Cuba: U.S. Response to the 1994 Cuban Migration Crisis (Letter Report,
09/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-211).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. government's
actions to address the 1994 Cuban migration crisis, focusing on: (1) how
U.S. policy has changed since the crisis; (2) the agencies involved with
and costs to the government of the exodus of Cubans; (3) the
government's capability to process Cuban applicants seeking legal entry
into the United States; and (4) the adequacy of living conditions at the
U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay.
GAO found that: (1) the U.S. government reversed its policy of welcoming
fleeing Cubans to the United States in August 1994 and took Cuban
rafters interdicted at sea to safe haven camps at the U.S. Naval Station
in Guantanamo Bay; (2) in September 1994, the United States and Cuba
agreed that the United States would allow at least 20,000 Cubans to
enter annually in exchange for Cuba's pledge to prevent further unlawful
departures by rafters; (3) in May 1995, the President announced that
Cubans interdicted at sea would no longer be taken to safe havens, but
would be returned to Cuba to apply for legal entry into the United
States; (4) the President also stated that eligible Cubans in the safe
haven camps would be paroled into the United States and those ineligible
would be returned to Cuba; (5) the agencies involved in implementing the
migration policy included the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of State,
at a combined cost of about $533 million; (6) the United States has been
able to meet its workload of processing applicants seeking legal entry
into the country and has approved 16,305 Cubans for entry as of June
1995; and (7) the living conditions at the safe haven camps appear to be
adequate and exceed the United Nations' inspection guidelines for
minimal shelter, food, and water.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-211
TITLE: Cuba: U.S. Response to the 1994 Cuban Migration Crisis
DATE: 09/95
SUBJECT: International relations
Immigration or emigration
Immigrants
Immigration and naturalization law
Aid to refugees
Resident aliens
Parole
Eligibility determinations
IDENTIFIER: Cuba
Havana (Cuba)
Special Cuban Migration Program
**************************************************************************
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO *
* report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, *
* headings, and bullets are preserved. Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are *
* identified by double and single lines. The numbers on the right end *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the page *
* numbers of the printed product. *
* *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble *
* those in the printed version. *
* *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015, *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time. *
**************************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
September 1995
CUBA - U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994
CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS
GAO/NSIAD-95-211
Cuba
(711131)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CRS - Community Relations Service
INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
JTF - Joint Task Force
IOM - International Organization for Migration
MRE - Meals Ready to Eat
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-265830
September 18, 1995
The Honorable Jose E. Serrano
The Honorable Lamar Smith
House of Representatives
In response to your request, we reviewed the U.S. government's
actions to address the mass exodus of people from Cuba in the summer
of 1994. Our objectives were to (1) describe how U.S. policy toward
those seeking to leave Cuba has changed since that time, (2) identify
the agencies and costs to the U.S. government associated with the
exodus of Cubans, (3) assess the capabilities of the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana to process applicants seeking legal entry into the
United States, and (4) evaluate the adequacy of living conditions at
the Cuban safe haven camps at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay.
We briefed your staff on the results of our review on June 30, 1995.
This report summarizes and updates the information provided during
that briefing.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
For over 30 years, fleeing Cubans had been welcomed to the United
States. However, the U.S. government reversed this policy on August
19, 1994, when President Clinton announced that Cuban rafters
interdicted at sea would no longer be brought to the United States.
Instead, they would be taken to safe haven camps at the U.S. Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with no opportunity for eventual entry
into the United States other than by returning to Havana to apply for
entry through legal channels at the U.S. Interests Section. On
September 9, 1994, the U.S. and Cuban governments agreed that the
United States would allow at least 20,000 Cubans to enter annually in
exchange for Cuba's pledge to prevent further unlawful departures by
rafters. On May 2, 1995, a White House announcement was released
stating that Cubans interdicted at sea would not be taken to a safe
haven but would be returned to Cuba where they could apply for entry
into the United States at the Interests Section in Havana. The
announcement also stated that eligible Cubans in the safe haven camps
would be paroled into the United States\1 and that those found to be
ineligible for parole would be returned to Cuba.\2
Several U.S. agencies have been involved in implementing the U.S.
policy regarding Cubans wishing to leave their country. The
predominant agencies are (1) the Department of Defense, which will
spend about $434 million from August 1994 through September 1995
operating the safe haven camps; (2) the U.S. Coast Guard, which
spent about $7.8 million interdicting Cubans at sea from August 1994
to the present; (3) the Department of Justice's Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) and Community Relations Service (CRS),
which together will spend about $48.3 million for the Cuban migration
crisis from August 1994 through September 1995; and (4) the
Department of State, which will spend an estimated $7.1 million
during this same period.\3
The U.S. Interests Section in Havana has been able to meet the
workload of processing applicants seeking legal entry into the United
States. As of June 9, 1995, it had approved 16,305 Cubans for U.S.
entry. However, not all those approved for travel will leave Cuba by
September 1995, the anniversary of the September 1994 agreement.
The Cubans' living conditions at the Guantanamo Bay safe haven camps
are difficult but, we believe, adequate based on our observations at
the camps. We found no internationally accepted standards of what
the living conditions should be at refugee camps, but we noted that
conditions in all camps generally exceeded U.N. inspection
guidelines for minimal shelter, food, and water.
--------------------
\1 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C.
sec. 1182, grants the Attorney General the discretionary authority
to temporarily parole aliens into the United States for humanitarian
or public interest reasons. Under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966,
Cuban parolees may apply for permanent resident alien status after 1
year in the United States. Permanent resident aliens are generally
eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship after 5 years residence in
the United States.
\2 In accordance with 8 U.S.C. sec. 1182 (the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, as amended), camp residents can be
determined ineligible for parole for reasons such as criminal
history; medical, physical, or mental conditions; or commission of
acts of violence while in the camps.
\3 These figures represent incremental costs that would not have been
incurred had there been no migration operation.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD FLEEING
CUBANS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
For decades Cubans have fled Cuba, often by raft, seeking freedom in
the United States. For example, during the first 6 months of 1993,
the U.S. Coast Guard picked up about 1,300 rafters and brought them
to the United States. This number increased to about 4,700 during
the same period in 1994. At that time, Cuba was maintaining its
strict policy of forbidding its citizens from illegally exiting the
country.
In June 1994, violence by both the Cuban authorities and would-be
asylum seekers escalated when, for example, Cuban authorities shot
and killed a Cuban who was attempting to escape the island. From
July 13 through August 8, 1994, at least 37 asylum seekers and 2
Cuban officials were killed in a series of boat hijackings. In
addition, a riot erupted in Havana on August 5 when police attempted
to disperse a crowd that had gathered when a false rumor circulated
that a flotilla of boats was on its way to pick up people seeking to
leave. On August 13, Fidel Castro gave a televised speech blaming
the United States for the riots and violence and threatened to remove
restrictions on Cubans exiting the country if the United States did
not take steps to deter boat departures and return those hijackers
who had reached the United States.
Not receiving the response he anticipated from the United States,
Castro indicated he would not prevent Cubans from leaving. Over the
next week, Cubans flocked to the beaches, where they constructed
make-shift vessels and set out to sea.
As the flow of rafters increased, President Clinton announced on
August 19, 1994, that the Coast Guard would no longer bring
interdicted Cubans to the United States but would hold them at
Guantanamo Bay. The President and the Attorney General indicated at
that time that those Cubans taken to Guantanamo Bay would have no
opportunity for eventual entry into the United States. This
announcement reversed a 3-decade policy of welcoming Cubans seeking
refuge into the United States. Many Cubans did not believe that the
United States would actually enforce the new policy and consequently
continued to leave Cuba. About
33,000 Cubans were picked up at sea and taken to Guantanamo Bay.\4
Concerned about the continuing exodus, on September 9, 1994, the
United States and Cuba signed an accord under which the United States
agreed to admit at least 20,000 Cubans per year directly from Cuba
through legal channels.\5 The U.S. Interests Section in Havana
estimated that this number would comprise approximately 7,000
refugees and family members,\6
8,000 immigrant visa recipients and their families, and 5,000 paroled
through the Special Cuban Migration Program--a special lottery. The
Cuban government agreed "to prevent unsafe departures using mainly
persuasive methods." Within days the Cuban police again were
patrolling the roads leading to the beaches, under orders to arrest
persons carrying rafts or the materials to build them, and Cubans
stopped departing by raft.
The United States later began granting parole to certain categories
of Cubans in the safe haven camps at Guantanamo Bay. On October 14,
1994, President Clinton announced that parole would be granted to
those over age 70, unaccompanied minors, or those with serious
medical conditions and their caregivers. On December 2, 1994, the
Attorney General announced that parole would be considered on a
case-by-case basis for children and their immediate families who
would be adversely affected by long-term presence in safe havens.
These four categories became known as the "four protocols."
On May 2, 1995, the White House Press Secretary announced that Cubans
interdicted at sea would no longer be taken to safe haven at
Guantanamo Bay but would be returned to Cuba where they could apply
for entry into the United States through legal channels at the U.S.
Interests Section. In discussing this announcement, the Attorney
General stated that measures would be taken to ensure that persons
who claimed a genuine need for protection, which they believed could
not be satisfied by applying at the U.S. Interests Section, would be
examined before their return to Cuba. She also announced at that
time that remaining Cubans at Guantanamo Bay--about 18,500 as of June
7, 1995--would be considered for parole into the United States,
excluding those found to be ineligible for parole due to criminal
activity in Cuba, in the United States, or while in safe haven and
those with certain serious medical conditions.
--------------------
\4 This number included 8,763 who were subsequently transferred to a
Panama safe haven from September 1994 through February 1995.
\5 The United States also agreed that during the first year of the
agreement, it would parole those currently on the immigrant visa
waiting list, raising the total to be admitted in 1995 to about
26,700.
\6 In 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101 (a) (42) a refugee is defined as a person
who has fled his or her home country because of persecution, or a
well-founded fear of persecution, for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
AGENCIES INVOLVED WITH CUBAN
MIGRATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Within the executive branch, an interagency working group is
responsible for developing strategies for implementing the Cuban
migration policy. The working group is chaired by the National
Security Council and includes representatives from the State
Department's Bureaus for Inter-American Affairs and Population,
Refugees, and Migration and the Legal Advisor's Office; the
Department of Justice's INS and CRS; the Defense Department's Offices
of the Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) and
Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Coast Guard.
The U.S. Interests Section in Havana is responsible for processing
the more than 20,000 expected Cuban applicants for U.S. entry,
annually. As of August 1995, the Interests Section had increased its
processing staff to
6 full-time consular officers and about 3 temporary-duty consular
officers, 4 INS officers, about 40 local nationals, and 4 U.S. and
third country contract hires. Consular officers at the Interests
Section process immigrant visa applications and prescreen parole
applicants; the Refugee Coordinator prescreens refugee applicants.
INS adjudicates refugee and parole applications in Havana and parole
applications at Guantanamo Bay.
The Defense Department is responsible for carrying out the safe haven
program at Guantanamo Bay. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff oversee safe haven operations, and the
U.S. Atlantic Command has operational responsibility. Joint Task
Force (JTF)-160 executes the safe haven mission at Guantanamo--caring
for the inhabitants, providing for their security and protection, and
preparing them for travel to the United States. JTF-160 is also
charged with the safety and security of U.S. personnel at Guantanamo
Bay and the security of the station itself. The U.S. Coast Guard
interdicts rafters at sea and, until May 2, 1995, it took them to
safe haven at Guantanamo Bay. Since May 2, 1995, most Cubans
interdicted at sea have been returned by the Coast Guard to Cuba.
Civilian agencies implement various components of the safe haven
program. The Department of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees,
and Migration provides assistance to the safe haven population at
Guantanamo Bay through a grant to the World Relief Corporation. At
Guantanamo Bay, CRS assists in parole processing and provides human
resource services, such as family reunification, conciliation and
mediation assistance and training, and recreation and education. CRS
also provides resettlement assistance to parolees when they arrive in
the United States. The State Department also maintains an officer in
Guantanamo Bay as a liaison with the military and civilian agencies.
Other organizations are also involved in Cuban migration operations
at Guantanamo Bay. The World Relief Corporation, a nongovernmental
organization, provides public health and social services, vocational
training, mail services, and coordination of private donations. The
International Organization for Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental
organization based in Geneva, Switzerland, arranges resettlement for
Cubans wishing to migrate to countries other than the United States.
Pursuant to an agreement with the Cuban government to allow some
voluntary repatriation over land rather than flying to Havana, IOM
also arranges voluntary repatriation through the station's Northeast
Gate. IOM was also working with the remaining Haitians in camps at
Guantanamo Bay.
Considerable military and civilian personnel resources are at
Guantanamo Bay to support the safe haven operation. As shown in
table 1, more than 5,000 personnel were providing security and
services to Cubans in the safe haven camp at the time of our visit in
June 1995.
Table 1
Organization and Assigned Personnel
Providing Security and Services at the
Cuban Guantanamo Bay Safe Haven Camps
Organization Assigned personnel
-------------------------------------------------- ------------------
Department of Defense (JTF-160) 4,897
Department of Justice
----------------------------------------------------------------------
INS 13
CRS 57
Department of State 1
World Relief Corporation 40
IOM 15
======================================================================
Total 5,023
----------------------------------------------------------------------
INS planned to increase its personnel to at least 18 by the end of
summer to augment parole eligibility determination. IOM, on the
other hand, expects to decrease its presence to six as the remaining
Haitians are repatriated or allowed entry into the United States.
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CUBAN
MIGRATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
We estimate that the total cost of the U.S. response to the Cuban
exodus from August 1994 through fiscal year 1995 will exceed $497
million (see table 2). This represents incremental costs, which are
costs that agencies would not have incurred had there been no Cuban
migration crisis.
Table 2
Estimated Costs of Cuban Migrant
Operations from August 1, 1994, through
September 30, 1995
(Dollars in millions)
Agency Cost
-------------------------------------------------- ------------------
Defense Department $434.0
Coast Guard 7.8
State Department 7.1
INS 8.8
CRS 39.5
======================================================================
Total $497.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense costs include procuring construction materials, food, medical
supplies, and miscellaneous items for camps at Guantanamo Bay and in
Panama; shipping food and supplies; transporting military personnel
to the camps and about 500 to 550 parolees to Homestead Air Force
Base, Florida, each week; and moving 8,763 Cubans from Guantanamo Bay
to Panama in September 1994 and 7,291 back again in February 1995.
Defense does not budget for such migrant operations, and it requested
a $370-million supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1995 to
minimize the impact of these activities on military operations.
Coast Guard expenses cover the costs of patrolling the waters between
Cuba and Florida and bringing people to Guantanamo Bay and Cuba.
CRS' costs primarily cover resettlement assistance to parolees
arriving in the United States (about $31.3 million). State
Department costs include expanding consular processing in Havana and
providing a liaison officer at Guantanamo Bay and a grant to the
World Relief Corporation to provide services at the safe haven camps.
PROCESSING CAPABILITY IN HAVANA
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Our review of the processing workload at the Interests Section
indicates that it will process 20,000 applicants for U.S. entry and
the additional
6,700 applicants on the waiting list by September 8, 1995--the end of
the first year under the agreement.\7 As of June 9, 1995, the
Interests Section had approved 16,305 for entry into the United
States. This number included 7,693 refugees, 40 paroled family
members of refugees,
3,601 immigrant visas, 3,073 paroled family members of immigrant visa
recipients, and 1,898 parolees selected through a lottery. An
additional 4,451 applicants for immigrant visas who were on the
noncurrent preference lists had been approved for parole and 1,269 of
their immediate relatives had been issued immigrant visas, pursuant
to the September 1994 agreement. From 1996 through 1998, the
workload will be somewhat reduced because the 20,000-person
requirement will be offset each year for 3 years by up to 5,000 as a
result of the May 2 announcement that all eligible Guantanamo Bay
camp applicants would be paroled into the United States.
--------------------
\7 On August 21, 1995, the U.S. Interest Section announced that the
first-year commitment agreed to in the Migration Accord had been
achieved as of August 15.
RESETTLEMENT FROM GUANTANAMO
BAY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
Resettlement processing continues, as about 500 to 550 Cubans enter
the United States from Guantanamo Bay each week. As of June 27,
1995, 14,746 had been paroled into the United States under the four
humanitarian protocols, including 1,270 paroled from the temporary
Howard Air Force Base safe haven in Panama from October 1994 through
February 1995. Another 622 had returned to Cuba through diplomatic
channels, 139 had resettled in third countries, and 1,000 had
returned to Cuba on their own, either over land or by water. Sixty
Cuban rafters had been interdicted and repatriated to Cuba as of that
date, pursuant to the May 2 announcement that such individuals would
be returned to Cuba.
At the time of our visit to Guantanamo Bay, 18,802 Cubans remained in
the camps. Of these, 5,856 qualified for parole under the four
protocols, and 12,946 were eligible to apply for parole consideration
under the May 2 announcement. The INS officer-in-charge noted that
JTF-160 had compiled about 4,500 camp incident reports involving camp
infractions that INS staff will review for impact on individual
parole eligibility. However, INS estimates that only a small number
of those involved will be ineligible for parole.
CONDITIONS AT THE GUANTANAMO
BAY CAMPS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
While detention in safe haven camps is undoubtedly difficult, our
review at the Guantanamo Bay camps indicated that living conditions
were adequate. While we found no internationally accepted criteria
for minimal refugee living standards,\8 we noted that the U.S.
Atlantic Command had developed standards for safe haven conditions
based on inspection guidelines of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and standard military regulations
and manuals' requirements. The Command developed a camp construction
model for migrant operations based on a population of 10,000 that
could be adapted for population changes and issued corresponding
operational guidelines, including camp organization, services,
construction, and logistics.
We found that conditions generally met or exceeded Atlantic Command
standards and UNHCR inspection guidelines. For example, minimal
UNHCR inspection guidelines include 3.5 square meters of living space
per migrant. Using this as guidance, the Command recommended using
medium-sized tents to house up to 15 Cubans.\9 We found no indication
that these tents housed more than 15 persons.
Camp conditions have improved since the influx of Cubans in the
summer of 1994, due to decreasing population density and a Defense
Department "Quality of Life" facilities upgrade. In late August
1994, thousands of people were arriving daily at the Guantanamo Bay
camps. Together with about 12,000 Haitians, the camps' population
totaled about 45,000 in September 1994. At that time, living
conditions were marginal, according to Atlantic Command officials, as
JTF-160 was erecting tents and installing portable toilets as quickly
as people arrived. Crowded conditions began easing as most Haitians
were repatriated to Haiti following President Aristide's return in
October 1994, and more than 8,000 Cubans were relocated to safe haven
camps in Panama for 6 months. Also, Cubans began leaving via parole
following the October and December protocol announcements.
The Defense Department had intended to spend almost $35 million to
upgrade facilities to accommodate a longer term camp operation.
However, the May 2 announcement that most camp inhabitants would be
eligible for parole lessened the urgency to improve conditions. As a
result, the Defense Department spent about $25.3 million for its
upgrade program.\10 Not all camps were upgraded; some camps were
scheduled to be disassembled as populations decreased. Upgrades
included elevated hardback tents, plumbing, tension fabric structures
as multipurpose buildings, and electricity. (See figs. 1 through
3.)
Figure 1: Elevated Hardback
Tents
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure 2: Tension Fabric
Structure
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure 3: Women's Rest Room
(See figure in printed
edition.)
In general, those who are expected to be paroled in late 1995 and
early 1996 are located in the newer camps. Those eligible for parole
under the first four protocols are scheduled to leave by the end of
summer 1995 and, for the most part, are located in the camps that
have not been upgraded (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Non-upgraded Camp
Area
(See figure in printed
edition.)
In addition to adequate shelter, camp residents receive breakfast, a
hot dinner prepared by Cuban cooks, and Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) for
lunch. Cubans with whom we spoke said that the food was better than
when they first arrived, when they mostly received rice. They also
receive medical treatment at camp clinics and in military medical and
surgical units as necessary. Recreational activities include
baseball, basketball, pool, ping-pong, movies, music, arts and
crafts, and libraries. In addition, adults can attend English and
vocational classes coordinated by World Relief. Most children have
left the camps, but the few remaining receive basic schooling
organized by CRS. Many of these services are provided by camp
residents with special skills.
Security is professional but not overtly oppressive. Camp residents
are relatively free to move around within camp areas. When they
first arrived, the Cubans were restricted to smaller areas behind
razor concertina wire. According to military personnel, tensions
have eased since the May 2 announcement that the Cubans would not be
detained indefinitely but could apply for parole.
--------------------
\8 Refugees: Living Conditions are Marginal (GAO/NSIAD-91-258, Sept.
11, 1991).
\9 The military services use medium-sized tents to house 10 to 20
personnel, depending upon the quality of life desired.
\10 The upgrade program, begun in December 1994, was well underway
when the May 2 announcement altered the program's scope.
TRAVEL FROM CUBA TO THE UNITED
STATES IS BEING DELAYED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
Although by September 1995 the Interests Section will likely have
processed for U.S. entry the 20,000 Cubans called for in the
September 9, 1994, agreement as well as the 6,700 on the noncurrent
immigrant visa preference list,\11 it is unlikely that this number
will travel to the United States by that date. Of the 7,693 refugees
approved for travel, only 1,494 had left as of June 9, 1995. While
this partly reflects the normal lag in obtaining sponsorship for
approved refugees, the relatively small number who have left also
reflects the adverse impact of steep Cuban government-imposed air
fare increases and fees for migration-related services. In February
1995, the Cuban government raised the one-way fare from Havana to
Miami from $150 to $990.\12 When the rate was increased, the
Interests Section refused to pay the higher amount and negotiated
rates with commercial airlines for regularly scheduled flights to
Miami through Mexico and Costa Rica. The number of such seats was
limited, resulting in 5,267 refugees waiting to travel at the time of
our visit. The remaining 932 refugees had been adjudicated but had
not yet obtained all documents required for travel.
Unlike refugees, immigrant visa holders and parolees must arrange and
pay for their own transportation to the United States. Because they
arrange their own travel, the Interests Section does not track the
number that has departed from Cuba. Although INS will report in 1997
on numbers of Cubans coming through U.S. ports of entry in 1995,
these numbers will reflect country of nationality, not country of
departure.
The U.S. government repeatedly voiced its concern to the Cuban
government about the exorbitant airfare. Cuba agreed to lower the
fare; however, it also imposed additional fees in June 1995,
including $400 for the medical examination required for all people
seeking U.S. entry ($250 for children), $250 for an exit permit and
related documents, and $50 for a passport. U.S. officials told us
that they believe that some fees for these previously free services
may be reasonable, but the fees imposed (even with reduced air
charters) will pose serious obstacles for Cubans seeking to emigrate.
At the time of our visit to Guantanamo Bay, the backlog of those
approved for travel from there was estimated by INS at about 1,200.
Parolees leave Guantanamo Bay on three charter flights each week, and
depending on the size of the aircraft, 500 to 550 parolees depart
each week. At this rate, the camps should be empty by March 15,
1996. However, the availability of transportation is not the
limiting factor in more rapidly reducing the camps' population.
Despite the backlog and the continuing cost to operate the camps, the
weekly departure rates are not expected to increase. According to
Defense, State, and Justice officials, state of Florida officials
maintain that the state can accommodate no more than 550 parolees per
week. Defense, State, and Justice officials said that senior Clinton
administration officials have agreed not to exceed that figure.
According to Defense Department officials, if departures could be
accelerated to
690 per week, they could empty the camps by December 15, 1995, and
save about $22.2 million in operating expenses.
--------------------
\11 According to the U.S. Interests Section, the first-year
commitment agreed to in the Migration Accord was achieved as of
August 15.
\12 The U.S. government normally provides transportation for
refugees who sign a promissory note to reimburse the government for
these costs within 4 years.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State provided oral comments
on this report. Their technical comments have been incorporated
where appropriate. State Department officials suggested that it
would have been useful to have compared costs incurred with those
that might have been incurred by both the federal and state of
Florida governments had no action been taken to stem the flow of
Cubans to the United States. Such an analysis may be interesting,
but it was not within the scope of work we were requested to perform.
Furthermore, such analysis would be highly subjective because the
cost would depend on many unknown factors such as the number of
Cubans who would have fled to the United States had no action been
taken to stem the flow, and what benefits and services would have
been provided. Also, we found no evidence that the decision to
reverse a 30-year policy of welcoming fleeing Cubans to the United
States was based on cost consideration.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10
We identified U.S. policies toward Cubans seeking U.S. entry
through discussions with State, INS, and CRS officials and reviewing
documentation such as agreements with the Cuban government, joint
communiques, administration announcements of parole and safe haven
positions, and pertinent legislation. To determine the processing
capabilities of the Interests Section, we interviewed INS officials
in Washington, D.C., and visited the Interests Section in Havana. In
Havana, we discussed with consular, INS, and senior post officials
the various screening and adjudication processes for refugees,
immigrants, and parolees; reviewed sample case files; and observed
ongoing screenings.
To determine living conditions at Guantanamo Bay, we visited the U.S.
Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia, to discuss its oversight of
migrant operations and how it developed criteria for living
standards. We also visited Guantanamo Bay, where we observed camp
conditions, examined the parole processing procedures, and monitored
the weekly meeting with the JTF Commander and the Cuban
representatives from each camp. In addition, we met with JTF-160
operations and logistics officers and officials from CRS, INS, State,
World Relief Corporation, IOM, and UNHCR to discuss their activities
at Guantanamo Bay.
To determine program costs, we obtained estimated actual and
projected Cuban migrant program incremental cost data for fiscal
years 1994 and 1995 from the Departments of Defense and State, INS,
CRS, and the Coast Guard. We did not verify the accuracy of the
agencies' estimates.
We conducted our review between April and August 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10.1
Unless you announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 15 days after its issue date. At
that time, we will send copies to the Departments of State, Defense,
and Justice and to interested congressional committees, and to others
upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4128. Major contributors to this
report were David R. Martin, Assistant Director, and Audrey E.
Solis, Senior Evaluator.
Harold J. Johnson, Director
International Affairs Issues