Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of
NATO's Stabilization Force (Letter Report, 10/08/98, GAO/NSIAD-99-19).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -led military force in
Bosnia--known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR), focusing on: (1) how
SFOR's operations in Bosnia have changed since mid-1997, particularly
its support for the operation's civil aspects, and whether any such
changes have exceeded SFOR's defined mission; (2) the mission and force
structure of the post-June 1998 SFOR follow-on force, including the
decision-making sequence for U.S. participation in the force and the
status of developing the force's new Multinational Specialized Unit; and
(3) NATO's transition strategy for removing NATO-led forces.
GAO noted that: (1) the increased emphasis on implementing the Dayton
Agreement that began in mid-1997 included an intensified effort by SFOR
to support the agreement's civil provisions, but the force continued to
employ most of its resources to control the Bosnik, Bosnian Croat, and
Bosnian Serb militaries; (2) the mission and force structure of the SFOR
follow-on force will remain largely the same as prior to June 1998; (3)
SFOR levels in Bosnia increased from about 31,700 troops in August 1998
to about 36,100 troops at the time of the September elections in Bosnia
but are expected to decrease again by November 1998; (4) in light of
SFOR's need to deal with civil disturbances, NATO established a new
Multinational Specialized Unit, a paramilitary- or gendarmerie-type
unit, within SFOR; (5) as of September 1998, only part of the
specialized unit was operational because countries have not yet
committed sufficient resources to the unit; (6) this new unit will not
replace U.S. or other SFOR combat units; (7) after considering several
military analyses and a range of factors, the executive branch decided
in January 1998 to reduce the U.S. troop level for the SFOR follow-on
force from about 8,500 troops in Bosnia to about 6,900 troops; (8) after
the drawdown decision was made, the U.S. military identified ways to
reduce U.S. force levels; (9) NATO then lowered operational requirements
for the follow-on force; (10) NATO will continue its practice of
reviewing SFOR operations every 6 months to determine whether SFOR force
levels could be further reduced; (11) NATO has developed a transition
strategy for an eventual disengagement from Bosnia; (12) NATO has not
fully developed specific criteria for determining when conditions would
allow SFOR combat units to draw down and withdraw, but was in the
process of doing so; (13) the NATO transition strategy consists largely
of turning over various activities to local authorities or the peace
operation's civilian organizations as conditions permit; (14) the
transition strategy calls for the Multinational Specialized Unit to
leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR's combat units; (15)
according to Department of Defense and NATO officials, specific drawdown
criteria are expected to be developed before NATO's next 6-month review
of SFOR operations; and (16) during this review, NATO will assess
changes to the security and political conditions in Bosnia, including
the results of the September 1998 elections, and determine whether SFOR
force levels could be further reduced.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-19
TITLE: Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition
Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force
DATE: 10/08/98
SUBJECT: International organizations
NATO military forces
International agreements
Military intervention
Foreign governments
International cooperation
IDENTIFIER: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement)
Bosnia
Bosnian Serb Republic
Serbia
Herzegovina
NATO
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
October 1998
BOSNIA PEACE OPERATION - MISSION,
STRUCTURE, AND TRANSITION STRATEGY
OF NATO'S STABILIZATION FORCE
GAO/NSIAD-99-19
Bosnia Peace Operation
(711361)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
IFOR - Implementation Force
IPTF - International Police Task Force
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHR - Office of the High Representative
OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR - Stabilization Force
UNHCR - U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIBH - U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-281072
October 8, 1998
The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The December 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and its supporting annexes (also known as the Dayton
Agreement) provided the structure and mandates for an international
operation intended to promote an enduring peace in Bosnia and
stability in the region. In mid-December 1997, recognizing the
continued need for an international military force in Bosnia,
President Clinton announced that the United States would continue to
take part in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led
military force in Bosnia--known as the Stabilization Force
(SFOR)--after June 1998, thereby enabling the Bosnia peace
operation's civilian aspects to proceed in a secure atmosphere. The
operation's civilian aspects include efforts to return refugees and
displaced people to their homes across ethnic lines; develop
democratic, multiethnic governments at all levels; and ensure that
persons indicted for war crimes are brought to justice.
As requested, this report provides information on (1) how SFOR's
operations in Bosnia have changed since mid-1997, particularly its
support for the operation's civil aspects, and whether any such
changes have exceeded SFOR's defined mission; (2) the mission and
force structure of the post-June 1998 SFOR follow-on force, including
the decision-making sequence for U.S. participation in the force and
the status of developing the force's new Multinational Specialized
Unit; and (3) NATO's transition strategy for removing NATO-led forces
from Bosnia. Appendix I provides background information on the
overall structure of the military and civilian components of the
Bosnia peace operation.
OUR PRIOR REPORTS ON THE BOSNIA
PEACE OPERATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
We have reviewed progress in implementing the Dayton Agreement's
military and civilian provisions since early 1996. In May 1997, we
reported that the Bosnia peace operation had helped Bosnia take
important first steps toward the Dayton Agreement's goals.\1 The
NATO-led military forces--first the Implementation Force (IFOR) and
later SFOR--had created and sustained an environment that allowed the
peace process to move forward and Bosnians to begin returning to
normal life. Nevertheless, while the task of implementing the civil
aspects of the Dayton Agreement had begun, Bosnia remained
politically and ethnically divided due principally to the failure of
the political leaders of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups to
embrace political and social reconciliation and to fulfill their
obligations under the Dayton Agreement. Many western observers told
us that based on the current pace of political and social change in
Bosnia, some sort of international military force would likely be
needed there for many years to deter an outbreak of hostilities while
Bosnians continue the reconciliation process.
In June 1998, we reported that the pace of implementing the Dayton
Agreement had accelerated beginning in mid-1997, due to a renewed
commitment and level of effort--both political and military--by the
international community.\2
This renewed commitment led to an increased and intense involvement
of the operation's civilian and military organizations in
implementing the agreement. Their efforts, combined with
international pressure on Bosnia's political leaders and positive
political changes in the country, helped to accelerate the pace of
Dayton implementation. However, we reported that conditions in
Bosnia will have to improve significantly before international
military forces could substantially draw down; even with the
accelerated pace of implementing the agreement, it will likely be
some time before these conditions are realized.
--------------------
\1 Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton
Agreement's Goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-132, May 5, 1997). See also Bosnia
Peace Operation: Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement's Goals--An
Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997).
\2 See Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton
Accelerated as International Involvement Increased (GAO/NSIAD-98-138,
June 5, 1998).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The increased emphasis on implementing the Dayton Agreement that
began in mid-1997 included an intensified effort by SFOR to support
the agreement's civil provisions. For example, SFOR began taking a
more active role in efforts to return people to their prewar homes in
areas controlled by another ethnic group, detain persons indicted for
war crimes, and elect and install multiethnic governments at all
levels. In the spring of 1998, SFOR also began to support a March
1998 U.N. Security Council resolution to stop the flow of arms and
other military assistance to Serbia's province of Kosovo, where
fighting had broken out, and to other areas of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). These efforts by SFOR are
consistent with its mission as defined by the Dayton Agreement and
NATO operation plans. Although SFOR's support for the civilian
aspects of the peace operation increased, the force continued to
employ most of its resources to control the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat,
and Bosnian Serb militaries, its primary mission.\3
The mission and force structure of the SFOR follow-on force--which
will also be called SFOR--will remain largely the same as prior to
June 1998. SFOR levels in Bosnia increased from about 31,700 troops
in August 1998 to about 36,100 troops at the time of the September
elections in Bosnia\4 but are expected to decrease again by November
1998. In light of SFOR's need to deal with civil disturbances, NATO
established a new Multinational Specialized Unit, a paramilitary- or
gendarmerie-type unit, within SFOR. As of September 1998, only part
of the specialized unit was operational because countries have not
yet committed sufficient resources to the unit. This new unit will
not replace U.S. or other SFOR combat units.
After considering several military analyses and a range of factors,
including improvements in Republika Srpska's political environment
during late 1997 and early 1998, the executive branch decided in
January 1998 to reduce the U.S. troop level for the SFOR follow-on
force from about 8,500 troops in Bosnia to about 6,900 troops. After
the drawdown decision was made, the U.S. military identified ways to
reduce U.S. force levels.\5 NATO then lowered operational
requirements for the follow-on force. NATO will continue its
practice of reviewing SFOR operations every 6 months to determine
whether SFOR force levels could be further reduced.
NATO has developed a transition strategy for an eventual
disengagement from Bosnia. As of September 1998, NATO had not fully
developed specific criteria for determining when conditions would
allow SFOR combat units to draw down and withdraw, but was in the
process of doing so.\6 The NATO transition strategy consists largely
of turning over various activities to local authorities or the peace
operation's civilian organizations as conditions permit. The
transition strategy calls for the Multinational Specialized Unit to
leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR's combat units.
According to Department of Defense (DOD) and NATO officials, specific
drawdown criteria are expected to be developed before NATO's next
6-month review of SFOR operations.\7 During this review, NATO will
assess changes to the security and political conditions in Bosnia,
including the results of the September 1998 elections, and determine
whether SFOR force levels could be further reduced.
--------------------
\3 The war in Bosnia was fought among Bosnia's three major
ethnic/religious groups--Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs (Eastern Orthodox
Christians), and Croats (Roman Catholics)--the latter two being
supported directly by the republics of Serbia and Croatia,
respectively. This report defines "Bosniaks" as "Muslims," the
definition used in State Department human rights reports.
\4 Bosnia held a countrywide election for national and entity-level
governments on September 12 and 13, 1998. These elections were
supervised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). Bosnia consists of two entities: (1) Republika Srpska, the
Bosnian Serb Republic; and (2) the Federation, the Bosniak-Bosnian
Croat entity.
\5 U.S. force levels were reduced to 6,900 troops in Bosnia by
mid-July 1998. The number of U.S. troops in Bosnia was scheduled to
increase to between 10,500 to 11,300 troops around the time of
Bosnia's September 1998 elections due to a planned troop rotation and
to decrease back to 6,900 by November 1998. U.S. SFOR and non-SFOR
personnel in Croatia would remain at about 500, while the number of
U.S. troops in Italy and Hungary supporting the SFOR operation--but
not part of SFOR--had decreased from about 3,600 troops down to 2,600
troops by July 1998.
\6 The U.S. executive branch prepared what it referred to as
"benchmarks" in early 1998; however, these "benchmarks" are not
intended to provide criteria for determining when NATO forces can
draw down or withdraw; instead, the executive branch believes that
they represent the point at which Dayton implementation can continue
without the support of a major NATO-led military force. The
executive branch did not define what constitutes a major NATO-led
military force.
\7 According to a July 28, 1998, letter from President Clinton to
Congress, NATO is also expected to develop an estimate of the time
likely to be required for implementation of the military and civilian
aspects of the Dayton Agreement based on the criteria. The letter
states that while they will be useful as a tool to promote and review
the pace of Dayton implementation, these estimated target dates will
be notional, and their attainment will be dependent upon a complex
set of interdependent factors.
INTENSIFIED SFOR OPERATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
In mid-1997, SFOR intensified its support for the civilian aspects of
the Dayton Agreement and later began operations that supported the
United Nations arms embargo against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. At the same time, SFOR continued its primary mission of
controlling the three militaries in Bosnia. SFOR's actions in all of
these areas were consistent with its Dayton mission and were part of
much broader international efforts that helped accelerate the pace of
Dayton implementation.
INCREASED SFOR SUPPORT FOR
DAYTON'S CIVIL ASPECTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
With the increased international emphasis on implementing the Dayton
Agreement, beginning in mid-1997 SFOR increased its support for the
civilian components of the peace operation. This increased support
is consistent with SFOR's authority as specified in annex 1A of the
Dayton Agreement. The agreement specified that if resources were
available and assistance were requested, NATO-led forces were to (1)
help create secure conditions for the conduct of other Dayton
Agreement tasks, such as elections; (2) assist the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international
organizations in their humanitarian missions; (3) observe and prevent
interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and
displaced persons and respond appropriately to deliberate violence to
life and person; and (4) monitor the clearing of minefields and
obstacles.
SFOR's support for civilian aspects of the operation was often
provided indirectly as SFOR conducted its primary military mission.
For example, SFOR's general security presence has ensured that
fighting among the three militaries in Bosnia has not resumed,
thereby allowing the operation's civilian organizations to continue
their work and the people of Bosnia to proceed with the long process
of political and social reconciliation. Further, during August 1997
SFOR began to take control of special police as called for by annex
1A of the Dayton Agreement,\8 a step toward disbanding and disarming
them and/or bringing them under the U.N. restructuring program for
civilian police. This move helped convince Bosnian Serb political
leaders to begin to participate in the U.N. police restructuring
program in September 1997.
In other cases, SFOR provided more direct support for the
implementation of the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement,
primarily by providing a security presence, as shown in table 1.
Table 1
SFOR Support for the Civil Aspects of
the Dayton Agreement Since Mid-1997
Civil aspect SFOR support
------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of Since May 1997, SFOR has supported international efforts to
movement increase freedom of movement in Bosnia by helping the U.N.
International Police Task Force (IPTF) to enforce its police
checkpoint policy.\a SFOR assisted IPTF by confiscating
weapons and identity cards of noncompliant police; jointly
patrolling with IPTF's unarmed police monitors in certain
sensitive geographic areas, such as the strategically
important area of Brcko; and by cooperating in removing 38
of 151 identified illegal checkpoints (as of mid-March
1998).\b
Minority returns\c In June/July 1997, SFOR troops began to provide general and
local security for people returning to their prewar homes
across ethnic lines. SFOR's security presence has been the
most important confidence-building measure thus far for
these returnees. In the spring of 1998, during a period of
increased violent incidents associated with visits and
returns across ethnic lines, SFOR began to coordinate
international efforts at all levels to ensure a phased and
orderly return process.
Detention of war From July 10, 1997, through October 2, 1998, SFOR troops
crimes indictees detained nine persons indicted for war crimes;\d no persons
indicted for war crimes had been detained by NATO-led troops
in Bosnia during 1996 and the first half of 1997. These
detentions, along with other international efforts, helped
encourage other indictees to surrender voluntarily to the
international war crimes tribunal. From April 28, 1997,
through October 2, 1998, a total of 26 indictees were
surrendered to the tribunal, over three times as many as had
been surrendered prior to that time; three of the indictees
were later released due to lack of evidence.
Arms control SFOR assisted OSCE in its efforts to gain Bosnian Serb
compliance with arms reductions targets\e by
(1) restricting the Bosnian Serb military's movements and
training as a means of forcing compliance,
(2) inspecting military storage and installations to account
for heavy weapons, and (3) helping to transport weapons to
their reduction sites. All parties met their arms reductions
requirements by the October 31, 1997, deadline.
Demining SFOR helped U.S. and international civilian organizations
establish an indigenous demining capacity in Bosnia.
Specifically, SFOR has (1) trained and equipped 450 military
deminers from all three militaries in Bosnia and monitored
their performance; (2) trained 71 military demining
instructors in late 1997, who in turn trained 430 deminers
in early 1998; and (3) established three military demining
training centers in Bosnia that are staffed by the SFOR-
trained demining instructors.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a This policy prohibited any fixed or mobile checkpoint that (1) was
manned by two or more police officers and (2) operated for more than
30 minutes without a valid IPTF checkpoint permit.
\b SFOR has also supported, on a case-by-case basis, IPTF-led
inspections of local police stations. During these inspections,
according to a NATO document, weapons in excess of the expected
inventory are immediately confiscated and subsequently destroyed.
\c "Minority returns" refers to people that return to areas under the
control of another ethnic group. In many cases, the group that is
currently in the minority was in the majority before the war and
would return to majority status if all internally displaced persons
and refugees returned.
\d Another indictee was shot and killed by SFOR soldiers after he
fired at them. On July 22, 1998, SFOR soldiers incorrectly
identified and detained two people and later transferred them to
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the
Hague, the Netherlands (hereafter referred to as the international
war crimes tribunal), based on the belief that they had been indicted
by the tribunal.
\e Bosnian Serb political leaders had largely not complied with
interim arms reduction targets as of December 31, 1996. This policy
changed during the summer of 1997.
SFOR Support for the Civil Aspects of
the Dayton Agreement Since Mid-1997
(continued)
Civil aspect SFOR support
------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------
Media During October 1997, SFOR supported the High Representative-
-the lead international civilian official in Bosnia--in his
attempts to curtail media that "blatantly and persistently"
violated the Dayton Agreement by taking control of five
radio and television transmitters operated by Bosnian Serb
hard-liners. This move shut down inflammatory broadcasts
aimed against the international community and allowed the
reform of the Bosnian Serb media network to begin under
international supervision.
On May 20, 1998, SFOR began a phased withdrawal from the
five transmitter towers; as of early September 1998, four of
the five towers had been returned to Bosnian Serb
authorities. Following withdrawal from all of the towers,
SFOR will continue to ensure the network's compliance with
its restructuring agreement by media monitoring, routine
patrols of the tower sites, and unannounced technical
inspections of the network's tower equipment.
Electing and SFOR supported OSCE in preparing for and administering
installing Bosnia's municipal elections held in September 1997 and
multiethnic Republika Srpska's National Assembly elections held in
governments November 1997. Among other things, SFOR ensured increased
security during the polling periods; provided significant
planning and logistics support to OSCE, such as the
transportation of ballots and other election materials; and
provided personnel to the OSCE/SFOR joint elections
operations center.\f These elections resulted in a more
pluralistic political culture and began the process of
developing multiethnic governments throughout Bosnia.
In late 1997 and early 1998, SFOR supported international
efforts to install the newly elected, relatively moderate
Republika Srpska government by, among other things,
increasing patrols and establishing observation posts in the
vicinity of Republika Srpska government offices in and
around Pale, the base of Bosnian Serb hard-liners. SFOR also
assisted OSCE in helping to form multiethnic municipal
councils and governments by ensuring a safe environment for,
and freedom of movement to, council meetings in contentious
areas.
Establishing SFOR supported the High Representative's efforts to
Bosnia's establish Bosnia's national institutions that would link the
national country's three major ethnic groups, primarily by providing
institutions security, communications, and liaison to meetings of the
Standing Committee on Military Matters. The committee, which
was established in early June 1997 and has met infrequently
since then, was designed to coordinate the activities of the
three militaries in Bosnia at the national level.\g
Opening civilian SFOR, which controls the airspace over Bosnia, worked with
airports the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to open up
Bosnia's regional airports by, among other things, ensuring
that there were no technical grounds to preclude making the
airports available to civilian traffic.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\f The precursor to SFOR--IFOR--provided similar support to OSCE
during Bosnia's September 1996 elections.
\g Although the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat armed forces are attempting
to merge into a unified Federation Army, each of the three major
ethnic groups--Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks--still
maintains its own separate military. This condition must evolve into
a unified armed forces, according to a State Department official, if
Bosnia is to become a unified country. As an interim measure under
the Dayton Agreement, the Standing Committee on Military Matters is
to coordinate the activities of the armed forces. An international
official was appointed coordinator to the committee's secretariat in
March 1998.
According to officials from the U.S. mission to NATO, the North
Atlantic Council\9 provided guidance and approved additional rules of
engagement specifically for SFOR's operations against the Bosnian
Serb media. The council did not provide additional guidance for
other SFOR operations that support the civil aspects of the peace
agreement since these operations were already covered by existing
rules of engagement.
--------------------
\8 Although special police had always been considered military forces
under annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement, NATO-led forces in Bosnia had
not taken steps to control them until mid-1997, when requested to do
so by the High Representative.
\9 The North Atlantic Council is the political leadership of NATO,
which comprises 16 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
SFOR'S MILITARY TASKS
RELATED TO KOSOVO
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
In late April/early May 1998, according to a NATO report, SFOR
stepped up its military operations near Bosnia's border with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to help ensure compliance with a U.N.
Security Council arms embargo related to the escalating crisis in
Serbia's province of Kosovo. For the purpose of fostering peace and
stability in Kosovo, the Security Council called on all countries to
prevent the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to Kosovo and
other areas of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\10 The prohibition
covered such things as the sale and supply of weapons and ammunition;
military vehicles, equipment, and spare parts; and training for
terrorist activities. This resolution was aimed at preventing the
participants in the Kosovo conflict--Serbs and ethnic Albanian
Muslims--from receiving illicit military assistance from outside
actors.
According to a senior SFOR officer, the increased monitoring of the
border and other tasks associated with SFOR support for the arms
embargo do not constitute a new mission for SFOR but are an integral
part of SFOR's original mission to keep the peace in Bosnia. He
explained that SFOR will have failed in its mission if the
nationalist passions and anger of the Kosovo conflict--the same
things that started the war in Bosnia--are allowed to permeate the
country. Thus, the specific tasks being conducted by SFOR are
designed to create a climate that does not allow Serb and Muslim
extremists to inflame passions inside Bosnia.
This view was reinforced by a NATO Secretary General's report that
concluded SFOR is conducting Kosovo-related operations under the
authority of annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement. Specifically, the
agreement gives SFOR "the unimpeded right to observe, monitor, and
inspect any Forces, facility or activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina
that the [SFOR] believes may have military capability. The refusal,
interference, or denial by any Party of this right to observe,
monitor, and inspect by the [SFOR] shall constitute a breach of this
Annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by
the [SFOR], including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance
with this Annex."\11
--------------------
\10 U.N. Security Council resolution 1160 dated March 31, 1998.
\11 Article VI, paragraph 6, of annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement.
SFOR'S CONTINUING
MILITARY TASKS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
Throughout 1997 and 1998, SFOR continued to fulfill tasks associated
with its primary mission of enforcing the Dayton Agreement's military
aspects, as outlined in annex 1A of the agreement. Under SFOR
supervision, the three militaries in Bosnia continued to observe the
October 1995 cease-fire and to keep their forces separated. The
militaries also demobilized additional troops, bringing their forces
down to 55,500 soldiers by October 1997.\12 SFOR enforced compliance
with the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement by continually
patrolling throughout the country, including in the zone of
separation;\13 routinely monitoring and inspecting SFOR-approved
military storage sites and installations; and monitoring
SFOR-approved military training and movement activities.\14
According to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),\15 because
the Dayton Agreement's military objectives have largely been
achieved, SFOR is in a position to provide broad support to civil
implementation, within its existing mandate and capabilities. IFOR
had largely accomplished Dayton's military objectives by the end of
its mission in December 1996, thereby allowing SFOR to be deployed
with about half the force levels of IFOR.\16
--------------------
\12 At the time of the October 1995 cease-fire, the three militaries
in Bosnia had over 400,000 men under arms, including civilian
militias and an estimated 45,000 police that fought in conjunction
with the three armies.
\13 The zone of separation is an area generally 2 kilometers wide on
each side of the interentity boundary line between Bosnia's two
entities--the Federation and Republika Srpska.
\14 During 1997, under SFOR direction, the three militaries reduced
the number of their military storage sites and installations
(cantonment sites) by 29 percent, from 770 sites to 545 sites; SFOR
in early 1998 directed a further 25-percent reduction in cantonment
sites by the end of February 1999.
\15 SACEUR is a U.S. Army general officer who is also the Commander
in Chief, U.S. European Command. For purposes of this report, we
refer to him only as "SACEUR." As the Commander in Chief, U.S.
European Command, this general officer has the authority to plan and
conduct U.S. land, maritime, and air operations within the command's
geographic area of responsibility, which includes Bosnia and other
areas of the Balkans region. As SACEUR, he is responsible for, among
other things, the development of NATO defense plans, the
determination of NATO force requirements, and the deployment and
exercise of NATO forces under his command or control.
\16 The transfer of authority from the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) to IFOR took place on December 20, 1995. IFOR was
deployed with about 60,000 troops and was to complete its mission and
be withdrawn from Bosnia by December 1996. Recognizing the continued
need for an international military force, in December 1996 the North
Atlantic Council authorized a new mission--SFOR--for an 18-month
period. SFOR had an authorized force level of 31,000 troops but
consistently maintained somewhat higher force levels throughout 1997.
SFOR'S FOLLOW-ON FORCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
On June 15, 1998, the U.N. Security Council authorized the SFOR
follow-on force, also known as SFOR, for a 12-month mission but left
open the possibility that the authorization could be extended if
warranted by the situation in Bosnia and developments in implementing
the Dayton Agreement.\17
SFOR's mission will remain the same, but overall SFOR force levels
are expected to decrease by November 1998. In January 1998, based on
many political-military considerations such as improved conditions in
Bosnia, the executive branch decided to draw down U.S. forces in
Bosnia from about 8,500 troops to about 6,900 troops. After the
United States decided to draw down troops, NATO lowered the
operational requirements for the SFOR follow-on force. The new
Multinational Specialized Unit began operations in late August 1998
but with force levels far below operational requirements due to the
lack of force commitments from troop contributing countries.
--------------------
\17 U.N. Security Council resolution 1174.
MISSION AND FORCE STRUCTURE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
The mission of the follow-on force will continue to be to (1) deter
renewed hostilities and (2) contribute to a secure environment for
ongoing civil implementation efforts in order to stabilize and
consolidate the peace. As with IFOR and the first SFOR mission, the
SFOR follow-on force has the authority to use force to ensure the
parties' compliance with annex 1A and force protection.
According to NATO documents, SFOR will continue, within its means and
capabilities, to provide broad support for the implementation of the
Dayton Agreement's civil aspects. Specifically, it will assist
-- UNHCR as a matter of high priority, with the phased and orderly
return of refugees;
-- IPTF in the reform and restructuring of Bosnia's local police;
-- OSCE in support of Bosnia's September 1998 elections, including
the installation of elected officials;
-- the international war crimes tribunal by transferring persons
indicted for war crimes to the tribunal; and
-- the High Representative in implementing the civil aspects of the
agreement.
SFOR will retain its existing force structure of three multinational
divisions in Bosnia led by the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom, as well as air, naval, and support units located outside of
Bosnia (see figs. 1 and 2). The number and nationality of maneuver
brigades and battalions within the three multinational divisions will
generally remain the same\18 (see app. II). The United States will
remain the largest force provider to SFOR, and Americans will
continue to hold the key NATO military positions that control the
operation.
Figure 1: Map of SFOR's
Military Sectors in Bosnia
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure 2: Organization of the
SFOR Follow-on Force, as of
August 1998
(See figure in printed
edition.)
In preparation for the SFOR 6-month review due in December 1997, and
in contemplation of a possible drawdown, NATO had performed a
troop-to-task analysis for a smaller force\19 with a relatively
restricted mission called for under the first SFOR operation plan.
Under this plan, NATO would have executed a phased drawn down to
reduced deterrence force levels when security conditions in Bosnia
had substantially improved. The U.S. military contribution to this
force would have been 6,900 troops, with a significantly reduced
force structure. In December 1997, the North Atlantic Council--based
on NATO military authorities' assessment of SFOR
operations--determined that conditions in Bosnia would not allow SFOR
to draw down to those levels for the foreseeable future.
--------------------
\18 The only exception is the addition of a Belgian battalion and the
withdrawal of a Malaysian battalion.
\19 This force was known as "SFOR Phase III" or "Deterrence Force
(DFOR)."
U.S. DECISION TO DRAW DOWN
FORCES IN BOSNIA
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
In late January 1998, the President decided that the United States
would prefer to contribute about 6,900 troops to the SFOR follow-on
force in Bosnia rather than continue to provide about 8,500 troops.
NATO lowered its operational requirements for the follow-on force
after the United States decided to draw down its forces. The U.S.
drawdown occurred by mid-July 1998. The number of U.S. troops in
Bosnia increased to between 10,500 and 11,300 troops by mid-September
1998 and, under current plans, will decrease to 6,900 troops by
November.\20
--------------------
\20 Planned rotations that increased U.S. force levels also occurred
during prior elections in Bosnia. For example, in October 1997, the
number of U.S. Army personnel in Bosnia peaked at 14,400 due to the
planned troop rotation around the time of the September 1997
municipal elections
FACTORS CONSIDERED IN
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.1
In describing the decision-making process, DOD officials told us that
during December 1997 and January 1998 DOD had considered a wide range
of political-military factors in deciding on the U.S. contribution
to the SFOR follow-on force. They said that DOD's decision to
recommend a draw down to 6,900 personnel in Bosnia was based on a
Joint Staff strategic assessment of the mission to be accomplished,
the environment that it was likely to be accomplished in, and the
risks to U.S. soldiers and their ability to accomplish their
mission.
During the strategic assessment process, according to DOD officials,
improvements in Bosnia's political and security environment,
particularly in Republika Srpska, led DOD to conclude in January 1998
that existing U.S. force levels in Bosnia could safely be reduced.
DOD officials believed that the rise of a relatively moderate Bosnian
Serb leadership under Republika Srpska President Plavsic beginning in
mid-1997--including the election of a relatively moderate Republika
Srpska parliament and moderate Prime Minister in November 1997 and
mid-January 1998, respectively--and the resulting reduction in power
of Bosnian Serb hard-liners had improved conditions such that U.S.
forces in Bosnia could safely be drawn down to 6,900 troops.
A December 1997 options document prepared by the Joint Staff, which
was the basis for the January 1998 drawdown decision, presented
information on the force structure and associated force levels
required for a range of potential missions for the SFOR follow-on
force. In describing the option that was selected by the National
Command Authority, the document indicated that the U.S. military
could accomplish the current SFOR mission with two combat battalions
in the country rather than its existing three combat battalions,
thereby allowing the United States to reduce forces there to 6,900
troops.
In the decision-making process, DOD had considered an operational
assessment done by the U.S. European Command\21 in late October
1997. This assessment--based on troop-to-task analyses for various
mission options--showed that
(a) if the SFOR follow-on force were to continue SFOR's current
mission, the United States would have to maintain its current force
levels of about 8,500 troops\22 and its current force structure in
Bosnia, particularly its combat capability that included three U.S.
combat battalions and two aviation task forces;\23 and
(b) if security conditions in Bosnia substantially improved and
SFOR's mission were to be reduced to providing restricted support for
civil implementation, the United States could withdraw one of the
three U.S. combat battalions from Bosnia and thereby reduce the
number of U.S. troops there to 6,900.\24
DOD had also considered SACEUR's military judgment that to do the
current SFOR mission with a 6,900 U.S. force level for Bosnia, the
United States would have to maintain three combat battalions in the
country and relocate some units nearby to Croatia. While this would
have shifted some U.S. troops from Bosnia to Croatia, the overall
U.S. SFOR force levels in theater would have remained about the
same.
After the decision was made, the U.S. military spent February
through April 1998 identifying ways of reducing U.S. force levels in
Bosnia to 6,900 troops while still maintaining three combat
battalions in the country--the option of moving some units to Croatia
was no longer being considered. In early March 1998, SACEUR
explained to us that three U.S. combat battalions were still needed
in Bosnia because (1) although the situation on the ground in Bosnia
had changed and the risk had been reduced somewhat, the situation had
not altered sufficiently to draw down the number of U.S. combat
battalions from three to two;\25 and (2) the Multinational
Specialized Unit is not a replacement for SFOR's combat units.
--------------------
\21 Among its other responsibilities, the U.S. European Command
directs the development and execution of U.S. military operations in
support of the NATO alliance.
\22 The actual number of U.S. troops in Bosnia varied significantly
under the first SFOR mission, mainly due to planned troop rotations.
As of mid-November 1997, the United States had 8,300 troops in
Bosnia.
\23 One aviation task force supported the U.S. military sector only,
the other served as SFOR's operational reserve for all of Bosnia.
\24 This force structure was designed for the U.S. contribution to
SFOR Phase III or Deterrence Force. NATO in December 1997 decided
not to draw down to deterrence force levels.
\25 According to a special assistant to SACEUR, SACEUR had never
concluded that the current SFOR mission could be accomplished with
only two U.S. combat battalions in Bosnia.
NATO LOWERED SOME
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
AFTER THE U.S. DRAWDOWN
DECISION
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.2
On February 20, 1998, NATO decided that the SFOR follow-on force
would continue SFOR's existing mission, and soon after, the U.S.
military and NATO began the troop-to-task analysis and force
generation process for that force. To reach the 6,900 U.S. force
level in Bosnia, DOD determined during this process that the U.S.
military would maintain its three combat battalions in the country
and instead reduce the number of other combat, combat support, and
combat service support units. In planning for the drawdown, DOD
expected other countries to contribute resources to make up for some
of the U.S. force reductions, but other countries generally did not
commit to do so.
Instead, to achieve the reduced troop level objective, the SFOR
Commander--a U.S. Army general officer\26 --reassessed the force's
operational requirements during March and April 1998 and determined
that the force could perform its mission with the lower-than-expected
number of resources. This included, for example, consolidating two
U.S. aviation task forces\27 and reducing the number of U.S. attack
helicopters from 40 to 16. After another NATO country agreed to
contribute an additional two attack helicopters, the SFOR Commander
determined that the force could accomplish its mission with only 18
attack helicopters in the consolidated task force. In another case,
after the U.S. military decided to remove the U.S. target
acquisition battery from the Sarajevo airport,\28 the SFOR Commander
decided that the battery was not needed given the low artillery
threat in the Sarajevo area.\29
According to DOD officials, NATO finalized the operational
requirements for the SFOR follow-on force in late April 1998 and, in
late May, officially approved the requirements and decided to draw
down SFOR force levels.
As of August 1998, 35 countries had pledged to provide about 33,300
soldiers to the SFOR follow-on force in Bosnia and Croatia, a lower
number than the first SFOR mission (see table 2).\30 Almost all of
these troops are located in Bosnia. These numbers increased
significantly around the time of Bosnia's September 1998 elections
and are expected to decrease back to August levels by November 1998.
Appendix II provides more detailed information on the number of
troops contributed to the SFOR follow-on force.
Table 2
Troop Contributions to the SFOR Follow-
on Force, as of August 1998
Country In Bosnia In Croatia\a Total
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ============
NATO countries\b 26,740 848 27,588
Non-NATO countries\c 4,947 803 5,750
======================================================================
Total 31,687 1,651 33,338
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Numbers are not available for 3 of the 12 countries with troops
located in Croatia.
\b Fifteen of 16 NATO countries pledged troops for the SFOR follow-on
force.
\c Twenty non-NATO countries pledged troops for the SFOR follow-on
force.
Source: DOD documents.
NATO plans to continue the practice of reviewing SFOR operations at
least every 6 months to determine whether changes in conditions in
Bosnia would allow changes to SFOR's tasks and force structure.
These reviews would permit NATO members, in consultation with other
SFOR contributors, to consider possible force reductions, taking into
account the level of SFOR support required for military and civil
implementation and deterrence requirements. The first 6-month review
for the follow-on force would occur sometime before the end of
December 1998.
--------------------
\26 The SFOR Commander is also the Commanding General of U.S. Army
Europe, and Seventh Army, which are part of the U.S. European
Command. For purposes of this report, we refer to him only as the
"SFOR Commander."
\27 The consolidated task force would serve as both the SFOR
operational reserve and the U.S. military sector's aviation support
unit.
\28 The Sarajevo airport is located in the French military sector.
\29 A target acquisition battery detects and tracks incoming
artillery and mortar rounds in order to direct artillery fire back to
the source of the incoming rounds. A U.S. target acquisition
battery would remain on call in Germany.
\30 Actual SFOR force levels have varied over time. For example, the
number of SFOR troops in Bosnia and Croatia increased to about 39,000
from August through October 1997 because of the support provided to
OSCE for preparations for, and conduct of, Bosnia's municipal
elections held in mid-September. By mid-November 1997, SFOR force
levels had declined to about 34,300 troops in Bosnia and 2,500
support troops in Croatia.
MULTINATIONAL SPECIALIZED
UNIT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
According to NATO officials and documents, the Multinational
Specialized Unit--which has been described as a paramilitary,
constabulary, or gendarmerie-type unit--will assist in dealing with
civil disturbances associated with the return of refugees and
displaced persons and the installation of elected officials. In
doing so, the unit will work in close cooperation with international
civilian organizations in Bosnia and will not engage in police
functions. As of early September 1998, the new unit was
significantly short of infantry personnel and air and ground
transport assets and unable to become fully operational. According
to SACEUR, the unit is an added force rather than a replacement for
SFOR's combat battalions and will leave Bosnia before or at the same
time as SFOR's combat units.
UNIT IS UNDERRESOURCED
AND NOT FULLY OPERATIONAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.1
Under current NATO plans, the Multinational Specialized Unit would
consist of 800 soldiers in a brigade headquarters, two infantry
battalions, and support and reserve components. As of September 3,
1998, five countries--specifically, Argentina, Italy, Romania,
Slovenia, and the United States--had pledged about 500 of the
required 800 soldiers. This would provide enough resources for one
of the two battalions, a reserve company, a logistics company, and
most of the brigade headquarters staff. Italy pledged to provide the
bulk of these resources, or about 370 personnel; Argentina made the
second largest pledge of about 70 personnel.\31 DOD plans to provide
two U.S. military personnel to the brigade headquarters, which will
be based in the Sarajevo area.
No countries had agreed to contribute resources to fill NATO
operational requirements for the unit's air and ground transport or
for most of the second battalion.\32 Because of these shortfalls,
only one of the unit's two battalions became operational before
Bosnia's September 1998 elections. According to DOD officials, the
first battalion became combat ready on August 20, 1998. SACEUR said
he had visited the battalion and considers them fully operational and
most capable. The unit's Italian commander, according to DOD
officials, prefers to use the battalion's organic ground transport
rather than SFOR air transport that is external to his span of
control.
Differing views were expressed about why European countries are
reluctant to contribute resources to the Multinational Specialized
Unit. Senior international officials in Bosnia told us that European
countries with troops in Bosnia believe that they had no operational
requirement for such a unit; they believe their soldiers are already
trained for and capable of dealing with civil disturbances faced by
SFOR.\33 On the other hand, SACEUR said that European countries are
reluctant to provide resources because they view the unit as an
effort by the United States to remove U.S. troops from Bosnia while
European troops remained behind. According to a DOD official, the
United States has reinforced this belief by contributing only two
people to the brigade headquarters, rather than contributing a more
significant number such as a company of military police.
As constituted, the new Multinational Specialized Unit is to operate
under SFOR control and the same rules of engagement as other SFOR
elements. The SFOR Commander will have the authority to control the
unit's operations, within the operational parameters specified by
each participating country's national command authority.\34 As of
late July 1998, questions remained as to where, when, and how the
unit would use force in fulfilling its mission and how the unit would
coordinate its actions with IPTF and local police authorities.
DOD officials said that the Multinational Specialized Unit should be
looked at as a long-term "force multiplier" for SFOR because the unit
is providing a new capability, rather than as a near-term unfilled
requirement. They believe that the one-battalion-strong unit is
quite capable and that the slower- than-expected deployment of the
Multinational Specialized Unit will actually benefit, rather than
hinder, the unit's ability to conduct operations. They said that the
slower deployment will allow the unit to be built and trained
gradually for the mission and will enable better turnover of the
unit's forces in the future. According to SACEUR, under current
plans the second battalion will come on line during the spring of
1999, as remaining forces are committed for this purpose.
--------------------
\31 This represents Argentina's first contribution to a NATO-led
force in Bosnia.
\32 Argentina pledged to provide some personnel for the second
battalion headquarters, but no country had pledged personnel for the
three companies in the second battalion.
\33 They also told us that (1) the rules of engagement and mission of
the unit were unclear; and (2) depending on the unit's mission, the
unit could interfere with the efforts of international civilian
organizations to restructure Bosnia's police forces in accordance
with democratic policing standards.
\34 Since the start of NATO-led operations in Bosnia, national
command authority for participating forces has remained with each
country. Participating countries have allowed their forces to
participate in IFOR and SFOR within specified areas and with specific
rules of engagement. The SFOR operation plan of June 1998 contains
the most permissive rules of engagement for countries participating
in the Multinational Specialized Unit and other SFOR elements; the
plan also permits each participating country to issue clarifying
instructions that restrict these rules of engagement to ensure
compliance with such things as national law. These clarifying
instructions must be developed in consultation with the SFOR
Commander.
UNIT WILL NOT REPLACE
SFOR COMBAT UNITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.2
In early February 1998, DOD officials stated that the new specialized
unit would eventually replace U.S. and other combat units in Bosnia.
They said that the new unit would (1) take over SFOR's "policing"
functions and thereby allow SFOR's combat units to withdraw and (2)
remain in Bosnia after these units withdraw.
However, by June 1998, this view of the unit's role had changed.
According to SACEUR, the Multinational Specialized Unit is not a
replacement for SFOR's combat battalions either in the near or long
term; it will leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR combat
units. SACEUR said that the unit would allow SFOR to facilitate a
secure climate of return for refugees and prevent hard-liners in
Bosnia from inciting civil disturbances and intimidating returnees.
NATO would deploy the unit immediately; the unit's work would be
finished when those refugees and displaced persons who want to go
home are afforded an opportunity to do so. After the unit departed,
NATO and SFOR would then be left with the problem of deterring any
resumption of the conflict.
DOD officials later explained that during the debate within NATO over
the Multinational Specialized Unit's role in the transition strategy,
other NATO members did not accept the U.S. view of the unit's role.
Instead, they--and the NATO operation plan for the SFOR follow-on
force--agreed with the views articulated by SACEUR.
DEVELOPMENT OF NATO'S
TRANSITION STRATEGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
As outlined in NATO documents, NATO's strategy for transitioning
NATO-led forces out of Bosnia consists of (1) reducing the size,
role, and profile of the SFOR follow-on force as conditions in Bosnia
improve; and (2) progressively transferring responsibilities to
Bosnia's institutions, other civil authorities, the United Nations,
the High Representative, OSCE, and other international organizations
as appropriate. While NATO has established aims or objectives that
are similar to those set by the civilian side of the Bosnia peace
operation, NATO has not yet fully developed specific criteria for
determining when conditions will have been achieved that would allow
SFOR units to draw down or withdraw. According to DOD officials, the
drawdown criteria are expected to be developed before NATO's next
6-month review of SFOR operations.
NATO IN EARLY STAGES OF
DEVELOPING DRAWDOWN CRITERIA
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
In describing its transition strategy for Bosnia, NATO has continued
its effort to delineate conditions that must be met for the desired
end-state objective for NATO operations in Bosnia to be realized.
(See app. IV for a chronology showing the development of NATO's
end-state objective.) These conditions, described as "aims" in the
NATO operation plan, are similar to (1) the set of "benchmarks"
developed by the executive branch in early 1998 (see app. V) and (2)
a set of conditions/goals established by the Peace Implementation
Council's Steering Board in early June 1998 (see app. VI).\35 All
three sets of aims describe the political, social, economic, and
security conditions that the international community hopes to achieve
in Bosnia at some undefined point in time.
While NATO has further defined the conditions to be achieved in
Bosnia, it has not yet established criteria that would link
improvements in specific conditions to a drawdown or withdrawal of
NATO forces from Bosnia. In early June 1998, SACEUR said that NATO
would develop criteria that would relate troop levels and overall
force structure to the accomplishment of or progress toward reaching
the U.S. executive branch "benchmarks," that is, conditions that are
to be realized in Bosnia. According to SACEUR, in determining when
and by how much to draw down forces, NATO will look at such things as
the level of cooperation and security conditions in particular
geographic areas in Bosnia and the way in which NATO troops
contribute to the accomplishment of each one of the executive branch
"benchmarks."
According to DOD officials, the operation plan for the SFOR follow-on
force directs SFOR to develop drawdown criteria in conjunction with
the peace operation's principal civilian organizations. As part of
this effort, DOD and NATO are working to prioritize NATO's stated
objectives and conditions so that NATO planners can focus on the most
important tasks to be accomplished before a troop drawdown and/or
eventual withdrawal can begin. According to DOD and State Department
officials, some of these conditions do not necessarily have to be
completely achieved prior to an SFOR drawdown or withdrawal.
In the absence of drawdown criteria, the U.S. military has been
reducing its contribution to SFOR due to considerations other than
mission requirements and may continue to do so in the future. Many
U.S. military officials told us that concern about continued
political support for the mission played a large role in the January
1998 decision to drawdown U.S. forces in Bosnia from about 8,500
troops to 6,900. Further, according to U.S. officials at NATO's
military headquarters and the U.S. European Command, cost and other
factors may drive future decisions regarding the timing of U.S.
force reductions. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD
stated that to insinuate that the process was largely the result of
"top down" political and cost concerns rather than force appropriate
reasons was misleading and inaccurate.
--------------------
\35 The Peace Implementation Council Steering Board is an
international organization that provides political guidance to the
High Representative. The Steering Board directed the High
Representative to submit for its consideration a report on progress
toward these goals by mid-September 1998.
RECENT EVENTS AND SFOR'S
NEXT 6-MONTH REVIEW
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
Although NATO has not yet finalized its drawdown criteria, DOD,
State, and NATO have recognized that the results of the September
1998 elections, along with other changes in Bosnia's political and
security conditions, will play a large role in NATO's upcoming
decision on whether conditions would allow a further reduction in
SFOR force levels. As previously stated, NATO will again consider
potential SFOR force reductions sometime before the end of December
1998.
While the overall security situation has improved in Bosnia,
political and security conditions remain very volatile and will
likely remain so for the foreseeable future.\36 For example, in early
September 1998, a senior State Department official told us that after
the upcoming elections, returns of refugees and displaced persons
across ethnic lines would likely spark violent incidents that require
an SFOR response, even with the expectation that relatively moderate
Bosnian Serb leaders would be elected. Also, in the recent
elections, Republika Srpska voters elected a hard-line Serb
nationalist to replace the relatively moderate Plavsic as Republika
Srpska's President.\37
Thus, it may be more difficult than anticipated by DOD and State to
implement key civil aspects of Dayton that directly affect Bosnia's
security environment--specifically, the return of non-Serb refugees
and displaced persons to their prewar homes in Republika Srpska and
the integration of non-Serbs into Republika Srpska's police
forces.\38 Moreover, as previously discussed, the situation in Kosovo
has the potential to inflame nationalist passions in Bosnia and
thereby adversely affect the security environment there.
--------------------
\36 For a description of changes in Bosnia's political and security
conditions from mid-1997 to mid-1998, see Bosnia Peace Operation:
Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated As International Involvement
Increased.
\37 Nikola Poplasen--the newly-elected President of Republika Srpska,
President of the Serb Radical Party of Bosnia, and a paramilitary
commander during the war--ran as a candidate for a coalition of Serb
Radicals and another hard-line nationalist party, the Serb Democratic
Party (SDS). According to OHR and OSCE documents, the Serb Radical
Party of Bosnia has also publicly linked itself with the Serb Radical
Party of Serbia--led by Serbia's Deputy Prime Minister and former
paramilitary commander Vojislav Seselj--to the cause of uniting into
one nation Serb people from Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and
Republika Srpska, thereby challenging Bosnia's territorial integrity
and violating the Dayton Agreement. Immediately after the election,
the Serb Radical Party encouraged its supporters to intimidate and
harass OSCE and other international organizations and incited its
supporters to demonstrate by creating rumors that OSCE would remove
Poplasen as a candidate for violating election rules. On September
21, 1998, OSCE ruled that the Serb Radical Party had violated
numerous election rules and removed nine candidates from the party's
candidate lists for Bosnia's Parliamentary Assembly and Republika
Srpska's National Assembly, but did not remove Poplasen as a
candidate. The High Representative has the authority to remove from
office any elected official in Bosnia who obstructs Dayton
implementation.
\38 We note that almost no progress had been made in these two areas
as of late September 1998, even after the installation of the
relatively moderate Republika Srpska government in January 1998. In
June 1998 we reported that although the moderate Republika Srpska
Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, had expressed full support for Dayton
implementation, he had appointed Ministers of Justice, Interior, and
Defense who had either expressed limited support for Dayton
implementation or were closely associated with hard-line nationalists
and people indicted for war crimes; thus, these people may continue
to obstruct efforts to implement Dayton.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
DOD, State, and the U.S. European Command provided comments on a
draft of this report. DOD and State agreed with much of our draft
report and said that the decision to draw down U.S. troops in Bosnia
was made only for force-appropriate reasons. Both agencies said that
any inference that political considerations played a role is
incorrect. DOD further said that the U.S. military did conduct
detailed troop-to-task/operational and strategic mission analyses and
that a thorough, strategically-based examination by the Joint Staff
and the U.S. European Command led to the range of proposed options
from which the option with the associated force structure was chosen.
DOD also indicated that the drawdown decision was largely based on
the recommendation of SACEUR, in his capacity as the Commander in
Chief, U.S. European Command. Our draft report had discussed the
operational and strategic analyses mentioned by DOD, but we modified
the report to focus more clearly on the timing of the U.S. and NATO
decision-making sequences and the related military assessments.
DOD was also concerned about what it said was our negative portrayal
of the manning and readiness of the Multinational Specialized Unit.
We believe that our report accurately depicted the status of the
unit's manning and readiness. However, we have added to the report
information on DOD's views regarding the Multinational Specialized
Unit. DOD's written comments and our response to them are included
in appendix VII.
The Department of State found the draft report to be good overall,
but it observed that SFOR's support for the civil aspects of Dayton
needed to be considered in the larger context that would include
international civilian efforts--particularly with regard to
surrendering indictees to the international war crimes tribunal--as
civilian and military efforts to implement Dayton had been closely
coordinated since mid-1997. We have expanded our discussion of this
matter, noting that prior GAO reports on the Bosnia peace operation
discuss in great detail the larger context of international efforts
in Bosnia.\39
State's written comments and our response to them are included in
appendix VIII.
The U.S. European Command concurred with DOD's response to the draft
report and commented on additional issues. The command said that (1)
we should not use of the term "expanded scope" when referring to SFOR
military operations; (2) our description of the timing of U.S. troop
reductions was incomplete; (3) one battalion of the Multinational
Specialized Unit was fully operational; and (4) our report created an
impression that NATO allies are not fully supportive of force
requirements for the SFOR mission. We believe our report accurately
depicted the situation in each of these four areas, but we have
modified the report to add the command's views on these matters. The
command's written comments and our response to them are included in
appendix IX.
--------------------
\39 See Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton
Accelerated as International Involvement Increased and Bosnia Peace
Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's Goals.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
To assess how the scope of the NATO-led military force's operations
in Bosnia has changed since mid-1997, we made visits to Bosnia in
June and October 1997 and February 1998. During these visits, we did
audit work in numerous locations throughout Bosnia and interviewed
officials from the headquarters of SFOR and two of its multinational
divisions; OHR; the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including IPTF, U.N. Civil Affairs, and the Mine Action Center;
UNHCR; and OSCE; as well as Bosnian displaced persons, many of whom
had returned to their homes in areas controlled by another ethnic
group. We also visited NATO headquarters and the U.S. mission to
NATO in Brussels, Belgium, during September 1997 and February 1998
and obtained information from U.S. and NATO officials at these
locations. Further, we analyzed numerous situation reports and other
documents from U.S. agencies, NATO, SFOR, OHR, OSCE, IPTF, UNHCR,
and other organizations.
To assess (1) the mission, force structure, and force levels of the
recently approved, NATO-led military force in Bosnia and (2) NATO's
strategy for transitioning NATO-led forces out of Bosnia, we obtained
information from U.S. and NATO officials at NATO headquarters and
the U.S. mission to NATO; SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, Bosnia;
DOD, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency in
Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. European Command and U.S. Army
Europe in Germany. We also analyzed State, DOD, U.S. European
Command, NATO, and OHR documents pertaining to these issues.
We conducted our audit work from June 1997 through October 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, and other
appropriate congressional committees. Copies will also be made
available to other interested parties upon request.
This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson,
Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, who may
be contacted on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Other major contributors to the report
include David Bruno,
B. Patrick Hickey, and Judith McCloskey.
Sincerely yours,
Benjamin F. Nelson, Director
International Relations and Trade Issues
BACKGROUND
=========================================================== Appendix I
Implementing the Dayton Agreement is a complex, decentralized peace
operation designed to help Bosnia's political leaders achieve the
commitments they had made in signing the agreement. These
commitments include providing a secure environment for the people of
Bosnia; developing the institutions and practices of a unified,
multiethnic, and democratic country that respects the rule of law;
surrendering people indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia to the tribunal; ensuring the right of
refugees and displaced persons to return to their prewar homes; and
rebuilding the economy.
To assist the parties in their efforts, the international community
established military and civilian components of the Bosnia peace
operation. The peace operation consists of five principal
organizations--a multinational military force led by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and four international civilian
organizations. It also includes numerous countries and international
organizations that have donated economic and other assistance to aid
in Bosnia's reconstruction and recovery since late 1995.\1 Figure I.1
shows how the operation was organized as of December 1997.
Figure I.1: Organization of
the Bosnia Peace Operation, as
of December 1997
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The peace operation's military component consists of a NATO-led
military force. The North Atlantic Council, the political leadership
of NATO, authorized a military force, known as the Implementation
Force (IFOR), for a 1-year mission that began on December 20, 1995.
Recognizing the need for a continued NATO force in Bosnia, the North
Atlantic Council in December 1996 authorized SFOR for an 18-month
period that ended on June 20, 1998. The mandate of IFOR and later
SFOR was to (1) monitor and enforce the military aspects of the
agreement, including the separation and cantonment of the Bosniak,
Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb militaries in Bosnia;\2 and (2)
support the operation's civilian organizations in accomplishing their
missions, when requested and if resources allowed.
The civilian component of the peace operation contained many
organizations. OHR was established by the Dayton Agreement to assist
the parties in implementing the civil aspects of the agreement and to
coordinate the operation's civilian organization. Other
organizations participating in the operation include UNMIBH, with its
unarmed, civilian police monitoring operation--IPTF--and other
components; OSCE, which was to administer many aspects of and
supervise countrywide elections, monitor arms control measures, and
monitor and report on human rights; and UNHCR, which was responsible
for developing a plan for and fostering the phased, orderly return of
Bosnia's refugees and displaced persons, of whom about 1.3 million
have not returned home.
--------------------
\1 In the first year of Bosnia's Priority Reconstruction Program, 59
donors--48 countries and
11 organizations--pledged $1.9 billion for Bosnia's economic
reconstruction. In the program's second year, the pace of donor
contributions slowed somewhat as 31 of the program's original donors
pledged an additional $1.2 billion. In 1998, 26 countries and 4
international organizations pledged an additional $1.25 billion for
the program, bringing the total amount pledged for Bosnia's economic
reconstruction to $4.35 billion since late 1995.
\2 IFOR, and later SFOR, had the authority to use force to ensure
implementation of annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement and the protection
of IFOR. The U.N. Security Council provided IFOR's authority to use
force in resolution 1031 on December 15, 1995, and provided SFOR's
authority in resolution 1088 on December 12, 1996.
SFOR TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS AND
ORGANIZATION
========================================================== Appendix II
This appendix provides information on troop contributions to SFOR by
NATO and non-NATO countries (see table II.1) and organizational
charts for SFOR's three multinational divisions in Bosnia, as well as
the support command in Croatia (see figs. II.1 through II.4). The
three divisions are led by the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom and operate in three separate military sectors.
Table II.1
Troop Contributions to the SFOR Follow-
on Force, by Country, as of August 1998
In In
Country Bosnia Croatia Total
---------------------------------------- -------- -------- ========
NATO
Belgium 800 50 850
Canada 1,250 1,250
Denmark 747 747
France 2,500 \a 2,500
Germany 2,470 \a 2,470
Greece 280 280
Italy\b 1,970 1,970
Luxembourg 18 18 36
Netherlands 1,080 1,080
Norway 615 615
Portugal 320 320
Spain 1,550 1,550
Turkey 1,520 1,520
United Kingdom 5,000 \a 5,000
United States\b, c 6,900 500\d 7,400
======================================================================
Subtotal 26,740 848 27,588
Non-NATO
Albania\e 35 35
Argentina\b 68 68
Austria 230 230
Bulgaria 30 28 58
Czech Republic 640 640
Egypt 270 270
Estonia 41 41
Finland 341 341
Hungary 310 310
Ireland 50 50
Jordan 10 10
Latvia 39 39
Lithuania 40 40
Morocco 650 650
Poland 400 400
Russia 1,400 1,400
Romania\b 21 200 221
Slovenia\b 22 35 57
Sweden 510 510
Ukraine\f 380 380
======================================================================
Subtotal 4,947 803 5,750
======================================================================
Total 31,687 1,651 33,338
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Number of troops deployed in Croatia is not available.
\b Includes the country's contribution to SFOR's new Multinational
Specialized Unit.
\c The United States has deployed about 2,600 additional non-SFOR
troops in Hungary and Italy in support of U.S. SFOR troops.
\d Includes some non-SFOR troops supporting the SFOR operation.
\e As of September 1998.
\f Scheduled to increase the contribution during the summer and
autumn of 1998.
Figure II.1: Organization of
the U.S. Military Sector
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: SFOR's consolidated aviation task force also provides sector
support for Multinational Division (North).
Figure II.2: Organization of
the French Military Sector
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure II.3: Organization of
the British Military Sector
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure II.4: Organization of
the SFOR Support Command in
Croatia
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: U.S. SFOR troops in Croatia serve in the SFOR support command
and at the SFOR headquarters in Zagreb.
U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN BOSNIA
========================================================= Appendix III
This appendix provides information on the drawdown of U.S. forces in
Bosnia from about 8,500 personnel to about 6,900 personnel. In
planning for the drawdown, the Department of Defense (DOD) expected
other countries to contribute additional assets to make up for some
of the U.S. force reductions; however, as shown in table III.1,
other countries generally did not commit to do so. According to the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the "expected
contributions" were SFOR hopes--nothing more--as the countries never
were committed to numbers listed in the table below. DOD officials
also said that there was never any specific commitment by any country
to provide additional forces; rather, there was just a general sense
that the allies might be prepared to meet unfilled U.S.
requirements.
In most cases, NATO reassessed its operational requirements during
March and April 1998 and determined that SFOR could accomplish its
mission with the reduced force levels that would result from the U.S.
drawdown. The United States, however, will provide 32 more civil
affairs personnel than it had originally planned to make up some of
the shortfall in this category. Also, a U.S. target acquisition
battery will remain on call in Germany.
Table III.1
Other Countries' Responses to Reductions
in U.S. Military Assets in Bosnia
Expected Actual pledges
U.S. military contributions from from other
assets U.S. reductions other countries countries
------------------ ------------------- ------------------- ------------------
Two aviation task Consolidated two
forces\a task forces into
one by August 1998;
new task force
given dual-hatted
mission of sector
support and theater A company of 10-12 2 attack
operational attack helicopters helicopters were
reserve. was expected to be pledged by the
provided by another Netherlands (for a
Attack helicopters NATO country (for a total of 18 attack
reduced from 40 to total of 26-28 helicopters in the
16. attack helicopters consolidated task
in the consolidated force).
task force).
None expected. Not applicable.
Medium lift
helicopters reduced
from 25 to 15.
The reduction in
helicopters reduced
the number of U.S.
troops in Bosnia by
about 590.
Target acquisition This low-density, Another NATO None provided.
battery\b high-usage asset is country was
to be removed from expected to provide
Sarajevo airport, this resource.
located in the
French military
sector, for a
reduction of 30
U.S. troops in
Bosnia.
Civil affairs and Number of these Unnamed countries None provided.
psychological personnel in U.S. were expected to
operations military sector provide replacement
personnel reduced civil affairs
significantly, with personnel. Not applicable.
psychological
operations No replacements
personnel reduced expected for
to one-third of psychological
previous numbers. operations
personnel.
Artillery and fire Reduced by 70 Unnamed countries None provided.
support\c percent, for a were expected to
reduction of at provide resources
least 400 U.S. for some fire
troops in Bosnia. support and field Not applicable.
artillery units.
The U.S. European
Command determined
that other
artillery support\c
could be removed
from Bosnia at a
very low level of
risk.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a One of these task forces supported the U.S. military sector in
Bosnia, and the other served as the SFOR operational reserve that
covered all of Bosnia.
\b The target acquisition battery at the Sarajevo airport consisted
of one Q-36 radar and support equipment with a crew of about 30
personnel. A target acquisition battery detects and tracks incoming
artillery and mortar rounds in order to direct artillery fire back to
the source of the incoming rounds.
\c The United States provided the bulk of this support to the
Nordic-Polish brigade as a condition of the brigade's operations in
Bosnia.
DEVELOPMENT OF NATO'S END-STATE
OBJECTIVE FOR BOSNIA
========================================================== Appendix IV
This appendix provides a chronology showing the development of NATO's
end-state objective for its operations in Bosnia from December 1995
through December 1996.
IFOR ESTABLISHED IN DECEMBER 1995
WITH NO END-STATE OBJECTIVE
In December 1995, as directed by the North Atlantic Council, the
operation plan for the first NATO-led mission in Bosnia, IFOR, was
approved with an end date rather than an end-state objective.\1 In
the absence of a defined end state, IFOR's objectives were to
complete the military tasks specified in the Dayton Agreement, to
support the operation's civilian organizations when requested and if
resources allowed, and to withdraw from Bosnia by December 1996.
END-STATE OBJECTIVE APPROVED IN
DECEMBER 1996
The North Atlantic Council approved an end-state objective when it
established the second NATO-led mission in Bosnia--SFOR--in December
1996. According to the SFOR operation plan, the desired NATO end
state is an environment adequately secure for the "continued
consolidation of the peace" without further need for NATO-led
military forces in Bosnia. The plan lists four conditions that must
be met for the desired end-state objective to be realized:
-- The political leaders of Bosnia's three ethnic groups must
demonstrate a commitment to continue negotiations as the means
to resolve political and military differences;
-- Bosnia's established civil structures must be sufficiently
mature to assume responsibilities for ensuring compliance with
the Dayton Agreement;
-- The political leaders of Bosnia's three ethnic groups must
adhere on a sustained basis to the military requirements of the
Dayton Agreement, including the virtual absence of violations or
unauthorized military activities; and
-- Conditions must be established for the safe continuation of
ongoing, nation-building activities.
In defining these conditions, NATO recognized that the ability of
NATO forces to withdraw without the conflict resuming is closely
linked to the achievement of the Bosnia peace operation's civilian
goals.
Although the SFOR operation plan defined an end-state objective, it
also asserted that these conditions would be achieved within 18
months, by June 1998. The plan did not, however, provide information
on how the civil-related conditions were to be achieved or what
criteria NATO would use to determine when the desired end state had
been realized. Instead, the plan based the 18-month time frame on
the assumption that the international community would develop a
political framework and civil implementation strategy for 1997 and
1998 that would increase the emphasis on efforts of the operation's
civilian organizations and Bosnia's political leaders to consolidate
the peace.
--------------------
\1 The Dayton Agreement provided little guidance about what would
constitute a desired end state for NATO operations in Bosnia. The
agreement sought to establish "lasting security" based on a "durable
cessation of hostilities" but did not further define these terms.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OBJECTIVES AND
CONDITIONS FOR CREATING AN
IRREVERSIBLE PEACE PROCESS IN
BOSNIA
=========================================================== Appendix V
This appendix provides the key objectives and conditions (what the
executive branch refers to as "benchmarks") that the executive branch
believes must be achieved if the peace process is to become
irreversible (see table IV.1). The objectives and conditions cover
10 different areas, most of which are related to the civil aspects of
the Dayton Agreement.
The linkage between the executive branch "benchmarks" and a drawdown
of NATO-led forces in Bosnia is unclear. In early June 1998, a
senior State Department official said that NATO-led forces may be
able to drawdown and withdraw once a "critical mass" of progress
toward some or all of these "benchmarks" has been achieved. This
official did not further define the term "critical mass." In a letter
to Congress dated July 28, 1998, the President said that the 10
conditions represent the point at which Dayton implementation can
continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. The
letter did not define what constitutes a major NATO-led military
force.
Table V.1
U.S. Executive Branch Objectives and
Conditions for Ensuring a Self-
Sustaining Peace Process
Area Objectives Conditions to be realized
-------------------- ---------------------------- ----------------------------
Military stability Ensure absence of conflict; Cease-fire maintained.
support continued military
balance. Weapons remain in storage,
and arms limits not
Establish basis for exceeded.
interentity cooperation.
Special police disbanded or
Prevent return of extremist restructured.
influence.
Interentity arms control and
confidence-building measures
adopted.
Covert external support for
entity armies terminated.
Federation train and equip
program\a completed;
traditional support and
sustainment arrangement with
Federation Army in place.
Police and judicial Restructure, equip, and All local police forces
reform train police in accordance restructured and ethnically
with democratic standards. integrated, equipping
underway.
Separate police forces from
party/ethnic control. Basic skill and human rights
training completed.
Reform and integrate
judicial sector. Police deal effectively with
civil disturbances and
disorder.
Police academies
functioning; leadership
professionalized.
Intelligence services/
secret police stripped of
police function.
Effective judicial reform
program in place.
Operationalize Entity/national institutions Outlawed pre-Dayton
Bosnia's functioning and taking institutions dissolved.
institutions increased control of
functions now under Functioning customs services
international authority. and control over revenues
established.
Empower legitimate
institutional control over Transparency established in
revenue collection and budgets and disbursements.
disbursement.
Funds flowing to Bosnia's
Dismantle corrupt, national institutions;
nongovernmental entities/ permanent staff and
institutions. facilities in place.
Curb official corruption.
Media reform Divest political parties of Political parties divested
control over media. of control of broadcast
networks.
Access to media for all
political parties. Entity-and national-level
policy and regulatory
Foster growth of independent structures in place.
media.
Opposition party access to
airwaves for future
elections guaranteed under
new election law.
Alternative and/or
independent media generally
available throughout Bosnia.
Electoral process Election results Local, entity, and national
and democratization implemented. governments beginning to
function transparently.
Influence of extremists
reduced as moderates gain Parties accept binding
control. arbitration for
implementation of results in
Elections are conducted in a contested local elections.
free and fair manner.
Electoral laws modified to
meet international/OSCE
standards.
September 1998 elections
conducted in free and fair
manner.
Need for OSCE supervision
reduced.
Economic Republika Srpska economy Interim currency circulating
reconstruction and improving, Federation freely, being used for
recovery economy continues to official transactions.
improve.
Agreement reached on
Foster interentity trade, permanent currency.
commercial links, and inter-
dependence. Public corporations formed;
privatization laws in line
Free market economic reforms with Dayton.
in place.
Transparent budgets in
Improve investment climate. place; government control
established over sources of
revenue.
Major infrastructure (i.e.,
transportation, power,
telecoms) repaired and
functioning.
Businesses and industry are
opening, expanding.
International Monetary Fund
program in place,
traditional lending programs
begun.
Refugee returns A credible minority return Entity property laws comply
process is functioning. with Dayton.
Process for regional returns Property Commission fully
underway. functioning.
Entity governments permit or
participate in phased,
orderly, cross-ethnic
returns.
Key cities have accepted
substantial returns
(Sarajevo, Banja Luka,
Mostar).
Local police protect
returnees of all ethnic
groups.
Brcko Arbitral award implemented Local elections
without violence. implemented.
Secure environment for Integrated police
returns established. functioning.
Ethnic integration Two-way returns
continues; multiethnic progressing.
administration functioning.
Ethnic reintegration of
Brcko continues.
Economic investment, job
creation underway.
War crimes Parties to the Dayton Control of political,
Agreement cooperate with the military, and media sectors
international war crimes by war criminals
tribunal in arresting and terminated.
prosecuting indictees.
Indictees' access to
Significant number of top economic resources
indictees at the Hague. terminated.
Entity justice sectors
cooperating with the war
crimes tribunal.
Local authorities facilitate
the apprehension of
indictees.
International International organizations Local authorities and/or
organizations and agencies effectively entity armies capable of
carry out implementation assuming responsibility for
efforts without military demining operations.
support.
OHR demonstrates authority
to encourage and enforce
interentity agreements
without military backup.
OSCE, NATO, and the European
Union develop more
traditional relationships
with Bosnia.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Federation train and equip program is a U.S.-led international
effort to provide training and equipment for the Bosniak and Bosnian
Croat militaries as they integrate into a unified Federation
military.
PEACE IMPLEMENTATION COUNCIL'S SET
OF CONDITIONS FOR A
SELF-SUSTAINING PEACE IN BOSNIA
========================================================== Appendix VI
In a declaration dated June 9, 1998, the Steering Board of the Peace
Implementation Council--the body that provides political guidance to
the High Representative--established a set of 11 conditions that must
be realized for a self-sustaining peace to take hold in Bosnia. The
Steering Board did not attempt to link improvements in conditions to
a drawdown or withdrawal of NATO-led forces from Bosnia, nor did it
establish specific criteria for measuring progress in the 11 areas.
The declaration stated the following:
"The Steering Board underscores that conditions must be
established in order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a
modern country with the key elements of democratic institutions
in place and the basic factors of ethnic confrontation removed:
that requires a self-sustaining peace. The Steering Board asks
the High Representative to submit for its consideration a report
on the state of peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
by mid-September [1998]. The report should focus on progress in
relation to, inter alia, the following goals in the main areas:
"A significant mass of returns reached and the phased,
orderly, peaceful return of
refugees and displaced persons on a self-sustaining basis in
significant numbers.
A self-sustaining and continuing cease-fire supported by
transparent mechanisms for military to military cooperation.
A core of basic legislation that imposes the rule of law and
the establishment of an independent judiciary.
Consolidation of free-market reforms, including a transparent
privatisation that
precludes political influence on the key economic sectors, and
maintenance of an
IMF [International Monetary Fund] program and effective free
movement of goods,
services and capital within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The restructuring, re-integration, retraining and equipping of
police in both Entities
[the Federation and Republika Srpska] in accordance with
democratic and
professional standards.
The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions, with
revenue and disbursement mechanisms brought under the control
of legitimate authorities.
The regulation of media in accordance with democratic
standards and the availability
of free and independent media throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The regular conduct of elections and implementation of
election results in accordance
with democratic standards.
Cooperation by the Parties to the Peace Agreement with the
ICTY [international war
crimes tribunal] in the arrest and prosecution of war
criminals.
The consolidation of multi-ethnic institutions and of a secure
environment for returns
in Brcko.
Full cooperation in peace implementation by neighbouring
countries."
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VII
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix VI
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 2.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's
letter dated September 3, 1998.
GAO COMMENTS
1. Our report reflects DOD's views that the new Multinational
Specialized Unit represents an additive capability rather than a
replacement for SFOR units. We have added information to convey
DOD's views that (a) the one-battalion-strong unit is already quite
capable and (b) the unit's Italian commander prefers to use the
battalion's organic ground transport rather than air transport that
is external to his control.
2. DOD's comments present information on operational and strategic
analyses and commanders' revised assessments without stating when
these analyses and assessments occurred. We revised our report to
clarify the timing of the various military assessments for U.S.
participation in the SFOR follow-on force.
As discussed in the report, none of the assessments provided to us by
DOD showed that the U.S. drawdown decision in January 1998 was based
on an operational or troop-to-task analysis of mission options. The
troop-to-task analyses done by the U.S. military prior to the
drawdown decision, which were the basis of the late October 1997 U.S.
military/U.S. European Command assessment, determined the U.S.
force structure and force levels necessary to perform (1) the current
SFOR mission and (2) a relatively restricted mission in a
substantially more favorable operating environment. Neither analysis
showed that the U.S. military could accomplish the current SFOR
mission with only two combat battalions or 6,900 troops in Bosnia.
In contrast, the options document referred to by DOD said that the
U.S. military could accomplish the current SFOR mission with only
two combat battalions in Bosnia, thereby allowing the U.S. military
to draw down to 6,900 troops.
After the U.S. drawdown decision was made, the U.S. military did
the troop-to-task analysis for the SFOR follow-on force concurrently
with NATO/SFOR and identified ways of reducing force levels in Bosnia
to 6,900 troops while still maintaining three U.S. combat battalions
in Bosnia. According to officials from NATO military headquarters,
DOD, and the U.S. European Command, the U.S. military and NATO
began these troop-to-task analyses and the force generation process
for the follow-on force in late February 1998. During this process,
SACEUR and the SFOR Commander revised their assessments and concluded
that SFOR could accomplish the current SFOR mission with the reduced
U.S. force levels. According to DOD officials, NATO finalized its
operational requirements for the SFOR follow-on force in late April
1998 and, in late May 1998, officially approved the operational
requirements and decided to draw down SFOR force levels.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VIII
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
========================================================== Appendix VI
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated September 11, 1998.
GAO COMMENTS
1. We have expanded our discussion of the larger context of military
and civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement, particularly in
the area of international efforts to bring war crimes indictees to
justice. We also noted that prior GAO reports on the Bosnia peace
operation discuss in great detail the larger context of international
efforts in Bosnia.\1
2. We believe that our report accurately reflects the status of the
Multinational Specialized Unit's manning and readiness. Our report
states that the unit is not a replacement for U.S. or other SFOR
combat units. We note that State's assertion that the unit adds to
the capabilities of the international community to implement all
aspects of the Dayton Agreement goes beyond the unit's role as
currently articulated by NATO. As discussed in our report, NATO
intends for the unit to enhance SFOR's capability to deal with civil
disturbances associated with returns of refugees and displaced
persons and the installation of elected officials.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IX
--------------------
\1 See Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton
Accelerated as International Involvement Increased; Bosnia Peace
Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's Goals;
and Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement's
Goals--An Update.
COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN
COMMAND
========================================================== Appendix VI
See comment 1.
See comment 2.
See comment 3.
See comment 4.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 5.
Now on p. 39.
The following are GAO's comments on the U.S. European Command's
letter dated September 10, 1998.
GAO COMMENTS
1. Appendix VII provides DOD's comments on our draft report and our
response to them.
2. We believe SFOR's scope of operations has expanded but not beyond
the bounds of the Dayton Agreement. We agree with the U.S. European
Command that annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement has always called for
the NATO-led force in Bosnia--first IFOR and later SFOR--to take
control of special police; however, we note that neither NATO-led
force began to control special police until mid-1997, after the High
Representative had asked NATO to do so. We have added information on
this matter to the report. We have also added the command's view
that because the Dayton Agreement's military objectives had largely
been achieved, SFOR is in a position to provide broad support to
civil implementation, within its existing mandate and capabilities.
3. Our report discussed the timing of the U.S. drawdown, but we
modified the report to clarify the information.
4. We believe our report accurately depicts the status of the
Multinational Specialized Unit. However, we have added the command's
view that one of the unit's two battalions is fully operational and
most capable, as well as information provided by the command on plans
for the second battalion to start operations during the spring of
1999 as forces are committed for this purpose.
5. We did not intend for our report to leave the impression that
NATO allies are not fully supportive of force requirements for the
SFOR mission; rather, we had intended to describe the U.S. military
and NATO/SFOR planning processes for the SFOR follow-on force and to
illustrate how operational requirements for the force appeared to be
driven by the planned reduction in U.S. forces in Bosnia. Thus, the
report included information on NATO lowering its operational
requirements for the follow-on force during the force generation
process that occurred after the U.S. decision to draw down to 6,900
troops in Bosnia.
*** End of document. ***