value in
judging the readiness of U.S. forces to conduct joint operations,
according to these officials.
The J-7 staff recognizes the need for objective training standards
and is working with CINCs to develop a universal joint task list that
would assist them in developing such standards. An example of a
revised task with a measurable standard would be to "conduct
long-range fires with a certain percent of attrition rates for threat
forces." The J-7 staff expects the revised tasks and standards to be
developed by December 1995 but does not believe they can be
integrated into exercises until fiscal year 1998.
FEW INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS OF
JOINT EXERCISES ARE MADE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
The J-7 staff relies on CINCs to evaluate their own exercises and
observes few exercises to gain first-hand knowledge of the problems
that occur. As a result, the J-7 staff is not aware of all the
problems, some of which could have serious implications. For
example, in fiscal year 1994, J-7 staff observed only 4 of the 200
exercises conducted (2 percent). J-7 staff officials told us that
they cannot observe more exercises at current staffing levels. The
Evaluation and Analysis Division in the J-7 has only three personnel
assigned to observe CINC exercises.
Before submitting evaluation reports to the J-7, the CINCs' staffs
discuss exercise results and the problems that occurred. Among other
things, the staffs decide on the nature of problems, determine any
joint implications, and recommend corrective actions. The staffs
also decide whether CINCs should report the problems to the J-7
directorate for inclusion in the lessons learned system or if CINC
staff should correct them on their own. J-7 officials told us that
the CINCs' process of screening problems from joint exercises could
allow some serious problems to go unreported. As noted above, this
lack of reporting was demonstrated in the Center for Army Lessons
Learned report on the lack of measurable exercise objectives in the
1992 REFORGER exercise. The Center documented the problem and
prepared an evaluation report; however, the matter was not forwarded
to the J-7 and, consequently, could not be entered into the tracking
system. Although J-7 officials observed this exercise, they did not
attend the briefing of Army officials and consequently were not aware
of the problem.
STRONGER J-7 COORDINATING ROLE
IS NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
A major factor contributing to the lingering problems in joint
training is the diffusion of joint training responsibilities among
several DOD entities without a strong Joint Staff focal point. As
noted in chapter 1, joint training responsibilities are divided among
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, two Joint Staff entities (J-7
directorate and the Joint Warfighting Center), USACOM, the remaining
regional CINCs, and the individual military services.
J-7 STAFF MUST DELEGATE
TASKS DUE TO ITS SMALL SIZE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.1
The Joint Staff designated its J-7 directorate the responsible entity
for coordinating joint training activities; however, this entity
lacks the staff to effectively conduct all desirable management tasks
commensurate with its oversight role. As a result, it has had to
delegate some responsibilities to other DOD entities, thereby
heightening its coordinating role. For example, in fiscal year 1995,
the two J-7 offices responsible for joint training--the Joint
Exercise and Training and the Evaluation and Analysis Divisions--have
35 staff. The J-7 suboffice responsible for observing CINC exercises
has only three staff. Although officials in this latter J-7 office
believe they should conduct additional independent evaluations, it
was not possible because the process of independently evaluating a
single CINC exercise takes about 6 months.
The J-7 staff acknowledged that a broader range of oversight
responsibilities was desirable, but not possible because of their
limited staff. Therefore, they have limited their role to developing
joint doctrine and policy, coordinating exercise schedules, and
entering data into the lessons learned system and delegated other
responsibilities to the Joint Warfighting Center and CINCs. This
approach appears reasonable, given the current budgetary climate that
makes it unrealistic to assume that additional resources would be
forthcoming to increase the J-7 staff.
SHIFTING COORDINATING ROLE
TO THE JOINT WARFIGHTING
CENTER OR USACOM DOES NOT
APPEAR PRACTICAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.2
At first glance, it would appear that either the Joint Warfighting
Center or USACOM might be better equipped than J-7 to provide more
comprehensive oversight of joint training. However, reassigning this
role to either entity would have drawbacks. For example, the Joint
Warfighting Center has been given increased responsibilities for
joint training, with responsibility for helping CINCs develop their
exercise programs and integrate computer simulations into the actual
exercises. With the merger of two separate organizations, the Center
has had a substantial personnel increase and would appear to be able
to assume more authority. However, 145 of the 202 staff at the
Center are contractors that provide technical and other
support--personnel who would not be well-suited to conducting the
range of oversight responsibilities required.
Joint Warfighting Center personnel were not anxious to assume
additional responsibilities for critically reviewing CINC joint
training plans since the Center--headed by a major general--might not
command sufficient authority to oversee the activities of CINCs, who
are 4-star general officers. Also, the Center has not yet
established credibility with CINCs, who will have to be convinced of
the value of the Center's services before they will use the
assistance offered to them. (See ch. 4.) Similarly, USACOM, having
been given a major role in joint training and a substantial staff,
would appear to be in a better position than the small J-7 staff to
coordinate joint training activities and provide the needed program
oversight. However, J-7 and USACOM officials felt that, given
USACOM's current responsibilities to train U.S.-based forces, provide
forces to CINCs, and function as a combatant CINC for the Atlantic
region, an expanded role would not be feasible. Such a role would
concentrate too much authority in one CINC, reinforce already
strained relations between USACOM and the remaining CINCs, and remove
training and operational responsibilities that are rightfully
assigned to each of the warfighting CINCs, according to the
officials.
The Commander of the Center and the USACOM Director of Training both
agreed that joint training needed closer oversight. However, they
disagreed on how to accomplish this objective. The USACOM Training
Director believed that oversight responsibility should not be
centralized under one organization and felt that CINCs were in the
best position to perform the task. The Center Commander stated that
a stronger focal point for joint training was needed but that, given
resource constraints, it would be unrealistic to expect the J-7
directorate to assume the role. He concluded that J-7's current
approach of assigning responsibilities to the other entities and then
attempting to coordinate the activities was, in effect, the only
practical way to manage joint training activities.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
We have reviewed DOD's joint training activities two other times over
the last 16 years. Both times, we found weaknesses in the program
and recommended that the Joint Staff be directed to play a stronger
role in overseeing joint training activities. Although the Joint
Staff has taken steps aimed at strengthening joint training, it has
neither ensured that the full range of management initiatives needed
to correct long-standing problems were carried out nor that they were
adequately coordinated.
In our opinion, effective Joint Staff oversight should include a
routine, critical review of the content of planned CINC exercises.
The purpose of this review would be to ensure that the exercises
contain the maximum number of activities that provide joint training,
even though the primary objectives for conducting them may be for
other than joint training purposes. In addition, such reviews would
enable the Joint Staff to ensure that planned exercises test whether
past problems have been overcome and that joint training remedial
action items are not closed without problems having been corrected.
Integrating measurable evaluation standards into joint exercises and
independently evaluating the exercises are also essential elements of
an effective oversight program.
The full-range of program oversight needed goes beyond the current
capability of the Joint Staff's J-7 directorate or any other single
organization. The J-7 directorate would need a large increase in its
staff to perform all necessary functions. However, because the J-7
is responsible for overseeing joint training activities, it is in the
best position to advise DOD on which organization--Joint Warfighting
Center, USACOM, or the other regional CINCs--should be assigned
responsibilities that were currently not being performed. Assigning
responsibilities to other organizations does not absolve the J-7
directorate from its oversight responsibility for joint training. If
the United States is to effectively carry out joint military
operations in the future, the J-7 staff must be proactive in ensuring
that all delegated responsibilities are effectively carried out and
coordinated.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the
Chairman, JCS, improve the oversight of joint training activities by
ensuring that the appropriate DOD entities take the following
management actions:
Routinely review the CINCs' plans for the CJCS Exercise Program to
ensure that each exercise (1) provides maximum joint training
value without compromising its primary purposes and (2) includes
tasks that test the effectiveness of actions taken to correct
previously identified problems.
Ensure that exercises held to achieve presence or access or other
objectives include joint training tasks, to the extent possible.
Ensure the development of measurable joint training standards and
expedite their integration into joint training exercises so that
the exercises can be more effectively evaluated.
Examine what additional resources might be used to permit more
independent exercise evaluations to be made.
Close remedial action projects only after the effectiveness of
corrective actions are demonstrated either in joint exercises
or, if this is not appropriate, through alternative means.
We also recommend that, once these specific responsibilities have
been assigned, the J-7 increase its monitoring of the related
activities to ensure that the full range of desirable management
activities are effectively carried out.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7
DOD concurred with our finding on the need to improve Joint Staff
coordination of joint training activities. However, it only
partially concurred with our recommendation that additional Joint
Staff oversight was needed. DOD stated that, rather than increasing
oversight, it needed more time for actions aimed at improving joint
training to mature. DOD pointed to many of the ongoing Joint Staff
initiatives we discussed in our report as evidence that progress is
being made.
While we agree that these initiatives are steps in the right
direction, we continue to believe that the Joint Staff must improve
oversight of joint training activities if lingering problems are to
be corrected. For example, DOD implied in its response that the
Joint Staff is currently conducting critical reviews of planned joint
exercises. However, as our report notes, the primary focus of these
reviews has not been to critique the exercise plans but rather to
determine what resources were needed to conduct them. Routine
critical reviews of the exercise plans would permit the Joint Staff
to (1) assure itself that the exercises include tasks testing whether
past problems have been corrected, (2) suggest inclusion of tasks
where common proficiency across the force is important, and (3)
suggest how exercises done primarily for presence or access reasons
might include some tasks with joint training value.
With respect to presence and access exercises, DOD said that most of
these exercises include some joint training. However, when we asked
for documentation to support this position, we were advised that DOD
would have to query CINCs for this data--a step we had already taken
when making our own analysis of the exercises. According to the
CINCs' own assessments, the vast majority of these presence and
access exercises do not include joint training tasks. DOD said that
it is currently categorizing the planned exercises according to their
primary purposes and would begin to balance the training and
strategic requirements of the program. DOD further stated that it
will continue to emphasize the need to achieve joint training
whenever possible.
With respect to our recommendation on measurable joint training
standards, DOD said that developing such standards is a CINC
responsibility and that current joint doctrine is intended to guide
them in this process. DOD added that the Joint Staff's current
effort to develop a universal joint task list would be a useful tool
to CINCs in developing standards. We recognize the importance of
joint doctrine, essential tasks, and the CINCs' input in developing
standards for assessing joint exercises. However, as we point out,
unless these standards are made so that performance in joint
exercises can be objectively and uniformly measured, DOD may never
have a true picture of how prepared U.S. forces are to engage in
joint operations. In our opinion, the Joint Staff is in the best
position to develop common joint training standards. Although we
recognize that such standards would need to be adapted for
theater-unique factors, such standards would provide a basis for
objectively and uniformly determining the proficiency of U.S. forces
in critical joint tasks.
With respect to our recommendation that more exercises be
independently evaluated, DOD stated that the J-7 staff would continue
to independently review selected CINC-sponsored exercises even though
there was no requirement to do so. As our report notes, due to its
small staff, the J-7 staff was only able to observe 4 of 200
exercises held in fiscal year 1994. We believe that this small
number of evaluations is insufficient to provide assurance that
problems surfacing in exercises are promptly and accurately reported.
We have revised our recommendation to suggest that the Joint Staff
examine what additional resources might be used to permit more
independent exercise evaluations to be made.
DOD did not agree with our recommendation to close remedial action
projects only after demonstrating their effectiveness in joint
exercises. It opposed focusing exercises objectives on RAP items
from previous exercises. DOD stated that exercise objectives should
focus on those missions that CINCs must accomplish to support
national security and military strategies and plans. Further, it
stated joint exercises were only one method of validating a RAP or
corrective action. We recognize that testing the effectiveness of
some RAP solutions--such as absence of a training policy in a
particular area--is not always feasible in joint exercises. However,
according to Joint Staff training guidance, testing RAP solutions in
joint exercises is a common method to validate the effectiveness of
corrective actions. As our report notes, CINCs seldom conduct such
tests because they are not required to do so. In our opinion,
testing RAP items in joint exercises is a vital part of assessing the
CINCs' capabilities to support national security strategies and meet
operation plan requirements. Further, the failure to require such
testing, when appropriate, reduces the effectiveness of collecting
data on problems and, in our opinion, is a major reason contributing
to recurring joint training and operational problems. We continue to
stress the importance of testing remedial actions through the joint
exercise program. However, we have modified our recommendation to
recognize that, in some instances, it may be appropriate to close
remedial action projects if their effectiveness can be demonstrated
through alternative means.
ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO IMPROVE
JOINT TRAINING, BUT GREATER
CONSENSUS ON STRATEGIES IS NEEDED
============================================================ Chapter 4
The procedures for managing and conducting joint training and
operations are evolving. Over the last few years, the J-7 staff has
developed and issued numerous joint doctrinal publications, issued
additional joint policy guidance, and increased the capabilities of
the Joint Warfighting Center to provide technical assistance to CINCs
in their joint training programs. The Secretary of Defense, upon the
recommendation of the Chairman, JCS, increased the joint training and
operational responsibilities of USACOM. To discharge these new
responsibilities, USACOM developed a new joint training program for
U.S.-based forces and revised the operational strategy for deploying
them to the regional CINCs.
These actions--aimed at correcting past problems--are steps in the
right direction. However, CINCs have reservations about USACOM's new
joint training program and operational strategy and appear reluctant
to use the Joint Warfighting Center's technical assistance. A
stronger Joint Staff role is needed to ensure that these concerns are
adequately addressed.
THE JOINT STAFF IS ACTIVELY
WORKING TO IMPROVE JOINT
TRAINING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
The Joint Staff's J-7 directorate and Joint Warfighting Center have
issued joint doctrine, developed common terminology, and enhanced
their technical assistance to CINCs. Additional actions are planned,
but their impact will not be realized for several years.
THE JOINT STAFF HAS
DEVELOPED MUCH JOINT
DOCTRINE AND COMMON
TERMINOLOGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1
Sound joint doctrine is essential to successful joint operations
since it establishes the fundamental principles to guide military
actions, provides the common perspective from which forces can plan
and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way U.S. forces train for
war. Common terminology is critical to the individual services
communicating effectively with each other and avoiding confusion on
the battlefield. Yet, lessons learned reports from past operations
and exercises revealed that joint operations were being hindered by a
lack of joint doctrine and common terminology.
In response to these findings, the Joint Staff has issued numerous
joint doctrinal publications over the last 2 years and recently
prepared a dictionary of common terms that should be used in joint
operations. As of March 1995, the Joint Staff had issued 59 of 102
planned joint doctrinal publications; it expects to issue the
remainder by the end of fiscal year 1996. These publications cover a
wide range of joint operations, from the use of nuclear weapons to
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions.
To help overcome the problem of inconsistent terminology for joint
training and operations, the Joint Staff issued a Universal Joint
Task List in October 1993. The list represents a compilation of all
joint tasks that forces must be capable of performing. It also
provides a common basis for CINCs to use in planning, conducting, and
assessing joint exercises and operations. Examples of joint tasks
include conducting operational maneuvers, such as deploying forces to
a theater, employing them, and overcoming obstacles; conducting
intelligence, such as collecting information on the enemy threat and
vulnerability; and providing combat service support, such as
repairing equipment, providing health services, and conducting
prisoner-of-war operations.
NEW RESPONSIBILITIES
ASSIGNED TO THE JOINT
WARFIGHTING CENTER
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2
In May 1993, the Chairman, JCS, gave new joint training
responsibilities to the Joint Warfighting Center. The Center was
created in 1993 by merging two existing Joint Staff
organizations--the Joint Warfare Center located at Hurlburt Field,
Florida, and the Joint Doctrine Center located at the Naval Air
Station, Norfolk, Virginia.\1 The new Center is responsible for (1)
providing training assistance to CINCs in joint exercise design,
execution, and assessment and (2) assisting the Joint Staff in
developing and assessing joint doctrine and establishing the need for
new doctrine.
In fiscal year 1994, most of the Center's activities focused on
relocating to newly refurbished facilities at Fort Monroe, Virginia,
and defining the roles and responsibilities of the new organization.
A technical staff of military and contractor personnel began
assessing the CINCs' needs for computer simulation support for joint
exercises and designing computer simulation packages to train CINC
forces and staff in their theaters of operations.
At the CINCs' invitation, the Center plans to help train overseas
forces and staff in joint operations. To provide more uniform
training, the Center plans to help CINCs design exercises based on
the Joint Staff's universal list of joint tasks. The Center will
also offer its technical support in using simulation models in the
CINCs' joint training activities.
For fiscal year 1995, CINCs have requested the Center's technical
assistance on 11 of the 212 planned exercises. For these exercises,
the Center will (1) identify training requirements and develop joint
exercise plans, (2) provide observers and controllers to the CINCs'
exercises, and/or (3) assess exercise results. The Center also plans
to assess the adequacy of 30 joint doctrinal publications covering
such topics as joint operations, peacekeeping, and airspace control.
In commenting on our report, DOD noted that it remains to be seen how
much computer-driven simulations can replace field training
exercises. To the extent that such substitutions become possible,
DOD suggested that the future CJCS Exercise Program may not be
representative of the past program.
--------------------
\1 \1 The Joint Warfare Center's former mission was to provide
computer simulation support for joint exercises. The Joint Doctrine
Center's mission was to assess and develop joint doctrine.
USACOM ASSIGNED TO TRAIN MOST
FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
Given new responsibilities for joint training of U.S.-based forces,
USACOM is now responsible for training about 2 million military
personnel--more than 75 percent of all U.S. forces. It developed a
new joint training program and introduced an innovative operational
strategy based on joint force packages.
USACOM HAS DEVELOPED A NEW
JOINT TRAINING PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1
The joint training program consists of three levels of training.
Under the first level, the services train their own personnel in the
basic skills needed to conduct military operations, such as infantry
tactics, armor, aviation, or support skills. Under the second level,
USACOM trains five major force groups in joint tasks through field
and computer-simulated exercises. These forces include those in the
Army's 18th Airborne Corps and II Corps, 8th Air Force, II Marine
Expeditionary Force, and the Navy's 2nd Fleet. This level of
training will begin with six exercises in fiscal year 1995 and
increase over time to eight exercises annually.
USACOM is also responsible for the third level of training, which
uses a combination of academic seminars and computer-assisted
exercises to train staffs in commanding joint task forces. Using a
hypothetical real-world scenario, a joint task force team is
assembled to plan and direct a mission from deployment to
redeployment. The training emphasizes joint planning,
decision-making, and the application of joint doctrine. USACOM began
some portions of the training in fiscal year 1994 and plans to
conduct its first complete program in fiscal year 1995. By fiscal
year 1998, USACOM expects to conduct six such exercises.
USACOM'S NEW OPERATIONAL
STRATEGY IS BASED ON JOINT
FORCE PACKAGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2
In 1993, USACOM also developed a new strategy for deploying forces to
regional crises. A key principal of this new strategy is to develop
packages of U.S.-based forces from the various services, which USACOM
could provide to the warfighting CINCs based on the specific
situation. These joint force packages would provide varying levels
of capability that could be tailored to the specific conflict
scenario. By planning these packages in advance, USACOM officials
believe that they will be able to quickly provide the forces CINCs
need. In developing the packages, USACOM asked the other CINCs to
assess what capabilities are needed for various missions. In a
crisis, USACOM, in concert with the affected CINC, would identify and
deploy the appropriate force package to the CINC's area of operation.
USACOM will focus on training these packages in joint operations
since some packages will entail deploying forces in nontraditional
ways.
USACOM expects this strategy to help overcome past problems of forces
being inadequately trained for joint operations. In the past, CINCs
requested forces directly from the services when crises arose. This
created problems because forces from the various services had not
always trained together prior to their deployment. Even if they had,
there might have been significant differences in the tasks performed,
as well as the procedures and terminology used.
An advantage of USACOM's strategy is that when a crisis occurs, CINCs
will have a predetermined list of forces available as a starting
point, which they can then tailor as needed to the specific
situation. For example, if the predetermined forces are too large
for the operation, a CINC could select a portion of the force package
or a smaller force package more appropriate to the situation.
Although USACOM hopes that CINCs will request its predetermined force
packages, they are not required to do so. It remains the CINCs'
prerogative to mix and match forces. USACOM is developing standard
joint task force packages for foreign disaster relief, seaport
operations, and crisis response. However, as of January 1995, it did
not have an estimated time for completing these packages.
Appropriate training will follow this planning effort.
CINCS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS
ABOUT NEW JOINT TRAINING
INITIATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
CINCs have raised serious concerns about USACOM's new joint training
program and operational strategy and appear reluctant to use the
Joint Warfighting Center's technical assistance. J-7, Joint
Warfighting Center, and USACOM officials are aware of the concerns
and believe that, over time, they will be resolved. However, the
disagreements among CINCs, USACOM, and the Center were at an impasse
at the time of our review.
RESERVATIONS OVER USACOM'S
JOINT TRAINING PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1
CINC officials expressed strong concerns about the soundness of
USACOM's joint training program. The concerns focus on whether
USACOM (1) can adequately train U.S.-based forces for overseas CINCs
and (2) is targeting its joint staff training toward the correct
audience.
In a March 1994 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, the former USACOM commander stressed the importance of
developing a program that provides CINCs with highly trained forces.
However, officials from the European and Pacific Commands told us
they questioned whether USACOM could adequately train U.S.-based
forces for their use. They cited two reasons that will make it
difficult for USACOM to train forces for overseas CINCs: (1) the
increasingly diverse missions that forces are expected to conduct and
(2) the CINCs' different terrain, tactics, and procedures. In the
past, CINCs had large forces permanently assigned to them and trained
these forces. Thus, the forces were familiar with the CINCs' terrain
and operating procedures, and CINCs had first-hand knowledge of their
readiness. Now that CINCs will have to rely more on forces stationed
in the United States, they have less assurance of force readiness and
are reluctant to use U.S.-based forces without further training.
Because of these concerns, one CINC issued instructions requiring
that all forces deployed to his theater train with forces already in
the theater prior to undertaking any mission.
Central and European Command officials stated that USACOM's program
to train personnel to command joint forces is also targeting the
wrong audience. The program focuses on training commanders and
staffs from the U.S.-based forces under USACOM's control. However,
CINC officials said that joint task force commanders are typically
selected from their own theaters of operation. One CINC issued
guidance to this effect. CINC officials cited recent operations by
the European Command in Rwanda and Somalia and USACOM's efforts in
Haiti to demonstrate their point. In those instances, the joint
force commanders were selected from European and Atlantic Command
personnel, respectively.
The Commander of the Joint Warfighting Center agreed that commanders
are generally selected from the affected theater of operation.
However, the Commander believed that as personnel rotate between
assignments in the United States and the regional commands and become
familiar with the differing missions, terrain, and procedures, this
matter will resolve itself.
USACOM officials are aware of the CINCs' concerns about the new joint
training strategies but also believe that, over time, their concerns
will be allayed. They agreed that (1) USACOM could not train
U.S.-based forces for every conceivable task and condition in the
various CINC theaters and (2) joint force commanders would usually
come from the affected region. USACOM officials emphasized that
CINCs, not USACOM, were responsible for training their forces
stationed in their areas to their regional-unique needs but believed
that the additional training required for new forces would be
minimal. These officials, including the USACOM Training Director,
noted the following:
The recent changes to joint training and operational planning, such
as the identification of a common set of joint tasks and
preplanned joint force packages, should enhance training and
minimize training differences.
The new strategies are an improvement over past CINC training
approaches that lacked uniformity and did not train forces for
joint tasks.
The Joint Warfighting Center is available to CINCs to help train
their forces and commanders to joint standards.
The strategy is too new to evaluate how much additional training time
forces and commanders trained by USACOM will need before CINCs can
effectively integrate USACOM-trained forces into their joint
operations. Upcoming USACOM joint exercises are designed to test the
validity of the new training strategy.
CONCERNS OVER USACOM'S JOINT
FORCE PACKAGING CONCEPT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2
Officials at all three CINCs we visited were concerned about the
soundness of USACOM's plan to provide predetermined joint force
packages. Their concerns focused on whether the strategy provides
CINCs with sufficient capabilities to conduct joint operations.
The United States used to have the capability to form large
amphibious joint task forces to augment the CINCs' forces.
Typically, these forces centered around an aircraft carrier and its
associated destroyers, guided missile frigates, and submarines and an
amphibious ready group housing a large complement of ground forces
and their associated equipment. The Navy had a large complement of
nearly 600 ships available to form large task forces. For example,
the European Command used to have about 320,000 forces stationed
overseas and could form large task forces of up to 19 ships for
year-round deployment. In 1994, the Command had only about 146,000
forces stationed overseas and will have only 100,000 forces by fiscal
year 1996. Further, because the Navy has only about 390 ships
available (a 35-percent reduction), it can no longer support CINCs
with large task forces. For example, USACOM joint forces, to be
deployed in 1995 to the European Command, will consist of only 11 to
14 ships and will be available for only 9 months--a 25-percent
reduction.
In a March 1994 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, CINCs from both the Central and European Commands stated
that the joint force packages provided by USACOM so far had failed to
fully support mission requirements. With smaller joint forces, they
had to make trade-offs in the types of capabilities available. They
each cited examples of two USACOM deployments in 1993. As part of
the first deployment--an exercise in the Persian Gulf--USACOM placed
Marines on board a Navy aircraft carrier. The former Central Command
commander, said that when the carrier deployed to the coast of Iraq,
not enough Marines and equipment were on board. Further, carrying
the Marines forced the carrier to displace the normal complement of
F-14s and other aircraft, thereby reducing air combat capabilities,
according to the former CINC.
In a second deployment, a carrier battle group and an amphibious
group traveled from the Mediterranean area to conduct operations in
Bosnia and Somalia. However, according to the former Central Command
CINC, the joint force was reorganized from its standard package, some
Marines and aircraft were removed, and the battle and amphibious
groups were separated. One group deployed for operations in Bosnia
and the other went to Somalia--an action that resulted in neither
group having the capabilities to meet their missions, according to
the Central and European Command CINCs. Both CINCs felt that
separating the two groups was not sound and that the new joint forces
provided only limited air and ground capabilities. The Central
Command CINC was also concerned about USACOM's joint force strategy
in an August 1994 letter to the Chairman of DOD's Commission on Roles
and Missions of the Armed Forces. He stated that
"the concept . . . is not the panacea for forward presence,
deterrence, and crisis response. Force structure, roles,
missions, and functions decisions should not count so heavily on
this concept; rather, [such decisions should count on] joint
synergism in general, so that we may reduce forces to a point
where they are strategically flexible but not operationally
hollow."
CINC officials expressed similar concerns during our visits. They
said that USACOM's joint force packaging strategy represents a threat
to command capabilities when forces deviate from their traditional
configurations. According to the Central Command Deputy Director for
Operations, units separated and combined with portions of other units
provide less than their normal capability. Although the joint forces
deployed by USACOM are based on the CINCs' determination of their
needs, CINC officials stated that USACOM's guidance had not enabled
them to accurately determine their joint force requirements.
USACOM officials were aware of the CINCs' concerns about the new
joint force packaging strategy and explained that the strategy is an
attempt to meet the CINCs' needs with smaller forces. Further, the
reality is that the United States no longer has the capability to
operate in the configuration of the large amphibious groups. They
said that the Command's operational strategy is evolving and that
they are working with CINCs to define more precise joint force
requirements.
CINCS ARE RELUCTANT TO
REQUEST JOINT WARFIGHTING
CENTER ASSISTANCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.3
It is too early to tell what impact the Joint Warfighting Center will
have on the CINCs' joint training programs. Officials at two
regional commands stated that they are capable of developing their
own joint training programs and, therefore, do not plan to
extensively use the Center's services. Further, two of the three
regional commands that we visited have developed their own simulation
centers to support their training, and command officials stated that
they did not need the Center's services. Nevertheless, Center
officials pointed out that the CINCs' use of their services could
help make joint training more uniform across the force and that the
CINCs' approach of "going it alone" could simply perpetuate past
problems.
Our review showed that each CINC trains its staff differently for
joint operations. The Pacific Command has a formal training program
built around a permanent force of personnel trained in joint
operations. A team of 30 personnel from all services trains twice a
month. The training includes classes on crisis action planning and
development of operational plans and orders. When a mission begins,
the Pacific Command joint task staff assists the joint task force
commander in the initial phases of the operation.
Neither the Central nor European Commands conduct a similar training
program for joint task force staff. The European Command uses joint
exercises to train staff. Command officials told us that in 1994, it
revised three exercises to include training staff in joint
operations. In fiscal year 1995, the Command plans to significantly
increase this training by conducting 12 such exercises. The Central
Command does not have a formal joint training program for its staff,
and it has not revised any exercises to provide better training
opportunities. In fiscal year 1994, the Command conducted two
exercises that trained staff in joint operations.
CINCs do not plan to extensively use the Center for simulation
support because they either have their own simulation centers or
place little priority on simulated training. Both the European and
Pacific Commands have centers with the capability to conduct
large-scale simulation exercises, for both live exercises and
exercises to train staff in joint operations. The Central Command
does not have a simulation center and has used the former Joint
Warfare Center to support its training. However, the last exercise
the Center conducted for the Central Command was in 1990. According
to Central Command officials, they conduct few simulation exercises
because they train extensively with forces from other nations, which
have little experience with or capability to use simulation.
Finally, USACOM is developing its own simulation training facilities
in the Tidewater, Virginia, area, even though the Center is
developing its simulation facility nearby.\2
The Commander of the Center recognized the CINCs' limited use of the
Center, but stated that CINCs are not required to use the Center.
The Commander hopes that by extensively marketing the Center's
services, CINCs will use it more.
--------------------
\2 This potential overlap was the subject of our inquiry to the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Simulation Training (GAO/NSIAD-94-249R,
Aug. 18, 1994). DOD did not respond to our inquiry requesting it
reconsider the need for two centers and has proceeded to construct
them.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
Numerous actions have been taken aimed at improving joint training.
However, they will not be effective unless the Chairman, JCS, exerts
a strong leadership role and resolves the impasse over USACOM's joint
training and operational strategies and the role of the Joint
Warfighting Center. The new strategies are vast departures from past
practices, which gave virtually all decision-making authority for
joint training and force deployment to CINCs. Accordingly, some
resistance by CINCs is understandable. However, the CINCs have
raised basic concerns about the soundness of the new strategies. The
success of the new strategies is questionable--unless CINCs feel
confident that their concerns have been addressed and the strategies
have been adequately tried and tested. Moreover, a lack of consensus
among the CINCs could perpetuate past problems in joint training and
operations. In our opinion, top-level DOD officials must address the
CINCs' concerns if the strategies are to succeed.
Similar attention must be paid to the CINCs' reluctance to use the
Joint Warfighting Center's services. Uniform training is important
given the substantially reduced size of DOD's forces and the
flexibility needed to deploy forces anywhere in the world. The
Center can fulfill an important role in making CINC training efforts
more uniform across the force, but only if CINCs use its services.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
To improve the uniformity of joint training and promote USACOM's
efforts to strengthen joint training and operational capabilities, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the
Chairman, JCS, take appropriate actions to achieve a stronger
consensus among the CINCs about (1) USACOM's new strategies for
training joint task force commanders and their staffs and the use of
joint force packages and (2) the merits of the Joint Warfighting
Center's technical assistance.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:6
DOD concurred with our recommendation but said that the CINCs'
concerns about USACOM's joint training and force deployment
strategies had already been addressed. DOD supported its position by
citing a draft response from one CINC to questions submitted for the
record in testimony before the House Committee on National Security
in March 1995. In his response, the CINC said that he had reached
agreement with USACOM on how forces provided to his theater would be
trained. However, he did not comment on the overall soundness of the
training and operational strategies that this CINC's staff told us
during our work. With regard to joint force packaging, he emphasized
that he must continue to have a strong influence over the forces
deployed for joint operations and that these packages must be robust
and responsive to deal with anticipated missions and unforeseen
contingencies.
These were the same reservations that the CINCs' staffs voiced during
our review. Further, contrary to DOD's position that it had
addressed the CINCs' concerns about the new joint training and
operational strategies, the Commission on Roles and Missions, in its
May 1995 report, noted that the CINCs' concerns had not been
resolved. For example, the Commission noted improvements were needed
for evaluating joint training and assessing joint readiness and that
CINCs must have greater influence over training and packaging the
forces used in joint operations. It also found that USACOM's new
capacity as "joint force integrator" has not been adequately
developed and defined and CINCs must adequately understand and accept
this concept. Based on these lingering concerns, we have retained
our original recommendation that would focus top-level attention on
achieving a stronger consensus on these strategies.
DOD disputed our finding that CINCs appeared reluctant to seek
assistance from the Joint Warfighting Center. It said that the
Center would support
17 joint exercises during fiscal years 1995 and 1996. It should be
noted that these exercises represent only about 4 percent of the 400
exercises planned and may suggest the CINC's continuing reluctance to
extensively use the Center's technical assistance.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 4
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Sharon A. Cekala
Carol R. Schuster
Barry W. Holman
Rodney E. Ragan
Christine D. Frye
KANSAS CITY REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Joseph F. Lenart, Jr.