Navy Aircraft Carriers: Cost-Effectiveness of Conventionally and
Nuclear-Powered Carriers (Chapter Report, 08/27/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-1).
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO: (1) compared the relative
effectiveness of conventionally powered and nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers in meeting national security requirements; (2) estimated the
total life-cycle costs of conventionally powered and nuclear-powered
carriers; and (3) identified implications of an all nuclear carrier
force on overseas homeporting in Japan and overseas presence in the
Pacific region.
GAO noted that: (1) its analysis shows that conventional and nuclear
carriers both have been effective in fulfilling U.S. forward presence,
crisis response, and war-fighting requirements and share many
characteristics and capabilities; (2) conventionally and nuclear-powered
carriers both have the same standard air wing and train to the same
mission requirements; (3) each type of carrier offers certain
advantages; (4) for example, conventionally powered carriers spend less
time in extended maintenance, and as a result, they can provide more
forward presence coverage; (5) by the same token, nuclear carriers can
store larger quantities of aviation fuel and munitions and, as a result,
are less dependent upon at-sea replenishment; (6) there was little
difference in the operational effectiveness of nuclear and conventional
carriers in the Persian Gulf War; (7) investment, operating and support,
and inactivation and disposal costs are greater for nuclear-powered
carriers than conventionally powered carriers; (8) GAO's analysis, based
on an analysis of historical and projected costs, shows that life-cycle
costs for conventionally powered and nuclear-powered carriers (for a
notional 50-year service life) are estimated at $14.1 billion and $22.2
billion (in fiscal year 1997 dollars), respectively; (9) the United
States maintains a continuous presence in the Pacific region by
homeporting a conventionally powered carrier in Japan; (10) if the U.S.
Navy transitions to an all nuclear carrier force, it would need to
homeport a nuclear-powered carrier there to maintain the current level
of worldwide overseas presence with a 12-carrier force; (11) the
homeporting of a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan could face several
difficult challenges, and be a costly undertaking, because of the need
for nuclear-capable maintenance and other support facilities,
infrastructure improvements, and additional personnel; and (12) the
United States would need a larger carrier force if it wanted to maintain
a similar level of presence in the Pacific region with nuclear-carriers
homeported in the United States.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-98-1
TITLE: Navy Aircraft Carriers: Cost-Effectiveness of
Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered Carriers
DATE: 08/27/98
SUBJECT: Nuclear powered ships
Defense capabilities
Comparative analysis
Military vessels
Life cycle costs
Naval aircraft
Cost effectiveness analysis
IDENTIFIER: Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program
Japan
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy
U.S.S. Nimitz
DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
DOD Bottom-Up Review
Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier
U.S.S. Eisenhower
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
August 1998
NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS -
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF
CONVENTIONALLY AND NUCLEAR-POWERED
CARRIERS
GAO/NSIAD-98-1
Nuclear Carrier Cost-Effectiveness
(701030)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
AOE - fast combat support ship
CLF - Combat Logistics Force
CNA - Center for Naval Analyses
COH - complex overhaul
CV - conventionally powered aircraft carrier
CVBG - notional conventional battle group
CVN - nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
CVNBG - notional conventional and nuclear battle group
DFM - diesel fuel marine
DOD - Department of Defense
DOE - Department of Energy
DPIA - Docking Phased Incremental Availability
DSRA - Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability
EOC - Engineered Operating Cycle
FASAB - Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board
GAO - General Accounting Office
IMP - Incremental Maintenance Program
JFACC - joint force air component commander
JP-5 - jet fuel (Navy aircraft fuel)
NAVSEA - Naval Sea Systems Command
nm - nautical mile
NTU - New Threat Upgrade
MSC - Military Sealift Command
OPNAV - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPTEMPO - operating tempo
PERA - Planning, Engraving, Repairs, and Alterations
PERSTEMPO - Personnel Tempo of Operations
PIA - Phased Incremental Availability
QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review
RCOH - Refueling Complex Overhaul
SNF - spent nuclear fuel
SRA - Selected Restricted Availability
SLEP - Service Life Extension Program
VAMOSC - Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Cost
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-259298
August 27, 1998
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The aircraft carrier forms the building block of the Navy's forward
deployed peacetime presence, crisis response, and war-fighting
forces. The nuclear-powered carrier is the most expensive weapon
system in the Nation's arsenal and represents a significant portion
of the Navy's shipbuilding and conversion future years defense
program. As requested, this report discusses the cost-effectiveness
to the Navy of using conventionally and nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers. As the Defense Department and the Navy assess design
concepts for a new class of carriers, they will evaluate a number of
factors, including different propulsion types. This report contains
information and analysis that you may find useful in the process of
allocating future defense resources.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
Navy, Energy, and State and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request.
Please contact me on (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix VIII.
Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The Defense Appropriations Act of 1994 Conference Report directed GAO
to study the cost-effectiveness of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
The aircraft carrier forms the building block of the Navy's forward
deployed peacetime presence, crisis response, and war-fighting
forces. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) is the most
expensive weapon system in the Nation's arsenal. Pursuant to the
Conference Report, GAO (1) compared the relative effectiveness of
conventionally powered and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in
meeting national security requirements, (2) estimated the total
life-cycle costs of conventionally powered and nuclear-powered
carriers, and (3) identified implications of an all nuclear carrier
force on overseas homeporting in Japan and overseas presence in the
Pacific region.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Navy policy, doctrine, and practice have been to operate aircraft
carriers as the centerpiece of the carrier battle group. The
standard carrier battle group includes the carrier and its air wing,
six surface combatants, two attack submarines, and one multipurpose
fast combat supply ship. As a major element of a carrier battle
group, surface combatants provide the primary defensive capabilities
for the group. Navy guidance states that one or more surface
combatants are necessary at all times to escort and protect the
aircraft carrier. Collectively, the battle group's forces provide
the combatant commanders with an adequately balanced force to
offensively and defensively deal with a range of threats.
Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the Navy pursued a goal
of creating a fleet of nuclear carrier task forces. The centerpiece
of these task forces, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, would be
escorted by nuclear-powered surface combatants and nuclear-powered
submarines. In deciding to build nuclear-powered surface combatants,
the Navy believed that the greatest benefit would be achieved when
all the combatant ships in the task force were nuclear-powered. The
Navy ceased building nuclear-powered surface combatants after 1975
because of the high cost. Recently, most of the remaining
nuclear-powered surface combatants have been decommissioned early
because they were not cost-effective to operate and maintain.
The 1993 Bottom-Up Review prescribed a force of 12 aircraft carriers.
The Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 reaffirmed the need to retain
12 carriers. At the end of fiscal year 1997, the Navy's force
consisted of four conventionally powered carriers and eight
nuclear-powered carriers. One of the conventionally powered carriers
is homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, and another is in operational
reserve status.
The Navy is building two nuclear-powered Nimitz-class carriers, the
Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) and the Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), which are
scheduled to be delivered in fiscal years 1998 and 2003,
respectively. In fiscal year 2001, the Navy will begin to build the
last Nimitz-design carrier, CVN-77. These nuclear-powered carriers
will replace three of the four conventionally powered carriers now in
the force.
The U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68) begins a 3-year refueling complex
overhaul in fiscal year 1998 at an estimated cost of $2.1 billion
(then-year dollars), followed by the U.S.S. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in
fiscal year 2001 at an estimated cost of $2.3 billion (then-year
dollars). Table 1 shows the changes in the Navy's carrier force
through fiscal year 2018 based on planned service lives.
Table 1
Navy's Carrier Force Structure Plan (end
of fiscal year)
1996 1998 2003 2008 2013 2018
-------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
CV-Active Conus 2 1 0 0 0 0
CV-Japan 1 1 1 0 0 0
CV-Reserve training 1 1 1 1 1 0
================================================================================
Total conventional 4 3 2 1 1 0
================================================================================
Total nuclear 8 9 10 11 10 10
Planned carrier CVX class 0 0 0 0 1 2
================================================================================
Total 12 12 12 12 12 12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key: CV=conventionally powered carriers.
The Navy is assessing design concepts for a new class of aircraft
carriers, designated the CVX. As a part of this assessment, the Navy
will study a number of factors, including various types of
propulsion. The formal design process for CVX began in 1996. The
project received $45.7 million in fiscal year 1998 and $190.2 million
is being requested for fiscal year 1999. One of the principal
objectives of the CVX project is to reduce life-cycle costs by 20
percent. The Navy wants to begin building the first CVX-78 class
carrier in fiscal year 2006 and commission it in 2013. Not
withstanding the decision on the propulsion type for the CVX, a
majority of the Navy's carriers will be nuclear-powered for at least
the next 30 years (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Illustrative Carrier
Force Mix with CVX Carriers,
1990-2035
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
GAO studied the cost-effectiveness of nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers, including analyses of total life-cycle costs and the
implications of an all nuclear-powered fleet on overseas homeporting.
After consulting with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and Navy officials, GAO identified three principal measures
of effectiveness to evaluate the relative effectiveness of
conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers in meeting national
security requirements and objectives: (1) overseas presence, (2)
crisis response, and (3) war-fighting. GAO examined the major
assumptions and requirements used in developing overseas presence,
crisis response, and war-fighting plans and evaluated the recent
operational experience of the conventionally and nuclear-powered
carrier force. GAO also evaluated several characteristics and
capabilities of large, modern conventionally and nuclear-powered
carriers. Relying principally on Navy data, GAO examined the
historical and projected costs to acquire, operate, support,
inactivate, and dispose of conventionally and nuclear-powered
carriers such as those now in the force. Unless otherwise noted, GAO
used the Kitty Hawk/John F. Kennedy-class and the Nimitz-class
aircraft carriers in its conventionally and nuclear-powered carrier
cost-effectiveness analysis.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
GAO's analysis shows that conventional and nuclear carriers both have
been effective in fulfilling U.S. forward presence, crisis response,
and war-fighting requirements and share many characteristics and
capabilities. Conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers both have
the same standard air wing and train to the same mission
requirements. Each type of carrier offers certain advantages. For
example, conventionally powered carriers spend less time in extended
maintenance, and as a result, they can provide more forward presence
coverage. By the same token, nuclear carriers can store larger
quantities of aviation fuel and munitions and, as a result, are less
dependent upon at-sea replenishment. There was little difference in
the operational effectiveness of nuclear and conventional carriers in
the Persian Gulf War.
Investment, operating and support, and inactivation and disposal
costs are greater for nuclear-powered carriers than conventionally
powered carriers. GAO's analysis, based on an analysis of historical
and projected costs, shows that life-cycle costs for conventionally
powered and nuclear-powered carriers (for a notional 50-year service
life) are estimated at $14.1 billion and $22.2 billion (in fiscal
year 1997 dollars), respectively.
The United States maintains a continuous presence in the Pacific
region by homeporting a conventionally powered carrier in Japan. If
the U.S. Navy transitions to an all nuclear carrier force, it would
need to homeport a nuclear-powered carrier there to maintain the
current level of worldwide overseas presence with a 12-carrier force.
The homeporting of a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan could face
several difficult challenges, and be a costly undertaking, because of
the need for nuclear-capable maintenance and other support
facilities, infrastructure improvements, and additional personnel.
The United States would need a larger carrier force if it wanted to
maintain a similar level of presence in the Pacific region with
nuclear-carriers homeported in the United States.
GAO'S ANALYSIS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
CONVENTIONALLY POWERED AND
NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
To evaluate the relative effectiveness of conventionally and
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in meeting national security
requirements and objectives, GAO identified three principal measures
of effectiveness: (1) overseas presence, (2) crisis response, and
(3) war-fighting.
Using the Navy's Force Presence Model and data, GAO's analysis shows
that, on a relative basis, a force of 12 conventional carriers, when
compared to a force of 12 nuclear carriers, can provide a greater
level of overseas presence in the European Command, the Central
Command, and the Western Pacific\1 or that a force of 11
conventionally powered carriers can provide an equivalent level of
forward presence as a force of 12 nuclear-powered carriers. Because
a conventionally powered carrier's maintenance requirements are not
as stringent and complex as those of a nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier, the conventionally powered carrier spends a smaller
proportion of its time in maintenance than does the nuclear aircraft
carrier and, thus, is more available for deployment and other fleet
operations. Unified Commanders consider the quality of presence of
the two types of carriers to be the same.
Navy carriers have been tasked to respond to various crises across
the full range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance
to major theater wars. Nuclear-powered carriers are known for their
abilities to sustain long duration high-speed transits. Although
both types of carriers can transit to crisis areas at the same top
speed, the conventional carriers take somewhat longer to cover long
distances than nuclear carriers due to their need to refuel. For
example, GAO's analysis of Navy data indicates that in an 18-day
voyage from the U.S. West Coast to the Persian Gulf, a distance of
about 12,000 nautical miles, steaming at a sustained speed of 28
knots, a conventional carrier would arrive about 6 hours later than a
nuclear carrier. On a shorter voyage from the U.S. East Coast to
the eastern Mediterranean Sea, a distance of about 4,800 nautical
miles, a conventional carrier would arrive about 2 hours later than a
nuclear carrier. Neither of these two examples include the time
delay caused by refueling the other ships in the battle group, which
would have the same refueling requirements, regardless of the
carrier's propulsion.
Conventionally powered carriers can be available sooner for large
scale crises because it is easier to accelerate or compress their
maintenance. Carrier maintenance periods can be shortened by varying
degrees, depending on the stage of the maintenance being performed.\2
The degree a depot maintenance period can be shortened--or
surged--depends on when the decision is made to deploy the carrier.
For both types of carriers, the decision must be made early if the
period is to be substantially shortened. Due to the complexity of
its maintenance, a nuclear carrier's maintenance period cannot be
surged to the same degree as that of a conventional carrier. In
addition, the crews for both carrier types train to the same
standards, except for the power-plant crew, and spend comparable time
in predeployment training.
GAO found little difference in the operational effectiveness of
nuclear and conventional carriers in the Persian Gulf War. Although
the Navy had opportunities to place more nuclear carriers in the
combat zone, it followed previously planned deployment schedules. As
a result, five of the six carriers that participated in the air
campaign were conventionally powered. GAO found that the Navy
operated and supported all six carriers and their battle groups in
essentially the same manner during the conflict. Each battle group
was assigned its own dedicated support ships, which enabled frequent
replenishment of fuel and ordnance. Conventional carriers
replenished aviation fuel about every 2.7 to 3.1 days and the nuclear
carrier every 3.3 days--after only a fraction of their fuel and
supplies were exhausted. The distance to targets and the number and
mix of aircraft aboard each carrier, rather than propulsion type,
determined the number of air sorties flown. The average number of
sorties flown were nearly identical for both types of carriers when
based on the number of aircraft assigned to the respective carriers.
In comparing their characteristics and capabilities, GAO found that
the two types of carriers are similar in many respects. For example,
both carriers follow the same operational guidance; have the same
standard airwing; and, can surge to conduct additional air
operations, if necessary. The most noticeable differences are the
nuclear carrier's ability to steam almost indefinitely without
needing to replenish its propulsion fuel and its larger aircraft fuel
and ordnance storage capacity, thereby further reducing dependence on
logistics support ships. The larger storage capacity is primarily
due to design decisions that have little to do with propulsion
type.\3 Nuclear carriers still need periodic resupply of aviation
fuel, ordnance, and other supplies, and as such, remain dependent on
logistics support ships to sustain extended operations at sea.
Logistics support ships are an integral part of carrier battle groups
and accompany the groups during peacetime deployments, in crisis
response, and during wartime. Nuclear carriers also can accelerate
faster than conventional carriers, enabling them to respond faster if
conditions affecting the recovery of landing aircraft suddenly
change, but the Navy could not provide any examples where an aircraft
was lost because a conventionally powered carrier could not
accelerate in sufficient time.
--------------------
\1 An all conventionally powered carrier force and an all
nuclear-powered carrier force were used to illustrate the relative
ability of the two carrier types to fulfill peacetime overseas
deployment requirements. This analysis assumes that a carrier is
permanently forward deployed in Japan.
\2 An employment cycle typically includes three maintenance periods,
three predeployment training periods, and three deployments. For the
conventionally powered carrier, two of the maintenance periods last 3
months and the other maintenance period lasts 12 months, and for the
nuclear-powered carrier, the first two periods last 6 months and the
final period lasts 10-1/2 months.
\3 Analyses by the Naval Sea Systems Command and the Center for Naval
Analyses show that a Nimitz-class nuclear design with a conventional
propulsion system could provide equivalent aviation ordnance and fuel
capacities while retaining the same range and speed characteristics
of the current Kennedy-class conventional carrier.
LIFE-CYCLE COSTS FOR
NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIERS ARE
HIGHER THAN CONVENTIONALLY
POWERED CARRIERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Nuclear-powered carriers cost more than conventionally powered
carriers to acquire, operate and support, and inactivate. GAO
estimates that over a 50-year life, the costs of a nuclear-powered
carrier is about $8.1 billion, or about 58 percent, more than a
conventionally powered carrier (see
table 2). Historically, the acquisition cost for a nuclear-powered
carrier has been about double that of a conventionally powered
carrier. Midlife modernization\4 for nuclear-powered carriers is
estimated to be almost three times as expensive as a conventionally
powered carrier--about
$2.4 billion versus $866 million (in fiscal year 1997 dollars).\5
Table 2
Life-Cycle Costs for a Conventionally
Powered Carrier and a Nuclear-Powered
Carrier (based on a 50-year service
life)
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in billions)
Conventionally
powered Nuclear-
Cost category carrier powered carrier
------------------------------------- -------------- ---------------
Investment cost\a $2.916 $6.441
Ship acquisition cost 2.050 4.059
Midlife modernization cost 0.866 2.382
Operating and support cost 11.125 14.882
Direct operating and support cost 10.436 11.677
Indirect operating and support cost 0.688 3.205
Inactivation/disposal cost 0.053 0.899
Inactivation/disposal cost 0.053 0.887
Spent nuclear fuel storage cost n/a 0.013
======================================================================
Total life-cycle cost $14.094 $22.222
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
\a CVN investment cost includes all nuclear fuel cost; CV fuel is
included in operations and support activities.
Source: GAO's analysis.
GAO estimates that nuclear-powered carriers have cost about 34
percent more than conventionally powered carriers to operate and
support because personnel and maintenance costs are higher and
nuclear-powered carriers require unique support organizations and
activities. Personnel costs for nuclear carriers are greater because
more personnel are required for a nuclear-powered carrier,
nuclear-qualified personnel receive greater total compensation, and
they are required to complete additional training. For example, a
nuclear-powered carrier needs about 130 more personnel in its
engineering and reactor departments than are needed in the
conventionally powered carrier's engineering department. Also, each
year, nuclear-qualified officers receive up to $12,000 and nuclear
qualified enlisted personnel receive about $1,800 more than personnel
do in nonnuclear jobs.
Nuclear-powered carriers are also more costly to maintain because the
scope of work is larger and considerably more labor hours are
required. Because of the complex procedures required to maintain
nuclear power plants, shipyard workers must be specifically trained
to maintain nuclear carriers. Additionally, the materials used in
nuclear carriers must meet exacting standards and the shipyards must
have the facilities needed for the specialized work. Also, these
projects cost more because of the unique industrial base, specialized
nuclear suppliers, and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program's
exacting and stringent environmental, health, and safety standards.
Shipbuilders must follow �non-deviation� plans (i.e., no deviation
from the approved plans without government approval). An unavoidably
high cost overhead structure (engineering, quality assurance, and
production control) and costly production work are required in the
naval nuclear propulsion industry. Based on the Navy's maintenance
plans, GAO estimates that over a 50-year life, nearly 40 percent more
labor hours are needed to maintain a nuclear-powered carrier than are
required to maintain a conventionally powered carrier.
The Navy estimates that it will cost between $819 million and $955
million to inactivate and dispose of the first Nimitz-class
nuclear-powered carrier. This is almost 20 times more costly than
the $52.6 million that is estimated it will cost to inactivate and
dispose of a conventionally powered carrier. Most of the costs can
be attributed to removing contaminated nuclear equipment and
material, including the highly radioactive spent fuel.
--------------------
\4 The midlife modernization represents the service life extension
program for conventional carriers and the nuclear refueling complex
overhaul for nuclear carriers. Both investments accomplish the
common objectives of extending the operating life of the ship.
\5 The initial nuclear fuel load and its installation are included in
the acquisition cost category. The midlife modernization cost
category includes removal of the initial fuel load. It also includes
the cost of the replacement fuel load and its installation.
IMPLICATIONS OF AN ALL
NUCLEAR CARRIER FORCE ON
HOMEPORTING A CARRIER IN
JAPAN AND OVERSEAS PRESENCE
IN THE PACIFIC REGION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
Homeporting Navy ships overseas enables the United States to maintain
a high level of presence with fewer ships because the need for a
rotation base to keep forces deployed is smaller. A conventionally
powered carrier has been permanently forward deployed in Japan since
1973. Japan currently pays a substantial share of the costs for the
permanently forward deployed carrier, including all yen-based labor,
berthing and maintenance facilities improvements, and other support
costs such as housing.
The last two conventionally powered carriers, including the carrier
now homeported in Japan, will reach the end of their service lives in
the 2008 to 2018 period. The Navy will have to decide if it wishes
to change how it maintains forward presence in the Pacific region.
That is, the Navy will have to decide whether to continue the current
approach to presence in the region and design and acquire a
conventionally powered replacement carrier to homeport in Japan.
Alternately, if the Navy wished to provide the same level of presence
in the region with nuclear-powered carriers, it would need to (1)
establish a nuclear-capable maintenance facility and related
infrastructure in Japan to accommodate the nuclear-powered carrier to
be homeported there or (2) expand the force to include the additional
nuclear-powered carriers that would be necessary, but with ships
deployed from the United States.
While it would be several years before the carrier force would
undergo a complete transition to nuclear propulsion, it would also
take several years to implement any of the strategies that will allow
the United States to maintain a long-term continuous naval carrier
presence in the Pacific region.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
The Navy is assessing design concepts for a new class of aircraft
carriers. As part of this assessment, it will evaluate a number of
factors, including different propulsion types. GAO's analysis of
measures of effectiveness (forward presence, crisis response, and
war-fighting) shows that conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers
both have effectively met the Nation's national security
requirements. The analysis also shows that conventionally powered
carriers have lower total life-cycle costs. This report also
discusses the implications of a changing carrier force structure on
providing overseas presence for the Pacific region.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
The Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy, and State provided comments
on a draft of this report. DOD's comments (see app. VII) and GAO's
detailed evaluation are included in the report where appropriate.
Overall, DOD partially concurred with the report. Specifically, DOD
concurred there is a life-cycle cost premium associated with nuclear
power. However, DOD believed GAO's estimate of that premium was
overstated by several billion dollars because of what DOD believed
are analytic inconsistencies in GAO's analysis. DOD also believed
the draft report did not adequately address operational effectiveness
features provided by nuclear power.
DOD did not agree with GAO's approach of making cost-per-ton
comparisons between the two types of carriers currently in the force,
believing the conventionally powered carriers reflect 40-year old
technologies. DOD believed a more appropriate cost comparison would
include pricing conventionally and nuclear-powered platforms of
equivalent capabilities. According to DOD, any analysis of platform
effectiveness should include mission, threat, and capabilities
desired over the life of the ship. Further, it stated the draft
report did not adequately address future requirements but relied on
historical data and did not account for platform characteristics
unrelated to propulsion type. That is, many of the differences may
be explained by platform size, age, and onboard systems than by the
type of propulsion.
Congress asked GAO to examine the cost-effectiveness of
conventionally and nuclear-powered aircraft carrier propulsion. Such
an analysis seeks to find the least costly alternative for achieving
a given requirement. In this context, GAO used as the requirement
DOD's national military strategy, which is intended to respond to
threats against U.S. interests. That strategy encompasses overseas
peacetime presence, crises response, and war-fighting capabilities.
GAO used those objectives as the baseline of its analysis and
selected several measures to compare the effectiveness of
conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers. Those measures were
discussed with numerous DOD, Joint Staff, and Navy officials at the
outset. Those measures reflect the relative capabilities of each
propulsion type, including the nuclear-powered carrier's greater
aviation fuel and munitions capacity and unlimited range.
Notwithstanding the enhanced capabilities of nuclear propulsion, GAO
found that both types of carriers share many of the same
characteristics and capabilities, that they are employed
interchangeably, and that each carrier type possesses certain
advantages. GAO also found that both types of carriers have
demonstrated that each can meet the requirements of the national
military strategy. GAO's analysis shows that conventionally powered
carriers can meet that strategy at a significantly lower life-cycle
cost.
The primary reason that GAO's analysis shows a higher premium for
life-cycle costs of a nuclear-powered carrier is because different
methodologies were used. The GAO methodology compared the
investment, operating and support, and inactivation/disposal costs of
operational carriers. This approach allowed GAO to use historical
costs to the extent possible. GAO also used a cost-per-ton approach
to develop its acquisition cost estimate. This approach is an
accepted method for estimating procurement costs and has been used by
the Navy.
The GAO methodology showed that the life-cycle cost premium
associated with nuclear propulsion was about $8 billion per carrier
over a 50-year life versus about $4 billion using the Navy's
approach. GAO's and the Navy's estimated life-cycle costs for a
nuclear-powered carrier were very similar even though different
methodologies were used. However, the life-cycle cost of a
conventionally powered carrier using the two methodologies varies
significantly--$14 billion versus $19 billion. Several factors
account for the variance. For example, a different universe of ships
was used to determine the estimated cost for a Service Life Extension
Program. In estimating procurement costs, the Navy used actual labor
hours for the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), adjusted to reflect
current labor, overhead, and material rates for a nuclear
shipbuilding facility, Newport News Shipbuilding. Operating and
support costs varied, in part, because DOD used fully burdened fuel
delivery costs and a different methodology for estimating personnel
costs.
GAO believes its methodology of reviewing a historical perspective
covering a wide range of peacetime presence, crises response, and
war-fighting scenarios that both types of carriers faced during the
past
20 years is sound. A full discussion of GAO's methodology can be
found in appendix I. GAO continues to believe that this assessment
will be helpful to the Navy as it assesses design concepts for a new
class of aircraft carriers.
The Energy Department concurred with DOD's comments addressing
estimates of costs associated with nuclear reactor plant support
activities and storage of naval spent fuel. These comments and GAO's
evaluation of them are discussed in appendix VII. The State
Department noted that the entry of nuclear-powered vessels into
Japanese ports remains sensitive in Japan and there would have to be
careful consultations with the government of Japan should the U.S.
government wish to homeport a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Since World War II, the carrier battle group has been a key political
and military component in achieving the goals of presence, combining
robust crisis response capability with the firepower needed to
protect U.S. interests should a conflict erupt. These capabilities
are known and respected throughout the world, thereby reinforcing
deterrence. The aircraft carrier forms the building block of the
Navy's forces. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) is the
most expensive weapon system in the Nation's arsenal.
The Defense Appropriations Act of 1994 Conference Report directed us
to study the cost-effectiveness of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
Accordingly, we (1) compared the relative effectiveness of
conventionally powered and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in
meeting national security requirements and (2) estimated the total
life-cycle costs of conventionally powered and nuclear-powered
carriers. We also examined the implications of an all nuclear
carrier force on overseas homeporting in Japan. A conventionally
powered carrier is permanently homeported there now and operates in
the Western Pacific, but it will eventually be replaced with a
nuclear-powered carrier if the trend toward an all nuclear carrier
force continues.
BUILDING BLOCKS OF U.S.
SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE
AIRCRAFT CARRIER
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
The National Military Strategy states that the military forces must
perform three sets of tasks to achieve the military objectives of
promoting stability and thwarting aggression -- (1) peacetime
engagement, (2) deterrence and conflict prevention, and (3) fighting
and winning the Nation's wars. Accomplishing the specific tasks of
the strategy is facilitated by the two complementary strategic
concepts of overseas presence and power projection. U.S. forces
deployed abroad protect and advance U.S. interests and perform a
wide range of functions that contribute to U.S. security.
The aircraft carrier battle group, with the aircraft carrier as the
centerpiece, is the focal point for the Navy's operational strategy,
Forward. . .From the Sea. The strategy underscores the premise
that the most important role of naval forces in situations short of
war is to be engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of
preventing conflicts and controlling crises. The carrier battle
group's forward presence demonstrates the Nation's commitment to
allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, gains U.S.
familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined
training among forces of friendly countries, and provides timely
initial response capabilities. U.S. naval forces, designed to fight
and win wars, must be able to respond quickly and successfully to
support U.S. theater commanders. Forces that are deployed for
routine exercises and activities undergirding forward presence are
also the forces most likely to be called upon to respond rapidly to
an emerging crisis.
The battle group, along with its Combat Logistics Force ships,
carries a full range of supplies needed for combat, including fuel
and ammunition, which will sustain the battle group for about 30
days, depending on the tempo of operations, enough food to feed the
force for 45 days, and sufficient spare parts and other consumables
to last for more than 60 days. Moreover, forward-deployed naval
forces can draw on an established worldwide logistics pipeline,
including Combat Logistics Force ships plus over 22
strategically-located worldwide fuel storage sites, prepositioned
munitions, fuel, and other supplies. This logistics force posture
gives the U.S. Navy the ability to remain on-station as long as
required.
BOTTOM-UP REVIEW ESTABLISHES
CARRIER FORCE SIZE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The Bottom-Up Review was a 1993 evaluation of the Nation's defense
strategy, force structure, and modernization and was done in response
to the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former Soviet
Union. The review concluded that the peacetime presence provided by
the Navy's aircraft carriers was so important that even though a
force of 8 to 10 aircraft carriers could meet the military's
war-fighting requirements, the Navy needed 12 carriers (11 active
plus 1 reserve/training carrier) to provide sufficient levels of
presence in the three principal overseas theaters (the Western
Pacific, the Mediterranean Sea, and the North Arabian Sea/Indian
Ocean).
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
REAFFIRMS CARRIER FORCE SIZE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), required by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, was designed by the
Department of Defense (DOD) to be a fundamental and comprehensive
examination of U.S. defense needs from 1997 to 2015: potential
threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military
modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of
the defense program. The QDR has determined that a total force
structure of 12 carriers will allow the United States to sustain
carrier battle group deployments at a level that helps shape the
international security environment in support of the Nation's
security strategy and commitments.
To ensure that DOD continued to provide the right levels and types of
overseas presence to meet the objectives stated in its strategy, DOD
undertook a detailed examination of its overseas presence objectives
and posture in all regions. This study, conducted by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, built on the pre-QDR
work done by the Joint Staff and involved all relevant participants,
including the services and the regional Commanders in Chief. The
analysis formed the basis DOD considered in making its decisions on
the appropriate levels of presence in key regions throughout the
world.
The demands associated with maintaining an overseas presence play a
significant role in determining the size of the carrier force. To
illuminate the implications of overseas presence demands an
additional analysis was done by the QDR to examine the impact of
possible naval force structure options. Using the Navy's Force
Presence Model, a range of aircraft carrier force structures were
analyzed and compared by the QDR to the forward presence levels then
provided in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and
U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility. The analysis
concluded that a force of 11 active aircraft carriers plus one
operational Reserve/training carrier was necessary to satisfy current
policy for forward deployed carriers and accommodate real world
scheduling constraints.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
MODERN CONVENTIONALLY AND
NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
Except for their power plants, the conventionally and nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers operating in the fleet are very similar in size,
form, and function and embark the same standard air wing. As table
1.1 shows, the Kennedy-class conventional carriers and the
Nimitz-class nuclear carriers share many common attributes.
Table 1.1
General Characteristics of Modern, Large
Deck Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered
Carriers
U.S.S. John F. U.S.S. Nimitz
Kennedy (CV-67) (CVN-68)
-------------------------- ------------------ ----------------------
Displacement (full load) 82,000 tons 95,000 tons\a
Ship dimensions
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Length (overall) 1,051 ft. 1,092 ft.
Length (waterline) 990 ft. 1,040 ft.
Beam (waterline) 126 ft. 134 ft.
Beam (flight deck) 268 ft. 251 ft.
Propulsion 8 boilers/4 shafts 2 reactors/4 shafts
Shaft horse power (total) 280,000 280,000
Speed 30+ knots 30+ knots
Aircraft handling
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum density of 130 130
aircraft\b
Catapults 4 4
Elevators 4 4
Crew
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ship's company\c 3,213 3,389
Air wing 2,480 2,480
Range (unrefueled) \d 1.5 million miles
Fuel capacity (in gallons)
Aviation fuel (JP-5)\e 1.8 million 3.5 million
Ship fuel (DFM) 2.4 million N/A
Ordnance (cubic feet)\f 76-80% 94-100%
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The full load displacements of the later ships of the Nimitz-class
have increased to about 99,000 tons.
\b A carrier's total aircraft capacity is called its maximum density.
The F/A-18 equivalent is the unit of measure for calculating maximum
density. The U.S.S. Carl Vinson (CVN-70) has a maximum density of
127. (See ch. 2 for more information.)
\c Number of officers and sailors needed to operate the ship.
\d A conventional carrier's cruising range varies with its speed.
For example, maintaining a 30-percent fuel reserve, it can sail from
San Francisco to Hong Kong at 14 knots. At 28 knots, it can sail
from Singapore, across the Indian Ocean, to Bahrain in the Arabian
Gulf without refueling while maintaining the same reserve.
\e Aviation fuel (JP-5) can be substituted for ship fuel (diesel fuel
marine (DFM), also known as F-76) in surface ships.
\f Measured as a percentage of the baseline, which includes the first
three Nimitz-class carriers (CVN-68-70); later Nimitz-class carriers
have enhanced magazine protection that reduces magazine volume.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OPERATE AS
PART OF BATTLE GROUPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5
To provide a balanced force to deal with a range of threats, the Navy
employs aircraft carriers as part of a combat formation of ships--a
carrier battle group--of which, it considers the aircraft carrier to
be the focal point. The collective capabilities of the battle
group's ships allow the group to carry out a variety of tasks ranging
from operating in support of peacetime presence requirements to
seizing and maintaining control of designated airspace and maritime
areas and projecting power ashore against a variety of strategic,
operational, and tactical targets as discussed in the Policy for
Carrier Battle Groups.\1 \2 According to the policy, a battle group
can operate in environments that range from peacetime to a
�non-permissive environment characterized by multiple threats.�
The policy also established a �standard carrier battle group� that
consists of
-- one nuclear- or conventionally powered aircraft carrier;\3
-- one carrier air wing;\4
-- six surface combatants, of which at least
three are cruisers or destroyers with Aegis weapons systems,
four ships are equipped with Vertical Launching Systems that can fire
Tomahawk cruise missiles, and
ten antisubmarine warfare helicopters are collectively embarked;
-- two attack submarines, one of which is equipped with a Vertical
Launch System; and,
-- one multipurpose fast combat support ship.
The policy further states that a battle group's composition can vary,
depending on the mission needs. Figure 1.1, for example, shows ships
of the U.S.S. George Washington battle group as they transit the
Suez Canal. (President Clinton ordered elements of the battle group
to the Arabian Gulf to support U.N. efforts to compel Iraq's
compliance with U.N. resolutions.)
Figure 1.1: Elements of the
U.S.S. George Washington
(CVN-73) Carrier Battle Group
Transit the Suez Canal Toward
the Persian Gulf
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Pictured are the cruiser
U.S.S. Normandy (CG-60)
(front), the submarine U.S.S.
Annapolis (SSN 760), and the
fast combat support ship U.S.S.
Seattle (AOE-3) (rear); not
pictured, but making the
transit, are the U.S.S. George
Washington (CVN-73) and the
U.S.S. Carney (DDG-64).
Members of the George
Washington battle group
remaining in the Mediterranean
Sea include the nuclear-powered
cruiser U.S.S. South Carolina
(CGN-37), U.S.S. John Rodgers
(DD-983), U.S.S. Boone
(FFG-28), U.S.S. Underwood
(FFG-36), and U.S.S. Toledo
(SSN-769).
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Navy photo.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The ships perform various roles within the battle group. The
aircraft carrier, with its embarked air wing, is the group's
principal means of conducting offensive operations against enemy
targets. The air wing's aircraft also help defend the battle group
against air, surface, and submarine threats. The surface combatants,
with their installed missile systems, guns, and torpedoes, defend the
aircraft carrier and the rest of the battle group against air,
surface, and submarine attack. With their Tomahawk missile systems,
surface combatants can also strike enemy targets ashore. Their
embarked antisubmarine helicopters also help defend the battle group
against submarine and surface threats. The submarines provide
protection, surveillance, and intelligence support to the battle
group, and their torpedoes and Harpoon missiles contribute to the
battle group's defense against enemy submarines and surface threats.
As with the surface combatants, the submarines' Tomahawk missile
systems allows them to strike targets ashore.
The multipurpose fast combat support ship (AOE) is the only
noncombatant ship in the battle group. Its role is the underway
replenishment of the ships in the group.\5 As the battle group's
station ship, it resupplies ships with fuel (both JP-5 for the
aircraft and DFM for the ships), other petroleum products,
ammunition, provisions, and other supplies. This replenishment
allows the ships to remain at sea for prolonged periods since they do
not have to return to port to be resupplied. The AOE classes of
ships can easily cruise for sustained periods at battle group speeds,
replenishing and rearming the entire battle force. The ship has the
armament to operate as an integral part of the battle group.
--------------------
\1 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction
3501.316, Subject: Policy for Carrier Battle Groups, dated February
17, 1995.
\2 The specific tasks discussed in the policy are
surveillance/intelligence, command and control, air superiority,
maritime superiority, power projection, theater ballistic missile
defense, operations in support of the peacetime presence mission,
amphibious force operations, insertion and withdrawal of land-based
forces into uncertain and hostile environments, special operations,
combat search and rescue, mine warfare, and sustainment.
\3 The policy does not differentiate between nuclear and conventional
aircraft carriers in its discussion of a carrier battle group's
tasks.
\4 The same standard air wing is assigned to both conventionally and
nuclear-powered carriers. That wing consists of a mix of 74 fighter,
attack, electronic countermeasure, antisubmarine, search-rescue, and
surveillance aircraft. (See table 2.5 for a complete list.)
\5 When an AOE is not available, a combination of ships can be used
to carry out its role. These include oilers (AO or T-AO) and
ammunition ships (AE and T-AE). However, these other types of ships
do not carry the range of products that an AOE carries and, since
their top speeds are about 20 knots, they do not have the speed to
keep up with the other ships in the battle group at all times.
THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER'S
EMPLOYMENT CYCLE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:6
The employment operations of both types of carriers follow a typical
cycle comprised of depot-level maintenance periods and intervals
during which a carrier prepares for and deploys to overseas theaters.
As shown in
figure 1.2, the cycle normally begins with a depot-level maintenance
period. When the maintenance is completed, the carrier begins
interdeployment training, which includes training with the air
wing.\6 With the training's successful completion, the aircraft
carrier and its air wing, as part of a battle group, are ready to
deploy. Upon returning from an overseas deployment, the carrier
enters a short stand-down period during which it may be retained in a
surge readiness status--a nondeployed carrier that would be tasked to
respond to an emerging overseas crisis. After the stand-down, it
begins a maintenance period--starting a new cycle.
Figure 1.2: Aircraft Carrier
Employment Cycle
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Our analysis of Navy
data.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The length of a carrier's employment cycle, sometimes called its
maintenance cycle, depends on the carrier's propulsion type and the
maintenance strategy it uses. Each cycle typically includes three
depot-level (i.e., shipyard) maintenance periods and three
deployments. For the conventionally powered carrier, two of the
maintenance periods last 3 months and the other maintenance period
lasts 12 months; and, for the nuclear-powered carrier, the first two
periods last 6 months and the final period lasts 10-1/2 months. For
both carrier types, an 18-month operating interval, including the
6-month deployment, separates the maintenance periods.
--------------------
\6 According to a Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet official, the
carrier becomes a �surge� carrier when it successfully completes
�ship and air wing� training.
AIRCRAFT CARRIER FORCE
STRUCTURE AND ACQUISITION PLAN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:7
The number of conventionally powered aircraft carriers in the force
is diminishing. At the end of fiscal year 1997, the Navy's force
included four conventionally powered carriers and eight
nuclear-powered carriers. One of the conventionally powered carriers
is homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, and another, the U.S.S. John F.
Kennedy (CV-67), is in the Reserve Fleet. Figure 1.3 shows the
Navy's projected carrier force through fiscal
year 2020, including its refueling complex overhaul (RCOH) schedule.
(See app. VI for a complete list of hull numbers, names,
commissioning, and decommissioning dates.)
Figure 1.3: Aircraft Carrier
Force Structure for Fiscal
Years 1994-2020
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Our analysis of U.S. Navy data.
The Navy is building two Nimitz-class nuclear-powered carriers, the
Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) and the Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), which are
scheduled to be delivered in fiscal years 1998 and 2003,
respectively. In fiscal year 2001, the Navy will begin building the
last Nimitz-design nuclear-powered carrier, CVN-77, estimated to cost
over $4.4 billion (then-year dollars). The U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68)
begins its 3-year refueling complex overhaul in fiscal year 1998 at
the cost of $2.1 billion (then-year dollars), followed by the U.S.S.
Eisenhower (CVN-69) in fiscal year 2001 at the cost of $2.3 billion
(then-year dollars).
The formal design process for a new carrier class, designated the
CVX, began in 1996. The CVX project received $45.7 for fiscal year
1998 and $190.2 has been requested for 1999. Construction of the
first carrier of the new class, CVX-78, is expected to begin in 2006,
with commissioning planned for 2013. The objective of this carrier
project is to develop a class of aircraft carrier for operations in
the 21st century that (1) maintains core capabilities of naval
aviation, (2) improves affordability of the carrier force, and (3)
incorporates an architecture for change. Another is to reduce
life-cycle costs by 20 percent. The propulsion type for CVX-78 has
not yet been decided. Notwithstanding the decision on the propulsion
type for the CVX, a majority of the Navy's carriers will be
nuclear-powered for at least the next 30 years (see fig. 1.4).
Figure 1.4: Illustrative
Carrier Force Mix with CVX
Carriers, 1990-2035
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
THE NUCLEAR PROPULSION AND
AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:8
The aircraft carrier program is managed by the Navy, but all programs
having a nuclear component come under the jurisdiction of the
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, a joint Department of
Energy (DOE) and Navy organization. The Director is assigned to
design, build, operate, maintain, and manage all technical aspects of
the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Established in 1947, the
Program delivered the first nuclear-powered submarine in 1954 and the
first nuclear-powered carrier, the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65), in
1961. The U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68) was commissioned in 1975.
The Program, responsible for the cradle to grave management of all
nuclear propulsion plants in the Navy, currently manages several
laboratories, schools, shipyards, operating reactors, and vendors
(see
fig. 1.5). The Program is directly supported by two
government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories dedicated solely
to naval nuclear propulsion work, Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory and
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. The laboratories have a combined
workforce and annual budget of about 5,800 people and $625 million.
Their missions are to develop safe, militarily effective nuclear
propulsion plants and ensure the continued safe and reliable
operation of naval reactors. The missions are achieved through
continuous testing, verification, and refinement of reactor
technology.
Figure 1.5: Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program
Infrastructure
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: INEEL is the Idaho
National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Navy and DOE.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Two other DOE laboratories support the Program, the Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory Hanford Site. The Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory houses the Navy's expended core facilities.
The Navy sends expended nuclear cores from retired or refueled
reactors to that laboratory to measure fuel consumption and explore
design improvements for future reactors. Until a few years ago, the
cores were also reprocessed at the laboratory's facilities so that
uranium from the cores could be recovered and recycled. Now, the
expended fuel is held in temporary storage water tanks. The
laboratory also provides other reactor and radioactive waste
management support to the Program. The Hanford site is the ultimate
repository of reactor compartments from decommissioned nuclear ships
(less their highly radioactive expended fuel).
THE NUCLEAR POWER DEBATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:9
Propelling the Navy's aircraft carriers and surface combatants with
nuclear power has been the subject of much debate. Key issues have
been whether the cited operational advantages that nuclear power
confers offset the increased costs of nuclear-powered surface ships
and the value of battle groups composed of a mixture of
nuclear-powered and conventionally powered fossil fuel ships.
Nuclear power advocates within DOD and the Navy have cited certain
advantages to justify the nuclear-powered carrier program. They
point out that nuclear-powered carriers have larger storage areas for
aviation fuel and ordnance, can steam almost indefinitely without
having to be refueled, and have superior acceleration, thereby
enabling them to better recover aircraft. In a 1963 memorandum, the
Secretary of the Navy advocated that the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy
(CV-67) should be constructed with nuclear-power: �Increased range
and staying power, plus a reduction in vulnerability provided by
nuclear propulsion, will make naval forces much stronger and more
useful as instruments of national policy and power.�
Appendix II contains a detailed discussion of the advantages cited at
that time for nuclear power in surface ships.
Others, however, balanced their desire for the benefits derived from
nuclear propulsion against nuclear propulsion's increased costs. In
January 1960, Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations,
submitted a report on the attack aircraft carrier as part of his
testimony during congressional hearings before the House Committee on
Appropriations.\7 According to that report,
"[Nuclear power] does not provide a dramatic new mode of
operation for the carrier as it does for the submarine. It does
provide a greatly increased endurance before refueling, and the
capability for long periods of steaming at high speeds.
However, because of the aircraft fuel requirement, the tight
logistic bonds of hydrocarbon fuels for the carrier are not
severed by the use of nuclear propulsion."
"For this reason, the military tactics for aircraft carriers are
not altered nearly so drastically by nuclear power as are those
for submarines . . .
There are no misgivings about the existence of military
advantages in a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. These have
been stated before, and are still true. In light of
increasingly accurate knowledge of the additional cost, however,
these military advantages simply do not compare well with the
military potential in other needed areas which can be purchased
for this money."
In regards to the cost of nuclear propulsion, Admiral Burke, who
previously had advocated an all-nuclear surface fleet noted in 1960
that
". . . budgetary considerations have forced us to review and
weigh most carefully the inherent advantages of the
nuclear-powered carrier against the additional cost involved in
its construction. The nuclear-powered carrier would cost about
$743 million\8 more than an oil-fired carrier. We can build
into the conventionally powered carrier all of the improvements
that have gone into the nuclear-powered U.S.S. Enterprise
(CVN-65). . . except that nuclear plant. . . The funds
gained in building this CVA with a conventional rather than a
nuclear power plant have been applied in this budget to the
procurement of other badly needed ships, aircraft, and missiles
for the Navy.�\9
Even though the Navy still wanted nuclear propulsion, increasingly
scarce resources necessitated a general belt tightening; the marginal
costs of nuclear propulsion were not viewed as justifiable on the
basis of the benefits derived, particularly when other needs had to
be satisfied. The Secretary of Defense argued that the Navy could
buy about five antisubmarine surface combatants--which were needed to
defeat the grave threat posed by the expanding Soviet submarine
force--with the funds saved by buying a conventionally powered
carrier rather than a second nuclear-powered carrier.
Three decades later, the dependence of surface combatants on at-sea
replenishment remains. According to a 1992 Center for Naval Analyses
study (CNA),\10
"There seems to be little substance to the conventional wisdom
that CVNs [nuclear carriers] are less demanding logistically
than CVs [conventional carriers], and that, consequently, there
may be significant savings and profound freedoms for employment
relating to the battle force formed on the CVN. What might have
been true for an all nuclear battle force, is of little
consequence when examining an aircraft carrier accompanied by
conventionally powered escorts."
The study also concluded that
"Engaged battle forces need the support of many CLF [Combat
Logistics Force] ships. All other things being equal, the
presence of a few nuclear-powered units will not reduce the
logistic pipeline, significantly. The increased capacity for
ordnance and aviation fuel in the CVN design is not sufficient
to untether the force from the pipeline. The hoped for increase
in freedom of operational employment for CVNs is further
restricted by the fossil-fuel dependence of the accompanying
surface combatants."
--------------------
\7 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, DOD
Appropriations Bill, 1961, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2nd session, 1960.
Part 2, p. 32.
\8 The original text cited $130 million. We escalated the dollar
amount to fiscal year 1997 dollars.
\9 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, DOD
Appropriations Bill, 1961, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2nd Session, 1960.
Part 2, p. 19.
\10 Combat Logistics Force Ships for CV and CVN Battle Forces, CRM
91-257, dated February 1992.
HIGH COSTS LED NAVY TO STOP
BUILDING NUCLEAR-POWERED
SURFACE COMBATANTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:10
Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the Navy pursued a goal
of creating a fleet of nuclear carrier task forces. The centerpiece
of these task forces, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, would be
escorted by nuclear-powered surface combatants and nuclear-powered
submarines. In deciding to build nuclear-powered surface combatants,
the Navy believed that the greatest benefit would be achieved when
all the combatant ships in the task force were nuclear-powered. The
Navy ceased building nuclear-powered surface combatants after 1975
because of the high cost. More recently, most of the remaining
nuclear-powered surface combatants were decommissioned early because
they were not cost-effective to operate and maintain.
Nuclear-powered surface combatants share many of the characteristics
of the nuclear-powered carrier--unlimited high speed endurance,
sustainability, and their larger size than their sister ships. The
first nuclear-powered surface combatant was initially developed and
fielded at about the same time as the first nuclear-powered carrier,
in 1961. A total of nine nuclear-powered surface combatants were
purchased with the final ship authorized in fiscal year 1975.
Nuclear-powered surface combatants were intended to be part of all
nuclear-powered task forces, but this goal never materialized. In
1974, nuclear power seemed so promising that the Congress, in title
VIII of the DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1975, stated that
as a matter of policy all future U.S. warships intended to serve
with the strike forces should be nuclear-powered. Exceptions would
require a presidential finding that providing nuclear power was not
in the national interest. On February 13, 1976, the President
formally made a finding that constructing all nuclear surface
combatants for the strike forces was not in the national interest.
It was the Secretary of Defense's assessment that �the military value
of an all nuclear-powered Aegis ship program does not warrant the
increased costs or, alternatively, the reduced force levels.�
Further, he proposed a mixed propulsion program to provide
nuclear-powered surface combatants, which could undertake crisis
response and other operations in areas far from supply bases, and
conventionally powered Aegis ships to supplement the nuclear-powered
surface combatants in protection of high-value forces (including
carriers) under conditions of sustained conflict. However, no more
nuclear-powered surface combatants were acquired.
In fiscal year 1993, the Navy decided to decommission the newest
class of nuclear-powered surface combatants instead of refueling
them. These ships are being inactivated after an average of 17 years
of service and with nearly half of their planned service life
remaining. The decision was based on two factors--the need to reduce
force structure in order to recapitalize the force and the ships'
need for expensive nuclear refueling overhauls. Faced with declining
budgets and large fiscal requirements, the Navy determined that the
midlife modernization and upgrading through a refueling complex
overhaul were not cost-effective. Even though there would be a
near-term inactivation cost, the Navy would not incur the expense of
a more costly refueling complex overhaul. Moreover, the decision
would provide an opportunity to divest a large surface nuclear
infrastructure supporting a small ship population. Another rationale
for the decision to decommission the nuclear-powered surface
combatant force was that a decision to invest in a refueling complex
overhaul would drive retention of this force for the next 20 years.
Operationally, the nuclear-powered surface combatants are expensive,
and they are maintenance and infrastructure intensive ships.
Personnel, training, maintenance, and other supporting infrastructure
costs were more expensive than their modernized, conventionally
powered counterparts.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:11
The Defense Appropriations Act of 1994 Conference Report directed the
Comptroller General to study the cost-effectiveness of
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Overall, our objectives were to
(1) evaluate the adequacy of conventionally and nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers in meeting the Nation's forward presence, crisis
response, and war-fighting requirements and (2) estimate the total
life-cycle costs of conventionally and nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers. The conferees noted the study should include (1) a
life-cycle cost analysis, including the costs of processing and
disposing of nuclear waste and spent fuel; (2) an estimate of the
costs associated with processing and disposing of nuclear fuel and
other nuclear material for the existing nuclear-powered fleet; and
(3) the implications of an all nuclear carrier force on overseas
homeporting.
To accomplish our objectives, we met with officials in DOD, State,
and DOE and reviewed studies and reports concerning the U.S.
military strategy, policy, employment concepts, missions,
requirements, operations, characteristics, and costs relating to
conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers. We also reviewed
carrier peacetime deployment, surge, and war-fighting operations;
performed several analyses controlling for the effects of propulsion
type on conducting these operations; reviewed and evaluated
conventionally and nuclear-powered carrier cost information; and,
developed life-cycle cost estimates. (See app. I for a list of
contacts and locations visited and a more detailed discussion of the
methodology we used in our analyses.)
We performed our review in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
CONVENTIONALLY AND NUCLEAR-POWERED
CARRIERS
============================================================ Chapter 2
Our analysis indicates that conventionally powered and
nuclear-powered carriers both have been effective in meeting national
security objectives and requirements, share many characteristics and
capabilities, and that the Navy employs them interchangeably. Our
analysis shows that conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers both
have been effective in fulfilling U.S. forward presence, crisis
response, and war-fighting requirements. Both carrier types embark
the same standard air wing and train to the same mission
requirements. We also found that each carrier type possesses certain
advantages. For example, conventionally powered carriers spend less
time in extended maintenance and, as a result, can provide more
forward presence coverage. By the same token, nuclear carriers can
carry larger quantities of aviation fuel and munitions and, as a
result, are less dependent upon at-sea replenishment. Both types of
carriers in the Persian Gulf War effectively performed their
war-fighting missions.
We compared the two carrier types from the standpoints of their
ability to fulfill U.S. forward presence, crisis response, and
war-fighting requirements. Our comparison represents a historical
perspective--the experiences of the Navy over the past several years
operating a mixed force of conventionally powered and nuclear-powered
ships.\1
That perspective addresses a broad spectrum of operations that
includes providing routine peacetime presence, the Navy's response to
emerging crises such as the movement of Iraqi forces to the Kuwait
border in 1994, and the open conflict of Operation Desert Storm.
--------------------
\1 With the exception of the first nuclear carrier, the U.S.S.
Enterprise (CVN-65), the nuclear carriers operating with the fleet
have all been 90,000 ton-plus Nimitz-class ships--the Navy's most
recent carrier class. Conversely, the conventional carriers
operating in the fleets have included ships of the World War II-era
Midway-class, the first large-deck carriers of the Forrestal-class,
the subsequent Kitty Hawk-class, and the U.S.S. Kennedy (CV-67)--a
ship that was originally designed for nuclear propulsion.
BOTH TYPES OF CARRIERS HAVE
BEEN EFFECTIVE FULFILLING
FORWARD PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Both conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers are employed
overseas without consideration of propulsion type. Joint Staff and
combatant command officials told us that the quality of presence
provided by both types of carriers is indistinguishable.
Conventionally powered carriers spend a smaller proportion of their
time in depot-level maintenance than nuclear-powered carriers and,
thus, are more available for deployment to meet presence and other
fleet requirements. An all conventionally powered carrier force
could either provide a greater level of overseas presence or require
fewer carriers to meet U.S. peacetime presence requirements than
would an all nuclear-powered force.
BOTH CARRIER TYPES SATISFY
THEATER COMMANDERS' NEEDS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
The Navy has employed a mixed force of conventional and nuclear
carriers since the U.S.S. Enterprise's commissioning in 1962.
During our discussions, officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, two
unified commands, and the Navy could recall no instances since the
Enterprise's commissioning where the United States failed to achieve
its objectives because a conventionally powered carrier, rather than
a nuclear-powered carrier, was employed. Officials from the Joint
Staff and at two unified commands said that a carrier's type of
propulsion is not a critical factor in making employment decisions.
The unified command officials said that their concern is the mix and
number of aircraft on board the carrier and that both types generate
the same number of aircraft sorties--the critical purpose of the
aircraft carrier. They also said that they had never specifically
requested the scheduling and deployment of a nuclear-powered, rather
than a conventionally powered, aircraft carrier.
Overseas presence promotes regional stability by giving form and
substance to the Nation's bilateral and multilateral security
commitments and helps prevent the development of power vacuums and
instability. It contributes to deterrence by demonstrating the
Nation's determination to defend U.S., allied, and friendly interests
in critical regions and better positions the United States to respond
rapidly to crises. The presence posture enhances the effectiveness
of coalition operations across the spectrum of conflict by promoting
joint and combined training, encouraging responsibility sharing on
the part of friends and allies, and facilitating regional
integration.
The Pacific Command uses a �Forward Presence Matrix� as part of its
cooperative engagement strategy for the Pacific Region. The matrix
outlines the Command's goals and states how it intends to achieve
them, including port visits, exercises with foreign navies,
Navy-to-Navy talks, personnel exchanges, and community relations
projects. According to Command officials, the matrix makes no
distinction between conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers--it
is not an important issue--the only issue is having a carrier as a
tangible indicator of U.S. presence.
Unified command and Navy officials could not identify any instances
where a presence mission or operation was adversely affected because
a conventional rather than a nuclear carrier responded. However,
many officials believed that a nuclear-powered carrier could respond
more quickly over long distances and that because a commander is not
concerned about the ship's fuel consumption, a nuclear-powered
carrier can �just do it.�
CONVENTIONALLY POWERED
CARRIERS ARE MORE AVAILABLE
DUE TO THEIR LESS DEMANDING
MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
Because their maintenance requirements are not as stringent and
complex as those of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, conventional
aircraft carriers spend a smaller proportion of their time in
maintenance than do nuclear aircraft carriers and, thus, are more
available for deployment and other fleet operations.
During their service lives, aircraft carriers progress through a
maintenance cycle of alternating operating intervals and depot-level
maintenance periods.\2 In addition to the normal depot maintenance
periods, nuclear-powered carriers must complete a refueling complex
overhaul (RCOH) midway through their service lives.\3 While the
conventional carriers do not have a similar requirement, during the
1980s and early 1990s, six underwent modernization, five of which had
their service lives extended through the Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP).\4 Given the large scope of its 1993 comprehensive
overhaul and its expected service life, we included the U.S.S. John
F. Kennedy (CV-67) among the six carriers.\5
We compared the proportion of time the two carrier types spent in
depot-level maintenance from October 1984 through December 1996 and
found that, collectively, the ships of each type spent about 30
percent of their time undergoing depot-level maintenance. However,
during that time, three conventional carriers underwent a SLEP while,
because of their relatively short times in service, none of the
Nimitz-class nuclear carriers were refueled.\6 When we adjusted the
data to reflect the time they would typically have spent in an
overhaul, the conventional carriers would have collectively spent 24
percent of their time in depot-level maintenance--about 6 percent
less time than did the nuclear carriers with complex overhauls.
The difference between the two carrier types is generally consistent
with their notional (planned) maintenance cycles. Figure 2.1 shows
the notional (planned) maintenance cycle for conventional carriers
extends over
72 months. The Nimitz-class nuclear carriers have been maintained
within the parameters of an Engineered Operating Cycle (EOC), which,
in its current form, extends over either 102 or 108 months, depending
on the length of the overhaul at the end of the cycle. However, the
Navy is changing the Nimitz-class maintenance cycle to an Incremental
Maintenance Program (IMP), which will reduce the cycle time to
76.5 months.
Figure 2.1: Comparison of
Nuclear and Conventional
Aircraft Carrier Maintenance
Cycles
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Navy data.
Because less depot-level maintenance is needed, conventionally
powered carriers would be available for fleet operations about 5
percent more than nuclear carriers during a single maintenance cycle.
As table 2.1 shows, this is consistent with the adjusted data for the
October 1984 through December 1996 period.
Table 2.1
Notional Carrier Maintenance Cycles
(Percent of time)
Single maintenance
cycle\a Over service life\b
---------------------- ----------------------
Available In depot Available In depot
for maintenanc for maintenanc
Type operations e operations e
---------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
CV 75 25 74 26
CVN\c
EOC 69 31 \d \d
IMP 71 29 69 31
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Based on one cycle, as shown in figure 2.1.
\b Our analysis assumed a carrier's service life is to be 50 years
for either conventional or nuclear power. The depot-level
maintenance includes a SLEP for the conventional carriers and a RCOH
for the nuclear carriers.
\c All data is for Nimitz-class only and does not include U.S.S.
Enterprise (CVN-65).
\d Not calculated.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
--------------------
\2 Depot-level maintenance is normally performed in naval shipyards,
private shipyards, or ship repair facilities. In addition to
completing necessary repairs, modifications and alterations are made
that improve the ships' capabilities. Because the procedures to
maintain nuclear power plants are complex shipyard workers must be
specifically trained to maintain nuclear carriers. Additionally, the
materials used in nuclear carriers must meet exacting standards and
the shipyards must have the facilities for the specialized work.
\3 During a nuclear reactor's operation, the nuclear material in the
core splits or is �burned� as part of the fission process that
produces the heat that generates the steam that powers the ship.
Consequently, the core becomes progressively less efficient in
generating the required heat and, therefore, at some point, must be
replaced. Generally, a Nimitz-class carrier should be refueled after
it has been in service for about 23 years, during the third complex
overhaul (COH) or the fourth Docking Phased Incremental Availability
(DPIA). Practically, the ship's operating tempo will also affect
when it is refueled. In developing its maintenance schedules the
Navy plans for a 32-month refueling period.
\4 The objective of a SLEP was to restore and preserve the carrier's
mission capabilities so that it could remain a first-line, battle
group ship for up to 45 years of service. The modernizations
averaged 32 months--ranging from 24 to 42 months.
\5 The Kennedy now has a longer projected service life than the
average of the carriers with a SLEP.
\6 We did not include the Forrestal's SLEP in this adjustment since
it did not occur entirely within our time period.
CONVENTIONALLY POWERED
CARRIER FORCE COULD PROVIDE
MORE OVERSEAS PRESENCE THAN
A LIKE-SIZED NUCLEAR FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3
An all conventionally powered carrier force could either provide a
greater level of overseas presence or require fewer carriers to meet
U.S. peacetime presence requirements than would an all
nuclear-powered force. Providing the carriers needed to meet U.S.
forward presence objectives in peacetime is an important determinant
of the Navy's carrier force structure. In its 1993 Bottom-Up Review,
DOD concluded a force of 10 aircraft carriers could meet the
military's war-fighting requirements, but it retained 12 carriers (11
active carriers plus 1 deployable training carrier) to meet the
larger peacetime forward presence requirements in the three principal
overseas theaters.\7 (Those theaters include the Western Pacific,
Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Mediterranean Sea.) Currently, these
carriers provide substantial, although not continuous presence.\8 The
Global Naval Force Presence Policy sets priorities and provides
scheduling guidance.
--------------------
\7 DOD's report on the recently completed Quadrennial Defense Review
stated that the Navy would maintain a force of 12 aircraft carrier
battle groups.
\8 DOD's Bottom-Up Review concluded that, with a 12-carrier force,
the Navy could provide full-time coverage in one of the three regions
while there would be a minimum of a 2-month gap in coverage during a
year in each of the other two regions. According to the Global Naval
Force Presence Policy, during gaps, a carrier battle group in another
theater must be able to reach the "gapped" theater within a specified
time frame.
GLOBAL NAVAL FORCE
PRESENCE POLICY
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:1.3.1
During peacetime, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, service
chiefs, and chiefs of the five unified geographic commands establish
long-range planning guidance for the location and number of U.S.
naval forces assigned to all regions on a fair-share basis.\9 This
scheduling guidance--Global Naval Force Presence Policy--can be
adjusted, as necessary, to meet unexpected contingencies. This
policy results in planned gaps in various theaters, particularly in
the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The policy represents a
balanced distribution of naval assets while preserving personnel
policy objectives. The policy does not differentiate between
conventional and nuclear carriers.
The naval forward presence requirements articulated by the Commanders
in Chief of the European, Central, and Pacific Commands largely
determine how the Navy deploys to meet its global commitments. The
commanders base their requirements on the strategic objectives set
for their theaters by the National Command Authorities\10
and the strategic situation in their theaters. According to a Navy
doctrinal publication, "Overseas presence promotes national influence
and access to critical global areas, builds regional coalitions and
collective security, furthers stability, deters aggression, and
provides initial crisis-response capability." The commanders believe
that sustained, forward deployed, combat ready forces are vital to
achieving these goals and are critical to ensuring timely crisis
response.
In its August 1994 assessment, Naval Forward Presence Report, DOD
analyzed peacetime presence options for naval forces to meet the five
geographic unified commands' unconstrained requirements for naval
presence. It concluded that the unified commands' naval force
requirements generally exceeded the levels of available assets. The
report stated that
"the totality of this set of all-encompassing requirements is
beyond what could be reasonably covered by naval forces alone,
it is a representation of the broad scope of presence missions
confronting the theater commander" and that "any exercise in
determining alternative force structures must necessarily
account for other service contributions . . . ."
The assessment also stated that the most important overseas presence
requirements can be met through a range of measures, including
"tethers,"\11 other service forces, and greater acceptance of
periodic presence in some cases. Changing assumptions, such as
operating tempo, availabilities, and originating ports and
destinations, can also alter conclusions about force requirements.
The Navy has periodically assessed naval force requirements using a
model to calculate the total force necessary to meet the unified
commands' presence requirements for given assumptions and inputs.
The Navy deploys one carrier battle group and one amphibious ready
group with an embarked, special operations-capable Marine
expeditionary unit for a substantial portion of each year in the
three theaters. According to the presence policy, if neither a
carrier battle group nor an amphibious group is near an unfolding
crisis, an equivalent force can be deployed to the vicinity on short
notice from another theater.
An important constraint that bounds the ability to employ carriers in
support of forward presence is Personnel Tempo of Operations
(PERSTEMPO). The Navy initiated the PERSTEMPO Program in 1985 to
balance support of national objectives with reasonable operating
conditions for naval personnel, coupling the professionalism
associated with going to sea with a reasonable home life. The
Program is built around the following goals:
-- a maximum deployment length of 6 months,
-- a minimum turn around ratio of 2.0:1 between deployments, and
-- a minimum of 50 percent time in homeport for a unit over a
5-year cycle.
The importance the Navy places on meeting PERSTEMPO goals is found in
the presence policy that states that in scheduling carriers to meet
these presence requirements, "CNO Perstempo goals remains inviolate."
--------------------
\9 There are a total of nine unified combatant commands, five of
which are called geographic unified commands, or theater commands.
The five theater commands are the Atlantic, Central, European,
Pacific, and Southern Commands. The commanders in chief of these
commands are responsible for all operations within their designated
geographic areas.
\10 The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly
deputized alternates or successors constitute the National Command
Authority.
\11 Tether refers to the practice of maintaining ships at acceptable
distances away from a specific area of presence operations while
allowing them to return within a specified number of days. The
tethered presence policy is a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
DOD policy that is supported by funding in the fiscal year 1998
budget and the Future Years Defense Program for fiscal years 1998
through 2003. This policy results in lower force level requirements
than those needed to support continuous presence in all three major
regions.
CALCULATING AIRCRAFT
CARRIER OVERSEAS PRESENCE
REQUIREMENTS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:1.3.2
Our analysis of force requirements estimates for overseas presence,
derived from the Navy's Force Presence Model, shows an all
conventional carrier force could either provide a greater level of
overseas presence or require fewer carriers to meet U.S. peacetime
presence requirements than would an all nuclear carrier force.\12
Several variables enter into the equation that calculates the carrier
force level required to attain a level of peacetime presence. These
variables include the time spent in depot-level maintenance, the
restrictions imposed by the PERSTEMPO policy, the distance carriers
must transit from their U.S. homeports to the overseas theater, the
speed of the transit, and the length of deployment. Depot-level
maintenance time is the single distinguishing variable when
calculating conventionally and nuclear-powered carrier requirements.
As table 2.2 shows, an all conventional carrier fleet generally could
provide about 9 percent more presence coverage--an average of
32 days--in the European and Central Commands, while providing
full-time coverage in the Western Pacific, than could an all nuclear
fleet.
Table 2.2
Presence Coverage Provided by Deployable
Forces of 12-, 11-, and 10-Conventional
and Nuclear Carriers
Annual presence coverage\a
--------------------------------------
All conventional
force All nuclear force
------------------ ------------------
Deployable carriers\b Days Percent Days Percent
------------------------------ -------- -------- -------- --------
12 369 101 336 92
11 336 92 303 83
10 303 83 274 75
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Coverage provided to both the European and Central Commands over
the course of a year. Includes a carrier homeported in Japan
providing full-time presence in the Western Pacific. This example
assumes that a nuclear-powered carrier can be permanently forward
deployed in Japan. (Ch. 4 discusses the implications of this
assumption in greater detail.)
\b An additional carrier would be added to the above levels for each
one that is in SLEP or RCOH or that serves as a dedicated training
carrier.
Source: Our analysis using the Force Presence Model.
Table 2.3 shows the results of our analysis of the comparative number
of carriers needed to provide various levels of overseas presence.
Our estimates indicate that an all conventional carrier fleet
generally needs about one less carrier to provide presence in the
European and Central Commands and the Western Pacific than would an
all nuclear fleet.
Table 2.3
Number of Deployable Carriers Required
to Provide 100, 80, and 60 Percent
Presence Coverage
100 Percent\a 80 Percent\a 60 Percent\a
-------------------- -------------------- --------------------
CVN CVN CVN
-------------- -------------- --------------
CV EOC\b IMP\c CV EOC\b IMP\c CV EOC\b IMP\c
-- -- ---- ------ ------ -- ---- ------ ------ -- ---- ------ ------
Nu 12 13 13 10 11 11 8 9 9
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
a
r
r
i
e
r
s
\
d
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Percentage of time a carrier is present in European and Central
Commands' areas of responsibility. Totals include the one carrier
homeported in Japan, providing 100-percent presence coverage to the
Western Pacific, regardless of propulsion type. (See ch. 4 for more
information.)
\b Nuclear carrier maintained under the EOC strategy.
\c Nuclear carrier maintained under the IMP strategy.
\d Rounded up to the next whole carrier. An additional carrier would
be added to the above levels for each one that is in a SLEP or a RCOH
or that serves as a dedicated training carrier.
Source: Our analysis using the Force Presence Model.
Neither the number of deployable carriers shown in table 2.2 nor the
totals shown in table 2.3 provide for such needs as a training
carrier or take into account extended maintenance periods such as
nuclear carrier refuelings or conventional carrier service life
extensions.\13 \14 Meeting those needs could require an additional
one or two carriers.
To minimize any factors other than propulsion type that could
influence the number of carriers needed to provide forward presence,
we based our calculations on the Navy's standard transit distances
and the standard fixed transit speed of 14 knots.\15 The only delay
we included in the transits was a 1-day delay for transiting the Suez
Canal where appropriate.\16 The total requirement for the European
and Central Commands is based on the assumption that Atlantic and
Pacific Fleet ships would meet the presence requirements of those two
Commands in the same proportion as they are currently scheduled for
in the 1996 to 2000 time frame. We used the Navy's notional values,
as inputs for operation cycle length (IMP cycle for nuclear
carriers), deployment length, number of deployments per cycle, and
overhaul length.
--------------------
\12 The Navy uses this model to estimate the number of ships needed
to provide overseas presence under specific conditions.
\13 The Navy considers that it needs one carrier to meet the needs of
the pilot training pipeline and to fill occasional gaps in its
ability to meet peacetime presence requirements with the other
carriers, as demonstrated by the Kennedy's recent deployment.
\14 One conventional carrier was nearly continuously in SLEP while
that program was underway. As the nuclear carrier fleet ages into
the 21st Century, a similar situation will exist from a refueling
overhaul standpoint.
\15 Our calculations assume that the carriers are homeported in
Norfolk, Virginia, and San Diego, California.
\16 This delay occurred when an Atlantic Fleet carrier entered the
Central Command's area of responsibility or when a Pacific Fleet
carrier provided presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
SEVERAL FACTORS AFFECT THE TIME
NEEDED FOR THE CARRIER FORCE TO
RESPOND TO A CRISIS OR MAJOR
THEATER WAR
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
Several factors affect how quickly both types of carriers can respond
to a crisis or mobilize for a major theater war. One factor is the
speed the carrier and its accompanying battle group can maintain
during their voyage to the crisis. Another factor is the degree to
which any on-going depot-level maintenance periods and training
periods can be shortened to accelerate deployment of the carrier.
NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIER'S
UNLIMITED HIGH SPEED RANGE
REDUCES TRANSIT TIMES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
Because nuclear-powered carriers do not need to slow for underway
replenishment of propulsion fuel, they can transit long distances
faster than can conventional carriers. Even though both types have
similar top speeds, a conventional carrier normally slows to a speed
of about 14 knots during underway replenishment. Our analysis showed
that a conventional carrier, steaming at 28 knots, would arrive about
6 hours later than a nuclear carrier on a 12,000-nautical mile (nm)
voyage (the distance from San Diego, California, to the Persian Gulf)
and would have been refueled three times. On a 4,800-nautical mile
voyage (the distance from Norfolk, Virginia, to the eastern
Mediterranean Sea), the conventional carrier, steaming at 28 knots,
would arrive about 2 hours later than a nuclear carrier. As table
2.4 shows, in most cases, a nuclear carrier completes a transit more
quickly than does a conventional carrier.
Table 2.4 compares carrier transit times only. Carriers being
escorted by conventionally powered surface combatants would transit
more slowly because of the escorts' need to replenish more
frequently. As a result, the overall transit speeds of both types of
carrier battle groups would be slower than those shown, if all of the
ships in the battle group were to arrive in the same vicinity at
about the same time. A comparison of transit times of nuclear and
conventional carriers that have responded to several crises in this
decade is presented in appendix IV.
Table 2.4
Comparison of Nuclear and Conventional
Carrier Transit Times
Transit time
(days)
--------------
Transi
t
speed CV
(knots refuelin
Transit distance (nm) ) CVN CV\a gs\b
------------------------------------ ====== ------ ------ --------
4,800 (Norfolk, Va., to th
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 10.0 10.0 0
24 8.3 8.4 1
28 7.1 7.2 1
8,600 (Norfolk, Va., to th Canal)\c
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 17.9 18.0 1
24 14.9 15.0 1
28 12.8 13.0 2
12,000 (San Diego, Calif., Gulf)\c
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 25.0 25.1 2
24 20.8 21.0 2
28 17.9 18.1 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Transit time is based on the conventional carrier slowing to 14
knots for the duration of each refueling.
\b The number of refuelings required is based on refueling the
conventional carrier when its propulsion fuel level reaches 30
percent of capacity.
\c This distance is to the central part of the Gulf.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Figure 2.2 shows an oiler providing simultaneous replenishment with a
Spruance-class destroyer and the nuclear-powered carrier
U.S.S. George Washington (CVN-73) while transiting the Atlantic
Ocean.
Figure 2.2: An Oiler Providing
Simultaneous Replenishment to a
Surface Combatant and the
Nuclear-Powered Carrier U.S.S.
George Washington (CVN-73)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Navy photo.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
A CONVENTIONALLY POWERED
CARRIER CAN MORE EASILY
SURGE FROM MAINTENANCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2
If a carrier is required in an emergency, maintenance periods can be
shortened by varying degrees, depending on the stage of the
maintenance being performed. Navy officials said that it is easier
to shorten the conventional carriers' maintenance periods than it is
for those of the nuclear carriers and that this is an important
factor governing the carriers' ability to respond to a major crisis.
The degree to which a carrier undergoing depot-level maintenance can
be �surged� for deployment by shortening that maintenance period
depends on how much of the period has been completed when the surge
decision is made. For both types of carriers, the decision must be
made early if the period is to be substantially shortened. However,
Navy officials said, and documents show, that due to the complexity
of its maintenance, a nuclear carrier's maintenance period cannot be
shortened to the same degree as that of a conventional carrier.
Also, a nuclear carrier's refueling overhaul cannot normally be
shortened or accelerated since rushing the process would be neither
economical nor prudent from a safety standpoint.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the degree to which a conventional aircraft
carrier can be surged out of an ongoing Selected Restricted
Availability (SRA) and a nuclear aircraft carrier can be surged out
of an ongoing Phased Incremental Availability (PIA) when the decision
to do so is made at various times during the normal duration of those
maintenance periods. The periods can be substantially shortened only
if the decision is made early in the maintenance periods.
Maintenance on both carrier types could be considerably curtailed if
less than 15 percent of the scheduled maintenance time had been
completed. However, a nuclear carrier's maintenance would normally
proceed to its normal completion after about 33 percent of its
scheduled maintenance had been completed, while a conventional
carrier could complete up to 40 percent of its maintenance before
proceeding to its normal completion. The figure also shows that a
conventional carrier undergoing an SRA could be available to the
fleet much quicker in an emergency than a nuclear carrier undergoing
a PIA.
Figure 2.3: Comparative
Ability to Surge From an SRA
and a PIA
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the difference in the ability between a
conventional carrier undergoing a COH and a nuclear carrier
undergoing a DPIA to surge from maintenance. Again, the decision to
accelerate the maintenance period must be made early--before 15
percent is completed--if it is to be substantially shortened.
Additionally, the periods will proceed to normal completion after
about 33 and 40 percent of the nuclear and conventional carriers'
maintenance periods, respectively, have been completed.
Figure 2.4: Comparative
Ability to Surge From a COH and
a DPIA
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
As the two figures show, while a conventional carrier can be more
easily surged out of an SRA than a nuclear carrier can be surged out
of a PIA, the reverse is true when a carrier is in either a COH or a
DPIA. However, as figure 2.1 shows, SRAs and PIAs are the most
common types of depot maintenance periods. Thus, from an overall
depot-level maintenance standpoint, conventional carriers could more
readily mobilize in response to a major crisis.
BOTH TYPES OF CARRIERS TRAIN
TO COMMON REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.3
The degree to which interdeployment training can be compressed is
unrelated to a carrier's type of propulsion. Crews of nuclear and
conventional carriers undergo the same interdeployment training
except for training specifically related to the power plants. Two
important factors in compressing interdeployment training are an air
wing's proficiency and the turnover in the ship's crew since the last
deployment.
The Navy's Aircraft Carrier Training and Readiness Manual, which does
not differentiate between nuclear and conventional carriers,
describes the interdeployment training cycle. The cycle progresses
through three phases of training--unit, ship and air wing, and battle
group. The cycle also includes other activities such as in-port
periods and preparation for deployment. Despite the common training
program, our analysis of interdeployment cycle data since fiscal year
1984 shows that interdeployment training periods of conventional
carriers have averaged 9.8 months while those of nuclear carriers
have averaged 10.6 months.
CONVENTIONALLY AND
NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIERS WERE
BOTH EFFECTIVE IN THE PERSIAN
GULF WAR
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
The Navy generally adhered to peacetime carrier deployment and
maintenance schedules that had been established before Iraq invaded
Kuwait and did not take any special actions to ensure a greater
nuclear carrier presence during Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. Our review of data summarizing carrier operations and support
during Desert Storm showed that both types of carrier were effective
in their war-fighting missions. Details about the carriers'
participation in Desert Storm are contained in appendix V.
Given the presence of U.S. Air Force and allied aircraft, geographic
constraints, and the relatively benign threat environment in the
Persian Gulf and Red Sea carrier operating areas, Desert Storm may
not be representative of the type of conflict in which nuclear
carriers could demonstrate any of its operational advantages over
conventional carriers. However, Desert Storm represents the most
extensive and extended combat use of carrier aviation since the
Vietnam conflict--before nuclear carriers comprised a significant
portion of the U.S. carrier fleet. Additionally, it is the
prototype of one of the two major theater wars or dangers that have
been, and continue to be, a key element of U.S. military policy
since the demise of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Navy doctrine
states the future role of naval forces has shifted from the Cold
War-era independent blue-water, open-ocean naval operations on the
flanks of the Soviet Union to a new emphasis on joint littoral
operations in an expeditionary role against regional challenges.
Thus, the nature of Desert Storm portends the types of conflict in
which U.S. forces expect to be engaged in the foreseeable future.
PRE-ESTABLISHED CARRIER
SCHEDULES WERE FOLLOWED TO
RESPOND TO DESERT
SHIELD/DESERT STORM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
According to DOD's April 1992 report to the Congress entitled Conduct
of the Persian Gulf War, during the first 2 months after the Iraqi
invasion, the Commander in Chief, Central Command, believed there was
a "window of vulnerability" when it was uncertain whether Coalition
forces could defeat an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. As shown in
figure 2.5, carriers generally deployed, returned from deployment,
and began maintenance as scheduled during this period.
Figure 2.5: Comparison of
Previously Planned Carrier
Deployments With Actual Desert
Shield/Storm Deployments
(See figure in printed
edition.)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note 1: Carriers' names highlighted in bold participated in Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.
Note 2: This schedule does not include either the Kitty Hawk (CV-63)
which was undergoing Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) during the
entire period, or Constellation (CV-64) which entered SLEP on July 1,
1990.
Note 3: Planned deployment dates reflect the first day of the month
when the deployment is to start, and the last day of the month when
the deployment is to end.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
The Navy had several opportunities for a greater nuclear carrier
presence in Desert Shield/Desert Storm but followed established
deployment and maintenance schedules, as discussed below.
-- The U.S.S. Eisenhower (CVN-69) was well into a scheduled
6-month deployment when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Eisenhower
entered the Red Sea on August 8th, remaining for 16 days, until
relieved by the
U.S.S. Saratoga (CV-60). Instead of being retained in theater
during the initial period of uncertainty and concern following
the invasion, the Eisenhower immediately departed for Norfolk
and began shipyard maintenance in late October. Two
conventionally powered carriers, the U.S.S. Kennedy (CV-67) and
the Saratoga, were deployed for 7-1/2 months throughout all of
Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
-- The U.S.S. Carl Vinson (CVN-70) returned from a 6-month
deployment on July 31, 1990, just 2 days before the Iraqi
invasion. According to the Navy's tactical training manual,
"Selected units [ships] returning from deployment can be
retained for a period in a surge readiness status to meet
contingency requirements." Instead, nonessential materials and
supplies were offloaded during August and September, and the
ship began a complex overhaul on September 29, 1990, lasting
until April 1993.
-- The U.S.S. America (CV-66) completed shipyard maintenance on
August 2nd, the day of the Iraqi invasion, and underwent a
significantly compressed 5-month training period, deploying for
the war in
December 1990. In contrast, the U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68), which
had completed scheduled shipyard maintenance in April 1990, was
used to qualify Reserve and student pilots in carrier landings
for most of August and spent all of September and most of
October in port in Bremerton, Washington. The ship did not
deploy until February 25, 1991, 3 days before the end of the
war.
-- The U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65) arrived in Norfolk in March
1990, after completing a 6-month around-the-world deployment
from Alameda, California. From the time of its arrival in
Norfolk until the start of a RCOH in January 1991, the ship
spent over 7 months in port, and about 1 month at sea conducting
carrier landing qualifications and independent steaming
activities. The Enterprise became nonoperational on August 15,
1990, less than 2 weeks after the Iraqi invasion, when the crew
began removing everything not needed for the overhaul, which
lasted over 3-1/2 years.
Ultimately, the Navy deployed six carriers to fight in Desert
Storm--the nuclear-powered U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and
five conventionally powered carriers: the World War II vintage
U.S.S. Midway (CV-41), the U.S.S. Saratoga (CV-60), the U.S.S.
Ranger (CV-61), the
U.S.S. America (CV-66), and the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67).
LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF ALL
CARRIERS WAS COMPARABLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
The Navy operated and supported all six carriers in essentially the
same manner. Each carrier battle group was assigned its own
dedicated support ships, which enabled frequent replenishment of fuel
and ordnance.
All carriers were replenished about every 3 to 3-1/2 days, well
before fuel and ordnance reached critical levels. Using Center for
Naval Analyses-generated fuel and ordnance consumption rates, we
estimate that the nuclear-powered U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
expended about 8 percent of its jet fuel and 2 percent of its
ordnance per day, while the conventional carriers expended about 15
percent of their jet fuel and 5 percent of their ordnance per day.
It is our observation that the carriers were resupplied whenever the
opportunity arose, in accordance with naval doctrine, to maintain a
high state of readiness.
AIR OPERATIONS WERE
COMPARABLE AMONG THE
CARRIERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3
The distance to targets and the number of aircraft assigned to each
carrier were primarily responsible for the differences in sorties
launched by each carrier. Carriers operating in the Persian Gulf
generated more missions than the Red Sea carriers because they were
considerably closer to their targets. While the Roosevelt launched
more sorties than any other carrier, it, along with the Kennedy, had
the most aircraft assigned aboard (78). The Roosevelt operated in
the Persian Gulf, while the Kennedy operated in the Red Sea. In
contrast, two other Persian Gulf carriers, the Midway and the Ranger,
had only 56 and 62 aircraft, respectively. When sorties were
averaged based on the number of aircraft assigned, each of the
Persian Gulf carriers averaged about 53 sorties per aircraft.
None of the carriers operated around-the-clock. Instead, they
rotated on an operating schedule that would enable them to have
intervals of off-duty time for rest and replenishment. When sorties
were analyzed based on operating days, the Roosevelt averaged 106
sorties per day compared to 89 for the Midway. However, the latter
had 22 fewer aircraft aboard. When the number of assigned aircraft
was considered, the Midway led all carriers with an average of 1.59
sorties per aircraft per operating day, followed by the Ranger with
1.41 sorties, and the Roosevelt with 1.36 sorties.
CONVENTIONALLY AND
NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIERS SHARE
MANY SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS
AND CAPABILITIES BUT DIFFER IN
OTHERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
Even though the nuclear carriers are newer and larger than the
conventional carriers, the two ship types have several common
characteristics and capabilities. They are similar in that they
-- are subject to the same operational guidance;
-- carry the same number and types of aircraft in their air wing
and can generate the same number of sorties;
-- have top speeds in excess of 30 knots;
-- do not differ with respect to their survivability; and
-- can produce adequate supplies of fresh water.
However, there are some differences. For example, nuclear carriers
-- have larger storage areas for aviation fuel and ordnance and
-- are better able to recover landing aircraft due to their
superior acceleration.
The similarities in these key features have allowed the Navy to
employ both types of carriers interchangeably for routine deployments
overseas and employment in contingency operations.
OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE DOES
NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
CARRIER TYPES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1
When establishing the required capabilities of aircraft carriers,
providing operational guidance, and preparing plans for employing
them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commanders, and the Navy do
not distinguish between conventional and nuclear carriers. Both
carrier types are expected to carry out the same tasks, operate under
similar conditions, and are allocated to peacetime presence missions
and wartime tasks irrespective of propulsion type. For example, the
document that discusses carrier missions and required operational
capabilities states that the mission of multipurpose aircraft
carriers is to operate offensively in a high density, multithreat
environment. It lists specific tasks and readiness requirements but
does not distinguish between the two carrier types. It also lists
various readiness conditions under which the carriers must sustain
operations. In meeting these conditions, there is no differentiation
between conventional and nuclear carriers.
Neither is there any differentiation in carrier types in setting
requirements for overseas presence or in allocating assets to achieve
presence objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved Global Naval
Force Presence Policy, for example, states the requirements for
carrier presence in terms of the number of carriers allocated to each
theater without specifying the type of carrier.
Similarly, the guidance various headquarters and commands provide on
transit speed, escorts, and fuel and ordnance loads does not
differentiate between carrier types. The guidance we reviewed
specifies the same maximum transit speeds for all carriers and
requires that one or more surface combatants, such as a cruiser or a
destroyer, are necessary at all times to escort and protect the
aircraft carrier irrespective of propulsion type. The guidance also
states that all ships will replenish their supplies after reaching a
specified minimum level, which is the same for both conventional and
nuclear carriers.
The operational planning process for wartime does not distinguish
between the two propulsion types. Joint Staff officials said that a
carrier's type of propulsion is virtually transparent at their level.
The Joint Staff apportions carriers to the unified commanders
irrespective of propulsion type, and regional commanders prepare
their operational plans based on the expectation that they will
receive this specified number of carriers if the plans are executed.
With the current mixed fleet of nuclear and conventional carriers,
the specific carriers that will respond if the plans are executed
will depend on the availability and readiness status of the
individual carriers at that time.
CONVENTIONALLY AND
NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIERS
EMPLOY A STANDARD AIR WING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.2
The Navy's Policy for Carrier Battle Groups prescribes a standard
composition for the air wings assigned to aircraft carriers. The
standard composition is the same for both conventionally powered and
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.\17 The composition of an air wing
is shown in table 2.5.
Table 2.5
Composition of a Standard Carrier Air
Wing
Number
of
Aircraft Mission aircraft
-------------- -------------------------------------------- --------
F-14 Strike/fighter 14
F/A-18 Strike/fighter 36
E-2C Airborne early warning 4
EA-6B Suppression of enemy air defense/electronic 4
warfare
S-3B Antisubmarine warfare/anti-surface ship 8\a
warfare/air refueling
ES-3A Electronics intelligence 2
H-60 Antisubmarine warfare/search and rescue/ 6
utility
======================================================================
Total 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The S-3 is normally used to refuel the wing's other aircraft
during the launch/recovery process. However, it is not well-suited
for refueling the other aircraft on long-range missions. On those
missions, the air wing's aircraft frequently refuel from Air Force
tanker aircraft such as the KC-135 and the KC-10.
We examined the air wing composition of five carrier deployments
(three conventional and two nuclear) and found that both carrier
types deployed with only minor variations in the number of aircraft
prescribed in the policy. Some deployments that included both
carrier types carried one to three more support aircraft than the
standard wing.
With the embarked standard air wing, the two types of carriers are
expected to generate the same number of sorties per day. During a
crisis, a carrier may be tasked to fly more than the normal number of
sorties or "surge" operations. The Battle Group Policy states that
for augmented operations (during which an additional 12
strike-fighter aircraft would be assigned to the carrier), carriers
must be able to generate 170 sorties per day during the initial
crises response, 140 sorties per day for 3 to 5 days, and 90 sorties
per day thereafter for sustained operations.
Both types of carriers are subject to the same limitations of crew
fatigue (both aircrew and ship's company) and equipment maintenance,
which could affect sortie generation. For example, Navy regulations
limit how much flight personnel can fly and mandate rest periods.
Officials told us that deck crews and ordnance personnel would also
be stressed during periods of increased sortie generation.
Additionally, both types of carriers have the same catapult and
arresting gear equipment that is subject to a strict inspection and
maintenance schedule. These factors can limit a carrier's ability to
generate sorties before aviation fuel and ordnance levels are
depleted. As a result, the type of propulsion does not affect the
length of time either carrier type could sustain periods of increased
sortie generation.
--------------------
\17 As noted in chapter 1, the aircraft carrier �maximum density� is
the same for both the
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and Nimitz-class (CVN-68) carriers.
An aircraft carrier's capacity for carrying aircraft is expressed as
aircraft carrier maximum density, a comparative number of F/A-18
equivalents that can be carried aboard a ship. Maximum density takes
into account the space on the hanger and flight decks that the
aircraft and helicopters in the air wing need as well as space for
other items such as boats, boat skids, aircraft ground support
equipment, forklifts, cranes, and aircraft jacks. It also allows for
the clearances needed between the aircraft and between the aircraft
and ship structures. The Navy's guidance on aircraft carrier density
states that 75-78 percent of maximum density is the optimum number of
aircraft to have aboard and that deck loading in excess of 80 percent
must be coordinated with headquarters. Ship officials said that
about 47-50 aircraft on the flight deck at any one time provides the
flexibility to conduct flight operations and move aircraft on the
flight deck and between the flight deck and hangar bay.
TOP SPEEDS ARE SIMILAR
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.3
The two types of carriers have similar top speeds--in excess of 30
knots. Additionally, neither type has any unique, propulsion-related
constraints to maintaining speeds at that level for extended periods.
One difference when sailing at high speeds is the conventional
carrier's need to slow for underway refueling. However, as discussed
earlier, the impact is minimal.
According to Navy and shipyard officials, the method used to generate
steam does not determine a carrier's top speed. Factors such as
shaft horsepower, shaft torque limits, propeller design,
displacement, and the naval architectural characteristics of the hull
are the determinates of speed.
Defense and Navy officials also said that other restraints preclude
routinely sailing at high speeds for extended periods. Air crews
have to fly periodically during a transit to remain qualified.
Because a carrier would be unable to conduct flight operations during
a 30-knot plus sustained voyage, the air crews would have to spend
several days after arrival at the destination requalifying before
they could be operationally employed.\18 Officials at one of the
unified commands said that they would prefer to have a carrier battle
group with trained crews arrive in their theater later than have one
with an air wing that needed to requalify arrive earlier.
High sea states and inclement weather could also preclude sustained,
high speed voyages. A ship cannot sail fast in heavy weather without
punishing the ship and its crew, regardless of its type of
propulsion. Additionally, while the escorts in the battle group are
generally capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots, they experience
greater difficulty than carriers sustaining high speeds in very rough
sea conditions. Also, as a Navy official pointed out, even at 30
knots, a long transit from the West Coast to the Central Command's
area of responsibility would still take about
2 weeks.
--------------------
\18 At high transit speeds, a carrier may not be able to maneuver as
necessary to conduct flight operations.
PROPULSION TYPE DOES NOT
MATERIALLY AFFECT CARRIER
SURVIVABILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.4
To successfully attack and degrade a U.S. aircraft carrier's ability
to perform its mission, an enemy must detect the carrier and fix its
location with sufficient accuracy so that one or more weapons can
strike it. Additionally, the lethality of the attacking weapon(s)
must be of sufficient magnitude to severely damage or sink the
carrier. Officials of the Naval Sea Systems Command told us,
according to their survivability analyses, neither type of carrier
possesses any inherent, overriding advantage over the other in its
susceptibility to detection or its vulnerability to the damage
inflicted by the weapons.\19 They also said that the two types of
carriers are very similar in construction, were built to the same
shock standards, and use similar machinery and equipment. Thus,
while there are some differences, neither has a distinct advantage
withstanding or recovering from the effects of enemy weapons that can
be attributed specifically to the ship's propulsion type.\20
Naval Sea Systems Command officials believe that the nuclear
carrier's speed and unlimited range give it a distinct operational
advantage, but they also told us that there were no analytical
studies addressing these operational factors to support this belief.
They said that these attributes allow a nuclear-powered carrier to
employ tactics that minimize the risk of detection, thus reducing its
overall susceptibility to attack. Additionally, a conventional
carrier must be periodically refueled with propulsion fuel. Thus, it
is susceptible to attack while alongside an oiler because it is
steaming a steady course at a steady speed. A nuclear carrier is not
as exposed to this susceptibility because it does not have to
replenish its propulsion fuel.
Both types of carriers, however, must periodically replenish their
supply of aviation fuel. Since carriers normally replenish all
supplies and fuel during an underway replenishment, a conventional
carrier normally takes on ship propulsion fuel (DFM) and JP-5
simultaneously. However, the nuclear carrier still retains an
advantage because, with its greater JP-5 capacity, it does not have
to refuel as often.\21 Additionally, while refueling does restrict a
carrier's ability to maneuver, the carrier typically moves to the
rear to be less exposed when replenishing fuel, ammunition, and other
supplies. That operation takes place under the defensive umbrella of
the surface combatants of the battle group.
--------------------
\19 DOD defines survivability as the capability of a system and crew
to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environment without
suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its
designated mission. Susceptibility is the degree to which a weapon
system is open to effective attack due to one or more inherent
weakness (a function of operational tactics, countermeasures,
probability of enemy fielding a threat, etc.). Vulnerability is the
characteristic of a system that causes it to suffer a definite
degradation as a result of having been subjected to a certain level
of effects in an unnatural hostile environment. Both susceptibility
and vulnerability are considered to be subsets of survivability.
\20 The officials said that, while the more recent nuclear carriers
have been built with enhanced magazine protection, this same level of
protection could be incorporated in newly constructed conventional
carriers.
\21 During Operation Desert Storm, the conventionally powered
carriers in the Persian Gulf replenished aviation fuel about every
2.7 to 3 days. The U.S.S. Roosevelt, the only nuclear-powered
carrier in the Desert Storm air campaign also operating in the
Persian Gulf, replenished its aviation fuel about every 3.3 days.
FRESH WATER PRODUCTION
CAPABILITIES ARE SIMILAR
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.5
An adequate fresh water supply is critical to both types of ships.
The steam that drives the turbines that propel the carriers through
the water and powers the catapults that launch the aircraft is
produced from fresh water. Fresh water is also used to cool
equipment, for damage control, and to wash aircraft and the flight
deck.\22 Both types of carriers need to retain fresh water reserves.
About half of a nuclear carrier's fresh water storage capacity is for
use as emergency reactor coolant. Finally, there is the requirement
for �hotel services,� the water the crew uses daily for preparing
meals, drinking, laundry, and personal hygiene. According to Newport
News Shipbuilding officials, both types of carriers have essentially
the same water requirements.
Some of the older conventional carriers produce about 20,000 gallons
a day less than the Nimitz-class, which can produce about 400,000
gallons per day. However, the U.S.S. Kennedy (CV-67) can produce
50,000 gallons a day more than the Nimitz-class. Navy officials said
that any differences in fresh water production between conventional
and nuclear carriers may be due to the conventional carriers' age.
Newport News Shipbuilding officials also said that the differences
are due to increases in the number of aircraft and personnel, not to
differences in the propulsion type.
Some Navy officials said that in harsh environments such as the
Persian Gulf, conventional carriers frequently resort to water
rationing to provide for essential services. Our review showed that
the conventional carriers' ability to produce fresh water is similar
to that of nuclear carriers and that rationing does not occur that
frequently.
Other Navy officials we met with discounted the problem of rationing
aboard conventional carriers. They believe that fresh water
shortages are, in many instances, indicative of management problems
or inefficiencies aboard the ship--leaking boilers or pipes, for
example. Some officials stated that, during their service, they had
experienced water rationing as frequently, if not more frequently,
aboard nuclear carriers as they had aboard conventional carriers.
Officials, who had recently served aboard three conventional carriers
in the Persian Gulf said that the ships had experienced no water
rationing.
--------------------
\22 Some Navy officials told us that conventional carriers use more
fresh water to wash their aircraft to remove the boiler stack gas
residue.
NUCLEAR CARRIERS' DESIGN
AFFORDS GREATER ORDNANCE AND
AVIATION FUEL STORAGE
CAPACITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.6
The design of nuclear carriers has provided greater aviation fuel and
ordnance storage capacity than conventional carriers, while their
propulsion system has provided almost unlimited steaming endurance.
Together, these factors could give nuclear carriers a decided
operational advantage and superior war-fighting capability over their
conventional counterparts if no at-sea logistics support were
present. In reality, however, at-sea logistics support is present,
and both carrier types and their surface escorts depend on this
support to sustain operations.
THE LARGER STORAGE
CAPACITY OF NUCLEAR
CARRIERS IS DUE PRIMARILY
TO SHIP DESIGN
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:4.6.1
The larger fuel and ordnance storage capacities of the nuclear
carrier are primarily due to ship design differences that have little
to do with the type of propulsion and the fact that nuclear carriers
do not have to store large amounts of propulsion fuel. A ship's
length, height, and width determine its internal volume, and as a
result, the amount of fuel and ordnance that can be carried. Due to
its larger hull size, the Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier is
about 10 percent larger than the last conventional carrier.\23
According to officials at Newport News Shipbuilding, the hull size of
the nuclear carrier was more to provide increased space for ordnance,
aviation fuel, and other supplies.
The debate that took place when the Navy was originally considering
building more nuclear aircraft carriers, in addition to the
U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65), illustrates this point. For example,
Admiral Rickover, in a 1964 letter to the Secretary of the Navy
arguing that CV-67 be nuclear-powered, cited advantages of the
Enterprise.\24 The letter states that the Enterprise hull is 50 feet
longer than the CV-67's hull, which provides the 60-percent increase
in ammunition storage. It also states the ". . . conventional
carrier could also be built in an Enterprise size hull. This would
provide an equivalent increase in the ammunition in the conventional
carrier and would also provide a[n] . . . small increase (about
15%) in aviation fuel."
Additionally, a 1992 Center for Naval Analyses research memorandum
documenting the feasibility of five alternative aircraft carrier
concepts developed by the Naval Sea Systems Command stated that,
other than endurance range, a carrier built with a Nimitz-type hull
but powered by a Kennedy-type oil-fired steam plant would be
essentially equivalent to the Nimitz-class design. With enough
propulsion fuel for a range of 8,000 nautical miles--a distance equal
to about one-third the way around the world--at 20 knots (the
equivalent of the current conventional carriers), the conventional
variant would have the same magazine and aviation fuel (JP-5)
capacities as today's CVN-68 class.
--------------------
\23 The conventional carrier U.S.S. Kennedy (CV-67) has about 75
percent of the storage capacity of the first three nuclear ships of
the Nimitz-class and about 80 percent of that of the
U.S.S. Roosevelt (CVN-71) and the latter ships of the Nimitz-class.
These latter ships have less storage space due to the addition of
enhanced overhead and side protection that earlier Nimitz-class
carriers lacked.
\24 Admiral Rickover prepared the letter in his capacity as the
Manager of Navy Reactors at the Atomic Energy Commission.
AT-SEA REPLENISHMENT
OFFSETS THE CONVENTIONAL
CARRIER'S MORE LIMITED
STORAGE CAPACITY AND
ENDURANCE
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:4.6.2
While nuclear carriers can operate for years before requiring
propulsion fuel, they have a finite storage capacity for aviation
fuel, ordnance, and other supplies. In addition, they are escorted
by conventionally powered escorts, such as cruisers and destroyers,
that require underway support due to their smaller fuel capacities
and relatively high rate of fuel consumption. All surface combatant
ships are highly dependent on regular resupply at sea.
The Navy operates a Combat Logistics Force fleet of about 40 ships
that resupply combatant ships at sea with ship and aircraft fuel,
ordnance, food, and other supplies. The Combat Logistics Force
enables combatant ships to operate at sea almost indefinitely, if
required, without returning to port to replenish their stocks. The
Combat Logistics Force consists of two basic types of ships--station
ships and shuttle ships. Station ships, such as the AOE multipurpose
fast combat support ship, are an integral element of carrier battle
groups, routinely resupplying the other ships in the group. AOEs can
simultaneously deliver fuel, ordnance, and other supplies.\25
The station ships provide the initial logistic support in theater
until shuttle ships, such as fleet oilers and ammunition and other
supply ships, can catch up. According to Navy logistics doctrine,
station ships support a typical battle group with fuel for 20-30
days, consumables (other than fuel and ordnance) for 75 days, and
spare parts for 90 days.
The station ships, in turn, are generally replenished by ships that
shuttle from forward naval bases to the battle group. At times,
these single-product shuttle ships also replenish the combatant ships
directly. The Combat Logistics Force represents additional days of
sustainability for the naval force by serving as an extension of the
combatant ships' bunkers, magazines and store rooms. See appendixes
III and V for a more-detailed discussion of the impact of the Combat
Logistics Force on carrier battle group operations.
We compared the endurance of a notional conventional carrier battle
group to a nuclear carrier battle group using Navy fuel and ordnance
consumption rates contained in a 1993 Center for Naval Analyses
report.\26 The notional battle groups we used consisted of either a
conventional or nuclear carrier, plus two Ticonderoga-class Aegis
guided missile cruisers (CG-47/52s), two Spruance-class destroyers
(DD-963s), and two Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile
destroyers (DDG-51s). Each battle group was supported by one
Sacramento-class supply ship (AOE-1). We estimated that the
conventional battle group would have enough (1) fuel to steam for 29
days, (2) aviation fuel to operate at a tempo comparable to the final
days of Desert Storm for 17 days, and (3) aircraft ordnance for
30 days. The conventional escorts of the nuclear carrier battle
group would have enough fuel to steam for 34 days, while the nuclear
carrier would have enough (1) aviation fuel to operate at a tempo
comparable to the final days of Desert Storm for 23 days and (2)
ordnance to operate for 41 days.
--------------------
\25 The multipurpose fast combat supply ship (AOE) is the only
noncombatant ship in the battle group and has the speed to keep up
with the other ships. The Navy currently has four Sacramento-class
(AOE-1) ships, and three slightly smaller Supply-class (AOE-6) ships,
with one more being built. When an AOE is not available, a
combination of ships can be used to carry out its role, such as
oilers (AO) and ammunition ships (AE). However, these other types of
ships do not carry the range of products that an AOE carries and,
since their top speeds are about 20 knots, they do not have the speed
to keep up with the other ships in the battle group.
\26 Center for Naval Analyses Report 205, "Sizing the Combat Logistic
Force," June 1993. The Center used 1990 and 1991 fleet data
contained in the Navy Energy Usage Reporting System (NEURS) for fuel
consumption and aircraft fuel and ordnance consumption based on the
final days of Desert Storm.
NUCLEAR CARRIERS HAVE A
GREATER ACCELERATION
CAPABILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.7
Navy officials said that a nuclear carrier would be better able to
recover landing aircraft if wind and weather conditions suddenly
changed or if the aircraft experienced mechanical difficulties, since
it could accelerate more quickly than a conventional carrier to
generate the additional �wind over deck� needed to safely land an
aircraft.\27 The officials said that, under such conditions, a
nuclear carrier can accelerate much quicker than a conventional
carrier can because its reactors are always �on line.� According to
Navy data, a nuclear carrier needs about 1-1/2 minutes to accelerate
from 10 to 20 knots and about 3 minutes to accelerate from 10 to 30
knots. On the other hand, a conventional carrier steaming with four
boilers on line producing steam can accelerate from 10 to 20 knots in
about 2-1/2 minutes to 5 minutes. However, it cannot achieve 30
knots with four boilers--all eight boilers are needed.\28 If its
eight boilers are on line, it needs as little as 12-1/2 minutes to
accelerate from 10 to 30 knots. However, according to Navy
officials, it can take as long as 1-1/2 to 2 hours to place boilers
that are in a standby condition into full operation.
According to fleet and ship officials, additional factors, such as
preparing the flight deck, may affect the recovery of aircraft. They
said that a ship's crew is aware of wind conditions during flight
operations and, on a conventional carrier, they will normally have
enough boilers on line so that the carrier can respond in a timely
manner to recover landing aircraft. In addition, aerial tankers are
always airborne during aircraft recovery to ensure that planes do not
run low on fuel while waiting to land. Officials also noted that on
a light wind day, both conventional and nuclear carriers may restrict
flight operations rather than risk a situation where not enough wind
over deck could be generated.
Our review of Naval Safety Center data concerning carrier landings
and Class A mishaps indicated that landing accidents of that
magnitude are rare.\29 The Center identified 10 carrier-related
landing mishaps from 1986 through 1996 (6 aboard conventional
carriers and 4 aboard nuclear carriers). During that time period,
there were about 545,000 and 470,000 landings aboard conventional and
nuclear carriers, respectively. One Center official and fleet
officials told us that the flight deck's layout plays a greater role
in safety than does the ship's ability to accelerate. Such design
features are not related to the ship's type of propulsion.
Navy officials could not provide us examples of aircraft being lost
because a conventional carrier could not accelerate fast enough.
Additionally, a Naval Safety Center official told us that the Center
had no record of an aircraft crashing because a carrier could not
increase its speed quickly enough.
--------------------
\27 The �wind over deck� is the sum of a carrier's speed and natural
wind speed. Carrier aircraft have a minimum required �wind over
deck� to safely land aboard a carrier. The �wind over deck� required
varies by aircraft type and condition. A Navy official said that an
F-14, for example, needs about 25 knots wind across the deck. There
are some instances that would require natural wind in excess of 10
knots, even if the carrier was steaming at its top speed.
\28 For example, the Kennedy's top speed, with four boilers on line,
is about 26 knots.
\29 DOD defines a Class A flight mishap as one involving a DOD
aircraft with an intent to fly, which resulted in damages totaling $1
million or more, a destroyed aircraft, a fatality, or a permanent
total disability.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
DOD believed the draft report did not adequately address operational
effectiveness features provided by nuclear power. According to DOD,
any analysis of platform effectiveness should include mission,
threat, and capabilities desired over the life of the ship. Further,
it stated the draft report did not adequately address future
requirements but relied on historical data and did not account for
platform characteristics unrelated to propulsion type. That is, many
of the differences may be explained by platform size, age, and
onboard systems than by the type of propulsion.
The Congress asked us to examine the cost-effectiveness of
conventionally and nuclear-powered aircraft carrier propulsion. Such
an analysis seeks to find the least costly alternative for achieving
a given requirement. In this context, we used as the requirement
DOD's national military strategy, which is intended to respond to
threats against U.S. interests. That strategy encompasses overseas
peacetime presence, crises response, and war-fighting capabilities.
We used those objectives as the baseline of our analysis and selected
several measures to compare the effectiveness of conventionally and
nuclear-powered carriers. Those measures were discussed with
numerous DOD, Joint Staff, and Navy officials at the outset. Those
measures reflect the relative capabilities of each propulsion type,
including the nuclear-powered carrier's greater aviation fuel and
munitions capacity and unlimited range. Notwithstanding the enhanced
capabilities of nuclear propulsion, we found that both types of
carriers share many of the same characteristics and capabilities,
that they are employed interchangeably, and that each carrier type
possesses certain advantages. We also found that both types of
carriers have demonstrated that each can meet the requirements of the
national military strategy.
We believe our methodology of reviewing a historical perspective
covering a wide range of peacetime presence, crises response, and
war-fighting scenarios that both types of carriers faced during the
past 20 years is sound. A full discussion of our methodology can be
found in appendix I. We continue to believe that this assessment
will be helpful to the Navy as it assesses design concepts for a new
class of aircraft carriers.
LIFE-CYCLE COSTS FOR
NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
ARE GREATER THAN FOR
CONVENTIONALLY POWERED CARRIERS
============================================================ Chapter 3
A nuclear-powered carrier costs about $8.1 billion, or about 58
percent, more than a conventionally powered carrier to acquire,
operate and support for 50 years, and then to inactivate. The
investment cost for a nuclear-powered carrier is more than $6.4
billion, which we estimate is more than double that for a
conventionally powered carrier. Annually, the costs to operate and
support a nuclear carrier are almost 34 percent higher than those to
operate and support a conventional carrier. In addition, it will
cost the Navy considerably more to inactivate and dispose of a
nuclear carrier (CVN) than a conventional carrier (CV) primarily
because the extensive work necessary to remove spent nuclear fuel
from the reactor plant and remove and dispose of the radiologically
contaminated reactor plant and other system components. (See table
3.1.)
Table 3.1
Life-Cycle Costs for Conventional and
Nuclear Aircraft Carriers (based on a
50-year service life)
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Cost category CV CVN
------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------
Investment cost\a
Ship acquisition cost $2,050 $4,059
Midlife modernization cost 866 2,382
Total investment cost $2,916 $6,441
Average annual investment cost $58 $129
Operating and support cost
Direct operating and support cost $10,43 $11,67
6 7
Indirect operating and support cost 688 3,205
Total operating and support cost $11,12 $14,88
5 2
Average annual operating and support cost $222 $298
Inactivation/disposal cost
Inactivation/disposal cost $53 $887
Spent nuclear fuel storage cost n/a 13
Total inactivation/disposal cost $53 $899
Average annual inactivation/disposal cost $1 $18
======================================================================
Total life-cycle cost $14,09 $22,22
4 2
Average annual life-cycle cost $282 $444
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
\a CVN investment cost includes all nuclear fuel cost; CV fuel is
included in operations and support activities.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
WHAT IS A LIFE-CYCLE COST
ANALYSIS?
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
One of the most persistent challenges facing DOD is the ability to
provide adequate resources for the acquisition, operations, and
support of its systems and equipment. A life-cycle cost analysis
provides managers with important information for a number of
purposes, including improved long-range planning and budgeting,
decisions about replacing aging equipment, and comparisons of
competing programs and systems. A keystone to sound acquisition
decisions is having an estimate of the total cost of a program or
equipment over its full life (i.e., life-cycle cost). For this
reason, a life-cycle cost analysis has been part of the DOD
acquisition system for many years.
The life-cycle cost is the sum total of direct, indirect, recurring,
and nonrecurring costs of a system over its entire life through its
disposal. The important point is that the total cost is not just the
initial near term cost. Typically, a life-cycle cost analyst will
focus attention on the annual operating and support cost because it
usually accounts for the largest share of the total cost. The most
common cost components that are included in a life-cycle cost
analysis are shown in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Life-Cycle Cost
Components
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
We developed a life-cycle cost model to estimate the life-cycle cost
for a nuclear- and a conventionally powered aircraft carrier. We
used the Nimitz-class carrier as our baseline for the nuclear
carrier. We selected the Kennedy-class\1 as the baseline for a
conventional carrier because it is comparable in size to the
Nimitz-class carrier, it can employ an air wing that is similar to
that on a Nimitz-class carrier, and there was adequate historical
cost data available to build our cost estimates. Detailed
information about the methodologies we used to develop our cost
estimates is discussed in this chapter and appendix I.
--------------------
\1 For our analysis, the Kennedy-class includes the CV-63, CV-64,
CV-66, and CV-67 as these carriers are similar in size, displacement,
crew size, and maintenance plans, and are often grouped together.
INVESTMENT COSTS ARE HIGHER FOR
NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIERS THAN
FOR CONVENTIONALLY POWERED
CARRIERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
Ship acquisition and midlife modernization costs for a
nuclear-powered carrier are double that estimated for a
conventionally powered carrier. (See table 3.2.)
Table 3.2
Investment Costs for Conventional and
Nuclear Aircraft Carriers
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Investment category CV CVN
------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------
Ship acquisition $2,050 $4,059
Midlife modernization 866 2,382
======================================================================
Total $2,916 $6,441
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
ACQUISITION COST
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
Historically, nuclear carriers have cost more to acquire than
conventional carriers, for several reasons. First, they are larger
and heavier than conventional carriers. Second, the acquisition cost
for a nuclear carrier includes nuclear fuel cost. Finally, the
unique industrial base, specialized nuclear suppliers, and the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program's exacting and stringent environmental,
health, and safety standards add to this cost. For example, an
unavoidably high cost overhead structure (engineering, quality
assurance, and production control) and costly production work are
required in the naval nuclear propulsion industry. Shipbuilders must
follow �non-deviation� plans (i.e., no deviation from the approved
plans without government approval).
We obtained acquisition cost data for 27 carriers that were
authorized or built since 1942. Figure 3.2 shows, in constant
dollars, the acquisition cost per ton\2 of conventionally and
nuclear-powered carriers. Acquisition costs for the Nimitz-class
nuclear-powered carriers have averaged about $3.9 billion\3 while the
last conventionally powered carrier, the
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), cost $2.1 billion. Regardless of
the year the ship was commissioned, nuclear carriers cost more than
conventional carriers.
Figure 3.2: Acquisition Cost
per Ton for Conventional and
Nuclear Carriers (fiscal year
1997 dollars)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Navy.
The acquisition costs of about $2.1 billion for the conventional
carrier and $4.1 billion for the nuclear carrier were based on an
estimating methodology similar to one used by us in an earlier
study\4 and by the Center for Naval Analyses. Historical acquisition
cost per ton and the ship's displacement tonnage were used to provide
rough order of magnitude estimates for the acquisition costs of a
Kennedy-class and a Nimitz-class ship. (See table 3.3 and app. I
for a detailed discussion of the methodology.)
Table 3.3
Acquisition Cost Estimates for the
Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered
Carrier
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars)
Ship
Cost per ton\a displacement\b Estimated cost
---------------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
CV $35,191 58,268 $2,050,500,000
CVN $51,549 78,741 $4,059,000,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
\a We determined the ratio between the cost per ton of CV-67 and
CVN-68 (less any nuclear fuel related cost) and applied this ratio to
the average cost per ton for the CVN-68 class to estimate the cost
per ton for a newly acquired conventional carrier. We used the
average cost per ton for the CVN-68 class as the estimated cost per
ton for the nuclear carrier.
\b Displacement as measured in light tons.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
--------------------
\2 To allow for increases in both ship weight and cost, the
acquisition cost per ton is produced by dividing the ship's
acquisition cost by its tonnage. We used the ship's light
displacement tonnage that did not include weight due to the ship's
fuel, water, or ammunition.
\3 Includes nuclear fuel cost.
\4 Navy's Aircraft Carrier Program: Investment Strategy Options
(GAO/NSIAD-95-17, Jan. 1995).
MIDLIFE MODERNIZATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
Our analysis shows that it will cost the Navy nearly three times as
much to refuel, overhaul, and modernize a nuclear carrier than it
will a conventional carrier. Both carrier types require some level
of midlife modernization to allow the Navy to use the ships for
nearly 50 years. When a nuclear carrier has been in service for
nearly 24 years,\5 it will undergo a 2-1/2 year refueling complex
overhaul (RCOH), which includes refueling the reactor plant,
repairing the propulsion plant, restoring the ship's material
condition, and performing modernization efforts. The nuclear carrier
is expected to operate another 24 years after the RCOH. Similarly,
at about
age 30, a conventional carrier can undergo a 2-1/2 year Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) which includes restoring the ship's
condition, installing system upgrades and performing modernization
efforts. After a SLEP, the conventional carrier should operate an
additional 15 years or more. In both cases, the actual work required
for midlife modernization will vary for each individual ship,
depending on the ship's condition.
Figure 3.3 shows the estimated RCOH cost for the first two
Nimitz-class carriers and the actual cost for SLEPs performed on the
Kennedy-class\6 conventional carriers. We used the Navy's best
estimate for the RCOH planned for the CVN-68 as the estimated midlife
modernization cost for the nuclear carrier. For our cost model, we
used the average historical cost for SLEPs performed on the
Kennedy-class conventional carriers as the estimated midlife
modernization cost for the conventional carrier.
Figure 3.3: Midlife
Modernization Cost for CVN-68,
CVN-69 and Kennedy-class
Conventional Carriers
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: We used estimated cost for nuclear carriers and actual cost
for the conventional carriers.
Source: Navy.
--------------------
\5 Given current operating tempo, its nuclear fuel is expected to
last about 24 years before it needs to be replaced. Midlife
modernization will take place at the time of refueling.
\6 The CV-66 did not undergo a SLEP.
NUCLEAR CARRIERS ARE MORE
EXPENSIVE TO OPERATE AND
SUPPORT THAN CONVENTIONAL
CARRIERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
We estimate that it will cost about $14.9 billion to operate and
support a nuclear carrier over its lifetime, which is nearly 34
percent more than the $11.1 billion we estimate it will cost to
operate and support a conventional carrier. As shown in table 3.4,
the cost for a conventionally powered carrier's fossil fuel is more
than offset by the added cost for a nuclear-powered carrier's
personnel and depot maintenance. A major cost difference between the
two carrier types is in the indirect cost category for support
activities provided by DOE to the nuclear carriers.
Table 3.4
Life-Cycle Direct and Indirect Operating
and Support Costs for a Conventionally
and Nuclear-Powered Carrier
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Cost category CV CVN
------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------
Direct operating and support costs
Personnel $4,636 $5,206
Fossil fuel 738 n/a
Depot maintenance\a 4,130 5,746
Other\b 933 724
Total direct operating and support costs $10,43 $11,67
6 7
Indirect operating and support costs
Training $161 $1,107
Fossil fuel delivery 469 n/a
Nuclear support activities n/a 2,045
Other\c 58 53
Total indirect operating and support costs $688 $3,205
======================================================================
Total operating and support costs $11,12 $14,88
5 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
\a Includes routine maintenance, repairs, and ship modernization work
but not the cost of midlife modernization.
\b Includes a number of direct unit cost categories such as spare
parts, supplies, and intermediate maintenance.
\c Includes a number of indirect support cost categories such as
publications, ammunition handling, and technical services.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
DIRECT OPERATION AND SUPPORT
COSTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1
Nuclear carriers have higher personnel costs than conventional
carriers primarily because they require additional personnel and
their nuclear personnel receive special pay and bonuses. Depot
maintenance costs are greater for a nuclear carrier because more
labor is needed to maintain it than is needed for a conventional
carrier. In a separate analysis, we found that the total cost
related to nuclear fuel over a nuclear carrier's lifetime exceeded
the lifetime cost for a conventional carrier's fossil fuel. We did
not review the reasons for the cost differences for other elements in
the direct cost category because it included costs from a number of
subcategories such as travel, spare parts, and intermediate
maintenance. In most cases, the cost difference for each individual
subcategory was not significant enough to warrant detailed review.
PERSONNEL COSTS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:3.1.1
The personnel cost for a nuclear carrier is estimated at about $5.2
billion over its lifetime compared to about $4.6 billion for a
conventional carrier (see table 3.5). Our estimated personnel cost
is based on historical personnel cost reported by the Navy's
Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Cost (VAMOSC)
Management Information System database for the CV-67 class and CVN-68
class carriers as well as an additional 30.6 percent to account for
accrued retirement cost, which is not captured by that database.
Table 3.5
Personnel Costs for Conventionally and
Nuclear-Powered Carriers
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
CV CVN
------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------
Annual personnel cost $71 $80
Annual accrued retirement 22 24
Total annual $93 $104
Life-cycle cost $4,636 $5,206
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
To determine why the nuclear-powered carrier's personnel cost is
higher, we analyzed ship manpower documents. On the basis of our
work, we are reasonably certain that most of the cost difference can
be attributed to the different propulsion plants and not some other
ship characteristic. Our work further indicates that the higher cost
are the result of three factors: increased personnel needed to
operate the nuclear propulsion plant, higher grade structure for
propulsion plant personnel and bonuses, and special duty pay for
nuclear personnel.
A nuclear carrier has a requirement for nearly 3,400 personnel
compared to about 3,200 for a conventional carrier. A majority of
the added personnel can be traced to the departments that operate the
propulsion plant.\7 Table 3.6 provides a comparative summary of the
required propulsion plant personnel for nuclear and conventional
carriers.
Table 3.6
Propulsion Plant Personnel for
Conventional and Nuclear Carriers
Personnel CV CVN Difference
------------------------------------------ ------ ------ ----------
Officers\a 22 33 11
Enlisted 597 716 119
======================================================================
Total 619 749 130
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Includes warrant officers.
Source: Navy.
Some of the higher personnel cost for the nuclear carrier can be
attributed to the grade structure of propulsion plant personnel.
Nuclear propulsion plant personnel are a higher grade level than
propulsion plant personnel for a conventional carrier. As shown in
figure 3.4, nearly 50 percent of a nuclear carrier's enlisted
propulsion plant personnel are E-5 and above whereas 75 percent of a
conventional carrier's propulsion personnel are E-4 and below.
Figure 3.4: Grade Structure
for the Enlisted Propulsion
Plant Personnel for
Conventionally and
Nuclear-Powered Carriers
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
The higher personnel cost for a nuclear carrier can also be
attributed to special pay and bonuses. The Navy uses a variety of
incentive pay and bonuses to attract and retain nuclear personnel
(see table 3.7).
Table 3.7
Special Pay and Bonus Incentives
Available for Nuclear Personnel in
Fiscal Year 1997
Enlisted
---------------------------------- ----------------------------------
Enlistment bonus Up to $4,000
Selective reenlistment bonus Up to $30,000\a
Special duty assignment pay Up to $275 per month\b
Officers
Accession bonus Up to $8,000
Annual incentive Up to $12,000\c
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Variable bonus based on award level. Nominal bonus of $22,000 for
a 6-year reenlistment of an E-5 with 24 months in service.
\b An E-5 would receive $150 per month.
\c Variable bonus based on active duty commitment length.
Source: Navy.
--------------------
\7 This includes the Engineering Department for the conventionally
powered carrier and the combination of the Engineering and Reactor
Departments for the nuclear-powered carrier.
FUEL COSTS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:3.1.2
We estimate it costs $738 million to provide fossil fuel over a
conventional carrier's 50-year life. Historical data indicate that a
conventional carrier uses about 500,000 barrels of fossil fuel each
year or about 25 million barrels over its lifetime. Our estimate was
developed by multiplying the estimated barrels of fuel consumed by
$29.52, which was the average per barrel price the Navy paid for
fossil fuel from fiscal year 1991-95. Because of historical interest
and speculation as to escalation in fossil fuel prices, we examined
trends in fossil fuel prices and performed a sensitivity analysis of
a conventional carrier's life-cycle cost if fuel prices were to
double (see app. I).
The fuel cost for a conventional carrier is clearly visible as an
operating and support cost. Conversely, the fuel cost for a nuclear
carrier is included within the investment cost (e.g., acquisition,
midlife modernization) and, therefore, is not clearly identified. We
compared the costs of fossil and nuclear fuel and found that the
life-cycle cost for nuclear fuel is greater than for fossil fuel.
Given current operating tempo, the nuclear fuel cores for the
Nimitz-class carrier are expected to provide enough power for about
24 years. When the initial fuel cores are depleted, the cores are
removed and replacement fuel cores are installed. Replacement cores
will be removed when the ship is inactivated at the end of its
service life. To provide a comparison of fuel cost, the Navy
identified portions of the investment costs that directly relate to
the initial and replacement cores (see table 3.8).
Table 3.8
Nuclear Fuel Cost for a Nimitz-class
Carrier
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Total cost
------------------------------------------------------ --------------
Initial core
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Uranium $24
Fuel core procurement 308
Fuel installation 12
Fuel removal at midlife 150
Replacement core
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Uranium 24
Fuel core procurement 308
Fuel installation 64
Fuel removal at inactivation 85
======================================================================
Life-cycle nuclear fuel cost $975
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: Navy.
The uranium costs shown were based on what it cost to manufacture
during the late 1980s, when it was last manufactured for the Navy.
The uranium used to fuel nuclear reactors is supplied by DOE.\8 DOE
ceased production of defense grade uranium in 1991. There is
sufficient uranium to operate the Navy's nuclear force for decades.
Excess uranium can be reconfigured and sold to private utility
companies for use in commercial reactor plants. An alternative cost
methodology based on the opportunity cost for the uranium appears in
appendix I.
Table 3.9 provides a comparative summary of fuel costs for
conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers.
Table 3.9
Comparison of Life-Cycle Fuel Cost for
Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered
Carriers
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Total Annual
life ized
Fuel type cost cost
------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------
CVN nuclear fuel $975 $19.5
CV fossil fuel $738 $14.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
--------------------
\8 All domestic enrichment services were handled by DOE until 1993,
when these operations were transferred to the United States
Enrichment Corporation.
DEPOT MAINTENANCE COST
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:3.1.3
We estimate that the life-cycle cost for depot maintenance for a
conventional carrier is about $4.1 billion compared to about $5.7
billion for a nuclear carrier. Depot maintenance activities include
routine maintenance, repairs, alterations, and fleet modernization
expected to be performed over the life of the carrier. Midlife
modernization activities, although performed at the depot-level, are
not included in our estimated depot maintenance cost. Rather, they
are included as part of investment costs.
Our cost estimates were not based on the historical depot maintenance
costs captured by the Navy's VAMOSC database for several reasons.
First, the cost data collected for the nuclear carriers reflected
depot maintenance performed under the Engineered Operating Cycle
(EOC) maintenance plan. Since the Navy is changing its depot
maintenance strategy for nuclear carriers, we did not believe that
historical costs would provide the best estimate for depot
maintenance costs. Second, the VAMOSC data, which captured costs for
each fiscal year between 1985 and 1994 and the 10-year average cost,
could lead to over- or underestimating this cost because of the
carriers' age. For instance, the average depot maintenance cost for
nuclear carriers reflected maintenance and fleet modernization work
performed on nuclear ships that had been in commission, on average,
10 years or less. Conversely, the average depot maintenance cost for
conventional carriers reflected maintenance and fleet modernization
work performed on carriers that had been in commission for an average
25 years.
Because of these reasons, we developed depot maintenance cost
estimates based on the Navy's notional plans for routine maintenance
and fleet modernization for conventionally and nuclear-powered
carriers. Estimates of how often depot maintenance will be needed
(interval), how many months the ship will be in maintenance
(duration), and how much shipyard labor (labor workdays) will be
needed for the carrier are guided by the Chief of Naval Operations.
Figure 3.5 shows the notional depot maintenance cycle for the two
carrier types.
Figure 3.5: Notional Depot
Maintenance Cycle for
Conventionally and
Nuclear-Powered Carriers (in
months)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Navy.
To estimate depot maintenance cost, we determined the number and
types of depot maintenance periods that would occur over each of the
carrier's 50-year service life. Based on the Navy's notional plans,
we determined that the nuclear carrier would need about 38 percent
more workdays of labor for anticipated depot-level maintenance and
fleet modernization over its 50-year life than the conventional
carrier. Next, we developed an estimated cost for each type of depot
maintenance by multiplying the number of labor workdays\9 by the
composite labor workday rates\10 for public and private shipyards.
We estimated additional depot costs for materials, centrally procured
equipment, spare parts, and other miscellaneous items based on our
analysis of historical costs for these items. Table 3.10 summarizes
the estimated depot maintenance and fleet modernization costs for
nuclear and conventional carriers.
Table 3.10
Life-Cycle Cost for Depot Maintenance of
a Conventionally and a Nuclear-Powered
Carrier
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Number
in Cost Life-
lifeti per cycle
Depot maintenance type me type cost
---------------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------
CV
SRA 17 $51.3 $872
COH 6 543.0 3,258
======================================================================
Total $4,130
CVN
PIA1 2 $188.3 $377
PIA2 4 214.6 858
PIA3 9 240.8 2,167
DPIA1 1 327.7 328
DPIA2 2 376.8 754
DPIA3 3 421.2 1,263
======================================================================
Total $5,746
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
The actual depot maintenance cost for the nuclear carrier could be
more than our estimate and lower than our estimate for the
conventional carrier because we used composite or average shipyard
labor rates. However, our earlier work\11 showed that the actual
labor cost for nuclear work was higher than the labor cost for
nonnuclear work. Specifically, we found that the average cost of
$213 per workday for nuclear labor (then-year dollars) was 25 percent
more than the average cost for nonnuclear labor, which was about $170
per workday. We also found that the applied overhead for nuclear
work was an average of $303 per workday, nearly 60 percent more than
the average overhead of $189 per workday for nonnuclear work.
Maintenance of nuclear ships costs more due to the complex nature of
nuclear work. Shipyards must provide a greater level of service, pay
higher costs for specially trained and skilled workers, and maintain
specialized shipyard departments that support nuclear work, such as
radiological controls, nuclear engineering, nuclear planning, and
nuclear quality assurance. In addition, shipyards must make
provisions to package and dispose of nuclear waste that is generated
during maintenance. The cost to process low-level waste generated
during maintenance was included in the depot maintenance cost
estimate. Parts and other materials used in nuclear systems are
often of a unique design and require specialized material.
--------------------
\9 The Navy provided labor workdays estimated for both maintenance
and fleet modernization for each type of depot maintenance.
\10 The Navy provided composite public and private shipyard rates
that are the average cost for labor and overhead.
\11 Nuclear-powered Ships: Accounting for Shipyard Costs and Nuclear
Waste Disposal Plans (GAO/NSIAD-92-256, July 1, 1992).
INDIRECT OPERATION AND
SUPPORT COSTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2
A significant sustaining base is needed to support both the nuclear
and the conventional carriers. Some examples include logistics
services, training, engineering, and software support. The VAMOSC
database captures many of the costs for these activities and reports
a portion of the costs as an indirect operating and support cost for
each ship. However, we identified several supporting activities and
functions that were not captured or were partially captured by that
database, such as training, fossil fuel delivery and nuclear support
activities.
Indirect support costs for a nuclear carrier are significantly more
than those for a conventional carrier. We estimate a nuclear
carrier's indirect support cost--$3.2 billion--is nearly five times
more than the estimated $0.69 billion for a conventional carrier.
This difference is primarily due to several expensive activities that
support the nuclear carrier but are not needed for the conventional
carrier.
TRAINING COST
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:3.2.1
We estimate that the Navy spends nearly $1 billion more to provide a
steady flow of trained personnel to operate and maintain a nuclear
carrier's propulsion plant than it does to train personnel to operate
and maintain a conventional carrier's propulsion plant. The primary
reason is the nuclear carrier has a greater requirement for personnel
with specialized skills than a conventional carrier does.
Our estimate was not based on the historical VAMOSC database because
it does not capture certain training costs that are central to the
differences in the propulsion system, nor does its allocation method
provide visibility to reasons for the cost difference. Therefore, we
developed estimates for initial and specialized training pipeline
costs for both carrier types.
To estimate indirect training cost, we used a methodology similar to
one developed by the Navy's Center for Cost Analysis. The
methodology is based on determining the annual training requirement
needed to provide a steady flow of skilled personnel that are
required in the propulsion plant departments for each carrier type.
The annual training requirement is determined by the number of
billets, crew turnover, and attrition.\12 For our analysis, we
determined the annual training requirement initial skills training
for four enlisted ratings (machinist's mates, electrician's mates,
electronics technicians and boiler technicians)\13 and the annual
training requirement for additional specialized\14 training beyond
the initial level. We selected these skill types because they
accounted for most of the difference between the required skills for
propulsion plant departments of the two types of carriers. We also
determined the annual training requirement for specialized officers
skills.\15 Using information provided by the Navy, we identified the
training courses required for these skills, and the Chief of Naval
Education and Training provided the cost per graduate for each
course. The Chief of Naval Education and Training did not have cost
information for the required 26 weeks for practical training required
for specialized officer and enlisted nuclear skills. Therefore, we
estimated the cost per officer and enlisted student based on Navy
budget data.
Table 3.11 compares the indirect training costs.
Table 3.11
Propulsion Plant Pipeline Training Costs
for a Conventionally and Nuclear-
Powered Carrier
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Initia Specia
l l Life-
traini traini Annual cycle
ng ng cost cost
-------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Conventional carrier
Enlisted $2.50 $0.71 $3.21 $160.6
2
Officers \a
======================================================================
Total $2.50 $0.71 $3.21 $160.6
2
Nuclear carrier
Enlisted $4.28 $16.47 $20.75 $1,037
.57
Officers \a 1.38 1.38 69.10
======================================================================
Total $4.28 $17.85 $22.13 $1,106
.67
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
\a Our model assumed the training cost for officer's initial training
would be the same for both carriers.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
--------------------
\12 Annual training requirement = ((billet /turnover) *attrition).
\13 As of October 1, 1996, the boiler technicians rating was merged
with the machinist's mates rating.
\14 We focused on Navy Enlisted Classifications (NECs) that are
earned after required training has been satisfied.
\15 We focused on additional qualification designation (AQD) for
officer billets, which indicated a requirement for skills and
knowledge beyond those implicit by the officer's billet
classification or submarine specialty.
FOSSIL FUEL DELIVERY
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:3.2.2
We estimate that it costs about $469 million to deliver fossil fuel
to a conventional carrier over its lifetime. Our estimate is based
on a Navy methodology\16 that allocates a portion of the annual
operating and support cost for these facilities and ships to each
barrel of fossil fuel issued. For example, since Navy depots store
fuels other than fossil fuel, the total cost to operate and maintain
these facilities is allocated based on the proportion of fossil fuel
to total fuel issued from each depot. This cost is then divided by
the number of barrels of fossil fuel delivered to produce the
delivery cost per barrel. The same method was used to determine the
cost per barrel for the Navy ships and oilers operated by the
Military Sealift Command (MSC) that deliver fossil fuel. Table 3.12
shows how the fossil fuel delivery cost of $18.77 per barrel cost was
computed. Assuming a conventional carrier uses about 500,000 barrels
of fossil fuel per year, or 25 million barrels over its lifetime, we
estimate that it will cost about $469 million to deliver fuel to the
conventionally powered carrier.
Table 3.12
Cost to Deliver Fossil Fuel to a
Conventionally Powered Carrier
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars)
Portion Cost
Annual allocated allocated
Activity/ operating and to fuel for fuel Barrels of Cost per
ship type support delivery delivery fuel issued barrel
------------ -------------- ---------- ------------ ------------ ----------
Fleet supply $54,295,049 41.77% $22,679,042 10,526,000 $2.19
centers\a
Ships
Navy ships\b $294,480,540 45-65% $144,815,575
MSC oilers $273,057,960 100% $273,057,960
================================================================================
Total $567,538,500 $417,873,535 25,198,595 $16.58
================================================================================
Total per $18.77
barrel
delivery
cost
Number of 25,000,000
barrels
delivered
over a
conventiona
l carrier's
lifetime
================================================================================
Total cost $469,250,0
to deliver 00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
\a The cost per barrel for the fleet supply centers also includes an
allocation of $0.04 for the annual operation of service craft.
\b Navy ships included are the AO, AOE, and AOR class ships. The
percentage of the ship cost allocated to the delivery of fossil fuel
varied from 45 to 65 percent.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
--------------------
\16 The Navy's cost methodology, which has been used for many years,
includes an annualized acquisition cost as well as the annual
operating and support cost. However, our analysis does not include
an allocation of acquisition cost because we did not have comparable
acquisition cost data for facilities (i.e., DOE laboratories) that
support the delivery of nuclear power to the Navy's fleet.
NUCLEAR SUPPORT
ACTIVITIES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:3.2.3
We estimate that it will cost about $2.04 billion to provide
supporting services to the nuclear carriers. Most of this cost is
due to the work performed by the activities of the Bettis and Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratories, large research and engineering facilities
that are solely dedicated to support the Navy's nuclear propulsion
program.
More than half of the laboratories' activities are funded through the
DOE appropriation for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. DOE's
budget for the Program averaged $731 million annually during the
1990s. Program activities are primarily focused on operational
research, development, and testing\17 for the purpose of gaining a
better understanding of reactor behavior fundamentals, evaluating
reactor performance, and verifying and improving the accuracy of
models. The laboratories evaluate cladding, structural, and
component materials suitable for use in the operating nuclear plant
and develop and test nuclear fuel. The laboratories also evaluate
equipment and systems that transfer, convert, store, control, and
measure power that the naval reactor has created. The DOE-funded
activities are an integral and necessary component to providing
effective military nuclear propulsion plants to the Navy and to
ensure their safe and reliable operation.
In addition to the support provided by DOE, the Navy also budgets
about $200 million in operation and maintenance funds to provide
essential technical and logistical support for its operational
reactors. The types of activities include routine maintenance and
engineering support, inspection and refurbishment of reactor plant
components, safety surveillance at shipyards, and power plant safety
assessments.
Our cost estimate was based on allocating a portion of the annual
cost for these activities to a nuclear carrier. For the DOE-funded
activities, we allocated 5 percent of DOE's average funding between
fiscal year 1991 and 1997 and 2.08 percent of the Navy's average
funding between fiscal year 1994 and 1996 for Navy support activities
(see table 3.13).
Table 3.13
Cost to Provide Nuclear Support
Activities to a Nuclear Carrier
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Percen
t Allocated Life-
Annual alloca annual cycle
cost ted cost cost
---------------------------------- ------ ------ ---------- ------
Energy-funded $731.0 5.0\a $36.6 $1,828
Navy-funded 208.4 2.08\b 4.3 217
======================================================================
Total $2,045
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
\a DOE activities were allocated on the basis of a nuclear carrier's
demand for power in relationship to other nuclear ships in the Navy's
fleet. (See app. I for additional information regarding the
relative demand for power nuclear ships.)
\b The Navy-funded activities were allocated based on our analysis of
the number of reactor plants supported by these funds.
Source: Our analysis of DOE and Navy data.
--------------------
\17 The Navy's research development test and evaluation budget is the
source for obtaining funds needed for specific development, test, and
evaluation of new reactors. For example, about $413 million
(then-year dollars) of the budget for fiscal years 1994 to 1998 will
fund the laboratories' development of the reactor for the New Attack
Submarine. These funds are not included in this discussion.
NUCLEAR CARRIERS ARE MORE
COSTLY TO INACTIVATE AND
DISPOSE OF THAN CONVENTIONAL
CARRIERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
Nuclear carriers are significantly more expensive to inactivate and
dispose of than conventional carriers. The cost to inactivate and
dispose of a nuclear carrier is estimated at $887 million. In
addition, it will cost the Navy an estimated additional $13 million
to provide long-term storage\18 of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) after
it is removed from the carrier's reactor plant. On the basis of Navy
data, we estimate that the cost to inactivate and dispose of a
conventional carrier is $52.6 million.
--------------------
\18 Radioactive materials will need safe storage for thousands of
years. Our estimate is based on the radioactive materials storage
requirement during the first 100 years after a carrier is
commissioned.
CARRIER DISPOSAL COST
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.1
A conventional carrier can be placed in the reserve fleet or retained
as a mobilization\19
asset at the end of its service life. When the Navy no longer needs
a conventional carrier, it can transfer the carrier to the Maritime
Administration, sell the carrier to a private firm or foreign
government, or sell the carrier for its scrap value. Our estimate of
$52.6 million to inactivate and dispose of a conventional carrier is
based on Navy data and includes the cost to place the carrier in
reduced mobilization status,
3 years maintenance in a reduced mobilization status, and final
disposal cost less scrap value.
These are not realistic options for a nuclear aircraft carrier
because of its nuclear propulsion systems. A nuclear ship is
constructed with a nuclear power plant inside a section of the ship
called the reactor compartment. The components of the nuclear power
plant include a high-strength reactor vessel, heat exchangers (steam
generator), and associated piping, pumps, and valves. Each reactor
plant contains over 100 tons of lead shielding, part of which is made
radioactive by contact with the radioactive material. At the end of
its useful service life, the nuclear carrier and its radioactive
materials must be disposed of.
Although a nuclear carrier has never been disposed of, the basic
steps necessary to dispose of a carrier would be similar to those
performed on nuclear submarines and surface ships. The first step is
defueling the reactor plant. The highly radioactive SNF is removed
from the reactor and sent to the Naval Reactor Facility, located at
DOE's Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory for
examination and temporary storage. (Disposition of spent nuclear
fuel is discussed later in this chapter.) Next, piping systems,
tanks, and vessels are drained; the radioactive systems are sealed;
and the reactor compartment is sealed and enclosed in a high
integrity steel package. Reactor compartments removed from
submarines have been transported by barge from Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard to DOE's Hanford, Washington, site for final burial.
The Navy provided us with a cost range of between $818.6 million and
$955.5 million to dispose of the first Nimitz-class nuclear-powered
carrier. We used the mid-point cost in our analysis--$887 million.
Most of the cost can be attributed to defueling and removing
contaminated nuclear equipment and material. This estimate did not
include the cost associated with storing the SNF or any cost
associated with maintaining oversight of the reactor plant's burial
site in Hanford.
--------------------
\19 The Navy keeps three carriers in Mobilization B status. When a
carrier is taken out of active service, it is placed in a
Mobilization B status; the oldest carrier in Mobilization B status is
then disposed of.
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.2
Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) will be removed from the carrier's reactor
plant twice during the Nimitz-class carrier's service life--at its
midlife and at inactivation. Because it is highly radioactive, SNF
will need to be safely stored for thousands of years. Based on
estimates recently provided in DOD's official comments on our draft
report, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program now estimates it will
cost about $13 million to safely store the SNF during the first 100
years after a nuclear-powered carrier is decommissioned using a new
dry storage method (see table 3.14). We were unable to verify the
accuracy and completeness of this estimate but we do know that the
new method promises to be significantly less expensive than the
method formerly used, called the wet storage method.
Table 3.14
Navy Cost Estimate for the Dry Storage
of a Nuclear-Powered Carrier's Spent
Nuclear Fuel
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
Cost
-------------------------------------------------------------- ------
Initial cores
Hardware per ship set of cores $ 4.8
Operational costs for 75 years of dry storage 1.8
Replacement cores
Hardware per ship set of cores 4.8
Operational costs for 50 years of dry storage 1.7
======================================================================
Total cost $13.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
The Navy has been temporarily storing its SNF using a wet storage
method. Under this method the nuclear propulsion program stores the
fuel in special pools located at DOE's Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory. The water in the pools serves the dual
purpose of acting as the barrier for the radiation and dispersing the
heat in the SNF. Using this method, DOE estimated that it would cost
about $306 thousand to receive and place the Nimitz-class cores into
the storage pools and an additional $1.144 million for each year the
cores are stored. The storage cost begins to accumulate after the
first cores are removed during the carrier's refueling complex
overhaul near its 25th year of service. The storage cost will double
when the replacement cores are removed upon carrier inactivation.
Temporary storage costs for naval SNF are likely to change as the
Navy transitions\20 to the dry storage method. Table 3.14 reflects
the anticipated savings from adopting the new method of spent nuclear
fuel storage.
Ultimately, SNF will have to be permanently disposed of, which will
present an extremely difficult challenge because it will remain
dangerous for thousands of years. The national strategy focuses on
disposal of SNF generated by civilian nuclear power plants and
high-level waste in a geologic repository. DOE is responsible for
developing an underground repository. However, DOE does not expect
that the repository will be operational until about 2010,\21 more
than 10 years behind that envisioned. Thus, estimating the cost is
complicated because the current repository plans were not based on
disposing defense-grade SNF, such as that from naval reactor plants,
but on the high-level waste that is generated from reprocessing
defense-grade SNF. Thus, we did not estimate final disposal costs
for the carrier's SNF but instead focused on the current storage
practices.
--------------------
\20 In October 1995, the state of Idaho, the Navy, and DOE reached an
agreement regarding the shipment and storage of SNF in Idaho. As a
result, all SNF located at DOE's Idaho site will be placed in dry
storage by 2023 and all SNF will be removed from Idaho by 2035.
\21 Nuclear Waste: Foreign Countries' Approaches to High-Level Waste
Storage and Disposal (GAO/RCED-94-172, Aug. 4, 1994) and Nuclear
Waste: Comprehensive Review of the Disposal Program Is Needed
(GAO/RCED-94-299, Sept. 27, 1994).
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
DOD partially agreed with our life-cycle analysis. DOD agreed that a
thorough understanding of total life-cycle costs is key to allocating
scarce resources. However, DOD disagreed that comparing the
life-cycle costs of conventionally powered carriers such as the
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy with Nimitz-class nuclear-powered carriers
was appropriate because of differences in the age, size, and
capabilities of the carriers.
DOD agreed that the life-cycle cost of nuclear-powered carriers is
greater than conventionally powered carriers but that the premium is
not as large as estimated by us. DOD did not agree with our approach
of making cost-per-ton comparisons between nuclear-powered
Nimitz-class carriers and conventionally powered carriers such as the
Kennedy. DOD believed that it would be more appropriate to compare
conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers with equivalent
capabilities.
While the nuclear-powered Nimitz-class carrier and the conventionally
powered Kennedy-class carrier are not identical, we chose to compare
them because the Kennedy was the last and largest conventionally
powered carrier built, it employs an airwing of comparable size to
that of the Nimitz-class carriers, and there was adequate historical
data available. Further, both classes of carriers have performed the
same missions for more than two decades.
Our estimate of the difference in costs between the two types of
carriers is greater than DOD's estimate primarily because of
differing methodologies. Our acquisition cost estimate was based on
a cost-per-ton methodology, which is an accepted method for
estimating these costs and has been used by the Navy and others. The
actual acquisition cost for the Kennedy, adjusted for inflation, is
virtually the same as the acquisition costs used in our estimate.
According to the Navy, it estimated the cost for a "new"
conventionally powered carrier with the capabilities of the newest
Nimitz-class carriers and assumed the conventionally powered carrier
would have a larger displacement than a Nimitz-class carrier. It
stated that the conventionally powered carrier's cost was based on
actual manhours adjusted to reflect manhour and material growth over
30 years. Navy officials told us they assumed the conventionally
powered carrier would be constructed at Newport News Shipbuilding and
therefore used that company's cost factors (for example, labor rates,
overhead rates, and material rates). In addition, because the Navy
did not include the cost of the Kennedy's SLEP when it calculated the
average cost for a CV SLEP, its estimate was greater than ours.
Our operating and support costs were based on historical data for the
conventionally powered Kennedy-class and the nuclear-powered
Nimitz-class. The DOD estimate is based on estimates of a much
larger conventionally powered carrier as discussed above. We also
used different methodologies for estimating indirect costs (see app.
VII, comments 33, 34, and 35). The Navy chose to estimate personnel
cost using its Manpower Billet Cost Factor Model. This model is
intended to estimate the full manpower cost, including indirect cost,
such as training. We did not use this model because much of the
nuclear training costs are not captured by that model. Instead, we
used validated historical costs to estimate direct personnel costs.
We separately estimated training pipeline cost using a methodology
developed by the Navy's Center for Cost Analysis.
The Navy also used a different method for allocating the annual cost
of DOE's laboratories that support its nuclear fleet. We allocated
this cost based on the demand/consumption of nuclear power. Finally,
the Navy's new estimate to inactivate and dispose of the CVN is
nearly 40 percent less than the estimate used in our analysis. We
did not use the Navy's newer estimate because no evidence was
provided or found to support the significant reductions in cost to
the original estimate provided to us.
DOE concurred with DOD's comments addressing estimates of costs
associated with nuclear reactor plant support activities and the
storage of SNF. These comments and our evaluation of them are
discussed in appendix VII.
IMPLICATIONS OF AN ALL
NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIER FORCE ON
NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC
============================================================ Chapter 4
Homeporting Navy ships overseas enables the United States to maintain
a high level of presence with fewer ships because the need for a
rotation base to keep forces deployed is smaller. The homeporting of
a conventionally powered carrier at Yokosuka, Japan, provides a level
of presence that would otherwise require six nuclear-powered carriers
homeported in the United States. However, the Navy has been
replacing conventionally powered carriers with nuclear-powered
carriers. If this trend continues, the Navy will eventually have to
either
-- establish a nuclear-capable maintenance facility and related
infrastructure in Japan to accommodate a nuclear-powered carrier
to be homeported there or
-- expand the force to include the additional nuclear-powered
carriers that would be needed to keep the same level of
presence, but with ships deploying from the United States.
Alternatively, the Navy could either construct a new conventionally
powered carrier or accept a lower level of presence.
While it would be several years before the carrier force would have
undergone a complete transition to nuclear propulsion, it will also
take several years to implement any of the strategies that will allow
the United States to maintain a long-term continuous naval carrier
presence in the Pacific region.
CONVENTIONALLY POWERED CARRIER
FORCE STRUCTURE HAS BEEN
DECLINING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
The conventionally powered carrier force has declined from nine
carriers in fiscal year 1991 to the current force of four
conventionally powered carriers.\1 By fiscal year 2008, current Navy
plans project there will be one conventionally powered carrier in the
force. Three of the current carriers are in the active force and one
is assigned to the reserve force. One of the active carriers, the
U.S.S. Independence (CV-62), is homeported at Yokosuka, while two,
the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63) and the
U.S.S. Constellation (CV-64), are periodically deployed overseas.\2
The fourth, the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), is considered an
operational reserve carrier. It provides Navy and Marine Corps
aviators carrier landing training and qualification, participates in
exercises, and can be deployed to fill gaps in overseas presence and
help meet crisis response needs. Table 4.1 shows the four carriers
now in the force, their last full year of active service, and their
age at the end of their estimated service life.
Table 4.1
Conventionally Powered Carrier Force--
Last Full Year in Active Service
Ship
age
(in
Carrier Year years)
------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------
U.S.S. Independence (CV-62) 1997 39
U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63) 2007 47
U.S.S. Constellation (CV-64) 2002 41
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67) 2017 43-50
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Navy.
As recently as 1994, the U.S.S. Kennedy was scheduled for
decommissioning in fiscal year 2011. However, current long-range
Navy carrier construction plans indicate it will be decommissioned in
fiscal
year 2018, thus adding 7 years to its service life. The remaining
service life of the Kennedy will depend on several factors, including
whether it undergoes extensive major maintenance and modernization,
whether it deploys regularly in support of the active force, or
whether it is primarily used as a training carrier. Unlike many of
the other conventionally powered carriers, the Kennedy did not
receive an extensive service life extension overhaul that would have
added 15 years of service life.
--------------------
\1 There were nine conventionally powered carriers in the Navy's
force structure from fiscal year 1981 through fiscal year 1991.
\2 The U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63) is scheduled to replace the U.S.S.
Independence (CV-62) in fiscal year 1998 as the permanently
forwardly-deployed carrier in Yokosuka. The U.S.S. Independence
(CV-62) will be decommissioned.
BENEFITS OF HOMEPORTING A
CARRIER IN JAPAN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
A conventionally powered carrier has been permanently forward
deployed and homeported in Japan since 1973. This carrier provides
full-time presence in the Pacific region without the need for long
transit times and can respond to a crisis in the region in a matter
of days. Providing continuous forward presence is a clear advantage
to having an aircraft carrier and its battle group permanently
forward deployed in Japan. Additionally, the government of Japan
makes significant contributions for the yen-based costs of
maintaining U.S. forces in Japan.
The United States and Japan share the cost of basing U.S. forces in
Japan through the Special Measures Agreement. Japan also pays for
new facilities and improvements the United States uses through the
Japanese Facilities Improvement Program. The Program, begun in 1979,
is a cost and burden-sharing program funded and administered by the
Japanese government. It is not required or protected by any treaty
or agreements between the United States and Japan. According to
Pacific Command and Pacific Fleet officials, the Program could fund
construction of the additional maintenance facilities to permanently
homeport a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan.
Japan contributes more than 70 percent of the total yen-based cost of
stationing U.S. forces there (more than $5 billion in 1995). These
contributions include aircraft carrier maintenance and repairs
performed by the Japanese work force at the U.S. Naval Ship Repair
Facility, Yokosuka. Currently, these facilities have no nuclear
repair capability. If the carrier now homeported in Japan were to
return to a U.S. homeport, the United States would incur all
maintenance costs. For nuclear-related maintenance to be conducted
at the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Yokosuka, several
infrastructure improvements would be required and the maintenance
would be performed by U.S. shipyard workers at U.S. expense.
HOMEPORTING A NUCLEAR-POWERED
CARRIER IN JAPAN COULD BE
DIFFICULT AND COSTLY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
Homeporting a nuclear-powered carrier permanently at Yokosuka would
require a major base reorganization, including nuclear-propulsion
maintenance and support facilities, upgraded utilities, and dredging
of the harbor and approach to accommodate a deeper draft ship. It
would also require additional family housing and support facilities.
Although funds could be obtained through the Japanese Facilities
Improvement Program, the approval process could be lengthy. The
Department of State noted that the entry into Japanese ports of
nuclear-powered vessels remains sensitive in Japan and that there
would have to be careful consultations with the Government of Japan
should the U.S. Government wish to homeport a nuclear-powered
carrier in Japan.
FACILITIES AND PORT
IMPROVEMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1
The Navy's requirements for additional facilities to support a
nuclear-powered carrier homeported at a base that supports
conventionally powered carriers are described in the Navy's March
1995 report entitled Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carrier Homeporting Cost
Comparison Between NAS (Naval Air Station) North Island and NSY
(Naval Shipyard) Long Beach. Each facility's requirements will
differ based on what exists at the facility. The facilities and port
improvements being made to accommodate the homeporting of a
nuclear-powered carrier at Naval Air Station, North Island in San
Diego, which is already capable of homeporting conventionally powered
carriers, illustrates what improvements may be needed to expand the
maintenance, harbor, and infrastructure capabilities of the
conventionally powered carrier homeport in Yokosuka, so that it could
accommodate a nuclear-powered carrier.
The facilities planned for the nuclear-powered carrier homeport at
the North Island Naval Air Station are similar to those at Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard. The North Island facilities include an
aircraft carrier wharf, a controlled industrial facility, a ship
maintenance facility, and a maintenance support facility. Other
projects at North Island include the dredging of the harbor channel
and a turning basin for the ship. Also, upgraded power would be
required at the ship berthing. The controlled industrial facility
and ship maintenance facility provide depot-level repair and
maintenance of nuclear propulsion plant systems and components. The
total area required for these facilities is the equivalent to 4-1/2
football fields. The projects at North Island are estimated by the
Navy to cost about $260 million.
According to facilities and logistics officials from the Pacific
Command, Pacific Fleet, and Navy headquarters, in addition to the
nuclear maintenance facilities, other improvements would be needed at
Yokosuka to support a homeported nuclear-powered carrier. For
example, a larger, stronger pier would be needed to accommodate the
larger, heavier nuclear-powered carrier and cranes for pier-side
maintenance. Also, upgraded and expanded electrical power supplies
would be needed to run the reactor coolant pumps while the ship is
berthed. Additional substations would be required for redundancy,
and commercial power would also have to be upgraded. Access to
controlled pure water would also be required.
According to these officials, Nimitz-class aircraft carriers need
harbors and pierside-areas dredged to 50 feet or more, compared to a
45-foot depth for conventionally powered carriers. The harbor and
pier side at Yokosuka would need to be blasted and dredged, because
of the rock bottom, to accommodate a nuclear-powered carrier. Other
improvements could include modifications to the drydock and
associated equipment. However, the Navy has not conducted a survey
to identify specific drydock improvements needed to support a
nuclear-powered carrier at Yokosuka.
LIMITED SPACE FOR ADDITIONAL
FACILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2
The Navy restricts access to nuclear propulsion system components to
U.S. citizens, even though some of the components are the same used
in conventionally powered ships. Restrictions on access to nuclear
propulsion components require separate facilities for nuclear
maintenance and general ship repair. However, according to Pacific
Command officials, there is little room at Yokosuka for additional
maintenance facilities. Thus, providing additional maintenance
facilities would require replacing existing structures; however,
Yokosuka's existing conventional carrier maintenance facilities are
spread over several buildings throughout the facility.
According to Department of State officials, there may be space
constraints at Yokosuka that could make the homeporting of
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers difficult. The port of Yokosuka is
congested. The city of Yokosuka is adjacent to the base, which also
limits expansion.
FAMILY HOUSING AND OTHER
PERSONNEL SUPPORT FACILITIES
ALREADY STRESSED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.3
Family and bachelor housing shortages are severe at Yokosuka.
According to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Shore Installation
Management, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the base needs over 1,200 additional
units. The planned homeporting of additional and larger surface
combatants at Yokosuka will increase the need for additional housing.
For example, homeporting a nuclear-powered carrier could add about
200 families. The housing situation could be further exacerbated
with the addition of hundreds of U.S. workers to work on
nuclear-related equipment during maintenance periods. The additional
personnel would add to the requirement for commissaries and
recreation and other support facilities.
LENGTHY APPROVAL PROCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.4
According to Pacific Command officials, facility improvements at
Yokosuka could be funded through the Japanese Facilities Improvement
Program. However, obtaining approval is a lengthy process. For
example, a family housing project took 10 years to obtain approval
and funding. Pacific Command officials estimated it could take
between 7 to 15 years to obtain approval for nuclear-powered carrier
homeporting facilities improvements.
OTHER OVERSEAS HOMEPORTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.5
The Navy's 1994 Naval Forward Presence Report stated that forward
homeporting a nuclear carrier overseas is problematic because of
potential host nation opposition as well as the complexity of
nuclear-related maintenance that might require the ship to return to
the United States for repairs. The report estimated that the
establishment of a nuclear-capable maintenance facility at an
overseas location would be expensive and politically unacceptable.
PROVIDING REGIONAL PRESENCE
WITH CARRIERS HOMEPORTED ON THE
WEST COAST
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
The Pacific Command's policy requires continuous presence of an
aircraft carrier in the Pacific region. The carrier now permanently
forward deployed in Japan provides this level of presence. Based on
our analysis using the Navy's Force Presence Model and data, we found
the single, conventionally powered carrier permanently forward
deployed in Japan provides forward presence coverage in the Pacific
region that would require six nuclear-powered carriers homeported at
West Coast ports of the United States. Reducing regional presence
requirements to 75 percent still would require four nuclear-powered
carriers in an all nuclear-powered force.
The requirement for an increased number of nuclear-powered carriers
when based out of the United States is a function of deployment cycle
policies and requirements, including a maximum 6-month deployment,
the need for post deployment shipyard maintenance, predeployment
training and exercises, and the deployment transit distance and
speed. (See chs. 1 and 2 for a more complete discussion.) However,
the Navy currently does not have the infrastructure to support
additional nuclear-powered carriers at West Coast homeports.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
DOD partially concurred with the discussion of the difficulties
associated with homeporting and maintaining a nuclear-powered carrier
in Japan. According to DOD, infrastructure changes would not be as
significant as we portray because the non-propulsion plant
maintenance would continue to be supported by Ship Repair Facility,
Yokosuka. DOD said that if a nuclear-powered carrier was homeported
in Japan, maintenance plans could be modified to improve the ability
of the ship's force to maintain the propulsion plant, augment the
ship's force with "fly-away" teams, and periodically return the ship
to the United States for depot-level maintenance and replace it with
another carrier. DOD agreed that some changes in base support
infrastructure would be required if a nuclear-powered carrier was
homeported in Japan.
Our discussion of the implications of homeporting a nuclear-powered
carrier in Japan was based, in part, on the Navy's current
maintenance strategy. We note the Navy has not modified that
strategy. Further, we note that significant changes in base support
infrastructure would be required to accommodate a nuclear-powered
carrier homeported in Japan. We note that the Navy made significant
and costly infrastructure changes at North Island Naval Air Station
when it decided to homeport a nuclear-powered carrier there.
The Department of State noted in its only comment on the draft report
that the entry of nuclear-powered vessels into Japanese ports remains
sensitive in Japan and there would have to be careful consultations
with the government of Japan should the U.S. government wish to
homeport a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan.
OJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
The Defense Appropriations Act of 1994 Conference Report directed us
to study the cost-effectiveness of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the adequacy of conventionally
and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in meeting the Nation's forward
presence, crisis response, and war-fighting requirements and (2)
estimate the total life-cycle costs of conventionally and
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The conferees noted the study
should include (1) a life-cycle cost analysis that includes the cost
of processing and disposing of nuclear waste and spent fuel, (2) an
estimate of the costs associated with processing and disposing of
nuclear fuel and other nuclear material for the existing
nuclear-powered fleet, and (3) the implications of an all nuclear
carrier force on overseas homeporting. An evaluation of aircraft
carrier and/or industrial base issues was not included in our scope
of work.
In performing our analysis, we reviewed policy directives, planning
guidance, strategies, threat assessments, operational histories,
statistics, schedules, studies, and assessments on conventionally and
nuclear-powered carriers. We reviewed and conducted analyses using
the Navy's Force Presence Model to gain an understanding of the
various factors that affect the required numbers of carriers to
achieve various overseas presence levels, and examined the Navy's
assessments of aircraft carrier requirements for presence. We also
reviewed several Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy studies, for
example, the Naval Forward Presence Report; several historical
cost-effectiveness studies, including Nuclear Power for Surface
Warships, the Sea-Based Air Platform Cost/Benefit Study, and the
Carrier 21 Study; the Report on the Bottom-Up Review; defense
guidance; and other documents relevant to understanding how
assumptions on key operational and cost factors affect plans,
programs, and operations. We consulted with officials of the Joint
Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Navy, and the
Center for Naval Analyses to develop and concur with our proposed
measures of effectiveness--peacetime presence, crisis response, and
war-fighting. In addition, we met with agency officials to obtain
information on new technologies and system improvements and future
aircraft carrier requirements, capabilities, and operations.
To understand how the Navy has and is using its carrier force during
peacetime, crises, and war, we discussed past and current naval
operations with U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet
officials. We also talked with officials of the Joint Staff and the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Central Commands to obtain their perspectives
on how the conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers support their
strategies, plans, and operations. We met with battle group
commanders and carrier commanders and their staffs from both
conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers and examined briefings on
recent deployments to understand the role, use, and missions of the
conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers. In addition, we toured
both conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers to discuss ship and
air wing operations and capabilities with the ships' and air wings'
commanders and staff. We also met with the Combat Logistics Fleet
Commander for the Atlantic Fleet, the Combat Logistics Fleet Chief of
Staff for the Pacific Fleet, and the commanding officer of the
U.S.S. Sacramento, a fast combat support ship that directly supports
the battle group.
To gain an understanding of nuclear propulsion cost, technology, and
the nuclear fuel cycle, we talked with officials of the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program and visited facilities and laboratories dealing
with naval nuclear propulsion research and development, test, and
evaluation; training; fuel processing; and radioactive waste
management.
We talked with experts and academicians from both public and private
organizations to obtain additional perspectives covered in our visits
with U.S. military and defense officials. We performed our
fieldwork from February 1995 to February 1997 at the following
locations :
Washington, D.C., area
-- Office of the Secretary of Defense
-- The Joint Staff
-- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)
Air Warfare Division, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources,
Warfare Requirements, and Assessments)
Assessment Division, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources,
Warfare Requirements, and Assessments)
-- Naval Sea Systems Command
Aircraft Carrier Program Management Office
Cost Estimating and Analysis Division
Engineering Directorate
-- Naval Center for Cost Analysis
-- Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center
-- Defense Intelligence Agency
-- Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
-- Headquarters, Department of Energy
-- Headquarters, Department of State
-- Institute for Defense Analyses
-- Center for Naval Analyses
Norfolk, Virginia, area
-- Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Command
-- Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
-- Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
-- Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
-- Carrier Group Eight (Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group)
(commanding officer/battle group staff)
-- Carrier Group Six (America Battle Group) (commanding officer)
-- U.S.S. America (CV-66)
-- U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
-- Commanding Officer, U.S.S. George Washington (CVN-73)
-- Commanding Officer, Logistics Group Two
-- Naval Doctrine Command
-- Naval Safety Center
-- Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (Newport
News)
-- Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company
Tampa Bay, Florida, area
-- Headquarters, U.S. Central Command
-- Headquarters, Navy Central Command
Seattle, Washington, area
-- Commander, Naval Surface Group Pacific Northwest
Commander, Task Force 33
Commander, Logistics Group One
-- Planning, Engineering, Repairs, and Alterations, Carriers
(PERA/CV), Naval Sea Systems Detachment
-- Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
-- U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) (commanding officer and staff)
-- U.S.S. Sacramento (AOE-1) (commanding officer and staff)
Alameda, California, area
-- Carrier Group Three (Lincoln Battle Group) (commanding
officer/battle group staff)
San Diego, California, area
-- Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
-- Naval Air Station North Island
-- U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63) (commanding officer, air wing, and
department heads)
-- U.S.S. Constellation (CV-64) (executive officer, air wing, and
department heads and chief of staff, Cruiser-Destroyer Group
One)
Honolulu, Hawaii, area
-- Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command
-- Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet
-- Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
-- Former Commanding Officer, U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67)
(Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet)
Other Locations
-- Department of Energy
Pittsburg Naval Reactors Office, West Mifflin, Pennsylvania
Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, West Mifflin, Pennsylvania
Schenectady Naval Reactors Office, Schenectady, New York
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Niskayuna, New York
Kesselring Prototype Reactors Site, West Milton, New York
Department of Energy-Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, Idaho
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho Falls,
Idaho
-- Chief of Naval Education and Training, Pensacola, Florida
-- TradeTech, Denver, Colorado
-- The Uranium Exchange Company, New Fairfield, Connecticut
AIRCRAFT CARRIER MAINTENANCE
ANALYSIS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
Our comparison of operating and maintenance time encompassed the
aircraft carriers of the Forrestal- (except for U.S.S.
Independence),
Kitty Hawk-, Kennedy,- and Nimitz-classes. We excluded the U.S.S.
Midway and the U.S.S. Coral Sea because they were designed and built
during World War II and we believed their age made them
unrepresentative. Additionally, the U.S.S. Midway was homeported in
Japan during part of the period and, thus, was not subject to the
normal maintenance cycle--the same reason we excluded the U.S.S.
Independence. We also excluded the U.S.S. Enterprise because, as
the first nuclear-powered carrier, it was a unique design and, thus,
we believed its data would not be comparable to the ships of the
Nimitz-class.
Our comparisons also only include that time the carriers spent
undergoing regular depot-level maintenance in a shipyard. Our data
also represents the collective experience of the two ship types, not
per ship-type averages. That is, we determined the total number of
days all conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers were (1) in
service during the time period, (2) in a shipyard undergoing
depot-level maintenance, and (3) available for operating with the
fleet. Our results are based on those totals by propulsion type, not
on individual ship, ship class, or ship type averages.
We revised our methodology for adjusting service life extension
program (SLEP) time as follows. Three conventionally powered
carriers, CV-60, CV-66, and CV-67, underwent complete comprehensive
overhauls during the period. The mean length of those overhauls was
436 days. Four ships--CV-59, CV-63, CV-64, and CV-67--underwent SLEP
during the time period. Using the original start date of each ship's
SLEP, we substituted a 436-day overhaul for each SLEP. We further
modified each ship's remaining schedule by eliminating the Post
Shakedown Availability/Selected Restricted Availability scheduled
after the SLEP and scheduled the next SRA 18 months after the SLEP's
completion. We then moved each ship's remaining schedule forward to
compensate for the reduced length of the availability. We also added
an additional SRA and sufficient operating time to CV-59's schedule
to allow it to reach its actual deactivation date of September 15,
1992.
As in our earlier calculations, when calculating depot-level
maintenance time for the period October 1, 1997, through December 31,
2007, we excluded the Enterprise and the conventionally powered
carriers homeported in Japan. We also excluded the Ronald Reagan
since it will be under construction for about half the period.
CONVENTIONALLY AND
NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
CARRIER COST MODEL
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
We developed a life-cycle cost model to estimate the life-cycle costs
for both a nuclear and a conventionally powered aircraft carrier.
For the nuclear ship, we used data available for the Nimitz-class
carrier (CVN-68 class). We selected the Kennedy-class\1 as the
comparable conventional carrier for several reasons. The U.S.S.
John F. Kennedy (CV-67) was the last and largest conventional
carrier built, it employs an airwing of comparable size to that of
the Nimitz-class, and there were adequate historical data available.
Our life-cycle cost model includes the cost of nuclear fuel as part
of the investment activity: acquisition, refueling complex overhaul
(RCOH), and inactivation. Operating and support costs were generally
based on historical data for the two ship classes. Our model also
included an assignment of indirect cost when the cost was determined
to be significant. In each case, we did not determine the
incremental or marginal cost of a support activity, but we did
allocate a portion of the total annual cost as an indirect cost for
the carrier. All costs are expressed in constant fiscal year 1997
dollars, except as noted. As discussed later in this appendix, we
also performed a present value analysis to identify any potential
differences when the time value of money was considered.
--------------------
\1 For our analysis, the Kennedy-class includes the CV-63, CV-64,
CV-66 carriers that are similar in size, displacement, and crew size
and other ship characteristics.
SHIP ACQUISITION COSTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1
We developed our own estimate for the cost to acquire a conventional
carrier based on the historical acquisition cost per ton to build
aircraft carriers. Our methodology was similar to one used in our
earlier study\2 and by the Center for Naval Analyses in some
preliminary work it did for the Navy as it began to assess its future
carrier needs. We determined a ratio between the acquisition cost
per ton of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and the U.S.S.
Nimitz (CVN-68). This ratio was then applied to the Navy's projected
acquisition cost per ton of the CVN-76 to provide an estimated
acquisition cost per ton for a new conventionally powered carrier.
The resulting cost per ton was then multiplied by the Kennedy's
displacement to provide a rough order of magnitude acquisition cost.
While there are many unknowns involved in estimating the current cost
to acquire a ship (conventionally powered carrier) that has not been
built for over 25 years, our estimate was based on the best available
information we could obtain. For the nuclear carrier, we multiplied
the displacement weight for the CVN-76, the most recently authorized
Nimitz-class carrier, by the average acquisition cost per ton for the
Nimitz-class carriers built.
Although research, development, test, and evaluation and military
construction costs are normally included in developing an acquisition
cost estimate, in contrast to the more limited procurement estimate,
our estimate did not include several nuclear-related military
construction costs because they were not included in the Selected
Acquisition Reports for the Nimitz-class. For example, the costs of
nuclear maintenance facilities for the nuclear-powered carriers to be
homeported in San Diego, California, have not been captured.
--------------------
\2 Navy's Aircraft Carrier Program: Investment Strategy Options
(GAO/NSIAD-95-17, Jan. 1995).
OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2
Ship operating and support costs were generally based on the 10-year
average cost for the CV-67 and CVN-68 class carriers during fiscal
years 1985 through 1994, which were obtained from the Navy's
Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Cost (VAMOSC)
Management Information System database. Several operating and
support cost categories were modified or added because data were not
fully captured by the system. The categories we adjusted included
personnel, depot maintenance, fossil fuel, indirect training, fossil
fuel delivery, and nuclear support structure.
We adjusted the VAMOSC baseline data for direct personnel, depot
maintenance, and fuel costs. We modified the personnel cost to
capture the cost of accrued retirement by adding an additional 30.6
percent, the percentage for DOD's contribution to its retirement fund
for fiscal
year 1997. We estimated depot maintenance costs using the Navy's
notional maintenance plans for each carrier over its lifetime. We
did not use the historical depot maintenance costs captured by the
Navy's VAMOSC database for several reasons. First, the cost data
collected for the nuclear carriers reflected maintenance performed
under the Engineered Operating Cycle (EOC) strategy. Since the Navy
is changing its maintenance strategy for nuclear carriers and does
not intend to use the EOC strategy in the future, we were not
confident that the historical costs would provide the best basis for
estimating life-cycle depot maintenance costs. We were also
concerned that the VAMOSC data, which captured costs for fiscal
years 1985-94, would lead to over- or underestimating costs because
of the carrier types' average age. Thus, our estimated maintenance
cost was determined by the number, type, and cost for the notional
maintenance expected over each of the carrier's life time. Using the
Navy's notional plans, we determined the number and type of depot
maintenance periods that would occur over each of the carrier type's
50-year service life. To estimate the cost for each type of depot
maintenance period, we multiplied the number of labor workdays\3
expected for each type of maintenance times the Navy's composite
labor workday rates\4 for public and private shipyards. We estimated
additional maintenance costs for materials, centrally procured
equipment, spare parts, and other miscellaneous items based on our
analysis of historical costs for these items.
Nuclear fuel cost was provided by the Naval Sea Systems Command's
Nuclear Propulsion Directorate. For this analysis, the direct
nuclear fuel cost included the procurement of the initial and
replacement fuel cores, the uranium used in the cores, and the cost
to install and remove the initial and replacement cores. Our
estimated cost for fossil fuel was based on the historical average
number of barrels a conventionally powered carrier used and the
average price per barrel between fiscal year 1991 and 1995 paid by
the Navy.
We also modified the VAMOSC baseline data to account for several
indirect operating and support cost categories that are affected
because of the difference in propulsion systems. These categories
include indirect cost for training, fossil fuel delivery system, and
nuclear power supporting activities. Indirect cost estimates are
generally based on an allocation of the annual cost.
The indirect training cost was based on the personnel training
requirement needed to support the specific enlisted ratings in the
engineering department of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and
the engineering and reactor departments of the U.S.S. Nimitz
(CVN-68). We selected four ratings (machinist's mates, electrician's
mates, electronics technicians and boiler technicians) because the
requirements for rating skills were most affected by the type of
propulsion plant. The training requirement for these skills was
determined by the number of required billets, annual crew turnover,
and attrition rates. Using Navy provided crew turnover and attrition
rates and the cost per student for initial and specialized skills
training, we developed the cost per student for specialized training
received at the moored ships and prototypes. Our estimated cost per
student was based on 26 weeks of pay and allowance per student plus
an allocated portion of the total cost for instructors and base
support personnel and operation and maintenance funding for these
facilities. Training cost was estimated by multiplying the annual
training requirement by the applicable initial and specialized
training cost per student.
Indirect fossil fuel delivery cost was based on the Navy's method of
determining the fully burdened cost for each barrel of fuel delivered
to its fleet of ships. Our methodology allocated a portion of the
Navy's total annual cost to operate and maintain its fleet supply
activities, service craft, and oilers\5 to each barrel of fuel
delivered. For example, the Navy spends about $54 million to operate
and support its fleet industrial centers. Since these centers store
other fuels, we allocated about 42 percent, or $22.7 million, based
on the proportion of fossil fuel to total fuel issued at each center.
The $22.7 million was then divided by 10.5 million, the total number
of barrels of fossil fuel issued by the Fleet Industrial Supply
Centers, to produce an estimated delivery cost per barrel. A similar
method was used to allocate the annual cost to operate and support
Navy and Military Sealift Command oilers to each barrel of fuel
delivered.
The estimated indirect nuclear support activities cost was based on
an allocation of the total costs for these activities. The
Navy-funded activities support operational reactor plants and the
funding level are directly influenced by the number of plants being
supported. There are eight operating reactor plants types, one of
which is for the Nimitz-class. Therefore, we allocated 12.5 percent
of the Navy's average funding for the Nimitz-class carriers. Since
there are six Nimitz-class carriers in the force, one-sixth (or 2.08
percent) of the funding was used to estimate the cost of this support
activity for one nuclear-powered carrier. The estimated indirect
cost for DOE-funded nuclear supporting activities was allocated based
on the nuclear carriers' demand for power (or energy needs). Based
on our analysis of uranium consumed and shaft horsepower needs of the
nuclear fleet, we determined that the nuclear carrier accounted for
about five percent of the total uranium consumed and shaft horsepower
required by naval nuclear ships. We allocated 5 percent of the
average funding between fiscal year 1991 and 1997 for Energy's Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program as our estimated annual cost of these
support activities.
--------------------
\3 The Navy provided labor workdays estimated for both depot
maintenance and fleet modernization for each type of depot
maintenance period.
\4 The Navy provided composite public and private shipyard rates that
reflected the average labor and overhead cost of work performed.
\5 This includes the AO, AOE, and AOR class ships as well as oilers
operated by the Military Sealift Command.
INACTIVATION AND DISPOSAL
COSTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3
Our estimate to inactivate and dispose of a conventional carrier was
based on the Navy's estimated cost to place the carrier in reduced
mobilization status, 3 years maintenance in mobilization status, and
final disposal cost less scrap value. We estimated scrap value based
on scrap sales of naval ships during fiscal years 1993 and 1995.
Our estimate to inactivate and dispose of a nuclear carrier was based
on data provided by the Navy and the DOE. The Navy provided a cost
range to inactivate and dispose of a carrier. We used the mid-point
estimate. In its official comments on our draft report, DOD provided
a new estimate for the receipt and annual storage of the spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) from a Nimitz-class carrier. This estimate, which
is based on the dry storage method, is much less expensive than the
estimate for the wet storage method. We were unable to verify the
accuracy or the completeness of the new estimate but have included it
since the dry storage method is generally much less expensive than
the wet method. The dry storage estimate does not include costs for
the new dry storage facility or fuel characterization. SNF storage
costs include the storage costs of spent nuclear fuel for the first
100 years after a carrier is commissioned. We assumed the initial
SNF cores would be removed at a carrier's midlife and sent to storage
in its 25th year of service and remain there for 75 years and the
replacement cores would be removed at the end of the carrier's
service life and sent to storage near its 50th year of service and
remain there for
50 years.
EFFECTS OF PRICING
ALTERNATIVES FOR FOSSIL AND
NUCLEAR FUEL
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.4
The cost of fuel has been of interest throughout the debate over
nuclear versus conventional propulsion. Because of the interest, we
analyzed the affect of different pricing strategies on the cost of
the conventional and nuclear carriers.
FOSSIL FUEL
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.4.1
Crude oil prices were fairly stable during the 1950s and 1960s.
Prices rose significantly as a result of the oil crises of 1973 and
1979-80, although they did not remain at these peak levels. Figure
I.1 shows the price of crude oil and the price the Navy paid for
fossil fuel, as well as the major events affecting U.S. crude oil
prices. Table I.1 shows the affect on life-cycle costs for a carrier
if the cost of fossil fuel were double the current price.
Figure I.1: Crude Oil, Fossil
Fuel, and Major Events
Affecting U.S. Crude Oil
Prices
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Sources: Navy and Energy Information Administration.
The cost estimate of $48 million for the uranium used in a
Nimitz-class carrier over its lifetime was provided to us by the
Navy. The estimate reflected the cost incurred by DOE when the
uranium for the Navy was produced\6 sometime during the late 1980s.
Table I.1
Comparison of Life-Cycle Costs for the
Conventionally Powered Carrier and the
Nuclear-Powered Carrier Using Different
Fuel Price Scenarios
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)
CVN
CV cost CV cost CVN cost alternative
if fuel = if fuel = if fuel = fuel = $101
$29.52 $59.04 $48 mil mil
----------------------- --------- --------- --------- ------------
Investment $2,916 $2,916 $6,441 $6,494
Direct operating and
support
Personnel 4,636 4,636 5,206 5,206
Fuel 738 1,476 0 0
Maintenance 4,130 4,130 5,746 5,746
Other 933 933 724 724
Indirect operating and 688 688 4,290 4,290
support
Disposal 53 53 1,031 1,031
Life-cycle cost $14,094 $14,831 $23,438 $23,492
Annual cost $282 $297 $469 $470
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: Our analysis.
DOE stopped all production at its plants capable of producing
defense-grade uranium\7
in 1991 because there was a surplus of defense-grade uranium as a
result of nuclear weapon agreements. Defense-grade uranium could be
blended down to enrichment levels suitable for use in commercial
reactors and sold to the private sector. The value of the uranium if
sold and not used in a naval reactor is considered an opportunity
cost. The uranium from one Nimitz-class carrier has an estimated
market value, or opportunity cost, which is more than twice that of
our estimate.
--------------------
\6 Natural uranium undergoes a number of processes before it is a
usable fuel: mining and milling, conversion, and enrichment. All
domestic enrichment services were handled by the DOE until 1993, when
these operations were transferred to the United States Enrichment
Corporation.
\7 The difference between fuel used in commercial reactors and for
naval reactors is the degree to which the uranium has been enriched.
Commercial grade uranium is enriched to about 3-4 percent U-235 where
defense grade uranium is enriched to above 90 percent. Uranium used
to fuel a naval reactor is a defense grade uranium.
METHODOLOGY FOR ALLOCATING
INDIRECT COSTS FOR
NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS USING
A DEMAND FOR POWER FACTOR
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.5
Naval propulsion plants use a pressurized water reactor design that
has two systems: a primary system and a secondary system (see fig.
I.2). The primary system circulates water in a closed loop
consisting of the reactor vessel, piping, pumps, and steam
generators. The heat produced in the reactor is transferred to the
water. The heated water passes through the steam generators where it
gives up its energy. The primary water is then pumped back to the
reactor to be reheated.
Figure I.2: Diagram of a
Pressurized Water Reactor
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Navy.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Nuclear and conventional propulsion systems of similar capacity have
many common features. Both require heat to produce steam to drive
turbines and generators. In the case of a nuclear system, the
fissioning of uranium within the reactor replaces the burning of
fossil fuel to generate the necessary heat. Inside a reactor, the
uranium fuel is assembled in such a way that a controlled chain
reaction can be achieved. Control rods can be inserted into or
withdrawn from the reactor to create the necessary power level
needed. Over time, the uranium is burned and eventually it must be
replaced.
Size, weight, and operations influence a ship's demand for power as
well as the propulsion plant and fuel that supply the power. For
example, a Nimitz-class carrier, weighing nearly 100,000 tons,
requires far more shaft horsepower from its propulsion plant than is
necessary for a submarine or surface ship that weighs about 8,000
tons. Similarly, there is a difference in the amount of nuclear fuel
that is burned. We calculated the weighted average for each nuclear
ship's demand for power, as measured by: shaft horsepower
requirements and uranium burn. We found that one Nimitz-class
carrier's demand for power is about equal to that of eight SSN-688s.
As shown in figure I.3, in 1995, nuclear carriers accounted for about
35 percent of the nuclear power used by the fleet and are expected to
account for nearly 60 percent by 2015 based on current force plans.
Figure I.3: Demand for Power
by Nuclear-Powered Ships Based
on Force Structures in Fiscal
Years 1995, 2000, and 2015
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Sources: Our analysis and Navy and Jane's Directory of Fighting
Ships 1994-1995.
PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.6
Because investment alternatives normally incur different costs over
different time streams it is our policy to compare the alternatives
on an equal economic basis using a technique called present value
analysis. This analysis, which converts costs occurring at different
times to a common unit of measurement, is predicated on the theory
that costs incurred in the future are worth less than costs incurred
today. Present value analysis also provides a means to transform a
stream of costs to a single number so it can be compared to another.
Caution should be exercised when discounted dollars are used in
performing analyses because discounted numbers are artificially small
and can invite misinterpretation both in absolute amount and in
comparing alternatives, especially in programs with very long time
periods. A concern expressed about long duration projects is that
normal discount rates virtually eliminate from consideration any
values occurring beyond 25 years into the future. The expenditure
streams in our analysis are about 60 years for the conventionally
powered carrier and more than 100 years for the nuclear-powered
carrier.
Our present value analysis used budgetary profiles we developed for
each carrier type. The budget profiles included the major investment
costs (initial acquisition, midlife modernization, inactivation, and
disposal) as well as annual operating and support costs. The timing
of the budget profiles was based on the assumption that both carriers
would be commissioned in the same year and have 50-year service
lives. The notional procurement profile of a nuclear carrier
includes advance procurement of long lead nuclear components 2 years
prior to full funding of the ship, and the construction period is
estimated to be 1 year longer than for a conventional carrier. As a
result, the nuclear-powered carrier's investment profile begins 3
years earlier than for a conventional carrier. We also used
annualized operating and support costs. The budget profiles were
then converted into projected outlay profiles using the Navy's
official outlay rates.
While a performing present value analysis is a generally accepted
practice, there is no generally agreed upon discount rate. However,
there is agreement that a range of rates should be used to determine
the investment's relative sensitivity to changes in rates. Our
policy, in general, is to use the interest rate on marketable
Treasury debt with maturity comparable to that of the program being
evaluated (adjusted to reflect expected inflation when using constant
dollars). We calculated the present value of the two carrier types
using three different discount rates--our rate, the Office of
Management and Budget rate, and the Congressional Budget Office rate.
As table I.2 shows, regardless of the discount rate used, the nuclear
carrier's present value was at least 57 percent more than the present
value of the conventional carrier.
Table I.2
Discounted and Undiscounted Life-Cycle
Costs for a Conventionally and Nuclear-
Powered Carrier
(Dollars in billions)
Our rate
(4.43\a OMB rate CBO rate
Carrier option Outlays percent) (3.6 percent) (2.8 percent)
---------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Conventional $14.1 $4.9 $5.8 $6.9
Nuclear 22.2 8.2 9.5 11.1
================================================================================
Difference $8.1 $3.3 $3.7 $4.2
Percent 57% 67% 64% 61%
difference
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Note 2: CBO is Congressional Budget Office. OMB is Office of
Management and Budget.
\a Rate of return for 30-year treasury bonds minus the most recent
estimate of inflation by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates.
Source: Our analysis.
CONVENTIONALLY VERSUS
NUCLEAR-POWERED COST-EFFECTIVENESS
DEBATE--THE RATIONALE FOR NUCLEAR
POWER
========================================================== Appendix II
For fiscal year 1963, DOD requested a conventionally powered carrier.
A prolonged debate to change the propulsion of the carrier, later
named the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), to nuclear power,
followed. The campaign to support nuclear power was led by the
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Secretary of
the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Opposition to
nuclear-powered carriers eventually weakened, and all aircraft
carriers since have been nuclear-powered, beginning with the U.S.S.
Nimitz (CVN-68) in the fiscal year 1967 program. Including the
U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65), a total of eight nuclear-powered
carriers have been built and two more are under construction.\1
In an April 1963 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Navy concluded that �nuclear propulsion permits a
significant increase in the beneficial military results for a given
expenditure and that we must exploit and take maximum advantage of
it. . .and that all new major warships should be nuclear-powered.�
The Navy staff's comparative analyses showed that the costs of a
nuclear task force would be about the same as a nonnuclear task force
with its fuel replenishment and escort ships. The advantages of
nuclear propulsion in surface warships were summarized in an
enclosure to the memorandum:
"As a nation with an overseas strategy, nuclear propulsion in
our combatant surface ships adds an essential new dimension to
their versatility and effectiveness in war or deterrence of war.
Increased range and staying power, plus a reduction in
vulnerability provided by nuclear propulsion, will make naval
forces much stronger and more useful as instruments of national
policy and power."
The specific advantages accruing to nuclear propulsion, according to
the Navy study, were
-- virtually unlimited high-speed endurance;
-- optimized prepositioning of (nuclear) fuel (the reactor cores
reduce the quantity and total costs of conventional fuel which
must be prepositioned and protected);
-- reduced vulnerability to atomic fallout because nuclear-powered
ships do not depend on a constant intake of large amounts of air
for boilers;
-- increased shipboard electric power for new radars, sonars, and
missile systems that would otherwise reduce the operating range
of conventionally powered ships; and
-- elimination of stack gases.
In the language of the memorandum the meaning of "virtually unlimited
high-speed endurance" was elaborated
-- Nuclear-powered forces can be sent at high sustained speeds to
distant areas of operations and arrive ready to go into
action--they do not have to refuel before engaging the enemy.
-- Independent operations of nuclear ships can be conducted in
those areas where simultaneous deployment of the usual
replenishment forces may require an unacceptable amount of time
or risk. The necessary logistic support ships can start later
and/or transit more slowly and still arrive in time for
replenishment of aviation fuel and ammunition.
-- The requirement of oil-fueled forces to take into account the
risk of loss of fuel oil facilities either at the source or en
route to the refueling rendezvous is eliminated.
-- Absence from the restrictions imposed by fueling requirements
significantly reduces the vulnerability of the force by
eliminating the requirement to slow down to conserve fuel and to
refuel. These required refuelings reduce the tempo of any
offensive and defensive effort.
-- The nuclear-powered forces require less overall replenishment
and have much greater freedom in the selection of location and
time for the replenishment rendezvous. Nuclear propulsion also
reduces the size of the logistic support force and its escorts.
-- Nuclear-powered ships can be kept in an area of minimum
vulnerability with respect to the enemy submarine threat until
required to move into another action area. They can proceed at
a high sustained speed using such indirect routes and
circumvention to increase enemy submarine tasks as may be
indicated by the overall tactical situation.
The Defense Secretary's February 1963 memorandum also asked the Navy
to comment on specific topics. The Navy's comments regarding
worldwide deployments, underway replenishments, future shipbuilding
programs, and force structure reductions are summarized below.
-- Worldwide Deployments
Nuclear propulsion will greatly facilitate fast initial reaction,
rapid transit, readiness for combat on arrival, and strike group
operations with reduced task group vulnerability and logistic support
requirements.
The improved efficiency of coverage of potential trouble areas
associated with nuclear-powered task groups can be capitalized on by
either (1) better coverage, using the same numbers of groups as with
conventional forces or (2) comparable coverage, using fewer groups.
The potential exists to compensate for the increased costs of
individual nuclear-powered ships by obtaining more effectiveness or
by reducing force levels as these nuclear ships are delivered to the
fleet.
As they are delivered to the fleet, the nuclear-powered ships will be
phased into those assignments where transit distances may be long and
logistic support somewhat limited. For example, a nuclear-powered
task group could perform a high speed transit of about 5,000 miles
from 10 to 50 percent faster than a conventionally powered group,
depending upon the level of fuel support received by the
conventionally powered carrier groups.
The costs of achieving this capability with a nuclear force would be
approximately the same as with a nonnuclear force with its fuel
replenishment and escort ships.
-- Replenishment
Underway replenishment is the most reliable and effective method of
restocking naval forces with large quantities of consumables in
combat or in peacetime deployment to remote areas. This kind of
support, however, cannot be relied on in armed conflict situations or
in areas characterized by inadequate or nonexistent bases.
By eliminating the requirement for ship propulsion fuel, requirements
for replenishment of aviation fuel and ordnance will become the
controlling factors, varying directly with the level of aircraft
activity and/or combat operations.
Design and operational evaluations will continue to be directed
toward minimizing dependence on nuclear-powered ships upon logistic
support by increasing consumables storage, such as was done in the
case of the CVAN-67 design for aviation fuel and ordnance.
-- Future shipbuilding programs
The application of nuclear propulsion is toward a goal of all nuclear
attack carrier groups. The greatest advantages of nuclear power
accrue when the entire task group is so equipped. However, the
advantages to screen ships themselves are significant. An
alternative would be to use a nuclear-powered carrier with a
conventional screen; however, in this case, the operational and
logistics gains will be less if the nuclear-powered carrier must
function as a part-time oiler and is still tied to the logistics of
her escorts.
-- Force reductions
Nuclear-powered task groups will provide improved efficiency of
coverage of potential trouble areas. The benefits thereby can be
capitalized on, in part, by a reduction in carrier task groups or by
increased effectiveness.
A general transition to nuclear propulsion should permit some
reduction in total numbers of ships required to meet the Navy's
widespread, worldwide commitments.
--------------------
\1 The Harry S. Truman was commissioned in July 1998.
UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT EXTENDS THE
ENDURANCE OF CARRIERS
========================================================= Appendix III
The Navy operates a Combat Logistics Force fleet of about 40 ships
that resupply combatant ships at sea with several commodities. The
ships carry significant amounts of these commodities, for example,
ship and aviation fuel (DFM and JP-5, respectively), ordnance, and
other supplies such as ship and aircraft fuel, ordnance, and food
(see table III.1), which enables combatant ships to operate at sea
almost indefinitely, if required, without ever needing to go into
ports to replenish their stocks. The force represents additional
days of sustainability for the naval force by serving as an extension
of the combatant ships' bunkers, magazine and store rooms.
Table III.1
Capacities of Selected Combat Logistics
Force Ships
Other
Class Speed Fuel\ a Ordnance supplies
---------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(knots) (barrels) (tons) (tons)
(T-) AE-26 20 \b 6,000 \b
(T-) AFS-1 20 18,000 \c 7,000
AO-177 20 150,000 625 420
(T-) AO-187 20 180,000 \c \d
AOE-1 30 177,000 2,500 750
AOE-6 30 156,000 1,800 650
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: T-class Combat Logistics Force ships are operated by the
Navy's Military Sealift Command. These ships use civilian, instead
of military, crews but may have a small military detachment aboard.
A majority of the non-AOE class ships are now operated by the
Military Sealift Command.
\a Reflects a combined total for DFM and JP-5.
\b Primary mission is ordnance replenishment. Limited quantities of
fuel and other supplies are also available.
\c No ordnance carried.
\d Primary mission is fuel replenishment. Limited capacity to carry
other supplies.
Source: Navy.
A comparison of these capacities with average daily ship and aviation
fuel consumption and ordnance expenditures reflected in table III.2
shows that daily fuel consumption represents only a small percentage
of the fuel capacity carried by Combat Logistics Force ships.
Table III.2
Average Daily Fuel and Ordnance
Consumption Rates for Selected Ship
Classes
DFM JP-5 Ordnance
Ship class (barrels) (barrels) (tons)
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Carrier (CV) 2,700 6,500 70-150
Carrier (CVN) \a 6,500 70-150
CG-47 725 \a \a
DD-963 710 \a \a
DDG-51 710 \a \a
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a No quantities shown.
Source: Center for Naval Analyses report.\1
The conventionally powered cruisers and destroyers that are a part of
carrier battle groups are dependent on underway replenishment support
by Combat Logistics Force. Compared to a conventional carrier, they
have smaller fuel storage capacities and relatively high fuel
consumption rates at higher speeds. Table III.3 compares the
approximate range and endurance of these ships as well as of a
conventional carrier.
Table III.3
Battle Group Ship Range and Endurance at
Various Speeds
Speed (knots) 18 22 26 30
-------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------
CV
Range (nm) 8,600 7,800 6,300 5,100
Daily fuel consumption (percentage of 5 7 10 14
total load)
Days endurance 20 15 10 7
CG-47
Range (nm) 6,200 5,600 4,600 3,300
Daily fuel consumption (percentage of 7 9 14 22
total load)
Days endurance 14 11 7 5
DD-963
Range (nm) 5,100 4,800 4,200 3,300
Daily fuel consumption (percentage of 8 11 15 22
total load)
Days endurance 12 9 7 5
DDG-51
Range (nm) 4,300 4,000 3,500 2,800
Daily fuel consumption (percentage of 10 13 18 26
total load)
Days endurance 10 8 6 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Ranges rounded to nearest 100 nautical miles. Fuel
consumption and days endurance rounded to nearest whole number.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
As shown in table III.4, the other ships in the battle group require
a higher proportion of the fuel during a transit than a conventional
carrier requires. Thus, from a practical standpoint, the time
penalty for refueling is more associated with the rest of the battle
group than with the conventional carrier.
Table III.4
Battle Group Propulsion Fuel Underway
Replenishment Requirements During
Transits
Underway replenishment
requirement
--------------------------
Percent of total
------------------
Transi Total Remainder
t (barre of battle
Transit distance (nm) speed ls) CV group\a
---------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ----------
4,800--Norfolk, Va. to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 52,370 0 100
24 91,953 43 57
28 106,28 37 63
6
8,600--Norfolk, Va. to the Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 158,65 25 75
6
24 158,65 25 75
6
28 236,27 34 66
6
12,000--San Diego, Calif. to the Persian Gulf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 229,56 34 66
4
24 250,60 32 68
9
28 342,56 35 65
2
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a For this analysis, we used a battle group configuration that
included one conventional carrier, two CG-47 class cruisers, two
DD-963 class destroyers, and two DDG-51 class guided missile
destroyers. This configuration is consistent with the Navy's
standard carrier battle group. We also assumed that underway
replenishments would occur when the ships' fuel levels reached 30
percent of capacity and that the ships were then refueled to full
capacity.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
The presence of a station ship\2 in the battle group extends the
group's range considerably compared to those shown in table III.3.
Table III.5 reflects an AOE's impact on the ability of notional
conventional (CVBG) and nuclear (CVNBG) carrier battle groups to
reach their destinations. As in the previous analyses, these battle
groups consist of a carrier (CV or CVN), two CG-47s, two DD-963s, two
DDG-51s, and one AOE-1. As the table shows, the capabilities of the
two groups are about equal.
Table III.5
Battle Group Comparative Transit
Capabilities With AOE Support
(illustrative transit destinations and
distances)
Transi
t
Transit distance (nm) speed CV\a CVN\a
---------------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------
4,800--Norfolk, Va., to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 Yes Yes
24 Yes Yes
28 Yes Yes
8,600--Norfolk, Va., to the Persian Gulf via the Suez Cana
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 Yes Yes
24 No Yes
28 No No
12,000--San Diego, Calif., to the Persian Gulf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
20 No No
24 No No
28 No No
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a A "Yes" indicates that the battle group completes the transit with
at least 30 percent propulsion fuel remaining, collectively.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
To further illustrate the information presented in table III.5, we
compared the estimated remaining fuel levels of these battle groups
when they reached their destinations, assuming that the battle groups
sailed at a constant speed of 20 knots. We assumed that the ships
would be fully refueled whenever they reached 30 percent of their
fuel capacities. We also assumed that the diesel fuel marine (DFM)
carried by AOEs represented 60 percent of their total fuel capacity.
For example, the distance from Norfolk to the Eastern Mediterranean
Sea is approximately 4,800 nautical miles and could be covered in
about
10 days. The conventional carrier would have arrived with over 40
percent of fuel remaining and would not have needed refueling during
the transit. The carrier could steam another 2 days at a constant 20
knots before reaching 30 percent of capacity (consuming about 6
percent of capacity per day). Once refueled the carrier could
operate about another 12 days at a constant 20 knots before again
reaching 30 percent. The destroyer and cruiser escorts of both
battle groups would arrive with between 53 and 90 percent of their
fuel remaining, depending on the type of ship and interval since
their last at-sea refueling. The AOE supporting each battle group
would have about 54,000 barrels of ship fuel remaining when arriving
on station, if no other Combat Logistics Force support was provided.
In another instance, the distance from Norfolk to the Persian Gulf is
approximately 8,600 nautical miles and could be covered in about 18
days. The conventional carrier would arrive in the Persian Gulf with
about 65 percent of its fuel remaining, having been refueled once
during the voyage. We estimated that the carrier could operate
another 6 days at
20 knots before reaching 30 percent fuel remaining. The AOE would
have enough capacity to refuel the DDG-51s twice but could only
refuel the CG-47s and DD-963s once, if not refueled itself during the
voyage. The DDG-51s would arrive in the Persian Gulf with about 80
percent fuel remaining, while the CG-47s would have about 30 percent
fuel remaining. The DD-963s would not be able to reach the Persian
Gulf. In this case, either the AOE would need to be refueled or
another oiler, such as a T-AO-187, would need to accompany the battle
group. In the latter case, all combatant ships would reach the
Persian Gulf with over 60 percent fuel on board, and the oilers would
have over 55,000 barrels remaining. On this voyage, the carrier
would require about 25 percent of the replenishment fuel, while the
escorts would require the remainder. The CG-47s and the DDG-51s in a
nuclear carrier battle group would arrive at nearly full fuel
capacity, having been replenished two and three times, respectively,
while the DD-963s would have about 65 percent fuel remaining. The
AOE, however, would essentially be empty. We believe that on a
voyage of this distance, either the AOE would be replenished itself
at some point or another oiler would accompany the battle group.
Additionally, the distance from San Diego to the Persian Gulf is
about 12,000 nautical miles and could be covered in about 25 days at
a sustained speed of 20 knots. With the refueling support of one AOE
and no additional Combat Logistics Force ships, only the carrier in
the conventional battle group would reach the Persian Gulf. It would
have about 25 percent fuel remaining. None of the conventional
battle group's escorts would reach the Gulf. In the case of the
nuclear carrier battle group, the CG-47s would arrive with about 40
percent fuel remaining, and the DDG-51s would have about 15 percent
fuel remaining. The DD-963s would run out of fuel before reaching
the Gulf. A voyage of this distance would most likely require
additional Combat Logistics Force support. If another oiler, such as
a T-AO-187, accompanies each battle group, all the ships of both
battle groups reach the Persian Gulf with no additional support
provided. The conventional carrier would arrive with about 70
percent fuel remaining, while the escorts would have from about 40 to
85 percent fuel remaining. The conventional battle group's two
oilers, however, would essentially be out of fuel, unless they were
resupplied during the voyage. In this example, the conventional
carrier required about 35 percent of the battle group's overall
underway refueling requirement. In the nuclear carrier battle group,
the escorts would also have between 40 and 85 percent of their fuel
remaining, and the two oilers would have about 65,000 barrels
remaining.
--------------------
\1 Center for Naval Analyses Report 205, Sizing the Combat Logistic
Force, June 1993. The Center for Naval Analyses used 1990 and 1991
fleet data contained in the Navy Energy Usage Reporting System for
fuel consumption, and aircraft fuel and ordnance consumption based on
the final days of Operation Desert Storm.
\2 Station ships travel with carrier battle groups. They carry
petroleum products, ordnance, and other supplies and are generally
replenished by shuttle ships operating from land-based facilities
worldwide.
COMPARISON OF THE TRANSIT TIME OF
CONVENTIONALLY AND NUCLEAR-POWERED
CARRIERS RESPONDING TO SELECTED
CRISES
========================================================== Appendix IV
We examined the movement of carriers that responded to several crisis
situations in this decade to compare the transit times of
conventionally and nuclear-powered ships. The crises examined were
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, U.N. operations in Somalia in
1993, threatening Iraqi troop movements toward Kuwait in 1994, and
operations in Bosnia in 1995. We also examined the transits of
carriers responding to the crisis caused by Iraq's violation of the
�no-fly-zone� over southern Iraq in October 1997 and actions taken in
January 1998 to maintain a two-carrier presence in the Persian Gulf.
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1
When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the nuclear-powered
U.S.S. Eisenhower (CVN-69) was in port in Naples, Italy. The
carrier traveled about 1,040 nautical miles to Port Said, Egypt, from
August 3-7, a period of 5 days, and later moved through the Suez
Canal into the Red Sea. The conventional powered U.S.S.
Independence (CV-62) was operating near Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean when the invasion began. The Independence arrived in the Gulf
of Oman on August 5th, covering about 2,200 nautical miles in 3 to 4
days. Considering the time taken to travel this distance, the
Independence would probably have made the voyage at a sustained speed
of between 24 and 32 knots.
Table IV.1 summarizes the transit times of six other carriers that
sailed from ports in the United States and Japan and participated in
Desert Storm.
Table IV.1
Steaming Time/Speed of Carriers
Deploying to Desert Shield/Storm
Depart Arrive Days
-------------- --------------- -------------
Net
Distan Elaps Underw speed Rema
From Date At Date ce ed ay \a rks
Carrier ------- ----- -- -------- ----- ------ ----- ------ ----- ----
Midway Yokosuk 10/ Gulf of 11/ 6,495 30 24 11.3 3-
(CV- a, 02/ Oman 01/ day
41) Japan 90 90 port
visi
ts
at
Subi
c
Bay
and
at
Sing
apor
e
Saratog Mayport 08/ Red Sea 08/ 5,867 15 14 17.5 Assu
a (CV- , Fla. 07/ 22/ mes
60) 90 90 a 1-
day
dela
y to
tran
sit
Suez
Cana
l
San 12/ Strait 01/ 11,666 38 33 14.7 5-
Rangers Diego, 08/ of 15/ day
(CV- Calif. 90 Hormuz 91 port
61) visi
t at
Subi
c
Bay;
assu
mes
no
othe
r
stop
s in
rout
e
Norfolk 12/ Red Sea 01/ 5,527 18 17 13.5 Assu
America , Va. 28/ 15/ mes
(CV- 90 91 a 1-
66) day
dela
y to
tran
sit
Suez
Cana
l
Red Sea 02/ Persian 02/ 3,450 7 7 21.1
07/ Gulf 14/
91 91
Norfolk 08/ Red Sea 09/ 5,527 30 27 8.5\b 2-
Kennedy , Va. 15/ 14/ day
(CV- 90 90 port
67) visi
t to
Alex
andr
ia,
Egyp
t,
also
assu
mes
a 1-
day
dela
y to
tran
sit
Suez
Cana
l
Rooseve Norfolk 12/ Red Sea 01/ 5,527 17 16 14.4 Assu
lt , Va. 28/ 14/ mes
(CVN- 90 91 a 1-
71) day
dela
y to
tran
sit
Suez
Cana
l
Red Sea 01/ Persian 01/ 3,540 7 7 21.1
14/ Gulf 21/
91 91
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Net steaming speed was derived from the total elapsed days minus
days spent in port and/or awaiting to transit the Suez Canal,
multiplied by 24 (hours), divided into the distance.
\b The Kennedy spent about 7 days in the Virginia Capes operating
area conducting battle group training and carrier landing
qualifications before proceeding eastward. If this time is not
counted as days underway toward the Red Sea, then the ship's transit
speed was 11.5 knots.
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
COMPARISON OF THE VOYAGES OF
THE LINCOLN AND THE AMERICA
SUPPORTING U.N. OPERATIONS IN
SOMALIA (1993)
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2
The U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) operating in the Persian Gulf
supporting Operation Southern Watch was ordered to move to the coast
of Somalia to support U.N. operations on October 7, 1993. The
Lincoln moved through the Straits of Hormuz on October 8 and arrived
off the coast of Mogadishu, Somalia, 4 days later, on October 12th.
We estimate that the Lincoln would have traveled at a sustained speed
of 19 knots to cover the approximately 1,800 nautical miles from the
Straits of Hormuz to Somalia in 4 days. The Lincoln operated off the
coast of Somalia until November 4, 1993.
The U.S.S. America (CV-66) was operating in the Adriatic Sea
supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when
ordered on October 27, 1993, to relieve the Lincoln operating off the
coast of Somalia. The America traveled from the Adriatic Sea to the
Mediterranean Sea entrance to the Suez Canal, in about 2 days,
covering a distance of about 1,040 nautical miles, which equated to a
sustained speed of about 22 knots. The America completed the Suez
Canal transit on October 30th and reached the coast of Somalia on
November 4th. We estimate that if the America traveled about 2,400
nautical miles from the Suez Canal to the coast of Somalia in about 5
days, it could have done so at a sustained speed of about 20 knots.
We estimate that the America would have completed the total trip with
about 60 percent of its propulsion fuel remaining if no refueling had
taken place.
COMPARISON OF THE TRANSIT OF
THE WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER 1994,
AND A TRANSIT OF SIMILAR LENGTH
BY AMERICA IN DECEMBER 1995
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3
When Iraq moved two divisions of the Republican Guard south of the
Euphrates River, toward Kuwait, in early October 1994, the President,
faced with the imminent possibility of another Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, directed that U.S. forces be dispatched to the region. This
effort was called Operation Vigilant Warrior. Included among those
forces was the
U.S.S. George Washington (CVN-73), the closest American aircraft
carrier to the Middle East, operating in the Adriatic Sea. Two other
carriers were also deployed at sea at that time but were much farther
away; the
U.S.S. America (CV-66) was operating near Haiti, and the
U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63) was operating near Korea.
The George Washington battle group was ordered to move to the Persian
Gulf on the evening of October 7, 1994, and arrived in the Red Sea on
October 10th.\1 The George Washington, with one escort, continued to
proceed around the Arabian Peninsula, arriving in the Persian Gulf on
October 14th.\2 According to a Center for Naval Analyses study,\3 the
George Washington averaged about 25.6 knots, excluding the time spent
waiting to transit the Suez Canal and actually transiting the canal.
By comparison, the U.S.S. America made a similar voyage, but in the
opposite direction, from the Persian Gulf to the Adriatic Sea in
December 1995. The America began the voyage on December 2nd,
transited the Suez Canal on December 9th, and was in position in the
Adriatic Sea on December 11, 1995, in time for the signing of the
peace agreement between the fighting Balkan factions. Assuming that
this voyage took 8 full steaming days, excluding the time associated
with transiting the Suez Canal, the America would have covered the
nearly 4,200 nautical miles at a sustained speed of about 22 knots.
If the America had steamed at the same sustained speed (26 knots) as
the
George Washington did during Vigilant Warrior, a speed within its
capability, it would have arrived with about 33 percent fuel
remaining if there was no refueling during the voyage. With one
refueling, the
U.S.S. America would have taken about 2 hours longer than the
George Washington to cover the same distance but would have arrived
with full fuel tanks.
--------------------
\1 Once in the Red Sea, attack aircraft from the U.S.S. George
Washington, or any other carrier, could have reached targets in
southern Iraq with refueling by aerial tankers. Also, on October
10th, Saddam Hussein announced that the Republican Guard divisions
would withdraw, and they began to move northward soon afterwards.
\2 Several dozen Air Force tactical aircraft arrived in the theater
about the same time as did the
U.S.S. George Washington. On October 8th, Air Force units at
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and Pope Air Force Base, North
Carolina, were alerted to deploy, but their aircraft were held at
their bases pending final basing arrangements with Saudi Arabia. The
Langley fighters arrived in Saudi Arabia on
October 11th, while the Pope aircraft arrived on October 13th and
15th, after completing approximately 17-hour flights.
\3 Exploring Alternative Paths for Future Sea-Based TACAIR Platforms,
Report CAB 95-62, July 1995.
COMPARISON OF THE TRANSIT OF
THE
NIMITZ IN OCTOBER 1997, AND A
SIMILAR TRANSIT BY THE
INDEPENDENCE IN
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1998
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:4
On October 1, 1997, after Iraqi aircraft had violated the southern
�no-fly-zone,� the U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68) was ordered to proceed to
the Persian Gulf at best speed. The carrier had completed a port
visit to Hong Kong and was scheduled to visit Singapore before
heading for the Persian Gulf. According to the Navy, the Nimitz
completed this 5,500 nautical mile transit in 11 days at an average
speed of advance of about
21 knots. Our review of transit data indicated the carrier spent
about 39 percent of the voyage at 27 knots and above. The carrier's
longest sustained steaming period at or above 27 knots was one 9-hour
period. The Navy reported that the Nimitz was able to conduct flight
operations on 6 of the 11 transit days. The carrier arrived in the
Persian Gulf on October 11, 1997.
On January 23, 1998, the U.S.S. Independence (CV-62) was ordered to
transit from Japan to the Persian Gulf to replace the Nimitz, which
was scheduled to return to the U.S. for a scheduled comprehensive
refueling overhaul. Our analysis of transit data for the
Independence indicated the carrier averaged over 24 knots during the
voyage and spent over 70 percent of the time at 27 knots and above.
During various parts of the transit, the ship sustained speeds of 27
knots and above for several lengthy periods of time, including 42,
31, and 27 continuous hours. Our review of transit data indicated
that aircraft flew on at least 5 days of the transit, the last period
ending late in the evening of February 4, 1998, the night before the
ship entered the Persian Gulf. The ship slowed down to speeds of 14
knots or less to conduct fuel replenishments and make periodic course
and speed changes to conduct flight operations.
OPERATIONS OF CARRIERS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR
=========================================================== Appendix V
An October 1995 report on the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
Classification Review included a discussion of the impact of nuclear
propulsion in the Gulf War. The report stated:
"During this war the U.S. had unchallenged use of the oceans.
Over 85 percent of the war supplies were transported by ocean,
halfway around the world. Accomplishing this required complete
control of the sea. A few enemy nuclear-powered submarines
could have significantly disrupted our supply lines.
Nuclear-powered submarines with their covert capability provided
platforms for launching cruise missile strikes without concern
for detection prior to launch. The nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers provided U.S. Commanders with platforms for aircraft
strikes that could be located for sustained periods in areas of
the Middle East not available by land. If Iraq had obtained
access to nuclear propulsion technology and had developed
nuclear-powered submarines, it would have significantly impacted
the course of the war."
Our analysis of carrier operations and support during Operation
Desert Storm did not reveal any significant differences between the
nuclear-powered carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and five
conventionally powered carriers, including the World War II-vintage
U.S.S. Midway (CV-41), that could be attributed to nuclear
propulsion. Although aircraft from the Roosevelt flew more missions
than any other Desert Storm carrier, this was due to several factors
independent of the propulsion system, including the distance to
targets and the number and mix of aircraft aboard each carrier. When
the number of assigned aircraft is considered, the number of sorties
generated by each carrier is almost identical.
Our analysis also indicated that the Navy supported all six carriers
in essentially the same manner. Despite the nuclear carrier's
greater jet fuel and ordnance capacity, and its reduced reliance on
logistics support, the Roosevelt did not operate for longer intervals
between replenishment actions than the conventional carriers.
Instead, all of the carriers were replenished at about the same
frequency, well before fuel and ordnance reached critical levels.
MISSIONS GENERATED BY EACH
CARRIER WERE COMPARABLE FOR THE
REGIONS IN WHICH THEY OPERATED
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1
When Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, the Navy had
three conventional carriers, U.S.S. America (CV-66),
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), and U.S.S. Saratoga (CV-60),
positioned in the Red Sea and two conventional carriers, U.S.S.
Midway (CV-41) and
U.S.S. Ranger (CV-61), in the Persian Gulf. The nuclear-powered
U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), sailing from the Red Sea to the
Persian Gulf when hostilities began, did not begin to strike targets
until January 22nd. The Navy operated three carriers each in the Red
Sea and Persian Gulf for about 3 weeks until the America moved to the
Persian Gulf in mid-February 1991, shifting the number of carriers in
each operating area to two and four ships, respectively.
Navy fixed-wing carrier-based aircraft flew over 18,000 sorties
during the war, according to statistics developed by Center for Naval
Analyses in an analysis of Desert Storm carrier operations. Aircraft
from the Red Sea Battle Force flew nearly 6,200 sorties (one-third of
the sorties), while aircraft from the Persian Gulf Battle Force flew
nearly 11,800 sorties. We believe that the significant differences
in the operations of the two battle forces were largely driven by the
ranges to their targets. The Red Sea carriers were about 400 to 600
nautical miles away from their targets. Their aircraft had to fly
even greater distances to get to and from aerial tanker positions and
to use specific entry and exit corridors to reach the targets. The
Persian Gulf carriers, on the other hand, launched many missions to
the coastal region and were generally closer to their targets than
the Red Sea carriers. As a result, the Persian Gulf carriers
generally launched more sorties of shorter duration. As the war
progressed, the Persian Gulf carriers moved further north in the
Gulf, reducing strike ranges even more. The shorter distances
allowed the carriers to shift into cyclic operations and generate
many more sorties in the same span of time. In addition, the
America's move to the Persian Gulf increased the number of carriers
to four and added further to the total sorties generated by those
carriers.
Because of the extended ranges involved during attacks on Iraq,
carrier-based aircraft required refueling from land-based tankers.
Aircraft from the Red Sea carriers relied on land-based tankers for
the duration of the war. In the Persian Gulf, the carriers were
initially positioned about 280 nautical miles southeast of Kuwait
City. As the war progressed and the threat of Iraqi air and missile
attacks on the Persian Gulf carriers diminished, the carriers moved
farther north, reducing their dependence on land-based tankers. By
the start of the ground war in late February, the carriers were
positioned about 185 nautical miles southeast of Kuwait City. After
the carriers' arrival in the northernmost operating areas, Navy
refueling aircraft provided all refueling for Persian Gulf naval air
strikes.
The total sorties generated by each carrier, as well as the average
number of sorties flown during the war, are shown in table V.1. The
Kennedy and the Saratoga operated in the Red Sea during the entire
period, while the Midway, the Ranger, and the Roosevelt operated in
the Persian Gulf. The America began the war in the Red Sea but moved
to the Persian Gulf in mid-February for the final stages of the war.
Table V.1
Average Sorties Per Day Per Carrier
During Desert Storm (43 days)
Sarato Roosev
Midway ga Ranger Americ Kenned elt
(CV- (CV- (CV9- a (CV- y (CV- (CV-
41) 60) 61) 66) 67) 71) Total
------------------------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Total sorties 3,019 2,374 3,329 2,672 2,574 4,149 18,117
================================================================================
Daily average 70.2 55.2 77.4 62.1 59.9 96.5 421.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis of Center for Naval Analyses data.
NUMBER OF SORTIES GENERATED BY
INDIVIDUAL CARRIERS WERE
PROPORTIONAL TO THE SIZE OF
THEIR AIR WINGS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:2
The number of aircraft assigned to each carrier varied considerably
and had a direct impact on the sorties generated by each carrier.
When the average number of sorties per assigned aircraft are
compared, there is little difference between carriers operating in
the same area (see
table V.2). Although the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
launched the most sorties of any carrier (4,149), the ship, along
with the
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), had the most aircraft assigned--78
aboard each carrier. Since the Roosevelt operated in the Persian
Gulf, considerably closer to assigned targets than the Kennedy in the
Red Sea, it was able to generate more sorties. On the other end of
the spectrum, the World War II-vintage U.S.S. Midway (CV-41) had
only 56 aircraft assigned (nearly 30 percent less than the
Roosevelt), the least of any carrier, followed by the U.S.S. Ranger
(CV-61) with 62 aircraft.
When sorties are compared based on the number of aircraft assigned,
the sortie generation rates are nearly identical between the
carriers. The significant differences are between the Red Sea and
Persian Gulf carriers. When carriers in the same region are
compared, their sortie generation rates are also almost identical.
The Kennedy and the
U.S.S. Saratoga (CV-60), which operated in the Red Sea for all of
Desert Storm, each averaged 33 sorties per aircraft. The three
full-time Persian Gulf carriers, Midway, Ranger, and Roosevelt, each
averaged about 53 sorties per aircraft.
Table V.2
Comparison of the Average Number of
Sorties Generated By Each Carrier
Midway Saratoga Ranger America Kennedy Roosevelt Tota
(CV-41) (CV-60) (CV-61) (CV-66) (CV-67) (CVN-71) l
-- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ====
================================================================================
To 3,019 2,374 3,329 2,672 2,574 4,149 18,1
t 17
a
l
s
o
r
t
i
e
s
Aircraft
assigned:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F- 0 20 20 20 20 20 100
14
F/ 30 18 0 18 0 19 85
A-
1
8
A- 14 14 22 14 13 18 95
6E
A- 0 0 0 0 24 0 24
7
E- 4 4 4 4 5 4 25
2
EA 4 4 4 5 5 5 27
-
6
B
KA 4 4 4 4 3 4 23
-
6
D
S- 0 8 8 8 8 8 40
3B
================================================================================
To 56 72 62 73 78 78 419
t
a
l
================================================================================
Av 53.9 33.0 53.7 36.6 33.0 53.2 43.2
e
r
a
g
e
s
o
r
t
i
e
s
p
e
r
a
i
r
c
r
a
f
t
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis of Center for Naval Analyses data.
CARRIERS OPERATED ON A ROTATING
BASIS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:3
Although Navy aircraft flew sorties every day throughout Desert
Storm, none of the carriers operated around-the-clock. Instead, they
rotated on an operating schedule that enabled them to have intervals
of off-duty time. According to the Center for Naval Analyses data,
the three carriers initially operating in the Red Sea, the U.S.S.
America (CV-66), the
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), and the U.S.S. Saratoga (CV-60),
followed a rotating schedule with two carriers conducting flight
operations while the third stood down for 2 days. When the America
departed for the Persian Gulf on February 7th, the remaining two
carriers continued to operate with periodic stand-down intervals. In
the Persian Gulf, the
U.S.S. Midway (CV-41), the U.S.S. Ranger (CV-61), and the
U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) also followed a rotating
operating schedule. Each carrier conducted air operations for
approximately
15 hours during a 24-hour interval. During the remaining 9 hours of
a 24-hour interval, one carrier suspended air operations. The
Ranger's and Roosevelt's on-duty periods occurred during opposite
portions of the 24-hour interval--with 3 hours of concurrent
operations during turnovers. The Midway's on-duty period was roughly
centered on one of Ranger's and Roosevelt's turnovers. The Center
for Naval Analyses reported that there were only 6 days during the
war when all six carriers operated. The rest of the time usually
four or five carriers were on line while others stood down.
AVERAGE SORTIES PER OPERATING
DAY WERE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY
DIFFERENT AMONG THE CARRIERS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:4
When daily sortie rates were based on the number of days each carrier
operated, there was a significant increase in average sorties. As
shown in table V.3, the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) led all
carriers, averaging about 106 sorties per day. The smallest and
oldest carrier, the
U.S.S. Midway (CV-41), averaged about 89 sorties, 17 less than the
Roosevelt, but did so with 22 fewer aircraft. When we factored in
the number of assigned aircraft to average number of sorties per
operating day, the Midway led all carriers. The Midway averaged 1.59
sorties per aircraft per operating day, followed by the U.S.S.
Ranger (CV-61) with an average of 1.41 sorties, and the Roosevelt
with 1.36 sorties.
Table V.3
Average Sorties Per Operating Day
Generated By Each Carrier
Midwa Sarato Range Ameri Kenned Roosev
y ga r ca y elt
(CV- (CV- (CV- (CV- (CV- (CVN-
41) 60) 61) 66) 67) 71)
------------------------- ----- ------ ----- ----- ------ ------
Total sorties 3,019 2,374 3,329 2,672 2,574 4,149
Aircraft assigned 56 72 62 73 78 78
Operating days 34 33 38 31 31 39
Average sorties per 88.8 71.9 87.6 86.2 83.0 106.4
operating day
======================================================================
Average operating day 1.59 1.00 1.41 1.18 1.07 1.36
sorties per aircraft
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis of Center for Naval Analyses data.
LOGISTICS SUPPORT WAS
COMPARABLE FOR ALL CARRIERS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:5
The Navy committed about 40 percent of its Combat Logistics Force
ships--combat stores ships, oilers, ammunition supply ships, and
multicommodity fast combat support ships--to Desert Storm. Each of
the carrier battle groups was assigned its own dedicated support
ships, to the extent possible, that remained on station with its
battle group and enabled frequent replenishment of fuel and ordnance.
According to Center for Naval Analyses, all carriers were replenished
at about the same frequency, approximately every 3 to 3-1/2 days.
The Center for Naval Analyses concluded that the increased capacity
for ordnance and aviation fuel in the nuclear design was not
sufficient to untether the battle force from the logistics pipeline.
It also concluded that the hoped for increase in freedom of
operational employment for nuclear carriers was restricted by the
fossil fuel dependence of their accompanying surface combatants.
FUEL REPLENISHMENT DURING
DESERT STORM WAS COMPARABLE FOR
NUCLEAR- AND CONVENTIONALLY
POWERED CARRIERS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:6
According to the Center for Naval Analyses, which published several
studies related to Desert Storm, the frequency that aviation fuel was
replenished was essentially the same for all carriers, including the
U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), even though nuclear-powered
carriers have about 1.7 million more gallons of aviation fuel storage
capacity. Table V.4 shows that aviation fuel was replenished about
every
3 days for the carriers operating in the Persian Gulf.
Table V.4
Frequency of Aviation Fuel Replenishment
by Persian Gulf Carriers During January
and February 1991
Roosev
Midway Ranger Americ elt
(CV- (CV- a (CV- (CVN-
41) 61) 66) 71)
-------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Number of replenishments 19 41 6 12
Days in Persian Gulf 59 46 16 40
Replenishment frequency (days) 3.1 3.1 2.7 3.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis of Center for Naval Analyses data.
Similarly, in the Red Sea, the conventionally powered carriers
operating also received aviation fuel every 2 to 3 days. The Center
for Naval Analyses stated that, �In practice, ships are topped-off
whenever other operational demands make it possible.� It reported
that from February 17-27, 1991, the peak period of the air campaign,
aircraft from the Roosevelt consumed an average of over 4,930 barrels
(207,060 gallons) of fuel daily, while
U.S.S. America (CV-66) aircraft consumed about 4,990 barrels
(209,580 gallons) daily. The amount of aviation fuel consumed daily
represented only a small percentage of each carrier's JP-5 capacity.
ORDNANCE WAS ALSO REPLENISHED
FREQUENTLY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:7
According to Center for Naval Analyses, ordnance expenditures by the
Persian Gulf carriers averaged about 49 tons per day per carrier
during the entire war. This rate increased to 116 tons per day
during the 4-day ground offensive. Each Red Sea carrier averaged
about 43 tons per day during the war and 59 tons per day during the
ground war. The smaller Red Sea expenditure rates were probably due
to the smaller number of sorties flown as a result of the longer
distances these aircraft had to fly to reach their targets. Like
fuel, ordnance was also replenished about every 3 days for the
Persian Gulf carriers and about every 1 to 2 days in the Red Sea,
even though the ordnance expended over a 2- to 3-day period was only
a fraction of the ships' storage capacities. For example, according
to Center for Naval Analyses, the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
was rearmed seven times during the last 20 days of February 1991,
receiving over
1,600 tons of ordnance. During this period, the Roosevelt expended
an average of about 2 percent of the capacity (by weight) per day.
The
U.S.S. Ranger (CV-61) was also rearmed seven times over this
interval, even though only about 5 percent of its ordnance capacity
was consumed daily. Similarly, the U.S.S. Midway (CV-41) was
rearmed nine times between January 16 and February 16, 1991, even
though only about 5 percent of its ordnance capacity was expended
daily.
LIST OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER HULL
NUMBERS, NAMES, AND AUTHORIZATION
AND COMMISSIONING AND
DECOMMISSIONING DATES
========================================================== Appendix VI
Fiscal year\a
----------------------------------------------
Authorized Commissioned Decommissioned
---------- -------------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Convention ers
ally
powered
carri
CV-59 U.S.S. Forrestal 1952 1955 1993
CV-60 U.S.S. Saratoga 1953 1956 1994
CV-61 U.S.S. Ranger 1954 1957 1993
CV-62 U.S.S. Independence 1955 1959 1998
CV-63 U.S.S. Kitty Hawk 1956 1961 2008
CV-64 U.S.S. Constellation 1957 1962 2003
CV-66 U.S.S. America 1961 1965 1996
CV-67 U.S.S. John F. 1963 1968 2018
Kennedy
Nuclear-
powered
carriers
CVN-65 U.S.S. Enterprise 1958 1962 2013
CVN-68 U.S.S. Nimitz 1967 1975 2023
CVN-69 U.S.S. Dwight D. 1970 1978
Eisenhower
CVN-70 U.S.S. Carl Vinson 1974 1982
CVN-71 U.S.S. Theodore 1980 1987
Roosevelt
CVN-72 U.S.S. Abraham 1983 1990
Lincoln
CVN-73 U.S.S. George 1983 1992
Washington
CVN-74 U.S.S. John C. 1988 1996
Stennis
CVN-75 U.S.S. Harry S. 1988 1998
Truman
CVN-76 Ronald Reagan \b 1995 2003
CVN-77 Unnamed 2001 2008
CVX-78 Unnamed 2006 2013
CVX-79 Unnamed 2011 2018
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Future years are planning dates subject to nuclear fuel state,
material condition of the ship, and shipyard building schedules.
\b Under construction.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VII
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix VI
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
and 127-133.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are our comments on DOD's letter dated March 30, 1998.
GAO COMMENTS
1. We note that conventionally powered carriers have been upgraded
with new features. During their midlife modernization periods, the
carriers received extensive rehabilitation and upgrading of their
hull, propulsion, auxiliary machinery, electrical and piping systems,
improved radars and communications equipment, and aircraft launch and
recovery systems. Kevlar armor was added to vital spaces. As part
of the Navy's Fleet Modernization Program, the fleet is continuously
upgraded with new weapons and electronics systems, as well as other
features. For example, one of the conventionally powered carriers,
the
U.S.S. Constellation (CV-64), has received several upgrades to its
aviation maintenance equipment; intelligence, combat, engineering,
and navigation systems; and habitability, and it embarks the newest
and most capable aircraft that exist in the Navy. At the time of our
visit to the U.S.S.
Kitty Hawk (CV-63), the commanding officer told us that it had the
most modern systems installed in the command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) area and that its
joint force air component commander (JFACC) is the model for West
coast carriers. Another conventionally powered carrier, the U.S.S.
John F. Kennedy (CV-67), was the first carrier to operationally
deploy with two state-of-the-art intelligence systems, the Battle
Group Passive Horizon Extension System and the Common High Bandwidth
Data Link. The conventionally powered carriers also are scheduled to
receive cooperative engagement capability\1 along with their
nuclear-powered counterparts.
We disagree that a new design conventionally powered carrier would
necessarily result in a larger and heavier ship. The assumptions
underlying this statement disregard the space and weight made
available through adopting new technologies and the reduced personnel
requirements for the ship and its air wing. Personnel reduction
goals for the next carrier ship's force are about 50 percent.
Potential air wing reductions can be illustrated by the personnel
savings expected in replacing F-14A squadrons with two-seat F/A-18E/F
squadrons. An F-14 squadron generally requires 275 maintenance
personnel, while an F/A-18E/F squadron will require about 180, a
reduction of about 35 percent. For an air wing of 2,480 persons,
this could result in a reduction of about 870 persons. Cumulatively,
these reductions are expected to require less demand for hotel
services such as mess halls, berthing, laundry, and food stores and
free up space and weight for aviation fuel and ordnance.
2. We believe the measures of effectiveness we chose are appropriate
for comparing the two types of carriers. Our methodology for
evaluating the effectiveness of conventionally and nuclear-powered
carriers uses performance-based mission outcomes (national security
objectives) as its metric and is not engineering requirements derived
(maximum speed or load carrying capacity). We coordinated our
measures of effectiveness with Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and Navy officials. In fact, some senior Navy officials
said that they believed that our methodology was sound.
3. We do not state that carriers operate exclusively with battle
groups. Rather, we state that a battle group's composition can vary
depending on the mission need. For example, figure 1.1 and related
text shows a CVN �surging� from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf,
with elements of its battle group, including a supporting fast combat
support ship. The carrier left five of its battle group ships in the
Mediterranean Sea, including a nuclear-powered cruiser.
4. Our analysis of the ship deck logs for the U.S.S. Nimitz does
not support DOD's statement. According to the logs, ships of the
U.S.S. Nimitz battle group passed through the Strait of Hormuz
around 6:00 p.m. on March 12, 1996, while the U.S.S. Nimitz exited
the Strait of Hormuz around 10:00 a.m. on March 14, 1996,
approximately a day and a half later. We note that while the U.S.S.
Nimitz and one escort remained in the Gulf, several other ships of
the separate Middle East Task Force operated in the Gulf. The
average transit speed of the U.S.S. Nimitz to the South China Sea
was less than 20 knots.
5. While we agree that conventionally powered carriers are more
dependent on battle group logistics support than nuclear-powered
carriers, we do not agree with DOD that fuel consumption concerns
limit conventionally powered carriers to the slower speeds of
logistics ships. We note that the AOE-class battle group supply ship
can sustain speeds of 30 knots and thus will not limit the transit
speed of the battle group. In situations where an AOE is not
available, the Combat Logistics Force can resupply fuel oil with its
worldwide network of prepositioned oilers. Logistics force planners
and operators told us they knew of no time when a conventionally
powered carrier could not obtain Combat Logistics Force support
during peacetime or crisis. Recently, the conventionally powered
carrier U.S.S. Independence (CV-62) traveled from its homeport in
Yokosuka, Japan, to the Arabian Gulf at an average speed of 24 knots.
During the transit, the ship sustained speeds of at least 27 knots
over two-thirds of the time.
6. We added information on more recent carrier deployments to
appendix IV.
7. Our report states that the maintenance strategy, along with
propulsion type, affects the length of a carrier's employment cycle.
Although the Navy's guidance for accomplishing ship depot-level
maintenance availabilities nominally sets depot intervals, durations,
and mandays by ship class, the Navy has deviated from this guidance
for conventionally powered carriers and nuclear-powered cruisers that
have been grouped by type for at least the last 8 years. We note
that nuclear propulsion maintenance requires exacting and stringent
environmental, health, and safety standards. Our analysis shows
that, under the Navy's current strategy, nuclear-powered surface
ships have longer depot-level maintenance periods than their
conventionally powered counterparts. For example, the typical
post-deployment maintenance period for a nuclear-powered carrier
lasts 6 months and about 62 percent of the work is related to the
propulsion plant. The typical post-deployment yard period for a
conventionally powered carrier is about 3 months. The
nuclear-powered carrier spends more time undergoing propulsion plant
work than the conventionally powered carrier does for all its
maintenance, repairs, and modernization. A similar relationship
exists between conventionally and nuclear-powered surface combatants.
Our analysis also shows that a conventionally powered Aegis cruiser
or Kidd-class guided-missile destroyer spends about one-fourth the
maintenance mandays per deployment as a nuclear-powered cruiser.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that a conventionally powered surface
combatant spends about 16 percent of its time in depot-level
maintenance compared to around 25 percent for a nuclear-powered
cruiser. As shown in table VII.1, the nuclear-powered cruiser
maintenance cycle is more like a conventionally powered carrier than
a conventionally powered cruiser in terms of the time spent in
maintenance (about 25 percent) and mandays of work to perform the
maintenance (about 38,000 mandays after a typical deployment and over
300,000 mandays for a complex overhaul).
Table VII.1
Maintenance Period Characteristics of
Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered
Surface Combatants and Aircraft Carriers
Typical post-
deployment
depot maintenance
period Complex overhaul
-------------------- --------------------
Cycle time in Mandays Mandays
maintenance (thousands (thousands
Ship type (percent) Months ) Months )
------------------ ---------------- -------- ---------- -------- ----------
Surface combatant
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conventionally 16 2-3 10 8.0 48
powered
Nuclear-powered 24 3-4 38 18.0 350
Aircraft carrier
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conventionally 25 3 45 12.0 376
powered
Nuclear-powered 29 6 162 10.5 289
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis of Navy data.
8. The September 1997 Chief of Naval Operations memorandum stated
that to prevent confusion and misunderstanding, the OPNAV Notice
4700\2 is being revised to reflect these comments. The OPNAV Notice
4700 has not been revised to reflect that information.
9. We included information on the arguments that led to the use of
nuclear propulsion for surface ships in the 1960s to provide
important historical context for the debate. We did not discuss the
arguments that culminated in approval of nuclear propulsion for the
Nimitz-class because DOD was unable to provide us with supporting
documentation. However, we understand that many of the arguments in
favor of nuclear propulsion were the same as those presented in the
1960s.
10. While DOD said that the risk and cost associated with developing
the new Aegis capability in parallel with the new design nuclear
propulsion plant were factors in its choice of choosing conventional
power for Aegis cruisers, it provided no evidence to support this
belief. The Secretary of Defense's assessment was that �the military
value of an all nuclear-powered Aegis ship program does not warrant
the increased costs or, alternatively, the reduced forced levels.�
DOD was unable to provide support for its rationale for deciding to
retire the nuclear-powered surface combatants at an average age of 17
years. Instead, it provided Navy point papers that noted adding the
New Threat Upgrade (NTU) will provide extremely capable anti-air
warfare for 10 plus years--combat system capabilities comparable to
AEGIS ships and an engagement range greater than AEGIS (until
introduction of the Standard Missile (SM2) Block 4 to AEGIS
cruisers). The point papers also stated that the nuclear-powered
surface combatants are (1) superior to all surface combatants in
tactical mobility and (2) the only combatant escorts that do not
constrain a CVN battle group's mobility, flexibility, and rapid surge
capability--�an essential element of the future force structure.�
11. We were asked to assess the cost-effectiveness of conventionally
and nuclear-powered carriers and did not perform any comparisons of
the advantages and costs of using nuclear power in surface ships
versus aircraft carriers.
12. Our congressional mandate was to review the cost-effectiveness
of conventionally versus nuclear-powered carriers, not to develop
potential designs for a new carrier or to evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of such designs. We do not agree that a
cost-effectiveness analysis should assume that the next
conventionally or nuclear-powered carrier would have the same
capabilities and features, nor do we agree that the highest end
technology should be assumed in the analysis. Rather, the goal of
designing a new carrier is to build a system with the capability
necessary to meet U.S. national security objectives. We also note
that the Center for Naval Analyses used a methodology similar to ours
in some preliminary work it did for the Navy as the Navy began to
assess its future carrier needs. This historical perspective covered
a wide range of peacetime forward presence, crisis response, and
war-fighting scenarios that both types of carriers have faced for
over two decades. We believe this provides a sound foundation for
evaluating the relative cost and effectiveness of these two ship
types.
Although DOD said that the current assessment of a new carrier design
would include various features, including new fossil fuel and
nuclear-powered designs, we note that in the 1998 Navy Posture
Statement, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval
Operations state, �This next generation nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier is scheduled to begin construction in 2006. . .� and �CVX
will be the most technologically advanced nuclear-powered carrier the
Navy has ever developed.�
13. We believe the report adequately addresses the support required
for both types of carriers. For example, it specifically states that
nuclear-powered carriers can transit long distances faster because,
unlike conventionally powered carriers, they do not need to slow for
underway replenishment of propulsion fuel. It also included a table
comparing nuclear and conventionally powered carrier transit times
that highlights refueling requirements for conventionally powered
carriers. We note that DOD's comment that operational commanders
task the closest or next-to-deploy carrier rather than selecting a
particular carrier is consistent with our finding that the carrier's
type of propulsion is not a critical factor in making employment
decisions. We also note that the vast majority of Navy ships are
fossil fuel-powered, thereby necessitating a continuous logistics
presence. In fact, the Navy has specifically designed and
strategically located its logistics infrastructure to provide
continuous support to peacetime and wartime naval operations.
Elements of the logistics infrastructure include naval depots,
inventory control points, distribution centers and bases in the
United States; advanced overseas support bases located in or near the
theater of operations; and a highly mobile fleet of Combat Logistics
Force ships that carry a broad range of supplies. Logistics planning
to provide that support is a continuous, organized process, performed
in parallel with naval operations planning.
A recent example that we believe demonstrates the timeliness and
effectiveness of the Navy's worldwide logistics infrastructure was
the unanticipated deployment of the conventionally powered
U.S.S. Independence from Japan to the Persian Gulf in January 1998,
during a confrontation with Iraq, to relieve the U.S.S. Nimitz. On
January 21, 1998, the Secretary of Defense ordered the U.S.S.
Independence to depart for the Persian Gulf. The carrier got
underway on January 23, 1998, and conducted a high-speed transit to
the Persian Gulf, arriving on February 5, 1998. During the voyage,
the carrier was replenished by three separate Military Sealift
Command tankers, already prepositioned in the western Pacific and
Indian Ocean areas. Crisis logistics planning enabled the tankers to
rendezvous with the carrier to provide needed replenishment without
hindering the carrier's ability to respond in a timely manner to
fulfill its tasking.
14. Our analysis shows that a conventionally powered carrier
steaming at 28 knots would cover 6,740 nautical miles (a distance
equivalent to that from Norfolk to the Red Sea) in about 9-1/2 days
and arrive with
77 percent of its propulsion fuel remaining. We project that the
AOE-6 would still have over 11,700 barrels of DFM remaining to give
to other ships. (Our analysis assumed that the AOE-6 had a maximum
capacity of 93,600 barrels of DFM. Of this amount, 30,950 barrels
would be needed for the AOE-6's own propulsion, leaving 62,650
barrels available to refuel other ships--the carrier would need
50,893 barrels.)\3
Our calculations were based on published fuel consumption rates from
the ships' engineering manuals, fuel capacities from ship manuals,
and the distances cited in the example. We calculated burn rates
based upon the more demanding 28-knot transit vice DOD's 26-knot rate
and we assumed that the carrier would be refueled when its DFM levels
reached 70 percent of its capacity. Our analysis is very
conservative because our burn rates assumed all eight boilers being
on-line when only five boilers need to be on-line to sustain a
28-knot speed for the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67).
15. Subsequent to providing written comments on our draft report,
DOD provided adjusted maintenance data that showed conventionally
powered carriers were in depot- level maintenance about 32 percent of
the time (26 percent when adjusted for the Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP) and the Nimitz-class ships were in depot-level
maintenance about 27 percent of the time.
After receiving DOD's comments, we re-examined our methodology but
could not replicate DOD's results. Our original results
remained--each carrier type spent about 30 percent of its
�unadjusted� time from October 1, 1984, to December 31, 1996, in
depot-level maintenance availabilities.\4 We also examined two other
time periods to gauge the variability of the results. According to
our calculations, from October 1, 1982, through December 31, 1996,
conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers were in the shipyards for
depot-level maintenance 31 percent and 30 percent of the time,
respectively, while accounting for 30 percent of the time for both
carrier types from October 1, 1983, through December 31, 1996.
In our draft report, we stated that, after adjusting for the time
they spent in SLEP, the conventionally powered carriers collectively
would have spent about 23 percent from October 1, 1984, through
December 31, 1996, in depot-level maintenance--about 7 percent less
than the nuclear-powered carriers. After receiving DOD's comments,
we re-examined and modified our methodology for making the SLEP
adjustment. According to our revised calculations, the
conventionally powered carriers would have spent about 24 percent of
their time in depot-level maintenance, about 6 percent less than the
nuclear-powered carriers. Our adjustments have been incorporated
into the report, and our methodology for adjusting SLEP time is
discussed in appendix I.
We also examined the effect that refueling overhauls would have on
the time that the nuclear-powered carriers would spend in depot-level
maintenance. According to current maintenance schedules, starting in
mid-1998 and ending in mid-2007, one of the Nimitz-class carriers
will be almost continually undergoing a refueling overhaul, a
situation analogous to the conventionally powered carrier SLEPs in
the 1980s and early 1990s (the notional durations of both a refueling
overhaul and a SLEP is
32 months). We found, that from October 1, 1997, through December
31, 2007, the nuclear-powered carriers will spend about 32 percent of
their collective time undergoing depot-level maintenance in a
shipyard--about 2 percent more than during the original time period.
The two operating conventionally powered carriers will spend about 19
percent of their time undergoing depot-level maintenance in a
shipyard during this period.
16. We agree that, within the time period we examined, six of nine
conventionally powered carriers were inactivated or were within 5
years of inactivation and that these ships would have received less
maintenance and modernization. However, because of the timing of the
inactivation decision and the actual inactivation, there would have
been insufficient time to significantly decrease the amount of
maintenance and modernization on the ships prior to their
inactivation. For example, the decision to inactivate the Forrestal
(CV-59), the Saratoga (CV-60), and the Ranger (CV-61) was first
reflected in documents supporting DOD's Fiscal Year 1992 Future Year
Defense Plan. The Forrestal and the Ranger were decommissioned in
1993 and the Saratoga was decommissioned in 1994.
These three ships underwent regularly scheduled, and in some cases,
extensive maintenance. For example, the Saratoga, underwent a
comprehensive 15.9 month overhaul starting in January 1988 that
lasted about 1-1/2 months longer than the average overhaul for all
conventionally powered carriers. It also underwent SRAs that were
longer than average SRAs in 1991 and 1993. Also, the Navy has
approved modernization on carriers that are within 5 years of
inactivation. For example, as we reported in 1997, the Navy plans to
install an improved ship self-defense system on the U.S.S. Kitty
Hawk in 2003, 5 years before its inactivation.\5 According to a
carrier maintenance planning official, modernizations necessary for
safe and effective operation can be and are applied to a carrier
within 5 years of its inactivation, and the ship must be maintained
so that it can complete its deployments.
We agree that the Kitty Hawk/Kennedy-class carriers were older and
may have required more maintenance. Those carriers were, on average,
three times as old as the ships of the Nimitz-class, over the actual
maintenance periods we examined. Because older ships require more
maintenance, the data for the Kitty Hawk/Kennedy-class ships may
reflect a lower availability than would the same ships if they were
of similar age to the Nimitz-class.
17. Our work shows that nuclear-powered carriers spend more time in
maintenance than do conventionally powered carriers. A key reason
for the difference is propulsion plant work. According to the Navy's
standard maintenance planning factors, a nuclear-powered carrier
requires about 613,000 mandays of depot-level maintenance to complete
three deployments, about 32 percent more than the 466,000 mandays a
conventionally powered carrier requires. A carrier maintenance
planning official said propulsion plant maintenance accounts for
about 44 percent of the total repair mandays on both conventionally
and nuclear-powered carriers. Moreover, according to a Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard carrier maintenance report, in a nuclear-powered
carrier's predominate post-deployment major maintenance period of 6
months, about 100,000 of the 162,000 notional mandays of work would
involve nuclear propulsion plant work. Additionally, a document
discussing the factors that must be considered when planning aircraft
carrier maintenance ranked propulsion type as the second most
important factor, after operational requirements.
18. DOD's assessment of the role maintenance schedules play in a
ship's employment cycle relates more to conditions in a crisis
situation vice normal peacetime operations. To illustrate, Navy
doctrine, as outlined in Naval Warfare Publication 1, Strategic
Concepts of the U.S. Navy, states that the length of the employment
cycle for each ship class is based on the depot-level maintenance
requirements for that class of ship. A regular maintenance program
is essential so that operational commanders have ships with the
material condition and capabilities to fight and win wars.
Furthermore, Navy guidance contained in the Chief of Naval
Operation's OPNAV Notice 4700, which provides definitive guidance
concerning depot-level maintenance availabilities, states that ships
shall accomplish depot maintenance availabilities at the notional
intervals, durations, and repair mandays set forth. It also states
that the durations specified provide the best notional estimates for
long-range programming. To ensure compatibility with the ship's
employment schedule and to facilitate depot work loading, it
authorizes minor deviations from the notional depot availability
interval.
Commenting on the challenges of providing peacetime presence
requirements and the relationship of ship maintenance and deployment
schedules, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, recently
stated,
"The degree of attention required to manage many operational
variables--maintenance, training, operating tempo (OPTEMPO),
personnel percentage of time in homeport (PERSTEMPO), personnel
rotation, new contingencies--is growing, and we are often forced
to make tradeoffs...If scheduled maintenance for a ship gets
delayed it directly impacts the maintenance, training, or
PERSTEMPO of other ships." \6
The Eisenhower's experience during Desert Shield illustrates the
degree of coordination between deployment needs and scheduled
maintenance periods. The Eisenhower was not retained in the theater
during the initial stages of uncertainty after the 1990 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, but it returned to Norfolk for a previously
scheduled maintenance period.
19. DOD's conclusion that the Navy will maintain a force of 12
carriers is based on an analysis of naval force structure options
that it performed during its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Using
the Navy's Force Presence Model, DOD analyzed various aircraft
carrier force structure options and compared them to the forward
presence currently provided in the U.S. European Command, U.S.
Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility.
DOD concluded that a force of 11 active aircraft carriers plus one
operational Reserve/training carrier was necessary to satisfy current
policy for forward deployed carriers and accommodate real world
scheduling constraints.
Our analysis of the comparative number of conventionally and
nuclear-powered carriers needed to meet overseas presence
requirements was based on the Navy's Force Presence Model, which was
also used in the QDR. Specifically, we used standard assumptions
relating to carrier type maintenance cycle, average speed of advance,
distance, PERSTEMPO restrictions, and length of deployments. We did
not postulate what future carrier type maintenance cycles may or may
not be in terms of mandays or durations. Although the maintenance
strategy for conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers can be
similar, the actual maintenance requirements for nuclear-powered
carriers are very different than those for conventionally powered
carriers. For example, carrier maintenance experts have told us that
if an oil-fired steam boiler carrier were moved from its existing
maintenance strategy, the EOC to an IMP type cycle, its profile would
probably consist of two 4-month PIAs followed by a 8-month DPIA
compared to the two 6-month PIAs followed by a 10.5-month DPIA for
the nuclear-powered carriers.
20. Our analysis was intended to present a notional comparison of
the differences in time between the two carrier types to cover the
same distances at the same speeds when factoring in the impact of
underway replenishment. We recognize that neither type would sustain
high speeds during an entire long-distance voyage. Both types of
carriers adjust their speed to control for the proper amount of
wind-over-the-deck for air operations; accomplish underway
replenishment; conduct propulsion plant drills, and rudder swing
checks; and adjust to weather conditions. Nevertheless, both types
of carriers can steam at high speeds and have demonstrated this
capability for extended periods of time for many consecutive hours
and even days.
21. We do not agree with DOD's figures on the amount of propulsion
fuel and AOE fuel capacity that would be required for a
conventionally powered carrier on a 4,800- and 12,000-nautical mile
transit at 28 knots. Based on fuel consumption rates that the Navy
provided to us, we found the following.
-- A conventionally powered carrier steaming at 28 knots on a
4,800-nautical mile transit would require approximately 1.9
million gallons of replenishment fuel if it were refueled when
its propulsion fuel reached
60 percent of its usable capacity. When the AOE fuel
requirements (1.4 million gallons) for this voyage are added, a
total of 3.3 million gallons of propulsion fuel would be
required. This is the equivalent of 0.6 of an AOE based on an
AOE's total usable ship propulsion fuel (DFM) capacity of 5.2
million gallons. If the carrier and the AOE were accompanied by
a battle group of six fossil-fueled escorts (2 CG-47/52s, 2
DD-963s, and
2 DDG-51s), a total of about 7 million gallons of fuel would be
required, the equivalent of 1.3 Sacramento-class ships.
-- A conventionally powered carrier on a 12,000-nautical mile
transit steaming at 28 knots would require approximately 4.75
million gallons of replenishment fuel if it were refueled when
its propulsion fuel reached
60 percent of its usable capacity. When the AOE's fuel
requirements (3.3 million gallons) for this voyage are added to
the carrier's, a total of 8 million gallons of propulsion fuel
would be required. This is the equivalent of 1.5 AOE ships. If
the carrier and the AOE were accompanied by a battle group of
six fossil-fueled escorts (2 CG-47/52s, 2 DD-963s, and
2 DDG-51s), a total of about 17.6 million gallons of fuel would
be required, the equivalent of 3.4 Sacramento-class ships.
22. We based our transit time and fuel consumption comparisons on
the assumption that the conventional carrier would have eight boilers
on line for speeds of 28 knots or faster and four boilers for speeds
below 28 knots. This produced conservative estimates of transit time
and fuel consumption. However, as a Navy-provided document shows,
the Kennedy, for example, can maintain a speed of 28 knots with only
five boilers on line and 29 knots with six boilers on line, with
sufficient steam to operate the catapults in both cases. We believe
that such operations over an extended period of time would be more
stressful than normal. However, under these conditions, not all
boiler rooms would have to be continually manned and operating.
Thus, boilers could be rotated off-line for routine preventive or
emergent maintenance. Additionally, the boiler maintenance
information DOD provided in response to our request that it amplify
its comments indicates substantive scheduled maintenance actions are
generally only required at quarterly intervals or longer. While the
watch-standing requirements would be greater when only four boilers
are operating, carriers are supposed to be manned at a sufficient
level that their endurance at a peacetime cruising level of readiness
is not constrained.\7
Additionally, Fleet officials familiar with the operation of
conventional carriers told us that conventional carriers can operate
for extended periods at high speeds. We also noted that they have
done so in the past. For example, logs maintained by the
Independence during its January/February 1998 transit from Japan to
the Arabian Gulf indicated that the ship sailed at 27 knots or
faster, generally on six boilers, for over 70 percent of the voyage.
The Saratoga, when responding to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
sailed at 25 knots or faster for extended intervals again, generally
with six boilers on line. As noted elsewhere in this report, this
was considered to be the fastest Atlantic Ocean crossing since World
War II.
23. We agree that conventionally powered carriers normally refuel
when their on-board fuel level reaches 50 percent to 60 percent of
capacity. However, the 30-percent minimum fuel level we used is
consistent with the provisions of various fleet operating
instructions and is greater than that allowed in some instances by
those instructions. Therefore, we believe that, in a time of crisis,
it is reasonable to expect that reaching the intended theater of
operations would have priority over maintaining a high fuel level.
24. For a slightly different perspective, compare the crisis
response transits of the U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68) and the U.S.S.
Independence (CV-62) in late 1997 and early 1998 (see app. IV).
25. We added information on more recent carrier deployments to
appendix IV, as noted in comment 3. Further, our independent review
of Navy records in some cases differed from the facts the Navy
provided. For example, the Navy reported that
"In May 1992, EISENHOWER left the Arabian Gulf and transited to
the Norwegian Sea steaming 7000 miles at 30 knots average speed.
As part of a joint exercise, EISENHOWER sprinted ahead of
schedule and launched simulated strikes into northern English
air bases earlier than anticipated. The Royal Air Force was
taken by complete surprise thinking the battle group was 300-400
miles further south."
Our review showed that in May 1992, the U.S.S. Eisenhower was at its
homeport of Norfolk, Virginia, having completed a 6-month deployment
on April 2, 1992. Navy records also show that the Eisenhower
transited the Strait of Hormuz on February 4, 1992, and proceeded to
operate in the North Arabian Sea for 10 days before entering the Gulf
of Aden on February 15th. The ship operated in the Red Sea for 4
days, spent 3 days in port in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, then operated in
the Red Sea for another
3 days. The ship transited the Suez Canal on February 27, steamed
through the Mediterranean, and spent 5 days in port at Palma de
Mallorca, Spain. The Eisenhower passed through the Straits of
Gibraltar on March 7th and began operating in the exercise in the
Norwegian Sea on March 11. The actual period of time for the
Eisenhower to travel from the Arabian Gulf to the Norwegian Sea was
approximately 35 days. Had the ship averaged
30 knots, it would have covered 7,000 miles in 10.7 days, including a
day to transit the Suez Canal.
The Navy also said that
"On 1 October 1997, NIMITZ was ordered to proceed from the South
China Sea (Hong Kong) to the Arabian Gulf at best speed. This
5500 nm transit was completed in 11 days for an average SOA
[speed of advance] of about 21 knots. Since NIMITZ was able to
conduct flight operations for 6 of the 11 transit days, NIMITZ
arrived on station with its airwing fully qualified on 11
October 1997."
Our analysis of this transit indicated that the U.S.S. Nimitz
averaged
24 knots for the trip. As discussed earlier, the U.S.S.
Independence (CV-62) averaged the same speed when it made a similar
voyage about
3 months later. The Nimitz spent 30 percent of the voyage at 30 or
more knots (38 percent at 27 knots and above), while its longest
sustained period of high-speed sailing was 9 hours.
In another example, the Navy stated that
"In March 1996, the NIMITZ battle group was ordered to move from
the Persian Gulf to the western Pacific (Taiwan Straits). The
increased self-sustaining capability of a CVN allowed NIMITZ to
remain on-station in the Persian Gulf with only one of its
(fossil fueled) escorts, while the remaining ships in the battle
group began the transit toward east Asian waters. Five days
later, NIMITZ departed the Gulf and while en route, refueled her
remaining escort and conducted proficiency flight operations
prior to overtaking the rest of her battle group as they entered
the Taiwan Straits."
Our analysis of this transit indicated that ships of the battle group
passed through the Strait of Hormuz approximately 40 hours (1.7 days)
before the U.S.S. Nimitz and its escort the U.S.S. Port Royal. The
Nimitz averaged
19.8 knots for the transit while spending less than 5 percent of the
time at speeds of 27 knots and above. The ship sustained speeds of
28-30 knots one time for a 6.5-hour period.
In another instance, the Navy stated:
"On 23 January 1998, U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE (CV-62) was ordered to
transit from Japan to the Arabian Gulf to replace U.S.S. NIMITZ
(CVN68), a transit similar to the October 1997 NIMITZ transit.
INDEPENDENCE transited 6800 nm with USNS GUADALUPE (TAO 200) at
an SOA of about 20 knots, arriving in the Straits of Hormuz on 6
February 1998. INDEPENDENCE did not conduct flight operations
en route. Therefore, upon arrival in the Arabian Gulf,
INDEPENDENCE required over 3 days of flight operations to
qualify her airwing."
Our analysis of Navy transit data showed that the U.S.S.
Independence averaged over 24 knots for the entire voyage and spent
over 70 percent of the time at 27 knots and above. During various
parts of the transit, the ship sustained 27 or more knots for several
lengthy periods of time, including 42, 31, and 27 hours continuous
hours. The U.S.S. Independence refueled three times during the
voyage from three separate T-AO-187-class oilers. Since these oilers
have a top speed of 20 knots, and the Independence steamed at 27
knots most of the time, it is unlikely that any of the oilers
remained with the carrier during the entire voyage. Our review of
ship logs and other data indicated that Independence aircraft flew
during at least
5 days of the transit, with the last period ending after 11:00 p.m.
on February 4th, the night before the ship reached the Strait of
Hormuz. Our records indicate that the Independence passed through
the Strait of Hormuz shortly before noon on February 5, 1998.
26. We agree that the ability to surge is dictated by the scope and
complexity of the maintenance to be performed, which varies from
availability to availability. In fact, based on discussions with
Navy officials directly responsible for maintenance and actual
maintenance data, we found that due to the complexity of its
maintenance, a nuclear-powered carrier's maintenance period cannot be
shortened to the same degree as that of a conventionally powered
carrier. The report provides an example for which the data show that
a conventionally powered carrier would require less time to surge
from maintenance.
We based our analysis on data provided by the Naval Air Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet, and developed by the Navy's aircraft carrier repairs,
maintenance, and modernization planning organization. Officials from
the Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet reviewed and concurred
with the planning organization's information. The data were also
provided to the Naval Sea Systems Command's Aircraft Carrier Program
Office prior to our receipt. These commands are responsible for
coordinating ship maintenance and modernization.
Officials from the planning organization noted that a conventionally
powered carrier can be brought out of maintenance before all repairs
are completed and begin its transit while remaining repairs and
maintenance are performed. The nuclear propulsion plants require a
more structured approach because of nuclear maintenance requirements
and radiological safety concerns. Atlantic Fleet officials stated it
would be easier to surge the conventionally powered carrier because
additional workers could easily be assigned to complete the work more
quickly by completing work tasks in parallel. In contrast,
nuclear-powered carrier work is sequential and there are a finite
number of nuclear-certified workers.
27. We did not characterize the Persian Gulf War as the definitive
wartime scenario. The report states that the nature of Desert
Storm--a major regional conflict--portends the types of conflict in
which U.S. forces expect to be engaged in the foreseeable future.
This statement is based on our assessment of the QDR, Defense
Planning Guidance, and other DOD documents that include regional
dangers among the threats facing U.S. forces. For example, the QDR,
in discussing the regional dangers confronting the United States,
states that Southwest Asia--especially Iraq and Iran--is among the
foremost threats of coercion and large-scale, cross border aggression
by hostile states with significant military power. Furthermore,
according to Defense Planning Guidance,
"The security environment between now and 2015 will also likely
be marked by the absence of a 'global peer competitor' able to
challenge the U.S. militarily around the world as the Soviet
Union did during the Cold War. . .the U.S. is the world's
only superpower today, and it is expected to remain so through
at least 2015."
We agree with DOD that the United States benefited from a local
supply of oil during the Gulf War. However, based on further
analysis, we do not believe this was a controlling factor in the
outcome of the Gulf War, nor do we believe it would be a significant
factor in any of the threats facing the Nation. The Navy has
prepositioned large amounts of fuel oil throughout the Central
Command, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific areas. We used the Gulf
War scenario to evaluate the effectiveness of conventionally and
nuclear-powered carriers in their war-fighting missions because it
actually occurred and involved the most extensive and extended combat
use of carrier aviation since the Vietnam conflict.
28. We agree that light wind conditions or the necessity to perform
downwind air operations can make sortie generation more difficult.
However, our review of carrier transit data indicates that
conventionally powered carriers, like nuclear-powered carriers,
adjust their steaming speeds to meet operational needs. If
conditions and operations call for higher speeds, the propulsion
plant in the conventionally powered carriers can quickly generate and
sustain higher speeds to support flight operations. Throughout this
review, we repeatedly sought examples where conventionally powered
carriers were unable to meet operational needs. Navy officials
provided no examples.
29. We agree that the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) letter
states that the nuclear propulsion system gives the nuclear-powered
carrier an edge. However, its detailed comparisons noted many
similarities between various aspects of the two carrier types.
Additionally, in discussing this analysis with NAVSEA officials, they
told us that neither type of carrier possesses any inherent,
overriding advantage over the other in its susceptibility to
detection or vulnerability. While there are some differences between
the two carriers, neither has a distinct advantage that can be
specifically attributed to the ship's propulsion type. These
statements support our conclusion that the propulsion system does not
materially affect survivability. We also note that DOD's response
commented on the CVN-71's and later ships' enhanced survivability to
antiship cruise missile attack compared to that of CV-67 and the
earlier CVN-68 ships. While engine room fires impair a carrier's
mobility, analyses we reviewed discussed a carrier's loss in terms of
magazine detonation or sinking due to uncontrollable flooding
resulting from blast and fragmentation damage. These analyses
indicated that the degree and type of magazine protection
incorporated into the ship's design is a greater determinant of
survivability than is propulsion and showed that the conventionally
powered carrier can have a higher probability of surviving an
antiship cruise missile attack than can a nuclear-powered carrier.
Furthermore, we continue to believe that while refueling does
restrict a carrier's ability to maneuver, the need to replenish will
be driven as much by the need to replenish other ships of the battle
group as by the carrier.
30. We disagree that a new design conventionally powered carrier
would necessarily result in a larger and heavier ship, as discussed
in comment 1.
31. Increases in fleet oiler requirements because of conventional
propulsion in carriers may not be as great as postulated because, in
general, infrastructure requirements are seldom increased or
decreased in response to small changes in force structure. A 1992
Center For Naval Analyses report on Combat Logistics Force ship
requirements for battle forces centered around conventionally or
nuclear-powered carriers concluded that nuclear propulsion for
carriers alone had only a marginal effect on the number of support
ships needed to sustain battle forces in a typical combat scenario.
The scenario postulated a naval deployment to a limited regional
conflict in Southwest Asia with naval forces supported from bases in
the Western Pacific. This scenario was chosen because the extreme
distances involved would tend to highlight the differences between
the numbers of Combat Logistics Force ships needed to support battle
groups with nuclear-powered carriers and battle groups with
conventionally powered carriers.
The report also found that on an individual basis, a conventionally
powered carrier needs only one-half more of an oiler than a
nuclear-powered carrier used in a similar fashion (or, for a force of
12 carriers, an additional 6 fleet oilers). The report noted that
earlier studies of Combat Logistics Force requirements used much
higher estimates for ship propulsion fuel. This fact may contribute
to the view that the nuclear-powered carrier offers a freedom from
oilers not possible with conventionally powered carriers. The report
also noted that, in practice, carriers, regardless of propulsion
type, are replenished whenever operational demands make it possible,
typically during rest periods between major flight operations, which
normally occur every few days.
As we note in appendix V, the Center for Naval Analyses concluded
that the "increased capacity for ordnance and aviation fuel in the
CVN [nuclear-powered carrier] design is not sufficient to untether
the force from the [logistic] pipeline. The hoped for increase in
freedom of operational employment for CVNs is further restricted by
the fossil-fuel dependence of the accompanying surface combatants."
Another important factor that could affect the ultimate size of the
oiler infrastructure is the Navy's general need for a global array of
fuel replenishment ships and depots. We note that the Navy requires
a worldwide supply system because the ship battle force is mostly a
conventionally powered ship force (253 of 349 ships as of April 14,
1998).\8 Appendix III shows that escort ships of a conventionally
powered carrier battle group generally needed from two-thirds to
three-quarters of the total battle group's overall underway
replenishment fuel requirement.
32. In response to our requests, DOD provided no specific examples
where a conventionally powered carrier's inability to accelerate
actually caused the situations it mentioned to occur. As stated in
the report, ship personnel are aware of wind conditions during flight
operations and can adjust the ship's speed, as necessary, to respond
to varying landing conditions in a timely manner. Our review of data
gathered during specific ship transits revealed numerous examples
where dramatic speed and directional changes were made by
conventionally powered carriers in short periods of time to respond
to operational needs. We identified two instances during the recent
high-speed transit of the
U.S.S. Independence (CV-62) from Japan to the Persian Gulf where
aircraft experienced single-engine emergencies. With the exception
of a minor speed change in one instance, no other speed or
directional changes were made, and both aircraft were recovered
safely.
33. Our estimate did not include an allocation of acquisition cost
of the fuel delivery costs because we did not have comparable
acquisition cost data for facilities (i.e., Department of Energy
(DOE) laboratories) that supported the delivery of nuclear power to
the Navy's fleet. We view these as sunk costs because they tend to
be invariant with the size and mix of the forces. We excluded
acquisition costs for all supporting activities and functions whether
they supported conventionally or nuclear-powered carriers or both
types of carriers.
34. Our pipeline training cost estimate is greater because it
includes a more complete universe of costs that are required to
provide a steady supply of trained nuclear propulsion plant
personnel. In its comments, the Navy estimates training pipeline
costs at about $13.4 million, which is based on an allocation of the
$142 million it spends annually on nuclear training. However, budget
data indicate that the Navy spends nearly $195 million annually for
student, instructor, operations, and support personnel and over $80
million in operations and maintenance funds for its moored ships; the
latter amount does not include operations and maintenance funds for
classroom training at the Nuclear Power School. Our estimate was
based on applying the annual per student training cost, which
includes all applicable personnel and operations and maintenance
costs, to the estimated annual training requirement to support one
nuclear-powered carrier.
35. We allocated the cost of DOE's nuclear support activities based
on the benefit received by the nuclear-powered ships. Since the
purpose of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is to ensure safe and
efficient production of energy, we allocated the program costs
according to the amount of energy consumed. This methodology is in
accordance with The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board
(FASAB), which recommends that indirect costs be assigned or
allocated based on the consumption or demand for the activity.
Moreover, several DOE and Navy officials suggested this was the best
allocation methodology. This methodology is also consistent with the
way fossil fuel support activities are allocated based on fuel usage.
We overstated the costs for nuclear support activities in our draft
report, but we adjusted these costs in the final report.
36. Our carrier disposal costs are based on an estimate provided by
the Navy in fiscal year 1994 and updated in fiscal year 1996. In its
comments, DOD provided a new estimate for the inactivation and
disposal costs of a Nimitz-class carrier. We did not use the newer
estimate, which was about 40 percent less than the 1996 estimate,
because the Navy did not provide any evidence that would support
significant changes to the 1996 estimate. Most of the reductions in
its new estimate are attributed to a large learning curve and to new
technologies.
Officials from the Navy's principal shipyard for nuclear plant
inactivation and disposal, the Navy's carrier maintenance experts,
and the cost estimating community have told us that it is highly
unlikely that any significant cost reductions can be obtained from
learning in an episodic activity such as the refueling or
inactivations of a Nimitz-class carrier. Large scale activities such
as these with intervals of about 4 years do not lend themselves to
learning curve reductions on the scale that is included in DOD's new
estimate.
Further, over the past 20 years, the methods and technologies have
remained fairly constant. The Navy was unable to provide any
examples of technologies that could result in potential cost
reductions ranging from
20 to 40 percent. Moreover, according to a recent Navy report,
�although delaying disposal could potentially allow the development
of some new technology to deal with the disposal of radioactivity,
there is nothing presently on the horizon that would hold the promise
of a more cost effective, environmentally safe disposal method for
reactor departments.�\9
37. In our draft report, our estimate for spent nuclear fuel (SNF)
was based on a "wet storage" method. The Navy told us that it plans
to store SNF using a different method referred to as dry storage. We
modified the report accordingly.
--------------------
\1 This capability is a computer-based system that permits
simultaneous sharing of detailed targeting data between ships or
forces at extensive ranges within the littoral area, thereby
increasing reaction time and firing opportunities against enemy
missile attacks.
\2 Chief of Naval Operations. OPNAV Notice 4700, Subject: Notional
Intervals, Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair Mandays for
Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy Ships.
\3 According to data DOD provided to us on April 2, 1998, Commander
Logistics Group Two assumed a 26-knot or higher transit for 10 days,
with the transferable propulsion fuel capacity from an AOE-6 class
ship (2.1-4.0 million gallons of DFM).
\4 See app. I for a more detailed explanation of our methodology for
calculating the availabilities.
\5 Ship Self Defense: Program Priorities Are Questionable
(GAO/NSIAD-97-195R, Aug. 15, 1997).
\6 Statement of Admiral Archie Clemins, U.S. Navy, Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, before the Subcommittee on Readiness,
House Committee on National Security, Mar. 6, 1998.
\7 The document discussing the required operating capabilities of the
aircraft carriers specifies four readiness conditions for a carrier
that is underway. These range from Condition I: Battle Readiness to
Condition IV: Peacetime Cruising Readiness. Our review of several
extended transits indicates that the carriers generally steam at
Condition IV.
\8 The Ship Battle Forces consists of Battle Forces, Mobilization
Forces, Category A Assets, Strategic Forces and Support Forces. The
Battle Forces include aircraft carriers, surface combatants,
submarines, amphibious warfare ships and mine warfare ships in an
active status. Combat logistics ships, both active and those under
the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force,
are also included.
\9 Department of the Navy. Final Environmental Impact Statement on
the Disposal of Decommissioned, Defueled Cruiser, Ohio Class, and Los
Angeles Class Naval Reactor Plants (April 1996).
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
======================================================== Appendix VIII
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Richard J. Herley, Assistant Director
Roderick W. Rodgers, Evaluator-in-charge
Kenneth W. Newell, Sr. Evaluator
Joseph P. Raffa, Sr. Evaluator
Madelon B. Savaides, Sr. Evaluator
Tim F. Stone, Sr. Evaluator
NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE
Brenda Waterfield, Sr. Evaluator
Mary Jo LaCasse, Evaluator
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
William McNaught, Assistant Director
Harold J. Brumm, Senior Economist
Several other persons assisted during the assignment, including Edna
Thea Falk, Rick Yeh, and Steve Katz. Mark Wielgoszynski provided
advice in defining the methodology and approach and reviewed the
draft report. Data analysis quality assurance checks were performed
by Ricardo Aguilera, Anthony DeFrank, Fred Dziadek, Bob Kenyon, Marc
Schwartz, and Dale Wineholt.
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1
Surface Combatants: Navy Faces Challenges Sustaining Its Current
Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-57, May 21, 1997).
Nuclear Waste: Impediments to Completing the Yucca Mountain
Repository Project (GAO/RCED-97-30, Jan. 17, 1997).
New Attack Submarine: Program Status (GAO/NSIAD-97-25, Dec. 3,
1996).
Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates For 1996-2001 Offer Little
Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).
Marine Corps: Improving Amphibious Capability Would Require Larger
Share of Budget Than Previously Provided (GAO/NSIAD-96-47, Feb. 13,
1996).
Future Years Defense Program: 1996 Program Is Considerably Different
From the 1995 Program (Letter Report GAO/NSIAD-95-213, Sept. 15,
1995).
Nuclear Carrier Homeporting (GAO/NSIAD-95-146R, Apr. 21, 1995).
Navy's Aircraft Carrier Program: Investment Strategy Options
(GAO/NSIAD-95-17, Jan. 1995).
Nuclear Waste: Comprehensive Review of the Disposal Program Is
Needed (GAO/RCED-94-299, Sept. 27, 1994).
Nuclear Waste: Foreign Countries Approaches to High-Level Waste
Storage and Disposal (GAO/RCED-94-172, Aug. 4, 1994).
Future Years Defense Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead to Billions
in Overprogramming (GAO/NSIAD-94-210, July 29, 1994).
Navy Modernization: Alternatives for Achieving a More Affordable
Force (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-171, Apr. 26, 1994).
Navy Carrier Battle Groups: The Structure and Affordability of the
Future Force (GAO/NSIAD-93-74, Feb. 25, 1993).
Navy Maintenance: Overseas Ship Repairs and Associated Costs
(GAO/NSIAD-93-61, Nov. 13, 1992).
Nuclear Submarines: Navy Efforts to Reduce Inactivation Costs
(GAO/NSIAD-92-134, July 21, 1992).
Nuclear-Powered Ships: Accounting for Shipyard Costs and Nuclear
Waste Disposal Plans (GAO/NSIAD-92-256, July 1, 1992).
*** End of document. ***