Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign (Letter Report,
06/12/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-134).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Operation Desert
Storm air campaign, focusing on the: (1) use and performance of
aircraft, munitions, and missiles employed during the air campaign; (2)
validity of Department of Defense (DOD) and manufacturer claims,
particularly those for weapon systems utilizing advanced technology; (3)
relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and (4)
extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met. DOD
unclassified approximately 85 percent of the originally classified
material in the in the classified report and GAO has included that
material in this version of the study. The best available data did not
permit GAO to either: (1) make a comprehensive system-by-system
quantitative comparison of aircraft and weapon effectiveness; or (2)
validate some of the key performance claims for certain weapon systems.
GAO noted that: (1) air power clearly achieved many of Desert Storm's
objectives but fell short of fully achieving others; (2) the available
quantitative and qualitative data indicate that air power damage to
several major target sets was more limited than DOD's title V report to
the Congress stated; (3) these data show clear success against the oil
and electrical target categories, but less success against Iraqi air
defense, command, control, and communications, and lines of
communication; (4) success against nuclear-related, mobile Scud, and
Republican Guard targets was the least measurable; (5) the lessons that
can be learned from Desert Storm are limited because of the unique
conditions, the strike tactics employed by the coalition, the limited
Iraqi response, and limited data on weapon system effectiveness; (6) the
strong likelihood of campaign success enabled U.S. commanders to favor
strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability rather
than weapon system effectiveness; (7) the Iraqis employed few, if any,
electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air
opposition; (8) as a result, Desert Storm did not consistently or
rigorously test all the performance parameters of aircraft and weapon
systems used in the air campaign; (9) many of DOD's and manufacturers'
postwar claims about weapon system performance were overstated,
misleading, inconsistent with the best available data, or unverifiable;
(10) aircraft and pilot losses were historically low, partly owing to
the use of medium- to high-altitude munition delivery tactics that
nonetheless both reduced the accuracy of guided and unguided munitions
and hindered target identification and acquisition; (11) air power was
inhibited by the limited ability of aircraft sensors to identify and
acquire targets, the failure to gather intelligence on critical targets,
and the inability to collect and disseminate battle damage assessments
(BDA) in a timely manner; (12) the contributions of guided weaponry
incorporating advanced technologies and their delivery platforms were
limited because the cooperative operating conditions they require were
not consistently encountered; (13) the important contributions of
stealth and laser-guided bombs were emphasized as was the need for more
and better BDA and less attention was paid to the significant
contributions of less-sophisticated systems and the performance of crit*
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-97-134
TITLE: Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign
DATE: 06/12/97
SUBJECT: Air warfare
Fighter aircraft
Advanced weapons systems
Bombs
Missiles
Military intelligence
Defense capabilities
Military intervention
Combat readiness
IDENTIFIER: Desert Storm
Iraq
Kuwait
Tomahawk Cruise Missile
BGM-109 Missile
Maverick Missile
AGM-65 Missile
A-6E Aircraft
Intruder Aircraft
B-52 Aircraft
F-16 Aircraft
Falcon Aircraft
F-15E Aircraft
Eagle Aircraft
F/A-18 Aircraft
Hornet Aircraft
F111-F Aircraft
Pacer Strike Aircraft
F-117 Aircraft
Stealth Aircraft
F-4G Aircraft
Wild Weasel Aircraft
F-15C Aircraft
EF-111 Aircraft
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, House
of Representatives
June 1997
OPERATION DESERT STORM -
EVALUATION OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN
GAO/NSIAD-97-134
Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign
(973364/713004)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
AAA - antiaircraft artillery
ABCCC - airborne battlefield command, control, and communications
AC - aircraft
ACTD - Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
ADOC - air defense operation center
AI - air interdiction
AIF - automated intelligence file
ALCM - air-launched cruise missile
AOB - air order of battle
APC - armored personnel carrier
ATO - air tasking order
ATODAY - air tasking order day
AWACS - airborne warning and control system
BDA - battle damage assessment
BE - basic encyclopedia
BUR - Bottom-Up Review
C\2 - command and control
C\3 ,CCC - command, control, and communications
CALCM - conventional air-launched cruise missile
CAP - combat air patrol
CAS - close air support
CBU - cluster bomb unit
CENTAF - Air Force Component, Central Command
CENTCOM - Central Command
CEP - circular error probable
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
CINC - commander in chief
CNA - Center for Naval Analyses
COG - center of gravity
CSAR - combat search and rescue
CW - continuous wave
D-day - first day of Operation Desert Storm (17January1991)
DAISUM - daily intelligence summary
DAWMS - Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study
DCA - defensive counterair
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
DLIR - downward-looking infrared
DMA - Defense Mapping Agency
DMPI - desired mean point of impact
DOD - Department of Defense
DS - Desert Storm
DSCS - Defense Satellite Communication System
DSMAC - Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator
ELE - electrical facilities
EO - electro-optical
EW - electronic warfare
FLIR - forward-looking infrared
FOV - field of view
FS - fully successful
FSTC - Foreign Science and Technology Center
G-day - first day of the ground campaign (24February1991)
GBU - guided-bomb unit
GOB - ground order of battle
GPS - global positioning system
GVC - government centers
GWAPS - Gulf War Air Power Survey
HARM - high-speed anti-radiation missile
IADS - integrated air defense system
IDA - Institute for Defense Analyses
IFF - identification of friend or foe
IOC - intercept operations center
IR - infrared
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEWC - Joint Electronic Warfare Center
JMEM - Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual
JMO - joint maritime operations
JSTARS - Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
KBX - kill box
KTO - Kuwait theater of operations
LANTIRN - low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night
LGB - laser-guided bomb
LOC - lines of communication
MAP - Master Attack Plan
MIB - military industrial base
MTL - Master Target List
NAV - naval
NBC - nuclear, biological, and chemical
NFS - not fully successful
NMAC - near midair collision
OCA - offensive counterair
OIL - oil refining, storage, and distribution
OPORD - operation order
PD - probability of destruction
PGM - precision-guided munition
P(k) - probability of kill
POL - petroleum, oil, and lubricants
PWD - programmed warhead detonation
RCS - radar cross-section
RG - Republican Guard
RGFC - Republican Guard Forces Command
RP - reporting post
SAD - strategic air defense
SAM - surface-to-air missile
SCAP - surface combat air patrol
SCU - Scud missile
SEAD - suppression of enemy air defenses
SOC - sector operations center
SOF - special operations forces
SPEAR - Strike Projection Evaluation and Anti-Air Research
SSPH - single-shot probability of hit
TALD - tactical air-launched decoy
TERCOM - Terrain Contour Matching
TFW - tactical fighter wing
TLAM - Tomahawk land attack missile
TOE - type of effort
TOT - time on target
TRAM - target recognition and attack multisensor
USAF - U.S. Air Force
WOE - weight of effort
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-276599
June 12, 1997
The Honorable John D. Dingell
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Commerce
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Dingell:
This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that
we issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air campaign.\1
At your request, the Department of Defense (DOD) reevaluated the
security classification of the original report, and as a result,
about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be
classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is
presented in this report. The data and findings in this report
address (1) the use and performance of aircraft, munitions, and
missiles employed during the air campaign; (2) the validity of DOD
and manufacturer claims about weapon systems' performance,
particularly those systems utilizing advanced technology; (3) the
relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and (4)
the extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met.
The long-standing DOD and manufacturer claims about weapon
performance can now be contrasted with some of our findings. For
example, (1) the F-117 bomb hit rate ranged between 41 and 60
percent--which is considered to be highly effective, but is still
less than the 80-percent hit rate reported after the war by DOD, the
Air Force, and the primary contractor (see pp. 125-132); (2) DOD's
initially reported 98-percent success rate for Tomahawk land attack
missile launches did not accurately reflect the system's
effectiveness (see pp. 139-143); (3) the claim by DOD and
contractors of a one-target, one-bomb capability for laser-guided
munitions was not demonstrated in the air campaign where, on average,
11 tons of guided and 44 tons of unguided munitions were delivered on
each successfully destroyed target (with averages ranging from 0.8 to
43.9 tons of guided and 6.7 to 152.6 tons of unguided munitions
delivered across the 12 target categories--see p. 117); and, (4) the
all-weather and adverse-weather sensors designed to identify targets
and guide weapons were either less capable than DOD reported or
incapable when employed at increasing altitudes or in the presence of
clouds, smoke, dust, or high humidity (see pp. 78-82).
The report also now includes analyses of associations between weapon
systems and target outcomes (see pp. 112-118); selected
manufacturers' claims about product performance in Desert Storm (see
pp. 143-146); the air campaign's effectiveness in achieving
strategic objectives (see pp. 148-159); and the costs and
performance of aircraft and munitions used during the campaign (see
pp. 162-193). Although some initial claims of accuracy and
effectiveness of these weapon systems were exaggerated, their
performance led, in part, to perhaps the most successful war fought
by the United States in the 20th century. And though some claims for
some advanced systems could not be verified, their performance in
combat may well have been unprecedented.
While this report reveals findings that were not previously publicly
available, our analyses of the air campaign's success against
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) targets predates recent
revelations regarding suspected locations and confirmed releases of
chemical warfare material during and immediately after the campaign.
In our report, we indicate that available bomb damage assessments
during the war concluded that 16 of 21 sites categorized by Gulf War
planners as NBC facilities had been successfully destroyed. However,
information compiled by the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) since the end of Desert Storm reveals that the number of
suspected NBC targets identified by U.S. planners, both prior to and
during the campaign, did not fully encompass all the possible NBC
targets in Iraq.\2 Thus, the number of NBC targets discussed in the
report is less than the actual suspected because (1) target
categorizations were based on the predominate activity at the
facility that may not have been NBC-related (i.e., a major air base
or conventional weapons storage depot may have contained a single
chemical or biological weapons storage bunker); (2) target
categorizations were inconsistent across agencies; and (3) the
intelligence community did not identify all NBC-related facilities.
UNSCOM has conducted investigations at a large number of facilities
in Iraq, including a majority of the facilities suspected by U.S.
authorities as being NBC-related.\3 With three exceptions,
Khamisiyah, Muhammadiyat, and Al Muthanna, UNSCOM found no evidence
that chemical or biological weapons were present during the campaign;
and only at Muhammadiyat and Al Muthana did UNSCOM find evidence that
would lead them to conclude that chemical or biological weapons were
released as a result of coalition bombing. Post-war intelligence
compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency indicates some releases
of chemicals at Muhammadiyat and Al Muthanna; however, both are in
remote areas west of Baghdad, and each is over 400 kilometers north
of the Saudi Arabian border and the nearest coalition base.
Regarding the few suspected chemical weapon sites that have not yet
been inspected by UNSCOM, we have been able to determine that each
was attacked by coalition aircraft during Desert Storm and that one
site is located within the Kuwait Theater of Operations in closer
proximity to the border, where coalition ground forces were
located.\4 However, we have yet to learn why these facilities have
not been investigated. We are seeking additional information on
these sites.
--------------------
\1 In July 1996, we also issued a report entitled Operation Desert
Storm: Evaluation of the Air War (GAO/PEMD-96-10), that set forth
our unclassified summary, conclusions, and recommendations.
\2 In the CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses,
dated 2 August 1996, the number of sites suspected to have been
connected to Iraq's chemical warfare program alone, totaled 34 (p.
6). UNSCOM has conducted chemical weapons-related inspections at
over 60 locations and investigations continue.
\3 UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency have had
responsibility to investigate Iraq's NBC weapons programs since the
cease-fire and the number of suspected chemical weapons-related
facilities investigated by UNSCOM far exceeds the number of sites
originally suspected (or attacked) by the United States. For
example, Khamisiyah, which was first inspected by UNSCOM in October
1991, was not identified as an NBC air campaign target during the war
and, thus, is not among the 21 NBC sites evaluated in our report.
\4 The Kuwait Theater of Operations is generally defined as Kuwait
and Iraq below 31 degrees north latitude.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :0.1
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate and House
Committees on Appropriations and their respective Subcommittees on
National Security and Defense; Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; and
Senate and House Committees on the Budget. We will also make copies
available to others upon request.
This report was prepared under the direction of Kwai-Cheung Chan,
Director, Special Studies and Evaluation, who may be reached on (202)
512-3092 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major
contributors are listed in appendix XIII.
Sincerely yours,
Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-260509
July 2, 1996
The Honorable David Pryor
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable John D. Dingell
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Commerce
House of Representatives
This report responds to your request that we comprehensively evaluate
the use and effectiveness of the various aircraft, munitions, and
other weapon systems used in the victorious air campaign in Operation
Desert Storm in order to aid the Congress in future procurement
decisions.
Over 5 years ago, the United States and its coalition allies
successfully forced Iraq out of Kuwait. The performance of aircraft
and their munitions, cruise missiles, and other air campaign systems
in Desert Storm continues to be relevant today as the basis for
significant procurement and force sizing decisions. For example, the
Department of Defense (DOD) Report on the Bottom-Up Review (BUR)
explicitly cited the effectiveness of advanced weapons used in Desert
Storm--including laser-guided bombs (LGB) and stealth aircraft--as
shaping the BUR recommendations on weapons procurement.\1
--------------------
\1 Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 1993), p. 18.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Operation Desert Storm was primarily a sustained 43-day air campaign
by the United States and its allies against Iraq between January 17,
1991, and February 28, 1991. It was the first large employment of
U.S. air power since the Vietnam war, and by some measures
(particularly the low number of U.S. casualties and the short
duration of the campaign), it was perhaps the most successful war
fought by the United States in the 20th century. The main ground
campaign occupied only the final 100 hours of the war.
The air campaign involved nearly every type of fixed-wing aircraft in
the U.S. inventory, flying about 40,000 air-to-ground and 50,000
support sorties.\2 Approximately 1,600 U.S. combat aircraft were
deployed by the end of the war. By historical standards, the
intensity of the air campaign was substantial. The U.S. bomb
tonnage dropped per day was equivalent to 85 percent of the average
daily bomb tonnage dropped by the United States on Germany and Japan
during the course of World War II.
Operation Desert Storm provided a valuable opportunity to assess the
performance of U.S. combat aircraft and munitions systems under
actual combat conditions. Unlike operational tests or small-scale
hostilities, the air campaign involved a very large number of
conventional systems from all four services used in tandem, which
permits potentially meaningful cross-system comparisons. The combat
data in this report can be seen as an extension of the performance
data generated by DOD's operational test and evaluation programs that
we have previously reviewed.\3
--------------------
\2 Support sorties comprised missions such as refueling, electronic
jamming, and combat air patrol.
\3 See Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy
Weapon Systems Prematurely (GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994); Weapons
Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change (GAO/NSIAD-93-15,
Dec. 1992); Weapons Testing: Quality of DOD Operational Testing and
Reporting (GAO/PEMD-88-32BR, July 26, 1988); Live Fire Testing:
Evaluating DOD's Programs (GAO/PEMD-87-17, Aug. 17, 1987); and How
Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat? DOD's Joint
Test and Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers
(GAO/PEMD-84-3, Feb. 22, 1984).
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
To respond to your questions about the effectiveness of the air
campaign; the performance of individual weapon systems; the accuracy
of contractor claims, particularly in regard to stealth technology
and the F-117; and the relationship between the cost of weapon
systems and their performance and contributions to the success of the
air campaign, we established the following report objectives.
1. Determine the use, performance, and effectiveness of individual
weapon systems in pursuit of Desert Storm's objectives and, in
particular, the extent to which the data from the conflict support
the claims that DOD and weapon contractors have made about weapon
system performance.
2. Describe the relationship between cost and performance for the
weapon systems employed.
3. Identify the degree to which the goals of Desert Storm were
achieved by air power.
4. Identify the key factors aiding or inhibiting the effectiveness
of air power.
5. Identify the contributions and limitations of advanced
technologies to the accomplishments of the air campaign.
6. Determine whether the unique conditions of Desert Storm limit the
lessons learned.
We compared the performance of nine fixed-wing air-to-ground aircraft
and assessed several major guided and unguided bombs and missiles
used in the war, including Tomahawk land attack (cruise) missiles
(TLAM), laser-guided bombs (LGB), Maverick missiles, and unitary
unguided bombs.\4 The primary focus of our analysis was on the use of
these weapon systems in missions against targets that war planners
had identified as strategic.\5
Historically, studies of air power have articulated differing points
of view on the relative merits of focusing air attacks on targets
deemed to be strategic (such as government leadership, military
industry, and electrical generation) and focusing them on tactical
targets (such as frontline armor and artillery). These contending
points of view have been debated in many official and unofficial
sources.\6 In this study, we did not directly address this debate
because data and other limitations (discussed below) did not permit a
rigorous analysis of whether attacks against strategic targets
contributed more to the success of Desert Storm than attacks against
tactical targets.
A primary goal of our work was to cross-validate the best available
data on aircraft and weapon system performance, both qualitative and
quantitative, to test for consistency, accuracy, and reliability. We
collected and analyzed data from a broad range of sources, including
the major DOD databases that document the strike histories of the war
and cumulative damage to targets; numerous after-action and
lessons-learned reports from military units that participated in the
war; intelligence reports; analyses performed by DOD contractors;
historical accounts of the war from the media and other published
literature; and interviews with participants, including more than 100
Desert Storm pilots and key individuals in the planning and execution
of the war.\7 And after we collected and analyzed the air campaign
information, we interviewed DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and
service representatives and reviewed plans for the acquisition and
use of weapon systems in future campaigns to observe how the lessons
learned from Desert Storm have been applied.
To compare the nature and magnitude of the power that Operation
Desert Storm employed against strategic targets to the nature of
outcomes, we analyzed two databases--the "Missions" database
generated by the Air Force's Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS)
research group to assess inputs and the Defense Intelligence Agency's
(DIA) phase III battle damage assessment (BDA) reports to assess
outcomes. While this methodology has limitations, no other study of
Desert Storm has produced the target-specific, input-outcome data
that can be derived by merging these databases.
The data we analyzed in this report constitute the best information
collected during the war.\8 We focused our analyses on data available
to commanders during the war--information they used to execute the
air campaign. These data also provided the basis for many of the
postwar DOD and manufacturer assessments of aircraft and weapon
system performance during Desert Storm.\9
--------------------
\4 The aircraft included the A-6E, A-10, B-52, F-16, F-15E, F/A-18,
F-111F, and F-117 from the U.S. air forces, as well as the British
GR-1. The AV-8B, A-7, and B-1B were not included. Both the AV-8B
and the A-7 were excluded because of their relatively few strikes
against strategic targets. The B-1B did not participate in the
campaign because munitions limitations, engine problems, inadequate
crew training, and electronic warfare deficiencies severely hampered
its conventional capabilities.
\5 Campaign planners categorized all strategic targets into 1 of 12
target sets: command, control, and communication (C\3 ); electrical
(ELE); government centers or leadership (GVC); lines of communication
(LOC); military industrial base (MIB); naval (NAV); nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC); offensive counterair (OCA); oil
refining, storage, and distribution (OIL); Republican Guard (RG) or
ground order of battle (GOB); surface-to-air missile (SAM); and Scud
missile (SCU).
\6 Examples include Edward C. Mann, III, Thunder and Lightning
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, Apr. 1995);
John A. Warden, III, The Air Campaign (Washington, D.C.:
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989); and Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the
Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq (Maxwell Air
Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, Apr. 1995).
\7 We interviewed pilots representing each type of aircraft
evaluated, with the exception of British Tornados. The British
government denied our requests to interview British pilots who had
flown in Desert Storm.
\8 We also sought data and analyses collected and conducted after the
war. We used these data to check the reliability and validity of
information collected earlier.
\9 Constraints in the reliability and completeness of some important
portions of the data imposed limitations on our analysis of the air
campaign. For example, relating specific types of aircraft or
munitions to target outcomes was problematic because BDA reports
provided a comprehensive compilation of damage on strategic targets
at given times during the campaign--not necessarily after each strike
against the targets. Therefore, we balanced data limitations, to the
extent possible, through qualitative analyses of systems, based on
the diverse sources cited above. For example, we compared claims
made for system performance and contributions to what was supportable
given all the available data, both quantitative and qualitative.
(See app. I for additional information on the study methodology and
the strengths and limitations of the data.)
DATA LIMITATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The best available data did not permit us to either (1) make a
comprehensive system-by-system quantitative comparison of aircraft
and weapon effectiveness or (2) validate some of the key performance
claims for certain weapon systems from the war. However, we were
able to compare aircraft and munition performance in Desert Storm
using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data. There are
major limitations in the available data pertaining to the effects of
aircraft and munitions on targets. At the same time, DOD
successfully collected a large amount of data across a wide range of
issues, including weapon use, aircraft survivability, sortie rates,
and support needs. With the caveats stated above, these data
permitted us to analyze aircraft and weapon system performance,
performance claims, and the effectiveness of air power.\10
--------------------
\10 See appendix I for an expanded discussion of our methodology.
Appendixes II through XI present the analyses in support of our
findings. A description of aircraft and munition use is presented in
appendix II. Appendix III discusses aircraft and munition
performance and effectiveness. Cost and performance of aircraft and
munitions are analyzed in appendix IV. The development of air
campaign objectives and the Iraqi air defense system are described in
appendixes V and VI, respectively. Appendix VII compares the design
mission of aircraft with their actual use, while the weight and types
of effort expended are summarized in appendix VIII. Supplementary
information on target sensor technologies and combat support
platforms are presented in appendixes IX and X. Finally, an
examination of the employment of the F-16 and F-117 against the
Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility is presented in appendix XI.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Air power clearly achieved many of Desert Storm's objectives but fell
short of fully achieving others.\11 The available quantitative and
qualitative data indicate that air power damage to several major
target sets was more limited than DOD's title V report to the
Congress stated.\12 These data show clear success against the oil and
electrical target categories but less success against Iraqi air
defense; command, control, and communications, and lines of
communication. Success against nuclear-related, mobile Scud, and RG
targets was the least measurable.
The lessons that can be learned from Desert Storm are limited because
of the unique conditions, the strike tactics employed by the
coalition, the limited Iraqi response, and limited data on weapon
system effectiveness. The terrain and climate were generally
conducive to air strikes, and the coalition had nearly 6 months to
deploy, train, and prepare. The strong likelihood of campaign
success enabled U.S. commanders to favor strike tactics that
maximized aircraft and pilot survivability rather than weapon system
effectiveness. In addition, the Iraqis employed few, if any,
electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air
opposition. As a result, Desert Storm did not consistently or
rigorously test all the performance parameters of aircraft and weapon
systems used in the air campaign. Moreover, as we noted above, data
are not available to fully assess the relative or absolute
effectiveness of aircraft and weapon systems in the war. This
combination of factors limits the lessons of the war that can be
reasonably applied to future contingencies.
Many of DOD's and manufacturers' postwar claims about weapon system
performance--particularly the F-117, TLAM, and laser-guided
bombs--were overstated, misleading, inconsistent with the best
available data, or unverifiable.
Aircraft and pilot losses were historically low, partly owing to the
use of medium- to high-altitude munition delivery tactics that
nonetheless both reduced the accuracy of guided and unguided
munitions and hindered target identification and acquisition, because
of clouds, dust, smoke, and high humidity. Air power was inhibited
by the limited ability of aircraft sensors to identify and acquire
targets, the failure to gather intelligence on critical targets, and
the inability to collect and disseminate BDA in a timely manner.
Similarly, the contributions of guided weaponry incorporating
advanced technologies and their delivery platforms were limited
because the cooperative operating conditions they require were not
consistently encountered.
DOD did not prominently emphasize a variety of systems as factors in
the success of the air campaign. The important contributions of
stealth and laser-guided bombs were emphasized as was the need for
more and better BDA; less attention was paid to the significant
contributions of less-sophisticated systems and the performance of
critical tasks such as the identification and acquisition of targets.
For example, more than is generally understood, the air campaign was
aided by relatively older and less technologically advanced weapon
systems and combat support aircraft, such as unguided bombs, the
B-52, the A-10, refueling tankers, and electronic jammer aircraft.
There was no apparent link between the cost of aircraft and
munitions, whether high or low, and their performance in Desert
Storm.
After our analysis of the air campaign, we performed a review of the
actions taken by DOD to address the lessons learned from our
findings. While we found that several lessons were being addressed
by DOD, we also found that others have not been. The lessons that
have not been fully or appropriately addressed are the subject of
three recommendations at the conclusion of this letter.
--------------------
\11 The initial objectives of the strategic air campaign were to (1)
disrupt the Iraqi leadership and command and control; (2) achieve air
supremacy; (3) cut supply lines; (4) destroy Iraq's nuclear,
biological, and chemical capability; and (5) destroy the Republican
Guard. Destroying Scud missiles and mobile launchers became a
priority early in the air campaign.
\12 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final
Report to Congress Pursuant to
Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991
(P.L. 102-25), April 1992.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
USE, PERFORMANCE, AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRCRAFT
AND WEAPON SYSTEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON
SYSTEMS USED AS DESIGNED
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1.1
In general, the actual use of aircraft and weapon systems in the
conflict was consistent with their stated prewar capabilities. (App.
II compares in detail the combat mission categories attributed to
each aircraft before Desert Storm and those actually performed during
the campaign.) Most targets were attacked by several types of
aircraft or weapon systems. However, from strike data and pilot
interviews, we did find that certain aircraft were somewhat preferred
in certain target categories. The F-117 was the preferred platform
against fixed, often high-value C\3 , leadership, and NBC targets;
against naval targets, the A-6E and F/A-18 were preferred; and
against fixed Scud missile targets, the F-15E. (The distribution of
strikes by each type of aircraft across each of the strategic target
categories is discussed in app. II.)
Support aircraft, including refueling tankers, airborne
intelligence-gathering aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and strike
support aircraft like the F-4G, F-15C, EF-111, and EA-6B flew more
than 50,000 sorties and were instrumental in the successful execution
of the air campaign. Each type of strike aircraft, conventional and
stealthy, received support--such as jamming and refueling--although
not necessarily on each mission. (See app. II for a discussion of
the support provided to both conventional and stealth aircraft.)
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY
ENHANCED BY TACTICS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1.2
The aircraft casualty rate (that is, aircraft DOD identified as lost
to Iraqi action or damaged in combat) for the aircraft we reviewed
was 1.7 aircraft per 1,000 strikes. This rate was very low compared
to planners' expectations and historic experience. The combination
in the first week of the war of a ban on low-level deliveries for
most aircraft and a successful effort to suppress enemy air defenses
(SEAD) that greatly degraded radar surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and
the Iraqi integrated air defense system (IADS) resulted in a
reduction in the average number of aircraft casualties per day from
6.2 during the first 5 days to about 1.5 for the remaining
38 days of the campaign. If the aircraft combat casualty rate for
the first
5 days had continued throughout the war, a total of about 267
coalition aircraft would have been casualties. Avoiding low
altitudes, 48 aircraft were actually damaged in combat during the
entire war, and an additional 38 were combat losses.
The attrition rate (including both loss and damage) of all combat
aircraft was especially low when they flew at medium and high
altitudes and at night. For example, only one-third of the Air Force
casualties occurred above 12,000 feet, and only one-quarter of the
coalition aircraft casualties occurred at night. The attrition rate
at low altitudes was notably higher because of the continuing
presence of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and portable infrared (IR)
SAMs--systems that are also generally less effective at night.
Nonetheless, AAA and IR SAMs, perceived before the campaign to be
lesser threats than radar-guided SAMs, were responsible for four
times more casualties than radar SAMs. (See app. II for additional
information and analysis on aircraft losses and damage.)
One of the stated advantages of stealth technology is that it
enhances survivability, and in Desert Storm, the stealthy F-117 was
the only aircraft type to incur neither losses nor damage. However,
these aircraft recorded fewer sorties than any other air-to-ground
platform and flew exclusively at night and at medium altitudes--an
operating environment in which the fewest casualties occurred among
all types of aircraft.\13 Moreover, given the overall casualty rate
of 1.7 per 1,000 strikes, the most probable number of losses for any
aircraft, stealthy or conventional, flying the same number of
missions as the F-117 would have been zero. (See app. II for more
information on the tactics and support used by F-117s to minimize
their exposure to air defense threats.)
--------------------
\13 For example, nonstealthy aircraft, such as the F-111F and F-16,
also suffered no losses when operating at night, and the A-10s
experienced neither damage nor losses at night. Each of these three
aircraft types flew at least as many night strikes as the F-117.
GUIDED AND UNGUIDED
MUNITIONS REVEALED
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1.3
While higher altitude deliveries clearly reduced aircraft casualties,
they also caused target location and identification problems for
guided munitions and exposed unguided bombs to uncontrollable factors
such as wind. Medium- and high-altitude tactics also increased the
exposure of aircraft to clouds, haze, smoke, and high humidity,
thereby impeding IR and electro-optical (EO) sensors and laser
designators for LGBs. These higher altitude tactics also reduced
target sensor resolution and the ability of pilots to discern the
precise nature of some of the targets they were attacking. While
pilots and planners reported that unguided bombs were substantially
less accurate and target discrimination problems were sometimes
severe, these unguided bombs were employed with radar against area
targets in poor weather.
Our interviews with pilots also revealed a mix of concerns about
survivability with guided and unguided munitions. Pilots pointed out
that in some circumstances, guided munitions permitted the aircraft
to "stand off" at relatively long distances from targets and their
defenses, which was not possible with unguided munitions, while
retaining accuracy. [DELETED] (See apps. II and IV for more pilot
views on the use of guided and unguided munitions.)
Guided bombs were the weapon of choice against small, point targets,
such as reinforced bunkers, hardened aircraft shelters, and armored
vehicles. However, from high altitude, unguided bombs were the
weapon of choice against area targets, such as ammunition storage
facilities and ground troop emplacements. In addition, pilots,
especially of the F-16, remarked to us that they believed their
high-altitude unguided bomb deliveries were ineffective against point
targets such as tanks.
Over the course of the campaign, the overall ratio of
guided-to-unguided munitions delivered (1 to 19) did not
significantly change from week to week. This and other data--such as
interviews with campaign planners and pilots--indicate that there was
no discovery of a systematic failure of either type of munition or
any broad effort to change from one type of munition to another.
(Patterns of munition use are discussed in app. II.)
AIRCRAFT AND MUNITION
EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
DEVELOPED
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1.4
Despite data limitations in some instances, sufficient data were
generated to permit a limited analysis of the relative effectiveness
of aircraft and munitions. We developed a surrogate effectiveness
measure by calculating the ratio of fully successful (FS) to not
fully successful (NFS) target outcomes for the set of strategic
targets attacked by each type of weapon system.\14 By comparing these
ratios, we found that effectiveness varied by type of aircraft and by
type of target category attacked. For example, the F-111F
participated in a higher ratio of FS versus NFS (3.2:1) than any
other aircraft type. The F-117 and the F-16 performed next best and
at about the same ratio (1.4:1 and 1.5:1, respectively), and the
F-15E and the A-6E both participated in about the same number of
successfully attacked targets as not fully successfully attacked
(1.0:1 and 1.1:1 respectively).\15 Only the B-52 and the F/A-18
participated in more NFS target outcomes than FS (with ratios of
0.7:1 and 0.8:1, respectively). Data were not available for the
A-10.
The effectiveness of aircraft and munitions in aggregate varied among
the strategic target sets.\16 While the attainment of strategic
objectives is determined by more than the achievement of individual
target objectives, the compilation of individual target objectives
achieved was one tool used by commanders during the war to direct the
campaign. Among strategic targets for which BDA were available, the
percent of targets where objectives were successfully met ranged from
a high of 76 percent among (known) nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) targets to a low of 25 percent among fixed Scud-related
strategic targets.\17
No consistent pattern indicated that the key to success in target
outcomes was the use of either guided or unguided munitions. On
average, targets where objectives were successfully achieved received
more guided and fewer unguided munitions than targets where
objectives were not determined to have been fully achieved. In
comparing the use of guided munitions to unguided munitions, on
average, approximately 11 tons of guided munitions were delivered
against FS targets and over 9 tons were released against NFS targets.
Fewer unguided munitions were used against FS targets (44 tons) than
NFS (54 tons). However, neither pattern held across all target
categories. In four target categories, NFS targets received more
tons of guided munitions than successful ones, and in six categories,
successful targets received more unguided munitions than the NFS
ones. (Our complete analysis of air campaign inputs [that is,
numbers and types of aircraft and munitions] and target outcomes
[that is, successfully or not fully successfully met target
objectives] is presented in app. III.)
--------------------
\14 Using intelligence gathered during the war from multiple sources,
DIA conducted BDA on 357 of the 862 strategic targets in the GWAPS
Missions database. We categorized the outcomes for these 357
strategic targets as being either fully successful or not fully
successful. We classified a target outcome as FS if the last BDA
report on that target stated that the target objective had been met
and a restrike was not necessary. We classified all other target
outcomes as NFS. DIA produced BDA during the war at the request of
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Thus, although the
representativeness of the targets assessed by DIA is unknowable,
these 357 do represent the set of targets of greatest interest to the
commanders in the theater. (See app. I for a more detailed
discussion of our BDA classification methodology.)
\15 Although the F-111F participated in the highest ratio of FS to
NFS target outcomes, the F-117 participated in the highest number of
successful outcomes. The F-117 participated in 122 FS outcomes (as
well as 87 NFS); the next 2 aircraft with the highest participation
in successful outcomes were the F-16, with 67 (and 45 NFS), and the
F-111F, with 41 (and 13 NFS).
\16 The number of targets in each strategic target set where the
target objectives had been successfully met was used as a measure of
the effectiveness of aircraft and munitions in the aggregate.
Whether a target objective had been met was determined from the final
DIA phase III BDA report written on a target during the campaign.
\17 Less than 15 percent of the nuclear-related facilities were
identified before the end of the air campaign.
SOME DOD AND CONTRACTOR
CLAIMS OVERSTATED
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1.5
As requested, we analyzed numerous Desert Storm performance claims
and found from the available data that DOD, individual military
services, and manufacturers apparently overstated the Desert Storm
performance of certain aircraft and weapon systems that used advanced
technologies. We found justification in several instances for the
congressional concern that some contractor claims may have been
overstated. For example, some key claims concerning the F-117, the
TLAM, and LGBs, among other advanced systems, were either misleading,
inconsistent with available data, or unverifiable because of the
absence of data.
F-117s. DOD's title V report stated that 80 percent of the bombs
dropped by F-117s hit their target--an accuracy rate characterized by
its primary contractor, Lockheed, as "unprecedented." However, in
Desert Storm, (1) approximately one-third of the reported F-117 hits
either lacked corroborating support or were in conflict with other
available data; (2) the probability of bomb release for a scheduled
F-117 mission was only 75 percent; and (3) for these reasons and
because of uncertainty in the data, the probability of a target's
being hit from a planned F-117 strike in Desert Storm ranged between
41 and 60 percent.\18 Similarly, (1) F-117s were not the only
aircraft tasked to targets in and around Baghdad where the defenses
were characterized as especially intense, (2) F-117s were neither as
effective on the first night of the war as claimed nor solely
responsible for the collapse of the Iraqi IADS in the initial hours
of the campaign, (3) F-117s did not achieve surprise every night of
the campaign, and (4) F-117s occasionally benefited from jammer
support aircraft. (Analyses of F-117 bomb hit data are presented in
app. III; the ability of F-117 stealth fighters to achieve tactical
surprise is discussed in app. II.)
TLAMs. While TLAMs possess an important characteristic distinct from
any aircraft in that they risk no pilot in attacking a target, they
can be compared to aircraft on measures such as accuracy and
survivability. Their accuracy was less than has been implied. The
DOD title V report stated that the "launching system success rate was
98 percent." However, this claim is misleading because it implies
accuracy that was not realized in Desert Storm. Data compiled by the
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and DIA in a joint study revealed
that only [DELETED] percent of the TLAMs arrived over their intended
target area, and only [DELETED] percent actually hit or damaged the
intended aimpoint.\19
From [DELETED] TLAMs were apparently lost to defenses or to system
navigation flaws. Thus, the TLAMs experienced an en route loss rate
as high as [DELETED] percent.\20 (See app. III for a more detailed
analysis of TLAM performance.)
LGBs. The manufacturer of the most advanced LGB guidance system
(Paveway III) claimed that it has a "one target, one bomb"
capability. DOD officials adopted the phraseology to demonstrate the
value of advanced technology in Desert Storm. We sampled Paveway III
LGB targets and found that the "one target, one bomb" claim could not
be validated, as no fewer than two LGBs were dropped on each target.
Six or more were dropped on 20 percent of the targets, eight or more
were dropped on 15 percent of the targets, and the overall average
dropped was four LGBs per target. And larger numbers of Paveway III
and other LGB types were dropped on other targets. Moreover, as
noted earlier, an average of approximately 11 tons of guided
munitions--most of them LGBs--were used against targets that DIA's
phase III BDA messages showed were successfully attacked. This
notwithstanding, the number of LGBs required for point targets was
clearly less than the number of unguided munitions needed in this and
previous wars, especially from medium and high altitudes. (See app.
III for our analysis of the "one target, one bomb" claim.)
Table 1 shows some of the discrepancies between the claims and
characterizations of manufacturers to the Congress and the public
about the actual and expected performance of weapon systems in combat
and what the data from Desert Storm support. (App. III contains
additional examples of discrepancies between manufacturers' claims
and our assessment of weapon system performance in Desert Storm.)
Table 1
Manufacturers' Statements About Product
Performance Compared to Our Findings
Manufacturer Their statement Our finding
---------------- ---------------------------- --------------------------------
General Dynamics "No matter what the [F-16] The F-16's delivery of guided
mission, air-to-air, air- munitions, such as Maverick, was
to-ground. No matter what impaired and sometimes made
the weather, day or night." impossible by clouds, haze,
humidity, smoke, and dust. Only
less accurate unguided munitions
could be employed in adverse
weather using radar.
Grumman "A-6s . . . [were] The A-6E FLIR's ability to
detecting, identifying, detect and identify targets was
tracking, and destroying limited by clouds, haze,
targets in any weather, day humidity, smoke, and dust; the
or night." laser designator's ability to
track targets was similarly
limited.\a Only less accurate
unguided munitions could be
employed in adverse weather
using radar.
Lockheed "During the first night, 30 On the first night, 21 of the 37
F-117s struck 37 high-value targets to which F-117s were
targets, inflicting damage tasked were reported hit; of
that collapsed Saddam these, the F-117s missed
Hussein's air defense system 40 percent of their air defense
and all but eliminated targets. BDA on 11 of the F-117
Iraq's ability to wage strategic air defense targets
coordinated war." confirmed only 2 complete kills.
Numerous aircraft, other than
the F-117, were involved in
suppressing the Iraqi IADS,
which did not show a marked
falloff in aircraft kills until
day five.
Martin Marietta Aircraft with LANTIRN\ can The LANTIRN can be employed
"locate and attack targets below clouds and weather;
at night and under other however, its ability to find and
conditions of poor designate targets through
visibility using low-level, clouds, haze, smoke, dust, and
high speed tactics."\b humidity ranged from limited to
no capability at all.
McDonnell TLAMs "can be launched . . . The TLAM's weather limitation
Douglas in any weather." occurs not so much at the launch
point but in the target area
where the optical [DELETED].
Northrop The ALQ-135 "proved itself [DELETED]
by jamming enemy threat
radars"; and was able "to
function in virtually any
hostile environment."
Texas "TI Paveway III: one target, Of a selected sample of 20
Instruments one bomb." targets attacked by F-117s and
F-111Fs with GBU-24s and GBU-
27s, no single aimpoint was
struck by only 1 LGB--the
average was 4, the maximum 10.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Forward-looking infrared (FLIR).
\b Low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night
(LANTIRN).
--------------------
\18 A planned strike is the tasking of one or more bombs against a
specific aimpoint or target on a scheduled F-117 mission as recorded
in the official 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) Desert Storm
database.
\19 This analysis addresses TLAM C and D-I models only; data on the
D-II model were excluded because of classification issues.
\20 Beyond TLAM's [DELETED]-percent miss rate against intended
targets, it demonstrated additional problems. The relatively flat,
featureless, desert terrain in the theater made it difficult for the
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) to produce usable Terrain Contour
Matching (TERCOM) ingress routes, and TLAM demonstrated limitations
in range, mission planning, lethality, and effectiveness against hard
targets and targets capable of mobility. Since the war, the Navy has
developed a Block III variant of the TLAM. Its improvements include
the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) in TLAM's guidance system.
With GPS, TLAM route planning is not constrained by terrain features,
and mission planning time is reduced. However, some experts have
expressed the concern that GPS guidance may be vulnerable to jamming.
Thus, until system testing and possible modifications demonstrate
TLAM
Block III resistance to electronic countermeasures, it is possible
that the solution to the TERCOM limitations--GPS--may lead to a new
potential vulnerability--jamming. Moreover, the Block III variant
continues to use the optical Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator
(DSMAC), which has various limitations. [DELETED]
DATA INADEQUATE FOR
COMPREHENSIVE AIRCRAFT
AND WEAPON SYSTEM
COMPARISONS OR VALIDATION
OF SOME CLAIMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1.6
The data compiled on campaign inputs (that is, use of weapon systems)
and outcomes (that is, battle damage assessments) did not permit a
comprehensive effectiveness comparison of aircraft and weapon
systems. The most detailed Desert Storm strike history summary is
less than complete, does not provide outcome information
consistently, and does not provide strike effectiveness information.
For example, because data on a large number of A-10 strike events
were unclear or contradictory, we found it impossible to reliably
analyze and include A-10 strike data.\21 In addition, the most
comprehensive BDA database is less than complete, is constrained by
technological limitations associated with imagery intelligence, and
in most cases did not benefit from ground verifications or damage
updates after the war. Because multiple aircraft of different types
delivered multiple bombs of different types, often on the same
aimpoint, and because damage was often not assessed until after
multiple strikes, it is not possible to determine for most targets
what effects, if any, can be attributed to a particular aircraft or
particular munition. Moreover, DIA conducted BDA on only 357 of the
862 strategic targets in our analysis for which strike data were
available. Therefore, many questions on the effectiveness of
aircraft and missile strikes could not be answered nor could some
effectiveness claims. (For additional information on data
limitations, see apps. I and III.)
--------------------
\21 This was significant for two reasons. First, the data that are
available on the A-10 imply that it may have performed even more than
the large number of sorties currently attributed to it. Second,
because the A-10 was a major participant in the air war and because
it performed at relatively high levels on measures such as sortie
rate and payload, it would have been useful to be able to compare its
success rate, particularly as a low-cost aircraft, against targets to
the other aircraft under review.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COST
AND PERFORMANCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
Data limitations did not permit a systematic comparison of weapon
system cost and performance; where data were available, our analysis
results either were ambiguous or revealed no consistent trends.
PERFORMANCE OF HIGH-COST
COMPARED TO LOW-COST
AIRCRAFT
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2.1
The cost of aircraft was not consistently associated with performance
for several measures such as effectiveness, adverse weather
capability, sortie rate, payload, and survivability. Survivability
was consistently high for all types of aircraft and therefore
indistinguishable for high- and low-cost aircraft.\22 The high-cost
F-117 stealth fighter and the low-cost A-10 both experienced
100-percent survivability when operating at night. Although the data
on some measures were ambiguous (such as survivability and
effectiveness), differences in performance or capabilities between
high- and low-cost aircraft were evident for some measures.
Depending on the measure one uses, aircraft types with different
costs can be characterized as more, less, or equally capable. For
example, in Desert Storm, average sortie rates and payloads for
different aircraft showed an inverse relationship between cost and
performance. Moreover, during the campaign, high- and low-cost
aircraft were often employed against the same targets. Nearly 51
percent of the strategic targets attacked by the stealthy F-117s were
also attacked by less costly, conventional aircraft--such as the
F-16, F-15E, and F/A-18. The incompleteness of A-10 strike data
prevents our identifying the extent, if any, to which A-10 and F-117
target taskings overlapped. However, according to GWAPS, both
aircraft performed over 40 strikes in the C\3 , offensive counter
(OCA), SAM, and Scud missile (SCU) strategic target categories. In
regard to other aircraft, the available strike data reveal that the
F-117 and the F-16 were tasked to 78 common targets, the F-117 and
the F/A-18C/D to 62, and the F-117 and the F-15E to 49.
Advocates of the F-117 can argue, based on its performance in Desert
Storm, that it alone combined the advantages of stealth and LGBs,
penetrated the most concentrated enemy defenses at will, permitted
confidence in achieving desired bombing results, and had perfect
survivability. Advocates of the A-10 can, for example, argue that
it, unlike the F-117, operated both day and night; attacked both
fixed and mobile targets employing both guided and unguided bombs;
and like the F-117, suffered no casualties when operating at night
and at medium altitude. Similarly, other aircraft also performed
missions the F-117 was unable to and were used successfully--and
without losses--against similar types of strategic targets. Each
aircraft of the various types has both strengths and limitations;
each aircraft can do things the other cannot. Therefore, despite a
sharp contrast in program unit costs, we find it inappropriate, given
their use, performance, and effectiveness demonstrated in Desert
Storm, to rate one more generally "capable" than the other.
We also found no consistent relationship between the program unit
cost of aircraft and their relative effectiveness against strategic
targets, as measured by the ratio of FS to NFS target outcomes for
the set of strategic targets that each type of aircraft attacked.
The high-cost F-111F participated in proportionately more successful
target outcomes than any other aircraft type, but the low-cost F-16
participated in a higher proportion of successful target outcomes
than either the F-117 or the F-15E, both much higher cost aircraft.
However, the F-117 and the F-111F, two high-cost, LGB-capable
aircraft, ranked first and third in participation against successful
targets.\23 (The complete analysis of the performance of low- and
high-cost aircraft is presented in app. IV.)
--------------------
\22 Survivability depends on numerous factors, including assistance
from support aircraft, quantity and quality of air defenses, size of
strike package, altitude, and tactics. In Desert Storm, neither cost
nor stealth technology was found to be a determinant of
survivability.
\23 Participation by each type of air-to-ground aircraft against
targets assessed as FS targets was as follows: F-117 = 122; F-16 =
67, F-111F = 41, A-6E = 37, F/A-18 = 36, F-15E = 28, B-52 = 25, and
GR-1 = 21. No data were available for the A-10. TLAM participated
against 18 targets assessed as FS. Participation against FS targets
by type of aircraft is a function of two factors--the breadth of
targets tasked to each type of aircraft (see app. III) and their
FS:NFS ratio as presented previously.
GUIDED MUNITIONS COMPARED
TO UNGUIDED MUNITIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2.2
In Desert Storm, 92 percent of the munitions expended were unguided.
On the assumption that this tonnage contributed to the successful
outcome of the entire campaign--at a minimum by permitting nearly
continuous attacks against both ground force and strategic targets
for 38 days--it is evident that the same campaign accomplishments
would have been difficult or impossible with aircraft dropping
comparatively small numbers of precision-guided munitions (PGM).
Although only 8 percent of the munitions used against planned targets
were guided, they represented approximately 84 percent of the total
cost of munitions. The difference in cost between various types of
guided and unguided munitions was quite substantial: the unguided
unitary bombs used in the air campaign cost, on average, $649 each,
while the average LGB cost more than $30,000 each--a ratio of
1:47.\24 IR Maverick missiles cost about $102,000 each--a cost ratio
to the unguided bombs of 1:157.
Although cost ratios between guided and unguided weapon systems used
in Desert Storm can be readily calculated, data on the relative
accuracy or effectiveness of the systems in Desert Storm are limited
and often ambiguous. For example, guided and unguided munitions were
often used against the same targets. Therefore, given shortfalls in
BDA, a precise probability of kill for munitions could not be
determined in most instances. However, CNA found a small number of
bridges where conditions and data enabled an assessment of
effectiveness. These bridges had been attacked with either guided or
unguided bombs, and BDA had been performed in time to distinguish
which type of munitions were successful. While the sample is small
and cannot be generalized, these data show that (1) substantially
more unguided bombs than either LGBs or Walleyes were required to
successfully destroy a bridge and (2) the cost of the guided
munitions used was substantially higher.\25 (See app. IV.)
Cost appears to have been a factor in the selection of munitions by
Desert Storm campaign commanders. For example, some pilots we
interviewed were instructed to use LGBs and Mavericks only against
high-value targets such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
artillery (rather than trucks or other GOB targets). If they could
not hit these targets, they were not able to use these munitions.
They could, however, drop unguided bombs on other targets before
returning to base. Similarly, the employment of TLAMs was terminated
after February 1. GWAPS reported that Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf,
commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, approved no additional
TLAM strikes because either (1) television coverage of daylight
strikes in downtown Baghdad proved unacceptable in Washington or (2)
their use was deemed too expensive given the TLAM's relatively small
warhead and high cost. Thus, this high-cost munition was not used
during the latter two-thirds of the war.
Increasing the proportion of the U.S. weapons inventory comprised of
high-cost munitions has potential implications for the future
effectiveness and employment of air power. First, for a given level
of resources, much higher costs limit the number of weapons that can
be procured. With fewer weapons, the priority attached to the
survival and successful employment of each high-cost bomb is likely
to be high, as demonstrated in Desert Storm. Second, Desert Storm
revealed that a focus on increasing aircraft and pilot survivability
may have reduced mission effectiveness, thereby increasing the number
of munitions required to destroy or damage a target. Third, Desert
Storm showed that commanders were less willing to permit the
widespread use of very expensive munitions; the value of the target
had to be sufficient to justify the cost of a guided weapon.
Thus, an increasing dependence on high-cost weaponry can lead to
three types of concerns: limitations in the availability and use of
high-cost systems, the need to increase the munition expenditure rate
per target to compensate for lessened effectiveness when emphasizing
survivability, and a diminished ability to attack large numbers of
targets (such as lower priority GOB).\26 (See app. IV for further
discussion of the performance of high- and low-cost munitions in
Desert Storm.)
--------------------
\24 All munitions costs are presented in 1991 dollars.
\25 Depending on the platforms involved, the delivery of unguided
munitions would (in some cases but not all) require more aircraft
sorties than would the delivery of guided munitions. This would
increase the cost of the unguided delivery, and it would expose a
larger number of aircraft to defenses. However, guided munition
delivery requires more straight and predictable flight time and
greater pilot workload, thus making guided munition aircraft
vulnerable to defenses. In short, the cost and survivability
trade-offs between guided and unguided munitions are not simple, and
the cost difference, if any, can be assessed only on the basis of
specific delivery circumstances.
\26 These implications need to be considered within a wider array of
issues not discussed here, such as delivery platform cost and
survivability as well as munition capabilities and effectiveness.
ACHIEVEMENT OF CAMPAIGN
OBJECTIVES BY AIR POWER
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3
Air power was clearly instrumental to the success of Desert Storm,
yet air power achieved only some of its objectives, and clearly fell
short of fully achieving others. Even under generally favorable
conditions, the effects of air power were limited. Some air war
planners hoped that the air war alone would cause the Iraqis to leave
Kuwait (not least by actively targeting the regime's political and
military elite), but after 38 days of nearly continuous bombardment,
a ground campaign was still deemed necessary.
There were some dramatic successes in the air campaign. It caused
the collapse of the national electric grid and damaged up to 80
percent of Iraq's oil-refining capacity. At the end of the campaign,
only about 40 percent of the Iraqi air force survived.
While air supremacy was achieved within the first week of the
campaign, delivery at low altitudes remained perilous throughout the
war because of the ever-present AAA and IR SAMs. Iraq's C\3 and LOC
capabilities were partially degraded; although more than half of
these targets were successfully destroyed, Saddam Hussein was able to
direct and supply many Iraqi forces through the end of the air
campaign and even immediately after the war.
Lack of intelligence about most Iraqi nuclear-related facilities
meant that only less than 15 percent were targeted. The concerted
campaign to destroy mobile Scud launchers did not achieve any
confirmed kills. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis showed
that more than 70 percent of the tanks in three Republican Guard
divisions located in the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO) remained
intact at the start of the ground campaign and that large numbers
were able to escape across the Euphrates River before the cease-fire.
(Our assessment of the degree to which the objectives were achieved
is in app. III; the development of the Desert Storm objectives is
described in app. V.)
FACTORS AFFECTING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR POWER
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4
SUCCESS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
WEIGHT AND TYPE OF EFFORT
EXPENDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4.1
The mix of available aircraft types enabled the United States and the
coalition to successfully attack or put pressure on a variety of
targets and target types; at various times of the day and night; in
urban, marine, and desert environments; with various guided and
unguided munitions. Even including the platform and munition
preferences discussed above, no target category was exclusively
struck by a single type of aircraft, and no type of aircraft or
munition was exclusively used against a single type of target or
target category.
Older, less costly, and less technologically advanced aircraft and
weapon systems made substantial contributions to the air campaign as
did the newer, more technologically advanced systems.\27 No
particular weapon system--whether of low or high technology, new or
old, single or multirole, high or low cost (or in between on any of
these criteria)--clearly proved more effective than another or
demonstrated a disproportionate contribution to the objectives of the
campaign. For example, while the F-117 carried more tonnage per day
than the F-111F, the latter reported a higher rate of success hitting
the same targets using the same munitions; the F-16 had only a
slightly higher success rate than the F/A-18 when using the unguided
MK-84 against similar types of targets. The B-52 and F-16 dropped
the largest known bomb tonnages, the F-16 and A-10 had the highest
sortie rates, and the B-52 and A-10 were cited by Iraqi prisoners of
war as the most feared of the coalition aircraft. (The weight of
effort (WOE) and type of effort (TOE) that proved successful in the
air campaign are in apps. II and VIII; specific weapon system
comparisons are in apps. III and IV.)
--------------------
\27 The Desert Storm air campaign may have been the last large-scale
employment for several of the older types of aircraft. For example,
the A-6E fleet is scheduled to be retired by 1998; the F-4G and F-111
fleets by fiscal year 1997; and all but two wings of the A-10 fleet
by the end of fiscal year 1996.
INTELLIGENCE NEEDS NOT
FULLY MET
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4.2
Intelligence shortfalls led to an inefficient use of guided and
unguided munitions in some cases and a reduced level of success
against some target categories. The lack of sufficient or timely
intelligence to conduct BDA led to the additional costs and risks
stemming from possibly unnecessary restrikes. For example, BDA was
performed on only 41 percent of the strategic targets in our
analysis. Restrikes were ordered to increase the probability that
target objectives would be achieved. This may partly account for the
high tonnage of munitions expended on strategic targets--averaging
more than 11 and 44 tons of guided and unguided munitions,
respectively, for successful outcomes and more than 9 and 53 tons of
guided and unguided munitions, respectively, for less than fully
successful outcomes.
Insufficient intelligence on the existence and location of targets
also inhibited the coalition's ability to perform necessary strikes
and achieve campaign goals. The lack of target intelligence meant
that [DELETED] major Iraqi nuclear-related installations were neither
identified nor targeted, and no mobile Scud launchers were
definitively known to have been located and destroyed. (See apps. I
and III.)
LIMITATIONS IN TARGET
SENSORS INHIBITED
EFFECTIVENESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4.3
The capabilities of target location and acquisition sensors were
critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of the air campaign. IR
sensors allowed night operations, and although pilots praised many
sensor systems, they also pointed out numerous shortcomings. IR, EO,
and laser systems were all seriously degraded by weather conditions
such as clouds, rain, fog, and even haze and humidity. They were
also impeded by dust and smoke. At high altitudes and even at low
altitudes in the presence of high humidity or other impediments,
pilots were unable to discriminate targets effectively. They
reported being unable to discern whether a presumed target was a tank
or a truck and whether it had already been hit by a previous attack.
Radar systems were less affected by weather, but the poor resolution
of some radars made it impossible to identify targets except by
recognizing nearby large-scale landmarks or by navigating to where
the target was presumed to be. Radar systems specifically designed
for target discrimination and identification suffered reduced
resolution at the higher altitudes (and greater standoff distances)
where they were operating. Pilots told us that the F-15E's
high-resolution radar, while designed to detect an object as small as
[DELETED] at a distance of [DELETED], could actually discriminate
only between a tank and a car at a range of about [DELETED]. (Target
identification and weapon system sensor issues are discussed in app.
II.)
CAMPAIGN PLANNING FAILED
TO ANTICIPATE THE BDA
LIMITATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4.4
The kinds of constraints encountered in Desert Storm do not appear to
have been adequately anticipated in planning the air campaign. The
air campaign planners were overoptimistic concerning the number of
days that each phase of the campaign would require and the level of
damage each objective would require. Moreover, many of the early
missions were canceled because of adverse weather, and after the
initial strikes were conducted, the BDA was neither as timely nor as
complete as planners had apparently assumed it would be.
CONTRIBUTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS OF ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4.5
Desert Storm demonstrated that many newer systems incorporating
advanced technologies require specific operating conditions for their
effective use. However, these conditions were not consistently
encountered in Desert Storm and cannot be assumed in future
contingencies. Therefore, the level of success attained by various
costly and technologically advanced systems in Desert Storm may not
be replicated where conditions inhibit operations even more.
Although much of what has been written about Desert Storm has
emphasized advanced technologies, many of these were subject to
significant operating constraints and a lack of flexibility that
limited their contributions and effectiveness. [DELETED] While the
TLAM risks no pilot, it achieved a hit rate that CNA and DIA
estimated at [DELETED] percent, and it is costly. [DELETED]
(Limitations on weapon system performance are discussed in app. II.)
These limitations need to be recognized and anticipated when planning
air strikes or estimating the likely effectiveness of air
power--particularly for a short conflict, when there may not be
opportunities to restrike missed or partially damaged targets. Even
in Desert Storm--with months of planning and a vast array of
in-theater resources available from the very start--uncertainties and
unknowns were typical rather than the exception.
DESERT STORM'S UNIQUENESS
LIMITS LESSONS LEARNED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5
The relevance of the air campaign in Desert Storm to likely future
contingencies depends at least partially on how closely its operating
conditions can be judged to be representative of future conditions.
In this respect, Desert Storm's lessons are limited in some regard
because the environmental and military operating conditions for
aircraft and weapon system performance are unlikely to be repeated
outside southwest Asia and because future potential adversaries--not
least, Iraq itself--are likely to have learned a good deal about how
to reduce the effectiveness of guided weapons, such as LGBs.\28 At
the same time, performance in Desert Storm can be highly instructive
about the performance and outcomes that can be expected with existing
technologies under conditions like those encountered over Iraq.
--------------------
\28 It is appropriate to note that "aggression by a remilitarized
Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia" was one of two scenarios
envisioned in planning strategy, force structure, and modernization
programs in DOD's BUR report.
COMBAT CONDITIONS OVER
IRAQ AND KUWAIT
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5.1
The terrain and climate in Iraq and Kuwait were generally conducive
to the employment of air power. The terrain was relatively flat and
featureless as well as devoid of vegetation that would obscure
targets. Although the weather was the worst in that region in 14
years, weather conditions even less conducive to an air campaign
would be expected in many other locations of historic or topical
interest such as Eastern Europe, the Balkans, or North Korea.\29
(See app. II.)
--------------------
\29 For example, the average percentage of time that the cloud
ceiling over Baghdad is less than or equal to 3,000 feet is,
historically, only 9 percent; comparable percentages over Beirut,
Lebanon; Osan Air Base, Korea; and St. Petersburg, Russia; are 17,
33, and 64, respectively.
SIX-MONTH PERIOD TO
DEPLOY, TRAIN, AND
PREPARE FORCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5.2
The success of the air campaign is also attributable, in part, to the
6 months of planning, deployment, training, and
intelligence-gathering preceding Desert Storm. During this interval,
President Bush assembled a coalition of nations that augmented U.S.
resources and isolated Iraq. War preparations were also aided by
preexisting facilities in the region and the lack of Iraqi
interventions to slow or deter the buildup of forces. (See
app. II.)
SOME ENEMY CAPABILITIES
OVERSTATED OR POORLY
EMPLOYED
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5.3
Contrary to widespread prewar and postwar claims, the Iraqi IADS was
not "robust" or "state of the art." Rather, its computers were
limited in their capacity to monitor incoming threats; the system was
vulnerable to disruption by attacks on a relatively few key nodes;
and its design was [DELETED]. IADS had been designed to counter
limited threats from the east (Iran) and west (Israel), not an attack
from a coalition that included nearly 1,600 U.S. combat aircraft
primarily from the south, hundreds of cruise missiles, and the most
advanced technologies in the world.
On various dimensions, the Iraqi armed forces were not well disposed
to effectively counter the coalition's armed response to the Iraqi
seizure of Kuwait. After U.S. and coalition aircraft dominated
early air-to-air encounters, the Iraqi air force essentially chose to
avoid combat by fleeing to Iran and hiding its aircraft or putting
them in the midst of civilian areas off-limits to attack by coalition
aircraft. Except for the failed Iraqi action directed at the town of
Khafji, the Iraqis did not take any ground offensive initiative
throughout the air campaign, and the coalition was able to repeatedly
attack targets, including those missed or insufficiently damaged on a
first strike. As a result, when the ground war began, Iraqi ground
forces had been subjected to 38 days of nearly continuous
bombardment. Evidence from intelligence analyses and prisoner-of-war
interviews also indicated that many Iraqi frontline troops had low
morale and were prone to heavy desertions even before the air
bombardment started.
During the war, the Iraqis were unable to effectively resist
coalition air attacks from medium and high altitudes. While the
Iraqis maintained a potent AAA and IR SAM threat to aircraft below
10,000 feet, the lack of an active Iraqi fighter threat (especially
after the first week); the coalition's suppression of most
radar-guided SAM defenses in the early days of the war; and the Iraqi
use of many of the remaining radar SAMs in an ineffective, nonradar
mode created a relative sanctuary for coalition aircraft at medium
and high altitudes. Moreover, Iraq employed few potential
countermeasures (such as jamming) against coalition strikes. (See
app. II.)
LIKELIHOOD OF VICTORY
ALLOWED EMPHASIS ON
SURVIVABILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5.4
Given the overwhelming nature of the coalition's quantitative and
qualitative superiority, the conflict was highly asymmetric. U.S.
and coalition commanders controlled strike assets that were
numerically and technologically superior to the capabilities of the
enemy. They expressed little doubt of a victory. One result of this
was a command emphasis on aircraft and pilot survivability. The
philosophy was "No Iraqi target was worth an allied pilot or
aircraft."\30
Other operating decisions were also taken to increase survivability.
For example, after two F-16 losses on day three in the Baghdad area,
the Air Force ceased tasking large package daylight strikes of F-16s
against metropolitan Baghdad targets. Similarly, after A-10 attacks
on the Republican Guard, during which two aircraft were hit while
operating at lower altitudes, the A-10s were ordered to cease such
attacks. Instead, much higher altitude attacks by F-16s and B-52s,
with unguided bombs, were used. (See apps. II and III.)
--------------------
\30 GWAPS, Highlights (briefing slides), p. 30.
SOME AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
DIMENSIONS NOT TESTED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.6
A number of lessons cannot be drawn directly from Desert Storm
because systems were not stressed in ways that could be considered
likely and operationally realistic for future conflict. For example:
(1) with little or no Iraqi electronic countermeasures against U.S.
munitions, airborne intelligence assets, or target identification and
acquisition sensors, no data were obtained on how these systems would
perform in the presence of such countermeasures; (2) with almost no
Iraqi air-to-air opposition for most of the war, many U.S. aircraft
were also not exposed to these threats; and (3) many U.S. weapons
were not delivered within the low-altitude parameters for which they
were designed, both platforms and munitions (thus, we do not know how
they would perform if delivered lower).
However, precisely because of the advantages enjoyed by the
coalition, the problems that were encountered should be especially
noted. These include the substantial amounts of unguided and guided
munitions that were used to achieve successful target outcomes and
the severe effect that the weather had on target identification and
designation sensors--some of which had earlier been described to the
Congress as capable in "all weather," "adverse weather," or "poor
weather." (See apps. II-IV.) These problems should be considered as
warning signs about the effectiveness of various systems and
technologies under more stressful circumstances in the future.
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
Operation Desert Storm was a highly successful and decisive military
operation. The air campaign, which incurred minimal casualties while
effecting the collapse of the Iraqis' ability to resist, helped
liberate Kuwait and elicit Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions.
Our analysis of the air campaign against strategic targets revealed
several air power issues that should be planned for in the next
campaign. First, the effectiveness of air power in Desert Storm was
inhibited by the aircraft sensors' inherent limitations in
identifying and acquiring targets and by DOD's failure to gather
intelligence on the existence or location of certain critical targets
and its inability to collect and disseminate timely BDA. Pilots
noted that IR, EO, and laser systems were all seriously degraded by
clouds, rain, fog, smoke, and even high humidity, and the pilots
reported being unable to discern whether a presumed target was a tank
or a truck and whether it had already been destroyed. The failure of
intelligence to identify certain targets precluded any opportunity
for the coalition to fully accomplish some of its objectives. And
the reduced accuracies from medium and high altitudes and absence of
timely BDA led to higher costs, reduced effectiveness, and increased
risks from making unnecessary restrikes.
Second, U.S. commanders were able to favor medium- to high-altitude
strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability,
rather than weapon system effectiveness. This was because of early
and complete air superiority, a limited enemy response, and terrain
and climate conditions generally conducive to air strikes.
Low-altitude munitions deliveries had been emphasized in prewar
training, but they were abandoned early. The subsequent deliveries
from medium and high altitudes resulted in the use of sensors and
weapon systems at distances from targets that were not optimal for
their identification, acquisition, or accuracy. Medium- and
high-altitude tactics also increased the exposure of aircraft sensors
to man-made and natural impediments to visibility.
Third, the success of the sustained air campaign resulted from the
availability of a mix of strike and support assets. Its substantial
weight of effort was made possible, in significant part, by the
variety and number of air-to-ground aircraft types from high-payload
bombers, such as the B-52, to PGM-capable platforms, such as the
stealthy F-117, to high-sortie-rate attack aircraft, such as the
A-10. A range of target types, threat conditions, and tactical and
strategic objectives was best confronted with a mix of weapon systems
and strike and support assets with a range of capabilities.
Fourth, despite often sharp contrasts in the unit cost of aircraft
platforms, it is inappropriate, given aircraft use, performance, and
effectiveness demonstrated in Desert Storm, to characterize higher
cost aircraft as generally more capable than lower cost aircraft. In
some cases, the higher cost systems had the greater operating
limitations; in some other cases, the lower cost aircraft had the
same general limitations but performed at least as well; and in still
other cases, the data did not permit a differentiation. (See app.
IV.)
Fifth, the air campaign data did not validate the purported
efficiency or effectiveness of guided munitions, without
qualification. "One-target, one-bomb" efficiency was not achieved.
On average, more than 11 tons of guided and 44 tons of unguided
munitions were delivered on targets assessed as successfully
destroyed; still more tonnage of both was delivered against targets
where objectives were not fully met. Large tonnages of munitions
were used against targets not only because of inaccuracy from high
altitudes but also because BDA data were lacking. Although the
relative contribution of guided munitions in achieving target success
is unknowable, they did account for the bulk of munitions costs.
Only 8 percent of the delivered munitions tonnage was guided, but at
a price that represented 84 percent of the total munitions cost.
During Desert Storm, the ratio of guided-to-unguided munitions
delivered did not vary, indicating that the relative preferences
among these types of munitions did not change over the course of the
campaign. More generally, Desert Storm demonstrated that many
systems incorporating complex or advanced technologies require
specific operating conditions to operate effectively. These
conditions, however, were not consistently encountered in Desert
Storm and cannot be assumed in future contingencies.
Four issues arise from these findings. First, DOD's future ability
to conduct an efficient, effective, and comprehensive air campaign
will depend partly on its ability to enhance sensor capabilities,
particularly at medium altitudes and in adverse weather, in order to
identify valid targets and collect, analyze, and disseminate timely
BDA. Second, a key parameter in future weapon systems design,
operational testing and evaluation, training, and doctrine will be
pilot and aircraft survivability. Third, the scheduled retirement of
strike and attack aircraft such as the A-6E, F-111F, and most A-10s
will make Desert Storm's variety and number of aircraft unavailable
by the year 2000. Fourth, the cost of guided munitions, their
intelligence requirements, and the limitations on their effectiveness
demonstrated in Desert Storm need to be considered by DOD and the
services as they determine the optimal future mix of guided and
unguided munitions.
DOD and associated agencies have undertaken initiatives since the war
to address many, but not all, of the limitations of the air campaign
that we identified in our analysis, although we have not analyzed
each of these initiatives in this report. First, DOD officials told
us that to address the Desert Storm BDA analysis and dissemination
shortcomings, they have
created an organization to work out issues, consolidate national
reporting, and provide leadership;
developed DOD-wide doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures;
established more rigorous and realistic BDA training and realistic
exercises; and
developed and deployed better means to disseminate BDA.
DOD officials acknowledge that additional problems remain with
improving BDA timeliness and accuracy, developing nonlethal BDA
functional damage indicators (particularly for new weapons that
produce nontraditional effects), and cultivating intelligence sources
to identify and validate strategic targets. Moreover, because timely
and accurate BDA is crucial for the efficient employment of high-cost
guided munitions (that is, for avoiding unnecessary restrikes), it is
important that acquisition plans for guided munitions take fully into
account actual BDA collection and dissemination capabilities before
making a final determination of the quantity of such munitions to be
acquired.
Second, DOD officials told us that the most sophisticated targeting
sensors used in Desert Storm (which were available only in limited
quantities) have now been deployed on many more fighter aircraft,
thereby giving them a capability to deliver guided munitions.
However, the same limitations exhibited by these advanced sensor and
targeting systems in Desert Storm--limited fields of view,
insufficient resolution for target discrimination at medium
altitudes, vulnerabilities to adverse weather, limited traverse
movement--remain today.
Third, DOD officials told us that survivability is now being
emphasized in pilot training, service and joint doctrine, and weapon
system development. Pilot training was modified immediately after
the air campaign to meet challenges such as medium-altitude
deliveries in a high AAA and IR SAM threat environment. Service and
joint doctrine now reflects lessons learned in Desert Storm's
asymmetrical conflict. Several fighter aircraft employment manuals
specifically incorporate the tactics that emphasized survivability in
the campaign. DOD and service procurement plans include new
munitions with GPS guidance systems, justified in part by their
abilities to minimize the medium-altitude shortcomings and adverse
weather limitations of Desert Storm while maximizing pilot and
aircraft survivability.
Fourth, DOD officials told us that although Desert Storm's successful
aircraft mix will not be available for the next contingency, DOD and
the services have made plans to maintain an inventory of aircraft
that they believe will be more flexible and effective in the future.
Flexibility will be anticipated partly from the modernization of
existing multirole fighters to enable them to deliver guided
munitions (the aircraft systems being retired are single-role
platforms), and their effectiveness is expected to increase as new
and more accurate guided munitions are put in the field. However, we
believe that strike aircraft modernization and munition procurement
plans that include increasing numbers and varieties of guided
munitions and the numbers of platforms capable of delivering them
require additional justification.\31
--------------------
\31 In Desert Storm, 229 U.S. aircraft were capable of delivering
laser-guided munitions; in 1996, the expanded installation of LANTIRN
on F-15Es and block 40 F-16s will increase this capability within the
Air Force to approximately 500 platforms. The services have bought
or are investing over $58 billion to acquire 33 different types of
guided munitions totaling over 300,000 units. (See Weapons
Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production,
and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 23, 1995.) Air Force plans
reveal that nearly 62 percent of all interdiction target types in a
major regional conflict in Iraq could be tasked to either guided or
unguided munitions today (1995) but that will fall to approximately
40 percent in 2002. Concurrently, the percentage of targets to be
tasked to only guided munitions will increase from 19 percent in 1995
to nearly 43 percent in 2002.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
Desert Storm established a paradigm for asymmetrical post-Cold War
conflicts. The coalition possessed quantitative and qualitative
superiority in aircraft, munitions, intelligence, personnel, support,
and doctrine. It dictated when the conflict should start, where
operations should be conducted, when the conflict should end, and how
terms of the peace should read. This paradigm--conflict where the
relative technological advantages for the U.S. forces are high and
the acceptable level of risk or attrition for the U.S. forces is
low--underlies the service modernization plans for strike aircraft
and munitions. Actions on the following recommendations will help
ensure that high-cost munitions can be employed more efficiently at
lower risk to pilots and aircraft and that the future mix of guided
and unguided munitions is appropriate and cost-effective given the
threats, exigencies, and objectives of potential contingencies.
1. In light of the shortcomings of the sensors in Desert Storm, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense analyze and identify DOD's
need to enhance the capabilities of existing and planned sensors to
effectively locate, discriminate, and acquire targets in varying
weather conditions and at different altitudes. Furthermore, the
Secretary should ensure that any new sensors or enhancements of
existing ones are tested under fully realistic operational conditions
that are at least as stressful as the conditions that impeded
capabilities in Desert Storm.
2. In light of the shortcomings in BDA exhibited during Desert Storm
and BDA's importance to strike planning, the BDA problems that DOD
officials acknowledge continue today despite DOD postwar initiatives
need to be addressed. These problems include timeliness, accuracy,
capacity, assessment of functional damage, and cultivation of
intelligence sources to identify and validate strategic targets. We
recommend that the Secretary of Defense expand DOD's current efforts
to include such activities so that BDA problems can be fully
resolved.
3. In light of the quantities and mix of guided and unguided
munitions that proved successful in Desert Storm, the services'
increasing reliance on guided munitions to conduct asymmetrical
warfare may not be appropriate. The Secretary should reconsider
DOD's proposed mix of guided and unguided munitions. A reevaluation
is warranted based on Desert Storm experiences that demonstrated
limitations to the effectiveness of guided munitions, survivability
concerns of aircraft delivering these munitions, and circumstances
where less complex, less constrained unguided munitions proved
equally or more effective.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
The Department of Defense partially concurred with each of our three
recommendations. In its response to a draft of this report, DOD did
not dispute our conclusions; rather, it reported that several
initiatives were underway that will rectify the shortcomings and
limitations demonstrated in Desert Storm. Specifically, it cited (1)
the acquisition of improved and new PGMs, (2) two studies in
process--a Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) and a Precision
Strike Architecture study, and (3) several proposed fiscal year 1997
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) as programs capable
of correcting Desert Storm shortcomings. In addition, DOD emphasized
the importance of providing funds to retain the operational test and
evaluation function to ensure the rigorous testing of our weapons and
weapon systems. (See app. XII for the full text of DOD's comments.)
We agree that the actions DOD cited address the shortcomings in
sensors, guided munitions, and battle damage assessment we report in
our conclusions. However, the degree to which these initiatives are
effective can be determined only after rigorous operational test and
evaluation of both new and existing munitions and after the
recommendations resulting from the Deep Attack/Weapons Mix and
Precision Strike Architecture studies have been implemented and
evaluated. Moreover, we concur with the continuing need for
operational test and evaluation and underscore the role of this
function in rectifying the shortcomings cited in this report.
DOD also supplied us with a list of recommended technical
corrections. Where appropriate, we have addressed these comments in
our report.
If you have any questions or would like additional information,
please do not hesitate to call me at (202) 512-6153 or Kwai-Cheung
Chan, Director of Program Evaluation in Physical Systems Areas, at
(202) 512-3092. Other major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix XIII.
Joseph F. Delfico
Acting Assistant Comptroller General
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
The data we analyze in this report are the best information collected
during the war. They were compiled for and used by the commanders
who managed the air campaign. These data also provided the basis for
postwar Department of Defense (DOD) and manufacturer assessments of
aircraft and weapon system performance during Desert Storm. We
balanced the limitations of the data, to the extent possible, against
qualitative analyses of the system. For example, we compared claims
made for system performance and contributions to what was supportable
given all the available data, both quantitative and qualitative. In
the subsequent appendixes, we use these data to describe and assess
the use of aircraft and weapon systems in the performance of
air-to-ground missions. And to the extent that the data permit, we
assess the claims for and relative effectiveness of individual
systems. Finally, we use these data to discuss the overall
effectiveness of the air campaign in meeting its objectives.
SCOPE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
In this report, we assess the effectiveness of various U.S. and
allied air campaign aircraft and weapon systems in destroying ground
targets, primarily those that fall into the category of "strategic"
targets. In Operation Desert Storm, some targets were clearly
strategic, such as Iraqi air force headquarters in Baghdad, while
others, essentially the Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwaiti theater of
operations, could be considered both strategic and tactical. For our
purposes, we concentrated on the effects achieved by the air campaign
before the start of the ground offensive, including successes against
ground forces in Kuwait. Unlike most previous large-scale conflicts,
the air campaign accounted for more than 90 percent of the entire
conflict's duration. Therefore, what we have excluded from our
analysis is the role of air power in supporting ground forces during
the ground offensive ("close air support"), as well as such
nonstrategic missions as search and rescue.
We evaluated the aircraft and munitions that were deemed to have had
a major role in the execution of the Desert Storm air campaign by
virtue of their satisfying at least one (in most cases, two) of the
following criteria: the system (1) played a major role against
strategic targets (broadly defined); (2) was the focus of
congressional interest; (3) may be considered by DOD for future major
procurement; (4) appeared likely to play a role in future conflict;
or (5) even if not slated currently for major procurement, either was
used by allied forces in a manner or role different from its U.S.
use or used new technologies likely to be employed again in the
future. These criteria led us to assess the A-6E, A-10, B-52,
F-111F, F-117A, F-15E, F-16, F/A-18, and British Tornado (GR-1). We
examined both guided and unguided munitions, including laser-guided
bombs, Maverick missiles, Navy cruise missiles, and unguided "dumb"
bombs. (We did not examine Air Force cruise missiles because so few
were used.)
We focused our analysis on strategic targets in part because they
received the best-documented bomb damage assessments (BDA), although
there was very substantial variation from target to target and among
target types in the quantity and quality of BDAs. Twelve categories
of strategic targets in Desert Storm are listed in table I.1. With
the exception of mobile Scud launchers and ground forces, each type
of target was a fixed item at a known location on which battle damage
assessments were possible.
Table I.1
Twelve Strategic Target Categories in
the Desert Storm Air Campaign
Abbrevia
tion Target category
-------- ------------------------------------------------------------
C\3 Command, control, and communication facilities
ELE Electrical facilities
GOB Ground order of battle (Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait
theater of operations, including the Republican Guard)\a
GVC Government centers
LOC Lines of communication
MIB Military industrial base facilities
NAV Naval facilities
NBC Nuclear, biological, and chemical facilities
OCA Offensive counterair installations
OIL Oil refining, storage, and distribution facilities
SAM Surface-to-air missile installations
SCU Scud missile facilities
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In our database, GOB targets are in the kill box target set.
METHODOLOGY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
DATA NEEDS AND SOURCES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1
To examine how the different types of aircraft and munitions
performed and were used to achieve the air campaign objectives, we
required data on the aircraft missions flown and missiles launched
against each type of target. To assess the effectiveness of the
aircraft and munitions, we needed data on the outcome of each
aircraft and missile tasked (what was dropped or launched and where
it landed) as well as the physical and functional impact of the
munitions on the targets. We had to review DOD and manufacturers'
Desert Storm claims for selected weapon systems and seek out data to
validate their assertions.
To assess the relative costs of the systems employed, we needed
various cost measures of the systems and sufficient data on their
effectiveness to be able to relate cost and performance. To examine
operating conditions of the air campaign, we required data on the
characteristics of the Iraqi threat, political and military operating
conditions in the theater, and the environmental conditions in which
combat occurred.
To determine the degree to which air campaign objectives were met
with air power, we required, first, data that described the campaign
objectives and the plans to achieve those objectives and, second,
data that addressed the outcome of air campaign efforts in pursuit of
air campaign objectives.
We obtained descriptive data on objectives and plans from a series of
interviews and a review of the literature. We interviewed 108 Desert
Storm veteran pilots, representing each type of aircraft evaluated,
with the exception of British Tornados.\1 We also interviewed key
Desert Storm planners and analysts from a wide spectrum of
organizations, both within and outside DOD. (See table I.2.)
We also conducted an extensive literature search and reviewed
hundreds of official and unofficial documents describing the planning
for, conduct of, and performance by the various aircraft and
munitions used in the campaign, and we searched for documents on
Desert Storm operating conditions.
To examine the nature and magnitude of Desert Storm inputs employed
against strategic target categories, as well as outcomes, we needed
two types of databases. We needed the "Missions" database generated
by the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) to assess inputs. And we
needed the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) phase III battle
damage assessment reports to assess Desert Storm outcomes.
Table I.2
Organizations We Contacted and Their
Locations
Organization Location
----------------------------------- ------ -----------------------------------
Air Combat Command Langley Air Force Base, Va.
Center for Air Force History Washington, D.C.
Center for Naval Analyses Alexandria, Va.
Central Intelligence Agency Langley, Va.
Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C.
Department of Air Force, Washington, D.C.
Headquarters
Embassy of the United Kingdom Washington, D.C.
Foreign Science and Technology Charlottesville, Va.
Center
Grumman Corporation Bethpage, N.Y.
Gulf War Air Power Survey (research Arlington, Va.
site)
Institute for Defense Analyses Alexandria, Va.
Lockheed Advanced Development Burbank, Calif.
Corporation
McDonnell Douglas Corporation St. Louis, Mo.
Naval A-6E Unit Oceana Naval Air Station, Va.
Naval F/A-18 Unit Cecil Naval Air Station , Fla.
Navy Operational Intelligence Suitland, Md.
Center, Strike Projection
Evaluation and Anti-Air Research
(SPEAR) Department
Office of the Chief of Naval Washington, D.C.
Operations
Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C.
Rand Corporation Santa Monica, Calif.
Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C.
Survivability/Vulnerability Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Information Analysis Center Ohio
Texas Instruments Dallas, Tex.
U.N. Information Center Washington, D.C.
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Headquarters Norfolk, Va.
U.S. Central Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, N.C.
Headquarters
U.S. Central Command, Headquarters MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
U.S. Space Command Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Base,
Colo.
4th Tactical Fighter Wing Seymour Johnson Air Force Base,
N.C.
48th Tactical Fighter Wing RAF Lakenheath, U.K.
49th Fighter Wing Holloman Air Force Base, N.Mex.
57th Test Group Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
363rd Fighter Wing Shaw Air Force Base, S.C.
926th Fighter Wing (reserve) New Orleans Naval Air Station, La.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
\1 We did not select pilots randomly, given constraints on their
availability, travel, and time. The only requirement was that a
pilot had flown the relevant type of aircraft in a Desert Storm
combat mission. In most cases, the pilots had flown numerous
missions. The purpose of interviewing pilots was to receive as
direct input as possible from the aircraft and munition user rather
than views filtered through official reports. In Operation Desert
Storm: Limits on the Role and Performance of B-52 Bombers in
Conventional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-93-138, May 12, 1993), we assessed
the B-52 role in detail. Where they were relevant, we incorporated
the data and findings from that report into our comparisons. The
British government denied our requests to interview British pilots
who had flown in Desert Storm. However, we were able to obtain some
official assessments of the British role in the air campaign, and we
questioned U.S. pilots about their interactions with British pilots.
MISSIONS DATABASE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2
The Missions database represents a strike history of air-to-ground
platforms and ordnance in the Persian Gulf War. GWAPS researchers
compiled a very large computerized database on aerial operations in
the Gulf War from existing records. It documents aircraft strikes on
ground targets, number and type of ordnance, date, and time on target
(TOT) information, target names and identifiers, desired mean point
of impact (DMPI), and additional mission-related information. It
contains strike history information across the duration of the air
campaign for most of the air-to-ground platforms that participated.
There are data on 862 numbered targets that together comprise more
than 1 million pieces of strike information.
The Missions database also contains strike records across the
duration of the air campaign for most of the air-to-ground platforms
that participated in the Gulf War. This database includes platforms
from the U.S. military services and some non-U.S. coalition
partners. The Missions database was intended to provide information
not on aircraft sortie counts but, rather, on aircraft strike counts
and associated target attack information. Further, it was not
intended to provide information on platform or munition
effectiveness.
The selection criteria that guided our use of the database records
required us to select targets that were designated by a unique basic
encyclopedia (BE) number and an associated target priority code
(target category designation) and that were records of identifiable
U.S. aircraft strikes or strikes conducted by the British Tornado,
GR-1 (interdiction variant).\2 We did not include records that did
not meet these criteria.\3 Also, we did not include A-10 records
because the majority of A-10 strike events as represented in the
database are unclear.\4 Finally, we did not include strike events
that were designated as ground aborted missions or headquarters
cancellations. Unless indicated otherwise, the data we reviewed on
strategic target categories, the nine platforms, and their munitions
originate from this data set.
Targets were assigned to target categories based on the AIF
functional target category designations. (See table I.3.)
The AIF target category designations indicate broad categories of
strategic targets (for example, offensive counterair) as well as
provide more specific examples of individual target types within the
broad target categories (for example, hardened aircraft shelters).
The AIF strategic target category referred to as ground order of
battle (GOB) was expanded to include all "kill box" targets that had
an assigned BE number, and it is subsequently identified in our
database as the KBX category.\5
Table I.3
AIF Target Categories and Target Types
Target category Target type
------------------ --------------------------------------------------
Government control Government control centers
(GVC)
Government bodies, general
Government ministries and administrative bodies,
nonmilitary, general
Government detention facilities, general
Unidentified control facility
Trade, commerce, and government, general
Civil defense facilities (in military use)
Electricity (ELE) Electric power generating, transmission, and
control facilities
Command, control, Offensive air command control headquarters and
and communications schools
(C\3)
Air defense headquarters
Telecommunications
Electronic warfare
Space systems
Missile headquarters, surface-to-surface
National, combined and joint commands
Naval headquarters and staff activities
Surface-to-air Missile support facilities, defensive, general
missiles (SAM)
SAM missile sites/complexes
Tactical SAM sites/installations
SAM support facilities
Offensive Airfields (air bases, reserve fields, helicopter
counterair (OCA) bases)
Noncommunications electronic installations (radar
installations, radars collocated with SAM sites,
ATC/Nav aids, meteorological radars)
Air logistics, general (air depots)
Air ammo depots (maintenance and repair bases,
aircraft and component production and assembly)
Nuclear, Atomic energy feed and moderator materials
biological, and production
chemical (NBC)
Chemical and biological production and storage
Atomic energy-associated facilities production and
storage
Basic and applied nuclear research and
development, general
Military Basic processing and equipment production
industrial base
(MIB)
End products (chiefly civilian)
Technical research, development and testing,
nonnuclear
Covered storage facilities, general
Material (chiefly military)
Industrial production centers
Defense logistics agencies
Scuds (SCU) Guided missile and space system production and
assembly
Fixed missile facility, general
Fixed, surface-to-surface missile sites
Offensive missile support facilities
Medium-range surface-to-surface launch control
facilities
Fixed positions for mobile missile launchers
Tactical missile troops field position
Naval (NAV) Mineable areas
Maritime port facilities
Cruise missile support facilities, defensive
Shipborne missile support facilities
Cruise surface-to-surface missile launch positions
Naval bases, installations, and supply depots
Petroleum, oil, POL and related products, pipelines, and storage
and lubricants facilities
(POL)
Lines of Highway and railway transportation
communication
(LOC)
Inland water transportation
Ground order of Military troop installations
battle (GOB)\a
Ground force material and storage depots
Fortifications and defense systems
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In our database, GOB targets are in the kill box target set.
While the Missions database contains an abundance of Desert Storm
strike history information, it has its limits. Different reporting
procedures adopted during Desert Storm and the use of different
terminology and language, within and among services, have resulted in
more or less detailed data for particular platforms. These
limitations in the final form of the database transfer to all users
of the database. For example, in some instances, database records
documenting Air Force aircraft strikes may be more complete with
fewer missing observations than the same data for other service
platforms because services may have adopted different methods of
tracking and identifying outcomes during the war. As stated
previously, GWAPS indicates that A-10 data are difficult to summarize
and interpret because of the way the data were initially recorded.
Where relevant and necessary for this research, we consulted with the
appropriate GWAPS staff regarding limitations and usage of the
Missions database.
Studies using the database for different purposes should not be
expected to generate identical data. For example, the number of
strikes conducted by a particular platform against strategic targets
may not be equivalent across studies because of the degree of
specificity in the question being posed. One study may be concerned
with strategic targets regardless of any other delimiting factors,
while another may be concerned with strike counts against strategic
targets, discounting those strikes where some mechanical failure of
the aircraft was reported to have occurred over the target area.
Therefore, differences among studies that rely on the use of the
Missions database, in some form or another, should be interpreted
considering differences in research questions, methodologies, and
protocols.
We also used the Missions database to create the variables to measure
air campaign inputs. These variables are used to measure either the
weight of effort (WOE) or the type of effort (TOE) expended and are
defined in
table I.4.
Table I.4
Definition of Composite Variables for
WOE and TOE Measures
Measure Variable
-------- ---- ------------------------------------------------------
WOE Quantity of BE numbers to which platforms were tasked
Quantity of strikes that platforms conducted
Quantity of bombs that platforms delivered
Quantity of bomb tonnage that platforms delivered
TOE Quantity of bombs that were guided bombs
Quantity of bombs that were unguided bombs
Quantity of bomb tonnage that was guided
Quantity of bomb tonnage that was unguided
Other Quantity of day and night strikes
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The only variable in the list above that was directly accessible from
the Missions database was the number of BEs to which aircraft were
tasked. All other variables were derived by us from the raw data
provided in the Missions database.
--------------------
\2 Designating targets by a BE number is a method of identifying and
categorizing target installations for target study and planning.
\3 In several instances in which records met all selection criteria
except for a missing target category designation, we used all
available target-identifying information and assigned the target to a
target category based on automated intelligence file (AIF) target
category designations.
\4 At least one-third of the A-10 strike data could not be accurately
determined from the original records, and GWAPS researchers were not
able to reconcile the inconsistencies.
\5 Kill boxes were areas where the Republican Guard (RG) and other
Iraqi troops were dug in. According to GWAPS, the vast majority of
kill box strikes were directed against GOB targets. However, GWAPS
did not include the universe of BE-numbered kill boxes in the GOB
target category. Therefore, we expanded the GOB target category to
include all BE-numbered kill boxes and subsequently identified it as
the KBX category. GWAPS indicates that approximately 8 percent of
kill box strikes were conducted against targets other than GOB
targets. Examination of the database indicates that these other
target types include SAM sites, artillery pieces, and some bridges.
WOE VARIABLES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2.1
Quantity of BE Numbers. BE numbers are a method of categorizing and
identifying various types of target installations for target study
and general planning. The number of BEs are only considered an
approximation of the actual number of targets or desired mean points
of impact (DMPI) that aircraft were assigned to and may have struck.
The quantity of BE numbers can only be considered an approximation
because a single BE number can encapsulate more than a single DMPI.
For example, an entire airfield may be assigned a single BE number,
yet there may exist multiple DMPIs on that airfield (hardened
aircraft shelters) that could potentially inflate the actual number
of targets.\6
Quantity of Strikes. We used the GWAPS method of assessing strike
counts based on Missions data. We excluded only those strike efforts
that were most likely not to have expended some actual weight of
effort against targets. For example, we included strike events from
the database that were signified as weather-aborted or canceled,
without reference to why or whether or not the cancellation occurred
over the target or on the ground before takeoff. Aircraft that
arrived at the target area, and then the strike events were canceled
because of weather, still represented a part of the weight of effort
that was expended on a target. This is because numerous resources
are required simply to get the aircraft safely to the target (for
example, tankers, planning time and resources, airborne warning and
control system (AWACS) resources, and possibly escort and SEAD
aircraft). As concluded by GWAPS researchers, their database has
inconsistent abbreviations and meanings attached to the codes for
canceled missions.\7 This lack of consistency and clarity suggests
that using mission cancellation codes as a filter for strike summary
information is not reliable, and therefore, we did not use them.
Quantity of Bombs. The quantity of bombs was determined from those
database fields that provided some information on the number of bombs
that an aircraft delivered and the number of aircraft that delivered
it. If the database fields listing the quantity of bombs were empty,
bomb quantities for those strike events were not determined.\8 The
quantity of bombs measure does not include clearly designated
air-to-air ordnance, aircraft gun ordnance, decoys, or psyop delivery
canisters.
Quantity of Bomb Tonnage. The quantity of bomb tonnage was
determined by entering a new variable into the database representing
the weight of air-to-ground bombs (in pounds), summing these weights,
and then dividing the sum by 2,000 to determine the overall amount of
bomb tonnage. The quantity of bomb tonnage could only be calculated
for those entries in the database where a verifiable type and
quantity of bomb actually appeared.\9
--------------------
\6 The lack of consistently detailed DMPI indicators in the database
does not permit a reliable estimate of the actual number of targets
represented by individual BE-numbered targets within all target
categories. Because the database contains at least two fields to
capture information on DMPIs, there could be at least two DMPIs per
BE number. This would effectively double the number of targets.
Therefore, at most, the 862 BE-numbered targets in our database may
be the lower bound of the actual number of targets.
\7 Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. V, pt. I: Statistical
Compendium and Chronology (Secret), pp. 425-26.
\8 Approximately 2 percent of the database records used in the
analysis, and which provide designation of the primary type of
aircraft ordnance, were blank.
\9 The quantity of bomb tonnage is obviously a function of
information on the quantity of bombs. Thus, the baseline percentage
of database records where information on bomb tonnage could not be
calculated is 2 percent--as noted in the previous footnote.
TOE VARIABLES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2.2
Quantity of Guided and Unguided Bombs. The quantity of guided and
unguided bombs was calculated in the same manner as the quantity of
bombs described previously; however, ordnance was categorized
according to whether it was precision-guided or unguided.
The ability to determine guided and unguided bomb categorizations was
dependent on the way that ordnance was designated in the database.
If the type of bomb was clearly indicated in the Missions database,
then the category to which it belonged--guided or unguided--could be
determined. In many cases, if bomb types were unclear or missing
(thus not permitting clear categorizations), those bombs would not
have been categorized.\10
However, in those instances in which a bomb type was unclear but
additional information permitted a categorization, bomb
categorizations were done. For example, it was not unusual to see an
entry like `27X' in the database field that was supposed to contain
the primary type of aircraft ordnance. In many cases, examination of
the type of aircraft that was associated with the ordnance would
indicate what type of ordnance it was. Using the example above,
aircraft ordnance entries like `27X' had other data indicating that
the delivery platform was an F-117; thus, the bomb was assumed to be
a GBU-27 and a guided categorization would have been provided.
Quantity of Guided and Unguided Bomb Tonnage. The method and
restrictions for calculating guided and unguided bomb tonnage are the
same as those described previously under the WOE Variables section.
--------------------
\10 Estimates are approximately the same as noted previously--about 2
percent of the database records used in the analysis.
OTHER DESCRIPTIVE
VARIABLES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2.3
The time at which strikes occurred was determined from the time on
target variable provided in the Missions database. TOTs, designated
in Zulu time, were translated to an air tasking order (ATO) time to
determine whether strike events were occurring during daylight or
night hours. A key provided by GWAPS indicated the ATO hours
associated with daylight and night hours.\11
--------------------
\11 GWAPS, vol. V, pt. I (Secret), p 558.
DIA PHASE III BDA REPORTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) generated battle damage
assessments during Operation Desert Storm in support of U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM). The DIA's phase III reports detailed the extent
of physical and functional damage on strategic targets based on
multiple intelligence sources.\12 DIA prepared phase III BDA reports
only for targets identified by CENTCOM. These targets were of
special interest to CENTCOM and lent themselves to data collection
from national sources. The phase III analyses reported the degree to
which campaign objectives were met at a BE-numbered target at a
specific point in time.\13 These reports did not necessarily assess
the impact of any one mission or strike package; rather, they
assessed the effect of the cumulative efforts of the air campaign on
the function and capability of a specific target. After assessing
all sources of intelligence to determine the functional damage
achieved at a target, DIA made a summary recommendation of whether a
restrike was needed.
Phase III reports were written for 432 fixed strategic targets. The
number of strategic targets assessed by DIA is only somewhat over
half the number of strategic targets CENTCOM identified by the end of
the war (772) and half the number of the BE-numbered targets
identified in GWAPS' Missions database (862). In addition, these
targets were not necessarily representative of the entire strategic
target set.\14 However, they do represent the targets of greatest
interest to CENTCOM planners. CENTCOM's level of interest is
reflected in the repeated assessments requested for and conducted on
some key targets; several of the targets were assessed over 10 times.
The phase III reports do not provide strike-by-strike functional BDA
for each strategic target, but they represent the best cumulative
all-source BDA available to planners during the course of the war.\15
Though a few agencies produced postwar BDA analyses on narrowly
defined target sets, no other agency or organization prepared BDA
reports comparable to DIA's, which drew upon multiple sources and
assessed hundreds of diverse targets throughout the theater.\16
--------------------
\12 Intelligence sources included imagery from national sources,
human intelligence, signal intelligence or electronic intelligence,
and tactical reconnaissance.
\13 DIA also produced phase I and II reports during the war. Phase I
reports identified whether a target was hit or missed on a specific
mission. These reports contained the initial indications from the
imagery and were transmitted orally to the theater. Phase II reports
were more detailed than phase I reports, describing the extent of
physical damage as well as functional impact based on imagery.
Phase III reports also provided functional BDA to the theater but
required more time because they were based on a fusion of all
available intelligence sources rather than imagery alone.
\14 Our data sources did not provide us with some detailed target
information such as number and characteristics of DMPIs, threat
environment, campaign objectives, or Iraqi adaptations or
countermeasures that would enable us to compare targets assessed by
DIA and those that were not.
\15 Gulf War planners who were frustrated with the timeliness,
coverage, and occasionally the conclusions of BDA based primarily on
imagery increasingly relied on aircraft video to assess strike
success. One blackhole planner stated that strike BDA was assessed
in theater based on F-117, F-15E, and F-111F video (taken during the
delivery of laser-guided bombs) and restrikes were postponed until
phase III reports confirmed or refuted the cockpit video. Thus,
during the campaign, for some targets, BDA and restrike
determinations were supplemented by--but not wholly replaced
by--cockpit video.
\16 See Central Intelligence Agency, Operation Desert Storm: A
Snapshot of the Battlefield (Sept. 1993); Defense Intelligence
Agency, Vulnerability of Hardened Aircraft Bunkers and Shelters to
Precision Guided Munitions (Apr. 1994); Foreign Science and
Technology Center, Desert Storm Armored Vehicle Survey/BDA
(Charlottesville, Va.: Joint Intelligence Survey Team, Jan. 1992).
OUR DETERMINATIONS OF
TARGET SUCCESS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3.1
We used phase III reports on fixed strategic targets to determine the
extent to which the functional capabilities of the target had been
eliminated.\17 Using the final BDA report prepared during the
campaign on each target, we assessed whether the campaign against
that target had been fully successful or not fully successful. We
based our judgments on the phase III report's (1) physical damage
summary, (2) cumulative summary of intelligence data on functional
damage, and (3) restrike recommendation, if provided.
We rated the campaign against a target as fully successful (FS) if
the
phase III report stated following:
The target was destroyed or so damaged as to be unusable or
nonfunctional, and the diminished condition of the target was
because of the physical damage of air strikes or indirectly
attributable to the air campaign, such as the threat of strikes.
The restrike recommendation was "no."\18
We rated the campaign against the target as not fully successful
(NFS) if the phase III report stated the following:
The target was not destroyed or so damaged as to be unusable or
nonfunctional.
The facility had been struck and suffered only partial (or no)
damage or degradation and remained on the target list.
Insufficient data were available to confirm that the objective had
been met, and the target therefore remained on the list.\19
The restrike recommendation was "yes."\20
Table I.5 illustrates examples of the phase III BDA information
reported by DIA and our FS or NFS determinations.
Table I.5
Examples of Phase III BDA and Our FS or
NFS Assessments
Target Our
category Target type BDA summary assessment
------------ ------------------ -------------------------------- ------------
C\3 Air defense radar 50 percent degraded; FS
nonoperational; restrike: no
Air defense radar Radar and command capability NFS
remain; restrike: yes
\ELE Power plant Turbines not operating; FS
restrike: no
Power plant Installation 70 percent NFS
operational; switchyard must be
destroyed
LOC Highway bridge Direct hit, bridge FS
nonoperational; traffic rerouted
Highway bridge Bridge still operable; no damage NFS
NBC Munitions storage All bunkers out of operation; FS
restrike: no
Chemical warfare Laboratory intact; restrike: yes NFS
production and
storage
OCA Airfield Limited operations possible; FS
restrike: no--unless flight
operations resume
Airfield 50 percent hardened aircraft NFS
shelters intact; airfield
operational; restrike: yes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
\17 DIA generated 986 phase III reports covering 432 separate
targets. We used the final phase III report when more than one
report was produced on a target.
\18 Additional strikes on a target were recommended by DIA to CENTCOM
when the results of their BDA indicated that military activity or
capability remained at the target site. Restrikes may or may not
have occurred for a number of reasons (for example, changing or
conflicting priorities in-theater, constraints imposed by the
weather, or limited dissemination of BDA results).
\19 It was standard procedure during the air campaign to retain
targets on the daily air tasking order and the Master Target List
(MTL) and retask aircraft to the target if BDA was absent or
inconclusive.
\20 By categorizing a target as NFS, we are not implying that the
strikes (or other actions of the air campaign) did not have an
adverse impact on the enemy at that location. In many instances,
strikes resulted in the partial destruction of the targets and may
have affected the tactics and level of enemy activity. An NFS rating
implies only that the complete destruction of the target or the
elimination of its function had not been achieved (or could not be
confirmed) and additional strikes were necessary.
DATA LIMITATIONS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3.2
Although DIA's phase III reports were by far the most comprehensive
compilation of BDA for strategic, fixed targets produced during or
after the campaign, there were several limitations to these data.
These include
Not all strategic targets were assessed. DIA issued phase III
reports on
432 BE-numbered strategic targets, which was a total lower than
either the final number of strategic targets identified by
CENTCOM during the war or the number of BE-numbered targets in
the Missions database, and which was a set of targets that were
not necessarily representative of the universe of strategic
targets.
No effort was made after the campaign to update or verify the vast
majority of the reports. The accuracy of some analyses without
ground verification is very difficult to determine.
Imagery limitations can hinder analysis. Imagery collection may at
times have preceded strikes because combat missions were delayed
or postponed. Imagery may not have been taken from the optimal
side of a target or at an inappropriate angle for assessment
purposes.
According to DIA, the reliability of assessments grew over the
course of the war with the increased experience of the analysts.
Thus, the assessments later in the conflict may be more reliable
than those made earlier because analysts learned more about the
capabilities of the aircraft and munitions through the course of
the war.
OTHER DATA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3.3
We obtained aircraft and munitions cost data from Air Force and Navy
documents and costs as identified in DOD's periodic Selected
Acquisition Reports to the Congress.
ANALYSES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.4
To analyze the use of aircraft and munitions in achieving air
campaign objectives, we used the Missions database to determine
weight-of-effort and type-of-effort measures at two levels. First,
we calculated WOE and TOE at the broad level of the target category
for each of the 12 strategic target categories shown in table I.1.
Second, we calculated WOE and TOE for each aircraft and TLAM across
the 12 categories.
We used phase III reports on 432 fixed strategic targets to determine
the extent to which the functional capabilities of the target had
been eliminated. To correlate outcomes on targets with the input to
them, we matched phase III data with data in the Missions database.
For 357 strategic targets (where both BDA and WOE/TOE data existed),
we sought to assess the relationship between the WOE and TOE data
representing campaign inputs with phase III BDA representing campaign
outcomes at the target level.\21
We conducted our work between July 1992 and December 1995 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------
\21 This methodology was discussed with DIA analysts who were
familiar with both the Missions database and the phase III reports.
They identified no reason why this methodology would not result in
valid comparisons of inputs and outcomes. In addition, they believed
that the use of WOE and TOE variables would alleviate data problems
previously encountered by analysts conducting strike BDAs.
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
This analysis of campaign, aircraft, and munitions use and
effectiveness benefited from our use of the most comprehensive strike
and BDA data produced from the Persian Gulf War; a previously untried
methodology to match inputs and outputs on targets; additional
qualitative and quantitative data obtained from Desert Storm veterans
and after-action reports to corroborate information in the primary
databases; and the results of other Desert Storm analyses, such as
the Gulf War Air Power Survey.
This study is the first to match available Desert Storm strike and
BDA data by target and to attempt to assess the effectiveness of the
multiple weapon systems across target categories. Despite the data
limitations discussed below, our methodology provided systematic
information on how weapon systems were employed, what level and types
of weapons were required to achieve success, and what was the
relative cost-effectiveness of multiple platforms. The reliability
and validity of these findings are strengthened by our use of
interviews, after-action reports, and other Desert Storm analyses to
better understand platform performance variables and place the
results of our effectiveness analyses in the appropriate context.
Our analyses of campaign inputs (from the Missions database) and
outcomes (from the phase III reports) against ground targets have
limitations of both scope and reliability imposed by constraints in
the primary Desert Storm databases. Systematically correlating
munition inputs against targets to outcomes was made highly
problematic by the fact that the phase III BDA reports did not
provide a comprehensive compilation of BDA for all strategic targets
and could not differentiate the effects of one system from another on
the same target.\22
We sought to work around data limitations through a qualitative
analysis of systems, based on diverse sources. Claims made for
system performance were assessed in light of the most rigorous
evaluation that could be made with the available data. We have
explicitly noted data insufficiencies and uncertainties. Overall,
data gaps and inconsistencies made an across-the-board
cost-effectiveness evaluation difficult. However, there were
sufficient data either to assess all the major claims made by DOD for
the performance of the major systems studied or to indicate where the
data are lacking to support certain claims.
--------------------
\22 Such assessments, system by system, were not the goal of these
reports. Since targets were generally assessed only episodically
and, in most cases, after being hit by numerous diverse aircraft and
munitions over a period of time, it was impossible to know which
munition from which aircraft had caused what amount of damage.
THE USE OF AIRCRAFT AND MUNITIONS
IN THE AIR CAMPAIGN
========================================================== Appendix II
In this appendix, we respond to the requesters' questions about the
use, performance, and contributions of individual weapon systems used
in Desert Storm, particularly in regard to stealth technology and the
F-117. We organize our discussion by four sets of subquestions, as
follows.
Operating environment: What predominant operating conditions
prevailed during the air campaign? Specifically, we examine the
time available to the coalition to plan the air campaign and
deploy forces to the region; the desert environment, the
weather, and environmental factors that affected air operations;
and the quality of the Iraqi threat, including Iraqi air defense
capabilities and countermeasures to coalition bombing efforts.
Weapon system capability and actual use: Based on original design
or previous performance, what were the expected capabilities of
the U.S. air-to-ground aircraft and their munitions before the
war? Did performance during Desert Storm differ from
expectations and, if so, in what way? We assess patterns of
aircraft and munition use during the war, such as the kind of
targets to which aircraft were tasked; night versus day
employment; the relative use of guided and unguided munitions;
and the particular performance capabilities of the F-117. We
also evaluate official statements made before and after the war
about the capabilities of aircraft and their respective target
sensors in locating and identifying targets in various weather
and when operating at night.
Combat operations support requirements: What was required to
support the air-to-ground aircraft in the form of refueling
tankers, sensors, and suppression of Iraqi defenses? We also
address three controversies related to support for the F-117:
Did the F-117s receive radar jamming or other types of support?
What is the evidence that they were detectable by radar? Did
they achieve tactical surprise?
Survivability: Were the survival rates of the various
air-to-ground aircraft similar, and what factors affected
aircraft survivability? In particular, was the F-117 survival
rate unique among these aircraft? And were the defenses faced
by the F-117s uniquely severe or comparable to those encountered
by other aircraft?
OPERATING CONDITIONS: TIME,
ENVIRONMENT, AND ENEMY
CAPABILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
In this section, we review the operating conditions in Desert Storm
with the object of distilling the lessons that can be learned for the
future.
A 6-MONTH PLANNING AND
DEPLOYMENT PERIOD
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.1
Following the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait, U.S. forces had nearly 6
months to plan the air campaign and to deploy massive forces, many to
existing bases and facilities in Saudi Arabia and the other Persian
Gulf states, supplied in part from prepositioned stores as the
buildup proceeded.\1 The Iraqis chose not to interfere in any regard
with this massive buildup, leaving their own troops in static
positions as the coalition deployed increasingly large air, ground,
and sea forces. The coalition had the luxury of time to deploy all
the forces it needed, along with their supplies, while the enemy did
little to obstruct the process. In considering future contingencies,
and using Desert Storm as a baseline experience, it is important to
remember that the United States was permitted an uncurtailed buildup
of forces and military supplies to existing infrastructures on
foreign, yet friendly, soil that directly bordered the hostilities.
The 6-month period also permitted identifying and studying important
strategic targets in Iraq. Planners were able to extensively review
and revise plans for the critical strikes that took place in the
opening days of the air campaign. During this period, many of the
units that saw some of the most activity in Desert Storm were able to
practice flying in the desert environment, honing their skills under
conditions for which some had not previously trained, given the
expectation that large-scale combat would most likely take place in a
European scenario. There were opportunities to accumulate
intelligence on the nature of Iraqi defenses in part by intentionally
tripping Iraqi radars and observing Iraqi reactions. In effect, the
U.S. military services were able to plan their initial actions
thoroughly and in great detail, including the complex interactions
among dozens of U.S. and allied military units, and to build up
large frontline forces and reserves without enemy interference.
--------------------
\1 See Operation Desert Storm: Transportation and Distribution of
Equipment and Supplies in Southwest Asia (GAO/NSIAD-92-20, Dec. 26,
1991).
THE DESERT ENVIRONMENT AND
AIR POWER
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.2
The vast, flat, open terrain of the KTO and Iraq was considerably
more favorable the effective employment of air power than most other
geographies around the globe. While camouflage, gullies, and
revetments offered some possibilities for Iraqi concealment, almost
all analyses of the conflict conclude that, overall, it was easier to
find targets in the desert than in jungle or mountainous terrain.
Moreover, until the ground campaign started after 40 days of air
bombardment, many Iraqi ground forces remained entrenched in fixed
positions, permitting repeated strikes against both personnel and
equipment.
Cloud cover and storms made for the worst weather in that region for
at least 14 years, but conditions were no worse than what would
probably be the best ones likely in other conflicts. At the same
time, because many air strikes were carried out at night, and some
under adverse weather conditions, the sensors used by aircraft and
munitions to locate, identify, and track targets were used under a
wide variety of environmental conditions.
IRAQI AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.3
On paper, Iraq's air defense system appeared to be formidable to many
observers before the air campaign. Iraq had purchased what was
widely described as a state-of-the-art integrated air defense system
(IADS) from France, which linked 17 intercept operations centers
(IOC) to four sector operations centers (SOC). The IOCs were linked
to air bases with interceptor aircraft, as well as to dozens of
surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery sites. With
multiple and redundant communication modes, the system could, in
theory, rapidly detect attacking aircraft and direct antiaircraft
defenses against them. (The IADS is described in app. VI.)
However, the Iraqi IADS had been designed to counter limited threats
from either Israel, to its west, or Iran, to its east, not from the
south and north, nor from a massive coalition force to which the
United States alone contributed more than 1,000 combat aircraft. As
the Navy's Strike Projection Evaluation and Anti-Air Research (SPEAR)
department reported before the war:
"the command elements of the Iraqi air defense organization (the
. . . interceptor force, the IADF [Iraqi Air Defense Force],
as well as Army air defense) are unlikely to function well under
the stress of a concerted air campaign."\2
Similarly, on almost every performance dimension, the Iraqi IADS was
remarkably vulnerable to massive and rapid degradation. Evidence
from the Air Force, DIA, GWAPS, SPEAR, and other expert sources shows
that the principal deficiencies of the Iraqi IADS were that (1) it
could track only a limited number of threats, and it had very limited
capabilities against aircraft with a small radar cross-section, such
as the F-117; (2) its design was easy to disrupt, and the key IADS
nodes were easy to target, [DELETED]; and (3) many of its SAMs were
old or limited in capability, and the Iraqi air force played almost
no role in the conflict, although it had been intended to be a major
component of air defenses.
In addition, the political context of the war permitted the
development of a strong, cohesive, coalition force while Iraq had few
allies, none of which were particularly strong or in a position to
materially aid Iraq.
--------------------
\2 Naval Intelligence Command, Navy Operational Intelligence Center,
SPEAR Department, Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces (Secret), December
1990, p. 3-14.
IRAQI COUNTERMEASURES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.4
Our review of unit after-action reports, lessons-learned reports, and
interviews with pilots suggests that Iraqi countermeasures to degrade
or impede the effectiveness of coalition air attacks or
communications were inconsistent and did not appear to have
represented as much as could have been achieved.
[DELETED]
Finally, toward the end of the war, the Iraqis ignited hundreds of
Kuwaiti oil wells, creating vast plumes of black oil-based smoke,
which seriously degraded visual observation and air reconnaissance as
well as the
infrared (IR) and electro-optical (EO) weapon sensors and the laser
designators on aircraft. The purpose of this action appears to have
been more to punish Kuwait than to impede bombing efforts, although
it ultimately did this.
It is difficult to assess the overall success of the Iraqi
countermeasures employed against aircraft sensors since it is not
readily known how many decoy targets were attacked or how many actual
targets were not attacked because they were effectively camouflaged
or hidden among their surroundings. At the same time, given the
absence of attempted Iraqi jamming of satellite communications,
little if any jamming against coalition aircraft radars, and the
apparent absence of any discovery during or after the war that
countermeasures were used on a massive or even broad scale, it would
appear, on balance, that the use of countermeasures in Desert Storm
was inconsistent, at best, and did not seriously stress or impede
U.S. aircraft sensors, bombing efforts, or communications.
In sum, to answer our first subquestion, we found that a number of
unique political, logistic, intelligence, and threat conditions
characterized the environment in which Desert Storm took place.
These conditions appear to have, at minimum, facilitated the overall
planning and execution of the air campaign and, therefore, must be
considered in assessments of Desert Storm outcomes and in
generalizing the lessons learned from this campaign.
AIR-TO-GROUND WEAPON SYSTEMS:
PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL USE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
The second major evaluation subquestion concerns the prewar
capabilities of air-to-ground aircraft, munitions, and sensors; their
stated prewar missions; and their actual use in Desert Storm.\3 In
this section, we discuss (1) comparing prewar aircraft mission
capabilities to actual mission use in Desert Storm, (2) examining
specific performance issues for the F-117, and (3) comparing prewar
target location and acquisition capabilities to capabilities observed
in Desert Storm.
--------------------
\3 A comparison of design and actual Desert Storm missions for
aircraft under review has the potential to reveal findings about the
attributes and limitations of the aircraft, the adequacy of pilot and
crew training, and the nature of the conflict. For example,
deviations found between design and actual missions might reveal (1)
an inability of an aircraft to perform an expected mission, (2) an
unanticipated mission, or (3) a unique tactical environment.
PRE-DESERT STORM AIRCRAFT
MISSIONS VERSUS DESERT STORM
USE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.1
We compared official Air Force and Navy descriptions of the types of
combat missions for which their respective air-to-ground aircraft
were designed and produced to whether each aircraft actually
performed such missions in Desert Storm.\4 (See table II.1.)
Table II.1
Air-to-Ground Combat Mission Categories
Attributed to Selected Aircraft Before
Desert Storm Versus Those Actually
Performed\a
Aircra
ft C\ DS\ C DS C DS C DS C DS \C DS
------ ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----- -----
F-117 X X N \N X X X X N N X\h N
F- X X N N X X X X N N X\i N
111F
F-15E X X N N X X X X X N X N
A-6E X X X X X X X X N N\j X X
F-16 X X X X X X X X X N X X
F/A- X X X X X X X X X X X X
18
A-10 X\k X X X X X N X X N X\l N
B-52 X X X N X X X X N N X N
GR- X X X N X X X X X N X N
1(U.K
.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a An "X" in column C (capability) indicates that the platform was
credited with the mission capability before Desert Storm (DS); an "N"
indicates that it was not credited with the capability. An "X" in
column DS indicates that records show that the platform conducted
missions or strikes of this type in Desert Storm; an "N" indicates
that available records do not show this.
\b Air interdiction (AI): These are missions to destroy, neutralize,
or delay enemy ground or naval forces before they can operate against
friendly forces. AI targets include transportation systems and
vehicles, military personnel and supplies, communication facilities,
tactical missiles, and infrastructure.
\c Close air support (CAS): These missions support ground operations
by destroying enemy capability in close proximity to friendly ground
forces.
\d Suppression of enemy air defenses: These missions strive to
increase the survival or effectiveness of friendly aircraft
operations by destroying or neutralizing enemy air defenses.
\e Offensive counterair: These missions seek out and neutralize or
destroy enemy aerospace assets, such as airfields, aircraft in
shelters, and radar sites.
\f Defensive counterair: These are defensive air-to-air missions
flown against airborne enemy aircraft.
\g Surface combat air patrol and joint maritime operations: Surface
combat air patrol are sorties of naval aircraft to protect surface
ships from attack. Joint maritime operations include the use of Air
Force aircraft to assist in the achievement of military objectives in
the naval environment.
\h The F-117's JMO capability to attack naval targets at sea is
described as "minimal." It does, however, have the capability to
attack ships and other naval targets in port.
\i Note h applies to the F-111F also.
\j The A-6E is not credited with capability in this mission category.
Only four DCA sorties were flown in Desert Storm; for that reason,
the cell has an "N."
\k The A-10's AI capability was described as limited in MCM 3-1 vol.
III.
\l The A-10's JMO capability was described as limited.
Sources: USAF TAC MCM 3-1 vols. III, V, VI, XIII, XVII, XIX
(Secret), NAVAIR Tactical Manuals for the F-18 and A-6
(Confidential), official descriptions of the GR-1 from the Ministry
of Defense of the United Kingdom, and GWAPS, vol. V, pt. I
(Secret), pp. 336-404.
We note in the table where the Air Force or Navy declared a mission
capability to be limited. If an aircraft performed a very small
number of missions, such as fewer than five, we did not credit the
aircraft with exhibiting that capability in Desert Storm. A very
small sample of missions does not permit the reliable determination
that the aircraft, successfully or unsuccessfully, demonstrated the
capability.
Table II.1 shows that in the four mission categories that emphasize
air-to-ground attack--AI, CAS, SEAD, and OCA--all the aircraft under
review were used to a meaningful extent during Desert Storm to
perform missions consonant with their stated capabilities. In only
one case--that of A-10s carrying out OCA missions--was an aircraft
used for a mission for which it had not been envisioned.\5
The DCA mission category was one of two in which aircraft were not
used for a mission for which they had an acknowledged pre-Desert
Storm capability. Except for F/A-18s, none of the aircraft under
review credited with a defensive air-to-air capability actually had
an opportunity to use it in Desert Storm. Overall, nearly all of the
Iraqi aircraft that were shot down were attacked by F-15Cs.
The relative paucity of air-to-air combat missions reflects the fact
that, for the most part, comparatively few Iraqi aircraft attempted
to attack either coalition aircraft or ground targets, despite the
fact that Iraq had about 860 combat aircraft and attack helicopters
combined. Overall, the Iraqi air force essentially chose not to
challenge the coalition. Over 100 Iraqi combat aircraft were flown
to Iran during the war.
In sum, the data on intended versus actual Desert Storm mission use
indicate no substantial discrepancies between the anticipated
capabilities of aircraft and the missions for which they were
actually employed in Desert Storm. Where stated capabilities were
not used, it was apparent that there was little need for them. (See
app. VII.)
--------------------
\4 We excluded two types of missions that are highly
specialized--search and rescue and support of special operations
forces.
\5 Although Navy aircraft performed SCAP and JMO missions, Air Force
aircraft with this capability performed no significant number. This
may have reflected a combination of sufficient Navy assets to deal
with these targets and traditional service rivalries.
PATTERNS OF AIRCRAFT AND
MUNITIONS USE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.1
Our second evaluation subquestion further concerns whether the Desert
Storm data revealed particular patterns of aircraft and munitions
usage, on the weight of effort and type of effort measures, across
the 12 strategic target categories. (See app. I for a summary of
the WOE and TOE analysis.)
PATTERNS IN AIRCRAFT
TARGET ASSIGNMENTS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.2
Many strategic targets were assigned basic encyclopedia numbers in
the target planning and study process. Target assignment data that
include the number and type of aircraft and munitions were available
from the Missions database for 862 targets with BE numbers, including
kill box targets assigned individual BE numbers.\6 Figure II.1 shows
BE-numbered strategic targets in each of 12 categories that were
tasked to different types of aircraft.\7
The data in figure II.1 can be analyzed in terms of the pattern (or
lack thereof) in aircraft target assignments to BE-numbered targets
across the target categories, thus suggesting which aircraft, if any,
planners tended to prefer.
In less than half the strategic target categories--that is, GVC, NAV,
NBC, SCU, and C\3 --did one or two types of aircraft strongly
predominate. First, in the GVC category, F-117s were assigned to 27
(87 percent), F-16s to 8 (26 percent), and F-111Fs to 1 (3 percent)
of the BE-numbered targets. Given that GVC targets were generally
high-value, in heavily defended areas, and sometimes either deeply
buried bunkers or heavily reinforced structures, the F-117's role
here appears consistent with its intended mission and the
capabilities of the specially designed warhead-penetrating I-2000
series LGBs with which it was equipped.
Figure II.1: BE-Numbered
Targets Assigned to Aircraft\ a
(See figure in printed
edition.)
\a The total BE-numbered targets depicted is greater than 862 because
some BEs were assigned to more than 1 type of aircraft.
A preference pattern can also be found in F-117 assignments to NBC
targets (25 of 29, or 86 percent) and C\3 targets (151 of 229, or 66
percent). In none of these was any other aircraft assigned to even
half the percentage accounted for by the F-117s. However,
considerable redundancy among aircraft target assignments is
apparent: while the F-117s were assigned to 86 percent of the NBC
BEs, the seven other aircraft, in sum, were assigned to over 90
percent of these BEs.
Second, a strategic target category assignment preference was evident
in the NAV category, where two types of Navy aircraft, A-6Es and
F/A-18s, were respectively assigned to 83 and 79 percent of the 24
naval-related targets with BEs.\8
Third, a pattern of preference can be found in the SCU category,
where F-15Es were assigned to just over 68 percent of the 51
BE-numbered targets. In contrast, the next highest participant
against these targets was the F-117, assigned to about 30 percent.
Finally, in half of the strategic target categories--ELE, KBX, LOC,
MIB, OIL, OCA--no aircraft among those under review was alone
assigned to more than 60 percent of the targets or was otherwise
clearly predominant in terms of assigned BEs.\9 For example, in the
OCA category, all eight aircraft were assigned to between 27 and 48
percent of the BE-numbered targets, indicating very substantial
overlap among assigned aircraft and targets. The data show similar
overlap in the five other categories (ELE, KBX, LOC, MIB, and OIL).
In sum, the F-15E, F-117, A-6E, and F/A-18 were preferred platforms
against particular sets of strategic targets. However, the general
patterns suggest that preferences, as revealed by patterns in target
assignments, were the exception and that among the aircraft reviewed,
most were assigned to multiple strategic targets across multiple
target categories.
--------------------
\6 KBX targets were mostly related to ground troops, for example,
tanks, artillery, and trucks located in large geographic areas. (See
app. I for a discussion of kill box targets.)
\7 This and similar analyses of the Missions database do not include
the A-10. If the data on the over 8,000 A-10 sorties had been
usable, it obviously would have comprised a major part of these
analyses.
\8 Clearly, 83 and 79 percent do not add to 100 percent. When the
combined percentages of individual aircraft target assignments do not
add to 100, it means that at least two or more aircraft were assigned
to some of the same BE-numbered targets.
\9 The F-16 was assigned to 51 percent of the BE-numbered KBX
targets. However, a large number of the targets in this category had
no BEs assigned to them and are therefore not included in this
analysis. Thus, the 51 percent for the F-16s may not most accurately
characterize the percentage of KBX-related targets that were assigned
to F-16s.
PATTERNS OF MUNITIONS USE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.1.3
Contrary to the general public's impression about the use of guided
munitions in Desert Storm, our analysis shows that approximately 95
percent of the total bombs delivered against strategic targets were
unguided; 5 percent were guided. Unguided bombs accounted for over
90 percent of both total bombs and bomb tonnage. Approximately 92
percent of the total tonnage was unguided, compared to 8 percent
guided. These percentages characterized not only the overall effort
but also the proportion of guided and unguided tonnage delivered in
each week of the air campaign.
Interviews with pilots and Desert Storm planners and a review of
relevant DOD reports, such as tactical manuals on aircraft and
munitions, identified reasons for this pattern. Among these were (1)
poor weather and conflict-induced environmental conditions such as
smoke from bombing, which degraded or blocked the targeting sensors
required for the delivery of guided ordnance; (2) the comparatively
high cost of guided bombs and resulting smaller inventories (pilots
were frequently told to conserve guided bomb deliveries); and related
to inventory, (3) the fact that many strategic targets were large and
therefore generally appropriate for the use of unguided ordnance.
The F-111F and the F-117 accounted for the majority of the guided
bomb tonnage delivered against strategic targets compared to the
other platforms reviewed. Together, the 42 F-117s and 64 F-111Fs in
theater delivered at least 7.3 million pounds of guided bombs against
Desert Storm strategic targets over the course of the 43-day air
campaign. Overall, more guided bomb tonnage was delivered against
OCA targets than against the other types of strategic targets, and
the F-111F accounted for the bulk of this delivery. OCA targets
included hardened aircraft shelters and bunkers, which were
considered important and were targeted consistently, not least
because they housed much of Iraq's air force. The achievement and
retention of air supremacy was critical to the successful, safe
continuation of the air campaign; thus, OCA targets were important.
In at least one case--that of the Navy's night-capable A-6E--it
appears that capability to deliver LGBs was used only sparingly,
despite the fact that the 115 A-6Es deployed constituted almost 51
percent of all U.S. LGB-capable aircraft on the first day of Desert
Storm. A-6Es delivered fewer than 600 LGBs, or approximately 1.1
million pounds of bombs; these constituted about 7 percent of all the
LGBs used in the war.
Summing across all target categories, the data show that, excluding
the A-10, F-16s and B-52s accounted for the preponderance (70
percent) of all unguided bomb tonnage delivered. B-52s delivered at
least 25,000 tons (37 percent of total tonnage), and F-16s delivered
at least 21,000 tons of unguided ordnance against strategic targets
(31 percent).\10
--------------------
\10 The tonnage delivered by A-10s is unknown but may have been
substantial given its sizable payload and more than 8,000 sorties
during the air campaign.
NIGHT STRIKES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.2
Most strikes against strategic targets, including nearly all from
U.S. LGB-capable aircraft, were conducted at night. Five of the
eight air-to-ground aircraft under review carried out at least two
thirds of their strikes against strategic targets at night: F-117
(100 percent), F-111F (99.6 percent), F-15E (94.2 percent), A-6E (72
percent), and B-52 (67 percent). Figure II.2 compares the percentage
of day and night strikes.
Figure II.2: Percent of Day
and Night Strikes for Selected
Aircraft
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The use of the F-117 and F-111F nearly exclusively at night reflects
pre-Desert Storm expectations regarding mission capability. Although
the F-111F can operate during the day, it has a designated emphasis
on night operations. The F-117 can technically also operate during
the day. But it was designed for night employment: it is not
stealthy in day or low-light conditions, being readily visible to the
human eye. Some of the design and performance characteristics that
make the F-117 low-observable to radar [DELETED] compared to other
aircraft.
The F-15E conducted 94.2 percent of its strikes at night, reflecting
a preference for this operational context since its stated mission
capability includes either day or night operations. B-52s and A-6Es
also showed a preference for night operations, with more than two
thirds of their strikes against strategic targets conducted at night.
Finally, the British Tornado was about evenly split on its percentage
of day and night strikes. Overall, the data indicate that among the
air-to-ground platforms reviewed, more than half conducted two thirds
or more of their operations at night.
The apparent preference for nighttime operations seems most likely
related to maximizing aircraft survivability. As discussed later in
this appendix, in Desert Storm, optically guided Iraqi IR SAMs and
AAA were responsible for the largest number of aircraft casualties
(losses and damage). Therefore, nighttime operations appear to have
enhanced aircraft survivability. Further, in the desert environment,
the effectiveness of night attacks was improved for aircraft with
infrared targeting systems because operations at night provide
optimal heat contrast for some targets as the sand cools faster than
many objects in it.
F-117 PERFORMANCE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.3
The F-117 has received highly favorable press for its achievements in
the Gulf War. The Air Force has officially stated that the F-117
contributed much more to the Desert Storm strategic air campaign than
would have been expected given its limited numbers. In its September
1991 white paper on Desert Storm, the Air Force stated that although
the F-117s made up only 2.5 percent of the aircraft in theater on the
first night of the war, they hit over 31 percent of the strategic
targets, and this pattern was exhibited both on the first night of
the campaign, when Iraqi air defenses were the strongest, and
throughout the remainder of the war.\11
Similarly, Lockheed, the primary contractor for the F-117, reported
that over the course of the war, F-117s represented only 2 percent of
total tactical assets yet accounted for 40 percent of all strategic
targets attacked. The contribution of the F-117s was also
highlighted in DOD's title V report as the only aircraft to strike
targets in all 12 strategic categories.
Clearly, the question of the relative contribution of the F-117, in
combination with claims about its accuracy (see app. III) and
stealth characteristics, has important implications for future force
structure and procurement decisions. In particular, we sought to
determine if the F-117 had been appropriately compared to aircraft
with similar missions and whether the data supported the claims made
for F-117 performance.
--------------------
\11 As recently as the February 1995 Annual Report to the President
and the Congress, the report of the Secretary of the Air Force stated
that "the F-117 destroyed 40 percent of all strategic targets while
flying only 2 percent of all strategic sorties during Desert Storm."
(See p. 300) While the portion of the coalition air forces
represented by the F-117 is addressed in this section, the accuracy
and effectiveness of the F-117 are addressed in appendix III.
THE APPROPRIATENESS OF
AIRCRAFT COMPARISONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.4
The 2.5 percent DOD cited as representing the percentage of F-117s in
the "shooter" force is derived from data that include many types of
aircraft that cannot bomb ground targets--the only mission of the
F-117. Shooters are defined as aircraft that can deliver any kind of
munitions from bullets to bombs. Table II.2 lists Desert Storm
combat aircraft classified as "shooters."
Not all shooter aircraft, however, can perform the same missions.
Shooter aircraft include those that have solely air-to-air
capabilities as well as those that have air-to-ground capability.
Since air-to-air shooters cannot hit ground targets but were included
in the shooter totals, the claim about the percentage of the total
shooter force that F-117s represented in Desert Storm is not
accurate.\12 Although they may have attacked 31 percent of the
strategic targets, they did not comprise only 2.5 percent of the
relevant shooters in the theater--that is, those that could deliver
munitions against ground targets.
We sought to determine what percentage of the relevant aircraft they
did comprise. On the first day of Desert Storm, 229 aircraft were
capable of both designating targets with lasers and autonomously
delivering LGBs.\13 The 36 F-117s in theater at the start of the
campaign were 15.7 percent of these 229 aircraft. Thus, of all the
aircraft that had the potential to deliver some kind of LGB, the
stealth force represented not 2.5 percent of the assets but 15.7
percent. Moreover, because the I-2000 series LGBs were only in the
Air Force's inventory, the F-117s actually constituted 32 percent of
all coalition aircraft that could deliver such bombs.
Table II.2
Number and Percent of Coalition
"Shooter" Aircraft
Percen
Aircraft type Number t
------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------
F-117 42 2.2
A-6E 115 6.2
A-7E 24 1.3
A-10 132 7.0
AC-130 8 0.4
AV-8B 62 3.3
B-52 66 3.5
EA-6B 39 2.1
F-4G 60 3.2
F-111E 18 1.0
F-111F 66 3.5
F-14 100 5.3
F-15C 124 6.6
F-15E 48 2.6
F-16 247 13.2
F/A-18 169 9.0
A-4 (Kuwait) 19 1.0
CF-18 (Canada) 24 1.3
F-15 (Saudi Arabia) 81 4.3
F-16C/D (Bahrain) 12 0.6
F-5 (Bahrain) 12 0.6
F-5E/F (Saudi Arabia) 84 4.5
Hawks (Saudi Arabia) 30 1.6
Jaguar (France) 24 1.3
Jaguar (United Kingdom) 12 0.6
Mirage (United Arab Emirates) 64 3.4
Mirage 2000 (France) 12 0.6
Mirage F-1 (France) 12 0.6
Mirage F-1 (Qatar) 12 0.6
Mirage F-1 (Kuwait) 15 0.8
Strikemaster (Saudi Arabia) 32 1.7
Tornado F3 (United Kingdom) 53 2.8
Tornado ADV (Italy) 9 0.5
Tornado ADV (Saudi Arabia) 48 2.6
======================================================================
Total 1,875 100.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD title V report, 1991.
--------------------
\12 The shooters total used to calculate the 2.5 percent figure
included not only air-to-air aircraft but also over 500 non-U.S.
aircraft that never entered Iraq during Desert Storm. Neither French
nor coalition Arab aircraft attacked targets in Iraq, although some
were used against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Thus, these coalition
aircraft did not represent aircraft that performed the same type of
mission as the F-117 (that is, attacking ground targets in Iraq).
\13 Four types of LGB-capable aircraft and their respective
percentages in theater were 36 F-117 (15.7), 115 A-6E (50.2), 66
F-111F (28.8), and 12 F-15E (5.2). Although the interdiction variant
of the Panavia Tornado, which the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and
Italy had in theater, did deliver LGBs in a few instances, these
aircraft could not or did not autonomously operate with LGBs.
Therefore, they are not included here. Similarly, only the 12 F-15Es
that could autonomously deliver LGBs are included.
COMPARISONS OF TARGET
ASSIGNMENTS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.5
Contrary to DOD claims, the F-117 represented approximately 16
percent of the Desert Storm LGB assets on day one and 32 percent of
LGB-capable aircraft that could deliver the penetrating I-2000 series
LGBs, particularly useful against hardened, reinforced, and buried
hardened targets. Given this, it is not altogether surprising that
the F-117 seems to have been a preferred platform against GVC and NBC
targets. The F-117 attacked approximately 78 percent of the targets
receiving LGBs on day one and attacked about one-third of all the
first-day targets, but it attacked less than 10 percent of all the
strategic targets that had been identified at the start of the air
campaign.
During the first day of Desert Storm, F-117s performed 61 strikes,
which accounted for 57 percent of all first day LGB strikes against
strategic targets.\14 Three of the four LGB-capable carriers actually
delivered LGBs--the A-6Es, the F-111Fs, and the F-117s; F-15Es
delivered unguided munitions exclusively. However, the F-117s and
F-111Fs accounted for all but about 7 percent of the strikes with
LGBs. Fifty-nine BE-numbered targets received 108 strikes with LGBs.
F-117 strikes represented 57 percent of these strikes (which were
against 46 of the 59 targets, or 78 percent); F-111F strikes were 36
percent of the total.
--------------------
\14 The first "day" was actually the first 29 hours in the Missions
database, from 1800 Zulu on January 16, 1991, to 2300 Zulu on January
17, 1991.
COMPARISON OF TARGET
ASSIGNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE
WAR
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.6
One of the prominent claims the Air Force made for the F-117 in
comparing it to other bombers was that it, alone, attacked targets in
all
12 strategic target categories. We found this claim to be accurate;
however, we also found that in three of the target categories--naval,
oil, and electricity--the F-117s attacked only one, two, and three
BE-numbered targets, respectively. Further, we found that F-16s,
F/A-18s, and A-6Es each attacked targets in 11 of the 12 strategic
target categories; F-15Es attacked targets in 10 categories; and
B-52s and F-111Fs attacked targets in 9 categories. As table II.3
shows, each of the other U.S. air-to-ground aircraft in Desert Storm
attacked targets in no less than three-fourths of the target
categories.
Table II.3
Coverage of Strategic Target Categories,
by Aircraft Type
Tota Perce
Aircraft C\3 ELE GVC KBX LOC MIB NAV NBC OCA OIL SAM SCU l nt
----------------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --- --- ---- ---- ---- -----
F-15E X X \a X X X \a X X X X X 10 83
F-117 X X X X X X X X X X X X 12 100
F-16 X X X X X X \a X X X X X 11 92
F-111F X \a X X X X \a X X \a X X 9 75
F/A-18 X X \a X X X X X X X X X 11 92
A-6E X X \a X X X X X X X X X 11 92
B-52 X X \a X X X \a X X X \a X 9 75
GR-1 X \a \a X X X \a \a X X \a X 7 58
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a No targets in this category were attacked, by aircraft type.
Although the F-117s attacked at least one target in each of the
12 categories, their taskings were concentrated on a narrow range of
target types within target categories. These types of targets were
typically fixed, small, and greatly reinforced, being deeply buried
or protected by concrete. F-117s conducted relatively few strikes in
categories where the targets were area or mobile (for example, MIB or
KBX targets). Characteristic F-117 targets had known locations and
did not require searching.
The relative contribution of the F-117 can also be assessed by
examining the number of targets assigned exclusively to it. Table
II.4 shows that the F-117 was assigned exclusive responsibility for
more targets than any other aircraft among the 862 BE-numbered
targets for which there are data. These targets were primarily in
C\3 , GVC, NBC, and SAM--categories that include known, fixed, often
hardened targets.
Table II.4
BE-Numbered Targets Assigned Exclusively
to One Type of Aircraft
Unkno Tota Perce
Aircraft C\3 ELE GVC LOC MIB NAV NBC OCA OIL SAM SCU wn l nt
---------------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --- --- ---- ----- ---- -----
A-6 8 3 0 2 4 4 0 2 1 3 0 0 27 14.6
B-52 3 4 0 0 8 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 19 11.7
FA-18 4 3 0 1 0 4 0 1 2 2 1 2 20 10.1
F-111F 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 6 0 1 1 1 16 13.6
F-117 94 3 13 7 7 0 8 4 2 27 3 7 175 46.3
F-15E 12 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 21 1 42 22.6
F-16 25 4 2 6 3 0 1 2 4 8 1 1 57 16.9
GR-1 1 0 0 7 1 0 0 1 7 0 0 12 29 46.0
TLAM 1 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 31.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Percent of all target assignments that were exclusive.
PREWAR TARGET ACQUISITION
CAPABILITIES VERSUS DESERT
STORM CAPABILITIES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.7
Here we address how the claimed prewar aircraft target acquisition
capabilities compared to those experienced in Desert Storm. The
capabilities of aircraft to locate targets and then deliver munitions
accurately against them is intimately connected to sensors that aid
the pilots in carrying out these tasks.
A series of steps must be performed to successfully attack a ground
target from the air, especially when precision munitions are being
used. For fixed targets that have been previously identified and
located, the delivery aircraft must navigate to the geographic
coordinates of the target and then pick it out from other
possibilities, such as neighboring buildings or other objects. For
mobile targets, the aircraft may have to search a broad area to find
and identify the right candidates for attack. For either type of
target, the pilot may need to determine that the target is a valid
one--for example, the extent of previous damage, if any; for
vehicles, what kind; whether the object is a decoy; and so forth.
TARGET SENSOR SYSTEMS
DEPLOYED IN DESERT STORM
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.8
Various sensor systems were used in Desert Storm to search for,
detect, and identify valid targets and to overcome impediments to
normal human vision, such as distance, light level (night versus
day), weather, clouds, fog, smoke, and dust. These sensor systems
can be grouped into three technology categories: infrared, radar,
and electro-optical. (See app. IX.) Each of these different sensor
technologies has been described to the Congress and to the public as
enhancing capability in poor visibility conditions, such as in the
day; at night; and in "poor," "adverse," or "all" weather conditions.
Table II.5 shows the prewar official descriptions of the capabilities
of the sensors as well as their Desert Storm demonstrated
capability.\15
Table II.5
Official Public Descriptions of the
Prewar and Desert Storm Capabilities of
Air-to-Ground Aircraft Sensors
Prewar description of Our findings on Desert
Target search and target-sensing Storm actual
Aircraft detection sensor capability capability
-------- ---------------------- ---------------------- ----------------------
F-117 Infrared (FLIR and Night only;\b weather Clear weather only;
DLIR)\a is "a constraint not flew exclusively at
imposed by technology night
limitations"\c
F-15E Infrared (LANTIRN) Day and night; All weather only with
radar "adverse weather" unguided bombs; clear
weather only for
guided munitions; flew
almost only at night
F-111F Infrared (Pave Tack) Day and night; "poor All weather only with
radar weather" unguided bombs; clear
weather only for
guided munitions; flew
almost only at night
A-6E Infrared (TRAM)\d Day and night; "all All weather only with
radar weather" unguided bombs; clear
weather only for
guided munitions; flew
day and night
F-16 Infrared, electro- Day and night; "under Clear weather only
optical (LANTIRN) and the weather" (Maverick); all
IR and EO (LANTIRN); "adverse weather only with
(Maverick),\e and weather" (Maverick) unguided bombs; flew
radar day and night
F/A- Infrared (FLIR) radar; Day and night and All weather only with
18\f electro-optical adverse weather unguided bombs; clear
(Walleye) capability not weather only for
prominently stated Walleye and FLIR pod;
flew day and night
A-10 Infrared and electro- Day and night capable; Clear weather only for
optical (Maverick) "adverse weather" guided (Maverick) and
(Maverick) unguided munitions;
flew day and night
B-52 Radar Day and night and All weather only with
weather capability not unguided bombs; flew
prominently stated day and night
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Forward- and downward-looking infrared.
\b Based on a postwar Air Force description; unofficial prewar
descriptions available to us did not make clear the night-only
limitation.
\c Prewar unclassified descriptions were unclear about the F-117's
weather capability, so this is a postwar statement.
\d Target recognition and attack multisensor.
\e Some F-16s were equipped with LANTIRN navigation pods but no
targeting pods.
\f See Naval Aviation: The Navy Is Taking Actions to Improve the
Combat Capabilities of Its Tactical Aircraft (GAO/NSIAD-93-204, July
7,1993).
--------------------
\15 Equipment and capabilities beyond those specifically described
and directly related to target sensing functions are not addressed.
For example, separate navigation and air-to-air combat equipment and
capabilities are not assessed.
EFFECT OF OPERATING
CONDITIONS ON TARGET SENSOR
PERFORMANCE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.9
Although desert environments are widely believed to exhibit
relatively nonhazy, dry weather providing uninhibited visibility,
there was actually great variation on this dimension in Desert Storm.
Moreover, winter weather in the gulf region during Desert Storm was
the worst in 14 years. Records show that there was at least
25-percent cloud cover on 31 of the war's 43 days, more than
50-percent cloud cover on 21 days, and more than 75 percent on 9
days. Also, there were occasionally violent winds and heavy rains.
As a result, the adverse-weather capabilities of the target-sensing
systems were frequently tested in the air campaign. While the
frequency and severity of cloud cover and poor weather were not
comparable to more adverse weather conditions normal for other
climates, they were not nearly as benign as had been expected.
IR, EO, and laser sensor systems demonstrated [DELETED] degradation
from adverse weather, such as clouds, rain, fog, and even haze and
humidity, [DELETED]. Sensors were also impeded by conflict-induced
conditions, such as dust and smoke from bombing. In effect, these
systems were simply [DELETED] systems as characterized by DOD. In
contrast, air-to-ground radar systems were not impeded by the weather
in Desert Storm. This permitted their use for delivery of unguided
munitions, although usually with low target resolution.
Similarly, night weapon delivery capabilities were tested, since as
noted previously, a large percentage of aircraft strikes were
conducted at night, including essentially all F-117 and F-111F
strikes and most F-15E strikes. Of the more than 28,000 U.S. combat
strikes and British Tornado strikes, about 13,000 (46 percent) were
flown at night.
At the same time, a number of conditions during the air campaign
aided the effectiveness of target-sensing systems. The flat, open,
terrain in the KTO, without significant foliage or sharp ground
contours, exposed targets to sensors and made all but the smallest
targets hard to conceal completely.\16 The desert climate provided a
strong heat contrast for targets on the desert floor, especially at
night. The flat, monochrome nature of much of the terrain presented
a good optical contrast during much of the day for EO systems, by
making objects or their shadows--when camouflaged--salient. The
Iraqi practice of deploying tanks in predictable patterns facilitated
their identification. Similarly, because many Iraqi frontline ground
units remained in fixed positions for nearly 6 weeks of the air
campaign--essentially until the coalition ground offensive
began--they were easy to find and not difficult to distinguish from
friendly forces.
[DELETED]
--------------------
\16 For example, there is evidence that the Iraqis took advantage of
areas where there was greater terrain variation to hide mobile Scud
launchers under bridges.
PERFORMANCE OF INFRARED
SENSORS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.9.1
Pilots generally reported that certain target sensors and bombing
systems gave them an effective capability to operate at night that
they otherwise would not have had. These assessments were
particularly relevant to the IR sensing systems, such as LANTIRN, IR
Maverick, TRAM, Pave Tack, and FLIR/DLIR.
[DELETED] F-15E pilots stated that they were "exponentially more
effective" with LANTIRN than without. The A-10 was able to operate
at night in significant numbers [DELETED].
IR sensors proved important for effective night attack; however,
pilots of virtually every aircraft type also told us about a variety
of limitations.
Effects of High-Altitude Releases on IR Sensor Resolution. During
the air campaign, the majority of bombs were released from aircraft
flying above 12,000 to 15,000 feet because Brig. Gen. John M.
Glosson ordered that restriction enforced after aircraft losses early
in the air campaign during low-altitude munition deliveries.\17
Higher altitudes provided a relative sanctuary from most air defenses
but resulted in a major compromise in terms of bomb accuracy and,
ultimately, effectiveness.\18 For example, some F/A-18 pilots
reported that bombing from high altitude sometimes meant a total
slant range to the target of 7 miles. At this range, even large
targets, like aircraft hangars, were "tiny" and hard to recognize.
[DELETED]
Several methods were used to help overcome poor target image
resolution. [DELETED]
Other Hindrances to IR Sensors. Pilots reported that a variety of
environmental conditions, some natural and some conflict-induced,
impeded the capabilities of their IR sensor systems. [DELETED]
--------------------
\17 Brig. Gen. Glosson was Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force
Middle East, and Director of Campaign Plans for the air campaign.
\18 In general, the higher an aircraft flew, the less vulnerable it
was to AAA, IR SAMs, and small arms fire.
FIELD OF VIEW AND OTHER
DESIGN PROBLEMS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.10
FIELD OF VIEW ISSUE
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.10.1
[DELETED]
ELECTRO-OPTICAL SYSTEMS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.11
EO sensors depended on both light and optical contrast for target
searching and identification. This obviated their use at night and
in any significantly adverse weather or visual conditions where the
line of sight to a target was obscured. The requirement for visual
contrast between the target and its immediate surroundings imposed an
additional problem: for Walleye delivery, F/A-18 pilots reported
that a target was sometimes indistinguishable from its own shadow.
This made it difficult to reliably designate the actual target,
rather than its shadow, for a true weapon hit. They also said that
the low-light conditions at dawn and dusk often provided insufficient
light for the required degree of optical contrast.
F/A-18 pilots told us that a "haze penetrator" version of Walleye
used low-light optics to see through daytime haze and at dawn and
dusk, permitting use in some of the conditions in which other optical
systems were limited. That notwithstanding, EO systems proved at
least as vulnerable to degradation as other sensors and lacked
full-time night capability.
RADAR SYSTEMS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.12
[DELETED]
Despite the target discrimination limitations of most radar systems,
they had the advantage of not being impeded by adverse weather.
However, even with this advantage, only comparatively inaccurate
unguided bombs could be delivered in poor weather since all the
guided munitions used in Desert Storm basically required clear
weather to enable their various IR, EO, and laser sensors and
designator systems to deliver munitions.
COMBAT OPERATIONS SUPPORT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3
A realistic evaluation of the performance of combat aircraft in
Desert Storm involves acknowledgment of the nature and magnitude of
their support. Here we address our third evaluation subquestion:
What was required in Desert Storm to support various air-to-ground
aircraft?
Targeting activity and the success of strike aircraft are
inextricably linked to the performance and availability of external
support assets. In many instances, aircraft relied on a number of
support assets to conduct missions: for example, refueling tankers;
airborne control platforms like AWACS; airborne platforms that permit
battlefield command and control capability like JSTARS (Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System); platforms that provide
fighter escort for strike aircraft (such as F-15Cs); airborne
platforms that conduct electronic warfare (such as F-4Gs, EA-6Bs, and
EF-111s); and airborne reconnaissance platforms that collect
intelligence and information used for BDA and those that detect and
monitor threats.
Approximately 1,011 U.S. fixed-wing combat aircraft were deployed to
Desert Storm, compared to 577 support aircraft, or a ratio of 1.75 to
1.\19 While combat aircraft outnumbered support aircraft in Desert
Storm, the latter flew more sorties--a fact that is important to
consider for future military contingencies. Nearly 50,000 sorties
were conducted in support of approximately 40,000 combat
air-to-ground sorties, for a ratio of about 1.25 to 1. Support
aircraft were relied upon for air-to-ground and air-to-air missions
in Desert Storm, both of which were conducted around the clock. To
support the efforts of combat aircraft, the smaller number of
combat-support platforms would have had to fly more sorties.
--------------------
\19 See GWAPS, vol. V, pt. I (Secret), pp. 31-32. Fixed-wing Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft as of February 1, 1991, are
the only aircraft included in the 1,011 total. Aircraft identified
as "Special Operations" are not included. Combat aircraft include
fighters, long-range bombers, attack aircraft, and gunships.
Combat-support aircraft include tankers, airlift, reconnaissance,
surveillance, and electronic combat aircraft.
DESERT STORM AS A
TANKER-DEPENDENT WAR
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.1
IN-FLIGHT AIRCRAFT
REFUELING
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3.1.1
One of the combat-support platforms that was perhaps most critical to
the execution of the air campaign was the aerial refueling tanker.
Most Desert Storm combat missions required refueling because of
around-the-clock operations and the great distances from many
coalition aircraft bases and U.S. aircraft carriers in the Red Sea
to targets in Iraq.\20 Virtually every type of strike and direct
combat support aircraft required air refueling. At least 339 U.S.
in-flight refueling tankers off-loaded more than 800 million pounds
of fuel. For Air Force tankers alone, there were approximately
60,184 recorded refueling events. On average, over the 43-day air
campaign, there were 1,399 refueling events per day, or approximately
58 per hour.
Table II.6 shows the percentages of total known refueling events
accounted for by some of the U.S. platforms reviewed here (data on
the F-117 were "not releasable").\21 Among all the known, recorded,
Desert Storm refueling events from U.S. Air Force tankers, the F-16
and F-15 account for the highest percentages among the selected
platforms.\22
Table II.6
Percent of Total Known Refueling Events
for Selected Air-to-Ground Platforms
Platform Percent\a
-------------------------------------------------------- ------------
F-16 23.0
F-15 20.0
F/A-18 9.5
A-10 6.0
F-111 4.3
B-52 3.5
A-6 3.4
F-117 \b
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Percentages of the total known number of Desert Storm refueling
events from U.S. Air Force tankers only.
\b Data were not available.
To put the percentage of aircraft refueling events in context, we
examined the extent to which the number of known refueling events was
related to the number of strikes that platforms conducted. We found
that the statistical correlation between the number of refueling
events and the number of strikes was large, indicating that among all
aircraft considered, there was a positive relationship.\23 In effect,
as the number of strikes conducted by all the included aircraft
increased, generally, so did the number of refuelings required by
those aircraft. This is clearly illustrated by the F-16s, which
accounted for both the largest percentage of known aircraft refueling
events and the largest number of strikes among the platforms
reviewed.
--------------------
\20 DOD's title V report (Secret), p. 115.
\21 Although the number of F-117 refueling events was not available,
we developed an approximation measure in order to estimate a lower
bound of their number. Based on the reported number of F-117 Desert
Storm sorties (1,299) and the minimum number of reported refueling
events per sortie (2), we estimate the lower bound of F-117 refueling
events to be 2,598, or 4.1 percent of a total of 62,782 from U.S.
Air Force tankers only.
\22 Not only U.S. Air Force platforms received fuel from U.S. Air
Force tankers. Air Force tankers provided fuel for some non-Air
Force aircraft, including some Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.
Therefore, the percentages reported in table II.6 are percentages
based on total number of refueling events for Air Force aircraft
only.
\23 Pearson correlation coefficient, r = 0.69. Strikes conducted
against strategic targets as reported in our WOE/TOE analysis, which
does not include F-117 data.
IN-FLIGHT REFUELING
COMPLICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3.1.2
In-flight refueling is a normal, routine part of air operations and
not one for which aircrew or tanker crew were unprepared. However, a
number of factors in the Desert Storm environment caused this routine
process to become highly complex and sometimes quite dangerous for
tankers as well as other airborne platforms and, in instances,
resulted in restrictions or limitations in air operations.
The use of large strike packages as well as constant,
around-the-clock air strikes resulted in heavily congested air space
during most of the air campaign. The number of airborne aircraft was
sometimes constrained by the number of tankers that had to be present
to meet refueling needs. Aircraft strikes on targets were sometimes
canceled or aborted because aircraft were unable to get to a tanker.
To preserve tactical surprise as well as to keep tankers, which have
no self-protection capability, out of the range of Iraqi SAMs, nearly
all tanker tracks or orbits occurred in the limited airspace over
northern Saudi Arabia, south of the Iraqi border.\24 The heavily
saturated airspace alone increased the probability of near midair
collisions (NMAC). Nighttime operations and operations in bad
weather only exacerbated an already complex, precarious, operational
environment.\25
The Air Force Inspection and Safety Center reported 37 Desert Storm
NMACs, believing, however, that these were only a fraction of the
actual number. In one reported NMAC, a KC-135 tanker crew saw two
fighter aircraft approaching from the rear, appearing to be rejoining
on the tanker. It became apparent to the tanker crew that the
fighters had not seen the tanker. The tanker crew accelerated to
create spacing, avoiding an NMAC, but the reported distance between
the fighters and the tanker was only between 50 and 100 feet before
evasive action was taken.
--------------------
\24 We were told by several Desert Storm pilots, from different
units, that there were instances in which tankers had to cross over
into Iraq to refuel aircraft that would not have made it back to the
tanker before running out of fuel.
\25 We made several recommendations for enhancing the efficiency of
aerial refueling operations based on Desert Storm. See Operation
Desert Storm: An Assessment of Aerial Refueling Operational
Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-94-68, Nov. 15, 1993).
AIRBORNE SENSOR AIRCRAFT
SUPPORT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.2
The U.S. air order of battle (AOB) during the third week of the air
campaign indicates that over 200 airborne sensor aircraft, providing
a range of combat-support duties, were in the Persian Gulf theater.
These included a variety of reconnaissance, surveillance, electronic
combat, and battlefield command and control platforms. A discussion
of the roles of each of these can be found in appendix X.
STRIKE SUPPORT-RELATED
MISSIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.3
Combat air patrol (CAP), escort missions, and SEAD are types of
combat-support missions that, in Desert Storm, were frequently tied
directly to aircraft strike missions or were conducted in areas near
where strikes were occurring and, therefore, also benefited strike
aircraft.
CAP missions protect air or ground forces from enemy air attack
within an essentially fixed geographic area. In Desert Storm, these
included coalition ships, aircraft striking targets, and high-value
air assets such as AWACS and tankers. Escort missions were normally
conducted by air-to-air fighter aircraft and were used to protect
strike aircraft from attack by enemy air forces en route to and
returning from missions. In contrast to CAP, escorts do not remain
in a relatively fixed area but, rather, stay with the strike package.
Fighter escort also served as force protection, when needed, for
airborne assets such as AWACS and tankers that have limited or no
self-protection capability. Finally, jamming and SEAD support
aircraft like EF-111s, EA-6Bs, and F-4Gs provided direct support to
strike packages or target area support that benefited nearby strike
aircraft.
Figure II.3 compares the number of CAP, SEAD, and escort strike
support missions conducted during each week of the Desert Storm air
campaign. Overall, the total number of CAP missions was somewhat
greater than SEAD missions and substantially greater than escort
missions, and there were no significant fluctuations in this number
during the 6-week air campaign. That CAPs were often necessary for
combat-support aircraft (such as tankers and AWACS) as well as strike
aircraft may explain the greater number of CAP missions relative to
SEAD and escort missions. In figure II.3, we also observe that the
only type of combat support-related activity that actually showed
some gradual decline over time was escort missions. This is logical
given that the threat from enemy aircraft was significantly
diminished, if not eliminated, by the second week of the air
campaign.
Figure II.3: Strike Support
Missions by Week
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The only notable drop in SEAD missions was after the first week of
the air campaign. However, the number remained rather static during
the following 5 weeks. This may reflect the fact that although the
Iraqi IADS had been disrupted early in the air campaign, numerous SAM
and AAA sites remained a threat, with autonomous radars, until the
end of the war. The fact that there was not a consistent decline in
SEAD missions, over time, suggests that simply destroying the
integrated capabilities of the air defense system did not,
unfortunately, eliminate its many component parts. (This is
discussed further in app. VI.)
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
PERSONNEL
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.4
The range of combat-related support encompasses some understanding of
the personnel required to maintain airborne assets. In Desert Storm,
approximately 17,000 Air Force personnel had force maintenance
responsibilities. This figure accounts for approximately 31 percent
of the total Air Force population in the area of responsibility.
SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR THE
F-117 WAS UNDERSTATED
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.5
Shortly after Desert Storm, Air Force Gen. John M. Loh told the
Congress that
"Stealth . . . restores the critically important element of
surprise to the conduct of all our air missions" and " . . .
stealth allows us to use our available force structure more
efficiently because it allows us to attack more targets with
fewer fighters and support aircraft."\26
In describing the performance of the F-117 in Desert Storm, another
Air Force general testified that
"Stealth enabled us to gain surprise each and every day of the
war. . . . Stealth allows operations without the full range
of support assets required by non-stealthy aircraft."\27
In contrast, as discussed previously, conventional aircraft in Desert
Storm were routinely supported by SEAD, CAP, and escort aircraft.
Because F-117s could attack with much less support than conventional
bombers, they were credited with being "force multipliers," allowing
a more efficient use of conventional attack and support assets.\28
For example, in their April 1991 post-Desert Storm testimony to the
Congress, Gens. Horner and Glosson testified that 8 F-117s, needing
the support of only 2 tankers, could achieve the same results as a
package of 16 LGB-capable, nonstealth bombers that required 39
support aircraft or 32 non-LGB capable, nonstealth bombers that
required 43 support aircraft.\29 The Air Force depicted this
comparison in its congressional testimony with the graphic reproduced
as figure II.4.\30
Figure II.4: " The Value of
Stealth"
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense (Apr.
30, 1991), p. 472.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
In figure II.4, the use of the stealthy F-117 in Desert Storm is
depicted as having several positive effects: it reduces the number
of aircraft employed on a mission, thereby reducing overall costs; it
reduces the number of aircraft and pilots at risk; and it increases
the number of missions that can be tasked without increasing the
number of aircraft.\31 However, following our review of after-action
reports and interviews with F-117 pilots and planners, we found that
this depiction does not adequately convey the (1) specific operating
procedures required by the F-117, (2) modifications in tactics during
the campaign to better achieve surprise, and (3) support, in addition
to tanking, that it received.
--------------------
\26 Testimony by Gen. Loh (then USAF, Commander, Tactical Air
Command). Department of Defense Appropriations for 1992, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on the Department, of Defense, House
Committee on Appropriations, Apr. 30, 1991, p. 510.
\27 Testimony by Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, then commander of 9th
Air Force and Central Command U.S. Air Forces, before the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Apr. 30, 1991, pp. 468-69.
\28 Information that would definitively address the extent to which
the F-117s were detected by the Iraqis and the extent to which the
F-117s were supported by other airborne assets in Desert Storm is
classified. We requested but were not granted access to information
that would have enabled us to fully understand the detectability of
the F-117 during Desert Storm. Although that information could not
have been presented in this report, our review of it would have given
us greater confidence that the information contained in the report
was reliable and valid. The information presented in this section
was the best we could obtain given our limited access to records.
\29 House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (Apr. 30, 1991), p.
472.
\30 Figure II.4 depicts two actual strike packages employed against
the Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility. Appendix XI addresses the
effectiveness of the conventional (F-16) and the stealth (F-117)
strike packages against this target.
\31 The "value of stealth" depicted in figure II.4 is essentially
anecdotal--it depicts two missions flown during the first week of the
campaign. The Air Force does not cite evidence that this represents
the typical, or average, use of support aircraft by conventional and
stealth aircraft in Desert Storm. For example, because the standard
package illustrated for the conventional fighters was substantially
downsized by the end of the first week of the air campaign, as the
threat level was reduced, the claimed life-cycle cost for each of
these packages is not necessarily an appropriate measure for
comparison. As discussed here, the depiction does not properly
credit other (nontanker) support assets that helped the F-117s attain
their Desert Storm achievements.
F-117 DETECTABILITY AND
OPERATING PROCEDURES
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3.5.1
In addition to its low observable features, the F-117 achieves
stealthy flight through the avoidance of daylight, active sensors or
communications, and enemy air defense radars.
[DELETED] Every F-117 strike mission in Desert Storm was carried out
at night.
[DELETED]
Stealth Requires Extensive Mission Planning. Each pilot has an
individual mission plan tailored to the assigned target and the
threats that surround the target. Because F-117s are not "invisible"
to radar but, rather, as the Air Force points out, are "low
observable," a computerized mission planning system [DELETED].
[DELETED]\32
--------------------
\32 The F-117s were deployed to King Khalid Air Base near Khamis
Mushait in the southwestern corner of Saudi Arabia. Mission times
averaged over 5 hours.
STEALTH AND TACTICAL
SURPRISE IN DESERT STORM
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3.5.2
A significant claim made by the Air Force is that because of stealth,
F-117s were able to achieve tactical surprise each night of the
campaign, including the first night when F-117s attacked the key
Iraqi air defense nodes and, in so doing, opened the way for attacks
by nonstealth aircraft, thereby greatly reducing potential losses.
However, we found the following Desert Storm information to be
inconsistent with the Air Force claim.
AAA Before and After F-117 Bomb Impacts. A number of Air Force
officials told us that because AAA did not start until after the
first F-117 bombs had exploded, this was evidence that F-117s had
achieved tactical surprise. However, we found that the absence of
AAA prior to bomb impact was neither consistent for all F-117
missions nor unique to F-117s.
An Air Force after-action report stated that in the case of the A-10,
AAA began after the first bomb detonation, not just sometimes but "in
most cases" and in "the majority of first passes."\33
Similarly, pilots of other aircraft, including F-16s and F-15Es, also
reported the same phenomenon. They encountered no AAA until after
their bombs exploded, and like the F-117s, they were subject to AAA
primarily during egress from the target. Moreover, F-117 pilots told
us that, on occasion, AAA in a target area would erupt
"spontaneously"--before they had released their bombs or the bombs
had exploded. In response to this threat, the F-117 Tactical
Employment manual states (on pp. 3-11, 3-29, and 3-31) that F-117
refueling and jamming support procedures were altered during Desert
Storm to delay "spontaneous" AAA in the target area.
[DELETED]
In sum, the claim that the F-117s consistently achieved tactical
surprise is not fully consistent with the information we obtained.
The absence of AAA prior to F-117 bomb impact was not universally
observed and was not unique to the F-117. [DELETED]
--------------------
\33 57th Fighter Weapons Wing, Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Nellis Air
Force Base 92-2 (Secret), pp. 6-7 and 6-8.
F-117S BENEFIT FROM
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3.5.3
In contrast to the Air Force illustration to the Congress that F-117s
require only tanker support in combat (see fig. II.4), Desert Storm
reports and participants stated explicitly that the F-117s did, in
fact, receive more than just tanker support in Desert Storm.
At the end of 1991, after press accounts stated that the Air Force
had exaggerated the degree to which F-117s operated without defense
suppression and jamming support, Air Force officials then concurred
that standoff jamming from EF-111s had been employed from time to
time in conjunction with F-117 strikes.\34
This position--that the F-117 did, in fact, benefit from jamming on
occasion--is more consistent with the title V report than with the
Air Force's testimony in April 1991 that failed to note nontanking
combat support having been provided to F-117s in Desert Storm. As
discussed previously, the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW)
lessons-learned report unambiguously describes how jamming assets
were incorporated in F-117 tactics and operations. Pilot interviews
and portions of the lessons-learned report also suggest that F-117s,
occasionally, benefited from fighter support aircraft.
[DELETED]
In terms of air-to-air fighter support, the Air Force states that
there was typically little or none provided for the F-117s. The
Desert Storm "Lessons Learned" section of the F-117 Tactical
Employment manual is unclear on this issue, stating (on p. 3-29)
that
"Unit coordination with the F-15s occurred each day. While we
never had any F-15s tied to us, we had to make sure they
understood our general plan for the night."
In addition, several pilots we interviewed believed that air-to-air,
F-15 aircraft were in a position to challenge any Iraqi interceptors
that would have posed a threat to the F-117s.
--------------------
\34 Bruce B. Auster, "The Myth of the Lone Gunslinger," U.S. News
and World Report, November 18, 1991, p. 52, and Davis A. Fulghhum,
"F-117 Pilots, Generals Tell Congress About Stealth's Value in Gulf
War," Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 6, 1991, pp. 66-67, as
reported in GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Secret), p. 354.
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4
The percentage of aircraft lost and damaged in Desert Storm was very
low--compared both to planners' expectations and to historic
experience. The attrition rates of the Israeli air force in the 1967
and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars were about 10 times those of Desert Storm.
Coalition combat aircraft conducted approximately 65,000 combat
sorties in Desert Storm. A total of 38 aircraft was lost to Iraqi
action, and
48 other aircraft were damaged in combat, making a total of 86 combat
casualties. However, of these casualties, only 55 involved any of
the
8 air-to-ground U.S. aircraft under review, of which just 16 were
losses, with the remaining 39 being damage incidents. All coalition
aircraft casualties and the known causes are shown in table II.7,
with the aircraft under review listed first; for comparison, TLAM en
route losses are also shown.\35
Table II.7
Type of Coalition Aircraft Lost or
Damaged and Attributed Cause
Radar
Aircraft SAM IR SAM AAA Other Total
-------------- ------ ------ ---- -------------- ================
F-117 lost 0 0 0 0 0
F-117 damaged 0 0 0 0 0
F-111F lost 0 0 0 0 0
F-111F damaged 0 0 3 0 3
F-15E lost 1 0 1 0 2
F-15E damaged 0 0 0 0 0
A-6E lost 1 0 2 0 3
A-6E damaged 0 0 3 2 5
O/A-10 lost 0 6 0 0 6
O/A-10 damaged 0 3 11 0 14
F-16 lost 2 0 1 0 3
F-16 damaged 1 2 0 1 4
F/A-18 lost 0 0 0 2\a 2
F/A-18 damaged 0 7 1 0 8
B-52 lost 0 0 0 0 0
B-52 damaged 2 1 2 0 5
GR-1 lost\b 4 1 2 2 9
GR-1 damaged\b 1 0 0 0 1
Other lost\c 2 6 3 2 13
Other 0 2 4 2 8
damaged\c
======================================================================
Total lost 10 13 9 6 38
======================================================================
Total damaged 4 15 24 5 48
======================================================================
Total 14 28 33 11 86
casualties
TLAM lost\d 0 0 0 [DELETED] [DELETED]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a One loss was attributed by GWAPS to a MIG-25; the second was
stated as unknown.
\b GR-1 data in this table include aircraft from the United Kingdom,
Italy, and Saudi Arabia.
\c These rows include AC-130, EF-111, F-4G, F-14, F-15C, AV-8B,
OV-10, A-4, F-5A, and Jaguar casualties. While these aircraft are
not part of the focus of this report, they are included in this table
as part of our discussion of the effectiveness of the Iraqi air
defenses.
\d TLAM losses are based on a study by Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) and DIA that found that of the 230 TLAM Cs and D-Is, an
estimated [DELETED] did not arrive at their target areas. An
additional 30 TLAM Cs with airburst mode warheads and 22 D-IIs could
not be assessed. If the hit rate for these 52 TLAMS is assumed to be
the same as for the 230 assessable TLAM Cs and D-Is, then an
additional [DELETED] TLAMS did not arrive at their targets. Thus, an
estimate for the total losses, using this assumption, would be a
minimum of [DELETED] and a maximum of [DELETED].
Source: GWAPS, vol. V, pt. I (Secret), pp. 670-81.
--------------------
\35 By aircraft "casualties," we mean both aircraft that were lost
and aircraft that were damaged. While some, but not all, damaged
aircraft were returned to service after repairs of varying extent and
while there can be important differences between an aircraft that is
lost and one that is damaged, we include damaged aircraft in our
analysis for the following reasons: (1) air defense systems that
incur only damage nonetheless often achieve their aim of forcing the
damaged aircraft to return to base before the target is reached or
weapons are released; (2) DOD reports and statements made about
various aircraft refer not just to lost aircraft but also to hits
from air defense systems; and (3) including damaged aircraft is more
analytically conservative--that is, in assessing air defense systems
and aircraft survivability, it is impossible to predict for the
purposes of deriving "lessons learned" whether a hit will result in a
loss or merely damage.
RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF
IRAQI THREAT SYSTEMS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.1
The system perceived before Desert Storm as most threatening--radar
SAMs--actually accounted for less than one-fifth the number of
casualties caused by AAA and IR SAMs. Moreover, the system generally
considered to be a lesser threat, AAA, proved throughout the war to
be quite lethal.
The data in table II.7 show that small, portable, shoulder-launched
SAMs with IR guidance systems were the leading cause of Desert Storm
aircraft kills, responsible for 13 of 38 (34 percent), followed by 10
(26 percent) attributed to radar SAMs and 9 (24 percent) to AAA. In
contrast, AAA was the leading cause of damage to aircraft, accounting
for 24 of 48 cases (50 percent of total damaged). IR SAMs were the
next leading cause of damage, with 15 cases (31 percent), and radar
SAMs were last, with 4 cases (8 percent).
If we sum the losses and damage by cause, portable IR SAMs accounted
for 31 percent of the total casualties, and AAA accounted for 38
percent--both more than twice the 16 percent of total casualties from
radar SAMs. In effect, the data show that the antiair threat
assessed by many both before and during the war as the "high" threat
system--radar SAMs--was responsible for just 16 percent of the
coalition's total casualties. Conversely, the expected "low threat"
AAA and man-portable IR SAMs, such as the 1970's vintage SA-7, which
made up the majority of the Iraqi IR SAM force, accounted for 71
percent of total casualties (58 percent of total kills and 81 percent
of total damage cases).
There are a number of possible explanations for this overall
inversion of the perceived high and low threats to combat aircraft.
First, radar SAM sites proved vulnerable to attack and destruction
from U.S. high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) and other SEAD
systems that were able to detect and thus locate radar systems and
directly attack them.\36 Every time a SAM radar was turned on, it
provided a beacon for the weapons that could attack it--as occurred
frequently, according to pilots.
Second, and directly related, when the Iraqis operating the SAM sites
chose not to turn on their radars, to avoid being detected and
attacked, and then launched the SAMs ballistically--that is, without
radar guidance--the SAMs could not track a moving aircraft.
Therefore, these SAMS had little, if any, chance of damaging
aircraft, which could easily evade them by maneuvering out of their
path.
In effect, the radar that was critical to ensuring SAM lethality made
every SAM site vulnerable to destruction by U.S. SEAD aircraft.
Further, coordination among SAM sites was essentially precluded by
the fact that, as explained above, the Iraqi IADS proved vulnerable
to disruption and degradation very early in the air campaign.\37 As a
result, coalition aircraft were generally not threatened by a
well-integrated air defense system, with coordinated multiple defense
layers, but rather by hundreds of autonomously operating SAM and AAA
sites with individual radar(s), and by thousands of inherently
mobile, portable, shoulder-launched IR SAMs and thousands of AAA guns
without radars.
Figure II.5 shows the day-by-day coalition aircraft casualties from
radar-guided SAMs for the 43 days of the war. After day 5, aircraft
casualties from radar-guided SAMs dropped off sharply: there were
nine casualties over the first 5 days but only five more from
radar-guided SAMs during the remaining 38 days of the war.
In sharp contrast to the readily detectable and locatable
radar-guided SAMs (of which there were hundreds), neither IR SAMs nor
optically aimed AAA emit any signal during their search and
acquisition phase. Moreover, there were thousands of AAA sites
throughout Iraq and the KTO and thousands of portable IR SAMs in the
KTO. Except for the small number of fixed AAA sites that had, and
actually used, radar, all IR SAMs and most AAA were very hard to find
before they were actually used. As a result, even at the end of the
war, pilots reported little if any diminution of AAA, and aircraft
casualties from AAA and IR SAMs continued up to February 27--at the
end of the war. As the Desert Storm "Lessons Learned" section of the
F-117 Tactical Employment manual reported (on p. 3-29), "The threats
[to aircraft] were never attrited . . . AAA tended to be the
highest threat."
Figure II.5: Combat Aircraft
Casualties From Radar SAMS
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Air tasking order day (ATODAY).
Figure II.6 shows clearly that 17 aircraft casualties occurred within
the first 24 hours, or nearly 20 percent of the war's entire aircraft
casualties (during less than 2.5 percent of its total length). It
was during this time that Iraqi defenses were at their strongest and
were first attacked and that coalition pilots were at their lowest
levels of Desert Storm combat experience. Similarly, there was a
significantly higher overall daily casualty rate in the first 5 days
of the war, during which 31 aircraft casualties occurred (36 percent
of the total and an average of 6.2 per day), compared to the
following 38 days, with a total of 55 more casualties (an average of
1.45 per day).
This diminution in aircraft casualty rates may partly be explained by
the fact that losses to radar-guided SAMs fell to nearly 0 after day
5, having accounted for 29 percent (9 out of 31) of total casualties
by then. They accounted for just 9 percent (5 out of 55) of all
aircraft casualties in the remainder of the war. It is apparent,
therefore, that by the end of day 5 of the air campaign, radar SAMs
had been virtually eliminated as an effective threat to coalition
aircraft.
Figure II.6: Daytime Combat
Aircraft Casualties From All
Threats
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Moreover, in the first 3 days of the war, some aircraft (B-52s,
A-6Es, GR-1s, and F-111Fs) attacked at very low altitude, where they
found they were vulnerable to low-altitude defenses--AAA and IR SAMs.
As a result, on day two, Brig. Gen. Glosson ordered that all
coalition aircraft observe a minimum attack level of about 12,000
feet. While probably improving overall survivability, this tactic
also resulted in much less accuracy with unguided weapons (see
discussion in app. III). In effect, Brig. Gen. Glosson's order
served to manage the attrition rate of the air campaign, taking into
account the view, as one general stated, that no Iraqi target was so
important as to justify the loss of a pilot's life.
Since the effects of having degraded the Iraqi IADS cannot be easily
separated out from the effects of also consistently flying only at
higher altitudes, the extent to which the latter decreased
vulnerability cannot be quantitatively specified. However, there are
data on the altitude at which 32 U.S. Air Force aircraft casualties
occurred (data were not available for other aircraft). Of these 32
cases, 21, or about two-thirds, were hit at or below 12,000 feet.\38
This suggests that the altitude floor did serve to save lives.\39
Figure II.6 also shows that after the first week, aircraft casualties
occurred sporadically, but there were 17 hits during the last week of
the war. Since only two of these were attributed to a radar-guided
SAM, it is apparent that AAA and IR SAMs remained potential threats
to the end. The casualty data therefore confirm the statements of
numerous pilots who told us that, unlike radar SAMs, AAA and IR SAMs
were never effectively suppressed, thereby continuing as lethal
threats throughout the war.
--------------------
\36 Aircraft with HARMs or those that engaged in SEAD included the
A-10, F/A-18, F-16, F-15E, F-117, F-111F, B-52, GR-1, F-4G, A-6E,
EA-6B, and EF-111.
\37 See the "Operating Conditions" section above and appendix VI.
See also Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC), Proud Flame
Predictive Analysis for Iraq (Secret), San Antonio, September 1990,
p. 28.
\38 Of those 21, 12 were A-10 casualties. A-10s were permitted to
operate below 12,000 feet to as low as 4,000 to 7,000 feet on January
31 and thereafter. After January 31 is when 10 of the 12 medium- to
low-altitude casualties occurred.
\39 Additional evidence that low-altitude deliveries were more lethal
than higher ones can be found in the pattern of A-6E and British
Tornado losses. Of the seven British Tornados that were lost, four
were shot down during the first week of the campaign at very low
altitude while conducting strikes against airfields. In an analysis,
DIA concluded that the basic cause was delivering ordnance at very
low altitude in the face of very heavy defenses, rather than being
the function of a defect in the aircraft. After the change to
medium-altitude deliveries, only three more British Tornados were
lost in the remaining 5 weeks of the air campaign. A-6E pilots told
us that their casualty rate dropped significantly after units using
low-altitude tactics switched to high altitudes.
AIRCRAFT CASUALTY RATES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.2
Aircraft casualty rates can be calculated by dividing casualties by
total sorties or total strikes. Table II.8 shows aircraft casualty
rates per strike for the aircraft under review.
The overall aircraft casualty rate was 0.0017 per strike, or in other
words, about 0.0017 aircraft were lost or damaged per strike in
Desert Storm. The F-117 was the only aircraft under review that
reported no losses or damage. However, using an analysis performed
in DOD but not publicly reported, we calculated the likelihood of a
nonstealthy aircraft being hit if it flew the same number of strikes
as the F-117 (that is, 1,788), with a general probability of hit
equal to 0.0017.\40 This calculation showed that 0 hits would be the
most likely outcome for a nonstealthy aircraft conducting 1,788
strikes. This indicates that although there were no F-117 casualties
in Desert Storm, the difference between its survivability and other
aircraft may arise from its smaller number of strikes as much as
other factors.
Table II.8
Desert Storm Aircraft Casualty Rates
Total Total Aircraft casualty
Aircraft casualties strikes rate per strike
-------------------------- ---------- ---------- ------------------
F-117 0 1,788 0
F-111F 3 2,802 0.0011
F-15E 2 2,124 0.0009
A-6E 8 2,617 0.0031
O/A-10 20 8,640\a 0.0023
F-16 7 11,698 0.0006
F/A-18 10 4,551 0.0022
B-52 5 1,706 0.0029
GR-1 10 1,317 0.0076
======================================================================
Total 65\b 37,243 0.0017
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Precise A-10 strike data were not available. GWAPS recorded 8,640
A-10 sorties. Given the definition of a strike, the number of A-10
strikes may have been larger than the number of bombing sorties. If
the number of A-10 strikes is larger than 8,640, then its per-strike
aircraft casualty rate would be lower.
\b Totals do not conform to the total shown for all coalition
aircraft in this table because only the air-to-ground aircraft under
review are included.
--------------------
\40 This analysis considers only the number of strikes flown.
Factors known to be related to aircraft survivability--for example,
the severity of defenses and the time of day when strikes were
conducted--were not factored into the analysis.
AIRCRAFT CASUALTIES DURING
NIGHT ATTACKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.3
Other ways to compare Desert Storm aircraft casualty rates put the
F-117's survival rate in a clearer perspective. Since the F-117s
attacked only at night, we examined the casualties for other aircraft
during night missions, in effect controlling for daylight (when
optically aimed antiaircraft weapons can be used most effectively).
Data on whether aircraft casualties occurred in day or at night were
provided for 61 of the 86 coalition aircraft casualties. Twenty-five
(29 percent) were not identified as either day or night and were
presumably unknown or unrecorded. Of the 61, 44 (72 percent) of the
casualties with a known time occurred in daytime; 17 (28 percent)
occurred at night. (See table II.9.) These and other data strongly
suggest that flying combat operations at night was safer than flying
during the day.
Table II.9
Aircraft Casualties in Day and Night
Aircraft Lost Damaged Lost Damaged
-------------- -------------- ---------- -------------- ----------
F-117 \a \a \a \a
F-111F \a \a \a 3
F-15E \a \a 2 \a
A-6E 2 1 1 \a
O/A-10 6 12 \a \a
F-16 3 3 \a \a
B-52 \a 2 \a 1
F/A-18 1 \a 1 \a
GR-1 3 \a 4 \a
Other 11 \a 4 1
======================================================================
Total 26 18 12 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a No casualties or no day or night data on casualties.
Five types of aircraft--F-111Fs, F-15Es, A-6Es, A-10s, and
F-16s--flew at least as many night strikes as the F-117. As shown in
table II.9, of these aircraft, F-111Fs, A-10s, and F-16s also
incurred no losses at night, and the A-6Es, A-10s, and F-16s received
no damage at night. In this context, it is notable that the aircraft
that incurred the highest absolute number of casualties, but not the
highest attrition rate, the A-10, incurred neither losses nor damage
at night, although it conducted approximately the same number of
night sorties as the F-117. These data suggest that, in Desert
Storm, flying at night was much safer than during the day, regardless
of size of radar cross-section or other aircraft-specific
characteristics.
The casualty data also show that after the first few days of the war,
the number of night casualties fell off considerably. Of the 17
identifiable nighttime casualties, all but 3 occurred during the
first 6 days of the war. There are two plausible, complementary
explanations for this. First, by day five, the IADS and radar SAMs,
which were unaffected by time of day, had been rendered ineffective
through a combination of actual destruction to radar facilities and
deterrence in turning radars on, achieved through bombing. Second,
after day three, most low-altitude attacks, and their lower survival
rates, were terminated. Thus, by the end of the first week, the only
air defense weapon that was not impeded at night--radar SAMs--had
been suppressed and the optically aimed AAA and IR SAMs that were
impeded by night were reduced in effectiveness by the coalition's use
of high-altitude tactics.
In effect, the data indicate that most Desert Storm aircraft
casualties occurred during the day. Therefore, it is simply less
likely that any aircraft, including the F-117, which operated only at
night, would have been hit or lost, especially after radar SAMs were
suppressed and low-altitude attacks were discontinued.
AIR DEFENSE CONCENTRATIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.4
Because no F-117s were lost or damaged in Desert Storm, they have
been thought of as uniquely survivable, compared to other aircraft.
Indeed, the Air Force contended in its September 1991 Desert Storm
white paper that "the F-117 was the only airplane that planners dared
risk over downtown Baghdad" where air defenses are claimed to have
been uniquely dense or severe.\41
--------------------
\41 USAF, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States
Air Force in the Gulf War
(Sept. 1991), p. 56.
DOWNTOWN THREATS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4.4.1
More radar-guided SAM systems were deployed to the Baghdad area than
any other area in Iraq, and diagrams of SAM coverage confirm that the
greatest concentration of defenses were in that area. (Table II.10
presents the number and location of Iraqi SAM batteries.)
Table II.10
Number and Location of Iraqi SAM
Batteries
SA- SA- SA- SA-
Location 2 3 6 8 Roland Total
------------------------------ ---- ---- ---- ---- ------ ======
Mosul/Kirkuk 1 12 0 1 2 16
H-2/H-3 1 0 6 0 6 13
Talil/Jalibah 1 0 0 0 2 3
Basrah 2 0 8 0 5 15
Baghdad 10 16 8 15 9 58
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: USAF, History of the Air Campaign, p. 254.
However, it is relevant to note that the defense systems located in
the Baghdad area did not necessarily protect downtown Baghdad at a
higher threat level than the rest of the overall metropolitan area.
This would be logical, since likely targets for any of Iraq's
adversaries were not only downtown, but were dispersed--along with
radar SAM sites--throughout the Baghdad area. The distribution of
radar SAMs deployed to the overall Baghdad region is shown in figure
II.7. These include SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, and Roland missiles.
Figure II.7: Radar-Guided SAM
Locations in the Baghdad Area
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: 52nd Fighter Wing
Desert Storm, A success story ,
Briefing, GWAPS Files, GWAP,
vol. IV, pt. I: Weapons,
Tactics, and Training Report
(unclassified), p. 12.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The greatest concentrations of radar SAMs were clearly not in the
center of the city but, rather, in its outlying regions. The lethal
range of these systems was described by Air Force intelligence
experts as extending over the general Baghdad area, as far as 60
miles outside the city.
Moreover, because the engagement range of the five different types of
SAMs varied, and because they were dispersed throughout the Baghdad
area, it appears unlikely that they somehow converged over the
downtown area to make it the most dangerous locus of all. The
maximum engagement ranges of the systems varied from 3.5 miles for
the Roland to 27 miles for the SA-2.\42 Only the Vietnam-era vintage
SA-2s would have had sufficient range to cover most of the area shown
in figure II.7 and to converge over the center of the city.\43
For the others, with ranges varying from 3.5 to 13 miles, the
deployment pattern shows that the densest concentrations of
overlapping radar SAM defenses were outside downtown Baghdad.
[DELETED]
With regard to the two other principal antiaircraft defenses, IR SAMS
and AAA, there were clearly more AAA sites in the Baghdad area than
elsewhere in Iraq, but IR SAMs were deployed only to army field
units, mostly in the KTO and not at all in Baghdad. (See fig.
II.8.)
However, AAA sites, like radar SAMs, were deployed throughout the
greater metropolitan Baghdad area, not just downtown. Therefore,
while AAA in the Baghdad region may have been more severe than
elsewhere, it is also the case that it endangered not just the F-117s
but all other coalition aircraft that conducted strikes in the
general metropolitan area.
Figure II.8: AAA Deployment in
Iraq\ a
(See figure in printed
edition.)
[FIGURE DELETED]
\a Does not include IR SAMs and AAA deployed to Iraqi army and
Republican Guard forces in the field.
Source: GWAPS, vol. II, pt. I: Operations Report (Secret), p.
82.
--------------------
\42 According to USAF intelligence data, the maximum ranges were
SA-2, 27 miles; [DELETED]; Roland, 3.5 miles.
\43 Also, the SA-6, with the next greatest assessed range of these
systems, is at least 20 years old and [DELETED].
AIRCRAFT RISKED OVER
DOWNTOWN
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4.4.2
Given the distribution of defenses throughout the Baghdad region, the
survivability of the F-117 is more appropriately compared to that of
other aircraft that were tasked to targets in the region, not just to
those tasked to downtown targets.\44 In this context, we found that
five other types of aircraft made repeated strikes in the Baghdad
region--F-16s, F/A-18s, F-111Fs, F-15Es, and B-52s. Large packages
of F-16s were explicitly tasked to "downtown" targets in the first
week of the air campaign, but these taskings were stopped after two
F-16s were lost to radar SAMs over the Baghdad area during daytime.
Available data report no casualties over the Baghdad area, except for
one F/A-18, one GR-1, and the two F-16s cited above.\45
Assertions that the F-117 was uniquely survivable because it alone
was tasked to uniquely severe defenses over downtown Baghdad are
therefore not supported by the data. F-117s never faced the defenses
that proved to be the most lethal in Desert Storm--daytime AAA and IR
SAMs. Whereas, the defenses around metropolitan Baghdad were among
the most potent in Iraq, the defenses over downtown were not more
severe than those over the metropolitan area. Other aircraft were
tasked to equally heavily defended targets. Moreover, some aircraft
that flew at night also conducted strikes without casualties.
In sum, the factor most strongly associated with survivability in
Desert Storm appears to have been the combination of flying high and
flying at night--an environment that the F-117s operated in
exclusively.
--------------------
\44 Other aircraft that were tasked to Baghdad and attacked during
the day would have faced more severe defenses than did the F-117s at
night: during the day optically aimed AAA would be able to operate
at its most effective level.
\45 GWAPS and other reports did not specify the locations of all
aircraft casualties. Therefore, it is possible that some of these
aircraft were damaged or lost over the Baghdad metropolitan area, but
the data available do not specify locations.
OTHER FACTORS IN AIRCRAFT
SURVIVABILITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.5
Two additional factors are notable about aircraft survivability from
available data.
SIZE OF STRIKE PACKAGES
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4.5.1
One early tactic in the air war that may have had the effect of
causing some aircraft losses to Iraqi defenses was to send large
numbers of aircraft over a target one after another. While the first
aircraft over the target frequently encountered no defenses, its bomb
detonations would alert the Iraqis, resulting in AAA and SAMs being
directed against the aircraft that followed. [DELETED]
ATTEMPT TO CHANGE
AIRCRAFT CAMOUFLAGE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4.5.2
The fact that the optically aimed AAA and IR SAMs remained lethal
throughout the air campaign put a premium on the extent to which
aircraft operating during the day could be made less visible through
camouflage. A-10 pilots told us that the aircraft's dark green paint
scheme--intended for low-level operations in northern Europe
(including for concealment from aircraft from above)--made them stand
out in the desert against both sand and sky. Consequently, some A-10
units began to paint their aircraft the same light grey color scheme
of most other Air Force aircraft. However, the units that repainted
their A-10s were subsequently ordered by Air Force Component, Central
Command (CENTAF) to change them back to dark green.
A total of 20 A-10s was hit during the war--nearly 25 percent of all
aircraft casualties. Some A-10 pilots we spoke to believed--and one
participating unit's after-action report stated--that the dark green
paint was unacceptable and may have been responsible for some of the
casualties. A postwar Air Force study on survivability stated that
the concerns over the A-10's paint scheme were "valid" and
recommended that, in the future, "Paint schemes must be adaptive to
the environment in which the aircraft operate."\46 It is noteworthy
that no A-10s were shot down, or even damaged, at night, when the
dark paint scheme very probably assisted them or, at minimum, did not
make them stand out.
--------------------
\46 USAF Air Warfare Center, U.S. Air Force Surface-to-Air
Engagements During Operation Desert Storm (Secret), Eglin Air Force
Base: January 1992, p. 12.
SUMMARY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:5
In this appendix, we addressed questions concerning pre-Desert Storm
claims made for air-to-ground aircraft, munitions, and target sensor
systems versus how they were actually used in Desert Storm. In
addition, we examined trends in aircraft and munition use, with
particular emphasis on the F-117, and aircraft survivability,
including the factors suggested by Desert Storm data that are most
likely to account for aircraft casualties.
We first examined the operating environment of Desert Storm to
provide the relevant context. The coalition faced a well-understood
threat and had considerable lead time to prepare and actually
practice for the eventual conflict. This provided coalition forces
with an edge that should not be discounted in evaluations of the
outcomes of the Persian Gulf War. The coalition had 6 months to plan
for the war, deploy the necessary assets to the theater, practice
strikes and deceptions, gather intelligence on targets, and become
highly familiar with the operating environment. The fact that the
coalition knew which IADS nodes to hit to inflict the most damage,
the most quickly, was critical to its rapid degradation, and to the
achievement of a form of air supremacy--elimination of an integrated,
coordinated air defense. Without this supremacy, the air campaign
might have proceeded at a much slower pace and perhaps with more
losses. Further, the United States had the advantage of facing a
highly isolated adversary, essentially unable to be reinforced by
air, sea, or ground. The unique and often cooperative conditions of
Desert Storm also severely limit the lessons of the war that can be
reasonably applied to potential future contingencies.
We next compared planned aircraft and munitions use to actual Desert
Storm use, along with patterns of aircraft and munition weight of
effort against sets of strategic targets. While there were few
notable discrepancies between original aircraft or munitions design
and actual use of either in the conflict, two that are related did
stand out: the survivability decision to bar munitions deliveries
from below 12,000 feet after day 2 and the corresponding fact that
most unguided munitions tactics, before the war, planned for
low-altitude deliveries. The switch to medium- to high-altitude
deliveries meant that the accuracy of unguided munitions was greatly
reduced. This trade-off was feasible in Desert Storm as a way to
reduce attrition--in fact, to almost eliminate it. But since 95
percent of the bombs and 92 percent of the total tonnage were
unguided, there may have been a severe reduction in the accuracy of
that ordnance.
In less than half of the strategic target categories, there was a
clear preference for a particular type of air-to-ground platform.
Preferences were evidenced for F-117s, F-15Es, A-6Es, and F/A-18s
against C\3 , GVC, NBC (F-117), NAV (A-6E and F/A-18), and SCU
(F-15E) targets. Nonetheless, considering all target categories and
selected platforms, most aircraft were assigned to multiple targets
across multiple target categories.
The combination of the ban on low-altitude tactics after day two, the
degradation of radar SAMs and the IADS in the early days of the war,
and the fact that a high proportion of strikes were flown at
night--which constituted another form of aircraft sanctuary--almost
certainly was responsible for a coalition aircraft attrition rate
well below what planners expected and below historical precedent in
the Middle East.
The Desert Storm air campaign was not accomplished by the efforts of
strike aircraft alone. Aerial refueling tankers, airborne
intelligence-gathering aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and strike
support aircraft like F-4Gs, F-15Cs, and EF-111s were vital
ingredients in the successful execution of the air campaign.
While many factors about the operating environment in Desert Storm
were highly favorable to the coalition's air effort, aircraft
targeting capabilities and precision munitions were put to the test
by some periods of adverse weather as well as adverse conditions like
smoke from oil fires or dust from bombing. Even mild weather
conditions, including humidity, rendered precision bombing sensors
(such as IR target detection systems and laser target designation
systems) either degraded or unable to work at all. Moreover, even in
clear weather, pilots sometimes found it difficult to locate or
identify valid targets from medium and high altitudes. In sum, our
research and analysis found that official DOD descriptions of
aircraft targeting capabilities were overstated based on the Desert
Storm experience.
Finally, we addressed the role of the F-117 in the Desert Storm air
campaign and examined some of the significant controversies about its
use and contribution. Contrary to their "Lone Ranger" image, F-117s
certainly required tanking as well as radar jamming support, while
support from air-to-air fighter aircraft is less clear. The claim
that F-117s--often, but not always--achieved tactical surprise, as
defined by the absence of AAA until bombs made impact, was matched by
the experience of other aircraft. The gains provided by stealthiness
also required substantial trade-offs in terms of capabilities and
flexibility, including [DELETED]. No F-117s were reported lost or
damaged in Desert Storm, but they operated exclusively at night and
at medium altitudes. This operational context was clearly less
likely to result in aircraft casualties than low-level attacks or
attacks at any level in daylight. Moreover, like the F-117s, some
other nonstealth attack aircraft experienced no losses operating in
the high-threat areas of Baghdad and operating at night at medium
altitude.
AIRCRAFT AND MUNITION
EFFECTIVENESS IN DESERT STORM
========================================================= Appendix III
In this appendix, we respond to requester questions concerning the
effectiveness of the different types of aircraft and munitions, the
validity of manufacturer claims about weapon system performance, and
the extent to which the air campaign objectives for Desert Storm were
achieved. We address aircraft and munition effectiveness by
answering nine questions, the first of which focuses on the quality
and scope of the weapon system performance data from the Gulf War.
Questions 2 through 7 address the effectiveness of individual weapon
systems, and questions 8 and 9 address the combined effectiveness of
the air campaign in achieving various objectives. The specific
questions are as follows.
1. Effectiveness Data Availability: What data are available to
compare the effectiveness of the weapon systems used, and what are
the limitations of the data?
2. Associations Between Weapon Systems and Outcomes: Did outcomes
achieved among strategic targets vary by type of aircraft and
munition used to attack targets?
3. Target Accuracy and Effectiveness as a Function of Aircraft and
Munition Type: Did accuracy in hitting targets with LGBs vary by
type of delivery platform? Similarly, did outcomes achieved among
strategic targets vary by platforms delivering unguided munitions?
4. LGB Accuracy: Did laser-guided bombs achieve the accuracy
claimed to permit using only one per target?
5. F-117 Effectiveness Claims: Did the F-117s actually achieve an
unprecedented 80-percent bomb hit rate? Were the F-117s highly
effective against strategic air defense targets on the first night of
the campaign, thereby opening the way for more vulnerable nonstealthy
aircraft to attack?
6. TLAM Effectiveness Claims: Do the data support claims for the
effectiveness of Tomahawk land-attack (cruise) missiles?
7. Weapon System Manufacturers' Claims: What are the claims that
have been made by defense contractors for the effectiveness of the
weapons they produced, and do the data support these claims?
8. Air Campaign Effectiveness Against Mobile Targets: What was the
effectiveness of the air campaign against small ground
targets--tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery?
9. Air Campaign Effectiveness in Achieving Strategic Objectives: To
what extent were the overall military and political objectives of
Desert Storm met, and what was the contribution of air power?
EFFECTIVENESS DATA AVAILABILITY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
Our first subquestion is concerned with the reliability of the data
available to assess and compare the effects of the weapon systems
used in Desert Storm. Under the best of circumstances, there would
be sufficient data on the use of aircraft, missiles, and munitions,
and on the damage inflicted on each target, to compare inputs and
outcomes comprehensively. This would permit analysis, for example,
of whether or not an aircraft with unguided bombs is as effective as
one with LGBs or how different kinds of aircraft and munitions
performed against various targets under a range of threat and strike
conditions.
However, Desert Storm was not planned, executed, or documented to
satisfy the information needs of operations analysts or program
evaluators.\1 As a result, there are sometimes significant gaps in
the data on weapon system performance and effectiveness, the latter
as a result of insufficient BDA, in particular. For example, because
multiple aircraft of different types delivered multiple bombs, often
on the same aimpoint, and damage was often not assessed until after
multiple strikes, for most targets, it is not possible to determine
what target effects, if any, can be attributed to a particular
aircraft or particular munition.
Making use of the best available data on both inputs and outcomes, we
compared the effectiveness of several air campaign systems both
quantitatively and qualitatively and also examined the extent to
which campaign goals were achieved. Because specific aircraft and
munitions could not, for the most part, be identified with specific
damage to targets, we developed alternative measures of
effectiveness. In particular, the Desert Storm data permitted us to
determine (1) the aircraft, munitions, and missiles that were
expended against the set of targets in each strategic category and
(2) the levels of damage achieved for many of the targets in most
target categories. BDA reports indicating that restrikes were needed
provided a measure of inputs that had not fully achieved the required
results. And when BDA reports indicated success, this was taken as
an upper-bound measure of what it took to achieve a successful
outcome.
The total input measure can be compared with the prewar probability
of destruction (PD) estimates of the effectiveness of a given
munition, missile, or aircraft against a specific target type.
Observed differences can potentially be explained by various factors
such as the effect of tactics on effectiveness, the uniqueness of
conditions encountered in Desert Storm, or the uncertainties and
risks to be considered when tasking aircraft and missiles against
specific target types.
Our assumption is that under wartime conditions with imperfect field
information, delays in reporting BDA, communications breakdowns, and
other sources of friction, the inputs used on a target or class of
targets are likely to be the more accurate measure of future inputs
than PD calculations derived from less than fully realistic field
tests or earlier conflicts.\2 For example, the latter may indicate
that, under certain conditions, a 2,000-pound LGB has a 0.9 PD of
destroying a room inside a building with 2-feet-thick concrete walls.
However, it may be more useful to know that, in an actual
contingency, six LGBs were used against such targets, because the
costs and risks of tasking additional pilots, aircraft, and munitions
against a target were less than the risk that the target objectives
had not been met.
--------------------
\1 While some may see this as solely a problem for postwar
evaluations, the frequent lack of timely data, such as BDA, was
repeatedly cited by Desert Storm pilots and planners as a problem
during the war.
\2 Delivery accuracy data in the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual
are based in part on visual, manual system accuracies achieved in
prior combat dating as far back as World War II. (JMEM, ch. 1, p.
1-24, change 4.)
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN WEAPON
SYSTEMS AND OUTCOMES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
Our second subquestion is concerned with whether the degree to which
target objectives were met varied by type of aircraft or munition
used. The available data reveal associations of greater and lesser
success against targets between types of aircraft and munitions over
the course of the campaign and with respect to individual target
categories. However, data limitations inhibit direct comparisons
between weapon systems or generalizations about the effectiveness of
individual weapon systems.
TARGET OUTCOMES BY TYPE OF
AIRCRAFT AND MUNITION
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.1
Data on the number of munitions, aircraft, and TLAMs used against
certain strategic targets were available, as were damage assessment
reports for 432 strategic targets with BE numbers that were attacked.
By matching inputs to the targets for which damage assessments were
made, we examined whether any patterns could be ascertained between
the types of inputs and the outcomes.
Using specific criteria, we rated outcomes on the strategic targets
with BE numbers for which there were sufficient phase III BDA data to
reach a judgment about whether attacks on a target had been either
"fully successful" or "not fully successful."\3 Out of 432 targets
with BDA reports, 357 could be matched with BE-numbered targets for
which campaign input data were also available.\4 For both the TLAMs
and eight air-to-ground aircraft reviewed here that delivered
ordnance against strategic targets, table III.1 shows a frequency
count, by platform, of the number of targets that we rated as damaged
to an FS or NFS level and the ratio of FS to NFS targets.
Table III.1
Number of Targets Assessed as Fully
Successful and Not Fully Successful by
Platform
FS:NFS
Platform FS NFS ratio
------------------------------------------ ------ ------ ----------
A-6E 37 34 1.1:1
A-10 \a \a \a
B-52 25 35 0.7:1
F-111F 41 13 3.2:1
F-117 122 87 1.4:1
F-15E 28 29 1.0:1
F-16 67 45 1.5:1
F/A-18 36 47 0.8:1
GR-1 21 17 1.2:1
TLAM 18 16 1.1:1
======================================================================
Total\b 190 167 1.1:1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a No data available.
\b Individual platform data do not sum to the total because
individual targets were often attacked by multiple platforms.
Table III.1 shows that, overall, there were more FS than NFS target
assessments and that, except for the B-52, F-15E, and F/A-18, all
platforms participated in more FS than NFS target outcomes. The
ratio of FS to NFS target assessments was greatest for the F-111F,
indicating that it participated in proportionally more FS than NFS
target outcomes. In addition, the ratios of FS to NFS outcomes for
the F-117 and F-16 were similar in magnitude.
Another way in which to compare and contrast success rates among
platforms is to look at the number of FS and NFS targets with which
each delivery platform was associated across target categories.
These comparisons are shown in table III.2.
Table III.2 illustrates associations between individual types of
aircraft and outcomes (that is, number of FS and NFS assessments) in
various strategic target categories. Two types of comparisons
evident in the data include the success of individual platforms
against individual target categories compared with (1) the success of
all platforms against individual target categories and (2) a
platform's success against all campaign targets.
Table III.2
Number of FS and NFS Targets by Platform
and Target Type
Platform FS NFS FS NFS FS NFS FS NFS FS NFS
---------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
A-6E 9 6 4 0 \a \a 9 1 3 7
B-52 0 4 3 3 \a \a 0 2 8 18
F-111F 4 0 \a \a 0 0 11 3 5 3
F-117 49 36 0 1 9 11 21 4 9 17
F-15E 3 6 1 0 \a \a 8 1 0 2
F-16 19 10 4 2 3 3 3 1 10 16
F/A-18 6 9 3 0 \a \a 7 5 3 8
GR-1 0 0 \a \a \a \a 7 3 2 3
TLAM 6 1 2 6 7 3 0 0 1 0
================================================================================
All\b 63 43 11 10 12 11 28 12 17 33
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Platform FS NFS FS NFS FS NFS FS NFS FS NFS FS NFS
---------------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
A-6E 3 9 1 1 7 4 0 2 1 0 0 4
B-52 \a \a 1 1 10 2 2 3 \a \a 1 2
F-111F \a \a 5 1 15 6 \a \a 0 0 1 0
F-117 0 1 14 5 13 6 0 1 5 4 2 1
F-15E \a \a 1 0 12 6 0 1 0 1 3 12
F-16 \a \a 4 2 16 5 2 1 3 0 3 5
F/A-18 1 9 1 1 10 6 1 4 3 0 1 5
GR-1 0 0 \a \a 10 6 1 5 \a \a 1 0
TLAM 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0
====================================================================================================
All\b 3 10 15 5 22 12 4 12 10 4 5 15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a No records of platform tasked against target type in Missions
database.
\b Individual platform data do not sum to category total because
individual targets were often attacked by multiple platforms.
Success rates for individual platforms against individual categories
did not necessarily mirror the overall campaign's rate of success
against individual categories. For example, while the overall ratio
of FS to NFS C\3 targets showed more FS relative to NFS assessments
(63:43), the ratios for the B-52, F-15E, and F/A-18 (0:4, 3:6, and
6:9, respectively) indicate that these platforms were less successful
against these types of targets than the campaign as a whole.
However, some platforms are associated with higher rates of success
against individual categories than were achieved by the overall
campaign. For example, the number of FS:NFS LOC targets associated
with the A-6E (9:1), F-111F (11:3), F-117 (21:4), and F-15E (8:1)
indicate higher rates of success than were achieved by the campaign
in the aggregate (28:12).
While most platforms participated in more FS than NFS outcomes during
the campaign as a whole, some platforms participated against selected
target categories in more NFS than FS outcomes. For example, TLAMs
participated in strikes against more NFS than FS targets in the ELE
and NBC categories, while F-117s and F-16s participated in more NFS
than FS outcomes in the MIB targets. In contrast, while the B-52s
and the F/A-18s had more NFS relative to FS overall against OCA
targets, both platforms participated in more FS than NFS outcomes.
In addition, the F/A-18s participated in more FS than NFS outcomes
against ELE, LOC, and SAM targets.
The success rates for individual platforms over the course of the
campaign did not necessarily mirror the pattern of success achieved
by a platform against targets in specific categories. For example,
while the ratio of FS:NFS for targets struck by the F-15E during the
campaign was 28:29, its association with success in the LOC and OCA
categories was proportionately far better (8:1 and 12:6,
respectively), yet its association with success in the SCU category
was worse (3:12). In another example, the ratio of FS to NFS for
targets struck by B-52s over the course of the campaign was
relatively unfavorable (25:35); its association with success in the
OCA category was much better (10:2).
In sum, while these data do not allow direct effectiveness
comparisons between aircraft types, they do indicate that
effectiveness did vary by type of aircraft and by type of target
category attacked. Subsequent subquestions address more direct
aircraft effectiveness comparisons where the data permit.
--------------------
\3 An FS assessment means that the target objective had been met
sufficiently to preclude the need for a restrike. An NFS assessment
does not equate with failure--rather, it means that despite the
damage that may have been inflicted at the time of the BDA, the
target objective had not been fully achieved and, in the opinion of
the BDA analysts, a restrike was necessary to fully achieve the
target objective. For a more complete explanation of the strengths
and limitations of our methodology for assessing target outcomes, see
appendix I.
\4 The Missions database contained input data on 862 BE-numbered
targets.
MUNITION TYPES AND OUTCOMES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.2
Another way in which the Desert Storm databases permit comparison of
inputs and outcomes is by type of munition used in each target
category. Table III.3 shows the average amount, in tons, of guided
and unguided munitions used per BE, by target category, for both FS
and NFS targets and the ratio of unguided-to-guided bomb tonnage
used.
Table III.3 shows that, on average, FS targets received more guided
munition tonnage (11.2 tons versus 9.4) and less unguided munition
tonnage (44.1 tons versus 53.7) per BE than NFS targets. However,
this pattern did not hold across all target categories. For example,
the opposite pattern occurred in the ELE, NAV, NBC, and SAM target
categories, where NFS targets generally received more guided munition
tonnage than targets rated FS, and the ratio of unguided to guided
munition tonnage was lower than for targets rated FS, as well.
Table III.3
Average Guided and Unguided Tonnage Per
BE by Outcome by Category
Unguided- Unguided-
Target Unguided Guided to-guided Unguided Guided to-guided
------------ ---------- ------ ------------ ---------- ------ ------------
C\3 7.2 3.9 1.9:1 14.7 4.0 3.6:1
ELE 49.8 5.4 9.2:1 36.8 7.5 4.9:1
GVC 6.7 11.2 0.6:1 4.4 9.5 0.5:1
LOC 8.5 7.6 1.1:1 18.4 6.1 3.0:1
MIB 120.2 10.0 12.0:1 119.8 5.2 23.1:1
NAV 17.5 1.2 14.2:1 29.0 5.2 5.6:1
NBC 41.1 19.3 2.1:1 125.7 73.7 1.7:1
OCA 152.6 43.9 3.5:1 106.7 36.0 3.0:1
OIL 110.8 2.3 49.3:1 45.6 1.5 31.4:1
SAM 7.2 0.8 8.8:1 1.1 4.8 0.2:1
SCU 94.2 7.1 13.3:1 66.3 5.0 13.3:1
================================================================================
Total 44.1 11.2 3.9:1 53.7 9.4 5.7:1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOMB TONNAGE, MUNITION TYPE,
AND OUTCOMES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.3
A widespread image from Desert Storm was that of a single target
being destroyed by a single munition. However, the data show that an
average of 55.3 tons (110,600 pounds) of bombs were expended against
each BE rated FS. The average for BEs rated NFS was 63 tons of bombs
(126,000 pounds).\5 If the tonnage in each case was composed solely
of 2,000-pound bombs, this would have meant using, at a minimum,
nearly 56 bombs against every BE rated FS and about 63 on every NFS
target. If the mix of munitions included smaller sizes as well, more
than 56 munitions would have been dropped on each FS target. While
some of this tonnage almost surely reflects the fact that many
BE-numbered targets had more than one DMPI (or aimpoint), the fact
remains that the amount of tonnage used per BE (whether FS or NFS),
as well as the number of bombs that were dropped, was substantial.
Since the exact number of DMPIs per BE is not known, we are unable to
determine whether the differences between the average tonnages
dropped on FS versus NFS targets are meaningful. The fact that NFS
targets received more tonnage, on average, than FS targets, may
simply reflect restrikes directed at targets insufficiently damaged
by initial attacks.
The data also show that FS targets received, on average, more tonnage
per BE of guided munitions than NFS targets (11.2 tons versus 9.4)
and less unguided tonnage per BE (approximately 44 versus 54 tons).
Since most of the LGBs weighed from 500 to 2,000 pounds, the average
difference of 3,600 pounds of munitions is equivalent to about one
2,000-pound LGB and three 500-pound LGBs or to about seven 500-pound
LGBs.
--------------------
\5 These data represent the total weight of bombs dropped on targets
according to the Missions database. The database does not
consistently provide information on whether the bombs actually hit
the intended aimpoints. Nor do these data include munitions dropped
by coalition members other than the United States and the United
Kingdom.
TARGET ACCURACY AND
EFFECTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF
AIRCRAFT AND MUNITION TYPE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
Although the Desert Storm input and BDA data do not permit a
comprehensive aircraft-by-aircraft or munition-by-munition comparison
of effectiveness, it is possible to compare and examine the effects
of selected types of munitions and aircraft where they were used in
similar ways. This is because the data on some systems--such as the
F-117 and F-111F--are more complete, better documented, and more
reliable than data collected on other systems. Thus, our third
subquestion addresses the relationship between the (1) type of
delivery platform and target accuracy using LGBs and (2) type of
delivery platform and bombing effectiveness using unguided munitions.
A major issue raised during and after Desert Storm concerns the bomb
delivery accuracy of stealthy versus conventional aircraft. The Air
Force states that the F-117 was more accurate than any other
LGB-capable platform because its stealthiness negated the necessity
to engage in evasive defensive maneuvers in the target area, making
it easier to hold the laser spot on the target and reducing the
distance between the target and the aircraft. In contrast,
nonstealthy aircraft are more likely to engage in defensive maneuvers
after the bombs are released--increasing the chance of losing the
laser spot, as the aircraft seeks to avoid air defense threats and
speeds away from the target. Therefore, in LGB delivery against
fixed targets, it was argued that the type of platform did make a
difference in accuracy.
Of all the Desert Storm strike aircraft, there were sufficient data
to compare only the F-117 to the F-111F on this dimension.\6 We
compared the reported target hit rates of the F-117 and F-111F
against 49 Desert Storm targets struck by both aircraft.\7 The 49
targets comprised primarily airfields; bridges; large military
industrial bases; and nuclear, biological, and chemical facilities.
Table III.4 shows summary LGB strike data on the 49 targets for the
F-117 and F-111F.
Table III.4
F-117 and F-111F Strike Results on 49
Common Targets\a
Average
Laser- bombs
guided bombs Number of Total dropped per Percen
Aircraft dropped strikes dropped strike Number t
----------- ------------ ---------- ----------- ------------ ------ ------
F-111F GBU-10 422 93 2.1 357 85
GBU-12
GBU-15
GBU-24A/B
GBU-28
F-117 GBU-10 456 517 1.1 363 80
GBU-12
GBU-27
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a For this table, a strike is defined as one aircraft attacking one
target where one or more bombs were dropped. More than one bomb can
be delivered on the same target. More than one strike can occur on
the same sortie, which is one flight by one aircraft.
The F-111Fs and the F-117s flew comparable numbers of bombing strikes
against the same 49 targets--422 and 456, respectively. However, the
F-111Fs dropped more bombs than the F-117s (893 versus 517); thus,
the F-117s averaged only slightly more than 1 bomb per strike while
the F-111Fs averaged over 2 bombs. For the F-111F, the reported
target hit rate was 85 percent, for the F-117s, 80 percent. Thus,
despite the advantages of stealth in LGB-deliveries--for the 49
common targets for which we have data--the reported target hit rate
for the nonstealthy F-111F was greater than for the stealthy F-117.
As noted above, the total number of F-111F bomb hits on a given
target was not recorded; a "hit" was counted if at least one bomb of
four released hit the target. Therefore, it cannot be determined
from these data whether perhaps (1) the F-111Fs achieved a higher
reported target hit rate because they could drop more bombs on a
target than the F-117s, and therefore, the F-111Fs had a greater
number of chances of hitting the target with at least one bomb, or
(2) the F-111Fs achieved more bomb hits per target than the F-117s,
causing more damage per strike than the F-117s.\8
--------------------
\6 The 48th TFW operations summary reported the outcome of each
F-111F strike mission as a hit ("Yes") or miss ("No"). The F-111Fs
dropped from one to four bombs per target, per mission. A hit was
reported when at least one bomb struck the target. It was not
possible to determine from the database the number of bombs that
impacted on a target reported as hit. The F-117 database, in
contrast, reported outcome data for each bomb dropped.
\7 Even though there are some data and methodological limitations to
this comparison (that is, aimpoints may differ; over time, the
intensity of the defenses could vary), the results on these
49 targets compare LGB results on the same targets, albeit with
limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn.
\8 In Desert Storm, the F-111F typically carried four LGBs per
mission; the F-117 can carry a maximum of only two.
F-117 VERSUS F-111F TARGET
HIT RATES WITH SAME TYPE OF
LGB
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.1
We compared the F-117 and F-111F target hit rates when using
precisely the same munitions on the same targets by analyzing only
strikes for which the same types of munitions were dropped (that is,
GBU-10 or GBU-12).\9 Table III.5 shows the number and percent of
strikes by F-117s and F-111Fs on 22 targets where only GBU-10 and
GBU-12 LGBs were dropped.
Table III.5
F-117 and F-111F Strike Results on 22
Common Targets With GBU-10 and GBU-12
LGBs
Laser- Average
guided bombs
bombs Number of Total dropped per
Aircraft dropped strikes dropped strike Number Percent
-------- ------------ ---------- -------- ------------ -------- ----------
F-111F GBU-10 130 285 2.2 123 95
GBU-12
F-117 GBU-10 212 271 1.3 167 79
GBU-12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The F-117s flew almost twice as many strikes with GBU-10s and GBU-12s
as the F-111F; however, the total number of GBU-10s and GBU-12s
dropped was almost identical. Thus, the F-111Fs dropped more bombs
per strike (2.2) than the F-117s (1.3). As with the set of 49 common
targets, the percentage of strikes where the target was reported hit
was higher for the F-111F than for the F-117, and the differential in
target accuracy was greater.
--------------------
\9 Reliability and generalizability constraints on this comparison
include the fact that the F-111F target hit data could not be
verified; a significant portion of the reported F-117 hits lacked
corroborating support or was inconsistent with other available data;
and the calculated target hit rates per mission do not necessarily
equate with bomb hit rate. Moreover, the results apply only to
targets struck by both types of aircraft and thereby do not address
other target types where one aircraft may have performed better than
the other, such as F-111F conducting "tank-plinking" or F-117s
striking hardened bunkers in Baghdad.
EFFECTIVENESS BY AIRCRAFT
TYPE WITH UNGUIDED BOMBS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3.2
To examine whether the type of aircraft used was related to the
effectiveness of unguided bombs, we compared damage to targets
attacked with only a single type of unguided bomb. Sixty-eight
strategic targets were attacked with the 2,000-pound MK-84 unguided
bomb and no other munition. The available data indicate that the
platform of delivery may affect the effectiveness of the munition.
Table III.6 shows the number of targets attacked by aircraft type and
the number and percent that were assessed as successfully destroyed.
Table III.6
Outcomes for Targets Attacked With Only
MK-84 Unguided Bombs
Targets Categories
Aircraft attacked Number Percent struck\
------------ ---------- ------------ ------------ -- ------------
F-111E 1 0 0 MIB
F-15E 3 1 33 C\3, LOC
F-16 34 18 53 C\3, ELE,
GVC, LOC,
MIB, NBC,
OIL, SCU
F/A-18 7 3 43 C\3, LOC,
MIB, OIL
A-6E 1 1 100 ELE
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The two types of aircraft with the highest representation were the
F-16 and the F/A-18.\10 Of the 34 targets attacked by the F-16, 53
percent were successfully destroyed. Forty-three percent of the
seven targets struck by the F/A-18 were fully destroyed. However,
the differences in percentage of targets where the objectives were
successfully achieved were not statistically significant.\11
The number of target categories struck by the F-16 with MK-84s was
considerably larger than those struck by the F/A-18. To eliminate
any bias from the range of categories struck, table III.7 presents
F-16 and F/A-18 strike results only for targets in categories common
to both.
Table III.7
Outcomes for Targets Attacked With Only
MK-84s Delivered by F-16s and F/A-18s
Targets Categories
Aircraft attacked Number Percent struck\
------------ ---------- ------------ ------------ -- ------------
F-16 23 12 52 C\3, LOC,
MIB, OIL
F/A-18 7 3 43 C\3, LOC,
MIB, OIL
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III.7 reveals that the F-16s appear to have been somewhat more
effective than the F/A-18s.\12 As in table III.6, the difference in
success rates was not statistically significant. However, the ratios
of FS to NFS targets for each aircraft (12:11 for the F-16s; 3:4 for
the F/A-18s) are consistent with the ratios of FS to NFS targets
associated with these aircraft in the campaign. (See table III.1.)
In each case, the FS to NFS ratio for the F-16s is greater than 1:1;
the ratio for the F/A-18s is less than 1:1.
--------------------
\10 With only 2 exceptions, each of the 44 targets was attacked
exclusively by a single type of aircraft. One target was struck by
both the F-16s and F/A-18s, and a second target was struck by both
the F-16s and F-111Es.
\11 We tested the direct comparisons between the F/A-18 and the F-16
statistically using the chi-square procedure, and we found them not
to be significant at the 0.05 level.
\12 As noted in the discussion of table III.6, several data
limitations limit the reliability of conclusions. These limitations
include the fact that data on Air Force aircraft in the Missions
database are more reliable than on Navy aircraft; some phase III
reports on targets may have been produced before the final strikes
occurred (with the result that damage that came after the last BDA
report would not be credited); and not all of the 68 common targets
were assessed by DIA.
LGB ACCURACY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4
Videotapes of LGBs precisely traveling down ventilator shafts and
destroying targets with one strike, like those televised during and
after Desert Storm, can easily create impressions about the effect of
a single LGB on a single target, which was summed up by an LGB
manufacturer's claim for effectiveness: "one target, one bomb."\13
The implicit assumption in this claim is that a target is
sufficiently damaged or destroyed to avoid needing to hit it again
with a second bomb, thus obviating the need to risk pilots or
aircraft in restrikes. However, evidence from our analysis and from
DIA's does not support the claim for LGB effectiveness summarized by
"one target, one bomb."
To examine the validity of the claim, we used data from attacks on
bridges, aircraft shelters, radar sites, and bunkers of various types
with the most advanced LGBs used in Desert Storm, those with the
"Paveway III" guidance system.\14 (See table III.8.)
Table III.8
List of DMPIs and Identifying
Information
Number Target name DMPI 1 ATODAY\a
---------- ------------------ ------------------ ------------------
1 North Taji command Fac 2 3
bunker
2 Karbala depot, E bnkr (1) N. 17
ammo storage
3 Samarra CW Bnk 1 20
facility
4 Samarra CW Bnk 4 20
facility
5 Tallil airfield Bnk 38 D116 23
6 Iraqi AF hdq, Bnk 5 OSP4 33
Baghdad
7 Iraqi intel hdq, Entrance 36
Ku bks
8 Al Fahud Bridge 38
9 Suq Ash Shuyukh Bridge 38
10 Pontoon bridge None indicated 42
11 Taji bunker Bunker 42
12 Highway bridge 32 08 90 N 2
13 Al Amarah Command bunker 3
14 6 Corp Army hdq Command bunker 14
15 Al Taqaddum Shelter #2 8
16 Kuwait City Radar Site 29
17 Al Qaim Mine Mine entrance 32
18 Az Zubayr Radcom Antenna 33
19 Al Qaim phosphate Earth covered bnkr 33
plant
20 Ar Rumaylah Afld Bridge S. end 36
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a ATODAY is the air tasking order day, the day of the war on which
the strike occurred.
Source: Missions database, January 1993.
Each of these targets had a single, identifiable DMPI. If the
"one-target, one-bomb" claim is accurate, there should have been a
one-to-one relationship between the number of targets and the number
of LGBs delivered to those targets. Our data did not allow us to
determine whether one bomb typically caused sufficient damage to
preclude a restrike, and campaign managers evidently did not assume
this was the case, for the average number of LGBs dropped per target
was four. Figure III.1 depicts the number of Paveway III LGBs that
were delivered against 20 DMPIs.
Figure III.1: Paveway III LGBs
Delivered Against Selected
Point Targets
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure III.1 shows that the "one-target, one-bomb" claim for Paveway
III LGBs was not validated in a single case in this sample from
Desert Storm. No fewer than two LGBs were dropped on each target;
six or more were dropped on 20 percent of the targets; eight or more
were dropped on 15 percent of the targets. The average dropped was
four LGBs per target.\15
Similarly, a DIA analysis of the effectiveness of 2,000-pound
BLU-109/B (I-2000) LGBs dropped by F-117s and F-111Fs on Iraqi
hardened aircraft shelters and bunkers found that many shelters were
hit by more than one LGB, often as a result of insufficient BDA data
prior to restrike.\16 At Tallil airfield, for example, many bunkers
"were targeted with two or more weapons." (DIA, p. 28.) One bunker
was hit by at least seven LGBs, although aircraft video showed that
the required damage had been inflicted by the third and fourth bombs.
As DIA noted, this meant that "two unnecessary restrikes using three
more weapons were apparently conducted because complete information
was not available, utilized, or properly understood/relayed." (DIA,
p. 49.) The DIA analysis also shows that one bomb was insufficient;
four bombs were required to achieve the necessary damage.
The DIA analysis noted that the "penetration capability of a warhead
is determined by many factors: impact velocity, impact angle, angle
of attack, target materials, and weapon design." (DIA, p. 7.) The
DIA data are consistent with our finding that targets were hit by
more than one LGB in part because more than one LGB was needed to
reach the desired damage level. They also demonstrate that
insufficient BDA sometimes prevented knowing at what point a target
had been destroyed, thereby putting pilots and aircraft at risk in
conducting additional strikes. Moreover, planners were apparently
ordering the delivery of multiple bombs because either BDA revealed
that one bomb did not achieve target objectives or they did not
believe the presumption that "one target, one bomb" was being
achieved.
--------------------
\13 This phraseology has been used by Texas Instruments, a
manufacturer of LGBs, in its public advertising.
\14 LGBs have three component parts: a guidance and control
mechanism, a warhead or bomb body, and airfoil or wings. Three
generations of Paveway LGB technology exist, each successive
generation representing a change or modification in the guidance
mechanism.
\15 DOD commented that the types of targets in table III.8 are
primarily hardened shelters and bunkers or bridges where
probabilities of kill typically, require more than one bomb--even
with a direct hit. We concur. A single advanced 2,000-pound LGB was
often insufficient to achieve the desired level of damage against
high-value single-DMPI targets. Thus, "one target, one bomb" was not
routinely achieved.
\16 DIA, Vulnerability of Hardened Aircraft Bunkers and Shelters to
Precision-Guided Munitions (Secret), April 1994.
F-117 EFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5
The Air Force has written that
"The Gulf War illustrated that the precision of modern air
attack revolutionized warfare.
. . . In particular, the natural partnership of smart weapons
and stealth working together gives the attacker unprecedented
military leverage."\17
According to a former Secretary of the Air Force, "In World War II it
could take 9,000 bombs to hit a target the size of an aircraft
shelter. In Vietnam, 300. Today [May 1991] we can do it with one
laser-guided munition from an F-117."\18
According to DOD's title V report, the F-117 proved to be a highly
accurate bomber with a bomb hit rate of 80 percent against its
targets--accuracy characterized by its primary contractor, Lockheed,
as "unprecedented."\19 In addition, DOD emphasized in post-Desert
Storm assessments that the F-117's stealth attributes and capability
to deliver LGBs were instrumental on the first night of the war when
the aircraft struck over 30 percent of all strategic targets,
including components of the Iraqi IADS, thereby opening major gaps in
Iraqi air defenses for conventional nonstealthy aircraft. The Air
Force also contends that no other aircraft struck IADS and other
targets in downtown Baghdad on the first night of the campaign and
throughout the war because of the intensity of air defenses.
It may well be that the F-117 was the most accurate platform in
Desert Storm. However, the Desert Storm data do not fully support
claims for the F-117's accuracy against IADS-related targets, targets
on the first night of the campaign, or targets throughout the war.
As discussed in detail below, we estimate that the bomb hit rate for
the F-117 was between 55 and 80 percent, the rate of weapon release
was 75 percent. Thus, Desert Storm demonstrated that even in an
environment with historically favorable weather conditions, the bomb
release rate for the F-117 may be lower than for other aircraft.\20
Finally, the F-117 was not the only aircraft tasked to targets in
downtown Baghdad, but after the third day, planners concluded that
for the types of targets and defenses found in Baghdad, the F-117 was
more effective.\21
--------------------
\17 USAF, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States
Air Force in the Gulf War
(Sept. 1991), p. 55.
\18 Statement contained in a summary of public quotes and comments
about performance of the F-117A Stealth Fighter in Operation Desert
Storm provided to us by Lockheed Corporation on March 19, 1993.
\19 In a briefing to us in September 1993, Lockheed also concluded
about the F-117 in Desert Storm "stealth, combined with precision
weapons, demonstrated a change in aerial warfare . . . one bomb =
one kill."
\20 For example, historically over Baghdad, the average percentage of
time that the cloud ceiling is less than or equal to 3,000 feet is
only 9 percent; comparable percentages over Beirut, Lebanon; Osan AB,
Korea; and St. Petersburg, Russia; are 17, 33, and 64, respectively.
Thus, while the weather over Iraq was less favorable than average for
that location, the conditions encountered in Desert Storm may well
have been better than likely conditions in other likely contingency
locations.
\21 As discussed in appendix II, we also found that based on Air
Force intelligence analysis and other data, the defenses of the
greater Baghdad metropolitan area were as intense as those of
"downtown" Baghdad. Multiple aircraft types were tasked to the large
area without experiencing casualties.
THE F-117 BOMB HIT RATE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.1
Various components of DOD and GWAPS reported similar bomb hit rates
based on slightly different numbers of bomb drops and hits. DOD's
title V report to the Congress stated that F-117s dropped 2,040 bombs
during the campaign, of which 1,634 "hit the target," achieving a
bomb hit rate of 80 percent. (DOD, p. T-85.) The Air Force Studies
and Analysis Group reported that the F-117s achieved an 80-percent
hit rate based on 1,659 hits. The Air Force Office of History
reported that "Statistically, the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing compiled
a record that is unparalleled in the chronicles of air warfare: the
Nighthawks [F-117s] achieved a 75 percent hit rate on pinpoint
targets . . . recording 1,669 direct hits . . . ."\22
The GWAPS report stated that "They [F-117s] scored 1,664 direct hits
. . . ." and achieved a bomb hit rate of 80 percent.\23 We sought
to verify the data supporting these statements.
--------------------
\22 Office of History, Headquarters 37th Fighter Wing, Special Study:
37FW/HO-91-1 (Jan. 9, 1992).
\23 GWAPS, vol. IV, pt. I (Secret), p. 44; vol. II, pt. II
(Secret), p. 392.
DATA UNDERLYING CLAIMED
F-117 HITS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.2
During the war, mission videos of F-117 bomb releases were reviewed
after each night's strikes by analysts at the 37th TFW (and often by
planners in the Black Hole) to determine hits and misses and the need
for restrikes. The analysts at the 37th TFW were able to determine
whether a bomb hit its intended target, or if the bomb missed, why
and by what distance. This information was recorded on the 37th TFW
Desert Storm database, which summarized the disposition of each F-117
strike mission. Our review of the database and interviews with F-117
pilots and the analysts who compiled the database show that some
reported hits (1) were accompanied by data indicating the "miss
distance" between the DMPI and point of bomb impact, (2) were not
based on mission video, (3) were credited when the available video
failed to record bomb impact, and (4) were accompanied by conflicting
remarks. Our finding is that approximately one-third of the bomb
drops assessed to be hits either lacked corroborating video
documentation or were in conflict with other information in the
database. (See table III.9.)
Table III.9
Reported F-117 Hits Lacking
Corroborating Support or in Conflict
With Other Available Data
F-117 hits Number Percent
---------------------- ---------------------- ----------------------
Total reported 1,677 100.0
Hits with miss 360 21.5
distance data
Hits with no video 96 5.7
record
Hits with video tape 69 4.1
recorder problems or
impact not recorded
Hits with conflicting 49 2.9
remarks
Total reports of hits 574
lacking corroborating
support or in
conflict with other
available data
Reported F-117 hits 535\a 31.9
without corroborating
video or in conflict
with other available
data
Reported F-117 hits 1,142 68.1
with corroborating
video
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a This total is less than the sum of the first four rows because, in
several instances, a reported hit was accompanied by more than one
piece of missing or incompatible data.
REPORTED HITS WITH MISS
DISTANCE DATA
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.2.1
The distance by which the bomb missed the aimpoint was recorded in
the TFW database. For 360 of the 1,677 hits reported, the miss
distances ranged from 1.6 meters (approximately 5 feet) up to 164.5
meters (approximately 540 feet). This range was comparable to the
range of miss distances recorded for the 70 reported misses, which
ranged from 3.2 to 178.1 meters.\24 However, while the ranges of miss
distances for hits and misses were equivalent, the distribution of
miss distances was clearly skewed toward larger values for reported
misses. The mean miss distance for the hits was 13.1 meters (43
feet), while the mean miss distance for the misses was 69.2 meters
(226.9 feet)--five times the mean for hits.\25
--------------------
\24 Paradoxically, the database contains more miss distances for
reported hits (360) than for reported misses (70). This may be
because miss distances for misses occurring outside the field of view
of the F-117 DLIR could not be determined.
\25 The median miss distance for the hits was 4.98 meters (16.33
feet), while the median miss distance for the misses was 66.75 meters
(218.94 feet)--13 times the average for hits.
REPORTED HITS WITHOUT
DOCUMENTING VIDEO
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.2.2
In 96 instances, hits were credited despite the absence of a video
record of the mission and in contrast to 37th TFW peacetime training
policy and the policies of other LGB-capable aircraft in Desert
Storm. In peacetime training, bomb drops by F-117s without video
documentation are considered misses. In Desert Storm, the 37th TFW
credited hits solely on the basis of pilot accounts; in contrast,
pilot reports were substantially discounted by Air Force analysts of
air campaign hits or kills by other types of air-to-ground aircraft
employing guided munitions but with inconclusive video. For example,
for every three tanks claimed as kills by A-10 pilots, only one was
credited, for a 33-percent kill rate; F-111F pilots were credited
with a 50-percent tank kill rate for pilot-only claims. The 37th TFW
justified crediting hits based solely on pilot reports on the grounds
that the F-117 demonstrated superior accuracy in Desert Storm.
REPORTED HITS WITH VIDEO
PROBLEMS OR WHERE BOMB
IMPACTS WERE NOT RECORDED
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.2.3
In 69 instances, the video recorded during a mission--from which hits
and misses are determined--was of poor quality or failed to record
bomb impact. Poor quality video and video that did not record bomb
impact within its field-of-view pose unique BDA problems for the
F-117s. F-117s are unique in that all missions are flown at night.
A lone pilot must concentrate on the cockpit display to aim the laser
designator on the aimpoint until bomb impact, and the impact
typically occurs directly beneath the aircraft as it passes over the
target. The aircraft's video records the image seen by the pilot
during the mission. There is no other means for the pilot or BDA
analysts to view bomb impacts. The intelligence chief for the 37th
TFW during Desert Storm told us that while to claim hits when miss
distances were small could be justified, hit claims made when
available video did not record bomb impact could not be justified.
Table III.10 illustrates examples of remarks indicating nonsupporting
video.
Table III.10
Examples of Remarks Indicating
Nonsupporting Video
Reported
Day BE hits Remarks
-------------------- ------ ---------- -- ------------------------
022 A 2 No release on tape
006 B 2 No impact seen, bad tape
001 C 1 Gimbal, no impact seen
034 D 1 Tape bad . . . , can't
see impact
019 E 1 Not on tape
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 37th TFW Desert Storm database.
REPORTED HITS WITH
CONFLICTING REMARKS
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.2.4
In 49 cases, credited hits were accompanied by remarks indicating
that the bombs missed the aimpoint or malfunctioned. There was no
standing requirement that remarks be entered in the database, but the
analysts who reviewed mission video entered explanatory or clarifying
comments at their discretion. Examples of remarks that are in
conflict with reported hits include references to dud bombs, bombs
that struck objects other than the DMPI, and bombs that did not
guide. Table III.11 illustrates examples of remarks indicating
nonsupporting video.
Table III.11
Examples of Remarks in Conflict With
Reported Hits
Reported
Day Target hits Remarks
-------------------- ------ ---------- -- ------------------------
025 F 2 2nd bomb hit short and
left
011 G 1 Dud wpn
040 H 2 One bomb no guide
023 I 1 Hit on wrong bunker
004 J 1 Bomb long
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 37th TFW Desert Storm database.
THE DEFINITION OF F-117 BOMB
HITS IN DESERT STORM
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.3
One of the primary reasons that reported hits are apparently in
conflict with other information recorded on the 37th TFW database is
that during Desert Storm, specific objective peacetime bomb hit
criteria were replaced with subjective wartime criteria. According
to former 37th TFW officials, bombs making impact more than 3 feet
from a DMPI in peacetime training were considered "gross errors."
(And as noted previously, bomb drops without video were classified as
misses.) However, these officials told us that in wartime, they
deemed these criteria no longer appropriate. In the words of one
former wing intelligence officer, "A GBU-10 striking 4 feet from a
radar will accomplish the objective of the mission." Thus, a bomb was
judged to be a hit when 37th TFW officials concluded that it probably
had an adverse effect on the enemy. For example, if the intended
target was a specific bunker in a large ammunition storage facility
and the bomb missed the intended bunker but hit a bunker nearby, the
bomb was counted as a hit.
In its Desert Storm white paper, the Air Force reported that campaign
planners' faith in the F-117 targeting system was so great that
pilots were tasked to hit not merely a particular building or shelter
"but a particular corner, a vent, or a door. In fact, if they hit
the building, but not the particular spot, their sortie counted as a
miss, not a hit."\26 We conclude that the 80-percent "direct" bomb
hit rate claim is not fully justified. The level of bomb accuracy
was clearly less than the characterization in the Air Force white
paper. However, the subjective criteria and other data problems
prohibit us from recalculating a fully documented rate.\27
Therefore, we estimate that the F-117 bomb hit rate is likely to have
been somewhere in the interval between the upper bound asserted by
the Air Force of 80 percent and a worst-case, lower bound of
approximately 55 percent. The lower bound assumes that all the
reported hits lacking corroborating support or in conflict with other
available data are discounted.\28 Whatever the actual bomb hit rate
for the F-117, it may well have been "unprecedented," "unparalleled,"
and higher than the rates achieved by any other aircraft in Desert
Storm; however, the data on the F-117 as well as other aircraft are
insufficient to make such characterizations.
--------------------
\26 Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully (1991), p. 24.
\27 We reviewed a selective sample of mission videos in which
reported hits contained contradictory information to determine the
feasibility of verifying hit data. We determined that hit data could
not be comprehensively verified because of (1) missing video, (2)
video records lost when tape was reused during the campaign, (3)
video images that were poor, (4) mislabeling of video, and (5) video
in which the impact image was inconclusive.
\28 Clearly, some of the data in conflict with reported hits are more
convincing than others; we believe that it is likely that some of
these cases can be justified as functional hits. However, some of
the evidence is equally convincing that some of the reported hits
should not have been credited (such as miss distances as great as 540
feet and hits credited when bomb impact was outside DLIR FOV). The
data do not permit a bomb-by-bomb reassessment.
PROBABILITY OF WEAPON
RELEASE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.4
An aircraft's bombing accuracy or bomb hit rate is one of two
essential variables that operational planners use in estimating the
probability that a given target will be damaged to the desired level
when a specific number of aircraft attack it.\29 The second variable
required by planners is the probability of weapon release. Planners
need to know not only the accuracy of a weapon system but also the
likelihood that on a given sortie the aircraft will be able to
release its weapons. The 37th TFW database allowed the calculation
of the probability of weapon release for the F-117 in Desert Storm.
The probability of weapon release is a function of multiple
probabilities of potential failures during a mission that would
prevent an aircraft from arriving over a target and releasing its
weapons. The potential aircraft failures include (1) mechanical
failure; (2) mission kill by enemy aircraft, SAM, or AAA; (3)
diversion in reaction to enemy air defenses; (4) inability to locate
the intended target; (5) inability to acquire the target in time to
effectively launch weapons; (6) inability to complete attack
coordination, and (7) inability to release weapons after arriving at
the target. The F-117 proved more prone to some of these failures
than others. In Desert Storm, no F-117 failed to release because of
enemy aircraft, SAMs, or AAA or because of reactions to enemy air
defenses.\30 However, F-117s did experience mechanical problems and
adverse weather. Table III.12 presents the number of each type of
failure that resulted in aborts and prevented bombs from being
dropped on tasked F-117 strikes.
Table III.12
Failures That Prevented Bombs From Being
Dropped on F-117 Primary Strikes\a
Final disposition Number Percent
---------------------- ---------------------- ----------------------
Total primary strikes 2,271 100.0
tasked
Weather aborts 412 18.1
Air aborts 140 6.2
Ground aborts 17 0.8
Total primary strikes 569 25.1
where no bombs were
dropped
Total primary strikes 1,702 74.9
where bombs were
dropped
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a A primary strike is defined as one aircraft tasked to deliver one
or more bombs on a specific DMPI during a single sortie.
Source: 37th TFW Desert Storm database.
As table III.12 shows, one-quarter of all F-117 primary strikes
tasked were aborted, principally because of bad weather.\31 (As
explained in app. II, poor weather made it difficult for F-117s to
identify and acquire targets and could prevent lasers from
illuminating targets for the bombs.) Thus, based on the Desert Storm
experience, operational planners considering the use of the F-117 in
a comparable scenario and environment would anticipate that the
expected probability of a target's being damaged to the desired level
would be based on the number of bombs tasked, reduced by the proven
probability of bomb release (75 percent), and reduced further by the
demonstrated hit rate (between 55 and 80 percent). Therefore, in
Desert Storm, the probability of a target's receiving damage from a
scheduled F-117 strike (that is, the probability of bomb release
times the demonstrated hit rate) was between 41 and 60 percent.\32
--------------------
\29 The Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual states that damage
expectancy is determined by the probability of damage to a target
(that is, bomb hit rate) times the probability of release. A
complete assessment of the probability that a target will receive the
desired level of damage would also need to consider the number of
aircraft sorties tasked and the appropriate selection of munition
type given the characteristics of the target.
\30 We discussed F-117 survivability in Desert Storm in appendix II.
\31 In contrast, according to GWAPS, 3,154 Air Force sorties were
canceled and 2,280 were aborted during Desert Storm and 69,406
sorties were flown, for a combined sortie cancellation and abort rate
of approximately 8 percent. The GWAPS data include the range of
deployed Air Force aircraft performing the full range of service
missions. Thus, while data are not available to compare mission
cancellation and abortion rates by strike aircraft, the available
data do indicate that the F-117 was more vulnerable to poor weather
in performing its mission than was the average Air Force aircraft.
GWAPS, vol. V, pt. I (Secret) tables 76 and 174, pp. 267, 408.
\32 DOD provided the following comment in response to this finding in
our draft report, "This statement corrects exaggerated information
(80 percent hit rate) supplied in the DOD title V report. The
difference in the report represents confirmed and corroborated hits.
Although statistically different, the important point is that two out
of every five bombs delivered were on target. This represents a
quantum leap in bombing accuracy, especially when considering that
the CEP for laser guided munitions are measured in feet, not hundreds
of feet. Aircraft without a precision guided munition (PGM)
capability could not repeatedly duplicate these results."
F-117 EFFECTIVENESS ON THE
FIRST NIGHT OF THE AIR
CAMPAIGN
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.5
Lockheed, the primary contractor for the F-117, claimed after the war
that
"During the first 24 hours [of the air campaign], 30 F-117s
struck 37 high value targets, inflicting damage that collapsed
Saddam Hussein's air defense system and all but eliminated
Iraq's ability to wage coordinated war. The concept of modern
air warfare had been changed forever."\33
In April 1991, Lt. Gen. Horner, the Joint Force Component Commander
in Desert Storm, testified before the Congress that
"The F-117 allowed us to do things that we could have only
dreamed about in past conflicts. Stealth enabled us to gain
surprise each and every day of the war. For example, on the
first night of the air campaign the F-117s delivered the first
bombs of the war against a wide array of targets, paralyzing the
Iraqi air defense network."\34
This claim is useful in assessing F-117 performance because the first
night's missions exemplified the design mission of the aircraft: to
strike selected high-value, well-defended targets with LGBs. In
Desert Storm, these included the strategic air defense targets
referred to--comprising primarily SOCs, IOCs, and key C\3 elements of
the IADS.
To assess whether the F-117s were as effective as claimed on the
first night, and specifically in contributing to the collapse of the
IADs, we addressed the following questions: (1) What were the
reported F-117 bomb hit rates on the first night of the campaign
against all targets, and IADS-related targets in particular? (2) Can
the damage done to IADS targets by the F-117s on the first night be
separated out from damage done by other aircraft?
We found that the claim that the F-117s alone were crucial in
collapsing the IADS on the first night of the campaign is not fully
supported by strike, BDA, and other intelligence data. These data
indicate that the F-117s achieved only partial strike success on the
first night; many other coalition aircraft attacked IADS-targets at
the onset of the campaign; and IADS capabilities were diminished but
continued to operate and remain viable past the first night.
--------------------
\33 Lockheed Corporation, "We Own the Night," Lockheed Horizons,
Issue 30 (May 1992), p. 57.
\34 DOD 1992 appropriations hearings (Apr. 30, 1991).
F-117 HIT RATE ON PLANNED
AIMPOINTS ON THE FIRST
NIGHT
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.5.1
We examined the F-117 database to evaluate whether it supported the
claim that the F-117s had hit all 37 targets to which they had been
tasked during the first night of the air campaign. These data show
that only 57 percent of the targets were hit on the first night.\35
Further, approximately half of the reported bomb hits (16 of 31) did
not have corroborating documentation or were in conflict with other
available data. (See table III.13.)
Table III.13
37th TFW Data on Bombs Dropped by F-
117s During the First 24 Hours
Hits with
Bombs AC No data
Target Category DMPIs tasked tasked Hits Misses drops problems\a
-------- ---------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ----------
A [DELETED] 1 2 1 0 0 2 0
B [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
C [DELETED] 2 2 2 1 1 0 1
D [DELETED] 2 2 2 1 1 0 1
E [DELETED] 2 2 2 1 0 1 0
F [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
G [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
H [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
I [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
J [DELETED] 2 2 2 2 0 0 1
K [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
L [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
M [DELETED] 2 3 2 3 0 0 0
N [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
O [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
P [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Q [DELETED] 3 4 4 4 0 0 2
R [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
S [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
T [DELETED] 2 2 2 0 2 0 0
U [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
V [DELETED] 2 2 2 0 2 0 0
W [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
X [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
Y [DELETED] 4 4 2 2 1 1 1
Z [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
AA [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
BB [DELETED] 2 2 2 1 0 1 0
CC [DELETED] 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
DD [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
EE [DELETED] 3 3 3 2 1 0 2
FF [DELETED] 4 4 4 1 3 0 1
GG [DELETED] 2 2 2 2 0 0 1
HH [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
II [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
JJ [DELETED] 2 2 1 2 0 0 1
KK [DELETED] 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
================================================================================
Total 57 60 \b 31 16 13 16
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Reported hits that lack corroborating support or are in conflict
with other available data.
\b Column total would not equal sum of aircraft tasked because some
aircraft were tasked to more than one DMPI.
Source: 37th TFW Desert Storm and Missions databases.
--------------------
\35 Fifty-nine percent of the tasked targets were hit on the second
night, for a two-night average of 58 percent. Although the claim was
based only on the first night's 37 targets, we examined the data on
the second night as well, to determine if the first night's
performance was an anomaly.
F-117 FIRST-NIGHT HIT RATE
ON IADS TARGETS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.6
A key claim made for the F-117s is that their effectiveness in
destroying IADS targets on the first night opened up holes that
nonstealthy aircraft then used to successfully attack other targets.
Fifteen of the 37 F-117 first-night targets were IADS-related.
Because of weather aborts and misses, only 9 of these 15 F-117
targets (60 percent) were reported hit by the F-117s on the first
night of the campaign. Table III.14 shows our analysis of the 37th
TFW database and DIA BDA reports.
Table III.14
F-117 Hit Rate on Strategic Integrated
Air Defense Targets on the First Night
Ta Aircra Hits with
rg DMPI Bombs ft Misse No data Day\
et s tasked tasked Hits s drops problems\b Yes No I\c d
-- ---- ------ ------ ----- ----- ------ ---------- ---- ---- ---- ----
A 1 2 1 0 0 2 0
C 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 X 28
H 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 X 5
I 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 X 7
J 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 X 6
L 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
M 2 3 2 3 0 0 0 X 2
Q 3 4 4 4 0 0 2 X 2
T 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 X 3
V 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 X 2
W 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 X 2
GG 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 X 3
HH 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
II 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
JJ 2 2 1 2 0 0 1 X 2
==================================================================================
To 24 27 17\e 17 5 5 7 2 8 1
t
a
l
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Assessment of first phase III report issued on target.
\b Reported hits that lack corroborating support or are in conflict
with other available data.
\c Phase III assessment inconclusive.
\d Day of Desert Storm on which first DIA BDA report on target was
issued.
\e Total does not equal sum of aircraft tasked; some aircraft were
assigned more than one target.
Source: 37th TFW Desert Storm and Missions databases.
The table shows that 17 F-117s were tasked to deliver 27 LGBs on 15
IADS-related targets with a total of 24 DMPIs. According to the 37th
TFW database, 5 of the scheduled 27 LGBs (19 percent) were not
dropped, another 5 (19 percent) were misses; and 17 (63 percent) were
hits. Of the 17 claimed hits, however, 7 (41 percent) either lacked
supporting video or were in conflict with other available data. This
means that there are unambiguous data supporting hits by 10 of the 22
LGBs (45 percent) that were dropped on IADS targets. The F-117s did
not hit 6 of the 15 (40 percent) IADS targets to which they were
tasked, 1 of which was the Air Defense Operations Center in Baghdad.
During Desert Storm, DIA produced phase III BDA assessments on 11 of
the 15 IADS targets to which the F-117s were tasked on the first
night. According to initial DIA BDA assessments of the IADS targets
(most of which were made by the end of day 3 of the campaign), 2 of
the 11 targets assessed were damaged sufficiently to preclude
restrikes, 8 targets remained functional and were recommended for
restrikes, and 1 could not be conclusively assessed.
In sum, the claim that the F-117s were responsible for collapsing the
IADS on the first night appears open to question because (1) the
F-117s did not hit 40 percent of their tasked targets on the first
night and (2) of the 11 IADS-related targets attacked by F-117s and
assessed by DIA, 8 were assessed as needing additional strikes. In
addition, the Missions database shows that 167 other platforms (such
as A-10s, F-4Gs, and F/A-18s) also struck 18 air defense-related
targets (IOCs, SOCs, and radars) on the first night.
The lack of data on the exact degree to which most targets were
damaged, and how that might have affected total integrated
capabilities, precludes attributing greater effectiveness to the
F-117s than to other systems. Thus, while, overall, the coalition
was able to neutralize the IADS in the early days of the war, the
data are insufficient to validate the claim that the F-117s alone
were the critical element, above all on the first night of the air
campaign.
Moreover, Air Force intelligence assessments of the extent to which
the IADS was operating in the first few days of the war do not
support the assertion that the system was "collapsed" during the
first few hours of the first night. Daily intelligence summaries
prepared during the war, called DAISUMs, characterized the IADS on
the third day of the campaign as "crippled but information is still
being passed" and "evidence of degradation of the Iraqi C\2 network
is beginning to show." The DAISUMs also described overall Iraqi
electronic warfare activity as low but radar and SAM activity in
Baghdad and KTO as heavy. By the fifth day of the air war, the
DAISUMs described the situation as, "In general, the Iraqi IADS is
down but not out."
AIRCRAFT TASKED TO DOWNTOWN
BAGHDAD
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5.7
Related to the claim for F-117 effectiveness against IADS targets is
a broader claim made by the Air Force concerning the overall value or
survivability of stealth aircraft. The Air Force stated in its
Desert Storm white paper that "the F-117 was the only airplane that
the planners dared risk over downtown Baghdad." The Air Force further
stated that "so dangerous was downtown Baghdad that the air campaign
planners excluded all other attackers, except F-117s and cruise
missiles, from striking it."\36 Similarly, in joint testimony to the
Congress on stealth and Desert Storm, Gens. Horner and Glosson
stated "F-117s were the only aircraft that attacked downtown Baghdad
targets--by most accounts more heavily defended than any Eastern
Europe target at the height of the Cold War."\37 A virtually
identical claim was made by Air Combat Command's Gen. Loh, also in
congressional testimony.\38 Contrary to these statements, however, we
found that strikes by other aircraft were not only planned but also
executed against key targets in downtown Baghdad.
A CENTAF-prepared Master Attack Plan (MAP) identified all planned air
campaign strikes for the first 72 hours of the air war. For the
third day of Desert Storm, the MAP called for three large-package
F-16 strikes against targets both in downtown Baghdad and against the
nearby Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility. Forty F-16s in package G
were assigned to strike 5 leadership targets in the heart of the
city--the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence service, directorate of
internal security, military intelligence, national air force, and
Baath Party. Another 16 F-16s in package N were assigned to restrike
military intelligence headquarters;
8 more were tasked to a sixth central city target, the Ministry of
Information and Culture. Although planned, these attacks were
canceled because of poor weather.
On day 3 of the campaign, the third and largest package (package Q)
included 72 F-16s; 56 were tasked against the Baghdad Nuclear
Research Facility, on the edge of the city and just 10 miles from the
presidential palace. Eight F-16s were tasked against the Baghdad
Petroleum Refinery, across the Euphrates River from central Baghdad
and barely 2 miles from the presidential palace. Four each were
tasked to restrike the air force and Baath Party headquarters. These
attacks were carried out, and two F-16s in this package were lost.
Thus, the MAP for day 3 called for a total of 152 F-16s to strike
targets within a radius of 10 miles of the presidential palace; 96
were specifically tasked to targets in the heart of the city.
Moreover, those tasked to the nuclear research center were well
within the threat ranges of SAM and AAA sites that defended Baghdad
area targets, whether core or suburban. And as explained in appendix
II, many types of aircraft struck targets in metropolitan Baghdad,
which was heavily defended throughout, thus making the distinction
about taskings over downtown Baghdad versus the metropolitan area
somewhat moot.
While aircraft other than F-117s were not subsequently tasked against
downtown targets after package Q on day 3 of the campaign, many types
of bombers struck targets in the Baghdad metropolitan area repeatedly
throughout the air campaign. And those attacks carried out at night
resulted in either zero or minimal casualties for nonstealthy,
conventional aircraft.
--------------------
\36 USAF, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully (1991), p. 19.
\37 DOD 1992 appropriations hearings (Apr. 30, 1991), p. 468.
\38 Gen. Loh, the "Value of Stealth," DOD 1992 appropriations
hearings (Apr. 30, 1991), p. 2. Figure II.4 is an Air Force
depiction of the use of F-117s and F-16s against the Baghdad Nuclear
Research Facility to demonstrate the "value of stealth." Appendix XI
addresses the claim that the comparative advantage of stealth
aircraft delivering LGBs over conventional aircraft delivering
unguided bombs was demonstrated in Desert Storm when both types of
aircraft attacked the same Baghdad target.
TLAM EFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6
Extensive analysis of BDA imagery and other data on the effectiveness
of Tomahawk land-attack missiles by the Center for Naval Analyses has
found that TLAM performance in Desert Storm was well below the
impression conveyed in DOD's title V report to the Congress, as well
as in internal DOD estimates.
The title V report, while essentially silent about the missile's
actual accuracy and effectiveness, notes that the "launching system
success rate was 98 percent." (DOD, p. T-203.) CNA and DIA reported
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated in April 1991 (just a couple
months after the conflict ended) that 85 percent of the TLAMs had hit
their intended targets.\39 Three variants of TLAMs were used in
Desert Storm: TLAM Cs, with conventional unitary warheads; and TLAM
D-Is; and TLAM D-IIs, which dispense different types of conventional
submunitions.\40
--------------------
\39 Joint CNA/DIA Research Memorandum 93-49, TLAM Performance During
Operation Desert Storm: Assessment of Physical and Functional Damage
to the TLAM Aimpoints, Vol. I: Overview and Methodology (Secret),
March 1994, p. 21. CNA/DIA noted that JCS assumed that TLAMs were
always responsible for all the damage at the aimpoint, even when it
had been targeted by other U.S. weapons.
\40 This report and the CNA/DIA reports cited do not assess the
performance of the TLAM D-IIs because of classification issues.
NUMBER OF TLAMS LAUNCHED AND
TYPE OF TARGETS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.1
During Desert Storm, a TLAM mission was loaded 307 times into a
particular missile for launch from a Navy ship or submarine.\41 Of
those 307, 19 experienced prelaunch problems. Ten of the 19 problems
were only temporary, thus these missile were either launched at a
later time or returned to inventory. Of the 288 actual launches, 6
suffered boost failures and did not transition to cruise. Of the 282
missiles that transitioned to cruise, 22 were TLAM D-IIs and 260 were
TLAM Cs and D-Is.
Of the 38 targets attacked by TLAMs, 37 were attacked by the 260 TLAM
Cs and D-Is. The 37 targets had a total of 173 individual aimpoints;
they were aimed at 10 leadership targets: 6 C\3 targets, 3 air
defense targets, 8 electric power targets, 4 oil-related targets, 4
chemical and missile targets, and
2 airfield targets. (The 38th target was targeted by TLAM D-IIs
alone.) However, TLAMs were limited in the type of target to which
they could be aimed, since they did not have anywhere near the "hard
target" capability of a 2,000-pound bomb. CNA/DIA reported that
although two TLAMs hit the Baghdad air defense operations center,
they made only "small craters on the roof" of the 11-feet-thick
reinforced concrete bunker.
--------------------
\41 Some analysts may be more familiar with a lower figure of
intended launches. However, as CNA/DIA stated, "a TLAM mission was
loaded 307 times into a particular missile for launch (i.e., there
were missile/mission pairs)." Of these, 10 missiles experienced
"temporary problems" preventing launch when intended (some were
launched later and some returned to inventory), and 9 had prelaunch
failures. Subtracting these 19 missiles, there were 288 TLAM Desert
Storm launches at the time intended. Since 307 missiles were
originally matched to a mission, we used that number as the universe
of TLAM launches. (For further discussion, see CNA/DIA, vol. I
(Mar. 1994), pp. 70-72.)
CONCENTRATED LAUNCH PERIOD
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.2
TLAM launches occurred overwhelmingly in the first 3 days of the war.
Of the 260 TLAM Cs and D-Is that transitioned to cruise phase, more
than 39 percent were fired in the first 24 hours; 62 percent were
launched during the first 48 hours; just over 73 percent in the first
72 hours; and no TLAMs of any kind were launched after February 1,
1991, just 2 weeks after the war started. CNA/DIA offered no
explanation for why there were no launches after February 1.
However, CNA/DIA noted that on February 1, six TLAM Cs were fired in
a "stream raid," all aimed at the Rasheed airfield; they arrived in
the Baghdad area about 11 a.m., they were fired upon, and only two of
the six arrived at the target. GWAPS reported that Gen. Schwarzkopf
did not approve any additional TLAM strikes either because (1)
television coverage of daylight strikes in downtown Baghdad proved
unacceptable in Washington or (2) their use was deemed too expensive
given its relatively small warhead and high cost.
PROBLEMS WITH BDA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6.3
Despite initial strong positive claims made for TLAM performance in
Desert Storm, analysis of TLAM effectiveness was complicated by
problematic BDA data. Multiple TLAMs were targeted to the same
targets, and attacks by U.S. Air Force bombers with other weapons
were also made against some TLAM targets before the targets could be
assessed for BDA purposes. Thus, for many TLAMs, it was difficult to
identify the damage a particular missile may have done, or to know
whether it actually even reached the target, if the target was
scheduled for attack by other weapons before BDA collection.
However, using BDA imagery and analysis, CNA/DIA's postwar analyses
have shown that about as many TLAM Cs and D-Is failed to arrive at
their intended targets--termed "no shows"--as are estimated to have
hit their targets. Others arrived at the designated target area, but
impacted so far away from the aimpoint as to only create a crater.
Of the 260 TLAM Cs and D-Is that transitioned to cruise flight, 30
were TLAM Cs with "programmed warhead detonation"--airburst
mode--that created damage effects that CNA/DIA stated could not be
evaluated adequately by existing BDA imagery. Therefore, these 30
are excluded from CNA/DIA's assessment of the percentage of TLAMs
that arrived at the target area and that hit their intended target.
(Since there was no way to reliably ascertain any damage caused by
the airburst mode TLAMS, it could not be determined how many arrived
over the targets either.) Ranges in the estimates for arrival and
hits reflect BDA uncertainties.
Table III.15 shows the number of TLAMs launched and the number of
TLAM Cs and D-1s estimated by CNA/DIA to have arrived at their
targets and to have caused some damage.
For those TLAMs for which CNA/DIA were able to interpret BDA data, an
estimated [DELETED] percent hit their intended aimpoint. These
[DELETED] missiles represented [DELETED] percent of all 307 attempted
launchings. If the [DELETED]-percent hit rate for the 230 detectable
TLAM Cs and D-Is was assumed to have been the case also for the 30
PWD TLAM Cs and the [DELETED] TLAM D-IIs that transitioned to cruise,
then a total of [DELETED] TLAMs would have hit their intended
targets, or [DELETED] percent of the 307 attempted launches.\42
However, actual damage to targets may well have been even less than
the [DELETED]-percent hit rate appears to imply, given that, as
CNA/DIA noted, the methodology used to define a TLAM hit was "in some
ways generous." CNA/DIA stated that a hit was defined as "damage of
any kind to the aimpoint or element containing the aimpoint."
(CNA/DIA, p. 67.) This meant, CNA/DIA explained, that "if a TLAM
impacts the dirt some distance from the target but causes even minor
fragment or blast damage to its aimpoint element, it is counted as a
hit." (CNA/DIA, p. 67.) CNA/DIA reported that there were [DELETED]
such marginal hits; if they are excluded, the TLAM hit rate was
[DELETED]-percent for nonairburst TLAMs.
Table III.15
TLAM Performance in Desert Storm
of C and D-I C and D-
TLAMs f TLAM use All only All I only
------ -------------------- ---- ------------- --------- ---------
Missile/mission pairs 307 [DELETED]\a [DELETED] [DELETED]
Successful launches 282 [DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED]
Transition to cruise flight \b [DELETED] \b [DELETED]
Arrived in target area\c \b [DELETED] \b [DELETED]
No shows at target\d \b [DELETED] \b [DELETED]
Hit or damaged target \b [DELETED] \b [DELETED]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Excludes 10 TLAMs with "temporary problems" from base used to
calculate percentages.
\b Data not available.
\c Excludes 30 TLAMs with programmed warhead detonation or airburst
mode that could not be assessed. Therefore, numbers and percentages
at this line and below are based on a set of 230 non-airburst mode
TLAMs. For further details, see CNA/DIA, TLAM Performance During
Desert Storm (Secret), March 1994, pp. 2-3.
\d An additional [DELETED] TLAMs that arrived in their target areas
impacted at distances at least five times greater than their
predicted CEP (circular error probable)--that is, from [DELETED] from
their aimpoints. These [DELETED] were not counted as "no shows" or
as hits.
Source: CNA/DIA, vol. 1 (Secret), March 1994, pp. 71-72.
Beyond TLAM's [DELETED]-percent miss rate against intended targets,
it demonstrated additional problems. The relatively flat,
featureless, desert terrain in the theater made it difficult for the
Defense Mapping Agency to produce usable TERCOM ingress routes, and
TLAM demonstrated limitations in range, mission planning, lethality,
and effectiveness against hard targets and targets capable of
mobility. Specifically, CNA/DIA reported that mission failures
resulted from three issues independent of the missile and were
problems that existed before the missile was launched. First,
mission guidance was not always clear and specific (12 TLAMs were
expended against 12 aimpoints where objectives were vague). Second,
supporting intelligence was not always accurate (five TLAM aimpoints
were misidentified with respect to their function). And third,
targets were not always within the capabilities of the TLAM warhead
(five aimpoints were either mobile or too hardened for the TLAM
warhead).
Since the war, the Navy has developed a Block III variant of the
TLAM. Its improvements include the use of Global Positioning System
in TLAM's guidance system. With GPS, TLAM route planning is not
constrained by terrain features, and mission planning time is
reduced. Some experts have expressed the concern that GPS guidance
may be vulnerable to jamming. Thus, until system testing and
possible modifications demonstrate TLAM Block III resistance to
electronic countermeasures, it is possible that the solution to the
TERCOM limitations--GPS--may lead to a new potential
vulnerability--jamming. Moreover, the Block III variant continues to
use the optical Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator, which has
various limitations. [DELETED]
In sum, TLAMs were initially believed to be extremely successful in
hitting--and therefore damaging--their targets; however, subsequent
intensive analysis shows that the hit rate for 230 TLAM Cs and D-Is
was [DELETED] percent. Moreover, a stricter definition of a "hit"
indicates a slightly lower rate of [DELETED] percent. TLAMs were
aimed at just 38 targets, perhaps based on their limited capabilities
against reinforced targets. While TLAMs offered a distinct
alternative to having to deliver weapons from a manned aircraft, the
data from Desert Storm suggest that there are important limitations
to their effectiveness in terms of hit rate and capability of
damaging a wide range of targets.
--------------------
\42 There were [DELETED] PWD TLAM Cs and D-IIs that transitioned to
cruise. The range is [DELETED] percent, which is [DELETED]. Adding
[DELETED].
WEAPON SYSTEM MANUFACTURERS'
CLAIMS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7
We assessed the accuracy of statements made by various U.S.
manufacturers about the performance of their products that played a
major role in the air campaign. Table III.16 presents manufacturers'
statements and summarizes our finding on each product.\43
Table III.16
Manufacturers' Statements About Product
Performance Compared to GAO Findings
Manufacturer Product Statement Finding
------------ -------- --------------------------- ---------------------------
General F-16 "No matter what the The F-16's delivery of
Dynamics mission, air-to-air, air- precision air-to-ground
to-ground. No matter what munitions, such as
the weather, day or night. Maverick, was impaired, and
The F-16 is the premier sometimes made impossible,
dogfighter."\a by clouds, haze, humidity,
smoke, and dust. Only less
accurate unguided munitions
could be employed in
adverse weather using
radar.
Grumman A-6E "A-6s . . . [were] The A-6E FLIR's ability to
detecting, identifying, detect and identify targets
tracking, and destroying was limited by clouds,
targets in any weather, day haze, humidity, smoke, and
or night."\b dust; the laser
designator's ability to
track targets was similarly
limited. Only less accurate
unguided munitions could be
employed in adverse weather
using radar.
Lockheed F-117 Achieved "80 percent direct The hit rate was between 55
hits."\c and 80 percent; the
probability of bomb release
was only 75 percent; thus,
the probability of a hit
during a scheduled F-117
mission was between 41 and
60 percent.
The "only aircraft to Other types of aircraft
attack heavily defended frequently attacked targets
downtown Baghdad."\c in the equally heavily
defended metropolitan area;
the Baghdad region was as
heavily defended as
downtown.
"During the first night, 30 On the first night, 21 of
F-117s struck 37 high- the 37 high-value targets
value targets, inflicting to which F-117s were tasked
damage that collapsed were reported hit; of
Saddam Hussein's air these, the F-117s missed 40
defense system and all but percent of their strategic
eliminated Iraq's ability air defense targets. BDA on
to wage coordinated war."\d 11 of the F-117 SAD targets
confirmed only 2 complete
kills. Numerous aircraft,
other than the F-117, were
involved in suppressing the
Iraqi IADS, which did not
show a marked falloff in
aircraft kills until day 5.
"On Day 1 of the war, only The 2.5-percent claim is
36 Stealth Fighters (less based on a comparison of
than 2.5% of the the F-117s to all deployed
coalition's tactical aircraft, including those
assets) were in the Gulf incapable of dropping
theater, yet they attacked bombs. The F-117s
31% of the 17 January represented 32 percent of
targets."\d U.S. aircraft capable of
delivering LGBs with
warheads designed to
penetrate hardened targets.
F-117s were tasked against
35 percent of the first-
day strategic targets.
"The F-117 reinstated the Other nonstealthy aircraft
element of surprise."\c also achieved surprise.
Stealth characteristics did
not ensure surprise for all
F-117 strikes;
modifications in tactics in
the use of support aircraft
were required.
Martin LANTIRN Can "locate and attack LANTIRN can be employed
Marietta targets at night and under below clouds and weather;
other conditions of poor however, its ability to
visibility using low- find and designate targets
level, high speed through clouds, haze,
tactics."\e smoke, dust, and humidity
ranges from limited to no
capacity at all.
McDonnell F-15E An "all weather" attack The ability of the F-15E
Douglas aircraft.\f using LANTIRN to detect and
identify targets through
clouds, haze, humidity,
smoke, and dust was very
limited; the laser
designator's ability to
track targets was similarly
limited. Only less accurate
unguided munitions could be
employed in adverse weather
using radar.
TLAM C/ "Can be launched . . . in TLAM's weather limitation
D cruise any weather."\g occurs not so much at the
missile launch point but in the
target area where the
optical [DELETED].
"Incredible accuracy"; "one From [DELETED] percent of
of the most accurate the TLAMs reached their
weapons in the world intended aimpoints, with
today."\g only [DELETED] percent
actually hitting the
target. It is impossible to
assess actual damage
incurred only by TLAMs.
Northrop ALQ-135 "Proved itself by jamming [DELETED]
jammer enemy threat radars"; was
for F- able "to function in
15E virtually any hostile
environment."\a
Texas Paveway "Employable" in "poor Clouds, smoke, dust, and
Instruments guidance weather/visibility" haze impose serious
for LGBs conditions.\h limitations on laser
guidance by disrupting
laser beam.
"TI Paveway III: one Our analysis of a selected
target, one bomb."\a sample of targets found
that no single aimpoint was
struck by one LGB--the
average was 4, the maximum
was 10.
"LGBs accounted for only 5% Data were not compiled that
of the total ordnance. But would permit a
Paveway accounted for determination of what
nearly 50%" of targets percentage of targets were
destroyed.\a destroyed by any munition
type.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a From a company advertisement in Aviation Week and Space
Technology, (1991).
\b Grumman Annual Report, 1991, p. 12.
\c Lockheed briefing for GAO.
\d From Lockheed Horizons, "We Own the Night," Issue 30 (1992), p.
55, 57.
\e Martin Marietta, 10-K Report to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1992, p. 14.
\f McDonnell-Douglas, "Performance of MCAIR Combat Aircraft in
Operation Desert Storm," brochure.
\g McDonnell-Douglas, "Tomahawk: A Total Weapon System," brochure.
\h Texas Instruments, "Paveway III: Laser-Guided Weapons," brochure,
1992.
Table III.16 shows that each of the manufacturers made public
statements about the performance of their products in Desert Storm
that are not fully supported. We also found that although some
manufacturers told us that they had only limited information
available to them--to the point of relying on hearsay--this did not
inhibit them from making unfounded assertions about system
performance, attempting to create favorable impressions of their
products. Finally, while the manufacturers' claims were often
inaccurate, their assertions were not significantly different from,
nor appreciably less accurate than, many of the statements of DOD
officials and DOD reports about the same weapon systems.
--------------------
\43 We culled statements from annual reports to stockholders, "10-K"
annual reports to the federal government, and public advertisements
appearing in a major weekly publication (Aviation Week and Space
Technology).
AIR CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS
AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:8
Over the 38 days preceding the ground campaign, approximately 37,500
strikes were conducted against Iraqi forces in kill box areas,
targeting tanks, armored personnel carriers (APC), and other tactical
vehicles. Because there are few data on the precise number of
munitions expended or sorties flown against tanks and other vehicles,
and because it was impossible to systematically collect and compare
BDA data to assess munition hit rates, it is also impossible to know
what level of effectiveness was achieved in Desert Storm for the
various munition types used.
Pilots reported that they had been able to destroy large numbers of
vehicles on the ground--tanks, APCs, and trucks--as well as artillery
pieces, before and during the ground campaign, especially with guided
munitions such as LGBs and Maverick missiles. While much pilot
frustration stemmed from the use of unguided bombs from medium to
high altitudes, a number of limitations were also revealed in the use
of guided munitions.
The Desert Storm databases do not provide data on attacks against
specific vehicles; many such attacks are subsumed as strikes against
kill boxes in the KTO. Interviews with pilots revealed that the
effectiveness of munitions against small ground targets was
constrained both by Desert Storm altitude delivery restrictions and
the combined technical limitations of the aircraft, sensors, and
munitions used, whether guided or unguided. At the same time,
because Iraqi KTO forces tended to remain in place through the 38
days preceding the ground campaign--and often put tanks in
recognizable formations--they were comparatively easy to identify.
As noted in appendix II, after day 2, aircraft delivery tactics were
designed to maximize survivability--by dropping ordnance from medium
to high altitudes--rather than to maximize weapon effectiveness.
Most pre-Desert Storm training occurred at low altitudes where bombs
are not subject to the high winds found in the gulf at high
altitudes. It was the consensus of the Desert Storm veteran pilots
we interviewed that unguided munitions were much less accurate from
high altitude than from low.
Pilots reported that guided munition effectiveness also decreased
somewhat from higher altitudes because (1) targets were more
difficult to designate with lasers, (2) some computer software did
not allow high-altitude bombing, and (3) the LGBs were also subject
to the effects of wind. Depending on the missile sensors, guided
munition delivery was also degraded, if not altogether prevented at
times, by clouds, smoke, dust, haze, and even humidity.
The difficulty in identifying and targeting vehicles and other small
ground targets, whether with guided or unguided munitions, was
reflected in the findings of postwar studies by the Army's Foreign
Science and Technology Center (FSTC) and the CIA that sought to
distinguish the relative effectiveness of the air and ground
campaigns in destroying Iraqi armor.
FSTC and CIA both found that the attrition of armored vehicles from
guided munitions was probably less than was initially claimed for air
power. FSTC personnel examined tanks that the Iraqis had left behind
in the KTO.\44 Of 163 tanks analyzed, 78 (48 percent) were abandoned
intact by the Iraqis or were destroyed by Iraqi demolition,
presumably to deny them to the coalition, while 85 (52 percent) had
sustained 145 hits. Of these hits, only 28 (17 percent) were
assessed as having come from air-to-ground munitions.
Using aerial photography, the CIA identified the number of Iraqi
tanks and APCs that did not move from areas where they were deployed
during the entire air campaign to areas where ground fighting
occurred and were therefore "destroyed or damaged during the air
campaign . . . inoperable because of poor maintenance, or . . .
abandoned."\45
The CIA study examined the damage done to armored vehicles of 12
Iraqi divisions, 3 of them Republican Guard divisions. Of the 2,665
tanks deployed to those 12 divisions, the CIA estimated that 1,135
(43 percent) were destroyed by aircraft before the ground war and
1,530 (57 percent) were undamaged. Of 2,624 APCs, 827 (32 percent)
were assessed as destroyed by aircraft; 1,797 escaped damage. The
levels of attrition among divisions varied greatly, with the RG units
experiencing the lightest attrition, although there was substantial
variation among them as well--from 13 to 30 percent of tanks
destroyed before the ground campaign.\46
In sum, although the CIA and FSTC studies each had methodological
shortcomings, taken together, their findings suggest that while the
air campaign may have been less effective than first estimated
against these targets, it still destroyed (or rendered unusable) less
than half the Iraqi armor in the KTO.
--------------------
\44 The sample of tanks studied was not scientifically selected; it
consisted simply of those that the study participants were able to
locate and inspect.
\45 CIA, Operation Desert Storm: A Snapshot (Sept. 1993), last
page. Even though some number of the vehicles were possibly
abandoned or broken down because of lack of maintenance, the study's
methodology credited all vehicles that did not move as vehicles
killed by air attack; thus, the study may have overcounted the
percentage of tanks, APCs, and artillery destroyed by air-to-ground
munitions.
\46 The Hammurabi, Madinah, and Tawakalna RG divisions experienced
13, 23, and 30 percent attrition of their tanks, respectively (for an
average attrition of 21 percent). Nine regular army armored and
mechanized divisions experienced an average tank attrition rate of 48
percent.
AIR CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS IN
ACHIEVING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9
To what extent were each of the strategic objectives of the air
campaign met? We addressed this subquestion in two parts. First, we
reviewed the available outcome data for each category of strategic
targets as possible indicators of the campaign's effectiveness in
destroying different categories of targets. Second, we reviewed the
available data and literature on the aggregate effectiveness of the
campaign in meeting each of the strategic objectives.
OUTCOME DATA BY STRATEGIC
TARGET CATEGORY
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.1
The effectiveness of aircraft and munitions in the aggregate varied
among the strategic target sets.\47 While the attainment of strategic
objectives is determined by more than the achievement of individual
target objectives, the compilation of individual target objectives
achieved was one tool used by commanders during the war to direct the
campaign. Table III.17 illustrates that just over half (53 percent)
of the final DIA phase III reports concluded that the target had been
destroyed or the objective had been met and no additional strikes
were required. The percentage of targets assessed as fully destroyed
in each category ranged from a low of 25 percent in the SCU category
to a high of 76 percent in the NBC category.
Table III.17
Targets Categorized as Fully
Successfully Destroyed and Not Fully
Successfully Destroyed
Number Percen Number Percen
Target category\ FS t FS NFS t NFS Total
---------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
C\3 73 57 55 43 128
ELE 13 57 10 43 23
GVC 13 52 12 48 25
KBX \a \a \a \a \a
LOC 35 67 17 33 52
MIB 18 31 40 69 58
NAV 4 29 10 71 14
NBC 16 76 5 24 21
OCA 24 65 13 35 37
OIL 9 38 15 62 24
SAM 18 69 8 31 26
SCU 6 25 18 75 24
================================================================================
Total 229 53 203 47 432
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Data were not available.
Although the rate of success varies across target categories, for
several reasons these rates do not necessarily reflect the relative
degree to which individual campaign objectives--as operationalized
through the formation of target categories--were achieved. Desert
Storm campaign goals were not necessarily achieved through the
cumulative destruction of individual targets. For example,
destroying x percent of all bridges does not automatically equate to
reducing the capacity of the lines of communication by x percent, for
several reasons: the bridges destroyed may not be the most crucial
to the flow of supplies, intelligence may not have identified all of
the bridges, and the enemy may effectively respond with
countermeasures (such as pontoon bridges). In addition, not all
targets are of equal importance. The value in destroying a key
bridge over the Euphrates may well be higher than destroying a bridge
in Baghdad with its numerous alternative bridges.
Another reason why the data in table III.17 must be interpreted with
caution is that the partial damage to the majority of targets
assessed as not fully successful could have contributed toward the
attainment of the overall campaign objectives. Moreover, no
criteria, and no data, exist to determine the absolute or relative
effect of partially (or fully) damaged targets on the attainment of
campaign objectives.
Further, table III.17 presents data only on targets for which BDA
data exist. These targets constitute less than half of the targets
in the Missions database, and they do not necessarily represent all
of the targets in each category. In addition, relevant targets that
should have been struck but were not on the list of strategic targets
(such as unknown Iraqi NBC targets) are not represented among the
targets in the table.
--------------------
\47 The number of targets in each strategic target set where the
target objectives had been successfully met was used as a measure of
the effectiveness of aircraft and munitions in the aggregate. The
determination of whether the target objective had been met was based
on the final DIA phase III BDA report written on a target during the
campaign.
AIR CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS
IN ACHIEVING KEY OBJECTIVES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2
The Desert Storm air campaign had larger goals than simply damaging
individual target. For example, it is one thing to destroy a dozen
bridges; it is another to achieve the objective of effectively
cutting supply lines. In this section, we examine the effectiveness
of the air campaign with regard to several broad objectives that
account for nearly all 12 of the strategic target categories shown in
table III.17.\48 Because of their limitations, the data shown in
table III.17 should be used only as supporting or partial evidence.
We augment those success rates with information from pilots,
planners, and analysts summarized in table III.18, which compares the
Desert Storm results as reported in DOD's title V report to our
findings.
Table III.18
Desert Storm Achievement of Key
Objectives
Target set DOD title V result Our finding
---------------- ------------------------------ ------------------------------
IADS and Air supremacy "attained." Coalition rapidly achieved
airfields complete control of Iraqi and
IADS "fragmented" within KTO airspace, almost
hours; medium-and high- uncontested by Iraqi
altitude sanctuary created; aircraft.
however, AAA and IR SAMs
remained a threat to the end. IADS fragmented over first few
days, but autonomous SAM and
Iraqi air force "decimated." AAA sites and IR SAMs remained
serious threats.
Integrated threat overstated;
autonomous threat
understated.
290 of 724 fixed-wing Iraqi
aircraft destroyed, 121
escaped to Iran, and remainder
not hit; 43 percent of air
force intact and in Iraq at
end of war.
Leadership and Leadership forced to "move 52 percent of leadership and
command, often," reducing C\3; 57 percent of C\3 targets were
control, and telecommunications facilities successfully destroyed or
communications destroyed but were often damaged.
repaired.
Despite hits on C\3 nodes,
Redundant and alternative Saddam was able to communicate
communication facilities "were with and direct Iraqi forces.
difficult to destroy."
Much of command structure was
"degraded."
Oil and 80 percent of oil-refining Data support title V report's
electricity capacity "damaged." assessment.
National electric power grid
"eventually collapsed."
Early disruption of primary
sources negatively affected
entire war industry
capabilities.
Scuds Scud facility damage "less No known destruction of mobile
than previously thought." Scud launcher.
Launches reduced after day 11, Scud launches seemingly
with some increase in last temporarily suppressed but
week and occasional large end-of-war launches suggest
salvos. large reserve may still
exist.
No destruction of mobile
launchers confirmed; they were Scud hunt level of effort
difficult to find. overstated.
No correlation between rate of
launches and anti-Scud
sorties.
Nuclear, Nuclear facility destruction 76 percent of known NBC
biological, and "was incomplete"; damage to targets fully successfully
chemical "known" nuclear facilities was destroyed.
"substantial"; however,
nuclear program "did not While known nuclear sites were
suffer as serious a setback as severely or moderately
desired." damaged, overall program was
virtually intact because only
Chemical warfare program was less than 15 percent of the
"seriously damaged; 75 percent facilities were known and,
of production capability therefore, attacked.
destroyed."
NBC destruction estimates
"suffered from incomplete
target set information."
Nuclear program virtually
intact; only less than 15
percent of the facilities hit
because of lack of knowledge
about the program.
Railroads and Three-quarters of bridges to 67 percent of LOC targets
bridges (lines- KTO destroyed; major food fully successfully destroyed.
of- shortages for frontline
communication) forces; lines of communication Iraqi ground forces
in KTO effectively experienced some shortages
interdicted. but, overall, remained
adequately supplied up to
ground war start.
Republican Guard Iraqi forces' overall combat Frontline troops and equipment
and other ground effectiveness "reduced apparently hit hard, but
forces in the dramatically," "significantly morale apparently very low
KTO degraded"; "not every before the air campaign.
Republican Guard division was
hit equally hard." Static tactics of Iraqi ground
forces aided targeting.
Those south of Basrah
"received less damage." Some RG heavy armor divisions
escaped with large inventory.
RG forces overall less damaged
than frontline forces.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
\48 The only strategic target category not clearly subsumed under one
of several broader sets is that of naval-related targets, including
port areas. These targets were not a major focus of our study. Both
DOD's title V report and GWAPS reported that the air campaign was
highly effective in eliminating Iraq's naval forces.
AIR SUPREMACY
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2.1
Using DOD's definition of air supremacy, we can state that the
coalition rapidly achieved and maintained it--meaning that there was
no effective opposition to coalition aircraft from the Iraqi air
force within just a few days of the onset of the air campaign.\49
However, coalition aircraft were never safe from AAA or handheld IR
SAMs while flying at either low or medium altitude at any time during
the conflict, and actual damage to the Iraqi air force was less than
implied by the claim of air supremacy.
The primary response of the Iraqi air force to coalition attacks and
capabilities was either to flee to Iran or to try to remain hidden in
hardened aircraft shelters or in civilian areas. As a result, after
some initial resistance--including the likely shooting down of an
F/A-18--the Iraqi air force retreated, offering little threat to
either coalition aircraft or to coalition ground forces. At the same
time, an estimated 290 (40 percent) of Iraq's 724 fixed-wing aircraft
were destroyed in the air or on the ground by the coalition; another
121 escaped to Iran, leaving 313 (43 percent) intact and inside Iraq
at the end of the war. GWAPS' conclusion that the "Iraqi Air Force
was not completely destroyed by the war's end" may be an
understatement, since more fixed-wing aircraft survived than were
destroyed.\50 While the Iraqi air force never posed a serious threat
to a qualitatively and quantitatively superior coalition force, more
than enough of it survived to remain a regional threat.
Similarly, as evidenced by pilots' accounts and low-level losses that
continued throughout the war, coalition aircraft were not able to
defeat the AAA or portable IR SAM threats because of the very large
number of these systems and the difficulty in finding such small,
mobile, nonemitting systems. This meant that while coalition
aircraft had a high-altitude sanctuary, medium- and especially
low-altitude deliveries remained hazardous throughout the war.
Moreover, although radar-guided SAMs accounted for almost no damage
or losses after the first week of the air war--because they were
being launched unguided--the number of launches remained quite
substantial throughout the campaign. About 151 SAMs were launched in
the last 8 days of the air war, although only 2 resulted in loss or
damage to coalition aircraft.\51 Eleven coalition aircraft were shot
down in the last 3 days of the war, almost all at low altitudes
(either in advance of the ground war or during it), from AAA or IR
SAMs. Of a total 86 coalition aircraft lost or damaged during the
war, 21 losses (25 percent) occurred in the last
7 days--long after air supremacy had been declared.
--------------------
\49 On January 27, 1991, Gen. Schwarzkopf declared that coalition
air forces had achieved air supremacy. (DOD title V report to the
Congress [Apr. 1992], pp. 124, 127, and 129. See glossary for
definition.)
\50 GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Secret), p. 156. GWAPS also notes
that there are some questions about the exact number of aircraft;
this reflects data gaps and counting issues. Therefore, all numbers
cited are estimates.
\51 GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Secret), p. 140, fig. 10. Numbers
are our estimates based on the bar charts shown in the figure.
LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND,
CONTROL, AND
COMMUNICATIONS
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2.2
The effectiveness of the air war against the Iraqi "national command
authority" is less clear than for air supremacy, not least because
there is no readily quantifiable measure about what it would have
meant to "disrupt" command, control, and communications. There are
no agreed-upon yardsticks about how many communication nodes or lines
need to have been destroyed, how much dispersion or degradation of
authority fulfills the term "disrupt," or what it means to "isolate"
Saddam from the Iraqi people or to force him to "cry uncle."
Moreover, while the kind of targets that were related to C\3 were
fairly apparent, they were also diverse--including the "AT&T
building," the presidential palace, numerous deeply buried command
bunkers, military headquarters, telecommunication switching
facilities, and so forth. Further, even if all these had been
destroyed--and analysis of the DIA phase III messages shows that at
least 57 percent of the C\3 category and 52 percent of the GVC
were--the fact that C\3 could be and was maintained through radios
meant that C\3 was very difficult to disrupt. In effect, the extent
of communications disruption was "unknown."\52 It is clear, however,
that the air campaign against the Iraqi leadership did not cause the
regime to collapse and thereby preclude the need for a ground
offensive.
--------------------
\52 GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Secret), p. 348, notes that "the
available evidence will not permit even a rough quantitative estimate
as to how much Baghdad's national telecommunications and C\3 were
disrupted by strategic air attack."
OIL AND ELECTRICITY
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2.3
The attacks on electricity-related targets largely achieved their
objective of sharply reducing generated electricity but apparently
did not succeed in weakening popular support for the regime, as hoped
by air war planners. Oil supplies were somewhat reduced by air
attacks but not enough to affect the Iraqi forces. Table III.17
reports that 38 and 57 percent of the oil and electric facility
targets, respectively, were assessed as fully successfully destroyed.
These data are consistent with GWAPS and title V accounts of the
damage to the oil and electricity infrastructure, which concluded
that the campaign was more successful in achieving its goals in the
electricity category than in the oil category.
With regard to electricity, both accounts agree that attacks on
electric power plants and transformer facilities in the first 2 days
resulted in a fairly rapid reduction in generating capacity. By
January 20, capacity had dropped from about 9,500 megawatts to about
2,500; after numerous restrikes against smaller plants, it was
eventually reduced to about 1,000 megawatts, or about 15 percent of
prewar capability. While the lights did go off in Baghdad as well as
in much of the rest of central and southern Iraq, GWAPS found no
evidence that this negatively affected the popularity of the Hussein
regime.\53
GWAPS notes that damage to electric generator halls was somewhat
greater than had been planned. While the planners had wanted only
the electrical transformers and switching systems hit, to avoid
long-term damage, the pilots, perhaps unaware of these plans, hit the
generators. Forcing the Iraqis to rely on secondary backup power
sources was an undoubted hindrance to overall capabilities.
With regard to oil, the air campaign focused on reducing refining
capability and destroying stored refined oil. Iraqi oil production
was concentrated at three major refineries. According to GWAPS, the
CIA estimated that more than 90 percent of the total Iraqi refining
capability was rendered inoperative by air strikes. However, only
about 20 percent of the refined product storage capacity was
destroyed, perhaps because fewer than 400 sorties struck these
facilities. Further, because Iraqi units had sufficient stocks to
last for weeks, if not months, when the ground war started, the
attacks on oil had no significant military impact on Iraqi ground
forces.
--------------------
\53 GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Secret), p. 308.
MOBILE SCUD LAUNCHERS
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2.4
The overall record against mobile Scuds strongly suggests that even
under highly favorable circumstances--namely, in a condition of air
supremacy with no jamming of airborne sensors and with Scud launches
lighting up the night sky--the United States did not have the
combination of real-time detection and prosecution required to hit
portable launchers before they moved from their launch points. There
is no confirming evidence that any mobile Scud launchers were
destroyed, and data to support the deterrent effect of the
Scud-hunting campaign are weak because the rate of firings does not
appear to have been related to the number of anti-Scud sorties.
The launches of Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia forced a
major unplanned diversion of air resources into trying to locate and
target trucks and other vehicles being used as mobile launchers.
Preventing these launches became an urgent mission, yet both GWAPS
and DOD title V reported that there is not a single confirmed kill of
a mobile launcher; a draft Rand analysis reached essentially the same
conclusion.\54
In 42 instances, F-15s on Scud-hunting missions were directed to an
area from which a Scud had been launched but prosecuted only 8 to the
point of delivering ordnance. However, both GWAPS and DOD credit the
anti-Scud campaign with suppressing the number of launches after the
initial 10 days of the war. There was a clear drop-off in Scud
launches after day 10 of the war, but an increase again starting with
day 36. The firing rate of Scuds averaged about 5 per day for the
first 10 days--but with large daily variations--and declined to
approximately 1 per day until the last week of the war, during which
it averaged 3 per day.\55
The number of launches on a given day shows no consistent
relationship to the number of planned counter-Scud sorties. This can
be seen from the fact that while the number of anti-Scud sorties
ranged from about 45 to 90 on days 2 through 12, the number of Scud
launches varied from 0 to 14 per day during that period.
--------------------
\54 Rand, "Technology Lessons From Desert Storm Experience: A
Preliminary Review and Assessment," draft report (Oct. 1991), p. 3
and chart 25.
\55 Institute for Defense Analyses, Desert Storm Campaign, P-2661
(Apr. 1992), p. I-16.
NBC WARFARE CAPABILITIES
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2.5
The coalition's objective was to eliminate Iraq's capabilities to
build, deploy, or launch nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
The goal of eliminating Iraq's NBC capabilities was not even
approximated by the air campaign; very substantial NBC capabilities
were left untouched. An intelligence failure to identify NBC targets
meant that the air campaign hit only a tiny fraction of the nuclear
targets and left intact vast chemical and biological weapons
stores.\56
While 3 nuclear-related facilities were severely or moderately
damaged by air power, these turned out to be only less than 15
percent of those identified by U.N. inspection teams after the war.
The United Nations identified 16 "main facilities." Moreover, some
facilities may have remained shielded from the United Nations.
Therefore, effectiveness against this target category was probably
even less than can be estimated from damage to known sites. The
unclassified title V report stated
(on p. 207) that the nuclear program "did not suffer as serious a
setback as was desired."
With regard to chemical warfare production facilities, DIA concluded
that by February 20, 1991, a 75-percent degradation of production and
filling facilities had been achieved. However, it was also the case
that large stocks of chemical weapons were not destroyed: "it took
numerous inspections and much effort after the war by U.N.
inspectors to begin even to approach eliminating the bulk of Iraq's
chemical weapons."\57 For example, in April 1991, Iraq admitted to
the U.N. that it still had 10,000 nerve gas warheads, 1,500
chemical-weapon bombs and shells, and 1,000 tons of nerve and mustard
gas. Later, it conceded that it still had 150,000 chemical
munitions. Therefore, it is readily apparent that, as with the
nuclear weapons targets, much was missed, either through lack of
target information or through ineffective attacks.
For several years following the cease-fire, U.N. inspection teams
were unable to find conclusive evidence that Iraq had produced
offensive biological weapons. However, in mid-1995, in response to
U.N. inspection commission evidence, the Iraqis admitted to
producing large quantities of two deadly agents--the bacteria that
cause botulism and anthrax--on the eve of the Gulf War. Several
suspected production facilities were hit during the war, as were
suspected research facilities at Taji and Salman Pak. In addition, a
number of refrigerated bunkers believed to contain biological weapons
were hit. DOD's classified title V report stated
(on p. 224) that the biological warfare program "was damaged and its
known key research and development facilities were destroyed.
Further, most refrigerated storage bunkers were destroyed." Whether
these constituted the entirety of Iraq's biological warfare program
is not yet known.
--------------------
\56 It is fair to note that although the air campaign was not
directly effective in destroying the vast majority of Iraq's NBC
warfare capabilities by the end of the war, the campaign was
instrumental in securing the coalition victory and motivating Saddam
Hussein to accept U.N. resolutions and on-site inspection teams.
Thus, the air campaign indirectly led to the achievement of this
campaign objective following the cease-fire.
\57 GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Secret), p. 331.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2.6
Destroying railroads and bridges as well as supply convoys was seen
as the key to meeting several related objectives--cutting supply
lines to the KTO to degrade and demoralize Iraqi forces and blocking
the retreat of those forces, leading to their destruction in the
ground campaign. While large numbers of bridges, railroad lines, and
other LOC targets were destroyed by air attacks, the sheer amount of
in-place stocks, as well as the number of available transport
vehicles, apparently served to keep most of the Iraqi ground forces
adequately supplied, up to the start of the ground war. Thus, the
goal of cutting lines of communication was only partially met.
Table III.17 indicated that approximately two-thirds of the LOC
targets assessed were determined to be successfully destroyed. GWAPS
and the
title V report stated that so many bridges over the Euphrates and
Tigris rivers were destroyed that supply flows were severely reduced
to frontline troops. GWAPS stated (on p. 349) that "all important
bridges [were] destroyed"; the title V report noted that
three-fourths of the bridges from central Iraq to the KTO were
destroyed or heavily damaged. It is estimated that attacks on LOC
targets reduced the carrying capacity of traffic on the
Baghdad-to-KTO highways from about 200,000 metric tons per day to
about one-tenth that amount by the end of the war. In addition,
damage to railroad bridges completely cut the only rail line from
Iraq to Kuwait.
However, GWAPS noted (on p. 371) that the Iraqis' stocks of material
in theater were so large that "by the time the ground war began, the
Iraqi army had been weakened but not 'strangled' by air interdiction
of its lines of communications." For example, at the start of the air
campaign, Iraq had 40,000 to 55,000 military cargo trucks, 190,000
commercial vehicles, and 120,000 Kuwaiti vehicles. In addition, Iraq
had 300,000 metric tons of ammunition in dozens of locations in the
KTO; only an estimated 10 percent of this was destroyed before the
ground war.\58 The GWAPS report stated that logistic movement
difficulties within Kuwait may have resulted as much from Iraqi
ineptitude as from air attacks; the effect of the latter is
impossible to separate out. Moreover, despite the air attacks, GWAPS
found that the Iraqi forces were adequately sustained overall
throughout the air campaign, although some units reported food
shortages.
--------------------
\58 GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Unclassified), p. 194.
IRAQI GROUND FORCES,
INCLUDING THE REPUBLICAN
GUARD
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:9.2.7
Assessments differ about the extent to which the effectiveness of the
Iraqi forces in the KTO was reduced before the ground war. Estimates
of overall effectiveness must take into account not only the
inventory of weapons but also morale and readiness. Moreover, not
all equipment was equally valuable, and some, such as artillery, was
potentially more lethal against an attacking force (including feared
chemical munitions) but less important than tanks for degrading Iraqi
offensive capabilities.
The Iraqi ground forces were diverse in a number of ways: the
better-equipped, elite Republican Guards were kept relatively far
back from the front while the lesser supplied frontline troops were
heavily composed of ethnic groups out of favor and out of power
within Iraq. Evidence from interviews with Iraqi prisoners of war
suggests it was not just the air campaign that destroyed the
effectiveness of their ground forces: they characterized themselves
not as "battle hardened" after
8 years of war with Iran but, rather, as "war weary." U.S. Army
intelligence summaries of the statements of prisoners stated the
following:
"War weariness, harsh conditions, and lack of conviction of the
justice of the invasion of Kuwait caused widespread desertion in
the Iraqi Army prior to the air campaign, but in some units the
genuine foot race north [that is, desertion] really commenced
when the bombs began to fall."\59
In effect, the air campaign was a factor in that collapse of morale,
but it was clearly not the only cause: the fact that the Iraqi
forces were in a preexisting state of low morale cannot be ignored.
Another measure of the effect of air power against Iraqi ground
forces is its destruction of Iraqi equipment. GWAPS stated that the
operations plan set a requirement that Iraqi ground forces in the KTO
were to be reduced to no more than 50-percent effectiveness by the
start of the ground war. According to some sources, this meant a
50-percent reduction not in the number of weapons in each and every
category but, rather, in overall capabilities. However, GWAPS stated
(on p. 203) that phase III of the air campaign had been designed to
"reduce Iraqi armor and artillery by that planned amount." The broad
objectives were not only to reduce the capability of these units to
inflict casualties but also--as the title V report states at least
three times--to "destroy" the Republican Guard.
In effect, several competing objectives existed under the broader
umbrella of meeting the goal of reducing the Iraqi ground forces by
50 percent. For while the commander in chief of the Central Command
ordered that attrition against Iraqi frontline forces be maximized,
this meant that fewer sorties were flown against the less-threatening
"third echelon" Republican Guard divisions, and fewer against the
Republican Guard heavy armor divisions, than against the infantry
divisions closer to the front.\60 As a result, destruction of the
three "heavy" Republican Guard divisions ("holding the bulk of all
the armor") was considerably less than that against either the
frontline forces or the Republican Guard infantry divisions.\61 All
frontline forces had been reduced to less than 50-percent
effectiveness just before the ground war, while most of the rear
units were above 75-percent effectiveness. The consequence of the
much greater weight of effort on the front lines was that very large
numbers of Republican Guards and their armor were either not attacked
or only sporadically attacked during the air campaign. The end
result was that many of these forces escaped back into central Iraq,
leaving some of the most formidable Iraqi forces intact.
The CIA estimated that no more than about 30 percent of the tanks of
the three key Republican Guard "heavy" divisions were destroyed by
air power before the ground campaign. Total tank losses by the end
of the ground war for those three heavy divisions were 50 percent,
according to the CIA, compared to an estimated 76 percent for all
Iraqi tanks in the KTO. Our analysis of the Missions database found
that targets most closely associated with ground troops received by
far the most strikes and the most bombs and bomb tonnage compared to
other target categories. These targets received at least nine times
more strikes, five times more bombs, and five times more bomb tonnage
than the next highest strategic target category, MIB.
Whatever the exact cause of armor or personnel losses, the fact
remains that large numbers of Republican Guard armor were able to
avoid destruction or capture by U.S. ground war forces. They were
then available to Saddam for maintaining his power and to threaten
Kuwait in October 1994.
--------------------
\59 Department of the Army, "The Gulf War: An Iraqi General
Officer's Perspective," memorandum for the record, 513th Military
Intelligence Brigade, Joint Debriefing Center (Mar. 11, 1991), p.
4.
\60 The title V report states that there were fewer sorties against
the rearward Republican Guard units because they were better dug in
and had better air defenses, requiring more air support and more
sorties. The Republican Guard infantry divisions formed a "second
echelon" reserve, well behind the front lines but in front of the
heavy, armored divisions.
\61 GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Secret), p. 161.
SUMMARY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix III:10
Many claims of Desert Storm effectiveness show a pattern of
overstatement. In this appendix, we addressed the effectiveness of
different types of aircraft and munitions used in Desert Storm and
the overall effectiveness of the air campaign in achieving its
objectives. The Desert Storm input and BDA data did not permit a
comprehensive aircraft-by-aircraft or munition-by-munition comparison
of effectiveness; however, we were able to combine input and outcome
data to (1) reveal associations of greater and lesser success against
targets between types of aircraft and munitions and (2) examine the
effects of selected types of munitions and aircraft where they were
used in similar ways. Thus, we were able to work within the data
constraints to examine several aspects of aircraft, munition, and
campaign effectiveness.
While the available Desert Storm input and outcome data did not allow
direct effectiveness comparisons between all aircraft types, they did
indicate that overall effectiveness varied somewhat by type of
aircraft and more so by type of target category attacked. The data
also revealed patterns of greater and lesser success against targets,
both between types of aircraft and munitions over the course of the
campaign and with respect to individual target categories.
There was no consistent pattern indicating that the key to success in
target outcomes was the use of either guided or unguided munitions.
On average, targets where objectives were successfully achieved
received more guided and fewer unguided munitions than targets where
objectives were not determined to have been fully achieved. But in
several target categories, the reverse was true. Nor were there
major differences in the apparent effect of platform type on strike
performance. When attacking the same targets with LGBs, the F-111Fs
reported achieving only a slightly greater target hit rate than the
F-117s. Similarly, there was little difference in the rates of
success achieved by F/A-18s and F-16s when delivering the MK-84
unguided munition.
The results of our analyses did not support the claim for LGB
effectiveness summarized by "one target, one bomb." Moreover,
planners apparently ordered restrikes either because BDA revealed
that one bomb did not achieve target objectives or they did not
believe that "one target, one bomb" was being achieved.
Desert Storm data also do not clearly support a number of major DOD
claims for the F-117. For example, according to some, the accuracy
of the F-117 in combat may have been unprecedented; our estimates of
the bomb hit rate for the F-117 show that it was between 55 and 80
percent. Of equal importance, the rate of weapon release for the
F-117 during Desert Storm was only 75 percent--largely because of a
weather abort rate far higher than for other strike aircraft. Thus,
the effectiveness of scheduled F-117 strikes was between 41 and 60
percent. And the accuracy and effectiveness of the TLAM was less
than generally perceived.
Our analysis of manufacturers' claims revealed the same pattern of
overstatement. All the manufacturers whose weapon systems we
reviewed made public statements about the performance of their
products in Desert Storm that the data do not fully support. And
while the manufacturers' claims were often inaccurate, their
assertions were not significantly different from, nor appreciably
less accurate than, many of the statements of DOD officials and DOD
reports about the same systems' performance in Desert Storm.
Finally, we found that the available quantitative and qualitative
data indicate that damage to several major sets of targets was less
complete than DOD's title V report to the Congress made clear and,
therefore, that the objectives related to these target sets were only
partially met. The gap between what has been claimed for air power
in Desert Storm and what actually occurred was sometimes substantial.
In effect, even under the generally favorable tactical and
environmental conditions prevalent during Desert Storm, the
effectiveness of air power was more limited than initially expected
(see app. V) or subsequently claimed.
In light of the favorable conditions under which the air campaign was
pursued and the technological and numerical advantages enjoyed by the
coalition, it would not have been surprising if the effectiveness of
the individual aircraft and munitions had been quite high. However,
the commander of the U.S. air forces clearly stated at the onset of
the war that his top priority in the air campaign was survivability.
Conducting the war from medium and high altitudes precluded some
systems from being used in ways that would probably have maximized
their effectiveness. At the same time, the basically flat terrain,
the attainment of air supremacy, and the dearth of Iraqi
countermeasures provided favorable delivery conditions. Aircraft,
munitions, and campaign effectiveness, to the extent that they can be
measured, should be extrapolated only with care to another enemy in
another contingency.
COST AND PERFORMANCE OF THE
AIRCRAFT AND MUNITIONS IN DESERT
STORM
========================================================== Appendix IV
This appendix compares the costs and performance of the aircraft and
munitions used in the Desert Storm air campaign, as well as the
results from them. Because the data collected in Desert Storm about
the performance of weapon systems contain numerous inconsistencies in
quality and quantity, they do not allow us to make a reliable
cost-effectiveness comparison of all the systems under review.
For some aircraft, such as the F-117, there are relatively good data
about the number of sorties conducted, while for others, such as the
A-10, numerous questions remain about the most basic kind of
performance data. For most systems, including the TLAM, there are
relatively few instances in which the effects of a particular attack
with a particular weapon on a given target can be separated out from
other attacks on the same target. This is because BDA data often
were not collected until after several attacks had occurred.
To approximate a measure of cost-effectiveness, we considered an
aircraft's total program unit cost; sortie cost; and Desert Storm
performance data such as survivability, sortie rate, and outcomes
achieved by target category. Combining aircraft input and output
performance data with cost estimates permits us to present as
comprehensive a comparison as possible of the multiple weapon systems
used in the air campaign.
COST AND PERFORMANCE OF
AIRCRAFT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1
MEASURES USED
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.1
The following measures assisted us in our comparative evaluation of
the aircraft under review. Dollar costs are in constant fiscal year
1994 dollars.
TOTAL PROGRAM UNIT COST
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.1
This measure includes research and development and procurement costs
identified in DOD's periodic Selected Acquisition Reports to the
Congress, to permit a comparison of aircraft per unit costs.
DESERT STORM COST PER
SORTIE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.2
This is the cost to operate each type of aircraft under review on a
typical sortie. These estimates of comparative costs were generated
by the Air Force at our request, using Air Force and Navy data and an
agreed-upon methodology.
AVERAGE DESERT STORM
SORTIES PER DAY
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.3
This measure was derived by dividing total sorties for each aircraft
under review by the 43 days of the air campaign and by the number of
aircraft deployed. Since these averages were clearly dependent upon
multiple factors--such as distance to target, which can vary greatly
for identical Navy aircraft on different carriers or identical Air
Force aircraft at different bases--there are various factors that can
explain differences between aircraft on this measure.\1 However, it
is a summary measure of overall aircraft availability and, as such,
permits an understanding of the range of the comparative availability
of each aircraft to perform its assigned mission at its own
particular level of effectiveness, which can vary by type while not
showing the explanation for differences. Availability is commonly
regarded as advantageous, since it is assumed that it is better to be
able to attack the enemy more rather than less in a given time
period.
--------------------
\1 Other factors can include, aircraft reliability and
maintainability, mission planning requirements, aircrew fatigue and
availability, and ability or inability to operate out of forward
operating bases; all can vary by aircraft type.
DESERT STORM CASUALTY
RATE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.4
This measure permits a comparison of the survivability of aircraft,
derived by dividing total sorties of each aircraft type by total lost
and damaged aircraft of each type.
NUMBER AND RATIO OF
GUIDED AND UNGUIDED
MUNITIONS DELIVERED
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.5
This performance measure presents the type and number of munitions
delivered, by aircraft type, on all target categories.
TOTAL TONNAGE AND AVERAGE
TONNAGE PER DAY PER
AIRCRAFT
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.6
This performance measure compares each aircraft's delivery of
munitions, as measured by total Desert Storm tonnage and average
tonnage per day per aircraft. The assumption is that, given a
specific munition type, it is advantageous to deliver more rather
than less tonnage per day against an enemy. This measure is, of
course, complicated by variance in the type of munitions that
different aircraft types deliver. Thus, it is also necessary to
review the effect that the various aircraft types had on targets with
their different munition combinations.
ENVIRONMENTAL FLEXIBILITY
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.7
This measure compares aircraft on their capability to operate in two
stressful environmental conditions: conducting combat flight
operations at night and in adverse weather. First, we indicate
whether an aircraft was used for both day and night strikes in Desert
Storm (versus day or night only). Second, we indicate whether an
aircraft had the capability to deliver munitions effectively under
adverse weather conditions. We did not have sufficient data to know
whether pilots chose to release bombs in poor weather regardless of
accuracy degradation.
PREDOMINANT TARGET
TASKINGS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.8
The strategic target categories we measure accounted for
three-quarters or more of an aircraft's Desert Storm strikes. By
eliminating those categories for which only a comparatively small
number of aircraft strikes were performed, we obtained an overall
assessment of what target categories an aircraft was used most often
against. This, we believe, is somewhat more useful and informative
than simply tallying up the gross number of target categories an
aircraft was used against, even if only a handful of strikes were
flown in some categories. This latter methodology was used by the
Air Force and DOD in descriptions of the F-117s' contribution to the
air campaign.
RATIO OF TARGETS
SUCCESSFULLY AND NOT
FULLY SUCCESSFULLY
DESTROYED
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.9
Using the data discussed in appendix III, we compared the various
aircraft on the overall ratio of targets they attacked that were, or
were not, assessed as successfully destroyed. At best, these ratios
reflect assessments of the level of success associated with the
various aircraft, though not necessarily exclusively attributed to
them.
OTHER POSSIBLE MEASURES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.2
Numerous measures could be used in comparing Desert Storm air
campaign systems, such as aircraft mission capable rates or aircraft
range. We chose the measures that, in our view, offered the most
useful ways in which to compare systems used in Desert Storm, again
taking into account data availability and limitations. Thus, for
example, rather than comparing mission capable rates, we compared
sortie rates actually flown in the air campaign: we believe it more
informative to measure that a combat sortie was actually flown than
that an aircraft was determined "mission capable" yet may not have
actually flown a combat mission. Similarly, aircraft range was not
compared because the availability of tanker aircraft in Desert Storm
tended to mask differences between aircraft on this dimension.
(However, if fewer tankers are available in future conflicts, range
differences among aircraft could have a significant effect on
availability.)
Finally, it is important to emphasize that no single measure should
automatically be given greater weight than others in assessments of
aircraft or munitions. The comparison we proffer here intentionally
presents multiple dimensions on which to assess air campaign systems,
not least because of the data reliability problems already discussed.
Further, aircraft have different missions, and effectiveness on one
type of mission may have been achieved through design requirements
that greatly limit performance on other missions. Therefore, no one
single cost or performance measure will consistently capture all that
should be known or understood in comparing one aircraft type to
another.
OVERALL RESULTS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.3
Table IV.1 presents cost and performance data for the aircraft under
review.
The following appear to be the major points that can be drawn with
regard to the issue of Desert Storm aircraft cost and performance.
Comparatively, none of the air-to-ground aircraft examined
demonstrated overall consistently superior performance across the
measurable performance indicators. Similarly, no aircraft performed
consistently poorly on all or most of these dimensions.
Neither single-role bombers, nor multirole fighter-bombers
demonstrated obvious superiority compared to others in the
air-to-ground role. Defensive air-to-air missions were predominantly
performed by single-role air-to-air aircraft, with single-role F-15Cs
credited with over 85 percent of Desert Storm air-to-air kills.
While multirole aircraft did perform some support and some air-to-air
missions, their participation by no means eliminated the need for
single-role air-to-air and support aircraft. The evidence from
Desert Storm points to the usefulness of single-role aircraft in
their respective missions and the usefulness of multirole aircraft
most predominantly in the air-to-ground mission.
The data in table IV.1 reveal no clear link between the cost of
either aircraft or weapon system and their performance in Desert
Storm. Neither relatively high-cost nor low-cost air-to-ground
aircraft demonstrated consistently superior performance across a
range of measures such as sortie rate, survivability, amount of
munitions delivered, and participation in successful target outcomes.
Table IV.1
Cost and Performance of Major U.S. and
U.K. Desert Storm Air-to-Ground Aircraft
and TLAM
Total Rate of lost
program Average per and damaged
Platfo unit Sortie\ day per aircraft per Number Number
rm cost\a b aircraft sortie guided unguided Ratio
------ ------- ------- ------------ ------------ -------- -------- ------
F-117 $111.2\ $15.7 0.7 0 2,000 4 500:1
e
F- $68.3 $24.9 0.9 0.0011 2,935 586 5:1
111F
F-15E $39.1 $11.5 1.0 0.0009 1,669 14,089 1:8
without
LANTIR
N
$46.5
with 2
LANTIR
N pods
A-6E $39.3 $27.8 1.1 0.0031 623 17,588 1:28
F-16 $18.9 $5.9 1.2 0.0006 159 38,438 1:242
without
LANTIR
N
$22.6
with 1
LANTIR
N pod
F/A- $35.9 $17.2 1.2 0.0022 368 11,179 1:30
18
GR-1 $32 - \g 0.9 0.0076 497 1,346 1:3
$57.3\f
A-10 $11.8 \g 1.4\h 0.0023 4,801 \g \g
B-52 $163.8\ \g 0.6 0.0029 36\k 71,885 1:1,19
j 6
TLAM $2.85 $2,855. \g [DELETED]\l 297 0 \i
0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tonnage Predominan
per t target
Total aircraft Strike categories FS:NFS
Platform tonnage per day conditions \c ratio\d
---------- ------------ ---------- -- ------------ ---------- ------------
F-117 1,990 1.10 Night only; C\3, LOC, 1.4:1
no weather MIB,
capability NBC, OCA
F-111F 2,004 0.71 Night only; KBX, LOC, 3.2:1
limited by OCA
weather
F-15E 5,593 2.71 Mostly KBX, OCA, 1.0:1
night; very SCU
few day
missions;
limited by
weather
A-6E 5,715 1.16 Mostly KBX, NAV 1.1:1
night; some
day; limited
by weather
F-16 20,866 1.93 Mostly day; KBX, OCA 1.5:1
some night;
limited by
weather
F/A-18 5,513 0.74 Day and C\3, KBX, 0.8:1
night; OCA
limited by
weather
GR-1 1,090 0.38 Day and KBX, OCA, 1.2:1
night; OIL
limited by
weather
A-10 \g \g Mostly day; \KBX \g
some night;
no weather
capability
B-52 25,422 8.69 Mostly KBX, MIB 0.7:1
night; some
day; no
weather
limitation
TLAM 144 3.30\m Day and C\3, ELE, 1.1:1
night; GVC, NBC,
limited by SCU
weather
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In millions of fiscal 1994 dollars.
\b In thousands of fiscal 1994 dollars. Generic aircraft sortie
costs, not specific Desert Storm sortie costs. Total program unit
cost and sortie cost for the TLAM are the same because a combat
sortie for the TLAM requires the physical destruction of the missile.
\c Target categories in which approximately three-quarters of all
strikes by aircraft type were directed.
\d Based on the analysis in appendix III and summarized in table
III.1.
\e Lockheed data expressed in "then-year" dollars. DOD data exist
but are classified at the "special access required" level. Because
the specific "then-year" dollars were not identified by year and
amount, we were unable to convert them to fiscal 1994 dollars. Even
though this figure understates the cost of the F-117, it is the best
figure we could obtain.
\f Estimated costs obtained from public sources.
\g Data were not available.
\h A-10 sorties may have been undercounted; thus, 1.4 may be too low.
\i Data were not applicable.
\j Includes $6.8 billion in acquisition costs for 102 aircraft and $9
billion in modifications since the B-52H was deployed in the early
1960s. A portion of the $9 billion spent on modifications were for
upgrades of its strategic-nuclear capability or upgrades subsequently
superseded by other modifications. The data we received from the Air
Force did not specifically identify those modification costs relevant
to the B-52s as used in Desert Storm. Also, the total program unit
costs attributed to other aircraft could be understated somewhat in
comparison to the B-52. Cost data for all aircraft other than the
B-52 were obtained from Selected Acquisition Reports. However, these
reports, which include modification costs, are no longer issued after
airframe production ceases. Thus, modification costs for
out-of-production aircraft are not captured on these reports and are
not reflected in table IV.1. Therefore, the costs cited here tend to
overstate the B-52's cost relative to the other aircraft.
\k The B-52 launched 35 CALCMs (conventional variants of the
air-launched cruise missile).
\l TLAM losses are based on a study by CNA/DIA that found that of the
230 TLAM C and D-I models launched, an estimated [DELETED] did not
arrive at their target areas.
\m Tonnage per day for TLAMs is its total tonnage (144 tons) divided
by the number of days in the entire air campaign (43).
Virtually every type of aircraft and the TLAM demonstrated both
significant strengths and limitations. For example, no F-117s were
lost or damaged; it was the platform of choice among planners for
nighttime strikes against stationary, point targets, yet it was
employable in only highly limited conditions. The much older,
nonstealthy F-111F achieved a somewhat higher target hit rate than
the F-117 against targets attacked by both with the same type of
munition (although the F-111F expended more munitions per target).
The low-cost A-10s and F-16s made large contributions in terms of
missions flown and bomb tonnage delivered and performed as well on
other measures, such as survivability rates. However, neither was
equipped to deliver LGBs, and the F-16's potential effectiveness with
unguided munitions was diminished by operating from medium and high
altitudes. B-52s delivered much more tonnage individually and as a
force than any other aircraft, but accuracy from high altitude was
low.\2
Similarly, the F-16s delivered about 21,000 tons of bombs, but this
worked out to only 1.93 tons daily per aircraft, compared to 2.71
tons for the F-15Es; F-15Es, however, accounted for only about
one-quarter as much total tonnage as the F-16s. Thus, on one
performance measure, the F-15Es look better than the F-16s, but much
less impressive on another. In addition, the F-15Es had sortie costs
about double those of the F-16s but also delivered a much greater
ratio of guided-to-unguided munitions (1 to 8 versus 1 to 242). This
was a result, in part, of the command decision to assign the
available LANTIRN targeting pods, and thus the ability to deliver
LGBs, to F-15Es rather than to F-16s; it was also a result, in part,
of the decision to assign all but a few Maverick missiles to A-10s
rather than to the F-16 units that were trained to employ them.
A comparably mixed picture can be seen for all the other aircraft
under review. Overall, therefore, the data in table IV.1 present an
inconclusive picture when it comes to rank-ordering the costs and
performance of the aircraft as they were used in Desert Storm.
--------------------
\2 See Operation Desert Storm: Limits on the Role and Performance of
B-52 Bombers in Conventional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-93-138, May 12,
1993).
COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS AND
LIMITATIONS OF AIRCRAFT
TYPES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.4
To facilitate comparative assessment of the aircraft, we examined the
extent to which the data above, in combination with data discussed in
appendixes II and III, can address four questions that involve
aircraft acquisition issues of concern to the Congress:
1. Did the F-117 stealth bomber differ in air-to-ground combat
performance and effectiveness from nonstealth aircraft, and what was
the contribution of stealth technology to the outcome of the air
campaign?
2. What were the contributions of single-purpose aircraft versus the
multirole or dual-role aircraft recommended by DOD's "Bottom-Up
Review"?
3. Was there a relationship between aircraft cost and performance?
4. How did the TLAM cruise missile perform compared to various
aircraft?
STEALTH VERSUS NONSTEALTH
AIRCRAFT
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.4.1
Stealth was one of many options used to achieve portions of what was
accomplished in the air campaign. It could not serve to achieve all
objectives given its operating limitations. For example, it was not
designed to, and in Desert Storm it did not, engage targets (1) that
were mobile and required searching, (2) that were large "area
targets" requiring coverage by dozens of bombs, or (3) that planners
wanted to attack during the day. Most notably, the F-117's bomb hit
rate was between 55 and 80 percent, and equally important, its weapon
release rate was only 75 percent.
In addition, in some respects, other aircraft may have equaled the
F-117 on the very dimensions for which special claims had been made
for it. The limited data available showed that the F-111F missions
were about as successful in hitting common targets. Pilots of
aircraft other than the F-117 reported that they, too, achieved
surprise on many, and in some cases most, attacks, according to an
Air Force criterion for the success of stealth--namely that defensive
fire from SAMs and AAA did not commence until after the first bombs
detonated. While the F-117 attacked targets in every strategic
category--more than any other aircraft--in some categories, very few
strikes were conducted, and every type of aircraft under review
attacked targets in no less than three-fourths of the categories.
And unlike several other aircraft, the F-117 never faced the daytime
air defenses that turned out to be the war's most lethal.
As the second most expensive aircraft in our study--costing almost
twice as much as the next most costly aircraft--the F-117 did not
perform as well as several other aircraft on the sorties- and
tons-per-day measures. For example, the F-15Es averaged 1 mission
per day (about 50 percent higher than the 0.7 average for F-117s) and
averaged 2.71 tons of released munitions per day (246 percent more
than the F-117 average). The F-16s averaged 1.2 sorties daily (70
percent more) and delivered 75 percent more tonnage daily than the
F-117s.
To maintain stealth, F-117s can carry bombs only internally; this
limits them to two LGBs. As a result, each F-117 was clearly very
limited in the number of aimpoints it could hit before having to
return home. Also, the F-117s were based more than 1,000 miles from
Baghdad, which meant a round-trip mission as long as 6 hours with
multiple refuelings. One Air Force explanation for this basing
decision was the need to keep the F-117s out of range of Scud
missiles. Another explanation was that the air base at Khamis
Mushayt was one of only a select few in-theater bases with sufficient
hangars to house the F-117 fleet and protect its sensitive radar
absorptive coating from the elements. Another possible reason for
the F-117s being based so far away was the fact that a complex and
time-consuming mission planning process was necessary to exploit its
stealth characteristics. The time this mission planning system took
and the fact that the F-117 was able to conduct combat operations
only at night could have meant that the time required to fly between
Khamis Mushayt and the Saudi border was not the key limiting factor
on the F-117's Desert Storm sortie rate. Moreover, unlike other
aircraft, such as the A-10 and the F-16, the F-117 did not fly from a
more distant main operating base to a forward one from which multiple
sorties were generated.
Other Desert Storm aircraft were also limited by their distance from
targets. For logistics reasons, most B-52s flew from far more
distant bases than the F-117s, resulting in a slightly lower 0.6
average on daily sorties. In contrast, the B-52s had nearly eight
times the daily average munition delivery (8.69 tons versus 1.10
tons) because of their greater carrying capability. Navy planes on
carriers in the Red Sea were similarly limited in terms of sortie
rates because of the distance from targets and carrier rotations.\3
The A-6Es averaged 1.1 daily sorties and 1.16 tons per day in
munitions. The F/A-18s averaged nearly the same number of daily
sorties (1.2), but delivered only an average of 0.74 tons of
munitions per day, approximately two-thirds that of the F-117s.
F-111Fs were based 525 nautical miles from the Iraqi border, some
F-16s were 528 nautical miles from the border, and some F-15Es were
about 250 nautical miles away. Thus, distance to targets was clearly
a factor in various aircrafts' sortie rates, but it was not the only
factor; additional reasons included complex mission planning
requirements, logistics needs, inability to operate out of forward
operating bases, and requirements to operate only from aircraft
carriers that could not be deployed close by.
Nevertheless, distance to target alone cannot explain performance,
since the F-111Fs averaged 0.9 sorties per day (28 percent higher
than the F-117s) but released only 0.7 tons of munitions per day per
aircraft--36 percent below the F-117's average. Similarly, the
British, Saudi, and Italian air-to-ground variants of the Tornado
flew slightly more sorties per day (0.9), yet they delivered less
than half the daily tonnage (0.4).
At the same time, the F-117s were not able to perform tasks routinely
carried out by other aircraft because of the operating trade-offs
that were necessary to enable them to be stealthy and to deliver
LGBs. Such routine tasks include strikes in poor weather or under
any conditions in daylight or dusk, attacks against mobile targets
that required searching, and missions that required deviation after
takeoff from planned flight paths.
However, to the extent that air defense systems depend on radar, it
is surely an advantage to be less detectable by radar than other
aircraft, and the available evidence suggests that in Desert Storm,
the F-117 was not easily detectable by radar. However, nonstealthy
aircraft were also able to escape engagement by radar-based defense
systems by other means such as by being masked by jamming support
aircraft or by virtue of the physical destruction of radars by SEAD
aircraft such as the F-4G. Moreover, given the widespread jamming
that occurred in Desert Storm, the availability of fighter
protection, as well as the relatively rapid degradation of the Iraqi
IADS, it is clear that the F-117s sometimes also benefited from these
support factors and did not always operate independent of them.
--------------------
\3 Sortie rates and munition payloads cited here are for all Navy
aircraft, from both Red Sea and Persian Gulf carriers and for Marine
Corps F/A-18s and A-6Es based on land.
SINGLE-ROLE VERSUS
MULTIROLE AIRCRAFT
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.4.2
In its October 1993 "Bottom-Up Review," DOD expressed a strong
preference for multirole as opposed to "special-purpose" aircraft
because "multi-role aircraft, capable of air superiority, strike, and
possible support missions have a high payoff."\4 The use of both
types of aircraft in Desert Storm permits a comparison on some
dimensions of their performance and contribution.
The Navy F/A-18 was the only multirole aircraft that was actually
employed in both air-to-ground strikes and air-to-air engagements. A
large number of F/A-18 missions, especially in the early stages of
the air war, were escort, and one F/A-18 was credited with two
air-to-air kills. Although the F-16 and the F-15E were equipped with
guns and missiles for self-defenses, neither of these Air Force
multirole aircraft performed any escort or air-to-air missions.
Air-to-air engagements for Air Force aircraft were the domain of the
single-role, air-to-air, F-15C, which was neither equipped nor tasked
to air-to-ground missions.\5 While the exercise of air-to-air
capability by Air Force multirole aircraft was apparently strongly
discouraged, air supremacy meant that there was limited need for
air-to-air capability, and what did exist was adequately covered by
F-15Cs and F-14s.\6
With regard to support roles, F/A-18s and F-16s employed HARM
missiles and other munitions to suppress enemy air defenses.
However, this supplemented rather than eliminated the role played by
specialized F-4Gs, EF-111s, and EA-6Bs--all of which were used
extensively in SEAD or jamming.
The data available permit a limited comparison of multirole aircraft
and more specialized, single-role bombers (F-117, F-111F, A-10, A-6E,
GR-1, and B-52) in the air-to-ground mission. In terms of unit cost,
the single-role aircraft are both the most and the least expensive
(the B-52 and the F-117 versus the A-10).\7 In terms of the average
daily sorties, only the single-role A-10 exceeded the multirole
F-16's and F/A-18's rate of 1.2 per day. Excluding the B-52,
multirole aircraft had the highest as well as the lowest average
daily munition tonnage; the F-15E was the highest, at 2.71 tons, and
the F/A-18 was the lowest, at 0.74 tons.
On other performance measures, the two aircraft types appear to be
generally indistinguishable. All were very survivable, most had
comparable overall night and weather capability, as well as similar
night and weather limitations, and most delivered a mix of guided and
unguided munitions.
In terms of the ratios reflecting rate of participation against
successfully and not fully successfully destroyed targets, the
single-role F-111F had the highest ratio and the single-role B-52 had
the lowest ratio. However, the multirole F/A-18 had a ratio that was
nearly identical to that of the B-52, and the multirole aircraft with
the highest ratio--the F-16 at 1.5:1--had a ratio that was 47 percent
of the F-111F's 3.2:1.
In sum, in air-to-air combat, multirole aircraft had only minimal
opportunity, accounting for only 2 of 38 air-to-air kills. Some
multirole aircraft were used in air-to-air support SEAD missions, but
their use did not halt the need for aircraft specialized for those
type of missions. Both single and multirole aircraft appeared at
both ends of the cost scale. As a generic type, multirole aircraft
did not demonstrate any major payoff in the air-to-air role since the
more specialized F-15Cs accounted for almost all air-to-air kills.
In the air-to-ground role, multirole performed at the same overall
level as specialized aircraft. Generally, the multirole aircraft did
not perform as multirole aircraft in Desert Storm.
However, using Desert Storm data, it is not possible to reach firm
conclusions about the multirole aircraft's potential payoff, relative
to single-role aircraft. With greatly varying total program unit
costs, as well as a wide range of daily average bomb tonnage dropped
and especially the apparent lack of need for multirole aircraft on
missions other than air-to-ground attack, the case for or against
multirole and single-role aircraft is not readily apparent solely
from Desert Storm experiences.
--------------------
\4 DOD, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, Secretary of
Defense, (Oct. 1993), p. 36. Secretary of Defense William J.
Perry endorsed the Bottom-Up Review and has not altered the review's
advocacy of multirole aircraft over special purpose aircraft.
\5 U.S. F-15Cs were credited with 31 coalition air-to-air kills, 87
percent of the Desert Storm total. F-14s were also assigned to the
air-to-air mission; however, none had any air-to-air kills of
fixed-wing aircraft (though one enemy helicopter was shot down by an
F-14).
\6 Pilots told us that Gen. Horner said the first F-16 pilot to
unload his bombs in order to attack an Iraqi aircraft would be "sent
home."
\7 In terms of sortie cost, the single-role A-6E and the F-111F were
high and the multirole F-16, F/A-18, and F-15E were lowest and lower;
however, it is not clear whether it was the A-6's and F-111F's much
older age than the multirole aircraft that explains their higher cost
or their single role.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
AIRCRAFT COST AND
PERFORMANCE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.4.3
It is often asserted that, on average, the more that something
costs--such as a passenger car--the better it is, compared to similar
things that cost less. A more expensive automobile is assumed to
possess certain performance qualities that make it superior to a
low-cost car: it might accelerate more quickly, handle more
precisely, or ride more comfortably. Moreover, these advantages are
assumed not to have limitations that would prevent the car from being
used as frequently as one chose or under a wide variety of
conditions. Similarly, a common impression of military hardware is
that an airplane that costs much more than others would have greater
capabilities that distinguish it from other aircraft, making it
overall a "better" aircraft. While this perception may appear to be
simplistic, it has been sufficiently widespread, even among military
experts, to warrant examination in light of the Desert Storm data.
Moreover, DOD commonly justifies very costly aircraft and other
weapons to the Congress, and to the public, on the grounds that they
are more capable than other aircraft and they offer unique
capabilities that warrant the greater cost.
In this section, we consider aircraft total program unit costs and
whether there was any discernible correlation between those costs and
the Desert Storm performance measures cited above. As noted above,
at $111 million and $164 million, respectively, the F-117 and B-52H
cost far more than the next most expensive aircraft under review (the
$68 million F-111F). The A-10, at $12 million, was the least
expensive U.S. air-to-ground aircraft in Desert Storm; the
F-16--with one LANTIRN pod--was the next least expensive at $23
million.
Survivability and Operating Conditions. In terms of aircraft
survivability, high- and low-cost aircraft were almost identical at
night and at medium-to-high altitudes (as shown in app. III,
statistically speaking, there was no meaningful difference in the
survivability rates of any of the Desert Storm air-to-ground
aircraft). Most high- and low-cost aircraft were able to operate
both day and night, although high-cost F-117s, F-111Fs, and F-15Es
were used almost exclusively in the more survivable nighttime
environment. In effect, in general, high cost did not correlate with
improved survivability, although it may correlate with it in the case
of the F-117, which, as intended, operated only at night and at
medium altitudes--an environment where substantially fewer aircraft
casualties occurred in Desert Storm.
In terms of other environmental conditions, there was no pattern of
high-cost aircraft offering consistently better performance in
adverse weather. Indeed, the more costly aircraft with LGB
capability were more likely to be vulnerable to weather degradation
than were aircraft that used unguided ordnance. For, while both
types of aircraft delivered guided and unguided ordnance, most of the
more costly aircraft delivered more guided, relative to unguided,
bombs.\8 One reason for this was that low-cost aircraft were not
equipped to deliver LGBs, which can partially account for aircraft
cost differentials.\9 Whether the capability to deliver LGBs versus
unguided munitions made the platform more or less effective would
depend on an assessment of the relative merit of those munition
types, discussed later in this appendix.
Number Deployed. All other things being equal, one would expect that
the more costly an aircraft, the fewer would be available to be
deployed in combat, since fewer would likely have been produced.\10
This proved to be the case in Desert Storm, with 251 F-16s and 148
A-10s deployed compared to 42 F-117s, 48 F-15Es, and 66 F-111Fs.
Although obvious, it may be worth recalling that, in terms of total
program unit costs, a single F-117 costs about as much as about 9
A-10s; a single F-111F equals 3 F-16s with LANTIRN pods.
Thus, in assessing an overall force, the appropriate comparisons
should not be between one high-cost aircraft and one low-cost
aircraft because to acquire equal forces of the two would obviously
require vastly different amounts of money. A more appropriate way to
measure aircraft forces might be the number of aircraft that an equal
amount of acquisition funding can purchase. For example, the fleet
of 42 F-117s deployed to Desert Storm cost $4.7 billion to develop
and build, while the three times larger fleet of 148 A-10s cost $1.7
billion; that is, 106 additional aircraft for $3 billion less.
Similarly, for the same amount of money, very different sized fleets,
and capability, can be procured. For example, $1 billion in funding
would procure 9 F-117s or 85 A-10s. The Desert Storm performance
data reveal that the 9 F-117s would have carried out fewer than 7
sorties per day; in contrast, the 85 A-10s would have flown 119.
While the design missions of the two aircraft differ substantially,
their use in Desert Storm demonstrated that they are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Nearly 51 percent of the strategic targets
attacked by the stealthy F-117s were also attacked by less costly,
conventional aircraft--such as the F-16, F-15E, and F/A-18.\11
Based on its performance in Desert Storm, advocates of the F-117 can
argue that it alone combined the advantages of stealth and LGBs,
penetrated the most concentrated enemy defenses at will, permitted
confidence in achieving desired bombing results, and had perfect
survivability. Advocates of the A-10 can argue that it, unlike the
F-117, operated both day or night; attacked both fixed and mobile
targets employing both guided and unguided bombs; and like the F-117,
it suffered no casualties when operating at night and at medium
altitude. In short, the argument can be made that to buy more
capability, in the quantitative sense, the most efficient decision
could be to buy less costly aircraft. Moreover, to buy more
capability in the qualitative sense, it may be a question of what
specific capability, or mix of capabilities, one wants to buy: in
the F-117 versus A-10 comparison, each aircraft has both strengths
and limitations; each aircraft can do things the other cannot.
Therefore, despite a sharp contrast in program unit costs, based on
their use, performance, and effectiveness demonstrated in Desert
Storm, we find it inappropriate to call one more generally "capable"
than the other.
The data did not demonstrate a consistent relationship between the
program unit cost of aircraft and their relative effectiveness
against strategic targets, as measured by the ratio of fully
successful to not fully successful target outcomes for the set of
strategic targets attacked by each type of aircraft. For example,
while the high-cost F-111F had the highest ratio of all aircraft
reviewed, the relatively low-cost F-16 had a higher ratio than either
the F-117 or the F-15E, both of which were on the high end of the
cost scale. The F/A-18, in the middle of the cost scale, had a low
ratio of participation against successfully destroyed targets
relative to unsuccessfully destroyed targets, but the medium-cost
A-6E had a ratio that was higher than or equivalent to the F-15E and
F-117, both much higher cost aircraft. However, the F-117 and the
F-111F, two high-cost, LGB-capable aircraft, ranked first and third
in participation against successful targets.\12
Summary. We found no clear link between the cost of either aircraft
or weapon system and their performance in Desert Storm. Aircraft
total program unit cost does not appear to have been strongly
positively or negatively correlated with survivability rates, sortie
rates or costs, average daily tonnage per aircraft, or success ratio
of unguided-to-guided munition deliveries. No high-cost aircraft
demonstrated superior performance in all, or even most, measures, and
no low-cost aircraft was generally inferior. On some measures
low-cost aircraft performed better than the high-cost ones (such as
sortie rate, sortie cost); on some measures, the performance of low-
and high-cost aircraft was indistinguishable (such as survivability
and participation against targets with successful outcomes).
--------------------
\8 Two prominent exceptions to this are the high-cost B-52, which
delivered very few guided munitions, and the low-cost A-10, which
delivered about 4,800 guided Maverick missiles.
\9 For example, providing the low-cost A-10 with LGB-capability
would, at a minimum, raise the A-10 unit price by about $7.4 million
by adding two LANTIRN pods, to $19.2 million, an increase of 63
percent. This increase would, however, result in the A-10's
continuing to be the lowest cost aircraft under review. It should
also be noted that since the war, the relatively low-cost F-16 has
been equipped with both types of LANTIRN pods, thus enabling it to
deploy LGBs.
\10 The statistical correlation between aircraft unit cost and
numbers deployed was r = -0.54. Unit cost data for the Tornado was
calculated as the average of the highest and lowest fiscal 1994 unit
cost figures that were available. The number of Tornado GR-1s
deployed to Desert Storm was taken from the British AOB for February
1991 cited in the British Ministry of Defense Gulf War Lessons
Learned report. The number of all other aircraft deployed to Desert
Storm was taken from DOD's title V report.
Because the number of aircraft deployed to battle is likely to be
related to the number available for deployment, we also examined,
where the data permitted, the correlation between the number of
aircraft produced and unit cost. The correlation was r = -0.54,
indicating that more costly aircraft are produced in smaller numbers,
thus leaving fewer available for deployment, relative to less costly
aircraft. GR-1 data are not included because production numbers for
these aircraft were unavailable.
\11 The incompleteness of A-10 strike data prevents our identifying
the extent, if any, to which, A-10 and F-117 target taskings
overlapped. However, each type of aircraft performed 40 or more
strikes in the following strategic target categories: C\3 , KBX,
OCA, SAM, and SCU.
\12 Participation by each type of air-to-ground aircraft against
targets assessed as fully successful targets was as follows: F-117 =
122, F-16 = 67, F-111F = 41, A-6E = 37, F/A-18 = 36, F-15E = 28, B-52
= 25, and GR-1 = 21. No data were available for the A-10. The TLAM
participated against 18 targets assessed as fully successful.
Participation against FS targets by type of aircraft is a function of
two factors--the breadth of targets tasked to each type of aircraft
(see app. III) and their FS:NFS ratio as presented previously.
TLAM CRUISE MISSILE
COMPARED TO AIRCRAFT
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.4.4
The Navy's TLAM cruise missile is substantially different from the
aircraft reviewed. Its unit cost of approximately $2.9 million is
clearly well below that of any aircraft, but because it is not
reusable, it had the highest cost per sortie. Moreover, there were
major categories of strategic targets (mobile, very hard, or buried
targets) that it was inherently incapable of attacking or destroying.
Also, like many guided munitions, the TLAM's optical guidance and
navigation system (employed in the last portion of flight) can be
impeded by [DELETED].\13 This means that the costs of hitting any
given target are substantial, given that TLAMs are single-use
weapons.
These TLAM characteristics must be balanced against the fact that its
employment does not risk an aircraft or its pilot. There is, of
course, essentially immeasurable benefit to avoiding the loss or
capture of pilots. However, TLAMs are limited in their applicability
compared to some aircraft because many target types (for example,
very hard targets) are not vulnerable to TLAMs or are not feasible as
TLAM targets (for example, mobile ones). Further, given the TLAM's
high-unit cost and demonstrated P(k), consideration must be given to
whether a given target is sufficiently valuable to be worth using a
TLAM. High costs mean that relatively few targets in an air campaign
would be worth targeting with TLAMs, especially if aircraft
survivability is high.
--------------------
\13 Even if the P(k) for a single TLAM against a given target is
[DELETED], no less than [DELETED] missiles would be required to guard
against reliability failure if the target is deemed to have urgent or
high value.
COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
MUNITIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2
A review of the cost and use of the air-to-ground munitions in Desert
Storm supplements the foregoing assessment of aircraft to examine
what aircraft-munition combinations may have been the most effective
in the air campaign. The GWAPS study presented data on air
combat-related ordnance expended in Desert Storm by U.S. forces.
Neither a separate breakout nor ordnance dropped by other coalition
air forces was available.\14 Five major types of ordnance were
released by U.S. air-to-ground aircraft in Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. Table IV.2 shows these and their cost.
Table IV.2
Desert Shield and Desert Storm Air-
Related Ordnance Expenditures by U.S.
Forces
Number Cost\a
---------------------------------------------- ---------- ----------
Bombs and noncruise missiles
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Unguided bombs 210,004 $432.0
Guided bombs 9,342 298.2
Antiradiation missiles 2,039 510.9
Air-to-surface guided missiles 5,448 549.1
======================================================================
Total 226,833 $1,790.2
Cruise missiles
TLAMs 297\ $861.3
CALCMs 35 52.5
======================================================================
Total 332 $913.8
======================================================================
Total bombs and missiles 227,165 $2,704.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In millions of fiscal 1990 dollars.
Source: GWAPS, vol. v, pt. I (Secret), pp. 581-82, and DOD
Selected Acquisition Report on TLAM.
It is evident from table IV.2 that while the vast majority of the
expended ordnance was unguided--92.4 percent--the inverse was true
for cost. About 84 percent of cost was accounted for by the 7.6
percent of ordnance that was guided. If the 332 cruise missiles are
excluded--with their extremely high unit costs--unguided ordnance
still represented about 92.6 percent of the total number expended,
but the percentage of cost for ordnance that was guided decreases to
75.9 percent.
The points summarized in table IV.3 concerning the relative strengths
and weaknesses of guided and unguided munitions are supported in the
discussion below.
Table IV.3
Relative Strengths and Limitations of
Guided and Unguided Munitions in Desert
Storm
Measure Relative strengths Relative limitations
---------------- ------------------------------ ------------------------------
Guided
Cost No demonstrated strengths. High unit cost; cost ratio of
LGBs, Mavericks, and other LGBs to unguided unitary bombs
guided munitions were much ranged up to 48:1; for
more expensive than unguided Mavericks, 164:1.
munitions.
Survivability Varying amounts of standoff Standoff capability did not
capability avoided defenses negate defenses not at the
collocated with the target. target. [DELETED]
LGB and other guided munition
use permitted medium-and high-
altitude releases while
retaining accuracy, thus
reducing aircraft
vulnerability to AAA and IR
SAMs.
Operating Night-capable, clear weather Adverse weather, clouds,
characteristics (except for most EO guidance smoke, dust, haze, and
systems); some correctable humidity either eliminated or
accuracy degradation from high seriously restricted
winds. employment. Sometimes required
precise intelligence and more
demanding mission planning.
Effectiveness Sometimes highly accurate even "One target, one bomb" is an
from high altitudes, even inappropriate and illusive
against point targets; lower characterization of LGB
likelihood of collateral effectiveness; no consistent
damage. relationship between use of
guided munitions and targets
that were successfully
destroyed.
Unguided
Cost Low unit cost; made up 92 No cost disadvantages
percent of the munitions used identified.
but only 16 percent of
munitions cost.
Survivability Permitted higher pilot Little or no standoff
situation awareness and more capability from defenses at
ready ability to maneuver to target except for use at high
evade threats. altitude, which severely
degraded accuracy.
Operating Exploited radar bombing Nonradar unguided bombing
characteristics systems impervious to weather systems had virtually as many
but only for missions limitations from weather,
requiring limited accuracy. smoke, dust, and so on as
guided munition sensors;
accuracy seriously degraded by
winds, especially when used at
medium-to-high altitude.
Effectiveness Of all munitions used, 92 Not accurate from medium-to-
percent were unguided; high altitude against point
unguided munition use was an targets. Higher likelihood of
essential part of the air collateral damage; no
campaign, especially against consistent relationship
area targets and ground between use of unguided
forces. munitions and targets that
were successfully destroyed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
\14 The ordnance included cruise missiles, of which 35 were CALCMs
launched from B-52s, and 297 TLAMs from Navy ships and submarines.
We include both types of missiles because they were integral to the
air campaign in terms of their targets and their role in the planning
of the air campaign.
WEIGHTED AVERAGE MUNITION
COSTS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2.0.1
We analyzed and compared the munitions used in Desert Storm,
calculating the weighted average unit cost for each munition, which
is based on the different numbers of each type used and their unit
cost. Table IV.4 compares these costs for unguided unitary bombs,
unguided cluster bombs, LGBs, the IR/EO guided GBU-15, and the
Maverick and Walleye air-to-surface munition.
The data in table IV.4 show that there are very large differences in
the unit costs between the categories of guided and unguided
munitions, as well as substantial cost variations within each
category. The unguided unitary bombs used in the air campaign cost,
on average, $649 each, while LGBs cost, on average, more than $31,000
each--a cost ratio of about 1:48. The cost ratio of the average
unguided unitary bomb to the other major type of guided munition, the
Maverick, was 1:164. Even the cost for more expensive unguided
cluster munitions was just one-fifth the average LGB and
one-eighteenth the cost of a Maverick.\15
In terms of munition expenditures, 17 times more unitary unguided
bombs were dropped than LGBs and 30 times more unguided unitary bombs
than Mavericks. Six times more cluster munitions were used than
LGBs, 11 times more clusters than Mavericks.
Table IV.4
Unit Cost and Expenditure of Selected
Guided and Unguided Munitions in Desert
Storm\a
Average
Unit Number unit
Munition cost expended Total cost cost\b
-------------------------- -------- -------- ------------ --------
Unguided unitary
MK-82LD $498 69,701 $34,711,098
MK-82HD 1,100 7,952 8,747,200
MK-83 1,000 19,018 19,018,000
MK-84GP 1,871 9,578 17,920,438
MK-84HD 2,874 2,611 7,504,014
M-117 253 43,435 10,989,055
Subtotal 152,295 $98,889,805 $649
Unguided cluster
CBU-52/58/71 2,159 7,831 $38,497,129
CBU-87 13,941 10,035 139,897,935
CBU-89 39,963 1,105 44,159,115
CBU-72 3,800 254 965,200
CBU-78 39,963 209 8,352,267
MK-20 3,449 27,987 96,527,163
Subtotal 57,421 $328,398,809 $5,719
Laser guided
GBU-10 $22,000 2,637 $58,014,000
GBU-12 9,000 4,493 40,437,000
GBU-16 150,000 219 32,850,000
GBU-24 65,000 284 18,460,000
GBU-24/109 5,000 897 76,245,000
GBU-27 75,539 739 55,823,321
GBU-28 100,000 2 200,000
Subtotal 9,271 $282,029,321 $30,421
IR GBU-15 $227,600 71 $16,159,600 $227,600
IR and EO Maverick
AGM-65B $64,100 1,673
AGM-65C 110,000 5 $107,239,300
AGM-65D 111,000 3,405 550,000
AGM-65E 101,000 36 377,955,000
AGM-65G 269,000 177 3,636,000
Subtotal 5,255 47,613,000 $102,187
$536,993,300
Walleye II
AGM-62B $70,000 133 $9,310,000 $70,000
======================================================================
Total 224,446 $1,271,680,8
35
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In fiscal 1990 dollars.
\b The weighted average unit cost for each general munition type
takes into account the different numbers of each munition type
actually used.
Source: GWAPS, vol. V, pt. I (Secret), pp. 581-82.
Similar to our findings regarding the relationship between aircraft
cost and numbers deployed, the data in table IV.4 show that the more
costly a munition, the fewer were expended, for both guided and
unguided categories of munitions.\16 More than 150,000 unguided
unitary bombs were expended, costing just under $100 million, while
in contrast, the 9,271 LGBs used cost over $282 million. Only 5,255
Maverick missiles were used, but these cost over $536 million, or 30
percent of all noncruise missile costs, while representing about 2.3
percent of ordnance expended. Even if cruise missile costs are
included, Mavericks were 21.5 percent of total ordnance costs, or
nearly 10 times their share of total ordnance numbers.
--------------------
\15 Some unguided munitions were more expensive than some guided:
CBU-89s cost four times more than GBU-12s, [DELETED].
\16 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the number of
munitions expended and cost was negative and moderate in size, r =
-0.42. The correlation between the number of unguided munitions
expended and unguided munition cost was r = -0.44, while the
correlation between the number of guided bombs expended and munition
cost was slightly stronger r = -0.52, although still in the moderate
range.
MUNITION COSTS TO ATTACK
TARGETS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.1
The data available permit us to calculate the munition costs to
attack the targets assessed in appendix III as fully successfully
destroyed and not fully successfully destroyed. These data are shown
in table IV.5, grouped into target categories, for targets that we
were able to evaluate from DIA phase III damage assessments. Data
for the A-10 are not included, for the reliability reasons noted
previously.
Table IV.5
Number and Cost of Munitions Expended by
Target Category and Success Rating
NF
Ta S: Total
rg Number Munitions Munitions FS Total BE cost NFS:
et Rating of BEs\a expended per BE \ targets per BE\b FS
-- -------- -------- ---------- ---------- -- ---------- ---------- ----
C\ FS 62 974 15.7 2. 105 $190 1.58
3 41
NFS 43 1,626 37.8 300
EL FS 10 1,298 129.8 1. 14 391 0.30
E 92
NFS 4 996 249.0 119
GV FS 10 139 13.9 0. 21 186 1.91
C 90
NFS 11 133 12.1 356
LO FS 28 605 21.6 2. 40 300 1.01
C 47
NFS 12 641 53.4 302
MI FS 17 4,814 283.2 1. 50 1,590 0.69
B 11
NFS 33 10,378 314.5 1,091
OC FS 22 7,682 349.0 0. 34 4,661 0.95
A 73
NFS 12 3,059 254.9 4,445
OI FS 4 1,017 254.3 0. 16 447 1.07
L 44
NFS 12 1,353 112.8 478
NA FS 3 132 44.0 2. 13 323 4.13
V 10
NFS 10 939 93.9 1,334
NB FS 15 1,458 97.2 2. 20 1,600 2.72
C 79
NFS 5 1,354 270.8 4,346
SA FS 10 189 18.9 0. 14 51 4.84
M 63
NFS 4 48 12.0 248
SC FS 5 972 194.4 0. 20 929 1.52
U 90
NFS 15 2,633 175.5 1,416
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a BEs attacked exclusively by cruise missiles are not included.
\b Costs are in thousands of fiscal 1991 dollars. As official data
on the cost of British munitions were not available to us, we assumed
that the cost of the U.K. 1000 LGB was equivalent to the GBU-10, the
most common U.S. LGB.
Few, if any, consistent patterns can be discerned from the data shown
in table IV.5. Among targets rated FS, the average number of
munitions used per BE ranged from about 12 to 350; among NFS targets,
the average per BE ranged from 12 to 315. The ratio of munitions
used on targets rated NFS versus FS within each category also showed
great variation--from 0.44 for OIL (on average, less than half as
many munitions were used on OIL targets rated NFS as on those rated
FS) to 2.8 for NBC targets (NBC NFS targets received nearly three
times as many munitions per BE as those rated FS). Moreover, in 5 of
the 11 target categories, more munitions were expended on FS targets
than on NFS targets; however, in 6 categories, the NFS targets
received more munitions than FS ones. In other words, success across
categories did not clearly correlate with the amount of munitions
delivered.
Weapon costs and target success showed some degree of pattern, but it
was counterintuitive: in most categories, nonsuccess was more costly
than success in terms of the munitions employed. In three categories
(ELE, MIB, and OCA), the successfully attacked target costs were
higher than those not fully successful. In the other eight
categories, target costs were higher for the NFS targets.
To control for outliers, or unrepresentative data from small samples,
we looked at the two categories that received the most munitions, MIB
(15,192 weapons on both FS and NFS) and OCA (10,741 total weapons).
Even between these two categories there were notable variations. The
ratio of weapons used on NFS versus FS targets was 1.11 for MIB and
0.73 for OCA--that is, in one target category, FS targets received
more munitions on average than NFS targets, and in the other
category, they received less. The same was true of cost--in one
category FS targets had higher munitions costs, on average, than NFS
targets and in the other target category, the relationship was
reversed. In addition, the cost of weapons used for each FS target
was about three times greater for OCA than for MIB ($4.7 million for
OCA targets versus $1.6 million for MIB targets). Also, because
there were less than twice as many munitions used against FS OCA
targets as FS MIB targets, it is apparent that more expensive
munitions per unit were used against OCA targets than MIB targets.
However, the ratio of success against MIB targets was more favorable
than against OCA targets.
Any generalizations must be tempered by the fact that the data are
incomplete in at least three regards: (1) A-10 weapons expenditures
are absent, and these aircraft conducted approximately 8,000 combat
sorties during Desert Storm, although the great majority were in the
KBX category not listed in table IV.4; (2) the 357 BE-numbered
targets for which FS and NFS evaluations could be made are a subset
of all targets with BEs and a considerably smaller subset of all
targets against which munitions were delivered during the air
campaign; and (3) data on TLAMs and CALCMs are not included.
Given these limitations, the data shown must be treated as indicators
of Desert Storm performance, not definitive measures. Two
conclusions seem apparent: (1) there was great variability in the
number and cost of munitions used to attack targets, whether
successfully or unsuccessfully, and (2) neither greater numbers of
munitions used nor greater munition costs consistently coincided with
success across target categories. In 6 of 11 categories, greater
numbers of munitions used coincided with NFS, and in 8 out of 11
comparisons, greater cost of munitions more closely coincided with
NFS assessments.
The use of guided and unguided munitions against the rated targets
can also be compared. Costs of the weapons delivered, per BE, in
each target category are illustrated in table IV.6. (Note, data on
TLAMs and A-10s are not included; therefore, both the weight of
effort and costs are somewhat understated.)
Two points can be made from the data shown in table IV.6. First, in
8 of the 11 target categories, the cost per BE of precision-guided
munitions used on FS targets exceeded the cost of unguided munitions.
The same is true of the NFS targets in 7 of 11 categories. However,
in all cases but one (GVC, NFS), more unguided munitions were used
than guided munitions against any target, whether it was successfully
destroyed or not. Thus, even though more unguided munitions were
almost always used than guided, the cost to use guided munitions was
usually greater.
Perhaps more importantly, the data in table IV.6 permit an analysis
of whether an increase in the number of either guided or unguided
munitions coincided with successfully destroyed targets. In only 4
of 11 categories, more PGMs were used on average against the FS than
NFS targets; in 7 of 11, more PGMs were used against NFS targets. In
5 of 11 categories, more unguided munitions were used against the
successfully destroyed targets. In other words, the data do not show
that a key difference between successfully and not fully successfully
destroyed targets was that the former were simply bombed more than
the latter. This was the case for both types of munitions, PGMs and
unguided.
Table IV.6
Munition Costs Associated With
Successfully and Not Fully Successfully
Destroyed Targets
PGM
Number PGMs cost Unguided Unguided
of per per munitions cost per
Target BEs\a BE BE\b per BE BE\b\
----------------------- ------- ----- ------- --------- ---------
C\3 62 3.5 $160.4 12.2 $29.6
ELE 10 2.0 307.3 127.8 83.4
GVC 10 5.9 167.3 8.0 19.0
LOC 28 6.2 261.7 15.0 38.3
MIB 17 16.3 982.7 266.9 607.5
NAV 3 4.3 287.0 39.6 35.9
NBC 15 19.3 1,194.5 77.9 405.4
OCA 22 51.9 3,498.4 297.0 1,162.6
OIL 4 0 0 254.2 446.6
SAM 10 0.8 22.4 18.1 28.9
SCU 5 11.6 243.9 182.8 685.3
======================================================================
Total 186 12.1 $730.7 91.5 $277.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
PGM
Number PGMs cost Unguided Unguided
of per per munitions cost per
Target BEs\a BE BE\b per BE BE\b
----------------------- ------- ----- ------- --------- ---------
C\3 43 3.8 $254.4 34.0 $45.8
ELE 4 0.5 11.0 248.5 107.9
GVC 11 7.7 345.2 4.4 10.4
LOC 12 10.7 281.4 42.7 20.3
MIB 33 7.5 775.1 306.9 316.3
NAV 10 9.1 1,210.6 84.8 123.7
NBC 5 51.0 4,051.7 219.8 294.6
OCA 12 39.7 3,355.6 215.3 1,089.6
OIL 12 0.3 25.1 112.5 452.9
SAM 4 4.8 104.5 7.3 143.9
SCU 15 6.0 372.0 169.5 1,043.7
======================================================================
Total 161 9.7 $761.9 134.1 $314.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a BEs attacked exclusively by cruise missiles are not included.
\b Costs are in thousands of fiscal 1991 dollars. As official data
on the cost of British munitions were not available to us, we assumed
that the cost of the U.K. 1000 LGB was equivalent to the GBU-10, the
most common U.S. LGB.
PILOT'S VIEWS ON GUIDED
VERSUS UNGUIDED MUNITIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.2
With regard to the effectiveness of individual munitions, the Desert
Storm data do not permit a comprehensive comparison, since the
effects of one type of weapon were almost never identified before
other weapons hit the target. However, pilots did report both pluses
and minuses with both guided and unguided munitions.
With guided munitions, pilots reported three negative consequences as
delivery altitude increased. First, because the slant range to
targets was increased by higher altitude, [DELETED].
Second, the higher altitude deliveries made LGBs more subject to
winds, and pilots had to correct the [DELETED].
A third problem reported by F-117 and F-15E pilots was the need to
revise some of the computer software for LGBs to accommodate the
higher altitude tactics. [DELETED]
While each of these problems affected accuracy, they were correctable
or caused problems only on the margin. The accuracy problems
encountered by unguided munitions were more difficult, if not
impossible, to overcome. Pilots of virtually every type of aircraft
remarked that they had little confidence in hitting point targets
with consistent accuracy from high altitudes with unguided bombs.
Several reasons were cited. First, pilots stated that much of their
training before Desert Shield had been for low-altitude tactics. As
a result, some pilots had to learn high-altitude bombing techniques
either just before or during the war. Second, the Persian Gulf
region experienced winds that were both strong (as much as 150 mph in
jet streams) and unpredictable. The high-altitude tactics
exacerbated the effects of these winds wherever they occurred,
[DELETED].
As a result, pilots reported considerable difficulty attacking small,
point targets, such as tanks, from high altitude with unguided bombs.
Some expressed a high level of frustration in being assigned to do so
and said that it was simply inappropriate, even "ridiculous," to
expect that unguided bombs were capable of hitting a target like a
tank from high altitude with any consistency. It was also clear that
such inaccuracy made unguided munitions inappropriate for use in
inhabited areas, where civilian assets could easily be hit in error.
The large number of circumstances using unguided munitions was
described by pilots as both appropriate and effective. These
included military units in the field or other large, area targets,
such as buildings or complexes of buildings, when not near civilian
areas.
ATTACKS ON BRIDGES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.3
Beyond the experiences and observations of pilots, the data permit
some analyses that shed some additional insights about the relative
effectiveness and cost of different munition types.
CNA was able to analyze U.S. Navy attacks against certain bridges
that employed LGBs, unguided bombs, and Walleye electro-optical
guided bombs.\17 The CNA data and analysis are only one of a few
instances where it is possible to link target damage with the use of
specific types and numbers of munitions. The analysis separated out
the effects of attacks with the different munitions, and it found 29
strikes on bridges where the BDA was unambiguous--that is, when no
other attack was scheduled between the time of the attack and the
collection of the BDA.
The study found that in eight strikes against bridges using Walleye,
[DELETED]. The same rate of success was found when unguided
munitions were used--[DELETED].\18 CNA data also reveal that, on
average, more unguided munitions were delivered per bridge strike
than guided munitions. On Walleye missions, an average of 1.3 bombs
were used per strike. When LGBs were employed, an average of 3.2
were delivered per strike. And when unguided bombs were selected, an
average of 15 were used per bridge.
Table IV.7 presents the cost of each type of munition employed and
calculates the average cost of munitions per dropped span.
Table IV.7
Number and Cost of Munitions Used in
Naval Air Attacks on 13 Bridges in
Desert Storm
Average Total
munitions cost
Numbe per span per span
Munition type r Cost\a Spans dropped dropped dropped
------------- ----- ------ -------------- ------------ ----------
Walleye 8 $560,0 [DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED]
00
LGB 34 1,260, 3 11.3 420,000
000
Unguided 85 120,05 1 85.0 120,052
2
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The range in costs of guided munitions used against these bridges
was from $22,000 for the GBU-10 to $150,000 for the MK-83 LGB. The
range in costs for unguided munitions was from $498 for the MK-82 to
$1,871 for the MK-84.
Based on table IV.7, we find that (1) far fewer--as few as
one-tenth--the number of guided munitions than unguided were
required, on average, to destroy a bridge; (2) there is an inverse
relationship regarding cost--that is, the cost to drop a span with
guided munitions was three-to-four times more than the cost of
unguided munitions; and (3) as with our previous analysis, the Desert
Storm evidence did not substantiate the "one-target, one-bomb"
claim--rather, on average, 11 laser-guided bombs were used for each
span dropped. (See app. III.)
These conclusions must be treated cautiously. The sample is from
only
13 bridges and consists only of Navy aircraft and munitions. Within
these limitations, the data support our previous findings concerning
the relationship between the cost and effectiveness of guided and
unguided munitions and the numbers actually used to achieve target
objectives.
--------------------
\17 CNA, Desert Storm Reconstruction Report; Volume II: Strike
Warfare (Secret), Alexandria, Va.: 1992.
\18 Using these data, CNA concluded (on p. 6-41) that "Irrespective
of weapon employed, for those bridge strikes with directly associated
BDA, 17 percent of the strikes dropped a [bridge] span. When
considering individual weapon types, the percentages of strikes
resulting in dropped spans are similar, although the percentage for
LGB/GBU strikes is somewhat higher. When the indeterminate BDA cases
are considered, the individual results become indistinguishable."
OTHER BRIDGE ATTACK ANALYSIS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.4
Using the Missions database and the phase III BDA messages, we
performed a second analysis of attacks against bridges. The phase
III messages included 24 bridges attacked by both Air Force and Navy
aircraft. Nineteen of these were successfully destroyed; five were
not. The BDA did not, in these cases, allow any distinctions of what
munition type effected the damage. Using the munition cost data in
table IV.4, we calculated the munition cost to successfully destroy a
bridge with both Air Force and Navy aircraft and guided and unguided
munitions. The results are shown in table IV.8.
Table IV.8
Munitions Costs to Attack 24 Bridges in
Desert Storm
Assessment Cost of Cost of Cost of
of bridges Guided guided Unguided unguided bridges
attacked munitions munitions\a munitions munitions\b attacked\c
---------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
FS 10.8 $237,600 18.2 $34,052 $271,652
NFS 7.2 158,400 14.2 26,568 184,968
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a This assumes that the guided munition used was the GBU-10, with a
unit cost of $22,000.
\b This assumes that the unguided munition used was the MK-84 GP,
which pilots stated to be the unguided munition of choice against
bridges. The unit cost of this munition was $1,871.
\c The average costs to attack bridges presented in tables IV.7 and
IV.8 are not directly comparable for two reasons. First, the
chronological BDA and strike data compiled by CNA allowed the
calculation of costs up to and including the first successful strike
against a bridge. Unambiguous chronological BDA and strike data were
not available through the missions and phase III databases; thus,
costs include strikes before, during, and after the initial
successful attack. Second, the criteria for success are different.
In the CNA study, the criterion was "span dropped." In our
interpretation of DIA's phase III messages, the criterion was that
the mission objective was met, which often equated with the absence
of a restrike recommendation. In addition, ambiguous BDA was
included in the NFS category.
While these data do not distinguish the effects of different types of
munitions, they do support many of the points made earlier. First,
as with the CNA data, it is clear that while fewer guided munitions
were used, their cost was substantially higher. Second, in both
analyses, about 11 LGBs were used per destroyed bridge. Thus, the
data from the CNA analysis--with unambiguous BDA--suggest that our
analysis of the number of LGBs dropped per successful target--in this
case a bridge--is not inappropriate. It also reinforces the point
that it is misleading to characterize LGBs as "one-target, one-bomb"
weapons. Third, and finally, there are so few cases where BDA
permits a reliable analysis of the exact number of a specific type of
munition used per successful mission; thus, the data available from
Desert Storm do not permit supportable general conclusions about the
comparative effectiveness of guided versus unguided munitions.
SURVIVABILITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.5
One characteristic pilots cited as a strong advantage of guided
munitions over unguided was the ability to release a munition at a
substantial standoff distance from a target, thereby limiting
exposure to any defenses at the target.\19 There were, however,
limitations to the advantages of standoff capability. [DELETED] A-10
pilots noted that Iraqi defenses were not always directly collocated
with the target, with the result that launching a weapon from maximum
delivery range could still expose aircraft to defenses not at the
target. Standoff capability distanced aircraft from defenses
collocated with the target, but that was not necessarily all the
defenses.
Another factor cited by pilots about guided munitions was the
relatively high workload required to employ them. [DELETED]\20
[DELETED]
Pilots delivering unguided munitions experienced different problems:
vulnerability to AAA was high when releasing at the low altitude that
maximized the accuracy of unguided munitions. Thus, CENTAF's order
to cease low-level deliveries after the third day of the campaign
meant a trade-off of reduced accuracy with unguided bombs for
improved survivability.
In sum, delivery tactics for guided and unguided munitions both
compromised aircraft survivability but in different ways. The
advantage of guided munitions to standoff from a target's defenses
varies by PGM type, and some pilots reported that standoff from
target defenses did not always ensure standoff from all relevant
defenses. Moreover, guided munitions can make aircraft more
vulnerable [DELETED], while maximum accuracy for unguided bombs
requires more dangerous low-altitude delivery.
--------------------
\19 Different guided munitions could be delivered at standoff
distances greater or lesser than others: specifically, the IR
version of the GBU-15 had a standoff capability of up to [DELETED].
Maverick missiles stood off at slant ranges of [DELETED]. Unpowered
LGBs were described by some pilots as having a limited standoff
capability.
\20 The "heads down" and subsequent situational unawareness problem
was much less of a problem in two-seat aircraft (the F-15E, A-6E, and
the D model of the F/A-18). In these, the pilot could concentrate on
external threats while the weapon systems officer performed the
"heads down" tasks necessary to deliver the guided munition.
However, this advantage of two-seat air-to-ground aircraft did not
appreciably reduce the "wings level" time of the aircraft.
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.6
As discussed in appendix II, night, clouds, haze, humidity, smoke,
dust, and wind had significant, but different, effects on guided and
unguided munitions. Delivery of guided munitions was either limited
or prevented altogether by weather or other conditions that impaired
visibility. In contrast, when weather and other environmental
conditions affected infrared or optical search sensors for unguided
munitions, they could still be delivered with radar. Doing so meant
that the ability to identify valid targets among relatively
indiscriminate radar returns was usually poor and accuracy from high
altitude was also poor, but the employment of unguided munitions was
still possible.
Another operating characteristic was the support that the different
munition types normally required. Pilots reported varying levels of
intelligence and mission planning they needed for guided and unguided
munitions. For example, [DELETED]. (In F-111F LGB missions, such as
"tank plinking," detailed information and planning were not
necessary.) Although they strongly preferred receiving detailed
target and mission planning data, pilots using unguided munitions
reported that they often had less support. For example, B-52 pilots
stated that they sometimes received new targets just before takeoff,
or even when they were en route to a previously planned target, but
the new targeting information was sometimes little more than
geographic coordinates.
In addition, "precision" for guided munitions requires not only
precise accuracy from the munition but also precise intelligence
support. Pinpoint accuracy is impossible if the right aimpoint is
unknown.
In sum, to achieve accuracy, guided munitions were normally more
limited by weather and by their support and intelligence needs than
unguided munitions. In contrast, unguided munitions were usable in
poor weather, but they were also less accurate.
SUMMARY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3
In this appendix, we found that each type of aircraft and munition
under review demonstrated both significant strengths and weaknesses.
There was no consistent pattern indicating that either high-cost or
low-cost aircraft or munitions performed better or were more
effective in Desert Storm.\21
The limited data do not show that multirole aircraft were either more
or less effective in the air-to-ground capacity than more
specialized, single-role aircraft. However, air-to-air missions were
predominantly performed by single-role air-to-air aircraft, and while
multirole aircraft did perform some air-defense escort and some
support missions, their use did not eliminate the need for
single-role, air-to-air, and other support aircraft. The evidence
from Desert Storm would seem to suggest the usefulness of single-role
aircraft in their respective missions and the usefulness of multirole
aircraft most predominantly in the air-to-ground mission.
The high-cost F-117 stealth bomber has significant operating
limitations that affect when, where, and how it can be used; its
target hit rate appears to have been matched by the F-111F against
similar targets. Although the F-117 was often, but certainly not
always, tasked against different targets, on certain performance
dimensions--such as sortie rate, operations in weather, and tonnage
delivered--it did not match the performance of several moderate- and
even low-cost aircraft.
Guided munitions are many times more costly than unguided munitions,
and their employment was constrained by poor weather, clouds, heavy
smoke, dust, fog, haze, and even humidity. However, guided munitions
were less affected by winds and, unlike unguided munitions, they were
more consistently accurate from medium-to-high altitude. Although
quite inexpensive and less restricted by low visibility, unguided
munitions cannot reliably be employed against point targets from the
medium and high altitudes predominantly used in Desert Storm.
Both guided and unguided munitions have important implications for
aircraft survivability. To be accurate, unguided munitions need
low-altitude delivery, which in Desert Storm was found to be
associated with too many casualties. While guided munitions can be
accurate from high altitude, their standoff capability does not
necessarily protect them from defenses not at the target. [DELETED]
While guided munitions are clearly more accurate from medium and high
altitudes, their high unit cost means that they may not be the least
expensive way to attack certain targets, sometimes by a considerable
margin, compared to unguided bombs. There was no apparent pattern
indicating that guided munitions were, overall, more effective than
unguided munitions in successfully destroying targets or that the
difference between targets that were successfully destroyed and that
were not fully successfully destroyed was simply that the latter were
not attacked as often as the former by either guided or unguided
munitions.
The TLAM cruise missile demonstrated a high-cost sortie rate, low
survivability, and severe employment limitations. Its accuracy was
substantially less than claimed; however, unlike any aircraft, its
use does not risk an aircraft or, more importantly, its pilot.
--------------------
\21 Despite the absence of an overall, consistent pattern, there were
clearly cases where both types were ineffective: weather either
seriously degraded or rendered unusable guided munitions;
high-altitude deliveries made unguided munitions highly inaccurate,
according to pilots who termed the use of unguided munitions against
point targets, "ridiculous." Conversely, there were conditions where
the data indicated that both munitions were effective.
OPERATION DESERT STORM OBJECTIVES
=========================================================== Appendix V
In an address to the Congress on August 5, 1990, 3 days after Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait, President George Bush stated that the U.S.
national policy objectives in the Persian Gulf were to
effect the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
restore Kuwait's legitimate government;
ensure the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and other Persian
Gulf nations; and
ensure the safety of American citizens abroad.\1
Initially, U.S. forces were deployed as a frontline deterrent to an
Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. However, almost immediately, planning
began for an offensive air campaign aimed at forcing an Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait and accomplishing the other national policy
objectives. Between early August 1990 and January 16, 1991, the
phase of the campaign named Operation Desert Shield, U.S. and
coalition planners drew up a series of increasingly refined and
progressively more ambitious offensive campaign plans.\2 The plans
changed as the number and size of U.S. and coalition forces
committed to the campaign increased, but we did not review each
variation in these plans. Rather, we present the plan as it stood on
the eve of the war, to understand better what the goals of the
campaign were as it was about to start. In addition, we examine how
the offensive campaign's goals were to be operationalized in terms of
phases and targets.
--------------------
\1 Cited in DOD's title V report, p. 30, and GWAPS, vol. I, pt. I:
Planning (Secret), p. 87.
\2 During the course of Desert Shield, more than 25 countries joined
the coalition to oppose Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and enforce U.N.
sanctions against Iraq. Nine coalition members (in addition to the
United States) participated in the Desert Storm air campaign; the
remaining countries contributed either to the ground and maritime
campaigns or in a supporting capacity (for example, medical teams,
supply ships, and financial aid). Approximately 16.5 percent of the
combat sorties during the air campaign were flown by non-U.S.
forces. About 5 percent were flown by the United Kingdom; the others
were flown by the aircraft of other coalition members.
DESERT STORM CAMPAIGN
OBJECTIVES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1
On the eve of the offensive campaign, the commander in chief of the
Central Command issued his operational order (OPORD) to U.S. and
coalition forces to carry out Operation Desert Storm. The OPORD was
almost identical to the operations plan that had been distributed to
U.S. forces earlier in the month.
According to the OPORD (p. 5), the
"offensive campaign is a four-phased air, naval and ground
offensive operation to destroy Iraqi capability to produce and
employ weapons of mass destruction, destroy Iraqi offensive
military capability, cause the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait, and restore the legitimate government of Kuwait."
To achieve these general objectives, the OPORD further stated that
offensive operations would focus on the following theater objectives:
"attack Iraqi political/military leadership and command and control
(C\2 );
"gain and maintain air superiority;
"sever Iraqi supply lines;
"destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear capability; and
"destroy Republican Guard forces."\3
According to OPORD, the offensive campaign would be executed in four
phases, of which the first three essentially involved the air
campaign and the last, the ground offensive. Although each phase had
its own specific objectives, the OPORD stated (on p. 6) that
execution would not necessarily be sequential and that "phases may
overlap as objectives are achieved or priorities change." In effect,
the plan recognized the need for flexibility in the face of changing
circumstances.
According to the OPORD, phase I--the strategic air campaign-- would
start the offensive and was estimated to require 6 to 9 days to meet
its objectives. The OPORD stated (on p. 9) that the
"strategic air campaign will be initiated to attack Iraq's
strategic air defenses; aircraft/airfields; strategic chemical,
biological and nuclear capability; leadership targets; command
and control systems; Republican Guard forces; telecommunications
facilities; and key elements of the national infrastructure,
such as critical LOCs, electric grids, petroleum storage, and
military production facilities."
The amount of damage to be inflicted on each of these target
categories was not stated, but the OPORD noted (on p. 9) that
"repaired or reconstituted targets will be re-attacked throughout the
offensive campaign as necessary."
Phase II--the attainment of air superiority in the Kuwait theater of
operations--was estimated to begin sometime between day 7 and day 10
and to require 2 to 4 days, ending no later than D+13 (days after
D-Day). The OPORD stated (on p. 9) that
"air superiority in the Kuwait theater of operations will be
established by attacking aircraft/airfields, air defense weapons
and command and control systems in order to roll back enemy air
defenses. . . . The ultimate goal of this phase is to
achieve air supremacy through the KTO."
Phase III--battlefield preparation--was estimated to start sometime
between D+9 and D+14 and to require 6 to 8 days. The OPORD noted (on
p. 10) that phase III would involve
"attacking Iraqi ground combat forces (particularly RGFC units)
and supporting missile/rocket/artillery units; interdicting
supply lines; and destroying command, control and communications
systems in southern Iraq and Kuwait with B-52s, tactical air,
and naval surface fires . . . . The desired effect is to
sever Iraqi supply lines, destroy Iraqi chemical, biological,
and nuclear capability, and reduce Iraqi combat effectiveness in
the KTO by at least 50 percent, particularly the RGFC. . . .
[Moreover,] the purpose . . . is to open the window of
opportunity for initiating ground offensive operations by
confusing and terrorizing Iraqi forces in the KTO and shifting
combat force ratios in favor of friendly forces."\4
Phase IV--the ground offensive--had no estimated concrete start day
in the OPORD, since it was dependent on achieving at least some of
the goals of the first three phases, most especially that of
degrading overall Iraqi ground force effectiveness by 50 percent.
Nor did the OPORD cite the anticipated duration of phase IV.
However, in a December 20, 1990, briefing, the CENTAF Director of Air
Campaign Plans estimated that the ground offensive would require 18
days, with the total campaign taking
32 days.
--------------------
\3 The operations plan states that the Iraqi leadership was to be
"neutralized"; this wording does not appear in the OPORD.
\4 After the war, a considerable controversy arose over whether the
50-percent criterion referred to overall Iraqi ground force
capabilities in the KTO or to the actual number of vehicles to be
destroyed. Based on the actual order presented here, it appears to
have been the broader criterion, relating to the effectiveness of the
units.
CENTERS OF GRAVITY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.1
The OPORD further stated that Iraq had three centers of gravity (COG)
to be targeted for destruction throughout the offensive campaign.
These were Iraq's (1) national command authority, (2) NBC capability,
and (3) the Republican Guard forces. The operations plan of December
16, 1990, cited the identical COGs, but also included a matrix
"showing the phase in which each theater objective becomes the focal
point of operations." (See
pp. 9-10.) This matrix is reproduced in table V.1.
Table V.1
Desert Storm Theater Objectives and
Phases
Phase II: Phase
Kuwait III: Phase
Phase I: theater of battlefi IV:
strategic operations eld ground
air air preparat offensiv
Theater objective campaign supremacy ion e
-------------------------- ---------- ---------- -------- --------
Disrupt leadership and X
command and control
Achieve air supremacy X X
Cut supply lines X X X X
Destroy NBC capability X X
Destroy Republican Guard X X X
Liberate Kuwait City X
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CENTCOM operations plan, December 16, 1990, p. 10.
POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
AIR POWER
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.2
Air power was intended to be used in all four phases but clearly
would dominate the first three phases, which preceded the ground
offensive. According to one of the key planners of the air campaign,
it was hoped that the ground offensive would be rendered unnecessary
by the effectiveness of the coalition air force attacks against Iraqi
targets.\5 A senior Desert Storm planner we interviewed told us that
the strategic air campaign (phase I) would concentrate on
leadership-related targets deep inside Iraq, with the goal of forcing
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to "cry uncle." If destruction of key
leadership facilities--ranging from the presidential palace to
critical communications nodes to military headquarters--did not
result in an Iraqi collapse, then the elite Republican Guard units in
the KTO would be hit next.\6 It was hoped that Saddam Hussein would
flinch if severe destruction were inflicted on the Republican Guard,
a key prop of Iraqi power. Finally, according to one key Black Hole
planner (see glossary), if those attacks did not result in an Iraqi
retreat, then the air campaign would continue with massive attrition
of the Iraqi frontline forces, followed by a ground offensive.
As noted above, the OPORD did not specify the precise level of damage
to be inflicted during phase I on a broad variety of strategic
targets. This probably reflected the planners' focus on "an
effects-based plan." That is, rather than concentrating on achieving
a specific level of damage to individual targets or target sets, the
goal was to achieve a greater impact, such as shutting down the
national electric power grid or paralyzing the ability of the Iraqi
leadership to transmit orders or receive information from field
units. Therefore, it was more important to destroy critical nodes,
such as the generating halls of electric power plants or the
telephone switching centers in Baghdad, than to flatten dozens of
less important targets. Further, as a number of observers have
noted, in certain categories, the goal was not to destroy them for
years to come but, rather, to severely disrupt Iraqi capabilities
temporarily. (This was particularly true with regard to oil
production and electrical generation but not true for NBC targets.)
In sum, and not for the first time in armed conflict in this century,
it was hoped that the shock and effectiveness of air power would
precipitate a collapse of the opponent before a ground campaign.
Failing that, it was expected that sufficient damage could be
inflicted on enemy ground forces to greatly reduce casualties to the
coalition ground forces.
These goals help explain, in part, the early concentration on key
strategic targets in the opening hours and days of the air campaign.
To operationalize these goals, the U.S. air planners divided fixed
targets in Iraq and the KTO into the 12 categories cited in appendix
I. (See table I.1.)
The air planners assigned targets within each of these categories to
different aircraft, deciding which specific targets to hit and when.
It is essential to realize that each of these categories is quite
broad; many of the targets that fell under a single category varied
considerably, along numerous dimensions. Perhaps most important, the
number of aimpoints at a given target type, such as an airfield,
could range from a few to dozens, depending on the number of
buildings, aircraft, radar, and other potential targets at the
location. Similarly, nuclear-related and military industrial
facilities contained varying numbers of buildings, each considered an
aimpoint.
In addition, each target category contained targets that had varying
degrees of hardness, creating different levels of vulnerability. For
example, "leadership" targets ranged from "soft" targets such as the
presidential palace and government ministry buildings to bunkers
buried tens of feet beneath the earth and virtually invulnerable to
conventional weapons. Bridges, a part of the "railroad and bridges"
category, varied in terms of the number of arches, the type of
material used to construct them, width, and other factors that could
significantly affect the number and type of weapons required to
destroy them. In effect, any interpretation of the number and kind
of weapons and platforms required to inflict desired damage on a
broad target category must start with the understanding that a
tremendous range of targeting-related variables existed within a
given category. (For a more complete list of the kinds of targets
contained within each broad category, see app. I.)
In an analysis of the intended effects of the air campaign, GWAPS
grouped the 12 target sets into 7 categories and, in greater detail
than the OPORD, stated the air campaign's goals based on an analysis
of Desert Storm documents and interviews with many participants.
Table V.2 summarizes this analysis.
Table V.2
Operational Strategic Summary of the Air
Campaign
Target sets Desired or planned effects
------------------ --------------------------------------------------
Integrated air Early air superiority
defense and
airfields
Suppress medium-and high-air defenses throughout
Iraq
Contain and destroy Iraqi air force
Naval targets Attain sea control--permit allied naval operations
in northern Persian Gulf
Leadership, Pressure and disrupt governmental functioning
telecommunications
, and C\3
Isolate Saddam Hussein from Iraqi people and
forces in the KTO
Electricity and Shut down national grid--minimize long-term damage
oil
Cut flow of fuels and lubricants to Iraqi forces-
-no lasting damage to oil production
NBC and Scuds Destroy biological and chemical weapons
Prevent use against coalition
Destroy production capability
Destroy nuclear program--long term
Prevent and suppress use of Scuds--destroy
production and infrastructure
Railroads and Cut supply lines to the KTO--prevent retreat of
bridges Iraqi forces
RG and other Destroy the Republican Guard
ground forces in
the KTO
Reduce combat effectiveness of remaining units by
50 percent by G-day (start of the ground war)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Analysis of GWAPS, vol. II, pt. II (Secret), p. 353,
table 25.
--------------------
\5 See DOD title V report, p. 135.
\6 The KTO area included RG units deployed as part of the attack on
Kuwait in the area of Iraq immediately north of Kuwait.
DISCUSSION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:2
Table V.2 shows that some target sets were intended to be destroyed
completely by air power, while others were to be damaged to a degree
that would prevent their use during the conflict and for a short-term
period afterward. Two of the three key COGs cited above--NBC and the
RG--were slated for complete destruction, as were the Scuds that
could deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. Although
there was no explicit goal to topple the Hussein regime, some
observers believe that effectively crippling the RG units might have
encouraged regular army officers to attempt a coup d'�tat. In
effect, the goals of the air campaign were almost surely more
ambitious than simply to "disrupt" the Iraqi leadership.
In addition, the goal of cutting supply lines to the KTO could only
be accomplished by effectively cutting all bridges and railroads
while also preventing supply trucks from using existing roads or
alternative routes, such as driving on the flat desert.
To achieve the results hoped for, the Desert Storm air planners put
together a list of strategic targets to be attacked during the first
2 to 3 days of phase I, the strategic air campaign. This list grew
during the months of planning, from 84 targets in late August 1990 to
476 by the eve of the war. The increase in the number of targets
reflected several factors, not the least of which was that as
coalition aircraft numbers deployed to the region rose dramatically,
so too did the capability to hit many more targets during a very
short period of time. In addition, the months of preparation had
permitted the development of intelligence about critical targets and
their locations and refinements in the plan to maximize the potential
shock to Iraq.
The increase in the targets, by set, is shown in table V.3. (Note
that the bottom two categories--"breach" and SAMs--are actually
components of other categories. "Breaching" would normally be a
tactical battlefield preparation mission; SAMs are part of strategic
air defense.)
Because this growth in both target sets and number of targets has
been thoroughly analyzed in previous studies, we review here only
several major points. According to a number of analyses, the
increase in the RG category (from 12 to 37 targets) reflected the
CENTCOM CINC's concern that these units be destroyed as essential to
maintaining regional stability after the end of the war. In his
view, these units not only propped up the Iraqi regime but also gave
it an offensive ground capability that had to be eliminated.\7
Table V.3
Target Growth, by Category, From the
Initial Instant Thunder Plan to January
15, 1991\a
Instan
t
Thunde 9/13/ 10/ 12/1/ 12/ 1/15/
Target category r 90 11/90 90 18/90 91
---------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
SAD 10 21 40 28 27 58
NBC 8 20 20 25 20 23
SCU \b \b \c \c 16 43
GVC 5 15 15 32 31 33
C\3 19 26 27 26 30 59
ELE 10 14 18 16 16 17
OIL 6 8 10 7 12 12
LOC 3 12 12 28 28 33
OCA 7 13 27 28 28 31
NAV 1 4 6 4 4 19
MIB 15 41 43 44 38 62
RG \b \d \d \d 12 37
Breach 0 0 \b \b 0 6
SAM 0 0 \b \b 0 43
======================================================================
Total 84 174 218 238 262 476
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Instant Thunder was the initial air campaign plan prepared by Air
Force planners only days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
\b Not available.
\c Scuds included in NBC category.
\d Republican Guard included in MIB category.
Source: GWAPS, vol. I, pt. I (Secret), p. 195.
Similarly, the air planners feared that a "premature" Iraqi
surrender, after only a short strategic air campaign, would preclude
the destruction of much of Iraq's offensive military capabilities,
particularly NBC. Therefore,
"as the plan execution date grew closer and additional aircraft
arrived in country . . . planners sought to spread sorties
across as many of the target categories as possible, rather than
concentrate on the neutralization of all or more targets in one
category before the next became the focus of attacks."\8
While seeking to eliminate as much Iraqi offensive capability as
possible, as quickly as possible, air planners also had to allocate a
large portion of the early strikes to the phase II goal of achieving
air superiority, according to most analyses of the conflict. This
reflected the CENTAF commander's priority of minimizing aircraft
losses. It was believed that this could be achieved only by
rendering ineffective the Iraqi integrated air defense system, a
highly centralized, computerized defense incorporating hundreds of
radar-guided SAMs and about 500 fighter aircraft. A second goal was
to prevent the Iraqis from attacking coalition units with aircraft
delivered chemical or biological weapons, much less with conventional
ones. The fear of nonconventional weapon attacks also generated
requirements to destroy as many Scud missiles and launchers as
possible. This target category was broken out from the chemical set
by December 18, 1990, and then increased from 16 to 43 targets by the
eve of the war.\9
Finally, air superiority was essential to prevent the Iraqis from
detecting or disrupting the movement of a huge coalition ground force
in Saudi Arabia to execute a surprise attack on Iraqi forces from the
west rather than through their front lines.
--------------------
\7 GWAPS, vol. I, pt. I (Secret), p. 173.
\8 GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. I (Secret), p. 174.
\9 It was also believed that Iraq would launch Scud attacks on Israel
in an attempt to bring that country into the war, thereby breaking
apart the allied coalition, with its many Arab state participants.
As events unfolded, this fear was justified, and a massive effort was
devoted to suppressing Scud launches.
TWO TO THREE DAYS PLANNED
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:2.1
As noted above, only the first 2 to 3 days of the strategic air
campaign were planned in great detail, with the remainder to be based
on the damage done to the high-priority targets that would be hit in
the first 48 to 72 hours. A master attack plan was prepared for the
first 72 hours, but actual air tasking orders were prepared for only
the first 48 hours, because the CENTAF commander believed that plans
would have to be changed given the results of the first 2 days.
Using BDA intelligence, planners anticipated that some targets would
have to be restruck, while new ones could be hit once BDA showed that
those of the highest value were destroyed or sufficiently damaged.
Sixty percent of the 476 targets designated by January 16, 1991, were
to be hit during the first 72 hours, including "34 percent [of the
targets attacked] . . . in the strategic air defense and airfield
categories."\10
Thus, by the eve of the war, an extremely detailed yet flexible air
campaign plan was ready to be formulated, using forces that had been
deployed to carry out the campaign.
--------------------
\10 GWAPS, vol. I, pt. I (Secret), p. 197.
AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED TO THE
CONFLICT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:2.2
There was very substantial variation in the proportion of U.S.
air-to-ground aircraft deployed to the gulf, compared to the total
number available of each kind of aircraft. Table V.4 shows the
maximum number of each kind of U.S. air-to-ground platform sent to
the gulf, the total worldwide U.S. inventory for each aircraft, and
the percentage that the Desert Storm deployment represented of total
inventory for that particular aircraft.
Table V.4
Number and Percent of Inventory of U.S.
Air-to-Ground Aircraft Deployed to
Desert Storm
Total U.S. Number deployed
Number inventory as percent of
Aircraft deployed (1990) U.S. inventory
-------------------------- ---------- ------------ ----------------
F-111F 66 83 80
F-117 42 56 75
B-52 68 118 58
F/A-18D 12 29 41
F-15E 48 125 38
A-6E 115 350 33
F/A-18A/C 162 526 31
A-10 148 565 26
F-16 251 1,759 14
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD's title V report, vol. III, appendix T.
It seems reasonable that a number of factors would have played roles
in determining the numbers deployed for any given type of aircraft,
including (1) the total inventory, which varied tremendously (from as
few as 29 to 1,759); (2) the perceived need or role for the aircraft;
and (3) the estimated likely effectiveness of the aircraft. It is
not clear from planning or other documents which of these factors (or
other ones) determined the different percentages of the worldwide
inventory for each type of aircraft that was eventually allocated to
the gulf. However, in general, the smaller the U.S. inventory of a
particular type of aircraft, the larger the proportion of that
inventory that was dedicated to Desert Storm.
SUMMARY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:3
In this appendix, we identified the KTO objectives: (1) attack Iraqi
leadership and command and control, (2) achieve air superiority, (3)
sever Iraqi supply lines, (4) destroy Iraq's NBC capability, and (5)
prepare the battlefield by attacking RG and other ground forces.
The U.S. objectives were to be achieved by conducting a four-phase
campaign, the first three phases of which constituted exclusively an
air campaign. Phase I--the strategic air campaign--would start the
offensive and address the centers of gravity and most of the 12
strategic target categories. Phase II--the attainment of air
superiority over Iraq and in the Kuwait theater of operations--was
initiated simultaneously with phase I. Phase III--battlefield
preparation--involved attacking Iraqi ground combat forces
(particularly RG units) to reduce Iraqi combat effectiveness in the
KTO by at least 50 percent. Finally, came phase IV--the ground
offensive--during which coalition ground forces would be supported by
the coalition air forces.
The air campaign plan continued to evolve from the initial Instant
Thunder plan proposed in August 1990 until the eve of the campaign.
During this time, the number of target categories remained nearly
constant, but the number of targets grew from 84 to 476. A
substantial portion of the U.S. air-to-ground inventory was
dedicated to Desert Storm to service the many targets. The planners
expected that the air campaign objectives could be decisively
achieved in days or, at most, weeks. On the eve of the campaign,
detailed strikes had been planned for only the first 48 to 72 hours.
Subsequent strikes on strategic targets were expected to be planned
based on the results achieved in the initial strikes.
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE IRAQI
INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
========================================================== Appendix VI
The country was divided into four sectors, each controlled by a
sector operations center and each reporting directly to the national
air defense operations center (ADOC) in Baghdad. The integrated air
defense system was highly centralized, [DELETED]. Each SOC
transmitted data back to intercept operations centers, which in turn
controlled SAM batteries and fighter aircraft at air bases.
There were [DELETED] IOCs across the four sectors in Iraq feeding
data to individual SOCs. Each IOC was optimized to direct either SAM
or fighter aircraft against incoming enemy aircraft. Each IOC was
connected to observer and early warning area reporting posts (RP)
[DELETED].
Figure VI.1 shows the four IADS sectors in Iraq, the Kuwait sector,
the RPs, IOCs, SOCs, ADOC, and the communication lines among these
components.
There were about 500 radars located at approximately 100 sites,
[DELETED].\1
[DELETED]\2
Figure VI.1: The Iraqi Air
Defense Network
(See figure in printed
edition.)
[FIGURE DELETED]
Source: [DELETED]
--------------------
\1 GWAPS, vol. II, pt. I (Secret), p. 83.
\2 SPEAR (Secret), December 1990, p. 3-11.
EVIDENCE ON IADS CAPABILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:1
IADS COULD ONLY TRACK A
LIMITED NUMBER OF THREATS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.1
Despite the numerous components of the IADS, its actual operating
capabilities were quite limited. The system was designed to counter
comparatively limited threats from Israel and Iran, with each SOC
capable of tracking [DELETED]. While sufficient against an attack
from either regional opponent, the system was inadequate to cope with
a force of hundreds of aircraft and unmanned aerial decoys.
[DELETED]\3
--------------------
\3 SPEAR (Secret), December 1990, p. 3-25. Similarly, DIA reported
that the IADS "could track only a limited number of threats and was
[DELETED]." DIA, BDA Highlights (March 22, 1991), p. 26.
IADS DESIGN MADE THE SYSTEM
EASY TO DISRUPT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.2
[DELETED]
IADS DESIGN WAS KNOWN IN
DETAIL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.3
Another advantage that the coalition had in attacking the IADS is
that all internal designs of the KARI computer system that controlled
it [DELETED].\4 [DELETED]
--------------------
\4 USAF, History of the Strategic Air Campaign: Operation Desert
Storm (Secret), p. 258.
IRAQI SAMS WERE OLD OR
LIMITED IN CAPABILITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.4
Some key Iraqi antiair weapons were either quite old, well understood
by U.S. intelligence, or limited in range and capability. SAMs with
the greatest range, SA-2s and SA-3s, had been deployed 30 years
earlier, putting them at the end of their operational lifespan.
Moreover, both the USAF and other coalition air forces had long
established countermeasures to these systems.
[DELETED]
The four types of SAMs just discussed--SA-2s, SA-3s, SA-6s, and
SA-8s--along with Roland, were those that entirely comprised the SAM
defenses of the five most heavily defended areas of Iraq: Baghdad,
Basrah, Tallil/Jalibah, H-2 and H-3 airfields, and Mosul/Kirkuk.
[DELETED]
AAA GUNS WERE NOT
RADAR-GUIDED
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.5
While linked to the IADS, AAA guns were mostly unguided and used in
barrage-style firing against attacking aircraft. Still, even
unguided barrage-style AAA remained a considerable threat to
attacking aircraft required to fly above 12,000 feet for most of the
war.
THE IRAQI AIR FORCE FAILED
TO PLAY A ROLE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VI:1.6
With a substantial portion of the Iraqi air force destroyed,
inactive, or fleeing to Iran early in the campaign, the threat was
severely reduced since part of the effectiveness of the IADS depended
on vectoring its fighters to attacking aircraft.
PRE-DESERT STORM MISSIONS AND
ACTUAL USE
========================================================= Appendix VII
F-117
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.1
The F-117 was originally only intended for selected missions against
heavily defended, high-value targets. The F-117's unique
"low-observable" design narrows the range of its mission capability
compared to other nonstealthy aircraft.
Before the war, planners primarily tasked the F-117s to high-value,
heavily defended, air defense, C\3 , leadership, and NBC targets in
and around Baghdad. The targets actually attacked by the F-117s
became somewhat more diverse as the war progressed. According to an
F-117 after-action report, the doctrinal target list for the F-117
"went out the window."
F-111F
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.2
Pre-air campaign mission plans for the F-111F focused on low-altitude
air interdiction against strategic targets, such as airfields, radar
sites, and chemical weapons bunkers. However, like all other
aircraft, almost all Desert Storm missions were conducted at
medium-to-high altitude. Another deviation from pre-Desert Storm
mission planning for the F-111F were LGB strikes against tanks
commonly referred to after the war as "tank plinking."
The F-111F was the only Desert Storm aircraft to deliver the GBU-15
and the 5,000-pound laser-guided, penetrating GBU-28.
F-15E
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.3
Pre-Desert Storm plans focused largely on an air interdiction role
for the F-15E. However, the F-15E minimally participated in the
overall air interdiction effort. Rather, F-15E missions were
predominantly Scud hunting, reconnaissance, and antiarmor missions in
kill boxes.
The F-15E is one of three U.S. Air Force LGB-capable platforms, yet
the majority of the bomb tonnage delivered by the F-15E was unguided.
Because of the limited number of LANTIRN targeting pods, only
one-quarter of the F-15Es deployed to the Persian Gulf had the
capability of autonomously delivering LGBs.
A-6E
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.4
Pre-Desert Storm plans involved air interdiction for A-6s with some
emphasis on attacking airfields and Iraqi air defenses located at
airfields. A-6s conducted air interdiction missions against a range
of Desert Storm strategic targets, delivering the bulk of the bombs
dropped on naval targets.
F-16
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.5
Initial air campaign plans tasked F-16s mostly during the daylight
hours in large strike packages against targets such as airfields,
chemical weapons storage areas, Scud missile production facilities,
Republican Guard locations, leadership targets, and military storage
facilities. Several strikes against strategic targets in the Baghdad
area occurred during the first
2 weeks of the war. F-16s conducted a proportionately large number
of strikes against C\3 , NBC, OCA, and OIL targets. F-16 pilots told
us that their missions further evolved at the end of the war to
patrolling highways and rivers and striking and harassing targets of
opportunity such as trucks, repaired bridges, and barges.
F/A-18
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.6
F/A-18s were initially assigned to carry out suppression of enemy air
defenses, fleet defense combat air patrol, escort of other strike
aircraft, and attacks against a range of ground targets. As Iraqi
threats against Navy aircraft carriers were degraded, the number of
F/A-18 CAP sorties was reduced while those allocated to interdiction
increased. However, the F/A-18's lack of an autonomous laser for
delivery of LGBs was cited in DOD's title V report as a
shortcoming.\1
--------------------
\1 See Naval Aviation: The Navy Is Taking Actions to Improve the
Combat Capabilities of Its Tactical Aircraft (GAO/NSIAD-93-204, July
7, 1993), for more information on F/A-18 limitations in Desert Storm.
A-10
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.7
When planners began to construct the air campaign plan, they did not
anticipate tasking the A-10 against strategic targets. However, the
role of the A-10 in the campaign evolved as the events of the war
unfolded. The lower air defense threat in Scud launching areas
enabled planners to task the A-10 against these targets and to
capitalize on the A-10's large payload capacity and loitering
ability. Intense AAA and IR SAM threats encountered near RG targets
motivated the Air Force to largely assign the A-10s to lower threat
areas.
According to the pilots we interviewed, combat air support performed
by the A-10 was difficult and nontraditional. For example, much of
it was performed at night for both the Marines and the Army, when a
key problem was how to identify targets. Although the A-10 is
generally considered a day-only aircraft, two squadrons flew night
missions [DELETED].
B-52
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.8
Over two-thirds of the B-52 missions were directed against Iraqi
ground forces, with the remainder against targets such as military
industrial facilities, electrical power plants, and airfields. B-52s
flew just over 3 percent of the total air combat missions, but
because of the aircraft's uniquely large payload, these accounted for
30 percent of the total bomb tonnage released.\2
The Strategic Air Command officially reported the B-52 CEP to be
[DELETED]. This level of inaccuracy resulted from the high winds
that affected unguided bomb ballistics and from an error introduced
by a contractor in misidentifying the ground coordinates of targets.
--------------------
\2 See Operation Desert Storm: Limits on the Role and Performance of
B-52 Bombers in Conventional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-93-138, May 12,
1993).
BRITISH TORNADO, GR-1
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:0.9
The British Tornado had a visible and consistent role in the
strategic air campaign, being one of the few non-U.S. coalition
aircraft assigned missions in the final, command-approved, version of
the Master Attack Plan. A primary planned mission for the Tornado
was attacking runways with the JP233 munition at very low altitude.
However, the combination of four British Tornado losses in the first
week of the air campaign and the command decision to go to
medium-altitude operations brought an end to these planned missions.
In the remaining 5 weeks of the air campaign, the primary Tornado
mission was air interdiction at medium altitude against a variety of
target types. Many of the new targets were point targets, like
hardened aircraft shelters and bridges believed to necessitate LGBs.
Because the Tornado had no laser self-designation capability, buddy
lasing tactics with the British Buccaneer aircraft were attempted. A
British Ministry of Defense report suggests that the buddy lasing
experience demonstrated the need for laser self-designation
capability in the Tornado.\3
--------------------
\3 British Ministry of Defense, The Gulf Conflict: Lessons Learned,
p. 8-6.
WEIGHT OF EFFORT AND TYPE OF
EFFORT ANALYSIS
======================================================== Appendix VIII
The weight of effort and type of effort indices permitted us to
examine the relative contributions of the air-to-ground platforms and
revealed the overall magnitude of the weight and type of effort that
was expended against the strategic target sets established pursuant
to the military objectives of the Persian Gulf War. In this
appendix, we report results not included in appendix I.
WOE PLATFORM COMPARISONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VIII:1
Collectively, military industrial base, offensive counterair and kill
box target sets received most of the weight of effort from the
air-to-ground platforms reviewed here, and KBX targets received by
far the most strikes, the most bombs, and the most bomb tonnage.
BE-numbered targets in the KBX target set received at least 9 times
more strikes, 5 times more bombs, and 5 times more bomb tonnage than
the next highest ranking strategic target set in this regard. The
comparisons indicate that the F-111F and the F-117 accounted for the
majority of the guided bomb tonnage delivered against strategic
targets, while the B-52 and the F-16 accounted for the majority of
the unguided bomb tonnage delivered.
The B-52 and the F-16 accounted for the majority of unguided ordnance
delivered against KBX targets. Respectively, they delivered
approximately 32 million and 31 million pounds of bombs on KBX
targets. The F-15Es participated most exclusively against Scud
targets. Of the PGM tonnage delivered on C\3 , NBC, and MIB targets,
the F-117 accounted for most of it. Weight of effort on NAV targets
was almost exclusively the domain of Navy platforms, where the A-6E
accounted for much of the weight of effort. The Navy platforms did
contribute a considerable WOE against KBX targets. The only non-U.S.
coalition platform reviewed here--the British Tornado, GR-1--did not
contribute a majority of WOE on any of the strategic target sets.
Figure VIII.1 shows the number of strikes by each platform against
all
12 target categories. Relative to other platforms, the F-16 was a
predominant force against KBX targets, accounting for at least 51
percent of the total strikes. The number of strikes conducted by the
F-16s, F/A-18s, F-111Fs, A-6Es, F-15Es, and the B-52s on KBX targets
was the largest number of strikes that each conducted compared to
other strategic target categories. Figure VIII.1 also shows that the
majority of the Desert Storm platforms expended more of their strike
efforts on KBX targets than on any other strategic target category.
Figure VIII.1: Target Category
Strikes, by Platform
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure VIII.2 depicts strike data for the selected platforms against
the target categories, excluding KBX targets.
Figure VIII.2: Target Category
Strikes, by Platform, Excluding
KBX Targets
(See figure in printed
edition.)
When KBX strikes are removed, figure VIII.2 more clearly shows other
patterns, particularly that more strikes were expended on the MIB and
OCA target categories relative to other target categories. In
addition to being one of the strategic target sets, MIB targets often
served as "dump" targets or secondary targets, while the OCA target
set was associated with the Desert Storm objective of achieving air
supremacy and would be expected to be given a considerable weight of
effort.
Similar to F-16 strike data against KBX targets, the F-16 stands out
in terms of the number of strikes conducted against OCA, MIB, ELE,
and OIL target sets. One factor that can account for this is that
more F-16s were deployed to the Persian Gulf theater than any other
aircraft.
Compared to other target sets, the F-111F delivered more strikes on
the OCA target category. This coincides both with the stated mission
capability of the F-111F, as well as the Desert Storm plans for the
F-111F, which focused predominantly on an air interdiction role.
The F-15E conducted the largest number of strikes against Scud
targets. In contrast to other platforms, the F-15E was not a
significant part of strike efforts on any other target category. The
F-117 conducted the most strikes on the C\3 target category, the GVC
target category, and the NBC target category. Figure VIII.3 shows
the number of bombs delivered by air-to-ground platforms against the
strategic target sets.
Figure VIII.3: Bombs
Delivered, by Platform
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure VIII.3 shows that the number of bombs delivered on KBX targets
was at least four times as great as the number of bombs delivered on
the MIB target set, the next highest.
Figures VIII.3 and VIII.4 show that the B-52 delivered more bombs
against 7 of 12 target categories (ELE, KBX, LOC, MIB, NBC, OCA, and
OIL). The F-16 was second only to the B-52 in bombs delivered
against MIB and OCA strategic targets. Together with the data from
the KBX target category, the F-16 is second to the B-52 in number of
bombs delivered against the KBX, the MIB, and the OCA strategic
target sets. The A-6E dominated strategic targets in the NAV target
set, and the F-15E delivered substantially more bombs on Scud targets
compared to the other platforms.
Figure VIII.4: Bombs
Delivered, by Platform,
Excluding KBX Targets
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Similar to the number of bombs delivered against target categories,
figure VIII.5 shows that the most bomb tonnage was delivered on the
KBX, MIB, and OCA target sets.
Figure VIII.5: Bomb Tonnage
Delivered, by Platform
(See figure in printed
edition.)
B-52s delivered more bomb tonnage, relative to the other platforms
against strategic targets in the ELE, KBX, MIB, OCA, and OIL target
categories. The F-16 delivered in excess of 31 million pounds of
bombs on KBX targets. This is second only to the B-52, which
delivered approximately 32 million pounds of bombs. (See fig.
VIII.6.)
Figure VIII.6: Bomb Tonnage
Delivered, by Platform,
Excluding KBX Targets
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure VIII.6 shows that the F-16 delivered more bomb tonnage on C\3
and NBC targets than on the other platforms. The F-15E delivered
more bomb tonnage on Scud targets than on any other strategic target
set. With regard to F-15E efforts against Scud targets, all of the
WOE indices (number of BEs, number of strikes, number of bombs, bomb
tonnage) converge to indicate that the F-15E was the predominant
force on Scud targets and was not a principal part of the weight of
effort on other strategic target categories.
Figure VIII.6 does not indicate that among the various platforms
tasked to C\3 , LOC, NAV, NBC, OCA, and SAM targets, a single
platform is distinctive in terms of the bomb tonnage delivered. The
data show distinctive variability in sources of bomb tonnage
delivered against ELE, MIB, OIL, and to some degree, SCU targets.
B-52 bomb tonnage accounts for this distinction against all these
target sets except for Scud targets, which were accounted for by the
efforts of the F-15E.
TOE PLATFORM COMPARISONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VIII:2
The type of effort measures indicate the quantity of guided and
unguided bomb tonnage delivered by the selected air-to-ground
platforms.
Figure VIII.7 shows PGM tonnage delivered by platforms.
The most PGM tonnage was delivered against OCA targets. A factor
that can account for this is that many OCA targets were hardened
aircraft shelters and were attacked with LGBs. F-111Fs delivered in
excess of 1.7 million pounds of bombs on OCA targets. F-111Fs also
delivered the most PGM tonnage on KBX targets, which largely reflects
F-111F tank-plinking efforts using LGBs. Compared to the other
platforms, the F-117 accounted for the bulk of the PGM tonnage
delivered on C\3 , NBC, and MIB targets.
Figure VIII.7 shows that the F-15E delivered a majority of guided
bomb tonnage on Scud targets and that this was the only strategic
target category in which the F-15E contributed the majority of the
PGM tonnage. This pattern is expected because the F-15E received
most of its tasking to Scud targets and because the wing had limited
PGM capability.
Figure VIII.7: PGM Tonnage
Delivered, by Platform
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure VIII.8 shows that not only were very sizable amounts of
unguided bomb tonnage delivered against BE-numbered KBX targets, but
the unguided bomb tonnage delivered against KBX targets, relative to
the other strategic target categories, was immense.
Figure VIII.8: Unguided
Tonnage Delivered, by Platform
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Approximately 78 million pounds of unguided bombs were delivered
against ground targets located in kill boxes. Comparatively, F-16
and B-52 are the two platforms that accounted for the preponderance
of unguided bomb tonnage delivered here. B-52s accounted for
approximately 32 million pounds; F-16s approximately 31 million
pounds, at least two-thirds of the total unguided bomb tonnage
delivered on BE-numbered KBX targets. Figure VIII.8 also shows that
the B-52 accounted for the majority of unguided bomb tonnage
delivered against MIB targets.
Figure VIII.9 indicates that more unguided bomb tonnage was delivered
against targets in the MIB and OCA strategic target categories than
in the other strategic target categories.
The F-16 delivered more of the unguided bomb tonnage against
strategic targets in the C\3 , GVC, NBC, and OCA categories, and it
was second to the F-15E in unguided bomb tonnage delivered against
targets in the SCU category. Summing across all target categories
and comparing to other platforms, B-52s and F-16s accounted for the
preponderance of bombs delivered against strategic targets.
Figure VIII.9: Unguided
Tonnage Delivered, by Platform,
Excluding KBX Targets
(See figure in printed
edition.)
TARGET SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES
========================================================== Appendix IX
RADAR
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IX:1
Radar systems vary from older, low-resolution ground-mapping radars
on the F-111F and B-52 to much newer, high-resolution target
detection synthetic aperture radar on the F-15E. The basic forms of
radar are pulse and continuous-wave types. Both detect targets by
transmitting radio waves and then searching for return radio waves
reflected from those targets in order to determine information about
the location and speed of targets.
ELECTRO-OPTICAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IX:2
Electro-optical systems exist as a sensor on munitions, such as the
EO version of the Maverick missile, and as separate systems, such as
night vision goggles. EO-guided weapons carry a miniature TV sensor
or camera in the nose that senses targets that provide suitable
visible (dark or light) contrasts. Night-viewing systems operate by
magnifying the tiny amount of light available from the sky, even in
the darkest night.
INFRARED
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IX:3
Imaging infrared systems are sometimes integral to the aircraft (Pave
Tack, TRAM, and FLIR/DLIR on the F-111F, A-6E, and F-117,
respectively) and are sometimes a part of a pod or munition attached
to the exterior of the aircraft (such as LANTIRN for the F-15E and
F-16 and the IR version of Maverick on the A-10). IR systems lock
onto targets by focusing on heat sources. Imaging IR systems are
virtually infrared TV cameras, which create a heat image of a target
and then rely on signal processing to lock onto a designated part of
the heat image, rather than simply the hottest part of the image, as
nonimaging IR systems do.
OTHER SENSOR SYSTEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IX:4
Other sensor systems using the technologies discussed above were
employed in Desert Storm, and other technologies were used to
supplement, or supplant, the systems described above. These systems
were not integral to the aircraft, themselves, nor to the munitions
carried by them; they were mostly either on separate platforms used
before or concurrently with the strike aircraft, or they consisted of
additional equipment employed by pilots. In the former category were
target images provided by intelligence or reconnaissance sensors and
sometimes made available to aircrew at the mission planning stage.
Pilots of virtually all aircraft reported that receipt of such images
and target planning materials were extremely important for mission
planning, target study, and mission success, although needed
materials were often unavailable or of poor quality. Pilots of
aircraft delivering guided munitions stated this was especially true
for them because they were often tasked to attack a specific
building, or a section of a building, and they needed the aids and
cues available in target images to ensure accurate selection of the
desired aimpoint.
While hardly a technology, a key "sensor system" was human vision.
Although limited to clear weather, pilots from several aircraft
reported confidence that they could hit a target, even with unguided
bombs, as long as they could see it. At night, some pilots attempted
to target visually by using illumination flares. Varying success
with this method was reported by some A-10 and F/A-18 pilots, while
A-6E pilots said they found it nearly impossible to find targets
using flares.
Another system used by pilots, especially those in aircraft without
infrared systems (A-10 and F/A-18), was handheld binoculars during
the day and night vision goggles at night. With binoculars, pilots
reported varying levels of success in finding and identifying targets
from medium and high altitude during the day. Binoculars required
unimpeded clear weather conditions and imposed a high workload on
pilots in single seat aircraft. Pilots also reported that night
vision goggles were ineffective for identifying valid targets on the
ground at 10,000 feet or higher.
COMBAT SUPPORT PLATFORMS
=========================================================== Appendix X
RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix X:1
[DELETED] reconnaissance platforms, including TR-1As, U-2s, RF-4Cs,
RC-135s, and S-3A/Bs were deployed to the Persian Gulf theater.
Reconnaissance platforms provided support to combat aircraft by
serving as airborne intelligence collection platforms, and they could
also provide communications and electronic and photographic
intelligence on enemy targets or situations.
In Desert Storm, intelligence from reconnaissance platforms was used
for target study, to plan strike missions, and for BDA purposes.
U-2/TR-1 intelligence was used in strike missions against Scud
missile launchers, ships, Iraqi tanks, armored vehicles, and
artillery.
Before the air campaign began, airborne intelligence collectors, such
as RC-135s and U-2/TR-1s, flew near the Iraqi-Saudi border and
gathered data on the nature of the Iraqi air defense system.
SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix X:2
There were approximately [DELETED] airborne surveillance and control
platforms, comprised of E-8 JSTARS, E-3 AWACS, E-2C Hawkeye, and U.S.
Marine Corps OV-10s. Respectively, these surveillance platforms
provided early-warning surveillance for Navy aircraft carriers
(E-2C), command and control for Desert Storm air defense forces
(AWACS), identification of friend or foe (IFF) capability, and
airborne surveillance of ground targets (JSTARS). Because of the
large number of aircraft simultaneously operating during the air
campaign, AWACS was critical for IFF, [DELETED]. Marine Corps OV-10s
conducted radio relay and visual reconnaissance missions on ground
troop targets and maintained 24-hour coverage over the battlefield
once the ground war started.
Notable from the Gulf War was JSTARS, which flew its first
operational mission in Desert Storm. JSTARS collected intelligence
on the movement of Iraqi ground forces in the KTO and other parts of
the theater where ground troops were situated. [DELETED]
ELECTRONIC COMBAT PLATFORMS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix X:3
Platforms that conducted electronic combat missions or electronic
warfare in a combat-support role included EF-111s, EC-135s, EC-130s,
and EA-6B aircraft. These aircraft conducted missions that either
involved jamming of enemy radars or attempted the destruction of
radar sites with the use of HARM missiles or tactical air-launched
decoys, within the range of enemy radars, for deception purposes.
Because electronic combat support missions helped disinfect target
areas of threats to strike aircraft, they facilitated the ability of
primary strike aircraft to conduct attacks on targets.
ABCCC
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix X:4
EC-130Es served as airborne battlefield command, control, and
communication (ABCCC) combat support platforms. ABCCC was designed
to provide real-time command and control over air forces. With
ABCCC, commanders on the ground could relay real-time information on
war developments and, if necessary, ABCCC could then relay
information to aircraft, providing a near real-time response
mechanism to unfolding events. ABCCC provided support to F-15Es
operating in kill boxes by providing target deconfliction information
before bomb deliveries. ABCCC also provided real-time ATO and BDA
information to some units, which pilots pointed out as helpful to
mission planning and strike activity given the large time lags in the
formal ATO and BDA dissemination process.
THE EXPERIENCE OF F-16S AND F-117S
AT THE BAGHDAD NUCLEAR RESEARCH
FACILITY
========================================================== Appendix XI
The Air Force has repeatedly claimed that an F-117 mission against
the Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility at Osirak was a major success,
following a failed mission by F-16s. It cites this case as a prime
example of the accuracy and effectiveness of stealth aircraft with
precision munitions over conventional aircraft with unguided
munitions.
On the third day of the campaign, a large conventional daylight
strike by 56 F-16s with unguided bombs attacked the nuclear complex,
which was one of the three most heavily defended areas in Iraq. The
results were assessed as very poor. Gen. Glosson told the Congress
that, in contrast, "four nights later, we launched a third package
[of F-117s] . . . three out of four reactors were destroyed."\1
To verify the claim, we sought to answer the following questions:
What was the frequency and number of F-16 and F-117 strikes on this
target?
Were aircraft other than the F-16 and the F-117 tasked against the
target?
When did DIA report that the target was functionally destroyed?
According to DIA, the nuclear research facility was not fully
destroyed following the F-117 strikes on day 6 of the campaign. DIA
produced seven phase III battle damage assessments on the target
beginning on the second day of the campaign. The final phase III
report, which was issued on February 26, day 42 of the campaign,
concluded that the ability to conduct nuclear research or processing
at the site was severely degraded. The report, however, went on to
recommend restrikes on four DMPIs at the site--if the objective was
to totally eliminate facility functions.
As illustrated in table XI.1, F-117s conducted strikes on an
additional
7 nights following the strike on day 6, the last not occurring until
day 38.
Table XI.1
Number of Days, Total Aircraft, and
Total Bombs Employed Against the Baghdad
Nuclear Research Center During Desert
Storm
Aircra
Aircraft Air campaign days of attack ft Bombs
---------- ------------------------------------------ ------ ------
F-117 2, 3, 6, 12, 14, 19, 22, 34, 35, 38 59 84
F-16 2, 3, 5 77 170
F-111F 19 7 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis of the 37th TFW Desert Storm and Missions
databases.
As successful as the F-117 strikes may have been on day 6, an
additional 48 F-117s were tasked seven more times against the target
over the next 32 days, dropping 66 more bombs. Moreover, on day 19
of the campaign, 17 F-111Fs were tasked to strike the site.
Therefore, the scenario described by the Air Force--an unsuccessful,
large conventional package strike using unguided munitions, followed
by a successful, small package of stealth aircraft using guided
munitions--neither fully presents the results of the two missions,
nor fully presents the weight and type of effort expended to achieve
success at this target.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix XII
--------------------
\1 DOD 1992 appropriations hearings (Apr. 30, 1991), p. 490.
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix XI
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the DOD's letter dated March 28,
1996.
GAO COMMENTS
1. The acquisition of new precision-guided munitions may well
provide new capabilities that overcome the limitations observed in
Operation Desert Storm. However, the degree to which these new
munitions may overcome the limitations of existing munitions can only
be determined after rigorous operational test and evaluation of both
new and existing munitions.
2. The Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study will not fully address the
implications of our findings concerning the strengths and limitations
of guided and unguided munitions. DAWMS is an analysis of the full
range of precision-guided munitions in production and in research,
development, test, and evaluation that will determine the number and
types of precision-guided munitions that are needed to provide a
complementary capability against each target class. By analyzing
only precision-guided munitions, the study does not address the
benefits realized from 92 percent of the munitions delivered in
Operation Desert Storm. The premise of the DAWMS does not
acknowledge the ambiguous results from Desert Storm regarding
munitions effectiveness, the cost and operational trade-offs between
guided and unguided munitions, and the demonstrated preference for
unguided over guided munitions against several strategic target
categories.
3. The Precision Strike Architecture study was designed to define a
"system of systems" for precision strike by
defining the mission,
identifying the component systems,
developing a concept of operations,
facilitating opportunities for system evolution,
creating criteria for establishing choices among alternatives, and
determining costs.
The resulting architecture for precision strike is a plan that
addresses the limitations in strike capabilities demonstrated in our
report. However, the degree to which the sensor and other precision
strike shortcomings are alleviated cannot be known until a new
precision strike architecture is implemented and tested.
4. We strongly acknowledge the need to maintain a rigorous
operational test and evaluation capability to ensure that commanders,
planners, and operators are aware of both the strengths and
weaknesses of existing and new weapon systems under a variety of
combat conditions.
5. While the physical limitations of all sensors, including laser
and forward-looking infrared, may have been known before Desert
Storm, they were not necessarily fully acknowledged by DOD or its
contractors either before the conflict or in reports to the Congress
after the coalition's victory.
6. Our recommendation addresses the demonstrated intelligence
shortcomings in performing BDA and in identifying strategic targets
in Operation Desert Storm. It is not apparent that the scope of the
Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study is sufficient to address DOD's need to
cultivate intelligence sources that can identify and validate
strategic targets in future scenarios.
7. Part of the significance of the munitions use data from Desert
Storm is that it reveals patterns of use when perfect BDA does not
exist. For example, we found in Desert Storm that multiple strikes
and weapon systems were used against the same targets; more munitions
were delivered than peacetime test capabilities would indicate as
necessary; determinations of whether target objectives were met were
frequently unknown; and when objectives were met, the specific system
responsible could not be determined. These observations should
temper one of the primary expectations of the DAWMS: that a growing
inventory and increasing capabilities of weapons will reduce the
sorties required for deep attack missions.
8. We recognize that where DOD concurs with the premises of our
recommendations, it does so based on information other than the
analyses we conducted of the Desert Storm air campaign. Owing to
these differences, the solutions pursued by DOD may not fully address
the needs we perceived. Therefore, although the scope of the
specific studies and ACTDs indisputably address our recommendations,
the degree to which they result in solutions to Desert Storm
shortcomings and limitations cannot be known until the resulting
changes and innovations are operational.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
======================================================== Appendix XIII
PROGRAM EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY
DIVISION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Kwai-Cheung Chan
Winslow T. Wheeler
Jonathan R. Tumin
Jeffrey K. Harris
Carolyn M. Copper
GLOSSARY
=========================================================== Appendix 0
AIMPOINT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.1
Desired location of bomb impact on target.
AIR SUPERIORITY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.2
The degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another,
which permits operations by the former and its related land, sea, and
air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference
by the opposing force.
AIR SUPREMACY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.3
The degree of air superiority wherein the opposing force is incapable
of effective interference.
BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.4
An analysis of the damage inflicted on a target from a bombing or
missile strike.
BLACK HOLE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.5
The Special Planning Group established by Gen. Glosson in Riyadh
during Desert Shield to design the air campaign.
BREACH
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.6
To create a break or opening in a line of defenses.
CENTER OF GRAVITY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.7
The economic, military, and political pillars of an existing regime.
EFFECTIVENESS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.8
The level of functional damage achieved for a given munition or
strike.
FULLY SUCCESSFUL
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 0:0.9
A bomb damage assessment determination that the target objective was
achieved and a restrike was unnecessary.
IMAGERY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.10
Intelligence derived from visual photography, infrared sensors,
lasers, electro-optical systems, and radar sensors such as synthetic
aperture radar.
KARI
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.11
A French-design computer network for Iraq's air defense components.
(KARI is Iraq spelled backward in French.)
KILL BOX
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.12
A 30-mile by 30-mile geographic designation within the Kuwait theater
of operations in which autonomous strike operations were conducted.
LASER-GUIDED BOMB
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.13
A bomb that uses a seeker to detect laser energy reflected from a
target and, through signal processing, guides itself to the point
from which the laser energy is being reflected.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.14
Land, water, or air route that connects an operating military force
with a base of operations and along which supplies and military
forces move.
MUNITION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.15
Explosive projectiles (such as missiles) or items (such as bombs)
with a fuse.
NOT FULLY SUCCESSFUL
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.16
A bomb damage assessment determination where the target objective was
not achieved and a restrike was necessary.
OPERATION ORDER
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.17
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate
commanders to effect the coordinated execution of an operation.
OPERATION PLAN
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.18
A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried
out simultaneously or in succession.
PLATFORM
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.19
An aircraft or missile that delivers a munition to a target.
SORTIE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.20
One flight by one aircraft.
STRATEGIC TARGET
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.21
A target integral to the source of an enemy's military, economic, or
political power.
STRIKE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix 0:0.22
The delivery of munitions on one target by one platform during one
sortie.
*** End of document. ***